

CHAPTER-IV

The establishment of the theory of '*anyathākhyāti*' refuting '*akhyātivāda*'

Part-I

A Critique of '*Akhyātivāda*' by the Naiyāyikas

We have to know as to the nature of valid knowledge ('*pramā*') in accordance with Gangeśa before the establishment of the theory of '*anyathākhyāti*'.

Gangeśa defines '*pramā*' as such: "*Yatra yadasti tatra tasyānubhavaḥ pramā* ".

Actually, the intuition ('*anubhava*') of that entity in that locus ('*adhikaraṇa*') is called '*pramā*' which entity definitely remains there.¹ To exemplify it we may say that, the existence of the silverness remains in the 'this thing' ('*idam*') like the silver in the valid knowledge like '*idam rajatam*'. So, the silverness-oriented knowledge in the this thing is called '*prama*'. On the other hand, the silverness does not remain in the 'this thing' ('*idam*') like 'the shell' ('*śukti*') in spite of this situation, the knower gains the knowledge of silver; it is called invalid knowledge ('*apramā*').

Prabhākara upheld that, ‘*nanu sarvajñānānām yathārthatvāt pramālakṣaṇe viśeṣaṇavyavarttyaprasiddheh viśeṣaṇavaiyarthyaṁ anyathākhyātau mānābhāvāt*’. Actually, ‘*tadabhāvavat viśeṣyaka tatprakāraka*’—such kind of cognition is not proved in accordance with Prābhākara. In consideration of Prābhākara, ‘thisness’ (*idanta*) is a perceptual cognition and ‘the cognition of silver’ is a remembrance in the ‘shell-silver’ case. The difference between those two is not accepted to the knower by virtue of blames. Not only the difference between these two kinds of cognition is not accepted to the knower on account of blames but also these two types of things like ‘the shell’ and ‘the silver’. The person who is interested to collect the silver (*rajaṭārthī*) undertakes to the shell for the sake of those two kinds of cognition whose difference is not accepted. So, it is not necessary to accept that shell-oriented cognition, shell is qualified by the silverness. If we accept the shell-oriented knowledge then the shell is specified by the silverness and the adjective like ‘*tadvadviśeṣyakatva*’ is necessary in the definition of ‘*pramā*’ (‘valid cognition’) to differentiate it from the invalid cognition (*apramā*). But, someone who does not accept the erroneous cognition (*tadabhāvavadviśeṣyaka tatprakāraka jñāna*), according to them, such adjective is unnecessary.

In pursuance of the Prābhākaras that cognition would be necessarily '*tadvadviśeṣyaka*' which is '*tatprakāraka*'.

Why would not be accepted the theory of '*anyathākhyāti*' ?

After the above-mentioned question Prābhākaras say that, '*anyathākhyātau mānābhāvāt*'. Actually, there is no any evidence in the theory of '*anyathākhyāti*' in accordance with the Prābhākaras.

To refute the above-said argument, the Naiyāyikas deliberate that, '*anyathākhyātau mānābhāvāt*' means 'there is no evidence in the *anyathākhyāti*'. So, the Prābhākaras say that, there is the absence of the evidence in the locus like '*anyathākhyāti*'. But, the Prābhākaras cannot say it; because, they actually do not accept such locus like '*anyathākhyāti*'. 'The absence of anything' is not established in any unproved locus¹.

For this reason, Mathurānātha, commentator of Gangeśa has given the meaning of the term like '*anyathākhyātau mānābhāvāt*' as such: there is no evidence as to the term 'otherwiseness' ('*anyathātva*') which remains in the cognition. Actually, 'otherwiseness' ('*anyathātva*') means 'that adjectiveness which is limited by the attribute of the noun/subject which is the locus of the absence of that' ('*tadabhāvavadviśeṣyakatvāvaccinna tatprakāratva*'). The Prābhākaras' opinion

is that: ‘that adjectiveness which is limited by the attribute of the subject which is the locus of the absence of that’ (*tadabhāvanadvīṣeṣyakatvāvaccinna tatprakāraakatva*) remains in the unsuccessful or abortive desire (*visamvādi iccā*). Such unfruitful desire does not remain in cognition. The person who is interested to collect the silver (*rajatārthī*) must undertake the shell once in a way for the sake of such desire which is the cognition of the shell qualified by the silverness. The silverness which is limited by the attribute of the subject/noun like the shell (*śuktivīṣeṣyakatvāvaccinna rajatatvaprakāraakatva*) remains in such desire. But, the shell is such locus which is specified by the absence of the silverness.. It is called ‘otherwiseness’ (*anyathātva*).

The *Prābhākara* school has refuted the above-mentioned argument by dint of the statement as:

“ *tathāhi---* *rajatārthipravṛttiviśayatvaṃ rajatatvaprakāra-*
kānubhavaviśayatvavyapyam rajatārthipravṛttiviśayamātravṛttidharmatvāt
rajatamātravṛttidharmavaditi anyathākhyātivapyam siddhātīti. Aprāptakālatvaṃ,
rajatamātravṛttiṅcopādhih”² being doubted the *Naiyāyikas*’ opinion concerning

the ‘*anyāthākhyāti*’. The *Naiyāyikas* said that, the attribute of a subject of the inclination(*pravṛttiviśayatva*) of the person who is interested to collect the silver(*rajatārthī*) is pervaded with the attribute of the subject of that intuition or cognition which is specified by the adjective ‘silverness’(*rajatatvaprakāra-*

anubhavaviṣayatva’). Actually, there is an invariable concomitance relation [*vyāpti*] between the *rajatārthī*’s *pravṛtṭiṣayatva*’ and *’rajatattvaprakāra anubhavaviṣayatva*’). If that statement is accepted then it also would be accepted “the attribute of the subject of the intuition which is specified by the adjective like ‘silverness’ (*’rajatatvaprakāra anubhavaviṣayatva*’) in the shell”. Because, the person who is interested to collect the silver (*’rajatārthī*) becomes unsuccessful being engaged to the shell at some times. Such attribute of the subject of the unfruitful or abortive inclination (*’viphalā-pravṛtṭiṣayatva*’) is accepted to all. If the attribute of the subject of the unfruitful inclination is pervaded with the attribute of the subject of that cognition which is qualified by the silverness then the attribute of that subject of the knowledge which is qualified by the silverness would be accepted in the shell. The shell-oriented intuition which is qualified by the silverness, is called ‘theory of error with regard to otherwise’ (*’anyathākhyāti*’). In that intuitive cognition, the ‘probans’ or ‘the attribute which remains only in the subject which is the subject of the inclination of that person who is interested to collect the silver (*’rajatārthipravṛtṭi-ṣayamātravṛtṭidharmatva*’). As a result, the ‘probahdum’ or ‘the pervasiveness which is the characteristic feature of that intuition which is qualified by the silverness’ (*’rajatatvaprakāra anubhavaviṣayatvavyāpyatva*’) also remains in the shell-oriented intuition which is qualified by the silverness. In this way, the

attribute of the subject of the inclination of the person who is interested to collect the silver, that is proved as pervaded of the characteristic feature of that intuition which is qualified by the silverness. If the invariable concomitance relation is accepted in the shell then the ‘*anyathākhyāti*’ or ‘*tadabhāvavadaviśeṣyakatvāvaccinna tatprakāraakatva*’ is accepted.

The Naiyāyikas demonstrated another argument to establish the theory of ‘*anyathākhyāti*’. The argument is as such: “*Rajatatvam arajataavr̥ttijñānaviśayatāvaccedakam arajataviśayapravr̥ttihetujñānaprakāra- katvāt, śuktitvavat*”. In this argument, the inferential statement (‘*pakṣa*’) is ‘the silverness’(‘*rajatatva*’), the probandum is ‘the attribute of the limiter of the subjectness of that cognition which remains in the non-silver(‘*arajataavr̥ttijñānaviśayatāvaccedakatva*’) and the probans is: ‘the adjectiveness of that cognition which is the cause of that inclination whose object is the non-silver’(‘*arajataviśayapravr̥ttihetujñānaprakāraakatva*’).

‘The attribute of the limiter’(‘*avaccedaka*’) means ‘adjectiveness’(‘*prakāraakatva*’). So, actually the probandum is: ‘the adjectiveness of the objectness of that cognition which remains in the non-silver’(‘*arajataavr̥ttijñānaviśayatāprakāraakatva*’). In the shell-silver erroneous cognition, ‘the silverness’ is the inferential subject(‘*pakṣa*’). The adjectiveness of the attribute of the subject of

that cognition(*jñānaviṣayatā*) which remains in the shell and such adjectiveness(*prakāraṅkatva*) remains in such inferential subject (*pakṣa*). The probans(*hetu*) is : ‘the adjectiveness of that cognition which is the cause of that inclination whose object is the non-silver’. The person who is interested to collect the shell’ (*śuktyārthī*) goes forward to collect the shell. The object of such inclination (*pravṛtti*) is non-silver (*arajata-viṣayaka pravṛtti*).

‘This is shell’ ---such cognitive state is the cause of that shell-oriented inclination. The shellness is the adjective of this cognition. As a result, the adjectiveness of the cognition (*jñānaprakāraṅkatva*) remains in the shellness (*śuktitva*). So, the probans remains in the shellness. The attributeness(*prakāratva*) of the attribute of the subject of the cognition (*jñānaviṣayatā*) also remains in the shell or non-silver. So, both the probandum and probans remain in the shellness. The shellness is the example of this inferential statement.

It is necessary to clarify the above-mentioned statement. The inferential subject (*pakṣa*) is ‘the silverness’ (*rajatatva*) in this statement. The probandum (*sādhya*) is: ‘the attribute of the limiter of the subjectness of that cognition (*jñānaviṣayatāvaccadakatva*)’ which remains in the non-silver (*arajata*). The attribute of the limiter (*avaccadakatva*) means ‘the adjectiveness’ (*prakāratva*). So, the probandum is ‘the adjectiveness ascertained by the subjectness of that

cognition which remains in the non-silver’ (*‘arajataavr̥ttijñānaviṣayatānirūpita prakṣratva’*). Actually, ‘the adjectiveness is ascertained by the subjectness of that cognition which remains in the non-silver like the shell etc.’ is the probandum in this cognition. If the adjectiveness ascertained by the subjectness of that cognition which remains in the non-silver’, it remains in the silverness. The cognitive state also would be accepted like ‘the cognition of non-silver qualified by the silverness’ (*‘arajata-viśeṣyaka rajatatvaprakāraka jñāna’*). It is an erroneous otherwiseness cognition (*‘anyathākhyāti’*)³.

The *Prābhākara* school of *Mimāṃsaka* has shown the fallacy of ‘*upādhi*’ after that argument. The *Prābhākaras* point out that, the ‘*rajataavr̥ttitva*’ or ‘the non-existenceness of the silver’ is the ‘*upādhi*’ in this argument. We know that, the definition of ‘*upādhi*’ is as such: ‘*sādhyavyapakatve sati sādhanāvyāpakatvaṃ*’. In this case, the ‘*rajataavr̥ttitva*’ or ‘the non-existenceness of the silver’ is pervasive than the probandum or ‘the adjectiveness ascertained by the subjectness of that cognition which remains in the non-silver’ (*‘arajata-avr̥tti jñānaviṣayatānirūpitaprakāratva’*). This probandum remains in the shellness or non-silverness in accordance with the *Prabhakara*. Hence, the theory of ‘otherwiseness’ or ‘*anyathākhyāti*’ is not applicable.

The *Naiyāyikas* pointed out another argument to accomplish the ‘*anyathākhyāti*’. The argument is as such:

“*Vivādapadam rajatajñāna Śuktiviṣayakam*

Śuktau pravartakajñānatvāt”.

The significance of the above-mentioned argument is as such: the cause of the inclination to the shell of that person who is interested to collect the silver is as such form of cognition: ‘the substantive cognition of the shell which shell is qualified by the silvertness’ (“*śuktiviśeṣyaka rajatattvaprakāra jñāna*”) in accordance with the *Naiyāyikas*. But, it is impossible for the *Prabhakaras* to accept as such cognition; because, they do not accept the erroneous cognition. For this reason, the *Naiyāyikas* point out that, the shell-oriented cognition which is qualified by the silverness is a matter of doubt. It is the cause of shell-oriented inclination. The silverness-oriented cognition (*‘rajatatvaprakāra jñāna’*) is the inferential subject (*‘pakṣa’*) in this statement. ‘The subjectness of the shell’ (*‘śuktiviśeṣyatva’*) is the probandum. ‘The attribute of that cognition which is the cause of the inclination whose subject is the shell’ (*‘śuktiviśeṣyaka-pravṛttijanaka-jñānatva’*) is the probans in this cognition.

The Prābhākaras admitted that, the above-mentioned argument also is fallacious. Because, the probandum like the subjectness of the shell' (*'śuktiviśeṣyakatva'*) does not remain in the inferential subject⁴.

Actually, the Nyāya-thinkers upheld that, the identical cognition between the shell and silver is the cause of the unfruitful inclination to the shell of the person who is interested to collect the silver. But, the Prabhakaras do not accept such kind of 'theory of otherwiseness' (*'anyathākhyāti'*). According to them (Prābhākara), the knowledge of difference (*'bhedāgraha'*) between 'the silver' and 'thisness' and also the presence separately between the 'this' and 'silver' are the causes of that unfruitful inclination.

The identical cognition of the desirous thing (*'iṣṭabheda jñāna'*) is the cause of the unfruitful inclination in accordance with the Nyāya-thinkers. In this respect, '*iṣṭa'*' means 'the object of desire'. If any person is desirous to collect the silver then that person goes forward to the 'this thing' (*'idam'*) which remains in front of the knower for the sake of the identical cognition of the silver to this thing. But, if we accept the cognition whose subject is the identical with the desirous thing as the cause of the inclination then we also have to accept it in the cause of unfruitful inclination. As for example, when the person who is interested to collect the silver

(*‘rajatārthī*) goes forward to collect the shell in that case, the identical cognition of the silver in the shell is the cause of that inclination.

Actually, the cause of the fruitless inclination (*‘visamvādipravṛtti’*) which is characterized by the silverness to the shell of that person who is interested to collect the silver is the identical cognition between the shell and the silver or the knowledge which is qualified by the shell and characterized by the silver in accordance with the *Nyāya*-thinkers. On the other hand, the Prabhakaras’ view concerning error, the fruitless inclination which is characterized by the silverness originates in the shell by reason of the absence of knowledge of discrimination between the ‘idam’ or the foremost thing and the silver which exists far from the knower and the presence of the shell and the silver separately.

That the absence of knowledge of discrimination of the desired thing (*‘iṣṭabhedāgraha’*) is the cause of inclination is accepted by the Prābhākara school of Mīmāṃsā. Refuting this argument, the *Nyāya*-thinkers say that, in which case, there is the knowledge of difference of the desired thing on account of the particular blame etc. in that case and also seen the inclination. For example, ‘the conch is yellow, not white’ ... in this case, if *‘śvetatvavyāpya śamkhyatvavān ayaṃ*’ or ‘this is full of conchness which is to be pervaded by whiteness’. In the same manner the knowledge of pervasion of whiteness in the conch has to be

originated. In consequence of this particular perceptual knowledge '*śamkyah śvetah*' or 'the white conch'..... the inclination originates of that person who is interested to collect the white thing etc. to the conch. The white-thing is the desired thing to that person who is interested to collect the white thing. This identical knowledge of the white is the cause of the inclination in accordance with the *Naiyāyikas*. Because, the *Naiyāyikas*' point of view is that, the identical knowledge of the desired thing is the cause of the inclination. But, behind such point of view, the absence of knowledge of discrimination is the cause of inclination. According to them, it is not possible to become inclined to this case.

The *Mīmāṃsakas*' point of view is that, if we say that, the identical knowledge of the desired thing is the cause of inclination then the desired thing is yellow to whom it is not possible for him to become inclined for the knowledge of 'the conch is yellow'. Because, the person who has bile-disease, he knows that, the conch is not yellow. So, he infers that, '*ayaṃśamkhah no pītah śamkhatvāt*' or 'this conch is not yellow' as it is known with the conchness'. With this inference the knowledge of difference of the desired thing exists by that person who is interested to collect the yellow thing. As a result, the cause of the inclination as the absence of knowledge of discrimination in accordance with the *Prābhākara* does not exist. But, according to the *Naiyāyikas*, there is an identical knowledge of the desired yellow of that person who is interested to collect the yellow thing with the

knowledge ‘the conch is yellow’. So, the Nyāya-thinkers accept this inclination. Yet, it is not accepted to all that, the inclination originates from the knowledge ‘the conch is yellow’ for the particular blames etc. The Naiyāyikas’ opinion is that, the identical knowledge of the desired thing which is the cause of inclination that exists in this case. But, in the Prābhākara’s opinion, the absence of knowledge of discrimination of the desired yellow that does not exist in this case; because, the knowledge of difference (*‘bheda-graha’*) becomes with the conchness (*‘probans’*) in that case. For this reason, the Prābhākaras raised the opposite the standpoint and say that, the absence of knowledge of discrimination of the desired thing is the cause of inclination which is reasonable.⁵

Part-II

‘Anyathākhyātivādasiddhāntapakṣa’

Both the Prābhākaras and the Naiyāyikas upheld that, the desired silver (*‘iṣṭa rajata’*) and the cognition of thisness (*‘idam’*) are the causes of the valid inclination like ‘the cognition of silver qualified by the silverness’. But, there is the diversion (*‘vyābhicāra’*) between ‘the inclination’ and ‘the cognition of thisness’. Because, the inclination of the knower also is created by ‘the adjectiveness which is the limiter of the desirousness’ (*‘iṣṭatāvaccedaka prakāra’*) and ‘the cognition of thisness’ (*‘idamviśeṣyaka jñāna’*) in ‘the cognition of this is not silver’ (*‘idam na rajatam’*). But, ‘the inclination concerning thisness’ (*‘idamviśeṣyaka pravṛtti’*) may not be created by anybody in ‘the cognition of this is not silver’. Nevertheless, both the object (*‘viśaya’*) and also the subject (*‘viśeṣya’*) are the desired thing (*‘iṣṭa’*) in ‘the cognition of this is not silver’ (*‘idam na rajatam’*). So, it is necessary to accept the inclination in this case also. To refute this, we have to accept such cognition which is *‘iṣṭatāvaccedaka rajatatvaniṣṭha prakāratānirūpita idamnistha viśeṣyatāśālī’* as the cause of that inclination.

The Prābhākaras said after that, ‘the attribute of the absence of knowledge of discrimination’ (*‘bhedāgrahatva’*) remains in the cognition of ‘this is silver’. So, ‘the attribute of the absence of knowledge of discrimination’ (*‘bhedāgrahatva’*)

may be the limiter (*‘avaccedaka’*) of the causation (*‘kāranatā’*) in such cognitive state.

The Naiyāyikas said after the Prābhākaras’ above-mentioned argument that, the acceptance of ‘the attribute of the cognition of thisness qualified by the silverness’ (*‘idamviśeṣyaka rajatatvaprakāraka jñānatva’*) is lighter (*‘lāghava’*) than the acceptance of ‘the attribute of the absence of the knowledge of discrimination’ (*‘bhedāgrahatva’*) as ‘the limiter of the causation’ (*‘kāranatāvaccedaka’*) in the causation of ‘this is silver’.

The certainty of the cause-effect relation is dependent upon the knowledge of co-existenceness between the cause and effect. If we accept the cognition of this qualified by the silverness as the cause of inclination then this kind of cognition will remain in previous time of that inclination and we will give the ‘*anuvyavasaya*’ of this cognition in the time of inclination. We also will give ‘the attribute of such cognition of this qualified by the silverness (*‘rajatatvaprakaratanirupita-idam-visesyaka jnanatva’*) as the subject (*‘viśaya’*) of that ‘*anuvyavasaya*’ of the cognition. By dint of this ‘*anuvyavasāya*’ the cause and the limiter of the cause (*‘kāranatāvaccedaka’*) regularly (*‘niyata’*) remain in the time of inclination. On the other hand, ‘the attribute of the absence of knowledge of discrimination (*‘bhedāgrahatva’*) does not regularly remain in the time of such inclination. For this reason, it is more justified to accept ‘the attribute of

knowledge of this qualified by silverness' (*'idaṁviśeṣyaka-rajatatvaprakāra-
jñānatva'*) as the limitor of the causation (*'kāranatāvacedaka'*).⁶

According to the Nyāya-thinkers, 'the cognition of silver qualified by the silverness' (*'rajata-viśeṣyaka-rajatatvaprakāra jñāna'*) is the cause of 'the inclination of silver qualified by the silverness' (*'rajata-viśeṣyaka rajatatvaprakāra pravṛtti'*). So, the valid cognition is the cause of the valid inclination. On the other hand, the false cognition is the cause of the false inclination. With reference to this context, Gaṅgeśa established an argument like:

"Viśamvādipravṛtṭih viśiṣṭajñānasādhyā, pravṛtṭitvāt, satyapravṛtṭivat".⁷

According to the above-mentioned argument, the subject and adjective of an inclination they also will be the qualificand (*'viśaya'*) and adjective (*'prakāra'*) respectively of that cognition which is the cause of that inclination. By dint of this inferential statement, 'the inclination of the shell qualified by the silverness' (*'śuktiviśeṣyaka rajatatvaprakāra jñāna'*) --- it has been established. As a result, it is proved that, the erroneous inclination (*'viśamvādī pravṛtti'*) is the effect of 'the erroneous cognition of otherwiseness' (*'anyathākhyāti'*). Gaṅgeśa said that, any effect cannot be created without its cause.

The Prābhākaras apprehended that, if we accept the erroneous cognition as a cause of the invalid inclination then it would not be possible to ascribe the cause of the erroneous cognition. Because, the object and the operative relation of the sense-organs of the knower are the causes of the valid cognition. But, these do not remain in the erroneous cognition. For this reason, it would be necessarily accepted that, the erroneous cognition is deprived of the cause. If the erroneous cognition is deprived of the cause then it also would be accepted that, this erroneous cognition is eternal. Because, we know that, any existing category which is deprived of any cause that actually is an eternal category. Because the eternal entity are only uncaused.

After that argument, Gaṅgeśa said that, the particular cognition (*'viśiṣṭa jñāna'*) is the cause of the erroneous inclination. Through this particular cognition the blame, sense-organs etc. are proved as its causes. Actually, the blemished sense-organs are accepted as the particular cognition.

To refute the above-mentioned argument, the prabhakaras apprehended that, 'blame' actually is the sublating entity (*'vādhaka'*) of an effect, it may not be the cause of any effect at any time.

After that argument, Gaṅgeśa pointed out that, *'sarvato valavati hi.....'* as on. According to him, even though 'blame' (*'doṣa'*'s) may not be proved as the cause

besides 'error' notwithstanding that, the effect as the erroneous cognition which is proved by the inclination that may be the effect of the blame.⁸

Gangeśa Upādhyāy pointed out that, “*na ca bhedāgrahāt pravṛtṭyupapatterapī*” to prove that, the absence of knowledge of discrimination may not be the cause in the case of the fruitful and non-fruitful inclination both. *Gangeśa* said that, “*viparītacatuṣke yugapat pravṛtṭi-nivṛtṭyapatteh.....*” etc. The meaning of the technical term ‘*viparītacatuṣka*’ is as such: the case of the illusory cognition where the silver is the subject qualified by the attribute of tin-foilness (‘*rajate raṅgatvaparakāraka bhramajñāna*’). In the case of this illusory cognition, the qualifier is in the silver and on the other hand, the qualifier is the silverness in the tin-foil. This is the explanation of the *Nyāya*-philosophers. But, the *Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas* pointed out with regard to this explanation in another way. Because, there is nothing any illusory cognition in accordance with the *Prābhākaras*. According to the *Prābhākaras*, the perceptual cognition of the shell, the presence of the silverness and the absence of knowledge of discrimination between the shell and the silver---- this is the illusion in the shell-silver case. The person who is interested to collect the silver (‘*rajatārthī*’) goes forward to the shell and on the other hand, he comes back from the shell in the presence of such illusory cognition. Because, the perceptual cognition of the locus, the presence of

the silverness and the absence of knowledge of discrimination between the shell and silver ---these are the causes of the inclination of the desired person as to the silver in accordance with the *Prābhākara* school. In this case, the perceptual cognition of the locus as the shell, the presence of the silverness and the absence of knowledge of discrimination between the shell and the silver presented. For this reason, there is the inclination of the knower. Similarly, there is the completion of the knower also is presented. Because, there are the causes of the completion of the knower have also been presented. Because, there are the perceptual knowledge of the shell, the presence of the shellness and the absence of knowledge of discrimination between the shell and the substratum like ‘this’ (*idam*). So, there are the inclination and completion both are presented in the substratum like ‘this’. Those above-discussed cases are the unfruitful inclination and completion both. Now, we will discuss the fruitful cases in accordance with the *Prābhākara* school of *Mīmāṃsakas*. In the same manner, the perceptual knowledge of silver or ‘this’, the presence of silverness and the absence of knowledge of discrimination between the silver and the substratum like ‘this’ (*idam*) --- these are presented in the case of inclination. Again, there are the perceptual knowledge of the substratum, the presence of shellness and the absence of knowledge of discrimination between the shell and the substratum or ‘this’. So, there is the completion also in the substratum like ‘this’ (*idam*). So, it is established by the *Prābhākaras* that, the inclination

and completion both remain in the identical substratum simultaneously. But, it is not possible. For this reason, the absence of knowledge of discrimination may not become the cause in the case of fruitful and non-fruitful inclination and completion in accordance with the *Nyāya*-philosophers.

The *Prābhākara* school of *Mīmāṃsakas* said that, the absence of knowledge of discrimination (*bhedāgraha*) is the cause of the inclination and completion both of the fruitful (*saṃvādī*) and fruitless (*viśaṃvādī*). Refuting this argument Gangeśa demonstrated another objection. That argument is as such: “*Na ca bhedāgrahāt pravṛttyupapattirapi. Viparītacatuṣke yugapat pravṛttnivṛtтыapattih.....*”. ‘*Viparītacatuṣke*’ is a technical term. It means ‘the illusory cognition of this silver qualified by shellness’. The silver and the shell are presented as the locative cases which are qualified by thisness. The silverness and the shellness are presented as imposing entities. In this illusory cognition, the shellness is the adjective (*prakāra*) in the silver which silver is presented by thisness again, the silverness is the adjective in the shell which shell is presented by thisness in this illusory case. This is the view of the *Naiyāyikas*. The *Prābhākaras* pointed out this illusory cognition in another way. According to the *Prābhākaras*, the perceptual cognition of the shell like thisness (*īdantena śuktipratyakṣa*,) the presence of silverness and the absence of knowledge of discrimination between the shell and the silver --- this is the illusion of the silver in

the shell by thisness. Similarly, the perceptual knowledge of the silver which silver is presented by thisness, the presence of the shellness and the absence of knowledge of discrimination between the shell and the silver --- these are the causes of this illusory cognition. The inclination and the completion are created of that person who is interested to collect the silver (*‘rajatārthī’*) in the case of this illusory cognition. Because, according to the *Prābhākaras*, the perceptual knowledge of the substratum (*‘dharmī’*), the presence of the silverness and the absence of knowledge of discrimination between the substratum and the silver --- these are the causes of the inclination of that person who is interested to collect the silver. In this case, the perceptual knowledge of the substratum as the shell which shell is presented by thisness, the presence of silverness and the absence of knowledge of discrimination of the silver in the shell which shell is presented by thisness. Because, the knower accepted the shell as the silver, so, the inclination creates in this way. Similarly, the completion also creates in this way. Because, the perceptual knowledge of the substratum (*‘dharmipratyakṣa’*), presence of the shellness and the absence of knowledge of discrimination between the ‘thisness’ and the shell --- all of these remain in this case which are the causes of the completion(*‘nivr̥ṭṭi’*). So, in the case of silver which silver is presented by thisness that silver is qualified by the shellness. And which shell is presented by thisness that shell is qualified by the silverness --- this is the illusory cognitive case which

is known as '*samuhalambana bhrama*'. Because, the subjectness ascertained by the adjectiveness as the silverness ('*rajatatvaaprakaratānirūpita viśesyata*') remains in the tin ('*rāṅga*') and the another type of subjectness ascertained by the adjectiveness of the tinfoilness ('*raṅgatvaprakāratānirūpita viśeṣyatā*') remains in the silver. The tin ('*raṅga*') and the silver ('*rajata*') both of them are the objects of that cognition mainly. So, it is called '*samuhāḷambana*'.⁹

According to the Naiyāyikas, there is the knowledge of discrimination ('*bheda-graha*') of the silver in the illusory case of the tin in the silver. And there is also the knowledge of discrimination ('*bheda-graha*') of the tin in the illusory cognition of the silver in the tin. It would not be possible the apprehension like '*idaṃraṅgaṃ rajataṃ vā*' in the substratum like this for the sake of the existence of the knowledge of discrimination ('*bhed-graha*') of the silver in the silver. In the same manner, it would not be possible the apprehension like '*idaṃ raṅgaṃ rajataṃ vā*' in the substratum like this on account of the existence of the knowledge of discrimination of the tin in the tin. On the other hand, the Prābhākaras accept that apprehension. According to them, there is nothing any knowledge of discrimination between the shell and the silver due to blames; there is actually 'the absence of knowledge of discrimination' ('*bhedāgraha*'). If we accept the knowledge of

discrimination (*bhed-graha*) of the tin in the tin then it also would be accepted the theory of '*anyathākhyāti*'.¹⁰

According to the Prābhākaras, 'the absence of knowledge of discrimination' (*bhedāgraha*) is the cause of the inclination and completion both. According to them, the tin is presented to the knower by virtue of the attribute of glistening which remains in the silver. On the contrary, the silver is presented to the knower for the sake of the same attribute of glistening which also remains in the tin.

The Nyāya-thinkers upheld that, the difference of the silver is accepted in the silver due to blames; and for this reason, the illusion of that tin is created in that silver in the subsequent time. Again, the difference of the silver is accepted in the tin for the sake of blames.

According to the Naiyāyikas, the silver is not known by the silverness and the tin is not known by dint of the tinfulness. Because, if it would not be possible then the illusory cognition of tin in the silver and also the illusory cognition of the silver in the tin in the subsequent time. So, this illusory cognition has been created through the blames. The silver is not known to the knower as silverness and the tin also is not known to the knower as tinfulness for the sake of blames.¹¹

The Prābhākaras said that, ‘the blame’ is the cause of the inclination and completion both which ‘blame’ is accepted by the Naiyāyikas as the cause of the erroneous cognition. Actually, the ‘blame’ is necessary in accordance with both of them. But, the Prābhākaras cannot accept the argument given by the Naiyāyikas; because, there is nothing any erroneous cognition in view of the Prābhākaras. According to the Prābhākaras, ‘truthfulness’ (‘*satyatva*’) may not be the differentiator (‘*vyāvartyaka*’) of any cognition.

According to the Prābhākaras, the particular cognition (‘*viśiṣṭajñāna*’) is the cause of the fruitful inclination. But, there is no any particular cognition in previous time of the unfruitful inclination regularly in accordance with the Prābhākaras. If it would be accepted by the Prābhākaras then the theory of ‘*anyathākhyāti*’ also would be accepted. For this reason, the absence of knowledge of discrimination is the cause of the unfruitful inclination. ‘The absence of knowledge of discrimination (‘*rajata-bhedāgraha*’) of the silver’ means: the absence of the attribute of the subject/noun (‘*viśeṣyatvābhāva*’) of the difference cognition of the silver (‘*rajata-bheda-jñāna*’).¹²

The Naiyāyikas said that, “*jñānaṁ svaviṣaye pravartakaṁ*”. Or, the cognition originates the inclination to the subject of oneself. Being accepted this

rule, the cognition also would be ‘the shell-oriented qualified by the silverness’ (*‘śuktiviśeṣyaka-rajatatva-prakāraḥ’*) which is the cause of that inclination which also is ‘the shell-oriented qualified by silverness’ (*‘rajatatva-prakāra-śuktiviśeṣyaka pravṛtti’*). This kind of unfruitful inclination (*‘viśamvādi pravṛtti’*) is accepted by all. So, the unfruitful cognition also would be accepted which is the cause of the unfruitful inclination. It is called *‘anyathākhyāti’*.

The Naiyāyikas have been concluded their theory of error in this manner that, *“Tataḥ iṣṭajñānaṃ śuktou pravarttakam tadviśayakam tadvyāvahārahetutvāt. Svaviśaye tasyāsamarthyāt”*. According to this argument ‘the shell-oriented cognition qualified by silverness’ (*‘śuktiviśeṣyaka rajatatvaparakāra jñāna’*) is the cause of that ‘shell-oriented inclination qualified by the silverness’ (*‘śuktiviśeṣyaka-rajatatva-prakāra pravṛtti’*). Because, any kind of cognition does not create the inclination in the non-subject (*‘aviśeṣya’*) of own. Actually, the Naiyāyikas’ point of view is : the subject/noun (*‘viśeṣya’*) of the limiter (*‘avaccedaka’*) of the desirousness (*‘iṣṭatā’*) is also the subject (*‘viśeṣya’*) of the inclination (*‘pravṛtti’*).¹³

The Prābhākaras tried to refute the theory of *‘anyathākhyāti’* by dint of the argument: *“rajatajñānaṃ na śuktiviśayakam tatprativeddhavyāvahārahetutvāt”*.

The inferential subject of this argument is: ‘the silver-oriented cognition’ (*‘rajata-jñānam’*). Or, that ‘silverness-oriented cognition’ (*‘rajatatva-prakāra-kajñāna’*) is the subject of this argument which is the cause of the silverness-oriented inclination (*‘rajatatvaprakāra prakṛṣṭi’*). Because, the Naiyāyikas have been accomplished the theory of *‘anyathākhyāti’* accepting that cognition whose adjective is the silverness and subject is ‘the shell’. The present argument is the opposing of this. The probandum of this argument is *‘na śuktiviṣayakam’* or ‘the shell which limited by the absence of the subjectness (*‘viśeṣyakatvābhāva’*). The probans is *‘tatprativaddhavyāvahārahetutva’* or ‘the non-probansness of that inclination whose subject is the shell’.

The Naiyāyikas have been shown the *‘svarūpāsiddhi’* fallacy in that above-mentioned argument. Because, the probans does not remain in the present inferential subject in accordance with the Naiyāyikas.

The Prābhākaras said that, *“jñānam yathārtham eva”*. Or, ‘where is the knowledgeness (*‘jñanatvaṁ’*) there also is the validness/validity (*‘yathārthatvaṁ’*). It is the concomitance rule in this context. This concomitance rule is the obstacle to establish the theory of *‘anyathākhyāti’*.¹⁴

The Naiyāyikas presented two-fold arguments to refute the above-mentioned concomitance rule given by the Prābhākaras. In the case of fruitful inclination (*‘samvādi pravṛtti’*). We see that, if there ‘the silverness-oriented cognition’ (*‘rajatatvaprakāra jñāna’*) remains then actually ‘the silverness-oriented inclination’ (*‘rajatatvaprakāra pravṛtti’*) also remains. This cause-effect relation is effective depending on that agreement-disagreement. the form of this first argument is as such:

‘śuktiviśeṣyakarajatatvaprakārapravṛtti’ or ‘that inclination whose subject is the shell and the adjective is the silverness’. the probandum of this argument is ‘the subjectness which is the same of that subjectness of the inclination (*‘samānaviśeṣyatāsambandhena rajatatvaprakārajñānanajanyatva’*). The inclination which is the inferential subject of this argument remains in that place through the subjectness (*‘viśayatā’*) relation if the silverness-oriented cognition (*‘rajatatvaprakārajñāna’*) remains in the same locus then the silverness-oriented cognition (*‘rajatatvaprakāra jñāna’*) also remains in the same locus by dint of the same relation of being a qualificand (*‘samānaviśeṣyatā sambandha’*) to the shell-oriented inclination qualified by silverness (*‘śuktiviśeṣyaka rajatatvaprakāra pravṛtti’*).

The cause-effect relation (*kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva*) is possible between ‘the shell-oriented inclination qualified by the silverness’ (*śuktiviśeṣyaka-rajatatvaprakāraṇa pravṛtti*) and ‘the silverness-oriented cognition’ (*rajatatvaprakāraṇa jñāna*) for the co-existenceness (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*) through relation of being qualificand (*visayata sambandha*). ‘The shell-oriented inclination qualified by the silverness’ (*śukti-viśeṣyaka-rajatatvaprakāraṇa pravṛtti*) remains in the shell through ‘the subjectness relation’ (*viśeṣyatā sambandha*); for this reason, ‘the silverness-oriented cognition’ (*rajatatvaprakāraṇa jñāna*) also will remain in the same locus through ‘the *viśeṣyatā sambandha*’. If the silverness-oriented cognition (*rajatatva-prakāraṇa jñāna*) remains in the shell through the ‘*viśeṣyatā*’ relation then it is necessary to accept that, the ‘adjective’ (*prakāra*) of this cognition is ‘the silverness’ (*rajatatva*) and the subject/noun is ‘the shell’ (*śukti*). This kind of cognition is actually illusory.

The form of the second argument given by the Naiyāyikas is as such:

“*Śuktou pravartakam rajatatvaprakāraṇajñānam śuktiviśeṣyakam*

rajatatvaprakāraśuktiviśeṣyakapravṛttihetutvāt”.

The inferential subject of this statement is that silverness-oriented cognition which is the cause of the inclination to the shell'. The probandum is: 'the probandumness of the inclination whose subject ('*viśeṣya*') is the shell' ('*rajatatvaprakāraśuktiviśeṣyaka pravṛttihetutva*'). Through this argument 'the subjectness of the shell' ('*śuktiviśeṣyakatva*') has been established in the silverness-oriented cognition ('*rajatatva-prakāra-jñāna*') which is the cause of the inclination whose subject ('*viśeṣya*') is 'the shell'. It is an erroneous cognition. So, such rule as 'each cognition is valid' ('*jñānam yathārthameva*') has been sublated by dint of the above-mentioned two-fold arguments given by the Nyāya-thinkers.

Prābhākarean statement "*jñānam yathārthameva*" would be refuted with the above-mentioned argument given by the *Naiyāyikas*.

The form of the second argument given by the *Naiyāyikas* as such:

"*Śuktou pravartakam rajatattvaprakāraśuktiviśeṣyakaṁ*

Rajatattvaprakāraśuktiviśeṣyakapravṛttihetutvāt".

The inferential subject of this statement is 'that knowledge which is the originator of the inclination to the shell qualified by silverness'. The probandum of this argument is '*śuktiviśeṣyakatva*' or 'the term particularized by shell'. The probans of this argument is '*rajatattvaprakāraśuktiviśeṣyaka pravṛttihetutva*'

or ‘the attribute of the cause of that inclination which is particularized by the shell and that shell is qualified by the silverness’. The particular shell has accomplished in that cognitive state which is qualified by silverness and which cognition is the originator of that inclination which inclination is particularized by the shell. So, the cognitive state which is particularized by the shell and that shell is qualified by the silverness is necessarily called erroneous. The *Prābhākaras*’ statement “*jñānam yathārtham eva*” become refuted with the *Naiyāyikas*’ second argument too.¹⁵

A question may be raised that, if the knowledge is recognized to us as invalid then by what means we accept the knowledge confidently in accordance with the *Prābhākaras*. The *Prābhākaras* strongly established the theory of non-error with this argument.

After that, *Gangeśa* said that, the truthfulness of all cognition become ejected with the sublating cognition in accordance with all of us too. So, when the sublating cognition does not originate then we accept the truthfulness of cognition.

The *Naiyāyikas* refuted some others arguments given by the *Prābhākaras*. The *Prābhākaras* raised an argument on behalf of the non-acceptation of the illusory cognition. That is: when in the case of ‘this is silver’, the subject would be the shell yet the silver-oriented knowledge would be originated then this type of

cognition would be referred as illusory. It is unreasonable to accept that, 'this is silver' --- the subject of this cognitive state is 'the shell'. Because, the shell may not be appeared in this cognitive state. So, it is not reasonable to accept the theory that, the silver-oriented knowledge has become concerning the shell. So, the illusory cognition may not be accepted.

In pursuance of the *Naiyāyikas*, when the set of conditions of the cognition would be combined with then the nature of veridical cognition ('*pramātvā*') would be originated in the cognition. According to the *Nyāya* philosophy, the operative relation ('*sannikarṣa*') of the sense-organ ('eye') with an object which object or noun is qualified with an adjective is known as 'guna' or 'quality'. In the shell-silver case, yet, the operative relation with the shell there does not originate the operative relation with the shell which shell is qualified by silverness. So, that conjunction is not known as the 'quality' or 'guṇa'. For this reason, it is not possible to accept the origination of the valid knowledge ('*pramā*') from the absence of the producer of the quality. So, the cognitive state as the shell-silver case is not unknown as the valid cognition or '*pramā*'. In this way, it is called as the invalid cognition or '*apramā*' or the erroneous cognition.

END NOTES:

1. *Tattvacintāmaṇi, Pratyakṣa paricceda, anyathākhyātivādaprakaraṇa, page: 430, “Nanu sarvajñānānām yathārthatvāt pramālakṣaṇe viśeṣaṇavyāvarttyaprasiddheh viśeṣaṇavaiyarthyaṁ anyathākhyātou mānābhāvāt”.*
2. *Ibid. page: 431, “Tathāhi Rajatārthiravṛtṭiviśayatvaṁrajatatva-prakārakānubhavaviśayatvavyāpyaṁ rajatārthipravṛtṭiviśayamātra-vṛtṭidharmatvāt rajatamātravṛtṭidharmavaditi anyathākhyāti - vyāpyamsiddhātiti. Aprāptakālatvaṁ, rajatamātravṛtṭivañcopādhi.*
3. *Ibid., page: 433-435, “rajatattvaṁ arajatavṛtṭijñānaviśayatāvaccadakam arajataviśayapravṛtṭihetujñānaprakāratvāt, śuktitvavat-ityatra-rajatavṛtṭitvaṁ upādhi”.*
4. *Ibid., page: 436-437*
5. *Ibid., page: 452-455 “Ibid., page: 477,*
6. *Ibid., page: 480-485*
7. *Ibid., page: 485---486,*
8. *Ibid., page: 486---487,*
9. *Ibid., page: 489,*

10. *Ibid.*, page: 491---492,
11. *Ibid.*, page: 497---498,
12. *Ibid.*, page: 501---502,
13. *Ibid.*, page: 508,
14. “*Ibid.*, page: 509---510,