

Chapter-5

PLACE OF CHINA IN INDIA, PAKISTAN AND THE UNITED STATES

South Asia remain to be the most important region of Asia as such there has been seen a plenty of times when super powers like US, USSR and China had been meddling its policies among the regional states especially with matters related centering the Indo-Pakistan confrontational relationship. While since from the beginning Pakistan adopted a policy of inviting external involvement in the regional affairs, India has always opposed these efforts. Among the super powers who have been involved in the regional politics of the region and has been playing a very vital role in molding and remolding the relationship status between the two countries (India and Pakistan) one vital remain to be the Peoples Republic of China and its relationship with the United States, India and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

(5. 1) Sino-Indian Relationship:

Despite sharing a common border and having a close geographical and strategic proximity China and India as neighbours in the modern political context had minimal interactions between them. Although there are ample evidences of continuous overland trade and exchange of ideas through the centuries, but this appears to have occurred despite political cooperation and confrontation. There are several reasons behind this historical experience. First, apart from few notable exceptions, China and India were primarily self-sufficient societies preoccupied with their own internal dynamics. Secondly, geography-particularly the natural barrier mass movement and confined the interaction to a few traders, adventures and explorers. With some exception, almost all of the interaction was through the primarily nomadic tribes of the Tibetan plateau or along the trade centers and routes of Central Asia, notably Taxila and Bactria (in present day Afghanistan). Thirdly, the epicenters of the two civilizations were so far removed from each other that they did not warrant any direct interactions. However ironically it was the colonial experience and the exploitation of the sea routes by the European powers that provided China and India with a common political history. Moreover during the globalization of trade in the eighteenth and the nineteenth century, the two civilizations were pitched against each other for the first time in the history during the Opium Wars; when the European powers were determined to forcibly sell the Indian opium in China to pay for tea. Thus China and India were inevitably compelled to

compete against each other under this Western mode of Globalization.⁶⁴⁹ Also during the II World War, China and India were compelled to cooperate with each other by various western powers as they sought to prevent Japan's expansion and the construction of Stilwell Burma Road that linked the two regions together. So China and India before Independence had regional confrontations with Tibet which was then a suzerain territory had a similar history on the basis of colonialism and such history was not based on their free will.

In 1947 when India became independent, the Nationalist Government (Kuomintang) who was in power in China established its diplomatic relations with India, Government of India in 1948 and send E.M. Pannikar as its first ambassador to China. However military defeat of the Nationalist Government in the hands of the Communist Forces led the birth of the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949. There was a great expectation that the two ancient civilizations would forge a formidable partnership in the post colonial world; and as expected soon the Government of India extended its official recognition to the PRC on December 30, 1949. Indian became the second non-communist country in the world to do so after Burma and it was hoped that this would further strengthen the friendship between India and China and be conducive to the stability of Asia and the peace of the world. Pannikar became the India's ambassador to PRC and presenting his credentials to Mao-Tse-Tung, Chairman of the PRC, Pannikar stated that: "The People's Republic of China and the Republic of India representing the oldest communities in the world are now in a position to cooperate effectively for mutual advantage and for the welfare of the people. He two sister republics of Asia, which between them over a third of the world population, can through their cooperation become a great and invincible force".⁶⁵⁰

From 1949 to 1957 both the nations enjoyed a great period of bonhomie and friendship with each other, which included high level ministerial talks, diplomatic exchange etc. but however this relation did not last long. As by the end of 1950's serious differences emerged between the two neighbours, particularly with regards to the un-demarcated border issue which later led to the war of 1962 the aftermath of which gave birth to an ominous relations between the

⁶⁴⁹ Sidhu, Waheguru Pal Singh & Yuan, Jing-dong; *China and India: Cooperation or Conflict?*; (New Delhi; Indian Research Press; 2003) pp 10

⁶⁵⁰ Broadcast from Peaking Radio in English, 21 May 1950 as quoted in Appadorai A. & Rajan, M.S; *India's Foreign Policy and Relations*; (New Delhi; South Asian Publishers; 1985) pp 114

two. The following phases has divided the relations between India and China which was more a roller coaster ride from better to bitter in times.

(5.1.1) Phase I- Sino Indian Friendship- an Era of *Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai* (1950-1958)

In the year 1949 when China emerged as an independent nation under the flag of People's Republic of China it was India which came up as the second nation (Burma was the first) to extend official recognition to it. It was hoped that this would further strengthen the immemorial friendship between India and China and be conducive to the stability of Asia. The essentials of this policy stemmed from Nehru's vision and conviction that India and China were big countries and has an important part to play in world affairs. During a debate on Foreign Affairs in Lok Sabha on 30 September 1954, Nehru said: 'Countries like China and India once they get rid of foreign domination and internal disunity, inevitably become strong; here is nothing to stop them.' Peace, cooperation and friendly relations with China were basic to Nehru's China policy.

There are ample of evidence which proves the fact that from 1950's to 1958 there was a strong desire from both the nation to cultivate a strong friendship relations between them. The Indian delegation to the General Assembly to the United Nations sponsored resolutions, year after year urged that the Government of People's Republic of China as against the national regime of Formosa should represent China in the United Nation. India also voted against the February 1951 UN General Assembly Resolution which branded China as the aggressor. Similarly in September 1951 India declined to sign a Peace Treaty with Japan because, among other reasons, People's China was not a party to it, and India felt that attending and important conference on Far East with China. India's policy of friendship and brotherhood was similarly reciprocated by China. They were exchange of State Visits by the Prime Minister of China and India, between June 1954-July 1957, Chou En-lai paid four visits to India. It was resounded by the visits of Jawaharlal Nehru in October 1954. When Chinese premier Zhou Enlai visited India in 1956, Indians lined the streets and chanted "*Hindi-Chini bhai bhai*," or "India and China are brothers."

However, perhaps the high-water mark in the development of friendly relations between the two countries was reached on 29 April 1954 when the agreement with China on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet Region of China and India was signed; which became famous as the PanchSheel Accord.

- Panchsheel:

The Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, also famous as Panchsheel were first formally enunciated in the Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet region of China and India signed on April 29, 1954, which stated, in its preamble, that the two Governments “have resolved to enter into the present

Agreement based on the following principles: -

- i. Mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty,
- ii. Mutual non-aggression,
- iii. Mutual non-interference,
- iv. Equality and mutual benefit, and
- v. Peaceful co-existence.

Two months later, during the visit of Premier Zhou Enlai to India, he and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru issued a Joint Statement on June 28, 1954 that elaborated their vision of Panchsheel as the framework, not only for relations between the two countries, but also for their relations with all other countries, so that a solid foundation could be laid for peace and security in the world. Speaking at banquet held in honour of Premier Zhou Enlai in New Delhi on June 26, 1954 Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru said “These principles are good not only to our two countries but for others as well...each country would have freedom to follow its own policy and work out its own destiny learning from others, cooperating with others, but basing itself essentially on its own genius.”⁶⁵¹ Panchsheel, as envisioned by its creators, gave substance to the voice of newly established countries who were seeking the space to consolidate their hard won independence, as it provided an alternative ideology dedicated to peace and development of all as the basis for international interaction, whether bilateral or multilateral. At that time, the two Prime Ministers also expressed the hope in the Joint Statement that the adoption of Panchsheel “will also help in creating an area of peace which as circumstances permit can be enlarged thus lessening the chances of war and strengthening the cause of peace all over the world.”⁶⁵² It should be noted here that the Principle of

⁶⁵¹ *PanchSheel*; External Publicity Division; Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India; http://www.mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/191_panchsheel.pdf

⁶⁵² *PanchSheel*; External Publicity Division; Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India; http://www.mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/191_panchsheel.pdf

Panchsheel was adopted as the basic pillar on which foreign policy was made by most of the South East Asian nations and later by China itself.

The Sino Indian bonhomie got again reflected in the year 1955 during the Bandung Conference. Before the conference, both India and Burma (now Myanmar) took a firm stand that China should take part in the conference. At the conference, Nehru made a number of efforts to support Zhou Enlai, giving a helping hand to New China, which had just ascended the international stage. This vision caught the imagination of the peoples of Asia and the world. Panchsheel was incorporated into the Ten Principles of International Peace and Cooperation enunciated in the Declaration issued by the April 1955 Bandung Conference of 29 Afro-Asian countries. The universal relevance of Panchsheel was emphasized when its tenets were incorporated in a resolution on peaceful co-existence presented by India, Yugoslavia and Sweden, and unanimously adopted on December 11, 1957, by the United Nations General Assembly. In 1961, the Conference of Non-Aligned Nations in Belgrade accepted.⁶⁵³ All these events led to a high tide of friendship between China and India, which had been unprecedented in history. It was during this period that India gave up its special privileges in Tibet.

But however although sharing a very bright and affable beginning gradually the relations between India and China turned bitter in the subsequent days. The succeeding phase in the relationship between the two nations focused with important events and developments which gave birth to a belligerent relation between the two.

(5.1.2) Phase II- Tracing the source of irritant relationship: (1959-1961)

Finding the source of the tension in the Sino-Indian relationship does not require much searching. Both the nation hands experienced some degree of imperialist control in the nineteenth century.⁶⁵⁴ The nationalist movement and the Chinese communist movement drew specific conclusion from the experience of European imperial expansion in and Domination

⁶⁵³ Ruisheng, Cheng; *Sino-Indian Relations: Sixty Years of Experience and Enlightenment*; IPCS Special Report; June 2011

⁶⁵⁴ Moon, Penderel; *The British Conquest of India*; (London; Duckworth; 1986); pp 51

of Asia. As the principle inheritor of the British imperialism in the subcontinent, India also zealously adhered to the legacy of colonially bequeathed borders.⁶⁵⁵

For India's first Prime Minister and the principle architect of the foreign policy, Nehru, the borders of British India provided a geographical identity of an India that had existed among the collective historical imagination of the region's populace.⁶⁵⁶ This perspective however did not accord well with the Chinese communist leadership under Mao Zedong. Thus after the departure of the colonial ruler from the subcontinent, the Chinese leadership sought to recover the territory 'lost' to the Western colonizers by resorting to fictitious historical maps, which they practice till date. Moreover the communist perceptions held by the leaders in Beijing put them at odds with Nehru's commitment to liberal democracy. More to the point, Nehru's uncritical acceptance of inherited colonial borders propelled the two countries down a path of confrontation as China sought to question the legitimacy of British colonial expansion to the outer reaches of China in the Himalayas.

Among India's inheritance from the British colonial empire were the results of a set of colonial border policies. The northern frontier of India, especially as they related to China and Tibet had been formulated as a consequence of the interplay of cartography and imperial concerns about warding off potential expansionist threat from the then Bolshevik Revolution⁶⁵⁷ Out of three possible alignments proposed by the colonial administrator and cartographers for the western sector of the northern Himalayan borders, the most expansive was the Ardagh-Johnson Line fashioned between 1865 and 1867, bordering the labeled Aksai-Chin, which is adjacent to Tibetans part and parcel of British colonial territory under the tutelage of Maharaja Hari Singh of Kashmir. The second proposed alignment was the McCartney- MacDonald Line, placed portions of the Aksai-Chin in the China's Xinjiang region. Finally the Trelawney Saunders survey placed the boundaries along the Karakoram mountain range. Based on the evidence in the public domain the national government of independent India chose the most expansive alignment, the Ardagh-Johnson Line, as its

⁶⁵⁵ Hoffmann, Steven; *India and the China Crisis*; (Berkeley: University of California Press; 1990); pp 102

⁶⁵⁶ Hubel, Teresa; *Who's India? The Independence Struggle in British and Indian Fiction and History*; (Durham, N.C.; Duke University Press; 1996); pp 201

⁶⁵⁷ Chakravarti, P.C; *The Evolution of India's Northern Borders*; (New Delhi; Asia Publication House; 1971); pp84

interpretation of its frontier with China in the West.⁶⁵⁸ There is need to understand that China did not attained independence like that of India. India attained Independence after a long nationalist movement which ultimately left of the decision of British to left India on the basis of multiple agreements and decisions within which was the decision of partition, the treaty of annexation as well as the definitive borders with that other nations that India and Pakistan agreed during the time of independence. That is why it is not only Mac-Mohan line which raised question but also the Durand Line which created problems between nations.

Key political and strategic choices, which in the retrospect area speculatively flawed, sparked the tensions between India and China within a decade of the former's emergence as an independent state and the latter's emergence as a communist one.⁶⁵⁹ Some of the major bone of contentions that remains as a lynching pin between the bitter Sino-Indian relations during that period has been traced under the following points.

- Tibet:

In the aftermath of India's independence, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was prim sinter pares in the new government on matters concerning India's foreign and defense policies. Nehru was acutely concerned maintaining materially weak India's freedom and autonomy in the realm of foreign policy. Consequently, he seized upon a moral and normative vision that he believed would enhance India's ability to play a significant yet independent role in global affairs. The quest for this moral mission of world order, of course, was also based on a shrewd calculation of India's national interests.⁶⁶⁰ Passionately opposed to high levels of military spending and fearing the militarization of Indian society Nehru sought to steer India away from the super-power entanglements.⁶⁶¹ Despite a war with Pakistan in 1947-1948 the leaders in Delhi never felt the need to perceive the military threat from Pakistan to be

⁶⁵⁸ Maxwell, Neville; *India's China War*; (New York; Pantheon Books; 1970); pp 53

⁶⁵⁹ Mullik, B.N; *My Years With Nehru; The Chinese Betrayal*; (Bombay Allied Publisher; 1971); pp 62

⁶⁶⁰ Rana A.P; *The Imperatives of Non-Alignment: A conceptual Study of India's Foreign Policy in the Nehru Period*; (Delhi; Macmillan Publishers; 1976); pp 75

⁶⁶¹ Cohen, Stephen P; *The Indian Army: Its contribution to the Development of a Nation*; (Delhi; OUP; 1990); pp 102

substantiated.⁶⁶² However the sudden militarization of the People's Republic of China gave Nehru a second thought in this policy of non-alignment and consequently Nehru's strategy in dealing with People's Republic of China (PRC) was one of conciliation and appeasement.⁶⁶³ In word of Indian historian P.C Chakravarti, Nehru's dilemma and his strategy toward China 'were determined, in large measure by her unrealistic assessment of Chinese leadership. In Nehru's eyes, the supreme need of the moment was peace, particularly in Asia. The only power that might disturb Asian peace was China, with her irredentist ambitions. Once those ambitions were satisfied, China was believed, would settle down to peaceful internal development. Unfriendly policies would merely antagonize the Chinese Communist and make them belligerent'.⁶⁶⁴

- The Mc-Mohan Line Controversy:

Colonial Legacy was primarily responsible for the India-China border dispute. The 1913-1914 Simla meeting attended by representative from British India, Tibet and Republic of China resulted in an agreement that made vague references to watersheds and natural boundaries as the border between British India and Tibet. This was the basis of Mac-Mohan Line.⁶⁶⁵ The Chinese representative initiated the document, but the central government in Beijing, under tremendous pressure at home, never formally signed it. And though it was accepted by the government of Tibet, the legitimacy of the Mac-Mohan line was challenged by the nationalist government of Chian Kai-shek as well as the Communist government of Mao-tse-Tung, both of whom had committed themselves to the restoration of China's former historical power and territory. Thus, at the time of its independence India inherited one of the

⁶⁶² Gangly, Sumit; *Conflict Unending: India Pakistan Tension Since 1947*; (New Delhi; OUP; 2001); PP 103

⁶⁶³ Kennedy Paul (eds.); *Staetegy and Diplomacy 1870-1945: Eight Studies*; (London: Allene and Unwin, 1983)

⁶⁶⁴ Chakravarti P.C; *India's China Policy*; (Bloomington; Indiana University Press; 1962); pp 59

⁶⁶⁵ Lall, John; *Akasichin and Sino-Indian Conflicts*; (Nnew Delhi, Allied Publishers; 1989) pp 242 & Maxwell Neville; *India's China War*; (London; Jonathan Cape; 1970); pp 107

longest, poorly demarcated and disputed borders with and important neighbours-Tibet and later, China.⁶⁶⁶

Apart from the border dispute, serious ideological differences between the two nations were also evident in the early days of post-colonial Sino-Indian relations. This became evident when India's deputy Prime Minister Sardar Patel in his letter to Nehru on November 7, 1950; characterized China as a 'potential enemy' in the context of China's liberation of Tibet. The incident happened after the denial and discouragement of Indian to endow of forces by the Chinese in Tibet and warned that it might hamper the entry of PRC in UN. In a rude reply China criticized India 'as having being affected by foreign influences hostile to China and Tibet'. Sardar Patel also added that 'while our Western and North-Western threat of security are still as permanent as before, a new threat has developed from North and North East.....we must thus have a clear ideas of what we wish to achieve and of the method by which we should achieve.'⁶⁶⁷ Meanwhile Nehru's sympathy for the Tibet rebellion of 1959, asylum to Dalai Lama in India and frictions over territorial boundaries in Aksai Chin, along Indian Kashmir and China's Xinjiang province, and Arunachal Pradesh, along India's northeast and Tibet's south, led to the further deterioration in relations between the two nations.

In the year 1950, the PLA of China marched into Lhasa and brought Tibet under China's control. This de-factor take over became de-jure fact when Tibetan Leader Dalai Lama accepted the seventeen point agreement in the year May 1951, which effectively nullified the Tibetan claim as an independent status.⁶⁶⁸ Where on one hand the Chinese annexation of Tibet was an act for unification of the five-races of China; on the other for India it was a grave cause of concern as because the Tibet plateau which was a very vital buffer zone between China and India –vanished over night.⁶⁶⁹

⁶⁶⁶ Sidhu, Waheguru Pal Singh & Yuan, Jing-dong; *China and India: Cooperation or Conflict?*; (New Delhi; Indian Research Press; 2003) pp 11

⁶⁶⁷ Text of Sardar Patel in Brigadier Dalivi, J.P.; *Himalayan Blunder: The curtain Raiser to the Sino-Indian War of 1962*; (Bombay, 1969) pp 489-495

⁶⁶⁸ Shakya, Tsering; *The Dragon in the land of Snows: A History of Modern Tibet since 1947*; (London; Pimlico; 1999); Ranganathan C.V and Khanna Vinod C, *India and China: The Way Ahead After 'Mao's India War'*; (New Delhi: Sangam Books; 1990) pp 26-27

⁶⁶⁹ Garver, John W; *Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century*; (Seattle; University of Washington Press; 2001); pp 68

Following the Chinese entry in Tibet Nehru adopted a broad two-prolonged response- Firstly it took rapid steps to include Nepal Bhutan and Sikkim into India's Defense perimeter and extended India's administration into Tawang, a monastery town beyond McMahon line. Secondly, Nehru tried desperately to persuade China to maintain a low-profile relationship with Tibet based on a system of suzerainty, which would guarantee autonomy to Lhasa. But unfortunately the Indian negotiators were failed in their attempts and as a fact accompli Nehru eventually acknowledged Tibet as an autonomous region of China under the Panchsheel Agreement in 1954.

Although being backed down over the question of China's suzerainty over Tibet New Delhi however hoped to use the goodwill generated by Panchsheel to reach a working agreement with communist China over the McMahon Line.⁶⁷⁰ Both the nation's started having border talks in 1954 but throughout the late 1950's there was hardly any development and on contrary the relations between the two countries grew steadily worsening up.⁶⁷¹ The tings turned out worsen when in the year 1958, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai in a letter to Nehru proposed that 'the two sides temporarily maintain the *status quo* , that is to say, each side keep for the time being to the border areas at present under its jurisdiction and not go beyond them.'⁶⁷² Zhou further elaborated on these issues by pointing out that 1. Boundary dispute existed, 2 there was the existence of a LAC exercising administrative jurisdiction on either side, 3. In setting the boundary dispute certain geographical principles like watersheds, river valley and mountain passes should be considered, 4. The national feeling of the two people should be respect, 5. The two sides should observe the current LAC pending a final resolution, and 6. Both sides should refrain from patrolling close to disputed areas to ensure tranquility along the border.⁶⁷³

⁶⁷⁰ MEA, Government of India; *White Paper No. I*; (New Delhi; Government of India), pp 48, 52-53 and 56 in Sidhu, Waheguru Pal Singh & Yuan, Jing-dong; *China and India Cooperation or Conflict*; (India Research Press; 2003)

⁶⁷¹ Ranganathan C.V and Khanna Vinod C, *India and China: The Way Ahead After 'Mao's India War'*; (New Delhi: Sangam Books; 1990) pp 32

⁶⁷² Indian Ministry of External Affairs; *White Paper No. I*, pp 54; Cited in Liu, Xuecheng; *The Sino-Indian Border Dispute and Sino-Indian Relations*; (Lanham MD; University Press of America; 1994) pp 21

⁶⁷³ Liu, Xuecheng; *The Sino-Indian Border Dispute and Sino-Indian Relations*; (Lanham MD; University Press of America; 1994) pp 139-140

(5.1.3) Phase III- The Sino-Indian Border War (1962):

Meanwhile during the late 1950's along with the deteriorating Sino-Indian relationship with regard to border issue, the Tibetan Rebellion against the Chinese oppression was also simmering which finally got busted in the year March 1959. Following the failed revolt, the Dalai Lama, disguised as a soldier, escaped from Lhasa and, assured of political asylum by Nehru, reached India on 31 March 1959. Following the failed revolt, the Dalai Lama, disguised as a soldier, escaped from Lhasa and, assured of political asylum by Nehru reached Indian on 31 March 1959 to set-up a Tibetan Government in exile. China alarmed by the asylum blamed both US and India of supporting the rebellion and it was believe the 'without CIA's assistance it was impossible for Dalai Lama to escape the PLA's pursuit.'⁶⁷⁴ These tensions brought into question the status of Tibet and India's adherence to the 1954 agreement and also exacerbated the difference that had emerged during the ongoing boundary negotiation in the late 1950s. It highlighted the question of the historical borders in the Ladakh region of Indian Kashmir and in the North Eastern Frontier Agency of India, north of Assam and East of Myanmar.⁶⁷⁵ During this period China had already occupied the Akasai Chin plateau of Ladakh and built a road through it connecting its Tibetan region with that of Xinjiang. Similarly, in 1959 India launched Operation Onkar for establishing military post along Mc Mahon Line.⁶⁷⁶

Meanwhile in 1959 armed clashes erupted in Longju and Kongka region between China and India. In the last try to get the border talks back on track finally again the two Head of nations met in New Delhi from 19-25 April 1960. However the sheer unwillingness in both the fronts to budge from its position led the deadlock continues and drifted the relations between the two closer to war. With the Indian army pursuing its 'forward policy' and pushing northward, and with the PLA units responding tit-for-tat, small skirmishes between the two nations soon escalated into an open major military confrontation. The war between China and India erupted on 20 October 1962 when the Chinese troops forcibly evicted Indian troops from the

⁶⁷⁴ Liu, Xuecheng; *The Sino-Indian Border Dispute and Sino-Indian Relations*; (Lanham MD; University Press of America; 1994) pp 23

⁶⁷⁵ *Documents on the Sino-Indian Boundary Question* (Beijing; Foreign Language Press; 1960); as cited in Sidhu, Waheguru Pal Singh & Yuan, Jing-dong; *China and India Cooperation or Conflict*; (India Research Press; 2003)

⁶⁷⁶ Saigal, J.R; *The Unfought war of 1962: The NEFA Debacle*; (New Delhi; Allied Publishers; 1979) pp 19

Dhola post in the eastern sector, which lay beyond the Mc Mahon line. Over the next month-until the unilateral withdrawal on 21 November 1962-Chinese troops easily overwhelmed ill prepared Indian forces in all the sectors along the Mc Mahon Line.⁶⁷⁷ This inexplicably unilateral withdrawal of Chinese Government to points where it's considered the territorial boundaries should be was vehemently opposed and objected by India but there was little it could do. Although the war did not change the status quo of the border, for all intents and purposes India lost the war and was forced to accept both territorial loss and national humiliation.

The war of 1962 brought the Sino-Indian relation to its nadir. For the sake of rapprochement in the two on December 1962 the prime minister of Sri Lanka Srimavo Bandaranaike, made a very honest attempt to bring China and India back on the negotiating Table in the Afro-Asian Conference but unfortunately the effort went in vain.⁶⁷⁸ Subsequently China and India broke off all bilateral relations.

(5.1.4) Phase IV- The Sino- Indian Cold war (1962-1976):

In the aftermath of the 1962 war the relationship between China and India got deteriorated further and the processes of normalization in the relations also stood still. Soon after the war a tense military buildup and confrontation developed. The two sides deployed more than 4000,000 troops along the desolate mountain terrain and started building up multiple infantries on both sides of the borders.⁶⁷⁹ Countries in South Asia tried to defuse tension between India and China, the two Asian Giants as such tensions would seriously reprimand the growth of the entire Asian continent. For that reason the leaders of the South Asian region formulated the Colombo Plan which tried to mediate between India and China providing suggestions like redrawing orders after troops were withdrawn till before the war position. However gradually in the course of time such plan got fissile out with the stand taken by India and China.

Scholars like Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu and Jing-dong Yuan had tried to identify this phase as an era of Sino-Soviet Cold war where India and the Soviet were on one side and Pakistan

⁶⁷⁷ Hoffman, Steven A; *Indian and the China Crisis*; (Berkeley; University of California Press; 1990); pp 42

⁶⁷⁸ Sidhu, Waheguru Pal Singh & Yuan, Jing-dong; *China and India Cooperation or Conflict*; (India Research Press; 2003)

⁶⁷⁹ Kulkarni, V.G; 'Eyeball to Eyeball on the Himalayan Border'; *Far East Economic Review*; 9 April 1987; pp 36

and China (later United States) where on the other. Any attempt to improve the relationship between New Delhi and Beijing were constrained by the Sino-Soviet antagonism and the Indo-Pakistan confrontation. In this phase three, international developments actually determined the course of Sino-Indian Relations. Firstly: The growing rift between Soviet Union and China which began over ideological differences, quickly deteriorated into a state of animosity between the two nations. USSR charged China with irresponsible radicalism that might result in open military confrontation between Socialist and Capitalist camps, whereas on the other hand Beijing accused Moscow of betraying the revolutionary principles in search of peaceful coexistence with the capitalist United States. The dispute escalated in the late 1960's and culminated in a shooting war in 1969 on the bank of Ussuri River-the first hot war between two nuclear armed states.⁶⁸⁰ Secondly: the Sino-Soviet rift coincided with not only evolving a partnership with India embodying into the famous Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty in 1971, but it also resulted with a new emerging US-China rapprochement, which resulted in the famous secret visit by President Richard Nixon's national Security adviser Henry Kissinger, to Beijing in 1971, where Pakistan played a very vital role.⁶⁸¹ And the third incident which played a very vital role in this phase was the growing Sino-Pakistan relationship post 1962, which began to rapidly develop into a strategic and anti-Indian axis, as New Delhi's relations with both Beijing and Islamabad deteriorated.⁶⁸² Among these three major developments perhaps the most influential one which reinforced Sino-Indian rivalry to its nadir was perhaps the growing Sino-Pakistan relationship especially against the anti-Indian axis.

The origin of the entente cordiale between China and Pakistan can be traced back to 1961 when Pakistan for the first time supported the Soviet draft resolution that sought to restore China's membership in the United Nations. This was followed by the Sino-Pakistan boundary agreement of 3 March 1963 that defined their common borders. This bilateral agreement

⁶⁸⁰ Goldstein, Steven M; *Nationalism and Internationalism: Sino-Soviet Relations*; in Thomas W Robinson and David Shambaugh eds; *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*; (Oxford; UK; 1994); pp 224-265

⁶⁸¹ Jonathan D Pollack; *The Opening to America 1968-1982*; in John K Fairbank and Roderick MacFarquhar eds. *The Cambridge History of China*; Vol. 15; (Cambridge University Press; 1992); pp 402-472

⁶⁸² Garver, John W; *Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century*; (Seattle; University of Washington Press; 2001); pp 168

between the two coming within months of Sino-Indian war over the border issue, took the form of an anti Indian Alliance. Subsequently in the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War China completely sided with Pakistan on almost all the issues and accused India of building military structure in Tibet and issued an ultimatum to New Delhi to dismantle these structures.⁶⁸³

Even in the 1971 War China side lining it with Pakistan warned India that it would intervene if New Delhi attacks East Pakistan (present day Bangladesh).⁶⁸⁴ It was in this war where the Sino-Pak cooperation was evident both on diplomatic and military levels. In April 1971 when the movement was on its last phase to take of Zhou assured Pakistan's military dictator, General Yahya Khan, that 'should the Indian expansionist dare to launch aggression against Pakistan, the Chinese Government and people will, as always, firmly support the Pakistan Government and people in their struggle to safeguard their sovereignty and national independence.'⁶⁸⁵ This April statement by Zhou, compelled with the news of Kissinger's secret visits to Beijing in July, was the primary factor that prompted India to sign the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty on 9 August 1971.⁶⁸⁶

(5.1.5) Phase V- The Sino- Indian Détente (1979-1998):

By the 70's and during the post-Mao period Beijing realized the fact that the Indo-Soviet friendship was closely linked to Indo-Chinese enmity, therefore improvement in the later means a distance of India from Soviet, Moreover during this time due to the military defeat of US army in Vietnam there was a power vacuum in South Asia and China wanted to use the opportunity. Thus in the year 1976 the Chinese asked the Romanian president Nicolae Ceausescu, to relay the message that Beijing wants to improve relations and was prepared to hold talks on border issues. This probe was reciprocated when the Indian Prime Minister, Morarji Desai, indicated during his visit to Washington in June 1978 that 'India is ready,

⁶⁸³ Rose, Leo E; 'India and China: Forging a New Relationship' in Dharma, Shailandra D; *The Asia Pacific in the New Millennium: Geo-Politics, Security and Foreign Policy*; (Berkeley; University of California; Institute of East Asian Studies; 2000); pp 226

⁶⁸⁴ Gowasmi, B.N; *Pakistan and China*; (Bombay; Allied Publishers; 1971); pp 118-119

⁶⁸⁵ Vertzberger, Yaarov; *The Enduring Etente: Sino-Pakistan Relations, 1960-1980*; (New York; Praeger; 1982); pp 47

⁶⁸⁶ Hersh, Seymour M; *The Price of Power- Kissinger in the White House*; (New York; Summit Books; 1983); pp 452

sometimes in the future, to recognize the present frontier as the Indo-Chinese boundary, and that India would not demand the return of territory seized by China between 1957-1962.⁶⁸⁷

In February 1979 Indian Foreign Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited China. In June 1980 senior Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping, in an interview with the editor of an Indian defense journal, offered to settle the long-standing border dispute with India. Deng suggested that a resolution of the border issue be based on mutual recognition of the status quo: India would accept Chinese control of Aksai Chin, and in return China would recognize Indian control over disputed territories in the eastern sector. For the first time China also departed from its previous stand on Kashmir, and declared it as a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan.⁶⁸⁸

The year 1981 saw a yet new move in the direction of détente between the two nations when the border talks commenced and were followed by seven more separate round of meetings that paved the way for future agreements. Since then the process of normalization in Sino-Indian relations has evolved slowly through three distinct yet reinforcing activities: summit meeting between head of state and government; regular exchange visits between high ranking military and civilian officials and the gradually process of institutionalizing a series of Confidence building measures (CBMs). This bonhomie in the relations was witnessed when in 1986-1987 Beijing adopted a sharply neutral stand with regard to Kashmir particularly during the operation Brass-tacks crisis.⁶⁸⁹

However the road to détente was not always smooth as there were several incidents occurred during the period that set back the entire normalization process. The foremost among them was the statehood right given to Arunachal Pradesh by New Delhi in December 1989 which was seen as an effort to impose the contentious McMahon Line on China. Secondly Chinese encroachments in the western Ladakh across the LAC raised alarm among New Delhi. Finally it was the Chinese Nuclear test during India's President R Venkataraman's visit in May 1992 was another source of friction between the two nations. Nevertheless although despite all these crisis the next major shift in the relations between the two nations was seen with the advent of the young Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and his historical trip to Beijing in

⁶⁸⁷ Swamy, Subramanian; *India's China Perspective*; (New Delhi; Konark; 2001); pp 101

⁶⁸⁸ Louis, Arul B.; 'The Thaws in the Himalayas', *Far East Economic Review*; 4 July 1980; pp 26-27

⁶⁸⁹ Garver, John W; 'Sino-Indian Rapprochement and the Sino-Pakistan Entente'; *Political Science Quarterly* 111:2; (Summer 1996); pp 337-343

December 1988-the first such visits since 1954 when his Grand Father Jawaharlal Nehru, went to China- was a definitive movement in Sino-Indian relations. During his visit India accepted Chinese proposition that bilateral relations could be expanded and improved before there solution of border issue. In response China accepted India's timeframe for the settlement for the settlement of the dispute and the creation of a joint working group headed by the deputy foreign ministers. A tentative but significant program of CMBs was also put in place, including direct links for commercial airlines and telecommunications, cooperation in science and technology and bilateral cultural exchanges. Although nothing was said on Kashmir question but there was increasing sympathy for the Indian position given China's own separatist movement among the Tibetans in Tibet and Uighur Muslim of Xinjiang.

Followed by Rajiv's visit to China in December 1991 Chinese premier Li Peng visited India- the first Chinese Primisted to do so since Zhou in late 1960. The 1991 communiqué issued by Li Peng and Indian Prime Minister P.V. Narashimaha Rao condemned the military domination of the West in the post-cold war era. Later during the visit of Indian President Venkataraman in May 1992, the Chinese President, Yang Shangkun, declared that the cooperation between India and China was essential in order to avoid being left behind and bullied by others. These visits were significant largely in terms of adding to the ongoing gesture of Sino-Indian reconciliation. These diplomatic visits were followed by major breakthrough in September 1993 when Prime Minister Rao attended a summit in Beijing, hosted by Premier Li. The two leaders penned the agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility, which called for the renunciation of forces, recognition and respect for LAC, and the resolution of the border issue through negotiations. In addition, there were mutually agreed upon troop reductions and process of transparency was introduced to help implement the agreement.⁶⁹⁰ A highest point in the growing ties between the two nations reached in the year 1996, when Jiang Zemin became the first Chinese President to pay and official visit to India. During this visit both the sides agreed on significant troop reductions along the LAC by signing the Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures. However, no formal treaty was signed to settle the border dispute; the Tibetan and Sikkim questions were not addresses; and China did not raised the Kashmir question again on behalf of Pakistan. The evidence of Sino-Indian relations was visible in almost every aspect of their bilateral relations. New Institutional links were established, scholarship and research opportunities for scholar in both

⁶⁹⁰ Sidhu, Waheguru Pal Singh & Yuan, Jing-dong; *China and India Cooperation or Conflict*; (India Research Press; 2003); pp23

the sides were increased, and both the nations explored cooperation in the space. China and India reached an agreement for supply of uranium fuel for the Tarapur nuclear power plant under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).⁶⁹¹ Perhaps the biggest gain made by the two nations was in the area of trade, which increased from a mere US\$ 117.4 million in 1987 to US \$ 700 million in 1993-1994 and by 1998 it stood at US \$ 1.922 billion.⁶⁹²

(5.1.6) Pokhran II and the Changing Relations (1998-till date):

China's successful test of its device had sparked an outpouring of Indian strategic thought. It was not clear what impact this test had on the decision making process in Delhi but however within a year of the Chinese tests there was discernible shift in the nuclear policy under the new Lal Bahadur Shastri government. In a speech on 24 November barely a month after a month of Chinese test, Prime Minister Shastri categorically reiterated the Nehru policy of not producing a bomb. Following the Pakistani attack on India in September 1965 this policy of having a bomb got further reinforced. On 16 November 1965 Shastri told in Rajya Sabha that India would reconsider its policy of not making nuclear weapons if China succeeded in stockpiling nuclear weapons and perfecting a delivery system. Finally in December 1965 when secretary of Congress parliamentary party returned from the UN General Assembly he argued that China could occupy a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and hinted that India should acquire a nuclear capability to achieve parity with China, and thereby clinch to a permanent council seat.⁶⁹³ Against this backdrop, Shastri launched a two-pronged strategy, the first was to seek nuclear guarantees; the second was to go ahead with the subterranean nuclear explosive project (SNEP) to validate the nuclear option. Eventually India moved ahead for its peaceful nuclear test on 18 May 1974 in the Pokhran Desert, although Mrs. Gandhi did not make an explicit connection between India's test and China's nuclear capability but however the Ministry of Defense made this connection tacitly. Thus it

⁶⁹¹ McDonald Hamish; 'Nuclear Pay-Off: China to Supply Enriched Uranium to India'; *Far East Economic Review*; 19 January 1995

⁶⁹² MEA; Government of India; 'India-China Relations' in *India's Foreign Relations*; accessed at www.meadev.nic.in/foreign/ind-china.htm.

⁶⁹³ Ray, J.K.; *Security in the Missile Age*; (New Delhi: Allied Publishers; 1967); pp 130

was evident that between 1964-1984 India's weapon option policy was primarily directed at the perceived nuclear threat from China.⁶⁹⁴

By the early to mid 1980's India analysts were convinced that Pakistan had put together an effective nuclear weapon program.⁶⁹⁵ Moreover the growing evidence of Pakistan-China nuclear nexus coupled with a series of military crisis that India faced with China and Pakistan gave a new urgency to the notion that India had to respond.⁶⁹⁶ It was this coupling threat which was clearly spelled out in Vajpayee's letter to Clinton – 'Although our relations with that country (China) have improved in the last decade or so, an atmosphere of distrust persists mainly due to the unresolved border problem. To add the distrust that country has materially helped other neighbors of ours (Pakistan) to become a covert nuclear weapon state.'⁶⁹⁷

In the weeks leading up to the May 1998 tests, India's Defense Minister George Fernandes, a well known sympathizer with both the Tibetan and Burmese causes, made a series of statements that expressed similar sentiments even more strongly. Soon after Islamabad flight-tested its Ghauri missile on 6 April 1998, Fernandes noted that 'China was the mother of Pakistan's Ghauri missile.'⁶⁹⁸ He also asserted that China had set up a monitoring station on Myanmar's Coco Islands, a remark that coincided with the first-ever visits of the PLA chief of staff, General Fu Quanyou, to New Delhi from 27 to 30 April 1998. Finally a week before the tests, Fernandes claimed during a T.V. interview that 'China is potential threat number one.'⁶⁹⁹ Finally a combination of several domestic and international factors India finally went ahead for testing its second peaceful nuclear test on 11 May 1998. Beijing initial response to

⁶⁹⁴ Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu; *India's Nuclear Use Doctrine*; in Peter R Lavoy, Scott Sagan and James J Wirt zeds. *Planning the Unthinkable: New Proliferators and the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction*; (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press; 2000); pp 125-157

⁶⁹⁵ Palit D.K & Namboodripad P.K.S.; *Pakistan's Islamic Bomb*; (New Delhi; Vikas; 1982); pp 42

⁶⁹⁶ Garver, John W; *Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century*; (Seattle; University of Washington Press; 2001); pp 216-242

⁶⁹⁷ *New York Times*; 13 May 1998 as cited in Sidhu, Waheguru Pal Singh & Yuan, Jing-dong; *China and India Cooperation or Conflict*; (India Research Press; 2003); pp25

⁶⁹⁸ Joshi, Manoj; *George In China's Shop*; India Today International; 18 May 1998

⁶⁹⁹ *Agence France-Presse*; 'China Bigger Threat to India Than Pakistan' May 3; 1998 as cited in Sidhu, Waheguru Pal Singh & Yuan, Jing-dong; *China and India Cooperation or Conflict*; (India Research Press; 2003); pp25

India's test was rather restrained. Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Zhu Bangzao expressed the Chinese government's deep concern over the tests and pointed out that these were contrary to the international trend and not conducive to peace and stability in South Asia. Two days later India conducted a second round of tests. However after the *New York Times* had published Prime Minister Vajpayee's letter to President Clinton alluding to the China threat as the justification to the nuclear tests, Beijing reacted angrily and strongly. A statement from the foreign affairs ministry on 14 May condemned India's behavior in the following words 'In disregard of the strong opposition of the international community, the Indian Government conducted two more nuclear tests on May 13 following the May 11 tests. The Chinese Government is deeply shocked by this and hereby expresses its condemnation.'⁷⁰⁰ Thus it appeared that initially China was relatively unconcerned about the tests per se. What upset the Chinese was India's insistence on using China as a justification, in addition to the statements about Tibet made by Fernandes on the eve of the test. It was felt among Chinese officials that India had been foolhardy in reversing several years of extraordinary promising political developments, which even included Chinese offer to assist India with its nuclear power program.

Since from the late 1998 and early 1999 there was seen a rapprochement and an attempt from the Indian side to open dialogue of bonhomie for China. A track-II dialogue was initiated, paving the way to the gradual resumption of official bilateral contacts.⁷⁰¹ Indian Prime Minister Jaswant Singh's June 1999 visit to China was another watershed in turning around bilateral relations. Occurring amid the Kargil crisis, the visit also served to demonstrate Beijing's neutrality in the conflict. China's stand during the Kargil crisis dispelled India's concern over possible Chinese support of Pakistan.⁷⁰² In the year 2000 a security dialogue was initiated and Chinese Foreign Minister Tan Jiaxun reciprocated Jaswant Singh's visit by coming New Delhi. On June the same year to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations President Narayanan visited China. In January 2001 and

⁷⁰⁰ 'China's Statement on India's Nuclear Tests'; *Beijing Review* 1-7 June 1998; pp 7 as cited in Sidhu, Waheguru Pal Singh & Yuan, Jing-dong; *China and India Cooperation or Conflict*; (India Research Press; 2003); pp25

⁷⁰¹ Sidhu, Waheguru Pal Singh & Yuan, Jing-dong; *China and India Cooperation or Conflict*; (India Research Press; 2003); pp25

⁷⁰² Singh, Swaran; *The Kargil Conflict: The Why and How of China's Neutrality*; Strategic Analysis 23:7 (October 1999); pp 1083-1094

January 2002 Li Peng Chai of the National People's Congress Standing Committee and Premier Zhu Rongji visited India. This high level of diplomatic visits by Beijing was again reciprocated by the visit of Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee to China in 2003.

During UPA I and II Government there was a significant closeness between the India and the US administration regarding Civil Nuclear Cooperation which turned into a major irritant or a cause of concern for nations like China and Russia. They felt that this strategic tilting towards US will further allow US administration to interfere in core areas of the Asian sub-continent. However the present government rebranding Gujral Doctrine as 'Neighborhood First Policy' has seen multiple diplomatic and high level visits by the Head of States in between Beijing and New Delhi. Cultural diplomacy was used as a tool of CBM to enhance business avenues of opportunities. However India has been extremely reluctant to openly support China's pet projects like OBOR or CPEC as the leadership has made it clear that though connectivity remains to be an important factor for mutual growth and prosperity but it cannot override the sovereignty of other nations. China on similar lines has been reluctant to open avenues for India gaining access to nuclear fissile material and has blocked India's membership in the Nuclear Supplier Group. The Chinese leadership also has used UNSC Resolution 1267 by not declaring specific individuals as global terrorist which India along with other western nations had made significant attempt of achieving. In the present day the relationship between India and China has been stated crisply by the Indian Prime Minister Modi in the 2nd Edition of the Raisina Dialogue stated that the rise of India and China brings for the an unprecedented economic opportunity for not only both the countries but also for the whole world. But at the same time it's not unnatural for the two large neighboring powers to have some differences.

(5.2) Sino- Pakistan Relations:

For about decade of its existence Pakistan's Policy towards the PRC remained ambivalent. Subsequently, this ambivalence was replaced by the cordial relationship which still continues between them till today. Diplomatic relationship between Islamabad and Beijing began in the 1955's at the 1955 Afro-Asian conference in Bandung when the Head of the States of both then nation Zhou Enlai and Mohammad Ali Bogra initiated a series of high level contacts and visits. Pakistan had recognized the Peoples Republic of China on 4 January 1950 and the two countries established diplomatic relations a year later. The end of the 1950's also saw a downturn from *Hindi-Chinni-Bhai-Bhai* days of Sino-Indian Relations. It was however after the 1962 Sino-Indian war Pakistan realized that China could be an ideal friend against India.

Earlier that year a joint communiqué signed in February by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Marshal Chen Yi had urged that the Kashmir dispute should be resolved according to the plebiscite.⁷⁰³

Relations between China and Pakistan began with the thread of extremely suspicious towards each other. Till late 1950s, Pakistan was seen as the ‘most allied ally’ of the United States by Peking, and moreover due to Pakistan’s ‘joint defense’ of South Asia against the Chinese border incursions, China considered it as one of its major threat in the region. Thus, although Pakistan recognized the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in early 1950’s; yet their formal diplomatic ties were established only after 21 May 1951.⁷⁰⁴ However, it was a common threat faced by these two nations which finally brought them close to each other. Till the late 1950’s China was witnessing its ties deteriorating both with former Soviet Union and India. On the same hand for Pakistan, India had always been its arch enemy, right from the day the idea of Pakistan was first articulated. This was to be followed by their rising communal hatred, violent partition, border problems and frequent wars which all had further re- enforced their animosity towards India. Until 1955 things were going in a very slow pace between the two nations and there was no positive sign of any level China–Pakistan rapprochements. The situation remained the same until Chinese Premier Zhou En-Lai met with his Pakistani counterpart Mohammed Ali Bogra during the Afro–Asian Conference at Bandung in April 1955. It was at Bandung that these two leaders agreed that (a) China and India were emerging as rivals for leadership amongst Afro – Asian countries, (b) China and Pakistan should cooperate to increase their leverage against Moscow and New Delhi, and (c) China and Pakistan could evolve a working relationship despite differences in their political systems and ideologies.⁷⁰⁵ The next level of talks between China-Pakistan commenced with the historic visit of Pakistani, Prime Minister H.S. Suhrawardy to visit China in 1956. This extended hand of friendship was reciprocated by the Beijing on the same tune with the visit of Premier Zhou En-Lai to Pakistan strengthening the China-Pakistan ties further more. A more meaningful interaction between the two begins only from early 1960s when a series of agreements and pacts were signed between the two nations. China and Pakistan went forward for signing-

⁷⁰³ Rasul Baksh-Rais, *China and Pakistan: A Political Analysis of Mutual Relations*; (Lahore, Progressive Publishers; 1977) pp 45

⁷⁰⁴ *China and South Asia in the 21st Century*; Spotlight on Regional Affairs; Islamabad Institute of Regional Studies; Vol- XVIII, No-10) October 1999; pp-02

⁷⁰⁵ Bhola, P.L; *Pakistan-China Relations: Search for Politico-Strategic Relations*; (Jaipur; Oscar Publications; 1986); pp-69

trade agreement in January 1963, border demarcation agreement during March 1963, air services agreement during August 1963 followed by a cultural agreement during March 1965.⁷⁰⁶

Since a foreign policy of any two nations are deeply influenced by the foreign policy of the world view of the leadership thus in the case of the Sino-Pakistan relationship too there are certain areas of commonality that had led the birth of a all weathered bonhomie between the two.

(5.2.1) Birth of the Relationship:

Relations between China and Pakistan began with the thread of extremely suspicious towards each other. Till late 1950s, Pakistan was seen as the ‘most allied ally’ of the United States by Peaking, and moreover due to Pakistan’s ‘joint defense’ of South Asia against the Chinese border incursions, China considered it as one of its major threat in the region. Thus, although Pakistan recognized the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in early 1950’s; yet their formal diplomatic ties were established only after 21 May 1951.⁷⁰⁷ However, it was a common threat faced by these two nations which finally brought them close to each other.

Till the late 1950’s China was witnessing its ties deteriorating both with former Soviet Union and India. On the same hand for Pakistan, India had always been its arch enemy, right from the day the idea of Pakistan was first articulated. This was to be followed by their rising communal hatred, violent partition, border problems and frequent wars which all had further re-enforced their animosity towards India. Until 1955 things were going in a very slow pace between the two nations and there was no positive sign of any level China–Pakistan rapprochements. The situation remained the same until Chinese Premier Zhou En-Lai met with his Pakistani counterpart Mohammed Ali Bogra during the Afro–Asian Conference at Bandung in April 1955. It was at Bandung that these two leaders agreed that (a) China and India were emerging as rivals for leadership amongst Afro – Asian countries, (b) China and Pakistan should cooperate to increase their leverage against Moscow and New Delhi, and (c) China and Pakistan could evolve a working relationship despite differences in their political

⁷⁰⁶ Singh Swaran; *China-South Asia: Issues, Equations, Policies*; (Lancer Books, New Delhi; 2003); pp 173

⁷⁰⁷ *China and South Asia in the 21st Century*; Spotlight on Regional Affairs; Islamabad Institute of Regional Studies; Vol- XVIII, No-10) October 1999; pp-02

systems and ideologies.⁷⁰⁸ The next level of talks between China-Pakistan commenced with the historic visit of Pakistani, Prime Minister H.S. Suhrawardy to visit China in 1956. This extended hand of friendship was reciprocated by the Beijing on the same tune with the visit of Premier Zhou En-Lai to Pakistan strengthening the China-Pakistan ties further more. A more meaningful interaction between the two begins only from early 1960s when a series of agreements and pacts were signed between the two nations, especially after the failure of Nehru-Zhou Delhi talks. The relationship between the two came out more prominent when after the U-2 spy plane incident Soviet Union gave grave warning to Pakistan but China did not even send a note of protest which hinted the fact that the two nations are ready for having a normalized relationship with each other.

Meanwhile with the advent of J.F Kennedy as the leader of US India came much closer to United States displeasing Ayub Khan in Islamabad and as an act of resentment threatened us to vote for China's representation in the UNO.⁷⁰⁹ In the mean time in the wake of the deterioration of Sino- Indian relation on account of the border dispute both the nations confronted with each other in the border war of October 1962 and India was receiving economic and military assistance from both US and USSR which deeply upset Islamabad.

(5.2.2) Determinants and Objective of Sino-Pak relations:

Owing to a geographical location of Pakistan strategically placed in the Indian sub-continent where on the east, north-east and the south-east lying India, since from the very inception Pakistani rulers have perceived a threat to their countries security. On its north-west lies the politically unstable Afghanistan which separates it from the Soviet Union and on the North beyond the Pakistan Occupied Kashmir lays the PRC. Topographically the nation has been marred by the – mountainous region in the north plateau of Baluchistan and the plains of the Indus River. President Ayub Khan on his word describes the locational status of Pakistan in the following word- 'West Pakistan is wedged in between the three enormous powers, with the Soviet Union at the top, the People's Republic of China in the north-east, and India in the South and East. I know of no other small countries which has the somewhat dubious

⁷⁰⁸ Bhola, P.L; *Pakistan-China Relations: Search for Politico-Strategic Relations*; (Jaipur; Oscar Publications; 1986); pp-69

⁷⁰⁹ Mohammad Ayub Khan, *Speeches and Statements, Vol. IV, July 1961-June 1962* ; Karachi; pp 53-54

distinction of having three such mighty neighbors.’⁷¹⁰ As the nation shares a very complicated and controversial relationship with its two neighbors Soviet and India as such the only option left for the leaders of the nations since from the beginning seemed to the only and only PRC.

Moreover starting with an agrarian economy since 1947 gradually Pakistan as a nation has expanded its non-agrarian sectors considerably. Till mid sixties emphasis was given to the development of the consumer industries, by the late sixties attention was on the basic and heavy industries, however this growth rate received a thaw in the early seventies and the growth rate showed a stagnancy.⁷¹¹ However by the eighties the growth rate of Pakistan’s showed a significant development by 8.9 percent. By 1983-84 its GDP showed a tremendous development by 17.5 to 18.9 percent which was one of the most significant transformations in the economic development of Pakistan.⁷¹² Among the factors that induced such high profile economic development of Pakistan was the great rise in the industrialization and the significant amount of foreign trade that the nation received from its western alliance partners especially United States. Foreign aid has played a crucial role in the economic growth of Pakistan. Inadequacy of foreign exchange earnings and the weak domestic saving further reinforced the foreign trade and aid in Pakistan’s economy. Thus scholars tend to call the economic development of Pakistan as ‘dependent capitalist development.’⁷¹³ However the considerable reliance on foreign trade tied Pakistan’s economy to the Western Countries, particularly the United States. This had implications for Pakistan’s foreign policy. Things turned out worsen when in the wake of change in the South Asian region during the early sixties Pakistan leaders sought to cultivate relations with the socialist countries, which deeply annoyed the Western patrons of Pakistan. Thus soon the United States and its allies started reducing their trades and aid to Pakistan and put hard term on the condition of the loans. Thus from 1965 onwards China started giving aid to Pakistan on the most attractive terms and

⁷¹⁰ Khan, Mohammad Ayub; *Friends Not Masters*; (London, 1967), pp 117

⁷¹¹ Naqvi, A.N.H & Sarmand Khwaja; *Pakistan’s Economy thorough the Seventies*; (Pakistan Institute of Development, Islamabad) pp 35

⁷¹² Ramakant (eds.); *China and South Asia; South Asia Study Series 18*; (South Asian Publishers; New Delhi; 1988) ; pp 87

⁷¹³ Ramakant (eds.); *China and South Asia; South Asia Study Series 18*; (South Asian Publishers; New Delhi; 1988) ; pp 86

condition. Thus China has from them become the most important donors and trade pattern of Pakistan.⁷¹⁴ Thus, once Pakistan President said that ‘we are grateful to the leaders of the Peoples Republic of China for their positive contribution to the economic and industrial cooperation between the two countries which is playing a vital role in our economic development.’⁷¹⁵ Similarly on the other hand the ports and the geo-political strategic location of Pakistan induced China to reinforce the economic relationship between them. China has forever maintained an all weathered economic, political and military ally of Pakistan and thus it’s the relationship of commonality that has brought the two nations closer to each other.

(5.2.3) Pakistan’s aspiration and closeness with China-reason and rational:

From the determinants analyzed above one can find out four major Pakistan’s policy toward China into focus: 1 Security and preservation of territorial integrity of Pakistan; 2. Kashmir Issue, 3. Economic Aid and Assistance and finally maintaining its status-quo with India in the South-Asian region.

Pakistan’s security objectives vis-à-vis China can be viewed from two angles. First whether China poses a threat to Pakistan’s security directly or indirectly; secondly, whether China can bolster Pakistan’s security vis-à-vis its other neighbour. As regards to the first the Pakistani rulers do not spell out any apprehensions more over the rugged terrain in the Xinjiang-Kashmir region.⁷¹⁶ Whereas with regard to the second, China can surely bolster Pakistan’s security vis-à-vis other neighbours. The location of Tibet and Xinjiang on the north of Indian sub-continent places China in a position to intervene militarily in a confrontation between India and Pakistan and between Afghanistan and Pakistan too. Thus keeping in mind this objective Pakistan has always developed friendly relationship with China.

China has been one of the key elements in Pakistan’s foreign policy and since from the time of independence it has been the touch-stone of Pakistan’s foreign policy. Those countries

⁷¹⁴ Bholia P.L; Sino-Pakistan Economic Relations (1950-1983) *South Asian Studies Journal*, Vol 19 No.1 January-June 1984 pp 41-61 *China and South Asia; South Asia Study Series 18;* (South Asian Publishers; New Delhi; 1988) ; pp 87

⁷¹⁵ Ramakant (eds.); *China and South Asia; South Asia Study Series 18;* (South Asian Publishers; New Delhi; 1988) ; pp 86

⁷¹⁶ However with the creation of the Karrakoram Highway facilities for means of communication and transportation between Xinjiang and Gilgit Pakistani leaders do visualizes a possibility of Chinese attack analogous to the one in Ladakh, and one cannot rule out the possibility of Sino-Pak relations getting strained. The instance was seen when in 1953 and 1959 China violated the sir-spaces of the Pakistan Occupied Kashmir and it was to eliminate the possibility of Chinese attack, the Pakistan moved to sign the Sino-Pak border agreement.

which supported Pakistan on the issue where recognized as friends of Pakistan. In that decade China's attitude toward the issue was ambivalent. However with the rise of the Sino-Indian border dispute, Pakistan saw an opportunity of getting China involved in the Indo-Pak dispute over Kashmir. In 1963 Pakistan signed an agreement with China on the demarcation of boundaries between Xinjiang and Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir. In return of the agreement China changed its stand on Kashmir and has time and again supported Pakistan against Indian in regional as well as international forays.

(5.2.4) Economic Aid and Assistance:

Economic development remains to be the one of the most important issue among the previous 4 factors that has led the strengthening of the relationship between the two nations. During the fifties after independence Pakistan relied heavily on the aid and loans from the United States of America. This cost Pakistan heavily on the term of independence in the field of impartial and independent foreign policy making. However during the 60's when the relationship between China and Pakistan were declining the Pakistani leaders diversified their sources of aid and economic relationship with many other nations. Among them one of the prominent everlasting and all-weathered ally's remains to be China and its development has already been mentioned above.

However in the present decade One such mammoth economic development of China within the Pakistan remains to be the landmark proposed China Pakistan Economic corridor (CPEC) The proposed economic corridor will connect the north-western Chinese province of Xinjiang with the Pakistani port of Gwadar through a network of roads measuring around 3000 kms (1,800 miles), providing Pakistan its much-needed economic infrastructure, especially power-generation plants.⁷¹⁷ China has made commitments to provide around \$46 billion in development deals, which is equivalent to roughly 20 per cent of Pakistan's annual GDP.⁷¹⁸

⁷¹⁷Saeed Shah, "China's Xi Jinping Launches Investment Deal in Pakistan", *The Wall Street Journal*, April 20, 2015, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-xi-jinping-set-to-launch-investment-deal-in-pakistan-1429533767>

⁷¹⁸ Andrew Stevens (2015), "Pakistan Lands \$46 Billion Investment from China", *CNN, Money*, April 20, <http://money.cnn.com/2015/04/20/news/economy/pakistan-china-aid-infrastructure/>

Under the CPEC, China and Pakistan plan to build infrastructure to Connect Gwadar Port in Pakistan with Kashgar in Xinjiang.⁷¹⁹ The project has become a “flagship project” of China’s Silk Road Economic Belt, although it was proposed in May 2013, a few months earlier than the broader economic belt. As a sign of its important place in the overall strategy, the CPEC was the first project to receive an investment from China’s \$40 billion Silk Road Fund, providing partial financing for the \$1.65 billion Karot hydropower project in Pakistan.⁷²⁰ Pakistani President Mamnoon Hussain predicted that the CPEC will be “a monument of the century” during his February 2014 visit to China. China and Pakistan also signed 20 cooperation agreements, worth \$1.6 billion, at the forum. During Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Pakistan in April of this year, the two sides identified four key areas for cooperation: “Gwadar Port, energy, transport infrastructure and industrial cooperation.”⁷²¹ For Pakistan, the project represents an economic boost and a potential solution to an ongoing energy crisis. According to *China Daily*; “gas, coal and solar energy projects” — planned under the CPEC framework have the potential to double Pakistan’s current capacity.⁷²² For China, meanwhile, the project is a must if the broader Silk Road Economic Belt, with its attendant benefits for China’s domestic economy, geopolitical clout, and regional stability, is to get off the ground.



⁷¹⁹ The Diplomat; *China Pakistan Flesh out new Economic Corridor*, <http://thediplomat.com/2014/02/china-pakistan-flesh-out-new-economic-corridor/>

⁷²⁰ Xianhua; *China’s Silk Road Fund makes first investment in Pakistan’s hydropower project*; http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-04/21/c_134167533.htm

⁷²¹ China Daily; *Backgrounder: China-Pakistan Economic Corridor*, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2015xivisitpse/2015-04/22/content_20503693.htm

⁷²² China Daily; *Backgrounder: China-Pakistan Economic Corridor*, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2015xivisitpse/2015-04/22/content_20503693.htm

Pakistan, China's "iron brother," will likely be Beijing's most eager partner along the planned Silk Road. China also sees the CPEC in particular as a way to diversify its energy supply, lessening reliance on easily disrupted maritime trade routes. In total, the economic corridor project aims to add some 17,000 megawatts of electricity generation at a cost of around \$34 billion. The rest of the money will be spent on transport infrastructure, including upgrading the railway line between the port megacity of Karachi and the northwest city of Peshawar.⁷²³

(5.2.5) Maintaining its status-quo with India in the South-Asian region:

In the South Asian neighborhood the country that has reaped maximum benefit out of the India Pakistan rivalry is no one else than China. Tibet has been a bone of contention for the Chinese leadership but in the guise providing a helping hand in Pakistan's infrastructural growth it is not only been able to build a strong strategic infrastructure within Tibet but has also been able to strangled India's growth in the region. It has been in multiple forms: the Karakorum Highway, Aksai Chin, China's stand on Kashmir, 1965 and 1971 wars PLA's role in Infrastructural development in Gilgit and Baltistan or the CPEC of modern days. There is a need to assess how China Pakistan relationship has strengthened the conflict between India and Pakistan and the role the US has played in such a triad.

Ever since its birth Pakistan had an ambition of achieving the status of a co-equal power with India. This ambition is incongruous with reality. By virtue of its size, population, resources and industrial and technological capabilities, India holds a dominant position in South Asia. Pakistan has been seeking the involvement of the external powers for creating artificial parity between India and Pakistan. Assessing the Chinese policy toward Pakistan Lisa Curtis of Heritage Foundation, in one of his articles has argued that the closeness is basically driven to offset the Indian power in the region and averting the strategic and military attention of India away from China. China has been the largest arms provider for Pakistan. In the year 1992 China officially acknowledged the fact that it supplied 36 M9 ballistic missiles, JF-17, F-7 fighter aircrafts to Pakistan. Moreover from time to time it has also assisted Pakistan by providing it with multiple kinds of small arms and ammunition whenever needed and required. It's believed that almost 70% of Pakistan's armed forces fighter aircrafts and Main

⁷²³ Saeed Shah, "China's Xi Jinping Launches Investment Deal in Pakistan", *The Wall Street Journal*, April 20, 2015, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-xi-jinping-set-to-launch-investment-deal-in-pakistan-1429533767>

Battle Tanks (MBT) are procured from Beijing, mostly all the major missile projects of Pakistan are funded and guided by China. Apart from this China has helped to modernize the arsenal of Pakistan armed forces by providing it more than 400 military aircraft, 1600 MBT, 40 navy ships, and the latest version of J-10 and JF-17 aircrafts. Not only has China helped Pakistan to modernize its armory but even the two nations have also established joint projects in Pakistan. Besides creating the JF-17 other landmark projects that have been jointly created by the two nations includes the K-8 Karakorum advance training aircraft, Al Khalid Tanks, Babur cruise missiles, F-22 naval frigates, the AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) etc. Apart from the strategic and military ventures Beijing's flagship project of OBOR and Gwadar Sea Port is being constructed with the assistance of Pakistan. Further China has also assisted Pakistan to develop its space technology project, Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO) and also the Heavy Rebuild Factory (HRF) at Taxila. Moreover the Pakistani Nuclear Programme remains highly indebted to the China for its support in not only assisting in creating Pakistan's nuclear weapons designs but also its weapon grade uranium. The twin nuclear reactor in Chasma has been built by China.

In the December of 2009 in a meeting with the Pakistan Chief of Naval Staff Noman Bashir the Defense Minister of Beijing Liang Guangile urged to deepen their ties with Pakistan and confirmed to supply a total of eight F-22 P 3000 tonner Frigates to Pakistan. Along with this Pakistan also acquired 120 Chinese C 802 long range anti-ship cruise missiles, second ERIEYE radar-equipped SAAB 2000 and has expected to receive the Shaanxi ZDK-03 airborne early warning aircraft from Beijing. China even aspire to built up a military base in Pakistan for the dual goal of pressuring India and to counterbalance and the influence of United States in Pakistan and Afghanistan and to curb the uprising of Uyghur who are demanding an independent nation in Xinxiang province.⁷²⁴

(5.2.6) China- Pakistan Border Agreement:

Indignant Pakistan because of the US aid to India was however convinced by UK and US and they manipulated and assured Ayub Khan that India won't use the military aid against Pakistan rather the western allies of Pakistan advised Islamabad to go ahead and open a dialogue with India on issue of border demarcation in Kashmir. India agreed and the talks

⁷²⁴ Pakistan Defense; *Chinese Military Assistance to Pakistan and its implications for India* <http://defence.pk/threads/chinese-military-assistance-to-pakistan-and-implications-for-india.70422/#ixzz3s2Kg30z5>

were to begin in December 1962. Reverting to the Kashmir problem the Chinese leader apprehended that the Indo-Pakistan talk on Kashmir might led to the setting up of Indo-Pakistan joint front against China for which the United States has been working since 1953 and Ayub's proposal for joint defense was a link in the chain. To forestall such possibility Beijing hastened its pace of boundary negotiation talks with Islamabad, which the later had initiated long back but was unattended by China.

On the eve of Indo-Pakistan talk it was announced that Pakistan and China has reached on the complete agreement on the location and alignment of the boundary between Xinxiang and the areas of Kashmir under Pakistan's control.⁷²⁵ Obviously it vitiated the atmosphere of Indo-Pakistan talks and it ultimately resulted in failure. Consequently China and Pakistan went forward for signing Sino-Pak border Demarcation Agreement on 2 March 1963. The joint communiqué issued by the two governments stated that the two sides 'have agreed to conduct negotiation so as to attain an agreed understanding of location and alignment of this boundary and to sign on this basis and agreement of a provisional nature.'⁷²⁶ According to the agreement, according to the Indian sources about 2050 square miles of territory was surrendered to China by Pakistan.⁷²⁷ India lodged vehement protest against the border agreement asserting that Pakistan was not entitled to negotiate with China or any other country about territory that was not its own and also declared that New Delhi will never agree to any such arrangement or agreements 'provisional or otherwise' which constitute an inalienable part of the Indian union. However Chinese replied that Peaking 'could not leave unsettled indefinitely its boundary merely because there is s dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir.'⁷²⁸

Thus following the boundary agreement there was beginning of cordial relationship between China and Pakistan, which was evident by the exchange of numerous delegations and the declaration of support on the issues impinging on their national interests. During the

⁷²⁵ Bholia P.L; Sino-Pakistan Economic Relations (1950-1983) *South Asian Studies Journal*, Vol 19 No.1 January-June 1984 pp 41-61 *China and South Asia; South Asia Study Series 18*; (South Asian Publishers; New Delhi; 1988) ; pp 96.

⁷²⁶ *Pakistan New Digest*; 15 May 1962

⁷²⁷ Kahn, Mohammad Ayub; *Friend's Not Master*; (Karachi, 1967); pp 163

⁷²⁸ MEA: *Notes Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements signed between the Governments of India and China*(White Paper), VI, 99-102

exchange visits of Zhou Enlai and Ayub Khan while China departed from its earlier neutral stand on Kashmir, Pakistan supported China's stand on its seat in United Nation.⁷²⁹

(5.2.7) 1962 Indo-China War and Pakistan's Stand:

During the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962 the Pakistan's reporting was much inclined in favour of China. *Dawn*, on 20 October 1962, likened India of Nehru to 'a wolf that had been fattened with economic aid and equipped with military fangs by the communist as well as non-communist white power to fall on the Chinese Sheep beyond the Himalayas.'⁷³⁰ Peaking was praised by the Pakistani leaders for their peaceful intentions while New Delhi came to be described as the aggressor. Bhutto quite openly described the Chinese attack on India as 'illusory aggression,'⁷³¹ and declared that there is no possibility of Pakistan coming in help for the India in the war with China.⁷³² While some other Pakistani misters described the conflict as a mock fight, the Pakistan's Ambassador to Japan called India as the original aggressor in the conflict.⁷³³ In a statement issued from Rawalpindi Ayub Khan curiously argued that the large amount of military equipment that was being supplied to India by the US and the UK has the effect of 'enlarging and prolonging the conflict between China and India.'⁷³⁴ Pakistan's foreign minister Mohammad Ali openly blamed India for initiating the war with China he observed that 'the conflict stems from India's unrealistic and fallacious foreign policy.' Supporting China's stand on the unilateral cease fire and willingness to withdraw 12 km behind the LOC Ali applauded the action of China and marked it as an act of great statesmanship criticizing India vehemently.⁷³⁵

⁷²⁹ *Pakistan Times*, 23 March 1962

⁷³⁰ *Dawn*, 20 October 1962

⁷³¹ UN Documents S/PV 1221 as quoted in Jain, J.P; *China, Pakistan and Bangladesh*; (Radiant Publishers; 1974; pp 59)

⁷³² *Pakistan Times*, 9 October 1962

⁷³³ Burke, S.M; *Sino-Pakistani Relations* ;(Orbis, 1964; pp 396)

⁷³⁴ Mohammad Ayub Khan, *Speeches and Statements, Vol. V, July 1962-June 1963* ; Karachi; pp 53

⁷³⁵ Pakistan National Assembly Debate; 22 November 1962; p3-6

However, although more than seventy countries of the world expressed their deepest sympathies with India but Pakistan sided with Peking completely both to smite India and to curry favor with Pakistan. The Chinese terms and condition for settlement were applauded by Bhutto and he completely ruled out any collaboration with India against China even if the Kashmir issue was resolved amicably. Friendship with China Bhutto declared was ‘a fundamental principle’ of Pakistan’s foreign policy and was unconditional.’ He also added ‘we will not barter or bargain it with anything’,⁷³⁶

(5.2.8) The Rann of Kutch War and the Chinese Stand:

The unequivocal support and response that Pakistani leaders and policy makers resembled to China in the Sino-Indian war of 1962 was equally reciprocated by China in the India-Pakistan war of 1965. Though the Indo-Pakistani conflict was the result of Pakistani frustration in getting a satisfactory solution to the Kashmir problem yet Beijing response and attitude toward Pakistan was explicit. The Chinese Vice-Minister for Foreign trade Nan Han-chen, during his visit to Pakistan in December 1963 remarked: ‘If ever there is war between India and Pakistan, China will surely support Pakistan not India.’ Even Marshal Chen Yi, who accompanied Premier Chou-En lai during his visit to Pakistan in February 1964, observed that the two neighboring countries Pakistan and China were confronted with common fighting task.⁷³⁷ Thus encouraged by Chinese persuasion and promise of support, military dictatorship in Pakistan became bold in staging border incursion and provocation against India. The cease fire violation increased much in the year 1964 and Pakistan went to that extent when it wanted to think in term of settling its goals with India by the use of force. Bhutto’s Government attempted to teach India a lesson when surreptitious intrusions into Indian Territory were started by the Pakistani Rangers in the beginning of 1965 on the Gujarat-West Pakistan borders which came to known as the Raan of Kutch crisis between India and Pakistan.

The part played by the People’s Republic of China before and during the Raan of Kutch crisis was however quite significant and important. Soon after Pakistan stated its intrusions, Marshal Chen Yi, the Foreign Minister of China, stated during Ayub Kahn’s visit to China was not afraid ‘to offend an aggressor’ and that Peking would go to the assistance of every friend

⁷³⁶ *Dawn*, 29 November 1962

⁷³⁷ *Dawn*, 22 October 1965

if asked for against an aggressor. He added that China could never forget the support Pakistan rendered in the 1962 war and observed that ‘rest assured, we would not disappoint you.’⁷³⁸ While speaking at the banquet given in honour of President Ayub Khan on 2 March 1965, Chairman Liu Shao-chi characterized Ayub as ‘an outstanding statesman of Pakistan and an esteemed friend of Chinese people.’ He spoke that the two countries have given ‘sympathy and support to each other in the cause of safeguarding our respective independence and state sovereignty.’⁷³⁹ Similar tone addressing on the Peaking rally on 5 March 1965 Ayub assured his Chinese friends of the ‘close friendly cooperation.’⁷⁴⁰ The exchange of these visits and the mutual consultations between China and Pakistan were followed by the launching of an armed attack by Pakistan in the Rann of Kutch on 9 April 1965. As did by the Pakistani media during the 1962 War similarly the Chinese Press gave a clear one-sided coverage of the Kutch crisis. The first reference was in the *People’s Daily* which captioned ‘Pakistan Repulses the fresh Indian attack.’ In a way the Chinese media wanted to portray the fact that India is disturbing the status quo of the region and tried to blame India for adopting an intransigent attitude for not being interested in peaceful negotiations. On 4 May 1965 in the official Chinese reaction published in *Hsinhua* Peaking directly blamed India for having gone back on the Indo-Pakistan Agreement of 1960 which, it added was the ‘crux of the present Indo-Pakistan border conflict.’ In order to project the image of an intransigent and unreasonable India the Chinese official asserted that ‘events show that India’s neighbours have often been subjected to its bullying and interference.’ In its perverted logic China accused India in the following maxim ‘My territory is mine, yours is also mine’ The authorized *Hsinhua* statement concluded with the threat that if India insisted on having her own way and continued to ‘play with fire’ and widened armed conflict, she would certainly come to no good end.⁷⁴¹

Thus both the nation sought to create border dispute with India by trying to alter the status quo through use of military forces. Thus when Pakistan attempted to emulate China in the Rann crisis, Peaking was delighted to extend its strong support to its partner in aggression

⁷³⁸ *Dawn*, 7 March 1965

⁷³⁹ *Dawn*, 7 March 1965

⁷⁴⁰ *Peaking Review*, (17 March, 1965) pp 8-9

⁷⁴¹ *Hsinhua News Agency*; 4 May 1965

against India and thereby encourage Pakistan to take further action to humiliate India. Peking main objective in unconditional support for Pakistan lied on the fact that it wanted to justify its own case before the world community by accusing India as an intransigent and unreasonable nation.

(5.2.9) 1965 India-Pakistan War and the Pro-Pakistan Stand of China:

Like the Sino-Indian war of 1962, the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965 was an important landmark in the relations between China and Pakistan. From the moment Pakistan mounted the massive attack on the Chamb sector, China gave consistent support to Pakistan and condemned India Marshal Chen Yi flew to Karachi on 4 September 1965 and had a long meeting with Pakistan's Foreign Minister. After the meeting Chen Yi declared that China supported 'the Kashmir people's struggle to resist Indian tyrannical rule' and also 'Pakistan's just action in hitting back at armed Indian provocations.'⁷⁴²

The Observer's article in the *People's Daily* of September 1965 not only characterized the 'armed uprising' in Kashmir as 'an inevitable result of Indian Government's reactionary rule...communal oppression and political persecution,' but also accused India of violating the Cease Fire line, launching armed provocation against Pakistan and adopting the policy of bullying and threatening its neighbours.⁷⁴³ The Chinese Government's statement, issued on 7 September 1965 after India had launched a counter-offensive against Pakistan, condemned India for what it called 'an act of aggression.' Voicing its concern over India's armed aggression Beijing made a threat that 'India's aggression against any one of its neighbours concerns all of its neighbors' and warned New Delhi that 'it cannot evade responsibility of the chain of consequences arising there from.' Speaking on Kashmir issue the Chinese Government openly spoke the fact that the people of Kashmir are 'subjected to brutal national oppression.' The Chinese statement supported the right of 'national self determination' for Kashmir and called the report of UNSG 'unfair.'⁷⁴⁴ In order to exert more pressure on Pakistan Chinese Foreign Ministry deemed necessary to address a protest note to India on 8 Sep 1965 against what it called serious violation on Chinese territory and sovereignty by

⁷⁴² *Survey of China Mainland Press*, No 3535 as quoted in Jain, J.P; *China, Pakistan and Bangladesh*; (Radiant Publishers; 1974; pp 105-106)

⁷⁴³ *Peaking Review*, (10 September, 1965) pp 7-8

⁷⁴⁴ Jain, J.P; *China, Pakistan and Bangladesh*; (Radiant Publishers; 1974) ;pp 105-106

Indian troops and thereby attempting to involve itself with the Indo-Pakistan conflict and preparing ground for opening a second front against India, in case it was considered necessary.⁷⁴⁵ The *People's Daily*; editorial of 11 September 1965 described the August events in Kashmir as 'an armed uprising...to oppose Indian tyranny and demand self-determination of their own future'. This was 'an entirely just action' and there was no question of Pakistani 'infiltration.' Drawing comparison with the Sino-Indian conflict, it stated that the tactics which India applied against China in the past 'are now being used against Pakistan.'⁷⁴⁶

(5.2.10) 1971 Bangladesh Liberation war and Beijing's Role:

Similarly, the 1971 India – Pakistan war had come when China was obliged to Pakistan for its role in Henry Kissinger's secret mission to Beijing during July 1971 which had facilitated the historic China-US détente. This had also coincided with the Indo-Soviet Treaty of August 1971, making China suspicious about Indo – soviet collusion in South Asia. Accordingly, China not only provided Pakistan the moral and political support, but again enhanced its supplies of military political support, but again enhanced its supplies of military equipment through the Karakoram International Highway since March 1971.⁷⁴⁷ China was also to prevail over Sri Lanka to allow landing facilities for Pakistani planes flying between East and West Pakistan. Chinese media was to compare India's role in the birth of Bangladesh to that of the Japanese creation of Manchu Guo.⁷⁴⁸ Peking supplied 110 Chinese T-59 Tanks, approximately 50 MiG-19s (F-6) aircrafts and 3 Shanghai II motor gun boats.⁷⁴⁹ Guerilla training were imparted to the Pakistani regular soldiers by the Chinese instructors. Vehemently criticizing India's stand and condemning Soviet Union China openly supported Pakistan in almost every regional and international forum. However China did not intervene militarily, nor did it take a diversionary action to ease pressure on Pakistani forces. In and outside the United Nations, China defended Pakistan's action. However China's limited role

⁷⁴⁵ *Peaking Review*, (17 September, 1965) pp 11

⁷⁴⁶ *Peaking Review*, (17 September, 1965) pp 12-14

⁷⁴⁷ Mohanty; J.N; *China and the Emergence of Bangladesh: Role of Great Power Global Perceptions*; India Quarterly; (New Delhi; Vol-39, No-02; April-June 1983); pp 139

⁷⁴⁸ *Beijing Review*; (Beijing); December 10, 1971; pp 7-8

⁷⁴⁹ Yasmin Samina; *Pakistan's Relations with China, 1947-1979*; (Islamabad, 1979), pp 26

was mainly guided by three factors. One, in Chinese perception East Pakistan was almost case which China had; already warned Pakistan. Secondly in the wake of Indo-Soviet Treaty Beijing did not take risk of a clash with Moscow and thirdly, India itself was now militarily in better shape than it was in 1962. The year 1971 had also witnessed a complete transformation in the very profile of South Asian security complex as third most important power – Bangladesh – had arrived on the scene. For China, this had not only made India the most powerful country in the South Asia but nullified their unique leverage of countering India from two sides i.e. East and West Pakistan. Followed by Indo-Soviet Treaty and India's nuclear explosion of May 18, 1974, all this was to compel Beijing to enhance its indulgence with weakened West Pakistan as East Pakistan i.e. Bangladesh was now friendly to India.⁷⁵⁰ Zhou Enlai joined Bhutto in calling on India to respect the UN resolutions and withdraw its forces from all occupied territories. The two leaders expressed their concerns over the fate of POWs in India and urged their immediate repatriation.⁷⁵¹ Bhutto was also even able to pursued Beijing not to recognize Bangladesh thus in August 1972 when the question of the admission of Bangladesh came before the United Nations, China used the first ever veto to bar Bangladesh's entry to the world body.⁷⁵²

(5.2.11) Sino-Pak Nuclear Nexus:

It was early in the mid-1960 that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto made strong overture requesting the Chinese to help Pakistan develop nuclear weapon capabilities that could match the India programme. China did not oblige then, however it was in 1976, according to subsequent intimation by Bhutto, the Beijing Government agreed to be more forthcoming. This was to result in China deciding to strengthen Pakistan and finally conceding to persistent Pakistan requests for assistance in building nuclear weapons and missiles which was formalized in an agreement of September 1974.⁷⁵³ This nuclear nexus was to since become the single most critical factor defining south Asia's profile. China reportedly supplied Pakistan with blue-

⁷⁵⁰ Yasmin Samina; *Pakistan's Relations with China, 1947-1979*; (Islamabad, 1979), pp 28

⁷⁵¹ Ahmend Naved; *Sino-Pakistan relations (1971-1981)*; Pakistan Horizon, Vol. XXXIV, no. 03; 1981 pp 61

⁷⁵² *Pakistan Times*, 30 August 1972

⁷⁵³ Bhole, P.L; *Pakistan's Nuclear Policy*; (New Delhi; Apt Books; 1993); pp52 also see Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali; *If I am Assassinated*; (New Delhi; Vikas Publishing House; 1979); pp-223

prints for a fission weapon around or before 1983, observers attributes this to the marked warmth and swing of Indo-Russian relations.⁷⁵⁴ *Declassified Documents Show That, For Over Fifteen Years, Beijing Rebuffed U.S. Queries on Chinese Aid to Pakistani Nuclear Program*; Over the course of three presidential administrations, U.S. governmental officials repeatedly pressed the Chinese government to explain whether it was providing any assistance to Pakistan in the nuclear weapons field, but Chinese officials responded with denials and equivocation. New evidence from Libya of Chinese-language material among the nuclear weapons-design documents supplied by Pakistan raises new questions about the Chinese contribution to Pakistan's nuclear proliferation activities. Exactly what the U.S. government knew and when it knew it remains highly secret in closed intelligence files, but **the newly available diplomatic record** shows:

- U.S. unease over secret China-Pakistan security and military cooperation during the late 1960s
- Chinese assistance to Pakistani nuclear-weapons related projects in 1977
- the refusal by Chinese diplomats in 1982 to give an "unequivocal answer" to queries about nuclear weapons aid to Pakistan
- the conclusion reached by State Department analysts in 1983 that China was assisting with the production of fissile materials and possibly with the design of weapons
- the George H. W. Bush administration's concern in 1989 over "reports of Chinese assistance to Pakistan's nuclear weapons program"
- denials by Chinese diplomats that same year of reports of Chinese nuclear aid to Pakistan
- U.S. pressure on China in 1992 to impose full-scope safeguards on the sale of a nuclear reactor to Pakistan because of proliferation concerns
- more disquiet (late 1992) over China's "continuing activities with Pakistan's nuclear weapons programs"
- the Clinton administration's 1997 certification of improvements in Beijing's nuclear proliferation policies

⁷⁵⁴ State Department Briefing Paper: *The Pakistani Nuclear Programme*; 22 June 1983, in Joyce Battle; *India and Pakistan: On the Nuclear Threshold*; National Security Archives; Washington, DC, 2000; <http://www.seas.gwu.edu/nsaarchive/NSAEBB/NSAEBB6/index>.

The extent to which Chinese government agencies actually assisted the Pakistani nuclear weapons program remains conjectural. The Chinese Foreign Ministry has announced an investigation into the latest charges as well as strengthened commitment to the nonproliferation system.⁷⁵⁵

However although it's difficult to say when exactly the nuclear cooperation between the two nations began yet it is argued that Pakistan's quest for the nuclear bomb originated at the famous Multan meeting of 1972 addressed by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. China Pakistan nuclear cooperation began in the early 1980's. The United States government concluded that China assisted Pakistan in developing its nuclear explosive prior to its accession of NPT in 1992. In the year 1983, US intelligence agencies reported that China had transferred a complete nuclear weapon design to Pakistan, along with enough weapons-grade uranium for two nuclear weapons. China also reportedly was helping Pakistan operate its Kahuta uranium-enrichment plant.⁷⁵⁶ US concerns are summarized in a 1985 declassified State Department assessment of Sino-Pak nuclear cooperation. In 1986, China concluded a comprehensive nuclear cooperation agreement with Pakistan. That same year, Chinese scientists began assisting Pakistan with the enrichment of weapons grade uranium, and China also reportedly transferred tritium gas to Pakistan that could be used as fusion in hydrogen bombs and boosts the yields of atomic bombs. According to the media reports the amount transferred was enough for making ten nuclear bombs.⁷⁵⁷ Since then China has supplied to Pakistan with varieties of Nuclear products and services, ranging from uranium enrichment technology to research and power reactors.

⁷⁵⁵ ***China, Pakistan, and the Bomb: The Declassified File on U.S. Policy, 1977-1997;*** National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 114; March 5, 2004; William Burr, editor; <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB114/index.htm>

⁷⁵⁶ Chen, Kathy; *Beijing Admits to sale Ring Magnets to Pakistan in Bid to Clear U.S. Tension;* Wall Street Journal; 15 April 1996; pp B6

⁷⁵⁷ White Gerard and Milhollion, Gary; *Bombs from Beijing's Atomic: A Report on China's Nuclear and Missile Exports;* Washington DC; Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control; May 1991; pp 17

Operating Nuclear Reactors in Pakistan⁷⁵⁸

Reactor	Province	Type	MWe net	Construction start	Commercial operation	Planned close
Karachi 1	Sindh	PHWR	125	1966	12/72	2019
Chashma 1	Punjab	PWR	300		June 2000	2040
Chashma 2	Punjab	PWR	300	2005	May 2011	2051
Total (3)	725 operating					

(5.2.12) The Issues and Instances of the nuclear relationship:

The coming up of General Zia-ul-Haq as the new President following the military coup in Pakistan did not affect the collaboration between the two. In 1978 it was reported by an Iraqi news agency that a 'generous offer' of nuclear cooperation- to help build a reprocessing plant to Pakistan was made by China.⁷⁵⁹ In 1980's the report appeared in the media about China having responded positively to a Pakistani request to conduct a nuclear test on China's soil. In the early 80's China also provided Pakistan with enriched uranium for one or two bombs.⁷⁶⁰ In 1981 James Malone, US Assistant Secretary of State's said that China had supplied to Pakistan material other than fuel- related items which he declined to specify.⁷⁶¹ In September 1982 US suspended the talks with China for helping Pakistan in the latter's effort to help Pakistan acquire nuclear bomb capability. In June 1984 Senator Cranston told the Senate that 'Pakistan could make at least a dozen of bombs. He based his reports on document prepared on Chinese assistance to Pakistan prepared by 90 experts'. He also mentioned that the 'state department has been hiding the fact from the Congress because it feared that; it would stop \$302 billion aid given to Pakistan in the wake of Soviet intervention in

⁷⁵⁸ *Nuclear Power in Pakistan*; <http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-O-S/Pakistan/>

⁷⁵⁹ Chowdhary, G.W; *China in World Affairs; The Foreign Policy of China since 1970*; (Colorado, 1982); pp 868

⁷⁶⁰ Spector, Leonardo; *Tracking Nuclear Proliferation*; (Washington D.D, Brookings Institution Press, 1995), pp 49

⁷⁶¹ *The New York Times*; 9 September 1982 as quoted in Swaran Singh (eds), *China Pakistan Strategic Cooperation Indian Perspectives*; (Delhi; Mannohar Publication; 2007) pp 164-168

Afghanistan.⁷⁶² On June 1984 *New York Times* reported that China was helping Pakistan operate in Kahuta uranium enrichment plant.⁷⁶³ In 1986 China and Pakistan signed an accord on nuclear energy. China agreed to extend financial and technical help to Pakistan for the second phase of Chashma nuclear power plant for building another 300-megawatt nuclear power plant, likely to be completed within next six years, and estimated to cost over \$7000 million.⁷⁶⁴ In 1989 China was reportedly blamed for designing a nuclear system for Pakistani research reactor PAAR-II which used highly enriched uranium.⁷⁶⁵ In 1991 a report in the *Washington Post* said that the Chinese scientists have been sighted at the Kahuta complex, and that in 1986 China sold tritium, an element used to boost the yield of fission weapons to Pakistan. China has also assisted Pakistan in construction of an unsafeguarded plutonium production reactor at Khushab⁷⁶⁶ and probably a reprocessing plant at Chashma.⁷⁶⁷ China has also been projected as a nation helping Pakistan to supply heavy water to the safeguarded Kanupp reactor (originally supplied by Canada). According to report by the Nuclear Control Institute, a shortage of heavy water is apparently the principle obstacle to the start up of the nearly completed unsafeguarded Khushab reactor, which Pakistan had build with Chinese assistance. It says that recent reports indicated that China is supplying heavy water to the safeguarded Kanupp reactor at a rate of two to four percent per year to make a heavy water losses.⁷⁶⁸ Much furor was raised when disclosures of China's ring magnets transfer to Pakistan was made in 1996. China's assistance to Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme was brought into public notice. It was reported first in the *Washington Times* on 5 February

⁷⁶² *The Times of India*; 22 June 1982 as quoted in Swaran Singh (eds), *China Pakistan Strategic Cooperation Indian Perspectives*; (Delhi; Mannohar Publication; 2007) pp 164-168

⁷⁶³ *The New York Times*; 23 June 1984 as quoted in Swaran Singh (eds), *China Pakistan Strategic Cooperation Indian Perspectives*; (Delhi; Mannohar Publication; 2007) pp 164-168

⁷⁶⁴ *The Dawn*; 2 November 2003; url=(0039) <http://www.dawn.com/2003/11/02/top4.htm>

⁷⁶⁵ *Nucleonics Week*; 9 August; 1990 as quoted in Swaran Singh (eds), *China Pakistan Strategic Cooperation Indian Perspectives*; (Delhi; Mannohar Publication; 2007) pp 164-168

⁷⁶⁶ Hibbs Mark; *China May Continue D20 Reactors exports to Pakistan After U.S. Certification*; Nuclear Fuel; 11 August 1997 pp 01

⁷⁶⁷ Spector, Leonardo; *Tracking Nuclear Proliferation*; (Washington D.D, Brookings Institution Press, 1995), pp 97

⁷⁶⁸ Dolley, Steven; *China's Record of Proliferation Behaviour*; Issue Brief; Nuclear Control Institute; 19 September 1997; pp 05

1996, when intelligence reports on the transfer of China National Nuclear Cooperation, a state-owned corporation, to the A.Q. Khan Research laboratory in Kahuta were cited. According to the report the intelligence experts 'believed that the magnets provided by Pakistan are t be use in special suspension bearings at the top of rotating cylinders in the centrifuges'.⁷⁶⁹ The *New York Times* of May 12, 1996, reported that the shipment was made after June 1994 and was worth \$70,000. The PRC Company involved was China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation, a subsidiary of the China National Nuclear Corporation.⁷⁷⁰ Subsequently, the State Department's report on non-proliferation efforts in South Asia (21 January 1997) confirmed that 'between late 1994 and mid-1995, a Chinese entity transferred a large number of ring magnets to Pakistan for use in its uranium enrichment program.'⁷⁷¹ In early 1996, some in Congress sought sanction after reports of transfer made in gross violation of NPT and contradiction of US laws, including the Arms Export Control Act ad Export-Import Bank Act.⁷⁷² On 11 May 1996, Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a statement that 'China will not provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.'⁷⁷³ Similarly Islamabad also denied any such transfer occurred, China said that the cooperation with Pakistan was solely for peaceful purpose. However, although after China took a pledge there has been reporting that China has been continuously providing Pakistan with all sorts of facilities and help covertly. The CIA report of 2003 was reported to have said, 'we cannot rule out,

⁷⁶⁹ CRS Report: IB92056-China's Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Current Policy Issue http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/international/inter-73.cfm#_1_9
Kan, Sherley A; *CRS Issue Brief For Congress Foreign Affairs; Defense, and Trade Division*; 16 May 2001

⁷⁷⁰ CRS Report: IB92056-China's Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Current Policy Issue http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/international/inter-73.cfm#_1_9
Kan, Sherley A; *CRS Issue Brief For Congress Foreign Affairs; Defense, and Trade Division*; 16 May 2001

⁷⁷¹ Kan, Sherley A; *CRS Issue Brief For Congress Foreign Affairs; Defense, and Trade Division*; 16 May 2001

⁷⁷² Kan, Sherley A; *CRS Issue Brief For Congress Foreign Affairs; Defense, and Trade Division*; 16 May 2001

⁷⁷³ Kan, Sherley A; *CRS Issue Brief For Congress Foreign Affairs; Defense, and Trade Division*; 16 May 2001

however, some continued contacts subsequent to the pledge between Chinese entities and entities associated With Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme.'⁷⁷⁴

In the year 2013 China has committed \$6.5 billion to finance the construction of a major nuclear power project in Pakistan's port city of Karachi as it seeks to strengthen ties with its strategic partner, Pakistani officials said. Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif broke ground on the \$9.59 billion project last month but officials have provided few details of how they plan to finance it. Financing documents seen by Reuters showed China National Nuclear Cooperation (CNNC) has promised to grant a loan of at least \$6.5 billion to finance the project which will have two reactors with a capacity of 1,100 megawatts each. Under its long-term energy plan, Pakistan hopes to produce more than 40,000 MW of electricity through nuclear plants by 2050. The United States sealed a nuclear supply deal with India in 2008, irking both China and Pakistan. Pakistan wants a similar agreement with the United States but it is reluctant, largely because Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan admitted in 2004 to transferring nuclear secrets to North Korea, Iran and Iraq.⁷⁷⁵

On 19 June 2015 the Sindh Environmental Protection Agency granted approval for the construction of new nuclear reactors to continue at Paradise Point, west of Karachi. The new reactors, named K-2 and K-3, are of Chinese origin and are expected to contribute a much needed 2200 MW of power output. The K-2 and K-3 are based on the Chinese ACP1000 reactor design (although they are marketed as the export version, the Hualong-1). This indigenous Chinese design passed an International Atomic Energy Agency safety review at the end of 2014, but the technology remains untested. China is constructing its own ACP1000 in Fuqing, Fujian province, but Pakistan is the first importer of the technology.⁷⁷⁶

Moreover recently a Chinese official publicly confirmed on 09 February 2015 that Beijing is involved in at least six nuclear power projects in Pakistan and is likely to export more to the country. In a press conference in Beijing, Wang Xiaotao, the vice-minister of the National

⁷⁷⁴ Sino-Pak Nties can't be ruled out: CIA, *The News*, 15 November 2003, <http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/>

⁷⁷⁵ *Reuters*: China commits \$6.5 billion for Pakistani nuclear project; <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/24/us-pakistan-china-nuclear-idUSBRE9BN06220131224#xHVWKeJh8zqc5d8Z.99>

⁷⁷⁶ *Sino-Pakistan civil nuclear cooperation: A growing challenge to the global nuclear order*; <http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/07/09/Sino-Pakistan-civil-nuclear-cooperation-A-growing-challenge-to-the-global-nuclear-order.aspx>

Development and Reform Commission, said China “has assisted in building six nuclear reactors in Pakistan with a total installed capacity of 3.4 million kilowatts.” Wang, who was unveiling plans for new guidelines for Chinese exports in the nuclear sector, also said that Beijing was keen to provide further exports to countries, which would presumably include Pakistan given previous reports and trends. China declared the first two reactors it already agreed to construct for Pakistan – the Chashma-1 and Chashma 2 – at the time it joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 2004, with the expectation that no new deals would follow. But in 2010, the China National Nuclear Cooperation announced it would export technology for two new reactors, Chashma-3 and Chashma-4 because it argued – rather controversially – that these projects were already grandfathered in under previous agreements rather than being fresh proposals.⁷⁷⁷

(5.3) Sino-US Relations

At the end of World War II the Chinese communist endeavored to win the United States over to their side in the Chinese civil dispute, but Washington chose to remain tied to Chiang Kai-Shek. The United State supported Chiang during the civil war by providing substantial material and training assistance to the nationalist forces.⁷⁷⁸ Such support caused the communist to view Washington as a dangerous potential adversary. Even after defeating Chiang on the mainland and taking power in Peking in 1949, the communist were unsure of American intentions and predictability sought security for their newly independent state by moving closer to their ideological allies in Moscow. The Soviet Union provided protection and acted as a safeguard for China against American intimidation and possible attack.

By 1949 the international situation was characterized by the dominance of Cold War between two mutually hostile ideologies. For China there was no middle road at that time. Indeed Mao declared clearly in ‘On People’s Democratic Dictatorship’ that China was bound to ‘lean to on one side’ i.e. toward the Soviet bloc.⁷⁷⁹ In the context of the polarized world it was not possible for China to ‘sit on fence’ or to build a third road Although Mao expressed him

⁷⁷⁷ *The Diplomat*; China Confirms Pakistan Nuclear Projects;
<http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/china-confirms-pakistan-nuclear-projects/>

⁷⁷⁸ Sutter, Robert G.; *China-Watch Toward Sino-American Reconciliation*; (The Johns Hopkins University Press; ;London; 1978); pp 31

⁷⁷⁹ Zedong, Mao; *On People’s Democratic Dictatorship*; (Beijing, 1950) pp 11

exclusively in ideological terms, he was fully conscious of the practical necessity of such an alliance 'to attain victory and consolidate it.'⁷⁸⁰

The US attitude towards China, and especially the policy of containing communism that the United States pursued after the Korean War, made it more difficult for China to think of any alternative to tightening its link with the USSR. The American attitude to China was expressed in a White Paper which explicitly stated that, China being a part of the Soviet Communist System, the only practicable policy for the United States to adopt was the policy of containment.⁷⁸¹ Thus the US attitude virtually came to be that every anti-communist element or group should be regarded as friend, regardless of its nature.

Similarly there was no corresponding concern in the People's Republic of China over improving relations with United States at that time. The CCP leaders were well on their way to obtaining full control of the China mainland, and they had gained a strategic guarantee against outside pressure by aligning with the Soviet Union. They viewed the United States with greater suspicion and saw no great need to strive for better relations with the Americans.

(5.3.1) Chinese Representation in the UNO and the US's Critical Stand:

The beginning of US and People's Republic of China (PRC) relations marked with suspicion, it further got surfaced after the proclamation of the People's Republic of China in the United States. China represented by the National Government, was one of the Four sponsoring nations of the San Francisco Conference which drafted the United Nation Charter, and China was the first country of the world to embody support of the world body on the fundamental law of land- the Constitution of 1947. On the instance of the United States, which in 1944-1945, was inserted in securing for China the status of a Big Power, China was assigned a permanent seat on the Security Council. After the coming into force of the Charter on October 24, 1945, the Nationalist Delegation continued to represent China in the United Nations.

However after the proclamation of the Communist regime, the Chinese seat in the United Nations became a bone of contention between the PRC on the mainland and the Republic of China on Formosa. While the Nationalist delegation continued to represent China, the

⁷⁸⁰ Zedong, Mao; *On People's Democratic Dictatorship*; (Beijing, 1950) pp 11

⁷⁸¹ US Department of States, *The United Relations with China* (Washington, D.C., 1949), pp xvi

communist authorities challenge the rights of the delegation to do so. The problem was not of admitting a new member, in which the five Big Powers would have a veto in the Security Council, but rather was one of the deciding whose credentials to accept from occupying the China's seat.

After the Nationalist Government was driven away to Formosa, the language of the Communists became very strong. On January 8, 1950, Chou sent notes to the President of the General Assembly, the Secretary General of the UN and the Government of the States representative in the Security Council stating that the delegate of the 'Chinese Kuomintang reactionary remnant clique' was 'illegally' occupying China's seat in the Security Council and the delegate should be 'expelled.'⁷⁸² Although the Soviet Union strongly and vehemently supported the cause of the Peking regime, the American Government only mildly took up the case of the Chiang's regime. When the matter came up before the First Committee of the General Assembly Dr Tsiang, representative of the Nationalist Government severely criticized the USSR, and requested the General Assembly through a resolution A/C.1/551 'recommend that all Member-States refrain from giving further military and economic aid to the Chinese Communists.'⁷⁸³ The Soviet on the other hand rejected the resolution on the ground that the delegation has 'no right to represent China and Chinese people.' US representative Dr Philip Jessup did not choose to dwell upon the Chinese resolution. He rather expounded the fact that the activities of the Soviet Union in China alleged by the Chinese representative were a matter of serious concern for the United States.

The Soviet delegate, Yakov Malik, supported the claim of the PRC and introduced a resolution which in its operative part stated: 'The Security Council considers illegal the maintenance in the Security Council of the United Nations of the representative of the Kuomintang Group and insists upon his exclusion from the Security Council.'⁷⁸⁴

⁷⁸² UN Security Council, *Official Record*; (5th Year), No.1,2 as stated in Gupta D.C; *United States Attitude Towards China*; (S. Chanda & Co.; New Delhi; 1969) pp 304

⁷⁸³ Dr Tsiang's Statement, November 25, 1949, before the First Committee of the General Assembly, *Official Records*, 1949, pp 339-340; in Gupta D.C; *United States Attitude Towards China*; (S. Chanda & Co.; New Delhi; 1969) pp 306

⁷⁸⁴ UN Security Council, *Official Record*; (4th Year), No.54,2 as stated in Gupta D.C; *United States Attitude Towards China*; (S. Chanda & Co.; New Delhi; 1969) pp 311

The Soviet proposal was taken up by the Security Council on January 12, 1950. Malik asserted that if the largest nation in the world was not properly represented, the Security Council would not be able to work effectively. He also observed that 'diplomatic recognition or non-recognition of any given governments not a decisive factor in determining that government's right to be represented on the organs of the United Nations.'⁷⁸⁵

However the United States representative Earnest Gross in the UN took an entirely opposite stand. He said that the Soviet resolution was designed to unseat Dr Tsiang, representative of the Nationalist Government because the USSR no longer recognized his government, and that the United States recognized as the Government of China that Government which had accredited Dr. Tsiang to the Security Council. He declared that Tsiang's credentials remained valid, and that he would vote against the Soviet Union's resolution. He however added that since the measure was a procedural question the United States would accept any Council decision arrived at by 'an affirmation vote of seven Members' and that his vote would not be considered as a veto, because the issue involved was a 'procedural one.'⁷⁸⁶ After the discussion was over, the Soviet proposal (S/1443) was put to vote, and was rejected by 6 votes to 3, with 2 abstentions. The United States voted against.⁷⁸⁷ As an expression of distrust the Soviet delegation left the Council Chamber, and declared that he would not sit on the Security Council as long as the representative of the KMT Group has not been excluded.⁷⁸⁸

After January 1950, the American Government had almost written off the Republic of China on Formosa. President Truman declared that the United States would not provide any military aid or advice to her and would not interfere in the Chinese civil strife; she was waiting to see whether Peking's attitude of hostility and hatred toward America changed or whether the Communist regime was genuinely desirous of establishing normal diplomatic relations. On the question of Communist China's admission in the UN while the United Kingdom favoured

⁷⁸⁵ UN Security Council, *Official Record*; (4th Year), No.54,2 as stated in Gupta D.C; *United States Attitude Towards China*; (S. Chanda & Co.; New Delhi; 1969) pp 311

⁷⁸⁶ Gupta D.C; *United States Attitude Towards China*; (S. Chanda & Co.; New Delhi; 1969) pp 311

⁷⁸⁷ India and Yugoslavia voted in favour and UK and Norway remained abstain, Gupta D.C; *United States Attitude Towards China*; (S. Chanda & Co.; New Delhi; 1969) pp 312

⁷⁸⁸ United States Security Council, *Official Records*, 461st meeting (January 13, 1950) as stated in Gupta D.C; *United States Attitude Towards China*; (S. Chanda & Co.; New Delhi; 1969) pp 312

the idea of waiting for some more time the authorities in Washington were inclined to have her in if the other members of the Security Council chose to do so. In the view of the mild attitude of the United States and realizing that the UN will be paralyzed if the Soviet Union continues to boycott, Secretary General Trygve Lie endeavored the East-West difference and bring the PRC in the world body. In the third week of June 1950 it was reported that Lie was planning a 'periodic meeting' of the Security Council in Geneva to discuss on the question of accrediting the Government on the Chinese mainland but on June 25 a cablegram came from the United Nations Commission on Korea which brought completely ruined the process of rapprochement of US-China relations it was the outbreak of the Korean War.

(5.3.2) Korean War- China's role and US response:

On June 25, 1950 a cablegram came from the United Nations Commission on Korea: 'North Korean forces all along the thirty-eight Parallel had launched an attack on the Republic of South Korea.' And that the situation was serious enough to assume that the 'character of full-scale war' and might 'endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.' On the same day Lie called an emergency meeting of the Security Council, and the council called for 'the immediate cessation of hostilities' and urged North Korea 'to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the thirty-eight Parallel.' But the North Korean advances continued, and gradually the situation became more and more grave. On June 27, the Security Council adopted, another resolution, presented by the United States representative, Warren Austin, recommending that the Members of the United Nations 'furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack...'

Moreover this development convinced the American authorizes, who had opposed United States military or naval action in defense of Formosa, that the Formosan policy should be reversed.⁷⁸⁹ The Chief Executive declared that '... in these circumstances the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific Area'⁷⁹⁰ However the Soviet Union rejected the legality of the United Nations decision on Korea and put the war blame on South Korea and on those who stood behind it- presumably the United

⁷⁸⁹ N.Y Times June, 28 , 4:6, 1950 as stated in Gupta D.C; *United States Attitude Towards China*; (S. Chanda & Co.; New Delhi; 1969) pp 319

⁷⁹⁰ Department of State, *Bulletin*, Vol.23, No. 574, July 3, 1950, pp 5-6 as stated in Gupta D.C; *United States Attitude Towards China*; (S. Chanda & Co.; New Delhi; 1969) pp 320

States.⁷⁹¹ Meanwhile on July 7, the Security Council adopted a resolution setting up unified command, and named General MacArthur as Commanding General, UN Command in Korea. A week later, , *The New Times*; the Soviet Publication, laid down two Russian conditions for ending the fight, but Choung in Korea: 1. withdrawal of the American forces from Korea and 2. admission of Communist China to the United Nation.⁷⁹²

At this stage the Communist China joined hands with the Soviet Union. Truman's statement preventing Communist take-over of Formosa and reopening the issue of Taiwan's legal status dismayed and annoyed the rulers of Peking. Chou En-lai, Minister of Foreign Affairs, promptly accused Washington of 'armed aggression against the territory of China',⁷⁹³ and on July 6, he notified the Lie that 'despite any military steps of obstruction taken by the US Government the Chinese people are irrevocably determined to liberate Taiwan without fail.'⁷⁹⁴ Meanwhile situation in Korea continued to deteriorate. Reports began to appear in the Press that the Communist troops were getting ready to enter the arena of fighting. Possibly to keep the Communist China away, the Security Council called up on September 29, on the basis of a United States resolution, Communist China to send a representative to the United Nations on November 15 for hearing on the Formosan situation, but Chou declared that 'Chinese will not stand aside' if the 'imperialist want only invade the territory of their neighbour.'⁷⁹⁵ On October 7, US forces crossed the 38th Parallel, and two weeks later, they captured Pyongyang, the North Korean capital. By October 26, they reached quite close to the Yalu River. The US even in the face of victory, appealed Peking to respond to the Security Council resolution of September 29, but Chou challenged the Assembly's right to discuss the US resolution calling

⁷⁹¹ N.Y Times June, 30 , 1:4, 1950 as stated in Gupta D.C; *United States Attitude Towards China*; (S. Chanda & Co.; New Delhi; 1969) pp 321

⁷⁹² N.Y Times July, 14 , 3:6, 1950 as stated in Gupta D.C; *United States Attitude Towards China*; (S. Chanda & Co.; New Delhi; 1969) pp 321

⁷⁹³ *People's China*, July 16, 1950; as stated in Gupta D.C; *United States Attitude Towards China*; (S. Chanda & Co.; New Delhi; 1969) pp 321

⁷⁹⁴ N.Y Times July, 7 , 3:3, 1950 as stated in Gupta D.C; *United States Attitude Towards China*; (S. Chanda & Co.; New Delhi; 1969) pp 322

⁷⁹⁵ N.Y Times October, 2 , 3:1, 1950 as stated in Gupta D.C; *United States Attitude Towards China*; (S. Chanda & Co.; New Delhi; 1969) pp 323

that the resolution ‘interference with the internal affair of China.’⁷⁹⁶ By mid-October, Chinese ‘Communist Volunteers’ began crossing the Yalu River, and by early November thousand of them joined the fighting. General MacArthur immediately reported the new situation to the Security Council and charged Peking with ‘one of the most offensive acts of international lawlessness of historic record and gave specific details of 12 instances of Chinese intervention.’⁷⁹⁷ On November 26, Chinese Communist allegedly supported by Russian made planes, tanks and artilleries launched a massive drive which spitted and trapped UN forces and carried them past the 38th parallel. The war in Korea was gradually broadened, and the United States was confronted with a grave situation. While on the on the other hand the Chinese volunteers were engaged in combat against American soldiers on the battle field the political leaders in Peking intensified the Hate-America campaign through Radio, newspaper, posters mass rallies and house-to-house call. The *New China News Agency* depicted America ‘a fierce paper tiger’, and said that the Korean War had revealed ‘the barbaric character of American Civilization.’⁷⁹⁸

While the policy makers in Washington sought to localize the Korean War in the hope of bringing it to an early end the Communist showed no such intentions. The fighting was going on in full ferocity, both sides were engaged in feverish preparations to overpower each other, and the danger was that unless stopped in time the hostilities might turn into another world war. Realizing the gravity of the situation finally the Soviet representative at the United Nation, Mallick, made a proposal on June 23, 1951, for a settlement of the Korean conflict through the negotiation of a cease-fire by the belligerents, followed by an armistice and mutual withdrawal of troops from the 38 Parallel. The North Korean and Chinese Commanders, probably realizing that they might not cope-up with the superior power of UN forces, responded promptly, and on July 10, 1951 the cease fire negotiation between the UN and the Communist China opened at Kaesong, but hardly any fruitful result came out. Meanwhile in the domestic politics in US took a new turn and defeating Truman for the first time after a gap of 20 years a Republican President, Dwight D. Eisenhower was elected in

⁷⁹⁶ N.Y Times October, 18 , 6:2, 1950 as stated in Gupta D.C; *United States Attitude Towards China*; (S. Chanda & Co.; New Delhi; 1969) pp 323

⁷⁹⁷ N.Y Times November, 6 , 1:8, 1950 as stated in Gupta D.C; *United States Attitude Towards China*; (S. Chanda & Co.; New Delhi; 1969) pp 323

⁷⁹⁸ N.Y Times August 1, 7:1, 1950 as stated in Gupta D.C; *United States Attitude Towards China*; (S. Chanda & Co.; New Delhi; 1969) pp 327

1953. Eisenhower after coming to power declared that America have n aggressive intent against Communist China and had ‘no obligation to promote a nation fighting us in Korea.’ This step in particular produced immediate result, and just two days after, Chow requested Washington to return to Korean truce talk which has been in suspense since October 1952. Finally negotiation were again commenced and on July 27, an armistice was finally signed bring down the end of the long drawn Korean War.

(5.3.3) The estrangement of Sino-US Relations:

However the end of Korean War marked paradigm shift in US policy over PRC. Instead of the ‘wait and watch’ policy the US hope for maintaining a bonhomie with PRC withered away and Washington was not to deal with not only with a Communist China but a hostile China. The US policy was now aimed at ‘containing’ its territorial possession and influence and isolating it from the international community. The component of that policy was mainly were: opposing the admission of PRC in UN, withholding the diplomatic recognition, embargo on trade, prohibition of travel by American and encirclement through military bases and military alliance.

Regarding the arguments that Washington made against the admission of PRC in UNO were: first that the Communist Regime was not fit for membership as because the UN Charter limited membership to ‘peace loving state’ where as on the contrary Communist China supports aggression whether it may be the case with Indo-China, occupying defenseless Tibet and seize its administration, providing substantial aid to Vietminh forces, sponsoring guerrilla and subversive forces in Malaya or supporting and encouraging rebellion in Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and Indonesia. Thus US representative to UN Henry Cabot said it would mean a ‘deliberate’ decision to ‘stultify itself by flagrantly acting in contrary to its primary and basic purpose to save succeeding generation from the scourge of war.’⁷⁹⁹ Communist China’s attitude to the various plan and proposal of disarmament also influenced the American determination to keep her out of the UNO. She not only refused to sign the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, signed by the US, UK and Soviet Union on August 5, 1963, she called it’s ‘a big

⁷⁹⁹ Lodge, H.C; *Why the Chinese Communist Regime is unfit for representation in the United Nation*; Vital Speeches of the Day; May 1, 1954; pp 436-437

fraud to fool the people of the world' and a treaty 'consolidating the status of the nuclear monopoly of the nuclear powers.'⁸⁰⁰

Meanwhile during the period from 1951 to 1967, the US prevented the seating of Chinese Communist delegates not by exercising its veto in the Security Council but by political persuasion and influence. But the continued isolation of Peking from the family of nations gave rise to many complications and tensions in the world affairs. Proposals from time to time emanated from different unofficial quarters suggesting a political settlement of the 'Two Chinas'. However in October 1966, twenty seven prominent Americans, members of the United Nations Association- an independent, non-partisan organization devoted to support the UN- published a study of the problem of Chinese representation in the world body, and urged that the US adopt a 'two- China policy', permitting representation of both Peking and Taipei in the United Nations. These persons warned that if the US continued to insist on the exclusion of Communist China, other UN members might vote Nationalist China out of the organization, and that would be extremely embarrassing for the US.⁸⁰¹

However despite sharing a debilitated relationship, in the wake of the regional and global development Beijing came closer to the United States in multiple periods. One such incident that brought the two nations closer to each other was the events related to Sino-Vietnam rivalry.

(5.3.4) Sino-Vietnam War:

The Vietnam War of 1954 was one of the long armed conflicts that pitted the communist regime of North Vietnam and its southern allies, known as the Viet Cong, against South Vietnam and its principal ally, the United States. Continued against the backdrop of the cold war power politics the war had a great impact on the international global politics and also had its implication on the Sino-US relations. America's direct involvement in the war basically started during the first quarter of 1950's when it decided to economically aid France in suppressing the Vietminh revolution. In the course of time Washington's commitment to the war gradually expanded and from economic and military aid to France during the first Indochina war US started to support for an independent South Vietnam after the 1954 Geneva

⁸⁰⁰ Congress Quarterly Service, N.7, 124 in Hinton, *Communist China in the World Politics*; pp 144-52

⁸⁰¹ Gupta D.C; *United States Attitude Towards China*; (S. Chanda & Co.; New Delhi; 1969) pp 356

conference. Thus US involvement in the war was a result of multidimensional decisions and factors that for over a period of fifteen years finally led in its direct involvement.

The Chinese entry into the war was however highly interesting. Ho Chi Minh and his communist Viet Minh party in North Vietnam were deeply committed to establish communism in Vietnam. In order to attain the desired goal by 1950's the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union in almost every possible way started assisting and supporting Ho. But despite the support provided by the Soviet Union and China to Viet Minh the aids were neither unlimited, unconditional and nor unequivocal.⁸⁰²

Meanwhile despite sharing a close bonhomie with each other in the course of time the relations between China and Vietnam started worsening stridently specifically after the fall of Saigon in April 1975. The Chinese suspicion toward Vietnam started basically by 1974 as it started getting suspicious of Hanoi's aggressiveness and military stand against the ethnic Chinese from one of the Paracel Islands that it had occupied. The Chinese claimed that after the unification of the country, the Communist forces of Vietnam started targeting the ethnic Chinese community, first taking their wealth for redistribution and finally expelling them in significant numbers from northeast Vietnam.⁸⁰³ Internationally around this time, China was worried that Vietnam was moving too close to the Soviet Union and that a unified Vietnam would pose a security threat to China.

By mid 1970's China witnessed itself all around surrounded by hostile nations. On its Northern side its border dispute of late 1960's with Soviet got severely worsened which made Beijing to put a halt to the thirty years treaty of Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance. Moreover not only did China reject all forms of advances from Moscow to negotiate a nonaggression pact; it even worried that if renewed the aforesaid treaty would reduce its influence in Asia. Similarly, in the Southern Region the growing Indo-Soviet bonhomie and closeness between Vietnam and Moscow ushered yet another matter of tension for Chinese policy makers. Beijing realized that its national interest and security were at a major threat and the growing interest of Soviet Union was reducing the Chinese influence in Southeast Asia. In course of time Vietnam and Moscow came very close

⁸⁰² George C. Herring, *America and Vietnam: The Unending War* Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 5, *America and the Pacific*, 1941-1991 (Winter, 1991), pp. 104-119

⁸⁰³ Ezra F. Vogel, *Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2011 pp. 483-484

to each other and very soon Vietnam joined the Soviet-led Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.⁸⁰⁴ Hanoi allowed Moscow to use its naval ports and build missile bases that could house Soviet missiles aimed at China and by November 2, 1978, the two countries signed the Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.⁸⁰⁵

Meanwhile there was a rise of tension between Vietnam and its neighbour Democratic Kampuchea which was under the influence of present day Cambodia. Basically Vietnam considered Cambodia as its primer barrier of dominating Indochina region, since from 1945-1977 both the two nations had multiple maritime and land clashes. But the water crossed its mark as when on December 25, 1978 Vietnam invaded Cambodia backed by the support of Soviet Union, as Moscow believed that the invasion will limit the Chinese influence in the region which will under power Deng. Moreover USSR believed that even if the attack was not successful, it may be able to drive a wedge between China and the United States by showcasing China's brutality if China were to defend its ally.⁸⁰⁶ This string of events set the stage for China to invade Vietnam on February 17, 1979, three days after the anniversary of the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty. The official reason China proclaimed for the attack was Vietnamese occupation of the Spratly Islands and Hanoi's mistreatment of ethnic Chinese.

But the things turned in favour of China as its invasion on Vietnam ushered a large scale support from the region. Since the Vietnam's attack on Cambodia threatened the regional peace and posed a threat to Thailand it led the formation of a strong Association of Southeast Asian Nations coalition opposed to Vietnam and the anti-Vietnam role of China in the entire scenario enhanced Beijing's prestige in the South Asian Region. The war clearly signaled Chinese opposition to Vietnam becoming a regional hegemon and its willingness to fight to prevent that from happening. On the one hand, the war lent credibility to later Chinese warnings of unacceptable aggressive Vietnamese behavior. This included, for example, a June 1980 Chinese warning to Vietnam not to conduct military operations deeper into

⁸⁰⁴ Bruce A. Elleman, *Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795–1989*, New York: Routledge, 2001 , 2001, p. 287

⁸⁰⁵ Bruce A. Elleman, *Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795–1989*, New York: Routledge, 2001 , 2001, p. 287

⁸⁰⁶ Kenneth G. Weiss, "Power Grows Out of the Barrel of a Gunboat: The U.S. in Sino-Soviet Crises," Center for Naval Analyses, Professional Paper 376, December 1982, pp. 55–56

Thailand and a Chinese attack on Vietnam in 1984 to force it back from seizing a critical pass from Cambodia into Thailand.⁸⁰⁷

However despite all their efforts the war turned into an operational failure for China as it was limited in its scope, duration and goal. But Deng brilliantly used the failure to its advantage as he used the war to consolidate its rule and domestic control over the nation and brought a radical military reform throughout China. Moreover apart from the domestic advantages the war also provide a long term geo-political and geo-strategic benefit for Beijing as it demonstrated the mighty strength of China by resisting the Soviet-Vietnam union, it also destroyed the illusion of a strong Soviet-Vietnamese alliance and mitigated the threat of encirclement; and it eventually economically and militarily overstretched the Vietnamese, preventing Vietnam from dominating Indochina, which certainly brought US and China closer to each other.

(5.3.5) The Ping-Pong Diplomacy Kissinger China Visit, and Nixon's historic Beijing trip:

Pre 1970's, the Sino-US relations were mainly exemplified by scathing propagandas, trade embargos, and serious differences and tensions regarding multiple international factors. After almost a decade of isolation and enmity, both the two nations cautiously adopted a friendly move toward each other. However in the last few decades the two nations have radically molded their policies towards each other and the sheer closeness between them has developed them into the two largest economies in the world and in the present decade the Sino-American liaison is described as the most important bilateral relationship of the 21st century.

One such development which brought the two nations closer to each other was the famous 'ping-pong diplomacy' which occurred during the time period of President Nixon and encompassed a crucial series of diplomatic events that dawned a new encouraging beginning in the Sino-American politics which had a long lasting impetus.⁸⁰⁸ Initiation was made when Kissinger in the year 1970 persuaded ambassador Vernon Walters in Paris to insist his desire

⁸⁰⁷ Kenneth G. Weiss, "Power Grows Out of the Barrel of a Gunboat: The U.S. in Sino-Soviet Crises," Center for Naval Analyses, Professional Paper 376, December 1982, pp. 55–56

⁸⁰⁸ Erik Bao, "Ping Pong Diplomacy: The Historic Opening of Sino-American Relations during the Nixon Administration." Ohio History Society. (2011), p. 1

to hold secret talks with the Chinese embassy.⁸⁰⁹ Nixon's desire was immediately responded by Mao and in an interview to Edgar Snow of Life he expressed that "would be happy to talk to him, either as a tourist or a president."⁸¹⁰

Amidst these developments in the Sino-US politics, a masterpiece of diplomacy unfolded on the most unlikely stage of the 1971 World Table Tennis Championships in Nagoya, Japan which came to be as a boon for the two nation's rapprochement policy. Basically, in wake of the game post a match, US ping-pong player Glenn Cowan, missed his bus and instead holdup for a ride with the Chinese team to a nearby sight-seeing event.⁸¹¹ In the course of the events Chinese player Zhang Zedong and Cowan came very close to each other and in a friendly gesture the two exchanged souvenirs.⁸¹² When Chairman Mao came to know about the incident, he astoundingly complimented the Zhang in his words: "Zhang Zedong is not only a good ping-pong player, but also a diplomat. He is quite politically sensitive."⁸¹³ Within two days of the events, on April 10, 1971 Mao invited the US team for a friendly tour to China. Nixon highly appreciated Mao's goodwill gesture as he commented: "I was as surprised as I was pleased by this news. I had never expected that the China initiative would come to fruition in the form of a ping-pong team."⁸¹⁴

Meanwhile the US table tennis players who visited China were highly amazed by the warm Chinese hospitality and welcome by Premier Zhou Enlai as he greeted in his opening words that: "You have opened a new chapter in the relations of the American and Chinese people."⁸¹⁵ Although the visit was very much informal and friendly in nature it had a greater

⁸⁰⁹Alistair Horne, Kissinger: 1973, The Crucial Year (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009), p. 68.

⁸¹⁰Walter Isaacson, Kissinger (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), p. 338

⁸¹¹Walter Isaacson, Kissinger (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), p. 339

⁸¹²Erik Bao, "Ping Pong Diplomacy: The Historic Opening of Sino-American Relations during the Nixon Administration." Ohio History Society. (2011), p.2

⁸¹³Zhaohui Hong and Yi Sun, "The Butterfly Effect and the Making of Ping Pong Diplomacy," Journal of Contemporary China 9 (2000), p. 437, www.cbtm.org.br/scripts/arquivos/3862998.pdf

⁸¹⁴Richard Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), p. 548

⁸¹⁵Walter Isaacson, Kissinger (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), p. 339

outcome for the Sino-US relationship as in the succeeding years it acted as a catalyst paving the way for future visits by Kissinger and Nixon.⁸¹⁶

In the course of time on June, 1971, to have a discussion regarding the Taiwan question and the Sino-Soviet rift, Chinese premier Zhou Enlai invited a US envoy to China. Kissinger after receiving the invitation reported to Nixon that “This,” Kissinger said, “is the most important communication that has come to an American president since the end of World War II.”⁸¹⁷ As a act of reciprocity the Nation Security Council of Washington on the advice of Nixon scheduled Henry Kissinger to make the first visit to the Beijing capital on July 9, 1971, which later set the platform of Nixon’s secret visit to Beijing.⁸¹⁸ In Nixon’s autobiography, the President recalls, “Because of the need for secrecy, [...] we agreed on a single codeword – Eureka – which he would use if the presidential trip had been arranged.” Kissinger visited lasted for two days and on July 11, he sent a one-word cable to Nixon: “Eureka”.⁸¹⁹ Meanwhile Nixon’s trip to China proved to be a historic event. The stakes were extremely high: on February 19, 1972, Kissinger reminded White House aides, “Everything we are doing with Moscow” and to “end the Vietnam War” hinged on the China trip.⁸²⁰ The visit witnessed serious exchange of views and high level diplomatic discussions on Sino-US relations and on a variety of issues that had been left untouched for the past twenty-two years.⁸²¹

The talks led to the birth of the historic ‘Shanghai Communiqué’ which was detailed diplomatic document outlining the common goals and stands shared by both the nation on

⁸¹⁶Erik Bao, “Ping Pong Diplomacy: The Historic Opening of Sino-American Relations during the Nixon Administration.” Ohio History Society. (2011), p.3

⁸¹⁷Robert Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power (New York: HarperCollinsPublishers, 2007), p. 333

⁸¹⁸“Two Eyewitnesses Behind the Bamboo Curtain,” Time, 21 April 1971, p. 1, www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,902879,00.html

⁸¹⁹Richard Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), p.553

⁸²⁰Patrick Tyler, A Great Wall (New York: A Century Foundation, 1999), p.113.

⁸²¹Richard Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), p.553

multiple issues. Firstly, the communiqué articulated a “mutual desire between China and the US for further exchange in science, technology, culture, sports, and journalism.” They even agreed “to facilitate the progressive development of trade between each other.”⁸²² Secondly, both the nations highly criticized all forms of hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region by any country.⁸²³ Basically it was an implicit warning, as described by Nixon, “subtly but unmistakably made it clear that we both would oppose efforts by the USSR or any other major power to dominate Asia.”⁸²⁴ Finally, the communiqué clearly stated the Sino-US stands on the political status of Taiwan, in the following words that it was “the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States.”⁸²⁵ The Chinese firmly maintained that “Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland”, and that “China wanted the withdrawal of all US forces and military installations from Taiwan.”⁸²⁶ On the contrary, Washington’s stance was far more equivocal. The Communiqué read, “[The] United States did not challenge the Chinese position that Taiwan is a part of China.”⁸²⁷ Although the United States agreed to recognize the existence of unified China but it diplomatically did not specified the recognized body. Kissinger called this stand as “constructive ambiguity”, as the US hoped to both continue its tenured support for the Nationalist-led Taiwan and foster new relations with the Communist People’s Republic.⁸²⁸ Finally Nixon in the flag-end of the summit stated publicly that “In the years ahead, we will build a bridge across 16,000 miles and 22 years of hostility which have

⁸²²The Shanghai Communiqué, Department of State Bulletin, 1972, *The Annals of America* 61 (March 1972), p. 283.

⁸²³The Shanghai Communiqué, Department of State Bulletin, 1972, *The Annals of America* 61 (March 1972), p. 284.

⁸²⁴Richard Nixon, *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), p.558

⁸²⁵The Shanghai Communiqué, Department of State Bulletin, 1972, *The Annals of America* 61 (March 1972), p. 285

⁸²⁶The Shanghai Communiqué, Department of State Bulletin, 1972, *The Annals of America* 61 (March 1972), p. 285

⁸²⁷The Shanghai Communiqué, Department of State Bulletin, 1972, *The Annals of America* 61 (March 1972), p. 285

⁸²⁸James Lilley and Jeffrey Lilley, *China Hands: Nine Decades of Adventure, Espionage, and Diplomacy in Asia* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), pp.164-165

divided us in the past. We have been here a week. This was the week that changed the world.”⁸²⁹

(5.3.6) China under Den Xiaoping:

The rise of Deng Xiaoping, a pragmatist in practice and a nationalist at heart, represented the inflection point that eventually propelled China to the top of the global economic and political hierarchy. In retrospect, however, one could argue that it was precisely Mao’s radical ideological experimentation that provided a perfect Hegelian antithesis to a centuries-old process of political decay and economic stagnation in China that coincided with the rise of Western colonialism. Following this line of argumentation, Deng reflected a new synthesis in China’s national consciousness, one that was founded upon an astute mixture of technological modernity and traditional Confucian thought. Post Mao China remolded its economic policy entirely which even impacted its political decision making. While reframing its economic policy it had to abandoned its isolationist policy and open China for foreign direct investment. After his assumption of office in early 1977, the U.S. President Jimmy Carter sent his Secretary of State Vance and his White House National Security Assistant Zbigniew Brzezinski to visit China in August 1977 and May 1978 respectively to hold talks on the normalization of Sino-U.S. relations. At the time when Vance visited China, the U.S. Government was not finally determined to accept the three principles China raised for establishing diplomatic relations between China and the United States. By the time when Brzezinski visited China, the Carter Administration has made up its mind to establish diplomatic relations with China first and then to negotiate with the Soviet Union from a position of superiority with an attempt to check the momentum of Soviet expansion and to fortify the global strategic status of the United States. During his visit, Brzezinski expressed that President Carter was determined to normalize Sino-U.S. relations before his first term ended, and that the United States was ready to accept the three principles set forth by China for the establishment of diplomatic relations (namely, the U.S. must sever its diplomatic relations with Taiwan, abrogation of the mutual defense treaty between the U.S. and Taiwan and the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Taiwan). He also expressed the hope (not as a condition) that when the U.S. side said it expected a peaceful solution to the Taiwan question which was purely an internal affair of China, it would not meet with an obvious refutation

⁸²⁹Richard Nixon, *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), p.577

from China. He announced that the U.S. had authorized Leonard Woodcock, Chief of the U.S. Liaison Office in China, to conduct detailed negotiations with the Chinese side on the normalization of Sino-U.S. relations.⁸³⁰

(5.3.7) US-China in Post Cold War:

In the last decade of 20th century China's pragmatic turn represented its growing appreciation of and confidence in mastering the virtues of capitalism for the benefit of national development which had led Beijing managed to inspire both admiration and fear among its peers. Not only the post-Cold War era saw not only the demise of the Soviet threat to China (a critical factor in binding Washington and Beijing in the twilight years of Chairman Mao) but also it witnessed the emergence of a capable diplomatic core that impressively glittered China's public diplomacy and international image. The first decade of the 21st century saw a perceptible shift in US public opinion with respect to China, the credit of which goes to the Bush administration's aggressive display of unilateral hubris. China's economic miracle not only represented an attractive model of state-led capitalist development (with a so-called "Beijing Consensus" supposedly reshaping the terms of international trade and investment) but created a "commodity boom" that dramatically enhanced the economic fortunes of many developing and emerging economies. This represented the "peaceful rise" dimension of China's unrelenting national development.⁸³¹

Post Cold war situation has turned a bit bitter for the two nations as it has deepened the existing cleavages of security difference between the two.⁸³² According to a western scholar Lampton the reasons for such indifferences between the two relies on five major factors: firstly the radical modernization of Chinese armed forces especially in the area of navy and air force. Secondly the strong disagreements among the two nations with regard to the desired international world order. Where on one hand US desires a uni-polar world order as itself

⁸³⁰ *The Establishment of Sino-U.S. Diplomatic Relations and Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping's visit to the United States*; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC; http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/t18007.shtml

⁸³¹ The Huffington Post ; Javad Heydarian; Richard; *The Post-Deng China: The End of China's Soft Power?*; http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/the-postdeng-china-the-en_b_5117198.html?section=india

⁸³² Celico, Amy P. (2001), "Chinese and American Views of National Security" in Lampton David M. (ed), *Major Power Relations in Northeast Asia: Win-Win or Zero-Sum Game*, Japan Center for International Exchange, Tokyo, New York

being the head, on the other hand China intend for a multi-polar world order so that it can manipulate one country against other. Thirdly the rampant economic growth China is witnessing in the preset days is a matter of grave concern for the United States as it fears that in the upcoming days the economic plight might turn into its military might challenging the global leadership of United States. Fourthly the highly authoritarian political setup of China and its enigmatic military setup have created suspicion for Washington; and lastly the contradictory and incongruous stand of both the countries towards each other on security interest have also worsen the situation much more.⁸³³ However apart from these five factors there are few agendas those which acts a role of catalyst in straining the relations between two like the undervalued exchange rate, Taiwan question, competition of dominance in strategically important regions of the world like the Middle East, South East Asia, Central Asia, Africa, Russia, Latin America etc

Moreover the strong competing that United States is receiving form the wide range of many low tech consumers' Chinese products, loop-sided trade benefits and its rampant economic growth is now a matter of serious question for United States.⁸³⁴ The realist scholars even hold the belief that the rapid economic growth of China in the next upcoming two to three decades might possibly overtake the economic and military superiority of United States. Comparing China's economic and military with former Soviet Union, Nazi Germany they also expect that to redress its historical grievances China in the upcoming days might try to dominate Asia and especially East Asia if not politically then militarily.⁸³⁵ They argue that it is unreasonable to think that China will not use military force in the near future. China has fought more border wars with its neighbors than any other country in the world since its independence in 1949.⁸³⁶ Therefore, it is better to contain authoritarian China as early as

⁸³³ Lampton, David M. Same Bed, (2001), Different Dreams: Managing U.S-China Relations, 1989-2000, University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angels, London.Pp 69-0

⁸³⁴ Xinhua HE, Haiying WU, Shiguo LIU and Ling WANG; *A Quarterly Macro-econometric Model of China*; The Institute of Quantitative and Technical Economics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; 2003; <http://ecomod.net/sites/default/files/document-conference/ecomod2004/252.pdf>

⁸³⁵ Bernstein, Richard, (1997), Munro Ross H., *The Coming Conflict with China*, Alfred A Knope, New York; Mearsheimer, John J. (2001), *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, London.

⁸³⁶ Shambaugh, Davis, (1996) "Containment or Engagement of China: Calculating Beijing's Responses", *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 2

possible. Mearsheimer asserts that “It is clear that the most dangerous scenario the United States might face in the early twenty-first century is one in which China becomes a potential hegemon in Northeast Asia.”⁸³⁷ He further argues that “China might be far more powerful and dangerous than any of the potential hegemon that the United States confronted in the twentieth century. Neither Wilhelmina Germany, nor imperial Japan, nor Nazi Germany, nor the Soviet Union had merely as much latent power as the United States had during their confrontations.”⁸³⁸

It is believed that if in future China turns itself as the sole key player in the Asian continent then for sure it will collide with the US interest because of the geo-political, economic and strategic importance of the region.⁸³⁹ However most of the realist scholars argue that engagement is a modern form of conciliation and this will give Beijing more power to become a potential aggressor.⁸⁴⁰ They even argue that liberal means are highly obsolete to counter the rising hegemony of China in and around the region and thus suggest for traditional realist means; that are arms build-up, unilateral diplomacy, balance of power, and alliance formation.⁸⁴¹

Matching itself against Washington is not possible for Beijing, and at even it’s not considered as the driving principle of China’s security policy.⁸⁴² One scholar mentions that Chinese strategies have consensus on: “first, the stronger China become, the more accommodating the United States will be toward China. Second, it is unwise for China to challenge the United States directly during its ‘unipolar moment’ of unparallel power except where absolutely

⁸³⁷ Mearsheimer, John J. (2001), *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, London; pp 401

⁸³⁸ Mearsheimer, John J. (2001), *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, London; pp 401

⁸³⁹ Bernstein, Richard, (1997), Munro Ross H., *The Coming Conflict with China*, Alfred A Knope, New York

⁸⁴⁰ Shambaugh, Davis, (1996) “Containment or Engagement of China: Calculating Beijing’s Responses”, *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 2

⁸⁴¹ Islam, AKM Khairul; *The Post-Cold War U.S.-China Relations: Win-Win Or Zero-Sum Game*; *Asian Affairs*, Vol. 28, No. 2, April - June 2006 pp 36

⁸⁴² Roy, Danny, (2003), “A Late Honeymoon for Bush and China: Enjoy It While It Lasts”, *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, Vol. 30, and Issue 2; p.79-87

necessary.”⁸⁴³ China’s first broad based national defense white paper, published in 1998, mentions that “it will seek a peaceful, stable, prosperous world into the new century.”⁸⁴⁴ China’s military strategists periodically have cautioned China’s leadership not to indulge in any types of lopsided arms race with the United States that will hamper its economic development and modernization process.⁸⁴⁵ China’s policies towards its neighbors clearly indicate that China is willing to avoid conflicts and has focused more on economic development and peace and stability of the region.⁸⁴⁶

Despite Beijing’s enormous economic growth it is argued by various Western scholars like James H. Nolt that it’s militarily and strategic potentialities are much feeble in comparison to the United States and he undermines the possibility of China to turn itself an autonomous military power .⁸⁴⁷ Nolt thus argues that the US policy toward China must be “with confidence, not with fear” as there are ample of areas where the US enjoys considerable advantage and leverage in comparison with China⁸⁴⁸ He believes that the only for the survival and the legitimacy of the communist regime, a strong and unconditional economic relations with the United States is extremely needed. Japan’s recession, sluggish economic growth of Europe and a slow recuperation of economic situation in East and Southeast Asia after multiple economic and financial crises, has still helped the United States to retain the most important export market in China. Thus he believes that for China an envious economic relation with the U.S. will not only definitely hamper its export market but will also have

⁸⁴³ Roy, Danny, (2003), “A Late Honeymoon for Bush and China: Enjoy It While It Lasts”, *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, Vol. 30, and Issue 2; p.79-87

⁸⁴⁴ Celico, Amy P. (2001), “Chinese and American Views of National Security” in Lampton David M. (ed), *Major Power Relations in Northeast Asia: Win-Win or Zero-Sum Game*, Japan Center for International Exchange, Tokyo, New York; pp 23

⁸⁴⁵ Sinha, Radha (2003), *Sino American Relations: Mutual Paranoia*, Palgrave, Macmillan.

⁸⁴⁶ Montaperto, Ronald N. (2005), “China Shows its Sensitivity to Southeast Asia,” *Asia Times Online*; http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/GD27Ae03.html

⁸⁴⁷ Nolt, James H. (1998), “U.S.-China Security Relations”, *World Policy*, Volume 3, No 19

⁸⁴⁸ Nolt, James H. (1998), “U.S.-China Security Relations”, *World Policy*, Volume 3, No 19

tremendous impacts on its overall economic growth, aggravating large scale unemployment in urban areas and mass discontent in rural areas.⁸⁴⁹

The so-called third generation of Jiang, Premier Li Peng, and Vice Premier Zhu Rongji is largely made up of Soviet-style electrical engineers. But in many institutions, the more technocratic, market-oriented, politically relaxed, Western-oriented fourth generation of leaders whose members are now in their forties is grabbing power. The faster economic development progresses and the calmer China's relations with the outside world, the less the old ideological and nationalistic slogans will support the traditional third generation and the faster the center of gravity will shift toward the more liberal fourth. China's totalitarianism has receded into what some call normal Asian authoritarianism. People can wear what they like, share opinions with their neighbors, choose their careers, change jobs, hear conflicting opinions from their national leaders, vote in competitive local but not national elections, move around the country with limited hindrance, start their own businesses, and in general do pretty much anything other than directly challenge the authority of the government. China after Deng will continue to move in the right direction.⁸⁵⁰

(5.4) Assessment:

China as a nation has molded and remolded itself positioning to play a larger regional player initially later transforming itself into a global layer in the regional hegemon. Though Chinese communism was an eye sore for the West initially but due to the growing economic prowess the West slowly found the eastern giant a challenge economic partner but a necessary evil to partner with. The clash with India was more to teach India a lesson in global politics and keep its southern neighbour within its control. It was more a strategic game for China than a military victory as still date. The Chinese political leadership are in no mode to resolve the crisis between India and China and wants it to linger more so to keep the 'China fear' within the minds of the Indian strategic planners. Pakistan for China has been an 'all weathered ally' as the former from the sixties has been more than happy o partner with China in all possible aspects. If one takes into consideration how much China has benefited from the relations it

⁸⁴⁹ Islam, AKM Khairul; The Post-Cold War U.S.-China Relations: Win-Win Or Zero-Sum Game; Asian Affairs, Vol. 28, No. 2, April - June 2006 pp 40

⁸⁵⁰ Overholt, William H; *China After Deng: Coping Well with Succession*; (May/June 1996 Issue); <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/1996-05-01/china-after-deng-coping-well-succession>

can be seen that all though it has been a strategic game for China than having any reflections on its economic productivity or strengthening its GDP. Pakistan has not only been the gateway to Central Asia and Middle East but also the fulcrum through which China got access to South Asia. China always maintained the carrot and sticks approach for Pakistan and has been able to keep US and India at a safe distance by using such policies in Pakistan. China considers US to be its large competitor economically as well as strategically henceforth South Asia, especially India and Pakistan will be witness to more such strategic and economic power play from US and China in proxy.