

## First Chapter

### The Legacy of *Vedānta Darśan*

#### Section-I

##### Sacred *Veda*

Sacred *Veda* is the most ancient literature in India and it is regarded as the heart of Indian philosophy, religion and culture. The term '*veda*' derives from the root '*vid*' means to know together with the '*ṛij*' and '*ghan*' in *karaṇavāchye*. The root '*vid*' has several meanings as-

- *Vid* means *jñāne*, to know
- *Vid* means *sattiyām*, to be
- *Vid* means *lābhe*, to obtain or to profit by
- *Vid* means *vicāraṇe*, to think about
- *Vid* means *ākhyāne*, to declare, to communicate.<sup>1</sup>

According to Swāmi Dayānanda we may say that by which man reaches supreme knowledge, by the study of which one becomes learned that helps to attain knowledge, and sets man to discuss about knowledge.<sup>2</sup>Our scholars derive the term '*Veda*' from the root, '*vid*' and interpret to mean knowledge. However, this knowledge is not ordinary sense-perception type knowledge rather this knowledge is that of *gods* mentioned in the *hymns*, sacrifices of the *Brāhmaṇas*, ultimate supreme truths of the *Upaniṣads*.

Our traditional view is that *Veda* was not composed by any ordinary being or by any divine being but it revealed near to pious sages. Their minds were very much pure having no mundane attachments. They were called *ṛṣi* or *mantradraṣṭāh*.<sup>3</sup>Our ancient scholars tried to propose various

definitions. Āpastambha defines *Veda* as “*mantrabrāhmaṇayorvedanāmadheyam*”.<sup>4</sup>It means *mantra* and *brāhmaṇa* together composed the *Veda*. Sāyanācārya defines that *Vedas* help man to obtain knowledge neither by perception nor by inference. *Veda* is extraordinary means to attain, which is good for humanity, and to avoid evil.<sup>5</sup>Some define *Veda* as eternal speech- “*vācavirupanītya uccāraṇa viṣayatā*”, some as “*sajātīya uccāraṇa sāpekṣa*”. As human being breathes normally without any effort similarly, *Veda* was uttered by *Īśvara* like the natural process of breathing. In the moment of creation, *Īśvara* without effecting any change simply repeated the same *Veda* in their order and arrangements. For this reason, *Vedas* are considered as ‘*apauruṣeya*’. *Vedas* are also called *Śruti*. The disciples simply chant the *hymns* of the sacred *Vedas* exactly in the same way and process as they hear from their respected *gurus*. *Veda* remains unwritten for centuries but to memories the whole literature became a mammoth task and day by day it became impossible to protect these by any human mind. Feeling the necessity Kṛṣṇadvaipāyana classified *Vedas* into *Ṛk*, *Sāma*, *Yajuḥ* and *Atharva* and distributed his meritorious disciples for preserving and handed down to next generation.

<b><i>Veda</i></b>	<b>Disciple</b>
<i>Ṛgveda</i>	Paila
<i>Sāmaveda</i>	Jaimini
<i>Yajurveda</i>	Vaiśampāyana
<i>Atharvaveda</i>	Sumanta

*Mantra* and *Brāhmaṇa* composed *Veda*. Then we find further conceptual developments in *Āraṇyakas* and *Upaniṣads*. Therefore, in each *Veda* there are four sub sections-

- *mantra or saṁhitā*,
- *brāhmaṇa*,
- *āraṇyaka and*
- *upaniṣad*

In *Mantras* or *Samhitās*, we find that worshippers dedicated various prayers, *hymns* to *gods*. All sorts of ideas also enshrined here in subtle manner deals with ritualistic process and sacrificial ceremonies. In *Āraṇyaka*, we find some esoteric ideas. The significances of the worship were enumerated and in the *Upaniṣads*, they reached their final form. It is said that the *Upaniṣads* are quintessence of the *Vedas*.

There are four *Vedas*- *R̥k*, *Sāma*, *Yajur* and *Atharva*. Each of the four *Vedas* has four parts- *Samhitā*, *Brāhmaṇa*, *Āraṇyaka* and *Upaniṣad*. The *Upaniṣads* as the last part of the *Vedas* are called *Vedānta*. *Vedānta* has been recognised one of the most important, powerful, widely well-known philosophical system of Indian legacy. The word ‘*Vedānta*’ literally means the end-portions or the essence of the *Vedas*. Generally, the *Upaniṣads* are thought at the end of the *Vedic* instruction and the latter philosophers found the final aim of the *Vedas* in *Upaniṣads*. As the *Upaniṣads* are the concluding portion and essence of the *Vedas*, the term ‘*Vedānta*’ is generally used to denote the philosophy of the *Upaniṣads*, which were realised by the *Vedic* seers over a range more than a thousand years. *Vedānta* are called *Upaniṣads* for three reasons-

- They are the last part of each *Veda*.
- They are recited lastly after the recitation of the three other parts of each *Veda*.
- They contain the essence or the sum and substance of all the *Vedas*.

Sadānanda in his *Vedāntasāra* rightly opined that-“*vedānto nāmopaniṣadpramāṇam*.”<sup>6</sup>The term has two meanings—firstly, “*upaniṣad eva pramāṇam*”<sup>7</sup>-according to the derivation it

denotes that the means of *Upaniṣads* is *Vedānta*. Secondly, “*upaniṣado yatro pramāṇamiti vā*”<sup>8</sup>-according to this derivation the decision whose very root enshrined in the *Upaniṣad* is also *Vedānta* or ‘*upaniṣad pramāṇam*’ stand behind the decision of those doctrines. *Vedānta* is also known as *uttaramīmāṃsā*. The *śāstra* (scripture) with rays of arguments help to understand the meanings of the *Upaniṣads* is called *Uttaramīmāṃsā* or *Vedānta*. However, the meaning and enshrined significance of the *Upaniṣads* are not easy to understand. Hence, it includes the other texts, which are auxiliary and instrumental to the understanding of the meaning of the *Upaniṣads*. The scholars believed that the *śāstras*, which, help to grasp the meaning of *Upaniṣads*, namely *Śārīrakasūtras* and its *bhāṣyas*, should also treat as *Vedānta*. Sadānanda opined –“*yat upakārīṇīśārīrakasūtrādīni ca*”. It means that even all commentaries, which help to understand the *Upaniṣadic* utterances, are to be taken as *Vedānta* also. This indicated by the word ‘*ādi*’. The meaning of the word ‘*Vedānta*’ has been extended to include all the vast literature written by commentary or gloss on the basic text or any system of philosophy claiming to be based on the *Upaniṣads*.<sup>9</sup> Brahmānanda Sarasvatī opined that *Vedānta* literature comprises of five books namely, *Śārīrakamīmāṃsā* having four chapters, its commentary and gloss, the book composed by Vācaspati Miśra, i.e., *Bhāmatī*, its gloss *Kalpataru* and its gloss the *Parimala*.<sup>10</sup>

## Section-II

### The Three Pillars of *Vedānta*

Actually there are three pillars of *Vedānta* on which remains the main tenets of *Vedānta* namely *Śruti*, *Smṛti* and *Nyāya*. The system has based on these three canonical works. These are collectively termed as *prasthāna traya*. As a part of the *Vedas*, the *Upaniṣads* belong to

*Śruti* and the *Upaniṣads* regarded as the *Śrutiprasthāna*. Our tradition has always given the status of the highest authority to the *Upaniṣads* since it has been unquestioningly accepted as *Śruti*. Generally, in *Sanskṛt* the meaning of a word is determined with the help of derivation. Here the word '*Upaniṣad*' has formed from the root verb '*sad*', prefixed by '*upa*' means near and '*ni*' means surely. The verbal root '*sad*' has several meanings: loosening, movement and annihilation. Remembering all these three senses together, we may say that the word '*Upaniṣad*' refers to such divine knowledge or wisdom, which loosens the bands of *samsāra* of a being, annihilates his *ajñāna* or ignorance of his real nature and leads to *Brahman* or God or Absolute.<sup>11</sup> *Upaniṣad* is the self-knowledge or *ātmavidyā*.<sup>12</sup> The book or scriptural work that teaches this self-knowledge is also termed as *Upaniṣad*. Such type of secondary meaning is accorded in our day-to-day language. As per example, water is my life. It means the water is my source of livelihood.<sup>13</sup>

The *Bhagavadgītā*, which utters the teaching of the *Upaniṣadic* doctrines, has known as the *Smṛtiprasthāna*. The *Bhagavadgītā* considered as the essence of the *Upaniṣadic* philosophy. It is said be the immortal milk (*Bhagavadgītā*) was extracted by the cowherd Lord *Kṛṣṇa* out of the *Upaniṣadic* cows making Arjuna the calf, for the benefit of the learned.<sup>14</sup>

Different *Upaniṣads* did not produce a coherent picture of its various subjects. It became necessary to give them a more coherent look. Bādarāyaṇa, the great author had taken an attempt to systematize and harmonize the *Upaniṣadic* philosophy. His efforts have received its final form through these *Brahmasūtra* which also known as *Vedāntasūtra* or *Uttaramīmāṃsāsūtra* etc. Through the systemization of the philosophy of the *Upaniṣads*, *Brahmasūtra* build the metaphysical frame of the *Vedānta*. *Brahmasūtra* because of its

logical and reflective style it has defined as the *Nyāyaprasthāna*. *Brahmasūtra* divided into four chapters under the headings like *samanvaya*, *avirodha*, *sādhana* and *phala*. The chapters are further sub-divided into four *pādas* each of which constitutes a number of *adhikaraṇas* dealing with specific topics. We may submit a table of this:

Adhyaya	Pada-I	Pada-II	Pada-	Pada-IV	Compiled in the <i>adhikaraṇas</i>
1	31	32	43	28	134
2	37	45	53	22	157
3	27	41	66	52	186
4	19	21	16	22	78

The *sūtras* are cryptic statements and afford full-fledged interpretation to the commentators.

It is for this reason that the *Ācāryas* of *Vedānta* have chosen the *Brahmasūtra* to comment upon in their major work and their respective systems. *Brahmasūtra* of Bādarāyaṇa has attracted the attention of the distinguish scholars over the years, who have enriched the *Vedānta* literature by their brilliant expositions. However, the differences in their views give rise to the emergence of various schools of *Vedānta* in later days. The names of the scholars along with their schools are given below:

Śaṅkara	<i>Advaita</i>
---------	----------------

C.E.788-820	
Bhāskara C.E.996-1061	<i>Bhedābheda</i>
Yādavprakāśa C.E.1000	<i>Bhedābheda</i>
Rāmānuja C.E. 1017- 1137	<i>Viśiṣṭādvaita</i>
Madhva C.E. 1238-1317	<i>Dvaita</i>
Nimbārka latter half of 13 <sup>th</sup> century	<i>Dvaitādvaita</i>
Śrīkantha C.E. 1270	<i>Śaiva-viśiṣṭādvaita</i>
Śrīpati C.E. 1400	<i>Bhedābhedatmakaviśiṣṭādvaita</i>
Vallabha C.E. 1479-1544	<i>Śuddhādvaita</i>

Śuka C.E.1550	<i>Bhedāvada</i>
Vijñānabhikṣu C.E.1550	<i>Ātma-brahmaikya-bhedāvada</i>
Baladeva C.E. 1725	<i>Achintya-bhedābheda</i>

Moreover, the three sources of this philosophy have been interpreted in different ways by different commentators. Therefore different schools of the *Vedānta* have developed.

### Section-III

#### Main features of the *Advaita Vedānta*

*Vedānta* is generally divided into two main sections as *Dvaita* and *Advaita*. The term ‘*dvaita*’ derives from prefix ‘*dvi*’ then root ‘*I*’ together with suffix ‘*ḱta*’ in *karaṇvāchya*. Then the term ‘*dvaita*’ is formed by the addition of the suffix ‘*aṅ*’ in *bhāvārthe* or *svārthe*. The attribute of being united with two is *dvaita*. The term ‘*vāda*’ derives from the root ‘*vad*’ together with the suffix ‘*ghan*’ in *bhāvārthe*. It means right judgment. In *Dvaitavāda*, there are three real entities as *Brahman*, *jīva* and *jagat*. *Na dvaita=Advaita*. *Advaitavāda* is the negation of *Dvaitavāda*. We got the term ‘*Advaitavāda*’ from ‘*advaiter vāda*’. *Dvaitavāda* is a system of philosophy in which one Supreme Entity i.e. *Brahman* unite with two entities, which are also real. On the other hand, *Advaitavāda* is the negation of *Dvaitavāda*. In this system, *Brahman* does not unite with

anything neither with *jīva* or individual nor with *jagat* or world. We uttered from the *Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣyavārttika* –

*Dvidhetarṁ dvītamityāhus tadbhāvo dvaitamucyate/*

*Tad niṣedhena cā dvaitam pratyag vastvabhīdhīyate//*

*(Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣyavārttika 4.3.1807)*

The *Advaita Vedānta* has mainly three stages-Pre-Śaṅkara, Śaṅkara and Post-Śaṅkara. To interpret the inner significance of the *Advaita* teachings the scholars have never become unanimous. According to Śaṅkara the principal teaching of the *Advaita Vedānta* is-

*Brahma satyam jagannithyā jīvo brahmaiva nāparaḥ / (Brahmajñāvalīmālā, 20)*

The truth of the second and third teaching is implied by the first. Actually, if *Advaita=Na dvaita*, be the conclusions of the *Advaitins* then it follows that *jagat* and *jīva* never be regarded as separate realities.

a) *Brahma satyam*

In the *Advaita Vedānta*, *Brahman* or self has said to be the only reality and whatever is other than, self has declared as false. The Self alone is real in the sense that pure knowledge or consciousness is real, since it is beyond of all changes and modifications and never disappeared at all, therefore eternal. We know from Śaṅkara's commentary that Vāṣkali asked his teacher Bādhva about the nature of *Brahman*. Bādhva explained *Brahman* merely by his silence or not uttering a word. When the question was asked repeatedly a second and a third time, he replied, "I have already spoken, but of course you do not understand. That self is Quiescence."<sup>15</sup> *Brahman* is inexpressible. Any object can describe through the help of its

attributes, action, class or relation. However, being devoid all of these *Brahman* cannot be expressed through words. *Brahman* best described as “*neti neti...*”<sup>16</sup>. Yājñavalkya uttered that *Brahman* is neither gross nor subtle neither short nor long, neither heat nor moist, neither shadow nor darkness, neither air nor *ākāśa*. It is unattached; it is without taste or smell, without eyes or ears, without tongue or mind. It is non-effulgent, without vital breath or mouth, without measure and without exterior or interior. It does not anything or eaten by anyone. Through these negative descriptions *ṛṣi* (the seer of truth) depicted that *Brahman* is devoid of all attributes and is one only, without a second. It means that *Brahman* may be expressed actually via negative as being not this or not that when compared to anything. The *Upaniṣads* speak of *Brahman* negatively as having no attribute. *Brahman* is devoid of qualifying attributes or characteristic marks. *Śruti* said-*Brahman* is neither gross, nor atomic, neither small, nor long etc. *Brahman* cannot be grasped through the sense organ that is why *Brahman* is beyond the reach of mind since mind knows only the object, which is presented before it through senses. *Śruti* told us that *Brahman* is not ascertainable by speech nor by mind-‘*avānmanasogocaram*’.<sup>17</sup> *Brahman* is devoid of three limitations-*deśapariicchda* or limitation of space, *kālapariicchda* or limitation of time and *vastupariicchda* or limitation of objects. *Brahman* being devoid of space limitation is omnipresent, being devoid of time limitation is eternal and being devoid of object limitation is one.<sup>18</sup> The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* has maintained that “*ekamevādvitīyam Brahman*”(6.2.1). *Brahman* is only one without a second. Śaṅkarācārya in his commentary unfolded the very much significance of these words. In this *mantra* the term ‘*eka*’ stands for non discrimination of homogeneous changes, ‘*eva*’ stands for part-whole non discrimination and ‘*advitīya*’ for heterogeneous non-discrimination.<sup>19</sup> Vidyāraṇya(1400C.E.) in his famous writings *Pañcadaśī* tries to expound

these with the help of a beautiful example. The difference because of the leaves, flowers and fruits of the same tree is called *svagatabheda* (difference within the same object). One tree differs from another tree and this difference is called *sajātīyabheda* (difference among the species of the same kind). Again, a tree is not only different from other trees; it is different from rocks etc. This difference between a tree and a rock is called *vijātīyabheda* (difference among the different kinds). If there had been two *Brahman*, we able to speak of *sajātīyabheda* or *vijātīyabheda* between them. Being partless *Brahman* is beyond of *svagatabheda*. The three kinds of differences are totally absent in *Brahman*.<sup>20</sup>

An accepted procedure to define *Brahman* in thus manner that *Brahman* is in essence *sat*, *cit*, *ānanda*. “*saccidānandamayam param brahma*”(Nṛsimhatāpanīyopaniṣad 1.6). However, these are not attributes or adjectives of *Brahman* and they are also non-different from another. To them which is *sat* is also *cit* and that which is *cit* is identical with *ānanda*. *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* defines *Brahman* as “*satyaṁ jñānam anantam Brahman*” (2.1.3). This definition distinguishes the reality from world, which is non-eternal, non-intelligent, and non-bliss.

There is another method to understand *Brahman*. It is said that *Brahman* is the creator, sustainer and destroyer of the world.<sup>21</sup> The features of creation belong to *Brahman* for some time and help us to acquire some knowledge about *Brahman* for all times. These criterions will be disappeared when one realizes the true nature of *Brahman*.

b) *Jagat mithyā*

The second cardinal doctrine of the *Advaita Vedānta* is *jagat mithyā* or world is false. In the *Advaita Vedānta*, reality is one without a second and that is none other than *Brahman*.

However, the non-duality of reality cannot be proved as false. That is why the concept of falsity is so important in an *Advaita* parlance. In the *Advaita Vedānta*, falsity does not mean unreality. Here the word ‘false’ or ‘*mithyā*’ is a technical expression denotes ‘*sadāsatvilakṣaṇa*’. The *Advaitins* only accept the empirical reality or *vyavahārika sattā*<sup>22</sup> of the universe, which is nothing but a false appearance. Our scholars define that which cannot be admitted as real or unreal or as both real and unreal or as neither real nor unreal at the same time and locus is regarded as ‘*sadāsadvilakṣaṇa*’ and this called *mithyā*. Actually linguistic expression fails to describe it so it is *anirvācya*. Now the questions arise how should falsity be explained? Why world is other than reality and non-reality? Reality is consciousness. That which is non-contradicted at any time is *Sat* or Real (*trikālāvādhita*). Since *Brahman* is never contradicted at any time, *Brahman* is *sat* or real. However, the world appears to us as real, but the appearance of the world shall disappear when the knowledge of *Brahman* arises. World is not ontological existent since it is sublated by the knowledge of *Brahman*. That is why the world cannot be regarded as *sat*. Again, the world appears so it does not consider as unreal. The world cannot be regarded as unreal, since which is *asat* or unreal can never be manifested. As per example, a barren woman’s son or hare’s horn, the world appearance does not non-existent since it is perceived. According to the principle of non-contradiction, the world cannot be admitted as both real and unreal together at a same time and locus. Being mutually exclusive the presence of *sat* and *asat* in the same locus at one and the same time is totally impossible. The existence and nonexistence are contradictory terms. There is no intermediate possibility between them. We know very well that two contradictory predicates cannot be both true and both false at the same time. The world cannot be considered either as *sat* or *asat* and neither as devoid both of them. The

existence and non-existence are contradictory terms. There is no intermediate possibility between them. We know very well that two contradictory predicates cannot be both true and both false at the same time *Mithyā* is to be named as *anirvācya* or inexpressible through words. Prof. Nirod Baran Chakraborty in his famous thesis “*The Advaita Concept of Falsity: A Critical Study*” rightly observed –“...the *Advaitins* never deny the objectivity and externality of the world. To the *Advaitins*, the world has both objectivity and externality but it has no reality at all”.<sup>23</sup>

The *Advaitin* never denies the empirical reality of the world only denies the transcendental reality of the world. This may be explained with the help of popular example. In the case of snake-rope illusion, we perceive snake instead of a piece of rope. The rope never be called as ‘*sat*’ or real since, it was not there. The rope is not *asat* like barren-woman’s son because we perceive this. Something, which is *asat*, can never be perceived. The snake cannot be *sadāsat* because co-existence is impossible. Thus in illusion this snake is *sadāsadvilakṣaṇa* which is technically called *anirvacanīya* or logically incompatible. *Advaita* scholars say that something may be false if it has superimposed or ascribed on something else. As per example, in the case of rope- snake illusion the snake is false because it is superimposed on a piece of rope. Due to some unmindfulness or feeble light, someone failed to know the rope and due to the ignorance of the rope, a snake is seen. Actually, the person superimposed the snake on the piece of rope. The superimposed snake is false. By showing the same argument, the *Advaitin* proves the falsity of the world too. Similarly, the world is superimposed on *Brahman* by *māyā*, which has the twin powers of concealment, and projection.<sup>24</sup> *Māyā* through its *āvaraṇasakti* covers and hides the locus, whereas *vikṣepasakti* helps to project something as true, which is not true at all. The illusory snake is superimposed on rope which

is its locus on *adhikaraṇa* or *adhithāna* and it is on the knowledge of *adhithāna* that the superimposed object is known to be *mithyā* or false. We fail to know that the snake, which appears, is an illusory one until we have the knowledge of the *adhikaraṇa* namely the rope on which the snake is superimposed. The apparent world is being felt to be real so long as we do not have the knowledge of *Brahman*, which is its *adhikaraṇa*.

c) Ancient Ācāryas' views on jīva-Brahman identity

Āśmarathya, ancient ācārya of the *Vedānta* upholds that the relation between *jīva* and *Brahman* is *tādātmya*. According to him as the sparks issuing from a fire, are not absolutely different from the fire as they participate in the nature of the fire. On the other hand, sparks are not absolutely non-different from the fire because in such case sparks could not be distinguished neither from fire nor from each other. Similarly, the individual selves, which are effect of *Brahman*, are not absolutely different from *Brahman*. Otherwise, they are not of nature of knowledge. The souls are not absolutely non-different from *Brahman* because, in that case they could not be distinguishing from each other. Secondly, if they were identical with *Brahman* and therefore omniscient, it would be useless to give them any instruction like *Tattvamasi*. Hence, individuals are somehow different and non-different from *Brahman*. This view is known as *bhedābhedavāda*.<sup>25</sup>

According to Auḍulomi, both difference and non-difference become clearly discernible as bound up with the different states of the self under bondage and liberation. Generally being unacquainted by the contact with its different limiting adjuncts the individual self is absolutely different from the Supreme Self in the time of bondage. However, being purified means of supreme knowledge it may pass-out of the body and become one with the Supreme

Self. The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* utters-“*eṣa samprasādaḥ asmachhīrāt samuthhāya param jyotirūpasampadya svena rūpeṇābhinippadyate* (8.12.3). It is said that upto the moment of emancipation being reached the individual self and the Supreme Self are different. However, the emancipated self is no longer different from the Supreme Self, since there is no further cause of difference. The technical name of the doctrine advocated by Auḍulomi is ‘*satyabhedavāda*’.<sup>26</sup>

Kāśkr̥tsna, the another ancient *ācārya* holds the view that the non-modified Supreme Self itself is the individual self and nothing else. According to Śaṅkara the view of Kāśkr̥tsna is grasped to be in accord with the *Upaniṣads*, for it agrees with the instruction sought to be imparted as stated in such *Śruti* like ‘That thou art’ (*Ch. Up.6.8.7*) and from the view point of non-difference, the attainment of immortality as a result of the knowledge self is quite in order.

In this connection, Vācaspati (900C.E) further explained that being absolutely non-different from *Brahman* is truly the natural status of this individual self. As per example, by realising the reality of a rope one’s illusion of serpent in the rope disappears or advising a prince being grown up in a ‘*mlechha*’ family that you are the prince but not ‘*mlechha*’ the previous wrong notion of his being ‘*mlechha*’ disappeared. Similarly, ones *avidyā* gets cease and the real nature of the individual self is attained by the instruction of ‘*Tattvamasi*’ through the recognised course of *śravaṇa*, *manana*, and *nididhyāsana*. This is the view of Kāśkr̥tsna.<sup>27</sup>

d) Popular views on jīva-Brahman identity

The relation between *jīva* and *Brahman* has explained by the three different theories. They are- limitation theory, appearance theory and reflection theory. We try to explain these theories briefly.

*Avacchedavāda*: The limitation theory or *avacchedavāda* was profounded by Vācaspati Miśra. It is an attempt to establish that the individual self is nothing but the Absolute *Brahman*. Generally, this theory is explained by pot-space analogy. The space being limited by pot is defined as pot-space or *ghatākāśa*. The pot-space is nothing but a part of eternal sky. Similarly, the Universal Self limited by *antaḥkaraṇa*<sup>28</sup> is known as individual self, which is none other than the part of *Brahman*. There are many *sūtras* in favour of this limitation theory. As per example, we may say from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*- “*yathāgneḥvisphulingā vyuccarantye bamebāsmādātmanaḥ sarbam prāñāḥ sarbe lokāḥ sarbe devāḥ sarbāni vyuccarantiḥ*” (2.2.20). It means from a big fire comes out small sparks similarly from *Ātman* comes out all living beings like all men, all gods, all entities. All these various small living beings are but only parts of *Brahman*.

Now an opponent may ask that whether an individual self is really a part of *Brahman*? Is there any possibility of having any part of part less *Brahman*? If *Brahman* has parts then it will be non-eternal. On the other hand, if *jīva* becomes a part of *Brahman* then the sufferings of *jīva* will be of *Brahman* also. In reply, the *Advaitins* argue that though the individual self is not really a part of *Brahman* but it felt to be a part of part less *Brahman*. The *Advaitins* argue that, though the space is part less it appeared as *ghatākāśa*, *mathākāśa*, *patākāśa* etc. Similarly, though the individual self is not really a part of *Brahman* but it felt to be a part of part less *Brahman*. Gauḍapāda stated that as the limited sky wrongly asserted to be created or

destroyed the limited self is wrongly said to born or dead.<sup>29</sup> Following him, we may say that in spite of many pot-spaces being created when broken is unified into the eternal space. Similarly, though the individuals felt to be innumerable when released from bondage are unified in that Supreme Self. Now again one may asked that if the individuals are apparently different and truly, non-different from *Brahman* then all individuals should be mutually non-different. However, our everyday experience against this conclusion. The *Advaitins* replied that the space being one and indivisible is the same in all rooms. But the smoke and dust of one room is not felt in other rooms owing to the separate limitations of those rooms like walls etc. the sense body connection of one being different from that of others the pleasure and pain of our are not felt in other individuals.

*Ābhāsavāda*: Vidyāraṇyamuni who follows mainly the *Vivaraṇa* tradition admits a modified form of the reflection theory, which is generally reflected to as *ābhāsavāda*. While the *Vivaraṇa* School regards the reflection as real and as identical with the prototype the theory admitted in the *Pañcadaśī* holds that the reflection (*ābhāsa*) is nothing but mere appearance, an illusory manifestation. *Ābhāsa* is nothing but a seeming appearance.<sup>30</sup> It is neither identical with the underlying reality nor is itself real. According to this view, the apposition between the *jīva* and *Brahman* is through sublation (*bādha*) and not through identification. Vidyāraṇya was not the founder of *ābhāsavāda*. Before him *Vārttikāra*, Sureśwara, who was the direct disciple of Śaṅkara, suggested the doctrine of *ābhāsa*. He admitted that the reflection is unreal. Sureśwara depicted that *jīvas* are reflections of *Brahman* (*cidānvāsa*) on individual *antaḥkaraṇa* and this reflection being different from the original is a false phenomenon. Therefore, pure *cit* that runs into bondage through the *ābhāsa* will be liberated with the destruction of the *ābhāsa*. According to him, *Brahman*, through its own *māyā*,

seemed to forget its real nature and appeared as *jīva*. He gave the example of a prince who brought up by the cowboys from infancy forgot his real nature and behave like a cowboy. When the prince realizes his real nature, he received his real position. So also does *Brahman* through its own knowledge, seems to be released from the so-called bondage.

*Pratibimbavāda*: Two main views are found regarding this non-different since *bimba* and *pratibimba* are identical or non-different reflection of *Brahman*. One of them may be described in thus way-when *Brahman* is reflected in *avidyā*, the prototype or *bimba* is called *Īśvara* while its reflection or *pratibimba* is called *jīva*. The other view depicts that both *Īśvara* and *jīva* are reflection of *Brahman* in the mirror of only *avidyā* while *jīva* is the reflection of *Brahman* in the mirror of *avidyā* along with egoism. Whatever may be the difference we can say generally that reflection theory accepts that *Īśvara* as *Brahman* in a particular condition. Of being, the *bimba* or prototype to the reflection is called *jīva*. The *jīva* is the reflection of consciousness on egoism. The reflection imitates its prototype. The face reflecting in a mirror always becomes identical with the original face, otherwise we could not have identified ourselves seeing the reflection of our face in the mirror. Just as on the removal of the mirror the reflection, merge back into the original object in the same manner on the removal of the adjunct of nescience the *jīvas* are one with *Brahman*. Just as the reflections appearing in mirror are identical with prototype, in the same way *jīvas* also are identical and one with *Brahman*. The same holds good for *Īśvara*. However, with this difference that while the *jīvas* are affected by the dual potencies of *māyā* while the *Īśvara* above such influences.

Generally, the *Vivaraṇa* School upholds the theory of reflection or *pratibimbavāda*. Padmapāda (900 C.E.), Prakāśatman (1200 C.E.) and other followers of *Vivaraṇa* School advocated the theory of *pratibimbavāda*. The followers try to explain it by showing the example of face of *Caitra* and its reflection in the mirror, that self and *Brahman* are identical. Only when a mirror is taken before the face, it appears as prototype or *bimbamukha*. However, if there is no mirror and no reflection of the face, then all consider the face is pure face or *śuddhamukha*. When the face is reflected on the mirror becomes *bimbamukha*. Here technically the face is called prototype or *bimbamukha* (when there is a mirror before the face) the mirror is determinant or *upādhi*. *Upādhi* means something adventitious apparently influencing something else. The image on the mirror is called reflected face or *pratibimbamukha*. Now it would be easy to understand that the reflection of the face on a mirror and the image on the mirror is identical with the original face based on the analogy. The *Advaitins* tried to prove that Pure *Brahman* and *Īśvara* are identical and the individuals are identical with *Brahman*. According to the *Advaitins*, there is universal pure consciousness or *caitanya*. *Śuddha Brahman* is reflected on *avidyā*, which is endowed with three qualities *sattva*, *rajaḥ* and *tamaḥ*. On them *sattva* has the properties of reflection. Therefore, Pure Consciousness becomes capable of being reflected on *avidyā*. Some *Advaitins* maintain that there is one Universal Consciousness or *caitanya*, that when it becomes the prototype, it is called ‘*Īśvara* consciousness’, and then when it is reflected in an adjunct its reflection is called consciousness. In the theory of ‘one-self’ (*ekajivavada*), the nescience is the adjunct in which *Īśvara* –consciousness is reflected. In theory of ‘many-self’ (*bahujivavada*) internal organs are the adjuncts on which ‘I-consciousness’ is reflected. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (16<sup>th</sup> century) stated that the difference between the original and its reflection is apparent and not

real. Due to the mirror the face is superimposed on it, everyone accept that reflection is the same as the original. Similarly, the original and its reflection are not essentially different. Therefore, the analogy of the original and its reflection is offered to establish the identity of the self with *Brahman*.<sup>31</sup>

## References:

1. Bhattoji Diksit, *Siddhānta Kaumudī Pāniniya-Dhātupātha*:  
*Vid jñāne* under the *sūtra* N.3.4.111, D.P.N.1140, P-415  
*Vid sattāyām* under the *sūtra* n.3.1.60, D.P.N 1247, P-428  
*Vidlābhe* under the *sūtra* N.7.1.59,D.P.N 1525, P-449  
*Vid vicāraṇe* under the *sūtra* N.6.4.36, D.P.N.1544, P-445  
*Vid cetanākhyānavivaśeṣu* under the *sūtra* N.7.3.101, D.P.N.1843, P-459  
Dr. Meena P. Pathak, *A study of Taittirīya Upaniṣad* (Delhi: Bharatiya Kala Prakashan, 1999), p.5.
2. *Vidanti, jananti, vidhyante, bhavanti, vindanti, vindante, labhante, vindanti, vicarayanti, sarve manusyah satyavidyamaih yesu va tatha vidvansah ca bhavanti te vedah.* –Swami Dayananda, *Rgvedadibhasya bhumika*, ibid., p-5
3. *Sāksātkṛtadharmān ṛṣayo babhūbuḥ/ Yāska, Nirukta*, 1-20  
Yāska, *Nirukta* (Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass, 1967)
4. *Āpastamba Paribhāṣāsūtra*, 1.33  
*The Veda Bhāṣya Bhūmikā Samgraha* (a collection of all available śayana's introduction to his Vedic commentaries), ed. Acharya Baladeva Upadhyaya (Varanasi: Chaukhambha Sanskrit Sansthan, 1985), p.15.
5. *iṣṭa prāpti aniṣṭaparihārayoḥ alaukikam upāyam yo grantho vedayati sa vedah/ Śāyana's Com. on Taittirīya Samhitā*, ibid., p.2.
6. Sadānanda, *Vedāntasāra*, 3  
  
Sadānanda, *Vedāntasāra*, trans.& ed. Brahmachari Medhacaitanya (Kolkata: Adyapitha Balakashram, 2010), p.7.
7. *Upaniṣad eva pramāṇam-upaniṣat-pramāṇam, upaniṣad yatra pramāṇam iti vā/ Subodhinī of Vedāntasāra-3*, ibid., p.7.
8. ibid., p.7.
9. *Tadupakārīni –vedāntavākyasamgrahakāni yathātthyena nirupayate yah tāni śārīrakasūtrāni, athāto brahmajijñāsā (B.S.111) ityādini/ Ādi"-śabdo bhāṣyādi samgrahārthah ca śabda vedāntaśabdanusangarthah yadvā śārīrakasūtrāni,*

*tadyathārthavādi vedāntasamgrahavākyeni “athāto brahmajīñāsā” (B.S.1.1.1) ityādīni sūtrādīni ādi śabdena bhagavad- gītādyadhyātmā śāstrani gṛhante, teṣām api upaniṣacchabda vacyatvāt iti bhābhāh”//Subodhinī of Vedāntasāra-3, ibid., p.8.*

10. *vedānta-śāstretī/śāīrakamimāmsārūpacaturadhyayī-tadbhāṣya-tadīyatīkā-vācaspatya-tadīyatīkā-kalpataruḥ-tadītikā parimalrūpagranthapañcaketyearthaḥ/ Nyāyaratnāvali on siddhāntbindu*

Śaṅkarācārya, *Sankara Granthamala*, vol.3, ed. Pancanan Tarkaratna (Calcutta: Vasumati Sahityamandir, 1932), pp.43-162.

11. *Upa-ni-pūrbhasya kvip pratyayāntasya sad biśarangatyabasādaneṣu ityāsyā dhātoḥ upaniṣat itirūpam//Bālbodhinī on Vedāntasāra-3, Sadānanda, Vedāntasāra, trans.& ed. Brahmācari Medhācāitanya op.cit., p.8.*

12. *Upaṇiṣad śabdena ātmajñānam uccayate/ ibid.,p-7*

13. *yoḥoktavidyā-bodhitvād grantho’pi tad abhedātaḥ/bhaved upaṇiṣdam nāma lāngalam jīvanam yathā// Sambandahvārtika 8*

Sureśwara, *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣyavārtika*, ed. Kashinath Sastri ( Beneras: Anada Ashrama, 1892 Śakābda).

14. *Sarvopaniṣado gābo dogdhā gopālanandanah/pārtho batsya sudhīrbhoktā dugdham gītamaṭam mahat// Gitādhyānam-4*

15. *Vāṣkalinā ca bādvhah pṛṣṭah san navacanenaiva brahma provaceti srūyate-sa hovācadhihibho iti satuṣṇim babhūva tam ha dvīya vā tritīye vacana uvāca brūmah khalu tvam tu na vijānāsi upasānto’yam ātma.”-Śaṅkarabhāṣya on Brahmasūtra 3.2.17. The Brahmasūtra Sāṅkarabhāṣya with the commentaries Bhāmati, Kalpataru and Parimala, vol-2, ed. K.L.Joshi (Delhi: Parimal Publications, 2007), p.709.*

16. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaṇiṣad 2.3.6*

*Upaṇiṣat-samgraha* (containing 188 upaṇiṣads) ed. Prof. J.L. Sastri (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1970), p.97.

17. *Vedāntasāra, 1*

Sadānanda, *Vedāntasāra*, trans.& ed. Brahmācari Medhācāitanya op.cit., p.1.

18. *jātinītikulagotrādūragam/Nāmarūpagunadoṣavarjitam/Deśakālaviśayātivarti yad  
Brahma tattvamasi bāavayātmani// Vivekacūḍāmaṇi -254*
- Śrī Śaṅkārācārya, *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi*, trans. Swami Madhavananda, (Mayabati: Advaita Ashrama,2009), p.111.
19. ...*kimidam sad ityapekṣayam tallakṣanamaha-ekamiti/Avatarite lakṣaṇavākye pratham  
viśeṣaṇayor arthamaha  
svakaryeti/sajatiyasvagatabhedahinamityarthah/viśeṣaṇantaram ādāya vyakaroti-  
advitiyamititi/ vijātīyabhedasunyamityarthah// Interpretation of Ānanda Giri on  
Śaṅkarabhāṣhya of Chāndogya upaniṣad 6.2.1.  
Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, trans. Durgacharan Samkhyavedantatirthya (Kolkata:  
Devasahityakutir Pvt. Ltd., 1382 Bangābda), p.628-634.
20. *Bṛkṣasya svagato bhedaḥ patrapuṣpāphalādibhiḥ / Bṛkṣāntarāt sajātīyo vijātīyah  
śilāditaḥ/Pañcadaśī 2.20*
- Vidyāranyamuni, *Pañcadaśī*, trans. Swami Swahananda (Madras: Sri Ramakrishna Math,1975), p.38.
21. *Janmyādasya yatoḥ/ Brahmasūtra 1.1.2.*
- The Brahmasutra Sāṅkarabhāṣya with the commentaries Bhamati, Kalpataru and Parimala*, vol-1, ed. K.L.Joshi, op.cit., p.83.
22. *Vyabahārika sattā*— it is illustrated by this world of our day-to-day experience. This world appearance has much a higher degree of reality and lasts till one gets realization of Truth.
23. Nirodbaran Chakrobarty, *The Advaita Concept of Falsity: A Critical Study* (Calcutta: Sanskrit College,1967), p.1.
24. *Ajñānasyāvarenaḥvikṣepanamakamasti śaktidvayam/ Vedāntasāra -50*
- Sadānanda, *Vedāntasāra*, trans.& ed. Brahmācari Medhacaitanya op.cit., p.73.
25. *Bhāmati on Brahmasūtra 1.4.20*
- The Brahmasutra Sāṅkarabhāṣya with the commentaries Bhamati, Kalpataru and Parimala*, ed. K.L.joshi, op.cit., p.415.

26. *Bhāmati* on *Brahmasūtra* 1.4.21, *ibid.*, p.416.
27. *Bhāmati* on *Brahmasūtra* 1.4.22, *ibid.*, p.416-417.
28. *Antaḥkaraṇa*: intellect or mind, which is transformed into the form of an object that comes in contact with a sense organ at the time of perception.
29. *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā* 3.3
- Upaniṣad*, trans. swami Lokeswarananda (Calcutta: Anada Publishers Pvt. Limited, 1999), p. 381.
30. *Pañcadaśī* 6.11.  
Vidyāranyamuni, *Pañcadaśī*, trans. Swami Swahananda, *op.cit.*, p.129.
31. P.S. Roodurmun, *Bhamati and Vivarana Schools of Advaita Vedanta A Critical Approach* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 2002), p.138.