

## Chapter- VII

### The Conclusion

In this concluding chapter we would like to do three things. First, we would like to add some details that we omitted earlier in the interest of uninterrupted discussion. Secondly, we would also discuss certain general objections that we could not discuss before. And thirdly, we would like to begin this chapter by stating a few major points of my present work. We do not claim these points as our achievements or contributions. But they certainly show where we attained clarity of understanding and expression during my present research on the subject of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). The value of this work for us lies in this gain. We also found that the original literatures on the subject were much clearer than the works of many modern scholars. These scholars, some of them great thinkers, appear to be more eager to express their views and opinions than establishing them or even sometimes explaining them. In general we found them critical of what may be called the classical view in the matter. But we also noted that they often did not care to state the classical view in question. Most of these thinkers are teachers and scholars of philosophy. But none of them distinguished the *popular* view of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or FVP and the *philosophical* theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or PTP. Till we undertook the present research we also did not know that this distinction was there or that this distinction was so important. We got the first hint of it in the *Vedāntaparibhāṣāsamgraha* of Pandit Pañcānan Śāstri. It later proved to be the major source of clarity that we gained on the subject of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or the theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ).

Many do not know that the four-fold scheme of human values or *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) is actually the *Paurāṇic* (पौराणिक) or *Purāṇa* theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). The *Purāṇa* (पुराण) and *darśana* (दर्शन) or roughly philosophy are different systems of knowledge and different kinds of literature. So we inquired if the familiar fourfold scheme of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) was the *Paurāṇic* (पौराणिक) scheme or view then what was the source of the philosophical theory or view of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). The reasonable expectation was that the philosophical treatment of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) must be more systematic and analytical. It was refreshingly new when we found that according to the philosophical view the scheme of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) contained only *one puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Some modern scholars debated over the issue whether the fourfold scheme (चतुर्वर्ग) was better or the threefold scheme (त्रिवर्ग) was better. They did not notice or discuss the philosophical view according to which the scheme of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) contained only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). For a student of philosophy and in a research work in the field of philosophy this distinction proved to be the most important. But then there was a problem. There are many different schools of philosophy. If they all admit only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) then the natural question is whether they have different theories of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or the same theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). We found that though these schools did not differ in respect of the *number* of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), but they differed about the *nature* of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Even when all these schools agreed to call the one single *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) as *mokṣa* (मोक्ष), they did not mean by *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) the same thing. Taking into consideration these two points of agreement and difference between them we in this work

suggested that the philosophical theories of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) proposed by different schools of philosophy were actually so many different *versions* of PTP. We also explained why the different philosophical schools offered *different versions* of PTP. The *way in which the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika version differs from the Vedānta version* is different from the way it differs from the version to be found in the Cārvāka School. If the notion of *puruṣa* (roughly man) differs then the notion of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) must also be different. The notion of *puruṣa* (पुरुष) according to both Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Vedānta philosophy are more or less the same. This will be clear when we consider that both these schools of thought reject the view of *puruṣa* (पुरुष) of Cārvāka school. So though the one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in the version of Cārvāka PTP is *kāma* (काम), it is *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) according to both Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Advaita Vedānta schools of philosophy. In the standard Vaiṣṇava philosophical version of the theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) the one (final and ultimate) *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is *bhakti* (भक्ति). It is neither *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) nor *kāma* (काम). So far as the Advaita Vedānta version and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika version of PTP are concerned there is a difference about the nature of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). According to the first version of PTP, the one and the final *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is pleasure of a kind. But according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika version of PTP, *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the only *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) but it is something negative in its nature. This is well known among the serious scholars of philosophy. But there are many technicalities in the systematic Vedānta philosophy. Those who take these technical points seriously know that neither the nature of *Brahman* nor the nature of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) can be of the nature of *positive* pleasure or

*sukha* (सुख). Such an admission will conflict with the monism of this Vedānta. We took great pain to state the point clearly and offered arguments for this. Yet another difference among the philosophical schools is about the means (उपाय) of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Even when *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is admitted in certain philosophical schools as the one and final *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ), different schools suggest different means for its attainment. For a long time a debate is going on. Some hold that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) can be attained through *karma* (कर्म) or through performing dutiful actions (कर्म). Other hold the view that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) can be attained through *jñāna* (ज्ञान) only. Both monist Vedānta philosophers and dualist or pluralist Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers agree that *karma* (कर्म) cannot be regarded as the independent or final cause or independent or final means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). But many of us who are unaware about these technical philosophical issues do not understand this point properly. So, they think that men should denounce all *karma-s* (कर्म) as rituals and take the path of *jñāna* (ज्ञान) or *bhakti* (भक्ति) to attain highest fulfillment of life. They make reference to the *Gītā*. But the *Gītā* does not teach us to denounce all *karma-s* (कर्म) as rituals. In the first place till the time of Śaṅkarācārya or Gaṅgeśopādhyāy and before the time of Madhusūdana Svarasvatī nobody held the view that the *Gītā* in its three parts teach us *karma* (कर्म), *jñāna* (ज्ञान) and *bhakti* (भक्ति). All through his *bhāṣya* on the *Gītā* Śaṅkarācārya discussed the relative roles of *karma* (कर्म) and *jñāna* (ज्ञान). And according to him, they cannot be practiced together, meaning thereby their *samuccaya* (समुच्चय) is not possible. Like Śaṅkarācārya and his followers, majority of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers, hold *a-samuccaya* (असमुच्चय) theory or *a-*

*samuccayavāda* (असमुच्चयवाद). It is generally believed that Madhusūdana Svaraswatī, though a great advaita Vedāntin, deviated from Śaṅkarācārya and held that *bhakti* (भक्ति) and not *jñāna* (ज्ञान) is the source of *mukti* (मुक्ति). But a deeper study of his works convinced us that his view of *bhakti* (भक्ति) is different from what goes in the name of Madhusūdana's view of *bhakti* (भक्ति). While studying the literature on this debate we came to notice another important thing. In recent time two great classical scholar-philosophers of India (Mm. Phaṇībhuṣana Tarkvāgīś and Mm. Gopīnāth Kavirāj) expressed different opinions about the exact position of Nyāya in the matter of the nature of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) and the means of attaining it. We felt very happy to study the 'debate' between such stalwarts. But unfortunately this debate was ignored so long. We also found that the position or the stand of Mm. Phaṇībhuṣana Tarkvāgīś was more convincing.

During the earlier days of this research work we took the fourfold scheme of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) not only as the standard view but also as the *popular* view. We continued to view it in the same way and contrast it with PTP for some time. But when we inquired about the source of PTP and many of its versions we realized that this source is nothing but the *Veda* and the *Upaniṣada*. According to the classical view of them there is no conflict or contradiction among the teachings of the *Veda*, *Upaniṣada*, *Purāṇa* (पुराण), *ītiḥāsa* (इतिहास) and *Dharmaśāstra*. So FVP and PTP are different but not opposed to each other. As theories they first differ in their generality. Secondly, FVP represents the scheme of values which is empirically visible in the life of ordinary and worldly men and these values are recommended for them. PTP becomes the true

scheme of values for the same people when they are more evolved and have successfully lived the life of a student (ब्रह्मचर्य) and that of a householder (गार्हस्थ्य). Some romantically oriented people develop a sort of pseudo-asceticism when they want to reach the state of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) too early without going through the proper process. Then they do not gain anything; they become a great loser. They do not succeed in this world nor can get the best of the other world. The *Puranic* theory is as valid as the philosophical view. However, philosophy is more systematic and analytic; further it admits only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). So in philosophical theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) there is not many scope of anomaly and problem of reconciling different values. The major problem with FVP was for us whether to accept all the four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) or less or more number of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). Other scholars did not make serious effort to reconcile them or to give an interpretation of FVP so that it becomes a consistent theory. We suggested many different ways of doing that. Ultimately we found that it is too easy to reconcile greater or smaller number of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) with FVP. But it was not that easy to interpret the linear arrangement of the four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). Our final conclusion in the matter was that the lowest position assigned to the *dharma puruṣārtha* (धर्म पुरुषार्थ) does not signify that it is less important. The idea is that *dharma* (धर्म) is the root of all *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) in the sense that unless it is pursued as a *dharma* (धर्म) or as a provision of normative ethics *kāma* (काम) and *artha* (अर्थ) could not be regarded as a value. However, the same cannot be said about *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). *Artha* (अर्थ) and *kāma* (काम) become value when we pursue it in the right and dutiful way. But when a man seeks *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) he actually seeks

to transcend the limits of morality.<sup>1</sup> The question now is: when one reaches the limit of morality? One view is that one reaches the limit of morality when one (truly) finds that there is nothing for him to seek in this world or after. This explanation cannot be accepted. For, if nothing is there for him to seek, then he cannot be a seeker of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष), he cannot be a *mumukṣu* (मुमुक्षु). The better answer is: one reaches the limit of morality when one has nothing to attain *through duties* or moral deeds. But how can such a man attain *mokṣa* (मोक्ष)? If *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is not to be attained through doing dutiful actions, then also there must be some *way* to attain it. Only by adopting some appropriate means one can get *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). Some would like to answer this objection or question by saying that *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is already an attained goal; man is already *mukta* (मुक्त). So, it is not a valid question how one can attain *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). But then how can we distinguish a *mumukṣu* (मुमुक्षु) from a *mukta* (मुक्त)? It is said that man is always and already *mukta* (मुक्त) but he does not know it. He *wrongly* thinks that he is in bondage. So no effort is needed to attain freedom or *mukti* (मुक्ति). But there is a need to remove the false belief (अज्ञान) that we are not *mukta* (मुक्त) but in bondage. The means of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is actually a means of removing the false belief that we are not already *mukta* (मुक्त). Man through his effort removes the false belief and its cause. But no effort is needed for achieving *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). There are some points in this answer but still it is difficult to accept. If *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is not an object of seeking or if no human effort (पुरुष प्रयत्न) is necessary to attain it then it cannot be called a *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). The answer we offer is that even when a man reaches the limit of morality, he can still seek *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) and try to achieve it. But he does not try

to attain *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) in an ethical way or through performing moral duties. In fact *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) cannot be attained (directly) through any action (कर्म), not even through moral action (धर्म or धर्म-कर्म). The path of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is *jñāna* (ज्ञान). Actually one attains *mukti* (मुक्ति) through (i) the direct and right knowledge of the true nature of the soul (आत्मतत्त्व-साक्षायतकार) and (ii) the *bhoga* (भोग) or experience of the *prārabdha karma* (प्रारब्ध कर्म). Of these in (ii) man has no active role to play. He passively experiences the effect of the remaining few of those *karmas* (कर्म) that caused him to be born. Such *karmas* (कर्म) are called *prārabdha karma-s* (प्रारब्ध कर्म). So far as the other factor (i) is concerned man has to work hard to acquire this sort of knowledge. But once this knowledge is obtained, then the man becomes *mukta* (मुक्त) if the other condition (ii) is fulfilled. According to this answer, a man has transcended morality when he has reached the limits of morality and does not have any duties to perform. Such a man obtains *mukti* (मुक्ति) as a result of hard earned knowledge but not through any action. Even though this answer is right a little refinement is necessary. Ordinarily a man is said to have reached the limit of morality when he has nothing to seek through morality. But actually these moral actions through performing which one seeks some result are called *pravṛtti lakṣaṇa dharma* (प्रवृत्ति लक्षण धर्म). Ordinarily understood one reaches the limit of morality when one cannot or does not need to perform the duties or dutiful actions which are called *pravṛtti lakṣaṇa dharma* (प्रवृत्ति लक्षण धर्म). Even such a man can and does perform what is called *nivṛtti lakṣaṇa dharma* (निवृत्ति लक्षण धर्म) or the duties of a man which has no result other than *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) to attain. The performance of *nivṛtti lakṣaṇa dharma* (निवृत्ति लक्षण धर्म) leads to no

result other than the *jñāna* (ज्ञान), or the knowledge of the soul. Thus *nivṛtti lakṣaṇa dharma* (निवृत्ति लक्षण धर्म) leads to *jñāna* (ज्ञान) or self realization and through this a man secures *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) which is the highest goal or value of human life. So there remains an object of human seeking and it is obtained through human effort that leads to the right sort of *jñāna* (ज्ञान). This human effort consists in performing ethical or moral actions of a higher order. These are called *nivṛtti lakṣaṇa dharma* (निवृत्ति लक्षण धर्म). Because these actions consists in taming (निवृत्ति) the desire (इच्छा or काम) for ordinary goals of life or goals other than the goal of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष).

I

Due to their failure to distinguish between FVP and PTP different modern scholars raised different objections against familiar scheme of fourfold *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Some held that the scheme of fourfold (चतुर्वर्ग) *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) was a later addition. Originally there was only a scheme of threefold (त्रिवर्ग) *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) theory. We showed that fourfold (चतुर्वर्ग) theory was quite old and could be traced to the *Vedas* and *Upaniṣada*. But what is more important is that we pointed out that there was also scheme of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) in which there was only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) instead of three or four *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). We also showed that some object that in the classical literatures of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ), there was no place for such *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) as intellectual pleasure as is held by some modern scholars. We argued that the objection is not valid. For the classical conception of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) kept room for many other *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) such as long life, intellectual pleasure and so on.

We also discussed the three related questions or objections that are frequently raised about the Indian scheme of values or *puruṣārthas* (पुरुषार्थ). (1) The fourfold scheme of *puruṣārthas* (पुरुषार्थ) is neither the best nor the only Indian scheme of values. This we discussed in connection with resolving the debate about *trivarga* (त्रिवर्ग) and *caturvarga* (चतुर्वर्ग) theories of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). We also discussed, in addition, the *ekavarga* (एकवर्ग) doctrine of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). We first pointed out that ideally the philosophical doctrine of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) must be *ekavarga* (एकवर्ग) doctrine of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). Ordinarily according to such a doctrine the only *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is *mokṣa puruṣārtha* (मोक्ष पुरुषार्थ). *Mokṣa* (मोक्ष) is the only *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) from a point of view of philosophy. On the other hand, from the ordinary or popular point of view *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are not three as the supporters of the *trivarga* (त्रिवर्ग) doctrine hold. Rather the number of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) is four which includes *mokṣa puruṣārtha* (मोक्ष पुरुषार्थ) also. At this point some raise the objection why the number of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) cannot be more. We have shown that such an objection does not have any basis. If we take any *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) individually, it can be many. There are many *kāma puruṣārtha-s* (काम पुरुषार्थ) and many *dharma puruṣārtha-s* (धर्म पुरुषार्थ). But they are all same as *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). The point of building a theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is to arrive at some general truth about it. For this reason those who built a theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) generalized *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) to different degrees. So in such a theory every *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is a class or kind of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) within which many individually different *puruṣārthas* (पुरुषार्थ) can be included. When we say *sukha* (सुख) is *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) we

know that there are many different kinds of *sukha* (सुख). There is the *sensory* pleasure of enjoying a good dish and also *intellectual* pleasure of theoretical inquiry like philosophy or science. So it is not a objection to say that Indian doctrine of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) keeps no room for such pleasure as intellectual pleasure.

Thus we showed that the familiar fourfold scheme of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is not just fourfold and keeps room for many other values or *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ). What is more important is that we showed, on the other hand, that the single or one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) scheme has different versions. We first discussed that any *ideal philosophical* theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or PTP can accept only one *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). For, no greater generalization is possible or the number of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) cannot be less than one. However there can be *different versions* of PTP. We first discussed that the *version* of the PTP which the supporters of the monism like the Advaita Vedānta supports was different from the version of the PTP which the supporters of the dualist or pluralists like the Naiyāyika-s or Vaiśeṣika-s prefer. We discussed, in addition, the view of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) as a philosophical theory of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) and it is different from the Vedānta PTP as well as Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika PTP.

## II

Another important point we made was that the discussion of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) was not an accidental or unimportant part of philosophy. Those who think differently fail to note a number of important points. In the first place the conception of philosophy in India is different from the conception of philosophy in modern Europe or America. Secondly, this conception of philosophy is

common to almost all schools of philosophy in India. Thirdly, according to this conception, *mokṣa puruṣārtha* (मोक्ष पुरुषार्थ) is an essential part of philosophy. Nobody can ignore these points to show that *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is not a proper subject matter of philosophy. By ignoring this they practically suggest knowingly or unknowingly that the western conception of philosophy is the only conception of philosophy. We noted earlier that there was no want of systems of analytical philosophy in India. And these systems of philosophy discuss with all seriousness both the subject of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in general and the particular *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) called *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). So, it cannot be said that *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is not a subject matter of philosophy truly speaking. To realize this we need to note that even the systematic and technical philosophy of India is marked by its practical orientation. We also argued that the scheme of *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) can be viewed as the foundation of acceptable moral and legal theories and practice.

But some object against the Indian philosophical theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). They have mainly two objections. The first is that for this ideology of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) India has a world negating culture. Secondly, because of their concern for *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) Indians became selfish. They have no concern for general welfare or the good of mankind.

In answer to the second objection we showed that we cannot ascribe selfishness to those who are the real or true aspirant of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). For, such aspirant or *mumukṣu* (मुमुक्षु) is necessarily *virakta* (विरक्त). He has already renounced all cravings, all interests and attachments. For, they seek or *want mokṣa* (मोक्ष). We cannot

ascribe any need or attachment or self-interest to such persons in the ordinary sense of the term. Instead of saying that *mumukṣu* (मुमुक्षु) seeks to achieve or secure *mokṣa*, (मोक्ष) we should more appropriately say they 'seek' emancipation from all that are viewed ordinarily as good and desirable. For them none of these things is *really* good. They have self-realization (आत्म-साक्षात्कार). Vātsyāyana in his *bhāṣya* on *Nyāya sūtra* while elucidating on the *apavarga sūtra* of Gautama has already clarified these things. So, we need to reconcile the account of *mumukṣu* (मुमुक्षु) given so far with those texts of *Purāṇa-s* that say ideology of *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) promotes selfishness.

The point of the objector is that it follows from the meaning of the word that *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) is indeed a matter of *self-interest*. A socially and morally better and higher life is one in which one's personal interest (स्वार्थ) is consciously controlled and ignored. And so, it (personal interest) is subordinated to general interest or interest of the other people. A selfish man who gives more importance to self-interest is not an ideal man either socially or morally. However, it is also to be admitted that a man does not generally do anything if he does not have some interest in it. In other words, if the action in question does not serve some of his purposes, he will not be interested to do that thing. Now, how can we say that a person can be both a worthy in the social and moral sphere and also an active at a time? We cannot act without interest but to give importance to one's interest is to be selfish. To be selfish (act for one's own interest) is bad in the eyes of society and morality. To be good and right a man needs to sacrifice his interest or self interest. On the other hand it has been rightly said that no

intelligent man ever acts without interest (प्रयोजनमनुद्दिश्य न मन्दोऽपि प्रवर्तते।<sup>2</sup>). Different solutions of this problem have been suggested. Sometimes they differ in forms and words and not in content or substance. One way of answering the problem is to draw a distinction between self-interest and enlightened self-interest. An enlightened man, an educated and cultured man, also acts for some purpose. The actions what he performs serve some purpose or interest. But this is not just ordinary self-interest which a selfish man pursues. It is enlightened self-interest. One who pursues in his actions enlightened self-interest cannot be regarded as a selfish man. We will come back to answering the problem in terms of the distinction between selfishness and enlightened self-interest. There is a second way of solving the problem. For that man, who prefers this second way, the sentence that man cannot act without any self interest becomes false. In this sense, man can act simply from a sense of duty. Eventually we will have to distinguish between acting from enlightened self-interest and acting from a sense of duty. For the present there are three types of action: actions done to fulfill some selfish interest of the agent; actions done from enlightened self-interest and actions done from a sense of duty. Some radical theorists would say that when one acts from a sense of duty there is no interest whatsoever to be served.

To return to enlightened self-interest, there are cases when a man saves the life of a total stranger from drowning without any thought of return or reward. It is not just a thoughtless habitual action. It is done from explicit or implicit sense of duty. One may say that this man also acts from interest or self-interest; and the interest is to do one's duty. In reply we would say, it is the case of

enlightened self-interest. In this sense a man is a cultured man in whom love for others (or universal love) and sense of duty are predominant and for this there developed a sense of social and moral responsibility. There is no place in their life for narrow self-interest. Interest one takes to save the life of a total stranger is enlightened self-interest. Here the agent's interest is to fulfill the interest and desire of the other man, in this case, the man who is drowning. So far there is only difference in words whether we describe this action as action done from a sense of duty or as an action done from enlightened self-interest. Enlightened self interest values other's interest more than one's private and personal interest. More radical thinkers hold that while acting from the sense of duty the doer takes no notice of interest whether of his own or of someone's else. He acts under the dictation or command of reason or of the moral imperative. To act from a sense of duty one must first subjugate completely one's desire, inclination, interest and the like. He must subjugate his passions and emotions to reason or sense of duty. On such radical interpretation of acting from duty the threefold division of actions is possible. Man can act in his own interest (स्वार्थ) or to serve the interest of others (परार्थ) or he can act without reference to any interest at all; he can act only in consideration of the demand of the sense of duty.

True values are the objects for that man who acts from the sense of enlightened self-interest. Values are of general interest. It may be my own duty to serve my aging and ailing parents. But serving the ailing and aging parents is a universal duty in the sense that it is the duty of every man to serve his parents (at least when they need it). If truth telling is a value, it is everyone's interest

(enlightened self-interest) to seek it. Recognition of this obliges us to grant everyone the *right* to truth telling. Neither the individual nor the state has the (opposite) right to prevent anyone from telling the truth or exercising his right to truth-telling. Rather it is the duty of every man and of the state to preserve and promote every one's right to truth-telling. This is the way in which value constitutes the foundation of (both legal and moral) right and (legal and moral) duty. It is in this way we can distinguish a theory of value from two other related theories — namely the theory of right and the theory of duty (or again the moral theory of right and duty and legal theory of right and duty). The theory of value is the foundational theory or more basic theory. We propose that the theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) or values may be taken as a theory which is related to ethics or moral theory but is more basic than either of them.

To be more specific, it now becomes our duty first (a) not to prevent others from exercising their right; and secondly, it is our duty (b) to allow and encourage them to exercise it. So the theory of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) recognizes that as a matter of enlightened self-interest every man should pursue *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) which is appropriate for his age, station and so on. For being and being recognized in the society as a worthy member men from ordinary individuals to the members of the royal family of the Hindu society used to pursue these *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ).<sup>3</sup> So it is in the context of a scheme of basic values that we organize our thought and theories of rights and duties.

Familiar *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) are values primarily in the context of the life and growth of an individual man. The question is raised

whether there was in classical India any concern for collective growth and welfare. So far as universal values and general welfare are concerned another well known saying is there: सर्वे भवन्तु सुखिनः सर्वे सन्तु निरामया । सर्वे भद्राणि पश्यन्तु मा कश्चित् दुःखभाक् भवेत् ॥<sup>4</sup> from this statement the concern of classical Indian thinkers for collective growth and welfare becomes evident. In the *Vaidika* and classical Indian literature we rarely find an individual prays for himself by using first person singular number. Prayers are not for me (in the singular) but for *us* (and all). Scholars like Gopīnāth Kavirāj have drawn our attention to this fact. Indians always prayed for collective good and not for the fulfillment of one's narrow and selfish interest. The objective is the highest and best fulfillment of the *individual* life as well as the collective good like universal health, happiness, prosperity and freedom from suffering. There is also a well-known prayer for long life.<sup>5</sup> Our ancestors went further. They prayed for the pleasure, happiness and fulfillment of all sentient creatures.<sup>6</sup> Such collective goods are also values and objects of pursuit and seeking. If one wants one can easily take these long-life etc. to be *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ). If, on the other hand, one wants to generalize these individual goods they can bring them under either say *kāma* (काम) (good) or *dharma* (धर्म) or duty. If one wants to further generalize the values one can include them all into freedom from pain and suffering.

The distinctive conception of philosophy in India, that is, the distinctive conception of *darśana* (दर्शन) makes *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) a natural subject matter of it. So even if for the arguments sake we admit that (modern European) *philosophy* does not have place for the subject like *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) we cannot deny that *puruṣārtha*

(पुरुषार्थ) is a central concern and subject matter of *darśana* (दर्शन). It is to be noted as one of the distinguishing marks of *darśana* (दर्शन) that *darśana* (दर्शन) or Indian philosophy has great *practical* bearing. One does not do *darśana* (दर्शन) simply for the intellectual pleasure of gaining theoretical understanding. In India men philosophize (do or study *darśana*) to be clear about the true goal of life and the way of securing it. The Indian conception of *darśana* (दर्शन) is rather close to the classical European and the ancient Greek conception of philosophy. Men expect to know from it the true nature of the world and our place in it. To put it in the way which is closer to *darśana* (दर्शन), man expects to know from *darśana* (दर्शन) such truths about our life and the world as may secure for us that which can end all our cravings and strivings. Our life on earth is a life of constant striving for some good. Our striving does not end with securing one good or the other. The moment we get a thing we strive for another. The striving never ends and we are never at rest. Schopenhauer has shown this beautifully in his writing 'The Vanity of Existence'. This constant striving for something or other, this constant effort or exerting becomes so painful that we begin to dislike this life. We want to escape from such a state. A pessimist would commit suicide. In fact there is a popular saying which expresses the view of such pessimists. They say the best thing is not to be born, but once born the next best thing is to die. The Indian view is different and positive. First, death and suicide are themselves painful. Secondly, they bring much more suffering in their train since committing suicide is a sin. In the third place, in suicide there is a temporary relief. Such relief we have almost every day during sleep. What is actually needed is to put an end not just

to this *life* but to the very necessity of rebirth. If we cannot do that then we will be reborn again and again and will experience the pain of constant striving. According to the positive view of *darśana* (दर्शन), we need to get the final good or reach the final fulfillment. Once we get that we will never strive for any other thing; for there will be nothing more to strive for. Our constant seeking will stop permanently. So we need to get that

“यं लब्ध्वा चापरं लाभं मन्यते नास्तिकं तथा ।

यस्मिन्स्थितो न दुःखेन गुरुणापि विचाल्यते॥” (*Bhagavad Gītā*, 6/22).

Now one moot question is: Is there such a thing? If there is, what is it and how can we get it? We expect from *darśana* (दर्शन) the answers to these questions. Since these questions are about *puruṣārtha-s* (पुरुषार्थ) in general and the final *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in particular, *darśana* (दर्शन) is regarded as the *mokṣa-Śāstra* (मोक्ष-शास्त्र). There are other *mokṣa-Śāstra* (मोक्ष-शास्त्र) also. For example, *Āgama* (or *Tantra*) and *Nigama* (or the *Veda*) are also *Śāstra* (शास्त्र) that tell us about the final fulfillment and its means. But only in Indian philosophy (दर्शन) we get the analytical and critical discussion of the questions just stated and answers based on rational inquiry. So Indian philosophy's concern is the most burning problem of life: how to remove life's suffering from the very root? *Darśana* (दर्शन) does not give us only the *theoretical* understanding of such matters about the world, the human life, life's suffering and so on. It also provides guidance for a meaningful and successful life. It gives us the knowledge which does not only make us wise but also fulfilled and free; free from all actual and possible sufferings. *Mokṣa* (मोक्ष)

is another name for this freedom. The Indian conception of philosophy or *darśana* (दर्शन) makes the discussion of *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) including in particular the *mokṣa-puruṣārtha* (मोक्ष-पुरुषार्थ) its central concern. Those who find *difficulty* in finding a place for *mokṣa* (मोक्ष) or *puruṣārtha* (पुरुषार्थ) in philosophy — in philosophy of mind or morals — need to carefully consider that *darśana* (दर्शन) is not merely an abstract intellectual discipline of theoretical knowledge as modern European philosophy is. *Darśana* (दर्शन) is a system of knowledge which has immediate and highest practical bearing. It is not for knowledge or for the sake of knowledge that one does in *darśana* (दर्शन). Indians take a positive and practical view of philosophy. Man does or studies *darśana* (दर्शन) as a way (even if indirect way) of securing highest fulfillment of life and final eradication of sufferings. Once the knowledge of the truth (तत्त्वज्ञान), obtained from *darśana* (दर्शन), is put to practice and turned into immediate realization of the soul (आत्म-साक्षात्कार) one secures *mokṣa* (मोक्ष). And then nothing remains to seek or to know. Man gets which knowingly or unknowingly he has been seeking from untold past.

## Notes and References

<sup>1</sup> Professor Sushil Kumar Maitra has stated this point beautifully in his *The Ethics of the Hindus*, University of Calcutta, Calcutta, 1963.

<sup>2</sup> Ślokvārtika, Kumāril Bhaṭṭa.

<sup>3</sup> The beginning verses of Kalidasa's *Raghuvamsaṃ*.

<sup>4</sup> *Vaidika mantra*.

<sup>5</sup> 'जीवेम शरद शतम', Quoted by Tripathi, Bhagiratha (Vagish Shastri), *Sanskṛtavānmayamanthanam*, Sanskrit Bharati, Varanasi, 1990, p.

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