

Chapter-V

Some Philosophical problems and their probable solutions

In this chapter an attempt has been made to point out some philosophical problems of Bhartṛhari's philosophy and subsequently probable solutions to those problems have been suggested. Bhartṛhari observed that *Śabdabrahman* can modify itself into the form of the world and thus be the cause of it without any external help for the purpose. But here a problem comes. *Brahman* has been described in the philosophy of Śaṅkarāchārya as a single unitary whole without having any parts whatsoever. Bhartṛhari also accepted that *Śabdabrahman* is a single unitary whole out of which everything comes into being¹. Now, if such a whole is to change into a different form, it must be wholly changed into it, without leaving any vestige of its former position. In such a case *Śabdabrahman* would be entirely lost in the form of the world. That is there would be just this world, the complete substitute of *Sabdabrahman*, and nothing else. In that case, the scriptural injunction to attain the knowledge of *Brahman* would be quite point less, because we just open our eyes and see the world, i.e., *Brahman*, without any efforts. If on the other hand we suppose that *Brahman* becomes in part the world and in part remains itself as *Brahman* even then problem crops up. In that case we have to imagine that it has parts which would militate against many explicit scriptural assertions. Moreover, to suppose that *Brahman* has parts is to suppose that it is liable to disintegration and is therefore perishable and cannot be eternal. This goes directly against the very conception of *Brahman*. Hence it is difficult to maintain that the world has come out of *Brahman*. As Bhartṛhari was influenced by the *Vedānta* scripture a probable solution can be offered from the *Vedāntic* viewpoint.

To meet this objection, we have to refer to our only source of knowledge about *Brahman*, i.e., to scripture, and in scripture we are told that the world has come out of *Brahman*, and also

that *Brahman* has no parts and is not subject to any change or modification². We have to perfectly clear that *Brahman* is not known through any ordinary perception or inference, but from scriptural revelation. And our ordinary logic which follows common sense and sense experience may not be applicable here. It is told that we should not try to apply logic where it has no scope, i.e., to matters which are not definitely thinkable. *Brahman* is such a subject. We have therefore to think, on the evidence of scripture that through some inscrutable power of its own, *Brahman* can change into the form of the world and also remain essentially unchanged³.

But one may still argue that even scripture cannot make us understand and accept what is self-contradictory, viz., that *Brahman* is partless and yet undergoes change, but not wholly. Our ordinary reason, then, says that if *Brahman* is partless, either it does not change at all, or, if it changes, it changes wholly.

It cannot be supposed that *Śabdabrahman* is changed in some respects and remains the same in other respects. This is as good as to suppose that it is changed partly and partly remains the same, which after all means that it consists of parts. This supposition, as we have already seen, will make *Śabdabrahman* subject, to disintegration and make the very concept of *Brahman* self-contradictory and meaningless.

When different and opposed courses of action are prescribed in scripture, it does not involve any self-contradiction. Because action depends upon man's will which is various and the different courses of action may be just alternatives to be adopted by different persons. But there are no alternatives in reality; reality is just what it is and is not dependent on any subjective choice. We cannot therefore tolerate contradiction in fact. When a statement of fact is seen to involve self-contradiction, we have to reject it as false or meaningless.

This crucial objection, presenting a fundamental difficulty, is sought to be met in the following way.

Bhartrhari readily granted that in fact there is no variety of aspects possible in *Śabdabrahman*. But through ignorance we may conceived it differently and the variety of aspects or forms, so conceived, will not make *Śabdabrahman* consist of parts. When a person, for instance, suffering from some eye-trouble, sees the moon as double, the moon remains just one and does not become two. The variety of forms, and in fact the element of plurality and diversity, consists of nothing but mere names and forms presented by ignorance (i.e., are due to misconception) without any substantial reality. We cannot, however, in our present empirical condition, definitely assert them to be either real or unreal and therefore we describe them as unspeakable. *Śabdabrahman*, viewed under this fundamentally illusory aspect is what is subject to modification and change and constitutes the basis of practical thought and action. In itself, however, *Śabdabrahman* is absolutely changeless and never suffers any modification and really transcends the limits of our thought and speech.

There are no doubt scriptural passages which speak of the transformation of *Brahman* into the form of the world; what is really meant to be conveyed by these passages is not the fact of change (the knowledge of such change is not said to lead to any spiritually desirable result), but something else. The real purpose of these passages is to make us understand that *Brahman* is the ultimate basis of all that exists and is at the same time beyond all changes and beyond the scope of our thought and speech. *Brahman* is absolutely distinct from everything empirical that is said to lead to our highest spiritual good or liberation.

We should not wonder how a single unitary principle, *Śabdabrahman*, can account for the manifold creation, because such things are seen due to our ignorance and therefore is not real. A self, although a unitary principle, is responsible for, and is really the creator of the various

objects seen in a dream. We know that jugglers also can produce, out of themselves, multifarious objects shown by them. In such cases neither the self nor the juggler loses himself or his unity, in spite of his manifold creation.

The question about how a manifold world can be produced out of a single unitary principle is not peculiar in the philosophy of Bhartṛhari. If it be a defect to derive the manifold world out of a single unitary principle, then we find this defect to be equally present in the Sāṃkhya-Yoga or in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. According to the former the world is produced out of *Pradhāna* and according to the latter the world comes out of atoms. *Pradhāna* is supposed to be without any parts or determinations and devoid of all sensible qualities, and the question can pertinently be asked how this determinate world of infinite complexity, endowed with all sensible qualities, can be produced out of such *Pradhāna*. It may be supposed that *Pradhāna* is not really partless, in as much as it consists of the three elements of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, which may be considered as its parts. But the Sāṃkhya School does not consider them as parts of *Pradhāna*. Besides this, these elements themselves are partless and each is supposed to be responsible for the creations of its own kind. Even if it is helped by others in its creation, the fact remains that it alone is responsible for its effects, and hence, here also, the charge of deriving a manifold out of a single unitary principle remains valid.

We found a similar difficulty with the atomic theory of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school also. Atoms are partless, and when they are joined with others, they are supposed to produce effects with many parts. But how is this possible? An atom being partless, if it is joined with another of the same nature, it must be wholly lost in the other and the effect will be atomic, and one can never get an effect of a bigger size. If we supposed that an atom, in joining with another atom, remains partly outside the other, then we shall be obliged to deny its partless character which would go against the original hypothesis of the atomists. Thus we find that what our

opponents argue against us as a defect of our theory is common to their theories also, and so they should not charge us particularly with this defect.

Now the question is how can the cognition which is designated by Bhartṛhari as inner and indivisible be explained? Actually, here an attempt will be made to show the nature, validity and the scope of the cognition. Following Bhartṛhari it can be said that in communication what is figured in the mind is the language itself and the meaning revealed non-differently by it⁴. Bhartṛhari accepted cognition on the basis of how it figured in the mind by language in usual communication. Some metaphysicians were taking the relation between cognition and Reality to be the crucial problem by putting Reality in the centre of their speculation. But Bhartṛhari did not follow the traditional metaphysical trend. Bhartṛhari was not interested in the ontic nature of things though he has given some hints in the very beginning of his *Vākyapadīya*. He explained the metaphysical issue like *Śabdabrahman* as it is used in communication or as it revealed cognition in the mind. For him, the ontological substratum of the being i.e the transcendental being is expressed by language in mind and that transcendental being is actually the cognitive being which is the unit of awareness in nature. He was concerned with the transcendental beings as they seem unavoidable in the analysis and interpretation of the beings of language and of meanings. Bhartṛhari did not take epistemology as a system of justification of his metaphysical assumption. He did not use the term “language” in his *Vākyapadīya* as an indicator to reality rather he used the term “language” as revealers of cognition. The meaning that is an idea or cognised being is revealed by language but the reality (in the ontological sense) is not revealed by language. Bhartṛhari claimed that meaning is not different from language and that is why it can be said that both are revealed non-differently. But the non-difference of thought and language in interpreting communication is the basic problem of Bhartṛhari’s *Vākyapadīya*.

Bhartrhari's *Vākyapadīya* maintained that the sentence, the word and the meaning are revealed non-differently. Bhartrhari accepted *Śabda* or language as awareness or as a self-determinate cognition. He claimed that language and meaning revealed non-differently in the mind and in that way a clear exposition of communication is possible. Actually, *Vākyapadīya* is a cognitive analytic inquiry into the nature of cognition and communication and that is why it is claimed that what is real are beings or ideas which are revealed in the mind by language non-differently by it. Our world of communication is based on these beings or ideas through which philosophical reflections are confined. That being or intelligible being forms the subject matter of philosophy as a cognitive activity. Bhartrhari accepted the existence of beings that is things –in- themselves as ontological substratum of the cognition and of the objects of cognition and that object of cognition revealed in the mind by language. Bhartrhari interpreted the problem of Reality from the cognitive viewpoint which is revealed in the mind by language. So, his viewpoint is different from that of other metaphysicians because like others he did not speculate into the problem of Reality on the basis of mystical experiences. For him, communication becomes possible without any ontological reality. Bhartrhari claimed that what is directly revealed by words serves as the base of inferred reality. So, the inferred reality is secondary and the former is the primary. So, as the outside reality is inferred by the cognition that is revealed by language it is accepted by Bhartrhari as secondary. Actually, Bhartrhari explained beings from the cognitive viewpoint and he did not admit *Śabdabrahman* as an ontological reality⁵. For Bhartrhari, Reality is the known and expressed (*vācya*) and it is not an ontological Reality⁶. This Reality is an idea or being which is revealed by language independently of Being and it is inferred as substratum of the cognition and of the object of cognition revealed in the mind by words.

The philosophy of Bhartrhari accepts that cognition is made directly by the indivisible unit i.e *vākya- sphoṭa*. The indivisible flash of understanding is the meaning which is revealed non-

differently in the mind by *sphoṭa*. Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* is a treatise on the philosophy of language and Grammar which claimed that the indivisible unit of understanding i.e *sphoṭa* can be realised by associating of the grammatically analyzed words, word meanings and so on. But following Bhartṛhari it can be said that there is no part in an indivisible sentence i.e *sphoṭa*. The process of understanding and explaining the indivisible sentence through parts is significant only for the purpose of grammatical analysis. So, we can understand the holistic approach of sentences in our day to day life communication only when the indivisibility of cognition is taken place. We cannot deny the indivisibility of cognition because cognition is intertwined with the inner indivisible unit of communication i.e *sphoṭa*. . Bhartṛhari opined that *sphoṭa* is the inner indivisible unit having a character of awareness and there is no part in awareness. Meaning is conveyed non-differently by this *sphoṭa* which is partless and because of our ignorance we can understand this part less reality having parts. There is no separate awareness of words in cognition of a sentence and of letters in a word because the awareness as a whole made communication possible. Bhartṛhari claimed that if a complete meaning is revealed by a word or even by a single letter they are then sentences and not discrete words or letters. So, word is also an indivisible unit and its meaning is conveyed indivisibly. Actually, words are taken to be real meaning conveying units of language in Grammar and practice. In *Vākyapadīya* Bhartṛhari explained the communication, cognition and semantic rules of language by taking the word and its meaning as real cognitive units.

Bhartṛhari accepted meaning as the expressed and language as the expresser. As a linguistic philosopher he confined reflections to beings by accepting meaning as the expressed and language as the expresser. Actually, Bhartṛhari was interested in interpreting cognition as revealed in communication. His philosophical approach is different from others because he interpreted cognition with the help of grammar, metaphysics and philosophy. Bhartṛhari claimed that there is no need to accept things-in-themselves for explaining concepts. For

Bharṭṛhari *sphoṭa* is the expresser and it is accepted by him as an inner language which when manifested by utterances revealed itself and its meaning non-differently⁷. Accepting language as the expresser Bharṭṛhari opined that language is the revealing force of awareness⁸. He accepts also the *vaikharī vak* i.e outer language for the accomplishment of communication in our day to day practice. Primarily, philosophy is concerned with language as a cognitive activity because cognition is confined to language and always infused by language. But Bharṭṛhari observed that Philosophy is not concerned only with a specific discipline of cognition but with all sorts of disciplines of cognition. Philosophical reflections are concerned with the clarifications of problems for cognition of the beings as they figured by language in communication. In *Vākyapadīya* Bharṭṛhari said that cognition is revealed by language and that is why the primacy of language has been accepted as the object of philosophical reflections. Bharṭṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* clearly mentioned that thought is infused with language and thought cannot be there within us being isolated from language. Language is not confined to the articulated sounds or written marks but it is the expressive power of itself and of meaning. According to Bharṭṛhari language is not confined to what we speak, read or write. For him, uttered sounds, written words and other experiences are only the instrument through which the indivisible language is manifested. When this inner indivisible language *is* manifested by verbal utterances or written words it reveals itself first and then meaning is revealed by it non-differently in the mind.

Language that is designated by Bharṭṛhari as *sphoṭa* is communicative by its own nature. Bharṭṛhari claimed that *sphoṭa* is given ubiquitously in the mind of all individuals and it is manifested differently through the uttered sounds or written words which are the instrument to articulate *sphoṭa*. In our society we can make communication through verbal or written language which demands the participation of speakers and hearers. So, if following Bharṭṛhari it is maintained that language i.e *sphoṭa* is ubiquitously given to all then the idea

of private language does not arise in philosophy. Bhartṛhari held that only for the ubiquitous nature of language one can participate in a linguistic community and that ubiquitous nature of language revealed cognition. In our society the uttered languages are accepted only for the communicative nature of language. We know that Bhartṛhari recognised language (*sphoṭa*) as the foundational being of the world of communication. But he did not reject the uttered languages because he accepted uttered languages as an instrument to manifest *sphoṭa*. Actually, Bhartṛhari opined that the uttered language and the inner meaning revealing language (*sphoṭa*) both are involved inseparably for the purpose of communication⁹. Uttered languages are the tools through which the *sphoṭa* can be manifested. Through the analysis of language in our usual communication Bhartṛhari clarified the concept of meaning on the basis of cognition. Bhartṛhari's enquiry on language and meaning played an important role for the purpose of cognitive philosophical analysis and for understanding concepts in its clarity. The *Vākyapadīya* of Bhartṛhari dealt clearly and distinctly with the syntactic and semantic issues in philosophy. Bhartṛhari argued that the foundational character of cognition cannot be denied because cognition revealed by language is always veridical. For Bhartṛhari language is awareness in nature and it revealed meaning non-differently by it and that is why Bhartṛhari accepted the foundational character of language.

Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* clearly mentions that cognition is revealed by language in the mind and the sources of cognition like perception, inference, implication etc. are only the instruments which are helpful for the manifestation of the real language i.e. *sphoṭa*. So, it can be said that Bhartṛhari is not an epistemologist as the term is taken popularly. Accepting cognition as virtue and in the light of cognition as virtue Bhartṛhari has criticized *tarka* specifically in the verses *Vākyapadīya* 1/31, 1/36-38, 2/78, perception in *Vākyapadīya* 2/296 and inference in *Vākyapadīya* 1/30-42, 136, 138, 2/46, 2/368, 2/352, 2/140. He has criticized *tarka*, perception, and inference as the sources of leading erroneous cognition on the basis of

which communication cannot be possible. For him the world of communication is possible only intertwined with language i.e *sphoṭa*. The main cause of refuting *tarka* and inference is the subjective nature of these through which the acquiring knowledge is vitiated. For Bhartṛhari, *tarka*, inference etc. cannot work independently of the cognition which is revealed in the mind by language that serves as the cognitive ground of reasoning. Though the other theorists accept inference, perception as a means of cognition independently of language Bhartṛhari has refuted them as a valid means of cognition. But it is important to note that Bhartṛhari have accepted the importance of inference, perception, and implication as they are based on the scripture (*veda*). Scripture is the expresser of cognition which is revealed by the language used in it. So, cognition cannot be possible isolated from language.

For Bhartṛhari language and the meaning which is revealed non-differently by the language both are the objects of cognition. Our reflections are confined to the objects of cognition which are revealed by language (*sphoṭa*) in the mind. German philosopher Immanuel Kant maintained that we know only the phenomena and the noumena is unknown and unknowable. Kant argued that the objects of our cognition are the subjective qualities that are constituents of perceptual things¹⁰. But Bhartṛhari's view is different from Kantian view. Bhartṛhari observed that perceptual things cannot be revealed as being or non-being rather being and non-being are known as they are revealed in the mind by language. We know that some philosophers interpreted the noumenal world through the linguistic analysis but Bhartṛhari's thought is quite different from them. Bhartṛhari explained that the noumenal world is something that is beyond the grasp of language and mind. For him, cognition is revealed by language (*sphoṭa*) in usual communication and the interpretation of cognition is the main aim of philosophy. As far as the cognition or the purpose of communication is concerned there is no need of physical entities. We can acquire the sense data through the written or spoken utterances which can be used as an instrument in the manifestation of language and meaning.

The objects are formed in the mind by language and our cognition is confined to these objects. Language for Bharṭṛhari is an inner indivisible meaning revealing unit which is not confined to the utterances or written sentences or words. These are acts as an instrument to manifest language (*sphoṭa*) and language is accepted by him as an expresser and meaning as an expressed but both of these are manifested inseparately by language (*sphoṭa*). For Bharṭṛhari language is accepted as the object of cognition.

In *Vākyapadīya* it is mentioned that the cognition of being and non-being is revealed by language in the mind. The language which is revealed itself in the mind is an intelligible being or idea and it is accepted by Bharṭṛhari as the expresser (*vācaka*) and the meaning which is accepted by Bharṭṛhari as the expressed (*vācya*) is revealed unitedly by the language that is the expresser. Language revealed itself and is eternally fit to reveal the meaning non-differently. So, the accomplishment of indivisible cognition is made possible by language. To Bharṭṛhari meaning without language is not possible and cognition independently of language is ceased to be cognition. Following Bharṭṛhari we can say that the analysis of thought and language is possible only if cognition is intertwined with language. But some philosophers have doubted the objectivity of the study of language by language itself. For them all thoughts about language must be carried out in language itself due to human limitations that he has only language to study even language itself. Bharṭṛhari opined that language as the expresser revealed itself first in every cognition and then meaning is revealed by it. Bharṭṛhari did not accept any meaning independent of language and isolated from language and if language is not revealed itself first then meaning could not be revealed. Now one question may arise in connection with Bharṭṛhari's opinion. How can the language as an expresser be expressed itself also? In reply to this question following Bharṭṛhari we may say that language also figures as an object of cognition through language. According to Bharṭṛhari functional language is a totality of two- one is the cause of the cognition of

language and another is the cause of the cognition of the meaning. Language is an expressed being and it is expressed by itself as an object of cognition. Before revealing the meaning language reveals itself first. Bhartṛhari is of the opinion that the cognition is revealed by language first and then meaning is revealed non-differently by it. According to Bhartṛhari verbal utterances are only the instruments to manifest indivisible language given in the mind and after manifesting in a sequence of verbal utterances it revealed its own nature i.e *sphoṭa*.

According to Bhartṛhari the main characteristic of language is to reveal itself in cognition and it is distinguished from the sense. Bhartṛhari accepted their differences on the basis of the fact that before knowing the objects senses need not be cognised themselves. For Bhartṛhari, senses can be cognised only when they came into contact with the objects. But language (*Śabda*) reveals itself before revealing meaning and that is why Bhartṛhari defined it as the expressed and the expresser. If for the accomplishment of cognition the language is taken only as an instrument then there would be no need for knowing the language itself before knowing the meaning. So, language is known first when it is manifested by utterances and then the meaning is known when it is expressed by the real language (*Śabdabrahman*) non-differently by it. As all cognitions are expressed by the language no cognition is possible unless and until language is revealed. But the Mīmāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas refute the aforementioned view of Bhartṛhari and claim that without perceiving the senses themselves we can perceive a thing by the senses. Similarly we can say that as language is taken only as a means of cognition there is no need for accepting it as prior to cognition. But Bhartṛhari accepted language as an active principle. For him, the nature of language is to reveal its own nature before revealing meaning. If the language itself is not revealed in the mind first then the meaning cannot be revealed because language revealed meaning non-differently by it. Bhartṛhari did not accept language only as a means of cognition. In *Vākyapadīya* language is

taken as consciousness or awareness which reveals itself and the meaning is revealed accompanied by it.

In *Vākyapadīya* we have seen a sharp distinction between the process of perception and the process of cognition. The senses and the indications in perception and inference stand at a distance from each other. After expressing knowledge they are separated from the knowing objects. But in Verbal cognition the language is not separated from the cognition. For Bhartṛhari, language is an inner indivisible meaning revealing unit which is ubiquitously given to all and when it is manifested by the verbal noises it reveals its own nature that is *sphoṭa*. Though meaning is an inner being it is not independent of language because meaning is revealed by the language non-differently by it. So, it can be said that the two inner beings are related with each other. Bhartṛhari defined cognition as intertwined with language. Language is infused with all sorts of cognitions. So, the process of cognition is the only cause for the differences among them. But Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṃsakas refute the Vaiyākaraṇas view and argued that cognition as intertwined with language cannot be proved. They opined that language is an instrument in the indication of the meaning. So, the language is an indicator and the meaning is indicated. The indicator and the indicated cannot be taken to be intertwined. The indicator stands always at a distance from what it indicates and is separated after performing the act of indicating. Now the question may arise: is there any authenticity to claim that the senses which are the means for the accomplishment of cognition of an object and the object cognised through them are intertwined with each other? Those who accepted language only as an instrument of cognition argued that the word cow, the meaning cow and the cognition cow are indicated by the speaker by the same word cow because except language there is no other instrument to indicate it. The speaker used the same word cow as an indication of all of them and this is the limitation of the speaker. But this limitation of the speaker cannot be taken as a ground of accepting cognition as

intertwined with language. The opponents strongly argued that there is no infusion of the senses and the object perceived by them and they rejected *Vaiyākaraṇas* holistic approach of language which is based on the infusion of cognition and language as ignorance.

But in response to the above objection following Bhartṛhari it can be said that the Mīmāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas are based on their oversight of the difference between perception and cognition. Before revealing meaning the language reveals itself and this is the main characteristic of language. As language is infused with cognition and this nature of language cannot be changed, one is bound to accept the cognition which is cognised directly by the language. If one rejects that cognition then the communication cannot be made. It is important to note that the discriminative nature of cognition is based on language. If the cognition of cow and the cognition of pot is not taken as infused with language then the different senses of them cannot be distinguished from each other. As cognition is infused by language the very sense of cow separated from language cannot be known as the object of cognition. The perceptual or inferential cognition of cow cannot be understood distinctly isolated from language.

But Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in his *Nyāya Mañjarī* refuted the above view of Bhartṛhari and argued that between the determinate and indeterminate perceptual cognition the later could not be taken as intertwined with language. For him, the indeterminate perceptual cognition is not associated with language. The determinate perceptual cognition is associated with language. The determinate and indeterminate cognition cannot be differentiated if both of them are infused with language. Rejecting the above views the grammarians replied that it is wrong to confine language with verbal noises. Actually, Bhartṛhari's theory of *sphoṭa* claimed that the cognition is essentially and cognitively intertwined with language. The language (*Śabda*) as the expresser expresses itself and the meaning. As the objects of cognition are revealed by language they cannot be known separately from the language. If cognition is separated from

language then it is ceased to be cognition. We can perform an action with the help of cognition and no cognition is possible being isolated from language. Even the cognition in a newborn baby is intertwined with language. The crying, sucking, vibrating of the vocal organs of a newborn baby cannot be accomplished if there is no incentive to act. So, as the incentive to act or not to act cannot deny the cognition as the cause of the incentives must be accepted. But it is important to point out that there is no possibility of a newly born baby being taught the language we speak, read or write. So, those who took language as confined with spoken or written language which we learnt gradually after birth failed to understand the nature of cognition and they denied it to the newly born baby. Bhartrhari argued that if the inner language as potency for incentive is not accepted as given in the mind of a newborn baby its activities of crying, sucking etc. would not be possible. The modern scientists and the psychologists also prove the presence of cognition as the cause of the incentive to crying, smiling of a baby. The inner language as potency reveals the cognition that causes incentive in a baby and that inner linguistic potency is given since its birth. As this potency is given since its birth it tries to communicate by crying, smiling etc. If it is not then it would not be possible for it to make efforts for learning and communicating. So, Bhartrhari explained the cognition of a newborn baby as infused with language. But it is important to note that here he used the term language as an inner linguistic potency which is needed for incentive to perform an act.

Bhartrhari claimed that infusing with language cognition is distinctively known as cognition. Inferential cognition can be known distinctively on the basis of language. Even the cognition of dream objects is also intertwined with language. Actually, cognition cannot be illuminated in isolation from language. So, it can be said that nothing can be expressed separately from and independently of language. Bhartrhari refuted the propositionalist's view who accepts proposition as abstracted from several instances and occurrences of sentences. Bhartrhari

argued that a sentence i.e inner meaning revealing unit is not an abstraction from the occurrences and the perceived instances. For him, sentence i.e inner language is foundationally given as awareness itself. Verbal noises are the instruments through which the inner meaning revealing language can be manifested. Following Bhartṛhari's we can say that language is not an abstraction from the outside and it is also not a mental construction. Actually, it is an awareness that reveals itself and the meaning. If *sphoṭa* is taken as an abstraction then it must lose its expressive character. No cognition can be made if thought itself is abstracted from language because without infusing with language thought cannot reveal itself and the meaning also. The idea of abstraction may lead to the undesirable metaphysical presumption of the things from which it is abstracted. If an abstracted proposition is not signified itself first then the meaning cannot be signified by it and hence the idea of proposition as abstraction is cognitively and logically inconsistent. For Bhartṛhari the inner meaning revealing language i.e *sphoṭa* is not abstracted from verbal utterances or verbal noises. It is a self-restrained being that acts for expressing thoughts of itself and of its meaning. So, it can be said that there is no difference between language and thought. But those who have taken language and thought as different did not accept the above view of Bhartṛhari. They have taken meaning as thought and made a difference between thought and language. Because they accept language only as a referring instrument of thought. But Bhartṛhari denied the above view and argued that if language and thought are taken as different then the clarification of thought by the analysis of language cannot be possible. Actually, the analysis of thought through the analysis of language cannot be possible if language is taken only as confined to verbal utterances and as abstracted from verbal utterances. Actually, Bhartṛhari's view of *akhandavākyasphoṭa* is based on the idea of infusion of language and thought and of language and cognition.

There is no philosophical and logical need for accepting proposition as an abstraction. The proposition as an abstraction denied the revealing nature of language and that abstraction amounts to unnecessary metaphysical assumption. According to Bhartṛhari language is a foundational being of awareness in nature. It reveals itself and its meaning that is the primary being of the cognitive world of communication. Bhartṛhari accepted cognition as infused with language on the basis of the illuminative character of cognition and of the expressive nature of language. But it is important to note that language does not infuse thought only but it is thought itself. Language reveals itself and the meaning is revealed non-differently by it. Verbal utterances, written words are the only tools in the manifestation of the *sphoṭa*. So, the representative theory of cognition is inconsistent with the distinctive nature of cognition and language itself.

Here an attempt has been made to discuss Bhartṛhari's view on the nature and philosophical significance of the being that is figured in the mind by language in the accomplishment of communication.

It is started with the view of Mahābhāsyakāra Patañjali who has classified all beings into two categories, one is external being (*vāhya-sattā*) and another is intelligible being (*buddhistha-sattā*). Intelligible being is figured in the mind non-differently by language and hence it is eternally related with the language. Mahābhāsyakāra claimed that meaning is never deprived of being. Though all the 'tables' may be destroyed, the meaning of the word 'table' is necessarily revealed in the mind by the word 'table.' Now the problem is if being is not taken as externally existent then the uses like being exists would be contradictory. The opponents argues against the pāṇini *sūtra* '*tadasyāstyasminniti matup*' (*Astādhyayi*, 5/2/95) and claimed that if the *padārtha* is never deprived of its being then there is no need of using the word 'exist' in the *sūtra* for characterizing the being as exist. Bhartṛhari observed the external being as the only being revealed by language and the intelligible being as the *mukhya-sattā*

which is transcendental to cognition. The intelligible being in contrast with the external being is figured in the mind by language. Though from the cognitive perspective the intelligible being is taken as primary, yet as the word 'exist' is popularly used for the external being, its use for the intelligible being is taken for the secondary being. According to Bhartṛhari both kinds of beings are not separated one from another from the cognitive viewpoint. The external being is also revealed as a being in order to be known and it is also the object of cognition. It is contradictory to accept that the inner intelligible being is never deprived of existence. Its existence in the present is not denied also. That inner intelligible being is figured in the mind by the words in all the times past, present and future.

The intelligible being can be figured in the mind by language as being and non-being as well. As that intelligible being is revealed in the mind by language it is revealed equally as being, non-being, existence, and non-existence etc. Actually, that being can be expressed when it is revealed by language. Following Bhartṛhari it can be said that the external existence cannot be revealed as an existent and a non-existent being and it is also not revealed as an existent or a non-existent both at the same time. Bhartṛhari opined it is not the case that the idea of being can be figured in the mind positively and the idea of non-being can be figured in the mind negatively by the language. Both the idea of being and non-being can be figured in the mind positively. By taking the example of crystal, mirror, and jewel Bhartṛhari has clarified the issue of figuring the ideas equally as being and non-being. Being transparent they configured as the form and colour of the things kept near to them. Similarly, the idea of being is revealed as both the being and non-being by the respective expresser that is language. For Bhartṛhari, as the meaning is figured in the mind by language the idea that it is a cow and the idea that it is not a cow is known as they figured in the mind by the respective sentences. There is no any contradiction to the being. The idea of the term contradiction is figured as the idea of it on account of which it is cognised. Helārāja, one of the commentators of Bhartṛhari's

Vākyapadīya dealt with the purpose of accepting intelligible being which is figured equally as being and non-being. He argued that the crystal mirror does not undergo any change with the association of different things of different colour and configured things kept near to them. Similarly, the intelligible being figured always positively as being or non-being by the respective expresser (*vācaka*). It is important to note that the intelligible being can be figured positively even by the negative sentences. If it is not then no knowledge by negative expressions would be possible. As being of awareness in character the existence of being and non-being is revealed by language equally as being and non-being. Meaning is accepted by Bhartṛhari as universal. For him, meaning is the meaning of being and of non-being as well.

Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas refuted Bhartṛhari's theory of meaning as inner-being. They opined that language is the expression for the external existents or non-existents. For them if the negation of the intelligible being is accepted then it would be a *pratiyogi* of negation. As the *pratiyogi* and its negation are opposite to each other both of the two cannot co-exist simultaneously. They argued that the *Vaiyākaraṇas* claimed that the intelligible being can be figured as both being and non-being and if it is the case then the word negation cannot be taken as the negator of the inner being and similarly existence cannot be taken as the expresser of its existence. On the basis of the above arguments they have accepted the terms 'exist' and 'non-exist' as expressions for Being and Non-being of external existence.

In reply to the above objections Bhartṛhari and his commentator Helārāja explained the intelligible being by the analogy of Vaiśeṣika's notion of *sattā*. Vaiśeṣika accepts *sattā* as the unity of substance, quality and action. Bhartṛhari accepted intelligible being as the unit that is figured equally as being and non-being. Unlike Vaiśeṣika Bhartṛhari accepted intelligible being as the universal that is figured in both the being and non-being. *Vaiyākaraṇas* accept intelligible being as a crystal that is configured as the things kept near to it. *Vaiyākaraṇas* claim that intelligible being is figured equally as the idea of negation, emptiness, non-

existence etc. by the respective expressions. That which is common to both in figuring as being and non-being by language can be opposit neither to a being nor to a non-being. External existence can be perceived only as existence and not as non-existence. It is only intelligible being that figured in the mind equally as being and non-being when it is revealed so by the language (inner meaning revealing unit i.e *sphoṭa*) in the mind.

The opponents argued that though Vaiyākaraṇas have accepted the being as existence, it cannot be a *pratiyagi* (counterpart) of negation. In other words, being externally existence it can never be non-existence. Contrary to it for them external being is non-existence in the past and in future as well. Thus, that of which non-existence is possible can only be negated by the negative usage of words. As non-existence of only being is possible, it is only the being which is negated by the use of the negative words.

Replied to the above objections the Vaiyākaraṇas claimed that a negative word is naturally expressive of negation. By the usages of negative word the existence of the external being is not negated. It only expressed the idea of the negation of external existence. Actually, negation did not negate the existence of externals but it revealed the idea of the negation of them. The idea of the non-existence of some external existence is revealed by the negative word (*nañ*). The negation of the *Brahman* by the word *nañ* in the expression *abrahman* will not be possible if external being is taken as the meaning of the words. The word *Brahman* is expressive of inner-being and by the use of negative words the idea of the inner being of *brahman* which is the object of negation is negated in the external being by the use of the word *abrahman*.

Bhartṛhari did not accept any metaphysical substance for the explanation of the world of communication. For him, all cognitions as confined to the beings are revealed by language in the mind. But it is true that in some parts of *Vākyapadīya* he discussed about the

metaphysical issues from which it appears that his *Vākyapadīya* is a book of metaphysics which is based on non-dual indivisible language unit i.e *Śabdabrahman*. Now a question may arise: if our cognition is confined to the beings and revealed in the mind by language and if metaphysical reality is beyond the touch of language then how can it be accepted at all? But it is important to note that Bhartṛhari's view to explain the metaphysics is different from those who explained the world of physical things by accepting a metaphysical reality as ultimate. Bhartṛhari explained cognition by the language in usual communication and it is restricted to beings only. He accepted language not as a metaphysical being but as a cognitive being. Bhartṛhari opined that metaphysical beings are not cognised by language directly. He accepts it as a logically inferred being. For the explanation of the cause of cognition, the existence of mind, soul or consciousness is implicated as the substratum of the cognition revealed by these words in particular and that of language in general. Taking these matters of fact in consideration Bhartṛhari has accepted the existence of mind or soul as the metaphysical substratum of the cognition revealed by language. For him cognition is intertwined with language and language and meaning are the objects of cognition. If one goes through the *Vākyapadīya* seriously then he finds that Bhartṛhari has a cognitive understanding of language and he has not viewed the metaphysical understanding of it as contradictory to the cognitive understanding. However, this kind of evaluation of the *Vākyapadīya* faced many problems for reconciling the metaphysical beings that are beyond the grasp of language and the beings that are revealed by language. We know that any ontic substratum beyond the ideas is not an object of cognition revealed by language. Bhartṛhari observed that ontic substratum as the object of yogin's realization and hence it is a subject matter of *sādhanā*. So, we can say that the world of metaphysical, physical, and psychological entities and the world of communication can well be explained only if the *Śabdabrahman* as the ontic substratum of the cognitive beings is presumed on the basis of cognition revealed by language. Though in

Vākyapadīya the ontological process of creation of the physical entities of the empirical world is not clearly mentioned Bhartṛhari accepted these entities as the external substratum of the meaning of language which is known by implication made on the basis of them. The *paśyanti* level of *Śabdabrahman* is bursts forth as different beings when it instrumented through the *vaikhari* level of *Śabdabrahman*. On this account language and meaning are understood as different. The ignorant person accepts it only as a form of language and he does not realize its meaning revealing unit or awareness character. Among the three levels of *Śabdabrahman* *vaikharī* level is important for communication because of its two functions in cognition: one is, it manifests the inner indivisible meaning revealing language and another is it distinguishes correct and incorrect uses of the given words. The inner meaning revealing language i.e *paśyantī* level and the *madhyamā* level both are manifested gradually through the *vaikharī* level. Only yogins can realized the *paśyantī* level of language that is the inner indivisible unit of language without the help of *vaikharī* level of language.

Now the question comes is Bhartṛhari a *vivartavādin* in the sense of the term as taken by Śaṅkara or not? *Vivarta* can also be taken for falsity only when the relation between the cause and effect is false. Those who accept Reality as independent of mind and matter take the relation between independent ultimate Reality and the world of mind and matter as false. But Bhartṛhari's position is different from them. For him the independent ultimate Reality as power of manifestation is responsible for all sorts of creation and manifestation. If the relation between Reality and its powers is taken as *yogyatā* of an independent Reality it will be contradictory to accept the relation between the two as false. It is the *yogyatā* of *Śabdabrahman* on account of which it manifested in specific forms of diversity. Taking this matter of fact in view it can be said that Bhartṛhari's concept of *vivarta* cannot be taken for falsity but for the manifestation of the unmanifested. In *Vākyapadīya* this process of manifestation is operated by the *yogyatā* of the reality of which time, space, action and means

are given much importance as the power which specified the *yogyatā* of language principle. Bhartṛhari accepted beings revealed by language as the self-sustained beings of awareness in character. As beings revealed by language are taken as an awareness in character there is no need of any other cause of incentive in order to reveal them. The beings revealed by language serves itself as the cause of incentive. Actually it is awareness in itself and that is why it is taken as the self-restrained. Awareness is the cause of all expectancy and no expectancy is possible isolated from language that revealed it. The beings are revealed by language independently of any sort of metaphysical or psychological entities and that is why also the beings i.e awareness is taken as self-restrained. No substance can be expressed without the awareness of that substance.

In conclusion following Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* it can be said that language revealed itself first and then it revealed meaning and that is why Bhartṛhari accepted language as self-restrained. In *Vākyapadīya* it is clearly mentioned that cognition is infused by language and independently of physical or psychological entities the cognition of the beings revealed in the mind by the language¹¹. The intelligible being is a self-restrained being and by self-restrained being we mean to say that the objects of cognition are not abstracted but foundational. The beings revealed non-differently by language itself into the mind but these are not the construction of the mind. There we have seen a difference between the cognition of objects and the cognition itself in *Vākyapadīya*. The cognition of objects is relational to the cognition itself. But as the light does not need another light in order to be illuminated in the same way cognition is also foundational in itself. As communication is made possible by the accomplishment of cognition by language the objects of cognition also become the objects of communication and of philosophical reflections. The existence of things-in-themselves is not rejected by Bhartṛhari. He accepted things-in-themselves as the ontic substrata of the cognition. In cognition we know only the beings and when that cognition is imposed upon

external beings by habit, practice, perception is indiscriminately taken as the object of cognition. Following Bhartṛhari we can say that verbal noises like sense data are taken as tools only in the manifestation of the inner-language and when that inner-language is manifested it revealed itself first as expresser and then the meaning as expressed is revealed by it non-differently. We perceive the physical world by our physical organs because of our ignorance and because of that ignorance we cannot realize the actual role of these physical organs which act as the tools in the manifestation of inner language. We cannot realize the foundational character of cognition intertwined with language.

Bhartṛhari opined that things-in-themselves are beyond the grasp of language and they are not beings revealed by language¹². If we follow Bhartṛhari's holistic philosophy of language then we can find that he did not admit things-in-themselves as Reality. Even sense data cannot be known isolated from language. We know that the philosophical reflections are confined to the objects which are figured in the mind by language. But as things-in-themselves are beyond the grasp of language there is no philosophical significance of them. So, Bhartṛhari's theory of objects of cognition is justified only when he accepted the objects of cognition as revealed by language and not as a constructed form of mind. Bhartṛhari did not accept the objects of cognition as ideas hypothesized as external-things. So, it can be said that Bhartṛhari's holistic philosophy of language accepted the object of cognition not as an ontic or a psychic one but as a cognizable and communicable one that revealed in the mind by language.

By taking cognition as intertwined with language Bhartṛhari resolved the problem of relation between language and meaning in a verbal cognition. The being i.e thought object is figured by language in the mind and for Bhartṛhari that being is identified as meaning or intelligible being that is awareness in character. If inner being as revealed by the expressions is not taken into account as philosophical being then the empty concepts like the hare's horn, barren's son etc. cannot be explained. No expression of the external things which exists only in the present

can be possible if meaning as inner being is denied. If the inner being is not accepted as its cause then the prior expectancy of expression is not possible. Bhartṛhari's holistic approach of philosophy has given importance to the cognition infused by language. Language in his philosophy is taken as a luminous and illuminating being of the world of communication. Our cognitions and reflections are confined to the language. Bhartṛhari accepted external being as the external substratum of the inner-being revealed in the mind by language. Cognition cannot be made possible if it is not revealed by and intertwined with language. So, it can be shown that language is the luminous and illuminating principle of cognition and cognition is intertwined with that language that is designated by Bhartṛhari as inner meaning revealing unit.

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