

Third Chapter

Metaphysical Significance of *Tattvamasi* from the *Advaitic* point of view

Tattvamasi or ‘that art thou’ was advised nine times in section 8th to 16th of chapter 6th of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*. It was well-known instruction about the Supreme Reality given to Śvetaketu by his father Uddālaka in ever-memorable words. Uddālaka advised in the beginning, that the modifications of things are dependent on mere words, a name only. The Supreme Self, the only *sat*, one without second, projecting name and form by entering first into fire, water and earth, the manifoldness of the world is mere phenomenal.¹ Uddālaka produces nine arguments with analogies to establish the nature of being and individual self is essentially of the nature of *Brahman*. Each of nine arguments ends with the famous passage-

“*Aitādātmyamidam sarvam tat satyam sa ātmā tattvamasi Śvetaketu.*”(Ch.Up.6.8.7)

It means –that existence which is this extremely subtle thing, is the self of this entire universe. That Reality is the Self that thou art Śvetaketu. Uddālaka told to Śvetaketu that he is *ātman*, and that all this is *ātman*, the very subtle essence, the *sat*. Gobindānanda (17th century), the author of *Ratnaprabhā*, the famous gloss on *Śārīraka-bhāṣya* explains the text ‘*tattvamasi*’ as-“...*na asi tvam samsāri, kintu tattvamasi...*”² The message of this section is- Śvetaketu not just a *samsāri* but the unconditional *sat*, the Supreme *Brahman*, the Self of all. Actually Uddālaka did not just teach monism of being in a general form rather he wanted to led his son to apply the teaching to himself to include himself consciously in the fact of the Universal one, to identify himself with the truth ‘That art thou’.

Section-I

Vākya and its types

Before we enter into a detailed critical discussion on the purport of *mahāvākya* we at first try to compare and contrast it with *vākya* or ordinary sentence. A sentence is a unit of words, which express our thoughts meaningfully. The collection of words in a sentence is such that it does not leave the hearer in the eager expectation of hearing more to get information complete in itself. A sentence may be defined as follows: "... sentence is a means of valid knowledge in which the relation that is the object of its intention is not contradicted by any other means of valid knowledge."³ A sentence is not mere a combination of words.

Generally, every sentence has at least two words-a subject and a predicate. A sentence with an intransitive verb requires a minimum of two words. A sentence with a transitive verb requires a minimum of three words. Both these types are called simple sentence. By nature, ordinary sentence is always relational. As per example, '*pustakam ānaya*' or 'bring a book' expresses a kind of knowledge providing relation among the book i.e. '*pustakapadārtha*', the object i.e. '*karma padārtha*' and activity of bringing i.e. '*ānayan kriyā*'. These types of sentences are called relational sentences or '*saṃsṛṣṭārthavākya*'. Technically they are defined as-'*saṃsarga gocara pratīijanakam*'⁴. Besides this type of relational sentences, we find other types of sentences, which are non-relational in nature. Such types of sentences never produce any relational meanings. They only establish the '*svarūpmātratva*' or identity between subject and predicate. These types of identity sentences are known as '*akhaṇḍārthakavākya*' or non-relational sentences. They are defined as '*saṃsarga-agocara-pratīijanakam*'.⁵ *Saṃsṛṣṭārtha-vākya*s are of two types in nature-

- *Bheda-saṃsargārthaka*
- *Abheda –saṃsargārthaka*

As per example –‘*pustaka ānaya*’ this types of sentence are ‘*bheda-saṃsargārthaka*’ and a paper is white is an example of ‘*abheda-saṃsargārthaka*’. Following Āpadeva (C.1580-1650 C.E.), the commentator of *Vedāntasāra*, we are going to explain this type of sentence. Sarvajñātmamuni (9th century), the author of *Samkeśapaśārīraka*, Āpadeva, the commentator of *Vedāntasāra* cited the example of ‘*prakṛṣṭaparakāśa candraḥ*’. One may argue that this type of sentence is also relational in nature. Here the *viśeṣya* ‘*candraḥ*’ is being characterized by *viśeṣaṇa* ‘*prakṛṣṭa prakāśatva*’. Undoubtedly, the sentence produces a relation between moon and bright illumination. However, the *Advaitins* producing their own view try to establish this. Being innocent one may ask: In this sky which is the moon? The answer from a knowledgeable person is thus: ‘The brightest object in the sky is the moon’. Here obviously the answer does not refer to any quality of the moon, nor the rational nature of the moon, which shines with the excelling brightness-only the moon is indicated and not the senses of those words themselves. Thus, the sentence has an impartatite sense of the identity of the moon. The word ‘*prakṛṣṭa*’ cannot express any relation rather it simply identifies ‘*candraḥ*’ with ‘*prakṛṣṭaparakāśaḥ*’. Like ‘*prakṛṣṭa prakāśaḥcandraḥ*’ the sentence ‘*so’yam Devadattaḥ*’, ‘*Tattvamasi*’ etc. are ‘*akhaṇḍārthavodhakavākya*’. We should keep in mind that all *mahāvākya*s are ‘*akhaṇḍārthavodhakavākya*’ but not all ‘*akhaṇḍārthavodhakavākya*’ are *mahāvākya*. ‘*Prakṛṣṭa-prakāśaḥ candraḥ*’ is an *akhaṇḍārthavodhakavākya* but not *mahāvākya*.

The *Advaitins* declare the identity of *jīva* with *Brahman* based on *mahāvākya* like *Tattvamasi*. However, it is our common assumption that the literal meaning of ‘*Tat*’ significantly differs from that of ‘*tvam*’. The former denotes the meaning of consciousness characterized by indirectness

and infinity. The word ‘*Tat*’ stands for the ultimate metaphysical principle, all encompassing and one without a second. It also signifies that is something transcending experience, remote and mediately cognised. On the other hand, ‘*tvam*’ signifies the individual self, that is immediate, self-revealing and is also related with all the finitude and imperfections of mundane life. According to Vidyāraṇyamuni (14th century), the direct meaning of the word ‘*Tat*’ is pure consciousness with *māyā* and reflection of consciousness in it. On the other hand, ‘*tvam*’ stands for the consciousness, which is limited by the adjunct, the inner organ and the object of the idea and word. The word ‘is’ stands for the relation between ‘*Tat*’ and ‘*tvam*’.⁶None can deny the fact that ‘*prakāśattva*’ and ‘*aparakāśattva*’, ‘*sarvajñatva*’ and ‘*alpajñatva*’ are opposed in nature. So their identity, which is the intentionality of *mahāvākya*, can never be literally achieved. Neither *Brahman* can be one without a second and still be one with the individual self, which is supposed to be one entity among many entities limiting by their very being, nor the individual self, which is immediate and self-manifesting in all experience be one with *Brahman* supposed to be transcendent of immediate experience. Therefore, a simple identification of the two –the limited and the Absolute, is impossible because of the incompatibility of the characteristic attributed to the two. Now the question arises with be regard to the establishment of the identity of two different entities. *Tattvamasi*, which expresses non-relational identity (*akhaṇḍārtha*), is explicated by means of three relations. As it is said-

Sāmānādhikaraṇyam ca viśaṇaviśeṣyatā/

Lakṣyalakṣyaṇasambandhaḥ padārthapratyagātmanām// (Citsukhī)

These three relations are-

- *Sāmānādhikaraṇya* (coordination)
- *Viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva* (relation between attribute and substance)

- *Lakṣya-lakṣaṇā-bhāva* (relation between indicated and indicator)

The significance of the text *Tattvamasi* may be understood by means of three kinds of relations. We are going to explain the nature of these relations in our next section to present the fullness of knowledge of *Tattvamasi*.

Section-II

Akhaṇḍārtha and the three relations

a) Sāmānādhikaraṇyam

Nṛsiṃha Sarasvatī (16th century), the author of *Subodhinī* the famous gloss of *Vedāntasāra* defines *Sāmānādhikaraṇya* as-“*bhinna-pravṛtti-nimittayoḥ ekasmin arthe pravṛtṭiḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyam*”.⁷ It means when two words having different denotative meanings, are used to stand for one *akhaṇḍārtha*, they have to be in the same relation of *Sāmānādhikaraṇya*. *Sāmānādhikaraṇya* is the relationship between two words having the same locus. It exists between two words with the same case endings or termination conveying one whatever may be the difference in their connotation. To start with, we must have two terms with different imports. The initial divergence of meanings must be overcome by fusion of significance affected by the unitary force of the proposition. The *Advaitins* tried to expound this kind of relation with the help of mundane example-‘This is that Devadatta’ or ‘*So’yam Devadattaḥ*’. None can deny that through the sentence ‘This is that Devadatta’ an identity is established, and the identity is achieved through the contradictory expressions ‘that’ and ‘this’. We know from our acquaintance with the *Sanskṛit* language that the word ‘that’ signifies ‘Devadatta of a past time and of a distant place’ where as ‘this’ signifies ‘Devadatta of the present time and of the

contiguous place'. If such interpretation is reached through the primary function (*abhidhā*) of the words of the sentence, contradiction is inevitable, but none can deny the fact that inspite of such apparent contradiction the sentence indicates in the identity of 'Devadatta of past time and distant place' and 'Devadatta of present time and contiguous place'. Here in two cases, the connotation of being different in tense, one may presume that 'that' and 'this' respectively distinguish 'Devadatta' of a past time from that of a present time. However observing the grammatical agreement between the two words, we can conclude both the words are intended to refer one and the same person called namely 'Devadatta'. Similarly, it occurs in the case of the *Vedic* dictum '*Tattvamasi*'. Here '*Tat*' and '*tvam*' are different words. Their denotative meanings are different. Here the word '*Tat*' signifies consciousness which is characterized by the quality of invisibility remoteness, omniscience etc. and the word '*tvam*' signifies consciousness characterized by the quality of visibility, immediacy, limited knowledge etc. though their difference in connotation. Both '*Tat*' and '*tvam*' appear to be different things. However, both refer to one and the same *Brahman*. Actually, the '*śakyatāvachhedaka*' or '*pravṛtti-nimittaḥ*' or denotative meaning of '*Tat*' is *parokṣatva-sarvajñatvādi-viśiṣṭa-caitanya* and the denotative meaning of '*tvam*' is *aparokṣatva-ālpajñatvādi-viśiṣṭa-caitanya*. However, both of the two words refer to same consciousness as their locus. Now noticing grammatical agreement between '*Tat*' and '*tvam*', we may say that these two refer to the same consciousness or *Brahman*.⁸ An objection may be raised: is the *sāmānādhikarāṇya* to be understood in the sense of '*abheda*' or '*bheda*'? Is there any stronger argument in favour of the one rather than the other? *Sāmānādhikarāṇya* may occur for the *bhādha-nimittaka*. As per example-'*ya sarpaḥ sa rajjuḥ*'. Here the words '*sarpaḥ*' and '*rajjuḥ*' being in the first case ending are known to have *sāmānādhikarāṇya*. Here the '*tātparyā*' does not enshrined in the *abheda* of two rather the

sāmānādhikaraṇya is due to *bādha*. *Sarpa* is contradicted by the *rajju*. Similar thing may occur in the case of *Tattvamasi*.

Tat = *Brahman* who is *asaṁsārī*

Tvam = *jīva* who is *saṁsārī*

Here identity is impossible. Here *sāmānādhikaraṇya* is *bādha-nimittaka*. Vivaraṇācārya counters this problem. According to him, *pratibimba* cannot differ from *bimba*. Infact they are identical. Though the *śakyatāvachchedaka* of ‘*Tat*’ and ‘*tvam*’ are different, they both indicate one undivided consciousness. The author of the *Bālabodhinī* further added-“*samānavibhakyantayoḥ padayoḥ ekasmin arthe tātparyam sāmānādhikaraṇyam ityārthaḥ*”. Therefore, their intended meaning may be understood in the sense of *abheda* only.

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in his famous writings ‘*Advaitasiddhi*’ classified *sāmānādhikaraṇya* into four main types-⁹

- *Adhyāsa-sāmānādhikaraṇyam*
- *Bādhasāmānādhikaraṇyam*
- *Viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyabhāva-sāmānādhikaraṇyam*
- *Abheda-sāmānādhikaraṇyam*

Now the question arises which of them will be adequate to bring out the true significance of *Tattvamasi*? *Adhyāsa* is the apprehension of something as something else. When we see a snake in place of a piece of rope mistakenly, we express our cognition in the form-‘this is snake’. The statement is due to erroneous cognition. As the main aim of *mahāvākya* is to remove the false knowledge, it cannot be interpreted as *adhyāsa-sāmānādhikaraṇya*. If it is further argued that this type of *sāmānādhikaraṇya* can be applied to the *Tattvamasi*, then the *mahāvākya* should

have been in the form ‘this is *Brahman*’ or ‘this is *jīva*’. But the *mahāvākyas* are always in the form *jīva is Brahman*. Hence, the *mahāvākya* cannot be interpreted through *adhyāsasāmānādhikaraṇyam*, which is nothing but erroneous cognition. In the case of *bādha sāmānādhikaraṇyam*, someone mistakes ‘the trunk of a tree to be a man’. Another man corrects him by saying that the ‘the object is tree’. The statement intends to show that the object is only ‘a trunk of a tree’. The terms ‘trunk’ and ‘man’ are contradictory related. Yet on hearing the statement the man who has misunderstood the ‘trunk of a tree to be a man’, corrects him by giving up the object ‘man’. Therefore, the coordinate relation, which exists between the terms ‘trunk of a tree’ and ‘man’ in the above statement is in terms of contradiction. If we accept this type of coordinate relation of *sāmānādhikaraṇya* in interpreting the *Tattvamasi* (which expresses the *jīva-Brahman* identity), we have to give up either the *jīva* or *Brahman*. If one of them is to give up by this process, then the purpose of *Tattvamasi* is lost. For instance, if *Brahman* is abandoned by this process, the purport of the *mahāvākya*, that the ‘*jīva* is nothing but *Brahman*’ is lost. The well-known example of ‘*viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyabhāva-sāmānādhikaraṇya sambandha*’ or coordinate relation of substansive attribute is the ‘blue lotus’ (*nīlam utpalam*). The expression denotes one and the same thing which being a lotus has also the attribute of blueness. Generally, adjective differentiates objects from one another, which are belonging to the same class. In the case of blue lotus, there are many individuals having the colour of red, white etc. in the class lotus. Therefore, when we predicate a quality like blue of a particular individual of this class, the adjective ‘blue’ distinguishes it from others of different colours as well as negates the application of other adjectives. In spite of the two words, ‘blue’ and ‘lotus’ have different connotations, they have the same denotation. No doubt it is a case of linguistic identity although there is a

difference between the 'lotus' and the 'blueness'. Where and how can this type of relation involving the 'substantive-attribute relation' be applied to the *Tattvamasi*?

To eradicate this type of doubt the *Advaitins* are going to ask between the two words referring to 'Tat' (*Brahman*) and 'tvam' (*ātman*), which is the substance and which is the attribute? Neither 'Tat' nor 'tvam' can be considered as *guṇa* or attribute for only insentient things are attributes of something else. Secondly, since *Brahman* is unique, there is no use of applying adjectives to it. If *Brahman* be considered as a known object (*prasiddha*) then adjectives applied to *Brahman* will be meaningful. However, since *Brahman* is not such an object any number of adjectives to it is meaningless. In substance-attribute relation, the identity is of relational identity. However, in the case of '*Tattvamasi*' the identity that is referred to be a non-relational unitary identity. Therefore, *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyabhāva sāmānādhikaraṇya* cannot be applied to the *Tattvamasi*.

We may explain the *Abheda sāmānādhikaraṇya* with the help of well-known example of 'So'yam *Devadattaḥ*'. Devadatta whom had seen a few years ago at a certain place now is seen today at a different place under other circumstances. After a careful looking, we recognize that he is the same Devadatta. Here we overlook the essential differences and emphasize the essential identity of the same person, 'Devadatta'. In spite of difference in respect of time, place, circumstances the identity of the Devadatta is established. Similarly, the well-known illustration of real identity as advised in the *Upaniṣad* is 'thou art that'. Hearing the import of the expression from the teacher, being conceived by the arguments in favour and last by meditating upon this the student attains the truth that *jīva* is identical with *Brahman*.

b) *Viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyabhāva*:

The second relation is that of *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyabhāva*. Sadānanda tries to relate the meanings of

the two terms as ‘*viśeṣaṇa*’ and ‘*viśeṣya*’ i.e. as attribute and substance. In the same sentence, “*So’yam Devadattaḥ*”, the meaning of the term ‘*sah*’ (that) is Devadatta existing in the past and the meaning of ‘*ayam*’ (this) is Devadatta existing in the present. These two are contrary concepts but they qualify each other as they indicate one and the same ‘Devadatta’. Similarly, in the sentence, ‘*Tattvamasi*’ there is a relation between the consciousness characterized by mediacy etc., as indicated by the term ‘*Tat*’, and the consciousness characterized by immediacy etc., as indicated by the term ‘*tvam*’. Though they are contrary concepts, still they qualify each other to signify a common substratum. Thus, the *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyabhāva* relation is constituted here between *Tat* and *tvam*.¹⁰

c) *Lakṣaṇā*

The third relation through which this identity is established is known as *lakṣaṇā*. According to *Advaitins*, the identity of *jīva* and *Brahman*, which is the intention of the *Śruti*, communicated through *lakṣaṇā*. Generally, words have two types of meanings:

- Primary meaning
- Secondary meaning

What is directly meant by a word is its primary meaning. It is known through its inherent potency. However, there are some exceptional situations. If primary meaning of a word has taken in account, then the expression sometimes would turn out to be meaningless. Now in order to make such expressions meaningful, we have to take to some other meaning of the word to solve the problem. However, newly accepted meaning must be related to the original primary meaning of the word. Primary meaning is something, which is directly meant by a word. An implied or secondary meaning is something, which is implied by a word indirectly. If the primary meaning

of the words of a sentence were inadequate for the apprehension of their logical connection and its import then implied meaning should be accepted. As per example, the city mourned over the death over the king. Here the word ‘city’ implied citizens. In other words, if primary meaning is incomprehensible (*mukhyārtha-bādha*) then we look for the secondary one.

According to the author of the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* the intention of the sentence rather than the logical connection of the words that compels us to take implication or secondary meaning of words or sentences.¹¹ However, the root of implication is the frustration of intention alone, and not the logical connection of words. As per example, we discuss the famous example of ‘*kākebhyo dadhi rakṣyatām*’. In this sentence, there is no logical inconsistency between the words. However, here the intention of the speaker is that the protections of curd not only from the crows but also from other creatures like dogs and cats that may soil the curd. Here the implication is urgent not for logical inconsistency but for the intention. *Vedāntins* claimed that sentences as well as the words have implied meanings or secondary meanings or *lakṣaṇā*.

Lakṣaṇā can be divided three types-

- *Jahat*
- *Ajahat*
- *Jahadajahat*

In the case of *jahat lakṣaṇā*, primary meaning is totally abandoned and it substitutes a new meaning, which has connection with literal meaning.¹² As per example ‘*Gangāyām ghoṣaḥ*’. There is a cowherd colony on the bank of the river. Here the direct meaning of the river is the stream of water or *jalaprabāha*. The meaning is discarded as there cannot be a village on the river of *Ganges*. Therefore, we compel to accept an implied meaning-‘the village of cowherd

colony is on the bank of *Ganges*'-though the latter meaning is altogether distinct from the former. Here the primary meaning is excluded and some other meaning, which is other than primary sense, is accepted. The direct meaning of '*Ganges*' i.e. the stream of water is replaced by the indirect meaning the bank. The village on the '*Ganges*' is a classic example of the primary meaning to be rejected. The meaning for treating it as an example of the primary meaning to be rejected. The meaning for treating it as an example of *jahallakṣaṇā* is that the village and river *Ganges* stand to each other as the supported and supporter relationship (*ādhāra-ādheya-sambandha*). When it is interpreted literally, the primary meaning does not hold good. In the primary sense, the word '*Ganges*' refers to the flow of water and not to the bank so we are leaving the primary meaning(*Ganges*) and take the bank which is associated with the river *Ganges*, as the secondary one. Now there is no contradiction in understanding the meaning of this expression.

In some cases the literal meaning unable to generate the meaning in the true sense of the term therefore it is required something extra besides the literal meaning.¹³ Here the denotative meaning is not given up and the implied meaning includes the primary meaning too. As per example '*Śvetaḥ dhāvanti*'-the white colour is running. It is impossible for an action like running to be present in a quality like white colour. The action like running can be possible only in a qualified substance. Now to make the expression sensible we are to mean by 'white' something like 'white horse'. We get the meaning of the sentence by associating a white horse with the white colour. When we add a suitable meaning to understand the sentence without abandoning the primary meaning, it is called *ajahallakṣaṇā*. In such cases, something extra is taken into account after retaining the primary meaning. The term means 'coloured entity' i.e. horse.

In *jahadajahallakṣaṇā* some part of the expressed sense of the sentence is accepted and partly is abandoned.¹⁴ Here the expressed sense of the sentence is partly included and partly excluded. As per example, ‘*So’yam Devadattaḥ*’ or ‘this is that Devadatta’. Here the general meaning of the sentence is thus-‘this is the man whom I had met before is seen at this time in this place’. The primary meaning of ‘that Devadatta’ is the Devadatta seen at some other time in some other place. The expressive meaning of spatio-temporal difference is given up and another portion of the expressed meaning that remains and conveys the idea of the same Devadatta is taken up. Their identity points to a single individual devoid of the temporal and spatial qualifier.

The meanings of two words are partially given up and partially accepted by means of *bhāgatyāgalakṣaṇā*. In the case of *Tattvamasi*, the conflicting qualities like *parokṣatva*, *sarvajñatva*, *aparokṣatva*, and *alpajñatva* respectively are given up. There is the relation of identity with another portion conveying the idea of pure consciousness. After the discussion of the text, *Tattvamasi* leaves the conclusion that the import of that statement can be established by *bhāgatyāgalakṣaṇā* as in the example of ‘*So’yam Devadattaḥ*’ or its meaning. Though the two expressions ‘that’ and ‘this’ denote by their primary meaning ‘Devadatta of past time and distant place’ and ‘Devadatta of present time and contiguous place’ respectively we can easily establish the identity of Devadatta. Because of the contradictions involved in one part of their import (Devadatta as existing in the past and in the present) implies, by abandoning the conflicting portion, which has reference to time and place, only the non-conflicting portion i.e. the man Devadatta. Similarly, in the sentence, ‘that art thou’ or its meaning, because of the contradictions involved in one part of their import, the identity of consciousness cannot be obtained. In the sentence, ‘*Tattvamasi*’ or its meaning, on account of the contradictions involved in one part of their import, the identity of consciousness cannot be obtained. However, abandoning that

contradictory portion which has relation to invisibility, visibility etc; their remains only absolute pure consciousness which is common to both 'Tat' and 'tvam'. This proves the identity of *jīva* and *Brahman*, which is the real purport of the *Upaniṣadic* dictum, *Tattvamasi*.

An opponent holds the view that the meaning of the words 'Tat' and 'tvam' in the sentence *Tattvamasi* may be established in the manner of the phrase like the blue lotus without taking the help of *bhāgalakṣaṇā*.

However, the words 'nīlam' and 'utpalam' are themselves distinguished from each other, yet by virtue of their position in the phrase they qualify each other pointing to the one and the same object *utpalam*. In the phrase 'nīlam utpalam'-the meaning of the word 'nīlam' is the blue colour excludes other colours such as white etc. and the meaning of the word 'utpalam' is flower called lotus which excludes other objects like cloths etc. they respectively excludes other colour and things. Thus, the two words mutually stand in the relation of qualifier and qualified and this relation means their mutual qualification or their unity since it does not contradict any other means of knowledge the interpretation of the sentence is admissible. Blue lotus indicates neither all lotuses nor all blue things. Here the blue lotus means that lotus, which is blue, and that blue colour which is associated with the lotus is only indicated. This interpretation does not contradict any other means of knowledge, like direct perception etc., therefore 'nīlam utpalam' can be well understood without taking the help of *bhāgatyaḡalakṣaṇā*.

However, application of *bhāgatyaḡalakṣaṇā* is necessary here. The word 'Tat' indicates the consciousness characterized by invisibility and another word 'tvam' indicates consciousness which characterized by visibility etc. these two objects possess mutually contradictory qualities. Hence any mutual relationship of qualifier and qualified between them cannot be possible like

‘*nīlam utpalam*’. In the sentence ‘*nīlam utpalam*’, the ‘*nīlatva*’ refers to the *guṇa* (quality) and ‘*utpalatva*’ refers to *dravya* (substance), whereas in the case of *tattvamasi* both ‘*Tat*’ and ‘*tvam*’ refer to *dravya* only. Therefore, the relation of *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyabhāva* does not suitable in the case of *Tattvamasi*.¹⁵

Moreover, these ‘*Tat*’ and ‘*tvam*’ together by the relationship of *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyabhāva* conflicts with other perceptual knowledge itself. It is known by perception that is of partial knowledge, partial power etc. but everyone know that *Īśvara* is omniscient, omnipotent etc. *jīva* is visible whereas *Īśvara* is invisible. No doubt, the features of *Īśvara* conveyed by the word ‘*Tat*’ does not found in *jīva* conveyed by the word ‘*tvam*’. Therefore, an application of *bhāgatyaḡalakṣaṇā* is essential to find out the import of *Tattvamasi*.

Since these two ideas eliminate their mutual distinction stand to each other in the relation of qualifier and qualified meaning their mutual qualification of their unity; it involves a contradiction with direct perception and other means of knowledge and therefore is consistent. Therefore, there cannot be any mutual relationship of qualifier and qualified between them, as in the phrase ‘*nīlam utpalam*’ because they are contradictory ideas and their co-existence in the same individual is unthinkable.¹⁶

The author of *Pañcadaśī* uttered clearly, that we can obtain the correct meaning of ‘*Tattvamasi*’ by the application of *bhāgalakṣaṇā* but neither by the union of two ideas (*samsarga*) nor by their mutual qualification (*viśiṣṭa*). The real meaning of this sentence is the *akhaṇḍarasa*.¹⁷

Now one may ask that whether it is consistent to be regarded *Tattvamasi* as an instance of *jahalllakṣaṇā*? To eradicate this doubt Sadānanda gave some serious explanations. In

jahallakṣaṇā, primary meaning of the terms requires to be completely given up; from our previous discussion, we know that ‘the bank’ becomes the secondary meaning of the word ‘*Gangā*’. Unlike ‘*Gangāyām ghoṣaḥ*’, *jahallakṣaṇā* cannot be applicable to the expression *Tattvamasi* because in the case of *Tattvamasi* contradiction has found partly as regards the visibility of ‘*Tat*’ and invisibility of ‘*tvam*’, but on the part of consciousness they are identical. Here the part of Pure Consciousness, which never involves any contradiction, should not be given up. Therefore, we cannot accept *jahallakṣaṇā* where primary meaning is totally given up.¹⁸

The opponent may argue that in the example of ‘*Gangāyām ghoṣaḥ*’ the word ‘*Gangā*’ giving up its primary meaning i.e. flow of water denotes ‘the bank’. In the same way, the word ‘*Tat*’ having given up its primary meaning consciousness may secondarily denote divine consciousness which is the primary meaning of the word ‘*tvam*’. Likewise, the word ‘*tvam*’ may secondarily denote divisible individual consciousness by abandoning its own primary meaning. Therefore, the identity between ‘*Tat*’ and ‘*tvam*’ can be established by *lakṣaṇā* of anyone of the word ‘*Tat*’ and ‘*tvam*’ and then *jahallakṣaṇā* would not be inconsistent.

However, this proposal cannot be accepted for the following reason: in the case of ‘*Gangāyām ghoṣaḥ*’ the term ‘*Gangā*’ does not indicate to the meaning of ‘bank’. This meaning can only be conveyed through *jahallakṣaṇā*. However, in the case of *Tattvamasi* the word ‘*Tat*’ and ‘*tvam*’ and their meaning *Īśvara* and *jīva* are explicit. Hence, there is no need of the perception of the sense of each by the other means of *lakṣaṇā*. Further, in the example cited to explain *jahallakṣaṇā* the village and the river *Ganges* stand to each other as the sustained and the sustainer. However, such is not the case between ‘*that*’ and ‘*thou*’. It is altogether absurd to consider the words ‘*that*’ and ‘*thou*’ literally in the sense of container and contained respectively.¹⁹

In the case of *ajahallakṣaṇā* the *vācyārtha* does not totally abandon like *jahallakṣaṇā* rather, it provides a scope of inclusion of additional factors for clear comprehension. The literal meaning is consistent in the sentence ‘*Soṇaḥ dhāvati*’. As ‘*soṇaḥ*’ is nothing but mere a quality, it cannot run. This inconsistency can be removed without giving up the meaning of the term ‘*soṇaḥ*’ by interpreting it to mean an animal like horse of that colour. ‘*soṇaḥ dhāvati*’-in this case contradiction is removed by the additional word locus of redness. However, in the case of *Tattvamasi*, *ajahallakṣaṇā* is not possible because of abandoning the contradictory portion. Even in the case of bringing some additional factors, the present contradiction cannot be removed. *Ajahallakṣaṇā* is applicable in such cases like ‘*soṇaḥ dhāvati*’, ‘white flag is running’ etc. But in the case of *Tattvamasi* the literal meaning conveying identical consciousness is self contradictory as both of them are associated with invisibility, visibility etc. relating this meaning something else connected with it may be implied, but still the contradiction persists there in, therefore here *ajahallakṣaṇā* is not applicable.²⁰

An opponent may propose: either of the words ‘*Tat*’ or ‘*tvam*’ may abandon the contradictory portion of its meaning that of invisibility or visibility respectively and remaining the other non-contradictory portion of consciousness to indicate the meaning of ‘*Tat*’ and ‘*tvam*’. There will be no need of accepting *bhāgalakṣaṇā*. After the discussion of the text, *Tattvamasi* leaves the conclusion that the import of that statement can be established by *bhāgatyaḡgalakṣaṇā* as in the example of ‘*So’yam Devadattaḥ*’ or its meaning. Though the two expressions ‘that’ and ‘this’ denote by their primary meaning ‘Devadatta of past time and distant place’ and ‘Devadatta of present time and contiguous place’ respectively we can easily establish the identity of Devadatta. Because of the contradictions involved in one part of their import (Devadatta as

existing in the past and in the present) implies, by abandoning the conflicting portion, which has reference to time and place, only the non-conflicting portion i.e. the man Devadatta. Similarly, in the sentence, ‘ that art thou’ or its meaning, on account of the contradictions involved in one part of their import, the identity of consciousness cannot be obtained by abandoning that contradictory portion which has relation to invisibility, visibility etc; their remains only absolute Pure Consciousness which is common to both ‘*Tat*’ and ‘*tvam*’. This proves the identity of *jīva* and *Brahman*, which is the real purport of the *Upaniṣadic* dictum, *Tattvamasi*.

The opponent wanted to say here that the word ‘*Tat*’ giving up the contradictory portion of its meaning like omniscience etc. denote only the non-contradictory portion i.e. Pure Consciousness. Then it can be combined with the import of the word ‘*tvam*’, which is individual consciousness with all its limitations. On the other hand, the word ‘*tvam*’ giving up the contradictory portion of its meaning like partial knowledge etc., and combine the non-conflicting portion, i.e. Pure Consciousness, with the import of the word ‘*Tat*’. Hence, there is no necessity of admitting a third category of *lakṣaṇā*. In this way by having recourse to refusal of primary import like *jahallakṣaṇā* and admittance of additional factors like *ajahallakṣaṇā* we can justify the case of *Tattvamasi*.²¹

However, hardcore *Advaitins* deny the possibility of such proposal. It is impossible to denote by one word the partial meaning of its own along with the entire meaning of the other. When the meaning is directly expressed by other word, it does not require the application of *lakṣaṇā* to the first word to indicate it. It is clear that the word ‘that’ cannot simultaneously mean Pure Consciousness and individual consciousness. Therefore, objection is not admissible here.²² Again, since the word, ‘*Tat*’ and ‘*tvam*’ clearly express their respective meanings it is

absurd to try to get the meanings of each from the other by resorting to *lakṣaṇā*. We cannot admit the applicability of two types of *lakṣaṇā* in one word. Therefore, we have to admit now the third category of *lakṣaṇā* to justify the case of *Tattvamasi* that can establish the unity of the Universal Self and the individual self.²³

Section-III

Tradition-break interpretation of Dharmarājā Adhvarīndra

Dharmarājā (1600 C.E.), the author of *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* differs from the traditional *Advaitins* regarding the interpretation of *Tattvamasi*. He does not accept any secondary implication to interpret *Tattvamasi*, though only a part of the denotation is accepted as the purport. His eagerness not to accept any types of *lakṣaṇā* to interpret such type's sentences like 'thou art that' or 'this is that Devadatta'. Perhaps, Dharmarājā believed that there would not be any type of contradiction in taking the reference to the substrates as the primary sense of the words. He himself cites the example of 'pot is eternal'. Here pot denotes both 'individual pot' and the 'potness'. Universal potness is an attribute of individual pot. Words refer to both the substantive and the attribute. Here 'irrespective of the qualification, the predication only holds good of the bare subject'. Therefore, secondary qualification is unnecessary. Non-eternality does not belong to the potness, but only to the pot. The qualification or attribute 'potness' is not urgent to the interpretation of the sentence. There is syntactical relation of non-eternity with what is competent i.e. the bare pot. In the sentence like 'bring the pot', the word 'pot' does not mean the universal potness, which is an attribute of the pot. Rather we mean the individual substance pot and for this, we do not apply *lakṣaṇā* here. Similarly, it occurs in the case of 'thou art that'. It can be explained by the primary

meaning 'thou' in the sentence 'thou art that' signifies consciousness with the attributes of bodily states of joy and sorrow, etc; whereas 'that' denotes consciousness with the attributes of omniscience and bliss. When 'thou' is said to be identical with 'that', identity of the substantives is to be posited ignoring the attributes. 'Thou' and 'that' do not refer to the attributes but to the substantives and hence their identity can very well be explained with reference to their primary meaning. Dharmarājā says that previous philosopher's position with respect to the statement 'thou art that' as involving *lakṣaṇā* should be understood as 'a tentative admission' in the course of argument '*abhyaupagamavadnabodya*' or a position, which is not finally acceptable. However, in the case of 'pot is eternal', the primary meaning of 'pot' is given up. The 'potness' is eternal in relation to the predicate. The expression 'that thou art' resembles more with 'pot is eternal'. If the 'pot' predicate holds good only of the bare subject without the qualification that is irrelevant than 'that' and 'thou' are referred only by the primary sense of the words and there would be no urgency for any secondary implication or *lakṣaṇā*. If we do so, we must have to be compelled to interpret even such simple statement like 'bring the pot' by secondary implication or *lakṣaṇā* since 'potness' which cannot be brought has to be discarded.²⁴

Generally, Dharmarājā is charged with inconsistency. As an *Advaitin*, he should maintain to the theory that a term primarily refers the class or the *jāti*. As per example, 'pot' would refer 'potness' for its primary sense. Without recourse to implication, how can this be regarded in 'pot is non-eternal' in the statement 'pot is eternal'. One who denies implication in interpreting this statement in this way must not be an *Advaitin* who always keep the view that the primary meaning of a term is its *jāti*. Therefore, pot cannot be a particular. Dharmarājā argues that 'pot' and its primary sense 'potness' is the subject. It is clear to all that 'pot' is not potness but bare

particular. Thus, either Dharmarājā surrenders the *Advaitic* position regarding the primary sense of terms or accepts traditional view.

Section –IV

Metaphysical import of *Tattvamasi*

Vācaspati Mīśra (9th century), the author of *Bhāmatī* the famous gloss of *Śārīraka-bhāṣya* holds the view that verbal testimony gives only mediate knowledge and characterizes the mind as a sense organ.²⁵ In the case of direct experience as in perception, an *indriya* serves as *karaṇa*. Vācaspati and his followers argue that the continued meditation or *nididhyāsana* i.e. *prasankhyāna* is the process which leads to self-realization. In *prasankhyāna*, mind works as the *karaṇa* required for the immediate realization of the non-dual self.

Perhaps he derives the view from Mandaṇa Mīśra (8th century) who believes knowledge generated by *śabda* to be mediate. *Avidyā* can be removed only through immediate knowledge. Therefore, verbal testimony is unable to do this since it indicates what is related and mediate. Therefore, deep meditation, which transmutes the mediate knowledge, acquired from verbal testimony into immediate knowledge.

According to Prakāśtman Yati (11th century), the author of *Vivaraṇa* and his followers *Brahman* cannot be grasped through mind as *Śruti* assured us that clearly-“*Yato vācānibartante aprāpya manasā saha*”(Taitt.Up 4.2.1). On the other hand, *Śruti* declared that “*tam tvaupaniṣadam puruṣam pṛcchāmi*”(Br.Up.3.9.26). *Brahman* is known through *vedāntavākya* or *aupaniṣadic* texts. Hearing *vedāntavākya* is the *karaṇa* of knowledge. Again Sarvjñātman (9th century) says that a person who engaged in deep-sleep arise when someone calls him. The power of words

makes him arise. As well as *vedāntavākyas* have such a power that it may arise the true knowledge immediately.

Pañcadaśī tells us that *jīva* is the reflection of the self,²⁶ which is affected by the pleasure, and pain of this transmigratory life but not the real life. This understanding is called knowledge. It is achieved through *vicāra* or analytical study.

The immediate knowledge of *jīva Brahman* identity is arisen through the *vicāra* of *vedāntavākyas*. *Mahāvākya* is a kind of *vedāntavākya*. Therefore, *mahāvākya* does the same.

We may raise the question if self-realization is arisen through the *vicāra* of *vedāntavākyas* then why only *mahāvākya* should be considered as primarily. It can be arisen from other *vedāntavākyas* too. The answer is thus given-such types of *vedāntavākyas* raised the immediate knowledge of *ātman* but the point should be noted here that some texts reveal the nature of *Brahman* immediately and some texts reveal the nature of *jīvātman* immediately. However, they never reveal the *jīva-Brahman* identity immediately. Therefore nescience is not properly eradicated through the other *Vedāntic* scriptures. The principal texts of *Upaniṣads* are those, which teach the unity of *Brahman* and individual self. They are called the major texts or *mahāvākyas*. However, the purports of the other *Vedānta* texts are to pave the way for an understanding of the *mahāvākyas*. They serve as the doorway for the aspirant to realize the truth of non-duality. To eradicate the nescience the *mahāvākya* like *Tattvamasi* is necessary. The identity of 'Tat' and 'tvam' is the real part of the *Śruti*. *Jīva* and *Brahman* are not distinct rather identical.

Sarvajñātman argues that whether a sentence gives rise to mediate knowledge or immediate knowledge depends upon the nature of the object concerned. If the object is mediate, then the sentence would give rise to only a mediate knowledge of the object. If the object is immediate, then, knowledge could be immediate. Here ‘*ātman*’ is always immediate and hence the *Upaniṣadic* texts give rise to the immediate knowledge of it. Mediacy or immediacy of the knowledge derived from verbal testimony depends upon the character of the object of knowledge.²⁷ Generally, words can give mediate knowledge of a mediate object. However, in the case of an immediate object they can give also immediate cognition. *Brahman* is immediate and self-luminous. The principal or major texts of the *Upaniṣads* like ‘That thou art’ are capable of giving rise to the immediate knowledge of *Brahman*. Generally, verbal testimony gives us mediate knowledge of things that are remote. What is immediate, it can give us immediate knowledge of *Brahman*. The *Vedāntins* give us the story of ten travelers. The classical example of the story of the tenth man is given. Ten men cross a river, and on reaching the other bank, each man counts to check whether all have reached safe or not? Each one counts only nine and they begin to weep for the tenth man who they think has drowned in the river. A wise man learns of their problem. When the wise man heard the problem of the ten foolish men, he immediately understood the situation. The wise man then proceeds to show them how each one has forgotten to count him and in reality each one is the tenth man.-‘you are the tenth man’. When each one finds out that ‘I am the tenth man’ that becomes his immediate (*aparokṣa*) knowledge.

Similarly in the case of *Brahman* there is at first the mediate knowledge of its existence from the scriptural statement like “in the beginning this was *sat* alone one only without a second” etc. then the *mahāvākyas* like *Tattvamasī* when their purport is clearly understood reveal the immediacy of *Brahman*. Never more does the knowledge that the self is identical with *Brahman* attain

inconstancy. Śaṅkara in his *Vākyavṛtti* states that the *mahāvākyas* are for the sake of the establishment of the immediate experience of *Brahman*.²⁸ Hence, it is wrong to contend that the *mahāvākyas* do not yield immediate insight into the truth. Through inquiry into the purport of the *mahāvākyas*, one realizes the identity between self and *Brahman*.

Yoga or *upāsanāyoga* is the instrument of self-realization; which is assured by Vidyāraṇyamuni. However, he argued that *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *nididhyāsana* of *vedāntic* text also have pragmatic value. *Śravaṇa* means hearing, stands for a thorough study of the *Upāniṣadic* texts under a competent *guru*. The investigation on the meaning of the *mahāvākya* is called *śravaṇa* or listening. *Manana* is the relational reflection. With the help of reasoning, the disciple should reflect on what he has studied. Doubts may be arisen regarding non-duality. The enquiry and contemplation based on logic and in accordance with the scriptures is called *manana* or reflection. *Nididhyāsana* is the meditation on what acquired mediate to be true through *śravaṇa* and *manana*. By these *śravaṇa* and *manana* when the meaning is grasped without a single doubt and doubtless knowledge is gained then mind is fully established in this meaning of the *mahāvākya*, namely that which *akhaṇḍa*, *saccidānanda*, that *Brahman* I am is. When *nididhyāsana* is practiced for some time, it leads to *samādhi*. In this state, the mind is very absorbed in the *sat-cit-ananda*. The state is compared to '*nibatdipavatcittam*'.²⁹ A flame, which is kept in a place where there is no wind, is steady with no flicker. So also is the mind fixed steadily on the *Brahman*.

In this state, all the impurities are completely uprooted. The merits and sins of accumulated actions are removed, and the individuality is no more evident from the point of manifestation. Now Vidyāraṇya concluded that the obstacles in the understanding of the meaning of the

mahāvākya being removed the direct knowledge about one's own essential nature becomes as evident and self-revealing as the *āmlaka* fruit on the palm of one's hand.³⁰ From the *Upaniṣadic* text, the immediate knowledge of *Brahman* is arised. However, the person who has analytically studied the *Upaniṣadic* text also may trap into the circle of *saṁsāra*. Why it happened so? Therefore, we must agree that immediate knowledge never be arised from *Upaniṣadic* text.

Generally, the veil of avidya is of two types –

- *Ābhanāpādaka āvaraṇa*
- *Asattāpādaka āvaraṇa*

According to Vidyāraṇya and others which envelopes the essence of an object –*ābhanāpādaka āvaraṇa* resting on *Brahmacaitanya* particularized by an object and that which envelopes the bare existence of an object – *asattāpādaka āvaraṇa* hanging on the *sākṣī caitanya* associated with the mind. Mediate knowledge destroyes the *asattāpādaka āvaraṇa* and immediate knowledge of the *Tattvamasi* destroyes the veil of *ābhanāpādaka āvaraṇa*.

According to Madhusūdāna Sarasvatī, *vedāntic* texts eradicate four types of *pratibandhakas* they are the followings-

- *Viśayabhogavāsanā*
- *Pramāṇāsambhāvanā*
- *Prameyāsambhāvanā*
- *Vīparitabhāvanā*

Self-control eradicates *viśayabhogavāsanā* (lust towards mundane objects). The direct or immediate knowledge of *Brahman* arising from *Upaniṣadic* text is of the immediate or direct in variety. However, owing to the various impurities, obstacles the knowledge appeared as mediate. The impurities, which destroy the assurance that the *Upaniṣadic* texts are the only proof of the

identity of the *jīva* and *Brahman* is known as *pramānagata-asambhāvanā* (doubt as the authoritativeness of the *Upaniṣad*). This is removed by *śravaṇa*. It is not mere cognition due to the hearing of the *śāstras* but the analytical study (*vicāra*) of the *Upaniṣads*. Doubts are still hanging in respect of the nature of the reality declared by the *Upaniṣadic* text. It is called *prameyagata-asambhāvana*. They are removed by *manana*. The identity of the *jīva* and *Brahman* is achieved in a way, which is not opposed to the direct knowledge of the self. Even then the impurities, which closely attach with the *jīva* that the *jīva* is nothing but the physical body still exists. This is known as *viparītabhāvanā*. These impressions are removed by *nididhyāsana*. Then *akhaṇḍākaravṛtti* arising from the great sayings of the *Upaniṣads* removes the primal nescience and brings out emancipation.³¹

Now we may conclude with Śaṅkara's interpretation. In his commentary on *Brahmasūtra*, Śaṅkara stresses on linguistic analysis as a means of philosophical enlightenment called '*brahmāvagati*', which is none other than liberation. Here *vākyārthvicāraṇā* or consideration of the meaning of statements has a significant role in the *Advaita Vedānta*. However, it should be kept in mind that *vākyārthvicāraṇā* indicates consideration of the *vedāntic* statements not merely the understanding of any other statements. '*Vākyārtha*' means *mahāvākyārtha* like 'that thou art' and '*vicāraṇā*' implies analysis or critical study of the explicit meaning and implicit meaning of the statement. Not all the statements of *vedāntic* literatures are of the same status. Sometime they indicate something indistinct. As per example whenever there is any talk of creation i.e. *Brahmapariṇāma* actual purport indicates something quite different from what they actually signify viz. the realization of non-duality of *Advaitin*. Therefore, statements speaking of *pariṇāma* are significant as far as they help us to realize the identity of *Brahman* and *ātman*,

which alone liberates us. Therefore, *mahāvākyas* have a special privilege status in *Advaita Vedānta* as far as *brahmāvagati* is concerned. *Advaitins* boldly claimed that when we get rid of the *avidyā* and its multiple forms through analysis of the *mahāvākya* like *Tattvamasi* we ultimately realize the unity of all existence. Analysis of *Tattvamasi* becomes necessary for eradication of ignorance.³²

Our observation

The *Advaitins* have interpreted the *mahāvākya* in various ways. It has been taken as an instance of *bhāgalakṣaṇā* or *jahadajahatlakṣaṇā* because in this case there is the relation of identity between ‘*tvam*’ (individual self) and ‘*Tat*’ (Supreme Self) as far as their consciousness part is concerned. As an individual self (*jīva*) and *Brahman* are conscious, there is identity between them. At the same time, there lies a difference also as far as their power is concerned. An individual being has less quantity of power while *Brahman* is associated with unlimited power. In other words, an individual being is has limited or less knowledge (*alpāñjnata*) while divine being is having unlimited knowledge or omniscience (*sarvajñata*). Though there is similarity between two there is also difference which described by the *Vedāntins* as ‘*bhedasahiṣṭurabheda*’ or identity marked by difference.

The *Advaitins* have used the sentences like *Tattvamasi* etc. as instance of both *lakṣaṇā* and *nirvikalpakapratyakṣa* (indeterminate perception), which establish that such type of cognition, belongs to both perception and verbal testimony. However, the *mahāvākya*, which is taken an instance of *jahadajahallakṣaṇā*, cannot be taken as an instance of *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*. It has been shown that any relation between *viśeṣya* and *viśeṣaṇa* does not vitiate such indeterminate

perception and hence it should be taken as having indivisible holistic meaning (*akhaṇḍa-vākyārtha*). Such cognition is taken as *vaiśiṣṭya-anavagāhī* i.e. not abiding in relation between *viśeṣya* and *viśeṣaṇa*, which entails that no relationship can be found between two relata. For this reason, the meaning of the sentence is taken holistically without any decision.

If the above-mentioned status of *mahāvākya* is taken into account, how can it be interpreted as *bhāgalakṣaṇā* or *jahat-ajahat-lakṣaṇā*? Because, such *lakṣaṇā* presupposes the identity relation between individual being and Divine being, this is obviously a relation. If it is admitted then the theory of *akhaṇḍavākyārtha* must be ruled out. The problem lies on the fact that how can a same instance be interpreted as *nirvikalpakapratyakṣa* and *jahat-ajahat-lakṣaṇā*? The contradiction may be removed if this *mahāvākya* is interpreted as *lakṣaṇā* but not *nirvikalpakapratyakṣa* after considering large import of the same.

The *mahāvākya* is efficacious in realizing *Brahman*. When an individual has a realization that he is the part of the divine, he has a direct realization of him, which is described by the *Advaitins* as *śabdāparokṣavāda* or *śabdajanyapratyakṣavāda*. Though the *mahāvākya* is instrumental to the immediate knowledge of *Brahman*, it is a testimonial perception as per their description. They have cited another example ‘you are the tenth’ (*daśamastvamasi*) to justify the present case. One can know himself as ‘tenth’ after being pointed out by someone with the sentence ‘you are the tenth’. In this case, there is a perceptual cognition no doubt, but it is not caused by sense organ, but by testimony. Hence, the knowledge of divinity through the *mahāvākya* is taken as ‘testimonial perception’, may be described as neither perception nor testimony. In such case, we have to accept a peculiar type of *pramāṇa*, which is never enumerated in their list, which again leads us to contradiction. In order to avoid this it is better to admit testimonial cognition in such

cases. We may say that the essential identity, which is shown through the *jahadjahallakṣaṇā*, first, is realized through perception. Though the property of being generated through verbal testimony is there, it ultimately culminates in the level of the immediate realization (perception) of the identity between an individual self and *Brahman*. Such theory is also applicable to the experience like ‘you are the tenth’. That is why; it is rightly described as *śābdāparokṣavāda* by the *Advaitins*.

References:

1. *Yathā soumya ekena mṛṭpiṇḍena sarvam mṛṇmayam vijñātam syāt vācārambhaṇambikāro nāmadhyeam mṛṭiketyeba satyam”/ Ch.Up. 6.1.4*

Upanisat Saṁgrahamḥ, ed. Prof. J.L.Sastri (containing 188 upanisads) (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1970), p. 66.
2. *Ratnaprabhā* commentary on *Brahmasūtra*1.1.2 (commentary wrote by Govindananda)

Bādarāyaṇa, *Vedāntadarśan*, trans. Viswarupananda (Kolkata: Udbodhan Karyalaya, 1999), p.106
3. Swami Satprkasananda, *Methods of Knowledge* (Mayabati: Advaita Ashrama, 2005), pp.173-174.
4. *Atra vākyam dvibidham-saṁsṛṣṭārtham akhaṇḍārtham ca iti tatra saṁsṛṣṭārthamakhaṇḍārtham ca iti/ Tatra saṁsṛṣṭārthaṁ saṁsargagocara pratīti janakam, yathā ‘gāmānaya’ ityādi/ akhaṇḍārtham tu saṁsargagocara pratīti janakam yathā praṛṣṭa prakāśaḥ candraḥ ityādi... tattvamasi vākyam api svarūpamātra vivakṣayaprayuktvatvāt akhaṇḍārtham iti.../ Bālbodhinī of Vedāntasāra* 113.

Sadānandayogīndra, *Vedāntasāra*, trans. & ed. Bramacārī Medhācāitanya (Kolkata: Adyāpītha, 2010), p.141.
5. *Akhaṇḍārthavodhakam iti saṁsargagocarapramiti viśayabodhakam/ Bālbodhinī of Vedāntasāra* 113. *ibid.*, p.141
6. *Jagato yadupādānam māyāmādaya tāmasīm /nimittam śuddha sasattvām tāmucyate brahma tadgirā// Pañcadaśī 1.44. yadā malina sattvām tam kāma karmādi*

*dūṣitam/ādatte tatparambrahma tvam padena tadocyate// Pañcadaśī 1.45 ekatā
gṛhyateh asiti tadeaikyamnubhūyatām/Pañcadaśī 5.6*

Vidyāraṇyamuni, *Pañcadaśī*, trans. Swami Swahananda (Madras: Sri
RamakrishnaMath, 1975), p.21, 22, 124.

7. *Vinna pravṛttinimittanam śabdānam ekasmin arthe tātparyasambandha-
sāmānādhikaraṇyam/Subodhinī of Vedāntasāra 114.*

Sadānandayogīndra, *Vedāntasāra*, trans. & ed. Bramacari Medhacaitanya, op.cit.,p.142.

8. *Tattvamasi iti vākyeopi parokṣatva sarvajñatvādivaiśiṣṭam
tatpadeapravṛttinimittamaparokṣtva kincitjñatvādivaiśiṣṭam tvampadapravṛtti
nimittam tathā ca vinnapadapravṛtti nimittayo tattvampadayoḥ ekasmin caitanya
tātparyasambandhaḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyam iti arthaḥ/SubodhinīofVedāntasāra 114*

Sadānandayogīndra, *Vedāntasāra*, ibid.,p.142.

9. *Caturdhā hi sāmānādhikaraṇyam/adhyāse idam rajatam ityādau, bādhāyām'stāṇuḥ
puman' ityebmādau, viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhābena 'nīlamutpalam' ityādau, abheden
tattvamasi ityebmādau//*

Madhusūdan Sarasvatī, *Advaitasiddhi*, (Bombay: Nirnaysagar Press, 1917), p.425.

10. *Viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvasambandhastu yathā tatraiva vākye sa-śabdārtha-
tatkālviśiṣṭadevadattasya ayam-śabdārtha Gangāghoṣayoh
adhārādheyabhāvalakṣaṇasya vākyārthasya aśeṣataḥ viruddhatvāt vākyārtham
aśeṣataḥ parityajya tatsambandhitiralaksanaya yuktatvat jahallakṣaṇā
samgacchate/Vedāntasāra 115*

Sadānandayogīndra, *Vedāntasāra*, trans. & ed. Bramacārīmedhācāitanya,
op.cit.,p.143

11. *Lakṣaṇābījantu tātparyānupapattireva, na tu anvayānupapattiḥ/ Vedānta Paribhāṣā, āgama parichheda*
- Dharmarājā Adhvarīndra, *Vedānta Paribhāṣā*, trans. & ed. Swāmī Madhavananda, (Mayabati: Advaita Ashrama, 2000), p.102.
12. *Vācyārtham aśeṣataḥ parityajya tat sambandhini arthāntare vṛttiḥ jahallakṣaṇā/ Vidvanmanorañjinī of Vedāntasāra* 116,
Sadānandayogīndra, *Vedāntasāra*, trans. & ed. Bramacārī medhācāitanya, op.cit., p.145.
13. *Vācyārthaparityagena tatsambandhini vṛttiḥ jahallakṣaṇā / ibid.*, p.145.
14. *Vācyārthaikadeśaparityāgena ekadeśavṛttiḥ jahadjahallakṣaṇā / ibid.*, p.145.
15. *Asmin vākye 'nīlam utpalam' itivākyavat vākyārthaḥ na sangachhate/ tatra tu nīlapadārtha-nīlaguṇasya utpalpadārthotpaldravyasya ca śauklyapatādibhedabyābartkatayā anyonyaviśeṣaṇaviśeṣyarūpa-saṃsargasya anyataraviśiṣṭasya anyatarasya tadaikyasya vā, vākyārthatvāngīkaraṇe pramāṇantarvirodhābhābat vākyārthaḥ sangachhate/ ibid.*, p.145.
16. *Atra tu tatpadarthaparokṣatvādiviśiṣṭacāitanyasya tvam-padārthāparo ṣ atvādiviśiṣṭacāitanyasya ca anyonyabhedavyavartkatayā viśeṣaṇāviśiṣṭasyābhābasansargasya, anyataraviśiṣṭasya anyatarasya tadaikasya vā vākyārthatvāngīkāre pratyakṣādi pramāṇavirodhāt vākyārthaḥ na sangachhate/-Vedāntasāra* 117, *ibid.*, p.145.
17. *Pañcadaśī 7/75*
- Vidyāraṇyamuni, *Pañcadaśī*, trans. Swami Swahananda (Madras: Sri Ramakrishna Math, 1975), p.264.

18. *Atra tu parokṣatvāparokṣatvādiviśiṣṭacaitanyaikatvarūpasya vākyārthasya bhāgamātrevirodhāt bhāgāntaramapi parityajya annyalakṣaṇāyā ayuktatvāt jahallakṣaṇā nasamgacchate/ Vedāntasāra*118

Sadānandayogīndra, trans. & ed. Bramacārī Medhācāitanya, op.cit., p.148.

19. *Tatra tīrapadāśravanena tadarthāpratītau tatpratītyapekṣāyām apitat-tvampadayoḥ śrūyamāṇatvena tadarthapratītau lakṣaṇayā punaḥ anyatarapadenaanyatarapadārthapratītyapekṣābhāvāt/Vedāntasāra*119, ibid., p. 150.

20. *Ttra tu parokṣatvāparokṣatvādiviśiṣṭacaitanyaikatvasya vākyārthasya viruddhatvāttadaparityāgena tatsambandhinaḥ yasya kasyacit arthasya lakṣitatve'pitadvirodhāparihārāt ajahallakṣaṇā na sambhavatyeva/Vedāntasāra* 120, ibid., p.151.

21. *Tattvamasiti vākya tatpadam svārtham parokṣatvādiviśiṣṭam parityajya jīvacaityam lakṣayatu evam tvampadam api svārtham kincijñatvādiviśiṣṭam parityājya īśvaracaitanyam vā lakṣayatu, -InterpretationofNṛsimhasarasvatīon Vedāntasāra* 119, ibid., p.150.

22. *Ekena padena svārthāśa-padārthantarobhayalakṣaṇayā asambhavāt, padāntareṇatadarthapratītau lakṣaṇayā punaḥ anyatarapadārthapratītyapekṣābhāvātca/Vedāntasāra* 121, ibid., p.152.

23. *Tattvamasyādivākyaasya apiparokṣatvāparokṣatvādiviśiṣṭacaitanyaikatvalaksannamukhyārthapratipādatvāsambhavāt jahadajahat lakṣaṇayā viruddhaparokṣatvāparokṣatvādivaiśiṣṭyāśa-parityāgenaaviruddhākhaṇḍacaitanyam ātrapratipādatvam/InterpretationofNṛsimhasarasvatī onVedāntasāra*122., ibid., p. 154.

24. *So'yaṁ devadattaḥ*" - " *tattvamasi*" *ityādou viśiṣṭavācakaḥ padānāmekadeśaparavēopi nalakṣaṇā, śaktyupastitaviśiṣṭayoḥ abhedānvayānupapattou viśeṣyayoḥ śaktyupastitayoreba abhedānvayāvirodhāt/ Yathā "ghatonityaḥ" ityatra 'ghata'-padavācyāikadeśaghattvasyāyogytveopi yogyaghatavyaktyā sahānityatvānvayaḥ/yatra padārthaikadeśasya viśeṣaṇa tayopastitiḥ, tatraiba, svātantrēṇa upastitaye lakṣaṇāvyupagamaḥ/ Yathā 'nitya ghataḥ' ityatra 'ghataḥ'-padātghatatvasya śaktyā svātantrēṇānupastityā tādṛśopastityarthe 'ghata'-padasya ghatatvelakṣṇā/ Ebameva 'tattvamasi' ityādivākyeopi na lakṣṇā, śaktyā svātantryeṇopastitayoḥ 'tattvam'-padarthyorbedānuaye bādhakābhāvāt/ Anyaathā 'geha ghataḥ', 'ghate rūpam', 'ghatamānaya' ityādou ghatagehatvāderbhīmātamvayavodhāyoghyotayā tatrāpi 'ghatā' dipadānām viśeṣyamātraparatvam lakṣaṇaiba syāt/ Tasmāt 'tattvamasi' ityādivākyeṣu ācāryāṇām lakṣaṇoktirbhyupagamvādena vodhyā/" *Vedānta Paribhāṣā, Āgama parichheda**

Dharmaraja Adhvarindra, *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, trans. Swami Madhavananda (Kolkata: Advaita Ashrama, 2000) p.99.

25. *ebam ca śabdapramāṇam svabhiṣayabhiṣayaka jñānajanayam parokṣapramāṇeḥ janayati nāparokṣapramāṇaḥ heturiti bhābaḥ/ Kalpataruparimala*

Appaya Dīkṣita, *Kalpataruparimala* (Bombay: Nirnaya Sagar Press, 1938), p.56.

26. *ātmābhasasya jībasya saṁsāro nātmabastunaḥ/ Pañcadaśī 6.11*

Vidyāraṇyamuni, *Pañcadaśī*, trans. Swami Swahananda (Madras: Sri Ramakrishna Math, 1975), p.129.

27. *sambidāparokṣyaam nakaraṇviśeṣanibandhanam kintuprameyaviśeṣa nibandhanam iti upapāditaḥ/ tathā brahmaṇḥ pramāṇjībāvinnatayā tadgocaram śabdajanyam jñānamapi aparokṣam/ Vedāntaparibhāṣā,*

Dharmaraja Adhvarindra, *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, trans. Swami Madhavananda, op.cit., p.207.

28. *śrūtvācāryaprasādena dra bodho yadā bhabet/ nirastāśeṣasaṁsārñidānḥ puruṣastadā//vākyavṛtti 52*

Śaṁkaracārya, *Vākyavṛtti*, Swami Jagadananda (Chennai: Sri Ramakrishna Math, 2004), p.32.

29. *Gitā* 6.19.

Bhagavadgītā, (with Madhusūdan Sasvatī's Gūḍārthadīpikā) trans. Swami Gambhirananda (Kolkata: Advaita Ashrama, 2013), p.419.

30. *vākyamaprati baddham sat prāk parokṣāvabhāsite/karāmalaka vad bodham aparokṣam prasūyate//Pañcadaśī 1.62*

Vidyāranyamuni, *Pañcadaśī*, trans. Swami Swahananda, op.cit., p.30.

31. *parokṣajñānato naśyedasattāvṛttihetutā/aparokṣajñānāśyāhi āvānāvṛttihetutā//Pañcadaśī 7.45, ibid., p.250.*

32. *Śaṁkarabhāṣya on Braḥmasūtra 1.1.2*

The Braḥmasūtra Śaṁkarabhāṣya with the commentaries Bhāmati, Kalpataru and Parimala, vol-1, ed. K.L.Joshi (Delhi: Parimal Publications, 2007), p.82.