

Introduction

The present work is intended to undertake a philosophical enquiry into the concept of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). But the appropriateness of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) as a subject of philosophical enquiry may itself be doubted. We first need to clear this doubt. *Puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) as a subject of philosophical enquiry is doubtful because there are two groups of thinkers: one group holds that it is a proper subject matter of philosophy, whereas in the second group belong those who are interested in philosophy but not in the theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). This second group appears to think that *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) may be a subject of religion or spirituality or mythology or eschatology; but it cannot be a theme of philosophy proper. Sometimes they also appear to hold that if it is at all a topic of philosophy, then it is a topic of *speculative* philosophy of older days like the topic of immortality. It cannot be, therefore, be an interesting subject of modern analytical philosophy. Nor can it be a part of any rigorous branch of Indian philosophy.

Let us explain the matter in a bit detail. Philosophy is a theoretical subject. It is concerned with such things as knowledge, truth, understanding, meaning etc. A theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) on the other hand is a non-philosophical study — it is sub-philosophical or super philosophical. Subjects like wealth and pleasure are concerns of ordinary men and of theory like economics but not of philosophy. On the other hand the subject of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in general and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) in particular are of interest to religious persons or *sanyāsi-s* (संन्यासी). So, *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) does not seem to be a

philosophical subject. Do we have any satisfactory answer to this objection? Let us see.

Before answering this question we want to highlight another problem, which cannot be ignored. There are great scholars who are divided in their views on *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or on some topics related to *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Some hold the opinion that India's pre-occupation with *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is the misery of Indian mind and thinking. (Prof. Daya Krishna and some other thinkers have discussed this view). But there are also Indian and non-Indian thinkers who hold that India's pre-occupation with *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is her glory. Scholars like Bal Gangadhar Tilak seem to hold this second view. We will elaborate this point later. First let us discuss the objection stated above. Is *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) a subject of philosophy? We have discussed this in greater detail in the first chapter of this work. Here we may say two things. First, in these days many working philosophers and teachers of philosophy in India discuss this subject. They have published many articles and books on it. These writers include well known philosophers like J. N. Mohanty, Daya Krishna, Rajendra Prasad, P. K. Mahapatra, Billimoria, Prof. Bhelke etc. On this ground one may hold that *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is a subject of philosophical enquiry.

The second point is that in many important source books of classical Indian philosophy *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) has been given an important place. Great philosophers like Gautama, Śaṅkarācārya, Udayanācārya, Gaṅgeśopādhyāy, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī etc. have discussed in detail the subject *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Even standard philosophical texts like *Bhāṣāpariccheda* with *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* or *Vedānta Paribhāṣā* contain relevant discussions on *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). In the first sutra of *Nyāyadarśana* Goutama has discussed

nihśreyas (निःश्रेयस). This *nihśreyas* (निःश्रेयस) includes both the final *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) and other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). The first *Sāṃkhyakārikā* also introduces the theme of final *puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ). The same thing can be said about Kaṇāda's *Vaiśeṣika sūtra* or Praśastapāda's *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*. Śaṃkarācārya at the end of his introductory *bhāṣya* on *Brahmasūtra* which is known as *Adhyāṣabhāṣya* has introduced this subject. The author of *Brahmasūtra* concluded his *sutra* text with a *sutra* that speaks of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). So, it cannot be said that *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is not a topic of rigorous or analytical philosophical discussion.

The objectors may say that what we have written in the two previous paragraphs is well known. But this does not answer his objection. In recent time those thinkers who discuss *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) do not differentiate *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) from *kratvartha* (कृत्यार्थ). This is one proof that these scholars do not pay serious attention to the literature of classical Indian philosophy or to the discussion of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) there. Therefore, it appears that many who discuss the theme of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) want to ignore classical Indian philosophical literature on the subject. On the other hand some show that Indian philosophy (दर्शन) is not a philosophy proper, for it discusses topics like *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). They sometimes put it differently. Philosophy is a theoretical enquiry. *Puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are matters of men's practical concern. Only by confusing the theoretical and practical the Indians discuss *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) in philosophy. It is possible to say in reply that we admit that the discussion of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) does not go well with the Western philosophy. But Indian philosophy is different from Western philosophy. Those who raise the objection that *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ)

cannot be a philosophical topic seems to confuse these two kinds of philosophy.

Another point to note in this connection is that ethics is recognized by all as a part of philosophy. Ethics discusses human actions and actions are not theoretical things but fall on the practical side of man. Discussion of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) can be easily included into that part of Indian philosophy which is properly called Indian ethics. It is true that some have expressed doubt whether the theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) can be regarded as ethical theory or not. We would try to say for the present that Indian ethics must at least include the discussion of *dharma* (धर्म) and *dharma* (धर्म) is an important *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Anyway, one of our objectives is to restore classical Indian philosophical theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) from the neglect by Indian and western scholars and teachers of philosophy today. So we begin the present study of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in the **first chapter** with the discussion on the relation between the *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and philosophy (दर्शन).

Here we may say a few words about our notion of the theoretical and practical. How do we understand their nature or their relation? A theoretical enquiry is also a goal oriented enterprise. No normal human being acts without purpose. It has been said that if one is seen to blow in the air without purpose he is considered mad. So both theoretical enquiry and practical endeavor are goal oriented. The difference is that the goal of the theoretical enquiry is knowledge or understanding. But in his practical life and in disciplines like religion or morality, man's goal is something practical. This goal is to change or transform himself. A man who practices morality wants to change himself and become a better man. Similarly, a man who practices religion wants to transform himself and become a better being in the

eyes of God. Thus religion and morality are matter of practice and hence practical. (But ethics is not morality or *practice* of morality; it is the *theory* of such practice and all that such practice entails). In everyday life ordinary man is concerned with the worldly good and happiness. He wants to change himself into a person who would live in a way which God likes. Ethics takes note of all these practical matters. Still it is a theoretical enquiry and a part of philosophy. Ethics is not moral practice. It is a theoretical enquiry the goal of which is to know or understand what human action is and when a human action becomes moral action and so on. One may practice morality without studying ethics. One may argue without studying logic. But one who studied ethics or logic does also *know* what is right or wrong action or what is valid or invalid argument. Such a person is not deceived and takes an action to be moral when the action really is not moral but only looks like a moral action. One who knows logic will not mistake an invalid argument as valid. So for successful practice and practical life we need to know the theory. Successful practice of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) needs theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Such theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is and should be a part of ethics or theory of morality or moral philosophy.

Similarly, science is a theoretical enquiry. It has a theoretical goal to achieve. It (natural science) is to understand the nature or the natural phenomena of the world. The purpose of (natural) science is fulfilled when this theoretical goal is achieved. But this does not mean that this knowledge cannot be used for transforming the world or changing our lives. In technology scientific knowledge is used to achieve practical goals of making our life more comfortable — e.g. to make the soil yield more food and to make water to give us electricity.

Similarly, Indian philosophy has as its primary goal something theoretical. It seeks *jñāna* (ज्ञान) or basically the truth or knowledge about self (आत्मा). It is followed by *sādhana* (साधन), which is the practice of the truth or knowledge gained. This knowledge through suitable practices including the ethical practices or *sādhana* (साधन) transforms our life so that no longer sorrows and sufferings affect us. Philosophers (Indian) not only seek the theoretical goal or knowledge (of self) but also know that this knowledge can enable us to attain the highest practical goal of life. This is no defect of Indian philosophy that it has this other or unique goal in view which Western philosophy does not seek. In addition to being a theoretical inquiry which aims at correct understanding or knowledge or *tattvajñāna* (तत्त्वज्ञान), Indian philosophy (दर्शन) remains fully aware of the practical value of the knowledge it seeks.

Thus philosophy is fully theoretical so far as its primary goal is concerned. It is also theoretical and rational enterprise so far as its methods are concerned. However Indian philosophy (दर्शन) is philosophy in the classical sense. It is philosophy in the sense of study of man and morals. Science is the study of (external) nature. Indian philosophy is not philosophy in the sense of the contemporary logical positivists and other analytical philosophers. According to them, philosophy is not a factual study like science. So it cannot give us knowledge of fact. It is a conceptual study or it studies or analyzes language. Philosophy in this sense clarifies meaning of utterances. In the classical sense philosophy in the west was an enquiry into reality or fundamental principles and truths. As distinct from science it is humanistic study. This is close to the Greek sense. Many Greek thinkers including Socrates and Plato used to believe that

philosophical wisdom leads to tranquility or peace. This is very similar to *mokṣa* (मोक्ष).

In the ultimate source book of *Nyāya* Philosophy, the *Nyāyasūtra* of Goutama, there are 527 aphorisms or *sūtra*-s. The first *sūtra* gives us a list of sixteen major topics (तत्त्व). In this list the fourth is *prayojana* (प्रोयोजन) or utility or usefulness and it comes immediate after *saṃśaya* (संशय) or doubt. The idea is that a serious and critical theoretical inquiry such as philosophy is undertaken if it serves some purpose like settling *and if there is* some doubt or dispute. There are things whose knowledge may not serve any purpose (at least on some occasions). So we cannot undertake an inquiry to acquire this (type of) knowledge. Again, nobody doubts or disputes the existence of the 'I' or the self. Nobody has doubt of the form "अहम न वा"; and nobody offers the denial of the form "अहम नास्मि". So, there is no point in undertaking an inquiry into what all already know, what is already known and proved (निर्णीत). Even in his ordinary life a common man proceeds to do some theoretical or academic activity when he believes that the action will serve some purpose, i.e. the action will be useful. While explaining the fourth topic of the list of sixteen topics in the *Nyāyasūtra* 1/1/1 Vātsyāyana writes 'अथ प्रोयोजनं, येन प्रयुक्तः प्रवर्तते, तत् प्रोयोजनं'¹. In this sense utility or the consideration of usefulness pervades everything in the world; all living beings, all actions, and all disciplines of knowledge.

Leaving out a few possible exceptions we may agree that everything we do consciously (or even instinctively) is useful and often we do those things because we somehow know that they are useful. When it is said theoretical inquiry does not seek anything other than knowledge we mean knowledge is the value or purpose or utility which this inquiry serves. When we say knowledge for the sake of

knowledge we mean for a theoretician, as theoretician, only knowledge counts, his *prayojana* (प्रयोजन) or need is knowledge. But this does not mean that this knowledge cannot or does not serve any purpose. Strictly as a theoretician he does not ask what value this knowledge has. But as a man he can ask this question. Often he asks this question or knows the answer. An Indian philosopher knows that philosophical knowledge he seeks has greatest value or utility. It serves man's highest value or enables him to achieve life's highest goal. Still philosophy remains theory and not practice. It does not teach man how to use this knowledge to transform his present life, how to become a better man or a free man. Philosophy does not teach and it is not a form of practice like *sādhana* (साधन); it is not *sādhana* (साधन). It stops by generating knowledge which a practitioner or spiritual practitioner (साधक) can use to obtain some practical result, some good (for him or for others). Freedom from evil or suffering is one such goal or good.

There are some scholars who are engaged in writing and discussing about the theme of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). And they are successful to make an image that they are discussing philosophical doctrine of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or PTP. But actually there is a difference between Indian philosophical theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and what these scholars discuss. They actually discuss popular and familiar view of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or FVP. In the **second chapter** we will state and discuss FVP. One of the major points that are discussed here is the difficulties and inconsistencies in FVP. We shall seek to systematize this theory and find a statement of the theory which will be consistent and clear. In other words, we shall first show some anomalies in the standard formulation of FVP and then try to remove them. To put it more precisely, we shall try to systematize FVP as it is

commonly known. One of the reasons why FVP does not appear to be free from anomalies is that it uses the term *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in two different senses. It is used to mean both good as an end and good as a means. Problem arises when we try to decide which *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) is good as an end and which is good as a means or when we try to include them in one list keeping the two different senses in mind. Then there is the problem that certain *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in both these senses: (i) good as an end (फलरूप पुरुषार्थ) and (ii) good as a means (उपायरूप पुरुषार्थ). It seems to be clear and certain that *dharma* (धर्म) is a good as a means and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is only good as an end (in itself). But it is not at all clear if these two *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are related to each other as means and end. We shall also discuss how we are to make sense of a scale of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in which *dharma* (धर्म) is placed at the bottom and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) at the top. *Dharma* (धर्म) is certainly not of a lesser value than *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम). In FVP four broad human goals (पुरुषार्थ) will be discussed but we will not discuss them individually in the **second** chapter. So we cannot emphasize in this chapter the specific characteristics of individual *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). Our discussion of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in this chapter remains general.

In the **third chapter** we discuss *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) of FVP individually. In this chapter we try to introduce some more details that are necessary for understanding them individually as *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). However, in this chapter we do not discuss the *bhakti puruṣārtha* (भक्ति पुरुषार्थ). One reason for this is that in the third chapter we discuss individually only those *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) that are included in FVP. *Bhakti* (भक्ति) is not included in the list of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) of standard form of FVP. We discuss later whether we can

have different forms and versions of FVP. Anyway, we discuss the individual *puruṣārtha bhakti* (भक्ति पुरुषार्थ) in a separate chapter.

In the **fourth chapter** we discuss philosophical theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or PTP. Here we discuss only two versions of PTP; one we find in the *Nyāya* philosophy and the second we find in the (Advaita) *Vedānta* philosophy. In none of these forms of PTP *bhakti* (भक्ति) is included. We devote a separate chapter, i.e. the **fifth chapter**, where we discuss the *bhakti-puruṣārtha* (भक्ति पुरुषार्थ). We cannot extend FVP to include *bhakti puruṣārtha* (भक्ति पुरुषार्थ) because those who advocate *bhakti* as a *puruṣārtha* (भक्ति पुरुषार्थ) do not hold that it is just one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) among many. They hold that it is *the puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or the *only puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in the ultimate sense of the term. This point remains unclear in the usual version of *bhakti puruṣārtha* (भक्ति पुरुषार्थ) which says *bhakti* (भक्ति) is the fifth *puruṣārtha* (पञ्चम पुरुषार्थ). This suggests that there is a version of FVP which includes five *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ) — the usual four plus *bhakti* (भक्ति). Actually, according to the advocates of the *bhakti puruṣārtha* (भक्ति पुरुषार्थ), the ultimate *puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) is just one and that is *bhakti* (भक्ति). In this sense it is similar to the two versions of PTP (*Nyāya* version and *Vedānta* version). *Nyāya* as well as *Vedānta* admit that in the philosophical sense *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is just one and it is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). *Nyāya* may understand *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) in one way and *Vedānta* in another way, but according to them number of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is one. The advocates of the *bhakti puruṣārtha* (भक्ति पुरुषार्थ) hold that even *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) cannot be or is not *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in the ultimate sense. In the ultimate sense it is *bhakti* (भक्ति). We also discuss in this chapter some of the reasons why we cannot take the theory of *bhakti* (भक्ति) as a form or version of the philosophical theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) at all. Besides the *bhakti*

(भक्ति) theorists hold that the means (साधन) of the *bhakti puruṣārtha* (भक्ति पुरुषार्थ) is also *bhakti* (साधन भक्ति). So we thought it appropriate to discuss *bhakti* (भक्ति) in a separate chapter having discussed FVP and PTP.

It is clear enough from our title of the work that we consider *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) as a subject of philosophical inquiry. But simply by knowing (all about) *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) we will not achieve *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Philosophy may not even say how *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) can be attained in addition to revealing the truths about *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). We, therefore, need to distinguish *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), the theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and *puruṣārtha-sādhana* (पुरुषार्थ-साधन). For, without anyone of these the other two are incomplete. So, in the sixth chapter we discuss *puruṣārtha-sādhana* (पुरुषार्थ-साधन). Here we state and examine different views about the means of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ-साधन) or means of attaining *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). In a theory we do not practice *puruṣārtha-sādhana* (पुरुषार्थ-साधन), but we discuss *puruṣārtha-sādhana-s* (पुरुषार्थ-साधन) and problems regarding them. There is nothing wrong, therefore, if classical Indian philosophers or some philosophers of modern India discuss *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). We have found, however, that many modern philosophers do not discuss much about India's philosophical theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or PTP. They mostly discuss what is more popular and is widely known — it is the familiar view of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or FVP. In the Indian philosophical texts very little discussion is found of any *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) other than *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). The relation between philosophical theories of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and the spiritual practice or *sādhana* (साधन) of it are very close. In philosophy *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) alone is elaborately discussed as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). This does not mean that in philosophy other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are totally rejected. But

philosophy is interested in the highest *puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) or ultimate goal of human life. And it is one in number. There cannot be more than one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) which is the highest and the ultimate goal. But to say *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the highest *puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) is to imply that there are other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) which are not the highest. So, in some sense other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are also recognized in PTP. But from the strictly philosophical point of view the ultimate *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or the highest *puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) alone is important. The modern Indian philosophers do not often discuss in detail the views and arguments available in the philosophical texts about *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) or about other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). Their discussions fail to be included into the mainstream of Indian philosophy proper. Their discussions are not also part of western philosophy. These remain part of the literature on the FVP. I have tried to bring the discussion of (highest) *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) into mainstream Indian philosophy. This I tried to do by taking note of these modern discussions and responding to them from the point of view of Indian philosophical theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) as and when possible. These reflections are meant to be responses from the point of view of the rigorous philosophies of classical India. We also want to highlight that working scholars and teachers of philosophy need to discuss the subject more philosophically following the classical Indian philosophers. It may be noted that we here discuss the subject of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) with reference to standard works of Indian philosophies in the original and after their authors. But we have not just translated portions of such texts. We used the lines of reasoning followed there. Wherever we felt the necessity, we also critically examined them and reinterpreted or reconstructed them.

Modern scholars have not distinguished between FVP and PTP. Some of them also did not give much importance to the distinction between (Western) philosophy and *darśana* (दर्शन) or Indian philosophy. Though these scholars have discussed four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) mentioned in FVP, but they have failed to clear the importance of *mokṣa puruṣārtha* (मोक्ष पुरुषार्थ) both in Indian philosophy and Indian culture. In other words, these scholars failed to convey the point about centrality or its paramount importance in *darśana* (दर्शन).

In the field of philosophy Prof. Debiprasad Chattopadhyay is most notable personality who does not give importance to *mokṣa* (मोक्ष)². Some contemporary thinkers, e.g. Daya Krishna, have argued that the number of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) cannot be confined to just four (or five). Such controversies regarding it make *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) a worthy topic for philosophical discussion. It should be noted in this connection that in India, and even outside India, Swami Vivekananda has great influence on general public, educated men and academicians. He, however, has strongly emphasized the value of salvation (मोक्ष) of the individual self along with the universal human welfare. Accordingly he formulated the motto of the Ramakrishna Math and Mission: 'आत्मनो मोक्षार्थं जगत् हिताय च'.

We have tried in our whole work to explain and justify why philosophers and students of philosophy should take up this theme for serious study. We have tried to show how the special and distinctive outlook and character of the Indian culture give central importance to *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) both in life and thought. So the terms "philosophy" and "*darśana*" (दर्शन) are not synonymous. On the other hand, those who are not ready to give importance to the discussion of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) are

originally influenced by modern European outlook and the conception of philosophy there.

Swami Vivekananda was aware about the fact that for some modern Indian thinkers India's pre-occupation with liberation or self-liberation is India's great drawback or misfortune. It made the Indians ignore the worldly well being and concentrate on the other worldly goods. As a result of their world negating attitude, it did not allow them to prosper socially. Indian society is full of evils and injustices. So he did not ignore it. For this reason he added another part — 'जगत हिताय च'— the welfare of the mankind, of the whole world or the universe — in his formulation of the motto of his organization. This is meant to be the motto of the life of all men including the academicians. It is true that Indian philosophy gives ultimate importance to *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). But for this reason we should not ignore the other values of life nor should we object that India neglects them. The point is that according to the Indian culture and philosophy due attention to social matters is given yet these other concerns do not matter ultimately. On the other hand, people of the other part of the world pay excessive attention to those worldly problems and for this reason their only interest (and not just the main interest) is the social welfare of the mankind. They in some cases ignore and in some cases overlook the value of salvation or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). Some oppose the practice of giving importance to *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) and think that it should be avoided. Their argument is that unlike health, education etc. *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is a matter of *personal* concern of individual man. Some find that while Swami Vivekananda has emphasized both social welfare and personal (spiritual) liberation he has not done much successfully differentiate the selfish goal of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) from the non-selfish goal of general welfare. Actually, Vivekananda presented the balanced view of India. According to

Indian view, paying exclusive attention to the other-worldly and self-oriented concern is wrong and un-helpful. Similarly paying excessive attention to this-worldly and other-oriented concern is also wrong and un-helpful. One may say here that it is not a solution; rather it is a statement which indicates only the problem regarding the said matter. There are others who hold that for solution we should turn to the classical Indian philosophers and thinkers. They hold that for the majority the social and this-worldly wellbeing is practically the only concern and goal. Only for a rare few *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the only goal. So the teaching of India is that we should lead our social life in such a way that it does not block the higher pursuit of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). Social life is to be lived successfully. And a part of the success of social life for general good is that it prepares us in time for the highest pursuit of life called *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). The scheme of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and of *varṇa* (वर्ण) and *aśrama* (आश्रम) chalk out for us a long path. If we follow the path we will *gradually* move from the most common good to the best and the highest good. Viewed in this way there is no conflict between life of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) and life of *artha* (अर्थ), *kāma* (काम) and *dharma* (धर्म). This has been made clear by scholars like Professor Sushil Kumar Maitra and others in their works.

Some may say that it cannot be a solution rather it presents a problem when we say that both individual liberation and worldly welfare are important and we should pay attention to both of them. These — personal liberation and common welfare — are radically different goals and opposite to each other and hence cannot be combined. This is the reason why India which pays great attention to *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) ignores common values of social development, growth, welfare and so on. This-worldly concern and the other-worldly concerns are opposed to each other and hence they cannot be

combined. It is a task of philosophy to enquire about the situation created by the views of two radical groups and examine whether and how one can reconcile the interest of the self on one hand and the interest of others or the good for all on the other. Thus *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are conflicting values and scholars have found many problems in the standard way we think about them and in our attempt to accept all of them. If the theme of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) was not controversial or problematic, it could not be a proper subject of philosophical inquiry. We have shown that there are many questions about *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and we should try to address them philosophically. There is no reason, therefore, to say that the discussion of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) should fall outside of the scope of philosophy.

Keeping the above discussion in mind one may say that Swami Vivekananda has not raised or solved the problem how the two kinds of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) can be reconciled. But the point is that Vivekananda is just an example. If these two radical views are not effectively and successfully combined, then India will fail to do justice to the worldly concern or the concern for all or good for all. Anyway, we think through his formulation of the motto Vivekananda helped to bring to our notice the problem of reconciling the self-oriented concern and the other-oriented concern though he gave no philosophical argument or rational argument to show that they could be combined in the life and thought of man. So, it is a big challenge for modern scholars and even students of philosophy to inquire whether Indian philosophers in the past solved the problem or whether their solution could be accepted. We should also inquire if we can solve it. Simply to dismiss *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) or *dharma* (धर्म) is not the way expected from a student of philosophy. If the modern scholars ignore these *puruṣārtha-*

s (पुरुषार्थ) as not a philosophical issue but only a religious issue, then it will be unreasonable. If we study carefully, we will notice that classical Indian philosophers never ignored ordinary pursuits of life — pursuits of man as he is ordinarily and in his everyday life. *Artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम) are such human needs or goals of human life. In this life itself man seeks higher values when he gets proper motivation for that. So also ordinary men in this life want to live a better life, want to become better men. Hence, in a complete scheme of values of life *dharma* (धर्म) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) must find place side by side *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम). This does not mean that man first seeks *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम) and then leave them and seek *dharma* (धर्म) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). This is not the meaning of leading or living a better life. To lead a better life a man in this world should give more importance to *dharma* (धर्म) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). First he would continue to desire *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम) but should seek them as and when *dharma* (धर्म) permits. *Dharma* (धर्म) is for him a way of seeking of *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम). Usually he seeks artha or kama without provision of dharma or even sometimes relegating them to the background of their minds. So long he was seeking these very things without consideration of the provisions of *dharma* (धर्म) or even in violation of them. So, we sought to reconcile the four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) included in FVP. Secondly, we argued that though in discussing *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) scholars discuss almost exclusively FVP, yet the philosophical theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or PTP is quite different. This PTP is an integral part of *darśana* (दर्शन) even if it is not so of philosophy.

Notes and References

¹ Vātsyāyana, *bhāṣya* on *Nyāya sūtra* of Gautama 1.1.1, Paschim Banga Rajya Pustak Parsad, Kolkata, 2011, p. 28.

² Chattopadhyaya, Debiprasad, *What is Living and What is Dead in INDIAN PHILOSOPHY*, People's Publishing House, New Delhi, 1993, pp. 564-636.

Chapter- I

Philosophy and the Theory of Human Needs

(दर्शन & पुरुषार्थ)

We would like to address in this chapter an initial doubt: Is human need a philosophical subject? Is there a relation between the two? The word '*puruṣārtha*' (पुरुषार्थ) is a very familiar expression in Sanskrit and in many other Indian languages. No single English expression seems to capture every aspect of the meaning of this word. For the term '*puruṣārtha*' (पुरुषार्थ) we will sometimes use the expression 'human need' and some other times 'human goal'. We shall also use sometimes the expression 'the object of human seeking'. So far as the initial doubt is concerned it can be easily removed if we can decide to which branch of philosophy *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) belongs as a proper subject. There are some modern scholars who have just raised the question whether *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) can be a topic of philosophy or not. According to some scholars, *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) can be a topic of philosophy or its branch which is called ethics.¹ Already a sort of answer to this question is available in the work of an earlier great scholar, Professor Sushil Kumar Maitra.² Without referring to his work some recent scholars expressed different view. They feel difficulty in accepting the discussion of *mokṣa-puruṣārtha* (मोक्ष-पुरुषार्थ) as a part of (Indian) ethics. The same point was settled earlier by Professor Maitra.

So, the moot point that we want to answer here is: Is *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) a subject matter of philosophy? If the answer is in affirmative then another question will arise and that is — under which branch of philosophy it falls? It is clear that the theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) does not fall under either epistemology or metaphysics or logic etc. Some scholars are of opinion that it falls

under the branch of Indian ethics. In western philosophy ethics is generally understood as either normative ethics or meta-ethics. Accordingly the question is whether we can regard the theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) as a meta-ethical theory or as a system of normative ethics? But before going to discuss this matter let us discuss why we have such doubt first.

One may say that the theory of liberation or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष), one of the four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ), need not always be said as an ethical theory. In other words, it is true that the most of the Indian philosophical schools admit their own theory of liberation according to their own categories and metaphysical framework which are already admitted. But we cannot say that these theories of liberation are necessarily ethical theory.³ In recent time some Indian and western scholars find interest in discussing whether India has any ethical theory of her own or not and they conclude that there is no theory of Indian ethics or rather there is no ethics in Indian philosophy. They admit that there are theories of liberation. But a theory of liberation and a list of moral maxims alone cannot constitute any moral theory or any ethical theory. But it has been said that these scholars are right when they say that a list of maxims do not make any moral theory, but not right when they deny the existence of ethical theorizing in Indian philosophy.⁴ They deny the existence of Indian moral philosophy because they have only one model, the western model, in their mind. It seems they think that by accepting the categories and procedures of Western philosophy only one can build up a moral philosophy. Not only some western scholars but some Indian scholars also believe in this view. Rajendra Prasad⁵ has pointed out, as for example, that

Prof. Haridas Bhattacharya is of the opinion against the possibility of ethics in Indian philosophy.⁶ He begins his essay 'Indian Ethics' with the sentence that '...ethics is not to be had as a separate study in Indian philosophical and religious literature'.⁷ Similarly P.S. Sivaswami Aiyer says that '...compared with the amount of attention given by Hindu thinkers to the subjects of religion and philosophy, the scientific study of ethics has received very little attention from them.'⁸ He further said that 'The Upanisadas are mainly concerned with problems of metaphysics and it is only very rarely that one meets with moral rules as in the Taittiriya Upanisada'.⁹

Here one may say that it may not be fully right to say that Prof. Haridas Bhattacharya's opinion is against the possibility of Indian ethics. For, he continues in the same essay '... the other studies like psychology and ethics remaining embedded within the general organization of philosophy and religion. In order to study ethics therefore, it is necessary that the ethical element should be extricated from their general religious and philosophical settings.'¹⁰ So, we cannot say that Prof. Haridas Bhattacharya was fully wrong. For it is true that in Indian philosophy there is no separate discussions called ethics. But it is true that P.S. Sivaswami Aiyer is not right by saying that the scientific study of ethics has received very little attention from the early period. We will briefly show how classical Indian ethics is an important part of Indian philosophical tradition from the very early period. There we will argue that those who say that in India we do not have ethics of any one of the two kinds are wrong. In India there may not be ethics as a separate and

independent branch of philosophy yet in India there are both normative and meta-ethics.

Before going to the answer of the problem stated above let us take another example on the same matter. Famous western philosopher W.T. Stace was of the opinion that India has no ethics. In fact he wanted to prove that India has no philosophy. Indian philosophy is not really philosophy but religion.¹¹ Here Stace says 'although Hinduism has its scale of values, and its doctrine of development, it has no rational foundation for these, and though it has the idea of higher and lower, yet, because this is without foundation, it lets it slip, it never *grips* the idea, and so easily slides into the view that all is equally divine'¹². The same conclusion he asserted in his another popular book.¹³ We may as well name Max Weber. He also holds the view that there is ethics in India. From his writings it becomes clear why the Western thinkers think that India has no ethics. They believe that universalism is the heart of ethics. But the Indian society is dominated by *varṇa* (वर्ण) and *āśrama* (आश्रम) division. Here duty is not universal but relative to *varṇa* (वर्ण) and *āśrama* (आश्रम). So the Western thinkers hold that in India there is no universal ethics; and the ethics which is not universal is not ethics proper. Weber emphasizes the practice of *svadharma* (स्वधर्म) and holds that in India there is no (universal) ethics. There is, he says, "...only a status and professionally differentiated dharma according to caste".¹⁴ Under this conception of ethics some Indian scholars seem to ignore *varṇāśrama dharma* (वर्णाश्रम धर्म) or *svadharma* (स्वधर्म) according to Weber and emphasize only *sādhāraṇa dharma* (साधारण धर्म) or universal duty. P. V. Kane seems to do so.¹⁵

The intriguing question is why these scholars are arguing against Indian ethics when ethical discussions are very much present in almost all Indian philosophical systems? One possible answer may be this. Almost all philosophers of Indian philosophical tradition are found to be engaging themselves in a first order or first level inquiry of the nature of the subject-matter and not any second-order or second level (or meta-level) inquiry (over and above the first level discussion they made). We heard about the ethical theory of Immanuel Kant or the ethical theory of David Hume. But we never heard about the ethical theory of Maharshi Goutam or the ethical theory of Maharshi Kapil. So, it is an exclusive and unique way of philosophizing which the Great Indian philosophers have done. So, those who are not acquainted with the way of philosophizing of Indian philosophers, it may be difficult for them to understand Indian philosophy properly or find ethical theory in it. They never found any ethical theory in Indian philosophical tradition like the ethical theory of Plato or Aristotle. But then also to say that there is no ethical theory in Indian philosophy also doing injustice to one of the oldest and great philosophical traditions and the spirit of its great philosophers. I would like to add that not only in different schools of Indian philosophy but also in many non-technical philosophical works ethical values and teachings are there in good measure. For example the epics — *The Rāmāyana*, *The Mahābhārata*, some *Purāṇa-s* like the *Bhāgavatapurāṇa*, in the *Dhammapada* etc. enough moral teachings are there. In *smṛti-s* like the *Manusmṛti*, and in some socio-political works like Kautilya's *Arthaśāstra*, and Kamāndaka's *Nītisāra* etc. proper materials for ethical theory are found.¹⁶

Hence, it cannot be said that India has no ethics. We have said that in western philosophy ethics is generally understood as either normative ethics or meta-ethics. We will first distinguish these two types of ethics and their relation to each other and then discuss the problem whether the theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) can be regarded as ethics or not. If our answer is in the negative then also one need not give up hope. If there is necessity we may suggest for extending the current scope of ethics in order to include *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) in it. In that case like environmental ethics, business ethics etc., there may be ethics of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ).

Broadly speaking, ethics is concerned with human conduct. Ethics is an enquiry where we analyze the concepts like 'duty', 'oughtness', 'obligations', 'rightness' etc. and principles of evaluating human behavior with reference to certain given set of norms and values. So, the task of ethics is to give an account of the ways in which human beings ought to behave. Ethics, in a sense, is always practical. Like science its role is not to give only theoretical understanding but practical guidance. Its aim is to guide human beings in their practical life in which his actions have impact on others and their actions have impact on our life. We nowadays consider ethically how human actions impact physical and biological environment as well as animal beings. How to behave and act so that our actions would be right or wrong or will affect rightly or wrongly other men, environment, animals and so on — are the sort of questions we ask and answer in ethics. In other words main task of ethics is to give us the criterion of rightness and wrongness on the one hand and to analyze the concepts like duty, moral rightness, moral imperative, moral principles etc. on the

other. But to be moral it is not enough to know the criterion of rightness or wrongness only, the agent has to apply it and act according to the moral norms. So, in this sense ethics is practical. Its aim is to tell us about or make us aware of those actions through performing which we can improve ourselves, our life. When we say truth is a value, helping poor is a duty — we mean if we perform this duty and if we realize this value, then we become a better and more moral person. Therefore we can say that even as a philosophical theory (as distinct from normative ethics) ethics is concerned with the practical life of man. Man is to use his moral knowledge to conduct himself in a morally right way. So far even meta-ethics or philosophical theory of morality is different from many other more purely theoretical disciplines like mathematics. Ethics is not merely or completely a theoretical disciplines. It is a theoretical enquiry which has direct practical bearing. We should keep this in mind when we draw the distinction between meta-ethics and normative ethics. So we hold that as philosophical enquiry meta-ethics analyzes moral notions like duty, Obligation etc. and it discusses the form, nature, conditions of truth or correctness etc. of moral utterances. On the other hand, normative ethics is better understood as a scheme of duties. One best example of such a scheme we find in *Manusamhitā*. It gives us lists of duties in a planned way — dividing and classifying them according to different principles like *varṇa* (वर्ण), *āśrama* (आश्रम) and so on. So to the question what is duty, two types of answers are possible. One can answer the question by saying *ahiṃsā* (अहिंसा) is a duty. This answer does not tell us what is there in *ahiṃsā* (अहिंसा) so that it is correct to say that it is a duty; or what feature of *ahiṃsā* (अहिंसा) constitutes its character as duty. But the *Mimāṃsā darśana*

gives answer to such question when it says 'चोदनालक्षणोऽर्थो धर्मः' ¹⁷ (i.e. such actions as are enjoined and lead to good is *dharma*.)

We have discussed two senses or kinds of ethics. Now the question is whether the theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) can be said to be ethics in any of these senses or not. Before answering this question, we should discuss a little more whether there is any such thing as Indian ethics or not. For, if the theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is to be a kind of ethics, it must be some kind of Indian ethics. But if there is no such thing as Indian ethics, the theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) cannot be an Indian ethical theory or a part of an Indian ethical theory.

People have debated over decades whether in the Indian tradition we find anything called philosophy or any branch of it which can be called Indian ethics. It has been said that in the Western tradition the questions about morality are considered separately from questions that are discussed in other branches of knowledge or philosophy. This is not so in India. Even if we admit this, Indian ethics can still be possible. In his book *Gītārahasya* Lokmanya Tilak shows how the discussion of morality has to be carried out in the context of *dharma* (धर्म) and *nīti* (नीति) and it is not necessary to have a separate discussion of morality like western philosophy. In this connection one important point we need to note here which Prof. Meena A. Kelkar mentioned in her paper 'The Nature of Indian Moral Philosophy'. She said '... he (Tilak) shows how Indian moral thought can be compared with the utilitarian moral philosophy of Bentham and J.S.Mill or with the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Lokmanya Tilak suggests how without making use of Western categories one can concentrate on

the issues of moral life and establish a dialogue or debate with the western thought.¹⁸

In the Indian tradition from the very beginning of the Vedic period the sense of duty is pervasively present. It is embodied in the *Āgama* (आगम) or *Śruti* (श्रुति). The *Veda* (including the *Upaniṣada*), which is orally found and taught by the Seers (ऋषि), is the main source of the Indian Hindu Culture and also its religio-philosophical tradition. The other sources like the *Purāṇas*, *Itihāsa*, and *Dharmaśāstra* are subordinated to it. Some people again say that the essence of Indian culture is Spirituality; fundamentally speaking, it is not ethical. By this they mean to say that the Indian culture is esoteric and mystical in character and not ethical or ritualistic. But it is also not correct. It is important to note that to be ethical is not necessarily to be non-spiritual. It is even possible to view the ethical life of man (or ethical stage of his life) as preparatory to his still higher form (or stage) of life which is spiritual. Spirituality consists in the quest for the knowledge of the self (आत्मज्ञान) and liberation (मोक्ष). The ethical life of man consists in moral practices or doing moral duties or morally right actions. The practice of duties purifies man's mind and he becomes eligible for the pursuit of liberation.

Indian normative ethics is primarily embedded in the *Śruti* (श्रुति). It is elaborated later in *Purāṇa*, *Itihāsa*, *Dharmaśāstra*, and so on. In each one of these literature we find the statement of code of duties or different codes of duty. However, rigorous and analytical discussions on the meaning of moral concepts and analysis of moral commands are found only in the works of analytical Indian philosophy. But these philosophical discussions or

the philosophical literature of the later period are also based on the *Veda*; they do not conflict with the *Veda*.

Let us discuss a little more about the normative ethics of India. It was clear enough to the thinkers of the classical period that there should be a specific way through which, according to his capacity, man can pay off his debt to his particular *varṇa* (वर्ण) where he took birth and as well as the community of mankind which provides facilities and opportunities for his life. Manu has enumerated and classified *dharma-s* (धर्म) or duties of man. Here a point should be noted that the term '*dharma*' (धर्म) may be used in many senses. It may be used to mean subjective virtue (पुण्य), it may also be used as a religious merit (*subha adṛṣṭa*). The term may again be used in an objective sense of observable actions and conduct. Here we are concerned with only the last sense. Manu's classification is one of the earliest attempts for a systematic, well-connected treatment of the subject. Manu classified *dharma-s* (धर्म) into two types — a) *Varṇadharmas* (वर्ण धर्म or relative duties), i.e., duties relative to man's own *varṇa* (वर्ण) or social class and *āśrama* (आश्रम or specific class of spiritual discipline). Here the *dharma-s* (धर्म) are categorized as those relating to the people of four *varṇa-s* (वर्ण), i.e., *Brāhmaṇa* (ब्राह्मण), *khatriya* (खत्रिय), *Vaiśya* (वैश्य) and *Śūdra* (शुद्र). b) The second type of duties are called *Sādhāraṇa dharmas* (साधारण धर्म or common duties) i.e., duties which are equally obligatory to all men irrespective of their different *varṇa-s* (वर्ण). These *dharma-s* (धर्म) help man to build-up his social as well as moral character. For an adequate account of ethics or man's moral life we need to discuss not only moral actions but also moral laws or principles and moral command (*Vidhi* including *Niṣedha*

Vidhi). Moral law is different from both scientific law and law of the state in many ways. The main difference between moral law and scientific law is this: moral law can be violated but scientific law can never be violated. On the other hand one of the main differences between moral law and law of the state is this: the first one prescribes us what to do, but the later one orders us what to do. The main difference between an order (आदेश) and a moral prescription (धर्म विधि) is that in case of prescription if man obeys it, the man himself will be the gainer, but in case of carrying out an order a man may benefit the institution or the man who issued the order will be the gainer.

Moral law prescribes for the betterment of our life. These are not order. Now we come to our point, both *Varṇāśrama dharma* (वर्णाश्रम धर्म) and *Sādhāraṇa dharma* (साधारण धर्म) prescribe us the way how one can make his life morally good. *Varṇāśrama dharmas* (वर्णाश्रमधर्म) are the specific duties relating to one's *varṇa* (वर्ण) or *āśrama* (आश्रम). It is a kind of hypothetical imperative. If you are married, you have to follow the duties of the married life. If you belong to such and such *āśrama* (आश्रम), you have to do such and such duties. There cannot be any subjective choice; it is one's *varṇa* (वर्ण) or *āśrama* (आश्रम) which fixes the duties of the man in question; other conditions like subjective choice do not matter. On the other hand *Sādhāraṇa dharma* or code of common duties (साधारण धर्म) must be followed by every man irrespective of his social position or individual capacity. Prof. S. K. Moitra shows very convincingly in the introduction of his book *The Ethics of the Hindus* how *Sādhāraṇa dharma* (साधारण धर्म) constitutes the foundation of the *Varṇāśrama dharma* (वर्णाश्रम धर्म) and how the former is to be

regarded as the limit within which the latter is to be observed and obeyed.

There is no individual freedom. If you belong to any specific *āśrama* (आश्रम), you have to obey the duties selected for that specific *āśrama* (आश्रम). Moreover no man of a specific *āśrama* (आश्रम) has freedom to perform the duties of the other *āśrama*-s (आश्रम). According to Prof. S. K. Moitra, '...there may be exceptional cases, men with special powers and capacities, may attain the later stages without going through the earlier'.

Manu enumerated following ten duties under the name of *Sādhāraṇa dharma* (साधारण धर्म) or common duty:

- (i) *Dhṛti* or steadfastness (धृति);
- (ii) *Kṣama* or forgiveness (क्षमा);
- (iii) *Dama* or application (दम);
- (iv) *Asteya* (अस्तेय) or *cauryābhāva* (चौराभाव) [non-stealing or avoidance of theft];
- (v) *Śauca* or cleanliness (शौचं);
- (vi) *Indriya-nigraha* (इन्द्रिय-निग्रह) or repression of the sensibilities and sensuous appetites;
- (vii) *Dhī* or wisdom (धी);
- (viii) *Vidyā* or learning (विद्या);
- (ix) *Satya* or veracity (सत्य);
- (x) *Akrodha* or restraint of anger (अक्रोध).

Like Manu, Praśastapāda also enumerated *dharma* (धर्म) or duty into two groups: *Sāmānya dharma* (सामान्य धर्म) or common or

generic duty and *Viśeṣe dharma* (विशेष धर्म) or relative or specific duty. *Sāmānya dharma-s* (सामान्य धर्म) are common to all *varṇa-s* (वर्ण) or classes. On the other hand *Viśeṣe-dharma-s* are only for specific classes.

From the above discussion it is clear that moral concerns are very much present in Indian tradition; they are not only there in the *Veda* and the other *Śāstra-s* (शास्त्र) but also they are deep rooted in the Indian ethos and mind. But it has been observed by scholars like Professor S. K. Maitra that, in contrast with the Western tradition of ethics, in the Indian ethics the viewpoint of the individual is not so prominent. What is prominent here is the tradition — the *Āgamic* perception or the *Śāstric* perception of the value and purpose of individual's life and actions or his conduct. What is right or virtuous is entirely derived from our Tradition and *Śāstra* (शास्त्र). Numerous examples of Ideal code of conduct one can find in *the Gitā*, *the Mahābhārata*, and *the Purāṇa-s* etc. Obviously the aim was to control and conduct the life of man towards a disciplined moral life through which man can pay off his debt to his *varṇa* (वर्ण), his community, and after all to the world of mankind.

But there was also a broader aim also of life and morality. Through morality, *dharma* (धर्म) and *sadācāra* (सदाचार) man can make himself aware about the true nature of his self and the ultimate goal or value of life. It is true for any man or even for any living being that the worldly pleasure is (ordinarily) desirable. But a careful observation and critical thinking will convince us that the worldly pleasure is always mixed up with pain. Our unrestricted craving and pursuit of them will do us great harm and will not allow us to go beyond our lower animal life to higher life of a truly human

being. In his higher life man does not seek only ordinary sensuous pleasure. He seeks higher goals of life which are arranged hierarchically from ordinary sensuous to the moral and then to the spiritual. The code of moral conduct or duties in hierarchical arrangement is one of the guiding principles towards liberation (मोक्ष). Thus, if our take off point is ordinary sensuous urge, morality is the basis of the ultimate spiritual goal which is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) or spiritual liberation. Based in the *Āgamic* perception different schools of Indian thought and knowledge were developed; among them there are normative ethics as well as meta-ethics or philosophy of moral. Not only the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya and Vedānta darśan, but also Mimāṃṣā darśana and Yoga darśana include discussions that are ethical in character.

Incidentally, it may be noted that according to some thinkers Indian ethics is situational. However, to my mind it is not situational in its entirety. It may be situational so far as *Varṇāśrama dharma* (वर्णाश्रम धर्म) is concerned. But there are *Sādhāraṇa dharma-s* (साधारण धर्म) also; and so far as morality consists in the obligation of performing these common and universal duties, morality in the Indian view is not situational.

Another point to note is that according to some thinkers the Indian Vedic tradition is very old and has lost its modern relevance. In our times men are guided more by reason than by Scriptures or *Śāstra-s* (शास्त्र). Hence, we need to reform the *Śāstra* (शास्त्र) based ethics which does not give importance to either conscience or reason. In other words, we should accept only those ethical teachings of the *Śāstra* (शास्त्र) that can stand the test of reason. The rest we should give up as superstitious. Division of men according

to *varṇa* (वर्ण) is not rational at all and *varṇa* (वर्ण) based duties are not truly moral. But there are also some great thinkers (e.g. Tilak) who do not feel any need to reform the Tradition. They even do not want the reinterpretation or reconstruction of classical Indian moral thinking by using foreign categories and concepts. They admit the importance of our effort to understand Indian Tradition and through our own categories and preserve its identity.¹⁹ We should not first accept the Western model of ethics and then say that traditional Indian ethics is to be reformed to suit that model. Indian ethics should be viewed from the Indian standpoint and Indian ethical ideas and ideals are to be understood in the Indian way, i.e, according to the way they have been explained in Indian *Śāstra-s* — the scriptural *Śāstra-s* as well as later ethical and philosophical *Śāstra-s*.

Thus if we try to understand the place of morality and moral philosophy in the context of Indian tradition and culture, we find that it includes, every aspect of ethics. The vast and varied ethical literature of India includes rich rational enquiry of various ethical subjects and many different norms and ideals of moral life and behavior. And if we do not take a narrow view of philosophy as linguistic analysis or conceptual inquiry or only epistemic enquiry, then it will not be difficult to find in India vast comprehensive system of rational inquiry of all substantial problems of life. And we will also find in it both normative and meta-ethical discussions. Indian philosophy as a whole and the ethical discussions it contains help man to systematically develop himself from a sensuous being through moral being and finally to a spiritual being.

Meena A. Kelker in her paper “the nature of Indian moral philosophy” rightly said that ‘....this different understanding of philosophy gives a different place of ethics or morality’²⁰. So, it is not reasonable to find similar ethical observation like the west in Indian philosophical tradition.

Now we turn to the question whether the theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is a part of Indian ethics or not. If ethics is understood as the study of duty, then it seems difficult to say that the theory or *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is a form of ethics or study of duties. In the first place the texts and literature of Indian philosophy rarely include discussions of *all puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). We will show this in detail later. Secondly, even though Indian philosophy discusses *mokṣa-puruṣārtha* (मोक्ष पुरुषार्थ), it is not a form of duty in any usual sense. It has a spiritual value but not a moral duty. For this reason some argue that the theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is not a form of ethical theory. They say that the discussion of this *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) falls outside the scope of ethics. We can say the same thing about *kāma* (काम) and *artha* (अर्थ) if not about *dharma* (धर्म). If three of the four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) fall outside ethics then it becomes doubtful if the theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is an ethical theory.

Though in the Indian philosophical tradition the discussion of morality is very prominent, yet *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) do not form any part of them. In Indian philosophy we find the discussion of such topics as moral command (विधि) and its meaning and authority (प्रामाण्य), moral will and its genesis, means of knowing duty etc., there is not much discussion of *artha* (अर्थ) or *kāma* (काम). If we are to understand this situation then we need to distinguish first the

popular or familiar doctrine of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and then in the second place we need to clarify the sense in which we use the term 'ethics'. We have elaborately discussed the first point in our chapter on 'The Philosophical Theory of *Puruṣārtha* (PTP)'. So far as the second point is concerned in course of its development a subject extends its scope and the meaning of the name of the subject changes. At one time psychology meant the study of the mental processes of only normal and average man. In course of time there emerged animal psychology and abnormal psychology. If we look at the Western culture and philosophy we find similar changes in the scope of ethics and similar changes in the meaning of the word 'ethics'.

Various discussions, that were not included within the scope of ethics before, are nowadays included in it. And there has developed legal ethics, environmental ethics, business ethics etc. So, today one can say that like the extended sense of ethics in the Western tradition, Indian theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) can be regarded as Indian ethics [or the study of *dharma* (धर्म) and *dharmanīti* (धर्मनीति)] or part of Indian ethics in its extended sense. Here we may note a few features of some extended or broader ethics. We need to realize that the scope of ethics has been broadened not without reason. The scope was extended only when some urgency was felt. Unethical conduct and practices in the field of law and business made it necessary to study and regulate human behavior in these fields. Otherwise individual men and the whole human society will suffer. The society will produce corrupt business men and legal practitioners and less number of good and honest men.

Environmental ethics is the study of the ethical dimension of man's attitude and behavior towards environment. It is quite popular nowadays to divide the culture of the world into scientific rational culture and non-scientific mystical and religious culture. The scientific rational culture accepts the existence of natural sensible external material world, but it does not ascribe any ethical value to it. In the first place only the natural and physical phenomena are real from the point of view of science. Science does not accept value (including moral value) as a fact or reality. Because the natural phenomena are governed by scientific laws, they are intelligible scientifically and are admitted as real. Some religious faiths or religions also deprive the world of every moral worth. According to them, since this world is inanimate and irrational and it is created for the consumption of man and used by man, it deserves no ethical treatment from us. It is often believed that only normal and average *human* beings who can be treated as moral agent deserve to be treated morally. Even the mentally retarded men or animals and their life and activity fall outside the scope of the moral theory or ethics. So the physical or biological environment is outside the scope of moral considerations. In the opinion of these religions, nature is devoid of any moral quality or value and is outside moral considerations. It is not included within the scope of ethical study. Under the influence and teaching of such religious ideology or philosophy men became indifferent to nature and showed no respect or concern for it. For both science and the religion like Christianity, nature is devoid of all moral value. Born and brought up in such a culture men came to believe that nature is only a dead matter and started to exploit it. Once we take the nature to be a dead matter, question of caring it or treating it

with love and morality does not simply arise. Because moral treatment or any sort of care requires that the object must be conscious being to which the agent wants to be moral, that is, act morally. So, unless we completely change our outlook, unless we learn to view nature not just as a dead body, but a living organism, which can receive our action and can re-act also, we cannot treat nature as something moral. Nor can we in that case take nature as a part of the subject matter of ethics. For long men in modern scientific culture (and religion like Christianity) viewed nature as amoral something.

Only now we have become aware that such view and treatment of nature created the present environmental imbalance or ecological crisis. This is not just an event among thousand events but is a matter of worldwide concern. So we now feel if we cannot solve the present ecological crisis, then the whole human race will be destroyed. In order to solve it, we need to change our view and attitude to Nature. What would be that changed and proper attitude or view are being explored and explained by the new branch of ethics — the environmental ethics. This is one concrete instance of how and why the scope of ethics changes. If *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are very important, then for the proper understanding of it we may extend the scope of Indian ethics to include them as ethical subject. Actually we need to change our conception and understanding of Indian culture, philosophy and ethics in order to realize that it is not impossible or unnatural to treat *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) as ethical subject or the theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) as a form of ethics, or Indian ethics.

Anyway, the scope of ethics is not fixed. Whenever there is need we extend its scope to include some phenomena which were so long outside the purview of ethics. If *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are important and it is necessary to discuss *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) in ethics, we can extend the current scope of Indian ethics to include *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) or the discussion of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ).

Directly or indirectly ethics is concerned with the practical aspect of man's life. This means it is concerned with human action and conduct. Either it (that is, normative ethics) gives us a code of conduct, that is, a systematic list of concrete duties or certain moral actions. Or it (meta-ethics) tells us what is *dharma* (morally right action); what makes a certain action *dharma* (धर्म); conditions of the possibility of *dharma* (धर्म) etc. In this way ethics is somehow concerned with human actions. Now human actions are generally rational actions. Such actions involve a distinction between ends and means. Sometimes some persons find that they need food. They find this when they are hungry. Hunger is painful. Man as a rational being chooses to act in such a way that his hunger can be satisfied or his pain of hunger can be removed. In this case his ultimate need is satisfaction of hunger. This is his good as an end. To achieve it, the hungry man rationally chooses to perform the act of cooking, say as an instance. When he cooks he actually cooks as his end. But this is end as means. The satisfaction of hunger is the end in itself.

In the moral sphere man as moral agent has certain end in view. This end is of the nature of value. Outside the sphere of morality when a rational man acts as a natural human agent he has some ends. But this end is not a value. Every conscious action of a

man has behind it that man's idea of some end and the desire to attain it. Where the end is a value (or a moral value in particular) we say man *ought* to act so as to realize that value (or the end). But in some normal and non-moral situation a man *does* act to realize certain end. Thus moral actions have two features. (i) They are means for certain good as an end and (ii) they are good as means of such good as end that we do not naturally desire. In case of duty or *dharma* (धर्म) the ends are not *naturally* desired or the actions (that is means of that end) are not *naturally* performed. Even against their natural inclination moral command (विधि) reveals to them that they should perform the act and they should aspire to realize the end. What makes a man act in such case is not just his natural desire or inclination; not merely logical (rational) consideration but the moral command. *Śruti* (श्रुति) tells us “धर्मम् चर” (i.e., do your moral duty); and we feel obliged to obey. We perform moral actions. In this way moral actions are (a) value oriented action and (b) they are actions that are enjoined by moral imperative (विधि).

The idea of value is not only the idea of a good as an end; but has a normative content. It is not just good which we (naturally) seek but what we should seek. Where the value is moral value, the means of it — the action as means of it — is morally commanded. Therefore, in a broad sense ethics is concerned with all these human actions that are morally commended and are means of some good as end which also have a normative feature.

Artha (अर्थ) is one of the *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). We naturally seek it. And we seek it by any effective means. *Artha* (अर्थ) in this sense is not a value and not a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). *Puruṣārtha*

(पुरुषार्थ) is not just a human need. For, what man naturally desires — food when hungry, sleep when sleepy — is not *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). *Puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) means what we should consider as desirable; what we should seek. If there is a kind of *artha* (अर्थ) or a certain sense of *artha* (अर्थ), according to which we *should* seek *artha* (अर्थ) then such *artha* (अर्थ) becomes a value and seeking *artha* (अर्थ) becomes a duty. In that case *artha* (अर्थ) will be a part of ethics. In this way we can decide whether or not the *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are subject matter of ethics. If *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is a subject matter of ethics, then the theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) will be an ethical theory. Or, it will be a part of Indian ethics. This is one answer to the question whether the theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is an ethical theory or not.

We will note one more point. There is close connection between Indian philosophy and philosophizing on the one hand and seeking to realize the *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) on the other. This is not so clear when we use the word 'philosophy' but when we use the word '*darśana*' (दर्शन) this connection is very clear. When we use the word 'philosophy' we are likely to understand by the word predominantly Western philosophy. But Indian philosophy means *darśana* (दर्शन). The conception of it is derived from the *Upaniṣadas*²¹, where it has been said that we *should* have *ātmadarśana* (आत्मा द्रष्टव्य) or self realization. This *ātmadarśana* or *ātma-sākṣātkāra* (आत्म-साक्षात्कार) or immediate realization of our self is the first meaning of the word '*darśana*' (दर्शन). The means of *darśana* (दर्शन) in this sense is also called *darśana* (दर्शनशास्त्र). However, *darśana* (दर्शन) is one of the many means of *darśana* (दर्शन) in the sense of self realization. *Śravaṇa* (श्रवण) or receiving

instruction from the Veda through teacher and *nididhyāsana* (निदिध्यासन) or practicing the truth acquired through *śravaṇa* (श्रवण) and *darśana* (दर्शन) are the other two means. The other name of the means called *darśana* (दर्शन) is *manana* (मनन)²². *Manana* (मनन) means critical and analytical enquiry or discussion. This is the essential nature of Indian philosophy or *darśana* (दर्शन) as means. *Darśana* (दर्शन) as an end is self-realization or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) (or the immediate means of it, the knowledge of the true nature of the self). *Darśana* (दर्शन) or Indian philosophy is not done for its own sake but for the attainment of *mokṣa-puruṣārtha* (मोक्ष-पुरुषार्थ). Thus the relation between *darśana* (दर्शन) and *mokṣa-puruṣārtha* (मोक्ष-पुरुषार्थ) is immediate and essential. The other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are indirectly connected to *darśana* (दर्शन). One who acts in a way which violates the pursuit of the *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) of *artha* (अर्थ) or *kāma* (काम) or *dharma* (धर्म) cannot have necessary purification of the mind (चित्तशुद्धि). In that case one cannot acquire the philosophical knowledge or the knowledge of the true nature of the self which is the immediate means of *mokṣa-puruṣārtha* (मोक्ष-पुरुषार्थ).

This account of *darśana* (दर्शन) and its connection with *mokṣa-puruṣārtha* (मोक्ष-पुरुषार्थ) is common to almost all the systems of Indian philosophy or *darśana* (दर्शन). Thus the very concept of *darśana* (दर्शन) or Indian philosophy essentially involves reference to *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) and other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). Thus *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) including *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is a central theme of Indian philosophy. This is very clearly brought out in *sūtra* texts of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya, Vedānta and so on.

Still this *darśana* (दर्शन) is closely similar to philosophy which is a rational and critical study and it studies among other things knowledge and its means. We can say *darśana-śāstra* (दर्शन शास्त्र) is *darśana* (दर्शन) because it generates philosophical knowledge (*darśana* as means). This *śāstra* (शास्त्र) does two things. It builds a theory of *pramāṇa* (प्रमाण) and *kathā* (कथा) and it also uses these two to generate and preserve the knowledge of the true nature of the self. This knowledge of self which *darśana* (शास्त्र) generates is, however, mediate (परोक्षो). Through *sādhana* (*nididhyāsana* etc.) this knowledge develops into immediate realization of the self i.e., *ātmadarśana* (आत्मदर्शन) which in its turn secures *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). Prof. Meena. A. Kelkar rightly said ‘it is this understanding of philosophy which gives a different place to ethics. The discussion of morality is carried out at two levels. At one level, morality is concerned with the rules of conduct, prescriptions and prohibitions that are accepted in a society. It is the foundation of social and communal life. At another level, morality is not a socially binding force but a liberating force.... In this sense, being moral does not mean knowing and following the rules of conduct but knowing the ultimate reality or preparing the grounds for the knowledge of ultimate reality, the primordial existence Par Excellence.’²³

On the basis of above discussion we conclude that *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is a central topic of Indian philosophy or *darśana* (दर्शन) and the Indian philosophical theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) can be viewed as a form of ethical theory.

Notes and References

- 1 Chattopadhyay, Uma, 'Purusartha: ekti samiksha' (in Bengali) in Sanyal, Indrani and Dutta Sharma Ratna (eds.), *Dharmanīti O Śruti*, (in Bengali), Jadavpur University, Kolkata, 2009, pp. 17-21.
- 2 Maitra, Sushil Kumar, *The Ethics of the Hindus*, University of Calcutta, Calcutta, 1963.
- 3 It has been said that the theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) may be taken as a theory of general value or a general theory of value but not as ethical theory of value or a theory of ethical value.—Prasad Rajendra, *History of science, philosophy and Culture in Indian civilization*, Vol-XII, part- I, Centre for Studies in Civilization, New Delhi, 2009, p. 208.
- 4 *Ibid.*, p.157.
- 5 *Ibid.*, pp. 157-158.
- 6 Bhattacharyya, Haridas (ed.), *The Cultural Heritage of India*, vol-III, Ramakrishna Mission, Calcutta, 1993, p. 620.
- 7 *Ibid.*, p. 620.
- 8 Aiyer, Sivaswami, P.S, *Evolution of Hindu Moral Ideals*, Nag Publishers, Delhi, 1976, p. 5.
- 9 *Ibid.*, p. 20.
- 10 Bhattacharya, Haridas (ed.) *The Cultural Heritage of India*, vol-III, Ramakrishna Mission, Calcutta, 1993, p. 620.
- 11 Stace, W.T. *A Critical History of Greek Philosophy*, Macmillan & Co LTD, New York, 1964, pp.14-16.

¹² Ibid., p. 313.

¹³ Stace, W.T. *The Philosophy of Hegel*, Dover Publications, INC, New York, 1955, p. 498.

¹⁴ Mukhopadhyay, P. K., "On the Availability of Ethics in India", in *Classical Indian Thought and the English Language: Perspectives and Problems*, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi, 2015, p. 221.

¹⁵ Ibid., p.222.

¹⁶ Prasad Rajendra, *History of Science, Philosophy and Culture in Indian Civilization*, Vol-XII part I, Centre for Studies in Civilization, New Delhi, 2009, p.74.

¹⁷ Śāstrī, Dwarikādās (ed.), *Saḍadarśanasūtrasaṃgraha* (sūtra no. 1/1/2), Sudhi Prakashanam, Varanasi, 1988, p. 1.

¹⁸ Kelker, Meena.A., 'The Nature of Indian Moral Philosophy', in Bhelke, S.E & Gokhle, P.P (eds.), *Studies in Indian Moral Philosophy : Problems, Concepts & Perspectives*, Indian Philosophical Quarterly Publication, Pune, 2002, pp.13-14.

¹⁹ According to Meena A. Kelker, this second claim made by Tilak which presupposes to one's own tradition by maintaining it's own identity, Ibid., p.14.

²⁰ Ibid., p.15.

²¹ आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्त्यव्यो तिदिध्यसित्यव्य —*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣada* —2/4/5.

²² श्रोतोव्यो श्रुतिवाक्येभ्यो मन्त्यव्यश्च उपपत्तिभिः.

²³ Kelker Meena.A., 'The Nature of Indian Moral Philosophy', in
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