

CHAPTER FIVE

ACQUISITION OF LANGUAGE: A DEBATE BETWEEN QUINE AND CHOMSKY

Quine criticizes and rejects the mentalistic interpretation of meaning developed by Noam Chomsky. In this chapter, an attempt would be made to explore the ground of controversy between Quine and Chomsky regarding acquisition of language and other epistemological accounts. Noam Chomsky denies Quine's claim that there persists an asymmetry between under-determination of theory on one hand and indeterminacy of translation on the other hand. According to Chomsky, indeterminacy of translation is primarily associated with epistemology or theory of knowledge. In this regard, there is nothing wrong in assuming that indeterminacy of translation is nothing but a sort of under-determination. Moreover, Chomsky finds indeterminacy uninteresting simply for the fact that here the translator very similar to any scientist goes beyond the data available to them. However, Chomsky fails to realize that Quine's ontological point is the denial of meanings as entities. Besides, he perceives the notion of fact of the matter as an epistemological notion. In this regard, he goes on to say that there is no fact of the matter either to physics or to translation and as a result of that we cannot rule out the possibility of skeptical doubts. Here both manuals and theories are under-determined. As a result of that, both lack a fact of the matter.

In his learned paper 'Quine's Empirical Assumptions', Chomsky goes on to raise a question by saying whether there underlies an asymmetry between physics and translation with regard to under-determination and indeterminacy. Here he intends to say that there is no point of accepting indeterminacy of translation in addition to under-determination theory. According to Eve Gaudet, Chomsky commits a mistake here in rejecting the idea that there is an asymmetry

between the two cases just cited above. The mistake is entrenched in his understanding of ‘the notion of fact of the matter as an epistemological notion and his reading of indeterminacy of translation as an epistemological thesis.’¹³⁹ Chomsky, however, does not intend to say that the indeterminacy thesis is false; rather he is deeply concerned about its relevance. For him, this theory is itself uninteresting because it is just the mere replica of the theory of under-determination. Thus, in a sense, it should be comprehended as a redundant theory. Quine, however, does not agree with Chomsky. Quine’s statement about analytical hypotheses is true even though the question has been raised to unearth its important. Now, it is undeniable from Quine’s perspective that if a system of analytic hypothesis in the real sense of the term ‘goes beyond evidence’ then it is possible to conceive alternatives compatible with the evidence very similar to Quine’s ‘genuine hypotheses’ about stimulus meanings and truth-functional connectives. Thus, it may be claimed with sound ground that the situation in the case of ‘common sense knowledge’ is no different from the case of physics. Accordingly, Chomsky inclines to say that physics and translation are on a par. He then concludes by saying that neither translation nor physics in the real sense of the term ‘has a fact of the matter’ in the line of Quine’s perception.

As a firm believer of innate idea, Chomsky certainly would conflict with Quine. Quine is a conceptual relativist. In this regard, Quine differs from Kant as well as from Strawson. Kant talks in favour of a unified conceptual scheme and Strawson followed Kant in this regard. However, Quine thinks the other way round. For Chomsky, Quine’s theory is nothing but a simple version of familiar skeptical arguments that can equally be applied to physics or for that matter to his

¹³⁹ Gaudet, E., *Quine on Meaning: The Indeterminacy of Translation*, op. cit., p. 72.

‘genuine hypotheses’¹⁴⁰. According to Chomsky, serious hypotheses concerning a native speaker’s knowledge of English or concerning the essential properties of human language, i.e., the innate schematism would determine what counts as linguistic data and what intellectual structures are developed on the basis of these data. It will eventually go beyond the evidence. Otherwise, they would be without interest. On the basis of the background so far discussed Chomsky intends to say that ‘there is no fact of the matter either to physics or to translation’ simply on the grounds that manuals and theories are both under-determined by evidence and thus both go beyond the evidence. This position of Chomsky that goes against Quine would be treated as a mistake. In this regard, Gibson offers us a correct interpretation. According to Gibson, Quine’s understanding of the term ‘fact of the matter’ is primarily naturalistic and physicalistic. Accordingly, when Quine goes on to say that there is a fact of the matter to physics and no fact of the matter to translation, he is thinking about physical facts. Besides, he is talking from *within* an already accepted naturalistic-physicalistic theory.¹⁴¹ While illuminating Gibson’s rebuttal of Chomsky’s reading, let us review how Gibson describes Quine’s naturalism in *Enlightened Empiricism*. Naturalism has two usages, an affirmative and a negative. In its negative usage, ‘naturalism’ actually means the denial of ‘the first philosophy’, i.e., of classical or traditional epistemology. Quine’s naturalism in its negative sense thus leads us to claim that the project of founding science on a class of non-scientific truths is condemned to failure. This perception of Quine is linked with his holism where it has been claimed that many of the sentences of our scientific theories do not have their own unique content in the true sense of the term. Now, if Quine’s holism is true, then traditional rationalists’ philosophers must abandon their project because they usually deduce all scientific truths from non-scientific a priori truths. In such a case

¹⁴⁰ Davidson, D. and Hintikka, J., (eds.), *Words and Objections: Essays on the Work of W. V. Quine*, op. cit., p. 66.

¹⁴¹ Hahn, L. E. and Schilpp, P. A., (eds.), *The Philosophy of W. V. Quine*, op. cit., p. 143.

one has to access the empirical content of theories taken as wholes. It would then be impossible to differentiate between analytic and synthetic judgments. However, empiricists who have defended a traditional epistemology must abandon their project of rational reconstruction of scientific discourse from certain a posteriori non-scientific truths and norms. Even from the doctrinal side of epistemology, the project of deducing scientific knowledge from experience has been unrestrained since Hume. The problem of induction remains even if we could express scientific discourse with regard to observation alone. Empiricist like Carnap from the perspective of conceptual side of epistemology desired to attempt a rational reconstruction or reduction of scientific discourse with regard to observation, logic, and set theory. This is how scientific theory gains clarity. Whether holism within this paradigm can retain its position is a matter of boundless debate. Many would say that holism affects the empiricists' traditional epistemology if we add to holism *a verificationist theory of meaning*. Accordingly, theories must be taken as a whole. They cannot be translated sentence by sentence into the language of observation, logic, and set theory. Thus, for Eve Gaudet, holism informs Quine's argument for naturalism understood in its negative sense, i.e., *as the denial of traditional epistemology*.

However, careful study would reflect that Quine has also used naturalism in an affirmative sense to mean *scientism*. According to Quine, scientism amounts to the claim that it is acceptable for epistemologists to use the findings of science to justify science. By way of approaching this, Quine actually favours his realism which states that "the robust state of mind of the natural scientist who has never felt any qualms beyond the negotiable uncertainties internal to science."¹⁴² In this regard, Eve Gaudet remarks: "if Quine's realism is adopted, the new epistemologist's use of scientific findings to justify science is legitimate, for Quine's realism

¹⁴² Quine, W. V. O, *Theories and Things*, op. cit., p. 72.

involves the acknowledgement that even skeptical challenges presuppose science itself. Skeptical doubts are themselves scientific doubts. Quine's point here is not to say that the skeptic's appeal to science is illegitimate, but rather that both the skeptic and the epistemologist need to make use of science."¹⁴³ Thus, it seems to us that Quine's holism serves to defend the negative usage of 'naturalism'. Of course, one has to work within the framework of a scientific theory, because it is within this theory that reality is identified and described.

Now, let us back to Chomsky's critical outlook of Quine's epistemological reading. Gibson does not intend to say that Chomsky ignores Quine's naturalism completely. Chomsky insists on the negative aspect of naturalism while repudiating the asymmetry between physics and translation. To Chomsky, translation and physics are on a par because both the translator as well as the physicist works within a tentative theory of the world. In physics we may work within the framework of a tentative theory. In fact, Chomsky acknowledges the first aspect of naturalism and in this context; he inclines to say that the translator is working within a theory of the world. But when he denies to physics a fact of the matter Chomsky shows that he misses the second aspect, i.e., positive aspect of Quine's naturalism. Quine's naturalism is a species of realism concerning the idea that our experiences of nature are nothing but experiences of the real. Alternatively, it can be said that Chomsky actually overlooks the fact that Quine's naturalism involves not only the assumption that we are always working within the framework of a particular theory but also that it is within this theory where reality is identified and described. We consider that the ontology of this theory as the actual furniture of the world. According to Eve Gaudet, Chomsky perhaps fails to recognize that Quine's naturalism in some sense or other is deeply involved with the idea "that the theory within which one is working fixes the fact of the

¹⁴³ Gaudet, E., *Quine on Meaning: The Indeterminacy of Translation*, op. cit., p. 75.

matter, fixes the ontology of the moment.”¹⁴⁴ This is the big mistakes, Gaudet opines, committed by Chomsky. Translation always remains indeterminate, whereas physics is not. Chomsky fails to recognize it. Accordingly, it can be said that Chomsky dodged one important aspect of Quine’s naturalism. Chomsky fails to acknowledge the ontological commitment of Quine’s naturalism and without recognizing it; he brings the epistemological issue as prominent. He denies *a fact of the matter* to both physics and translation on the grounds that translation manuals as well as theories are both under-determined by evidence. This position of Chomsky is primarily epistemological in nature. This is vividly reflected when Chomsky attributes Quine by saying that “the assumption that although in physics we may work within the framework of a tentative theory, in studying language (or learning language, or translating, or interpreting that we hear), this is not possible.”¹⁴⁵ Chomsky further contends that there can be no fixed set of analytic hypothesis concerning language in general. In fact, one needs a new set for each language for each speaker of each language. This actually paves the way of denying the universal approach of language and this problem is faced by the linguist. In this regard, Chomsky criticizes Quine on the ground that he (Quine) does not rely on the perception that ‘the physicist is working within the framework of a theory whereas this is not the case for the translator’. While defending on the asymmetric relationship between a physicist and a translator, Quine wrongly presumes, Chomsky opines, the very idea that they do not have the same epistemological resources. This position of Chomsky about Quine is again false according to Gaudet as he thinks that Quine does not repudiate that the translator works within the background of a theory of nature as anticipated by Chomsky. It is indeed reflected in Quine’s reply to Chomsky. Quine says, “Though the linguistics is of course a part of the theory of nature, the indeterminacy of

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 76.

¹⁴⁵ Davidson, D. and Hintikka, J., (eds.), *Words and Objections: Essays on the Work of W. V. Quine*, op. cit., pp. 65-66.

translation is not just inherited as a special case of the under-determination of our theory of nature. It is parallel but additional. Thus, adopt for now my fully realistic attitude towards electrons and muons and curved space-time, thus failing in with the current theory of the world despite knowing that it is in principle methodologically under-determined. Consider, from this realistic point of view, the totality of truths of nature, known and unknown, observable and unobservable, past and future. The point about indeterminacy of translation is that it withstands even all this truth, the whole truth about nature.”¹⁴⁶

The above remarks of Quine clearly suggest that he does not want to deny that a translator works ‘within a theory of nature’. In fact, he intends to say that ‘linguistics is of course a part of the theory of nature’. Of course, a translator does work within our theory of nature, but the very fact is that there is no point in assuming that it is an absolute constraint. It may perhaps be the case that a theory may not be absolute parameter in physics but may be an absolute parameter in translation. According to Quine, if the translator faces indeterminacy additional to under-determination of theory, it is because theory is an absolute parameter in physics, but is not the same in translation. This clearly reflects a failure of parallelism between physics and translation. In this regard, it can be said that there are no objects behind the translator’s data whereas there are objects behind the physicist’s data. This point is very important. A translator translates a script without taking the help from any object and this is unlikely in the case of a physicist. The relevance of ontology may be overlooked or so to speak is indifferent to the choice between behaviourally equivalent translation manuals, but not to the choice between empirically equivalent theories. Thus, there is no point in saying that Quine is wrong for not providing the translator with the framework of a theory of nature. Chomsky seems to think that Quine assumed

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 303.

that the translator suffers from a lack of epistemological resources, or so to speak, mental resources. This position is again problematic because realistically Quine relies on behaviouristic assumptions rather than mentalist ones.

Chomsky further states that while developing the indeterminacy thesis, Quine sharply distinguishes between the construction of analytic hypotheses on the basis of data and the postulation of ‘stimulus meanings of observation sentences’ on the basis of data. The latter, Quine himself recognizes, involves uncertainty of the normal inductive kind. The same is true, apparently, about the inductive inference involved in translation of sentences containing truth-functional connectives. In such cases, Chomsky opines, induction leads us to ‘genuine hypotheses’ which are sharply distinguished from the ‘analytic hypotheses’ to which reference is made in the discussion of indeterminacy of translation. Hence, it seems that Quine has in mind a distinction between ‘normal induction’ which does not involve serious epistemological problem and ‘hypothesis formation’ or ‘theory construction’ which involves epistemological problem. According to Chomsky, Quine has intended to make such distinction but ended with far less than obvious one. It is not at all clear what Quine is presuming when he passes over the ‘normal uncertainty of induction’ within the realm of radical translation. In this regard, Chomsky says, “It would then be necessary for him to justify the empirical assumption that the mind is natively endowed with the properties that permit “normal induction” to “genuine hypotheses”, but not “theory construction” with some perhaps narrowly constrained class of “analytical hypotheses.”¹⁴⁷

Thus, Chomsky inclines to say that Quine’s indeterminacy thesis relies on a distinction between two radically different kinds of hypotheses without taking any recourse of empirical evidence. In

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 61.

fact, Quine does not provide empirical evidence for the distinction. Rather he provides arguments, provides his behaviouristic view of linguistic meaning. Quine says that there are no meanings as entities. It is because of the ontological vacuity. For this, a translator needs a radically different kind of hypothesis. Analytic hypotheses are no longer genuine hypotheses according to Quine. It is not because of an epistemological lack in the translator's mind, rather there are no entities for those hypotheses to be right or wrong about, and contrary to what is the case with the physicist's hypotheses. Quine, in contrast to what Chomsky has said, is justified when 'he distinguishes two kinds of hypotheses and thereby sees in translation an indeterminacy additional to under-determination of theory.'¹⁴⁸ According to Chomsky, Quine developed his theory with the background of psychology and stimulus response. As a result of that the theory of indeterminacy suffers from inconceivability. In this regard, he draws some unsubstantiated empirical claim about 'what the mind brings to the problem of acquisition of language' as an innate property. It has, Chomsky opines, historical interest and nothing else. Chomsky further claims that Quine's thesis of indeterminacy is simply a version of familiar skeptical arguments which can be applied in physics as well. However, Gaudet inclines to say that it was a mistake on the part of Chomsky to assess Quine because Quine has adequately justified his position about asymmetric relationship between a physicist and a translator. He repeatedly asserts that there are no meanings as entities. Chomsky, of course, reprimands Quine for not providing empirical evidence for indeterminacy additional to under-determination of theory. Quine has in mind a different objective for not doing it. Quine twigs to a firm empiricist approach to language and in this regard he prefers behaviouristic approach of meaning. Quine in fact intends to say that if we

¹⁴⁸ Gaudet, E., *Quine on Meaning: The Indeterminacy of Translation*, op. cit., p. 79.

approach language and meaning from a purely empirical perspective, then in such a case we will never be justified 'in relying meanings, or to supposing meanings as entities.'¹⁴⁹

We think that the whole debate between Chomsky and Quine actually hinges on the very perception of the asymmetric relationship between a physicist and a translator. Chomsky denies Quine's position in this regard. His position is based on the following arguments. First, he asserts that Quine's indeterminacy of translation actually derives from epistemic facts where the translator does not work within the framework of a theory of nature. Here the analytic hypotheses go beyond the data. Secondly, he suggests that Quine's indeterminacy of translation is either a claim about the mind's contribution to the problem of language learning or a version of familiar skeptical arguments. The second point is more important than the first one. Chomsky actually has been a firm believer of innatism and, in this regard, he actually indebted to Descartes. He acknowledged Descartes' contribution of innate ideas. However, Descartes innatism was regarded as the primary source of knowledge whereas Chomsky's innatism is primarily concerned with the acquisition of language. That is why Copper remarked that Descartes innatism is known as *old innatism* whereas Chomsky's innatism has been attributed as *new innatism*. In this regard, Chomsky introduces the mentalistic turn of language. According to Chomsky, every native speaker at the time of his or her birth biologically preoccupied a linguistic organ placed in the left-hemisphere of the brain from where language is spontaneously generated. Chomsky named it as Transformational Generative Grammar (in short TGG). Thus, acquisition of language, for Chomsky, is internal. Chomsky called it I-language. This is where the debate between Quine and Chomsky actually hinges on. However, the proponents of Quine incline to say that Chomsky in fact fails to read Quine properly. He in fact fails to see that

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 80.

Quine's indeterminacy of translation actually comes from a *lack of reality*. It is the main failure that leads Chomsky to fail to see the asymmetry between indeterminacy of translation and underdetermination of theory. According to Eve Gaudet, 'Gibson perhaps is right in tracing Chomsky's error to his epistemological conception of this issue.'¹⁵⁰

We think that the impact of analytic-synthetic distinction was not concerned within the classical epistemologists, even its impact is revealed in Chomsky as well. Here let us take a brief reflection of such distinction in the light of Quine and Chomsky. We have already seen that Chomsky differs from Quine on many important philosophical accounts. Quine took the behavioural position as far as the development and acquisition of language whereas Chomsky takes mentalistic interpretation as far as the acquisition of language. For Quine, acquisition of language is primarily external whereas for Chomsky it is primarily internal. Thus, there develops two different types of language, such as, Public language (hence forth PL) and Internal language (hence forth IL). PL draws attention to the fact that someone's knowledge of it is attributed on the basis of public phenomena. A language in this sense is an association of sounds with ideas and understating PL is knowing the association. However, acknowledgement of PL is not in itself a commitment to behaviourism. It does not impede a concern with the hidden, inner mechanisms underlying our linguistic behaviour, i.e., the possession of IL in Chomsky's sense. Here we can refer Putnam's metaphor 'twin-earth' to clarify the distinction between PL and IL. The hypothetical planet, twin-earth, on which all things are exactly as they are here except that the watery-looking liquid in the rain and lakes which people drink is not made of H₂O. From scientific point of view, this liquid appears to the contrary, is not really water, since their conception of water is of something chemically similar to the 'stuff' we call 'water'. However,

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 81.

from laymen's perspective, it is quite proper to say 'The water on twin-earth is not made of H₂O'. From that perspective the liquid is water. Since the ordinary conception is of stuff having same observable role what we call 'water'. Accordingly, one can distinguish the scientific as well as the theoretical perception from the ordinary and observable conception of water. We observe the same in language front as well. Assume that there is on twin-earth a language that appears to be English but which turns out on scientific exploration that would appear different from those occurred in us at first sight. Again here one can presume a psychologist's conception of language which does not suit with IL. Thus, one can distinguish from this the more behaviouristic, folk conception, of course in a different way. Thus, one may anticipate a behaviourist account of language along with the line of Quine. The point, of course, is that if such fairly behaviourist conception of language exists at all, what could possibly be the point of isolating and articulating it if one would not perhaps be the firm believer of behaviourism like Chomsky, Katz and others. The plausible reply perhaps would be the case that there underlies a philosophical motive. The very conception of public language persists under the sphere of folk psychology. Accordingly, when conceptual confusions from language front arises vis-à-vis about meaning, translation, reference, truth, holism, atomism, etc., they arise for that conception of language and attempt to resolve such linguistic muddles by means of perspicuous view of it. Philosophical problems are very much linguistic in nature and by any means of imagination they are no longer scientific in nature. Problems of philosophy appear not because of the fact that we do not know how the mind-brain works; rather we are fallen victim to some linguistic confusion. Language is nothing but just like a tool in the tool box. Ordinary or PL language has versatile uses, multifarious uses and it would be very difficult to tackle ordinary language. Quine knows it and also appreciates it through his principle or theory of indeterminacy of translation.

Indeterminacy is very much there in language in every level and there is no need to block it or criticize it. It is the means of the growth of language. Even there are paradoxes resulting from fallacious reasoning about language as we ordinarily and pre-theoretically conceive of it. One has to have a clear characterization of that conception.

Thus, when we talk into this matter after Quine and Chomsky, we have to keep in mind about the division of language. It is natural to divide the systematization of a PL into two parts, such as, syntax and the other semantics and pragmatics. As per the syntax is concerned the trouble comes from our notion of the rules of language. Rules of language are not sufficiently ties to the facts of linguistic behaviour. Along with Quine's line of thought, we can say that one's expressions of belief form an inextricably interconnected system of sentences evolving under the impact of experience, of course, subject to constraints of conservation and global simplicity. This position goes in favour of Quine's understanding of language in three different ways. Quine's model actually is concerned about sentences but not about propositions. Accordingly, it can be said that certain sentences are revisable in the contexts of their meanings and this sort of revision makes the distinction between analytic and synthetic vulnerable. According to Quine, this is possible because sentences have no individual empirical contents or verification conditions, analyticity, synonymy, etc. Accordingly, sentences cannot be characterized by reference to the empiricist's own conception of meaning, namely, verification. Since empiricist model eschews semantic notions, it means that they play no explanatory role in understanding the evolution of science. Thus, there are some reasons to agree with Quine's skepticism about the notion of analyticity, i.e., truth by virtue of the rules of language, subject to the fact that we constrain our attention to PL. What camp does Quine belong? Does he belong to PL or IL? Quine has been regarded as conceptual relativist. Certainly, he would prefer PL instead of IL or artificial language.

According to Quine, in psychology one may or may not be a behaviourist but in linguistic one has no choice because here each of us learns his language by observing other people's verbal behaviour. We actually depend strictly on explicit behaviour in observable situations. This position of Quine differs from Chomsky. Chomsky classifies two different levels of grammar, such as, deep structure and surface structure. Observable behaviour actually is the surface structure of grammar and it would not be the real structure. The real structure is deep structure where the role of innate idea matters the most. Being a behaviourist, Quine inclines to say that our command of PL fits all external checkpoints where our utterance or our reaction to someone's utterance can be appraised in the light of some shared situations. Our mental life between checkpoints is indifferent to our rating as a matter of language. Therefore, there remains nothing in linguistic meaning then beyond overt behaviour in 'observable circumstances'.¹⁵¹ In this regard, Quine's position is similar to Wittgenstein's position appeared in his *Blue Book* where Wittgenstein remarks, that in practice if you were asked which phenomenon is the defining criterion and which is a symptom, you would in most general cases were not be in a position to give a reply to the question except by making an arbitrary decision *ad hoc*. Doctors will use the names of diseases without ever deciding which phenomena are to be taken as criteria and which as symptoms. This need not be a deplorable lack of clarity. We do not use language according to strict rules, it has not been taught by means of strict rules either. Quine says, "Perhaps the doctrine of indeterminacy of translation will have little air of paradox for readers familiar with Wittgenstein's latter-day remarks on meaning."¹⁵²

The above observation clearly suggests that Quine is against the mentalist interpretation of language as developed by Chomsky. He does not accept the relevance of IL. Nor does he accept

¹⁵¹ Quine, W. V. O., "Indeterminacy of Translation Again", *Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 84 (1987), p. 5.

¹⁵² Quine, W. V. O., *Word and Object*, op. cit., p. 77.

the foundation of semantics based on ideal or artificial language. As a relativist, Quine, unlike Chomsky, Carnap and others, does not accept any stringent rules and principles on the basis of which the workability of language can be evaluated. The most pertinent question that may be taken up whether the notion of 'semantic rule' whose application is indeterminate with respect to a public language, might become objective once we open the door to non-behavioural evidence and turn out attention to hidden mechanisms. Here the response would perhaps be yes. It may be thought in support of the view that the knowledge of some truly inner language, i.e., an IL, is stored in a certain component of the mind/brain and it contains amongst other things various postulates which are transmitted to that area of the brain in which beliefs are stored. At the same time there might be evidence that under certain circumstances certain contents of the language faculty are revised, constituting a change in language. Such changes are pragmatically, but not epistemologically, driven. The result from a practical desire is to achieve an overall simplification in our network of belief-representations. According to Chomsky, the concept of analyticity is deeply rooted and associated with innateness. Quine denies it. He says that we can explain the concept of analyticity in a determinate manner without taking the reference of innateness. For Quine, there is nothing wrong in assuming that an innate might concern contingent matters of fact and as a result of that might be revisable in the light of experience without any meaningful change of language. Moreover, it should be taken into account after Quine that an IL has shown to be pragmatically valuable.

It thus seems to us that the concept of analyticity as developed by classical and traditional epistemologists within the realm of First Philosophy can adequately be retained within the philosophical scheme of Chomsky. This so happens that the concept of analyticity does not bear any sense without preconceiving the notion of innate ideas. Descartes long back had admitted it

and Chomsky again revived it in the twentieth century. Thus, in a sense, Chomsky does not have any debate with the classical epistemologists towards making analytic-synthetic distinction. Quine goes against Chomsky in this regard. Chomsky does not admit innate ideas very similar to Descartes. However, there are some other philosophers, namely, Katz, who besides PL and neural IL, admits language as a *platonian object* deeply associated with inter-related abstract facts. The speakers of such a language have or do possess some intuitive access to some of the facts in that language. In addition, there are more theoretical, linguistic facts which explain the intuitively evident ones. Having said this, we think that Quine's skepticism about the analytic-synthetic distinction is plausible subject to its understanding with regard to the folk conception of language as a claim about PL. It is, however, not justified as a thesis about IL. If our language is taken to be the PL, then there is in principle no way of finding out which systematization is correct. If we renounce behaviourism and in turn allow ourselves to countenance the existence of IL, it is then possible to have an objective sense of analyticity. What then is wrong to proceed with Carnap instead of Quine? We think Quine's objection is not merely to the notion of determinate analyticity, but to the epistemological model, or in short, reductionism. Reductionism states that for each empirical hypothesis there is such a thing as *the set of possible observations that would verify it and the set that would falsify it*. Accordingly, it can be presumed that Quine's holistic alternative appears as a better approach of the evolution and justification of our belief expressions or definitions. Thus, even if one is pursuing the concept of analyticity, there is no need to adopt the philosophical strategy of Carnap, Chomsky and others. Moreover, the new theory of analyticity deeply linked with IL is quite different from the old one. In particular, analytic truths were thought to be obvious, but I-analyticity in line with Chomsky and others will desire erudite techniques to uncover. Therefore, it may be thought that the

concepts of I-analyticity, synonymy, rule of language, truth of meaning, pragmatic question, etc., cannot be presumed to have epistemological implications. Further, it should equally be recorded that the intuitive property of analyticity is simply not the same property as I-analyticity because the former is a participant in the behavioural facts of PL, whereas the latter is an internal, intrinsic, individual, neural characteristic. Accordingly, it would perhaps be the case that the former may be indeterminate and the latter determinate.
