

Chapter-1

INTRODUCTION

State interacts with a set of long-established rules of games governing what is considered a state and how a state treats each other. Together these rules shape the international system.¹ International Politics concerns people and culture throughout the world. The scope and complexity of the interactions among these groups makes International Politics a challenging subject to the master. Narrowly defined the scope of the subject is concerned with the relationship among the world governments. But these relations cannot be understood in isolation. They are closely connected with each other actors (such as nation-states, international organizations and individuals); with each social structures (including economics, culture and domestic politics). The field of IR reflects the world's complexity, and IR scholars use many theories, concepts and buzz words in trying to explain and describe it. Underneath this complexity however, lays a few basic principles that shape the field. Basically the subject matter revolves around one key problem: How can groups such as two or more nations- serves its collective interests and while doing so how they forgo their individual interest. Three basic principles –which we call dominance, reciprocity and identity-offers possible solution to this core problem of getting nations or individual to cooperate for common or relative truth without a central authority to make them do so.²

During Cold War, International Politics was groomed by politics of ideology, the end of the cold war dawn a new era of realist politics to the study of IR, which not only helped us to understand the study of international politics but also the politics among the nations. With the end of the Cold War, international politics witnessed uni-polar world transforming into multi-polar world, rise of religious extremism and fanaticism, secessionist and insurgent movements throughout Europe and the Middle East, civil war on the basis of natural resources leading to the loss of millions of life and properties throughout the nations of Asia and Africa, and ironically all events were overlapped by the attempts of establishing US hegemony in global international as well as regional politics and economy.

¹Dehio, Ludwig; *The Precarious Balance: Four Centuries of the European Power Struggle*; Translated by Charles Fullman; (Vintage Books, 1962);pp56

² Olson, Mancur; *The Logic of Collective Action*; (Harvard, 1971) pp 44

Ominously titled "The Clash of Civilizations," in 1993 Samuel Huntington contributed a boldly simplistic paradigm to the ever-growing debate about security in the post-Cold War world; he argued that after the cold war the international system would no longer be divided into two camps based on ideology or politics. Instead, it would be fractured along civilizational lines. "The fundamental source of conflict in the new world," he predicted, "will be cultural." Five years later, in 1998 as India and Pakistan's reckless forays into the nuclear realm; and seven year later, in 2001 when the ugliest face of Islamic terrorism came up against the capitalist western world as '9/11' it seemed as if Huntington's dire predictions coming to be true. Prior to the 9/11, the world was rapidly becoming US centric, but in the post 2001 scenario the study of global politics went through significant transformations, basically after the 9/11 incident, things changed completely when non-state actors directly challenged the military, economic and technological dominance of the US as an invulnerable world hyper-superpower. The rational-choice model remained no longer germane to the analyses of the foreign behavior and security policies of ruling elites. The globalists are now faced with the problem of evolving and articulating a new paradigm in order to explain the present complex nature of the interconnected and independent world order. A mix of geo-economics and geo strategic factors, propelled by increasing global cooperation, is likely to force the decision makers to refashion and reframe their countries policies as well as to work out new strategies in accordance with the ongoing trend. This new wave of world order also had its impact on the countries of the South Asian region. The new South Asia apparently differs from the old South Asia of the cold war era both from domestic and external point of view ; monarchy in Nepal is replaced by a republican state, Bhutan has turned into parliamentary democracy, Maldives witnessed a peaceful transformation of the older power structure with 'significant and historic' democratic elections in 2008, with the end of more than two decade of ethnic conflict in may 2009 Sri Lanka heralded a new era, This new order also had its impact in remolding the relationship between the two neighboring South Asian nation states – India and Pakistan.

However this relationship between them was not a new thing rather it was something which had its legacy in past, related to the independence movement which began in earnest from the last half of the 19th Century, and gained its strength as nationalism swept in nations of Asia and Africa. But much like the building of the Berlin Wall, the partitioning of India created as many problems as it solved. Having a traditional mythological base, India, however, was not just one country full of like-minded people when it came to worship and religion. Two

fundamentally different religious groups dominated the soulful landscape of the world's second most populous country. It was the tension between followers of those two faiths, which transcended the partition of from Colonial India into the creation of two sovereign states of the Dominion of Pakistan (later the Islamic Republic of Pakistan) and the Union of India (later Republic of India) in 1947, on 14 and 15 August, respectively in accordance to the “Indian Independence Act 1947”, with the Radcliffe Line announced on 17 August 1947 as a boundary demarcation line between India and Pakistan. But unfortunately this historic incident which was supposed to pacify the problems within the South Asian region proved to be a curse in the history of relationships between these two nations and the creation of Pakistan left unspeakable violence in its trail.

India and Pakistan tested their nuclear devices in the year 1998 which brought forth stringent economic sanctions on both the countries (though India tested its first nuclear device in 1974 and it was its second test). From 2001 onwards India and Pakistan have gone through severe ups and down which includes Operation Parakram and even had multiple summits to normalize the already strife ridden bilateral relations. On the one hand, these developments have contributed to enhancing Pakistan’s geostrategic importance to the United States, which is fighting a global war on terror against the al-Qaeda and Taliban elements with Pakistan’s military and logistic support. On the other hand, India’s loss of strategic preeminence with Pakistan’s attainment of nuclear parity has complicated New Delhi’s relationship with Islamabad on the interconnected issue of Kashmir and cross-border terrorism, which might trigger off a nuclear exchange between them. The study will try to identify the role US played in such a political milieu where the leadership of both the countries had to decide on terrorism, nuclear deterrence, Kashmir, role of the intelligence organization of both the countries, the misunderstanding , the ceasefires and the role of US in such decision making process.

(1.1) Statement of the Problem:

Though born out of the same continent, and sharing a lot of commonalities, there are hardly very few countries which shares such a relationship of misunderstanding and lack of trust as shared by the two neighboring South-Asian nations: India and Pakistan. This relationship between India and Pakistan characterized by periodical ups and down, hot and cold diplomacy and intermittent breakdown had thrice brought these two nations into full fledged wars 1948, 1965, &1971 once a mini-wars, 1965(Raan of Kutch) and once in major military skirmish 1999 (Kargil) and twice 2 near wars (January and June, 2002). Various subjective

and objective factors are regarded responsible for the development of such a strange relationship of bitterness between these two South-Asian nation states, for some it's the Kashmir issue, the cross-border terrorism factor, insurgencies which is regarded as the main reason of rivalry between these two nations, whereas on the other hand there are also some who justifies that subjective factors like fear psychosis, India's secular stand which has strained the relationship between them. However apart from these two major areas one might also can't undermine the role which the Western Powers especially the United States of America, played in molding the relation between these two important South Asian Nations.

The United States has been a significant factor for the nations in the 3rd world countries in the pre and the post cold war era. For the sake of their global and strategic policy of the world and the United States seems to have had an equal stake in the Asian and south Asian subcontinents. India and Pakistan too have been significantly influenced by this US global policy. If observed carefully one can find a distinct paradigmatic shift in the relationship between these three nations. Viz., Cold-War period, Post-Cold War period, Post 9/11 period.

Cold War Period:

When we find that US was in search of a strong partner ally in the South Asian region for the containment of communism and similarly Pakistan also for the sake of its survival was in search of a search of a strong western power. Thus both the two nations came very close to each other in this period of time. Though being a relationship of necessity, gradually Pakistan came to occupy a very strong strategic position in the US foreign policy this tie strengthened more due to the close tie between India and USSR.

Post-Cold War Period:

The disintegration of Erstwhile Soviet Russia and the transformation of the bi-polar world to a uni-polar world with emergence of the US as a single super power completely changed the whole scenario of I.R. Pakistan which was blessed by tremendous amount of military and financial aid & equipments during the cold war period for the containment of Communism was using them for settling its scores with India. And India on the other hand was ravaged by the terrorist activities which was sometimes covertly and sometimes overtly supported and financed by Pakistan. Despite the fact that India opted for liberal path of development and tried to come closer to the United States in its War on Terror (WoT), the result has been what shouldn't have been – with the kind of support and patronage from the United States Pakistan all along sincerely kept on trying to settle scores with India.

Post 9/11 Period:

Before the 9/11 all the terrorist attacks which occurred in India, which were sometimes covertly and sometimes covertly supported and sponsored by Pakistan were simply leveled as a problems of law enforcement and internal disturbances and insurgencies by the almost all the International Organizations and Western Powers , U.S in particular. But the whole scenario changed after the 9/11 incident when the western powers and America in particular took the problem of terrorism as a global threat/ menace and lodged a major ‘War on Terror, (WoT)’. To curb the menace of terrorism it shifted its onus to Afghanistan pushing the South Asian Nations remold their Foreign Polices as well as bilateral relations as per changing regional politics especially India and Pakistan.

The focus of the research study lies here, to keenly study the reason for the sudden change of the US foreign policy toward the South Asian Region, particularly towards India and Pakistan, and how the involvement of US has affected the relation between the two nations especially focusing on the role which it played covertly and overtly in order to exaggerate the same. Various separate incidents have taken place within Pakistan and India which redefine the role not only between India and Pakistan but with US between India and Pakistan respectively. Separate terrorist incidents, civil nuclear deals, bilateral agreements have also brought forth avenues of remolding relations between the trios. The study has examined the major elements, which has redefined the relationship between the two nations. It has also analyzed how US still play a decisive role in the bilateral relationship between the two nations.

(1.2) A Theoretical Understanding of Conflict

Enduring rivalries are defined as conflicts between two or more states that last more than two decades with several militarized inter-state disputes punctuating the relationship in between. An enduring rivalry is characterized by a “persistent, fundamental, and long term incompatibility of goals between two states,” which “manifests itself in the basic attitudes of the parties toward each other as well as in recurring violent or potentially violent clashes over a long period of time”.³ Although there is difference of opinion among analysts on the number of disputes and inter-state crises required for calling a rivalry “enduring”, the categorization by Paul Diehl and Gary Goertz seems to be more acceptable, who treat an

³Zeev Maoz and Ben Mor, *Bound by Struggle: The Strategic Evolution of Enduring International Rivalries* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002), p.5

enduring rivalry as one that involves at least six militarized disputes during a twenty-year period. This specification, according to them, allows defining the concept along “spatial consistency, duration and militarized competition”.⁴ As such the question is whether the animosity between India and Pakistan can be considered as enduring rivalry. As Low Intensity Conflict between the two countries have been a continuous facet in the relations, counting the number of cross border fires that takes place can surely categorize the relation as such. It can be stated that in an enduring rivalry cannot be associated with a single issue, episodic or of limited time span; and rather remain ongoing for a reasonably long period on a continuous basis before it can be termed “enduring”. It is for that reason also coined as “protracted conflicts”, but the main difference between the two concepts perhaps lies in the inter-state dimension of the former.⁵ A protracted conflict can be internal or intra-state, involving state and/or non-state actors, an enduring rivalry specifically refers to inter-state conflicts. An enduring rivalry is often characterized by zero-sum perspectives on the part of the participants. The conflict can become entrenched and societal as parties view each other as highly threatening to their security and physical survival. Enduring rivalries tend to be typified by periodic inter-state crises and, in some instances, war, although war is not a necessary condition for a rivalry to be categorized as “enduring”.⁶ John Vasquez argues that relative equality in power capabilities is necessary for a rivalry to remain enduring, since in a highly unequal power situation the stronger party will in general be able to impose its will on the weaker side and put an end to the conflict.⁷

⁴ Paul Diehl and Gary Goertz, *War and Peace in International Rivalry* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001), pp. 44-48; William R. Thompson, "Principal Rivalries," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 39 (June 1995), pp. 195-223; Frank W. Wayman, "Rivalries: Recurrent Disputes and Explaining War," in John Vasquez (ed.), *What Do We Know about War?* (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), pp. 219-34; Scott D. Bennett, "The Dynamics of Enduring Rivalries," *American Political Science Review* 93 (September 1999), pp. 749-50.

⁵ Edward Azar, Paul Jureidini, and Ronald McLaurin, *Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Practice in the Middle East*, *Journal of Palestine Studies* 29 (1978), pp. 41-60; Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, *A Study of Crisis* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), p. 6

⁶ Patrick James, *International Relations and Scientific Progress* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2002), pp. 57-62

⁷ John A. Vasquez, "Distinguishing Rivals that Go to War from Those that Do Not: A Quantitative Comparative Case Study of the Two Paths to War," *International Studies Quarterly* 40 (December 1996), pp. 531-58

Asymmetric conflicts involve states of unequal aggregate power capability, measured in terms of material resources, i.e., size, demography, military capability, and economic prowess. In international politics, intangible characteristics do not usually impinge on the decision making process and that is the reason why will and morale are not included in assessing national power capabilities.⁸ With the passage of time, the will of the masses as well as the nature of morale and remain decisive till the situation arises where the armed forces act as moral police. Weaker parties in asymmetric power dyads often use these intangible means to bolster their military and political positions during both war and peace. Within asymmetric conflict dyads one may notice wide disparity in power capabilities (as in the US—Cuba or China—Taiwan cases) or limited disparity (as in the North Korea—South Korea case).⁹ The India—Pakistan conflict is both enduring and asymmetric, but the power asymmetry is truncated and mitigated by many factors. In particular, the weaker party, Pakistan, has been successful in reducing the asymmetry through strategy, tactics, alliances with outside powers, acquisition of qualitatively superior weapons and nuclear arms since the late 1980s, and, for over a decade, low-intensity warfare. The materially stronger power, India, is not overwhelmingly preponderant in the theater of conflict — Kashmir — and has been vulnerable to asymmetric challenges by the weaker state, Pakistan. Nor is Pakistan too small or incapable of mounting a sustained challenge, as it has proved over half a century. Pakistan, with a population of over 192 million, is the seventh largest country in the world. Its territorial size is larger than most Middle Eastern and Gulf states, except Saudi Arabia and Iran, and its elite, particularly the military and bureaucracy has sufficient wherewithal and high level of motivation to sustain the conflict even if at a high cost to its society in terms of economic and political underdevelopment. The asymmetry is built into the structure of the conflict, the power balance, and the goals and objectives that the two parties seek.¹⁰

⁸ T. V. Paul, *Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 20; Andrew Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict," *World Politics* 27 (January 1975), pp.175-200; Ivan Arreguin-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict," *International Security* 26 (Summer 2001), pp. 93-128.

⁹ TV Paul, *The India-Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry* (New Delhi: Cambridge, 2006), p. 3-6.

¹⁰ TV Paul, *The India-Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry* (New Delhi: Cambridge, 2006), p. 3-6.

Coupled with a growing involvement of non-state entities, the disparity between belligerents is steadily increasing, and various contemporary armed conflicts appear to be more and more asymmetric in structure. Unlike the geostrategic set-up that prevailed throughout the cold war period, it is a widely perceived paradox of today's strategic environment that military superiority may actually accentuate the threat of nuclear, biological, chemical and, generally speaking, perfidious attack. Indeed, direct attacks against civilians, hostage-taking and the use of human shields – practices that have long been outlawed in armed conflicts – have seen a revival in recent conflicts in which the far weaker party has often sought to gain a comparative advantage over the militarily superior enemy by resorting to such practices as a matter of strategy.¹¹ Terrorism, although not necessarily conducted within the context of an armed conflict triggering the application of international humanitarian law (IHL), is often regarded as the epitome of such asymmetry. At the same time militarily superior parties at the other end of the spectrum have had recourse to indiscriminate attacks, illegal interrogation practices and renditions, as well as legally dubious practices such as targeted killings or hardly reviewable covert operations, in order to strike at their frequently amorphous enemy.¹²

In this age of information and mass communications, what is of critical importance is not just the scale of armed terrorist violence and its direct human and material costs, but also its destabilizing effect on national, international, human and public security and its ability to affect politics. A series of high-profile, mass-casualty terrorist attacks of the early 21st century carried out in various parts of the world demonstrate that it no longer takes hundreds of thousands of battle-related deaths to dramatically affect or destabilize international security and significantly alter the security agenda of major states and international organizations. While the number of deaths caused by the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States (almost 3000 fatalities, most of them civilians) is not comparable to the huge military and civilian death tolls of the major post-World War II wars such as those in Korea or Vietnam, the political impact of the 2001 attacks and their repercussions for global

¹¹Robin Geib, “*Asymmetric conflict structures*”, *International Review of the Red Cross*, vol. 88, no. 864, December 2006, p. 758

¹²Toni Pfanner, “*Asymmetrical warfare from the perspective of humanitarian law and humanitarian action*”, *International Review of the Red Cross*, Vol. 87, No. 857, March 2005; Colin S. Gray, *Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare*, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 2005, p. 223

security are comparable.¹³ Similar is the case with US war on terror and its massive fallout resulting in the killings of millions of civilians in Iraq and Afghanistan. The case is no different for India, as the number of civilian casualties and mortality amongst defense personnel in peaceful times through terrorist attacks in the last three decades far surpasses the number of lives lost during armed conflicts within Indian defense personnel.

The relations that India Pakistan had though has seen less wars that it could have witnessed, but low scale conflict, cross border firings, terrorism and many other features of conflict has been a major element in the relations all through these years. Many have tried to describe this new type of warfare and many catchphrases and buzzwords have come and gone: low-intensity conflict, military operations other than war, asymmetric warfare, fourth-generation warfare, irregular warfare and many more. The complex relationship between the state and the Islamists in Pakistan makes it difficult for the government to fulfill its promise of eliminating terrorism even if it had the will to stop all groups. Pakistan has paid a price for not confronting the terrorists in the past. They brought their battles to Pakistan, while holding out the promise of helping in Pakistan's conflict with India.¹⁴ But such a state policy has boomeranged on Pakistan itself. It does not seem that they have given any thought of abandoning such a policy with regard to India. Similarly, Pakistan's role in the rise of proliferation in the region and beyond may have been fast forgotten by the global players, but not by Indian decision makers, and they know how short sighted Pakistani decision makers are, when they want to achieve short term goals.

Understanding the concept of asymmetric warfare has always been challenging. During the Cold War, the two world superpowers participated in various arms races each side always in fear of a gap in their capabilities when compared to the other. Peace was secured through mutually assured destruction (MAD). This bipolar order of the world's military forces relied mainly on concepts of symmetry. The 9/11 terrorist attacks, of course, changed many concepts. The attacks demonstrated that a military could no longer guarantee its ability to serve as a buffer between the enemy and its own government or people. This shock to the

¹³Ekaterina Stepanova, *Terrorism in Asymmetrical Conflict Ideological and Structural Aspects*, Stockholm, SIPRI Research Report No. 23, 2008, p. 3

¹⁴Husain Haqqani, "Pakistan's Terrorism Dilemma", in Satu P Limaye, Mohan Malik and Robert G Wirsingeds. *Religious Radicalism and Security in South Asia*, Hawaii: Asia Pacific Centre for Security Studies, 2004, p. 353

Western psyche spurred much of the discussion that was already transpiring on the concept of asymmetric warfare changing perceptions of strategy, tactics, security and threat forever.¹⁵

Realist theory is taken to be one of the most accurate tools for understanding the events in the sphere of international relations. Amongst all the existing theories, Realism takes an explanatory rather than a normative approach to its study of relations between nations, and through its analytical character provides a pragmatic framework for the examination of current issues in the international arena. The basic fulcrum of this perspective is the concept of 'statism', which means that "the state is the pre-eminent actor and all other actors in world politics are of lesser significance".¹⁶ Realists consider that states have the highest authority in the international system, given the condition of anarchy that prevails as per their assessment.¹⁷ States form the bodies of other actors, such as International Organizations, thus have influence on the actions of the latter. The action of the state depicts its own welfare, which remains above the moral duty of humanitarian intervention, and ethics are being "interpreted in terms of politics".¹⁸ When some action of a state seem to be irrational and not in accordance with social ethics, it should be understood on Machiavellian maxims of Realist statesmanship, where political responsibility implies the pursuit of self-interest and cannot always be in accordance "with the principles of Christian ethics".¹⁹ Besides economic grounds, a state actor's position can be explained using Morgenthau's realist concept of 'animus dominandi'²⁰, which refers to human, and implicitly states', drive for power. Consequently, it can be asserted that the behaviour of states "can be interpreted in terms of

¹⁵David L. Buffaloe, "Defining Asymmetric Warfare", *The Land Warfare Papers*, No. 58, September 2006, p. 3

¹⁶ Dunne, T. and Schmidt, B. C. (2008) 'Realism' in Baylis, J., Smith, S. and Owens, P. (eds), *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, 4th edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 103

¹⁷ Steans, J. and Pettiford, L. (2005) *Introduction to International Relations: Perspectives and Themes*, Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, p.49

¹⁸Carr, E. H. (2001) *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939: An introduction to the Study of International Relations*, London: Palgrave, p. 19

¹⁹ Jackson, R. and Sørensen, G. (1999) *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 73

²⁰Jackson, R. and Sørensen, G. (1999) *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 76

the pursuit of power”²¹, as Realists believes. In that way, Realism inquires into the intricate reasons behind international actors’ actions, thus it assists in understanding the causes of conflict and crucial decisions in world politics.

For neo realists like Waltz, it is the systematic or structural level of anarchy in the international system that dictates state behaviour and he rejects as reductionist, realist, liberal and Marxist accounts of international relations because they fail to take into account the international system which “comes between the intentions of states and the results of their interactions”. For structural realists like Waltz, war and inter-state conflicts occur because of the anarchic nature of the international system. Structural realism moved the debate away from human nature and focused on the international system. For Waltz war occurs as there is nothing to prevent it.²² The systematic structure of the international system forces states to act the way they do. The absence of any overarching international government to arbitrate between them, forces states into the self help system. Thus all states, no matter what their endogenous political complexion, share a homogenized foreign policy pattern.²³

The basic understanding of neo-realism will fail to identify states like Pakistan and India, as at the reductionist levels the endogenous Muslim state of Pakistan and the endogenous secular state of India will remain to be irrelevant. For many neo-realists, India and Pakistan have been forced into power politics on account of the anarchic nature of the international system and not because of the inherent contradictions that it impacts on each other or the role of powers who thought of strengthening their sphere of influence. The anarchic structure of the international system breeds suspicion and distrust. The lack of a single sovereign or authority makes it a self help system, and it is not necessarily irrational or a sign of paranoia to be pre-occupied with real, potential or imagined threats.²⁴ It may not be out of context to state that it is the kind of international structure and its complications that have captivated

²¹ Wight, M. *Power Politics*, London: (Leicester University Press, 1995), p. 17

²² Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 23

²³ Duncan McLeod, ed., *India and Pakistan: Friends, Rivals Or Enemies?* (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2008), p. 9

²⁴ Duncan McLeod, ed., *India and Pakistan: Friends, Rivals Or Enemies?* (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2008), p. 9

Pakistan to be guided by short term strategies mainly to destabilize India, either through the so called low intensity conflict or through the state sponsored terrorism against India.

Although different in approach, Waltz like Morgenthau shares the same objectives of creating a clear systemic theoretical approach or objective laws to the study of international politics and both make a claim to have found a theoretical approach that allows for the inclusion of relevant and rejection of the irrelevant. For Waltz this requires a systemic approach that will demonstrate 'how the systems level or structure is distinct from the level of interacting units'.²⁵ To do this Waltz elaborates on his distinction between systemic and reductionist levels and develops three images or levels. The first image is human nature, the second image is the state and the third and most important image is the anarchic nature of the international system, which he argues is the systemic cause of war.

Waltz suggests that according to the third image "there is a constant possibility of war in a world in which there are two or more states each seeking to promote a set of interests and having no agency above them upon which they can rely for protection".²⁶ In other words the first and second image play a part in international politics but the permissive cause of war has always been the third image – the anarchic international system.²⁷ Waltz cites the example of the European powers becoming more inclined to peace in the inter war period just as Hitler was becoming more belligerent, 'the increased propensity to peace of some participants, in international politics may increase, rather than decrease, the likelihood of war. This illustrates the role of the permissive cause, the international environment.'²⁸ It also demonstrates a clear departure from realism, which would argue that war occurred because the European states failed to balance power between themselves and Nazi Germany. Individuals such as the

²⁵Hedley Bull, *Herbert Butterfield, and Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics*, (Addison-Wesley Publishing Co.,1979), p. 44

²⁶Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 227

²⁷Duncan McLeod, ed., *India and Pakistan: Friends, Rivals Or Enemies?* (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2008), p. 10

²⁸ Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 233

British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain instead of defining interests in terms of engaging normative appeals to the German regime should have defined interests in terms of power.²⁹

Neo realism suggests that anarchy is a permissive cause of war in the third image, and the first and second images are efficient causes of war. First and second images being variables such as types of government, past history, location and interest. The first and second images in India-Pakistan relation are unique given that the two states were borne out of the same geopolitical territory of the former British Raj and the Princely States and as such have a unique cultural history that became separated at Partition by the creation of two new independent states.³⁰

For neo-realism it is the quantitative structure of the third image – the international system and the self help system that constitutes and explains state behaviour. Competing with the third image for explanatory power are the qualitative first and second images that allow for inter-subjectivity impacting on state behaviour. In the Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens framework, a qualitative approach allows for an interpretation of ‘soft facts’ as opposed to the quantitative reliance on the ‘hard facts’ speaking for themselves and thus doing all the constitutive and causal explanatory work.³¹ Neo realism had a dominant role in international relations theory, but it does have its critics. Steve Smith writes, “[t]he state, made by war in many cases, is the product of the interaction between internal forces and an external setting. This undermines realist and especially neo-realist, claims of the external setting in determining state behaviour”.³² Neo-realism also has difficulty accounting for systemic change because of its insistence of the immutability of international anarchy as the causal mechanism, leaving it no room to account for change at the unit level. Moreover, liberal

²⁹Duncan McLeod, ed., *India and Pakistan: Friends, Rivals Or Enemies?* (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2008), p. 10

³⁰Duncan McLeod, ed., *India and Pakistan: Friends, Rivals Or Enemies?* (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2008), p. 11

³¹Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens and John D. Stephens, *Capitalist Development & Democracy*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992) pp 52

³²Steve Smith, *'Self-images of a discipline: genealogy of international relations theory'*, in Steve Smith and Ken Booth (eds.), *International Relations Theory Today* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), pp. 1-37.

internationalists argue that the trading state has replaced the military state because the rise of trans-nationalism and trade, have replaced territorial conquest by empires.³³

There are also various constructs that can be applied to the region and the nation in question is the theory of structuralism. An approach, which lay emphasis on the structures that motivate human behavior, is structuralism. Fundamental themes of structuralism includes: the core elements of the structure remain considerably analogous, but the relationships between them alter; concepts that appear 'natural' to people, such as masculinity and femininity, are in fact social constructs; and that the individuals, too, are the product of relationships. Thus, individual's actions are dictated by the overall circumstances-structures in which they operate. These structures are comprised of the rules, conventions, and restraints upon which human behavior is based. Decisions taken by leaderships, psyche of nations are based on such behavioural patterns that make an impact on national and regional policies. The theory of structuralism can be elaborated by the twist given to realist international relations theory by Kenneth Waltz. Instability and war were less the result of fraudulent human nature or poorly constituted states than of fluctuating distributions of power across states in an anarchical international system.³⁴ Earlier realist explanations that had dwelt on the characteristics of individual states and their leaders were dismissed as reductionist. Relations can be understood on a case to case basis either through historical processes or thematically. In doing so, it is important to identify the points of convergence and divergence; subsequently explaining them in historical perspective or rationally. A rational approach points to a structural explanation of relations. It is the structure that ascertains the schedule of interests for states. No state can adhere to policies with regard to another state that are incongruent with the logic of the given structure.³⁵ Hence the regional balance of power and regional systems must be taken in consideration while formulating relations with other states. The character of such systems influences the strategic policy culture of the pursuing state in a given system. Observing such influences on national policies and their interaction with other state policies develops a structure which determines internal and external factors of foreign

³³Richard Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World*, (New York: Basic Books, 1986), p.15

³⁴Kenneth N. Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War", *International Security*, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000), pp. 5-41

³⁵R Rajgopalan, & V Sani; *India and the Great Powers: Strategic Imperatives, Normative Necessities*, *South Asian Survey*, 2008; Vol. 15(1), pp. 12-13

policy.³⁶ The debate of internal and external factors in foreign policy can be approached a bit more directly by incorporating Kenneth Waltz's views. He contrasts this theory of regional politics from foreign policy theories by arguing that they are different in *raison d'être*.³⁷ A structural theory of regional policies explains why different states behave similarly; while foreign policy theory reasons out why similar placed states behave differently. One cannot refute the fact that every state is primarily concerned about its own physical survival. Survival remains the distinctive leitmotif of all states.³⁸ However, states differ on the basis strategy selection and the means of survival. Great regional powers maintain its regional structure by ensuring stability whereas weaker nations balance the structure by acquiring friendship of extra-territorial global nations. Thus a regional structure is intercepted by global actors for the physical security of lesser powers. During the Cold War bipolar system, Pakistan acquired a strategic regional balance in relation to India, a regional power, by drawing the US sponsored anti Communist alliances- South East Asia Treaty organization, (SEATO) and Central Treaty organization (CENTO) which has been discussed in detail in later sections of the study.³⁹

Game theory is a discipline of Operational Research which tries to model human interaction as a game. The games are analyzed to elicit a deeper understanding of strategic thinking among humans. The underlying assumption is that humans are rational actors who try and maximize their benefit in any situation. India and Pakistan have fought several wars and have lived through the era of cooperation (though limited) and cold peace (since Mumbai, Pathankot or for that matter Uri attacks) and the attempt of re-initiating dialogue between the two. They have been unable to make a transition to the era of cooperation and durable peace. India-Pakistan relations have been studied extensively by analysts from the politico-military, economic and social points of view. Game-theoretic exercises, applied to India-Pakistan

³⁶ Syed Hussain Shaheed Soherwordi, Reena Abbasi & Tabassum Javed, "Structuralism and the Indo-Pak Rivalry: Responsible Politico Economic Factors and Policy Analysis", A Research Journal of South Asian Studies, Vol. 30, No.2, July – December 2015, p. 26

³⁷ Kenneth Waltz, (1998, Fall); *The Emerging Structure of International Politics*. *International Security*, 18(2), pp. 44-97.

³⁸ Ashley J Tellis, (2007). *Rising India: Friends and Foes*. (P. Nanda, Ed.) New Delhi, India: Lancer

³⁹ SH Soherwordi, (2010, Jan/June). *The U.S Foreign Policy Shift towards Pakistan during 1960s*. *South Asian Studies*, 25(1), PP. 21-37

situations, can supplement and even strengthen traditional analysis. Game theory can be particularly helpful in understanding how the two countries can get out of the low paying unhelpful situations. It can also throw light on crisis escalation and crisis stability. It is also possible to apply game theory to understand the nuclear thresholds of the two countries. Famous game theoretical models include Prisoners' Dilemma and Chicken. These models can be applied to India-Pakistan relations and suitably modified to India-Pakistan situations. Prisoner's dilemma is a game in which two players try to maximize their own benefits. The benefits, called pay-offs in game theory parlance, are such that the two players end up in a state where they choose not negotiating over an issue (say Siachen glacier). This state of play is called NASH Equilibrium, named after mathematician John Nash. Consider the following pay off matrix modeling the behaviour of India and Pakistan. Both players have two strategies to choose from, either negotiate or not negotiate. The pay-off matrix is at Figure 1.

Figure 1 Payoff Matrix⁴⁰

		Pakistan	
		Negotiate	Not Negotiate
India	Negotiate	2, 2	0, 3
	Not Negotiate	3, 0	1, 1

↓
↓

Pareto-optimal solution

Nash Equilibrium

Table 1: Payoff matrix

If Pakistan chooses to “negotiate”, India has two choices - either negotiate or not negotiate. If it chooses to negotiate, it will get a benefit of 2, but if it chooses not to negotiate it will get a benefit of 3. Thus it will choose the strategy of not negotiating. What if Pakistan chooses not to negotiate? India's benefit will be 0 if it chooses to negotiate. Its benefit will be 1 if it chooses not to negotiate. Clearly it will choose not to negotiate. Thus, in this special game, India has a dominant strategy of not negotiating irrespective of the strategy chosen by Pakistan. Likewise the game is structured in such a way that Pakistan also has the dominant strategy of not negotiating. Thus, both players have the dominant strategy of not negotiating. Therefore they will eventually end up in a situation where both choose not to negotiate and get a payoff of (1, 1). It can be noted that if both had chosen (negotiate, negotiate) they would have gained a better pay off of (2, 2). Why did they not choose this strategy? Because, either

⁴⁰Prakarsh Singh, “*Games parties play: Nash equilibrium of the Nuclear Agreement*”, IDSA Comments, July 31, 2008, http://www.idsa.in/idsastrategiccomments/GamespartiesplayNashequilibriumoftheNuclearAgreement_PSingh_310708

player then had the temptation of moving on to a situation of not negotiating where its pay off would be even higher (3) in the hope that the opponent will continue to negotiate. In such a situation the one who negotiates gets a pay of only 0 while the one who did not negotiate got a payoff of 3. Thus, both players will end up not negotiating and settle for lower pay offs of (1, 1) rather than risk being caught in any other situation where their pay offs may be higher but the chances of cheating by the other player could not be ruled out.⁴¹ However, in this case too Waltz structuralism becomes relevant particularly for Pakistan because the structures molding Pakistan's decision making make them adopt a 'non-negotiating' strategy even in the face of fatal consequence.

Now another game can be considered where the consequences of following a hard strategy all the time are very severe. The game of Chicken (the name was given by Bertrand Russell) models brinkmanship. The two players are on a collision course. Who will blink first, swerve (i.e. blink, compromise, or give in) and leave the arena? Or will they go for an ultimate clash, conflict, or even war? Pay off matrix for an essential Chicken game is shown at Figure 2.

Figure 2: Game of Chicken with numerical payoffs⁴²

		Pakistan	
		Swerve	Straight
India	Swerve	0, 0	-1, +1
	Straight	+1, -1	-10, -10

Here, the pay offs are such that there is a very heavy price if both players continue on the collision course. One or both must give in to avoid a collision. There is no Nash equilibrium, i.e. no dominant strategy, in this game unlike in prisoners' dilemma. The players will have to consider the consequences of a collision course which could even be a war. The Cuban missile crisis was an example of the game of Chicken. The US and USSR initially adopted tough stances but eventually the USSR had to give in. In 2002, India mobilized its army

⁴¹Arvind Gupta, "Game-theoretic Understanding of India-Pakistan Relations", IDSA Comments, August 16, 2011, http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/GametheoreticUnderstandingofIndiaPakistanRelations_agupta_160811%20

⁴²Prakarsh Singh, "Games parties play: Nash equilibrium of the Nuclear Agreement", IDSA Comments, July 31, 2008, http://www.idsa.in/idsastrategiccomments/GamespartiesplayNashequilibriumoftheNuclearAgreement_PSingh_310708

along the India-Pakistan border for ten months in response to a terror attack on the Indian parliament. The attack was carried out by a terrorist group based in Pakistan. Both countries were in a situation of rising tension and fears of nuclear war raised their head. General Musharraf, the President of Pakistan, felt the heat and gave an open statement that Pakistan would not allow its territory to be used for supporting terrorism. The Indian government which was finding it difficult to sustain a large scale mobilization for such a long time began to relax its posture after the assurance was given. The international community also did some deft diplomacy to avoid war. Operation Parakram had elements of the game of Chicken in it although it is not known whether the two sides actually used Game theory to model their responses. But it can be suggested that it was because of Pakistan's stubborn attitude that ultimately made Pakistan the 'chicken' in 1965, 1971 and also in 1999. The Operation was eventually called off and war averted. Operation Parakram should be thoroughly analyzed for understanding the behaviour of the two countries. Did India's coercive diplomacy succeed? Or was it the danger of nuclear escalation that led to India drawing down its military mobilisation? Did external actors play a role in ending the crisis? What has been the impact of Operation Parakram in the subsequent evolution of India Pakistan relations? Was Operation Parakram weighing on the Indian policy makers' mind after the November 2008 Mumbai terror attacks? Pakistan was not deterred from sponsoring terrorism. Could Indian and Pakistani responses have been played differently? Game theory also throws light on crisis stability. When can a crisis be stabilized and when does it spin out of control? The key insight here is that whenever a threat or a promise of reward is given, it should be credible. Empty threats or rhetoric can lead to crisis escalation. Another insight is that one should be clear about the points of no return. The crisis can escalate if repeated threats push the opponent to a point where he does not care whether the threat will be implemented or not. Whenever a threat is issued, an escape route should also be provided. Game theory shows that sometimes threats can bring about stability while in other cases, beyond a threshold, threats can prove to be destabilizing. The key is to find that threshold. This will depend upon the pay-off structures and probabilities assigned to the likelihood of strategies which an opponent will adopt. Thus, perception about how the opponent will react becomes important in deciding own strategies. Using game theory for understanding India's strategic behaviour is uncharted territory.⁴³ It has not yet been developed fully and remains in the realm of thinkers and strategists.

⁴³Arvind Gupta, "*Game-theoretic Understanding of India-Pakistan Relations*", *IDSA*

In the 21st century, decisions by one state affect more than just the participating countries. Scholars as well as well policy analysts and even the general public, have a greater desire to understand foreign policy decisions and what motivates the head of government in his foreign policy decision making. Political decision-making concerns authoritative allocation of public values. The essence of responsible political leadership is very often the need for just, equitable and deliberate or conscious allocation of common values that are held in trust for the commonwealth, by the leadership. This conscious allocation however involves the notion of opportunity costs. This implies that the more the government directs its resources towards the attainment of particular ends, the less it has the ability to deploy the same resources to meet other pressing needs. The decision making framework involves essentially the following five elements: the situation that requires taking a decision, the participants in the decision-making process, the organization they belong to, the process that is adapted to reach a decision and the decision outcome. It can be stated as well as that when the question is raised why a nation-state behaves as it does, one needs to ask questions such as: Who are the most important decision-makers, what are their motivations and perceptions, and what are they trying to achieve? What is the type of decision being made? What kind of process is required to reach a decision?

The influence of external powers such as China, Russia and western powers including the USA in South Asia region remained a matter of discussion because intense rivalry between two big South Asian powers India and Pakistan always attracted the external power to take advantages from their rivalry. Therefore, Indo-Pak bitter relations were exploited by external powers by many times during the period of cold war politics and even in the new millennia. After partition, Pakistan started to counter the suspected Indian threat by engaging herself in military strength build up and maintaining relations with great powers which came on screen when it concluded a Military Security Pact with the US in 1954 which is considered as a dramatic change in the South Asia Geopolitics.⁴⁴As per the US Army Strategy it is defined as “the art and science of developing and employing instruments of national power in a

Comments, August 16, 2011,
http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/GametheoreticUnderstandingofIndiaPakistanRelations_agupta_160811%20

⁴⁴ Sandeep Singh, Amanpreet Kaur, and Amandeep Singh, “*Changing Equations of India-Pakistan Relations: Unresolved Kashmir Dispute as a Decider Factor*”, *International Research Journal of Social Sciences*, Vol. 4(3), 88-95, March (2015), p. 91

synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives.”⁴⁵ The strategy is implemented under various garbs. Sometimes it is in the form of democratization, containing Communism, establishing New World Economic Order or terrorism. But the basic objectives of decision makers is to enhance one’s sphere of influence and gain strategic advantage over immediate and forthcoming adversaries to the country’s economic and political advantages.

The United States has always been a significant factor in the region, but has become an even bigger stakeholder in Southern Asian stability since the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, D.C. on 11 September 2001. During the cold war, the US perceived Pakistan as a strategic asset and turned it into an ally against Soviet expansionism. Washington initially viewed China as a Soviet ally, but eventually played the China card to hold back the spread of Soviet influence in Asia and elsewhere. Non-aligned India was neither with the US nor against the US throughout the cold war even after signing the treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union. However, with the end of the cold war and the passing of a decade India’s impressive economic performance, coupled with its stable polity and military prowess, brought is a sea change to the US perspective on India, which has given birth to an optimistic image of the country among American policymakers. The US decision to establish a strategic partnership with India has been influenced by India’s rising international weight and strength and partly by new US disquiet over an assertive China.⁴⁶ The recent reaction of US in the form of condemnation followed by warning to Pakistan for its proved involved in the Uri incident has further brought the two countries closer to each other- the state of affair that India had been seeking for long.

The United States, being a global power, engaged itself in the region on the basis of global political and security considerations. The impact of US policy on India and Pakistan was intricate, particularly in its bilateral equations with these two countries. During the decades of the 1950s and ’60s, India and Pakistan were low-priority countries, although the US roped in Pakistan in its cold war alliance system and, by implication, undermined India’s non-alignment. The decade of the 1990s, seen from certain perspectives, rendered the global

⁴⁵ Joint Staff, J-7, Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary and Associated Terms, Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Staff, November 30, 2004, p. 509

⁴⁶Chintamani Mahapatra, “*India-China-Pakistan Triangle: The US Factor*”, Indian Foreign Affairs Journal Vol. 6, No. 4, October-December 2011, pp. 407-421.

balance-of-power concept almost redundant. The US being the only surviving superpower had none to balance its capabilities. The American policymakers naturally sought to craft new national security strategies to deny or delay the emergence of a rival global power. The global systemic transformation was bound to impact the Southern Asian strategic positioning. The strategic relevance of Pakistan faded away, China's earlier strategic weight waned and, more significantly, the perception of India as a Soviet ally also vanished. Moreover, India's economic liberalization generated new thinking in the US and gave rise to a novel rationale for more intimate Indo-US associations. But economy was not the only determining factor in American rethinking on policy towards India.⁴⁷ Unfortunately to settle its scores in West Asia American global strategy still needs the support of Pakistan to counter the rising power of China and the present upheavals' in the Islamic states and therein lies the tragedy for India.

It is not just the territorial mindedness of the leadership in the two states, but also their deep set insecurities that make them stick to traditional paradigms and not look for new initiatives. In the circumstances, territorial disputes do not get resolved and bilateral hostility cannot be overcome in the backdrop of domestic political imperatives of policymaking. Moreover, their adverse perception of each other reinforces belligerence of the two establishments instead of building mutual confidence. In the case of Pakistan, the military establishment's control over policymaking, especially the military's control of politics, seemingly under the blessings of US in the past has led to the disregard for non-military options in addressing India-Pakistan problems. That is the reason why even during civilian leaderships in Pakistan, the military has not shown much interest in breaking the mould to make or show positive overtures to their Indian counterpart, even when the civilian leadership has shown much interest to walk on new avenues of bonhomie and cordiality.⁴⁸

Presently, the fundamental overtone of their relationship is characterized by competition with the smaller neighbour, Pakistan; adamant to compete with a bigger India at all levels. The national objectives of Pakistan are juxtaposed against India's ambitions of attaining a global power status in a complex manner. It is not these divergent objectives per se that create problems, but the underlying perceptions that tend to make the objectives confrontational. To

⁴⁷ChintamaniMahapatra, "*India-China-Pakistan Triangle: The US Factor*", Indian Foreign Affairs Journal Vol. 6, No. 4, October-December 2011, pp. 407-421.

⁴⁸Ayesha Siddiq Agha, "*India Pakistan Relations: Confrontation to Conciliation*", Asia Foundation and the U.S. Agency for International Development, Islamabad, July 2004, p. 1

understand India-Pakistan relations it is equally important to comprehend their conflicting strategic perceptions, putting them on a confrontational course against each other. Strategic perceptions, it must be noted, relate to political objectives, a national vision, and their respective perception of themselves and each other. In the case of India and Pakistan, their strategic perceptions are also a product of their respective national insecurities.⁴⁹ The study will try to assess these strategic perspectives which dominated decision making of the two nations, as well as the relations that they built with larger nations and neighbours.

The above theories that has been selected is not at random but each theory either tries to identify the manner in which nations align themselves. Along with the necessity of power, there are questions of survival and growth along with the psyche of the leadership as well as the general populace. The manner in which decisions are taken by nations, which varies in size and power, where geo-political imperatives are different, but their decisions make a significant impact on national, regional as well as international politics can be assessed while keeping a base of the above selected theories. Needless to say, the theoretical frameworks outlined above seem to have relevance in explaining the relations between India and Pakistan. But the basic thrust of the present study, that is, the role of US in the strained relations between India and Pakistan cannot be explained by any of the theories. However structural realism comes closer to a greater extent to explain the intricacy of the triangle- India, Pakistan and the United States.

(1.3) Literature Review:

There has been enormous literature on the subject of India-Pakistan relations and also the involvement of the United States in the politics of the Asian Continent in general and the subcontinent in particular.

Aftab, Alam's, in his book *US Policy towards South Asia: Special Reference to Indo-Pakistan Relations* (Delhi: Raj Publications. 1998) tries to show that how the Indo-Pakistan relations, have been profoundly influenced by the actions and pronouncements of the external powers, especially the United States which does influence to a great deal the bilateral

⁴⁹Ayesha Siddiqa Agha, "India Pakistan Relations: Confrontation to Conciliation", Asia Foundation and the U.S. Agency for International Development, Islamabad, July 2004, pp.4-5

relations of India and Pakistan.⁵⁰ It attempts to highlight the United States' policy dynamics in South Asia on three important issues via nuclear, military assistance and Kashmir and its impact on between India and Pakistan relations. The book explores that how the United States by making Pakistan its cold war ally barely helped in improving India-Pakistan relations; rather its involvement has further widened the existing gap between the two neighbours. It is also surprising that both India and Pakistan hardly rely on each other but have spent time and energy to woo the United States to their favour, making the thing even more perplexed and prospect of a solution more remote. Had the situation been reversed India-Pakistan relations would not have experienced such a bitter state.

Nagaich, B B; Kumar, Jayant; Nagaich, Rajiv Nagaich, Sharda in their book *Six Decades of Indo-US-Pak Relations (2009, New Delhi; New Century Publications)* recounts the recent history of relations between the countries of India, Pakistan, and the United States dealing with varying subjects like diversities in India, Pakistan and the United States, cooperation between India and United States in economic, agricultural and other sectors, United States perspective of India and India's perspective of United States; nuclear issues and regional security; Kashmir imbroglio, international terrorism and strategies of India, Pakistan, United States, Russia, and China.⁵¹ The course of events discussed starts from early 1940s and ends with 2009, covering a wide geographical area and a variety of subjects.

In *The Kashmir Question: Retrospect and Prospect; (New York; Routledge; 2003)* Sumit Ganguly has written extensively written on India and Pakistan. In one of his books where he has specifically dealt with the Kashmir dispute, he along with many other scholars has provided a comprehensive assessment of a number of different facets of the on-going dispute over 'Kashmir Issue' between India and Pakistan, the respective endgames of both states, the dangers of nuclear escalation in the region, the state of the insurgency in the Indian-controlled portion of the disputed state and how these on-going issues and factors have led to the evolution of American policy toward the dispute affecting the two nations, whose

⁵⁰ Alam.Aftab, *US Policy towards South Asia: Special Reference to Indo- Pakistan Relations* (Delhi: Raj Publications. 1998).

⁵¹ B B; Kumar Nagaich, Jayant; Nagaich, Rajiv; Nagaich, Sharda; *Six Decades Of Indo-US-Pak Relations* (2009, New Delhi; New Century Publications).

respective claims to Kashmir are mostly on the basis of statecraft. It unearths the issues that how United States has been using ‘Kashmir’ as a veil to enter into this South-Asian region.⁵²

Abbas Hassan’s book *Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army and America’s War on Terror*; (New York; M E Sharpe Inc; 2004) is a narration of the history of governance of Pakistan that starts from the early years of governance till Musharraf’s regime.⁵³ It has in brief dealt with the governance of all the leaders that has risen to the helm of power in Pakistan. The manner in which Pakistani politics has gone through its ups and downs has been dealt in this book. It has also elaborated the manner in which recent political developments have changed the regional and national scenario of the nation. The author being in the Pakistani administration during Benazir Bhutto and later in General Musharraf’s governments has been able to give first hand experiences of governments. But it has given more of a journalistic version rather than an analytical and theoretical base for his explanations.

Zahid Hussain’s book *Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam*; (New York; Columbia University Press; 2008) provides an, exposure of the rise and continuation of Islamic extremism in Pakistan.⁵⁴ Zahid Hussain tries to show the links between the major jihadi groups of Pakistan, Al Qaeda, and the ISI with a degree of detail. It focuses how former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf’s decision to join the United States ‘war on terror’ led Pakistan to war with itself as Pakistan had to fight those very forces which it had nurtured, since the early eighties, in a very detailed manner he portrays the origin and nature of the jihadi movement in Pakistan and Afghanistan, the long-standing and often denied links between militants and Pakistani authorities, the weaknesses of successive elected governments, and the challenges to Musharraf’s authority posed by politico-religious, sectarian, and civil society elements within the country, and how the Pakistani army and intelligence services and even madrasas are thoroughly penetrated by jihadis. In his words, “Many of the religious parties operating the madrasas turned to militancy courtesy of the US-

⁵²SumitGanguly, eds; *The Kashmir Question: Retrospect and Prospect*; (New York; Routledge; 2003).

⁵³Abbas, Hassan; *Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army and America’s War on Terror*; (New York; M E Sharpe Inc; 2004).

⁵⁴ Zahid Hussain, *Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam*; (New York; Columbia University Press; 2008).

sponsored jihad in Afghanistan” (p.77); The US actively promoted militancy and the culture of jihad. Special textbooks were published in Dari and Pashto by the University of Nebraska-Omaha and funded by USAID with an aim to promote jihadist values and military training. Millions of such books were distributed at Afghan refugee camps and Pakistani madrasas. (pg.80). The book wonderfully shows that how the Americans relied almost entirely on the ISI to allocate weapons to the mujahideen groups during the Afghan, crisis emphasizes how General Zia cleverly used Islam to consolidate his power and legitimize his rule through the American blessings and how once the Soviet Union collapsed, the United States lost interest in this surreptitious game; which again rejuvenated after 9/11 when Pakistan once again became important for United States policy makers in their fight against global terrorism.

Rizwan Hussain, in his book *Pakistan And The Emergence Of Islamic Militancy In Afghanistan; (Great Britain; Ashgate Pub Ltd.; 2005)*.explores how the Pakistan Army's involvement with the Afghan Islamists became integrated with the Pakistani elites' post-Cold War strategic agenda.⁵⁵ The author takes into account the nature of the Pakistani polity and the foremost role of the Pakistani military in the policy formulation and how security concerns play a pivotal role in Pakistan's attempt to create a client state in Afghanistan in order to enhance Pakistan's wider economic and political influence in the region.

Artemy Kalinovsky in his edited book *The End of the Cold War and The Third World: New Perspectives on Regional Conflict (Cold War History); (2001)* showed how the end of the cold war shaped and molded the internal and external policy of the third world countries like India, Pakistan and Latin America.⁵⁶ This book brings together recent research on the end of the Cold War in the Third World and engages with ongoing debates about regional conflicts, focuses on the role of great powers in the developing world, and the role of international actors in conflict resolution. It tries to depict that how the great transformation of the world in the late 1980s affected regional conflicts and client relationships. Who "won" and who "lost" in the Third World and why do so many Cold War-era problems remain unresolved and many other facets of the implication of Cold War on the 'developing nations' has been explained in

⁵⁵RizwanHussain, *Pakistan And The Emergence Of Islamic Militancy In Afghanistan; (Great Britain; Ashgate Pub Ltd.; 2005)*.

⁵⁶Artemy Kalinovsky and Sergey Radchenko, (edts), *The End of the Cold War and The Third World: New Perspectives on Regional Conflict (Cold War History); (NewYork; Routledge; 2011)* pp 110

a systematic way, both from the perspectives of the superpowers and the Third World countries.

Owen Bennett Jones's book *Pakistan: Eye of the Storm; (USA; Yale University Press; 2003)* also remain to be an excellent master-piece about Pakistan concentrating on the Musharraf regime, focuses that how 'Pakistan' - with its political instability, vociferous Islamic community, pressing economic and social problems, access to nuclear weapons, and proximity to Afghanistan - stands at the very centre of global attention.⁵⁷ The book looks at Pakistan's battle with India over Kashmir and argues that most Pakistanis want to live in a free and tolerant state, not a theocracy. He considers the future of former Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf's attempt to undo the Islamisation; initiated by his predecessor, General Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq. Vital issues like the Kashmir, Nationalism, Bangladesh, Bomb, Democracy and the Army are analyzed very minutely and in a detailed manner and the concise history given is very revealing.

Stephen Cohen in his book *The Idea of Pakistan; (Washington D.C; Brookings Institution Press; 2006)* grapples with the question that what is Pakistan? Is it a 'rogue state', 'a delinquent nation', 'Taliban East' a 'failing state' or just 'misunderstood but an effective United States ally' (pp. 2)?⁵⁸ Cohen proceeds with two purposes first, he wants to demonstrate why Indian Muslims felt the need for a separate homeland to pursue their 'civilizational destiny' and second, how the state of Pakistan has evolved into a military-dominated entity that has nuclear capabilities, hostile relations with its neighbours and is characterized by weak economic institutions and socio-political strife. Instead of following the chronological order to describe the details of developments in Pakistan, Cohen has discussed in different chapters, players, factors and issues which in his understanding best define Pakistan: Idea of Pakistan, the state of Pakistan, Regionalism and separation, demographic, educational and economic prospects, Pakistan's future and American options. He concludes his study by outlining five different paths that Pakistan could take in the future and how the United States should shape its policy towards Pakistan bearing these plausible 'futures' in mind. Cohen also outlines five other scenarios that are likely to arise in the next five to eight years: the emergence of a moderate, democratic state; the rise of

⁵⁷Owen Bennett Jones, *Pakistan: Eye of the Storm; (USA; Yale University Press; 2003)*

⁵⁸ Stephen Philip Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan; (Washington D.C; Brookings Institution Press; 2006)*.

authoritarianism; the rise of an Islamist state; Pakistan's possible breakup and Pakistan after a major war with India (p. 297).

Ahmed Rashid in his appropriately titled book *Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia*; (USA Penguin Groups; Viking Adult; 2008) tries to portray how because of the United States' interventionist policy and policy makers, Pakistan, South and Central Asia had descended into chaos.⁵⁹ He starts exploring how the Clinton administration bears responsibility for where we find ourselves today and then focuses his attention to the real target of blistering critique which to him is the Bush administration, particularly Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and VP Dick Cheney. One of the most valuable contributions of the book is the discussion of Kashmir and his explanation of Afghan policy through the prism of India. His conclusions are devastating: to him an unstable and nuclear-armed Pakistan, a renewed al' Qaeda profiting from a booming opium trade, and a Taliban resurgence and reconquest may come out a serious menace. Though Rashid places the blame for continued instability in Central Asia mainly on the United States for failing to address the root cause (Islamic extremism) and biggest drivers (Pakistan and other autocratic regimes) but does not really explore why the United States made the decisions it made, he just dismisses them as the products of United States obsession with Iraq and torture.

Navnita Chadha Behera's *Demystifying Kashmir*; (Washington D.C Brookings Institution Press; 2006) mainly deals on a subject on which Indians and Pakistanis can't shake off their nationalist positions- 'Kashmir Issue'.⁶⁰ Tracing the history of Kashmir from the pre-partition India to the current-day situation the author in her book wonderfully elucidates how Kashmir came to be a part of the Indian suzerainty, how Pakistan has been using Kashmir as war-game, Kashmir's demand from Azadi to Jihadi and the detrimental role of the western powers from erstwhile Soviet Union to United States in solving the dispute .She provides a comprehensive analysis of the philosophical underpinnings and the local, bilateral, and international dynamics of the key players involved in this flashpoint of conflict, including New Delhi, Islamabad, political groups and militant outfits on both sides of the Line of

⁵⁹ Ahmed Rashid, *Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia*; (USA Penguin Groups; Viking Adult; 2008).

⁶⁰ Navnita Chadha Behera, *Demystifying Kashmir*; (Washington D.C Brookings Institution Press; 2006)

Control, and international powers. This book explains and explores the political and military components of India's and Pakistan's Kashmir strategy, the self-determination debate, and the insurgent movement that began in 1989. And in the conclusion it focuses on what Behera terms the 'four P's: parameters, players, politics, and prognosis' of the ongoing peace process in Kashmir.

Victoria Schofield in her book *Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War*; (London; I. B. Tauris; 2003) tries to examine the Kashmir conflict from the period when the valley was an independent kingdom right up to the struggles of the present day, when it has confirmed its status as a battleground for two of the world's newest nuclear powers, India and Pakistan.⁶¹ Tracing the origin of the state in the nineteenth century and the controversial 'sale' by the British of the predominantly Muslim valley to a Hindu Maharaja is dealt in details in the book. In her book she explains the serious issues that divides India and Pakistan and accesses the military position of both the states as their troop's masses on both side of the border, and also analyses the current crisis starting from partition and ending at the year 2000. This fairly balanced the author in her book and tries to give the perspectives of the Pakistanis, the Indians, and for once, the Kashmiries themselves; on the much disputed Kashmir issue.

George Perkovich's path-breaking book *India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation*; (Los-Angeles; University of California Press; 1999) is the definitive, comprehensive history of how the world's largest democracy, grappled with the twin desires to have and to renounce the bomb.⁶² Why did India bid for nuclear weapon status at a time when 149 nations had signed a ban on nuclear testing? What drove India's new Hindu nationalist government to depart from decades of nuclear restraint, a control that no other nation with similar capacities had displayed? How has U.S.'s nonproliferation policy affected India's decision making are some of the key issues which has been dealt very meticulously and thoroughly in this book. He in his book mainly focuses on two major questions: i) why did India decide to proceed with a test of what it called a "peaceful nuclear explosion" in 1974, and ii), why did it then refrain from further testing for twenty-four years? Which

⁶¹Victoria Schofield, *Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War*; (London; I. B. Tauris; 2003).

⁶² George Perkovich, *India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation*; (Los-Angeles ; University of California Press; 1999).

Perkovich concludes that India's profound ambivalence toward nuclear weapons, on the one hand, it was a leader in calling for world nuclear disarmament, condemning the nuclear powers for the arms race and expressing moral revulsion at the existence of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, it was committed to throwing off the vestiges of colonialism, demonstrating its scientific prowess, and winning recognition as a major power. Moreover, Perkovich shows the Indian decision to build the bomb did not respond to external security threats but to the domestic Indian need to assert its national identity, break from its colonial legacy, and become the great power that it felt it should rightfully be -- a complex mix of domestic and psychological factors. However he concludes that the Indian tests "were bold statements" (p. 438) that generally failed to accomplish their objectives.

India, Pakistan, and the Bomb: Debating Nuclear Stability in South Asia; (New York; Columbia University Press; 2010) another masterpiece book by Sumit Ganguly's along with S. Paul Kapur focuses that whether nuclearisation has created a barrier to escalation during crises between the two nations - the so-called nuclear stability theory, drawn from the United States-Soviet Cold War experience - or whether it has instead created a shield for Pakistani adventurism and a risk of Indian overreaction, by offering competing theories on the transformation of the region and showing what these patterns mean for the world's next proliferators.⁶³ Where on one hand Ganguly emphasizes that, nuclear weapons have prevented Indo-Pakistani disputes from blossoming into full-scale war, on the other Kapur views that, nuclear weapons have fueled a violent cycle of Pakistani provocation and Indian response, giving rise to a number of crises that might easily have spun into chaos. However they both agree that the presence of nuclear weapons would make a failure to manage a crisis more catastrophic but disagree about whether nuclear arms increase or reduce the likelihood of such a failure and as for policy recommendations, think India should refrain from developing ballistic missile defenses and that Pakistan should rein in its militant groups.

Sumit Ganguly in one of his another of his book *The Origins of War in South Asia: Indo-Pakistani Conflicts Since 1947;* (West view Press; 1994) studies the causes, consequence and implications of the wars between India and Pakistan since 1947.⁶⁴ He not only provides a

⁶³SumitGanguly and S Paul Kapur, *India, Pakistan, and the Bomb: Debating Nuclear Stability in South Asia;* (New York; Columbia University Press; 2010).

⁶⁴SumitGanguly, *The Origins of War in South Asia: Indo-Pakistani Conflicts Since 1947;* (West view Press; 1994).

comprehensive exploration of the causes and consequences of three clashes but also offers some interesting reasons why there may not be a fourth. Ganguly's book observes that after two of the three wars in and on 'Kashmir' only a vocal minority now seeks independence from India diminishing the force of Pakistani irredentism in this region, not only this but also the breakup of Pakistan in 1971 and India's unquestioned military strength had made it difficult for any Pakistani regime to contemplate an attack on India. Finally, the acquisition of nuclear capabilities by both sides may in fact lead to increased prudence by the two South Asian rivals. The uniqueness of the work lies in that it suggests that the India-Pakistan conflicts are irredentist in nature — that each country seeks confirmation of its national identity through Kashmir. While the Kashmir dispute dominates the subject, the topics of nuclearisation of the sub-continent, limited war of Kargil and repercussions of 9/11 terrorist strike in the United States have also been subjected to author's detailed examination.

Praveen Swami's *India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad: The Covert War in Kashmir, 1947-2004*; (New York; Routledge; 2006) seeks to explore the history of Jihadist groups in Jammu and Kashmir.⁶⁵ Eight chapters of the book chronologically explore the history of jihadist groups in Jammu and Kashmir, documenting the course of their activities and their changing character from 1947 to 2004. Swami's book addresses three key issues I.) The history of jihadist violence in Jammu and Kashmir, which is examined as it evolved from 1947-48 onwards, II.) The impact of the secret jihad on Indian policy-making on Jammu and Kashmir, and its influence on political life within the state, III.) Why the jihad in Jammu and Kashmir acquired such intensity in 1990. His main research questions are: How jihadist violence was not, as is widely assumed, a phenomenon that manifested itself in Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir only after 1988? It further investigates how a welter of jihadist groups waged a sustained campaign against Indian rule in Jammu and Kashmir from the outset, after the partition of India? The book ends up with an optimistic viewpoint that a resolution of the multiple crises and conflicts which together constitute what we call the Kashmir conflict may be years or even decades in future. Bringing an end to the long jihad offers the best prospect of ensuring that there at least remains a place where a conflict may one day be solved (p217-18).

⁶⁵Praveen Swami, *India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad: The Covert War in Kashmir, 1947-2004*; (New York; Routledge; 2006).

Harold Gould's book *The South Asia Story: The First Sixty Years of US Relations with India and Pakistan*; (New Delhi; Sage Publications Pvt. Ltd.; 2010) can be an encyclopedia for studying the complex and changing U.S. relations with India and Pakistan in the last sixty years since World War II.⁶⁶ Gould tries to provide a series of brief sketches on how twelve US presidents since Franklin Roosevelt to Barrack Obama perceived and dealt with South Asia-most particularly, of course, India and Pakistan, from World War II to present day. The book highlights how personal whims and preferences of the elected presidents, political considerations, individual actions, contexts, foreign policy, their unique personalities, levels of awareness, and intellectual gifts had shaped the relations between the trios. Gould's book highlights the facts that events such as World War II, Cold War and most recently, the rise of Islamic radicalism and terrorism posed the most sustained challenges which the presidents have had to encounter and negotiate with caution as far as their political interaction with India and Pakistan was concerned, and also how interestingly, none of these American Presidents ever had any meaningful experience with South Asia prior to entering office.

Former Pakistani President Musharraf's book *In the Line of Fire: A Memoir*; (New York; Free Press; 2006) is an attempt to show General Musharraf as the saviour who brought out Pakistan from the brink of extremism and saved the country for the world. In his book Musharraf disclosed his view about 9/11, Afghanistan, Al-Qaida, War on terrorism, relation with India, East Pakistan, Pakistan political scenario, Pakistan- United States relations, Islam, Nuclear Proliferation and threat made United States for having their site democracy and many more issues.⁶⁷ He depicts hastily narrated memoir of the horrifying incident of September 11, 2001, the murder of United States' journalist Daniel Pearl, the ongoing efforts to dislodge al-Qaeda from the borders with Afghanistan and the fight against the 'Talibanisation' threatening Pakistan from the same direction. However the book does give insight into the perspective of the Muslim world on the events of 9/11, confusing, too, is Musharraf's account of Kargil, the Indo-Pakistan conflict in the mountains of Kashmir that led to a breakdown of trust and co-operation between Pakistan's civil and military powers in 1999 and to the bloodless coup that pushed him to power - and brought two nuclear powers to the brink of war. In his book the former. Pakistani President offers a portrait of Mullah Omar,

⁶⁶Harold A Gould, *The South Asia Story: The First Sixty Years of US Relations with India and Pakistan*; (New Delhi; Sage Publications Pvt. Ltd.; 2010).

⁶⁷Pervez Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire: A Memoir*; (New York; Free Press; 2006).

with stories of Pakistan's attempts to negotiate with him, A. Q. Khan and his proliferation network, and he reveals fascinating details of Khan's operations and the investigations into them. Lastly, he tells the sad story of Pakistan's experience with democracy and what he has done to make it workable.

Dennis Kux in his book *The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies; (Pennsylvania Avenue; The Johns Hopkins University Press; 2001)* provides a biased but comprehensive and authoritative study of United States-Pakistan relations from the cold war period till the present era, he tries to focus how in the 1950s, the two countries became alliance partners against the communists and how in the 1960s, the relationship fell apart and Pakistan developed itself as a nuclear weapon and moved toward China, until the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, which again brought these two partners of necessity together and United States-Pakistan bilateral relations improved.⁶⁸ He had tried to show that United States and Pakistani interests have been alternately in accord with and in opposition to each other and this fact accounts for the hot and cold relationship between the two nations. Traditionally, the future of Kashmir and the perceived Indian threat have been the cornerstones of Pakistani foreign and security policy whereas the United States, saw its relationship with Pakistan through the lens of the Cold War between 1947 and 1991. This book in a very brilliant way tries to highlight that how these two nations of the world has been embittered partners of each other from time to time and explains that why and how the two nations were close partners during the Eisenhower, Nixon and Reagan years, though estranged during the Kennedy, Johnson, Carter, Bush and Clinton years.

Nicolas Burns's edited book *American Interests in South Asia: Building a Grand Strategy in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India; (Washington D.C; The Aspen Institute; 2011)* contains a collection of commissioned papers that provide an intensive exploration of the interconnected national security challenges posed by the events in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India.⁶⁹ This book which focuses on the issues like the lessons from history and balance of power in the region; highlights the current strategy in Afghanistan, enumerates the effect of American foreign assistance and private sector development, and depicts though not on a detailed that

⁶⁸Dennis Kux, *The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies; (Pennsylvania Avenue; The Johns Hopkins University Press; 2001)*.

⁶⁹Nicholas Burns and Jonathan Price, eds; *American Interests in South Asia: Building a Grand Strategy in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India; (Washington D.C; The Aspen Institute; 2011)*.

how the United States interest has been playing a very dynamic role in the relations between India-Pakistan relations. Burn's book seeks to understand the current issues that the United States is being facing in this region and also suggests the American policymakers a way to cope with what has become one of America's most pressing security problems.

J.N. Dixit's book *India-Pakistan in War and Peace*; (London; Routledge; 2002) provides an account of the history and politics of the two great South Asian rivals- India and Pakistan.⁷⁰ Dixit in his book has tried to portray that like the Israel-Palestine struggle, the Indian-Pakistan rivalry has also its legacy in history. In a very balanced way he has tried to provide how both the two countries went to war within months of becoming independent and, how over the following half-century, they have fought three wars with each other, and what were their implications and consequence, and how both the two nations have been at odds at not only in the United Nations but also at other global forums.

Christine Fair and Tellis in their book *Limited Conflicts Under the Nuclear Umbrella: Indian and Pakistani Lessons from the Kargil Crisis* (Washington DC: Rand, 2002) examines the aftermath views of two nuclear armed states- India and Pakistan on the significance of Pakistan's foray into the Kargil-Dras sector that has come to be known as the Kargil conflict in their book and unlike other books that specifically which deals with the general causes and the consequence only.⁷¹ The broad purpose of the study is to understand how India and Pakistan viewed the significance of the Kargil conflict, what lessons they drew from this conflict, and the implications of those lessons for future stability in South Asia. Tellis tries to portray that even the presence of nuclear weapons might not appreciably dampen security competition between the region's largest states and, questions that whether or not the Kargil war represents a foretaste of future episodes of attempted nuclear coercion if India and Pakistan. However, since it was a compilation of reports on the request of the United States during the United States' Presidential election as such not every view pertaining to Kargil is recorded and, further, many nuances and variations on the main themes recorded here are excluded which were found by the author of no interest to policymakers in the United States.

⁷⁰JN Dixit, *India-Pakistan in War and Peace*; (London; Routledge; 2002)

⁷¹Ashley J. Tellis, C. Christine Fair, Jamison Jo Medby, *Limited Conflicts Under the Nuclear Umbrella: Indian and Pakistani Lessons from the Kargil Crisis* (Washington DC: Rand, 2002)

Teresita Shaffer in her monograph *India and the United States in the 21st Century: Reinventing Partnership (Significant Issues)*; (Washington D.C; Center for Strategic & International Studies; 2009) examines the new strategic partnership between the United States and India.⁷² This book brings together the two countries' success in forging bilateral relations and their relatively skimpy record of seeking common ground on global and regional issues, highlighting how India's economic growth and thirst for energy create important common interests between India and United States. Schaffer's book has tried to show how since the Clinton era India and the United States focused on 4 key issues primarily an evolving, bi-lateral relationship that has particularly grown years, their Economic foreign policy, Energy Security of the Indian Ocean, Global partnership since end of Cold War. It focuses four opportunities where these two nations can jointly work on important global issues like the International Finance Reform, Trade, Climate Change, and Nuclear Proliferation. However Schaffer has also highlighted some of the major Key hurdles that the U.S and India have to overcome to be able to build a strategic partnership: United States – Burden of History, India's Concept of Sovereign Autonomy and Ability to create a Strategy. At the conclusion Schaffer counsels that a U.S.-Indian partnership holds great promise but will require a lot of diplomatic cultivation to pay off.

Ashok Kapur's edited book *India and the United States in a Changing World*; (New Delhi; SAGE Publications Pvt. Ltd; 2002) provides a course of India- United States relations, and offers pragmatic policy recommendations.⁷³ In their introduction to this book, the authors tries to focus on factors such as distance, cultural apathy and a deep distrust of the outsider that did not allow India to acquire a prominent place in American foreign policy until the end of the Second World War and how now it's the end of an extremely transformative period in India- United States relations, because of the end of three key obstacles; viz, the Cold War - which saw the United States locked in an intense ideological confrontation with the Soviet Union thus making the India-led Non-Aligned Movement incompatible with United States policy; secondly, India- United States relations that had for long completely lacked economic content and had changed with the process of liberalization ; lastly, the nuclear bottleneck in

⁷²Teresita C Schaffer; *India and the United States in the 21st Century: Reinventing Partnership (Significant Issues)*; (Washington D.C; Center for Strategic & International Studies; 2009).

⁷³Ashok Kapur, Yogendra K Malik, Harold A Gould, and Arthur G Rubinoff, *India and the United States in a Changing World*; (New Delhi; SAGE Publications Pvt. Ltd; 2002).

the relationship that has been removed with the help of the India- United States nuclear deal. The introductory essay by Malik and Kapur contextualizes the crests and the troughs of India-United States relations, where they argue that how when India sought to emerge as the dominant regional power, the United States crushed its ambitions by consolidating its military alliance with Pakistan, thereby creating a regional balance of power. Tremblay, on the Kashmir issue in India- United States relations argues that how the United States attitude of mistrust and a paucity of interest in any region outside of the American continent were responsible for the United States ambivalence on the resolution of Kashmir issue. Louscher, Cook and Barto, describes military relations between the United States and India as somewhat unique in international politics, as both countries have often declared their desire for intimate military ties but in practice have remained decidedly cold towards each other. Whereas Gandhi, in his essay on the financial relations between the two countries, expounds that the main reason for India's low economic visibility is that over the years, the structure of the bilateral trade has changed very little. Finally it focuses that there are three major questions that are likely to arise now in the India- United States relationship: first, to what extent would their future relationship be determined by the unfinished agenda, for instance of defense and space cooperation. Second, is there a next big idea to take this relationship to an even higher level? Third, how will the two sides manage issues such as climate change and to a lesser degree the Doha round of trade negotiations and arms control regimes such as the CTBT.

David Malone's book *Does the Elephant Dance? Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy; (USA; Oxford University Press, 2011)* elegantly surveys the key features of contemporary Indian foreign policy and provides a broad-ranging but substantive survey of the Indian foreign policy horizon.⁷⁴ Identifying the relevant aspects of Indian history, the author examines with insight and sympathy the role of domestic politics and internal and external security challenges, and of domestic and international economic factors, the "Hindu rate of growth", India's 'soft power', the role of migration and India's aspirations to play a significant role on the United Nation Security Council; for crafting of the Indian foreign policy are discussed. Separate chapters examine the specifics of India's policies toward its neighbours, and individually with China, the United States, West Asia, East and Southeast Asia, Europe and Russia, and multilateral diplomacy. Malone divides India's engagement

⁷⁴ David M Malone, *Does the Elephant Dance? Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy; (USA; Oxford University Press, 2011)*

with the world into three periods: idealism under Nehru, hard realism under Indira Gandhi, and economically driven pragmatism today. Malone's approach to his subject is constructed around "three major preoccupations and an important partner". The preoccupations, inevitably, are the challenge of managing our relationships with our immediate neighbours; handling China; and striving to ensure India's emergence as a major global player. The partner is the United States, with whom India possesses "specific shared interests in some areas and quid pro quo arrangements in others, all underscored by strong economic interdependence" but with whom we should beware of basing "long-term strategies excessively on systematic cooperation", has been dealt in this book.

Prem Shankar Jha's book *The Origins of a Dispute: Kashmir 1947*; (London; Oxford University Press; 2003) is an account of the origins of the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan.⁷⁵ Over the decades two entirely opposed versions of Kashmir's accession to India, have come into being, this book examines both versions, and the role of the British government. Through documents such as the Mountbatten papers and the Pinnell files, Prem Shankar Jha tests the rival versions of history and confirms that the dispute has its origin neither in the unfinished business of Partition nor in the vacillation of a weak, indolent and despotic Maharaja of Kashmir rather it was mere a product of power politics with its seed sown by the British policy in the last days before the Transfer of Power as London. Jha tackles head-on Alistair Lamb's claims about the collusion between Mountbatten and the Indian government in 1947 to deprive Pakistan of Kashmir and provides plausible alternative readings of some of the key issues that Lamb raises, not only this but Jha's book provides an end to the long lasting controversy over Mountbatten's alleged tampering to India's advantage with Lord Radcliff's partition of the Punjab.

Stephen Cohen's *The Future of Pakistan*; (Washington D.C; Brookings Institution Press; 2011) presents and evaluates several scenarios for how the country (Pakistan) will develop, evolve, and act in the near future, as well as the geopolitical implications of each.⁷⁶ The book focuses on the issues like why Pakistan is been a major foreign policy headache for the United States, how Pakistan can get out of what you call the burden of its history and

⁷⁵Prem Shankar Jha, *The Origins of a Dispute: Kashmir 1947*; (London; Oxford University Press; 2003).

⁷⁶Stephen Philip Cohen, *The Future of Pakistan*; (Washington D.C; Brookings Institution Press; 2011).

narrative of victimhood how Pakistani military were ineffective in running the country effectively, how the influence which Islam and the army continue to exercise on the future of Pakistan, How is failure in Afghanistan going to affect Pakistan? What should or can be done to immediately bring Pakistan into what you call a 'normal state category'? Cohen's book helps us understand the current circumstances, the relevant actors and their motivation, the critical issues at hand, the different outcomes they might produce, and what it all means for Pakistanis, Indians, the United States, and the entire world. Cohen argues that if Pakistan pursues policies which are hostile to American interests in Afghanistan and if they support terrorism then we might move to a policy of containment and to him the long-term key to normalizing Pakistan is India, which if gets normalize then Pakistan can devote its resources and energy to becoming a more attractive and respected country. He predicts that Pakistan a country with one of the world's biggest armies with nuclear arsenal, sharing its western borderlands with such a country which have emerged as the epicenter of international terrorism in the last few decades, having its civilian and military establishments have boldly instrumentalised Islam for political purposes; will remain, but its identity will change. Moreover United States military raid on Abbottabad last May and the execution of Osama bin Laden without the permission of Pakistan, the continuing drone attacks on Pakistan's western borderlands, and last November's NATO attack on a Pakistani military post and Washington's plans to withdraw from Afghanistan has set the stage for the transformation of the regional security complex in the north-western subcontinent, may really bring out a big question on the future of Pakistan.

Riedel's book *Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of the Global Jihad*; (Washington D.C; Brookings Institution Press; 2012) explains how the United States, on several occasions, actually helped the foes of democracy in Pakistan and aided in the development of the very enemies it is now fighting in the region.⁷⁷ The book seeks to unravel this paradox, revealing and interpreting the tortuous path of relations between two very different nations, which remain, in many ways, stuck with each other. His conclusion is that a "jihadist state" is possible in Pakistan and a proactive United States policy to forestall that danger is needed. In the wake of Osama bin Laden's death at the hands of United States' Special Forces in Pakistan, all eyes are turned to the relations and tensions between the two nations which have been locked in a deadly embrace for decades. The book effectively shows

⁷⁷Bruce O Riedel, *Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of the Global Jihad*; (Washington D.C; Brookings Institution Press; 2012).

that the Pakistanis' anti-American sentiments and actions are not solely based on irrational hatred or zealotry; for the balance of Pakistan's history, the United States has acted remarkably inconsistent toward the country and bears some responsibility for its radicalization. Riedel counsels Washington to attempt to resolve some of the most complicated and entrenched issues in the region—Kashmir, for one—in order to sever the ties between local terrorists and their global counterparts. Somewhat surprisingly for a self-styled realist, Riedel argues that a relationship based on momentary self-interest has not worked for either Pakistan or the United States, and both sides must be willing to “agree to disagree” on some issues while defining the core purpose of their alliance: defeating terrorism and settling the grievances that nurture extremism.

Teresita C. Schaffer and Howard B. Schaffer's book *India and the United States in the 21st Century: Reinventing Partnership (Significant Issues)*; (Washington D.C; Center for Strategic & International Studies; 2009) analyses the themes, techniques, and styles that have characterized Pakistani negotiations with American civilian and military officials since Pakistan's independence.⁷⁸ It portrays how Pakistan's distinctive history, geography, and political culture have shaped its approach to negotiating with the United States. It then describes the asymmetric interactions of the governing institutions that produce Pakistani foreign policy, covering the military (including the intelligence service), career diplomats and the bureaucracy, politicians, ideological core, geopolitical position, culture, ideological core, geopolitical position, and culture, has shaped negotiations with the United States. Pakistan's perception of India as an existential threat warrants a separate chapter on Indian-Pakistani negotiations, which highlights the contrasting styles Pakistan uses when negotiating with India versus when negotiating with the United States.

Schaffer's book records America's views on-and involvement in-the long-standing struggle waged between India and Pakistan over Kashmir since their independence in 1947 and provides an exemplary account of the United States' efforts over the last 60 years to settle, or at least manage, this problem. Schaffer sees three distinct phases in the United States involvement — a 15-year period of “deep engagement” from 1948 to 1963; another 15-year period of “diplomatic quiescence”; and, a third phase since 1990 during which the focus was

⁷⁸Teresita C Schaffer, *India and the United States in the 21st Century: Reinventing Partnership (Significant Issues)*; (Washington D.C; Center for Strategic & International Studies; 2009).

on cooling down India-Pakistan tensions.⁷⁹ The book focuses on several key, aspects of the United States involvement, in Jammu & Kashmir. These include the plebiscite issue, the most proactive intervention of the American establishment during the era of John F Kennedy in the aftermath of the 1962 Sino-Indian war, handling of situation during the Kargil war, the balancing act of United States post the 26/11 attacks to fight the global war on terror and also mentions reasons as to which the Obama administration should take initiative by playing a major role in helping solve the Kashmir dispute. It portrays that how United States Presidents like Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy administrations from time to time had sought to develop a framework for a Kashmir settlement, the Kargil war proved a turning point, veering diplomacy towards. Schaffer analyses issues like why the Swaran Singh-Bhutto talks failed, why President Eisenhower's sympathetic behavior to the non-alignment movement, Menon's six hours speech in the Security Council on the Kashmir Issue in 1956 hardly received six inches of space whereas the same by Sir Feroze Noon was given full page treatment, plebiscite, partition of valley proposal, election in Kashmir etc and the role which United States played in these issues. This book also looks that how the "US policy has been more effective in crisis management; than peace building in Kashmir" The main challenge, from the author's perspective lies, in persuading, India and, Pakistan to be, more pragmatic in, their expectations. At the end of the book, the author has summarized the events in the "Chronology of America's Role in Kashmir".

Norman Brown's volume evokes the richness and complexity of the history, cultural evolution and politics of the three major countries on the subcontinent; he encapsulates the most complex situations, providing a summary introduction for a careful exposition.⁸⁰ The book tries to analyze that how between 1963 and 1972 the two nations of India and Pakistan made a number of important governmental, political, economic, and cultural changes, meet crises caused by forces of nature as well as crises originating in their own institutions, and how repudiated democratic processes in Pakistan led to the civil war in East Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh. His chapters on the traditional heritage; the British legacy; the contrasting perspectives of Hindus and Muslims, Hindu-Muslim communalism and the Kashmir quarrel; and regional-linguistic politics are unusually penetrating. Regional and

⁷⁹Howard Schaffer, *The Limits of Influence: America's Role in Kashmir*; (Virginia; Brookings Institution Press; 2009).

⁸⁰Norman W Brown, *The United States, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh*; (Cambridge, Harvard University Press; 1972).

linguistic political issues are skillfully sketched. However there is only limited attention to the major issues of economic policy or alternative development models, a more analytical approach to the way India's and Pakistan's elite perceived their contrasting security problems and assessed their military capabilities would have provided a more solid base for foreign policy analysis.

Lars Blinkenberg's two-volume study *India-Pakistan: The History of Unsolved Conflicts: The Historical Part, Vols. I & II* (Odense: Odense University Press; 1998) has made an attempt to understand the major causes and history of the troubled relations between the two states.⁸¹ The first volume, published in 1972, adopts historical and analytical perspectives to examine three interrelated issues: the history of the Kashmir problem, the pattern of India-Pakistan relations, and the major political developments inside Indian-administered Kashmir. The second volume covers the same period but is more interpretative and extends the arguments of the first volume by looking at the impact of the partition in 1947, structural factors, the role of the personalities involved and their perceptions, and the political setting. The roles of the United Nations and states such as China, the Soviet Union, the United States, and other Western countries have also been examined with reference to the Kashmir problem. The discussion of the right of self-determination is interesting, although Blinkenberg does not take a definite position on its application to Kashmir, although he leans towards the Indian view that after the establishment of Bangladesh, which negated the two-nation 'theory', the original basis for the creation of Pakistan, 'no justification could be found for letting Kashmir choose its own way'. The major part of this volume (pp. 114-261) examines India's domestic politics in the 1950s and 1960s, the roles of leading political personalities, and explains how both impinged on India's policy towards Kashmir and its relations with Pakistan. The study provides a detailed account of the Kashmir problem: its pre-partition history, political movement against the ruler, and shows how a section of the Kashmiri elite came under the influence of the Muslim League, whereas the larger section led by Sheikh Abdullah remained close to the Congress Party, the initial moves by India and Pakistan to cope with the situation in Kashmir, especially the former's decision to raise the matter in the UN Security Council, are explained in some detail, followed by an excellent summary of different moves by the Security Council for the resolution of the problem. The book offers three insightful explanations as to why Jawaharlal Nehru backed out of the commitment to hold a plebiscite

⁸¹Lars Blinkenberg, *India-Pakistan: The History of Unsolved Conflicts: The Historical Part, Vols. I & II* (Odense: Odense University Press; 1998)

in Kashmir. Acknowledging the complexities of the Kashmir issue and other problems, Blinkenberg calls upon the two sides to make 'a realistic reappraisal of their positions' (ii. 274) for promoting peace in the region.

Amitabh Mattoo, Kapil Kak, and Happymon Jacob's (eds.) book *India & Pakistan: Pathways Ahead*; (New Delhi: KW Publishers Pvt. Ltd.; 2007) encapsulates the faith that, "cold peace no longer characterizes Indo-Pak relations: there is a constructive engagement towards fulfilling common regional goals and aspirations."⁸² The book focused on issues like how long will the Pakistan armies, the ultimate arbiter of Pakistan's fate; remain in the barracks, which is the preferred choice of its present Chief, Gen. Kayani? How will the Americans safeguard their huge investment in Pakistan, a frontline state in the war on terror in Afghanistan? Will India's commitment to the peace process with Pakistan remain on track, since elections to the Kashmir Assembly are slated for later this year, and the Indian general elections are expected in early-mid 2009? Amitabh Mattoo in his introductory essay, shows that the security community in India, termed subedars support an aggressive posture towards Pakistan; there are others who prefer a policy of benign neglect, termed saudagars (businessmen or brokers); and a small minority that favors promoting peace, termed sufis (secular philosophers). What he does not inform us about is that this policy informed India's very successful excision of east Bengal and the creation of Bangladesh in 1971. Frederic Grare examines how the peace process has evolved, the risks and constraints obtaining and various scenarios regarding its future. Other essays here, written by recognized specialists like Jasjit Singh, Kalim Bahadur, Malini Parthasarathy, Rajesh Rajgopalan, Pervez Hoodbhoy, Gen. Afsir Karim, Prem Shankar Jha, Pran Chopra, Satish Kumar and Frederic Grare; have been placed into four major sections - the regional dimension, a historical overview of the bilateral relationship, peace-building with the focus on Kashmir, and the way forward encapsulating the pathways ahead - the subtitle to this volume. The concluding essay by co-editor, Kapil Kak, attempts to sum up the arguments in this book on the influence of global perspectives and regional imperatives on India-Pakistan dynamics, an evaluation of Pakistan's internal compulsions, the 'internalities' of the J&K issue that impact their bilateral relationship, and finally an estimation of the problems and prospects of the ongoing peace process.

⁸² Amitabh Mattoo, Kapil Kak and Happymon Jacob (eds.); *India & Pakistan: Pathways Ahead*; (New Delhi: KW Publishers Pvt. Ltd.; 2007).

Beside the selected books reviewed, there have been a plethora of research articles on the India-Pakistan- United States relations and individual references to the great powers involvement in the sub-continent relations in particular and Asian in general, focusing on the complexity of relationship between the three- India-Pakistan-United States.

Victoria Schofield in her paper deals in depth the present status or condition of Pakistan. Schofield focuses that a nation like Pakistan has been in the forefront of foreign policy debate for decades, at times condemned as a failing or failed state, also as a ‘terrorist’ state.⁸³ As the country faces continuing pressure from the fallout of the war in Afghanistan as well as deepening internal strife, this article gives an overview of Pakistan’s problems, highlighting growing anti-Western sentiment and emphasizing the importance of institutional stability, as well as a resolution of ‘the Kashmir issue’.

Ashok K. Behuria, critically analysis Pakistan’s ‘Kashmir first’ approach since Lahore Agreement and ex-Pakistani President Musharraf’s four-step approach to resolve the Kashmir issue, and tries to show that Was it for real?⁸⁴ Was there any sincere effort to find a solution or was it mere showmanship? Was it sincere and genuine? Was there political consensus behind such an approach or was it the fancy of the top leadership? Will it last? or were they mere occasioned by the changing global political context and that they were more apparent than real. This paper seeks answers to such questions and critically analyses Pakistan’s approach to Kashmir in recent years. Making a prophecy the paper even tries to highlight that if there is a realization that the policy of subversion and militancy has backfired, the temptation to retain jihadis as the last option will continue to play havoc with the process of dialogue aimed at finding a solution to Kashmir in the days to come.

Alexander Evans in his article has tried to highlight that how after the fall of the Taliban, Pakistan’s policy of strategic depth in Afghanistan had to adapt.⁸⁵ How ‘Brand Pakistan’ has suffered over the last ten years, portrayed in the media as an obstacle to peace and on what grounds Pakistan is willing to support an Afghan political process which reflects Pakistan’s critical role in the region, has been dealt in this article. The article focuses that how

⁸³Victoria Schofield (2011): Pakistan: 2011, *The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 100, No.417, pp. 623-628.

⁸⁴Ashok K. Behuria, *Strategic Analysis*; 2009; Vol. 33, No. 3, pp. 433–449.

⁸⁵Alexander Evans, *Pakistan and the Shadow of 9/11*; *The RUSI Journal*; Vol. 156, No. 4, 2011, pp. 64-70.

ultimately, India, not Afghanistan, is at the heart of Pakistani strategic foreign policy, and this will continue to define the region into the future and also the need of an effective United States-Pakistan bilateral relationship to be built on more than transactionalism.

Mary Miner, Gauri Patankar, Shama Gamkhar & David J. Eaton's article focuses on the long 50 years a relatively stable Indus Water Treaty (IWT) moderated competition for the Indus water between Pakistan and India.⁸⁶ The authors had tried to show that how the present rising demand for water in each nation could unsettle this stable relationship, as foreshadowed by the involvement of a third party during 2005–2007 for the first time in the treaty's history. This paper also discusses Pakistan and India's experience in the context of other international shared rivers. For the benefit of their people, Pakistan and India could coordinate unilateral development and resolve issues rather than defer them.

C.Christine Fair examines the arc of the United States–Pakistan relations amid the developments of the last decade of the war on terror.⁸⁷ It argues that Washington's pursuit of dehyphenated relations with India and Pakistan, and failure to follow through on early promises to Pakistan, made it more likely that Pakistan would again return to a policy of supporting the Taliban and increase Pakistan's dependence upon Islamist terror groups to prosecute its security interests. Fair tries to show that how after a decade of fraught ties, culminating in a particularly tumultuous year in 2011, the United States and Pakistan seemed poised for collision and also makes an prophecy that with no remedy in sight, this rupture in the United States–Pakistan relations will have enormous implications for regional and international security.

Rahul Roy-Chaudhury's article explains, how India Pakistan's nuclear arsenals have probably helped steer both countries away from all-out conventional war and even led to a thaw in bilateral relations.⁸⁸ He argues that the key to better relations in the future will be how effectively India and Pakistan can co-operate to deter non-state actors from carrying out

⁸⁶Mary Miner, Gauri Patankar, Shama Gamkhar & David J. Eaton, *Water sharing between India and Pakistan: a critical evaluation of the Indus Water Treaty*; Water International, Vol. 34, No. 2, 2009, pp. 204-216.

⁸⁷C.Christine Fair; *The US–Pakistan relations after a decade of the war on terror*, Contemporary South Asia, Vol.20, No. 2, 2012, pp. 243-253.

⁸⁸Rahul Roy Chaudhury, *India Versus Pakistan*, The RUSI Journal, Vol. 154, No. 4, 2009, pp. 60-65.

major terrorist attacks since Mutual trust is in short supply between South Asia's two major rivals, India and Pakistan.

Harsh V Pant explores that how United States–India nuclear pact has virtually rewritten the rules of the global nuclear regime by underlining India's credentials as a responsible nuclear state that should be integrated into the global nuclear order.⁸⁹ Given its far-reaching Pant says that implications, the Indo- United States nuclear agreement has sparked off a heated debate in India, the United States and the larger international community. This article examines the debate surrounding the nuclear pact. It argues that the nuclear agreement is about much more than mere nuclear technicalities: it is about the emergence of a new configuration in the global balance of power and a broader need for a new international nuclear order in the face of a global nuclear non-proliferation regime that seems to have become ineffective in meeting the challenges confronting the international community today.

Mutahir Ahmed's article traces the problems faced by the people of India and Pakistan, identifying and examining areas of conflict such as Kashmir, nuclear weapons and religious extremism.⁹⁰ An attempt is made to suggest what measures should be taken in order to defuse tensions between the two state, India and Pakistan who have remain locked in traditional Cold War concepts of security and development. Ahmed makes a prediction that in this regard, economic confidence-building measures have the greatest potential, including the granting of 'most favored nation' status to each other. In order to achieve these goals, the removal of the 'enemy myth' which continues to perpetuate a highly negative image of each country to the other is necessary, as is the support of the people of India and Pakistan for a range of confidence-building measures.

Vikram Jagadish tries to portray that over seven years after the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States, Afghanistan is again at the forefront of the headlines, faced with a brutal insurgency and a resurgent Taliban.⁹¹ To which many argues that are because of the terrorist

⁸⁹Harsh V Pant; *The US–India nuclear deal: the beginning of a beautiful relationship?*, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 20, No.3, 2007, pp. 455-472.

⁹⁰Mutahir Ahmed; *Confidence-building measures between Pakistan and India: An argument for change*, Contemporary South Asia, Vol. 7, No.2, 2007, pp. 137-145.

⁹¹Vikram Jagadish; *Reconsidering American strategy in South Asia: destroying terrorist sanctuaries in Pakistan's tribal areas*, Small Wars & Insurgencies, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2009, pp. 36-65.

sanctuary in the neighboring Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). This paper argues that Pakistani strategy has failed to achieve its desired results because of local tribal norms, the weak nature of previous agreements, military units ill-equipped for a counterinsurgency and counterterrorism role, as well as ideological fissures in the Pakistani establishment. Afterward, the paper argues that the United States and Coalition forces should pursue their strategy remaining cognizant of local tribal norms, step up training efforts for Pakistani forces, promote development of the tribal areas, and cultivate options for eliminating the FATA sanctuary through covert means.

T. V. Paul in his article tries to examine that why the India-Pakistan conflict is one of the most enduring rivalries of the post-World War era, which has witnessed four wars and a number of serious interstate crises.⁹² Instead of focusing on the existing literature on enduring rivalries which suggests that the India-Pakistan dyad contains factors such as unsettled territorial issues, political incompatibility, irreconcilable positions on national identity, and the absence of significant economic and trade relations between the two states, all cause the rivalry to persist. The author in this article presents a crucial neglected structural factor that explains the endurance of the rivalry. He argues that the peculiar power asymmetry that has prevailed between the two antagonists for over half a century has made full termination of the rivalry difficult in the near-term. Truncated power asymmetry is a causal factor in this rivalry's persistence, as rivalries between a status quo power and a challenger state that are relatively equal in their capabilities at the local level are the most intractable and nearly impossible to resolve quickly. The duration of many other asymmetric rivalries can also be explained using a framework of global superiority versus local parity in power capabilities that exist between the antagonists.

Bharat Karnad in his analyses the 'supremacist' trends in current United States foreign policy emphasizing 'unilateralism' which are to the detriment of cooperative security arrangements and international/bilateral treaties.⁹³ He tries to focus that how Less Developed Countries have become vulnerable because of 'democratic norms' and 'human rights' which provide entry points for interference in internal affairs. The implications for India include: a)

⁹²T. V. Paul; *Why has the India-Pakistan Rivalry Been so Enduring? Power Asymmetry and an Intractable Conflict*, Security Studies, Vol. 15, No.4, 2010, pp. 600-630.

⁹³Bharat Karnad; *Perils of a tight embrace: India, US, Kashmir and non-proliferation issues*, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 26, No.3, 2008, pp. 329-340.

increased activism on the Kashmir issue b) continuing support to Pakistan and economic bail-out due to its importance to United States geo-strategic interests; and, therefore, no reduction in Pakistan's proxy war in Kashmir and c) continuation of United States counter proliferation efforts due to the 'nuclear flash point' hypothesis to ensure that India's deterrence posture is regional, de-alerted and de-mated as acceptable to United States. In the prevailing environment, the paper finds new justifications for the deployment by India of a spectrum of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles with intercontinental range. India would be immune to United States pressure and become a truly independent player in the international scene only with this capability.

Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, in her article; examines the changing United States policy towards Pakistan in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks.⁹⁴ The argument in the paper maintains that the main issues in United States -Pakistan ties remain as before, and have in fact become more complicated in the context of the United States war on terrorism. The article concludes that the hopes, particularly the Pakistani ones, about a long-term turnaround in United States -Pakistan ties may be overly optimistic.

Shanthie Mariet D'Souza's article tries to analyse that how following the 9/11 attacks on the American homeland, India and Pakistan emerged as important states in the United States -led Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), how suddenly the gathering momentum in the India-United States relations during the Clinton Presidency underwent a dramatic transformation but the shocking thing which comes out is that although increased cooperation in defense issues is understood to have 'led' the India- United States relationship to its current level, it has not culminated in enhanced counter-terrorism cooperation.⁹⁵ This perceived lack of cooperation can be located within the perceptual differences on key security issues. This paper seeks to examine whether the upswing in India- United States relations and claims of heightened cooperation, has led to a commensurate level of counter-terrorism cooperation between both countries.

⁹⁴Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, *Emerging US policy towards Pakistan*, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 26, No.3, 2008, pp. 370-379.

⁹⁵ShanthieMariet D'Souza; *Indo-US Counter-Terrorism Cooperation: Rhetoric versus Substance*, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 32, No. 6, 2008, pp.1067-1084.

Srinath Raghavan examines the use of strategic coercion by a non-Western, regional power: India.⁹⁶ This ambition is lent focus by a detailed study of India's use of coercion during the crisis with Pakistan in 2001–02. The crisis was precipitated by a terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001 carried out by a Pakistan-based group. India responded by mobilizing its forces to the border, threatening to impose costs on Pakistan unless it cracked down on the terrorist groups operating from its soil. The outcome of the crisis was ambiguous: Pakistan made some moves towards curbing the terrorist groups but refused to accede completely to India's demands. The article begins by explaining the background to the crisis, both in terms of India-Pakistan political relations and the influence of past crises. It then examines the moves made by India, Pakistan and the United States during the crisis of 2001–02. The article contends that prevalent theses that purport to explain the outcome of coercion do not provide an entirely satisfactory account of this crisis. In particular, it contends that the role of the United States is crucial in understanding the course and the outcome of the confrontation.

Rifaat Hussain attempts to review recent developments in the structure of bilateral ties between India and Pakistan against the historical backdrop of their enduring enmity.⁹⁷ It pays special attention to the resumption of India–Pakistan composite dialogue in February 2004 and the efforts made by both countries to identify areas of common interest despite their divergent outlooks on Kashmir.

Robert G. Wirsing's examines the impact of India's growing involvement with the Muslim countries in Pakistan's neighborhood—Iran, the Central Asian republics, and Afghanistan—on the contemporary U.S.-Pakistan strategic alliance, in particular the cooperation of these two allies in waging the war in Afghanistan.⁹⁸ Driven largely by its need for expanded access to the region's energy resources, India has been moving rapidly to cement its ties with these countries. This article argues that U.S. and Pakistani objectives in Afghanistan are far from fully convergent, and that they are perhaps least convergent when it comes to India. India's

⁹⁶Srinath Raghavan; *A Coercive Triangle: India, Pakistan, the United States, and the Crisis of 2001–2002*, *Defence Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2009, pp. 242-260.

⁹⁷Rifaat Hussain; *The India–Pakistan Peace Process; Defense & Security Analysis*, Vol.22, No.4, 2010, pp. 409-419.

⁹⁸Robert G. Wirsing; *In India's Lengthening Shadow: The U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Alliance and the War in Afghanistan*, *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, Vol.34, No.3, 2010, pp. 151-172

lengthening strategic shadow in the region, it maintains, especially when coupled with its growing strategic partnership with the United States, is bound to have an important bearing on the evolution of the war in Afghanistan.

James Chiriyankandath's paper analyses that how after the end of the Cold War India confronted unprecedented challenges and opportunities in the midst of a new era of globalization.⁹⁹ This paper argues that, despite the eagerness of the Hindu nationalist BJP to gain recognition for India as a major power, Indian foreign policy remains primarily responsive and characterized by relative caution. The paper begins by considering the political and economic context within which foreign policy is made and how this has changed in the past decade and a half. It then focuses on two key aspects of post-cold war Indian foreign policy: the adoption of nuclear weapons and relations with the United States. Evaluating the realignment that has occurred in Indian policy, it concludes that over the past decade India has made headway in evolving a foreign policy that assures its emergence as a power with an effective presence on the international stage. Ultimately, however, success will depend not just on adapting to changes in the wider international arena but on the proximate and interdependent factors of economic growth, political stability and regional peace.

Bessma Momani, deeply analyses the facts that did the United States intervene to approve the final disbursement of Pakistan's International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan as a reward for supporting the U.S.- led war on terrorism. Moreover, the article traces that in the past, the IMF has been politicized to achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives.¹⁰⁰ Pakistan's loan approval, which occurred immediately after the September 11 attacks, however, already was slated to be approved by the IMF executive board. In this case, there is little evidence of American interference with or politicization of the approval of the final disbursement of Pakistan's IMF loan.

Prithvi Ram Mudiam, gives an in-depth analysis that how the audacious and devastating attacks by Islamic militants on the World Trade Center (WTC) and the Pentagon in the United States on September 11, 2001 constitute a watershed event in modern world history

⁹⁹James Chiriyankandath; *Realigning India: Indian foreign policy after the Cold War*, The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 93, No. 374, 2007, pp. 199-211.

¹⁰⁰Bessma Momani; *The IMF, the U.S. War on Terrorism, and Pakistan*, Asian Affairs: An American Review, Vol.31, No.1; 2010, pp. 41-51.

whose repercussions are still being felt everywhere.¹⁰¹ This paper, however, seeks to focus on the American decision to convert Pakistan yet again into a ‘frontline state’, this time in its fight against international terrorism, and the implications of this partnership for India–Pakistan relations, particularly their dispute over Jammu and Kashmir.

Stephen Philip Cohen, analyses India’s comprehensive and debilitating rivalry with Pakistan continues, including that dimension of the rivalry that encompasses the 50-year-old Kashmir dispute.¹⁰² Further it analyses that, the India–Pakistan conflict is now especially alarming because it has implications for the international system itself. This essay attempts a deeper probe of the India–Pakistan relationship, including the difficulties that India faces in managing, let alone resolving, the Kashmir dispute.

Rajat Ganguly’s article seeks to analyze and interpret that how the Indo-Pak hostility has resulted in the bifurcation of the erstwhile princely state ‘Kashmir’ and led to two major wars and several near misses in the past.¹⁰³ It views that how with the onset of a secessionist ethno-religious insurgency in Indian Kashmir in 1989, a proxy war developed between India and Pakistan, which brought bilateral relations between the two states to its nadir, contributed directly to an arms race and nuclear weapons testing in the subcontinent, undermined regional integration efforts, and resulted in gross human rights violations in the state, eventually led to a short conventional war along the line of control (LoC) in Kashmir in 1999. This article analyses the origins and dynamics of the secessionist insurgency in Indian Kashmir, its impact on endemic instability and insecurity in South Asia in general and Indo- Pakistan relations in particular , and the prospects for its resolution.

Anthony Wanis St. John focuses brilliantly that how an enduring rivalry coupled with an internal insurgency define the current state of the conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir.¹⁰⁴ The circumstances are now in place to give a third party the opportunity to act as

¹⁰¹Prithvi Ram Mudiam; *The India-Pakistan Dispute over Jammu and Kashmir and the United States; Global Change, Peace & Security*: formerly Pacifica Review: Peace, Security & Global Change, Vol. 15, No.3, 2010, pp. 263-276.

¹⁰²Stephen Philip Cohen; *India, Pakistan and Kashmir*, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 25 No.4, 2010, pp.32-60

¹⁰³Rajat Ganguly; *India, Pakistan and the Kashmir insurgency: causes, dynamics and prospects for resolution*, Asian Studies Review, Vol.25, No.3, 2007, pp. 309-334.

¹⁰⁴Anthony Wanis St. John; *Third party mediation over Kashmir: A modest proposal*, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 4, No. 4, 2007, pp. 1-30.

mediator in the long-standing conflict, as well as in the dispute between India and the Kashmiri insurgency. The progress and status of the dispute, as well as the dynamics of the triadic relationship between India and Pakistan and the United States are examined and reveal that the interests inherent in the US-India and the US-Pakistan relationships are converging. The role of the United States as mediating party is then brought into focus against a background of geo-political change and bilateral stalemate. The issue of whether mediator bias will affect the outcome of mediation is considered in a theoretical analysis. The author concludes that perceptions of bias will not affect the outcome negatively, and that the United States can encourage constructive perceptions of bias by both India and Pakistan in order to maximize its leverage over the parties and encourage a political settlement.

In a commentary published in the Strategic Commentary in 2010, the focus was on how at present situation United States is struggling in making or influencing the policy of Pakistan.¹⁰⁵ The author cites the reason for such is mainly because Many Pakistanis regard the US as a threat, directly and indirectly, rather than as a supporter of their country's interests. Only 22% of Pakistanis thought the United States took their interests into account when making foreign policy decisions. Secondly, rather than enhancing security, United States operations in Afghanistan are seen as destabilizing influences on Pakistan. Thirdly, the contention that the United States supports Pakistan's prosperity is open to question. The United States has no tradition of development cooperation with Pakistan. Fourthly, the suggestion by Obama that America will remain a supporter of Pakistani interests is viewed in Pakistan as even more dubious. The United States is seen as a serial betrayer of friendship: Pakistanis felt let down by Washington during Pakistan's wars with India in 1965 and 1971 and again at the end of the Afghan war in 1989, when the United States re-imposed sanctions on Pakistan which were only lifted in 2001 when George W. Bush declared Pakistan to be an ally in combating terrorism. These doubts and concerns in Pakistan mean that Washington is considerably handicapped in seeking to meet its objectives. While Pakistanis have become more aware of the dangers of extremism – and the recent Pakistani army offensives in Swat and South Waziristan attest to this – this does not mean that American and Pakistani interests are identical. There is, therefore, an uncomfortable mismatch between Obama's rhetoric towards Pakistan and his practice.

¹⁰⁵ *United States struggles to craft Pakistan policy*, Strategic Comments, Vol. 16, No.1, 2010, pp. 1-4

Teresita C. Schaffer has tried to show that how from the very beginning both the two nations United States and Pakistan became strong parts of each other only because of the relationship of necessity.¹⁰⁶ It chronologically portrays that how these two nations came close to each other in the 1950s and particularly in the 1980s, against the Soviets. How in the 1950s, despite the clear limitations in its treaties with the United States, Pakistan thought it had lined up an ally against its Indian adversary and was bitterly disillusioned when the United States cut off arms supplies during its 1965 war with India. Later in the 1980s, Pakistan's nuclear program undid the two countries' cooperation. Complicating the policy agenda was Washington's tendency to overemphasize relations with particular Pakistani presidents—Field Marshall Ayub Khan in the 1950s and 1960s, Gen. Zia ul-Haq in the 1980s, and more recently Gen. Pervez Musharraf rather than make policy based on long-term interests and prospects in Pakistan. As a result, issues such as the viability of Pakistan's political system have received inadequate attention. Today, many Pakistani policymakers and politically active citizens are asking how long it will be before the United States once again loses interest and files for another divorce in the U.S.-Pakistani partnership. To avoid repeating history, U.S. policymakers must depersonalize U.S. policy toward Pakistan and establish two fundamental bases for engagement: i. a long-term democracy agenda designed to strengthen and legitimize Pakistan's institutions; and ii. a sustained and realistic approach to working with both Pakistan and India to deal with and ideally resolve their enduring, dangerous dispute.

Sumita Kumar's article explains that how not only the domestic pressures remain an important reason for Pakistan's readiness to talk with India.¹⁰⁷ But, more importantly, external factors have of late been instrumental in the recent change of Pakistan's attitude towards India. This analysis is focused mainly on the external factors impinging on Pakistan's thinking and decision-making. The single most visible external factor influencing Pakistan's stated desire to talk with India on all outstanding issues (as opposed to focusing mainly on Kashmir) is the United States. While China, Europe, and Japan are important to Pakistan for strategic or economic reasons, none of them can influence Pakistan's vital security or domestic policy as much as the United States can. Post-September 11, 2001, Pakistan has re-

¹⁰⁶Teresita C. Schaffer; *U.S. influence on Pakistan: Can partners have divergent priorities?* The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 26 No.1, 2010, pp.169-183

¹⁰⁷Sumita Kumar; *External Factors Impinging on Pakistan's Decision to Talk with India*, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 27, No. 3, 2008, pp. 489-493.

emerged as a vital strategic ally for the United States. However, the new United States posture is different from that of the Cold War phase and has brought in many complications for Pakistan. The United States determination to eliminate global terrorism, an aim which stands at the top of the United States foreign and defense policy agenda, has forced Pakistan to cooperate with the United States. All major foreign policy decisions of Pakistan flow from its involvement in 'counter-terrorism'.

Amitabh Mattoo's article presents an Indian view of endgame in Kashmir, it seeks to answer two essential questions: Does India have a plan for final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir?¹⁰⁸ If so what are its essential elements? While there may not be a publicly discernable Indian game plan, a combination of factors has helped to create the possibility of generating a process that could eventually lead to durable peace in Kashmir. Events subsequent to Kargil-1999, the 9/11, and the perception in India of a shift in international public opinion regarding Kashmir have all coalesced to provide an opportunity for India settle the Kashmir Question. The article assumes that the two central hurdles that stands in the way of peace in Kashmir is the conflict between India and people of Kashmir (conflict in Kashmir); and problem between New Delhi and Islamabad (conflict over Kashmir). Divided in three sections this article focus on India's changed policy and possible end games for resolving the conflict; factors responsible for the shift in the India's Policy and lastly in a brief manner seeks to put forward India's "potential" endgame for resolving the conflict in Kashmir.

Rudra Chaudhuri analyses focuses that what role does really the United States foreign policy in South Asia remains: what can be done to reconcile India–Pakistan relations?¹⁰⁹ This question is especially potent since it underlies Pakistani calculations vis-à-vis its approach to the war in Afghanistan. As importantly, an answer is required to instill confidence in a relationship marred by deep-seated mutual suspicion revolves around the fooling aspects; this is the primary question this article sets out to explore, in four parts. First, it briefly traces attempts made by successive United States administrations during the Cold War to balance its relations with India and Pakistan. Second, the article outlines the initiatives – and the tensions therein – adopted by the Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations in the past two decades.

¹⁰⁸Amitabh Mattoo; *India's "potential" endgame in Kashmir*, India Review, Vol. 2, No. 3, 2010, pp. 14-33.

¹⁰⁹Rudra Chaudhuri (2011): *Balancing US Interests in India and Pakistan*, *The International Spectator*: Italian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 46, No.2, pp. 75-89.

Third, it provides an account of India–Pakistan relations since the terrorist attacks in Mumbai. The conclusion sets out current efforts to encourage dialogue, and what more can be done to assist this process.

India and Pakistan remain to be an issue that has been debated on extensively and from all possible dimensions. The study has selected to study that literature that has assisted the study in some form or other, in understanding the perceptions and making a proper understanding of the problems concerned.

(1.4) Justification of the Study:

The foregoing review of literature suggest that there have been volumes of research and writings on the Indo-Pak relations, Indo-US relations, US-Pakistan relations, Indo-China relations, Pakistan-China relations and other similar bilateral and multilateral relations across the globe. There have been plethora of scholarly writings based on research of the subject concerning a wide spectrum of areas – historical - analytical survey of Indo-Pakistan Relations, the involvement of big powers in the affairs of the sub-continent and its fall out on the state of affairs in the Asian Continent and in particular the stake of the United States in the Asian Continent in general and the subcontinent in particular but there is found a very little research on the specific role of United States on the sustenance of strained Indo – Pakistan relations. These writings also contain the intricacies of these bilateral relations supported by raised theoretical explanations. As far as the basic thrust of the present study is concerned, literatures are available extensively on either Indo-Pakistan relations in the pre and the post cold war period or Indo-US relations in the pre and the post cold war period. But however there lies a dearth of pin pointed study on the role the United States in the strained relations between India and Pakistan which has seldom been attempted. Given this research gap, the study has made an attempt to unearth some hidden agenda of America’s policy towards Pakistan despite changes in the international environment in general and change in the India’s policy toward United States in particular. The United State’s strategic, political and economic interests in the South Asian region have been dealt with, either with the focus on the significance of Pakistan in the strategic domain of United States to sustain its dominance and control in the West Asian region particularly in the name of containing global terrorism or with focus on sustaining the war like situation in the region to serve the arms manufacture lobby of America. The review of literature clearly suggest that a focused study on the calculated role of the Unites States in the strained relations between India and Pakistan in the changed scenario of the post cold war era has not been attempted. In fine the present

study by way of attempting to highlight this virtually unexplored area has attempted to fill this gap. Herein lies the very significance and justification of the study.

(1.5) Method of Research:

Given the broad objective of the study and the research questions that the study has addressed, the proposed study was done in a combination of descriptive, exploratory and diagnostic type of historical analytical research. By virtue of the objective of the study the present research is primarily historical and analytical in nature. The informations were collected from documents, books and articles published in journals and periodicals. The informations were carefully analyzed, that is the method of content analysis was employed. For the analysis of the informations the insight of the researcher (myself) was used to locate the gaps between the lines, thus identifying the grey areas and on the basis of that explanations have been sought to be made. Utmost care however to make the analysis objective one has been taken into consideration.

Besides the analytical method, the interview method was also used where a limited number of decision makers – politicians – bureaucrats – and experts – have been interviewed to supplement the findings of the research that has arrived through the use of analytical method. In fine, however, the research was library based supplemented by the use of interview method.

(1.6) Plan of the Study:

The study has been divided into six sections. The present section has made an attempt of bringing out a theoretical perspective of disputes between nations which has taken birth with the end of the colonial era. It is tried to understand how history and behavior of leaderships have been a basic impediment in coming to a process of mediation. It has also accessed the disputable role of a mediator who has complicated the dispute more than resolving it an example of which is Palestine and Israel. It has also provided a basic literature review that is present and the study has taken assistance of.

The second section is a historical retrospect of the long seven decades of relationship between India and Pakistan. The chapter makes an attempt of dealing with the genesis of India-Pakistan which was mainly shared with lack of trust and misunderstanding. The chapter also make an attempt to delve into the historical facets of India Pakistan relations, which has molded the animosity between the two nations.

The third section of the study analyze the perceived compulsions and realities that centers around with regards to the birth of the US- Pakistan Relationship. United States and Pakistan has survived a chequered relation, which had its own ups and downs. The chapter analyze how the relations developed, deteriorated and the manner in which it has impacted India Pakistan relations. The chapter also examines the present phase of relations, and will makes an assessment of the present status of Pakistan US relations.

The fourth section of the study make an attempt to examine the perception and realities that led the birth of the India and United States relationship. How during the initial years Washington evolved its interest in the South Asian region, the manner in which India US relation went through decades long stagnancy and how the present decade has brought in a dynamism in Indo US relations.

The fifth chapter of the study centers on the place of China and its role in the India, Pakistan and US policy making. The manner in which China has expanded its role in global politics along with its sphere of influence in South Asian politics has in detailed manner dealt in this section.

Finally, the concluding section of the study makes an assessment of the study, explaining the findings that it will unfurl while assessing the various periods and equations between the nations, and makes some prescriptive suggestions for an amicable solution if any. Though there have been various theoretical pretexts that have studied India Pakistan relations, one of the most studied topics in the South Asian region, trying to assess the role of a super power in the bilateral relations of these two countries in dispute will be a challenging task.