

CHAPTER FOUR

ANTI-NATURALISM AND ANTI-REDUCTIONISM: A DEBATE BETWEEN QUINE AND KANT AND QUINE AND CARNAP

Within the sphere of analytic philosophical tradition, we read Quine as a critique. His theory of naturalized epistemology actually hinges on his very interpretation of meaning. Besides, being a critique, Quine involves in conflict with other well-known philosophical theories previously developed by original philosophers, such as, Kant, Carnap and Chomsky. In this sequel, we propose to analyze and examine Quine's debate with other philosophers. Quine, while developing his theory of meaning, criticizes Kant's well-established distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments. He then criticizes the reductionism of Rudolf Carnap. Accordingly, this sequel may be segmented into two sub-sections. In **Section One**, an attempt will be made to show in what sense Kant's distinction between analytic and synthetic judgment has appeared to Quine as the First Dogma of empiricism. In **Section Two**, an attempt will be made to examine and explicate in what sense Carnap's reductionism appeared as the Second Dogma of empiricism to Quine.

SECTION ONE

ANTI-NATURALISM: A DEBATE BETWEEN QUINE AND KANT

Quine in his "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" appeared in *The Philosophical Review* in 1951 raised some serious philosophical issues that would go against Kant as well as Carnap. According to Quine, Kant is responsible to create a philosophical dogma that would lead the distinction between analytic and synthetic. In this section, an attempt would be made to explore the root of

the debate between Kant and Quine regarding First Philosophy. In his paper Quine challenges two doctrines which are directly or indirectly linked to Logical Positivism. The first challenge is the analytic-synthetic distinction and the second challenge is the belief that there are propositions which future experience can never cause us to reject as false. There is no question of doubt that the analytic-synthetic distinction has a prolonged philosophical history particularly in modern and contemporary philosophy of epistemology. Even the contemporary distinction is foreshadowed in the writings of Leibnitz, Hume and Kant. Logical positivism also made the distinction between logically true and factually true. Quine raises a serious question about the feasibility or legitimacy of such philosophical distinction. According to Quine, both dogmas are 'ill-founded'. One dogma is directed towards 'blurring of the supposed boundary between speculative metaphysics and natural science'. The other one is shifting toward pragmatism.

Let us look in brief the background for analyticity that was linked with the first dogma. It was claimed that Kant's distinction between analytic and synthetic truths was foreshadowed in Hume's distinction between *relations of ideas* and *matters of fact* and Leibniz's distinction between *truths of reason* and *truths of fact*. Leibniz conceived truths of reason with regard to possible-world. For him, truths of reason remained as true in all possible-worlds. Thus, in a sense, it is universally and necessarily true. Alternatively, it can be said that truths of reason are those truths which can never be false. Very similar to this, analytic statements defined as statements whose denials are self-contradictory. Let us make this point clear in the light of Kantian analytic judgment. While developing analytic proposition or judgment, Kant sets out two important features of analytic judgment, such as, (i) in all analytic judgment the predicate is *overtly* or *covertly* contained in the subject term. It means that in the case of analytic statement, the predicate concept is already contained in the subject concept and (ii) the denial of an analytic

statement clearly leads to self-contradiction. According to Kant, this is true not only a particular analytic judgment, it would equally be true in all analytic judgment. That means the principle of which an analytic judgment is determined as universal and necessary. Any judgment that would be determined by the principle of universality and necessity would be a dogma oriented judgment. This is clearly a philosophical dogma or philosophical decorum that can never be violated to text whether a statement is analytic or not.

Quine, however, goes against such philosophical dogma based on strict principles. Quine immediately finds two important loopholes of Kantian formulation of analytic statement just stated. The first one is that 'it limits itself to statements of subject-predicate form, and secondly, it appeals to a notion of containment which is left at a metaphysical level.'¹¹³ While giving a further clarification, Kant inclines to say that a statement is analytic when it is true by virtue of meanings and independent of fact. According to this formulation, we have to know the concept of meaning which is presupposed while giving the definition of analytic statement. According to Quine, *meaning* cannot be identified with *naming*. In this regard, Quine refers Frege's example of "Morning star" and "Evening star" and Russell's example of "Scott" and "the author of Waverly" where terms can name the same thing but differ in meaning. Meaning is the cognitive account of naming. According to Quine, the distinction between meaning and naming is no less important at the level of abstract terms. For example, the terms "9" and "the number of the planets" name one and the same abstract entity but they are unlike in meaning. Here astronomical observation was required to determine the sameness of the entity in question. Careful study would reflect that the example contains singular terms, concrete and abstract nature. According to Quine, when a singular term purports to name an entity, abstract or

¹¹³ Quine, W. V. O., "Two Dogmas of Empiricism", in Robert R. Ammerman (ed.), *Classics of Analytic Philosophy* (Bombay-New Delhi: Tata McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, 1965), p. 197.

concrete, a general term does not. However, it may be the case that a general term would be true of an entity. The class of all entities of which a general term is true is called the extension of the term. Very similar to the meaning of a singular term and the entity named, we can equally distinguish between the meaning of a general term and its extension. For example, the general terms ‘creature with a heart’ and ‘creature with kidneys’ are perhaps very similar in extension but unlike in meaning. Thus, one must be careful about the very concept of meaning. For Quine, misunderstanding or misconception about meaning with extension is less common than confusion of meaning with naming in the case of singular terms. Having said this, one thing should be kept in mind that it is indeed a commonplace in philosophy to oppose *intension* (meaning) to *extension*, or in different terms, *connotation to denotation*.¹¹⁴ The modern or contemporary notion of intension or meaning is deeply linked with the Aristotelian notion of essence. For Aristotle, it was essential in men to be rational, accidental to be two-legged. Here rationality is involved in the meaning of the word ‘man’, while two-legged is not. However, two-legged may at the same time be involved in the meaning of ‘biped’, while rationality is not. Thus, it makes no sense to say, from the doctrine of meaning of the actual individual, who is at once a man and a biped, that his rationality is essential and his two-legged accidental and vice-versa. In this context, Aristotle said that ‘things had essences, but only linguistic forms have meanings. Quine says, “Meaning is what essence becomes when it is divorced from the object of reference and wedded to the word.”¹¹⁵

Quine further contends that when we discuss about meaning, the notion of object comes into consideration. What sorts of things do have meanings? In this regard, one has to keep in mind the distinction between *meaning* and *reference*. Whether meaning and reference are distinct or not is

¹¹⁴ Ibid., p. 198.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

a tricky philosophical issue. In our case, we have to show that meaning and reference are distinct. That means once the theory of meaning is sharply parted from the theory of reference, we can then say that the primary business of the theory of meaning simply *the synonymy of linguistic forms*. This sort of meaning is completely obscure and may be abandoned according to Quine.¹¹⁶ Quine further goes on to remark that there are various types of analytic statements. In this regard, he acknowledges two different classes of analytic statements, such as, *logically true* and *merely true*. The statement “No unmarried man is married” is logically true. It is not only true, but would remain true under any and all reinterpretations of ‘man’ and ‘married’. However, there is also a second class of analytic statement such as “No bachelor is married” which truth remained intact by putting or substituting synonyms for synonyms. As the term ‘unmarried man’ is synonymous with ‘bachelor’, we can substitute the term ‘unmarried man’ in place of the term ‘bachelor’ and hence can get the analytic statement “No unmarried man is married”.

Quine’s problem is not with the first class of analytic statement, but with the second class of analytic statement where the principle of substitution has been taken into account on the basis of synonymy. It is shown how the second class of analytic statement can be reduced into the first class of analytic statement which is logically true or true by definition and seems to be warranted in any sort of situation whatsoever. But how do we find that ‘bachelor’ is defined as ‘unmarried man’? Who defined it in the desired fashion and when? Had it been defined with regard to the nearest dictionary and thereby accept the lexicographer’s formulation as law? For Quine, ‘this would be to put the cart before the horse.’¹¹⁷ As Quine’s reading, a lexicographer is nothing but an empiricist scientist “whose business is the recording of antecedent facts; and if he glosses “bachelor” as “unmarried man” it is because of his belief that there is a relation of synonymy

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., p. 199.

between those forms, implicit in general or preferred usage prior to his own work.”¹¹⁸ Since the notion of synonymy is purely linguistic matter, it needs further clarification, presumably in terms relating to linguistic behaviour. Where there is a scope of clarification, a report of observed synonymy, it cannot be granted as an absolute criterion. Quine is suspicious about the legitimacy of the term synonymy that has been used in the case of second class of analytic statement. Quine says that definition is not an activity exclusively of philologists. Philosophers and scientists very often tend to ‘define’ a recondite term by paraphrasing it into terms of familiar vocabulary. Such attempt does not make any significant because it is like the philologist’s, a pure lexicography and nothing more than that. We do not have adequate necessary and sufficient conditions on the basis of which something can be accepted legitimately on linguistic front that two terms are properly synonymous. Such requisition on synonymy front is far from clear according to Quine. They are grounded in usage and hence it can be said that definitions reporting selected instances of synonymy come as reports upon usage. Even there are alternative types of definitional activity which does not limit itself to the reporting of preexisting synonymies or explication in Carnapian term, an activity to which philosophers are given. Quine says, “In explication the purpose is not merely to paraphrase the definiendum into an outright synonym, but actually to improve upon the definiendum by refining or supplementing its meaning.”¹¹⁹ For Quine, any word worth explicating has some *contexts* which are clear to be useful and the very purpose of explication is to preserve the usage of these favored contexts while sharpening the usage of other contexts. What is more important to Quine is not that “the definiendum in its antecedent usage be synonymous with the definiens, but just that each of these favored contexts of the definiendum, taken as a whole in its antecedent usage, be synonymous with the corresponding context of the

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., p. 200.

definiens.”¹²⁰ Quine’s over-all perception is that definition except in the extreme case of the explicitly conventional introduction of new notations, hinges on prior notions of synonymy. As a result of that, it can be asserted after Quine that the very notion of definition does not hold the key to synonymy and analyticity. An extreme sort of definition which does not require prior synonymies can survive because here the definiendum becomes synonymous with the definiens simply because it has been created expressively for the purpose of being synonymous with the definiens. Therefore, it may be concluded after Quine that the very concept of definition does not help us to formulate analytic proposition.

4.1.1 Interchangeability

Interchangeability is another approach through which one can formulate analytic proposition. It is said that the synonymy of two linguistic forms consists simply in their interchangeability in all contexts without change of truth-value. Interchangeability, in Leibniz’s sense means *salva veritate*. Accordingly, it is claimed that the synonyms “bachelor” and “unmarried man” are everywhere interchangeable *salva veritate*. This again is problematic to Quine as he finds that with the help of synonymy and interchangeability something may be turned from true to false and vice-versa. For example, ‘unmarried man’ and ‘bachelor’ are synonymous and hence the proposition ‘All unmarried men are bachelors’ is analytic and true. Now, if the term ‘bachelor’ is substituted by another synonymous term, such as, ‘bachelor of arts’ and thereby formulate the proposition ‘All unmarried men are bachelors of arts’, then it would be turned as false. There are many other cases where we find the same situation. The question thus remains whether interchangeability *salva veritate* is supposed to be strong enough condition for synonymy or on the contrary some heteronymous expressions might be thus interchangeable. Of course, we are

¹²⁰ Ibid.

not concerned here with synonymy in the case of complete identity in psychological associations or poetic quality, rather we are very much concerned about cognitive synonymy. As per as cognitive synonymy is concerned, it can be said that any analytic statement could be turned into logical truth by putting synonyms for synonyms. Accordingly, to say that ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’ are cognitively synonymous is to say no more nor less than the statement: *All and only bachelors are unmarried men*, is analytic. The question before us whether such cognitive interchangeability is a sufficient condition for *cognitive synonymy*. The answer would be affirmative like the following: *Necessarily all and only bachelors are bachelors* is evidently true. Here the modal term *necessity* is applicable to analytic statement because it would strengthen the truth claim of analytic statement. Now if ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’ are interchangeable *salva veritate* from the perspective of cognitive synonymy, then we have the following analytic statement: *Necessarily all and only bachelors are unmarried men*, where the term ‘unmarried men’ is replaced in place of ‘bachelors’. Now, to say that it is analytic is to say that the sentence from which it is derived is also analytic and hence the terms replaced in between are cognitively synonymous.

This, however, does not exhaust the anxiety of Quine. For Quine, the condition of interchangeability *salva veritate* varies in its force along with the variations of the richness of language at hand. Even here we are working with a language rich enough to contain the adverb ‘necessarily’ which is particularly relevant in the case of analytic statement. The question then is: Does the adverb really make sense? If it does, then it makes the sense to say that we have already made satisfactory sense of ‘analytic’. Then are we not involving into circularity? For Quine, even though our argument is not emphatically circular, but it is something like it. For Quine, interchangeability *salva veritate* is to be meaningless if it is not relativized to a language whose

extent is specified in relevant respects. There is an indefinitely large number of one place-predicates and many place predicates and the rest of the language is logical. Even abstract singular terms naming classes, classes of classes etc., are contextually definable. The language of this type is extensional in the sense that any two predicates which do agree extensionally, i.e., are true of the same objects, are interchangeable *salva veritate*. It should be noted here that in an extensional language, interchangeability *salva veritate* is no assurance of cognitive synonymy of the desired type. Accordingly, it can be said after Quine that the terms ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’ are interchangeable *salva veritate* in an extensional language assures us no more than the statement : *All and only bachelors are unmarried men*, as cited above is true. According to Quine, “there is no assurance here that the extensional agreement of “bachelor” and “unmarried man” rests on meaning rather than merely on accidental matters of fact, as does the extensional agreement of “creature with a heart” and “creature with kidneys.””¹²¹

Of course, we have to appreciate the relevance of extensional agreement as the nearest appropriation to synonymy. Having said this, there still remains a problem because extensional agreement actually tumbles far short of cognitive synonymy for explaining analyticity in the desired sense. However, if a language contains an intensional adverb ‘necessarily, then in such a case interchangeability *salva veritate* in such a language provides a sufficient condition of cognitive synonymy. But the problem here is that such a language would be intelligible subject to the notion of analyticity has already been understood in advance. There we thus sense circularity. Therefore, Quine inclines to say that the effort to explain cognitive synonymy first for the sake of deriving analyticity from it is again perhaps the wrong approach on the part of Kant. Instead of that, one might try to explain analyticity without appeal to cognitive synonymy.

¹²¹ Ibid., p. 204.

The same explanation works for any other pair of one-place predicates and it can equally be extended in many-place predicates as well. In this sense, singular terms may be said to be cognitively synonymous when the identity mark placed in between them is analytic. The same practice can equally be made in **biconditional** statement as well.

Quine equally brings back the relevance of semantic rules towards explicating analyticity. For Quine, analyticity in its inauguration is definable by appeal to a realm of meanings and the appeal to meanings gave way to an appeal to synonymy or definition. However, it eventually seems that definition and synonymy are turned out to be inadequate for having a clear cut picture of analyticity. Quine in this regard says, “But definition turned out to be a will-o-the-wisp, and synonymy turned out to be best understood only by dint of a prior appeal to analyticity itself. So we are back at the problem of analyticity.”¹²² According to Quine, the notion of analyticity about which we express our anxiety is a purported relation between statements and languages. However, the gravity of this is not discernibly less for artificial languages than for natural ones. Artificial language is guided by semantical rules and it would be completely foreign in natural language. Carnap has given preference on artificial language while developing his reductionism. For Quine, from the point of view of the problem of analyticity, ‘the notion of an artificial language with semantical rules is a *feu follet par excellence*’¹²³. Semantical rules towards determining the analytic statements of an artificial language are of interest only in so far as we already understand the notion of analyticity. Accordingly, they are of no help in gaining this understanding. However, Quine affirms that hypothetical languages of an artificially simple kind could be believably useful in clarifying analyticity provided that if the mental or behavioural or cultural factors are supposed to be relevant to analyticity. For Quine, a merely an irreducible

¹²² Ibid., pp. 204-5.

¹²³ Ibid., p. 207.

character is unlikely to throw light on the problem of explicating analyticity. Of course, the concept of truth depends on both language and extra-linguistic fact. For example, the statement ‘Brutus killed Caesar’ would be treated as false if the world had been different in certain ways. It would also be false if the word ‘killed’ happened rather to have the sense of ‘begat’. This clearly reflects that the truth of a statement is somehow analyzable into a linguistic component and also a factual component. It thus seems reasonable after Quine that in some statements the factual component should be null. Such statements are analytic statements. If it would be the case then it would be very difficult to draw a clear cut distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments. Quine thus concludes by saying that “for all its a priori reasonableness, a boundary between analytic and synthetic statements simply has not been drawn. That there is such a distinction to be drawn at all is an unempirical dogma of empiricists, a metaphysical article of faith.”¹²⁴

SECTION TWO

ANTI-REDUCTIONISM: A DEBATE BETWEEN CARNAP AND QUINE

Quine in his “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” criticizes Carnap. According to Quine, Carnap is responsible for making philosophy a dogma oriented enterprise. Carnap has led the dogma based on reductionism. It states that ‘the belief that each meaningful statement is equivalent to some logical construct upon terms which refer to immediate experience.’ Alternatively, it can be said that the belief that there are certain propositions which no experience can ever lead us to reject. Quine first met with Carnap after returning from Europe to America in 1993. Initially, Quine was fond of Carnap’s philosophy. In this regard Hylton remarks, “No philosopher had greater

¹²⁴ Ibid.

influence on Quine than Rudolf Carnap.”¹²⁵ Quine says, “Carnap was my greatest teacher. ... I was very much his disciple for six years. In later years his views went on evolving and so did mine, in divergent ways. But even where we disagreed he was still setting the theme; *the line of my thought was largely determined by problems that I felt his view presented.*”¹²⁶ As a result of that Quine has dedicated his first philosophical monograph *Word and Object* to Carnap. However, Quine in his paper entitled “Truth by Convention” published in 1936 took some philosophical perception that actually anticipated as a rejection or even refutation of certain fundamental doctrines of Carnap’s philosophy. Of course, it was the fact that Quine’s initial reception of Carnap’s work was very friendly and they were involved in philosophical discussion in important ways. Of course, Quine took Russell seriously before his encounter with Carnap. The most important aspect of Carnap’s philosophy is that it was oriented out of important philosophical dogmas. Accordingly, Carnap like Kant was responsible for designing philosophy on the foothold of dogmas. Carnap’s epistemology is the idea that fundamental epistemic principles serve to define the terms of a language and as definitions these principles are at bottom matters of convention. According to Carnap, any sentence whose truth is established by the ***convention alone is analytic***, i.e., true in virtue of the meaning of the expressions involved. This position of Carnap appeared as a dogma to Quine. According to Quine, this was the basic problem of First Philosophy or the so-called classical or traditional epistemology as developed by Kant, Carnap and others as well. First Philosophy was oriented on the basis of many dogmas and it goes against philosophical growth. There can be little question that Quine’s “Truth by Convention” (henceforth TC) expresses some doubts about analyticity. However, it was reflected particularly from Benacerraf’s observation that TC had ‘clearly, convincingly, and decisively’

¹²⁵ Hylton, P., *Quine*, op. cit., p. 32.

¹²⁶ Quine, W. V. O., “Homage to Rudolf Carnap”, in W. V. Quine, *The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays*, op. cit., p. 41.

refuted “the view that the truths of *logic* are to be accounted for as the products of convention.”¹²⁷ Even Putnam more recently called TC as a crucial break with the whole *conventionalist theory*.¹²⁸ According to Richard Creath, neither Benacerraf, nor Putnam gave a historical account; rather each of them was deeply engaged in a substantial philosophical argument of his own. Each of them was rightly offering Quine’s credit for an important contribution to that argument.

We think that the insight of TC lies in the perception that logic is a matter of convention and it would be true besides Carnap as well. Having said this, it should be kept in mind that TC is not a decisive break with analyticity as developed by Carnap and other reductionists. Nor does it offer a decisive and conclusive argument against Carnap’s views on the conventionality of logic *per se*. What Quine’s paper does do is even more subtle and important towards developing an approach to the problem of language and knowledge within which it is highly doubtful that Carnap’s notion of analyticity can plausibly be reconstructed. In our sense, Quine’s TC appears as a mark of revision of the very conception of analyticity prevailing within the realm of First Philosophy or traditional epistemology. The impact of Quine’s TC is philosophically colossal as it is integrated with so many other unpublished philosophical manuscripts which gave several arguments in favour of the doctrine that logic is to be conceived as a matter of linguistic convention. Of course, it was a reality that Quine initially find himself uncomfortable towards outright rejection of the concept of analyticity.

It is know that Quine first met with Carnap in late 1992 in Vienna and they were better acquainted in Prague thereafter. At that time, Quine was deeply involved with his doctoral

¹²⁷ Benacerraf, P., “Mathematical Truth”, *Journal of Philosophy*, LXX (1973), p. 676.

¹²⁸ See Putnam, H., “Convention: A Theme in Philosophy”, in H. Putnam, *Realism and Reason* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 172.

degree at Harvard. He was enjoying travelling fellowship in Europe. On his return to United States, he became a member of the first group of Junior Fellows of the Harvard Society of Fellows. This position actually paved Quine the way of developing research work within the enlightened environment. In November 1934, Quine gave a series of three lectures on Carnap entitled “The A Priori”, “Syntax”, and “Philosophy as Syntax” respectively which remained unpublished. The first lecture comprehends Quine’s substantive argument for making logic and mathematics true by convention which eventually helped him a lot to rework into TC. The second lecture contains a precise summary of some important notions from Carnap’s “Logical Syntax of Language” where Quine accentuated that syntax is to include not only rules of grammar but also rules of inference (logic). The rules of inference or logic are called transformation rules by Carnap and it may be thought of as an implicit definition for a notion of direct consequence. This, in turn, is used to define the key concepts of analyticity and synonymy. The third and final lecture contains a wide-ranging discussion of Carnap’s thesis that *philosophy is all about of syntax and nothing else*. Here Quine is particularly interested to outline the view that there are some sentences which appear to be about extra-linguistic objects and which may be construed as being in fact about expressions of various kinds. Here Quine brings the concept of quasi-syntactical. For Quine, sentences which are misleading in nature are called quasi-syntactical and investigation of such sentences shows “how to banish possibilities in favour of talk directly of sentences and relations among sentences.”¹²⁹ It states that properties and relations can be replaced in favour of one or more place predicates. At that time, Quine was passionate not only about ontological economics, but also about Carnap’s program in general. He closes his lecture with the remark: “This is not the end of Carnap’s contribution; rather it is only the

¹²⁹ Creath, R., “The Initial Reception of Carnap’s Doctrine of Analyticity”, in D. Follesdall (ed.), *General, Reviews, and Analytic/Synthetic (Philosophy of Quine, A Garland series, New York and London: Garland Publishing, Inc. 2000)*, p. 323.

starting point.”¹³⁰ According to Quine, Carnap’s philosophy is worthy not because of the fact that he advances a negative doctrine, not because of the fact that he attempt to construe philosophy as trivial, but because of the fact that he was concerned about to have a clear picture of philosophy by way of overcoming philosophical muddles and thereby laying the foundation of a rigorous and fruitful study of the logic of science. For Carnap, the worthy of philosophy is found in the clear and vivid foundation of the logic of science. It is the *logic of science*, the analysis, criticism and refinement of the methods and the concepts of science that Carnap respects as the most *defensible province of philosophy*. Thus, it seems to us that Carnap addressed a reductionist account of philosophy based on the foundation of logic of science where sufficient care has been given to proper analysis of language, what Carnap precisely termed as *the syntax of language* or *in short syntax*. On the basis of this, Carnap draws the conclusion that philosophy is syntax. It is supposed to be the cornerstone of his reductionism. He delimited philosophy within the realm of syntax and in this regard he acknowledges that his achievement stands independently of the thesis that no meaningful metaphysics remains beyond syntax. If there is any sort of metaphysics, it should be structured within the realm of syntax. However, it would be a matter of great philosophical concern about the success and acceptability of the claim.

Carnap was a *radical reductionist*. It asserts that every meaningful statement is held to be translatable into a statement, true or false, about immediate experience. Radical reductionism in some form or other is linked with the verification theory of meaning. The language that Carnap adopted in his reductionism was not a sense-datum language in the narrowest conceivable sense, but it included the notations of logic applicable in higher set theory. It is thus be treated as artificial language of pure mathematics. The ontology implicit in it comprised not only sensory

¹³⁰ Ibid. See also R. Creath (ed.), *Dear Carnap, Dear Van: The Carnap-Quine Correspondence and Related Work* (Berkeley CA: University of California Press, 1990), p. 102.

events but classes, classes of classes, and so on. In the process of constructions or reductions, Carnap exploits the resources of modern logic with sufficient clarity and ingenuity and in turn succeeds in defining a wide array of important additional sensory concepts. In fact, he has been treated as the first empiricist who, not gratified with stressing the reducibility of science in terms of immediate experience, took serious steps towards carrying out the reduction as the mark of analyticity. Even if we think that Carnap's starting point of reductionism is by far satisfactory, but still it can be said that his constructions were only a fragment of the full program. However, the dogma of reductionism has continued to influence the thought of empiricists. The notion is, of course, implicit in the verification theory of meaning. According to Quine, Carnap's dogma of reductionism can survive in the supposition that each statement in isolation can admit of confirmation. However, Quine's counter suggestion issuing essentially from Carnap's doctrine of the physical world in the *Aufbau*, is that 'our statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as a corporate body'. Quine further claims that the dogma of reductionism is essentially connected with the other dogma which states that there is a distinction between the analytic and the synthetic.

According to Quine, the two dogmas, one anticipated by Kant and the other by Carnap, are identical as far as their root or locus is concerned. The truth of statements does obviously depend both upon language and upon extra-linguistic fact and it carries in its train, not logically but all too naturally. It is a sort of feeling or realization that the truth of a statement is somehow analyzable into a linguistic component as well as a factual component. The factual component, Quine opines, actually boils down to a range of confirmatory experiences where the linguistic component in extreme case is all that matters, a true statement is analytic. However, Quine says that it is nonsense to speak of a linguistic component and a factual component in the truth of any

individual statement. Putting everything into perspective, Quine still believes that the unit of empirical significance is the whole of science where there is no place of dogma. Thus, Quine in a sense seeks empiricism without the dogmas. As an empiricist, Quine thinks of the conceptual scheme of science as a tool for predicting future experience in the light of the past experience. Physical objects are conceptually imported not by definition in terms of experience, but simply as to the gods of Homer. The myth of the physical objects, Quine asserts, is epistemologically superior to most in that it has proved more efficacious than other myths as a device for working a manageable structure into the flux of experience. According to Quine, Carnap takes a pragmatic stand on the question of choosing between forms, scientific knowledge. Having said this, his pragmatism leaves off at the imagined boundary between the analytic and the synthetic. In repudiating such a boundary, Quine espouses a more thorough pragmatism. In this context, Quine says, "Each man is given a scientific heritage plus a continuing barrage of sensory stimulation; and the considerations which guide him in warping his scientific heritage to fit his continuing sensory promptings are, where rational, pragmatic."¹³¹ In this sequel we are not so much interested to acknowledge Carnap from Quine's perspective. So far it has been discussed in what sense Carnap's philosophy has been recognized as philosophically worthy. It also seems that Quine is not just Carnap's expositor; he is more about Carnap's defender. Quine's first lecture on Carnap contains three sections of which the first deals with definition, the second reflects in what sense or how to edge definitions or linguistic conventions so as to render a large part of logic true by definition or by convention, and the third and final section engages to resolve the question of how far this conventionalizing is to work. The lecture, in general, is directed to shield the claim that *a priori is analytic*. However, Quine has in mind with an informal specification of the

¹³¹ Quine, W.V.O., "Two Dogmas of Empiricism", in W. V. Quine, *From a Logical Point of View: 9 Logico-Philosophical Essays* (Cambridge: Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953; revised edition, 1980), p. 46.

intended sense of analytic. In this regard, Quine says, “Analytic judgments are consequences of linguistic fiat.”¹³² The sanctity of analytic judgment actually hinges on the very perception of synonymy and substitution on language front. Traditionally, it was held by Kant and everyone recognizes the a priori character of analytic. However, there are some non-analytic or synthetic judgments, such as; the propositions of geometry are also a priori according to Kant. In this regard, Quine responds by saying that ‘the development of foundational studies in mathematics during the past century has made it clear that none of mathematics, nor even geometry, need rest on anything but linguistic conventions of a definitional kind. In this way it becomes possible to relegate geometry to the analytic realm, along with the rest of mathematics.’¹³³ This we think is a serious degradation of both mathematics and geometry at the hand of Quine.

Now, owing to explicate and examine towards defending the doctrine that the *a priori is all analytic*, Quine goes on to start with definition. In this regard, Quine distinguishes two kinds of definitions, such as, explicit and implicit. Explicit definition is nothing but simply a convention of abbreviation and implicit definition of a word says that a specific set of sentences containing the word are to be accepted as true conventionally. Here their truth constitutes *the meaning of the word*. Thus, in a sense both definitions, implicit as well as explicit, are conventions overriding the use of words. Explicit definition unlike implicit definition is necessarily relative as it specifies the use of a given word relative to other words whose previous definitions are presupposed. Having said this, it is true to say that in our ordinary conventional life, we have little to do with the so-called deliberate definition, rather we are used to learn our language

¹³² Quine, W. V. O., “Lectures on Carnap”, Unpublished, in the collection of W. V. O. Quine, p. 2 (Quoted in R. Creath “The Initial Reception of Carnap’s Doctrine of analyticity”, in D. Follesdall (ed.), *General, Reviews, and Analytic/Synthetic*, op. cit., p. 324, by permission of W. V. O. Quine”). See also R. Creath (ed.), *Dear Carnap, Dear Van: The Carnap-Quine Correspondence and Related Work*, op. cit., p. 48.

¹³³ Ibid., pp. 2-3.

through psychological conditioning. However, as our thought on a topic seeks to accuracy, clarity and precision the informal use of words must give way to usage deliberately defined. Quine is focused on a detailed suggestion as to how this giving way might take place. Let us suppose that we begin at a stage where no deliberate definition has taken place. Let us further assume that for some word K, consider all of the sentences in which K occurs that we now accept. Among the sentences no discrepancy is drawn between a priori and empirical. Here we have a body of doctrine in which our task is to frame our definition of K that all of the accepted K sentences come out true under that definition. For Quine, this is supposed to be the highest and perhaps the only standard of adequacy to which definition under consideration can be held. However, this may leave room for alternative definitions or even incomplete ones. This, however, does not vitiate the very objective of definition because even incomplete definitions are unobjectionable because by hypothesis the truth of all accepted K sentences is preserved. Quine further contends that number of recognized K sentences may be infinite. In such a case, we simply specify that each sentence in that set is to be taken conventionally as true. This is an implicit definition.

It may perhaps be the case that some of the recognized K sentences may contain other words, say H, and accordingly may be accepted as H sentences. In order to decide whether to provide for the sentence under the definition of K or under that of H, we need to draw a slightly technical distinction such as: “Any sentence which contains a word H ..., and which remains unaffected in point of truth or falsity by all possible substitutions upon the word H ..., will be said to involve H vacuously.”¹³⁴ Here by the term ‘possible substitution’, Quine means to say about ‘grammatically possible substitutions’. However, Quine does not think that non-vacuous

¹³⁴ Ibid., p. 7.

engagement of a word in sentence is irrelevant; rather he anticipated it as essential component of the sentence. For example, in the sentence ‘Within any class of two apples there is at least one apple’, the word ‘two’ is used materially but the word ‘apple’ is used only vacuously. This distinction, according to Quine, is useful in the case of an accepted sentence involves a word vacuously and it will much more convenient to provide for that sentence in the definition of words involved in that sentence materially.¹³⁵ As far as mathematics and logic are concerned, there remains the possibility of massive scheme of definition. However, Quine does not show that such a massive scheme of definition is possible even in principle. We certainly can make a great many things true by convention which we cannot do ordinarily. There may have some sentences where we would not bother to make them analytic. There remains scope for revision and we have some choice as to where to make revision. Here our choice is largely guided by the tendency to dislodge as little of the previous doctrine as we can compatibly with the ideal of unity and simplicity in the resulting doctrine. However, if every sentence were made analytic, then the required revision would involve unnecessary and unwanted fluidity in the definitions of our words. In this sense we may confidently make logic and mathematics analytic along with those parts of the empirical sentences we shall be least willing to revise. But how does it relate to the a priori? The a priori is analytic suggests that the a priori has the character or property of inward necessity. Here we have framed definition in a certain way, where the set of accepted sentences is given in advance as well as complete with an indication of those sentences accepted most firmly.

Quine proposes to reject a synthetic a priori sentence. For him, it actually allows us to peruse the foundations of mathematics as well as the logic of science without encountering extra-logical

¹³⁵ Ibid., p. 8.

questions as to the source of validity of our a priori judgments. Moreover, it shows that all metaphysical problems are gratuitous and as a matter of fact the rejection of metaphysics depends on a priori gratuitous metaphysics. Thus, on the three parts of the lecture, the first embraces implicit definition, presenting a method of accepted sentences which ultimate objective is to determine the set of sentences by true definition. In the second part of the lecture, Quine shows how the elementary parts of logic may be made true by convention. He then suggests how the method may be extended to the rest of logic, to mathematics, and beyond. Finally, in the third part of the lecture, Quine raises and answers a question about how much of the body of our belief should accept by convention. Analyticity, for Carnap, is an epistemic notion and hence it concerns the manner of justification of a given belief. Here the justificational structure is constitutive of the belief in question. As a result of that, there can be no question of having a set of beliefs and then overlaying them with this or that epistemic system. Here if a set of beliefs is given, a system of justification is presupposed. Since Quine's method of accepted sentences seems to be about a body of existent belief, there can be no question of where the limits of analyticity ought to lie. Here the normative structure of our language is based on empirical matter. Here one should not bank on accepted sentences, rather one has to look at what sentences justify what other sentences, what sentences may be justified in ways other than by inference.

What language we ought to adopt? Or what the limits of analyticity ought to be? According to Carnap, the issue of how to structure a language is a proposal about what shall be taken as sentences and what the rules of inference shall be. Further Carnap suggests that it would be pragmatically inconvenient to choose a language in which any sizeable portion of the descriptive sentences is determinate. In a sense, it would be more convenient to allow theoretical change within a language than to have the required changes from one language to another. In this regard,

Quine is fully agreed with Carnap. However, Quine goes beyond this. He says that either in our current language or in one that we ought to choose, the analytic will coincide with the deeply entrenched. Why it should correlate with being fully justifiable on the basis of convention alone is a further question. Quine's whole approach here is psychological rather than epistemic. This actually creates a gulf between Carnap and Quine about the perception of analyticity. Carnap here fully banks on epistemic justification whereas Quine fully banks on psychological aspect. We do not intend to say that what Quine asserts has been objectionable, rather we intend to say that it marks a divergence from Carnap. Quine hints that conventionalism is preferable to metaphysical intuition or mystic insight as a source of justification. The debate between Carnap and Quine stands as Quine comes no closer than this to addressing the epistemic core of Carnap's conventionalism. The debate between Carnap and Quine has been sustained even though they were remarkably modest enough during the early stages. At one stage, Quine is championing Carnap's doctrines including those on convention and analyticity. Even we do not find a decisive break even in the lectures on Carnap. The lectures do not contain any decisive refutation of the view that logic is a product of convention.

However, speaking of a contrast between analytic or conventional truth on one hand and non-conventional truth on the other, Quine goes on to say that 'it is less the purpose of the present inquiry to question the validity of this contrast than to question its sense.'¹³⁶ It, thus, means that analyticity is asserted without sense or as request for further clarification or as anything in between. Now, if TC is an attack on or a refutation of analyticity or convention, that must come with what is new in TC. What is new in TC is more nearly a request for clarification by Carnap than an attack. The overall theme of the paper TC is based on the perception that logic and

¹³⁶ Quine, W. V. O., "Truth by Convention", in W. V. Quine, *The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays*, op. cit., p. 70. See also O. H. Lee (ed.), *Philosophical Essays for A. N. Whitehead* (New York: Longmans, 1936).

mathematics are true by convention while the physical sciences are not. In this sense, definition creates no truth because they are neither premises, nor even claims of any kind. Accordingly, logic is not true by definition. For Quine, since all contexts of our new word are meaningless to begin with, neither true nor false, we are free to run through the list of each context and pick out as true such ones as we like. Those selected become true by fiat, by linguistic convention, not surely by strict and rigorous definition. For those who would question them we have always the same answer, “you use the word differently.”¹³⁷ Quine takes psychological view rather than epistemic underpinning of making logic and mathematics true by convention, and Carnap does the other way round. It may perhaps be the case that Quine did not realize properly how fundamentally his psychologistic view differs from Carnap’s normative epistemology. Carnap while reading notes on TC of Quine met the challenge to distinguish logic and mathematics from physics and botany by drawing the distinction, not at the level of doctrine, but at the level of languages. For Carnap, the language of logic and mathematics is determinate whereas the language of physics and botany is not. Quine of course does not make such distinction because as a relativist his interpretation of language is different from Carnap. As a reductionist, Carnap favored and stick to artificial or logical language; Quine’s understanding of language is no longer artificial in nature. Our perception is that Carnap’s notion of analyticity was itself epistemic; there could be no better way to defend it than to exhibit its epistemic role. Since Carnap’s concept of analyticity and reductionism has been developed and grown up within the realm of classical epistemological womb, Quine denies Carnap’s position. Being a relativist and to some extend physicalist and behaviourist, Quine takes initiatives to free philosophy from the womb of dogmas.

¹³⁷ Ibid., p. 83.

It, thus, seems to us that there underlies a general disagreement between Quine and Carnap over analyticity. It should be kept in mind that Carnap was not the only philosopher to have used the notion of analyticity. Therefore, it should be treated as one sided discussion if Quine disagrees with Carnap alone regarding analyticity. The idea of truth in virtue of meaning or truth by definition is the hallmark of analyticity Carnap like others does share. Quine banks on this perception and expresses his dissatisfaction to Carnap. Quine, being an empiricist, takes empirical attitudes towards meaning if it would be suitable for 'philosophical and scientific purposes'.¹³⁸ Quine's general perception is that the idea of meaning cannot simply be taken into account for granted and accordingly used it as a philosophical tool like the proponents of First Philosophy do. Instead, it should be treated as the available for philosophical use only to the extent that *'we are able to make empirical sense of it'*. Quine insists in favour of offering a cognitive account of language which would be purely naturalistic in character and makes no appeal to an unconstructed notion of meaning. Carnap, on the other hand, banks in favour of artificial language instead of natural language while illuminating his perception of analyticity. As a result of that Carnap's idea of analytic-synthetic distinction is straightforward than Quine. Quine from his naturalized epistemological perspective rules out any clear-cut distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments. Quine, thus, rejects any version of analyticity based on stringent philosophical canon. He does not think that the concept of analyticity as developed by the classical epistemologists including Kant has any philosophical significant. He, therefore, rejects the idea that there is a defensible distinction which will play the role that Carnap allotted it. According to Carnap, the analytic-synthetic distinction has a clear epistemological impact which Quine rejects out rightly. For Quine, it has no bearing as far as epistemological significance is concerned. Thus, in a sense Quine rejects the epistemological implications of

¹³⁸ Quine, W. V. O., *Theories and Things*, op. cit., p. 184.

holism as the mark of the *Principle of Tolerance*. Thus, their difference and disagreement about the perception of analyticity and the distinction between analytic and synthetic is fundamental and it has far reaching philosophical implications.
