

Chapter-4

THE UNITED STATES - INDIA RELATIONS: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITIES

In the year immediately after independence India adopted the policy of Non-Alignment under the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru and decided to follow a policy of peace and friendship with all nations. But the two great powers of the world did were not so benign and supportive towards this stand of India and viewed such possession with suspicion. While the Soviet Union under Stalin treated India as still not free and under the dominance of imperialist nations, the United States viewed it as potentially rich for private investment, and a source of minerals and other materials of strategic use in the American development of atomic power.⁴⁷⁰

The two countries –India and America whose democratic traditions and rule of law stands as an aspiration to millions of people in the world had closer and intimate relations of mutual contact with them much before India attained its independence. As N.D Palmer says “India and America have been linked ever since 1492, when Christopher Columbus, sailing boldly over unknown seas in his search for passage to India discovered America”⁴⁷¹ It was nearly after four centuries of Columbus historic voyage that significant relations between India and United States began to develop. Norman Brown believes that the “American contacts with the India started before the American Revolution through soldiers and seamen who had lived both in the American colonies and in India”⁴⁷² These two regions, so distinct from each other, were parts of the expanding British Empire, and were already the brightest jewel in British crown. However official relations between the United States and India really developed to a significant degree only after India achieved its independence and entered into independent relations with each other.

⁴⁷⁰ B.M Jain; pp-1

⁴⁷¹ Palmer, N.D; *The United States and India*; Prager Publications; 1984; pp-11

⁴⁷² Brown; W. Norman; *The United States and India and Pakistan*; Cambridge; Mass; Harvard University Press; 1953; pp-263

(4.1) Evolution of American Interest in the South Asian region:

Until the late 1930's the operative word for American foreign policy was 'isolation'; as was addressed by President Washington in his farewell speech as he warned America against entanglement in European quarrels. American entry into World War I and II was the first major breach after 100 years which brought the US again into the vortex of world politics. On each occasion the country displayed a greater degree of consensus that there was a threat to national security and the task at hand was to defeat or contains it. It also emphasized the fact that the concept of security to the Americans was not merely limited to the security of its geographical boundaries but more that physical security.⁴⁷³ By the time the Second World War ended, the United States at almost a fractional cost to itself as compared to other belligerents of that conflict, had accumulated the greatest amount of power-both economically as well as militarily including that of the atomic bomb-ever known in human history. While the power of the British Empire degenerated, Europe devastated, and Japan almost wiped out as an entity, the Americans emerged as the most powerful country of the world.⁴⁷⁴ In the year 1949, two major events took place in the world one was the explosion of the Atomic Bomb by the Soviet Union in September, and the other was the establishment of a Communist Government by the Chinese Communist Party in the mainland of China.

The United States policy towards South Asia grew out of US interest in maintaining a global as well as regional balance in various regions. Apart from this the enormous and promising market and raw materials was also a matter of great concern for the United States. However it was the emergence of communism which made the American task all the more important.

(4.2) Role of US in the Indian Freedom Movement:

In Washington the question of India's status became a matter of interest at the senior levels of government by early 1941. Although the anti war sentiments remained strong in the United States, the sympathy of the US was very clear. As the American looked more closely at India they saw possibilities of sub-continent making a major contribution to the war effort, but soon they became disenchanted with the British attitude. Secretary of State's Cordell Hull and President Roosevelt were convinced that "the Indians would cooperate better with the

⁴⁷³ Barnds, J. William; *India Pakistan and the Great Power*; Prager Publications; 1972; pp-257

⁴⁷⁴ Aslam, Aftab; *US Policy Towards South Asia: Special Reference to Indo-Pak Relations*; Raj Publications; 1998; New Delhi; pp-17

British if they if they were assured of independence, atleast after war.”⁴⁷⁵ Thus the United States began to take interest in the political situation and gradually moved towards favoring Indian independence movement during the thirties and forties when they started frequently discussing the Indian situation in every diplomatic conference. By early 1940’s President Roosevelt tried to persuade Prime Minister Churchill to pledge Indian independence on the basis of Atlantic Charter and later he sends his personal emissary, Louis Johnson to India during the Cripps mission to act as an intermediary.⁴⁷⁶ Referring the positive and helpful attitude of the American’s Nehru referred US as “a great democratic country which seems alone to keep the torch of democratic freedom alight in a world given over to violence and aggression and opportunism of the worst kind.”⁴⁷⁷ During the World War II, the United States and India were drawn closer to their problems-economic and political and settled through the British embassy in London. Even before the end of the war Indo-American relations began to strengthen through various diplomatic channels. It played a very vital role in the 1945 Simla Conference in the release of the Indian leaders.⁴⁷⁸ The more immediate reason for the US intervention was its belief that the security of the democratic America was inextricably interwoven with the survival of other democracies, especially France, Britain and India.

The new era of Indo-US cordiality and reciprocation in international affairs began with the greeting from President Harry S. Truman on August 15, 1947: “We welcome India’s new and enhanced status in the world community of sovereign independent nations, assures the new dominion of our continued friendly and goodwill and reaffirm our confidence that India, dedicated to the cause of peace and to the advancement of all peoples, will take its place at the forefront of the nation of the world in the struggle to fashion world society founded in mutual trust and respect...I earnestly hope that our friendship will in future as in the past

⁴⁷⁵ Hull, Cordell; *Memoirs*; Vol-II; New York; Macmillan Press; 1948; pp 1482

⁴⁷⁶ Rao; ChandraSekhar RVR; *Searching for a mature Relationship; the United States and India*; The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs; London; July 1976; pp249

⁴⁷⁷ Chakravarty, B.N; *India speaks to America*; The John Day Company; New York; 1966; pp16

⁴⁷⁸ Rosinger, Lawrence.K; *India and the United States-Political and Economic Relations*; Macmillan Press; New York; 1950; pp-24

continue to be expressed in close and fruitful co-operational in international understandings and in cordiality in our relations one with the other.”⁴⁷⁹

(4.3) Indonesian Crisis of 1949:

Soon after independence the Indonesian crisis of 1949 brought India and United States in the forefront for the first time in the history of independent India to test the reciprocity in the international affairs between the two countries. As an Asian neighbour India strongly favored Indonesian independence from the Dutch dominations. United States and Australia called for an immediate meeting of the Security Council, where the delegates of India, Australia and USSR condemned the Dutch action as ‘deliberate act of aggression.’⁴⁸⁰ Condemning the Dutch action as ‘monstrous’ Nehru on January 20, 1949, called the Eighteen Nation Conference on Indonesia in New Delhi, where Nehru said “we meet today because the freedom of sister country of ours has been impelled and a dying colonialism of the past has raised its head again and called all the forces that are struggling to build up a new structure of the world”⁴⁸¹. This was apparently the kind of statement for which the United States had been looking from India. The American Ambassador, Henderson quickly declared in Calcutta that America would appreciate such conference which would help world understand in an atmosphere like that mentioned by Nehru. The Eighteen Nation Conference on Indonesia in New Delhi passed a resolution for the withdrawal of Dutch troops from Republican areas, which was forwarded to the Security Council where China, Cuba, Norway and the United States spoke in favor of Delhi. Within the initial years of Independence Indian managed to develop a very close affinity with Washington. But however with the course of time his closeness between the two nations started getting strained because of multiple developments one such major irritant factor lies to be the like the socialist outlook of Nehru and the birth of NAM.

⁴⁷⁹ Dennett, Raymond’s & Turner, Robbert K; (eds); *Documents on American Foreign Relations*; Princeton University Press; Princeton; Vol:IX; 1947; pp-581

⁴⁸⁰ Campbell; John. C; *The United Sates in World Affairs 1948-49*; Council on Foreign Relations; Harper and Brother; New York; 1949; pp-317-318

⁴⁸¹ Nehru, Jawaharlal: *India’s Foreign Policy Selected Speeches; September 1946-April 1961*; Ministry of Information and Broadcasting; Government of India; New Delhi; pp-407

(4.4) NAM:

The foreign policy of the two nations became divergent because of the cold war that followed World War II. During that point of time US was already a major player in the Cold War game and its foreign policy veered around- Truman Doctrine, Marshal Plan, Containment of Alliance and Foreign Aid; whereas India during the point of time had already insisted in taking a non-aligned, and peaceful friendly relationship between the world and its neighboring nations states. Jawaharlal Nehru believed that it was creation of military power blocks that was the cause of the two major wars in 20th century. Hence he propounded that India will follow a path of Non Alignment. For the American policy makers, India's policy of Non Alignment was something which they compared with the US policy of 'isolation' that it adopted in its initial years of independence. However unlike US's policy of 'isolation' which meant to remain aloof of European military power, non-alignment meant the freedom of the nation to judge every international issue

(4.5) 1962 Sino-Indian War and the Role of US:

Meanwhile with the course of development in Indian politics, the Indo-US relations started drifting away from each other. India's non-aligned stand during the cold war, Nehru's mixed economic policy and socialist outlook and the rising US-Pak nexus in the region further brought an estrangement in the relations. However the rise of Kennedy in power in United States and the growing Sino-Indian rivalry brought a new turn in the relations between India and United States. For the Kennedy administration India occupied a very crucial stature basically due to the-then various international developments and its lucrative strategic position. Among them one of the vital issues was the Chinese threat to the Asian equilibrium. Which was evident from the letter written by Under Secretary of State's Chester Bowles to the President of USA Kennedy, where he mentioned 'the existence of Communist China as the central problem in Asia'⁴⁸². With the growing hostile and military adversities between China and Soviet Russia, US feared that the Chinese policy toward Asia might become bolder and aggressive. Some senior US officials believed that in the current juncture New Delhi could play a vital role and as such insisted that India along with Japan must be recognized in their own sake for the containment of rising China and should take the

⁴⁸² Mac Mohan, Robert J.; "*Choosing Sides in South Asia*" in *Kennedy's quest for victory: American foreign Policy, 1961-1963*; Thomas G Paterson. eds (New York, OUP, 1989); pp 204-205

initiatives in guaranteeing the security of Asia against Communist China. But unfortunately despite such initiations the Kennedy administration failed to bring about any major fundamental recognition it sought in Indo-American relationship against China; until it was the late October 1962, when there was the outbreak of open hostilities between India and China.

The Chinese attack on India began on 20 October 1962. They invaded in the Northeast Frontier Agency and Ladakh section of Kashmir. The attack led to the forced departure of Indian Defense Minister V.K. Krishna Menon from his post and Nehru soon came to realize that we are living in 'own world of Illusion'. Within days of the Chinese attack, White House National Security Council (NSC) aide Robert Komer predicted that "we may have a golden opportunity for a major gain in our relations with India."⁴⁸³ Komer and other policy maker believed that India, due to this attack will awaken finally to the reality of the Chinese threat and would need – and request-American military aid, thereby tactically abandoning of its non-aligned stance and enabling Washington to draw New Delhi into its orbit.⁴⁸⁴ Meanwhile in Washington American policy makers were stirred by the attack and were ready to support and assist India in every possible way. Nehru's policy of Non-alignment was in flux. Compelled by the situation he was now ready to denounce its policy of reaming aloof from any block and was looking for military assistance from any quarters. Kennedy responded promptly to the Indian feelers. On October 28, 1962 he offered American aid in a personal letter to Nehru, which was immediately accepted by the Indian Prime Minister.⁴⁸⁵ In a speedy response to the Indian military requirement, Washington was so desperate in order to assist and rescue India that without waiting for the conclusion of formal pact between the

⁴⁸³ Mac Mohan, Robert J.; "Choosing Sides in South Asia" in *Kennedy's quest for victory: American foreign Policy, 1961-1963*; Thomas G Paterson. eds (New York, OUP, 1989); pp 213-214

⁴⁸⁴ Mac Mohan, Robert J.; "Choosing Sides in South Asia" in *Kennedy's quest for victory: American foreign Policy, 1961-1963*; Thomas G Paterson. eds (New York, OUP, 1989); pp 213-214

⁴⁸⁵ Mac Mohan, Robert J.; "Choosing Sides in South Asia" in *Kennedy's quest for victory: American foreign Policy, 1961-1963*; Thomas G Paterson. eds (New York, OUP, 1989); pp 214 and Appadorai A. & Rajan, M.S; *India's Foreign Policy and Relations*; (South Asian Publishers; New Delhi; 1985) pp 238

two countries it sent a small arms and equipment package of the value \$5 millions.⁴⁸⁶ The US arms aid arrived on 3 November 1962, while the pact was signed between the two nations on November 14 1962.⁴⁸⁷ However in the wake of the war there was a major uproar within a section of Indian policy makers who believed that accepting the US military assistance would dismantle and will force India to abandon its policy of non-alignment. But Nehru assured that the US military aid came without any political string attached to it. While thanking the Western Nation for the aid Prime Minister Nehru said that the “the head of one western country now giving us arms has written to me saying he had not wanted India to change its traditional policy of non-alignment”⁴⁸⁸ Basically the Kennedy administration soon directed American policy along three related tracks: first it decided to provide India rapidly with appropriate military assistance; second, it chose to use its new leverage with New Delhi to break the Kashmir stalemate and third it sought to mollify the Pakistanis with the prospect of a more moderate Indian position toward that dispute while, at the same time warning them against the consequence of drawing closer to the Chinese.⁴⁸⁹

Meanwhile India’s position in the war was getting more and more critical day by day. By November 20, 1962 the Chinese forces broke through the last line of Indian defense and almost reached the borders of Assam. They threatened the Indian Government to over-run Tezpur and Digboi oilfields. In this grave situation the Indian Government made very urgent request to the Kennedy Administration for more arms aid. India submitted five list of request to the US government which included small arms, artillery, road building equipment, radars and transport plane.⁴⁹⁰ The States Department and the Pentagon were urgently working out the emergency request for India. Beside arms the US government also sent twelve C-130

⁴⁸⁶ It was generally believed that US against the favor of arm aid will never receive Indian rupees as by the time it had already possessed large quantity of Indian currency through the food assistance programme. But shockingly in order to avoid a drain on India’s foreign exchange resource, the US agreed that India’s payment on rupees. @ Appadorai and Rajan

⁴⁸⁷ Makekar, D.R.; *The Guilty Men of 1962* (Bombay, 1968); pp64

⁴⁸⁸ As cited in Appadorai A. & Rajan, M.S; *India’s Foreign Policy and Relations*; (South Asian Publishers; New Delhi; 1985) pp 238 from *New York Times*, 12 Nov, 1962

⁴⁸⁹ Appadorai A. & Rajan, M.S; *India’s Foreign Policy and Relations*; (South Asian Publishers; New Delhi; 1985) pp 238

⁴⁹⁰ As cited in Appadorai A. & Rajan, M.S; *India’s Foreign Policy and Relations*; (South Asian Publishers; New Delhi; 1985) pp 238 from *New York Times*, 20 Nov, 1962

Hercules transport plans which American crews to ferry troops and equipment to the border battle region.⁴⁹¹ Apart from this President Kennedy also announced on 20 November the dispatch of an American mission under the leadership of Assistant Secretary of States for Far Eastern Affairs, Averell H. Harriman, to India to make an on-spot survey of India's long-term requirements.⁴⁹² Moreover later it was unveiled in a report of conversation between President Kennedy and Sudhir Ghosh, the then MP, that Nehru proceed further and made a very specific request to the United States for "American fighting air support" to protect India's defenseless territories.⁴⁹³ This was further validated and substantiated by Thodore C. Soreson, Special Counsel to President Kennedy in his book where he reported that President Kennedy worked out a joint agreement with the British to provide air defense to India.⁴⁹⁴ But before the western powers could take any action the Chinese troops declared a unilateral ceasefire.

However despite India got defeated in the war but the Sino-Indian conflict opened up a new paradigm shift of relationship between India and United States. India drew up plans to strengthen mountain warfare divisions with the assistance from the US and Nehru drew up a plan for a long-term defense preparedness involving estimated US aid of a billion dollar. Pakistan strongly protested to such a move; Mohammad Ali Bogra the External Affairs Minister of Pakistan asserted that the Sino- Indian conflict was not a "major" but "a localized one restricted to the are under dispute." So the US aid to India was just meaningless and unnecessary.⁴⁹⁵ Even President of Pakistan Ayub Khan in July 1963 also hinted that if the US military aid and flow continued to India then Pakistan would positively drift toward China. He indicated that the western arms supply to India will only aggravate the threat from India and Pakistan would be compelled to seek Chinese protection. As a result of such threat and

⁴⁹¹ As cited in Appadorai A. & Rajan, M.S; *India's Foreign Policy and Relations*; (South Asian Publishers; New Delhi; 1985) pp 238 from *New York Times*, 22 Nov, 1962

⁴⁹² *Department of States Bulletin*; Vol 46, 22 January 1962; pp124 in Appadorai A. & Rajan, M.S; *India's Foreign Policy and Relations*; (South Asian Publishers; New Delhi; 1985) pp 238

⁴⁹³ Makekar, D.R.; *The Guilty Men of 1962* (Bombay, 1968); pp 72

⁴⁹⁴ Sorenson, Theodore C. ; *Kennedy*; (London; 1965) pp 665

⁴⁹⁵ As cited in Appadorai A. & Rajan, M.S; *India's Foreign Policy and Relations*; (South Asian Publishers; New Delhi; 1985) pp 238 from Speech in the Pakistani National Assembly on 22 November 1962; *Dawn* (Karachi), 23 November 1962

pressure US offer of military aid to India was just restricted to \$500 millions.⁴⁹⁶ The US also pressurized India to negotiate with Pakistan on a settlement over Kashmir issue. It was thus under the US pressure that Nehru for the first time proposed internationalizing existing cease fire line between India and Pakistan which however turned to be a failure.⁴⁹⁷

(4.6) PL-480:

Post 1962 Sino-Indian war US and India started cultivating a strong essence of closeness with each other. The US aid and assistance in various fields to strengthen and develop India further boosted the relationship much more. Moreover it was basically the threat perception from the rising Communist China to the Indian economy that induced United States to assign priority to India's sinking economic development. The Kennedy-Cooper Resolutions, which drew the attention of the World Bank to the situation in the sub-continent and the Development Loan Fund of 1960's marked the opening of a new chapter of better relationship between the two nations. Kennedy's perceptions about India were completely different from its predecessors.⁴⁹⁸ He fascinated India as economic modernized nation within a democratic polity which could lead the East and all Asia.⁴⁹⁹

In course of time gradually US came to occupy a very vital position in the domestic policy of India despite the ups and down of the relations. Not only had this but United States tried to back India's demand and its demands for aid in every possible international debates and meetings. It played a major role in the formulations of the Third Five Year plan for India and also played a havoc role in the 'Aid India Consortium' which was set up in 1958 by the World Bank. One such extension of aid that India received from the United States was with regard to agricultural and food related area which unveiled the historic Green Revolution in India was the US Public Law 480 also famous as PL780.

⁴⁹⁶ Kamath P.M.; *The Relevance of American Election to India*; (Free Press Journal; Bombay; 1984); pp 4

⁴⁹⁷ Kamath P.M.ed.s; *Indo-US Relations, Dynamics of Change*; (South Asian Publishers; New Delhi; 1987) pp10

⁴⁹⁸ The nature of aid during Kennedy's administration suggested that India's neutralism was not a disqualification for aid purpose. For him the attitude and motive which aid was given were much important that its quantum and so he visualized aid without any political strings.⁴⁹⁸

⁴⁹⁹ Schlesinger, Arthur M. ; *The Thousand Days*; London; 1965; pp 454

Under the leadership of President Dwight D Eisenhower on July 10, 1954 the Department of States formulates the famous policy of PL-480 (Public Law 480) for providing food and agricultural aid. PL-480 since its inception was used as a vehicle to dispose of unwanted US surplus agricultural produce within the twin objectives of ensuring profitable return to American farmers and expand the developing market of US agriculture. Under the Title-I of PL-480 US government was supposed to sell agricultural and food items in and under a concessional rate.⁵⁰⁰ With regard to India, the food assistance package that the US provided under the PL-480 reflected the convergence of interests of both the nations. As such India concluded the first PL-480 agreements on August 1956 with USA, which proved a great benefit and saved the Indian foreign expenditure of a large magnitude and it also offered rupees resource for economic development.⁵⁰¹

However Kennedy's approach to the issue of PL-480 was a bit different from his predecessors. Although he visualized that the development of those receptive countries was linked with the economic growth of US as well but he seriously disliked the 'surplus disposal philosophy' which to him had serious limitations to the programme both as aid and development tool. He believed that the philosophy of surplus disposal in PL-480 looked upon the recipient nations with a skeptic attitude and he gave a prompt attention in reorienting the food aid philosophy. Finally his appointment of a task force under the chairmanship of Murry Lincoln recommended for the transformation of what was known as the surplus disposal act into a 'food for peace act' to meet the human need of the world over and to meet the world economic development.⁵⁰² Under the new policy and philosophy India was granted a loan of \$256.8 million from the sales proceeds of agricultural commodities on 26 March 1962, signatories of the agreement were there then Secretary, Ministry of Finance, L.K. Jha and Prof J.K. Galbraith, US Ambassador to India. The agreement also provided for 'the sales of food and fiber valued \$1,370 million,' which was the biggest agreement ever conceded by the

⁵⁰⁰ *Fact Sheet No. 23; US Economic Assistance to India*; New Delhi; 1971; pp 03; as in Jain, B.M.; *India and the United States 1961-1963*; (New Delhi ; Radiant Publishers; 1987); pp 204

⁵⁰¹ Bjorkaman, James Warner; *Public Law-480 and Policies of Self-help: Indo-American Relations; 1965-1968*; "Commission on the Organization of the Government for the conduct of Foreign policy"; (Vol 07; Washington D.C. 1975); PP 194

⁵⁰² Schlesinger, Arthur M. ; *The Thousand Days*; London; 1965; pp 153

US government.⁵⁰³ Besides the supply of the food grains, the US government contributed to the development of India's textile industries under the agreement as such US agreed to sale \$46.6million long staple cotton from India.⁵⁰⁴ The next dynamic development that took place under the agreement was in the 1963 when Indian the then Agricultural Minister S.K. Patil visited US and held discussion with Orville L. Freeman the US Agricultural Secretary regarding India's immediate need for rice for which it received considerable and commendable amount of help and support in return from the Kennedy administration. In a joint communiqué signed in Washington on 8 June 1963 'it was finally agreed that shipment of about 150,000 tons (of rice) under the current agreement would be made available to India...'⁵⁰⁵ Thus Kennedy's Food for Peace Programme not only played a notable role in averting mass food shortage in India but also open up a new era in strengthening the relationships and confidence between the two nations. As Professor Chandra Shekhar, argues that, it gave 'sufficient economic independence to pursue an independent foreign policy - that of non alignment' for country like India.⁵⁰⁶

(4.7): Kashmir and the Indo- US relations:

However in the course of time the Indo-US relations took again a new turn and gradually misunderstanding started ruining the relations in between the two and the long drawn unsettled issue of Kashmir again crept up a thorn between the two nations. The unfinished business of partition centering round the Princely state of 'Kashmir' was perhaps first major issue of divergence between the Indo-US relations immediately in the post independence era.⁵⁰⁷

The Kashmir dispute emerged within a couple of month after the independence of India and Pakistan. It was alleged in the month of October Pakistan fabricated a civil and political strife

⁵⁰³ Foreign Affairs Record; New Delhi; MEA; March 1962; in Jain, B.M.; *India and the United States 1961-1963*; (New Delhi ; Radiant Publishers; 1987); pp 206

⁵⁰⁴ Foreign Affairs Record; New Delhi; MEA; March 1962; in Jain, B.M.; *India and the United States 1961-1963*; (New Delhi ; Radiant Publishers; 1987); pp 207

⁵⁰⁵ Foreign Affairs Record; New Delhi; MEA; March 1962; in Jain, B.M.; *India and the United States 1961-1963*; (New Delhi ; Radiant Publishers; 1987); pp 208

⁵⁰⁶ Schlesinger, Arthur M. ; *The Thousand Days*; London; 1965; pp 527

⁵⁰⁷ Kux, Dennis; *Estranged Democracies: India and the United States 1941-1991*; (Sage Publications; New Delhi); 1993;

in Kashmir against Maharaja Hari Singh through Pathan tribe men from the Pakistan's North-West Frontier of Pakistan. Helpless Maharaja unable to settle the dispute approached the Government of India for help and signed the treaty of Accession with Nehru making Kashmir an integral part of India, followed by which the first ever war between India and Pakistan took place details of which are given in the preceding chapters.

Initially the reaction of President Truman was neutral in nature as it didn't want to interfere in the bilateral issue between the two nations. Even the Director of the Near East Office in the State Department, Loy Henderson, recommended the Acting Secretary of State Robert Lovett to keep their hands off of the dispute to avoid 'making a choice between giving support to the interests of India or of Pakistan.'⁵⁰⁸ Things however changed when Prime Minister Nehru at the initiation of Lord Mountbatten took up the 'Kashmir Question' in UNSC for an amicable and peaceful solution of the problem, and this made the US representatives in UNSC took active interest in the issue. As the Kashmir Question was raised in the UNSC, UK and USA moved a resolution by which they made the UNO fail to treat Islamabad as the only aggressor nation and rather blamed both the nations equally. Infuriated with this approach of the two major world powers Nehru stated that Washington and London played a 'dirty role' in the UN on the Kashmir Issue.⁵⁰⁹ Thus, since from the initial stage the Indian leaders have considered the US stand regarding the Kashmir Question as very much discriminatory and anti-Indian in nature, similarly the United States believes that the main problem to resolve the issue remains to be the uncooperative and unsupportive stand of India; which has thus made Kashmir as a vitiate issue preventing India and the US from moving politically closer towards each other.

Meanwhile as United States occasionally kept on interfering in matters related to the Kashmir Question the relations between India and US kept on getting more and more strained. In 1953, when Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah wanted to change its position and was even toying for demanding for the idea of Azad Kashmir, his meet with a former US Democratic Presidential candidate lighted a severe political upheaval between New Delhi and Washington, as it was believed that the Americans were conspiring with Abdullah to create

⁵⁰⁸Kux, Dennis; *Estranged Democracies: India and the United States 1941-1991*; (Sage Publications; New Delhi); 1993; pp 303 pp60

⁵⁰⁹*Speeches of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series; Vol-05; pp 188-190, 201-211, 2018*

an independent Kashmir so that its geo-strategic goal in the regions could be secured.⁵¹⁰ Similarly was the case with the pro-Pakistani stand adopted by United States in the 1965 India-Pakistan War over Kashmir; when despite of adopting a neutral approach towards both the nations it equated the aggressor with the victim of aggression.⁵¹¹ This truth unveiled when UNSC Representative Goldberg on September 18, 1956, supported the UN Secretary General U Thant's report on the series of infringement in Kashmir that started from 5 August 1965 blaming Pakistan as the real aggressor, by saying, '....The Secretary General has reported to us in full on his mission of peace. The United States commended to Secretary General for his impartial efforts to give effect to the Council's resolution and achieve an honorable settlement.'⁵¹² Even though the United States silently accepted that fact that Pakistan was the real aggressor and that it was Pakistan who had initiated (Operation Gibraltar) to destabilize the peace process in India and the region; yet they forcefully imposed an arm embargo on both the nations which offended India and estranged the Indo-US relationship further which made US lost all good will in India.⁵¹³

Similarly again the pro-Pakistani closed eye attitude of United States in the Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971 again validated its anti-India discriminatory stand creating a thaw in the relations. However the Simla Agreement between India and Pakistan, post 1971 war proved to be a positive step for resolving the dispute between the two nations as both agreed to resolve any indifference, even Kashmir, bilaterally without any third party mediation. Washington significantly came around to accept this position.⁵¹⁴

⁵¹⁰ Mahapatra, Chintamani; American Activism on Kashmir Question; <https://www.idsa-india.org/an-oct-3.html>; accessed on 12/05/2016

⁵¹¹ For details, see K. Subrahmanyam, "Deception on Kashmir-1965: US Knew but Wouldn't Tell," Times of India, August 11, 97

⁵¹² Jain R.K eds. *US-South Asia Relations; 1947-1982*; Vol. 02; (New Delhi; Radiant Publishers; 1983); pp 245

⁵¹³ Gangully, Sumit; *US-Indian Relations During the Lyndon Johnson Era* in Gould and Gangully; pp 82

⁵¹⁴ Kux, Dennis; *Estranged Democracies: India and the United States 1941-1991*; (Sage Publications; New Delhi); 1993; pp309

(4.8) US role in the Bangladesh Liberation War:

With the advent of Richard Nixon as the 37th President of United States the equations between US and Pakistan changed a lot. Nixon was not like its predecessors; rather he had developed a deep sense of prejudice against India and a very special liking for Pakistan, since ever he became the vice-president of US in 1953. During his visit to India and Pakistan the sense of cold reception that he received from India disappointed him a lot whereas on the contrary he was much influenced and appreciated by the warm and cordial relations that Pakistan showed.⁵¹⁵ Thus when Nixon became the President of the State in 1968, Washington moved a little more closely to Islamabad. New developments were taking place in the arena. The growing Sino-Soviet rift and the nuclear parity that Soviet Union maintained with United States motivated the Nixon administration to normalize its relations with People's Republic of China. Pakistan out here played a very significant role in developing pathways of communication between the US and China that resulted in the historic President Richard Nixon's visit and consolidation of Sino-US relations.⁵¹⁶ Pakistani President Yahya Khan went to Peking on July 1971 with a personal message from President Nixon for Mao-Tse-tung and arranged a secret visit of Nixon's National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger to Peaking.⁵¹⁷ Moreover the growing Indo-Soviet intimacy and the consolidation of Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union and India in the 1970's, made Nixon administration even more pro Pakistan and a bitter relationship with India grew. Things came out openly when in the year December 1971 the war broke out between India and Pakistan. The American government under Nixon, in disregard of American public opinion, and of Congressman, Senators and other influential sections of the American public; not only helped the Pakistani military junta but also held India responsible for the Bangladesh Crisis.

⁵¹⁵ Krishnan, Kunni; *The Unfriendly Friends: India and America*; (New Delhi, 1974), pp 24-25

⁵¹⁶ Arshed Tanwir; *China Factor: In India Pakistan Relations: A Review*; Journal of Politics and Governance; Vol-3; No-4; October-December 2014; pp 106

⁵¹⁷ Burr, William, Chamberlain, Shron; Bein Gao and Han Zhao (eds); *Negotiating U.S.-Chinese Rapprochement; New American and Chinese Documentation Leading Up to Nixon's 1972 Trip*; National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 70; Document 1-27; George Washington University; see also: *The Beijing-Washington Backchannel and Henry Kissinger's secret trip to China*; (<http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB70/#docs>); accessed on 10/07/2014 at 1.57 am

The War of 1971 also known as Bangladesh Liberation War, basically developed due to the extreme dissatisfaction and tensions between the two wings of Pakistan –East and West. The previous chapter of the study has dealt the causes of the war in a detailed manner. During the brutal military repression, countless thousands were killed and millions left their homes and fled to India for safety. As the campaign of death and destruction unleashed by the Pakistani armed forces continued unabated in Bangladesh, the influx of refugees into India also continued. The Indian Government faced the tremendous problem of providing shelter, food and clothing to these refugees, as its own resources were meager to meet the situation. The initial response of the Nixon Administration to the issue was very reluctant. Washington basically deemed it as an internal affair of Pakistan and was not that interested in the issue. It became evident from the words of Henry Kissinger, the-then, National Security Adviser to President Nixon, who while summing up the attitude of the US Government toward the issue, argued that almost all nations would fight for their unity, even if a large segment of population of the affected area was overwhelmingly for secession. He stated that the events in East Bengal were the “internal problems of a friendly country.”⁵¹⁸

Although US public opinion, represented by many Senators, Congressmen, intellectuals and the press, severely condemned the Yahya regime for its brutal suppression of the Bengalese and urged the US Government to stop military supplied to Pakistan and provide more relief supplies to the refugees, yet Nixon Administration remained unmoved by the Pakistani atrocities and the American public sentiments. Moreover by that time even New Delhi made an appeal to the world powers, including the United States, to exert pressure on the Pakistani President Yahya Khan, to stop the genocide in what subsequently became Bangladesh and find a political solution to the crisis, so that the refugees could return to their homes. But all appeals remained unheeded and the US Government did not even issue a statement disapproving Islamabad’s repressive measures in East Pakistan. Even the American Consul-General in Dacca (East Pakistan) was sending cables to Washington urging the US Government to criticize the Pakistani repression there. The American Ambassador in New Delhi, Kenneth B. Keating, also told Washington that he was “deeply shocked at the massacre” and was “greatly concerned at the United States’ vulnerability to damaging association with a reign of military terror.” Keating urged that the United States promptly, publicly and prominently deplore “this brutality,” privately intervene with Yahya Khan and

⁵¹⁸ Kissinger, Henry A.; *The White House Years*; (London; 1979); pp 852

suspend all military deliveries to Pakistan. But nothing could turn the cards of the President any way and despite looking to the facts and real source of problem Nixon found it “outrageous” that his diplomats were sending “petitions, rather than reports.” He transferred the Consul-General from Dacca and chided Keating for having been “taken over by the Indians.”⁵¹⁹

Surprisingly, the Nixon administration threw the blame for the situation mainly on India and tried to bail out the West Pakistani military junta from the critical situation. He praised Pakistan for internationalization of relief efforts in East Pakistan; replacement of the military governor in East Pakistan by a civilian rule; proclamation of general amnesty; the promise not to execute Mujibur Rahman; agreement to unilateral withdrawal of Pakistani forces from the border; Yahya Khan’s willingness to talk to the leaders of the Bangladesh Government-in-exile, and; acceptance of the good offices of the UN Secretary-General and the UN observers on both sides of the borders and much more.⁵²⁰ On each of these counts he bitterly criticized India for neither cooperating with Pakistan, nor with the United States and the United Nations.⁵²¹ A senior State Department official said in a statement that the Indian policy led to the deepening of the crisis. He cited three areas where the Government of India had thwarted the US efforts for peace. The Indian Government rejected the US proposal for a mutual withdrawal of Indian and Pakistani troops from the border. He disclosed that President Nixon informed Prime Minister Indira Gandhi during her November visit to Washington that Pakistani President Yahya Khan would pull back his troops, if India reciprocated later. But India rejected that offer. The official also blamed Prime Minister Indira Gandhi for refusing to use Indian influence to help to arrange talks between Yahya Khan and the representatives of the Bangladesh Government-in-exile in Calcutta. On the military front, he said, India not only trained and equipped the Bengali guerrillas, but the Indian forces were engaged in direct support of guerrilla border crossings into East Pakistan.

⁵¹⁹ Kissinger, Henry A.; *The White House Years*; (London; 1979); pp 853

⁵²⁰ *US Foreign Policy for the 1970’s: The emerging structure of Peace: A report to the Congress by Richard M Nixon, President of the United States; February 9, 1972* (Washington D.C.; 1972); pp142 as quoted in Appadorai A. & Rajan, M.S; *India’s Foreign Policy and Relations*; (South Asian Publishers; New Delhi; 1985) pp 244

⁵²¹ *US Foreign Policy for the 1970’s: The emerging structure of Peace: A report to the Congress by Richard M Nixon, President of the United States; February 9, 1972* (Washington D.C.; 1972); pp 146 as quoted in Appadorai A. & Rajan, M.S; *India’s Foreign Policy and Relations*; (South Asian Publishers; New Delhi; 1985) pp 244

The regular Indian forces along with the Mukti Bahini (the guerrilla fighters of the Bangladesh liberation movement) were operative in East Pakistan, In the humanitarian efforts, he said India, had hurt relief to the people of East Pakistan by refusing to restrain Bengali guerrillas trained on Indian soil from attacking the transport system essential for moving relief supplies. The Indian Government linked the return of the refugees to East Pakistan to a political settlement in Pakistan, rather than dealing with the issue on a purely humanitarian basis.⁵²²

All these accusations were refuted by India ambassador L.K. Jha described State Government allegations as “distortion of facts”. Not only this even Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi herself India had nothing to do with Bangladesh and she added “If we wanted to create trouble for Pakistan, we could have done so. But we do not want to do so.”⁵²³ She argued that it was due to the strong repressive measures adopted Pakistani military junta in East Pakistan which had driven million of refugees into India, and it had put a great strain on India internal resources and economy. Moreover she also urged Washington to put pressure on Islamabad to come to terms with the elected representatives of East Pakistan so that the refugees could go home. In June 1971 when India’s External Affairs minister Swaran Singh visited Washington he appealed President Nixon and Secretary of State’s William Roger to persuade Pakistan to find a political solution and also expressed deep concern regarding the US economic and military aid to Pakistan. But despite US assurance of not sending arms and aid the promise was violated and US speeded up the economic and military aid to Pakistan and continued to press India not to intervene in East Bengal.⁵²⁴ Not only this but even Nixon administration threatened India that if India intervene or continue to create trouble for Pakistan in East Pakistan then if China come to help Pakistan; New Delhi , ‘must not expect any help for the United States.’⁵²⁵

⁵²² *Daily Telegraph*; (London; 6 December; 1971) as quoted in Appadorai A. & Rajan, M.S; *India’s Foreign Policy and Relations*; (South Asian Publishers; New Delhi; 1985) pp 245

⁵²³ *Hindustan Times*; (6 December; 1971) as quoted in Appadorai A. & Rajan, M.S; *India’s Foreign Policy and Relations*; (South Asian Publishers; New Delhi; 1985) pp 245

⁵²⁴ *New York Times*; 22 and 23 June 1971; as quoted in Appadorai A. & Rajan, M.S; *India’s Foreign Policy and Relations*; (South Asian Publishers; New Delhi; 1985) pp 246

⁵²⁵ Bhatia, Krishnan; “*About Some Leaks*”; *Hindustan Times*; 23, August 1972 as quoted in Appadorai A. & Rajan, M.S; *India’s Foreign Policy and Relations*; (South Asian Publishers; New Delhi; 1985) pp 245

There are multiple versions of ‘who attacked whom, who shot the first bullet’ between India during the liberation war of Bangladesh but the study has tried to maintain a neutral stand. On the night of 3 December, Pakistan attacked eight Indian airfields in the western parts of the country, and the next day it declared war on India.⁵²⁶ The Indian counter attacked in the east and mounting probing operations in the west to pin down the Pakistani forces. On 6 December, India recognized the Awami League government-in-exile as the government of Bangladesh. As tensions mounted during November, the United States perceptively hardened its stance toward India, which Kissinger and Nixon claimed was inciting the conflict. On 2 December, Washington announced a suspension of military sale to India (of which most important was the \$70million communications system designed to improve air defense capabilities). On 6 December, the US froze its economic assistance to India, including \$87.6 million worth foreign aid already in pipeline.⁵²⁷

Soon the matter escalated to the UN Security Council where, acting under the direct orders of Nixon, US Representative George Bush criticized India as responsible for the war. Moreover Bush also requested an urgent secession of Security Council to examine the deteriorating situation in the Indian sub-continent. The Security Council met on 4 December 1971 and George Bush accused India of “incursion across borders of East Pakistan”⁵²⁸ Introducing a draft resolution Bush also asked for an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of Indian and Pakistani troops to their own sides.⁵²⁹ However both the resolutions against India were vetoed by the Soviet Union. Participating for the first time as Security Council member, Communist China joined the United States. France, Britain and other permanent members of UN abstained from the vote.⁵³⁰ As a result the US and its allies shifted their focus from Security

⁵²⁶ Kux, Dennis; *Estranged Democracies: India and the United States 1941-1991*; (Sage Publications; New Delhi); 1993; pp 302

⁵²⁷ Kux, Dennis; *Estranged Democracies: India and the United States 1941-1991*; (Sage Publications; New Delhi); 1993; pp 302

⁵²⁸ *Department of States Bulletin* ; Vol: 65; 17 December 1971; pp 723 as quoted in Appadorai A. & Rajan, M.S; *India’s Foreign Policy and Relations*; (South Asian Publishers; New Delhi; 1985) pp 247

⁵²⁹ *SCOR, S/PV. 1606*; 4 December 1971; pp 91 as quoted in Appadorai A. & Rajan, M.S; *India’s Foreign Policy and Relations*; (South Asian Publishers; New Delhi; 1985) pp 247

⁵³⁰ Kux, Dennis; *Estranged Democracies: India and the United States 1941-1991*; (Sage Publications; New Delhi); 1993; pp 303

Council to General Assembly on 7 December 1971, where the US representative strongly and bitterly criticized India and accused it of invasion and dismemberment of sovereign state of Pakistan. Bush condemned India's action and urged the Council "to end this threat to world peace on the most urgent basis". Moreover he wanted to know the 'intentions of India' and also to "give assurance that it does not intend to annex Pakistani territory and change the status quo in Kashmir" Finally, the call of cease fire won overwhelming support by a vote of 104-11 with 10 abstentions.⁵³¹

Nixon in order to further pressurize India took up the issue to the Special Action Group. The Minutes of the meeting of the National Security Council's Washington Special Action Group (WSAG) which was later revealed by columnist Jack Anderson fully exposed the anti-Indian basis of Nixon Administration. Anderson in his report exposed how President Nixon ordered Kissinger to "tilt American policy in favour of Pakistan". One memorandum from the WSAG quotes Henry Kissinger as saying "I am getting hell every half hour from the President that we are not being tough enough on India...He wants to tilt in favour of Pakistan." Kissinger continued: "He has just called me. He does not believe we are carrying out his wishes. We have to take action; the President is blaming me."⁵³² Anderson Paper further revealed that in one of the meetings of the WSAG, Kissinger directed the administration to show coolness to Indian and the Indian subcontinent and the Indian ambassador is not to be treated at too high level."⁵³³

Moreover the US stand on Bangladesh question was affected by the fact that Nixon and Kissinger were then deeply preoccupied with secret diplomacy to patch up relations with People's Republic of China about which the State Department and the American Diplomats in Dacca and New Delhi were then unaware. On 5 December in a meeting Kissinger directed that aids to India should be cut-off and thus the cut should apply to India alone. Consequently the US Government suspended an aid of \$87 million economic assistance loan to India on the

⁵³¹ *Department of States Bulletin* ; Vol: 65; 25 December 1971; pp 91 as quoted in Appadorai A. & Rajan, M.S; *India's Foreign Policy and Relations*; (South Asian Publishers; New Delhi; 1985) pp 248

⁵³² *Washington Post*, 2 January 1972; as quoted in Appadorai A. & Rajan, M.S; *India's Foreign Policy and Relations*; (South Asian Publishers; New Delhi; 1985) pp 248

⁵³³ *The Statesman* (New Delhi); 4 January 1972; as quoted in Appadorai A. & Rajan, M.S; *India's Foreign Policy and Relations*; (South Asian Publishers; New Delhi; 1985) pp 249

grounds that such aid might be used by the Indians on war with Pakistan.⁵³⁴ Meanwhile after the heavy loss of men and arms in war when Pakistani government asked for arms and war planes from US; despite several international limitations and constraints President Nixon directed the high US officials to find out the possibility of providing American arms and war planes to Pakistan through third world countries like Jordan, Libya and Saudi Arabia.⁵³⁵ Even Nixon and Kissinger in a bid to help Pakistan proposed to revoke SEATO military alliance to provide military aid to Pakistan, but the States Department refuted the proposal of Kissinger on the ground that such aids were to be given only with reference to communist aggression only.⁵³⁶ Having failed in the diplomatic effort to pressurize India to end the military operations against Pakistan, President Nixon pursued gun-boat diplomacy. He ordered the USS Enterprise, a nuclear powered aircraft carrier of the Seventh Fleet, to sail toward Bay of Bengal. Officially it was stated that the purpose behind the dispatch of the Seventh Fleet was to evacuate American nationals from Bangladesh. But it was a patently lame excuse which was exposed later as when the Seventh Fleet steamed into Bay of Bengal, only seventeen Americans were in the East Bengal.⁵³⁷ Later Andersons' report established the fact that the deployment of the US Seventh Fleet was mainly intended - (a) to compel India to divert both ships and war planes to shadow the task-force; (b) to weaken India's blocked against East Pakistan, (c) possibly to divert Indian Aircraft carrier INS Vikrant from its military mission; (d) to force India to keep planes on defense alert, thus reducing their operation against Pakistani ground force.⁵³⁸ But however with the intervention and support of the USSR, US had to back-off its Seventh Fleet, and finally on December 10, 1971 Pakistani army surrendered themselves to the Indian army calling a cease fire.

⁵³⁴ *The Times*; 7 December; 1971; as quoted in Appadorai A. & Rajan, M.S; *India's Foreign Policy and Relations*; (South Asian Publishers; New Delhi; 1985) pp 249

⁵³⁵ *The Hindu* 14 December 1971; as quoted in Appadorai A. & Rajan, M.S; *India's Foreign Policy and Relations*; (South Asian Publishers; New Delhi; 1985) pp 249

⁵³⁶ *Indian Express*; 7 January 1972 & *The Hindu* 20 January 1972; as quoted in Appadorai A. & Rajan, M.S; *India's Foreign Policy and Relations*; (South Asian Publishers; New Delhi; 1985) pp 249

⁵³⁷ *International Herald Tribune* (Paris); 15 December 1971; as quoted in Appadorai A. & Rajan, M.S; *India's Foreign Policy and Relations*; (South Asian Publishers; New Delhi; 1985) pp 250

⁵³⁸ *Washington Post*, 31 December 1971; as quoted in Appadorai A. & Rajan, M.S; *India's Foreign Policy and Relations*; (South Asian Publishers; New Delhi; 1985) pp 250

(4.9) NPT and Pokhran-I:

In the shadow of the Atomic cloud that hangs over all of human kind, the United States and India found themselves at odds on wide variety of nuclear issue. The prospects of using atomic and nuclear energy for peaceful purposes had been the aim of Jawaharlal Nehru and it was at his initiative that the Indian Atomic Energy Commission was established on August 10, 1948. Since then the AEC has been engaged in such programmes of peaceful nature. During the cold war in order to eliminate the spread of the atomic power to the non-nuclear nation United States came up with the policy of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), India however refused to adhere to the NPT on the ground that it was discriminatory in its policies and their political falls. India did not sign Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 along with the Super Powers because she thought it would be a major hurdle for peaceful experiments and considered the treaty agreement to be extremely biased for the members who had achieved a level of technological development regarding nuclear weapons. Thus difference over the nuclear issues greatly complicated the overall course of Indo-American relations since the late 1960's. The difference created a number of political dilemmas for both the countries, and it adversely affected the overall relation between the two nations. The difference became magnified as a result of India's unexpected explosion of a nuclear device in May 1974, the US reactions to this momentous event, and the controversies that soon developed over the nuclear intention and policies of both countries. It was in August 1972 itself when Mrs. Gandhi had made her intentions obvious to carry out underground nuclear explosion for economic advancement of the country. Finally the long cherished dream of India came true when she successfully exploded her first nuclear device on May 18, 1974 at about 08.05 A.M. at Pokhran in the Thar Desert of Rajasthan. Thus followed by the test India emerged as the sixth nation to conduct such a test.⁵³⁹

The Government of India in its official announcement on the test made it clear that it had “no intention of nuclear weapons”. While speaking to media, Gandhi reiterated, the Government's strong opposition to military uses of nuclear devices. She made it clear that India's “nuclear programme was designed for peaceful uses”. The Indian Atomic Energy Commission declared: “It was part of the programme to keep India abreast of developments in underground explosions technology, particularly with reference to its use in the field of

⁵³⁹ History Channel, 1974 India Joins the Nuclear Club <http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/india-joins-the-nuclear-club>

mining and earth moving operations”⁵⁴⁰. Foreign Minister, Swaran Singh issued a statement on India’s peaceful nuclear explosion to the Press on May 21, 1974, ‘...represents a step forward on the road to peaceful uses of nuclear energy for the welfare of our people. I would like to congratulate our scientists and others who have made it possible for this achievement by our country. This experiment is an important land-mark in the development of nuclear technology for peaceful and economic uses. We have no intention of developing nuclear weapons.’⁵⁴¹ Dr. H.N. Sethna, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission stated that it was a peaceful nuclear test and a part of the overall research and development experiment to utilize nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Dr. H.N. Sethna emphasized was to utilize the blasting technique for extracting gas and oil from the depleted fields by the stimulation method. The object of the experiment was in fact to study crater mechanics, rock dynamics and to understand how these could be used to construct dams and canals. It would be the Atomic Energy Commission efforts to overcome the conventional methods so that expenses would be curtailed while deploying the new technique.⁵⁴²

The Pokhran test carried out by the Indian Atomic Energy Commission by and large evoked predictable repercussion and reverberated around the world that it was contrary to the norms of non-alignment and thus it would pose a threat to the neighboring countries. Moscow published without embellishment the official statement issued by the Indian Atomic Energy Department. The Soviet news agency, Tass commented: “String to keep at the level of world technology in the peaceful uses of nuclear explosions, the Indian Government carried out a research programme. The results of these investigations may be used in mining and earth moving jobs.”⁵⁴³ The official statement in Washington said: “The United States has always been against nuclear proliferation for the adverse impact it will have on world stability. That remains our position”.⁵⁴⁴ Japan protested against India’s underground nuclear test, but hoped

⁵⁴⁰Desai A. Balwant;(eds.); *Atoms for Peace-An exposition of India’s Nuclear Policy*; (AICC Publication; New Delhi; 1975); pp44

⁵⁴¹ Jain, J.P; *Nuclear India*; Vol-II (Radiant Publishers; New Delhi;1974); pp 339

⁵⁴² Kaul, Ravi; *India’s Nuclear Spin off*; (Chanaya Publishing House; Allahabad; 1974); pp21

⁵⁴³ *Indian Express* (New Delhi) 20 May; 1947 quoted in Rahamtullah B. *Indo-American Politics 1970-78*; (Surjet Publications; New Delhi; 1980) pp57

⁵⁴⁴ *Washington Post*; 19 May; 1974; quoted in Rahamtullah B. *Indo-American Politics 1970-78*; (Surjet Publications; New Delhi; 1980) pp57

it would not disrupt the peace in the sub-continent. “The Government can only express regret (for the test) because we have been and are still, against any nuclear test by any nation for any reason.”⁵⁴⁵ Since the French Government had adopted the policy of building up a nuclear arsenal in defiance of world opinion, she did not hesitate to congratulate the nuclear scientists of India. The Chinese did not comment on the explosion. Britain approved the Indian contention of using nuclear energy for civil purposes.⁵⁴⁶ Indeed most of the non-aligned countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America hailed the nuclear blast as ‘a major triumph’ to India.⁵⁴⁷

However, Pakistan Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had held out a solemn pledge to his countrymen that he would never allow Pakistan to become a victim of nuclear blackmail and declared that Pakistan would never surrender its rights just only because of India’s nuclear status and would not be deflected from its policies by this fateful development. He declared publicly that the people of Pakistan would be ready to offer any sacrifices and even eat grass to ensure nuclear parity with India.⁵⁴⁸ The Canadian Government also sharply reacted and suspended its nuclear aid to India on May 22, 1974 on the ground that India exploded her nuclear blast in contravention to the agreement signed between the two countries. The Canadian External Affairs Minister, Mitchell W Sharp said that the Government would review the aid programmes “to be sure that our priorities are the same as the Indians.” He further declared that Canada was seeking assistance from other Governments for joint consideration of “the broad international implications of the explosion”. Sharp said “What concerns us about this matter is that the Indians, notwithstanding their great economic difficulties should have devoted tens or hundreds of millions of dollars to the creation of a

⁵⁴⁵ *Mainichi Daily News (Tokyo)*; 20 May; 1974; quoted in Rahamtullah B. *Indo-American Politics 1970-78*; (Surjet Publications; New Delhi; 1980) pp57

⁵⁴⁶ In Karachi’s News Paper *Morning News*, on 20 May, 1974 Bhutto declared that “This would be disastrous for our national determination to maintain the fullness of our independence. Let me make it clear that we are determined not to be intimidated by this threat. I give solemn pledge to my countrymen that we will never lead Pakistan a victim of nuclear blackmail.”

⁵⁴⁷ *Times of India (New Delhi)* 20 May 1974 as quoted in Rahamtullah B. *Indo-American Politics 1970-78*; (Surjet Publications; New Delhi; 1980) pp57

⁵⁴⁸ Rahamtullah B. *Indo-American Politics 1970-78*; (Surjet Publications; New Delhi; 1980) pp57

nuclear device for a nuclear explosion”. The aid suspension affected all shipment of nuclear equipment as well as technological information.⁵⁴⁹

Both the American officials and press were outraged by the Pokhran experiment and reacted rather angrily to the so-called nuclear proliferation and they condemned India for its over ambitious and audacious move. They regarded it as “moral and political sins”, “national hypocrisy” and “callous endangerment of humanity”. The United States, Defense Secretary, Schlesinger threatened to withdraw its country’s commitment to protect India with nuclear weapons if India enters into the nuclear era.⁵⁵⁰ Senator Edward Kennedy, however, supported India’s action and held the Super Powers responsible for it. He charged: “The real failure to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons rests not with India, but with United States, with the Soviet Union, with France, with China and with Britain. Although France and China have declined to accede to the partial test ban treaty, the United States and the Soviet Union bear the major responsibility for our failure to conclude a comprehensive test ban treaty. Although we have endorsed, encouraged and proselytized on behalf of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, we have refused to take the basic steps that could have dissuaded India from its action.”⁵⁵¹ Kissinger’s reaction to the Indian explosion was however a mild one where he remonstrated indirectly: “I do not believe that the Indian nuclear explosion changes the balance of power, though if India had asked our advice we would probably had not recommended it. But we do not believe it changes the balance of power, since its resources will be relatively limited. Nevertheless, we are opposed to proliferation.”⁵⁵²

The news that India exploded an atomic bomb, however, did not come as a great surprise to American nuclear experts. Nevertheless, they were dismayed by it out of the apprehension that other nations might follow India’s steps. “I am very discouraged that they joined the club”, said Dr. Theodore B. Taylor, a onetime designer of nuclear weapons at the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory. “Peaceful or not, whatever they want to call their reason for

⁵⁴⁹ *Facts on Files*; Volume-34; No: 1751; 1 June; 1974; pp 432 quoted in Rahamtullah B. *Indo-American Politics 1970-78*; (Surjet Publications; New Delhi; 1980) pp 58

⁵⁵⁰ Kaul, Ravi; *India’s Nuclear Spin off*; (Chanaya Publishing House; Allahabad; 1974); pp 40

⁵⁵¹ *Congressional Record*, 93rd Congress; 2ND Session; Vol 12; Part 12 (May 20-28; 1974); pp 16020; as quoted in Rahamtullah B. *Indo-American Politics 1970-78*; (Surjet Publications; New Delhi; 1980) pp 70

⁵⁵² *Department of State Bulletin*; Vol LXX; No- 1826; June 24; 1974; pp 708

blowing up a bomb, it still means they now have nuclear weapons.”⁵⁵³ The US officials were of the view that the development of India’s nuclear capacity could disrupt Indo-US relations at a time when they are beginning to improve. They felt that questions would be raised in Congress about giving New Delhi economic aid. As, one of the officials said: “I do not see how this is going to grow more rice, which is what the Indians need.”⁵⁵⁴ While speaking in the House of Representatives on May 22, 1974, Gross questioned Mrs. Gandhi’s Government for having ventured such a costly project when 75% of India’s children are suffering from malnutrition. He pleaded with the Congress to suspend the aid to Indian Government whose priority is to manufacture nuclear weapons.⁵⁵⁵

The press reaction and resentment to Indian nuclear explosion, however, followed the lines of the State Department and the White House. The Los Angeles Times commented, “Often running only a borrowed bushel ahead of famine, torn by political and labor dissent in large measure the result of unrealized expectations and despite of all this, deciding to go ahead with a massive deployment of scarce resources to join the exclusive circle of nuclear nations. And if the leaders of India feel this way what then will be the force of their example on the labor of Israel, or Brazil or Japan?”⁵⁵⁶ The Boston Herald American, while blaming Mrs. Gandhi’s Government, expressed its pessimistic view about the future industrialization of India even if she masters nuclear energy.⁵⁵⁷ The Washington Post cartoonist, Herblock drew a cartoon depicting India as the “Fakir” clad in nothing but a loin cloth with a beggar’s bowl and a puffing at a mushroom - cloud producing cigar and leaning on the chair of a wealthy

⁵⁵³ *Washington Post*; 19 May, 1974; quoted in Rahamtullah B. *Indo-American Politics 1970-78*; (Surjet Publications; New Delhi; 1980) pp 70

⁵⁵⁴ *Washington Post*; 19 May, 1974; quoted in Rahamtullah B. *Indo-American Politics 1970-78*; (Surjet Publications; New Delhi; 1980) pp 70

⁵⁵⁵ Congressional Record; No 54; pp 16108; quoted in Rahamtullah B. *Indo-American Politics 1970-78*; (Surjet Publications; New Delhi; 1980) pp 71

⁵⁵⁶ *Los Angeles Times*; California; May 21, 1974; quoted in Rahamtullah B. *Indo-American Politics 1970-78*; (Surjet Publications; New Delhi; 1980) pp 71

⁵⁵⁷ *Boston Herald American*; May 22; 1974; quoted in Rahamtullah B. *Indo-American Politics 1970-78*; (Surjet Publications; New Delhi; 1980) pp 71

looking person in western dress and remarking : “Surely you would not let a fellow club member down”.⁵⁵⁸

Mrs. Gandhi’s explanation that the manufacturing of nuclear weapons was meant to test the utility of such power for building dams or oil exploration could not convince either the American officials or other western nations. Inevitably, this led to a set-back in Indo-American relations for some time and India had to dispense with, for the time being, the US aid.⁵⁵⁹ The Central Treaty Organization at the end of the two day Ministerial Conference in Washington in a statement on May 22, 1974 took note of India’s nuclear test and expressed opposition to nuclear proliferation. The United States Senate decided by a voice vote to prohibit military aid or US grant or sales of equipment to India except for military training purposes.⁵⁶⁰ The Senate Committee also suspended the US economic aid, military assistance and sales credit to India to a combined total of 850 million, 825.6 million less than proposed by the Administration.⁵⁶¹ The officials of the United States Atomic Energy Commission also suspended on September 7, 1974 the delivery of enriched uranium fuel to India until New Delhi pledged not to use the atomic fuel in any nuclear explosion.⁵⁶² The Ford-Tanaka Accord on nuclear safeguards and the United States resolution to support the idea of nuclear free-zone in the West Asia, South Asia and elsewhere in the world was, in fact, an indirect outcome and reaction to the Indian nuclear explosion.⁵⁶³ The United States started paying more attention to nuclear safeguards particularly in Asia after the Indian nuclear blast. This

⁵⁵⁸ *Boston Herald American*; May 22; 1974; quoted in Rahamtullah B. *Indo-American Politics 1970-78*; (Surjet Publications; New Delhi; 1980) pp 71

⁵⁵⁹ Bhatia, Krishna; *Annoyance Over Nuclear Blast*; The Hindustan Times; New Delhi; June 1; 1974; quoted in Rahamtullah B. *Indo-American Politics 1970-78*; (Surjet Publications; New Delhi; 1980) pp 70

⁵⁶⁰ *Congressional Quarterly; Almanac*; 93rd Congress; 2nd Seession; 1974; Vol XX; (Washington D.C.); pp 538

⁵⁶¹ *Congressional Quarterly; Almanac*; 93rd Congress; 2nd Seession; 1974; Vol XX; (Washington D.C.); pp 538

⁵⁶² *Facts on Files*; Volume-34; No: 1771; 19 October; 1974; pp 847 quoted in Rahamtullah B. *Indo-American Politics 1970-78*; (Surjet Publications; New Delhi; 1980) pp 73

⁵⁶³ Rahamtullah B. *Indo-American Politics 1970-78*; (Surjet Publications; New Delhi; 1980) pp 74

was, however, contrary to the United States initial preaching's sometime in 1950s, when she had favored the use of small scale nuclear weapons.

However despite such harsh criticism from every quarter of the world leaders Mrs. Gandhi unequivocally stated and assured all the nations that India's intention was to utilize nuclear technology for economic advancement of the country. She even sent a letter to Pakistan Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto on May 22, 1974 in which she said to have reaffirmed India's commitment to peace agreements with Pakistan and to have denied that India had any intention to dominate or exercise any hegemony over other sub-continent countries.⁵⁶⁴ Pakistan allegations of radio-activity in the explosion were repudiated by Dr. Raja Ramanna, Director of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, Bombay. Dr. H.N. Sethna pointed out that India was the first country to explode an atomic device underground. "We did so because", he declared: "We did not want to add to radio-activity in the atmosphere".⁵⁶⁵ Mrs. Gandhi in a Danish Television interview confirmed: "We are against atmospheric tests and we have signed the treaty and because we genuinely believe that, that is not good for the world, for the environment, we wanted till we could have a more contained underground explosion And, I am glad that there was no increase of radio-activity seen by our scientists, who went to the spot almost immediately afterwards. Here again I would like to clear another misapprehension because I have seen a report in a foreign paper that radio-activity was felt or detected in another country. Now this is entirely false. As a matter of fact, the wind that day was in the opposite direction. We waited for the wind to blow eastwards."⁵⁶⁶ India's peaceful nuclear explosion hit the head-lines of all leading newspapers in the world. There was in fact, great jubilation at home; the event was failed as a great land mark in India's nuclear history. The Hindustan Times saw it as "a tremendous morale booster to the people" and felt it had enhanced "the Government's sagging prestige both at home and abroad."⁵⁶⁷ However, nuclear India created as much of misunderstanding as non-aligned India had. The nuclear

⁵⁶⁴ *Facts on Files*; Volume-34; No: 1751; 1 June; 1974; pp 432 quoted in Rahamtullah B. *Indo-American Politics 1970-78*; (Surjet Publications; New Delhi; 1980) pp 58

⁵⁶⁵ Subramaniaum, K; *The Indian Nuclear Test in Global Perspective*; (Indian International Center; New Delhi; 1974); pp 18-22

⁵⁶⁶ Desai A. Balwant;(eds.); *Atoms for Peace-An exposition of India's Nuclear Policy*; (AICC Publication; New Delhi; 1975); pp 37

⁵⁶⁷ *Hindustan Times*; New Delhi; 19 May; 1974; as quoted in Rahamtullah B. *Indo-American Politics 1970-78*; (Surjet Publications; New Delhi; 1980) pp59

India posed a challenge to the five monopolistic and privileged nuclear nations who disapproved India's completion to a status of equality with them in a multibillion dollar world of nuclear market.⁵⁶⁸ While giving a statement in both the Houses of Parliament on July 12, 1974 on India's nuclear explosion the then Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi expressed India's genuine desire to utilize nuclear energy for constructive purposes. She reiterated: "This experiment was part of the research and development work which the Atomic Energy Commission has been carrying on in pursuance of our national objective of harnessing atomic energy for peaceful purposes." She made clear to the Members of Parliament that the materials, equipment and the personnel used in the project were totally Indian. Nor India had conducted the experiment in contravention to any International Law or obligation or any commitment with any country. She regretted the western reaction to nuclear experiment. However, she welcomed the developing countries' favorable response because they accepted Indian nuclear device as a 'step in the research and developmental work', Mrs. Gandhi refuted Pakistani allegations of 'nuclear blackmail' and assured Pakistan that nuclear device was absolutely free from radio-activity.⁵⁶⁹ Mrs. Gandhi felt that it was unreasonable to criticize India as she never had an intention of using nuclear technology for military purposes. She declared: No technology is evil in itself; it is the use that nations make of technology which determines its character. India does not accept the principle of apartheid in any matter and technology is no exception.⁵⁷⁰ Initiating the discussion in the Lok Sabha, Samar Guha (PSP) described 18 May, 1974 as a 'Red Letter Day' in the history of our scientific and technological development. He was of the view that the atomic test created a sense of respectability to the Indians of the western countries and explained to the Members in the House that: "Many of the countries in the world firstly do not want us to get into the world of scientific and technological development after having affirmed self-confidence and mastering nuclear engineering technology."⁵⁷¹

(4.10) Indo-US Relations post Nuke Test:

⁵⁶⁸ Jain, J.P; *Nuclear India*; Vol-II (Radiant Publishers; New Delhi;1974); pp 137

⁵⁶⁹ *Lok Sabha Debates*; Vol. XLI; No- 1; July 22; 1974; Cols. 264-69 also see *Statement by Prime Minister on the Underground Nuclear Explosion Experiment; Parliamentary Debates; Rajya Sabha Official Report*; Vol- LXXXIX; No-1; 22 July; 1974; cols-185-189

⁵⁷⁰ *Rajya Sabha Official Report*; Vol- LXXXIX; No-1; 22 July; 1974; cols-269

⁵⁷¹ *Lok Sabha Debates*; Vol. XLII; No- 14; August 8; 1974; Cols. 202

The United States had promised to supply uranium fuel to the Tarapur Atomic Power Plant for over 30 years in accordance with the agreement signed between the two countries. The atomic power plant near Bombay was built with the American assistance in 1963.⁵⁷² The United States officials had suspended the delivery of uranium fuel to India in the wake of her nuclear blast in May, 1974. However, at meeting in Washington between Indian Ambassador, Kewal Singh and the Secretary of State, Kissinger on August 2, 1974 it was decided in principle that the Indo American Atomic Agreement of 1963 for the supply of enriched uranium 235 fuel elements for the Tarapur Atomic Power Plant should be specifically modified. It was decided that the supply of uranium fuel would be only for power generation at this particular plant and not elsewhere for any other purpose without prior US approval.⁵⁷³

The issue was again discussed in September 1974 by the US Atomic Energy Commission Chairman, Dixie Lee Ray and Dr. H.N. Sethna, Chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission during the Annual Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. Dr. H.N Sethna assured the US AEC Chairman that India would utilize the enriched uranium fuel exclusively for power generation purpose at Tarapur Atomic Power Plant. Dr. Ray and State Department official in Washington denied a report that the United States had stopped delivery of uranium fuel to India-pending clarification of nuclear policy by India.⁵⁷⁴ The United States officially notified on September 16, 1974 that it would maintain uninterrupted supply of uranium fuel in India.⁵⁷⁵

In March 1976, however, three private domestic groups which had the support of Congressmen filed a petition before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission of the US Congress demanding that the supply of nuclear fuel to India should be suspended or stopped because they were skeptic of India's intention of using uranium for peaceful purposes.⁵⁷⁶

⁵⁷² Khan ; Yar Anwar; *India: The Next Super Power*; On Looker (Bombay); Vol XXXVII; No 06; June 1974; pp 12

⁵⁷³*Times of India* (New Delhi) 3 August; 1974 as quoted in Rahamtullah B. *Indo-American Politics 1970-78*; (Surjet Publications; New Delhi; 1980) pp 75

⁵⁷⁴*New York Times*; September 9; 1974; quoted in Rahamtullah B. *Indo-American Politics 1970-78*; (Surjet Publications; New Delhi; 1980) pp 75

⁵⁷⁵*Facts on Files*; Volume-34; No: 1751; 1 June; 1974; pp 847 quoted in Rahamtullah B. *Indo-American Politics 1970-78*; (Surjet Publications; New Delhi; 1980) pp 75

⁵⁷⁶*New York Times*; April 3; 1976; quoted in Rahamtullah B. *Indo-American Politics 1970-78*; (Surjet Publications; New Delhi; 1980) pp 75

Nevertheless, the Union Deputy External Affairs Minister, Bipin Pal Das expressed optimism in the Rajya Sabha on April 2, over the United States intention to fulfill its 1963 contractual agreement despite the controversy over US supplied enriched uranium to Tarapur Atomic Plant.⁵⁷⁷

The US continued to be suspicious of India's nuclear advances more particularly till the present Janata Government in India clearly declared its nuclear non-proliferation policy. Prime Minister Morarji Desai categorically stated that India would not manufacture nuclear weapons for defense although China possessed them and Pakistan was frantically trying to get the same. He outlined for the first time Janata Government's nuclear policy at a Press Conference in New Delhi on May 16, 1977. In an unequivocal rejection of nuclear weapons, Morarji Desai said, "Such weapons were no good for defense; they were meant only for destruction. To defend itself, the country needs conventional weaponry, 'conventional army' and 'courage of the people'. Since nuclear weapons would only destroy the world, they should be removed from the earth. If we go on saying to everybody that such weapons are bad, should be take to them?" Prime Minister Morarji Desai in the same Press Conference went on to add that India would not sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty unless all those who have atomic weapons give them up.⁵⁷⁸

The Carter Administration after having examined Prime Minister Morarji Desai's statement decided to supply uranium to meet several months' needs of the Tarapur Plant on the condition that the two countries start broad talks on their future nuclear relations. Joseph Nye, State Department's Senior Nuclear Expert told the Senate Foreign Relations sub-Committee that the United States is prepared to negotiate with India a wide variety of objectives in the non-proliferation field.⁵⁷⁹

These statements of the Prime Minister and the External Affairs Minister gave an added impetus to the US to supply enriched uranium fuel for the Tarapur Atomic Power Plant.

⁵⁷⁷*New York Times*; April 3; 1976; quoted in Rahamtullah B. *Indo-American Politics 1970-78*; (Surjet Publications; New Delhi; 1980) pp 75

⁵⁷⁸*Times of India* (New Delhi) 17 May; 1977 as quoted in Rahamtullah B. *Indo-American Politics 1970-78*; (Surjet Publications; New Delhi; 1980) pp 76

⁵⁷⁹*Indian Express* (New Delhi); May 27, 1977; as quoted in Rahamtullah B. *Indo-American Politics 1970-78*; (Surjet Publications; New Delhi; 1980) pp 76

Prime Minister Morarji Desai declared in the Lok Sabha on July 13, 1977 that the license for 12tonnes of enriched uranium for the Tarapur Atomic Power Station had been cleared on June 29, 1977 by the US Administration and the consignment was shortly expected. During the debate on the US supply of uranium in the Lok Sabha, Morarji Desai informed Jyotirmoy Basu (CPIM), G.M. Banatwala (ML), C.K. Chandrappan (CPI) and others that : “The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission had directed the issuance of the pending export license DSNM-845, authorizing the shipment of enriched uranium fuel for the Tarapur Atomic Station. There is no precondition as such but there is an understanding that discussion would be held between US and India on the larger questions of nuclear proliferation.”⁵⁸⁰

During the initial stages, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission had blocked the shipment of uranium fuel to India on the ground that its proliferation would affect the environment adversely and at the same time it would encourage other nations to follow India’s course. But the State Department made a strong appeal to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission that the export license for the shipment of the second installment of enriched uranium to India for the Tarapur Atomic Power Plant should be allowed without any pre-conditions. The NRC ultimately agreed to issue export license for shipment of enriched uranium to India. In the course of time, Victor Gilinsky, the US Commissioner of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission had spelt out the conditions under which future shipments of nuclear fuel to India’s Tarapur Plant should be made. While approving the shipment Gilinsky said: “The Indian Government understands that permission to extract plutonium from the Tarapur spent fuel will not be forthcoming. It is further my understanding that the State Department has informed the Indian Government that it will recommend against further shipment of fuel should India explode another nuclear device.” He further said that serious problems remained and “there is little reason to be sanguine about the licensing action” because India continues to maintain in its claim for fuel that there is a difference between a “peaceful” nuclear device and a nuclear weapon.”⁵⁸¹

⁵⁸⁰*The Hindustan Times*; (New Delhi); July 14; 1977 as quoted in Rahamtullah B. *Indo-American Politics 1970-78*; (Surjet Publications; New Delhi; 1980) pp 76

⁵⁸¹Stan Benjamin "NRC Refuses to Approve Nuclear Shipments; Issue Goes to Carter," Associated Press, 16 May 1980, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "NRC Refuses to Approve Nuclear Shipments," Associated Press, 17 May 1980; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 17 May 1980, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Congressional Fight Seen If Carter Approves India Fuel Exports," *Nucleonics Week*, Vol. 21 No. 21, 22 May 1980, pp. 1-2.

Meanwhile Jimmy Carter in his first address after sworn-in-ceremony as President of the United States on January 20, 1977 assured that he would move for the elimination of all nuclear weapons. He said: “We pledge wisdom in our efforts to limit the world’s armaments to those necessary for each nation’s own domestic safety. We still move this year a step towards our ultimate goal - the elimination of all nuclear weapons from the earth.”⁵⁸² Thus it appears President Jimmy Carter sincerely believes in pursuance of anti-proliferation policy all over the world. He insists on banning the sale of the reprocessing and enrichment plants which might be used to provide material for nuclear weapons.

The American nuclear experts and intelligentsia are well aware of the nuclear capability of India and it is also known to them that it is beyond the means of India to attain nuclear parity with the United States in the near future, yet, the US public and press got alarmed and lashed out at the trifle Indian blast. This in fact had an adverse impact on Indo-American relations. However, Prime Minister Morarji Desai’s recent repeated utterance that India does not believe in the manufacturing of nuclear weapons has appreciated by the US Administration. There is great similarity of views between Prime Minister Morarji Desai and President Jimmy Carter on anti-proliferation policy both at home and elsewhere in the world. The emphasis on the use of nuclear energy exclusively for civil purposes may help other nations take a direction and discourage the manufacturing of nuclear weapons. The grounds on which India objected to signed the Non Proliferation Treaty were: firstly: the treaty did not guarantee the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons but rather it only prevented the spreading of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapon States without daunting any stringent actions on the manufactures, stockpiling and sophisticating nuclear weapon by the existing nuclear weapon states; secondly: The treaty was lopsided as it gave special superior status of power and prestige to those nations who possessed nuclear weapons; thirdly the treaty lacked in balancing properly the obligation and responsibility which needs to be shared between the nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states; fourthly the treaty lacks concrete and systemic steps needed to proceed towards global nuclear disarmament; fifthly the treaty strangely provides provision of assistance in form of technical aid and advice to a nonnuclear state from a nuclear state; sixthly Article X of the treaty endorse to legitimize an unrestricted vertical proliferation among the nuclear empower states; seventhly Article VI of the treaty fails to

⁵⁸²*International Herald Tribune* (Paris); January 21; 1977 as quoted in Rahamtullah B. *Indo-American Politics 1970-78*; (Surjet Publications; New Delhi; 1980) pp 79

generate any judicial obligation with regards to the termination of nuclear arms race; eighthly the treaty conveys a fake sense of security to the world; ninthly it extremely discriminatory with regard to the peaceful use of nuclear power through explosion; tenthly the treaty is highly prejudiced with regard to the safeguards and controls that are imposed on the non-nuclear-weapon states while on the other hand none such safeguards were obligatory on the nuclear weapon states; lastly India believe that the guarantee of security to the non nuclear states could not be a quid pro quo for the acceptance of a treaty. Rather this need to be a mandatory guideline even for a nuclear state.⁵⁸³ India's participation in discussions to the Non Proliferation Treaty had led the inclusion of Article VI in the NPT which talks of the complete nuclear disarmament. Thus, finally the Indian Parliament vetoed Indian signature of the recently completed Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty⁵⁸⁴ and since from then India's stand on the nonproliferation remains the same.

(4.11) Carter, Reagan, Rajiv and the Bonhomie:

Indo-US relationship till the mid- of 1970's was mainly a relationship which Denis Kux has called as relationship of estranged democracies. However this estranged relationship might be but the seed of the Indo-US defense ties were sown in the midst of the Cold War period itself. This relationship got further strengthen by the beginning of the change that was seen with the emergence of Carter's Administration. During the initial years Carter's administration, President Carter was apparently pleased by the Janata Government's foreign policy. As Prime Minister Morarji Desai and his Foreign Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee vowed to practice 'genuine non-alignment', the leadership in the two countries got along quite well. The climate of Indo-US relationship appeared bright and positive, despite Morarji's refusal to come under Washington's pressure particularly on the issue of the fuel supply to Tarapur. However in 1979 when the Soviet intervention took place in Afghanistan, the relationship between the two received a thaw when President Carter's policy to encourage India for condemning the Soviet attack in Afghanistan went in vain. In the 1980's things were turning out a bright when an Indian team visited the United States in 1980's to explore possibility of buying TOW anti-tank missiles and long-range howitzers. The Carter administration not only

⁵⁸³ Subrahmanyam, K. (1974), "Indian Attitudes towards the NPT" in Frank Barnaby (ed.) Nuclear Proliferation Problems, (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) pp 249-260

⁵⁸⁴ George Perkovich, *India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press) pp 125

gave a positive response to the demands but even it moved a step further by also reversed its earlier policy of disapproving the use of and advanced American electronic guidance system in India's Jaguar aircraft.⁵⁸⁵ Similarly in the nuclear field too, while waving the Symington Amendment in the case of Pakistan, President Carter approved two more enriched uranium fuel shipments to Tarapur in the face of stiff domestic opposition. These landmark developments in the relationship of the two nations somewhere proved the fact that as if President Carter was seeking to balance his policies towards India and Pakistan, in the wake of the Afghanistan crisis.

Ronald Reagan who succeeded President Carter also adopted a somewhat similar approach towards India, though the emphasis was different. President Reagan's goal was to wean out India away from the Soviet Union. Even as the Cold war ravaged Afghanistan, the US policy maker during the Reagan administration began to think in terms of forging defense and security ties with India. In the midst of unprecedented arming of Pakistan and overlooking Islamabad quest for a nuclear weapon capability, the Reagan administration adopted certain policies that characterised that non containment of India but its engagement that would make India more self-reliant and would move away from the Soviet Union. The comeback of Indira in power in India, had a belief that the relation between the nations would receive a back forth but when the two head of states met at the Cancun Summit in Mexico for the creation of a new international economic order in October 1981, the 'personal chemistry' between the two leaders were remarkably positive in terms.⁵⁸⁶ As New Delhi was seeking to diversify its sources of military acquisition, scientific and technological cooperating and trade and investment destinations, improvement of the relations with US was considered to be important. Indira Gandhi with all these objectives, in the year 1982 thus visited to United States. This was one of the most important developments between the relations of the, as for the first time in the last eleven years the India went ahead for an official bilateral trip in United States. Among many other things she launched an initiative on scientific and technological cooperation with the United States. As a result to her initiatives, 'for the first time in many years the possibility of transfer of high technology, including military, from US

⁵⁸⁵New York Times; February 2; 1980; as quoted in Mahapatra, Chinatamani; *Indo-US Relations into the 21st Century*; (IDSA; New Delhi; 1998); pp 99

⁵⁸⁶Cannon Lou; *President Reagan: The Role of Life Time* (New York, London; Simon and Shuster 1991) pp 468

to India was discussed seriously.⁵⁸⁷ The famous MoU on transfer of technology which came in force in 1985 was actually signed in this trip was made in the backdrop of strengthening the friendly ties between the two nations.

When Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in Moscow and President Reagan got re-elected for the second time there were few major international political events that changed world politics entirely. The policy of Glasnost and Perestroika adopted by Gorbachev, made way for an unprecedented détente between the US and USSR. However this did not lead to any major change in the Reagan administration's thinking on India. The disintegration of the Soviet Union was not even in the realm of dreams at that time; Washington continued to follow a policy of improving relationship and defense ties with India. Since 1985 mid and high level policy makers in Reagan administration began to use the term 'opening' to India.⁵⁸⁸ Infact, the Reagan Administration officials considered the emergence of young leadership in the Indian policy as a positive development from the American perspective. According to Reagan's foreign policy advisor's Rajiv's concept of 21st century India and his ideas of bringing about a technological revolution in Indian society would induce India to look at the United States for friendship and close cooperation. The Reagan administration aspired to take advantage of it and sought to build defense and friendly ties with India. Thus when Rajiv himself endeavored to repair the political damage between the two nations, the Reagan administration officials reciprocated Rajiv's gesture and sought to transfer certain high technology items to India by implementing the MoU on transfer of technology. It was in October 1984 that the National Security Decision Directives 147 (NSDD-147) of the Reagan administration was called for establishment of closer US-Indian relations by accommodation New Delhi's request for high technology items with framework of US export control regime. In the period from 1984-1988 there was almost a five-fold increase in the US Government approvals of civilian technology export to India.⁵⁸⁹ In October 1986, Us Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger visited India and discussed the supply of defense related technology,

⁵⁸⁷ Malhotra Inder *Indira Gandhi: A Personal and Political Biography*; (London; Hooder and Stoughton; 1989) pp 264

⁵⁸⁸ Cohen, Stephan Phillips; *The Regan Administration and India*; in Harold Gould and Sumit Ganguly eds' *The Hope and the Reality: US-Indian Relations from Rousevelt to Regan*; (Boulder: Westview Press; 1992) pp 141

⁵⁸⁹ Chellaney, Brahma; *Nuclear Proliferation: The US Indian Conflict*; (New Delhi, Orient Longman; 1993) pp 202

including engines and equipments for the Light Combat Aircraft project and advanced electronic systems. Weinberger came to discuss this issue despite the continuing reservations in certain circles of Pentagon but despite the fact India at that time received better terms on high technology trade than China and Pakistan, especially in areas of Computer and Jet Engines.⁵⁹⁰ Around this time, the US also refrained from making any unfriendly remarks on the Indian Peace-Keeping Forces (IPKF) operations in Sri Lanka and the role of the Indian Navy in the Maldives, despite Pakistan's intense propaganda against India. For the first time in so many years India and United States very close to each other in every field. However the domestic turmoil in India and Rajiv's preoccupation with the worsening domestic economic situation, regional crisis and unprecedented political development along with Pakistan's continued hurdles created a thaw and paws in the relations between the two.

(4.12) CTBT, Pokhran—II & US's Sanctions:

So divergent were the security perception of Indian and the United States during the first forty-five years of the post World War II period that there was no meeting of mind between them on most key international security issues. The security and defense relationship between India and America during all these years was aptly characterized by Selig Harrison, a US Specialist on South Asian Affairs, as 'dialogue between the deaf.'⁵⁹¹

In the course of time the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) came up as a new shield to the issue of nuclear proliferation on September 24, 1996. Seventy-one states were its signatories which includes five out of eight nuclear empowered nations. The main essence of the treaty was: firstly that the signatories will remain abstain from carrying out any form of nuclear test or explosion and will also prevent any such tests and explosion to happen under its jurisdiction; secondly each signatories will desist itself and encourage others in participating or carrying out and nuclear test or explosion. Meanwhile in the course of negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament on CTBT in Geneva, Indian representative participated actively and put forwarded its long-standing proposals constructively to the

⁵⁹⁰Cohen, Stephan Phillips; *The Regan Administration and India*; in Harold Gould and Sumit Ganguly eds' *The Hope and the Reality: US-Indian Relations from Rousevelt to Regan*; (Boulder: Westview Press; 1992) pp 141

⁵⁹¹ Harrison, Selig S. *Dialogue of the Deaf: Mutual Perceptions and Indo-American Relations*; in S.R. Glazer and Nathan Glazer (eds) "Conflicting Images" (Riverdale, 1990); cited in Selig S Harrison and Geoffrey Kemp, *India and America after the Cold War*; (Washington DC., 1990)

forum. When the discussions began India positively hold the position, that, the nuclear weapon states (NWSs) were ready to take such a first step on the road to nuclear disarmament but afterwards India realized that “NWSs show no interest in giving up their nuclear hegemony.”⁵⁹² Finally the negotiation ended up without a consensus decision as it was blamed to have a discriminatory text and it failed to satisfy the ambitions for creating a nuclear weapon free world.⁵⁹³ As Desai points out “With a declared NWS to our north, another undeclared NWS to our west and vessels carrying nuclear weapons sailing in the Indian Ocean, India cannot afford to give up her nuclear option or accept any restraint on it unless there is genuine acceptance of the goal of nuclear disarmament.”⁵⁹⁴

India aspired CTBT as a tool for the complete elimination and disarmament of all form of nuclear weapon globally but it failed to quench its desire. Although India did not signed the CTBT but it has always vowed for a nuclear weapon free world order. Thus, India’s stand is quite distinct from the U.S. principle of “Nuclear proliferation is inevitable; at best it can be managed, not prevented.”⁵⁹⁵ However before analyzing and interpreting the credibility of the CTBT it would be sensible to have a look on the development of India’s Indigenous nuclear programme.

On May 11 1998, India conducted three underground nuclear tests at Pokhran. A couple of days later, on May 13, India conducted two more nuclear tests a low yield fission device and a thermonuclear device. Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee announcing the successful conduct of the N-tests said at a Press Conference in the capital that twenty-four year after its first and only “peaceful nuclear explosion”, India had moved decisively towards exercising the nuclear option by conducting three underground tests including that of a thermonuclear device. The then Vajpayee Government officially justified the action in the light of the “dangerous nuclear environment” and claimed that the people of India now has a “credible

⁵⁹² Desai, Jatin (2000), *Nuclear Diplomacy: The Art of the Deal*, (New Delhi, Commonwealth pub.) pp 157

⁵⁹³ Desai, Jatin (2000), *Nuclear Diplomacy: The Art of the Deal*, (New Delhi, Commonwealth pub.) pp 157

⁵⁹⁴ Desai, Jatin (2000), *Nuclear Diplomacy: The Art of the Deal*, (New Delhi, Commonwealth pub.) pp 161

⁵⁹⁵ Potter William C., (2005), “*India and the New Look of US Nonproliferation Policy*”, (Nonproliferation Review, 12 (2) pp 343

nuclear deterrent” and went on to offer the world, particularly the United States an olive branch by offering to consider “being an adherent to some of the undertakings in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.”⁵⁹⁶ Supplementing to this view Brajesh Mishra, the then Prime Minister’s Special Secretary claimed that the tests established that India now had a proven capacity for a weaponised nuclear programme and said they “also provide a valuable database useful in the design of nuclear weapons of different yields for different applications and for different delivery systems.” Mishra however pointed it out that these test were not directed at the US, as he believed that; “the US would like to secure its interests, so would the people of India. I hope the US understands our security concerns” While the government had taken into account the possibility of economic sanctions, he was optimistic that none would be imposed. Mishra stoutly denied suggestions that the Indian action was part of any ‘deal’ or ‘quid pro quo’ with Washington on the question of the CTBT. He pointed out that there was a ‘big difference’ between ascending to the treaty and adhering to some of its understandings.⁵⁹⁷

The twin test which India conducted within 24 hours was done despite of an unequivocal warning by US President Bill Clinton that New Delhi should stop further testing any sign the CTBT without any precondition. This adamant move of India was basically a signal to the international community that New Delhi could not be pressurized into giving up the option it had chosen “in defense of its security interests.” In other word the test entailed a message that the answer to the problem lay in negotiations and not in any unilateral diktat. Even Vajpayee said in one of the rally that “If such steps are taken, we will face them. If we have to take difficult routes, we will not shy away from them.” However at the same time he asserted that, “we believe in a nuclear-free world, but this policy cannot be one-sided”. In a letter to the US President Bill Clinton, Prime Minister Vajpayee expressed that “I assure you that India will continue to work with your country in a multilateral or bilateral framework to promote the cause of nuclear disarmament.”⁵⁹⁸

⁵⁹⁶ Hindustan Times; May 12; 1998; as quoted in Mahapatra, Chinatamani; *Indo-US Relations into the 21st Century*; (IDSA; New Delhi; 1998); pp 156

⁵⁹⁷ Hindustan Times; May 12; 1998; as quoted in Mahapatra, Chinatamani; *Indo-US Relations into the 21st Century*; (IDSA; New Delhi; 1998); pp 157

⁵⁹⁸ Hindustan Times; May 14; 1998; as quoted in Mahapatra, Chinatamani; *Indo-US Relations into the 21st Century*; (IDSA; New Delhi; 1998); pp 157

President Clinton found the tests by India an affront to the US efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. He stated that he was “deeply disturbed by the nuclear tests” and argued that such tests is a challenge to “building a safer 21st century”. Clinton further expressed that the belief that “this action by India not only threatens the stability of the region, it directly challenges the firm international consensus to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destructions.”⁵⁹⁹ Washington’s intention of taking stringent action against India was clearly visible in President Clinton’s statement issued on May 12, 1998. It read: “I want to make it very, very clear that I am deeply disturbed by the nuclear tests which India has conducted, and I do not believe it contributes to building a safer 21st century. The United States strongly opposes any new nuclear testing. This action by India has not only endangered the solidity of the region, but it has directly challenged the firm international harmony to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. I call on India to announce that it will conduct no further tests and that it will sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty now and without conditions. I also urge India’s neighbors not to follow suit - not to follow down the path of a dangerous arms race. As most of you know, our laws have very stringent provisions, signed into law by me in 1994, in response to nuclear tests by non-nuclear weapons states. And I intend to implement them fully.” The US reaction transformed into action and economic sanctions were imposed under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, 1994 (Glenn Amendment) on both India and Pakistan.⁶⁰⁰ The Deputy Secretary of US Department of States, Strobe Talbot, characterized the explosion by the two nations as an important path to “dead end” and advised other not to “follow those paths”⁶⁰¹ Things turned out more acute when Henry Sokolski, a former senior Pentagon official for non-proliferation policy commented that “India has just dug a hole for itself by doing this test- a military, political and economic hole.....It is about to get a death blow. This is not just a nuclear test for India. It is a political

⁵⁹⁹Inderfurth; Karl F; *Situation in India*; Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s Sub-Committee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs; May 13, 1998; Washington D.C.; as quoted in Mahapatra, Chinatamani; *Indo-US Relations into the 21st Century*; (IDSA; New Delhi; 1998); pp 158

⁶⁰⁰ President Clinton's remarks in Text: Ambassador Grey on India’s Nuclear Weapons Testing; http://fas.org/news/india/1998/05/98051401_ppo.html
Mishra, Bhabani; *India-US Relations: A Paradigm Shift*; Strategic Analysis, Vol. 29, No. 1, Jan-Mar 2005; IDSA

⁶⁰¹ Cable News Network (CNN); Internet Website; June 18; 1998, as quoted in Mahapatra, Chinatamani; *Indo-US Relations into the 21st Century*; (IDSA; New Delhi; 1998); pp 158

test for the United States”.⁶⁰² Thus, finally on May 13 he went on to announce imposition of sanctions against India under Section 102 of the US Arm Export Control Act, also known as the Glenn Amendment. Madeleine Albright the Secretary of State stated that the Indians had deceived the United States by conducting the nuclear tests.⁶⁰³

Thus acting under the law Washington imposed the following sanctions over India on May 13, 1998: Firstly except for humanitarian assistance US terminated all forms of assistance to India under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961; secondly Washington terminated all forms of defense equipments, license and military transactions with India under the Arms Export Control Act; fourthly it denounced all form of credit and financial assistance and denied extension of any form of loan, aid or technical assistance to New Delhi; and fifthly it prohibited the export of any form of good and technology to India. These sanction soon sparked a severe outrage not only in India but even among other nations of the world. Although nations like Japan, Australia, New Zealand and a few European countries following the US line and imposed their own sets of sanctions over India, but nations like Russia, France, Britain and Germany were relatively more restrained in reacting to the Indian nuclear tests. France, Russia and Britain openly went against the US policy of imposing blanket sanctions against India.

Where on one hand numerous scholars and foreign policy analysts projected the US resentment as a result of the surprise nuclear explosion by India, similarly on the other the closed eyed attitude of Washington during the Regan and Bush era by acknowledging the Pressler Amendment certifying Pakistan’s nuclear virginity and the Brown Amendment during the Clinton administration projected the duality of US stand with regard to the nuclearization of South Asia. Similarly the US inaction over the Sino-Pakistan nuclear and missile cooperation, in addition, sets another example of US soft policy towards Pakistan’s nuclear activities.⁶⁰⁴ In course of such sanctions imposed on India, Pakistan however audaciously went ahead for conducting its nuclear explosion within a couple of week after the

⁶⁰² Hindustan Times; MAY 13; 1998; as quoted in Mahapatra, Chinatamani; *Indo-US Relations into the 21st Century*; (IDSA; New Delhi; 1998); pp 158

⁶⁰³ *Economic Times*; June 17, 1998 Hindustan Times; MAY 14; 1998; as quoted in Mahapatra, Chinatamani; *Indo-US Relations into the 21st Century*; (IDSA; New Delhi; 1998); pp 159

⁶⁰⁴ Mahapatra, Chinatamani; *American Approach to Sino-Pakistan Nuclear Cooperation*; (Strategic Analysis; January; 1998); pp 159

Indian tests, which turned the heat in favour of Pakistan and in the similar lines United States was compelled to set off the sanctions against Pakistan too by which the US wanted to “to send a message to would be nuclear testers; to have maximum influence on Indian and Pakistani behavior; to target the governments, rather than the people; and to minimize the damage to other US interests.”⁶⁰⁵ The last part of the statement “to minimize the damage to other US interests” is significant.

(4.13) US pro Pakistani outlook in Kashmir and the Relations:

Post Simla agreement Pakistan was actively involved in the Afghanistan crisis and during this time period there was a halt in Kashmir issue, but soon the communist forces moved out of Afghanistan, problems in Kashmir got invigorated with the rise of terrorist activities in the valley from December 1989. It was believe that the rise of militant activities in the valley could have been easily resolve if the democratic leadership of Pakistani under the Prime Ministership of Mrs. Benazir Bhutto would have desisted itself from capitalizing on brewing unrest in Kashmir. But despite having a cordial relationship with India and having a positive improvement in multiple areas Bhutto was forced and compelled by her opponents to take advantage of the law and order problem in Kashmir and supporting efforts at formation and training of anti-Indian and pro-Pakistani groups in Kashmir and within few months the valley was scathed by trans-border terrorist activities and violent insurgencies and uprising.⁶⁰⁶ Meanwhile terrorism in Kashmir started growing more and more strident in nature, moreover the domestic turmoil in India like militancy in Punjab, Babri Masjid crisis, communal catastrophe etc were giving enough space to Pakistan for breeding and sponsoring terrorist activities in the Kashmir valley. Despite India’s constant claim of Pakistani involvement in a game of destabilization United States’ attitude was very much lethargic in nature and it considered the problems in Kashmir as mere human rights issue and domestic strife, which further complicated the Indo-US differences. By 1990’s when the difference between India and Pakistan reached its zenith following the growing frequency of Islamabad-backed militancy in Kashmir, President Bush in order to settle difference sent his deputy National Security Advisor, Robert Gates, and Assistant Secretary of State, John Kelly to the region,

⁶⁰⁵ *Fact Sheet: India and Pakistan Sanctions*; Wireless Files; June 18; 1998 Mahapatra, Chinatamani; *Indo-US Relations into the 21st Century*; (IDSA; New Delhi; 1998); pp 165

⁶⁰⁶ Mahapatra, Chintamani; American Activism on Kashmir Question; <https://www.idsa-india.org/an-oct-3.html>; accessed on 12/05/2016

who suggested that any new confrontation with regard to Kashmir between India and Pakistan might lead to a nuclear holocaust in South Asia.⁶⁰⁷ This created a serious upheaval among the administrators and leaders of Washington as by any means they desperately wanted to ease off the nuclear outbreak. By early 1955 in his speech US Secretary of Defense William Perry stated that "I would start off by observing that India and Pakistan have long-standing ethnic, religious, and territorial differences dating back to their partition in 1947. These differences have caused them to fight three wars since partition. Today each of them has the capability to build nuclear weapons. Because of this nuclear capability, a fourth Indian/Pakistan war would not just be a tragedy, it could be a catastrophe--so we care a lot about what happens there."⁶⁰⁸ In a similar tone In March 1996, in his annual report to the Congress on the global situation and the role of the US military, Perry wrote: "...The ongoing dialogue can help all three countries (US, India and Pakistan) to focus on areas of common interest, such as international peacekeeping, nuclear proliferation and the long-simmering conflict over Kashmir,"⁶⁰⁹ which showed the US concern regarding the nuclear holocaust. However although India managed to provide convincing evidences regarding the Pakistani involvement in Kashmir, yet the Bush administration keeping a closed eyes on Pakistan failed to declare Pakistan as a destabilizing entity in the region. Meanwhile the birth of Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) which aims for an independent Kashmir including the Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) in 1989 came as a boon for Pakistan as Islamabad used all possible ways to encourage them in destabilizing the valley either by economically or by providing arms, ammunition and trainings, which led to the birth of organization like Hizb-ul-Mujaheedin, Tehrik-ul Mujaheedin and others. During the early 90's when US was undergoing through the process of Presidential election, Indo-Pakistan relation centering Kashmir deteriorated to the maximum followed by the incidents like Islamabad's initial permission to JKLF leader Amanullah Khan to march across the LOC in Kashmir, kidnap and torture of Indian diplomat in Islamabad and clashes in the Siachen Glacier, but still US kept a blind eye toward the role of Pakistan in destabilizing the valley. The emergence of Bill Clinton as the new President of the United States raised high hopes within New Delhi. It was believed that he would take more serious look at Pakistani activities in Kashmir and take

⁶⁰⁷ New York Times, May 16, 1990

⁶⁰⁸ Official Text, United States Information Service, New Delhi, February 3, 1995

⁶⁰⁹ Pioneer, March 31, 1996.

appropriate steps to discourage Islamabad from fomenting the regional instability. But soon such hopes were belied when Clinton's approach was indicated by a speech he made in the United Nation General Assembly in 1993 and branded the Kashmir dispute as a mere 'ethnic conflict.'⁶¹⁰ Clinton's remarks highly disappointed India and it's proved the fact again that Washington has still kept its eyes closed on Pakistan. Things turned much grave when on October 1993 in a statement Robin Raphel, Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs argued off record that United States does not considers the instrument of accession as valid document regarding the merger of Kashmir to India. By the late 1993, the Indo-US split got further widened as President Clinton shared Pakistan's concern over the "human rights violation" in Kashmir.

With the rise of Narasimha Rao Government in India there was seen a new impetus in Indo-US relations, for the first time perhaps in many years Washington refrain itself from making any rhetorical statements on Kashmir. Soon within few years the Pakistani misadventure in Kargil proved yet again a blow to Pakistan from the United States as they didn't received the favorable support it desired from the United States. The 9/11 terror attack, 26/11 Mumbai terror attack, Abbotabad incident and the recent Uri and Pathankot terror attacks completely unveiled the real face of Pakistan globally as a nation which breeds and harbor terrorism.

(4.14): Kargil & Indo-US:

In the late 1990s, high publicity American engagement with South Asia took place on nuclear issues, sparked off by multiple Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests in May 1998. On 11 and 13 May 1998, India carried out a series of five underground nuclear tests, twenty-four years after its first 'peaceful nuclear explosion' on 18 May 1974. This was promptly followed by six Pakistani nuclear tests on 28 and 30 May 1998. Although the immediate American reaction was to impose economic and military-related sanctions on both India and Pakistan, their respective importance in United States foreign policy soon generated less coercive measures to counter proliferation. In a significant development, within the Lahore Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), both countries agreed to develop confidence-building measures (CBMs) in the nuclear and conventional fields aimed at the avoidance of conflict within nine

⁶¹⁰Mahapatra, Chinatamani; *Indo-US Relations into the 21st Century*; (IDSA; New Delhi; 1998); pp 46

months of the nuclear tests.⁶¹¹ The Lahore documents—signed at the Summit between Vajpayee and Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in Lahore—appeared to provide the momentum towards enhanced and formalized nuclear stability in South Asia.

However, the feeling of euphoria generated by the Lahore Declaration proved to be short-lived. Pakistan's military intrusion across the LoC, allegedly at the time of the Lahore Summit, effectively ended all moves towards regional nuclear stability. Instead, India and Pakistan were involved in an armed conflict with each other for the first time after their nuclear tests in the Kargil conflict of May-July 1999 which formally ended with United States facilitation. Code-named Operation AI Badr, the Pakistani misadventure involved yet another Operation Gibraltar (1965) type operation, led by infiltrators in Jammu and Kashmir. The infiltrators this time were mostly Pakistani army regulars disguised as mujahideens. The deliberate employment of Pakistani army regulars disguised as mujahideens was to project Operation AI Badras an action by "Kashmiri freedom fighters." In early 1999, Pakistan's regular and irregular forces crossed the LoC and occupied positions in the Kargil sector of Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir. When this was detected in early May 1999, Delhi's response was swift and comprehensive, involving the use of land and air forces to evict the intruders from the Indian side of the LoC. On May 25, 1999 the high-powered Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) met in New Delhi to take stock of the situation and undertake a comprehensive political-military analysis of the emergent problem.

When the Indian Army began its offensive against the intruders on May 8, 1999, Washington paid little attention to the initial reports of clashes, assuming them as domestic turmoil between the Indian forces and Kashmiri "insurgents" along the LoC. As a US official later explained, "Everyone assumed it was the usual shootouts that happen after the snows melt."⁶¹² However gradually as the things started getting intensified, Washington became more concerned and began to receive a steady flow of intelligence reports about the happenings at the Kargil front. President Bill Clinton put special attention on the Kargil conflict and on 28 May 1999, the US State Department in a major diplomatic move, summoned the Indian and Pakistani Ambassadors to underline the need for utmost restraint in

⁶¹¹ Text of the Lahore Declaration and the Memorandum of Understanding at www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/southasia/Lahore022299.html#Memo

⁶¹² As quoted in ChidanandRajghatta, "There's a Thaw on the Hill," *Indian Express*, 23 July 1999.

handling the sensitive situation which had the potential of getting out of control. Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, Karl Inderfurth held separate meetings with India's envoy Naresh Chandra and Pakistani envoy Riaz Khokkar and expressed "very strong concern" over the fighting in Kargil. He urged both the parties to show respect to Lahore peace process of February 1999.⁶¹³ In the meantime, the US Ambassador to India, Richard Celeste, personally carried President Clinton's appeal for restraint to the Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes. Similarly, the US diplomats in Islamabad met with the Pakistani officials to convey the American concern. Although the US refused to intervene directly in the conflict and was also reluctant to mediate to end the crisis but still it continued to expect both the contending parties to negotiate directly to find a solution. The US Ambassador to India, Richard Celeste, also echoed such a policy of non-interference. As the fighting intensified, Pakistan began its diplomatic offensive against India and its overall plan was to have the UN Security Council (UNSC) take up the issue and, as it had done in previous Indo-Pakistani conflicts, -call for a cease-fire. Islamabad seemed to have hoped that if a cease-fire 'Was called, the LoC would shift and Pakistan would be allowed to hold on to the territory it had seized.⁶¹⁴

However, the US policy response at this period came to direct conflict with the Pakistani objectives. By early June, the US had got confirmed reports and evidence from satellite surveillance and intelligence sources about the direct involvement of Pakistani Army in the Kargil intrusions. Thus Washington unequivocally held Pakistan responsible for the conflict and asked Islamabad to vacate the intrusion to end the conflict. The US was also at the forefront to prevent the Pakistani attempt to internationalize the conflict, or to gain any mileage from its aggression. The US ascertained by early June that the positions of the other P-5 nations complemented its own. Throughout the conflict, Washington repeatedly stressed that it believed India was a victim of aggression and was well within its rights to use its military to push them out.⁶¹⁵ More significantly, the US showed little inclination to support a Pakistani effort to bring the issue before the UNSC. Washington also blocked a Canadian

⁶¹³ "Inderfurth urges Restraint," *Hindu*, 29 May 1999.

⁶¹⁴ "From Surprise to Reckoning", *Kargil Review Committee Report*, p. 82.

⁶¹⁵ As quoted in Kapil Kak, "International Responses," in Jasjit Singh, "The Fourth War," in Jasjit Singh ed., *Kargil 1999: Pakistan's Fourth War for Kashmir*(New Delhi,1999), p.196.

attempt to bring Kargil to the attention of the Security Council.⁶¹⁶ In the first week of June, President Clinton personally involved himself in the diplomatic effort to defuse the crisis. On 2 June, he spoke to Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee and Pakistani Prime Minister Sharif and once again urged them to resolve the conflict by negotiations and in the spirit of Lahore Declaration. In his communication to Sharif, Clinton called upon Islamabad to take steps to defuse the crisis and respect the LoC. In effect, he blamed Pakistan for Kargil war and told Nawaz Sharif government to withdraw the Pakistani intruders out of Kargil. President Clinton then wrote to Vajpayee about the advice he gave to Sharif. At the same time, he expressed his appreciation for the "restrain" shown by India in dealing with the situation. The US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright also told Sharif to use every possible means to get the intruders out and restore the LoC.⁶¹⁷ To, build further pressure on Sharif, the Chairman of the House International Committee, Benjamin Gilman, sent a letter to him, bluntly instructing him to "withdraw" the military forces and end the fighting. Gilman wrote: "... The insertion of a large Pakistan-supported military force across the LoC threatens the peace and stability of South Asia... Pakistan has nothing to gain by permitting the fighting to continue and much to lose by prolonging the crisis. I urge you to instruct Pakistan's military forces to withdraw and to end its support for the current fighting."⁶¹⁸ It was clear that the US executive as well as the legislative branch refused to believe in the Pakistani version of the Kargil event. In effect, both the executive and the legislative branches of the US government were united in their response to the Kargil conflict.

Consequently, having realized the explosive nature of the crisis and wary of the danger of a wider war, the Clinton Administration decided to involve itself directly in the crisis and take pro-active steps to defuse the situation. Worried about the possible escalation of the crisis, which would lead to an all-out Indo-Pakistani war, President Clinton rang up Vajpayee and urged him to hold to a policy of restraint. He then called Sharif on 15 June and asked him to

⁶¹⁶ Bruce Riedel, Briefing, Foreign Press Center, Washington DC 8 June, 1999, as cited in Pramit Pal Chaudhury, "A Question of Restraint: US Policy During the Kargil Conflict," in Kanti Bajpai and others ed., *Kargil and After: Challenges for Indian Policy* (New Delhi, 2001), p. 338.

⁶¹⁷ "Respect LoC, Clinton Advises Nawaz Sharif", *Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), 5 June 1999; Pranay Sharma and Bishakha De Sarkar, "All Smiles on the Western Front", *Telegraph* (Calcutta), 27 June 1999;

⁶¹⁸ Seema Sirohi, "US Raps Sharif on Knuckle Again", *Telegraph*, 6 June 1999.

pull back his forces out of the Indian side of the LoC, warning that the deployment would hold up any effort to end the fighting between the two countries. He also persuaded both the sides to resume direct -talks in the spirit of Lahore Declaration to defuse the crisis.⁶¹⁹ The US also stepped up its diplomatic efforts and took a number of initiatives to exert pressure on Pakistan to withdraw the intruders and de-escalate the conflict. First, it persuaded the G-8 countries then meeting at Cologne, to issue a statement expressing deep concern over the "infiltration of armed intruders which violated the Line of Control."⁶²⁰ Moreover, President Clinton decided to send a two-member delegation to Islamabad consisting of General Anthony Zinni, the Commander-in-Chief of the US Central Command, and Gibson Lanpher, the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State. According to a State Department official, the purpose of the US delegation to Islamabad was to ensure the withdrawal of Pakistani incursion from the Indian side of the LoC.⁶²¹ However, Zinni-Sharif meeting ended inconclusively as both sides remained stuck to their known and stated positions on the Kargil crisis. After the return of Zinni and Lanpher mission, Pakistan turned towards China for support but Pakistan did not received any positive response from China Desperate to find a way out, Sharif finally called Clinton on 3 July and requested for an early meeting. The US President agreed, but on the understanding that Pakistan would accept a pullback from Kargil. Sharif agreed and left for Washington that night with 26-member delegation.⁶²² After the end of Clinton-Sharif meeting, a joint statement was issued by Washington on 5 July 1999, where it clearly stated that both the US President Clinton and Pakistani Prime Mister Nawaz Sharif have unanimously agreed immediately to cease the hostilities between India and Pakistan. They also shared the viability of the potential threat and collateral damage of the war in Kargil and as such they have agreed that for maintenance of international and regional peace the sacred LOC in Kashmir must be respect and restored by both the

⁶¹⁹ "Pull Back Troops, Clinton Tells Pak", *Hindustan Times*, 16 June 1999; "Clinton Seeks Pak Pullout", *Indian Express* (New Delhi), 16 June 1999; "Back off & Now, US Tells Pak", *Pioneer* (New Delhi), 16 June 1999.

⁶²⁰ *Statesman*, 21 June 1999; Jyoti Malhotra, "Major Diplomatic Win for India", *Indian Express*, 21 June 1999; K. K. Katyal, "G-8 Stand was Based on Clear Evidence", *The Hindu*, 24 June 1999.

⁶²¹ "US Aims at Pak Withdrawal", *Hindustan Times*, 25 June 1999.

⁶²² Dennis Kux, *The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies* {Karachi, 2001},, p. 353

contending parties following the guidelines of Simla Accord. Moreover Clinton also assured a personal interest in encouraging an expeditious resumption and intensification of these bilateral efforts.⁶²³ Thus finally with the mediation of the United States the war came to an end and the fear of a nuclear breakdown between two nuclear empowered states was subsided. The Kargil episode not only marked US fair and positive stand on the Indo-Pak enduring rivalries but it yet again exposed the face and reality of Pakistan as a nation which breed terrorism.

(4.15) India- US 10 Year Defense Pact:

On June 28, 2005 in order to further strengthen its strategic, military and defense alliance with India the two nations signed a 10-year Defense Pact in Washington D.C. This landmark agreement provided a boon for the joint weapons production, co-operation on missile defense and the transfer of civil and military technology to India.⁶²⁴ Washington justified that the pact was based on the global security challenges and its perceived strategic interests in South Asia. The defense pact which came after intense talk's hours before the formal negotiations of Indian Defense Minister Pranab Mukkherjee and the US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld is a logical offshoot of the strategic partnership.⁶²⁵ The agreement paved the way for the possible lifting of US export controls for sensitive military technology to India without signing the CTBT.⁶²⁶ Mainly the two main objectives of the agreement was a. to help India to advance America's strategic goals in Asia b. to help India to become a major world power this may project its military presence beyond its border.⁶²⁷

From the US government perspective, the New York Times wrote: "Weapon supply to Pakistan and India strengthen the American presence on the Chinese border and its interest in this region. The deal will open the new markets for US throughout the Asian region for military contractors, which are looking for the more foreign buyers as the Pentagon budget

⁶²³*The Hindu*, 6 July 1999.

⁶²⁴ Dawn, Karachi, June 30, 2005.

⁶²⁵ Washington Post, Washington, June 29, 2005.

⁶²⁶ The Nation, Lahore, June 30, 2005.

⁶²⁷ Afzaal Mahmood, "A Strategic Defence Pact," Dawn, Lahore, July 9, 2005.

comes under pressure.”⁶²⁸ On June 30, 2005, the Pakistan foreign office spokesman expressed Islamabad’s concern over the defense pact. He said that Pakistan had already conveyed its concern to Bush administration over its negative consequences of the Indo-US strategic partnership, in particular, over the induction of new weapons system such as missile defense that would destabilize the strategic balance in the region and may trigger an arms race here”.⁶²⁹ In the wake of the events on June 2005 Nicholas Burns, Assistant Secretary of State visited New Delhi and said that US has devolved a strategic partnership with India as she is a rising and democratic power in the world and a trusted friendly country”⁶³⁰. The statement testified the fact clearly that the Washington has recognized India to play a vital role in South Asia. Washington also believes that Asia is poised to become flush point of strategic gravity in international politics and is keen to develop its ties with India due to the vitality and importance of India and its long- term interests in South Asia and beyond. Alan Kroonstad of the Congressional Research Centre has also acknowledged this claim. According to report prepared by this centre: Washington has changed its policy in South Asia and it appears to be inserting a bigger gamble on India and according to various political analysts; New Delhi and Islamabad are no longer recognized as the same in Washington. Pakistan is observed as a middle power and India has the much larger prospective down the road. You would not listen to strategic associate being used much with Pakistan but you will hear it with India.”⁶³¹ An Indian leading English daily, The Indian Express stated this pact a “Path breaking Defense Agreement” that will make out the mutual goals on which collaboration between armed services of both countries can be identified. The agreement is being witnessed as a noteworthy accomplishment as it is for the first time after the Pokharan tests that Washington has determined to advance defense ties with New Delhi.⁶³² It was thus for the first time in Indo-US relationship that both countries recognized the political parameters for further significant defense cooperation.

⁶²⁸ The New York Times, New York, July 3, 2005.

⁶²⁹ The News, Islamabad, July 1, 2005.

⁶³⁰ The Hindu, Delhi, June 14, 2005.

⁶³¹ <http://fpc.state.gov/c4763.htm>

⁶³² The Indian Express, New Delhi June 30, 2005.

(4.16): The Nuclear Deal:

The Indo-US nuclear agreement was the result of the close Indo-US bonhomie, India's strong policy in the field of non-proliferation despite not being a part of it and the Washington's recognition of India as -"an anchor of stability in Asia and an engine of global economic growth."⁶³³ In October 8, 2008 George W. Bush the President of United States signed the landmark law on the Indo-US nuclear deal which later on became famous as the 'United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act' under the safe guidelines of IAEA and Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG). The foundation of the deal traced back to civil nuclear cooperation that initiated with the joint statement between US President Bush and Indian P.M Dr. Manmohan Singh in the year 2005 with a broad framework of cooperation. Apart from the strong scrutiny of NSG, IAEA guidelines the act was scrutinized under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and India's "Weapons of Mass Destruction and their Delivery Systems (Prohibition of Unlawful Activities) Act, 2005," which brought about more stringent non-proliferation regulations and tighter export control measures projecting India's dedicated obligation to the cause of non-proliferation.⁶³⁴ Thus finally in March 2006 in his visit to New Delhi President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh went ahead to sign the landmark and historic Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement which brought forth a bright beginning in the Indo-US bonhomie.⁶³⁵

⁶³³ Merle D. Kellerhals Jr., "Congress approves US India Civil Nuclear Accord," 02 October 2008, available at <http://www.america.gov/st/peacesecenglish/2008/October/20081002094758dmslahrellek0.3916284.html>

⁶³⁴ This piece of legislation was also in recognition of the UN Security Council Resolution 1540 that called upon states to establish stringent export control measures on the transfer, shipment, retransfer and trans-shipment of materials or technology that may be used in the development, manufacture, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. See, United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1540," 28 April 2004, available at <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/328/43/PDF/N0432843.pdf?OpenElement>. Also see, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, "The Weapons of Mass Destruction and Their Delivery Systems (Prohibition of Unlawful Activities) Act, 2005," no. 21 of 2005, 6 June 2005, available at <http://meaindia.nic.in/actsadm/30aa08.pdf>

⁶³⁵ According to the separation plan, India has put 14 of the 22 thermal power reactors in operations under the civilian list. These include: TAPS 1, TAPS 2, RAPS 1, RAPS 2, KK 1, KK 2, RAPS 5, RAPS 6, RAPS 3, RAPS 4, KAPS 1, KAPS 2, NAPS 1 and NAPS 2. The facilities identified under the civilian category will be offered for the IAEA safeguards. However, the decision as to which facilities would come under the civilian or military categories was based solely on Indian determination. In terms of future reactors, it is up to India to determine which category they will belong to (except, of course, imported reactors,

Consequently, in May 2006, a separation plan was announced by the Indian government, separating it was immediately opposed: as per this separation plan, eight plants would be left outside international safeguards. In addition, the Fast Breeder Reactors (FBRs) located at Kalpakkam were not offered for safeguards, as the Fast Breeder programme is still at the R&D stage and the technology will take time to mature. This came under sharp criticism from the non-proliferation activists in the US who argued that the large number of facilities outside the safeguards would make available “significant additional nuclear weapons production capacity” to India.⁶³⁶ Upon finalization of the separation plan, the US agreed to build into the bilateral 123 Agreement, fuel supply assurances; help negotiate with the IAEA and India specific Safeguards Agreement; help develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to “guard against any disruption of supply”; and in case of disruption, the US and India agreed to put in place alternatives - countries like France, Russia and UK, which might be able to restore fuel supply to India. After the separation plan was agreed upon, the Hyde Act was signed into law by President Bush in December 2006. (The Hyde Act, considered the parent act of the 123 Agreement, provides the legal basis for nuclear commerce between India and the US, since India is not party to the NPT.)⁶³⁷

However the Hyde Act came under sharp criticism because of certain clauses which stated that India would work with the US in containing Iran’s nuclear programme and that the two would work together on a Fissile Materials Control Treaty. Apart from several negative factors in the Hyde Act one was with regard to the preventive provisions with regard to India’s autonomous right to nuke test in future, on which the then opposition party in

which will all be under safeguards). See, Ministry of External Affairs, “Implementation of the India-United States Joint Statement of July 18, 2005: India’s Separation Plan,” 11 May 2006, available at <http://meaindia.nic.in/treatiesagreement/2006/11ta1105200601.pdf>

⁶³⁶ Arms Control Association, “The US-India Nuclear Deal: A Critical Assessment,” Arms Control Association Press Briefing, Prepared Remarks of Daryl G. Kimball, 15 February 2006, available at http://www.armscontrol.org/events/20060215_Kimball_Prepared_Remarks. Also brought into issue was the fact that the infusion of foreign fuel will free up India’s current stock for its weapons programme and thereby aid expansion of India’s nuclear weapons programme. This, according to Kimball, was in gross violation of Article I of the NPT, which stipulates that states shall “not in anyway” assist the nuclear weapons programmes of others.

⁶³⁷ "Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006," United States Public Law 109-401, 18 Dec 06 (22 U.S.C. 8001 et seq.) also see J. Müller, "The Signing of the U.S.-India Agreement Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy," Göttingen Journal of International Law 1 179 (2009)

parliament criticized the Manmohan Government a lot. But despite the hurdles, opposition and high hullabaloo, the 123 Agreement got finally signed in August 2007, makes it copiously clear that the Indo-US nuclear deal will not impact India's strategic weapons programme in any manner. In lieu of the above the accord also stated that Washington will positively work to facilitate and assist India in making nuclear trade with other nations. Although the agreement was supposed to be for a term period of forty years but conditions were set to extend it for more ten years and if found discriminatory any of the party can terminate it after a one-year notice. However it also stated that in case of termination of the agreement, the US retains the right to take back "any nuclear material, equipment, non-nuclear material or components transferred." The understanding is that the "right of return" will impact bilateral relations significantly, and therefore, a consultative mechanism has been put in place that will "give special consideration to the importance of uninterrupted operation of nuclear reactors of the party (country) concerned with respect to the availability of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as a means of achieving energy security."⁶³⁸

The signing of the 123 agreement moved the Indo-US nuclear deal a step further; by July 2008 the India-specific IAEA Safeguards were secured and a waiver of NSG rules came by September 2008. Finally the agreement was placed for the approval of US Congress where despite stiff opposition from the strong nonproliferation lobby supporters of the agreements like Senators Richard Lugar and Christopher Dodd and others smoothly passed the agreement out. While justifying the agreement Senator Dodd highlighted that "compelling geopolitical reasons" like the India geographic propinquity to China, Pakistan and Afghanistan, are some vital reasons for passing the bill to strengthen Indo-US bonhomie, similarly Senator Lugar accentuated that the shared its democratic values which the two nations enjoys could "exert increasing influence on the world stage."⁶³⁹

⁶³⁸If the right to return is exercised at some stage, it is necessary under the agreement, to "compensate promptly that Party for the fair market value thereof and for the costs incurred as a consequence of such removal." See, Text of the 123 Agreement titled, "Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of India and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy," 01 August 2007, available at <http://meaindia.nic.in/cgibin/db2www/meaxpsite/coverpage.d2w/coverpg?sec=pr&filename=pressrelease/2007/08/03pr01.pdf>

⁶³⁹Foster Klug, "Senate debates US-India Nuclear Deal," *The Associated Press*, 01 October 2008, available at <http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5hjHnPz7XX0WpdjPiswhHLvaXj0pAD93HPTU83>

The Indo-US nuclear deal not only just marked an agreement of energy for India but it had severe regional strategic implication especially with regard to China and Pakistan. Firstly the agreement projected US's acknowledgment of India's rising potential not only regionally but even globally in the 21st century. Moreover the rising power of China, Japan and Russia compels US to have a strengthened and comprehensive relationship with India for the sake of its geo-strategic policy in South Asia. Moreover the rise of China and its rampant military modernization and economic development further necessitate Washington for bidding the deal with India. Secondly a common goal of trade in strategic goods and technology further makes the relationship an enduring one.⁶⁴⁰ Thirdly the deal marks an end to the long nuclear apartheid India has been subject to in the last three decades and lastly the impact of the deal will encourage the use of nuclear technology globally instead of proliferating it for the sake of weapons.

(4.17): 9/11 Terror Attacks:

As Indo-US bilateral relations were on the ascendancy, the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon transformed the overall situation in South Asia. It brought Pakistan back to centre stage and put parts of India-US relations on hold.⁶⁴¹ "Pessimism began to cloud public thinking in Delhi on the future of India-US relations based on the feelings that the post-9/11 developments had swept away more than a decade of political efforts to restructure the relationship."⁶⁴² India gave assurance to US to full cooperate in war on terror after 9/11 the assurance which US was searching during the long period of cold war. Moreover US policy makers also realized the fact that the Kashmiri freedom movement which they had always projected as regional domestic problem as terrorism. American policy

⁶⁴⁰ Several analysts maintain that it is the trade in strategic goods that will take the bilateral relations to a higher level. For instance, Varun Sahni, in an essay, states, "access to dual-use technology" will be the "litmus test" of this strategic relationship between India and the US. See, Varun Sahni, "Limited Cooperation Between Limited Allies," in Sumit Ganguly, Brian Shoup and Andrew Scobell (eds.), *US-Indian Strategic Cooperation into the 21st Century: More than Words* (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), p.178.

⁶⁴¹ Teresita C. Schaffer, "The US and South Asia: New Priorities, Familiar Interests", The Global Beat Issue Brief, (66) available at www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/pubs/ib66.html

⁶⁴² Advocated by C Raja Mohan as cited in Mishra, Vivek; *Indo-US Relations: After Narendra Modi's Visit*; Issue Brief; Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies; <http://www.ipcs.org/issue-brief/us-south-asia/indo-us-relations-after-narendra-modi-visit-257.html>

for fighting terrorism somewhat gave a false notion of Indian hopes because the Bush policy of pre-emptive strike was not making according with Indian interests.

The September 11 terrorist attacks established very close and powerful attachment between the US and India. The attacks were created horrible effects on US mind and after these attacks the US arranged her policies, the South Asia and the Middle East centric with its objective to take out the terrorism roots from the use of force at both the places. So America attacked Afghanistan and later on Iraq according to its master-plan to stop the more terrorist activities. In the South Asia region India was located on a valuable spot to check and to find alternative of Pakistan if needed but its importance was less than Pakistan, because Pakistan was more helpful for America to play a role as a frontline state in the war against terrorism in Afghanistan. India had great expectations with US and made a great effort to get US attention from Pakistan to India as a regional ally and help India on the high level diplomacy. The Indian government offered 'unconditional and unambivalent' support to America to achieve its objectives in Afghanistan.⁶⁴³ However, the ulterior motive of the India was to get peace in the back yard of Pakistan consequently it was considered security to threat to Pakistan by Pakistan security analyst. Some Indian officials showed uneasy attitude towards the US policies to support Pakistan in the war against terrorism, on the pattern of cold war conditions. America lifted sanctions and gave economic aid and provided legitimacy to the Pakistani government that it has not enjoyed before.⁶⁴⁴ Ever since 9/11 both India and the US have embarked on security cooperation like never before. The cooperation that began with the "war against terror" has only grown, particularly with new and divergent modes of threat facing both the countries. In fact security cooperation has been one of the hallmarks of bilateral cooperation. The US has recently hinted that it would provide an exhortative ground for new cooperation with India in the area of security. It recently described cooperation in security as, "a central element of the broad US-India strategic partnership" and pledged that it looked forward to work with the new government in New Delhi. More in the consecutive

⁶⁴³ Washington Post, 2001 September 17

⁶⁴⁴ Mohan, C Raja, (2002-3 Winter), "A *Paradigm Shift towards South Asia*," (The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 1) pp 144

meetings of John Kerry and Chuck Hagel with India's National Security Adviser points to important aspects of homeland security as a common agenda for both governments.⁶⁴⁵

(4.18): Modi-Obama and the Relations:

Post 9/11 decade India-U.S. bilateral relations have gradually developed and evolved into a "global strategic partnership", based on shared democratic values and increasing convergence of interests on bilateral, regional and global issues. The emphasis placed by the new Government in India on development and good governance has created new opportunity to reinvigorate bilateral ties and enhance cooperation under the new motto --- "Chalein Saath Saath: Forward Together We Go", which was adopted following Prime Minister Narendra Modi's first summit with President Barack Obama on 30 September 2014 in Washington DC. Regular exchange of high level political visits has provided sustained momentum to bilateral cooperation, while the wide-ranging and ever-expanding dialogue architecture has established a long-term framework for India-U.S. engagement. Today, the India-U.S. bilateral cooperation is broad-based and multi-sectoral, covering trade and investment, defense and security, education, science and technology, cyber security, high-technology, civil nuclear energy, space technology and applications, clean energy, environment, agriculture and health. Vibrant people-to-people interaction and support across the political spectrum in both countries nurture our bilateral relationship.⁶⁴⁶

In less than two months after the visit by Prime Minister Narendra Modi to the US, President Barak Obama accepted the invitation to become the first President of the United States to be the Guest of Honour at the Republic Day celebrations in India. The acceptance of the invitation through the social media was, perhaps, to indicate the personal equation that has developed between the two leaders. It is an established fact in diplomacy that good personal relations between political leaders are crucial to building an understanding between two nations especially on controversial and/or important issues. India has a commitment to regional development but it could now define for the US how it could influence the States of the region to advance security interests of the nations and how India would like to use its

⁶⁴⁵ Mishra, Vivek; *Indo-US Relations: After Narendra Modi's Visit*; Issue Brief; Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies; <http://www.ipcs.org/issue-brief/us-south-asia/indo-us-relations-after-narendra-modirsquos-visit-257.html>

⁶⁴⁶ India and United States Relation, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/USA_Dec2014.pdf

leadership position for regional integration and take advantage of opportunities for economic and political cooperation. The US could support India in its endeavour for regional cooperation and seek views and counterview on its policy discussion with respect to region. It has to be understood that the relationship is no longer a zero sum game, which is based on certain select issues. It is based on long term gains and encompasses a range of issues.⁶⁴⁷

It has to be kept in mind that the relationship between these two nations is evolving at a time when cooperation is needed to address key international issues, such as the crisis in Ukraine and the tensions between ‘the West’ and Russia, the challenges in Afghanistan, the situation in Pakistan, the rise of the Islamic State, outbreak of epidemics like the Ebola virus that can spread quickly across borders. These varied events are proof that nations are individually ill prepared to address them and international cooperation is a necessity. There is growing recognition within the Indian government that the US is a partner despite the differences that persist between the two countries and the questions about reliability. India is critical to the US as it is politically stable, and perhaps, is the only country that follows a very similar concept of democracy as the US in the subcontinent. Economically, India has a stable economy which is crucial for US trade, commerce and industry. The Obama administration, on its part, has repeatedly stated that even if India and the US may not always be on the same page, India’s rise is in US interest—not least because a strong, prosperous, inclusive India could help manage global and regional disorder.⁶⁴⁸

(4.19) Assessment:

United States and India remain to be the two largest democracies in the world, and could have had closer and more amicable relations with each other, if their strategic perceptions were similar. For India, sovereignty, pride on the history and ideology that the country represents, the magic of democracy that it represents, where equality is practically based on its diverse nature, its secular character, having the second largest Muslim population in the world after Indonesia, where poverty and economic development prevail hand in hand, growth and the will of the people remaining high in the agenda of all political parties. It

⁶⁴⁷ Stuti Banerjee, “India and the United States: Strengthening the Partnership”, Policy Brief, Indian Council of World Affairs, March 9, 2015, <http://www.icwa.in/pdfs/PB/2014/Indiausstrengthening09032015PB.pdf>

⁶⁴⁸ Stuti Banerjee, “India and the United States: Strengthening the Partnership”, Policy Brief, Indian Council of World Affairs, March 9, 2015, <http://www.icwa.in/pdfs/PB/2014/Indiausstrengthening09032015PB.pdf>

remains difficult for the West to understand, how a country that has been robbed and plundered for centuries, partitioned, bombed, terrorized, facing constant threats from various non state actors, overflowing with population and unbalanced growth can still be the home of the largest skilled and educated work force, birth place for two major religions of the world, culturally vibrant, and a major cohesive force for Asia, which no other country can compete with, excluding its geo strategic location. United States in that perspective has been self-centric and had its own hurdles on its path to achieve the super power status that it gained from the time it used two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. When India did not agree to be a satellite state in the grander strategy that US had in plan for itself then immediately India lost its prominence in their policy making. Events and policies adapted by Indian decision makers, sometimes brought them to the front of their decision makers, sometimes they lost prominence to other global events, which became important for US. But with the beginning of the millennium, the issue of terrorism along with nuclear politics started bringing India and US closer to each other. Presently, the spiraling Western financial crisis and global economic slowdown have made India more important for US policy and decision makers. In perspective of the various rising powers in the world, and changing strategic theaters, one can expect more positive Indo US relations in the future.