

CHAPTER- III

Individual *Puruṣārtha*-s

At first glance it might appear that what we will discuss in this chapter was already discussed in previous chapters. But earlier we discussed *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ) in general; that is to say, even when we discussed *artha* (अर्थ) or *kāma* (काम) we discussed them as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Here we will discuss the same *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ) individually, that is, as *kāma* *puruṣārtha* (काम पुरुषार्थ), as *artha* *puruṣārtha* (अर्थ पुरुषार्थ) and so on and not as *kāma puruṣārtha* (काम पुरुषार्थ), as *artha puruṣārtha* (अर्थ पुरुषार्थ) and so on. To put it otherwise, in the previous chapter we have given the emphasis on *kāma* (काम) as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or *dharma* (धर्म) as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). But in this chapter we will give emphasis on different *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ) individually, i.e, *kāma* (काम) as *kāma* (काम) or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) as *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). We will discuss here in great detail only the *kāma* *puruṣārtha* (काम पुरुषार्थ) and *mokṣa* *puruṣārtha* (मोक्ष पुरुषार्थ) and some important points about *dharma* *puruṣārtha* (धर्म पुरुषार्थ). We also do not find that we can add much to our earlier discussion of *artha* *puruṣārtha* (अर्थ पुरुषार्थ). One reason is that we could not get enough material in the standard literature on *artha* *puruṣārtha* (अर्थ पुरुषार्थ). We will discuss *bhakti puruṣārtha* (भक्ति पुरुषार्थ) in a separate chapter. Though we will discuss *mokṣa puruṣārtha* (मोक्ष पुरुषार्थ) in detail in the chapter on PTP, yet we have to omit there some necessary details. Only what we intend to skip there about *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) will be discussed here. To be more precise, we would like to discuss briefly some *āgamika* theory of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) or *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ). Earlier our

discussion of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) was confined to the *naigamika* view of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष).

One very pertinent question needs to be answered first. The two individual *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) of *dharma* (धर्म) and *artha* (अर्थ) are good or end *as means*; they are *puruṣārtha sādhan* (पुरुषार्थ साधन). So they are discussed or should be discussed in the chapter on *puruṣārtha sādhan* (पुरुषार्थ साधन) (i.e. chapter sixth). Why do we devote a separate chapter for them — a chapter dealing with individual *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ)? Our answer to this question is that in the chapter on *puruṣārtha sādhan* (पुरुषार्थ साधन) we actually discuss the *sādhana* or means of only *mokṣa puruṣārtha* (मोक्ष पुरुषार्थ). It is difficult to think that *artha* (अर्थ) or *kāma* (काम) is a means of *mokṣa puruṣārtha* (मोक्ष पुरुषार्थ). So we need to discuss separately at least the *kāma puruṣārtha* (काम पुरुषार्थ). So far as the *mokṣa puruṣārtha* (मोक्ष पुरुषार्थ) is concerned, we will discuss it in the chapter on philosophical theory of *puruṣārtha* or PTP. There we will discuss two versions of PTP. There are other versions of PTP also. We will take note of some of them briefly. Besides, there are some general controversies about the number of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) to be included in a scheme of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). We need to discuss this also. In this chapter our focus will be on *kāma puruṣārtha* (काम पुरुषार्थ) and certain views of *mokṣa puruṣārtha* (मोक्ष पुरुषार्थ) and some little about *dharma puruṣārtha* (धर्म पुरुषार्थ) that we did not discuss earlier.

In this chapter we are to discuss the *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) separately and not together. For this we need to settle first how many *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are there. The total number of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is a debatable issue. This point we did not

discuss before. We discussed the standard view according to which there are four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). Pandit Pancānan Śāstri has written in his *Paribhāṣā-saṃgraha* that the *Purāṇas* are the source of this FVP.¹ And by FVP we meant the familiar doctrine of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) according to which there are four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ)². Some may ask whether the number could be more or less. Scholars like Daya Krishna actually held that there could be or are greater number of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ).³ But there is no comprehensive and critical discussion of the question. Here we also do not have scope to do that. We will discuss the issue only briefly. Previously we said that PTP is the most general theory about *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). In it the conception of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) has been fully generalized. Accordingly, in philosophical theory the number of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is naturally only one. Many recent scholars did not notice that philosophers practically ignored all except one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and that is the *mokṣa puruṣārtha* (मोक्ष पुरुषार्थ). And they have good reason for this. Generally the modern scholars debated over the issue whether the *trivarga* (त्रिवर्ग) view of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is correct or the *caturvarga* (चतुर्वर्ग) view of it is correct. According to the first, the number of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) is three. According to the second, *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are four in number. Actually this is a debate about whether or not to include *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) in the list of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). The supporters of the *caturvarga* (चतुर्वर्ग) view are in favour of including *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) in the list of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) and the followers of *trivarga* (त्रिवर्ग) want to exclude it from there. In their actual discussion they hardly ever give good and explicit arguments for their views. Sometimes it appears that they want to make some hoistorical point; they want to say that in fact

there was a time when men used to admit only three *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). Only later the *trivarga* (त्रिवर्ग) view was changed to the *caturvarga* (चतुर्वर्ग) view. Sometimes it appears that their concern is social; they think that if people admit *mokṣa puruṣārtha* (मोक्ष पुरुषार्थ), then men will run after this other-worldly and selfish goal and will ignore social development and general welfare. One may think that this difference regarding the *number* of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is one of the points of debate between FVP and PTP. For, PTP admits only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) but FVP admits four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). However, neither PTP nor FVP admits a *trivarga* (त्रिवर्ग) scheme of values. So the debate between *trivarga* (त्रिवर्ग) scheme and *caturvarga* (चतुर्वर्ग) scheme may be regarded as a new point. There is no clear statement in FVP about the number of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). It has not been said there that the number of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) is four and that it cannot be more or less. But from the way some modern scholars debate on the issue it seems that they have not noticed this point. Besides the *caturvarga* (चतुर्वर्ग) view has not been defended explicitly. Still the standard view is that the number of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) is four. Against this view some scholars have pointed out that the number of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) can be and in fact is more than the standard four. Nobody however discussed earlier that it could be even less. We in PTP have shown that from the philosophical point of view there is only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and that is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष).

According to the *trivarga* (त्रिवर्ग) view, there are three or three kinds of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). They are *dharma* (धर्म), *artha* (अर्थ), and *kāma* (काम). The *caturvarga* (चतुर्वर्ग) view adds *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) to this three. Some hold that the doctrine of four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ),

with *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) as the fourth one, emerged later in the history of Indian culture. Daya Krishna has said 'The ideal of *mokṣa* was, thus, a later incorporation from the non-Vedic religious and spiritual traditions of India.'⁴ Originally there were only three *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ) and the *trivarga* (त्रिवर्ग) view is historically and also perhaps logically correct. Sometimes it has been held that from the time of the *Vedas* till the time of the *Mahābhārata* men commonly believed in the *trivarga* (त्रिवर्ग) view of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). During this period due importance was given to man's worldly existence and to his personal and social problems *in this world*. *Trivarga* (त्रिवर्ग) represents the scheme of values of common and worldly man. Only later on the spiritual concerns became so dominant in Indian society that men became more and more other worldly and started neglecting his socio-political life. On the basis of this some foreign scholars and their Indian followers came to hold that India has a world negating culture⁵. In this culture the spiritual matter is given all importance and worldly concerns are totally or mostly neglected. So some modern scholars argue that the life of a man in *this world* is dominated by the values of *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम). It has also a place for *dharma* (धर्म) in the sense of morality. The other worldly value of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) plays no important role in the life of ordinary and worldly man. It may be the first and last concern of a man who is religious (as distinct from moral), spiritual, ascetic or a mystic. Some modern scholars also claim that the traditional literature shows that *trivarga* (त्रिवर्ग) was commonly believed in earlier days. The later addition of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) to these three turned the original *trivarga* theory to *caturvarga* (चतुर्वर्ग) theory. Some thinkers hold the same view in a modified way. They hold that originally men more *commonly* believed in *trivarga* (त्रिवर्ग) and not in

caturvarga (चतुर्वर्ग). This view seems to be more probable. For, in the Vedas we come across with the familiar passages like “मृत्युर्मुक्षियमामृतात्” or “तरति शोकम् आत्मवित्” or “येनाहं नामृतं स्यात् तेनाहं किं कुर्याम” etc. These passages speak about *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). Secondly, it is problematic to hold that the *Mahābhārata* rejects *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). For, the *Gītā* is a part of the *Mahābhārata* and in it Bhagavān Kriṣṇa has taught Arjuna (and others) the *Karma yoga* (कर्म योग) which is the right way of conducting our social and moral life. It is the right way particularly because it frees us from (or does not lead the agent to) the bondage (which results when we act in the ordinary and familiar way). In this way acting according to *karma yoga* (कर्म योग) paves the way for *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). There is one more point. The author of the *Mahābhārata* is also the author of the *Brahmasūtra*. And this *sūtra* text ends with an assertion about *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). Pandit Srimohan Bhattacharya in recent times has said that *dharma* (धर्म), *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम) are not matters of concern for *Vedānta* (दर्शन)⁶. It is also to be noted that in the *Sabhāparva* of the *Mahābhārata* Bidur told Dhṛtarāstra that *dharma* (धर्म) is the foundation (मुल) of the *trivarga* (त्रिवर्ग) which consists of *artha* (अर्थ), *kāma* (काम) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष).⁷ This shows two things: first, sometimes *trivarga* (त्रिवर्ग) excludes *dharma* (धर्म) and not *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) and secondly, according to the *Mahābhārata*, the number of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) is four.

In recent time Professor Kamalakar Mishra has discussed this controversy about *trivarga* (त्रिवर्ग) and *caturvarga* (चतुर्वर्ग).⁸ But the details of his account seem to be different from the account we presented above and also what may be found in the writings of other scholars. In the first place, according to him, those who believe in

trivarga (त्रिवर्ग) doctrine hold that ‘the class of three values (*trivarga*) — *artha* (अर्थ), *kāma* (काम) and *dharma* (धर्म) — forms the complete picture of values, and there is no need of accepting four values (*caturvarga*) which accepts *mokṣa* as an additional value.’⁹ He first presents the argument for the *trivarga* (त्रिवर्ग) doctrine according to which *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) need not be admitted as a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Then he answers this argument and defends *caturvarga* (चतुर्वर्ग) doctrine which includes *mokṣa puruṣārtha* (मोक्ष पुरुषार्थ). His argument against *trivarga* (त्रिवर्ग) and his defence of *caturvarga* (चतुर्वर्ग) or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) do not appear to be convincing. He writes: “The argument from the side of the *trivarga* theory, is that there are *only two basic values*, namely (i) pursuit of ‘*sukha*’ or ‘*ānanda*’ (pleasure or happiness) and (ii) morality (*dharma*), then what is the need of accepting *mokṣa* as another value?”¹⁰ We do not know who advanced such a view. No ground is stated for believing that the number of basic values is two and they are pleasure and morality. We have discussed in detail that value, in the sense of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), is the *object* of pursuit and not the *pursuit* of certain object as has been said here. Besides, pleasure can be a value as it is in itself an object of pursuit. But *dharma* (धर्म) is not or cannot be an object of pursuit or value in itself. *Dharma* (धर्म) in the sense of moral *action* involves exertion and hence is a form of pain which is not a *desired* object. *Dharma* (धर्म) can still be a value if it is the *means* of something which is a desired object or value *in itself*. In the scheme as presented here to be a value *dharma* (धर्म) must be a *means* of pleasure as it cannot be a pleasure in itself. It is not sure whether the supporters of *trivarga* (त्रिवर्ग) say so. According to the standard view, *dharma* (धर्म) is primarily a *means* of other-worldly pleasure called *svarga* (स्वर्ग). But the supporters of *trivarga* (त्रिवर्ग) view generally

accept only the worldly values including pleasure. In short, a theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) not only admits a fixed number of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) but also states the sense in which they are *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and how the different *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are mutually related [in case there are more than one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ)].

If we turn now to Professor Mishra's reply to the supporters of the *trivarga* (त्रिवर्ग) doctrine, we find that he makes reference to "Indian seers" (ऋषि). He attributes to them the view that values are either *preya* (प्रेय) or *śreya* (श्रेय). He then says that the *preya* (प्रेय) values are *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम) and the *śreya* (श्रेय) value is *dharma* (धर्म).¹¹ But this does not seem to be correct. The traditional view, as expounded in works like *Kathopaniṣad* or in the literature of the Vedānta philosophy (including *Brahmasūtra* and *bhāṣya* on it), is that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the (only) *śreya* (श्रेय). Professor Mishra's problem seems to be that he wants to find a place for *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) in the scheme of values and also give importance to the *trivarga* (त्रिवर्ग) theory. He proposes that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is to be viewed as the "synthesizer" of the two conflicting values of *śreya* (श्रेय) and *preya* (प्रेय). So he had to find both these conflicting values [*śreya* (श्रेय) and *preya* (प्रेय)] within the remaining three of *artha* (अर्थ), *kāma* (काम) and *dharma* (धर्म). He, therefore, suggests that *dharma* (धर्म) is the *śreya* (श्रेय) and *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम) are *preya* (प्रेय). Then he holds that in *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) or self-realisation as a value the two conflicting values of *preya* (प्रेय) [*artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम)] and *śreya* (श्रेय) [*dharma* (धर्म)] "are naturally synthesized ..." His argument is that "In *mokṣa* my action becomes good and pleasant — two in one. The Indian seers discovered this wonderful value as the answer to *their* problem. So, they included it in the scheme of

values and gave it the status of the highest value (*parama puruṣārtha*)¹². We think that this exposition cannot be attributed to the Indian seers or Indian philosophers of the classical period. One reason for this is that action *in the state of mokṣa* (मोक्ष) does not make any good sense; *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is not a state in which men act. The second reason is that even in the worldly state many social actions of man can be and are both pleasant and good. Finally, when we philosophically consider the matter, actions by nature involve pain of exertion and hence cannot be a state of unmixed pleasure. We have explained these points earlier also.

The point of some other modern scholars, like Daya Krishna, is that it is not reasonable to fix the number of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) as three or four. They argue that there can be many more *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). Friendship is a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and the intellectual pleasure which a scientist experiences in his effort to understand natural phenomenon is also a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Again the welfare of mankind as a whole is also a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). We would like to state that it is irrelevant to say all these things to criticize the standard view of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). For the scholars of earlier period or even the supporters of the standard *caturvarga* (चतुर्वर्ग) view did not mean to say that *individually* taken the number of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) is just four. The four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are just four *kinds* of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). For example, individually taken *dharma* (धर्म) is many. There are many actions and goods to which the general name *dharma* (धर्म) applies. These are brought under three narrower classes or heads of *kāyika dharma* (कायिक धर्म) or duties to be performed by using the physical body, *vācika dharma* (वाचिक धर्म) or the duties to be observed when

speaking (for example, we should not speak rudely to anyone and hurt him) and *mānasika dharma* (मानसिक धर्म) or the duties to be observed in thinking, i.e. we should not even think what is unjust or wrong. The word '*puruṣārtha*' (पुरुषार्थ) is one and there is one broad class or kind of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). This word covers many smaller classes of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) as well as *individually* many and also *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in general. All these come under the *one* broadest kind. Similarly, the word *dharma* (धर्म) is one but there are many concrete *dharma-s* (धर्म). The point of using one single word for all of them is to indicate that they all have some common property and so can be grouped together under one head. *Puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is the name of a group under which every single *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), in the given sense of the word, can be or will be included. Thus there is no problem of including the intellectual pleasure or friendship under *kāma puruṣārtha* (काम पुरुषार्थ). So, theoretically speaking there can be a view of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) which we can describe as *ekavarga* (एकवर्ग) theory. According to this view, all *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) come under one head. But if this broad class is the class of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), then such big generalization does not clarify things. *Ekavarga* (एकवर्ग) view does not say this. First, we are to realize that we are to strike a mean between the two — between (i) the highest possible generality, which includes under one single class of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) infinite number of individual *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) and (ii) absolute particularity, according to which there are infinite number of individually different *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) and no two of them can be brought together under one class. The purpose of having a scheme of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) is to strike a mean between these two extremes and bring together individually different infinite

number of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) under a small number of classes of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). *Dharma* (धर्म), *artha* (अर्थ), and *kāma* (काम) are such classes¹³. *Trivarga* (त्रिवर्ग) or *caturvarga* (चतुर्वर्ग) are suggested as such *schemes* of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). If there is good reason one can also choose a scheme of five or six *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). It is not a very significant issue. Nowhere it has been said that we cannot have a scheme of five *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). But we can have it if we find a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) which we cannot bring under any one of the standard three or four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ).

We have noted above the views of Professor Kamalakar Mishra and Professor Daya Krishna. We have also shown the difficulties found in their views and also that their disagreement can be easily reconciled. This does not mean that there is no difficulty at all in the standard view. For example, it is not clear what exactly is meant by *kāma* (काम). It is a serious issue which many modern scholars do not discuss thoroughly. If anything that is good or anything that man wants for himself is *kāma* (काम), then one can think that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) can be reduced to *kāma* (काम)¹⁴. Some have suggested or supported such reduction¹⁵ but even they did not fully investigate all the different senses of *kāma* (काम) or try to reconcile them. We find in classical literature many different senses of the term.

One can even use *kāma* (काम) in such a sense (in the sense of pleasure) that *artha* (अर्थ) can come under it. In that case the *caturvarga* (चतुर्वर्ग) theory can be reduced to *trivarga* (त्रिवर्ग). Even *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) (as understood in some schools of thought) can be included in *kāma* (काम). We admit that scholars of India should know that this is a real possibility. Actually *Bṛhaspati sūtra*, which is

the source of the Cārvāka thought, says this. One *Bṛhaspati sūtra*, quoted by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in his *Gūḍārthadīpikā*, says that the word *puruṣa* (पुरुष) signifies the physical body (such as what we have) endowed with consciousness ('चैत्यन्यविशिष्ट कायः पुरुष...').¹⁶ It further says pleasure [*kāma* (काम)] is the only single *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ).¹⁷ So far there are at least two *ekavarga* (एकवर्ग) theories (views) of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). They are first, the Cārvāka view or the Cārvāka PTP according to which only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is there and it is *kāma* (काम); and secondly, there are other versions of PTP according to which *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the only *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Advaita Vedānta philosophy on the one hand and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy on the other hold this *Mokṣaika-puruṣārtha-vāda* (मोक्षौक-पुरुषार्थ-वाद) or the view according to which only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is there and that is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). Even other versions of *āstika* PTP (and some versions of *nāstika* PTP) admit only *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) as the *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). This difference between the *Kāmaika-puruṣārtha-vāda* (कामैक-पुरुषार्थ-वाद) or the view according to which only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is there and it is *kāma* (काम) and the *Mokṣaika-puruṣārtha-vāda* (मोक्षौक-पुरुषार्थ-वाद) or the view according to which only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is there and it is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is first due to the difference in the conception of man or *puruṣa* (पुरुष). According to the Cārvākas (and hence Cārvāka PTP), man is hardly anything more than a biological being like a dog or a tiger. On the other hand, other *nāstika* (नास्तिक) philosophers (the Buddha or Jaina) and all *āstika* (आस्तिक) philosophers of India take man to have that property by which he is different from animals. It has been said that *dharma* (धर्म) is the distinguishing feature of a man. It distinguishes man from animals. *Dharma* (धर्म), therefore, is the most fundamental thing in the life of

a man¹⁸. Even an animal seeks pleasure. Pursuit of pleasure (strictly speaking pleasure) cannot be a value in the life of a man as man. Pursuit of pleasure which is consistent with *dharma* (धर्म) alone can count as a value in the life of a man. Pleasure [or *kāma* (काम)] can be *kāma puruṣārtha* (काम पुरुषार्थ) if *kāma* (काम) means pleasure that is consistent with *dharma* (धर्म) or is obtained through *dharma* (धर्म)¹⁹. A truly human being decides what is value or *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) keeping the consideration of *dharma* (धर्म) in the forefront. And then he seeks such value. *Dharma* (धर्म) by and large is a restraining force. Consideration of it does not allow man to degrade his life of pursuit of goals and ends into the life of a lower being. In the life of a lower being also there is the pursuit of pleasure or satisfaction of the senses; but this pleasure is not a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or human value, nor the pursuit of it is a value seeking. This is something which perhaps no one will contradict.

Indian philosophical view extends further and contends that though man cannot have *less than* a life of *dharma* (धर्म), he can go beyond *dharma* (धर्म), can transcend *dharma* (धर्म) and realize his full potential or attain the highest fulfillment of life. However, if *dharma* (धर्म) is not the highest *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or the direct means of the highest *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), it can still be a means (an indirect means) of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) which is a value beyond *dharma* (धर्म). Thus *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) does not negate *dharma* (धर्म). *Mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is to be attained *through* *dharma* (धर्म). The final goal is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) in which the pain associated with *dharma* (धर्म), the pain of exertion, is also absent. But *dharma* (धर्म) is generally speaking a necessary step or means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष).

Even *asamuccayavāda* (असमुच्चयवाद) admits the value of *dharma* (धर्म). It contends that immediate means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is *jñāna* (ज्ञान); and *dharma* (धर्म) is primarily²⁰ not *jñāna* (ज्ञान) but *karma* (कर्म) by nature. Yet we cannot get that *jñāna* (ज्ञान) if we do not purify ourselves first by performing *dharma* (धर्म)²¹. *Dharma* (धर्म) is the *necessary foundation* of every *human* pursuit of value even if the value is *artha* (अर्थ) or *kāma* (काम) or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). It is for this reason that *dharma* (धर्म) has been placed first and at the bottom of the list of four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). PTP admits this but it also tells us that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) which has been placed at the top of the list of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) is the final value.

According to the *asamuccayavāda* (असमुच्चयवाद), one can and one should pursue both *dharma* (धर्म) and *kāma* (काम) together [or *dharma* (धर्म) and *artha* (अर्थ) together]. But strictly speaking one cannot pursue *dharma* (धर्म) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) together. One needs to transcend *dharma* (धर्म) in order to pursue *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). This is the reason for which *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the *only* concern of philosophical theory of values. *Dharma* (धर्म) is the *first* or the most basic of all *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the last or the highest of all *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). Once the two are fixed — the necessary first [*puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ)] and the most coveted last and final [*puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ)] — we can proceed to determine the interrelation between four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) admitted in FVP. Against this background we would like to discuss briefly the four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) individually (in the way we said above). Before we do that we would like to note one argument why one cannot pursue both *dharma* (धर्म) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) in the way one

can and should pursue both *dharma* (धर्म) and *kāma* (काम) or *dharma* (धर्म) and *artha* (अर्थ) together.

In our discussion of individual *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) we begin by admitting the fourfold scheme of fundamental *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) or the *caturvarga* (चतुर्वर्ग) view of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). We have said earlier that this *caturvarga* (चतुर्वर्ग) doctrine is better described as the *paurāṇik* (पौराणिक) doctrine and it is different from the philosophical doctrine which admits only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). However, both the *Purāṇa* and *darśana* (दर्शन) have their root in the *Veda*. *Purāṇa* is the elaboration of the *Vaidika* view and teaching in an easy to understand language. Swami Chandraśekharendra Svaraswatī has said in his work *Hindu Dharma* that *Purāṇas* illustrate with stories the abstract and abstruse truths taught in the *Vedas*.²² Even the *kāma puruṣārtha* (काम पुरुषार्थ) can be traced to the *Veda*.²³ We need to decide the order in which the four individual *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are related and may be discussed. We propose to discuss first the *kāma puruṣārtha* (काम पुरुषार्थ). Our discussion of this *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) has been most sketchy so far. We will be brief in our discussion of *mokṣa puruṣārtha* (मोक्ष पुरुषार्थ) which we have discussed more elaborately before. So far as the *artha puruṣārtha* (अर्थ पुरुषार्थ) is concerned we do not find enough discussion in the standard literature on the subject. So the discussion of the *artha puruṣārtha* (अर्थ पुरुषार्थ) will also be extremely sketchy or we may even omit it. We will add some detail about *dharma puruṣārtha* (धर्म पुरुषार्थ) which we did not include earlier.

Dharma (धर्म) is the root of all other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) and the very foundation of man's life of value seeking. Besides *dharma*

(धर्म) in the sense of dutiful *action* is not and cannot be a good as an end in itself. It is only good as a means. On the other hand *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is good as end only; it is an end in itself. It cannot be an end as means. If we view them in this way, *dharma* (धर्म) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) mark the two endpoints of the scale and scheme of four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). In between there are *artha* (अर्थ पुरुषार्थ) and *kāma puruṣārtha* (काम पुरुषार्थ). To distinguish these two we need to fix the meaning of these two terms. According to one sense of the word *kāma* (काम), *artha* (अर्थ) also becomes *kāma* (काम). In his elucidation of the Gīta – verse 16/11 Madhusūdana Svārasvatī has said “...काम्यन्त इति कामाः...”²⁴, that which is desired is *kāma* (काम). Accordingly, any object of desire is *kāma* (काम). In that case *artha* (अर्थ) also becomes *kāma* (काम) for men who want or desire *artha* (अर्थ) or wealth. In a more restricted sense appropriate to the context, *kāma* (काम) is understood to mean not any object of desire but only such objects of desire that are empirical objects and the objects of the *senses* (इन्द्रिय) of the external sense organs only. These objects are *gandha* (smell), *rasa* (taste), *rūpa* (colour), *sparsā* (touch) and *śabda* (sound). The Cārvākas deny anything that cannot be known by the senses. For them, only the sensible or perceptible things are real. *Puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) to be real must be something *laukika* (लौकिक) or sensuous. *Dharma* (धर्म) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) are *alaukika* (अलौकिक); they can be known only from the *Śāstra* (शास्त्र) like the *Veda*. In other words, they can be known through the *śabdapramāna* (शब्दप्रमाण) which the Cārvākas do not accept²⁵. They do not accept also *paraloka* (परोलोक) to which *dharma* (धर्म) is related. So, for the Cārvākas, this-worldly (ईहलौकिक) and perceptible (दृष्ट) things man seeks can only be regarded as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Such objects of desire are the five things just

enumerated. But in fact nobody seeks or desires just *śabda* (शब्द) or sound like noise. But when a man wants to listen to music, it is *śabda* (of a sort) that he wants. Similarly, when a man enjoys a beautiful red rose he desires such *colorful* things or colour. When he relishes a good dish and likes its taste, he actually seeks the object of gustatory sense that is called *rasa* (रस) and so on. Though *artha* (अर्थ) is something perceptible and this-worldly object yet it is not immediately any of the five things like colour, sound and the like. When a man desires money he does not desire the colour of the coin or the note. Nor does he seek the smell of it. How then can *artha* (अर्थ) be a *pursartha* (पुरुषार्थ) for a Cārvāka? For them, *kāma* (काम) alone is *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ).²⁶ *Kāma* (काम) in the sense of object of desire the five sorts of thing *śabda* (शब्द), *gandha* (गन्ध) etc. constitute *kāma puruṣārtha* (काम पुरुषार्थ). The answer is that wealth or *artha* (अर्थ) is a means of *kāma* (काम). *Kāma* (काम) is end in itself and *artha* (अर्थ) is an end as means; it is means of *kāma* (काम). Whether *kāma* (काम) is a delicious dish or sensuous pleasure, it can be purchased by using wealth. *Artha* (अर्थ) thus becomes a means of the *kāma puruṣārtha* (काम पुरुषार्थ) [where *kāma* (काम) means sensuous or perceptible objects of desire]. The means of a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or of a desired end is also an end though it is an end *as means*. *Kāma* (काम) is an end in itself and *artha* (अर्थ) is an end as means of *kāma* (काम). So far for as Cārvāka-s are concerned there can be only a scheme of two *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ) — *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम) — both of which are (this) worldly things and desired by (this) worldly people.²⁷

But there are people who are not *nāstika* (नास्तिक) like the Cārvākas and they believe in *paraloka* (परोलोक).²⁸ The conception of *puruṣa* (roughly man) is different for a *nāstika* and an *āstika* (आस्तिक). Again, the different groups of *nāstika* (नास्तिक) have different conceptions of *puruṣa* (पुरुष). One *nāstika* (नास्तिक) conception of *puruṣa* (पुरुष) is found in the *Bṛhaspatīsūtra* which is a major source of the Cārvāka philosophy. In this work the standard Cārvāka conception of *puruṣa* (पुरुष) is stated thus 'चैत्यन्यविशिष्ट कायःपुरुषः', i.e., a conscious body is *puruṣa* (पुरुष). For, such a *puruṣa* (पुरुष) who is conscious (physical) body *dharma* (धर्म) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) that bear reference to the *alaukika* (अलौकिक) or other-worldly state cannot have any significance. For, with the perceptible body that we (men) have we cannot enjoy the fruits of *dharma karma* (धर्म कर्म) which is *svarga* (स्वर्ग). With such a body we cannot also attain the state of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) [at least the final *mukti* (मुक्ति) or *videha mukti* (विदेह मुक्ति)]. The *āstika* (आस्तिक) conception of *puruṣa* (पुरुष) is different. According to this conception, a *puruṣa* (पुरुष) is capable of having as his objects of seeking *dharma* (धर्म) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). According to this conception, man is essentially an embodied *soul* (आत्मा) or a *soul* (आत्मा) which has body. So long a soul is embodied in a this-worldly body (मर्त्य or ईहलौकिक देह), he cannot attain *svarga* (स्वर्ग) or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). Some such soul can be embodied in an *amartya* (अमर्त्य or अलौकिक देह). Such a soul can enjoy *svarga* and endeavour to attain *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) through *pravṛtti lakṣaṇa dharma* (प्रवृत्ति लक्षण धर्म) which leads to *svarga* or *nivṛttilakṣaṇa dharma* (निवृत्ति लक्षण धर्म) which is necessary to be practised for *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). The actual attainment would imply that man (the soul) has left this-worldly body or body as such. Thus fourfold scheme of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) is for the *āstika-s* (आस्तिक)

only. For these people man as (embodied) soul survives after death or the destruction of the *ihalaukika deha* (ईहलौकिक देह). He can be embodied in a *devadeha* (देवदेह) and realize that *sukha* (सुख) or pleasure which is called *svarga* (स्वर्ग). Or soul as disembodied (that is, the human soul in its disembodied state) can realize the *mokṣa puruṣārtha* (मोक्ष पुरुषार्थ). The *āstika* (आस्तिक) conception of *puruṣa* (पुरुष) makes it possible to have as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) both *dharma* (धर्म) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) as well as *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम). So the scheme of fourfold *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) implies the *āstika* (आस्तिक) conception of *puruṣa* (पुरुष).

In the scheme of fourfold *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) [*caturvarga* (चतुर्वर्ग) view of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ)] the ultimate *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is *mokṣa puruṣārtha* (मोक्ष पुरुषार्थ) and this is the only *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in which a philosophical doctrine of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) (PTP) is or can be interested. It has been explicitly said with reference to the *Vedānta darśana*;²⁹ but it is true about all *darśanas*. There are different kinds of *āstika-s* (आस्तिक). Those who are householders or *saṃsāri* for them only *trivarga* (त्रिवर्ग) or a scheme of threefold *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is appropriate. For those who are *mumukṣu* (मुमुक्षु) or seeker of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष), the scheme of one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is (ultimately) appropriate. However, *mumukṣu* (मुमुक्षु) or the authentic seeking of spiritual liberation is the result of long practice of *trivarga* (त्रिवर्ग) *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). So far all *āstika-s* (आस्तिक) have a fourfold *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) to begin with. At certain stage of evolution or elevation man drops the first two *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ), *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम). When man succeeds in elevating him further there remains only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) [*mokṣa* (मोक्ष)] for him. So long a man is not

evolved to that extent, that is, so long he craves for अभ्युदय (or prosperity in this world or the world after), he remains bound to the threefold *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) [without *mokṣa* (मोक्ष)]. So, in the *Rāmāyana*, Rāmacandra inquired from Bhrata whether he was pursuing *trivarga* (त्रिवर्ग) or not in such a way that the pursuit of one did not conflict with another.³⁰

Kāma puruṣārtha (काम पुरुषार्थ):

One who is a *puruṣa* (पुरुष), not in the Cārvāka sense of conscious *body* but in the *āstika* (आस्तिक) sense of embodied *soul*, desires not only perceptible sense objects that are desirable. A *puruṣa* (पुरुष) in the *āstika* (आस्तिक) sense desires *svarga* (स्वर्ग) and also *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). Such a *puruṣa* (पुरुष) may not consciously pursue right now the ends of *svarga* (स्वर्ग) or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष); he may want to be a worthy family man and a social man. For this he may feel that he needs such things as wealth [*artha* (अर्थ)] and also pleasure [*kāma* (काम)] of food and home, health and friendship and the like. He may also want to be just and moral (धार्मिक), for a man who is not just or moral cannot be considered a worthy member of a human society. In this sense besides seeking *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम) he may practice *dharma* (धर्म) [not as *svarga* (स्वर्ग), a goal or end in itself] in the sense of dutiful actions. So *svarga* (स्वर्ग) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) are not objects of his pursuit. However, unknown to him, the *svarga* and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) are also his *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). For what he explicitly believes implies that he admits *svarga* (स्वर्ग) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) to be also *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). One who wants to

be *dhārmika* (धार्मिक) must perform duties or morally right *actions*. *Svarga* (स्वर्ग) is the result of some of the dutiful actions. Similarly, *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the result (direct or indirect) of *nivṛtilakṣaṇa dharma* (निवृत्ति लक्षण धर्म). So, who pursues *dharma* (धर्म) also strives for the result of them. This is one argument why it is wrong to say that man may not want *svarga* (स्वर्ग) or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) but only worldly goods and morality. To believe in morality or in the performance of dutiful actions is to accept its implication including *svarga* (स्वर्ग) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). The second argument is that those who need worldly goods also want pleasure. These goods are desired objects that give them pleasure. It is, therefore, possible to generalize man's need for worldly goods as his desire for *kāma* (काम) and *artha* (अर्थ) or as man's need for pleasure. Pleasure in this sense is the only object of desire, *kāmya* (काम्य) or *kāma* (काम). Now, since *svarga* (स्वर्ग) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) are also forms of pleasure whoever seeks pleasure by implication accepts *svarga* (स्वर्ग) and *kāma* (काम) as objects of seeking or as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). *Svarga* (स्वर्ग) signifies maximum positive pleasure and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) signifies the ultimate 'negative' pleasure; by negative pleasure we mean freedom from pain (दुःखनिवृत्ति). If now *kāma* (काम) means what is desired or *kāmya* (काम्य) as Madhusūdana Sarasvatī said, then it is possible to generalize all *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) and can be ultimately reduced to only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) which is *kāma* (काम). However, this *kāma* (काम) is the *kāma* (काम) of the *āstika-s* (आस्तिक) and not of the *nāstika-s* (नास्तिक). For the *nāstika-s* (आस्तिक) only sensible and perceptible objects of desire are *kāma* (काम). In the present case even imperceptible objects of desire like *svarga* (स्वर्ग) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) are also *kāma* (काम). There is one difficulty in describing both *kāma* (काम) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) in the same way. Vātsyāyana in his

bhāṣya on the *apavarga sūtra* of Gautama has shown that for the pursuit of any goal other than *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) one needs to have desire for that end. Thus any other *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) implies that the man in question is subject to desires, inclinations and the like. Such men are called *āśakta* (आसक्त) or attached. For *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) one must have *vairāgya* (वैराग्य) or detachment. A man who has transcended all attachments and does not seek anything (positive) is alone a true *mumukṣu* (मुमुक्षु). Hence, *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) only for those who have transcended all *kāma* (काम). We need to admit two *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ) as end in themselves and not as end as means. *kāma* (काम) is fundamentally different from *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). And *kāma* (काम) is more than sensuous pleasure or objects of sensuous pleasure. In a doctrine of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) which will be acceptable to an *āstika* (आस्तिक) we, therefore, need to understand *kāma* (काम) too narrowly that is in the sense of the *nāstika* (नास्तिक) or Cārvāka's and too generally in the sense in which it becomes the same as *mokṣa* (मोक्ष).

Earlier we have seen that *kāma* (काम) means the objects of senses that we seek. These objects are generally speaking five in number and they correspond to the five sense organs (ज्ञानेन्द्रिय) that we have. These sense objects, on the one hand, and *artha* (अर्थ), on the other, are *dṛṣṭa* (दृष्ट) and *ihalaukika puruṣārtha*-s (ईहलौकिक पुरुषार्थ). How are they related to the *alaukika puruṣārtha* (अलौकिक पुरुषार्थ) called *dharma* (धर्म)? Let us take, for example, *artha puruṣārtha* (अर्थ पुरुषार्थ). This *artha* (अर्थ) and *dharma* (धर्म) are mutually related as means and end. *Artha* (अर्थ) is needed to perform acts of *dharma* (धर्म) like *yajña* (यज्ञ), and in this sense *artha* (अर्थ) is a means of *dharma* (धर्म). On the other hand, through

performing the *dharma* (धर्म) of teaching, say, one can earn one's livelihood, if teaching is a prescribed way of earning for him. Similar things can be said about *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम). The desired objects of pleasure [*kāma* (काम)] can be procured by spending money [*artha* (अर्थ)]. So far *artha* (अर्थ) is related to *kāma* (काम) as means. On the other hand, one seeks *artha* (अर्थ) only when he turns it into his object of desire [*kāma* (काम)]. *Artha* (अर्थ) in such a case is pursued as *kāma* (काम). In the *Ayodhyākānda* of Valmiki *Rāmāyana* Rāma was taught how a king should rule his kingdom. In this connection he suggested that *dharma* (धर्म), *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम) all three should be pursued in such a way that the pursuit of one does not conflict with the pursuit of the other. *Kāma* (काम) in the sense of greed (लोभ) should not be allowed to defeat all the pursuit of all the three *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ). Similarly, the pursuit of *kāma* (काम) should not be allowed to defeat the pursuit of *artha* (अर्थ) or the pursuit of *artha* (अर्थ) should not be allowed to conflict with the pursuit of *kāma* (काम). It was even suggested that if all the three cannot be pursued at the same time, we should pursue them at different times.³¹

There are other senses of *kāma* (काम) as well. We need to discuss in particular both *kāma* (काम) and *prem* (प्रेम). For, in a sense, *prem* is a form of *kāma* (काम); it is not ordinary *kāma* (काम) but sublime *kāma* (काम). Another thing we need to discuss is the relation between *bhoga* (भोग) and *kāma* (काम). Referring to Gauḍapāda's *Māndukyakārika* Madhusūdana has distinguished *bhoga* (भोग) and *kāma* (काम). It has been said that *bhoga* (भोग) signifies actual (physical) consumption. But *kāma* (काम) is enjoying the same objects but only in thought or contemplation and not

actually or physically.³² It has been said that both *kāma* (काम) and *bhoga* (भोग) — mental pursuit of objects of pleasure and physical pursuit of them — are equally detrimental to the pursuit of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). *kāma* (काम) (*bhoga*) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) are incompatible. *Prem* (प्रेम) is understood not just as love. For this English word also denotes the love play which is utterly a physical act of humans or even animals. When *prem* (प्रेम) is understood as love it is first understood in a broad sense so that Platonic love is also love. It may be nearer to *prem* (प्रेम) which implies among other things *śṛṅgār* (शृङ्गार) in the sense of love play. But this *śṛṅgār* (शृङ्गार) involves *aprākṛta deha* (अप्राकृत देह). This is clear from the treatment of the subject in works like *Ujjalanilamani*. In our context also love as *prem* (प्रेम) as distinguished from *kāma* (काम) refers not to pleasures of the senses which love and *kāma* (काम) in the narrow sense mean. *Prem* (प्रेम) is not desire for objects of sense. Such objects, even when they are beloved persons, are things other than the person who desires and are outside him (बाह्य). The true object of *kāma* (काम) in the sense of *prem* (प्रेम) is one's own soul. In the ultimate and strict sense of it *kāma* (काम) has for its object the soul (आत्मा) of the person in question. In this sense primary object of *kāma* (काम) is one's soul and, in the second place, it is object which is related to this soul. Such related objects include one's wife and sons and daughters and so on. *Prem* (प्रेम) is primarily desire for the internal objects and not the external objects of the senses. Such *prem* (प्रेम) also is a form of attachment, even if it is an attachment of a superior kind. But when the object of love or superior or highest attachment (परानुरक्ति) is the loving God Himself, *prem* (प्रेम) is transformed into *bhakti* (भक्ति). It has been said 'सा परानुरक्ति ईश्वरे' (*Śāṅḍilya sūtra*), meaning thereby *bhakti* (भक्ति) is the highest love

when it is placed to God. Sometimes it appears from the Vaiṣṇava literature that true *prem* (प्रेम) is a matter that cannot be realized in the ordinary physical plane and in *prākṛta deha* (प्राकृत देह). From the text like *Ujjalanilamanī* it appears that *prem* (प्रेम) or at least *prembhakti* (प्रेम भक्ति) is a superior kind of emotion. It is superior to *kāma* (काम) and even of ordinary *bhakti* (भक्ति). So *prem* (प्रेम) is also referred to as *prembhakti* (प्रेम भक्ति).

In the *Bhagavdgītā* we find many discussions about *kāma* (काम) in the ordinary sense of attachment (आसक्ति) or its source. The *Gītā* also tells us about the cause and effect of *kāma* (काम).³³ It is said there that regular association (संग) with something produces in us a craving for it (काम). Suppose someone does not actually or physically mix with something or some person but he constantly thinks about it in his mind. His external sense organ is not operative here but his internal sense organ (मनस) is operative. Due to constantly thinking about it the man will develop what is called *sanga* (संग). It means he will develop the view that the thing is a source of my pleasure.³⁴ From such sense there arises a desire of the form 'may I have this thing, may it be mine'. This is called *kāma* (काम). Thus attachment (संग) in the sense of the belief that a thing is the source of my pleasure leads to the desire of the form 'let it be mine'. This is *kāma* (काम). Having told us how *kāma* (काम) originates, the *Gītā* tells us that such *kāma* (काम) leads to anger (क्रोध) when one is prevented from having the object for which he has *kāma* (काम). The process does not end there. It ultimately leads to man's ruin.

There are many references to *kāma* (काम) as something that is harmful and lowly; it is something bad and should be avoided. But

sometimes completely different things have been said about *kāma* (काम). This makes the subject of *kāma* (काम) most interesting and also difficult to understand. How to reconcile all the negative and positive things said about *kāma* (काम)? We are to hold either that there are different meanings of the word *kāma* (काम) or there are many different aspects of *kāma* (काम).

In the *Veda* and the *Upaniṣadas* there are many references of *kāma* (काम) and discussions about it. In some places *kāma* (काम) is the original creative force, it is the source of this universe. It has been said that there was a time when only the ultimate reality (*Brahman* or God or *ātma*) alone was there. It has been said 'आत्मौवेदमग्र आसीदेक एव'.³⁵ From this one came the whole world of multiplicity when the One desired to create or be many, it desired (ईच्छा) or felt that it needed a companion.³⁶ So, He divided Himself into two. This is the beginning of the creation of the rest of the Universe. *Kāma* (काम) is thus the most basic creative force. Everything that is created originates ultimately in the desire [*kāma* (काम)] for it. There are a number of things to note here. First, what is the form and requirement of complete fulfillment? Is not God completely fulfilled in Himself? According to the standard view, God is perfect and He has no want or need and therefore no *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). He is *āptakāma* (आप्तकाम). Then what does it mean to say that He wanted a companion, a second being? It has been even said in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣada* that he needed a wife.³⁷ How exactly are we supposed to understand such passages of the *Upaniṣada*? Śaṅkarācārya has elaborately and lucidly discussed the sense of these passages. We are here interested in the *Upaniṣada* view of the *kāma puruṣārtha* (काम पुरुषार्थ). Here

puruṣa (पुरुष) means God [*Bhagavat puruṣa* (पुरुष)] on the one hand and on the other the embodied soul (as we are) which is under the spell of *avidyā* (अविद्या). *Avidyāvat puruṣa* (अविद्यावत् पुरुष) is subject to *kāma* (काम). And where such *puruṣa* (पुरुष) resides is called *loka* (लोक). Śaṅkarācārya has noted that there are primarily at least three loka-s: *manuṣyaloka* (मनुष्यलोक) or the abode of men, *pitṛloka* (पितृलोक) or abode of dead ancestors and the *devaloka* (देवलोक) or the abode of the deities. Now every man wants to grow and be happy. The growth signifies move towards higher and better. For men who are the inhabitants of the *manuṣyaloka* (मनुष्यलोक) the (immediate higher) goal is to attain *devaloka* (देवलोक)³⁸. This *devaloka* (देवलोक) or the pleasure or happiness it stands for [namely *svarga* (स्वर्ग)] is the end (फल) that man seeks. The means or the *sādhana* (साधन) of this *svarga* (स्वर्ग) or *devaloka* (देवलोक) are wife (जाया), son (पुत्र), wealth (वित्त) and *karma* (dutiful actions or धर्म कर्म).³⁹ The *Upaniṣad* says that the one desired a wife; but what for? Śaṅkarācārya says, He wanted a wife in order to qualify for performing the dutiful actions that would lead to *svarga* (स्वर्ग) or *devaloka* (देवलोक). *Vitta* (वित्त) within which are included *paṣu* (household animals like cow) and *putra* (पुत्र) also are needed for *yajña* (जज्ञ) the result of which is *svarga* (स्वर्ग).

At one point in his discussion Śaṅkarācārya noted that *kāma* (काम) is innumerable as the *kāmyavastu* [object of *kāma* (काम)] is also innumerable. As internal state of desire *kāma* (काम) is not one but many and as object of such desire also *kāma* (काम) is many. But we use singular number when we enumerate *kāma* (काम) as a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Another *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is *artha* (अर्थ) or *vitta* (वित्त). And the third is *dharma* (धर्म). Just there are many

individual *kāma* (काम) so also there are many individual *dharma* (धर्म) and *artha* (अर्थ). Yet there is a way of generalizing them. Śaṅkarācārya says among all perceptible things man finds nothing to be desired (लब्धव्य) if it is not an end of life (फल) or its means (साधन). *kāma* (काम) as things desired are then only two (that is, of two kinds). It is either the *sādhana* (means) or it is the end (फल). But these are two forms of the same thing *kāma* (काम) or *eṣaṇā* (एषणा). The object of *eṣaṇā* (एषणा) is *loka* (लोक) such as *devaloka* (देवलोक). So the original *eṣaṇā* (एषणा) is *lokaiṣaṇā* (लोकैषणा). But the *devaloka* (देवलोक) signifies long lasting pleasure which the *devatās* (देवता) or deities enjoy. These *devatās* (देवता) are distinguished from men in many different ways. One difference is that the *devatās* (देवता) have *deva śarīra* (देव शरीर) or body fit to enjoy the superior pleasures available in the *devaloka* and men have *manuṣya śarīra* (मनुष्य शरीर) or *martya śarīra* (मर्त्य शरीर). The body of the *devatās* (देवता) or deities (देव शरीर) is superior and is fit for the soul which has such *śarīra* (शरीर) to enjoy the superior *sukha* (pleasure) or *svargasukha* (स्वर्ग सुख). In the *Upaniṣada* there is description of the superior pleasure which *devatās* (देवता) or one who has *deva śarīra* (देव शरीर) can enjoy.⁴⁰ There is a Sanskrit word 'abhyudaya' (अभ्युदय) which can be translated as prosperity and covers pleasures of all the three *loka-s* (लोक). Anything that is less than *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) but which man seeks and becomes happy to get is generally known as prosperity or mark of prosperity. The superior pleasure called *svarga* (स्वर्ग)⁴¹ is a state of abhyudaya (अभ्युदय) in this sense.

The result so far is this: *kāma* (काम) is either pleasure or is the means of pleasure. And the pleasure is either the inferior pleasure

of this world or the superior pleasure of the other worlds like the *pitṛloka* (पितृलोक) and *svargaloka* (स्वर्गलोक). When *kāma puruṣārtha* (कामपुरुषार्थ) is a means it can be the means of some other *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) as its end. When one desires for wife (जाया or धर्मपत्नी) or wealth (वित्त) so that one can practice *dharma* (धर्म) like *yāga* (याग) one's desire [*kāma* (काम)] as well as the object of desire [*kāma* (काम)] wife etc. is means of *dharma* (धर्म) which is a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Such *dharma* (धर्म) is usually *pravṛtti lakṣaṇa dharma* (प्रवृत्ति लक्षण धर्म). The practice of such *dharma* (धर्म) secures such purification as is needed for (superior) *bhoga* (experience of higher pleasure). Such purification is called *bhogānugūṇa śuddhi* (भोगानुगुण शुद्धि) or purification that makes one eligible for higher pleasure.

By *kāma puruṣārtha* (काम पुरुषार्थ) is to be understood not just *kāmanā* (कामना) or desire; nor again any object of desire or *kāmya* (काम्य). It is to be understood as desire for certain particular (or particular kind of) thing. Such thing is either pleasure in general or a certain particular kind of pleasure. Nobody can deny that pleasure is *kāmya* (काम्य) or object of desire. We may think that man desires so many things from money to music and from food to fire. But all these have one common property, they all yield pleasure (under suitable conditions). So as means to pleasure or as pleasing things money, food, music and fire are *kāmya* (काम्य). *Kāmya* (काम्य) means object of desire.⁴² But when we say *kāma* (काम) is a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) we cannot say that *kāma* (काम) or desire is an object of desire. For desire is not pleasure. Just as *kāma* (काम) means pleasure in general so also it sometimes means a specific kind of pleasure called *maithunecccha* (मैथुनेच्छा). Here the object of

desire is *maithun* (मैथुन). It is the *kāmya* (काम्य). But *maithun* (मैथुन) is *kāmya* (काम्य) or desired because it is a means of pleasure of a distinct kind. It has been said in the *Upaniṣada* that the ultimate object of desire is the dear self itself. We love or desire such other things that are related in a certain way to self.⁴³ Man considers his wife dear or son and daughter dear because they are related to self in a particular way. It has been said so in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣada*.⁴⁴ Such a soul which is so much attached to itself actually recreates itself as (its) son by mixing with his wife.⁴⁵ *Putra* (पुत्र) is said to be an object of desire and *maithun* (मैथुन) is a means of it. Thus desire for self, desire for wife, desire for son and marriage are all related. For complete success of marriage a man and his woman need to know all these and have correct knowledge not only of the ethics of marriage but also of the *Kāma vijñāna* (कामविज्ञान) or *Kāma Śāstra* (काम शास्त्र).⁴⁶

So far we have considered *kāma* (काम) in two senses, as desire in general and as pleasure and sexual gratification. In course of given exposition to the relevant thoughts in the matter of the Naiyāyikas as expressed in *Nyāyakusumānjaliḥ* of Udayanācārya Gopīnāth Kavirāj⁴⁷ has said the same thing. Let us quote from Kavirāj-ji. “The *Puruṣārtha*-s, the ‘Ends of man’, are usually counted as four in number, called by the collective name of *caturvarga* (चतुर्वर्ग) — the fourfold group. These are (1) *dharma* (धर्म), (2) *artha* (अर्थ), (3) *kāma* (काम) and (4) *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). On analysis of human aspirations it would appear that *what men really strive after is nothing but pleasure (or absence of pain)*.”⁴⁸ Kavirāj-ji has also stated certain way of classifying the *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ) and the rationale behind classifying them in that way Kavirāj ji maintains that

though there is no (or practically no⁴⁹) difference among thinkers of different schools regarding *dharma* (धर्म), *artha* (अर्थ), and *kāma* (काम) there is great difference regarding the view of pleasure being the highest *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) as the Mīmāṃsaka-s are believed to hold.⁵⁰ For, the Naiyāyikas hold that the highest *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is of the nature of absence of pain. Among those who hold that the highest *puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) is the eternal pleasure, there is difference whether this pleasure is *Brahmānanda* (ब्रह्मानन्द) or the divine love that is *bhakti* (भक्ति) or *svarga* (स्वर्ग). The means of *Brahmānanda* (ब्रह्मानन्द) is knowledge but of the latter or the (साध्य) *bhakti* (साध्य भक्ति) the means is *bhakti* (साधन भक्ति).⁵¹

Dharma puruṣārtha (धर्म पुरुषार्थ):

We will note some of the important details about this *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) which were not discussed earlier. According to Dr.S. Radhakrishnan, 'By far the most debated concept in Indian thought and the one that has raised the maximum number of controvercies is the concept of, indeed, next to the concept of reality, *dharma* is the most important concept in indian thought.'⁵² The most debated concept in Indian thought is '*dharma*' (धर्म). P. K. Mahapatra has said 'The meaning of *dharma* and its implication are so complex and so variegated that in the depth of this single word lies an entire Indian civilization that is typically Indian. In spite of numerous senses in which this word has been used by Indian thinkers, philosophers, moralists and theologians, the word or the concept is frequently used and understood by the common Indian.'⁵³ The *Mahābhārata* is regarded as the fifth *Veda* and an authoritative text on all the *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ).⁵⁴ Both Rāma and Yudhisthira are symbol of

dharma (धर्म). Prof. Samiran Chandra Chakrabarti said 'The Vedic value system resulted in the concept of the set of values called *caturvarga*.These values are, in Sanskrit, called the *puruṣārthas*, objects or aim of man's existence'.⁵⁵

Dharma (धर्म) has been defined in the Hindu Tradition in many ways. Now, let us mention some of the most important senses of the term '*dharma*' (धर्म).⁵⁶

1. As 'upholder or supporter or sustainer' (*Rgveda* I. 187.1 and X. 92.2),
2. As 'religious ordinance and rites' (*Rgveda* I.22.18, V. 26.6, VIII.43.24 and IX 64.1); the primeaval or first ordinances, '*prathama dharma*' (*Rgveda* II, 17.1) and ancient ordinances '*sanātana dharma*' (*Rgveda* II 3.1),
3. As 'fixed principles or rules of conduct', (*Rgveda*, IV.53.3, V.63.7, VI 70.1 and VIII. 89.5),
4. As 'merit acquired by the performance of religious rites' (*Atharva Veda*, XI.9.17),
5. As 'the whole body of religious (and moral?) duties' (*Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*, VII.17), and
6. As *āśrama dharma* in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, which envisages *dharma* as denoting moral duties of the three (or four?) different stages of a person's life?

Since we are talking about *dharma* as *purusartha*, for our present purpose senses 3 and 6 are important. According to Śabar Swāmi, 'whatever is a means to the well-being of humanity and of the world at large is *dharma*'⁵⁷. According to Godabarish Mishra,⁵⁸ *dharma* (धर्म) is the basic as well as regulatory principle of all ethical principles.

Though *dharma* (धर्म) is counted as a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) yet it is doubtful whether we can take *dharma* (धर्म) as a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in the sense of end in itself. We have discussed two sense of the word *dharma* (धर्म) earlier. Either it is *phalarupa dharma* (फलरूप धर्म) [an end which is *dharma* (धर्म)] or it is *upāyarupa dharma* (उपायरूप धर्म) or end as means. In the latter sense of morally right *action* or duty, *dharma* (धर्म) can hardly be an end in itself. Some radical moralist may hold that *dharma* (धर्म) in the sense of duty is the end in itself. However the two standard views about *dharma* (धर्म) (in India) hold it to be a means. Accordingly even if it is a good or an end, it is not a good or end in itself but only good *as means*. *Mokṣa* (मोक्ष) alone is a good or end in itself and is unconditionally an end. In his *Vaiśeṣika sūtra* 1.1.2. Kaṇāda says 'यतोअभ्युदयनिःश्रेयससिद्धिः स धर्मः'.⁵⁹ In this statement the word "यतो" literally means from which. Thus *dharma* (धर्म) is here said to be that from which man gets both prosperity (अभ्युदय) and *niḥshśreyas* (निःश्रेयस). *Dharma* (धर्म) is thus said to be the source or *means* also of liberation or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). *Mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the only unconditional end in itself which is permanent and it is not associated with suffering. Further *dharma* (धर्म) is the one *common* means of all the other *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ). There is no sense in saying that *dharma* (धर्म) is the means of *dharma* (धर्म). So *dharma* (धर्म) is a means of the other three *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ): *artha* (अर्थ), *kāma* (काम) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). The important point for us here is that *dharma* (धर्म) is a means of other *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ). So [even if it is itself a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ)]⁶⁰ it cannot be denied that it is a means of some other *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). In fact it is believed to be a means of all the other three *puruṣārtha*-s. These other *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ) are grouped under two heads. One is *abhyudaya* (अभ्युदय) and this includes all prosperities of this world or of the other world. *Artha* (अर्थ)

or wealth and pleasures or *kāma* (काम) of all kinds are included in the class of *abhyudya* (अभ्युदय). *Mokṣa* (मोक्ष) forms a class by itself it is and belongs to the class of *niḥśreyas* (निःश्रेयस). We will soon return to the question in which sense *dharma* (धर्म) is a means of other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ).

The second statement of the meaning of the word *dharma* (धर्म) and the nature of the thing *dharma* (धर्म) is found in the *sūtra* 1.1.2 of Jaimini. It reads “चोदनालक्षणोऽर्थो धर्मः”.⁶¹ The word “चोदना” means *vidhi* (विधि). Both these words are names of those statements of the Veda that are in the imperative mood and enjoin duties or morally right actions of man. Thus *codonā* (चोदना) is moral imperative and only certain utterances of the *Veda*. The other word ‘लक्षणा’ is to be understood as “informs”⁶². Accordingly, the expression ‘चोदनालक्षणा’ means ‘informed by the statements in the imperative mood of the Veda’. So far *dharma* (धर्म) (duties or dutiful actions) is *vidhi bodhita* (विधि बोधित), i.e. injunction of Vidhi. The *sūtra* in question as a whole means the following. *Dharma* (धर्म) is that action which we know from some moral imperative (विधि-वाक्य) of the *Veda* and which is useful (or which will serve some purpose). In the *Veda* there are different kinds of statements of which *vidhi-s* (विधि) form one kind. A *vidhi* (विधि) statement (or better sentence) is in the imperative mood. Such sentences *enjoin* actions as duties. So far they are prescriptive utterances; our word for prescriptive sentence is *pravartaka vākya* (प्रवर्तक वाक्य). A *vidhi* (विधि) or *vidhi vākya* (roughly moral imperative) is called *pravartaka vākya* (प्रवर्तक वाक्य) because it induces or casues (is the janaka of) *pravrtti* (प्रवृत्ति) or volition. However, in India it is admitted that the same sentence can be both prescriptive (प्रवर्तक) and informative (ज्ञापक). A *vidhi*

vākya (चोदना) informs us (ज्ञापक) of a certain duty and obliges us to do that duty; so it is *pravartka* (प्रवर्तक) in respect of that action.

Such actions or duties are of two kinds, *pravṛtilakṣaṇa dharma* (प्रवृत्ति लक्षण धर्म) and *nivṛtilakṣaṇa dharma* (निवृत्ति लक्षण धर्म)⁶³. Many people mistake that *nivṛtilakṣaṇa dharma-s* (निवृत्ति लक्षण धर्म) as those that have no result or no positive result. It is a mistake that *nivṛtilakṣaṇa dharma* (निवृत्ति लक्षण धर्म) is not necessarily the *nityadharmas* (नित्य धर्म) or *nityakarmas* (नित्य कर्म). *Nityakarmas* (नित्य कर्म) are held to have no result or no positive result. But both *pravṛtilakṣaṇa karma* (प्रवृत्ति लक्षण कर्म) and *nivṛtilakṣaṇa karma* (निवृत्ति लक्षण कर्म) produce at least *śuddhi* (शुद्धि) or purification. So far there is no difference between these two types of *karma* (कर्म). But the purifications they produce are of different kinds. The performance of the *pravṛtilakṣaṇa dharmas* (प्रवृत्ति लक्षण धर्म) produces such *śuddhi* (शुद्धि) or purification which is necessary for the eligibility for higher or superior kind of pleasure. Such purification is called *bhogānugūṇaśuddhi* (भोगानुगुणशुद्धि). The performance of the *nivṛtilakṣaṇa dharma* (निवृत्ति लक्षण धर्म) leads to such purification that enables man to have knowledge or *jñāna* (ज्ञान). Such *śuddhi* (शुद्धि) is, therefore, called *jñānānugūṇaśuddhi* (ज्ञानानुगुणशुद्धि). *Jñāna* (ज्ञान) in this context means the right knowledge of the true nature of the soul or *ātmatattvajñāna* (आत्मतत्त्वज्ञान). We did not discuss these points in detail in our earlier discussion of *dharma* (धर्म). Through producing *bhogānugūṇaśuddhi* (भोगानुगुणशुद्धि) *pravṛtilakṣaṇa dharmas* (प्रवृत्ति लक्षण धर्म) becomes a means of the pleasure called *svarga* (स्वर्ग) or the object of *kāma* (काम) called *svargaloka* (स्वर्गलोक). *Nivṛtilakṣaṇa dharma* (निवृत्ति लक्षण धर्म) becomes a means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) by

helping a man to have *jñāna* (ज्ञान) that is necessary for *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). Anyway, *dharma* (धर्म) is a means of *kāma* (काम) or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). We have already discussed how and why (प्रवृत्तिलक्षणधर्म) *dharma* (धर्म) is the means of *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम). Thus it is reconfirmed that *dharma* (धर्म) is the means of all the other three *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ). So, it is itself *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) as end and also as means. And since it is means of all the *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ) other than itself it is the most basic of all *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ). We would also like to suggest that if we eventually find a fifth or a sixth *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) then *dharma* (धर्म) must be a basis of it also.

Mokṣa puruṣārtha (मोक्ष पुरुषार्थ):

There are two major contexts of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) or *mokṣa puruṣārtha* (मोक्ष पुरुषार्थ). One is the context of practice and the other is the context of theory. In the first context the *major* issue is what we need *to do* in order to attain *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). Systems like Yoga⁶⁴ and Tantra or *Kriyāpradhān Tantra*⁶⁵ primarily keeps this context in view. Here also the idea of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) matters but this is expected to be expounded fully and primarily in other systems of knowledge particularly philosophical systems like Sāṃkhya, Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya, Vedānta, Bauddha and so on. In these systems also we inquire about the *mokṣa sādhana* (मोक्ष साधन) but this *sādhana* (साधन) is mainly *jñāna* (ज्ञान). Practices leading to *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) and the details of these practices are not discussed in the philosophical systems. We are here mainly interested in some details about the idea of *mokṣa puruṣārtha* (मोक्ष पुरुषार्थ) which we could not include earlier.

In the chapter on philosophical theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or PTP we will discuss only two versions of PTP. Both of them are versions of the *āstika* (आस्तिक) philosophy. *Nāstika* (नास्तिक) philosophies also have their own version or versions of PTP. Secondly, the two versions of PTP that we will discuss are *Naigamika* (नैगमिक) forms of PTP or the versions of PTP which we find in the philosophies that belong to the *Nigama* (निगम) tradition or *Vaidika* Tradition. It is necessary that we take note of, though briefly, PTPs available in systems of thought that belong to the *Āgama* tradition. Here *Nigama* (निगम) tradition means the tradition of *Śruti* or the *Veda*. The versions of PTP that we will discuss here are belong to this tradition. There are versions of PTP that belong to the *Āgama* tradition also. Here *Āgama* means Tantra.

Normally Indian philosophies (दर्शन) are grouped under two heads: *āstika* (आस्तिक) and *nāstika* (नास्तिक). The familiar forms of *āstika* (आस्तिक) philosophies belong to the *Vaidika* or the *Nigama* (निगम) tradition. In standard philosophical discussions *Āgama* or Tantra theories of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) are not discussed. Vedānta PTP or Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika PTP belongs to the tradition of *Nigama* (निगम); they are *Naigama* versions of PTP. The same is true about the views of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or *mokṣa puruṣārtha* (मोक्ष पुरुषार्थ) of other four standard *āstika* (आस्तिक) schools of philosophy. But the *Āgama* tradition or *Āgamika* theories of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and *mokṣa puruṣārtha* (मोक्ष पुरुषार्थ) are different from the *nāstika* (नास्तिक) theories as well as the theories of the *nigama* (निगम) or the *Vaidika* tradition. The *nigama* (निगम) tradition and the *Āgama* (आगम) tradition are different but not *opposed to* each other. The *nāstika* (नास्तिक) tradition is opposed to the *Vaidika* tradition. This is

one reason why Tantra or the *Āgama* tradition and the theories belonging to this tradition cannot be treated as versions of the *nāstika* (नास्तिक) view. They also do not belong to the *nigama* (निगम) tradition. The final source of the *Āgama* tradition is not *apauroṣeya* (अपौरोषेय).⁶⁶ *Veda* is the teachings of God or Goddess.⁶⁷ So there is some justification for the view that the *Āgama* and *Nigama* traditions are different but not opposed; and none of these is a *nāstika* (नास्तिक) tradition.

For the reason stated above we should, it seems, discuss (i) some *nāstika* (नास्तिक) version of PTP and (ii) some Tantra form of PTP in addition to the (the *Vaidika*) versions of PTP we discussed so far. Many people think that Tantra is not *darśana* (philosophy) and in a philosophical discussion of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), it is not necessary to discuss the Tantra view of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). However, according to some great Indian philosophers of the past and some great scholars of recent times, it is appropriate to discuss Tantra view in philosophical works. We may give three examples. Mm. Gopīnāth Kavirāj in recent time noticed the influence of *Kāśmīr Śaiva Tantra* (which is also known as *Trik darśana* or *Pratyabhijñā darśana*) on such standard *darśana* or *darśana* tradition as Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Yoga⁶⁸. Secondly, Madhavācārya in his *Sarvadarśana Saṃgraha* has devoted one chapter on the *Pratyabhijñā darśana* which is also known as *Kāśmīr Śaiva Tantra*. This shows that he has taken at least this Tantra as a form of philosophical system. In the third place, we note that Udayanācārya has taken serious note of the view of *Kāśmīr Śaivism* when he discussed *mokṣa puruṣārtha* (मोक्ष पुरुषार्थ).⁶⁹ In the literature of classical Indian philosophy in general or of the Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika

School in particular Udayanācārya is a great figure and he took notice of the conception of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) of the *Pratyabhijñā darśana*. Anyway, earlier we could not discuss the *nāstika* (नास्तिक) version of PTP on the one extreme and the *Āgamika* (philosophical) version of PTP on the other extreme.

Many think that among *nāstika-s* (नास्तिक) the Buddhist philosophers have their own theory of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) or *mokṣa puruṣārtha* (मोक्ष पुरुषार्थ) yet the *nāstika* Cārvākas do not believe in *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) and so they cannot have a PTP of any form. Others may say that their conception of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) may be different but in their own way they admit *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). They can argue that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is nothing but death. For the central part of the meaning of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is such a state that if one attains *mokṣa* (मोक्ष), then one is never reborn; he never returns to this world. There is no further return (पुनरागमन) from a state of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). For the Cārvākas, once one is dead he never returns to life; there is no further return (पुनरागमन). They say 'भष्मीभूतस्य देहस्य पुनरागमनं कुतः', where do we see that the body which has been burnt and reduced to ashes returns back? This similarity with *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) in its standard sense makes death (मृत्यु) the same thing as *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). However, there is one difficulty to hold that according to the Cārvākas death is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). If this difficulty was not there we could easily say that the Cārvāka School of philosophy admits *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) but *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) according to this school is death and nothing else. Even ordinary men do not seek unhappiness, sorrow or suffering. And for such men death is a thing to be afraid of. No normal and ordinary man wants to die. Every such man considers death to be painful. And what is painful and hence not an object of

desire can be a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). PTP is a philosophical theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). And death is not a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). So the above view of the Cārvāka that no dead man returns to life cannot be considered as a theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). *Puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) must be a state of positive pleasure of some kind or it must be freedom, of some kind, from pain. How can death be a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ)? Besides, there are arguments to show that the Cārvākas are mistaken to think that every death is the final death. It is only about the final death that Śaṅkarācārya has said ‘... यस्य पुनः न मृत्यु’⁷⁰. Śaṅkarācārya distinguishes the death of a liberated soul from the death of an ordinary man and asks “who is (really) dead, ‘मृतो हि को?’’. And then he answers ‘यस्य पुनर न मृत्यु’ - who will not die a second time. Only he is really dead who will not have to die again. Such men are those who will never be born again. Till a man’s all *prārabdha* (प्रारब्ध कर्म) and *sañcita karma-s* (संचित कर्म) are destroyed he cannot escape the necessity of rebirths and successive deaths. The visible end of life in death is not the end of the necessity of rebirth and successive death. For all these reasons it is unacceptable to hold that there can be a version of PTP according to which there is only one (ultimate) *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) which is death. And this is the Cārvāka version of PTP or the conception of *mokṣa puruṣārtha* (मोक्ष पुरुषार्थ) according to the Cārvāka philosophy.

From what has just been said one should not think that the Cārvāka philosophy does not admit that there is one ultimate goal of life or one final *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Madhusūdana Svarasvatī has presented or interpreted the Cārvāka view of final *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and traced it to their conception of *puruṣa* (पुरुष). According

to him, the Cārvākas believe that there is one ultimate *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). If one likes to call it *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) on this ground, then according to this conception *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the ultimate *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). It will be still questioned what the Cārvākas call the ultimate is really ultimate or not. It is also not the final *puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) of the standard PTPs we discussed. The Cārvākas know that it cannot be of the nature of *duḥkha* (दुःख) or suffering. Madhusūdana Svarasvatī tells us that according to the Cārvāka PTP the final *puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) is *kāma* (काम).⁷¹ They understand by *kāma* (काम) the highest kind of pleasure and pleasure is a positive good. This view of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is consistent with the other tenets of the Cārvāka philosophy. One such tenet is that only sensuous perception is the source of knowledge. Another such tenet is that man is a body — a living and conscious *body*. It is not, what some other schools of Indian philosophy maintain, a conscious *soul* (आत्मा). This Cārvāka view of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is a form of PTP and according to it ultimately speaking *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is one. There is no reason why the Cārvākas should deny that *artha* (अर्थ) is a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). But for them it will be a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) only *as a means* of the ultimate *puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) which is *kāma* (काम). This *kāma* (काम) is a good as end in itself. Like some *āstika* (आस्तिक) *philosophies*, the Cārvāka *philosophy* also admits that *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is one. The Cārvākas further maintain that this one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is *kāma* (काम). This Cārvāka view is better described as a *nāstika* (नास्तिक) version of PTP.

Now the question is: Can we accept this view of the Cārvākas? The Cārvākas are right when they understand by the

word 'puruṣārtha' (पुरुषार्थ) as *puruṣasya artha* (पुरुषस्य अर्थ) or *prayojana* (प्रयोजन); *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is what *puruṣa* (पुरुष) needs. The *āstika-s* have nothing to say against this. The crucial question is: What we should understand by the word *puruṣa* (पुरुष).⁷² We noted that one important tenet of the Cārvāka philosophy is that perception is the only source of knowledge and truth. The Cārvākas hold that we have perceptual evidence for the existence of the physical body (which the *āstika-s* also associate⁷³ with a man). So they admit the existence of body and this is found to be accepted by all including the *āstika-s*. The *nāstika-s* may⁷⁴ admit that this body has sense organ. But they would not admit a sense organ in the sense in which a Naiyāyika admits the sense organ of a man. The dead body of a man is not also *puruṣa* (पुरुष) for it is neither living⁷⁵ nor conscious. *Puruṣa* (पुरुष) means a *conscious* physical body which every one of us has. It is also perceptually evident that we (the conscious bodies) crave for sensuous or bodily pleasure; we desire it. So it is perceptually evident that we have *kāma* (काम) in the sense of desire (इच्छा). And we have *kāma* (काम) in the sense of object of such desire; in this latter sense *kāma* (काम) means things like perceptible smell, taste and the like. So *kāma* (काम) is a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). And everyone including the *āstika-s* also admits *kāma puruṣārtha* (काम पुरुषार्थ). The Cārvākas do not admit in addition any (permanent) soul or permanent pleasure. For, there is no perceptual evidence for their existence. So for the Cārvākas the *dharma* (धर्म) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) of the FVP list of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) have no existence or reality. The *āstika-s* admit that these two are not perceptible; they are *alukika* (अलौकिक). Though *artha* (अर्थ) is a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) it is not *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in the ultimate sense of the term. Man

needs or wants *artha* (अर्थ) only because it could secure pleasure. So in the ultimate sense *kāma* (काम) is the only *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). So the Cārvākas are *Kāmaikapuruṣārthavādin-s* (कामैकपुरुषार्थवादी), that is, they are people who admit *kāma* (काम) alone as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). The *āstika-s* admit *svarga* (स्वर्ग) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) on the basis of *Śāstra* which they call *śabda pramāṇa* (authoritative sentence which produces in the hearer correct knowledge). It may be thought that they admit these on the strength of inference or *anumāna* (अनुमान). But according to the *āstika-s*, like the Naiyāyika-s, for an *anumāna* (अनुमान) to be a *pramāṇa* (प्रमाण) it must not contradict the teachings of the *Śāstra* which is ultimately the *Veda* or *Vedarūpa śabda pramāṇa* (वेदरूप शब्दप्रमाण). The Cārvāka-s argue that *Śāstra* and *Śāstra* controlled *anumāna* (अनुमान) are not *pramāṇa-s* (प्रमाण); they do not give us knowledge or truth. So there is only *pramāṇa* (प्रमाण) which is *pratyakṣa* (प्रत्यक्ष) and there is only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and that is *kāma* (काम).

This view is to be rejected for reasons that we cannot discuss here in detail. Many scholars⁷⁶ of different schools of *āstika* philosophy have convincingly shown that the Cārvākas are wrong when they reject *anumāna pramāṇa* (अनुमान प्रमाण) or *śabda pramāṇa* (शब्द प्रमाण) or suggest that man is nothing but a conscious physical body. So we admit that the Cārvāka view is only one version of PTP. This version of PTP is unacceptable. Now we turn to the *Āgamika* or Tantra form of PTP.

In the standard philosophical texts and discussions on the subject much is not said about the conception of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) in the literature of tantra. Some may think that it is justified as tantra and philosophy (दर्शन) are different. This is true, yet all trantas are not of

the same type. Some tantras or some branches of the same tantra is mainly a system of knowledge (ज्ञानप्रधान). The *Pratyabhijñā* school and *Trik tantra* or *Kāśmīr Śaiva Tantra* are examples⁷⁷. Sāyanamādhavācārya in his book *Sarvadarśaṃgraha* has devoted a whole chapter on *Pratyabhijñā Tantra* (प्रत्यभिज्ञा तन्त्र) and has given the name *Pratyabhijñā darśana* (प्रत्यभिज्ञा दर्शन) to it. What is more important for us that the Great Ācārya of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools of philosophy, Udayanācārya has discussed the *pratyabhijñā* conception of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) in his rather comprehensive treatment of the subject in his book *Kiraṇāvalī* which is an elucidation (व्याख्या) of Praśastapāda's *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*. In his treatment of the subject Udayanācārya discussed the view of the *Trik tantra* or *Trik philosophy*.⁷⁸ He has also noted many different ideas of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) proposed by scholars of different schools of thought.⁷⁹ Among these schools of thought the *pratyabhijñā* branch⁸⁰ of *Kāśhmīr Śaivism* or *Kāśhmīr Śaiva Tantra* is one.

According to *Pratyabhijñā darśana* the ultimate reality is God Śiva. Since Śhiva is *īśvara* (ईश्वर) and He has no second so *Pratyabhijñā darśana* is also called *īśvarādvaitavāda*⁸¹. There are four principal *Advaitavāda*: *Brahmādvaitavāda* of Advaita Vedānta, *Vijñānādvaitavāda* of Yogacāra Bauddhas, *Śabdādvaitavāda* of the Vaiyākaraṇas and *īśvarādvaitavāda* of *Trik Tantra*. The *īśvara* (ईश्वर) or Śiva of *Pratyabhijñā darśana* though One and has no second (He is *advaita* or non-dual) yet He is to be distinguished from the absolute non-dual *Brahman* of the Advaita Vedānta system. *Brahman* does not have even any property or *śakti*, *Brahman* is *nirdharmaka* (निर्धर्मक); but the God Śhiva of *Pratyabhijñā darśana*

has different *śakti-s* (शक्ति) including *jñāna śakti* (ज्ञान) and *kriyā śakti-s* (शक्ति). Both Śhiva and His *śakti-s* (शक्ति) are real. It is not like the *māyāśakti* (मायाशक्ति) of the *Brahman* of the Vedānta. This *māyāśakti* (मायाशक्ति) is different from *Brahman* but it is not real [not *sat* (सत्) but *sat bhinna* (सतभिन्न)]. In spite of admitting both God and his *śakti* (शक्ति), and admitting them both as real, Pratyabhijñā darśana retains its monism; it remains a form of *Advita vāda*. To make this possible it is held in the Pratyabhijñā darśana that *śakti* (शक्ति) and that which has it (the *śaktimān*) is one and the same.

Now the question is: What is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) according to this Pratyabhijñā darśana? Realization of the ultimate and most fundamental principle of reality (परम तत्त्व) is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). This is admitted by all. Only the nature etc. of this *parama tattva* (ultimate reality) differs from one system to another. In *Īśvarādvitavāda* it is *Īśvara* or Śhiva (शिव). So to realize *Īśvara* or Śhiva (शिव) is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) here. But *Īśvara* has many *śakti-s* that are not different from *Īśvara*. Can we say then that to realize the *jñāna śakti* (ज्ञान शक्ति) or *krīyā śakti* (क्रिया शक्ति) of *Īśvara* is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष)? Following Abhinavagupta pāda, Swami Laksana Joo has discussed this in his work⁸² and said it is not so. *Mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is realizing the *Svatantra śakti* of God in which are merged His both *Jñāna śakti* (ज्ञान शक्ति) and *kriyā śakti* (क्रिया शक्ति).⁸³

In his *Kiraṇāvalī* Udayanācārya notes that according to *Pratyabhijñā darśana mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is *svatantrya* (स्वतन्त्र) and *bandha* (बन्ध) is *paratantrya* (परतन्त्र); “पारतन्त्रयं बन्धः स्वातन्त्र्यं च मुक्तिरिति”⁸⁴ Neither Udayanācārya in his *Kiraṇāvalī* nor Gourināth Śāstri in his Bengali elucidation has fully explained these two notions of *paratantrya* (परतन्त्र) and *svatantrya* (स्वतन्त्र). It is not easy

to do so here also. But briefly and simply speaking according to the *Pratyabhijñā darśana mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is God realization (ईश्वर प्रत्यभिज्ञा). This means when one knows the real nature of God then one becomes liberated or *mukta* (मुक्त). Now what is the true nature (तत्त्व) of *Īśvara*? It is His *svātantrya* (स्वातन्त्र) or *svatantrya śakti* (स्वतन्त्र शक्ति). This *śakti* (शक्ति) is nothing other than God or Śiva. God is *svatantrya svarup* (स्वतन्त्र स्वरूप), His nature is *svatantrya svarupatā* (स्वतन्त्र स्वरूपता). So according to this *darśana, mokṣadaśā* (मोक्ष दशा) and *svarupa-svātantrya daśā* (स्वरूप स्वातन्त्र दशा) are one and the same.⁸⁵ Since God is *svatantrya śaktisvarupa* (स्वतन्त्र शक्तिस्वरूप) and Jiva is not really anything other than God then God realization and self realization is the same thing. When Jiva realizes, that is, arrives at the immediate realization (साक्षात्कार) of his own *svatantrya svarup* (स्वतन्त्र स्वरूप) or *svarupa-svātantrya śakti* (स्वरूप स्वातन्त्र शक्ति) he becomes liberated.⁸⁶

Udayanācārya rejects this view of the *Pratyabhijñā darśana*. His reason is that *paratantrya* (परतन्त्र्य) is not in itself or as such a state of bondage or *bandha* (बन्ध). For *Bandha* (बन्ध) is a state of suffering or *duḥkha* (दुःख). If *paratantrya* (परतन्त्र्य) is at all *bandha* (बन्ध) it is so because it causes *duḥkha* (दुःख).⁸⁷ Then if *svātantrya* (स्वातन्त्र) means the cessation of this *duḥkha* (दुःख) and its causes then that is acceptable to the Vaiśeṣikas (and the Naiyāikas). Finally, he says the nature of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is what the Vaiśeṣikas say and what is the minimum sense of the word. It being the minimum sense every school of philosophy has to admit it. Thus *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the final and absolute (आत्यन्तिक) *annihilation* (निवृत्ति) of *duḥkha* (दुःख) which is unconditional evil or *aniṣṭa* (अनिष्ट)⁸⁸.

There are three objections to this position of the Vaiśeṣika. First objection is that the Vaiśeṣikas should make their position clear. Do they mean that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is such annihilation of *duḥkha* (दुःख) plus abundance (प्राचुर्य or निरतिशयत्व) of pleasure? Or do they say along with the annihilation of *duḥkha* (दुःख) *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) means or implies a state in which *sukha* (सुख) is also annihilated. If they mean the second then they are wrong as annihilation of *sukha* (सुख) cannot be *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) which is desirable for men. The second point is that many believe, and it seems to be correct, that human effort or striving presupposes that there should be some *positive* result [*phala* (फल)] which is *bhāvasvarūpa* (भावस्वरूप) for man to strive for. Those who strive for *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) actually strive for *niratiśaya sukha* (which is a positive state) and not *just* for such negative state as *duḥkha nivṛtti* (दुःख निवृत्ति). The third objection is that the effort required for the annihilation of *duḥkha* (दुःख) does not make good sense.

Udayanācārya answered each of these objections in his *Kiraṇāvalī*. His answer to the first objection is that the Vaiśeṣika means by *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) annihilation of all *duḥkha* (दुःख) and also of all *sukha* (सुख). The opponents object that *sukha* (सुख) is what man desires; its annihilation cannot be something that man seeks or needs. In reply to this it is said that we need to clarify the ordinary belief that man desires *sukha* (सुख) or pleasure. Any intelligent or discerning man knows *all* pleasures are not truly desirable. To be desirable it is not enough to be pleasure; for, some pleasures are associated with greater pain. Ultimately only such pleasure is desirable on final analysis which is not *followed* by *any* pain⁸⁹ and is not otherwise associated with greater pain. It follows that permanent

pleasure which is not associated with greater pain can be the true object of seeking or desire. The pleasures which ordinary and ignorant men seek are not permanent. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers found that there is no permanent pleasure. So there is nothing which is really an object of seeking. Therefore if some pleasure is also annihilated along with the annihilation of *duḥkha* (दुःख), then that pleasure is not really a pleasure but *duḥkha* (दुःख) or pain. Even if it is not pain in itself, it is still a pain since it is necessarily associated with pain or even followed by pain. The Vaiśeṣikas say pleasures that are annihilated in the state of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) are not pure or unmixed pleasure. They are such pleasure as is necessarily associated with pain (दुःखानुविद्ध). Though we do not want the annihilation of pure *sukha* (सुख) yet we want to get rid of even pleasure if it is necessarily related to pain or is necessarily followed by pain. It is in this sense only that the Vaiśeṣika conception of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) entails that in the state of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) there is neither *sukha* (सुख) nor *duḥkha* (दुःख). It is total annihilation of all the *viśeṣa guṇa-s* (विशेष गुण) of self that are also impermanent. Within this class of *viśeṣa guṇa-s* (विशेष गुण) are included both *duḥkha* (दुःख) and *sukha* (सुख).

Answer to the second objection is clear now. If man cannot have permanent and unmixed pleasure (for such pleasures do not exist) then the best thing for man to seek is (absolute) freedom from *all* pain. There is nothing absurd or unnatural in seeking freedom from pain. A man who is suffering from severe headache wants to be relieved from this pain. This he wants to secure by taking medicine. He takes medicine not for getting any pleasure as such but for securing relief from pain. So we cannot say man does

not or cannot strive for freedom from pain but only for some positive state of pleasure. Vātsyāyana has said that it is a matter of common experience that we speak of absence of pain as *sukha* (सुख)⁹⁰. A man who has become exhausted after walking a long distance carrying a heavy load on his head gives expression of happiness (सुख) when he gets the opportunity for off loading. This shows that sometimes freedom from pain is as desirable as some state of positive pleasure. The third objection Udayanācārya considers has been noted by Gangeśopādhyāy also in his *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. We may return to it later.

Udayanācārya has noted that different schools of thought have understood different things by *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). The idea of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) they have is significantly different. But a necessary part of all these different ideas is that in the state of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) there is no suffering or *duḥkha* (दुःख). So far as the Vaiśeṣikas (and also Naiyāyikas) hold that *mukti* (मुक्ति) consists in complete freedom from pain, no school of thought can object to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position.⁹¹ Gaurīnāth Śāstri has raised an objection that according to Vedānta, *mukti* (मुक्ति) is not *duḥkha nivṛtti* (दुःख निवृत्ति).⁹² But he seems to have missed the point. Those who hold *mukti* (मुक्ति) is *Brahman* (ब्रह्म) or *Brahmacaitanya* (ब्रह्मचैतन्य) they also would hold that in the state of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) there is no suffering. Thus freedom from suffering is the *common part* of the meaning of the word '*mukti*' (मुक्ति) as it is used in different schools. Besides *Brahman* (ब्रह्म) is *mukti* (मुक्ति) not because he is *Brahman* (ब्रह्म) but because he is *sukha svarūpa* (सुख स्वरूप) or *ānanda svarūpa* (आनन्द स्वरूप). This *ānanda svarūpatā* (आनन्द स्वरूपता) of *Brahman* (ब्रह्म) could not count as *mukti* (मुक्ति) if it were a state of

mixed pleasure, mixed with suffering. So the Vedāntins say *niratiśaya sukha* (निरतिशय सुख) is *mukti* (मुक्ति). According to them the *ānanda* (आनन्द) which is the *svarūpa* (स्वरूप) of *Brahman* (ब्रह्म) is something which is unmixed with pain or suffering. Thus Udayanācārya is right when he says all must admit that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is *duḥkha nivṛtti* (दुःख निवृत्ति). In saying this he means whatever else one means by *mukti* (मुक्ति) he at least means freedom from or annihilation of suffering. We have discussed in PTP chapter the Vedānta conception of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) in detail; here we only discuss the point raised against Udayanācārya by Gourīnāth Śāstri. Udayanācārya is right when he says that there is no difference of opinion among thinkers of different schools that it is necessary for *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) that *duḥkha* (दुःख) is to be completely annihilated. Some may at the most say that in addition to the annihilation of *duḥkha* (दुःख) there must be positive pleasure or *sukha* (सुख). According to these people, the absence of *duḥkha* (दुःख) is a *necessary* condition of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). It is not the whole of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) or not the *sufficient* condition of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष).

Now the question is can we take the Vedāntins to hold such a view? Gourīnāth Śāstri thinks that the answer to this question must be in the affirmative. We do not have the scope to discuss this technical point in detail. The actual position of the analytical Vedānta philosophy is that, according to Vedānta, *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is nothing but *Brahman* (ब्रह्म) itself. And this *Brahman* (ब्रह्म) is by nature *Ānanda* (निरतिशय सुख). On final analysis this *sukha* (सुख) is nothing but the absence of pain (दुःखाभाव). To put it differently according to the Vedāntins *avidyānivṛtti-upalakṣito Brahman* (अविद्यानिवृत्ति उपोलोक्षित ब्रह्म) is *mukti* (मुक्ति). This *avidyānivṛtti*

(अविद्यनिवृत्ति) is something negative; it is referred to by the word (निरतिशय) *sukha* (सुख). Thus, according to the Vedānta also, *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is something negative.

Udayanācārya anticipates that the *Nairātmavādī* Bauddha can argue that a Vaiśeṣika or a Naiyāyika must admit that for *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) annihilation of *ātmā* (आत्मा) will also be necessary. For according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, *ātmā* (आत्मा) is the inherence *cause* of *duḥkha* (दुःख). If for *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) the annihilation of causes of *duḥkha* (दुःख) is necessary, then it is to be admitted that unless *ātmā* (आत्मा) is destroyed there cannot be *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). On the other hand if Vaiśeṣika or Naiyāyika admits that *ātmā* (आत्मा) is annihilated [in the state of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष)] then he must admit *Nairātmavād* (नैरात्मवाद). In other words, they must convert to Buddhism. In reply Udayanācārya clarifies the actual argument. The rule is not that every cause of *duḥkha* (दुःख) must be annihilated if man is to have complete absence of *duḥkha* (दुःख) or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). The actual principle is that for *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) all destructible or *anitya* (अनित्य) causes of *duḥkha* (दुःख) should be annihilated. Among the causes of *duḥkha* (दुःख) there are impermanent and destructible causes like body (शरीर) as well as indestructible cause like *ātmā* (आत्मा) or self. No question of annihilation of *ātmā* (आत्मा) arises as it is permanent and indestructible.⁹³

Notes and Refferences

¹ Sāstri, Pañcānan, *Paribhāṣā-saṃgraha* on *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, Pañcānan Sāstri edition, Kolkata, 1884 (Shakabda) p. 6.

² In the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* we find such statement as 'धर्मार्थ-काम-मोक्षेषु चतुर्विध- पुरुषार्थेषु मोक्ष एव परमपुरुषार्थ'. Here there are *four puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) in the list. — Adhvarīndra, Dharmarāja, *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, Pañcānan Sāstri edition, Kolkata, p. 4.

³ Krishna, Daya, *Indian Philosophy: A Counter Perspective*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1991, p. 205.

⁴ Ibid., p. 6.

⁵ Dr. A. Schweitzer in his 'Indian Thought and its Development' has written that the Hindu attitude is world and life negating but the Christian attitude is world and life affirming. —Kane, P.V., *The History of Dharmasastra*, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, poona, 1975, p.1647.

⁶ He has said this on the basis of Kathoponiṣad (2/14) in the introduction of his translation of *Khandanakhandakhādyam* by Sṛīharṣa, Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture, Golpark, 2000, p.18.

⁷ Basu, Rajasekhara, *Mahābhārat* (in Bengali), M.C. Sarkar & sons. Pvt.Ltd, Kolkata, 1414 (Bengali era),.

⁸ Mishra, Kamalakar, *Indian Values For Success In Practical Life*, Kashi Yoga Evam Mulya-Shiksa Sanstha, Varanasi, 2016, p. 47.

⁹ Ibid., p. 47.

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 47- 48. Italics are ours.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 48.

¹² Ibid., p.48, emphasis is ours. We do not find any evidence to say that the Seers experienced this problem.

¹³ About *mokṣa puruṣārtha* (मोक्ष पुरुषार्थ) there is some uncertainty. According to some version of PTP there is only one soul. It may appear that according to such PTP the class of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) will be a unit class.

¹⁴ Prasad, Rajendra, *Karma, Causation and Retributive Morality: Conceptual Essays in Ethics and Metaethics*, ICPR, New Delhi, 1989, p. 276.

¹⁵ Krishna, Daya, *Indian Philosophy: A Counter Perspective*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1991, p. 6.

¹⁶ As stated by Madhusūdāna Svaraswatī in the elucidation, *Gūḍārthadīpikā*, on the verse 16.11 of the *Bhagavad Gītā*, Nababharat Publishers, Kolkata, 1986, p. 1020.

¹⁷ '...काम एवैकः पुरुषार्थ', Ibid., p. 1020.

¹⁸ The central point is that man and not animals come under the purview of moral injunction; only actions of man are subjected to moral judgment.

¹⁹ This shows that *dharma* (धर्म) must also be taken as a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), may be more basic *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). So far ekavarga (एकवर्ग) theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) with *kāma* (काम) as the only *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) does not seem to be possible.

²⁰ We will explain later why we need to add the qualification primarily.

²¹ What we generally take to be *dharma* (धर्म) is *pravṛtti lakṣaṇa dharma* (प्रवृत्ति लक्षण धर्म) and it secures *bhogānugūṇaśuddhi* (भोगानुगुणशुद्धि). The man who has attained this śuddhi (शुद्धि) is able to enjoy higher form of pleasure or sukha (सुख). For *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) we need to transcend or go beyond this type of *dharma* (धर्म). There is another kind of *dharma* (धर्म) called *nivṛtti lakṣaṇa dharma* (निवृत्ति लक्षण धर्म) which secures *jñānānugūṇaśuddhi* (ज्ञानानुगुणशुद्धि). Performance of this kind of *dharma* (धर्म) helps us in securing *mokṣa* (मोक्ष).

²² Svaraswatī, Swamī Chandraśekharendra, 'Magnifying Glass of the Veda' in *Hindu Dharma: The Universal Way of Life*, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Mumbai, 1996, p. 433.

²³ Tripathi Bhagirath Prasad, *Sanskritvāṃmayamanthanam* (in Sanskrit), Sanskrit Bharati, Varanasi, 1990.

²⁴ *The Gīta* with the elucidation *Gūḍārthadīpikā* of Madhusūdana Svaraswatī, Nababharat Publishers, Calcutta, 1986, p. 1019.

²⁵ To put it truly and more strictly the Cārvākas do not accept *śabdapramāna* (शब्दप्रमाण) as a *separate* and independent source of knowledge.

²⁶ Madhusūdana Svaraswatī mentioned this *Bṛhaspati sūtra* "...कामएवैकः पुरुषार्थः..." in *Gūḍārthadīpikā* on *the Gīta* (16/11), Nababharat Publishers, Calcutta, 1986, p.1020.

²⁷ Such people are called *āsakta* (आसक्त) people or people who tread *pravṛttimārga* (प्रवृत्तिमार्ग) or the path of desire or inclination.

²⁸ One standard meaning of *nāstika* (नास्तिक) is that one who denies the existence of *paraloka* (परोलोक) is *nāstika* (नास्तिक) and one who believes in it is *āstika* (आस्तिक). This sense can be traced to the *Kathopaniṣad*.

²⁹ Srimohan Tarka Vedānta Tīrtha has said this in the Introduction of the Bengali translation of *Khandanakhandakhādyam* by Śrīharṣa, Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture, Golpark, 2000.

³⁰ Maharṣi Vālmiki, *Rāmāyana*, Ayodhyākānda 100/62-63, Gita Press, Gorakhpur.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 100/62-63.

³² Svaraswatī, Madhusūdana, *Gūḍārthadīpikā* on the Gīta (6/26), Nababharat Publishers, Calcutta, 1986, pp. 553-558.

³³ *Bhagavad Gītā* — 2/62-63.

³⁴ Svaraswatī, Madhusūdana, *Gūḍārthadīpikā* on the Gīta (2/62), Nababharat Publishers, Calcutta, 1986, pp. 267-269.

³⁵ *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣada*—1/4/17, with the commentary of Śaṃkarācārya, Gita Press, Gorakhpur, 2052 (vikramavda).

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 1/4/3.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ This goal is called *abhyudaya* (अभ्युदय) or prosperity. This is different from the highest goal *mokṣa* (मोक्ष).

³⁹ *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣada*, p. 689.

⁴⁰ *Kathopaniṣada* — 1/25.

⁴¹ The pleasure which the devatās in *svarga* (स्वर्ग) enjoys has two features which make it superior. It is not associated with pain or suffering (न दुःखेन संबिन्नम्) and it is long lasting (न ग्रस्थं अनन्तरम्). And it is desired. So the meaning of the word 'svarga' is this. Bhutnāth Saptatirtha has said this in the introduction of his Bengal translation of the book *Mimāṃsādarśanam*, Basumati Sahitya Mandir, 1348 (Bengali era), p. 22.

⁴² 'काम्यत्वं अभिलाषविषयत्वं' — *Nyāyakosh*.

⁴³ 'न वा अरे सर्वस्व कामाय सर्वम् प्रियं भभति, आत्मानस्तु कामायसर्वम् भभति'-
Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣada.

⁴⁴*Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣada* 1/4/17 and Tripathi Bhagirath Prasad, *Sanskritavānmayamanthanam*, Sanskrit Bharati, Varanasi, 1990, pp. 61-62.

⁴⁵ Tripathi Bhagirath Prasad, *Sanskritavānmayamanthanam*, Sanskrit Bharati, Varanasi, 1990, p. 62.

⁴⁶ In the Rgveda Mandala 10, the story of Yama and his sister Yami illustrates that *dharma* (धर्म) demands that the successful conjugal life is possible only for those who like Yama exercise discipline as per the rules of *dharma* (धर्म) and not for Yami who were devoid of this and were only guided by her sensual urge. —Tripathi Bhagirath Prasad, *Sanskritavānmayamanthanam*, Sanskrit Bharati, Varanasi, 1990, pp. 68-69

⁴⁷ Kavirāj, Gopināth, 'Nyāyakusumānjali' (in English), Shāstri, Gourināth (ed) in *Notes On Religion and Philosophy*, Sampurnanada Sanskrit University, Varanasi, 1987, pp. 282-308

⁴⁸ Ibid., Italics added by me.

⁴⁹ We say this because the Mīmāṃsā view of *svarga* (स्वर्ग) is not shared by philosophies like Nyāya.

⁵⁰ Often the Mīmāṃsā position is misunderstood. We cannot discuss it here. One may read the Introduction to the work *Mīmāṃsā darśanam* in which Bhutanāth Saptatīrtha has edited and translated in Bengali Mīmāṃsā sutra text in two volumes.

⁵¹ Saptatīrtha, Bhutanāth, Bengal translation of the book *Mīmāṃsādarśanam*, Basumati Sahitya Mandir, 1348 (Bengali era), p. 289.

⁵² Radhakrishnan, S, *Indian philosophy*, (George Allen and Unwin, 1923), p.52 as quoted by Mahapatra, P. K, in Prasad, Rajendra (ed.), *A Historical-Developmental Study of Classical Indian Philosophy of Morals*, Centre for Studies in Civilization, Delhi, 2009, p.16.

⁵³ Mahapatra, P. K, in Prasad, Rajendra (ed.), *A Historical-Developmental Study of Classical Indian Philosophy of Morals*, Centre for Studies in Civilization, Delhi, 2009, p.16.

⁵⁴ Chakrabarti, Samiran Chandra, *The Concept of Puruṣārthas*, Maharshi Sandipani Rashtriya Ved Vidya Pratisthan, Ujjain, 2000, p. 63.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 62.

⁵⁶ Kane, P, V, *History of Dharmaśāstra*, (Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, 1930), pp. 1-4 as quoted in Mahapatra, P.K, in Prasad, Rajendra (ed.), *A Historical-Developmental Study of*

Classical Indian Philosophy of Morals, Centre for Studies in Civilization, Delhi, 2009, pp. 17-18.

⁵⁷ *Mimāṃṣā Darśanam* with Śābarabhāṣyam, (Anandasrama Press, Poona, 1976) p-20 as quoted in Mahapatra, P.K, in Prasad, Rajendra (ed.), *A Historical-Developmental Study of Classical Indian Philosophy of Morals*, Centre for Studies in Civilization, Delhi, 2009, p.18.

⁵⁸ Mishra, Godabarish, 'Dharma-Ethics Gleanings from Buddhism and Advaita' in *Dharma and Ethics*, edited by Srivastava, D.C., Bijoy H.Boruah, p. 56.

⁵⁹ Śāstri, Swami Dvarikādāsa (ed.), *Saḍdarśanasūtrasaṃgrahah*, Sudhi Prakashanam, Varanasi, 1988, p.151.

⁶⁰ We will not enter into any controversy on this point here. Our point is to show evidence for regarding *dharma* (धर्म) as a good as means.

⁶¹ Śāstri, Swami Dvarikādāsa (ed.), *Saḍdarśanasūtrasaṃgrahah*, Sudhi Prakashanam, Varanasi, 1988, p.1.

⁶² Saptatirtha, Bhutnāth, Bengal translation of the book *Mimāṃṣādarśanam* (vol-1), Basumati Sahitya Mandir, 1348 (Bengali era), p. 11.

⁶³ 'द्विविधो हि वेदोक्त धर्मः प्रवृत्तिलक्षणो निवृत्तिलक्षणः च' — Saṃkarācārya, the beginning of the adhyāṣbhāṣya on Srimadbhagavat *Gītā*, Gita Press, Gorakhpur.

⁶⁴ *Yoga darśanam* of Patanjali is an example.

⁶⁵ Joo, Swami Laksman, *Trikṣāstra Rahasya Prakriyā* (in Hindi), (available in manuscript form and its photocopy), Isvar Ashram Trust, Srinagar, Kashmir, 2006.

⁶⁶ It is to be noted that the āstika (आस्तिक) Naigamika (नैगमिक) systems like Nyāya or Vaiśeṣika do not admit that the Veda is apauruṣeya (अपौरुषेय). But at least some Naigamika (नैगमिक) schools believe that the Veda is apauruṣeya (अपौरुषेय). But no Āgamika school agrees that the source of the Āgama Tradition like *Malinivijayatantra* is apauruṣeya (अपौरुषेय).

⁶⁷ 'आगतम शिव वक्त्रेभ्यो घटं च गिरिजा श्रुतौ मतं च वासुदेवस्य तस्मागतं उच्यते', quoted in Jha *Kamales, Āgama-Samvid*, Indica Books, 2064 (vikrama Samvat).

⁶⁸ Kavirāj, Gopināth, *History and Bibliography of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Literature*, Sampurnanada Sanskrit University, Varanasi, 1982.

⁶⁹ Udayanācārya, *Kiraṇāvalī* (edited with Bengali translation and explanation by Śāstri, Gaurināth), Paschimbanga Rajya Pustak Parsat, Kolkata, 1990, p. 94.

⁷⁰ *Praśnattoro Malikā* of Śaṅkarācārya.

⁷¹ Svaraswatī, Madhusūdan, *Gūḍārthadīpikā* (Elucidation in Sanskrit of the *Bhagavad Gītā*) with Bengali translation by Pt. Bhūtanāth Saptatīrtha and edited by Nalinikānta Brahma, Navabharat Publishers, Calcutta, 1986.

⁷² It has been elaborately discussed by Bhattacharya, Swati, 'The Logic of Human Needs', JICPR, vol- xxvi, number-3, New Delhi, 2009.

⁷³ The *āstika*-s do not hold that this body *is* the man; but they *associate* it with man. A man *has* a body.

⁷⁴ Any physical body like a mountain is not a man. For, one reason is that it has no sense organ even if it can be said to have a physical 'body' in some sense.

⁷⁵ It has no *prāna* (प्राण). If this *prāna* (प्राण) is an imperceptible form of *vāyu* (air) then the Cārvākas cannot admit it.

⁷⁶ Udayanācārya and Gangeśopādhyāy are among them.

⁷⁷ Joo, Swami Laksman, *Trikśāstra Rahasya Prakriyā* (in Hindi), (available in manuscript form and its photocopy), Isvar Ashram Trust, Srinagar, Kashmir, 2006, p. 10.

⁷⁸ Udayanācārya, *Kiraṇāvalī* (edited with Bengali translation and explanation by Gaurīnāth Śāstri), Paschimbanga Rajya Pustak Parsat, Kolkata, 1990.

⁷⁹ In another useful work *Setu* we find many different notions of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). This work is an elucidation (व्याख्या) of the *Praśastapāḍa bhāṣya*.

⁸⁰ The four schools of *Kāshmir Śaivism* or *Trik Tantra* are Kaula, Pratyabhijñā, Krama, and Spanda, —Joo, Swami Laksman, *Trikśāstra Rahasya Prakriyā* (in Hindi), (available in manuscript form and its photocopy), Isvar Ashram Trust, Srinagar, Kashmir, 2006, p. 10.

⁸¹ Kavirāj, Gopināth, *The History and Bibliography of Nyāya Vaiśeṣika Literature*, Sampurnanada Sanskrit University, Varanasi, 1982, p. 7.

⁸² Joo, Swami Laksman. *Triksastra Rahasya Prakriya* (in Hindi), Isvar Ashram Trust, Srinagar, Kashmir, 2006.

⁸³ Ibid., pp. 30-31.

⁸⁴ Udayanācārya, *Kiraṇāvalī* (edited with Bengali translation and explanation by Śāstri, Gaurīnāth), Paschimbanga Rajya Pustak Parsat, Kolkata, 1990, p. 94.

⁸⁵ Joo, Swami Laksman, *Triksāstra Rahasya Prakriyā* (in Hindi), (available in manuscript form and its photocopy), Isvar Ashram Trust, Srinagar, Kashmir, 2006, p. 30.

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 31.

⁸⁷ Udayanācārya, *Kiraṇāvalī* (edited with Bengali translation and explanation by Śāstri, Gaurīnāth), Paschimbanga Rajya Pustak Parsat, Kolkata, 1990, p. 94.

⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 102.

⁸⁹ Or preceded by greater pain. If a pleasure is such that to acquire it men are to encounter greater pain no man will seek it.

⁹⁰ दृष्टो हि दुःखाभावे सुखशब्दप्रयोगो बहुलं लोक इति- Bhāṣya on *Nyāyāsūtra* 1.1.22, Paschimbanga Rajya Pustak Parsat, Kolkata, 2011, p. 242.

⁹¹ निःश्रेयसम् पुनर्दुःखनृत्तिरात्यन्तिकीः अत्र च वादिनामविवाद एव— Udayanācārya, *Kiraṇāvalī* (edited with Bengali translation and explanation by Śāstri, Gaurīnāth), Paschimbanga Rajya Pustak Parsat, Kolkata, 1990, p. 62.

⁹² Ibid., p. 75.

⁹³ Udayanācārya, *Kiraṇāvalī* (edited with Bengali translation and explanation by Śāstri, Gaurīnāth), Paschimbanga Rajya Pustak Parsat, Kolkata, 1990, p. 76.
