

## CHAPTER SIX

### CONCLUDING REMARKS

Willard Van Orman Quine has played a crucial role in the realm of philosophy in general and analytic philosophy in particular during the second half of twentieth century. Initially, he was known as a logician but subsequently he had been regarded as a general philosopher and extended himself into the province of logic and language, metaphysics, ontology, epistemology and communication and what not. He has been regarded as a prolific *critique of philosophy*. Even though he began his carrier with logic, but his work in logic was philosophically motivated and gradually focused more and more on serious and much concerned philosophical issues. He sharpened the ontological issues and discussed ontological commitment. Together with Nelson Goodman, he explored the possibility of being a nominalist. However, unlike Goodman, he settled for a platonic realism which eventually took an absorbing new turn towards indeterminacy of reference. The other important dimension of Quine's naturalized epistemology in particular and his main contribution to philosophy in general is *his skeptical standpoint towards meaning and other related notions*, such as, analyticity and modality developed by the proponents of classical and traditional epistemology in the name of **First Philosophy**. His philosophical skepticism grew into a major titivating of previous philosophical views on communication and the relation of language to the world. It was first appeared in "Truth by Convention" in 1936 and after that particularly from 1943 onwards, a number of articles were published and directed in some sense or other against modal notions, such as, possibility and necessity. However, in 1951, Quine actually sketched an alternative view on meaning in "Two

Dogmas of Empiricism” and further extended in his *Word and Object* where Quine criticized modalities into modal contexts.

We think Quine’s main concern, his criticism of the notions of logical necessity and possibility, analyticity and traditional views on meaning remains vibrant. His critical and skeptical position about **First Philosophy**, in fact make philosophy more worthy and interesting in the real sense of the term. He accentuated more on the problem of meaning even in his *Word and Object* and along with other philosophers and linguists; he viewed on *the public nature of language*. We think that Quine’s major philosophical achievement is that he has taken this idea of public nature of language seriously that many philosophers finds it difficult to accept. His main idea *indeterminacy of translation* has widely been discussed and his fundamental ideas concerning the public nature of language has been refined and partly revised in his later writings.

We think that the whole program of Quine’s naturalized epistemology actually hinges on the very perception about the concepts of *semantics and epistemology*. In his *Word and Object*, Quine stressed what we perceive and what we take others to perceive plays a very significant role in *language learning and language use*. The problem with **First Philosophy** is that it admits non-naturalized epistemological contents or backed up by some philosophical dogmas based on stringent rules and principle. Quine’s philosophical gravity actually hinges on his very perception of naturalized epistemology. Quine’s epistemology is naturalistic in the sense that it contains natural science based on empirical psychology. It would be a sort of epistemology that provides an account of the evidential bases of natural science including empirical psychology. In his *Word and Object*, Quine endeavored to do this in terms of **stimulus and response** which are empirically but not publicly accessible. Quine applies this in language learning and he contended that language must be accessible to the members of the community in their daily lives. *From*

*Stimulus to Science* (1995), Quine has sought to find out a way of dealing with what others perceive without begging the questions of meaning and translation. This philosophical enterprise involves the whole range of Quine's philosophical insights, his views on epistemology and ontology, on causality, natural kinds, time, space and individualism. In a nutshell, it can be said that Quine has created a new way of looking at these basic issues of philosophy by introducing the philosophically forceful theory in the name of naturalized epistemology which eventually ventured and created various others integrated philosophical interpretations for the benefit of the new beginners. Through his theory of naturalized epistemology and indeterminacy of translation manuals, Quine offered us a transformed philosophical landscape for the forthcoming generations of philosophers to explore. We think that Quine's concept of naturalized epistemology is integrated with various others philosophical insights, such as, the analytic-synthetic distinction along with the related notions including verificationism, holism, stimulus meaning, observation sentences, translation manuals, ontological commitment, indeterminacy of reference, truth, realism, physicalism, classes and grammar.

We think that Quine's naturalized epistemology appears as a revolt against traditional epistemology or what may be termed as **First Philosophy**. What then is wrong with First Philosophy? Quine's simplistic reply is that First Philosophy or classical epistemology is guided by philosophical dogmas. What then is wrong with philosophical dogmas? Quine's replay is that such philosophical dogmas do not bear any sense within the realm of public or natural language. Philosophical dogmas can be found relevant to a certain context only within the straight jacket of logical or artificial language. It would vitiate the dimensional functions of language. His philosophical program in the name of naturalism is based on his rejection of any form of knowledge other than ordinary knowledge *vividly manifested in common sense and in science*,

*i.e., in psychology, economics, sociology and history.* Thus, by the term science Quine means natural science. In this sense Quine's naturalism would be treated as a replica of empiricism. Quine's naturalism does not allow any philosophical decision based on a distinctively philosophical standpoint that would eventually allow philosophical reflection to prescribe standards as a whole. That was the main reason of Quine's revolt against classical epistemologists, particularly, Kant and Carnap and mentalist like Chomsky and his followers. Kant's position of analyticity was problematic to Quine because it is based on philosophical dogma or stringent rules. The sanctity of Kant's analytic and synthetic distinction eventually rested on the clarification of the meaning of language. When it was said that in the case of analytic statement, the predicate concept is contained, overtly or covertly, in the subject concept (for example, all bachelors are unmarried), it is actually known just by proper analyses of the meaning of the terms as used as subject and predicate in a subject-predicate proposition. Quine then claims that such stringent dogma does not make any sense within the realm of public or natural language having evaluative epistemological insight or language dealing with psychological contents as well as stimulus responses. The analytic-synthetic distinction thus appears as a dogma that can only be retained on the basis of so many stringent and inviolable articulated rules and presuppositions. This cannot be accepted when we are talking in favour of public language and also believe in conceptual relativism within the paradigm of natural science and common sense. Quine's position in this regard is very simple and clear. He finds philosophical scope of criticizing Kant because his understanding of naturalism actually allows him to do it. For him, naturalism in the real sense of the term can be comprehended within the sphere of science itself. His understanding of naturalism in the real sense of the term can be recognized within the womb of natural science. As a result of that there is no place for prior

philosophy. Reality cannot be identified apart from natural science. Thus, there is no theory distinct from science and naturalism in Quine's sense that must reflect 'science from the womb of science'.

Quine was equally vocal against Carnap as well. He in this regard says that out of two dogmas of empiricism, the second dogma was created by Carnap. Carnap was a radical reductionist. He drew logical conclusion on the basis of artificial language based on logical canons, forms and structure. Of course, by way of criticizing Carnap's reductionism, Quine equally criticizes all other reductionists. The problem with reductionism is that it anticipated the theory of knowledge on the basis of some uniform and universal standards and as a result of that *it has transcended the realm of natural science or in short naturalism*. Carnap while developing his reductionism clearly rejects the idea that philosophy gives us knowledge of the world; the philosopher's activity is higher-order. Quine, by contrast, is concerned with the most general features of the world. For Quine, in Neurath words, *we are like sailors who must rebuild their boat on the open sea*. Reductionism is functioning on the basis of external standpoint. As a result of that, it would overlook or bypass the crucial philosophical standards of clarity, of evidence, and of justification and interpretation available in natural sciences. He does not think that philosophy consists of attempting to solve eternal and unchanging problems as it was reflected in the case of First Philosophy and for which analysts and reductionists including Kant and Carnap respectively were responsible. Rather, he favours the very idea that the problems of philosophy are *historically conditioned* which can be solved just by looking at our common sense backed up by natural sciences. In this regard, we may reckon Quine as a radical empiricist in the sense that like the empiricists of the past he acknowledged common sense as the mark of empiricism and he added more with that by incorporating the relevance of natural science with common sense.

We think that Quine's debate against Chomsky is philosophically revolutionary in a different sense. Chomsky has not been treated as the proponent of First Philosophy by any means. Nor even we can say that he is an epistemologist in the real sense of the term. Chomsky is a mentalist who gives a different interpretation of language. In this regard, he is deviated from semantics and pragmatics. It should be kept in mind that the linguistic revolution of twentieth century was begun with the appearance of semantics followed by pragmatics. These two schools of philosophy were mainly responsible for the so-called linguistic revolution. Each of these school used language from external perspective to know about reality or ontology. Chomsky offered us a different interpretation of language what he termed it as internal language, popularly known as I-language. According to Chomsky, language is internal and the primary function of language is internal but not external. In this regard, Chomsky brings the second linguistic revolution in philosophy by offering us an internal application of language. While in doing so, Chomsky acknowledged Descartes innate idea and accordingly affirmed its relevance in acquisition of language. This may be treated another dogma after Quine. Quine, of course, considers the acknowledgement of innate idea as a philosophical dogma or philosophical standard without which acquisition of language is not possible. We do believe that Quine's debate with Chomsky is two-fold. First, for Chomsky acquisition of language is purely internal creation based on internal and cognitive grammar what Chomsky termed as **Transformational Generative Grammar** whereas for Quine, acquisition of language is external and behaviouristic in nature. Secondly, as a believer of innate idea, Chomsky has a different interpretation of the concept of analyticity and in this regard his perception would be in congruence with the classical epistemologists which Quine does not accept. Considering the philosophical debates between Quine with Kant, Carnap, Chomsky and others, many would charge *Quine as a negative*

*philosopher*. We do not think so. In our sense, such charge actually developed out of philosophical mistake because it would arise from a failure to recognize how systematic a thinker Quine actually is. We sense and read Quine as a genuine and rare philosophical critique. In most general cases, his philosophical theories appeared and developed as the criticism of other well established philosophical theories. His very idea of naturalism or naturalized epistemology is a case in point. While developing his naturalized epistemology, Quine actually offers us two philosophical projects, such as, *epistemological and metaphysical*, more in a constructive outlook rather than a negative outlook. He was very much clear that linguistic concepts do not have any epistemological bearings in the real sense of the term. Even Quine anticipates various degrees of epistemology. In this regard, he acknowledges *normative epistemology* which perhaps would be relevant in naturalized epistemology in a loose sense of the term. He completely denies the concept of meaning developed with regard to definitions; instead he acknowledges the same with regard to *various contexts*. He says that the concept of meaning is determined with regard to definitions does not bear any sense and we have no need for it.

In short, it can be said that Quine's naturalized epistemology voices against any sort of *philosophical standard* based on external rules and principles. Even Quine's denial of a distinction, we do reckon, between the a priori and the a posteriori is intimately linked with his attitudes towards *analytic-synthetic distinction*. He thinks that such distinction perhaps might be worthy to the classical analysts, but it does not serve any philosophical work. He denied Carnap on that front as well. He talks in favour of *seamlessness of knowledge* which he thinks science and common sense can adequately offer. He denies any sort of external bondage in philosophy; rather he claims that *philosophy seeks to understand our theory from within*. Accordingly, he inclines to say that there is no a priori part which can be drawn upon prior to experience and

prior to natural science. This philosophical position goes against naturalized epistemology. Quine voices in favour of physicist's knowledge just like 'there is a table in front of me'. If this would be the case while acquiring knowledge, then it would be difficult to imagine a priori knowledge in the real sense of the term. As Quine conceives knowledge as seamless, unified, and continuous, science, in his view, is continuous with common sense. Knowledge has to be maximized with regard to clarity and objectivity and in this regard Quine banks on to 'purify the language of science'. Quine has twined common sense experience with science as even though he believes that experience is worthy for philosophical and scientific clarification and analysis, but still it is ill-suited for use as an instrument of philosophical clarification and analysis. Thus, even though in some sense or other Quine has been recognized as an empiricist but he should be treated as a radical empiricist by way of twining common sense experience with science. Quine was vocal against classical epistemologists simply because he thought that they used so many philosophical concepts, such as, a priori, analyticity, reductionism, innate idea etc., which are not sufficiently clear and precise in the desired sense.

We think it would be wrong to treat Quine as a proponent of disparaging critique. He does not claim that terms such as 'means' or 'understand' as used by classical epistemologists are senseless, nor does he intend to say that they should be wholly banished from the language, rather he inclines to say that there is no reason to insist on high standards *of clarity and precision*. They must be accepted for philosophical and scientific purposes. They would be accepted if they fulfill the standards of clarity, otherwise he is willing to dismiss these terms. He finds fall short of those terms used for making distinction between analytic and synthetic, to explain the concept of analyticity, to explain the concept of internal grammar and above all to explain the concept of reductionism. The other distinctive aspect of Quine's theory of meaning is

that he accentuates more on sensory stimulation and the physical forces which impinge sensory surfaces and thereby stimulating our sensory nerves. This position becomes him a behaviourist and physicalist as well. Thus, Quine designs his naturalism is a 'finding of natural science itself where our information about the world comes only through impacts on our sensory receptors.' This position of Quine again reaffirms his empirical standpoint. There are some observation sentences which are directly correlated with sensory stimulations. For Quine, science is 'refined common sense' and hence is an extension of common sense. It is justified by the fundamental fact that it is only through the impact of energy on our sensory surfaces, and consequent stimulations, of our sensory nerves, that we find out anything about the world. Thus, for Quine, 'our theory' or 'our system of the world' is based on our 'knowledge as something public', not merely 'public in principle', but actually accessible as well as sharable. Since all knowledge must be thought of linguistic, our theory of the world must be embodied in language. Accordingly, an acquisition of one goes hand-in-hand with an acquisition of the other. In this regard, Quine differs from Chomsky. For Quine, a child makes primitive vocal responses to stimulation, being encouraged in some responses and discouraged in others. In this process, the full catalogue of sophisticated language gradually emerges as this process continues. For Quine, it is possible to give a naturalistic account of this process and there is no need for granted ideas such as meaning and understanding. Chomsky thought the other way round. For Chomsky, acquisition of language is completely internal. As per as acquisition of language is concerned there is a continuous process of internalization of language. The debate stands because unlike Chomsky, Quine takes the behaviourist account of language.

Quine equally voices about the cognitive account of language. For Quine, there is to the meaning of cognitive language and to the knowledge which is embodied in that language. In this regard,

Quine inclines to say that 'we enable us to see whatever there is to see about the evidence relation, i.e., the relation borne by theory to the observations that support it.' Such position bears the sense of cognitive language. Interestingly Quine also talks of metaphysics. His celebrated article: 'What There Is' actually represents the ontology of Quine. The method of Quine's metaphysics is primarily clarification and simplification of our theory of the world. Our theory as thus clarified tells us what it is when we are really committed to believing. Quine, of course, does not insist that there is a metaphysical source of knowledge distinct from what the natural science relies upon. Metaphysics in Quine's sense is not a rival to the science. Metaphysics, for Quine, is required at making theory safe for the acquisition of logic. It would further benefits to have the clarity and prosperity of the syntax of logic. Quine, thus, does not renounce metaphysics, nor does it embrace it in the traditional sense, rather he reinterprets it, naturalizes it, for making it responsible to the idea of the best language for accommodation our natural science. His understanding of 'our science' is just what we take ourselves to know about the world, which enhances its objectivity, clarity, simplicity and fruitfulness. It would be a process of refinement through language, a further way of refining and improving our knowledge. Following Hylton, it can be said that 'there is thus every reason that our knowledge, as improved in this way, gives us the best available picture of reality'.

We think that Quine's notion *of the matter of fact* is not clear in Quine's texts. Apart from some unequivocal claims to the effect that the notion is ontological, physicalistic and naturalistic, Quine is not sufficient to give a clear cut picture to his readers. Therefore, in order to grasp the notion of fact of the matter, readers have to make multiple links with the particularities of Quine's position on physicalism, ontology, and naturalism. Besides, Quine also insists on talking of factuality and fact of the matter and also talking about extra-linguistic reality in terms of

objects. We think Quine conceives factuality and truth are relative to a theory and his readers might be wondering to extract the difference between ascriptions of truth and ascriptions of factuality. We also observe after Quine various formulations of his theory of indeterminacy of translation and we do believe that such variations should not be treated as substantive because within these variations, the core thesis remains intact. It seems to us that Quine's argumentation about naturalized epistemology actually moved on from an insistence on physicalism to an insistence on behaviourism. This is indeed a theoretical and textual evolution and argumentation that has been developed by Quine. Of course, it might be the case that Quine's argumentation for indeterminacy of translation changed at times in regard to the importance it assigned to physicalism, his behaviourism, but such change in argumentation should not be treated as a far-reaching change. Is Quine a behaviourist? Of course, it would be the case that Quine initially does not bank on behaviourism; rather it was part of the argumentation from the beginning. Even though Quine does not fully acknowledge behaviourism initially, but it can be said such approach was the source of the indeterminacy. Alternatively, it can be said that Quine's source of indeterminacy was behaviourism. If it would indeed be the case, why it does not treat as important in Quine's philosophy? This change is not drastic one because it is supposed to be a change in the arguments for the thesis, but it is not at all associated with the content of the thesis.

Quine elsewhere has claimed that his notion of naturalized epistemology is physicalistic, ontological and naturalistic, but one has to have a deep understanding of his positions on physicalism, ontological and naturalism in order to apprehend the insight of Quine. Ironically many critics and commentators knowingly or unknowingly overlooked such concepts. For example, according to Gibson, Quine's notion of fact of the matter has been overlooked by Chomsky and Rorty. One must appreciate the fact that Quine's naturalism involves a *robust*

*realism*. We think that in his treatment of the notion of fact of the matter, Quine actually has left to the reader the task of making the links *with physicalism, ontology, naturalism and realism*. This is indeed a huge responsibility to the commentators for understanding Quine's naturalized epistemology properly. The other knotty issue in Quine's naturalized epistemology is associated with the confusion between indeterminacy of translation and its asymmetry with underdetermination. We think, Quine invokes physicalism in his defense of indeterminacy, but at the end he acknowledged that physicalism is in fact irrelevant to this argumentation. Here he claims that instead of physicalism, linguistic behaviourism avails to entail indeterminacy of translation. Thus, it would be really difficult to treat Quine as a consistent behaviourist. He may perhaps be treated as qua-behaviourist or contingent behaviourist according to me. This position should not be conceived undesirable in Quine because he always invokes relativist standpoint. He has been treated as conceptual relativist.

As per as epistemological relevance is concerned, again we have noted various philosophical position. Unquestionably, a serious confusion has been raised over asymmetry between the standpoint of physicalism and naturalism. We do not rule out the epistemological relevance in Quine's thesis. Indeed, Quine has epistemological reasons for adopting the ontological position that the indeterminacy of translation thesis constitutes. Thus, even if it would be treated as a mistake to take the content of the indeterminacy thesis as being epistemological, philosophers such as Noam Chomsky and Richard Rorty, and may be to some extent Dagfinn Follesdal, are not wrong in anticipating that certain epistemological considerations are relevant to this issue. We think that Quine's arguments for indeterminacy are of an epistemological nature. This is so because at times, he invokes the epistemological data available for semantics. Even closer inspection would reveal it very well that at some passage in Quine's writings where he shields

indeterminacy of translation shows that the text can easily lead readers to think that the issue is very much epistemological. Having said this, with regard to expressions, such as, justification, ground, evidence, which are very much epistemic in nature, the readers may easily be led to think that Quine's indeterminacy of translation expresses an epistemological lack rather than an ontological one. This position of Quine offers a herculean task to Quinean readers. Quine's 'Epistemology Naturalized' actually offers little clue about what Quine has in mind. The article rather put emphasizes more on the 'verification theory of meaning'.

We think that Quine's theory of indeterminacy of translation and under-determination of theory are equally attractive to both scientists as well as philosophers. Under-determination of theory should matter to any philosophers or scientists who are interested in the link between evidence and theory, the links between observation and theory. Of course, we have different perception as well regarding the same. Some would say that Quine's indeterminacy of translation has a more limited interest and it matters only those philosophers and scientists who are particularly interested in meaning. We have noted after Quine that indeterminacy of translation appears in the context of the thought experiment of radical translation and against the reification of meanings. Even Quine points out that field linguist or broad semantic are not interested in translation rather in interpretation. According to Quine, translation is not the objective of field linguist. Rather a field linguist is more interested towards implementing fluent dialogue and successful negotiation with the natives. His understanding is interpretation which is broader than translation. Donald Davidson appreciates interpretation than translation. Translation is narrower than interpretation to extract the inner meaning of the sentence. In this spirit Quine goes on to say that indeterminacy does not appear in practice. It would equally be true even in the case of radical translation. Rather indeterminacy of translation concerns the inter-linguistic case and is

interesting basically in the context of the project of replacing First Philosophy known as traditional or classical epistemology. We do reckon that Quine's indeterminacy of translation is based on translational reduction of knowledge to the language of observation by a naturalized epistemology where we can continue to talk about meanings. Following Eve Gaudet, it may be concluded that 'indeterminacy of translation has an interest that is limited to philosophical and scientific discussions about meaning'. Having said this, there may have another consideration through which indeterminacy of translation should interest even the semantic. Moreover, Quine's indeterminacy of translation shows us that we cannot tell what people mean independently of a chosen translation manual. This does not hamper the progress of translation. Translation is fine and should go. The very insight of Quine's indeterminacy of translation is that it tells us that what people mean is not something, that it is not an object in our world. All we have access to be what people actually say. Thus, within the realm of translation manuals, combination happens. However, it might not be as deep as we ordinarily have anticipated. There is no sense to the question of the quality of communication over and above overt behaviour. In this context Quine says, "Who is to say to what degree we talk past one another between checkpoints?"<sup>153</sup> Quine's indeterminacy of translation affirms the impossibility of individuating not only meanings, but also any other kind of intensional entities or mental contents. Here the ordinary conception of the mind itself is importantly affected.

We think that Quine's naturalized epistemology addresses Quine as *naturalist*, *physicalist*, and *an empiricist*. As a naturalist, (i) Quine accepts there is no successful first philosophy, and (ii) it is up to science to tell us what there is (ontology) and how we know what there is (epistemology). As a physicalist, (i) Quine rejects mentalistic semantics in the context of

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<sup>153</sup> Hahn, L. E. and Schilpp, P. A., (eds.), *The Philosophy of W. V. Quine*, op. cit., p. 75.

philosophy of language, (ii) Quine denies mind-body dualism in the context of philosophy of mind, and (iii) Quine accepts ontological physicalism in the context of general ontology. And as an empiricist Quine admits two cardinal tenets of empiricism such as (i) whatever evidence there is for science is sensory evidence, and (ii) all inculcation of meanings of words must rest ultimately on sensory evidence. Thus, in a nutshell, it can be said that Quine's acceptance of *physicalist ontology and an empiricist epistemology* is based on scientific findings. To sum it up in a few words, Quine's systematic philosophy amounts to an attempt to elaborate a thoroughgoing and uncompromisingly naturalistic account of both the world and our knowledge of it. Moreover, his naturalism paves the way of **indeterminacy of translation** what Quine attributed as *radical translation*. Putting everything into perspective, we can understand Quine as a *fallibilist* as even though he advocates naturalized epistemology which is based on science, but at the same time he recognizes that even science changes over time and that someday science could conceivably withdraw its support for physicalism and/or empiricism. Thus, we think that Quine's commitments to physicalism and empiricism are firm but tentative.<sup>154</sup>

But before concluding the thesis, I do feel privilege to response some of the questions raised by scholars in the **Pre-Submission Seminar Presentation**. I salute to my beloved teachers for their worthy and valuable comments. The first question that has been raised is: Whether Quine develops a new foundationalism towards developing Naturalized Epistemology? Undoubtedly, Quine's naturalized epistemology has revolted against classical or traditional epistemology. For Quine, the problem with classical or traditional epistemology is that it is functioning under epistemic dogmas or foundation. Quine with the help of his proposal **Naturalized Epistemology** attempts to show the limitations and problems of classical epistemology in claiming knowledge

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<sup>154</sup> See Gibson, Roger F. (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Quine* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 9.

in various sphere of epistemic dimension. Putting everything into perspective, we can say that Quine's naturalized epistemology may be treated as new form of epistemology or modified version of traditional epistemology which may be treated as fruitful within the sphere of commonsense and natural sciences. Therefore, we may be cautious of conceiving Quine's naturalized epistemology as the new foundationalism of epistemology *per se*. Rather, we find comfortable to conceive Quine's *naturalized epistemology* as a revised version of classical or traditional epistemology which eventually helps classical or traditional epistemology to coup up with the new epistemic needs and demands.

The second question raised is: Whether Quine's naturalized epistemology has a simile with Wittgenstein philosophical discourse? Precisely speaking, Wittgenstein is a focal linguistic philosopher who gives less emphasis on epistemic inquiry. On the other hand Quine's naturalized epistemology deals with issues which are predominantly epistemological in nature. Wittgenstein was a linguistic philosopher and as a linguistic philosopher he is most concerned about the very nature of language because he uses language as a philosophical method. Quine is not concerned about the method of language; rather he is concerned about the acquisition of language and the functional aspect of language. In short, we can say unlike Wittgenstein the epistemic inquiry is more prominent for Quine's philosophy.

The third question is: What are the constituents of science according to Quine? The term '**science**' Quine applies broadly. Quine referring the term *science* not only to the 'hard' or natural sciences, but also psychology, economics, sociology, history, and even other descriptive disciplines. By the term *science* Quine does not mean *philosophy of science* rather a set of reflections on the nature of science within the same empirical spirit that animates scientific inquiry. He conceives science from within the resources of science itself with the perception of

epistemological dimension and ontological dimension. His naturalized epistemology consists of his attempt to provide an improved scientific explanation of how we have developed elaborate scientific theories on the basis of sensory input. In this regard he puts emphasis on the explanatory power of empirical science.

It is important in understanding Quine to appreciate that he takes naturalism in a very serious and important way. The world of science and the world of commonsense have widely been accepted by Quine's naturalism. Quine also claims that naturalism based on science. Quine rejects the idea that there is a fundamental epistemological distinction, which Quine calls his *naturalism*. Even by *naturalism* Quine mean the denial of a first philosophy, i.e., classical or traditional epistemology. However, Quine does not repudiate epistemology altogether. There remains naturalized epistemology, i.e., *the scientific study of man's acquisition of science*. Quine claims that knowledge, mind and meaning belong to the same world. Equally, they are to be studied in the same empirical spirit that animates natural science. That is why, in Quine's epistemology there is no room for a prior philosophy. He also seems to conceive that natural science as an inquiry into reality. In other words, in Quine's thought there can be no sharp distinction between *science and philosophy or science and epistemology*. Thus, philosophy and science are continuous with one another because 'a scientist is a man who uses words and a philosopher is a man who talks about such words'. For Quine, science and philosophy of science must be in same conceptual scheme. Alternatively, science and philosophy are not mutually exclusive fields. Thus in a nutshell, it can be said that the ultimate aim of Quine's work in 20<sup>th</sup> century scientific philosophy is the emphasis on knowledge and its objects as the primary concern of philosophy is an emphasis on the 'True'. This is an emphasis on science, particularly on natural sciences. The important feature of scientific philosophy is to take natural sciences as paradigmatic of all

knowledge. Accordingly, Quine claims that ‘epistemology is concerned with the foundation of science.’

Finally, we do believe that Quine’s theory of naturalized epistemology is still worthy of philosophical consideration. Quine’s skeptical position appears not as a revolt to dismantle the well-known philosophical theories developed under the womb of **First Philosophy**; rather it should be appreciated as a constructive approach towards revisiting these theories in the contexts of recent philosophical development. In our sense Quine’s skeptical of traditional epistemology should not be counted as an alternative approach to philosophy, rather it should be treated as a viable means of revisiting the targeting theories. In most general cases, Quine is sufficient enough to defend himself towards his own reservation about these theories. Putting everything into perspective, we would like to conclude that Quine’s naturalized epistemology might be considered as a constructive philosophical theory through which theories developed under the head First Philosophy can be revisited and linked with the modern development of philosophy of language.

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