

## Chapter 6

### Conclusions

Parliamentary versus Revolutionary Politics-Fragmentation versus Unity within Parliamentary Phase-Communist Parties and National Sentiments-Ideological Shift/Ideological Dependence-Social Basis of Communist Movement: Economic Backwardness, Caste, Ethnicity and Communist Mobilisation

Considering the objectives of this study, the work has dealt, at length, the various strategies and the ideological positions of the different Communist factions operating within the Communist movement of Nepal. In its long course, the movement evinced certain characteristic trends answering, though partially, the various questions raised in the beginning of this study. These answers, presented below under different section headings, form the conclusion drawn out of the study.

#### 1. Parliamentary Versus Revolutionary Politics

The study indicates that one basic debate which has haunted Communist parties and its leadership in Nepal revolves around issues of participation in elections, parliamentary system and ultimately parliamentary government. In the early years of communist mobilisation, during the decade of 1950s, the basic debate was whether the party should participate in the election held under the Constitution framed by the King or whether it should follow a revolutionary line, that is, agitate for elections for the creation of the Constituent Assembly. In this debate if Rayamajhi and his group supported participation of the party in the election under the Constitutions framed by the King (the Interim Constitution and the February 1959 Constitution) Pushpalal and Hikmat Singh supported the line which was for election for the creation of the Constituent Assembly. From 1960 onwards, when the kingdom entered the Panchayat phase (1960–1990), and when the communist movement began splitting the debate within the communist party rotated around the question whether Communists should participate in the elections held under the system. In this debate, those who supported participation in the elections under the Panchayat system or the establishment of parliamentary democracy were considered as supporter of a non-revolutionary line and

those opposing such participation and parliamentary democracy were the followers of revolutionary line. During this period, the Rayamajhi faction supported participation in the elections held for the creation of National Panchayat whereas Pushpalal Shrestha and Tulsilal Amatya were against such participation. and were in favour of ‘destroying’ the Panchayat system. The difference led to the expulsion of the Rayamajhi faction from the NCP in VS 2021 (1964/65) causing the birth of NCP (Rayamajhi). Thereafter, the NCP split in May 15, 1968. The split resulted in two factions, NCP (Pushpalal) and NCP (Amatya) where NCP (Pushpalal) faction chose revolutionary line condemning Tulsilal Amatya’s line of National Democracy for advocating the establishment of constitutional democracy. Similarly, in the 70s two Communist factions came into existence: NCP (Kendriya Nucleus) in 1971 and NCP (ML) in 1975. At the time of their formation both the factions chose the New Democratic strategy advocating revolutionary politics which repudiated parliamentary democracy and electoral politics. The same was true of the factions born of the NCP (Kendriya Nucleus)—NCP (Chautho Mahadhiwayshun (Fourth Congress)), NCP (Mashal) and NCP (Masal). However, after 1971 NCP (Pushpalal) began advocating the establishment of parliamentary democracy and maintained the line even after its transformation into NCP (Marxist) in 1987. Similarly, NCP (ML) progressively tilted towards parliamentary line from 1980 and ultimately began advocating the establishment of multi-party democracy from 1989.

In the parliamentary phase (1990–2002), many of these factions united creating NCP (United), NCP (UML) and NCP (Unity Centre) in 1991. NCP (United) was born of the combination of NCP (Manandhar), NCP (Verma) and NCP (Amatya). NCP (UML) was the combination of NCP (Marxist) and NCP (ML) and NCP (Unity Centre) was a combination of NCP (Mashal), NCP (Fourth Congress) under Nirmal Lama, the UNPM under Baburam Bhattarai [which had evolved out of a minor faction of NCP (Masal)] and the Proletarian Labour Organisation. During this period all the Communist parties—barring NCP (Masal) which took part only after the second General Election—chose to take part in the elections. In this phase there were

three splits. The NCP (UML) split in 1992 and 1998 and the NCP (Unity Centre) in 1994. Since, the split in the NCP (UML) was not for formation of a new party, but for the re-formation of NCP (Marxist) and NCP (ML), both of whom had already chosen electoral politics/Parliamentary system, the issue of participation or non-participation in the electoral politics/Parliamentary system did not figure in the split. However, the split in the NCP (Unity Centre) in May 1994 led to the formation of a new party, CPN (Maoist). Hence, the CPN (Maoist) at the time of its formation repudiated electoral politics and parliamentary government for the sake of revolutionary New Democratic strategy. However, ultimately it also accepted the idea of constitutional government and multi-party democratic structure in 2006. Thus, on the whole the trend of the movement showed that the communist factions at the time of their formation always chose to follow a revolutionary line repudiating participation in elections, but at some point accepted and participated in electoral politics and Parliamentary system. Such a behaviour on their part led this study to raise a question: why did the different Communist factions join the electoral process despite repudiating such participation at the initial stage? Considered in the light of the study, it has been found that from the very beginning the trend of the Communist movement was liberal in its content. It was so in the 50s and even when Pushpalal adopted the strategy of New Democracy in 1968 he favoured the struggle for parliamentary democracy emphasising upon such ideals as freedom of individuals, equality etcetera as a stepping stone towards New Democratic governmental structure. Similarly, major factions like NCP (ML), NCP (Marxist) in the eighties had begun advocating individual liberty, freedom of speech, freedom of occupation etcetera. And in the Parliamentary phase, as indicated by the study, their choices were essentially for liberal values. And if the article of Baburam Bhattarai after Gyanendra's coup is taken as a pointer of the intents of the CPN (Maoist) then it is clear that even the Maoists were not averse to liberal ideals. Besides, if one considers the social basis of the communist leaders of Nepal then it is clear that they all represent the educated middle class of the society without any proletarian background save in the case of Man Mohan Adhikari. And a large majority

of them hail from a brahmanical background which also share some of the values of educated middle class. These factors perhaps explain their liberal outlook as well as their ultimate participation in the electoral process after repudiating such participation at the initial phase. Their initial repudiation of the Parliamentary system seems to suggest that they were doing so simply to project themselves as revolutionaries to gain support for their cause.

## 2. Fragmentation Versus Unity within Parliamentary Phase

Fragmentation in the party/movement or party splits or existence of factions in the movement is one of the significant issues which attract scholars working on Communist movements in different parts of the world, though fragmentation or splits are not historically/empirically alien to Communist movements. The Marxist in Russia before 1917 and also after and the Communist movement in China also suffered due to fragmentation and factionalism, and the problem of fragmentation of Indian Communist movement has been well attended by Marcus Franda. Actually the image of a Communist movement or party is that of a highly centralised, well disciplined monolith and thereby any contradiction within is taken or viewed as an aberration. In case of Nepal; however, the problem of fragmentation is more acute in the sense that there were as many as nine Communist parties in 1991 when parliamentary system was first introduced. The electoral compulsions of parliamentary system brought the parties together but the unity move was soon succeeded by further fragmentation in 1992, 1994 and 1998. Besides, there were numerous splits in the Communist movement of Nepal from the 60s producing a number of factions. The process of fragmentation in the movement set in from the Panchayat period which began from 1960. The first split in Nepal Communist Party (NCP) occurred in VS 2021 (1964/65) when the party expelled Rayamajhi for his pro-King/pro-Panchayat stand. This led to the birth of NCP (Rayamajhi). However, the NCP (Rayamajhi) faction also fragmented twice. The first split occurred in VS 2038 (1981/82) leading to the birth of NCP (Manandhar) and the second, in VS 2040 (September 1982). The latter split gave birth to NCP (Verma) faction. Meanwhile, NCP , after its Third Congress in April

1962, was operating under the General-Secretaryship of Tulsilal Amatya under whom the party had chosen the strategy of National Democracy. The choice of the strategy led to a bitter struggle between Tulsilal Amatya and Pushpalal. The struggle weakened the party centre and many regional committees broke their ties with the party. Besides, the struggle between the two leaders ultimately led to the fragmentation of the party in May 15, 1968. This split led to rise of NCP (Pushpalal) and NCP (Amatya) in which the former advocated New Democratic strategy and the latter, the strategy of National Democracy. After its formation, NCP (Pushpalal) functioned as a single party for sometime only to witness two splits. One in 1974 and the other in 1975. The latter split led to the birth of an enduring party the NCP (NWPP). Running parallel to these events, by the end of the 60s when jailed Communist leaders became free they decided to form a party with a strong centre and this led to the rise of NCP (Kendriya Nucleus) in 1971. In the same period, copying Naxalite movement and combining numerous committees, one of the committees of the NCP, the Purva Kosi Prantiya Committee, functioning in the eastern part of the kingdom evolved into NCP (ML) in January 1979. Both these parties subscribed to the New Democratic strategy. However, the NCP (Kendriya Nucleus) suffered from multiple splits during its march through time. The first split occurred in 1974 when leaders like Man Mohan Adhikari went out of the party. His faction eventually emerged as NCP (Man Mohan) in 1979. After, the exit of Man Mohan group from the party, the NCP (Kendriya Nucleus) functioning under Mohan Vikram Singh/Gharti was named as NCP (Chautho Mahadhiwayshun (Fourth Congress)) only to suffer from more splits. First split occurred in January, 1984 as a result there came into existence two factions: NCP (Fourth Congress) under Nirmal Lama and NCP (Mashal) under Mohan Vikram Singh/Gharti. The latter faction split again in 1985 leading to the rise of NCP (Mashal) under Mohan Bikram Baidhya and NCP (Masal) under Mohan Vikram Singh/Gharti. Besides, in existence there were many other minor factions as well. In this phase, the NCP (Pushpalal) combined with NCP (Man Mohan) in March 1987 to create NCP (Marxist). With the coming of the 90s, as noted earlier, many of these

factions united in 1991 to form NCP (UML), NCP (United) and (Unity Centre) in 1991. However, even in this phase there were splits. NCP (UML) split in February 1992 to re-form NCP (Marxist), and in April 1998 to re-form NCP (ML). The NCP (Unity Centre) also fragmented in 1994 leading to the rise of NCP (Maoist). Such fragmentation in the movement was the product of multiple factors. It was due to the lack of class analysis, differences in the perceptions of the leadership on the role of the King, the differences in the choice of strategy and tactics, differences on the identification of the enemy, struggle for leadership and, at times, owing to the idea of nationalism and perceptions about India. The following paragraphs seek to present the factors identified above as the causes behind the fragmentation of the Communist movement in Nepal.

The study reveals that throughout the movement the various Communist factions failed in carrying out a thorough class analysis of the Nepalese society. In the name of class analysis they always presented the social analysis of the society. As a result, they failed to identify the Party which represented the bourgeoisie or national bourgeoisie of Nepal. They sometimes identified Nepali Congress as the representative of the bourgeoisie with dual character and sometimes as the representative of national bourgeoisie of Nepal. As a bourgeois force with dual character, they viewed Nepali Congress aligned both with the interests of the feudal forces of Nepal and the bourgeoisie of India. Hence, they viewed them as a force, which carried on bourgeois revolt to the extent that the revolt served the interest of India and ended the revolt in a compromise with the feudal force to serve the interest of Nepalese King. However, some considered them as the national bourgeoisie of Nepal despite the fact that the kingdom was not industrialised. This difference in opinion about the class character of Nepali Congress was one of the important factors contributing to the birth of NCP (Kendriya Nucleus) in the seventies. The Party did not consider Nepali Congress as the representative of national bourgeoisie hence it criticised NCP (Pushpalal) faction for taking up such a position and for considering Nepali Congress as an ally of the New Democratic strategy. This difference was

further carried over by all other factions emerging out of the NCP (Kendriya Nucleus) lessening the chances of unity between them and the Pushpalal faction.

Similarly, there were differences among the Party leaders regarding the role of the King in the politico-economic context of Nepal. Though leaders like Rayamajhi considered him as a feudal force, yet he believed that the institution of monarchy was not to be attacked since people had faith upon the institution as a uniting force of the kingdom. On the other hand, the whole lot of Communist leaders considered the King as a force aligned to Indian bourgeoisie and as a force working in their interest to serve his own interest rather than the interest of the masses. This difference in the perception about the role of the King in Nepal had its toll. In the beginning of the 60s, Nepal Communist Party expelled Rayamajhi for his pro-King/pro-Panchayat stance leading to the birth of NCP (Rayamajhi) faction. The same was the cause behind the fragmentation of Rayamajhi faction leading to the birth of NCP (Verma) in 1987.

The other factor behind the fragmentation of the Communist movement of Nepal was the difference in the choice of the strategy and the tactics. Fragmentation in the movement began surfacing in Nepal Communist movement after Tulsilal Amatya began advocating the strategy of National Democracy in 1962. In 1967, NCP (Pushpalal) faction emerged when it opted for New Democratic strategy condemning National Democratic strategy as revisionist and as a strategy, which believed in peaceful transition towards socialism. Similarly, the 1992 split in NCP (UML), occurred when a group of earlier NCP (Marxist) leadership, besides being disenchanted by the UML's support for the market economy, rebelled against its new strategy—the strategy of *Janatako Bahudaliya Janabad*. Besides, splits within parties following the same strategy was caused by the differences among the leaders on the issue of tactics. The NCP (Rohit) faction had two tactical differences with NCP (Pushpalal). First it favoured the use of election and parliamentary processes available within the Panchayat system for revolutionary purposes that is for educating the masses. Second, it pointed out that a Communist party should not, in the name of main contradiction, focus on the destruction of only one enemy that is the Panchayat

system. By saying so it was pointing out that in the then situation even the Soviet Union, which had degenerated into a Socialist imperialist after invading Czechoslovakia in 1968 should be the object of struggle of NCP (Pushpalal). When the faction found NCP (Pushpalal) not in agreement with its tactical position then it dissociated from the party. Similarly, though both NCP (Pushpalal) and NCP (ML) subscribed to the same strategy of New Democracy yet their tactics differed. The tactics of NCP (Pushpalal) in the beginning of the 70s was to give directions to all spontaneous movements emerging in the nation to direct them to form a united front of all classes opposed to the Panchayat system and to ready them for the destruction of the system. But, the tactics of the NCP (ML) from its very inception was to implement armed struggle as the only means of leading the revolution. Similarly, the split in Kendriya Nucleus after its transformation into NCP (Fourth Congress) was also due to tactical differences, which existed between Mohan Bikram Singh/Gharti led group and Nirmal Lama led group over the question of uniting with Pushpalal faction and Man Mohan faction in the electoral process of the Panchayat period. If Gharti group rejected such alliances Lama group considered such alliances as revolutionary practices. Similarly, in the 1990s the split in the NCP (Unity Centre) in 1994 was caused by tactical differences that the leadership held on the question of initiating the armed peasant revolt. Those who felt that the opportune moment for such revolt had come in Nepal—possibly under the influence of the RIM—turned into the CPN (Maoist) in 1994.

The next factor which perpetuated differences and caused fragmentation in the movement was the differences which the parties had on the identification of the enemy. To the NCP (ML) and the NCP (Kendriya Nucleus) the main enemies were Indian expansionist, American imperialist, Soviet-Socialist imperialist, feudal forces and comprador bourgeoisie that is the Nepali Congress, but for NCP (Pushpalal) the main enemy was the feudal force and contrary to the stand of NCP (ML) and NCP (Kendriya Nucleus) it considered Nepali Congress as its ally and maintained silence even in categorising Soviet Union as Soviet-Socialist imperialist. The differences,

therefore, encouraged the existence of factions in the movement besides promoting further fragmentation. Condemning NCP (Pushpalal)'s failure in identifying Soviet Union as a Soviet-Socialist imperialist, as already noted, Narayanman Bijukche went out of NCP (Pushpalal) to form his faction in 1975. Further, fragmentation in the Communist parties were also caused by leadership struggle. Though, the documents of the NCP (Fourth Congress) under Nirmal Lama and of the NCP (Mashal) under Mohan Bikram Singh/Gharti give the impression that the split was caused by differences in tactics, yet closer reading of the documents and comparison of the split with the later split in NCP (Mashal) which created NCP (Masal) under Mohan Bikram Singh/Gharti and NCP (Mashal) under Mohan Bikram Baidhya reveals that both the splits were engineered by the Mohan Bikram Baidhya group to capture the party leadership. Finally, the Communist idea of nationalism that is their perception about India was the primary cause behind the split of the NCP (UML) in April 1998 which led to the re-formation of the NCP (ML). In this split, 46 NCP (UML) legislators went out of the party to re-form the NCP (ML) criticising NCP (UML)'s soft stand towards American imperialism and, in particular, Indian expansionism which, it argued, was increasingly penetrating Nepal to exploit her natural resources while interfering in her internal affairs. To point Indian interference the faction, at that point of time, was objecting against Indian claim over Kalapani, an area located in Western Nepal, where India had stationed her soldiers. But, the movement was not always assailed with fragmentation. There were unity moves as well. Of these unity moves, the significant ones, which occurred before 1990 were those which created the NCP (Kendriya Nucleus), the NCP (ML), and the NCP (Marxist). In creating the Kendriya Nucleus the objective was to establish a Party with a centralised structure and to struggle against the strategies of both NCP (Pushpalal) and NCP (Rayamajhi). The NCP (ML) was born out of the union of several factions believing in the tactics of armed peasant revolt. But, the unity move between NCP (Pushpalal) faction and a minor faction, NCP (Man Mohan Adhikari) faction was not due to any similarities. This unity which led to the birth of NCP (Marxist) was meant for serving the personal

interest of the leadership, in this case the interest of Man Mohan Adhikari and in enhancing the prestige of the Party—the NCP (Pushpalal) after the death of Pushpalal. Under Man Mohan Adhikari, a venerated Communist leader with a proletariat background, the NCP (Pushpalal) faction felt that its prestige will be enhanced.

In the Parliamentary phase, the trend was just the opposite. Propelled by one single desire of Communist factions to share power, the phase began with a definite trend towards unity leading to the birth of Communist factions like NCP (UML), NCP (Unity Centre), and NCP (United). And throughout the period, minor Communist factions as well as NCP (United) were advocating the need for unity among the Communist factions. However, this is not to say that there were no fragmentation in the movement. As already noted, the NCP (UML)'s fragmentation in 1992 and in 1998 were caused by issues related with strategy and nationalism respectively. The 1992 split led to the re-formation of NCP (Marxist), and the 1998 split, the re-formation of NCP (ML). However, the latter group ultimately joined the NCP (UML). Similarly, as already noted, in 1994, there was split in NCP (Unity Centre) because of tactical reasons. However, the split exhibited two notable characteristics. First, it was a split between those controlling the party organisation, the majority group under Prachanda and majority of those elected in the election because seven out of the nine elected representatives had sided with the minority in the party organisation. Second, in this split, the Maoist unlike other Communist factions tried to project themselves as a faction without its link with the pre-1994 Communist movement of Nepal. This was subtly reflected in their choice of identifying themselves as CPN (Maoist) and not as NCP (Maoist). However, such nature of split cannot be generalised since the trend was not visible in other splits. Barring these peculiarities, the Parliamentary phase, on the whole proved favourable for the unity of Communist factions with fewer incidents of fragmentation in the movement.

### 3. Communist Parties and National Sentiments

The nationalistic outlook of entire Communist factions of Nepal is conditioned by their views about Indian state/ government as a partner of imperialist

forces. Drawing upon the provisions of the existing treaty relations between the two nations, Communists of Nepal see India as an exploiter of Nepal's natural resources and, therefore, as an imperialist. In such construction, India is seen as a perpetuator of the feudal regime or as the supporter of a political Party which helps her continue the exploitation of Nepal. In the process, India is viewed as a nation which seeks to extend her control over Nepal on the pretext of supporting her security concerns by defining the treaty based relation as an special relation. This makes India an expansionist. Such perceptions of Nepalese Communists are bolstered when there are border related problems and when India enters into treaty relations to develop the vast potential of Nepal's hydro-resources. In Communist perception, the trade and transit relation between the two countries are also influenced by Indian economic and political interests. Indian practice of limiting entry of Nepalese goods into India by imposing the condition of stipulated Nepalese content of labour and raw materials in the Nepalese product is also viewed in the same vein. In their eyes, this gamut of relation prevents Nepal from achieving democracy and in developing an independent economy. The logic is extended forward to argue that in Nepal's inability to create an independent economy lies its inability to solve the problem of poverty and of social inequality. So, all the documents of factions practising both Parliamentary and non-Parliamentary politics try to project the movement as a national struggle—a struggle against a more powerful neighbour, the expansionist, imperialist India. Besides, this outlook also projects the movement as a struggle against neo-colonialism, where India is the centre and Nepal a peripheral economy. Such nationalistic outlook or nationalism as the Communist factions call it, describes the neo-colonial configuration as an explanation about all the problems facing the nation and exhorts Nepalese to struggle against it. Considering the many occasions (for example, the Tanakpur issue, the issue of Indian policemen in Baneshwor etcetera) where their documents make use of such outlook, it is evident that the Communist factions of Nepal use nationalism as a weapon to mobilise the masses. In this context, it would be opportune here to focus on the re-formation of NCP (ML) in April 1998. The 46 UML legislators who

went out of NCP (UML) then espoused the cause of nationalism. And since the third General election was only a year away, that is in May 1999, they were using nationalism to justify the split to mobilise their supporters for the election. But, since the NCP (UML) was also using the nationalism card the NCP (ML) could not fare well. However, it did gross 6.38% of the votes damaging the score of the UML substantially. Had the NCP (ML)'s share of votes gone to the NCP (UML) then the latter could have won a comfortable majority in the Parliament. Empirical findings (as used by Whelpton in explaining the 1991 election) which have not probed how Communist faction use nationalism to explain Nepal's problem can comfortably disregard its role in the movement, but the present study reveals that nationalism, because of its power to explain the woes of Nepal, has turned into a core value of the Communist movement of Nepal. It has, therefore, been utilised throughout, whether in the past or in the Parliamentary phase, to mobilise forces. Hence, Communists' use of nationalism in Nepal is not without reason. In contrast to such use of nationalism class does not seem to be the basis of mobilisation because while identifying the classes whom the Communist parties sought to serve, the documents of factions like the NCP (UML) and NCP (United) often use terms like "people of all classes" which when analysed means the general masses. Besides, though the documents of the non-Parliamentary factions, like those of NCP (NWPP) and NCP (Maoist), do mention the four classes (the peasants, the petty bourgeoisie, the numerically insignificant proletariat and the national bourgeoisie), yet one finds in them a definite tilt towards wooing the *janajatis* (the nationalities) implying the importance of ethnic category in the mobilisation of their forces.

#### 4. Ideological Shifts/Ideological Dependence

The study reveals that the Communist parties had to resort to shifts in their ideological positions to adjust themselves to the changed conditions of electoral politics. However, if one were to find the effects of such shifts then in the context of Nepal Communist movement one has to take the activities of NCP (UML) and NCP (United) in the Parliamentary phase, because shifts in ideology was particularly

traceable in the positions of these two parties. In case of the UML, the ideological shift led to the dilution of its strategy. From New Democratic strategy it shifted to *Janatako Bahudaliya Janabad*, which was aimed at gaining maximum support from the people to win elections and to come to power. The consequences of this change in the UML were many. First, the change in its strategy changed its Ideological position: from a Party which was wedded to the interest of four classes it turned into a Party seeking solutions to the problem of the masses and then it came to support a market driven economy. As a result of such change, it passed out as any other non-Communist parties, but with a Communist tag. This placed it in a queer situation: it had to maintain its image of being a Communist Party while following tactics unlike that of a Communist Party. As a progressive Communist Party, it opposed what it claimed as Koirala's autocratic rule when he dealt with the participants of Employees Organisation severely, but unlike a Communist Party it sought his resignation without asking for the resignation of the Government. The same was true of NCP (United), whose strategy was tailored along the lines of the UML. Second, the changes, it seems—considering the characterisation of the UML by other Communist factions—brought changes in the class composition of the Party. It welcomed even earlier Panchayat activists, the revivalist, into its fold. Third, it influenced its method of protests. Since, winning elections and coming to power was its primary goal its method of protests were also geared towards that end. In its bid to appeal the widest sections of the people, its protest movements lost focus in furthering the interest of the classes whom it claimed to represent. Lastly, when it sought to power its protest movements it sought the support of other Communist factions who were opposed to the system. This helped radical Communist forces to keep their presence felt under the system by exploiting the protest movements led by the UML.

As for the electoral performance of the Party itself, the change in its ideological position appears to have worked in favour of the UML, because throughout the Parliamentary phase it could reasonably maintain its winning trend in the elections. But, in the case of NCP (United) the change was not favourable. With

the passage of time, its performance in the elections reflected that it had lost its support base, but there exist no documentary evidences to understand why it happened. Perhaps, its claim that the loss of its support base was due to the expansion of the UML at its cost explains the situation. Similarly, there are no documentary evidence to assess whether these factions changed their organisational structure to adapt to the changed environment. The answer to this question can perhaps be sought in the inner party directives, which are not in the public domain. As for the question, whether problem arises in combining revolutionary ideology with the compulsions of electoral system the functioning of the UML and other Communist factions, especially the NCP (United)—others were in favour of exposing the system—in the Parliamentary phase provides the answer. Though the UML and the NCP (United) changed their strategies to suit the needs of parliamentary system, yet they kept intact their revolutionary views on democracy, which were not in tune with the power and class equation prevalent in the then Nepal. And since such views conformed to the views of communist factions working against the system, their activities—the activities of NCP (United) and NCP (UML)—which sought to achieve their variety of democracy undermined the system. Hence, it appears that the combining of revolutionary ideology with the Parliamentary system erodes the parliamentary system and works against it.

Further the study reveals that the Communist leadership of Nepal was not very clear in choosing the strategies. They did not pay attention to the objective condition of the kingdom while fixing their goals though their documents emphasised the need for such consideration. The choice for National Democracy as a strategy in was influenced by their consideration of nationalism. And such considerations can be detected even when Pushpalal was choosing the strategy of New Democracy in 1968. Besides, they often confuse the two strategies: they equate the strategy of National Democracy with the strategy of Peoples Democracy though there is a subtle difference between the two. Such attitude on their part gives the feel that they were not very keen on the question of strategy and given their dependence on nationalism and ethnicity

for mobilising their forces with their ultimate choice for liberal democracy, it appears that they were dependent more on factors which were exogenous to their chosen strategies.

#### 5. Social Basis of Communist Movement: Economic Backwardness, Caste, Ethnicity and Communist Mobilisation

On the issue of the relation between areas of economic backwardness and Communist mobilisation in Nepal one cannot come out with a definitive answer. Had there been a positive relation between areas of economic backwardness with Communist mobilisation then the UML should have succeeded in capturing maximum seats from Nepal's western part, which was the most economically backward development region of the kingdom. But, this was not the case. However, when one goes by the tenor of the Maoist movement then it appears that there was some relation between backward regions and Communist mobilisation, because the movement was first localised in Rolpa and Rukum, which were the worst areas in the scale of the HDI of the period. Similarly, other areas where the movement flared up were Jajarkot, Kalikot and Salyan which exhibited worst HDI performance. Besides, all these areas were located in the far-flung regions of Nepal. However, there was an exception. The movement did not flare up in Sindhupalanchok which was equally worse in terms of HDI. Hence, the finding partially suggests a strong link between backward/far flung regions and Communist mobilisation especially for a radical movement. However, this is not to say that such mobilisation and radical movements are possible only in far-flung, underdeveloped regions of Nepal, because similar type of movement, the Jhapa movement, was there in Nepal in the beginning of the 70s in the eastern part. It died down because of administrative pressure. This proves, that any area in Nepal provides the environment necessary for armed movement. Therefore, what seems to answer the puzzle of Communist mobilisation is not the localised characteristics of the regions, but the overall economic nature of Nepal, which was essentially mired in poverty.

As regards, the role of caste factor in Communist mobilisation the leadership of the Communist factions apparently suggests that the higher castes namely the Brahmin-Chettri from the *Khas* and higher castes of the Newar community have a definite predilection towards the Party. But, considering the fact that the stronghold of the UML is not the western region, the region where the *Khas* are in the majority, and that the leadership of the Nepali Congress is also in the hands of the *Khas* group, one cannot, based on such findings, conclude that caste affiliation has a role in Communist mobilisation. Finally, similar confusion assails the question about the relation between ethnic identity and Communist mobilisation in Nepal. Before 1990, their documents do not consider the issue of ethnic identity as a problem. As a result, only a few of them occasionally seek to project the problems of the ethnics. But, even then they consider ethnic problems not as a problem of identity, but as a problem related with the issue of equality, that is, economic equality. Hence, they argue the solution to their problems in the destruction of the feudal system which they thought would bring about economic equality. Thus, in the pre-1990 situation the Communist factions were not using issues of ethnic identity as an instrument of mobilisation. However, in the post-1990 situation when issues of ethnic identity came to the fore they used them in their election manifestos. But, there is no study to reflect whether such tactics paid them. Besides, their manifestos mix issues of ethnic identity with issues of resource appropriation making it more difficult to understand which out of the two helped them in mobilising forces. If the trend of the Maoist movement seems to suggest the role of ethnic identity and issues of division of resources in their mobilisation pattern, the fact that ethnic parties supporting the cause of identity could never win even one seat in the entire Parliamentary phase of the kingdom casts doubt on the role of ethnic identity in the mobilisation of forces. Hence, it was probably the issue of division of resources which played its role in Communist mobilisation. Therefore, the factor behind Communist mobilisation seems to lie in the general nature of Nepalese economy, that is poverty, and in the expectation of the educated lot for a change in the condition of the nation.