

The *Nyāya* Critique of *Akhyātivāda* : Some Reflections

A Thesis submitted to the University of North Bengal

For the award of Doctor of Philosophy

in

Philosophy

By

Rupa Bal

Guide

Professor Raghunath Ghosh

Retired Professor of Philosophy

Department of Philosophy

University of North Bengal

March, 2018

DECLARATION

I declare that the thesis entitled, “ The *Nyāya* Critique of *Akhyātivāda*: Some Reflections” has been prepared by me under the supervision of Professor Raghunath ghosh, Retired Professor of Department of Philosophy, University of North Bengal. I also declare that no part of this thesis has formed the basis for the award of any degree or fellowship previously.

Rupa Bal
Rupa Bal

Department of Philosophy, University of North Bengal,

Raja Rammohanpur, Dist- Darjeeling, West Bengal,

India, Pin – 734013.

Date: 15.03.2018

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH BENGAL

P. O. North Bengal University, Raja Rammohanpur, Dt. Darjeeling, West Bengal, India. Pin - 734013

Professor Raghunath Ghosh

Professor of Philosophy (Retd.)
Coordinator, Special Assistance Programme (UGC) DRS II
Director, Centre for Ambedkar Studies



Phone : (0353) 2776 - 334 (O)
(0353) 2433 250 (R)
Fax : 0353-2669001
E-mail : raghunbu@yahoo.co.in
raghunbu@sanchamet.in
Web site : http://www.nbu.ac.in

Ref.No.

Date : *The 12th Feb 2018*

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that Sm. Rupa Bal has carried out her research on '*The Nyāya Critique of Akhyātivāda: Some Reflections*' under my supervision for the award of the PhD degree in Philosophy (Arts) of the University of North Bengal. She has done her research work at the Department of Philosophy, University of North Bengal after maintaining rules under new regulation.

Raghunath Ghosh
(Professor Raghunath Ghosh),

Retired Professor of Philosophy,

University of North Bengal

Professor of Philosophy (Retired)
University of North Bengal

URKUND

Urkund Analysis Result

Analysed Document: RUPABAL_PHILOSOPHY.PDF.pdf (D35915550)
Submitted: 2/26/2018 6:49:00 AM
Submitted By: nbuplg@gmail.com
Significance: 0 %

Sources included in the report:

Instances where selected sources appear:

0

Rupa .Bal
14.03.2018

Raghuwathi Ghosh
14.03.2018

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This present work entitled “The *Nyāya* Critique of *Akhyātivāda* : Some Reflections” is a research-work for my Ph.D degree. It is a traditional Indian epistemological and logical work. This dogmatism as to ‘*khyāti*’ or ‘error’ is an important epistemological concept.

I developed an interest in Indian Epistemology and Logic when I was studying at Graduation level from Rabindra Bharati University, Kolkata. It becomes entirely coming to proximity of my revered mentor teacher Professor Raghunath Ghosh, Department of Philosophy, University of North Bengal, W.B. This present research-work for Ph.D degree has been completed under the supervision of him. I am therefore grateful to my Supervisor, Professor Raghunath Ghosh for having initiated me into this mammoth work and for the sake of giving valuable speeches for betterment all through. This entire study would not have been fulfilled without his tireless co-operation.

ABSTRACT

The Nyāya Critique of *Akhyātivāda*: Some Reflections

‘Error’ is very important subject-matter of epistemological thoughts. Theories of erroneous knowledge are known as ‘*khyātivāda*’ in Indian philosophical system. The word ‘*khyāti*’ is derived from the Sanskrit root ‘*caḥṣa*’ alongwith ‘*ktin*’ inflection.¹ Actually, ‘*khyāti*’ means ‘knowledge’. But, the word ‘*khyāti*’ technically is used in Indian Philosophy that is ‘knowledge of an object which is appeared in error.

It is necessary to mention that, the ‘soul’ is the absolute knowable entity or ‘*prameya*’ in accordance with the orthodox philosophical point of view. ‘*Prameya*’ means that which is accurately knowable. The orthodox schools of philosophers incessantly have tried to realise this Absolute Soul since the succession of ages. Erroneous knowledge regarding Absolute Soul is the ultimate cause of all worldly miseries. In this regard, ‘error’ means the imposition of Absolute Soul in the non-soul. The living-beings identify the non-soul entities like body, mind, reformation (‘*samskāra*’), knowledge (‘*buddhi*’) and so on with the ‘Absolute Soul’. We feel that the soul would be realized through the negation of the non-soul entities. As a result, our minds become full of miseries. So, the first and foremost motivation of Indian Philosophy is to bring the eternal emancipation of all living-beings. So, the

ultimate purpose of all saviours is to gain the absolute true knowledge rejecting the fallacious knowledge for ever. So, we have to accept the existence of the invalid cognition or the erroneous cognition for being aware of the nature of valid cognition. Because, valid- invalid, good-bad, red-non-red etc. these all are relative terms. It will be impossible to separate the valid cognition from the invalid one without having the nature of invalid cognition. Besides that, we cannot deliberate correctly the truthfulness-falsity of daily happenings also due to the absence of valid cognition. For this reason, it is necessary to know the nature of erroneous knowledge in order to reject this. After all, 'error' is an important epistemological problem and also a psychological phenomenon. Actually, it is also a fact of our life.

The well-known kārīkā in regard to the theories of error is:

“Ātmakhyātirasatkhyātirakhyāti khyātiranyathā.

Tathā 'nirvacanakhyātirityetat khyātipañcakam'”²

According to this kārīkā or verse, the 'asatkhyāti', 'akhyāti', 'anyathākhyāti', 'ātmakhyāti', 'anirvacaniyakhyāti' - these five-fold theories of error are particularly well-known in the Indian Philosophy. Besides these, the theories called 'satkhyāti', 'viparītakhyāti', 'sadasatkhyāti', 'aloukikakhyāti' etc. are also well-known in the Indian Philosophy.

The main aim of this thesis is the substantiation of the theory of ‘*anyathākhyāti*’ refuting the theory of ‘*akhyāti*’. The present thesis is divided into mainly five chapters. In the introductory chapter or the first chapter it will be discussed about the above-mentioned various types of theory of error in a nutshell. It is necessary to discuss about the definition of ‘error’ and to give proper evidence concerning this subject-matter. Because, the nature of all objects are proved by means of their definitions and also their proper evidence. Because, the evidence in accordance with the principle - “*lakṣaṇapramāṇābhyām hi vastusiddhiḥ*” which is approved by all schools of Indian philosophers. For this reason, the subject-matter of the second chapter of this thesis is “Definition of ‘error’ in the light of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy”. After that, it will be discussed about ‘error’ in accordance with Prābhākara Mīmāṃsaka and Nyāya schools through various arguments in the next three chapters. After that, the discussion about the Prabhākaras’ theory of ‘non-error’ is the subject-matter of the third chapter of this thesis. The title of this chapter is “Elucidation of ‘*Akhyativāda*’ and background of such theory”. “A Critique of ‘*Akhyātivāda*’ by the *Naiyāyikas*” is the subject-matter of the fourth chapter of this thesis. Last of all, the thesis is concluded through some critical and evaluative remarks, which is the fifth chapter or last chapter of this thesis.

According to the '*ātmakhyātivādins*', the error is actually the appearance of the attribute existing in the internal world or the '*ātmān*' on the external object. The silver appears in the shell which is known as the external thing. Actually the *Yogācāras* do not admit extra-mental realities. The *Yogācāra* school of Buddhism points out that '*jñāna*' or cognition is only real entity. There is no external thing besides cognition in their view. For this reason, their view or theory is known as '*vijñānavāda*'. In pursuance of this opinion, the 'knowledge' and the 'object of knowledge' is identical; so the fictitious external things are also knowledge by nature. The invalid knowledge or the erroneous knowledge regarding the external things also is acquired by feelings like the valid knowledge. In the shell-silver case, the fictitious shell is knowledge by nature. The silver is the form of knowledge. The erroneous knowledge of the silver which is the form of cognition becomes in the fictitious shell. In this case, the error becomes in the one type of cognition. It is called '*ātmakhyāti*'

According to the *Śūnyavadins* or the nihilists, the '*śūnya*' or the 'voidness' is the absolute reality. So, in pursuance of the nihilists, the internal thing or the '*ātmān*' and the external world --- all these are non-existent or no-being or '*asat*'. So, according to their view, all internal and external things are erroneous. They hold that, non-existent thing manifests itself as existent.

The ‘*Śūnyavādins*’ or the *Mādhyamika* school of Buddhism holds that, the real entity or the reality is not real or ‘*sat*’, not unreal or ‘*asat*’, not real-unreal or ‘*sat-asat*’, even it is not the different category besides real and unreal. There are no other alternatives besides these four-fold category. For this reason, the nature of reality is not eligible for determination. So, their point of view about reality is ‘*śūnya*’ or ‘void’ or ‘nothing’.¹⁴ *Mādhavācārya* said in his *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* regarding this view of the *Mādhyamika* school of Buddhism is that “*atastattvaṃ sadasadubhayatmakacatuṣkotivinirmuktaṃ śūnyameva*”. According to the *Mādhyamika* school, actually all external things are fictitious. These fictitious things are called the ‘*saṃvṛti sat*’ or the ‘*vyāvahārika sat*’. These ‘*saṃvṛti sat*’ things are called by the *Mādhyamika* school is ‘*anirvacanīya*’ or ‘undeterminable’. According to him, in the ‘shell-silver’ case, the shell is unreal and the silver also is unreal. In this case, the ‘silver’ which is unreal imposes on the another unreal thing ‘shell’. In this view, the object of error is unreal or ‘*asat*’. So, their view regarding error is called ‘*asatkhyātivāda*’.

Madhvācārya also accepts the theory of ‘*asatkhyāti*’. According to *Madhvācārya*, the object of erroneous knowledge is unreal or ‘*asat*’. So, their theory of ‘*khyātivāda*’ is also known as ‘*asatkhyātivāda*’.

These two views of error imply a fundamental contrast between the two schools of the *Śūnyavādin* Buddhists and the *Mādhva* school of *Vedānta*. According to the

Śūnyavādin Buddhists, the resort (‘*adhithāna*’) of error is unreal or ‘*asat*’ and on the other hand, the *Mādhva* school of *Vedānta* point out concerning this view the resort of error is real or ‘*sat*’.

According to the Advaita Vedantins, ‘*adhyāsa*’ or the erroneous knowledge is as such : The appearance of any other object in another object like that object seen by the knower in previous time. The meaning of the term ‘*bhāsa*’ is ‘knowledge’ and ‘*ava*’ is ‘*avasanna*’ (apparent) which are included in ‘*avabhāsa*’. So, the meaning of the term ‘*avabhāsa*’ is ‘*avasannajñana*’ or ‘the apparent knowledge’. That is called apparent which is taken as the depression. The depression of knowledge is to be ‘*vādhita*’ or to be proved false. After the knowledge of silver in the shell the inclination may be originated to the knower but, the cognition in the form: ‘it is not silver, it is the shell’ --- does not allow inclination to the thing. So, the knowledge of silver in the shell will be apparent. The apparent knowledge is known as the erroneous knowlledge.

According to the *Advaita Vedānta*, the object of erroneous knowledge is ‘indescribable’ or ‘*anirvacanīya*’. In this opinion, the erroneous object is a new object like the object which was seen in previous time. For example, in the shell-silver case, the silver is a new object like that silver seen in the previous time.

It is relevant to refer that, in accordance with the *Advaita Vedānta*, the real entity or ‘*sattā*’ is three-fold --- ‘*pāramārthika*’, ‘*vyāvahārika*’ and ‘*prātibhāsika*’. That is the ‘*pāramārthika*’ entity which exists in all time or which is not proved as false in any time. According to them, the ‘*pāramārthika*’ entity is only ‘*Brahman*’ or ‘*Paramātman*’. That is to be taken as the ‘*vyāvahārika*’ entity which is not proved false in the time of use (‘*vyāvahārikakāla*’). For example, pot etc. That is the ‘*prātibhāsika*’ entity which is not proved in the level of apparent reality (‘*prātibhāsikakāla*’) but, it is proved false in ‘*vyāvahārikakāla*’ or the time of use. For example, in the case of illusion, the entity of silver exists on the shell. So, it is proved that, in the shell-silver case, the silver is proved false in the time of use. For this reason, it is not the ‘*vyāvahārika*’ entity, it is ‘*prātibhāsika*’ entity. Again, the silver is not unreal entity like the ‘sky-lotus’ case. Because, the perception of the silver originates from the fault after shell and the knower’s sense-organ becomes related. The unreal entity is not a perceptual object. So, this new-born silver may not be real or unreal or real-unreal. For this reason, the silver or the erroneous object is ‘*anirvacanīya*’ or false. That is why, the Advaita theory of error is known as ‘*anirvacanīyakhyāti*’.

Maharsi Gautama has pointed out in his sutra that, the locus of the imposing entity is called ‘*tattva*’ and ‘the imposing entity’ is called ‘*pradhāna*’ in the erroneous case. So, the erroneous cognition is valid in so far as *the part of the locus is*

concerned and valid so far as the imposing property is concerned. In this way, the erroneous cognition is of two-fold. In the erroneous case of the cognition of the human-being in the tree', the subject or 'the tree' is called '*tattva*' and on the other hand, 'the human-being' is called '*pradhāna*'. The erroneous cognition of the human-being originates in the tree due to the similar perception between them. In this present case, the tree is not actually the human-being, but, really it is tree. For this reason, it is called '*tattva*' in which the human-being becomes imposed on the tree. So, the main imposed object which is called '*pradhāna*'. The error originates from the similarity between them. So, the human-being is the main object to create error.

Prābhākara Mimāṃsaka and *Sāṃkhya* school of Indian Philosophy do not accept the existence of erroneous cognition. So, their theory of error is known as '*akhyātivāda*' or '*vivekākhyāti*'.

According to *Sāṃkhya* Philosophers, cessation of sorrow for ever is possible with the *laukika* and *Vaidika* activities but, that result is not eternal. The better way to get the eternal emancipation is the knowledge of an outward relation. Gaining the metaphysical knowledge between the *Prakṛti* and *Purusa* is the better way to gain the eternal emancipation. We or all human-beings think that, 'illness of the body' means 'I am ill'. But, 'I' means only the 'Soul', not body. We do not understand this fact. As a result, we inherit all worldly miseries. The absence of

this factual cognition is known as ‘sublation’ in Indian Scripture. It is the cause of error. So, ‘error’ or ‘illusion’ means ‘ the absence of the cognition of discrimination’ (*vivekājñāna*) in accordance with the *Sāṃkhya* school of Indian Philosophy. So, this theory is called ‘*vivekākhyāti*’ or shortly ‘*akhyāti*’.

‘*Akhyātivāda*’ is a doctrine about the erroneous knowledge advocated by *Mīmāṃsakācārya Prabhākara* and his followers. They maintain that an invalid cognition is not possible. All cognitions are valid according to them.

According to *Prābhākara*, the ‘*pramātva*’ is the property of all cognitions. According to him, all cognitions are valid. The property of the valid cognition is called ‘*pramātva*’. In the same way, the property of the invalid cognition is called ‘*apramātva*’. According to *Prabhākara*, the ‘*apramātva*’ or invalidity is not the property of cognition. Always the ‘*pramātva*’ or validity exists in cognition, ‘*apramātva*’ does not exist in cognition. The ‘*apramātva*’ or invalidity exists in usages. The invalidity or ‘*apramātva*’ of the usages imposes on the cognition which cognition is the originator of the usages. *Prābhākara* has pointed out that, cognition is pure for ever and self-luminous.

The view of the *Prābhākaras* has been challenged by the *Naiyāyikas* who has defined error as ‘*yatra yadadhyāsastasyaiva viparītadharmatva-kalpanamadhyāsadh*’. That is, the superimposition is nothing but the assumption of

the opposite character on something. It is the imposition of the opposite character i. e. silverness in place of shell. These arguments are not developed by Gangesa but they are very strong to support the Nyāya standpoint.

The Naiyāyikas argue how the Mīmāṃsakas prove the absence of the knowledge of discrimination between the remember content (*smṛta*) and acquired content (*grhīta*). From the fact of one's inclination towards getting silver it is proved that there is cognition of non-discrimination between 'thisness' (*idantā*) and 'silverness' (*rajatattva*). Such inclination proves and absence of doubt about its nature of object and its causal efficiency.

Secondly, if there is the cognition of non-discrimination (*bhedāgraha*) between the two as told earlier, how does an individual know the same as 'two'? 'The cognition of the non-discrimination of the two' proves that there is the knowledge of 'two' leading to the contradiction of the knowledge of non-discrimination.

Thirdly, it may be argued that the knowledge of the similarity between shall and silver may lead an individual to the knowledge of identity. It is not tenable, because if someone has got the knowledge in the form: 'Tiger is similar to cat', does an individual being desirous of tiger incline to have cat?

Fourthly, if it is argued that one inclines to have silver, as it was not known as non-silver, the Naiyayikas are of the opinion that the object was neither taken as ‘silver’ nor as ‘non-silver’. If it is so, there would have been an ‘indifferent attitude’ (*upekṣābuddhi*) towards the object. But a clear inclination is found instead of indifference which proves one’s cognition of what is conducive to the desired (*iṣṭa-sāadhanatā-jñāna*). It ultimately proves the object as silver.

Lastly, it has been told by the Prābhākaras that if there is a defect in the cause, it cannot produce an effect, but it is not true that it produces a different type of effect. The Naiyāyikas do not agree with this. To them a defective cause may produce a different type of effect (*kāryāntara*). For it is found that a particular creeper called *Betralata*, if burnt by forest-fire (*dābānala*) can produce a banana tree. This is an example taken from the botanical world. Another example is put forth from the physiological world. It is pointed out that an ulcer in the stomach increases the hunger of an individual instead of loss of it.

In fact, the theories of error are formulated in such a way so that their notion of *pramā* (right cognition) is protected. If the nature of right cognition is determined in a particular system, error is also to be determined in the light of that. In each and every theory something is superimposed on something else (*sarvathāpi tu anyasyānyadharmāvasatām na vyabhicarati*). The Vijñānavādin-s have imposed extra-mental things on mental one, the Prābhākaras impose silver on shell

due to the cognition of non-discrimination, and the Naiyāyikas impose the opposite properties to something else (*anyathā*). In all the cases error is nothing but superimposition of one thing on another.

The Prābhākaras do not believe in the existence of any erroneous cognition while the Naiyāyikas believe in illusory cognition or error. We would like to point some points which indicate the pragmatic value of error. From the fact of its pragmatic value it is known to us that there is the existence of the phenomenon of error, which ultimately disproves the Prābhākara position.

First, error has been taken as invalid cognition, because it can only mislead an individual. Now an effort will be made to show that error serves a virtuous role also in our life as envisaged in *Mārkandeyapurāṇa* where error has been taken as a form of Mother Goddess existing in all creatures (*'yā devī sarvabhūteṣu bhrāntirūpeṇa samsthitā'*). In fact, forgetfulness can also be included under the causes of error. An individual would be able to survive in this empirical world amidst sufferings, arising out of lust, misunderstanding, ego etc. due to having the forgetfulness (*bhrānti*) in his life. Had there been no such quality, he would have been mad being overburdened by the sorrows and sufferings. Hence *bhrānti* or error sometimes occupies a prominent role for psychological balance. Sometimes the tranquilizers are applied to make a man psychologically normal after removing his over-concerned situation towards a particular matter. That is why; we come

across a definition of human being which runs as follows: 'To err is human'. In fact, error lies in the very nature of a human being. In other words, the essential characteristic of a man is to commit error. In other words, we cannot get rid of this error as it is in the very nature of a man.

Secondly, error has got a positive value in the sense that it serves as a rectifier of certain policy or principle. Error provides us certain lesson through which we can correct ourselves. Hence error can be taken as a means of rectification or correction. That is why, the *trial and error* method is still a valuable method in the field of learning or Psychology.

Thirdly, it is found in our life that error which is not a reality provides us some picture of reality indirectly. As for example, when the driver sees the reflection of a following car in the looking glass, he becomes cautious of it. Though the reflection is not the real object, it provides an idea of the real object. Though the photograph pasted in an application form does not entail reality yet it can provide some idea of the real applicant to the authority. Even now-a-days a computer sketch which is not a reality can help the investigating officer to identify a criminal. In the Advaita text *Pañcadaśī Vidyāraṇya* Muni has taken the help of picture which may act as a lamp to illumine the Ultimate Reality (*Brahman*) in a section called *Citrādīpaparakaraṇa*. Moreover, Sankara in his *Adhyāśabhāṣya* has admitted the necessity of falsity or superimposition. To him, all our behaviours,

Vedic or secular, all the usages of means of knowing (*pramāṇa*) and knowable objects (*prameya*), injunctions and liberation are possible due to the falsity (superimposition) between self and non-self. In order to go beyond the range of duality we must begin with duality which is nothing but falsity between self and non-self.

Lastly, the theory of error is taken as one of the methods of philosophizing. If any error in the opponent's arguments is not shown, the proponent's standpoint cannot be substantiated. Therefore, error is to be pointed out only to save-guard our own philosophical position. No philosophical position is final and hence each and every standpoint is subject to challenge. To challenge means to show error in a theory. That is why; philosophy becomes a flowing water, but not stagnant. Had there been no error, no new philosophical standpoint would come up. In Indian Philosophy the fundamental function is the show fault or error to other's view (*paramatadūṣana*) and establishing one's own standpoint.

END NOTES:

1. *Cakṣin* 1017, 'bhavadi, vyaktāyām vāci. Ayam darśane'pi. "Cakṣinh khyā"
(2436, 2/4/54) *Paṇini Sūtra*.
2. Viswarupananda, Swami (Trs.): *Vedantadarśana*, Swami Cidghanananda Puri and Vedantabagisa Sri Ananda Jha, Nyayacarya (Ed.), 1st chapter, page no. 31

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. Annambhaṭṭa, *Tarkasaṃgraha* with *Dīpikā*, Sri Nārāyaṇa Chandra Goswami [Ed. & Trs.], Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, Kolkata, Aswin, 1390
2. *Anubhavānanda, Swāmī, Pañcadaśī, Central Chinmaya Mission Trust, Bombay, 1994.*
3. Basu, Charuchandra (Ed.), *Dhammapada*, Mohabodhi Book Agency, Kolkata, 2010
4. *Brhadaranyaka Upanisad*, MLBD, 1964
5. Bhatt, G. P., *The Basic Ways of knowing*, MLBD, 1989
6. Bhattacharya, Viswabandhu [Trs. & Ed.], *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, Anyathakhyativada, Dasgupta & Co.(Pvt.) Limited, Kolkata, 2009
7. Bhattacharya, Viswabandhu [Trs.], *Tattvacintāmaṇi* (Pratyaksalakṣaṇa), Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture, Golpark, Kolkata, March, 2000
8. *Chāndogya Upanisad*, MLBD, 1964
9. Citsukhācārya, *Tattvapradīpikā*, Choukhamba, Surabharati prakashan, Varanasi, 2005
10. Dīksit, Appay, *Siddhāntaleśasaṃgraha*, Gambhirananda, Swami (Trs.), Udbodhana Karyalaya, Kolkata, 1987

11. Gangeśopādhyay, Sri, *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, 1st part: Pratyakṣa Khanda, Tarkavāgīśa, Kāmākhyānātha [Ed.], with Tarkavāgīśa, Mathurānātha, *Rahasya tīkā*, Motilal Banarasidas, Delhi, 2013
12. Goswami, Sitanath (Trs. in Bengali), *Adhyāśabhāṣya*, sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, Kolkata, 2012
13. Hiriyanna, M, *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, London George Allen & Unwin Ltd. Museum Street, 1956
14. Īśwarkrishna, *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, Miśra, Vācaspati, *Sāṃkhyatattvakoumudi*, Goswami, Chandra, Narayana, Sri (Trs. in Bengali), Adhyapana, Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, Kolkata, Mahalaya, 1406
15. Jha, Ganganatha, *Sadholal Lectures on Nyāya*, Sri Satguru Publications, A division of Indian Book Centre, Shakti Nagar, Delhi, India, 1994
16. Jha, Ganganatha (Tr.), *The Nyāya Sūtra of Gautama (with Vātsyāyana Bhāṣya)*, MLBD, 1984
17. Mahasthavira, Sridharmaratna, Rajguru (Trs. & Ed.), *Mahāparinivvāna Suttam*, Mohabodhi Book Agency, Kolkata, 2011
18. Medhacaitanya, Brahmācari [Trs. & Ed.], *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, Adyapith, Kolkata, Ashar, 1417

19. Miśra, Vācaspati, *Brahmasutra Sāṃkarabhāṣya Bhāmati*,
Bhaattacharya, Sri Sri Mohan [Ed. & Trs.], Sanskrit Pustaak Bhandar,
Kolkata, 1973
20. Miśra, Keśab, *Tarkabhāṣā*, Nyāyācārya, Kar, Gangadhar [Trs. & Ed.],
Dept. of Philosophy, Jadavpur University, Kolkata, January, 2009
21. Miśra, Śalikanātha, prakaraṇapañcikā, Bhatta, Narayana, Joypuri,
Nyayasiddhi, satri, Subrahmanya, sri (Ed.), Kasi Hindu Viswavidyalaya,
Varanasi, 1961, Nayavithi Prakarana (part-III)
22. Padmapādācārya, Sri, *Pañcapādikā*, Śāstrī, Subrahmanya, S,
Sastralankara, Panditraja (Ed.), Shri Daksinamurti Math Prakasana,
Varanasi, 2009
23. Radhakrishnan, S, *The Brahma-Sūtra: The Philosophy of Spiritual
Life*, George Allen & Unwin Ltd. , London, 1960
24. Rāmānuja, acarya, Śribhāṣyam, Vol. I., The Academy of Sanskrit
Research, Melkote, 1987
25. Saṃkarācārya, *Vivekacudāmaṇi*, Lokeswarananda, Swami (Trs. &
Ed.), Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture, Golpark,
Kolkata, 2009
26. Śāstri, Haraprasad, *Bouddhavidyā*, Mohabodhi Book Agency,
Kolkata, 2010

27. Sthavira, Prajnaloaka, Sri, *Patikkasamuppāda*, Mohabodhi Book Agency, Kolkata, 2008
28. Taittiriya Upanisad, MLBD, 1964
29. Tarkavāgīśa, Phanibhuṣaṇa (Trs. & Ed.), *Nyāyadarśana*, Vātsyāyanabhāṣya (Part-V), Paschimanga Rajya Pustak Parsad, 1989
30. Vādarāyana, Maharṣi, *Vedāntadarśanam*, Viswarupananda, Swami [Trs.], Puri, Cidghanānanda, Swami [Ed.], Udbodhan Karyalaya, Kolkata, August, 1999.

Preface

The subject-matter of my thesis is: “The *Nyāya* Critique of *Akhyātivāda*: Some Reflections”. It is actually a critique of the Nyāya-thinkers about the Prabhakaras’ theory of error. A question may be raised in this connection that, what is the necessity of selection this topic for Ph.D degree?

In response, I want to say that, we may be able to gain the valid knowledge about something and some other knowledgable subjects are appeared to us as invalid. Even, we also gain something as true or valid at first, after some times, those objects are appeared to us as invalid or false. As a result, usually we are deceived through falsity or error in our running way of life. For this reason, we should have the capacity to separate the valid cognition from invalid knowing about the invalid or erroneous cognition. It would not necessary for us to gain erroneous cognition about anything, our ultimate purpose to accure the valid cognition of anything. Thinking this, I have been drowned to search this topic as my research-work for Ph.D degree.

Various opinions with regard to ‘error’ are known as ‘*khyātivāda*’ in Indian Philosophical system. There are mainly two-fold theories in this connection namely, (i). *Khyātivāda* and *akhyātivāda*. According to the *akhyātivādīns*, ‘error’ does not exist in cognition; it exists in public-usages. On the other hand, ‘error’

exists in cognition in accordance with the *khyātivādīns*. There are various types of ‘*khyātivāda*’ in Indian Philosophy namely, ‘*ātmakhyāti*’, ‘*asatkhyāti*’, ‘*akhyāti*’, ‘*anyathākhyāti*’, ‘*anirvacanīyakhyāti*’ and so on. Gangeśa’s theory of ‘*anyathākhyāti*’ has been highlighted in my thesis. The establishment of Gangeśa’s theory of error refuting Prābhākara’s theory of non-error is the ultimate aim of this present research-work.

Gangeśa Upādhyay is a renowned logician of Mithila. He gave birth of a new era in the development of logic in India. Gangeśa’s famous book is *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. This book is immortal work of Gangeśa. He very delicately has been judged the four ways of knowing in his book. *Tattvacintāmaṇi* is divided into four books namely, (i). Perception (*Pratyakṣa*), (ii). Inference (*Anumāna*), (iii). Comparison (*Upamāna*) and (iv). Verbal Testimoni (*Śabda*). These are the four ways of deriving valid cognition. ‘*Anyathākhyātivādaprakaraṇa*’ is included in the ‘*pratyakṣakhaṇḍa*’ (Perception) of the book named *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. In this part, Gangeśa established his theory of ‘*anyathākhyāti*’ refuting Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas’ theory of ‘*akhyāti*’. The ultimate aim of this present research-work is: to show the Gangeśa’s theory of error (*anyathākhyāti*) is more argumentative method than others. Because, his logical thinking is very minute. It is main subject-matter of this thesis.

CONTENTS

	PAGE NO.
Chapter-I	1-22
Chapter-II	23-36
Chapter-III	37-90
Chapter-IV	91-123
Chapter-V	124-137
Bibliography	138-141
Index	142-150

Chapter – I

Introduction: An Explanatory note on '*Khyātivāda*' in general

Theories of erroneous knowledge are known as '*khyātivāda*' in Indian philosophical system. The word '*khyāti*' is derived from the Sanskrit root '*cakṣa*' alongwith '*ktin*' inflection.¹ Actually, '*khyāti*' means 'knowledge'. But, the word '*khyāti*' technically is used in Indian Philosophy that is 'knowledge of an object which is appeared in error'.

At the outset, we have to know that, what is the necessity of gaining as to 'the theories of error'?

In response, it is necessary to mention that, the 'soul' is the absolute knowable entity or '*prameya*' in accordance with the orthodox philosophical point of view. '*Prameya*' means that which is accurately knowable. The orthodox schools of philosophers incessantly have tried to realise this Absolute Soul since the succession of ages. Erroneous knowledge regarding to Absolute Soul is the ultimate cause of all worldly meseries. In this regard, 'error' means the imposition of Absolute Soul in the non-soul. The living-beings identify the non-soul entities

like body, mind, reformation (*saṃskāra*), knowledge (*buddhi*) and so on with the 'Absolute Soul'. We feel that the soul would be realized through the negation of the non-soul entities. As a result, our minds become full of miseries. So, the first and foremost motivation of Indian Philosophy is to bring the eternal emancipation of all living-beings. So, the ultimate purpose of all saviours is to gain the absolute true knowledge rejecting the fallacious knowledge for ever. So, we have to accept the existence of the invalid cognition or the erroneous cognition for being aware of the nature of valid cognition. Because, valid- invalid, good-bad, red-non-red etc. these all are relative terms. It will be impossible to separate the valid cognition from the invalid one without having the nature of invalid cognition. Besides that, we cannot deliberate correctly the truthfulness-falsity of daily happenings also due to the absence of valid cognition. For this reason, it is necessary to know the nature of erroneous knowledge in order to reject this. After all, 'error' is an important epistemological problem and also a psychological phenomenon. Actually, it is also a fact of our life.

The well-known *kārikā* in regard to the theories of error is:

“Ātmakhyātirasatkhyātirakhyāti khyātiranyathā.

Tathā'nirvacanakhyātirityetat khyātipañcakam.”²

According to this *kārikā* or verse, the ‘*asatkhyāti*’, ‘*akhyāti*’, ‘*anyathākhyāti*’, ‘*ātmakhyāti*’, ‘*anirvacaniyakhyāti*’ - these five-fold theories of error are particularly well-known in the Indian Philosophy. Besides these, the theories called ‘*satkhyāti*’, ‘*viparītakhyāti*’, ‘*sadasatkhyāti*’, ‘*aloukikakhyāti*’ etc. are also well-known in the Indian Philosophy.

There are mainly two different theories of error in Indian philosophical system namely, ‘the theory of error’ and ‘the theory of non-error’. The theory of ‘non-error’ or ‘*Akhyātivāda*’ held by the Prābhākara school of *Pûrva-Mīmāṃsā*. According to the Prābhākara school, all cognition are regarded as valid. On the other hand, according to the theory of ‘error’ or ‘*Khyātivāda*’, cognition may be regarded as invalid in sometimes.

As there is the existence of numerous theories of error in the Indian Philosophy a question may be raised: what is the reason behind the different theories of error ?

The answer to the question that mentioned above may be basically divided into two categories. Certain Indian Philosophers do not accept the existence of erroneous knowledge at all. Their theory is known as ‘*akhyātivāda*’. Prābhākara *Mīmāṃsaka* and *Sāṃkhya* – these two schools of Indian Philosophers’ communities accept this opinion. Other Indian Philosophers accept the existence of

erroneous knowledge. For this reason, their opinion is known as the ‘theory of error’ or the ‘*khyātivāda*’. But, there are different types of ‘*khyātivāda*’ or ‘theories of error’ too among the *khyātivādīns*. The question in the context may be raised in the form. What is the reason for accepting the different types of the theories of error or the ‘*khyātivāda*’?

The answer to this question is as follows. Even though there is no different opinion among the ‘*khyātivādīns*’ about the existence of the erroneous knowledge there are different types of opinion about the erroneous object. The erroneous object may be four-fold as real, unreal, both real and unreal, not both real and unreal or really indefinable or ‘*anirvacanīya*’. No fifth alternative (*vikalpa*) is possible beyond these four-fold alternatives. All ‘*khyātivādīns*’ accept that the illusory object is real have also expressed difference of opinion among themselves. The illusory- object may either be external or internal. According to the *Yogācāra Buddhists*, the illusory-object is internal. They deny the existence of the external world. The *Yogācaras* uphold that the illusory-object is a form of cognition. Their opinion is known as ‘*ātmakhyātivāda*’. In pursuance of the *Mādhva Vedāntins* and *Śunyovādīn Buddhists*, the illusory-object is unreal. So, their theory of error is called the ‘*asatkhyātivāda*’. But, there are also different types of views among themselves. According to the *Mādhva* school, the illusory-object is unreal although the substratum or locus of the illusory- object is real. So, they accept the

‘*svādhīsthāna-bhrama*’. On the other hand, the *Śūnyovādī Buddhists* uphold that the illusory-object is unreal and the locus of the illusory-object is also unreal. So, they accept the ‘*niradhīsthānabhrama*’. The *khyātivādīns* who think the illusory-object is external are also divided. Some Philosophers point out that the illusory-object is real and it appears far from the knower. The view is known as ‘*anyathākhyātivāda*’. This view is corroborated by the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas*. According to the *Viśiṣṭādvaitavādīn* Rāmānuja, the erroneous-object is real but it exists in front of the knower whose opinion is called the ‘*satkhyātivāda*’. In accordance with the *Advaita Vedānta*, the erroneous object is not real, not unreal and both real-unreal –it is ‘*sadasadvilakṣaṇa*’ or ‘*anirvacanīya*’. Their opinion concerning the erroneous knowledge is known as the ‘*anirvacaniyakhyātivāda*’.

The main aim of this thesis is the substantiation of the theory of ‘*anyathākhyāti*’ refuting the theory of ‘*akhyāti*’. Before this critical discussion, I will be discussing the theory of ‘*ātmakhyāti*’, ‘*asatkhyāti*’, and ‘*anirvacanīyakhyāti*’ shortly.

The present thesis is divided into mainly five chapters. In the introductory chapter or the first chapter it will be discussed about the above-mentioned various types of theory of error in a nutshell. It is necessary to discuss about the definition of ‘error’ and to give proper evidence concerning this subject-matter. Because, the nature of all objects are proved by means of their definitions and also their proper

evidence. Because, the evidence in accordance with the principle - “*lakṣaṇapramāṇābhyām hi vastusiddhiḥ*” which is approved by all schools of Indian philosophers. For this reason, the subject-matters of the second, third, fourth and fifth chapters are the definition of error and critical discussion about this matter. “Definition of ‘error’ in the light of the Ancient Naiyāyikas: An Epistemic Deliberation” is the title of the second chapter. After that, it will be discussed about ‘error’ in accordance with Prābhākara Mīmāṃsaka and Nyāya schools through various arguments in the next two chapters. The discussion about the Prabhākaras’ theory of ‘non-error’ is the subject-matter of the third chapter of this thesis. The title of this chapter is “Elucidation of ‘*Akhyātivāda*’ and background of such theory”. The establishment of the theory of ‘*anyathākhyāti*’ refuting ‘*akhyātivāda*’ is the subject-matter of the fourth chapter of this thesis. This fourth chapter is divided into two parts namely, (i). A Critique of ‘*Akhyātivāda*’ by the Naiyāyikas, (ii). ‘*Anyathākhyātivādasiddhāntapakṣa*’. Last of all, the thesis is concluded through some critical and evaluative remarks, which is the fifth chapter or last chapter of this thesis.

Vātsyāyana defines the erroneous knowledge as such: “*atasmimstaditi pratyayah yathā sthānau puruṣa iti*³ (2/1/36) in his famous commentary *Nyāyabhāṣya* on *Nyāyasūtra* of Maharṣi Goutama. Once more, *Ācārya Śaṅkara*

defines the erroneous knowledge in his *Adhyāśabhāṣya* as such : “*smṛtirūpah paratra pūrvadṛṣṭāvabhāśah*”⁴. At the end of *Adhyāśabhāṣya* Ācārya Śaṅkara again remembers the definition of the erroneous knowledge and then he said that, “*adhyāso nāmātasmiṁstadbuddhiritiavocāmoh*”⁵. So, it is mentionable that, the previous definition of the erroneous knowledge which is given by Śaṅkara is actually: “*atasmimstadbuddhih*”.

It is proved by the *Naiyāikas*, in the shell-silver case, the silver is true which is seen in the previously acceptable shell. But, the *Advaita Vedāntins* always accept that the silver is false which imposes on the shell. According to them, the whole world is false which is imposed on the Absolute Soul or *Brahman*.

“*Smṛtirūpah paratra pūrvadṛṣṭāvabhāśah*”---this definition of the ‘*adhyāśa*’ or ‘*bhrama*’ has been incorporated in the *Adhyāśabhāṣya* by Śaṅkara refuting the theories of error which are given by other schools. He actually had established ‘*anirvacanīyakhyātivāda*’ with this definition.

The above-mentioned definition of the ‘*adhyāśa*’ or ‘*bhrama*’ will be explained shortly. But, before the discussion about the definition of ‘*adhyāśa*’, we have to know about the term ‘*adhyāśa*’ or ‘*bhrama*’ or ‘error’. The term ‘*adhyāśa*’ is derived from the Sanskrit root ‘*adhi-as*’ alongwith ‘*ghaṇi*’ inflection. This ‘*ghaṇi*’ inflection is applied by passively and actively both. For this reason, the

two-fold meaning of the term ‘*adhyāsa*’ has to be accepted by us. The meaning of the term ‘*bhāva*’ or ‘passive’ is action. So, the meaning of the term ‘*adhyāsa*’ passively is ‘*adhyāsakriyā*’ or ‘erroneous action’. The root ‘*as*’ means ‘to cast’. The prefix ‘*adhi*’ is ‘top of anything’. So the total meaning of the term ‘*adhyāsa*’ in passive sense is ‘to cast anything on any other thing’. Again, the total meaning of the term ‘*adhyāsa*’ in active sense is that thing which is thrown on the other thing. For example, in the shell-silver case, that cognitive state is ‘*adhyāsa*’ or ‘error’ and that knowable silver also is erroneous. In the first sense, the cognitive state or knowledge is erroneous and in the second sense, the knowable is erroneous⁶.

“*Smṛtirûpah paratra pûrvadṛṣṭāvabhāśah*”.

- The meaning of the term ‘*smṛtirûpah*’ is ---- “*smṛyate iti smṛti*” or that thing is called ‘*smṛti*’ or memory which is remembered. The term ‘*smṛtirûpah*’ is given as that whose appearance is like the appearance of that remembered thing. It is given by *vahuvrihi* compound. So, the ultimate meaning of this term ‘*smṛtirûpah*’ in the case of imposition in case of meaning (‘*arthādhyāśapakṣe*’) is: any ‘*prātibhāsika*’ thing like remembered (*vyavahārika*) thing. The term ‘*paratra*’ means: in another locus, or, the object not existing in its own locus. The meaning of the term

‘pûrvadr̥ṣṭāvabhāsaḥ’ is: *‘pûrva’* means previous, *‘dr̥ṣṭa’* means ‘to see’ or ‘knowledge’, *‘avabhāsa’* means ‘appearance’ or that which is appeared is called *‘avabhāsa’*. So, the initial meaning of the sentence “*smṛtirûpah paratra pûrvadr̥ṣṭāvabhāsaḥ*” in the case of the superimposition of meaning (*‘arthādhyāsapakṣe’*) : that *‘prātibhāsika’* or appeared entity (for example, the snake etc.) is called the erroneous thing which is imposed on another thing (for example, the rope) due to the impression of the previous perceptual thing like the remembered thing which is *‘vyāvahārika’* (for example, the snake etc.) thing.

Now, we discuss the definition of *‘adhyāsa’* or the erroneous knowledge “*smṛtirûpah paratra pûrvadr̥ṣṭāvabhāsaḥ*” in case of superimposition of knowledge (*‘jñānādhyāsapakṣe’*).

In this sense, the meaning of the term “*smṛtirûpah*” is as such : “*smaraṇam eva smṛtiḥ*” or the remembrance is *‘smṛti’* or memory whose appearance is like the appearance of the remembrance. It is given by *‘vahuṣṛhi’* compound. In this sense, the meaning of the term *‘smṛtirûpah’* is as such: the *‘jñāna’* or the knowledge which is like the *‘smṛtijñāna’* or the memory-cognition. The meaning of the term *‘paratra’* is ‘in another place’. The meaning of the term *‘pûrva’* is ‘previous’. *‘Dr̥ṣṭa’* means ‘to see’ or ‘knowledge’, the meaning of the term *‘avabhāsa’* is

‘*jñāna*’ or ‘knowledge’. So, the initial meaning of the sentence “*smṛtirūpah paratra pūrvadṛṣṭāvabhāsaḥ*” is as such: That knowledge is called the erroneous knowledge which originates from the impression of the previously perceived object and which is just a memory cognition (‘*smṛtirūpah*’)⁷.

A question may be raised whether the above-mentioned definition of ‘*adhyāsa*’ which is given by Saṅkara is accepted by other schools of Indian Philosophers or not. In order to the answer of that question *Ācārya* Saṅkara explained in his *Adhyāsaśāstra* other three definitions of ‘*adhyāsa*’ given by other schools of Indian Philosophers. These three definitions will be explained as follows:

- 1). “*Tam kecit anyatra anyadharmādhyāsaḥ iti vadanti*”⁸.
- 2). “*Kecit tu yatra yadadhyāsa tadvivēkāgrahanibandhanā bhramah iti*”⁹.
- 3). “*Anye tu yatra yadadhyāsaḥ tasyaiva viparītadharmatvakalpanām ācakṣate iti*”¹⁰.

Anyathākhyātivādins or the *Naiyāyikas* and ‘*ātmakhyātivādins*’ or the Buddhist Philosophers’ point of view concerning error is stated with the 1 no. definition which is ---“ *tam kecit anyatra anyadharmādhyāsaḥ iti vadanti*”. According to the *anyathākhyātivādins*, ‘*adhyāsa*’ or illusion is created by the

manifestation of the attribute in the object which object is situated in front of the knower but this attribute exists on the object which is situated at different place from the knower. For example, the illusion is created by the manifestation of the attribute of silver or silverness on the shell which is situated in front of the knower but this attribute or silverness exists at silver and this silver is situated at different place from the knower.

Besides this, according to the '*ātmakhyātivādins*', the error is actually the appearance of the attribute existing in the internal world or the '*ātmān*' on the external object. The silver appears in the shell which is known as the external thing. Actually the *Yogācāras* do not admit extra-mental realities. The *Yogācāra* school of Buddhism points out that '*jñāna*' or cognition is only real entity. There is no any external thing besides cognition in their view. For this reason, their view or theory is known as '*vijñānavāda*'. In pursuance of this opinion, the 'knowledge' and the 'object of knowledge' is identical; so the fictitious external things are also knowledge by nature. The invalid knowledge or the erroneous knowledge regarding the external things also is acquired by feelings like the valid knowledge. In the shell-silver case, the fictitious shell is knowledge by nature. The silver is the form of knowledge. The erroneous knowledge of the silver which is the form of cognition becomes in the fictitious shell. In this case, the error becomes in the one type of cognition. It is called '*ātmakhyāti*'¹¹

Now, it will be discussed about illusion in the light of Buddhism as explained by Vācaspati in his *Bhāmati*.

Vācaspati Miśra had remarked an important statement in this context in his *Bhāmati* that is “*Yad yādrśamanubhavasiddhyam tat tādrśmevabhyupagantavyam, anyathātvam tu asya valavadvadhakapratyavasād bhavati*’. It may be explained in the following manner. The things that appeared to us as such are the nature of that thing. But, if any more powerful cognition comes here then we become obedient to accept the subsequent cognition leaving off the antecedent cognition. In the shell-silver case, when the knower realized as: ‘this is silver’ then that thing is accepted to the knower as ‘the silver’ and perhaps the knower goes forward to collect that thing. But, when the knower realized that, ‘this is not silver’ (*idam na rajatam*) then the knower being destitute was compelled to give importance to the more powerful obstructing cognition. If the knower wants to realize the valid nature of the silver which appeared in the error then it is very important to analyse the subsequent cognition to the knower.

It is necessary to mention in this context that, according to the Buddhism, categories are two-fold --‘internal’ which is referred to as ‘I’, it is called ‘*ālayvijñāna*’ and on the other hand, ‘external’ which is referred to as ‘blue’, ‘yellow’ etc. that is called ‘*pravṛttivijñāna*’. The main opinion of the Buddhist Philosophers’ is that one kind of cognition is expressed in two manners – ‘knower’

and 'knowable'. This knower is known as '*ālayvijñāna*' and the knowable is known as '*pravṛttivijñāna*'. 'Knowledge' exists in 'knower'; so the 'knower' is called the '*ālayvijñāna*' and the inclination originates in respect of the 'knowable'. So, the 'knowable' is called the '*pravṛttivijñāna*'.

'*Na*', '*idam*', '*rajatam*'--- these three terms are in the '*nedam rajatam*' sentence. The question may arise that, which term is connected with that negative term '*na*' among them? That is the case under consideration. It is importance to retain in memory that 'the silver' is '*dharmī*'. It has many properties ; for example, the 'silverness', 'thingness', 'glitterness', 'worthness', 'whiteness' etc. On the other hand, the 'thisness' or the '*idam*' is a property. The meaning of this property is the 'outerness'. Because, the term 'this' always refers to something remaining outside or in front of me.

Now, the Buddhist Philosophers point out that, if the negation of the silver is accepted by the '*na*' then all properties of the silver will be negated. But, if the knower negates the 'thisness' with '*na*' then only one property will be negated. As a result, it will come under the law of testimony ('*lāghava*'). The fallacy of the lightness ('*lāghava*') and heaviness(''*gourava*') is an important case under consideration in Philosophy and Science. The lighten procedure is accepted to all. According to this, if 'thisness' would be negated with the '*na*' then the meaning of this sentence would be the absence of 'thisness' of the silver. So, it is proved that

the silver is ‘internal’ or the cognition in nature, but not in the external world or non-mental world.¹²

The akhyātivādins or the Prābhākara schools’ point of view concerning ‘error’ is stated with the second definition which is --- “*Kecit tu yatra yadadhyāsah tadvivekāgrahanivandhanah bhramah iti*”

Ācārya Śaṅkara introduces the opinion of *Prābhākara* concerning error with the foregoing definition.

In accordance with the *Prābhākara* school of *Mīmāṃsakas*, two types of cognition belong in fact in the case of illusion which are as such --- perception and memory. These two types of cognition are originated simultaneously. As a result, the knower mixes up the perceived and the remembered element. The illusion originates by virtue of the absence of knowledge of discrimination. So, the illusion becomes in use only, not in knowledge in accordance with the *Prābhākaras*.¹³

Then Ācārya Śaṅkara introduces the opinion of *Śūnyovādīn Buddhist* Philosophers concerning error with the following --- “*anye tu yadadhyāsah tasyaiva viparītdharmattvakalpanām ācaksate iti*”. According to the *Śūnyovādīn Buddhist* school, the ‘*adhyāsa*’ or error occurs when the knower imagines the

opposite property in thing which exists in front of the knower. For example, we know that the 'silverness' is the opposite property of the shell and it is the property of silver which exists in another place. But, the knower's imagination of the silverness in the shell is error. It is mentionable that, according to the *Śūnyavādīns* or the nihilists, the 'śūnya' or the 'voidness' is the absolute reality. So, in pursuance of the nihilists, the internal thing or the 'ātman' and the external world -- all these are non-existent or no-being or 'asat'. So, according to their view, all internal and external things are erroneous. They hold that, non-existent thing manifests itself as existent.

The '*Śūnyavādīns*' or the *Mādhyamika* school of Buddhism holds that, the real entity or the reality is not real or 'sat', not unreal or 'asat', not real-unreal or 'sat-asat', even it is not the different category besides real and unreal. There are no other alternatives besides these four-fold categories. For this reason, the nature of reality is not eligible for determination. So, their point of view about reality is 'śūnya' or 'void' or 'nothing'.¹⁴ *Mādhavācārya* said in his *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* regarding this view of the *Mādhyamika* school of Buddhism is that "atastattvaṃ sadasadubhayatmakacatuṣkotivinirmuktaṃ śūnyameva". According to the *Mādhyamika* school, actually all external things are fictitious. These fictitious things are called the 'saṃvṛti sat' or the 'vyāvahārika

sat'. These '*saṃvṛti sat*' things are called by the *Mādhyamika* school is '*anirvacanīya*' or 'undeterminable'. According to him, in the 'shell-silver' case, the shell is unreal and the silver also is unreal. In this case, the 'silver' which is unreal imposes on the other unreal thing 'shell'. In this view, the object of error is unreal or '*asat*'. So, their view regarding error is called '*asatkhyātivāda*'.

Madhvācārya also accepts the theory of '*asatkhyāti*'. According to *Madhvācārya*, the object of erroneous knowledge is unreal or '*asat*'. So, their theory of '*khyātivāda*' is also known as '*asatkhyātivāda*'.

These two views of error imply a fundamental contrast between the two schools of the *Śūnyavādīn* Buddhists and the *Mādhva* school of *Vedānta*. According to the *Śūnyavādīn* Buddhists, the resort ('*adhīsthāṇa*') of error is unreal or '*asat*' and on the other hand, the *Mādhva* school of *Vedānta* point out concerning this view the resort of error is real or '*sat*'.

After the discussion of all views about error *Ācārya Saṃkara* points out that, "*sarvathāpi tu anyasya anyadharmāvabhāsaṃ na vyābhicarate*".¹⁵ 'The appearance of another property in another thing' --- is accepted by all schools of Indian Philosophers. It is their common opinion concerning error.

Now, we will discuss the theory of '*anirvacanīyakhyāti*' or the *Advaita Vedāntin*'s opinion concerning error.

The perception of the inherent part of that thing like 'thisness' originates from the relation between the sense-organ of the knower and the thing which remains in front of the knower in the non-metaphysical case. The particular part of that thing is not appeared to the knower on account of the different types of fault which exists in the knower, knowable thing etc. But, the knower has interest to the particular knowledge of that thing. For this reason, the '*samskāra*' (impression) of that thing seen in previous time awakens in the mind of the knower on account of the similarity of that thing with the thing which exists in front of the knower. 'Fault', 'impression' and 'the knowledge of the inherent part of the concern thing' --- these are the causes of the erroneous knowledge.

The '*adhyāsa*' or the erroneous knowledge is as such: The appearance of any other object in another object like that object seen by the knower in previous time. The meaning of the term '*bhāsa*' is 'knowledge' and '*ava*' is '*avasanna*' (apparent) which are included in '*avabhāsa*'. So, the meaning of the term '*avabhāsa*' is '*avasannajñāna*' or 'the apparent knowledge'. That is called apparent which is taken as the depression. The depression of knowledge is to be '*vādhita*' or to be proved false. After the knowledge of silver in the shell the inclination may be originated to the knower but, the cognition in the form: 'it is not silver, it is the shell' --- does not allow inclination to the thing. So, the knowledge

of silver in the shell will be apparent. The apparent knowledge is known as the erroneous knowlledge.

According to the *Advaita Vedānta*, the object of erroneous knowledge is ‘indescribable’ or ‘*anirvacanīya*’. In this opinion, the erroneous object is a new object like the object which was seen in previous time. For example, in the shell-silver case, the silver is a new object like that silver was seen in the previous time.

It is relevant to refer that, in accordance with the *Advaita Vedānta*, the real entity or ‘*sattā*’ is three-fold --- ‘*pāramārthika*’, ‘*vyavahārika*’ and ‘*prātibhāsika*’. That is the ‘*pāramārthika*’ entity which exists in all time or which does not prove false in any time. According to them, the ‘*pāramārthika*’ entity is only ‘*Brahman*’ or ‘*Paramātman*’. That is to be taken as the ‘*vyāvahārika*’ entity which is not proved false in the time of use (‘*vyavahārikakāla*’). For example, pot etc. That is the ‘*prātibhāsika*’ entity which is not proved in the level of apparent reality (‘*prātibhāsikakāla*’) but, it is proved false in ‘*vyāvahārikakāla*’ or the time of use. For example, in the case of illusion, the entity of silver exists on the shell. So, it is proved that, in the shell-silver case, the silver is proved false in the time of use. For this reason, it is not the ‘*vyāvahārika*’ entity, it is ‘*prātibhāsika*’ entity. Again, the silver is not unreal entity like the ‘sky-lotus’ case. Because, the perception of the silver originates from the fault after shell and the knower’s sense-organ

becomes related. The unreal entity is not a perceptual object. So, this new-born silver may not be real or unreal or real-unreal. For this reason, the silver or the erroneous object is '*anirvacanīya*' or false. That is why, the Advaita theory of error is known as '*anirvacanīyakhyāti*'.

According to this theory of error, all things impose on the Absolute Soul or "*Brahman*". In the rope-snake case, the rope imposes on the Absolute Soul. The false snake also imposes on that rope. In this sense, 'false' means '*anirvacanīya*' or indeterminate. It is a technical term. That is called '*anirvacanīya*' or false which is not real, not unreal, even which is not known as real and unreal both. If the snake were real then that thing may not become sublated by the cognition of rope. Again, if the snake were unreal then it would not become perceptible like the son of the barren woman. Again, that snake may not be known as 'real-unreal both'. Because, a thing may not be real-unreal both in the same thing these two terms 'real' and 'unreal' – are contradictory in nature. It may not be acceptable that, the snake exists in another place in accordance with the *Anyathākhyātivādīns*. Again, it also may not be acceptable that, the snake exists in the cognition in accordance with the *Vijñānavādīns*. Because, the snake appears as the rope which exists in front of the knower. So, according to the *Advaitīns*, the snake creates from the ignorance in that moment¹⁶.

END NOTES

1. *Cakṣin 1017, 'bhavadi, vyktāyām vāci . Ayam darśane' pi'.*

“Cakṣin khyā” (2436, 2/4/54) Paṇini sūtra.

2. *Swami Viswarupananda(Trs.) : Vedāntadarśana, Swāmi Cidghanānanda Puri and Vedāntabāgisa Sri Ānanda Jha, Nyāyācārya(Edt.), 1st Chapter, Page No.---31,*

“Ātmakhyātirasatkhyātirakhyāti khyātiranyathā.

Tathā anirvacanakhyaṭirityetat khyātipaṅcakam”.

3. Goswami, Sitanath, Adhyōsabhūsyā, Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, Kolkata, 2012, p: 02

4. *Swami Viswarupananda(Trs.) : Vedāntadarsana, Swami Cidghanananda Puri and Vedāntabāgisa Sri Ānanda Jha, Nyāyācārya(Edt.), 1st Chapter, Pamkti:4*

“Smrtirupah paratra purvadrstāvabhāsah”.

5. *Ibid., Page No. 59, Pamkti:39,*

“Adhyāsah nāma atasmin tadbuddhih iti avocāma.”

6. *Dr. Sitanath Goswami, Adhyāśabhāśya, Sanskrit Pustaka Bhandar, Kolkata*
– 700 006, 2012, page : 1

7. *Swami Viswarupananda(Trs.) : Vedāntadarśana, Swami Cidghanananda*
Puri and Vedāntavagisa Sri Ananda Jha, Nyayacarya (Edt.), 1st Chapter,
Paṁkti : 4,

“Smṛtirūpah paratra purvadṛṣṭāvabhāśah”.

8. *Ibid. , Page : 29*

9. *Ibid., page : 36, paṁkti : 5,*

“Tam kecit anyatra anyadharmādhyasah iti vadanti.”

10. *Ibid., page : 42, paṁkti : 6,*

“Kecit tu yatra yadadhyāsah tadvivekāgrahanivandhanah bhramah iti.”

11. *Ibid., page: 44, paṁkti : 7,*

“ Anye tu yatra yadadhyāsah tasaiva viparitdharmatvakalpanām ācaksate
iti.”

12. *Dr. Sitanath Goswami, Adhyāśabhāśya, Sanskrit Pustaka Bhandar, Kolkata*
– 700 006, 2012, page : 179 - 180

13. Swami Viswarupananda(Trs.) : *Vedāntadarsana*, Swami Cidghanananda Puri and Vedāntavagisa Sri Ananda Jha, Nyāyācārya(Edt.), 1st Chapter, Page : 36
14. Ibid., page : 42
15. Ibid., page : 45
16. ibid., “Sarvathāpi tu anyasya anyadharmāvabhasataṁ na vyābharati”.
17. Ibid., “ Sarvathāpi tu anyasya anyadharmāvabhāsatam na vyābharati.

CHAPTER- II

Definition of 'error' in the light of the Naiyāyikas

The fundamental subject-matter of philosophy is 'knowledge' or 'cognition'. 'Knowledge' is mainly two-fold namely, (i). memory or '*smṛti*' and (ii). feeling or '*anubhava*'. '*Anubhava*' is of two kinds namely, (i). valid cognition or '*pramā*' and (ii). invalid cognition or '*apramā*'. It is understandable for us that, it is necessary to know about the nature of invalid cognition for the sake of gaining valid cognition. The main objective of this present thesis is to give the nature of one of the forms of invalid cognition like erroneous cognition. So, at first, an effort will be made to discuss about the definition of 'error' in accordance with the *Naiyāyikas*.

It is necessary to know about the term '*lakṣaṇa*' or 'definition'. The term '*lakṣaṇa*' is defined as "*asādhāraṇam kāranaṁ karanatvaṁ*" in Indian philosophy.¹ The extra-ordinary property of any category is called '*lakṣaṇa*'. This property is a determining quality which separates the concerned category from others. This determining quality also helps the concern category to be used. Because, the important statement is: '*vyāvṛttirvyāvahāro vā lakṣaṇasya prayojanam*' i.e. the necessity of definition is to differentiate an entity from others and to use the same. 'Definition' is used in two cases namely, '*vyāvṛtti*' or 'to particularize the concern

category' and 'vyavahāra' or 'to give the ability the concerned category for public-use'. Actually, the meaning of the term 'vyabhicāra' or 'use' is 'to apply such terms by which the concerned category to be made known.'²

Invalid cognition or 'apramā' may be classified into three kinds namely, (i).*samśaya*, (ii). *tarka*, and (iii). *Viparyaya*.

The term 'viparyaya' or 'error' is defined by Annambhaṭṭa in his famous book *Tarkasaṃgraha* as: "Tad abhāvavati tatprakārah anubhavah ayathārthānubhavah". The significance of such definition is: If the feeling of an entity becomes realized by the knower in any entity where actually the absence of such entity exists then that feeling is called as 'erroneous feeling'.³ If any category becomes knowable to the knower qualified by any attribute but actually that attribute does not exist in that category then that feeling is called 'viparyaya' or 'error'. For example, the knowledge of the fire in the lake, the knowledge of the silver in the shell, the knowledge about the snake in the rope etc. The 'silverness' does not remain in the shell at any time; rather the shellness exists in the shell in all times. For this reason, the cognition of silver in the shell is called 'erroneous'.⁴

Now, all the terms of the above-mentioned definition of erroneous cognition will be separated and critically analyzed below.

Annambhaṭṭa gave the definition of ‘invalid cognition’ or ‘*apramā*’ as such:
“*Tad abhāvavati tatprakārah anubhavaḥ ayathārthānubhavaḥ*”.

The above-mentioned definition has been signified as such: The term ‘*tat*’ is signified by ‘adjective’ or ‘such property which exists in any subject and it separates the subject from another subjects’. The meaning of the term ‘*abhāvavati*’ is ‘the locus of the absence’. The question may be raised in this connection that, whose absence has been indicated? The answer is that, it is the absence of that determining property which separates the particular thing from another. If the cognition becomes qualified by the determining property but actually that determining property does not exist in that thing or subject then that is called ‘invalid cognition’ or ‘*apramā*’. For example, in the shell-silver case, the knower gains the knowledge of the shell qualified by the silverness. But, the silverness does not exist on the shell; rather the shellness exists on the shell. The cognition of the shell by the silverness --- such cognition becomes originated on the locus which is qualified by the absence of the silverness. For this reason, it is called as ‘invalid cognition’ or ‘*apramā*’.

Annambhaṭṭa points out in his *Dīpikā* that, the above-mentioned definition of ‘invalid cognition’ also is not valid; it is a fallacious definition. Because, ‘*saṁyoga*’ or ‘connection’ is one of the category of twenty-four-fold qualities accepted by the Vaiśeṣikas. The ‘conjunction’ is such quality which exists on such

locus where also exists the absence of that conjunction. For example, in the case of the conjunction between the pen and the hand of the knower; there the absence of the conjunction also exists on the hand of the knower. The ‘conjunction’ exists on the three fingers of the knower despite that portion of the knower’s hand, the absence of the conjunction exists on another portion of the hand. In this case, ‘the conjunction of the pen’ is the adjective. The hand of the knower is the locus of that absence of ‘the conjunction of the pen’. The cognition qualified by ‘the conjunction of the pen’ becomes originated on such locus where ‘the absence of the conjunction of the pen’ exists. So, ‘the knower’s hand is qualified by the conjunction of the pen’ --- such cognition becomes fallacious.

To remove this blame, Annambhaṭṭa said in his *Dīpikā* that, “*Yadavaccede yatsambandhābhāvah tadavaccede tatsambandhajñānasya vivakṣitatvāt*”. In this connection, the significance is that, the cognition of that relation in any space is called as invalid cognition where actually the absence of that relation exists. For example, if the cognition of the conjunction of the pen originates in that space of the hand where ‘the absence of the conjunction of the pen exists then that cognition would be erroneous. So, the definition of the ‘invalid cognition’ or ‘*apramā*’ given by Annambhaṭṭa is an accurate definition.⁵

Now, we have to judge about the Naiyāyikas’ theory of error. We know that, the main opponent school of the Ancient Naiyāyikas is the buddhist philosophers. For

this reason, we have to highlight the Buddhistic theory of error at first. After that, we have to try to establish the theory of '*anyathākhyāti*' refuting the Buddhistic theory of error.

There are mainly four schools in Buddhism namely, (i). *Sautrāntrika*, (ii). *Vaibhāṣika*, (iii). *Yogācāra* and (iv). *Mādhyamika*. In those four-fold schools, the *Vaibhāṣikas* accept the existence of the external things. These external things become acceptable as they are capable of being known through perception in accordance with the *Vaibhāṣikas*. But, according to the *Sautrāntikas*, the external things are known to be existence as they are cognised through inference. The Yogācāra Buddhists accept only the existence of cognition or '*vijñāna*'; besides cognition, there is not knowable entity. According to them, the knower and the knowable entity--- those two categories are included in cognition or '*vijñāna*'. This '*vijñāna*' or 'cognition' is temporal and it has a visible form. Again, the *Mādhyamika* philosophers are known as '*śūnyavādīns*'. Because, they do not accept anything - the existence of the knowledge and knowable entity. Their theory of error is called as '*asatkhyātivāda*'. The others schools of Buddhism are known as '*atmakhyātivādīn*' concerning the theory of error. But, usually the *Yogācāra* school of Buddhism is called as '*ātmakhyātivādīns*'. According to them,

all categories like shell, silver etc. are actually the forms of cognition. They say that, “*Vijñānameva khalvetad gr̥hṇātyātmānamātmanā.*

Vahir nirūpyamāṇasya grāhyasyānupapattitah.”⁶

The main theory of the *Vijñānavādins* is: the perceptible external things are actually the internal forms of cognition.

According to the *Vijñānavādins*, the identity between the knowledge and knowable entity is proved through the inferential statement like “*jñeyam jñānabhinnam jñānopalambhakṣana niyatopalambhagrāhyatvāt.*” The validity of this inferential statement becomes proved through the concomitance invariable rule like ‘*yad yena niyatasahopalambham tat tato na bhidyate yatha ekasmaccandramaso dvitiyascandramah*’. So, the knowable entity and knowledge --- both of those are actually the forms of cognition in accordance with the *Vijñānavādins*.⁷

Besides that, the doctrine of ‘*asatkhyāti*’ is a theory of error upheld by the *Mādhyamika* Buddhist philosophers. At first, we must know about the nature of ‘*asat*’ or ‘*unreal*’. Because, there are various meanings *as* to the term ‘*asat*’ in Indian Philosophy. For example:--

(i). According to the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* philosophers, substance, quality and action -- these three entities are the loci of the real entity or ‘*satta*’. ‘*Satta*’ or the real

entity exists on these categories through the inherence relation. So, these categories or substance, quality and action are real entities or 'sat'. But, the real entity does not exist on 'universal'(sāmānya), 'particular'(viśeṣa), 'inherence'(samavāya) and 'absence'(abhāva) through the direct relation or the inherent relation. So, these four-fold categories are not the loci of the real entity. As a result, these are the different categories from the loci of the real entity. For this reason, the ancient Naiyāyikas have been said that, the universal etc. four-fold categories are unreal or 'asat'.

(ii). The absence which is the originator of any effect --- the counterpositive (*pratiyogī*) of that absence is unreal due to the absence of that negatum in that time. For example, the pot, cloth etc. are the effects. The originators of those effects are the absences of the pot, cloth etc. The negatums of those absences do not exist in the time of effects. As a result, these are the unreal entities or 'asat' in accordance with the ancient *Naiyāyikas*.

(iii). The non-related categories with the time are unreal entities or 'asat'. For example, 'the sky-lotus' etc.

(iv). That is called 'asat' or unreal whose nature would not be indeterminable by

us. ⁸

According to the *Mādhyamika* Buddhist philosophers, the ultimate real entity is not real (*sat*), not real (*asat*), not real-unreal both (*sadasat*) even it is not the different category from the real-unreal both. No alternative is left behind besides those four-fold alternatives. As a result, the nature of the ultimate real entity is undeterminable; and for this reason, the ultimate real entity is void in accordance with the *Mādhyamikas*. With reference to this context, Mādhavācārya has been said in his famous book *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* that, “*Atastattvam sadasadubhayānubhayatmakacatuskotivinirmukam śūnyameva*”.⁹

Actually, all categories are imaginary or fictitious in accordance with the *Mādhyamikas*. These fictitious entities are called practical real entities. These are undeterminable entities in accordance with them. These are void of nature (*‘svabhavaśūnya’*); as a result, these are undeterminable. All categories are void of its nature; for this reason, their theory is called *‘śūnyavāda’* or *‘nihilism’*.

In the erroneous cases, actually, a category imposes on another category. These two types of category are unreal or *‘asat’* in accordance with the *Mādhyamikas*. In the shell-silver case, the imaginary silver becomes imposed on another imaginary shell; it is called the erroneous cognition in accordance with the *Mādhyamikas*. The noun and adjective --- both of them are unreal in the erroneous statement¹⁰.

It is mentionable that, the doctrine of ‘śūnya’ has been explained in various ways in ancient time. According to Nāgārjuna, there is no existence and also non-existence of any category. Because, the ultimate real entity is not real, not unreal, not real-unreal both, not enough of real-unreal both also; the ultimate real entity is something besides those four alternatives. Besides these no other entity is possible. So, the ultimate real entity is actually ‘void’ or ‘nothing’ or ‘śūnya’. It is called ‘the doctrine of sunya’. Nāgārjuna does not admit the theory of “*sarvaṃ nāsty*” or ‘*nothing exists*’. This doctrine may be called as ‘*sarvābhāvavāda*’, which is supported by *an* another school of Buddhist philosophers. They are also known as ‘*ānupalambhika*’. According to Vātsyāyana, the opponent school of the ancient Nyāya philosophy is the ‘*ānupalambhikas*’.

Maharṣi Gautama in the *Nyāyasūtra* mentioned the opinion of the *Ānupalambhikas* with the following words: “*Buddhyā vivecanāttu bhavanam yathatmyanupalabdhistanttvapakarsane*

patasadbhavanupalabdhivattvadanupalabdhih”¹¹. The significance is that, the nature of all things which are the objects of cognition may not be realized to the knowers in accordance with the *ānupalambhikas*. For example, a piece of cloth becomes proved to be non-existent thing if we divide the materials of that piece of cloth i.e., the threads one by one. In the same manner, all things may be proved as the non-existent things. In this way, it is proved that all things are unreal. So, the

cognition with regard to all things may be erroneous in accordance with the *Ānupalambhikas*.

To refute the argument of the *Ānupalambhikas*, Maharṣi Gautama said *in the sūtra* “*pramāṇānupapattyupapattibhyām*”. The significance is that, if the ‘*pramāna*’ or evidence exists in respect of the statement like “*sarvaṃ nāsti*”, it may not be said that, all things or categories are non-existent in accordance with Maharṣi Gautama. Again, there is no any evidence with regard to that statement then this argument may not be proved. Because, any thing *is* not proved without any evidence.¹²

According to Maharṣi Gautama, in the form ‘the cognition of human-being in the tree’ *the* cognition is called ‘the false cognition’. On the other hand, the cognition in the form ‘the cognition of the tree in the tree’ --- is called ‘the valid cognition’ or ‘the certain cognition’. The false cognition has been refuted through ‘the certain cognition’. But, ‘the tree’ and ‘the human-being’ ---these two categories are not refuted. Actually, the absence of reality of those categories is not possible to prove. Even, universally all trees or ‘treeness’ and all human-beings or ‘humanity’ may not be refuted. In the same manner, the absence of those categories of the state of dream may not be refuted through the cognition of the awakened person. According to Vātsyāyana, the significance of Maharṣi is that, the erroneous cognition becomes refuted through the accurate cognition but, the unreality of the

erroneous objects may not be proved by means of such accurate cognition. The accurate knowledge is the opposing entity of the erroneous cognition but, it is not opposing of those erroneous objects. In this way, Maharṣi established that, the erroneous objects are real entities.

After that, Maharṣi has established that, the erroneous cognition is real through the statement like “*buddheścaivam nimittasadbhāvopalambhāt*”(36// 446)¹³. The term ‘*sadbhāva*’ has been indicated with regard to the reality or the extra-ordinary property of the real entities in the above-mentioned statement. The significant meaning of such statement is as such: all human-souls perceive the erroneous cognition through the minds after the origination of such erroneous cognition. Because, the erroneous cognition also is the knowable entity for the sake of becoming the mental perception of the erroneous cognition. In this way, Maharṣi has established the existence of the erroneous cognition.

According to the explanation of Vātsyāyana, it becomes understandable to us that, ‘knowledge’ and ‘knowable entities’ --- both of them are non-existent in accordance with the Śunyovādīns. To refute their argument concerning error, Maharṣi has been established the reality of the erroneous objects and also the reality of the erroneous cognition.

Maharṣi Gautama has pointed out in the 37/447 sutra that, the locus of the imposing entity is called 'tattva' and 'the imposing entity' is called '*pradhāna*' in the erroneous case. So, the erroneous cognition is valid in so far as *the part of the locus is concerned and valid so far as* the imposing property is concerned. In this way, the erroneous cognition is of two-fold. In the erroneous case of the cognition of the human-being in the tree', the subject or 'the tree' is called '*tattva*' and on the other hand, 'the human-being' is called '*pradhāna*'. The erroneous cognition of the human-being originates in the tree due to the similar perception between them. In this present case, the tree is not actually the human-being, but, really it is tree. For this reason, it is called 'tattva' in such cases where the human-being becomes imposed on the tree. So, the main imposed object is called '*pradhāna*'. The error originates from the similarity between them. So, the human-being is the main object to create error.

Actually, '*pramātvā*' or 'the property of the valid cognition' and '*bhramatva*' or 'the property of the erroneous cognition' --- those are not the opposing entities. Again, there are such erroneous cases where the error is acceptable in all parts. The Neo-Naiyāyikas accepted such cases also. In those cases, the cognition of the property of thisness does not become understandable in the part of the subject; the

cognition of the subject originates from the determining quality which exists on the another entity. ¹⁴

END NOTES:

1. Miśra, Chandra, Keshab, Sri, Tarkabhāṣā, Nyāyācārya, Kar, Gangadhar, Sri (Trs. & Ed.), Part-II, Jadavpur University, Kolkata, 2013, p: 424
2. Annambhaṭṭa, Tarkasaṁgraha with Dīpikā, Goswami, Chandra, Nārāyaṇa, Sri (Trs. & Ed.), Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, Kolkata, Aswin, 1390, p: 25
3. *ibid.*, p: 286
4. *Tarkabhāṣā*, p: 432
5. *Tarkasaṁgraha*, p: 287-288
6. Miśra, Vācaspati, *Bhāmati* (Part-I), Bhattacharya, Mohan, Sri, Sri (Ed. & Trs. in Bengali), Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, Kolkata, 1973, p: 63
7. *ibid.*, page: 65
8. Bhattacharya, Biswabandhu (Trs. & Ed.), *Tattvacintāmaṇi, Anyathākhyātivāda*, Navatirtha, Tripathi, Dinanath & Bhattacharya,

Jyotiprasad (Ed.), Dasgupta & Co. (Private) Limited, Kolkata, page: VIII
(Introduction)

9. *ibid.*, VIII

10. *ibid.*, VIII

11. Gautama, Maharṣi, *Nyāyadarśana*, Vātsyāyana, *Vātsyāyanabhāṣya*,
Tarkabagisa, Phanibhusana (Trs. & Ed.), Nyayadarśana, Paschimbanga,
Rajya Pustak Parsad, Kolkata, July, 1989, p: 147

12. *ibid.*, page: 156

13. *ibid.*, page: 181

14. *ibid.*, p; 183

CHAPTER – III

Elucidation of ‘*Akhyātivāda*’ and background of such theory

Prābhākara Mimāṃsaka and *Sāṃkhya* schools of Indian Philosophy do not accept the existence of erroneous cognition. So, their theory of error is known as ‘*akhyātivāda*’ or ‘*vivekākhyāti*’.

Vācaspati Miśra said in his *Sāṃkhyatattvakoumudī* that, “*aksararthastu --- tasmadanusravikadduksapaghatakaddhetoh viparitah sattvapurusanyatapatyayah saksatkaro duhkhopaghātaka hetuh, atah eva śreyān*”. (*Kārikā1*, page : 61, Gaya Edition).

According to *Sāṃkhya* Philosophers, cessation of sorrow for ever is possible with the *laukika* and *Vaidika* activities but, that result is not eternal. The better way to get the eternal emancipation is the knowledge of an outward relation. Gaining the metaphysical knowledge between the *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa* is the better way to gain the eternal emancipation. We or all human-beings think that, ‘illness of the body’ means ‘I am ill’. But, ‘I’ means only the ‘Soul’, not body. We do not understand this fact. As a result, we inherit all worldly miseries. The absence of this factual cognition is known as ‘sublation’ in Indian Scripture. It is the cause of error. So, ‘error’ or ‘illusion’ means ‘the absence of the cognition of

discrimination' (*vivekājñāna*) in accordance with the *Sāṃkhya* school of Indian Philosophy. So, this theory is called '*vivekākhyāti*' or shortly '*akhyāti*'.

An effort will be made to throw some light on '*Akhyātivāda*' according to Prābhākara school of Philosophy in this chapter.

'*Akhyātivāda*' is a doctrine about the erroneous knowledge advocated by *Mīmāṃsakācārya Prabhākara* and his followers. They maintain that an invalid cognition is not possible. All cognitions are valid according to them.

At the outset, we will try to gain as to the nature of 'valid knowledge' ('*pramā*') in a nutshell. After that, we will go forward 'invalid knowledge' ('*apramā*') which is the subject-matter of my Ph.D thesis.

The kind of knowledge is called as 'valid knowledge' ('*pramā*') whose contents ('*viṣaya*') are property and possessor of property ('*dharmā-dharmī*') and their unattachment ('*asaṃsarga*') is not acceptable ('*agrīhita*') to the knower. As for example, the knowledge about 'this silver' in the silver ---- the object of '*dharmī*' is 'thisness' ('*idam*') and the object of '*dharmā*' is 'the silver' ('*rajat*'). The unattachment of those is not accepted to the knower in this case. So, there is the non-existence of the knowledge ('*agraha*') of the unattachment. It is also the one knowledge ('*ekajñāna*'). So, it is a valid knowledge ('*pramā*'). On the other hand, the knowledge about 'this is silver' in the shell ---- there also the non-

existence of the knowledge ('*agraha*') of the unattachment ('*asamsarga*') remains; because, there is not the relation between the '*dharma*' and '*dharmī*' notwithstanding that, there is not also the knowledge ('*graha*') of attachment ('*asambandha*'). If there the knowledge ('*graha*') of the unattachment ('*asambandha*') remains between the 'this' ('*idam*') and 'the silver' ('*rajata*') then the illusory cognition would not be possible like 'this is silver' ('*idam rajatam*'). But, it is not the 'one knowledge' ('*ekajñāna*'). So, it is not the valid knowledge ('*pramā*'); it is actually the invalid knowledge ('*apramā*').

Śālikanātha Miśra in his *Prakaraṇapañcikā* established the validity of all cognitions before the establishment of the '*akhyātivāda*.'¹ Because, the establishment of the '*akhyātivāda*' is dependent upon the establishment of the validity of all cognitions.

It is mentionable that, the *Prābhākaras*' opinion about 'cognition is that it is actually 'self-revealed'. Cognition may not become unrevealed. It is not imaginary that, cognition becomes originated but it remains as unrevealed. So, all cognitions are valid or non-erroneous.

According to *Prābhākara*, the '*pramātvā*' is the property of all cognitions. According to him, all cognitions are valid. The property of the valid cognition is

called '*pramātvā*'. In the same way, the property of the invalid cognition is called '*apramātvā*'. According to *Prabhākara*, the '*apramātvā*' or invalidity is not the property of cognition. Always the '*pramātvā*' or validity exists in cognition, '*apramātvā*' does not exist in cognition. The '*apramātvā*' or invalidity exists in usages. The invalidity or '*apramātvā*' of the usages imposes on the cognition which cognition is the originator of the usages. *Prābhākara* has pointed out that, cognition is pure for ever and self-luminous. Besides *Prābhākara* all Indian philosophers accept the erroneous cognition and also accept the existence of '*apramātvā*' or 'invalidity' in cognition.

At first, we have to know about the nature of valid knowledge or '*yathārthajñāna*' ?

The meaning of the term '*yathārtha*' is 'the similarity of the object'. But, a question may be raised: that, 'Is there any similarity between the external object and the knowledge? The similarity between the external object and the knowledge may not be accepted in all parts. So, we have to accept the technical meaning of the term '*yathā*'. The technical meaning of the term '*yathā*' is '*arthāvyabhicāri*'. That is called '*yathārthajñāna*' or valid cognition which is practicing no adultery with own object.

If we accept the existence of the cognition then the object of the cognition has also to be accepted. It may not be established through argument that a cognition is possible without its object. Again a question may be raised: ‘what is the object (*viṣaya*) of knowledge?’ It would be accepted by all that, that thing is called the object of that cognition which is appeared to the knower after knowing. So, the valid cognition is that which is practicing deviation from own object. So, all cognitions are valid. The cognition of silver is originated in the shell. Sometimes the silver is appeared in such cognition not the shell as accepted by all. The shell may not be appeared like silver because, the essence of the shell like silver is unreal. So, we have to accept that, the silver is the object in the shell-silver case. For this reason, this cognition becomes valid. The cognition of silver in the silver is valid cognition; in the same way, the cognition of silver in the shell is also valid. If the cognition of silver in the shell becomes adulterous with it’s own object then it would be doubtful to us that, all types of cognition are erroneous. As a result, all knowable things would be doubtful to us. So, all cognitions are valid.

The invalidity may not exist in cognition due to the absence of cause. Our sense-organs become able to generate valid cognition. So, those sense-organs are not able to originate invalid cognition. An objection may be raised in this connection that invalid cognition may be originated by the blemish sense-organs of the knower.

Afterwords *Prābhākara* said that, it is necessary to cast a glance to the nature of fault (*doṣa*) which is taken as an impediment to produce the new effect. The fault does not produce the opposite effect. So, the invalid cognition may not be originated through the blemish sense-organs.

The meaning of the term '*akhyati*' is '*nāsti khyātiryatra ah*',. That is called '*akhyāti*' where the knowledge of 'thatness' does not exist.

The *Akhyātivādins* do not accept a particular cognition in the illusory case. The '*idam*' or 'this' and the 'silver' are separate types of cognition known through perception and memory respectively. At first, a perceptual apprehension becomes originated due to the connection between the thing which exists in front of the knower and the sense-organ of the knower. After that, the memory of silver becomes originated due to the similarity between the shell and silver through the arousal of the impression of the silver is apprehended to the knower earlier. Though generally the objects of memory are those things which are really the objects of that memory and the 'thatness' also is the object of that memory. But, the 'thatness' becomes vanished in the erroneous case. The difference between these two types of cognition like the perception and memory cannot be grasped due to their simultaneous occurrence and due to the abolishment the 'thatness'. This knowledge of discrimination of two cognitions which is not grasped is the root for the fruitless inclination. As a result, it is called 'error'. Actually, the apprehension

like ‘this’ and the memory like the ‘silver’ --- these two types of cognition are valid; but not erroneous. All types of cognition are valid in accordance with the *Prābhākaras*.

If any cognition becomes invalid then it would not be possible for us to depend upon any cognition. It is *Prābhākara*’s opinion. In this connection *Sālikanātha Miśra* said in his *Prakaraṇapañcikā* that,

“*Ahovata mahaneṣa pramādo dhīmatamapi.*

Jñānasya vyābharitve viśvāsah kiminivandhanah”..

It becomes the object of perceptual cognition if there is a connection between the object and the sense-organ of the knower. So, the ‘this thing’ or the thing which exists in front of the knower may be the object of the perception due to the existence of the direct connection between the ‘this thing’ and ‘the sense-organ of the knower. But, there is no connection between the silverness and the sense-organ of the knower. So, how would ‘silver’ be an object of perception?

After that question, the answer would be as such that, the connection is of two-fold --- direct and indirect. There is the indirect connection between the silver and the eye-sense-organ of the knower in the silver-oriented erroneous case. This connection is called ‘*jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa*’ in Indian Philosophy. This indirect connection is actually an impression or memory by nature.

It becomes drawn out that, all types of cognition are axiomatically valid in accordance with the *Prābhākara* school of *Mīmāṃsakas*. *Bhavanātha* in his *Nyāya-viveka* and *Śālikanātha* in his *Prakaraṇapañcikā* have elaborated the opinion of *Prābhākara*. *Śālikanātha* asserts that, what appears in a cognition that is the object of that cognition. For example, the silver appears in the cognition of the form ‘this is silver’; so the silver surely is the object of that cognition, not the shell. The matter of fact is that, we have two distinct cognitions here: the perception like ‘this’ and the remembrance like ‘the silver’. These two types of cognition are originated simultaneously. For this reason, these do not appear distinctly. Actually, the memory of the silver produces by such kind of connection of the silver which is previously cognized. This kind of memory is different from another types of memory. In the case of other kinds of memory, the object of memory appears as qualified by ‘thatness’. But, in the illusory case, a kind of memory originates among the two objects which of them one is situated in front of the knower and that object is similar with the another object which was perceptible in the previous time. In this memory, ‘thatness’ is erased. For this reason, this kind of memory is known as ‘*pramuṣṭatattvākasmarāṇa*’ or ‘the obscuration of memory’ in Indian Philosophy.

The error consists of two cognitions--- perception and memory. In this case, the memory is originated for the characteristic feature of thatness due to the defects of the knower. So, the memory of the silver and the perception of ‘this’ are not mutually discriminated due to the similarity between the objects of those cognitions. The knower cannot understand the difference between the perception and memory due to the absence of knowledge of discrimination between them².

“All types of cognition are valid” –in this context of *Prābhakara*’s opinion a question may arise from the opponent school that, all schools of Philosophy too accept the four-fold cognition- ‘*pramā*’, ‘*smṛti*’, ‘*saṁśaya*’ and ‘*viparyaya*’. The two-fold cognition ‘*Samśaya*’ and ‘*viparyaya*’, among them are invalid in accordance with public opinion and all schools of philosophers. In such cases perception leads to the supreme *pramāna*. In case of perception, another variation of knowledge is generated even though one object has been active alongwith the senses. For instance, silver-related knowledge is generated in spite of the *sannikarsa* of the sight to the shell.

A question may arise against the *Prābhākara* that if the shell-silver case is considered valid why is it regarded as error in public parlance/use or in accordance with the philosophers?³

If the valid knowledge also called the erroneous knowledge then all valid knowledge will be known as the erroneous knowledge. As a result, it is not possible for us to establish the '*prāmāṇya*' of any knowledge.⁴

The *Prābhākara* school of *Mīmāṃsaka* say that in the shell-silver case two types of cognition belong in fact and these two types of cognition are as such --- perception and memory. At first, the perception of the form of 'thisness' is created due to the connection between the knower's sense-organ and the shell. But, the perception of particular part of the object is not originated for the defective sense-organs of the knower. The glare of the shell also becomes perceptible with the perception of the form of 'thisness' in that case. The glare of the object is perceptible with the perception of 'thisness' due to having similarity between the shell and the silver regarding the glare.

The memory of the silver produces by such kind of '*samskāra*' or the mental residuum of the silver previously cognized. This kind of memory is different from the another types of memory. In the case of other kinds of memory, the object of memory appears as qualified by 'thatness' (*tattvāmśa*).

But, in the case of illusion a kind of memory is originated between the two objects - one is situated in front of the knower and another perceived in the previous time. In this case of memory 'thatness' is erased. For this reason, this kind

of memory is known as ‘the obscuration of memory’ in Indian Philosophy. So, when a person uses the shell as silver then actually two types of cognition are originated of when one is ‘perception’ and another is ‘memory’ in view of *Prābhākara* school. These two types of cognition are originated with simultaneously. As a result, the knower fails to discriminate the perceived and the remembered element. As a result, the ‘*rajatārthī*’ or the person who is interested to collect the silver inclines to collect the object which is situated in front of the knower for the sake of the absence of knowledge of discrimination.

From the *Prābhākaras*’ above-mentioned opinion, someone can think that, the absence of knowledge of discrimination is illusion. If the *Prābhākaras* accept that the absence of knowledge of discrimination is illusion then various problems will be raised. If the absence of knowledge of discrimination is known as ‘error’ then the ‘*susupti*’ or the ‘deep-sleep’ would be known as ‘error’. Because, in the time of deep-sleep, all kinds of discrimination are not understandable. In the time of deep sleep, the living-beings even cannot understand the discrimination between the another living-beings and the own self. So, the deep-sleep also is a type of the absence of knowledge of discrimination. But, the deep-sleep is not the illusion. So, it is not acceptable that, the absence of knowledge of discrimination is illusion. Besides that, the absence of knowledge is not accepted as illusion by anybody. The particular cognition is proved as illusion in the public use.⁵

After this question the Indian school of *Prābhākara* points out that, actually the usages do not originate from the absence of knowledge of discrimination. The ‘*rajatārthī*’ inclines to collect the object (the shell) due to not grasping knowledge of discrimination of two cognitions. On the *Prābhākara*’s view this inclination is illusory. But, the two types of cognition from what the inclination originates like the perception and the memory are not illusory. So, the *Prābhākara* do not accept the illusion in the cognition ---their opinion is that, the illusion but it belongs to the usages.

According to the *Prābhākara*, the difference (*bheda*) between two types of cognition is received with the sublating cognition in the subsequent time whose ‘difference’ was not grasped in the previous time. The invalidity of the previous cognition is not proved with the sublating cognition.⁶

Some Philosophers are of the opinion that, the shell-oriented knowledge is generated in the shell and hence the shellness belongs to the shell and in other time the silver-oriented knowledge is generated in the shell and hence the silverness also belongs to the shell sometimes. So, the two types of cognition in the form ‘the shell-oriented knowledge in the shell’ and ‘the silver-oriented knowledge in the shell’ ---are to be taken as valid. So, it leads us to accept that, all types of cognition are valid.

According to *Prābhākara*, actually two types of cognition originate in the case of controversial cognition like ; this is silver'. In these two types of cognition the universal perceptual cognition of 'this' and the particular remembrance of 'the silver' are originated due to the connection between the shell and the sense-organ of the knower. The discrimination of those two types of cognition is not grasped by the knower. Because, these two types of cognition are originated simultaneously. The person who is interested to collect silver inclines to the thing which exists in front of the knower due to the absence of knowledge of discrimination.

But, if the inclination is possible from the absence of knowledge of discrimination then the inclination would be too wide in the case of deep-sleep. Because, the deep-sleep is naturally the absence of knowledge and any inclination is not perceived in the case of deep-sleep.

If it is said that the inclination originates from the knowledge of the universal form from a distance and the absence of knowledge of discrimination then again the *Naiyāyikas* would object that any inclination is not possible from only the perception of the universal form.⁷

The *Prābhākaras* point out that, the particular form like 'shellness' ('*śuktitva*') is not grasped due to the organal faults etc. after the connection between the shell which exists in front of the knower and the defective

sense-organ of the knower. Only the universal form qualified by shining like 'thisness' is accepted. The impression of the silver becomes awakened due to the similarity between the universal form of the cognition and the silver. The memory of the silver is originated from that impression of the silver. The remembrance of the 'this' is not originated for the sake of defective cause from which the impression of the silver becomes awakened. So, there are two types of cognition in the case of the controversial silver-oriented cognition or 'this is silver' namely --- perception of the universal form or 'this' and the remembrance of 'the silver'. Only the perception of the 'thisness' is originated from the connection of the sense-organ of the knower with that thing which exists in front of the knower. Because, the perception of the universal form (thisness) is originated from the connection of the sense-organ. The impression of the silver becomes awakened due to the similarity of the silver which is perceived by the knower in previous time with the universal perception of 'this' after its origination from the connection of the sense-organ of the knower. So, the connection of the sense-organ with that thing which exists in front of the knower is not the direct cause of the memory of the silver, but it is cause of causes. So, it is called '*anyathāsiddhi*'. So, the connection of the sense-organ with an object is not the cause of the memory of silver. As a result, the subject of the controversial silver-oriented cognition is not the thing which exists in front of the knower. In this case, the *Prābhākaras* point out against the

Khyātivādins that the subjects of the two types of cognition are not cognized separately in spite of the existence of the two types of cognition in the case of the origination of erroneous use. According to the *Prābhākaras*, there is not also any unitary cognition between the ‘this’ and ‘the silver’. Actually, there is no unity because, the thing which exists in front of the knower is actually ‘the shell’.

The *Prābhākaras* said that, the perception of the ‘this’ is originated with the connection between the object which exists in front of the knower and the knower’s sense-organ. After that, the awareness of the silver is enlightened due to the similar cognition between the silver which cognized in previous time and ‘thisness’. The remembrance of the silver is originated from that reformation. So, the connection between the ‘this’ and ‘the sense-organ of the knower’ is not the direct cause of the remembrance of the silver. That connection is the cause of causes. So, the subject of the cognitive state - ‘this is silver’ is not that object which exists in front of the knower.

The *Prābhākaras* said that, there is not only the difference between the ‘this’ and ‘silver’ is not grasped but also the difference between those two types of cognition does not appear. The *Prābhākaras* point out that it is necessary to know that the objects of the two types of cognition are contradictory for knowing the difference between the two types of cognition. The knower does not feel it.

The *Prābhākaras* said that, both ‘this’ and ‘silver’ are valid knowledge, though object is one. In this case the difference of them does not exist. For this reason, the absence of knowledge of discrimination exists in the valid cognition. But, the ‘difference’ between the ‘this’ and ‘silver’ is not grasped in the valid or erroneous cognition in spite of the existence of ‘difference’.

According to the *Prābhākaras*, the usages are two-fold—mental use and corporeal use. Again, a question may be raised: what kind of usages is called as mental usages of an object in accordance with *Prābhākaras*? In response to this, the *Prābhākara* say that determinate cognition of an object arises at first and after the origination of the determinate cognition feelings like sorrow-enjoyment, desires etc. arise --- these are all called as mental usages concerning the objects. The denoting words about the objects can also be applied after the origination of the determinate cognition concerning those objects. Such usages of denoting words are also called as ‘mental usages’ in accordance with the *Prābhākaras*.

Prābhākaras said that, quality, action—universal property remains in any substance with the inherent relation. The substance is the possessor of that quality, action and universal property. As a result, quality, action and universal property which are inhered in that substance. So, that type of cognition is called appearance of an object which is necessary for the sake of use of that object. That is called

object of a cognition which is appeared in that cognition. So, the object which does not appear in any cognition that may not be called the object of that cognition.

The *Prābhākaras* said that, when a piece of shell is accepted by the knower then the impurity of the shell also is accepted. But, generally the impurity which exists in the shell does not become the object of knowledge. So, it is not acceptable that, which are capable of being used are the objects of knowledge. For this reason, the *Prābhākaras* said that, the attribute of appearance with cognition is called the attribute of object.

The *Prābhākaras* established that, the ‘silver’ is the ‘subject’ (*viśaya*) in the shell-silver case. Because, the ‘silver’ is appeared in this cognition but not the shell. If the ‘shell’ is appeared in the cognition then the usages would be successful for the public-usages are originated from that cognition. So, the ‘shell’ is not the subject of that cognition. The silver is the subject of that cognition.

The *Prābhākaras* main view is to show that, ‘a thing appears in another appearance’ which is completely contradictory in nature.

The *Prābhākaras* established that a thing does not appear in another appearance. The significance of this utterance is that, the shell does not appear as the form of silver at any time. Because, the entity of the shell in the form of silver

does not exist. For example, the ether does not appear as the lotus. Similarly, the shell has not the non-existence in the form of silver so, the shell does not appear as the silver. For this reason, the shell is not the subject of the statement ‘this is silver’.

The *Prābhākaras* said that, the universal form of the shell is known in the erroneous case after the contact of the sense-organ with object existing in front of the knower. The particular form of the shell is not known due to blames. The particular part like ‘shellness’ is the separating property (*bhedaka*) between the shell and silver. The remembrance of the silver is originated due to the similarity between the universal form of the shell and silver. The ‘thatness’ of the memory becomes unnoticed for the sake of mental blame. For this reason, the knowledge of discrimination between the shell and silver is not originated.

The *Prābhākaras* said that, the shellness does not appear in this erroneous case. As a result, the knowledge of discrimination does not appear in that case. The *Prābhākara* school points out that, the perceptual cognition as ‘this’ gives rise to inclination to the thing is lying in front of the knower and on the other hand, the cognition of ‘the silver’ gives rise to inclination to the thing which is characterized by the silverness. There are two types of cognition in this case. That thing is the subject of that cognition which appears in our cognition. Each cognition gives rise

to inclination to the respective subject. For this reason, these two types of cognition are valid too. These two types of cognition are not invalid.

The *Prābhākara* school points out that, in the erroneous case, the universal part of the shell is grasped by the knower with the connection between the his sense-organ and that thing existing in front of the knower. The particular part of the shell is not grasped by the knower for the blames etc. of the knower. The particular part of the shell is the differentiator (*bhedaka*) between the shell and the silver. The remembrance of the silver is originated due to similarity between the silver and the universal part of that shell. The ‘thatness’ (*tattvāmśa*) becomes extincted owing to mental blame etc. of the knower For this reason, the difference between the appearance of the silver and the appearance of the universal part of the shell is not grasped by the knower.⁸

The *Prābhākaras* said that, the two different categories become appeared in different cognition when there an ability exists to become the subject of such cognition whose forms are different. On the other hand, if two categories have an ability of becoming the subject of such cognition whose forms are non-different then the non-difference exists in those categories. Such procedure to ascertain the difference between the two categories is admitted by the *Prābhākaras*. According to this procedure, some categories become qualified by unequal form by nature. As

a result, they always are appeared by different forms. For example, colour, taste, smell, touch etc. The significance is that, the colour does not appear as taste in any time. Again, taste does not appear as smell in any time. So, those different types of quality always appear as different forms. Again, the pot does not appear as cloth in any time. So, the pot, cloth, colour, taste etc. are always having different forms. But, in some cases, two categories are non-different in nature for the sake of the absence of knowledge of discrimination of two contradictory properties in spite of having different character by nature. For example, the difference between the ‘this’ of the shell and the silver is not grasped on account of the non-acceptance of the shellness which is the different from shell in spite of having different character by nature. The knower does not feel that, the perceptual cognition of ‘this’ and the memory of the silver belong to completely two different subjects. The person who is interested to collect silver inclines to set the shell due to the absence of proper cognition of difference.

The significance of the *Prābhākaras*’ utterance is as such: the silver-oriented knowledge in shell does not belong to perception, inference or any type of apprehension. There is no sense-object-contact with silver. As a result, that cognition may not become silver. In that case, there is no any measuring probans or ‘hetu’. For this reason, there is no any inferential cognition. Testimonial

cognition is also not possible in that case. So, that silver-oriented cognition may not belong to any type of means of knowing (*'pramāṇa'*). For this reason, necessarily it is called memory.

An objection again may be raised against the *Prābhākara* that, the silver-oriented manifestation in the erroneous case is not the valid knowledge namely perceptual cognition etc. due to the absence of the testimonies like sense-organs etc. But, it may not be said that, this cognition is memory. Because, this type of cognition may be as an erroneous one. It may be said by the *Khyātivādins* that, it has not been demonstrated by the *Prābhākaras* that, no cognition is erroneous. So, it also may not be proved by the *Prābhākaras* that, if any cognition does not become valid one then it would become memory.

In response to, the *Prābhākaras* said that, the cause of memory exists in this case. The impression of the silver becomes aroused due to the perception of the similarity between the silver and the universal part of the thing which exists in front of the knower. Memory is always originated from the impression. As a result, in the present case also the memory may be originated from the impression. In this case, 'thatness' becomes unnoticed owing to the blemish cause.

A question may be raised against the *Prābhākaras* that, if the cognition is called memory in spite of the absence of the manifestation of 'thatness' then why

second, third etc. types of cognition would not become 'memory' in the case of incessant cognition?

In reply, the *Prābhākaras* said that, the second, third etc. types of cognition also may be called perception like first cognition in the case of incessant cognition owing to the existence of the causes of perception before the origination of the second, third etc. types of cognition. For this reason, the second, third etc. types of cognition cannot be called as 'memory'. It is mentionable that, the collection of causes (*sāmagrī*) of the perception are stronger than those of another types of cognition. For this reason, if the collection of causes of the perception exist then the perceptual cognition must not originate in that case.

Again an objection may be raised against the *Prābhākaras* that, perception and memory may be originated in the erroneous case. The difference between these two types of cognition may be admitted by any knower due to having different kind of two types of cognition. As a result, the difference between the two types of object also may be admitted in the erroneous case.

The *Prābhākaras* pointed out that, there the difference between the silver and the object which exists in front of the knower is not accepted but also the difference between the two types of cognition is not also accepted in case of error. According to the *Prābhākaras*, all types of cognition is self-luminous.

It also is necessary to know that, the subjects of those two types of cognition are contradictory with each other. The knower does not feel that the subjects of two types of cognition like apprehension and memory are contradictory in the erroneous case. According to the *Prābhākaras*, the cognition is self-luminous but, the difference between those is not the same.

Again, a question may be raised against the *Prabhakaras* that, the form of the valid cognition also is as such: ‘this is silver’. In this case also the manifestation between ‘this’ and ‘silver’ may not have originated. Why the difference between two types of cognition does not appear in that case?

After that question, the *Prābhākaras* would say that, the ‘this’ and ‘silver’ is the same in the valid silver-oriented case. Actually, there is no difference between the silver and the thing which exists in front of the knower in the valid case. For this reason, there is the absence of knowledge of discrimination between the silver and that thing which exists in front of the knower. So, the difference between the valid and invalid cases is also accepted by the *Prābhākaras*.

After that the *Khyātivādīns* have raised an another heavier objection against the *Prābhākaras*. The *Khyātivādīns* would say that, the ‘*sāmānādhikaraṇyapratīti*’ originates in the case where the absence of knowledge of discrimination exists between the universal part and particular part. The absence of knowledge of

discrimination exists in the erroneous case like the valid case. As a result, the ‘*sāmānādhikaraṇyapratīti*’ exists also in the erroneous case. The ‘*sāmānādhikaraṇyapratīti*’ exists in both of the cases. So, the cognitive state in the form: ‘this is silver’ which originates in the erroneous case would also be said as the ‘particular cognition’ like the valid silver-oriented knowledge. As a result, the particular cognition would be grasped in the erroneous case. The erroneous case may not be explained with two types of non-particular cognition.

After that objection, the *Prābhākaras* said that, that ‘*sāmānādhikaraṇyapratīti*’ of the erroneous case is not the particular cognition in spite of having similarities ‘*sāmānādhikaraṇyapratīti*’ of the valid case.

Afterwards, the *Prābhākaras* point out that, the person who is interested to collect the silver set about to ‘this’ owing to the absence of knowledge of discrimination between the silver and that thing which exists in front of the knower and also between the silver-oriented knowledge and the cognitive state like ‘this’. The difference between the cognition of clod and the cognition of silver has been accepted by the knower. The person who is interested to collect the silver feels the difference between the clod and the silver. For this reason, the person who is interested to collect the silver does not incline to the clod. Because, there is no similarity between the silver and the clod. For this reason, the person who is

interested to collect the silver does not incline to the clod; but, he may be inclined to the shell.

In this way, the *Akhyātivādins* tried to demonstrate the inclination to ‘this’ of the person who is interested to collect the silver with the absence of knowledge of discrimination.

After that, a question may be raised by the *Khyātivādins* against *Prābhākara*; What is called the absence of knowledge of discrimination?

In response to this question, the *Akhyātivādins* said that, the non-acceptance of the particular form and the acceptance of the universal form is called ‘the absence of knowledge of particular’. For example, the particular form like shellness of the shell is not accepted in the case of ‘this is silver’ in the shell. If the shell were accepted as the shellness then the person who is interested to collect the silver would not have inclined to the shell. For this reason, the difference between the shell and the another thing and also between the cognition of shell and the another cognition is not accepted in that case where the non-acceptance of the particular form like shellness of the shell and the acceptance of the universal form like ‘this’ exists.⁹

Again, an objection would be raised against the *Prābhākaras* that the origination of the inclination is not perceived from the absence of knowledge of discrimination in any time.

The *Prābhākaras* have said that, it is not accepted that if a thing is knowable in another form then the inclination originates from that thing. The *Prābhākaras* accept the absence of knowledge of discrimination in the erroneous case. And the *Khyātivādīns* accept the acceptance of the thing which exists in front of the knower in another form in the same case. If the *Khyātivādīns* point out that, the inclination does not originate from the absence of knowledge of discrimination in all time then the *Akhyātivādīns* would apply a *prativandī* against the *Khyātivādīns*. That argument is called '*prativandī*' by which self-opinion is not established in spite of having capability of refuting others.

The *Prābhākaras* have been said that, it is not acceptable that, the inclination will originate from the acceptance in another form. So, the *Akhyātivādīns* also may raise the same objection against the *Khyātivādīns* like the objection of the *Khyātivādīns* against the *Akhyātivādīns*.

The *Khyātivādīns* again may raise an objection against the *Akhyātivādīns*. The *Khyātivādīns* point out that, the memory of silver is originated due to the arousal of the impression of silver having the similarity between the silver and the

universal form of the shell. From this ground why there does not originate the memory of another shell due to the similarity between the universal form of the silver and another shell?

The *Akhyātivādīns* may explain in a different way about the origination of the inclination to the shell of that person who is interested to collect the silver in the erroneous case. The *Akhyātivādīns* may say that, the cause of the inclination of the knower to the shell is that cognition which is the form of dependent (*paratantrākār*) of the form of non-dependent (*aparatantrākārā*). There is an apprehension between the universal form of a thing and a memory of the particular form of a property exists in any erroneous case. The locus or ‘*dharmī*’ is dependent thing and the property is non-dependent entity both of them. The property which becomes manifested in the erroneous case is not the property of that locus or ‘*dharmī*’ . There is the cognition of types of category in the erroneous case namely, --- the cognition of such category which is dependent entity and the cognition of such category which is non-dependent entity. The difference between those two types of category is not accepted by the knower. And that two types of cognition become originated simultaneously. The inclination of the person who is interested to collect the silver to the shell becomes originated from these two types of cognition. It is called ‘*akhyāti*’.

The *Akhyātivādīns* would raise such objection against the *Prābhākaras* that, if all types of cognition become valid then the sublation may not be demonstrated. The falsity of the cognitive state ‘this is silver’ become accomplished with that sublating cognition like ‘this is not the silver, but the shell’ which become originated after the cognition like ‘this is silver’ in the shell. The absence of the silverness in ‘this’ becomes accomplished with such sublating cognition. The prohibition of an entity is not possible which is not connected at all. That can be negated which is capable of being negated. The prohibition becomes possible of that entity which is connected or attached with the negation. If the absence of the silverness becomes accomplished in ‘this’ with the sublating cognition then it becomes accomplished that the silverness was connected in the ‘this’ with that sublating cognition. The ‘this’ is appeared qualified by silverness in that cognition which is sublated. If ‘this’ does not appear qualified by silverness then the absence of silverness would not be possible in the ‘this’ in the subsequent sublating cognition. So, the previous cognition where ‘this’ was not appeared by self-nature, it was appeared like the ‘silver’. That previous sublating cognition was a particular cognition. That particular cognition was erroneous.

After that objection the *Prābhākaras* have pointed out that, actually the usages become sublated with that sublating cognition which is originated in the

erroneous case. According to the *Akhyātivādīns*, the silver-oriented usages are originated to the 'this'. These types of usages are erroneous. These types of erroneous usages become rejected with that sublating cognition. ¹⁰

The *Akhyātivādīns* have said that, the ignorance becomes ceased with the cognition, another cognition is not sublating with that. All schools of the *Khyātivādīns* accept that, any previous cognition become sublating with the later cognition. But, it is not acceptable to the *Akhyātivādīns*.

After that argument a question may be raised against the *Khyātivādīns* that, if it is accepted in accordance with the *Khyātivādīns* that, the cognition becomes sublating with another cognition then is it a different the subject of the sublating cognition and the same as the subject of the sublating cognition? This is the question of the *Akhyātivādīns* against the *Khyātivādīns*. If the subject of the sublating cognition and sublating cognition become non-different then it would be said that, a cognition sublating another cognition whose subject is the same or non-different. But, if this argument is accepted then it also would be taken for granted that, the first cognition becomes sublating with the second cognition in the case of incessant cognition. But, actually the first cognition is not sublating with the second cognition in the case of incessant cognition. So, a cognition is not sublating by another cognition whose object is same or non-different. On the other hand, if it is

accepted that, the subjects of the sublating cognition and sublated cognition are different then it would be accepted that the cognition of taste would be sublated with the cognition of form. But, it is not possible to accept the sublation of a cognition with another cognition. As a result, the subject of the sublating cognition and sublated cognition is not different. For this *reason*, *Prabhākara* or the *preceptor of the Prābhākaras* said in his *Vṛhatī* that, '*jñānena jñanam nivartita iti vadhavidah*'. The significant meaning of this statement is: if the sublation of cognition is accepted then it also would be accepted that, the ignorance become ceased with cognition.

The *Khyātivādīns* have said that, it is accepted to all that, 'this is silver' --- this cognitive state becomes sublated with the sublating cognition. As a result, in which point of view the *Akhyātivādīns* say that the ignorance becomes sublated with cognition?

After this argument, the *Akhyātivādīns* said that, 'this is silver' --- this type of cognition is the sublating cognition. The ignorance whose subject is really the shell that is sublated with that cognition whose subject also is 'the shell'. If this type of ignorance is sublated then the usages like silver also would be sublated. So, it may be accepted that the ignorance whose subject is really 'the shell' is sublated with the sublating cognition.

Actually the *Akhyātivādīns* do not accept the cognitive state like ‘this is not silver’ as the sublating cognition. According to them, ‘this is shell’ --- this cognitive state whose subject is actually the shell is called the sublating cognition. This type of cognition whose subject is actually the shell not only sublates the ignorance whose subject is really the shell but also that usages like silver also is sublated with that shell-oriented cognition. In this way the *Prābhākaras* have established that, the usages like silver of that person who is interested to collect the silver becomes ceasedbeing destroyed the ignorance whose subject is really the shell with the sublating cognition. Before this the *Prābhākaras* also have established that, the absence of knowledge of discrimination exists in both of the cases valid and invalid. For this reason, the *Prābhākaras* have accepted the absence of knowledge of discrimination as the cause of inclination in these both of the cases of valid and invalid cognitions.

A question may be raised that, the inclination originates from cognition, but it is not originated from the absence of cognition like the absence of knowledge of discrimination.

Actually, the *Prābhākaras*’ main view point is that, the usages do not originate from the absence of knowledge of discrimination. The person who is interested to collect the silver set about to collect the object which is actually the

shell from the knowledge of discrimination of two cognitions is not properly grasped. ¹¹

A question again may be raised against the Prābhākaras that, how do they explain the dream-cognition? It is mentionable that, most of the Indian philosophers accept the dream-cognition as the erroneous cognition. According to the *Khyātivādins*, the dream- cognition is a type of particular erroneous cognition. The usages of the dream-cognition like fear, etc. originate from this type of particular erroneous cognition. But, the *Akhyātivādins* do not accept the erroneous cognition. As a result, it may not be accepted by them that, the dream-cognition is an erroneous cognition. Besides that, in the case of dream-cognition the thing is not not perceived by the knower which was similar with that thing which was perceived in previous time. So, there is no any stimulant (*udvodhaka*) of the impression with regard to that thing which was perceived in previous time. The memory of that thing which was perceived in previous time may not be originated except the stimulant of the impression. For this reason, the *Khyātivādins* arised the question to the *Akhyātivādins* that, how do *Akhyātivādins* explain the case of dream-cognition ?

After that question the *Akhyātivādins* would like to say that, the dream-cognition also is a particular memory. There is no absence of the stimulant in that

case. There is no stimulant like the similar cognition but, there is such stimulant like the unseen or invisible entity (*adr̥ṣṭa*) etc. in the case of dream-cognition.

A question may be raised by the *Khyātivādins* that, if the dream-cognition become memory then why does appear the object of memory like that thing which is being taken (*grhyamānas*) ? The object of memory is appeared as that thing which is being taken. From this it has been established that, the dream-cognition is the third type of a spare cognition like erroneous cognition.

The *Khyātivādīns* have pointed out that, the impression is an extra-ordinary cause in the case of the erroneous cognition. The impression gives rise to a third type of cognition like the erroneous cognition with other causes in accordance with most of the *Khyātivādīns*. The erroneous cognition is accepted as an intuition in accordance with the *Anyathākhyātivāda*, *Asatkhyātivāda*, *Ātmakhyātivāda* and *Anirvacanīyakhyātivāda* and so on. As a result, the object of the erroneous cognition is appeared as the previous thing which is being experienced (*anubhuyamāna*). The dream-cognition also is a type of intuition in accordance with all of the *khyātivādīns*. As a result, the object of the dream cognition also is realized as that thing which is being taken. It is mentionable that, all *Khyātivādīns* accept the origination of a third type of cognition like the erroneous cognition in the erroneous cases. There is an equal opinion about this. But, there are different opinions concerning the procedure of the origination of that third type of cognition.

According to the *Anyathākhyātivādīns*, the impression of a thing which was perceived in previous time originates a memory also in the erroneous case but, this type of memory is called as ‘*pramuṣṭatattvākasmṛti*’. The ‘thatness’ of the memory become vanished in the erroneous case. This type of memorial cognition connects the memorial object with the sense-organ of the knower, and with this supernatural connection the perceptual erroneous cognition becomes originated. According to the *Naiyāyikas*, the erroneous cognition is a type of supernatural cognition. As a result, the *Naiyāyikas* accept the erroneous cognition as an intuition. The dream-cognition also is a type of error. So, the dream-cognition also is a type of an intuition in accordance with the *Naiyāyikas*. But, the Advaitins do not accept the origination of a memory from the impression. According to the Advaitīns, the impression gives rise to the erroneous cognition in association with blame and the universal cognition of that thing which exists in front of the knower etc. causes such erroneous cognition. This type of cognition is called intuition in accordance with the *Advaitīns*. The dream-cognition also is a type of error in view of the *Advaitīns*. Actually, the erroneous cognition is a type of intuition in accordance with all of the *Khyātivādīns*. But, the *Akhyātivādīns* accept the error and dream as the memorial cognition. According to the *Akhyātivādīns* the object of error and object of the dream-cognition are called as that thing which is accepted by

memory. But, the object of the error and object of the memory are always appeared as that thing which is being taken by intuition.

Śālikanātha Miśra has accepted that, all memories are the comprehension of that thing which is perceived by the knower in previous time. In the erroneous case, cognition is originated about a thing which was perceived by the knower in previous time that is called ‘memory’ in accordance with the *Akhyātivādīns*. But, there is a difference between this type of erroneous memory and another type of memory. The object of the erroneous memory does not appear at that time as that object which was perceived in previous time. For this reason, the object is appeared as that thing which does not take that type of memory whose ‘thatness’ becomes vanished.

A question may be raised against the Prābhākaras that, why does the ‘thatness’ of the erroneous memory vanish?

In reply the *Akhyātivādīns* have said that, the ‘thatness’ has been vanished in the erroneous memory due to the blames of the knower. For this reason, the erroneous memory is appeared as the apprehension of the non-apprehended thing.

Again an objection may be raised against the *Akhyātivādīns* that, if the *Akhyātivādīns* accept the apprehension of the yellowish which exists in the bile of the knower’s sense-organ then why not the blackish nature of the collyrium which

exists in the knower's eye-sense-organ is not apprehended as such? But, actually why the collyrium which exists in the knower's eye-sense-organ and its black colour is not perceived with the eye-sense-organ of the knower?

In response to this, the *Akhyātivādīns* have said that, the blackish is not taken for the sake of the obstruction of the eye-sense-organ of the knower. The significance of the Prābhākaras' view is: the eye-sense-organ of the knower becomes proceeds through the passage of the eye-sense-organ existing in the middle of the eye-sense-organ which is qualified by the black-colour. If the collyrium exists in the middle passage of the eye-sense-organ of the knower then the cognition of it would become obstructed with that collyrium. As a result, the collyrium which exists in the middle passage of the eye-sense-organ is not grasped, because, that collyrium becomes obstacle of the cognition of the eyelash.

The *Khyātivādīns* again raise an objection against the *Akhyātivādīns* that, that collyrium may be taken which exists in front of the white part of the eye-sense-organ. The significant meaning of the *Khyātivādīns*' opinion is as such: the ray of eye-sense-organ does not go through the white part of the eye-sense-organ. As a result, if the collyrium exists in the white part of the eye-sense-organ then the issuing ray of eye-sense-organ may not be obstructed with collyrium. As a result, the collyrium which exists in the white part of the eye-sense-organ and its blackish colour may not be taken for granted.

After the above-mentioned objection the *Akhyātivādīns* would say that, the white part of the eye-sense-organ is not metallic thing. So, the metallic ray of eye-sense-organ does not go through the white part of the eye-sense-organ. For this reason, any entity may not be taken through the white part of the eye-sense-organ. So, the collyrium which exists in the white part of the eye-sense-organ and it's blackish colour have not been perceived.

Again a question may be raised by the *Khyātivādīns* that, if the issuing ray of eye-sense-organ is obstructed through the collyrium which exists in the eye-sense-organ then why is not obstructed the issuing ray of eye-sense-organ through the bilious-entity which exists in the eye-sense-organ of the knower?

In reply the *Akhyātivādīns* would say that, the bilious entity becomes smeared on the top of the eye-sense-organ of the knower and it is transparent or very clear. The bilious entity is not obstructed with the issuing ray of eye-sense-organ of the knower for the sake of it's clearness. Śālikanātha Mīśra has been said in his *Prakaraṇapañcikā* that, the bile and 'kāca' – both of these are blames and these exist being smeared on the top of the eye-sense-organ. But, the difference between the two types of blame is that, the *kaca* is not clear-entity but the bile is a clear one. For this reason, the issuing forth of the ray of eye-sense-organ becomes obstructed through the *kāca* but, the issuing ray of the eye-sense-organ is not

obstructed through the bile entity. For this reason, it is possible to grasp the yellowish which exists in the bilious entity through the eye-sense-organ.

The *Khyātivādīns* may raise a question again that, the internal part of the collyrium which exists in the eye-sense-organ of the knower may be taken through the ray of eye-sense-organ of the knower, because, the internal part of the collyrium existing in the eye-sense-organ is connected with the ray of eye-sense-organ. But, anybody cannot perceive the internal part of the collyrium which exists in the eye-sense-organ of the knower in any time. How do establish the *Khyātivādīns* establish the absence of knowledge of the internal part of the collyrium?

In response to this *Akhyātivādīns* said that, the internal part of the collyrium which exists in the eye-sense-organ is not known through the ray of eye-sense-organ owing to its thinness. For example, the ray of eye-sense-organ is going out through the passage of the eye-sense-organ of the knower, which is not perceived for the sake of its thinness in spite of having its radiance.

The *Khyātivādīns* would raise an objection that, if the yellowish of the bilious thing which is situated within the eye-sense-organ of the knower then why does it not grasp the yellowish which is the shelter of the bilious thing? The significant meaning of this problem of the *Khyativādīns* that, the ray of eye-sense-

organ becomes connected with the yellowish of the bilious thing. In the same manner, the bilious thing which is the shelter of yellowish also becomes connected with the ray of eye-sense-organ in that time. As a result, if it is possible to perceive the yellowish which exists in the bilious thing through the eye-sense-organ then why not the thing which is the shelter of the yellowish is perceived?

As a rejoinder Śālikanātha Miśra has given the answer in his *Prakaraṇapañcikā* that, the thing which is the shelter of an object may not be taken for the sake of thinness. For example, the radiant thing which is the shelter of the ray of light not being taken in spite of the acceptance of the ray of light in some of the cases. In this present case the bilious thing also is not taken due to its thinness which is the shelter of yellowish in spite of its connection with the ray of eye-sense-organ. In the case of the yellow-conch the illusion becomes originated due to the absence of knowledge of discrimination between an apprehension and a memory.

Again an objection may be raised against the Prābhākaras that, the person usages the sweet thing as the bitter thing if he feels this bitterness due to the similarity of that bitter thing which he perceived in previous time.

A question may be raised that, in which manner that person will accept the bitter-juice qualified by the bitterness which exists in the bilious thing?

In reply, the *Akhyātivādīns* would say that, that person must have tasted the bitter-juice in another birth which was not tasted in previous time of the present birth.

Again an objection may be raised against the Prābhākaras that, the death is proved as a destroyer of the impression. If the impression becomes destroyed through the state of death then the bitterness may not be remembered by the new-born baby which bitterness was felt in another birth.

In response to this, the *Akhyātivādīns* would say that, they do not accept the destruction of the impression through the birth and death. So, according to them, the bitterness which was felt in another birth may be remembered by the new-born baby in the present birth. The Prābhākaras have been pointed out that, the another school also accepts the memory of those things which were felt in another birth.¹²

The *Khyātivādīns* may raise such objection that, the Prābhākaras may not give the explanation about the case of ‘dual moon’ like the other erroneous cases.

The objection is encountered in the following way. Śālikanātha Mīśra has been accomplished that, they necessarily may explain the case of dual moon in spite of the non-acceptance of any type of the erroneous cognition. They point out that, if two fingers exist in front of the knower’s eye-sense-organs then the sense-organs become appeared in different forms. The cognition of dual moon is

originated from the connection between the moon and rays of the eye-sense-organ of the knower. In this case, the perceptual cognition of the dual moon is not illusory; but, the usage of duality which exists in the moon is illusory in accordance with the *Akhyativadīns*.

Śālikanātha Mīśra has been pointed out that, no cognition can give its own object. For this reason, there is no invalid or erroneous cognition.

The *Prābhākaras* said that, the ‘silverness’ does not exist in the shell. As a result, it is not possible to co-exist between ‘this’ and ‘the silver’.

Subsequently, the *Naiyāyikas* said that, the person who is interested to collect the silver, would not be induced to the ‘this’ if there was the absence of the co-existent cognition. The person who is interested to collect the silver would be induced to the ‘this’ if he identifies the ‘this’ with the silver. To establish this conclusion the *Naiyāyikas* supplied an argument that is : “ *Vivādādhyāsitaṃ rajatavijñānaṃ purovartivastuvisayaṃ, tadarthinastatra niyamena pravartakatvāt. Yadyadarthinam yatra niyamena pravartayati tat tadviṣayaṃ, yathā samīcīnarajatajñānaṃ* ”.

The significance of this argument is : the subject of the cognitive state ‘this is silver’ is ‘this’. Because, the person who is interested to collect the silver, he induces to the ‘this’ regularly.

The *Prābhākaras* said that, the perception of the ‘this’ originates with the connection between the object which exists in front of the knower and the his sense-organ. After that, the reformation of the silver is enlightened due to the similar cognition between the silver which was cognized in previous time and ‘thisness’. The remembrance of the silver originates from that reformation. So, the connection between the ‘this’ and the sense-organ of the knower is not the direct cause of the remembrance of the silver. That connection is the cause of causes. So, the subject of the cognitive state ‘this is silver’ is not that object which exists in front of the knower.

The *Prābhākaras* said that, there is not only the difference between the ‘this’ and ‘silver’ is unaccepted but also the difference between those two types of cognition is aalso not admitted. The *Prābhākaras* point out that, it is necessary to know that the objects of the two types of cognition is contradictory for knowing the difference between the two types of cognition. The knower does not feel it.

An objection may be raised against the *Prābhākaras* that, why does there not appear of the difference between the ‘this’ and ‘silver’ in the valid knowledge?

In reply, the *Prābhākaras* said that, the ‘this’ and ‘silver’ are same in the valid knowledge. The object is one in the valid cognition. There the ‘difference’ does not exist. For this reason, the absence of knowledge of discrimination exists

in the valid cognition. But, the ‘difference’ between the ‘this’ and ‘silver’ does not appear in the invalid or erroneous cognition in spite of the existence of ‘difference’.

There are different types of opinion between the *Khyātivādins* and *Akhyātivādins* with regard to this question --- what is the subject of the judgement ‘this is silver’? For this reason, the *Prābhākaras* tried to prove about the nature of ‘subject’ before the establishment of the theory of ‘*akhyāti*’. At first, we have to know that, what is the ‘subject’?

Śālikanātha Miśra defines the ‘subject’(*viśaya*) in his *Prakaraṇapañcikā* as such : “*Ya evārtha yasyām samvidibhāsate vedyah sa eva nānāddhi vidyadvedyasya lakṣaṇam*”. The significance of this definition is : that which is appeared in the presence of a particular cognition is the subject of that cognition.

The *Prābhākara* school established that, the ‘silver’ is the ‘subject’ (‘*viśaya*’) in the ‘shell-silver’ case. Because, the ‘silver’ is appeared in this cognition and the shell does not appear in the same. If the ‘shell’ were appeared in the cognition then the usages would be followed by the word ‘shell’, but actually it is not seen. So, the ‘shell’ is not the subject of that cognition. The silver is the subject of that cognition.¹³

After the *Prābhākara* schools' opinion, the *Khyātivādīns* may point out that, in the 'shell-silver' case, actually the subject is 'the shell'. But, the shell does not appear by nature in that cognition, it is appeared in another appearance.

In reply, the *Prābhākara* school point out that, a thing appears in another appearance which is completely contradictory in nature. Because, a thing does not appear in another appearance.

The *Prābhākara* school established that a thing does not appear in another appearance with an inferential statement that is: “*Śukti rajatatvena na prakāśate tadrūpenāsattvāt, yadvadrūpenāsat tattvenākarena na prakāśate, yathā vyoma kamalarūpeneti*”. The significance of this inferential statement is : the shell does not appear as the form of silver at any time. Because, the entity of the shell as the form of silver does not exist. The thing is non-existent as the form of a thing that non-existent thing does not appear as that form. For example, the ether does not appear as the lotus. Similarly, the shell has not the non-existence as the form of silver so, the shell does not appear as the silver. For this reason, the shell is not the subject of the statement 'this is silver'.¹⁴

The *Prābhākara* school points out that, the perceptual cognition as 'this' gives rise to inclination to the thing which is lying in front of the knower and on the other hand, the cognition of 'the silver' generates inclination to the thing which

is specialized by the silverness. There are two types of cognition in this case. That thing is appeared in which cognition that thing is the subject of that cognition. Each cognition generates inclination to the respective subject. For this reason, these two types of cognition are valid too. These two types of cognition are not invalid . The *Khyātivādīns*' significance regarding the above-mentioned opinion of the *Prābhākara* school is : in the erroneous case, the thing which exists in front of the knower is not the silver and hence the silver-oriented appearance may not be originated with the connection(*sannikarṣa*) of the knower's sense-organ. For this reason, it is out of the question for the origination of the silver-oriented knowledge.

Considering above, the *Prābhākara* school points out that, in the erroneous case, the universal part of the shell is accepted to the knower with the connection between the knower's sense-organ and that thing which exists in front of the knower. The particular part of the shell is not accepted by the knower for the blames etc. of the knower. The particular part of the shell is the distinguisher (*bhedaka*) between the shell and the silver. The remembrance of the silver originates for the sake of similarity between the silver and the universal part of that shell. The 'thatness' (*tattvāmśa*) becomes extincted owing to mental blame etc. of the knower. For this reason, the difference between the appearance of the silver and the appearance of the universal part of the shell is not accepted to the knower.

The *Prābhākaras* said that, the cognition become erroneous due to the future exercise of the use of cognition. The *Prābhākaras* point out with various examples that, the valid cognition also cannot use as valid due to the fruitlessness of the use of the cognition. For example, the ice is the water by nature. But, the ice does not use as the water. But, the ice is actually the water in spite of the fact that ice cannot perform for the necessity of the water. We cannot drink the ice etc. But, if anybody thinks that the ice is equal with the water then the cognition would not be erroneous. But, this type of feelings is used as erroneous for the sake of uselessness of the use of water in the ice¹⁵.

A question is raised that, almost all Indian Philosophers explain the state of dream as erroneous; so, in what sense the state of dream explained by the *Prābhākaras*? According to the *Khyātivādins*, the state of dream is a type of particular erroneous cognition. From this particular erroneous cognition, fear etc. have been originated. But, the *Akhyātivādins* do not accept the erroneous cognition. So, they also do not accept the state of dream as the erroneous cognition. In the state of dream, that type of substance is not perceived which is similar with that any object perceived in previous time. So, there is no thing which enlightens the reformation. The memory cannot be originated without the reformation. So, in what manner the *Akhyātivādins* will explain the dreaming state? This question can be raised against the *Prābhākaras*.

The *Prābhākaras* said that, the cognition of dreaming state also is a state of memory. In that case, *adr̥ṣṭa* etc. are enlightened the reformation. As a result, a state of memory is originated in connection with the dreaming state.

The *Akhyātivādīns* said that, in what cases it is possible to think concerning objects which are perceived by the knower in previous time. The thinking of objects which were perceived by the knower in previous time and thinking of the similar cognition of the thing which exists in front of the knower with the thing which perceived in previous time --- these are the factors of enlightening the case of dreaming state. For example, if anybody thinks about a thing before sleeping then that thing is originated in dream.

Anyathākhyātivādīns have raised an objection against the *Akhyātivādīns* about the opinion of the validity of all types of cognition. The *Naiyāyikas* said that, the *Prābhākaras* cannot accept the validity of all illusory cases. Because, 'the yellow conch' ---this type of cognition originates the 'white conch' due to the bilious fever of the knower. The illusion is originated by this type of blame. The *Naiyāyikas* said that, the knower's sense-organ being connected with the conch the whiteness is not accepted by the knower due to the blame of the knower's sense-organ. But, the conchness is accepted by the knower. The yellowish is accepted by the knower's sense-organ which exists in the knower's sense-organ(eye) due to the

bilious fever etc. The yellowish is connected with the knower's sense-organ as the indirect relation (*jñānalakṣaṇasannikarṣa*). After that, 'the yellow conch'--- this type of particular erroneous cognition originates. It is mentionable that, the yellowish appears as the existence in the conch besides the non-appearance as the existence in the yellow-thing¹⁶.

The *Naiyāyikas* point out that, in what way the *Akhyātivādīns* explain the others erroneous case, in the same manner they cannot explain this erroneous case. Because, the cognition originates after the connection between the knower's sense-organ and the white conch which exists in front of the knower and there is no any similarity between this cognition and any yellow thing perceived in the previous time. As a result, the *Prābhākaras* cannot say that, the reformation has enlightened of this thing which perceived in previous time due to the similarity between that thing and that universal cognition which is originated with the connection of the knower's sense-organ with the white conch. The *Naiyāyikas* say that, what factor enlightens the reformation in this case in accordance with the *Prābhākaras*?

The above-mentioned objection is faced by Śālikanātha in the following way. Śālikanātha Miśra said in his *Prakaraṇapañcikā* that 'the yellow conch' would be explained by them like the others erroneous case. They will explain this case with the two types of valid cognition. But, there is a distinction between the others

erroneous cases and ‘the yellow conch’ case. The fruitless inclination becomes originated due to the absence of knowledge of discrimination between the two types of cognition (perception and memory) and that two parts (universal and particular) in the others erroneous cases. But, in ‘the yellow conch’ case, the ‘thisness’ of the conch and conchness are accepted by the knower due to the connection between the sense-organ of the knower and the white conch. But, the whiteness of the conch is not accepted by the knower due to the bilious fever of the knower. In that case, the yellowish is also accepted by the knower which exists in the sense-organ of the knower. But, the substance which is the locative case of the yellowish is not accepted by the knower. So, in this case, two types of cognition also are perceived. The first type of perception is of the substance like ‘this’ which is qualified by ‘conchness’ and the second type of perception is of the quality like ‘yellowish’. But, in this case, the substance becomes perceptible if it is devoid of quality. On the other hand, in this case, that quality becomes perceptible which is devoid of substance. The ‘difference’ between the conch and yellowish also is not perceptible in this case.

A question may be raised to the *Prābhākaras* that, why they accept the ‘difference’ between the conch and yellowish ?

In reply, the *Akhyātivādīns* said that, each substance is depending on any quality and each quality is depending on any substance. In this case, a substance

which is devoid of any quality and a quality which is devoid of any substance become perceptible. As a result, the difference between the substance and quality is not acceptable due to mutually desirability in both of them. So, 'the yellow conch'---this type of cognition originates due to the absence of knowledge of discrimination between the conch and yellowish.

In the same manner, the cognition of bitterness originates in the sweetmeat. The sweetness is not accepted in the sweetmeat due to bile in the sense-organ of the taste; but the bitterness is accepted which exists in the sense-organ of the taste. According to the *Prābhākaras*, the sweetmeat is accepted but, the sweetness does not accept which exists in the sweetmeat. Again, the bitterness is accepted but the bile-substance does not accept which is the locus of the bitterness. In this way, the 'difference' between the substance which is devoid of any quality and the quality which is devoid of any substance is not accepted due to the mutually desirability in both of them. The sweetmeat is used as bitterness due to the absence of knowledge of discrimination.

The *Prābhākara* school of Philosophers points out that, the nature of sense-organs is as such that, they produce the valid knowledge.

After that argument some philosophers point out that, distance, inability of the sense-organs, inattentiveness etc. interrupt the natural ability of the production of the valid knowledge and give rise to the invalid knowledge.

Prābhākara said that, there is not only the absence of two different cognitions but also the absence of two different objects. *Prābhākara* said that, the object of a cognition is ‘this’ and the another object of a cognition is ‘the silver’. When a person who is interested to collect the silver, he would unable to get the silver in spite of going forward, because he cannot differentiate the two cognitions and also two objects.

To establish the theory of ‘non-error’ (*akhyātivāda*), *Prābhākara* gave an argument that is as such : “ *Yathārthah sarve vipratipannah samdehavibhramah, pratyayatvāt ghatādipratyayavat*”. The inferential subject of this argument is ‘ *sarve vipratipannah samdehavibhramah*’, probandum is ‘*yathārthatva*’, probans is ‘*pratyatva*’ and example is ‘*ghatādipratyaya*’. The significance of this statement is the ‘*jñanatva*’ and ‘*yathārthatva*’ exist in the knowledge of pot. In this way, *Prabhakara* proved the concomitance rule between the ‘*jñanatva*’ or ‘the attribute of knowledge’ and ‘*yathārthatva*’ or ‘attribute of validity’. In this way, *Prābhākara* established that, all types of cognition are valid. There is no concept about the erroneous cognition.

Śālikanātha Mīśra gave an argument in his *Prakaraṇapañcikā* from the above-mentioned view-point in order to establish the theory of ‘*akhyati*’ which argument is as such : “*Yadi cārtham parityajya kācidvuddhiḥ pravartate.*

Vyabhicāravati svārthe katham viśvasakaranam?”..66..

Jñānasya vyabhicāre hi viśvasah kimnivandhanah?

Jñānasya vyabhicāre’ pi jñānam yat satyameva tat”..69..

The significance of that argument is as such : if the cognition is being invalid then we will loss our confidence to all cognitions. As a result, all usages concerning the whole Universe would be interrupted¹⁷.

It is mentionable that ‘knowledge’ or ‘cognition’ is one type of feeling. The main characteristic feature of this feeling is ‘truthfulness’. For this reason, the another name of cognition is called accurate knowledge or ‘*pramā*’. The way of gaining this accurate knowledge or ‘*pramā*’ is ‘*pramāna*’. If there is any obstacle in the process of gaining knowledge, the knowledge will remain invalid. The obstacle or sublation may become in different ways namely, defective sense-organs of the knower, absence of sufficient light etc. These are not knowledge. These are the sublating categories of the procedure of gaining knowledge. If there is no truthfulness in feelings, it cannot be considered as knowledge. So, the cognition

may not become illusory. Western Philosopher John Hospers also said in his famous book *An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis* that, the knowledge has to be true. Truthfulness is the necessary characteristic feature of knowledge.

END NOTES

1. Miśra, Vācaspati, Bhaṭṭāchārya, Mohan, Śrī, Śrī (Ed. & Trs.), *Bhāmati*, Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, Kolkata, 1973, page: 38-39 (Introductory Chapter)
2. *ibid.*, page: 69 (Śaṅkara Bhāṣya)
3. Miśra, Śālikanātha, *Prakaraṇapañcikā*, Bhaṭṭa, Nārāyaṇa, Joypuri, Nyāyasiddhi, Śāstri, Subrahmaṇya, Śrī (Ed.), Kasi Hindu Viswavidyalaya, Varanasi, 1961, Nayavīthi prakaraṇa (Part- III). page: 43
4. *ibid.*, page: 44
5. *ibid.*, page: 44
6. *ibid.*, page: 44
7. *ibid.*, page: 45
8. *ibid.*, page: 46-50
9. *ibid.*, page: 50-51
10. *ibid.*, page: 52

11. *ibid.*, page: 53

12. *ibid.*, page: 54-57

13. *ibid.*, page: 47-48

14. *ibid.*, page: 49

15. *ibid.*, page: 50-52

16. *ibid.*, page: 53-56

17. *ibid.*, page: 58-59

CHAPTER-IV

The establishment of the theory of '*anyathākhyāti*' refuting '*akhyātivāda*'

Part-I

A Critique of '*Akhyātivāda*' by the Naiyāyikas

We have to know as to the nature of valid knowledge ('*pramā*') in accordance with Gangeśa before the establishment of the theory of '*anyathākhyāti*'.

Gangeśa defines '*pramā*' as such: "*Yatra yadasti tatra tasyānubhavaḥ pramā* ".

Actually, the intuition ('*anubhava*') of that entity in that locus ('*adhikaraṇa*') is called '*pramā*' which entity definitely remains there.¹ To exemplify it we may say that, the existence of the silverness remains in the 'this thing' ('*idam*') like the silver in the valid knowledge like '*idam rajatam*'. So, the silverness-oriented knowledge in the this thing is called '*prama*'. On the other hand, the silverness does not remain in the 'this thing' ('*idam*') like 'the shell' ('*śukti*') in spite of this situation, the knower gains the knowledge of silver; it is called invalid knowledge ('*apramā*').

Prabhākara upheld that, ‘*nanu sarvajñānānām yathārthatvāt pramālakṣaṇe viśeṣaṇavyavarttyaprasiddheh viśeṣaṇavaiyarthyaṁ anyathākhyātou mānābhāvāt*’. Actually, ‘*tadabhāvavat viśeṣyaka tatprakāraka*’—such kind of cognition is not proved in accordance with Prābhākara. In consideration of Prābhākara, ‘thisness’ (*idanta*) is a perceptual cognition and ‘the cognition of silver’ is a remembrance in the ‘shell-silver’ case. The difference between those two is not accepted to the knower by virtue of blames. Not only the difference between these two kinds of cognition is not accepted to the knower on account of blames but also these two types of things like ‘the shell’ and ‘the silver’. The person who is interested to collect the silver (*rajatārthī*) undertakes to the shell for the sake of those two kinds of cognition whose difference is not accepted. So, it is not necessary to accept that shell-oriented cognition, shell is qualified by the silverness. If we accept the shell-oriented knowledge then the shell is specified by the silverness and the adjective like ‘*tadvadviśeṣyakatva*’ is necessary in the definition of ‘*pramā*’ (‘valid cognition’) to differentiate it from the invalid cognition (*apramā*). But, someone who does not accept the erroneous cognition (*tadabhāvavadviśeṣyaka tatprakāraka jñāna*), according to them, such adjective is unnecessary.

In pursuance of the Prābhākaras that cognition would be necessarily '*tadvadviśeṣyaka*' which is '*tatprakāraka*'.

Why would not be accepted the theory of '*anyathākhyāti*' ?

After the above-mentioned question Prābhākaras say that, '*anyathākhyātau mānābhāvāt*'. Actually, there is no any evidence in the theory of '*anyathākhyāti*' in accordance with the Prābhākaras.

To refute the above-said argument, the Naiyāyikas deliberate that, '*anyathākhyātau mānābhāvāt*' means 'there is no evidence in the anyathākhyāti'. So, the Prābhākaras say that, there is the absence of the evidence in the locus like '*anyathākhyāti*'. But, the Prābhākaras cannot say it; because, they actually do not accept such locus like '*anyathākhyāti*'. 'The absence of anything' is not established in any unproved locus¹.

For this reason, Mathurānātha, commentator of Gangeśa has given the meaning of the term like '*anyathākhyātau mānābhāvāt*' as such: there is no evidence as to the term 'otherwiseness' ('*anyathātva*') which remains in the cognition. Actually, 'otherwiseness' ('*anyathātva*') means 'that adjectiveness which is limited by the attribute of the noun/subject which is the locus of the absence of that' ('*tadabhāvavadviśeṣyakatvāvaccinna tatprakāratva*'). The Prābhākaras' opinion

is that: ‘that adjectiveness which is limited by the attribute of the subject which is the locus of the absence of that’ (*tadabhāvavadviśeṣyakatvāvaccinna tatprakāraakatva*) remains in the unsuccessful or abortive desire (*visamvādi iccā*). Such unfruitful desire does not remain in cognition. The person who is interested to collect the silver (*rajatārthī*) must undertake the shell once in a way for the sake of such desire which is the cognition of the shell qualified by the silverness. The silverness which is limited by the attribute of the subject/noun like the shell (*śuktiviśeṣyakatvāvaccinna rajatatvaprakāraakatva*) remains in such desire. But, the shell is such locus which is specified by the absence of the silverness.. It is called ‘otherwiseness’ (*anyathātva*).

The *Prābhākara* school has refuted the above-mentioned argument by dint of the statement as:

“ *tathāhi---* *rajatārthipravṛttiviśayatvaṃ rajatatvaprakāra-*
kānubhavaviśayatvavyapyam rajatārthipravṛttiviśayamātravṛttidharmatvāt
rajatamātravṛttidharmavaditi anyathākhyātivapyam siddhātīti. Aprāptakālatvaṃ,
rajatamātravṛttiṅcopādhih”² being doubted the *Naiyāyikas*’ opinion concerning

the ‘*anyāthākhyāti*’. The *Naiyāyikas* said that, the attribute of a subject of the inclination(*pravṛttiviśayatva*) of the person who is interested to collect the silver(*rajatārthī*) is pervaded with the attribute of the subject of that intuition or cognition which is specified by the adjective ‘silverness’(*rajatatvaprakāra-*

anubhavaviṣayatva’). Actually, there is an invariable concomitance relation [*vyāpti*] between the *rajatārthī*’s *pravṛtṭiṣayatva*’ and *’rajatattvaprakāra anubhavaviṣayatva*’). If that statement is accepted then it also would be accepted “the attribute of the subject of the intuition which is specified by the adjective like ‘silverness’ (*’rajatatvaprakāra anubhavaviṣayatva*’) in the shell”. Because, the person who is interested to collect the silver (*’rajatārthī*) becomes unsuccessful being engaged to the shell at some times. Such attribute of the subject of the unfruitful or abortive inclination (*’viphalā-pravṛtṭiṣayatva*’) is accepted to all. If the attribute of the subject of the unfruitful inclination is pervaded with the attribute of the subject of that cognition which is qualified by the silverness then the attribute of that subject of the knowledge which is qualified by the silverness would be accepted in the shell. The shell-oriented intuition which is qualified by the silverness, is called ‘theory of error with regard to otherwise’ (*’anyathākhyāti*’). In that intuitive cognition, the ‘probans’ or ‘the attribute which remains only in the subject which is the subject of the inclination of that person who is interested to collect the silver (*’rajatārthipravṛtṭi-ṣayamātravṛtṭidharmatva*’). As a result, the ‘probahdum’ or ‘the pervasiveness which is the characteristic feature of that intuition which is qualified by the silverness’ (*’rajatatvaprakāra anubhavaviṣayatvavyāpyatva*’) also remains in the shell-oriented intuition which is qualified by the silverness. In this way, the

attribute of the subject of the inclination of the person who is interested to collect the silver, that is proved as pervaded of the characteristic feature of that intuition which is qualified by the silverness. If the invariable concomitance relation is accepted in the shell then the ‘*anyathākhyāti*’ or ‘*tadabhāvavadaviśeṣyakatvāvaccinna tatprakāraakatva*’ is accepted.

The Naiyāyikas demonstrated another argument to establish the theory of ‘*anyathākhyāti*’. The argument is as such: “*Rajatatvam arajataavr̥ttijñānaviśayatāvaccedakam arajataviśayapravr̥ttihetujñānaprakāra- katvāt, śuktitvavat*”. In this argument, the inferential statement (‘*pakṣa*’) is ‘the silverness’(‘*rajatatva*’), the probandum is ‘the attribute of the limiter of the subjectness of that cognition which remains in the non-silver(‘*arajataavr̥ttijñānaviśayatāvaccedakatva*’) and the probans is: ‘the adjectiveness of that cognition which is the cause of that inclination whose object is the non-silver’(‘*arajataviśayapravr̥ttihetujñānaprakāraakatva*’).

‘The attribute of the limiter’(‘*avaccedaka*’) means ‘adjectiveness’(‘*prakāraakatva*’). So, actually the probandum is: ‘the adjectiveness of the objectness of that cognition which remains in the non-silver’(‘*arajataavr̥ttijñānaviśayatāprakāraakatva*’). In the shell-silver erroneous cognition, ‘the silverness’ is the inferential subject(‘*pakṣa*’). The adjectiveness of the attribute of the subject of

that cognition(*jñānaviṣayatā*) which remains in the shell and such adjectiveness(*prakāraṅkatva*) remains in such inferential subject (*pakṣa*). The probans(*hetu*) is : ‘the adjectiveness of that cognition which is the cause of that inclination whose object is the non-silver’. The person who is interested to collect the shell’ (*śuktyārthī*) goes forward to collect the shell. The object of such inclination (*pravṛtti*) is non-silver (*arajata-viṣayaka pravṛtti*).

‘This is shell’ ---such cognitive state is the cause of that shell-oriented inclination. The shellness is the adjective of this cognition. As a result, the adjectiveness of the cognition (*jñānaprakāraṅkatva*) remains in the shellness (*śuktitva*). So, the probans remains in the shellness. The attributeness(*prakāratva*) of the attribute of the subject of the cognition (*jñānaviṣayatā*) also remains in the shell or non-silver. So, both the probandum and probans remain in the shellness. The shellness is the example of this inferential statement.

It is necessary to clarify the above-mentioned statement. The inferential subject (*pakṣa*) is ‘the silverness’ (*rajatatva*) in this statement. The probandum (*sādhya*) is: ‘the attribute of the limiter of the subjectness of that cognition (*jñānaviṣayatāvaccadakatva*)’ which remains in the non-silver (*arajata*). The attribute of the limiter (*avaccadakatva*) means ‘the adjectiveness’ (*prakāratva*). So, the probandum is ‘the adjectiveness ascertained by the subjectness of that

cognition which remains in the non-silver’ (*‘arajataavr̥ttijñānaviṣayatānirūpita prakṣratva’*). Actually, ‘the adjectiveness is ascertained by the subjectness of that cognition which remains in the non-silver like the shell etc.’ is the probandum in this cognition. If the adjectiveness ascertained by the subjectness of that cognition which remains in the non-silver’, it remains in the silverness. The cognitive state also would be accepted like ‘the cognition of non-silver qualified by the silverness’ (*‘arajata-viśeṣyaka rajatatvaprakāraka jñāna’*). It is an erroneous otherwiseness cognition (*‘anyathākhyāti’*)³.

The *Prābhākara* school of *Mimāṃsaka* has shown the fallacy of ‘*upādhi*’ after that argument. The *Prābhākaras* point out that, the ‘*rajataavr̥ttitva*’ or ‘the non-existenceness of the silver’ is the ‘*upādhi*’ in this argument. We know that, the definition of ‘*upādhi*’ is as such: ‘*sādhyavyapakatve sati sādhanāvyāpakatvaṃ*’. In this case, the ‘*rajataavr̥ttitva*’ or ‘the non-existenceness of the silver’ is pervasive than the probandum or ‘the adjectiveness ascertained by the subjectness of that cognition which remains in the non-silver’ (*‘arajata-avr̥tti jñānaviṣayatānirūpitaprakāratva’*). This probandum remains in the shellness or non-silverness in accordance with the *Prabhakara*. Hence, the theory of ‘otherwiseness’ or ‘*anyathākhyāti*’ is not applicable.

The *Naiyāyikas* pointed out another argument to accomplish the ‘*anyathākhyāti*’. The argument is as such:

“*Vivādapadam rajatajñāna Śuktiviṣayakam*

Śuktau pravartakajñānatvāt”.

The significance of the above-mentioned argument is as such: the cause of the inclination to the shell of that person who is interested to collect the silver is as such form of cognition: ‘the substantive cognition of the shell which shell is qualified by the silvertness’ (“*śuktiviśeṣyaka rajatattvaprakāraka jñāna*”) in accordance with the *Naiyāyikas*. But, it is impossible for the *Prabhakaras* to accept as such cognition; because, they do not accept the erroneous cognition. For this reason, the *Naiyāyikas* point out that, the shell-oriented cognition which is qualified by the silverness is a matter of doubt. It is the cause of shell-oriented inclination. The silverness-oriented cognition (*‘rajatatvaprakāraka jñāna’*) is the inferential subject (*‘pakṣa’*) in this statement. ‘The subjectness of the shell’ (*‘śuktiviśeṣyakatva’*) is the probandum. ‘The attribute of that cognition which is the cause of the inclination whose subject is the shell’ (*‘śuktiviśeṣyaka-pravṛttijanaka-jñānatva’*) is the probans in this cognition.

The Prābhākaras admitted that, the above-mentioned argument also is fallacious. Because, the probandum like the subjectness of the shell' (*'śuktiviśeṣyakatva'*) does not remain in the inferential subject⁴.

Actually, the Nyāya-thinkers upheld that, the identical cognition between the shell and silver is the cause of the unfruitful inclination to the shell of the person who is interested to collect the silver. But, the Prabhakaras do not accept such kind of 'theory of otherwiseness' (*'anyathākhyāti'*). According to them (Prābhākara), the knowledge of difference (*'bhedāgraha'*) between 'the silver' and 'thisness' and also the presence separately between the 'this' and 'silver' are the causes of that unfruitful inclination.

The identical cognition of the desirous thing (*'iṣṭabheda jñāna'*) is the cause of the unfruitful inclination in accordance with the Nyāya-thinkers. In this respect, '*iṣṭa'*' means 'the object of desire'. If any person is desirous to collect the silver then that person goes forward to the 'this thing' (*'idam'*) which remains in front of the knower for the sake of the identical cognition of the silver to this thing. But, if we accept the cognition whose subject is the identical with the desirous thing as the cause of the inclination then we also have to accept it in the cause of unfruitful inclination. As for example, when the person who is interested to collect the silver

(*‘rajatārthī*) goes forward to collect the shell in that case, the identical cognition of the silver in the shell is the cause of that inclination.

Actually, the cause of the fruitless inclination (*‘visamvādipravṛtti’*) which is characterized by the silverness to the shell of that person who is interested to collect the silver is the identical cognition between the shell and the silver or the knowledge which is qualified by the shell and characterized by the silver in accordance with the *Nyāya*-thinkers. On the other hand, the Prabhakaras’ view concerning error, the fruitless inclination which is characterized by the silverness originates in the shell by reason of the absence of knowledge of discrimination between the ‘idam’ or the foremost thing and the silver which exists far from the knower and the presence of the shell and the silver separately.

That the absence of knowledge of discrimination of the desired thing (*‘iṣṭabhedāgraha’*) is the cause of inclination is accepted by the Prābhākara school of Mīmāṃsā. Refuting this argument, the *Nyāya*-thinkers say that, in which case, there is the knowledge of difference of the desired thing on account of the particular blame etc. in that case and also seen the inclination. For example, ‘the conch is yellow, not white’ ... in this case, if *‘śvetatvavyāpya śamkhyatvavān ayaṃ*’ or ‘this is full of conchness which is to be pervaded by whiteness’. In the same manner the knowledge of pervasion of whiteness in the conch has to be

originated. In consequence of this particular perceptual knowledge '*śamkyah śvetah*' or 'the white conch'..... the inclination originates of that person who is interested to collect the white thing etc. to the conch. The white-thing is the desired thing to that person who is interested to collect the white thing. This identical knowledge of the white is the cause of the inclination in accordance with the *Naiyāyikas*. Because, the *Naiyāyikas*' point of view is that, the identical knowledge of the desired thing is the cause of the inclination. But, behind such point of view, the absence of knowledge of discrimination is the cause of inclination. According to them, it is not possible to become inclined to this case.

The *Mīmāṃsakas*' point of view is that, if we say that, the identical knowledge of the desired thing is the cause of inclination then the desired thing is yellow to whom it is not possible for him to become inclined for the knowledge of 'the conch is yellow'. Because, the person who has bile-disease, he knows that, the conch is not yellow. So, he infers that, '*ayamśamkhah no pītah śamkhatvāt*' or 'this conch is not yellow' as it is known with the conchness'. With this inference the knowledge of difference of the desired thing exists by that person who is interested to collect the yellow thing. As a result, the cause of the inclination as the absence of knowledge of discrimination in accordance with the *Prābhākara* does not exist. But, according to the *Naiyāyikas*, there is an identical knowledge of the desired yellow of that person who is interested to collect the yellow thing with the

knowledge ‘the conch is yellow’. So, the Nyāya-thinkers accept this inclination. Yet, it is not accepted to all that, the inclination originates from the knowledge ‘the conch is yellow’ for the particular blames etc. The Naiyāyikas’ opinion is that, the identical knowledge of the desired thing which is the cause of inclination that exists in this case. But, in the Prābhākara’s opinion, the absence of knowledge of discrimination of the desired yellow that does not exist in this case; because, the knowledge of difference (*‘bheda-graha’*) becomes with the conchness (*‘probans’*) in that case. For this reason, the Prābhākaras raised the opposite the standpoint and say that, the absence of knowledge of discrimination of the desired thing is the cause of inclination which is reasonable.⁵

Part-II

‘Anyathākhyātivādasiddhāntapakṣa’

Both the Prābhākaras and the Naiyāyikas upheld that, the desired silver (*‘iṣṭa rajata’*) and the cognition of thisness (*‘idam’*) are the causes of the valid inclination like ‘the cognition of silver qualified by the silverness’. But, there is the diversion (*‘vyābhicāra’*) between ‘the inclination’ and ‘the cognition of thisness’. Because, the inclination of the knower also is created by ‘the adjectiveness which is the limiter of the desirousness’ (*‘iṣṭatāvaccedaka prakāra’*) and ‘the cognition of thisness’ (*‘idamviśeṣyaka jñāna’*) in ‘the cognition of this is not silver’ (*‘idam na rajatam’*). But, ‘the inclination concerning thisness’ (*‘idamviśeṣyaka pravṛtti’*) may not be created by anybody in ‘the cognition of this is not silver’. Nevertheless, both the object (*‘viśaya’*) and also the subject (*‘viśeṣya’*) are the desired thing (*‘iṣṭa’*) in ‘the cognition of this is not silver’ (*‘idam na rajatam’*). So, it is necessary to accept the inclination in this case also. To refute this, we have to accept such cognition which is *‘iṣṭatāvaccedaka rajatatvaniṣṭha prakāratānirūpita idamnistha viśeṣyatāśālī’* as the cause of that inclination.

The Prābhākaras said after that, ‘the attribute of the absence of knowledge of discrimination’ (*‘bhedāgrahatva’*) remains in the cognition of ‘this is silver’. So, ‘the attribute of the absence of knowledge of discrimination’ (*‘bhedāgrahatva’*)

may be the limiter (*‘avaccedaka’*) of the causation (*‘kāranatā’*) in such cognitive state.

The Naiyāyikas said after the Prābhākaras’ above-mentioned argument that, the acceptance of ‘the attribute of the cognition of thisness qualified by the silverness’ (*‘idamviśeṣyaka rajatatvaprakāraka jñānatva’*) is lighter (*‘lāghava’*) than the acceptance of ‘the attribute of the absence of the knowledge of discrimination’ (*‘bhedāgrahatva’*) as ‘the limiter of the causation’ (*‘kāranatāvaccedaka’*) in the causation of ‘this is silver’.

The certainty of the cause-effect relation is dependent upon the knowledge of co-existenceness between the cause and effect. If we accept the cognition of this qualified by the silverness as the cause of inclination then this kind of cognition will remain in previous time of that inclination and we will give the ‘anuvyavasaya’ of this cognition in the time of inclination. We also will give ‘the attribute of such cognition of this qualified by the silverness’ (*‘rajatatvaprakaratanirupita-idam-visesyaka jnanatva’*) as the subject (*‘viśaya’*) of that ‘anuvyavasaya’ of the cognition. By dint of this ‘anuvyavasāya’ the cause and the limiter of the cause (*‘kāranatāvaccedaka’*) regularly (*‘niyata’*) remain in the time of inclination. On the other hand, ‘the attribute of the absence of knowledge of discrimination’ (*‘bhedāgrahatva’*) does not regularly remain in the time of such inclination. For this reason, it is more justified to accept ‘the attribute of

knowledge of this qualified by silverness' (*idaṁviśeṣyaka-rajatatvaprakāra-
jñānatva*) as the limitor of the causation (*kāranatāvacedaka*).⁶

According to the Nyāya-thinkers, 'the cognition of silver qualified by the silverness' (*rajata-viśeṣyaka-rajatatvaprakāra jñāna*) is the cause of 'the inclination of silver qualified by the silverness' (*rajata-viśeṣyaka rajatatvaprakāra pravṛtti*). So, the valid cognition is the cause of the valid inclination. On the other hand, the false cognition is the cause of the false inclination. With reference to this context, Gaṅgeśa established an argument like:

“Viśāṁvādipravṛtṭih viśiṣṭajñānasādhyā, pravṛtṭitvāt, satyapravṛtṭivat”.⁷

According to the above-mentioned argument, the subject and adjective of an inclination they also will be the qualificand (*viśaya*) and adjective (*prakāra*) respectively of that cognition which is the cause of that inclination. By dint of this inferential statement, 'the inclination of the shell qualified by the silverness' (*śuktiviśeṣyaka rajatatvaprakāra jñāna*) --- it has been established. As a result, it is proved that, the erroneous inclination (*viśāṁvādī pravṛtti*) is the effect of 'the erroneous cognition of otherwiseness' (*anyathākhyāti*). Gaṅgeśa said that, any effect cannot be created without its cause.

The Prābhākaras apprehended that, if we accept the erroneous cognition as a cause of the invalid inclination then it would not be possible to assert the cause of the erroneous cognition. Because, the object and the operative relation of the sense-organs of the knower are the causes of the valid cognition. But, these do not remain in the erroneous cognition. For this reason, it would be necessarily accepted that, the erroneous cognition is deprived of the cause. If the erroneous cognition is deprived of the cause then it also would be accepted that, this erroneous cognition is eternal. Because, we know that, any existing category which is deprived of any cause that actually is an eternal category. Because the eternal entity are only uncaused.

After that argument, Gaṅgeśa said that, the particular cognition (*'viśiṣṭa jñāna'*) is the cause of the erroneous inclination. Through this particular cognition the blame, sense-organs etc. are proved as its causes. Actually, the blemished sense-organs are accepted as the particular cognition.

To refute the above-mentioned argument, the prabhakaras apprehended that, 'blame' actually is the sublating entity (*'vādhaka'*) of an effect, it may not be the cause of any effect at any time.

After that argument, Gaṅgeśa pointed out that, *'sarvato valavati hi.....'* as on. According to him, even though 'blame' (*'doṣa'*'s) may not be proved as the cause

besides 'error' notwithstanding that, the effect as the erroneous cognition which is proved by the inclination that may be the effect of the blame.⁸

Gangeśa Upādhyāy pointed out that, “*na ca bhedāgrahāt pravṛtṭyupapatterapi*” to prove that, the absence of knowledge of discrimination may not be the cause in the case of the fruitful and non-fruitful inclination both. *Gangeśa* said that, “*viparītacatuṣke yugapat pravṛtṭi-nivṛtṭyapatteh.....*” etc. The meaning of the technical term ‘*viparītacatuṣka*’ is as such: the case of the illusory cognition where the silver is the subject qualified by the attribute of tin-foilness (‘*rajate raṅgatvaparakāraka bhramajñāna*’). In the case of this illusory cognition, the qualifier is in the silver and on the other hand, the qualifier is the silverness in the tin-foil. This is the explanation of the *Nyāya*-philosophers. But, the *Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas* pointed out with regard to this explanation in another way. Because, there is nothing any illusory cognition in accordance with the *Prābhākaras*. According to the *Prābhākaras*, the perceptual cognition of the shell, the presence of the silverness and the absence of knowledge of discrimination between the shell and the silver---- this is the illusion in the shell-silver case. The person who is interested to collect the silver (‘*rajatārthī*’) goes forward to the shell and on the other hand, he comes back from the shell in the presence of such illusory cognition. Because, the perceptual cognition of the locus, the presence of

the silverness and the absence of knowledge of discrimination between the shell and silver ---these are the causes of the inclination of the desired person as to the silver in accordance with the *Prābhākara* school. In this case, the perceptual cognition of the locus as the shell, the presence of the silverness and the absence of knowledge of discrimination between the shell and the silver presented. For this reason, there is the inclination of the knower. Similarly, there is the completion of the knower also is presented. Because, there are the causes of the completion of the knower have also been presented. Because, there are the perceptual knowledge of the shell, the presence of the shellness and the absence of knowledge of discrimination between the shell and the substratum like ‘this’ (*idam*). So, there are the inclination and completion both are presented in the substratum like ‘this’. Those above-discussed cases are the unfruitful inclination and completion both. Now, we will discuss the fruitful cases in accordance with the *Prābhākara* school of *Mīmāṃsakas*. In the same manner, the perceptual knowledge of silver or ‘this’, the presence of silverness and the absence of knowledge of discrimination between the silver and the substratum like ‘this’ (*idam*) --- these are presented in the case of inclination. Again, there are the perceptual knowledge of the substratum, the presence of shellness and the absence of knowledge of discrimination between the shell and the substratum or ‘this’. So, there is the completion also in the substratum like ‘this’ (*idam*). So, it is established by the *Prābhākaras* that, the inclination

and completion both remain in the identical substratum simultaneously. But, it is not possible. For this reason, the absence of knowledge of discrimination may not become the cause in the case of fruitful and non-fruitful inclination and completion in accordance with the *Nyāya*-philosophers.

The *Prābhākara* school of *Mīmāṃsakas* said that, the absence of knowledge of discrimination (*bhedāgraha*) is the cause of the inclination and completion both of the fruitful (*saṁvādī*) and fruitless (*viśaṁvādī*). Refuting this argument Gangeśa demonstrated another objection. That argument is as such: “*Na ca bhedāgrahāt pravṛttyupapattirapi. Viparītacatuṣke yugapat pravṛttnivṛtтыapatteh.....*”. ‘*Viparītacatuṣke*’ is a technical term. It means ‘the illusory cognition of this silver qualified by shellness’. The silver and the shell are presented as the locative cases which are qualified by thisness. The silverness and the shellness are presented as imposing entities. In this illusory cognition, the shellness is the adjective (*prakāra*) in the silver which silver is presented by thisness again, the silverness is the adjective in the shell which shell is presented by thisness in this illusory case. This is the view of the *Naiyāyikas*. The *Prābhākaras* pointed out this illusory cognition in another way. According to the *Prābhākaras*, the perceptual cognition of the shell like thisness (*īdantena śuktipratyakṣa*,) the presence of silverness and the absence of knowledge of discrimination between the shell and the silver --- this is the illusion of the silver in

the shell by thisness. Similarly, the perceptual knowledge of the silver which silver is presented by thisness, the presence of the shellness and the absence of knowledge of discrimination between the shell and the silver --- these are the causes of this illusory cognition. The inclination and the completion are created of that person who is interested to collect the silver (*‘rajatārthī’*) in the case of this illusory cognition. Because, according to the *Prābhākaras*, the perceptual knowledge of the substratum (*‘dharmī’*), the presence of the silverness and the absence of knowledge of discrimination between the substratum and the silver --- these are the causes of the inclination of that person who is interested to collect the silver. In this case, the perceptual knowledge of the substratum as the shell which shell is presented by thisness, the presence of silverness and the absence of knowledge of discrimination of the silver in the shell which shell is presented by thisness. Because, the knower accepted the shell as the silver, so, the inclination creates in this way. Similarly, the completion also creates in this way. Because, the perceptual knowledge of the substratum (*‘dharmipratyakṣa’*), presence of the shellness and the absence of knowledge of discrimination between the ‘thisness’ and the shell --- all of these remain in this case which are the causes of the completion(*‘nivr̥ṭṭi’*). So, in the case of silver which silver is presented by thisness that silver is qualified by the shellness. And which shell is presented by thisness that shell is qualified by the silverness --- this is the illusory cognitive case which

is known as '*samuhalambana bhrama*'. Because, the subjectness ascertained by the adjectiveness as the silverness ('*rajatatvaaprakaratānirūpita viśesyata*') remains in the tin ('*rāṅga*') and the another type of subjectness ascertained by the adjectiveness of the tinfulness ('*raṅgatvaprakāratānirūpita viśeṣyatā*') remains in the silver. The tin ('*raṅga*') and the silver ('*rajata*') both of them are the objects of that cognition mainly. So, it is called '*samuhāḷambana*'.⁹

According to the Naiyāyikas, there is the knowledge of discrimination ('*bheda-graha*') of the silver in the illusory case of the tin in the silver. And there is also the knowledge of discrimination ('*bheda-graha*') of the tin in the illusory cognition of the silver in the tin. It would not be possible the apprehension like '*idaṃraṅgaṃ rajataṃ vā*' in the substratum like this for the sake of the existence of the knowledge of discrimination ('*bhed-graha*') of the silver in the silver. In the same manner, it would not be possible the apprehension like '*idaṃ raṅgaṃ rajataṃ vā*' in the substratum like this on account of the existence of the knowledge of discrimination of the tin in the tin. On the other hand, the Prābhākaras accept that apprehension. According to them, there is nothing any knowledge of discrimination between the shell and the silver due to blames; there is actually 'the absence of knowledge of discrimination' ('*bhedāgraha*'). If we accept the knowledge of

discrimination (*bhed-graha*) of the tin in the tin then it also would be accepted the theory of '*anyathākhyāti*'.¹⁰

According to the Prābhākaras, 'the absence of knowledge of discrimination' (*bhedāgraha*) is the cause of the inclination and completion both. According to them, the tin is presented to the knower by virtue of the attribute of glistening which remains in the silver. On the contrary, the silver is presented to the knower for the sake of the same attribute of glistening which also remains in the tin.

The Nyāya-thinkers upheld that, the difference of the silver is accepted in the silver due to blames; and for this reason, the illusion of that tin is created in that silver in the subsequent time. Again, the difference of the silver is accepted in the tin for the sake of blames.

According to the Naiyāyikas, the silver is not known by the silverness and the tin is not known by dint of the tinfulness. Because, if it would not be possible then the illusory cognition of tin in the silver and also the illusory cognition of the silver in the tin in the subsequent time. So, this illusory cognition has been created through the blames. The silver is not known to the knower as silverness and the tin also is not known to the knower as tinfulness for the sake of blames.¹¹

The Prābhākaras said that, ‘the blame’ is the cause of the inclination and completion both which ‘blame’ is accepted by the Naiyāyikas as the cause of the erroneous cognition. Actually, the ‘blame’ is necessary in accordance with both of them. But, the Prābhākaras cannot accept the argument given by the Naiyāyikas; because, there is nothing any erroneous cognition in view of the Prābhākaras. According to the Prābhākaras, ‘truthfulness’ (‘*satyatva*’) may not be the differentiator (‘*vyāvartyaka*’) of any cognition.

According to the Prābhākaras, the particular cognition (‘*viśiṣṭajñāna*’) is the cause of the fruitful inclination. But, there is no any particular cognition in previous time of the unfruitful inclination regularly in accordance with the Prābhākaras. If it would be accepted by the Prābhākaras then the theory of ‘*anyathākhyāti*’ also would be accepted. For this reason, the absence of knowledge of discrimination is the cause of the unfruitful inclination. ‘The absence of knowledge of discrimination (‘*rajata-bhedāgraha*’) of the silver’ means: the absence of the attribute of the subject/noun (‘*viśeṣyatvābhāva*’) of the difference cognition of the silver (‘*rajata-bheda-jñāna*’).¹²

The Naiyāyikas said that, “*jñānaṁ svaviṣaye pravartakaṁ*”. Or, the cognition originates the inclination to the subject of oneself. Being accepted this

rule, the cognition also would be ‘the shell-oriented qualified by the silverness’ (*‘śuktiviśeṣyaka-rajatatva-prakāraḥ’*) which is the cause of that inclination which also is ‘the shell-oriented qualified by silverness’ (*‘rajatatva-prakāra-śuktiviśeṣyaka pravṛtti’*). This kind of unfruitful inclination (*‘viśamvādi pravṛtti’*) is accepted by all. So, the unfruitful cognition also would be accepted which is the cause of the unfruitful inclination. It is called *‘anyathākhyāti’*.

The Naiyāyikas have been concluded their theory of error in this manner that, *“Tataḥ iṣṭajñānaṃ śuktou pravarttakam tadviśayakam tadvyāvahārahetutvāt. Svaviśaye tasyāsamarthyāt”*. According to this argument ‘the shell-oriented cognition qualified by silverness’ (*‘śuktiviśeṣyaka rajatatvaparakāra jñāna’*) is the cause of that ‘shell-oriented inclination qualified by the silverness’ (*‘śuktiviśeṣyaka-rajatatva-prakāra pravṛtti’*). Because, any kind of cognition does not create the inclination in the non-subject (*‘aviśeṣya’*) of own. Actually, the Naiyāyikas’ point of view is : the subject/noun (*‘viśeṣya’*) of the limiter (*‘avaccedaka’*) of the desirousness (*‘iṣṭatā’*) is also the subject (*‘viśeṣya’*) of the inclination (*‘pravṛtti’*).¹³

The Prābhākaras tried to refute the theory of *‘anyathākhyāti’* by dint of the argument: *“rajatajñānaṃ na śuktiviśayakam tatprativeddhavyāvahārahetutvāt”*.

The inferential subject of this argument is: ‘the silver-oriented cognition’ (*‘rajata-jñānam’*). Or, that ‘silverness-oriented cognition’ (*‘rajatatva-prakāra-kajñāna’*) is the subject of this argument which is the cause of the silverness-oriented inclination (*‘rajatatvaparakāra prakṛṣṭi’*). Because, the Naiyāyikas have been accomplished the theory of *‘anyathākhyāti’* accepting that cognition whose adjective is the silverness and subject is ‘the shell’. The present argument is the opposing of this. The probandum of this argument is *‘na śuktiviṣayakam’* or ‘the shell which limited by the absence of the subjectness (*‘viśeṣyakatvābhāva’*). The probans is *‘tatprativaddhavyāvahārahetutva’* or ‘the non-probansness of that inclination whose subject is the shell’.

The Naiyāyikas have been shown the *‘svarūpāsiddhi’* fallacy in that above-mentioned argument. Because, the probans does not remain in the present inferential subject in accordance with the Naiyāyikas.

The Prābhākaras said that, *“jñānam yathārtham eva”*. Or, ‘where is the knowledgeness (*‘jñanatvaṁ’*) there also is the validness/validity (*‘yathārthatvaṁ’*). It is the concomitance rule in this context. This concomitance rule is the obstacle to establish the theory of *‘anyathākhyāti’*.¹⁴

The Naiyāyikas presented two-fold arguments to refute the above-mentioned concomitance rule given by the Prābhākaras. In the case of fruitful inclination (*‘samvādi pravṛtti’*). We see that, if there ‘the silverness-oriented cognition’ (*‘rajatatvaprakāra jñāna’*) remains then actually ‘the silverness-oriented inclination’ (*‘rajatatvaprakāra pravṛtti’*) also remains. This cause-effect relation is effective depending on that agreement-disagreement. the form of this first argument is as such:

‘śuktiviśeṣyakarajatatvaprakārapravṛtti’ or ‘that inclination whose subject is the shell and the adjective is the silverness’. the probandum of this argument is ‘the subjectness which is the same of that subjectness of the inclination (*‘samānaviśeṣyatāsambandhena rajatatvaprakārajñānanajanyatva’*). The inclination which is the inferential subject of this argument remains in that place through the subjectness (*‘viśayatā’*) relation if the silverness-oriented cognition (*‘rajatatvaprakārajñāna’*) remains in the same locus then the silverness-oriented cognition (*‘rajatatvaprakāra jñāna’*) also remains in the same locus by dint of the same relation of being a qualificand (*‘samānaviśeṣyatā sambandha’*) to the shell-oriented inclination qualified by silverness (*‘śuktiviśeṣyaka rajatatvaprakāra pravṛtti’*).

The cause-effect relation (*kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva*) is possible between ‘the shell-oriented inclination qualified by the silverness’ (*śuktiviśeṣyaka-rajatatvaprakāraṇa pravṛtti*) and ‘the silverness-oriented cognition’ (*rajatatvaprakāraṇa jñāna*) for the co-existenceness (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*) through relation of being qualificand (*visayata sambandha*). ‘The shell-oriented inclination qualified by the silverness’ (*śukti-viśeṣyaka-rajatatvaprakāraṇa pravṛtti*) remains in the shell through ‘the subjectness relation’ (*viśeṣyatā sambandha*); for this reason, ‘the silverness-oriented cognition’ (*rajatatvaprakāraṇa jñāna*) also will remain in the same locus through ‘the *viśeṣyatāsambandha*’. If the silverness-oriented cognition (*rajatatva-prakāraṇa jñāna*) remains in the shell through the ‘*viśeṣyatā*’ relation then it is necessary to accept that, the ‘adjective’ (*prakāra*) of this cognition is ‘the silverness’ (*rajatatva*) and the subject/noun is ‘the shell’ (*śukti*). This kind of cognition is actually illusory.

The form of the second argument given by the Naiyāyikas is as such:

“*Śuktou pravartakam rajatatvaprakāraṇajñānam śuktiviśeṣyakam*

rajatatvaprakāraśuktiviśeṣyakapravṛttihetuvāt”.

The inferential subject of this statement is that silverness-oriented cognition which is the cause of the inclination to the shell'. The probandum is: 'the probandumness of the inclination whose subject ('*viśeṣya*') is the shell' ('*rajatatvaprakāraśuktiviśeṣyaka pravṛttihetutva*'). Through this argument 'the subjectness of the shell' ('*śuktiviśeṣyakatva*') has been established in the silverness-oriented cognition ('*rajatatva-prakāra-jñāna*') which is the cause of the inclination whose subject ('*viśeṣya*') is 'the shell'. It is an erroneous cognition. So, such rule as 'each cognition is valid' ('*jñānam yathārthameva*') has been sublated by dint of the above-mentioned two-fold arguments given by the Nyāya-thinkers.

Prābhākarean statement "*jñānam yathārthameva*" would be refuted with the above-mentioned argument given by the *Naiyāyikas*.

The form of the second argument given by the *Naiyāyikas* as such:

"*Śuktou pravartakam rajatattvaprakāraśuktiviśeṣyakaṁ*

Rajatattvaprakāraśuktiviśeṣyakapravṛttihetutvāt".

The inferential subject of this statement is 'that knowledge which is the originator of the inclination to the shell qualified by silverness'. The probandum of this argument is '*śuktiviśeṣyakatva*' or 'the term particularized by shell'. The probans of this argument is '*rajatattvaprakāraśuktiviśeṣyaka pravṛttihetutva*'

or ‘the attribute of the cause of that inclination which is particularized by the shell and that shell is qualified by the silverness’. The particular shell has accomplished in that cognitive state which is qualified by silverness and which cognition is the originator of that inclination which inclination is particularized by the shell. So, the cognitive state which is particularized by the shell and that shell is qualified by the silverness is necessarily called erroneous. The *Prābhākaras*’ statement “*jñānam yathārtham eva*” become refuted with the *Naiyāyikas*’ second argument too.¹⁵

A question may be raised that, if the knowledge is recognized to us as invalid then by what means we accept the knowledge confidently in accordance with the *Prābhākaras*. The *Prābhākaras* strongly established the theory of non-error with this argument.

After that, *Gangeśa* said that, the truthfulness of all cognition become ejected with the sublating cognition in accordance with all of us too. So, when the sublating cognition does not originate then we accept the truthfulness of cognition.

The *Naiyāyikas* refuted some others arguments given by the *Prābhākaras*. The *Prābhākaras* raised an argument on behalf of the non-acceptation of the illusory cognition. That is: when in the case of ‘this is silver’, the subject would be the shell yet the silver-oriented knowledge would be originated then this type of

cognition would be referred as illusory. It is unreasonable to accept that, 'this is silver' --- the subject of this cognitive state is 'the shell'. Because, the shell may not be appeared in this cognitive state. So, it is not reasonable to accept the theory that, the silver-oriented knowledge has become concerning the shell. So, the illusory cognition may not be accepted.

In pursuance of the *Naiyāyikas*, when the set of conditions of the cognition would be combined with then the nature of veridical cognition ('*pramātvā*') would be originated in the cognition. According to the *Nyāya* philosophy, the operative relation ('*sannikarṣa*') of the sense-organ ('eye') with an object which object or noun is qualified with an adjective is known as 'guna' or 'quality'. In the shell-silver case, yet, the operative relation with the shell there does not originate the operative relation with the shell which shell is qualified by silverness. So, that conjunction is not known as the 'quality' or 'guṇa'. For this reason, it is not possible to accept the origination of the valid knowledge ('*pramā*') from the absence of the producer of the quality. So, the cognitive state as the shell-silver case is not unknown as the valid cognition or '*pramā*'. In this way, it is called as the invalid cognition or '*apramā*' or the erroneous cognition.

END NOTES:

1. *Tattvacintāmaṇi, Pratyakṣa paricceda, anyathākhyātivādaprakaraṇa, page: 430, “Nanu sarvajñānānām yathārthatvāt pramālakṣaṇe viśeṣaṇavyāvarttyaprasiddheh viśeṣaṇavaiyarthyam anyathākhyātou mānābhāvāt”.*
2. *Ibid. page: 431, “Tathāhi Rajatārthiravṛtṭiviśayatvaṁrajatatva-prakārakānubhavaviśayatvavyōpyam rajatārthipravṛtṭiviśayamātra-vṛtṭidharmatvāt rajatamātravṛtṭidharmavaditi anyathākhyāti - vyōpyamsiddhātiti. Aprāptakālatvaṁ, rajatamātravṛtṭivañcopādhi.*
3. *Ibid., page: 433-435, “rajatattvaṁ arajatavṛtṭijñānaviśayatāvaccadakam arajataviśayapravṛtṭihetujñānaprakāratvāt, śuktitvavat-ityatra-rajatavṛtṭitvaṁ upādhi”.*
4. *Ibid., page: 436-437*
5. *Ibid., page: 452-455 “Ibid., page: 477,*
6. *Ibid., page: 480-485*
7. *Ibid., page: 485---486,*
8. *Ibid., page: 486---487,*
9. *Ibid., page: 489,*

10. *Ibid.*, page: 491---492,
11. *Ibid.*, page: 497---498,
12. *Ibid.*, page: 501---502,
13. *Ibid.*, page: 508,
14. “*Ibid.*, page: 509---510,

CHAPTER-V

CONCLUSION

From the previously mentioned chapters now I am arriving at the conclusion.

A question may be raised that, why is the theory of ‘*anyathākhyāti*’ advocated by the Naiyāyikas highlighted in this thesis?

After the above-mentioned question, I will point out that, all the theories of error are reasonable from various angles. But the Nyāya theory of error in accordance with Gangeśa Upādhyāya, founder of Navya-Nyāya is more reasonable for me.

Because, we know that, critical thinking is the accurate way for gaining the knowledge of absolute reality of any category. The Nyāya philosophy is known as ‘*anvīkṣikī*’ which means ‘critical thinking’. The term ‘*Nyāya*’ derived from the Sanskrit root ‘in’ (motion) after ‘*nī*’ alongwith the inflection ‘*ghañ*’ with an instrumental case. So, it is the way to gain the signified meaning of any category.

The Navya-Nyāya philosophy founded by Gangeśa Upādhyāya is more critical and more logical than the Ancient Nyāya-philosophy. Gangeśa minutely has investigated the Nyāya-theory in his famous book *Tattvacintāmaṇi*.

The main subject-matter is the discussion about ‘the Nyāya-theory of error’ or ‘*anyathākhyātivāda*’ in accordance with *Tattvacintāmaṇi* of Gangeśa. Gangeśa has been established ‘the Nyāya-theory of error’ or ‘*anyathākhyātivāda*’ in the ‘*anyathākhyātivādaprakaraṇa*’ of the ‘*pratyakṣaparicceda*’ of *Tattvacintāmaṇi* refuting the Prābhākaras’ theory of ‘Non-error’.

It is necessary to know the nature of cognition in accordance with the Mīmāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas before the establishment of the nature of erroneous cognition in accordance with both of them. For this reason, the nature of cognition in accordance with the Prābhākaras and the Naiyāyikas will be explained in this chapter.

The Mīmāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas—both of them accept that, ‘cognition is such category which is a sheltered thing in the soul. According to them, cognition originates from the causes like the connection of mind etc. According to both of them, cognition reveals the subjects of the World.

A question may be raised that, how does the cognition reveal to oneself?

After that question the answer is that, cognition also reveals to oneself when it reveals all objects in accordance with the Sāṃkhya philosophy, Vedānta philosophy, Buddhism, Jainism and Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā. On the other hand, the Naiyāyikas, Vaiśeṣikas, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Murāri Miśra accept that cognition reveals only objects of that cognition, it is not able to reveal oneself. According to the Naiyāyikas, cognition is revealed by another inferential cognition.¹

A question may be raised that, if any cognition becomes valid then the validity of that cognition will come from which source?

After the above-mentioned question, someone say that, cognition will necessarily become valid when it is originated. They are known as '*svatahprāmāṇyavādīns*'.

Again, someone say that, the validity of a cognition depends on another cause. They are known as '*paratahprāmāṇyavādīns*'. According to the *svatahprāmāṇyavādīns*, the validity of a cognition is originated from those causes from which of the causes that cognition originates itself. On the other hand, according to the *paratahprāmāṇyavādīns*, the validity of a cognition is originated from spare cause besides those causes from which of the causes that cognition creates itself.

The doctrines of erroneous cognition have been reduced from the doctrines of validity of cognition. The Prābhākaras' opinion is that, when a thing becomes knowable to us then we understand about that cognition like valid. And we uses that knowable thing in such way. So, this doctrine is called as 'self-validity of cognition'.

On the other hand, the Naiyāyikas say that, when the knower says a silver in front of his eye-sense-organ then some causes are necessary to generate the silver-oriented cognition namely, the knower, the eye-sense-organ of the knower, the connection between the object of the cognition and the mind of the knower, the object or the silver, light, magnanimity etc. But, this silver-oriented cognition may be a valid cognition if it being noticeable that, there is no any blame in any cause of this cognition. According to the Naiyāyikas, the silver-oriented cognition becomes valid owing to the presence of 'the absence of blame'. 'The absence of the blame' is an additional cause of the silver-oriented cognition. It is not the cause of the origination of that cognition on. So, the Naiyāyikas' doctrine is called '*paratahprāmāṇyavāda*'. Again, the silver-oriented cognition may be an invalid cognition if there any blame exists in the cause of that cognition. So, 'the blame' is an additional cause to create the invalidity of this cognition.²

According to the Naiyāyikas, the validity or invalidity of a cognition becomes knowable to us through a mental perception which is known as '*anuvyāvasāya*' in Indian Philosophy. When the knower perceives a thing which exists in front of him like the another thing which exists in far from the knower then actually any blame exists in the procedure of the origination of this type of cognition. After some times, the knower becomes unable to take the silver. Because, actually the silver does not exist in front of the knower. The silverness is connected with the shell' or 'this thing' which exists in front of the knower. But, it is not possible; because, the silverness may not exist in the shell; the silverness may exist in the silver. In this case, the silverness became connected with the shell through the *jñanalaksana sannikarsa* being aroused the previous impression of the silver in the knower's mind. It happens owing to the similarity between the shell and the silver. And, the knower is desired to take silver. As a result, the knower goes forward to the shell. But, after some times, the knower may not take the thing as silver. Because, that thing actually is not the silver. The knower went forward to the 'this thing' thinking as the silver due to his defective eye-sense-organs, the absence of the light, greedness or desirousness of the knower etc. These are the blamish causes of the erroneous cognition. So, this silver-oriented cognition is an erroneous or

invalid cognition. The invalidity of this cognition becomes knowable through the mental perception or '*anuvyāvasāya*' of the knower.

It is mentionable that, the *jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* becomes acceptable owing to the demonstration of the mental perception or '*anuvyāvasāya*'. With reference to this context, we have to know about '*anuvyavasaya*'. The mental perception of the determinate perception is called '*anuvyāvasāya*'. The determinate perception reveals the self-object, but, it does not reveal itself. This determinate perception is revealed by the mental perception of the knower or '*anuvyāvasāya*'. Actually, our mind does not accept the external things separately. The object of the determinate perception may not be connected with knower's mind through the ordinary perception. The object of the determinate perception may be connected with knower's mind through the extra-ordinary perception. This extraordinary perception is called '*jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa*'.

The above-mentioned '*jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa*' connects the attribute of the things which exists far from the knower with that thing which exists in front of the knower. As a result, the knower thinks the desired thing exists in front of him in spite of it's non-existence in front of the person. So, it is called erroneous or invalid cognition.

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika schools, the locus which is appearing on the error, the imposing entity and the relation between them --- these all categories are real. But, according to Vācaspati Miśra and Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas, the ‘relation’ between the locus and the imposing category is unreal notwithstanding the reality of the locus and the imposing entity in the erroneous case.

“*Anyasyakhyātiḥ anyathā-anyadharmaprakāśenā*” is ‘*anyathākhyāti*’. This opinion has been accepted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers, Yoga-philosophers, Jaina philosophers and also Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas.

In the erroneous case of ‘this is silver’, the knower knows the shell which is qualified by the silverness. But, we know that actually the shell becomes qualified by the shellness; and the silver is qualified by the silverness. The silverness is not the property of the shell. In spite of this situation, the knower knows the shell which is qualified by the silverness. So, it is called ‘*anyathākhyāti*’.

A question may be raised that, that thing becomes the perceptual object in which thing the contact of the sense-organ with object exists. In the erroneous case of ‘this is silver’ the contact of the eye-sense-organ of the knower exists on the ‘this thing’, as a result, the locus like ‘this thing’ may be the perceptual object. But, a

question may be raised that, why does the perceptual cognition occur about that thing which exists in front of the knower in spite of the non-existence of the ordinary connection like '*samyukta samavāya*' between the silverness and that thing? So, the cognition of the shell qualified by the silverness may not be possible.

The answer after the above-mentioned question may be as such: the connection (*sannikarṣa*) is mainly of two-fold namely, (i). the ordinary connection and (ii). The extra-ordinary connection. Notwithstanding the non-existence of the ordinary connection like 'the conjunctive inherence relation' between the silverness and the eye-sense-organ of the knower, there the extra-ordinary connection like 'the *jñānalakṣana sannikarṣa*' exists between them. This type of '*sannikarṣa*' is actually the impression by nature in accordance with an opinion; again, it is the memory by nature in accordance with another opinion. In 'the shell-silver' case, the impression of the silver becomes aroused due to the similarity between the 'this thing' and the impression of the silver which had been cognized by the knower in previous time. This type of silver-oriented impression is called as '*jñānalakṣana sannikarṣa*' in accordance with an opinion. Again, the memory which is originated

by the impression that memory of the silver is known as the '*jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa*' in accordance with the another opinion.³

The view of the Prābhākara has been challenged by the Naiyāyikas who has defined error as '*yatra yadadhyāsastasyaiva viparītadharmatvakalpanamadhyāsadh*'. That is, the superimposition is nothing but the assumption of the opposite character on something. It is the imposition of the opposite character i. e. silverness in place of shell. These arguments are not developed by Gangesa but they are very strong to support the Nyāya standpoint.

The Naiyāyikas argue how the Mīmāṃsakas prove the absence of the knowledge of discrimination between the remember content (*smṛta*) and acquired content (*grhīta*). From the fact of one's inclination towards getting silver it is proved that there is cognition of non-discrimination between 'thisness' (*idantā*) and 'silverness' (*rajatattva*). Such inclination proves and absence of doubt about its nature of object and its causal efficiency.

Secondly, if there is the cognition of non-discrimination (*bhedāgraha*) between the two as told earlier, how does an individual know the same as 'two'? 'The cognition of the non-discrimination of the two' proves that there is the

knowledge of 'two' leading to the contradiction of the knowledge of non-discrimination.

Thirdly, it may be argued that the knowledge of the similarity between shall and silver may lead an individual to the knowledge of identity. It is not tenable, because if someone has got the knowledge in the form: 'Tiger is similar to cat', does an individual being desirous of tiger incline to have cat?

Fourthly, if it is argued that one inclines to have silver, as it was not known as non-silver, the Naiyayikas are of the opinion that the object was neither taken as 'silver' nor as 'non-silver'. If it is so, there would have been an 'indifferent attitude' (*upekṣābuddhi*) towards the object. But a clear inclination is found instead of indifference which proves one's cognition of what is conducive to the desired (*iṣṭa-sāadhanatā-jñāna*). It ultimately proves the object as silver.

Lastly, it has been told by the Prābhākaras that if there is a defect in the cause, it cannot produce an effect, but it is not true that it produces a different type of effect. The Naiyāyikas do not agree with this. To them a defective cause may produce a different type of effect (*kāryāntara*). For it is found that a particular creeper called *Betralata*, if burnt by forest-fire (*dābānala*) can produce a banana tree. This is an example taken from the botanical world. Another example is put

forth from the physiological world. It is pointed out that an ulcer in the stomach increases the hunger of an individual instead of loss of it.

In fact, the theories of error are formulated in such a way so that their notion of *pramā* (right cognition) is protected. If the nature of right cognition is determined in a particular system, error is also to be determined in the light of that. In each and every theory something is superimposed on something else (*sarvathāpi tu anyasyānyadharmāvasatām na vyabhicarati*). The Vijñānavādin-s have imposed extra-mental things on mental one, the Prābhākaras impose silver on shell due to the cognition of non-discrimination, and the Naiyāyikas impose the opposite properties to something else (*anyathā*). In all the cases error is nothing but superimposition of one thing on another.

The Prābhākaras do not believe in the existence of any erroneous cognition while the Naiyāyikas believe in illusory cognition or error. We would like to point some points which indicate the pragmatic value of error. From the fact of its pragmatic value it is known to us that there is the existence of the phenomenon of error, which ultimately disproves the Prābhākara position.

First, error has been taken as invalid cognition, because it can only mislead an individual. Now an effort will be made to show that error serves a virtuous role

also in our life as envisaged in *Mārkaṇḍeyapurāṇa* where error has been taken as a form of Mother Goddess existing in all creatures ('*yā devī sarvabhūteṣu bhrāntirūpeṇa samsthitā*'). In fact, forgetfulness can also be included under the causes of error. An individual would be able to survive in this empirical world amidst sufferings, arising out of lust, misunderstanding, ego etc. due to having the forgetfulness (*bhrānti*) in his life. Had there been no such quality, he would have been mad being overburdened by the sorrows and sufferings. Hence *bhrānti* or error sometimes occupies a prominent role for psychological balance. Sometimes the tranquilizers are applied to make a man psychologically normal after removing his over-concerned situation towards a particular matter. That is why; we come across a definition of human being which runs as follows: 'To err is human'. In fact, error lies in the very nature of a human being. In other words, the essential characteristic of a man is to commit error. In other words, we cannot get rid of this error as it is in the very nature of a man.

Secondly, error has got a positive value in the sense that it serves as a rectifier of certain policy or principle. Error provides us certain lesson through which we can correct ourselves. Hence error can be taken as a means of rectification or correction. That is why, the *trial and error* method is still a valuable method in the field of learning or Psychology.

Thirdly, it is found in our life that error which is not a reality provides us some picture of reality indirectly. As for example, when the driver sees the reflection of a following car in the looking glass, he becomes cautious of it. Though the reflection is not the real object, it provides an idea of the real object. Though the photograph pasted in an application form does not entail reality yet it can provide some idea of the real applicant to the authority. Even now-a-days a computer sketch which is not a reality can help the investigating officer to identify a criminal. In the Advaita text *Pañcadaśī Vidyāraṇya* Muni has taken the help of picture which may act as a lamp to illumine the Ultimate Reality (*Brahman*) in a section called *Citrādīpaparakaraṇa*. Moreover, Sankara in his *Adhyāśabhāṣya* has admitted the necessity of falsity or superimposition. To him, all our behaviours, Vedic or secular, all the usages of means of knowing (*pramāṇa*) and knowable objects (*prameya*), injunctions and liberation are possible due to the falsity (superimposition) between self and non-self. In order to go beyond the range of duality we must begin with duality which is nothing but falsity between self and non-self.

Lastly, the theory of error is taken as one of the methods of philosophizing. If any error in the opponent's arguments is not shown, the proponent's standpoint cannot be substantiated. Therefore, error is to be pointed out only to save-guard our

own philosophical position. No philosophical position is final and hence each and every standpoint is subject to challenge. To challenge means to show error in a theory. That is why; philosophy becomes a flowing water, but not stagnant. Had there been no error, no new philosophical standpoint would come up. In Indian Philosophy the fundamental function is the show fault or error to other's view (*paramatadūṣana*) and establishing one's own standpoint.

END NOTES:

1. Annambhaṭṭa, *Tarkasamgraha* with *Dīpikā*, Sri Narayana Chandra Goswami (Ed. & Trs.), Sanskrit pustak Bhandar, kolkata, aswin, 1390, page: 508-511
2. Goswami, Sitanatha (Trs. in bengali), *Adhyāśabhāṣya*, Sanskrit Pustak bhandar, Kolkata, 2012, p: 103
3. Miśra, Vācaspati, *Brahmasūtra Śaṅkarabhāṣya Bhāmati*, Bhattacharya, Sri Sri Mohan (Ed. & Trs.), Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, Kolkata, 1973, p: 38-39

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Annambhaṭṭa, *Tarkasaṁgraha* with *Dīpikā*, Sri Nārāyaṇa Chandra Goswami [Ed. & Trs.], Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, Kolkata, Aswin, 1390
2. *Anubhavānanda, Swāmī, Pañcadaśī, Central Chinmaya Mission Trust, Bombay, 1994.*
3. Basu, Charuchandra (Ed.), *Dhammapada*, Mohabodhi Book Agency, Kolkata, 2010
4. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upanisad*, MLBD, 1964
5. Bhatt, G. P., *The Basic Ways of knowing*, MLBD, 1989
6. Bhattacharya, Viswabandhu [Trs. & Ed.], *Tattvacintāmaṇi, Anyathakhyativada*, Dasgupta & Co.(Pvt.) Limited, Kolkata, 2009
7. Bhattacharya, Viswabandhu [Trs.], *Tattvacintāmaṇi (Pratyaksalakṣaṇa)*, Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture, Golpark, Kolkata, March,2000
8. *Chāndogya Upanisad*, MLBD, 1964
9. Citsukhācārya, *Tattvapradīpikā*, Choukhamba, Surabharati prakashan, Varanasi, 2005
10. Dīksit, Appay, *Siddhāntaleśasaṁgraha*, Gambhirananda, Swami (Trs.), Udbodhana Karyalaya, Kolkata, 1987

11. Gangeśopādhyay, Sri, *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, 1st part: Pratyakṣa Khanda, Tarkavāgīśa, Kāmākhyānātha [Ed.], with Tarkavāgīśa, Mathurānātha, *Rahasya tīkā*, Motilal Banarasidas, Delhi, 2013
12. Goswami, Sitanath (Trs. in Bengali), *Adhyāśabhāṣya*, sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, Kolkata, 2012
13. Hiriyanna, M, *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, London George Allen & Unwin Ltd. Museum Street, 1956
14. Īśwarkrishna, *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, Miśra, Vācaspati, *Sāṃkhyatattvakoumudi*, Goswami, Chandra, Narayana, Sri(Trs. in Bengali), Adhyapana, Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, Kolkata, Mahalaya, 1406
15. Jha, Ganganatha, *Sadholal Lectures on Nyāya*, Sri Satguru Publications, A division of Indian Book Centre, Shakti Nagar, Delhi, India, 1994
16. Jha, Ganganatha (Tr.), *The Nyāya Sūtra of Gautama (with Vātsyāyana Bhāṣya)*, MLBD, 1984
17. Mahasthavira, Sridharmaratna, Rajguru (Trs.& Ed.), *Mahaparivivāna Suttam*, Mohabodhi Book Agency, Kolkata, 2011
18. Medhacaitanya, Brahmachari [Trs. & Ed.], *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, Adyapith, Kolkata, Ashar, 1417

19. Miśra, Vācaspati, *Brahmasutra Sāṃkarabhāṣya Bhāmati*, Bhaattacharya, Sri Sri Mohan [Ed. & Trs.], Sanskrit Pustaak Bhandar, Kolkata, 1973
20. Miśra, Keśab, *Tarkabhāṣā*, Nyāyācārya, Kar, Gangadhar [Trs. & Ed.], Dept. of Philosophy, Jadavpur University, Kolkata, January, 2009
21. Miśra, Śalikanātha, prakaraṇapañcikā, Bhatta, Narayana, Joypuri, Nyayasiddhi, satri, Subrahmanya, sri (Ed.), Kasi Hindu Viswavidyalaya, Varanasi, 1961, Nayavithi Prakarana (part-III)
22. Padmapāḍācārya, Sri, *Pañcapādikā*, Śāstrī, Subrahmanya, S, Sastralankara, Panditraja (Ed.), Shri Dakshinamurti Math Prakasana, Varanasi, 2009
23. Radhakrishnan, S, *The Brahma-Sūtra: The Philosophy of Spiritual Life*, George Allen & Unwin Ltd. , London, 1960
24. Rāmānuja, acarya, Śribhāṣyam, Vol. I., The Academy of Sanskrit Research, Melkote, 1987
25. Saṃkarācārya, *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi*, Lokeswarananda, Swami (Trs. & Ed.), Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture, Golpark, Kolkata, 2009
26. Śāstrī, Haraprasad, *Bouddhavidyā*, Mohabodhi Book Agency, Kolkata, 2010

27. Sthavira, Prajnaloaka, Sri, *Patīccasamuppāda*, Mohabodhi Book Agency, Kolkata, 2008
28. Taittiriya Upanisad, MLBD, 1964
29. Tarkavāgīśa, Phanibhuṣaṇa (Trs. & Ed.), *Nyāyadarśana*, Vātsyāyanabhāṣya (Part-V), Paschimbanga Rajya Pustak Parsad, 1989
30. Vādarāyana, Maharṣi, *Vedāntadarśanam*, Viswarupananda, Swami [Trs.], Puri, Cidghanānanda, Swami [Ed.], Udbodhan Karyalaya, Kolkata, August, 1999.

INDEX:**PAGE NO.****A**

1. *abhāva* 29
2. *adhyāsa* 7, 8, 10, 17
3. *adhyāśabhāṣya* 7, 10, 136
4. *adhyāśakriyā* 8
5. *Advaita Vedānta* 5, 18
6. *Advaita Vedāntīns* 16
7. *akhyāti* 3, 42, 64
8. *akhyātivāda* 3, 6, 88, 91
9. *akhyātivādīns* 14, 42, 61, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 71, 72, 73, 74, 76, 77, 79, 84, 85
10. *aloukikakhyāti* 3
11. *anubhava* 23
12. *anubhuyamāna* 69
13. *anuvyāvasāya* 105, 129
14. *anyathātva* 93, 94

15.	<i>anyathākhyāti</i>	96, 99, 100, 116
16.	<i>anyathākhyātivāda</i>	5, 6, 69, 125
17.	<i>Anyathākhyātivādīns</i>	10, 70, 83
18.	<i>Anyathākhyātivādasiddhāntapakṣa</i>	104
19.	<i>apramā</i>	23, 25, 26, 38, 92
20.	<i>arthadyāsapakṣe</i>	8, 9
21.	<i>asambandha</i>	39
22.	<i>asamsarga</i>	39
23.	<i>asat</i>	15, 29, 30
24.	<i>asatkhyāti</i>	3, 4, 5, 16, 69
25.	<i>attribute of the absence of knowledge of discrimination</i>	104, 105
26.	<i>avabhāsa</i>	9, 17
27.	<i>avaccedaka</i>	96, 105,
28.	<i>avasanna</i>	17
Â		
1.	Âcārya Śamkara	7, 10, 14
2.	Ânupalambhikas	31, 32

3. ātmakhyāti 69

4. Ātmakhyātivādīns 10, 11, 27

B

1. Bhavanātha 44

2. *Bhāmati* 12, 35

3. *bhāsa* 17

4. *bhāva* 8

5. *bheda* 48

6. *bhedaka* 54, 55, 81

7. *bheda-graha* 103, 112

8. *bhedāgraha* 110, 112

9. *bhedāgrahatva* 104, 105

10. *Brahman* 19

11. *buddhi* 2

D

1. *dharma-dharmī* 38

2. *differentiator* 114

3. *doṣa* 42

E

1. *ekajñāna* 39

2. *error* 2

G

1. *Gangeśa* 107, 108, 120, 125

2. *gr̥hyamāna* 69

I

1. *idaṁ* 12, 42, 91

2. *iṣṭa* 104

J

1. *jñāna* 9, 10, 11

2. *jñānalakṣanasannikarṣa* 84, 129, 131, 132

K

1. *kāranatāvaccedaka* 105

2. *khyātivāda* 1, 3, 4, 16

3. *khyātivādīns* 4, 5, 51, 57, 61, 62, 65, 66, 68, 69, 70, 73, 74, 80, 81

L

1. lakṣana 23

M

1. Madhāvācārya 15, 16
2. Maharṣi Gautama 6, 31, 32, 33, 34, 36
3. Mathurānātha 93
4. *Mādhyamikas* 15, 28, 30
5. Mādhva Vedāntins 4
6. Mārkaṇḍeyapurāna 135

N

1. Nāgārjuna 31
2. Naiyāyikas 6, 10, 26, 29, 49, 70, 77, 84, 103, 104, 105, 112, 113, 115, 116, 117, 120, 121, 125, 127, 128, 132
3. Neo-Naiyāyikas 34
4. *non-error* 3
5. Nyāya 31
6. Nyāya-bhāṣya 6

7.	Nyāya-Sūtra	6, 31
8.	Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas	5, 28
P		
1.	<i>paratahprāmāṇyavāda</i>	127
2.	<i>paratra</i>	9
3.	<i>pāramārthika</i>	18
4.	<i>pradhāna</i>	34
5.	<i>Prakaraṇapañcikā</i>	39, 43, 73, 75, 84, 88
6.	<i>pramā</i>	23, 92
7.	<i>pramāṇa</i>	32
8.	<i>pramātvā</i>	34
9.	<i>prameya</i>	1
10.	<i>pramuṣṭatattvākasmarāṇa</i>	44, 70
11.	Prābhākaras	3, 6, 14, 37, 39, 40, 42, 43, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 62, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 71, 72, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 85, 86, 87, 93, 94, 101, 102, 105, 107, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 120, 127, 134
12.	<i>prāmāṇya</i>	46

13. *prātibhāsika* 8, 9, 18

14. *pūrva* 9

R

1. *rajatam* 12, 13, 39, 91

2. *rajatārthī* 47, 48, 92, 95, 101, 111

S

1. *Śōlikanātha* 39, 43, 71, 73, 75, 77, 79, 85

2. *śūnya* 15, 31

3. *śūnyavādīns* 4, 5, 14, 15, 16, 28

4. *sadasat* 30

5. *samśaya* 24, 45

6. *saṃskāra* 2, 17, 46

7. *saṃyoga* 25

8. *samavāya* 29

9. *satkhyāti* 5

10. *Sāṃkhya* 3, 37

11. *svatahprāmāṇyavādīns* 126

12. <i>smṛti</i>	23, 45
13. <i>smṛti-jñāna</i>	9
14. <i>smṛtirūpah</i>	7, 8, 9
15. <i>svādhīsthānabhrama</i>	5

T

1. <i>tadvadvīśeṣyakatva</i>	92
2. <i>tarka</i>	24
3. <i>tattva</i>	34
4. <i>Tattvacintamani</i>	125
5. <i>tattvāṁśa</i>	46, 55, 81

V

1. <i>Vaibhāṣika</i>	27
2. <i>Vācaspati Miśra</i>	12
3. <i>vādhaka</i>	107
4. <i>Vātsyāyana</i>	6, 31, 33
5. <i>vijñāna</i>	11, 27
6. <i>Vijñānavādīns</i>	19

7.	<i>vikalpa</i>	4
8.	<i>viparyy</i>	24
9	<i>visamvādipravṛtṭi</i>	101,106,115
10	<i>viśeṣyatāsambandha</i>	118
11	<i>vyābhicāra</i>	24, 104
12	<i>vyāvahāra</i>	24
13	<i>vyāvahārika</i>	8, 9, 18
14	<i>vyāvahārakāla</i>	18
Y		
1.	<i>yathārtha</i>	40
2.	<i>yathārthajñāna</i>	40
3.	<i>Yogācāra</i>	4, 11, 27

NEO-VEDĀNTISM :

CONTRIBUTIONS OF
SRI RAMAKRISHNA AND VIVEKANANDA

Edited By :
Rupa Bal

Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar

38, Bidhan Sarani, Kolkata-700006

**NEO-VEDĀNTISM : CONTRIBUTIONS OF
SRI RAMAKRISHNA AND VIVEKANANDA**

Edited By : Rupa Bal

**Published By :
Debasish Bhattacharya
Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar
38, Bidhan Sarani
Kolkata-700 006
Ph. : 2241 1208**

1st Edition : 7th March, 2016

© Editor .

ISBN : 978-93-83368-21-1

Price : 300.00 Only.

**Composed By :
Dreamline Graphics
Kolkata-5**

**Printed By :
Abhinaba Mudrani
Kolkata-6**

Theory of Illusoriness of the World : A Critical Analysis

— *Rupa Bal*

'Brahman' or the Supreme Soul is considered as 'absolute true entity' in accordance with the Advaita Vedāntins. This true entity is only one. In this sense, the 'Jīva' (Individual Soul), 'Jagat' (World) and 'Īswara' (God) are equal by nature. These all are 'Brahman' in this monistic view. Actually, 'true entity' is that whose absence does not exist in any time. 'Brahman' is that whose absence does not exist in any time. On the other hand, the 'world' is such entity whose absence originates after the origination of the knowledge of 'Brahman'. In this sense, the 'world' is false or illusory. To accomplish the concept of unity between the individual souls and the supreme soul the Advaita Vedāntins established various types of arguments. How does Swāmī Vivekānanda establish the theory of Oneness of the 'Brahman' or the Absolute Real entity ? – It will be discussed in my present research-article.

The theory of Illusory World become established with the establishment of the theory of oneness of the 'Brahman' or the Absolute Soul. Swāmī Vivekānanda accomplished the oneness of the 'Brahman' with various arguments. These arguments will be discussed below.

Swāmī Vivekānanda points out that, the infinite may not become two-fold. If the soul become infinite then it will be only one category. Your soul, my soul –these type of feelings of the living-beings are erroneous. The real nature of all human beings is one, infinite and all-pervasive.¹

The arguments of the ancient Advaita Vedāntins are similar

with Swāmī Vivekānanda concerning the oneness of the soul. They said that, the attribute of the soulness may not exist in many types of category. Because, soulness means pervasiveness which exists in the pervasive category or the one category.

A question may be raised by the Dvaitavādin philosophers that is as such : what is the example on behalf of the concomitance rule between the attribute which exists in the pervasive category and the absence of the attribute which exists in the various categories ?

After the above-mentioned questions, the Advaita Vedāntins point out that, 'etherness' which is the attribute of the ether exists in the only ether which eternal and one. So, the etherness exists in the ether which ether is all-pervasive. The ether is one; so the etherness does not exist in the various categories.

To refute this theory, the Advaitins said that, the etherness is not the universal property or the generic attribute. So, it exists in the all-pervasive ether. The universal property exists in the various categories which categories are included in the same classes. The soulness is a universal property in accordance with the Dvaitavādin philosophers; so it exists in the various categories. So, the souls are various categories.

After that argument, the Advaitins pointed out that, if we say that, the soulness exists in the various categories then the soulness will be deliberated as the universal property. Again, the soulness will belong in the various categories because, the soulness is a universal property. In this way, the fallacy of mutual dependence would be originated. So, it is not possible to prove the existence of the various souls with the property like the soulness.

After the above-mentioned argument of the acceptance of the oneness of the soul in accordance with the Advaitins, a question may be raised by the Dvaitavādin philosophers. The question is as such : the existence of the space, time, direction—these three - fold all-pervasive categories, the earth, water etc. substances, quality, action etc. categories are accepted by the Dvaitavādins. For this reason, it may not be possible to prove the Advaitism.

After the above-mentioned argument, Swāmī Vivekānanda pointed out that, in which procedure the Sun originates the whole self-reflection on the each drops of water being reflected on the drops of water, in the same way, the same one category or the Absolute Soul is being realized in various forms being reflected in the drops of the innumerable forms. But, these various categories are equal in nature. Actually, 'I', 'You' – all of them are the same. The dual cognition is erroneous One category exists. He is the eternal Universe in nature. ²

One, non-dual soul is accomplished by the accomplishment of the falsity of all dual-entities. But, how does one prove that, all dual-entities are false ?

After that question, Swāmī Vivekānanda points out an example : The form differentiates the wave from the ocean. Suppose, if the wave mixes with the ocean then the form of that wave does not exist. So, the existence of the wave depends on the existence of the ocean. But, the existence of the ocean does not depend on the existence of the wave.³ So, the ocean is true, the wave is false. In the same manner, the soul is true, the whole world is imagined in the soul.

To explain the nature of 'Brahman' Ācārya Śaṅkara said in his famous book *Vivekacūṛāmoni* that,

" Satyaṁ jñānāmanantaṁ Brahman
 Viśuddhaṁ paraṁ svatahsiddhaṁ.
 nityānandaikaraṣaṁ pratyagabhinnaṁ
 niraṅtaraṁ jayati 225

The significance of the above mentioned sloka is as such : the 'Brahman' is true, knowledge, infinite, pure by nature. 'He' is not tarnished. The 'Brahman' is self-evident. 'He' does not originate from anything. He is eternal, delightful by nature. The meaning of the term 'ekarasaṁ' is as such : the 'Brahman' is always same. The meaning of the term 'pratyagabhinnaṁ' is as such : 'pratyakṣ' means 'jīva' or 'living-beings' or 'each'. 'He' is identical with 'each' or 'all living-beings'. So, the 'Brahman' or 'the Absolute Soul' is identical with the individual souls.⁴

"Sadidaṁ paramādvaitaṁ
 svasmādanyasya
 Vastuno'bhāvāt.
 na hyanyadasti kiñcit samyak
 paramārthatattvabodha-
 daśāyaṁ." 226

The significance of the above-mentioned śloka of Ācārya Śaṅkara is as such :

There is not any entity separate from the soul. So, this soul is the great and unique entity. After the realization of the self-knowledge, there is not any feelings of the separate entities from the self. Before the self-realization the World was false. But, after the self-realization we may feel about the World which is pervaded with the presence of the Supreme Being. After that self-realization the human-beings do not feel about the falsity of anything, then all entities are equal with 'Brahman' or the Supreme Soul. When I have gained the self-knowledge then I am seeing me everywhere.⁵

Before the establishment of the statement "Brahman satyaṁ jagāṁmithyā iti Brahmaiva na paraḥ", it is necessary to know

that, what is the meaning of the term 'true'? and what is the meaning of the term 'false' in Philosophy ? In what sense the 'Brahman' is called as "true"? In the same manner, in what sense the 'Jagat' is called as 'false'?

After the above-mentioned question, Advaitins say that the definition of 'true' is 'abādhitatva' or 'non-sublating property'. 'True' or 'non-sublation' is that entity whose absence does not exist in any time. Or, that is true entity which is the non-competitor of the absence of tri-times. On the other hand, that is false entity which is the competitor of the absence of tri-times 'Brahman or the Absolute Soul is not being accomplished as false in any time to the knower. So, the 'Brahman is 'true'. On the other hand, the whole world is being accomplished as false after gaining about the knowledge of 'Brahman' to the knower. So, in this sense, the world is false. The Advaitins define the sublating entity as such "Svaprakāra-krativivēṣyanisthatraikālikanisedhapratiyogitram Vdhita-tvam".

On that definition, the meaning of the term 'sva' is the sublating property. In the shell-silver case, the 'silverness' is appeared like adjective. The noun of that case is 'this'. There is the absence of 'silverness' in that noun. So, the 'silverness' is the competitor of the absence of tri-times in that noun. So, the 'silverness' is the sublating property. The 'silverness' imposes on 'the shell' or 'this' due to the similarity between 'this' and the silver and blames of the knower. As a result, the person who is interested to accept the silver become engaged and that inclination of the knower would be unfruitful. This unfruitful inclination originates due to the illusion of the knower. In the same manner, the whole world imposes on the 'Brahman' or the Absolute Soul due to illusion. Actually, the 'Brahman' and

the world are equal. Or, only one entity exists which is called 'Brahman', Beside that, the whole world is false, illusory.

Notes & References :

1. Vani O Racana, Swami Vivekananda, Vol :2, Udvodhana Karyalaya, Kolkata, 5th Edition, 1384, page :30.

2. *ibid.*, page : 51

3. *ibid.*, page : 51 - 52

4. Vivekacuramoni, Acarya Samkara, Swami Lokeswarananda (Trs. & Expl.), Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture, Glopark, Kolkata, 2009, page : 199

5. *ibid.*, page : 200.