

CHAPTER – III

Elucidation of ‘*Akhyātivāda*’ and background of such theory

Prābhākara Mimāṃsaka and *Sāṃkhya* schools of Indian Philosophy do not accept the existence of erroneous cognition. So, their theory of error is known as ‘*akhyātivāda*’ or ‘*vivekākhyāti*’.

Vācaspati Miśra said in his *Sāṃkhyatattvakoumudī* that, “*aksararthastu --- tasmadanusravikadduksapaghatakaddhetoh viparitah sattvapurusanyatapatyayah saksatkaro duhkhopaghātaka hetuh, atah eva śreyān*”. (*Kārikā1*, page : 61, Gaya Edition).

According to *Sāṃkhya* Philosophers, cessation of sorrow for ever is possible with the *laukika* and *Vaidika* activities but, that result is not eternal. The better way to get the eternal emancipation is the knowledge of an outward relation. Gaining the metaphysical knowledge between the *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa* is the better way to gain the eternal emancipation. We or all human-beings think that, ‘illness of the body’ means ‘I am ill’. But, ‘I’ means only the ‘Soul’, not body. We do not understand this fact. As a result, we inherit all worldly miseries. The absence of this factual cognition is known as ‘sublation’ in Indian Scripture. It is the cause of error. So, ‘error’ or ‘illusion’ means ‘the absence of the cognition of

discrimination' (*vivekājñāna*) in accordance with the *Sāṃkhya* school of Indian Philosophy. So, this theory is called '*vivekākhyāti*' or shortly '*akhyāti*'.

An effort will be made to throw some light on '*Akhyātivāda*' according to Prābhākara school of Philosophy in this chapter.

'*Akhyātivāda*' is a doctrine about the erroneous knowledge advocated by *Mīmāṃsakācārya Prabhākara* and his followers. They maintain that an invalid cognition is not possible. All cognitions are valid according to them.

At the outset, we will try to gain as to the nature of 'valid knowledge' ('*pramā*') in a nutshell. After that, we will go forward 'invalid knowledge' ('*apramā*') which is the subject-matter of my Ph.D thesis.

The kind of knowledge is called as 'valid knowledge' ('*pramā*') whose contents ('*viṣaya*') are property and possessor of property ('*dharmā-dharmī*') and their unattachment ('*asaṃsarga*') is not acceptable ('*agrīhita*') to the knower. As for example, the knowledge about 'this silver' in the silver ---- the object of '*dharmī*' is 'thisness' ('*idam*') and the object of '*dharmā*' is 'the silver' ('*rajat*'). The unattachment of those is not accepted to the knower in this case. So, there is the non-existence of the knowledge ('*agraha*') of the unattachment. It is also the one knowledge ('*ekajñāna*'). So, it is a valid knowledge ('*pramā*'). On the other hand, the knowledge about 'this is silver' in the shell ---- there also the non-

existence of the knowledge ('*agraha*') of the unattachment ('*asamsarga*') remains; because, there is not the relation between the '*dharma*' and '*dharmī*' notwithstanding that, there is not also the knowledge ('*graha*') of attachment ('*asambandha*'). If there the knowledge ('*graha*') of the unattachment ('*asambandha*') remains between the 'this' ('*idam*') and 'the silver' ('*rajata*') then the illusory cognition would not be possible like 'this is silver' ('*idam rajatam*'). But, it is not the 'one knowledge' ('*ekajñāna*'). So, it is not the valid knowledge ('*pramā*'); it is actually the invalid knowledge ('*apramā*').

Śālikanātha Miśra in his *Prakaraṇapañcikā* established the validity of all cognitions before the establishment of the '*akhyātivāda*.'¹ Because, the establishment of the '*akhyātivāda*' is dependent upon the establishment of the validity of all cognitions.

It is mentionable that, the *Prābhākaras*' opinion about 'cognition is that it is actually 'self-revealed'. Cognition may not become unrevealed. It is not imaginary that, cognition becomes originated but it remains as unrevealed. So, all cognitions are valid or non-erroneous.

According to *Prābhākara*, the '*pramātvā*' is the property of all cognitions. According to him, all cognitions are valid. The property of the valid cognition is

called '*pramātvā*'. In the same way, the property of the invalid cognition is called '*apramātvā*'. According to *Prabhākara*, the '*apramātvā*' or invalidity is not the property of cognition. Always the '*pramātvā*' or validity exists in cognition, '*apramātvā*' does not exist in cognition. The '*apramātvā*' or invalidity exists in usages. The invalidity or '*apramātvā*' of the usages imposes on the cognition which cognition is the originator of the usages. *Prābhākara* has pointed out that, cognition is pure for ever and self-luminous. Besides *Prābhākara* all Indian philosophers accept the erroneous cognition and also accept the existence of '*apramātvā*' or 'invalidity' in cognition.

At first, we have to know about the nature of valid knowledge or '*yathārthajñāna*' ?

The meaning of the term '*yathārtha*' is 'the similarity of the object'. But, a question may be raised: that, 'Is there any similarity between the external object and the knowledge? The similarity between the external object and the knowledge may not be accepted in all parts. So, we have to accept the technical meaning of the term '*yathā*'. The technical meaning of the term '*yathā*' is '*arthāvyabhicāri*'. That is called '*yathārthajñāna*' or valid cognition which is practicing no adultery with own object.

If we accept the existence of the cognition then the object of the cognition has also to be accepted. It may not be established through argument that a cognition is possible without its object. Again a question may be raised: ‘what is the object (*viṣaya*) of knowledge ?’ It would be accepted by all that, that thing is called the object of that cognition which is appeared to the knower after knowing. So, the valid cognition is that which is practicing deviation from own object. So, all cognitions are valid. The cognition of silver is originated in the shell. Sometimes the silver is appeared in such cognition not the shell as accepted by all. The shell may not be appeared like silver because, the essence of the shell like silver is unreal. So, we have to accept that, the silver is the object in the shell-silver case. For this reason, this cognition becomes valid. The cognition of silver in the silver is valid cognition; in the same way, the cognition of silver in the shell is also valid. If the cognition of silver in the shell becomes adulterous with it’s own object then it would be doubtful to us that, all types of cognition are erroneous. As a result, all knowable things would be doubtful to us. So, all cognitions are valid.

The invalidity may not exist in cognition due to the absence of cause. Our sense-organs become able to generate valid cognition. So, those sense-organs are not able to originate invalid cognition. An objection may be raised in this connection that invalid cognition may be originated by the blemish sense-organs of the knower.

Afterwords *Prābhākara* said that, it is necessary to cast a glance to the nature of fault (*doṣa*) which is taken as an impediment to produce the new effect. The fault does not produce the opposite effect. So, the invalid cognition may not be originated through the blemish sense-organs.

The meaning of the term '*akhyati*' is '*nāsti khyātiryatra ah*',. That is called '*akhyāti*' where the knowledge of 'thatness' does not exist.

The *Akhyātivādins* do not accept a particular cognition in the illusory case. The '*idam*' or 'this' and the 'silver' are separate types of cognition known through perception and memory respectively. At first, a perceptual apprehension becomes originated due to the connection between the thing which exists in front of the knower and the sense-organ of the knower. After that, the memory of silver becomes originated due to the similarity between the shell and silver through the arousal of the impression of the silver is apprehended to the knower earlier. Though generally the objects of memory are those things which are really the objects of that memory and the 'thatness' also is the object of that memory. But, the 'thatness' becomes vanished in the erroneous case. The difference between these two types of cognition like the perception and memory cannot be grasped due to their simultaneous occurrence and due to the abolishment the 'thatness'. This knowledge of discrimination of two cognitions which is not grasped is the root for the fruitless inclination. As a result, it is called 'error'. Actually, the apprehension

like ‘this’ and the memory like the ‘silver’ --- these two types of cognition are valid; but not erroneous. All types of cognition are valid in accordance with the *Prābhākaras*.

If any cognition becomes invalid then it would not be possible for us to depend upon any cognition. It is *Prābhākara*’s opinion. In this connection *Sālikanātha Miśra* said in his *Prakaraṇapañcikā* that,

“*Ahovata mahaneṣa pramādo dhīmatamapi.*

Jñānasya vyābharitve viśvāsah kiminivandhanah”..

It becomes the object of perceptual cognition if there is a connection between the object and the sense-organ of the knower. So, the ‘this thing’ or the thing which exists in front of the knower may be the object of the perception due to the existence of the direct connection between the ‘this thing’ and ‘the sense-organ of the knower. But, there is no connection between the silverness and the sense-organ of the knower. So, how would ‘silver’ be an object of perception?

After that question, the answer would be as such that, the connection is of two-fold --- direct and indirect. There is the indirect connection between the silver and the eye-sense-organ of the knower in the silver-oriented erroneous case. This connection is called ‘*jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa*’ in Indian Philosophy. This indirect connection is actually an impression or memory by nature.

It becomes drawn out that, all types of cognition are axiomatically valid in accordance with the *Prābhākara* school of *Mīmāṃsakas*. *Bhavanātha* in his *Nyāya-viveka* and *Śālikanātha* in his *Prakaraṇapañcikā* have elaborated the opinion of *Prābhākara*. *Śālikanātha* asserts that, what appears in a cognition that is the object of that cognition. For example, the silver appears in the cognition of the form ‘this is silver’; so the silver surely is the object of that cognition, not the shell. The matter of fact is that, we have two distinct cognitions here: the perception like ‘this’ and the remembrance like ‘the silver’. These two types of cognition are originated simultaneously. For this reason, these do not appear distinctly. Actually, the memory of the silver produces by such kind of connection of the silver which is previously cognized. This kind of memory is different from another types of memory. In the case of other kinds of memory, the object of memory appears as qualified by ‘thatness’. But, in the illusory case, a kind of memory originates among the two objects which of them one is situated in front of the knower and that object is similar with the another object which was perceptible in the previous time. In this memory, ‘thatness’ is erased. For this reason, this kind of memory is known as ‘*pramuṣṭatattvākasmarāṇa*’ or ‘the obscuration of memory’ in Indian Philosophy.

The error consists of two cognitions--- perception and memory. In this case, the memory is originated for the characteristic feature of thatness due to the defects of the knower. So, the memory of the silver and the perception of ‘this’ are not mutually discriminated due to the similarity between the objects of those cognitions. The knower cannot understand the difference between the perception and memory due to the absence of knowledge of discrimination between them².

“All types of cognition are valid” –in this context of *Prābhakara*’s opinion a question may arise from the opponent school that, all schools of Philosophy too accept the four-fold cognition- ‘*pramā*’, ‘*smṛti*’, ‘*saṁśaya*’ and ‘*viparyaya*’. The two-fold cognition ‘*Samśaya*’ and ‘*viparyaya*’, among them are invalid in accordance with public opinion and all schools of philosophers. In such cases perception leads to the supreme *pramāna*. In case of perception, another variation of knowledge is generated even though one object has been active alongwith the senses. For instance, silver-related knowledge is generated in spite of the *sannikarsa* of the sight to the shell.

A question may arise against the *Prābhākara* that if the shell-silver case is considered valid why is it regarded as error in public parlance/use or in accordance with the philosophers?³

If the valid knowledge also called the erroneous knowledge then all valid knowledge will be known as the erroneous knowledge. As a result, it is not possible for us to establish the '*prāmāṇya*' of any knowledge.⁴

The *Prābhākara* school of *Mīmāṃsaka* say that in the shell-silver case two types of cognition belong in fact and these two types of cognition are as such --- perception and memory. At first, the perception of the form of 'thisness' is created due to the connection between the knower's sense-organ and the shell. But, the perception of particular part of the object is not originated for the defective sense-organs of the knower. The glare of the shell also becomes perceptible with the perception of the form of 'thisness' in that case. The glare of the object is perceptible with the perception of 'thisness' due to having similarity between the shell and the silver regarding the glare.

The memory of the silver produces by such kind of '*samskāra*' or the mental residuum of the silver previously cognized. This kind of memory is different from the another types of memory. In the case of other kinds of memory, the object of memory appears as qualified by 'thatness' (*tattvāmśa*).

But, in the case of illusion a kind of memory is originated between the two objects - one is situated in front of the knower and another perceived in the previous time. In this case of memory 'thatness' is erased. For this reason, this kind

of memory is known as ‘the obscuration of memory’ in Indian Philosophy. So, when a person uses the shell as silver then actually two types of cognition are originated of when one is ‘perception’ and another is ‘memory’ in view of *Prābhākara* school. These two types of cognition are originated with simultaneously. As a result, the knower fails to discriminate the perceived and the remembered element. As a result, the ‘*rajatārthī*’ or the person who is interested to collect the silver inclines to collect the object which is situated in front of the knower for the sake of the absence of knowledge of discrimination.

From the *Prābhākaras*’ above-mentioned opinion, someone can think that, the absence of knowledge of discrimination is illusion. If the *Prābhākaras* accept that the absence of knowledge of discrimination is illusion then various problems will be raised. If the absence of knowledge of discrimination is known as ‘error’ then the ‘*susupti*’ or the ‘deep-sleep’ would be known as ‘error’. Because, in the time of deep-sleep, all kinds of discrimination are not understandable. In the time of deep sleep, the living-beings even cannot understand the discrimination between the another living-beings and the own self. So, the deep-sleep also is a type of the absence of knowledge of discrimination. But, the deep-sleep is not the illusion. So, it is not acceptable that, the absence of knowledge of discrimination is illusion. Besides that, the absence of knowledge is not accepted as illusion by anybody. The particular cognition is proved as illusion in the public use.⁵

After this question the Indian school of *Prābhākara* points out that, actually the usages do not originate from the absence of knowledge of discrimination. The ‘*rajatārthī*’ inclines to collect the object (the shell) due to not grasping knowledge of discrimination of two cognitions. On the *Prābhākara*’s view this inclination is illusory. But, the two types of cognition from what the inclination originates like the perception and the memory are not illusory. So, the *Prābhākara* do not accept the illusion in the cognition ---their opinion is that, the illusion but it belongs to the usages.

According to the *Prābhākara*, the difference (*bheda*) between two types of cognition is received with the sublating cognition in the subsequent time whose ‘difference’ was not grasped in the previous time. The invalidity of the previous cognition is not proved with the sublating cognition.⁶

Some Philosophers are of the opinion that, the shell-oriented knowledge is generated in the shell and hence the shellness belongs to the shell and in other time the silver-oriented knowledge is generated in the shell and hence the silverness also belongs to the shell sometimes. So, the two types of cognition in the form ‘the shell-oriented knowledge in the shell’ and ‘the silver-oriented knowledge in the shell’ ---are to be taken as valid. So, it leads us to accept that, all types of cognition are valid.

According to *Prābhākara*, actually two types of cognition originate in the case of controversial cognition like ; this is silver'. In these two types of cognition the universal perceptual cognition of 'this' and the particular remembrance of 'the silver' are originated due to the connection between the shell and the sense-organ of the knower. The discrimination of those two types of cognition is not grasped by the knower. Because, these two types of cognition are originated simultaneously. The person who is interested to collect silver inclines to the thing which exists in front of the knower due to the absence of knowledge of discrimination.

But, if the inclination is possible from the absence of knowledge of discrimination then the inclination would be too wide in the case of deep-sleep. Because, the deep-sleep is naturally the absence of knowledge and any inclination is not perceived in the case of deep-sleep.

If it is said that the inclination originates from the knowledge of the universal form from a distance and the absence of knowledge of discrimination then again the *Naiyāyikas* would object that any inclination is not possible from only the perception of the universal form. ⁷

The *Prābhākaras* point out that, the particular form like 'shellness' ('*śuktitva*') is not grasped due to the organal faults etc. after the connection between the shell which exists in front of the knower and the defective

sense-organ of the knower. Only the universal form qualified by shining like 'thisness' is accepted. The impression of the silver becomes awakened due to the similarity between the universal form of the cognition and the silver. The memory of the silver is originated from that impression of the silver. The remembrance of the 'this' is not originated for the sake of defective cause from which the impression of the silver becomes awakened. So, there are two types of cognition in the case of the controversial silver-oriented cognition or 'this is silver' namely --- perception of the universal form or 'this' and the remembrance of 'the silver'. Only the perception of the 'thisness' is originated from the connection of the sense-organ of the knower with that thing which exists in front of the knower. Because, the perception of the universal form (thisness) is originated from the connection of the sense-organ. The impression of the silver becomes awakened due to the similarity of the silver which is perceived by the knower in previous time with the universal perception of 'this' after its origination from the connection of the sense-organ of the knower. So, the connection of the sense-organ with that thing which exists in front of the knower is not the direct cause of the memory of the silver, but it is cause of causes. So, it is called '*anyathāsiddhi*'. So, the connection of the sense-organ with an object is not the cause of the memory of silver. As a result, the subject of the controversial silver-oriented cognition is not the thing which exists in front of the knower. In this case, the *Prābhākaras* point out against the

Khyātivādins that the subjects of the two types of cognition are not cognized separately in spite of the existence of the two types of cognition in the case of the origination of erroneous use. According to the *Prābhākaras*, there is not also any unitary cognition between the ‘this’ and ‘the silver’. Actually, there is no unity because, the thing which exists in front of the knower is actually ‘the shell’.

The *Prābhākaras* said that, the perception of the ‘this’ is originated with the connection between the object which exists in front of the knower and the knower’s sense-organ. After that, the awareness of the silver is enlightened due to the similar cognition between the silver which cognized in previous time and ‘thisness’. The remembrance of the silver is originated from that reformation. So, the connection between the ‘this’ and ‘the sense-organ of the knower’ is not the direct cause of the remembrance of the silver. That connection is the cause of causes. So, the subject of the cognitive state - ‘this is silver’ is not that object which exists in front of the knower.

The *Prābhākaras* said that, there is not only the difference between the ‘this’ and ‘silver’ is not grasped but also the difference between those two types of cognition does not appear. The *Prābhākaras* point out that it is necessary to know that the objects of the two types of cognition are contradictory for knowing the difference between the two types of cognition. The knower does not feel it.

The *Prābhākaras* said that, both ‘this’ and ‘silver’ are valid knowledge, though object is one. In this case the difference of them does not exist. For this reason, the absence of knowledge of discrimination exists in the valid cognition. But, the ‘difference’ between the ‘this’ and ‘silver’ is not grasped in the valid or erroneous cognition in spite of the existence of ‘difference’.

According to the *Prābhākaras*, the usages are two-fold—mental use and corporeal use. Again, a question may be raised: what kind of usages is called as mental usages of an object in accordance with *Prābhākaras*? In response to this, the *Prābhākara* say that determinate cognition of an object arises at first and after the origination of the determinate cognition feelings like sorrow-enjoyment, desires etc. arise --- these are all called as mental usages concerning the objects. The denoting words about the objects can also be applied after the origination of the determinate cognition concerning those objects. Such usages of denoting words are also called as ‘mental usages’ in accordance with the *Prābhākaras*.

Prābhākaras said that, quality, action—universal property remains in any substance with the inherent relation. The substance is the possessor of that quality, action and universal property. As a result, quality, action and universal property which are inhered in that substance. So, that type of cognition is called appearance of an object which is necessary for the sake of use of that object. That is called

object of a cognition which is appeared in that cognition. So, the object which does not appear in any cognition that may not be called the object of that cognition.

The *Prābhākaras* said that, when a piece of shell is accepted by the knower then the impurity of the shell also is accepted. But, generally the impurity which exists in the shell does not become the object of knowledge. So, it is not acceptable that, which are capable of being used are the objects of knowledge. For this reason, the *Prābhākaras* said that, the attribute of appearance with cognition is called the attribute of object.

The *Prābhākaras* established that, the ‘silver’ is the ‘subject’ (*viśaya*) in the shell-silver case. Because, the ‘silver’ is appeared in this cognition but not the shell. If the ‘shell’ is appeared in the cognition then the usages would be successful for the public-usages are originated from that cognition. So, the ‘shell’ is not the subject of that cognition. The silver is the subject of that cognition.

The *Prābhākaras* main view is to show that, ‘a thing appears in another appearance’ which is completely contradictory in nature.

The *Prābhākaras* established that a thing does not appear in another appearance. The significance of this utterance is that, the shell does not appear as the form of silver at any time. Because, the entity of the shell in the form of silver

does not exist. For example, the ether does not appear as the lotus. Similarly, the shell has not the non-existence in the form of silver so, the shell does not appear as the silver. For this reason, the shell is not the subject of the statement ‘this is silver’.

The *Prābhākaras* said that, the universal form of the shell is known in the erroneous case after the contact of the sense-organ with object existing in front of the knower. The particular form of the shell is not known due to blames. The particular part like ‘shellness’ is the separating property (*bhedaka*) between the shell and silver. The remembrance of the silver is originated due to the similarity between the universal form of the shell and silver. The ‘thatness’ of the memory becomes unnoticed for the sake of mental blame. For this reason, the knowledge of discrimination between the shell and silver is not originated.

The *Prābhākaras* said that, the shellness does not appear in this erroneous case. As a result, the knowledge of discrimination does not appear in that case. The *Prābhākara* school points out that, the perceptual cognition as ‘this’ gives rise to inclination to the thing is lying in front of the knower and on the other hand, the cognition of ‘the silver’ gives rise to inclination to the thing which is characterized by the silverness. There are two types of cognition in this case. That thing is the subject of that cognition which appears in our cognition. Each cognition gives rise

to inclination to the respective subject. For this reason, these two types of cognition are valid too. These two types of cognition are not invalid.

The *Prābhākara* school points out that, in the erroneous case, the universal part of the shell is grasped by the knower with the connection between the his sense-organ and that thing existing in front of the knower. The particular part of the shell is not grasped by the knower for the blames etc. of the knower. The particular part of the shell is the differentiator (*bhedaka*) between the shell and the silver. The remembrance of the silver is originated due to similarity between the silver and the universal part of that shell. The ‘thatness’ (*tattvāmśa*) becomes extincted owing to mental blame etc. of the knower For this reason, the difference between the appearance of the silver and the appearance of the universal part of the shell is not grasped by the knower.⁸

The *Prābhākaras* said that, the two different categories become appeared in different cognition when there an ability exists to become the subject of such cognition whose forms are different. On the other hand, if two categories have an ability of becoming the subject of such cognition whose forms are non-different then the non-difference exists in those categories. Such procedure to ascertain the difference between the two categories is admitted by the *Prābhākaras*. According to this procedure, some categories become qualified by unequal form by nature. As

a result, they always are appeared by different forms. For example, colour, taste, smell, touch etc. The significance is that, the colour does not appear as taste in any time. Again, taste does not appear as smell in any time. So, those different types of quality always appear as different forms. Again, the pot does not appear as cloth in any time. So, the pot, cloth, colour, taste etc. are always having different forms. But, in some cases, two categories are non-different in nature for the sake of the absence of knowledge of discrimination of two contradictory properties in spite of having different character by nature. For example, the difference between the ‘this’ of the shell and the silver is not grasped on account of the non-acceptance of the shellness which is the different from shell in spite of having different character by nature. The knower does not feel that, the perceptual cognition of ‘this’ and the memory of the silver belong to completely two different subjects. The person who is interested to collect silver inclines to set the shell due to the absence of proper cognition of difference.

The significance of the *Prābhākaras*’ utterance is as such: the silver-oriented knowledge in shell does not belong to perception, inference or any type of apprehension. There is no sense-object-contact with silver. As a result, that cognition may not become silver. In that case, there is no any measuring probans or ‘hetu’. For this reason, there is no any inferential cognition. Testimonial

cognition is also not possible in that case. So, that silver-oriented cognition may not belong to any type of means of knowing (*'pramāṇa'*). For this reason, necessarily it is called memory.

An objection again may be raised against the *Prābhākara* that, the silver-oriented manifestation in the erroneous case is not the valid knowledge namely perceptual cognition etc. due to the absence of the testimonies like sense-organs etc. But, it may not be said that, this cognition is memory. Because, this type of cognition may be as an erroneous one. It may be said by the *Khyātivādins* that, it has not been demonstrated by the *Prābhākaras* that, no cognition is erroneous. So, it also may not be proved by the *Prābhākaras* that, if any cognition does not become valid one then it would become memory.

In response to, the *Prābhākaras* said that, the cause of memory exists in this case. The impression of the silver becomes aroused due to the perception of the similarity between the silver and the universal part of the thing which exists in front of the knower. Memory is always originated from the impression. As a result, in the present case also the memory may be originated from the impression. In this case, 'thatness' becomes unnoticed owing to the blemish cause.

A question may be raised against the *Prābhākaras* that, if the cognition is called memory in spite of the absence of the manifestation of 'thatness' then why

second, third etc. types of cognition would not become 'memory' in the case of incessant cognition?

In reply, the *Prābhākaras* said that, the second, third etc. types of cognition also may be called perception like first cognition in the case of incessant cognition owing to the existence of the causes of perception before the origination of the second, third etc. types of cognition. For this reason, the second, third etc. types of cognition cannot be called as 'memory'. It is mentionable that, the collection of causes (*sāmagrī*) of the perception are stronger than those of another types of cognition. For this reason, if the collection of causes of the perception exist then the perceptual cognition must not originate in that case.

Again an objection may be raised against the *Prābhākaras* that, perception and memory may be originated in the erroneous case. The difference between these two types of cognition may be admitted by any knower due to having different kind of two types of cognition. As a result, the difference between the two types of object also may be admitted in the erroneous case.

The *Prābhākaras* pointed out that, there the difference between the silver and the object which exists in front of the knower is not accepted but also the difference between the two types of cognition is not also accepted in case of error. According to the *Prābhākaras*, all types of cognition is self-luminous.

It also is necessary to know that, the subjects of those two types of cognition are contradictory with each other. The knower does not feel that the subjects of two types of cognition like apprehension and memory are contradictory in the erroneous case. According to the *Prābhākaras*, the cognition is self-luminous but, the difference between those is not the same.

Again, a question may be raised against the *Prabhakaras* that, the form of the valid cognition also is as such: 'this is silver'. In this case also the manifestation between 'this' and 'silver' may not have originated. Why the difference between two types of cognition does not appear in that case?

After that question, the *Prābhākaras* would say that, the 'this' and 'silver' is the same in the valid silver-oriented case. Actually, there is no difference between the silver and the thing which exists in front of the knower in the valid case. For this reason, there is the absence of knowledge of discrimination between the silver and that thing which exists in front of the knower. So, the difference between the valid and invalid cases is also accepted by the *Prābhākaras*.

After that the *Khyātivādīns* have raised an another heavier objection against the *Prābhākaras*. The *Khyātivādīns* would say that, the '*sāmānādhikaraṇyapratīti*' originates in the case where the absence of knowledge of discrimination exists between the universal part and particular part. The absence of knowledge of

discrimination exists in the erroneous case like the valid case. As a result, the ‘*sāmānādhikaraṇyapratīti*’ exists also in the erroneous case. The ‘*sāmānādhikaraṇyapratīti*’ exists in both of the cases. So, the cognitive state in the form: ‘this is silver’ which originates in the erroneous case would also be said as the ‘particular cognition’ like the valid silver-oriented knowledge. As a result, the particular cognition would be grasped in the erroneous case. The erroneous case may not be explained with two types of non-particular cognition.

After that objection, the *Prābhākaras* said that, that ‘*sāmānādhikaraṇyapratīti*’ of the erroneous case is not the particular cognition in spite of having similarities ‘*sāmānādhikaraṇyapratīti*’ of the valid case.

Afterwards, the *Prābhākaras* point out that, the person who is interested to collect the silver set about to ‘this’ owing to the absence of knowledge of discrimination between the silver and that thing which exists in front of the knower and also between the silver-oriented knowledge and the cognitive state like ‘this’. The difference between the cognition of clod and the cognition of silver has been accepted by the knower. The person who is interested to collect the silver feels the difference between the clod and the silver. For this reason, the person who is interested to collect the silver does not incline to the clod. Because, there is no similarity between the silver and the clod. For this reason, the person who is

interested to collect the silver does not incline to the clod; but, he may be inclined to the shell.

In this way, the *Akhyātivādins* tried to demonstrate the inclination to ‘this’ of the person who is interested to collect the silver with the absence of knowledge of discrimination.

After that, a question may be raised by the *Khyātivādins* against *Prābhākara*; What is called the absence of knowledge of discrimination?

In response to this question, the *Akhyātivādins* said that, the non-acceptance of the particular form and the acceptance of the universal form is called ‘the absence of knowledge of particular’. For example, the particular form like shellness of the shell is not accepted in the case of ‘this is silver’ in the shell. If the shell were accepted as the shellness then the person who is interested to collect the silver would not have inclined to the shell. For this reason, the difference between the shell and the another thing and also between the cognition of shell and the another cognition is not accepted in that case where the non-acceptance of the particular form like shellness of the shell and the acceptance of the universal form like ‘this’ exists.⁹

Again, an objection would be raised against the *Prābhākaras* that the origination of the inclination is not perceived from the absence of knowledge of discrimination in any time.

The *Prābhākaras* have said that, it is not accepted that if a thing is knowable in another form then the inclination originates from that thing. The *Prābhākaras* accept the absence of knowledge of discrimination in the erroneous case. And the *Khyātivādīns* accept the acceptance of the thing which exists in front of the knower in another form in the same case. If the *Khyātivādīns* point out that, the inclination does not originate from the absence of knowledge of discrimination in all time then the *Akhyātivādīns* would apply a *prativandī* against the *Khyātivādīns*. That argument is called '*prativandī*' by which self-opinion is not established in spite of having capability of refuting others.

The *Prābhākaras* have been said that, it is not acceptable that, the inclination will originate from the acceptance in another form. So, the *Akhyātivādīns* also may raise the same objection against the *Khyātivādīns* like the objection of the *Khyātivādīns* against the *Akhyātivādīns*.

The *Khyātivādīns* again may raise an objection against the *Akhyātivādīns*. The *Khyātivādīns* point out that, the memory of silver is originated due to the arousal of the impression of silver having the similarity between the silver and the

universal form of the shell. From this ground why there does not originate the memory of another shell due to the similarity between the universal form of the silver and another shell?

The *Akhyātivādīns* may explain in a different way about the origination of the inclination to the shell of that person who is interested to collect the silver in the erroneous case. The *Akhyātivādīns* may say that, the cause of the inclination of the knower to the shell is that cognition which is the form of dependent (*paratantrākār*) of the form of non-dependent (*aparatantrākārā*). There is an apprehension between the universal form of a thing and a memory of the particular form of a property exists in any erroneous case. The locus or 'dharmī' is dependent thing and the property is non-dependent entity both of them. The property which becomes manifested in the erroneous case is not the property of that locus or 'dharmī'. There is the cognition of types of category in the erroneous case namely, --- the cognition of such category which is dependent entity and the cognition of such category which is non-dependent entity. The difference between those two types of category is not accepted by the knower. And that two types of cognition become originated simultaneously. The inclination of the person who is interested to collect the silver to the shell becomes originated from these two types of cognition. It is called 'akhyāti'.

The *Akhyātivādīns* would raise such objection against the *Prābhākaras* that, if all types of cognition become valid then the sublation may not be demonstrated. The falsity of the cognitive state ‘this is silver’ become accomplished with that sublating cognition like ‘this is not the silver, but the shell’ which become originated after the cognition like ‘this is silver’ in the shell. The absence of the silverness in ‘this’ becomes accomplished with such sublating cognition. The prohibition of an entity is not possible which is not connected at all. That can be negated which is capable of being negated. The prohibition becomes possible of that entity which is connected or attached with the negation. If the absence of the silverness becomes accomplished in ‘this’ with the sublating cognition then it becomes accomplished that the silverness was connected in the ‘this’ with that sublating cognition. The ‘this’ is appeared qualified by silverness in that cognition which is sublated. If ‘this’ does not appear qualified by silverness then the absence of silverness would not be possible in the ‘this’ in the subsequent sublating cognition. So, the previous cognition where ‘this’ was not appeared by self-nature, it was appeared like the ‘silver’. That previous sublating cognition was a particular cognition. That particular cognition was erroneous.

After that objection the *Prābhākaras* have pointed out that, actually the usages become sublated with that sublating cognition which is originated in the

erroneous case. According to the *Akhyātivādīns*, the silver-oriented usages are originated to the 'this'. These types of usages are erroneous. These types of erroneous usages become rejected with that sublating cognition. ¹⁰

The *Akhyātivādīns* have said that, the ignorance becomes ceased with the cognition, another cognition is not sublating with that. All schools of the *Khyātivādīns* accept that, any previous cognition become sublating with the later cognition. But, it is not acceptable to the *Akhyātivādīns*.

After that argument a question may be raised against the *Khyātivādīns* that, if it is accepted in accordance with the *Khyātivādīns* that, the cognition becomes sublating with another cognition then is it a different the subject of the sublating cognition and the same as the subject of the sublating cognition? This is the question of the *Akhyātivādīns* against the *Khyātivādīns*. If the subject of the sublating cognition and sublating cognition become non-different then it would be said that, a cognition sublating another cognition whose subject is the same or non-different. But, if this argument is accepted then it also would be taken for granted that, the first cognition becomes sublating with the second cognition in the case of incessant cognition. But, actually the first cognition is not sublating with the second cognition in the case of incessant cognition. So, a cognition is not sublating by another cognition whose object is same or non-different. On the other hand, if it is

accepted that, the subjects of the sublating cognition and sublated cognition are different then it would be accepted that the cognition of taste would be sublated with the cognition of form. But, it is not possible to accept the sublation of a cognition with another cognition. As a result, the subject of the sublating cognition and sublated cognition is not different. For this reason, *Prabhākara* or the preceptor of the *Prābhākaras* said in his *Vṛhatī* that, ‘*jñānena jñanam nivartita iti vadhavidah*’. The significant meaning of this statement is: if the sublation of cognition is accepted then it also would be accepted that, the ignorance become ceased with cognition.

The *Khyātivādīns* have said that, it is accepted to all that, ‘this is silver’ --- this cognitive state becomes sublated with the sublating cognition. As a result, in which point of view the *Akhyātivādīns* say that the ignorance becomes sublated with cognition?

After this argument, the *Akhyātivādīns* said that, ‘this is silver’ --- this type of cognition is the sublating cognition. The ignorance whose subject is really the shell that is sublated with that cognition whose subject also is ‘the shell’. If this type of ignorance is sublated then the usages like silver also would be sublated. So, it may be accepted that the ignorance whose subject is really ‘the shell’ is sublated with the sublating cognition.

Actually the *Akhyātivādīns* do not accept the cognitive state like ‘this is not silver’ as the sublating cognition. According to them, ‘this is shell’ --- this cognitive state whose subject is actually the shell is called the sublating cognition. This type of cognition whose subject is actually the shell not only sublates the ignorance whose subject is really the shell but also that usages like silver also is sublated with that shell-oriented cognition. In this way the *Prābhākaras* have established that, the usages like silver of that person who is interested to collect the silver becomes ceasedbeing destroyed the ignorance whose subject is really the shell with the sublating cognition. Before this the *Prābhākaras* also have established that, the absence of knowledge of discrimination exists in both of the cases valid and invalid. For this reason, the *Prābhākaras* have accepted the absence of knowledge of discrimination as the cause of inclination in these both of the cases of valid and invalid cognitions.

A question may be raised that, the inclination originates from cognition, but it is not originated from the absence of cognition like the absence of knowledge of discrimination.

Actually, the *Prābhākaras*’ main view point is that, the usages do not originate from the absence of knowledge of discrimination. The person who is interested to collect the silver set about to collect the object which is actually the

shell from the knowledge of discrimination of two cognitions is not properly grasped. ¹¹

A question again may be raised against the Prābhākaras that, how do they explain the dream-cognition? It is mentionable that, most of the Indian philosophers accept the dream-cognition as the erroneous cognition. According to the *Khyātivādins*, the dream- cognition is a type of particular erroneous cognition. The usages of the dream-cognition like fear, etc. originate from this type of particular erroneous cognition. But, the *Akhyātivādins* do not accept the erroneous cognition. As a result, it may not be accepted by them that, the dream-cognition is an erroneous cognition. Besides that, in the case of dream-cognition the thing is not not perceived by the knower which was similar with that thing which was perceived in previous time. So, there is no any stimulant (*udvodhaka*) of the impression with regard to that thing which was perceived in previous time. The memory of that thing which was perceived in previous time may not be originated except the stimulant of the impression. For this reason, the *Khyātivādins* arised the question to the *Akhyātivādins* that, how do *Akhyātivādins* explain the case of dream-cognition ?

After that question the *Akhyātivādins* would like to say that, the dream-cognition also is a particular memory. There is no absence of the stimulant in that

case. There is no stimulant like the similar cognition but, there is such stimulant like the unseen or invisible entity (*adr̥ṣṭa*) etc. in the case of dream-cognition.

A question may be raised by the *Khyātivādins* that, if the dream-cognition become memory then why does appear the object of memory like that thing which is being taken (*grhyamānas*) ? The object of memory is appeared as that thing which is being taken. From this it has been established that, the dream-cognition is the third type of a spare cognition like erroneous cognition.

The *Khyātivādīns* have pointed out that, the impression is an extra-ordinary cause in the case of the erroneous cognition. The impression gives rise to a third type of cognition like the erroneous cognition with other causes in accordance with most of the *Khyātivādīns*. The erroneous cognition is accepted as an intuition in accordance with the *Anyathākhyātivāda*, *Asatkhyātivāda*, *Ātmakhyātivāda* and *Anirvacanīyakhyātivāda* and so on. As a result, the object of the erroneous cognition is appeared as the previous thing which is being experienced (*anubhuyamāna*). The dream-cognition also is a type of intuition in accordance with all of the *khyātivādīns*. As a result, the object of the dream cognition also is realized as that thing which is being taken. It is mentionable that, all *Khyātivādīns* accept the origination of a third type of cognition like the erroneous cognition in the erroneous cases. There is an equal opinion about this. But, there are different opinions concerning the procedure of the origination of that third type of cognition.

According to the *Anyathākhyātivādīns*, the impression of a thing which was perceived in previous time originates a memory also in the erroneous case but, this type of memory is called as ‘*pramuṣṭatattvākasmṛti*’. The ‘thatness’ of the memory become vanished in the erroneous case. This type of memorial cognition connects the memorial object with the sense-organ of the knower, and with this supernatural connection the perceptual erroneous cognition becomes originated. According to the *Naiyāyikas*, the erroneous cognition is a type of supernatural cognition. As a result, the *Naiyāyikas* accept the erroneous cognition as an intuition. The dream-cognition also is a type of error. So, the dream-cognition also is a type of an intuition in accordance with the *Naiyāyikas*. But, the Advaitins do not accept the origination of a memory from the impression. According to the Advaitīns, the impression gives rise to the erroneous cognition in association with blame and the universal cognition of that thing which exists in front of the knower etc. causes such erroneous cognition. This type of cognition is called intuition in accordance with the Advaitīns. The dream-cognition also is a type of error in view of the Advaitīns. Actually, the erroneous cognition is a type of intuition in accordance with all of the *Khyātivādīns*. But, the *Akhyātivādīns* accept the error and dream as the memorial cognition. According to the *Akhyātivādīns* the object of error and object of the dream-cognition are called as that thing which is accepted by

memory. But, the object of the error and object of the memory are always appeared as that thing which is being taken by intuition.

Śālikanātha Mīśra has accepted that, all memories are the comprehension of that thing which is perceived by the knower in previous time. In the erroneous case, cognition is originated about a thing which was perceived by the knower in previous time that is called ‘memory’ in accordance with the *Akhyātivādīns*. But, there is a difference between this type of erroneous memory and another type of memory. The object of the erroneous memory does not appear at that time as that object which was perceived in previous time. For this reason, the object is appeared as that thing which does not take that type of memory whose ‘thatness’ becomes vanished.

A question may be raised against the Prābhākaras that, why does the ‘thatness’ of the erroneous memory vanish?

In reply the *Akhyātivādīns* have said that, the ‘thatness’ has been vanished in the erroneous memory due to the blames of the knower. For this reason, the erroneous memory is appeared as the apprehension of the non-apprehended thing.

Again an objection may be raised against the *Akhyātivādīns* that, if the *Akhyātivādīns* accept the apprehension of the yellowish which exists in the bile of the knower’s sense-organ then why not the blackish nature of the collyrium which

exists in the knower's eye-sense-organ is not apprehended as such? But, actually why the collyrium which exists in the knower's eye-sense-organ and its black colour is not perceived with the eye-sense-organ of the knower?

In response to this, the *Akhyātivādīns* have said that, the blackish is not taken for the sake of the obstruction of the eye-sense-organ of the knower. The significance of the Prābhākaras' view is: the eye-sense-organ of the knower becomes proceeds through the passage of the eye-sense-organ existing in the middle of the eye-sense-organ which is qualified by the black-colour. If the collyrium exists in the middle passage of the eye-sense-organ of the knower then the cognition of it would become obstructed with that collyrium. As a result, the collyrium which exists in the middle passage of the eye-sense-organ is not grasped, because, that collyrium becomes obstacle of the cognition of the eyelash.

The *Khyātivādīns* again raise an objection against the *Akhyātivādīns* that, that collyrium may be taken which exists in front of the white part of the eye-sense-organ. The significant meaning of the *Khyātivādīns*' opinion is as such: the ray of eye-sense-organ does not go through the white part of the eye-sense-organ. As a result, if the collyrium exists in the white part of the eye-sense-organ then the issuing ray of eye-sense-organ may not be obstructed with collyrium. As a result, the collyrium which exists in the white part of the eye-sense-organ and its blackish colour may not be taken for granted.

After the above-mentioned objection the *Akhyātivādīns* would say that, the white part of the eye-sense-organ is not metallic thing. So, the metallic ray of eye-sense-organ does not go through the white part of the eye-sense-organ. For this reason, any entity may not be taken through the white part of the eye-sense-organ. So, the collyrium which exists in the white part of the eye-sense-organ and it's blackish colour have not been perceived.

Again a question may be raised by the *Khyātivādīns* that, if the issuing ray of eye-sense-organ is obstructed through the collyrium which exists in the eye-sense-organ then why is not obstructed the issuing ray of eye-sense-organ through the bilious-entity which exists in the eye-sense-organ of the knower?

In reply the *Akhyātivādīns* would say that, the bilious entity becomes smeared on the top of the eye-sense-organ of the knower and it is transparent or very clear. The bilious entity is not obstructed with the issuing ray of eye-sense-organ of the knower for the sake of it's clearness. Śālikanātha Mīśra has been said in his *Prakaraṇapañcikā* that, the bile and 'kāca' – both of these are blames and these exist being smeared on the top of the eye-sense-organ. But, the difference between the two types of blame is that, the *kaca* is not clear-entity but the bile is a clear one. For this reason, the issuing forth of the ray of eye-sense-organ becomes obstructed through the *kāca* but, the issuing ray of the eye-sense-organ is not

obstructed through the bile entity. For this reason, it is possible to grasp the yellowish which exists in the bilious entity through the eye-sense-organ.

The *Khyātivādīns* may raise a question again that, the internal part of the collyrium which exists in the eye-sense-organ of the knower may be taken through the ray of eye-sense-organ of the knower, because, the internal part of the collyrium existing in the eye-sense-organ is connected with the ray of eye-sense-organ. But, anybody cannot perceive the internal part of the collyrium which exists in the eye-sense-organ of the knower in any time. How do establish the *Khyātivādīns* establish the absence of knowledge of the internal part of the collyrium?

In response to this *Akhyātivādīns* said that, the internal part of the collyrium which exists in the eye-sense-organ is not known through the ray of eye-sense-organ owing to its thinness. For example, the ray of eye-sense-organ is going out through the passage of the eye-sense-organ of the knower, which is not perceived for the sake of its thinness in spite of having its radiance.

The *Khyātivādīns* would raise an objection that, if the yellowish of the bilious thing which is situated within the eye-sense-organ of the knower then why does it not grasp the yellowish which is the shelter of the bilious thing? The significant meaning of this problem of the *Khyativādīns* that, the ray of eye-sense-

organ becomes connected with the yellowish of the bilious thing. In the same manner, the bilious thing which is the shelter of yellowish also becomes connected with the ray of eye-sense-organ in that time. As a result, if it is possible to perceive the yellowish which exists in the bilious thing through the eye-sense-organ then why not the thing which is the shelter of the yellowish is perceived?

As a rejoinder Śālikanātha Miśra has given the answer in his *Prakaraṇapañcikā* that, the thing which is the shelter of an object may not be taken for the sake of thinness. For example, the radiant thing which is the shelter of the ray of light not being taken in spite of the acceptance of the ray of light in some of the cases. In this present case the bilious thing also is not taken due to its thinness which is the shelter of yellowish in spite of its connection with the ray of eye-sense-organ. In the case of the yellow-conch the illusion becomes originated due to the absence of knowledge of discrimination between an apprehension and a memory.

Again an objection may be raised against the Prābhākaras that, the person usages the sweet thing as the bitter thing if he feels this bitterness due to the similarity of that bitter thing which he perceived in previous time.

A question may be raised that, in which manner that person will accept the bitter-juice qualified by the bitterness which exists in the bilious thing?

In reply, the *Akhyātivādīns* would say that, that person must have tasted the bitter-juice in another birth which was not tasted in previous time of the present birth.

Again an objection may be raised against the Prābhākaras that, the death is proved as a destroyer of the impression. If the impression becomes destroyed through the state of death then the bitterness may not be remembered by the new-born baby which bitterness was felt in another birth.

In response to this, the *Akhyātivādīns* would say that, they do not accept the destruction of the impression through the birth and death. So, according to them, the bitterness which was felt in another birth may be remembered by the new-born baby in the present birth. The Prābhākaras have been pointed out that, the another school also accepts the memory of those things which were felt in another birth.¹²

The *Khyātivādīns* may raise such objection that, the Prābhākaras may not give the explanation about the case of 'dual moon' like the other erroneous cases.

The objection is encountered in the following way. Śālikanātha Mīśra has been accomplished that, they necessarily may explain the case of dual moon in spite of the non-acceptance of any type of the erroneous cognition. They point out that, if two fingers exist in front of the knower's eye-sense-organs then the sense-organs become appeared in different forms. The cognition of dual moon is

originated from the connection between the moon and rays of the eye-sense-organ of the knower. In this case, the perceptual cognition of the dual moon is not illusory; but, the usage of duality which exists in the moon is illusory in accordance with the *Akhyativadīns*.

Śālikanātha Mīśra has been pointed out that, no cognition can give its own object. For this reason, there is no invalid or erroneous cognition.

The *Prābhākaras* said that, the ‘silverness’ does not exist in the shell. As a result, it is not possible to co-exist between ‘this’ and ‘the silver’.

Subsequently, the *Naiyāyikas* said that, the person who is interested to collect the silver, would not be induced to the ‘this’ if there was the absence of the co-existent cognition. The person who is interested to collect the silver would be induced to the ‘this’ if he identifies the ‘this’ with the silver. To establish this conclusion the *Naiyāyikas* supplied an argument that is : “ *Vivādādhyāsitaṃ rajatavijñānaṃ purovartivastuvisayaṃ, tadarthinastatra niyamena pravartakatvāt. Yadyadarthinam yatra niyamena pravartayati tat tadviṣayaṃ, yathā samīcīnarajatajñānaṃ* ”.

The significance of this argument is : the subject of the cognitive state ‘this is silver’ is ‘this’. Because, the person who is interested to collect the silver, he induces to the ‘this’ regularly.

The *Prābhākaras* said that, the perception of the ‘this’ originates with the connection between the object which exists in front of the knower and the his sense-organ. After that, the reformation of the silver is enlightened due to the similar cognition between the silver which was cognized in previous time and ‘thisness’. The remembrance of the silver originates from that reformation. So, the connection between the ‘this’ and the sense-organ of the knower is not the direct cause of the remembrance of the silver. That connection is the cause of causes. So, the subject of the cognitive state ‘this is silver’ is not that object which exists in front of the knower.

The *Prābhākaras* said that, there is not only the difference between the ‘this’ and ‘silver’ is unaccepted but also the difference between those two types of cognition is aalso not admitted. The *Prābhākaras* point out that, it is necessary to know that the objects of the two types of cognition is contradictory for knowing the difference between the two types of cognition. The knower does not feel it.

An objection may be raised against the *Prābhākaras* that, why does there not appear of the difference between the ‘this’ and ‘silver’ in the valid knowledge?

In reply, the *Prābhākaras* said that, the ‘this’ and ‘silver’ are same in the valid knowledge. The object is one in the valid cognition. There the ‘difference’ does not exist. For this reason, the absence of knowledge of discrimination exists

in the valid cognition. But, the ‘difference’ between the ‘this’ and ‘silver’ does not appear in the invalid or erroneous cognition in spite of the existence of ‘difference’.

There are different types of opinion between the *Khyātivādins* and *Akhyātivādins* with regard to this question --- what is the subject of the judgement ‘this is silver’? For this reason, the *Prābhākaras* tried to prove about the nature of ‘subject’ before the establishment of the theory of ‘*akhyāti*’. At first, we have to know that, what is the ‘subject’?

Śālikanātha Miśra defines the ‘subject’(*viśaya*) in his *Prakaraṇapañcikā* as such : “*Ya evārtha yasyām samvidibhāsate vedyah sa eva nānāddhi vidyadvedyasya lakṣaṇam*”. The significance of this definition is : that which is appeared in the presence of a particular cognition is the subject of that cognition.

The *Prābhākara* school established that, the ‘silver’ is the ‘subject’ (‘*viśaya*’) in the ‘shell-silver’ case. Because, the ‘silver’ is appeared in this cognition and the shell does not appear in the same. If the ‘shell’ were appeared in the cognition then the usages would be followed by the word ‘shell’, but actually it is not seen. So, the ‘shell’ is not the subject of that cognition. The silver is the subject of that cognition.¹³

After the *Prābhākara* schools' opinion, the *Khyātivādīns* may point out that, in the 'shell-silver' case, actually the subject is 'the shell'. But, the shell does not appear by nature in that cognition, it is appeared in another appearance.

In reply, the *Prābhākara* school point out that, a thing appears in another appearance which is completely contradictory in nature. Because, a thing does not appear in another appearance.

The *Prābhākara* school established that a thing does not appear in another appearance with an inferential statement that is: “*Śukti rajatatvena na prakāśate tadrūpenāsattvāt, yadvadrūpenāsat tattvenākarena na prakāśate, yathā vyoma kamalarūpeneti*”. The significance of this inferential statement is : the shell does not appear as the form of silver at any time. Because, the entity of the shell as the form of silver does not exist. The thing is non-existent as the form of a thing that non-existent thing does not appear as that form. For example, the ether does not appear as the lotus. Similarly, the shell has not the non-existence as the form of silver so, the shell does not appear as the silver. For this reason, the shell is not the subject of the statement 'this is silver'.¹⁴

The *Prābhākara* school points out that, the perceptual cognition as 'this' gives rise to inclination to the thing which is lying in front of the knower and on the other hand, the cognition of 'the silver' generates inclination to the thing which

is specialized by the silverness. There are two types of cognition in this case. That thing is appeared in which cognition that thing is the subject of that cognition. Each cognition generates inclination to the respective subject. For this reason, these two types of cognition are valid too. These two types of cognition are not invalid . The *Khyātivādīns*' significance regarding the above-mentioned opinion of the *Prābhākara* school is : in the erroneous case, the thing which exists in front of the knower is not the silver and hence the silver-oriented appearance may not be originated with the connection(*sannikarṣa*) of the knower's sense-organ. For this reason, it is out of the question for the origination of the silver-oriented knowledge.

Considering above, the *Prābhākara* school points out that, in the erroneous case, the universal part of the shell is accepted to the knower with the connection between the knower's sense-organ and that thing which exists in front of the knower. The particular part of the shell is not accepted by the knower for the blames etc. of the knower. The particular part of the shell is the distinguisher (*'bhedaka'*) between the shell and the silver. The remembrance of the silver originates for the sake of similarity between the silver and the universal part of that shell. The 'thatness' (*'tattvāmśa'*) becomes extincted owing to mental blame etc. of the knower. For this reason, the difference between the appearance of the silver and the appearance of the universal part of the shell is not accepted to the knower.

The *Prābhākaras* said that, the cognition become erroneous due to the future exercise of the use of cognition. The *Prābhākaras* point out with various examples that, the valid cognition also cannot use as valid due to the fruitlessness of the use of the cognition. For example, the ice is the water by nature. But, the ice does not use as the water. But, the ice is actually the water in spite of the fact that ice cannot perform for the necessity of the water. We cannot drink the ice etc. But, if anybody thinks that the ice is equal with the water then the cognition would not be erroneous. But, this type of feelings is used as erroneous for the sake of uselessness of the use of water in the ice¹⁵.

A question is raised that, almost all Indian Philosophers explain the state of dream as erroneous; so, in what sense the state of dream explained by the *Prābhākaras*? According to the *Khyātivādins*, the state of dream is a type of particular erroneous cognition. From this particular erroneous cognition, fear etc. have been originated. But, the *Akhyātivādins* do not accept the erroneous cognition. So, they also do not accept the state of dream as the erroneous cognition. In the state of dream, that type of substance is not perceived which is similar with that any object perceived in previous time. So, there is no thing which enlightens the reformation. The memory cannot be originated without the reformation. So, in what manner the *Akhyātivādins* will explain the dreaming state? This question can be raised against the *Prābhākaras*.

The *Prābhākaras* said that, the cognition of dreaming state also is a state of memory. In that case, *adr̥ṣṭa* etc. are enlightened the reformation. As a result, a state of memory is originated in connection with the dreaming state.

The *Akhyātivādīns* said that, in what cases it is possible to think concerning objects which are perceived by the knower in previous time. The thinking of objects which were perceived by the knower in previous time and thinking of the similar cognition of the thing which exists in front of the knower with the thing which perceived in previous time --- these are the factors of enlightening the case of dreaming state. For example, if anybody thinks about a thing before sleeping then that thing is originated in dream.

Anyathākhyātivādīns have raised an objection against the *Akhyātivādīns* about the opinion of the validity of all types of cognition. The *Naiyāyikas* said that, the *Prābhākaras* cannot accept the validity of all illusory cases. Because, 'the yellow conch' ---this type of cognition originates the 'white conch' due to the bilious fever of the knower. The illusion is originated by this type of blame. The *Naiyāyikas* said that, the knower's sense-organ being connected with the conch the whiteness is not accepted by the knower due to the blame of the knower's sense-organ. But, the conchness is accepted by the knower. The yellowish is accepted by the knower's sense-organ which exists in the knower's sense-organ(eye) due to the

bilious fever etc. The yellowish is connected with the knower's sense-organ as the indirect relation (*jñānalakṣaṇasannikarṣa*). After that, 'the yellow conch'--- this type of particular erroneous cognition originates. It is mentionable that, the yellowish appears as the existence in the conch besides the non-appearance as the existence in the yellow-thing¹⁶.

The *Naiyāyikas* point out that, in what way the *Akhyātivādīns* explain the others erroneous case, in the same manner they cannot explain this erroneous case. Because, the cognition originates after the connection between the knower's sense-organ and the white conch which exists in front of the knower and there is no any similarity between this cognition and any yellow thing perceived in the previous time. As a result, the *Prābhākaras* cannot say that, the reformation has enlightened of this thing which perceived in previous time due to the similarity between that thing and that universal cognition which is originated with the connection of the knower's sense-organ with the white conch. The *Naiyāyikas* say that, what factor enlightens the reformation in this case in accordance with the *Prābhākaras*?

The above-mentioned objection is faced by Śālikanātha in the following way. Śālikanātha Miśra said in his *Prakaraṇapañcikā* that 'the yellow conch' would be explained by them like the others erroneous case. They will explain this case with the two types of valid cognition. But, there is a distinction between the others

erroneous cases and ‘the yellow conch’ case. The fruitless inclination becomes originated due to the absence of knowledge of discrimination between the two types of cognition (perception and memory) and that two parts (universal and particular) in the others erroneous cases. But, in ‘the yellow conch’ case, the ‘thisness’ of the conch and conchness are accepted by the knower due to the connection between the sense-organ of the knower and the white conch. But, the whiteness of the conch is not accepted by the knower due to the bilious fever of the knower. In that case, the yellowish is also accepted by the knower which exists in the sense-organ of the knower. But, the substance which is the locative case of the yellowish is not accepted by the knower. So, in this case, two types of cognition also are perceived. The first type of perception is of the substance like ‘this’ which is qualified by ‘conchness’ and the second type of perception is of the quality like ‘yellowish’. But, in this case, the substance becomes perceptible if it is devoid of quality. On the other hand, in this case, that quality becomes perceptible which is devoid of substance. The ‘difference’ between the conch and yellowish also is not perceptible in this case.

A question may be raised to the *Prābhākaras* that, why they accept the ‘difference’ between the conch and yellowish ?

In reply, the *Akhyātivādīns* said that, each substance is depending on any quality and each quality is depending on any substance. In this case, a substance

which is devoid of any quality and a quality which is devoid of any substance become perceptible. As a result, the difference between the substance and quality is not acceptable due to mutually desirability in both of them. So, 'the yellow conch'---this type of cognition originates due to the absence of knowledge of discrimination between the conch and yellowish.

In the same manner, the cognition of bitterness originates in the sweetmeat. The sweetness is not accepted in the sweetmeat due to bile in the sense-organ of the taste; but the bitterness is accepted which exists in the sense-organ of the taste. According to the *Prābhākaras*, the sweetmeat is accepted but, the sweetness does not accept which exists in the sweetmeat. Again, the bitterness is accepted but the bile-substance does not accept which is the locus of the bitterness. In this way, the 'difference' between the substance which is devoid of any quality and the quality which is devoid of any substance is not accepted due to the mutually desirability in both of them. The sweetmeat is used as bitterness due to the absence of knowledge of discrimination.

The *Prābhākara* school of Philosophers points out that, the nature of sense-organs is as such that, they produce the valid knowledge.

After that argument some philosophers point out that, distance, inability of the sense-organs, inattentiveness etc. interrupt the natural ability of the production of the valid knowledge and give rise to the invalid knowledge.

Prābhākara said that, there is not only the absence of two different cognitions but also the absence of two different objects. *Prābhākara* said that, the object of a cognition is ‘this’ and the another object of a cognition is ‘the silver’. When a person who is interested to collect the silver, he would unable to get the silver in spite of going forward, because he cannot differentiate the two cognitions and also two objects.

To establish the theory of ‘non-error’ (*akhyātivāda*), *Prābhākara* gave an argument that is as such : “ *Yathārthah sarve vipratipannah samdehavibhramah, pratyayatvāt ghatādipratyayavat*”. The inferential subject of this argument is ‘ *sarve vipratipannah samdehavibhramah*’, probandum is ‘*yathārthatva*’, probans is ‘*pratyatva*’ and example is ‘*ghatādipratyaya*’. The significance of this statement is the ‘*jñanatva*’ and ‘*yathārthatva*’ exist in the knowledge of pot. In this way, *Prabhakara* proved the concomitance rule between the ‘*jñanatva*’ or ‘the attribute of knowledge’ and ‘*yathārthatva*’ or ‘attribute of validity’. In this way, *Prābhākara* established that, all types of cognition are valid. There is no concept about the erroneous cognition.

Śālikanātha Miśra gave an argument in his *Prakaraṇapañcikā* from the above-mentioned view-point in order to establish the theory of ‘*akhyati*’ which argument is as such : “*Yadi cārtham parityajya kācidvuddhiḥ pravartate.*

Vyabhicāravati svārthe katham viśvasakaranam?”..66..

Jñānasya vyabhicāre hi viśvasah kimnivandhanah?

Jñānasya vyabhicāre’ pi jñānam yat satyameva tat”..69..

The significance of that argument is as such : if the cognition is being invalid then we will loss our confidence to all cognitions. As a result, all usages concerning the whole Universe would be interrupted¹⁷.

It is mentionable that ‘knowledge’ or ‘cognition’ is one type of feeling. The main characteristic feature of this feeling is ‘truthfulness’. For this reason, the another name of cognition is called accurate knowledge or ‘*pramā*’. The way of gaining this accurate knowledge or ‘*pramā*’ is ‘*pramāna*’. If there is any obstacle in the process of gaining knowledge, the knowledge will remain invalid. The obstacle or sublation may become in different ways namely, defective sense-organs of the knower, absence of sufficient light etc. These are not knowledge. These are the sublating categories of the procedure of gaining knowledge. If there is no truthfulness in feelings, it cannot be considered as knowledge. So, the cognition

may not become illusory. Western Philosopher John Hospers also said in his famous book *An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis* that, the knowledge has to be true. Truthfulness is the necessary characteristic feature of knowledge.

END NOTES

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2. *ibid.*, page: 69 (Śaṅkara Bhāṣya)
3. Miśra, Śālikanātha, *Prakaraṇapañcikā*, Bhaṭṭa, Nārāyaṇa, Joypuri, Nyāyasiddhi, Śāstri, Subrahmaṇya, Śrī (Ed.), Kasi Hindu Viswavidyalaya, Varanasi, 1961, Nayavīthi prakaraṇa (Part- III). page: 43
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7. *ibid.*, page: 45
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10. *ibid.*, page: 52

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12. *ibid.*, page: 54-57

13. *ibid.*, page: 47-48

14. *ibid.*, page: 49

15. *ibid.*, page: 50-52

16. *ibid.*, page: 53-56

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