

Chapter – I

Introduction: An Explanatory note on ‘*Khyātivāda*’ in general

Theories of erroneous knowledge are known as ‘*khyātivāda*’ in Indian philosophical system. The word ‘*khyāti*’ is derived from the Sanskrit root ‘*cakṣa*’ alongwith ‘*ktin*’ inflection.¹ Actually, ‘*khyāti*’ means ‘knowledge’. But, the word ‘*khyāti*’ technically is used in Indian Philosophy that is ‘knowledge of an object which is appeared in error’.

At the outset, we have to know that, what is the necessity of gaining as to ‘the theories of error’?

In response, it is necessary to mention that, the ‘soul’ is the absolute knowable entity or ‘*prameya*’ in accordance with the orthodox philosophical point of view. ‘*Prameya*’ means that which is accurately knowable. The orthodox schools of philosophers incessantly have tried to realise this Absolute Soul since the succession of ages. Erroneous knowledge regarding to Absolute Soul is the ultimate cause of all worldly meseries. In this regard, ‘error’ means the imposition of Absolute Soul in the non-soul. The living-beings identify the non-soul entities

like body, mind, reformation (*'saṃskāra'*), knowledge (*'buddhi'*) and so on with the 'Absolute Soul'. We feel that the soul would be realized through the negation of the non-soul entities. As a result, our minds become full of miseries. So, the first and foremost motivation of Indian Philosophy is to bring the eternal emancipation of all living-beings. So, the ultimate purpose of all saviours is to gain the absolute true knowledge rejecting the fallacious knowledge for ever. So, we have to accept the existence of the invalid cognition or the erroneous cognition for being aware of the nature of valid cognition. Because, valid- invalid, good-bad, red-non-red etc. these all are relative terms. It will be impossible to separate the valid cognition from the invalid one without having the nature of invalid cognition. Besides that, we cannot deliberate correctly the truthfulness-falsity of daily happenings also due to the absence of valid cognition. For this reason, it is necessary to know the nature of erroneous knowledge in order to reject this. After all, 'error' is an important epistemological problem and also a psychological phenomenon. Actually, it is also a fact of our life.

The well-known *kārikā* in regard to the theories of error is:

“Ātmakhyātirasatkhyātirakhyāti khyātiranyathā.

Tathā'nirvacanakhyātirityetat khyātipañcakam.”²

According to this *kārikā* or verse, the ‘*asatkhyāti*’, ‘*akhyāti*’, ‘*anyathākhyāti*’, ‘*ātmakhyāti*’, ‘*anirvacaniyakhyāti*’ - these five-fold theories of error are particularly well-known in the Indian Philosophy. Besides these, the theories called ‘*satkhyāti*’, ‘*viparītakhyāti*’, ‘*sadasatkhyāti*’, ‘*aloukikakhyāti*’ etc. are also well-known in the Indian Philosophy.

There are mainly two different theories of error in Indian philosophical system namely, ‘the theory of error’ and ‘the theory of non-error’. The theory of ‘non-error’ or ‘*Akhyātivāda*’ held by the Prābhākara school of *Pûrva-Mīmāṃsā*. According to the Prābhākara school, all cognition are regarded as valid. On the other hand, according to the theory of ‘error’ or ‘*Khyātivāda*’, cognition may be regarded as invalid in sometimes.

As there is the existence of numerous theories of error in the Indian Philosophy a question may be raised: what is the reason behind the different theories of error ?

The answer to the question that mentioned above may be basically divided into two categories. Certain Indian Philosophers do not accept the existence of erroneous knowledge at all. Their theory is known as ‘*akhyātivāda*’. Prābhākara *Mīmāṃsaka* and *Sāṃkhya* – these two schools of Indian Philosophers’ communities accept this opinion. Other Indian Philosophers accept the existence of

erroneous knowledge. For this reason, their opinion is known as the ‘theory of error’ or the ‘*khyātivāda*’. But, there are different types of ‘*khyātivāda*’ or ‘theories of error’ too among the *khyātivādīns*. The question in the context may be raised in the form. What is the reason for accepting the different types of the theories of error or the ‘*khyātivāda*’?

The answer to this question is as follows. Even though there is no different opinion among the ‘*khyātivādīns*’ about the existence of the erroneous knowledge there are different types of opinion about the erroneous object. The erroneous object may be four-fold as real, unreal, both real and unreal, not both real and unreal or really indefinable or ‘*anirvacanīya*’. No fifth alternative (*vikalpa*) is possible beyond these four-fold alternatives. All ‘*khyātivādīns*’ accept that the illusory object is real have also expressed difference of opinion among themselves. The illusory- object may either be external or internal. According to the *Yogācāra Buddhists*, the illusory-object is internal. They deny the existence of the external world. The *Yogācaras* uphold that the illusory-object is a form of cognition. Their opinion is known as ‘*ātmakhyātivāda*’. In pursuance of the *Mādhva Vedāntins* and *Śunyovādīn Buddhists*, the illusory-object is unreal. So, their theory of error is called the ‘*asatkhyātivāda*’. But, there are also different types of views among themselves. According to the *Mādhva* school, the illusory-object is unreal although the substratum or locus of the illusory- object is real. So, they accept the

‘*svādhīsthāna-bhrama*’. On the other hand, the *Śūnyovādī Buddhists* uphold that the illusory-object is unreal and the locus of the illusory-object is also unreal. So, they accept the ‘*niradhīsthānabhrama*’. The *khyātivādīns* who think the illusory-object is external are also divided. Some Philosophers point out that the illusory-object is real and it appears far from the knower. The view is known as ‘*anyathākhyātivāda*’. This view is corroborated by the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas*. According to the *Viśiṣṭādvaitavādīn* Rāmānuja, the erroneous-object is real but it exists in front of the knower whose opinion is called the ‘*satkhyātivāda*’. In accordance with the *Advaita Vedānta*, the erroneous object is not real, not unreal and both real-unreal –it is ‘*sadasadvilakṣaṇa*’ or ‘*anirvacanīya*’. Their opinion concerning the erroneous knowledge is known as the ‘*anirvacaniyakhyātivāda*’.

The main aim of this thesis is the substantiation of the theory of ‘*anyathākhyāti*’ refuting the theory of ‘*akhyāti*’. Before this critical discussion, I will be discussing the theory of ‘*ātmakhyāti*’, ‘*asatkhyāti*’, and ‘*anirvacanīyakhyāti*’ shortly.

The present thesis is divided into mainly five chapters. In the introductory chapter or the first chapter it will be discussed about the above-mentioned various types of theory of error in a nutshell. It is necessary to discuss about the definition of ‘error’ and to give proper evidence concerning this subject-matter. Because, the nature of all objects are proved by means of their definitions and also their proper

evidence. Because, the evidence in accordance with the principle - “*lakṣaṇapramāṇābhyām hi vastusiddhiḥ*” which is approved by all schools of Indian philosophers. For this reason, the subject-matters of the second, third, fourth and fifth chapters are the definition of error and critical discussion about this matter. “Definition of ‘error’ in the light of the Ancient Naiyāyikas: An Epistemic Deliberation” is the title of the second chapter. After that, it will be discussed about ‘error’ in accordance with Prābhākara Mīmāṃsaka and Nyāya schools through various arguments in the next two chapters. The discussion about the Prabhākaras’ theory of ‘non-error’ is the subject-matter of the third chapter of this thesis. The title of this chapter is “Elucidation of ‘*Akhyātivāda*’ and background of such theory”. The establishment of the theory of ‘*anyathākhyāti*’ refuting ‘*akhyātivāda*’ is the subject-matter of the fourth chapter of this thesis. This fourth chapter is divided into two parts namely, (i). A Critique of ‘*Akhyātivāda*’ by the Naiyāyikas, (ii). ‘*Anyathākhyātivādasiddhāntapakṣa*’. Last of all, the thesis is concluded through some critical and evaluative remarks, which is the fifth chapter or last chapter of this thesis.

Vātsyāyana defines the erroneous knowledge as such: “*atasmimstaditi pratyayah yathā sthānau puruṣa iti*³ (2/1/36) in his famous commentary *Nyāyabhāṣya* on *Nyāyasūtra* of Maharṣi Goutama. Once more, *Ācārya Śaṅkara*

defines the erroneous knowledge in his *Adhyāśabhāṣya* as such : “*smṛtirūpah paratra pūrvadṛṣṭāvabhāśah*”⁴. At the end of *Adhyāśabhāṣya* Ācārya Śaṅkara again remembers the definition of the erroneous knowledge and then he said that, “*adhyāso nāmātasmiṁstadbuddhiritiavocāmoh*”⁵. So, it is mentionable that, the previous definition of the erroneous knowledge which is given by Śaṅkara is actually: “*atasmimstadbuddhih*”.

It is proved by the *Naiyāikas*, in the shell-silver case, the silver is true which is seen in the previously acceptable shell. But, the *Advaita Vedāntins* always accept that the silver is false which imposes on the shell. According to them, the whole world is false which is imposed on the Absolute Soul or *Brahman*.

“*Smṛtirūpah paratra pūrvadṛṣṭāvabhāśah*”---this definition of the ‘*adhyāśa*’ or ‘*bhrama*’ has been incorporated in the *Adhyāśabhāṣya* by Śaṅkara refuting the theories of error which are given by other schools. He actually had established ‘*anirvacanīyakhyātivāda*’ with this definition.

The above-mentioned definition of the ‘*adhyāśa*’ or ‘*bhrama*’ will be explained shortly. But, before the discussion about the definition of ‘*adhyāśa*’, we have to know about the term ‘*adhyāśa*’ or ‘*bhrama*’ or ‘error’. The term ‘*adhyāśa*’ is derived from the Sanskrit root ‘*adhi-as*’ alongwith ‘*ghaṇi*’ inflection. This ‘*ghaṇi*’ inflection is applied by passively and actively both. For this reason, the

two-fold meaning of the term ‘*adhyāsa*’ has to be accepted by us. The meaning of the term ‘*bhāva*’ or ‘passive’ is action. So, the meaning of the term ‘*adhyāsa*’ passively is ‘*adhyāsakriyā*’ or ‘erroneous action’. The root ‘*as*’ means ‘to cast’. The prefix ‘*adhi*’ is ‘top of anything’. So the total meaning of the term ‘*adhyāsa*’ in passive sense is ‘to cast anything on any other thing’. Again, the total meaning of the term ‘*adhyāsa*’ in active sense is that thing which is thrown on the other thing. For example, in the shell-silver case, that cognitive state is ‘*adhyāsa*’ or ‘error’ and that knowable silver also is erroneous. In the first sense, the cognitive state or knowledge is erroneous and in the second sense, the knowable is erroneous⁶.

“*Smṛtirûpah paratra pûrvadṛṣṭāvabhāsaḥ*”.

- The meaning of the term ‘*smṛtirûpah*’ is ---- “*smṛyate iti smṛti*” or that thing is called ‘*smṛti*’ or memory which is remembered. The term ‘*smṛtirûpah*’ is given as that whose appearance is like the appearance of that remembered thing. It is given by *vahuvrihi* compound. So, the ultimate meaning of this term ‘*smṛtirûpah*’ in the case of imposition in case of meaning (‘*arthādhyāsapakṣe*’) is: any ‘*prātibhāsika*’ thing like remembered (*vyavahārika*) thing. The term ‘*paratra*’ means: in another locus, or, the object not existing in its own locus. The meaning of the term

‘pûrvadr̥ṣṭāvabhāsaḥ’ is: *‘pûrva’* means previous, *‘dr̥ṣṭa’* means ‘to see’ or ‘knowledge’, *‘avabhāsa’* means ‘appearance’ or that which is appeared is called *‘avabhāsa’*. So, the initial meaning of the sentence “*smṛtirûpah paratra pûrvadr̥ṣṭāvabhāsaḥ*” in the case of the superimposition of meaning (*‘arthādhyāsapakṣe’*) : that *‘prātibhāsika’* or appeared entity (for example, the snake etc.) is called the erroneous thing which is imposed on another thing (for example, the rope) due to the impression of the previous perceptual thing like the remembered thing which is *‘vyāvahārika’* (for example, the snake etc.) thing.

Now, we discuss the definition of *‘adhyāsa’* or the erroneous knowledge “*smṛtirûpah paratra pûrvadr̥ṣṭāvabhāsaḥ*” in case of superimposition of knowledge (*‘jñānādhyāsapakṣe’*).

In this sense, the meaning of the term “*smṛtirûpah*” is as such : “*smaraṇam eva smṛtiḥ*” or the remembrance is *‘smṛti’* or memory whose appearance is like the appearance of the remembrance. It is given by *‘vahuṃhi’* compound. In this sense, the meaning of the term *‘smṛtirûpah’* is as such: the *‘jñāna’* or the knowledge which is like the *‘smṛtijñāna’* or the memory-cognition. The meaning of the term *‘paratra’* is ‘in another place’. The meaning of the term *‘pûrva’* is ‘previous’. *‘Dr̥ṣṭa’* means ‘to see’ or ‘knowledge’, the meaning of the term *‘avabhāsa’* is

‘*jñāna*’ or ‘knowledge’. So, the initial meaning of the sentence “*smṛtirūpah paratra pūrvadṛṣṭāvabhāsaḥ*” is as such: That knowledge is called the erroneous knowledge which originates from the impression of the previously perceived object and which is just a memory cognition (‘*smṛtirūpah*’)⁷.

A question may be raised whether the above-mentioned definition of ‘*adhyāsa*’ which is given by Saṅkara is accepted by other schools of Indian Philosophers or not. In order to the answer of that question *Ācārya* Saṅkara explained in his *Adhyāsaśāstra* other three definitions of ‘*adhyāsa*’ given by other schools of Indian Philosophers. These three definitions will be explained as follows:

- 1). “*Tam kecit anyatra anyadharmādhyāsaḥ iti vadanti*”⁸.
- 2). “*Kecit tu yatra yadadhyāsa tadvivēkāgrahanibandhanā bhramah iti*”⁹.
- 3). “*Anye tu yatra yadadhyāsaḥ tasyaiva viparītadharmatvakalpanām ācakṣate iti*”¹⁰.

Anyathākhyātivādins or the *Naiyāyikas* and ‘*ātmakhyātivādins*’ or the Buddhist Philosophers’ point of view concerning error is stated with the 1 no. definition which is ---“ *tam kecit anyatra anyadharmādhyāsaḥ iti vadanti*”. According to the *anyathākhyātivādins*, ‘*adhyāsa*’ or illusion is created by the

manifestation of the attribute in the object which object is situated in front of the knower but this attribute exists on the object which is situated at different place from the knower. For example, the illusion is created by the manifestation of the attribute of silver or silverness on the shell which is situated in front of the knower but this attribute or silverness exists at silver and this silver is situated at different place from the knower.

Besides this, according to the '*ātmakhyātivādins*', the error is actually the appearance of the attribute existing in the internal world or the '*ātmān*' on the external object. The silver appears in the shell which is known as the external thing. Actually the *Yogācāras* do not admit extra-mental realities. The *Yogācāra* school of Buddhism points out that '*jñāna*' or cognition is only real entity. There is no any external thing besides cognition in their view. For this reason, their view or theory is known as '*vijñānavāda*'. In pursuance of this opinion, the 'knowledge' and the 'object of knowledge' is identical; so the fictitious external things are also knowledge by nature. The invalid knowledge or the erroneous knowledge regarding the external things also is acquired by feelings like the valid knowledge. In the shell-silver case, the fictitious shell is knowledge by nature. The silver is the form of knowledge. The erroneous knowledge of the silver which is the form of cognition becomes in the fictitious shell. In this case, the error becomes in the one type of cognition. It is called '*ātmakhyāti*'¹¹

Now, it will be discussed about illusion in the light of Buddhism as explained by Vācaspati in his *Bhāmati*.

Vācaspati Mīśra had remarked an important statement in this context in his *Bhāmati* that is “*Yad yādrśamanubhavasiddhyam tat tādrśmevabhyupagantavyam, anyathātvam tu asya valavadvadhakapratyavasād bhavati*’. It may be explained in the following manner. The things that appeared to us as such are the nature of that thing. But, if any more powerful cognition comes here then we become obedient to accept the subsequent cognition leaving off the antecedent cognition. In the shell-silver case, when the knower realized as: ‘this is silver’ then that thing is accepted to the knower as ‘the silver’ and perhaps the knower goes forward to collect that thing. But, when the knower realized that, ‘this is not silver’ (*idam na rajatam*) then the knower being destitute was compelled to give importance to the more powerful obstructing cognition. If the knower wants to realize the valid nature of the silver which appeared in the error then it is very important to analyse the subsequent cognition to the knower.

It is necessary to mention in this context that, according to the Buddhism, categories are two-fold --‘internal’ which is referred to as ‘I’, it is called ‘*ālayvijñāna*’ and on the other hand, ‘external’ which is referred to as ‘blue’, ‘yellow’ etc. that is called ‘*pravṛttivijñāna*’. The main opinion of the Buddhist Philosophers’ is that one kind of cognition is expressed in two manners – ‘knower’

and 'knowable'. This knower is known as '*ālayvijñāna*' and the knowable is known as '*pravṛttivijñāna*'. 'Knowledge' exists in 'knower'; so the 'knower' is called the '*ālayvijñāna*' and the inclination originates in respect of the 'knowable'. So, the 'knowable' is called the '*pravṛttivijñāna*'.

'*Na*', '*idam*', '*rajatam*'--- these three terms are in the '*nedam rajatam*' sentence. The question may arise that, which term is connected with that negative term '*na*' among them? That is the case under consideration. It is importance to retain in memory that 'the silver' is '*dharmī*'. It has many properties ; for example, the 'silverness', 'thingness', 'glitterness', 'worthness', 'whiteness' etc. On the other hand, the 'thisness' or the '*idam*' is a property. The meaning of this property is the 'outerness'. Because, the term 'this' always refers to something remaining outside or in front of me.

Now, the Buddhist Philosophers point out that, if the negation of the silver is accepted by the '*na*' then all properties of the silver will be negated. But, if the knower negates the 'thisness' with '*na*' then only one property will be negated. As a result, it will come under the law of testimony ('*lāghava*'). The fallacy of the lightness ('*lāghava*') and heaviness(''*gourava*'') is an important case under consideration in Philosophy and Science. The lighten procedure is accepted to all. According to this, if 'thisness' would be negated with the '*na*' then the meaning of this sentence would be the absence of 'thisness' of the silver. So, it is proved that

the silver is ‘internal’ or the cognition in nature, but not in the external world or non-mental world.¹²

The akhyātivādins or the Prābhākara schools’ point of view concerning ‘error’ is stated with the second definition which is --- “*Kecit tu yatra yadadhyāsah tadvivekāgrahanivandhanah bhramah iti*”

Ācārya Śaṅkara introduces the opinion of *Prābhākara* concerning error with the foregoing definition.

In accordance with the *Prābhākara* school of *Mīmāṃsā*, two types of cognition belong in fact in the case of illusion which are as such --- perception and memory. These two types of cognition are originated simultaneously. As a result, the knower mixes up the perceived and the remembered element. The illusion originates by virtue of the absence of knowledge of discrimination. So, the illusion becomes in use only, not in knowledge in accordance with the *Prābhākaras*.¹³

Then Ācārya Śaṅkara introduces the opinion of *Śūnyovādīn Buddhist* Philosophers concerning error with the following --- “*anye tu yadadhyāsah tasyaiva viparītdharmattvakalpanām ācaksate iti*”. According to the *Śūnyovādīn Buddhist* school, the ‘*adhyāsa*’ or error occurs when the knower imagines the

opposite property in thing which exists in front of the knower. For example, we know that the ‘silverness’ is the opposite property of the shell and it is the property of silver which exists in another place. But, the knower’s imagination of the silverness in the shell is error. It is mentionable that, according to the *Śūnyavādīns* or the nihilists, the ‘śūnya’ or the ‘voidness’ is the absolute reality. So, in pursuance of the nihilists, the internal thing or the ‘ātman’ and the external world -- all these are non-existent or no-being or ‘asat’. So, according to their view, all internal and external things are erroneous. They hold that, non-existent thing manifests itself as existent.

The ‘*Śūnyavādīns*’ or the *Mādhyamika* school of Buddhism holds that, the real entity or the reality is not real or ‘sat’, not unreal or ‘asat’, not real-unreal or ‘sat-asat’, even it is not the different category besides real and unreal. There are no other alternatives besides these four-fold categories. For this reason, the nature of reality is not eligible for determination. So, their point of view about reality is ‘śūnya’ or ‘void’ or ‘nothing’.¹⁴ *Mādhavācārya* said in his *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* regarding this view of the *Mādhyamika* school of Buddhism is that “*atastattvaṃ sadasadubhayatmakacatuṣkotivinirmuktaṃ śūnyameva*”. According to the *Mādhyamika* school, actually all external things are fictitious. These fictitious things are called the ‘*saṃvṛti sat*’ or the ‘*vyāvahārika*

sat'. These '*saṃvṛti sat*' things are called by the *Mādhyamika* school is '*anirvacanīya*' or 'undeterminable'. According to him, in the 'shell-silver' case, the shell is unreal and the silver also is unreal. In this case, the 'silver' which is unreal imposes on the other unreal thing 'shell'. In this view, the object of error is unreal or '*asat*'. So, their view regarding error is called '*asatkhyātivāda*'.

Madhvācārya also accepts the theory of '*asatkhyāti*'. According to *Madhvācārya*, the object of erroneous knowledge is unreal or '*asat*'. So, their theory of '*khyātivāda*' is also known as '*asatkhyātivāda*'.

These two views of error imply a fundamental contrast between the two schools of the *Śūnyavādīn* Buddhists and the *Mādhva* school of *Vedānta*. According to the *Śūnyavādīn* Buddhists, the resort ('*adhīsthāṇa*') of error is unreal or '*asat*' and on the other hand, the *Mādhva* school of *Vedānta* point out concerning this view the resort of error is real or '*sat*'.

After the discussion of all views about error *Ācārya Saṃkara* points out that, "*sarvathāpi tu anyasya anyadharmāvabhāsaṃ na vyābhicarate*".¹⁵ 'The appearance of another property in another thing' --- is accepted by all schools of Indian Philosophers. It is their common opinion concerning error.

Now, we will discuss the theory of '*anirvacanīyakhyāti*' or the *Advaita Vedāntin*'s opinion concerning error.

The perception of the inherent part of that thing like 'thisness' originates from the relation between the sense-organ of the knower and the thing which remains in front of the knower in the non-metaphysical case. The particular part of that thing is not appeared to the knower on account of the different types of fault which exists in the knower, knowable thing etc. But, the knower has interest to the particular knowledge of that thing. For this reason, the '*samskāra*' (impression) of that thing seen in previous time awakens in the mind of the knower on account of the similarity of that thing with the thing which exists in front of the knower. 'Fault', 'impression' and 'the knowledge of the inherent part of the concern thing' --- these are the causes of the erroneous knowledge.

The '*adhyāsa*' or the erroneous knowledge is as such: The appearance of any other object in another object like that object seen by the knower in previous time. The meaning of the term '*bhāsa*' is 'knowledge' and '*ava*' is '*avasanna*' (apparent) which are included in '*avabhāsa*'. So, the meaning of the term '*avabhāsa*' is '*avasannajñāna*' or 'the apparent knowledge'. That is called apparent which is taken as the depression. The depression of knowledge is to be '*vādhita*' or to be proved false. After the knowledge of silver in the shell the inclination may be originated to the knower but, the cognition in the form: 'it is not silver, it is the shell' --- does not allow inclination to the thing. So, the knowledge

of silver in the shell will be apparent. The apparent knowledge is known as the erroneous knowledge.

According to the *Advaita Vedānta*, the object of erroneous knowledge is 'indescribable' or '*anirvacanīya*'. In this opinion, the erroneous object is a new object like the object which was seen in previous time. For example, in the shell-silver case, the silver is a new object like that silver was seen in the previous time.

It is relevant to refer that, in accordance with the *Advaita Vedānta*, the real entity or '*sattā*' is three-fold --- '*pāramārthika*', '*vyāvahārika*' and '*prātibhāsika*'. That is the '*pāramārthika*' entity which exists in all time or which does not prove false in any time. According to them, the '*pāramārthika*' entity is only '*Brahman*' or '*Paramātman*'. That is to be taken as the '*vyāvahārika*' entity which is not proved false in the time of use ('*vyāvahārikakāla*'). For example, pot etc. That is the '*prātibhāsika*' entity which is not proved in the level of apparent reality ('*prātibhāsikakāla*') but, it is proved false in '*vyāvahārikakāla*' or the time of use. For example, in the case of illusion, the entity of silver exists on the shell. So, it is proved that, in the shell-silver case, the silver is proved false in the time of use. For this reason, it is not the '*vyāvahārika*' entity, it is '*prātibhāsika*' entity. Again, the silver is not unreal entity like the 'sky-lotus' case. Because, the perception of the silver originates from the fault after shell and the knower's sense-organ

becomes related. The unreal entity is not a perceptual object. So, this new-born silver may not be real or unreal or real-unreal. For this reason, the silver or the erroneous object is ‘*anirvacanīya*’ or false. That is why, the Advaita theory of error is known as ‘*anirvacanīyakhyāti*’.

According to this theory of error, all things impose on the Absolute Soul or “*Brahman*”. In the rope-snake case, the rope imposes on the Absolute Soul. The false snake also imposes on that rope. In this sense, ‘false’ means ‘*anirvacanīya*’ or indeterminable. It is a technical term. That is called ‘*anirvacanīya*’ or false which is not real, not unreal, even which is not known as real and unreal both. If the snake were real then that thing may not become sublated by the cognition of rope. Again, if the snake were unreal then it would not become perceptible like the son of the barren woman. Again, that snake may not be known as ‘real-unreal both’. Because, a thing may not be real-unreal both in the same thing these two terms ‘real’ and ‘unreal’ – are contradictory in nature. It may not be acceptable that, the snake exists in another place in accordance with the *Anyathākhyātivādīns*. Again, it also may not acceptable that, the snake exists in the cognition in accordance with the *Vijñānavādīns*. Because, the snake appears as the rope which exists in front of the knower. So, according to the *Advaitīns*, the snake creates from the ignorance in that moment¹⁶.

END NOTES

1. *Cakṣin 1017, 'bhavadi, vyktāyām vāci . Ayam darśane' pi'.*

“Cakṣin khyā” (2436, 2/4/54) Paṇini sūtra.

2. *Swami Viswarupananda(Trs.) : Vedāntadarśana, Swāmi Cidghanānanda Puri and Vedāntabāgisa Sri Ānanda Jha, Nyāyācārya(Edt.), 1st Chapter, Page No.---31,*

“Ātmakhyātirasatkhyātirakhyāti khyātiranyathā.

Tathā anirvacanakhyaṭirityetat khyātipaṅcakam”.

3. Goswami, Sitanath, Adhyōsabhūsyā, Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, Kolkata, 2012, p: 02

4. *Swami Viswarupananda(Trs.) : Vedāntadarsana, Swami Cidghanananda Puri and Vedāntabāgisa Sri Ānanda Jha, Nyāyācārya(Edt.), 1st Chapter, Pamkti:4*

“Smrtirupah paratra purvadrstāvabhāsah”.

5. *Ibid., Page No. 59, Pamkti:39,*

“Adhyāsah nāma atasmin tadbuddhih iti avocāma.”

6. Dr. Sitanath Goswami, *Adhyāśabhāśya*, Sanskrit Pustaka Bhandar, Kolkata
– 700 006, 2012, page : 1

7. Swami Viswarupananda(Trs.) : *Vedāntadarśana*, Swami Cidghanananda
Puri and Vedāntavagisa Sri Ananda Jha, Nyayacarya (Edt.), 1st Chapter,
Paṁkti : 4,

“Smṛtirūpah paratra purvadṛṣṭāvabhāśah”.

8. *Ibid.* , Page : 29

9. *Ibid.*, page : 36, paṁkti : 5,

“Tam kecit anyatra anyadharmādhyasah iti vadanti.”

10. *Ibid.*, page : 42, paṁkti : 6,

“Kecit tu yatra yadadhyāsah tadvivekāgrahanivandhanah bhramah iti.”

11. *Ibid.*, page: 44, paṁkti : 7,

“ Anye tu yatra yadadhyāsah tasaiva viparitdharmatvakalpanām ācaksate
iti.”

12. Dr. Sitanath Goswami, *Adhyāśabhāśya*, Sanskrit Pustaka Bhandar, Kolkata
– 700 006, 2012, page : 179 - 180

13. *Swami Viswarupananda(Trs.) : Vedāntadarsana, Swami Cidghanananda Puri and Vedāntavagisa Sri Ananda Jha, Nyāyācārya(Edt.), 1st Chapter, Page : 36*
14. *Ibid., page : 42*
15. *Ibid., page : 45*
16. *ibid., “Sarvathāpi tu anyasya anyadharmāvabhasataṁ na vyābharati”.*
17. *Ibid., “ Sarvathāpi tu anyasya anyadharmāvabhāsatam na vyābharati.*