

Chapter- IV

Philosophical theory of *Puruṣārtha* (PTP)

After discussing the Familiar view of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or FVP and individual *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) now we intend to concentrate in this chapter on Philosophical theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or PTP. One may ask here: What more things to be discussed about *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) here? In other words, as we have already discussed in detail the definition and classification of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and relations among different *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ), a new chapter on PTP is otiose. Let us first answer to this misgiving. It is true that, what we have shown earlier, philosophy tries to clarify, systematize and justify FVP because FVP is full of anomalies. It is also known to us that in spite of philosopher's efforts to do so FVP remains inadequate and ultimately unacceptable. It is also true that philosophy (दर्शन) is not a theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). However, *darśana* (दर्शन) is mainly a theory of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is one of the four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) mentioned in FVP. Philosophy, in the sense of *darśana* (दर्शन), offers its own theory or theories of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or PTP. Here a point should be noted that even if we are successful to keep FVP free from anomalies, it will not be regarded as philosophical theory from the strictly philosophical point of view. So we require PTP. But why it is so? The reason is — even after the best systematization and giving adequate justification of FVP, it remains a socio-ethical doctrine of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or a normative scheme of values of man as a social and moral being. But man is not only a social and moral being; he is also a spiritual being. As a spiritual being man's life is soteriologically oriented. Man is essentially a pure spirit. *Darśana*

(दर्शन) is especially concerned with man's soteriological and spiritual goal. These two different conceptions of man and his orientation or goal make FVP and PTP quite distinct from each other. It may not be apparently so, but it lies at the deeper level. FVP could not be, in any sense, regarded as philosophical theory. It is true that neither FVP nor PTP is just empirical theory. So, neither they discuss how man in fact conducts himself, his beliefs and practices nor they are merely *a priori* formal theories of action. They both are realistic systems in the sense that they begin by accepting what a man actually is and he has some needs in his daily life. For this reason they introduce certain normative considerations and try to discover how best man can make his life most meaningful and worthy. FVP takes man to be essentially a worldly being (भोक्ता). So, it prescribes a scheme of values for a man which he should pursue for a betterment of his life. A man will attain the best fulfilment of his socio-moral and religious life and existence if he conducts himself in the light of the scheme of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) which FVP contains. But PTP tells us how man should live and behave if he is to understand and realize his real and essential nature as a world transcending (लोकत्तर) being. In other words, how he should conduct himself if he is to realize his true being. This realization and the absolute freedom from pain go together. This absolute freedom from pain brings the highest fulfilment of life. This final goal or the highest value (परम पुरुषार्थ) is called liberation (मोक्ष). This shows that there is a different dimension of his existence. These two dimensions are the spiritual and soteriological dimension. Once a man discovers these dimensions of his life he realizes that he is not just what he looks to be. He orients his life and activity for a higher pursuit — pursuit of liberation. PTP is concerned with this.

But one may not be convinced by our above view. He may still argue that the discussion of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is common to both FVP and PTP. So, there will be some sort of repetition. There are many reasons which make sure the point that after the discussion of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) in FVP we still need the discussion of the philosophical theory of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). We are mentioning only two of them: (a) *Mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is one of the four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) discussed in FVP. On the other hand according to PTP, there is only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and that is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). (b) When FVP tells about *mokṣa* (मोक्ष), the source of it is *Purāṇa* (पुराण) and *ītihāsa* (इतिहास). On the other hand when we discuss *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) in PTP, the source of it is different philosophical systems of India. For this reason after the discussion of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) as one of the four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) in FVP we still need the discussion of the same in the light of great Indian philosophical systems.

It is true that philosophy does not ignore all the four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) admitted in FVP. Because they accept scriptures where these four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are discussed and accepted. But it is also true that *darśana* (दर्शन) is mainly concerned with the *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ), the theory of it and the means of achieving it. All philosophical schools are agreed at the point that *avidyā* (अविद्या) or ignorance about the true nature of the self is the cause of bondage. They all admit that when one gets real and direct knowledge (यथार्थ साक्षातकार) of the true nature of the self, the very cause of bondage is removed. Because the right knowledge of the self is opposed to the false belief of the same. When bondage is removed the knower (the man who is by nature free) becomes liberated. *Darśana* (दर्शन) discusses all these. So, *darśana* (दर्शन) can

be said to be the theory of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष), so far it is a theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) though it does not usually discuss other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). According to PTP, *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is one. There are at least three forms of PTP. One form of PTP contends that this one and the highest *puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) is the absolute absence of all suffering. Nyāya philosophers hold this view and according to them, liberation means absolute freedom from pain. The second form of PTP contends that the one and the highest *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is absolute happiness. Advaita Vedāntin-s hold this view and according to them *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is *niratiśaya sukh* (निरतिशय सुख) or absolute pleasure. Some Vaiṣṇava-s advocate a third form of PTP. According to them, *bhakti* (भक्ति) or love or devotion is the highest *puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ). We will discuss only the first two in this chapter. The third form of PTP we will discuss in a separate chapter.

One may ask here that why *darśana* (दर्शन) does not discuss other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ)? Why it discusses only *mokṣa* (मोक्ष)? We will answer it when we will discuss the position of the *Vedāntin* author Dharmarāj. Another important question one may ask here is that how we can say that Indian philosophy (दर्शन) is mainly viewed as *mokṣa-sāstra* (मोक्ष-शास्त्र)? How do the philosophers of India come to the conclusion that the discussion of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) or liberation and the means of it are the central task of *darśana* (दर्शन)? If we look at the different text of Indian philosophy, we see quite different pictures. We see that some schools discuss about *pramāṇa* (प्रमाण) or sources of knowledge and *prameya* (प्रमेय) or object of knowledge while some discuss the ways of knowing the real import (तात्पर्यार्थ) of the *Veda*. Again, some philosophical schools discuss how mind (चित्त) can be

controlled and some discuss how the world of diversity has evolved or originated from one single ultimate principle. Moreover, some discuss how many categories are there and how many properties are there of these categories.

As an answer we can say that all are true what is said about different schools of Indian philosophy in previous paragraph. But we should make a distinction between different topics or issues what a subject generally or specially discusses and the main or central concern of the same. The central concern of a particular subject lies in the need of that particular subject. It is true that there are so many topics or issues on which different philosophical schools of India discuss, but it is also true that the main concerns of these schools are liberation (मोक्ष) and the means to achieve it. If we study carefully them we find that these schools are ultimately *mokṣa-sāstra* (मोक्ष-शास्त्र). We will show this by discussing two or three schools namely Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Advaita Vedānta by the help of some well known texts of these schools of philosophy.

Vaiśeṣika philosophy begins with Kanāda's book of aphorisms known as *Vaiśeṣika sūtra* (सुत्र) or Kanāda *sūtra* (सुत्र). There are many different versions of this work. Here we take the version which is recorded in the *Upaskāra tīkā* of Śankara Mishra. This *tīkā* is directly on Kanāda's *sūtra* (सुत्र) text. It is the most famous among the works on it. Praśastapāda's work is not directly a commentary on Kanāda's *sūtra* (सुत्र) and it does not explain every *sūtra* (सुत्र) of Kanāda-s *sūtra* text. But Śankara Mishra's work explains every *sūtra* (सुत्र) of Kanāda's work.

Śankara Mishra notes that the first two sūtra-s (सूत्र) of Kaṇāda's text are:

1. अथातो धर्म व्याख्यास्याम 1/1/1 and
2. यतोऽभ्युदयनिःस्तेयससिद्धिः स धर्मः 1/1/2

In these sūtra-s (सूत्र) some words occurred and they are ‘*dharmaḥ*’ (धर्मः), ‘*abhyudaya*’ (अभ्युदय) and ‘*nīḥśreyas*’ (निःश्रेयस).¹ Scholars do not agree about the meaning of the term ‘*dharma*’ (धर्म) and ‘*abhyudaya*’ (अभ्युदय).² Generally ‘*nīḥśreyas*’ (निःश्रेयस) means *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) or *apavarga* (अपवर्ग) and it has been understood in this sense by Śankara Mishra. In some Nyāya text also the word ‘*nīḥśreyas*’ (निःश्रेयस) has been used in the same sense. In both Goutama's *Nyāya sūtra* and Vātsāyana's commentary on it this word is used to mean *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) or *apavarga* (अपवर्ग). It is true that different schools have taken *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) in different senses. But the most important difference among them about *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is whether it means a positive state of pleasure or a state of only final freedom from pain. In this chapter we will discuss it in great detail. We will show later that how Śankara Mishra interprets the word ‘*abhyudaya*’ (अभ्युदय) in an uncommon way. And gradually we will try to make clear that *darśana* (दर्शन) is ultimately the theories of *mokṣa* or *mokṣa-śāstra* (मोक्ष-शास्त्र). In that sense at least *darśana* (दर्शन) is a theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ).

In his *sūtra* (सूत्र) text Kaṇāda explicitly mentions the words ‘*dharma*’ (धर्म) and ‘*mokṣa*’ (निःश्रेयस). Śankara Mishra in his *Upaskāra Tikā* goes further and introduces the concept of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). According to him, Kaṇāda means by *dharma* (धर्म) the common cause of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ)³. He further says that highest

puruṣārtha-s (पुरुषार्थ) are two — pleasure and absence of pain.⁴ He then says that these two ultimate *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are *svarga* (स्वर्ग) and *apavarga* (अपवर्ग).⁵ We will come back to this point later on. But here we should note a point that Kaṇāda in his *Sūtra* (सूत्र) 1/1/4 explicitly says that *tattvajñān* (तत्त्वज्ञान) is the means of *nīḥśreyas* (निःश्रेयस).⁶

Here one may notice the similarity between the *sūtra* (सूत्र) of Kaṇāda just mentioned and the very 1st *sūtra* (सूत्र) of Goutama mentioned in his *sūtra* (सूत्र) Text. Gautama mentioned there clearly that *tattvajñān* (तत्त्वज्ञान) is the means of *nīḥśreyas* (निःश्रेयस).⁷ So, we can say that both Gautama and Kaṇāda are agreed at the point that *nīḥśreyas* (निःश्रेयस) or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) or liberation is obtained through *tattvajñān* (तत्त्वज्ञान). But *tattvajñān* (तत्त्वज्ञान) of what? Here Gautama and Kaṇāda have their own different views. According to Gautama, these things are sixteen in number as enumerated in *Nyāyasūtra* 1/1/1. The list of these sixteen things begins with *pramāṇa* (प्रमाण) and ends with *nigrahasthāna* (निग्रहस्थान). On the other hand, for Kaṇāda, these things are similarities and dissimilarities of *padārtha-s* (पदार्थ) [*svadharma* (स्वधर्म) and *Vaidharma* (वैधर्म) of *padārtha-s* (पदार्थ)] and these *padārtha-s* (पदार्थ) are six (or seven) in number.

Maharshi Bādarāyaṇa's *Brahmasūtra* (सूत्र) Text end with the *sūtra* (सूत्र) “अनावृत्तिः शब्दादनावृत्तिः शब्दात्” (4/4/22). Here ‘*anavrtti*’ (अनावृत्ति) means “absence of return i.e. does not return”. The idea is that the soul (or jiva) does not return to this *samsāra* (or world) after getting liberation. *Samsāra* (संसार) is the phenomenal state of being and it is the state of bondage and suffering. The only way to return to this phenomenal world is through birth (or rebirth). The *Gītā* says —

जातस्य हि ध्रुवो मृत्युध्रुवं जन्ममृतस्य च।

तस्मादपरिहार्येऽर्थे न त्वं शोचितुमहसि ॥ 2/17

Meaning thereby for death of anyone born is certain, and of the dead (re-)birth is a certainty. Therefore, we ought not to grieve over an inevitable fact. But liberation means transcending the cycle of repeated births and deaths. Taking repeated births and deaths is explained as the state of bondage (बद्धावस्ता). For this reason actually *janma* (जन्म) means *duḥkha* (दुःख) or suffering. At the stage of liberation men transcend this state of bondage. *Darśana* (दर्शन) is that enterprise which helps man to go beyond or to transcend the state of *samsāra* (संसार) and suffering. Śamkarācārya writes at the end of *Adhyāṣa bhāṣya* “अस्य अनर्थहेतोः प्रहाणाय आत्मौक्त्वविद्याप्रतिपत्तये सर्वे वेदान्ताः आरभ्यन्ते”⁸, meaning thereby the reason why Vedānta was evolved is to get rid of *samsāra* (अनर्थ). This will be possible if we have the knowledge of one and non-dual (अद्वैत) Brahman (आत्मा). Vedānta is meant to give us this knowledge.

Like the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika School the *Vedānta darśana* (दर्शन) also begins with the very purpose of removing the cause of all suffering. The value of *Vedānta sāstra* (शास्त्र) is to enable man to attain his highest goal or fulfil life's greatest need. Jaimini's *Mimāṃṣā sūtra* (सुत्र), Kapil's *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* and Patanjali's *yoga sūtra* (सुत्र) also mainly concern about *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) and the means to attain it but in their own different ways. The main concern of Buddhism and Jaina systems are also to help man to be free from bondage. So, from the above discussion it is clear that the main concern to all Indian philosophical schools (perhaps without Cārvāka School of philosophy) is liberation and the means to achieve it. [Cārvākas also

believe in *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) in their own sense. For them *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is what others say death and they don't believe in rebirth].

In *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣada* it has been said 'आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्त्यव्यो निदिध्यसित्यव्य' — (2/4/5) and 'श्रोतोव्यो श्रुतिवाक्येभ्यो मन्त्यव्यश्च उपपत्तिभिः'. So, it is clear that philosophy is concerned with *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ); at least with the final *puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). What is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) or liberation, why man should have it, how he can have it — these are the basic enquiries of different philosophical schools. Kapil in the very first *sūtra* (सूत्र) of his *sūtra* Text (*Sāṃkhya sūtra*) mentions *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). The *sūtra* (सूत्र) is 'अथ त्रिविधुःखात्यन्तनिवृत्तिरत्यन्तपुरुषार्थ' 1/1/1.⁹

Sāṃkhya philosophers admit three kinds of *duḥkha* (दुःख) — *ādhyātmik* (आध्यात्मिक), *ābhibhoutik* (आधिभौतिक) and *ādhidaivik* (आधिदैविक). According to them, the final *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or the ultimate human need is complete removal of these threefold suffering. At the end of the *Sāṃkhya sūtra* text Kapil says — "यदा तद्वा तदुच्छीतिः पुरुसर्थस्तदुच्छीतिः पुरुषार्थः" (6/70).¹⁰ It means removal of these suffering by any means is *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) [final or ultimate]. Similarly in the last *sūtra* (सूत्र) of the *Yoga darśana* of Patanjali also we get the reference of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). There it has been said — 'पुरुषार्थश्रुन्यानां गुणानां प्रतिप्रसबः कैवल्यं स्वरूपप्रतिष्ठा वा चितिशक्तिरिति' — 4/34.¹¹

In Goutama's *Nyāya sūtra* Text we get many references to *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). In *Navya Nyāya*, Gangeśa in his *Tattvacintāmaṇi* gives *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) a great importance. Generally Gangeśa's *Tattvacintāmaṇi* known as a great work in the field of epistemology and logic of *Nyāya* philosophy. Men (who are mainly trained in western philosophy) usually do not notice that he has made some

Valuable and philosophically significant reference to *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). They think that *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is a topic of soteriology and it is very much different from philosophy. But the fact is that in the second *prakaraṇ* (प्रकरण) of the first part (प्रत्यक्षखण्ड) of his *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, which is known a *prāmānyavāda prakaraṇ* (प्रामाण्यवाद प्रकरण), Gangeśa made reference to *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). It is the actual beginning of the book. This section deals with the question of *prāmānya* (प्रामाण्य). If we think about Gautama's *Nyāyasūtra* we see a similarity in this regard. Gautama has mentioned a list of sixteen *padārtha-s* (पदार्थ) in the very first *sūtra* (सुत्र) of his *Nyāya sūtra* Text. There he started with *pramāṇa* (प्रमाण). Vātsāyana also begins his commentary on *Nyāya sūtra* with the discussion of *prāmānya* (प्रामाण्य). This is one of the reasons for which *Nyāya* is known as *pramāṇa-śāstra* (प्रमाण शास्त्र) or a theory of *pramāṇa* (प्रमाण). Yet Gangeśa notes in the beginning of the *prāmānyavāda* (प्रामाण्यवाद) of *Tattvacintāmaṇi* that according to Gautama the knowledge of *pramāṇa* (प्रमाण) etc. is needed for *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) or liberation. He writes that the discipline called *Nyāya* (न्याय) is indirectly related to *nīḥśreyas* (निःश्रेयस). Mathurānāth in his *Rahasya* commentary on this portion of *Tattvacintāmaṇi* explains the word indirectly to mean through yielding such knowledge which is the means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). At the end of the second part of *Anumāna khanda* of *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, Gangeśa elaborately discusses both the subject God (ईश्वर) and liberation (मोक्ष). In the beginning of his *Iṣvarvāda* (ईश्वरवाद) or discussion on God Gangeśa writes that once it has been established that *anumāna* is a *pramāṇa* (प्रमाण), God's existence can be established through it. This suggests that *Nyāya* does not take the trouble of building a theory of *anumāna* (अनुमान) or logic without some ulterior purpose. This purpose is ultimately to prove God's

existence. And he has already established in the preceding and greater part of *Tattvacintāmaṇi* that *anumāna* is a *pramāṇa* (प्रमाण). He has established this through the discussion of various aspects of *anumāna* (अनुमान) and many different views about these aspects.

In his *muktivāda prakaraṇa* (मुक्तिवाद प्रकरण) of *Tattvacintāmaṇi* Gangeśa discusses about spiritual liberation or *mukti* (मोक्ष). He begins this *prakaraṇa* (प्रकरण) by saying that the greatest need of inference is liberation (अपवर्ग)¹².

Gangeśa ends his discussion of liberation by saying that *anumāna* [as *manana* (मनन)] is the cause of *apavarga* (अपवर्ग) or liberation and in *Śruti* it has been said clearly. Gangeśa also has discussed it in detail in this *prakaraṇa* (प्रकरण). But how do we know the *Śruti* suggests this? In the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣada* it has been said “आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्त्यव्यो निदिध्यसित्यव्य” (2/4/5), which means one may have direct self-realization (आत्म-साक्षातकार) through *sravaṇa* (श्रवण), *manana* (मनन) and *nididhyāsana* (निदिध्यासन). Here ‘*mantavya*’ (मन्त्यव्य) means critically reflected on or through *manana* (मनन). Udayanācārya shows that this *manana* (मनन) consists of arguments and inferences. It has been said that ‘श्रोतोव्यो श्रुतिवाक्येभ्यो मन्त्यव्यश्च उपपत्तिभिः’. It means hearing the sentences of the *Sruti* from the teacher with proper awe (*sravana*) and critical reflection (*manana*) on the same subject is necessary.

From our earlier discussion it has been clear that Indian philosophy (दर्शन) is primarily concerned with *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ). Since one of the great needs of Indian Philosophy (दर्शन) is to give a philosophical theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), it will not be wrong if it is regarded as *mokṣa-śāstra* (मोक्ष-शास्त्र). Such a

theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or PTP should contain the discussion of the nature of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), number of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), definition or criterion of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), relative superiority or inferiority of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ), means of attaining *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) etc. It is true that different schools of Indian philosophical Tradition (Except perhaps Cārvāka) have their own different forms of PTP. But they all have offered some PTP (as distinct from FVP) in their own ways. We will cite a few more textual evidences later. First we will discuss major points of agreements and differences between PTP-s of two major Indian schools of philosophy namely Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika PTP and Advaita-Vedānta PTP. We will also discuss out of these two PTP-s which one is more acceptable and why.

Both *Advaita Vedānta* theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or VPTP and *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or NVPTP exclusively discuss the only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) the *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ). It may be the first point of agreement between them. Philosophy (दर्शन) tells us about direct realization of the self (आत्म-दर्शन), which is the direct cause or direct means of achieving *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ). Here it should be noted that *darśana* (दर्शन) itself is an indirect means of such *ātmadarśana* (आत्मदर्शन). The second point of agreement between VPTP and NVPTP is that they both admit *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) or *apavarga* (अपवर्ग) as *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ).¹³ But why is *mokṣa* (अपवर्ग) called as *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ)? Both NVPTP and VPTP show more or less same reasons why *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is called as *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ). This may be called as third point of agreement between them. In some philosophical texts of *Advaita Vedānta* some reasons have been shown very clearly and explicitly.

These reasons are acceptable to *Naiyāika-s*, *Vaiśeṣika-s* and some other groups of philosopher.

Now let us discuss about the differences or some major points about *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) according to these two schools. The important point is that specially two major points of differences made their theory different. The first point is what is the nature of *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ)? And the other is what is the means of attaining this *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ)?

According to both these PTP, there is only one *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ). Philosophy is not just an empirical and descriptive theory; it rather aims at the higher general truths. Thus when philosophy (ontology) discusses what are real in the world, it does not want to know what particular real things are there in the world. Because all we know that real things are innumerable. So, no one will try to make a list of them. Actually philosophy discusses and tells us what are the most general kinds of things in the world.¹⁴ *Vaiśeṣika* school gives us a list of categories, but not a list of real objects of the world. We have said that the great concern of *darśana* (दर्शन) is to discuss *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or human need. From this one should not mean that *darśana* (दर्शन) is interested in particular objects which man really seek to live in this world, such as medicine, education, food, cloths, shelter etc. Man seeks these objects and the objects are innumerable. *Darśana* (दर्शन) is not concerned with their number; it is not interested to make a list of these objects. Rather it is interested in most general need of human being. Here by general need it does not mean the need of this man or that man. It is not the need at one time and not at another time, under one condition and not another condition. *Darśana* (दर्शन) is interested in that human

need which is not relative to particular individual man, time, taste, situation etc. It is rather interested in the absolute need which every man seeks unconditionally, provided that he knows the nature of it. It may be the fact that a man does not know it and so he does not seek it. But if a man knows that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the absolute need, then he should seek it. Since every man does not know it, there enters an element of morality. And this morality is based on practical rationality. Our reason tells us what we should do and what we should not do. When reason determined an action as what we should do and what we should not do, then it is a case of practical rationality. Man generally seeks many things to live in this world. But we cannot say that man should seek those things. Seeking an object practically does not include seeking that object morally. We cannot say a man as 'you should breath'. But the very condition of seeking *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is to attain the proper knowledge about *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). It is very obvious that some men know it and some do not know. So, it is said that man should seek *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). If man knows *mokṣa* (मोक्ष), he will seek it unconditionally. So, philosophers formulate the most general conception of human need and general principle or criterion of such human need. This need should be an object of unconditional desire. Such a need is absolute need. It is what every man desires for its own sake. If there is a man who does not want *mokṣa* (मोक्ष), it is because he is ignorant of the true nature of it or actual condition of his life. If he knows that it is inevitable that his life will be full of suffering and pain, he obviously will try to get rid of this suffering. If he knows that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is complete freedom from pain, he will seek *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) for it's own sake.

So, we can formulate it in this way: if *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is a thing that whoever knows (who is rational also) what it is, he will have desire to have it. We can say that he should want to have it. If a person is such that he does not have any idea of what *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is, he can say that he does not want *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) though his life is full of suffering and pain. So, it is proved that the concern of philosophy is to give a most general theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) according to which there is only one *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) or need of life. So, everybody wants (or should want) *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) provided that he knows it. If *x* is such that any man who knows it, also wants it, then *x* is a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or absolute human need in the philosophical sense. There may be many theories of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) but PTP is the most general and rational theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ).

Though food is said to be one of the basic needs, it cannot be said about *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) from a philosophical standpoint (sense). For, man seeks food only when he is hungry. Moreover hungry man, when gets food and satisfies his hunger, does not further seek food. That means it is not his any eternal desire. Then his knowledge about food will not lead him to desire food. So, we can say that the knowledge of the food is not the sufficient condition or cause of man's desire for food. For this reason all needs are not *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in the philosophical sense. There are innumerable needs which man seeks for the betterment of his life. But, they are not *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in the philosophical sense. That need of a thing is *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in a philosophical sense, the knowledge of which is sufficient condition for desiring it. If to know a thing is to desire it — then that thing is a human need in the most

general, absolute and philosophical sense. Philosophers of different schools, by maintaining this principle strictly, formulate *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) in their own ways.

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers also formulate the *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) in this way. It has been said that “निर्दुःखत्वे सुखे चेच्छा तज्ज्ञानादेव जायते” (*Bhāṣāparichcheda* -146). Meaning thereby, absence of pain and pleasure is only the two objects the knowledge of which is sufficient to seek these objects. It follows (philosophically speaking) that the highest human needs are two — pleasure and absence of pain. These are two different things because one of these cannot be reduced to the other. For this reason, NVPTP says that highest human need or *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) are two and not one. This view of NVPTP is quite different from both the view of VPTP and FVP. FVP makes a list of four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) where *mokṣa* (परम पुरुषार्थ) is placed at the top position of the list. On the other hand VPTP holds the view that *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) is one and it is a kind of pleasure (सुख). They called it as *niratiśaya sukh* (निरतिशय सुख). In the book *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* the author Dharmarāj explicitly says that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the highest human need. And this view is fully agreed with the view of FVP.

VPTP and NVPTP — they both have not only different formulation but they have also different criterion of *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ). Following the hint of the last sūtra (सुत्र) of the source book of Vedānta Philosophy, *Brahmasūtra*, Dharmarāj says *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) because it is permanent. It is permanent in the sense that if one gets *mokṣa* (मोक्ष), he never loses it. To loose *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) means to return to this *samsāra* (world of suffering). The *samsāra* means the phenomenal

world which is full of suffering or pain (also pleasure). It has been said in other philosophical systems that birth or *janma* (जन्म or भव) means duḥkha (दुःख). For this reason, the last *Brahmasūtra* says ‘अनावृत्ति’ which means non-return to the phenomenal condition of existence or the state of bondage. Dharmarāj explicitly says that out of all the four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the *parama* or highest *puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ). He holds this when he says — “...धर्मार्थ-काम-मोक्षाख्येषु चतुर्विध-पुरुषार्थेषु मोक्ष एव परम पुरुषार्थः”.¹⁵ But one may ask the reason why is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) the highest *puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ)? Keeping this question in mind Dharmarāj mentions the reason by quoting the *Upaniṣad* text – “न च पुनरावत्ते”¹⁶, meaning there by *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) because if one gets *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) he never returns. So, permanence of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the reason what makes it the highest. The other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are not *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) because they are not permanent. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika (NV) criterion of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) emphasizes its character of unconditionality. Vedānta philosophy emphasizes its character of permanence. There are compatible views shared by both NV philosophers and Vedānta philosophers. But permanence may be viewed as debatable feature. For if *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is permanent, then everyone is already liberated. And then philosophical enterprise becomes unnecessary and useless. We will discuss this point later. It may also be said that Nyāya criterion applies only to *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) unconditionally. Knowledge of food leads to the desire if the man is hungry. But unlike hunger the feature of bondage is a universal feature which qualifies every man (except the *jivan mukta*) or every sentient creature at every moment.

One may find the conflict between VPTP and NVPTP from what is said in the previous passages. But the conflict is not reasonable. For the criterion, which we have mentioned as offered by NVPTP, is the criterion of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in the most general and philosophical sense. To put it otherwise NVPTP offers the criterion to test or to answer the question what can be a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in strict philosophical sense. It does not answer the question why *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is said to be the *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) or highest goal of life. But the criterion offered by VPTP (criterion of permanence) answers the question why *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) but not the question why *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). So, NVPTP and VPTP offer criterion but for different purpose. It is true that a Naiyāika, who takes *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) to be the object of unconditional desire of man and takes *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) as pleasure or freedom from pain, can easily accept *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) to be the highest *puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) in the *Upaniṣadic* sense that it is permanent. In other words, a Naiyāika will have no problem to accept that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is permanent in the sense that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) once attained is never lost again. So, there is no conflict between NVPTP and VPTP in this sense. Similarly, there is no conflict between NVPTP and VPTP on the one hand and FVP on the other. Because, all the four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ), admitted in FVP, are the form of either pleasure or absence of pain. FVP also accepts that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the highest pleasure or ultimate absence of pain and it is the highest *puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ). Moreover, it also accepts that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is permanent. So, there is no conflict.

But still FVP is different from NVPTP. It is in the sense that NVPTP is the most general and philosophical theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). But FVP is not. In the most general sense and criterion *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is only two. But since FVP is an empirical theory, it says about four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). If there were another theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) which is less general to FVP, then it could include few more *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). But a most general theory will include all this and it can be regarded as philosophical theory in true sense when PTP says about two (or one) *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) and includes all *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) in it. Thus all *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) come under these two highest kinds of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) — pleasure and absence of pain. NV philosophers are aware that FVP is an empirical theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and ordinary people generally admits four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). Keeping all these in mind Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers give the theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) which is a most general theory and it covers all the *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) of FVP. If we look at FVP from the point of view of NVPTP, then we see that FVP also gives us a general theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Because, logically speaking, there can be another theory which admits many more *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) than FVP. Then FVP will be regarded as general theory in comparison to that theory. But it is not as general theory as NVPTP. We can explain it in this way that different individual has different needs and they are, in a sense, innumerable. FVP first tries to draw a distinction among all these needs. Some needs are good as end (फल-रूप-इष्ट) and some needs are good as means (उपाय-रूप-इष्ट) of some other ends. Then FVP generalizes it and says that there are only two human needs which are good-in-itself. These needs are *kāma* (काम) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). It also says that there are only two human needs which are good-as-

means. And these are *dharma* (धर्म) and *artha* (अर्थ). These are means of the other two needs which are good-in-itself. Then it also shows that *artha* (अर्थ) is the means of *kāma* (काम) and *dharma* (धर्म) is the means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष).

So far as PTP is concerned it is a debatable issue whether *dharma* (धर्म) is a means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) or not. Both Kaṇāda and Goutama said that *jñāna* (ज्ञान) is the cause or means of ‘*nīḥśreyas*’ (निःश्रेयस) or *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ). Here ‘*jñāna*’ (ज्ञान) means *tattvajñāna* (तत्त्वज्ञान) or *tattvajñāna* of *padārtha* or *padārtha tattvajñāna* (पदार्थ तत्त्वज्ञान). According to Goutama, *Tattvajñāna* (तत्त्वज्ञान) of sixteen *padārtha-s* (पदार्थे) is the means of ‘*nīḥśreyas*’ (निःश्रेयस) or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). On the other hand, Kaṇāda holds the view that *tattvajñāna* (तत्त्वज्ञान) of six *padārthas* (पदार्थे) or strictly speaking of their similarities and dissimilarities is the means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). It is stated in the fourth *sūtra* (सुत्र) of Kaṇāda when he tells us “धर्मविशेषप्रसूताद् द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवायानां पदार्थानां साधर्मवैधर्मभां तत्त्वज्ञानान्निःश्रेयसम्” (1/1/4). Praśastapāda in his commentary *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* on Kaṇāda’s *sūtra* text says the same thing. This work is also known as *Praśastapāda bhāṣya*. He says “द्रव्य गुण कर्म सामान्य विशेष समवयानाम् षण्णाम् पदार्थानाम् स्वाधर्म वैधर्मभाम् तत्त्वज्ञान निःश्रेयस हेतु”. Jagadiśa tarkālankāra has done a commentary on this *Praśastapāda bhāṣya* called *Sukti*. Here he explains that if there was no ‘*nīḥśreyas*’ (निःश्रेयस) as the end, then *tattvajñāna* (तत्त्वज्ञान) would be meaningless and if *tattvajñāna* (तत्त्वज्ञान) was meaningless then the Kaṇāda’s *sūtra* text and Vaiśeṣika philosophy would be useless. To answer such possible charge Praśastapāda following Kaṇāda writes that *tattvajñāna* (तत्त्वज्ञान) which Vaiśeṣika

philosophy generates is usefull. For it is a means of *nīhsreyas* (निःश्रेयस).¹⁷

But neither Kanāda and Praśastapāda nor Jagadiśa explain why ‘*nīhsreyas*’ (निःश्रेयस) is an end. They all just take ‘*nīhsreyas*’ (निःश्रेयस) as the highest good-as-end-in-itself. This is true not only for Kanāda and Praśastapāda or Vaiśeṣika philosophy, but it is true for philosophical schools including Nyāya also. For all of them the highest human need in strict philosophical sense is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) or *nīhsreyas* (निःश्रेयस) or *apavarga* (अपवर्ग) or *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) and all are agreed at the point that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the highest good-as-end and not good-as-means. Both Goutama’s *sūtra* text and Kanāda’s *sūtra* text tell us that the means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is *tattvajñāna* (तत्त्वज्ञान). But they never said anywhere that *dharma* (धर्म) is the means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). Thus we can say that though PTP can agreed with FVP that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ), but it will never agree with FVP that *dharma* (धर्म) is the means (Good as means) of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). Not only Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika *darśana* (दर्शन) but in *Vedānta darśana* (दर्शन) also we get the same view. Dharmarāj in his *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* shows first that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the highest among the four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). He shows evidence from *Śruti* which tells us (as we noted above) that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is permanent. After that Dharmarāj shows the means of it. The means to this end is *Brahman*. Here *Brahman* is *tattvajñāna* (तत्त्वज्ञान). For this reason the main points which *Vedānta darśana* wants to establish is all about *Brahman*, knowledge of *Brahman*, means of the knowledge of *Brahman* etc. he says ‘...ब्रह्म तज्-ज्ञानं तत्-प्रमाणणन्च स प्रपञ्चम् निरूप्यते’.¹⁸

Thus we can say that all philosophical theories of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or PTP are agreed at the point that *dharma* (धर्म) is not the

means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). But one may say here that FVP also does not say that *dharma* (धर्म) is the means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). So, it will not be reasonable to say that unlike PTP, FVP says that *dharma* (धर्म) is the means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). Then what actually FVP wants to say? It has given only a list of four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). And if we read this list from bottom to top then only *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) will be placed at the top most or the highest place. After that FVP tries to give an interpretation of the relation obtained among these four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). If we follow this interpretation sincerely, then it seems to us that of these four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) *kāma* (काम) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) are the two good as ends. So, it will be quite easy to understand that remaining two *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) will be good as means. This familiar account seems to suggest that *dharma* (धर्म) is the means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) according to FVP.

If philosophy shows that *dharma* (धर्म) cannot be the means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष), then the above version of FVP can be given up and another version can be formulated. But what other version of interpretation or formulation of FVP is possible? It should be an interpretation in which atleast *dharma* (धर्म) will not be a means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). And if *dharma* (धर्म) is not the means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) [*mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the good-as-end-in-itself], then there will be some other options.

1. One option is that *dharma* (धर्म) is not at all a means to any other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ), rather it is an end-in-itself.
2. *Dharma* (धर्म) is a means of some other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ).

3. In this option one may argue that all the questions of reinterpretation of FVP take place because we formed FVP in this way.

3,i) We formed FVP to agree with PTP on the point that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) or liberation is the good-as-end-in-itself. It is the highest end.

3,ii) We formed FVP to disagree with PTP on the point that according to the PTP *jñāna* (ज्ञान) is the means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष); whereas according to FVP (usual version or familiar version) *dharma* (धर्म) is the means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). But one can doubt whether 3,i) is true or not. Whether the different philosophical theories of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) have proved it or not that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the good-as-end or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the highest human need (परम पुरुषार्थ). Nyāya PTP gives us a general criterion to test of what can be a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). On the other hand Advaita Vedānta PTP gives us a criterion to test which is the best and highest human need or goal of human life. Thus it has been told us by the different philosophical schools that the highest need of man or the goal he desires is either pleasure or absence of pain. But have they proved that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the highest *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ)? To show that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the highest *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) we need to show first that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is (by nature) either pleasure or absence of pain. After that we need to show that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is either highest form of pleasure or highest form of absence of pain. Suppose we say that *sukha* (सुख) is a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). But from this it does not mean that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or highest form of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). We need to show here that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is a form of *sukha* (सुख) and highest form of *sukha* (सुख). Similarly, suppose we may say that

duḥkhābhāva (दुःखाभाव) or absence of pain is a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). But from this it should not mean that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or highest form of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). We need to show here that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is a form of *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) or highest form of *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव). So we need two things to discuss: first, *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is either a form of pleasure or a form of absence of pain and secondly, *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is either the highest form of pleasure or the highest form of absence of pain. These points we will discuss when we will discuss two forms of PTP — NVPTP and VPTP.

Let us now discuss 1 and 2. We will not discuss much about 1. We have seen earlier that ‘*dharma*’ (धर्म) is an ambiguous word and it can be used in different senses. One of these senses, which is derived from the grammar and etymology of the word is that *dharma* (धर्म) sustains the society or the world (धारयते जगत्) and protect the people (धारयति प्रजा). In this sense *dharma* (धर्म) means *dharma vyavasthā* (धर्म व्यवस्था) [where the society (समाज) is a moral society, just society (धर्म समाज)]. Another sense of the term ‘*dharma*’ (धर्म) means dutiful actions. Actions cannot be treated as end-in-themselves. For, actions are always associated with pain. It may be means of some other ends. So, *dharma* (धर्म), in this sense, is never end-in-itself, rather it is end-as-means. In another sense *dharma* (धर्म) means *punya* (पुण्य) or *pāpa* (पाप) (usually translated as moral merit and demerit). Another sense of the word ‘*dharma*’ (धर्म) is *karmātiśaya*. Udayanācārya used the word ‘*karmātiśaya*’ (कर्मातिशय) in this sense in the first stavaka of his *Nyāyakusumāñjalih*.¹⁹ In this sense also *dharma* (धर्म) is primarily a means of resulting final pleasure or pain. It is not an end in itself. In our previous discussion

we have shown *dharma* (धर्म), as a form of dutiful action, is a natural object of aversion. So, we can say the alternative 1 is not true at all. Since *dharma* (धर्म) as action entails exertion and efforts, or we can say troubles and suffering (दुःख), it cannot be regarded as end-in-itself. But *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is always an object of desire. So, how can *dharma* (धर्म) be a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ)? The answer is *dharma* (धर्म) can be a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) if it is regarded as end-as-means.²⁰

Now, let us discuss about the alternative 2. Is this alternative true and acceptable? Can we say reasonably that *dharma* (धर्म) is a means of some other ends [some other *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ)] other than *mokṣa* (मोक्ष)? If we do not consider *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) and *dharma* (धर्म), then there will be two other *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ) in the scheme of FVP. And these are *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम). Now the question is can *dharma* (धर्म) be a means of any one of them or both of them? We have noticed that *dharma* (धर्म) has been placed at the bottom of the familiar list of *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ) of FVP. The reason is this: *dharma* (धर्म) is the root of all *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ). The implication is this: in a sense it is the means of all other *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ). To seek other *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ) one must seek it through *dharma* (धर्म). This suggests the criterion of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). A *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is any need or object of desire if it is or ought to be sought through right means. Here morality is based on practical rationality. *Dharma* (धर्म) within its standard meaning has both these characters of being rational to do and (morally) just to do. If we take an example the matter will be clear. *Artha* as *puruṣārtha* (अर्थ पुरुषार्थ) is included in the list of FVP. But *artha* (अर्थ) is not a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) because men need it or seek it. A man may earn it through any immoral or

unjustified means. But then it will not be regarded as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). *Artha* (अर्थ) is *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) if it is earned through *dharma* (धर्म) only. In another words, *artha* (अर्थ) is *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) if and when it is sought and through the ways approved or enjoined by *dharma* (धर्म) or morally just means.²¹ Similarly, if a *Brāhmaṇa* earns money (अर्थ) by performing *jajñā* (यज्ञ) i.e. by acting as a priest, it will be a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). So, *artha* (अर्थ) or wealth earned by a *brāhmaṇa* (ब्राह्मण) through *yājana* (याजन) or through acting as priest on behalf of a *yajmāna* (यजमान) is a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). It follows that *dharma* (धर्म) confers *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) character to *artha* (अर्थ). Simultaneously, *dharma* (धर्म), in this sense, becomes a way of earning *artha* (अर्थ) (अर्थ). In this special sense *dharma* (धर्म) can be a means to other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) like *artha* (अर्थ) etc. Similarly what *brāhmaṇa* (ब्राह्मण) gets as a gift from the king who appoints him for teaching (अध्यापना) students is rightful earning or *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). In the same way it can be shown that *dharma* (धर्म) is the means of *kāma* (काम). The implication is this when *kāma* (काम) is involved in rightfull marriage, it can be regarded as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Because such marriage is enjoined [i.e., such marriage is *dharma* (धर्म)]. To put it otherwise, *kāma* (काम), in the sanse of pleasure of conjugal life or married life is a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) when it is sought through rightful marriage or *dharma-vivāha* (धर्म-विवाह). Here *dharma* (धर्म) confers the character of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) to *kāma* (काम). So in this special sense *dharma* (धर्म) is a means of *kāma* (काम) also.

FVP may be interpreted in the way mentioned above. And then from the point of view of PTP it (FVP) can be regarded as an acceptable doctrine. FVP admits a list of four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ)

and there *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the highest. It is not a means of any other *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), it is the end-in-itself. Since there is no higher need than *mokṣa* (मोक्ष), it is the highest need (PTP also admits this, though PTP is yet to prove it). Among the other three *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) *dharma* (धर्म) is an end as means. But it is not proved whether it [*dharma* (धर्म)] is the means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) or not. There is no doubt that *dharma* (धर्म) is a means of both *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम). Now since there are few questions still unanswered, FVP cannot be acceptable in this interpretation. These questions are — (a) What are the status of *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम)? (b) What is the means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष)? So far as (b) is concerned we have two options — (b.i) *Mokṣa* (मोक्ष) has no means, or (b.ii) it has some means other than *dharma* (धर्म). If we choose (b.ii), then there will be another two options. The first option is the means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is either *artha* (अर्थ) or *kāma* (काम) or both. The second option is the means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is something different from *dharma* (धर्म), *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम). FVP does not mention any clue about what can be the means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) apart from *dharma* (धर्म), *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम). Apparently one may think that this problem will not be there if we choose the first option. But to my mind the problem will be still there. For, we cannot think how *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम) can be means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). *Artha* (अर्थ) cannot be the means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष), for, it cannot be purchased. Worldly pleasure can be purchased by money. *Kāma* (काम) also can be purchased by money. But *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is not this-worldly pleasure. *Kāma* (काम) also, on the other hand, cannot be means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). For, one cannot attain *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) by simply seeking it. Or one cannot attain *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) by leading a life of rightful carnal pleasure or *kāma* (काम) in the narrowest sense. In one sense every

puruṣārtha (पुरुषार्थ) is an object of desire or *kāma* (काम). But this does not mean that *kāma* (काम) is the means of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). In one sense *kāma* (काम) is the most basic and most universal object of pleasure. Desire for anything else is rooted (perhaps unknown to us) in the love for one's own self. This love is a form of *kāma* (काम). In a sense all *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) can be interpreted in terms of *kāma* (काम), but *kāma* (काम) is not the means of it. Our previous question still remains unsolved and that is how to interpret FVP so that it will be free from anomalies? There may be more than one such interpretation or re-interpretation or re-construction of FVP from the point of view of PTP.

Now, it is possible to take FVP to be a list of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in only one sense, in the basic sense. In this basic sense all *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) will be end-in-itself, nothing will be end-as-means. To put it differently all *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are object of desire. Now, if we take it in the basic sense, then all human goals or all object of desires will be *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in intrinsic sense, nothing will be *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in instrumental sense. For, all *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are end-in-themselves and nothing is end-as-means. As, for example, *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in intrinsic sense or it is *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) as end-in-itself. Similarly *dharma* (धर्म), *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम) will also be *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) as end-in-itself, and not end-as-means. Men seek *mokṣa* (मोक्ष), in the same way he seeks *dharma* (धर्म), wealth etc. Thus we can re-interpret and it is the most radical way to re-interpret FVP. And if we are successful to systematize and re-interpret FVP in this way, we can avoid the anomalies mentioned before and questions like the following. Why there are more good as end in the list than

good as means? Or, why there are more good as means and less good as ends? Or, which is the means of which good as end and so on.

Now there are some more questions which are not easy to answer. Can we say that man (directly) desires *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) and *dharma* (धर्म)? One can easily say that man seeks wealth and pleasure and we are ready to accept it. We are ready to accept it because it is proved in our day-to-day experience. But can we say that man desires *mokṣa* (मोक्ष)? We can empirically verify that man (or majority of them) desires *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम). But there is no such evidence to show than man (generally and naturally) desires *dharma* (धर्म) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). Hence the statements like *dharma* (धर्म) is a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or human need or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is a human need are, therefore, either false or are not empirical statements.

Similarly, can we say that man seeks *dharma* (धर्म)? *Dharma* (धर्म) means duty or rightful actions. Can we say that man seeks rightful actions? Man seeks pleasure, wealth etc. But it is clear to us that men do not seek duty in the same way men seek wealth and pleasure. As for example, men desire cooking. From this it does not mean man desires cooking for its own sake. Men need food and so they desire cooking. When his hunger will be satisfied he will not desire cooking. Hence men do not desire it all time. Man desires cooking for the sake of food. Similarly, man desires *dharma* (धर्म) or rightful action to be *dhārmika* (धार्मिक). Actually he desires to be *dhārmika* (धार्मिक). So, he desires *dharma* (धर्म) or desires righteousness. Man desires morality for its own sake. It is end-in-itself. To say a man is *dhārmika* (धार्मिक) actually to attribute a virtue

to him. The man who has this virtue always performs right actions or duties [*dharma-karma* (धर्म-कर्म)]. Such a man desires to perform *dharma-karma* (धर्म-कर्म) because he desires *dharma* (धर्म) [*dharma* (धर्म) or performance of right actions comes from the virtue of righteousness and more we perform duties the virtue becomes more firm]. To put it otherwise, at least some men want to be moral. The term '*dharma*' (धर्म) has many senses and one of the very important sense of it is duty. So, some men want to be *dhārmika* (धार्मिक) and for them *dharma* (धर्म) is end-in-itself. They seek *dharma* (धर्म) for its own sake. Hence, in this sense *dharma* (धर्म) may be a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ).

But here one may object by saying that in this sense also *dharma* (धर्म) cannot be regarded as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). The reason is this if we take *dharma* (धर्म) in the sense stated above then it will be a need of only few persons. Those who want to be moral or *dhārmika* (धार्मिक), will seek *dharma* (धर्म). But it is not the object of desire of all people. And unless it becomes object of desire of all people, it cannot be regarded as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). For, generally *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) means need of all people. Then how can *dharma* (धर्म) or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) be regarded as *purusartha* (पुरुषार्थ)? It is then that *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is not what man actually desires but what man *should* desire. Even when actually a man does not desire *dharma* (धर्म), he should. But then we have to say that all men should seek wealth or *kāma* (काम). If it is the case, then we will have problems. The problems are: a) it is difficult to accept that everyone should seek wealth or pleasure, and b) if we define *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in terms of *dharma* (धर्म), then how *dharma* (धर्म) can be said to be a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) without circularity?

The answer is as easy as simple. Generally *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) means human need. We take it to mean from this that a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) will be need of all people. But it is not true. As for example wealth or *kāma* (काम) and pleasure are *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). But ascetic, *sanyāsī* (सन्यासी) will not seek wealth and pleasure. *Mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is regarded as highest fulfilment of life. Hence *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ). But very few people seek *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) [and also have knowledge about *mokṣa* (मोक्ष)]. It has been said about *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) that 'आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्त्यव्यो निदिध्यसित्यव्य' (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣada* 2/4/5). It means self should be realized, though very few people seek to realize *ātmā* (soul). But there is no injunction or imperative that everyone should desire pleasure or wealth. Similarly, there is also no injunction that everybody should desire *dharma* (धर्म). Only actions can come within the scope of injunction. Desire is not an action and it cannot be within the scope of injunction. For this reason the word *jijñāsā* (जिज्ञासा) or desire for knowledge in the *Brahma sūtra* 1/1/1 was taken to mean *vicāra* (विचार). For *vicāra* (विचार) being an action it is possible to say that it is a duty to do (we should do).

Generally *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) means object of seeking or object of desire which man seeks in a normal condition. Man in normal condition seeks so many things. As for example a hungry man seeks food, an ill man seeks medicine etc. But when hunger of a man is satisfied or the illness of a man is cured, he does not seek food or medicine. But from this it does not mean that food and medicine are not need. The point is this: if we generalise, we see that it is not food or medicine or some other objects but the pleasure or satisfaction which the man gets from these objects. This pleasure

or satisfaction is actually the need of that man. In other words, it seems that man (hungry) needs food. But if we generalise we see that man needs the pleasure or satisfaction associated with food. Thus we can generalise it in this way that man actually needs or desires pleasure or *kāma* (काम) associated with the object.

Kāma (काम) is to be taken not as desire but what is desired (काम्य or कामना विषय). For, we do not desire the desire (काम) but we desire what is desired. So, in a generalised sense man seeks pleasure and it is *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). In the same manner if we keep in our mind that *dharma* (धर्म) means dutiful actions then no men will seek it. If we generalise, we see that, man want to be virtuous, so man seeks *dharma* (धर्म). But from this it does not mean that man seeks particular moral or dutiful actions. Man seeks moral disposition or virtue. *Dharma* (धर्म) means *dhārmika* (धार्मिक) in nature. Such a nature is a value, is a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Hence *dharma* (धर्म) is also a direct object of desire. Similarly, man seeks *artha* (अर्थ). But from this it should not mean that man seeks currency. In other words, man does not seek *artha* (अर्थ) for its own sake. He seeks *artha* (अर्थ) to secure his life, to purchase his other objects of desire.

Thus we can take each one of the list of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) of FVP and show that each *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) stands for direct object of desire, as good as end. And in this way also we can avoid the problem to explain what will be end-in-itself and what will be means of them.

But still there will be problem if we try to justify the order of the *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) of FVP. There is a difference between a moral man and a corrupt man. A moral man wants to be virtuous or

dhārmika (धार्मिक), which the corrupt man does not. But for both, wealth, right kind of protection and security are the basic objects of desire. A moral man at last achieves *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) and once it is achieved no other desire is left. So, *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) perfectly satisfies the description given in the *Gītā* - "यं लब्धवा चापरं लाभं मन्यते नाधिकं ततः" (6/22), meaning thereby after getting which no other thing is felt greater (or greater object of desire). But still it is difficult to make an order of *kāma* (काम) and *artha* (अर्थ). We will discuss this radical interpretation further. Four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are uttered or listed in sequence as it is physically impossible to utter or write down their names all at once. Each one is an irreducible *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). This is also a possibility.

There is another possible interpretation. According to this interpretation, the word '*kāma*' (काम) is the sense of *kāmya* (काम्य) which means pleasure or *sukha* (सुख). This pleasure is of two types — one is worldly pleasure or phenomenal or *laukika* (लौकिक) pleasure and other is other-worldly or *alaukika* (अलौकिक) or *pāralaukika* (पारलौकिक) pleasure.²² *Dharma* (धर्म) is the *alaukika* (अलौकिक) means of *alaukika sukha* (अलौकिक सुख) i.e. *svarga* (स्वर्ग); but *artha* (अर्थ) is the *laukika* (लौकिक) or worldly means of *laukika* or worldly *sukha* (लौकिक सुख). There is another sense of *artha* (अर्थ). This sense we get in *Nyāya kandalī*. Here it has been said that *artha* (अर्थ) means *dravya* (द्रव्य), *guna* (गुण), *karma* (कर्म). They have used the term '*artha*' to mean *padārtha* (i.e. *dravya*, *guna*, *karma* etc.).

Dharma (धर्म), has a dual character. For it serves two purposes. It serves as *laukika* (लौकिक) means for *laukika sukha* (लौकिक सुख) and as *alaukika* (अलौकिक) means for *alaukika sukha* (अलौकिक सुख). We can explain it in this way that the word '*dharma*' (धर्म) has two

main senses. In one sense *dharma* (धर्म) means enjoined actions or dutiful action and in this sense *dharma* (धर्म) is the *alaukika* (अलोकिक) means of *alaukika sukha* (अलोकिक सुख) or pleasure i.e. *svarga* (स्वर्ग). In another sense moral merit (पुण्य) is the result of *dharma* (धर्म) and this moral merit is one of the main causes of every effect of this world. Hence, in this sense, it is the cause of this-worldly *sukh* or *laukika sukha* (लौकिक सुख) also. To put it otherwise, *dharma* (धर्म) which means dutiful actions results moral merits (पुण्य). Now, firstly through moral merits it plays the casual role of *laukika sukha* (लौकिक सुख) or this-worldly pleasure and secondly through this *puṇya* (पुण्य) it results *alaukika sukha* (अलौकिक सुख) or *svarga* (स्वर्ग). [Similarly, we have shown above, *dharma* (धर्म) is the source of *kāma* (काम) which means both *laukika sukha* (लौकिक सुख) and *alaukika sukha* (अलौकिक सुख) or pleasure. Furthermore, *dharma* (धर्म) can be said as cause or means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). Those who deny that *dharma* (धर्म) is the means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) primarily keep in their mind that *dharma* (धर्म) is not a direct or immediate means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). Nobody will say that *dharma* (धर्म) is an immediate means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). Similarly, nobody will deny that *dharma* (धर्म) is the indirect means for achieving *mokṣa* (मोक्ष).] So, we can say that *dharma* (धर्म) is the base or root of all other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) and for this reason it is mentioned at the bottom position of the list.

In a sense *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is that which a man seeks. In this sense it is the result for which we strive. This is known as *phala-rūpa-puruṣārtha* (फल-रूप-पुरुषार्थ) or *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) as result. Now, such *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) must have some means through which it can be achieved. This means is known as *puruṣārtha-sādhana* (पुरुषार्थ-साधन). We will discuss *puruṣārtha-sādhana* (पुरुषार्थ-

साधन) in a separate chapter. Among four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the only end-in-itself. [one's desire for *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is not dependant on or derived from one's desire for some other thing]. This *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is neither a means of anything nor a result of any other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). On the other hand, other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are both a means and result of other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). We have discussed that *dharma* (धर्म) can be a means of or source of *artha* (अर्थ), *kāma* (काम) (two kinds of pleasure) and also *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). Hence if one gets *dharma* (धर्म), he can get or at least has ability to get *artha* (अर्थ), *kāma* (काम) and at last *mokṣa* (मोक्ष).

Man knowingly and hence willingly performs *dharma* (धर्म). Man who wants to be moral performs willingly what moral codes or injunctions obliges him to perform. He knows that through this performance he will get wealth or other things (पशु, पुत्र, स्वर्ग etc.) for what he performs *dharma* (धर्म). So, a man performs *dharma* (धर्म) for both *laukika sukh* (लौकिक सुख) and *alaukika sukh* or pleasure (अलौकिक सुख). *Dharma* (धर्म), therefore, is both *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and *puruṣārtha-sādhana* (पुरुषार्थ-साधन). But *kāma* (काम) as pleasure is only *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and not any *puruṣārtha-sādhana* (पुरुषार्थ-साधन). Man seeks pleasure or *sukh* (सुख) for itself and not as a means of other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). *Artha* (अर्थ) is also *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and *puruṣārthāntara sādhana* (पुरुषार्थान्तर साधन) [e.g. of *kāma* (काम)]. Now, let us sum up. *Dharma* (धर्म) is both good as an end and good as a means. *Artha* (अर्थ) is also both good as an end and good as a means. *Kāma* (काम) is only good as an end and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is also only good as an end. The difference between *kāma* (काम) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is that the last one is supreme and eternal pleasure whereas the first one is [both *laukika* pleasure

(लौकिक सुख) and *alaukika* pleasure (अलौकिक सुख) i.e. *svarga* (स्वर्ग)] impermanent and not supreme.

We have said earlier that our aim is to show that FVP and PTP are not antithetical, rather continuous. Now, we can reiterate the major points of FVP. But then we need to resolve some issues. These issues are: first, whether the word *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) has merely descriptive meaning or it has also normative meaning? Secondly, can we say that FVP list of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is an exhaustive list of the most general kinds of human need in which all needs can be reduced or included?

Since PTP admits only one (or two) *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), so the problem regarding accommodating four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) or arranging them does not arise. It has been clearly shown in different classical Indian text of Nyāya (e.g. *Nyāyasūtra* of Goutama) and Advaita Vedānta School (e.g. *Vedānta paribhāṣā*). But before that we need to answer one important objection. The objection is: like FVP in PTP also we have to admit four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). It is true that they are not the same as FVP, but they must be in number four. How is it possible? In PTP it has been said that pleasure is one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and another *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is absence of pain. Then another two *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) we have to admit which are the means of these two *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). Thus we get four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) in PTP:

1. Pleasure (सुख)
2. Means of pleasure (सुखोपाय)
3. Absence of pain (दुःखाभाव)

4. Means of absence of pain (दुःखाभावोपाय)

Here 1 and 3 are *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) as end-in-itself. But 2 and 4, though *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ), are dependent on 1 and 3 respectively. This means 2 and 4 are *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in the secondary sense (end as means).

Another important point is this: if 1 [*sukha* (सुख)] is not admitted as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), 2 will also be not regarded as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Similarly, it is true for 3 and 4. So, we can say that in the ultimate sense and from the point of view of philosophy (a study of the ultimate truth) there are only two independent *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) and not four.

There are innumerable objects which give pleasure. As for example milk, honey, sweet, ice-cream etc. They all are different. But they are not different in respect to that they all bring pleasure. In other words, though as caused by different objects pleasures are different, yet as pleasure they are not different. In brief, if we see them as pleasure caused by sweet and pleasure caused by honey they are different. But if we generalise them we get pleasure or *kāmya* (काम्य) as such. The same is applicable to pain also. Different objects cause pain e.g. thorne, death etc. Pain caused by death and pain caused by thorne are different. But as pain they are not different. We can generalise it in this way that all pleasures as pleasure it has *anukūlavedaniyatva* (अनुकूलवेदनियत्व) which means being experienced as likable and not contrary to our nature. But one important point to note here is that from the same thing different persons or different sentient being (जीव) gets different experiences. Same object may cause pleasure to one and pain to another. A

camel may be happy to get thorne but it is painful to a man. So, pleasures differ from one experiencing being (भोक्ता) to another experiencing being. But if we consider pleasure as pleasure and not as who experiences it then we can generalise all pleasure into one class. In other words, if we do not consider what or which object causes the pleasure or who is experiencing this pleasure (भोक्ता), then we can generalize it as the same as pleasure. This is not to deny what Udayanācārya said. He said experience of pleasure (or pain) is relative to experiencing persons. This is called *pratyatma niyata bhoga* (प्रत्यात्म नियत भोग), meaning thereby that there is individual differences in the experience of pleasure and pain. But every pleasure experienced by many individuals has the same character or property. This property is *anukūlavedaniyatva* (अनुकूलवेदनियत्व) or the property of being experienced as likeable, helpful etc.

Thus when PTP says that pleasure (सुख) is *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), it means pleasure in a most generalised sense. Similarly when PTP says absence of pain (दुःखाभाब) is *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), it means pain in a most generalised sense. Otherwise it could not be a philosophical theory. We have said earlier that when *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) becomes the concern of philosophy, philosophy takes it in the most generalised sense. Pain caused by different objects and different experiencing beings (भोक्ता) experience it differently. Pain from starvation is not the same as pain from fever. And what pains Ram may not pain Laksmana. But if we take pain as such and do not consider what causes it or who experiences it, then we get pain with one common characteristic and it has *pratikūlavedaniyatva* (प्रतिकूल वेदनियत्व) or having the property of non-likeability (or being

experienced as non-helpful or non-likeable). It is common to all pains at all times in all spaces. No one in the world experience pain as likeable. One may point out the case when a hungry man gives away his food to another hungry beggar, he does not experience pain but pleasure. In reply it is to be said that pain is still there. Such man feels the pain of hunger. But there is some over riding consideration and deferred pleasure which outweighs the pain. What motivates us in action is the final result and *balabattara sukh* (बलबत्तर सुख).

So from the philosophical point of view there is only one thing which every man seeks or needs irrespective of space, time, culture etc. This thing is pleasure (सुख). Similarly, there is only one thing which every man irrespective of space, time, culture etc. does not desire or need. This thing is pain. In other words, absence of pain is what everybody needs or desires. Thus, there are only two *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) — pleasure and absence of pain. Though what one experiences as painful may not be the same for all, yet no normal person wants pain. Similarly, no normal person can say that he does not want pleasure.

Here one question arises: can we have a more generalized theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ)? A philosophical theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is interested in most generalised version of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). In such a case, *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) will be only one and not two. For this reason every philosophical theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), in the true sense of the term, admits only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Thus PTP is a theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) according to which number of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is only one and not even two.

There may be many reasons for philosophers to admit only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in their theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). One important reason is the consideration of logical economy (or principle of *lāghava*). As we observe in a metaphysical theory that the theory should be judged in terms of the number of the ultimate principle of reality it admits. If one metaphysical theory explains the world on the basis of only one ultimate principle and another metaphysical theory does the same job on the basis of more than one ultimate principle, then obviously the first one will be considered to be the better than the second one. Here the criterion is the principle of logical economy (principle of *lāghava*). By the same reason a PTP should be judged best according to the principle of *lāghava* (लाघव) if it admits only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). For such a theory is successful to generalize all *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) to one only.

Now, let us agree that a PTP as a most generalized theory admits only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Then obviously the question arises which will be that *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) — pleasure or absence of pain? It is very difficult to answer this question. Some philosophers accept pleasure as *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) and some philosophers accept absence of pain as *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ). So, according to that, there developed two basic forms of PTP. Each PTP admits only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Hence, both PTPs are equally most general theory of human needs. Let us discuss these two PTPs. We will also examine if one of these can be said to be better than the other. Here better means logically stronger than the other. Generally speaking Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers admit absence of pain as *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ). On the other hand Advaita Vedānta philosophers admit highest pleasure as

parama puruṣārtha (परम पुरुषार्थ). According to the Tautātita (तौतातित) view also pleasure of certain kind is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). Vātsyāyana has discussed and refuted the view of those who said *nityasukhābhivyakti* (नित्यसुखाभिव्यक्ति) is *mukti* (मुक्ति).²³ There are other schools of philosophy who have their different views about *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ). But we will discuss here only two schools i.e. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school and Advaita Vedānta School. So, we will discuss here VPTP [Vedānta philosophical theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ)] and NVPTP [Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophical theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ)]. Among them VPTP admits that highest pleasure is *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) and NVPTP admits that absence of pain is the *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ).

In this connection we want to note here one point though we will not discuss it elaborately. Many thinkers believe that there is no fundamental difference between Nyāya philosophical conception of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and Vaiśeṣika philosophical conception of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). But some hold the view that though according to Vaiśeṣika philosophy absence of pain is *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ), but according to Nyāya philosophy pleasure is *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ). But how can they have this wrong idea? This is strange. If we notice the very source book of *Nyāyadarśana* — the *Nyāya sūtra* of Gautama — there we find ‘तदत्यन्तविमोक्ष अपवर्ग’ (1/1/22). Here 'tat' means all types of *duḥkha* (दुःख) or pain including birth. For in the just previous *sūtra* Gautama mentioned *duḥkha* (दुःख). According to Vātsyāyana 'विमोक्ष' means absence or freedom from. On the other hand, Udayanācārya discussed the Vaiśeṣika view regarding *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) in his *Kiranāvalī*. He said, according to Vaiśeṣika philosophers, *parama puruṣārtha* (परम

पुरुषार्थी) is freedom from pain. However, in this work and in other philosophical works of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school we do not often find very detailed discussion of the controversy regarding whether *sukha* (सुख) or *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) is *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) (Vātsyāyana is an exception). What is more elaborately discussed is what sort of absence of pain is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). Is it the *prāgabhāva* (प्रागभाव) or *dhamṣābhāva* (धंषाभाव) or *atyantābhāva* (अत्यन्ताभाव) of *duḥkha* (दुःख)? So, we can say that both Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika philosophers admit that absence of pain is *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). But according to VPTP though *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) but this *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) means highest pleasure.

But why some thinkers believe that Nyāya philosophy admits pleasure as *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष)? Why they believe that only Vaiśeṣika-s admit absence of pain as *mokṣa* (मोक्ष)? This point I have discussed in the paper ‘yoga and Nyāya: Allies or Adversaries’²⁴ which is also a part of the chapter *puruṣārtha-sādhana* (पुरुषार्थ-साधन) in our present work. There we have mentioned two points in this connection. The first one is a popular story which we will not discuss here. The other one is a more serious and textual evidence. This evidence shows that Nyāya admits pleasure as *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). Bhāsarvajña was a great Naiyāika of the Kāshmir region and he was a śaiva also. He in his book *Nyāyasāra* with *Bhusana*, its commentary, has expressed his view that in a state of liberation there exist happiness.²⁵ But the standard Nyāya view or Gautama and his followers maintain the view that final freedom from pain and suffering is *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). So, actually there is no difference between Nyāya view and Vaiśeṣika

view regarding the nature of *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). There may be any individual *Naiyāika* (*Nyāyaikadesi*) and he may have his own individual view. But it will be wrong to treat the view as the view of a whole philosophical school. Though according to Bhāsarvajña, in liberation there is pleasure, but according to standard *Nyāya* view just freedom from pain is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) or liberation.

We have stated before that here we will discuss only the views of two philosophical schools — *Advaita Vedānta* (VPTP) and *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* (NVPTP). First we will discuss VPTP.

Here we will not discuss in detail *Advaita Vedānta* theory of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). We are discussing here only their conception or view of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). Similarly after this we will discuss the conception or view of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) according to NVPTP. We will not discuss every argument given by *Vedāntins* or *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* philosophers. *Vedānta* philosophers admit only one *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) and that is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). But this position of VPTP may be challenged. In *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* it has been said that there are four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). ‘... धर्मार्थ-काम-मोक्षाख्येषु चतुर्विध-पुरुषार्थेषु’. The statement means ‘among *dharma* (धर्म), *artha* (अर्थ), *kāma* (काम) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष), the four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ)...’. In this part of the sentence the author of the text Dharmarāj says that the number of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is four. But the complete sentence says something more. It means that among the four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) namely *dharma* (धर्म), *artha* (अर्थ), *kāma* (काम) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) ‘मोक्ष एव परम पुरुषार्थ’ - that is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) alone is the best or highest *puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ). So, the text means *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is not the only *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), but among the four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ)

mokṣa (मोक्ष) is the highest. In other words, *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is not the only *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), but *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the only (एव) *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ).

Here we can say that philosophy (दर्शन) also is a highly general theory and it tries to adhere to the law of parsimony (लाघव). So, it is very obvious that a philosophical theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) will not admit more than one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) if there is provision or criterion according to which there can be only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ).

The difference between *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) and other *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is that other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are not eternal (नित्य), but *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is eternal (नित्य). Here Dharmarāj quoted from the *Upaniṣadic* text. For *Upaniṣad* also tells us that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is eternal (नित्य). Moreover, our experience also tells us that the other three *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are impermanent. In addition, these *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are associated with pain and suffering.

But one may have still some problems in Dharmarāj's position. For at first he suggests that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the only *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). But in the last chapter of the book [the *prayojana paricecheda* or the chapter which deals with the value of the system of Vedānta *darśana* (दर्शन)] he suggests that in the primary sense (मुख्य अर्थ) of the term '*puruṣārtha*' (पुरुषार्थ) it means mainly two human needs. These two needs are pleasure (सुख) and freedom from pain (दुःखाभाव).²⁶ He not only admits two *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) in the primary sense of the term, he also admits another two kinds of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) in the derivative (गौन) sense or secondary sense. In this sense the two *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are means of the

first two *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). Hence, Dharmarāj finally admits four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). Two of them are *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) in the primary sense or *mukhya artha* (मुख्य अर्थ) and another two of them are *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) in the secondary sense or *gauna artha* (गौन अर्थ). But after that Dharmarāj has offered another criterion to reinstate the thesis that there is only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). He says that one of the two primary *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) is *sukha* (सुख) or pleasure. Now, this pleasure can be of two types — qualified (सातिशय) and unqualified (निरतिशय). Among these *niratiśaya sukh* (unqualified) is the best and highest and it is the *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). He says "निरतिशय-सुखम् च ब्रह्मैव" (*prayojana parichhed*).²⁷ Thus we can say that according to Dharmarāj *niratiśaya sukh* (निरतिशय सुख) or *Brahman* (unblemished, unalloyed, highest and greatest pleasure) is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) and this is the *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). *Darśana* (दर्शन) is a part of man's quest of this highest fulfillment. This is the *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) or spiritual liberation. There are innumerable goals or needs of a human life. But *darśana* (दर्शन) is not concerned with these needs. *Darśana* (दर्शन) is concerned with the highest and universal goal of life. There are innumerable things in the world. But Vaiśeṣika philosophy is concerned with the six (or seven) most general kinds of things. Similarly, though there are innumerable needs, yet *darśana* (दर्शन) is concerned with the most general one. Let us go back to the Advaita Vedānta concept of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). According to them, *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the same as *Brahman* (ब्रह्म). So, since *Brahman* is one, *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) will be one. Dharmarāj begins by saying that primary *prayajana* (need, goal etc.) are only two — pleasure and absence of pain. He says '... सुखदुःखाभावौ मुख्ये प्रोयोजने'.²⁸ Here we notice the similarity between Nyāya and Advaita Vedānta philosophy. In the *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* under *Bhāṣāpariccheda* (verse 146)

Viswanāth says ‘फलन्तु सुखं दुःखाभावश्च’.²⁹ After this he has given argument why pleasure and absence of pain are *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). He says “तत्र फलेच्छां प्रति फलज्ञानं कारणम्”³⁰ Which means knowledge of the *phala* (good as end) is the cause of the desire of the *phala* (फल). So, if a man has no knowledge for the food x, then he cannot have any desire for that food x also. In other words knowledge of an object is the causal condition for the desire of that object. On the basis of such argument Viswanāth concludes that therefore pleasure and freedom from pain are *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Hence there are two *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) or good as end — pleasure and freedom from pain. But there may arise one question: Why do we say these are *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ)? Or what is the criterion for saying these as *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ)? As answer we can say that the thing is (rightly) called *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) if it satisfies the following description. That thing is *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) which is being known becomes the object of desire. *Puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is that object — if man knows it he wants to possess it for himself. We have said before that the word ‘*puruṣārtha*’ (पुरुषार्थ) means *puruṣasya artha* (पुरुषस्य अर्थ). Here *artha* (अर्थ) and *proyojana* (literally need) are synonymous. Now, there are innumerable needs in the world such as food, medicine, cloth, education etc. But nothing can satisfy the description or criterion stated above. Food has no value to the man who is not hungry. Medicine has no value to the man who is medically fit and has no disease. Only pleasure and freedom from pain can satisfy the description or criterion stated above. Once man knows that x is pleasure, he wants to have it. Once man knows that y is pain, he wants to avoid it. As for example, innocent small child gives pleasure to many human beings. Now once a person knows that there is an innocent beautiful small child, he wants to go there. Similarly,

suppose a man without any umbrella caught in rain when it was a winter season and he suddenly comes to know that there is a good shelter near to that place. If he goes to that place, there will be freedom from pain caused by excessive rain. Now the moment he knows about the absence of pain or *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव), he desires to experience that *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव). Thus, only pleasure and absence (freedom from) of pain satisfy the description or condition of being *purusartha* (पुरुषार्थ) stated above.

One may say here that according to the criterion or description stated above many things can be said as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). As for example, food for a hungry man, toy for a child may be said as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). For, these also satisfy the criterion. Here it can be said that a philosopher knows all these things. He will do one thing. He will formulate and justify certain general truths. And ultimately he draws the conclusion that all needs and desires of men can be generalised into ultimately two needs — pleasure and freedom from pain. As for example, a hungry man desires food. But he does not seek food for merely having food. He seeks food, for food gives him pleasure. Similarly a lover of music wants to listens music not for music itself, but because it gives him pleasure. Now, a philosopher analyses all these and concludes that men desires things either in the positive sense or in the negative sense. If he desires objects in the positive sense, then it is pleasure and if he desires objects in the negative sense, then it is absence of pain. Not the food but pleasure it offers, not the food but the freedom from hunger it ensures, is what man needs.

Now, it seems that both NVPTP and VPTP agreed at the point that the most common and general end of human life are pleasure

and absence of pain. But still they have some differences. We will discuss that at a later time. Before that we want to mention here an interesting point. Viswanāth offers the linguistic meaning of the word ‘*puruṣārtha*’ (पुरुषार्थ) and criterion of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). The interesting point is that Dharmarāj gives exactly the same but as the meaning of the word ‘*prayajana*’ (प्रयोजन) and criterion of *prayajana* (प्रयोजन). He writes “यदवगतं सत् स्ववृत्तियेस्यते तत् प्रयोजनम्”.³¹ Viswanāth writes, as we quoted above, “...यज् ज्ञातं सत् स्ववृत्तियेष्यते, स स्वतःपुरुषार्थ इति लक्षणात्”.³² In Dharmarāj’s formulation ‘*prayojana*’ means *puruṣa prayojana* (पुरुष प्रयोजन). So, here ‘स्व’ means *puruṣa* (पुरुष). ‘*prayojana*’ (प्रयोजन) and ‘*artha*’ (अर्थ) are synonymous. They refer same thing. There are cases when the word ‘*artha*’ (अर्थ) means something different. For example, in some of its use the word means substance (द्रव्य), quality (गुण) and action (कर्म). On the other hand, in Viswanāth’s formulation also ‘स्व’ means *puruṣa* (पुरुष).

As we said before, whether we take VPTP or NVPTP, the most generalised *artha* (अर्थ) or *prajana* (प्रयोजन) or need are pleasure and absence of pain. If *sukha* (सुख) is *artha* (अर्थ), then absence of *sukha* (सुख) is *anartha* (अनर्थ); and if *duḥkha* (दुःख) is *anartha* (अनर्थ), then absence of *duḥkha* (दुःख) is *artha* (अर्थ) or *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Śaṅkarācārya has said at the end of his *Adhyāśabdhāśya* that Vedānta or Vedānta philosophy is meant to get rid of *anartha* (अनर्थ). ‘अस्य अनर्थहेतोः प्रह्लाणाय आत्मैकत्वविद्याप्रतिपत्तये सर्वे वेदान्ताः आरभ्यन्ते’.³³ It means that the great purpose of Vedānta philosophy is to remove (प्रह्लाण) *anartha* (अनर्थ). This *anartha* (अनर्थ) or *duḥkha* (दुःख) is not the same as any particular pain or any individual pain. *Anartha* (अनर्थ) means most generalised pain or we can say pain as such. In a sense *samsāra* (संसार) and *janma* (जन्म) also means *duḥkha* (दुःख). *Samsāra*

(संसार) means the totality of *duḥkha* (दुःख) or pain. Since in *samsāra* (संसार) or in this phenomenal world every man has to constantly face suffering, it means totality of *duḥkha* (दुःख). Even pleasure in this phenomenal world is also a source of pain. Actually the life in this phenomenal world is marked by suffering. Every man, even every sentient being (जीव), has to suffer pain according to the order. There cannot be any exception. For this reason the world is said to be full of pain (दुःखमय). Man tries to remove his pain through some possible means. The man who is suffering from certain disease tries to remove it through proper medicine. But he cannot remove it permanently. It will come again and again and will cause more pains. So, two things are important here.

1. Man can remove some pains but not all.
2. The pain which man can remove, he cannot remove it permanently.

It has been said that the remedy for all sufferings or *duḥkha* (दुःख) is *jñāna* (ज्ञान). It does not mean any particular *jñāna* (ज्ञान), but that *jñāna* (ज्ञान) which is called *darśana* (दर्शन शास्त्र) in the technical sense. The question may arise does any philosophical system able to lead man to this *jñāna* (ज्ञान)? In other words, is Nyāya or Vaiśeṣika or Sāṃkhya or Yoga or Vedānta or Mīmāṃsā provides the *jñāna* (ज्ञान) or *darśana* (दर्शन) which can free man from all suffering permanently? The answer is: yes, it can provide. Freedom from pain as such is known as *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). And according to all systems, *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the only *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ).

Now, the problem is if *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) means both pleasure and freedom from pain which one of the two will be the highest *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष)? Dharmarāj in the beginning of

his book said *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the only highest *puruṣārtha* or *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ).³⁴ Dharmarāj appears to admit that there are four *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) as are admitted in FVP. But among them the best and highest is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). So, *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is one according to VPTP. But at the end of his book Dharmarāj first says that in the most generalised and primary (मुख्य) sense *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) or *prayojana-s* are two — pleasure and absence of pain. To the question what is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) he says limitless or infinite pleasure or happiness is *Brahman* (ब्रह्म). Then he says ‘.....ब्रह्मप्राप्तिश्च मोक्षः’. *Mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the attainment of *Brahman*. This attainment of Advaita Vedānta consists in getting merged in or identified with the *Brahman* and more accurately it means getting rid of the false belief. The false belief is we are different from *Brahman*. Thus according Advaita Vedānta the highest and the greatest pleasure or its attainment is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष).

But what about *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव)? Is it *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ)? If it is *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), then there will be two *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) according to VPTP. These two *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are *Brahman* or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) and freedom from pain. And it will be in addition to the other three *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). For, these three are either pleasure or absence of pain in nature. Only the difference is that they are not the highest pleasure or highest freedom from pain.

It has been already said in *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* that the highest *sukha* [*niratiśaya sukha* (निरतिशय सुख)] which is one of the two *prayojana-s* or needs of human life is the same as *Brahman*. Hence, this *sukha* (सुख) will be *nitya* (नित्य). For, *niratiśaya sukha* (निरतिशय सुख) will be the same as *Brahman*. So, we can say *Brahman* is *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ). Dharmarāj quotes Śruti ‘आनन्दो

ब्रह्मेति व्यजानाद्'. So, among the two *prayojana*-s only *niratiśaya sukha* (निरतिशय सुख) or eternal *sukha* (नित्य सुख) is the *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) (which once known man wants to have or posses it). We have said before that 'मोक्ष एव परम पुरुषार्थ'. So, now, we summarize that *Brahman*, whose nature is *Ānanda* (greatest pleasure) and who is *nitya* (नित्य) is the highest *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and it is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष).

But what about *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव)? *Duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) may be also of two types — *sātiśaya* (सातिशय) and *niratiśaya* (निरतिशय). As for example, a rich man does not have *duḥkha* (दुःख) what an ordinary man may have. So, in this sense he has *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव). But this *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) is limited. It may happen that his richness may vanish. Further he may have other *duḥkha* (दुःख) also. He may not have children. This is called *sātiśaya duḥkha* (सातिशय दुःख). But when a man gets *mokṣa* (मोक्ष), he will not return to this *samsāra* (संसार) or the world. This is called *niratiśaya duḥkhābhāva* (निरतिशय दुःखाभाव). This *niratiśaya duḥkhābhāva* (निरतिशय दुःखाभाव) is not limited and hence it is *nitya* (नित्य). So, like *niratiśaya sukha* (निरतिशय सुख), *niratiśaya duḥkhābhāva* (निरतिशय दुःखाभाव) is also *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ).

Thus highest *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ) are two. Dharmarāj says "आनन्दात्मक-ब्रह्मप्राप्तिश्च मोक्षः शोकनिवृत्तिश्च".³⁵ Meaning thereby *parama puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ) are two — pleasure and absence of pain. On the other hand, according to NVPTP there is only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and that is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). We have said that men have innumerable needs and FVP generalised them by making a list of four needs or *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ). But from the philosophical standpoint this generalisation is not sufficient. So, philosophers made further one step generalisation and said that *puruṣārtha*-s

(पुरुषार्थ) are two — *sukha* (सुख) and *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव). But to make a strictly philosophical theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) philosophers made one step generalisation further. According to the criterion of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), if x is such a thing that whoever knows, he wants it, then x is a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Both VPTP and NVTP used this criterion. According to this criterion, only pleasure and absence of pain are *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). Adhering to the notion of the principle of *lāghava* (principle of logical economy or persimony) philosophers (both Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika School and Vedānta school) try to generalise two *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) into one. To do this Vedānta philosophers introduce the criterion of permanence (नित्यत्व). So, among the four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) only one can be admitted in philosophy as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). At the primary stage both VPTP and NVPTP admits two *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). But after that VPTP introduces the notion of *carama puruṣārtha* or ultimate *puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ). This criterion says that if one attains this *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), he never losses it. Why he never losses it? Is it because he dies the next moment? No, the answer is because this ultimate *puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) is *nitya* (नित्य). Now, there is another important problem. Which one is eternal among these two *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ)? Pleasure or absence of pain?

The criterion is based on the linguistic sense of the term and the definition of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). This shows that *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are two. If we add the condition of permanence to it then the criterion of ultimate *puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) will be this — the criterion two is that only the permanent good as end is *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). It also fulfils the first criterion. So, ultimate *puruṣārtha* (परम

पुरुषार्थी) must be *nitya* or eternal. We have seen that according to VPTP *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) alone is ultimate *puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ). Now we have to see which one is *nitya* (नित्य) and hence ultimate *puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ). Nyāya position is very clear in this regard. According to them, one of the most generalised *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). So, VPTP admits two *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) and NVPTP admits only one. It is true that at first, like VPTP, NVPTP also holds the view that according to the criterion one there are two *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). Viswanāth in his *Bhāṣāpariccheda* also hold this view.³⁶ All philosophers of Nyāya and vaiśeṣika schools are agreed with this view. So, NVPTP have to offer another criterion to say that there is only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Is there any such criterion? If it is, what is it?

Very interestingly there can be two ways to establish that there is only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and one of them is adopted by NVPTP and the other is by VPTP. What are the ways? One way is to show that pleasure and absence of pain are identical. This highest pleasure is eternal and hence is the ultimate *puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ). Now, if absence of pain is identical with this highest pleasure, then there will be only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and not two. The other way to show that though theoretically there can be permanent and impermanent pleasure but practically there cannot be any permanent pleasure in the nyaya sense. In other words pleasure cannot be permanent. So, only absence of pain is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). But this absence of pain must be eternal. VPTP adopted the first way and NVPTP adopted the 2nd and the last way. In both these two ways we can have a strictly generalised philosophical theory of *puruṣārtha*

(पुरुषार्थ). And in both these ways philosophers prove that *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is neither four, nor two, but one.

Dharmarāj first said that there are two *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) — pleasure and absence of pain. After that he showed that *niratiśaya duḥkhābhāva* (निरतिशय दुःखाभाव) or *niratiśaya anarthanivṛtti* (निरतिशय अनर्थनिवृत्ति) is not different from *Brahman* itself. He also showed that *niratiśaya sukha* (निरतिशय सुख) is also not different from *Brahman*. Now, if this is the case that two things are identical with a third thing then we can say that these two things are also one and the same. So, *niratiśaya sukha* (निरतिशय सुख) and *niratiśaya duḥkhābhāva* (निरतिशय दुःखाभाव) are not different. In other words, according to VPTP, from the philosophical standpoint *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is one whether we call it as *niratiśaya sukha* (निरतिशय सुख) or permanent absence of pain.

Thus Dharmarāj shows that though VPTP admits two *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) in a most general sense yet *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is a simple and unitary *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). The logic was that if two things are identical with the third thing then these first two things are identical with each other. *Niratiśaya sukha* (निरतिशय सुख) and *niratiśaya duḥkhābhāva* (निरतिशय दुःखाभाव) or absence of all suffering are identical with *Brahman*. Then they are also identical with each other and hence *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is numerically one.

Another important point we need to clarify. We said that philosophy (दर्शन) is interested to give a most generalised theory about truth. And it is also same for the theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). But sometimes the word like ‘most general’ does not become clear and it may create some confusion. In the strict philosophical sense

mokṣa (मोक्ष) alone is the *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ). But what does the expression (most general) mean? In philosophy itself we generalise the things like Chair, Table, Window, The sun, Tree etc. and include them in a class called substance (द्रव्य). Is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) the name of a class like *dravya* (द्रव्य) in which all the *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are included? No, *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is not a class of all which includes the other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). Actually the philosophical theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) asserts two points:

1. *Mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and
2. *Mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is *carama* or *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ).

The second statement means that there cannot be other *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) which is better than *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) or highest than *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). But we need to satisfy here the respect in which it cannot be excelled. *Mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is *nitya* (नित्य) or we can say that it can be proved to be *nitya* (नित्य). This reason shows that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is highest from any other *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). For all will agree that all other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are impermanent [This may be incorrect in that *Mīmāṃsā* sense who holds that *svarga* (स्वर्ग) is permanent pleasure. But the general view is that a man who did good deeds enjoys the pleasure of *svarga* (स्वर्ग) for a limited period of time. After this he returns to this worldly existence or bondage]. But what is the reason for which Vedāntins admit that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is permanent? Those who belong to the Vedānta tradition is likely to cite the last *sūtra* (सुत्र) of the text known as *Brahmasūtra*. The *sūtra* (सुत्र) tells us that there is no coming back (to the world or state of bondage).³⁷ The *sūtra* (सुत्र) also tells us that there is *Śruti* in support of this view. So, evidence for the belief in the permanence of *mokṣa*

(मोक्ष) is the authority or the authoritative utterances of *Upaniṣada*. Śamkarācārya in his commentary on the last *Brahmasūtra* quoted some portions from *Chāndyogya Upaniṣada*. These portions and the last *Brahmasūtra* tells us that who has worshipped qualified *Brahman* also get rid, in due course, from this world and will not return to this world. Thus one can reach the state (of *niratiśaya sukh*) which is called *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). In an earlier *sūtra* 4/1/14 also it has been said worshipper gets *mukti* (मुक्ति). This *mukti* (मुक्ति) is a state from where one does not return to the state of bondage. It is true that these discussions show that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the result of the worship of *Brahman* (of the realization of *Brahman*) and does not prove that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is permanent. But it is also true that once somebody gets *mokṣa* (मोक्ष), it will not be destroyed. But one may not be satisfied with this answer. Still one may think that what *Chāndyogya Śruti* says is not convincing which Dharmarāj quoted to prove that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is permanent. But he just says “न च पुनरावर्तते” इत्यादि श्रुत्य | तस्य नित्यत्वावगमात्”.³⁸

It seems that Dharmarāj was aware about this type of objection. For this reason he says in the last chapter of his book that if *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is caused then we could hardly take the word ‘*anāvṛtti*’ (अनावृत्ति) to mean its permanence.³⁹ He, therefore, says that *mukti* (मुक्ति) is *niratiśaya suka* (निरतिशय सुख) which is nothing but *Brahman* itself. After that he has quoted from *Śruti* to prove this. The implication is this if he is successfull to mean *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) as *Brahman* then *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) will be proved automatically as *nitya* (नित्य) or permanent. Another point is this since *Brahman* is one, *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is also one and it is the *carama puruṣārtha* (चरम पुरुषार्थ).

Here an obvious question arises. What about *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) or absense of *duḥkha* (दुःख) or pain? *Duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) also fulfils the criterion required for a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). For, if one knows that the state x is a state of freedom from pain then he will desire it or seek to have it. So, it fulfils the first criterion. Now, does it also fulfil the second criterion i.e, the criterion of permanence? [Or we can say the criterion of *niratiśayatva* (निरतिशयत्व)]. Dhramarāja answers this question. According to him just as *niratiśaya sukha* (निरतिशय सुख) is identical with *Brahman*, complete freedom from pain is also identical with *Brahman*. Hence from this point it is also proved that complete freedom from pain is permanent or eternal. Dharmarāj proved that both *niratiśaya sukh* (निरतिशय सुख) and *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) are identical with *Brahman* by quoting from *Śruti text*. Commenting on Dharmarāj's writing pandit Pañcānan Śastri writes that Dharmarāj cites *Śruti text* in support of first the identity of *sukha* (सुख) and *Brahman* and next identity of *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) and *Brahman*.⁴⁰ These texts are "ब्रह्मविद् ब्रह्मैव भवति" and "तरति शोकमात्मविदि". The first one tells us that one who knows *Brahman* becomes identical with *Brahaman* (unqualified). But can we understand that this utterance means that *sukha* (सुख) is identical with *Brahman*? The answer is this: in *Śruti* it has been said that *Brahman* is *Sat*, *Cit* and *Ānanda* (आनन्द). This *Ānanda* (आनन्द) means *niratiśaya sukh* (निरतिशय सुख). One who gets *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) or liberation is identical with *Brahman* and *Brahman* is identical with *Ānanda* (आनन्द) or *niratiśaya sukh* (निरतिशय सुख). Another point is that this *Brahman* is *Sat* (सत्), meaning thereby *Brahman* is eternal or permanent. So, *niratiśaya sukha* (निरतिशय सुख) is also permanent. In the second utterance *Śruti* says that one who knows *Brahaman* (and hence becomes identical with *Brahman*

according to the previous sentence) gets rid of (तरति) pain or suffering (शोक). However, the second *Śrutivākya* (श्रुतिवाक्य) does not explicitly say that absence of pain is identical with *Brahman*, but Dharmarāj gives argument to prove this point. He said that in Vedānta philosophy it has been said that *Brahman* is identical with *Ānanda* (आनन्द). This *Ānanda* (आनन्द) is identical with freedom from pain which *Brahman* evidently has. Originally *Brahman* is the substratum [*adhiṣṭhāna* (अधिष्ठान) or locus] of *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव). Nyāya philosophy admits separate (स्वतन्त्र) existence of absence. But according to Vedānta philosophy, absence is not different from its locus where it resides. Absence is *adhikaraṇa-svarūpa* (अधिष्ठान-स्वरूप).⁴¹ Hence, *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) or absence of pain is identical with its locus, i.e. *Brahman*. So, *Brahman* and absence of pain are the one and the same.

Thus Dharmarāj has given his proof and the proof is complete. So, VPTP is concerned with *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). One may call it limitless pleasure [*niratiśaya sukha* (निरतिशय सुख)], other may call it absence of pain or *duḥkha nivṛitti* (दुःखनिवृत्ति). But these two are identical with *Brahman* and hence it is one. So, VPTP is concerned with only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ).

Two more questions are very important to understand the position of VPTP. The first one is how the Vedāntin proves that *Brahman* is eternal? On the basis of this one they prove that final *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is just one. To prove the identity of *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) and *Brahman* Vedānta philosophy gives extra argument in addition to the evidence given in *Śruti*. But to prove the identity between *sukha* (सुख) and *Brahman* they have not given any extra

argument. For, *sukha* (सुख) is a positive entity whereas *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) is a negative entity (*abhāva padārtha*).

To understand Vedāntin's position we have to understand the logic which Vedāntins use to protect (maintain) their non-dualism. According to (Advaita) Vedānta philosophy the only reality is unqualified *Brahman*. So, *Brahman* cannot have any properties or qualities. It is also said that *Brahman* is *Sat* (*nitya* or eternal), *Cit* (consciousness) and *Ānanda* (bliss or limitless pleasure). From this it seems that *Brahman* has these three qualities or properties. But if it is so, then the fundamental thesis of Advaita Vedānta will not be retained. This fundamental thesis is non-dualism. For, then at least three more things we have to admit apart from *Brahman*. To solve this problem and secure non-dualism, Advaita Vedānta philosophy takes the help of the theory of negation. According to this theory, absence (अभाव) has no separate (स्वतन्त्र) existence other than its locus. So, though *Sat* (सत्), *Cit* (चित्) and *Ānanda* (आनन्द) are the properties of *Brahman*, yet they have no separate existence other than their locus i.e. *Brahman*. But problem is still there. The theory of negation secures the identity of absence and its locus. But *Sat* (सत्), *Cit* (चित्) and *Ānanda* (आनन्द) are not any negative entity, rather they are positive entity. How can it secure the identity between *Sat* (सत्), *Cit* (चित्) and *Ānanda* (आनन्द) and *Brahman*? And if it is not possible, then the main thesis of Advaita Vedānta will not be preserved. To solve this problem Vedāntins interprets *Sat* (सत्), *Cit* (चित्) and *Ānanda* (आनन्द) to show that they are negative entity. *Sat* (सत्) means *nityatva* (नित्यत्व) and they interpret it as absence of *anityatva* (अनित्यत्व) or impermanence. Like this *Cit* (चित्) means *caitanya* (चैत्यन्य) or consciousness and is interpreted as absence of *jadatva*

(जडत्व) or mortality. Again *Ānanda* (आनन्द) means limitless pleasure and is interpreted as absence of pain or *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव). In this way we can show that *Sat* (सत्), *Cit* (चित्) and *Ānanda* (आनन्द) are identical with *Brahman*. Madhusūdana Svarasvatī in his *Advaitasiddhi* has shown this point convincingly.⁴²

The second and the last question about VPTP is how *Brahman* is proved to be *nitya* (नित्य) or eternal? If *Brahman* is proved to be eternal then only *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) will be eternal. For unlimited pleasure or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is identical with *Brahman*. The answer is the *ŚrutiVākyā* like "सत्यम् ज्ञानम् अनन्तम्"⁴³ etc. tells us that *Brahman* is eternal. For the word 'सत्' which is one of the *svarūpa lakṣaṇa*-s (स्वरूप लक्षण) of *Brahman* means *nitya* (eternal). Apart from such *ŚrutiVākyā* the *Brahmasūtra* (सुत्र) 1/1/2 says that *Brahman* is eternal. Even in *Upaniṣadas* also it is said the *Brahman* is *nitya* (नित्य). In the *sūtra* (सुत्र) it is said that *Brahman* is the cause of creation (of the Universe), it's substratum and destruction. Now, if *Brahman* is the cause of the creation of everything, it cannot be impermanent. For, if *Brahman* is impermanent or created then there must be another cause which is also *Brahman*. That means *Brahman* is self-caused. But to say something is self-caused is to say in another way that it is *nitya* (नित्य) or it is not caused.

Here we will discuss another argument by which Vedāntin proves the *nityatva* (नित्यत्व) of *Brahman*. This argument is similar to the argument which Descartes offered to prove the existence of the self. In this argument Vedāntins say that consciousness or *caitanya* (चैत्यन्य) or its existence cannot be doubted or denied. To say that consciousness is impermanent is to say that consciousness exists temporarily. Again, to accept that consciousness exists temporarily is

to accept the absence of consciousness. Now to say that there is absence of consciousness one must be conscious about that. So, one cannot prove the absence of consciousness. Hence, Consciousness is eternal.

We have seen that there are innumerable needs or *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) of human life. It is fact and no philosopher of any Indian philosophical system will deny that fact. So, when some modern scholars raise the question whether there are other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) or not, then they actually raise a useless question. No philosopher will deny that there are many more *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) than they admit. So, when one say that there can be other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) then they only utter the fact which everybody knows. Actually they are not aware about the meaning of the word ‘*puruṣārtha*’ (पुरुषार्थ). In this sense anything which man needs, desires or wants, is *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). [The word *puruṣa* (पुरुष) is also understood to mean any and every normal and adult human being]. They should note that the purpose of any theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is not to make a list of needs or *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ), rather to generalise and explain *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). There are mainly two ways to generalise for a philosopher of India. Either he can go a priori, or he can go by collecting emperical data. The second one is adopted by the Indian philosophers. They generalise *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in such a way that all individual *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) can be reduced in only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Since the theory is empirical, the reduction is not physical but definitional. First an effort has been made to generalise individual *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) so that other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) can be reduced to them. FVP has done this job. But it is not most generalised version.

Besides, it is not a fully systematic theory. FVP makes a list of four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). But they hardly explain by which criterion they accept four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). It may be possible that while admitting four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) they might have kept the division of the people of two groups in their mind. The first group of people is described as worldly persons. They mainly seek this-worldly pleasure. The second group of people is described as a sort of withdrawn persons. They want to spend their life in search of the good of the other world. This is the highest good.

A philosophical theory aims at the theoretical understanding and the explanation of the phenomenon it studies. Philosophical theory (we are talking about Indian philosophical theory) begins with facts or experiences. A philosophical theory knows that FVP makes a list of four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) — *dharma* (धर्म), *artha* (अर्थ), *kāma* (काम) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). It first seeks to connect the two. Why man wants *dharma* (धर्म)? Why man desires *artha* (अर्थ)? It tries to give explanation.

PTP begins with the problems of what man seeks and why man seeks. Man desires many things which he believes to be desirable. But man's believing a thing that it is desirable does not make it a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Suppose a man wants to commit suicide. He desires it. But can we say that committing suicide is a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ)? Let us take another example, a student wants to pass examination without studying the subject. Can we say that passing the examination without studying a subject is a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ)? Clearly, it is not. A man wants to grab other person's money and property by using an unfair means. But it is also not a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). So, there is nothing objectivity in death or in passing an

examination without studying the subject or capturing other's money and property. Then what does PTP say? PTP says that a thing will be *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) if it is desirable in itself or without depending on any conditions. *Artha* (अर्थ) is a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) not because a beggar seeks or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) though maximum men do not want it.

The above point begs the question: what makes a thing *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ)? It is clear that maximum men may not want a thing or even no man does not want a thing, but still it may be a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). So, there is no external condition which makes a thing *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Then what are the characteristics which make a thing *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ)? Suppose this characteristics or property is F according NVPTP. Now the obvious problem is if any internal or objective property makes a thing *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), then how a man can live without desiring it? NPTP has an answer to this problem. According to them the thing which has F and the thing which causes the desire of the thing are not the same. In other words suppose the thing T has the property F which makes T *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Now T has no role to make it desirable to men, it is something other than T. Then what makes it desirable? Actually the cause of any desire is a belief [*jñāna* (ज्ञान)]. Like belief, *jñāna* (ज्ञान) can be either true or false (ज्ञान जन्य भवेत् ईच्छा). Suppose there is a desirable thing, but I do not know this. Then I will not have any desire of that thing or object. So, the thing is not cause of my desire of that thing. It is the belief (certain) about that object which causes my desire of that object. So, it may be possible that a thing is actually desirable but still we do not desire it. On the other hand it is also possible that one may desire a thing but the thing is not actually

desirable. To put it otherwise, in case of desiring a thing as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) it (the thing) must have the objective property F and the desire must have the objective property G. We have said earlier that our desire is caused by our belief. So, G will be caused by the true belief of the object of desire or F. Now what is this F? Roughly speaking F is the property of being desirable. But then there will be circularity. Actually this property means the property of the thing which is truly known as conducive (अनुकूल वेदनीय) to our being. If we say something is *anukūla* (अनुकूल), then the question arises *anukūla* (अनुकूल) to what? Or to what it is conducive? A thing may be conducive to many things, many purposes. *Puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is conducive to our being. Water helps man to survive, but poison is not. So, we say water is conducive to the being. But poison is not. Similarly, fruits, vegetables are conducive to our being. So, when men feel happy in getting something, when he finds himself happy in relation to something which helps to live his life in better way then we can say that it is conducive to his being. It is not against his life. In a sense it promotes his life or helps to live a better life. There are innumerable things which are conducive to their being. But if we bring them in a same platform, we can say it is pleasure or *sukha* (सुख). And for this reason pleasure is *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). It is called स्वतः पुरुषार्थ. In the ultimate philosophical sense only svatah *puruṣārtha* (स्वतः पुरुषार्थ) is *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are सापेक्ष (relative or dependent) *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). For, they depend upon svatah *puruṣārtha* (स्वतः पुरुषार्थ) or they are *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) only because they are related to svatah *puruṣārtha* (स्वतः पुरुषार्थ).

Another important point is that this property or the property of being a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is a natural property and the state of mind when we feel that something is conducive to our being is natural state of mind (internal state). In the context of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy experience of pleasure, pain etc. are not any state of mind strictly speaking. So, in this context state of mind should be understood as internal state or the state of the self of the individual.

According to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers, *sukha* (सुख) which they admit as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is also a natural, empirically verifiable internal state. It is true for every normal human being or even every animal or sentient creature that they experience pleasure or they feel pleasure when they get something which is conducive to their being. This pleasure and the experience of this pleasure [we will discuss whether they are different or not] both are pleasing. A thing (for example, any particular food or fruit etc.) which we really want not because it is desirable but because it will help to live our life. It gives us pleasure. If we get such thing, we feel pleasure or *sukha* (सुख). We want this pleasure. We can test this with any *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and we will see that in all cases it produces pleasure. According to Vedānta philosophy, limitless *sukha* (निरतिशय सुख) or pleasure is *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Man naturally wants pleasure. *Dharma* (धर्म), *artha* (अर्थ) etc. give us pleasure in the sense that they are means of pleasure (सुखोपाय). If they were not means of pleasure we could not want them. *Dharma* (धर्म), *artha* (अर्थ), *kāma* (काम) — all are means of pleasure. This pleasure is agreeable (अनुकूल) with our nature.

We have said earlier that philosophy gives us a most general theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). FVP also gives us a general theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). But PTP gives most general theory of the subject. No theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) can be more general than VPTP. Because VPTP admits only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and that is pleasure. In *sukha* (सुख) two criteria are merged. *Puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) must be *anukūlavedaniya* (अनुकूलवेदनीय) or agreeable with the nature of man. For it makes no sense to say or it is contradictory to say that it is a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and it goes against man's nature or is found disagreeable. This is the objective property and pleasure or *sukha* (सुख) has this property. The other criterion of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) follows from the meaning of the term. Again, it makes no sense if a man says "I know that sharing food with a hungry man who is present is pleasing but I do not want to share my food with him."

By now it has become clear that in the strict philosophical sense *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is just one, not four. According to Vedānta, it is pleasure or *sukha* (सुख). It is known as *svataḥ puruṣārtha* (स्वतः पुरुषार्थ). If there is anything, other than pleasure, which is also *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), then it must be *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in a derivative or secondary sense. In this way we can say that *artha* (अर्थ) and *dharma* (धर्म) are *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in a secondary sense. But what about *kāma* (काम)? It is difficult to answer. But all four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) give us pleasure.

Another objection one may arise. We have said that all four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) give us pleasure. Now, the objection is: there is no logical and moral necessity that one must desire pleasure. Neither logically we can say that (as a matter of logical necessity)

one must desire pleasure nor morally we can say that (as a matter or moral or ethical necessity) one should desire pleasure. As an answer one may say that man is constituted in this way that he naturally desires pleasure. But then also one may say that there may be a differently constituted man. And his normal nature is to avoid pleasure. For this reason we already said that in their theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy offers a theory which is not a priori but empirical. In other words, the theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy is not based upon any a priori conditions, rather it is based upon empirical truths or facts. Empirically it is observed that any normal man seeks pleasure. No normal man, we observe, wants to avoid pleasure. It may be the case that a man does not want pleasure (in a case of a particular pleasure). But then also if we analyse the case we find that the man does not want pleasure either to get more valuable pleasure or to sacrifice his pleasure for his nearest dearest one (say for his son and daughter). Yogi or sannyāsī (सन्यासी) sacrifices his many pleasures to get God or a freedom fighter sacrifices his many pleasures for the sake of the independence of his motherland. In a sense they do not feel these as pleasure, which normal people feel as pleasure. Rather they felt pleasure to sacrifice for the sake of their motherland or for God. So, actually they also seek pleasure but in a special sense. So, we cannot say that some men reject or avoid pleasure. We can only say that they reject whatever they do not find attractive or desirable.

Now another question arises: Whether according to NVPTP *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) or absence of pain is a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in the principal sense or not? If it is regarded as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ),

then the number of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) will be two. We cannot deny *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव). For, it satisfies both criteria. If one knows that *x* is *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव), he must desire it. On the other hand, *sukha* (सुख) is also a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in the primary sense. So, both *sukha* (सुख) and *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) are *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). In other words, the objective property of being experienced as agreeable (अनुकूलवेदनिय) qualifies *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) as much as it qualifies *sukha* (सुख). A philosophical theory should be as general as possible and as economical [*laghu* (लघु), having *lāghava* (लाघव) or approved by law of parsimony] as possible. If we see that a philosophical theory admits two *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) and it is most general then it will be acceptable. Here the number of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) seems to be a non-issue. What we have to notice is that the theory should not be too wide or too weak to make it most comprehensive. And it should not admit any *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) which is reducible to another *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). In other words, it should be too strict such that no *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is admitted as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) which is not irreducible. It seems that a Naiyāika will not have any problem to accept both *Sukha* (सुख) and *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव). But this is not the case. How do they decide which of the two — *sukha* (सुख) and *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) — is better and why? A Naiyāika has answer to both these questions. So, according to NVPTP, philosophically speaking there is only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Now we will discuss this.

We have discussed that FVP and PTP are not antithetical to each other, rather continuous. FVP admits four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) but it includes neither *sukha* (सुख) nor *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव). We have also discussed the definition of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) which

shows that *dharma* (धर्म), *artha* (अर्थ), *kāma* (काम) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) are *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). Both VPTP and NVPTP mention the definition of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) according to which only *sukha* (सुख) and *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) are *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). So, if one wants to show *dharma* (धर्म), *artha* (अर्थ), *kāma* (काम) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) to be *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) according to the defination, he has to show that each of them are the form of either *sukha* (सुख) or *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव). Now it is a new problem which has cropped up. How can we show that these four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are the form of either *sukha* (सुख) or *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव)? We have already shown that *dharma* (धर्म), *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम) are form of *sukha* (सुख), for they are *anukūlavedaniya* (अनुकूलवेदनीय). For a Vedāntin, *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is also a form of *sukha* (सुख). For according to VPTP, *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is *niratiśaya sukha* (निरतिशय सुख). So, for a Vedāntin, all the four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are the form of *sukha* (सुख). But the criterion of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), like *sukha* (सुख), *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) also satisfies. If we say that this *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) is distinct from *sukha* (सुख), then VPTP have to admit two *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). We have already discussed how Vedāntins show that ultimate *sukha* (सुख) and *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) are identical. But they need to show why in the ultimate sense there is only one *sukha* (सुख) which is identical with the ultimate *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) and not three or four. Vedāntins show *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is not only a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in the sense of *sukha* (सुख). In that sense *dharma* (धर्म), *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम) are also *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). But Vedāntin brought one criterion which shows *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the ultimate and better than any one of the other three. This criterion is the criterion of permanence. For the Vedāntins only *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is permanent pleasure or *sukha* (सुख).

The other three *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) admitted in FVP are comparatively and relatively inferior. They all are impermanent.

But, for Nyāya, all *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are non- eternal. For each one of them are caused or produced. According to Nyāya philosophy, all the four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are object of desire and equally impermanent. They do not admit *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) as permanent as Vedāntin-s say. But since each one of the first three is a form of *sukha* (सुख), they need not be counted separately in a philosophical theory. They can be generalized and reduced to just one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and that is *sukha* (सुख). So, now we have two *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) — *sukha* (सुख) and *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव).

Now, the important question arises: Is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) a form of *sukha* (सुख) or a form of *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव)? The Nyāya answer is: *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is a form of *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव). In NPTP there is no hierarchy between *sukha* (सुख) and *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव). Man desires both and both are important. Here one may think that, if he is inspired by VPTP, the Nyāya exposition is most unreasonable. There are some reasons. It seems that Nyāya violates law of parsimony by admitting two *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) as ultimate. A philosophical theory can be rejected if it is not most economical. Is NPTP inferior to VPTP? Let us examine two options. The first option is that Naiyāika can say that *sukha* (सुख) is identical with *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव). For they already admit that both are impermanent and men want both. The second option is that Naiyāika can admit at least one of them as eternal. If they accept first option, then there will be ultimately one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and no problem will be there. They can accept second option also. If *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is *sukha* (सुख), then it [*sukha* (सुख)] will be eternal and if *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is

duḥkhābhāva (दुःखाभाव) then *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) will be eternal. If Naiyāikas admit either one of the two options, the problem will not be there.

Let us now state and examine the Nyāya responses to the above suggestions or criticism of the Vedāntin. Vedāntin says that Nyāya theory could be better theory if they identified *sukha* (सुख) and *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) and admitted only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). The first reply of Nyāya is that Nyāya realizes that to identify the two [*sukha* (सुख) and *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव)] would be illogical as they are different. Nyāya admits that it is easier for a Vedāntin to show that *sukha* (सुख) and *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) are different and yet they wrongly identified the two. And to do this they violated the basic law of logic. Nyāya does not only say that *sukha* (सुख) and *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) are different but they further say that this is so according to Vedānta philosophy also. A Vedāntin can show that *sukha* (सुख) and *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) are different in the case of *susupti* (सुषुप्ति) or deep dreamless sleep. According to Vedāntin, in the state of *susupti* (सुषुप्ति) there is obviously *sukha* (सुख). For *sukha* (सुख) is experienced in *susupti* (सुषुप्ति). But *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) is not experienced there. Thus for a Vedāntin *sukha* (सुख) and *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) are different.

According to a Naiyāika, in *susupti* (सुषुप्ति) one does not experience either pleasure or pain (or any other internal state). But still they are different. The cause of pleasure does not produce pain and vice versa. Moreover, pleasure is experienced as agreeable (अनुकूल वेदनीय) and pain as disagreeable (प्रतिकूल वेदनीय). If two things are different, then their absence (अभाव) is also different. Moreover, a positive entity (भाव) is different from an *abhāva* (अभाव). *Bhāva* (भाव)

is experienced as ‘*asti*’ (अस्तिबुद्धि-विषय) and an *abhāva* (अभाव) is experienced as ‘*nāsti*’ (नास्ति) or ‘*na*’ (नास्तिबुद्धि-विषय or भेदबुद्धि-विषय and so on). *Sukha* (सुख) is *bhāva padārtha* (भाव पदार्थ) and included in *guṇa* (गुण). *Duhkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) is *abhāva padārtha* (अभाव पदार्थ). How can they be identical? Nyāya maintained their logical consistency by not identifying the two. At the most this will cost the Naiyāikas to have a PTP which is only optimally simple and not absolutely simple and economical. It is better to build up a theory which is logically consistent and optimally economical than a theory which is absolutely simple and logically inconsistent.

We have so far seen that *sukha* (सुख) and *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) cannot straightway be identified. A Vedāntin identified the two by showing their identity to a third thing — *Brahman*. But how *sukha* (सुख) can be identified with *Brahman*? We saw that Vedāntin could do so only by first reducing *sukha* (सुख) to *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव), i.e., by identifying what cannot be identified. Thus neither directly nor indirectly *sukha* (सुख) and *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) can be identified [Besides Nyāya does not admit *Brahman* or the Vedānta view of *abhāva* according to which *abhāva* is identical with its locus.]

Here a Vedāntin may say that still there is a way if Naiyāika-s admit second option and say *sukha* (सुख) and *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) are permanent. It is true that in Nyāya philosophy both positive entity (भाव पदार्थ) and negative entity (अभाव पदार्थ) can be permanent (नित्य). Self (आत्मा) is a positive entity which is also permanent and absolute absence (अत्यन्ताभाव) is a negative entity which is also permanent. So far there can be *nitya sukha* (नित्य सुख) and *nitya duḥkhābhāva* (नित्य दुःखाभाव). But for a Naiyāika the problem will be the same whether they both admit *sukha* (सुख) and

duḥkhābhāva (दुःखाभाव) are *nitya* (नित्य) or as *anitya* (अनित्य). All the classical schools of Indian Philosophy [and followers of these schools even today] admit *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) as the highest *puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ). Even the Cārvāka-s admit *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) though in their view it is nothing other than death. We have already seen that the first three *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) admitted in FVP are positive in character. They can be easily brought under *sukha* (सुख). But what is the nature of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष)? Is it a positive entity or *sukh* (सुख) or negative entity or *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव)? Another problem is what makes it highest or *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ)? Vedānta has an answer. According to them, *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is permanent. But Nyāya has a problem. For, they do not admit any permanent pleasure. Secondly, they do not admit that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is a permanent absence (नित्य अभाव). Even if *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is absence of pain, it is not eternal absence of pain. For a Naiyāika if any argument contradicts the Scripture (*Āgama* or *Śruti*), then it will not be a valid argument. It is well known to all that *Śruti* says *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is *nitya* (नित्य). The last sūtra (सुत्र) of Vedānta *darśana* (दर्शन) also says this. The author of the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* also refers to this *Śruti* at the beginning of his text. Hence, Nyāya cannot say that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is not *nitya*.

Here a Naiyāika can say that even if *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is admitted as *nitya* (नित्य), the problem will still be there. The problem is regarding the number of ultimate *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). If a philosophical theory violates law of parsimony, then it will be regarded as less acceptable theory. If we admit *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) to be *nitya puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) even then we cannot reduce the number of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) to one. For if *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is of the nature of

pleasure and *nitya* (नित्य), then it will be the highest among all *sukha* (सुख) [admitting for the sake of argument that there is only one *nitya sukha* (नित्य सुख)], but not among all *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). So, on the side of *sukha* (सुख) there will be *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). But since *sukha* (सुख) cannot be reduced to *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव)[and vice versa] the scheme of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) of PTP would include at least two *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) — *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) and *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव). Similarly, if *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the highest kind of absence of pain because it is *nitya* (नित्य), then also a PTP should include *sukha* (सुख) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). *Mokṣa* (मोक्ष) would be highest among all forms of *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) only [and not also among all kinds of *sukha-s* (सुख)]. This general argument applies equally to all. So, just as *nitya* (नित्य) VPTP should also admit at least two *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) and not one. And both Nyāya and Vedānta are to be free from the problem that if there are two equally irreducible *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) then why they say that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the highest *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ)?

The final Nyāya position in brief is this. To solve the problem stated above Nyāya need not admit that there cannot be *nitya sukha* (नित्य सुख) [permanent pleasure] or *nitya duḥkhābhāva* (नित्य दुःखाभाव) [eternal absence of pain]. It is enough to admit that neither permanent pleasure nor permanent absence of pain can be *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). The argument is that anything that is *nitya* (नित्य) violates a central part of the meaning of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or a necessary criterion of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). This argument does not violate the Śruti text "न च पुनरावर्तते". This Śruti text does not mean *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is *nitya* (नित्य) nor does it violate the meaning or criterion of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). This Śruti means that once one attains liberation, one does

not return back to this world or *samsāra* (संसार). A man of the world is not already in a state of liberation [for the present we are talking about *videha mukti* (विदेह मुक्ति) or *lokottara avasthā* (लोकत्तर अवस्था)]. So, he needs liberation. It is his *prayojana* (प्रयोजन). This *prayajana* (प्रयोजन) leads him to take a way so that he can attain liberation. When he succeeds or when he finally attains his liberation through his effort, he never loses it again. So, after attaining liberation he never returns back to *samsāra* (संसार). Thus a part of the meaning of *prayajana* (पुरुष प्रयोजन) or *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थी) is that it leads men to adopt appropriate means (*puruṣārtha sādhana*) for attaining *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). Men lose the world in death and returns back to it again when he takes rebirth. But the man who attained liberation does not come back again. This is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष).

Mokṣa (मोक्ष) may be *sukha* (सुख) or may be *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव). But the most important point for a Naiyāika is that it is not eternal. It is not already there; it is caused or attained through proper means but it will never be destroyed again. We never lose it nor do we need to regain it. But for this Nyāya has no need to admit *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) as eternal. For, they admit one kind of negative fact — which is both caused and indestructionable. It is known as *dhamśābhāva* (ध्वंसाभाव) which has a cause but has never any end. If certain cause destroys a table, it never returns. That means the destruction of a table never ends. Another table can be produced. Thus *dhamśābhāva* (ध्वंसाभाव) is that kind of thing which is caused but never destroyed again. For this reason it is called *sādi* (has beginning) and *ananta* (never destroyed). According to Nyāya, *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is such kind of entity. Thus Nyāya builds a perfect PTP where *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) has been admitted as *dhamśābhāva* (ध्वंसाभाव). It

is the final destruction of all sufferings or pain. *Mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is *ātyanTika duḥkhābhāva* (आत्यन्तिक दुःखाभाव).

If there is any *sukha* (सुख) which is comparable with *ātyanTika duḥkhābhāva* (आत्यन्तिक दुःखाभाव) or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) then Nyāya PTP would have two *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ). But Vātsāyana elaborately argued why there may not be such kind of *sukha* (सुख). If there is a *sukha* (सुख) which is uncaused and cannot be brought into existence by human effort then it cannot be *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or *puruṣa prayajona* (पुरुष प्रयोजन). If *sukha* (सुख) is to be a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) the only possibility is that it should be caused but should not be destroyed later. But it is not possible. For, there is a rule and that is if an entity is caused (जन्य) and if it is also a *bhāva padārtha* (पदार्थ) (Positive entity) then it must be destroyed later. So, *sukha* (सुख) cannot be a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). And so, there is only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) — final destruction (आत्यन्तिक नित्रति) of all sufferings. All created or caused pleasure are destroyed later. But being an *abhāva* (धंषाभाव) *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is never destroyed. Hence it is superior to *sukha* (सुख). We need to achieve it only once. Thus NPTP establishes that the number of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) (in the ultimate philosophical sense) is just one. And further it is of the nature of *abhāva* (अभाव). It is *dhamṣābhāva* (धवंसाभाव); it is *duḥkha dhamṣa* (दुःख धवंस), destruction of all sufferings.

A Vedāntin will not be unhappy if Naiyāika-s say that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is of the nature of *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव). For they also do that. We have shown above that according to VPTP though *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is said to be *Ānanda* (आनन्द) yet this *Ānanda* (आनन्द) is interpreted as *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव). Otherwise in their system there is no way to preserve the truth of the *Śruti* — 'न च पुनरावर्तते' —

as they understand it [*mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is *nitya* (नित्य)]. And if they do not take *Ānanda* (आनन्द) to be *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव), they can neither show *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) or *Ānanda* (आनन्द) to be *nitya* (नित्य) nor they can show it as identical with *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव). Hence, considering all the arguments Nyāya PTP seems to be a better theory.

Notes and References

- ¹ Another word also occurs there and that is ‘यतः सिद्धि’ which means ‘from which it is obtained’.
- ² But the *Nyāyasūtra* 1/1/2 tells us clearly that *dharma* (धर्म) is a means of (getting) both *abhudaya* (अभ्युदय) and *nīḥśreyas* (निःश्रेयस).
- ³ ‘पुरुषार्थसाधारणः कारणम् धर्मः’ — *Upaskār tīkā* on *Kaṇāda sūtra* — 1/1/2.
- ⁴ ‘परमपुरुषार्थयो सुखो दुःखाभावयो’ — Ibid.
- ⁵ ‘स्वर्गापिवर्गयो एव परम पुरुषार्थत्वात्’ — Ibid.
- ⁶ ‘धर्मविशेषप्रसुताद् द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवायानां पदार्थानां साधर्म्य-वैधर्म्याभ्यां तत्त्वज्ञनान्निःश्रेयसम्’ – *Kaṇāda sūtra* (1/1/4), *śadadarśanasūtrasamgraha*, edited by Shastri, Dwarikadas, Sudhi Prakashana, Varanasi, 1988.
- ⁷ प्रमाणप्रमेयसंशयप्रयोजनदृष्टान्तसिद्धान्तावयवतर्कनिर्णयवादजल्पवितण्डाहेत्वाभासच्छल जातिनिग्रहस्था नानां तत्त्वज्ञनान्निःश्रेयसाधिगमः – *Gautam sūtra* 1/1/1, *śadadarśanasūtrasamgraha*, edited by Shastri, Dwarikadas, Sudhi Prakashana, Varanasi, 1988.
- ⁸ Śaṅkarācārya, *Adhyāsa bhāṣya* on *Brahma sutra*, Udbodhan Karyalaya, Kolkata, 1980, p. 62.
- ⁹ *Sāṃkhya sūtra* 1/1/1, *śadadarśanasūtrasamgraha*, edited by Shastri, Dwarikadas, Sudhi Prakashana, Varanasi, 1988.

¹⁰ *Sāṃkhya sūtra* 6/70, *śaḍadarśanasūtrasamgraha*, edited by Shastri, Dwarikadas, Sudhi Prakashana, Varanasi, 1988.

¹¹ *Yoga sūtra* 4/34, *śaḍadarśanasūtrasamgraha*, edited by Shastri, Dwarikadas, Sudhi Prakashana, Varanasi, 1988.

¹² परमप्रोयोजनम् तु अनुमानस्य अपवर्गः — Gangeśapādhyāy, *Muktivāda prakaraṇa* of *Tattvacintāmaṇi*.

¹³ This suggests that it is known that there are other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) or people believe that there are other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ), but those are not *parama puruṣārtha-s* (परम पुरुषार्थ) and hence they are not the concern of philosophy (दर्शन).

¹⁴ G.E.Moore has said all this in his *Some Main Problems of Philosophy*, Collier Books, New York, 1962.

¹⁵ Adhvarīndra, Dharmarāja, *Vedānta Paribhāṣā* (with Bengali translation by Pt. Śāstrī, Pañcānan), Pañcānan Śāstrī edition, Kolkata, 1892 (Shakabda). p. 4.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 5.

¹⁷ *Sukti*, in Kavirāj, Gopīnāth, and Śāstri, Dhundhirāj (eds.), *Praśastapādabhāṣyam* (with 3 *tīkās*), Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Benaras, 1924, p. 21.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 7.

¹⁹ Udayanācārya, *Nyāyakusumāñjalih*, 1/9 with Sanskrit commentary of Sri Bhattacharya, Haridas and edited by Shiromani, Visheshvar Siddhanta, Chowkhamba Vidyabhawan, Varanasi, 1988, p. 44.

²⁰ Sometimes efforts and exertions are welcome if it leads to greater pleasure. In that case such actions or efforts can be good as means but not good as end. It is not end-in-itself even if it is end as means.

²¹ Their may be many ways for earning wealth. But such wealth is not *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) if it is not earned through *dharma* (धर्म).

²² *Svarga* (स्वर्ग) [naraka, devatā etc.] is both *aloukika* (अलोकिक) and *pāralaukika* (पारलौकिक). *Mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is supposed to be *alaokika* (अलौकिक) but need not be essentially *pāralaukika* (पारलौकिक) if we admit *jivanmukti* (जीवन्मुक्ति). Besides, *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is a state beyond all *loka-s* (लोक). It is a *lokattara* (लोकत्तर) state.

²³ Vātsyāyana, *bhāṣya* on *Nyāya sutra* of Gautam, 1/1/22, Paschimbanga Rajya Pustak Parsad, Kolkata, 2011.

²⁴ Bhattacharya, Swati, 'yoga and Nyāya: Allies or Adversaries', Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research, vol- XXIX, Number-1, New Delhi, 2012.

²⁵ Bhāsarvajña, *Nyāyasāra* with *Bhuṣana*.

²⁶ '...सुखदुःखाभावे मुख्ये प्रयोजनें' — Prayojon parichhed of *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, (in Sanskrit) Pañcānan Śāstri edition, Kolkata, 1884 (shakabda), p. 296.

²⁷ Adhvārīndra, Dharmarāj, *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, (Bengali translation by Pt. Śāstri , Pañcānan), Pañcānan Śāstri edition, Kolkata, 1892 (Shakabda), p. 321.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 320.

²⁹ Viswanāth, Nyāyapañcānan, *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* under *Bhāṣāpariccheda* (verse 146), (Sanskrit translation by Pt. Śāstri , Pañcānan), Pañcānan Śāstri edition, Kolkata, 1884 (Shakabda).

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Adhvārīndra, Dharmarāj, *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* (Bengali translation by Pt. Śāstri, Pañcānan), Pañcānan Śāstri edition, Kolkata, 1892 (Shakabda), pp. 319-320.

³² Viswanāth, Nyāyapañcānan, *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* under *Bhāṣāpariccheda* (verse 146), (sanskrit translation by Pt. Śāstri , Pañcānan), Pañcānan Śāstri edition, Kolkata, 1884.

³³ Śamkarācārya, *Adhyāśabhbhāṣya* on *Brahmasūtra*, Udvodhan karyalaya, Kolkata, 2009, p. 62.

- ³⁴ ‘...मोक्ष एव परम पुरुषार्थ’ — Adhvarīndra, Dharmarāj, *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* (Bengali translation by Pt. Śāstri, Pañcānan), Pañcānan Śāstri edition, Kolkata, 1892 (Shakabda), pp. 4-5.
- ³⁵ ibid., p. 321.
- ³⁶ ‘निर्दुःखत्वे सुखे चेच्छा तज्जानादेव जायते’ — Viswanāth, Nyāyapañcānan, *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* under *Bhāṣāpariccheda* (verse 146), (Sanskrit translation by Pt. Śāstri, Pañcānan), Pañcānan Śāstri edition, Kolkata, 1884 (Bengali era).
- ³⁷ ‘अनावृत्ति शब्दात् अनावृत्ति शब्दात्’.
- ³⁸ Adhvarīndra, Dharmarāj, *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* (Bengali translation by Pt. Śāstri, Pañcānan), Pañcānan Śāstri edition, Kolkata, 1892 (Shakabda), p. 5.
- ³⁹ ‘तस्य कृतकृत्वेनानित्यत्वे मुक्तस्य पुनरावृत्यापत्तेः’ — Ibid., p. 321.
- ⁴⁰ Śāstri , Pañcānan, *Paribhāṣā-Sangraha* on *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, (in sanskrit), Pañcānan Śāstri edition, Kolkata, 1884 (Shakabda), p. 293.
- ⁴¹ ‘अधिकरनातिरिक्त अभाव अनभ्युपगमात्’ — Ibid., p. 299.
- ⁴² Ibid., p. 6.
- ⁴³ Quoted in his *Paribhāṣā-Samgraha* on *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* (Sanskrit), by Pt. Śāstri, Pañcānan, Pañcānan Śāstri edition, Kolkata, 1884 (Shakabda), p. 3.
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