

CHAPTER-V

CONCLUSION

From the previously mentioned chapters now I am arriving at the conclusion.

A question may be raised that, why is the theory of ‘*anyathākhyāti*’ advocated by the Naiyāyikas highlighted in this thesis?

After the above-mentioned question, I will point out that, all the theories of error are reasonable from various angles. But the Nyāya theory of error in accordance with Gangeśa Upādhyāya, founder of Navya-Nyāya is more reasonable for me.

Because, we know that, critical thinking is the accurate way for gaining the knowledge of absolute reality of any category. The Nyāya philosophy is known as ‘*anvīkṣikī*’ which means ‘critical thinking’. The term ‘*Nyāya*’ derived from the Sanskrit root ‘in’ (motion) after ‘*nī*’ alongwith the inflection ‘*ghañ*’ with an instrumental case. So, it is the way to gain the signified meaning of any category.

The Navya-Nyāya philosophy founded by Gangeśa Upādhyāya is more critical and more logical than the Ancient Nyāya-philosophy. Gangeśa minutely has investigated the Nyāya-theory in his famous book *Tattvacintāmaṇi*.

The main subject-matter is the discussion about ‘the Nyāya-theory of error’ or ‘*anyathākhyātivāda*’ in accordance with *Tattvacintāmaṇi* of Gangeśa. Gangeśa has been established ‘the Nyāya-theory of error’ or ‘*anyathākhyātivāda*’ in the ‘*anyathākhyātivādaprakaraṇa*’ of the ‘*pratyakṣaparicceda*’ of *Tattvacintāmaṇi* refuting the Prābhākaras’ theory of ‘Non-error’.

It is necessary to know the nature of cognition in accordance with the Mīmāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas before the establishment of the nature of erroneous cognition in accordance with both of them. For this reason, the nature of cognition in accordance with the Prābhākaras and the Naiyāyikas will be explained in this chapter.

The Mīmāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas—both of them accept that, ‘cognition is such category which is a sheltered thing in the soul. According to them, cognition originates from the causes like the connection of mind etc. According to both of them, cognition reveals the subjects of the World.

A question may be raised that, how does the cognition reveal to oneself?

After that question the answer is that, cognition also reveals to oneself when it reveals all objects in accordance with the Sāṃkhya philosophy, Vedānta philosophy, Buddhism, Jainism and Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā. On the other hand, the Naiyāyikas, Vaiśeṣikas, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Murāri Miśra accept that cognition reveals only objects of that cognition, it is not able to reveal oneself. According to the Naiyāyikas, cognition is revealed by another inferential cognition.¹

A question may be raised that, if any cognition becomes valid then the validity of that cognition will come from which source?

After the above-mentioned question, someone says that, cognition will necessarily become valid when it is originated. They are known as '*svatahprāmāṇyavādīns*'.

Again, someone says that, the validity of a cognition depends on another cause. They are known as '*paratahprāmāṇyavādīns*'. According to the *svatahprāmāṇyavādīns*, the validity of a cognition is originated from those causes from which of the causes that cognition originates itself. On the other hand, according to the *paratahprāmāṇyavādīns*, the validity of a cognition is originated from some cause besides those causes from which of the causes that cognition creates itself.

The doctrines of erroneous cognition have been reduced from the doctrines of validity of cognition. The Prābhākaras' opinion is that, when a thing becomes knowable to us then we understand about that cognition like valid. And we uses that knowable thing in such way. So, this doctrine is called as 'self-validity of cognition'.

On the other hand, the Naiyāyikas say that, when the knower says a silver in front of his eye-sense-organ then some causes are necessary to generate the silver-oriented cognition namely, the knower, the eye-sense-organ of the knower, the connection between the object of the cognition and the mind of the knower, the object or the silver, light, magnanimity etc. But, this silver-oriented cognition may be a valid cognition if it being noticeable that, there is no any blame in any cause of this cognition. According to the Naiyāyikas, the silver-oriented cognition becomes valid owing to the presence of 'the absence of blame'. 'The absence of the blame' is an additional cause of the silver-oriented cognition. It is not the cause of the origination of that cognition on. So, the Naiyāyikas' doctrine is called '*paratahprāmāṇyavāda*'. Again, the silver-oriented cognition may be an invalid cognition if there any blame exists in the cause of that cognition. So, 'the blame' is an additional cause to create the invalidity of this cognition.²

According to the Naiyāyikas, the validity or invalidity of a cognition becomes knowable to us through a mental perception which is known as '*anuvyāvasāya*' in Indian Philosophy. When the knower perceives a thing which exists in front of him like the another thing which exists in far from the knower then actually any blame exists in the procedure of the origination of this type of cognition. After some times, the knower becomes unable to take the silver. Because, actually the silver does not exist in front of the knower. The silverness is connected with the shell' or 'this thing' which exists in front of the knower. But, it is not possible; because, the silverness may not exist in the shell; the silverness may exist in the silver. In this case, the silverness became connected with the shell through the *jñanalaksana sannikarsa* being aroused the previous impression of the silver in the knower's mind. It happens owing to the similarity between the shell and the silver. And, the knower is desired to take silver. As a result, the knower goes forward to the shell. But, after some times, the knower may not take the thing as silver. Because, that thing actually is not the silver. The knower went forward to the 'this thing' thinking as the silver due to his defective eye-sense-organs, the absence of the light, greedness or desirousness of the knower etc. These are the blamish causes of the erroneous cognition. So, this silver-oriented cognition is an erroneous or

invalid cognition. The invalidity of this cognition becomes knowable through the mental perception or '*anuvyāvasāya*' of the knower.

It is mentionable that, the *jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* becomes acceptable owing to the demonstration of the mental perception or '*anuvyāvasāya*'. With reference to this context, we have to know about '*anuvyavasaya*'. The mental perception of the determinate perception is called '*anuvyāvasāya*'. The determinate perception reveals the self-object, but, it does not reveal itself. This determinate perception is revealed by the mental perception of the knower or '*anuvyāvasāya*'. Actually, our mind does not accept the external things separately. The object of the determinate perception may not be connected with knower's mind through the ordinary perception. The object of the determinate perception may be connected with knower's mind through the extra-ordinary perception. This extraordinary perception is called '*jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa*'.

The above-mentioned '*jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa*' connects the attribute of the things which exists far from the knower with that thing which exists in front of the knower. As a result, the knower thinks the desired thing exists in front of him in spite of it's non-existence in front of the person. So, it is called erroneous or invalid cognition.

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika schools, the locus which is appearing on the error, the imposing entity and the relation between them --- these all categories are real. But, according to Vācaspati Miśra and Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas, the ‘relation’ between the locus and the imposing category is unreal notwithstanding the reality of the locus and the imposing entity in the erroneous case.

“*Anyasyakhyātiḥ anyathā-anyadharmaprakāśenā*” is ‘*anyathākhyāti*’. This opinion has been accepted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers, Yoga-philosophers, Jaina philosophers and also Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas.

In the erroneous case of ‘this is silver’, the knower knows the shell which is qualified by the silverness. But, we know that actually the shell becomes qualified by the shellness; and the silver is qualified by the silverness. The silverness is not the property of the shell. In spite of this situation, the knower knows the shell which is qualified by the silverness. So, it is called ‘*anyathākhyāti*’.

A question may be raised that, that thing becomes the perceptual object in which thing the contact of the sense-organ with object exists. In the erroneous case of ‘this is silver’ the contact of the eye-sense-organ of the knower exists on the ‘this thing’, as a result, the locus like ‘this thing’ may be the perceptual object. But, a

question may be raised that, why does the perceptual cognition occur about that thing which exists in front of the knower in spite of the non-existence of the ordinary connection like '*samyukta samavāya*' between the silverness and that thing? So, the cognition of the shell qualified by the silverness may not be possible.

The answer after the above-mentioned question may be as such: the connection (*sannikarṣa*) is mainly of two-fold namely, (i). the ordinary connection and (ii). The extra-ordinary connection. Notwithstanding the non-existence of the ordinary connection like 'the conjunctive inherence relation' between the silverness and the eye-sense-organ of the knower, there the extra-ordinary connection like 'the *jñānalakṣana sannikarṣa*' exists between them. This type of '*sannikarsa*' is actually the impression by nature in accordance with an opinion; again, it is the memory by nature in accordance with another opinion. In 'the shell-silver' case, the impression of the silver becomes aroused due to the similarity between the 'this thing' and the impression of the silver which had been cognized by the knower in previous time. This type of silver-oriented impression is called as '*jñānalakṣana sannikarsa*' in accordance with an opinion. Again, the memory which is originated

by the impression that memory of the silver is known as the '*jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa*' in accordance with the another opinion.³

The view of the Prābhākara has been challenged by the Naiyāyikas who has defined error as '*yatra yadadhyāsastasyaiva viparītdharmatvakalpanamadhyāsadh*'. That is, the superimposition is nothing but the assumption of the opposite character on something. It is the imposition of the opposite character i. e. silverness in place of shell. These arguments are not developed by Gangesa but they are very strong to support the Nyāya standpoint.

The Naiyāyikas argue how the Mīmāṃsakas prove the absence of the knowledge of discrimination between the remember content (*smṛta*) and acquired content (*grhīta*). From the fact of one's inclination towards getting silver it is proved that there is cognition of non-discrimination between 'thisness' (*idantā*) and 'silverness' (*rajatattva*). Such inclination proves and absence of doubt about its nature of object and its causal efficiency.

Secondly, if there is the cognition of non-discrimination (*bhedāgraha*) between the two as told earlier, how does an individual know the same as 'two'? 'The cognition of the non-discrimination of the two' proves that there is the

knowledge of 'two' leading to the contradiction of the knowledge of non-discrimination.

Thirdly, it may be argued that the knowledge of the similarity between shall and silver may lead an individual to the knowledge of identity. It is not tenable, because if someone has got the knowledge in the form: 'Tiger is similar to cat', does an individual being desirous of tiger incline to have cat?

Fourthly, if it is argued that one inclines to have silver, as it was not known as non-silver, the Naiyayikas are of the opinion that the object was neither taken as 'silver' nor as 'non-silver'. If it is so, there would have been an 'indifferent attitude' (*upekṣābuddhi*) towards the object. But a clear inclination is found instead of indifference which proves one's cognition of what is conducive to the desired (*iṣṭa-sāadhanatā-jñāna*). It ultimately proves the object as silver.

Lastly, it has been told by the Prābhākaras that if there is a defect in the cause, it cannot produce an effect, but it is not true that it produces a different type of effect. The Naiyāyikas do not agree with this. To them a defective cause may produce a different type of effect (*kāryāntara*). For it is found that a particular creeper called *Betralata*, if burnt by forest-fire (*dābānala*) can produce a banana tree. This is an example taken from the botanical world. Another example is put

forth from the physiological world. It is pointed out that an ulcer in the stomach increases the hunger of an individual instead of loss of it.

In fact, the theories of error are formulated in such a way so that their notion of *pramā* (right cognition) is protected. If the nature of right cognition is determined in a particular system, error is also to be determined in the light of that. In each and every theory something is superimposed on something else (*sarvathāpi tu anyasyānyadharmāvasatām na vyabhicarati*). The Vijñānavādin-s have imposed extra-mental things on mental one, the Prābhākaras impose silver on shell due to the cognition of non-discrimination, and the Naiyāyikas impose the opposite properties to something else (*anyathā*). In all the cases error is nothing but superimposition of one thing on another.

The Prābhākaras do not believe in the existence of any erroneous cognition while the Naiyāyikas believe in illusory cognition or error. We would like to point some points which indicate the pragmatic value of error. From the fact of its pragmatic value it is known to us that there is the existence of the phenomenon of error, which ultimately disproves the Prābhākara position.

First, error has been taken as invalid cognition, because it can only mislead an individual. Now an effort will be made to show that error serves a virtuous role

also in our life as envisaged in *Mārkaṇḍeyapurāṇa* where error has been taken as a form of Mother Goddess existing in all creatures ('*yā devī sarvabhūteṣu bhrāntirūpeṇa samsthitā*'). In fact, forgetfulness can also be included under the causes of error. An individual would be able to survive in this empirical world amidst sufferings, arising out of lust, misunderstanding, ego etc. due to having the forgetfulness (*bhrānti*) in his life. Had there been no such quality, he would have been mad being overburdened by the sorrows and sufferings. Hence *bhrānti* or error sometimes occupies a prominent role for psychological balance. Sometimes the tranquilizers are applied to make a man psychologically normal after removing his over-concerned situation towards a particular matter. That is why; we come across a definition of human being which runs as follows: 'To err is human'. In fact, error lies in the very nature of a human being. In other words, the essential characteristic of a man is to commit error. In other words, we cannot get rid of this error as it is in the very nature of a man.

Secondly, error has got a positive value in the sense that it serves as a rectifier of certain policy or principle. Error provides us certain lesson through which we can correct ourselves. Hence error can be taken as a means of rectification or correction. That is why, the *trial and error* method is still a valuable method in the field of learning or Psychology.

Thirdly, it is found in our life that error which is not a reality provides us some picture of reality indirectly. As for example, when the driver sees the reflection of a following car in the looking glass, he becomes cautious of it. Though the reflection is not the real object, it provides an idea of the real object. Though the photograph pasted in an application form does not entail reality yet it can provide some idea of the real applicant to the authority. Even now-a-days a computer sketch which is not a reality can help the investigating officer to identify a criminal. In the Advaita text *Pañcadaśī Vidyāraṇya* Muni has taken the help of picture which may act as a lamp to illumine the Ultimate Reality (*Brahman*) in a section called *Citrādīpaparakaraṇa*. Moreover, Sankara in his *Adhyāśabhāṣya* has admitted the necessity of falsity or superimposition. To him, all our behaviours, Vedic or secular, all the usages of means of knowing (*pramāṇa*) and knowable objects (*prameya*), injunctions and liberation are possible due to the falsity (superimposition) between self and non-self. In order to go beyond the range of duality we must begin with duality which is nothing but falsity between self and non-self.

Lastly, the theory of error is taken as one of the methods of philosophizing. If any error in the opponent's arguments is not shown, the proponent's standpoint cannot be substantiated. Therefore, error is to be pointed out only to save-guard our

own philosophical position. No philosophical position is final and hence each and every standpoint is subject to challenge. To challenge means to show error in a theory. That is why; philosophy becomes a flowing water, but not stagnant. Had there been no error, no new philosophical standpoint would come up. In Indian Philosophy the fundamental function is the show fault or error to other's view (*paramatadūṣana*) and establishing one's own standpoint.

END NOTES:

1. Annambhaṭṭa, *Tarkasamgraha* with *Dīpikā*, Sri Narayana Chandra Goswami (Ed. & Trs.), Sanskrit pustak Bhandar, kolkata, aswin, 1390, page: 508-511
2. Goswami, Sitanatha (Trs. in bengali), *Adhyāśabhāṣya*, Sanskrit Pustak bhandar, Kolkata, 2012, p: 103
3. Miśra, Vācaspati, *Brahmasūtra Śaṅkarabhāṣya Bhāmati*, Bhattacharya, Sri Sri Mohan (Ed. & Trs.), Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, Kolkata, 1973, p: 38-39