

Chapter- II

Familiar View of *Puruṣārtha* (FVP)

In the First chapter we have discussed whether *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) could be a topic of philosophical theory or not. Our answer was in the affirmative. One of the main reasons was that some modern scholars have found it proper to discuss this subject. One of them is Prof. Daya Krishna. In the chapter “The Myth of the Purusarthas” in his book *Indian Philosophy: A counter perspective* he has discussed this theme. He has also raised a number of questions about *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ).¹ All through he has given prominence to the view according to which there are four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). This view we call as the familiar view of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) or FVP. We distinguish this from what is truly the Indian philosophical theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or PTP. Daya Krishna writes “The usual four-fold classification of the purusarthas, it is claimed, encompasses within it all the actual or possible goals that mankind may pursue for itself. ...in any clear manner the goals men pursue or ought to pursue?”² The emphasis is added to indicate that it is doubtful that every single *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) was meant to be pursuit for its own sake. It is not our plan to discuss the view of each one of these modern thinkers. And it is not our intention to take a historical approach on the subject. Indra Sen, who was influenced by Daya Krishna’s writings on *mokṣa* (मोक्ष), is right when he says the following: “Thus mokṣa becomes the focal theme of all life and existence and it needs to be understood and taken as such and not as a favourite historical concept in Indian philosophy with fixed variants, usages and connotations. We can easily get lost in these usages and connotations if we forget the

essential human urge behind them. This urge really unifies and gives them coherent meanings.”³

Keeping all these in mind we begin this chapter by drawing a distinction which the scholars do not usually draw. We distinguish the popular or familiar view of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or FVP from the philosophical theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or PTP. We will discuss PTP in a later chapter separately. In this chapter we will discuss FVP. Here we need to clarify first the meaning of the word ‘*puruṣārtha*’ (पुरुषार्थ) or which object the word ‘*puruṣārtha*’ (पुरुषार्थ) denotes. Afterwards, we will discuss the nature of the phenomenon *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). So, both the logic of the *word* approach and the logic of the *thing* approach will be our main point of concentration here. So far as the second point is concerned, we will discuss the definition and nature of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and also its sub-division and the relation among them.

‘*Puruṣārtha*’ (पुरुषार्थ) means ‘*puruṣasya artha*’ (पुरुषस्य अर्थ). Here ‘*artha*’ (अर्थ) means ‘*prayojana*’ (प्रयोजन) or in simple English ‘need’. The word ‘*puruṣa*’ (पुरुष) means here human being. So, ‘*puruṣārtha*’ (पुरुषार्थ) means human needs. Here a point should be noted that ‘*puruṣa*’ (पुरुष) or man means embodied soul. For, only such soul can have desire, strive after and action which the human perform to achieve the goal. Desire, strivings and actions cannot be literally ascribed to pure soul (आत्मा). *Puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is the goal of human being which he naturally wants to achieve in life. There are some needs which are also treated as value. So, it has been said that *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) means those needs which are also values of human life. In short, what man seeks is *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Hence, it is an object of man’s seeking. M. Hiriyanna in his book *Popular*

Essays in Indian Philosophy said the meaning of the term '*puruṣārtha*' (पुरुषार्थ) is 'what is sought by men'⁴. Here a point must be noted that even the animals other than man also seek some objects which will help them to survive in this world. *Puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), though is an object of seeking, yet is different from the other objects of seeking. M. Hiriyanna Expressed the matter in this way: "...man, like the other living beings, acts instinctively; but he can also do deliberately. That is, he can consciously set before himself ends and work for them. It is this conscious pursuit that transforms them into *purusartha*."⁵ Rationality makes the difference between man and animal other than man. Man can rationally choose what to do. So, the object of man's seeking becomes *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) whereas the object of other's (animal) seeking is just need. Since man is rational being, he can judge what should be his goal and through which means he can reach it or actualize this goal.

Thus we can say '*puruṣārtha*' (पुरुषार्थ) means the goal of human life which is chosen to be achieved. So, in this sense man is not only aware of what he seeks, he is also conscious about the way or path through which the goal can be achieved. According to M. Hiriyanna, the first part (पुरुष) of the compound word '*puruṣārtha*' (पुरुषार्थ) means who is not only conscious about the end of life but is also about the path to achieve the end. The other part (अर्थ) of the compound word refers to the end itself which is though non-existent or non-achieved at the time, yet can be achieved through the right means. It is a 'value to be realized.' So, in the Indian Philosophical Tradition it is described as '*sādhya*' (साध्य). In this sense all the *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are *sādhya* (साध्य). Now, the pursuit of a value or *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) presupposes knowledge not only of what that

puruṣārtha (पुरुषार्थ) is but also of a suitable means to its realization. The means or *sādhana* (साधन), in a derivative or secondary sense, to realize or to achieve the *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) are also known as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Keeping the distinction in mind Prof. Hirianna described the value which is to be realized as 'intrinsic' (मुख्य) and the means to achieve it as 'instrumental' (गौण). This distinction can also be described as good-as-end (फलरूप पुरुषार्थ) and good-as-means (उपायरूप पुरुषार्थ). As for example, money, when man seeks it for itself, becomes intrinsic *puruṣārtha* (मुख्य पुरुषार्थ). But when man treats it as a means to achieve other *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ), it becomes instrumental *puruṣārtha* (गौण पुरुषार्थ). Thus we may define a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) following Prof. Hirianna in this way. It is "...an end which is consciously sought to be accomplished either for its own sake or for the sake of utilizing it as a means of the accomplishment of a future end."⁶

Prof. J. N. Mohanty said in his book *Classical Indian Philosophy*⁷ that in Indian tradition these four goals become the themes of four basic sciences; *Arthaśāstra* (science of political economy), *Kāmasūtra* (the aphorisms on erotic pleasure), *Dharmaśāstra* (the science of ethics), and *Mokṣaśāstra* (the science of spiritual freedom). He uses the word 'science' in a broad sense to mean a systematic study or branch of knowledge. *Darśana* (दर्शन) is that system of knowledge which studies the theme *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) systematically.

Now let us come to our point. We have mentioned above that many recent scholars discuss *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or issues related to *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). However, there is a distinction between the philosophical doctrine of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in Indian Tradition and what these scholars discuss. What these scholars discuss can be

more appropriately described as the popular or familiar view of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or FVP. It is not, strictly speaking, the philosophical doctrine or doctrines of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or PTP. The nature of this distinctions and why we make it here will be elaborately discussed. We would also show in this connection what is the source of FVP other than philosophy. But it should not be concluded that FVP and PTP are necessarily antithetical. Rather my intention is to show that FVP and PTP, though are different, are not antithetical, but continuous. Though FVP is not a philosophical doctrine yet we will discuss it elaborately. For, there are many anomalies in FVP. Unless we clear FVP, the Indian view of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) will not be clear and we will show that this *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the only *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) which forms the subject-matter of PTP. We will also try to remove the anomalies in FVP and thereby we will try to systematize FVP as far as possible.

So far as PTP is concerned *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) means highest object of human seeking. Even among all the *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) admitted in FVP only the highest one (मोक्ष) is *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) according to PTP. In other words we can say *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the highest fulfilment or need of human life.

Now we will discuss FVP, the different *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) admitted in it and the relation among them. FVP is concerned with a scheme of four (or three) *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ): *dharma* (धर्म), *artha* (अर्थ), *kāma* (काम) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). According to FVP, *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the highest *puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ). In this theory *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are admitted in a hierarchical order. This hierarchical order is very significant for FVP. In this hierarchical list of them, the *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are a few broad kinds of human

needs. It is expected that all human needs will come under these few broad kinds. Here we should keep in mind that the order of these four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) has not been mentioned in the same way by all the different scholars. Sometimes the order is 'artha (अर्थ), kāma (काम), dharma (धर्म), mokṣa (मोक्ष)', and sometimes 'dharma (धर्म), artha (अर्थ), kāma (काम) and mokṣa (मोक्ष)'. The scholars have not discussed any reason for the different ways they order the *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). A very well known scholar Dr. Rajendra Prasad remarked that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) can be reduced to *kāma* (काम).⁸ Daya Krishna also said about this reduction.⁹ But students of Nyāya know that Vātsyāyana in his *bhāṣya* has already shown why this is not possible.¹⁰ According to Nyāya philosophy, the last three are positive state but *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is not. Another important point is that last three *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are impermanent whereas *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is not impermanent in that sense. Moreover, these last three *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are such pleasures as are always mixed with or associated with pain. *Mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is not such. As *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), the three by nature are pleasure. Then how can they be associated with pain? The answer is: these three are impermanent. So, at least the pain for losing the pleasure will be there (impermanent pleasure is lost or destroyed). But why these three impermanent things, which are associated with pain, are admitted in FVP as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ)? This question is not easy to answer. It is true that we all seek both *dharma* (धर्म) and *kāma* (काम). But how many of us have taken them as goal of life? Moreover, when we take *dharma* (धर्म) as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), we need to be sure of the meaning of the term. It is not easy to fix the meaning of the word '*dharma*' (धर्म). For it has different meaning.

Though FVP advocates the theory of four (or three) *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ), yet its claim is every particular good or need of human life is included in these *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). As for example, many different things having economic value are included in the *puruṣārtha artha* (अर्थ पुरुषार्थ). The same holds about *kāma* (काम पुरुषार्थ). If these are the only four broad classes of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ), then these classes are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. Some modern scholars like Prof. Daya Krishna doubts that they are jointly exhaustive. He holds that there are other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) as well.¹¹

Some again hold that the four-fold *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) was not there in the early Vedic period. At that time only three fold scheme of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) were there, i.e. first three without *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). At a later time *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) has been incorporated. Prof. J. N. Mohanty, Prof. Rajendra Prasad, Prof. Daya Krishna etc. admit this view. There are others who hold that like *dharma* (धर्म), *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम), *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) was also admitted in the *Vaidika* period.

There are some important questions about FVP. What is the sense of the word '*puruṣārtha*' (पुरुषार्थ) which is common to the four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) admitted in this popular view? Secondly, can there be more than four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) in this sense? How to understand the given hierarchy — *dharma* (धर्म), *artha* (अर्थ), *kāma* (काम) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष)? If we take it vertically, it is not difficult to take *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) to be the highest. But it is difficult to accept the place of *dharma* (धर्म) below *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम). What it means to place *dharma* (धर्म) at the bottom? Mīmāṃsā provides an answer why *dharma* (धर्म) cannot be an object of desire in the sense

in which *kāma* (काम) or pleasure can be. *Nyāyadarśana* tells us also why we cannot have desire of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). According to them, desire and liberation cannot co-exist. Again, why *kāma* (as desire for some good or happiness as the result of *dharma*) cannot be the means of *dharma* (धर्म)? If we cannot answer or explain these questions, FVP will appear to be unsystematic and anomalous.

The hierarchy in which FVP believes is from the bottom *dharma* (धर्म), *artha* (अर्थ), *kāma* (काम) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). Now, some questions, though difficult, are important to answer here. a) What are the inclusive and exclusive senses of the expression '*puruṣārtha*' (पुरुषार्थ)? b) What is meant by each of the expressions — '*dharma*' (धर्म), '*artha*' (अर्थ), '*kāma*' (काम) and '*mokṣa*' (मोक्ष)? The ordinary sense of the word '*puruṣārtha*' (पुरुषार्थ) we have stated above is also the inclusive sense of it. The need (प्रयोजन) of man is that sense.¹² One may ask here that how we know that man needs such thing. Is it a statement of fact that man needs *dharma* (धर्म), *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम) etc.? How do we know that men need them? Do we know them empirically? The answer is yes. From our own experiences we can say that man needs *artha* (अर्थ) etc. But this does not tell us why they need it. Is there any logical reason or formal criterion why man can be said to need *dharma* (धर्म) etc.? Man can be said to need an x if his awareness of x produces in him a desire of the form 'may I have it (x)'. According to this criterion, pleasure is a human need, i.e. it can take the place of x in the above criterion. We all want pleasure. The same criterion tells us on the other hand that man does not need pain but needs freedom from pain or absence of pain. We will discuss these two needs in greater detail later in our chapter on PTP. Now the point is this — it

is empirically known that man needs not just these four things but many more. Even, according to the above criterion, man needs education, health-care, food, cloth etc. All these should be equally *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). There is no problem to take these needs as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in both commonsense view and in the view of FVP. Even men are found to be simultaneously engaged in both the positive and negative seeking — seeking for pleasure and seeking for freedom from pain. So, there is no incompatibility between these two *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) — positive and negative *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). But one may feel essential incompatibility between seeking *parama puruṣārtha* (मोक्ष) and seeking of power and family etc. Anyway, another important question one may ask when we say there are innumerable *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). The question is: Why the number of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) is just four (as we see in FVP)? The answer is *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is not what man needs. *Puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is broadest class of things man needs. FVP has found that there are four such broad classes of things which man needs. FVP does not give us a list of human needs. It gives us a broad classification of human needs. We will do justice if we take FVP as a theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). However as a theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) it is not perfect. It has many anomalies and other defects. We will try to solve them and make it more systematic. Though the modern scholars discuss not PTP but FVP, yet they do not take FVP as an approximation to a theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). They also do not try to systematize it.

Now we are trying to mention some important anomalies of FVP.

- i. The number of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) it admits is four — *dharma* (धर्म), *artha* (अर्थ), *Kāma* (काम) and *Mokṣa* (मोक्ष).¹³
- ii. It admits *dharma* (धर्म) to be a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ).
- iii. It does not include *svarga* (स्वर्ग) in the list of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) and
- iv. It holds *dharma* (धर्म) to be the lowest *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ).

Here a point needs to be noted that PTP denies each and every point stated above. As for example,¹⁴ PTP admits that there may be only two *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) — pleasure and absence of pain. As we have said earlier that FVP admits four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ), viz. *dharma* (धर्म), *artha* (अर्थ), *kāma* (काम) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). About the source of FVP we can say that its source is not PTP. It is rather derived from sources like *Purāṇa* (पुराण) and *ītihāsa* (इतिहास). For example, in the *Viṣṇupurāṇa* and the *Mahābhārata* it has been said clearly that the number of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) is four.¹⁵ Both Pt. Pancānan Śastri¹⁶ and Mm. Phanībhuṣan Tarkavāgīśa¹⁷ have said that the present view about *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) was familiar and popular among the people in the past.

Now, how should one understand and justify the FVP scheme of four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ)? How in the four-fold scheme the four *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) are related to one another? It is stated above that sometimes *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) stands for good as means and sometimes for good as end. Now, the question: Which *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in the list stated above is related as means to which other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ)? All will agree at the point that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is not a means to any other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). It is necessarily an end in itself. A man who wants or needs freedom

from pain will not say that he needs freedom from pain for some other goals. He will say that it is for its own sake that he wants freedom from pain. He does not want to get anything still higher or better through this means. It is not a means of anything. It is not related as means to any other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). It is the goal in itself, the good in itself. Though it is not means to any other *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), some other *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) can be its means. If each one of the other three *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) is also an end in itself, then we cannot relate them as means and end. Let us then ask first: How *dharma* (धर्म), *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम) are related among them? If and how any one of the other three *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) is related to *mokṣa* (मोक्ष)? Secondly, is any one of them related to a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) other than *mokṣa* (मोक्ष)? If the three or four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are not related as means and as end, we will not be able to justify the order of four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) listed in FVP. And if it is that, then we will not be able to give any consistent interpretation of FVP. To put it differently, if we fail to show any relation (whether it is as means and end relation or any other relation) among these four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ), then we will not be able to justify the order in which these *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are mentioned in FVP. Our first problem was how to understand FVP and its four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ)? How to read the list of four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) and understand their order? Which is at the top and which is at the bottom? One possible suggestion is that the four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are arranged in a hierarchy of means and end. Now the question is: Which is the means to which other *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ)?

It is commonly understood that *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम) can be related as means and end. In this sense ‘*artha*’ (अर्थ) means money or wealth¹⁸. But *artha* (अर्थ) is not an end in itself. Men do not desire money for money’s sake but because we can buy pleasure with money. *Artha* (अर्थ) can be a means to get *kāma* (काम), i.e. it can be a means to another *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Money is a kind of means to get pleasure. So, it is not a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in the primary sense. It is not an end in itself. However, it can be admitted as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in the secondary sense¹⁹. On the other hand, in relation to *artha* (अर्थ), *kāma* (काम) can be admitted to be a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in the primary sense. If *kāma* (काम) is understood as pleasure, men desire it for its own sake and can readily spend money for it.

The word ‘*kāma*’ (काम), however, can be used in many senses. Ordinary people generally take the word ‘*kāma*’ (काम) to mean ‘love’ or desire of sensual enjoyment considered as one of the four ends of life²⁰. It seems, however, that sensual enjoyment²¹ or love rather than the desire (इच्छा) of it can be a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). For *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is not only desire but what we desire — both. What we desire directly and what we desire indirectly. If pleasure is the direct object of desire, the means of pleasure is the indirect object of desire. Just as pleasure is a direct object of desire so also freedom from pain is a direct object of desire. The means of freedom from pain is then also an indirect object of desire. These four are our fundamental needs. Men act for these. We cannot say that *dharma* (धर्म), *artha* (अर्थ), *kāma* (काम) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) are *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ) or human needs if we cannot say that they are of the nature of *sukha* (सुख), *duḥkhābhāva*

(दुःखाभाव) or means of them. We have said that the object of desire can be either pleasure (सुख) or eradication of pain (दुःखाभाव). *Kāma* (काम) is a kind of pleasure (सुखविशेष). So, since people desire it for its own sake, it is a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in the primary sense²². While discussing the subject *proyojana* (need), as it occurs in the *Nyāyasūtra* of Goutama, Uddyotkar, Vācaspati Mishra and Udayanācārya have discussed many important things in this connection. Anyway, according to the philosophy of *Nyāya*, motive force of all human (voluntary) actions is either desire for pleasure (सुखप्राप्ति) or avoidance of pain (दुःखहान).²³

Let us turn to *dharma* (धर्म) and its relation to other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). The word '*dharma*' (धर्म) is an ambiguous word, for it is used in many senses in different systems of thought.²⁴ Sometimes the word '*dharma*' (धर्म) is used to mean even '*svarga*' (स्वर्ग). In its usual sense however *dharma* (धर्म) means dutiful action. The word '*svarga*' (स्वर्ग) means a state of superior kind of pleasure. Pleasure is a natural object of desire. And *svarga* (स्वर्ग) is a superior kind of pleasure. Then, why *svarga* (स्वर्ग) is not admitted as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ)? *Sukha* (सुख) or pleasure is undoubtedly a human need. But FVP does not include it in its list of four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). Again, though *svarga* (स्वर्ग) is the ultimate or penultimate pleasure, FVP does not include *svarga* (स्वर्ग) as a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). This is a great anomaly. FVP list of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) does not include what is *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in the primary sense viz., *sukha* (सुख) or pleasure. It can be said that pleasures in the world are not pleasures proper for they are associated with pain. So, it does not deserve to be mentioned as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). The supporters of FVP may remind us that Goutama in his sutra 1/1/9 gives us a list

of twelve *prameya-s* (प्रमेय). In it he includes *duḥkha* (दुःख). But he does not include *sukha* (सुख). The commentators have explained this. They said Goutama rightly realized that what we ordinarily call pleasure or *sukha* (सुख) is not *sukha* (सुख) from the philosophical point of view. From this point of view all the so-called pleasure or *sukha* (सुख) is actually *duḥkha* (दुःख). For they are necessarily associated with *duḥkha* (दुःख) or pain. But according to Mīmāṃsā philosophy, *svarga* (स्वर्ग) is unmixed pleasure. It is not associated with pain. But as it has been said in the *Upaniṣada* and discussed in *Vedānta Paribhāṣā* that *svarga* (स्वर्ग) is also impermanent. When it ends, pain begins.

We should not confuse here two things. It is one question whether there is an ideal pleasure. It is another matter whether man needs pleasure or not. All agree that man needs pleasure and that it is what man desires. It is also agreed that *svarga* (स्वर्ग) is a superior kind of pleasure. It is a state of pure or unmixed pleasure and an object of desire. Now let us go back to the question why FVP does not mention either pleasure [*sukha* (सुख)] or *svarga* [(स्वर्ग) superior pleasure]? This seems to be an anomaly. We suggest as solution that FVP includes in its list *kāma* (काम). And this *kāma* (काम) is to be taken to mean *kāmanāviṣaya* (कामनाविषय). And *kāmanāviṣaya* (कामनाविषय) includes first pleasure of two kinds, ordinary pleasure (सुख) and superior pleasure (स्वर्ग). It also includes *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव). What it does not include is ultimate and absolute pleasure (*mokṣa* in the Vedānta sense) and absolute freedom from pain (*mokṣa* in the Nyāya sense). Thus FVP includes in its list *kāma* (काम) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) both.

Now there is another anomaly. FVP includes *dharma* (धर्म) as a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). But how *dharma* (धर्म) can be a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ)? For, in one of its major senses *dharma* (धर्म) denotes certain actions — duties or dutiful actions.²⁵ But normally we do not desire action. So, the situation is this, *dharma* (धर्म), which should not be claimed to be a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), is included in the list of FVP. On the other hand, *svarga* (स्वर्ग) which is a state of a superior kind of pleasure is not included in the list of FVP as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). The first anomaly can be solved in different ways. We can say first that *dharma* (धर्म), in the list of four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) of FVP, means *svarga* (स्वर्ग). If we interpret *dharma* (धर्म) to mean *svarga* (स्वर्ग), it will mean an end in itself. For, *svarga* (स्वर्ग) is said to be a state of pure or unmixed pleasure and so an object of desire. So, it is of the nature of pleasure or *sukha* (सुख). Though FVP list does not include pleasure or *sukha* (सुख) yet it includes *kāma* (काम). And we have said above that the word '*kāma*' (काम) may be understood as pleasure, that is object of *kāma* (काम). Though the object of *kāma* (काम) is not just pleasure yet it is one of its object. The solution is this — *dharma* (धर्म) is a means of *svarga* (स्वर्ग) which is its result (फल). It is not uncommon in Sanskrit language and literature to use the name of the result (फल) to denote the cause of the result. We call water (जल) 'the life' (जीवन) for water helps us to live. Similarly, if we use the name of means to denote the result then the word *dharma* (धर्म) can be understood to mean *svarga* (स्वर्ग). But in one of its major senses the word *dharma* (धर्म) means such actions as lead to *svarga* (स्वर्ग). Now if we relate *artha* (अर्थ) to *svarga* (स्वर्ग) [i.e. *dharma* (धर्म)] as means to end, there will be in FVP list three ends in themselves and one end as means. Three ends in themselves will be *svarga* (स्वर्ग) [i.e. *dharma* (धर्म)],

kāma (काम), and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) and one end as means will be *artha* (अर्थ). But it is not clear enough how *artha* (अर्थ) can be a means to each one of the other three *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). For example, how can *artha* (अर्थ) be a means to *mokṣa* (मोक्ष)? One way seems to be there. If *artha* (अर्थ) is the means of *dharma* (धर्म) and *dharma* (धर्म) is the means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) then *artha* (अर्थ) indirectly becomes the means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). But how *artha* (अर्थ) can be a means of *dharma* (धर्म)? If *dharma* (धर्म) is viewed as duty or dutiful and ritual action, then *artha* (अर्थ) can be a means of *dharma* (धर्म). For performance of *yāga* (याग) or sacrificial rites involves some expenditure or money. But the difficulty is that we have found it necessary to take *dharma* (धर्म) as *svarga* (स्वर्ग). Otherwise FVP cannot be systematized or anomalies in it cannot be removed. Apart from this the problem remains how the *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) called *dharma* (धर्म), *kāma* (काम) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) are related among them and how they form an hierarchy.

Since *dharma* (धर्म) [*svarga* (स्वर्ग)], *kāma* (काम) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) — these three are ends in themselves or are good as end then only good as means is *artha* (अर्थ). What is that good as end to which *artha* (अर्थ) is a means? Is it a means of *dharma* (धर्म) or of *kāma* (काम) or of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष)? Or is it a means of all three or is it a means to none? If it is means to none, then it is independent. If any one or all the items of the list of FVP are independent then there is no hierarchy of these *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). Hence, these *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are not hierarchically related. It is just a list of four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). There is no higher or lower *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). But this interpretation of FVP is not possible. For, it is generally agreed that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the highest *puruṣārtha*

(पुरुषार्थ). Those who do not accept *svarga* (स्वर्ग) [i.e. *dharma* (धर्म)] as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) for them there are not four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). But FVP holds both that there are four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the highest among them.

One may say *artha* (अर्थ) is clearly a means of *kāma* (काम). For attaining *kāma* (काम) or sensuous pleasure one needs to use *artha* (अर्थ) as means (at least in some cases). If *artha* (अर्थ) is directly a means to *kāma* (काम), then *artha* (अर्थ) is indirectly a means to that to which *kāma* (काम) is directly a means. For example, *artha* (अर्थ) is a means to *dharma* (धर्म) in the sense of *yāga* (याग) or sacrificial ritual. This *yāga* (याग) is a means to *svarga* (स्वर्ग). So, *artha* (अर्थ) can be said to be means of *svarga* (स्वर्ग) also in the indirect sense. Again, *dharma* (धर्म) in the sense of dutiful action is a (indirect) cause of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). Hence, *artha* (अर्थ) is indirectly the cause of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) also.

There are two important points to note here. Usually men believe and there is strong point to regard that *dharma* (धर्म) is the means of both *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम). Many scholars have discussed *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम) as end in itself in relation to *dharma* (धर्म) which is good as means. So, in this sense *dharma* (धर्म) (i.e. dutiful action) should not be considered as an end in itself. Moreover, some have found here no compelling reason to take *dharma* (धर्म) in the sense of *svarga* (स्वर्ग) ignoring its more usual sense of dutiful actions or sacrificial rites. But then also one problem remains. If *dharma* (धर्म) is taken to be an end as means, then one question arises — to which *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) it is means? Majority of Indian philosophers are *jñāna-karma-asamuccayavādīn-s* (ज्ञान-कर्म-असमुच्चयवादी). They strongly believe

that *jñāna* (ज्ञान) and not *karma* (कर्म) is the means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). So in this sense *dharma* (धर्म) or righteous action is not a means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष).²⁶ But if *dharma* (धर्म) is a means of *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम) and it is not a means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष), then either there is no means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) in the list or its means is either *artha* (अर्थ) or *kāma* (काम). Nobody accepts this. So, FVP remains anomalous.

Let us try to understand FVP more carefully. It begins with the ordinary and minimum sense of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). In this sense *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or human need is the object of desire. However, a desire can be either an independent desire or dependent desire. So the object of desire also may be an object of independent desire or an object of dependent desire. In both these cases object will be known as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). As for example, men desire *artha* (अर्थ) or wealth in order to get another object, pleasure. Wealth itself is not pleasure but we can buy pleasure by paying for it. So, *artha* (अर्थ) will be *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in the secondary sense (गौण अर्थ). On the other hand, desire of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is independent, i.e., men desire *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) for its own sake. One does not desire *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) because he has already desired for some other things. For example, one desires to cook if only he already has a desire for food. His desire for cooking is dependent on his desire for food. His desire for food is independent. In other words food will be *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in the primary sense as if food is the object of the independent desire. Similarly, *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) will be *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in the primary sense (मुख्यो अर्थ) or end in itself. But what about *dharma* (धर्म)? *Dharma* (धर्म) is a certain kind of action and to do *dharma* (धर्म) means to perform those actions.

Man exerts himself to perform these actions. Exertion is a kind of pain and men desire this exertion only when men already have a desire for some greater good for which this exertion is necessary. So, *dharma* (धर्म) is a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in the secondary sense. It is an end as means. Here greater good means comparatively greater than *dharma* (धर्म). Hence, *dharma* (धर्म) will be *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in the secondary sense.

There is also another point to note. There are two types of men and they seek two types of objects. Some men seek worldly prosperity i.e., *preyo* (प्रेयो) or *abhyudaya* (अभ्युदय); the world may be this world or world hereafter. And both these objects are worldly objects. The life of man who seeks these worldly objects is worldly life. But there are also some men who seek to transcend the worldly existence itself. So, they do not seek worldly prosperity rather they seek to transcend the worldly existence which means repeated births and deaths (प्रेत्यभाव). These second group of men are said to pursue *śreyas* (श्रेय) or *niśhreyas* (निःश्रेयस). These two classes of men are fundamentally different and making this difference is one of the ways to systematizing FVP. Actually the distinction has been made on the basis of the fact that whether a man conducts his life with an eye to achieving something for which he thinks that he has need or not. Having some needs means having some unfulfilled desires. Again, man has some unfulfilled desire means he definitely wants to achieve or fulfil those desires. So, he has some positive seeking (प्रवृत्ति). These are the people who are said to follow the path of attachment (प्रवृत्ति मार्ग). Since he has some positive seeking or we can say that he is attached with some positive goods of life, he has natural compulsion to perform

kāmya karma-s (काम्य कर्म). *Kāmya karma-s* (काम्य कर्म) are the actions the basis of which is desire (कामना). But there are also people who believe that the world has no value and desire (for thing) can never be fully satisfied. For example, more pleasure they get, they will seek still more of it. To put it otherwise, desire never ends and need for exerting themselves to satisfy their desire for, say, pleasure, never ceases. The people whose whole life is attached (आसक्त) are those whose needs never end. One need causes another need and it causes another and thus their final destination is never reached. Some men finally come to understand the fact that in this way all desires can never be fulfilled and they will not get peace. So, they give up their normal way of living and try to live a different sort of life which they can live more meaningfully. They then seek to eradicate permanently all desires and consequent suffering. It is the life of negative seeking (निवृत्ति मार्ग). They seek nothing, no pleasure; they seek to avoid suffering. They have only one goal to achieve — to transcend all sufferings, even possible sufferings and that is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) or liberation. So, there is no doubt that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is an end-in-itself. But one important point is to be noted here that only after they have tried all other ends (relative) and did not get fulfilment, they turn to *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) as the one and only end-in-itself which remains to be achieved. The people who are seekers of positive pleasure find the highest but this-worldly (इहलौकिक) pleasure in *kāma* (काम) and the still higher but other-worldly (पारलौकिक) pleasure in *svarga* (स्वर्ग). About *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) there are two views: some say it is a positive state or for some it is a negative state. But, according to both these views, *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is not worldly state — it is not a this-worldly state. Nor it is a state of the world hereafter like *svarga* (स्वर्ग). It is a

world transcending state. It is a *lokottara* (लोकतर) state. Now, if the two groups of people form a hierarchy, then we see that the detached group comes above the group who are known as attached. For, men start their life as attached and first spend the phase of *āsakta* (आसक्त) and then reach to the phase of *nirāsakta* (निरासक्त). Thus, since these two groups form a hierarchy, we find a similar hierarchy in the goals they seek. So, *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the higher (highest) goal, and not *kāma* (काम). This solution may solve two problems at a time. One is about the position of *kāma* (काम) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) in the hierarchy and another is about their relation. FVP includes each one of these two *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) as end-in-itself. The reason behind this is to show how different kinds of men can conduct their lives in order to attain the highest end and thereby make life most fulfilled and worthy. We all know that one cannot give any full-fledged list of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ), for *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are innumerable. Similarly, it is also not easy to identify the highest and best goal of human life, for it depends on the type of person one is and his situation. So, as a realistic and empirical theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), FVP suggests two *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) which are end-in-itself depending upon how different types of men can live their life meaningfully. These two *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are *kāma* (काम) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). The other two *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) of FVP are also fundamental in their own ways. They are ends as means.

There should be good arguments to show that *dharma* (धर्म) (in the sense of certain actions) and *artha* (अर्थ) are ends as means. It is also to be shown how *dharma* (धर्म) and *artha* (अर्थ) are related with *kāma* (काम) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). So, FVP needs re-construction

and a consistent interpretation. It is easier to find that *artha* (अर्थ) is the means to *kāma* (काम). But is *dharma* (धर्म) a means to *mokṣa* (मोक्ष)? The difference of opinion about the sense of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is familiar. But we need to clarify the sense of the word *kāma* (काम). In Apte's *The student's Sanskrit-English Dictionary* we find that the word *kāma* (काम) means both desire and object of desire. Apte has given examples of use of the term in both these senses. Desire or desire for object is the wider sense of the word '*kāma*' (काम). Many have taken the word *kāma* (काम) in this sense. But that is difficult to agree (we will see later that the Naiyāika-s at least do not take the word in this sense). First, if *kāma* (काम) means desire then it cannot be a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). For example, *artha* (अर्थ) is a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). But it is not a desire. It is an object of desire. But even object of desire cannot be the sense of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). For *kāma* (काम) is desire and not an object of desire. Apte has given another sense of the word *kāma* (काम) in which *kāma* (काम) is an object of desire and is a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). This dictionary says *kāma* (काम) is "love or desire of sensual enjoyment considered as one of the four ends of life (purusartha)."²⁷

In dictionary meaning very interestingly *kāma* (काम) means both a particular desire and the object of that desire. In these two senses only the second type of meaning of the word '*kāma*' (काम) is known as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Sometimes we seek some objects in a specific time or space. And if we know in case how or in which process we can get it, in that case we seek that process also. As for example, if one is hungry, he seeks food. Now if he knows the way how he can get food, i.e. cooking or buying from shop, he immediately seeks or adopts that process also. Now, there are also

some objects of desire (basically only two objects of desire are there) which do not depend upon any space or time. To put it in a different way, some objects we seek and our seeking is not conditioned by any space and time, e.g. pleasure and absence of pain. So, these two objects are known as unconditional object of desire or absolute objects of desire. *Kāma* (काम), more generally, means pleasure. It is controversial whether *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) means pleasure or freedom from pain. We will not discuss here about *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). In a separate chapter we will discuss it when we will discuss individual *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ). Here we only want to say that *kāma* (काम) means pleasure. Now, between *kāma* (काम) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) (pleasure and absence of pain whatever it may be) all the end-in-themselves are included. Or these two exhaust all that man desires. To put it differently, if anything is admitted as end-in-itself, it must be included in either *kāma* (काम) or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). *Dharma* (धर्म) and *artha* (अर्थ) are not ends-in-themselves.

Artha (अर्थ) and *dharma* (धर्म) have also been called *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). They now can be *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) only in the sense of ends as means. They are desired if only we desire those ends in themselves of which *artha* (अर्थ) and *dharma* (धर्म) are means. Can we now say *artha* (अर्थ) is means of *kāma* (काम) and *dharma* (धर्म) is means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष)? According to some systems of philosophy, the absolute freedom from all pains or sufferings is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). So, we have to distinguish between individual freedom from pain or suffering and absolute freedom from pain or suffering. Similarly, we have to distinguish between pleasure in general and pleasure which is *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Any pleasure and all pleasure are not *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Only the highest and

best form of pleasure is *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). What are the criteria to judge which pleasure is the highest and best? Such criteria are durability and purity; some may add here intensity also. Now, among all the pleasures sensual pleasure seems to be most intense and among sensual pleasures sexual one is the most intense and satisfying. In some *Tantra* literature sexual union is viewed as the perfect analogue of mystic union with God. Let different pleasures be different in respect of quality, quantity and intensity. But still all worldly pleasures can be said to be equal in that they are all impermanent. If we compare this-worldly pleasure with the other-worldly pleasure, we find that the other worldly pleasure is most durable. So as pleasure (and among all pleasures) it is the highest and best pleasure. This is known as *svarga* (स्वर्ग).

Let us try to clarify a little more why *kāma* (काम) as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) should mean *svarga* (स्वर्ग) or the other worldly pleasure. We also should show what is the nature of this-worldly pleasure. We have seen that *kāma* (काम) means both desire and object of desire. Often these two are different. We say for example that *artha* (अर्थ) or a particular flower is an object of desire. We do not say it is desire. Pleasure is an unconditional object of desire. But since pleasure is either this-worldly pleasure or it is other-worldly pleasure, then why *kāma* (काम) as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) should mean the other worldly pleasure or *svarga* (स्वर्ग)? What is the name for this worldly-pleasure? There is one word '*rāga*' (राग) which, according to the dictionary, means 'love or attachment.'

Now *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is *svarga* (स्वर्ग) and not *rāga* (राग). As forms of pleasure or object of pleasure they can both be object of human seeking. And most men seek sexual feeling and not

svarga (स्वर्ग). But man is a rational being. So, if he knows *svarga* (स्वर्ग) is a state of long durable and unmixed (unmixed with pain) pleasure, then men will seek *svarga* (स्वर्ग). In this sense men seek both *kāma* (काम) in the sense of *rāga* (राग) and *dharma* (धर्म) in the sense of *svarga* (स्वर्ग). But only few knowledgeable persons seek *dharma* (धर्म). Those who are ignorant do not seek *dharma* (धर्म). Still *svarga* (स्वर्ग) as the best form of worldly pleasure is the meaning of *dharma* (धर्म) as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). As pleasure it is not means to other goal, but is an end in itself.

Dharma (धर्म) has another meaning also. It means such actions as are necessary means for attaining *svarga* (स्वर्ग). *Artha* (अर्थ) also may be used as the means for procuring pleasure both directly and indirectly. But that pleasure is mainly this-worldly pleasure. Here '*artha*' (अर्थ) means wealth. In another sense *artha* (अर्थ) may also be used indirectly for procuring *svarga* (स्वर्ग). In this sense *artha* (अर्थ) helps to buy materials which are important for performing ritual sacrifices [*dharma* (धर्म) i.e. *yajña* (यज्ञ)]. Some of these materials are the necessary for rituals like *yāga* (याग). Difficulties still remain and FVP remains anomalous. It does not include in its list of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) *svarga* (स्वर्ग). And if we interpret *dharma* (धर्म) to mean *svarga* (स्वर्ग), then there are three ends-in-themselves — *kāma* (काम), *svarga* (स्वर्ग) [i.e. *dharma* (धर्म)] and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). How these three are related to one another? FVP has failed to give us a generalized theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). It has given us a theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) which includes at least three unrelated and irreducible *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). This shows FVP is not a hierarchical scheme of human values or needs. But it is taken to be a hierarchical scheme.

Another point to note is that *dharma* (धर्म) has been mentioned in the lowest position in hierarchical scheme of four-fold scheme of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). But it is not easy to answer why it has been ranked so. Common belief and intuition says that *dharma* (धर्म) is a higher value. How can it be at the bottom of the list? At the top there seems to be hardly any way of placing *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) and *svarga* (स्वर्ग) in one horizontal line. If we say that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is a kind of pleasure, then there will be no problem. But *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is absence of pain, not pleasure. According to Advaita Vedānta, *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is highest pleasure. They say it is *Brahmānanda* (ब्रह्मानन्द). If we take *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) as pleasure there will be no problem in the order of hierarchy, because it will be taken as the hierarchy of pleasure. Then the order will be from the lowest to the highest — the sensuous worldly pleasure (sexual union), i.e. *rāga* (राग) and then the other worldly pleasure that is *svarga* (स्वर्ग) and lastly the pleasure of the union with the highest reality or God or *Brahman*. According to some, this is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). If we mean this by *mokṣa* (मोक्ष), if *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is a kind of pleasure, then FVP hierarchy will be hierarchy of the three forms of only *kāma* (काम) [the fourth will be *artha* (अर्थ)]. Of these three forms of *kāma* (काम) the first one is known as this worldly pleasure or *ihaloukika sukha* (ईहलौकिक सुख); the second one is known as other-worldly pleasure or *pāraloukika sukha* (पारलौकिक सुख) and the last one is transcendental pleasure or *lokottara sukha* (लोकतर सुख). There are however schools of thought according to which *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) cannot be a form of *sukha* (सुख). If it is to be a form of *sukha* (सुख) then it must be eternal or *nitya sukha* (नित्य सुख). Vātsāyana has shown many defects in this view.

To conclude this chapter we will state our view why *dharma* (धर्म) has been placed at the bottom of the hierarchical scheme of four-fold *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). This scheme is the hierarchy of desirable things. In other words the list of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) is mainly the list of things which will give us normally pleasure. In that sense only pleasure and absence of pain are the desirable things. Keeping this in mind *mokṣa* (मोक्ष), as the greatest and highest value, has been placed at the top position in the scheme of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). *Dharma* (धर्म) has been placed at the bottom to indicate that it is the most basic value. It is most basic or fundamental in the sense that it is the very condition for anything to be considered as value. *Artha* (अर्थ) is a desirable thing. But it is desirable so long it does not violate *dharma* (धर्म). *Artha* (अर्थ) which violates *dharma* (धर्म) or is *dharma-viruddha* (धर्म-विरुद्ध) is not the object of authentic or commendable desire. It is not right to seek *artha* (अर्थ) in an immoral way. *Artha* (अर्थ) should be sought through moral way (धर्म-पथ). *Artha* (अर्थ) is a value, a matter or authentic human seeking if by *artha* (अर्थ) is meant *artha* (अर्थ) earned in a rightful way. A Brahmin should seek *artha* (अर्थ) through *yājan* (याजन) or performing *pūjā* (पुजा) etc. Such *artha* (अर्थ) is *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Similarly sexual pleasure through mating between couples properly married is *kāma* (काम) which is *dharma-avirodhi* (धर्म-अविरोधि). This sort of *kāma* (काम) is *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). So far is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is concerned, nobody can attain it if he violates *dharma* (धर्म) or is *adhārmika* (अधार्मिक). In this explanation *dharma* (धर्म) means moral provisions or duties. Performing duties and earning money or procuring pleasure through rightful means or *dhārmika upāya* (धार्मिक उपाय) is a value and it is right form of human seeking or right object of human seeking. Vyāsdeva has

said “धर्मति अर्थ च, काम च”, it means *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* are *puruṣārtha*-s, if they are approved by *dharma*. Lastly though for *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) one is to go beyond *dharma* (धर्म), yet it means that one must first perform *dharma* (धर्म). And when through this means man is so evolved as to transcend *dharma* (धर्म), then he attains *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) or liberation.

Notes and References

- 1 Krishna, Daya, “The Myth of the Purusarthas” in *Indian Philosophy: A counter perspective*, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1991, pp.189-205.
- 2 Ibid., p.189.
- 3 Sen, Indra, ‘What is Moksa?’, in Duby, S.P.(ed.), *The Philosophy of Life*, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, Delhi, 1998, p.189.
- 4 Hiriyan, M, *Popular Essays in Indian Philosophy*, Kavyalaya Publishers, Mysore, 1952, p. 65.
- 5 Ibid., p. 65.
- 6 Ibid., p. 66.
- 7 Mohanty, J.N, *Classical Indian Philosophy*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2000, p. 71.
- 8 Prasad, Rajendra, *Karma, Causation and Retributive Morality: Conceptual Essays in Ethics and Metaethics*, ICPR in association with Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, New Delhi, 1989, P. 276.
- 9 Krishna, Daya, ‘The Myth of the *Puruṣārthas*’ in *Indian Philosophy: A Counter Perspective*, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1991, p. 189.
- 10 Vātsyāyana shows in his *Bhāṣya* (भाष्य) on the Goutama *Sūtra* (सूत्र) 1/1/22 that in the stage of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) no *kāma* (काम) or desire is possible.

¹¹ Krishna, Daya, *Indian Philosophy: A Counter Perspective*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1991, p. 205.

¹² Philosophers have discovered, as we will see, that some of the senses of *prayojana* (प्रयोजन) is over inclusive and some other are over restrictive. In other words there is need for being careful when defining the term *prayojana* (प्रयोजन) in the present context.

¹³ We will not consider here the view of those according to whom *bhakti* (भक्ति) is also a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and perhaps the highest *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ).

¹⁴ Except where necessary we will speak as if there is only one PTP.

¹⁵ Śāstri, Pañcānan, *Paribhāṣā-saṃgraha on Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, Pañcānan Śāstri edition, kolkata, 1883 (शकाब्द), p. 6.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 6.

¹⁷ Tarkavāgiś, Phanībhūṣaṇa, *Nyāyadarśana* (Bengali translation of *Nyāyasūtra* of Gautama), Paschim Banga Rajya Pustak Parsad, kolkata, 1989.

¹⁸ “अर्थस्तु प्रसिद्ध धनादिरेव” — Śāstri, Pañcānan, *Paribhāṣā-saṃgraha on Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, Pañcānan Śāstri edition, kolkata, 1883 (शकाब्द), p. 5.

¹⁹ “स च जागादिधर्मः पुरुषेण अर्थ्यमानत्वात् पुरुषार्थः अपि अन्येच्छा अधीन इच्छाविषयत्वात् गौनो न मुख्यः” — Śāstri, Pañcānan, *Paribhāṣā-saṃgraha on Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, Pañcānan Śāstri edition, kolkata, 1883 (शकाब्द), p. 5.

²⁰ Apte, V. S.(ed.), *The Student's Sanskrit-English Dictionary* (revised and enlarged edition), Nag Publishers, Delhi, 2011. This sense seems to have been derived from the *Arthaśāstra*.

²¹ *Manusamhitā* 2.214 seems to use the word 'kāma' (काम) in the sense of carnal gratification or lust.

²² 'स च कामः सुखविशेष-रूपत्वेन फलत्वात् मुख्यः पुरुषार्थः' — Śāstri, Pañcānan, *Paribhāṣā-saṃgraha on Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, Pañcānan Śāstri edition, kolkata, 1883 (शकाब्द), p. 5.

²³ Nyāya admits that there are also many things which are object of neither desire nor aversion. We take an attitude of *upekṣā* (उपेक्षा) towards them. We are never cognitively engaged with these objects.

²⁴ Śāstri, Pañcānan, *Paribhāṣā-saṃgraha on Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, Pañcānan Śāstri edition, kolkata, 1883 (शकाब्द), pp. 4-5.

²⁵ Pt. Pañcānan Śāstri is one such person. He criticizes the author of *Vedāntaparibhāṣāprakāṣikā* for taking *dharma* (धर्म) in the SDP list of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) to mean *svarga* (स्वर्ग) and not *vihita karma* (विहित कर्म) —*Paribhāṣā-saṃgraha on Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, Pañcānan Śāstri edition, kolkata, 1883 (Bengali era), pp. 4-5.

²⁶ This is claimed to be the position of Upaniṣada-s.

²⁷ Apte, V. S. (ed.), *The Student's Sanskrit-English Dictionary* (revised and enlarged edition), Nag Publishers, Delhi, 2011.
