

THE THEORY OF HUMAN NEEDS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

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
Swati Bhattacharya

**Under the supervision of
Prof. Jyotish Chandra Basak
Professor of philosophy**

**Department of Philosophy
University of North Bengal
April, 2018**

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

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(Jyotish Chandra Basak)
Professor
Department of Philosophy

Supervisor
Department of Philosophy
University of North Bengal

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
Swati Bhattacharya.
(SWATI BHATTACHARYA)

Research Scholar

Department of Philosophy

North Bengal University

Date: *17.04.2018*



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Kasax
17/04/2018
Supervisor
Department of Philosophy
University of North Bengal

Swati Bhattacharya
17.04.2018

Abstract

One important area of philosophy is 'Man and Morals' and one important topic of a philosophical theory of morals is duty or morally right action. All conscious human actions are goal oriented. Moral actions are no exception, though there is great controversy as to what that goal is. In classical Indian culture there is a theory, — the theory of human needs or *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Here '*puruṣārtha*' (पुरुषार्थ) does not mean just any human need. *Puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is only such need which is consistent with *dharma* (धर्म). *Dharma* (धर्म) is the foundation of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). The standard doctrine of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) includes four (or three) broad kinds of human needs. But philosophical theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is different. It has only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) though it can be conceptualized positively or negatively. We have found very comprehensive discussion on the subject of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in the philosophical and religious literature of classical India. Analytical and detailed discussions on *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) are found in the source books of Sāṃkhya, Vedānta, Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika philosophy etc. It is also found in the source of these source books namely Vedic literature which includes not only *Vedas* and the *Upaniṣadas* but also *ītihāsa-s* and *Purāṇa-s*. Subsequently this subject has been more or less ignored by the working scholars of philosophy. We have tried here to restore the position which the subject of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) deserves.

Our present work consists of six chapters. We start our discussion with an important question without solving which we cannot even start our present research work in philosophy. The question is: whether the theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) can be regarded as a part or branch of philosophy.

Such doubt does not stop us from discussing this subject rather it shows that we can discuss it in philosophy. For in Indian philosophy nothing can be discussed if there is no doubt or dispute about it. If, however, the dispute is already solved we cannot take it up for philosophical discussion. In our introduction we have shown why it is doubted by some people whether *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is or can be a subject for philosophical investigation. After discussion we concluded that the discussion of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) forms a part of the branch of philosophy called theory or morals or values. Actually the four fold scheme of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) covers the moral value of *dharma* (धर्म) on the one hand and spiritual value of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) on the other.

The **first chapter** discusses in detail and have shown the close relationship between *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and *darśana* (दर्शन). Though philosophy, as we understand it in the west, may not be interested in the discussion of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), yet it is a central topic of *darśana* (दर्शन). It defines the goal and character of *darśana* (दर्शन). As a matter of fact we find rigorous and analytical discussion of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in *darśana* (दर्शन). This will be evident from our discussion in the chapter four.

The **second chapter** deals with another important question. Granted that *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is a topic of philosophical discussion, the next question is: Is the doctrine of threefold or fourfold *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) a philosophical doctrine? We have shown that it is not. Rather it is better viewed as a familiar or popular view of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or FVP. We have stated reasons in support of our stand. In connection with our discussion in this chapter we have discussed also the meaning of the word '*puruṣārtha*' (पुरुषार्थ) on the one hand and the definition and nature

of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) on the other. In other words, we have adopted here both the logic of the word approach and the logic of the thing approach.

There are many scholars in modern times who have discussed the theme of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), but most all of them never make it clear in their writings whether they distinguish FVP which admits three or four *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and the philosophical theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or PTP according to which the number of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is just one. We have also mentioned that the source of FVP and PTP are different and what these sources are. What is more important is that we have shown FVP is full of anomalies. Having shown the anomalies and inconsistencies in it we made various attempts to systematize FVP as far as possible so that FVP turns out consistent and free from anomalies. But ultimately we failed. Some anomalies remained and FVP remained unacceptable from the philosophical point of view. It is no wonder that the philosophers advanced a different theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) which we call here PTP.

Actually, in the previous chapter we could not discuss each one of the *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) one admits according to FVP individually. In the **third chapter** we have discussed the same *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) individually and in greater detail. Still we did not discuss in this chapter the *bhakti puruṣārtha* (भक्ति पुरुषार्थ). For in it we have discussed individually only those *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) that are included in the list of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) associated with FVP. This list does not include *bhakti puruṣārtha* (भक्ति पुरुषार्थ). So, we have devoted a separate chapter for *bhakti puruṣārtha* (भक्ति पुरुषार्थ).

After discussing both generally and individually in the previous two chapters the four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) associated with FVP we passed

on to the philosophical theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or PTP in the **fourth chapter**. Different systems of Indian philosophy have offered their own different versions of PTP. All these versions agree that the number of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is one and this is the *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ). But these versions or who offer them differ about the exact nature of that one single *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ). The philosophical literature and writings on this subject is vast. It is almost impossible to discuss all that have been said there. We have discussed in the fourth chapter only two forms or versions of PTP — the Nyāya PTP and the Vedānta (Advaita) PTP. The basic difference is this — according to the Nyāya PTP the *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is a *negative* state; it is a state of complete and absolute absence of pain and suffering. According to the Vedanta PTP *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is a *positive* state of best and highest happiness or bliss. Each school offers in support of its view many arguments and quotes many passages from philosophical and Vedic literature. We have critically presented and examined these two versions and finally found that the Nyāya version of PTP is more satisfactory from the philosophical point of view. This is at least an important result which we achieved after a long and laborious investigation. We hope that all will agree that this is a significant achievement; it is not just a repetition of past achievement or work.

In the **fifth chapter** we have concentrated on *bhakti puruṣārtha* (भक्ति पुरुषार्थ). Here we have first stated the reasons why we did not include the discussion of *bhakti puruṣārtha* (भक्ति पुरुषार्थ) in some previous chapter. Particularly the Vaiṣṇava sects have emphasized on the importance of *bhakti* (भक्ति). We have discussed mainly the view of the GauḍioVaiṣṇava sect or *sampradāya*. We have noted the distinction they draw between *sādhya bhakti* (साध्य भक्ति) and *sādhan bhakti* (साधन भक्ति). We also

discussed such critical points as whether they are right when they say that Śaṅkarācārya as well as Madhusūdana Svaraswatī turned to the path of *bhakti* (भक्ति) after failing to reach the fulfillment through the path of *jñāna* (ज्ञान) of the (Advaita) Vedānta. Referring to some textual evidences we have shown that their claim or observation is not correct.

We realized that our discussion of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) as a topic of philosophical research will remain incomplete if we do not include the discussion of *puruṣārtha sādhana* (पुरुषार्थ साधन). For as Gaṅgeśopādhyāy has shown nothing is *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) if it does not have a *sādhana* (साधन), through which it can be realized. So far the *puruṣārtha sādhana* (पुरुषार्थ साधन) is a part of the conception of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). So, we devoted a separate chapter, the **sixth chapter**, for the discussion of *puruṣārtha sādhana* (पुरुषार्थ साधन). Here we have discussed the great controversy between *samuccayavāda* (समुच्चयवाद) and *asamuccayavāda* (असमुच्चयवाद). There is vast literature in this subject and the discussions there are quite technical and intricate. We have also discussed the related themes of *jīvanmukti* (जीवन्मुक्ति) and *videhamukti* (विदेहमुक्ति). Some admit both the forms of *mukti* (मुक्ति) but others disagree.

In the last and **concluding chapter** we have summarized the discussions and stated the final outcome of our investigation. We have also incorporated here some important points which we have omitted in our previous chapters. More importantly we have considered here some objections which have been raised against the India's vision and culture on account of their belief in *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). For example, it has been said by some critics that India's ideology of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) led to the rise of a world negating attitude which prevented India's social growth and development. The related objection is that their concern for *mokṣa* (मोक्ष)

turned the Indians a selfish people. For *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is individual's own personal fulfillment. The quest for *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) does not allow individuals to think and act for others benefit or for the benefit of mankind. It has been shown, that if we deeply understand the idea of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) with reference to its proper philosophical and social context then we will realize that these objections are unfounded.

Thus we have shown that the distinctive conception of philosophy in India makes *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) a natural subject matter of it. Indian philosophy in the sense of *darśana* (दर्शन) has a great practical bearing. Here one does not do philosophy simply to get intellectual pleasure or theoretical understanding. In India men do philosophy to be clear about the true nature of the self for that will lead man to life's highest fulfillment.

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(Swati Bhattacharya)

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Introduction

The present work is intended to undertake a philosophical enquiry into the concept of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). But the appropriateness of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) as a subject of philosophical enquiry may itself be doubted. We first need to clear this doubt. *Puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) as a subject of philosophical enquiry is doubtful because there are two groups of thinkers: one group holds that it is a proper subject matter of philosophy, whereas in the second group belong those who are interested in philosophy but not in the theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). This second group appears to think that *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) may be a subject of religion or spirituality or mythology or eschatology; but it cannot be a theme of philosophy proper. Sometimes they also appear to hold that if it is at all a topic of philosophy, then it is a topic of *speculative* philosophy of older days like the topic of immortality. It cannot be, therefore, be an interesting subject of modern analytical philosophy. Nor can it be a part of any rigorous branch of Indian philosophy.

Let us explain the matter in a bit detail. Philosophy is a theoretical subject. It is concerned with such things as knowledge, truth, understanding, meaning etc. A theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) on the other hand is a non-philosophical study — it is sub-philosophical or super philosophical. Subjects like wealth and pleasure are concerns of ordinary men and of theory like economics but not of philosophy. On the other hand the subject of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in general and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) in particular are of interest to religious persons or *sanyāsi-s* (संन्यासी). So, *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) does not seem to be a

philosophical subject. Do we have any satisfactory answer to this objection? Let us see.

Before answering this question we want to highlight another problem, which cannot be ignored. There are great scholars who are divided in their views on *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or on some topics related to *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Some hold the opinion that India's pre-occupation with *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is the misery of Indian mind and thinking. (Prof. Daya Krishna and some other thinkers have discussed this view). But there are also Indian and non-Indian thinkers who hold that India's pre-occupation with *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is her glory. Scholars like Bal Gangadhar Tilak seem to hold this second view. We will elaborate this point later. First let us discuss the objection stated above. Is *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) a subject of philosophy? We have discussed this in greater detail in the first chapter of this work. Here we may say two things. First, in these days many working philosophers and teachers of philosophy in India discuss this subject. They have published many articles and books on it. These writers include well known philosophers like J. N. Mohanty, Daya Krishna, Rajendra Prasad, P. K. Mahapatra, Billimoria, Prof. Bhelke etc. On this ground one may hold that *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is a subject of philosophical enquiry.

The second point is that in many important source books of classical Indian philosophy *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) has been given an important place. Great philosophers like Gautama, Śaṅkarācārya, Udayanācārya, Gaṅgeśopādhyāy, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī etc. have discussed in detail the subject *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Even standard philosophical texts like *Bhāṣāpariccheda* with *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* or *Vedānta Paribhāṣā* contain relevant discussions on *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). In the first sutra of *Nyāyadarśana* Goutama has discussed

nihśreyas (निःश्रेयस). This *nihśreyas* (निःश्रेयस) includes both the final *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) and other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). The first *Sāṃkhyakārikā* also introduces the theme of final *puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ). The same thing can be said about Kaṇāda's *Vaiśeṣika sūtra* or Praśastapāda's *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*. Śaṅkarācārya at the end of his introductory *bhāṣya* on *Brahmasūtra* which is known as *Adhyāṣabhāṣya* has introduced this subject. The author of *Brahmasūtra* concluded his *sutra* text with a *sutra* that speaks of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). So, it cannot be said that *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is not a topic of rigorous or analytical philosophical discussion.

The objectors may say that what we have written in the two previous paragraphs is well known. But this does not answer his objection. In recent time those thinkers who discuss *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) do not differentiate *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) from *kratvartha* (कृत्यार्थ). This is one proof that these scholars do not pay serious attention to the literature of classical Indian philosophy or to the discussion of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) there. Therefore, it appears that many who discuss the theme of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) want to ignore classical Indian philosophical literature on the subject. On the other hand some show that Indian philosophy (दर्शन) is not a philosophy proper, for it discusses topics like *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). They sometimes put it differently. Philosophy is a theoretical enquiry. *Puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are matters of men's practical concern. Only by confusing the theoretical and practical the Indians discuss *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) in philosophy. It is possible to say in reply that we admit that the discussion of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) does not go well with the Western philosophy. But Indian philosophy is different from Western philosophy. Those who raise the objection that *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ)

cannot be a philosophical topic seems to confuse these two kinds of philosophy.

Another point to note in this connection is that ethics is recognized by all as a part of philosophy. Ethics discusses human actions and actions are not theoretical things but fall on the practical side of man. Discussion of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) can be easily included into that part of Indian philosophy which is properly called Indian ethics. It is true that some have expressed doubt whether the theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) can be regarded as ethical theory or not. We would try to say for the present that Indian ethics must at least include the discussion of *dharma* (धर्म) and *dharma* (धर्म) is an important *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Anyway, one of our objectives is to restore classical Indian philosophical theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) from the neglect by Indian and western scholars and teachers of philosophy today. So we begin the present study of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in the **first chapter** with the discussion on the relation between the *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and philosophy (दर्शन).

Here we may say a few words about our notion of the theoretical and practical. How do we understand their nature or their relation? A theoretical enquiry is also a goal oriented enterprise. No normal human being acts without purpose. It has been said that if one is seen to blow in the air without purpose he is considered mad. So both theoretical enquiry and practical endeavor are goal oriented. The difference is that the goal of the theoretical enquiry is knowledge or understanding. But in his practical life and in disciplines like religion or morality, man's goal is something practical. This goal is to change or transform himself. A man who practices morality wants to change himself and become a better man. Similarly, a man who practices religion wants to transform himself and become a better being in the

eyes of God. Thus religion and morality are matter of practice and hence practical. (But ethics is not morality or *practice* of morality; it is the *theory* of such practice and all that such practice entails). In everyday life ordinary man is concerned with the worldly good and happiness. He wants to change himself into a person who would live in a way which God likes. Ethics takes note of all these practical matters. Still it is a theoretical enquiry and a part of philosophy. Ethics is not moral practice. It is a theoretical enquiry the goal of which is to know or understand what human action is and when a human action becomes moral action and so on. One may practice morality without studying ethics. One may argue without studying logic. But one who studied ethics or logic does also *know* what is right or wrong action or what is valid or invalid argument. Such a person is not deceived and takes an action to be moral when the action really is not moral but only looks like a moral action. One who knows logic will not mistake an invalid argument as valid. So for successful practice and practical life we need to know the theory. Successful practice of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) needs theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Such theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is and should be a part of ethics or theory of morality or moral philosophy.

Similarly, science is a theoretical enquiry. It has a theoretical goal to achieve. It (natural science) is to understand the nature or the natural phenomena of the world. The purpose of (natural) science is fulfilled when this theoretical goal is achieved. But this does not mean that this knowledge cannot be used for transforming the world or changing our lives. In technology scientific knowledge is used to achieve practical goals of making our life more comfortable — e.g. to make the soil yield more food and to make water to give us electricity.

Similarly, Indian philosophy has as its primary goal something theoretical. It seeks *jñāna* (ज्ञान) or basically the truth or knowledge about self (आत्मा). It is followed by *sādhana* (साधन), which is the practice of the truth or knowledge gained. This knowledge through suitable practices including the ethical practices or *sādhana* (साधन) transforms our life so that no longer sorrows and sufferings affect us. Philosophers (Indian) not only seek the theoretical goal or knowledge (of self) but also know that this knowledge can enable us to attain the highest practical goal of life. This is no defect of Indian philosophy that it has this other or unique goal in view which Western philosophy does not seek. In addition to being a theoretical inquiry which aims at correct understanding or knowledge or *tattvajñāna* (तत्त्वज्ञान), Indian philosophy (दर्शन) remains fully aware of the practical value of the knowledge it seeks.

Thus philosophy is fully theoretical so far as its primary goal is concerned. It is also theoretical and rational enterprise so far as its methods are concerned. However Indian philosophy (दर्शन) is philosophy in the classical sense. It is philosophy in the sense of study of man and morals. Science is the study of (external) nature. Indian philosophy is not philosophy in the sense of the contemporary logical positivists and other analytical philosophers. According to them, philosophy is not a factual study like science. So it cannot give us knowledge of fact. It is a conceptual study or it studies or analyzes language. Philosophy in this sense clarifies meaning of utterances. In the classical sense philosophy in the west was an enquiry into reality or fundamental principles and truths. As distinct from science it is humanistic study. This is close to the Greek sense. Many Greek thinkers including Socrates and Plato used to believe that

philosophical wisdom leads to tranquility or peace. This is very similar to *mokṣa* (मोक्ष).

In the ultimate source book of *Nyāya* Philosophy, the *Nyāyasūtra* of Goutama, there are 527 aphorisms or *sūtra*-s. The first *sūtra* gives us a list of sixteen major topics (तत्त्व). In this list the fourth is *prayojana* (प्रोयोजन) or utility or usefulness and it comes immediate after *saṃśaya* (संशय) or doubt. The idea is that a serious and critical theoretical inquiry such as philosophy is undertaken if it serves some purpose like settling *and if there is* some doubt or dispute. There are things whose knowledge may not serve any purpose (at least on some occasions). So we cannot undertake an inquiry to acquire this (type of) knowledge. Again, nobody doubts or disputes the existence of the 'I' or the self. Nobody has doubt of the form "अहम न वा"; and nobody offers the denial of the form "अहम नास्मि". So, there is no point in undertaking an inquiry into what all already know, what is already known and proved (निर्णीत). Even in his ordinary life a common man proceeds to do some theoretical or academic activity when he believes that the action will serve some purpose, i.e. the action will be useful. While explaining the fourth topic of the list of sixteen topics in the *Nyāyasūtra* 1/1/1 Vātsyāyana writes 'अथ प्रोयोजनं, येन प्रयुक्तः प्रवर्तते, तत् प्रोयोजनं'¹. In this sense utility or the consideration of usefulness pervades everything in the world; all living beings, all actions, and all disciplines of knowledge.

Leaving out a few possible exceptions we may agree that everything we do consciously (or even instinctively) is useful and often we do those things because we somehow know that they are useful. When it is said theoretical inquiry does not seek anything other than knowledge we mean knowledge is the value or purpose or utility which this inquiry serves. When we say knowledge for the sake of

knowledge we mean for a theoretician, as theoretician, only knowledge counts, his *prayojana* (प्रयोजन) or need is knowledge. But this does not mean that this knowledge cannot or does not serve any purpose. Strictly as a theoretician he does not ask what value this knowledge has. But as a man he can ask this question. Often he asks this question or knows the answer. An Indian philosopher knows that philosophical knowledge he seeks has greatest value or utility. It serves man's highest value or enables him to achieve life's highest goal. Still philosophy remains theory and not practice. It does not teach man how to use this knowledge to transform his present life, how to become a better man or a free man. Philosophy does not teach and it is not a form of practice like *sādhana* (साधन); it is not *sādhana* (साधन). It stops by generating knowledge which a practitioner or spiritual practitioner (साधक) can use to obtain some practical result, some good (for him or for others). Freedom from evil or suffering is one such goal or good.

There are some scholars who are engaged in writing and discussing about the theme of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). And they are successful to make an image that they are discussing philosophical doctrine of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or PTP. But actually there is a difference between Indian philosophical theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and what these scholars discuss. They actually discuss popular and familiar view of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or FVP. In the **second chapter** we will state and discuss FVP. One of the major points that are discussed here is the difficulties and inconsistencies in FVP. We shall seek to systematize this theory and find a statement of the theory which will be consistent and clear. In other words, we shall first show some anomalies in the standard formulation of FVP and then try to remove them. To put it more precisely, we shall try to systematize FVP as it is

commonly known. One of the reasons why FVP does not appear to be free from anomalies is that it uses the term *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in two different senses. It is used to mean both good as an end and good as a means. Problem arises when we try to decide which *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) is good as an end and which is good as a means or when we try to include them in one list keeping the two different senses in mind. Then there is the problem that certain *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in both these senses: (i) good as an end (फलरूप पुरुषार्थ) and (ii) good as a means (उपायरूप पुरुषार्थ). It seems to be clear and certain that *dharma* (धर्म) is a good as a means and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is only good as an end (in itself). But it is not at all clear if these two *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are related to each other as means and end. We shall also discuss how we are to make sense of a scale of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in which *dharma* (धर्म) is placed at the bottom and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) at the top. *Dharma* (धर्म) is certainly not of a lesser value than *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम). In FVP four broad human goals (पुरुषार्थ) will be discussed but we will not discuss them individually in the **second** chapter. So we cannot emphasize in this chapter the specific characteristics of individual *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). Our discussion of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in this chapter remains general.

In the **third chapter** we discuss *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) of FVP individually. In this chapter we try to introduce some more details that are necessary for understanding them individually as *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). However, in this chapter we do not discuss the *bhakti puruṣārtha* (भक्ति पुरुषार्थ). One reason for this is that in the third chapter we discuss individually only those *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) that are included in FVP. *Bhakti* (भक्ति) is not included in the list of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) of standard form of FVP. We discuss later whether we can

have different forms and versions of FVP. Anyway, we discuss the individual *puruṣārtha bhakti* (भक्ति पुरुषार्थ) in a separate chapter.

In the **fourth chapter** we discuss philosophical theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or PTP. Here we discuss only two versions of PTP; one we find in the *Nyāya* philosophy and the second we find in the (Advaita) *Vedānta* philosophy. In none of these forms of PTP *bhakti* (भक्ति) is included. We devote a separate chapter, i.e. the **fifth chapter**, where we discuss the *bhakti-puruṣārtha* (भक्ति पुरुषार्थ). We cannot extend FVP to include *bhakti puruṣārtha* (भक्ति पुरुषार्थ) because those who advocate *bhakti* as a *puruṣārtha* (भक्ति पुरुषार्थ) do not hold that it is just one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) among many. They hold that it is *the puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or the *only puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in the ultimate sense of the term. This point remains unclear in the usual version of *bhakti puruṣārtha* (भक्ति पुरुषार्थ) which says *bhakti* (भक्ति) is the fifth *puruṣārtha* (पञ्चम पुरुषार्थ). This suggests that there is a version of FVP which includes five *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ) — the usual four plus *bhakti* (भक्ति). Actually, according to the advocates of the *bhakti puruṣārtha* (भक्ति पुरुषार्थ), the ultimate *puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) is just one and that is *bhakti* (भक्ति). In this sense it is similar to the two versions of PTP (*Nyāya* version and *Vedānta* version). *Nyāya* as well as *Vedānta* admit that in the philosophical sense *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is just one and it is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). *Nyāya* may understand *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) in one way and *Vedānta* in another way, but according to them number of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is one. The advocates of the *bhakti puruṣārtha* (भक्ति पुरुषार्थ) hold that even *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) cannot be or is not *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in the ultimate sense. In the ultimate sense it is *bhakti* (भक्ति). We also discuss in this chapter some of the reasons why we cannot take the theory of *bhakti* (भक्ति) as a form or version of the philosophical theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) at all. Besides the *bhakti*

(भक्ति) theorists hold that the means (साधन) of the *bhakti puruṣārtha* (भक्ति पुरुषार्थ) is also *bhakti* (साधन भक्ति). So we thought it appropriate to discuss *bhakti* (भक्ति) in a separate chapter having discussed FVP and PTP.

It is clear enough from our title of the work that we consider *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) as a subject of philosophical inquiry. But simply by knowing (all about) *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) we will not achieve *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Philosophy may not even say how *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) can be attained in addition to revealing the truths about *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). We, therefore, need to distinguish *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), the theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and *puruṣārtha-sādhana* (पुरुषार्थ-साधन). For, without anyone of these the other two are incomplete. So, in the sixth chapter we discuss *puruṣārtha-sādhana* (पुरुषार्थ-साधन). Here we state and examine different views about the means of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ-साधन) or means of attaining *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). In a theory we do not practice *puruṣārtha-sādhana* (पुरुषार्थ-साधन), but we discuss *puruṣārtha-sādhana-s* (पुरुषार्थ-साधन) and problems regarding them. There is nothing wrong, therefore, if classical Indian philosophers or some philosophers of modern India discuss *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). We have found, however, that many modern philosophers do not discuss much about India's philosophical theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or PTP. They mostly discuss what is more popular and is widely known — it is the familiar view of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or FVP. In the Indian philosophical texts very little discussion is found of any *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) other than *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). The relation between philosophical theories of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and the spiritual practice or *sādhana* (साधन) of it are very close. In philosophy *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) alone is elaborately discussed as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). This does not mean that in philosophy other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are totally rejected. But

philosophy is interested in the highest *puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) or ultimate goal of human life. And it is one in number. There cannot be more than one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) which is the highest and the ultimate goal. But to say *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the highest *puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) is to imply that there are other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) which are not the highest. So, in some sense other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are also recognized in PTP. But from the strictly philosophical point of view the ultimate *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or the highest *puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) alone is important. The modern Indian philosophers do not often discuss in detail the views and arguments available in the philosophical texts about *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) or about other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). Their discussions fail to be included into the mainstream of Indian philosophy proper. Their discussions are not also part of western philosophy. These remain part of the literature on the FVP. I have tried to bring the discussion of (highest) *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) into mainstream Indian philosophy. This I tried to do by taking note of these modern discussions and responding to them from the point of view of Indian philosophical theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) as and when possible. These reflections are meant to be responses from the point of view of the rigorous philosophies of classical India. We also want to highlight that working scholars and teachers of philosophy need to discuss the subject more philosophically following the classical Indian philosophers. It may be noted that we here discuss the subject of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) with reference to standard works of Indian philosophies in the original and after their authors. But we have not just translated portions of such texts. We used the lines of reasoning followed there. Wherever we felt the necessity, we also critically examined them and reinterpreted or reconstructed them.

Modern scholars have not distinguished between FVP and PTP. Some of them also did not give much importance to the distinction between (Western) philosophy and *darśana* (दर्शन) or Indian philosophy. Though these scholars have discussed four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) mentioned in FVP, but they have failed to clear the importance of *mokṣa puruṣārtha* (मोक्ष पुरुषार्थ) both in Indian philosophy and Indian culture. In other words, these scholars failed to convey the point about centrality or its paramount importance in *darśana* (दर्शन).

In the field of philosophy Prof. Debiprasad Chattopadhyay is most notable personality who does not give importance to *mokṣa* (मोक्ष)². Some contemporary thinkers, e.g. Daya Krishna, have argued that the number of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) cannot be confined to just four (or five). Such controversies regarding it make *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) a worthy topic for philosophical discussion. It should be noted in this connection that in India, and even outside India, Swami Vivekananda has great influence on general public, educated men and academicians. He, however, has strongly emphasized the value of salvation (मोक्ष) of the individual self along with the universal human welfare. Accordingly he formulated the motto of the Ramakrishna Math and Mission: 'आत्मनो मोक्षार्थं जगत् हिताय च'.

We have tried in our whole work to explain and justify why philosophers and students of philosophy should take up this theme for serious study. We have tried to show how the special and distinctive outlook and character of the Indian culture give central importance to *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) both in life and thought. So the terms "philosophy" and "*darśana*" (दर्शन) are not synonymous. On the other hand, those who are not ready to give importance to the discussion of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) are

originally influenced by modern European outlook and the conception of philosophy there.

Swami Vivekananda was aware about the fact that for some modern Indian thinkers India's pre-occupation with liberation or self-liberation is India's great drawback or misfortune. It made the Indians ignore the worldly well being and concentrate on the other worldly goods. As a result of their world negating attitude, it did not allow them to prosper socially. Indian society is full of evils and injustices. So he did not ignore it. For this reason he added another part — 'जगत हिताय च'— the welfare of the mankind, of the whole world or the universe — in his formulation of the motto of his organization. This is meant to be the motto of the life of all men including the academicians. It is true that Indian philosophy gives ultimate importance to *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). But for this reason we should not ignore the other values of life nor should we object that India neglects them. The point is that according to the Indian culture and philosophy due attention to social matters is given yet these other concerns do not matter ultimately. On the other hand, people of the other part of the world pay excessive attention to those worldly problems and for this reason their only interest (and not just the main interest) is the social welfare of the mankind. They in some cases ignore and in some cases overlook the value of salvation or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). Some oppose the practice of giving importance to *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) and think that it should be avoided. Their argument is that unlike health, education etc. *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is a matter of *personal* concern of individual man. Some find that while Swami Vivekananda has emphasized both social welfare and personal (spiritual) liberation he has not done much successfully differentiate the selfish goal of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) from the non-selfish goal of general welfare. Actually, Vivekananda presented the balanced view of India. According to

Indian view, paying exclusive attention to the other-worldly and self-oriented concern is wrong and un-helpful. Similarly paying excessive attention to this-worldly and other-oriented concern is also wrong and un-helpful. One may say here that it is not a solution; rather it is a statement which indicates only the problem regarding the said matter. There are others who hold that for solution we should turn to the classical Indian philosophers and thinkers. They hold that for the majority the social and this-worldly wellbeing is practically the only concern and goal. Only for a rare few *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the only goal. So the teaching of India is that we should lead our social life in such a way that it does not block the higher pursuit of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). Social life is to be lived successfully. And a part of the success of social life for general good is that it prepares us in time for the highest pursuit of life called *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). The scheme of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and of *varṇa* (वर्ण) and *aśrama* (आश्रम) chalk out for us a long path. If we follow the path we will *gradually* move from the most common good to the best and the highest good. Viewed in this way there is no conflict between life of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) and life of *artha* (अर्थ), *kāma* (काम) and *dharma* (धर्म). This has been made clear by scholars like Professor Sushil Kumar Maitra and others in their works.

Some may say that it cannot be a solution rather it presents a problem when we say that both individual liberation and worldly welfare are important and we should pay attention to both of them. These — personal liberation and common welfare — are radically different goals and opposite to each other and hence cannot be combined. This is the reason why India which pays great attention to *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) ignores common values of social development, growth, welfare and so on. This-worldly concern and the other-worldly concerns are opposed to each other and hence they cannot be

combined. It is a task of philosophy to enquire about the situation created by the views of two radical groups and examine whether and how one can reconcile the interest of the self on one hand and the interest of others or the good for all on the other. Thus *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are conflicting values and scholars have found many problems in the standard way we think about them and in our attempt to accept all of them. If the theme of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) was not controversial or problematic, it could not be a proper subject of philosophical inquiry. We have shown that there are many questions about *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and we should try to address them philosophically. There is no reason, therefore, to say that the discussion of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) should fall outside of the scope of philosophy.

Keeping the above discussion in mind one may say that Swami Vivekananda has not raised or solved the problem how the two kinds of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) can be reconciled. But the point is that Vivekananda is just an example. If these two radical views are not effectively and successfully combined, then India will fail to do justice to the worldly concern or the concern for all or good for all. Anyway, we think through his formulation of the motto Vivekananda helped to bring to our notice the problem of reconciling the self-oriented concern and the other-oriented concern though he gave no philosophical argument or rational argument to show that they could be combined in the life and thought of man. So, it is a big challenge for modern scholars and even students of philosophy to inquire whether Indian philosophers in the past solved the problem or whether their solution could be accepted. We should also inquire if we can solve it. Simply to dismiss *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) or *dharma* (धर्म) is not the way expected from a student of philosophy. If the modern scholars ignore these *puruṣārtha-*

s (पुरुषार्थ) as not a philosophical issue but only a religious issue, then it will be unreasonable. If we study carefully, we will notice that classical Indian philosophers never ignored ordinary pursuits of life — pursuits of man as he is ordinarily and in his everyday life. *Artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम) are such human needs or goals of human life. In this life itself man seeks higher values when he gets proper motivation for that. So also ordinary men in this life want to live a better life, want to become better men. Hence, in a complete scheme of values of life *dharma* (धर्म) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) must find place side by side *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम). This does not mean that man first seeks *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम) and then leave them and seek *dharma* (धर्म) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). This is not the meaning of leading or living a better life. To lead a better life a man in this world should give more importance to *dharma* (धर्म) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). First he would continue to desire *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम) but should seek them as and when *dharma* (धर्म) permits. *Dharma* (धर्म) is for him a way of seeking of *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम). Usually he seeks artha or kama without provision of dharma or even sometimes relegating them to the background of their minds. So long he was seeking these very things without consideration of the provisions of *dharma* (धर्म) or even in violation of them. So, we sought to reconcile the four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) included in FVP. Secondly, we argued that though in discussing *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) scholars discuss almost exclusively FVP, yet the philosophical theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or PTP is quite different. This PTP is an integral part of *darśana* (दर्शन) even if it is not so of philosophy.

Notes and References

¹ Vātsyāyana, *bhāṣya* on *Nyāya sūtra* of Gautama 1.1.1, Paschim Banga Rajya Pustak Parsad, Kolkata, 2011, p. 28.

² Chattopadhyaya, Debiprasad, *What is Living and What is Dead in INDIAN PHILOSOPHY*, People's Publishing House, New Delhi, 1993, pp. 564-636.

Chapter- I

Philosophy and the Theory of Human Needs

(दर्शन & पुरुषार्थ)

We would like to address in this chapter an initial doubt: Is human need a philosophical subject? Is there a relation between the two? The word '*puruṣārtha*' (पुरुषार्थ) is a very familiar expression in Sanskrit and in many other Indian languages. No single English expression seems to capture every aspect of the meaning of this word. For the term '*puruṣārtha*' (पुरुषार्थ) we will sometimes use the expression 'human need' and some other times 'human goal'. We shall also use sometimes the expression 'the object of human seeking'. So far as the initial doubt is concerned it can be easily removed if we can decide to which branch of philosophy *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) belongs as a proper subject. There are some modern scholars who have just raised the question whether *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) can be a topic of philosophy or not. According to some scholars, *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) can be a topic of philosophy or its branch which is called ethics.¹ Already a sort of answer to this question is available in the work of an earlier great scholar, Professor Sushil Kumar Maitra.² Without referring to his work some recent scholars expressed different view. They feel difficulty in accepting the discussion of *mokṣa-puruṣārtha* (मोक्ष-पुरुषार्थ) as a part of (Indian) ethics. The same point was settled earlier by Professor Maitra.

So, the moot point that we want to answer here is: Is *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) a subject matter of philosophy? If the answer is in affirmative then another question will arise and that is — under which branch of philosophy it falls? It is clear that the theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) does not fall under either epistemology or metaphysics or logic etc. Some scholars are of opinion that it falls

under the branch of Indian ethics. In western philosophy ethics is generally understood as either normative ethics or meta-ethics. Accordingly the question is whether we can regard the theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) as a meta-ethical theory or as a system of normative ethics? But before going to discuss this matter let us discuss why we have such doubt first.

One may say that the theory of liberation or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष), one of the four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ), need not always be said as an ethical theory. In other words, it is true that the most of the Indian philosophical schools admit their own theory of liberation according to their own categories and metaphysical framework which are already admitted. But we cannot say that these theories of liberation are necessarily ethical theory.³ In recent time some Indian and western scholars find interest in discussing whether India has any ethical theory of her own or not and they conclude that there is no theory of Indian ethics or rather there is no ethics in Indian philosophy. They admit that there are theories of liberation. But a theory of liberation and a list of moral maxims alone cannot constitute any moral theory or any ethical theory. But it has been said that these scholars are right when they say that a list of maxims do not make any moral theory, but not right when they deny the existence of ethical theorizing in Indian philosophy.⁴ They deny the existence of Indian moral philosophy because they have only one model, the western model, in their mind. It seems they think that by accepting the categories and procedures of Western philosophy only one can build up a moral philosophy. Not only some western scholars but some Indian scholars also believe in this view. Rajendra Prasad⁵ has pointed out, as for example, that

Prof. Haridas Bhattacharya is of the opinion against the possibility of ethics in Indian philosophy.⁶ He begins his essay 'Indian Ethics' with the sentence that '...ethics is not to be had as a separate study in Indian philosophical and religious literature'.⁷ Similarly P.S. Sivaswami Aiyer says that '...compared with the amount of attention given by Hindu thinkers to the subjects of religion and philosophy, the scientific study of ethics has received very little attention from them.'⁸ He further said that 'The Upanisadas are mainly concerned with problems of metaphysics and it is only very rarely that one meets with moral rules as in the Taittiriya Upanisada'.⁹

Here one may say that it may not be fully right to say that Prof. Haridas Bhattacharya's opinion is against the possibility of Indian ethics. For, he continues in the same essay '... the other studies like psychology and ethics remaining embedded within the general organization of philosophy and religion. In order to study ethics therefore, it is necessary that the ethical element should be extricated from their general religious and philosophical settings.'¹⁰ So, we cannot say that Prof. Haridas Bhattacharya was fully wrong. For it is true that in Indian philosophy there is no separate discussions called ethics. But it is true that P.S. Sivaswami Aiyer is not right by saying that the scientific study of ethics has received very little attention from the early period. We will briefly show how classical Indian ethics is an important part of Indian philosophical tradition from the very early period. There we will argue that those who say that in India we do not have ethics of any one of the two kinds are wrong. In India there may not be ethics as a separate and

independent branch of philosophy yet in India there are both normative and meta-ethics.

Before going to the answer of the problem stated above let us take another example on the same matter. Famous western philosopher W.T. Stace was of the opinion that India has no ethics. In fact he wanted to prove that India has no philosophy. Indian philosophy is not really philosophy but religion.¹¹ Here Stace says 'although Hinduism has its scale of values, and its doctrine of development, it has no rational foundation for these, and though it has the idea of higher and lower, yet, because this is without foundation, it lets it slip, it never *grips* the idea, and so easily slides into the view that all is equally divine'¹². The same conclusion he asserted in his another popular book.¹³ We may as well name Max Weber. He also holds the view that there is ethics in India. From his writings it becomes clear why the Western thinkers think that India has no ethics. They believe that universalism is the heart of ethics. But the Indian society is dominated by *varṇa* (वर्ण) and *āśrama* (आश्रम) division. Here duty is not universal but relative to *varṇa* (वर्ण) and *āśrama* (आश्रम). So the Western thinkers hold that in India there is no universal ethics; and the ethics which is not universal is not ethics proper. Weber emphasizes the practice of *svadharma* (स्वधर्म) and holds that in India there is no (universal) ethics. There is, he says, "...only a status and professionally differentiated dharma according to caste".¹⁴ Under this conception of ethics some Indian scholars seem to ignore *varṇāśrama dharma* (वर्णाश्रम धर्म) or *svadharma* (स्वधर्म) according to Weber and emphasize only *sādhāraṇa dharma* (साधारण धर्म) or universal duty. P. V. Kane seems to do so.¹⁵

The intriguing question is why these scholars are arguing against Indian ethics when ethical discussions are very much present in almost all Indian philosophical systems? One possible answer may be this. Almost all philosophers of Indian philosophical tradition are found to be engaging themselves in a first order or first level inquiry of the nature of the subject-matter and not any second-order or second level (or meta-level) inquiry (over and above the first level discussion they made). We heard about the ethical theory of Immanuel Kant or the ethical theory of David Hume. But we never heard about the ethical theory of Maharshi Goutam or the ethical theory of Maharshi Kapil. So, it is an exclusive and unique way of philosophizing which the Great Indian philosophers have done. So, those who are not acquainted with the way of philosophizing of Indian philosophers, it may be difficult for them to understand Indian philosophy properly or find ethical theory in it. They never found any ethical theory in Indian philosophical tradition like the ethical theory of Plato or Aristotle. But then also to say that there is no ethical theory in Indian philosophy also doing injustice to one of the oldest and great philosophical traditions and the spirit of its great philosophers. I would like to add that not only in different schools of Indian philosophy but also in many non-technical philosophical works ethical values and teachings are there in good measure. For example the epics — *The Rāmāyana*, *The Mahābhārata*, some *Purāṇa-s* like the *Bhāgavatapurāṇa*, in the *Dhammapada* etc. enough moral teachings are there. In *smṛti-s* like the *Manusmṛti*, and in some socio-political works like Kautilya's *Arthaśāstra*, and Kamāndaka's *Nītisāra* etc. proper materials for ethical theory are found.¹⁶

Hence, it cannot be said that India has no ethics. We have said that in western philosophy ethics is generally understood as either normative ethics or meta-ethics. We will first distinguish these two types of ethics and their relation to each other and then discuss the problem whether the theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) can be regarded as ethics or not. If our answer is in the negative then also one need not give up hope. If there is necessity we may suggest for extending the current scope of ethics in order to include *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) in it. In that case like environmental ethics, business ethics etc., there may be ethics of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ).

Broadly speaking, ethics is concerned with human conduct. Ethics is an enquiry where we analyze the concepts like 'duty', 'oughtness', 'obligations', 'rightness' etc. and principles of evaluating human behavior with reference to certain given set of norms and values. So, the task of ethics is to give an account of the ways in which human beings ought to behave. Ethics, in a sense, is always practical. Like science its role is not to give only theoretical understanding but practical guidance. Its aim is to guide human beings in their practical life in which his actions have impact on others and their actions have impact on our life. We nowadays consider ethically how human actions impact physical and biological environment as well as animal beings. How to behave and act so that our actions would be right or wrong or will affect rightly or wrongly other men, environment, animals and so on — are the sort of questions we ask and answer in ethics. In other words main task of ethics is to give us the criterion of rightness and wrongness on the one hand and to analyze the concepts like duty, moral rightness, moral imperative, moral principles etc. on the

other. But to be moral it is not enough to know the criterion of rightness or wrongness only, the agent has to apply it and act according to the moral norms. So, in this sense ethics is practical. Its aim is to tell us about or make us aware of those actions through performing which we can improve ourselves, our life. When we say truth is a value, helping poor is a duty — we mean if we perform this duty and if we realize this value, then we become a better and more moral person. Therefore we can say that even as a philosophical theory (as distinct from normative ethics) ethics is concerned with the practical life of man. Man is to use his moral knowledge to conduct himself in a morally right way. So far even meta-ethics or philosophical theory of morality is different from many other more purely theoretical disciplines like mathematics. Ethics is not merely or completely a theoretical disciplines. It is a theoretical enquiry which has direct practical bearing. We should keep this in mind when we draw the distinction between meta-ethics and normative ethics. So we hold that as philosophical enquiry meta-ethics analyzes moral notions like duty, Obligation etc. and it discusses the form, nature, conditions of truth or correctness etc. of moral utterances. On the other hand, normative ethics is better understood as a scheme of duties. One best example of such a scheme we find in *Manusamhitā*. It gives us lists of duties in a planned way — dividing and classifying them according to different principles like *varṇa* (वर्ण), *āśrama* (आश्रम) and so on. So to the question what is duty, two types of answers are possible. One can answer the question by saying *ahiṃsā* (अहिंसा) is a duty. This answer does not tell us what is there in *ahiṃsā* (अहिंसा) so that it is correct to say that it is a duty; or what feature of *ahiṃsā* (अहिंसा) constitutes its character as duty. But the *Mimāṃsā darśana*

gives answer to such question when it says 'चोदनालक्षणोऽर्थो धर्मः' ¹⁷ (i.e. such actions as are enjoined and lead to good is *dharma*.)

We have discussed two senses or kinds of ethics. Now the question is whether the theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) can be said to be ethics in any of these senses or not. Before answering this question, we should discuss a little more whether there is any such thing as Indian ethics or not. For, if the theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is to be a kind of ethics, it must be some kind of Indian ethics. But if there is no such thing as Indian ethics, the theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) cannot be an Indian ethical theory or a part of an Indian ethical theory.

People have debated over decades whether in the Indian tradition we find anything called philosophy or any branch of it which can be called Indian ethics. It has been said that in the Western tradition the questions about morality are considered separately from questions that are discussed in other branches of knowledge or philosophy. This is not so in India. Even if we admit this, Indian ethics can still be possible. In his book *Gītārahasya* Lokmanya Tilak shows how the discussion of morality has to be carried out in the context of *dharma* (धर्म) and *nīti* (नीति) and it is not necessary to have a separate discussion of morality like western philosophy. In this connection one important point we need to note here which Prof. Meena A. Kelkar mentioned in her paper 'The Nature of Indian Moral Philosophy'. She said '... he (Tilak) shows how Indian moral thought can be compared with the utilitarian moral philosophy of Bentham and J.S.Mill or with the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Lokmanya Tilak suggests how without making use of Western categories one can concentrate on

the issues of moral life and establish a dialogue or debate with the western thought.¹⁸

In the Indian tradition from the very beginning of the Vedic period the sense of duty is pervasively present. It is embodied in the *Āgama* (आगम) or *Śruti* (श्रुति). The *Veda* (including the *Upaniṣada*), which is orally found and taught by the Seers (ऋषि), is the main source of the Indian Hindu Culture and also its religio-philosophical tradition. The other sources like the *Purāṇas*, *Itihāsa*, and *Dharmaśāstra* are subordinated to it. Some people again say that the essence of Indian culture is Spirituality; fundamentally speaking, it is not ethical. By this they mean to say that the Indian culture is esoteric and mystical in character and not ethical or ritualistic. But it is also not correct. It is important to note that to be ethical is not necessarily to be non-spiritual. It is even possible to view the ethical life of man (or ethical stage of his life) as preparatory to his still higher form (or stage) of life which is spiritual. Spirituality consists in the quest for the knowledge of the self (आत्मज्ञान) and liberation (मोक्ष). The ethical life of man consists in moral practices or doing moral duties or morally right actions. The practice of duties purifies man's mind and he becomes eligible for the pursuit of liberation.

Indian normative ethics is primarily embedded in the *Śruti* (श्रुति). It is elaborated later in *Purāṇa*, *Itihāsa*, *Dharmaśāstra*, and so on. In each one of these literature we find the statement of code of duties or different codes of duty. However, rigorous and analytical discussions on the meaning of moral concepts and analysis of moral commands are found only in the works of analytical Indian philosophy. But these philosophical discussions or

the philosophical literature of the later period are also based on the *Veda*; they do not conflict with the *Veda*.

Let us discuss a little more about the normative ethics of India. It was clear enough to the thinkers of the classical period that there should be a specific way through which, according to his capacity, man can pay off his debt to his particular *varṇa* (वर्ण) where he took birth and as well as the community of mankind which provides facilities and opportunities for his life. Manu has enumerated and classified *dharma-s* (धर्म) or duties of man. Here a point should be noted that the term '*dharma*' (धर्म) may be used in many senses. It may be used to mean subjective virtue (पुण्य), it may also be used as a religious merit (*subha adṛṣṭa*). The term may again be used in an objective sense of observable actions and conduct. Here we are concerned with only the last sense. Manu's classification is one of the earliest attempts for a systematic, well-connected treatment of the subject. Manu classified *dharma-s* (धर्म) into two types — a) *Varṇadharmas* (वर्ण धर्म or relative duties), i.e., duties relative to man's own *varṇa* (वर्ण) or social class and *āśrama* (आश्रम or specific class of spiritual discipline). Here the *dharma-s* (धर्म) are categorized as those relating to the people of four *varṇa-s* (वर्ण), i.e., *Brāhmaṇa* (ब्राह्मण), *khatriya* (खत्रिय), *Vaiśya* (वैश्य) and *Śūdra* (शुद्र). b) The second type of duties are called *Sādhāraṇa dharmas* (साधारण धर्म or common duties) i.e., duties which are equally obligatory to all men irrespective of their different *varṇa-s* (वर्ण). These *dharma-s* (धर्म) help man to build-up his social as well as moral character. For an adequate account of ethics or man's moral life we need to discuss not only moral actions but also moral laws or principles and moral command (*Vidhi* including *Niṣedha*

Vidhi). Moral law is different from both scientific law and law of the state in many ways. The main difference between moral law and scientific law is this: moral law can be violated but scientific law can never be violated. On the other hand one of the main differences between moral law and law of the state is this: the first one prescribes us what to do, but the later one orders us what to do. The main difference between an order (आदेश) and a moral prescription (धर्म विधि) is that in case of prescription if man obeys it, the man himself will be the gainer, but in case of carrying out an order a man may benefit the institution or the man who issued the order will be the gainer.

Moral law prescribes for the betterment of our life. These are not order. Now we come to our point, both *Varṇāśrama dharma* (वर्णाश्रम धर्म) and *Sādhāraṇa dharma* (साधारण धर्म) prescribe us the way how one can make his life morally good. *Varṇāśrama dharmas* (वर्णाश्रमधर्म) are the specific duties relating to one's *varṇa* (वर्ण) or *āśrama* (आश्रम). It is a kind of hypothetical imperative. If you are married, you have to follow the duties of the married life. If you belong to such and such *āśrama* (आश्रम), you have to do such and such duties. There cannot be any subjective choice; it is one's *varṇa* (वर्ण) or *āśrama* (आश्रम) which fixes the duties of the man in question; other conditions like subjective choice do not matter. On the other hand *Sādhāraṇa dharma* or code of common duties (साधारण धर्म) must be followed by every man irrespective of his social position or individual capacity. Prof. S. K. Moitra shows very convincingly in the introduction of his book *The Ethics of the Hindus* how *Sādhāraṇa dharma* (साधारण धर्म) constitutes the foundation of the *Varṇāśrama dharma* (वर्णाश्रम धर्म) and how the former is to be

regarded as the limit within which the latter is to be observed and obeyed.

There is no individual freedom. If you belong to any specific *āśrama* (आश्रम), you have to obey the duties selected for that specific *āśrama* (आश्रम). Moreover no man of a specific *āśrama* (आश्रम) has freedom to perform the duties of the other *āśrama*-s (आश्रम). According to Prof. S. K. Moitra, '...there may be exceptional cases, men with special powers and capacities, may attain the later stages without going through the earlier'.

Manu enumerated following ten duties under the name of *Sādhāraṇa dharma* (साधारण धर्म) or common duty:

- (i) *Dhṛti* or steadfastness (धृति);
- (ii) *Kṣama* or forgiveness (क्षमा);
- (iii) *Dama* or application (दम);
- (iv) *Asteya* (अस्तेय) or *cauryābhāva* (चौराभाव) [non-stealing or avoidance of theft];
- (v) *Śauca* or cleanliness (शौचं);
- (vi) *Indriya-nigraha* (इन्द्रिय-निग्रह) or repression of the sensibilities and sensuous appetites;
- (vii) *Dhī* or wisdom (धी);
- (viii) *Vidyā* or learning (विद्या);
- (ix) *Satya* or veracity (सत्य);
- (x) *Akrodha* or restraint of anger (अक्रोध).

Like Manu, Praśastapāda also enumerated *dharma* (धर्म) or duty into two groups: *Sāmānya dharma* (सामान्य धर्म) or common or

generic duty and *Viśeṣe dharma* (विशेष धर्म) or relative or specific duty. *Sāmānya dharma-s* (सामान्य धर्म) are common to all *varṇa-s* (वर्ण) or classes. On the other hand *Viśeṣe-dharma-s* are only for specific classes.

From the above discussion it is clear that moral concerns are very much present in Indian tradition; they are not only there in the *Veda* and the other *Śāstra-s* (शास्त्र) but also they are deep rooted in the Indian ethos and mind. But it has been observed by scholars like Professor S. K. Maitra that, in contrast with the Western tradition of ethics, in the Indian ethics the viewpoint of the individual is not so prominent. What is prominent here is the tradition — the *Āgamic* perception or the *Śāstric* perception of the value and purpose of individual's life and actions or his conduct. What is right or virtuous is entirely derived from our Tradition and *Śāstra* (शास्त्र). Numerous examples of Ideal code of conduct one can find in *the Gitā*, *the Mahābhārata*, and *the Purāṇa-s* etc. Obviously the aim was to control and conduct the life of man towards a disciplined moral life through which man can pay off his debt to his *varṇa* (वर्ण), his community, and after all to the world of mankind.

But there was also a broader aim also of life and morality. Through morality, *dharma* (धर्म) and *sadācāra* (सदाचार) man can make himself aware about the true nature of his self and the ultimate goal or value of life. It is true for any man or even for any living being that the worldly pleasure is (ordinarily) desirable. But a careful observation and critical thinking will convince us that the worldly pleasure is always mixed up with pain. Our unrestricted craving and pursuit of them will do us great harm and will not allow us to go beyond our lower animal life to higher life of a truly human

being. In his higher life man does not seek only ordinary sensuous pleasure. He seeks higher goals of life which are arranged hierarchically from ordinary sensuous to the moral and then to the spiritual. The code of moral conduct or duties in hierarchical arrangement is one of the guiding principles towards liberation (मोक्ष). Thus, if our take off point is ordinary sensuous urge, morality is the basis of the ultimate spiritual goal which is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) or spiritual liberation. Based in the *Āgamic* perception different schools of Indian thought and knowledge were developed; among them there are normative ethics as well as meta-ethics or philosophy of moral. Not only the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya and Vedānta darśan, but also Mimāṃsā darśana and Yoga darśana include discussions that are ethical in character.

Incidentally, it may be noted that according to some thinkers Indian ethics is situational. However, to my mind it is not situational in its entirety. It may be situational so far as *Varṇāśrama dharma* (वर्णाश्रम धर्म) is concerned. But there are *Sādhāraṇa dharma-s* (साधारण धर्म) also; and so far as morality consists in the obligation of performing these common and universal duties, morality in the Indian view is not situational.

Another point to note is that according to some thinkers the Indian Vedic tradition is very old and has lost its modern relevance. In our times men are guided more by reason than by Scriptures or *Śāstra-s* (शास्त्र). Hence, we need to reform the *Śāstra* (शास्त्र) based ethics which does not give importance to either conscience or reason. In other words, we should accept only those ethical teachings of the *Śāstra* (शास्त्र) that can stand the test of reason. The rest we should give up as superstitious. Division of men according

to *varṇa* (वर्ण) is not rational at all and *varṇa* (वर्ण) based duties are not truly moral. But there are also some great thinkers (e.g. Tilak) who do not feel any need to reform the Tradition. They even do not want the reinterpretation or reconstruction of classical Indian moral thinking by using foreign categories and concepts. They admit the importance of our effort to understand Indian Tradition and through our own categories and preserve its identity.¹⁹ We should not first accept the Western model of ethics and then say that traditional Indian ethics is to be reformed to suit that model. Indian ethics should be viewed from the Indian standpoint and Indian ethical ideas and ideals are to be understood in the Indian way, i.e, according to the way they have been explained in Indian *Śāstra-s* — the scriptural *Śāstra-s* as well as later ethical and philosophical *Śāstra-s*.

Thus if we try to understand the place of morality and moral philosophy in the context of Indian tradition and culture, we find that it includes, every aspect of ethics. The vast and varied ethical literature of India includes rich rational enquiry of various ethical subjects and many different norms and ideals of moral life and behavior. And if we do not take a narrow view of philosophy as linguistic analysis or conceptual inquiry or only epistemic enquiry, then it will not be difficult to find in India vast comprehensive system of rational inquiry of all substantial problems of life. And we will also find in it both normative and meta-ethical discussions. Indian philosophy as a whole and the ethical discussions it contains help man to systematically develop himself from a sensuous being through moral being and finally to a spiritual being.

Meena A. Kelker in her paper “the nature of Indian moral philosophy” rightly said that ‘....this different understanding of philosophy gives a different place of ethics or morality’²⁰. So, it is not reasonable to find similar ethical observation like the west in Indian philosophical tradition.

Now we turn to the question whether the theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is a part of Indian ethics or not. If ethics is understood as the study of duty, then it seems difficult to say that the theory or *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is a form of ethics or study of duties. In the first place the texts and literature of Indian philosophy rarely include discussions of *all puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). We will show this in detail later. Secondly, even though Indian philosophy discusses *mokṣa-puruṣārtha* (मोक्ष पुरुषार्थ), it is not a form of duty in any usual sense. It has a spiritual value but not a moral duty. For this reason some argue that the theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is not a form of ethical theory. They say that the discussion of this *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) falls outside the scope of ethics. We can say the same thing about *kāma* (काम) and *artha* (अर्थ) if not about *dharma* (धर्म). If three of the four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) fall outside ethics then it becomes doubtful if the theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is an ethical theory.

Though in the Indian philosophical tradition the discussion of morality is very prominent, yet *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) do not form any part of them. In Indian philosophy we find the discussion of such topics as moral command (विधि) and its meaning and authority (प्रामाण्य), moral will and its genesis, means of knowing duty etc., there is not much discussion of *artha* (अर्थ) or *kāma* (काम). If we are to understand this situation then we need to distinguish first the

popular or familiar doctrine of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and then in the second place we need to clarify the sense in which we use the term 'ethics'. We have elaborately discussed the first point in our chapter on 'The Philosophical Theory of *Puruṣārtha* (PTP)'. So far as the second point is concerned in course of its development a subject extends its scope and the meaning of the name of the subject changes. At one time psychology meant the study of the mental processes of only normal and average man. In course of time there emerged animal psychology and abnormal psychology. If we look at the Western culture and philosophy we find similar changes in the scope of ethics and similar changes in the meaning of the word 'ethics'.

Various discussions, that were not included within the scope of ethics before, are nowadays included in it. And there has developed legal ethics, environmental ethics, business ethics etc. So, today one can say that like the extended sense of ethics in the Western tradition, Indian theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) can be regarded as Indian ethics [or the study of *dharma* (धर्म) and *dharmanīti* (धर्मनीति)] or part of Indian ethics in its extended sense. Here we may note a few features of some extended or broader ethics. We need to realize that the scope of ethics has been broadened not without reason. The scope was extended only when some urgency was felt. Unethical conduct and practices in the field of law and business made it necessary to study and regulate human behavior in these fields. Otherwise individual men and the whole human society will suffer. The society will produce corrupt business men and legal practitioners and less number of good and honest men.

Environmental ethics is the study of the ethical dimension of man's attitude and behavior towards environment. It is quite popular nowadays to divide the culture of the world into scientific rational culture and non-scientific mystical and religious culture. The scientific rational culture accepts the existence of natural sensible external material world, but it does not ascribe any ethical value to it. In the first place only the natural and physical phenomena are real from the point of view of science. Science does not accept value (including moral value) as a fact or reality. Because the natural phenomena are governed by scientific laws, they are intelligible scientifically and are admitted as real. Some religious faiths or religions also deprive the world of every moral worth. According to them, since this world is inanimate and irrational and it is created for the consumption of man and used by man, it deserves no ethical treatment from us. It is often believed that only normal and average *human* beings who can be treated as moral agent deserve to be treated morally. Even the mentally retarded men or animals and their life and activity fall outside the scope of the moral theory or ethics. So the physical or biological environment is outside the scope of moral considerations. In the opinion of these religions, nature is devoid of any moral quality or value and is outside moral considerations. It is not included within the scope of ethical study. Under the influence and teaching of such religious ideology or philosophy men became indifferent to nature and showed no respect or concern for it. For both science and the religion like Christianity, nature is devoid of all moral value. Born and brought up in such a culture men came to believe that nature is only a dead matter and started to exploit it. Once we take the nature to be a dead matter, question of caring it or treating it

with love and morality does not simply arise. Because moral treatment or any sort of care requires that the object must be conscious being to which the agent wants to be moral, that is, act morally. So, unless we completely change our outlook, unless we learn to view nature not just as a dead body, but a living organism, which can receive our action and can re-act also, we cannot treat nature as something moral. Nor can we in that case take nature as a part of the subject matter of ethics. For long men in modern scientific culture (and religion like Christianity) viewed nature as amoral something.

Only now we have become aware that such view and treatment of nature created the present environmental imbalance or ecological crisis. This is not just an event among thousand events but is a matter of worldwide concern. So we now feel if we cannot solve the present ecological crisis, then the whole human race will be destroyed. In order to solve it, we need to change our view and attitude to Nature. What would be that changed and proper attitude or view are being explored and explained by the new branch of ethics — the environmental ethics. This is one concrete instance of how and why the scope of ethics changes. If *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are very important, then for the proper understanding of it we may extend the scope of Indian ethics to include them as ethical subject. Actually we need to change our conception and understanding of Indian culture, philosophy and ethics in order to realize that it is not impossible or unnatural to treat *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) as ethical subject or the theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) as a form of ethics, or Indian ethics.

Anyway, the scope of ethics is not fixed. Whenever there is need we extend its scope to include some phenomena which were so long outside the purview of ethics. If *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are important and it is necessary to discuss *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) in ethics, we can extend the current scope of Indian ethics to include *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) or the discussion of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ).

Directly or indirectly ethics is concerned with the practical aspect of man's life. This means it is concerned with human action and conduct. Either it (that is, normative ethics) gives us a code of conduct, that is, a systematic list of concrete duties or certain moral actions. Or it (meta-ethics) tells us what is *dharma* (morally right action); what makes a certain action *dharma* (धर्म); conditions of the possibility of *dharma* (धर्म) etc. In this way ethics is somehow concerned with human actions. Now human actions are generally rational actions. Such actions involve a distinction between ends and means. Sometimes some persons find that they need food. They find this when they are hungry. Hunger is painful. Man as a rational being chooses to act in such a way that his hunger can be satisfied or his pain of hunger can be removed. In this case his ultimate need is satisfaction of hunger. This is his good as an end. To achieve it, the hungry man rationally chooses to perform the act of cooking, say as an instance. When he cooks he actually cooks as his end. But this is end as means. The satisfaction of hunger is the end in itself.

In the moral sphere man as moral agent has certain end in view. This end is of the nature of value. Outside the sphere of morality when a rational man acts as a natural human agent he has some ends. But this end is not a value. Every conscious action of a

man has behind it that man's idea of some end and the desire to attain it. Where the end is a value (or a moral value in particular) we say man *ought* to act so as to realize that value (or the end). But in some normal and non-moral situation a man *does* act to realize certain end. Thus moral actions have two features. (i) They are means for certain good as an end and (ii) they are good as means of such good as end that we do not naturally desire. In case of duty or *dharma* (धर्म) the ends are not *naturally* desired or the actions (that is means of that end) are not *naturally* performed. Even against their natural inclination moral command (विधि) reveals to them that they should perform the act and they should aspire to realize the end. What makes a man act in such case is not just his natural desire or inclination; not merely logical (rational) consideration but the moral command. *Śruti* (श्रुति) tells us “धर्मम् चर” (i.e., do your moral duty); and we feel obliged to obey. We perform moral actions. In this way moral actions are (a) value oriented action and (b) they are actions that are enjoined by moral imperative (विधि).

The idea of value is not only the idea of a good as an end; but has a normative content. It is not just good which we (naturally) seek but what we should seek. Where the value is moral value, the means of it — the action as means of it — is morally commanded. Therefore, in a broad sense ethics is concerned with all these human actions that are morally commended and are means of some good as end which also have a normative feature.

Artha (अर्थ) is one of the *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). We naturally seek it. And we seek it by any effective means. *Artha* (अर्थ) in this sense is not a value and not a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). *Puruṣārtha*

(पुरुषार्थ) is not just a human need. For, what man naturally desires — food when hungry, sleep when sleepy — is not *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). *Puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) means what we should consider as desirable; what we should seek. If there is a kind of *artha* (अर्थ) or a certain sense of *artha* (अर्थ), according to which we *should* seek *artha* (अर्थ) then such *artha* (अर्थ) becomes a value and seeking *artha* (अर्थ) becomes a duty. In that case *artha* (अर्थ) will be a part of ethics. In this way we can decide whether or not the *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are subject matter of ethics. If *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is a subject matter of ethics, then the theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) will be an ethical theory. Or, it will be a part of Indian ethics. This is one answer to the question whether the theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is an ethical theory or not.

We will note one more point. There is close connection between Indian philosophy and philosophizing on the one hand and seeking to realize the *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) on the other. This is not so clear when we use the word 'philosophy' but when we use the word '*darśana*' (दर्शन) this connection is very clear. When we use the word 'philosophy' we are likely to understand by the word predominantly Western philosophy. But Indian philosophy means *darśana* (दर्शन). The conception of it is derived from the *Upaniṣadas*²¹, where it has been said that we *should* have *ātmadarśana* (आत्मा द्रष्टव्य) or self realization. This *ātmadarśana* or *ātma-sākṣātkāra* (आत्म-साक्षात्कार) or immediate realization of our self is the first meaning of the word '*darśana*' (दर्शन). The means of *darśana* (दर्शन) in this sense is also called *darśana* (दर्शनशास्त्र). However, *darśana* (दर्शन) is one of the many means of *darśana* (दर्शन) in the sense of self realization. *Śravaṇa* (श्रवण) or receiving

instruction from the Veda through teacher and *nididhyāsana* (निदिध्यासन) or practicing the truth acquired through *śravaṇa* (श्रवण) and *darśana* (दर्शन) are the other two means. The other name of the means called *darśana* (दर्शन) is *manana* (मनन)²². *Manana* (मनन) means critical and analytical enquiry or discussion. This is the essential nature of Indian philosophy or *darśana* (दर्शन) as means. *Darśana* (दर्शन) as an end is self-realization or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) (or the immediate means of it, the knowledge of the true nature of the self). *Darśana* (दर्शन) or Indian philosophy is not done for its own sake but for the attainment of *mokṣa-puruṣārtha* (मोक्ष-पुरुषार्थ). Thus the relation between *darśana* (दर्शन) and *mokṣa-puruṣārtha* (मोक्ष-पुरुषार्थ) is immediate and essential. The other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are indirectly connected to *darśana* (दर्शन). One who acts in a way which violates the pursuit of the *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) of *artha* (अर्थ) or *kāma* (काम) or *dharma* (धर्म) cannot have necessary purification of the mind (चित्तशुद्धि). In that case one cannot acquire the philosophical knowledge or the knowledge of the true nature of the self which is the immediate means of *mokṣa-puruṣārtha* (मोक्ष-पुरुषार्थ).

This account of *darśana* (दर्शन) and its connection with *mokṣa-puruṣārtha* (मोक्ष-पुरुषार्थ) is common to almost all the systems of Indian philosophy or *darśana* (दर्शन). Thus the very concept of *darśana* (दर्शन) or Indian philosophy essentially involves reference to *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) and other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). Thus *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) including *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is a central theme of Indian philosophy. This is very clearly brought out in *sūtra* texts of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya, Vedānta and so on.

Still this *darśana* (दर्शन) is closely similar to philosophy which is a rational and critical study and it studies among other things knowledge and its means. We can say *darśana-śāstra* (दर्शन शास्त्र) is *darśana* (दर्शन) because it generates philosophical knowledge (*darśana* as means). This *śāstra* (शास्त्र) does two things. It builds a theory of *pramāṇa* (प्रमाण) and *kathā* (कथा) and it also uses these two to generate and preserve the knowledge of the true nature of the self. This knowledge of self which *darśana* (शास्त्र) generates is, however, mediate (परोक्षो). Through *sādhana* (*nididhyāsana* etc.) this knowledge develops into immediate realization of the self i.e., *ātmadarśana* (आत्मदर्शन) which in its turn secures *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). Prof. Meena. A. Kelkar rightly said ‘it is this understanding of philosophy which gives a different place to ethics. The discussion of morality is carried out at two levels. At one level, morality is concerned with the rules of conduct, prescriptions and prohibitions that are accepted in a society. It is the foundation of social and communal life. At another level, morality is not a socially binding force but a liberating force.... In this sense, being moral does not mean knowing and following the rules of conduct but knowing the ultimate reality or preparing the grounds for the knowledge of ultimate reality, the primordial existence Par Excellence.’²³

On the basis of above discussion we conclude that *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is a central topic of Indian philosophy or *darśana* (दर्शन) and the Indian philosophical theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) can be viewed as a form of ethical theory.

Notes and References

- 1 Chattopadhyay, Uma, 'Purusartha: ekti samiksha' (in Bengali) in Sanyal, Indrani and Dutta Sharma Ratna (eds.), *Dharmanīti O Śruti*, (in Bengali), Jadavpur University, Kolkata, 2009, pp. 17-21.
- 2 Maitra, Sushil Kumar, *The Ethics of the Hindus*, University of Calcutta, Calcutta, 1963.
- 3 It has been said that the theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) may be taken as a theory of general value or a general theory of value but not as ethical theory of value or a theory of ethical value.—Prasad Rajendra, *History of science, philosophy and Culture in Indian civilization*, Vol-XII, part- I, Centre for Studies in Civilization, New Delhi, 2009, p. 208.
- 4 *Ibid.*, p.157.
- 5 *Ibid.*, pp. 157-158.
- 6 Bhattacharyya, Haridas (ed.), *The Cultural Heritage of India*, vol-III, Ramakrishna Mission, Calcutta, 1993, p. 620.
- 7 *Ibid.*, p. 620.
- 8 Aiyer, Sivaswami, P.S, *Evolution of Hindu Moral Ideals*, Nag Publishers, Delhi, 1976, p. 5.
- 9 *Ibid.*, p. 20.
- 10 Bhattacharya, Haridas (ed.) *The Cultural Heritage of India*, vol-III, Ramakrishna Mission, Calcutta, 1993, p. 620.
- 11 Stace, W.T. *A Critical History of Greek Philosophy*, Macmillan & Co LTD, New York, 1964, pp.14-16.

¹² Ibid., p. 313.

¹³ Stace, W.T. *The Philosophy of Hegel*, Dover Publications, INC, New work, 1955, p. 498.

¹⁴ Mukhopadhyay, P. K., "On the Availability of Ethics in India", in *Classical Indian Thought and the English Language: Perspectives and Problems*, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi, 2015, p. 221.

¹⁵ Ibid., p.222.

¹⁶ Prasad Rajendra, *History of Science, Philosophy and Culture in Indian Civilization*, Vol-XII part I, Centre for Studies in Civilization, New Delhi, 2009, p.74.

¹⁷ Śāstrī, Dwarikādās (ed.), *Saḍadarśanasūtrasaṃgraha* (sūtra no. 1/1/2), Sudhi Prakashanam, Varanasi, 1988, p. 1.

¹⁸ Kelker, Meena.A., 'The Nature of Indian Moral Philosophy', in Bhelke, S.E & Gokhle, P.P (eds.), *Studies in Indian Moral Philosophy : Problems, Concepts & Perspectives*, Indian Philosophical Quarterly Publication, Pune, 2002, pp.13-14.

¹⁹ According to Meena A. Kelker, this second claim made by Tilak which presupposes to one's own tradition by maintaining it's own identity, Ibid., p.14.

²⁰ Ibid., p.15.

²¹ आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्त्यव्यो तिदिध्यसित्यव्य — *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣada* —2/4/5.

²² श्रोतोव्यो श्रुतिवाक्येभ्यो मन्त्यव्यश्च उपपत्तिभिः.

²³ Kelker Meena.A., 'The Nature of Indian Moral Philosophy', in
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Problems, Concepts & Perspectives*, Indian Philosophical Quarterly
Publication, Pune, 2002, p.15.

Chapter- II

Familiar View of *Puruṣārtha* (FVP)

In the First chapter we have discussed whether *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) could be a topic of philosophical theory or not. Our answer was in the affirmative. One of the main reasons was that some modern scholars have found it proper to discuss this subject. One of them is Prof. Daya Krishna. In the chapter “The Myth of the Purusarthas” in his book *Indian Philosophy: A counter perspective* he has discussed this theme. He has also raised a number of questions about *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ).¹ All through he has given prominence to the view according to which there are four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). This view we call as the familiar view of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) or FVP. We distinguish this from what is truly the Indian philosophical theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or PTP. Daya Krishna writes “The usual four-fold classification of the purusarthas, it is claimed, encompasses within it all the actual or possible goals that mankind may pursue for itself. ...in any clear manner the goals men pursue or ought to pursue?”² The emphasis is added to indicate that it is doubtful that every single *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) was meant to be pursuit for its own sake. It is not our plan to discuss the view of each one of these modern thinkers. And it is not our intention to take a historical approach on the subject. Indra Sen, who was influenced by Daya Krishna’s writings on *mokṣa* (मोक्ष), is right when he says the following: “Thus mokṣa becomes the focal theme of all life and existence and it needs to be understood and taken as such and not as a favourite historical concept in Indian philosophy with fixed variants, usages and connotations. We can easily get lost in these usages and connotations if we forget the

essential human urge behind them. This urge really unifies and gives them coherent meanings.”³

Keeping all these in mind we begin this chapter by drawing a distinction which the scholars do not usually draw. We distinguish the popular or familiar view of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or FVP from the philosophical theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or PTP. We will discuss PTP in a later chapter separately. In this chapter we will discuss FVP. Here we need to clarify first the meaning of the word ‘*puruṣārtha*’ (पुरुषार्थ) or which object the word ‘*puruṣārtha*’ (पुरुषार्थ) denotes. Afterwards, we will discuss the nature of the phenomenon *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). So, both the logic of the *word* approach and the logic of the *thing* approach will be our main point of concentration here. So far as the second point is concerned, we will discuss the definition and nature of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and also its sub-division and the relation among them.

‘*Puruṣārtha*’ (पुरुषार्थ) means ‘*puruṣasya artha*’ (पुरुषस्य अर्थ). Here ‘*artha*’ (अर्थ) means ‘*prayojana*’ (प्रयोजन) or in simple English ‘need’. The word ‘*puruṣa*’ (पुरुष) means here human being. So, ‘*puruṣārtha*’ (पुरुषार्थ) means human needs. Here a point should be noted that ‘*puruṣa*’ (पुरुष) or man means embodied soul. For, only such soul can have desire, strive after and action which the human perform to achieve the goal. Desire, strivings and actions cannot be literally ascribed to pure soul (आत्मा). *Puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is the goal of human being which he naturally wants to achieve in life. There are some needs which are also treated as value. So, it has been said that *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) means those needs which are also values of human life. In short, what man seeks is *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Hence, it is an object of man’s seeking. M. Hiriyanna in his book *Popular*

Essays in Indian Philosophy said the meaning of the term '*puruṣārtha*' (पुरुषार्थ) is 'what is sought by men'⁴. Here a point must be noted that even the animals other than man also seek some objects which will help them to survive in this world. *Puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), though is an object of seeking, yet is different from the other objects of seeking. M. Hiriyanna Expressed the matter in this way: "...man, like the other living beings, acts instinctively; but he can also do deliberately. That is, he can consciously set before himself ends and work for them. It is this conscious pursuit that transforms them into *purusartha*."⁵ Rationality makes the difference between man and animal other than man. Man can rationally choose what to do. So, the object of man's seeking becomes *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) whereas the object of other's (animal) seeking is just need. Since man is rational being, he can judge what should be his goal and through which means he can reach it or actualize this goal.

Thus we can say '*puruṣārtha*' (पुरुषार्थ) means the goal of human life which is chosen to be achieved. So, in this sense man is not only aware of what he seeks, he is also conscious about the way or path through which the goal can be achieved. According to M. Hiriyanna, the first part (पुरुष) of the compound word '*puruṣārtha*' (पुरुषार्थ) means who is not only conscious about the end of life but is also about the path to achieve the end. The other part (अर्थ) of the compound word refers to the end itself which is though non-existent or non-achieved at the time, yet can be achieved through the right means. It is a 'value to be realized.' So, in the Indian Philosophical Tradition it is described as '*sādhya*' (साध्य). In this sense all the *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ) are *sādhya* (साध्य). Now, the pursuit of a value or *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) presupposes knowledge not only of what that

puruṣārtha (पुरुषार्थ) is but also of a suitable means to its realization. The means or *sādhana* (साधन), in a derivative or secondary sense, to realize or to achieve the *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) are also known as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Keeping the distinction in mind Prof. Hirianna described the value which is to be realized as 'intrinsic' (मुख्य) and the means to achieve it as 'instrumental' (गौण). This distinction can also be described as good-as-end (फलरूप पुरुषार्थ) and good-as-means (उपायरूप पुरुषार्थ). As for example, money, when man seeks it for itself, becomes intrinsic *puruṣārtha* (मुख्य पुरुषार्थ). But when man treats it as a means to achieve other *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ), it becomes instrumental *puruṣārtha* (गौण पुरुषार्थ). Thus we may define a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) following Prof. Hirianna in this way. It is "...an end which is consciously sought to be accomplished either for its own sake or for the sake of utilizing it as a means of the accomplishment of a future end."⁶

Prof. J. N. Mohanty said in his book *Classical Indian Philosophy*⁷ that in Indian tradition these four goals become the themes of four basic sciences; *Arthaśāstra* (science of political economy), *Kāmasūtra* (the aphorisms on erotic pleasure), *Dharmaśāstra* (the science of ethics), and *Mokṣaśāstra* (the science of spiritual freedom). He uses the word 'science' in a broad sense to mean a systematic study or branch of knowledge. *Darśana* (दर्शन) is that system of knowledge which studies the theme *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) systematically.

Now let us come to our point. We have mentioned above that many recent scholars discuss *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or issues related to *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). However, there is a distinction between the philosophical doctrine of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in Indian Tradition and what these scholars discuss. What these scholars discuss can be

more appropriately described as the popular or familiar view of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or FVP. It is not, strictly speaking, the philosophical doctrine or doctrines of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or PTP. The nature of this distinctions and why we make it here will be elaborately discussed. We would also show in this connection what is the source of FVP other than philosophy. But it should not be concluded that FVP and PTP are necessarily antithetical. Rather my intention is to show that FVP and PTP, though are different, are not antithetical, but continuous. Though FVP is not a philosophical doctrine yet we will discuss it elaborately. For, there are many anomalies in FVP. Unless we clear FVP, the Indian view of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) will not be clear and we will show that this *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the only *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) which forms the subject-matter of PTP. We will also try to remove the anomalies in FVP and thereby we will try to systematize FVP as far as possible.

So far as PTP is concerned *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) means highest object of human seeking. Even among all the *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) admitted in FVP only the highest one (मोक्ष) is *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) according to PTP. In other words we can say *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the highest fulfilment or need of human life.

Now we will discuss FVP, the different *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) admitted in it and the relation among them. FVP is concerned with a scheme of four (or three) *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ): *dharma* (धर्म), *artha* (अर्थ), *kāma* (काम) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). According to FVP, *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the highest *puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ). In this theory *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are admitted in a hierarchical order. This hierarchical order is very significant for FVP. In this hierarchical list of them, the *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are a few broad kinds of human

needs. It is expected that all human needs will come under these few broad kinds. Here we should keep in mind that the order of these four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) has not been mentioned in the same way by all the different scholars. Sometimes the order is 'artha (अर्थ), kāma (काम), dharma (धर्म), mokṣa (मोक्ष)', and sometimes 'dharma (धर्म), artha (अर्थ), kāma (काम) and mokṣa (मोक्ष)'. The scholars have not discussed any reason for the different ways they order the *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). A very well known scholar Dr. Rajendra Prasad remarked that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) can be reduced to *kāma* (काम).⁸ Daya Krishna also said about this reduction.⁹ But students of Nyāya know that Vātsyāyana in his *bhāṣya* has already shown why this is not possible.¹⁰ According to Nyāya philosophy, the last three are positive state but *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is not. Another important point is that last three *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are impermanent whereas *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is not impermanent in that sense. Moreover, these last three *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are such pleasures as are always mixed with or associated with pain. *Mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is not such. As *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), the three by nature are pleasure. Then how can they be associated with pain? The answer is: these three are impermanent. So, at least the pain for losing the pleasure will be there (impermanent pleasure is lost or destroyed). But why these three impermanent things, which are associated with pain, are admitted in FVP as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ)? This question is not easy to answer. It is true that we all seek both *dharma* (धर्म) and *kāma* (काम). But how many of us have taken them as goal of life? Moreover, when we take *dharma* (धर्म) as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), we need to be sure of the meaning of the term. It is not easy to fix the meaning of the word '*dharma*' (धर्म). For it has different meaning.

Though FVP advocates the theory of four (or three) *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ), yet its claim is every particular good or need of human life is included in these *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). As for example, many different things having economic value are included in the *puruṣārtha artha* (अर्थ पुरुषार्थ). The same holds about *kāma* (काम पुरुषार्थ). If these are the only four broad classes of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ), then these classes are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. Some modern scholars like Prof. Daya Krishna doubts that they are jointly exhaustive. He holds that there are other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) as well.¹¹

Some again hold that the four-fold *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) was not there in the early Vedic period. At that time only three fold scheme of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) were there, i.e. first three without *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). At a later time *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) has been incorporated. Prof. J. N. Mohanty, Prof. Rajendra Prasad, Prof. Daya Krishna etc. admit this view. There are others who hold that like *dharma* (धर्म), *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम), *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) was also admitted in the *Vaidika* period.

There are some important questions about FVP. What is the sense of the word '*puruṣārtha*' (पुरुषार्थ) which is common to the four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) admitted in this popular view? Secondly, can there be more than four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) in this sense? How to understand the given hierarchy — *dharma* (धर्म), *artha* (अर्थ), *kāma* (काम) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष)? If we take it vertically, it is not difficult to take *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) to be the highest. But it is difficult to accept the place of *dharma* (धर्म) below *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम). What it means to place *dharma* (धर्म) at the bottom? *Mīmāṃsā* provides an answer why *dharma* (धर्म) cannot be an object of desire in the sense

in which *kāma* (काम) or pleasure can be. *Nyāyadarśana* tells us also why we cannot have desire of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). According to them, desire and liberation cannot co-exist. Again, why *kāma* (as desire for some good or happiness as the result of *dharma*) cannot be the means of *dharma* (धर्म)? If we cannot answer or explain these questions, FVP will appear to be unsystematic and anomalous.

The hierarchy in which FVP believes is from the bottom *dharma* (धर्म), *artha* (अर्थ), *kāma* (काम) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). Now, some questions, though difficult, are important to answer here. a) What are the inclusive and exclusive senses of the expression '*puruṣārtha*' (पुरुषार्थ)? b) What is meant by each of the expressions — '*dharma*' (धर्म), '*artha*' (अर्थ), '*kāma*' (काम) and '*mokṣa*' (मोक्ष)? The ordinary sense of the word '*puruṣārtha*' (पुरुषार्थ) we have stated above is also the inclusive sense of it. The need (प्रयोजन) of man is that sense.¹² One may ask here that how we know that man needs such thing. Is it a statement of fact that man needs *dharma* (धर्म), *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम) etc.? How do we know that men need them? Do we know them empirically? The answer is yes. From our own experiences we can say that man needs *artha* (अर्थ) etc. But this does not tell us why they need it. Is there any logical reason or formal criterion why man can be said to need *dharma* (धर्म) etc.? Man can be said to need an x if his awareness of x produces in him a desire of the form 'may I have it (x)'. According to this criterion, pleasure is a human need, i.e. it can take the place of x in the above criterion. We all want pleasure. The same criterion tells us on the other hand that man does not need pain but needs freedom from pain or absence of pain. We will discuss these two needs in greater detail later in our chapter on PTP. Now the point is this — it

is empirically known that man needs not just these four things but many more. Even, according to the above criterion, man needs education, health-care, food, cloth etc. All these should be equally *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). There is no problem to take these needs as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in both commonsense view and in the view of FVP. Even men are found to be simultaneously engaged in both the positive and negative seeking — seeking for pleasure and seeking for freedom from pain. So, there is no incompatibility between these two *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) — positive and negative *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). But one may feel essential incompatibility between seeking *parama puruṣārtha* (मोक्ष) and seeking of power and family etc. Anyway, another important question one may ask when we say there are innumerable *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). The question is: Why the number of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) is just four (as we see in FVP)? The answer is *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is not what man needs. *Puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is broadest class of things man needs. FVP has found that there are four such broad classes of things which man needs. FVP does not give us a list of human needs. It gives us a broad classification of human needs. We will do justice if we take FVP as a theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). However as a theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) it is not perfect. It has many anomalies and other defects. We will try to solve them and make it more systematic. Though the modern scholars discuss not PTP but FVP, yet they do not take FVP as an approximation to a theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). They also do not try to systematize it.

Now we are trying to mention some important anomalies of FVP.

- i. The number of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) it admits is four — *dharma* (धर्म), *artha* (अर्थ), *Kāma* (काम) and *Mokṣa* (मोक्ष).¹³
- ii. It admits *dharma* (धर्म) to be a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ).
- iii. It does not include *svarga* (स्वर्ग) in the list of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) and
- iv. It holds *dharma* (धर्म) to be the lowest *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ).

Here a point needs to be noted that PTP denies each and every point stated above. As for example,¹⁴ PTP admits that there may be only two *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) — pleasure and absence of pain. As we have said earlier that FVP admits four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ), viz. *dharma* (धर्म), *artha* (अर्थ), *kāma* (काम) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). About the source of FVP we can say that its source is not PTP. It is rather derived from sources like *Purāṇa* (पुराण) and *ītihāsa* (इतिहास). For example, in the *Viṣṇupurāṇa* and the *Mahābhārata* it has been said clearly that the number of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) is four.¹⁵ Both Pt. Pancānan Śastri¹⁶ and Mm. Phanībhuṣan Tarkavāgīśa¹⁷ have said that the present view about *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) was familiar and popular among the people in the past.

Now, how should one understand and justify the FVP scheme of four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ)? How in the four-fold scheme the four *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) are related to one another? It is stated above that sometimes *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) stands for good as means and sometimes for good as end. Now, the question: Which *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in the list stated above is related as means to which other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ)? All will agree at the point that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is not a means to any other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). It is necessarily an end in itself. A man who wants or needs freedom

from pain will not say that he needs freedom from pain for some other goals. He will say that it is for its own sake that he wants freedom from pain. He does not want to get anything still higher or better through this means. It is not a means of anything. It is not related as means to any other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). It is the goal in itself, the good in itself. Though it is not means to any other *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), some other *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) can be its means. If each one of the other three *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) is also an end in itself, then we cannot relate them as means and end. Let us then ask first: How *dharma* (धर्म), *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम) are related among them? If and how any one of the other three *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) is related to *mokṣa* (मोक्ष)? Secondly, is any one of them related to a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) other than *mokṣa* (मोक्ष)? If the three or four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are not related as means and as end, we will not be able to justify the order of four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) listed in FVP. And if it is that, then we will not be able to give any consistent interpretation of FVP. To put it differently, if we fail to show any relation (whether it is as means and end relation or any other relation) among these four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ), then we will not be able to justify the order in which these *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are mentioned in FVP. Our first problem was how to understand FVP and its four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ)? How to read the list of four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) and understand their order? Which is at the top and which is at the bottom? One possible suggestion is that the four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are arranged in a hierarchy of means and end. Now the question is: Which is the means to which other *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ)?

It is commonly understood that *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम) can be related as means and end. In this sense ‘*artha*’ (अर्थ) means money or wealth¹⁸. But *artha* (अर्थ) is not an end in itself. Men do not desire money for money’s sake but because we can buy pleasure with money. *Artha* (अर्थ) can be a means to get *kāma* (काम), i.e. it can be a means to another *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Money is a kind of means to get pleasure. So, it is not a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in the primary sense. It is not an end in itself. However, it can be admitted as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in the secondary sense¹⁹. On the other hand, in relation to *artha* (अर्थ), *kāma* (काम) can be admitted to be a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in the primary sense. If *kāma* (काम) is understood as pleasure, men desire it for its own sake and can readily spend money for it.

The word ‘*kāma*’ (काम), however, can be used in many senses. Ordinary people generally take the word ‘*kāma*’ (काम) to mean ‘love’ or desire of sensual enjoyment considered as one of the four ends of life²⁰. It seems, however, that sensual enjoyment²¹ or love rather than the desire (इच्छा) of it can be a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). For *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is not only desire but what we desire — both. What we desire directly and what we desire indirectly. If pleasure is the direct object of desire, the means of pleasure is the indirect object of desire. Just as pleasure is a direct object of desire so also freedom from pain is a direct object of desire. The means of freedom from pain is then also an indirect object of desire. These four are our fundamental needs. Men act for these. We cannot say that *dharma* (धर्म), *artha* (अर्थ), *kāma* (काम) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) are *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ) or human needs if we cannot say that they are of the nature of *sukha* (सुख), *duḥkhābhāva*

(दुःखाभाव) or means of them. We have said that the object of desire can be either pleasure (सुख) or eradication of pain (दुःखाभाव). *Kāma* (काम) is a kind of pleasure (सुखविशेष). So, since people desire it for its own sake, it is a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in the primary sense²². While discussing the subject *proyojana* (need), as it occurs in the *Nyāyasūtra* of Goutama, Uddyotkar, Vācaspati Mishra and Udayanācārya have discussed many important things in this connection. Anyway, according to the philosophy of *Nyāya*, motive force of all human (voluntary) actions is either desire for pleasure (सुखप्राप्ति) or avoidance of pain (दुःखहान).²³

Let us turn to *dharma* (धर्म) and its relation to other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). The word '*dharma*' (धर्म) is an ambiguous word, for it is used in many senses in different systems of thought.²⁴ Sometimes the word '*dharma*' (धर्म) is used to mean even '*svarga*' (स्वर्ग). In its usual sense however *dharma* (धर्म) means dutiful action. The word '*svarga*' (स्वर्ग) means a state of superior kind of pleasure. Pleasure is a natural object of desire. And *svarga* (स्वर्ग) is a superior kind of pleasure. Then, why *svarga* (स्वर्ग) is not admitted as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ)? *Sukha* (सुख) or pleasure is undoubtedly a human need. But FVP does not include it in its list of four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). Again, though *svarga* (स्वर्ग) is the ultimate or penultimate pleasure, FVP does not include *svarga* (स्वर्ग) as a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). This is a great anomaly. FVP list of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) does not include what is *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in the primary sense viz., *sukha* (सुख) or pleasure. It can be said that pleasures in the world are not pleasures proper for they are associated with pain. So, it does not deserve to be mentioned as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). The supporters of FVP may remind us that Goutama in his sutra 1/1/9 gives us a list

of twelve *prameya-s* (प्रमेय). In it he includes *duḥkha* (दुःख). But he does not include *sukha* (सुख). The commentators have explained this. They said Goutama rightly realized that what we ordinarily call pleasure or *sukha* (सुख) is not *sukha* (सुख) from the philosophical point of view. From this point of view all the so-called pleasure or *sukha* (सुख) is actually *duḥkha* (दुःख). For they are necessarily associated with *duḥkha* (दुःख) or pain. But according to Mīmāṃsā philosophy, *svarga* (स्वर्ग) is unmixed pleasure. It is not associated with pain. But as it has been said in the *Upaniṣada* and discussed in *Vedānta Paribhāṣā* that *svarga* (स्वर्ग) is also impermanent. When it ends, pain begins.

We should not confuse here two things. It is one question whether there is an ideal pleasure. It is another matter whether man needs pleasure or not. All agree that man needs pleasure and that it is what man desires. It is also agreed that *svarga* (स्वर्ग) is a superior kind of pleasure. It is a state of pure or unmixed pleasure and an object of desire. Now let us go back to the question why FVP does not mention either pleasure [*sukha* (सुख)] or *svarga* [(स्वर्ग) superior pleasure]? This seems to be an anomaly. We suggest as solution that FVP includes in its list *kāma* (काम). And this *kāma* (काम) is to be taken to mean *kāmanāviṣaya* (कामनाविषय). And *kāmanāviṣaya* (कामनाविषय) includes first pleasure of two kinds, ordinary pleasure (सुख) and superior pleasure (स्वर्ग). It also includes *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव). What it does not include is ultimate and absolute pleasure (*mokṣa* in the Vedānta sense) and absolute freedom from pain (*mokṣa* in the Nyāya sense). Thus FVP includes in its list *kāma* (काम) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) both.

Now there is another anomaly. FVP includes *dharma* (धर्म) as a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). But how *dharma* (धर्म) can be a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ)? For, in one of its major senses *dharma* (धर्म) denotes certain actions — duties or dutiful actions.²⁵ But normally we do not desire action. So, the situation is this, *dharma* (धर्म), which should not be claimed to be a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), is included in the list of FVP. On the other hand, *svarga* (स्वर्ग) which is a state of a superior kind of pleasure is not included in the list of FVP as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). The first anomaly can be solved in different ways. We can say first that *dharma* (धर्म), in the list of four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) of FVP, means *svarga* (स्वर्ग). If we interpret *dharma* (धर्म) to mean *svarga* (स्वर्ग), it will mean an end in itself. For, *svarga* (स्वर्ग) is said to be a state of pure or unmixed pleasure and so an object of desire. So, it is of the nature of pleasure or *sukha* (सुख). Though FVP list does not include pleasure or *sukha* (सुख) yet it includes *kāma* (काम). And we have said above that the word '*kāma*' (काम) may be understood as pleasure, that is object of *kāma* (काम). Though the object of *kāma* (काम) is not just pleasure yet it is one of its object. The solution is this — *dharma* (धर्म) is a means of *svarga* (स्वर्ग) which is its result (फल). It is not uncommon in Sanskrit language and literature to use the name of the result (फल) to denote the cause of the result. We call water (जल) 'the life' (जीवन) for water helps us to live. Similarly, if we use the name of means to denote the result then the word *dharma* (धर्म) can be understood to mean *svarga* (स्वर्ग). But in one of its major senses the word *dharma* (धर्म) means such actions as lead to *svarga* (स्वर्ग). Now if we relate *artha* (अर्थ) to *svarga* (स्वर्ग) [i.e. *dharma* (धर्म)] as means to end, there will be in FVP list three ends in themselves and one end as means. Three ends in themselves will be *svarga* (स्वर्ग) [i.e. *dharma* (धर्म)],

kāma (काम), and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) and one end as means will be *artha* (अर्थ). But it is not clear enough how *artha* (अर्थ) can be a means to each one of the other three *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). For example, how can *artha* (अर्थ) be a means to *mokṣa* (मोक्ष)? One way seems to be there. If *artha* (अर्थ) is the means of *dharma* (धर्म) and *dharma* (धर्म) is the means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) then *artha* (अर्थ) indirectly becomes the means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). But how *artha* (अर्थ) can be a means of *dharma* (धर्म)? If *dharma* (धर्म) is viewed as duty or dutiful and ritual action, then *artha* (अर्थ) can be a means of *dharma* (धर्म). For performance of *yāga* (याग) or sacrificial rites involves some expenditure or money. But the difficulty is that we have found it necessary to take *dharma* (धर्म) as *svarga* (स्वर्ग). Otherwise FVP cannot be systematized or anomalies in it cannot be removed. Apart from this the problem remains how the *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) called *dharma* (धर्म), *kāma* (काम) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) are related among them and how they form an hierarchy.

Since *dharma* (धर्म) [*svarga* (स्वर्ग)], *kāma* (काम) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) — these three are ends in themselves or are good as end then only good as means is *artha* (अर्थ). What is that good as end to which *artha* (अर्थ) is a means? Is it a means of *dharma* (धर्म) or of *kāma* (काम) or of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष)? Or is it a means of all three or is it a means to none? If it is means to none, then it is independent. If any one or all the items of the list of FVP are independent then there is no hierarchy of these *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). Hence, these *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are not hierarchically related. It is just a list of four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). There is no higher or lower *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). But this interpretation of FVP is not possible. For, it is generally agreed that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the highest *puruṣārtha*

(पुरुषार्थ). Those who do not accept *svarga* (स्वर्ग) [i.e. *dharma* (धर्म)] as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) for them there are not four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). But FVP holds both that there are four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the highest among them.

One may say *artha* (अर्थ) is clearly a means of *kāma* (काम). For attaining *kāma* (काम) or sensuous pleasure one needs to use *artha* (अर्थ) as means (at least in some cases). If *artha* (अर्थ) is directly a means to *kāma* (काम), then *artha* (अर्थ) is indirectly a means to that to which *kāma* (काम) is directly a means. For example, *artha* (अर्थ) is a means to *dharma* (धर्म) in the sense of *yāga* (याग) or sacrificial ritual. This *yāga* (याग) is a means to *svarga* (स्वर्ग). So, *artha* (अर्थ) can be said to be means of *svarga* (स्वर्ग) also in the indirect sense. Again, *dharma* (धर्म) in the sense of dutiful action is a (indirect) cause of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). Hence, *artha* (अर्थ) is indirectly the cause of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) also.

There are two important points to note here. Usually men believe and there is strong point to regard that *dharma* (धर्म) is the means of both *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम). Many scholars have discussed *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम) as end in itself in relation to *dharma* (धर्म) which is good as means. So, in this sense *dharma* (धर्म) (i.e. dutiful action) should not be considered as an end in itself. Moreover, some have found here no compelling reason to take *dharma* (धर्म) in the sense of *svarga* (स्वर्ग) ignoring its more usual sense of dutiful actions or sacrificial rites. But then also one problem remains. If *dharma* (धर्म) is taken to be an end as means, then one question arises — to which *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) it is means? Majority of Indian philosophers are *jñāna-karma-asamuccayavādīn-s* (ज्ञान-कर्म-असमुच्चयवादी). They strongly believe

that *jñāna* (ज्ञान) and not *karma* (कर्म) is the means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). So in this sense *dharma* (धर्म) or righteous action is not a means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष).²⁶ But if *dharma* (धर्म) is a means of *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम) and it is not a means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष), then either there is no means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) in the list or its means is either *artha* (अर्थ) or *kāma* (काम). Nobody accepts this. So, FVP remains anomalous.

Let us try to understand FVP more carefully. It begins with the ordinary and minimum sense of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). In this sense *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or human need is the object of desire. However, a desire can be either an independent desire or dependent desire. So the object of desire also may be an object of independent desire or an object of dependent desire. In both these cases object will be known as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). As for example, men desire *artha* (अर्थ) or wealth in order to get another object, pleasure. Wealth itself is not pleasure but we can buy pleasure by paying for it. So, *artha* (अर्थ) will be *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in the secondary sense (गौण अर्थ). On the other hand, desire of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is independent, i.e., men desire *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) for its own sake. One does not desire *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) because he has already desired for some other things. For example, one desires to cook if only he already has a desire for food. His desire for cooking is dependent on his desire for food. His desire for food is independent. In other words food will be *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in the primary sense as if food is the object of the independent desire. Similarly, *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) will be *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in the primary sense (मुख्यो अर्थ) or end in itself. But what about *dharma* (धर्म)? *Dharma* (धर्म) is a certain kind of action and to do *dharma* (धर्म) means to perform those actions.

Man exerts himself to perform these actions. Exertion is a kind of pain and men desire this exertion only when men already have a desire for some greater good for which this exertion is necessary. So, *dharma* (धर्म) is a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in the secondary sense. It is an end as means. Here greater good means comparatively greater than *dharma* (धर्म). Hence, *dharma* (धर्म) will be *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in the secondary sense.

There is also another point to note. There are two types of men and they seek two types of objects. Some men seek worldly prosperity i.e., *preyo* (प्रेयो) or *abhyudaya* (अभ्युदय); the world may be this world or world hereafter. And both these objects are worldly objects. The life of man who seeks these worldly objects is worldly life. But there are also some men who seek to transcend the worldly existence itself. So, they do not seek worldly prosperity rather they seek to transcend the worldly existence which means repeated births and deaths (प्रेत्यभाव). These second group of men are said to pursue *śreyas* (श्रेय) or *niśhreyas* (निःश्रेयस). These two classes of men are fundamentally different and making this difference is one of the ways to systematizing FVP. Actually the distinction has been made on the basis of the fact that whether a man conducts his life with an eye to achieving something for which he thinks that he has need or not. Having some needs means having some unfulfilled desires. Again, man has some unfulfilled desire means he definitely wants to achieve or fulfil those desires. So, he has some positive seeking (प्रवृत्ति). These are the people who are said to follow the path of attachment (प्रवृत्ति मार्ग). Since he has some positive seeking or we can say that he is attached with some positive goods of life, he has natural compulsion to perform

kāmya karma-s (काम्य कर्म). *Kāmya karma-s* (काम्य कर्म) are the actions the basis of which is desire (कामना). But there are also people who believe that the world has no value and desire (for thing) can never be fully satisfied. For example, more pleasure they get, they will seek still more of it. To put it otherwise, desire never ends and need for exerting themselves to satisfy their desire for, say, pleasure, never ceases. The people whose whole life is attached (आसक्त) are those whose needs never end. One need causes another need and it causes another and thus their final destination is never reached. Some men finally come to understand the fact that in this way all desires can never be fulfilled and they will not get peace. So, they give up their normal way of living and try to live a different sort of life which they can live more meaningfully. They then seek to eradicate permanently all desires and consequent suffering. It is the life of negative seeking (निवृत्ति मार्ग). They seek nothing, no pleasure; they seek to avoid suffering. They have only one goal to achieve — to transcend all sufferings, even possible sufferings and that is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) or liberation. So, there is no doubt that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is an end-in-itself. But one important point is to be noted here that only after they have tried all other ends (relative) and did not get fulfilment, they turn to *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) as the one and only end-in-itself which remains to be achieved. The people who are seekers of positive pleasure find the highest but this-worldly (इहलौकिक) pleasure in *kāma* (काम) and the still higher but other-worldly (पारलौकिक) pleasure in *svarga* (स्वर्ग). About *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) there are two views: some say it is a positive state or for some it is a negative state. But, according to both these views, *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is not worldly state — it is not a this-worldly state. Nor it is a state of the world hereafter like *svarga* (स्वर्ग). It is a

world transcending state. It is a *lokottara* (लोकतर) state. Now, if the two groups of people form a hierarchy, then we see that the detached group comes above the group who are known as attached. For, men start their life as attached and first spend the phase of *āsakta* (आसक्त) and then reach to the phase of *nirāsakta* (निरासक्त). Thus, since these two groups form a hierarchy, we find a similar hierarchy in the goals they seek. So, *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the higher (highest) goal, and not *kāma* (काम). This solution may solve two problems at a time. One is about the position of *kāma* (काम) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) in the hierarchy and another is about their relation. FVP includes each one of these two *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) as end-in-itself. The reason behind this is to show how different kinds of men can conduct their lives in order to attain the highest end and thereby make life most fulfilled and worthy. We all know that one cannot give any full-fledged list of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ), for *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are innumerable. Similarly, it is also not easy to identify the highest and best goal of human life, for it depends on the type of person one is and his situation. So, as a realistic and empirical theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), FVP suggests two *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) which are end-in-itself depending upon how different types of men can live their life meaningfully. These two *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are *kāma* (काम) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). The other two *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) of FVP are also fundamental in their own ways. They are ends as means.

There should be good arguments to show that *dharma* (धर्म) (in the sense of certain actions) and *artha* (अर्थ) are ends as means. It is also to be shown how *dharma* (धर्म) and *artha* (अर्थ) are related with *kāma* (काम) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). So, FVP needs re-construction

and a consistent interpretation. It is easier to find that *artha* (अर्थ) is the means to *kāma* (काम). But is *dharma* (धर्म) a means to *mokṣa* (मोक्ष)? The difference of opinion about the sense of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is familiar. But we need to clarify the sense of the word *kāma* (काम). In Apte's *The student's Sanskrit-English Dictionary* we find that the word *kāma* (काम) means both desire and object of desire. Apte has given examples of use of the term in both these senses. Desire or desire for object is the wider sense of the word '*kāma*' (काम). Many have taken the word *kāma* (काम) in this sense. But that is difficult to agree (we will see later that the Naiyāika-s at least do not take the word in this sense). First, if *kāma* (काम) means desire then it cannot be a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). For example, *artha* (अर्थ) is a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). But it is not a desire. It is an object of desire. But even object of desire cannot be the sense of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). For *kāma* (काम) is desire and not an object of desire. Apte has given another sense of the word *kāma* (काम) in which *kāma* (काम) is an object of desire and is a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). This dictionary says *kāma* (काम) is "love or desire of sensual enjoyment considered as one of the four ends of life (purusartha)."²⁷

In dictionary meaning very interestingly *kāma* (काम) means both a particular desire and the object of that desire. In these two senses only the second type of meaning of the word '*kāma*' (काम) is known as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Sometimes we seek some objects in a specific time or space. And if we know in case how or in which process we can get it, in that case we seek that process also. As for example, if one is hungry, he seeks food. Now if he knows the way how he can get food, i.e. cooking or buying from shop, he immediately seeks or adopts that process also. Now, there are also

some objects of desire (basically only two objects of desire are there) which do not depend upon any space or time. To put it in a different way, some objects we seek and our seeking is not conditioned by any space and time, e.g. pleasure and absence of pain. So, these two objects are known as unconditional object of desire or absolute objects of desire. *Kāma* (काम), more generally, means pleasure. It is controversial whether *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) means pleasure or freedom from pain. We will not discuss here about *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). In a separate chapter we will discuss it when we will discuss individual *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ). Here we only want to say that *kāma* (काम) means pleasure. Now, between *kāma* (काम) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) (pleasure and absence of pain whatever it may be) all the end-in-themselves are included. Or these two exhaust all that man desires. To put it differently, if anything is admitted as end-in-itself, it must be included in either *kāma* (काम) or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). *Dharma* (धर्म) and *artha* (अर्थ) are not ends-in-themselves.

Artha (अर्थ) and *dharma* (धर्म) have also been called *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). They now can be *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) only in the sense of ends as means. They are desired if only we desire those ends in themselves of which *artha* (अर्थ) and *dharma* (धर्म) are means. Can we now say *artha* (अर्थ) is means of *kāma* (काम) and *dharma* (धर्म) is means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष)? According to some systems of philosophy, the absolute freedom from all pains or sufferings is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). So, we have to distinguish between individual freedom from pain or suffering and absolute freedom from pain or suffering. Similarly, we have to distinguish between pleasure in general and pleasure which is *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Any pleasure and all pleasure are not *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Only the highest and

best form of pleasure is *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). What are the criteria to judge which pleasure is the highest and best? Such criteria are durability and purity; some may add here intensity also. Now, among all the pleasures sensual pleasure seems to be most intense and among sensual pleasures sexual one is the most intense and satisfying. In some *Tantra* literature sexual union is viewed as the perfect analogue of mystic union with God. Let different pleasures be different in respect of quality, quantity and intensity. But still all worldly pleasures can be said to be equal in that they are all impermanent. If we compare this-worldly pleasure with the other-worldly pleasure, we find that the other worldly pleasure is most durable. So as pleasure (and among all pleasures) it is the highest and best pleasure. This is known as *svarga* (स्वर्ग).

Let us try to clarify a little more why *kāma* (काम) as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) should mean *svarga* (स्वर्ग) or the other worldly pleasure. We also should show what is the nature of this-worldly pleasure. We have seen that *kāma* (काम) means both desire and object of desire. Often these two are different. We say for example that *artha* (अर्थ) or a particular flower is an object of desire. We do not say it is desire. Pleasure is an unconditional object of desire. But since pleasure is either this-worldly pleasure or it is other-worldly pleasure, then why *kāma* (काम) as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) should mean the other worldly pleasure or *svarga* (स्वर्ग)? What is the name for this worldly-pleasure? There is one word '*rāga*' (राग) which, according to the dictionary, means 'love or attachment.'

Now *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is *svarga* (स्वर्ग) and not *rāga* (राग). As forms of pleasure or object of pleasure they can both be object of human seeking. And most men seek sexual feeling and not

svarga (स्वर्ग). But man is a rational being. So, if he knows *svarga* (स्वर्ग) is a state of long durable and unmixed (unmixed with pain) pleasure, then men will seek *svarga* (स्वर्ग). In this sense men seek both *kāma* (काम) in the sense of *rāga* (राग) and *dharma* (धर्म) in the sense of *svarga* (स्वर्ग). But only few knowledgeable persons seek *dharma* (धर्म). Those who are ignorant do not seek *dharma* (धर्म). Still *svarga* (स्वर्ग) as the best form of worldly pleasure is the meaning of *dharma* (धर्म) as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). As pleasure it is not means to other goal, but is an end in itself.

Dharma (धर्म) has another meaning also. It means such actions as are necessary means for attaining *svarga* (स्वर्ग). *Artha* (अर्थ) also may be used as the means for procuring pleasure both directly and indirectly. But that pleasure is mainly this-worldly pleasure. Here '*artha*' (अर्थ) means wealth. In another sense *artha* (अर्थ) may also be used indirectly for procuring *svarga* (स्वर्ग). In this sense *artha* (अर्थ) helps to buy materials which are important for performing ritual sacrifices [*dharma* (धर्म) i.e. *yajña* (यज्ञ)]. Some of these materials are the necessary for rituals like *yāga* (याग). Difficulties still remain and FVP remains anomalous. It does not include in its list of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) *svarga* (स्वर्ग). And if we interpret *dharma* (धर्म) to mean *svarga* (स्वर्ग), then there are three ends-in-themselves — *kāma* (काम), *svarga* (स्वर्ग) [i.e. *dharma* (धर्म)] and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). How these three are related to one another? FVP has failed to give us a generalized theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). It has given us a theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) which includes at least three unrelated and irreducible *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). This shows FVP is not a hierarchical scheme of human values or needs. But it is taken to be a hierarchical scheme.

Another point to note is that *dharma* (धर्म) has been mentioned in the lowest position in hierarchical scheme of four-fold scheme of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). But it is not easy to answer why it has been ranked so. Common belief and intuition says that *dharma* (धर्म) is a higher value. How can it be at the bottom of the list? At the top there seems to be hardly any way of placing *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) and *svarga* (स्वर्ग) in one horizontal line. If we say that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is a kind of pleasure, then there will be no problem. But *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is absence of pain, not pleasure. According to Advaita Vedānta, *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is highest pleasure. They say it is *Brahmānanda* (ब्रह्मानन्द). If we take *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) as pleasure there will be no problem in the order of hierarchy, because it will be taken as the hierarchy of pleasure. Then the order will be from the lowest to the highest — the sensuous worldly pleasure (sexual union), i.e. *rāga* (राग) and then the other worldly pleasure that is *svarga* (स्वर्ग) and lastly the pleasure of the union with the highest reality or God or *Brahman*. According to some, this is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). If we mean this by *mokṣa* (मोक्ष), if *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is a kind of pleasure, then FVP hierarchy will be hierarchy of the three forms of only *kāma* (काम) [the fourth will be *artha* (अर्थ)]. Of these three forms of *kāma* (काम) the first one is known as this worldly pleasure or *ihaloukika sukha* (ईहलौकिक सुख); the second one is known as other-worldly pleasure or *pāraloukika sukha* (पारलौकिक सुख) and the last one is transcendental pleasure or *lokottara sukha* (लोकतर सुख). There are however schools of thought according to which *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) cannot be a form of *sukha* (सुख). If it is to be a form of *sukha* (सुख) then it must be eternal or *nitya sukha* (नित्य सुख). Vātsāyana has shown many defects in this view.

To conclude this chapter we will state our view why *dharma* (धर्म) has been placed at the bottom of the hierarchical scheme of four-fold *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). This scheme is the hierarchy of desirable things. In other words the list of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) is mainly the list of things which will give us normally pleasure. In that sense only pleasure and absence of pain are the desirable things. Keeping this in mind *mokṣa* (मोक्ष), as the greatest and highest value, has been placed at the top position in the scheme of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). *Dharma* (धर्म) has been placed at the bottom to indicate that it is the most basic value. It is most basic or fundamental in the sense that it is the very condition for anything to be considered as value. *Artha* (अर्थ) is a desirable thing. But it is desirable so long it does not violate *dharma* (धर्म). *Artha* (अर्थ) which violates *dharma* (धर्म) or is *dharma-viruddha* (धर्म-विरुद्ध) is not the object of authentic or commendable desire. It is not right to seek *artha* (अर्थ) in an immoral way. *Artha* (अर्थ) should be sought through moral way (धर्म-पथ). *Artha* (अर्थ) is a value, a matter or authentic human seeking if by *artha* (अर्थ) is meant *artha* (अर्थ) earned in a rightful way. A Brahmin should seek *artha* (अर्थ) through *yājan* (याजन) or performing *pūjā* (पुजा) etc. Such *artha* (अर्थ) is *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Similarly sexual pleasure through mating between couples properly married is *kāma* (काम) which is *dharma-avirodhi* (धर्म-अविरोधि). This sort of *kāma* (काम) is *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). So far is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is concerned, nobody can attain it if he violates *dharma* (धर्म) or is *adhārmika* (अधार्मिक). In this explanation *dharma* (धर्म) means moral provisions or duties. Performing duties and earning money or procuring pleasure through rightful means or *dhārmika upāya* (धार्मिक उपाय) is a value and it is right form of human seeking or right object of human seeking. Vyāsdeva has

said “धर्मति अर्थ च, काम च”, it means *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* are *puruṣārtha*-s, if they are approved by *dharma*. Lastly though for *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) one is to go beyond *dharma* (धर्म), yet it means that one must first perform *dharma* (धर्म). And when through this means man is so evolved as to transcend *dharma* (धर्म), then he attains *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) or liberation.

Notes and References

- 1 Krishna, Daya, “The Myth of the Purusarthas” in *Indian Philosophy: A counter perspective*, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1991, pp.189-205.
- 2 Ibid., p.189.
- 3 Sen, Indra, ‘What is Moksa?’, in Duby, S.P.(ed.), *The Philosophy of Life*, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, Delhi, 1998, p.189.
- 4 Hiriyan, M, *Popular Essays in Indian Philosophy*, Kavyalaya Publishers, Mysore, 1952, p. 65.
- 5 Ibid., p. 65.
- 6 Ibid., p. 66.
- 7 Mohanty, J.N, *Classical Indian Philosophy*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2000, p. 71.
- 8 Prasad, Rajendra, *Karma, Causation and Retributive Morality: Conceptual Essays in Ethics and Metaethics*, ICPR in association with Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, New Delhi, 1989, P. 276.
- 9 Krishna, Daya, ‘The Myth of the *Puruṣārthas*’ in *Indian Philosophy: A Counter Perspective*, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1991, p. 189.
- 10 Vātsyāyana shows in his *Bhāṣya* (भाष्य) on the Goutama *Sūtra* (सुत्र) 1/1/22 that in the stage of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) no *kāma* (काम) or desire is possible.

¹¹ Krishna, Daya, *Indian Philosophy: A Counter Perspective*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1991, p. 205.

¹² Philosophers have discovered, as we will see, that some of the senses of *prayojana* (प्रयोजन) is over inclusive and some other are over restrictive. In other words there is need for being careful when defining the term *prayojana* (प्रयोजन) in the present context.

¹³ We will not consider here the view of those according to whom *bhakti* (भक्ति) is also a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and perhaps the highest *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ).

¹⁴ Except where necessary we will speak as if there is only one PTP.

¹⁵ Śāstri, Pañcānan, *Paribhāṣā-saṃgraha on Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, Pañcānan Śāstri edition, kolkata, 1883 (शकाब्द), p. 6.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 6.

¹⁷ Tarkavāgiś, Phanībhūṣaṇa, *Nyāyadarśana* (Bengali translation of *Nyāyasūtra* of Gautama), Paschim Banga Rajya Pustak Parsad, kolkata, 1989.

¹⁸ “अर्थस्तु प्रसिद्ध धनादिरेव” — Śāstri, Pañcānan, *Paribhāṣā-saṃgraha on Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, Pañcānan Śāstri edition, kolkata, 1883 (शकाब्द), p. 5.

¹⁹ “स च जागादिधर्मः पुरुषेण अर्थ्यमानत्वात् पुरुषार्थः अपि अन्येच्छा अधीन इच्छाविषयत्वात् गौनो न मुख्यः” — Śāstri, Pañcānan, *Paribhāṣā-saṃgraha on Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, Pañcānan Śāstri edition, kolkata, 1883 (शकाब्द), p. 5.

²⁰ Apte, V. S.(ed.), *The Student's Sanskrit-English Dictionary* (revised and enlarged edition), Nag Publishers, Delhi, 2011. This sense seems to have been derived from the *Arthaśāstra*.

²¹ *Manusamhitā* 2.214 seems to use the word 'kāma' (काम) in the sense of carnal gratification or lust.

²² 'स च कामः सुखविशेष-रूपत्वेन फलत्वात् मुख्यः पुरुषार्थः' — Śāstri, Pañcānan, *Paribhāṣā-saṃgraha on Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, Pañcānan Śāstri edition, kolkata, 1883 (शकाब्द), p. 5.

²³ Nyāya admits that there are also many things which are object of neither desire nor aversion. We take an attitude of *upekṣā* (उपेक्षा) towards them. We are never cognitively engaged with these objects.

²⁴ Śāstri, Pañcānan, *Paribhāṣā-saṃgraha on Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, Pañcānan Śāstri edition, kolkata, 1883 (शकाब्द), pp. 4-5.

²⁵ Pt. Pañcānan Śāstri is one such person. He criticizes the author of *Vedāntaparibhāṣāprakāśikā* for taking *dharma* (धर्म) in the SDP list of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) to mean *svarga* (स्वर्ग) and not *vihita karma* (विहित कर्म) —*Paribhāṣā-saṃgraha on Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, Pañcānan Śāstri edition, kolkata, 1883 (Bengali era), pp. 4-5.

²⁶ This is claimed to be the position of Upaniṣada-s.

²⁷ Apte, V. S. (ed.), *The Student's Sanskrit-English Dictionary* (revised and enlarged edition), Nag Publishers, Delhi, 2011.

CHAPTER- III

Individual *Puruṣārtha*-s

At first glance it might appear that what we will discuss in this chapter was already discussed in previous chapters. But earlier we discussed *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ) in general; that is to say, even when we discussed *artha* (अर्थ) or *kāma* (काम) we discussed them as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Here we will discuss the same *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ) individually, that is, as *kāma* *puruṣārtha* (काम पुरुषार्थ), as *artha* *puruṣārtha* (अर्थ पुरुषार्थ) and so on and not as *kāma* *puruṣārtha* (काम पुरुषार्थ), as *artha* *puruṣārtha* (अर्थ पुरुषार्थ) and so on. To put it otherwise, in the previous chapter we have given the emphasis on *kāma* (काम) as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or *dharma* (धर्म) as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). But in this chapter we will give emphasis on different *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ) individually, i.e, *kāma* (काम) as *kāma* (काम) or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) as *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). We will discuss here in great detail only the *kāma* *puruṣārtha* (काम पुरुषार्थ) and *mokṣa* *puruṣārtha* (मोक्ष पुरुषार्थ) and some important points about *dharma* *puruṣārtha* (धर्म पुरुषार्थ). We also do not find that we can add much to our earlier discussion of *artha* *puruṣārtha* (अर्थ पुरुषार्थ). One reason is that we could not get enough material in the standard literature on *artha* *puruṣārtha* (अर्थ पुरुषार्थ). We will discuss *bhakti* *puruṣārtha* (भक्ति पुरुषार्थ) in a separate chapter. Though we will discuss *mokṣa* *puruṣārtha* (मोक्ष पुरुषार्थ) in detail in the chapter on PTP, yet we have to omit there some necessary details. Only what we intend to skip there about *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) will be discussed here. To be more precise, we would like to discuss briefly some *āgamika* theory of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) or *parama* *puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ). Earlier our

discussion of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) was confined to the *naigamika* view of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष).

One very pertinent question needs to be answered first. The two individual *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) of *dharma* (धर्म) and *artha* (अर्थ) are good or end *as means*; they are *puruṣārtha sādhan* (पुरुषार्थ साधन). So they are discussed or should be discussed in the chapter on *puruṣārtha sādhan* (पुरुषार्थ साधन) (i.e. chapter sixth). Why do we devote a separate chapter for them — a chapter dealing with individual *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ)? Our answer to this question is that in the chapter on *puruṣārtha sādhan* (पुरुषार्थ साधन) we actually discuss the *sādhana* or means of only *mokṣa puruṣārtha* (मोक्ष पुरुषार्थ). It is difficult to think that *artha* (अर्थ) or *kāma* (काम) is a means of *mokṣa puruṣārtha* (मोक्ष पुरुषार्थ). So we need to discuss separately at least the *kāma puruṣārtha* (काम पुरुषार्थ). So far as the *mokṣa puruṣārtha* (मोक्ष पुरुषार्थ) is concerned, we will discuss it in the chapter on philosophical theory of *puruṣārtha* or PTP. There we will discuss two versions of PTP. There are other versions of PTP also. We will take note of some of them briefly. Besides, there are some general controversies about the number of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) to be included in a scheme of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). We need to discuss this also. In this chapter our focus will be on *kāma puruṣārtha* (काम पुरुषार्थ) and certain views of *mokṣa puruṣārtha* (मोक्ष पुरुषार्थ) and some little about *dharma puruṣārtha* (धर्म पुरुषार्थ) that we did not discuss earlier.

In this chapter we are to discuss the *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) separately and not together. For this we need to settle first how many *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are there. The total number of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is a debatable issue. This point we did not

discuss before. We discussed the standard view according to which there are four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). Pandit Pancānan Śāstri has written in his *Paribhāṣā-saṃgraha* that the *Purāṇas* are the source of this FVP.¹ And by FVP we meant the familiar doctrine of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) according to which there are four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ)². Some may ask whether the number could be more or less. Scholars like Daya Krishna actually held that there could be or are greater number of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ).³ But there is no comprehensive and critical discussion of the question. Here we also do not have scope to do that. We will discuss the issue only briefly. Previously we said that PTP is the most general theory about *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). In it the conception of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) has been fully generalized. Accordingly, in philosophical theory the number of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is naturally only one. Many recent scholars did not notice that philosophers practically ignored all except one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and that is the *mokṣa puruṣārtha* (मोक्ष पुरुषार्थ). And they have good reason for this. Generally the modern scholars debated over the issue whether the *trivarga* (त्रिवर्ग) view of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is correct or the *catuvarga* (चतुर्वर्ग) view of it is correct. According to the first, the number of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) is three. According to the second, *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are four in number. Actually this is a debate about whether or not to include *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) in the list of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). The supporters of the *catuvarga* (चतुर्वर्ग) view are in favour of including *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) in the list of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) and the followers of *trivarga* (त्रिवर्ग) want to exclude it from there. In their actual discussion they hardly ever give good and explicit arguments for their views. Sometimes it appears that they want to make some hoistorical point; they want to say that in fact

there was a time when men used to admit only three *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). Only later the *trivarga* (त्रिवर्ग) view was changed to the *caturvarga* (चतुर्वर्ग) view. Sometimes it appears that their concern is social; they think that if people admit *mokṣa puruṣārtha* (मोक्ष पुरुषार्थ), then men will run after this other-worldly and selfish goal and will ignore social development and general welfare. One may think that this difference regarding the *number* of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is one of the points of debate between FVP and PTP. For, PTP admits only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) but FVP admits four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). However, neither PTP nor FVP admits a *trivarga* (त्रिवर्ग) scheme of values. So the debate between *trivarga* (त्रिवर्ग) scheme and *caturvarga* (चतुर्वर्ग) scheme may be regarded as a new point. There is no clear statement in FVP about the number of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). It has not been said there that the number of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) is four and that it cannot be more or less. But from the way some modern scholars debate on the issue it seems that they have not noticed this point. Besides the *caturvarga* (चतुर्वर्ग) view has not been defended explicitly. Still the standard view is that the number of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) is four. Against this view some scholars have pointed out that the number of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) can be and in fact is more than the standard four. Nobody however discussed earlier that it could be even less. We in PTP have shown that from the philosophical point of view there is only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and that is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष).

According to the *trivarga* (त्रिवर्ग) view, there are three or three kinds of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). They are *dharma* (धर्म), *artha* (अर्थ), and *kāma* (काम). The *caturvarga* (चतुर्वर्ग) view adds *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) to this three. Some hold that the doctrine of four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ),

with *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) as the fourth one, emerged later in the history of Indian culture. Daya Krishna has said 'The ideal of *mokṣa* was, thus, a later incorporation from the non-Vedic religious and spiritual traditions of India.'⁴ Originally there were only three *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ) and the *trivarga* (त्रिवर्ग) view is historically and also perhaps logically correct. Sometimes it has been held that from the time of the *Vedas* till the time of the *Mahābhārata* men commonly believed in the *trivarga* (त्रिवर्ग) view of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). During this period due importance was given to man's worldly existence and to his personal and social problems *in this world*. *Trivarga* (त्रिवर्ग) represents the scheme of values of common and worldly man. Only later on the spiritual concerns became so dominant in Indian society that men became more and more other worldly and started neglecting his socio-political life. On the basis of this some foreign scholars and their Indian followers came to hold that India has a world negating culture⁵. In this culture the spiritual matter is given all importance and worldly concerns are totally or mostly neglected. So some modern scholars argue that the life of a man in *this world* is dominated by the values of *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम). It has also a place for *dharma* (धर्म) in the sense of morality. The other worldly value of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) plays no important role in the life of ordinary and worldly man. It may be the first and last concern of a man who is religious (as distinct from moral), spiritual, ascetic or a mystic. Some modern scholars also claim that the traditional literature shows that *trivarga* (त्रिवर्ग) was commonly believed in earlier days. The later addition of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) to these three turned the original *trivarga* theory to *caturvarga* (चतुर्वर्ग) theory. Some thinkers hold the same view in a modified way. They hold that originally men more *commonly* believed in *trivarga* (त्रिवर्ग) and not in

caturvarga (चतुर्वर्ग). This view seems to be more probable. For, in the Vedas we come across with the familiar passages like “मृत्युर्मुक्षियमामृतात्” or “तरति शोकम् आत्मवित्” or “येनाहं नामृतं स्यात् तेनाहं किं कुर्याम” etc. These passages speak about *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). Secondly, it is problematic to hold that the *Mahābhārata* rejects *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). For, the *Gītā* is a part of the *Mahābhārata* and in it Bhagavān Kriṣṇa has taught Arjuna (and others) the *Karma yoga* (कर्म योग) which is the right way of conducting our social and moral life. It is the right way particularly because it frees us from (or does not lead the agent to) the bondage (which results when we act in the ordinary and familiar way). In this way acting according to *karma yoga* (कर्म योग) paves the way for *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). There is one more point. The author of the *Mahābhārata* is also the author of the *Brahmasūtra*. And this *sūtra* text ends with an assertion about *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). Pandit Srimohan Bhattacharya in recent times has said that *dharma* (धर्म), *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम) are not matters of concern for *Vedānta* (दर्शन)⁶. It is also to be noted that in the *Sabhāparva* of the *Mahābhārata* Bidur told Dhṛtarāstra that *dharma* (धर्म) is the foundation (मुल) of the *trivarga* (त्रिवर्ग) which consists of *artha* (अर्थ), *kāma* (काम) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष).⁷ This shows two things: first, sometimes *trivarga* (त्रिवर्ग) excludes *dharma* (धर्म) and not *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) and secondly, according to the *Mahābhārata*, the number of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) is four.

In recent time Professor Kamalakar Mishra has discussed this controversy about *trivarga* (त्रिवर्ग) and *caturvarga* (चतुर्वर्ग).⁸ But the details of his account seem to be different from the account we presented above and also what may be found in the writings of other scholars. In the first place, according to him, those who believe in

trivarga (त्रिवर्ग) doctrine hold that ‘the class of three values (*trivarga*) — *artha* (अर्थ), *kāma* (काम) and *dharma* (धर्म) — forms the complete picture of values, and there is no need of accepting four values (*caturvarga*) which accepts *mokṣa* as an additional value.’⁹ He first presents the argument for the *trivarga* (त्रिवर्ग) doctrine according to which *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) need not be admitted as a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Then he answers this argument and defends *caturvarga* (चतुर्वर्ग) doctrine which includes *mokṣa puruṣārtha* (मोक्ष पुरुषार्थ). His argument against *trivarga* (त्रिवर्ग) and his defence of *caturvarga* (चतुर्वर्ग) or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) do not appear to be convincing. He writes: “The argument from the side of the *trivarga* theory, is that there are *only two basic values*, namely (i) pursuit of ‘*sukha*’ or ‘*ānanda*’ (pleasure or happiness) and (ii) morality (*dharma*), then what is the need of accepting *mokṣa* as another value?”¹⁰ We do not know who advanced such a view. No ground is stated for believing that the number of basic values is two and they are pleasure and morality. We have discussed in detail that value, in the sense of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), is the *object* of pursuit and not the *pursuit* of certain object as has been said here. Besides, pleasure can be a value as it is in itself an object of pursuit. But *dharma* (धर्म) is not or cannot be an object of pursuit or value in itself. *Dharma* (धर्म) in the sense of moral *action* involves exertion and hence is a form of pain which is not a *desired* object. *Dharma* (धर्म) can still be a value if it is the *means* of something which is a desired object or value *in itself*. In the scheme as presented here to be a value *dharma* (धर्म) must be a *means* of pleasure as it cannot be a pleasure in itself. It is not sure whether the supporters of *trivarga* (त्रिवर्ग) say so. According to the standard view, *dharma* (धर्म) is primarily a *means* of other-worldly pleasure called *svarga* (स्वर्ग). But the supporters of *trivarga* (त्रिवर्ग) view generally

accept only the worldly values including pleasure. In short, a theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) not only admits a fixed number of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) but also states the sense in which they are *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and how the different *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are mutually related [in case there are more than one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ)].

If we turn now to Professor Mishra's reply to the supporters of the *trivarga* (त्रिवर्ग) doctrine, we find that he makes reference to "Indian seers" (ऋषि). He attributes to them the view that values are either *preya* (प्रेय) or *śreya* (श्रेय). He then says that the *preya* (प्रेय) values are *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम) and the *śreya* (श्रेय) value is *dharma* (धर्म).¹¹ But this does not seem to be correct. The traditional view, as expounded in works like *Kathopaniṣad* or in the literature of the Vedānta philosophy (including *Brahmasūtra* and *bhāṣya* on it), is that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the (only) *śreya* (श्रेय). Professor Mishra's problem seems to be that he wants to find a place for *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) in the scheme of values and also give importance to the *trivarga* (त्रिवर्ग) theory. He proposes that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is to be viewed as the "synthesizer" of the two conflicting values of *śreya* (श्रेय) and *preya* (प्रेय). So he had to find both these conflicting values [*śreya* (श्रेय) and *preya* (प्रेय)] within the remaining three of *artha* (अर्थ), *kāma* (काम) and *dharma* (धर्म). He, therefore, suggests that *dharma* (धर्म) is the *śreya* (श्रेय) and *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम) are *preya* (प्रेय). Then he holds that in *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) or self-realisation as a value the two conflicting values of *preya* (प्रेय) [*artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम)] and *śreya* (श्रेय) [*dharma* (धर्म)] "are naturally synthesized ..." His argument is that "In *mokṣa* my action becomes good and pleasant — two in one. The Indian seers discovered this wonderful value as the answer to *their* problem. So, they included it in the scheme of

values and gave it the status of the highest value (*parama puruṣārtha*)¹². We think that this exposition cannot be attributed to the Indian seers or Indian philosophers of the classical period. One reason for this is that action *in the state of mokṣa* (मोक्ष) does not make any good sense; *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is not a state in which men act. The second reason is that even in the worldly state many social actions of man can be and are both pleasant and good. Finally, when we philosophically consider the matter, actions by nature involve pain of exertion and hence cannot be a state of unmixed pleasure. We have explained these points earlier also.

The point of some other modern scholars, like Daya Krishna, is that it is not reasonable to fix the number of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) as three or four. They argue that there can be many more *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). Friendship is a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and the intellectual pleasure which a scientist experiences in his effort to understand natural phenomenon is also a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Again the welfare of mankind as a whole is also a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). We would like to state that it is irrelevant to say all these things to criticize the standard view of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). For the scholars of earlier period or even the supporters of the standard *caturvarga* (चतुर्वर्ग) view did not mean to say that *individually* taken the number of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) is just four. The four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are just four *kinds* of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). For example, individually taken *dharma* (धर्म) is many. There are many actions and goods to which the general name *dharma* (धर्म) applies. These are brought under three narrower classes or heads of *kāyika dharma* (कायिक धर्म) or duties to be performed by using the physical body, *vācika dharma* (वाचिक धर्म) or the duties to be observed when

speaking (for example, we should not speak rudely to anyone and hurt him) and *mānasika dharma* (मानसिक धर्म) or the duties to be observed in thinking, i.e. we should not even think what is unjust or wrong. The word '*puruṣārtha*' (पुरुषार्थ) is one and there is one broad class or kind of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). This word covers many smaller classes of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) as well as *individually* many and also *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in general. All these come under the *one* broadest kind. Similarly, the word *dharma* (धर्म) is one but there are many concrete *dharma-s* (धर्म). The point of using one single word for all of them is to indicate that they all have some common property and so can be grouped together under one head. *Puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is the name of a group under which every single *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), in the given sense of the word, can be or will be included. Thus there is no problem of including the intellectual pleasure or friendship under *kāma puruṣārtha* (काम पुरुषार्थ). So, theoretically speaking there can be a view of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) which we can describe as *ekavarga* (एकवर्ग) theory. According to this view, all *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) come under one head. But if this broad class is the class of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), then such big generalization does not clarify things. *Ekavarga* (एकवर्ग) view does not say this. First, we are to realize that we are to strike a mean between the two — between (i) the highest possible generality, which includes under one single class of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) infinite number of individual *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) and (ii) absolute particularity, according to which there are infinite number of individually different *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) and no two of them can be brought together under one class. The purpose of having a scheme of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) is to strike a mean between these two extremes and bring together individually different infinite

number of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) under a small number of classes of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). *Dharma* (धर्म), *artha* (अर्थ), and *kāma* (काम) are such classes¹³. *Trivarga* (त्रिवर्ग) or *caturvarga* (चतुर्वर्ग) are suggested as such *schemes* of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). If there is good reason one can also choose a scheme of five or six *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). It is not a very significant issue. Nowhere it has been said that we cannot have a scheme of five *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). But we can have it if we find a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) which we cannot bring under any one of the standard three or four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ).

We have noted above the views of Professor Kamalakar Mishra and Professor Daya Krishna. We have also shown the difficulties found in their views and also that their disagreement can be easily reconciled. This does not mean that there is no difficulty at all in the standard view. For example, it is not clear what exactly is meant by *kāma* (काम). It is a serious issue which many modern scholars do not discuss thoroughly. If anything that is good or anything that man wants for himself is *kāma* (काम), then one can think that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) can be reduced to *kāma* (काम)¹⁴. Some have suggested or supported such reduction¹⁵ but even they did not fully investigate all the different senses of *kāma* (काम) or try to reconcile them. We find in classical literature many different senses of the term.

One can even use *kāma* (काम) in such a sense (in the sense of pleasure) that *artha* (अर्थ) can come under it. In that case the *caturvarga* (चतुर्वर्ग) theory can be reduced to *trivarga* (त्रिवर्ग). Even *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) (as understood in some schools of thought) can be included in *kāma* (काम). We admit that scholars of India should know that this is a real possibility. Actually *Bṛhaspati sūtra*, which is

the source of the Cārvāka thought, says this. One *Bṛhaspati sūtra*, quoted by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in his *Gūḍārthadīpikā*, says that the word *puruṣa* (पुरुष) signifies the physical body (such as what we have) endowed with consciousness ('चैत्यन्यविशिष्ट कायः पुरुष...').¹⁶ It further says pleasure [*kāma* (काम)] is the only single *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ).¹⁷ So far there are at least two *ekavarga* (एकवर्ग) theories (views) of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). They are first, the Cārvāka view or the Cārvāka PTP according to which only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is there and it is *kāma* (काम); and secondly, there are other versions of PTP according to which *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the only *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Advaita Vedānta philosophy on the one hand and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy on the other hold this *Mokṣaika-puruṣārtha-vāda* (मोक्षौक-पुरुषार्थ-वाद) or the view according to which only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is there and that is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). Even other versions of *āstika* PTP (and some versions of *nāstika* PTP) admit only *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) as the *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). This difference between the *Kāmaika-puruṣārtha-vāda* (कामैक-पुरुषार्थ-वाद) or the view according to which only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is there and it is *kāma* (काम) and the *Mokṣaika-puruṣārtha-vāda* (मोक्षौक-पुरुषार्थ-वाद) or the view according to which only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is there and it is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is first due to the difference in the conception of man or *puruṣa* (पुरुष). According to the Cārvākas (and hence Cārvāka PTP), man is hardly anything more than a biological being like a dog or a tiger. On the other hand, other *nāstika* (नास्तिक) philosophers (the Buddha or Jaina) and all *āstika* (आस्तिक) philosophers of India take man to have that property by which he is different from animals. It has been said that *dharma* (धर्म) is the distinguishing feature of a man. It distinguishes man from animals. *Dharma* (धर्म), therefore, is the most fundamental thing in the life of

a man¹⁸. Even an animal seeks pleasure. Pursuit of pleasure (strictly speaking pleasure) cannot be a value in the life of a man as man. Pursuit of pleasure which is consistent with *dharma* (धर्म) alone can count as a value in the life of a man. Pleasure [or *kāma* (काम)] can be *kāma puruṣārtha* (काम पुरुषार्थ) if *kāma* (काम) means pleasure that is consistent with *dharma* (धर्म) or is obtained through *dharma* (धर्म)¹⁹. A truly human being decides what is value or *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) keeping the consideration of *dharma* (धर्म) in the forefront. And then he seeks such value. *Dharma* (धर्म) by and large is a restraining force. Consideration of it does not allow man to degrade his life of pursuit of goals and ends into the life of a lower being. In the life of a lower being also there is the pursuit of pleasure or satisfaction of the senses; but this pleasure is not a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or human value, nor the pursuit of it is a value seeking. This is something which perhaps no one will contradict.

Indian philosophical view extends further and contends that though man cannot have *less than* a life of *dharma* (धर्म), he can go beyond *dharma* (धर्म), can transcend *dharma* (धर्म) and realize his full potential or attain the highest fulfillment of life. However, if *dharma* (धर्म) is not the highest *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or the direct means of the highest *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), it can still be a means (an indirect means) of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) which is a value beyond *dharma* (धर्म). Thus *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) does not negate *dharma* (धर्म). *Mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is to be attained *through dharma* (धर्म). The final goal is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) in which the pain associated with *dharma* (धर्म), the pain of exertion, is also absent. But *dharma* (धर्म) is generally speaking a necessary step or means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष).

Even *asamuccayavāda* (असमुच्चयवाद) admits the value of *dharma* (धर्म). It contends that immediate means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is *jñāna* (ज्ञान); and *dharma* (धर्म) is primarily²⁰ not *jñāna* (ज्ञान) but *karma* (कर्म) by nature. Yet we cannot get that *jñāna* (ज्ञान) if we do not purify ourselves first by performing *dharma* (धर्म)²¹. *Dharma* (धर्म) is the *necessary foundation* of every *human* pursuit of value even if the value is *artha* (अर्थ) or *kāma* (काम) or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). It is for this reason that *dharma* (धर्म) has been placed first and at the bottom of the list of four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). PTP admits this but it also tells us that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) which has been placed at the top of the list of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) is the final value.

According to the *asamuccayavāda* (असमुच्चयवाद), one can and one should pursue both *dharma* (धर्म) and *kāma* (काम) together [or *dharma* (धर्म) and *artha* (अर्थ) together]. But strictly speaking one cannot pursue *dharma* (धर्म) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) together. One needs to transcend *dharma* (धर्म) in order to pursue *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). This is the reason for which *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the *only* concern of philosophical theory of values. *Dharma* (धर्म) is the *first* or the most basic of all *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the last or the highest of all *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). Once the two are fixed — the necessary first [*puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ)] and the most coveted last and final [*puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ)] — we can proceed to determine the interrelation between four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) admitted in FVP. Against this background we would like to discuss briefly the four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) individually (in the way we said above). Before we do that we would like to note one argument why one cannot pursue both *dharma* (धर्म) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) in the way one

can and should pursue both *dharma* (धर्म) and *kāma* (काम) or *dharma* (धर्म) and *artha* (अर्थ) together.

In our discussion of individual *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) we begin by admitting the fourfold scheme of fundamental *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) or the *caturvarga* (चतुर्वर्ग) view of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). We have said earlier that this *caturvarga* (चतुर्वर्ग) doctrine is better described as the *paurāṇik* (पौराणिक) doctrine and it is different from the philosophical doctrine which admits only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). However, both the *Purāṇa* and *darśana* (दर्शन) have their root in the *Veda*. *Purāṇa* is the elaboration of the *Vaidika* view and teaching in an easy to understand language. Swami Chandraśekharendra Svaraswatī has said in his work *Hindu Dharma* that *Purāṇas* illustrate with stories the abstract and abstruse truths taught in the *Vedas*.²² Even the *kāma puruṣārtha* (काम पुरुषार्थ) can be traced to the *Veda*.²³ We need to decide the order in which the four individual *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are related and may be discussed. We propose to discuss first the *kāma puruṣārtha* (काम पुरुषार्थ). Our discussion of this *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) has been most sketchy so far. We will be brief in our discussion of *mokṣa puruṣārtha* (मोक्ष पुरुषार्थ) which we have discussed more elaborately before. So far as the *artha puruṣārtha* (अर्थ पुरुषार्थ) is concerned we do not find enough discussion in the standard literature on the subject. So the discussion of the *artha puruṣārtha* (अर्थ पुरुषार्थ) will also be extremely sketchy or we may even omit it. We will add some detail about *dharma puruṣārtha* (धर्म पुरुषार्थ) which we did not include earlier.

Dharma (धर्म) is the root of all other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) and the very foundation of man's life of value seeking. Besides *dharma*

(धर्म) in the sense of dutiful *action* is not and cannot be a good as an end in itself. It is only good as a means. On the other hand *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is good as end only; it is an end in itself. It cannot be an end as means. If we view them in this way, *dharma* (धर्म) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) mark the two endpoints of the scale and scheme of four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). In between there are *artha* (अर्थ पुरुषार्थ) and *kāma puruṣārtha* (काम पुरुषार्थ). To distinguish these two we need to fix the meaning of these two terms. According to one sense of the word *kāma* (काम), *artha* (अर्थ) also becomes *kāma* (काम). In his elucidation of the Gīta – verse 16/11 Madhusūdana Svārasvatī has said “...काम्यन्त इति कामाः...”²⁴, that which is desired is *kāma* (काम). Accordingly, any object of desire is *kāma* (काम). In that case *artha* (अर्थ) also becomes *kāma* (काम) for men who want or desire *artha* (अर्थ) or wealth. In a more restricted sense appropriate to the context, *kāma* (काम) is understood to mean not any object of desire but only such objects of desire that are empirical objects and the objects of the *senses* (इन्द्रिय) of the external sense organs only. These objects are *gandha* (smell), *rasa* (taste), *rūpa* (colour), *sparsā* (touch) and *śabda* (sound). The Cārvākas deny anything that cannot be known by the senses. For them, only the sensible or perceptible things are real. *Puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) to be real must be something *laukika* (लौकिक) or sensuous. *Dharma* (धर्म) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) are *alaukika* (अलौकिक); they can be known only from the *Śāstra* (शास्त्र) like the *Veda*. In other words, they can be known through the *śabdapramāna* (शब्दप्रमाण) which the Cārvākas do not accept²⁵. They do not accept also *paraloka* (परोलोक) to which *dharma* (धर्म) is related. So, for the Cārvākas, this-worldly (ईहलौकिक) and perceptible (दृष्ट) things man seeks can only be regarded as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Such objects of desire are the five things just

enumerated. But in fact nobody seeks or desires just *śabda* (शब्द) or sound like noise. But when a man wants to listen to music, it is *śabda* (of a sort) that he wants. Similarly, when a man enjoys a beautiful red rose he desires such *colorful* things or colour. When he relishes a good dish and likes its taste, he actually seeks the object of gustatory sense that is called *rasa* (रस) and so on. Though *artha* (अर्थ) is something perceptible and this-worldly object yet it is not immediately any of the five things like colour, sound and the like. When a man desires money he does not desire the colour of the coin or the note. Nor does he seek the smell of it. How then can *artha* (अर्थ) be a *pursartha* (पुरुषार्थ) for a Cārvāka? For them, *kāma* (काम) alone is *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ).²⁶ *Kāma* (काम) in the sense of object of desire the five sorts of thing *śabda* (शब्द), *gandha* (गन्ध) etc. constitute *kāma puruṣārtha* (काम पुरुषार्थ). The answer is that wealth or *artha* (अर्थ) is a means of *kāma* (काम). *Kāma* (काम) is end in itself and *artha* (अर्थ) is an end as means; it is means of *kāma* (काम). Whether *kāma* (काम) is a delicious dish or sensuous pleasure, it can be purchased by using wealth. *Artha* (अर्थ) thus becomes a means of the *kāma puruṣārtha* (काम पुरुषार्थ) [where *kāma* (काम) means sensuous or perceptible objects of desire]. The means of a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or of a desired end is also an end though it is an end *as means*. *Kāma* (काम) is an end in itself and *artha* (अर्थ) is an end as means of *kāma* (काम). So far for as Cārvāka-s are concerned there can be only a scheme of two *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ) — *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम) — both of which are (this) worldly things and desired by (this) worldly people.²⁷

But there are people who are not *nāstika* (नास्तिक) like the Cārvākas and they believe in *paraloka* (परोलोक).²⁸ The conception of *puruṣa* (roughly man) is different for a *nāstika* and an *āstika* (आस्तिक). Again, the different groups of *nāstika* (नास्तिक) have different conceptions of *puruṣa* (पुरुष). One *nāstika* (नास्तिक) conception of *puruṣa* (पुरुष) is found in the *Bṛhaspatīsūtra* which is a major source of the Cārvāka philosophy. In this work the standard Cārvāka conception of *puruṣa* (पुरुष) is stated thus 'चैत्यन्यविशिष्ट कायःपुरुषः', i.e., a conscious body is *puruṣa* (पुरुष). For, such a *puruṣa* (पुरुष) who is conscious (physical) body *dharma* (धर्म) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) that bear reference to the *alaukika* (अलौकिक) or other-worldly state cannot have any significance. For, with the perceptible body that we (men) have we cannot enjoy the fruits of *dharma karma* (धर्म कर्म) which is *svarga* (स्वर्ग). With such a body we cannot also attain the state of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) [at least the final *mukti* (मुक्ति) or *videha mukti* (विदेह मुक्ति)]. The *āstika* (आस्तिक) conception of *puruṣa* (पुरुष) is different. According to this conception, a *puruṣa* (पुरुष) is capable of having as his objects of seeking *dharma* (धर्म) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). According to this conception, man is essentially an embodied *soul* (आत्मा) or a *soul* (आत्मा) which has body. So long a soul is embodied in a this-worldly body (मर्त्य or ईहलौकिक देह), he cannot attain *svarga* (स्वर्ग) or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). Some such soul can be embodied in an *amartya* (अमर्त्य or अलौकिक देह). Such a soul can enjoy *svarga* and endeavour to attain *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) through *pravṛtti lakṣaṇa dharma* (प्रवृत्ति लक्षण धर्म) which leads to *svarga* or *nivṛtilakṣaṇa dharma* (निवृत्ति लक्षण धर्म) which is necessary to be practised for *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). The actual attainment would imply that man (the soul) has left this-worldly body or body as such. Thus fourfold scheme of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) is for the *āstika-s* (आस्तिक)

only. For these people man as (embodied) soul survives after death or the destruction of the *ihalaukika deha* (ईहलौकिक देह). He can be embodied in a *devadeha* (देवदेह) and realize that *sukha* (सुख) or pleasure which is called *svarga* (स्वर्ग). Or soul as disembodied (that is, the human soul in its disembodied state) can realize the *mokṣa puruṣārtha* (मोक्ष पुरुषार्थ). The *āstika* (आस्तिक) conception of *puruṣa* (पुरुष) makes it possible to have as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) both *dharma* (धर्म) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) as well as *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम). So the scheme of fourfold *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) implies the *āstika* (आस्तिक) conception of *puruṣa* (पुरुष).

In the scheme of fourfold *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) [*caturvarga* (चतुर्वर्ग) view of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ)] the ultimate *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is *mokṣa puruṣārtha* (मोक्ष पुरुषार्थ) and this is the only *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in which a philosophical doctrine of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) (PTP) is or can be interested. It has been explicitly said with reference to the *Vedānta darśana*;²⁹ but it is true about all *darśanas*. There are different kinds of *āstika-s* (आस्तिक). Those who are householders or *saṃsāri* for them only *trivarga* (त्रिवर्ग) or a scheme of threefold *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is appropriate. For those who are *mumukṣu* (मुमुक्षु) or seeker of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष), the scheme of one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is (ultimately) appropriate. However, *mumukṣu* (मुमुक्षु) or the authentic seeking of spiritual liberation is the result of long practice of *trivarga* (त्रिवर्ग) *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). So far all *āstika-s* (आस्तिक) have a fourfold *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) to begin with. At certain stage of evolution or elevation man drops the first two *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ), *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम). When man succeeds in elevating him further there remains only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) [*mokṣa* (मोक्ष)] for him. So long a man is not

evolved to that extent, that is, so long he craves for अभ्युदय (or prosperity in this world or the world after), he remains bound to the threefold *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) [without *mokṣa* (मोक्ष)]. So, in the *Rāmāyana*, Rāmacandra inquired from Bhrata whether he was pursuing *trivarga* (त्रिवर्ग) or not in such a way that the pursuit of one did not conflict with another.³⁰

Kāma puruṣārtha (काम पुरुषार्थ):

One who is a *puruṣa* (पुरुष), not in the Cārvāka sense of conscious *body* but in the *āstika* (आस्तिक) sense of embodied *soul*, desires not only perceptible sense objects that are desirable. A *puruṣa* (पुरुष) in the *āstika* (आस्तिक) sense desires *svarga* (स्वर्ग) and also *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). Such a *puruṣa* (पुरुष) may not consciously pursue right now the ends of *svarga* (स्वर्ग) or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष); he may want to be a worthy family man and a social man. For this he may feel that he needs such things as wealth [*artha* (अर्थ)] and also pleasure [*kāma* (काम)] of food and home, health and friendship and the like. He may also want to be just and moral (धार्मिक), for a man who is not just or moral cannot be considered a worthy member of a human society. In this sense besides seeking *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम) he may practice *dharma* (धर्म) [not as *svarga* (स्वर्ग), a goal or end in itself] in the sense of dutiful actions. So *svarga* (स्वर्ग) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) are not objects of his pursuit. However, unknown to him, the *svarga* and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) are also his *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). For what he explicitly believes implies that he admits *svarga* (स्वर्ग) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) to be also *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). One who wants to

be *dhārmika* (धार्मिक) must perform duties or morally right *actions*. *Svarga* (स्वर्ग) is the result of some of the dutiful actions. Similarly, *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the result (direct or indirect) of *nivṛtilakṣaṇa dharma* (निवृत्ति लक्षण धर्म). So, who pursues *dharma* (धर्म) also strives for the result of them. This is one argument why it is wrong to say that man may not want *svarga* (स्वर्ग) or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) but only worldly goods and morality. To believe in morality or in the performance of dutiful actions is to accept its implication including *svarga* (स्वर्ग) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). The second argument is that those who need worldly goods also want pleasure. These goods are desired objects that give them pleasure. It is, therefore, possible to generalize man's need for worldly goods as his desire for *kāma* (काम) and *artha* (अर्थ) or as man's need for pleasure. Pleasure in this sense is the only object of desire, *kāmya* (काम्य) or *kāma* (काम). Now, since *svarga* (स्वर्ग) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) are also forms of pleasure whoever seeks pleasure by implication accepts *svarga* (स्वर्ग) and *kāma* (काम) as objects of seeking or as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). *Svarga* (स्वर्ग) signifies maximum positive pleasure and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) signifies the ultimate 'negative' pleasure; by negative pleasure we mean freedom from pain (दुःखनिवृत्ति). If now *kāma* (काम) means what is desired or *kāmya* (काम्य) as Madhusūdana Sarasvatī said, then it is possible to generalize all *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) and can be ultimately reduced to only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) which is *kāma* (काम). However, this *kāma* (काम) is the *kāma* (काम) of the *āstika-s* (आस्तिक) and not of the *nāstika-s* (नास्तिक). For the *nāstika-s* (आस्तिक) only sensible and perceptible objects of desire are *kāma* (काम). In the present case even imperceptible objects of desire like *svarga* (स्वर्ग) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) are also *kāma* (काम). There is one difficulty in describing both *kāma* (काम) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) in the same way. Vātsyāyana in his

bhāṣya on the *apavarga sūtra* of Gautama has shown that for the pursuit of any goal other than *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) one needs to have desire for that end. Thus any other *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) implies that the man in question is subject to desires, inclinations and the like. Such men are called *āśakta* (आसक्त) or attached. For *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) one must have *vairāgya* (वैराग्य) or detachment. A man who has transcended all attachments and does not seek anything (positive) is alone a true *mumukṣu* (मुमुक्षु). Hence, *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) only for those who have transcended all *kāma* (काम). We need to admit two *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ) as end in themselves and not as end as means. *kāma* (काम) is fundamentally different from *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). And *kāma* (काम) is more than sensuous pleasure or objects of sensuous pleasure. In a doctrine of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) which will be acceptable to an *āstika* (आस्तिक) we, therefore, need to understand *kāma* (काम) too narrowly that is in the sense of the *nāstika* (नास्तिक) or Cārvāka's and too generally in the sense in which it becomes the same as *mokṣa* (मोक्ष).

Earlier we have seen that *kāma* (काम) means the objects of senses that we seek. These objects are generally speaking five in number and they correspond to the five sense organs (ज्ञानेन्द्रिय) that we have. These sense objects, on the one hand, and *artha* (अर्थ), on the other, are *dṛṣṭa* (दृष्ट) and *ihalaukika puruṣārtha*-s (ईहलौकिक पुरुषार्थ). How are they related to the *alaukika puruṣārtha* (अलौकिक पुरुषार्थ) called *dharma* (धर्म)? Let us take, for example, *artha puruṣārtha* (अर्थ पुरुषार्थ). This *artha* (अर्थ) and *dharma* (धर्म) are mutually related as means and end. *Artha* (अर्थ) is needed to perform acts of *dharma* (धर्म) like *yajña* (यज्ञ), and in this sense *artha* (अर्थ) is a means of *dharma* (धर्म). On the other hand, through

performing the *dharma* (धर्म) of teaching, say, one can earn one's livelihood, if teaching is a prescribed way of earning for him. Similar things can be said about *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम). The desired objects of pleasure [*kāma* (काम)] can be procured by spending money [*artha* (अर्थ)]. So far *artha* (अर्थ) is related to *kāma* (काम) as means. On the other hand, one seeks *artha* (अर्थ) only when he turns it into his object of desire [*kāma* (काम)]. *Artha* (अर्थ) in such a case is pursued as *kāma* (काम). In the *Ayodhyākānda* of Valmiki *Rāmāyana* Rāma was taught how a king should rule his kingdom. In this connection he suggested that *dharma* (धर्म), *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम) all three should be pursued in such a way that the pursuit of one does not conflict with the pursuit of the other. *Kāma* (काम) in the sense of greed (लोभ) should not be allowed to defeat all the pursuit of all the three *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ). Similarly, the pursuit of *kāma* (काम) should not be allowed to defeat the pursuit of *artha* (अर्थ) or the pursuit of *artha* (अर्थ) should not be allowed to conflict with the pursuit of *kāma* (काम). It was even suggested that if all the three cannot be pursued at the same time, we should pursue them at different times.³¹

There are other senses of *kāma* (काम) as well. We need to discuss in particular both *kāma* (काम) and *prem* (प्रेम). For, in a sense, *prem* is a form of *kāma* (काम); it is not ordinary *kāma* (काम) but sublime *kāma* (काम). Another thing we need to discuss is the relation between *bhoga* (भोग) and *kāma* (काम). Referring to Gauḍapāda's *Māndukyakārika* Madhusūdana has distinguished *bhoga* (भोग) and *kāma* (काम). It has been said that *bhoga* (भोग) signifies actual (physical) consumption. But *kāma* (काम) is enjoying the same objects but only in thought or contemplation and not

actually or physically.³² It has been said that both *kāma* (काम) and *bhoga* (भोग) — mental pursuit of objects of pleasure and physical pursuit of them — are equally detrimental to the pursuit of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). *kāma* (काम) (*bhoga*) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) are incompatible. *Prem* (प्रेम) is understood not just as love. For this English word also denotes the love play which is utterly a physical act of humans or even animals. When *prem* (प्रेम) is understood as love it is first understood in a broad sense so that Platonic love is also love. It may be nearer to *prem* (प्रेम) which implies among other things *śṛṅgār* (शृङ्गार) in the sense of love play. But this *śṛṅgār* (शृङ्गार) involves *aprākṛta deha* (अप्राकृत देह). This is clear from the treatment of the subject in works like *Ujjalanilamani*. In our context also love as *prem* (प्रेम) as distinguished from *kāma* (काम) refers not to pleasures of the senses which love and *kāma* (काम) in the narrow sense mean. *Prem* (प्रेम) is not desire for objects of sense. Such objects, even when they are beloved persons, are things other than the person who desires and are outside him (बाह्य). The true object of *kāma* (काम) in the sense of *prem* (प्रेम) is one's own soul. In the ultimate and strict sense of it *kāma* (काम) has for its object the soul (आत्मा) of the person in question. In this sense primary object of *kāma* (काम) is one's soul and, in the second place, it is object which is related to this soul. Such related objects include one's wife and sons and daughters and so on. *Prem* (प्रेम) is primarily desire for the internal objects and not the external objects of the senses. Such *prem* (प्रेम) also is a form of attachment, even if it is an attachment of a superior kind. But when the object of love or superior or highest attachment (परानुरक्ति) is the loving God Himself, *prem* (प्रेम) is transformed into *bhakti* (भक्ति). It has been said 'सा परानुरक्ति ईश्वरे' (*Śāṅḍilya sūtra*), meaning thereby *bhakti* (भक्ति) is the highest love

when it is placed to God. Sometimes it appears from the Vaiṣṇava literature that true *prem* (प्रेम) is a matter that cannot be realized in the ordinary physical plane and in *prākṛta deha* (प्राकृत देह). From the text like *Ujjalanilamanī* it appears that *prem* (प्रेम) or at least *prembhakti* (प्रेम भक्ति) is a superior kind of emotion. It is superior to *kāma* (काम) and even of ordinary *bhakti* (भक्ति). So *prem* (प्रेम) is also referred to as *prembhakti* (प्रेम भक्ति).

In the *Bhagavdgītā* we find many discussions about *kāma* (काम) in the ordinary sense of attachment (आसक्ति) or its source. The *Gītā* also tells us about the cause and effect of *kāma* (काम).³³ It is said there that regular association (संग) with something produces in us a craving for it (काम). Suppose someone does not actually or physically mix with something or some person but he constantly thinks about it in his mind. His external sense organ is not operative here but his internal sense organ (मनस) is operative. Due to constantly thinking about it the man will develop what is called *sanga* (संग). It means he will develop the view that the thing is a source of my pleasure.³⁴ From such sense there arises a desire of the form 'may I have this thing, may it be mine'. This is called *kāma* (काम). Thus attachment (संग) in the sense of the belief that a thing is the source of my pleasure leads to the desire of the form 'let it be mine'. This is *kāma* (काम). Having told us how *kāma* (काम) originates, the *Gītā* tells us that such *kāma* (काम) leads to anger (क्रोध) when one is prevented from having the object for which he has *kāma* (काम). The process does not end there. It ultimately leads to man's ruin.

There are many references to *kāma* (काम) as something that is harmful and lowly; it is something bad and should be avoided. But

sometimes completely different things have been said about *kāma* (काम). This makes the subject of *kāma* (काम) most interesting and also difficult to understand. How to reconcile all the negative and positive things said about *kāma* (काम)? We are to hold either that there are different meanings of the word *kāma* (काम) or there are many different aspects of *kāma* (काम).

In the *Veda* and the *Upaniṣadas* there are many references of *kāma* (काम) and discussions about it. In some places *kāma* (काम) is the original creative force, it is the source of this universe. It has been said that there was a time when only the ultimate reality (*Brahman* or God or *ātma*) alone was there. It has been said 'आत्मौवेदमग्र आसीदेक एव'.³⁵ From this one came the whole world of multiplicity when the One desired to create or be many, it desired (ईच्छा) or felt that it needed a companion.³⁶ So, He divided Himself into two. This is the beginning of the creation of the rest of the Universe. *Kāma* (काम) is thus the most basic creative force. Everything that is created originates ultimately in the desire [*kāma* (काम)] for it. There are a number of things to note here. First, what is the form and requirement of complete fulfillment? Is not God completely fulfilled in Himself? According to the standard view, God is perfect and He has no want or need and therefore no *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). He is *āptakāma* (आप्तकाम). Then what does it mean to say that He wanted a companion, a second being? It has been even said in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣada* that he needed a wife.³⁷ How exactly are we supposed to understand such passages of the *Upaniṣada*? Śaṅkarācārya has elaborately and lucidly discussed the sense of these passages. We are here interested in the *Upaniṣada* view of the *kāma puruṣārtha* (काम पुरुषार्थ). Here

puruṣa (पुरुष) means God [*Bhagavat puruṣa* (पुरुष)] on the one hand and on the other the embodied soul (as we are) which is under the spell of *avidyā* (अविद्या). *Avidyāvat puruṣa* (अविद्यावत् पुरुष) is subject to *kāma* (काम). And where such *puruṣa* (पुरुष) resides is called *loka* (लोक). Śaṅkarācārya has noted that there are primarily at least three loka-s: *manuṣyaloka* (मनुष्यलोक) or the abode of men, *pitṛloka* (पितृलोक) or abode of dead ancestors and the *devaloka* (देवलोक) or the abode of the deities. Now every man wants to grow and be happy. The growth signifies move towards higher and better. For men who are the inhabitants of the *manuṣyaloka* (मनुष्यलोक) the (immediate higher) goal is to attain *devaloka* (देवलोक)³⁸. This *devaloka* (देवलोक) or the pleasure or happiness it stands for [namely *svarga* (स्वर्ग)] is the end (फल) that man seeks. The means or the *sādhana* (साधन) of this *svarga* (स्वर्ग) or *devaloka* (देवलोक) are wife (जाया), son (पुत्र), wealth (वित्त) and *karma* (dutiful actions or धर्म कर्म).³⁹ The *Upaniṣad* says that the one desired a wife; but what for? Śaṅkarācārya says, He wanted a wife in order to qualify for performing the dutiful actions that would lead to *svarga* (स्वर्ग) or *devaloka* (देवलोक). *Vitta* (वित्त) within which are included *paṣu* (household animals like cow) and *putra* (पुत्र) also are needed for *yajña* (जज्ञ) the result of which is *svarga* (स्वर्ग).

At one point in his discussion Śaṅkarācārya noted that *kāma* (काम) is innumerable as the *kāmyavastu* [object of *kāma* (काम)] is also innumerable. As internal state of desire *kāma* (काम) is not one but many and as object of such desire also *kāma* (काम) is many. But we use singular number when we enumerate *kāma* (काम) as a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Another *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is *artha* (अर्थ) or *vitta* (वित्त). And the third is *dharma* (धर्म). Just there are many

individual *kāma* (काम) so also there are many individual *dharma* (धर्म) and *artha* (अर्थ). Yet there is a way of generalizing them. Śaṅkarācārya says among all perceptible things man finds nothing to be desired (लब्धव्य) if it is not an end of life (फल) or its means (साधन). *kāma* (काम) as things desired are then only two (that is, of two kinds). It is either the *sādhana* (means) or it is the end (फल). But these are two forms of the same thing *kāma* (काम) or *eṣaṇā* (एषणा). The object of *eṣaṇā* (एषणा) is *loka* (लोक) such as *devaloka* (देवलोक). So the original *eṣaṇā* (एषणा) is *lokaiṣaṇā* (लोकैषणा). But the *devaloka* (देवलोक) signifies long lasting pleasure which the *devatās* (देवता) or deities enjoy. These *devatās* (देवता) are distinguished from men in many different ways. One difference is that the *devatās* (देवता) have *deva śarīra* (देव शरीर) or body fit to enjoy the superior pleasures available in the *devaloka* and men have *manuṣya śarīra* (मनुष्य शरीर) or *martya śarīra* (मर्त्य शरीर). The body of the *devatās* (देवता) or deities (देव शरीर) is superior and is fit for the soul which has such *śarīra* (शरीर) to enjoy the superior *sukha* (pleasure) or *svargasukha* (स्वर्ग सुख). In the *Upaniṣada* there is description of the superior pleasure which *devatās* (देवता) or one who has *deva śarīra* (देव शरीर) can enjoy.⁴⁰ There is a Sanskrit word 'abhyudaya' (अभ्युदय) which can be translated as prosperity and covers pleasures of all the three *loka-s* (लोक). Anything that is less than *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) but which man seeks and becomes happy to get is generally known as prosperity or mark of prosperity. The superior pleasure called *svarga* (स्वर्ग)⁴¹ is a state of abhyudaya (अभ्युदय) in this sense.

The result so far is this: *kāma* (काम) is either pleasure or is the means of pleasure. And the pleasure is either the inferior pleasure

of this world or the superior pleasure of the other worlds like the *pitṛloka* (पितृलोक) and *svargaloka* (स्वर्गलोक). When *kāma puruṣārtha* (कामपुरुषार्थ) is a means it can be the means of some other *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) as its end. When one desires for wife (जाया or धर्मपत्नी) or wealth (वित्त) so that one can practice *dharma* (धर्म) like *yāga* (याग) one's desire [*kāma* (काम)] as well as the object of desire [*kāma* (काम)] wife etc. is means of *dharma* (धर्म) which is a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Such *dharma* (धर्म) is usually *pravṛtti lakṣaṇa dharma* (प्रवृत्ति लक्षण धर्म). The practice of such *dharma* (धर्म) secures such purification as is needed for (superior) *bhoga* (experience of higher pleasure). Such purification is called *bhogānugūṇa śuddhi* (भोगानुगुण शुद्धि) or purification that makes one eligible for higher pleasure.

By *kāma puruṣārtha* (काम पुरुषार्थ) is to be understood not just *kāmanā* (कामना) or desire; nor again any object of desire or *kāmya* (काम्य). It is to be understood as desire for certain particular (or particular kind of) thing. Such thing is either pleasure in general or a certain particular kind of pleasure. Nobody can deny that pleasure is *kāmya* (काम्य) or object of desire. We may think that man desires so many things from money to music and from food to fire. But all these have one common property, they all yield pleasure (under suitable conditions). So as means to pleasure or as pleasing things money, food, music and fire are *kāmya* (काम्य). *Kāmya* (काम्य) means object of desire.⁴² But when we say *kāma* (काम) is a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) we cannot say that *kāma* (काम) or desire is an object of desire. For desire is not pleasure. Just as *kāma* (काम) means pleasure in general so also it sometimes means a specific kind of pleasure called *maithunecccha* (मैथुनेच्छा). Here the object of

desire is *maithun* (मैथुन). It is the *kāmya* (काम्य). But *maithun* (मैथुन) is *kāmya* (काम्य) or desired because it is a means of pleasure of a distinct kind. It has been said in the *Upaniṣada* that the ultimate object of desire is the dear self itself. We love or desire such other things that are related in a certain way to self.⁴³ Man considers his wife dear or son and daughter dear because they are related to self in a particular way. It has been said so in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣada*.⁴⁴ Such a soul which is so much attached to itself actually recreates itself as (its) son by mixing with his wife.⁴⁵ *Putra* (पुत्र) is said to be an object of desire and *maithun* (मैथुन) is a means of it. Thus desire for self, desire for wife, desire for son and marriage are all related. For complete success of marriage a man and his woman need to know all these and have correct knowledge not only of the ethics of marriage but also of the *Kāma vijñāna* (कामविज्ञान) or *Kāma Śāstra* (काम शास्त्र).⁴⁶

So far we have considered *kāma* (काम) in two senses, as desire in general and as pleasure and sexual gratification. In course of given exposition to the relevant thoughts in the matter of the Naiyāyikas as expressed in *Nyāyakusumānjaliḥ* of Udayanācārya Gopīnāth Kavirāj⁴⁷ has said the same thing. Let us quote from Kavirāj-ji. “The *Puruṣārtha*-s, the ‘Ends of man’, are usually counted as four in number, called by the collective name of *caturvarga* (चतुर्वर्ग) — the fourfold group. These are (1) *dharma* (धर्म), (2) *artha* (अर्थ), (3) *kāma* (काम) and (4) *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). On analysis of human aspirations it would appear that *what men really strive after is nothing but pleasure (or absence of pain)*.”⁴⁸ Kavirāj-ji has also stated certain way of classifying the *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ) and the rationale behind classifying them in that way Kavirāj ji maintains that

though there is no (or practically no⁴⁹) difference among thinkers of different schools regarding *dharma* (धर्म), *artha* (अर्थ), and *kāma* (काम) there is great difference regarding the view of pleasure being the highest *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) as the Mīmāṃsaka-s are believed to hold.⁵⁰ For, the Naiyāyikas hold that the highest *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is of the nature of absence of pain. Among those who hold that the highest *puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) is the eternal pleasure, there is difference whether this pleasure is *Brahmānanda* (ब्रह्मानन्द) or the divine love that is *bhakti* (भक्ति) or *svarga* (स्वर्ग). The means of *Brahmānanda* (ब्रह्मानन्द) is knowledge but of the latter or the (साध्य) *bhakti* (साध्य भक्ति) the means is *bhakti* (साधन भक्ति).⁵¹

Dharma puruṣārtha (धर्म पुरुषार्थ):

We will note some of the important details about this *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) which were not discussed earlier. According to Dr.S. Radhakrishnan, 'By far the most debated concept in Indian thought and the one that has raised the maximum number of controvercies is the concept of, indeed, next to the concept of reality, *dharma* is the most important concept in indian thought.'⁵² The most debated concept in Indian thought is '*dharma*' (धर्म). P. K. Mahapatra has said 'The meaning of *dharma* and its implication are so complex and so variegated that in the depth of this single word lies an entire Indian civilization that is typically Indian. In spite of numerous senses in which this word has been used by Indian thinkers, philosophers, moralists and theologians, the word or the concept is frequently used and understood by the common Indian.'⁵³ The *Mahābhārata* is regarded as the fifth *Veda* and an authoritative text on all the *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ).⁵⁴ Both Rāma and Yudhisthira are symbol of

dharma (धर्म). Prof. Samiran Chandra Chakrabarti said 'The Vedic value system resulted in the concept of the set of values called *caturvarga*.These values are, in Sanskrit, called the *puruṣārthas*, objects or aim of man's existence'.⁵⁵

Dharma (धर्म) has been defined in the Hindu Tradition in many ways. Now, let us mention some of the most important senses of the term '*dharma*' (धर्म).⁵⁶

1. As 'upholder or supporter or sustainer' (*Rgveda* I. 187.1 and X. 92.2),
2. As 'religious ordinance and rites' (*Rgveda* I.22.18, V. 26.6, VIII.43.24 and IX 64.1); the primeaval or first ordinances, '*prathama dharma*' (*Rgveda* II, 17.1) and ancient ordinances '*sanātana dharma*' (*Rgveda* II 3.1),
3. As 'fixed principles or rules of conduct', (*Rgveda*, IV.53.3, V.63.7, VI 70.1 and VIII. 89.5),
4. As 'merit acquired by the performance of religious rites' (*Atharva Veda*, XI.9.17),
5. As 'the whole body of religious (and moral?) duties' (*Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*, VII.17), and
6. As *āśrama dharma* in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, which envisages *dharma* as denoting moral duties of the three (or four?) different stages of a person's life?

Since we are talking about *dharma* as *purusartha*, for our present purpose senses 3 and 6 are important. According to Śabar Swāmi, 'whatever is a means to the well-being of humanity and of the world at large is *dharma*'⁵⁷. According to Godabarish Mishra,⁵⁸ *dharma* (धर्म) is the basic as well as regulatory principle of all ethical principles.

Though *dharma* (धर्म) is counted as a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) yet it is doubtful whether we can take *dharma* (धर्म) as a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in the sense of end in itself. We have discussed two sense of the word *dharma* (धर्म) earlier. Either it is *phalarupa dharma* (फलरूप धर्म) [an end which is *dharma* (धर्म)] or it is *upāyarupa dharma* (उपायरूप धर्म) or end as means. In the latter sense of morally right *action* or duty, *dharma* (धर्म) can hardly be an end in itself. Some radical moralist may hold that *dharma* (धर्म) in the sense of duty is the end in itself. However the two standard views about *dharma* (धर्म) (in India) hold it to be a means. Accordingly even if it is a good or an end, it is not a good or end in itself but only good *as means*. *Mokṣa* (मोक्ष) alone is a good or end in itself and is unconditionally an end. In his *Vaiśeṣika sūtra* 1.1.2. Kaṇāda says 'यतोअभ्युदयनिःश्रेयससिद्धिः स धर्मः'.⁵⁹ In this statement the word "यतो" literally means from which. Thus *dharma* (धर्म) is here said to be that from which man gets both prosperity (अभ्युदय) and *niḥshśreyas* (निःश्रेयस). *Dharma* (धर्म) is thus said to be the source or *means* also of liberation or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). *Mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the only unconditional end in itself which is permanent and it is not associated with suffering. Further *dharma* (धर्म) is the one *common* means of all the other *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ). There is no sense in saying that *dharma* (धर्म) is the means of *dharma* (धर्म). So *dharma* (धर्म) is a means of the other three *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ): *artha* (अर्थ), *kāma* (काम) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). The important point for us here is that *dharma* (धर्म) is a means of other *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ). So [even if it is itself a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ)]⁶⁰ it cannot be denied that it is a means of some other *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). In fact it is believed to be a means of all the other three *puruṣārtha*-s. These other *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ) are grouped under two heads. One is *abhyudaya* (अभ्युदय) and this includes all prosperities of this world or of the other world. *Artha* (अर्थ)

or wealth and pleasures or *kāma* (काम) of all kinds are included in the class of *abhyudya* (अभ्युदय). *Mokṣa* (मोक्ष) forms a class by itself it is and belongs to the class of *niḥśreyas* (निःश्रेयस). We will soon return to the question in which sense *dharma* (धर्म) is a means of other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ).

The second statement of the meaning of the word *dharma* (धर्म) and the nature of the thing *dharma* (धर्म) is found in the *sūtra* 1.1.2 of Jaimini. It reads “चोदनालक्षणोऽर्थो धर्मः”.⁶¹ The word “चोदना” means *vidhi* (विधि). Both these words are names of those statements of the Veda that are in the imperative mood and enjoin duties or morally right actions of man. Thus *codonā* (चोदना) is moral imperative and only certain utterances of the *Veda*. The other word ‘लक्षणा’ is to be understood as “informs”⁶². Accordingly, the expression ‘चोदनालक्षणा’ means ‘informed by the statements in the imperative mood of the Veda’. So far *dharma* (धर्म) (duties or dutiful actions) is *vidhi bodhita* (विधि बोधित), i.e. injunction of Vidhi. The *sūtra* in question as a whole means the following. *Dharma* (धर्म) is that action which we know from some moral imperative (विधि-वाक्य) of the *Veda* and which is useful (or which will serve some purpose). In the *Veda* there are different kinds of statements of which *vidhi-s* (विधि) form one kind. A *vidhi* (विधि) statement (or better sentence) is in the imperative mood. Such sentences *enjoin* actions as duties. So far they are prescriptive utterances; our word for prescriptive sentence is *pravartaka vākya* (प्रवर्तक वाक्य). A *vidhi* (विधि) or *vidhi vākya* (roughly moral imperative) is called *pravartaka vākya* (प्रवर्तक वाक्य) because it induces or casues (is the janaka of) *pravrtti* (प्रवृत्ति) or volition. However, in India it is admitted that the same sentence can be both prescriptive (प्रवर्तक) and informative (ज्ञापक). A *vidhi*

vākya (चोदना) informs us (ज्ञापक) of a certain duty and obliges us to do that duty; so it is *pravartka* (प्रवर्तक) in respect of that action.

Such actions or duties are of two kinds, *pravṛtilakṣaṇa dharma* (प्रवृत्ति लक्षण धर्म) and *nivṛtilakṣaṇa dharma* (निवृत्ति लक्षण धर्म)⁶³. Many people mistake that *nivṛtilakṣaṇa dharma-s* (निवृत्ति लक्षण धर्म) as those that have no result or no positive result. It is a mistake that *nivṛtilakṣaṇa dharma* (निवृत्ति लक्षण धर्म) is not necessarily the *nityadharmas* (नित्य धर्म) or *nityakarmas* (नित्य कर्म). *Nityakarmas* (नित्य कर्म) are held to have no result or no positive result. But both *pravṛtilakṣaṇa karma* (प्रवृत्ति लक्षण कर्म) and *nivṛtilakṣaṇa karma* (निवृत्ति लक्षण कर्म) produce at least *śuddhi* (शुद्धि) or purification. So far there is no difference between these two types of *karma* (कर्म). But the purifications they produce are of different kinds. The performance of the *pravṛtilakṣaṇa dharmas* (प्रवृत्ति लक्षण धर्म) produces such *śuddhi* (शुद्धि) or purification which is necessary for the eligibility for higher or superior kind of pleasure. Such purification is called *bhogānugūṇaśuddhi* (भोगानुगुणशुद्धि). The performance of the *nivṛtilakṣaṇa dharma* (निवृत्ति लक्षण धर्म) leads to such purification that enables man to have knowledge or *jñāna* (ज्ञान). Such *śuddhi* (शुद्धि) is, therefore, called *jñānānugūṇaśuddhi* (ज्ञानानुगुणशुद्धि). *Jñāna* (ज्ञान) in this context means the right knowledge of the true nature of the soul or *ātmatattvajñāna* (आत्मतत्त्वज्ञान). We did not discuss these points in detail in our earlier discussion of *dharma* (धर्म). Through producing *bhogānugūṇaśuddhi* (भोगानुगुणशुद्धि) *pravṛtilakṣaṇa dharmas* (प्रवृत्ति लक्षण धर्म) becomes a means of the pleasure called *svarga* (स्वर्ग) or the object of *kāma* (काम) called *svargaloka* (स्वर्गलोक). *Nivṛtilakṣaṇa dharma* (निवृत्ति लक्षण धर्म) becomes a means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) by

helping a man to have *jñāna* (ज्ञान) that is necessary for *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). Anyway, *dharma* (धर्म) is a means of *kāma* (काम) or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). We have already discussed how and why (प्रवृत्तिलक्षणधर्म) *dharma* (धर्म) is the means of *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम). Thus it is reconfirmed that *dharma* (धर्म) is the means of all the other three *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ). So, it is itself *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) as end and also as means. And since it is means of all the *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ) other than itself it is the most basic of all *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ). We would also like to suggest that if we eventually find a fifth or a sixth *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) then *dharma* (धर्म) must be a basis of it also.

Mokṣa puruṣārtha (मोक्ष पुरुषार्थ):

There are two major contexts of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) or *mokṣa puruṣārtha* (मोक्ष पुरुषार्थ). One is the context of practice and the other is the context of theory. In the first context the *major* issue is what we need *to do* in order to attain *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). Systems like Yoga⁶⁴ and Tantra or *Kriyāpradhān Tantra*⁶⁵ primarily keeps this context in view. Here also the idea of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) matters but this is expected to be expounded fully and primarily in other systems of knowledge particularly philosophical systems like Sāṃkhya, Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya, Vedānta, Bauddha and so on. In these systems also we inquire about the *mokṣa sādhana* (मोक्ष साधन) but this *sādhana* (साधन) is mainly *jñāna* (ज्ञान). Practices leading to *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) and the details of these practices are not discussed in the philosophical systems. We are here mainly interested in some details about the idea of *mokṣa puruṣārtha* (मोक्ष पुरुषार्थ) which we could not include earlier.

In the chapter on philosophical theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or PTP we will discuss only two versions of PTP. Both of them are versions of the *āstika* (आस्तिक) philosophy. *Nāstika* (नास्तिक) philosophies also have their own version or versions of PTP. Secondly, the two versions of PTP that we will discuss are *Naigamika* (नैगमिक) forms of PTP or the versions of PTP which we find in the philosophies that belong to the *Nigama* (निगम) tradition or *Vaidika* Tradition. It is necessary that we take note of, though briefly, PTPs available in systems of thought that belong to the *Āgama* tradition. Here *Nigama* (निगम) tradition means the tradition of *Śruti* or the *Veda*. The versions of PTP what we will discuss here are belong to this tradition. There are versions of PTP that belong to the *Āgama* tradition also. Here *Āgama* means Tantra.

Normally Indian philosophies (दर्शन) are grouped under two heads: *āstika* (आस्तिक) and *nāstika* (नास्तिक). The familiar forms of *āstika* (आस्तिक) philosophies belong to the *Vaidika* or the *Nigama* (निगम) tradition. In standard philosophical discussions *Āgama* or Tantra theories of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) are not discussed. Vedānta PTP or Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika PTP belongs to the tradition of *Nigama* (निगम); they are *Naigama* versions of PTP. The same is true about the views of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or *mokṣa pursartha* (मोक्ष पुरुषार्थ) of other four standard *āstika* (आस्तिक) schools of philosophy. But the *Āgama* tradition or *Āgamika* theories of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and *mokṣa puruṣārtha* (मोक्ष पुरुषार्थ) are different from the *nāstika* (नास्तिक) theories as well as the theories of the *nigama* (निगम) or the *Vaidika* tradition. The *nigama* (निगम) tradition and the *Āgama* (आगम) tradition are different but not *opposed to* each other. The *nāstika* (नास्तिक) tradition is opposed to the *Vaidika* tradition. This is

one reason why Tantra or the *Āgama* tradition and the theories belonging to this tradition cannot be treated as versions of the *nāstika* (नास्तिक) view. They also do not belong to the *nigama* (निगम) tradition. The final source of the *Āgama* tradition is not *apauroṣeya* (अपौरोषेय).⁶⁶ *Veda* is the teachings of God or Goddess.⁶⁷ So there is some justification for the view that the *Āgama* and *Nigama* traditions are different but not opposed; and none of these is a *nāstika* (नास्तिक) tradition.

For the reason stated above we should, it seems, discuss (i) some *nāstika* (नास्तिक) version of PTP and (ii) some Tantra form of PTP in addition to the (the *Vaidika*) versions of PTP we discussed so far. Many people think that Tantra is not *darśana* (philosophy) and in a philosophical discussion of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), it is not necessary to discuss the Tantra view of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). However, according to some great Indian philosophers of the past and some great scholars of recent times, it is appropriate to discuss Tantra view in philosophical works. We may give three examples. Mm. Gopīnāth Kavirāj in recent time noticed the influence of *Kāśmīr Śaiva Tantra* (which is also known as *Trik darśana* or *Pratyabhijñā darśana*) on such standard *darśana* or *darśana* tradition as Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Yoga⁶⁸. Secondly, Madhavācārya in his *Sarvadarśana Saṃgraha* has devoted one chapter on the *Pratyabhijñā darśana* which is also known as *Kāśmīr Śaiva Tantra*. This shows that he has taken at least this Tantra as a form of philosophical system. In the third place, we note that Udayanācārya has taken serious note of the view of *Kāśmīr Śaivism* when he discussed *mokṣa puruṣārtha* (मोक्ष पुरुषार्थ).⁶⁹ In the literature of classical Indian philosophy in general or of the Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika

School in particular Udayanācārya is a great figure and he took notice of the conception of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) of the *Pratyabhijñā darśana*. Anyway, earlier we could not discuss the *nāstika* (नास्तिक) version of PTP on the one extreme and the *Āgamika* (philosophical) version of PTP on the other extreme.

Many think that among *nāstika-s* (नास्तिक) the Buddhist philosophers have their own theory of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) or *mokṣa puruṣārtha* (मोक्ष पुरुषार्थ) yet the *nāstika* Cārvākas do not believe in *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) and so they cannot have a PTP of any form. Others may say that their conception of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) may be different but in their own way they admit *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). They can argue that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is nothing but death. For the central part of the meaning of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is such a state that if one attains *mokṣa* (मोक्ष), then one is never reborn; he never returns to this world. There is no further return (पुनरागमन) from a state of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). For the Cārvākas, once one is dead he never returns to life; there is no further return (पुनरागमन). They say 'भष्मीभूतस्य देहस्य पुनरागमनं कुतः', where do we see that the body which has been burnt and reduced to ashes returns back? This similarity with *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) in its standard sense makes death (मृत्यु) the same thing as *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). However, there is one difficulty to hold that according to the Cārvākas death is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). If this difficulty was not there we could easily say that the Cārvāka School of philosophy admits *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) but *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) according to this school is death and nothing else. Even ordinary men do not seek unhappiness, sorrow or suffering. And for such men death is a thing to be afraid of. No normal and ordinary man wants to die. Every such man considers death to be painful. And what is painful and hence not an object of

desire can be a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). PTP is a philosophical theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). And death is not a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). So the above view of the Cārvāka that no dead man returns to life cannot be considered as a theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). *Puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) must be a state of positive pleasure of some kind or it must be freedom, of some kind, from pain. How can death be a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ)? Besides, there are arguments to show that the Cārvākas are mistaken to think that every death is the final death. It is only about the final death that Śaṅkarācārya has said ‘... यस्य पुनः न मृत्यु’⁷⁰. Śaṅkarācārya distinguishes the death of a liberated soul from the death of an ordinary man and asks “who is (really) dead, ‘मृतो हि को?’’. And then he answers ‘यस्य पुनर न मृत्यु’ - who will not die a second time. Only he is really dead who will not have to die again. Such men are those who will never be born again. Till a man’s all *prārabdha* (प्रारब्ध कर्म) and *sañcita karma-s* (संचित कर्म) are destroyed he cannot escape the necessity of rebirths and successive deaths. The visible end of life in death is not the end of the necessity of rebirth and successive death. For all these reasons it is unacceptable to hold that there can be a version of PTP according to which there is only one (ultimate) *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) which is death. And this is the Cārvāka version of PTP or the conception of *mokṣa puruṣārtha* (मोक्ष पुरुषार्थ) according to the Cārvāka philosophy.

From what has just been said one should not think that the Cārvāka philosophy does not admit that there is one ultimate goal of life or one final *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Madhusūdana Svarasvatī has presented or interpreted the Cārvāka view of final *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and traced it to their conception of *puruṣa* (पुरुष). According

to him, the Cārvākas believe that there is one ultimate *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). If one likes to call it *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) on this ground, then according to this conception *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the ultimate *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). It will be still questioned what the Cārvākas call the ultimate is really ultimate or not. It is also not the final *puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) of the standard PTPs we discussed. The Cārvākas know that it cannot be of the nature of *duḥkha* (दुःख) or suffering. Madhusūdana Svaraswatī tells us that according to the Cārvāka PTP the final *puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) is *kāma* (काम).⁷¹ They understand by *kāma* (काम) the highest kind of pleasure and pleasure is a positive good. This view of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is consistent with the other tenets of the Cārvāka philosophy. One such tenet is that only sensuous perception is the source of knowledge. Another such tenet is that man is a body — a living and conscious *body*. It is not, what some other schools of Indian philosophy maintain, a conscious *soul* (आत्मा). This Cārvāka view of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is a form of PTP and according to it ultimately speaking *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is one. There is no reason why the Cārvākas should deny that *artha* (अर्थ) is a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). But for them it will be a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) only *as a means* of the ultimate *puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) which is *kāma* (काम). This *kāma* (काम) is a good as end in itself. Like some *āstika* (आस्तिक) *philosophies*, the Cārvāka *philosophy* also admits that *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is one. The Cārvākas further maintain that this one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is *kāma* (काम). This Cārvāka view is better described as a *nāstika* (नास्तिक) version of PTP.

Now the question is: Can we accept this view of the Cārvākas? The Cārvākas are right when they understand by the

word 'puruṣārtha' (पुरुषार्थ) as *puruṣasya artha* (पुरुषस्य अर्थ) or *prayojana* (प्रयोजन); *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is what *puruṣa* (पुरुष) needs. The *āstika-s* have nothing to say against this. The crucial question is: What we should understand by the word *puruṣa* (पुरुष).⁷² We noted that one important tenet of the Cārvāka philosophy is that perception is the only source of knowledge and truth. The Cārvākas hold that we have perceptual evidence for the existence of the physical body (which the *āstika-s* also associate⁷³ with a man). So they admit the existence of body and this is found to be accepted by all including the *āstika-s*. The *nāstika-s* may⁷⁴ admit that this body has sense organ. But they would not admit a sense organ in the sense in which a Naiyāyika admits the sense organ of a man. The dead body of a man is not also *puruṣa* (पुरुष) for it is neither living⁷⁵ nor conscious. *Puruṣa* (पुरुष) means a *conscious* physical body which every one of us has. It is also perceptually evident that we (the conscious bodies) crave for sensuous or bodily pleasure; we desire it. So it is perceptually evident that we have *kāma* (काम) in the sense of desire (इच्छा). And we have *kāma* (काम) in the sense of object of such desire; in this latter sense *kāma* (काम) means things like perceptible smell, taste and the like. So *kāma* (काम) is a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). And everyone including the *āstika-s* also admits *kāma puruṣārtha* (काम पुरुषार्थ). The Cārvākas do not admit in addition any (permanent) soul or permanent pleasure. For, there is no perceptual evidence for their existence. So for the Cārvākas the *dharma* (धर्म) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) of the FVP list of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) have no existence or reality. The *āstika-s* admit that these two are not perceptible; they are *alukika* (अलौकिक). Though *artha* (अर्थ) is a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) it is not *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in the ultimate sense of the term. Man

needs or wants *artha* (अर्थ) only because it could secure pleasure. So in the ultimate sense *kāma* (काम) is the only *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). So the Cārvākas are *Kāmaikapuruṣārthavādin-s* (कामैकपुरुषार्थवादी), that is, they are people who admit *kāma* (काम) alone as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). The *āstika-s* admit *svarga* (स्वर्ग) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) on the basis of *Śāstra* which they call *śabda pramāṇa* (authoritative sentence which produces in the hearer correct knowledge). It may be thought that they admit these on the strength of inference or *anumāna* (अनुमान). But according to the *āstika-s*, like the Naiyāyika-s, for an *anumāna* (अनुमान) to be a *pramāṇa* (प्रमाण) it must not contradict the teachings of the *Śāstra* which is ultimately the *Veda* or *Vedarūpa śabda pramāṇa* (वेदरूप शब्दप्रमाण). The Cārvāka-s argue that *Śāstra* and *Śāstra* controlled *anumāna* (अनुमान) are not *pramāṇa-s* (प्रमाण); they do not give us knowledge or truth. So there is only *pramāṇa* (प्रमाण) which is *pratyakṣa* (प्रत्यक्ष) and there is only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and that is *kāma* (काम).

This view is to be rejected for reasons that we cannot discuss here in detail. Many scholars⁷⁶ of different schools of *āstika* philosophy have convincingly shown that the Cārvākas are wrong when they reject *anumāna pramāṇa* (अनुमान प्रमाण) or *śabda pramāṇa* (शब्द प्रमाण) or suggest that man is nothing but a conscious physical body. So we admit that the Cārvāka view is only one version of PTP. This version of PTP is unacceptable. Now we turn to the *Āgamika* or Tantra form of PTP.

In the standard philosophical texts and discussions on the subject much is not said about the conception of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) in the literature of tantra. Some may think that it is justified as tantra and philosophy (दर्शन) are different. This is true, yet all trantas are not of

the same type. Some tantras or some branches of the same tantra is mainly a system of knowledge (ज्ञानप्रधान). The *Pratyabhijñā* school and *Trik tantra* or *Kāśmīr Śaiva Tantra* are examples⁷⁷. Sāyanamādhavācārya in his book *Sarvadarśaṃgraha* has devoted a whole chapter on *Pratyabhijñā Tantra* (प्रत्यभिज्ञा तन्त्र) and has given the name *Pratyabhijñā darśana* (प्रत्यभिज्ञा दर्शन) to it. What is more important for us that the Great Ācārya of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools of philosophy, Udayanācārya has discussed the *pratyabhijñā* conception of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) in his rather comprehensive treatment of the subject in his book *Kiraṇāvalī* which is an elucidation (व्याख्या) of Praśastapāda's *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*. In his treatment of the subject Udayanācārya discussed the view of the *Trik tantra* or *Trik philosophy*.⁷⁸ He has also noted many different ideas of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) proposed by scholars of different schools of thought.⁷⁹ Among these schools of thought the *pratyabhijñā* branch⁸⁰ of *Kāśhmīr Śaivism* or *Kāśhmīr Śaiva Tantra* is one.

According to *Pratyabhijñā darśana* the ultimate reality is God Śiva. Since Śhiva is *īśvara* (ईश्वर) and He has no second so *Pratyabhijñā darśana* is also called *īśvarādvaitavāda*⁸¹. There are four principal *Advaitavāda*: *Brahmādvaitavāda* of Advaita Vedānta, *Vijñānādvaitavāda* of Yogacāra Bauddhas, *Śabdādvaitavāda* of the Vaiyākaraṇas and *īśvarādvaitavāda* of *Trik Tantra*. The *īśvara* (ईश्वर) or Śiva of *Pratyabhijñā darśana* though One and has no second (He is *advaita* or non-dual) yet He is to be distinguished from the absolute non-dual *Brahman* of the Advaita Vedānta system. *Brahman* does not have even any property or *śakti*, *Brahman* is *nirdharmaka* (निर्धर्मक); but the God Śhiva of *Pratyabhijñā darśana*

has different *śakti-s* (शक्ति) including *jñāna śakti* (ज्ञान) and *kriyā śakti-s* (शक्ति). Both Śhiva and His *śakti-s* (शक्ति) are real. It is not like the *māyāśakti* (मायाशक्ति) of the *Brahman* of the Vedānta. This *māyāśakti* (मायाशक्ति) is different from *Brahman* but it is not real [not *sat* (सत्) but *sat bhinna* (सतभिन्न)]. In spite of admitting both God and his *śakti* (शक्ति), and admitting them both as real, Pratyabhijñā darśana retains its monism; it remains a form of *Advita vāda*. To make this possible it is held in the Pratyabhijñā darśana that *śakti* (शक्ति) and that which has it (the *śaktimān*) is one and the same.

Now the question is: What is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) according to this Pratyabhijñā darśana? Realization of the ultimate and most fundamental principle of reality (परम तत्त्व) is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). This is admitted by all. Only the nature etc. of this *parama tattva* (ultimate reality) differs from one system to another. In *Īśvarādvitavāda* it is *Īśvara* or Śhiva (शिव). So to realize *Īśvara* or Śhiva (शिव) is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) here. But *Īśvara* has many *śakti-s* that are not different from *Īśvara*. Can we say then that to realize the *jñāna śakti* (ज्ञान शक्ति) or *krīyā śakti* (क्रिया शक्ति) of *Īśvara* is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष)? Following Abhinavagupta pāda, Swami Laksana Joo has discussed this in his work⁸² and said it is not so. *Mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is realizing the *Svatantra śakti* of God in which are merged His both *Jñāna śakti* (ज्ञान शक्ति) and *kriyā śakti* (क्रिया शक्ति).⁸³

In his *Kiraṇāvalī* Udayanācārya notes that according to *Pratyabhijñā darśana mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is *svatantrya* (स्वतन्त्र) and *bandha* (बन्ध) is *paratantrya* (परतन्त्र); “पारतन्त्रयं बन्धः स्वातन्त्र्यं च मुक्तिरिति”⁸⁴ Neither Udayanācārya in his *Kiraṇāvalī* nor Gourināth Śāstri in his Bengali elucidation has fully explained these two notions of *paratantrya* (परतन्त्र) and *svatantrya* (स्वतन्त्र). It is not easy

to do so here also. But briefly and simply speaking according to the *Pratyabhijñā darśana mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is God realization (ईश्वर प्रत्यभिज्ञा). This means when one knows the real nature of God then one becomes liberated or *mukta* (मुक्त). Now what is the true nature (तत्त्व) of *Īśvara*? It is His *svātantrya* (स्वातन्त्र) or *svatantrya śakti* (स्वतन्त्र शक्ति). This *śakti* (शक्ति) is nothing other than God or Śiva. God is *svatantrya svarup* (स्वतन्त्र स्वरूप), His nature is *svatantrya svarupatā* (स्वतन्त्र स्वरूपता). So according to this *darśana, mokṣadaśā* (मोक्ष दशा) and *svarupa-svātantrya daśā* (स्वरूप स्वातन्त्र दशा) are one and the same.⁸⁵ Since God is *svatantrya śaktisvarupa* (स्वतन्त्र शक्तिस्वरूप) and Jiva is not really anything other than God then God realization and self realization is the same thing. When Jiva realizes, that is, arrives at the immediate realization (साक्षात्कार) of his own *svatantrya svarup* (स्वतन्त्र स्वरूप) or *svarupa-svātantrya śakti* (स्वरूप स्वातन्त्र शक्ति) he becomes liberated.⁸⁶

Udayanācārya rejects this view of the *Pratyabhijñā darśana*. His reason is that *paratantrya* (परतन्त्र्य) is not in itself or as such a state of bondage or *bandha* (बन्ध). For *Bandha* (बन्ध) is a state of suffering or *duḥkha* (दुःख). If *paratantrya* (परतन्त्र्य) is at all *bandha* (बन्ध) it is so because it causes *duḥkha* (दुःख).⁸⁷ Then if *svātantrya* (स्वातन्त्र) means the cessation of this *duḥkha* (दुःख) and its causes then that is acceptable to the Vaiśeṣikas (and the Naiyāikas). Finally, he says the nature of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is what the Vaiśeṣikas say and what is the minimum sense of the word. It being the minimum sense every school of philosophy has to admit it. Thus *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the final and absolute (आत्यन्तिक) *annihilation* (निवृत्ति) of *duḥkha* (दुःख) which is unconditional evil or *aniṣṭa* (अनिष्ट)⁸⁸.

There are three objections to this position of the Vaiśeṣika. First objection is that the Vaiśeṣikas should make their position clear. Do they mean that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is such annihilation of *duḥkha* (दुःख) plus abundance (प्राचुर्य or निरतिशयत्व) of pleasure? Or do they say along with the annihilation of *duḥkha* (दुःख) *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) means or implies a state in which *sukha* (सुख) is also annihilated. If they mean the second then they are wrong as annihilation of *sukha* (सुख) cannot be *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) which is desirable for men. The second point is that many believe, and it seems to be correct, that human effort or striving presupposes that there should be some *positive* result [*phala* (फल)] which is *bhāvasvarūpa* (भावस्वरूप) for man to strive for. Those who strive for *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) actually strive for *niratiśaya sukha* (which is a positive state) and not *just* for such negative state as *duḥkha nivṛtti* (दुःख निवृत्ति). The third objection is that the effort required for the annihilation of *duḥkha* (दुःख) does not make good sense.

Udayanācārya answered each of these objections in his *Kiraṇāvalī*. His answer to the first objection is that the Vaiśeṣika means by *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) annihilation of all *duḥkha* (दुःख) and also of all *sukha* (सुख). The opponents object that *sukha* (सुख) is what man desires; its annihilation cannot be something that man seeks or needs. In reply to this it is said that we need to clarify the ordinary belief that man desires *sukha* (सुख) or pleasure. Any intelligent or discerning man knows *all* pleasures are not truly desirable. To be desirable it is not enough to be pleasure; for, some pleasures are associated with greater pain. Ultimately only such pleasure is desirable on final analysis which is not *followed* by *any* pain⁸⁹ and is not otherwise associated with greater pain. It follows that permanent

pleasure which is not associated with greater pain can be the true object of seeking or desire. The pleasures which ordinary and ignorant men seek are not permanent. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers found that there is no permanent pleasure. So there is nothing which is really an object of seeking. Therefore if some pleasure is also annihilated along with the annihilation of *duḥkha* (दुःख), then that pleasure is not really a pleasure but *duḥkha* (दुःख) or pain. Even if it is not pain in itself, it is still a pain since it is necessarily associated with pain or even followed by pain. The Vaiśeṣikas say pleasures that are annihilated in the state of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) are not pure or unmixed pleasure. They are such pleasure as is necessarily associated with pain (दुःखानुविद्ध). Though we do not want the annihilation of pure *sukha* (सुख) yet we want to get rid of even pleasure if it is necessarily related to pain or is necessarily followed by pain. It is in this sense only that the Vaiśeṣika conception of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) entails that in the state of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) there is neither *sukha* (सुख) nor *duḥkha* (दुःख). It is total annihilation of all the *viśeṣa guṇa-s* (विशेष गुण) of self that are also impermanent. Within this class of *viśeṣa guṇa-s* (विशेष गुण) are included both *duḥkha* (दुःख) and *sukha* (सुख).

Answer to the second objection is clear now. If man cannot have permanent and unmixed pleasure (for such pleasures do not exist) then the best thing for man to seek is (absolute) freedom from *all* pain. There is nothing absurd or unnatural in seeking freedom from pain. A man who is suffering from severe headache wants to be relieved from this pain. This he wants to secure by taking medicine. He takes medicine not for getting any pleasure as such but for securing relief from pain. So we cannot say man does

not or cannot strive for freedom from pain but only for some positive state of pleasure. Vātsyāyana has said that it is a matter of common experience that we speak of absence of pain as *sukha* (सुख)⁹⁰. A man who has become exhausted after walking a long distance carrying a heavy load on his head gives expression of happiness (सुख) when he gets the opportunity for off loading. This shows that sometimes freedom from pain is as desirable as some state of positive pleasure. The third objection Udayanācārya considers has been noted by Gangeśopādhyāy also in his *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. We may return to it later.

Udayanācārya has noted that different schools of thought have understood different things by *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). The idea of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) they have is significantly different. But a necessary part of all these different ideas is that in the state of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) there is no suffering or *duḥkha* (दुःख). So far as the Vaiśeṣikas (and also Naiyāyikas) hold that *mukti* (मुक्ति) consists in complete freedom from pain, no school of thought can object to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position.⁹¹ Gaurīnāth Śāstri has raised an objection that according to Vedānta, *mukti* (मुक्ति) is not *duḥkha nivṛtti* (दुःख निवृत्ति).⁹² But he seems to have missed the point. Those who hold *mukti* (मुक्ति) is *Brahman* (ब्रह्म) or *Brahmacaitanya* (ब्रह्मचैतन्य) they also would hold that in the state of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) there is no suffering. Thus freedom from suffering is the *common part* of the meaning of the word '*mukti*' (मुक्ति) as it is used in different schools. Besides *Brahman* (ब्रह्म) is *mukti* (मुक्ति) not because he is *Brahman* (ब्रह्म) but because he is *sukha svarūpa* (सुख स्वरूप) or *ānanda svarūpa* (आनन्द स्वरूप). This *ānanda svarūpatā* (आनन्द स्वरूपता) of *Brahman* (ब्रह्म) could not count as *mukti* (मुक्ति) if it were a state of

mixed pleasure, mixed with suffering. So the Vedāntins say *niratiśaya sukha* (निरतिशय सुख) is *mukti* (मुक्ति). According to them the *ānanda* (आनन्द) which is the *svarūpa* (स्वरूप) of *Brahman* (ब्रह्म) is something which is unmixed with pain or suffering. Thus Udayanācārya is right when he says all must admit that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is *duḥkha nivṛtti* (दुःख निवृत्ति). In saying this he means whatever else one means by *mukti* (मुक्ति) he at least means freedom from or annihilation of suffering. We have discussed in PTP chapter the Vedānta conception of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) in detail; here we only discuss the point raised against Udayanācārya by Gourīnāth Śāstri. Udayanācārya is right when he says that there is no difference of opinion among thinkers of different schools that it is necessary for *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) that *duḥkha* (दुःख) is to be completely annihilated. Some may at the most say that in addition to the annihilation of *duḥkha* (दुःख) there must be positive pleasure or *sukha* (सुख). According to these people, the absence of *duḥkha* (दुःख) is a *necessary* condition of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). It is not the whole of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) or not the *sufficient* condition of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष).

Now the question is can we take the Vedāntins to hold such a view? Gourīnāth Śāstri thinks that the answer to this question must be in the affirmative. We do not have the scope to discuss this technical point in detail. The actual position of the analytical Vedānta philosophy is that, according to Vedānta, *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is nothing but *Brahman* (ब्रह्म) itself. And this *Brahman* (ब्रह्म) is by nature *Ānanda* (निरतिशय सुख). On final analysis this *sukha* (सुख) is nothing but the absence of pain (दुःखाभाव). To put it differently according to the Vedāntins *avidyānivṛtti-upalakṣito Brahman* (अविद्यानिवृत्ति उपोलोक्षित ब्रह्म) is *mukti* (मुक्ति). This *avidyānivṛtti*

(अविद्यनिवृत्ति) is something negative; it is referred to by the word (निरतिशय) *sukha* (सुख). Thus, according to the Vedānta also, *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is something negative.

Udayanācārya anticipates that the *Nairātmavādī* Bauddha can argue that a Vaiśeṣika or a Naiyāyika must admit that for *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) annihilation of *ātmā* (आत्मा) will also be necessary. For according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, *ātmā* (आत्मा) is the inherence *cause* of *duḥkha* (दुःख). If for *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) the annihilation of causes of *duḥkha* (दुःख) is necessary, then it is to be admitted that unless *ātmā* (आत्मा) is destroyed there cannot be *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). On the other hand if Vaiśeṣika or Naiyāyika admits that *ātmā* (आत्मा) is annihilated [in the state of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष)] then he must admit *Nairātmavād* (नैरात्मवाद). In other words, they must convert to Buddhism. In reply Udayanācārya clarifies the actual argument. The rule is not that every cause of *duḥkha* (दुःख) must be annihilated if man is to have complete absence of *duḥkha* (दुःख) or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). The actual principle is that for *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) all destructible or *anitya* (अनित्य) causes of *duḥkha* (दुःख) should be annihilated. Among the causes of *duḥkha* (दुःख) there are impermanent and destructible causes like body (शरीर) as well as indestructible cause like *ātmā* (आत्मा) or self. No question of annihilation of *ātmā* (आत्मा) arises as it is permanent and indestructible.⁹³

Notes and Refferences

¹ Sāstri, Pañcānan, *Paribhāṣā-saṃgraha* on *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, Pañcānan Sāstri edition, Kolkata, 1884 (Shakabda) p. 6.

² In the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* we find such statement as 'धर्मार्थ-काम-मोक्षेषु चतुर्विध- पुरुषार्थेषु मोक्ष एव परमपुरुषार्थ'. Here there are *four puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) in the list. — Adhvarīndra, Dharmarāja, *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* , Pañcānan Sāstri edition, Kolkata, p. 4.

³ Krishna, Daya, *Indian Philosophy: A Counter Perspective*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1991, p. 205.

⁴ Ibid., p. 6.

⁵ Dr. A. Schweitzer in his 'Indian Thought and its Development' has written that the Hindu attitude is world and life negating but the Christian attitude is world and life affirming. —Kane, P.V., *The History of Dharmasastra*, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, poona, 1975, p.1647.

⁶ He has said this on the basis of Kathoponiṣad (2/14) in the introduction of his translation of *Khandanakhandakhādyam* by Sṛīharṣa, Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture, Golpark, 2000, p.18.

⁷ Basu, Rajasekhara, *Mahābhārat* (in Bengali), M.C. Sarkar & sons. Pvt.Ltd, Kolkata, 1414 (Bengali era),.

⁸ Mishra, Kamalakar, *Indian Values For Success In Practical Life*, Kashi Yoga Evam Mulya-Shiksa Sanstha, Varanasi, 2016, p. 47.

⁹ Ibid., p. 47.

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 47- 48. Italics are ours.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 48.

¹² Ibid., p.48, emphasis is ours. We do not find any evidence to say that the Seers experienced this problem.

¹³ About *mokṣa puruṣārtha* (मोक्ष पुरुषार्थ) there is some uncertainty. According to some version of PTP there is only one soul. It may appear that according to such PTP the class of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) will be a unit class.

¹⁴ Prasad, Rajendra, *Karma, Causation and Retributive Morality: Conceptual Essays in Ethics and Metaethics*, ICPR, New Delhi, 1989, p. 276.

¹⁵ Krishna, Daya, *Indian Philosophy: A Counter Perspective*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1991, p. 6.

¹⁶ As stated by Madhusūdana Svaraswatī in the elucidation, *Gūḍārthadīpikā*, on the verse 16.11 of the *Bhagavad Gītā*, Nababharat Publishers, Kolkata, 1986, p. 1020.

¹⁷ '...काम एवैकः पुरुषार्थ', Ibid., p. 1020.

¹⁸ The central point is that man and not animals come under the purview of moral injunction; only actions of man are subjected to moral judgment.

¹⁹ This shows that *dharma* (धर्म) must also be taken as a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), may be more basic *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). So far ekavarga (एकवर्ग) theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) with *kāma* (काम) as the only *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) does not seem to be possible.

²⁰ We will explain later why we need to add the qualification primarily.

²¹ What we generally take to be *dharma* (धर्म) is *pravṛtti lakṣaṇa dharma* (प्रवृत्ति लक्षण धर्म) and it secures *bhogānugūṇasūddhi* (भोगानुगुणशुद्धि). The man who has attained this *sūddhi* (शुद्धि) is able to enjoy higher form of pleasure or *sukha* (सुख). For *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) we need to transcend or go beyond this type of *dharma* (धर्म). There is another kind of *dharma* (धर्म) called *nivṛtti lakṣaṇa dharma* (निवृत्ति लक्षण धर्म) which secures *jñānānugūṇasūddhi* (ज्ञानानुगुणशुद्धि). Performance of this kind of *dharma* (धर्म) helps us in securing *mokṣa* (मोक्ष).

²² Svaraswatī, Swamī Chandraśekharendra, 'Magnifying Glass of the Veda' in *Hindu Dharma: The Universal Way of Life*, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Mumbai, 1996, p. 433.

²³ Tripathi Bhagirath Prasad, *Sanskritvāṃmayamanthanam* (in Sanskrit), Sanskrit Bharati, Varanasi, 1990.

²⁴ *The Gīta* with the elucidation *Gūḍārthadīpikā* of Madhusūdana Svaraswatī, Nababharat Publishers, Calcutta, 1986, p. 1019.

²⁵ To put it truly and more strictly the Cārvākas do not accept *śabdapramāna* (शब्दप्रमाण) as a *separate* and independent source of knowledge.

²⁶ Madhusūdana Svaraswatī mentioned this *Bṛhaspati sūtra* "...कामएवैकः पुरुषार्थः..." in *Gūḍārthadīpikā* on *the Gīta* (16/11), Nababharat Publishers, Calcutta, 1986, p.1020.

²⁷ Such people are called *āsakta* (आसक्त) people or people who tread *pravṛttimārga* (प्रवृत्तिमार्ग) or the path of desire or inclination.

²⁸ One standard meaning of *nāstika* (नास्तिक) is that one who denies the existence of *paraloka* (परोलोक) is *nāstika* (नास्तिक) and one who believes in it is *āstika* (आस्तिक). This sense can be traced to the *Kathopaniṣad*.

²⁹ Srimohan Tarka Vedānta Tīrtha has said this in the Introduction of the Bengali translation of *Khandanakhandakhādyam* by Śrīharṣa, Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture, Golpark, 2000.

³⁰ Maharṣi Vālmiki, *Rāmāyana*, Ayodhyākānda 100/62-63, Gita Press, Gorakhpur.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 100/62-63.

³² Svaraswatī, Madhusūdana, *Gūḍārthadīpikā* on the Gīta (6/26), Nababharat Publishers, Calcutta, 1986, pp. 553-558.

³³ *Bhagavad Gītā* — 2/62-63.

³⁴ Svaraswatī, Madhusūdana, *Gūḍārthadīpikā* on the Gīta (2/62), Nababharat Publishers, Calcutta, 1986, pp. 267-269.

³⁵ *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣada*—1/4/17, with the commentary of Śaṃkarācārya, Gita Press, Gorakhpur, 2052 (vikramavda).

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 1/4/3.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ This goal is called *abhyudaya* (अभ्युदय) or prosperity. This is different from the highest goal *mokṣa* (मोक्ष).

³⁹ *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣada*, p. 689.

⁴⁰ *Kathopaniṣada* — 1/25.

⁴¹ The pleasure which the devatās in *svarga* (स्वर्ग) enjoys has two features which make it superior. It is not associated with pain or suffering (न दुःखेन संबिन्नम्) and it is long lasting (न ग्रस्थं अनन्तरम्). And it is desired. So the meaning of the word 'svarga' is this. Bhutnāth Saptatirtha has said this in the introduction of his Bengal translation of the book *Mimāṃsādarśanam*, Basumati Sahitya Mandir, 1348 (Bengali era), p. 22.

⁴² 'काम्यत्वं अभिलाषविषयत्वं' — *Nyāyakosh*.

⁴³ 'न वा अरे सर्वस्व कामाय सर्वम् प्रियं भभति, आत्मानस्तु कामायसर्वम् भभति'-
Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣada.

⁴⁴*Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣada* 1/4/17 and Tripathi Bhagirath Prasad, *Sanskritavānmayamanthanam*, Sanskrit Bharati, Varanasi, 1990, pp. 61-62.

⁴⁵ Tripathi Bhagirath Prasad, *Sanskritavānmayamanthanam*, Sanskrit Bharati, Varanasi, 1990, p. 62.

⁴⁶ In the Rgveda Mandala 10, the story of Yama and his sister Yami illustrates that *dharma* (धर्म) demands that the successful conjugal life is possible only for those who like Yama exercise discipline as per the rules of *dharma* (धर्म) and not for Yami who were devoid of this and were only guided by her sensual urge. —Tripathi Bhagirath Prasad, *Sanskritavānmayamanthanam*, Sanskrit Bharati, Varanasi, 1990, pp. 68-69

⁴⁷ Kavirāj, Gopināth, 'Nyāyakusumānjali' (in English), Shāstri, Gourināth (ed) in *Notes On Religion and Philosophy*, Sampurnanada Sanskrit University, Varanasi, 1987, pp. 282-308

⁴⁸ Ibid., Italics added by me.

⁴⁹ We say this because the Mīmāṃsā view of *svarga* (स्वर्ग) is not shared by philosophies like Nyāya.

⁵⁰ Often the Mīmāṃsā position is misunderstood. We cannot discuss it here. One may read the Introduction to the work *Mīmāṃsā darśanam* in which Bhutanāth Saptatīrtha has edited and translated in Bengali Mīmāṃsā sutra text in two volumes.

⁵¹ Saptatīrtha, Bhutnāth, Bengal translation of the book *Mīmāṃsādarśanam*, Basumati Sahitya Mandir, 1348 (Bengali era), p. 289.

⁵² Radhakrishnan, S, *Indian philosophy*, (George Allen and Unwin, 1923), p.52 as quoted by Mahapatra, P. K, in Prasad, Rajendra (ed.), *A Historical-Developmental Study of Classical Indian Philosophy of Morals*, Centre for Studies in Civilization, Delhi, 2009, p.16.

⁵³ Mahapatra, P. K, in Prasad, Rajendra (ed.), *A Historical-Developmental Study of Classical Indian Philosophy of Morals*, Centre for Studies in Civilization, Delhi, 2009, p.16.

⁵⁴ Chakrabarti, Samiran Chandra, *The Concept of Puruṣārthas*, Maharshi Sandipani Rashtriya Ved Vidya Pratisthan, Ujjain, 2000, p. 63.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 62.

⁵⁶ Kane, P, V, *History of Dharmaśāstra*, (Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, 1930), pp. 1-4 as quoted in Mahapatra, P.K, in Prasad, Rajendra (ed.), *A Historical-Developmental Study of*

Classical Indian Philosophy of Morals, Centre for Studies in Civilization, Delhi, 2009, pp. 17-18.

⁵⁷ *Mimāṃṣā Darśanam* with Śābarabhāṣyam, (Anandasrama Press, Poona, 1976) p-20 as quoted in Mahapatra, P.K, in Prasad, Rajendra (ed.), *A Historical-Developmental Study of Classical Indian Philosophy of Morals*, Centre for Studies in Civilization, Delhi, 2009, p.18.

⁵⁸ Mishra, Godabarish, 'Dharma-Ethics Gleanings from Buddhism and Advaita' in *Dharma and Ethics*, edited by Srivastava, D.C., Bijoy H.Boruah, p. 56.

⁵⁹ Śāstri, Swami Dvarikādāsa (ed.), *Saḍdarśanasūtrasaṃgrahah*, Sudhi Prakashanam, Varanasi, 1988, p.151.

⁶⁰ We will not enter into any controversy on this point here. Our point is to show evidence for regarding *dharma* (धर्म) as a good as means.

⁶¹ Śāstri, Swami Dvarikādāsa (ed.), *Saḍdarśanasūtrasaṃgrahah*, Sudhi Prakashanam, Varanasi, 1988, p.1.

⁶² Saptatirtha, Bhutnāth, Bengal translation of the book *Mimāṃṣādarśanam* (vol-1), Basumati Sahitya Mandir, 1348 (Bengali era), p. 11.

⁶³ 'द्विविधो हि वेदोक्त धर्मः प्रवृत्तिलक्षणो निवृत्तिलक्षणः च' — Saṃkarācārya, the beginning of the adhyāṣbhāṣya on Srimadbhagavat *Gītā*, Gita Press, Gorakhpur.

⁶⁴ *Yoga darśanam* of Patanjali is an example.

⁶⁵ Joo, Swami Laksman, *Trikṣāstra Rahasya Prakriyā* (in Hindi), (available in manuscript form and its photocopy), Isvar Ashram Trust, Srinagar, Kashmir, 2006.

⁶⁶ It is to be noted that the āstika (आस्तिक) Naigamika (नैगमिक) systems like Nyāya or Vaiśeṣika do not admit that the Veda is apauruṣeya (अपौरुषेय). But at least some Naigamika (नैगमिक) schools believe that the Veda is apauruṣeya (अपौरुषेय). But no Āgamika school agrees that the source of the Āgama Tradition like *Malinivijayatantra* is apauruṣeya (अपौरुषेय).

⁶⁷ 'आगतम शिव वक्त्रेभ्यो घटं च गिरिजा श्रुतौ मतं च वासुदेवस्य तस्मागतं उच्यते', quoted in Jha *Kamales, Āgama-Samvid*, Indica Books, 2064 (vikrama Samvat).

⁶⁸ Kavirāj, Gopināth, *History and Bibliography of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Literature*, Sampurnanada Sanskrit University, Varanasi, 1982.

⁶⁹ Udayanācārya, *Kiraṇāvalī* (edited with Bengali translation and explanation by Śāstri, Gaurināth), Paschimbanga Rajya Pustak Parsat, Kolkata, 1990, p. 94.

⁷⁰ *Praśnattoro Malikā* of Śaṅkarācārya.

⁷¹ Svaraswatī, Madhusūdan, *Gūḍārthadīpikā* (Elucidation in Sanskrit of the *Bhagavad Gītā*) with Bengali translation by Pt. Bhūtanāth Saptatīrtha and edited by Nalinikānta Brahma, Navabharat Publishers, Calcutta, 1986.

⁷² It has been elaborately discussed by Bhattacharya, Swati, 'The Logic of Human Needs', JICPR, vol- xxvi, number-3, New Delhi, 2009.

⁷³ The *āstika*-s do not hold that this body *is* the man; but they *associate* it with man. A man *has* a body.

⁷⁴ Any physical body like a mountain is not a man. For, one reason is that it has no sense organ even if it can be said to have a physical 'body' in some sense.

⁷⁵ It has no *prāna* (प्राण). If this *prāna* (प्राण) is an imperceptible form of *vāyu* (air) then the Cārvākas cannot admit it.

⁷⁶ Udayanācārya and Gangeśopādhyāy are among them.

⁷⁷ Joo, Swami Laksman, *Trikśāstra Rahasya Prakriyā* (in Hindi), (available in manuscript form and its photocopy), Isvar Ashram Trust, Srinagar, Kashmir, 2006, p. 10.

⁷⁸ Udayanācārya, *Kiraṇāvalī* (edited with Bengali translation and explanation by Gaurīnāth Śāstri), Paschimbanga Rajya Pustak Parsat, Kolkata, 1990.

⁷⁹ In another useful work *Setu* we find many different notions of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). This work is an elucidation (व्याख्या) of the *Praśastapāḍa bhāṣya*.

⁸⁰ The four schools of *Kāshmir Śaivism* or *Trik Tantra* are Kaula, Pratyabhijñā, Krama, and Spanda, —Joo, Swami Laksman, *Trikśāstra Rahasya Prakriyā* (in Hindi), (available in manuscript form and its photocopy), Isvar Ashram Trust, Srinagar, Kashmir, 2006, p. 10.

⁸¹ Kavirāj, Gopināth, *The History and Bibliography of Nyāya Vaiśeṣika Literature*, Sampurnanada Sanskrit University, Varanasi, 1982, p. 7.

⁸² Joo, Swami Laksman. *Triksastra Rahasya Prakriya* (in Hindi), Isvar Ashram Trust, Srinagar, Kashmir, 2006.

⁸³ Ibid., pp. 30-31.

⁸⁴ Udayanācārya, *Kiraṇāvalī* (edited with Bengali translation and explanation by Śāstri, Gaurīnāth), Paschimbanga Rajya Pustak Parsat, Kolkata, 1990, p. 94.

⁸⁵ Joo, Swami Laksman, *Triksāstra Rahasya Prakriyā* (in Hindi), (available in manuscript form and its photocopy), Isvar Ashram Trust, Srinagar, Kashmir, 2006, p. 30.

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 31.

⁸⁷ Udayanācārya, *Kiraṇāvalī* (edited with Bengali translation and explanation by Śāstri, Gaurīnāth), Paschimbanga Rajya Pustak Parsat, Kolkata, 1990, p. 94.

⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 102.

⁸⁹ Or preceded by greater pain. If a pleasure is such that to acquire it men are to encounter greater pain no man will seek it.

⁹⁰ दृष्टो हि दुःखाभावे सुखशब्दप्रयोगो बहुलं लोक इति- Bhāṣya on *Nyāyāsūtra* 1.1.22, Paschimbanga Rajya Pustak Parsat, Kolkata, 2011, p. 242.

⁹¹ निःश्रेयसम् पुनर्दुःखनृत्तिरात्यन्तिकीः अत्र च वादिनामविवाद एव— Udayanācārya, *Kiraṇāvalī* (edited with Bengali translation and explanation by Śāstri, Gaurīnāth), Paschimbanga Rajya Pustak Parsat, Kolkata, 1990, p. 62.

⁹² Ibid., p. 75.

⁹³ Udayanācārya, *Kiraṇāvalī* (edited with Bengali translation and explanation by Śāstri, Gaurīnāth), Paschimbanga Rajya Pustak Parsat, Kolkata, 1990, p. 76.

Chapter- IV

Philosophical theory of *Puruṣārtha* (PTP)

After discussing the Familiar view of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or FVP and individual *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) now we intend to concentrate in this chapter on Philosophical theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or PTP. One may ask here: What more things to be discussed about *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) here? In other words, as we have already discussed in detail the definition and classification of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and relations among different *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ), a new chapter on PTP is otiose. Let us first answer to this misgiving. It is true that, what we have shown earlier, philosophy tries to clarify, systematize and justify FVP because FVP is full of anomalies. It is also known to us that in spite of philosopher's efforts to do so FVP remains inadequate and ultimately unacceptable. It is also true that philosophy (दर्शन) is not a theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). However, *darśana* (दर्शन) is mainly a theory of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is one of the four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) mentioned in FVP. Philosophy, in the sense of *darśana* (दर्शन), offers its own theory or theories of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or PTP. Here a point should be noted that even if we are successful to keep FVP free from anomalies, it will not be regarded as philosophical theory from the strictly philosophical point of view. So we require PTP. But why it is so? The reason is — even after the best systematization and giving adequate justification of FVP, it remains a socio-ethical doctrine of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or a normative scheme of values of man as a social and moral being. But man is not only a social and moral being; he is also a spiritual being. As a spiritual being man's life is soteriologically oriented. Man is essentially a pure spirit. *Darśana*

(दर्शन) is especially concerned with man's soteriological and spiritual goal. These two different conceptions of man and his orientation or goal make FVP and PTP quite distinct from each other. It may not be apparently so, but it lies at the deeper level. FVP could not be, in any sense, regarded as philosophical theory. It is true that neither FVP nor PTP is just empirical theory. So, neither they discuss how man in fact conducts himself, his beliefs and practices nor they are merely *a priori* formal theories of action. They both are realistic systems in the sense that they begin by accepting what a man actually is and he has some needs in his daily life. For this reason they introduce certain normative considerations and try to discover how best man can make his life most meaningful and worthy. FVP takes man to be essentially a worldly being (भोक्ता). So, it prescribes a scheme of values for a man which he should pursue for a betterment of his life. A man will attain the best fulfilment of his socio-moral and religious life and existence if he conducts himself in the light of the scheme of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) which FVP contains. But PTP tells us how man should live and behave if he is to understand and realize his real and essential nature as a world transcending (लोकत्तर) being. In other words, how he should conduct himself if he is to realize his true being. This realization and the absolute freedom from pain go together. This absolute freedom from pain brings the highest fulfilment of life. This final goal or the highest value (परम पुरुषार्थ) is called liberation (मोक्ष). This shows that there is a different dimension of his existence. These two dimensions are the spiritual and soteriological dimension. Once a man discovers these dimensions of his life he realizes that he is not just what he looks to be. He orients his life and activity for a higher pursuit — pursuit of liberation. PTP is concerned with this.

But one may not be convinced by our above view. He may still argue that the discussion of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is common to both FVP and PTP. So, there will be some sort of repetition. There are many reasons which make sure the point that after the discussion of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) in FVP we still need the discussion of the philosophical theory of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). We are mentioning only two of them: (a) *Mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is one of the four *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ) discussed in FVP. On the other hand according to PTP, there is only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and that is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). (b) When FVP tells about *mokṣa* (मोक्ष), the source of it is *Purāṇa* (पुराण) and *ītihāsa* (इतिहास). On the other hand when we discuss *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) in PTP, the source of it is different philosophical systems of India. For this reason after the discussion of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) as one of the four *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ) in FVP we still need the discussion of the same in the light of great Indian philosophical systems.

It is true that philosophy does not ignore all the four *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ) admitted in FVP. Because they accept scriptures where these four *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ) are discussed and accepted. But it is also true that *darśana* (दर्शन) is mainly concerned with the *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ), the theory of it and the means of achieving it. All philosophical schools are agreed at the point that *avidyā* (अविद्या) or ignorance about the true nature of the self is the cause of bondage. They all admit that when one gets real and direct knowledge (यथार्थ साक्षात्कार) of the true nature of the self, the very cause of bondage is removed. Because the right knowledge of the self is opposed to the false belief of the same. When bondage is removed the knower (the man who is by nature free) becomes liberated. *Darśana* (दर्शन) discusses all these. So, *darśana* (दर्शन) can

be said to be the theory of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष), so far it is a theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) though it does not usually discuss other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). According to PTP, *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is one. There are at least three forms of PTP. One form of PTP contends that this one and the highest *puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) is the absolute absence of all suffering. Nyāya philosophers hold this view and according to them, liberation means absolute freedom from pain. The second form of PTP contends that the one and the highest *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is absolute happiness. Advaita Vedāntin-s hold this view and according to them *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is *niratiśaya sukh* (निरतिशय सुख) or absolute pleasure. Some Vaiṣṇava-s advocate a third form of PTP. According to them, *bhakti* (भक्ति) or love or devotion is the highest *puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ). We will discuss only the first two in this chapter. The third form of PTP we will discuss in a separate chapter.

One may ask here that why *darśana* (दर्शन) does not discuss other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ)? Why it discusses only *mokṣa* (मोक्ष)? We will answer it when we will discuss the position of the *Vedāntin* author Dharmarāj. Another important question one may ask here is that how we can say that Indian philosophy (दर्शन) is mainly viewed as *mokṣa-śāstra* (मोक्ष-शास्त्र)? How do the philosophers of India come to the conclusion that the discussion of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) or liberation and the means of it are the central task of *darśana* (दर्शन)? If we look at the different text of Indian philosophy, we see quite different pictures. We see that some schools discuss about *pramāṇa* (प्रमाण) or sources of knowledge and *prameya* (प्रमेय) or object of knowledge while some discuss the ways of knowing the real import (तात्पर्यार्थ) of the *Veda*. Again, some philosophical schools discuss how mind (चित्त) can be

controlled and some discuss how the world of diversity has evolved or originated from one single ultimate principle. Moreover, some discuss how many categories are there and how many properties are there of these categories.

As an answer we can say that all are true what is said about different schools of Indian philosophy in previous paragraph. But we should make a distinction between different topics or issues what a subject generally or specially discusses and the main or central concern of the same. The central concern of a particular subject lies in the need of that particular subject. It is true that there are so many topics or issues on which different philosophical schools of India discuss, but it is also true that the main concerns of these schools are liberation (मोक्ष) and the means to achieve it. If we study carefully them we find that these schools are ultimately *mokṣa-śāstra* (मोक्ष-शास्त्र). We will show this by discussing two or three schools namely Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Advaita Vedānta by the help of some well known texts of these schools of philosophy.

Vaiśeṣika philosophy begins with Kaṇāda's book of aphorisms known as *Vaiśeṣika sūtra* (सुत्र) or Kaṇāda *sūtra* (सुत्र). There are many different versions of this work. Here we take the version which is recorded in the *Upaskāra tīkā* of Śankara Mishra. This *tīkā* is directly on Kaṇāda's *sūtra* (सुत्र) text. It is the most famous among the works on it. Praśastapāda's work is not directly a commentary on Kaṇāda's *sūtra* (सुत्र) and it does not explain every *sūtra* (सुत्र) of Kaṇāda's *sūtra* text. But Śankara Mishra's work explains every *sūtra* (सुत्र) of Kaṇāda's work.

Śankara Mishra notes that the first two sūtra-s (सुत्र) of Kaṇāda's text are:

1. अथातो धर्म व्याख्यास्याम 1/1/1 and
2. यतोऽभ्युदयनिःश्रेयससिद्धिः स धर्मः 1/1/2

In these sūtra-s (सुत्र) some words occurred and they are 'dharmaḥ' (धर्मः), 'abhyudaya' (अभ्युदय) and 'niḥśreyas' (निःश्रेयस).¹ Scholars do not agree about the meaning of the term 'dharma' (धर्म) and 'abhyudaya' (अभ्युदय)². Generally 'niḥśreyas' (निःश्रेयस) means *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) or *apavarga* (अपवर्ग) and it has been understood in this sense by Śankara Mishra. In some Nyāya text also the word 'niḥśreyas' (निःश्रेयस) has been used in the same sense. In both Goutama's *Nyāya sūtra* and Vātsāyana's commentary on it this word is used to mean *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) or *apavarga* (अपवर्ग). It is true that different schools have taken *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) in different senses. But the most important difference among them about *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is whether it means a positive state of pleasure or a state of only final freedom from pain. In this chapter we will discuss it in great detail. We will show later that how Śankara Mishra interprets the word 'abhyudaya' (अभ्युदय) in an uncommon way. And gradually we will try to make clear that *darśana* (दर्शन) is ultimately the theories of *mokṣa* or *mokṣa-śāstra* (मोक्ष-शास्त्र). In that sense at least *darśana* (दर्शन) is a theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ).

In his sūtra (सुत्र) text Kaṇāda explicitly mentions the words 'dharma' (धर्म) and 'mokṣa' (निःश्रेयस). Śankara Mishra in his *Upaskāra Tikā* goes further and introduces the concept of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). According to him, Kaṇāda means by *dharma* (धर्म) the common cause of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ)³. He further says that highest

puruṣārtha-s (पुरुषार्थ) are two — pleasure and absence of pain.⁴ He then says that these two ultimate *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are *svarga* (स्वर्ग) and *apavarga* (अपवर्ग).⁵ We will come back to this point later on. But here we should note a point that Kaṇāda in his *Sūtra* (सुत्र) 1/1/4 explicitly says that *tattvajñān* (तत्त्वज्ञान) is the means of *niḥśreyas* (निःश्रेयस)⁶.

Here one may notice the similarity between the *sūtra* (सुत्र) of Kaṇāda just mentioned and the very 1st *sūtra* (सुत्र) of Goutama mentioned in his *sūtra* (सुत्र) Text. Gautama mentioned there clearly that *tattvajñān* (तत्त्वज्ञान) is the means of *niḥśreyas* (निःश्रेयस).⁷ So, we can say that both Gautama and Kaṇāda are agreed at the point that *niḥśreyas* (निःश्रेयस) or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) or liberation is obtained through *tattvajñān* (तत्त्वज्ञान). But *tattvajñān* (तत्त्वज्ञान) of what? Here Gautama and Kaṇāda have their own different views. According to Goutama, these things are sixteen in number as enumerated in *Nyāyasūtra* 1/1/1. The list of these sixteen things begins with *pramāṇa* (प्रमाण) and ends with *nigrahasthāna* (निग्रहस्थान). On the other hand, for Kaṇāda, these things are similarities and dissimilarities of *padārtha-s* (पदार्थ) [*svadharma* (स्वधर्म) and *Vaidharma* (वैधर्म) of *padārtha-s* (पदार्थ)] and these *padārtha-s* (पदार्थ) are six (or seven) in number.

Maharṣi Bādarāyaṇa's *Brahmasūtra* (सुत्र) Text end with the *sūtra* (सुत्र) “अनावृत्तिः शब्दादनावृत्तिः शब्दात्” (4/4/22). Here ‘*anavrtti*’ (अनावृत्ति) means “absence of return i.e. does not return”. The idea is that the soul (or jiva) does not return to this *saṃsāra* (or world) after getting liberation. *Saṃsāra* (संसार) is the phenomenal state of being and it is the state of bondage and suffering. The only way to return to this phenomenal world is through birth (or rebirth). The *Gītā* says —

जातस्य हि ध्रुवो मृत्युध्रुवं जन्ममृतस्य च।

तस्मादपरिहार्येऽर्थे न त्वं शोचितुमर्हसि ॥ 2/17

Meaning thereby for death of anyone born is certain, and of the dead (re-)birth is a certainty. Therefore, we ought not to grieve over an inevitable fact. But liberation means transcending the cycle of repeated births and deaths. Taking repeated births and deaths is explained as the state of bondage (बद्धावस्ता). For this reason actually *janma* (जन्म) means *duḥkha* (दुःख) or suffering. At the stage of liberation men transcend this state of bondage. *Darśana* (दर्शन) is that enterprise which helps man to go beyond or to transcend the state of *saṃsāra* (संसार) and suffering. Śaṅkarācārya writes at the end of *Adhyāṣa bhāṣya* “अस्य अनर्थहेतोः प्रहाणाय आत्मौकत्वविद्याप्रतिपत्तये सर्वे वेदान्ताः आरभ्यन्ते”⁸, meaning thereby the reason why Vedānta was evolved is to get rid of *sansāra* (अनर्थ). This will be possible if we have the knowledge of one and non-dual (अद्वैत) Brahman (आत्मा). Vedānta is meant to give us this knowledge.

Like the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika School the *Vedānta darśana* (दर्शन) also begins with the very purpose of removing the cause of all suffering. The value of *Vedānta śāstra* (शास्त्र) is to enable man to attain his highest goal or fulfil life’s greatest need. Jaimini’s *Mimāṃṣā sūtra* (सुत्र), Kapil’s *Sāṃkhyakārikā* and Patanjali’s *yoga sūtra* (सुत्र) also mainly concern about *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) and the means to attain it but in their own different ways. The main concern of Buddhism and Jaina systems are also to help man to be free from bondage. So, from the above discussion it is clear that the main concern to all Indian philosophical schools (perhaps without Cārvāka School of philosophy) is liberation and the means to achieve it. [Cārvākas also

believe in *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) in their own sense. For them *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is what others say death and they don't believe in rebirth].

In *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣada* it has been said 'आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्त्यव्यो निदिध्यसित्यव्य' — (2/4/5) and 'श्रोतोव्यो श्रुतिवाक्येभ्यो मन्त्यव्यश्च उपपत्तिभिः'. So, it is clear that philosophy is concerned with *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ); at least with the final *puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). What is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) or liberation, why man should have it, how he can have it — these are the basic enquiries of different philosophical schools. Kapil in the very first *sūtra* (सुत्र) of his *sūtra* Text (*Sāṃkhya sūtra*) mentions *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). The *sūtra* (सुत्र) is 'अथ त्रिविधदुःखात्यन्तनिवृत्तिरत्यन्तपुरुषार्थ 1/1/1.⁹

Sāṃkhya philosophers admit three kinds of *duḥkha* (दुःख) — *ādhyātmik* (आध्यात्मिक), *ābhibhoutik* (आधिभौतिक) and *ādhidaivik* (आधिदैविक). According to them, the final *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or the ultimate human need is complete removal of these threefold suffering. At the end of the *Sāṃkhya sūtra* text Kapil says — “यद्वा तद्वा तदुच्छीत्तिः पुरुसर्थस्तदुच्छीत्तिः पुरुषार्थः” (6/70).¹⁰ It means removal of these suffering by any means is *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) [final or ultimate]. Similarly in the last *sūtra* (सुत्र) of the *Yoga darśana* of Patanjali also we get the reference of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). There it has been said — ‘पुरुषार्थश्रुन्यानां गुणानां प्रतिप्रसबः कैवल्यं स्वरूपप्रतिष्ठा वा चितिशक्तिरिति’ — 4/34.¹¹

In Goutama's *Nyāya sūtra* Text we get many references to *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). In *Navya Nyāya*, Gangeśa in his *Tattvacintāmaṇi* gives *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) a great importance. Generally Gangeśa's *Tattvacintāmaṇi* known as a great work in the field of epistemology and logic of *Nyāya* philosophy. Men (who are mainly trained in western philosophy) usually do not notice that he has made some

Valuable and philosophically significant reference to *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). They think that *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is a topic of soteriology and it is very much different from philosophy. But the fact is that in the second *prakaraṇ* (प्रकरण) of the first part (प्रत्यक्षखण्ड) of his *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, which is known a *prāmānyavāda prakaraṇ* (प्रामाण्यवाद प्रकरण), Gangeśa made reference to *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). It is the actual beginning of the book. This section deals with the question of *prāmānya* (प्रामाण्य). If we think about Gautama's *Nyāyasūtra* we see a similarity in this regard. Gautama has mentioned a list of sixteen *padārtha*-s (पदार्थ) in the very first *sūtra* (सूत्र) of his *Nyāya sūtra* Text. There he started with *pramāṇa* (प्रमाण). Vātsāyana also begins his commentary on *Nyāya sūtra* with the discussion of *prāmānya* (प्रामाण्य). This is one of the reasons for which Nyāya is known as *pramāṇa-śāstra* (प्रमाण शास्त्र) or a theory of *pramāṇa* (प्रमाण). Yet Gangeśa notes in the beginning of the *prāmānyavāda* (प्रामान्यवाद) of *Tattvacintāmaṇi* that according to Gautama the knowledge of *pramāṇa* (प्रमाण) etc. is needed for *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) or liberation. He writes that the discipline called *Nyāya* (न्याय) is indirectly related to *niḥśreyas* (निःश्रेयस). Mathurānāth in his *Rahasya* commentary on this portion of *Tattvacintāmaṇi* explains the word indirectly to mean through yielding such knowledge which is the means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). At the end of the second part of *Anumāna khanda* of *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, Gangeśa elaborately discusses both the subject God (ईश्वर) and liberation (मोक्ष). In the beginning of his *Isvarvāda* (ईश्वरवाद) or discussion on God Gangeśa writes that once it has been established that *anumāna* is a *pramāṇa* (प्रमाण), God's existence can be established through it. This suggests that *Nyāya* does not take the trouble of building a theory of *anumāna* (अनुमान) or logic without some ulterior purpose. This purpose is ultimately to prove God's

existence. And he has already established in the preceding and greater part of *Tattvacintāmaṇi* that *anumāna* is a *pramāṇa* (प्रमाण). He has established this through the discussion of various aspects of *anumāna* (अनुमान) and many different views about these aspects.

In his *muktivāda prakaraṇa* (मुक्तिवाद प्रकरण) of *Tattvacintāmaṇi* Gangeśa discusses about spiritual liberation or *mukti* (मोक्ष). He begins this *prakaraṇa* (प्रकरण) by saying that the greatest need of inference is liberation (अपवर्ग)¹².

Gangeśa ends his discussion of liberation by saying that *anumāna* [as *manana* (मनन)] is the cause of *apavarga* (अपवर्ग) or liberation and in *Śruti* it has been said clearly. Gangeśa also has discussed it in detail in this *prakaraṇa* (प्रकरण). But how do we know the *Śruti* suggests this? In the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣada* it has been said “आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्त्यव्यो निदिध्यसित्यव्य” (2/4/5), which means one may have direct self-realization (आत्म-साक्षात्कार) through *sravaṇa* (श्रवण), *manana* (मनन) and *nididhyāsana* (निदिध्यासन). Here ‘*mantavya*’ (मन्त्यव्य) means critically reflected on or through *manana* (मनन). Udayanācārya shows that this *manana* (मनन) consists of arguments and inferences. It has been said that ‘श्रोतोव्यो श्रुतिवाक्येभ्यो मन्त्यव्यश्च उपपत्तिभिः’. It means hearing the sentences of the *Śruti* from the teacher with proper awe (*sravana*) and critical reflection (*manana*) on the same subject is necessary.

From our earlier discussion it has been clear that Indian philosophy (दर्शन) is primarily concerned with *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ). Since one of the great needs of Indian Philosophy (दर्शन) is to give a philosophical theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), it will not be wrong if it is regarded as *mokṣa- śāstra* (मोक्ष-शास्त्र). Such a

theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or PTP should contain the discussion of the nature of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), number of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), definition or criterion of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), relative superiority or inferiority of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ), means of attaining *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) etc. It is true that different schools of Indian philosophical Tradition (Except perhaps Cārvāka) have their own different forms of PTP. But they all have offered some PTP (as distinct from FVP) in their own ways. We will cite a few more textual evidences later. First we will discuss major points of agreements and differences between PTP-s of two major Indian schools of philosophy namely Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika PTP and Advaita-Vedānta PTP. We will also discuss out of these two PTP-s which one is more acceptable and why.

Both *Advaita Vedānta* theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or VPTP and *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or NVPTP exclusively discuss the only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) the *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ). It may be the first point of agreement between them. Philosophy (दर्शन) tells us about direct realization of the self (आत्म-दर्शन), which is the direct cause or direct means of achieving *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ). Here it should be noted that *darśana* (दर्शन) itself is an indirect means of such *ātmadarśana* (आत्मदर्शन). The second point of agreement between VPTP and NVPTP is that they both admit *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) or *apavarga* (अपवर्ग) as *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ).¹³ But why is *mokṣa* (अपवर्ग) called as *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ)? Both NVPTP and VPTP show more or less same reasons why *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is called as *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ). This may be called as third point of agreement between them. In some philosophical texts of *Advaita Vedānta* some reasons have been shown very clearly and explicitly.

These reasons are acceptable to *Naiyāika-s*, *Vaiśeṣika-s* and some other groups of philosopher.

Now let us discuss about the differences or some major points about *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) according to these two schools. The important point is that specially two major points of differences made their theory different. The first point is what is the nature of *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ)? And the other is what is the means of attaining this *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ)?

According to both these PTP, there is only one *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ). Philosophy is not just an empirical and descriptive theory; it rather aims at the higher general truths. Thus when philosophy (ontology) discusses what are real in the world, it does not want to know what particular real things are there in the world. Because all we know that real things are innumerable. So, no one will try to make a list of them. Actually philosophy discusses and tells us what are the most general kinds of things in the world.¹⁴ Vaiśeṣika school gives us a list of categories, but not a list of real objects of the world. We have said that the great concern of *darśana* (दर्शन) is to discuss *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or human need. From this one should not mean that *darśana* (दर्शन) is interested in particular objects which man really seek to live in this world, such as medicine, education, food, cloths, shelter etc. Man seeks these objects and the objects are innumerable. *Darśana* (दर्शन) is not concerned with their number; it is not interested to make a list of these objects. Rather it is interested in most general need of human being. Here by general need it does not mean the need of this man or that man. It is not the need at one time and not at another time, under one condition and not another condition. *Darśana* (दर्शन) is interested in that human

need which is not relative to particular individual man, time, taste, situation etc. It is rather interested in the absolute need which every man seeks unconditionally, provided that he knows the nature of it. It may be the fact that a man does not know it and so he does not seek it. But if a man knows that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the absolute need, then he should seek it. Since every man does not know it, there enters an element of morality. And this morality is based on practical rationality. Our reason tells us what we should do and what we should not do. When reason determined an action as what we should do and what we should not do, then it is a case of practical rationality. Man generally seeks many things to live in this world. But we cannot say that man should seek those things. Seeking an object practically does not include seeking that object morally. We cannot say a man as 'you should breath'. But the very condition of seeking *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is to attain the proper knowledge about *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). It is very obvious that some men know it and some do not know. So, it is said that man should seek *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). If man knows *mokṣa* (मोक्ष), he will seek it unconditionally. So, philosophers formulate the most general conception of human need and general principle or criterion of such human need. This need should be an object of unconditional desire. Such a need is absolute need. It is what every man desires for its own sake. If there is a man who does not want *mokṣa* (मोक्ष), it is because he is ignorant of the true nature of it or actual condition of his life. If he knows that it is inevitable that his life will be full of suffering and pain, he obviously will try to get rid of this suffering. If he knows that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is complete freedom from pain, he will seek *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) for it's own sake.

So, we can formulate it in this way: if *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is a thing that whoever knows (who is rational also) what it is, he will have desire to have it. We can say that he should want to have it. If a person is such that he does not have any idea of what *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is, he can say that he does not want *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) though his life is full of suffering and pain. So, it is proved that the concern of philosophy is to give a most general theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) according to which there is only one *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) or need of life. So, everybody wants (or should want) *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) provided that he knows it. If x is such that any man who knows it, also wants it, then x is a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or absolute human need in the philosophical sense. There may be many theories of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) but PTP is the most general and rational theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ).

Though food is said to be one of the basic needs, it cannot be said about *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) from a philosophical standpoint (sense). For, man seeks food only when he is hungry. Moreover hungry man, when gets food and satisfies his hunger, does not further seek food. That means it is not his any eternal desire. Then his knowledge about food will not lead him to desire food. So, we can say that the knowledge of the food is not the sufficient condition or cause of man's desire for food. For this reason all needs are not *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in the philosophical sense. There are innumerable needs which man seeks for the betterment of his life. But, they are not *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in the philosophical sense. That need of a thing is *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in a philosophical sense, the knowledge of which is sufficient condition for desiring it. If to know a thing is to desire it — then that thing is a human need in the most

general, absolute and philosophical sense. Philosophers of different schools, by maintaining this principle strictly, formulate *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) in their own ways.

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers also formulate the *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) in this way. It has been said that “निर्दुःखत्वे सुखे चेच्छा तज्ज्ञानादेव जायते” (*Bhāṣāparichheda* -146). Meaning thereby, absence of pain and pleasure is only the two objects the knowledge of which is sufficient to seek these objects. It follows (philosophically speaking) that the highest human needs are two — pleasure and absence of pain. These are two different things because one of these cannot be reduced to the other. For this reason, NVPTP says that highest human need or *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) are two and not one. This view of NVPTP is quite different from both the view of VPTP and FVP. FVP makes a list of four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) where *mokṣa* (परम पुरुषार्थ) is placed at the top position of the list. On the other hand VPTP holds the view that *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) is one and it is a kind of pleasure (सुख). They called it as *niratiśaya sukh* (निरतिशय सुख). In the book *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* the author Dharmarāj explicitly says that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the highest human need. And this view is fully agreed with the view of FVP.

VPTP and NVPTP — they both have not only different formulation but they have also different criterion of *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ). Following the hint of the last sūtra (सुत्र) of the source book of Vedānta Philosophy, *Brahmasūtra*, Dharmarāj says *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) because it is permanent. It is permanent in the sense that if one gets *mokṣa* (मोक्ष), he never loses it. To loose *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) means to return to this *saṃsāra* (world of suffering). The *saṃsāra* means the phenomenal

world which is full of suffering or pain (also pleasure). It has been said in other philosophical systems that birth or *janma* (जन्म or भव)) means *duḥkha* (दुःख). For this reason, the last *Brahmasūtra* says ‘अनावृत्ति’ which means non-return to the phenomenal condition of existence or the state of bondage. Dharmarāj explicitly says that out of all the four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the *parama* or highest *puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ). He holds this when he says — “... धर्मार्थ-काम-मोक्षाख्येषु चतुर्विध-पुरुषार्थेषु मोक्ष एव परम पुरुषार्थः”.¹⁵ But one may ask the reason why is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) the highest *puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ)? Keeping this question in mind Dharmarāj mentions the reason by quoting the *Upaniṣad* text – “न च पुनरावर्तते”¹⁶, meaning there by *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) because if one gets *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) he never returns. So, permanence of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the reason what makes it the highest. The other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are not *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) because they are not permanent. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika (NV) criterion of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) emphasizes its character of unconditionality. Vedānta philosophy emphasizes its character of permanence. There are compatible views shared by both NV philosophers and Vedānta philosophers. But permanence may be viewed as debatable feature. For if *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is permanent, then everyone is already liberated. And then philosophical enterprise becomes unnecessary and useless. We will discuss this point later. It may also be said that Nyāya criterion applies only to *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) unconditionally. Knowledge of food leads to the desire if the man is hungry. But unlike hunger the feature of bondage is a universal feature which qualifies every man (except the *jivan mukta*) or every sentient creature at every moment.

One may find the conflict between VPTP and NVPTP from what is said in the previous passages. But the conflict is not reasonable. For the criterion, which we have mentioned as offered by NVPTP, is the criterion of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in the most general and philosophical sense. To put it otherwise NVPTP offers the criterion to test or to answer the question what can be a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in strict philosophical sense. It does not answer the question why *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is said to be the *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) or highest goal of life. But the criterion offered by VPTP (criterion of permanence) answers the question why *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) but not the question why *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). So, NVPTP and VPTP offer criterion but for different purpose. It is true that a Naiyāika, who takes *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) to be the object of unconditional desire of man and takes *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) as pleasure or freedom from pain, can easily accept *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) to be the highest *puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) in the *Upaniṣadic* sense that it is permanent. In other words, a Naiyāika will have no problem to accept that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is permanent in the sense that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) once attained is never lost again. So, there is no conflict between NVPTP and VPTP in this sense. Similarly, there is no conflict between NVPTP and VPTP on the one hand and FVP on the other. Because, all the four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ), admitted in FVP, are the form of either pleasure or absence of pain. FVP also accepts that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the highest pleasure or ultimate absence of pain and it is the highest *puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ). Moreover, it also accepts that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is permanent. So, there is no conflict.

But still FVP is different from NVPTP. It is in the sense that NVPTP is the most general and philosophical theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). But FVP is not. In the most general sense and criterion *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is only two. But since FVP is an empirical theory, it says about four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). If there were another theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) which is less general to FVP, then it could include few more *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). But a most general theory will include all this and it can be regarded as philosophical theory in true sense when PTP says about two (or one) *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) and includes all *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) in it. Thus all *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) come under these two highest kinds of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) — pleasure and absence of pain. NV philosophers are aware that FVP is an empirical theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and ordinary people generally admits four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). Keeping all these in mind *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* philosophers give the theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) which is a most general theory and it covers all the *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) of FVP. If we look at FVP from the point of view of NVPTP, then we see that FVP also gives us a general theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Because, logically speaking, there can be another theory which admits many more *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) than FVP. Then FVP will be regarded as general theory in comparison to that theory. But it is not as general theory as NVPTP. We can explain it in this way that different individual has different needs and they are, in a sense, innumerable. FVP first tries to draw a distinction among all these needs. Some needs are good as end (फल-रूप-इष्ट) and some needs are good as means (उपाय-रूप-इष्ट) of some other ends. Then FVP generalizes it and says that there are only two human needs which are good-in-itself. These needs are *kāma* (काम) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). It also says that there are only two human needs which are good-as-

means. And these are *dharma* (धर्म) and *artha* (अर्थ). These are means of the other two needs which are good-in-itself. Then it also shows that *artha* (अर्थ) is the means of *kāma* (काम) and *dharma* (धर्म) is the means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष).

So far as PTP is concerned it is a debatable issue whether *dharma* (धर्म) is a means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) or not. Both Kaṇāda and Goutama said that *jñāna* (ज्ञान) is the cause or means of '*niḥśreyas*' (निःश्रेयस) or *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ). Here '*jñāna*' (ज्ञान) means *tattvajñāna* (तत्त्वज्ञान) or *tattvajñāna* of *padārtha* or *padārtha tattvajñāna* (पदार्थ तत्त्वज्ञान). According to Goutama, *Tattvajñāna* (तत्त्वज्ञान) of sixteen *padārtha*-s (पदार्थ) is the means of '*niḥśreyas*' (निःश्रेयस) or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). On the other hand, Kaṇāda holds the view that *tattvajñāna* (तत्त्वज्ञान) of six *padārthas* (पदार्थ) or strictly speaking of their similarities and dissimilarities is the means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). It is stated in the fourth *sūtra* (सूत्र) of Kaṇāda when he tells us "धर्मविशेषप्रसूताद् द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवायानां पदार्थानां साधर्मवैधर्मिभां तत्त्वज्ञानान्निःश्रेयसम्" (1/1/4). Praśastapāda in his commentary *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* on Kaṇāda's *sūtra* text says the same thing. This work is also known as *Praśastapāda bhāṣya*. He says "द्रव्य गुण कर्म सामान्य विशेष समवयानाम् षण्णाम् पदार्थानाम् स्वाधर्म वैधर्मिभाम् तत्त्वज्ञान निःश्रेयस हेतु". Jagadīśa tarkālankāra has done a commentary on this *Praśastapāda bhāṣya* called *Sukti*. Here he explains that if there was no '*niḥśreyas*' (निःश्रेयस) as the end, then *tattvajñāna* (तत्त्वज्ञान) would be meaningless and if *tattvajñāna* (तत्त्वज्ञान) was meaningless then the Kaṇāda's *sūtra* text and Vaiśeṣika philosophy would be useless. To answer such possible charge Praśastapāda following Kaṇāda writes that *tattvajñāna* (तत्त्वज्ञान) which Vaiśeṣika

philosophy generates is usefull. For it is a means of *nihsreyas* (निःश्रेयस).¹⁷

But neither Kaṇāda and Praśastapāḍa nor Jagadīśa explain why '*niḥśreyas*' (निःश्रेयस) is an end. They all just take '*niḥśreyas*' (निःश्रेयस) as the highest good-as-end-in-itself. This is true not only for Kaṇāda and Praśastapāḍa or Vaiśeṣika philosophy, but it is true for philosophical schools including Nyāya also. For all of them the highest human need in strict philosophical sense is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) or *niḥśreyas* (निःश्रेयस) or *apavarga* (अपवर्ग) or *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) and all are agreed at the point that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the highest good-as-end and not good-as-means. Both Goutama's *sūtra* text and Kaṇāda's *sūtra* text tell us that the means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is *tattvajñāna* (तत्त्वज्ञान). But they never said anywhere that *dharma* (धर्म) is the means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). Thus we can say that though PTP can agreed with FVP that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ), but it will never agree with FVP that *dharma* (धर्म) is the means (Good as means) of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). Not only Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika *darśana* (दर्शन) but in *Vedānta darśana* (दर्शन) also we get the same view. Dharmarāj in his *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* shows first that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the highest among the four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). He shows evidence from *Śruti* which tells us (as we noted above) that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is permanent. After that Dharmarāj shows the means of it. The means to this end is *Brahman*. Here Brahman is *tattvajñāna* (तत्त्वज्ञान). For this reason the main points which *Vedānta darśana* wants to establish is all about *Brahman*, knowledge of *Brahman*, means of the knowledge of *Brahman* etc. he says '...ब्रह्म तज्-ज्ञानं तत्-प्रमाणणन्व स प्रपण्चम् निरूप्यते'.¹⁸

Thus we can say that all philosophical theories of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or PTP are agreed at the point that *dharma* (धर्म) is not the

means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). But one may say here that FVP also does not say that *dharma* (धर्म) is the means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). So, it will not be reasonable to say that unlike PTP, FVP says that *dharma* (धर्म) is the means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). Then what actually FVP wants to say? It has given only a list of four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). And if we read this list from bottom to top then only *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) will be placed at the top most or the highest place. After that FVP tries to give an interpretation of the relation obtained among these four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). If we follow this interpretation sincerely, then it seems to us that of these four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) *kāma* (काम) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) are the two good as ends. So, it will be quite easy to understand that remaining two *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) will be good as means. This familiar account seems to suggest that *dharma* (धर्म) is the means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) according to FVP.

If philosophy shows that *dharma* (धर्म) cannot be the means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष), then the above version of FVP can be given up and another version can be formulated. But what other version of interpretation or formulation of FVP is possible? It should be an interpretation in which atleast *dharma* (धर्म) will not be a means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). And if *dharma* (धर्म) is not the means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) [*mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the good-as-end-in-itself], then there will be some other options.

1. One option is that *dharma* (धर्म) is not at all a means to any other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ), rather it is an end-in-itself.

2. *Dharma* (धर्म) is a means of some other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ).

3. In this option one may argue that all the questions of reinterpretation of FVP take place because we formed FVP in this way.

3,i) We formed FVP to agree with PTP on the point that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) or liberation is the good-as-end-in-itself. It is the highest end.

3,ii) We formed FVP to disagree with PTP on the point that according to the PTP *jñāna* (ज्ञान) is the means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष); whereas according to FVP (usual version or familiar version) *dharma* (धर्म) is the means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). But one can doubt whether 3,i) is true or not. Whether the different philosophical theories of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) have proved it or not that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the good-as-end or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the highest human need (परम पुरुषार्थ). Nyāya PTP gives us a general criterion to test of what can be a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). On the other hand Advaita Vedānta PTP gives us a criterion to test which is the best and highest human need or goal of human life. Thus it has been told us by the different philosophical schools that the highest need of man or the goal he desires is either pleasure or absence of pain. But have they proved that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the highest *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ)? To show that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the highest *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) we need to show first that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is (by nature) either pleasure or absence of pain. After that we need to show that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is either highest form of pleasure or highest form of absence of pain. Suppose we say that *sukha* (सुख) is a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). But from this it does not mean that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or highest form of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). We need to show here that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is a form of *sukha* (सुख) and highest form of *sukha* (सुख). Similarly, suppose we may say that

duḥkhābhāva (दुःखाभाव) or absence of pain is a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). But from this it should not mean that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or highest form of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). We need to show here that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is a form of *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) or highest form of *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव). So we need two things to discuss: first, *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is either a form of pleasure or a form of absence of pain and secondly, *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is either the highest form of pleasure or the highest form of absence of pain. These points we will discuss when we will discuss two forms of PTP — NVPTP and VPTP.

Let us now discuss 1 and 2. We will not discuss much about 1. We have seen earlier that ‘*dharma*’ (धर्म) is an ambiguous word and it can be used in different senses. One of these senses, which is derived from the grammar and etymology of the word is that *dharma* (धर्म) sustains the society or the world (धारयते जगत्) and protect the people (धारयति प्रजा). In this sense *dharma* (धर्म) means *dharma vyavasthā* (धर्म व्यवस्था) [where the society (समाज) is a moral society, just society (धर्म समाज)]. Another sense of the term ‘*dharma*’ (धर्म) means dutiful actions. Actions cannot be treated as end-in-themselves. For, actions are always associated with pain. It may be means of some other ends. So, *dharma* (धर्म), in this sense, is never end-in-itself, rather it is end-as-means. In another sense *dharma* (धर्म) means *punya* (पुण्य) or *pāpa* (पाप) (usually translated as moral merit and demerit). Another sense of the word ‘*dharma*’ (धर्म) is *karmātiśaya*. Udayanācārya used the word ‘*karmātiśaya*’ (कर्मातिशय) in this sense in the first stavaka of his *Nyāyakusumāñjalih*.¹⁹ In this sense also *dharma* (धर्म) is primarily a means of resulting final pleasure or pain. It is not an end in itself. In our previous discussion

we have shown *dharma* (धर्म), as a form of dutiful action, is a natural object of aversion. So, we can say the alternative 1 is not true at all. Since *dharma* (धर्म) as action entails exertion and efforts, or we can say troubles and suffering (दुःख), it cannot be regarded as end-in-itself. But *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is always an object of desire. So, how can *dharma* (धर्म) be a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ)? The answer is *dharma* (धर्म) can be a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) if it is regarded as end-as-means.²⁰

Now, let us discuss about the alternative 2. Is this alternative true and acceptable? Can we say reasonably that *dharma* (धर्म) is a means of some other ends [some other *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ)] other than *mokṣa* (मोक्ष)? If we do not consider *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) and *dharma* (धर्म), then there will be two other *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ) in the scheme of FVP. And these are *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम). Now the question is can *dharma* (धर्म) be a means of any one of them or both of them? We have noticed that *dharma* (धर्म) has been placed at the bottom of the familiar list of *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ) of FVP. The reason is this: *dharma* (धर्म) is the root of all *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ). The implication is this: in a sense it is the means of all other *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ). To seek other *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ) one must seek it through *dharma* (धर्म). This suggests the criterion of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). A *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is any need or object of desire if it is or ought to be sought through right means. Here morality is based on practical rationality. *Dharma* (धर्म) within its standard meaning has both these characters of being rational to do and (morally) just to do. If we take an example the matter will be clear. *Artha* as *puruṣārtha* (अर्थ पुरुषार्थ) is included in the list of FVP. But *artha* (अर्थ) is not a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) because men need it or seek it. A man may earn it through any immoral or

unjustified means. But then it will not be regarded as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). *Artha* (अर्थ) is *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) if it is earned through *dharma* (धर्म) only. In another words, *artha* (अर्थ) is *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) if and when it is sought and through the ways approved or enjoined by *dharma* (धर्म) or morally just means.²¹ Similarly, if a *Brāhmaṇa* earns money (अर्थ) by performing *jajña* (यज्ञ) i.e. by acting as a priest, it will be a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). So, *artha* (अर्थ) or wealth earned by a *brāhmaṇa* (ब्राह्मण) through *yājana* (याजन) or through acting as priest on behalf of a *yajmāna* (यजमान) is a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). It follows that *dharma* (धर्म) confers *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) character to *artha* (अर्थ). Simultaneously, *dharma* (धर्म), in this sense, becomes a way of earning *artha* (अर्थ) (अर्थ). In this special sense *dharma* (धर्म) can be a means to other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) like *artha* (अर्थ) etc. Similarly what *brāhmaṇa* (ब्राह्मण) gets as a gift from the king who appoints him for teaching (अध्यापना) students is rightful earning or *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). In the same way it can be shown that *dharma* (धर्म) is the means of *kāma* (काम). The implication is this when *kāma* (काम) is involved in rightfull marriage, it can be regarded as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Because such marriage is enjoined [i.e., such marriage is *dharma* (धर्म)]. To put it otherwise, *kāma* (काम), in the sanse of pleasure of conjugal life or married life is a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) when it is sought through rightful marriage or *dharma-vivāha* (धर्म-विवाह). Here *dharma* (धर्म) confers the character of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) to *kāma* (काम). So in this special sense *dharma* (धर्म) is a means of *kāma* (काम) also.

FVP may be interpreted in the way mentioned above. And then from the point of view of PTP it (FVP) can be regarded as an acceptable doctrine. FVP admits a list of four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ)

and there *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the highest. It is not a means of any other *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), it is the end-in-itself. Since there is no higher need than *mokṣa* (मोक्ष), it is the highest need (PTP also admits this, though PTP is yet to prove it). Among the other three *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) *dharma* (धर्म) is an end as means. But it is not proved whether it [*dharma* (धर्म)] is the means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) or not. There is no doubt that *dharma* (धर्म) is a means of both *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम). Now since there are few questions still unanswered, FVP cannot be acceptable in this interpretation. These questions are — (a) What are the status of *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम)? (b) What is the means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष)? So far as (b) is concerned we have two options — (b.i) *Mokṣa* (मोक्ष) has no means, or (b.ii) it has some means other than *dharma* (धर्म). If we choose (b.ii), then there will be another two options. The first option is the means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is either *artha* (अर्थ) or *kāma* (काम) or both. The second option is the means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is something different from *dharma* (धर्म), *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम). FVP does not mention any clue about what can be the means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) apart from *dharma* (धर्म), *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम). Apparently one may think that this problem will not be there if we choose the first option. But to my mind the problem will be still there. For, we cannot think how *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम) can be means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). *Artha* (अर्थ) cannot be the means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष), for, it cannot be purchased. Worldly pleasure can be purchased by money. *Kāma* (काम) also can be purchased by money. But *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is not this-worldly pleasure. *Kāma* (काम) also, on the other hand, cannot be means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). For, one cannot attain *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) by simply seeking it. Or one cannot attain *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) by leading a life of rightful carnal pleasure or *kāma* (काम) in the narrowest sense. In one sense every

puruṣārtha (पुरुषार्थ) is an object of desire or *kāma* (काम). But this does not mean that *kāma* (काम) is the means of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). In one sense *kāma* (काम) is the most basic and most universal object of pleasure. Desire for anything else is rooted (perhaps unknown to us) in the love for one's own self. This love is a form of *kāma* (काम). In a sense all *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) can be interpreted in terms of *kāma* (काम), but *kāma* (काम) is not the means of it. Our previous question still remains unsolved and that is how to interpret FVP so that it will be free from anomalies? There may be more than one such interpretation or re-interpretation or re-construction of FVP from the point of view of PTP.

Now, it is possible to take FVP to be a list of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in only one sense, in the basic sense. In this basic sense all *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) will be end-in-itself, nothing will be end-as-means. To put it differently all *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are object of desire. Now, if we take it in the basic sense, then all human goals or all object of desires will be *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in intrinsic sense, nothing will be *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in instrumental sense. For, all *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are end-in-themselves and nothing is end-as-means. As, for example, *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in intrinsic sense or it is *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) as end-in-itself. Similarly *dharma* (धर्म), *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम) will also be *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) as end-in-itself, and not end-as-means. Men seek *mokṣa* (मोक्ष), in the same way he seeks *dharma* (धर्म), wealth etc. Thus we can re-interpret and it is the most radical way to re-interpret FVP. And if we are successful to systematize and re-interpret FVP in this way, we can avoid the anomalies mentioned before and questions like the following. Why there are more good as end in the list than

good as means? Or, why there are more good as means and less good as ends? Or, which is the means of which good as end and so on.

Now there are some more questions which are not easy to answer. Can we say that man (directly) desires *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) and *dharma* (धर्म)? One can easily say that man seeks wealth and pleasure and we are ready to accept it. We are ready to accept it because it is proved in our day-to-day experience. But can we say that man desires *mokṣa* (मोक्ष)? We can empirically verify that man (or majority of them) desires *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम). But there is no such evidence to show than man (generally and naturally) desires *dharma* (धर्म) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). Hence the statements like *dharma* (धर्म) is a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or human need or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is a human need are, therefore, either false or are not empirical statements.

Similarly, can we say that man seeks *dharma* (धर्म)? *Dharma* (धर्म) means duty or rightful actions. Can we say that man seeks rightful actions? Man seeks pleasure, wealth etc. But it is clear to us that men do not seek duty in the same way men seek wealth and pleasure. As for example, men desire cooking. From this it does not mean man desires cooking for its own sake. Men need food and so they desire cooking. When his hunger will be satisfied he will not desire cooking. Hence men do not desire it all time. Man desires cooking for the sake of food. Similarly, man desires *dharma* (धर्म) or rightful action to be *dhārmika* (धार्मिक). Actually he desires to be *dhārmika* (धार्मिक). So, he desires *dharma* (धर्म) or desires righteousness. Man desires morality for its own sake. It is end-in-itself. To say a man is *dhārmika* (धार्मिक) actually to attribute a virtue

to him. The man who has this virtue always performs right actions or duties [*dharma-karma* (धर्म-कर्म)]. Such a man desires to perform *dharma-karma* (धर्म-कर्म) because he desires *dharma* (धर्म) [*dharma* (धर्म) or performance of right actions comes from the virtue of righteousness and more we perform duties the virtue becomes more firm]. To put it otherwise, at least some men want to be moral. The term '*dharma*' (धर्म) has many senses and one of the very important sense of it is duty. So, some men want to be *dhārmika* (धार्मिक) and for them *dharma* (धर्म) is end-in-itself. They seek *dharma* (धर्म) for its own sake. Hence, in this sense *dharma* (धर्म) may be a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ).

But here one may object by saying that in this sense also *dharma* (धर्म) cannot be regarded as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). The reason is this if we take *dharma* (धर्म) in the sense stated above then it will be a need of only few persons. Those who want to be moral or *dhārmika* (धार्मिक), will seek *dharma* (धर्म). But it is not the object of desire of all people. And unless it becomes object of desire of all people, it cannot be regarded as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). For, generally *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) means need of all people. Then how can *dharma* (धर्म) or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) be regarded as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ)? It is then that *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is not what man actually desires but what man *should* desire. Even when actually a man does not desire *dharma* (धर्म), he should. But then we have to say that all men should seek wealth or *kāma* (काम). If it is the case, then we will have problems. The problems are: a) it is difficult to accept that everyone should seek wealth or pleasure, and b) if we define *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in terms of *dharma* (धर्म), then how *dharma* (धर्म) can be said to be a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) without circularity?

The answer is as easy as simple. Generally *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) means human need. We take it to mean from this that a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) will be need of all people. But it is not true. As for example wealth or *kāma* (काम) and pleasure are *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). But ascetic, *sanyāsī* (सन्यासी) will not seek wealth and pleasure. *Mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is regarded as highest fulfilment of life. Hence *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ). But very few people seek *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) [and also have knowledge about *mokṣa* (मोक्ष)]. It has been said about *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) that 'आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्त्यव्यो निदिध्यसित्यव्य' (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣada* 2/4/5). It means self should be realized, though very few people seek to realize *ātmā* (soul). But there is no injunction or imperative that everyone should desire pleasure or wealth. Similarly, there is also no injunction that everybody should desire *dharma* (धर्म). Only actions can come within the scope of injunction. Desire is not an action and it cannot be within the scope of injunction. For this reason the word *jijñāsā* (जिज्ञासा) or desire for knowledge in the *Brahma sūtra* 1/1/1 was taken to mean *vicāra* (विचार). For *vicāra* (विचार) being an action it is possible to say that it is a duty to do (we should do).

Generally *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) means object of seeking or object of desire which man seeks in a normal condition. Man in normal condition seeks so many things. As for example a hungry man seeks food, an ill man seeks medicine etc. But when hunger of a man is satisfied or the illness of a man is cured, he does not seek food or medicine. But from this it does not mean that food and medicine are not need. The point is this: if we generalise, we see that it is not food or medicine or some other objects but the pleasure or satisfaction which the man gets from these objects. This pleasure

or satisfaction is actually the need of that man. In other words, it seems that man (hungry) needs food. But if we generalise we see that man needs the pleasure or satisfaction associated with food. Thus we can generalise it in this way that man actually needs or desires pleasure or *kāma* (काम) associated with the object.

Kāma (काम) is to be taken not as desire but what is desired (काम्य or कामना विषय). For, we do not desire the desire (काम) but we desire what is desired. So, in a generalised sense man seeks pleasure and it is *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). In the same manner if we keep in our mind that *dharma* (धर्म) means dutiful actions then no men will seek it. If we generalise, we see that, man want to be virtuous, so man seeks *dharma* (धर्म). But from this it does not mean that man seeks particular moral or dutiful actions. Man seeks moral disposition or virtue. *Dharma* (धर्म) means *dhārmika* (धार्मिक) in nature. Such a nature is a value, is a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Hence *dharma* (धर्म) is also a direct object of desire. Similarly, man seeks *artha* (अर्थ). But from this it should not mean that man seeks currency. In other words, man does not seek *artha* (अर्थ) for its own sake. He seeks *artha* (अर्थ) to secure his life, to purchase his other objects of desire.

Thus we can take each one of the list of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) of FVP and show that each *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) stands for direct object of desire, as good as end. And in this way also we can avoid the problem to explain what will be end-in-itself and what will be means of them.

But still there will be problem if we try to justify the order of the *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) of FVP. There is a difference between a moral man and a corrupt man. A moral man wants to be virtuous or

dhārmika (धार्मिक), which the corrupt man does not. But for both, wealth, right kind of protection and security are the basic objects of desire. A moral man at last achieves *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) and once it is achieved no other desire is left. So, *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) perfectly satisfies the description given in the *Gītā* - "यं लब्ध्वा चापरं लाभं मन्यते नाधिकं ततः" (6/22), meaning thereby after getting which no other thing is felt greater (or greater object of desire). But still it is difficult to make an order of *kāma* (काम) and *artha* (अर्थ). We will discuss this radical interpretation further. Four *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ) are uttered or listed in sequence as it is physically impossible to utter or write down their names all at once. Each one is an irreducible *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). This is also a possibility.

There is another possible interpretation. According to this interpretation, the word '*kāma*' (काम) is the sense of *kāmya* (काम्य) which means pleasure or *sukha* (सुख). This pleasure is of two types — one is worldly pleasure or phenomenal or *laukika* (लौकिक) pleasure and other is other-worldly or *aloukika* (अलौकिक) or *pāraloukika* (पारलौकिक) pleasure.²² *Dharma* (धर्म) is the *aloukika* (अलौकिक) means of *aloukika sukha* (अलौकिक सुख) i.e. *svarga* (स्वर्ग); but *artha* (अर्थ) is the *laukika* (लौकिक) or worldly means of *laukika* or worldly *sukha* (लौकिक सुख). There is another sense of *artha* (अर्थ). This sense we get in *Nyāya kandalī*. Here it has been said that *artha* (अर्थ) means *dravya* (द्रव्य), *guṇa* (गुण), *karma* (कर्म). They have used the term '*artha*' to mean *padārtha* (i.e. *dravya, guṇa, karma* etc.).

Dharma (धर्म), has a dual character. For it serves two purposes. It serves as *laukika* (लौकिक) means for *laukika sukha* (लौकिक सुख) and as *aloukika* (अलौकिक) means for *aloukika sukha* (अलौकिक सुख). We can explain it in this way that the word '*dharma*' (धर्म) has two

main senses. In one sense *dharma* (धर्म) means enjoined actions or dutiful action and in this sense *dharma* (धर्म) is the *alaukika* (अलौकिक) means of *alaukika sukha* (अलौकिक सुख) or pleasure i.e. *svarga* (स्वर्ग). In another sense moral merit (पुण्य) is the result of *dharma* (धर्म) and this moral merit is one of the main causes of every effect of this world. Hence, in this sense, it is the cause of this-worldly *sukh* or *laukika sukha* (लौकिक सुख) also. To put it otherwise, *dharma* (धर्म) which means dutiful actions results moral merits (पुण्य). Now, firstly through moral merits it plays the casual role of *laukika sukha* (लौकिक सुख) or this-worldly pleasure and secondly through this *punya* (पुण्य) it results *alaukika sukha* (अलौकिक सुख) or *svarga* (स्वर्ग). [Similarly, we have shown above, *dharma* (धर्म) is the source of *kāma* (काम) which means both *laukika sukha* (लौकिक सुख) and *alaukika sukha* (अलौकिक सुख) or pleasure. Furthermore, *dharma* (धर्म) can be said as cause or means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). Those who deny that *dharma* (धर्म) is the means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) primarily keep in their mind that *dharma* (धर्म) is not a direct or immediate means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). Nobody will say that *dharma* (धर्म) is an immediate means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). Similarly, nobody will deny that *dharma* (धर्म) is the indirect means for achieving *mokṣa* (मोक्ष).] So, we can say that *dharma* (धर्म) is the base or root of all other *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ) and for this reason it is mentioned at the bottom position of the list.

In a sense *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is that which a man seeks. In this sense it is the result for which we strive. This is known as *phala-rūpa-puruṣārtha* (फल-रूप-पुरुषार्थ) or *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) as result. Now, such *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) must have some means through which it can be achieved. This means is known as *puruṣārtha-sādhana* (पुरुषार्थ-साधन). We will discuss *puruṣārtha-sādhana* (पुरुषार्थ-

साधन) in a separate chapter. Among four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the only end-in-itself. [one's desire for *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is not dependant on or derived from one's desire for some other thing]. This *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is neither a means of anything nor a result of any other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). On the other hand, other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are both a means and result of other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). We have discussed that *dharma* (धर्म) can be a means of or source of *artha* (अर्थ), *kāma* (काम) (two kinds of pleasure) and also *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). Hence if one gets *dharma* (धर्म), he can get or at least has ability to get *artha* (अर्थ), *kāma* (काम) and at last *mokṣa* (मोक्ष).

Man knowingly and hence willingly performs *dharma* (धर्म). Man who wants to be moral performs willingly what moral codes or injuntions obliges him to perform. He knows that through this performance he will get wealth or other things (पशु, पुत्र, स्वर्ग etc.) for what he performs *dharma* (धर्म). So, a man performs *dharma* (धर्म) for both *laukika sukh* (लौकिक सुख) and *alaukika sukh* or pleasure (अलौकिक सुख). *Dharma* (धर्म), therefore, is both *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and *puruṣārtha-sādhana* (पुरुषार्थ-साधन). But *kāma* (काम) as pleasure is only *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and not any *puruṣārtha-sādhana* (पुरुषार्थ-साधन). Man seeks pleasure or *sukh* (सुख) for itself and not as a means of other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). *Artha* (अर्थ) is also *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and *puruṣārthāntara sādhana* (पुरुषार्थान्तर साधन) [e.g. of *kāma* (काम)]. Now, let us sum up. *Dharma* (धर्म) is both good as an end and good as a means. *Artha* (अर्थ) is also both good as an end and good as a means. *Kāma* (काम) is only good as an end and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is also only good as an end. The difference between *kāma* (काम) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is that the last one is supreme and eternal pleasure whereas the first one is [both *laukika* pleasure

(लौकिक सुख) and *alaukika* pleasure (अलौकिक सुख) i.e. *svarga* (स्वर्ग)] impermanent and not supreme.

We have said earlier that our aim is to show that FVP and PTP are not antithetical, rather continuous. Now, we can reiterate the major points of FVP. But then we need to resolve some issues. These issues are: first, whether the word *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) has merely descriptive meaning or it has also normative meaning? Secondly, can we say that FVP list of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is an exhaustive list of the most general kinds of human need in which all needs can be reduced or included?

Since PTP admits only one (or two) *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), so the problem regarding accommodating four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) or arranging them does not arise. It has been clearly shown in different classical Indian text of Nyāya (e.g. *Nyāyasūtra* of Goutama) and Advaita Vedānta School (e.g. *Vedānta paribhāṣā*). But before that we need to answer one important objection. The objection is: like FVP in PTP also we have to admit four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). It is true that they are not the same as FVP, but they must be in number four. How is it possible? In PTP it has been said that pleasure is one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and another *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is absence of pain. Then another two *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) we have to admit which are the means of these two *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). Thus we get four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) in PTP:

1. Pleasure (सुख)
2. Means of pleasure (सुखोपाय)
3. Absence of pain (दुःखाभाव)

4. Means of absence of pain (दुःखाभावोपाय)

Here 1 and 3 are *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) as end-in-itself. But 2 and 4, though *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ), are dependent on 1 and 3 respectively. This means 2 and 4 are *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in the secondary sense (end as means).

Another important point is this: if 1 [*sukha* (सुख)] is not admitted as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), 2 will also be not regarded as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Similarly, it is true for 3 and 4. So, we can say that in the ultimate sense and from the point of view of philosophy (a study of the ultimate truth) there are only two independent *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) and not four.

There are innumerable objects which give pleasure. As for example milk, honey, sweet, ice-cream etc. They all are different. But they are not different in respect to that they all bring pleasure. In other words, though as caused by different objects pleasures are different, yet as pleasure they are not different. In brief, if we see them as pleasure caused by sweet and pleasure caused by honey they are different. But if we generalise them we get pleasure or *kāmya* (काम्य) as such. The same is applicable to pain also. Different objects cause pain e.g. thorne, death etc. Pain caused by death and pain caused by thorne are different. But as pain they are not different. We can generalise it in this way that all pleasures as pleasure it has *anukūlavedaniyatva* (अनुकूलवेदनियत्व) which means being experienced as likable and not contrary to our nature. But one important point to note here is that from the same thing different persons or different sentient being (जीव) gets different experiences. Same object may cause pleasure to one and pain to another. A

camel may be happy to get thorne but it is painful to a man. So, pleasures differ from one experiencing being (भोक्ता) to another experiencing being. But if we consider pleasure as pleasure and not as who experiences it then we can generalise all pleasure into one class. In other words, if we do not consider what or which object causes the pleasure or who is experiencing this pleasure (भोक्ता), then we can generalize it as the same as pleasure. This is not to deny what Udayanācārya said. He said experience of pleasure (or pain) is relative to experiencing persons. This is called *pratyatma niyata bhoga* (प्रत्यात्म नियत भोग), meaning thereby that there is individual differences in the experience of pleasure and pain. But every pleasure experienced by many individuals has the same character or property. This property is *anukūlavedaniyatva* (अनुकूलवेदनियत्व) or the property of being experienced as likeable, helpful etc.

Thus when PTP says that pleasure (सुख) is *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), it means pleasure in a most generalised sense. Similarly when PTP says absence of pain (दुःखाभाव) is *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), it means pain in a most generalised sense. Otherwise it could not be a philosophical theory. We have said earlier that when *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) becomes the concern of philosophy, philosophy takes it in the most generalised sense. Pain caused by different objects and different experiencing beings (भोक्ता) experience it differently. Pain from starvation is not the same as pain from fever. And what pains Ram may not pain Laksmana. But if we take pain as such and do not consider what causes it or who experiences it, then we get pain with one common characteristic and it has *pratikūlavedaniyatva* (प्रतिकूल वेदनियत्व) or having the property of non-likeability (or being

experienced as non-helpful or non-likeable). It is common to all pains at all times in all spaces. No one in the world experience pain as likeable. One may point out the case when a hungry man gives away his food to another hungry beggar, he does not experience pain but pleasure. In reply it is to be said that pain is still there. Such man feels the pain of hunger. But there is some over riding consideration and deferred pleasure which outweighs the pain. What motivates us in action is the final result and *balabattara sukh* (बलवत्तर सुख).

So from the philosophical point of view there is only one thing which every man seeks or needs irrespective of space, time, culture etc. This thing is pleasure (सुख). Similarly, there is only one thing which every man irrespective of space, time, culture etc. does not desire or need. This thing is pain. In other words, absence of pain is what everybody needs or desires. Thus, there are only two *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) — pleasure and absence of pain. Though what one experiences as painful may not be the same for all, yet no normal person wants pain. Similarly, no normal person can say that he does not want pleasure.

Here one question arises: can we have a more generalized theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ)? A philosophical theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is interested in most generalised version of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). In such a case, *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) will be only one and not two. For this reason every philosophical theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), in the true sense of the term, admits only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Thus PTP is a theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) according to which number of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is only one and not even two.

There may be many reasons for philosophers to admit only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in their theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). One important reason is the consideration of logical economy (or principle of *lāghava*). As we observe in a metaphysical theory that the theory should be judged in terms of the number of the ultimate principle of reality it admits. If one metaphysical theory explains the world on the basis of only one ultimate principle and another metaphysical theory does the same job on the basis of more than one ultimate principle, then obviously the first one will be considered to be the better than the second one. Here the criterion is the principle of logical economy (principle of *lāghava*). By the same reason a PTP should be judged best according to the principle of *lāghava* (लाघव) if it admits only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). For such a theory is successful to generalize all *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) to one only.

Now, let us agree that a PTP as a most generalized theory admits only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Then obviously the question arises which will be that *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) — pleasure or absence of pain? It is very difficult to answer this question. Some philosophers accept pleasure as *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) and some philosophers accept absence of pain as *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ). So, according to that, there developed two basic forms of PTP. Each PTP admits only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Hence, both PTPs are equally most general theory of human needs. Let us discuss these two PTPs. We will also examine if one of these can be said to be better than the other. Here better means logically stronger than the other. Generally speaking Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers admit absence of pain as *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ). On the other hand Advaita Vedānta philosophers admit highest pleasure as

parama puruṣārtha (परम पुरुषार्थ). According to the Tautātita (तौतातित) view also pleasure of certain kind is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). Vātsyāyana has discussed and refuted the view of those who said *nityasukhābhivyakti* (नित्यसुखाभिव्यक्ति) is *mukti* (मुक्ति).²³ There are other schools of philosophy who have their different views about *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ). But we will discuss here only two schools i.e. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school and Advaita Vedānta School. So, we will discuss here VPTP [Vedānta philosophical theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ)] and NVPTP [Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophical theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ)]. Among them VPTP admits that highest pleasure is *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) and NVPTP admits that absence of pain is the *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ).

In this connection we want to note here one point though we will not discuss it elaborately. Many thinkers believe that there is no fundamental difference between Nyāya philosophical conception of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and Vaiśeṣika philosophical conception of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). But some hold the view that though according to Vaiśeṣika philosophy absence of pain is *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ), but according to Nyāya philosophy pleasure is *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ). But how can they have this wrong idea? This is strange. If we notice the very source book of *Nyāyadarśana* — the *Nyāya sūtra* of Gautama — there we find 'तदत्यन्तविमोक्ष अपवर्ग' (1/1/22). Here 'tat' means all types of *duḥkha* (दुःख) or pain including birth. For in the just previous *sūtra* Gautama mentioned *duḥkha* (दुःख). According to Vātsyāyana 'विमोक्ष' means absence or freedom from. On the other hand, Udayanācārya discussed the Vaiśeṣika view regarding *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) in his *Kiranāvalī*. He said, according to Vaiśeṣika philosophers, *parama puruṣārtha* (परम

पुरुषार्थ) is freedom from pain. However, in this work and in other philosophical works of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school we do not often find very detailed discussion of the controversy regarding whether *sukha* (सुख) or *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) is *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) (Vātsyāyana is an exception). What is more elaborately discussed is what sort of absence of pain is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). Is it the *prāgabhāva* (प्रागभाव) or *dhamṣābhāva* (धंषाभाव) or *atyantābhāva* (अत्यन्ताभाव) of *duḥkha* (दुःख)? So, we can say that both Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika philosophers admit that absence of pain is *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). But according to VPTP though *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) but this *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) means highest pleasure.

But why some thinkers believe that Nyāya philosophy admits pleasure as *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष)? Why they believe that only Vaiśeṣika-s admit absence of pain as *mokṣa* (मोक्ष)? This point I have discussed in the paper 'yoga and Nyāya: Allies or Adversaries' ²⁴ which is also a part of the chapter *puruṣārtha-sādhana* (पुरुषार्थ-साधन) in our present work. There we have mentioned two points in this connection. The first one is a popular story which we will not discuss here. The other one is a more serious and textual evidence. This evidence shows that Nyāya admits pleasure as *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). Bhāsarvajña was a great Naiyāika of the Kāshmir region and he was a śaiva also. He in his book *Nyāyasāra* with *Bhuṣana*, its commentary, has expressed his view that in a state of liberation there exist happiness.²⁵ But the standard Nyāya view or Gautama and his followers maintain the view that final freedom from pain and suffering is *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). So, actually there is no difference between Nyāya view and Vaiśeṣika

view regarding the nature of *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). There may be any individual Naiyāika (Nyāyaikadesi) and he may have his own individual view. But it will be wrong to treat the view as the view of a whole philosophical school. Though according to Bhāsarvajña, in liberation there is pleasure, but according to standard Nyāya view just freedom from pain is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) or liberation.

We have stated before that here we will discuss only the views of two philosophical schools — Advaita Vedānta (VPTP) and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika (NVPTP). First we will discuss VPTP.

Here we will not discuss in detail Advaita Vedānta theory of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). We are discussing here only their conception or view of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). Similarly after this we will discuss the conception or view of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) according to NVPTP. We will not discuss every argument given by Vedāntins or Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers. Vedānta philosophers admit only one *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) and that is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). But this position of VPTP may be challenged. In *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* it has been said that there are four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). ‘... धर्मार्थ-काम-मोक्षाख्येषु चतुर्विध-पुरुषार्थेषु’. The statement means ‘among *dharma* (धर्म), *artha* (अर्थ), *kāma* (काम) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष), the four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ)...’. In this part of the sentence the author of the text Dharmarāj says that the number of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is four. But the complete sentence says something more. It means that among the four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) namely *dharma* (धर्म), *artha* (अर्थ), *kāma* (काम) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) ‘मोक्ष एव परम पुरुषार्थ’ - that is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) alone is the best or highest *puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ). So, the text means *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is not the only *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), but among the four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ)

mokṣa (मोक्ष) is the highest. In other words, *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is not the only *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), but *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the only (एव) *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ).

Here we can say that philosophy (दर्शन) also is a highly general theory and it tries to adhere to the law of parsimony (लाघव). So, it is very obvious that a philosophical theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) will not admit more than one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) if there is provision or criterion according to which there can be only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ).

The difference between *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) and other *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is that other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are not eternal (नित्य), but *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is eternal (नित्य). Here Dharmarāj quoted from the *Upaniṣadic* text. For *Upaniṣad* also tells us that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is eternal (नित्य). Moreover, our experience also tells us that the other three *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are impermanent. In addition, these *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are associated with pain and suffering.

But one may have still some problems in Dharmarāj's position. For at first he suggests that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the only *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). But in the last chapter of the book [the *prayojana* pariceheda or the chapter which deals with the value of the system of Vedānta *darśana* (दर्शन)] he suggests that in the primary sense (मुख्य अर्थ) of the term '*puruṣārtha*' (पुरुषार्थ) it means mainly two human needs. These two needs are pleasure (सुख) and freedom from pain (दुःखाभाव).²⁶ He not only admits two *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) in the primary sense of the term, he also admits another two kinds of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) in the derivative (गौन) sense or secondary sense. In this sense the two *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are means of the

first two *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). Hence, Dharmarāj finally admits four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). Two of them are *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) in the primary sense or *mukhya artha* (मुख्य अर्थ) and another two of them are *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) in the secondary sense or *gauna artha* (गौण अर्थ). But after that Dharmarāj has offered another criterion to re-instate the thesis that there is only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). He says that one of the two primary *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) is *sukha* (सुख) or pleasure. Now, this pleasure can be of two types — qualified (सातिशय) and unqualified (निरतिशय). Among these *niratiśaya sukh* (unqualified) is the best and highest and it is the *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). He says "निरतिशय-सुखम् च ब्रम्हैव" (*prayojana parichhed*).²⁷ Thus we can say that according to Dharmarāj *niratiśaya sukh* (निरतिशय सुख) or *Brahman* (unblemished, unalloyed, highest and greatest pleasure) is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) and this is the *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). *Darśana* (दर्शन) is a part of man's quest of this highest fulfillment. This is the *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) or spiritual liberation. There are innumerable goals or needs of a human life. But *darśana* (दर्शन) is not concerned with these needs. *Darśana* (दर्शन) is concerned with the highest and universal goal of life. There are innumerable things in the world. But Vaiśeṣika philosophy is concerned with the six (or seven) most general kinds of things. Similarly, though there are innumerable needs, yet *darśana* (दर्शन) is concerned with the most general one. Let us go back to the Advaita Vedānta concept of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). According to them, *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the same as *Brahman* (ब्रम्ह). So, since *Brahman* is one, *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) will be one. Dharmarāj begins by saying that *primary prayajana* (need, goal etc.) are only two — pleasure and absence of pain. He says '... सुखदुःखाभावौ मुख्ये प्रोयोजने'.²⁸ Here we notice the similarity between Nyāya and Advaita Vedānta philosophy. In the *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* under *Bhāṣāpariccheda* (verse 146)

Viswanāth says 'फलन्तु सुखं दुःखाभावश्च'.²⁹ After this he has given argument why pleasure and absence of pain are *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). He says "तत्र फलेच्छां प्रति फलज्ञानं कारणम्".³⁰ Which means knowledge of the *phala* (good as end) is the cause of the desire of the *phala* (फल). So, if a man has no knowledge for the food x, then he cannot have any desire for that food x also. In other words knowledge of an object is the causal condition for the desire of that object. On the basis of such argument Viswanāth concludes that therefore pleasure and freedom from pain are *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Hence there are two *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) or good as end — pleasure and freedom from pain. But there may arise one question: Why do we say these are *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ)? Or what is the criterion for saying these as *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ)? As answer we can say that the thing is (rightly) called *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) if it satisfies the following description. That thing is *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) which is being known becomes the object of desire. *Puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is that object — if man knows it he wants to possess it for himself. We have said before that the word '*puruṣārtha*' (पुरुषार्थ) means *puruṣasya artha* (पुरुषस्य अर्थ). Here *artha* (अर्थ) and *proyojana* (literally need) are synonymous. Now, there are innumerable needs in the world such as food, medicine, cloth, education etc. But nothing can satisfy the description or criterion stated above. Food has no value to the man who is not hungry. Medicine has no value to the man who is medically fit and has no disease. Only pleasure and freedom from pain can satisfy the description or criterion stated above. Once man knows that x is pleasure, he wants to have it. Once man knows that y is pain, he wants to avoid it. As for example, innocent small child gives pleasure to many human beings. Now once a person knows that there is an innocent beautiful small child, he wants to go there. Similarly,

suppose a man without any umbrella caught in rain when it was a winter season and he suddenly comes to know that there is a good shelter near to that place. If he goes to that place, there will be freedom from pain caused by excessive rain. Now the moment he knows about the absence of pain or *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव), he desires to experience that *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव). Thus, only pleasure and absence (freedom from) of pain satisfy the description or condition of being *purusartha* (पुरुषार्थ) stated above.

One may say here that according to the criterion or description stated above many things can be said as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). As for example, food for a hungry man, toy for a child may be said as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). For, these also satisfy the criterion. Here it can be said that a philosopher knows all these things. He will do one thing. He will formulate and justify certain general truths. And ultimately he draws the conclusion that all needs and desires of men can be generalised into ultimately two needs — pleasure and freedom from pain. As for example, a hungry man desires food. But he does not seek food for merely having food. He seeks food, for food gives him pleasure. Similarly a lover of music wants to listen music not for music itself, but because it gives him pleasure. Now, a philosopher analyses all these and concludes that men desires things either in the positive sense or in the negative sense. If he desires objects in the positive sense, then it is pleasure and if he desires objects in the negative sense, then it is absence of pain. Not the food but pleasure it offers, not the food but the freedom from hunger it ensures, is what man needs.

Now, it seems that both NVPTP and VPTP agreed at the point that the most common and general end of human life are pleasure

and absence of pain. But still they have some differences. We will discuss that at a later time. Before that we want to mention here an interesting point. Viswanāth offers the linguistic meaning of the word ‘*puruṣārtha*’ (पुरुषार्थ) and criterion of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). The interesting point is that Dharmarāj gives exactly the same but as the meaning of the word ‘*prayajana*’ (प्रयोजन) and criterion of *prayajana* (प्रयोजन). He writes “यदवगतं सत् स्ववृत्तितयेस्यते तत् प्रोयोजनम्”.³¹ Viswanāth writes, as we quoted above, “...यज् ज्ञातं सत् स्ववृत्तितयेष्यते, स स्वतःपुरुषार्थ इति लक्षणात्”.³² In Dharmarāj’s formulation ‘*prayojana*’ means *puruṣa prayojana* (पुरुष प्रयोजन). So, here ‘स्व’ means *puruṣa* (पुरुष). ‘*prayojana*’ (प्रयोजन) and ‘*artha*’ (अर्थ) are synonymous. They refer same thing. There are cases when the word ‘*artha*’ (अर्थ) means something different. For example, in some of its use the word means substance (द्रव्य), quality (गुण) and action (कर्म). On the other hand, in Viswanāth’s formulation also ‘स्व’ means *puruṣa* (पुरुष).

As we said before, whether we take VPTP or NVPTP, the most generalised *artha* (अर्थ) or *prayojana* (प्रयोजन) or need are pleasure and absence of pain. If *sukha* (सुख) is *artha* (अर्थ), then absence of *sukha* (सुख) is *anartha* (अनर्थ); and if *duḥkha* (दुःख) is *anartha* (अनर्थ), then absence of *duḥkha* (दुःख) is *artha* (अर्थ) or *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Śaṅkarācārya has said at the end of his *Adhyāśabhāṣya* that Vedānta or Vedānta philosophy is meant to get rid of *anartha* (अनर्थ). ‘अस्य अनर्थहेतोः प्रहाणाय आत्मैकत्वविद्याप्रतिपत्तये सर्वे वेदान्ताः आरभ्यन्ते’.³³ It means that the great purpose of Vedānta philosophy is to remove (प्रहाण) *anartha* (अनर्थ). This *anartha* (अनर्थ) or *duḥkha* (दुःख) is not the same as any particular pain or any individual pain. *Anartha* (अनर्थ) means most generalised pain or we can say pain as such. In a sense *saṃsāra* (संसार) and *janma* (जन्म) also means *duḥkha* (दुःख). *Saṃsāra*

(संसार) means the totality of *duḥkha* (दुःख) or pain. Since in *saṃsāra* (संसार) or in this phenomenal world every man has to constantly face suffering, it means totality of *duḥkha* (दुःख). Even pleasure in this phenomenal world is also a source of pain. Actually the life in this phenomenal world is marked by suffering. Every man, even every sentient being (जीव), has to suffer pain according to the order. There cannot be any exception. For this reason the world is said to be full of pain (दुःखमय). Man tries to remove his pain through some possible means. The man who is suffering from certain disease tries to remove it through proper medicine. But he cannot remove it permanently. It will come again and again and will cause more pains. So, two things are important here.

1. Man can remove some pains but not all.
2. The pain which man can remove, he cannot remove it permanently.

It has been said that the remedy for all sufferings or *duḥkha* (दुःख) is *jñāna* (ज्ञान). It does not mean any particular *jñāna* (ज्ञान), but that *jñāna* (ज्ञान) which is called *darśana* (दर्शन शास्त्र) in the technical sense. The question may arise does any philosophical system able to lead man to this *jñāna* (ज्ञान)? In other words, is Nyāya or Vaiśeṣika or Sāṃkhya or Yoga or Vedānta or Mīmāṃsā provides the *jñāna* (ज्ञान) or *darśana* (दर्शन) which can free man from all suffering permanently? The answer is: yes, it can provide. Freedom from pain as such is known as *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). And according to all systems, *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the only *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ).

Now, the problem is if *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) means both pleasure and freedom from pain which one of the two will be the highest *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष)? Dharmarāj in the beginning of

his book said *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the only highest *puruṣārtha* or *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ).³⁴ Dharmarāj appears to admit that there are four *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) as are admitted in FVP. But among them the best and highest is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). So, *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is one according to VPTP. But at the end of his book Dharmarāj first says that in the most generalised and primary (मुख्य) sense *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) or *prayojana-s* are two — pleasure and absence of pain. To the question what is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) he says limitless or infinite pleasure or happiness is *Brahman* (ब्रह्म). Then he says ‘.....ब्रह्मप्राप्तिश्च मोक्षः’. *Mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the attainment of *Brahman*. This attainment of Advaita Vedānta consists in getting merged in or identified with the *Brahman* and more accurately it means getting rid of the false belief. The false belief is we are different from *Brahman*. Thus according Advaita Vedānta the highest and the greatest pleasure or its attainment is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष).

But what about *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव)? Is it *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ)? If it is *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), then there will be two *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) according to VPTP. These two *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are *Brahman* or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) and freedom from pain. And it will be in addition to the other three *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). For, these three are either pleasure or absence of pain in nature. Only the difference is that they are not the highest pleasure or highest freedom from pain.

It has been already said in *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* that the highest *sukha* [*niratiśaya sukha* (निरतिशय सुख)] which is one of the two *prayojana-s* or needs of human life is the same as *Brahman*. Hence, this *sukha* (सुख) will be *nitya* (नित्य). For, *niratiśaya sukha* (निरतिशय सुख) will be the same as *Brahman*. So, we can say *Brahman* is *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ). Dharmarāj quotes *Śruti* ‘आनन्दो

ब्रह्मेति व्यजानाद्'. So, among the two *prajoyana-s* only *niratiśaya sukha* (निरतिशय सुख) or eternal *sukha* (नित्य सुख) is the *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) (which once known man wants to have or possess it). We have said before that 'मोक्ष एव परम पुरुषार्थ'. So, now, we summarize that *Brahman*, whose nature is *Ānanda* (greatest pleasure) and who is *nitya* (नित्य) is the highest *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and it is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष).

But what about *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव)? *Duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) may be also of two types — *sātiśaya* (सातिशय) and *niratiśaya* (निरतिशय). As for example, a rich man does not have *duḥkha* (दुःख) what an ordinary man may have. So, in this sense he has *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव). But this *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) is limited. It may happen that his richness may vanish. Further he may have other *duḥkha* (दुःख) also. He may not have children. This is called *sātiśaya duḥkha* (सातिशय दुःख). But when a man gets *mokṣa* (मोक्ष), he will not return to this *samsāra* (संसार) or the world. This is called *niratiśaya duḥkhābhāva* (निरतिशय दुःखाभाव). This *niratiśaya duḥkhābhāva* (निरतिशय दुःखाभाव) is not limited and hence it is *nitya* (नित्य). So, like *niratiśaya sukha* (निरतिशय सुख), *niratiśaya duḥkhābhāva* (निरतिशय दुःखाभाव) is also *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ).

Thus highest *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are two. Dharmarāj says "आनन्दात्मक-ब्रह्मप्राप्तिश्च मोक्षः शोकनिवृत्तिश्च".³⁵ Meaning thereby *parama puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are two — pleasure and absence of pain. On the other hand, according to NVPTP there is only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and that is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). We have said that men have innumerable needs and FVP generalised them by making a list of four needs or *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). But from the philosophical standpoint this generalisation is not sufficient. So, philosophers made further one step generalisation and said that *puruṣārtha-s*

(पुरुषार्थ) are two — *sukha* (सुख) and *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव). But to make a strictly philosophical theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) philosophers made one step generalisation further. According to the criterion of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), if x is such a thing that whoever knows, he wants it, then x is a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Both VPTP and NVTP used this criterion. According to this criterion, only pleasure and absence of pain are *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). Adhereing to the notion of the principle of *lāghava* (principle of logical economy or persimony) philosophers (both Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika School and Vedānta school) try to generalise two *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) into one. To do this Vedānta philosophers introduce the criterion of permanence (नित्यत्व). So, among the four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) only one can be admitted in philosophy as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). At the primary stage both VPTP and NVPTP admits two *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). But after that VPTP introduces the notion of *carama puruṣārtha* or ultimate *puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ)). This criterion says that if one attains this *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), he never losses it. Why he never losses it? Is it because he dies the next moment? No, the answer is because this ultimate *puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) is *nitya* (नित्य). Now, there is another important problem. Which one is eternal among these two *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ)? Pleasure or absence of pain?

The criterion is based on the linguistic sense of the term and the definition of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). This shows that *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are two. If we add the condition of permanence to it then the criterion of ultimate *puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) will be this — the criterion two is that only the permanent good as end is *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). It also fulfils the first criterion. So, ultimate *puruṣārtha* (परम

पुरुषार्थ) must be *nitya* or eternal. We have seen that according to VPTP *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) alone is ultimate *puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ). Now we have to see which one is *nitya* (नित्य) and hence ultimate *puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ). Nyāya position is very clear in this regard. According to them, one of the most generalised *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). So, VPTP admits two *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ) and NVPTP admits only one. It is true that at first, like VPTP, NVPTP also holds the view that according to the criterion one there are two *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ). Viswanāth in his *Bhāṣāpariccheda* also hold this view. ³⁶ All philosophers of Nyāya and vaiśeṣika schools are agreed with this view. So, NVPTP have to offer another criterion to say that there is only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Is there any such criterion? If it is, what is it?

Very interestingly there can be two ways to establish that there is only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and one of them is adopted by NVPTP and the other is by VPTP. What are the ways? One way is to show that pleasure and absence of pain are identical. This highest pleasure is eternal and hence is the ultimate *puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ). Now, if absence of pain is identical with this highest pleasure, then there will be only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and not two. The other way to show that though theoretically there can be permanent and impermanent pleasure but practically there cannot be any permanent pleasure in the nyaya sense. In other words pleasure cannot be permanent. So, only absence of pain is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). But this absence of pain must be eternal. VPTP adopted the first way and NVPTP adopted the 2nd and the last way. In both these two ways we can have a strictly generalised philosophical theory of *puruṣārtha*

(पुरुषार्थ). And in both these ways philosophers prove that *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is neither four, nor two, but one.

Dharmarāj first said that there are two *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) — pleasure and absence of pain. After that he showed that *niratiśaya duḥkhābhāva* (निरतिशय दुःखाभाव) or *niratiśaya anarthanivṛtti* (निरतिशय अनर्थनिवृत्ति) is not different from *Brahman* itself. He also showed that *niratiśaya sukha* (निरतिशय सुख) is also not different from *Brahman*. Now, if this is the case that two things are identical with a third thing then we can say that these two things are also one and the same. So, *niratiśaya sukha* (निरतिशय सुख) and *niratiśaya duḥkhābhāva* (निरतिशय दुःखाभाव) are not different. In other words, according to VPTP, from the philosophical standpoint *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is one whether we call it as *niratiśaya sukha* (निरतिशय सुख) or permanent absence of pain.

Thus Dharmarāj shows that though VPTP admits two *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) in a most general sense yet *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is a simple and unitary *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). The logic was that if two things are identical with the third thing then these first two things are identical with each other. *Niratiśaya sukha* (निरतिशय सुख) and *niratiśaya duḥkhābhāva* (निरतिशय दुःखाभाव) or absence of all suffering are identical with *Brahman*. Then they are also identical with each other and hence *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is numerically one.

Another important point we need to clarify. We said that philosophy (दर्शन) is interested to give a most generalised theory about truth. And it is also same for the theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). But sometimes the word like 'most general' does not become clear and it may create some confusion. In the strict philosophical sense

mokṣa (मोक्ष) alone is the *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ). But what does the expression (most general) mean? In philosophy itself we generalise the things like Chair, Table, Window, The sun, Tree etc. and include them in a class called substance (द्रव्य). Is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) the name of a class like *dravya* (द्रव्य) in which all the *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are included? No, *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is not a class of all which includes the other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). Actually the philosophical theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) asserts two points:

1. *Mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and
2. *Mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is *carama* or *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ).

The second statement means that there cannot be other *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) which is better than *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) or highest than *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). But we need to satisfy here the respect in which it cannot be excelled. *Mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is *nitya* (नित्य) or we can say that it can be proved to be *nitya* (नित्य). This reason shows that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is highest from any other *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). For all will agree that all other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are impermanent [This may be incorrect in that Mīmāṃsā sense who holds that *svarga* (स्वर्ग) is permanent pleasure. But the general view is that a man who did good deeds enjoys the pleasure of *svarga* (स्वर्ग) for a limited period of time. After this he returns to this worldly existence or bondage]. But what is the reason for which Vedāntins admit that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is permanent? Those who belong to the Vedānta tradition is likely to cite the last *sūtra* (सूत्र) of the text known as *Brahmasūtra*. The *sūtra* (सूत्र) tells us that there is no coming back (to the world or state of bondage).³⁷ The *sūtra* (सूत्र) also tells us that there is *Śruti* in support of this view. So, evidence for the belief in the permanence of *mokṣa*

(मोक्ष) is the authority or the authoritative utterances of *Upaniṣada*. Śaṅkarācārya in his commentary on the last *Brahmasūtra* quoted some portions from *Chāndyogya Upaniṣada*. These portions and the last *Brahmasūtra* tells us that who has worshipped qualified *Brahman* also get rid, in due course, from this world and will not return to this world. Thus one can reach the state (of *niratiśaya sukha*) which is called *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). In an earlier *sūtra* 4/1/14 also it has been said worshipper gets *mukti* (मुक्ति). This *mukti* (मुक्ति) is a state from where one does not return to the state of bondage. It is true that these discussions show that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the result of the worship of *Brahman* (of the realization of *Brahman*) and does not prove that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is permanent. But it is also true that once somebody gets *mokṣa* (मोक्ष), it will not be destroyed. But one may not be satisfied with this answer. Still one may think that what *Chāndyogya Śruti* says is not convincing which Dharmarāj quoted to prove that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is permanent. But he just says “न च पुनरावर्तते” इत्यादि श्रुत्य । तस्य नित्यत्वावगमात्”.³⁸

It seems that Dharmarāj was aware about this type of objection. For this reason he says in the last chapter of his book that if *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is caused then we could hardly take the word ‘*anāvṛtti*’ (अनावृत्ति) to mean it’s permanence.³⁹ He, therefore, says that *mukti* (मुक्ति) is *niratiśaya sukha* (निरतिशय सुख) which is nothing but *Brahman* itself. After that he has quoted from *Śruti* to prove this. The implication is this if he is successful to mean *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) as *Brahman* then *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) will be proved automatically as *nitya* (नित्य) or permanent. Another point is this since *Brahman* is one, *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is also one and it is the *carama puruṣārtha* (चरम पुरुषार्थ).

Here an obvious question arises. What about *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) or absence of *duḥkha* (दुःख) or pain? *Duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) also fulfils the criterion required for a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). For, if one knows that the state x is a state of freedom from pain then he will desire it or seek to have it. So, it fulfils the first criterion. Now, does it also fulfil the second criterion i.e, the criterion of permanence? [Or we can say the criterion of *niratiśayatva* (निरतिशयत्व)]. Dharmarāja answers this question. According to him just as *niratiśaya sukha* (निरतिशय सुख) is identical with *Brahman*, complete freedom from pain is also identical with *Brahman*. Hence from this point it is also proved that complete freedom from pain is permanent or eternal. Dharmarāj proved that both *niratiśaya sukh* (निरतिशय सुख) and *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) are identical with *Brahman* by quoting from *Śruti text*. Commenting on Dharmarāj's writing pandit Pañcānan Śāstri writes that Dharmarāj cites *Śruti text* in support of first the identity of *sukha* (सुख) and *Brahman* and next identity of *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) and *Brahman*.⁴⁰ These texts are "ब्रह्मविद् ब्रह्मैव भवति" and "तरति शोकमात्मविदि". The first one tells us that one who knows *Brahman* becomes identical with *Brahman* (unqualified). But can we understand that this utterance means that *sukha* (सुख) is identical with *Brahman*? The answer is this: in *Śruti* it has been said that *Brahman* is *Sat*, *Cit* and *Ānanda* (आनन्द). This *Ānanda* (आनन्द) means *niratiśaya sukh* (निरतिशय सुख). One who gets *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) or liberation is identical with *Brahman* and *Brahman* is identical with *Ānanda* (आनन्द) or *niratiśaya sukh* (निरतिशय सुख). Another point is that this *Brahman* is *Sat* (सत्), meaning thereby *Brahman* is eternal or permanent. So, *niratiśaya sukha* (निरतिशय सुख) is also permanent. In the second utterance *Śruti* says that one who knows *Brahman* (and hence becomes identical with *Brahman*

according to the previous sentence) gets rid of (तरति) pain or suffering (शोक). However, the second *Śrutivākya* (श्रुतिवाक्य) does not explicitly say that absence of pain is identical with *Brahman*, but Dharmarāj gives argument to prove this point. He said that in Vedānta philosophy it has been said that *Brahman* is identical with *Ānanda* (आनन्द). This *Ānanda* (आनन्द) is identical with freedom from pain which *Brahman* evidently has. Originally *Brahman* is the substratum [*adhiṣṭhāna* (अधिष्ठान) or locus] of *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव). Nyāya philosophy admits separate (स्वतन्त्र) existence of absence. But according to Vedānta philosophy, absence is not different from its locus where it resides. Absence is *adhikaraṇa-svarūpa* (अधिष्ठान-स्वरूप).⁴¹ Hence, *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) or absence of pain is identical with its locus, i.e. *Brahman*. So, *Brahman* and absence of pain are the one and the same.

Thus Dharmarāj has given his proof and the proof is complete. So, VPTP is concerned with *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). One may call it limitless pleasure [*niratiśaya sukha* (निरतिशय सुख)], other may call it absence of pain or *duḥkha nivṛtti* (दुःखनिवृत्ति). But these two are identical with *Brahman* and hence it is one. So, VPTP is concerned with only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ).

Two more questions are very important to understand the position of VPTP. The first one is how the Vedāntin proves that *Brahman* is eternal? On the basis of this one they prove that final *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is just one. To prove the identity of *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) and *Brahman* Vedānta philosophy gives extra argument in addition to the evidence given in *Śruti*. But to prove the identity between *sukha* (सुख) and *Brahman* they have not given any extra

argument. For, *sukha* (सुख) is a positive entity whereas *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) is a negative entity (abhāva padārtha).

To understand Vedāntin's position we have to understand the logic which Vedāntins use to protect (maintain) their non-dualism. According to (Advaita) Vedānta philosophy the only reality is unqualified *Brahman*. So, *Brahman* cannot have any properties or qualities. It is also said that *Brahman* is *Sat* (*nitya* or eternal), *Cit* (consciousness) and *Ānanda* (bliss or limitless pleasure). From this it seems that *Brahman* has these three qualities or properties. But if it is so, then the fundamental thesis of Advaita Vedānta will not be retained. This fundamental thesis is non-dualism. For, then at least three more things we have to admit apart from *Brahman*. To solve this problem and secure non-dualism, Advaita Vedānta philosophy takes the help of the theory of negation. According to this theory, absence (अभाव) has no separate (स्वतन्त्र) existence other than its locus. So, though *Sat* (सत्), *Cit* (चित्) and *Ānanda* (आनन्द) are the properties of *Brahman*, yet they have no separate existence other than their locus i.e. *Brahman*. But problem is still there. The theory of negation secures the identity of absence and its locus. But *Sat* (सत्), *Cit* (चित्) and *Ānanda* (आनन्द) are not any negative entity, rather they are positive entity. How can it secure the identity between *Sat* (सत्), *Cit* (चित्) and *Ānanda* (आनन्द) and *Brahman*? And if it is not possible, then the main thesis of Advaita Vedānta will not be preserved. To solve this problem Vedāntins interpret *Sat* (सत्), *Cit* (चित्) and *Ānanda* (आनन्द) to show that they are negative entity. *Sat* (सत्) means *nityatva* (नित्यत्व) and they interpret it as absence of *anityatva* (अनित्यत्व) or impermanence. Like this *Cit* (चित्) means *caitanya* (चैत्यन्य) or consciousness and is interpreted as absence of *jaḍatva*

(जडत्व) or mortality. Again *Ānanda* (आनन्द) means limitless pleasure and is interpreted as absence of pain or *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव). In this way we can show that *Sat* (सत्), *Cit* (चित्) and *Ānanda* (आनन्द) are identical with *Brahman*. Madhusūdana Svarasvatī in his *Advaitasiddhi* has shown this point convincingly.⁴²

The second and the last question about VPTP is how *Brahman* is proved to be *nitya* (नित्य) or eternal? If *Brahman* is proved to be eternal then only *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) will be eternal. For unlimited pleasure or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is identical with *Brahman*. The answer is the *Śrutivākya* like "सत्यम् ज्ञानम् अनन्तम्"⁴³ etc. tells us that *Brahman* is eternal. For the word 'सत्' which is one of the *svarūpa lakṣaṇa-s* (स्वरूप लक्षण) of *Brahman* means *nitya* (eternal). Apart from such *Śrutivākya* the *Brahmasūtra* (सुत्र) 1/1/2 says that *Brahman* is eternal. Even in *Upaniṣadas* also it is said the *Brahman* is *nitya* (नित्य). In the *sūtra* (सुत्र) it is said that *Brahman* is the cause of creation (of the Universe), it's substratum and destruction. Now, if *Brahman* is the cause of the creation of everything, it cannot be impermanent. For, if *Brahman* is impermanent or created then there must be another cause which is also *Brahman*. That means *Brahman* is self-caused. But to say something is self-caused is to say in another way that it is *nitya* (नित्य) or it is not caused.

Here we will discuss another argument by which Vedāntin proves the *nityatva* (नित्यत्व) of *Brahman*. This argument is similar to the argument which Descartes offered to prove the existence of the self. In this argument Vedāntins say that consciousness or *caitanya* (चैत्यन्य) or its existence cannot be doubted or denied. To say that consciousness is impermanent is to say that consciousness exists temporarily. Again, to accept that consciousness exists temporarily is

to accept the absence of consciousness. Now to say that there is absence of consciousness one must be conscious about that. So, one cannot prove the absence of consciousness. Hence, Consciousness is eternal.

We have seen that there are innumerable needs or *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) of human life. It is fact and no philosopher of any Indian philosophical system will deny that fact. So, when some modern scholars raise the question whether there are other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) or not, then they actually raise a useless question. No philosopher will deny that there are many more *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) than they admit. So, when one say that there can be other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) then they only utter the fact which everybody knows. Actually they are not aware about the meaning of the word '*puruṣārtha*' (पुरुषार्थ). In this sense anything which man needs, desires or wants, is *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). [The word *puruṣa* (पुरुष) is also understood to mean any and every normal and adult human being]. They should note that the purpose of any theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is not to make a list of needs or *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ), rather to generalise and explain *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). There are mainly two ways to generalise for a philosopher of India. Either he can go a priori, or he can go by collecting empirical data. The second one is adopted by the Indian philosophers. They generalise *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in such a way that all individual *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) can be reduced in only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Since the theory is empirical, the reduction is not physical but definitional. First an effort has been made to generalise individual *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) so that other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) can be reduced to them. FVP has done this job. But it is not most generalised version.

Besides, it is not a fully systematic theory. FVP makes a list of four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). But they hardly explain by which criterion they accept four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). It may be possible that while admitting four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) they might have kept the division of the people of two groups in their mind. The first group of people is described as worldly persons. They mainly seek this-worldly pleasure. The second group of people is described as a sort of withdrawn persons. They want to spend their life in search of the good of the other world. This is the highest good.

A philosophical theory aims at the theoretical understanding and the explanation of the phenomenon it studies. Philosophical theory (we are talking about Indian philosophical theory) begins with facts or experiences. A philosophical theory knows that FVP makes a list of four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) — *dharma* (धर्म), *artha* (अर्थ), *kāma* (काम) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). It first seeks to connect the two. Why man wants *dharma* (धर्म)? Why man desires *artha* (अर्थ)? It tries to give explanation.

PTP begins with the problems of what man seeks and why man seeks. Man desires many things which he believes to be desirable. But man's believing a thing that it is desirable does not make it a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Suppose a man wants to commit suicide. He desires it. But can we say that committing suicide is a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ)? Let us take another example, a student wants to pass examination without studying the subject. Can we say that passing the examination without studying a subject is a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ)? Clearly, it is not. A man wants to grab other person's money and property by using an unfair means. But it is also not a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). So, there is nothing objectivity in death or in passing an

examination without studying the subject or capturing other's money and property. Then what does PTP say? PTP says that a thing will be *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) if it is desirable in itself or without depending on any conditions. *Artha* (अर्थ) is a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) not because a beggar seeks or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) though maximum men do not want it.

The above point begs the question: what makes a thing *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ)? It is clear that maximum men may not want a thing or even no man does not want a thing, but still it may be a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). So, there is no external condition which makes a thing *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Then what are the characteristics which make a thing *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ)? Suppose this characteristics or property is F according NVPTP. Now the obvious problem is if any internal or objective property makes a thing *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), then how a man can live without desiring it? NPTP has an answer to this problem. According to them the thing which has F and the thing which causes the desire of the thing are not the same. In other words suppose the thing T has the property F which makes T *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Now T has no role to make it desirable to men, it is something other than T. Then what makes it desirable? Actually the cause of any desire is a belief [*jñāna* (ज्ञान)]. Like belief, *jñāna* (ज्ञान) can be either true or false (ज्ञान जन्य भवेत् ईच्छा). Suppose there is a desirable thing, but I do not know this. Then I will not have any desire of that thing or object. So, the thing is not cause of my desire of that thing. It is the belief (certain) about that object which causes my desire of that object. So, it may be possible that a thing is actually desirable but still we do not desire it. On the other hand it is also possible that one may desire a thing but the thing is not actually

desirable. To put it otherwise, in case of desiring a thing as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) it (the thing) must have the objective property F and the desire must have the objective property G. We have said earlier that our desire is caused by our belief. So, G will be caused by the true belief of the object of desire or F. Now what is this F? Roughly speaking F is the property of being desirable. But then there will be circularity. Actually this property means the property of the thing which is truly known as conducive (अनुकूल वेदनीय) to our being. If we say something is *anukūla* (अनुकूल), then the question arises *anukūla* (अनुकूल) to what? Or to what it is conducive? A thing may be conducive to many things, many purposes. *Puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is conducive to our being. Water helps man to survive, but poison is not. So, we say water is conducive to the being. But poison is not. Similarly, fruits, vegetables are conducive to our being. So, when men feel happy in getting something, when he finds himself happy in relation to something which helps to live his life in better way then we can say that it is conducive to his being. It is not against his life. In a sense it promotes his life or helps to live a better life. There are innumerable things which are conducive to their being. But if we bring them in a same platform, we can say it is pleasure or *sukha* (सुख). And for this reason pleasure is *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). It is called स्वतः पुरुषार्थ. In the ultimate philosophical sense only svatah *puruṣārtha* (स्वतः पुरुषार्थ) is *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are सापेक्ष (relative or dependent) *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). For, they depend upon svatah *puruṣārtha* (स्वतः पुरुषार्थ) or they are *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) only because they are related to svatah *puruṣārtha* (स्वतः पुरुषार्थ).

Another important point is that this property or the property of being a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is a natural property and the state of mind when we feel that something is conducive to our being is natural state of mind (internal state). In the context of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy experience of pleasure, pain etc. are not any state of mind strictly speaking. So, in this context state of mind should be understood as internal state or the state of the self of the individual.

According to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers, *sukha* (सुख) which they admit as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is also a natural, empirically verifiable internal state. It is true for every normal human being or even every animal or sentient creature that they experience pleasure or they feel pleasure when they get something which is conducive to their being. This pleasure and the experience of this pleasure [we will discuss whether they are different or not] both are pleasing. A thing (for example, any particular food or fruit etc.) which we really want not because it is desirable but because it will help to live our life. It gives us pleasure. If we get such thing, we feel pleasure or *sukha* (सुख). We want this pleasure. We can test this with any *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and we will see that in all cases it produces pleasure. According to Vedānta philosophy, limitless *sukha* (निरतिशय सुख) or pleasure is *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Man naturally wants pleasure. *Dharma* (धर्म), *artha* (अर्थ) etc. give us pleasure in the sense that they are means of pleasure (सुखोपाय). If they were not means of pleasure we could not want them. *Dharma* (धर्म), *artha* (अर्थ), *kāma* (काम) — all are means of pleasure. This pleasure is agreeable (अनुकूल) with our nature.

We have said earlier that philosophy gives us a most general theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). FVP also gives us a general theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). But PTP gives most general theory of the subject. No theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) can be more general than VPTP. Because VPTP admits only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and that is pleasure. In *sukha* (सुख) two criteria are merged. *Puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) must be *anukūlavedanīya* (अनुकूलवेदनीय) or agreeable with the nature of man. For it makes no sense to say or it is contradictory to say that it is a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and it goes against man's nature or is found disagreeable. This is the objective property and pleasure or *sukha* (सुख) has this property. The other criterion of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) follows from the meaning of the term. Again, it makes no sense if a man says "I know that sharing food with a hungry man who is present is pleasing but I do not want to share my food with him."

By now it has become clear that in the strict philosophical sense *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is just one, not four. According to Vedānta, it is pleasure or *sukha* (सुख). It is known as *svataḥ puruṣārtha* (स्वतः पुरुषार्थ). If there is anything, other than pleasure, which is also *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), then it must be *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in a derivative or secondary sense. In this way we can say that *artha* (अर्थ) and *dharma* (धर्म) are *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in a secondary sense. But what about *kāma* (काम)? It is difficult to answer. But all four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) give us pleasure.

Another objection one may arise. We have said that all four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) give us pleasure. Now, the objection is: there is no logical and moral necessity that one must desire pleasure. Neither logically we can say that (as a matter of logical necessity)

one must desire pleasure nor morally we can say that (as a matter or moral or ethical necessity) one should desire pleasure. As an answer one may say that man is constituted in this way that he naturally desires pleasure. But then also one may say that there may be a differently constituted man. And his normal nature is to avoid pleasure. For this reason we already said that in their theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy offers a theory which is not a priori but empirical. In other words, the theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy is not based upon any a priori conditions, rather it is based upon empirical truths or facts. Empirically it is observed that any normal man seeks pleasure. No normal man, we observe, wants to avoid pleasure. It may be the case that a man does not want pleasure (in a case of a particular pleasure). But then also if we analyse the case we find that the man does not want pleasure either to get more valuable pleasure or to sacrifice his pleasure for his nearest dearest one (say for his son and daughter). Yogi or sannyāsī (संन्यासी) sacrifices his many pleasures to get God or a freedom fighter sacrifices his many pleasures for the sake of the independence of his motherland. In a sense they do not feel these as pleasure, which normal people feel as pleasure. Rather they felt pleasure to sacrifice for the sake of their motherland or for God. So, actually they also seek pleasure but in a special sense. So, we cannot say that some men reject or avoid pleasure. We can only say that they reject whatever they do not find attractive or desirable.

Now another question arises: Whether according to NVPTP *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) or absence of pain is a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in the principal sense or not? If it is regarded as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ),

then the number of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) will be two. We cannot deny *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव). For, it satisfies both criteria. If one knows that x is *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव), he must desire it. On the other hand, *sukha* (सुख) is also a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in the primary sense. So, both *sukha* (सुख) and *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) are *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). In other words, the objective property of being experienced as agreeable (अनुकूलवेदनिय) qualifies *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) as much as it qualifies *sukha* (सुख). A philosophical theory should be as general as possible and as economical [*laghu* (लघु), having *lāghava* (लाघव) or approved by law of parsimony] as possible. If we see that a philosophical theory admits two *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) and it is most general then it will be acceptable. Here the number of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) seems to be a non-issue. What we have to notice is that the theory should not be too wide or too weak to make it most comprehensive. And it should not admit any *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) which is reducible to another *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). In other words, it should be too strict such that no *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is admitted as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) which is not irreducible. It seems that a Naiyāika will not have any problem to accept both *Sukha* (सुख) and *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव). But this is not the case. How do they decide which of the two — *sukha* (सुख) and *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) — is better and why? A Naiyāika has answer to both these questions. So, according to NVPTP, philosophically speaking there is only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Now we will discuss this.

We have discussed that FVP and PTP are not antithetical to each other, rather continuous. FVP admits four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) but it includes neither *sukha* (सुख) nor *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव). We have also discussed the definition of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) which

shows that *dharma* (धर्म), *artha* (अर्थ), *kāma* (काम) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) are *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). Both VPTP and NVPTP mention the definition of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) according to which only *sukha* (सुख) and *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) are *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). So, if one wants to show *dharma* (धर्म), *artha* (अर्थ), *kāma* (काम) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) to be *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) according to the definition, he has to show that each of them are the form of either *sukha* (सुख) or *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव). Now it is a new problem which has cropped up. How can we show that these four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are the form of either *sukha* (सुख) or *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव)? We have already shown that *dharma* (धर्म), *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम) are form of *sukha* (सुख), for they are *anukūlavedanīya* (अनुकूलवेदनीय). For a Vedāntin, *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is also a form of *sukha* (सुख). For according to VPTP, *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is *niratiśaya sukha* (निरतिशय सुख). So, for a Vedāntin, all the four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are the form of *sukha* (सुख). But the criterion of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), like *sukha* (सुख), *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) also satisfies. If we say that this *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) is distinct from *sukha* (सुख), then VPTP have to admit two *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). We have already discussed how Vedāntins show that ultimate *sukha* (सुख) and *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) are identical. But they need to show why in the ultimate sense there is only one *sukha* (सुख) which is identical with the ultimate *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) and not three or four. Vedāntins show *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is not only a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in the sense of *sukha* (सुख). In that sense *dharma* (धर्म), *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम) are also *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). But Vedāntin brought one criterion which shows *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the ultimate and better than any one of the other three. This criterion is the criterion of permanence. For the Vedāntins only *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is permanent pleasure or *sukha* (सुख).

The other three *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) admitted in FVP are comparatively and relatively inferior. They all are impermanent.

But, for Nyāya, all *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are non- eternal. For each one of them are caused or produced. According to Nyāya philosophy, all the four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are object of desire and equally impermanent. They do not admit *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) as permanent as Vedāntin-s say. But since each one of the first three is a form of *sukha* (सुख), they need not be counted separately in a philosophical theory. They can be generalized and reduced to just one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and that is *sukha* (सुख). So, now we have two *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) — *sukha* (सुख) and *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव).

Now, the important question arises: Is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) a form of *sukha* (सुख) or a form of *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव)? The Nyāya answer is: *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is a form of *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव). In NPTP there is no hierarchy between *sukha* (सुख) and *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव). Man desires both and both are important. Here one may think that, if he is inspired by VPTP, the Nyāya exposition is most unreasonable. There are some reasons. It seems that Nyāya violates law of parsimony by admitting two *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) as ultimate. A philosophical theory can be rejected if it is not most economical. Is NPTP inferior to VPTP? Let us examine two options. The first option is that Naiyāika can say that *sukha* (सुख) is identical with *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव). For they already admit that both are impermanent and men want both. The second option is that Naiyāika can admit at least one of them as eternal. If they accept first option, then there will be ultimately one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and no problem will be there. They can accept second option also. If *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is *sukha* (सुख), then it [*sukha* (सुख)] will be eternal and if *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is

duḥkhābhāva (दुःखाभाव) then *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) will be eternal. If Naiyāikas admit either one of the two options, the problem will not be there.

Let us now state and examine the Nyāya responses to the above suggestions or criticism of the Vedāntin. Vedāntin says that Nyāya theory could be better theory if they identified *sukha* (सुख) and *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) and admitted only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). The first reply of Nyāya is that Nyāya realizes that to identify the two [*sukha* (सुख) and *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव)] would be illogical as they are different. Nyāya admits that it is easier for a Vedāntin to show that *sukha* (सुख) and *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) are different and yet they wrongly identified the two. And to do this they violated the basic law of logic. Nyāya does not only say that *sukha* (सुख) and *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) are different but they further say that this is so according to Vedānta philosophy also. A Vedāntin can show that *sukha* (सुख) and *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) are different in the case of *suṣupti* (सुषुप्ति) or deep dreamless sleep. According to Vedāntin, in the state of *suṣupti* (सुषुप्ति) there is obviously *sukha* (सुख). For *sukha* (सुख) is experienced in *suṣupti* (सुषुप्ति). But *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) is not experienced there. Thus for a Vedāntin *sukha* (सुख) and *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) are different.

According to a Naiyāika, in *suṣupti* (सुषुप्ति) one does not experience either pleasure or pain (or any other internal state). But still they are different. The cause of pleasure does not produce pain and vice versa. Moreover, pleasure is experienced as agreeable (अनुकूल वेदनीय) and pain as disagreeable (प्रतिकूल वेदनीय). If two things are different, then their absence (अभाव) is also different. Moreover, a positive entity (भाव) is different from an *abhāva* (अभाव). *Bhāva* (भाव)

is experienced as ‘*asti*’ (अस्तित्वबुद्धि-विषय) and an *abhāva* (अभाव) is experienced as ‘*nāsti*’ (नास्ति) or ‘*na*’ (नास्तित्वबुद्धि-विषय or भेदबुद्धि-विषय and so on). *Sukha* (सुख) is *bhāva padārtha* (भाव पदार्थ) and included in *guṇa* (गुण). *Duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) is *abhāva padārtha* (अभाव पदार्थ). How can they be identical? Nyāya maintained their logical consistency by not identifying the two. At the most this will cost the Naiyāikas to have a PTP which is only optimally simple and not absolutely simple and economical. It is better to build up a theory which is logically consistent and optimally economical than a theory which is absolutely simple and logically inconsistent.

We have so far seen that *sukha* (सुख) and *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) cannot straightway be identified. A Vedāntin identified the two by showing their identity to a third thing — *Brahman*. But how *sukha* (सुख) can be identified with *Brahman*? We saw that Vedāntin could do so only by first reducing *sukha* (सुख) to *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव), i.e., by identifying what cannot be identified. Thus neither directly nor indirectly *sukha* (सुख) and *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) can be identified [Besides Nyāya does not admit *Brahman* or the Vedānta view of *abhāva* according to which *abhāva* is identical with its locus.]

Here a Vedāntin may say that still there is a way if Naiyāika-s admit second option and say *sukha* (सुख) and *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) are permanent. It is true that in Nyāya philosophy both positive entity (भाव पदार्थ) and negative entity (अभाव पदार्थ) can be permanent (नित्य). Self (आत्मा) is a positive entity which is also permanent and absolute absence (अत्यन्ताभाव) is a negative entity which is also permanent. So far there can be *nitya sukha* (नित्य सुख) and *nitya duḥkhābhāva* (नित्य दुःखाभाव). But for a Naiyāika the problem will be the same whether they both admit *sukha* (सुख) and

duḥkhābhāva (दुःखाभाव) are *nitya* (नित्य) or as *anitya* (अनित्य). All the classical schools of Indian Philosophy [and followers of these schools even today] admit *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) as the highest *puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ). Even the Cārvāka-s admit *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) though in their view it is nothing other than death. We have already seen that the first three *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ) admitted in FVP are positive in character. They can be easily brought under *sukha* (सुख). But what is the nature of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष)? Is it a positive entity or *sukh* (सुख) or negative entity or *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव)? Another problem is what makes it highest or *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ)? Vedānta has an answer. According to them, *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is permanent. But Nyāya has a problem. For, they do not admit any permanent pleasure. Secondly, they do not admit that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is a permanent absence (नित्य अभाव). Even if *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is absence of pain, it is not eternal absence of pain. For a Naiyāika if any argument contradicts the Scripture (*Āgama* or *Śruti*), then it will not be a valid argument. It is well known to all that *Śruti* says *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is *nitya* (नित्य). The last sūtra (सूत्र) of Vedānta *darśana* (दर्शन) also says this. The author of the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* also refers to this *Śruti* at the beginning of his text. Hence, Nyāya cannot say that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is not *nitya*.

Here a Naiyāika can say that even if *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is admitted as *nitya* (नित्य), the problem will still be there. The problem is regarding the number of ultimate *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). If a philosophical theory violates law of parsimony, then it will be regarded as less acceptable theory. If we admit *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) to be *nitya puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) even then we cannot reduce the number of *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ) to one. For if *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is of the nature of

pleasure and *nitya* (नित्य), then it will be the highest among all *sukha* (सुख) [admitting for the sake of argument that there is only one *nitya sukha* (नित्य सुख)], but not among all *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). So, on the side of *sukha* (सुख) there will be *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). But since *sukha* (सुख) cannot be reduced to *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव)[and vice versa] the scheme of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) of PTP would include at least two *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) — *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) and *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव). Similarly, if *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the highest kind of absence of pain because it is *nitya* (नित्य), then also a PTP should include *sukha* (सुख) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). *Mokṣa* (मोक्ष) would be highest among all forms of *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) only [and not also among all kinds of *sukha-s* (सुख)]. This general argument applies equally to all. So, just as *nitya* (नित्य) VPTP should also admit at least two *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) and not one. And both Nyāya and Vedānta are to be free from the problem that if there are two equally irreducible *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) then why they say that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the highest *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ)?

The final Nyāya position in brief is this. To solve the problem stated above Nyāya need not admit that there cannot be *nitya sukha* (नित्य सुख) [permanent pleasure] or *nitya duḥkhābhāva* (नित्य दुःखाभाव) [eternal absence of pain]. It is enough to admit that neither permanent pleasure nor permanent absence of pain can be *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). The argument is that anything that is *nitya* (नित्य) violates a central part of the meaning of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or a necessary criterion of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). This argument does not violate the *Śruti* text "न च पुनरावर्तते". This *Śruti* text does not mean *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is *nitya* (नित्य) nor does it violate the meaning or criterion of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). This *Śruti* means that once one attains liberation, one does

not return back to this world or *saṃsāra* (संसार). A man of the world is not already in a state of liberation [for the present we are talking about *videha mukti* (विदेह मुक्ति) or *lokottara avasthā* (लोकतर अवस्था)]. So, he needs liberation. It is his *prayojana* (प्रयोजन). This *prayajana* (प्रयोजन) leads him to take a way so that he can attain liberation. When he succeeds or when he finally attains his liberation through his effort, he never loses it again. So, after attaining liberation he never returns back to *saṃsāra* (संसार). Thus a part of the meaning of *prayajana* (पुरुष प्रयोजन) or *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is that it leads men to adopt appropriate means (*puruṣārtha sādhana*) for attaining *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). Men lose the world in death and returns back to it again when he takes rebirth. But the man who attained liberation does not come back again. This is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष).

Mokṣa (मोक्ष) may be *sukha* (सुख) or may be *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव). But the most important point for a Naiyāika is that it is not eternal. It is not already there; it is caused or attained through proper means but it will never be destroyed again. We never lose it nor do we need to regain it. But for this Nyāya has no need to admit *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) as eternal. For, they admit one kind of negative fact — which is both caused and indestructionable. It is known as *dhaṃsābhāva* (ध्वंसाभाव) which has a cause but has never any end. If certain cause destroys a table, it never returns. That means the destruction of a table never ends. Another table can be produced. Thus *dhaṃsābhāva* (ध्वंसाभाव) is that kind of thing which is caused but never destroyed again. For this reason it is called *sādi* (has beginning) and *ananta* (never destroyed). According to Nyāya, *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is such kind of entity. Thus Nyāya builds a perfect PTP where *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) has been admitted as *dhaṃsābhāva* (ध्वंसाभाव). It

is the final destruction of all sufferings or pain. *Mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is *ātyanTika duḥkhābhāva* (आत्यन्तिक दुःखाभाव).

If there is any *sukha* (सुख) which is comparable with *ātyanTika duḥkhābhāva* (आत्यन्तिक दुःखाभाव) or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) then Nyāya PTP would have two *puruṣārtha*-s (पुरुषार्थ). But Vātsāyana elaborately argued why there may not be such kind of *sukha* (सुख). If there is a *sukha* (सुख) which is uncaused and cannot be brought into existence by human effort then it cannot be *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or *puruṣa prayajona* (पुरुष प्रयोजन). If *sukha* (सुख) is to be a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) the only possibility is that it should be caused but should not be destroyed later. But it is not possible. For, there is a rule and that is if an entity is caused (जन्य) and if it is also a *bhāva padārtha* (पदार्थ) (Positive entity) then it must be destroyed later. So, *sukha* (सुख) cannot be a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). And so, there is only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) — final destruction (आत्यन्तिक निवृत्ति) of all sufferings. All created or caused pleasure are destroyed later. But being an *abhāva* (धंषाभाव) *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is never destroyed. Hence it is superior to *sukha* (सुख). We need to achieve it only once. Thus NPTP establishes that the number of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) (in the ultimate philosophical sense) is just one. And further it is of the nature of *abhāva* (अभाव). It is *dhaṃsābhāva* (ध्वंसभाव); it is *duḥkha dhaṃsa* (दुःख ध्वंस), destruction of all sufferings.

A Vedāntin will not be unhappy if Naiyāika-s say that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is of the nature of *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव). For they also do that. We have shown above that according to VPTP though *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is said to be *Ānanda* (आनन्द) yet this *Ānanda* (आनन्द) is interpreted as *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव). Otherwise in their system there is no way to preserve the truth of the *Śruti* — 'न च पुनरावर्तते' —

as they understand it [*mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is *nitya* (नित्य)]. And if they do not take *Ānanda* (आनन्द) to be *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव), they can neither show *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) or *Ānanda* (आनन्द) to be *nitya* (नित्य) nor they can show it as identical with *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव). Hence, considering all the arguments Nyāya PTP seems to be a better theory.

Notes and References

- 1 Another word also occurs there and that is 'यतः सिद्धि' which means 'from which it is obtained'.
- 2 But the *Nyāyasūtra* 1/1/2 tells us clearly that *dharma* (धर्म) is a means of (getting) both *abhudaya* (अभ्युदय) and *niḥśreyas* (निःश्रेयस).
- 3 'पुरुषार्थासाधारणः कारणम् धर्मः' — *Upaskār tikā* on *Kaṇāda sūtra* — 1/1/2.
- 4 'परमपुरुषार्थयो सुखो दुःखाभावयो' — *Ibid.*
- 5 'स्वर्गापवर्गयो एव परम पुरुषार्थत्वात्' — *Ibid.*
- 6 'धर्मविशेषप्रसुताद् द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवायानां पदार्थानां साधर्म्य-वैधर्माभ्यां तत्त्वजनान्निःश्रेयसम्' – *Kaṇāda sūtra* (1/1/4), *ṣaḍadarśanasūtrasaṃgraha*, edited by Shastri, Dwarikadas, Sudhi Prakashana, Varanasi, 1988.
- 7
प्रमाणप्रमेयसंशयप्रयोजनदृष्टान्तसिद्धान्तावयवतर्कनिर्णयवादजल्पवितण्डाहेत्वाभासच्छल जातिनिग्रहस्था नानां तत्त्वज्ञानान्निःश्रेयसाधिगमः – *Gautam sūtra* 1/1/1, *ṣaḍadarśanasūtrasaṃgraha*, edited by Shastri, Dwarikadas, Sudhi Prakashana, Varanasi, 1988.
- 8 Śaṅkarācārya, *Adhyāṣa bhāṣya* on *Bramha sutra*, Udbodhan karyalaya, Kolkata, 1980, p. 62.
- 9 *Sāṃkhya sūtra* 1/1/1, *ṣaḍadarśanasūtrasaṃgraha*, edited by Shastri, Dwarikadas, Sudhi Prakashana, Varanasi, 1988.

- ¹⁰ *Sāṃkhya sūtra* 6/70, *ṣaḍadarśanasūtrasaṃgraha*, edited by Shastri, Dwarikadas, Sudhi Prakashana, Varanasi, 1988.
- ¹¹ *Yoga sūtra* 4/34, *ṣaḍadarśanasūtrasaṃgraha*, edited by Shastri, Dwarikadas, Sudhi Prakashana, Varanasi, 1988.
- ¹² परमप्रयोजनम् तु अनुमानस्य अपवर्गः — Gangeśapādhyāy, *Muktivāda prakaraṇa* of *Tattvacintāmaṇi*.
- ¹³ This suggests that it is known that there are other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) or people believe that there are other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ), but those are not *parama puruṣārtha-s* (परम पुरुषार्थ) and hence they are not the concern of philosophy (दर्शन).
- ¹⁴ G.E.Moore has said all this in his *Some Main Problems of Philosophy*, Collier Books, New York, 1962.
- ¹⁵ Adhvarīndra, Dharmarāja, *Vedānta Paribhāṣā* (with Bengali translation by Pt. Śāstrī, Pañcānan), Pañcānan Śāstrī edition, Kolkata, 1892 (Shakabda). p. 4.
- ¹⁶ Ibid., p. 5.
- ¹⁷ *Sukti*, in Kavirāj, Gopināth, and Śāstrī, Dhundhirāj (eds.), *Praśastapāḍabhāṣyam* (with 3 *tīkās*), Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Benaras, 1924, p. 21.
- ¹⁸ Ibid., p. 7.
- ¹⁹ Udayanācārya, *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, 1/9 with Sanskrit commentary of Sri Bhattacharya, Haridas and edited by Shiromani, Visheshvar Siddhanta, Chowkhamba Vidyabhawan, Varanasi, 1988, p. 44.
- ²⁰ Sometimes efforts and exertions are welcome if it leads to greater pleasure. In that case such actions or efforts can be good as means but not good as end. It is not end-in-itself even if it is end as means.
- ²¹ Their may be many ways for earning wealth. But such wealth is not *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) if it is not earned through *dharma* (धर्म).

²² *Svarga* (स्वर्ग) [*naraka, devatā* etc.] is both *aloukika* (अलौकिक) and *pāralaukika* (पारलौकिक). *Mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is supposed to be *alaokika* (अलौकिक) but need not be essentially *pāralaukika* (पारलौकिक) if we admit *jivanmukti* (जीवन्मुक्ति). Besides, *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is a state beyond all *loka-s* (लोक). It is a *lokattara* (लोकत्तर) state.

²³ Vātsyāyana, *bhāṣya* on *Nyāya sūtra* of Gautam, 1/1/22, Paschimbanga Rajya Pustak Parsad, Kolkata, 2011.

²⁴ Bhattacharya, Swati, 'yoga and Nyāya: Allies or Adversaries', Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research, vol- XXIX, Number-1, New Delhi, 2012.

²⁵ Bhāsarvajña, *Nyāyasāra* with *Bhuṣana*.

²⁶ '...सुखदुःखाभावै मुख्ये प्रयोजने' — Prayojon parichhed of *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, (in Sanskrit) Pañcānan Śāstri edition, Kolkata, 1884 (shakabda), p. 296.

²⁷ Adhvarīndra, Dharmarāj, *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, (Bengali translation by Pt. Śāstri, Pañcānan), Pañcānan Śāstri edition, Kolkata, 1892 (Shakabda), p. 321.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 320.

²⁹ Viswanāth, Nyāyapañcānan, *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* under *Bhāṣāpariccheda* (verse 146), (Sanskrit translation by Pt. Śhāstri Pañcānan), Pañcānan Śāstri edition, Kolkata, 1884 (Shakabda).

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Adhvarīndra, Dharmarāj, *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* (Bengali translation by Pt. Śāstri, Pañcānan), Pañcānan Śāstri edition, Kolkata, 1892 (Shakabda), pp. 319-320.

³² Viswanāth, Nyāyapañcānan, *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* under *Bhāṣāpariccheda* (verse 146), (sanskrit translation by Pt. Śāstri, Pañcānan), Pañcānan Śāstri edition, Kolkata, 1884.

³³ Śaṅkarācārya, *Adhyāṣabhāṣya* on *Brahmasūtra*, Udvodhan karyalaya, Kolkata, 2009, p. 62.

- 34 '...मोक्ष एव परम पुरुषार्थ' — Adhvarīndra, Dharmarāj, *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* (Bengali translation by Pt. Śāstri, Pañcānan), Pañcānan Śāstri edition, Kolkata, 1892 (Shakabda), pp. 4-5.
- 35 *ibid.*, p. 321.
- 36 'निर्दुःखत्वे सुखे चेच्छा तज्ज्ञानादेव जायते' — Viswanāth, Nyāyapañcānan, *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* under *Bhāṣāpariccheda* (verse 146), (Sanskrit translation by Pt. Śāstri, Pañcānan), Pañcānan Śāstri edition, Kolkata, 1884 (Bengali era).
- 37 'अनावृत्ति शब्दात् अनावृत्ति शब्दात्'.
- 38 Adhvarīndra, Dharmarāj, *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* (Bengali translation by Pt. Śāstri, Pañcānan), Pañcānan Śāstri edition, Kolkata, 1892 (Shakabda), p. 5.
- 39 'तस्य कृतक्त्वेनानित्यत्वे मुक्तस्य पुनरावृत्यापत्तेः' — *Ibid.*, p. 321.
- 40 Śāstri, Pañcānan, *Paribhāṣā-Saṅgraha* on *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, (in Sanskrit), Pañcānan Śāstri edition, Kolkata, 1884 (Shakabda), p. 293.
- 41 'अधिकरनातिरिक्त अभाव अनभ्युपगमात्' — *Ibid.*, p. 299.
- 42 *Ibid.*, p. 6.
- 43 Quoted in his *Paribhāṣā-Saṅgraha* on *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* (Sanskrit), by Pt. Śāstri, Pañcānan, Pañcānan Śāstri edition, Kolkata, 1884 (Shakabda), p. 3.

Chapter–V

Love as Human Need (भक्ति पुरुषार्थ)

Philosophical analysis always keeps a room for opponent's view, self- analysis, self-corrections and hence further progress. So, as we find another very important view regarding the ultimate *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or highest goal of life, it cannot remain (left) undiscussed. In this chapter we will concentrate on *bhakti* as *puruṣārtha* (भक्ति पुरुषार्थ) and the arguments which *bhaktivādin-s* generally give in favour of their doctrine. Discussion of *bhakti puruṣārtha* (भक्ति पुरुषार्थ) involves reference to *Vaiṣṇavism* in general and *Gouḍiya Vaiṣṇavism* in particular. The doctrine of *bhakti* (भक्ति) of the *Gouḍiya Vaiṣṇava-s* not only admits that *bhakti* (भक्ति) is *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) but also says that *bhakti* (भक्ति) is a *puruṣārtha-sādhana* (पुरुषार्थ-साधन) or the means to achieve it. The modern Hindu-s, in general, do not support *bhaktivādin-s* view that *bhakti* (भक्ति) is a *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) or highest goal of life. But they support mainly *bhaktivādin's* two points. One is that *bhakti* (भक्ति) is a way or *sādhana* (साधन) to achieve God and the other is that *karma* (कर्म) does not help to achieve *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ).¹

To start the discussion of *bhakti* (भक्ति) we want to discuss first why we have not included the discussion of *bhakti* (भक्ति) in FVP and PTP or in the chapter of individual *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). In general we can say that it was not included in PTP, for the doctrine of *bhakti* (भक्ति) is not admitted by any philosophical systems of India. And it was not included in FVP, for modern people of India or modern India has not added *bhakti* (भक्ति) in the popular or familiar

list of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). But it is not enough for explaining the reason why we have not included the discussion of *bhakti* (भक्ति) in either PTP or FVP. We would discuss this matter first. After that we would discuss how *Bhaktivādin-s* (भक्तिवादी) say that *bhakti* (भक्ति) is both a *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) and means to attain it. We would also concentrate on three sources of *Bhaktivāda* — the *Gītā*, the *Bhāgavatpurāṇam*, and *Tantra*. We would discuss also the place of *bhakti* (भक्ति) in the famous debate between *Samuccayavāda* (समुच्चयवाद) and *Asamuccayavāda* (असमुच्चयवाद). To strengthen their doctrine sometimes *bhaktivādin-s* say that some world famous Advaita Vedāntins also accept *bhakti* (भक्ति) as *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ). We would critically examine whether we can reasonably say that (or not) by citing some passages from original text on this matter. In discussing such points we would discuss many more points which will come in the scope of the said topics.

Many years ago *bhakti* (भक्ति) movement started and gradually it has taken a specific form. Even today it is very popular among a large number of people in India. Sri Chaitanya-deva founded *Gouḍiya Vaiṣṇavism* and the supporters of *Gouḍiya Vaiṣṇavism* plays a leading role to establish the distinction between *bhakti* as a means (साधन-भक्ति) and *bhakti* as an end in itself (साध्य-भक्ति). The people who do not accept *karma* (कर्म) theory admit *bhaktivāda* (भक्तिवाद). To put it otherwise, the person who does not believe in *karmavāda* (कर्मवाद), generally does not believe in *Classical Hindu dharma* (सनातन हिन्दु धर्म) also. And these modern Hindus though generally are not interested to support *bhakti* (भक्ति) as a *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) or ultimate goal of life, yet they strongly

support *bhakti* as a *sādhana* (साधन भक्ति) or means or way and not *karma* (कर्म) (whatever it is²). It follows, therefore, that the context of *bhaktivādin-s* and believers in modern Hinduism both admit *bhakti* (भक्ति) as a better way than *karma* (कर्म) to achieve life's highest fulfilment. Even uneducated simple minded people want to reach to their God through the path of *bhakti* (भक्ति).

We have not discussed *bhakti* (भक्ति) in our previous three important chapters — FVP, PTP and Individual *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). In the chapter of Individual *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) we have discussed those *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) which are already mentioned and admitted in FVP. So, since *bhakti* (भक्ति) has not been admitted in the list of *trivarga* (त्रिवर्ग) or *caturvarga* (चतुर्वर्ग) of FVP, it has not been explained in the chapter of individual *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) also. One may suggest here that we should admit two versions of FVP: one is of four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) which we have already discussed and another version will add another *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and that is *bhakti* (भक्ति). Then in the second version *bhakti* (भक्ति) will be placed in the fifth position. Many scholars have discussed *bhakti* (भक्ति) as fifth *puruṣārtha* (पञ्चम पुरुषार्थ). But problem will arise when one will try to understand the relation between *bhakti* (भक्ति) and the rest of the four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). For this reason and some other reasons *bhakti-vādin-s* do not admit any other *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) other than *bhakti* (भक्ति).

One may say here that *bhakti* (भक्ति) theory may be a philosophical theory and hence it may be explained as a version of PTP. Before going to discuss whether the theory of *bhakti puruṣārtha* (भक्ति पुरुषार्थ) is a philosophical theory or not let us discuss first what conditions a theory must fulfil to be a

philosophical theory. One of the important marks of a philosophical theory is that it must be a most general theory. Hence, a philosophical theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is a most general theory and it admits only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). This *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is the highest *puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) or highest goal of life. Different philosophical systems admit highest *puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) (only one) in their own ways. According to Advaita Vedānta, *niratiśaya sukh* (निरतिशय सुख) (pleasure that cannot be excelled) is the highest goal of life. But according to Nyāya philosophy, absolute freedom from suffering (आत्यन्तिक दुःख निवृत्ति) is the *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ). Similarly, according to the *bhaktivāda* (भक्तिवाद) or *Bhakti darśana* (भक्तिदर्शन),³ *bhakti* (साध्य भक्ति) is the highest goal of life. From this standpoint it seems that *bhaktivāda* (भक्तिवाद) may be admitted as a philosophical theory like Nyāya, Vedānta etc. So, one may suggest that *bhaktivāda* (भक्तिवाद) may be included in PTP and it may be admitted as a version of PTP. This answer we have explained with reason why a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) admitted in FVP and a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) admitted in PTP are not the same. The former is based on the sources like *Purāṇa*, *Itihās* etc, but the later is not derived from such sources. The theory of *bhaktivāda* (भक्तिवाद) whether we take it as the works of Sri Madhusūdana Saraswatī or *Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavism* — their views are mainly derived from *Bhāgavat Purāṇam*.⁴ So, the *bhakti* (भक्ति) theory or *Gouḍīya Vaiṣṇavism* is very much different from any philosophical system in Indian philosophical Tradition like Nyāya, Vedānta etc. In any philosophical system we see mainly two types of discussions — discussions of *pramāṇa* (प्रमाण) and discussions of *prameya-s* (प्रमेय). In another sense, philosophy includes the discussion of logic, metaphysics, epistemology, ontology etc. But

the *bhakti* (भक्ति) theory is not a study in that sense. Hence it is not a philosophy or *darśana* (दर्शन). It is often called *bhagavat dharma* (भगवत् धर्म).⁵

Secondly, in a sense the *bhakti* (भक्ति) theory can be said more like a theory of art (काव्य-शास्त्र). For, it offers analogies and not any argument and explanations in a strict philosophical sense. As for example, it tells us about the nature of *bhakti* (भक्ति), conditions of *bhakti* (भक्ति) and its types. But to explain these things it never offers any arguments, rather it tells us that *bhakti* (भक्ति) arises when the mind becomes liquefied (द्रवीभूत). And it is liquefied when it is heated. To answer the natural questions what heats it (तापक) and how mind can be liquefied, the *bhakti* (भक्ति) theory takes help of an analogy. They say a piece of sealing wax or lac (जतु द्रव्य) is a hard substance. When heated by fire it becomes liquid. Mind, like sealing wax, becomes liquid when it is heated by heating factors (तापक) like emotions, anger etc. When a mind is thus liquefied and it takes the impression of God (भगवत् आकार), we call it *bhakti* (भक्ति).⁶ Now the question is how the emotions of anger etc. are produced? The answer is *Bhagavat dharma* (भगवत् धर्म). What is to be understood by this *dharma* (धर्म)? It has been said that 'भगवद्धर्मश्च भगवद्गुणश्रवणम्'.⁷ This means *Bhagavat dharma* (भगवत् धर्म)⁸ consists in listening to the stories etc. about God. Thus in this way *bhaktivādin-s* tells about *bhakti* (भक्ति) and it proves that it is nothing philosophical. So we cannot take the *bhakti* (भक्ति) theory as a second version of PTP. We also discussed earlier why we cannot take it as a second version of FVP. Therefore, we decided to discuss it separately.

There are many more arguments why we should not take *bhakti* (भक्ति) theory as a version of PTP. One such important reason is that there is no such system of Indian philosophical Tradition which have mentioned *bhakti* (भक्ति) theory or any *darśana* (दर्शन) which can be called as '*Bhakti darśana*' (भक्तिदर्शन). Usually different standard systems mention other systems as opponent (पूर्वपक्ष) and refute their views. But no system mentioned *Bhakti darśana* (भक्ति दर्शन) as opponent's view. So, neither as opponent's view nor as proponent's view (सिद्धान्त) we get any reference of *bhakti* (भक्ति) or the theory of *bhakti* (भक्ति).

Thirdly, according to some modern scholars, *bhakti* (भक्ति) theory is not any kind of *darśana* (दर्शन), rather it is included in Tantra (तन्त्र).⁹ Tantra (तन्त्र) here stands for the *Āgama* (आगम)¹⁰ Tradition. But all the *āstika darśana-s* (दर्शन) are related (positively or negatively) to the tradition of *Nigama* (निगम) or the Veda (वेद) or the *Śruti* (श्रुति) or *Trayī* (त्रयी).

There is another sense in which the *bhakti* (भक्ति) theory is different from any philosophical system. Sometimes it is called *bhagavat dharma* (भगवत् धर्म). For it discusses mainly *dharma* (धर्म) or *paurāṇika dharma* (पोरानिक धर्म). It is not concerned about any philosophical theory or *darśana* (दर्शन) or any philosophical or practical discussion of life. It only tells us the means and goal of human life and this goal means highest fulfilment or highest value of human life.

So far as *bhakti* (भक्ति) as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is concerned it involves, as we have said before, the reference of *Vaiṣṇavism* in general and *Gauḍīo Vaiṣṇavism* in particular. According to Gauḍīo

Vaiṣṇava-s, *bhakti* (भक्ति) is not only a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) but the way or *sādhana* (साधन) to reach this *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is also *bhakti* (भक्ति). Like the different systems of Indian philosophical Tradition, *bhaktivāda* (भक्तिवाद) or *bhakti darśana* (भक्ति दर्शन) has not been developed. It is believed that like *Buddhism* and *Jainism*¹¹, or some may give other arguments in favour of the matter, *bhaktivāda* (भक्तिवाद) has been developed as a reaction to classical Hindu dharma or *sanātan Hindu dharma* (सनातन हिन्दु धर्म) and its rituals. This reaction is known as a movement and this movement is known as *bhakti* movement or *bhakti āndolone* (भक्ति आन्दोलन)¹² of India. It is a religious reform movement against *sanātan Hindu dharma* (सनातन हिन्दु धर्म) and its rituals. In other words, they were against *karmavāda* (कर्मवाद). *Gauḍīo Vaiṣṇavism*, advocated and founded by Sri Chaitanyadeva, played a leading role of this *bhakti* (भक्ति) movement. As a chief advocator of *Gauḍīo Vaiṣṇavism*, Sri Chaitanyadeva was also against classical Hindu dharma and its rituals. Not only that, he was also against the major forms of *bhaktivāda-s* (भक्तिवाद) of south India. The reason is this: in this major form of *bhaktivāda* (भक्तिवाद), *karma* (कर्म) has not been totally rejected. But in *Gauḍīo Vaiṣṇavism* both *karma* (कर्म) and the rituals related to *karma* (कर्म) are totally rejected. They believe that this *karmavāda* (कर्म वाद) is a very narrow and orthodox conservative theory. They also believe that *dharma* (धर्म) is not a matter of conservative ritualistic performances rather it is a matter of experience and feelings of the heart. Only *bhaktivāda* (भक्तिवाद) teaches us real *dharma* (धर्म) and that is *bhakti* (साध्यभक्ति) through *bhakti* (साधनभक्ति). For, according to them, the path or way to reach God is also *bhakti* (भक्ति). Here *bhakti* [*sādhana bhakti* (साधनभक्ति)] means *Bhagavat-prem* (भगवत्-प्रेम), *Bhagavat-seva* (भगवत् सेवा) or

loving and serving God, *kirtana* (कीर्तन) his names, his *karuṇā* (करुणा) or glories and deeds, listening his stories of different ages (श्रवण) and many more things. In brief, *sādhana bhakti* (साधनभक्ति) means the things related to God but not to *karma* (कर्म). They also say that it is the main message of the *Gītā* as well as the *Bhāgavat Purāṇam*.

But actually this is not the case. In the *Gītā* and the *Bhāgavat Purāṇam* it was never said anywhere that *karma* (कर्म) has no role to play for achieving *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). Rather in the *Gītā* it has been said that *jñāna* (ज्ञान), *karma* (कर्म) and *bhakti* (भक्ति) are admitted for their specific role to achieve *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). In the *Bhāgavat Purāṇam*, *karma* (कर्म) has been regarded as a means of *bhakti* (भक्ति) or *bhakti yoga* (भक्तियोग).¹³ So it is admitted in the *bhakti* (भक्ति) theory that *karma* (कर्म) has some role to play in man's quest for life's highest fulfilment. But in Advaita Vedānta we see a contrasting view.

According to some modern scholars, who are also known as modern Hindus, this contrasting view of Advaita Vedānta, in a sense, is more radical. These modern scholars believe that *karma* (कर्म) and rituals are not important and so not to be followed. According to them, *karma* (कर्म) is neither direct means nor indirect means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) or *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ). They also think that only those who are superstitious follow these rituals. But it is only the *jñāna* (ज्ञान) and not *karma* (कर्म) or anything else which is helpful for achieving liberation. So, *jñāna* (ज्ञान) is the heart of Hinduism¹⁴ and not *karma* (कर्म). They believe and give reasons in support of their views that Vedānta (in the *Upaniṣada* or Vedānta darśana) is the most acceptable form of Hindu *dharma*¹⁵. According

to some pro-Vedānta modern scholars, not only *bhaktivādins*, Vedāntins also opposed to *karma* (कर्म). These men believe that classical Hinduism wrongly emphasizes on *karma* (कर्म) and so called ritualistic performances and on the other hand the *bhakti* (भक्ति) theory wrongly emphasizes on emotions, moods and sentiments. The *jñānavāda* (ज्ञानवाद) of Vedānta avoids both these two approaches of classical Hinduism and *bhakti* (भक्ति) theory stated above. It avoids the mechanical approach of *karmavādin-s* (classical Hinduism) on the one hand and the emotional or sentimental approach of the *bhaktivādin-s* (भक्तिवादी) on the other. These men (scholars) are known as modern Hindus. Recent time, for these men, Vedānta is a great attraction.¹⁶ For, they think that Vedānta [in the sense of *darśana* (दर्शन)] gives importance to *jñāna* (ज्ञान) and not *karma* (कर्म).

This group believes that Vedānta rejects *karma* (कर्म) as a means of religious or spiritual uplift of man. For, Vedānta does not even grant that *karma* (कर्म) is an indirect means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). They cite passages from the *Gītā* in their support and refer in particular to the verses 42 – 44 of the canto two of the *Gītā*. The *Srīmad Bhagavad Gītā* is one of the three great sources (प्रस्थान) of Vedānta *darśana* (दर्शन). According to these scholars, the message of Vedānta is: *karma* (कर्म) has no role in man's greatest fulfilment of life¹⁷. In other words, *karma* (कर्म) has no place or even any subordinate place in achieving *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). But if it is true about *Vedānta darśana*, then they will be regarded as more radical *asamuccayavādin-s* (असमुच्चयवादि)¹⁸ than Nyāya or *Vaiśeṣika darśana* (दर्शन). For these modern scholars believe that Vedānta *darśana* (दर्शन) hold the view that there is only one means to

achieve liberation and that is *jñāna* (ज्ञान). *Karma* (कर्म) has no role at all to achieve this goal. So, the question does not arise whether it is an equally direct means (समुच्चय-वाद) or it is only an indirect means (असमुच्चय-वाद) of liberation. If we see the classical works on Advaita Vedānta or even the work (भाष्य) of Ādi Śaṅkarācārya, we do not get this radical view. So, this radical view about *karma* (कर्म) is a modern view and it is their own interpretation or understanding about Vedānta *darśana* (दर्शन). Their view about the *Gītā* needs to be thoroughly examined. Even when we study the commentary on the *Gītā* of Ādi Śaṅkarācārya, we see that he has discussed both *samuccayavāda* (समुच्चयवाद) and *asamuccayavāda* (असमुच्चयवादवाद) but he has not discussed radical *asamuccayavāda* (असमुच्चयवादवाद) where *karma* (कर्म) will have no role for achieving liberation. Anyway here we just want to show that there is a long debate between *samuccayavāda* (समुच्चयवाद) and *asamuccayavāda* (असमुच्चयवाद) regarding the means of liberation, but *bhakti* (भक्ति) as a means of liberation has not been discussed there. In other words, philosophers have ignored *bhakti* (भक्ति) both as a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and as a means of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). For this reason we have not discussed it either in the chapter of PTP and in the chapter of FVP.

But then also we cannot leave *bhakti* (भक्ति) undiscussed. There are some reasons. It is true that in our standard philosophical texts *bhakti* (भक्ति) has not been discussed anywhere as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or as a means of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). It is also true that in the long debate between *samuccayavāda* (समुच्चयवाद) and *asamuccayavāda* (असमुच्चयवाद) importance is given to only *jñāna* (ज्ञान) and *karma* (कर्म). But this is also true that it has not been said

anywhere that *bhakti* (भक्ति) is not important. Other than these philosophical discussions Ādi Śaṅkarācārya has given great importance to *bhakti* (भक्ति). He has written many devotional hymns and poems. Sometime in the *Upaniṣadas* also *bhakti* (भक्ति) has been highly praised.¹⁹ Even in recent time many educated (both in philosophy and in other areas) persons, who are against *karma* (कर्म), give importance to *bhakti* (भक्ति). They support *jñāna* (ज्ञान) or *bhakti* (भक्ति) (or both) but not *karma* (कर्म). The *Bhakti vāda* (भक्तिवाद) has a long tradition. They accept that *bhakti* (भक्ति) is a means [*puruṣārtha sādhana* (पुरुषार्थ साधन) or *sādhana bhakti* (साधनभक्ति)] of man's highest fulfilment. Our discussion of *puruṣārtha sādhana* (पुरुषार्थ साधन) cannot be completed if we do not discuss *bhakti* (भक्ति) and the place of it along with *jñāna* (ज्ञान) and *karma* (कर्म). So it is reasonable to discuss *bhakti* (भक्ति) in a separate chapter rather than not discussing it at all or discussing it only as a part of our discussion of philosophical theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or as a part of familiar view of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ).

We have mentioned earlier that on the subject of *puruṣārtha-sādhana* [means of attaining *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ साधन), here *mokṣa-sādhana* (मोक्ष-साधन)] neither the discussion about radical *asamuccayavāda* (असमुच्चयवाद) nor about *bhaktivāda* (भक्तिवाद) we have found in any classical works on philosophy. Even we can say that the references which they usually give on the basics of the *Gītā* are not also convincing. The radical *asamuccayavādīn-s* (असमुच्चयवादी) made reference to an earlier part of the *Gītā*'s verses 42 – 44 of the canto two. But in the last two verses ²⁰ of the canto sixteen the *Gītā* has explicitly stated that there is the need for both

karma (कर्म) and the *Śāstra* (शास्त्र); and here *Śāstra* (शास्त्र) means the *Veda* (and *Dharma-Śāstra*) which enjoins *karma* (कर्म) (actions or as the modern people said rituals or ritualistic actions.). In his commentary on this two verses Śaṅkarācārya has written that in this passages the *Gītā* tells us that those who do not follow what [*karma* (कर्म)] *Śāstra* (शास्त्र) has taught us (to perform) and act independently, they cannot become eligible for attaining *siddhi* (सिद्धि) or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष).²¹ So, it will not be reasonable to say that *Gītā* tells us to reject *karma* (कर्म) or *karma-mārga* (कर्ममार्ग) or to accept only *jñāna-mārga* (ज्ञान मार्ग). On this matter Sri Śaṅkarācārya only said that *karma* (कर्म) cannot be equally important or a direct means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). But he never said anywhere that *karma* (कर्म) has no role at all in achieving *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). In the writing of philosophers like Udayanācārya²² or Gaṅgeśopādhyāy²³ also we do not find any mention of the radical *asamuccayavāda* (असमुच्चयवाद). Perhaps this view is of some modern thinkers which do not have much philosophical importance. They probably base their views on selective readings of some texts like the *Gītā* and they do not seem to be acquainted with the philosophical literature on this subject. Moreover they perhaps are acquainted with only some portions of the *Gītā* and not full of it. Even the great supporter of *bhakti vāda* (भक्तिवाद), Madhusūdana Saraswatī, has not ignored the importance of *karma* (कर्म) in his elucidation of the *Gītā*.²⁴ The great scholar Bhutnāth Saptatīrtha has translated and explained this work of Madhusūdhana. He has also translated and explained the whole of Jaimini's *Mīmāṃsā sūtra*.²⁵ Thus he knows very well the position of both the forms of *Mīmāṃsā* — *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā* and *Uttara Mīmāṃsā*. He said explicitly that not only *bhakti* (भक्ति) but *karma* (कर्म) is also

necessary in achieving the highest goal of life.²⁶ We will not discuss radical *asamuccayavāda* (असमुच्चयवाद) any more here. But one should carefully study the other passages where the *Gītā* speaks of renouncing *karma* (कर्म) and how Śaṅkarācārya, Madhusūdana and many others have interpreted these passages without categorically saying that *karma* (कर्म) has no place whatsoever or that *bhakti* (भक्ति) is the only or the ultimate means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष).

Unlike the *jñānavādin-s* (ज्ञानवादी) all the *bhakti* (भक्ति) schools agree in believing that the absolute cannot be reached by knowledge. According to them, devotion (भक्ति) is essential and it is the most effective means to the realisation of God. Nalini Kānta Brahma is his book *Philosophy of Hindu Sādhanā*²⁷ said that there is a difference of opinion as to whether supreme devotion is by nature unmixed with knowledge (ज्ञान-शून्य), or is mixed with knowledge (ज्ञान-मिश्र). The highest stage of *bhakti* (भक्ति) is described in the *Bhāgavat Purāṇam* as *nirgūṇa bhakti* (निर्गुण भक्ति). Such supreme devotion can have, strictly speaking, no cause. Hence it is eternal. The *bhaktivādin-s* (भक्तिवादी) hold the view that Krishna-*prem* (devotion to the Lord) is eternal (नित्य-सिद्ध) and never comes into being (साध्य).

Like *Bhāgvat Purāṇam*, Sāndilya's *Bhakti sūtra* (भक्तिसुत्र) and Nārada's *Bhakti sūtra* (भक्तिसुत्र) are major sources of *Bhaktivāda* (भक्तिवाद). *Bhaktivādin-s* (भक्तिवादी) often offer to what Sāndilya and Nārada has said in their *Bhakti sūtra* (भक्तिसुत्र). Sāndilya defines *bhakti* (भक्ति) as supreme love to the Lord.²⁸ *Bhakti* (भक्ति) which is fully developed is known as *parā-anurakti* (परा-अनुरक्ति) or *parā bhakti* (पराभक्ति). The word 'parā' (परा) is very important here. Nārada also defines *bhakti* (भक्ति) as *parama-prem-rupa* (परम-प्रेम-

रूप). Here a point should be noted that the emphasis is put on the intensity of the process as well as on the object of devotion.

Generally speaking, two works as the source of bhakti-vāda are known to us. One is Nārada *sūtra* and the other is Śāndilya *sūtra*. Mm. Gopīnāth Kavirāj has said about a new *bhakti-sūtra*. In his book *Notes on Religion and Philosophy* Kavirāj-ji has said that the name of this book containing new *bhakti-sūtra* is *Bhakti-Mimāṃsā*. Though the name of the author of the book is not clear there, but it is clear that it belongs to a school of thought distinct from those Śāndilya and Nārada.²⁹ Here *bhakti* is described as a kind of *ulhāsa* (उल्लास) of the mind (1.1.2).³⁰

Bhaktivādin-s (भक्तिवादी) claim that many great Advaita Vedāntins like Sri Śaṅkarācārya, Madhusūdana Svaraswatī etc. also realised the fact and so they shifted from *jñāna-mārga* (ज्ञानमार्ग) to *bhakti-mārga* (भक्तिमार्ग). Madhusūdana Svaraswatī, according to them, in his book *Bhaktirasāyaṇam* established *bhakti* (भक्ति) as a *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ). We will come back to this point soon.

Here a point needs to be noted. It is that *bhakti* (भक्ति) as a *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) and *bhakti* (भक्ति) as a *mārga* (भक्तिमार्ग) are not one and the same thing. *Bhakti-mārga* (भक्तिमार्ग) is a way or path but *bhakti* (भक्ति) as *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) is the highest goal. Hence, the first one is *sādhana* (साधन) and the last one is *sādhya* (साध्य). Sri Durgācarana Sāṅkhyā Vedāntatīrtha said in the introduction of the Bengali translation of the book *Bhaktirasāyanam* written by Sri Madhusūdana Svaraswatī that *bhakti* (भक्ति) is of two types. One is *sādhana bhakti* (साधन भक्ति)

and the other is *sādhya-bhakti* (साध्य भक्ति) or *parā bhakti* (परा भक्ति) or *prem bhakti* (प्रेम भक्ति).³¹ Some may say here that this *sādhya-bhakti* (साध्य भक्ति) may be said as identical with *Bramha-vidyā* (ब्रम्ह विद्या) or *Brahma-sākṣātkār* (ब्रम्ह साक्षात्कार) which is nothing but a stage of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) or liberation. But *bhaktivādin-s* (भक्तिवादी) will not support this view. According to them, the *sādhya-bhakti* (साध्यभक्ति) is not the same as *Brahma-sākṣātkār* (ब्रम्ह साक्षात्कार). For, Advaitin-s admit that in the stage of *Brahma-sākṣātkār* (ब्रम्ह साक्षात्कार) the distinction between men (जीव) and *Brahman* get destroyed or disappeared. But in the stage of *sādhya-bhakti* (साध्यभक्ति) the distinction between *bhakta* (भक्त) or *jiva* (जीव) and the God does not get destroyed, rather this distinction is very important and plays a vital role for *sādhya-bhakti* (साध्यभक्ति). Moreover, *Brahma-sākṣātkār* (ब्रम्ह साक्षात्कार) is the stage of indeterminate perception (निर्विकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष), whereas *sadhya-bhakti* (भक्ति) is a stage of determinate perception (सविकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष).

Now let us discuss *bhakti* (भक्ति) as means for achieving the highest goal of life. So far as the *Vaidika* (वैदिक) and *Nigama* (निगम) tradition is concerned, scholars refer to two sorts or kinds of literature where *bhakti* (भक्ति) has been given a prominent role. First we will briefly discuss the first kind of literature. This literature mainly contains the works on which Śaṅkarācārya's Vedānta is based (प्रस्थानत्रय) as well as Śaṅkarācārya's own commentaries on these works. These works are the *Upaniṣadas*, the *Gītā* and the *Brahmasūtra*. Many believe that in the *Veda*, as distinct from *Upaniṣada*, there is no awareness of the importance of *bhakti* (भक्ति).³² This does not mean that such importance has been given in the *Upaniṣada*. In the *Upaniṣada* there are only occasional

reference to the importance of *bhakti* (भक्ति) towards *Guru* (गुरु) and *Devatā* (देवता). The commentaries of Śaṅkarācārya do not give much importance to *bhakti* (भक्ति).³³ However, some argue that one of the three sources from which Śaṅkarācārya derives his Advaita Vedānta *darśana* (दर्शन), namely, the *Gītā*, gives as much importance to the *bhakti* (भक्ति) as to *jñāna* (ज्ञान) (and also perhaps to *karma* (कर्म)). In the *Gītā*, *bhakti* (भक्ति) has been given a central position. The classical debate between *samuccayavāda* (समुच्चयवाद) and *asamuccayavāda* (असमुच्चयवाद) takes no note of this thing. Even Śaṅkarācārya in his commentary on the *Gītā* gives it no importance. Śaṅkarācārya has never said that according to the *Gītā*, *jñāna* (ज्ञान), *karma* (कर्म) and *bhakti* (भक्ति) are equally important. How then we come to believe that one third of the *Gītā* is devoted to *bhakti* (भक्ति) and its importance? It is a post-Śaṅkara view. Perhaps it originated only when Madhusūdana Saraswatī wrote his elucidation of the *Gītā* known as *Gūḍārthadīpikā*. Here he explained that in the first six chapters of the *Gītā*, *karma* (कर्म) and its importance has been discussed and in the last six chapters of it *jñāna* (ज्ञान) and its importance has been discussed. So, the first six chapters are separated from the last six chapters according to their subject. He also explained that to separate these two the *Gītā* discusses in the six chapters that fall in the middle portion of it and that is the theme of the yoga called *bhakti* (भक्ति). Madhusūdana Saraswatī has written all these in the beginning of the *Gūḍārthadīpikā*.³⁴ So, we can say that it was unknown to Śaṅkarācārya or even Udayanācārya and it is entirely Madhusūdana's original way of looking at the *Gītā*. But it may create problem to a student of Indian philosophy and he may ask how could Śaṅkarācārya miss the point that the *Gītā* gives equal

importance to *bhakti* (भक्ति)? Moreover, how could Madhusūdana find it there? We can give the answer following Madhusūdana's view. He reads and interprets the *Gītā* in the light of the *Bhāgavat Purāṇam* and not so much from the point of view of the *Upaniṣada* or the *Mahābhārata*.³⁵ In the *Bhāgavat Purāṇam* the three *yoga-s* — *jñāna-yoga* (ज्ञान योग), *karma-yoga* (कर्म योग) and *bhakti-yoga* (भक्ति योग) — are separately and clearly mentioned. In his *Bhaktirasāyanam*, Madhusūdana has quoted this passage of *Bhāgavat Purāṇam*.

Generally when we discuss about yoga, we mean Patanjali's *Yoga darśana*. He is famous for his teaching of the *aṣṭāṅga yoga* (अष्टाङ्ग योग). But when we speak of *karma-yoga* (कर्म योग), *jñāna-yoga* (ज्ञान योग) and *bhakti-yoga* (भक्ति योग) why the *aṣṭāṅga yoga* (अष्टाङ्ग योग) of Patanjali is not discussed? Madhusūdana in his *Bhaktirasāyanam* did not miss this point. He here exactly enumerated four *yoga-s* — the *karma-yoga* (कर्म योग), *aṣṭāṅga yoga* (अष्टाङ्ग योग), *jñāna-yoga* (ज्ञान योग), and *bhakti-yoga* (भक्ति योग). To reconcile his position with the explicit position of the *Bhāgavat Purāṇam* (which mentions only three *yoga-s*) Madhusūdana included *aṣṭāṅga yoga* (अष्टाङ्ग योग) into *jñāna-yoga* (ज्ञान योग).³⁶ He first says that there are four *yoga-s* which are good as means for man's attainment of goal of life (पुरुषार्थ). These four are *karma-yoga* (कर्म योग), *aṣṭāṅga yoga* (अष्टाङ्ग योग), *jñāna-yoga* (ज्ञान योग) and *bhakti-yoga* (भक्ति योग). Since he includes the second under the third there remains finally three; exactly the three which the *Bhāgavat Purāṇam* says.

As we stated above according to some *bhaktivādins*, even Śaṅkarācārya turned into a *bhakta* (भक्त) from *jñānī* (ज्ञानी) when he

realised the role of *bhakti* (भक्ति) to reach the state of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष).³⁷ Like Śaṃkarācārya, Madhusūdana Svaraswatī also, shifted from *jñāna-mārga* (ज्ञान मार्ग) to *bhakti--mārga* (भक्ति मार्ग). But, we can say that, there are no sufficient reasons to hold this view. *Bhaktivādin-s* (भक्तिवादी) may say that it seems to see *Soundrya Laharī* written by Śaṃkarācārya that he was also interested in the various actions (*karma-kānda*) of *Tantra*. Śibchandra Sārbabhroumo told in his book *Tantra Tattva* that in case of worshiping any God or Goddess in the field of *tantra* one must have a specific devotion technically known as 'bhāva' (भाव). This *bhāva* is nothing but *bhakti* (भक्ति) itself. To put it otherwise, worshiping God is not just a formal ritual but is supported by a deep emotion or *bhāva* (भाव). This *bhāva* (भाव) is the same as *bhakti* (भक्ति).

But from the above reasons one should not conclude in this way. Because according to Śaṃkarācārya *bhakti* (भक्ति) is nothing but a mature form of *jñāna* (ज्ञान) itself. *Tattvajñāna* (तत्त्वज्ञान) is the main cause [both for *jīvanmukti* (जीवन्मुक्ति) and *videhamukti* (विदेहमुक्ति)] for achieving *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). *Bhakti* (भक्ति) also helps but this *bhakti* (भक्ति) is a mature form of *jñāna* (ज्ञान) itself. For the stage of *jīvanmukti* (जीवन्मुक्ति), *bhakti* (भक्ति) or devotion to God plays a supporting role. Grace of God helps to achieve *tattvajñāna* (तत्त्वज्ञान). Another important point is that according to Madhusūdana, *bhakti* (भक्ति) is not the only means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). He also admits *jñāna* (ज्ञान) and *karma* (कर्म) as the means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). Many *bhaktivādīn-s* (भक्तिवादी), particularly Gaudīo *Vaiṣṇava-s*, hold the view that one can reach the highest fulfilment of life, i.e. *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) only through *bhakti* (भक्ति). However, Shāndilya³⁸ has said that he could not reach his fulfilment through the path of *jñāna*

(ज्ञान). But Madhusūdana holds that *dharma-karma* (धर्मकर्म) done in a detached way is the principal means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष)³⁹. He has also said that *bhakti* (भक्ति) follows *jñāna* (ज्ञान) and *karma* (कर्म) (उभयानुगत) in the sense that it is useful (उपकारक) for the two [*jñāna* (ज्ञान) and *karma* (कर्म)] and reinforces them. Since Madhusūdana has said that *jñāna* (ज्ञान) and *karma* (कर्म) are opposed to each other, he may be taken as *jñāna-karma-asamuccayavādin-s* (ज्ञान-कर्म-असमुच्चयवादि). In this respect he follows Śaṅkarācārya's position and hence Advaita Vedānta position. But it is also true that he speaks very highly of *bhakti* (भक्ति). But from this it should not mean that Madhusūdana had intention to minimize the Value of *jñāna* (ज्ञान). Though Madhusūdana writes that *bhakti* (भक्ति) or love of God is useful for all — *jñānī* (ज्ञानी) and *karmī* (कर्मी) — yet he gives the highest place to such *bhakti* (भक्ति) as is *jñāna* (ज्ञान) also.⁴⁰ According to him, only he can become the best *bhakta* (भक्त) who is *jñānī* (ज्ञानी). In the *Gītā* it has been said that the *bhakta* (भक्त), one who is devoted to God or loves him, can know him and can ultimately become one with him.⁴¹ Here also *bhakti* (भक्ति) or love and devotion seem to be necessary for knowing. Similarly, Śaṅkarācārya also explains the word '*bhakti* (भक्ति)' as *bhakti* (भक्ति) of a knowledgeable person.⁴²

Similarly, there are many more arguments for which it can be said that *bhaktivādīn's* (भक्तिवादी) conclusion is not right. Madhusūdana Svarasvatī wrote the book *Bhaktirasāyanam* before writing the commentary *Gūḍārthadīpikā* on the *Gītā*.⁴³ So, if the opponents demand that he shifted from *jñānamārga* (ज्ञानमार्ग) to *bhaktimārga* (भक्तिमार्ग) in his book *Bhaktirasāyanam* and established *bhakti* (भक्ति) then they should accept that after shifting

from *jñānamārga* (ज्ञानमार्ग) to *bhaktimārga* (भक्तिमार्ग) he wrote *Gūḍārthadīpikā*. Then they have to prove that Madhusūdana established *bhakti* (भक्ति) instead of *jñāna* (ज्ञान) in that work. But in this work he has not said anywhere that *bhakti* (भक्ति) is only necessary for achieving liberation and not *jñāna* (ज्ञान). Rather he has discussed on both *jñāna* (ज्ञान) and *bhakti* (भक्ति) where ever it is necessary to discuss. Mm. Phanībhūṣana Tarkavāgīś has rightly said in the Bengali translation of *Nyayadarśana* of Goutam that different types of *bhakti* (भक्ति) may reveal in different stages of *sādhana* (साधन). In the first two stages the difference between *bhakta* (भक्त) or devotee and God may be there, but in the third or last stage of worshipping God the difference between devotee and God get disappeared. Anyway, Madhusūdana has never said anywhere that *bhakti* (भक्ति) is the right means to liberation and not *jñāna* (ज्ञान). What he said is that without *bhakti* (भक्ति) *sannyās* (संन्यास), even *jñāna-mārga* (ज्ञानमार्ग) or knowledge as a way or path also is not able to help to achieve *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). He also said that the *Gītā* tells us about three *niṣṭhā-s* (निष्ठा) which are related as goal and as means to each other. These are *karma-niṣṭhā* (कर्म-निष्ठा), *jñāna-niṣṭhā* (ज्ञान-निष्ठा) and *bhakti-niṣṭhā* (भक्तिनिष्ठा). *Bhakti* (भक्ति) is the means of both *jñāna-niṣṭhā* (ज्ञान-निष्ठा) and *karma-niṣṭhā* (कर्म-निष्ठा). Knowledge of a person may not be successful to give liberation if the person is not a devotee in a true sense. So, *bhaktivādīn's* conclusion is not right.

Some held the view that the *bhaktivādīns* do not belong to the *Āgama* tradition, rather like the different schools of Indian philosophy, it belongs to the *Nigama* tradition. Because all schools of Indian philosophy are *Vaidika* systems. *Nigama* tradition means

what we call *Śruti* or the *Veda*. So, in this sense, all the conformist schools of Indian philosophical tradition will belong to the *Nigama* tradition. By *Āgama* tradition is meant the *Tantra* tradition. It has been said about *Nigama* tradition that *Nigama* means (*dharma*) *Karma-mārga* (कर्म-मार्ग) — the path of action. The *Āgama* or *tantra* has been said to be the “*Rāga mārga*”.⁴⁴ According to some scholars, this *Āgama* tradition admits all the three means to achieve *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) — i.e. *jñāna* (ज्ञान), *kārma* (कर्म) and *rāga* (राग). But here emphasis is on *rāga* (राग) or *upāsanā* (उपासना) including devotion and love.⁴⁵ It has been said “अमाये शिवमार्गेऽस्मिन् राग एव प्रशस्यते”,⁴⁶ which means in the path the devotees (of Śhiva) the *rāga* (राग) or love or devotion is the highly recommended⁴⁷ means of life’s fulfilment. It has also been said that in the *Kaliyuga* (कलियुग) the path recommended by *Āgama* is most suitable. This *Āgama* or *Tantra* is mainly divided into Śaiva, Vaiṣṇava, Śākta, Bauddha and Jaina.⁴⁸ There are many characteristic features of the *Āgamamārga* within which *Vaiṣṇavism* is included. These distinguish *Āgamamārga* from the *Nigama* or the *Vedamārga*. In the first place in the philosophies of the *Vedamārga* emphasis is on knowledge [*jñāna* (ज्ञान) or *prakāśa* (प्रकाश)] and not on action (क्रिया). In the philosophies of the *Āgamamārga*, *kriyā* (क्रिया) and *śakti* (शक्ति) are more or equally important. According to the *Āgama* tradition or *mārga*, the ultimate goal (चरम प्रयोजोन) of life are two — *bhoga* (भोग) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष).⁴⁹ By *bhoga* (भोग) it is meant prosperity (अभ्युदय) and by *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) (spiritual) liberation or emancipation. But all philosophical systems, all versions of PTP, fall in the *Vedamārga*. These PTPs contend that the ultimate goal is one and that is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). All philosophical systems of the *Āgama-mārga* believe in the *reality* of the world and also that the world is full of

enjoyment.⁵⁰ What is important for our present purpose is that *Vaiṣṇava bhaktivāda* (वैष्णव भक्तिवाद) belongs to the *Tantra* tradition and not to the *Vaidika* tradition. *Bhaktivāda* (भक्तिवाद) is traced to Śāndilya and Nārada. It has been said that Śāndilya did his *sādhana* (साधना) in Brajamandal. With him began the tradition according to which *bhakti* (भक्ति) is the ultimate and the fifth *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Of this *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), the means is also *bhakti* (भक्ति). So *bhakti* (भक्ति) is both a *puruṣārtha* (साध्यपुरुषार्थ) and its means (साधन पुरुषार्थ). So distinction is drawn between *sādhana-bhakti* (साधन-भक्ति) *bhakti* (भक्ति) as means and *sadhya-bhakti* (साधनभक्ति) or *bhakti* (भक्ति) as end in itself. These views that *bhakti* (भक्ति) is the fifth and the highest *puruṣārtha* (परमपुरुषार्थ) and that its means is not *jñāna* (ज्ञान) or *karma* (कर्म) but *bhakti* (भक्ति) are the views of some Vaiṣṇava-s. It is not necessarily the view expressed by the *Gītā* or accepted by Madhusūdana Saraswatī. Madhusūdana's interpretation of the *Gītā* verse 18/55 clearly shows this. The *Gītā* text in question explicitly says that *bhakti* (भक्ति) is the way to finding God and becoming one with Him. Madhusūdana there interprets *bhakti* (भक्ति) to mean *nididhyāsana* (निदिध्यासन). This *nididhyāsana* (निदिध्यासन) is clearly admitted in the *Nigamamārga* as a necessary step to liberation.⁵¹ So far Madhusūdana's view does not seem to be the same as the view of the Vaiṣṇava Tantra.

Some may still hold the view that Madhusūdana transformed later. As an argument they say that when he wrote the elucidation on the *Gītā* he perhaps was not sure about the supreme role of *bhakti* (भक्ति) in reaching life's highest fulfilment. But his latest view we find in his *Bhaktirasāyanam*.⁵² Though he admitted there that

bhakti (भक्ति) cannot go alone, yet it seems that in *Bhaktirasāyanam* he realised the value of *bhakti* (भक्ति). For, he there admitted *śuddha bhakti* (शुद्धभक्ति) or unmixed *bhakti* (भक्ति) in addition to *karma-misra-bhakti* (कर्म मिश्र भक्ति) or *bhakti* (भक्ति) involved in the practice of *karma* (कर्म) and *jñāna mishra bhakti* (ज्ञान मिश्र भक्ति) or *bhakti* (भक्ति) involved in the practice of pursuit of *jñāna* (ज्ञान).⁵³ It is an agreed truth that Madhusūdana was as great a bhakta (भक्त) as *jñāni* (ज्ञानी). But so far as the point of his latest work is concerned there are some views which do not seem to be correct. Some hold the view that *Bhaktirasāyanam* is Madhusūdana's latest book ⁵⁴ and *Gūḍārthadīpikā* is his first or earlier work. But this view is not correct, for in his *Gūḍārthadīpikā* on the Gītā 18/66 Madhusūdana has written explicitly that certain things he had discussed in detail in his book *Bhaktirasāyanam*. Though it is also true that he held the view that in every stage of achieving the highest goal of life *bhakti* (भक्ति) is helpful. Incidentally, it may be mentioned that even in his *Bhaktirasāyanam* Madhusūdana gives due importance to *karma* (कर्म) or ritual performances and shows that it is according to *Śruti*. But Madhusūdanan never left the *Śruti* or *Nigama Mārga* (निगम मार्ग). He does not belong to the *Āgama mārga* or the tradition of Tantra. Similarly, some people think that he rejects *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). But such view is not correct. He never said anywhere that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is not the right goal for man to pursue or it is not in fact a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Also he never said anywhere that pursuit of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is a form of utter selfishness ⁵⁵ and a man who is not above selfishness has not truly evolved. This charge of selfishness against the seekers of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is very popular. But theoretically and logically it is not tenable. We will continue this discussion but before that we have something more to

say regarding Madhusūdana and *bhaktivāda* (भक्तिवाद). Many *Bhaktivādin-s* (भक्तिवादी) do believe that *bhakti* (भक्ति) is the ultimate and fifth *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and that it is attainable through *sādhana bhakti* (साधनभक्ति). They think that Madhusūdana is the strongest supporter of this view. This also seems to be wrong. We have already considered Madhusūdana's position in his *Bhaktirasāyanam*. In his later book *Gūḍārthadīpikā* on the *Gītā* we find his more mature view. In this work he has spoken highly and extensively on the importance of *bhakti* (भक्ति). But in conclusion ⁵⁶ he says that the final view of the *Gītā* is that *Bhagavat bhakti* (भगवत् भक्ति) or love and devotion to God is an aid to (साधनभूत) both of *karma* (कर्म) and *jñāna* (ज्ञान). Further he also said that this *Bhagavat bhakti* (भक्ति) is the result (फलाभूत) of both *karma* (कर्म) and *jñāna* (ज्ञान). It follows that he has not said that *bhakti* (भक्ति) is an independent means (साधन) of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Even when it is *sādhyā* (साध्य) or *phala* (फल) its means is not *bhakti* (भक्ति) but *karma* (कर्म) and *jñāna* (ज्ञान). So, it is not reasonable at all to say that Madhusūdana ever held that *bhakti* (भक्ति) is the only ultimate *puruṣārtha* (परमपुरुषार्थ) and not *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) or that one can have this *bhakti* (साध्यभक्ति) only through *sādhana bhakti* (साधनभक्ति).

Many think that *mumukṣu-s* (मुमुक्षु) are selfish. But logically one can't say this. The main source on which selfishness is based is the belief in one's personal identity. Any man can only be selfish who have an ego sense. In the context of selfishness the self means ego (अहंकार). One who has this *ahaṁkāra* (अहंकार) can make difference between 'I', 'mine' on the one hand [*ahaṁ* (अहम्) & *mama* (मम)] and 'you', 'yours' on the other. Now, those who want to transcend this level of *ahaṁkāra* (अहंकार) or ego still may have ego-

sense. But these two are not the same. *Mumukṣu-s* (मुमुक्षु) are the people who really want to transcend this ego or selfishness.⁵⁷ *Mumukṣu* (मुमुक्षु) seeks to kill the ego in him for which he could be selfish. But they may still have ego in the sense that they are searching the true sense of soul or *ahaṁ* (अहम्). But since for them the difference between 'I' and 'You' are meaningless, they have no selfishness. This same goal *bhaktivādin-s* (भक्तिवादी) also mean but in a different way. In the *Nigama-mārga* (निगम-मार्ग) or the *Veda-mārga* (वेद-मार्ग), *mumukṣu* (मुमुक्षु) seeks to fully realize that he is not the ego.

According to *bhaktivādin-s* (भक्तिवादी), one can transcend ego-sense through the path of love to God or *bhakti* (भक्ति). Here love becomes universal. But still they have ego in the sense that they have universal ego. This universal ego kills small ego which is the main source of selfishness. Thus we can say that *mumukṣu* (मुमुक्षु) and *bhakta* (भक्त) — both want to transcend ego or selfishness but in a different way. One is saying that ego (small) sense is false and we need to replace it by the true knowledge of our own self and other is saying that (small) ego stands in our way of fulfilment and we should replace it by universal self which will bear love towards all.⁵⁸

From years ago and still now many uneducated, simple minded and even educated Hindu people expressed sympathy and support to the *bhakti āndolan* (भक्ति आन्दोलन). The *bhaktivāda* (भक्तिवाद) associated with this *bhakti āndolan* (भक्ति आन्दोलन) is nearer to the Gouḍiya Vaiṣṇava-s. *Bhaktivāda* (भक्तिवाद) of these Vaiṣṇava-s is derived directly from the teachings of Shri Chaitanya

Mahāprabhu and Mahāprabhu's views seem to be primarily based on the *Bhāgavat Purāṇam* and *Brahma Samhitā*.

Notes and References

¹ Generally speaking these modern Hindus hold that the final goal of life is self-improvement and self-realization which they think is more a spiritual goal rather than religious goal. Many of them are neither atheist nor theist. And they think spirituality is a third alternative between theism and atheism. The practice of spirituality does not require the performance of religious rituals nor does it require belief in personal God usually associated with idol worship etc. which are among the religious rites they abandon.

² It is, according to many of them, self-understanding and self realization [sort of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष)].

³ It may be said that there is no such *darśana* (दर्शन) or Indian philosophy and we need not discuss the theme of *bhakti* (भक्ति) in a philosophical discussion. It is better to say that it is not among the standard systems of Indian philosophy. But here we follow Madhusūdana Saraswatī who used the expression “अस्माकं दर्शने” to mean *Bhakti darśana* (भक्ति दर्शन) — Svaraswatī, Madhusūdan, *Bhaktirasāyanam*, (translated in Bengali and explained by Sri Sāmkhya Vedāntaīrtha, Durgācharan) Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, Kolkata, 1404 (Bengali era), p. 20.

⁴ Some may say that Madhusūdana Saraswatī's theory is based on the *Bhagvad Gītā* which is more like *Upaniṣada* or even *Smṛti* rather

than *Purāṇa*. We will discuss later that Madhusūdana viewed and interpreted the *Gītā* in the light of *Bhāgvat Purāṇam*.

⁵ It has been so called in a work of Madhusūdana Saraswatī, *Bhaktirasāyaṇam* (translated in Bengali and explained by Sri Sāmkhya Vedāntatīrtha, Durgācharan), Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, Kolkata, 1404 (Bengali era).

⁶ Ibid., p. 17.

⁷ Ibid., p. 19.

⁸ *Dharma* (धर्म) that has been taught particularly in the *Bhāgavat Purāṇam*.

⁹ Tripathi, Rammurti, *Āgam Ke Ālok Me Bhrātiya Kāvyaśāstra* (in Hindi), Pune Vidyapith, Pune, 2001.

¹⁰ In the Tantra literature, particularly the literature of Kāshmir Śaivism, *Āgama* is invariably used in the sense in which we use the word Tantra. In this sense the tradition of Tantra is a parallel and different tradition than the Vaidika tradition. In the Tantra literature Śruti or Veda is called *Nigama*. — Tripathi, Rammurti, '*Āgam Ke Ālok Me Bhrātiya Kāvyaśāstra*' (in Hindi), Pune Vidyapith, Pune, 2001.

¹¹ These are the two of the three major forms of *nāstika darśana*-s. It is commonly believed that all three oppose the entire *Vaidika* tradition including the Hindu dharma and the *āstika* philosophies of India. But there is a difference. Cārvākas are opposed to *dharma* (धर्म) but Buddhism or Jainism is not so opposed. They are opposed to Cārvāka's anti-religion position. — Kavirāj, Gopīnāth, *Notes on*

Religion and Philosophy, Sampurnananda Sanskrit University, Varanasi, 1987, P. 83.

¹² Sen, Kṣitimohan, *Hindu Dharma*, (in Bengali), (edited by Amartya Sen), Ananda Publishers, Kolkata, 2008.

¹³ *Bhāgavat Purāṇam* — 11/20/06.

¹⁴ In Bankimchandra's *Ānandamath* and also Rabindranātha's writing we find the place and importance of *bhakti* (भक्ति). Many *Brāhmadharmavādins* (ब्राम्हधर्मवादी) like Keśab Chandra Sen practiced *bhakti* (भक्ति).

¹⁵ In this form the Hindu dharma is often described as वेदान्त प्रतिपाद्य धर्म or वेदान्त धर्म or ब्राम्ह धर्म.

¹⁶ The Brāhmas like Śivanāth Śāstrī were *Jñāna-vādins* in this sense.

¹⁷ They may find supporting utterance in the *Rudrahṛdaya Upaniṣad*. There it has been said “ज्ञानेनैव हि संसारविनाशो नैव कर्मणा ...” II35II. But generally speaking the Upaniṣadas seem to hold that *jñāna* (ज्ञान) is the final and the most fundamental means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) or *samsāra nivṛtti* (संसार निवृत्ति).

¹⁸ As we explained Samuccaya-vāda means the view that *jñāna* (ज्ञान) and *karma* (कर्म) together and equally directly act as means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). *Karma* (कर्म) is as important and direct means as the *jñāna* (ज्ञान). In its standard version Asamuccaya-vada contends that *karma* (कर्म) is only *an indirect and less important* means, it is not equally primary or principal means as *jñāna* (ज्ञान). According to the modern Vedantins or some radical modern Hindus, *karma* (कर्म) is not a means at all, not even an indirect or secondary means.

19 'यस्य देवे परा भक्तिर्यथा देवे तथा गुरौ' — 6/23 श्वेताश्वेतरोपोनिषद्.

20 यः शास्त्रविधिमुत्सूज्य वर्तते कामकारतः।

न स सिद्धिमवाप्नोति न सुखं न परां गतिम् ॥ — 16/23 *The Gītā*.

तस्माच्छास्त्रं प्रमाणं ते कार्याकार्यव्यवस्थितौ ।

जात्वा शास्त्रविधानोक्तं कर्म कर्तुमिहार्हसि ॥ — 16/24 *The Gītā*.

21 *The Gītā* — 16/23.

22 Udayanācārya, *Kiranāvalī*, translated by Śāstri, Gourīnāth, West Bengal State Book Board, Kolkata, 1990.

23 Gangeśopādhyāy, *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, the last section of Anumāna khanda, edited by Pt. Kāmākhyānāth Tarkavāgīśa, Choukhamba Sanskrit Pratisthan, Delhi, 1990.

24 Saraswatī, Madhusūdana, *Guḍārthadīpika*, commentary on Sreemadbhagavad Gītā (editd by Brahma, Nalinī Kānta with Bengali translation of Saptatīrtha, Bhūtanāth), Nababharat Publishers, Kolkata, 1986.

25 Saptatīrtha, Bhūtanāth (translated and edited), *Mīmāṃsādarśanam*, (in two volumes), Basumati Sahitya Mandir, kolkata.

26 *Ibid.*, Nivedan.

27 Brahma, Nalinī Kānta, *Philosophy of Hindu Sādhanā*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1993.

28 'सा परानुरक्तिरिश्वरे'— *Śāndilya sūtra*, as quoted in the introduction of *Bhaktirasāyanam*, translated in Bengali and explained by Sri Sāmkhya

Vedāntatīrtha, Durgācharan, Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, Kolkata, 1404 (Bengali era).

²⁹ Kavirāj, Gopināth, *Notes on Religion and Philosophy*, (edited by Śāstrī, Gaurīnāth), Sampurnananda Sanskrit University, Varanasi, 1987, p. 33.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 33.

³¹ Svaraswatī, Madhusūdan, *Bhaktirasāyanam*, translated in Bengali and explained by Sri Sāṃkhya Vedāntatīrtha, Durgācharan, Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, Kolkata, 1404 (Bengali era), p. 5.

³² Yogendranāth Sāṃkhya Vedānta Tirtha, has decisively refuted this view in his book. — Bāgchi, Yogendranāth, *Veder Mantrabhāge Adhyātmavidyā*, (in Bengali) Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, kolkata, 1965.

³³ Some hold that it is not strictly true. First Śaṃkarācārya has written many hymns or stotras which are full of emotion of love and devotion to Gods and Goddesses. His *stotras* (स्तोत्र) of Annapūrṇā, Dūrgā, Gangā etc. are very popular. Many Vaiṣṇavas say that all these were written when in his later years Śaṃkarācārya became convinced that highest fulfillment of life cannot come through *jñāna* (ज्ञान) but only through *bhakti* (भक्ति). This however, seems unfounded.

³⁴ The opening verses 4-6 of the work.

³⁵ Though in the *Gītā māhātmyam* it has been said that the *Gītā* contains the essence of the teachings of the *Upanisadas*; as if it has been obtained from the *Upanisada* just as we get milk by milking a cow.

³⁶ Saraswatī, Madhusūdana, *Bhaktirasāyanam*, (translated in Bengali and explained by Sri Sāmkhya Vedāntatīrtha, Durgācharan), Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, Kolkata, 1404 (Bengali era), p. 2.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 2.

³⁸ Śāndilya is the author of one of the three *Bhaktisūtras*. It is generally known that only two *Bhaktisūtras* are available. The second is by Nārada and is known as Nārada *Bhaktisūtra*. But recently a third *Bhaktisūtra* known as *Bhakti-Mīmāṃsā* has been discovered and published by Gopināth Kavirāj.

³⁹ निष्कामकर्मानुष्ठानम् मूलम् मोक्षोस्य कीर्तितम् — Verse no.41, Saraswatī, Madhusūdana, *Guḍārthadīpika*, commentary on Srimadbhagavad Gītā, Nababharat Publishers, Kolkata, 1986.

⁴⁰ 'तेषाम् ज्ञानी नित्ययुक्त एकभक्तिर्विषिष्यते' — Beginning verse 39, Saraswatī, Madhusūdana, *Guḍārthadīpika*, commentary on Srimadbhagavad Gītā, Nababharat Publishers, Kolkata, 1986.

⁴¹ भक्त्या मामभिजानाति यावान्यश्चास्मि तत्त्वतः ।

ततो मां तत्त्वतो जात्वा विशते तदनन्तरम् — *Bhagavad Gītā* 18/55.

⁴² 'तेषां ज्ञानी नित्ययुक्त एकभक्तिर्विशिष्यते ।

प्रियो हि ज्ञानिनोऽत्यर्थमहं स च मम प्रियोः' — *Bhagavad Gītā* 7/17.

⁴³ The *Gītā* 18/65 and 18/66.

⁴⁴ Tripāthī, Rāmamurti, *Āgam ke Ālok me Bhrātiya Kāvyaśāstra* (in Hindi), Pune Vidyapith, Pune, 2001, P. 4.

⁴⁵ *Bhakti* (भक्ति) is defined as "सा परानुरक्तिरिश्चरे" — *Śāndilya sūtra*.

⁴⁶ Tripāthī, Rāmamurti, *Āgam ke Ālok me Bhrātiya Kāvyaśāstra* (in Hindi), Pune Vidyapith, Pune, 2001, p. 5.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 5.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p.13.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 5.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 5.

⁵¹ आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्त्यव्यो निदिध्यसित्यव्य — 2/4/5 — *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣada*.

⁵² Madhusūdana Saraswatī wrote in the *Gūḍārthadīpikā*, Beginning verses, verse no.19 that ignorance about self is removed when knowledge of the self is attained.

⁵³ Saraswatī, Madhusūdana, *Gūḍārthadīpikā*, Beginning verses, verse no.7, Nababharat Publishers, Kolkata, 1986.

⁵⁴ Introduction of *Bhaktirasāyanam* of Saraswatī, Madhusūdana, (translated in Bengali and explained by Sāṃkhya Vedāntatīrtha, Durgācarana), Sanskrita Pustak Bhandar, Kolkata, 1404 (Bengali era).

⁵⁵ 'प्रायेण देव मुनयः स्वविमुक्तिकामा मौनं चरन्ति विजने न पदार्थनिष्ठाः ॥

नैतान्विहाय कृपणान्विमुक्षु एको नान्यं तदस्य शरणं भ्रमतोऽनुपश्ये ॥ 7/9/44—
Srimad Bhāgavad Purāṇam, Motilal Banarsi Dass, Delhi, 1988.

⁵⁶ At the end of his book, that is on the portion of the *Gītā* 18/66.

⁵⁷ Best expression of this is the *Nirvānadaśakam* of Śaṃkarācārya.

⁵⁸ Swami Vivekānanda believed in this matter that the teachings of the Vedānta are a great help. His doctrine of Practical Vedānta is an elaboration of this insight. But without being opposed to *bhakti* (भक्ति) Vivekānanda was more in the line of *Jñāna-vāda* (ज्ञान-वाद) than the *bhakti-vāda* (भक्ति-वाद) of the *Bhakti āndolan* (भक्ति-आन्दोलन).

Chapter- VI

Puruṣārtha-Sādhana (पुरुषार्थ-साधन)

In our previous chapters we have discussed *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) both generally and individually. But our discussion will be incomplete if we do not include the discussion of the means of *puruṣārtha* or *puruṣārtha-sādhana* (पुरुषार्थ-साधन) in our present venture. Here *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) means final *puruṣārtha* or the highest *puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ). In the view of PTP *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the highest or *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ). So, here we would discuss only the means of *mokṣa* or the spiritual liberation (मोक्ष-साधन). According to the Gouḍīya Vaiṣṇava-s, *bhakti* (भक्ति) is the fifth and *parama* or highest *puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ). But since *bhakti puruṣārtha* (भक्ति-पुरुषार्थ) is not admitted in any philosophical theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) of Indian philosophical tradition, we have discussed the means of *bhakti* (भक्ति-साधन) with the discussion of *bhakti* (साध्य-भक्ति) in the fifth chapter. We are discussing here only *mokṣa-sādhana* (मोक्ष-साधन).

Some may think that the discussion of *puruṣārtha-sādhana* (पुरुषार्थ-साधन) is not necessary or relevant in a discussion of the theory of human needs (पुरुषार्थ). For one can know the nature and division of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) without knowing the *sādhana* (साधन) of it or way to achieve it. We have two answers in regard to this misgiving. But before answering them we want to mention here another problem. One may say that the discussion on *puruṣārtha-sādhana* (पुरुषार्थ-साधन) will be irrelevant if we do not already admit that *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) [here *mokṣa* (मोक्ष)] is *sādhya* (साध्य) or achievable. There may be some difficulties in holding *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) to be *sādhya* (साध्य). We would also discuss this problem.

Now let us turn to the discussion of our first problem, i.e. about the necessity of the discussion of *puruṣārtha-sādhana* (पुरुषार्थ-साधन). We have said that there may be two answers to this problem. First, to know the nature and division of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and to know the means of highest *puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) are not the same thing. FVP admits, as we have discussed before, four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). In these four types some *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are both *puruṣārtha* (साध्य-पुरुषार्थ) and *puruṣārtha-sādhana* (पुरुषार्थ-साधन). It means some of them are both *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or end-in-itself and means of any other *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or end-as-means.¹ But in the most philosophical sense PTP admits only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ).

In the strict philosophical sense *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), but not a means of any other *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). But from this it does not mean that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) does not have any *sādhana* (साधन). *Mokṣa* (मोक्ष) has *sādhana* (साधन) or we can say there are means to achieve *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). Different PTP has discussed elaborately both spiritual freedom or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) and the means to attain it. There cannot be any *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) which one cannot attain. If there is a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) without having any means to attain it (साधन), then it will always remain unfulfilled. Then why do we call it as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is a moot question. In this chapter we would mainly discuss the means of that *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or highest *puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) only which is admitted in PTP. In other words, we would discuss here mainly *mokṣa-sādhana* (मोक्ष-साधन).

The second answer to the problem stated above is quite different from the first. Gangeśopādhyāy in his *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, has

shown clearly and elaborately that a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) must be attainable through human efforts.² In other words a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) must be *puruṣa-prayatna-sādhya* (पुरुष-प्रयत्न-साध्य). *Prayatna-sādhya* (प्रयत्न-साध्य) means it can be brought about by will or volition. Here Gangeśopādhyāy has presented an opponent's position according to whom *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) as admitted by Naiyāika-s cannot be achieved through human efforts. And he considered it as a serious challenge to the Nyāya conception of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). He emphasized that it is a part of the idea of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) that it must be attained through suitable means. What we desire is actually a result (फल). *Mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is a result. Now, the result is different from its means or the way how this result can be achieved. Suppose we desire x. From this it also implies that we desire the means to the end x also. The desire of a means to an end (उपायेच्छा), i.e. the desire for the good as means, is dependent (अधीन) on the desire for that end (फलेच्छा or desire for the good as end) itself. In other words, the desire of a means to the end x is dependent on the desire for x. Because, if one does not seek x, he will not seek the means to achieve x also. Means to an end is important for that person who desires the end also. And if we have the desire (इच्छा) for a certain means, then we have volition for it [we have *prayatna* (प्रयत्न) or *pravṛtti* (प्रवृत्ति) about it]. The desire is a condition of *prayatna* (प्रयत्न). But it is only one condition. There is another necessary condition of *prayatna* (प्रयत्न) about a certain means (उपाय). We will do something (some action), we will use a means to achieve the end if it is our *kṛtisādhya* (कृतिसाध्य) or it is within our power to do. If we desire a particular goal, then we also desire the action which is the means to achieve it. And if the action is within our power to do i.e. *kṛtisādhya* (कृतिसाध्य), then we will have *prayatna* (प्रयत्न) about it. One can wish

to bring the Moon from the sky. But neither there is means to achieve it nor it is his *kṛtisādhya* (कृतिसाध्य). If *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) were such a thing then *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) also could not be achieved through human effort. But if it is a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), then it must be attainable by us. Here the condition of *kṛtisādhya* (कृतिसाध्य) is very important. That man can achieve *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) who can do what is needed to get *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). If it is said that to get *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) means to square a circle, then nobody will be successful to achieve *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). For, it is not *kṛtisādhya* (कृतिसाध्य) or within our power to do. For this reason *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and *puruṣārtha-sādhana* (पुरुषार्थ-साधन) are closely related and the discussion of *puruṣārtha-sādhana* (पुरुषार्थ-साधन) is quite relevant and necessary after the discussion of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ).³

According to some view, *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is not attainable through any means or *kṛtisādhya* (कृतिसाध्य). Gangeśopādhyāy considers the objection that according to the Nyāya conception *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is such that it cannot be attainable through human efforts. If it is the case, it follows from this that if it (मोक्ष) is not attainable through human effort, it (मोक्ष) is not a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Goutama, on the other hand, considered the objection that, *mokṣa* (मोक्ष), according to the Nyāya conception, cannot be achieved because the conditions for achieving it are not realizable.⁴

There is another important reason for discussing *puruṣārtha-sādhana* (पुरुषार्थ-साधन) in a work which is specially on *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). When we study different PTP-s of different philosophical schools we notice that they are not agreed about the means of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or *puruṣārtha-sādhana* (पुरुषार्थ-साधन). Here we will show why it appears to us that the Nyāya position on this matter

is more convincing. Here an interesting point should be noted. Advaita Vedānta on the one side and Nyāya and majority of Vaiśeṣika-s on the other though agreed about the means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष), but disagreed about the nature of *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ). Mīmāṃsāka-s oppose both the Vedāntins and Naiyāika-s on this matter. So, in considering PTP we need to discuss at least three philosophical schools namely, Vedānta (Advaita), Nyāya and Mimāṃsā. They have their own theories of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and *puruṣārtha-sādhana* (पुरुषार्थ-साधन). Here *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) means *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). We have already discussed in our previous chapter how Nyāya and Vedānta hold different views regarding the nature of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). According to Mimāṃsā school, ultimate *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is *svarga* (स्वर्ग) and not *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). There is a controversy about this, but we will not discuss it here. But about *puruṣārtha-sādhana* (पुरुषार्थ-साधन) Mimāṃsā-s hold different view from both Nyāya and Advaita Vedānta. We will discuss this debate first. Since it has not been reflected in FVP, we have not discussed it in our chapter FVP.

According to some classical philosophers and their modern followers, *karma* (कर्म) is the means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). However Nyāya and Vedānta are of the opinion that *jñāna* (ज्ञान) is the means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). Here we want to note a point which is very discouraging. Though many writers in modern time keep themselves engage in discussing the theme of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), but they are almost silent about this important issue. It seems that they are not aware about it. And I think it is very unfortunate. Discussion of *puruṣārtha-sādhana* (पुरुषार्थ-साधन) or *mokṣa-sādhana* (मोक्ष-साधन) will be incomplete if we do not discuss this important controversy. This

controversy is known as the controversy between *samuccayavāda* (समुच्चयवाद) and *a-samuccayavāda* (असमुच्चयवाद). We will also discuss some convincing views of two great thinkers of our time who came in the line of classical Indian philosophy. They are Mahamahopādhyāy Phanī Bhuṣan Tarkavāgīśa and Mahamahopādhyāy Gopī Nāth Kavirāj. But we will not discuss here *bhakti* as *puruṣārtha-sādhana* (भक्ति-पुरुषार्थ-साधन). For, different philosophical schools have not mentioned *bhakti* as *puruṣārtha* (भक्ति-पुरुषार्थ). And secondly *Bhaktivādin-s* do not consider *bhakti* (भक्ति) as a means to *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). We have already discussed *bhakti* in the previous chapter. We are discussing here only *mokṣa-sādhana* (मोक्ष-साधन).

The controversy between *samuccayavāda* (समुच्चयवाद) and *a-samuccayavāda* (असमुच्चयवाद) involves reference to only two means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष); they are *karma* (कर्म) and *jñāna* (ज्ञान). Both these words are used here in some restricted sense. In ordinary Sanskrit the word *karma* is used to mean *kriyā* (क्रिया) which means any action. But in present context the word *karma* (कर्म) means ethical-ritual action. Thus performing sacrificial rites like *yāga* (say, *Agnihotra yāga*) is a case of *karma* (कर्म). In other words, the word *karma* (कर्म) is to be understood as an action which is performed positively (विहित कर्म) or negatively (निषेध कर्म) following *Vidhi* (विधि). These *karma-s* (कर्म) are enjoined in the *Veda* or related literature called *Dharma Śāstra* (धर्म शास्त्र). These (विहित, निषेध कर्म) *karma-s* (कर्म) can be of different kinds such as *kāmya karma* (काम्य कर्म), *nitya karma* (नित्य कर्म), *naimittika karma* (नैमित्तिक कर्म) etc. These *karma-s* (कर्म) are usually called *dharma* (धर्म). There are also *Varṇadharmā* (वर्ण धर्म) (i.e. *dharma* or duty specified for different *varṇa-s*) and *Aśrama dharmā* (i.e. *dharma* or duty specified for different *Aśrama-s*)

or stages of one's life for moral development). Similarly the word *jñāna* (ज्ञान) also may be used in different senses. It may mean a false cognition or true cognition of an object. Here *jñāna* (ज्ञान) means true and immediate cognition of the real nature of the self. In other words, *jñāna* (ज्ञान) means *ātmajñāna* (आत्मज्ञान) or knowledge of the self. Now let us come to the controversy about the means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). Is it *jñāna* (ज्ञान) or *karma* (कर्म)? According to the *Samuccayavādin-s* (समुच्चयवादि) the means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is *karma* (कर्म) and according to the *Asamuccayavādin-s* (असमुच्चयवादि) the means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is *jñāna* (ज्ञान).

Regarding the controversy between *Samuccayavāda* (समुच्चयवाद) and *Asamuccayavāda* (असमुच्चयवाद), traditional thinkers hold different views from the views of modern thinkers and modern Hindus. Traditional *Samuccayavādin-s* (समुच्चयवादि) admit *karma* (कर्म) like *jñāna* (ज्ञान) as a means of spiritual liberation [as a means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष), *karma* (कर्म) is as important as *jñāna* (ज्ञान)]. Even traditional *Asamuccayavādin-s* (असमुच्चयवादि) also hold the view that *karma* (कर्म) has some useful role to play. But, according to modern thinkers and modern Hindus, *karma* (कर्म) has no role to play for man's social, moral and spiritual progress. It has no role to play as the means of spiritual liberation or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). In the context of the battle of *Kurukṣetra* the question of *parama Śreya* (परम श्रेय) and the means of it became very prominent. In *Śrīmadbhagavad Gītā* we see that Arjuna was confused. He was afraid by realizing the possible death of his relatives and friends. He thought it was right not to fight. He requested Sri Krishna to advise and teach him about the path of his good, about the means of real good. To solve Arjuna's problem Bhagavān Sri Krishna spoke many things about *karma* (कर्म), *jñāna*

(ज्ञान) and even *bhakti* (भक्ति). But Arjuna was confused and not understood which will lead him as means to his good. Śaṅkarācārya in the conclusion of his commentary on the *Gītā* discussed for the first time the debate between *Samuccayavāda* (समुच्चयवाद) and *asamuccayavāda* (असमुच्चयवाद). He begins the discussion by showing the origin of this debate. He says that in the *Gītā* many different things have been said. From these one may become confused about what is really the right means of the *parama-prayojana* (परम-प्रयोजन) or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). Is it *jñāna* (ज्ञान) or *karma* (कर्म)?⁵

Advaita Vedāntins and Naiyāika-s are *Asamuccayavādin-s* (असमुच्चयवादि) and Mīmāṃsā philosophers are *Samuccayavādin-s* (समुच्चयवादि). But there is a controversy within Nyāya philosophy. Unlike other Naiyāika-s, Bhāsarvajña admitted *samuccayavāda* (समुच्चयवाद). In this connection I would like to mention one important point. Prof. Rajendra Prasad has said that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) can easily be reduced to *kāma* (काम). Daya Krishna also admits this view.⁶ But I can hardly agree with their views. For *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) and *kāma* (काम) cannot be equivalent in any sense. *Kāma* (काम) is a positive state but *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is a negative state (at least for some schools of thought). Even those who admit *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) as a positive state cannot include *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) in *kāma* (काम). According to Advaita Vedāntins, *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is a positive state and it means *niratiśaya sukh* (निरतिशय सुख) or pleasure. Though, according to them, both *kāma* (काम) and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) are pleasure but *kāma* (काम) is impermanent and *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) permanent. So, *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) cannot be reduced to *kāma* (काम). In other way also we can prove it. *Kāma* (काम) is desire. Desire is not a need but what is desired or the object of desire is need. When we take *kāma* (काम) as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ)

we mean *kāma* (काम) as *kāmanā-viṣaya* (कामना-विषय). Sometimes we use the word '*pāpa*' (sin or पाप) to mean the object of *pāpa* or sometimes *pāpakartā* (पाप-कर्ता). Generally speaking *kāmanā-viṣaya* (कामना-विषय) or object of desire is *iṣṭa* (इष्ट) or good. This good is ultimately either pleasure (सुख) including its means (सुखोपाय) or it is freedom from pain or *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) and its means (दुःखाभावोपाय). One can get pleasure from many things. In other words many things can be object of pleasure such as food, fame, house, property etc. These are such pleasure or *kāma* (काम) which are known as *abhyudaya* (अभ्युदय) or prosperity. All these are this-worldly prosperity. *Svarga* (स्वर्ग) is other-worldly (अदृष्ट) prosperity. According to Nyāya philosophy, *kāma* (काम) includes all kinds of prosperity. This prosperity is good as end (फलरूप पुरुषार्थ). There are two means of these prosperity or *kāma* (काम). One is *artha* (अर्थ). For, one can buy this prosperity if he has enough money. So, *artha* (अर्थ) is good as means (उपायरूप सुख). In other words *artha* (अर्थ) is the means of *kāma* (काम). So, *kāma* (काम) is *mukhya* (intrinsic) *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and *artha* (अर्थ) is *gouna* (instrumental) *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). But actually speaking only means in the list of four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) of FVP is *dharma* (धर्म). We have already said that it is the root of all *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). So, it is placed in the bottom position. *Artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम) are *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) if they are achieved through *dharma* (धर्म). *Puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is that which is truly good for men. In other words *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is not only seeking a thing. It is seeking a thing in a right way or through *dharma* (धर्म) and which is good for men in a right sense. It is not good for x and y only, it is good for all men. This good has two form; it is either prosperity or it is spiritual freedom or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). It follows that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is achieved through human effort of

performing *dharma* (धर्म) and here *dharma* means right actions or duties. In other words the means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is *karma* (कर्म) or more accurately *dharma karma* (धर्म-कर्म). This position is much more debated in philosophy or PTPs than the view that *dharma* (कर्म) is the means of the other two *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) of *artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम).

Thus we can say if we rightly interpret FVP then it tells us that *dharma* or *dharma-karma* (धर्म-कर्म) is the means of all other three *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). So, *dharma* (धर्म) is the means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) also. But we already mentioned that according to Nyāya and Vedānta *jñāna* (ज्ञान) or knowledge is the means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). Here knowledge means immediate knowledge of the true nature one's own self. Now, coming to our previous problem the question is which is the means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) — is it *jñāna* (ज्ञान) or *karma* (कर्म)? It is true that both Nyāya PTP and Vedānta PTP admit that *karma* (कर्म) is a great help in the attainment of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). Yet there is an issue. This issue is famous and it is known as the controversy between *jñāna-karma-samuccayavādin-s* (ज्ञान-कर्म-समुच्चयवादि) and *jñāna-karma-a-samuccayavādin-s* (ज्ञान-कर्म-असमुच्चयवादि). According to *samuccayavādin-s* (समुच्चयवादि) both *karma* (कर्म) and *jñāna* (ज्ञान) are the means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). Even like *jñāna* (ज्ञान), *karma* (कर्म) is an immediate and direct means of spiritual freedom. According to *a-samuccayavādin-s* (असमुच्चयवादि), though *karma* (कर्म) has a role but it has only an indirect role to *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). The ultimate means is *jñāna* (ज्ञान). Mīmāṃsā philosophers are known as *samuccayavādin-s* (समुच्चयवादि) where as Naiyāika-s and Vedāntin-s are *a-samuccayavādin-s* (असमुच्चयवादि). For Mīmāṃsaka-s

karma (कर्म) means *vihita karma* (बिहित कर्म) or ritualistic action enjoined in the Vedic injunctions (विधि).

We have already discussed that the discussion of *puruṣārtha-sādhana* (पुरुषार्थ-साधन) is not only relevant but also necessary after the discussion of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). But still one may say that the discussion of *puruṣārtha-sādhana* (पुरुषार्थ-साधन) is meaningless. In our previous chapter we have discussed mainly two forms of PTP — Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of *puruṣārtha* or NPTP and Vedānta theory of *puruṣārtha* or VPTP. According to NPTP, *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is final destruction of pain (दुःखध्वंस). It is not identical with *sukha* (सुख). But according to VPTP, *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is *niratiśaya sukha* (निरतिशय सुख) which is identical with *Brahman* (ब्रह्म). This *Brahman* (ब्रह्म) is eternally realized fact (नित्य-सिद्ध परिनिष्पन्न वस्तु). And by understanding this one may say that *puruṣārtha-sādhana* (पुरुषार्थ-साधन) is meaningless. For, he may think that there is no scope for the discussion of the means of achieving *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) if we accept VPTP. Following Gangeśopādhyāy⁷ one may argue further that since there is no *puruṣārtha-sādhana* (पुरुषार्थ-साधन), there will be no *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) also. For, if we admit *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is *nitya siddha* (नित्य-सिद्ध), then it violates the meaning of term of the criterion of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Because nothing can be a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) if man cannot achieve it through his effort. If man cannot achieve x through his effort, then x cannot be regarded as *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Vedāntins also have answer to this problem. We will discuss that. But before that we will discuss Nyāya position regarding this matter. According to Nyāya, *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is of the nature of *dhaṃsa* (ध्वंस) or absence after the production or destruction. But every *dhaṃsa* (ध्वंस) has a cause (जन्य). It is also to

be accepted that every *dhamṣa* (ध्वंस) is produced by the effort of any conscious being (पुरुष-प्रयत्न-साध्य). In all cases this conscious being is not human being. Man can be the cause of a table or a cloth or the destruction of these things. But for the destruction of the created world (प्रलय अथवा संसार ध्वंस) human being is not the cause. The conscious being who causes it is only God. Here a point should be noted that God has no need to be fulfilled. He is eternally and completely fulfilled (नित्य तृप्त, पूर्ण तृप्त, आप्तकाम) being. So, he has no *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) also. But man has *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). For man has need, desires to be fulfilled. But this *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) must be achievable through human efforts. A man can say that he has a desire to bring the moon, but it is not a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). *Puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) must be achievable. *Brahman* is not achievable in this sense. Now, can we say *duḥkha dhamṣa* (दुःखध्वंस) is achievable by human effort? Suppose we have pain of hunger and through a means we are successful to get rid from this pain. Is it *mokṣa* (मोक्ष)? The answer is obviously in negative. There are thousands and thousands of such pains. Some of them we already have suffered and they are past. There are also pains in our present time and in coming day of future. When we say destruction of all pain is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष), we do not mean pains of past days. For these are already destroyed. We actually mean all present and future pains. Such pains are also innumerable in number. But how future pain can be destroyed? Destruction (ध्वंस) means subsequent absence or absence of a thing subsequent to its production. It is both logically and factually impossible to destroy future pain. Hence *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is not achievable. No human effort can make it possible. So, *puruṣārtha-sādhana* (पुरुषार्थ-साधन) in Nyāya philosophy is an inconsistent notion.

Thus we see that whether we take *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) in the sense of Nyāya philosophy or in the sense of Vedānta philosophy, it is not achievable through human effort. So, either the conception of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) of the Indian philosophers is wrong or there cannot be *puruṣārtha-sādhana* (पुरुषार्थ-साधन). To solve this paradox we need to discuss more thoroughly the nature of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष).

There is unanimity among the Indian philosophers that the means or *sādhana* of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष-साधन) is *tattvajñāna* (तत्त्वज्ञान) or saving knowledge. But if we accept this, then there will arise another problem whether *tattvajñāna* (तत्त्वज्ञान) alone is *mokṣa-sādhana* (मोक्ष-साधन) or there should be something more in addition to *tattvajñāna* (तत्त्वज्ञान) in achieving *mokṣa* (मोक्ष)?

Before discussing *puruṣārtha-sādhana* (पुरुषार्थ-साधन) we should discuss that *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is *sādhya* (साध्य). If *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is not *sādhya* (साध्य) at all, the discussion of *puruṣārtha-sādhana* (पुरुषार्थ-साधन) will not make any sense. But there may be difficulty in saying that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is *sādhya* (साध्य). For generally the things which are *sādhya* (साध्य) are caused (जन्य) and caused things are necessarily impermanent. But *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is believed to be permanent (नित्य). So, *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is different from *svarga* (स्वर्ग). Though duration may be very long, but *svarga* (स्वर्ग) is not permanent. One of the main reasons is that *jāgādīkarma* (जागादि कर्म) cause *svarga* (स्वर्ग). So, *svarga* (स्वर्ग) is *sādhya* (साध्य) and *jāgādī karma* (जागादिकर्म) is its *sādhana* (साधन). *Mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is permanent and so, *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is superior to *svarga* (स्वर्ग). Dharmarāja has explicitly said in his *Vedānta Paribhāṣā* 'तस्य नित्यत्वावगमात्'.⁸ He also said from *Śruti* (श्रुति) text 'न च पुनरावर्तते'.⁹ So, *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is *nitya* (नित्य) or permanent. But if we accept this then *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) cannot

be *sādhyā* (साध्य). And if it is not *sādhyā* (साध्य), the question of its *sādhana* (साधन) does not arise.

Gangeśopādhyāy has shown that if something cannot be achieved through man's effort, if something is not *puruṣa-prayatna-sādhyā* (पुरुष-प्रयत्न-साध्य), then it cannot be a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). We have never discussed this aspect of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) before. We have discussed *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) as need of human being. Gangeśopādhyāy brings our attention to the stricter sense of the term 'need'. Men wish so many things that are not *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) (e.g. a man may wish that all steel bowls in his house might become gold bowls). An important part of the word '*puruṣārtha*' (पुरुषार्थ) is that man can realize it or attain it through his effort. What man cannot achieve through his effort is not *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). *Puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) means what man seeks to achieve and which he can achieve by his own effort. In other words, it should be his *kr̥tisādhyā* (कृतिसाध्य). Thus *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is not only *sādhyā* (साध्य), but it is *sādhyā* (साध्य) of the seeker. And if *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is *puruṣa-prayatna-sādhyā* (पुरुष-प्रयत्न-साध्य), then it must be caused.

According to Nyāya philosophy, *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is achievable by human effort. But for this it seems that their view is against *Śruti* (श्रुति). We have already shown that Dharmarāja has clearly said that we know *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) to be *nitya* (नित्य) from the *Śruti* text and he has actually cited this text. As an *āstika dārśanika*, a Naiyāika cannot go against the authority of the *Śruti*. Goutama has clearly said that absolute absence (अत्यन्त अभाव or त्रैकालिक अभाव) of all *duḥkha* (दुःख) is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष).¹⁰

Clearly we are now in a different situation. For we cannot say on the one hand that liberation is impermanent, on the other we cannot say that liberation is permanent. However, both the Naiyāika-s and Vedāntin-s were aware about this situation. One obvious way out would be to carefully interpret the authorities which we seem to violate. According to the opponents, liberation is by nature permanent pleasure (नित्य सुख) and it has been said in the *Śruti* also. In this context Uddyotkara says “आगमो अपि एवम् विचारणीयः”.¹¹ Anyway, according to Naiyāika-s neither *Śruti* nor Vātsāyana said that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is *nitya* (नित्य). The quoted *Śruti* only says that he who attains *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) does not return back in a state of bondage again. According to Goutama, in liberation *duḥkha* (दुःख) including *janma* (जन्म), *pravṛtti* (प्रवृत्ति) etc. are all destroyed. But the absence of *janma* (जन्म) etc. are not absolute or *nitya* (नित्य). *Duḥkha* (दुःख), *janma* (जन्म) are not eternally absent. Man when successful to get liberation, these (i.e. *janma*, *pravṛtti* etc.) are destroyed. So, they are not eternally absent. And once destroyed these never return again. When all *duḥkha-s* (दुःख) are destroyed and man becomes liberated, these *duḥkha-s* (दुःख) never return. So, no liberated soul returns back to suffer pains, for they all are destroyed. Hence we can say logically that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is permanent as well as can be achieved through human effort. It is permanent in the sense men who got it never lose. And since man can achieve it through his effort, it is *sādhya* (साध्य).

This view of the Naiyāika-s are not unknown to Vedāntin-s. But they have another problem. From the particular *Śruti* text “न च पुनरावर्तते”, it does not mean that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is permanent. There is another *Śruti* text where it has been said that it is permanent. Vātsāyana has noted it in his *bhāṣya*. Vātsāyana has noted another

word for 'mokṣa' (मोक्ष) is 'abhaya' (अभय).¹² Udayanācārya in his *Tātparyatīkā* has actually quoted the *Śruti* text "अभयम् वै ब्रम्ह" and comments that *Brahman* and *abhaya* are same. Here we also get another word – 'ajaya' (अजय). These words are synonyms of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) and are negative words which denote some negative state of fact, i.e. absence (अभाव). This is supported by Nyāya thinkers, for according to them, *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is absence of all *duḥkha* (दुःख).

According to Vedānta, *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is by nature *sukha* (सुख). But it does not mean that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) means any kind of *sukha* (सुख). It means only *nitya sukha* (नित्य सुख). To express this *Śruti* equates *Ānanda* with *Brahman*. If *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is *niratiśaya sukha* (निरतिशय सुख), it must be the same as *Brahman*. In that case this *sukha* (सुख) or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) must be *nitya* (नित्य). Nyāya objection is that if it is *nitya* (नित्य), then it cannot be achieved through human effort. A Vedāntin can say here that if *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) were not of the nature of *sukha* (सुख) then men would not seek it and also it could not be a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Following Goutama Vātsāyana has elaborately discussed this point that man seeks *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव) as much as he seeks *sukha* (सुख). Moreover, sometimes we use the word *sukha* (सुख) to mean *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव). But if we mean *atyantābhāva* (अत्यन्ताभाव) of *duḥkha* by *duḥkhābhāva* (दुःखाभाव), then *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) will be *nitya* (नित्य). Hence it will not be *sādhya* (साध्य). So, according to Nyāya philosophers, *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is final destruction (अत्यन्तविमोक्ष) of all *duḥkha* (दुःख).

Thus it is proved that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is *sādhya* (साध्य). That means it can be achieved through human effort. Vedāntin-s also try to find a sense of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) where it is both an object of human seeking and can be attained by human effort. According to them,

Brahman is 'अनर्थं प्रहानं संसारं निवृत्तिं स कारणं प्रपन्नं' or *avidyā-nivṛtti* (अविद्या-निवृत्ति) can be such an object. If they use *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) to mean any of these three, they will use *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) in a stricter sense. The interesting point is that this view will come to close to the Nyāya view.

Before we turn to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Vedānta conception of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष), we would briefly state modern conception of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). It is also very popular. We have discussed that many scholars has expressed FVP in such a way that it seems that it is the view of classical Indian philosophy. Obviously one may have confusion for that. The originator and propagator of this view are the modern Hindus. It was flourished during the time of Bengal renaissance. According to them, this culture we get from *Upaniṣada* and in the *Upaniṣada* doctrine of *Brahman*. Another name of *Upaniṣada* is Vedānta. Even many scholars are unaware of the difference between Vedānta as *Upaniṣada* and Vedānta as the school of philosophical thought which starts with the *Upaniṣada*-s. We will not go into it in any detail. But briefly we can say that there are three lines of thought which are considered as the major sources (प्रस्थान) of Vedānta. One of these three sources of Vedānta *darśana* is *Upaniṣada*. It is known as *Śruti prasthāna* (श्रुति प्रस्थान). The other two sources are *Bhagavad Gītā* and *Brahmasūtra* of Bādarāyana. These are known as accordingly *Smṛiti-prasthāna* (स्मृति प्रस्थान) and *Nyāya-prasthāna* (न्याय प्रस्थान). But not only these three sources constitute Vedānta as a philosophical and analytical system, it also includes a long tradition of commentary, sub-commentary, *tīkā* and many more. The modern Hindus like Brāhmas and the followers of Vivekananda generally speak about Brahma and Vedānta. But hardly they have

cleared the conception about Vedānta as philosophical doctrine. As a result they made wrong statements about it. Not only a student of philosophy but student of other disciplines may also notice this difference. We would like to refer to the page of the Bengali book — *Atmaghati Bengali* by Nirad C. Chaudhuri,¹³. But not only modern Hindu-s but also many great scholars find very little to object to this account of liberation.

Here it should be noted that the view of Bipin Chandra Pal (1853 – 1932) is quite similar to the view of Swami Vivekananda (1863 – 1902). Both of them were closely associated with “the movement of social and religious reform in India, known as the Brāhmo Samāj”.¹⁴ While reading the writing of some famous modern Hindu’s, we should keep in mind that it is not the view of sām̐khya, yoga, Mimāṃsā philosophers. Though obviously it has some importance but it is neither the representative view of Indian philosophical Tradition nor it is identical with Vedānta as analytical and philosophical system. They may have some view regarding *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) and if one wants to call it Vedānta, it is better to call it Vedānta as interpreted by some modern writers.

Here a point should be noted that we are discussing *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) only in the *Vaidika* Tradition. We would not discuss *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in the other parallel Tradition i.e. the Tāntrica Tradition. It is a very old Tradition. We get it in a written form in Basugupta’s writing¹⁵. And for this reason we would not have any scope to discuss *bhakti* (भक्ति) as the means to attain *parama puruṣārtha* (परम पुरुषार्थ) or *puruṣārtha-sādhana* (पुरुषार्थ-साधन). The path of *bhakti* (भक्ति) is known as *bhakti-mārga* (भक्ति मार्ग). According to the believers of *jñāna-mārga* (ज्ञान-मार्ग) *bhakti* (भक्ति) may help

those who adopt *jñāna-mārga* (ज्ञान-मार्ग) or *karma-mārga* (कर्म-मार्ग). But it is not any independent *mārga* to *mokṣa* (मोक्षमार्ग). It has been said 'श्रद्धावान् लभते ज्ञानम्'. It means we can really learn from the wise and their teachings and from *Śāstra-s* like *Veda*, *Mahābhārata* etc. provided that we read them with genuine trust and respect.

We will discuss two stages of *mukti* (मुक्ति). But before that we would discuss the famous controversy between two stalwarts Mahāmahopādhyāy Phanī Bhuṣan Tarkavāgīśa (1876-1942) and Mahāmahopādhyāy Gopī Nāth Kavirāj (1887-1976) regarding the exact role of yoga in enabling man to attain *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). Some hold the view that yoga has an important role to attain *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). Tarkavāgīśa-ji critically examined and defended the Nyāya position in the matter as expounded in the Nyāya tradition which begins with Gautama. But it is surprising that differences between two universally respected great scholars on such an important issue remained unnoticed or at least un-discussed so long. Kavirāj-ji for the first time tells us that some texts have been found which contend that according to Nyāya (and Yoga), yoga is the immediate source of spiritual freedom. The medieval period thinker Bhāsarvajña, as a result of the influence on him of Yoga and Kāshmir Śaivism, substantially *transformed* Nyāya philosophy.¹⁶ He was a great Naiyāyika of Kāshmir and flourished in the early part of this period. Many of the doctrines of this philosopher, as we find them stated in his book *Nyāyasāra* and its elucidation *Bhūṣaṇa*, bear, according to Kavirāj-ji, clear mark of the influence of Yoga on Nyāya and of the influence of Kāshmir Śaivism on Bhāsarvajña. Since Indian philosophy (दर्शन) is mainly based on the *Vaidika* culture, it puts great emphasis on *parāvidya* (saving knowledge or system of such

knowledge) or *adhyātmaśāstra* (spiritual knowledge or knowledge of self). Passages like “तरति शोकमात्मबित” [those who know the self (*Brahman*) transcends suffering], “मृत्युर्मुक्षिय मामृतात” (save me from death but not from spiritual freedom) indicate this direction of the *Vaidika* culture. *Parāvidyā* recommends self realization (आत्मदर्शन or स्वात्मदर्शन) as the highest value or the immediate means of realizing the highest need of life which is spiritual freedom. All the three — *śravaṇa* (श्रवण), *manana* (मनन) and *nididhyāsana* (निदिध्यासन) — are, and in this order, necessary means of spiritual freedom. The idea is that for the attainment of highest goal of life or *mukti* (मुक्ति), first we need to study the *Trayī* (त्रयी) or the *Veda* or *Śruti*, then apply *Nyāya* (the methodology or procedure of which *Nyāya* is a philosophical theory) or to conduct critical reflections on the tenets of this *Trayī* (त्रयी). And lastly we must turn our firm rational convictions to obtain immediate realization through regular and resolute practice of contemplation (निदिध्यासन or ध्यान). Thus one can attain the immediate knowledge (साक्षात्कार) of the correct nature of the self (आत्मतत्त्व). It has been recommended as the proximate means (साक्षात्-साधन) of salvation.

Now the knowledge or theory of the techniques of *Nyāya* and *Yoga* (that is, *Nyāya darśana* and *Yoga darśana*) are necessary for their successful application. This knowledge we get from the respective theory (*Nyāya* and *Yoga*) or the art and science of these subjects (*Nyāya* and *Yoga*).

Gopīnāth Kavirāj has referred to the passages of some works of Śaṅkarācārya where Śaṅkarācārya has stated that in respect of the nature of freedom Bhāsarvajña’s view corresponds to the view of *Nyāya*. However, this view is not the view of Gautama or any other

Naiyāyika (excepting Bhāsarvajña). At best we can conclude that there might have been a section of the tradition of Nyāya (Nyāya-ekodeśi), which held that freedom was a positive state of happiness. We cannot on the basis of a single text say that this is the Nyāya view of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) when innumerable works of Nyāya are there which says that according to Nyāya *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is a negative state of complete absence of suffering and *ātmatattva-sākṣātkar* (आत्मतत्त्व-साक्षात्कार) is the means of spiritual liberation. The infinite happiness view of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is standardly known as the view of Advaita Vedānata and not of Yoga or Nyāya. Gopināthji does not fail to notice that “The Nyāya Darśana, in its present form, contains some Sūtras (4-2.38-49) where the practices of Yoga are strongly recommended”.¹⁷ We also admit that textual evidence shows that Nyāya *darśana* since the time of Gautama recognizes the relevance of *yoga* or spiritual practices, discussed in the Yogadarśana of Patanjali, for the attainment of freedom. It holds true even today.

The statements in question say or suggest that Patanjali and, under his influence, Gautama, the author of *Nyāyasūtra*, held that *yoga* is the direct source of freedom or liberation. But this is not the standard view of Nyāya in the matter and the tradition does not attribute it to Gautama. Besides, in the very first aphorism of *Nyāyasūtra* Gautama makes it explicit that freedom results from *jñāna* (तत्त्वज्ञान).¹⁸ He never says that it follows from *yoga*. Even *Yogasūtra*¹⁹ make it clear that *yoga* is a means of *tattvajñāna* (तत्त्वज्ञान) and not of liberation which is, in its turn, the immediate and direct source of freedom. The *Nyāyasūtra*²⁰ is, as Vātsyāyana finds it to be, is an answer to the question “How does knowledge of the truth (about the nature of the self) arise?”²¹ The knowledge under reference is the saving knowledge which immediately²² precedes

liberation. From this it is clear that Gautama is considering yoga as a means of *jñāna* (ज्ञान) or saving knowledge and not of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) or liberation.

To the question how does this knowledge arise Gautama's answer is 'समाधिविशोषाभ्यासात्'²³, that is, through the practice of specific *samādhi* (समाधि) (समाधि) the knowledge in question is attained. This *samādhi* (समाधि) is one of the eight items known in the system of Patanjali, as yoga. Now why is this question? From Nyāya itself we have the knowledge of the nature or reality of the self (आत्मतत्त्व). But even before we obtain it from Nyāya (that is through inference), we get it from (the study of the) scripture or spiritual studies (अध्यात्मशास्त्र or in particular *Upaniṣada*). But the knowledge of *ātmatattva* (truth about the self) which is obtained from *Śāstra* (शास्त्र) [testimony of scriptures] and *Nyāya* (inference) — is mediate (परोक्ष). What is required is immediate realization or immediate experience of the truth about self (आत्मतत्त्वसाक्षात्कार)²⁴. So the real question is how we can have immediate experience of the self (आत्मतत्त्वसाक्षात्कार) and not just belief about self (आत्मतत्त्वज्ञान). The answer is through the continued practice of the particular yoga which is called *samādhi* (समाधि) and which is included in the list of eight items known as *yogāṅga* (योगाङ्ग). This is the meaning of Gautama's reply 'समाधिविशोषाभ्यासात्'.

Instead of *samādhi* (समाधि) Gautama used the expression '*samādhiviśeṣa*' (समाधिविशेष). And by this he must have meant *nirvikalpaka samādhi* (निर्विकल्पक समाधि). This is how Tarkavāgīśa-ji has understood the passage²⁵. *Nirvikalpaka samādhi* (निर्विकल्पक समाधि) is the highest kind and the last stage of *samādhi* (समाधि). On the view that *yoga* is the immediate source of freedom, *yoga* must mean this *nirvikalpaka samādhi* (निर्विकल्पक समाधि). In no other way

the need for all the kinds and stages of *samādhi* (समाधि) can be accounted for. If Gautama held that yoga is the direct and immediate source of freedom, he would have said that one attains freedom immediately after one attains *nirvikalpaka samādhi* (निर्विकल्पक समाधि) or *samādhiviśeṣa* (समाधिविशेष). There is unambiguous textual evidence which shows that Gautama holds that after *samādhiviśeṣa* (समाधिविशेष) there arises not freedom but *saving knowledge* or *Tattvasākṣātkār* (आत्मतत्त्व साक्षात्कार). So, we can conclude from this that, according to Gautama, for freedom we need *tattvasākṣātkār* (आत्मतत्त्व साक्षात्कार) and for it we need *yoga* or yoga practices.

It is believed by almost all the systems of Indian philosophy and certainly by Nyāya that liberation is preceded by immediate knowledge of *ātmatattva* (आत्मतत्त्व) and this is produced by a special *dharma* or capacity which is obtained through yogic practices including *dhyāna* or *nididhyāsana*. There is unanimity among the Indian thinkers that for liberation one must finally have immediate and direct realization that self is *different* from (व्यावृत्त) every other thing with which we in our ignorance confuse it. This realization is of the nature of immediate experience or cognition. Yogic practices or yoga is certainly a great help in the attainment of liberation but it is not its immediate source. Gautama has systematized Nyāya system. He holds that knowledge and not practice is the *sākṣāt parama-puruṣārtha-sādhana* (साक्षात्-परमपुरुषार्थ-साधन) or the immediate means of the highest fulfillment of life.

Let us now discuss briefly two stages of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) or *mukti* (मुक्ति). Some people admit only *jīvanmukti* (जीवन्मुक्ति). There are also some people who admit only *videhamukti* (विदेहमुक्ति). On the other hand, some people admit both *jīvanmukti* (जीवन्मुक्ति) and *videhamukti* (विदेहमुक्ति). According to some Indian philosophical schools, there are

two ways to get *mukti* (मुक्ति). One can achieve straight the final stage of *mukti* (मुक्ति) from the stage of *saṃsāra* (संसार) i.e. the state of bondage or can stay some time in the stage of *jīvanmukti* (जीवन्मुक्ति) and at last can achieve *videha mukti* (विदेह मुक्ति). This happens under two conditions as we will see later. There is a debate regarding whether *jīvanmukti* (जीवन्मुक्ति) liberation in life is distinct from *videha mukti* (विदेह मुक्ति) after death or not. But both admit that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) or liberation can be attained only by one who has attained *ātmasākṣātkār* (आत्मतत्त्व साक्षात्कार) or *Brahmasākṣātkār* (ब्रह्मसाक्षात्कार). Even in a state of bondage we have indirect knowledge of the self or Brahman from inference or scriptures. Such indirect knowledge co-exists with the state of bondage. But from this men do not become liberated. Only when man attains *ātmatattvasākṣātkār* (आत्मतत्त्व साक्षात्कार), he becomes liberated.

This knowledge (immediate and true belief about the real nature of the self or Brahman) is attained by men when he is still in the state of bondage. Then after a long process of quest and effort when he attains direct and true apprehension of the self, he successfully terminates this bondage state and gets *mukti* (मुक्ति).

One may ask here a question that does one continue the embodied state even after he attains *ātmatattvasākṣātkār* (आत्मतत्त्व साक्षात्कार)? If one answers this in the negative then it implies that he does not admit *jīvanmukti* (जीवन्मुक्ति) stage. The attainment of *mukti* (मुक्ति) will mark the end of *jīva* (जीव) and the man will enter into the *videha* (विदेह) or disembodied state. But how can it be possible that one is free (mukta) and still he is alive?

All schools of Indian philosophy (even the Cārvāka school also in their own sense) admit *mukti* (मुक्ति). And majority of them admit two stages of *mukti* (मुक्ति) — *jīvanmukti* (जीवन्मुक्ति) and *videhamukti* (विदेहमुक्ति). Gautama in his *Nyāya sūtra* 1.1.9 explicitly enumerates *Apavarga* (अपवर्ग) as one of the twelve *prameya-s* (प्रमेय). This *prameya* (प्रमेय) is incidentally one of the sixteen themes of *Nyāyadarśana* that Gautama admitted explicitly in the very first *sūtra* (aphorism) of his book of aphorism called *Nyāyasūtra*. In the very first *sūtra* Goutama explicitly expresses that he admits *jīvanmukti* (जीवन्मुक्ति). For, Goutama says²⁶ that *Niḥśreyas* (निःश्रेयस) which means *mukti* (मुक्ति) or *Apavarga* (अपवर्ग) (includes along with *Abhyudaya*) results from *Tattvajñāna* (तत्त्वज्ञान). He indicates that there is a gap between the stage when man attains *tattvajñāna* (तत्त्वज्ञान) and the stage when he gets *mukti* (मुक्ति). During this period the man continues to have a body. But still he is liberated, for the cause of bondage or the false belief about the true nature of the self gets destroyed.

One may ask here how we can recognise the man who is liberated but is still in his body? In other words, is there any mark of change or transformation which can help us to understand that a particular man is *jīvanmukta* (जीवन्मुक्त)? Mandan Mishra holds the view that a person who has attained the state of a *sthitaprajña* (स्थितप्रज्ञ) or man of stable insight can be said to be a *jīvanmukta* (जीवन्मुक्त).²⁷ Diwakar Acharya has explained how in the *Gītā* Bhagawān Sri Kriṣṇa explained the answer to Arjuna's question that how a *sthitaprajña* (स्थितप्रज्ञ) can be translated as stable inside. Śaṅkarācārya explains it as one in whom unwavering conviction of the form "I am Brahman"²⁸ is established. By the word '*prajñā*' (प्रज्ञा)

he means *tattvajñāna* (आत्म तत्त्वज्ञान). This *tattvajñāna* (तत्त्वज्ञान) can be of two types — *sthita* (स्थित) and *asthita* (अस्थित).²⁹ One who ceaselessly contemplates this *tattva* (oneness of self with Brahman or God) has *sthitaprajñā* (स्थितप्रज्ञा)³⁰ and is called *sthitaprajña* (स्थितप्रज्ञ). In his answer to the question that Arjuna asked Bhagavān Kṛiṣṇa has elaborately described the nature and ways of *sthitaprajña* (स्थितप्रज्ञ) or *jīvanmukta* (जीवन्मुक्त).

In Advaita Vedānta, Śaṅkarācārya also admits *jīvanmukti* (जीवन्मुक्ति). But in the followers of Advaita Vedānta philosophy Rāmānujācārya who established Viśiṣṭadvaita Vedānta and Nimbākācārya who established Dvaitādvaita Vedānta do not admit *jīvanmukti* (जीवन्मुक्ति). Some other Vaiṣṇavas also do not admit the stage *jīvanmukti* (जीवन्मुक्ति). According to Rāmānujācārya, if one will speak about *jīvanmukti* (जीवन्मुक्ति), there will be contradiction.³¹ There are two major arguments against the possibility of *jīvanmukti* (जीवन्मुक्ति): (i) in the first place there is inference through which one can prove that *jīvanmukti* (जीवन्मुक्ति) is impossible, and (ii) the other evidence cited by Rāmānuja against *jīvanmukti* (जीवन्मुक्ति) is scriptural. In *Chāndogyoponiṣada* there is a statement “तस्य तावदेव चिरं यावन्न विमोक्ष्ये अथ सम्पतस्ये”. According to Rāmānuja, this statement means that one who has attained *tattvajñāna* (तत्त्वज्ञान) (saving knowledge) has to work till the destruction of the body and then one becomes liberated.³² Mm. Phanībhuṣan Tarkavāgīśa also elaborately discussed about *mukti* (मुक्ति) in his book. In this context he has discussed the position of the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavas also. But we will not discuss this point here.

Another *Śruti* text is cited against *jīvanmukta* (जीवन्मुक्त). Those who admit *jīvanmukti* (जीवन्मुक्ति) hold that a man is *jīvanmukta*

(जीवन्मुक्त) who is liberated but still has a body. The *Śruti* in question says that the result of this *tattvajñāna* (तत्त्वज्ञान) is the destruction of *karma-s* (कर्म). Here it is said that *tattvajñāna* (तत्त्वज्ञान) destroys not one or two *karma-s* (कर्म), but many (or all) *karma-s* (कर्म). If all *karma-s* (कर्म) are destroyed, then not only *sañcita* (सन्चित) and *Sañciyamāna* (सञ्चियमान) *karma-s* (कर्म) are destroyed, but *prārabdha karma-s* (प्रारब्ध कर्म) are also destroyed. Destruction of *prārabdha karma-s* (प्रारब्ध कर्म) necessitates the destruction of body. Thus no *sthitaprajña* (स्थितप्रज्ञ) or not any one who has attained *tattva-sākṣātkar* (आत्मतत्त्व साक्षात्कार) can continue to have a body after that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). So, when they will be liberated, there will not be body. Hence only *Videha mukti* (विदेह मुक्ति) is possible.

Those who believe in *jīvanmukti* (जीवन्मुक्ति) interpret it differently. For them the word '*karmāni*' (कर्माणि) means only *sañcita* (सन्चित) and *sañciyamāna karma* (सञ्चियमान कर्म) and not *prārabdha karma-s* (प्रारब्ध कर्म). But the opponents do not admit this view. According to them if it is the case then the word '*karma*' (कर्म) used in the *Śruti* passage would not have used in the plural number. It means more than two or at least three. Then all three kinds of *karma* – *sañcita* (सन्चित), *sañciyamāna* (सञ्चियमान) and *prārabdha karma-s* (प्रारब्ध कर्म) — are implied by this word. In their reply the believers of *jīvanmukti* (जीवन्मुक्ति) say that the use of plural number is justified in the sense that it refers many *karma-s* of both *sañcita* (सन्चित) and *Sañciyamāna karma* (सञ्चियमान कर्म). Because there are many *sañcita karma-s* (सन्चित कर्म) and many *Sañciyamāna Karma-s* (सञ्चियमान कर्म).

Nimbākācārya has offered a shorter argument against the Advaita Vedāntins who admits *jīvanmukti* (जीवन्मुक्ति). He says let us accept that *tattvajñāna* (तत्त्वज्ञान) destroys one's *sañcita karma* (सन्चित

कर्म) and *sañciyamāna karma* (सञ्चियमान कर्म) and not *prārabdha karma-s* (प्रारब्ध कर्म). Now, the problem is if a person becomes *jīvanmukta* (जीवन्मुक्त), then where the *prārabdha karma-s* (प्रारब्ध कर्म) reside? Generally it should reside in it's *upādāna* (उपादान). Since a *bhāva kārya* (भाव कार्य) or created positive entity resides in it's *upādāna* (उपादान), if *upādāna* (उपादान) get destroyed, the *kārya* (कार्य) also get destroyed. One option is that *Brahman* is it's *upādāna kāraṇa* (उपादान कारण). But since *Brahman* is permanent the *prārabdha karma-s* (प्रारब्ध कर्म) will also be permanent. And if *prārabdha karma-s* (प्रारब्ध कर्म) are permanent, no one can achieve *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). This position of Nimbākācārya is not acceptable to both dualists and monist like Advaita Vedāntin.

One may say here that *prārabdha karma-s* (प्रारब्ध कर्म) of a *jīvanmukta* (जीवन्मुक्त) do not reside in *Brahman*, rather it may reside in *ajñāna* (अज्ञान) or *avidyā* (अविद्या). Then Nimbākācārya will say that *ajñāna* (अज्ञान) or *avidyā* (अविद्या) is impermanent and gets destroyed by *tattvajñāna* (तत्त्वज्ञान). For, they are opposite in nature. So, in case of a *jīvanmukta* (जीवन्मुक्त) there will not be *ajñāna* (अज्ञान) and hence *prārabdha karma-s* (प्रारब्ध कर्म) cannot reside in *ajñāna* (अज्ञान).

Keeping these objections in mind proponents (सिद्धान्त वादी) like the Naiyāika-s offer two arguments. Their first argument is that if *jīvanmukti* (जीवन्मुक्ति) is denied then we cannot explain the emergence and continuity of *Śāstric* Tradition or *paramparā*. The important point of this argument is that the emergence and continuity of *Śāstric* Tradition is a fact; and fact cannot be denied. The authority (*prāmānya*) of the *Śāstra* (शास्त्र) that have come down to us from long antiquity has been proved by many independent arguments (*pramāṇa-s*). Now if we do not admit the stage of

jīvanmukta (जीवन्मुक्त), we will not be able to explain how it (शास्त्र) revealed and continued long time through teachers (*Guru-s*) and disciples (*śiṣya-s*) and hence it (*Śāstra*) will not have *prāmānya* (प्रामाण्य). Let us explain this point. Suppose we have a *Śāstric paramparā* like Vaiśeṣika or Vyākaraṇa. It has been proved that there were a great and wise personality who discovered (directly apprehended) the relevant truths and taught to his disciples and they in their turn taught the truth or the *Śāstra* (शास्त्र) to their disciples and so on. In the case of Vaiśeṣika *Śāstra paramparā* the founder of the tradition was Munī Kaṇāda. Now, if Kaṇāda himself did not know the truth expounded in the *Śāstra* (शास्त्र) by him then the Vaiśeṣika *Śāstra* would lack *prāmānya* or authority. For this and for many reasons we have to accept that Kaṇāda first accessed the truth directly and after that he taught this truth to his disciples. Thus Vaiśeṣika *Śāstra* was originated.

If Kaṇāda attained *Videha mukti* (विदेह मुक्ति) immediately after attaining *tattvajñāna* (तत्त्वज्ञान), he could not have opportunity to teach his disciples. On the other hand if he did not attain *tattvajñāna* (तत्त्वज्ञान) when he taught his disciples and was in embodied state, then he did not have direct knowledge of the truth which he taught. Without such knowledge nobody can be an *āpta* (आप्त) or an authoritative person. The only way in which a *Śāstra* (शास्त्र) has been handed down to us through a long chain of preceptors (*Guru-s*) and disciples is that the founder of this tradition attained direct knowledge of *Śāstra* (शास्त्र) and remained in body and taught his disciples. In other words the founder must have realized the truth (the saving truth) and must be in his earthly body. He must have been a

jīvanmukta (जीवन्मुक्त). Madhusūdana Saraswatī said in his book *Praśthānabheda* that those founders Munī -s were free from error.

The opponents of *jīvanmukti* (जीवन्मुक्ति) still may not be convinced. They may say let us admit that only a *jīvanmukta* (जीवन्मुक्त) can be the founder of a *Śāstra* (शास्त्र) *tradition*. But it is not convincing that *tattvajñāna* (तत्त्वज्ञान) destroys only *sañcita* (सन्चित) and *sañciyamāna karma* (सञ्चियमान कर्म) and not *prārabdha karma-s* (प्रारब्ध कर्म). As *karma* (कर्म) they are all same. They are caused by *ajñāna* (अज्ञान) or *mithyā jñāna* (मिथ्याज्ञान).

Now the Naiyāika-s offer it's answer in the following way. *Mithyā jñāna* (मिथ्याज्ञान) is not the immediate cause of *karma* and *tattvajñāna* (तत्त्वज्ञान) is not the immediate and sufficient cause of the destruction of body. So, when *tattvajñāna* (तत्त्वज्ञान) destroys *karma* (कर्म) through destroying *mithyā jñāna* (मिथ्याज्ञान), it does not destroy *karma* (कर्म) immediately. Hence, it is theoretically possible for both *tattvajñāna* (तत्त्वज्ञान) and *karma* (कर्म) along with the absence of *mithyajñāna* (मिथ्याज्ञान) to be there for sometime. This happens at least for *prārabdha karma-s* (प्रारब्ध कर्म). Goutama in his Nyāya *sūtra* has clearly noted the sequence following which *mithyā jñāna* (मिथ्याज्ञान) produces *karma* (कर्म) and causes of birth or body. In his *Bhāṣya* on this *sūtra* Vātsyāyana says this explicitly. According to this *sūtra*, *mithyā jñāna* (मिथ्याज्ञान) directly produces attachment or desire or *rāga* (राग) or *dveṣa* (द्वेष) for respective kind of things. The common name of these two is *doṣa* (दोष). So, in the causal sequence *doṣa* (दोष) comes after *mithyā jñāna* (मिथ्याज्ञान). According to this *sūtra* from *doṣa* (दोष) *pravṛtti* (प्रवृत्ति) is produced. *Pravṛtti* (प्रवृत्ति) means here *adr̥ṣṭa* (अद्रिष्ट) or *pāpa* (पाप) or *pūṇya* (पुण्य). So, if a man who has *mithyā jñāna* (मिथ्याज्ञान) about the true nature of the

self, his attraction (*rāga*) is produced for certain objects and aversion is produced towards some other objects. Attraction leads to positive volition or *pravṛtti* (प्रवृत्ति) and aversion leads to negative volition or *nivṛtti* (निवृत्ति). These in their turn produce *dharma* or *pūṇya* (पुण्य) and *adharma* (*pāpa* or sin). This *karma* (कर्म) has been meant by the word *pravṛtti* (प्रवृत्ति) by Gautama in Nyāya-sūtra 1/1/2. Gautama further says that this *pravṛtti* (प्रवृत्ति) or *karma* (कर्म) causes birth or the embodiment of the self. *Karma* (कर्म) causes embodiment of the self by producing its body. So, for the destruction of the body *karma* [particularly *prārabdha karma-s* (प्रारब्ध कर्म)] of the man is to be destroyed. *Tattvajñāna* (तत्त्वज्ञान) directly causes the destruction or removal of the corresponding *mithyā jñāna* (मिथ्याज्ञान). Only after *mithyā jñāna* (मिथ्याज्ञान) has been removed *doṣa* (दोष) can be removed. Still that time *karma* (कर्म) or *pravṛtti* (प्रवृत्ति) continues to be there along with *tattvajñāna* (तत्त्वज्ञान). At this stage a man is to be admitted as *jīvanmukta* (जीवन्मुक्त). Though he has attained *tattvajñāna* (तत्त्वज्ञान) and liberation, he has still his body. For, the cause of it has not still been removed. Gautama has told us the sequence or the steps—from *tattvajñāna* (तत्त्वज्ञान) to destruction of the body. Here the expression ‘destruction of body’ is ambiguous. It may mean destruction of present body or all future (or possible) bodies. The destruction of all possible future bodies cannot be achieved till all *sañcita* (सञ्चित) and *sañciyamāna* (सञ्चियमान) *karma-s* (कर्म) are destroyed. For, these *karma-s* (कर्म) are seeds (बीज) or necessary conditions of all possible future births. Immediately after *tattvajñāna* (तत्त्वज्ञान) is attained all these (two types of) *karma-s* (कर्म) are destroyed and future possibility of birth is transcended. But present body is still there. It will be destroyed only when the reasons for which it has been produced are fulfilled. And the reason is

prārabdha karma-s (प्रारब्ध कर्म). The fruits of these *prārabdha karma-s* (प्रारब्ध कर्म) are man's direct experience of pleasure and pain (भोग). Apart from that *karma-s* (कर्म) another necessary condition of *bhoga* (भोग) is body. A man can have *bhoga* (भोग) only in the embodied state. So, the body is called *bogāyatana* (भोगायतन). Only through *bhoga* (भोग) these *prārabdha karma-s* (प्रारब्ध कर्म) are destroyed. So, it may be theoretically possible that a man simultaneously attains *tattvajñāna* (तत्त्वज्ञान) and experiences the *bhoga* (भोग) due to his *prārabdha karma-s* (प्रारब्ध कर्म). In that case the current body of that man will be destroyed and the possibility of future births would be checked. But there is no necessity that destruction of the last *prārabdha karma-s* (प्रारब्ध कर्म) and *tattvajñāna* (तत्त्वज्ञान) will occur at the same moment. In such a case a man will continue to be in his body for some time even after attaining *jīvanmukti* (जीवन्मुक्ति). A *jīvanmukta* (जीवन्मुक्त) man has normally two ways to spend the remaining part of his life. He may completely withdraw from society and spend absolute *lonliness* and continue to observe *nivṛtilakṣaṇa dharma* (निवृत्ति लक्षण धर्म). Or, he may teach his disciples the saving truth including the real purpose of life, true nature of the self etc. to attain liberation. This is how the *Śāstric* Tradition are founded with *jīvanmukta* (जीवन्मुक्त) persons and are still continuing. So, *jīvanmukta* (जीवन्मुक्त) is not only possible but useful. A lot of things about *jīvanmukta* (जीवन्मुक्त) has been discussed by Madhusūdana Svaraswatī in his elucidation of the *Bhagavad Gītā* called *Guḍārthadīpikā*.

Notes and references

- 1 As for example, *artha* (अर्थ) is admitted as a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) and also a means of *kāma-puruṣārtha* (काम-पुरुषार्थ).
- 2 'ननु नासौ पुरुसार्थः अतीतदुःखध्वंसस्य सिद्धत्वात् अनागतदुःखस्य पुरुषप्रयत्नं विनैव विरोधिगुणनाशयत्वात् अतीतदुःखवत्' — Gangeśopādhyāy, *Muktivāda* in *Anumānkhanda* of *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, edited by Tarkavāgīś, Kāmākhyānāth, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Pratisthan, Delhi, 1990, p. 156f.
- 3 We have enough knowledge about what is our *kṛtisādhyā* (कृतिसाध्य) and what is not. And at last we must have *prayatna* (प्रयत्न) or will to seek the means. Then only we will achieve the result or *mokṣa* (मोक्ष).
- 4 'ऋण-क्लेश-प्रवृत्त्यनुबन्धादपवर्गभावः' — *Nyāyasūtra* 4/1/58.
- 5 *Srimadbhagavat Gitā* with Śānkar Bhāṣya (in hindi), (upasamhār prakaraṇa), Gitapress, Gorakhpur, 2072 (sambat).
- 6 Krishna, Daya, 'The Myth of the Puruṣārthas' in *Indian Philosophy – A counter perspective*, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1991.
- 7 Gangeśopādhyāy, *Muktivāda* in *Anumānkhanda* of *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, published with Gadadhari, Chowkhamba, Varanasi, 1970, P. 2056.
- 8 Adhvarīndra, Dharmarāj, *Vedānta Paribhāṣā* (with Bengali translation by Pt. Śāstrī, Pañcānan), Pañcānan Śāstrī edition, Kolkata, 1892 (Shakabda), p. 5.
- 9 Ibid.
- 10 'तदत्यन्तविमोक्षऽपवर्गः' — *Nyāya Sūtra* 1/1/22.
- 11 Uddyotkar in his *Vārtika* on the *Bhāṣya* of *Nyāya Sūtra* 1/1/22 in Tarkavāgīś, Phanībhūṣaṇa (ed. and translated), *Nyāyadarśana* (in Bengali), Paschim Banga Rajya Pustak Parsad, Kolkata, 1989.
- 12 'तदभयमजरममृत्युपदं ब्रह्म क्षेमप्राप्तिरिति' — *Bhāṣya* of *Nyāya Sūtra* 1/1/22, in Tarkavāgīś, Phanībhūṣaṇa (ed. and translated),

Nyāyadarśana (in Bengali), Paschim Banga Rajya Pustak Parsad, Kolkata, 1989.

¹³ Chowdhury, Nirod Chandra, *Atmaghati bangali*, Mitra and Ghosh Publishers, 1988, p. 169.

¹⁴ Pal, Bipin Chandra, *Soul of India*, Classic Publications, Kolkata, 2000, P. 35.

¹⁵ Tripāthī, Rāmamurti, *Āgam ke Ālok me Bhrātiya Kāvyaśāstra* (in Hindi), Pune Vidyapith, Pune, 2001, p. 3, 6.

¹⁶ Kavirāj, Gopīnāth, *The History and Bibliography of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Literature*, Sampurnanada Sanskrit University, Varanasi, 1982.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 6.

¹⁸ “....तत्त्वज्ञानान्निःश्रेयसाधिगम”. We ignore here the very subtle argument why the standard interpretation of this *sūtra* tells us that *tattvajñāna* (तत्त्वज्ञान) does not immediately precede liberation. For even so what immediately precedes liberation, according to this interpretation is not yoga.

¹⁹ *Yogasūtra* — 2.24-26, *ṣaḍadarśanasūtrasaṃgraha*, edited by Śāstrī, Dwarikādās, Sudhi Prakashana, Varanasi, 1988.

²⁰ *Nyāyasūtra* — 4/2/38.

²¹ ‘कथम् तत्त्वज्ञानम् उत्पद्यते इति’—*Vātsyāyana Bhāṣya* on *Nyāyasūtra* of Goutama.

²² In a technical sense into which we need not enter here.

²³ *Nyāyasūtra* — 4/2/38.

²⁴ There is good reason why it has to be *sākṣātkāra* (साक्षात्कार) rather than mere *jñāna* (ज्ञान) or knowledge. Immediate *mithyājñāna* is the cause of bondage and only immediate *tattvajñāna* or atma *sākṣātkāra* (साक्षात्कार) can remove this Immediate *mithyājñāna*.

- ²⁵ *Nyāyadarśana* of Goutama, Vol-5, p. 223, Paschim Banga Rajya Pustak Parsad, Kolkata, 1989.
- ²⁶ *Nyāyasūtra* — 1/1/1.
- ²⁷ Acharya, Diwankar, 'Major points of Vācaspati's Disagreement with Mandana' in *Logic and Belief in Indian Philosophy*, edited by Balcerowicz, Pitor, Motilal Banersidass, Delhi, 2010, p. 424.
- ²⁸ स्थितप्रज्ञस्य का भाषा समाधिस्थस्य केशवइ ।
स्थितधीः किं प्रभाषेत किमासीत ब्रजेत किम् ॥ — *Srīmadbhagavat Gītā* 2/54
with the commentary of Śaṅkarācārya.
- ²⁹ Kar, Minati, *Jivanmukti: Tattva, Pramāna o Sādhana* (in Bengali), Adityamoy, Calcutta, 1998, p. 69.
- ³⁰ Vidyāranya, *Jivanmuktiviveka*,(p . 178), as quoted by Kar, Minati, *Jivanmukti: Tattva, Pramana o Sādhana* (in Bengali), Adityamoy, Calcutta, 1998, p.69.
- ³¹ Kar, Minati, *Jivanmukti: Tattva, Pramāna o Sādhana* (in Bengali), Adityamoy, Calcutta, 1998, p. 47.
- ³² Rāmānuja, *Sribhāṣya*, p.404, as quoted by Kar, Minati, *Jivanmukti: Tattva, Pramāna o Sādhana* (in Bengali), Adityamoy, Calcutta, 1998, p. 47.

Chapter- VII

The Conclusion

In this concluding chapter we would like to do three things. First, we would like to add some details that we omitted earlier in the interest of uninterrupted discussion. Secondly, we would also discuss certain general objections that we could not discuss before. And thirdly, we would like to begin this chapter by stating a few major points of my present work. We do not claim these points as our achievements or contributions. But they certainly show where we attained clarity of understanding and expression during my present research on the subject of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). The value of this work for us lies in this gain. We also found that the original literatures on the subject were much clearer than the works of many modern scholars. These scholars, some of them great thinkers, appear to be more eager to express their views and opinions than establishing them or even sometimes explaining them. In general we found them critical of what may be called the classical view in the matter. But we also noted that they often did not care to state the classical view in question. Most of these thinkers are teachers and scholars of philosophy. But none of them distinguished the *popular view of puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or FVP and the *philosophical theory of puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or PTP. Till we undertook the present research we also did not know that this distinction was there or that this distinction was so important. We got the first hint of it in the *Vedāntaparibhāṣāsamgraha* of Pandit Pañcānan Śāstri. It later proved to be the major source of clarity that we gained on the subject of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or the theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ).

Many do not know that the four-fold scheme of human values or *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) is actually the *Paurāṇic* (पौराणिक) or *Purāṇa* theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). The *Purāṇa* (पुराण) and *darśana* (दर्शन) or roughly philosophy are different systems of knowledge and different kinds of literature. So we inquired if the familiar fourfold scheme of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) was the *Paurāṇic* (पौराणिक) scheme or view then what was the source of the philosophical theory or view of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). The reasonable expectation was that the philosophical treatment of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) must be more systematic and analytical. It was refreshingly new when we found that according to the philosophical view the scheme of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) contained only *one puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Some modern scholars debated over the issue whether the fourfold scheme (चतुर्वर्ग) was better or the threefold scheme (त्रिवर्ग) was better. They did not notice or discuss the philosophical view according to which the scheme of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) contained only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). For a student of philosophy and in a research work in the field of philosophy this distinction proved to be the most important. But then there was a problem. There are many different schools of philosophy. If they all admit only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) then the natural question is whether they have different theories of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or the same theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). We found that though these schools did not differ in respect of the *number* of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), but they differed about the *nature* of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Even when all these schools agreed to call the one single *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) as *mokṣa* (मोक्ष), they did not mean by *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) the same thing. Taking into consideration these two points of agreement and difference between them we in this work

suggested that the philosophical theories of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) proposed by different schools of philosophy were actually so many different *versions* of PTP. We also explained why the different philosophical schools offered *different versions* of PTP. The *way in which the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika version differs from the Vedānta version* is different from the way it differs from the version to be found in the Cārvāka School. If the notion of *puruṣa* (roughly man) differs then the notion of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) must also be different. The notion of *puruṣa* (पुरुष) according to both Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Vedānta philosophy are more or less the same. This will be clear when we consider that both these schools of thought reject the view of *puruṣa* (पुरुष) of Cārvāka school. So though the one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in the version of Cārvāka PTP is *kāma* (काम), it is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) according to both Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Advaita Vedānta schools of philosophy. In the standard Vaiṣṇava philosophical version of the theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) the one (final and ultimate) *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is *bhakti* (भक्ति). It is neither *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) nor *kāma* (काम). So far as the Advaita Vedānta version and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika version of PTP are concerned there is a difference about the nature of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). According to the first version of PTP, the one and the final *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is pleasure of a kind. But according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika version of PTP, *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the only *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) but it is something negative in its nature. This is well known among the serious scholars of philosophy. But there are many technicalities in the systematic Vedānta philosophy. Those who take these technical points seriously know that neither the nature of *Brahman* nor the nature of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) can be of the nature of *positive* pleasure or

sukha (सुख). Such an admission will conflict with the monism of this Vedānta. We took great pain to state the point clearly and offered arguments for this. Yet another difference among the philosophical schools is about the means (उपाय) of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Even when *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is admitted in certain philosophical schools as the one and final *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), different schools suggest different means for its attainment. For a long time a debate is going on. Some hold that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) can be attained through *karma* (कर्म) or through performing dutiful actions (कर्म). Other hold the view that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) can be attained through *jñāna* (ज्ञान) only. Both monist Vedānta philosophers and dualist or pluralist Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers agree that *karma* (कर्म) cannot be regarded as the independent or final cause or independent or final means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). But many of us who are unaware about these technical philosophical issues do not understand this point properly. So, they think that men should denounce all *karma-s* (कर्म) as rituals and take the path of *jñāna* (ज्ञान) or *bhakti* (भक्ति) to attain highest fulfillment of life. They make reference to the *Gītā*. But the *Gītā* does not teach us to denounce all *karma-s* (कर्म) as rituals. In the first place till the time of Śaṅkarācārya or Gaṅgeśopādhyāy and before the time of Madhusūdana Svarasvatī nobody held the view that the *Gītā* in its three parts teach us *karma* (कर्म), *jñāna* (ज्ञान) and *bhakti* (भक्ति). All through his *bhāṣya* on the *Gītā* Śaṅkarācārya discussed the relative roles of *karma* (कर्म) and *jñāna* (ज्ञान). And according to him, they cannot be practiced together, meaning thereby their *samuccaya* (समुच्चय) is not possible. Like Śaṅkarācārya and his followers, majority of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers, hold *a-samuccaya* (असमुच्चय) theory or *a-*

samuccayavāda (असमुच्चयवाद). It is generally believed that Madhusūdana Svaraswatī, though a great advaita Vedāntin, deviated from Śaṅkarācārya and held that *bhakti* (भक्ति) and not *jñāna* (ज्ञान) is the source of *mukti* (मुक्ति). But a deeper study of his works convinced us that his view of *bhakti* (भक्ति) is different from what goes in the name of Madhusūdana's view of *bhakti* (भक्ति). While studying the literature on this debate we came to notice another important thing. In recent time two great classical scholar-philosophers of India (Mm. Phaṇībhuṣana Tarkvāgīś and Mm. Gopīnāth Kavirāj) expressed different opinions about the exact position of Nyāya in the matter of the nature of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) and the means of attaining it. We felt very happy to study the 'debate' between such stalwarts. But unfortunately this debate was ignored so long. We also found that the position or the stand of Mm. Phaṇībhuṣana Tarkvāgīś was more convincing.

During the earlier days of this research work we took the fourfold scheme of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) not only as the standard view but also as the *popular* view. We continued to view it in the same way and contrast it with PTP for some time. But when we inquired about the source of PTP and many of its versions we realized that this source is nothing but the *Veda* and the *Upaniṣada*. According to the classical view of them there is no conflict or contradiction among the teachings of the *Veda*, *Upaniṣada*, *Purāṇa* (पुराण), *ītiḥāsa* (इतिहास) and *Dharmaśāstra*. So FVP and PTP are different but not opposed to each other. As theories they first differ in their generality. Secondly, FVP represents the scheme of values which is empirically visible in the life of ordinary and worldly men and these values are recommended for them. PTP becomes the true

scheme of values for the same people when they are more evolved and have successfully lived the life of a student (ब्रह्मचर्य) and that of a householder (गार्हस्थ्य). Some romantically oriented people develop a sort of pseudo-asceticism when they want to reach the state of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) too early without going through the proper process. Then they do not gain anything; they become a great loser. They do not succeed in this world nor can get the best of the other world. The *Puranic* theory is as valid as the philosophical view. However, philosophy is more systematic and analytic; further it admits only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). So in philosophical theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) there is not many scope of anomaly and problem of reconciling different values. The major problem with FVP was for us whether to accept all the four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) or less or more number of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). Other scholars did not make serious effort to reconcile them or to give an interpretation of FVP so that it becomes a consistent theory. We suggested many different ways of doing that. Ultimately we found that it is too easy to reconcile greater or smaller number of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) with FVP. But it was not that easy to interpret the linear arrangement of the four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). Our final conclusion in the matter was that the lowest position assigned to the *dharma puruṣārtha* (धर्म पुरुषार्थ) does not signify that it is less important. The idea is that *dharma* (धर्म) is the root of all *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) in the sense that unless it is pursued as a *dharma* (धर्म) or as a provision of normative ethics *kāma* (काम) and *artha* (अर्थ) could not be regarded as a value. However, the same cannot be said about *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). *Artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम) become value when we pursue it in the right and dutiful way. But when a man seeks *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) he actually seeks

to transcend the limits of morality.¹ The question now is: when one reaches the limit of morality? One view is that one reaches the limit of morality when one (truly) finds that there is nothing for him to seek in this world or after. This explanation cannot be accepted. For, if nothing is there for him to seek, then he cannot be a seeker of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष), he cannot be a *mumukṣu* (मुमुक्षु). The better answer is: one reaches the limit of morality when one has nothing to attain *through duties* or moral deeds. But how can such a man attain *mokṣa* (मोक्ष)? If *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is not to be attained through doing dutiful actions, then also there must be some *way* to attain it. Only by adopting some appropriate means one can get *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). Some would like to answer this objection or question by saying that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is already an attained goal; man is already *mukta* (मुक्त). So, it is not a valid question how one can attain *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). But then how can we distinguish a *mumukṣu* (मुमुक्षु) from a *mukta* (मुक्त)? It is said that man is always and already *mukta* (मुक्त) but he does not know it. He *wrongly* thinks that he is in bondage. So no effort is needed to attain freedom or *mukti* (मुक्ति). But there is a need to remove the false belief (अज्ञान) that we are not *mukta* (मुक्त) but in bondage. The means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is actually a means of removing the false belief that we are not already *mukta* (मुक्त). Man through his effort removes the false belief and its cause. But no effort is needed for achieving *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). There are some points in this answer but still it is difficult to accept. If *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is not an object of seeking or if no human effort (पुरुष प्रयत्न) is necessary to attain it then it cannot be called a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). The answer we offer is that even when a man reaches the limit of morality, he can still seek *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) and try to achieve it. But he does not try

to attain *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) in an ethical way or through performing moral duties. In fact *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) cannot be attained (directly) through any action (कर्म), not even through moral action (धर्म or धर्म-कर्म). The path of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is *jñāna* (ज्ञान). Actually one attains *mukti* (मुक्ति) through (i) the direct and right knowledge of the true nature of the soul (आत्मतत्त्व-साक्षायतकार) and (ii) the *bhoga* (भोग) or experience of the *prārabdha karma* (प्रारब्ध कर्म). Of these in (ii) man has no active role to play. He passively experiences the effect of the remaining few of those *karmas* (कर्म) that caused him to be born. Such *karmas* (कर्म) are called *prārabdha karma-s* (प्रारब्ध कर्म). So far as the other factor (i) is concerned man has to work hard to acquire this sort of knowledge. But once this knowledge is obtained, then the man becomes *mukta* (मुक्त) if the other condition (ii) is fulfilled. According to this answer, a man has transcended morality when he has reached the limits of morality and does not have any duties to perform. Such a man obtains *mukti* (मुक्ति) as a result of hard earned knowledge but not through any action. Even though this answer is right a little refinement is necessary. Ordinarily a man is said to have reached the limit of morality when he has nothing to seek through morality. But actually these moral actions through performing which one seeks some result are called *pravṛtti lakṣaṇa dharma* (प्रवृत्ति लक्षण धर्म). Ordinarily understood one reaches the limit of morality when one cannot or does not need to perform the duties or dutiful actions which are called *pravṛtti lakṣaṇa dharma* (प्रवृत्ति लक्षण धर्म). Even such a man can and does perform what is called *nivṛtti lakṣaṇa dharma* (निवृत्ति लक्षण धर्म) or the duties of a man which has no result other than *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) to attain. The performance of *nivṛtti lakṣaṇa dharma* (निवृत्ति लक्षण धर्म) leads to no

result other than the *jñāna* (ज्ञान), or the knowledge of the soul. Thus *nivṛtti lakṣaṇa dharma* (निवृत्ति लक्षण धर्म) leads to *jñāna* (ज्ञान) or self realization and through this a man secures *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) which is the highest goal or value of human life. So there remains an object of human seeking and it is obtained through human effort that leads to the right sort of *jñāna* (ज्ञान). This human effort consists in performing ethical or moral actions of a higher order. These are called *nivṛtti lakṣaṇa dharma* (निवृत्ति लक्षण धर्म). Because these actions consists in taming (निवृत्ति) the desire (इच्छा or काम) for ordinary goals of life or goals other than the goal of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष).

I

Due to their failure to distinguish between FVP and PTP different modern scholars raised different objections against familiar scheme of fourfold *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Some held that the scheme of fourfold (चतुर्वर्ग) *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) was a later addition. Originally there was only a scheme of threefold (त्रिवर्ग) *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) theory. We showed that fourfold (चतुर्वर्ग) theory was quite old and could be traced to the *Vedas* and *Upaniṣada*. But what is more important is that we pointed out that there was also scheme of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) in which there was only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) instead of three or four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). We also showed that some object that in the classical literatures of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ), there was no place for such *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) as intellectual pleasure as is held by some modern scholars. We argued that the objection is not valid. For the classical conception of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) kept room for many other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) such as long life, intellectual pleasure and so on.

We also discussed the three related questions or objections that are frequently raised about the Indian scheme of values or *puruṣārthas* (पुरुषार्थ). (1) The fourfold scheme of *puruṣārthas* (पुरुषार्थ) is neither the best nor the only Indian scheme of values. This we discussed in connection with resolving the debate about *trivarga* (त्रिवर्ग) and *caturvarga* (चतुर्वर्ग) theories of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). We also discussed, in addition, the *ekavarga* (एकवर्ग) doctrine of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). We first pointed out that ideally the philosophical doctrine of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) must be *ekavarga* (एकवर्ग) doctrine of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Ordinarily according to such a doctrine the only *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is *mokṣa puruṣārtha* (मोक्ष पुरुषार्थ). *Mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the only *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) from a point of view of philosophy. On the other hand, from the ordinary or popular point of view *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are not three as the supporters of the *trivarga* (त्रिवर्ग) doctrine hold. Rather the number of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) is four which includes *mokṣa puruṣārtha* (मोक्ष पुरुषार्थ) also. At this point some raise the objection why the number of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) cannot be more. We have shown that such an objection does not have any basis. If we take any *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) individually, it can be many. There are many *kāma puruṣārtha-s* (काम पुरुषार्थ) and many *dharma puruṣārtha-s* (धर्म पुरुषार्थ). But they are all same as *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). The point of building a theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is to arrive at some general truth about it. For this reason those who built a theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) generalized *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) to different degrees. So in such a theory every *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is a class or kind of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) within which many individually different *puruṣārthas* (पुरुषार्थ) can be included. When we say *sukha* (सुख) is *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) we

know that there are many different kinds of *sukha* (सुख). There is the *sensory* pleasure of enjoying a good dish and also *intellectual* pleasure of theoretical inquiry like philosophy or science. So it is not a objection to say that Indian doctrine of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) keeps no room for such pleasure as intellectual pleasure.

Thus we showed that the familiar fourfold scheme of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is not just fourfold and keeps room for many other values or *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). What is more important is that we showed, on the other hand, that the single or one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) scheme has different versions. We first discussed that any *ideal philosophical* theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or PTP can accept only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). For, no greater generalization is possible or the number of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) cannot be less than one. However there can be *different versions* of PTP. We first discussed that the *version* of the PTP which the supporters of the monism like the Advaita Vedānta supports was different from the version of the PTP which the supporters of the dualist or pluralists like the Naiyāyika-s or Vaiśeṣika-s prefer. We discussed, in addition, the view of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) as a philosophical theory of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) and it is different from the Vedānta PTP as well as Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika PTP.

II

Another important point we made was that the discussion of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) was not an accidental or unimportant part of philosophy. Those who think differently fail to note a number of important points. In the first place the conception of philosophy in India is different from the conception of philosophy in modern Europe or America. Secondly, this conception of philosophy is

common to almost all schools of philosophy in India. Thirdly, according to this conception, *mokṣa puruṣārtha* (मोक्ष पुरुषार्थ) is an essential part of philosophy. Nobody can ignore these points to show that *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is not a proper subject matter of philosophy. By ignoring this they practically suggest knowingly or unknowingly that the western conception of philosophy is the only conception of philosophy. We noted earlier that there was no want of systems of analytical philosophy in India. And these systems of philosophy discuss with all seriousness both the subject of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in general and the particular *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) called *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). So, it cannot be said that *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is not a subject matter of philosophy truly speaking. To realize this we need to note that even the systematic and technical philosophy of India is marked by its practical orientation. We also argued that the scheme of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) can be viewed as the foundation of acceptable moral and legal theories and practice.

But some object against the Indian philosophical theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). They have mainly two objections. The first is that for this ideology of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) India has a world negating culture. Secondly, because of their concern for *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) Indians became selfish. They have no concern for general welfare or the good of mankind.

In answer to the second objection we showed that we cannot ascribe selfishness to those who are the real or true aspirant of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). For, such aspirant or *mumukṣu* (मुमुक्षु) is necessarily *virakta* (विरक्त). He has already renounced all cravings, all interests and attachments. For, they seek or *want mokṣa* (मोक्ष). We cannot

ascribe any need or attachment or self-interest to such persons in the ordinary sense of the term. Instead of saying that *mumukṣu* (मुमुक्षु) seeks to achieve or secure *mokṣa*, (मोक्ष) we should more appropriately say they 'seek' emancipation from all that are viewed ordinarily as good and desirable. For them none of these things is *really* good. They have self-realization (आत्म-साक्षात्कार). Vātsyāyana in his *bhāṣya* on *Nyāya sūtra* while elucidating on the *apavarga sūtra* of Gautama has already clarified these things. So, we need to reconcile the account of *mumukṣu* (मुमुक्षु) given so far with those texts of *Purāṇa-s* that say ideology of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) promotes selfishness.

The point of the objector is that it follows from the meaning of the word that *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is indeed a matter of *self-interest*. A socially and morally better and higher life is one in which one's personal interest (स्वार्थ) is consciously controlled and ignored. And so, it (personal interest) is subordinated to general interest or interest of the other people. A selfish man who gives more importance to self-interest is not an ideal man either socially or morally. However, it is also to be admitted that a man does not generally do anything if he does not have some interest in it. In other words, if the action in question does not serve some of his purposes, he will not be interested to do that thing. Now, how can we say that a person can be both a worthy in the social and moral sphere and also an active at a time? We cannot act without interest but to give importance to one's interest is to be selfish. To be selfish (act for one's own interest) is bad in the eyes of society and morality. To be good and right a man needs to sacrifice his interest or self interest. On the other hand it has been rightly said that no

intelligent man ever acts without interest (प्रयोजनमनुद्दिश्य न मन्दोऽपि प्रवर्तते।²). Different solutions of this problem have been suggested. Sometimes they differ in forms and words and not in content or substance. One way of answering the problem is to draw a distinction between self-interest and enlightened self-interest. An enlightened man, an educated and cultured man, also acts for some purpose. The actions what he performs serve some purpose or interest. But this is not just ordinary self-interest which a selfish man pursues. It is enlightened self-interest. One who pursues in his actions enlightened self-interest cannot be regarded as a selfish man. We will come back to answering the problem in terms of the distinction between selfishness and enlightened self-interest. There is a second way of solving the problem. For that man, who prefers this second way, the sentence that man cannot act without any self interest becomes false. In this sense, man can act simply from a sense of duty. Eventually we will have to distinguish between acting from enlightened self-interest and acting from a sense of duty. For the present there are three types of action: actions done to fulfill some selfish interest of the agent; actions done from enlightened self-interest and actions done from a sense of duty. Some radical theorists would say that when one acts from a sense of duty there is no interest whatsoever to be served.

To return to enlightened self-interest, there are cases when a man saves the life of a total stranger from drowning without any thought of return or reward. It is not just a thoughtless habitual action. It is done from explicit or implicit sense of duty. One may say that this man also acts from interest or self-interest; and the interest is to do one's duty. In reply we would say, it is the case of

enlightened self-interest. In this sense a man is a cultured man in whom love for others (or universal love) and sense of duty are predominant and for this there developed a sense of social and moral responsibility. There is no place in their life for narrow self-interest. Interest one takes to save the life of a total stranger is enlightened self-interest. Here the agent's interest is to fulfill the interest and desire of the other man, in this case, the man who is drowning. So far there is only difference in words whether we describe this action as action done from a sense of duty or as an action done from enlightened self-interest. Enlightened self interest values other's interest more than one's private and personal interest. More radical thinkers hold that while acting from the sense of duty the doer takes no notice of interest whether of his own or of someone's else. He acts under the dictation or command of reason or of the moral imperative. To act from a sense of duty one must first subjugate completely one's desire, inclination, interest and the like. He must subjugate his passions and emotions to reason or sense of duty. On such radical interpretation of acting from duty the threefold division of actions is possible. Man can act in his own interest (स्वार्थ) or to serve the interest of others (परार्थ) or he can act without reference to any interest at all; he can act only in consideration of the demand of the sense of duty.

True values are the objects for that man who acts from the sense of enlightened self-interest. Values are of general interest. It may be my own duty to serve my aging and ailing parents. But serving the ailing and aging parents is a universal duty in the sense that it is the duty of every man to serve his parents (at least when they need it). If truth telling is a value, it is everyone's interest

(enlightened self-interest) to seek it. Recognition of this obliges us to grant everyone the *right* to truth telling. Neither the individual nor the state has the (opposite) right to prevent anyone from telling the truth or exercising his right to truth-telling. Rather it is the duty of every man and of the state to preserve and promote every one's right to truth-telling. This is the way in which value constitutes the foundation of (both legal and moral) right and (legal and moral) duty. It is in this way we can distinguish a theory of value from two other related theories — namely the theory of right and the theory of duty (or again the moral theory of right and duty and legal theory of right and duty). The theory of value is the foundational theory or more basic theory. We propose that the theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or values may be taken as a theory which is related to ethics or moral theory but is more basic than either of them.

To be more specific, it now becomes our duty first (a) not to prevent others from exercising their right; and secondly, it is our duty (b) to allow and encourage them to exercise it. So the theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) recognizes that as a matter of enlightened self-interest every man should pursue *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) which is appropriate for his age, station and so on. For being and being recognized in the society as a worthy member men from ordinary individuals to the members of the royal family of the Hindu society used to pursue these *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ).³ So it is in the context of a scheme of basic values that we organize our thought and theories of rights and duties.

Familiar *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are values primarily in the context of the life and growth of an individual man. The question is raised

whether there was in classical India any concern for collective growth and welfare. So far as universal values and general welfare are concerned another well known saying is there: सर्वे भवन्तु सुखिनः सर्वे सन्तु निरामया । सर्वे भद्राणि पश्यन्तु मा कश्चित् दुःखभाक् भवेत् ॥⁴ from this statement the concern of classical Indian thinkers for collective growth and welfare becomes evident. In the *Vaidika* and classical Indian literature we rarely find an individual prays for himself by using first person singular number. Prayers are not for me (in the singular) but for *us* (and all). Scholars like Gopīnāth Kavirāj have drawn our attention to this fact. Indians always prayed for collective good and not for the fulfillment of one's narrow and selfish interest. The objective is the highest and best fulfillment of the *individual* life as well as the collective good like universal health, happiness, prosperity and freedom from suffering. There is also a well-known prayer for long life.⁵ Our ancestors went further. They prayed for the pleasure, happiness and fulfillment of all sentient creatures.⁶ Such collective goods are also values and objects of pursuit and seeking. If one wants one can easily take these long-life etc. to be *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). If, on the other hand, one wants to generalize these individual goods they can bring them under either say *kāma* (काम) (good) or *dharma* (धर्म) or duty. If one wants to further generalize the values one can include them all into freedom from pain and suffering.

The distinctive conception of philosophy in India, that is, the distinctive conception of *darśana* (दर्शन) makes *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) a natural subject matter of it. So even if for the arguments sake we admit that (modern European) *philosophy* does not have place for the subject like *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) we cannot deny that *puruṣārtha*

(पुरुषार्थ) is a central concern and subject matter of *darśana* (दर्शन). It is to be noted as one of the distinguishing marks of *darśana* (दर्शन) that *darśana* (दर्शन) or Indian philosophy has great *practical* bearing. One does not do *darśana* (दर्शन) simply for the intellectual pleasure of gaining theoretical understanding. In India men philosophize (do or study *darśana*) to be clear about the true goal of life and the way of securing it. The Indian conception of *darśana* (दर्शन) is rather close to the classical European and the ancient Greek conception of philosophy. Men expect to know from it the true nature of the world and our place in it. To put it in the way which is closer to *darśana* (दर्शन), man expects to know from *darśana* (दर्शन) such truths about our life and the world as may secure for us that which can end all our cravings and strivings. Our life on earth is a life of constant striving for some good. Our striving does not end with securing one good or the other. The moment we get a thing we strive for another. The striving never ends and we are never at rest. Schopenhauer has shown this beautifully in his writing 'The Vanity of Existence'. This constant striving for something or other, this constant effort or exerting becomes so painful that we begin to dislike this life. We want to escape from such a state. A pessimist would commit suicide. In fact there is a popular saying which expresses the view of such pessimists. They say the best thing is not to be born, but once born the next best thing is to die. The Indian view is different and positive. First, death and suicide are themselves painful. Secondly, they bring much more suffering in their train since committing suicide is a sin. In the third place, in suicide there is a temporary relief. Such relief we have almost every day during sleep. What is actually needed is to put an end not just

to this *life* but to the very necessity of rebirth. If we cannot do that then we will be reborn again and again and will experience the pain of constant striving. According to the positive view of *darśana* (दर्शन), we need to get the final good or reach the final fulfillment. Once we get that we will never strive for any other thing; for there will be nothing more to strive for. Our constant seeking will stop permanently. So we need to get that

“यं लब्ध्वा चापरं लाभं मन्यते नास्तिकं तथा ।

यस्मिन्स्थितो न दुःखेन गुरुणापि विचाल्यते॥” (*Bhagavad Gītā*, 6/22).

Now one moot question is: Is there such a thing? If there is, what is it and how can we get it? We expect from *darśana* (दर्शन) the answers to these questions. Since these questions are about *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) in general and the final *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in particular, *darśana* (दर्शन) is regarded as the *mokṣa-Śāstra* (मोक्ष-शास्त्र). There are other *mokṣa-Śāstra* (मोक्ष-शास्त्र) also. For example, *Āgama* (or *Tantra*) and *Nigama* (or the *Veda*) are also *Śāstra* (शास्त्र) that tell us about the final fulfillment and its means. But only in Indian philosophy (दर्शन) we get the analytical and critical discussion of the questions just stated and answers based on rational inquiry. So Indian philosophy's concern is the most burning problem of life: how to remove life's suffering from the very root? *Darśana* (दर्शन) does not give us only the *theoretical* understanding of such matters about the world, the human life, life's suffering and so on. It also provides guidance for a meaningful and successful life. It gives us the knowledge which does not only make us wise but also fulfilled and free; free from all actual and possible sufferings. *Mokṣa* (मोक्ष)

is another name for this freedom. The Indian conception of philosophy or *darśana* (दर्शन) makes the discussion of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) including in particular the *mokṣa-puruṣārtha* (मोक्ष-पुरुषार्थ) its central concern. Those who find *difficulty* in finding a place for *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) or *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in philosophy — in philosophy of mind or morals — need to carefully consider that *darśana* (दर्शन) is not merely an abstract intellectual discipline of theoretical knowledge as modern European philosophy is. *Darśana* (दर्शन) is a system of knowledge which has immediate and highest practical bearing. It is not for knowledge or for the sake of knowledge that one does in *darśana* (दर्शन). Indians take a positive and practical view of philosophy. Man does or studies *darśana* (दर्शन) as a way (even if indirect way) of securing highest fulfillment of life and final eradication of sufferings. Once the knowledge of the truth (तत्त्वज्ञान), obtained from *darśana* (दर्शन), is put to practice and turned into immediate realization of the soul (आत्म-साक्षात्कार) one secures *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). And then nothing remains to seek or to know. Man gets which knowingly or unknowingly he has been seeking from untold past.

Notes and References

¹ Professor Sushil Kumar Maitra has stated this point beautifully in his *The Ethics of the Hindus*, University of Calcutta, Calcutta, 1963.

² Ślokvārtika, Kumāril Bhaṭṭa.

³ The beginning verses of Kalidasa's *Raghuvamsaṃ*.

⁴ *Vaidika mantra*.

⁵ 'जीवेम शरद शतम', Quoted by Tripathi, Bhagiratha (Vagish Shastri), *Samskṛtavānmayamanthanam*, Sanskrit Bharati, Varanasi, 1990, p.

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Yoga and Nyāya: Allies or Adversaries

SWATI BHATTACHARYA

Abstract. Yoga is usually aligned with Sāṃkhya and Nyāya with Vaiśeṣika. However, some textual evidences have been cited, which show that this is just not the case. It has been claimed that in some of their doctrines Nyāya and Yoga are aligned with each other and both of them differ from Sāṃkhya. This is not the standard, traditional or majority understanding of these systems. Yet, since the time this non-standard reading was brought to our notice by MM Gopinath Kaviraj¹ in the first half of twentieth century, it has not been subjected to serious study or examination which it deserves. We carefully examine here this controversial reading of the systems in question along with the evidences cited in support. We come to these conclusions: that the non-standard reading is untenable; that Nyāya and Yoga are closely aligned with each other just because they do not hold the controversial view attributed to them; they do not differ in this respect from Sāṃkhya either. We also examine the related issue and reject the view that some Naiyāyikas transformed Nyāya – its theory of *pramāna*, etc. – in the medieval period under the influence of Yoga and or Kāshmirā Sāivism. Finally we show that Nyāya and Yoga are seen in the tradition as mutual allies rather than adversaries.

A theory of human needs² has many dimensions. It is as much a theory of human values as a theory of human actions. Actions are means of realizing the values. However, there arises a question; is the doctrine of human needs (*puruṣārtha*)³ just about the desired goals of human life or of values of life as well

or primarily.⁴ Even if we leave that question aside, a comprehensive discussion of the doctrine of human needs demands that we discuss not only the *idea* of *puruṣārtha*⁵ but also the *means*⁶ of attaining it. In other words, a comprehensive theory of *puruṣārtha* should include as a part of it the doctrine of *puruṣārtha-sādhana* that is, the practices or practical measures necessary for attaining human needs (*puruṣārthas*) including spiritual freedom⁷.

It is generally claimed that yoga is a means of final *puruṣārtha* or *mokṣa*. However, a controversy has been created regarding the exact role which yoga plays in enabling man to attain freedom. The controversy was created when two stalwarts in the area of classical Indian philosophy – Phanībhūšana Tarkavāgīśa (PT) (1876–1942) and Gopinath Kaviraj (GK) (1887–1976) – expressed, independent of each other, different views about the exact role which yoga is supposed to play in the attainment of *mokṣa*. PT critically examined and defended the Nyāya position in the matter as expounded in the Nyāya tradition beginning with Gautama. In course of this PT gives us the familiar traditional view about the nature of and relationships between systems of philosophy like Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Yoga and Sāṃkhya. This relation is basically the relation between allies. GK, however drew our attention to certain textual evidences which, he thinks, point at the need for revising the familiar and traditional views about these philosophies in respect of the question what exact role does yoga play in the attainment of liberation and also regarding the nature and development of the Nyāya philosophy.

It is surprising that differences between two universally respected great scholars on such an important issue remained unnoticed or at least un-discussed so long. In this paper I would like to concentrate on the controversy, emanating from the cited differences between PT and GK, regarding the exact role which yoga (allegedly) plays in enabling man to attain freedom. GK for the first time tells us that some texts have been found which contend (i) that according to Nyāya (and Yoga), yoga is the

immediate source of freedom and (ii) that in this respect, that is to say, in holding this, both Nyāya and Yoga differ from Sāṃkhya. However this is not the standard view of the systems in question or the traditional understanding of them. This situation demands that we seriously examine this non-standard and controversial reading of Nyāya theory of means of freedom, the final human need or *puruṣārtha*, and the evidences on which such reading has been proposed. This controversy has assumed special interest since the expressed positions of (PT) and (GK) are opposed to each other.

II

Related to the controversial claim that Nyāya like Yoga holds that yoga is the immediate source of freedom, there is the larger claim which is equally controversial. It is that in the medieval period thinkers like Bhāsarvajña, as a result of the influence on him of Yoga and Kāśhmira Savism, substantially *transformed* Nyāya philosophy⁷. While claiming that the alleged transformations brought Nyāya closer to Yoga it is also claimed that the respect in which Nyāya is close to it, Yoga is different from Sāṃkhya. There are two questions: first, are the claims in question true and the second, can we dissociate a system from its natural and original setting and association and align it with a different one? Can we align Yoga, which is originally aligned with Sāṃkhya, with Nyāya instead? That Yoga is naturally related to Sāṃkhya is evident from the normal practice of referring to these philosophies in pair: Sāṃkhya-Yoga.

III

Incidentally it may be noted in passing that the second question may be further extended. Can we relate Yoga to Vedānta? Is it not problematic or more problematic to relate Yoga to Nyāya rather than such other philosophies as Vedānta? Here there is great divergence between the theoretical position and the actual practice. Theoretically speaking, aligning Yoga with Vedānta may prove to be more problematic than aligning it with Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika or (Pūrva) Mīmāṃsā. But in practice

most of the recent votaries and aspirants of yoga seem to be oblivious of this problem. They do not feel like asking the question "How Vedānta relates to Yoga or can we align Yoga with Vedānta Philosophy?" On the other hand, the question of the relation between Yoga and Nyāya is hardly ever entertained by anyone excepting specialists at the level of abstract theory. Why this is so or how this has come about is an important and interesting theme of investigation which can give us some useful insight into some aspects of the way Indian society is transforming these days.

Briefly speaking, there is a good reason to believe that Yoga and Nyāya philosophies are mutually related. For there is a good way of understanding yoga which makes it unproblematic to relate yoga to any philosophy including Vedānta philosophy. There is also a good reason and a good way of understanding of Yoga which make it more problematic to relate Yoga to Vedānta than to any other philosophy of the conformist variety. But the reason why actually yoga is widely taken as related most naturally to Vedānta is the popular understanding of yoga which is marked by a lot of over simplification of and confusion about, at least, the theory of yoga as has been expounded by Patañjali in his *Yogasūtra*. Generally speaking, the cast of mind of contemporary educated Indians is a contributory factor. They are eager to avoid at the same time religious spiritualism and scientific materialism. A space is presumably created between or beyond these two extremes in the form of ethical spirituality. These people seem to find support for their view in the doctrine of secular ethics or, as is sometimes called, spiritual ethics which is held to be distinct from religious ethics⁹. This creed of contemporary Indians is supposedly vindicated and exemplified also by the words and deeds of men like Vivekananda, Gandhi and others. In fact it is the legacy of reform movement of Indian renaissance. Anyway, the contemporary cast of mind is marked by ambivalent attitude not only to tradition and science but also to religion and spirituality. Many contemporary men are (or like to be taken as) secular but they seriously believe that there

is no compelling reason why secular men should be debarred from spiritual or ethical quest. Spirituality as they understand it is more a 'religion' of 'faith' than a religion of rituals; it is a matter of conscience rather than of scriptures; it is more ethical than religious. Many of these people seem to find Vedānta to be a spiritual system of thought which, unlike Nyāya is not a predominantly theistic system. For a non-religious but spiritual man the goal of life is to live in the light of the nature of self rather than according to materialism or scientific materialism. To live life in this way yoga is a great aid. This is how outside specialized theory or philosophy, Vedānta and yoga are closely related in practice and in popular thinking.

IV

We now turn to both the unproblematic and problematic relation between Nyāya and Yoga¹⁰. As to the link between Nyāya and Yoga, in the context of man's quest for spiritual freedom, very little can be added to what have been written by Gautama in his *Nyāyasūtra* and by PT in his *Nyāyadarśana*¹¹. While writing about the Nyāya philosopher and author of the medieval age, Bhāsarvajña, GK has written in his book cited above, many things that are extremely important. But important as they are they are also controversial; at least they are not in the line of standard and traditional understanding of the systems of Nyāya, Yoga, Sāṃkhya, Vaiśeṣika and the like. I find it difficult to accept some of these views and the evidences cited for them. I cannot bring myself to believing that the difficulty is entirely due to my own intellectual limitations. For, those views are contrary to the views of the majority of the scholars belonging to the schools of Nyāya including a stalwart like PT. Anyway, these difficulties deserve to be thoroughly discussed. Discussions are likely to bring desirable and necessary clarity in our understanding of the relation between Yoga and Nyāya. Certainly GK knew as much as PT that there was a close link between the two disciplines in question from long time back, yet the scope of his book in question seems to have restricted GK to elaborating the link between Yoga and Nyāya mainly

during the mediaeval period (roughly 8th to 12th century A.D) of the history of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thought. Bhāsarvajña, a great Naiyāyika of Kāśhmira flourished in the early part of this period. Many of the doctrines of this philosopher and author, as we find them stated in his book *Nyāyasāra* and its elucidation *Bhūṣana*, bear, according to GK, clear mark of the influence of Yoga on Nyāya and of the influence of Kāśhmira Śaivism on Bhāsarvajña. It is held that due to the influences of Yoga and Kāśhmira Śaivism on him, Bhāsarvajña significantly transformed Nyāya at many points. The definition of *pramāṇa* and the definition of perception, view of *mokṣa* and *mokṣaśādhana*, etc. are cases in point. GK speculated about the reason why Bhāsarvajña was so much influenced by Yoga. This system was there from long past but earlier Naiyāyikas did not show much sign of such influence of Yoga on them. GK writes "We may also remember that in Bhāsarvajña's time or even before it, the doctrines and practices of Yoga had been widely in currency in Kāśhmira. That peculiar form of Kāśhmira Śaivism which goes by the name of Pratyabhijñā Darśana had already been evolved as a compromise between the Theism of Yoga and the Advaita of Sāṃkara and in this Darśana, therefore, Yoga occupies a prominent position. Living in such a religious atmosphere, it was not strange that Bhāsarvajña should have been deeply influenced in his doctrines by Yoga."¹² We will return later to some of the concrete instances of influence of Yoga on Nyāya cited by GK and also to his speculation as stated above.

It may be a good idea to explain why Nyāya and Yoga got related in the thoughts of the Naiyāyika Bhāsarvajña. If nothing more were there to the relation between these two schools of thought, then the relation would have been little more than a matter of personal history of a particular individual (Bhāsarvajña). But according to both GK and PT the relation between Yoga and Nyāya is well enshrined in the entire length and breadth of Indian tradition. This seems to suggest that according to the traditional understanding the relationship between Nyāya and Yoga is founded in the very nature and value

of the quest which these two systems of thought represent. PT cited ample textual evidence to show that a close link between the two disciplines existed from ancient time. He had further shown that this relationship and this understanding of it were very much alive in the modern period of the history of Nyāya till at least 17th century if not still later. He has shown this with reference to the texts of Gaṅgeśa and Gadādhara.

What has been the traditional understanding of these disciplines? A good guide to the correct answer, through the labyrinth of many rather different and even free renderings of the relevant terms, may be found in the way the two names – Yoga and Nyāya – have been used in classical literature. First, according to the tradition there have been many Nyāya-s – many subjects were denoted by the common name Nyāya. This is perhaps not as well known as the fact that there is also a wide variety of systems of Yoga. In the Śāntiparva of *Mahābhārata* reference is there to Nyāyatantra-s in the plural – “Nyāyatantrānyekani” – that is, many systems of Nyāya. According to commentator Nīlakantha, among the many systems which are commonly called by the name Nyāya there are systems like Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya, Sāṃkhya and (Pātañjala) Yoga. Thus Yoga (of Pātañjali at least) was known in the tradition by the same name as Nyāya of Gautama. Many scholars think that the expression Nyāyavistara which occurs in the list of fourteen major disciplines of knowledge as given in the *Viṣṇupurana* should be understood accordingly to mean Nyāyatantra-s. But the earliest reference to Nyāya is not restricted to Purāṇa-s. In the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* Nyāya has been referred to by the word Vakovākya. This view has been endorsed by Saṃkarācārya in his commentary on this Upaniṣad. So far as the subject of Nyāya, particularly the Nyāyadarsana as systematized by Gautama in his *Nyāyasūtra*, is concerned, the word *ānvīkṣikī* is another name for it. In *Amarakośa* we find that *ānvīkṣikī* is *tarkavidyā*. But the *ānvīkṣikī* which was propounded by Dattātreyā, the sixth incarnation of Bhagavan, is different from the *ānvīkṣikī* in the

sense in which we find it in the *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana or in the tradition of Gautamīya Nyāya. Gautamīya Nyāya, which is something *more than adhyātma-vidyā* or spiritual study, has strong agreement with some other variety of *ānvīkṣikī* which are *only adhyātma-vidyā*. If we follow the grammar of the word and at the same time remember the basic concern of Indian thinkers in the Vaidika or Aupanīṣada tradition then we realize that *ānvīkṣikī* means *manana*, i.e., critical thinking or investigation. Again Gautamīya Nyāya is not just any *tarkavidyā* or discipline of reasoning. One variety of *tarkavidyā* has been strongly condemned in this tradition. Works like the *Mahābhārata* and *Rāmāyana* bear evidence to this. The condemned discipline of reasoning (*asat tarkavidyā*) is known as *nāstika tarkavidyā* which is distinct from Gautamīya *tarkavidyā* or Nyāya or *ānvīkṣikī*. It is not necessary for us to go into the difference between these two types of *tarkavidyā*. In the *Arthasāstra* of Kauṭilya the word "*Ānvīkṣikī*" has been used to mean Sāṃkhya, Yoga and Lokāyata. This list of meanings does not include Nyāya. But some scholars interpret the term Lokāyata here to include Gautamīya Nyāya also. Some more conservative thinkers think that the word "Yoga" was used for that purpose. But both these groups of thinkers agree that Gautamīya Nyāya is *Ānvīkṣikī*. And Vātsyāyana has explicitly used the three words "*Ānvīkṣikī*", "*Nyāya-vidyā*" and "*Nyāyasāstra*" to mean the same thing. Anyway, in some of its older uses the word Yoga included Gautamīya Nyāya in addition to Pātañjala Yoga¹².

In truth the words Nyāya and Yoga have overlapping extensions; each of the two words has been sometimes used to cover the subject denoted usually by the other word. This does not mean that there are no internal differences between Pātañjala Yoga and Gautamīya Nyāya. It shows that some fundamental unity or alliance between the two were noted and recorded in the tradition. The point of unity or alliance will be made clear later.

We have good reason to believe that the Nyāya which is found referred to by the word Yoga is much older than Bhāsarvajña's version of Nyāya. It may even be older than the version of Nyāya we find in Gautama's *Nyāyasūtra*. It will not appear surprising if we remember that Gautama did not propound Nyāya for the first time in his book *Nyāyasūtra*. Tradition does not look upon him as the *founder* of the Nyāya school of thought. He, however, for the first time compiled and systematized the relevant thoughts already available, in somewhat stray form in the oral tradition, and presented them in a cohesive way. Thus there is nothing strange in claiming that Gautamiya Nyāya was there, in some form, from long antiquity. Anyway, here we will understand by Nyāya only Gautamiya Nyāya unless clearly mentioned otherwise. By Gautamiya Nyāya we will understand here the Nyāya as it has been systematized and presented by Gautama and discussed by his followers.

The case with Yoga is somewhat similar. There are and have been many Yoga-s or many systems known as Yoga. However, in the conformist (*āstika*) tradition of classical India and even today many familiar systems of Yoga are adaptation of Pātañjala Yoga.¹⁴ This yoga is a Vaidika system and its root is traceable to different Upaniṣads and the *Gītā*¹⁴. But what was available in those sources only in the form of hints and in a rather stray form and partial, Patañjali elaborated and systematized them all in his *Yogasūtra*. The *Gītā* speaks of yogic practice of *Prāṇāyama*, *Nārāyaṇopaniṣada* speaks of *dhyāna* and *Rudrahridayopaniṣada* of *japa*. All these talks about these and many other Yogic ideas and practices were systematized by Patañjali and presented in an interconnected and comprehensive way in his *Yogasūtra*. Though Yoga was there from long antiquity¹⁶ (and there are archaeological evidence of that) and many forms of Yoga were also there, yet we will use the word Yoga here to mean, for the purpose of the present essay, Pātañjala Yoga as presented in the *Yogasūtra*.

We will basically discuss here the relationship between Gāutamiya Nyāya and Pātañjala Yoga. It is well known that the Vyāsābhāṣya on *Yogasūtra* had given us alternative derivations of the word yoga, and that in the *Gītā* the word has been used both strictly or narrowly and liberally. When in the *Gītā* the word is used more strictly yoga means any one of the three: *Karmayoga*, *Bhaktiyoga* and *Jñānayoga*. But the word is used more liberally when it occurs in the part of the name or description of each canto (chapter) of the *Gītā*. The first canto is called Arjuna *visādayoga*, the twelfth chapter is called *bhaktiyoga*, the eighteenth chapter is called *mokṣa-sanyāsayoga* and so on. In the context of Pātañjala Yoga we mean by yoga all or any one of the eightfold spiritual practice stated in the *Yogasūtra* 2.29. Of these eight the second *niyama* includes *kṛyāyoga* as discussed in *sūtra* 2.1. Another point needs to be clarified. (Gautamiya) Nyāya means in the first place a particular school of philosophical thought in India which goes by that name, i.e., Nyāyadarsāna. But there is a second sense of the word also. In this sense nyāya stands for a particular topic the discussion of which is central to the Nyāya school of thought. In no other school we find an equally comprehensive discussion of the subject of Nyāya. Similar ambiguity is there about the word Yoga. In one sense it means yoga or some eight major kinds of spiritual practice and it also means the comprehensive theory of these practices which is called Yogadarsāna. It seems, however, that in spite of the fact that the scheme of spiritual practices and its theoretical discussion in Yoga is systematic and comprehensive, Yoga still falls short of a full-fledged system of philosophy or *darsāna*. We are inclined to view *Yogasūtra* more as a theory of yoga (practices) than a full fledged philosophy. But the theory of yoga as propounded in Pātañjali's *Yogasūtra* needs such a *darsāna* or philosophy for its theoretical foundation. This founding philosophy must clarify and defend the basic postulates of the theory in question. So it is aligned originally with the Sāmokhyadarsāna which is a *darsāna* in a more full blooded sense of the term which provides the needed philosophical foundation to the theory of yogic practices or

Yoga. This also explains why in the standard use Yoga is mentioned as a member of the pair Sāṃkhya-Yoga. This point is important but to discuss it further is beyond the scope of this paper. We will, however, discuss later on that this limitation of Yoga leaves scope for Nyāya to come in support of Yoga and defend it against some serious objections against it or against yogic practices.

V

Now we turn to the link between Nyāya and Yoga which is, as we find it, quite natural. It is independent of a particular time and personal history of a certain Naiyāyika (or certain a particular Yoga theoretician (as the case may be). This we overlook partly because we often take these disciplines of knowledge as completely independent of each other or even as mutually rival systems of philosophy. This way of viewing them has created a lot of confusions; in particular it has made it very difficult to accept that Naiyāyika-s could or did incorporate or use Yoga or part of it in their own system. It is easier to make sense of such incorporation if we understand by Yoga a theory of yoga, i.e. yogic practice.

However, traditionally understood, *Darsāna* or Indian philosophy is contemporaneous with the Vaidika culture in so far as, at least, the latter puts great emphasis on *parāvidyā* (saving knowledge or a system of such knowledge) or *adhyātmavidyā* (spiritual knowledge or knowledge of self). Passages like "*Tarati śōkamātmavit*" (those who know the self (Brahman) transcends suffering), "*Mrtyormukṣīya mā'mrtat*" confirm this phrase (save me from death but not from the spiritual freedom) indicate this direction of the Vaidika culture. *Parāvidyā* recommends self-realization (*ātmadarsāna* or *svātmadarsāna*) as the highest value or the immediate means of realizing the highest need of life which is spiritual freedom. Actually, however, all the three – *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *nididhyāsana* – are, and in this order, necessary means of spiritual freedom. The idea is that for the attainment of highest goal of life or *mukti*, first we need to study the *Trayī* or the

Veda or *Śruti*, then apply *nyāya* (the methodology or procedure of which Nyāya is a philosophical theory) or to conduct critical reflections on the tenets of this *Trayī* and lastly we must turn our firm rational convictions so obtained into immediate realization through regular and resolute practice of contemplation (*nididhyāsana* or *dhyāna*). Thus the immediate knowledge (*sākṣātkāra*) of the correct nature of the self (*ātmatattva*) which has been recommended as the proximate means (*sākṣat-sādhana*) of salvation, is possible through the operation of all these three means. In this context, Nyāya and yoga which correspond respectively to *manana* (critical examination or reflection) and *dhyāna* (meditation), are therefore related to each other as complementary rather than as adversary. However, the knowledge or theory of the techniques of *nyāya* and *yoga* (that is, Nyāya and Yoga) are necessary for their successful application. We get this knowledge from the respective theory (Nyāya and Yoga) or the art and science of these subjects (*nyāya* and *yoga*). Nyāya (with N capital) and Yoga (with Y capital) – systems of thought or disciplines of knowledge respectively of *nyāya* and *yoga* – are or include such theories. Sometimes Nyāyasāstra and certainly Yogasāstra have been used or understood in this sense. And this use is supported by *Amarakoṣa*. But the scope of Gautamīya Nyāya as found in the *Nyāyasūtra* of Gautama in its present form is *more* than just a theory of *nyāya* in the sense of method of critical examination or disputation. First it is a theory of *nyāya* – argument exchanged in debate – which includes not only the study of the nature, definition and division of *nyāya* but also the criterion of the correctness of inference and all about fallacy. In addition it is a comprehensive epistemology which investigates into the nature, definition, etc. of forms of knowledge other than inference as well and their sources and correctness etc. Nyāya further discusses nature and conditions of bondage and the nature and means of spiritual freedom. Thus Nyāya is more than just a theory of *nyāya*. Yoga (and *Yogasūtra*) on the other hand is *more* a theory of *yoga* – techniques of controlling and quieting *manas* (often translated as mind) – than

a full fledged *darsāna* (philosophy) in the broad and comprehensive sense of the term. As said before, the philosophical foundation of yogic practices rather than just explanation, etc. of them is provided basically by Sāṃkhyadarsāna. It is a full fledged system of philosophy which includes among other things a theory of creation and a complete conceptual scheme for the understanding and description of the universe and our position in it. Therefore it is not without reason that we speak of these two systems of philosophical thought in pairs as Sāṃkhya-Yoga. For somewhat similar (but not exactly the same) reason we refer to Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika in pair (Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika), and treat them as closely similar systems of thought (or *samānāntara*) notwithstanding the fact that each of them is a complete *darsana* in its own right. The two were later made to fuse together and there developed a new syncretic school which came to be known as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika *darsana* or the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school of philosophy.

To be brief, neither the pair of expressions *nyāya* (technique) and Nyāya (philosophy) on the one hand nor again the pair of words *yoga* and Yoga (the theory of yogic practice) on the other have the same meaning. But these matters were never made sufficiently clear and explicit or it would have been easier to resolve the controversy or controversies in question – whether Yoga is aligned with Nyāya and rather than Sāṃkhya. I take it that the controversy can more easily be solved if we split the question about the relationship into two: the question about the relation between *yoga* and Nyāya and the question about the relation between Yoga and Nyāya.

Sometimes people think that any work which talks about *prāmāṇa* or *mokṣa* is a *darsāna*. In that sense not only *Yogasūtra* but also *Sāhityadarpaṇa* (a work of Indian aesthetics (*Alamōkaraśāstra*) is *darsāna*. Strictly speaking the heart of *darsāna* is *manana* or a certain sort of critical reflection involving the use of logical reasoning (*mantavyasca upapattibhi*) leading (indirectly) to spiritual freedom. To be more precise *manana* stands for rational reflection on *Śrutārtha*, that is on scriptural

truths taught in the Veda or *Śruti*. *Darsāna*, in short, seeks, in addition to explanation of these truths, a defense of them through rational reflection or critical examination. This involves critical examination of all rival views, views of the opponents (*pūrvapakṣa*), in the matter notwithstanding whether they belong to the conformist (*āstika*) or non-conformist (*nāstika*) group. This at least is the traditional understanding of the meaning of *darsāna* widely or uniformly accepted in the tradition. Consistently with this sense any single comprehensive philosophical system includes not only stray remarks or mention of themes which are discussed in epistemology etc. but systematic theories like epistemology (and logic), ontology, ethics, philosophy of language etc. If we consider the different *sūtra* literature then it will be clear that excepting Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Sāṃkhya other systems of thought which go by the name of Indian philosophy cannot really qualify for the title. It is therefore not without reason that in the well known lists of fourteen or eighteen disciplines of thought, six, nine or twelve systems which are popularly known as so many *darsānas* were mentioned by their individual names and not by the same and common name *darsāna*.

VI

Now we turn to the thoughts of the Naiyāyika Bhāsarvajña where some find concrete evidences of the influence of Yoga on Nyāya and transformation of Nyāya due to this influence¹⁷. It has been found that Bhāsarvajña modified Gautama's version of Nyāya philosophy. According to Gautama there are four accredited sources of knowledge¹⁸. But Bhāsarvajña writes that there are three (kinds of) accredited sources of knowledge; they are perception, inference, and verbal testimony¹⁹. He further emphatically asserts that the number of *pramāṇa* is three *only*²⁰ and that *upamāna* which is alleged to be the fourth *pramāṇa* in Nyāya is already included in the other three²¹. GK speculates, for reasons stated earlier, that this is an example that bears clear evidence of the influence of Yoga on Bhāsarvajña or Bhāsarvajña's version of Nyāya. For, in Pātañjala Yoga also

only three *pramāṇas* have been admitted. GK accepts that the influence of Yoga on Bhāsarvajña might have been direct or through Pratyabhijñādarsāna²².

It is true that we find in the *Yogasūtra* the statement that perception, inference and verbal testimony are the accredited sources of knowledge or *pramāṇas*.²³ However, we do not think that this or this much of similarity can be any conclusive evidence to show that Yoga came to influence Nyāya for the first time and transformed the latter in the works of Bhāsarvajña. It is easier to think that it was through Pratyabhijñādarsana or Kāsmira Śaivism, that Yoga influenced Bhāsarvajña. For, Bhāsarvajña belonged to Kāshmira where flourished, before him had flourished that particular variety of Śaivism which is called Kāshmira Śaivism. This is also known as Pratyabhijñādarana or Trikdarsāna.

It is suggested by scholars like GK that following the Yoga system of thought, Bhāsarvajña, otherwise a Naiyāyika, came to believe that the number of *pramāṇas* (accredited sources of knowledge) was three or, more precisely, *upamāna* (knowledge by analogy) was not a distinct kind of knowledge for which we needs must admit a separate and fourth accredited source of knowledge and name it *upamāna*.

With due respect to MM Gopinath Kaviraj and his unbounded scholarship we would like to state for the consideration of the readers why we feel hesitant to accept that it has been conclusively shown that Bhāsarvajña's views on *upamāna pramāṇa* were the result of the influence on him of Yogadarsāna. The fact is that the controversy regarding the number of *pramāṇas* or the status of *upamāna* – whether it is a separate *pramāṇa* or not – is as old as Gautama. For Gautama himself recorded this debate in his *Nyaysūtra*²³ and took part in it. There is no good reason to say that Gautama himself came to raise this controversy about *upamāna* under the influence of Kāshmira Śaivism. At least nobody said so. It is therefore quite possible and more natural to think that Bhāsarvajña has revisited or reopened the controversy regarding *upamāna* already

noticed by Gautama and familiar in the Nyāya tradition. We cannot also say that Gautama included in his *Nyāyasūtra* the controversy about *upamāna* under the influence of Yogadarsāna. For, the treatment of the problem by Gautama or the arguments, which Gautama recorded there, against the claim of *upamāna* to be a separate *pramāṇa* are not found either in the *Yogasūtra* of Patañjali or in the *Vyāsābhāṣya* on it. Thus the debate was already there in Nyāya tradition before Bhāsarvajña and it was not necessarily a debate between Nyāya and Yoga.

One may say, and it is true, that the position which Bhāsarvajña took in the debate is different from the position taken by Gautama or any noted Naiyāyika who came after Gautama and before Bhāsarvajña. This fact can itself be used in favour of the thesis of GK that Bhāsarvajña under the influence of Yogadarsāna (whether directly or through Pratyabhijñādashāna) came to hold that *upamāna* was not a separate *pramāṇa*. The short of implication of this, which Bhāsarvajña also held, is that the number of *pramāṇas* is three and not four. The standard Nyāya view, which is also the view of Gautama, is however that the number of *pramāṇas* is four and that *upamāna* is a separate *pramāṇa*. So it is held by some to be one example of how Bhāsarvajña transformed Nyāya philosophy under the influence of Yogadarsāna.

If we closely examine this line of argument it turns out to be less convincing than what it appears to be at first sight. In course of his detailed discussion on the controversial position that there are only three *pramāṇas* excluding *upamāna*, Bhāsarvajña never made any reference to *Yogasūtra*. He, however, made reference to the *Nyāyasūtra* of Gautama. He even insisted that his position was the same as the original Nyāya position. In fact he made arduous attempt to show that he was not making any departure from the traditional Nyāya position or at least from the position of Gautama rather he is rather actually reiterating the view of Gautama himself. Gautama held, according to Bhāsarvajña, that the number of *pramāṇas* is three and that *upamāna* is not to be included as a separate *pramāṇa*.

If we consider Bhāsarvajña's own explicit assertion, then we cannot say that Bhāsarvajña ever thought that he was transforming Nyāya or making any departure from Gautama. In the tradition and the history of Nyāya also Bhāsarvajña's view on *upamāna* is known as Bhāsarvajña's *interpretation* of Gautama. Like many others we also think that this interpretation of Gautama is forced. That, however, is a separate matter. The important point is that Bhāsarvajña leaves enough evidence to conclude that he derived his position regarding the number of *pramāṇas* from Gautama and Nyāya and not from Yoga or Patañjali. He argued (with what success is a separate matter) that it was never the intention of Gautama to say that *upamāna* was a (separate) *pramāṇa*. Bhāsarvajña went further and suggested that in holding that *upamāna* was not a (separate) *pramāṇa* he followed the intention, even perhaps the letters, of Gautama (in his *Nyāyasūtra*) very closely.²⁵ He has not given any hint that he was influenced by Patañjali.

It is not our intention to say that Bhāsarvajña was not acquainted with the position of Yoga or of Patañjali or that the number of *pramāṇas* according to Yoga is not three. It is well known that the list of *pramāṇas* in the *Yogasūtra* includes only three *pramāṇas* in which *upamāna* is not included. Our sole point is that there is no conclusive proof that Bhāsarvajña admitted three *pramāṇas* under the influence of Yoga. Merely because he just happens to admit as many *pramāṇas* as Patañjali admits we cannot say that he was influenced by the latter. Further, though Bhāsarvajña had natural scope to do so, he did not make any reference to Patañjali or his view about the number of *pramāṇas*. He on the other hand made reference to Cārvakas and Bauddhas who admitted less than three *pramāṇas*. But in proving that the number of *pramāṇas* was three and not more or less than that he did not cite the similar view of Yogadarsana with which he was acquainted. He tried a different way. He sought to establish that the number of *pramāṇas* was not more than three by rejecting the standard interpretation of Gautama's *Nyāyasūtra* which ascribes to Gautama the view that

the number of *pramāṇas* is four. He preferred to depend on rather the dubious²⁶ support of Gautama than on unambiguous support of Patañjali. But if he actually derived this view from Yoga or held this view under the influence of Yoga he would have referred to Yoga. This is a natural expectation which remained unfulfilled. We therefore conclude that Bhāsarvajña's conscious behaviour as well as indirect evidences as stated above incline us to believe that Bhāsarvajña's views on the number of *pramāṇas* and on whether *upamāna* is a separate *pramāṇa* do not bear conclusive evidence of the influence of Yoga on Nyāya which is supposed to be exemplified in his works *Nyāyasāra* and *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*.

VII

We have shown our reason why we fail to find any conclusive evidence *so far* of the influence of Yoga on Bhāsarvajña – the influence under the impact of which he is believed to have transformed the traditional Nyāya. Are there other evidences? GK has alluded to a number of other evidences. We do not intend to discuss all of them. But we will discuss at least the following one. GK has referred to passages in some work of Saṅkarācārya which bear testimony to the fact that in respect of the nature of freedom Bhāsarvajña's view corresponds to the view which Saṅkarācārya has stated in this work to be the view of Nyāya. However, this view is not the view of Gautama or any other Naiyayika of reckoning (excepting Bhāsarvajña) who came after him. At best we can conclude that there might have been a section or tradition of Nyāya, since lost and forgotten, which held that freedom was a positive state of happiness. We cannot on the basis of the assertion of a single text say that this is the Nyāya view of *mokṣa* when innumerable extant works of Nyāya of great repute state unambiguously that according to Nyāya *mokṣa* is a negative state of complete absence of suffering. So far as Yoga is concerned, it is a state of immediate experience of Puruṣa's complete independence of Prakṛti. It is a state in which the Puruṣa remains completely unattached to Prakṛti which also is the true nature of Puruṣa. So in the state of freedom

so conceived Puruṣa finds itself in its true nature and authentic state of real being – *svarūpena avasthāna*. So far neither in Nyāya nor in Yoga do we find any strong emphasis that *mokṣa* is primarily or fundamentally a state of happiness. (It is rather a state of *ātyantika-duḥkhanivṛtti* or *adrṣṭi*) Bhāsarvajña, however, believes that it is a state of (infinite) happiness. But this can hardly be a proof of influence of Yoga on him or of his success in transforming Nyāya under such influence. The infinite happiness view of *mokṣa* is standardly known as the view of Advaita Vedānta and not of Yoga or Nyāya.

GK believes “though Yoga in its wider form has been practically accepted by every system of Indian philosophy, its relation with Nyāya is in some manner more special, and perhaps fundamental.”²⁷ So he put great emphasis on some passages of a work in which Saṃkaracārya “affords distinct proof of a relation existing between Nyāya and Yoga, for it is maintained there that according to Nyāya *mokṣa* follows directly from Yoga, a doctrine which it shares in common with the Pātañjala system (as distinguished from the Sāṃkhya where *jñāna* is held to be the immediate cause of *mukti*)”²⁸ And this again he takes to prove the influence of Yoga on Nyāya and of the closeness of Yoga to Nyāya rather than to Sāṃkhya.

KG does not fail to notice that “Nyāya Darśana, in its present form, contains some *sūtras* (aphorisms) where the practices of yoga are strongly recommended”²⁸. We also admit that textual evidence shows that Nyāyadarśana since at least the time of Gautama recognizes the relevance of yoga or spiritual practices, discussed in the Yogadarśana of Patañjali, for the attainment of freedom. It holds true even today. However, we are not inclined to putting great emphasis on the statements or views of Saṃkaracārya which have been referred to by GK to show affinity of Nyāya with Yoga (and its difference from Sāṃkhya) as stated above. We even doubt whether GK himself would like to take these statements very seriously but for the fact that perhaps no other statements (or at least not many) could be cited if one wanted to make out a case for the sort of influence

of Yoga on Nyāya in question. The first reason for our disinclination to take these statements seriously is that they occur in *Sarvasiddhāntasamgraha* which is a minor text. Secondly, there is controversy about the authorship of many works attributed to (ādi) Saṃkarācārya. Many doubt or deny that these works are really from the pen of (ādi) Saṃkarācārya – who is the known author of the commentaries on the *Brahmasūtra*, the *Bhagavadgītā*, Upaniṣads, etc. Nobody till date has been able to dispel such doubt convincingly or conclusively.

Anyway, the statements in question refer to two rival views about the *immediate* source of (the state of) spiritual freedom. Dispute about the immediate source of freedom is nothing new or unknown. There is an age old and well known controversy on this issue which is quite independent of the difference and controversy between the advocates of the little known rival views found in *Sarvasiddhāntasamgraha* which GK highlights here. The old and familiar debate is between the advocates of *samuccayavāda* and *asamuccayavāda* – a debate to which Saṃkarācārya made substantial and rich contributions in his many famous works about the authorship of which there is no dispute. This controversy, however, is not about the little known issue whether *yoga* is the immediate source of freedom. In the case of debate between the advocates of *samuccaya* and *asamuccaya* the issue is whether *karma* (actions or duties enjoined in the scripture or the *Veda*) is the *immediate* (or as immediate as saving knowledge) source of freedom. Advocates of *samuccayavāda* hold it to be so. Those who advocate *asamuccayavāda*, among whom Saṃkarācārya is in the forefront, hold the contrary view that it is *jñāna* (immediate experience of the real self), and not *karma*, which is the immediate source. Anyway, the statements of *Sarvasiddhāntasamgraha* cited by GK are about the controversy as to whether *jñāna* or *yoga* is the direct and immediate source of liberation. Our concern here is to examine just this controversy. To put it more accurately we are interested in

critically examining whether it is correct to attribute to Gautama the view in question – that *yoga* and not *jñāna* is the immediate source of freedom – on the strength of the statements of the text in question. And further whether the *naiyāyikas* came to hold this view under the influence of Yoga. To anticipate the conclusion, it is not correct, in our opinion, to attribute to Gautama this view on the strength of certain non-standard and unfamiliar interpretation or exposition of standard and classical Nyāya view in the matter.

The statements in question say or suggest that Patañjali and, under his influence, Gautama, the author of *Nyāyasūtra*, held that *yoga* is the direct source of freedom or liberation. This is not the standard view of Nyāya in the matter and the tradition does not attribute it to Gautama. Besides in the very first aphorism of *Nyāyasūtra* Gautama makes it explicit that freedom results from *jñāna* (*tattvajñāna*)³⁰. He never says it follows from *yoga*. Even *Yogasūtras* 2.24-26, taken along with *Vyāsaśāstra* on them, make it clear that *yoga* is a means of *tattvajñāna* (and not of liberation) which is, in its turn, the immediate and direct source of freedom. The *Nyāyasūtra* 4.2.38 is, as Vātsyāyana finds it to be, an answer to the question “How does knowledge of the truth (about the nature of the self) arise?”³¹ The knowledge under reference is the saving knowledge which immediately³² precedes liberation. The *Nyāyasūtras* (Nyāya aphorisms) where GK noted Gautama to have talked about *yoga* are in answer to the question, Vātsyāyana’s formulation of which we have just noted. From this it is clear that Gautama is considering *yoga* as a means of *jñāna* (saving knowledge) and not of *mokṣa* or liberation.

To the question how does this knowledge arise, Gautama’s answer is *samādhiviseṣābhyāsāt*³³ that is, through the practice of specific *samādhi* the knowledge in question is attained. This *samādhi* is one of the eight items known in the system of Patañjali, as *yoga*. Now why this question? From Nyāya itself we have the knowledge of the nature or reality of the self (*ātmatattva*). But even before we obtain it from *nyāya* (that is

through inference) we get it from (the study of the scriptures) spiritual studies (*adhyātmasāstra* or in particular Upanishads). But the knowledge of *ātmatattva* (truth about the self) – obtained from *sāstra* (testimony of scriptures) and *anumāna* (inference) – is mediate (*parokṣa*). What is required is immediate realization or immediate experience of the truth about self (*ātmatattvaśāksātkāra*)³⁴. So the real question is how we can have immediate experience of self (*ātmatattvaśāksātkāra*) and how we can have belief about self (*ātmatattvajñāna*). To this the answer is through the continued practice of the particular *yoga* which leads to *samādhi* and which is included in the list of eight items known as *yoga* (*yogāṅgas*). This is the meaning of Gautama's words *samādhiviseṣābhyāsāt*.

The author of *Yogasūtra* said *samādhi* is *cittavrttinirodha*, that is, *samādhi* stands for the cessation of the modifications of the psychic matter (*citta*) which is otherwise in a constant change – *citta* constantly undergoes different modifications. The commentator on the *sūtra* asks "How is the cessation effected?"³⁵ What are the means of it? The answer of the *sūtra* answers "*abhyāsavairāgyābhyām tanmudhā*" – *abhyāsa*³⁷ (roughly, repeated practice) and *vairāgya* (renunciation) are the means of that cessation. All the eight spiritual practices (including *samādhi*), which the word *yoga* covers are means of *cittavrttinirodha* (another name for which is *yoga*). But how *yoga* can be the means of *yoga*? The answer is that the final cessation of the natural tendency of *citta* to change to undergo changes and modifications is attained through systematic and gradual practice of spiritual disciplining of *citta* (psychic matter). Of these the final stage of disciplining is *samādhi* itself has levels and varieties. Only when the last stage is attained the permanent cessation of the tendency of the *citta* to change is effected. At this stage final quieting of *citta* is attained.

Instead of *samādhi* Gautama used the expression *smādhiviseṣa*. And by this he must have meant *nirvikalpakasamādhi*. This is how PT has understood it.

passage.³⁹ *Nirvikalpakasamādhi* is the highest kind and the last stage of *samādhi*. On the view that *yoga* is the immediate source of freedom or precedes the attainment of freedom immediately, *yoga* must mean this *nirvikalpakasamādhi*. In no other way the need for all the kinds and stages of *samādhi* can be accounted for. If Gautama held that *yoga* is the direct and immediate source of freedom he would have said that one attains freedom immediately after one attains *nirvikalpakasamādhi* or *samādhivīśeṣa*. However, unambiguous textual evidence shows that Gautama holds that after *samādhivīśeṣa* there arises not freedom but saving knowledge or *tattvasākṣātkāra*. The idea is that only in such individual there arises saving knowledge (veridical and immediate experience of the true nature of self) since he has attained purification and quietude of *citta* (that is the permanent and total arrest of change of states) through long and systematic yogic practices up to *nirvikalpakasamādhi*. We can conclude from this that, according to Gautama, for freedom we need *tattvasākṣātkāra* and for it we need *yoga* or *yoga* practices.

However, before one commits oneself to systematic practice of *yoga* one must keep before the mind the purpose of it namely, the attainment of immediate knowledge of self and through it freedom. Only from prior instructions found in scripture and spiritual disciplines of knowledge one could come to know that freedom was the final goal of life and how and through which means this could be realized.

What then is the role of Nyāya or application of *nyāya*? To reiterate, through the application of *nyāya* we turn what we were taught in the scriptures into rational conviction. But the rationally confirmed knowledge or inference of self which Nyāya and *nyāya* yield is still mediate. We need to turn this mediate knowledge of self into immediate realization of the same through yogic practices. Even so such practices or *yoga* yields not freedom but *tattvajñāna* (*ātmatattvasākṣātkāra*) from which, Gautama said in the very first aphorism of *Nyāyasūtra*, freedom results. In this respect there is no difference between Nyāya

and Sāṃkhya. Sāṃkhya system explains with examples⁴⁰ why immediate knowledge and not mediate knowledge is necessary. In fact there is near complete consensus among the Indian schools of philosophical thought that freedom is attained 'immediately' after *jñāna*. Even Yoga philosophy does not seem to be an exception.⁴¹ It is thus clear that the ardent desire to know the self which leads men to the path of Yoga gets stopped, that is fulfilled, only when direct and immediate knowledge of self (*ātmasākṣātkāra*) or of *puruṣa* as different from *prakrōti* (the ultimate material principle of creation) is attained. This immediate knowledge of the difference is, we believe, the same as *vivekakhyāti* or *adrṣti* used in the relevant literature to explain the views of Yoga and Sāṃkhya.

Strictly speaking, there seems to be a still higher stage according to Yoga. Along with *vivekakhyāti* there arises in the knower – the *yoga* aspirant – certain powers or ability such as the ability to know everything, however distant or minute. There remains the possibility that a yogi, who has attained *vivekakhyāti*, may get attached (*āsakta*) to this higher achievements and abilities. Though there is no danger in his case of using this acquired power for some selfish motive yet it also is to be shunned for the attainment of last and final value, need or *puruṣārtha*, the *mokṣa*. Yoga philosophy has a term for this higher capacities (*sāmarthya*) – the ability to know virtually everything including things too distant in space and time, say; it is *prasṅkhyāna*⁴². Anyway, for attaining freedom even this attachment (*āsakti*), however superior and pure it may be, is to be transcended. So long this attachment is not vanquished *vivekakhāyati* of the yogi does not remain uninterrupted. Such a yogi has the direct experience of self but he cannot be permanently posted in that state. Only when one foregoes these powers – the awareness of or attachment to such powers – one's *vivekakhyāti* becomes uninterrupted. This is the state called *dharmamegha samādhi*. It is a state of *sarvathā vivekakhyāti* or uninterrupted awareness that self has no connection with all that it is falsely believed to be associated with. This state is so

called in view of its similarity with the cloud or *megha*. Just as cloud yields and has the capacity to yield showers which bring so much good to us in the form of good harvest and drinking water so also this state of *samādhi* has the capacity to give us liberation. This pure and non-natural capacity is called *dharma*. This state is the highest state of renunciation or *paravairāgya*, extreme non-attachment. Therefore (except in some special sense⁴³) we cannot attribute to either Nyāya or Yoga or to any major system of Indian philosophy whatsoever the view that what immediately precedes *mokṣa* is *yoga* or spiritual practice and not *jñāna*, that is, the veridical and immediate knowledge of the real nature of the self (*pramātmaka ātmatattvasākṣātkāra*).

Anyway, it is believed by almost all the systems of Indian philosophy, and certainly by Nyāya, that liberation is preceded by immediate knowledge of *ātmatattva* and this is produced by a special *dharma* or capacity which is obtained through yogic practices including *dhyāna* or *nididhyāsana*. Difference that still remains there, concerns the true nature of the self or *ātmatattva*. But one broad agreement among all major schools of Indian philosophy. In all of them self (*ātma*) is believed to be different from everything we associate it with and a common name for which is non-self or *anātma*. There is unanimity among the Indian thinkers that for liberation one must finally have immediate and direct realization that self is *different* (*vyāvṛtta*) from every other thing with which we in our ignorance confuse it. This realization is of the nature of immediate experience or cognition. It is this cognitive state and not certain practice which immediately precedes liberation. Yogic practices or *yoga* is certainly a great help in the attainment of liberation but it is not its immediate source. Nyāya and Yoga seem to concur on this point and at least Gautama or the Nyāya system of thought which he systematized hold knowledge and not practice as the *sākṣāt parama-puruṣārthasādhana* or the immediate means of the highest fulfillment of life.

VII

We have so far seen that Nyāya acknowledges the need of yoga for the fulfillment of the goal it (Nyāya) sets for itself – its *prayojana* – whether the proximate goal of freedom or its means, the saving knowledge. But we would like to end by referring to Gautama's answer to the question if and what benefit Yoga gets from Nyāya or *nyāya*. We owe to Gautama the demonstration that Nyāya is a great aid to Yoga and renders great service to the latter. In this it is an ally of Yoga. For Yoga as a theory of yogic practices tells us about the nature and use of these practices. In spite of that there are some actual or possible criticisms or objections that have been noticed by Gautama in his *Nyāyasūtra*. But since Nyāya fully endorses the general view that yogic practices are useful, Gautama takes it to be the responsibility of Nyāya to answer those objections and defend yoga. In the process our understanding of yoga gets further clarified and deepened. This shows that Nyāya adds to what Yoga does for yoga. Let us elaborate on this a little.

The Yoga or *Yogasūtra* is more a description of the yogic practices – their number, order and results – does not enter much into the theoretical discussions about the *possibility*, etc. of such practices. It does not entertain views of the opponent who questions the very possibility of yoga and hence who doubts or denies the efficacy of yoga – that yoga can really help the spiritual aspirant in achieving his goal. But such objections and questions can be or have been raised and they need to be answered as well. The responsibility of answering such doubts and questions does not lie with the Yoga or *Yogadarsāna* only or even primarily with it. It is the responsibility of a philosophy like Nyāya which endorses the practice of yoga as expounded in Yoga as a practical aid to the theoretical enterprise or philosophical reflections on the nature of man's phenomenal existence and its causes on the one hand and means of getting rid of them permanently. Gautama did exactly this within the limited scope he had in his *Nyāyasūtra*. But little that he did is instructive enough for the *Naiyāyikas* as to what they should

do in the matter. He has left indication about the direction in which such task is to be executed. Gautama is clear on the point that if critical question is raised as to the possibility and hence efficacy of *yoga* we (as philosophers in general and as Naiyāyikas in particular) should adopt a positive stance, i.e., speak in defense of *yoga*. He himself devoted not less than ten aphorisms or *sūtra-s*⁴⁴ of his book in which he first stated and formulated an objection and then defended *yoga* or practice of *yoga* against the objections in question. Considering the characteristic economy of style to which he is so accustomed, devoting ten *sūtras* for the purpose is a telling proof of how serious Gautama is in the matter. The objector argues that *yoga* does not or cannot have the efficacy it is claimed to have just because it is not feasible at all. He says in particular that we can hardly depend on the efficacy of the yogic practice called *samādhi* for it is not feasible or possible. On the other hand as a system of *Darsāna* devoted to the statement and examination of the means of salvation, Gautama left very clear hint that Nyāya should incorporate *yoga* (and recognize its use as a practical help without which the theoretical understanding which Nyāya affords would not be fully and finally effective) – not necessarily or primarily Yoga philosophy (with which Nyāya has many fundamental and irreconcilable differences) but *yoga* methodology or technique. Since Nyāya considers *yoga* to be useful even for the attainment of the final goal of life Nyāya itself has in view, Nyāya needs to show that its dependence on *yoga* is defensible. Thus the relationship between Nyāya and *yoga* is not a one way matter of using *yoga* by Nyāya to its own advantage. Rather Nyāya in its turn provides a strong defence in favour of *yoga* enough scope for which is not then in the *Yogasūtra* considered as a theory of *yoga* but not a comprehensive philosophy. In any case for the comprehensiveness of it Nyāya must include a defence of *yoga* as has been done by Gautama in the *sūtras* cited.

To conclude, no one can deny that Nyāya and Yoga are closely related and have many similarities between them.

However, they are not alike as systems of thought because they hold that freedom results immediately from *yoga*. On the contrary they both hold that *jñāna* immediately precedes freedom. Similarly there are no conclusive evidences that in the medieval period of its history, Nyāya was transformed under the influence, direct or through *pratyabhijñādārsana*, by Yoga. Some of the views of Bhāsarvajña, a prominent Naiyāyika of the middle age, which are closely similar to those of Yogadarsana, are not derived from Yoga. Contrary evidence of *Sarvasiddhāntasamgraha* are not to be relied on much. In spite of all this the value of the few pages which Gopinath Kaviraj wrote on Bhāsarvajña cannot be denied. He, with his commanding scholarship and deep understanding of all the relevant literature, has drawn our attention to one neglected area of research, namely, if and how the mainstream Indian philosophy, as enshrined in the familiar conformist and non-conformist philosophies, is related to the profound philosophy of Pratyabhijñā school. It may also be mentioned that much of the insight into the exact position of Nyāya in the matter under discussion was derived from PT who alone provides reliable source of insights needed to resolve the doubt whether Yoga and Nyāya are adversaries or allies.

Endnotes

- 1 See Kaviraj Gopinath, *The History and Bibliography of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Literature* (Reprint), Sampurnanada Sanskrit University, Varanasi 1982.
- 2 Please see Bhattacharya, Swati, "The Logic of Human Needs" in JICPR Vol. XXVI No. III. 2009 pp. 11-48.
- 3 In this paper the expressions "human need" and *puruṣārtha* will be used interchangeably; so also "means" and *sādhana*; "spiritual freedom" or "freedom" and *mokṣa*. Further we adopt the conventions of using Yoga with capital Y for the system of thought known as Yogadarśana (Philosophical system known as Yoga) and *yoga* with small y for certain spiritual practices enunciated in Yoga.
- 4 Unlike say wealth etc. truthfulness, charity etc. are values rather than just desired ends or *prayojana* in the broad sense.
- 5 This we have discussed in the paper cited against Note No. 2.
- 6 The Sanskrit equivalent for means is *sādhana*.

- 7 We use here the expressions *spiritual freedom*, *freedom*, *salvation* and *liberation* as synonyms of *mokṣa* or *mukṭi* though *spiritual freedom* seems to be more accurate rendering in English of *mokṣa*.
- 8 See Gopinath Kaviraj, *op.cit* p.4ff.
- 9 HH the Dalai Lama for example has repeatedly expressed and emphasized this distinction in different lectures; one such lecture was delivered by him at the Sampurnananda Sanskrit University, Benares on January 17, 2011.
- 10 Almost all fairly agree that *yoga* and hence *Yoga* and *Nyāya* are related and they also seem to agree on what relation they have. This is unproblematic. But it will be seen that the relation which some non-standard reading of systems like *Nyāya* as well as texts supporting such reading claims to be there between *Nyāya* and *Yoga* is problematic and difficult to accept.
- 11 Tarkavāgīśa, *Phaṇibhūṣaṇ, Nyāyadarśana* (in Bengali), Rajya Pustak Parsat, Kolkata (Calcutta) 1989. This book includes a translation and elucidation in Bengali of Gautama's *Nyāyasūtra* and Vatsyāyana's commentary on it. In addition there are long critical notes (*tippanī*) of Tarkavāgīśa, almost in every page, which can hardly be excelled by any one in their depth of analysis and vastness of scholarship.
- 12 Gopinath Kaviraj, *op.cit.* p. 117.
- 13 Tarkavāgīśa, *Phaṇibhūṣaṇ, Nyāyadarśana* Vol. I , Rajya Pustak Parshat, Paschim Banga, pp. p.15-17
- 15 See particularly the fourth canto (*adhyāya*) of the *Gītā*.
- 16 See the *Gītā* 4/1-5.
- 17 The relevant texts do not usually make or follow the distinction between *yoga* and *Yoga* and the like. But the distinction is very much there and it is logical.
- 18 *Pratyakṣānumānopamānaśabdāḥ pramāṇāni, Nyāyadarśana, Sūtra* 1.1.3.
- 19 Bhasarvajña, *Nyayasara* with *Nyayabhusana* (ed.) Swami Yogindrananda, Varanasi, 1968, p. 79. *Trividhamō pramādam - pratyak'amanumanamagama iti.*
- 20 *evamecāni trīnyeva pramāṇāni, Ibid.* p. 417.
- 21 *e'vevopamāna.... antarbhāvah, ibid.* p. 417.
- 22 Cf. Kaviraj G., *op.cit.*, p. 4.
- 23 *Pratyakṣānumānāgamāḥ pramāṇāni, Patañjali, Yogasūtra* 1.7.
- 24 See *sūtras* 2.1.44 - 48.
- 25 *Nyāyasāra.*

- 26 For many at least think that Gautama and his text tell us that the number of *pramāna-s* is four.
- 27 Gopinath Kaviraj, *op.cit.* p. 5.
- 28 Kaviraj, *op.cit.* p. 6. Here Kaviraj refers to Saṃkarācārya's *Sarvasiddhānta-samgrahah*.
- 29 *Ibid*, p. 6. We will also return to these *sūtras* later on.
- 30 "...*tattvajñānāt niths reyasādhigama*". We ignore here the very subtle argument why the standard interpretation of this *sūtra* tells us that *tattvajñāna* does not immediately precede liberation. For even so what immediately precedes liberation, according to this interpretation, is not *yoga*.
- 31 *katham tattvajñānam utpadyata iti*.
- 32 In a technical sense, into which we need not enter here.
- 33 *Nyāyasūtra* 4.2.38.
- 34 There is good reason why it has to be *sākṣātkāra* rather than mere *jñāna* or knowledge.
- 35 "*athāsam nirodhe kah upāyanti?*"
- 36 *Yogasūtra* 1.12.
- 37 *Tatrassthitaḥ yatn' bhyāsaḥ*, *Ibid*.1.13.
- 38 *Ibid*. 1.15.
- 39 See his *Nyāyadarsana* Vol. 5, p. 223.
- 40 "*yuktito'pi na bādhatc dinmuḍavadaproksāḍrte*" *Sāmkhyasūtra* 1.59.
- 41 *Yogasūtra* says "*viśeṣadarsina ātmabhāvabhāvanāvinivṛttiḥ*" *Yogasūtra* 4.25.
- 42 See the edition of *Pātañjala Yogadarsana* by Kalivar Vedanta Vagisa with his own elucidation in Bengali. *Sūtra* 4/25. For other meaning of the word *prasaṅkhyān* see Srimohan Bhattacharya et al (eds.) *Bhārtiya Darśan Koṣa* (in Bengali).
- 43 In the sense in which *yoga* means that kind and level of *Samādhi* in which one is constantly and permanently in a state of immediate awareness that the self in reality has no connection with or is different from all with which we associate it. But in this sense *yoga* is a cognitive state another name of which is *tattvajñāna*.
- 44 *Nyāyasūtra* 4.2.38-47.