

Chapter 3

Evolution of Communist Movement in Nepal till 1990

Early Years, Development after 1960, Splits within the Movement

1. Formation of Communist Party of Nepal: Its Initial Documents

As described (See p.43), disillusioned by Regmi's activities Pushpalal left for Calcutta. On reaching there, he says, "His contact with Nripen Chakraborty and Ratanlal Brahmin and ... his belief that the International Communists would instantaneously support the launch of a Communist Party in Nepal encouraged him to open Nepal Communist Party" (Pushpalal, *Itihas* 32). Further, he notes, "Revolutionary friends from Kathmandu Valley and from Eastern and Western Nepal were also conferring with me on the issue" (35). From then onwards, describing the formation of Nepal Communist Party, he writes:

On 22nd of April 1949 a meeting was held among Pushpalal, Niranjana Govind Vaid, Narayanvilas Joshi and Narbahadur at Shyambazar, 28, Naveen Sarkar Lane, Calcutta. Meanwhile, Durgadevi had also arrived from Kathmandu so she was also included as the founding member in the organisational committee of the Party. This committee appointed Pushpalal as the general secretary of the Party and gave him the responsibility of organising the Party at the Central level. The responsibility of organising the Party in Bara, Parsa and Rautahat was given to Niranjana Govind Vaid, because he had played an active role in Birganj area during the 1947 Satyagraha movement. Narayanvilas and Durgadevi were asked to look after Kathmandu Valley and Narbahadur was given the responsibility of working among the workers of Biratnagar and Jogbani (35).

However, there exists a controversy regarding the exact date when the Party was formed and regarding the number of founding members. The date controversy stems from one¹ of Pushpalal's articles and one later document² of the Party. In both these works, he points out that the Party was formed on 15 September 1949. However, in another article, Pushpalal writes, "The Party was formed on 22 April 1949 and it was

¹ See, Shrestha 32 In this article the author points out that the Party was formed on 15 September 1949.

² See, NCP (Pushpalal), "Nepal ... Singhawalokan Awam Siksha" 10 This document also declares that the Party was formed in September 1949.

formally declared on 15 September 1949” (Pushpalal, “Nepali ... Ek Samiksha” 186). Confounding the issues further, there exists a signed statement of three founding members, who in the 70s were in one of the later factions of Nepal Communist Party, NCP (Chautho Mahadhiwayshun (Fourth Congress)). In their statement, they point out that the Party was formed “On 22nd April 1949, the date which coincided with the birthday of Lenin, and there were only four founding members of the Party namely, Pushpalal, Narayanvilas Joshi, Narbahadur and Niranjan Govind Vaid” (NCP (Masal), “Partyko Janma Diwas Barey ... Baktabya” 804–5). Besides, Anirudha Gupta writes, “... some Nepalese met at Calcutta on 15 September 1949 and founded the Communist Party” (200), and if one goes through the footnote related to the statement then the reference is to the document “Jatiya Aandolanma Nepal Communist Party”.³ Surendra K C points out to Leo. E. Rose’s⁴ similar statement, which was based on the same document. Then he quotes, the document which only says, “When the Party was formed on 15 September 1949 there were only 5 (Niranjan Govind Vaid, Narayan Vilas, Narbahadur, Durgadevi and Pushpalal) members”. Then, he argues, on the basis of other documents, that on 15 September 1949 there was no meeting in Calcutta. Besides, he points out that the process of forming the Party had already started on 22 April 1949. Hence, he blames both Gupta and Rose for supplying the name of the city on their own (K. C., Nepalma Communist 56–7). Besides, he argues that they had disregarded the importance of April 22, 1949 in the Party formation process. However, for all these controversies he identifies three factors. First, Pushpalal, in his lifetime, did not clearly state that on 22 April the organisational committee of the Party was formed and that it was a step towards the formation of Nepal Communist Party. Second, because of fragmentation of the Party in later years the members of different factions tried to sully the names of Pushpalal by arguing that he even kept

³ See, K. C., “Jatiya Andolanma” 201–13 This is the document of the Party which the author has placed in the Appendix to his work.

⁴ He quotes Leo. E. Rose in Scalapino 346

the date of Party formation a secret. Third, both Anirudha Gupta and Leo E Rose spread wrong information. Then he concludes, “Documentary evidences suggest that the Party was formed on 15 September 1949 [the day its manifesto came out] ... but the process started in Calcutta on 22 April 1949 where there were 5 members” (61).

On 22 April 1949 the Party brought out its first document. Analysing the world situation and its influence in Nepal, it stated: “After the Second World War the influence and prestige of the socialist world is on the rise. No country can keep itself away from the influences of this new world, the socialist world. Even in Nepal the socialist wind is very strong...” (NCP, “Nagarik Swatantrata ... Banaw!” 47). But, instead of analysing the historic stage of Nepalese development it described the state of democratic rights in Nepal. And doing so it drew the relation between the Rana regime, Nehru and the Anglo-American imperialists for it stated:

The Ranas have the freedom to meet their God, the Anglo-American imperialist whenever and wherever they want. For jointly exploiting the people of Nepal the Ranas can meet Indian business tycoons: the Tatas, the Birlas, the Singhanias and the Goenkas whenever they want. The Ranas can meet Nehru to send our illiterate but brave youths outside Nepal to protect the wealth that the tycoons have amassed by exploiting the people of India. But, for us, the working people of Nepal there are no rights to organise against hunger, unemployment and the increasing exploitation of the Ranas. By curbing our rights to protest, the Ranas have stopped us from raising our voices against their design which in collusion with American imperialist and Nehru’s undeclared policy of neo-colonialism is trying to convert Nepal into a theatre of war against Soviet Union, China and all freedom movements of Asia... (NCP, “Nagarik Swatantrata ... Banaw!” 47).

And by way of explaining why the Ranas feared the transfer of democratic rights to the people it identified its enemies and allies. It stated, “The Ranas do not want us to enjoy democratic rights, because they know that under such circumstances we will raise our voices against the Zamindars, usurers, capitalists ... and against the imperialists who are exploiting us” (48). Then, indicating forces whom it considered as its allies, it stated, “They know it well that if we get our voices then we will organise our *majdoor* (working class), peasants, students, youths and all democratic forces against them” (48). So, its tactics then was aimed at destroying the Ranas, and “to fight for freedom” (48). This freedom was then to be used “by the labourers for

asking higher wages; by peasants to win their rights over land, by students for getting cheaper education and by women to end their exploitation” (48). But, while giving its call for action, which could be both ‘violent and non-violent’, it did not mention the classes upon whom it relied. It bundled them simply as ‘people’ and called upon them to form ‘revolutionary committees’ and if need be to ‘go underground’ for it stated: “To achieve these ends the people must organise themselves in every lane, village, town ... and every industrial establishment as revolutionary committees. If need be they should adopt even violent means and go underground” (49). However, in such action it ruled out the participation of Nepali Congress, whom it identified as “lackeys of treacherous socialist leaders of India and as a force habituated to ending struggle into compromises [impression which Pushpalal carried from 1947 see p.41] with the Ranas” (49). But, its strategy was clear it wanted to move towards communism for it said, “After destroying the Ranas the struggle should continuously move towards socialism and finally towards communism” (50).

Later on 15 September 1949⁵ the manifesto of the Party was brought out. After the Second World War, the document viewed the world divided into two camps: “the camp of imperialism, reaction and World War led by [the] U. S and British monopoly capital and the camp of anti-imperialism, democracy and peace led by the Socialist Soviet Union” (NCP, Manifesto 3). In it, the Party perceived Anglo-American imperialists engaged in aiding and abetting reactionaries worldwide to instigate war against Soviet Union to avert their—the imperialists’—internal economic crisis for it said:

The Anglo-American imperialist warmongers⁶ are actively helping the reactionaries throughout the world against the rising tide of democratic forces inside every country, [and] are arming and leading aggressive war against liberation struggles in the colonies and semi-colonies. They are making hurried preparations for instigating a Third World war

⁵ See, Pushpalal, Itihas 43 The Manifesto was brought out as ‘cyclostyled’ copies.

⁶ See, NCP, Manifesto 3 The party argues that American involvement in Nepal is chiefly guided by its goal of converting Nepal into an anti-Soviet military base.

against Soviet Union and people's democratic states in an attempt to escape the impending capitalist crisis and safeguard their bankrupt capitalist system of inhuman exploitation (3).

Under such circumstances, the document viewed the Ranas as Nepalese reactionaries, whose policies⁷ were aimed at “offering Nepal as a war-base in the service of U.S. war mongers”, “offering Nepal's man power to defend British imperialism”⁸ and in “Handing over Nepal's trade and commerce to the Indian bourgeoisie and their Nehru Government” (4). In their view, the last intent not only allowed Indian capitalists to exploit Nepal, but also ‘reinforced’ feudal exploitation to burden Nepalese under a system of ‘dual exploitation’ for their document said:

The Indian big business [es] protected and spearheaded by their own Govt. in New Delhi is ‘opening’ up Nepal in a big war. Birla, Singhanias and Chaudharias have already opened jute, textile, cotton and sugar mills in Nepal. Nehru Govt. itself has taken up the Koshi Project. Major portion of capital invested in Nepal today belongs to the Indian capitalists. These Indian capitalist sharks are out to exploit cheap labour and natural resources of Nepal to fatten their own money-bags and not to industrialise Nepal ... Thus Nepalese people are being put under double yoke-feudal exploitation is being reinforced by capitalist exploitation (4).

Such a doubly exploitative society, in their view, was in the ‘feudal’ stage of historic development where a few areas had come under capitalist mode of production. In it, the peasant class was the most burdened, because it suffered from the exploitation of

⁷ See, NCP, Manifesto 3 The Ranas were following such policies to strengthen their position against the rising tide of democratic movement in Nepal. The Party statement implied that Rana policies were meant for ingratiating themselves with the Anglo-American imperialists and the Indian Government to seek their support in maintaining Rana rule.

⁸ See, NCP, Manifesto 2 and 4 The Party sees the Ranas as British friends from the day they came to power in Nepal. As British friends, the Ranas ensure the supply of Nepalese youths to fuel its war efforts. In this relation Nehru government helps the British in recruiting Nepalese soldiers. To substantiate their argument the NCP points out the November 9, 1947 Treaty which was signed in Kathmandu between Nepal, India and Britain. In this Treaty, they argue, that in one of its clauses Nehru has agreed, as British friend, of course, to allow the British to maintain British recruitment centres in Indian soil in Gorakhpur and at Ghoom, a cantonment in Darjeeling of West Bengal, till alternative arrangements are made.

the feudal forces and shouldered the responsibility of maintaining the system for its document said:

Feudal despots rule over Nepal ever since 1385 [sic]. The changes that have taken place during the course of the centuries have only gone to strengthen despotism of the Ranas. Although capitalist mode of production has been introduced in certain parts of Nepal, feudal mode of production and administration has still the decisive influence.

Self-sufficient natural economy still prevails in the country, though in a dying form. The peasants produce not only their own food but also the most of the articles they use. The Ranas, landlords, *Dwarays*, *thalus* (big-courtiers) and the *Mukhias* spend away the rent extorted from the peasants for their own personal enjoyment. Formerly these rents were not used for bartering. But now even though bartering system has been introduced by this [these] feudal parasites, it has not yet any decisive effect.

The feudal ruling class – the Ranas, *Sahebjews*, nobles, landlords, *gurujees* (royal priests) and rising middle classes own most of the land. The peasants owned a very small portion of land or non-at all. The peasants use their own tools to plough the land of their overlords and have to part away with three-fourths of their crops to satisfy the greed of their masters....

The peasants are not only to bear the intolerable burden of exploitation by the whole breed of Ranas and the feudal overlords, but also to maintain the entire feudal bureaucracy and the anti-people Armed Forces of the state by paying tributes, taxes and forced labour (1–2).

On the basis of such analysis, the document then identifies the enemies of the people in the “foreign imperialists” (2), and the “Indian bourgeoisie” whom “The Maharana [Ranas] is inviting [has invited] ... to strengthen his position against the rising tide of democratic movement in Nepal”. For them, the ruling class of Nepal was “a puppet of Anglo-American imperialism and the Indian satellites”. Under them, it sensed the problems of the people of Nepal to “multiply and intensify” (3). So, it called upon the people to follow the path of destroying feudal order; imperialist-capitalist domination over Nepal and to establish a democratic State moving towards the goal of people’s democracy and socialism under the leadership of the working class, which it expected to grow numerically in future for it stated:

The people of Nepal must pave a different path [not the Third Path of Nehru, see p. 268]—the path of completely overthrowing the existing feudal order and the imperialist-capitalist domination over Nepal in active alliance with the world democratic camp and establish a democratic state of the toiling people led by the working class, a state system where people will own the wealth of the nation and develop it for their own benefit. The people of Nepal must fight to blast their way to people’s democracy and socialism. The experience of the land of victorious socialism – the USSR, the experience of people’s

democratic states of Eastern Europe, New China, North Korea, the marching ranks of the colonial people are daily inspiring them in this glorious struggle, as they are inspiring the enslaved people everywhere. In the struggle for the overthrow of feudal order and imperialist domination over Nepal, the working class is historically destined to lead the vanguard role. Though small in number today the working class of Nepal's daily growing stronger both numerically and politically in the very process of intensification of capitalist exploitation (NCP, Manifesto 4–5).

Then it called upon its allies “the workers, peasants, soldiers, toiling middle classes and the entire democratic minded people of Nepal” to wage their struggle against the system (5). However, such statements of theirs create a problem in understanding their strategy. From the classes identified as allies, theirs was an anti-capitalist strategy—there is no mention of the bourgeois class—but by the tenor of their argument, which is anti-imperialist and anti-feudal, the Party should have chosen anti-imperialist/anti-feudal strategy taking the national bourgeoisie as one of its allies. The fact that they were appealing to the people to struggle for the establishment of people's democracy and the fact that during this time Ranadive, one of the leaders of Communist Party of India was also advocating the same strategy it appears that Pushpalal might have picked up the strategy from Indian Communists. The doubt is further strengthened when one comes across Windmiller and Overstreet's observation on Ranadive's “formulation of ‘people's democracy’”, which they say, “implied” an anti-capitalist⁹ stance (288). Naturally, under such situation their strategy was bound to conflict with their tactics. Their tactics mixed anti-capitalist stance with anti-imperial and anti-feudal stances. It criticised Nehru's nascent ideas on non-alignment as a ‘third path’. It categorised it as a reactionary path, which the exploiters of Nepalese people had chosen to cover up their alliance with Nehru. And since the path, according to the

⁹ See, Windmiller and Overstreet 288–9 During this time Ranadive was critical of pre-1947 view of people's democracy. In his reformulation of the strategy he argued that Indian economy had already reached a high-stage of capitalist development and was ready for conversion to the socialist revolution. The authors argue, that such stand implied that in India democratic revolution had virtually been completed—that imperialism had been practically eliminated and the bourgeoisie had come to power. So, the bourgeois capitalism was the main enemy.

NCP, ultimately ended under the umbrella of the ‘imperialist-bourgeois-feudal’ camp, it asked for its rejection by observing,

To cover up their treachery to the exploited people and subservience to the exploiting classes, they have raised the false slogan of ‘Third Path’. But there can be no ‘third path’ no ‘middle-of-the-road’ policy in a world sharply divided into camps – the camp of capitalism led by Anglo-US monopoly capital and the camp of socialism, led by the USSR and the International working class. Everyone must choose between these two camps, two paths. The cry of ‘third path’ is a political camouflage to hide the alliance with reaction, to hide the face of treachery. The ‘third path’ of Nehru is a damning proof in point. Nehru began with ‘Third Path’ and within a few months has landed himself in the camp of imperialist-bourgeois-feudal combine, in the camp of Anglo-American warmongers. Such is the inevitable destination of ‘Third Path’. This is the foul banner of international social democracy – the banner of treachery to the working class (NCP, Manifesto 7–8).

However, the incident, which illustrated Nehru’s Third Path ending in the camp of the imperialist-bourgeois-feudal combine is not clearly indicated. The Party was perhaps referring to the 9 November 1947 treaty between Nepal, India and Britain (See footnote 8). Nevertheless, the statements were enough to reflect its tactical position. At the international level, it decided to forge an active alliance with the world democratic camp and within Nepal it called upon its allies “to unite in a common front against feudal autocracy” (5). This common front; which excluded the NNC (both Regmi and Koirala group), the representatives of “the thin strata of the rising middle class oriented towards reaction and the disconcerted Ranas”, was to be led by the working class to establish a democratic State (7). Then, in tune with its strategy, it listed a 12 point programme on the basis of which the front was expected to unite. Of these, the first called for “complete abolition of feudal autocracy and foreign domination” (5). The second, by focusing on the need for “A democratic Govt. representing workers, toiling peasants and oppressed petty-bourgeoisie ...” partially clarified its definition of a democratic Government (5). The third, eighth, eleventh and twelfth called for “A Constitution based on adult suffrage ... [which discouraged] privileges and discrimination [based] on caste, race and community”, “Repeal of all repressive legislation”, “the right to free education”, and “equal ... rights to women” (6). The remaining programmes raised voices for “Abolition of landlordism and all

forms of feudal exploitation ... land to the tillers ... living wage for agricultural labourers”, “industrial ... nationalisation”, “Economic plan to develop country’s resources ... Control of profits in the industries in private hands”, and the tenth programme called for “arming of the people and the establishment of a people’s democratic army” (6). Thus, the tactics then was focused on the fight for democracy, for the economic freedom of the nation and in creating a common front. However, if one goes by Gupta’s observations then it appears that its activities then were also influenced by the perceptions and guidance of Cominform for he states: “The ... Party set before itself the task of organising Nepalese peasants and workers into militant bodies and starting peace movement in Nepal as part of the Communist directed world peace movement”. However, he writes this to argue that the Nepalese Communists had chosen the tactics out of their “dogmatically held ... view that more than fighting the Ranas its primary task was to fight for world peace” (200), but such conclusion about NCP’s the then tactics is proved neither by existing documents nor by memoirs of Pushpalal. Hence, it would be more prudent to understand their peace movements as initiatives linked with their tactics of creating a broad front, and as Joshi and Rose write, as moves for enlisting the support of the intellectuals for they say:

Tactically, it attempted to organize numerous front organisations and to unite all ‘progressive forces’ into a broad ‘People’s Front’ to fight the Rana Congress coalition Government. It concentrated its attention on three groups in the capital — students, intellectuals (mainly writers and poets), and peasants. A pro-Communist student organization, the ‘Vidyarthi Federation’, was set up, and the Nepal Peace Council, with international Communist affiliations, was established to solicit the support of the intellectuals. A peasants’ organization (Nepal Kisan Sangh) was organised, as well as a women’s organization (Nepal Mahila Sangha) and a labour organization (the All Nepal Trade Union Congress)... (129).

Following the declaration of its manifesto, absence of documentary evidence bars one from describing NCP’s activities in between September 1949 and the beginning of 1950/51 revolt. As regards, their role in the revolt there exists conflicting evidences: both written and oral. These evidences, at one end, reject the Party’s participation in the revolt; at the other end, they credit the Party with participation. In between exist opinions, which neither accept nor reject the Party’s participation in the revolt leaving

space for much speculation. In the first category of such evidences comes one of the later documents of the Party, which categorically denies its participation in the revolt for it observes:

The capitalist democratic revolution was led by the Nepali Congress. But the decisive forces were not the Nepali Congress, but the King and the Indian capitalist class. The King had been made inconsequential by the Ranas so in the democratic transformation of Nepal the King and the Indian capitalists turned out to be an active force. In that revolt the peasants could not participate because it was under the autocratic regime of the Ranas. Therefore, the participants were the petty bourgeois class, the liberal-feudal elements dissatisfied with the familial role of the Ranas and the middle class of the cities (NCP, Rastriya ... Mulbato 5–6).

In the middle comes the finding of Surendra K. C who, on the basis of interviews with Communist leaders like Rayamajhi, Kamalraj Regmi and based on D. P Adhikari's writing concludes: "Though the Communists did not formally participate in the revolt, yet it informally took part in the revolt" (91). But, spreading across Pushpalal's writings are his claims which credit the Party with active participation in the revolt for he says: "... though the Communist Party was at its fledgling stage, yet it supported the revolt and declared that it would convert it into an anti-feudal, anti-imperialist movement" (Pushpalal, "Nepali ... Ek Samiksha" 190). Then in yet another work he writes, "It ... adopted the policy of leading the movement to its successful conclusion ... to convert the revolt into a long drawn armed peasant movement" (Pushpalal, Itihas 62). His comments on the role of the Communist in the revolt simply bolsters his claims (See p. 47). And if one goes by his claims then it amounts to believing that what precluded NCP from participating fully in the revolt was not the decision of the Party, but the machination of the Nepali Congress and the Government of India for he writes:

Immediately after the start of the armed movement the Nepali Congress in collusion with the Indian Government unleashed a policy of confrontation against the NCP. The revolutionary Government in Morang jailed Man Mohan Adhikari and Narbahadur. Similarly, the Indian Government jailed Tulsilal Amatya, Kedar Upadhyaya, PN Rana in Raxaul, an Indian town bordering Birganj, and issued warrant of arrest against Pushpalal in West Bengal (Pushpalal, Itihas 61–2).

After the conclusion of Delhi Accord, the Communists began repudiating the outcome

of the revolt when their intended goal was not fulfilled. Hence, the Party's later document which disowned its role in the revolt was perhaps its expression of its denigration of the revolt. As for Surendra K. C's conclusion one has to agree that they are based on opinions and writings of leaders whose positions within the Communist movement in Nepal are viewed with suspect. Moreover, the opinions were expressed much later hence they could be thought over opinions about the revolt. Hence, they need to be taken cautiously. But, one cannot, on similar basis, doubt the claims of Pushpalal, because they were his immediate reactions on the nature of the movement. Besides, historical facts also attest to his views that there was Indian complicity in the revolt. Hence, his perceptions cannot be brushed aside. Even then, his claims cannot be fully accepted because of the presence of the counterclaims. Hence, it would be better to leave the question unanswered until decisive evidences come to light.

For the balance of the period, Communist activities were concentrated in protesting against Indian interference whenever situations favoured them or in opposing the Rana-Nepali Congress coalition Government (See p. 56) and in creating common fronts for such purposes. One such front, as reported by Surendra K. C was the Jatiya Janatantrik Samyukta Morcha. According to him, it was formed on the 7th of July 1951, when NCP combined with the Praja Parishad (K. C, Nepalma Communist 91). But, evidence¹⁰ indicates that the Front was already in existence, and on the 7th the parties involved in the Front were just broadening it to include more groups. These groups, according to Devkota, were “the NCP, Praja Parishad, Nepal Yuvak Sangha, Akhil Nepal Kisan Sangh, Akhil Nepal Majdoor Sangh, Akhil Nepal Vidyarthi Federation, Samaj Sudhar Sangh, and Pragatishil Aadhyayan Mandali” (106). The manifesto, which the Front brought out on the occasion, included, for the

¹⁰ See, Gupta 277–9 Appendix A letter sent by Pushpalal to Tanka Prasad Acharya dated VS 2008 Asad 20 (4 July 1951) points out that the Front had already come into existence when the two parties had combined to protest against Nehru on his visit to Nepal. In it Pushpalal asks Tanka Prasad to re-forged the Front to include other progressive forces.

first time, the national bourgeoisie among the classes that it sought to represent. Besides, it clearly announced its strategy. It was an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal strategy aimed at establishing “true democracy” in Nepal for it said:

The objective of our United Front is to establish complete democracy where the true democratic forces, the Nepalese *majdoor*, peasants, middle class and national bourgeoisie will be represented. To fulfil this goal the unity among the different classes of Nepal will prove a powerful tool. If we do not sharpen this tool we will be unable to root out Anglo-American imperialist, Indian capitalists and feudalism from Nepal (Jatiya Janatantrik Samyuktamorcha 64).

However, going by the document of the first conference of the NCP, the other objective behind creating the Front was “to create a substitute for the Nepali Congress” with whom the Party had aligned in the past only “to be betrayed” (NCP, “Naya Janabadko Nimti ... Bato” 2). Announcing the objectives of the Front its manifesto listed a series of 30 point programmes divided into two sets. Of these the first set declared that it intended to “free the kingdom from the hold of Anglo-American imperialism, Indian capitalism and feudalism by establishing a democratic system which represented true democratic forces—the workers, peasants, middle class, intellectuals and national bourgeoisie”. Its other important objectives in the set included “land reform by destroying feudal system”, “ending of loans given by feudal exploiters to the peasants”, “industrialisation of the kingdom by encouraging national bourgeoisie”, “fixing of workers’ labour hours to eight hours”, “giving equal rights to women” (65), “ending all forms of exploitation based on religion”, “guaranteeing of all fundamental rights of the citizens”, “creation of elected judiciary amenable to recall” (66). The other set highlighted the immediate programmes of the Front. It included such demands like “barring the entry of Anglo-American capital while encouraging the flow of capital from India, China and from other democratic countries provided they were in the benefit of the kingdom’s policy of industrialisation”. Its political objective included “the creation of an United Advisory Council composed of members representing various progressive political parties and class organisations”. It expected the Council “to elect from among its members a Council of Ministers who would form a legislative body responsible to the Council” (66). Its other political

objectives included “rights of workers to go on strike”, “quashing of all suppressive Acts including the Public Security Act”, “the creation of an independent judiciary” (67) and finally the “ending of Indo-Nepal military pact which allowed Britain to recruit Nepali youths in British Army” (68). In essence, the first entry in the list of the Front’s programme reflected its inclination towards Mao’s New Democratic strategy this was perhaps due to Nepal Communist Party’s influence over the Front. With the coming of September, Shaha points out, that the Front combined with the Nepali National Congress (Regmi group)¹¹ to launch a struggle against the implementation of “the Public Security Act”¹² and for the release of all political prisoners including ... Regmi” (261). On the 22nd of September, it launched “a successful strike ... in the valley”. Following it, on the 24th, political leaders, 11 in all, were arrested under the Public Security Act. Prominent among them were Tanka Prasad Acharya, Rishikesh Shaha, of the Nepali National Congress and Tilak Raj Shahi of the Communist Party (Shaha 261). The movement came to an end and the Communist Party began focusing on holding its First Conference.

1.1. First Conference

From 27 September to 2 October 1951, the NCP, under the leadership of Pushpalal, held its First Conference in Calcutta. In the document of the Conference, the Party, like Mao in his writing on New Democracy, perceived a bipolar world after

¹¹ See, Shaha 260 Dilli Raman Regmi, the President of NNC (Regmi group) was in prison for publishing an article. Caught under the Public Security Act, the court had labelled contempt charges against him.

¹² See, Shaha 260 Dilli Raman Regmi, the President of NNC (Regmi group) was in prison for publishing an article. Caught under the Public Security Act, the court had labelled contempt charges against him.

¹³ See, Joshi, et al. 157 After the formation of Rana-Nepali Congress coalition Ministry the government had passed two laws. Of these, one was the Public Security Act. It gave the government discretionary powers to arrest a person and hold him in custody for a period of six months without trial in the interest of the nation’s security.

the Bolshevik revolution and drew attention to “the existence of a new world situation where the forces of democracy, under the leadership of the USSR were more powerful than the forces organised under the imperialists” (NCP, “Naya Janabadko Nimti ... Bato” 1). Thereafter, it analysed the economic situation of Nepal reflecting its feudal characteristics for it stated:

95% of our population is composed of the peasants. The produce of their labour... needs to be submitted to the big Zamindars ... and feudal lords ... Three-fourths of the peasants do not have their own land. Though they somehow lead their life by working in the fields of the Zamindars and usurers, yet their condition is no better than that of slaves... (4).

Then, it stopped at that leaving aside the task of identifying its enemies and allies. In the name of tailoring Maoism, Leninism and Mao Tse Tung’s thought to the objective condition of the kingdom it desisted from placing communism as its final goal. It rather focused on tactical aspects, which essentially reflected its position on replacing the Interim Government by an anti-imperialist, anti-feudal Government of non-Communist forces for it stated:

Marxism, Leninism ...and Maoist thoughts are not a body of philosophy to be copied. We have to implement it after understanding our situation. For this reason, in the present situation, the Communist Party is not keeping before the people its ultimate goal of Communism. Considering the political and economic underdevelopment of our nation such programme cannot be practically implemented.¹⁴But, even in such condition we can install an anti-feudal, anti-imperialist Government of non-Communist forces which is democratic. It will be a Government which will free the peasants from the shackles of the feudal lords; protect the rights of the workers, end imperialism and develop independent national industries by helping the national capitalist class... (7).

From then onwards, for establishing such a Government, the document prescribed the path to be followed. However, the path reflected multiple logical inconsistencies

¹⁴ See, Windmiller, et al. 306 The extent to which Nepal Communist Party leadership was influenced in its choice of its strategy and tactics by the activities of Communist Party of India is reflected here. The CPI, whose All India Party Conference was also held in October 1951 under the General Secretaryship of Ajoy Ghosh, used similar phrases to explain the status of possibilities of establishing communism in India.

bringing home the state of confusion that prevailed among the Communist leadership of the then Nepal in framing the Party tactics. Proposing the method for their variety of Government, the Party document listed a fourteen point programme and appealed the people of the country to form a front for implementing the programmes. Important among them were:

1) Expulsion of Mohan Shamsher and his group from the Interim Government; 2) Establishment of *Janatako Rajnaitik Chalfal Samiti* composed of all the democratic parties, groups, citizens and classes; 3) Establishment of a united Government which would represent all the democratic parties, groups, citizens and classes and which should be established According to recommendation of *Janatako Rajnaitik Chalfal Samiti*; 4) The Government so formed should snatch all the economic and political rights which are being enjoyed by the Ranas; 5) Distribute land belonging to the Ranas and their lackeys among the peasant cultivators; 11) Remove interference of Nehru's Army and of the American imperialists, and 14) give back land captured by the peasants in the 1950 revolt ... (8).

Then it said:

Without implementing the above programmes, a parliament representing the true opinion of the people cannot be formed. So our Party thinks that before the formation of the parliament the 14 point programs must be implemented. After the formation of the parliament, the New Democratic Government should function according to the 14 point programmes (8).

Thus the Party knew, as it claims, that its final goal was to establish Communism, and from its statements it is also clear that it was aware of the fact that New Democracy is the transitional stage that the country had to go through. However, it was trying to establish it through a non-revolutionary path composed of a series of steps. First, it consisted of the establishment of a non-Communist structure, *Janatako Rajnaitik Chalfal Samiti* (Deliberative Political Committee), composed of democratic parties, groups, citizens and classes. This *Samiti* or Committee was then supposed to recommend a Government, which in turn was expected to implement the 14 point programme. The implementation of the programmes was expected to change the political situation to help people express their opinion freely and the parliament formed after such change was the New Democratic Government. Moreover, for forming the *Chalfal Samiti* the Party was appealing the people to form a front. How could such a front be created and how could it ensure the representation of the groups,

which the Communists wanted to be represented in the *Chalfal Samiti*? If this was possible then why was it not possible to form the Parliament which the Communists wanted, at the first go? And why did they want the *Chalfal Samiti* not to represent the Communists? These are questions which cannot be answered and as such they perpetuate confusions. Further, the democratic parties, groups, citizens and classes who were expected to be present in the *Chalfal Samiti* cannot be classed, because of the broad manner in which they identified them, as the representative of any Communist strategy; neither anti-capitalist nor anti-imperialist, yet the *Chalfal Samiti* representing them was expected to carry out programmes; which were anti-feudal, anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist. So, while trying to apply Marxism to the Nepalese situation, Nepal Communist Party distorted the entire exercise in producing a document which at its best was naïve: it leaves one wondering as to how the changes could be brought about without the representation of a Party—a conscious agent functioning within the *Chalfal Samiti*. However, the document did succeed in clarifying that they were against imperialism; Indian control over their industries, the continuation of feudalism and the then Interim Government. Beyond these it served nothing more than reflecting the tactical confusion which informed the Communist leadership then. However, before the Party could implement its tactics, it was banned on the 24th of January 1952 (See p. 59).

1.2. Communist Activities in Its Banned Phase: The First Congress

In its banned state, the Party was involved in underground activities. According to Pushpalal, by that time the Party headed a number of organisations such as “Akhil Nepal Kisan Sangh ... Akhil Nepal Trade Union Congress ... Akhil Nepal Mahila Sangh ... Nyuna Vaitanik Karmachari Sangha (Low Paid Employees’ Union) ... Gairha Nepal Shanti Samiti (External Nepal Peace Committee) ... and Jana Adhikar Suraksha Samity” (Pushpalal, *Itihas* 82). Of these the Nyuna Vaitanik Karmachari Sangha (Low Paid Employees’ Union) was functioning “a year before 1952” (Pushpalal, *Itihas* 80) and Akhil Nepal Kisan Sangh was formed “...at Mohammadpur village bazaar at Rautahat district ... on 29 May 1952” (Ram 16).

According to Rajendra Ram, these organisations, during its banned state, served “the revolutionary purpose of the Party” (9). However, there are no documentary evidences which describe the nature of their activities. Even in case of Jana Adhikar Suraksha Samity and Nyuna Vaitanik Karmachari Sangh one has to go by the statements of either Shaha or Joshi and Rose. In case of Nyuna Vaitanik Karmachari Sangh Joshi and Rose write, “Shortly after the revolution [1950/51], a ‘Union of Low- Grade Government Employees’ had been established in Kathmandu ... The promoters of the union were associated with the ‘popular front’ organizations of the Communist Party” (Joshi, et al. 101). This organisation, according to them, presented their list of demands to the Matrika Government in May 1951 (101–2). “When their demands were not fulfilled even after a year”, Pushpalal says, “on May 16, 1952 the organisation threatened to go on strike on June 1, and they did launch the strike” (Pushpalal, *Itihas* 80). Then commenting on the scenario related with their strike Joshi and Rose write,

Members of opposition political parties, together with students, provided the strikers with both moral and physical support ... On June 2 Government press communiqué notified all striking employees of their dismissal. The strike continued until King Tribhuvan intervened with a Royal Proclamation on June 6, under whose provisions Prime Minister M. P. Koirala announced revised pay scales for Government employees, beginning with a minimum salary of thirty rupees per month (Joshi, et al. 102).

Taking the fact into consideration, that the Communist Party was at the back of the formation of the Organisation, writers of the past and the present have concluded that the strike was a success owing to the Communist infiltration and “Communist penetration into the Government services” (Shaha 277). Surendra K.C even goes to the extent of saying that “the movement carried importance, because it occurred under the Party’s banned stage when it was functioning underground” (96) meaning that the movement reflected the organisational strength of the Communist Party. As for its effect Joshi and Rose write, that it “contributed to the deterioration in the position of the M. P. Koirala Government that led finally to its resignation” (102) an unsubstantiated opinion, of course, in view of two facts: the Government fell two

months later and the immediate event preceding the fall was the intra-Party differences between Matrika and B. P Koirala led Nepali Congress and not the movement (See, p.60). After the end of the Councillor's regime in September 1953, the NCP was engaged in denying its participation in the Bhim Datta Pant revolt of Western Nepal. Besides, its performance in first Municipal election of Kathmandu, considered in the light of the ban, was impressive (See, p.64).

However, during this period, the Party fell victim to intra-Party wrangle—a phenomenon which was common among the non-Communist forces of Nepal—for Rajendra Ram points out to the existence of a “bitter feud ... [within the Party]”, which he says “led to the removal of Pushpalal from the General Secretary-ship of the Party in June/July, 1952” (9). However, he fails to describe the nature of the feud, which in Maheshmani Dixit's view was caused by the influences of the changing line of the Communist Party of India for he writes:

... From 1942 Man Mohan Adhikari was closely associated with the Indian Communists ... [but] by 1952/53, the CPI sloughed off the Rajeshwar Rao's line of armed peasants' revolt. In Rao's place they [i.e., the CPI] placed Ajay Ghosh as the General Secretary and passed the Dange-Ajay document, which averred Indian independence as true independence ... [and] then Indian Communists accepted the path of democratic change ... and gave up armed peasants' revolt which included forced removal of landlords to implement ceiling laws.

Furthermore, the NCP's Central Committee came under the dominance of such reformists like D.P Adhikari, Radha Ghimerey, Kedar Khanal, Keshar Jung Rayamajhi, Kamalraj Regmi, Kamar Shah and Krishnaraj Verma. These leaders feared and doubted the path of armed peasants' revolution... (85).

Under these circumstances, Sailendra Kumar Upadhyaya, D.P Adhikari, Keshar Jung Rayamajhi and Man Mohan Adhikari, who were influenced by the changes in the tactics of CPI, conspired against Pushpalal. Then in the Bateshwar meeting in June/July 1952, they removed Pushpalal and placed Man Mohan Adhikari as the General Secretary of the Party (Dixit 86).

However, there are no documents which support Maheshmani's views. Hence, to test the veracity of his description one has to take a detour: consider the tactics of Indian Communists during the period and compare earlier documents of the NCP with documents available during the period when the Party was under the stewardship of Man Mohan Adhikari. Authoritative study on Indian Communists like that of Overstreet and Windmiller indicates that Ranadive was removed by Andhra leaders in

May 1950 bringing in Rajeshwar Rao (297–8). Rao represented the Telengana line which was for violent agrarian movement. But, immediately both Dange and Ajoy Ghosh attacked the line as adventurist and when their views tallied with those of London Communists then the Party in its April 1951 Politburo meeting removed Rajeshwar Rao and placed Ajoy Ghosh as General Secretary. The new leadership, in line with the direction of London Communists, eschewed violent revolution for the time being (302–6). However the authors do not talk about the Dange-Ajoy document which sought to line up Indian Communist in favour of Parliamentary practices. Factual errors apart, considered in line with the findings of Overstreet and Windmiller, Maheshmani's description, in spirit, conforms to the changes going on in the Communist movement of India, at least, in their tactical line. As regards the documents of the Party published under the leadership of Pushpalal one comes across a consistent line. They do not rule out the use of violent means (as in the manifesto), they seek to represent the peasant class and the strategy progressively tilts towards an anti-feudal and anti-imperialist strategy that is the New Democratic strategy. Compared to it, the document of the First Congress considerably dilutes its stand to reflect change in the Party's strategy and tactics: it does not talk about New Democracy or about revolution. Besides, it gives up the strategy of socialism and negates the role of peasants in its prescribed movement for change (see below). Thus, it seems that Maheshmani's description about the cause of the feud was correct. As for his other descriptions, there are neither any document, nor any expert commentary which supports or rejects his claims. Hence, until further evidences come to light they should be taken with caution.

On 30th January 1954, the First Congress of the Party was held in an underground situation in Patan, a suburb of Kathmandu. Organised for nine days under the leadership of Man Mohan Adhikari, the Congress passed two documents titled "Communist Partyko Karyakram"¹⁵ and "Nepal Communist Partyko Karyaniti".

The former document, without analysing the historic stage of Nepalese development, gives up the strategy of socialism and opts for the establishment of a democratic Government by saying:

Considering the present stage of Nepal, Communist Party does not talk of socialism. Such strategy is not suitable today. Hence, Nepal Communist Party sides with the foremost demand of the present day Nepalese: ‘there should be a democratic Government. Nepal Communist Party advocates change in the political set up of the country’. It stands firm on its position that in place of autocratic Government there should be democracy and Constitutional Government (K. C., “Partyko Karyakram 1954” 232).

And for achieving such change it says:

To solve the political problems a meeting of all democratic forces, individuals and of professional organisations should be called. This meeting should frame a minimum programme to give immediate relief to the people and for holding election for the creation of an Interim Ministry. Then the Interim Ministry should hold election for the formation of a Constituent Assembly” (232).

But, the document maintains silence in naming the agency responsible for calling the initial meeting, which was to pave way for the creation of the Interim Ministry. Perhaps, the Party was banking on its tactical line to initiate the process, because its tactics then calls for a united front of workers, artisans, middle class and national bourgeoisie to solve the political as well as the peoples’ problems for it states:

The main problem of our revolution is to end the feudal autocratic rule and to establish, on the basis of adult franchise, a parliament which would frame a democratic constitution to solve the urgent needs of land reform, problems of the working class, artisans, middle class, and national bourgeoisie. For it we have to form a democratic front of the progressive classes, parties and forces (232).

The points to be noted in the above formulation of the strategy and tactics are: 1) the manner in which it gives up its strategy of socialism and 2) the absence of peasants in the class among the classes whose interests the Party sought to represent. Such a change in the Party line supports Maheshmani’s claim that Man Mohan Adhikari and

¹⁵ See, K. C., Nepal Communist 227–37 Appendix-3 for the original version of the document.

other leaders were against the New Democratic strategy and against the Rajeshwar line which advocated peasant uprising. Besides, its economic programme was tilted in winning the support of the national bourgeoisie for it stated:

The country's economy is suffering because of the competition thrown by imports of commodities. To ensure the rapid development of Nepalese economy the fundamental of our economy should be based on the development of national capital. Hence, the policies of democratic Nepal should be to: 1) Protect national industries; 2) develop transport facilities for conveying raw materials; 3) encourage national bourgeoisie; 4) provide cheap long term loan for the development of small scale industries; 5) provide quotas to small scale industries, and ... 8) allow foreign capital in the development of industries where the participation of foreign capital should be limited to the tune of 49% (K. C., "Partyko Karyakram 1954" 236-7).

In its other document, which was focused on *Karyaniti* (tactics) of the Party, it talks about the need for forging a united front both from above and below, and prescribes that such fronts should be formed on the basis of a minimum programme agreeable to the leaders of democratic parties without defining the parties falling under such category for it states:

While forming united front we should make effort in both directions, from above and from below. While forging such fronts we should negotiate with leaders of other political parties on the basis of minimum and agreeable programmes, and along with their workers we should carry on united movements. Only such struggle would help us in building true democratic front (NCP, *Partyko Karyaniti 1954* 3).

Thus, during this period, the strategy of the Party was anti-feudal, where the Constituent Assembly was thought to be the agency for such change. It was, therefore, a peaceful path where the tactics was united front from above and below for the materialisation of the initial meeting for the creation of a Constituent Assembly. Having passed the documents, the underground Congress was on the verge of completing its business, but then "the police came to know" about its activities. So, Pushpalal says, the Party "changed the venue and held a small meeting as its Second Conference". In the meeting he says, the Party "formed a group under Rayamajhi" and gave him "the responsibility of exploring ways and means for legalising the Party". But, then he rues, "it proved to be a suicidal step" (Pushpalal, *Itihas* 95). It was a

suicidal step because after that the Party, he says, progressively lost its ideological orientations (see below)

Throughout this period (1954-56) the underground NCP carried on its political activities through its “front organizations”, “the Kishan Sangh” and “the Jana Adhikar Suraksha Samity”. During this phase, Shaha says, its activities were centred on moves for the lifting of the “ban imposed on it”, and in “organizing” anti-American and anti-Indian demonstrations (304). On “18 August 1953, its wings in Birganj and Janakpur observed the day as the ‘Removal of Ban Day’” (K. C, Nepalma Communist 102). On 8 August 1954, its Kishan Sangh “ staged an anti-American rally complaining against American Imperialist activities in Nepal ... [and] on 21 September its Jana Adhikar Suraksha Samity organized the day as anti-Indian Interference Day” (Shaha 312). Then in January 1955, it participated in a Satyagraha campaign against Matrika Government (See, p. 67). Describing its activities in November 1955 Surendra K. C writes:

[When the Government did not pay heed to its demand for legalising it] ... the Party plenum, held in Kathmandu from 21st of November to 25th of November 1955, decided to take legal course. It gave the then Party General Secretary, comrade Man Mohan Adhikari the responsibility to file a case against the Government. But, the decision could not be implemented, because on the very day [that is in November 21, 1955] the Government issued a gazette notification which barred the Supreme Court/High Court from hearing any issue concerned with the fundamental rights of the citizens ... As such the Party was left with only one option—to take the issue to the public (102).

The moment came in April 1956. It was the month scheduled for the King’s coronation where heads of the states of China and the USSR were invited. The Party decided to use the occasion to pressurise the Government on the understanding that a mass movement then would embarrass the Government. The Party perception was right. Parleys began after its General Secretary; Man Mohan Adhikari’s press statement, which clarified the stand taken by the Party. The text of the press statement dated VS 2013 Baisakh 3 (5 April 1956), as quoted by Surendra K. C, ran as follows:

We have come to understand that in view of our repeated requests to the Government to remove the ban imposed on us, the Government

wants us to clarify our policy on this matter. We have appointed Shri Sambharam and Shri P. N Rana to take part in the dialogue and our policies are as follows:

The Party believes that it can realise its goal of socialism through peaceful means. In the present situation, the Party shall campaign for its ideology of socialism, while recognising the Constitution under the King. Until now the Party was carrying on its activities peacefully, and within the Constitutional norms. It shall do so even in future. Today, the most important task in the nation is to forge unity among all the democratic forces. The Party has always believed in this line of action (103).

On April 16, 1956 convinced of the Party's stand, the Acharya Government lifted the ban. Immediately after, there was a meeting of the Party's Central Committee. In this meeting, Surendra K. C writes, the Politburo expressed its dissent over the Party's earlier stand and passed a resolution rejecting the 5th April press statement. As quoted by him the resolution read:

Communist Party is a Republican Party; hence it is natural on its part to reject monarchical system of Government. It is a fundamental position of its ideology. Hence, in the interim period, as well as in the period that follows, it shall oppose the King's undemocratic moves, and shall go on spreading the ideals of republicanism. There is no illusion within the Party, on this issue (K. C, Nepal Communist 114).

There are no documents, except conjectures, to explain why the Party in the first place issued the 5th April statement and accepted to function under Constitutional Monarchy. Given Rayamajhi's pro-King tilt, Man Mohan's statements then was probably influenced by the ideas of Rayamajhi (See, below). But, equally surprising is its later politburo resolution which suggests that Man Mohan's earlier statement did not have the support of the Party. The conflicting statements, therefore, reflected the existence of a breach within the Party, a view which finds its support in the statement of Pushpalal for he says that the incident signalled "the sacrifice of the Party's fundamental ideological position: it accepted King's Constitutional leadership and the peaceful path towards socialism". As a result, he says, "there was a major clash of opinion within the Central Committee. A few supported Constitutional Monarchy, and a few, Republican Nepal" (Pushpalal, Itihas 96).

Meanwhile in 1956, China invited a delegation of Nepalese Communists to participate in the Eighth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. The NCP sent a

team headed by the then General Secretary, Man Mohan Adhikari. After the departure of the team, Dr Keshar Jung Rayamajhi was given the post of acting General Secretary of the Party. Commenting on the Party's orientation under Rayamajhi, NCP (Ekta Kendra (Unity Centre)), a later faction of the movement, observes: "After that the Party programme progressively tilted towards the King ... it advocated election for forming the Parliament, and gave up its earlier stand that elections should be held for the sake of forming the Constituent Assembly ... the Party lost its revolutionary character" (NCP (Ekta Kendra (Unity Centre) 72). A more elaborate description of the changes that came in the Party programme after the change of guard is expressed by Pushpalal in the following terms:

Among the Communists of Nepal, this change in the leadership brought forth a period of ideological controversy ... the movement witnessed two distinct ideological trends. One group embraced republicanism; advocated proletariat led revolution ... and New Democracy. In the process, they were to destroy the feudal economic and social system; expose the capitalist political parties ... organise united front from below; pressurise the King to hold elections for the creation of a Constituent Assembly, and stymie the concentration of power in the hand of the King ... The other group stood for Constitutional monarchy; advocated bourgeois participation in the revolt for the establishment of Capitalist democracy. They argued that bourgeois partnership in United Front was necessary to staunch the growing dictatorial tendency of the monarch. Besides, they proposed that for taking the bourgeoisie in the united front the Party programme should be amended to accommodate their interests. The programmes should be stripped off of peasants' movement; the policy of land to the tillers, and New democracy. If these are not done, then the Communist movement will lose their support and the King will take further advantage (Pushpalal, *Itihas* 97).

But, these changes, especially the Party's tilt towards peaceful path, were already visible in the document of the First Congress. Perhaps, what Pushpalal meant to say was that the trend became more conspicuous after the change in the leadership of the Party.

1.3. Party's Second Congress, May–June 1957

After the removal of the ban imposed on it, the Second Congress of the Party was openly held from 28 May to June 1957 at Fohora Palace, Kathmandu. However, the General Secretary of the Party, Man Mohan Adhikari, could not attend the Congress, because he had stayed back in China to treat his leprosy. So, the Congress

was held under the leadership of acting General Secretary, Dr. Keshar Jung Rayamajhi, but its meeting started amid controversies for Pushpalal writes, “before the start of the Congress, despite Pushpalal’s opposition, the politburo of the Party, composed of Rayamajhi, Kamar Shah, D.P Adhikari, Tulsilal Amatya and Pushpalal, had brought out a document titled Party Karyakramma Parivartan Kina” (Pushpalal, Itihas 97–8). Based on the document, he further says, “The majority of the Central Committee of the Party prepared the political report of the Second Congress. But, this report was opposed by other members of the Central Committee, namely Sambhuram, Hikmat Singh, Krishnalal, P.N Rana, Mohan Bikram and Pushpalal” (98). Even then, he says, “the document was placed in the Congress, where it was vehemently opposed and rejected unanimously ... and a new report was prepared with a decision, that the Central Committee should publish the report and circulate it among its Party members. But it was never done” (Pushpalal, Itihas 99). This brief account of the Second Congress activity raises three important questions: a). Why was the first political report rejected? (b) What were the contents of the second political report? c) Why was the second political report not published? Unfortunately, there are no documents to answer the first question. As regards the second and the third questions Hikmat Singh’s letter, which was circulated only among the Party worker has this to say:

Considering the existing class divisions in the kingdom the proposal did not fix socialism or communism as the strategy rather it chose republicanism ... to oppose the institution of monarchy; to de-mystify the falsity of divine nature of the King, to expose his class character and the suppression linked with the institution (Singh, H., Chithi Number 1 5).

According to him, the proposal viewed “the main contradiction in between the vestiges of medieval feudalism; its ally the monarchy, and the peasants, intellectuals, democratic forces, middle class, proletariats and national bourgeoisie. So, the Congress decided in favour of a bourgeois democratic revolution under the leadership of the proletariat...” (Singh, H., Chithi Number 1 11). Then he says,

The tactical line adopted was to expose the policy of compromise followed by the so-called democratic parties ... it was to expose their reformist, monarchist, bourgeois democratic propaganda to isolate them from the masses. Therefore, the Congress decided that under the Interim arrangement the Communists should lead a mass movement demanding General election (Singh, H., Chithi Number 1 11).

In sum, the letter confuses strategy: sometimes it says that the strategy was republicanism and sometimes bourgeois democratic revolution. Perhaps what Hikmat was trying to convey was that the strategy was bourgeois democratic which included republicanism. But, then he says, “The Rayamajhi group simply wanted republicanism as the stated strategy without a matching tactics” (Singh, H., Chithi Number 1 11). According to Hikmat Singh, the Rayamajhi group advocated such position because they argued, “Though monarchy is detrimental to the interest of the kingdom’s progress, yet people have their faith on it as a symbol of national unity. So, any move which rejects the institution would go against the interest of the Party. So, the Party should opt for Constitutional monarchy” (Singh, H., Chithi Number 1 21). Finally, his statements on the state of affairs after the Second Congress seems to answer the last question as to why the document of the Second Congress was not published for he says, “The majority group did not implement the decision on the contrary, attracted by the power of the palace, they eulogised monarchy just like any other pro-King democratic parties” (Singh, H., Chithi Number 1 21). Thus, if the content of the letter is taken as it is then it seems that the Rayamajhi group was not interested in exposing the monarchy, because in such tactics they feared the loss of mass support to the Party. In the Communist movement of Nepal, Rayamajhi is often dubbed as a revisionist and an anti-revolutionary for taking such stand which is considered pro-King, but considering the manner in which the August 1957 Democratic Front shunned the Communists (See, p. 71) it seems Rayamajhi’s reading of the then prevailing environment was correct. However, with the passage of time these differences had its effect in the activities of the Party: it could never function as a united body. The first instance of such disunity in its activities surfaced in November 1957 when its Central leadership had to take a decision regarding the role of the Party on the proposed civil

disobedience movement of the Democratic Front. In its “9–19 November 1957 Central Committee meeting”, the Party passed a resolution. The resolution, as quoted by Surendra K. C. reflects, that the Party “welcomed the movement” and “with the intent of making it wider” it proposed “the Front to make it a joint movement” (113). But, according to Bhim Rawal, “Pushpalal and Tulsilal opposed the decision; raised the demand for the creation of a Constituent Assembly, and stayed away from the movement” (47). However, despite being shunned by the Democratic Front, when the Front’s Satyagraha movement began from “7 December 1957”, Surendra writes, the Party, on its own, decided to support the Satyagrahis from 11 December (114). But, on that day when its activists under the “leadership of Dr. Kesharjung Rayamajhi” reached “the site of the movement” that is “the Supreme Court” to launch its *dharna* [picketing], scuffle broke down between the *Satyagrahis* and the police ending in the “arrest of Rayamajhi” (K. C, Nepalma Communist 115). According to Surendra K. C, the Government tried to blame “the Communists for the scuffle”. Hence, he says, “the Party Politburo on December 12, 1957 averted the plot of being banned again by declaring that its participation in the movement was only for seeking solution to the then political problems by adopting peaceful means” (K. C, Nepalma Communist 115). To what extent such reiteration of the Party’s faith in peaceful means for solving the political problems of the kingdom affected the equation among its leaders remains open to assessment. Rayamajhi was released on 15 December, the very day when the King announced the day for the holding of the General Elections. But, the whole incident left two questions unanswered. Why did the Communists support a movement which was simply for an election? And why did the King choose to hold election at that point of time? Going by the description that one has regarding the outcome of the Second Congress then the answer is simple: the Party leadership did not want to attack the monarch (with the demand for Constituent Assembly) for the fear that such attack would lessen the Party’s appeal among the people. However, Hikmat Singh’s second letter provides some fresh insight on the issue and his expressions give the feel that the election issue and the ensuing movement was just a

face saving device for the parties, including the Communists, for he writes:

From 1950 onward, the political parties were the victim of King's machinations which turned him into a powerful monarch and helped him in defaming political parties. Under such circumstances, the parties supported the King for the sake of winning his favour and to be in the Government. But, even with such tactics they realised that they had just become his puppet with an insecure position. Meanwhile, they had lost the spirit and the strength to go for the people's movement, so they saw in the election issue a chance to pressurise and blackmail the King in the name of creating people's movement. And by then ... the Communists had also come to the understanding that election was the only solution to end the political impermanence of the system (Singh, H., Chithi Number 2 2).

The real import of his last statement becomes clear when he says: "In lieu of developing a united democratic movement under the leadership of the Communist Party, the leadership stood by its proposition that it will be suicidal to lead the movement alone. As a result it failed to ... solve the real problem ... to forge an alliance in favour of a Constituent Assembly" (Singh, H., Chithi Number 2 7-8). These statements implied that the Communists should have mobilised forces for creating a Constituent Assembly, but it did not do so, because other parties were in support of General election. Hence, it tailored its position in line with the position of other parties diluting all differences between a Communist—which viewed in its demand for a Constituent Assembly a revolutionary trend—and a non-Communist Party. So, under the new leadership it had become just like any other party, hence its activities, that is its support for election, were also meant just for blackmailing the King. As regards the answer to the second question, Hikmat points out that the King announced the election to avoid the possibility of people's dissatisfaction turning into a demand for the creation of a Constituent Assembly for he writes:

Because of continuous change in the Government there was no economic development in the kingdom ... the people were dissatisfied ... under such a context the King feared the convergence of people's dissatisfaction with that of the political parties ending in the demand for a Constituent Assembly. So, he declared the election (Singh, H., Chithi Number 2 2-3).

Meanwhile, Surendra K. C points out that in the context of the 1959 election, "Kathmandu Municipality Election office declared second Kathmandu Municipality

election". It was slated on 20 January 1958. He further writes, in the election the Communists tried to "capitalise on" how the earlier Government had "mistreated the Party by arguing that earlier Municipality under a Communist could not implement its development plan because of the attitude of the then Government and of other Party representatives" (105). But, in the election, he says, the issue concerning which language, "Nepali or Newari?" should be the official language of the Municipality proved to be quite contentious. And in the outcome of the election for its 18 wards, it left its mark. Though the Communists won 4, one of their prominent losers was Sambhuram Shrestha. He lost against an independent candidate who was in favour of "Newari language" (106). Concluding his analysis of the results, he then says, "the outcome was an ominous signal for the Communists since majority of its candidates had lost" (107). Thereafter, the Central Committee of the Party held its meeting at Patan, Kathmandu in September 1958, "to discuss Party policies in the ensuing General Election" (K. C, Nepalma Communist 119). And it also decided to participate in the Advisory Assembly created for the interim period (See, p. 73). According to the Party circular of VS 2015 Jeth 24 (May 28, 1959)¹⁶, "the Party decided to send Pushpalal and Kamar Shaha as its representative in the Assembly". But, Surendra K. C indicates that ultimately it was "Kamar Shaha and Kamalraj Regmi", who went there and observes, "there are no evidences to account for the non-participation of Pushpalal in the Assembly" (118). Perhaps, it was because Pushpalal did not wish to be a party in the structure created by the King.

In the February 18, 1959 election, held six days after the declaration of the Constitution, the NCP was guided by its tactical decisions reached in the September 1958 Patan meet. Of the six decisions reached, the sixth, as Surendra K. C puts it, had decided on the use of "students" and "adoption of an attitude, which aimed at

¹⁶ See, K. C, Nepalma Communist 160 The author argues that this date is wrong, probably a misprint because the first Advisory Assembly meeting was held in October 1958.

increasing the Party base particularly among the peasants”. It signalled a change in its earlier decision taken in the Second Congress where it had erased peasants’ role in its tactics. Unfortunately, no document explains this change. Besides, the same meeting, Surendra says, had also released the Party’s election manifesto (119). It highlighted how successive Governments in the past diluted gains of 1950 revolution. It blamed them for their involvement in “deferring the creation of Constituent Assembly”, in “undermining the independence of Judiciary,” and in “weakening the importance of fundamental rights” (NCP, “Chunao Ghoshna-Patra 2051” 255). In sum, it argued that the kingdom’s foreign policy, economy and labourers were still in their earlier status, battling with nepotism, favouritism and corruption—the dominant governing culture of the kingdom (256–8). So, if voted to power, the Party promised to annul the 10-year agreement between Nepal and Britain which allowed the latter to recruit Gorkha soldiers. Besides, it promised to annul the 1950 Treaties between Nepal and India, and to stop American intrusion in the kingdom. In the economic front, it noted that its focus would be “on reconstructing Nepal by industrialising her economy; by implementing land reform and by generating employment opportunities” (258). It promised equality for women and for the untouchables (260). But, for such change it reasoned that “peoples’ creative force must be in the lead to strengthen the democratic arrangement” (262). In short, it said vote us “to empower the Parliament to amend the entire Constitution, to remove the Upper House, to ensure the independence of Judiciary, to implement secret voting in all layers, and to strengthen the bases of democracy: the Municipalities and the district boards” (262–3). But, their promises, whose fulfilment were premised on the democratisation of the kingdom’s political structure through the election was itself at fault. One wonders how the Party could repose such faith in the election outcome, which was being held under a Constitution that concentrated power in the King. As it is, there were few takers of its promises because the May result proved disappointing. In its four seat victory only one, Tulsilal Amatya represented its politburo. So immediately after the rout, to survey the causes behind the debacle, its politburo meeting of May 1959, as Surendra K. C puts it,

“decided to hold two separate meetings ... one of the Central Committee and other of the Central Plenum in July. But, they were simultaneously held from June 23 to 27 in Janakpur” (126). However, there is no document to reveal the content of the survey. Hence, Surendra K. C quotes an interview (taken in 1990) with D. P Adhikari, a member of the politburo. The quoted text points towards “the ideological differences which had destroyed organisational unity of the Party ... and the failure of the Party to forge alliances with democratic forces” as the causes behind its debacle (127). Similarly, Bhim Rawal quotes an interview with Bharat Mohan Adhikari where the interviewee blames “Rayamajhi’s leadership for encouraging factionalism within the Party, his failure to come up with a clear policy regarding the election, and the sapped spirit of the cadres” for the failure (51). Taken at face value, both the leaders, in essence, blame the organisational status of the Party which echoes the observations of Joshi and Rose which says:

The Communists were ... restricted territorially, having ... centres of ... strength only in Kathmandu Valley, two to three districts in the Terai, and a few places in the hills. The Communists were further weakened by serious internal disputes that aborted all efforts to form electoral alliances with other parties or political leaders (279).

Perhaps, news about internal dissension within the Communists was not confined within its confidants. After the formation of the Koirala Ministry, the Communists decided to lead the revolutionary forces to unmask the Government. It started with its criticisms of the budget proposal followed by its opposition against the Government’s decision to import *Dalda* from India (For reasons see, p. 76). On the 11th of September it held a protest rally which signalled the beginning of the use of extra-parliamentary measures to counter the dominance of the Congress in the Parliament. Describing their activities then, B. P Koirala says, “The Communists always arrived before Singha Darbar (the Secretariat) with processions, sometimes with *Dalda* issue and, at times, with other issues. The decision to import *Dalda* was taken ... in the Parliament ... when I was convinced that it would improve our balance of payment status with India” (Sharma 269). Perhaps, it was not an issue at all except the fact that involved in it was India, for Joshi and Rose write, “... [It] was a spurious issue

contrived skilfully by the Communist Party...” (321). Anyway, their movement died down when the ban was reimposed. However, in case of the amendment of the 1950 Trade and Transit Treaty there are no documents to record their reactions except those of Pushpalal’s belated comments in 1970 (See p. 77). But, in case of the Gandak Treaty of December 1959, the Party was quite vociferous in condemning the Treaty. After an initial reaction in its organ, on 21 January 1960 its representative in the Pratinidhi Sabha, Tulsilal Amatya, as Joshi and Rose put it, asked the Government “the cancellation of the Treaty and its replacement by a new Treaty. He suggested a change in the project site so that it would be ... beneficial to both the countries, and maintained that the Government had compromised with Nepal’s territorial integrity by handing over the project area to India” (331). To garner public support for its cause the Party then organised a public rally in Kathmandu on 13 February. There, Joshi and Rose say, “Some even compared India’s attempts to foist its terms on Nepal with the practices of the British East India Company [which had] two centuries earlier conquered India by force or duplicity” (332). When the movement tapered, the December 15, 1960 coup took the Communists by surprise. At that time, Pushpalal says, “only three politburo members were present in Kathmandu Central Office viz., Pushpalal, Tulsilal Amatya and D. P Adhikari and Dr. Rayamajhi, Kumar Shah, Hikmat Singh and Sambhuram were in Moscow to attend the International Communist conference ... Man Mohan Adhikari was in Biratnagar” (Pushpalal, “Nepali ... Ek Samiksha” 110). So, he says, “a meeting of the politburo was held and it appealed the people to fight for their democratic rights and directed Party members to go underground”. Meanwhile, probably by the end of February, “the Moscow team had returned and were in Darbangha and the Party was functioning under two centres: one in Kathmandu and the other in Darbangha”. To remove the “two-centre confusion” and “in the context of political situation within the kingdom a plenum was called in Darbangha” (Pushpalal, “Nepali ... Ek Samiksha” 111). According to Surendra K. C, it was held in “March 1961” and it lasted for “a month” (143). The meeting, according to Mohan Bikram Singh, after “assessing the past activities of the

Party blamed its leadership for following a pro-King policy” (Singh, M. B. 96). Besides, on the basis of interviews, Rawal points out that the plenum thought over three political lines (53). These were:

1 Restoration of Parliamentary system: the majority of the central committee members favoured it and it was the position of Rayamajhi.

2 Restoration of the dismissed Parliament: this was the proposal of Pushpalal.

3 Election for the formation of Constituent Assembly: this was the proposal of Mohan Bikram group.

Of these, the answer to the question as to which tactical line received the maximum votes is enmeshed in controversies. According to Anand Bahadur Khatri [Mohan Bikram Singh], it was his tactical line which had won the day (Khatri 67). But, Pushpalal’s follower, Balaram Upadhyaya¹⁷ claims that winning votes went in favour of Pushpalal’s line.¹⁸ Nevertheless, the Plenum adopted Rayamajhi’s line owing to the provision of the Party constitution, which barred the supersession of decision taken by a higher body. In this case, the decision of the Plenum was overridden by the decision of the Second Congress, the higher structure of the Party. And one of the writings of Pushpalal, though not very clear in its logic, reveals the politics that was involved in accepting the line of the Second Congress. Giving reasons as to why the political line was accepted, Pushpalal says, that during the period “the King” was in a position where he could not “be covered ... without an organised force”. In such a situation, “the Nepali Congress” was not in a position “to defer the requirement of unity among the democratic forces”, so the Communists “needed a slogan to attract the Party workers of the Nepali Congress, because when the Party workers get attracted the leaders will be forced to enter into a democratic alliance”. Since the “slogan” for restoration of the Parliament did not “state the type of

¹⁷ See, Upadhyaya 40–1

¹⁸ This seems to be the right claim, for reason see p. 295 .

Parliament, whether of the snatched one or of the one created after fresh election” the Nepali Congress leaders, he says, “will not be able to use us in their machination in collusion with the King” (Pushpalal, “Paus Ek Gateyko ... Bykhya” 28). Hence, the line was accepted. In revealing such perceptions, which he claimed were the perceptions of the NCP, Pushpalal probably meant to say, had the Communists taken the line of restoring Congress led parliament then they would have placed the Congress in an advantageous position. That would have allowed them to enter into compromises with the King at the expense of the Communists’ interest, but the line which advocated the establishment of Parliament without stating its nature would force the Congress to take NCP’s views into consideration. However, despite the lack of clarity in his statements the essence of his arguments boils down to this: the NCP did not want to place Nepali Congress in an advantageous position and the implied purpose behind such tactics was to unite with the Nepali Congress only to destroy the enemy while keeping the decision regarding the nature of future Parliament in abeyance.

1.4. Developments after 1960, Splits: Darbangha Plenum to Third Congress

Despite the adoption of Dr. Rayamajhi’s tactical line, the Plenum characterised him as a pro-King element and divested him of his Party position for the NCP document states:

Considering Dr Rayamajhi’s tilt towards the King and his policy for compromise, he was removed from his post of general secretary, and in lieu of him the Plenum created a three-member Secretariat¹⁹ And the Plenum decided that the Party should fight for:

- (a) Release of political prisoners.
- (b) Reinstatement of fundamental rights.
- (c) Removal of ban on the functioning of political parties and *Jana Bargiya Sangathans* (professional organisations).
- (d) Reinstatement of parliamentary democracy in Nepal (Antar Zone Samanjasya Samiti 18).

¹⁹ See, Antar Zone Samanjasya Samiti 18 The three-member Secretariat consisted of Dr. Kesar Jung Rayamajhi, D.P Adhikari and Sambhuram Shrestha. The Plenum accused the first two for being pro-king and gave the Secretariat the power of one Politburo member to prevent even the Secretariat from entering into compromises with the feudal forces.

To implement these decisions the Party sectored the whole of Nepal into five zones²⁰ with each zone under the control of a P.B.M [politburo member] and a committee. The P.B.M was to provide leadership in the zone and if need be, he was empowered to restructure the committees' functioning within the zone to give fillip to the Party activities (Antar Zone Samanjasya Samiti 18).

The Secretariat, Rawal says, was “to function from Kathmandu” (55). And according to the Party document, “under one of the members of the Secretariat a sub-headquarter was to be created in Darbangha to coordinate the activities of the five Zonal committees” (Antar Zone Samanjasya Samiti 18). Besides, Tulsilal Amatya [the later General Secretary of the Party] states that “the Secretariat was given the responsibility to organise the Third Party Congress within nine months after the conclusion of the Plenum. In the Congress the Party was expected to sort out the differences of opinions existing among the Party leaders” (Amatya, Nepal ... Matbhedharu 15).

However, question arises regarding the formation of the Secretariat. Why was Sambhuram, a supporter of Pushpalal taken in as a member of the Secretariat? Existing Party documents do not provide a definitive answer to the question. However, on the basis of an interview with Rayamajhi, Rawal writes:

According to Rayamajhi D. P. Adhikari was taken in because his view conformed to that of Rayamajhi and Sambhuram was inducted to represent P. L [Pushpalal] to save Party fragmentation ... In the end the three-member Secretariat consisted of Keshar Jung Rayamajhi, Sambhuram Shrestha and D. P Adhikari... (55).

And if this interview were reflecting the true picture then it also seems to answer the question as to whose line was the winner in the Plenum. The possibility of Party fragmentation comes when voice representing the majority is disregarded. Thus, if Sambhuram was included in the Secretariat to save the Party from fragmentation, then

²⁰ See, Antar Zone Samanjasya Samiti 28–9 The five zones were the Eastern Koshi Zone, the Western Koshi Zone, Eastern Gandak Zone, North Gandak Zone and Far-Western Gandak Zone or Karnali Zone.

it means that it was probably Pushpalal's line which had won the voting in the Plenum. But, the process created an anomaly: it created a lopsided Secretariat, where two members represented the same political line and one, the other²¹. As a result, it proved to be a bane for the future activities of the Party. Immediately after the conclusion of the Plenum, in Gorakhpur, Rayamajhi is said to have declared that an "agreement with the King could be hammered out, if fundamental rights of the people were respected" meaning, that the Communists would welcome even Panchayat democracy, if the King offered fundamental rights (Antar Zone Samanjasya Samiti 19). Such a statement was against the decision of the Plenum, the decision to fight for parliamentary democracy, and the Party document points out, that the Party Secretariat, thereafter, failed to function according to the plans chalked out by the Plenum for it states:

After some time Dr Rayamajhi, Com. D. P, Com. Malla and Com. Shah suddenly disappeared from Darbhanga and appeared in Kathmandu. As per the decision of the Plenum, Com. Malla was responsible for looking after Western Kosi-Gandak zone [Western Kosi and Western Gandak]. Com. D. P or Com. Majhi, the Western Kosi zone, and as a CCM [Central Committee member] Com. Shah was also expected to work in Western Kosi zone. But why were they in Kathmandu? Later on it came to the notice of the Party that they were there, without Party permission, to parley compromises with the King (Antar Zone Samanjasya Samiti 19).

Why were they doing so? The document alleges "that their intention was to be in the Council of Ministers, which the King was planning to create" (20). Later developments failed to vindicate the allegation—they were not included in the Ministry. But, if the allegation were made in the spirit of proving their good relation with the King then it was perhaps correct, because describing the post-plenum incidents in Kathmandu, Joshi and Rose write,

... Intriguing was the Government's sudden arrest of the leaders of the 'pro-monarchy' faction of the Nepal Communist Party ... Whatever the reasons may have been, the Government reversed itself quickly, for

²¹ Sambharam represented Pushpalal, who had floated the political line of restoring the parliament.

scarcely one month later Rayamajhi was released from prison and without having signed the usual declaration of loyalty to the King required of political prisoners (451).

Along with him, three other members²² of the Central Committee, the pro-Rayamajhi members, were also released. In September 1961, Rayamajhi left for Moscow for medical treatment. Emboldened, perhaps, by the increase of the Rayamajhi groups' members in the Central Committee, it threatened Pushpalal group [Pushpalal, Hikmat Singh, Rajman and Tulsilal Amatya] of expulsion from the Party in a meeting, which was held in November/December 1961 in Kathmandu. Thereafter, Joshi and Rose write, Pushpalal and his group left for India "to avoid detention by the authorities" (452). Meanwhile, according to the Party document, the situation changed. After the Sino-Nepalese agreement for the construction of Kathmandu-Kodar (gateway to Tibet) Road in October 1961 the two members of the three-member Secretariat, D P Adhikari and even Sambhuram issued statements appealing the people to support King Mahendra in implementing the agreement (Antar Zone Samanjasya Samiti 23). Besides, by this time, for reason which was obvious, the Secretariat formed by the Darbangha Plenum had taken no initiative to call the Third Congress. Under such situation, the document of the Antar Zonal Samanjasya Samiti states, "The Party was in complete disarray ... and there was a need for a coordinating structure—a structure to coordinate the activities of the five Zonal committees" (35). Besides, the document says, "the Party had to be activated; the decisions of the Plenum implemented and the Third Congress convened to bring unity among the leaders" (36). To do so, there was a joint meeting probably in January/February 1962²³, "in Darbangha among Tulsilal,

²² See, Antar Zone Samanjasya Samiti 26 and 32 The document claims that there were six jailed members. Out of them three belonging to Pushpalal group were not released.

²³ There is no document that gives the exact date of the event. Based on an interview, Rawal suggests V.S Bhadra 2018 [Aug 1961]. But this is not acceptable because till then the nine month period fixed by the Darbangha Plenum had not elapsed and the December 1961 Central Committee meeting, which had threatened Pushpalal and his group with expulsion had not taken place. The idea of Coordination

Com. Hikmat and Com. Mohan Bikram” (Pushpalal, Itihas 113). “This joint meeting formed the *Antar zonal Samanjasya Samity*” (Antar Zone Samanjasya Samiti 37). It elected Tulsilal Amatya as the General Secretary and empowered the *Samanjasya Samiti* (Coordination Committee)²⁴ to function as the organising committee of the Third Congress. The Committee then convened the Third Congress and as per Tulsilal, it was “the Requisitioned Congress”²⁵, which was held from 16 to 27 of April 1962 in Varanasi. Amatya claims that “It represented almost all the districts of Nepal, that is, districts where the Party was active, and the number of representatives were more than 50% of the total membership of the Party” (Amatya, Nepal ... Matbhedharu 21). But, Rawal writes “there were only three members of the Central Committee and none from the three-member Secretariat formed by the Darbangha Plenum” (58). Further, based on interviews with Tulsilal Amatya and Bharat Mohan Adhikari, Rawal states:

The Congress created a National Council of 51 members. From among them, a 17 member Executive Council [National Executive Committee]²⁶ and a seven-member Secretariat were formed. Tulsilal

Committee surfaced only after December 1961. The Appeal of the Samanjasya Samity was published on the 8th of March, 1962. Hence, the probable date for the event is Jan/Feb 1962.

²⁴ See, Adhikari 77 It is claimed that the Antar Zonal Samanjasya Samiti was formed by merging the two Zonal committees of the party namely Purva Koshi and Paschim Koshi.

²⁵ See, Amatya, Nepal ... Matbhedharu 20 Though the provision of calling such Congress was in the Constitution of the Party, it was Ajay Ghosh, who reminded the NCP leaders to make use of the provision. Under the Constitution the process was as follows: First a demand was to be made from below to the Central Committee to hold a Congress. If after the request the Central Committee failed to call the Congress, then Lower Committees commanding at least 1/3 of the total membership of the Party could call a Congress. Such Congress was called Requisitioned Congress

²⁶ See, NCP, Bidhan 1962 6 There was no structure by the name of Executive Council. The structures were: National Council, National Executive Committee and a Secretariat.

Amatya was elected as the General Secretary and along with him Man Mohan Adhikari, Pushpalal, Hikmat Singh Bhandari, Krishna Raj Verma, Mohan Bikram Singh and Com. Regmi were elected as the full members of the politburo. Bharat Mohan Adhikari, Punyapratap Rana, Bharatraj Joshi and Jai Govind Shah were elected as the alternative members of the politburo (59).

Joshi and Rose point out that the Congress then took “seven resolutions” among which “the most important” was the one, which “called for a revolution against the Royal regime”. A second resolution “expelled ten moderate members of Central Committee— including Rayamajhi, Sambhuram Shrestha, Kamar Shah, D. P Adhikari and PB Malla ...” (453). The Party document characterised them as “opportunist and liquidationist leaders²⁷ ... who had violated the decision of the Darbangha Plenum”. The new leadership also took the decision of launching “a nationwide peaceful movement linking the burning national questions²⁸ to the democratic movement” (NCP, Report of Third Executive ... Committee 9). It was to start from November 11, 1962.

After deliberations, the Congress passed its political proposal. In it the Party decided to struggle for the creation of a “supreme sovereign parliament”²⁹In the voting that followed the line of supreme sovereign parliament secured the highest votes. The line was expected to work towards the establishment of “National Democracy”. To do so the document states,

In the present circumstances, to establish National Democracy the military dictatorship [military was under the control of the King] of King Mahendra is to be destroyed ... the rights snatched from the citizens should be restored ... in the absence of democratic system

²⁷ See, p. 362 Kendriya Nucleus explains that they were supporting the nationalism of the King.

²⁸ Though the document does not explain what were these issues, yet in the context of Nepal this phrase always conveys Communist’s idea of nationalism which is against the treaties signed between Nepal and India.

²⁹ See, Rawal 59 Footnote. In the Congress there emerged three political lines. Tulsilal Amatya represented the line for supreme sovereign parliament, Pushpalal, restoration of Parliamentary democracy, the line of the Darbangha Plenum and Mohan Bikram group, Constituent Assembly.

National democracy cannot be achieved (NCP, Rajnitik Prastao [Antar Zone] 49).

Why did the Congress decide that it should fight for the establishment of a supreme sovereign parliament and snatch the power of the King? Explaining the rationale behind, Amartya writes: “The Congress felt that the earlier parliamentary system was destroyed by the King because he monopolised power,³⁰ so they decided to fight for a parliamentary system where the body would be all powerful and not in the control of the King” (Amartya, Kun Bato ? 21–3; Amartya, Nepal ... Matbhedharu 22). Further he writes, “the demand for transferring the power to the people was, therefore, an integral part of the demand for a supreme sovereign parliament”. And the Congress also realised that “both the demands could be achieved after a democratic revolution” (Amartya, Nepal ... Matbhedharu 23). So, the process envisaged was to carry out democratic revolution for the establishment of a supreme sovereign parliament, which was to work for the establishment of National Democracy. But, the Party did not opt for a “Republican” State (NCP, Rajnitik Prastao [Antar Zone] 51). To carry out such a struggle the Party proposed the tactics of a “united front”. A united front of the “proletariats, peasants, middle class town people, revolutionary intellectuals and the national bourgeoisie” (53), where the proletariats and the Communist Party were to be the leaders for the document states:

In today’s democratic movement, the question as to what will be set up, capitalist democracy or National Democracy, would be decided by the role played by the Communist Party and the proletariat class in the process of a struggle. Under the leadership of the bourgeois class, even a united front of revolutionary classes would set up capitalist democracy ... but under the leadership of the working class, the outcome will be National Democracy (56).

Why was it so? The answer to the question lies in the document of the *Antar Zonal Samanjasya Samiti*. Here the Party states:

³⁰ See, Amartya Kun bato? The argument of the entire work is that the King in Nepal has been able to remain in power owing to the armoury and the army which have always been under his control.

Parliamentary democracy is not always capitalist democracy. It can also be National Democracy or People's democracy ... So to establish National Democracy in the country, the weaknesses of parliamentary democracy should be weeded out ... Parliamentary democracy should be made a representative of the revolutionary class. Then and only then the goal of National Democracy will be achieved (Antar Zone Samanjasya Samiti 16).

In such a Parliament, Amatya claims that the Third Congress decided not to include the Nepali Congress because it was “a bourgeois Party linked with the imperialists, foreign capitalists and the feudal forces” (Amatya, Nepal ... Matbhedharu 23). But, the document of the Third Congress did not rule out the possibility of aligning with the Nepali Congress, the Party with “dual character” when the struggle was against the King's autocratic rule.³¹ However, in such tactics the NCP was to follow a policy of “unity and struggle”³² vis-à-vis the Nepali Congress. The policy was to be followed in a front, probably a front from above, which was expected to lead the movement for the establishment of a supreme sovereign Parliament and “the unity forged in the process [was] to be used to establish National Democracy” (NCP, Rajnitik Prastao [Antar Zone] 52). Defining the character of National Democracy, the document states:

National democratic countries are those who keep intact the political independence; oppose all imperialistic military organisations ... oppose neo- colonialism and the entry of imperialistic capital within

³¹ See, NCP, Rajnitik Prastao [Antar Zone] 59 The Party characterises Nepali Congress as a bourgeois party. But it is a party of the Nepali bourgeoisie which is not directly linked with the party of the Indian bourgeoisie [Congress Party of India]. Since Nepal is an underdeveloped state its bourgeois class is weak so this type of bourgeois class is bound to have its relation with land further it has relations with imperialists, foreign monopoly capitalists especially Indian bourgeois class. So it has dual character. (a) Since it is a bourgeois party it is revolutionary in its relation with the dictatorial King. (b) Since it is linked with the imperialists and Indian capitalists, it does not have the capacity to free the nation from the web of the Indian capitalists and imperialists nor does it intend to free the country from the vestiges of feudalism. Hence, it can be relied in the struggle against the King's autocratic rule, but it cannot be relied in the solution of the ultimate problem of the country.

³² See, NCP, Rajnitik Prastao [Antar Zone] 59–60 This tactics prescribed unity with Congress in its revolutionary ideology of fighting feudalism and the King, but struggle against its policy of compromise with Indian monopoly capitalism and imperialism.

the country ... support peoples' democratic rights and independence; support freedom of press, organisation, political parties and social organisations ... implement revolutionary land reform and ... allow the parties and social organisations in the process of forming policies (NCP, Rajnitik Prastao [Antar Zone] 45).

Under such a political system, the Party felt that the major problems of Nepal, namely, the feudal structure with its attendant features like “lack of land reforms”, “absence of citizens’ freedom”, “exploitation of villagers” (NCP, Rajnitik Prastao [Antar Zone] 45) will be removed and there will be development of “national trade and industry which would free the country from all imperialistic and foreign interests”. And the “Gorkha recruitment centres” will be removed and all “unequal treaties” would be ratified. Further, “unemployment of all types” would be removed and “all the areas of the nation democratised” (45–6). However, the programme of National Democracy was “so framed as to represent even the interests of the bourgeois class ... and national bourgeoisie” raising question whether it meant the interest of Nepali Congress (NCP, Rajnitik Prastao [Antar Zone] 57).

In the light of the classes identified (See p. 300) for the revolution, it is clear that the Party then advocated an anti-imperialist strategy³³ where the Parliament, a bourgeois instrument was visualised as a machinery for bringing about a change, and in this process the Party tolerated unity even with the bourgeois class, the Nepali Congress and the national bourgeoisie. Was this a strategy of People’s democracy as identified by Rawal (60) and even by the NCP (NCP, Hamro Mul Bato 81)? Certainly not, because the strategy which was devised by the USSR for Communist regimes established in Eastern Europe after World War II did use the Parliament; “temporarily tolerated bourgeois parties” and “proceeded cautiously with the gradual expropriation of the bourgeoisie, both urban and rural” (Windmiller, et al. 258). But, in the strategy of National Democracy adopted by the NCP though there was toleration towards the

³³ See, Windmiller, et al. 5 There are two basic strategies the anti-imperialist and the anti-capitalist. In the former a Communist Party aims at leading the four main classes of the community—the proletariat, peasantry, petty bourgeoisie and bourgeoisie.

bourgeoisie and also the idea of denying and therefore expropriating the Nepali Congress after the end of the struggle against the autocratic rule of the King, yet there was no idea of gradual expropriation of the national bourgeoisie, because national bourgeoisie was one of the classes that the strategy relied on. Hence, it would be wrong to equate the strategy of National Democracy, as adapted by the NCP, with that of People's democracy simply on the ground that they were both anti-imperialist strategies. Besides, while adopting the strategy of National Democracy the Party failed to consider the age for which the strategy was meant: National Democracy was a strategy meant for countries which had achieved "freedom from the imperialist" and had "remnants of feudalism" to deal with (See, p. 305). However, these situations did not inform the then conditions of Nepal. Rather than dealing with remnants of feudalism, history had posed upon the Party with the task of dealing with entrenched feudalism, because even one year after the holding of the Third Congress the Party, while criticising the Panchayat system, identified feudalism as the main hurdle in Nepal's progress towards an independent economy. Further, it held feudalism responsible for the sustenance of imperialism for it stated:

Today throughout the Asian and the African countries the main national problem is regarding the implementation of revolutionary land reform for the peasants to establish the foundation of an independent economy for rapid industrialisation ... our country [Nepal] which was exploited for centuries by the imperialists and the feudal forces wishes to progress in the path of industrialisation by destroying this vice. But this Panchayat system completely overlooks the task of destroying the hold of feudalism, which when done will make the peasants the owner of their land In the absence of revolutionary land reform the country will not be able to generate the zeal for independent economic development and it will be forced to invite foreign capital.... [At present] to do this [independent economic development] the Government has invited foreign capital. The Government has no policy to save national business from the competition unleashed by the entry of Indian capitalism and imperialist exploiters... (NCP, Rajnitik Prastao 1963 18–9).

This, however; is not to argue that the anti-imperialist strategy of National Democracy was not suitable for eradicating feudalism, or anti-imperialist strategy cannot be used against feudalism, but to point out that while adopting/adapting the strategy no fine thinking was resorted to: it was not clarified whether imperialism was dependent upon

feudalism or vice versa or whether they were intricately related with each other. But, the attempt was made after the adoption of the strategy indicating, thereby, the scant attention paid to the objective conditions of the nation at the time of adopting the strategy. Moreover, when the classes involved in the strategy are considered, and given the confusion that was involved in distinguishing the bourgeoisie from national bourgeoisie of Nepal, then the strategy hardly differs from the Maoist New Democratic strategy raising, thereby, a question regarding the rationale behind the adoption of the National Democratic strategy by shunning aside the Maoist strategy, which was current in the NCP documents of the 50s. No document of the NCP answers this question, the National Council's meeting of 16 June 1964 did think of addressing the stand of the Party regarding the Sino-Soviet ideological rift (NCP, Rastriya Parisadko Baithakma ... Pratibedan 21); but since the meeting failed, for reasons discussed later, there exists no authentic source to throw light upon this question except to point out, that while adopting the strategy of National Democracy, the NCP was swayed towards the Soviet side presumably to adopt and adapt a strategy that allowed for peaceful transition towards socialism: a conclusion, which is vindicated by the Party's categorical statement, that "the strategy of National Democracy was not aimed at establishing a Republican State" (NCP, Rajnitik Prastao [Antar Zone] 51). This indicates that the Party was averse to a struggle which entailed a headlong collusion with the King—the kingpin of feudalism in Nepal—which would have, in all probability, necessitated a violent revolution. However, in search for a peaceful path for transition to socialism the NCP created an ambiguous strategy—a strategy which on the one hand aimed at snatching the power of the King, and on the other hand sought to keep intact the institution of monarchy to strengthen the conclusion that the NCP was aiming then at nothing more than the establishment of a constitutional monarchy. Was this all? Or were there any other reasons which prompted the NCP in adopting the strategy of National Democracy? To answer this one needs to understand the strategy as perceived by the NCP in the light of the problems faced by Nepal. The strategy of National Democracy focuses on the

situation prevailing in the world after the liberation of the many Asian, African and Latin American countries from the yoke of imperialism (Fajardo Section IV). There, the document points out that even after their liberation the liberated countries are being colonised and “the United States is the mainstay of colonialism”. So, in these countries “a determined struggle is [to be] wage[d] against imperialism and the remnants of feudalism by all patriotic forces ... united in a single national democratic front”. Thereafter, pointing out the characteristic features of a National Democratic State the document observes:

In the present historical situation ... International conditions arise in many countries for the establishment of an independent National Democracy, that is, a State which consistently upholds its political and economic independence, fights against imperialism and its military blocs, against military bases on its territory ... a State in which the people are ensured broad democratic rights and freedoms ... the opportunity to work for the enactment of an agrarian reform ... and for participation in shaping Government policy ... the Communist parties [in such states] are working actively for a consistent completion of anti-imperialist, anti- feudal, democratic revolution.... They support those actions of national governments leading to the consolidation of the gains achieved and undermining the imperialists’ positions.

Thus, in fixing the line of supreme sovereign parliament the objective of creating an institution capable of framing State laws according to the wishes of the people certainly seems to have influenced the leaders of the Third Congress in adopting the line. Besides, what the strategy listed as the characteristic features of National Democracy, namely, National democratic State as an upholder of political and economic independence, as a State that fights against imperialism, and as a State which allows its citizen to frame policies for agrarian reform had also appealed the NCP, in believing that National democratic State would resolve its problem. So it stated:

Such National Democracy is able to solve the problems of Nepal. In the context of the present historical evolution of Nepal the following are the main goals of National Democracy: 1. (a) extermination of the feudal system and the implementation of pro-peasants land reforms. (b) Freedom of its citizens from feudal exploitation. (c) Freedom of the village peasants from ... the control of usurers. 2. Development of national trade and industry after freeing the nation from all types of imperialist and foreign interests ... 3 Closure of all Gorkha recruitment centres. 4. Abrogation of all uneven treaties ... 5 Deepening of the

Party's relationship with socialist countries ... 6 Preservation of the independence and sovereignty of Nepal, and 7. The development of the language, literature and culture of its different ethnic groups keeping in mind the interest of the nation (NCP, Rajnitik Prastao [Antar Zone] 45–6)

And why were these programmes necessary? Answering this the document says:

For quite long Nepal is under the clutches of the imperialist. Along with other things, imperialism is a hurdle in the development of our country ... After freeing ourselves from it we can build our nationalism. To strengthen and to ensure the permanence of Nepal's nationalism the following things are necessary viz., early industrialisation, end of all uneven ... treaties with India ... treaties on Kosi and Gandak projects ... treaties on trade and transit ... and end of all treaties which allow the establishment of Gorkha recruitment centres. After doing this the nations should develop its trade; develop its art and culture; deepen its relationship with socialist countries (NCP, Rajnitik Prastao [Antar Zone] 32).

The conformity of the programmes itemised under National Democracy especially under item 2, 4, 5 and 7 with those of the items necessary for strengthening nationalism in Nepal clarifies that the other reason, which prompted the NCP in adopting the strategy of National Democracy was its desire to strengthen the nationalism of Nepal. However, such nationalism was not simply anti-imperialist. It had other components as well, but for understanding them one has to go through one of the later documents of the Party, where the Party while dealing with the nature of programme necessary after 1960, states:

In the struggle against the dictatorial rule of the King we should consider two important issues. Firstly, we should remove from the minds of the people the delusion³⁴ that they have regarding the King. Secondly, we should strengthen the feeling of nationalism and sovereignty which is in them (NCP, Rajnitik Prastao 1963 4–5).

The same document, further clarifies the nature of nationalism which it was referring to when it states:

After the 1950–51 revolt, because of the effort of the Communist Party, and because of the changes which came in the national and international sphere, on the one hand there arose among the people of Nepal the desire to parry the pressure of Indian bourgeoisie and the

³⁴ The people were deluded in thinking that the king, because of his pro-Chinese activities, was a nationalist. They were impressed by his initiative for the construction of Kathmandu-Kodar Road.

influences of the imperialist to strengthen the nationalistic desire of national sovereignty, and on the other hand after the freedom of Tibet there grew among them the desire to improve economic relation and friendship with China to strengthen the nationalism of Nepal (4).

Therefore, for the Communists, moves which were aimed at culturing economic and friendly ties with China was also a component of Nepalese nationalism³⁵. Besides, they advocated democracy and nationalism³⁶ as complementary ideals for they stated, “by snatching the democratic rights of the common people, nationalism cannot be strengthened. Nationalism can grow only when more and more rights are given to the people” (NCP, Rajnitik Prastao [Antar Zone] 34). However, their documents of the period do not explain the relation fully. Hence, at this point of time, the perception which guided them into seeing a relation between democracy and nationalism can perhaps be explained by their statement that the people desired a better link with China. Since, people desired such link democracy was perhaps felt necessary by the Party to bring the people’s desire into play by allowing them the freedom of expression and action. So, democracy was necessary for nationalism and so was National Democracy. But, the question is why nationalism was so important? The answer lies in what the Party had to say while analysing the behaviour of King after the 1960 coup. It stated,

The present King, Mahendra, succeeded in misleading the people even after the royal coup ... Illusions were created among the masses that the Panchayat system was suited to the soil of Nepal, that he was the symbol of neutral foreign policy and nationalism....

Realising the weakness³⁷ of the Nepali Congress ... his main opponent, on Nepal-China relations, he sought to foster friendly relations with China. He paid a state visit to China and concluded a treaty settling the

³⁵ Why pro-Chinese sentiments or decisions are the expression of nationalism is explained in p. 317

³⁶ See page 342 where one of the later faction provides a clear explanation between nationalism and democracy in Nepal.

³⁷ During this period the Nepali Congress was operating from the soil of India and was carrying out cross-border raids into Nepal. This was the weakness of Nepali Congress because such acts were perceived as pro-Indian acts.

border problem between the two countries. Besides, an agreement was signed to construct a highway linking our capital with Kodar—the gateway to the Tibetan region of China. By taking these steps the King was able to mobilise the national sentiments of the people of Nepal behind him, which became a great political weapon in his hands to combat the democratic movement (NCP, Report of Third Executive ... Committee 8).

So, the NCP perceived nationalism—the national sentiments of the people of Nepal, a pro-Chinese sentiment, as a tool for mobilising the people and by giving it implicit recognition in the Third Congress’s strategy it wanted to better its political prospects vis-à-vis the King. In what way the NCP uses nationalism is for the later documents to reveal, but at this point suffice is to say that while adopting/adapting the strategy the NCP created a few confusions. First, the confusion was regarding the name of the strategy. Though from the classes taken it was an anti-imperialist strategy, yet it could neither be fully considered as National Democratic, nor as People’s Democratic strategy³⁸. Second, there was no clear class analysis,³⁹ as a result they could not differentiate the bourgeois element from the national bourgeoisie. Sometimes, they even considered the Nepali Congress as the bourgeoisie of Nepal, which could also be interpreted as national bourgeoisie (See footnote 31). Third, subsequent works of Tulsilal have created an impression that the strategy of National Democracy had absolutely rejected the role of Nepali Congress in the democratic revolution, but this was not so. However, because of this when one goes through the documents of other

³⁸ The National Democratic strategy did not match with the objective conditions of Nepal and the manner in which it was adapted it was not People’s Democracy because it did not consider the gradual expropriation of the bourgeoisie.

³⁹ In all the documents till now the NCP does not identify the major classes; their interdependence and relation of conflicts generated while producing, appropriating and distributing the surplus value. Lack of this exercise has generated a lot of debate among the Communist factions leading to differences among them. To cite one example, see NCP (Kendriya Nucleus), “Deshko Rajnitik ... Bislayshun” 19 where the faction, while criticising Pushpalal says, “Without considering the characters of Nepali Congress, Pushpalal still thinks that it represents the bourgeois class or national bourgeoisie of Nepal”. And the reasons given to deny Nepali Congress the character of national bourgeoisie is that it is connected with Indian bourgeoisie and does not look after the interest of Nepalese national capital.

Communist factions⁴⁰ one persistently comes across views which attest to the claims of Tulsilal creating much confusion.

1.5. Birth of NCP under Pushpalal and its transformation into NCP (Marxist)

The Third Congress of the NCP, which sought to iron out the differences between the leadership failed to bring about the much sought-after unity. Even in the course of the Congress Amatya states:

Pushpalal and Com. Hikmat were against the political line of the Third Congress. Pushpalal was of the opinion that the Nepali Congress was a decisive force, so the Communists should take the political line acceptable to them. In his opinion we were not to ask for anything more than the creation of the earlier type of Parliament... (Amatya, Nepal ... Matbhedharu 24).

Then he points out that until the end “Pushpalal remained adamant” as a result he sowed the seed of fragmentation. “Rayamajhi ... rejected the line of the Darbangha Plenum, and Pushpalal, the line given by the Third Congress...” (Amatya, Nepal ... Matbhedharu 26). After the conclusion of the Third Congress, one comes across writings of these leaders loaded with recrimination and counter recriminations. Pushpalal says, “In the Third Congress we had decided to resolve differences existing within the Party ... but after the Congress, owing to Tulsilal’s relations with International revisionists, especially with Indian Dange group ... he lobbied within the Party” (Pushpalal, Itihas 126).

Similarly Tulsilal states,

It was hilarious that Pushpalal believed in a political line, which sought to transform the Communists into a lackey of the Nepali Congress ... and according to him such politics was the politics of New Democracy. For him the politics of National Democracy, which believed in the unity of entire revolutionary classes and in the completion of revolution was revisionist politics (Amatya, Nepal ... Matbhedharu 28).

To come out of these polemics the following questions need to be answered: why was Pushpalal referring to Dange? Was Tulsilal right in pointing out that Pushpalal tried to

⁴⁰ See, NCP (Chautho Mahadhiwayshun (Fourth Congress)), “Kranti Ra Partyka ... Samasyaharu” 40 The Party says that the Third Congress had freed the Communist movement from the Nepal Congress.

turn the NCP into a lackey of the Nepali Congress? As claimed by Tulsilal, did the politics of National Democracy seek to unite the revolutionary classes? The first question cannot be answered in view of the fact that no documentary evidence, which proves the relation between Dange and Tulsilal, exists. Similarly, the extent to which Pushpalal wanted Nepali Congress to be a party in the National Democratic strategy is reflected nowhere in his writings or in the documents of the movement. But, considering how Pushpalal perceived the political intent behind the Darbangha line (See p. 293) it is difficult to accept Tulsilal's claim that Pushpalal wanted to turn Nepal Communist Party into a lackey of the Nepali Congress. Besides, in the entire works of Pushpalal or in the documents of the Party prepared by him one does not come across any expression which supports Tulsilal's claim. Perhaps, Tulsilal was making such a claim just to denigrate Pushpalal. As regards the last question, the foregoing account yields an easy answer. As already pointed out, the NCP documents until the 60s lack class analysis and as such without understanding as to how the bourgeois class of Nepal was related with its national bourgeoisie it is difficult to agree with Tulsilal that the politics of National Democracy was seeking to unite the revolutionary classes. Finally, if one considers the document of the Third Congress, which was prepared by Tulsilal and the later documents of NCP (Pushpalal)⁴¹ then one finds that both subscribed to the same tactical positions, that is to use the Nepali Congress as a force against the King. However, they did differ, as shall be discussed later, on the question of the path of revolution: peaceful path or a path of violence. Hence, Tulsilal's allegations against Pushpalal cannot be accepted for want of valid arguments.

For the balance of 1962, the NCP functioned amid differences between Tulsilal and Pushpalal. But, these differences were not confined to the leaders alone; it

⁴¹ Pushpalal does not clarify his stand when he splits, but in the Fourth Conference of 1972 he clarifies that NCP was never against the tactics of using Nepali Congress. See, p. 331

had seeped even among the rank and file. Portraying this situation, the NCP (Pushpalal) document states: “By placing the strategy of National democracy and supreme sovereign Parliament in the Third Congress, they [Tulsilal and his group] unnecessarily divided the Congress into the majority and the minority groups; created differences and blunted the fighting spirit of the Party” (NCP (Pushpalal), “Nepal ... Singhawalokan Awam Siksha” 53).

But, when the Party withdrew its November 11, 1962 “nationwide peaceful movement” which was supposed to be a “democratic movement” linked with “the burning national questions” (NCP, Report of Third Executive ... Committee 9), the Party did not talk about its organisational weakness rather it explained its decision by stating,

As a result of the flare up of the Sino-Indian border dispute into an actual fighting, the Central Secretariat ... called off the proposed movement on the ground that the neutral foreign policy of Nepal was being made insecure by virtue of its geographical position. The Nepalese mind was also diverted from the movement to see the outcome of the fighting (NCP, Report of Third Executive ... Committee 4).

Considering the fact that the movement was meant for solving issues of burning national questions, which in the Communist movement of Nepal is identified with issues connected with Indo-Nepal treaties, the above explanation was reasonable. But, later document of the Party added, without explaining, of course, that “there were other reasons, too” for pulling out of the movement (NCP, Report of Third Executive ... Committee 9). The other reasons were perhaps related with the Party’s organisational status, which might have influenced its decision for withdrawing the movement. Because, by then the organizational issue had really turned into a significant one for the fact that even in the first quarter of 1963, the concern of the Party was regarding its consolidation for carrying on its struggle. So, Pushpalal observed that the Third Executive (Extended) Committee meeting was called “to bring unity within the Party” (Pushpalal, Itihas 127). The meeting was held in April 1963 and its document read:

At the extended meeting the Central Executive Committee (CEC) discussed cardinal issues pertaining to the consolidation of the Party, and advancement of the democratic struggle and establishment of all the democratic and patriotic forces. The meeting took a number of decisions affecting these questions. The aim of these discussions is to lay down a suitable tactical line, both political and organisational, and to restore democracy in Nepal in place of the present Panchayat system which deprives the people of all their political rights (NCP, Report of Third Executive ... Committee 3).

The tactical line, both political and organisational, which were “placed” by “Com. Puspa Lal”⁴² discussed issues as to “how... The policy [of the Party should be taken] to the masses”; “how to reorganise Party committees, and how to materialise the principle of collectivism”. As regards the tactics, the document also explained “the need and importance of building a united front consisting of all the democratic and patriotic elements in the country” (5). It called upon all to “maintain unity even with those elements who [differed] with [the NCP] on the question of future political arrangement for Nepal, but [wanted] to fight for political liberties” (5–6).

But, there was no change in the strategy. The document titled “political resolution”, which was tabled by Amartya stressed upon “the decision of the Third Party Congress” to “stand for ... National Democracy and a supreme sovereign Parliament and for transferring of all legislative and executive powers ... to the people’s representative body”. Further, it observed, “owing to the set-back to the democratic movement ... there is no possibility of launching a big political movement in the country at present” (5).

From these statements certain facts come to light. The Party sought to achieve unity through the implementation of the resolutions on tactical line. And this tactical line was both political and organisational. Since, the main goal of its political tactics then was to fight for political liberties, its political tactics was to unite even with those elements ‘who differed’ on the question of political patterns on the assumption that all forces would agree to work for liberty—a move towards the democratisation of Nepal.

⁴² Pushpalal is the standard form but at times the name is spelled even as Pushpa Lal.

And the organisational tactics, as it was called, was for strengthening the principle of collectivism. What were these principles? The report of the Third Executive (Extended) Committee fails to clarify its elements and how the Party sought to achieve it. However, later document representing one of the NCP factions, the Pushpalal faction, gives some direction towards understanding as to what the phrase could have possibly meant. It probably meant democratic centralism for the document stated: “Even, at that point of time, the minority group stressed upon the need for establishing democratic centralism to resolve Party differences through discussion ... In this direction the Third Executive (Extended) Committee meeting played a crucial role” (NCP (Pushpalal), “Nepal ... Singhawalokan Awam Siksha” 55). Thus, principle of collectivism, in their understanding, meant democratic centralism and democratic centralism meant resolving issues through discussion. This understanding, that the Party was stressing on democratic centralism which meant resolving issues through discussion finds its support in another document of 1963. In it, describing the then status of the Party organisation the document portrays of a situation where discussions on important issues, within the Party, were a rarity for it says:

Today we have to remove the various illusions circling around in the Party. After the Third Congress the Party organisation has weakened because of our failure to discuss and analyse the politics of the past pro-King, opportunist leadership and the politics, strategy and constitution approved by the Third Congress (NCP, Tatkalik Karyaniti 1963 4–5).

Besides, the same document indicates that there was a break in the Party structure for it says, “Today it is essential to establish a planned, continuous contact among the different Party committees running from top to bottom” (NCP, Tatkalik Karyaniti 1963 5), indicating, by it, that such contacts did not exist. However, given the fact that the Party ultimately fragmented, it appears that it could never put to practice its idea of democratic centralism. During this phase when it was organisationally weak the Party sought to implement its tactics of heightening contradiction within the Panchayat structure and to reveal the class character of the King. Characterising the “National Panchayat ... [as] cover for the dictatorial rule of the King” its document said that

National Panchayat is “no more than an advisory body” where “the members ... have to seek permission from the King ... prior to moving any important Bill” (NCP, Tatkalik Karyaniti 1963 10). So, it is in “contradiction ... [with] the entire democratic forces” including those “who had imagined [that] the King would restore democratic rights gradually, [and] who had appealed the King to grant political rights within the framework of the Panchayat system ... and ... had pleaded for ‘Controlled Democracy’”. Besides, “unemployment” the “daily worsening” condition of the peasants, “nepotism and corruption ... in the administration” and “imperialist penetration ... and domination of Indian capitalist” (11) have brought the people in contradiction with the system. So, to heighten these “contradictions of the Panchayat system [and to] build a broad based movement of the masses from below” (12) the Party listed 15 political tactics. These tactics included “fight for immediate relief to the peasants from ... legal and illegal exploitation”; fight against “entry of foreign private capital with a view to protecting ... national capital”, fight for “employment of rural as well as urban youth”, fight for “living wages to workers in fields and factories”, fight against “all unequal treaties”, fight for “release of ... political prisoners”, legalisation of “political parties”, “rights of assembly” etcetera (NCP, Tatkalik Karyaniti 1963 12–3). But then, its statement, that “there is no possibility of launching a big political movement in the country at present” goads one to ask question regarding the nature of the movement that the Party had decided to launch by implementing its political tactics. The answer lies in what the Party had to say in its “Political Proposal” where it states:

It is a wrong assessment of the objective political condition to think [at present] that the entire classes and the people can jointly launch a big political movement. Such assessment done in a hurry will weaken the democratic forces, and will indirectly support the King. This is because until now... the character of the King, his class interest and the nature of the Panchayat system has not been fully revealed (NCP, Rajnaitik Prastao 1963 21).

Thus, in 1963 the NCP was not aiming at sea change in politics, but its actions were limited to the level of carrying out propaganda—propaganda to heighten the

contradictions⁴³ of the political system and to reveal the class character of the King. In its view, these tactics, as it document put it, were “a preparation for strengthening democracy against the system to launch a big political movement in future” (NCP, Tatkalik Karyaniti 1963 3). In this preparatory phase, the Party expected to contact people using “the rights available within the Panchayat system” and “open alignments with all those who believed in political freedom” (6, 7). This included even those whose hopes in “the progressive introduction of political rights under the Panchayat system” were belied (8). It wanted to bring all together, because it believed that “disunity among the democratic forces was the fountainhead of the King’s power” (9). Thus, the acid test for recognising the democratic forces was simply the groups’ belief in the need for restoring political freedom. To draw them together the Party believed in “appealing” the democratic forces, and such “appeal was to be backed by the power of the people” (9 and 10). This meant that the Party then charted out a course in increasing contacts and convincing people regarding the necessity for such tactics.

In this phase, the Party decided “to use even minor issues to rig movements for the cause of democracy” (10). But, it cautioned “we should raise movements only on those issues where victory is assured”. Because, only then it hoped to raise “the morale of the people ... and bring the revolutionaries together” (14). While carrying out these movements, the Party observed “we should make use of the legal instruments available in the system” (13). So, the tactics which the Party advocated then was for constitutional movements, whose primary goal was to inform the people about the need for more liberty. Had the document not stated that the then movement for liberty was for leading a larger movement, a movement against the system, then it would have created a problem in differentiating the Communists from those who had

⁴³ See, NCP, Tatkalik Karyaniti 1963 11 The party points out that in times to come contradictions such as demand for more powers to the Rastriya Panchayat and issues of corruption and nepotism in the works of Zonal and District Panchayats as well as the demands of class organisations for greater freedom would emerge as major contradictions. The party should utilise these contradictions to develop movements.

pinned their hopes in a Panchayat system with more political freedom. However, by addressing to such nuances the Party protected itself from sliding towards the politics of Rayamajhi faction, but despite this finesse the document reflected of a situation: a situation where the Party was desperately in need for mobilising forces by ascribing too broad a meaning to the term democratic. This was not the meaning which later factions of the movement were ready to accept (See, p. 364). Needless to say, that this democratic force even included the “students and urban youths [with dual class character] who had, in the past, played a significant role in the democratic movement of the nation” (14). The Party identified them as a class “readily available as groups who could be easily mobilised” and in “whom it could easily inculcate political consciousness” (16). As for the peasants, the suggested tactics was “to infuse in them the desire for class struggle” (17). And it did not discount the role of the bourgeoisie in its projected movement for it stated:

When different sections of the society... are involved in the political movement ... then the different political thought streams will certainly try to influence the course of the movement ... and the present regime will, in a bid to subjugate the movement, sop the representatives of the bourgeois thought processes ... and the bourgeoisie fearing the rise in the movement, will also be ready to enter into a compromise ... this will weaken the movement (NCP, Tatkalik Karyaniti 1963 20).

To check such probable outcome of the movement the Party, therefore, maintained the need for following a policy of “unity and struggle” in the united front. Thereafter, it said, “Even after the establishment of democracy we have to work towards the widening of democracy by uprooting feudalism and strengthening the foundations of independent economic development” (21). But, for widening democracy it states:

Since 1950, there has been a rise in nationalism. The main foundation of this nationalism is in the neutral foreign policy of Nepal between its two neighbours. So we have been opposing the policy of Indian Government which tries to keep Nepal under its economic, political and military control⁴⁴. But the bourgeois forces of Nepal ... especially

⁴⁴ Because such arrangement forces Nepal to function according to the dictate of India.

the Nepali Congress, having failed to maintain the neutrality,⁴⁵ has allowed the King in projecting himself as a protector of nationalism ... But nationalism and democracy are complementary, because without nationalism there cannot be democracy, and without democracy there cannot be nationalism (21–2).

Then it says, “In the present period, when these elements [the Nepali Congress] have failed in raising the issue of nationalism and democracy as complementary ideals, we should move forward and if we do so we will emerge as a national Party” (23), indicating, thereby, that nationalism and democracy were being considered as ideals to mobilise forces. Besides, indicating such tactics of the Party the statements have another importance: they bring out, implicitly, of course, yet another dimension of NCP’s concept of nationalism, and this dimension is perhaps related with its idea of neutrality. In common parlance neutrality in case of Nepal means maintenance of equidistance from its two neighbours and the following of a foreign policy uninfluenced by them. But, in the analysis of the NCP there exists an imperial relation between the Government of India and Nepal. As such, one hardly comes across an instance of the Government of India’s act, which has been perceived by the NCP as an act which is not influenced by India’s desire to control Nepal. Therefore, the statement of the NCP that it opposes the policies of the Indian Government which tries to control it means, in essence, its objection to the use of the imperial relation in forcing Nepal to act against its will. Therefore, neutrality in the context of Nepal refers to its ability to function without being coerced by the superiority which India enjoys by virtue of its imperial relation with Nepal. Contrary to this, Nepal does not have such relation with China; hence any decision/act of Nepal in relation to China is free from coercion so it enjoys freedom in such acts. Such acts are, therefore, neutral stances, an expression of sovereignty and nationalism of Nepal.

According to another document⁴⁶ of the Party, the Third EEC’s Political

⁴⁵ It is in reference to the border raids which Subarna Shamsher started after the coup, and in it the communists perceived the support of the Indian Government.

⁴⁶ See, NCP, Hamro Mul Bato 11 This document was prepared by Gurung

Proposal and tactical line were accepted by “everyone, even by those who were in jail”. Hence, “to keep up this optimistic upbeat among the members of the Party”, the document says, “the ... Secretariat held a meeting ... and decided to focus upon organisational issues and upon removing the pro-King ideology spread by Rayamajhi group (NCP, Hamro Mul Bato 6). Explaining further the reason behind the holding of the Secretariat meeting, the NCP (Pushpalal) document states:

... As per the decision of the Executive Committee the meeting of the Secretariat was held to remove the lack of faith among the members of the Secretariat ... and to infuse the spirit of teamwork among its members, the absence of which had, from the time of the Third Congress, stalled the progress of the Party organisational work (NCP (Pushpalal), “Nepal ... Singhawalokan Awam Siksha” 55–6).

This meeting passed a six-point disciplinary resolution and a three-month organisational programme. Among the six-point resolutions, the most important ones were those which called for “intra-Party discussion on debatable issues to find a common point”, “an end to the practice of publicising intra-Party differences outside the committees [where they were supposed to be discussed]” and “a need for establishing amicable relation between the two old leaders of the Party”, that is, Pushpalal and Tulsilal (56).

The same meeting also decided to place “the Central Office under Com. PL and Com. TL” (56). The three-month organisational programme was chalked out “keeping in view the most urgent organisational tasks necessary for strengthening the Party” (NCP, Rastriya Parisadko Baithakma ... Pratibedan 13). This programme stressed upon the need for ensuring “extensive study of all-Party documents published after the Third Congress”, “proper links among the committees”, “increase in Party membership ... without diluting class contradictions and class consciousness” and “creation of jail fund” (13–4).

[Pushpalal] for discussion in the Seventh EEC meeting.

In the meantime, cracks developed in the Rayamajhi group. According to the NCP version, Rayamajhi had joined the “Privy Council” [Raj Sabha] despite his group’s objection. What transpired thereafter is not clear, but Rayamajhi is reported to have conspired with the authorities to jail his earlier colleagues D. P Adhikari and Sambhuram Shrestha when they arranged “a meeting ... [on] July 22 to censure Mr Majhi for his ... activities”. Sambhuram was arrested but D. P Adhikari could plan his escape towards “Varanasi”, where he issued “a ... statement ... [accusing] Mr Majhi of his complete walk over to the camp of the King against democracy in Nepal” (NCP, “More ... Raimajhi’s Anti-Party Activities” 20). And despite D. P’s reservations against the “Third Congress’s activities” he is reported to have “entered into an agreement with the Secretariat of the NCP” to “work jointly towards revealing the wrong policies of Rayamajhi” (NCP, Rastriya Parisadko Baithakma ... Pratibedan 20).

After that the Party decided to hold a meeting of its Rastriya Parishad.⁴⁷ It was called on 16 June 1964, but when a few of its members, because of confusions regarding the venue, went astray the meeting could not achieve its “quorum” hence it was converted into the Fourth Executive (Extended) Committee meeting (NCP, Hamro Mul Bato 6). According to the document, the Rastriya Parishad meeting had been called to “vote for the political line given by the Darbangha Plenum and especially to discuss thoroughly the organisational issues and the ideological differences of the Party with the pro-King opportunistic tendencies”. But, when Tulsilal “objected to the report⁴⁸ passed by the Secretariat ... the meeting fizzled out” (NCP, Hamro Mul Bato 7).

⁴⁷ See, NCP (Pushpalal), “Nepal ... Singhawalokan Awam Siksha” 61 According to the Third Congress Constitution, the meeting of this body was to be held in between the party congresses, and this inter-congress meeting was considered the highest forum of discussion in the absence of the Congress.

⁴⁸ This report refers to the document. Rastriya Parisadko Baithakma Kendriya Mantriparisadlay Peshgareko Pratibedan

What were Tulsilal's objections? The document prepared by Gurung [Pushpalal] does not clarify the nuances involved in Tulsilal's objections except to report Tulsilal's statement against the document of the Third EEC meeting. He is reported to have said that "the Third EEC document was passed under pressure" (NCP, Hamro Mul Bato 7). Thereafter, the document reports about the Fifth EEC meeting, where Tulsilal is said to have resigned on "grounds of his failure to work with the then members of the Secretariat" (NCP, Hamro Mul Bato 9). Under such circumstances, possibly to assuage Tulsilal, the document states that the "Secretariat then ... handed over the entire responsibility of the Central office to Tulsilal" (NCP, Hamro Mul Bato 10). Commenting further on the failures of the Executive (Extended) Committee meetings the document says:

All these dampened the spirit of the comrades and in the Sixth EEC meeting there were only 10 members and the quorum was reached by only one. This meeting decided to hold the Fourth Congress; and in view of the tussle between the Secretariat and the General Secretary the responsibility to prepare the basic documents for discussion were given to TL ... But the basic documents were never prepared ... so when the possibility of holding the Fourth Congress seemed remote the Seventh EEC meeting was called (NCP, Hamro Mul Bato 10).

These meetings must have taken place in between 16 June 1964 and 15 September 1966.⁴⁹ However, when the Seventh EEC meeting was called Rawal says, Tulsilal "boycotted" it and the "Central Working Committee split into two groups of 6 and 11 members" (62). As a result, the possibility of any future meetings turned remote. Nevertheless, the document prepared by Gurung [Pushpalal] and a booklet authored

⁴⁹ No documents of these meetings are available and the dates of these meetings are not mentioned even in the document prepared by Gurung [Pushpalal] for the Seventh Executive (Extended) Committee meeting. See, NCP, Hamro Mul Bato 8 the date of the Fourth Executive (Extended) Committee meeting is clear. It was held on 16th June 1964. Tulsilal Amatya's work, *Janabadi Kranti Ya Sansodhanbad*, see, Amatya 18 dates the document prepared by Pushpalal to 1966. This work of Amatya is dated 15 September 1966. It criticises the document prepared by Pushpalal. Hence, Pushpalal must have prepared the document anywhere between January 1966 to 15 September 1966. So, the Seventh EEC meeting was also supposed to be held in between these dates. As for the 5th and the 6th EEC meetings they must have been conducted in between the period 16 June 1964 to December 1965.

by Tulsilal— Kun Bato ?—during the period bring out the differences which existed between them ever since the holding of the Third Congress. According to Tulsilal, there were two views current in the Party after the Third Congress. One of them admitted that the “The Political Proposal of the Third Congress had given the Party the task of moving towards National Democracy after completing democratic revolution”. It had also given “the Party the task of marshalling people’s support for the creation of supreme sovereign parliament” (Amatya, Kun Bato ? 52). But, according to him there was a second view of “A few friends”, who considered “the politics given by the Third Congress as radical. So, they wanted to keep aside the Third Congress strategy and limit the activities of the Party within the ambit of possible politics” (Amatya, Kun Bato ? 53). Then he states, “The discussion of the Secretariat [held before the Third EEC] had decided that the resolution of the Third EEC should try to accommodate both these views” (53). But, contrary to such understanding, Amatya quotes the resolution of the Third EEC to point out that it contained the following:

... The Communist Party of Nepal is firmly opposed to the Panchayat system and stands for the democratic system. But, in the changed political situation the Party does not visualise the possibility of launching a big political movement against the system immediately. The immediate tasks of the CPN are to try to accelerate all the inherent contradictions of the Panchayat system and build a broad based movement of the masses from below on the basis of ... economic, national and political demands (Amatya, Kun Bato ? 57).

Commenting on the above paragraph of the resolution he then states:

This paragraph opposes the Panchayat system ... and focuses on the need to replace the Panchayat system by the democratic system But, nowhere it indicates the necessity for completing the National Democratic revolution, nor does it state about the nature of the Parliament. As such it means nothing more than establishing the old type of Parliament (Amatya, Kun Bato ? 57–8).

In sum, Tulsilal argues that the resolution of the Third EEC, which was supposed to be a compromised resolution had, “shelved the revolutionary politics given by the Third Congress” by not stating “the strategy”, and that it “limited the range of politics to struggles meant for the achievement of parliamentary democracy whose nature was

also not clarified in accordance with the line given by the Third Congress” (59). This was perhaps true. Pushpalal’s tilt towards the line of only parliamentary democracy is revealed even in the content of the document prepared by him for discussion in the Seventh EEC meeting. In it, he firstly quotes from Lenin’s work “State and Revolution” profusely to support the view that the “working class” needs “political liberties for its emancipation” (NCP, Hamro Mul Bato 58) to finally say:

Quoted above are the statements made by Lenin during the formative stages of the Party and later. In essence, they imply that when there is an autocratic system in existence then ‘The vital task of the workers’ Party—the Communist Party—is to work for political liberty ... because only in course of such a struggle the workers will become powerful and will be able to establish democracy (66) .

Then he points out that even after “The December coup, the Darbhanga Plenum had voted in favour for the establishment of parliamentary democracy” and quotes a paragraph from the Appeal sent by Tulsilal after the formation of Antar Zonal Samanjasya Samiti, where he is said to have stated, “parliamentary democracy is the only system where people can form their Government ... the right to form and dissolve governments is in the hand of the people” (66, 67). Thereafter, he quotes a letter received, after the Third Congress of the NCP, from General Secretary, Ajoy Ghosh of the CPI where he is said to have stated that:

If the CPN [NCP] did not struggle for parliamentary democracy, [then] history will not forgive us and that there would be nobody even to spit upon the Communist Party. Democracy will come, sooner or later and when it would come it would be the Nepali Congress that had gained at the failure of the Communist Party (71–2).

On the strength of the above quotations; he then concludes, “In the present political crisis of the nation no one can, therefore, have a second opinion regarding the need for parliamentary democracy” clarifying, thereby, his position that he was against the political line given by the Third Congress which had voted in favour of a supreme sovereign Parliament, and that his political line was still the line of the Darbhanga Plenum, which was only for the restoration of Parliamentary system (NCP, Hamro Mul Bato 72). Since Pushpalal held such position even in 1966, Tulsilal Amatya’s

claim, that Pushpalal while preparing the resolution of the Third EEC focused only on the politics of parliamentary democracy disregarding the strategy given by the Third Congress, seems to be vindicated. But, given the fact that the resolution of the Third EEC is not in hand the whole discussion enables one to understand the nature of controversy between the two leaders without reaching a firm conclusion.

The controversy; however, had its toll. The movement was beset with a number of problems. Identifying them, the NCP (Pushpalal) document Circular 1/ 3 itemised eight issues. Chief among them were the “lack of clarity [among the leaders] regarding politics [strategy]”, “the absence of democratic centralism owing to lack of organisational discipline”, and “the prevalence of tendencies [among rank and file] to form units on regional basis⁵⁰” (NCP (Pushpalal), Circular No. 1/3 3). Hence, in 1965, as Rawal reports, the “Purva Kosi Prantiya Committee, with the help of the CPI held its conference in Katihar to function as independent unit and like organisations sprang up in Dang and Pyuthan” (65–6). Similarly, “in 1966 the Bagmati Prantiya committee rejected the politics [strategy] fixed by the Third Congress” (Rawal 65). Of these independent units, the Purva Kosi Prantiya committee, to be described later, gave birth to the Jhapa movement (See p. 345). But, the immediate reaction against the problems was reflected in the activities of three members of the Secretariat and three members of the Central Committee of the Third Congress. The three members of the Secretariat, namely, “Pushpalal, Hikmat Singh and Devendralal” along with “three members of the Central Committee namely Balaram Upadhayaya, Ekdev Alay and Premprakash” took to themselves the task of putting into effect five-point objectives (Pushpalal, Itihas 136). These objectives were: “1. To stall regionalism. 2. To restore democratic centralism within the Party. 3. To organise [a Party] on the basis of a clear strategy. 4. To establish a Party centre. 5. To create a ... Party which would identify

⁵⁰ See, NCP (Pushpalal), Tesro Sammelanko Aitihāsik Mahatwa 21 These units rationalised their actions on the ground of the existence of a non-functional central leadership.

feudalism and imperialism as its main enemy and function primarily among the peasants” (NCP (Pushpalal), Circular No. 1/3 3). This necessitated the formation of a “Central Organising Committee” to “draft the Party document *Singhawalokan*” and “... to publish a monthly Party organ⁵¹ ‘Nepal-Patra’ and its English edition ‘Nepal-Tribune’” (NCP (Pushpalal), Tesro Sammelanko Aitihāsik Mahatwa 6). When the document and the Party organ made its round throughout Nepal, the Party held its convention in Bhadra 2024⁵² [August/September 1967]. The convention “passed the *Singhawalokan* as a draft document” to be “circulated among the different committees”. The convention expected the committees “to read the document and to send one representative each with its advice in the third conference” (10). “In May 15, 1968”, in Gorakhpur (an Indian town bordering South of Nepal), the faction then held its third conference (Pushpalal, Itihas 143). It was aimed at forming a Party wedded to the ideals of armed peasant revolution for its document stated:

The main objective of this conference is to counter the revisionist, the regionalist and the opportunist ... tendencies prevalent in the Party after the Third Congress ... and to form a revolutionary Party equipped with Maoist ideology aimed at achieving armed peasant revolution (NCP (Pushpalal), Tesro Sammelanko Aitihāsik Mahatwa 15).

Providing greater details regarding the reasons behind the formation of the Party, the document further said:

The developments informing the national and international situations are not going to halt when we are involved in our inner party struggle. They demand our opinion.... For that we have to declare the formation of our Party to clarify our ideological position; to state our strategy and tactics....

As Party members and as the members of the leading committees of the Party, we used all means; constitutional and conventional to resolve the inner party struggle ... but when Tulsilal and his colleagues failed to respond we had no choice but to declare the formation of the Party.

For quite some time ... the people of the country are facing novel problems under the Panchayati system ... under such conditions our colleagues and Party supporters are interested to function under a clear

⁵¹ See, NCP (Pushpalal), “Nepal ... Singhawalokan Awam Siksha” 71 These editions of the party organ were circulated with the intention to make it known both at the national and international level the ideology of the new group.

⁵² See, NCP (Pushpalal), Tesro Sammelanko Aitihāsik Mahatwa 9

policy directive of the Party. But owing to the lack of clear Party policy there are misunderstandings going around regarding the Party ... our colleagues are under the influence of revisionist Tulsilal.... This needs to be stopped (11–2).

... Today on account of the lack of centralised Party directives spontaneous student and peasant movements⁵³ are on the rise. For centralising those movements and for unifying them it is necessary to declare the formation of the Party (12).

But what it stated while describing the mood of the conference raises question regarding the process that might have gone in adopting the strategy: it seems that the Party, while adopting the strategy, considered it also as a tool for mobilisation for it states:

The great cultural revolution which is going on today in China has influenced our people in Nepal: great is the influence of Mao's ideology here. Because of this thousand of our youths are interested in a strong Communist Party based on Maoist ideology. They are ready to join its rank and file. In this conference, the new friends who are present testify to the fact. Under such condition it will be easier for us to organise our Party (13).

In the conference, the Party passed two documents, namely, *Nepal Communist Partyko Aatharaha Barshako Krantikari Sangharsako Singhawalokan Awam Siksha* and *Naya Janabadi Karyakram: (Nepali Krantiko Ekmatra Mulbato)*. The former document is a survey of the Communist movement in Nepal from its inception. The survey was carried out with a view to “add momentum” to the movement, and to “draw lessons” for future (NCP (Pushpalal), “Nepal ... Singhawalokan Awam Siksha” 1). In it, the Party describes the entry of revisionism and its development within the movement. And in the process it explains the reasons behind the fragmentation of the Nepal Communist movement; explains the NCP (Pushpalal) faction's objections against the strategy of the Third Congress and clarifies its stand on the Sino-Soviet rift contributing, thereby, to the analytical framework of the narrative.

⁵³ The party was probably referring to the incipient Jhapa movement, which in the beginning was a spontaneous student/peasant movement.

Explaining revisionism as the cause behind the fragmentation of the Communist movement in Nepal from 2010/2012 (1954–1955), and by way of stating its disapproval of the Russian Communist Party, whom it perceived as the revisionists, the NCP (Pushpalal) faction clarifies its stand on Sino-Soviet rift by stating,

... In short today it is essential to determine the role of the working class in the prospective bourgeois democratic revolution of Nepal. From Lenin's period the question has created much controversy among the Marxists. Even today, in the international level, this question is the issue of controversy among the Marxist-Leninists. Also in our Party this question has generated controversy since 2010/2012 [1954–55]. Today there are many splinters within our Party, but closer look reveals that these splinters are divided into representatives of two broad ideologies. Between these, one group advocates the leadership of the working class in the prospective bourgeois democratic revolution of Nepal; and the other group, the role of the bourgeoisie in the revolution. The revisionists⁵⁴ do not agree with the role of the leadership of the working class in the revolution, but the Marxist-Leninists consider working class leadership in the revolution as an essential element. Today, if the entire group of the revisionists of Nepal are in favour of the revisionist Communist Party of Russia, the Marxist-Leninists of Nepal are inclined towards the Chinese Communist Party which is under the leadership of comrade Mao (NCP (Pushpalal), "Nepal ... Singhawalokan Awam Siksha" 3).

Arguing against the Third Congress's strategy, the Party observes:

In the political proposal published in the name of third Party Congress, the reasons for adopting the strategy of National Democracy is stated in the following lines 'the policies of King Mahendra's Panchayat democracy instead of resolving the fundamental problems of the nation is pushing it towards underdevelopment. Instead of ensuring rapid industrialisation, it is allowing foreign capital to loot the nation ... so today every countryman has to think whether there is an alternative to the capitalist path of development. Hence, all the underdeveloped countries of the world are following a path different from the capitalist path for their development'.

From the above quotation it is clear that ... the Third Congress's non-capitalist strategy of National Democracy was infused only with the purpose of bringing about rapid industrialisation of the nation (33–4).

Further the document states,

⁵⁴ See, NCP (Pushpalal), "Nepal ... Singhawalokan Awam Siksha" 12 Revisionism in the ideological front denies the leadership role of the working class, and in the organisational front rejects democratic centralism, and emphasises on the possibility of resolving social contradictions through peaceful means. Revisionism is the bourgeois thought trend that sprouts in the proletariat led movement.

Explaining the importance of the strategy [the political proposal] said such National Democratic strategy has appeared as historic necessity to resolve our fundamental problems. In the context of Nepal the main points [which the strategy will resolve] ... are: 1 (a) the destruction of feudalism and the [implementation of] land reform in the interest of the peasants.... (10) It will ensure entire rights and liberty (speech, press, association and social organisation) to the people by opposing all sorts of dictatorial rule and will enable the people to participate in the policy-making function of the State (34).

The only purpose behind quoting all the points is to point out that these issues especially the one under point 10 makes it clear that the Government formed under the national democratic strategy will not be a Government, which will represent the working class instead it will allow them only to pressurise the Government from outside... (35).

Then taking exceptions to the statement of the third Party Congress's strategy that "the strategy of National Democracy will be acceptable even to the Nepali Congress", the bourgeois Party of our nation the Party observes that "the strategy was not meant for ... bringing about socialism" in Nepal (35). By this the Party probably meant to say that the strategy was in the interest of the bourgeoisie.

Lastly, it states, "In page 51 of the political proposal, they [Tulsilal and others] are exposed when they say, 'that the demand for all powerful sovereign parliament is not a demand for Republic' ... The meaning is clear [they were for] constitutional democracy. As such, there is no difference between the thinking of traitor Rayamajhi and Tulsilal" (38). However, in the other document *Naya Janabadi Karyakram: (Nepali Krantiko Ekmatra Mulbato)* the Party dubs Tulsilal group as the representatives of "neo-revisionists" (NCP (Pushpalal), "Janabadi Karyakram" 253) by which it meant those "who believed in vanquishing the forces of imperialism through economic competition and of achieving socialism through peaceful means" (237). But, more interesting in its former document is the answer to the question why revisionism spread its hold in the Communist Party of Nepal. The answer is interesting, because it indicates partially the social base of the movement, especially after the 1950 revolt, making it evident that since its inception the movement was influenced by the entry of the deprived middle class for the document states:

Before 1950 and after, when the bourgeois class of Nepal was following a policy of compromise within Nepal with the feudal forces, and outside, with the monopoly capitalists, especially the monopoly capitalists of India, the middle class radical forces became dissatisfied

and turned towards the NCP as a result the membership of the Party swelled in the cities. Thereafter, when the Party began spreading its revolutionary policy among the peasants revisionist ideas poured forth from that class [the middle class]. In the present day campaign of modernising Nepal, a campaign which is necessary to protect the interest of the exploiting class, a section of middle class of Nepal is enjoying the fruit of the campaign. This section at present is either with the Nepali Congress or with the King. But the condition of the other section of the class is ever degrading. So, elements coming from this section support bourgeois democratic revolution. This is the social base of revisionism in Nepal (NCP (Pushpalal), “Nepal ... Singhawalokan Awam Siksha” 75)..

In Its other document, *Naya Janabadi Karyakram: (Nepali Krantiko Ekmatra Mulbato)* the Party presents its New Democratic strategy and the tactics. In the decision for adopting the strategy though the influence of the Sino-Soviet rift and the tilt of the Party towards the Chinese line must have weighed heavy, yet it was not the sole determinant, for the Party did identify the historical stage of Nepalese society, and the nature of the revolution to argue its case for adopting the strategy for it said:

Because of the exploitation of the Palace led feudal class of Nepal and international capitalism, especially the Indian monopoly capital and American imperialism, the social condition of our country is still semi-colonial and semi-feudal ... Hence the goals of our revolution today [are]: (1) To exterminate the Panchayat system which is functioning as the citadel of feudal exploitation,⁵⁵ and (2) To destroy foreign monopoly capitalism especially the Indian monopoly capital and American imperialism. Hence the nature of our revolution is anti-feudal; anti-imperialist. This revolution will be led by the proletariat and it will be based upon the unity of the proletariat-peasants and the entire revolutionary classes (266).

⁵⁵ See NCP (Pushpalal), “Janabadi Karyakram” 256 The party argues that feudal exploitation is the root cause of all problems. It points out that because of the feudal land relation there is exploitation of the most numerous class, the peasants’ class. So their exploitation has emerged as the pressing problem of the Nepalese society. Their exploitation can be removed by implementing land reform, and when there is land reform and the peasants are made the owners of land there will be more production; increase in wealth, and investment in industries. At present the feudal system, the document says, invites foreign capital for the establishment of industries, hence the country is in the clutches of the imperialists. So the end of feudalism will also bring about an end to imperialism.

From our past national movements it is proved that in this new historical age⁵⁶the bourgeoisie of Nepal cannot lead this anti-feudal, anti-imperial revolution ... only the Communist Party of the working class can lead it ... It will not be the old type of bourgeois democratic revolution, but a new⁵⁷ type of ... revolution. It will destroy feudalism and imperialism; establish socialist economy, and pave the way towards the establishment of socialism (266).

... It will establish a socialist Republic under the proletariat-peasants leadership ... (NCP (Pushpalal), “Janabadi Karyakram” 267).

Thereafter, to identify the classes who are in favour and against the strategy, it presents its “class analysis.” But the class analysis, which is based upon “the power position of the classes” (288) do not qualify as class analysis acceptable to the Marxist tradition, where such analysis considers the roles of different classes in the creation, appropriation and distribution of surplus value in specific class structure. Therefore, the analysis presented in the document can, at best, pass out as the social analysis of the then Nepal. On the basis of such analysis, the document then identifies the feudal landlord, comprador bourgeoisie and the high officials engaged in the administration of the nation as the enemies of the strategy. And the allies of the strategy are identified as the proletariats, the peasants, the urban middle class, the literate class, the low wage employees, the retail traders, artisans; the section of the society involved in illicit activities and the section of the national bourgeoisie opposed to the intrusion of foreign capital in Nepal (288–9).

To achieve its transitional goal of new democracy, the Party then clarifies its tactics of uniting all the forces, which are against the Panchayat system for it states:

⁵⁶ See, NCP (Pushpalal), “Janabadi Karyakram” 267 Like Mao the new historical age is referred to as a period characterised by the rise of Socialism and the fall of Capitalism.

⁵⁷ See, NCP (Pushpalal), “Janabadi Karyakram” 267 The party, like Mao, points out that the New democratic strategy is a strategy for the establishment of democracy of the new type, because it will be established in the new historical age and it will come into existence as a result of a revolt led by the proletariat. However, the document fails to underscore the fact that Mao’s strategy of New democracy was new also because it was being implemented in a historical phase of a society which was semi-feudal and semi-colonial, a phase distinct from the feudal phase identified in classical Marxism.

Today our enemies are feudalism, imperialism and Indian capitalism. The feudal autocratic Panchayat system is its protective citadel. In the present context, [the Panchayat system] is the common enemy. Hence our tactics today should be to forge unity among all classes which exhibit contradiction [in their relation] with the Panchayat system, and we should focus our entire strength in raising movements against the system (300)..

How did the Party plan to raise movements against the system? The document does not clearly answer this question instead it prescribes that the Party should “give directions to all the spontaneous movements” emerging in the nation, and that it should direct its entire energy in forging the “unity among the allies” (302, 304), where such unity was to result in the formation of a united front consisting only of the classes opposed to the Panchayat system for it stated:

In the past our Party formed united front based on the unity of political parties. Experience has proved that such policy [of forming united front] was wrong. By united front we should, in the main, understand the unity among the classes. United front refers to the unity of classes which are opposed to the main enemy. The allies mentioned in the strategy ... are the ones who can form the united front. In the present context a united front is to be formed among all the classes who are opposed to the feudal ... Panchayat system (304).

Therefore, the tactics of the Party, at that point of time, was limited to the mobilisation of forces against the Panchayat system, the main enemy. But, the document did not state clearly as to whether the Nepali Congress was to be a party in the united front. And though the idea of nationalism was not woven around the strategy as it was done in the Third Congress document, it can be argued that the idea did inform the strategy. This becomes clear when the Party’s position on national unity under the New Democratic system is considered. In it the idea of nationalism, national independence and the establishment of independent national economy were considered the basis of national unity; where independent economy was the product of nationalism and national independence, and where nationalism and national independence were the outcome of the extermination of feudalism and nationalisation of foreign capital for its document stated:

National unity in the present age can be achieved only in the long drawn struggle of the entire revolutionary class and the people

organised under the leadership of the proletariat. Under the New Democratic strategy the long drawn revolution; while exterminating feudalism, nationalising foreign capital aimed at protecting nationalism and independence shall establish an independent economy. [And such revolution] will form the basis of national unity (NCP (Pushpalal), “Janabadi Karyakram” 286).

Answering the question as to how the revolution would engender national unity the document points out to the “equality”, that it would create in the political, economic, cultural and religious front of the society, but it does not answer the question as to how the destruction of feudalism and the nationalisation of foreign capital was to result in the establishment of nationalism (287). But from the statements quoted above, it is clear that even while advocating the strategy of new democracy, the Party had an eye on nationalism. Was this reference to nationalism a ploy to garner support? Without adequate evidences it is difficult to answer the question definitively.

Thereafter, in Sept/Oct. 1972, under the General Secretary-ship of Pushpalal, the Party held its Fourth Conference in Varanasi (India). The main intention⁵⁸ of the Party behind the scheduling of the conference then was to clarify its tactics, and its position regarding its tactical relation with the Nepali Congress. Clarifying its tactical positions its document pointed out that history expected it to shoulder the responsibility of raising a united movement against the Panchayat system. It was to do so by capitalising on the dissatisfaction of the peasants, *janajatis*, students etcetera

⁵⁸ See, NCP (Pushpalal), Report on Current Situation in Nepal, 1984 3 The party explains that the Fourth Conference was also called in order to remove the confusions created by the statements of Man Mohan Adhikari after his release from prison. The party quotes different statements of Man Mohan where he is said to have stated that “the tactics of mass struggle ... [supports] the Nepali Congress”. He is also indicated to have said that “the Nepali Congress ... [is] the main enemy of Nepalese people...”, “described Bangladesh agitation as Indian interference and so anti-national” and called “Pushpalal ... [a] supporter of Russia for his refusal to characterise the Soviet Union as Social imperialist”. Then the party points out that his main intention was to oppose “our party and Nepali Congress”. As a result there were clashes between the Communist and Nepali Congress students which were not in the interest of the movement. To avoid such situation the Conference was called to clarify the party perception regarding the Nepali Congress.

and by using issues connected with the nationalism and sovereignty of Nepal. It felt that such tactics was essential for creating the conditions necessary for waging armed struggle against the Panchayat system in future for it stated:

The historic responsibility of raising a united movement against this autocratic feudal Panchayat system has fallen upon our shoulders. For it our Party units should function in the forefront; provide leadership, and use the issues connected with the sovereignty and nationalism of our country along with the dissatisfaction of the peasants, *janajatis*, untouchables, students, intellectuals and Government employees. For this is the only way to ready ourselves for the armed struggle against the system (NCP (Pushpalal), Rajnaitik Report Sept/Oct 1972 15).

In its bid to create the United front against the Panchayat system⁵⁹ it categorised “left forces as those, who intended to bring about fundamental changes in the social system by dislodging the archaic one” opening, thereby, the license to accept “all political parties, which are against the Panchayat system as left forces” (17 and 18). With such position, after a long winded analysis of the character of Nepali Congress, it observed, “from the above long analysis, it is clear that, all along, our Party, in spite of the dual character of Nepali Congress, has always considered the Nepali Congress as our friend in our battle against our main enemy the King” (26). And though the document nowhere stated, that Nepali Congress would be a part of the united front, the implications behind its definition of left forces and its characterisation of Nepali Congress as a friend against the King indicated, that the Party was not against the idea of using the Congress as a partner in its struggle during the period. Further, the document said:

The Party should take part even in those struggles, led by other parties, if those struggles weaken the system. It should not reject participation in such struggles arguing that the success of the movement would strengthen the other Party which is in the leadership. For such position would keep the Communist away from the people (33).

⁵⁹ See, NCP (Pushpalal), Rajnaitik Report Sept/Oct 1972 23 The party explains that in a situation when the ruling elites are in league with the imperialists, the American and the Indian, to exploit the masses and when there is no pressure of external aggression then the internal enemy, here the Panchayat system, turns into the main enemy.

Thus, during this phase, tactically the Party was trying to build up its united front by clarifying its relation with the Nepali Congress. Moreover, the tactics also involved the participation of the Party in movements led by other political forces, if those movements were aimed at weakening the system. In sum, it stood for centring the entire forces in the destruction of the Panchayat system, the obstacle in its path towards New Democratic revolution.

With the passing away of Pushpalal in July 1978, the Party held its emergency conference in Darbhanga in September 1978. It was its fifth national conference. In it, the Party “vowed to carry forward the tactical line of Com. Puspa Lal, decided to concentrate on building its strength and directing it towards developing the popular movement more effectively” (NCP (Pushpalal), Report on Current Situation in Nepal, 1984 4). Later, in Chaitra 14–19, 2043 [March 28–31, 1987], the Party held its sixth National conference in Sarnath (India). The conference was a joint conference between the NCP (Pushpalal) and the NCP (Man Mohan) faction (See, p. 365). Explaining the basis behind the holding of the joint conference, its document drew attention towards the similarities in the two parties’ ideas, which had come to the fore during the period of the referendum (See, p.108), that is, in 1979/80 for it stated:

Here special attention must be focused on the statements given by Comrade Man Mohan Adhikari on the analysis of the proclamation [of the referendum] and on the basic conditions (See p. 334) during the days of the referendum. On these questions his views were somewhat similar to ours. In his [Man Mohan’s] statements he had proposed an additional condition: to consider youths above 18 as adults. Both the parties had agreed to the proposal as an essential condition. It is, therefore, not an exaggeration to state that similarity and the similarities which evolved thereafter form the basis of the sixth conference (NCP (Pushpalal), Rajnitik Report 2043 [1987] 11).

Thereafter, analysing the prevailing political condition the document observed that “even after the third Amendment of the Constitution the people enjoy only the right to exercise adult franchise sans fundamental and political rights”. Therefore, “there is no difference between Panchayat system that existed before the referendum and the system that exists today” (13). Hence, “today the main issue at hand is the issue concerning the restoration of the democratic rights of the people” (14). This explained

why the document in the beginning had stated, “we have reached an understanding that the main task today is to restore democracy and for it we have felt the necessity for uniting all the classes and political parties to carry on a United People’s movement” (4). With such understanding at the tactical level, the two parties, therefore, merged to form the NCP (Marxist). However, the basis behind the joint meeting to which the Party draws attention to and the growing similarities of the parties’ in the tactical positions expressed by the document is debatable. They are debatable because of the characterisation of Man Mohan Adhikari drawn by the Party documents published as late as in 20 June 1984 and in 17 January 1986. In the former, the Party points out only to the agreement of Man Mohan with the five pre-conditions and that also under pressure, for it states:

When our Party declared that it would take part in the opinion poll only on the basis of the basic pre-conditions and brought pressures upon him to take part in a joint meeting, he accepted the five requirements and addressed joint meeting at some places ... But because of his ... opportunistic nature, he started supporting the King again (NCP (Pushpalal), Report on Current Situation in Nepal, 1984 15).

Thereafter drawing attention to Man Mohan’s unity move with the Party, its document of 17 June 1986 states:

This Party was formed after comrade Pushpalal’s death mainly to break our Party. This Party consists of members of Upper-class ... engaged in different organisations. There is no organisation as such, any activities, nor [sic] any People’s front. The basic political character of Man Mohan Adhikari is understood to be vacillating, pro-King and devoid of Communist character. Despite this, he is known to be a Communist in Nepal ... The Party has, therefore, to be very careful in this regard. Now he has started propagating to unite without any condition with our Party ... Our Party plenum has given serious thought to Adhikari’s such conspiracy. The Party has decided to reciprocate in the same manner. By forging ideological and political unity we shall make efforts to unite with Adhikari on the basis of Party norms. Our Party has enormous responsibility in this regard. Ideological and political unity is the key factor for unity in the Communist movement and not an opportunistic alliance (NCP (Pushpalal), A Report ... Political Situation, 1986 29–30).

In the light of the above comments, it is clear that even as late as in 1986 there was no understanding between the two parties. The *volte-face* in the 1987 Party position on Man Mohan’s stand, therefore, appears to point out that the reasons supplied to

explain the unity move were just to project the unity as an ideological unity based on tactical similarities. If, this is read with Rawal's comment that "the NCP (Pushpalal) had become weak by then, because of the death of Pushpalal and owing to the exit of his longtime co-worker Hikmat Singh from the Party", then it appears that the Party was in need of a leader with a Communist legacy and Man Mohan was in need of a foothold in a comparatively powerful Party organisation (73). The unity served them both, and this, perhaps, was the reason which brought the parties together. After the formation of the NCP (Marxist) in March 1987, documentary evidences of its activities do not exist. However, its activities came to the fore only during the 1989-90 *Jana Andolan* when it combined with the NCP (ML) and other Communist factions to form the United Left Front.

1.6. Rayamajhi Faction and Its Evolution until 1990

As pointed out, the Third Congress of the NCP held in February 1962 in Varanasi expelled Rayamajhi from the party. After his expulsion, Rayamajhi and his group held their third conference in VS 2021[1964/65]. In the conference the party opted for the "National Democratic Strategy" (NCP (Rayamajhi), Tesro Sammelanma ... Report 13). Since the evaluation of the strategy has already been done, the following paragraphs will highlight the tactical position of the party in the post-1960 Nepal

To announce its tactical position, the party first reviews the history of the movement until 1964/65. In the review, it highlights the characteristic features of the national politics and the mistakes committed by the NCP. According to its analysis, "the 2007[1950] revolt had not only smashed the Rana rule, but also secured fundamental rights and the right to form the Constituent Assembly for the people". Under such circumstances, it observes that "it was the duty of all the democratic forces of Nepal to protect the achievements of the revolt". But, when the "first Calcutta conference of the NCP failed to see the gains of the revolt" and when "Pushpalal's report in the conference declared that the Interim Government formed after the revolt was ineffective in accomplishing the political and economic and social

transformation of the society”, the Party declared its “New Democratic strategy”. The declaration then came “in the way of forging unity among the democratic forces and in preserving the achievements of the 1950 revolt” (NCP (Rayamajhi), Tesro Sammelanma ... Report 1). As a result, one by one the King and his anti-democratic forces snatched away the rights of the people to finally carry out the coup in 1960 (1). Thus, the analysis of the historical background of the movement naturally placed the faction among those who were against the new Democratic strategy. Besides, the party was guided by its understanding that democracy is necessary “for the creation of an organised and a conscious society”, a society which in turn is necessary for the establishment of “either a bourgeois economy or an economy through the non-capitalist path” (5) to observe, “had the democratic forces worked for the preservation of the democratic rights, then the nation could have developed its independent economy and freed itself from the clutches of the imperialists and the Indian capitalists” (2). Coming from a communist faction, such argument was indeed queer. Besides to argue in favour of unity among the democratic forces the party while commenting on the 1959 election states, “had the democratic forces engaged themselves in the debate regarding what was right: election for the Constituent Assembly or for the Legislative Assembly, then even the election would not have taken place” (5) meaning, by it, that the election was possible only because all the democratic forces had agreed to the election. Hence, even in the post-1960 Nepal the party’s prescribed tactics was to work for the achievement of democratic rights. This tactics, according to the party, involved the opening up of “two front struggle”. Such struggle, on the other hand, was expected “to develop peoples’ struggle” and on the other, it asked the “democratic forces to take part in the class organisations and the National Panchayat to wrest more democratic rights” for the people (6). And though the document of the party nowhere states, that the achievements of the democratic rights is a necessity for the weakening of or for the gradual destruction of the feudal system, yet what it says regarding the path to be followed for the establishment of National Democracy conveys the idea that the Party’s tactics was perhaps aimed

towards such a possibility for its document states:

Today the main issue facing the country is regarding the unity of the democratic forces for securing democratic rights. Past experiences prove that in the absence of democratic unity the possibility of securing democratic rights is remote. So, while fixing out strategy we must consider whether the strategy fixed by us comes in the way of such unity. There is no doubt that we intend to establish National Democracy, which will create the circumstances necessary for the establishment of socialism. Besides, the strategy of National Democracy by itself is the demand of the united national force, and to implement such strategy in the country we require a struggle of the highest order. Presently, in view of the lack of unity among the democratic forces, it is not possible to educate and develop among the people a character which is anti-feudal and anti-imperialist, and without the development of such character it is not possible to embrace such a strategy. Besides, in the absence of democratic rights the strategy of National Democracy cannot be pushed through... (NCP (Rayamajhi), Tesro Sammelanma ... Report 13).

Thus, the party tactics then was for forging unity among the democratic forces, use the combined force for wresting democratic rights, use the democratic rights to develop anti-feudal, anti-imperialist feeling among the people, use such people for the establishment of National Democracy, and use the democracy for the establishment of socialism. Therefore, the party then stood for gradual peaceful tactics for the establishment of socialism.

This conference of the party was followed by its Third Congress. Based on a paper report, Surendra K. C points out that “the Congress was held in 2023 [1966/67]. In the Congress, he says, “the party formed a 21 member Central Committee and elected Kesar Jung Rayamajhi as its General Secretary. Its 5 member politburo was composed of Rayamajhi, Kumar Shah, Krishnaraj Verma, Krishnaprasad Shrestha and Bishnubahadur Manandhar” (K. C, Nepal Communist Bhag 2 139). In view of the lack of documentary evidence it is not possible to comment upon the strategy and the tactics which the Congress advocated, but on considering its document of the Fourth Congress, it is evident that the party must have advocated the National Democratic strategy even in the Third Congress for the document of the Fourth Congress states:

In the present political system, where there is no political freedom...the fundamental problems of the society cannot be resolved. Hence, for the resolution of the economic and social problems of the country the requisite environment needs to be created. And for creating the environment it is essential to work for the establishment of democracy

where the people are fully involved. Only in a political system where democracy exists, the development of movement for the establishment of National Democracy is possible. As such if our immediate goal is to work for the development of the movement for the establishment of National Democracy, the political instrument for the development of such a movement is the democratic system (NCP (Rayamajhi), Nepal Communist Partyko Karya 18)

However, with the beginning of the 1979 movement, differences of opinion cropped up in between the Rayamajhi and the Bishnubahadur Manandhar group. Describing the point of difference between the two groups Rawal writes, “If Manandhar group stood for playing an active role and in developing the 1979 movement, Rayamajhi and his group went against the movement and stood for the maintenance of status quo. Thereafter, differences between the two groups widened and the Manandhar group formed its own party” (66).

The Manandhar faction, which eventually formed NCP [Bishnubahadur Manandhar], held its Fifth Congress in Tikapur in VS 2038[1981/82]. In the Congress, the Party viewed the existing Panchayat system as the main culprit behind all visible economic anomalies of the kingdom. It claimed that for changes the country required a polity, which reflected the essence of National Democracy for its document said:

The Panchayat system...is incapable of solving the problems of the nation. It can resolve neither the problems of the working class, nor the problem of the national bourgeoisie interested in protecting national industries. The nation can be freed from its crisis only when the present system is destroyed; the economic structure changed, land reform implemented, industries are developed, corruption is eradicated and cultural transformation is initiated. In other words, the problems can be resolved only under a democratic system which captures the essence of national democracy (NCP (Manandhar) 2).

Therefore, the party still followed the National Democratic strategy eulogising it as a strategy that opened the possibility of reaching socialism without entering into the transitional phase of bourgeois democracy for it stated:

The path of Nepalese revolution will pass through the phase of National Democracy. Under the participation of our party and the working class, National Democratic revolution will help the nation to enter into socialism. National Democratic revolution will be a transitional phase of revolution which will push the nation towards socialism without entering into the phase of bourgeois democracy. It will create the material and social bases for such transformation. The

ultimate aim of the party is to establish communism (NCP (Manandhar) 3)

However, these statements do not clarify what the party viewed as the essence of National Democracy, and how transitional phase of National Democratic revolution bypassed bourgeois democracy to reach socialism? But, what it says while analysing the then situation of Nepal answers the first question leaving the burden of answering the second to the readers. To start with , it describes Nepal as a nation “where 94 per cent of its population are engaged in agriculture” (8). Then it states:

To establish democracy we have to free them from the maze of imperialist and feudal forces...the peasants should snatch rights which enable them to carry on such revolution. In such effort our party should organise them...as auxiliary of the working class. To free the peasants from the feudal forces is the essence of democracy and since peasants alone cannot achieve such goal they should combine with the proletariat (8–9).

Thereafter, following what Tulsilal Amatya had stated in the past while advocating National Democratic strategy in the Third Congress, the party points out that it should take “national bourgeoisie as an ally of its revolution” (11). It includes them in its tactics of establishing democracy—the precondition for enabling peasants to carry on revolution. But, like Tulsilal it does not reject in its tactics of a “broad democratic front of united communists for achieving democracy” the “participation” of Nepali Congress (17). Moreover, it sees only the USA as an imperialist; seldom talks about China, praises Soviet Union and maintains silence on issues involving India (NCP (Manandhar) 20–6).

After the formation of NCP (Manandhar) faction, NCP (Rayamajhi) faction continued until VS 2040 Asoj [September 1983] only to witness yet another fragmentation. Objecting against “Rayamajhi’s membership in the Raj Sabha and his policies of compromise with the Panchayat system”, Rawal writes, “the Party expelled Rayamajhi and accepted Krishnaraj Verma as its unchallenged leader” (67). Thus, came into existence NCP (Verma) faction in the Communist movement of Nepal. According to Rawal, “this faction published its Rajnitik Pratibedan (Political Report) in 1987 where it advocated unity among communist factions. But, the unity was never

achieved”. So, the different factions continued, but in the process the Rayamajhi faction “vanished by VS 2043[1986/87]” (68). The remaining two; however, resurfaced before the 1989–90 *Jana Andolan* to play their part in the United Left Front. And if one takes the document of NCP (Verma) published in VS 2047[1990/91] where it says that its “Rajnitik Report of Rastriya Parishad [National Council] of VS 2045 Falgun [Feb/March 1989] had advocated unity among the communist factions for working with Nepali Congress for achieving democracy” (NCP (Verma) 15), then its stand was similar to that of NCP (Manandhar) which had also espoused the tactics of combining with the Nepali Congress. However, the factions falling in this line appear confused. There is no clarity in their understanding of National Democratic strategy. Their stand suggests that they wanted to achieve socialism by changing the superstructure, that is by achieving democracy, besides they sometimes say that one should first achieve democracy to achieve National Democracy and sometimes they advocate the path of bypassing democracy to reach socialism.

1.7. Fragmentation within NCP (Pushpalal): Birth of NCP (Nepal Majdoor Kisan Sangathan)

Documentary evidences point out to two factions, which the NCP under Pushpalal underwent in the 70s: one was in 1974 and the other in 1975. Though the 1974 faction did not result in the formation of an enduring political Party, yet in view of the nature of the work and the questions posed the faction assumes importance. The treatment of other faction is important not only because of the questions raised in the work, but also because the faction resulted in the evolution of an enduring NCP (Nepal Majdoor Kisan Party)[NeMKiPa]⁶⁰ Party.

In Srawan 2031 [July/August 1974], a group of Communists from the “Western” and “Central Zone” and from “outside” organised a meeting. The meeting,

⁶⁰ See, NCP (Nepal Majdoor Kisan Party), Bidhan 2047 3 This is its short form as declared by its Constitution of VS 2047. Its English translation is NWPP. However, in the communist circle of Nepal this faction is also called NCP (Rohit). Rohit is the nickname of the party leader, Narayan Man Bijukche.

“rejected outright the ideology of revisionist P. L [Pushpalal] and his group”. This group established a “Communist Ekta Samparka Samiti” until the evolution of the group into a Party (Communist Samparka Samiti (Nepal) 3). The Appeal of the Samiti (Committee) objected against the social basis of the Party; the intentions of the Party leadership and the different Communist parties’ analysis of the main enemy to put forward its view that in the context of Nepal the main enemy is the existing *Rajyasatta*,⁶¹ for its document stated:

Today the Communist movement in Nepal is in fragments. Within the circle of the Party’s fragments and factions; the leaders, instead of organising landless peasants and emerging proletariats, busy themselves in organising parties of the middle class and the educated class... (4).

By holding the so-called ‘Gorakhpur conference’, P. L [Pushpalal] has ... destroyed Party unity. The plot and intentions of P. L (to form his own Communist Party by running after the expansionists, tout capitalists and socialist-imperialists) until now was not understood by us, so we were after him. We have understood it now, so our Party today proposes to organise a Fourth Congress to unite the movement and to form a Party, which preserves the purity of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism.

In the unity of Nepal Communist movement the main hurdle is regarding the identification of the main enemy ... Some consider the King as the main enemy and the Nepali Congress as an ally, some consider the King as an ally and the Nepali Congress, the main enemy and some consider both the Nepali Congress and the King as the main enemy. But, we do not support these views. In reality for the Communists believing in Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, in the context of Nepal which is in semi-feudal and semi-colonial stage of historical development the main enemy of an armed peasants’ revolt is the present *Rajyasatta* (Communist Samparka Samiti (Nepal) 5).

Barring the objection of the faction towards the social base of the Party, its strategy and tactics added nothing fresh to the complexion of the movement: if its strategy was for the total destruction of the State system, its tactics subtly rejected the use of Nepali Congress by pointing out tout capitalism as an element of the *Rajyasatta*. And by referring to peasants’ armed struggle and expansionism, it rehashed the early 70s position of the NCP (ML) (See, p.349). A position, which was further clarified when the faction stated, “In the preliminary stage of armed peasants’ struggle the nature of

⁶¹ See, Communist Samparka Samiti (Nepal) 11

our revolt is to destroy the class enemy violently. Then the struggle will be developed into a guerrilla struggle ... and the encirclement of the cities by the villages” (11–2). This recourse to the strategy and tactics of the NCP (ML), was perhaps the faction’s way out to objecting the tactics of Pushpalal led NCP, which favoured the use of the Nepali Congress, and which after 1972 aimed at the destruction of only the Panchayat system. Later, as Rawal observes, “In 1976 the faction was organised as Sarvahara Krantikari Sangathan Nepal”. And according to him, “The faction since 1977 began advocating similarity between Buddha and Mao” to conclude that “without the amalgamation of the Buddhist thought with that of Mao, neither Buddhism will be respected in Nepal, nor the exploited lot of Nepal will gain access to the path of power as advocated by Maoism” (71). Such metaphysical stand taken by the faction was perhaps the reason behind its demise, but there was also another reason. The other reason was its adoption of the strategy and tactics of a faction which was, at least, more coherent in the expression of its position. As already stated, the faction’s strategy and tactics were similar to that of the NCP (ML), as such, according to the NCP (ML) document, “the Eastern group of the faction” joined the “NCP (ML) Co-ordination Committee in Bhadra 2035 [Aug./Sep.1978]”. Further, the document states, because of such amalgamation “our position in the Eastern zone was established” (NCP (ML), “Rajnitik Pratibedan 1989” 68) indicating, thereby, that the Eastern group of the faction did enjoy a dominant position in the zone. Thus, with its powerful section gone, and with its left-over mired in metaphysical ideology, the faction faded into the oblivion of history.

The other faction, NCP (Rohit) faction, was born on the “23rd of January 1975”. Its document points out that its “ideological bases” are contained in two of Narayanman Bijukche’s works namely, “*Nepalko Communist Andolanma Dekhapareyka Khota Vicharharuko Khandan* and *Russi Sansodhanbad Samajik Samrajyabadma Patan*” (NCP (Nepal Majdoor Kisan Party), Nepalko ... Andolanma ... Bhumika 1). Thus, to understand its ideological bases one has to go through the works. However, before entering into the subject related to its ideological bases one

had better address the question as to why the Party came out of NCP [Pushpalal]. But, in the two works one does not come across straightforward answer to the question. His work *Russi Sansodhanbad Samajik Samrajyabaddma Patan* simply puts forward clichés to conclude that the Socialist Soviet Union degenerated into a Socialist revisionist after Kruschev's support to the leaders of Yugoslav Communist League (Rohit, Russi-Sansodhanbad 21). And before, that is between 1957–60, it had already evolved as an imperialist nation which exported capital, in the name of Soviet loan, for earning profit (59). Thereafter, as an imperialist it invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968; attacked China in 1969, supported Indian expansionist in 1970 to invade East Pakistan, and helped India to capture Sikkim in 1974 (137). In his other work, which is a collection of articles, he argues his views on what he thinks correct in the practice of Marxism-Leninism and Maoist thought in the context of Nepal. Since the Party declares that these views form its ideological bases they need to be placed here hoping to find the causes behind the split assuming, of course, that a few (since the work is a criticism of all Communist factions of Nepal) of these ideological orientations were absent within NCP under Pushpalal. These views when paraphrased generate directives falling under three broad categories namely those related to strategy, tactics and identification of enemies. As a list they are as follows:

1 A strategy is a road map of revolution. It should not be the pet opinion of a person or of a group ... Communist parties in Nepal today are fragmented into many factions. If a strategy functions as an obstacle in the unity of Communists then it should be rejected or amended for a strategy acceptable to all ... a strategy should be written keeping in mind the needs of the society... (Rohit, "Party ... Sambandhama" 1–2).

2 Nepal is a semi-colonial and semi-feudal State. Hence, the enemies of the people are the feudal forces, foreign monopoly capitalists and elements connected with those capitalists ... the feudal forces and the capitalists are connected through different links (Rohit, "Hamra Satruharu" 5). While identifying the enemies of the people one should depend on class analysis and not on names of individuals or groups

(6). Hence, “to identify the internal and external enemies of Nepal ... one should watch the policies of the King and of the Congress” (9). At present, Communists should also consider Soviet Union at par with American imperialist, because it has degenerated into a Socialist imperialist (Rohit, “Antarastriya” 16).

3 While trying to destroy the enemy the Communists should not, in the name of main contradiction, focus on one enemy. Such approach is revisionist, a distortion of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong’s thought (Rohit, “Ke Ekchoti ... Ho?” 23). Communists should make use of the Panchayat bodies and reactionary institutions or else they will be disconnected from the masses (Rohit, “Ke Hamilay” 29–31). Besides, they should take part in elections and Parliamentary practices to educate the masses (Rohit, “Chunaoma Bhag ... Prashnama” 32–8). However, they should not limit themselves within electoral practices, because such practices alone will not lead to freedom. They should prepare for armed struggle (Rohit, “Kranti” 48–9).

Considered in the light of the overall trend of NCP (Pushpalal)—since Pushpalal sought to destroy only the Panchayat system, maintained silence on the question of participation in the system, which can be construed as rejection of such tactics, and did not characterise Soviet Union as the Socialist imperialist—only these directives reveal Narayanman’s objections against Pushpalal’s Party. However, his other directive—unreasonable and malicious, for reasons discussed below— which says that strategy should be considered a road map of revolution and not an opinion of a person or a group, and that it should be amended if amendment is necessary for the unity of the Communists seem to reveal his other differences with Pushpalal. First, strategies are based on assessment of the stage of historical development of society, so if they are based on right judgement of the historical stage then one cannot ask for their amendment for the sake of unity. Hence, it was an unreasonable directive and coming from Bijukche it projected him in a poor light. Second, it implied that within NCP (Pushpalal) what counted most was the opinion of a leader and not the interest of the Communist movement. And since the leader then was Pushpalal it reflected his dissatisfaction against him. Thus, what seems to have been the causes behind the

fragmentation are tactical differences, difference in the identification of enemy, and personal dislike against Pushpalal. As regards its strategy none of its documents state whether it was for New democracy or National Democracy except to point out that it wanted to establish a Government that represented the “Majdoor (proletariat), peasants, intellectuals, *Sahu-Mahajan* (merchant class) and different *jatis* [nationalities]” (NCP (Nepal Majdoor Kisan Party), Nirvachan Ghoshna-Patra 2056 1). Such a statement creates problem in classifying its strategy. Perhaps by such silence, the Party was trying to steer clear of the problems associated with class analysis, in the absence of which the Communists of Nepal were unable to decisively differentiate the national bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie of Nepal.

1.8. Jhapa Movement and the Birth of NCP (ML)

With the coming into being of the NCP (Pushpalal) faction, in May 1968 the Communist movement in Nepal was fragmented into three political factions namely, the NCP (Amatya), the NCP (Rayamajhi) and the NCP (Pushpalal). Besides, there were a number of Committees functioning independently. One such committee, which was under the charge of Tulsilal Amatya was the Purva Koshi Prantiya Committee [Eastern Koshi Zonal Committee]. It had revolted and snapped its tie with the Party centre in 1965. In view of the non-availability of its document concerning its first meeting in Katihar (an Indian town to the South of Nepal), it is difficult to find out the cause behind the revolt. However, the comments of the NCP (Pushpalal), in its document *Singhawalokan*, on the strategy adopted by the Committee provides some clue in understanding the cause behind the revolt. According to the NCP (Pushpalal) document, the Purva Koshi Prantiya Committee floated the strategy of New democracy, but it did not bring out the feudal class character of the King before the people. The strategy portrayed him progressive; as such it was floated in the interest of the King, the leader of feudal class, and not in the interest of the working class. So, it did not even analyse the class character of the “Panchayat system”, instead it characterised Panchayat’s industrial and land reform policies simply as faulty and partial respectively. In doing so, its intent was to hide the feudal interest implicit in

the policies and to support its reformatory view. Hence, the NCP (Pushpalal) document characterised the strategy of the Committee as reformatory for it stated:

... Bourgeois democratic revolution is a revolution against the feudal class. In our country the King is the leader of the reactionary feudal class. Hence, it is important to place before the people the feudal character of the King. But, in their strategy they have stated nothing regarding his class character, on the contrary regarding the character of the King they have tried to spread the illusion that he is progressive but with a few weaknesses. Regarding the King they have only said 'he runs after the foreign and national reactionaries to enter into compromises,' meaning, thereby, that he himself is not a reactionary. In the present condition, when the King has destroyed democracy what purpose do they have in thus characterising the King?

It is clear, that they are intentionally trying to spread illusion regarding the class character of the King. Thus, while floating the strategy of New democracy, they have not written it from the perspective of the working class. Hence, they have not even spoken a word regarding the class character of the Panchayat system, they have only criticised it [the Panchayat system]. From this it becomes clear ... that their strategy... is reformatory. In the industrial and land reform policies advocated by the Panchayat system, which is under the leadership of the King, they have failed to perceive the hidden feudal interest so they simply characterise them as, 'faulty industrial policy and partial land reform.' They are true only in stating that the Government is not sincere even in implementing the partial land reform (NCP (Pushpalal), "Nepal ... Singhawalokan Awam Siksha" 42-3)...

Being a reformatory strategy, framed "not in the interest of the proletariat class" and being unable to perceive "the hidden feudal interest" in the Panchayat policies the strategy of the Purva Koshi Prantiya Committee (henceforth PKPC), in the perception of the NCP (Pushpalal) was pro-feudal/pro-King. And if the comments of the NCP (Pushpalal) faction are taken at its face value, this very character in the strategy of the PKPC may have compelled it to revolt against the Party centre. And perhaps this strategy was also responsible for the "debate" which arose within the PKPC from "2022 [1965]" when its propounders were pitched against "a section of its activists," who advocated the strategy of "capturing power" through "class annihilation" (Rawal 80). This led to the split in the PKPC and the Jhapa Zilla Committee, which was responsible for spearheading the Jhapa movement. The events which brought about such split were contained in the activities of the students and peasants organised under the Jhapa Zilla Committee.

The Purva Koshi Prantiya Committee, which was “under the leadership of Man Mohan Adhikari”, had dissociated itself from the Party centre in 1965 (Bhandari and Baral 3). Since then the Jhapa Committee, which formed one of “its constituent” (Rawal 80) district committees was “organising the students and peasants” of the area for “various political” activities, and the area had turned into a hot spot of “spontaneous students and peasants’ movements” (Bhandari, et al. 3). These movements were the movements of poor, landless peasants against the Zamindar class to capture the seat of power. By the guerrilla actions of the poor, landless peasants it believed in forging unity with the middle class peasants and to neutralise the Zamindar class organising, thereby, the peasants under the Communist Party for its document said:

This struggle organised under the Communist Party is a class struggle of the peasants against the Zamindars. The main force of this struggle is the peasant class. Even among the class, its leaders are the poor, landless peasants. Being the most economically and politically exploited class; these peasants, with intense hatred against the Zamindars and their touts, are capable of moving ahead in the struggle. This very class by leading guerrilla war can forge unity with the middle peasants and neutralise Zamindar class and their touts to organise all the peasants around the Communist Party... (NCP (ML), “Dhakka Khanu ... Cha” 12).

Imbued with such ideals, around 1970, Bhandari and Baral point out that the students of the area under the Jhapa Zilla Committee “organised an attack upon a *marwari* trader in Gauriganj”. This incident “triggered” a “debate” within the Purva Koshi Prantiya Committee (3). Further, they state:

But the Purva Koshi Prantiya Committee under Man Mohan Adhikari rejected the action as a result the Jhapa Zilla committee revolted against the Purva Koshi Prantiya Committee. The Committee was split; if Gopalakrishna Prasai, Bharatmohun Adhikari and Meghraj Acharya were against the action, Mohanchandra Adhikari and Madan Khapangi supported it. Thereafter, the Jhapa Zilla committee was formed under Madan Khapangi (3).

Starting from “2029 Baisakh 29” [11 May 1972], the Jhapa Zilla Committee carried on a series of class annihilation campaigns. The administrative responses against these campaigns were either in the form of “jailing the leaders” (Bhandari, et al. 3), or in the form of killing the jailed activists in fake encounters (Shaha 10). As a result of the

repression, Bhandari and Baral point out that, “by 2030 Kartik 5 [21 October 1973] the movement was left dispirited” (3). However, the document of the faction says that it failed in the face of “intense administrative pressure” because the “revolutionaries had failed to work among the poor land less peasant class” (NCP (ML), “Sansodhanbad ... Bikas Garau” 74). Thus, it seems that its failure was due to both organisational weakness and administrative repression. In this phase of intense action, the movement produced a few documents. In these documents, the Jhapa Committee⁶² characterises the then Soviet Communist Party as “revisionists”, “socialist imperialists” (NCP (ML), “Sampurna Bhramharu Milkau ... Gara!” 23, 24), and “socialist China” as “a ... dependable friend” (25). Such characterisations reflected the influence of Sino-Soviet rift on the movement. Besides, the influences of the cultural revolution in China in the 60s, the Naxalite movement and the subsequent formation of CPI (ML) in India, which the activists of Jhapa movement perceived as a revolt against revisionism there, the trend which they wanted to emulate, were the main factors responsible for the birth of the Jhapa movement for their document states:

In the middle of the 60s, China witnessed Cultural Revolution. Under its explicit influence, in Naxalbadi, India there grew the historic peasant revolution. The heat of that movement incinerated the revisionists of the Indian Communist movement and gave birth to the CPI (ML). In the main, the influences of these very events spurred the Nepal Communist revolutionaries to break their tie with the revisionists,⁶³ thereby, enabling them to evolve guerrilla struggle against the Zamindar class (NCP (ML), “Sampurna Bhramharu Milkau ... Gara!” 28).

And to achieve its goal of “New Democratic revolution” and “socialism” the faction

⁶² Since the Committee ultimately turned into NCP (ML) all its documents are published in the name of NCP (ML)

⁶³ See, NCP (ML), “Sampurna Bhramharu Milkau ... Gara!” 23–5 According to the faction all Communist parties, which followed parliamentary line and peaceful path of change were revisionists. This included NCP (Amatya), NCP (Rayamajhi), NCP (Pushpalal) and NCP (Kendriya Nucleus).

aimed at capturing the national power Centre by leading a protracted People's struggle (NCP (ML), "Dhakka Khanu ... Cha" 12). Its tactics involved: violence against violence, annihilation of the Zamindar class with the help of peasant guerrillas, armed struggle for the capture of local power and creation of village base areas and People's Army to encircle the cities, for its document stated:

About two years ago the revolutionary peasants of Jhapa ... started snatching the power of the exploiters to kill people ... In this way the peasants of Jhapa started using violence against violence to kill ... the Zamindars and their touts. That was the beginning of the peasants' guerrilla struggle. Under the leadership of Marxist-Leninists Party, it seeks to capture local power with the help of arms. After forming base areas and creating People's Army [it will use] villages to encircle cities to carry out ... protracted armed struggle to capture the national power Centre. Begun as a Zamindar annihilation movement, this armed struggle, which is anti-feudal and anti-imperialist, has instilled fear into the mind of the reactionaries... (NCP (ML), "Aja Paschatap ... Uthnay Din Ho" 2).

Following an anti-imperialist strategy, it identified "the entire Marxist-Leninists friends, the proletariat class, the landless peasants, the urban petty bourgeoisie, the students and all anti-feudal and anti-imperialist forces" as its allies. In its enemy ranks were "the police and the military" (5), "the ruling elites" who were, as its document said, "hand in gloves with the imperialists and feudal forces" (NCP (ML), "Jhapa Zillako ... Jawaf Diwau" 6) and all "the revisionists" (NCP (ML), "Sampurna Bhramharu Milkau ... Gara!" 23). However, the documents maintained silence regarding who should lead the revolution. Often the documents point out that the movement should be led by the Communist Party. But, whether the so identified Communist Party meant the proletariat class is not clear. And if its statement that "the purpose of our armed revolt ... [and] our strategy of peasant revolution is to organise the working class, the intelligentsia, the petty bourgeoisie and the middle class in the revolution", is considered then it pushes the proletariat class to the second fiddle, a feature which does not conform with the new democratic strategy (NCP (ML), "Sampurna Bhramharu Milkau ... Gara!" 29). Further, while stating the strategy, the faction fails to identify the historical stage of the society, and it does not explain the

prevalent class relation, a defect which a later document of the faction realises to declare in the following words:

Class analysis is the Marxist method of understanding the society ... In our earlier phase [of the movement] we hardly used it. Though we knew that struggle should be developed consciously, yet we were after spontaneity because we never tried to study thoroughly the revolutionary strategies ... (NCP (ML), "Dhakka Khanu ... Cha" 15).

And its tactics of guerrilla struggle instead of being the outcome of a studied approach was an inspired tactics, inspired by the sayings of Charu Mazumdar, for its document stated:

Comrade Charu Mazumdar has stated, 'class annihilation is the highest form of class struggle and guerrilla war is its beginning.' This thinking has shown us the revolutionary path of developing class struggle to its highest level and of starting peasant guerrilla movement. We should tag peasants' guerrilla movement with our aim to capture local power... (NCP (ML), "Jhapa Zillako ... Jawaf Diwau" 9).

Besides, the faction believed its activities to serve as examples to other groups to take up arms, for it stated "the revolutionary path which the peasants of Jhapa have taken will certainly be followed by the peasants of other parts of the country as a result there will be armed struggle throughout the country" (7–8). But contrary to such beliefs, the movement remained more or less confined within the borders of Jhapa district. And when administrative repression weakened it, the *Jhapalese* may have realised the need for a conscious effort in organising their group. So on 14 Jestha 2031 [27 May 1974], the Jhapa Zilla Committee with the Krantikari Sangathan (ML), Morang issued an appeal asking all Marxist-Leninist groups to come under its Coordination Committee (ML). However, the conditions attached for joining the Committee were:

a Acknowledgement of Chairman Mao as the authority of revolution; acknowledgement of the then Mao's teaching as the most evolved form of Marxist-Leninist ideology, unconditional acceptance of Marxist-Leninists-Maoist teaching and its application in the revolution of the country.

b Acknowledgement of the prevalence of acute revolutionary condition throughout Nepal.

c Acceptance of the politics of capturing local areas.

d Acknowledgement of guerrilla tactics as the only means by which the level of armed struggle could be evolved and acknowledgement of the use of armed struggle according to the teachings of Charu Mazumdar to annihilate class enemy... (NCP (ML), “Deshbharika ... Hamro Appeal” 40–1).

Acknowledging the above directions, the groups joining the Committee were expected to carry out “New Democratic” revolution in a “semi-feudal, semi-colonial” Nepalese society by vanquishing “Indian expansionism”, “American imperialism”, “Soviet-socialist imperialism”, and the “feudal forces” and “comprador bourgeoisie” operating within Nepal (NCP (ML), “Deshbharika ... Hamro Appeal” 36). But before destroying the external forces, the revolution was to destroy feudalism, that is, the Zamindar class. It was to be a peasant revolution, where the main force the poor, landless peasants were to be led by the Communist Party under the leadership of the proletariat, for their document said:

Though contradictions exist between the Nepali people and its five enemies, yet the contradiction between the people and feudalism is the main contradiction. Only after resolving this contradiction the other contradictions can be resolved. The contradiction with feudalism means the contradiction between the Zamindar class and the peasants. There is only one way of resolving this contradiction; that is through peasant revolution, and peasant revolution will succeed only when the Communist Party under the leadership of the proletariat leads the peasant class, the main force, in an armed struggle to capture power from the hands of the Zamindar and the comprador bourgeois class (NCP (ML), “Deshbharika ... Hamro Appeal” 36).

There are no documents which explain why the acceptance of the conditions was necessary for joining the Coordination Committee. But, the documents published in between the period when the Appeal was floated that is 14 Jestha 2031 [27 May 1974] and 24–25 Jestha 2032 [7–8 June 1975] that is the date when the Akhil Nepal Communist Krantikari Coordination Committee came into being gives a feeling that the faction, by laying down the conditions, was trying to build a party based on a “right-line” (NCP (ML), “Janatako Agadi ... Gara” 45) and a Party which was against the “revisionists’ line of parliamentary politics” (NCP (ML), “Vichardharatmak ... Karyadisha ... Garcha” 61). Accordingly, on 24–25 Jestha 2032 [7–8 June 1975], the faction says, that in “some secret corner of Nepal” it held its “deliberations” to form

the “Akhil Nepal Communist Krantikari Coordination Committee (ML)” (NCP (ML), “Akhil Nepal ... Ghoshna” 67). In its document the Committee declared that its goals were to consciously counter revisionism within and outside the Party; to take its politics among the primary classes [the peasant class], and to form a Marxist-Leninist Party in the process of developing the already begun class struggle and guerrilla tactics for its document stated:

We the revolutionary Nepal Communist have formed the Akhil Nepal Communist Krantikari Coordination Committee (ML) to fight consciously revisionism within and outside the Party with more intensity and in an organised manner. Improving our method of functioning, we intend to take our politics among the primary classes and the goal of the Committee is to form a Marxist- Leninist Party while developing the already begun class struggle and guerrilla tactics (NCP (ML), “Akhil Nepal ... Ghoshna” 70).

Three years after, that is in V.S 11–17 Paus 2035 [26 December 1978 to 1 January 1979], the document of the Committee says that it organised the first national conference of the NCP (ML) in “some village”. In the conference, the Party identified its strategy of “Communism”, but in the immediate phase it targeted on “the completion of New Democratic revolution” (NCP (ML), Rajnaitik Prastao 1978–79 20), which was aimed at “destroying tout-bureaucratic capitalism which was supported by the imperialists, expansionist and the Panchayat system”. It sought to establish “the socialist dictatorship of the peasants and entire revolutionary classes under the leadership of the proletariat” (27). Its tactics rejected the “peaceful parliamentary politics” and stated,

The revolution can be completed only through armed struggle, which is based upon the method of capturing power at local level. For it the peasants should be organised into People's Army; carry on guerrilla struggle, encircle cities by creating base areas in villages and engage in a protracted People's War (28).

To carry out such revolution, the Party identified three weapons: “a disciplined Party”, “a People’s Army with a centralised command” and a “United front” (29). The United front was to be formed “under the leadership of the proletariat based on the unity of peasants-proletariat and all revolutionary classes” (31). However, one thing stood out

in the document. It was the concern of the Party regarding national independence and nationalism of Nepal. On the former it stated that “the threat from the South regarding possible interference, attack and expansion inside the territory of Nepal has increased more than it was there during the British period” (NCP (ML), Fascist Nirdaliya ... Gara! 4), and regarding the latter it argued that the then nationalism of Nepal represented the interest of the “Panchayat class, Congress and the ... Indian expansionist and the imperialists ... at the expense of the interests of the proletariats, urban poor, peasants, petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie” (4–5). It rejected such nationalism and pointed out that “Panchayat class and others ... subjugated” the nationalism, which represented the interest of the proletariats, peasants etc., meaning thereby, that the nationalism of the Panchayati class and of the others needed to be fought (4). Therefore, by saying so the Party surreptitiously introduced nationalism as a weapon to fight its enemy. And their idea of nationalism was revealed during the period between 24th May 1979 and 2nd May 1980 when they were campaigning against the referendum, which was announced by the King for its document, while analysing the nationalism of the *panchas* (the participants in the Panchayat system), stated:

The nationalism advocated by the *panchas* is only to rouse devotion towards the reactionary Government ... it is anti-national in nature. Does not the activity of the *panchas* in the last 19 years support such conclusion? If they had even an iota of nationalism in them, then why did they not close the Gorkha recruitment centre? Why have they not rejected the Kosi, the Gandaki, the 1950 treaty and other unequal treaties? Why did they sell out the Karnali project and other natural resources to India? Why have they bowed before the expansionist India on the ‘zone of peace’ proposal proposed by the King? ... There are no answers to these questions before the *panchas* ... these people cannot do such works (NCP (ML), Fascist Nirdaliya ... Gara! 5).

And the same document pointed out that “the policy of boycott [then] was essentially dictated by the need for protecting nationalism” and “for securing democratic rights, food, clothing and shelter for the masses” (31) indicating, thereby, the mix of nationalism with democracy, which carried the meaning of fulfilling the basic needs of the people, for mobilising forces. As the year progressed, the experience of the

Party in between the period 24 May 1979 and 2 May 1980 was instrumental in changing its tactical position. When its boycott call fell flat, and when the Party reflected upon its the then policies, it observed that “since our formative period”, because of the prevalence of “ultra-left deviation within the Party” our “perceptions regarding the referendum” and “the policies which we followed during the movement were coloured by the deviations” (NCP (ML), “Janmat Sangraha ... Mulyankan” 8). And though the Party nowhere explains as to what it meant by ultra-left deviation the statements which follow immediately gives a feel, that by such deviation it meant its one track method of analysing every event as the outcome of forces at play within and outside the nation instead of relying on ‘concrete situations’, and of relying not in other tactics as the means of struggle for it stated:

The proclamation of referendum was due to the interaction between the forces of the peoples’ struggle and the forces unleashed for subjugating it... For the proletariats it was necessary to analyse the forces in the context of the concrete situation. Accordingly it should have moved forward holding on to the rights returned to the people; reformulated its tactics, strengthened its revolutionary propaganda, lifted to greater heights the people’s struggle for democratic rights, revealed in wider scale the machination of the King in the proclamation, combined the entire forces, and used all the means of struggle against the panchayat system. But, our Party viewed the proclamation only as a plot of the national and outsiders’ against the revolutionary forces and took the decision to boycott the referendum from the very beginning (9).

This realisation brought about a change in the thinking of the Party, which it expressed by noting “by the end of VS 2036 [March/April 1980] our thinking changed ... and we felt the necessity for investigating the Party policies and tactics ... Under such context the seventh Central Committee meeting of the Party was held in Asoj 2037 [September/October 1980]”. The meeting, their document said, “in the context of changed national and international situation ... rectified the past mistakes of the Party” (NCP (ML), “Rajnitik Pratibedan 1989” 58, 59). If, the changed national situation referred to the situation of the nation during/after the referendum; the change in the international situation, which the Party referred to, is explained nowhere in the document of the period. However, the NCP (Masal) while characterising the Party in its document of the Ayodhya Congress held in Mangshir 2041[Nov/Dec. 1984] holds

the view that the changes in the NCP (ML)'s stand was due to its "acceptance of the policies of revisionist Chinese", expressed in Chinese "counter revolutionary" trend, which it says had begun before 1984 (NCP (Masal[Mashal]), "Party Ra Krantika ... Pachau Mahadhiwayshunma Parit" 247, 227). If one were to accept the NCP (Mashal)'s version, then the change of policies in the CPC (Chinese Communist Party) was perhaps what the NCP (ML) was referring to as the changes in the international situation. The past mistakes obviously pointed towards its realisation of the prevalence of ultra-left deviation in the Party. In a bid to rectify it, the Committee, therefore, gave up its earlier stand which viewed the existence of "an acute revolutionary condition in the nation", and it gave up its "tactics of armed struggle" as the only means of leading the revolution. In lieu of it, the Party observed the existence of a "revolutionary condition", but shifted its focus "on strengthening the revolutionary consciousness of the nation" and in building "Party organisations" by "organising the people more vigorously" (NCP (ML), "Rajnitik Pratibedan 1989" 59). So, for strengthening the revolutionary consciousness of the people it changed its perception towards the Panchayat elections and institutions. It decided to use them in exposing the system and in propagandising revolutionary *Janabad* (democracy) for it stated, "the Party since the referendum has decided to use the Panchayat elections and institutions to expose the system and to propagandise revolutionary *Janabad* [democracy]" (90). In sum, it gave up its armed tactics.

Thereafter, in a series of Central Committee and Extended Central Committee meetings the Party revised many of its earlier stands. In its 13th Central Committee meeting of Jestha 2039 [May/June 1982] the Party changed its earlier policy of giving even "critical support" to the King's proposal for zone of peace, because it felt that such support was creating "delusion" regarding the Party's policy "towards its prime enemy". Therefore, it decided to "oppose the proposal" (NCP (ML), "Rajnitik Pratibedan 1989" 62–3). Similarly, in its Kartik 2039 [October/November 1982] Central Committee meeting it declared that "the primary contradiction in Nepal is the contradiction between the people and the feudalism cum tout-bureaucratic capitalism"

(63). Its 31st Central Committee meeting of 2045 [1988/89] emphasised upon moving ahead with the primary slogan, which focused on “the destruction of autocratic monarchy and ... the Panchayat system for the establishment of a republic and for achieving total political rights” (63–4). In the same year, in Fagun [February/March], its Second Extended Central Committee meeting categorised “Soviet Union along with all other East-European states as socialist states” (64). This change in its perception was due to the changes which it perceived in the activities of the USSR in the decade of the eighties for it stated:

With the arrival of Gorbachev in the leadership position of the country, the country has taken important steps towards the establishment of world peace, disarmament and for lessening tensions in different parts of the world ... it has put forward the proposal for creating a nuclear free world by the end of the century... kept on going the disarmament dialogue with the USA ... pulled its forces from Afghanistan ... and normalised its relation with China which in turn has led to the improvement in the relation between India and China. The more this process goes on the faster will be the end of the hegemonic states of the world (NCP (ML), “Rajnitik Pratibedan 1989” 11–2).

This meant that, by 1989, the Party no more viewed Soviet Union as a tension generating, expansionist, socialist-imperialist State, and especially after the normalisation of its relation with China it was no more in league with India in its bid to expand inside Nepal to encircle the Chinese. This was an important change in its perception for it wiped away the difference which it had perceived in the past between the USSR and the Republic of China, the very difference which was one of the factors responsible for its birth.

Despite these changes, by the end of 1989 the Party perception regarding who constituted the enemies—India was still an enemy—was still the same, but there was a change in its tactics. It was reflected in its tactics of roping in all the forces of revolution in its united front. As a result, the scope of its united front was broadened to include all and sundry for it stated:

The Nepalese revolution at this point is at a historical stage of new democratic revolution. It can be completed only by bringing together the entire forces under the proletariat leadership against the forces of feudalism, tout-bureaucratic bourgeoisie, imperialists and the expansionists. That will be new democratic united front. In such front there will be the proletariats, the peasants, the petty bourgeoisie of the

towns, the national bourgeoisie and in special situations even a section or class of the Zamindars and the bourgeoisie can be included. However, depending upon the phase of the revolution the front may either be broad or narrow, but in all the circumstances it will include the proletariats, the peasants and the petty bourgeoisie of the towns (NCP (ML), "Rajnitik Pratibedan 1989" 98).

The objective of the Party behind the formation of such broad united front was "to strengthen the revolutionary forces by embracing even the centrists". Its objective was to "isolate the main enemy by forging tactical alliances on common issues" (106). And the main enemy which the Party identified then was "the autocratic monarchy and his Party-less Panchayat system" (108).

Looking forward to the post-1989 period, the Party criticises, both Man Mohan and Mohan Bikram trend. The Man Mohan trend is criticised for its perception, which considers "India as the main enemy", and the Mohan Bikram, for considering "both Indian expansionism and the Nepali Congress" as the main enemies (NCP (ML), "Nepali Krantiko ... Karyakram" 38). As such, by implication, the Party's main focus was against the King's autocracy without, of course, sloughing off its perceptions regarding India. For it still held India as an imperialist, which controlled the Nepalese economy by propping, as *quid pro quo*, the existing feudal system for it observed:

Among the foreign nations exploiting the Nepalese economy the role of Indian monopoly capitalists is the most predominant. In the protection of the autocratic monarchy it plays second fiddle to the American imperialist. As a result it [India] controls Nepalese economy ... as such in spite of Nepalese contradiction with India on the issues of foreign trade and security, Nepal has always bowed before the authority of India. On account of this very fact, the Indian Government is helping the monarchy to subjugate the democratic struggle of Nepal (NCP (ML), "Nepali Krantiko ... Karyakram" 10).

Thus, under the control of the foreign and the feudal forces, the Party perceived Nepal in the "semi-feudal, semi-colonial" stage of social development, where the production system, was distorted. Hence, the need was to replace it with "a progressive productive system". To do so, the Party observes that "the main aim of the revolt should be to destroy the monarchy" (8). Such revolution, the new democratic revolution, was expected to "capture the State power" (14) and form a "Constituent Assembly" to frame a "new democratic republican constitution" (15). And the

purpose behind the framing of such constitution was to establish “new democratic production system” (30). Thus, during 1989 the main concern of the Party was to replace the anachronistic production system with an advanced system, and since the King came on its way the monarchy and the Panchayat system were to be destroyed. And for accomplishing such destruction the Party banked “mainly on the support of the peasants based on the proletariat-peasant unity” (30). Thereafter, the Party does not indicate the other classes which were to be included as the allies of the revolution instead it indulges in a circumlocution, and says that “It is a given fact that the proletariat class must combine with other classes in order to accomplish the new democratic revolution, hence it must adopt the tactics of united front for we give importance to the question of united front with this ideological understanding” (31). Which were the other classes the Party was referring to? And what was to be the nature of the united front? These questions are answered much later. To answer them it says,

While analysing the political forces the question of the Nepali Congress comes to the fore. In this context ... one type, on the basis of Congress’s class character, considers it as an ally of the New Democratic struggle. The other, considers it as an enemy and proposes to fight continuously against it. But both these assessments are dogmatic and unreal... (45).

Basically it represents the interest of the Zamindar class and of the tout bureaucratic capitalists ... so without defeating it one cannot achieve New Democracy. But at this point of time when there is autocratic regime the Congress is in favour of constitutional monarchy and multi-Party system....

Hence, this aspect of the Congress needs to be encouraged ... and its wrong tendencies of compromising with the monarchy should be opposed. For doing so the minimum political basis of the front should be widely propagated and its support should be sought... (NCP (ML), “Nepali Krantiko ... Karyakram” 46).

And the minimum political bases of the front outlined by the Party were:

- 1 Oppose Monarchy and establish democracy.
- 2 Unite with those who are ready to accept the Congress in the struggle for democracy.

3 End the Party-less autocracy and adopt multi-Party democracy... (NCP (ML), “Nepali Krantiko ... Karyakram” 45).

Thus, by this time the tactical position of the Party was to unite even with the Congress for the sake of establishing democracy. In fact, so generous was its welcome to the Congress in its front, that other party’s entry into the front depended upon their agreeing to accept the Congress as a partner. Besides, the document lists a number of issues over which the front was expected to fight. Most of these issues were related with the basics of, what they called as *Bahudaliya Janabad*, a multi-Party democratic polity. And they were, “freedom of political association”, the “demand for the setting up of a Constituent Assembly”, removal of “ban on the functioning of political parties” etcetera (NCP (ML), “Nepali Krantiko ... Karyakram” 53). But, a few of them were related with its idea of nationalism and they were as follows: “Demand for scientific demarcation of Indo-Nepal border; demand for two separate treaties on trade and transit; ... demand for work permit to foreign labourers working in Nepal” (53–4) and “demands concerning issues of national freedom ... (such as) demand for the end of 1950 Treaty along with all unjust treaties based upon it” (54). However, there was no entry which highlighted ethnic issues. With such tactical position the Party was ready to enter the decade of the 90s.

1.9. Birth of NCP (Kendriya Nucleus), its Fragmentation into NCP (Masal), NCP (Chautho Mahadhiwayshun (Fourth Congress) and NCP (Mashal)

By the end of the 60s, King Mahendra released Man Mohan Adhikari and Sambhuram Shrestha from jail. This was followed by the release of Mohan Bikram Singh and Nirmal Lama in 1971. In the open, these leaders point out that they were faced with a situation where the Communist movement was in disarray. Describing the situation of the movement, the document of the NCP (Mashal), which originally began as NCP (Kendriya Nucleus) states:

[After the Third Congress] ... there was rank indiscipline in the movement. And by ... VS 2028 ... the situation was such that the Party had no Central Committee. It had no central line and most of the Zonal

and District committees were defunct. Those which existed were functioning by themselves like Central Committees. There was intense struggle among those functioning committees and in many of them Government agents had penetrated ... All professional organisations were non-existent... There was no Party to lead the movement (NCP (Masal[Mashal]), “Rajnitik Pratibedan: (2041 Salma [1984/85] ... Parit)” 196).

Under such circumstances, the Kendriya Nucleus (Centralised Nucleus) came into existence in “Mangshir 20, 2028 [December 6, 1971] in Kathmandu” (196). In explaining the reasons as to why the Nucleus was formed all existing works highlight in different versions the intentions of the leaders to bind together the strewn Communists under a single command structure (Rawal 74; Thapa and Sijapati 25). However, the document of the Kendriya Nucleus implies that the Nucleus was formed not only to create an organisation with a Centre, but also to unite ‘true Communist’ forces with a strategy and a political line opposed to those of the NCP (Rayamajhi), the NCP (Tulsil Amatya) and the NCP under Pushpalal for it states:

Rayamajhi, T.L [Tulsilal] and P.L [Pushpalal] are primarily moving in the same direction—in the direction of revisionism and opportunism. Today the reactionary forces are more powerful than the Communists ... Today owing to the disunity among true Communist forces; owing to the absence of a centre among them, and owing to the lack of a strategy and a political line they are unable to progress. But when we struggle for the creation of a centre and when we advocate a political line then the situation will improve ... (NCP (Kendriya Nucleus), “Nepal ... Bhadkauru” 35).

To form such a Party, the strategy adopted was the New Democratic strategy. The strategy, in comparison with the New Democratic strategy of NCP (Pushpalal), differed in one aspect: it differed at the tactical level. The difference lay around the question as to whether the Nepali Congress should be taken as a fellow traveller of the revolution. In comparison with NCP (Pushpalal)’s strategy, which considered the Nepali Congress as the representative of the national bourgeoisie and, therefore, an ally in the path of New Democratic revolution, the Kendriya nucleus characterised the Nepali Congress as the representative of the feudal forces, tout bureaucratic capitalists, foreign capitalists and it equated its class position with that of the King. It said: “Today besides the Communist Party there are two other political forces—the

King and the Nepali Congress. The class character of both is essentially the same. Both represent the feudal forces, tout bureaucratic bourgeois class, foreign capitalists and the imperialists” (NCP (Kendriya Nucleus), “Deshko Rajnitik ... Bislayshun” 18). However, the Party reached such conclusion not on the basis of class analysis, but on the basis of lessons learnt from past experiences for it stated:

... National bourgeois class in our country is in its infancy. Even then it is found championing for the rights of an underdeveloped, landlocked State. It raises demands for transit facilities, and raises objections against the Indian tactics of economic pressure and its policy of considering Nepal as its common market. Far from supporting these causes of the national bourgeoisie, the Nepali Congress is found supporting the interest of the Indian monopoly capitalists. Hence it is hilarious to consider the Nepali Congress as the representative of the national bourgeoisie (NCP (Kendriya Nucleus), “Deshko Rajnitik ... Bislayshun” 18).

It characterised the tactics of the NCP under Pushpalal as reactionary, because it sought to destroy the outer shell of the Panchayat system while keeping intact its anti-nationalist and undemocratic features (For explanation see, p. 364). On account of this, the Kendriya Nucleus bracketed the NCP under Pushpalal nearer to the Nepali Congress, the NCP (Rayamajhi) and Indian monopoly capitalists for it stated:

The existing Panchayat system is so corrupt, defamed and weak that in its present form, it cannot serve the interest of both the national and foreign reactionaries. Hence, the reactionaries channel the *vox populi* towards the external form of the system while trying to keep intact its anti-nationalist and undemocratic features. This is, in essence, the characteristic of present-day reactionary tactics. Either PL [Pushpalal] has not understood this [that is the nature of the tactics], or, because of his links with the reactionaries, he is not trying to understand the reality. So he is advocating the destruction of the outer shell of the Panchayat system as the basic duty of the revolution. As such he is going closer to the Nepali Congress, Rayamajhi and Indian monopoly capitalists⁶⁴... (NCP (Kendriya Nucleus), “Tatkalik” 9).

The criticism of the Nucleus against the tactics of NCP (Pushpalal), NCP (Rayamajhi)

⁶⁴ See, NCP (Kendriya Nucleus), “Tatkalik” 9 The Nepali Congress advocated the establishment of the parliamentary system and Rayamajhi stood for reforms in the Panchayat system. Since both these tactical positions kept intact the anti-nationalist and anti-democratic nature of the Panchayat system it conformed to the tactical position of the NCP under Pushpalal. However, the intention of the Indian monopoly capitalist is not clearly stated.

and the Nepali Congress stems from the faction's tactics, which considered democracy and nationalism as inalienably linked principles of the revolution. It was clarified by the document of the faction when its name became NCP (Fourth Congress) in 1974 (See, p. 365). After turning into NCP (Fourth Congress) the Party says, "Nationalism and democracy are closely linked with each other and now,⁶⁵ for their sake, time has come to struggle against both the Nepali Congress and the King" (NCP (Chautho Mahadhiwayshun (Fourth Congress)), "Kranti Ra Partyka ... Samasyaharu" 41). And after reviewing the various tactical positions, which were current in the Communist movement of Nepal it reached the conclusion that both democracy and nationalism should remain as the inalienable principles of the revolution or else Nepal will go the Sikkim way for it stated:

Regarding nationalism there appeared two types of mistaken views. One type accepted the King's leadership for the protection of nationalism; stressed on bolstering his status, thereby, strengthening nationalism at the cost of democracy [four-class democracy]. The other type went on embracing the Nepali Congress's position: it careened fully towards democracy [parliamentary democracy] little realising the threat to which the independence and sovereignty of the nation were exposed to as a result of such a position. The advocates of the first type of views were those who were expelled, on account of their pro-King stance, in the third Congress. The victims of the second view were all those who in the Darbanga plenum and even in the third Congress put forward the proposal for the re-establishment of the dissolved parliament while nakedly towing the line of the Nepali Congress. However, the majority of the third Congress was free from the influences of both these views. They took both democracy and nationalism as inalienable principles of the revolution ... and the same stance has been the foundation of the Fourth Congress. The political

⁶⁵ To understand why the Party thought that nationalism had become important then one has to refer to its earlier document NCP (Kendriya Nucleus), "Deshko Rajnitik ... Bislayshun" 22–3 In it the Party explains that the issue of nationalism had become important because of two reasons: the surrender of the King before India, especially after Indian conquest of Pakistan with the support of imperialist Soviet Union and because of Nepali Congress's pro-India policies. Since, the King's surrender before India had made him autocratic the issue of democracy had also gained importance. See, also NCP (Chautho Mahadhiwayshun (Fourth Congress)), "Kranti Ra Partyka ... Samasyaharu" 49 In their perception the King had surrendered before India by accepting the ratification of Trade and Transit Treaty in 1971, which they argue was based on the 1950 treaties which are against the sovereignty and independence of Nepal.

scenario of Sikkim also helps us to understand the danger underlying the tactics which segregate nationalism from democracy ... The events there also help us to understand the character of Nepali Congress. From VS 2007 (1950/51) they have, in Nepal, played the role of Sikkim Congress. Without paying attention to their [Nepali Congress]'s character and intentions if one unites with them only for democracy, then Nepal will turn into another Sikkim (NCP (Chautho Mahadhiwayshun (Fourth Congress)), "Kranti Ra Partyka ... Samasyaharu" 42).

However, the way the Party understood the relation between democracy and nationalism⁶⁶ is to be understood by placing together the implications of the foregoing statements with those of its statements on democracy. The above statements implied that in the Nepalese context an anti-nationalist tilted towards India or served the interest of India. So, nationalism meant not to tilt towards India; not to serve Indian interest, but to work for Nepalese independence and sovereignty. And democracy to the Party, besides meaning wider economic and political rights for the people (See, footnote 66) also meant the transfer of power to the people, for it stated:

Nepal for centuries has remained under autocratic monarchy ... [here] the rulers are always the feudal and the tout bourgeois classes. From these classes, the strategy of new democracy seeks to transfer power to the people. Until such transfer of power to the people is effected the goal of democratic revolution would remain unfulfilled (NCP (Chautho Mahadhiwayshun (Fourth Congress)), "Kranti Ra Partyka ... Samasyaharu" 43).

And since the New Democratic strategy of the Party defined people as the proletariat, the peasants, the petty and the national bourgeoisie the above statement implied that the coming of the four classes to power meant democracy.

⁶⁶ See, NCP (Chautho Mahadhiwayshun (Fourth Congress)), "Kranti Ra Partyka ... Samasyaharu" 74 The party explains that the question of nationalism should be linked with the question of wider economic and political rights of the people i.e., democracy. Then and then alone, the party says, the issue of nationalism would receive the support of the people, meaning thereby that even nationalism on its own was not sufficient to mobilise the people (this observation is of importance in view of the fact that this faction was the mother of the NCP (Maoist)), and tactically the Maoist also banked upon such formulation that linked democracy with nationalism. Besides, the document points out that if nationalism is linked only with the interest of the King then it is reactionary in nature.

In the light of the above conclusion, the connection which the Party perceived in between democracy and nationalism is clear. To the Party, the independence and sovereignty of Nepal were in safe hand if power were transferred to the four classes. So, such rule was democratic and in the interest of the nationalism of Nepal. Hence, it was opposed to NCP (Rayamajhi)'s tactics, which advocated reformed Panchayat system, and the tactics of NCP (Pushpalal) which advocated a parliamentary system because both the tactics⁶⁷ sought changes without asking for a change in the ruling classes. However, the Party believed that it was important to support nationalism to keep Indian aggression at bay for it was implied in its version where it stated, "In the past two decades, India has repeatedly tried to limit our sovereignty and independence. These efforts, however, could not manifest into open attacks only because since the day of the Delhi Accord there has been a constant struggle against the Indian reactionaries" (NCP (Kendriya Nucleus), "Deshko Rajnitik ... Bislayshun" 23). Besides, in its tactics for the period, it pointed out that for "developing an independent⁶⁸ and revolutionary Communist Party" (28) it must outperform the Nepali Congress's campaign for democracy and the King's campaign for nationalism for it stated:

In such a situation ... we have to struggle both for democracy and nationalism and while campaigning for democracy we must outperform Nepali Congress's campaign, and while campaigning for nationalism

⁶⁷ For further understanding of the objection of the Nucleus see NCP (Kendriya Nucleus), "Deshko Rajnitik ... Bislayshun" 29 The party observes that National democracy, the strategy of the Rayamajhi faction believes in achieving socialism through bourgeois parliamentary system and by following a peaceful path. NCP (Pushpalal) does not accept the Rayamajhi's strategy, but accepts the tactics of bourgeois parliamentary democracy. Hence, Rayamajhi's strategy is revisionist and Pushpalal's, neo-revisionist. Hence, they are both unacceptable.

⁶⁸ See, NCP (Kendriya Nucleus), "Deshko Rajnitik ... Bislayshun" 27–8 The party explains that in the past its role was confined to support either the Nepali Congress's struggle for democracy or to support the King's struggle for nationalism (knowing well that his nationalism was for the protection of monarchy). In the former instance it opposed the King but neglected its struggle against the Nepali Congress and vice versa in the latter. Hence, for evolving as a revolutionary force its tactics was to oppose both the forces.

we must outperform the King's campaign for nationalism ... Usually, in the past, when we struggled against either the King or the Nepali Congress we applied our main force against one of them while neglecting our struggle against the other as a result we could not play an independent role... (NCP (Kendriya Nucleus), "Deshko Rajnitik ... Bislayshun" 28).

However, the importance of the above statements lies not only in clarifying that for transforming itself into an independent revolutionary force the Nucleus approved of a tactics which avoided alliance both with the Nepali Congress and the forces representing the King, but also in revealing that its tactics was in favour of using democracy and nationalism as instruments of mobilisation.

Then in Varanasi in June/July 1974, the Nucleus held its Fourth Congress. In the Congress, Rawal points out that a few of the founder members of the Nucleus viz., "Man Mohan, Sambhuram, Bharatmohun, Siddhilal and Kamal Koirala were not present". According to him, these members ultimately formed the "NCP (Man Mohan) in 1979 after holding a 'unity conference'" (74). Since the documents related with these events are unavailable, one can neither account for the reasons behind the split in the NCP (Kendriya Nucleus) in 1974, nor explain the reasons behind the formation of the NCP (Man Mohan) in 1979. After the split, "the NCP (Kendriya Nucleus) under Mohan Bikram Singh ... came to be known as the NCP (Chautho Mahadhiwayshun (Fourth Congress))" (Rawal 75; K. C, Nepalma Communist Bhag 2 113).⁶⁹

As a continuation of the NCP (Kendriya Nucleus), the NCP (Fourth Congress) subscribed to the strategy of New Democratic revolution. This revolution was expected "to transfer land to the tillers ... nationalise the capital and industries which

⁶⁹ See, K. C, Nepalma Communist Bhag 2 114 The party then formed a Central Committee of 13 members, which included Mohan Bikram Singh, Nirmal Lama, Bhaktabahadur Shrestha, Jaigovinda Shaha, Khambasingh Kuwar, Chitrabahadur KC, Khiman Singh Gurung, Rawuviram Acharya, Suryanath Yadav, Haridwar Upadhyaya, Gangadhar Ghimire, Mohan Baidhya and Lalsingh Bhandari with Mohan Bikram Singh as the General Secretary. Of these 9 were full members and 4,

were in possession of tout bureaucratic bourgeoisie ... annul all unequal treaties ... equalise women's status with that of men, and give freedom and equal rights to the poor, deprived⁷⁰ and untouchables of the society" (NCP (Chautho Mahadhiwayshun (Fourth Congress)), "Kranti Ra Partyka ... Samasyaharu" 58). However, the Party felt that the above quoted elements of the strategy could be fulfilled only by "a Government representing the interest of the people" (58). And since such Government (representing the four classes) was not in existence it prescribed the creation of a *Deshbhakta Janatantrik Sarkar* (patriotic-democratic Government). For the creation of such a Government, the Party prescribed the use of the above quoted elements of the strategy along with 33 other issues [minimum programme]⁷¹ as "immediate demands and problems to be resolved" "to pressurise the then reactionary Government" (59). Such pressure tactics was expected "to raise the level of people's consciousness" and establish the "patriotic-democratic Government"⁷² (59). This

⁷⁰ See, NCP (Chautho Mahadhiwayshun (Fourth Congress)), "Kranti Ra Partyka ... Samasyaharu" 50–1 The party rejects movements based on ethnic lines. It points out that the Indian Government and the Americans are penetrating the ethnic population and instigating them to undermine the integrity and the strength of Nepal. They are doing so to maintain their control over Nepal.

⁷¹ See, NCP (Chautho Mahadhiwayshun (Fourth Congress)), "Kranti Ra Partyka ... Samasyaharu" 59–62 The party itemises 33 issues such as the rights of a land-locked state, issues concerning land reform etc., and for the first time it points out to the problem of migration from its southern border and the manner in which the corrupt officials sell citizenship to the migrants. The resolution of these 33 issues formed the minimum programme of the party.

⁷² See, NCP (Chautho Mahadhiwayshun (Fourth Congress)), "Kranti Ra Partyka ... Samasyaharu" 59 Tactically such Government was necessary for two reasons. First, without such Government in existence people would repose their faith in the reactionary Government to solve their problem. Secondly, without such Government it would not be possible to keep alive people's problems and demands, which were necessary for raising their level of consciousness till the Government of the people was established. Besides, the existence of such Government, which would keep the demands alive would help the subjective and objective conditions of the revolution to mature.

Government⁷³ was then expected to implement “the minimum programme, provide full political rights to the people, hold the election for the Constituent Assembly and pass on the responsibilities to the Government created thereafter” (56). Hence, at that point of time the Party aimed at destroying the “autocratic monarchy and the Panchayat system” and for it, the Party favoured the forging of a united front of patriotic, democratic and Communist forces, the very forces visualised in power in the patriotic-democratic Government (63). These, forces, as identified by the Party, were those “who favoured full political freedom for the people, supported the sovereignty and independence of the nation, advocated the implementation of the minimum programme especially progressive land reform; opposed, for the sake of achieving the foregoing goals, the autocratic rule of the King, Indian expansionism, American imperialism, and Soviet socialist imperialism” (62). This front was, however, supposed to remain clear from “both the Nepali Congress and [forces representing] the King as the front was struggling for nationalism and democracy” (NCP (Chautho Mahadhiwayshun (Fourth Congress)), “Kranti Ra Partyka ... Samasyaharu” 63). However, to achieve the destruction of autocratic monarchy and the Panchayat system, the Party believed essentially in armed peasant struggle for it stated:

In order to achieve the present revolutionary aims—the destruction of autocratic monarchy and the Panchayat system, the establishment of a Government of patriotic and democratic forces, the protection of the independence and sovereignty of the country and for implementing the minimum programme—it is essential to carry on a revolutionary struggle at the grass-roots. And the core of such a struggle should be armed peasant struggle (63).

The Party planned to organise peasant struggle by “progressively encouraging movements at the local level” taking “local problems”. In such a struggle the Party was to organise “poor villagers” “agricultural labourers”, “middle class peasants”

⁷³ See, NCP (Chautho Mahadhiwayshun (Fourth Congress)), “Kranti Ra Partyka ... Samasyaharu” 57 The party argues that this Government should emphasise nationalism and democracy, the interest of the four classes, then alone the Constitution framed by the Constituent Assembly would be in the interest of the people.

against “local feudal, rich agriculturists and the administration to transform the movement into armed peasant struggle”. The Party advocated “peasant struggle to be the primary form of peoples’ struggle”. However, the Party rued over the fact that “it had no organisation to carry out such struggle”, and problem existed especially regarding the “organisation of the proletariat, youth and student fronts” (65). In case of the proletariats, the Party said, “because of the weak condition of the proletariats in the country, their struggle has not developed and acquired political significance ... In the last two decades there was certainly a growth in the numerical strength of the proletariats, but the role of the Party among them was almost non-existent” (NCP (Chautho Mahadhiwayshun (Fourth Congress)), “Krantī Ra Partyka ... Samasyaharu” 65–66). In view of such situation of the proletariat it was, therefore, logical on the part of the Party to state that “The aim of the struggle would be to create situation conducive to the launching of armed peasant struggle” (64). And for generating such outcome the struggle was to take two forms: unconstitutional and constitutional. The unconstitutional struggle was for “directly opposing the King, the Constitution and the system” and the constitutional struggle was to be waged for “raising demands for various reforms while functioning within the limits of the Constitution”. If the former type of struggle was “to be waged in areas where people’s consciousness was developed”, the latter type of struggle was meant for “areas with less developed consciousness” (64). But, for waging such struggle the Party banked on “the proletariat, the peasants and the students’ movements as the three most important elements of the struggle” (66), without expressing, of course, the pre-eminent role of the peasants in the struggle. Was it the compulsion of the Party, in view of the status of the proletariat, to bank on the students and to categorise their movement as one of the important elements of the struggle? It seems so, because all across the Communist literature of Nepal the students are referred to as one of the most conscious sections of the society.

During the 70s, the Party—the NCP (Fourth Congress), as Rawal puts it, was “considered as one of the strongest Communist factions”, but all was not well within

the Party (75). “In VS 2035 [1978/79], the Party took disciplinary action against its General Secretary, Mohan Bikram Singh for his indulgence in immoral activities and replaced him with Nirmal Lama” (K. C, Nepalma Communist Bhag 2 115). But, Lama could not last long. Within two years, as pointed out by Surendra K. C, he lost his hold in the Party “for trying to transform the duly elected members of the Party Central Committee into a minority by unconstitutionally including new members”,⁷⁴ for “embracing a policy, which favoured participation in the Panchayat election”, and for his statement on the death of Pushpalal where he is said to have stated that “the death of Pushpalal was a great loss to the Communist movement of Nepal despite the fact, that the Party had characterised him as a ‘traitor’” (K. C, Nepalma Communist Bhag 2 115). So, he was removed from the office of the General Secretary to make way for the entry of Shersingh [Bhaktabahadur Shrestha]. During this period, the Party’s tactics was focused on struggling for nationalism and democracy.⁷⁵ However,

⁷⁴ See, NCP (Masal[Mashal]), “Chautho Mahadhiwayshunbhitra ... Singhawalokan” 185 This faction emerged after Nirmal Lama went out. The document of this faction points out that Nirmal Lama invented the rule that the Central Committee could rightfully include additional members numbering 1/3 of the total Committee members i.e., 1/3 of the 13 members. Further, in the next meeting 1/3 of the total members created after the first addition could be added and the process could go on. This according to the Party was an unconstitutional invention and it was invented by Lama to reduce the Central Committee elected by the Fourth Congress into a minority and to steer the Party according to his will.

⁷⁵ See, NCP (Chautho Mahadhiwayshun (Fourth Congress)), “Rajnaitik Pratibedan ... 2038 Salko Asadma” 143–50 Here the party points out that the characteristic feature of world politics then was the competition between the Soviet Socialist Imperialists and the Imperialist America for world domination. Its effect was also being felt in the Indian subcontinent. The Indian expansionist was in league with the Soviet Socialist Imperialists and was trying to penetrate Nepal. The party perceived the possibility of open attack from its southern neighbour and hence it pointed out that its tactics should be focused on the issue of nationalism and democracy. To do so, it proposed the creation of a united front where the only force that it considered eligible was the NCP (ML). It denigrated the NCP (Pushpalal) as a lackey of the Nepali Congress, the party of the feudal forces and the tout bourgeoisie; condemned Man Mohan faction as an opportunist and declined to the NCP (Rohit) faction and the Rayamajhi group, the revisionists, a place in the united front.

events like the May 1979 proclamation and the subsequent developments reveal that the Party could not function without differences even under the new leadership. And this becomes clear in its document “Rajnaitik Singhawalokan” of Paus 2036 [Dec. /Jan. 1979/80]. In it, the Party points out that its response to the May 1979 proclamation was not decisive: in the beginning, it perceived the proclamation as a “plot” (See, p.106), so it decided to boycott the referendum, but soon “a section of its leaders shared platform with Pushpalal and Man Mohan factions [Despite the fact that it characterised both Pushpalal and Man Mohan factions as touts of Indian reactionaries]⁷⁶ to advocate the cause for an environment where free and fair referendum could be conducted” conveying, thereby, “a message that the Party was not against participation in the referendum” (NCP (Chautho Mahadhiwayshun (Fourth Congress)), “Rajnaitik Singhawalokan” 92). According to its document, such confusion in its tactics then was due to the “Bhadra 1(August 17) pamphlet”, which according to the Party, was “published without the approval of the Central Committee and the politburo” (93). Since the pamphlet is not available it is not possible to assess the level of the differences, that the content of the pamphlet held with the official position of the Party. However, the differences must have been glaring in view of the Party statement, which assessed “the contents of the pamphlet [as] something beyond the understanding of the Central Committee” (93). Though the Central Committee, thereafter, boycotted the referendum, yet the vacillation in the activities of the Party and the pamphlet incident⁷⁷ brought into the open the breach within the Party: a breach which heralded the Party fragmentation of 1983/1984 (see following page).

⁷⁶ See, NCP (Kendriya Nucleus), Rajnaitik Singhawalokan, p-99 where the party characterises Manmohan, P.L [Pushpalal], Rayamajhi as the touts of Indian reactionaries. So it advocated that the party should avoid them.

⁷⁷ The differences which the document of the NCP (Fourth Congress (Nirmal Lama faction)) highlights with the opinions of the Central Committee after the fragmentation of the NCP (Fourth Congress) in 1984 as NCP (Mashal) and NCP (Fourth Congress (Nirmal Lama faction)) conveys a feeling that the party workers involved in the pamphlet incident were probably Nirmal Lama and his coterie.

The developments after 1980, in the organisational front as described by Rawal and as indicated by the Party document catalysed the process of fragmentation. Describing the developments, both Rawal and Surendra K. C point out that disciplinary action was again taken against Mohan Bikram [obviously followed by his expulsion from the Central Committee] and Nirmal Lama was also removed from the Central Committee (Rawal 78; K. C, Nepalma Communist Bhag 2 116). This was followed by the incarceration of General Secretary, “Shersingh” by the Government in “Srawan 2040 [August 1983]” (Rawal 77). Thereafter, a pamphlet of the Party published in 14 Aswin 2040 [30 September 1983] indicates that “for a long time differences existed within the Party over political and organisational issues” (see, following page), and because of these differences even the “Central Committee was divided” (NCP (Chautho Mahadhiwayshun (Fourth Congress)), “Partyo Sankat ... Prasna” 180). With existing differences intact, when “Com. Suryanath Yadav” and “Com. Jaigovinda Shaha” representing the “minority group” resigned from the Central Committee there emerged “a constitutional crisis”⁷⁸, which led to the dissolution of the Committee in its 27th meet (180). For creating such a situation, the “majority group”—the majority among the 13 member Central Committee of the NCP (Fourth Congress)—blamed the “minority group” (headed by Nirmal Lama) for its impatience when it stated:

For a long time there had been many types of differences among the Party members over political and organisational issues. The majority decision cannot always satisfy everybody. In such situation is it right on the part of the dissatisfied lot to indulge in indiscipline? Certainly not. The Central Committee was preparing for the Congress ... It had already published three documents. Moves were on to publish the documents of the minority groups. It was possible to discuss the viewpoints of all in the Congress ... [but] the minority group forced the dissolution of the Central Committee. They did not have even a

⁷⁸ The Constitution of the party is not available hence to understand the Constitutional crisis one needs to refer the document, NCP, Hamra Mukhya Matbhedharu ... Lama Pakcha 83 The faction observes that the existence of the Central Committee became unconstitutional when the numerical strength of the 9 full members of the Committee which was fixed by the NCP (Fourth Congress) became 4 after the resignation of its two members.

little patience to wait for the Congress which was scheduled to meet within a few months (NCP (Chautho Mahadhiwayshun (Fourth Congress)), “Partyo Sankat ... Prasna” 180).

After the dissolution of the Central Committee, the Mohan Bikram group formed a “temporary Central Committee” and under its initiative it held in “Kartik 2040 [Oct/Nov 1983] in Gorakhpur its Third National Conference and declared the birth of Nepal Communist Party (Mashal)” (K. C, Nepalma Communist Bhag 2 117). Similarly, on the “10th of Mangshir 2040 [26 Nov. 1983]”, the Nirmal Lama faction formed its “National Conference Organising Committee” (1), which after “two months” i.e., in January 1984 organised a “Conference” (NCP, Hamra Mukhya Matbhedharu ... Lama Pakcha 2), the first National Conference of the NCP (Fourth Congress (Nirmal Lama))⁷⁹. The NCP (Mashal (Mohan Bikram Gharti/Singh))⁸⁰ faction blamed Nirmal Lama Group for plotting the dissolution of the Central Committee of the NCP (Fourth Congress [original]) with the intention to take part in the upcoming election of National Panchayat for its document stated:

The minority group ... took such a step keeping in view the upcoming National Panchayat election. For years ordinary differences within the Party and the two line struggle were going on and for such differences it was not necessary to fragment the Party even before the fifth Congress which was due to be held a few months later. But time to organise for the upcoming Rastriya Panchayat election was less ... Besides the Central Committee of the Fourth Congress and its politics were not accommodative of their goal to participate in the election. And since the possibility of winning majority by their policies in the fifth Congress was remote, they hastened the dissolution of the Central

⁷⁹ Nirmal Lama Group took the name of the earlier Fourth Congress, whereas Mohan Bikram group came up with a new name. The documents used in this work are all from the original Fourth Congress that existed before January 1984. There is only one document of Nirmal Lama group which is also in the name of NCP and is only distinguished by its tag, Nirmal Lama Paksha, which in English means Nirmal Lama side.

⁸⁰ Since document of NCP (Mashal) which was under the leadership of Mohan Bikram Gharti are all published in the name of NCP (Masal) which emerged out of another split in NCP (Mashal) in 1985/86 the references are given with the name Mashal within square brackets to clarify that it was NCP (Mashal) formed in 1984, because after 1985/86 split another faction arrogated the name of Gharti faction and Gharti faction started using the name NCP (Masal).

Committee and engineered the fragmentation of the Party (NCP (Masal[Mashal]), “Chautho Mahadhiwayshunbhitra ... Singhawalokan” 183).

Further, the faction characterised the minority group as reformist interested in forging tactical alliance with the Nepali Congress and pro-Panchayat [Man Mohan faction] groups. It dubbed them as ‘careerists’ who were not interested in the revolutionary goal of the Party for it stated:

In place of protracted revolutionary people’s struggle and preparation for underground movement, they are stressing on reformist and constitutional movements. They are emphasising on tactical union with the pro-Panchayat forces and Nepali Congress. In fact, they are not interested in the revolutionary goal of the Party but as 'careerists', they intend to enter the Panchayat system... (184).

Finally, in the Rajnaitik Pratibedan of the Fifth Congress held in Ayodhya in 1984/85, the Party, in hindsight, pointed out that the split was due to the slackening in the effort of the Party in revealing the activities of the ultra-leftists⁸¹ and the right opportunists in the context of the controversy between the issue of the united front and the tactical front for it stated:

To deal with the ultra-left tilt visible in the activities of Com. Rishiraj Devkota (Com. Ajad) and the right opportunism of the minority group, we had to remove them after 3 years. The Party had to bear a significant loss because along with them the Party lost a sizeable section of honest friends. Behind all these happenings lay the slackness of the Party in exposing the activities of the ultra-left and right opportunists in the context of the controversy between the issue of united front and the tactical front (NCP (Masal[Mashal]), “Rajnaitik Pratibedan: (2041 Salma [1984/85] ... Parit)” 214).

Therefore, in the perception of the NCP (Mashal (Mohan Bikram Gharti/Singh)) the causes behind the split were essentially the NCP (Fourth Congress (Nirmal Lama))’s leaders desire to participate in the Panchayat elections; their reformatory attitude, and the controversies surrounding the issue of united front and tactical front. However, the NCP (Fourth Congress (Nirmal Lama)) itemised 7 issues, along with others, on which its perception differed from that of the NCP (Mashal (Mohan Bikram Gharti/Singh))

⁸¹ No document of this group is available

group when they were together as the NCP (Fourth Congress). First, it was regarding the analysis of the year 2007 (1949/50). The NCP (Fourth Congress) led by Nirmal Lama pointed out that the NCP (Mashal (Mohan Bikram Gharti/Singh)) analysed “the year 2007” simply as “an event” where “two feudal forces clashed” with each other (NCP, Hamra Mukhya Matbhedharu ... Lama Pakcha 17). Then it points out that such an analysis was against the perception of NCP (Fourth Congress), because in the 2007 [1949/50] revolt the NCP (Fourth Congress) “admitted of the existence of a revolutionary democratic force besides the force of the King and the Congress” (18). In the revolt, the King and the Congress “posed” as “democrats”, and misled “the bourgeois democratic revolution to failure”. Then they argue, that the NCP (Mashal (Mohan Bikram Gharti/Singh))’s analysis while going against the perception of the NCP (Fourth Congress), hid the “betrayal perpetrated by the Nepali Congress and the King”, because the analysis did not admit of the existence of a revolutionary force, which was misled by them and so it failed to “expose to the people that the betrayal was due to their [of the Nepali Congress and the King] class character” (19). By such analysis, the NCP (Fourth Congress (Nirmal Lama)) was probably arguing that the NCP (Mashal (Mohan Bikram Gharti/Singh)) was soft peddling with the Nepali Congress and the King, whom the NCP (Fourth Congress) had adjudged as forces to be avoided.

Second, after distinguishing strategic and tactical united front⁸², the NCP (Fourth Congress (Nirmal Lama)) points out that as per the decisions of the NCP (Fourth Congress [original]) it believed in tactical alliance even with patriotic,

⁸² See, NCP, Hamra Mukhya Matbhedharu ... Lama Pakcha 25–6 The Party points out that tactical alliance is a miniature form of United front. This type of alliance, formed on the basis of a special demand, binds together different political forces to fulfill the immediate needs of the people through constitutional struggle. This type of struggle may last for a day or for a while and its organisational structure is loose. But the function of Strategic United front is to capture the seat of power.

democratic and Communist forces with whom strategic alliance could not be forged immediately for it stated:

The patriotic, democratic and Communist forces with whom ... strategic United front cannot be forged; with them, in the course of functioning, we should adopt the policy of forging different types of political alliances. These types of unity could be either of the national and regional level or it could be open and secret ... It is possible to forge temporary alliances with forces that have the same policy regarding a particular issue in a particular situation. We have called such alliances tactical united front or tactical unity ... (NCP, Hamra Mukhya Matbhedharu ... Lama Pakcha 26).

Then the NCP (Fourth Congress (Nirmal Lama)) argues that the NCP (Mashal (Mohan Bikram Gharti/Singh)) does not distinguish between the strategic and tactical united fronts. As such “it considers tactical unity to be the most important and limits the formation of the united front to tactical united front” (27). So, the NCP (Fourth Congress (Nirmal Lama)) states, that “by holding such understanding the NCP (Mashal (Mohan Bikram Gharti/Singh)) is helping the reactionary forces” probably because it felt that the NCP (Mashal (Mohan Bikram Gharti/Singh))’s understanding of the tactical alliance did not allow it to use the alliance as a stepping stone towards strategic united front—a front necessary for the capture of power (27).

Third, in the 1979–1980 referendum if the Nirmal Lama group was in support of the movement for ensuring free and fair referendum, the Central Committee of the NCP (Fourth Congress [original]) was in favour of boycotting the referendum for continuing the struggle (See p. 131).

Fourth, the NCP (Fourth Congress (Nirmal Lama)) believed in the revolutionary use of the Panchayat election. It felt the necessity for such turn in the Party tactics after VS 2038 (1981–82), because it perceived a change in the situation. The change in the situation was perhaps explained in the Party perception, which viewed in the third amendments of the 1962 Constitution the desire of the monarchy to preserve and strengthen the system (see page139). Hence its document stated:

The boycott and the use of Panchayat (reactionary association-institution) election is two different forms of struggle used under two different political situations. They are not ideological stances. Earlier the Party had adopted the boycott form of struggle. The struggle of VS 2035/36 (1979/80) was in a different situation, where the Party was

expected to change the form of struggle. The Party could not understand that the necessity was for the revolutionary use of the election (NCP, Hamra Mukhya Matbhedharu ... Lama Pakcha 37).

And by the revolutionary use of the election, the faction meant that the Party should “participate in the election with a view to educate and make the citizens aware of the system while revealing the weaknesses of the process” (39), meaning, thereby, that the NCP (Mashal (Mohan Bikram Gharti/Singh)) did not see eye to eye with this understanding of the faction. On the contrary, the NCP (Mashal (Mohan Bikram Gharti/Singh)) was using the boycott form of struggle to form a Party, which would fight elections like a rightist opportunists and revisionists. It was propagandising such petty bourgeois stances, that is boycott, as revolutionary ideals among the Party members and the people to fulfil its narrow factional goal for the NCP (Fourth Congress (Nirmal Lama)) stated:

Like the rightist opportunists and revisionists, the advocates of boycott form of struggle are propagandising among the Party members and the people the wrong idea that to make a revolutionary use of the Panchayat election is to expend the entire energy of the Party in creating a Party which would fight elections. By propagating such petty bourgeois understanding as revolutionary ideals it is trying to fulfil its narrow factional goal (NCP, Hamra Mukhya Matbhedharu ... Lama Pakcha 39).

In sum, the Party was pointing out that the NCP (Mashal (Mohan Bikram Gharti/Singh)) was interested only in its goal of creating a Party to fight elections. Fifth, the NCP (Fourth Congress (Nirmal Lama)) points out that the leadership of the NCP (Mashal), that is, Mohan Bikram Singh, in the past, had introduced ideological deviation by revising the strategy fixed by the NCP (Fourth Congress) when it declared the maximum strategy as New democracy and minimum strategy of achieving a Government of the patriotic and democratic forces for its document states:

The Fourth Congress of the NCP had clearly spelled out the maximum strategy of Socialism and Communism, but Mohan Bikram Singh ... fixed the maximum strategy of the Party as New democracy and the minimum strategy as the creation of a Government of the patriotic and democratic forces. As a result the Central Committee of the Party also fell into the trap of this ideological deviation (NCP, Hamra Mukhya Matbhedharu ... Lama Pakcha 57).

However, here the NCP (Fourth Congress (Nirmal Lama)) is not clear, because it

neither explains why it considered such changes in the strategy as ideological deviations, nor it explains the results flowing out of such deviations. Therefore, this difference accounts for differences between the two factions without adding analytical content to the progress of the narrative.

Sixth, the difference between the two factions is based on the NCP (Fourth Congress (Nirmal Lama))'s understanding about the differences between basic contradiction and main contradiction. According to it, the main contradiction in Nepal is between the Nepalese people and feudalism. So, it points out that “the main force of revolution should aim at destroying feudalism”, but according to its version the “NCP (Mashal (Mohan Bikram Gharti/Singh)) considered the basic contradiction as the main contradiction” (62) and argued that “the focus of the struggle against feudalism alone would serve the interest of the imperialists, especially the Indian expansionists” (63) to mean that the stand of the NCP (Fourth Congress (Nirmal Lama)) is in favour of the imperialists. Rebutting such argument of the NCP (Mashal (Mohan Bikram Gharti/Singh)), the NCP (Fourth Congress (Nirmal Lama)) points out that in Nepal “the Indian exploitation and its interference as an expansionist is owing to the support of the feudal forces of Nepal. From the backstage, the Imperialists and the Indian expansionists protect Nepalese feudalism from the brunt of the people’s attack. So, an attack upon the monarchy, the kingpin of feudalism, is also an indirect attack upon them” (NCP, Hamra Mukhya Matbhedharu ... Lama Pakcha 63). So, they argue the stand of the NCP (Mashal (Mohan Bikram Gharti/Singh)) is wrong, because their stand does not reflect the “objective condition” of the kingdom (63) .

Lastly, the NCP (Fourth Congress (Nirmal Lama)) itemised 5 issues concerning Party organisational principles, which they claimed were violated by the NCP (Mashal (Mohan Bikram Gharti/Singh))'s leadership. These were issues concerning Collegiate leadership, Democratic centralism, principles related with the formation of *Jana Bargiya* organisation (professional organisation), and issues related to the relationship between Central Party organisations.

On collegiate leadership, the NCP (Fourth Congress (Nirmal Lama)) points out that the Party was infested from the “centre to the cell” with the leadership of individuals. As a result, the Party functioned not according to the principle of “Collegiate leadership with individual responsibility, but according to the principle of individual leadership with Collegiate responsibility” (66–7). This had, according to the NCP (Fourth Congress (Nirmal Lama)), “deified the Party leadership and turned them into ... autocrats” (67) implying, by it, the practice of personality cult within the Party. Based on its understanding about the principle of democratic centralism, the NCP (Fourth Congress (Nirmal Lama)) faction points out that for the last “9 years the Party Central leadership and its majority (the 7 out of the 13 Central Committee leaders) ... took decisions ... and imposed them upon the Party...” (68). The “decisions were imposed unilaterally ... destroying democratic centralism and [helping the growth of] bureaucratic centralism” (68).

Similarly, on the issue of *Jana Bargiya Sangathan* (professional organisations) the Party blamed that the leadership violated the Marxist organisational principle, because the fractions formed by the Party leadership were composed of Party members and not of members of professional organisations. This fulfilled the “formality of forming fractions”, but the fractions turned into Party organisations instead of “organisations formed for the larger interest of the classes” (70) represented by the professional organisations.

Lastly, the NCP (Fourth Congress (Nirmal Lama)) points out that before the 1983/84 fragmentation the Party Central organisations, functioned in contravention with the provisions of the NCP (Fourth Congress [original]) Constitution: On many occasions the politburo and the technical committee took decisions while keeping the Central Committee in the dark (71).

Besides, they objected against NCP (Mashal (Mohan Bikram Gharti/Singh))’s stand, which barred tactical alliance with forces categorised as the “reactionary forces” by the NCP (Fourth Congress [original]) (73). These forces were parties like the NCP (Pushpalal) and NCP (Man Mohan) (See, footnote 75 and 76 of this

Chapter). But, (NCP (Fourth Congress [Nirmal Lama]) faction viewed alliances with them as the “revolutionary use of the reactionary forces” as “prescribed by Lenin” (73). And true to its profession the leaders (Nirmal Lama and his group) had combined with the above mentioned Communist parties in 1979 in their bid to create a free and fair environment for the holding of the referendum.

However, to explain the causes behind the fragmentation the NCP (Fourth Congress (Nirmal Lama)) does not refer to the seven tactical and organisational issues instead it itemises three organisational tendencies which were prevalent in the Party. These tendencies as per the document were:

1 When the opportunist Communists were certain that their policies would lose their stand they indulged in mudslinging and in political-character assassination of those who advocated practical, objective tactics. They took disciplinary actions by implicating them in false allegations and blocked them from taking part in the Fifth Congress.

2 To serve the personal ambitions and selfish interests of a few they purged those who advocated the right opinion under the pretext of democratic centralism, collegiate leadership and Party secrecy.

3 In the process of inner struggle they ... suppressed the alternative opinions in the name of centralism (NCP, Hamra Mukhya Matbhedharu ... Lama Pakcha 89–90).

The reference to “Opportunist Communists,” “selfish interest of a few,” and “they” in each of the above statements reveal the concern of the Party regarding the activities of a few Communists, and these “a few communists” as pointed out by the document, were no other than “Shersingh, and Kiran [Mohan Bikram Baidhya]” (81). Therefore, all the three statements of the Party were pointing towards one direction. They were pointing towards the ‘group-ism’ (81), which Shersingh and Kiran indulged in, and which the Nirmal Lama faction considered as the single most cause behind the fragmentation of the Party. But, this raises a question why did the Party list out the 7 differences if the explanation for the fragmentation lay only in the ‘group-ism’ of the two leaders? Perhaps, this was their way of pointing out that the ‘group-

ism' stood in the Party's way in the proper resolution of the various issues. However, if one takes the claims of NCP (Masal [Mashal])'s and that of NCP (Fourth Congress (Nirmal Lama)) concerning the differences which paved the way for the split then one difference—both point out to it—gains prominence. It is about their difference in the understanding of the tactical unity. Hence, this, besides the 'group-ism', seems to be the most important cause behind the fragmentation of the NCP (Fourth Congress [original]).

1.9.1. Strategy and Tactics of NCP (Fourth Congress (Nirmal Lama Faction))

Its strategy, prefaced by the description of the external environment of the day, points out to the "fall of the Soviet Union and China" (93). In its characterisation of the Soviet Union as a fallen State, the Party perception must have been similar to those of the NCP (Fourth Congress), the NCP (ML), and the NCP (NWPP), but its characterisation of China in the same coin seems to have been influenced by its negative assessment of Chinese socialist modernisation policies initiated in the 80s under the leadership of Hu Yaobang. Thereafter, it identifies the historical stage of Nepalese society as "semi-colonial and semi-feudal", where "the growth of capitalism was imminent" (94). In such circumstances, the Party decides to work for the speedy transformation of the society by "destroying the vestiges of medieval feudalism through an armed revolution under the leadership of the proletariat" (95). Such revolution was expected to destroy "the monarchy which stood for imperialism, feudalism, tout-bourgeoisie and the bureaucratic bourgeois classes; complete bourgeois democratic revolution and push the society towards socialism" (95). In such a revolution the Party feared the absence of the "leadership of the proletariat". The absence, it observed, would allow "the monarchy, in collusion with the Congress and other revisionist opportunists to enact the drama of proclaiming hypocritical reforms to effect an still born revolution as in 1950 and 1979/80" (95). And to pinpoint the enemy and the supportive forces of the revolution it points out that at that stage of Nepalese society "the reactionary camp (the monarchy, the Nepali Congress and the pro-King Rayamajhi) is poised against the Communist camp and there is no liberal

bourgeoisie in sight” (96). It identifies “the reactionary forces in collusion with the imperialists” especially “the Indian expansionists as enemy of Nepali nationalism (national integrity and sovereignty), which is in political and economic danger, and which is burdened under iniquitous treaties, border incursion and the migration of population from the south” (96). It foresees, “the imperialists, who work in the background, to turn into a stumbling block of the bourgeois democratic revolution, when its emigrants would create a political problem” (96). And though, its strategy digresses from the usual New Democratic strategy, yet its observation regarding the necessity of the leadership of the proletariat; its statements regarding the absence of liberal bourgeoisie, and the need for moving towards the accomplishment of bourgeois democratic revolution raises doubts regarding the clarity of its strategy. Why did the Party announce such a confusing strategy? There is no reasonable answer to the question, moreover its reading that the country was in the phase of rapid economic transformation was itself a farfetched understanding about the objective condition of the country, because the economic growth rate of the country in between the period 1960 to 1982 was -01% (Shaha 54).

Finally, offering reasons for the formation of the tactical unity and identifying the supportive forces—the Communist parties (it does not identify the classes), the Party perceives that they should come together to form a national force to carry on national struggle, so it states:

Today the Communist forces are splintered under the pall of doubts and machinations. These divided forces are by themselves weak and none of them by themselves are powerful enough to do anything. Each of them are struggling to maintain even their existence, but when they will unite then a national force would be created and such national force would be actively supported by the people. Then this force will be able to lead, in planned manner, the organisation of national struggle. So, at this phase of Nepalese bourgeois democratic revolution, tactical unity is the objective necessity (NCP, Hamra Mukhya Matbhedharu ... Lama Pakcha 96–7).

Since the above quoted paragraph follows the identification of the dangers to the nationalism of Nepal what catches the eye are the two phrases, they are ‘national force’ and ‘national struggle’ implying by it that the formation of the tactical unity

was necessary in the interest of the nationalism of Nepal. Moreover, when the Party states that such force would be actively supported by the people, the implications comes to light: this Party was also in favour of using nationalism as a bait to hook the support of the people, it was necessary for mobilising its forces.

1.10. Activities of NCP (Mashal (Mohan Bikram Gharti))

After the fragmentation, NCP (Mashal) held its 5th Congress in Ayodhya in between 1–16 Mangshir 2041(16 Nov to 1 Dec. 1984). In the Congress Surendra K.C states:

... as the General Secretary of the organising committee Com. Ranabahadur (Chitra Bahadur K. C) presented the Rajnitik Pratibedan [Political Proposal]. The Congress elected a ... 15 member Central Committee and a 5 member Politburo. In the latter body, the three full members were Mohan Baidhya [Kiran], Chitra Bahadur K.C and Khambasingh Kuwar; and its 2 alternative members were Bhaktabahadur Shrestha, Chandraprasad Gajurel (C.P Gajurel). Mohan Baidhya was elected as the General Secretary (K. C, Nepalma Communist Bhag 2 119).

In the Congress, the Party, NCP (Mashal), while explaining the slogans to be used clarified, though indirectly, that its strategy was to be the strategy advocated by the NCP (Kendriya Nucleus) transformed as the NCP (Fourth Congress [original]). The Party decided to hold on to two slogans, the slogan for the establishment of a 'patriotic-democratic Government' and the slogan of 'New Democratic Government'. Both these slogans were considered as strategic slogans for it stated:

Only armed peasant struggle can destroy monarchy, but today such condition is not present in the nation. So, under such situation, the slogan for the establishment of a Government of De. Ja. Sha. (*Deshbhakta Janatantrik Sarkar* [patriotic-democratic Government]) is not a tactical but a strategic slogan ... And until its realisation, it will be intact in all the circumstances ... we will, therefore, have two strategic slogans: one, the slogan for New Democratic Government and the other for De. Ja. Sha (NCP (Masal[Mashal]), "Party Ra Krantika ... Pachau Mahadhiwayshunma Parit" 251)..

To work for the establishment of 'patriotic-democratic Government' the Party banked on its leadership. It was to lead a united front of the "proletariat, peasants, students, women, teachers, intellectuals and all those representing the patriotic, democratic and left forces in the society" (277). However, after reviewing its functioning in the past,

the Party sought to change its tactics. It decided to focus on the propaganda movement for the establishment of New Democratic Government; work towards the establishment of peoples' army, and make preparation for armed struggle; focus on the creation of Revolutionary United front keeping in view the New Democratic strategy, and establish link with revolutionary movements of the world. In the absence of such tactics in the past, the Party felt that it had fallen into the 'bog of right opportunism' for it stated:

While reviewing the functioning of our Party in the past, we have to focus on some of our weaknesses. First, in the past our main emphasis was on the creation of a Government of *Deshbhakta Janatantrik* [patriotic-democratic] forces, while neglecting the propaganda movement for the New Democratic Government. Secondly, we focused only on peoples' movement at the cost of creating People's Army and preparing for armed struggle. Thirdly, we formed only tactical alliances focused on immediate issues neglecting the task of forging united front under the leadership of the Party with the proletariat -peasant unity.... Fourthly, we are far behind in nurturing our links with revolutionary movements of the world. Because of all these mistakes our Party, in the past, fell into the bog of right opportunism. We have to fight against this, and lead the Party towards the revolutionary path by removing our weaknesses (NCP (Masal[Mashal]), "Party Ra Krantika ... Pachau Mahadhiwayshunma Parit" 250).

Besides, the documents of the Party made two observations on problems related with the *Janajatis*. The first observation, while explaining why the *Janajatis*' problems remained unresolved throws light upon the class basis of the movement for it states: "Today the Party has failed to work among the *Janajatis*. The leaders of the Party are all Brahmins, Chettris and Newars and they represent either the higher or the middle class of the society, so the Party has failed to work significantly among the *Janajatis*" (NCP (Masal[Mashal]), "Party Ra Krantika ... Pachau Mahadhiwayshunma Parit" 271). The second observation is concerned with the relation between the problems of the various *Janajatis* and nationalism. On this relation, the Party states, "the problems of the various *Janajatis* are, in fact, the problems falling within the ambit of nationalism" (NCP (Masal[Mashal]), "Janajati ... Prastao" 287), this meant that if the problem of nationalism is resolved then the problems of the *Janajatis* are resolved. But when the argument is paraphrased the document fails to present a

coherent view. According to what is stated, there are two types of nationalism. The first type, advocated in the interest of the ruling class, rationalises inequality which is the outcome of an underdeveloped economy characterised by lack of industries; lack of communication facilities, and lack of development in education and language. Such nationalism is divisive. The other type, advocates the cause of the majority of the exploited lot and is the outcome of a developed economy. Therefore, “capitalist development” (287) is necessary to move from the first type of nationalism to the second type. Such nationalism is cohesive because it is based on “equality of opportunities” (288). However, the document warns, that in the progress towards the second type of nationalism the Party should desist from applying Lenin’s principle of “the right to self-determination which encourages the carving out of different states for the *Janajatis*”. This is because the principle is applicable only in resolving the problem of “nationalities” and not of *Janajatis*, which are “historical construction of human groups”. Finally, it says, “We should avoid all such perceptions which seek to divide one *Janajati* from another, the aim of our movement should, therefore, be to unite the *janajatis* on the basis of progress” (288). Thus, the logic of the argument, instead of proving that the problems of the *Janajatis* are due to the problem of nationalism proves that the problems of the *Janajatis* are related with the problem of development and that too capitalist development. Hence, the Party fails to prove its stand. However, for the narrative the argument is important in revealing how the Party wanted its form of nationalism to be perceived: it wanted it to be perceived as an ideal possessing an explanatory capability. Besides, the document rejects the application of Lenin’s right to self-determination in resolving the problems of the *Janajatis*. This rejection is important in view of the fact that the documents of the Fifth Congress provided the foundations on which the NCP (Maoist) were to base their strategy and tactics, but with a difference.

1.11.1. Split in NCP (Mashal): Formation of NCP (Masal) and NCP (Mashal (Baidhya Group))

In the days ahead, the Party, the NCP (Mashal) could not maintain its

cohesiveness. “For about a year after the Fifth Congress” it witnessed “intense Party struggle”, which “ended in the further fragmentation of the Party” (34). The inner party struggle, as recorded in the document of NCP (Mashal (Mohan Bikram Baidhya or Kiran faction]) was “intense because of two reasons”. “Firstly, the advocates of individual leadership were not at all ready to resolve their attack on Party centralism while remaining within the bounds of Party discipline. Secondly, they were raising issues already resolved in the fifth Congress” (NCP (Mashal) 35).

The above statements, except for the fact that it allows one to make a reasonable guess regarding the period when the fragmentation occurred (the split may have occurred in and around November/December 1985 because the Fifth Congress was held in December 1984), leave many questions unanswered. It does not indicate the persons responsible for launching attack against the Party Centre. Further, it does not tell the issues involved in the struggle. However, if one were to go by the resolution passed by the Baglung District Committee of the NCP (Masal) on 3 Kartik 2042 [October 19, 1985], then it is clear that the issues involved were political and organisational and the comrades attacking the Central committee were none other than the members of the yet to be born NCP (Masal), see the following page, for the resolution stated:

On 3 Kartik 2042 [October 19, 1985], the meeting of the Baglung District Committee reviewed the political and organisational mistakes committed by the Central committee since the holding of the fifth Congress. To end the near chaotic situation prevalent within the Party; to organise a revolutionary Party based on the principle of Marxism, Leninism and the thinking of Mao Zedong, and to rectify the worsening condition of the Party by removing the mistakes committed by the Central committee, we appeal all the comrades of different district committees and of other committees to come together ... In this period of crisis, we hope to receive the full support of all the comrades in preserving the revolutionary image of the Party (NCP (Masal[Mashal]), “Baglung Zilla Samitiko Prastao” 291).

If the political issues referred to the changes the Central committee had introduced in the Rajnaitik Pratibedan passed in the fifth Congress, the organisational issues referred to its method of functioning, which the Baglung District Committee

resolution judged as unconstitutional. However, before entering into the controversies it would be better here to take note of two facts:

- The Central committee of the NCP (Mashal) then was divided into majority/minority groups. “If the majority group was of Kiran [Mohun Bikram Baidhya], the minority was of Mohan Bikram [Singh/Gharti]”, and the fifth Congress document, the “Rajnitik Pratibedan” represented “Mohan Bikram Singh's line” (K. C, *Nepalma Communist Bhag 2* 122, 119). In the Congress it was placed by Chitra Bahadur KC [Ranabahadur], “a fast friend of Mohan Bikram Singh” (119).

- As reported in the resolution of the NCP (Mashal) “the Central committee meeting held immediately after the fifth Congress, in contravention with the decision of the Congress, had decided to enter into tactical alliance with Man Mohan and P. L [Pushpalal] at the Central level” (NCP (Masal[Mashal]), “Rajnitik Pratibedan Ma ... Parivartanbarey” 310).

With these facts in place, one is now in a position to understand the contention of the NCP (Mashal). Explaining why the Central committee introduced changes in the *Rajnitik Pratibedan* (Political Proposal), the NCP (Mashal) points out that behind the Central committee's action was its intention to rationalise its decision to ally with Man Mohan and P. L groups, and to prove that the past policy guidelines concerning the formation of united front and tactical alliance was a weakness in the decision of the fifth Congress. To make its point clear, it quotes the relevant paragraphs from the Rajnitik Pratibedan passed in the Congress and the changes introduced by the C.C. as follows:

In the Rajnitik Pratibedan, it was stated [in reference to the expulsion of Nirmal Lama Group]: “along with the rightists a sizeable section of honest comrades also left the Party damaging the Party significantly. Behind the happening, the slackness of the Party in exposing the rightists and the ultra-leftists in the context of the united front or tactical alliance controversy ... was also responsible to a large extent”. The above lines were changed [by the Central Committee] and expressed as: “a few friends went along with the rightists. As such, the Party suffered some damages and this was due to the slackness of the Party in dealing with the issue of united front and tactical alliance” (NCP (Masal[Mashal]), “Rajnitik Pratibedan Ma ... Parivartanbarey” 312).

After that the Party argues;

To explain the split, the decision of the Congress focuses on the slackness of the Party in exposing the rightists and the ultra-leftists. To explain the split, the changed version, focuses on the slackness of the Party in dealing with the issue of united front or tactical alliance.... Behind these changes their intention [the intention of the majority] was to emphasise on the necessity to forge alliance with the rightists. Further, the C.C had already taken the decision to combine with P. L and Man Mohan at the Central level. So to rationalise the decision they wanted to prove that the earlier policy regarding united front or tactical alliance was wrong ... A weakness in the decision of the fifth Congress... (NCP (Masal[Mashal]), "Rajnitik Pratibedan Ma ... Parivartanbarey" 312).

Besides, in the published form of the *Rajnitik Pratibedan* the Party points out that the C.C expunged the name of the Secretary, Chitra Bahadur K.C, the presenter of the Rajnitik Pratibedan, from the document to "lower the importance of the minority group" (311). As regards the unconstitutional functioning of the C.C, the Baglung District Committee resolution points out to 21 issues, where activities like "the C.C [Central Committee] taking disciplinary action against comrades without allowing them the chance to explain their position"; "the suppression of alternative views by the C.C", and "the suppression of inner party struggle and democracy by the C.C" are listed (NCP (Masal[Mashal]), "Baglung Zilla Samitiko Prastao" 293). Although these differences are proffered by the parties involved in explaining the reasons behind the split, yet when the two splits (the earlier split that led to the formation of NCP (Fourth Congress (Nirmal Lama faction)) and the present split are viewed comparatively there seems to be much more than what meets the eye.

In explaining the causes behind the split, the NCP (Fourth Congress (Nirmal Lama faction)) had forwarded similar objections against the Central committee of the NCP (Fourth Congress (original)), and even then the main issue was whether tactical alliance should be forged with the Man Mohan and the Pushpalal groups. The only difference between the present and the past splits was regarding the position of the parties involved in the altercation. Then it was the Nirmal Lama group (the minority) against Mohan Bikram Baidhya [Kiran] and Bhaktabahadur Shrestha [Shersingh] group (the majority) functioning under the direction of Mohan Bikram Singh

[Dumdum]. And in the present instance, it is the Mohan Bikram Singh group (the minority) against the Mohan Bikram Baidhya group (the majority). However, in both the cases the Party in the majority was linked with the name of Mohan Bikram Baidhya group. If in the split of the NCP (Fourth Congress (original)), as indicated by the document of the NCP (Fourth Congress (Nirmal Lama faction)), the Baidhya group was against the tactics of joining with the Man Mohan and the Pushpalal groups, the contrary stand of the Baidhya group was pointed as one of the causes behind the split in the NCP (Masal [Mashal]) by the Mohan Bikram Singh's group. Such change in the tactical position of the Baidhya⁸³ group, and that too within a period of one year asks for an explanation, but there are none. Hence, these splits lend credence to the belief that they were probably engineered to capture the Party leadership or better still they were probably the outcome of leadership struggle within the NCP (Mashal).

As a result, the NCP (Mashal) split into two factions: the NCP (Masal) and the NCP (Mashal). The Mohan Bikram Singh group held its fourth national conference in Gorakhpur (India) in Chaitra 2042 (March/April 1986); formed a 12 member Central Committee and a 3 member politburo consisting of Mohan Bikram, Chitrabahadur K.C and Ramsingh Srish. Mohan Bikram was elected as its General Secretary (K. C, *Nepalma Communist Bhag 2* 122). In the conference, it passed a document, *Madhyapanthi Awsharbadko Singhawalokan*, where the name of the Party was indicated as NCP (Masal). However, no document exists to substantiate the formal date regarding the formation of the Party under the Mohan Bikram Baidhya group. Possibly, it came into existence in Nov/Dec 1985 and as indicated by this group's later document it was named as NCP (Mashal). Thus by March/April 1986, the NCP (Kendriya Nucleus), which had begun its journey as one single Party in December 6,

⁸³ This seems to be the trend of the group where Mohan Bikram Baidhya is involved. Even in the split of NCP (Unity Centre) in 1994 and later in the fragmentation of NCP (Maoist) in 2013 the name of the same leader appears again and again.

1971, to bring together the splintered Communist parties was itself split into three factions: the NCP (Fourth Congress (Nirmal Lama faction)) under the leadership of Nirmal Lama, the NCP (Masal) under the leadership of Mohan Bikram Singh and the NCP (Mashal) under the leadership of Mohan Bikram Baidhya.

In the foregoing discussion, the strategy and tactics of the NCP (Fourth Congress (Nirmal Lama)) has already been dealt with. The NCP (Mashal (Mohan Bikram Baidhya)) declared that it was following the footsteps of the Fifth Congress while changing its tactics in the course of its evolution until 1990. Since, this was the Party, which was behind the evolution of the NCP (Maoist) in 1996 it is essential to survey the changes in the tactics, which the Party introduced in between the period 1985 to 1990. The next section of the narrative is therefore devoted to this end.

1.11.1. Strategy and Tactics of NCP (Mashal (Mohan Bikram Baidhya))

During the period 1985–1990, NCP (Mashal (Mohan Bikram Baidhya)) produced only one document, “*Rajnaitik Pratibedan: (Pachau Mahadhiwayshun Pachiko Pratham Rashtriya Sammelanma Parit)*”. It was passed in the first national conference of Kartik 2047 (October/November 1990). In it the Party presents a survey of its past activities. The survey begins with an opening line, where it states: “After the fifth Congress exactly 6 years have passed. Therefore, to assess how far we succeeded in carrying out the responsibilities handed over to us by the fifth Congress, we need to survey our past” (13). This implied that the Party recognised itself as a continuation of NCP (Mashal); hence it had accepted the fifth Congress’s strategy which was a continuation of the strategy of the NCP (Fourth Congress). Hence, as usual, its document of October/November 1990 identified the Nepalese society passing through the “feudal and semi-colonial” stage of historical development (24). In it the domestic enemies, “the feudal, the bureaucratic and the tout bourgeoisie were still in power”. The enemies without, as usual, were identified as “Indian expansionist and the weakened [Soviet union under Gorbachev] Soviet socialist imperialist” (10, 11). As such, the problem of “nationalism and democracy” were yet to be resolved (13). So the Party chooses the “New Democratic strategy” (22). In keeping with the

strategy, the Party tactics was similarly a rehash of the tactics of the NCP (Mashal) fixed by the fifth Congress: in its struggle it tagged the issues of nationalism and democracy. And if its slogans were aimed at propagandising new democracy, destroying the Panchayat system and for transferring power to the people, its activities opposed feudalism, imperialism, socialist imperialism and especially the Panchayat system and Indian expansionism characterised by its dictatorial stand. Besides, it focused on campaigns which sought to expose the rightists. And these tactics, according to the document, helped the Party to enhance its image among the people for it says:

During this period we tagged our struggle with the issue of nationalism and with issues concerned with the day to day problem of the society. Besides we also focused on the problems of professional organisations. We used those tactics which were in tune with the strategy forwarded by us and our slogans were also framed in the same perspective. While framing the strategy we have always emphasised upon a strong propaganda slogan for new democracy. Our tactical slogan which calls for the end of the Panchayat system and which demands the transfer of power to the people is a centralised slogan. In this period, firstly the strength of our struggles were centred on fighting against feudalism, imperialism, Socialist imperialism and especially the autocratic Panchayat system and Indian expansionism characterised by its dictatorial stand. Secondly, we fought against the wrong policies of the Nepali Congress. Thirdly, we paid special attention in exposing the rightists. Today the image of 'Mashal' has improved among the people and behind such improvement lies the role of these tactics (NCP (Mashal) 27).

And since the Party admitted that it intended to shoulder the responsibilities handed over to it by the fifth Congress, in its survey of the period, it identified "25 [tactical and organisational] responsibilities" (14). Out of these the survey focuses on those which were worked out in greater details. Considering the later evolution of the Party, the important ones, where it claims to have made important changes, are described below:

According to the Party, this period was used in developing a revolutionary line; in the 'proletarianising'⁸⁴ of the Party, in developing a collegiate leadership, in

⁸⁴ The document nowhere explains what this term meant to them. But, when

developing its workers, on deciding its position on elections, on the development of three weapons of revolution, and on deciding the process to be adopted in the management of *Janabargiya Sangathan* (professional organisations). While developing the revolutionary line, the Party observes that “its emphasis was on the development of class struggle at the village level; in readying itself for armed struggle and in developing a line against the parliamentary line” (22). This sort of line “focused on understanding the local conditions and on understanding how the constitutional and unconstitutional tactics could be coordinated with the tactics of counter attacks on the reactionaries”. These understandings were “then used to achieve local strategies”,⁸⁵ under the direct command of the “the Party centre” (17). While dealing with the issue of ‘proletarianising’ the Party, it felt that “it was extremely important to weed out the influences of non-Marxist thinking on personal property and family in the Party”, as such it says that it “organised programmes to sanitise the Party of all rightist and petty bourgeois thinking” (22). However, on the issue of developing collegiate leadership the Party observed that during this phase “it understood the importance of such leadership, but while implementing it the Party was faced with a situation where the demand for absolute equality among the leadership was raised” (23). Then it points out, that “a revolutionary Party needs to respect a leader” and observes that so far “it has failed in resolving the contradictions

this faction fragmented in 1994 and when another faction NCP (Unity Centre) emerged under Nirmal Lama then the document of the Nirmal Lama faction explains what the term meant to them. See, NCP (Unity Centre) 18–23 ‘Proletarianisation’ meant three things. Proletarianisation of outlook and thinking, to struggle and to be one with the interest of the proletariat and to apply proletariat revolutionary outlook in all aspects of life. All these, essentially meant sloughing off individual ambitions, embracing proletarian value (which is not explained) in every facet of life and to be ready for class struggle. Therefore, this term was used to convey the idea of de-classed activists.

⁸⁵ These were put into effect in Rolpa and Rukum when this group formed NCP (Unity Centre) in 1991.

between the two positions” i.e., the demand for equality and the need for a respected leader (24). While developing Party workers, the document observes that it focused on “taking care about the workers and in solving the problems of their families”, besides this it “sought to develop their ideological and political understanding and in developing their organisational skills”. As a result, the document observes that “new leaders are emerging in the Party” (24). On the issue of elections, the Party does not seem to have developed a clear line. At one point it raises it to the level of strategy and rejects participation in elections and at the other level, it indulges in a linguistic rigmarole, which gives it the license to participate in elections for it states:

On considering the nature of Nepalese revolution, which is bound to be characterised by protracted peoples’ war, and for which preparations are needed from the beginning, the question of participating in elections is ruled out. Besides, we have reached a conclusion that our past tactics of active boycott of elections was the mechanical copying of Lenin’s tactics, which was suitable in the context of Russia. In short, in a country like ours the question of election assumes strategic importance. Hence, it is appropriate [in the Nepalese context] that the boycott movement should be adapted to the situation of the nation (25).

On the development of three weapons of revolution viz., revolutionary Communist Party, leadership of revolutionary united front and Peoples’ Army the Party observes that it reached the conclusion that for “accomplishing the New Democratic revolution ... the absence of even one of the weapons would make the revolution a distant cry” (25). Finally, it points out that during the period it reached the conclusion that “all its *Janabargiya Sangathan* (professional organisations) should be centrally managed” (26).

However, these changes, which the Party describes, are just in the nature of descriptions. As such, they leave many questions unanswered raising further questions, and even on a few issues where the Party tries to explain the changes, the explanations are vague. Therefore, it fails to enrich the analytical content of the narrative, but the description throws some light on the path followed by a faction, which, in future, was destined to lead a revolution.

1.12. Tactics of NCP (Masal) Mohan Bikram Singh/Gharti

The strategy of the Party, as indicated, was the continuation of the strategy of the NCP (Mashal)—it aimed at establishing new democracy. In 1989, the Party tactics was to move forward with a seven point programme. The programmes were:

1. To end the despotic Panchayat system and to transfer power to the people.
2. To achieve total political freedom for the people.
3. To end the ban on political parties.
4. To end the ban on fundamental rights.
5. To demand for the release of political prisoners.
6. To end the 1950 treaty and all unjust treaties related to it.
7. To fight for two separate treaties on trade and transit between India and Nepal, and to demand transit facilities as per international law (NCP (Masal), “Rajnitik Prastao 2046 [December/January 1989]” 372–3).

However, in order to carry out the struggle for achieving its programmes the Party decided to form a united front. But; according to its document, the united front was to be “strategic united front” (373). By this, it meant a class based front formed under the Party leadership. Thus, at the close of 1989, all Communist factions were thinking in line of destroying the Panchayat system and in establishing democracy.

Works Cited

- Adhikari, Bharat Mohan. "Com. Pushpalal, Samjhanaka Kehi Chanharu." Nepal-Patra: Nepal Communist Partyko Kendriya Mukhpatra (Pushpalal Smriti Anka). Bulletin No. 1. Np: Nepal-Patra Prakashan Board, VS 2047 Srawan 15 [30 July 1990]. 76–9.
- Kun bato?
- Amatya, Tulsilal. Nepal Communist Andolanma Dekhapareka Matbhedharu. Np: Nepal Communist Party, 1975, Dec. 12.
- . Janabadi Kranti Ya Sansodhanbad? Kathmandu: NCP, 1966, Sept. 15.
- Antar Zone Samanjasya Samiti. Nepal Communist Partyko Tamam Party Sadasyaharulai Appeal. Np: Antar Zonal Committee, VS 2018 Falgun 25 [7 February 1962].
- Bhandari, Hemraj and Arun Baral. "Kasari Bhayo Jhapa Bidroha?" Mahima 20 (Mar. 29 VS 2057 Chait 16 [29 March 2001]): 3.
- Communist Samparka Samiti (Nepal). Ratojhanda: Communist Ekta Samparka Samiti (Nepal) Ko Saidhantik Patra. Np: Np, VS 2031 Bhadra 31[16 September 1974].
- Devkota, Grishmabahadur. Nepalko Rajnitik Darpan. Kathmandu: Dhurbabahadur Devkota, VS 2036 [1979/80].
- Dixit, Maheshmani. "Nepal Communist Partyka Pratham Mahasachiv Pushpalal Shresthako Ek Prarambhik Charcha." Naya Janabad 3 (VS 2052 Srawan 15 [31 July 1995]): 83–6.
- Fajardo, Juan, trans. "Statement of 81 Communist and Workers Parties Meeting in Moscow, USSR, 1960."
- Gupta, Anirudha. Politics in Nepal: A Study of Post-Rana Political Developments and Party Politics. Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1964.
- Jatiya Janatantrik Samyuktamorcha. "Jatiya Janatantrik Samyuktamorcha Ko Ghoshna Patra." VS 2008/3/23 [7 July 1951]. Pushpalal Chaneyeka Rachanaharu: Bhag 4. 1, _ ed. Comp. Pushpalal Smriti Pratisthan. Kathmandu: Pushpalal Smriti Pratisthan, VS 2055 Srawan 7 [July 23, 1998]. 61–71.
- Joshi, Bhuwan Lal and Leo E Rose. Democratic Innovations in Nepal: A Case Study of Political Acculturation. Berkeley: U of California P, 1966.
- K. C., Surendra. "Jatiya Andolanma Nepal Communist Party: (1951, September 27-October 2, Samma Calcuttama Ayojit NeKaPako Pratham Aitihisik Sammelanma Pushpalaldwara Prastut Tatha Parit Rajnaitik Pratibedan)." Appendix. Nepalma Communist Andolanko Itihas. Kathmandu: Vidyarthi Pustak Bhandar, VS 2056 Bhadra [August 1999]. 201–13. VS2056 Baisakh [April 1999].

- . “Nepal Communist Partyko Karyakram: (1954, January 26–30 Samma Patanma Ayojit Partyko Pratham Mahadhiwayshunma Party Mahasachiv Manmohan Adhikaridwara Prastut Tatha Parit Karyakram).” Appendix. Nepalma Communist Andolanko Itihas: Bhag 1. Kathmandu: Vidyarthi Pustak Bhandar, VS Bhadra 2056 [August 1999]. 227–37. 1999, Apr.
- K. C, Surendra. Nepalma Communist Andolanko Itihas (Bhag 2). Kathmandu: Vidyarthi Pustak Bhandar, VS 2060 [2003/04].
- . Nepalma Communist Andolanko Itihas (Pahilo Bhag). 2, _ ed. Kathmandu: Vidyarthi Pustak Bhandar, VS Bhadra 2056 [August 1999]. VS Baisakh 2056 [April 1999].
- Khatri, Anand Bahadur, pseud for Mohan Bikram Singh. Gaddhar Pushpalal. Birbas, Nepal: Rato Tarwar Prakashan, VS 2030 [1973/74].
- NCP (Chautho Mahadhiwayshun (Fourth Congress)). “Kranti Ra Partyka Tatkalik Samasyaharu: (VS 2031 Salma Asadma Varanasima Sampanna Chautho Mahadhiwayshunma Kendriya Nucleuska Secretary Com. Mohan Bikram Singhdwara Prastut Ra Parit Rajnitik Paratibedanko Rajnitik Khandu).” VS 2031 Asad [June/July 1974]. Rato Tarwar: Dastabeja Bisheshanka. 1, _ ed. Kathmandu: Nepal Communist Party (Masal), Kendriya Karyalaya, VS 2059 Sravan [July/August 2002]. 36–80.
- . “Partyko Sankat Ra Baidhaniktako Prasna: (Alpamat Pakshalay Kendriya Samitiko Bighatan Garaunuko Udeshya Ke Ho?).” VS 2040 Aswin 14 [30 September 1983]. Rato Tarwar: Dastabeja Bisheshanka. 1, _ ed. Kathmandu: Nepal Communist Party, Kendriya Karyalaya, Asthayi Kendriya Samiti, VS 2059 Sravan [July/August 2002]. 178–82.
- . “Rajnitik Singhawalokan: (2036 Sal Pausma Nepal Communist Party Chautho Kendriya Samitiko Chaudhau Baithakdwara Parit).” VS 2036 Paus [Dec/Jan 1979/80]. Rato Tarwar: Dastabeja Bisheshanka. 1, _ ed. Kathmandu: Nepal Communist Party (Masal), Kendriya Karyalaya, VS 2059 Sravan [July/August 2002]. 91–105.
- . “Rajnitik Pratibedan: (2038 Salko Asadma Ayodhyama Sampanna Ne. Ka. Pa Chautho Kendriya Samitiko Pahilo Bistarit Baithakma Mahamantri Com. Bhaktabahadur Shresthadwara Parit).” VS 2038 Asad. Rato Tarwar: Dastabeja Bisheshanka. 1, _ ed. Kathmandu: Nepal Communist Party (Masal), Kendriya Karyalaya, VS 2059 Sravan [July/August 2002]. 143–58.
- NCP (Ekta Kendra (Unity Centre)). “Rajnitik Pratibedan: Nepal Communist Party (Ekta Kendr) Pratham Rastriya Sammelan-2054 Asaddwara Parit.” Kathmandu: Kendriya Prakashan Bibhag, Ne. Ka. Pa (Ekta Kendra), VS 2054 Asad [June/July 1997].
- NCP (Kendriya Nucleus). “Deshko Rajnitik Shaktiharuko Bislayshun: (2028 Sal Mangshirma Gathit Nepal Communist Partyko Kendriya Nucleusdwara Parit).” VS 2028 Mangshir. Rato Tarwar: Dastabeja Bisheshanka. 1, _ ed. Kathmandu: Nepal

- Communist Party (Masal), Kendriya Karyalaya, VS 2059 Sravan [July/August 2002]. 18–29.
- . “Nepal Communist Partybhitra Dekha Pareyka Bhadkauharu: (2028 Sal Mangshirma Gathit Nepal Communist Partyko Kendriya Nucleusdwara Parit).” VS 2028 Mangshir. Rato Tarwar: Dastabeja Bisheshanka. 1, _ ed. Kathmandu: Nepal Communist Party (Masal), Kendriya Karyalaya, VS 2059 Sravan [July/August 2002]. 30–5.
- . “Tatkalik Rajnaitik Prastao: (2028 Sal Mangshirma Gathit Nepal Communist Partyko Kendriya Nucleusdwara Parit).” VS 2028 Mangshir. Rato Tarwar: Dastabeja Bisheshanka. 1, _ ed. Kathmandu: Nepal Communist Party (Masal), Kendriya Karyalaya, VS 2059 Sravan [July/August 2002]. 6–11.
- NCP (Manandhar). Ne.Ka.Pa Ko Rajnitik Karyako Sambandhama Pachau Mahadhiwayshunko Nirdayshun (2038, Tikapur). Kathmandu: Np, VS 2038 [1981/82].
- NCP (Masal[Mashal]). “Chautho Mahadhiwayshunbhitra Dekhapareyko Dakshinpanthi Awsarbadko Singhawalokan: (2040 Salma Gorakhpurma Sampanna Tesro Rastriya Sammelan-Chautho Mahadhiwayshunpachiko Pratham Sammelan-Dwara Parit).” VS 2040 [1983/84]. Rato Tarwar: Dastabeja Bisheshanka. 1, _ ed. Kathmandu: Nepal Communist Party (Masal), Kendriya Karyalaya, VS 2059 Sravan [July/August 2002]. 183–94.
- . “Janjati Tatha Dalit Jatisambandhi Prastao: (2041 Sal Mangshirma Ayodhyama Sampanna Ne. Ka. Pa (Masal) Ko Pachau Mahadhiwayshundwara Swikrit).” VS 2041 Mangshir [Nov/Dec 1984]. Rato Tarwar: Dastabeja Bisheshanka. 1, _ ed. Kathmandu: Nepal Communist Party (Masal), Kendriya Karyalaya, VS 2059 Sravan [July/August 2002]. 286–90.
- . “Ne. Ka. Pa (Masal) Baglung Zilla Samitiko Prastao: (Pachau Mahadhiwayshundekehi Ahilaysamma Kendriya Samitilay Gareyka Rajnaitik Tatha Sangathanatmak Galti Kamjoriharubata Partylai Pugna Gayeko Gambhir Chatika Sambandhama 2042 Sal Kartikma Baglung Zilla Samitilay Parit Gari Kendriya Karyalayama Bodartha Didai Aru Zillaharulai Preshit Prastao).” VS 2042 Kartik 3 [19 October 1985]. Rato Tarwar: Dastabeja Bisheshanka. 1, _ ed. Kathmandu: Nepal Communist Party (Masal), Kendriya Karyalaya, VS 2059 Sravan [July/August 2002]. 291–5.
- . “Party Ra Krantika Tatkalik Niti Ra Karyaharu: (Ne. Ka. Pa (Masal) Ko 2041 Ma Ayodhyama Sampanna Pachau Mahadhiwayshunma Parit Tatkalik Rajnitik Prastao).” VS 2041[1984/85]. Rato Tarwar: Dastabeja Bisheshanka. 1, _ ed. Kathmandu: Nepal Communist Party (Masal), Kendriya Karyalaya, VS 2059 Sravan [July/August 2002]. 220–85.
- . “Rajnaitik Pratibedan: (2041 Salma Ayodhyama Sampanna Ne. Ka. Pa (Masal) Ko Pachau Mahadhiwayshunma Kendriya Sangathan Samitika Mahamantri Com.

- Chitrabhadur K. C. Dwara Prastut Ra Parit).” VS 2041 [1984/85]. Rato Tarwar: Dastabeja Bisheshanka. 1, _ ed. Kathmandu: Nepal Communist Party (Masal), Kendriya Karyalaya, VS 2059 Sravan [July/August 2002]. 195–219.
- . “‘Rajnitik Pratibedan’ Ma Gareyka Parivartanbarey: (2042 Sal Kartikma Gorakhpurma Chaliraheko Pachau Kendriya Samitiko Baithakma Com. Chitrabhadur K. C., Com. Bhairav Regmi, Com. Govind Singh Thapadwara Prastut Prastao).” VS 2042 Kartik. Rato Tarwar: Dastabeja Bisheshanka. 1, _ ed. Kathmandu: Nepal Communist Party (Masal), Kendriya Karyalaya, VS 2059 Sravan [July/August 2002]. 309–18.
- NCP (Masal). “Patryko Janma Diwas Barey Ne. Ka. Pa Ko Politburolay Nimna Likhit Baktabya Pesh Gareyko Cha.” Barsha 5, Anka 1, VS 2034 [1977/78]. Rato Tarwar: Dastabeja Bisheshanka. 1, _ ed. Kathmandu: Nepal Communist Party (Masal), Kendriya Karyalaya, VS 2059 Sravan [July/August 2002]. 804–5.
- . “Tatkalik Rajnitik Prastao: (2046 Sal Pausma Gorakhpurma Sampanna Ne. Ka. Pa (Masal) Ko Pachau Mahadhiwayshun Pachiko Kendriya Sangathan Samitiko Dwitiya Bistarit Baithakma Parit).” VS 2046 Paus [December/January 1989]. Rato Tarwar: Dastabeja Bisheshanka. 1, _ ed. Kathmandu: Nepal Communist Party (Masal), Kendriya Karyalaya, VS 2059 Sravan [July/August 2002]. 370–4.
- NCP (Mashal). Pratham Rastriya Sammelanka Rajnaitik Dastabejharu:(Pachau Mahadhiwayshun Pachiko Pratham Rastriya Sammelanma Prastut Awam Parit). Np: Kendriya Karyalaya, Nepal Communist Party (Mashal), VS 2047 Kartik [Oct/Nov 1990].
- NCP (ML). “Aja Paschatap Garnay Din Hoyena Aagoko Jwala Jhai Dankeyera Uthnay Din Ho.” VS 24 Falgun 2029 [7 March 1973]. Hamra Kehi Chaneaka Rachanaharu. Np: Kendriya Committee, NCP [ML], VS 11 Paus 2035 [26 December 1978]. 1–5.
- . “Akhil Nepal Communist Krantikari Co-Ordination Committee (ML) Ko Ghoshna.” Hamra Kehi Chaneaka Rachanaharu. Np: Kendriya Committee, NCP [ML], VS 11 Paus 2035 [26 December 1978]. 67–71.
- . “Deshbharika Marxbadi Leninbadi Communist Krantikariharusanga Hamro Appeal.” VS 14 Jestha 2031 [27 May 1974]. Hamra Kehi Chaneaka Rachanaharu. Np: Kendriya Committee, NCP [ML], VS 11 Paus 2035 [26 December 1978]. 33–41.
- . “Dhakka Khanu Awashyakta Cha.” VS 20 Magh 2030 [2 February 1974]. Hamra Kehi Chaneaka Rachanaharu. Np: Kendriya Committee, NCP [ML], VS 11 Paus 2035 [26 December 1978]. 11–21.
- . Facist Nirdaliya Panchayati Byawastha Biruddha Sabai Rupka Sampurna Prahar Kendrit Gara! Np: Kendriya Committee, NCP (ML), VS 7 Falgun 2036 [19 March 1980].
- . “Janatako Agadi Gaddar Charitraharu ko Bhandafor Gara, Navjawan Krantikariharuka Kamlai Samarthan Gara.” VS 17 Bhadra 2031 [2 September 1974]. Hamra Kehi

- Chaneaka Rachanaharu. Np: Kendriya Committee, NCP [ML], VS 11 Paus 2035 [26 December 1978]. 42–8.
- . “‘Janmat Sangraha’ Kalka Party Nitiharuko Mulyankan.” VS 2042 Paus 11 [December 14, 1985]. Bigatka Anubhavaharuko Singhawalokan [1]. Np: Barga Sangharsha Prakashan, VS 2043 Kartik [October/November 1986]. 1–25.
- . “Jhapa Zillako Sasatra Kisan Sangharshalai Dhwangsha Garnay Pratikriyabadiharuka Hingsatmak Karwahilai Jawaf Diwau.” VS 1 Bhadra 2030 [17 September 1973]. Hamra Kehi Chaneaka Rachanaharu. Np: Kendriya Committee, NCP [ML], VS 11 Paus 2035 [26 December 1978]. 6–10.
- . Nepal Communist Party (Marxbadi-Leninbadi) Ka Rajnaitik Prastao: (Partykay Pratham Rastriya Sammelan VS 2035 Paus 11–17 [26 December 1978- 1 January 1979] Dwara Parit). Np: Np, n.d.
- . “Nepali Krantiko Bartaman Karyakram: [Nepal Communist Party (Marxbadi-Leninbadi) Ko Kendriya Committee Dwara 25–30 August 1989 (9–14 Bhadau 2046) Ma Ayojit Nepal Communist Partyko Chautho Rastriya Mahadhiwayshundwara Parit].” Chautho Rastriya Mahadhiwayshundwara Parit Dastabejharu: Rajnitik Pratibedan Nepali Krantiko Bartaman Karyakram. Kathmandu: Kendriya Committee, NCP (ML), VS 2046 [1989]. 1–60.
- . “Rajnitik Pratibedan: [Nepal Communist Party (Marxbadi-Leninbadi) Ko Kendriya Committee Dwara 25–30 August 1989 (9–14 Bhadau 2046) Ma Ayojit Nepal Communist Partyko Chautho Rastriya Mahadhiwayshundwara Parit].” Chautho Rastriya Mahadhiwayshundwara Parit Dastabejharu: Rajnitik Pratibedan Nepali Krantiko Bartaman Karyakram. Kathmandu: Kendriya Committee, NCP (ML), VS 2046 [1989]. 1–122.
- . “Sampurna Bhramharu Milkau, Turunta Kisan Janatasanga Sambandha Gara, Barga-Sangharshalai Aagadi Badau Ra Samrajyabadi Sadyantra Tatha Aakramanko Mukabila Garnay Sakti Jamma Gara!” VS 6 Chaitra 2030 [19 April 1974]. Hamra Kehi Chaneaka Rachanaharu. Np: Kendriya Committee, NCP [ML], VS 11 Paus 2035 [26 December 1978]. 22–32.
- . “Sansodhanbadko Khandan Gardai Kisanko Sashastra Guerrilla Sangharsa Bikas Garau.” VS 30 Jestha 2032 [13 June 1976]. Hamra Kehi Chaneaka Rachanaharu. Np: Kendriya Committee, NCP [ML], VS 11 Paus 2035 [26 December 1978]. 74–9.
- . “Vichardharatmak Ra Rajnitik Karyadisha Sahi Ya Galat Hunulay Nai Sabai Kurako Nirnai Garcha.” 14 Jestha 2032 [28 May 1975]. Hamra Kehi Chaneaka Rachanaharu. Np: Kendriya Committee, NCP [ML], VS 11 Paus 2035 [26 December 1978]. 58–66.
- NCP (Nepal Majdoor Kisan Party). Nepal Majdoor-Kisan Party : (Sansodhan Sahit) 2047 Bidhan. Bhaktapur: Nepal Majdoor-Kisan Party, Kendriya Karyalaya, VS 2047 [1990/91].

- . Nepal Majdoor-Kisan Party: Nirvachan Ghoshna-Patra 2056. Bhaktapur: Nepal Majdoor-Kisan Party, Kendriya Chunao Prachar Samiti, VS 2056 [1999].
- . Nepalko Communist Andolanma Nepal Majdoor-Kisan Partyko Bhumika. Morang: Nepal Majdoor-Kisan Party, Zilla Samiti, Morang, 2055.
- NCP (Pushpalal). Kewal Party Samitisamma Matra: Circular No. 1/3. Np: Np, n.d.
- . “Naya Janabadi Karyakram: (Nepali Krantiko Ekmatra Mulbato) Bharatko Gorakhpurma Ayojit Tesro Aitihāsik Sammelanma Parit.” VS 2026 Aswin [June/July 1969]. Pushpalal Chaneyeka Rachanaharu: Bhag 1. 1, _ ed. Comp. Madan-Asrit Smriti Pratisthan. Kathmandu: Madan-Asrit Smriti Pratisthan, Nepal, VS 2053 Jeth [May/June 1996]. 234–307.
- . “Nepal Communist Partyko Atharaha Barshako Krantikari Sangharshako Singhawalokan Awam Siksha: (2025 Jestha Gorakhpurma Sampanna Bhayeko Tesro Aitihāsik Sammelandwara Parit).” VS 2025 Mangsir [November 1968]. Pushpalal Chaneyeka Rachana: Bhag 3. Comp. Pushpalal Smriti Pratisthan. Kathmandu: Pushpalal Smriti Pratisthan, n.d. 1–98.
- . Nepal Communistpartyko Tesro Sammelanko Aitihāsik Mahatwa: (Yo Nepal Communistpartyko Kendriya Sangathan Samitika Mantri Com. Pushpalaldwara Presit Tatha Tesro Sammelandwara Parit Report Ho). Varanasi: Pushpalal, VS 2026 Bhadra [September 1969].
- . Rajnitik Report [Sept/Oct 1972]:(Nepal Communist Partyko Akhil Nepal Chaturtha Sammelanma Kendriya Samitiko Tarfabata Mahamantri Com. Pushpalal Dwara Presit Tatha Ukta Sammelan Dwara Parit). 2, _ ed. Kathmandu: Kendriya Samiti, Nepal Communist Party, 1986, Jan. 26. 1972, Sept./Oct.
- . Rajnitik Report: 2043 [Nepal Communist Partyko Chaitau Rastriya Sammelanma Chaitra 14 Gatay Dekhi 19 Gatay 2043 [March 28–31, 1987] Samma Bhayeko Kendriya Samyojak Samitiko Tarfabata Com. Sahana Pradhandwara Presit Ra Ukta Sammelandwara Parit]. Varanasi: Nepal Communist Party, VS 2043 [1987].
- . A Report on Nepal’s Political Situation: [As Adopted by Central Plenum, NCP]. Np: Central Secretariat, Nepal Communist Party, 1986, Jan. 17.
- . Report on the Current Situation in Nepal and the Activities of the Nepal Communist Party. Np: Central Secretariat, Nepal Communist Party, 1984, June 20.
- NCP (Rayamajhi). Nepal Communist Partyko Karya: (Nepal Communist Partyko Chaturtha Mahadhiwayshun Dwara Parit). Np: Kendriya Karyalaya, Ne. Ka. Pa, n.d.
- . Tesro Sammelanma Pesh Gariyeko Report. Np: Np, VS 2021 [1964/65]. Typed.
- NCP (Unity Centre). “The Communist Movement of Nepal :(From the Political Report Adopted by the 1st National Convention (1997) of Communist Party of Nepal (Unity Centre)).” On the Communist Movement of Nepal and the Strategy and Tactics of Nepali Revolution. Np: Central Department of Publication, CPN (Unity Centre), 1998, Oct. 5–25.

- NCP (Verma). Ajako Hamro Karya. Kathmandu: Nepal Communist Party [Verma], Kendriya Prachar Samiti, VS 2047 [1990/91].
- NCP. “Communist Partyko Chunao Ghoshna-Patra (2015 Salko Am Nirvachanma Party-Mahasachiv Dr. Kesharjung Rayamajhidwara Likhit Tatha Partydwara Jari Ghoshna-Patra).” Appendix-5. Comp. Surendra K. C. Nepalma Communist Andolanko Itihas: Bhag 1. Kathmandu: Vidyarthi Pustak Bhandar, VS Bhadra 2056 [August 1999]. 255–64. 1999, Apr.
- . Hamra Mukhya Matbhedharu Ra Party Phutka Karanharu: (Pratham Rastriya Sammelandwara Parit Pratibedan) Nirmal Lama Pakcha. Np: Np, VS2040 Chaitra [March/April 1984].
- . Hamro Mul Bato. By Gurung. Np: Np, n.d.
- . Manifesto of the Communist Party of Nepal. Np: Np, n.d. Typed.
- . “More on Raimajhi’s Anti-Party Activities.” 26 July 1963. Report of the Third Executive (Extended) Committee of the Communist Party of Nepal. 1, _ ed. Varanasi: Puspa Lal, 1963, Aug. 1. 19–20.
- . “Nagarik Swatantrata Sampurna Bargalai Awasyakta-Ataha Krantikari Nagarik Swatantrata Samiti Banaw!” VS 2006 Baisakh 10 [22 April 1949]. Pushpalal Chaneyeka Rachanaharu: Bhag 1. 1, _ ed. Comp. Nepal Madan-Asrit Smriti Pratisthan. Kathmandu: Madan-Asrit Smriti Pratisthan, Nepal, VS 2053 [1996]. 45–51.
- . “Naya Janabadko Nimti Nepali Janatako Bato: (Nepal Communist Partyko Pratham Aitihashik Sammelan VS 2008 [1951/52] Ma Com. Pushpalaldwara Preshit Ra Ukta Sammelandwara Parit Karyakram Ra Niti).” VS 2008 [1951/52]. Pushpalal Chaneyeka Rachanaharu: Bhag 4. 1, _ ed. Comp. Pushpalal Smriti Pratisthan. Kathmandu: Pushpalal Smriti Pratisthan, VS 2055 Srawan 7 [July 23, 1998]. 1–17.
- . Nepal Communist Partyko Bidhan: Tiritiya Mahadhiwayshundwara Sansodhit. Varanasi: NCP, VS 2019 Baisakh 4–15 [16–27 April 1962].
- . Nepal Communist Partyko Karyaniti: (Pratham Party Congressdwara Swikrit). Np: Np, VS 2010, 17 Magh [January 26–30, 1954].
- . Nepal Communist Partyko Tatkalik Karyaniti: Karyanitima Parinat Kina? (Yo Karyaniti 2020 Sal Baisakh Mahinama Baseko Rastriya Karyakarini Samitika Bistarit Baithakdwara Pass Bhaeko). Np: NCP, VS 2020 Baisakh [April/May 1963].
- . Rajnaitik Prastao. Np: NCP, VS 2020 Baisakh [April/May 1963].
- . Rajnitik Prastao: (Com. Tulsi Lal Amatya, Mantri, Antar Zone-Samanjasya Samiti Dwara Presit Ra Tiritiya Mahadhiwayshundwara Parit) 2019 Baisakh 4 Gatay Dekhi 15 Gataysamma [16–27 April 1962]. Varanasi: Np, 1962.
- . Rastriya Parisadko Baithakma Kendriya Mantriparisadlay Peshgareko Pratibedan. Np: Np, n.d. Typed.

- . Rastriya Prajatantra Nepali Mulbato: Nepal Communist Partyko Pachau Rastriya Mahadhiwayshundwara Swikrit. Np: NCP, VS 2040 [1983/84].
- . Report of the Third Executive (Extended) Committee of the Communist Party of Nepal. 1, _ ed. Varanasi: Puspa Lal, 1963, Aug. 1. 1–13.
- Pushpalal. “Nepali Jana-Andolanko Ek Samiksha.” Pushpalal Chaneyeka Rachanaharu: Bhag 1. 1, _ ed. Kathmandu: Madan-Asrit Smriti Pratisthan, VS 2053 Jeth 3 [16 May 1996]. 151–232.
- . Nepalma Communist Andolanko Sangchipta Itihas. Kathmandu: Pushpalal Smriti-Pratisthan, VS 2053 Srawan [July/August 1996].
- . “Paus Ek Gatayko Ghatna Sambandhi Bykhya.” Pushpalal: Chaneyeka Rachanaharu Bhag 2. Kathmandu: Pushpalal Smriti Pratisthan, VS 2054 Baisakh [April/May 1997]. 21–9.
- Ram, Rajendra. Pushpalal: The Founder of the Communist Party of Nepal, 1925–1978. Patna: Janabharati Prakashan, nd.
- Rawal, Bhim. Nepalma Samyabadi Andolanko Udbhav Ra Bikash. 2, _ ed. Kathmandu: Pairavi Prakashan, VS Paus 2047 [Dec/Jan 1990/91].
- Rohit, Com. “Antarastriya Kurabarey.” Nepalko Communist Andolanma Dekhapareyka Khota Vicharharuko Khandan. 2, _ ed. Bhaktapur: Nepal Majdoor Kisan Party, Kendriya Prakashan Samiti, VS 2055 Magh 10 [24 Jan. 1999]. 12–16. 1976, Sept. 1.
- . “Chunaoma Bhag Linay Prashnama.” Nepalko Communist Andolanma Dekhapareyka Khota Vicharharuko Khandan. 2, _ ed. Bhaktapur: Nepal Majdoor Kisan Party, Kendriya Prakashan Samiti, VS 2055 Magh 10 [24 Jan. 1999]. 32–38. 1976, Sept. 1.
- . “Hamra Satruharu Ko Hun Ra Hamra Mitraharu Ko Hun?” Nepalko Communist Andolanma Dekhapareyka Khota Vicharharuko Khandan. 2, _ ed. Bhaktapur: Nepal Majdoor Kisan Party, Kendriya Prakashan Samiti, VS 2055 Magh 10 [24 Jan. 1999]. 4–11. 1976, Sept. 1.
- . “Ke Ekchoti Ewata Matra Satruko Birodh Garnay Ho?” Nepalko Communist Andolanma Dekhapareyka Khota Vicharharuko Khandan. 2, _ ed. Bhaktapur: Nepal Majdoor Kisan Party, Kendriya Prakashan Samiti, VS 2055 Magh 10 [24 Jan. 1999]. 21–23. 1976, Sept. 1.
- . “Ke Hamilay Pratikriyabadi Sangh-Sansthabhitra Kam Garnuhuncha?” Nepalko Communist Andolanma Dekhapareyka Khota Vicharharuko Khandan. 2, _ ed. Bhaktapur: Nepal Majdoor Kisan Party, Kendriya Prakashan Samiti, VS 2055 Magh 10 [24 Jan. 1999]. 28–31. 1976, Sept. 1.
- . “Kranti: Sasastra Wa Shantipurna?” Nepalko Communist Andolanma Dekhapareyka Khota Vicharharuko Khandan. 2, _ ed. Bhaktapur: Nepal Majdoor Kisan Party, Kendriya Prakashan Samiti, VS 2055 Magh 10 [24 Jan. 1999]. 46–49. 1976, Sept. 1.

- . "Party Karyakramko Sambandhama." Nepalko Communist Andolanma Dekhapareyka Khota Vicharharuko Khandan. 2, _ ed. Bhaktapur: Nepal Majdoor Kisan Party, Kendriya Prakashan Samiti, VS 2055 Magh 10 [24 Jan. 1999]. 1–3. 1976, Sept. 1.
- . Russi-Sansodhanbad Samajik Samrajyabadma Patan. Kathmandu: Yuva Adhyayan Gosthi, VS 2049 Bhadra [Sept. 1992]. VS 2032 Asad 6 [20 June 1975].
- Scalapino, Robert A., ed. The Communist Revolution in Asia; Tactics, Goals, and Achievements. Ed. Robert A. Scalapino. Englewood Cliffs: N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1965.
- Shaha, Rishikesh. Three Decades and Two Kings (1960–1990): Eclipse of Nepal's Partyless Monarchic Rule. New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1990.
- . Modern Nepal: A Political History, 1785–1955. New Delhi: Manohar, 1996. 1990.
- Sharma, Ganeshraj, narrator. Bisheshwarprasad Koiralako Atmabritanta. Reprinted from _2, _ ed. Lalitpur, Kathmandu: Jagadamba Prakashan, VS 1Falgun 2056 [13 Feb 2000]. VS 1Bisakh 2055 [14 April 1998].
- Shrestha, Pushpalal. "Nepal Communist Andolanma Dekha Pareyka Bhram Ra Tyesko Nirakaran." Article. Party Organ. Nepal Communist Partyko Bulletin No. 4 Naya Janabad [Party Sadasyako Lagi]. Np: NCP, 1971.
- Singh, Hikmat. Party Sadasyaharuko Namma Chithi Number 1: Dosro Mahadhiwayshunlay Pass Gareyko Ganatantrako Sawalma C.C Ko Byakhyama Mero Birodh Vichar, Keval Party Sadasyaharuko Lagi Matra. Np: Nepal Communist Party, VS 2018 Marg 15 [28 January 1961].
- . Party Sadasyaharuko Namma Chithi Number 2: (Dosro Mahadhiwayshun Pachi Am Nirvachanko Goshna Samma Netritwalay Apnaudai Aeka Karyanitiharuma Mero Vichar). Np: NCP, 6 years after 2nd Congress.
- Singh, Mohan Bikram. Dwitiya Mahadhiwayshundekehi Darbangha Plenumsamma Vs 2014–2017. Gorakhpur: Janasiksha Griha, VS 2047 [1990/91].
- Thapa, Deepak and Bandita Sijapati. A Kingdom Under Siege: Nepal's Maoist Insurgency, 1996 to 2004. 5th Reprint. Kathmandu: Printhouse, 2012. 2003.
- Upadhyaya, Balaram. "Sachha Krantikari Sikshak Mahan Neta Com. Pushapalal." Naya Janabad [Organ of the NCP]. Np: Np, nd.
- Windmiller, Gene D and Marshall Overstreet. Communism in India. Bombay: Perennial Press, 1960.