

Chapter 5

Revolutionary Groups (Non-Parliamentary Politics)

Emergence of the Maoist as a Major Force, Maoist Strategy, Maoist and Parliamentary Democracy

1. Revolutionary Groups

In the context of Nepal, Chapter IV has already discussed that there were two broad groups among the Communist factions. One group, which was represented by the UML, NCP (Marxist), NCP (ML), in its later form, were all in favour of preserving Parliamentary system and hoped using it as a plank for bringing about socialism. However, there was a second group, which participated in the system without any faith in the system. This group was represented by NCP (Masal), NCP (NWPP), NCP (Unity Centre) and NCP (MLM). Even after the split of NCP (Unity Centre) in May 1994 when two factions of the Centre came into being that is NCP (Unity Centre) under Nirmal Lama and NCP (Unity Centre) under Prachanda (Pushpa Kamal Dahal), the Lama faction continued as a group without faith in Parliamentary system. Their participation in the system was always guided by their tactics to expose the system and to destroy it to usher New Democratic revolution. In this sense, they qualified as a revolutionary group. Since, their strategy and tactics have already been dealt in Chapter four, the present Chapter will focus on the rise of CPN (Maoist) out of the group.

1.1. Emergence of CPN (Maoist): Its Strategy and Tactics

The emergence of CPN (Maoist), as seen in Chapter IV, is closely linked with the activities of CPN (Unity Centre)/UPFN from 1991. After the first General Election the areas of Rolpa and Rukum (Kham Magar dominated area) proved to be their stronghold, because three of their candidates, one from Rukum and two from Rolpa had succeeded in winning the elections. In accounting for the successes of the Centre in these areas, writers often credit NCP (Masal)'s leader Mohan Bikram Singh. They point out that he had, in his long carrier as a Communist leader, sensitised the people of Pyuthan, which bordered Rolpa, along Communist line. The writers contend

that the UPFN just reaped the benefit of his long campaign (Whelpton 203; Thapa and Sijapati 65). Besides, there were other factors: the exodus of *mandales* into the Nepali Congress and the UML in the pre-1991 Election and the UPFN's campaign against earlier *mandales* who had, as "usurers" and "cheaters",¹ cheated the people of the area (Thapa, et al. 68–9; Onesto 152–4). This had, they say, helped the UPFN in gaining popularity among the people there, but it had also brought the UPFN in conflict with the parties since the usurers and cheaters against whom the UPFN campaigned were affiliated with either the Nepali Congress or the UML. However, when Girija came to power in 1991 the animosity between the UPFN and the Congress became more intense, because Thapa and Sijapati claim that Girija, because of his past experiences, came to power harbouring a deep seated "antipathy and distrust" towards the Communists in general (68). As a result, in 1992–93, clashes between the UPFN activists and the Government increased in the area leading to situations where both parties violated human rights (Thapa, et al. 69–70). Majority of the writers² writing on the birth and the later evolution of CPN (Maoist) explain the emergence of the Party as the result of such clashes. And the tenor of their argument suggests that in these clashes the Government wronged against the UPFN/Maoist activists by treating them inhumanely. However, such explanation in accounting for the rise of Maoism and in its development neglects the influence that the RIM had on the Party. As pointed out the Party was linked with the RIM ever since its formation in 1991 (See, p. 416), but there was another Party, NCP (Masal) with similar link with the RIM. Since, documents of CPN (Unity Centre) before 1994 are not available one has to refer to the documents of NCP (Masal) to understand how RIM was influencing CPN (Unity

¹ See, Onesto 155 This was the party's tactics of class struggle implemented at the village level.

² See, Thapa, et al. 68–74; Karki and Seddon 20 and Sales 80 The Maoist in their several statements try to project similar arguments to paint the state in its vicious form.

Centre). In one of the documents of NCP (Masal), published in 1994, the Party indicates of a controversy rotating around the questions about “Maoist thought”, “Maoism”, and “third stage of Maoism” (NCP (Masal), “Mao Bichardharabarey 2051” 557–9). However, the content of the document is not clear—one cannot understand what constituted the third stage of Maoism— except in denouncing those who attested to the idea of third stage Maoism by pointing out that such groups were “going against the principles of Leninism” (NCP (Masal), “Mao Bichardharabarey 2051” 559). But, NCP (Masal) in its VS 2052/5/21 [6 September 1995] document reveals a letter sent to it by RIM welcoming the Party’s Sixth Congress. In it the Party indicates that the RIM had been insisting on its constituents to follow Marxism-Leninism-Maoism as their ideology to lead armed struggle in Nepal. RIM’s logic in advocating such line were as follows: in the letter, it says, “Mao, while leading Chinese struggle had developed many principles” bringing about “a qualitative development in Marxism-Leninism”. Hence, his contributions represented “a leap forward in Marxism-Leninism” making it “an integral component of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism”. Then pointing out Mao’s contributions the letter states, “In the context of establishing socialism he developed a universally applicable principle of revolutionary violence—the tactics of encircling cities by villages, and the principle of cultural revolution to raise the level of ideology to its third stage”. Hence, according to RIM’s logic, “Mao’s contributions deserve[d]to be raised to the level of Maoism”. Then it says that “Maoism qualifies as a new paradigm,³ without which Marxism-Leninism cannot be properly understood” (NCP (Masal), “Nepal Communist Party ... RIM Ko Abhiwadan” 587). NCP (Masal) had not accepted RIM’s logic, so in the letter RIM asks NCP (Masal) to “voluntarily resign” from the Body, but recognises “CPN (Maoist) as its member” implying that CPN (Maoist) were following its directions (NCP (Masal), “RIM Ko ... Prastao” 627) . The extent to which the CPN

³ If so then only Maoism should have been the sufficient ideology, but it presents the ideology as Marxism-Leninism-Maoism.

(Maoist) were under the ideological spell of the RIM was partially expressed by its 1997 statement, where it extolled “Marxism-Leninism-Maoism” as an “almighty ideology” (Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), “Editorial ... War!” 1), and fully by its later document of 2001 where it said:

In the face of complex situation, Mao seriously thought over the class-struggle in socialism ... put forward ... a scientific analysis of class-struggle ... a concept of continuous revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat as the principle to prevent restoration of capitalism and led the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution ... This great contribution established Mao as the propounder of a new, third and higher stage of Marxism, i.e. Marxism-Leninism-Maoism...after Mao’s death ... it has grown as a beacon for future revolutions (Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), “The Great Leap Forward ... History” 29).

Besides, when the Party split in May 1994 the Nirmal Lama group had specifically drawn attention towards Prachanda factions’ advocacy of the RIM’s line as the cause behind the split. Hence, both in the evolution and in the birth of the CPN (Maoist) as a violent faction the role of the RIM cannot be disregarded⁴. So, in leading the armed struggle CPN (Maoist) was following the dictate of a foreign body which was not conversant with the objective condition of the kingdom. After its split in 1994, its front organisation, the UPFN, also split into two factions in August 1994. One of them was UPFN (Baburam) faction. It was aligned to NCP (Unity Centre) under Prachanda. This Unity Centre under Prachanda, Mohan Bikram Baidhya (Kiran) and Baburam held its Third Extended meeting in VS 2051/11/2–4 (14–16 February 1995).⁵ The document produced on the occasion came out in the name of CPN

⁴ The other factor which has been grossly neglected in explaining the growth of Maoism, is the faulty tactics of the UML. The study of the period reveals that the UPFN exploited the tactics of the UML and other Communist factions to implement its tactics of exposing the Parliament. By doing so, it de-legitimised the Parliamentary system to create an environment where it could legitimise its violent tactics. Hence, in the evolution of the Maoist the role of UML and other Communist factions, especially their tactical stance, should also be taken into consideration.

⁵ See, Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), “Strategy and Tactics ... in Nepal” 19 The Party organ, English edition, gives a different month that is March 1995. So, many works have quoted this date. Besides, there is also difference in the

(Maoist). From it one has to draw out its strategy, because it is not properly structured. As usual with all Communist factions, it also describes the historical stage of Nepalese society as “semi-feudal and semi-colonial” (CPN (Maoist), “Nepali Naya Janabadi ... Karyadisha” 9). Under such a society, it identifies a series of contradictions clarifying that its enemies are the feudal forces, Indian expansionism, tout and bureaucratic capitalist who are under the umbrella of Indian expansionism for its document says:

To resolve the contradictions that exists between the feudal forces and Nepali people; imperialism, especially, Indian expansionism and Nepali people, tout and bureaucratic capitalist and Nepali people and the contradiction of the Nepali people against Nepalese reactionaries represented by the feudal forces, bureaucracy and tout capitalists who are aided and abetted by Indian expansionist is the goal of our armed struggle ... (CPN (Maoist), “Nepali Naya Janabadi ... Karyadisha” 7).

And like all other Communist factions of Nepal, it also fails in presenting its class analysis. So, as a substitute, it presents a social analysis of the usual type, prevalent among the Communist factions of Nepal, to identify its allies in (1) The proletariat class, which it admits is “numerically insignificant” (2) The peasants, which “includes the *Sukumbasis* and all ... workers like tempo drivers and wheel cart pushers working in the towns”. (3) Middle class peasants who “make their ends meet after working in their field for one whole year ...” (4) Rich peasants who “employ one or two labourers in their holdings” (5) Petty bourgeois class represented by “school, college and university teachers, students, doctors, engineers, lawyers, small traders and

title of the Nepali version and English version. The English rendition of the Nepali version is, *The Political and Military Line of Nepali New Democratic Revolution*. And there are subtle differences in the content for example in the English version the Northern neighbour with whom Nepal had fought is identified as the Chinese, but in the Nepali version it is Tibet of China. However, if history is taken then Nepal had fought valiantly with Tibet, but when supported by Chinese forces it had to pull back. Hence, the Nepali version seems to carry the right content. See also, Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), “The Great Leap Forward ... History” 47 In the Third Extended meeting CPN (Unity Centre), under Prachanda, gave up its earlier name and adopted its new name, CPN (Maoist).

artisans” and finally the national bourgeois class, which the Party says “is in a state of transformation and is trying to establish its independent existence” (CPN (Maoist), “Nepali Naya Janabadi ... Karyadisha” 7–8). Then it states its strategy of establishing communism in the following terms:

On the basis of Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideology ... the strategy of our Party is to carry out New Democratic revolution while destroying feudalism and imperialism to establish people’s dictatorship under the leadership of the proletariat based on the peasant -proletariat unity. Our future goal is to establish communism keeping intact the dictatorship of the proletariat while carrying on cultural revolution (CPN (Maoist), “Nepali Naya Janabadi ... Karyadisha” 7).

However, while advocating its line of “protracted war⁶ based on villages surrounding the towns” (CPN (Maoist), “Nepali Naya Janabadi ... Karyadisha” 7) the Party, to exhort the masses towards violence, romanticises Nepali valour⁷ and their love for violence and falsifies historical facts for it says:

In the historical process of the development of many Kings and principalities the Nepalese by circumstances were trained to be violent ... Later they fought with valour the forces of Tibet and the trained and well accoutred British forces from the south. Fighting war against the imperialist with the help of their own resources ... the people of Nepal succeeded in imprinting fear and anxiety in the minds of the imperialist and by doing so they have established an example of their bravery in the history of the world. This is a matter of pride and self-respect for

⁶ In the past, Communist factions advocating protracted war have always expressed the fear of aggression from Nepal’s Southern border. When NCP (ML) in the 70s propounded this tactics the same fear was there. This was probably because they viewed the need for such tactics in the event of Indian support to the feudal forces. However, if one takes the documents of NCP (Kendriya Nucleus) then it points out that it was just a propaganda to see to it that such aggression did not take place (See, p. 364). The Maoist document, however, considers it as a process of People’s War where the struggle needs to pass through a simple to a more complex form which ends in the capture of state apparatus. This means they were saying that the protracted nature of the struggle was a tactical mile stone, a complex tactics, which needed to be used in the ultimate capture of the State. In their document the usual fear from India cannot be detected.

⁷ Such romanticisation is interspersed throughout its various statements and documents. For another example, see, Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), “Editorial ... War!” 1 where it rejoices in the “obvious significance” of “the people’s war in the land of the legendary Gorkha fighters”.

all Nepalese. *The manner in which, Karl Marx, the advocate of Marxism, praised Nepalese role in those wars is a matter of pride* [italics added].

But, the present leadership of Nepal under the influence of foreign imperialist ... has bartered Nepali valour. We intend to pass on to Nepali people their legacy of bravery to encourage them to take their destiny in their hand (CPN (Maoist), “Nepali Naya Janabadi ... Karyadisha” 2).

Besides, to present its set of armed tactics it itemises six characteristic features of Nepal which are as follows:

1 In area, Nepal is a small State with 17% Terai land. Rest of its area is composed of hostile mountainous regions inhabited by people of diverse caste, languages and Janajatis. It is a land-locked State hemmed in by expansionist India from the South and revisionist China from the North.

2 From a very long period Nepal is under an autocratic, medieval monarchy with a strong and a permanent military establishment. His rule is mostly centred in the towns. Nepalese enemy are not only within but also outside: the Indian expansionist.

3 There is regional imbalance in the development of Nepal. It is a country where 90% of its peasants are spread across its villages.

4 Communists are popular among the people, but the influence of reformist and revisionists is also pervasive.

5 The ... ruling class of Nepal, at present, is passing through a crisis and this is reflected in the political arena.

6 A large section of Nepalese population are working in other parts of the world and out of it a large section is in the Indian Army (CPN (Maoist), “Nepali Naya Janabadi ... Karyadisha” 9).

On the basis of the above characteristics it then draws out the six components of its armed tactics which are stated in the following terms:

Considering the first characteristics, where we do not have a large area, jungle and a neighbour who is ready to help us, our geographical situation allows us to carry on guerrilla war by developing our close contact with the people. In doing so we can utilise the dissatisfaction that exists among the *Janajatis* (nationalities) against the caste group. The second characteristic shows that in Nepal there is no possibility of capturing power through direct military conflict ... Hence, the enemy should be engaged in several areas to weaken them progressively while increasing the military strength of the people ... Third characteristic shows that the foundation of the movement should be peasant revolution, where guerrilla war has to be carried out by developing good relation with the peasants. The fourth characteristic shows that if politics of exposition exposes the right deviation then there is possibility of people's support for armed struggle. The fifth characteristic shows that armed struggle for peoples' rule will help in the development of the struggle ... The sixth characteristic shows that the armed struggle will be successful if political works are carried on among Nepalese staying in India (CPN (Maoist), “Nepali Naya Janabadi ... Karyadisha” 9–10)

Thus, the centrality of the politics of exposition in the set of tactics as an auxiliary of

its armed tactic was obvious. However, this did not mean that the Party tactics was focused only on armed struggle for its document said that its cadres should also carry out “constitutional struggle”, “activities in the towns”, “involve themselves in *janandolan* [people’s movement]”, and “form front organisations” giving “primary importance to unconstitutional”, “rural”, “underground activities”, while carrying on “guerrilla war” and developing “militarily” to “strengthen Party’s organisation and its independent power” (CPN (Maoist), “Nepali Naya Janabadi ... Karyadisha” 10–11). Besides, it said that the Party should also give importance “to gaining international support” (CPN (Maoist), “Nepali Naya Janabadi ... Karyadisha” 11).

Following the document, the Party, in June/July 1995, brought out its another document, which elaborated the tactics of the Party until the initiation of the People’s War. It was its first plan consisting of several sub-plans. In essence, it outlined four tactical components namely propaganda, sabotage, guerrilla war and annihilation of class enemy. Its sabotage tactics directed its cadres to “destroy, in a planned way, the property of feudal class, zamindars, tout capitalists, Government, local exploiters and spies”. Besides, it directed them to “damage or destroy means of communications, roads, bridges and electric supply lines ... to lessen the power of the enemy” (CPN (Maoist), “Pahilo Yojana” 19). However, the document warned that they should not “give up mass movements”, but organise “such movements ... around issues of nationalism, democracy and day to day problems of the society to ... avoid the possibility of armed action from turning into an isolated tactics” (CPN (Maoist), “Pahilo Yojana” 21). The aim was, probably, to maintain its contact with the people without whose support, it said, “the enemy will ... destroy” its “leaders to nip the revolution in its bud” (CPN (Maoist), “Pahilo Yojana” 16). Then it declared, that on a “future date People’s War will be simultaneously initiated throughout Nepal” along with the use of “guerrilla war, sabotage and propaganda tactics” (CPN (Maoist), “Pahilo Yojana” 22). Thus, at this stage, annihilation of class enemy was not a part of its tactics. Thereafter, possibly before or after the Third Extended meeting of February

1995,⁸ the Party began its Sija campaign named “after the two big mountains, Sisne ... in Rukum and Jaljala ... in Rolpa”. The campaign, according to Onesto’s Report, was focused on developing the Party organisation, in helping people—to arouse the masses and heighten their political consciousness—and in developing links between the people of Rolpa and Rukum (155). Then in December, the Maoist claim that the Government launched its Romeo operation against their rural class struggle⁹, which it had been waging from sometime in Rolpa (Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), “One Year of People’s War” 8). According to them, in the backdrop of the “repressive” Romeo operation the “Central Committee of the Party ... met briefly in January 1996” and selected “the date of the historic initiation for February 13 (i.e., the first day of the month of Falgun ...)” (Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), “One Year of People’s War” 8). To rationalise its chosen path it identified the ever present “objective

⁸ There is no document which gives an exact date regarding the beginning of this campaign. See, Thapa, et al. 71 and Onesto 155 These works are confusing because Thapa and Sijapati claim that the campaign started in September 1995 and Onesto claims that the campaign was carried out for a year before the initiation of People’s War. Going by the claims of the Maoist, it seems Onesto was correct because the Maoist Organ, see, Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), “Editorial: Red Salute to the Immortal Martyrs of the People’s War!” 3 also reports that there was a preparation period of one year and it turned intense after September.

⁹ See, Thapa, et al. 71 and Onesto 156 Both write that the Romeo operation was against the Sija campaign, but there are reasons to doubt their information. First, Onesto’s Report, which is based on the narration of a Maoist narrator, indicates that the Romeo operation was launched in October/November. This is opposed to the Maoist’s claim that the Romeo operation began in December. By the same count, Thapa and Sijapati’s claim that the Romeo operation began in September is not acceptable. Besides, paper report also indicate the existence of Romeo operation only in December. Thus, if they could go wrong even in informing about the date of the Romeo operation there is every reason to doubt that they were not correct in saying that the operation was against the Sija campaign. Besides, the Maoist themselves claim that the operation was against the class struggle that they had been implementing there. Finally, the Sija campaign, as described by Onesto had nothing which could end in conflict between the Maoist and the Government, except, of course, if within the programme of raising the consciousness of the masses there were the component of class struggle. Hence, till further evidence comes to light it would be safer to go by the Party’s version.

conditions for ... the revolutionary transformations” of the Nepalese society in four factors (7). These were: 1) The “semi-feudal & semi-colonial” nature of the country. 2) The persistence of a feudal structure bound by “various semi-colonial unequal treaties with foreign powers (particularly India)” within which the “hegemony of the feudal and comprador & bureaucratic capital[ist] classes” had grown even after 1990 (6). 3) Low level of economic development characterised by “Total stagnation of society and absolute low level of productive forces ... engendered by imperialist/expansionist domination and attendant burgeoning bureaucratic capitalism” (6, 7). 4) The “political, economic and cultural domination” of “Mongoloid and Austric races ... who constitute a combined majority of the total population” since “the days of formation of the centralised state” under the Shahs. 5) Existence of a “vast mountainous regions and remote areas ... turned into sort of ‘internal colonies’ of the centralised state” owing to the “dynamics of polarised development inherent in bureaucratic capitalism”, and 6) The existence of a “reactionary state ... within the ambits of its old structure”, which had failed in resolving the “multifarious class, national and regional contradictions” and which was “sliding into deeper crisis as manifest in the ‘hung’ parliament, frequent change of the governments, pervading environment of instability and increasing recourse to fascist measures against the people” (Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), “One Year of People’s War” 7). Considering the low level of industrial development in Nepal and the numerically insignificant position of the working class, it was obvious that the Party was viewing crisis not in the frequent, widespread lockouts in factories, but in the frequent changes of the Government. As for the needed subjective conditions, it says that an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal feeling was there in Nepal “ever since 1816” (Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), “Editorial ... War!” 7) and adds, “What was essentially lacking was the conscious subjective efforts of the vanguard Party of the proletariat”. Then it claims that such need was fulfilled by the creation of CPN (Unity Centre) in “December 1991” (7, 8).

On the day when the Party initiated the People's War, it claims that its activists struck in Gorkha (Central), Sindhuli (Eastern Nepal), Rolpa and Rukum (Western) districts.¹⁰ In Gorkha, it claims that its cadres "took possession ... of ... an Agricultural Development Bank" and seized "loan papers ... and land registration certificates ... deposited by peasants as collateral". Then they burnt the loan papers and returned the land registration certificates to the respective peasants. In other areas they captured police posts with the aim of looting arms (Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), "Review ... Initiation and After" 4). The pattern indicated that they were targeting the State and propitiating the peasants. Thus, from the very beginning it was a peasant based revolution which, as it becomes clear from its Appeal, was fuelled by linguistic, religious, ethnic and nationalistic considerations. The Appeal, which they distributed on the occasion, complemented their action. It denigrated the State for having "handed over the whole economy of the country to a dozen families of the foreign comprador and bureaucratic capitalist" helping them amass wealth at the cost of "the toiling masses", who reeled "under unemployment and poverty" (Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), "Appeal" 11). It viewed it as a structure which had for centuries maintained the "hegemony of one religion (i.e. Hinduism) language (i.e. Nepalese) & nationality (i.e. Khas)" to discriminate, exploit and oppress other "religions, languages & nationalities" conspiring "to fragment the forces of national unity ... development and security of the country" (Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), "Appeal" 12). Besides, it tried to invoke national sentiment by pointing out that the State structure was in the interest of the imperialists and expansionist for it said:

[I]t has been prostrating before the foreign imperialists and expansionists and repeatedly mortgaging Nepal's national honor & sovereignty to them. The present state has been shamelessly permitting the foreign plunderers to grab the natural resources of Nepal and to trample upon our motherland. If this process is let to continue for some

¹⁰ See, Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), "Editorial ... War!" 9 In spreading the area of attack the Party was trying to avoid the concentration of the repressive force of the state in a particular area to minimise its losses.

more time ... the very existence of Nepal will be in jeopardy (Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), “Appeal” 12).

The Appeal brought into open the areas, where the Party wished to focus in future to mobilise its forces. It condemned the State for spreading, in league with the imperialists, their “corrupt, licentious and distorted culture”¹¹ to “corrupt the people culturally ... [and to] preserve their own heaven of plunder”. It categorised the then State as a “moribund ... structure”, which had “forced ... the people of different categories ... to live in a state of scarcity, injustice and terror”. It further said, that it treated “women as second class citizens”¹²; implemented an “educational system” which was tuned “to produce slaves of state”, and victimised people of all profession including the “national bourgeoisie” in the interest of “feudal and comprador & bureaucratic capitalist”. And in the name of democracy it “repeatedly ... [used] guns against the political activists or the ordinary masses that [held] political beliefs counter to the interest of the rulers” (Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), “Appeal” 12). Explaining why the country had reached to such “critical” stage of “nationalism, democracy and livelihood”, where the State was openly at war “against the people” it pointed out to “the alliance of feudalism [with] imperialism¹³” (Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), “Appeal” 13). Hence, as a solution to the state of affairs it observed, “Except for radical changes in all sphere, any possibility of reform has now become a mere chimera” (Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist),

¹¹ Its later attacks on private English schools were in tune with its denigration of imperialist culture.

¹² The state had failed even to pass a Bill in support of equal property rights for women till 2002. Hence, it was taking them into its fold by appealing to their condition.

¹³ See, Biswas 45–7 This article by Pushpa Kamal Dahal/Prachanda brings out exactly the relation that earlier Communist factions like NCP (Mashal) had perceived in between nationalism and democracy revealing that the Maoist perceptions were also guided by the idea of equating democratic ideal in nationalism to turn nationalism into an instrument of mobilisation. There was nothing superior in their versions which rationalised their violent tactics.

“Appeal” 12). The Appeal was in no way different from the documents of other Communist factions, at least, in projecting the woes of Nepal in the role of the imperialist and the expansionist. However, it differed on two counts. First, it was for the first time that a Party had raised objections against the very nature of the State (the documents of other factions focus on the ruling class) while calling for a total change. Second, it appealed the emotions of nationalities while denigrating the role of the *Khasas*.

From its beginning in 1996, Communist factions characterised CPN (Maoist) leadership and the revolt in various ways conveying similar perceptions. However, in NCP (UML)’s version there was a mild tinge of fear in losing its base. It characterised the revolt as a terrorist movement and its leaders as ultra-Leftist for it said:

When the popularity of Communist movement and NCP (UML) is on the rise, the NCP (Maoist) have started a violent, anarchist ‘People’s War’. By saying that there are no real Communists in the world they have generated among the people a dilemma and a pessimistic frame of mind ... Because of the entry of lumpen elements in its organisation ... its leadership has turned into an ultra-Leftist terrorist group. While remaining blind to the changing national and international scene ... its activities have only provided a support to the reactionary forces to work against the Communist movement. It has come up as a serious challenge to the movement (NCP (UML) 11)

In similar vein, NCP (NWPP) said: “From ideological point of view the ‘Maoist’ activities are an example of ‘Left’ opportunism and the State by its terrorist activities is supporting it” (NCP (Nepal Majdoor Kisan Party) 6). And using exactly the same words, NCP (Unity Centre) document said, “The ‘leftist’ opportunist group is now working under the name of Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)” (NCP (Unity Centre) 12). Other Communist factions, like NCP (MLM) commented, “The Party’s so-called People’s War lacks the basic ingredients needed for a genuine People’s War and its development”. However, NCP (Marxist) categorised it as a political problem demanding political solutions (Rising Nepal, “‘People’s War’ Criticised” 1996 Feb. 28). But, its later document commented:

The NCP (Maoist) represent the ultra-Leftist stream of the movement. Without analysing the present objective condition of the nation, its geopolitical characteristics and the power balance in the international

system ... the Party is waging its armed struggle on the basis of its subjective understanding. This will be suicidal for the Communist movement and will only invite repression which the movement will not be able to bear (NCP (Marxbadi (Marxist)) 18)

Finally, NCP (Masal) wrote:

The so-called People's War of the Maoist is a sign of 'Left' deviation. It will immensely harm the Communist movement of Nepal. We have reached this conclusion after thorough analysis of the country's subjective and objective conditions ... In fact, there is no People's War going on in our country, but what is going on in the name of 'People's War' is 'Police War' which the police is waging against the common people of the country (NCP (Masal), "RIM Ko ... Prastao" 630).

Thus, none of the Communist factions seemed to support the revolt. However, none of them explained why they considered the revolt as an act of terrorism or as an ultra-left deviation. Perhaps, at the back of their thinking was the class base of the Communist factions which conditioned their thinking to consider the CPN (Maoist)'s leadership from the same perspective. The CPN (Maoist), perceived in their reactions the polarisation of the parties into three distinct trends while pointing out that even within each group there was differences of opinion regarding the nature of the People's War for its document said:

On the basis of their reactions towards the people's war, it is clearly seen that they are divided into three main political trends ... Despite the differences of opinion within each group on whether to view the question as a political one or a purely terrorist activity, all in the reactionary camp are unanimous in repressing the people's war as 'anti-constitutional' and 'anti-democracy' activity, and the Nepali Congress (NC), the Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP [NDP]) and the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) are the main ones in this category ... The '*Bahudaliya Janabadi*' ... faction of this clique has been particularly aggressive to instigate the Government for repression and is conspiring to form its own Government & go into repression.

In the centrist camp fall mainly those small petty-bourgeois reformist groups that talk of Mao Thought & New Democratic revolution. These groups are trying to save their existence by hoodwinking the ordinary masses ... through their pretension of opposing both the people's war & the Government repression. Despite a qualitative difference, as the basic character of these groups is reformist & parliamentary cretinist, they are hurling the identical accusation of ultra-leftism to the people's war ... What has been seen in real life is that the honest & revolutionary cadres of these groups (particularly the liquidationist 'Unity Centre' and the neo-revisionist 'Mashal [Masal]') have been helping the people's war somehow or the other (Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), "Review ... Initiation and After" 17)

In pointing out that the minor factions were worried about their existence the Party

was perhaps correct, but in saying that there were differences within each group regarding the nature of People's War it was indulging in the spread of lies¹⁴. The Party was possibly doing so to fragment them—a revisit of Prithivinarayan's 18th century tactics which he had used in weakening his enemies. Immediately, after the initiation of the People's War the Government stepped up its security to check the Maoist activists, whom it viewed as terrorist. By February 22, the Home Ministry's spokesman declared the arrest of sixty people for taking part in terrorist activities (Rising Nepal, "HMG Steps up Security" 1996 Feb. 23). The RPP [NDP] which formed a constituent of the then Deuba Government viewed the movement as the result of deteriorating economic condition of the kingdom. It urged the Government to launch programmes to raise the living standard of the people. However, it also asked the Government to maintain law and order which seemed to carry a euphemistic connotation for stringent police action (Rising Nepal, "RPP Concerned" 1996 Mar. 11). By April 2, various Human Rights organisations were claiming that the Government was arresting people without prior notice and warrants; torturing them without presenting them before court within 24 hours, filing fake cases against them and killing them in fake encounters (Rising Nepal, "Rights Bodies Flay Govt" 1996 Apr. 3). Coming from independent Human Rights bodies, these complaints, seem to vindicate the Maoist claim that the "reactionary state" had thrown "into dustbin all pretensions of bourgeois democracy and rule of law" to let loose "fascist repression" against its activists. By the middle of May 1996, it claimed that the repression had taken the lives of 27 of its activist in Gorkha, Rukum, Rolpa and Sindhuli districts (Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), "Review ... Initiation and After" 6–7). Meanwhile, the Maoist held in 2052 Chaitra 10 [23 March 1996] their Politburo meeting at Syngja¹⁵ to declare their second plan or a set of tactics, which they called

¹⁴ Throughout the 90s neither their documents nor their actions reveal such differences of opinion.

¹⁵ See, CPN (Maoist), "Janayuddhako ... Agami Rananiti [23 March 1996]" 30

as their future strategy. The document produced on the occasion declared that the initiation of People's War had fulfilled its objective of putting the "politics of armed struggle in the forefront¹⁶ in the country" (16) and observed, "The initiation of the people's war was historic; but now the grave question of whether we are able ... to continue, defend and develop it is looming large before the Party" (17). Therefore, with the twin objective of giving continuity and developing the revolt the Party declared its set of tactics¹⁷. In brief, these were aimed at "prolonging the war" in a situation where there was a "balance of forces". In such a condition, its tactics was to "use the strategy of defence", "to harass the enemy, tire [it] out and attack at [its] weak points at the time & place of [the Party's] convenience [and] according to [the Party's] own plan" besides maintaining "constant interaction with the masses" (Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), "Review of Historic Initiation" 18). However, what it said after that needs to be noted for in those statements, which were stated as part of its tactics, lay its fear emerging out of its class basis for it said,

We should have a clear understanding that the danger of making wrong policies & programmes in the Party is inherent in the vacillating character of the petty-bourgeois class in Nepal. This class has the tendency of getting over excited and jumping into adventurism after a minor victory, and the tendency of getting disheartened [sic] and moving towards capitulation after minor defeat ... In the present

This is the Nepali version which gives the exact date and the place of the politburo meeting.

¹⁶ See, Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), "One Year of People's War" 9 By this the Party meant that the initiation of People's War had forced political forces to take a position vis-a-vis the new politics of revolt.

¹⁷ See, CPN (Maoist), "Janayuddhako ... Purak Prastao [1996/97]" 35 During this phase when the Party was under military attack from the Government side, it had made political campaign the main and military the auxiliary component of its tactics noting that when the political campaign becomes successful and when the Government turns defensive under the burden of political campaign then the main should be the military and political campaign the auxiliary component of the tactics. In fact, this in brief, as will be seen later, illustrated the entire tactical line of the Party throughout the period of struggle.

situation of the enemy in the offensive the capitulationist [sic] tendency is more dangerous for the Party (18).

The statement implied that even as a revolutionary Party, the Maoists were not free from petty-bourgeois deviations within their organisation. Finally, its document pointed out that the Party was now on its way to “concentrate on the development of guerrilla war in a planned way” (Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), “Review of Historic Initiation” 18). This was the essence of the second plan and according to the Party’s document it was “earnestly” implemented¹⁸ only from “October” 1996 (Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), “One Year of People’s War” 12). Under this plan the Party intended to “mobilise people for creating guerrilla zones¹⁹” (CPN (Maoist), “Janayuddhako ... Tesro ... Prastao [1997/98]” 51), “capture arms by attacking police posts” and “concentrate Party activities in the Western, Central and Eastern Zones to create guerrilla zones” (CPN (Maoist), “Janayuddhako ... Tesro ... Prastao [1997/98]” 52)

In the midst of these developments, from 26 August 1996, the Government began thinking in a different line: Home Minister, Khum Bahadur Khadka informed the Parliament of the day that efforts were on to establish contacts with the Maoists through Padma Ratna Tuladhar (a Communist), Jaya Prakash Anand and Rishikesh Shaha, a Human Right activist, to find solution to the problem through dialogue (Rising Nepal, “Govt Ready for Dialogue” 1996 Aug. 27). In such an “exercise” the Maoists perceived “conspiracy” (Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), “One Year of People’s War” 12). When Government changed, the Lokendra Bahadur Chand

¹⁸ See, Sharma 51 The writer, after consulting the Nepali version says that it began in June. This maybe true since the English version says that it started implementing the plan in earnest only in October. However, he again commits the mistake of dating the beginning of the Third Plan in June 1997 whereas the Maoist official version dates the beginning in mid-August. See below. Hence, it is better not to follow his dates.

¹⁹ Guerrilla Zones were areas where the guerrilla forces operated and where there was no scope for the exercise of People’s power. Places where such exercise of power was possible was called Guerrilla Base Areas.

Ministry, where the UML was one of its partners, formed a Commission in 27 April 1997—the Dhimi Commission to suggest ways to solve the Maoist problem. On 15 August, the Commission submitted its report (Rising Nepal, “Dhimi Panel” 1997 Aug. 15). According to Krishna Hachhethu, its suggestions, which he presents in a tabular form, were a mixture of non-coercive and coercive measures. The non-coercive measures suggested the path of “dialogue ... as the first initiative”, formation of “an all-Party negotiation team” to “prolong negotiations”, building of “national consensus”, launching of “political campaign” to brand “Maoists as terrorist”, bringing “ethnic groups into the mainstream” and of speeding development activities in “Maoist affected areas” while implementing “economic reforms” and increasing employment opportunities. The suggested coercive measures were, to “capture Maoist arsenals [and] to disarm them”, “arrest leaders and workers”, bring more areas “under military jurisdiction” while specially targeting “jungles occupied by Maoists” (Hachhethu 64). However, as seen in Chapter IV none of the Communist factions were in support of the coercive measures.²⁰ All of them favoured dialogue as the right

²⁰ See, Hachhethu 67 To explain why the Communist factions were pleading for peaceful means to resolve the issue, the author says, that in Nepal’s context to be left means one should advocate radical and revolutionary change. Such revolutionary change means to speak in favour of food, clothing and shelter, to be anti-India and to ask for absolute economic equality even at the cost of political liberty. Thus, a person could be a voter for the UML at election time as well as a worker for the CPN (Maoist) in the insurgency period. This explains why the UML and other communist parties are constantly pleading for the Maoist conflict to be resolved through non-violent means. Such explanation implies that in his perception cadres of all Communist factions were the same in posing themselves as revolutionaries and since they were supporting the Maoists in revolutionary phase their parent parties wished to protect them by advocating peaceful resolution of the problem. However, this explanation is deficient because it does not take into account two facts. First, the Maoists position, which till then was against the state structure. And second the failure of the Government in carrying out operations with precision. The former must have been construed by the factions as an end to the multi-party system and in that case it implied the end of their existence. They were, perhaps, seeking in the peaceful resolution the continuation of the system and thus their continued existence (this fact is revealed in M.K Nepal’s statement during Govt-Maoist talk. See, p. 195). The failure of the Government in carrying out operations with precision was another reason. The cry for peaceful resolution of the problem gave them the shield to hide their

course for the solution to the problem. Besides, this approach remained the avowed course of the Government throughout the period of Maoist insurgency possibly owing to the pressures from Human Rights groups and political parties. And for generating such pressure, if the claims of the Maoists is taken at face value, then the credit goes to their tactics, which had, after the declaration of the second plan, invited “Human Rights groups ... in the affected areas”, used “women, students and other groups” (CPN (Maoist), “Janayuddhako ... Purak Prastao [1996/97]” 32) and roped in “different political parties, organisations and individuals to pressurise the Government in eschewing the path of state terrorism” (CPN (Maoist), “Janayuddhako ... Purak Prastao [1996/97]” 33). In this stage, they were, according to their document, implementing the tactics of political attack against the Government when the Government was trying to suppress them militarily (See, footnote 17). This tactics of theirs became more pronounced when its new front organisation—the earlier being the UPFN under Baburam—the *Samyukta Rastriya Janandolan Samyojak Samiti* (United National People’s Coordination Committee), became active in the Nine Left parties’ movement from April 1998 (See, p.490). However, this front organisation had another intention. It was created in tune with the decisions of the Party which complemented its second plan. In the complementary document of the Party there were three more decisions to be implemented in the second plan period. These were: 1) “to work intensely for the mobilisation of poor peasants, workers, women and *janajatis*” 2) To “create a united front” and 3) “to create an army” (CPN (Maoist), “Janayuddhako ... Purak Prastao [1996/97]” 41, 42 and 44). Thus, the creation of the United National People’s Coordination Committee was a move towards the formation of a United Front at the Centre. Explaining why it was necessary, the Party document said:

There is a close relation between the development of protracted People’s War and the United Front. In our context, the function of the United Front should proceed along our tactics of creating local

actual intent.

Government until the capture of central power ... it has different functions at different tactical stages ... At present stage of developing guerrilla zones the Front has to function as an embryo of New Democratic Government and as an instrument to mobilise masses against imperialism and feudalism (CPN (Maoist), “Janayuddhako ... Purak Prastao [1996/97]” 42–3)

If it was its broad function its specific functions were, “to reflect the Party policy of autonomy for the nationalities”²¹ and “to carry out propaganda against the state” (CPN (Maoist), “Janayuddhako ... Purak Prastao [1996/97]” 43). And according to one of their leader’s note, written after the complementary decision, the United Front was formed “to isolate the principal enemy and unite the largest possible section of the people in every open and secret, military and non-military ... activities of the Party” (Biswas 45). The leader’s statement explained why the Coordination Committee/Front had to reflect the policy of autonomy for the nationalities (since the nationalities formed the bulk of the society) besides explaining its sudden appearance in the political scene of the kingdom. At that moment, there was, besides the different Communist factions, the NCP (ML) with its 46 MPs, which perhaps, besides the *Janajatis*, qualified as the representative of a large section of the people for the Maoists. Moreover, during that period the Government was under Girija Prasad Koirala under whom the revolt is said to have claimed 596 lives, the highest until 2000 (Maharjan 171). Hence, the situation was right not only for getting support from parties like NCP (ML), but also for taking steps towards the creation of a Front to carry on protest activities against the Government. Hence, the Maoist created the Coordination Committee to bring together the different Communist factions, but its plan to create a United Front, at the Centre, as an embryo of future Government did not materialise. The Coordination Committee simply vanished when the NCP (ML) joined the Girija Government in August 1998 (See p. 491). However, when its boycott

²¹ See, CPN (Maoist), “Janayuddhako ... Tesro ... Prastao [1997/98]” 96 During this period the Party was opening United Fronts even at the local level where one of the major intention was to publicise that without the coming of the Maoist to power autonomous structures for the nationalities would not be possible.

policy affected the local elections of May/June 1997 (See, Ch. II, footnote 114) its document, besides other, perceived in the phenomenon a crisis in the State structure; an opportunity to implement its tactics and its popularity among the people for it said:

According to the necessity of *Janyuddha*, the Party policy of boycott in the local elections has achieved unprecedented success. The success has brought into open the crisis in the reactionary ruling class and has intensified the contradictions among them creating many opportunities. First, it has opened up the opportunity for creating local People's Government. Second, it has reflected the popularity gained by the People's War among the people within a brief period of one and a half year challenging the propaganda against the War unleashed by the reactionaries. Third, the UML, in its bid to prove itself as a pro-people Party and to by-pass the crisis of the reactionary State, has to a large extent exposed the suppressive stance of the reactionary group against the People's War ... Fourth, this boycott has strengthened our Party organisation. Fifth, the boycott movement has more widely established the great People's War in the national and international level (CPN (Maoist), "Janayuddhako ... Tesro ... Prastao [1997/98]" 60)

By, "mid-August 1997" the Party launched its Third Plan. The plan was still a sub-plan of "Strategic Defence" (Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), "Develop Guerrilla Warfare" 1), where the political component of the tactics was the main and the military, the auxiliary. Hence, the kingdom had not as yet witnessed the full force of their violence. Its third plan, then set out two major objectives: political and military. Its political objectives had five tactical components among them the important ones were: "The establishment of United Front at the local level"²², "The political exposition of the UML faction ..." and "The organisation of political movements, based on the peasant class, both at the local and central level while advocating issues of day to day problems". Similarly, its military objective was centred around "creating

²² See, Prachanda 13 At the local level these Fronts were composed of oppressed classes (workers, peasants and women), nationalities, oppressed people (*dalits*) and the people of oppressed regions (people of Far-West and the Terai). According to the leader, this Front was necessary to smash a state which was based on unity imposed by the Hindu state power which in turn was based on class, national and regional inequality and oppression. He said the Front would ultimately build a new unity based on democratic values. The revolution was to give maximum importance to the question of national and regional oppression as an integral part of class struggle.

guerrilla zones in specific Western, Central and Eastern zones”, “Encouraging entire hill areas for armed struggle”, “Capturing of weapons to enhance the fighting capability of the Party” and “Readying itself to fight against the regular Army of the State” (CPN (Maoist), “Janayuddhako ... Tesro ... Prastao [1997/98]” 70). A press communiqué issued on 13 February 1998 by the Central Military Commission of the Party pointed out that the process of creating People’s Army was proceeding along three directions, namely “arming of the general masses, preparing a broad and extensive network of the people’s militia and principally, building a regular people’s army” (Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), “Press Communique ... C. P. N (Maoist)” 3). And the reason for creating such a violent society was expressed in high-sounding Marxist/Maoist cant as follows:

In a class-divided society, everything is an illusion except state power. The principal organ of the class-related state is the army. The people without an army have nothing of their own. The proletarian revolutionaries fight for the state power ... so that an environment may be created for weathering away of the class, state, army and all forms of wars from the society (Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), “Press Communique ... C. P. N (Maoist)” 3).

Their violence intensified and the State reacted with another operation, code named Kilo Sera Two from May 1998. If Communist factions like NCP (Unity Centre) saw in it the role of India (See, Chapter II p.181), the Maoist found in it the opportunity to intensify its violence for it said, “As the reactionary state, as expected, unleashed a genocidal suppression campaign under the garb of the so-called operation kilo-sera-two ... the glorious Party of the proletariat ... gave a tit-for-tat response” (Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), “Editorial ... Base Areas” 1). Then the Fourth Extended Central Committee of the Party held in August 1998 decided to implement its tactics of creating Base Areas (Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), “Editorial ... Base Areas” 1). It was its fourth plan which was implemented only in October 17, 1998 (Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), “Third Turbulent Year ... Review” 23). According to its document, it was necessary for waging “protracted People’s War of surrounding the city by the countryside” and for exercising “people’s political power”

(Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), “Document ... Fourth Expanded Meeting” 8, 9). For establishing such bases in Western region, the Party claimed that “situation [had] developed because of strong mass base, strong Party, favourable terrain ... elimination of social class enemies ... and to certain extent defeat of local military strength of the reactionary states” (9). However, it contended that for maintaining them the “guerrilla activities must be pursued uninterrupted throughout the country” complemented with “various forms of mass movements” (10). The kingdom was in for more violence. Then the Party held the full meeting of the Central Committee in July 1999. What transpired in the meeting is not clear, but it appears that it decided to launch its fifth plan in the July meeting, because according to Sudheer Sharma the Party launched its fifth plan “in August 1999” (52). The Fifth Plan according to the Party document, which is undated, was also for consolidating the Base Areas (CPN (Maoist), “Aitihashik ... Pachau Yojana” 126) and in the Sixth Plan the Party was on its way to creating more base areas, for its organ states, “During the Fifth & the Sixth Plans, there have been qualitative leaps in both military and administrative formation in the prospective base areas” (Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), “Reports ... Political Power” 40). According to Sudheer Sharma, the Sixth Plan lasted until February 2001 (52).

“In VS 2057 Magh 26–Fagun 1 [8–12 February 2001]” (CPN (Maoist), “Mahan Agragami Chalang ... Awasykta” 204), the Party held its Second National Conference to advocate a new “set of ideas”, which its document claimed to have developed “in the form of centralised expression of collective leadership, as ‘Prachanda Path’” (Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), “The Great Leap Forward ... History” 61). It was its new ideology prescribed for capturing State power in Nepal. To come to such ideological position the Party, claims, as was claimed by the RIM in the letter sent to NCP (Masal) while highlighting the contributions of Mao, that it has synthesised its “thoughts on the background of the experience of 5 stormy years of great People’s War” (Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), “The Great Leap Forward ... History” 43). And the areas where it claims to have brought changes as a result of

such synthesis is itemised as 1. On Party building 2. On the formation of Army and military line 3. On the New Democratic State and development of the United Front, and 4. On Party mass-line. On Party building process, following the principles of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, it claims that it gave up Stalin's concept that a Party is a "monolithic unity" and adopted, in line with Mao's prescription, the "dialectical method of developing the Party", meaning, it encouraged "unity of opposites and two-line struggle" (52). It says, without explaining, that its "Unity Congress set up a scientific method to contest two-line struggle on actual and genuine ideological and political ground instead of hypocritic tradition of addressing the individual and groupist dispute" (52–3). This, it says led to the birth of a united Party, CPN (Maoist) without the possibility of fragmentation in future [! the Party fragmented in June 2012, see, Postscript, footnote 3). The other change which it brought in the process of struggle was in the "structure and working style of the Party" (53) to recruit "New and young Party members from poor peasants, women, depressed communities, nations and indigenous nationality communities, and backward regions" (53). This was done to reduce old member, as prescribed by Lenin, and to infuse the Party with young blood as prescribed by Mao. Finally, it says, the Fourth Extended Meeting of the Central Committee added three more changes. These changes were: "to conduct rectification campaign, to centralise ... leadership at various levels, and nomination of youth to the Central Committee" (53). This was done to coordinate "the old, adult and young revolutionaries" and to ensure "continuous revolution under the leadership of the Proletariat" (53), but without recruiting activists from proletariat class. And the effect of all these it says, led to the creation of "a strong headquarter led by Com. Prachanda developed as a core of the Party unity", where "On the basis of struggle against and victory over right, 'left' and centrist trends, Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideology was synthesised" (53). After that, the Party claims that it has developed a military line of People's War for the 21st century. It says, that the military line of general insurrection, the Russian model, has certain characteristics, which the people of the third world, while leading their struggle, as per the Chinese model of protracted

war, should emulate. This meant the mixing of a “continuous intervention by the political Party of the proletariat at the centre of reactionary state”, “training the masses including the workers with continuous strikes and street struggles on the basis of revolutionary demands” etcetera with the “stages of the protracted People’s War” (56). On the New Democratic State and united Front it says, “in less than one year of People’s War, the Party started to proceed by adopting the proposal as presented by Com. Prachanda that the New Democratic state in Nepal shall take the form of a class ethnic and, regional United Front” (57). Finally, on the issue of Party mass-line it points out that its line emphasises “general mass insurgency” with a political purpose of seizing “state power by means of PW [People’s War]”. This it calls as “revolutionary massline” which had originated in “the revolutionary line led by Comrade Prachanda” and was “modified ... by the Unity Congress” (58). The synthesis of these thinking it says, “represents a great leap forward” in the “universal principles of MLM” (62). A cursory glance through these claims points out to the concentration of everything in one person, that is, Prachanda. Besides, it shows that the Party was not at all interested in the entry of proletariat into its organisational structure despite its claim that its structure was changed to ensure the continuous leadership of the proletariat. Moreover, in these synthesis one finds that it was more of a Party which was inclined towards the development of a structure which preferred the entry of members chosen on the basis of ethnic, nationalities and regional considerations. By advocating such a position, the Party had therefore revised Mao’s New Democratic strategy. One wonders how such thinking was being claimed by the Party as a new synthesis of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism. It was rather eclecticism, and in their own words Bernsteinism of the highest order.

After the meeting their violence continued amid news about possible dialogue between them and the Government. However, when the dialogue took place in October–November 2001 they backed out after attending the third round of talks (For reasons see p.194). Then, as per the decision of its First National Convention held in September 2001, the Party declared the formation of United Revolutionary People’s

Council, Nepal under Baburam Bhattarai. It was formed “to institutionalize the New Democratic/People’s Democratic²³ Republic in the country” (Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), “Common ... Policy ... of ... URPC” 56). It was a long document with seventy five programmes outlining the Party’s policies on all conceivable areas. Coming from the CPN (Maoist), it was the first document of its kind, which underlined the future governmental structure of the State. However, during the revolutionary period the Body itself, the URPC, was to function as a Council to “unite and mobilize all anti-feudal and anti-imperialist/anti-expansionist forces and the general masses” to initiate the tactics of “armed insurrection” with “People’s War” (56). And though the Council was a Front and an embryo of future Government structure its dependence on the ‘general masses’ seemed to reflect the future trend of the Party. Besides, its declaration of the classes, which the State was going to serve bordered on the position of the UML in the 90s, except in indicating that the State was going to consider the interest of the nationalities for it said:

The fundamental character of New Democratic or People’s Democratic republican State shall be the people’s democratic dictatorship with the participation of all the progressive classes including the national bourgeoisie and oppressed nations/nationalities based on worker-peasant alliance under the dictatorship of the proletariat (56)

To create such a State, it prescribed first the destruction of the then “reactionary state” followed by the formation of “an interim Government consisting of all anti-feudal and anti-imperialist/anti-expansionist forces”. Such a Government was expected to hold elections based on adult suffrage to elect “people’s representatives” to frame a “new constitution” (56). In such a State, it was not claiming one-Party dictatorship of the Communist Party, at least, for a long time, and its statements carried a veiled threat against those who were against its struggle for it said:

Contrary to the propaganda of the reactionaries that there is one-Party dictatorship of the Communist Party in the New Democracy/People’s Democracy, full freedom will be guaranteed for various patriotic,

²³ Note, how they equate two different strategy while talking about revisionism.

democratic and leftist parties on the basis of mutual co-operation and supervision with the Communist Party for a long time. However, the people ... who would play reactionary role during the people's revolution and act against the cause of the country ... shall be deprived of all political rights for a definite period (Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), "Common ... Policy ... of ... URPC" 56-7)

The threat and the license it gave for the continuity of multi-Party system were perhaps meant for gaining support of the parties in its the then struggle, because after the so-called synthesis of its thought it was also trying to initiate general insurrection. As such, its economic policy was also not averse to private property and in some way seemed to support a mixed economy with germs of socialist economy for it said:

Instead of imposing socialist relations in the economy from the very beginning, socialist-oriented capitalist relations shall be developed. Therefore, a proper balance of private ownership, joint-ownership and collective ownership shall be maintained in the New Democratic/People's Democratic system ... Except through legal means, nobody's private property shall be confiscated (57)

Its agrarian policy advocated the policy of "land to the tillers" after seizing land "owned by feudal, bureaucratic capitalist and *Guthis* ", but in case of "rich and medium level peasants" it declared that it would implement "ceiling ...keeping in mind the ratio of availability of land and population" (60). Here also it qualified its revolutionary land reform policies to propitiate the nationalities for it said, "While implementing revolutionary land reform programme in the autonomous areas of oppressed nationalities and regions, care shall be taken to prevent historical incursions into them" (61). On industrial development it prescribed "planned attempt ... for rapid development ... by nationalizing the capital being misused in the hand of the comprador and bureaucratic bourgeoisie ... and by liberating national industries from the grip of imperialism ... particularly Indian monopoly capital" (62). Such indecisive and pro-nationality policies coming from a Party which believed in destroying the State through armed struggle was in itself confusing. Rest of its policies indicated its stand over a collection of issues which were current in the political field of the kingdom. As usual, it declared its antipathy towards "All the semi-colonial and neo-colonial treaties ... including the Treaty of 1950"; it promised a "secular state" (57); "a People's Liberation Army" under the control of the Government, governance free

from “red-tapism, corruption and extravagance” (59), eradication and re-settlement of the *Kamaiya* (60), equal rights to women on paternal properties, and end to all forms of exploitation against oppressed castes (65). Finally, it devoted a complete section of the document to outline its policies about the nationalities. For ending *Aryan-Khas* exploitation of the nationalities it promised them “the right to self determination ... within the framework of national autonomy program of New Democratic/People’s Democratic system”. It ensured “more than one autonomous areas” for nationalities “scattered in more than one area”. In areas with mixed nationalities it declared “local state power on proportional basis”. Besides, it promised them entry into the “People’s Army”, “freedom to promote their languages” and in the same vein promised “separate national autonomous regions for ... nationalities speaking different languages (e.g., Maithili, Bhojpuri, Awadhi etc.)” (64–5). Thus, in essence, its policies, besides exploiting the current issues of the kingdom—other Communist factions also did this—were different on only one count: its heightened appeal to the nationalities. Thus, the petty bourgeois led movement was using ethnic dissatisfaction to mobilise them against a State to fulfil its objective of smashing the State. Besides, it also indicated how ideologies could be manipulated in applying them in a differing context. Moreover, coming to this document one understands that they were not very clear about their strategy: they were treating both New Democratic and People’s Democratic strategies as synonyms. As regards their views on the Parliamentary system the movement of the UPFN before its fragmentation in 1994 makes it clear that they were not in favour of continuing its existence, because they wanted to destroy it. However, the extent to which they disliked the Parliament, is reflected only in this document where they state,

Unlike the bourgeois parliament, which is merely a toothless debating club, the House of People’s Representatives²⁴ shall be the most

²⁴ See, Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), “Common ... Policy ... of ... URPC” 58 The House of People’s Representatives was to be there at all levels with representatives elected by the people on the basis of adult franchise.

powerful organs equipped with legislative and executive rights. They shall make the people experience not only formal democracy but also genuine democracy since they shall have representation of various classes, nationalities, regions, and also of patriotic and democratic eminent personalities (Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), “Common ... Policy ... of ... URPC” 58)

Thus, ended their last document before Gyanendra destroyed the parliamentary system of Nepal.

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