

CHAPTER – 3

The Role of Mind in Epistemology

Although the *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtras* lay their emphasis on the ontological aspect and the *Nyāya Sūtras* on the epistemological aspect but their theories of *manas* may be said to be almost identical. Like the *Upaniṣads*, we find the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems also maintain that *manas* is something distinct from Soul or *Ātman* and so that *manas* is material. Both Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems rely on the important factor of “attention” in their proof for the existence of *manas*. Perception requires attention, which again is active turning of the mind towards the object of perception. So the co-operation of the *manas* is a necessary condition of all knowledge whether it refers to external objects or internal states. We do not perceive colour, touch, taste, smell and sound simultaneously, even though all the external senses may be in contact with their objects, if there is no contact between *manas* and the sense - organ. In case of perception there are three stages of contact first between *ātman* and mind, second between mind and sense - organ and lastly sense - organ with the object (*Ātmā manasā samyuyate manaḥ indriyena indriyam arthena*). *Manas* must be in contact with the object through the medium of the sense- organ on the one hand, and with the self or the *Ātman* on the other hand. For example; sometimes we purposely look at a watch, but we do not yet see the time, for our *manas* has meanwhile come to be otherwise occupied. And that object on which the *manas* is concentrated or attending only that object is cognized by the soul.

In the respect of proof for the existence of *manas* Śrīdhara says in his *Nyāyakaṇḍalī*: “The contacts of the objects, the sense - organ and the soul, depended upon some other cause, in the bringing about of the due effect, - because even when the former contacts exist, the necessary effect does not appear.... and this instrumentality upon which they depend is that of the Mind.”¹

In the *Praśastapāda – bhāṣya*, *manas* is explicitly mentioned as a sense - organ which is instrumental in bringing about direct experience of pleasure and pain, and acts as the mediating organ in the experience of direct perceptual knowledge. In the case of perception, besides sense - object contact, mind must be in conjunction with sense. If the mind is not engaged then objects are not perceived though they have contact with the senses. Again *manas* is atomic and cannot come into contact with more than one thing at a time and therefore acts of perception can only by one at a time. Bosanquet also says the same thing. At one time what is given to the sense is only one unitary piece of knowledge because perception requires not only sense-object contact, but also mind and sense must be in conjunction. Even so, according to Kant the categories of the understanding are responsible for the systematization of knowledge. The Naiyāyika says that the systematization of knowledge occurs in the soul which has *buddhi* as its quality. Mind is only organ like the sense – organs.

The Naiyāyika maintains that the *manas* is a sense – organ. Before doing so, they go on telling us about the nature of a sense – organ and sensation. Usually the two terms are interdependent. Russell says, “Sensations are what is common to the mental and physical worlds; they may be defined as the intersection of mind and matter.... it is not itself knowledge, but it supplies the data for our knowledge of the physical world.”² Hence a

sense - organ is that which is responsible for the receiving of sensations. Sensations are those which make the object intelligible to the mind through the sense - organ. In the *Upaniṣads* we saw how *manas* is sometimes said to be the internal organ of sense and sometimes to be something more which controls the actions of all *indriyas*. In the *Nyāya Sūtras* both these ideas are also present. Gaṅgeśa in his *Tattvacintāmaṇi* enumerates six senses, the traditional five and the mind.³ But there are some epistemological difficulties in this position of the Naiyāyika. A sense - organ epistemologically would mean the special and instrumental cause of perceptual knowledge only. In this context an *indriya* is one which gives direct and immediate knowledge. In this sense, since mind is the cause of the direct awareness of pleasure and pain, we may consider mind to be a sense-organ. But there are other activities in which mind is involved, such as perception, where the function of mind is no more direct but indirect. What is directly conjoined with the senses is received and presented by the mind to the self. It is a *sādhāraṇa kāraṇa* (common causes) to all perceptual knowledge and not a special cause or instrumental cause (*asādhāraṇa kāraṇa*). Then mind seems to be a mediator between the objects and sense on the one hand and self on the other. In this sense mind cannot be an *indriya*. But mind must be described as an instrument in inference, memory and imagination because of its direct activity as a special cause (*asādhāraṇa kāraṇa*). Therefore sometimes the mind is an instrument, and other times mind is not an instrument. According to such contradiction if we characterize perception as a direct knowledge only, Gaṅgeśa adds a corollary to his definition of perception: “it is knowledge that is not derived through the instrumentally of other knowledge”.⁴ (*Jñānākaraṇakam jñānam pratyakṣam*). In the light of this definition

of perception it can be concluded that the mind acts as a special instrument in the direct perception of pleasure and pain.

The *Bhāmatī* School led by Vācaspati Miśra claims that the mind is a sense - organ like other sense - organs because it is the instrument of internal perception of pleasure and pain. Again according to the *Vivaraṇa* view of Advaita, *manas* need not be considered a sense-organ. The sense - organs are never self-revealing. Then if *manas* is a sense-organ, it cannot be the object of *pratyakṣa*. In this context the *Vedānta - pari bhāṣā* says “There is no evidence for this that the internal organ is a sense-organ”⁵ and goes on to show that the verse from the *Gītā* saying that the “sense-organs with the mind as the sixth”⁶, cannot be interpreted to mean that *manas* is also an *indriya* along with the other sense-organs. There cannot be any contradiction in the mind being made the sixth, although it is not included in the list of the *indriyas*. *Śruti text*⁷ claims the mind as something other than the sense - organs and superior to them. Professor Hiriyanna says, in his translation of the *Śankara bhāṣya* on these two verses of the *Kāthopaniṣad*,⁸ “the object of these two mantras is merely to indicate that the person is beyond everything else, for there is nothing to be gained by knowing that anyone of the others among the series is subtler than the other. Consequently not much value need be attached to the exact place which any of the phenomenal entities ought to take in series”⁹ By these two verses taken together it is not proved that *manas* is not sense-organ, but that it is more subtle than the external senses.

To *Vivaraṇa* School there are some more arguments to prove that *manas* need not be a sense - organ. If *manas* is taken to be an *indriya* it becomes an instrument along with the other instruments of perception and its functions must be limited to direct experience of

perceptual things. But *manas* also acts in other means of valid knowledge like *anumāna* etc., where it does not function as a sense-organ. Hence *manas* cannot be a sense - organ. Knowing a thing with the mind does not make the mind an *indriya*. “Mind is an auxiliary to *pramāṇa*. It is not the instrument of valid knowledge, it is the locus”¹⁰

According to the Advaitin, mind or *antaḥkaraṇa* is only a name for the totality of conscious states of which pleasure and pain are but two different aspects. The sensations such as touch, taste, sound and sight are presented to the mind in the ordinary way. Again the sensations such as pleasurable and painful are because of the apperceptive nature of the mind. Hence no *inner sense* is necessary. Like the modern introspectionists, the Advaitin believes that the mind is capable of looking on itself and knowing its subjective states without the aid of an internal sense. These psychological states of pleasure, pain, desire, are all mental and so do not require any other sense to perceive them. Again pain and pleasure are felt, but we cannot point to anything and say that it is painful or pleasurable. Thus pain and pleasure are more feelings than sensations,¹¹ and therefore mind is not the internal sense-organ producing the sensations of pain and pleasure.

According to the Naiyāyika, *manas* is not only material but also the internal sense - organ for the experiences of pleasure, pain and other such internal states. The materiality of *manas* is clearly emphasized in the Sāṃkhya-yoga where it is derived from *prakṛti*. According to Advaitin mind along with all other things is only a creation of *ajñāna*. But empirically, mind is subtle matter and also limited in size. Advaitin believes that though mind is an instrument of knowledge but it is not a sense-organ. Almost all the āstika darśans prove that mind exists and all of them believe that mind is material and unconscious. When knowledge arises in the self, then either activity of the mind and the

sense - organs or at least of the mind alone acting by itself. All living beings are able to react to their environment because of their knowledge. So knowledge is the basis of all intelligent activity. All systems of Indian philosophy believe that knowledge or *jñāna* is a quality of the self and self acts through the mind. Now we explain the characteristics of mind.

First, manas makes the *Ātman* aware of objects. So *samjñāna* is the first function of *manas*. The self gains knowledge of objects through *manas*.

Secondly, the second function of *manas* is not only to be aware of an object but also to perceive it through the senses. So *ajñāna* or *perception* is the second function of *manas*. *Samjñāna* and *ajñāna* or perception are not identical, because one can be aware of objects which are not directly be perceived.

Thirdly, *vijñāna* is the power of discrimination, which discrimination is the result of knowledge acquired by a study of different branches of knowledge,

Fourthly, *medhas* or *wisdom* comes next. *Wisdom* is that which is had when a person is able to remember the knowledge which is acquired.

Thought or *mati* and thoughtfulness or *manīṣā* are the next in the list. These show the particular content of mind. A man might have knowledge, but without thought, there will be no value for his knowledge.

Again man is also a creature of impulse. *Jūti*, distress of mind, is produced because of impulsive activities. Hence, *Jūti* is described as a mental quality. Memory or *smṛti* is different from the capacity which is required to remember studied knowledge (*medhas*).

Practical life would be impossible without *smṛti*, although life is possible without *medhas*. The continuity of life is possible because of *smṛti*.

Though *asu* or life is not a important mental characteristic, but without life there can be no *manas*.

Kāma and *vaśa* are the last two terms. *Kāma* is the desire for a thing. But mere desire is not enough. When this is backed up by will for possession or desire for company ¹² (*vaśa*), then overt behaviour issues. They are comparable to wish and will respectively as used by Mackenzie.

In the *Chāndogya*, *manas* is used to mean the “internal organ endowed with reflection” and mind is greater than speech because unless *manas* reflects, speech cannot function.

In *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* there is another list given and quoted in the *Maitrī Upaniṣad*, without the mention of which an account of the characteristics of mind in its search for knowledge as given in the *Upaniṣads* would not be complete. The mind is responsible for all perceptions in these texts. So mind exists. The nature of mind is expressed by some mental status. These are *kāma* (desire), *samkalpa* (determination), *vicikitsā* (doubt), *śraddha* (belief) *aśraddhā* (*disbelief*), *dhṛti* (steadiness) and *adhṛti* (unsteadiness), *hrīḥ* (shame), *dhīḥ* (meditation) and *bhīḥ* (fear). In the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*. The mind always leads the self to the object known.

Where one's mind is attached

- the inner self

Goes thereto with action being

Attached to it alone. ¹³

These different characteristics of mind given in the *Upaniṣads* is only to maintain that in the acquiring of knowledge the mind is instrumental, but it is only for the sake of the self that mind acts. From the epistemological point of view it is important to note that mind is not only conceived of as an *indriya or sense - organ* but also as that which determines the nature of the knowledge.

According to Naiyāyika, *manas* is definitely a sense-organ. Without *manas* no knowledge is possible for the self. It is the *antahkaraṇa*, the special cause which is internal. So, the uses of mind in the Nyāya theory of perception in both external perception and internal perception. The definition of perception given by the Naiyāyikas in various ways. To Gautama knowledge is derived between *indriya* (sense-organ) and *artha* (object). ¹⁴ But Gaṅgeśa says “Perception is immediate knowledge” (*Sākṣāt pratitīḥ pratyakṣam – Tattvacintāmaṇi*).

But it is important that the contact of the mind with the sense - organ and the contact of the mind with the soul is necessary in the process of perceptual which is not indicated in the definition of perception. These two are the *sādhāraṇa kāraṇas* (common causes) of all perception. We can know the importance of mind in perception with an example which is given in the *Nyāya-Bhāṣya* when a man is in sound sleep called *suṣupti*, there is no contact between the self and the sense-organ. Still when there is a sudden pain, the person wakes up. Here it is possible for the sleeping mind to function and provide knowledge to the self. Similarly also in the case of the preoccupied mind.¹⁵ There is an

interesting point about the Nyāya theory of perception is knowledge is never self-illuminative (*sva-prakāśaka*) but manifests only other thing (*paraprakāśaka*). So, to them no cognition can be directly apprehended. Knowledge is always secondary as reflected in the *anuvyavasāya* stage (i.e. apperceptive stage) where mind is operational. To produce this *anuvyavasāya* ((apperception) perception is the primary source of all knowledge. Without perceptual knowledge inference, comparison and verbal testimony would be impossible. According to Nyāya pleasure (*sukha*) and pain (*duḥkha*), desire (*icchā*) and aversion (*dveṣa*), cognition (*jñāna*) and volition (*prayatna*) are the qualities of the soul. But these qualities are not always evident. When the *manas* as a sense - organ comes into conjunction with the self then the self knows that it has these qualities.

In Nyāya Darśana the definition of pain is given a ‘*Bādhānā – lakṣaṇam duḥkham*’ - the characteristic of pain is to create obstruction. In other words that which is disagreeable to our sense - organs or body causes pain. When this is removed and agreeability is introduced, we have pleasure. Pleasure is *anukūla* (favourable to a person) and pain is *pratikūla* (non-favourable to a person). Everything that opposes mind is pain and everything that is opposite to this is pleasure. But this should not be interpreted to mean that the Naiyāyikas are pure hedonists. According to Naiyāyikas spiritual pleasure are more lasting and valuable than worldly pleasures. To the Naiyāyika pleasure is not a thing separate from pain, because every act of pleasure involves pain and the *vice-versa*. But the *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtras* maintain ¹⁶ that since the causes of pleasure and pain are different, these must be two different things and not the two aspects of one and the same thing as the Naiyāyika holds. To Praśastapāda, the effects of pleasure are *anugraha* (a feeling of pleasure or favourable pleasure), *abhiṣvaṅga* (attachment or attraction towards

an object), and *nayanādi-prasāda* (brightness of the eyes and the face etc.). And that condition of the mind which gives rise to anger, ideas of harm and depression of spirit are the effects of pain.

Praśastapāda says, pleasure and pain can be with reference to the past as well as to the future objects. Past objects are remembered as objects of pleasure and this brings about present pleasure. About future objects, pleasure is produced by reflection. The *Bhāṣya* says, even when there is no object of pleasure nor memory of such an object wise men feels pleasure, “because of their knowledge, the peaceful nature of their mind”. Here knowledge means the knowledge of the self, and peaceful nature of the mind means the control of the senses and the consequent tranquility.

The *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtras* maintain that *Jñāna* is always characterized by doubt (*saiṃśaya*) and assurance (*nirṇaya*) and these are absent from the experience of pleasure and pain. One is never doubtful whether an experience is pleasurable or not. Pleasure and pain are also not forms of cognitions. They are not either perception, inference or other forms of knowledge which are given to the individual. For pleasure and pain are not causally, (i.e. invariably) connected with the antecedents of perceptual and inferential forms of knowledge.¹⁷ Again *manas* is *asādhāraṇa kāraṇa* (uncommon causes) conjunction with the soul for both cognition and emotive experience of pleasure and pain. *Manas* or internal perception is direct knowledge about mental or subjective facts. In self perception, where the soul or the self comes to have knowledge of its own states, the mind acts as the instrument and the self as the conceiver. Otherwise, all sense experience which is instrumental in nature will have to be denied, and then no conception is possible.

The vedāntic view, in particular the Advaitic view, is that the mind goes to the object. Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra has clearly pointed out that no perceptual or inferential experience is possible without the assumption of the shape of an object through the inner-organ (*antaḥ-karaṇa*) that is another name of mind. It may appear that not only should the mind go out to the object but also assume the shape of the object. Every object has parts and these parts come into contact with the sense-organ as unitary parts. But this is not accepted by philosophers and psychologists. According to them the form of the object is perceived as a whole structure, and later on there is an analysis of this concept into its constituent parts. Psychologists like Stout and Brentano maintain that this function can only be done by a mind. There is a difference between the Vedāntic theory and the Gestalt theory is that to the Advaitin the *Vṛtti* is the result of the activity of both mind and the senses, whereas according to the Gestalt, there is no such interaction, as in perception the mind knows at once immediately the whole of the object. But there arises two epistemological troubles against this theory of perception. First, it is the out-going mental *vṛtti* that goes to the object and takes the form of the object at the place in which the object is and at the time in which the object is. But if this is so then perception of distant objects like star cannot be explained. How can we be sure that the likeness are of the object that we are seeing? This leads to a postulation of a series of *Vṛttis ad infinitum*. But according to the Advaitin, in perception there is an identity of object defined consciousness (*Viśayacaitanya*) with the cognitive consciousness (*pramāṇa caitanya*), so this doubt will be dispelled. The basic principle of Advaita is that the self alone is real. Hence both the object and the *antaḥkaraṇa* are only empirically existent. But the difference between the *antaḥkaraṇa* and the object is that the *antaḥkaraṇa* is transparent

enough to reflect the conscious principal because of the predominance of the *sattva* element and the object is not capable of this reflection. But the consciousness that is determined by the object takes the essence of the object as its nature.

The Naiyāyika says perception has been divided into two broad classes, namely *laukika* or the ordinary and *alukika* or the extra ordinary. Ordinary perception again, has been divided into six kinds of olfactory, gustatory, visual, tactual, auditory and mental perceptions. According to another classification, ordinary perceptions are of two kinds, namely *nirvikalpaka* or the indeterminate and *savikalpaka* or the determinate. According to the Naiyāyikas, *pratyabhijñā* or the recognition as a special form of determinate perception. To recognize a thing is to know it as a definite object, so recognition is a *savikalpaka pratyakṣa*, in a broad sense. But in a narrow sense, the recognition as a complex psychosis of presentative and representative of process. Therefore, recognition is dependent on memory, and is a complex process. But the Naiyāyikas believe that it is not a case of a complex psychosis, but a case of a single qualified psychosis as in recognition the present object is qualified by a distinct recollection of its past experience. To the Naiyāyika recognition is perceptual and direct, because for him whatever is caused by the stimulation of the external sense-organs is directly perceptual¹⁸

In the *Tarkasamgrah smṛti* or memory is defined as that knowledge which is caused by residual impressions or *samskāra* only¹⁹. Memory is caused when *manas* comes into contact with *samskāras* and thus it is a direct cognition. To Naiyāyikas *pratyabhijñā* is not identical with *smṛti*. Memory (*smṛti*.) is knowledge of one's own past. It is a representative cognition of past experience due solely to the impressions produced by them. It is thus different from recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) which, according to the Nyāya,

is a form of qualified perception and has reference to the direct presentation of some object, although it involves an element of representation²⁰. We may say that memory is knowledge arising solely out of the impressions of previous experiences and pertaining to a permanent soul. Memory has a number of specific causes. Now we explain them as enumerated in the *Nyāya Bhāṣya*²¹.

- 1) Attention (*prañidhāna*). This is fixing the mind on the thing to be remembered.
- 2) Association (*nibandha*). This connects different experiences and makes them suggestive of one other.
- 3) Repetition (*abhyāsa*). By repeated exercise, one is able to recollect easily.
- 4) Sign (*līnga*). This leads the mind to the thing signified. This is divided into four kinds.
 - a) Where there is conjunction between two things such as smoke and fire, seeing smoke always recalls the existence of fire.
 - b) Inherent indicative where, because of causal relation, one recalls the other as the horns of a bull.
 - c) Co-inherent indicative where, because the two things in here in the same thing, each recalls the other like hands serving to recall the feet.
 - d) Contradictory indicative, where the thing mentioned like light and darkness.
- 5) Characteristic mark (*lakṣaṇa*). This recalls the class to which object belongs. If the universal is seen, the special qualities of the particular are also recalled.
- 6) Similarity (*Sādṛśya*). When the image is seen, the original is recalled.

- 7) Ownership (*Parigraha*). It is suggestive of the owner or thing owned.
- 8) Supporter (*āśraya*) and
- 9) Supported (*āśrita*). These two mutually recall each other.
- 10) Relationship (*sambandha*). One term suggests the order.
- 11) Contiguity (*ānantaryya*). This binds together successive phenomena.
- 12) Separation (*Viyoga*). This frequently reminds one of what he is separated from.
- 13) Identity of functions (*ekakārya*). This recalls similar agents.
- 14) Enmity (*Virodha*). This suggests rivals in any sphere.
- 15) Superiority (*atiśaya*). This reminds us of what it is due to.
- 16) Acquisition (*prāpti*). This is reminding us of one from whom something has been or will be received.
- 17) Covering (*vyavadhāna*). This suggests what is covered.
- 18) Pleasure and pain (*sukhaduḥkha*). This is reminding us of that which caused them.
- 19) Desire and aversion (*icchā* and *dveṣa*). This is reminding us of one whom we liked or hated.
- 20) Fear (*bhaya*). This is reminding us of that which caused it.
- 21) Need (*ārthitva*). That which is wanted or prayed for.
- 22) Profession (*kriyā*). That is suggestive of the agent. Chariot reminding us of the charioteer.
- 23) Affection (*rāga*). That often reminds us of its objects.

- 24) Merit (*dharma*) and
- 25) Demerit (*adharma*). Through which there is recollection of joy and sorrow experienced in a previous life. These causes of memory cannot be simultaneously operative but successive.

Memory is of two kinds, namely true (*yathārtha*) and false (*ayathārtha*). It is true when it has its basis in some valid presentation (*pramājanya*) and is in agreement with the real nature of the remembered objects. On the other hand, memory is false when it arises out of such original cognitions as were erroneous (*apramājanya*) and so does not associate with the nature of the objects recalled in it.

According to the Nyāya, memory (*smṛti*) is not valid knowledge (*Pramā*). *Pramā* has been defined by the Nyāya as presentational cognition (*yathārthānubhava*), it is a definite and an assured (*asamdigdha*) cognition of an object, which is also true and presentational in character. Hence it is that *pramā* excludes all kinds of non-valid knowledge, such as memory, doubt error, hypothetical argument (*tarka*) etc. Memory or *smṛti* is made to depend entirely on the truth or falsity of the *anubhava* from which it originates. *Smṛti* is not directly in connection with the objects, since it is only a mediate knowledge and it depends on prior perceptual knowledge. We can speak of true and false memory. But even true memory, which gives us a true cognition of some past object, cannot be called *pramā* or valid knowledge. On this point Indian systems of philosophy are divided in their opinion. Some of them consider memory to be as valid as perception and inference, and look upon it as the source of our knowledge of past facts. The Vaiśeṣika accepts memory as valid knowledge distinguished from all forms of wrong cognition²². Again it

is also said that if memory is not valid, all inference would also be invalid, for *parāmarśa*, the corner stone of all inference, is dependent on memory. The Sāṃkhya-Yoga philosophy maintains that *smṛti* or memory is a form of a mental mode *citta Vṛtti*. *Smṛti* is responsible for the continuity of knowledge and experience. All activities of the mind leave behind their impressions. These are called subliminal impressions or *samskāras*. In the yoga theory of mental restraint, these *samskāras* play a very important part. When a particular mental state passes away and another takes places, the first one is never completely lost but is present in the form of latent impressions. According to Yoga these *samskāras* are the potencies which generate activities. As Ganganath Jha says, “The *samskāras* are like the roots stuck deep in the soil which grow with the growth of the plant above, but even when the plant above is destroyed, the roots remain undisturbed and may again shoot forth as plants whenever they may get a favourable season”²³, it is fact that the mind can never be absolutely empty. If some *vṛttis* are to be removed, then something else must take their place. Every activity is based, on the one hand, on sense-impressions caused by the sense coming into contact with the object and on the other hand, on the *samskāras* of the *citta* which have been stored up and which are associated with these sense impressions. So it is not only the individual perceptual differences that modify the resultant knowledge, but also these *samskāras* or memory that colours knowledge. We say that knowledge means awareness or apprehension of objects. Knowledge is said to be the property of illumination or manifestation that belongs to the self. Without this luminous light of knowledge we lose the ground of all rational practice and intelligent activity. Mind being material, it can reach the object which is also material, but the mind is saturated with *sattva guṇa* which is capable of reflecting the

Jñāna of the self. Whereas the object is being predominantly *tāmasic*, is not capable of doing so. The mind, as it were, forms the liaison between the self on the one hand and object on the other hand. Mind determines the nature of knowledge and gives rise to either valid knowledge or invalid knowledge. Recognition and memory are possible because the mind being material in nature is capable of retaining traces or *samskāras* of all its activities.

According to the Nyāya, dream-cognitions are all memory-cognitions and untrue in character²⁴. They are brought about by the remembrance of objects experience in the past, by organic disorders and also by the imperceptible influences of past desires and actions (*adr̥ṣṭa*)²⁵. Hence dream cognitions have sometimes moral value in so far as they produce pleasurable or painful experiences in the self. However, dream -knowledge is intrinsically false. It is no doubt related to certain objects of the real world. But they are either past or remote. Still in dream, objects are actually represented as present. Dreams sometimes turn out to be true and tally with the subsequent experiences of waking life. But such correspondence between dream- cognitions and waking experience is neither normal nor invariable. Hence dream can never be called *pramāṇa*. Dreams are called perceptions. But they are false perceptions because they are contradicted by our waking experiences. The Vaiśeṣika considers dream to be a kind of internal perception due to the inner sense (*manas*) as aided by impressions of past experiences. It is felt as if coming by way of the external senses²⁶. The advaita Vedānta finds in dream a phenomenon of some philosophical significance. In it there is the mental creation of a world under the influence of *avidyā* as aided by the impressions of waking experiences.

All invalid knowledge is because of some defect in the conditions of perception, e.g., wrong functioning of the sense-organs or wrong associated by the mind. The validity of knowledge leads to the implied question of the invalidity of knowledge. All schools of Indian philosophy give a psychological as well as epistemic logical explanation of erroneous cognition. Whether knowledge is ontologically valid or invalid, there must arise in the mind of the person the doubt as to the validity of the knowledge first received.

According to the *Nyāya-Bhāṣya*²⁷ doubt may arise out of five causes. **First**, it may arise from the perception of such properties as are common to many things, as when we perceive a tall object at a distance and are not sure if it be a man or a post or a tree trunk, because tallness is common to them all. **Secondly**, it arises from the cognition of any peculiar and unique property, as when the cognition of sound makes us doubt if it is eternal or non-eternal, since it is not found in eternal objects like the soul and the atom, nor in non-eternal things like water and earth. **Thirdly**, it may be due to conflicting testimony, as when the different philosophical theories of the soul leave us in doubt as to the real nature of the soul. **Fourthly**, it is caused by the irregularity of perception, as when we doubt if the perceived water really exists or not, since there is a perception of water both in a tank and a mirage. **Lastly**, doubt springs from irregularity of non-perception, as when we are not sure if the thing we cannot see now really exists or not, since the existent also is not perceived under certain conditions. According to the later Naiyāyikas such as Uddyotakara, Vacāspati and others, there are not five but only three or two kinds of doubt²⁸. Irregularity of perception or non-perception is not by itself a cause of doubt. So also conflict of testimony is not an independent cause, but only an auxiliary condition of doubt. In all cases of doubt there is either the perception of

common properties or the cognition of something quite new and uncommon. According to Gangeśa there are only two sources of doubt, namely, the suspicion of *Upādhi* or condition, and the perception of a property common to many things without any presentation of their differentiating attributes²⁹.

According to the Vaiśeṣika, there is fundamentally only one kind of doubt since it is always due to perception of properties common to many familiar objects³⁰. Here it should be noted that some of the writers on the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika include conjecture (*ūha*) and indefinite cognition (*anadhyavasāya*) under doubt.

Doubt or *samśaya* is not valid knowledge (*pramā*). It has the character of *anubhava*, but it is neither definite (*asamdigdha*) nor is it true (*yathārtha*) and hence there is no fruitful activity. Nevertheless doubt is not error (*Viparyaya*). For doubt as a form of cognition, is neither true nor false, whereas error is definitely wrong knowledge. The value of doubt is the starting point of a critical knowledge of objects. In this sense it may be said to be the beginning of philosophy.

In the view of Nyāya doubt gives us some important truths. As a mental state doubt is neither affirms nor denies anything, but only raises a problem for thought. Doubt is different from both belief and disbelief. In doubt, there are two or more alternatives in regard to the same thing. When we are in doubt about anything we do not really know nor do we claim to know what it is. We cannot even say that ‘it must be either this or that’. We can say: is it this or that?’ Therefore doubt is neither true nor false. It is not a judgment at all. It does not assert anything. According to Nyāya³¹, doubt is never a definite cognition (*avadhāraṇa*), but an indecisive questioning attitude towards an object.

The Sanskrit rendering of the term 'peace' is *Śānti*, which is derived from the root *Śam* meaning 'restraining of the sense-organ'. In Buddhism and Hindu tradition the root of the absence of peace is 'thirst' (*tanha*) or cravings for getting more and more consumable objects. The thirst is an unending phenomenon. The more we get, the more we urge for it. In order to get rid of such thirst we have to search for self-satisfaction, which ultimately leads to the world of peace affecting environment also.

Buddhism in general represents the way of compassion. The Buddha is an embodiment of compassion and hence he is regarded as the compassionate protector of all beings. As such thirst has been taken as the root cause of all worldly diseases (*bhava-roga*), the path as shown by Buddha is to be resorted to and hence he is called a physician of all worldly diseases (*bhava-roga-vaidyā*). To him the individuals following his path should practice loving kindness, which implies not to harm the life of all beings. It is advised always to protect mankind as well as animals and vegetations. It is his wisdom through which he can see all human beings in the universe as equal in nature. The well being of human being and animals is interrelated and mutual.

To ignore such instructions is to invite our environmental crisis. In the modern time we find that human beings have misused their power and destroyed the animals, forests and mountains resulting in environmental crisis. The greedy minds of mankind lead to such changes and destructions of the ecological balance.

The external environment is seriously polluted because of the pollution of the internal environment in the mind. The excessive greed is one of the reasons for the internal pollution. This disease may be eradicated if an individual finds some satisfaction and

contentment through the Buddha's teaching. That the external pollution is related to our internal one is evidenced in the *Dhammapada*. It is said that just as the maker of an arrow makes the end of it straight, so an individual should simplify his mind, which is wavering, fickle, uncontrolled and unprotected³².

The contentment in the context of Buddhism does not mean the eradication of all desires but to live in harmony with all beings and nature. It is said in the *Dhammapada* that a pure and developed mind alone can understand others mind (Panditavagga, verse no. 3). It is further emphasized that when the world is burning (*prajjalite*) there is no opportunity for adopting laughter (*hāso*) and joy (*ānanda*). In the like manner, if our mind is covered with darkness, would we not seek for light? (Jaravagga, verse no. 1). Those who believe in the teaching of Buddha will control their desire and live in harmony with nature keeping the environment in healthy condition. It is rightly mentioned in the *Dhammapada* that one who sees only the apparent beauty, who is not self-restraint in enjoying consumable things, who is lazy and weak is always attacked by one's enemies just like a weak tree. On the other hand, an individual refraining from seeing apparent beauty becomes self-controlled and respectful and hence he is not overpowered by the enemies just like a firm and stony mountain.³³

The historical account of Buddhism shows that for thousand years the Buddhist monasteries have developed a harmonious living with nature and hence they are established in the mountains and forests. The calm and cool atmosphere of the forest and mountain helps the Buddhist practitioners to develop their inner mind, which ultimately makes them 'feel' for the protection of animals. With loving and tolerant heart the

Buddhists live with natural vegetation, wild animals in the forest in harmony and for mutual survival.

In Buddhism we find a great celebration of the richness and diversity of the earth and the lotus is only one among many plants of great symbolic significance. In the Buddhist literature it is found that the Buddha was born in the forest surrounded by *Sal* and other trees having large leaves. The Buddha is found to achieve enlightenment under the trees Peepul or *Bodhi*, which is admitted as sacred in Buddhism and Hinduism.

In the *Sutta-nipāta* we find a deep appreciation of nature's beauty and diversity. Buddha says – “Know ye the grasses and the trees ... Then know ye the worms, and the moths and the different sort of ants ... Know yet also the four-footed animals small and great ... the serpents ... the fish which range in the water ... the birds that are borne along with on wings and move through the air ...”

The consideration for other individuals as a matter of moral obligation is not limited to other human beings alone but to other species. Buddhism seeks to transform in the way through which an individual conceives himself. The environmental ethics in Buddhism is not totally a matter of identifying and securing rights, but it is a matter of undertaking a practice of affirming and realizing the trans-human potential for enlightenment as an effect. The deeper insight in an individual is generated through the cultivation of it in human and trans-human species and hence it can become potential for enlightenment. This can express itself as a compassionate environmental sustaining altruism. Such an idea has been expressed by Shantideva in the following manner:

“Just as the body which is constituted with hands and other limbs should be protected as a single entity, the whole world divided into so many parts should be treated as undivided one so far as its nature is concerned. If it is taken as divided, it would suffer no doubt. I should remove suffering of others because it is suffering like my own. I should help others too because they exist as I exist.”

Shantideva adds that if someone is reluctant to remove sufferings of others, it would like refusing to use one’s hand to remove the thorn of one’s foot, because the pain of the foot is not the pain of the hand.³⁴

To get an ecological balance we should develop an ecological sensibility and actualize that sensibility in practice. So in Buddhism the phenomenon of interrelatedness is deeply felt and hence a comprehensive developmental path is sought. In the *Dhammapada* it is stated that the house-holders may belong to different professions like students, lecturers, labourers, executives etc, but they should not preclude themselves from following the path of truth, purity, lustlessness, angerlessness etc and should practice the virtues like love, compassion, affection etc. If these virtues are practiced in a balanced way, there would be less confrontation and conflict (Buddha-vagga). On proper analysis it is found that tensions and conflicts arise out of desire, cravings and attachment. We can shed desire, cravings and attachment if we understand the true nature of things and life. The control of body may be achieved by controlling the sense of sight, touch, smell etc and organs like hand and feet. For regulation of mind right thought and observance of ethical code of conduct is necessary. The *Dhammapada* gives us an insight into the mysteries and true nature of life and existence, and indicate how we can reduce the range of our attachment, cravings and desire (Bala-vagga, verse no. 3 and Maggavagga, verse no. 16).

It is clearly prescribed in the same text that he who seeks refuge in the Buddha, the Dhamma and the Sangha, he who sees with right knowledge the Four Noble Truths, sorrow, the causes of sorrow, the transcending the sorrow and the Eight-fold path can get rid of sorrow. (Buddha-vagga, Verse nos. 12-14).

Though the Buddhism talks about the protection of the environment, it gives emphasis on the three-fold training of human mind and seven factors of the enlightenment, which are the basis ethical sensibility to the environment. The *Mahāparinibbānasutta of the Dīghanikāya* discusses about the three-fold course of training like cultivation of ethical conduct (*śīla*) meditation (*samādhi*) and wisdom (*pañña*). These three are interconnected in the sense that the first is left behind when the second is undertaken. Without the development of these it is possible for one to lead happy and peaceful life. Wisdom (*prajñā*) goes beyond knowledge attained through reading books or hearing the tales. The practice of morality (*śīla*) and mental development (*samādhi*) develops a penetrative insight and realization into the nature of everything in its proper perspective. When the realization (wisdom) appears, the trained mind becomes an unshakable dynamic force that can handle any human problem without anxiety and thereby can remove the worldly problems. When the ethical conduct is firmly established, the meditation becomes effective. Through effect of meditation the transformative power of wisdom becomes possible.³⁵

The above mentioned three-fold practice has a tremendous influence on the Buddha's doctrine of seven factors of enlightenment viz. mindfulness (*sati*), discrimination of principles (*dhamma-vicaya*), energy in pursuit of the food (*vīrya*), rapture (*piiti*), tranquility (*passaddhi*), concentration (*samādhi*) and equanimity (*upekkhā*). It is

mentioned in the *Samyuttanikāya* that these seven are essential for any kind of social or moral development. When a monk remaining secluded recollects and reasons about the doctrine, he adheres to the mindfulness factor of enlightenment, which is followed by other steps. After mindful he can discriminate, reflects on and investigates the doctrine with understanding. In this way he can reach to the path of perfection, which includes rapture (*pitti*), tranquility (*passaddhi*), concentration (*Samādhi*) and equanimity (*upekkhā*). The latter four are connected with the phenomenon of meditation, which is available through the cognitive and affective refinement.³⁶

An individual having such moral qualities would be able to have sensitivity towards our environment. It is rightly mentioned in the *Tanhabaggo* chapter of the *Dhammapada* that the thirst for enjoyable object makes a man blind of his own future and hence he can go to any extent for his enjoyment adopting injury to human and non-human beings including environment. This thirsty person is compared to a monkey desiring fruits (*so pravati hurāhuram phalamiccham va vanasming vānaro*).³⁷ It is so dangerous that it is metaphorised as poison (*visattikā*).³⁸ Hence it is advisable to eradicate the root of such thirst through the weapon of wisdom (*paññacchindatha*), which is dependent on the paths mentioned above.³⁹

An individual having such freedom can have ‘real sympathy’ towards nature, environment and non-human beings. An individual possessing such a mental state cannot do harm to others. If he cuts trees, injures animals etc. he will be condemned as found in the *Vinayapiṭāka*. It has also mentioned in the *Bhaiṣajya-skandhaka* that how different trees serve us as medicines in our everyday life.⁴⁰

From the above discussion we may draw the following conclusions. Only advice to protect environment or to adopt *ahimsā* will fall flat upon others until and unless they are enlightened with wisdom. The true solution of the environmental crisis will be neither technological nor legal. It must be stereological. It must involve the evolution of a significant number of human beings to a higher level of awareness, to a higher ethical sensibility. It does not mean that the technological and legal efforts to safeguard the environment are pointless, but we think there is at least a stopgap measure but not the ultimate solution. To Buddhism there is a potentiality in human being to evolve into a higher ethical sensibility. This will happen through the concerted practice and discipline. The whole Buddhist tradition consists precisely in a sustained effort to devise effective methods for undertaking this transformation. The tradition says that we have our own resources though the task is very difficult. If we can master over the method, the energy in pursuit of the good, patience, the living kindness, the concentration and the wisdom to bring these substantial resources to bear evolve automatically in a man. With this inner tranquility alone outer tranquility, free from pollution, may come into being.

First, in order to arrive at such stage it is essential to go through some rigorous meditative training so that we can control our sense-organs including the inner one (*antaḥ-karaṇa*) or mind. To the Buddhists the Eight-fold path (*aṣṭāṅgika-mārga*) is the correct path to know the right knowledge of reality, which ultimately leads to the control of sense-organs. If it is realized that each and every object is transitory or momentary, essenceless (*śūnya*), our mind, being controlled, can reduce the thirst for enjoyment. As individual, being free from mental pollution, can achieve peace. That is why; Buddha himself is

called an embodiment of peace and an aesthetic pleasure called *śāntarasa*. By virtue of worthy of it he is called *śantātmā* and *śānta-manas*.

Secondly, proper counseling is an alternative way through which a man can be made free from the clutch of thirst. Human beings can be convinced through arguments and examples that no one in this world is found happy through his wish-fulfillment. Because the fulfillment of one desire gives rise to another one leading us to the path of *Infinite Regress*. The logic of counseling (sravana) has been admitted by Sankara also who advised an individual not to boast of wealth, man-power and youth, because all might be taken away within a moment by the Time. Our life is as transitory as the water in the lotus-leaf (“*Mā kuru dhana-jana-yauvana - garvam/ harati nimeṣāt kālah sarvam // Nalinī-dala-gata-jalavat-taralam / tadvajjīvanamatiśayacapalam //*” if a human being is convinced with these, he will start minimizing his cravings or thirst, which ultimately leads him to the world of mental balance and thereby environmental balance,.

The last method of reducing one’s thirst is to encourage him to engage in the enjoyment of fine arts like film, drama, music, dance painting etc. It is a well - known fact that while enjoying aesthetic pleasure a human being can bracket his day to day problems and engross himself in some non-pathological enjoyment. It is non – pathological in sense that this type of enjoyment has no connection with the fulfillment of our this-worldly matter. Through such non-pathological enjoyment one can easily reduce one’s this-worldly interested pathological desires arising out of cravings.

To the Advaitins the whole world is nothing but the manifestation of Brahman or *Ātman* or Consciousness (*Caitanya*). Keeping this presupposition in view Dharmaraja

Adhvarindra, a philosopher belonging to the Advaita School, thinks that mere connection (*sannikarsa*) between sense-organ and an object is not the cause of perceptual cognition. If the whole world is covered by the Consciousness (*Caitanya*), an object ontologically cannot remain without being covered by the said Consciousness. If the Consciousness were taken as an all-pervading entity, it would logically follow that nothing is left uncovered by this. Hence all the objects including sense-organ etc are covered by this. Though the Reality or the Consciousness is one, it may have some limited forms which are called limiting adjuncts (*upādhis*) for our phenomenal necessity. The *Upādhi* or limiting adjunct experienced in our life is called constitutive while the main entity, which is free from limiting adjuncts (*niravacchinna or nirupādhika*) is called regulative. In the Dialectic part of the *Critique of the Pure Reason* Kant institutes a distinction between regulative and constitutive ideas in the context of cosmological ideas. By 'ideas' Kant means a set of *a-priori* ideas such that are derived from Reason, the highest human faculty. One feature of these ideas is that there can never be intuitions or facts corresponding to them. But they do regulate the ways in which certain other ideas are to be used. Freedom, ought, Immortality of the soul, God etc. are regulative notions. The constitutive ideas always have intuitions corresponding to them, and together they render knowledge possible. The *a-priori* categories of understanding are constitutive notions. They are *a-priori* but intentional, and it is with their help that we can organize the world as and when we come to know it. The result of the application of constitutive ideas is verifiability. But the application of the regulative ideas is never verifiable, but they can be dispensed with. They are unalienable presuppositions of human state of affairs. The limiting adjuncts like *ghatākāśa* (space limited by a jar), month, week, day, night etc. are constitutive in the sense that they have intuitions corresponding to them through which

our phenomenal purpose is served while the absolute entities like Time (*kāla*), Space (*ākāśa*) etc. that are free from limiting adjuncts (*nirupādhika*) are accepted as regulative on account of the fact that they are accepted ontologically but not verifiable through experience or there we do not find intuitions or facts corresponding to them. That is why; *upādhi* is called an introducer (*paricāyaka*) by the Naiyāyikas.⁴¹

The Advaitins also accept three types of Consciousness though it is ontologically one. These limiting adjuncts are Consciousness limited by an object (*viśayāvacchinnacaitanya*), Consciousness limited by the mental mode in the form of an object (*antaḥkaraṇavṛtavyacchinnacaitanya*) and Consciousness limited by mind (*antaḥkaraṇāvacchinnacaitanya*). These limiting adjuncts of the Consciousness are technically called *viśayacaitanya*, *pramāṇacaitanya* and *pramāṭṛcaitanya* respectively⁴² just as Time, though one in number, has got various limiting adjuncts like hour, month, week, fortnight etc. Keeping these metaphysical presuppositions in view Dharmaraja Adhvarindra has accepted two criteria of perceptuality – *Jñānagata* (existing in cognition) and *viśayagata* (existing in an object). To him when there is a union between *pramāṇacaitanya* (Consciousness limited by mental mode-*antaḥkaraṇavṛtti*) and *viśayacaitanya* (Consciousness limited by an object), there is the perceptuality of knowledge or cognition (*jñānagatapratyakṣatva*).⁴³ It is to be born in mind that he has made a clear distinction between perception of the knowledge of a jar and perception of a jar. In the case of the perception of the knowledge of a jar there is a unity between *viśayacaitanya* and *pramāṇacaitanya*, but *pramāṭṛcaitanya* remains isolated under such situation. How is such union of these *caitanyas* possible? Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra had made an effort to convince about the logic of such description. When our mind goes out

of the body with the help of the sense-organ and assumes the shape of the object then it called mental mode (*vṛtti*) which is also a limited form of the Consciousness. To them mind or *antaḥkaraṇa* has no shape of its own just as a liquid substance but it can assume the shape of the object just as water assumes the form of the container. If this were the case, the *viśayacaitanya* (Consciousness limited by an object) becomes identified with its corresponding mental mode (*antaḥkaraṇavṛtti*). The union of these two limited forms of consciousness gives rise to the perception of the knowledge of an object. The *Pramāṭṛcāitanya* (Consciousness limited by mind) who, being a knower, remains isolated and perceives the knowledge of an object (*jñānagatapratyakṣatva*)⁴⁴, after retaining its character of being a knower. In this case there is the distinction between a knower (*jñātā*) and a known object (*jñeya*). That is why; it is the perceptuality of knowledge of an object (*jñānagatapratyakṣatva*). In this case the cognition of an object is perceived.

In the case of inference etc. the mind does not go to the space occupied by fire etc. on account of the fact that the latter is not in connection with the eye etc. In the same way, in the perceptual cognition of a jar in the form-‘This jar’, the jar etc., and their corresponding mental states in the form of those are united in the same space outside the body, and hence the Consciousness limited by both is one and the same. For, the mental states and objects like jar etc. do not produce any difference due to their occupation of the same space. On account of this the ether limited by a jar existing in a temple is not different from the ether limited by temple. In the like manner, in the perception of a jar as ‘This jar’, the mental state in the form of the jar being in contact with the jar, the Consciousness limited by that mental state is not different from the Consciousness limited by the jar and hence in the knowledge of a jar there is a perception so far as the

jar is concerned. One can perceive the Cognition – ‘I am happy’, because the Consciousness limited by the happiness etc. and the Consciousness limited by the mental state in the form of that are invariably limited by two adjuncts occupying the same space. It may be argued that when an individual recollects happiness etc. of the past, he may have perceptual experience of the happiness remaining in the past. In reply it can be said that perception is not possible in such cases. Because the happiness that is recollected from the past is a past event and the mental state in the form of the recollection of the same is a present event. As these two limiting adjuncts in the mind remain in two different times, the criterion of the unification of the two is not maintained. Hence in such cases the perceptual awareness is not possible.

It may again argued that when someone realizes the righteousness etc. existing in him through verbal testimony, it may be taken as perceptual due the identification of the Consciousness in the form of righteousness and its corresponding mental state. This is not acceptable, because any object cannot come under the purview of perception. In this case the righteousness is not capable of being perceived. Hence the question of its perception does not arise at all. In the case of the cognition in the form – ‘The Mountain is fiery’ there is perceptuality so far as the mountain is concerned, because there we find the amalgamation of the two forms of Consciousness i.e., the Consciousness in the form of mountain and its corresponding mental state. So far as the cognition of fire is concerned, it is inferential due to not fulfilling the above-mentioned criterion. Applying the same principle it can be said that in the case of the cognition in the form: ‘The sandal wood is fragrant’, the knowledge of the sandalwood is perceptual while the cognition of fragrance is inferential.

There is another type of perception, which is called the perceptuality of an object (*viṣayagatapratyakṣatva*). By virtue of being cognition of an object in the previous case there is a knower; otherwise the knowledge of an object becomes meaningless. If it is said that there is the perceptuality of an object, it should be treated as different from the earlier one. It is not knowledge, which is perceived, but the object only. Such a situation cannot give rise to knower-known relationship (*jñātr-jñeya-bhāvasambandha*). Hence Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra opines that in such cases there is only the knower in the form of consciousness (*pramātrcāitanya*); but the other two i.e. consciousness limited by mental mode (*antaḥkaraṇavṛtti*) and consciousness limited by an object are united in the knower (*pramā*) and are absorbed in it. It is described by him as ‘*pramātrṣattātiriktasattākatvabhāvah*’ i.e., there will be an absence of the existence of the other forms of consciousness excepting the existence of *pramātā* or knower.⁴⁵ It has been said that the amalgamation of the three into one is not the real intention (*natāvadaikyam*), but it is the awareness of the existence of the *Pramātrcāitanya* in which other forms of Consciousness and subsumed. Therefore, the *pramātrcāitanya* would be an object of our awareness, but other forms of the same are the manifestations of the *pramātrcāitanya* and hence their existence does not come to our awareness.

When a person thinks himself identified with the world, it is the stage of liberation due to the absence of more than one Reality (*Advaita*). At this stage an object is ‘*not merely an object*’, but ‘*subjectified object*’. Though there is no difference between the expressions ‘*subjectified object*’ and ‘*objectified subject*’ as evidenced in the *Bhagavadgīta* ‘*Sarvabhūtaṣṭhamātmānam sarvabhūtāni cātmani*’.⁴⁶ (i.e., extension of self to others and bringing others under self), Dharmarāja preferred to use ‘*subjectified object*’, since

pramātā (knower) only remains at this stage being identified with others. In this case an object or *viśaya* is engulfed by the *pramātā* or knower. As the knower (*pramātā*) sees himself in the object, it may be called self-perception (*ātmagatapratyakṣa*). Moreover, self is the locus (*adhiṣṭhāna*) on which the object is superimposed in the phenomenal stage. To the Advaitins locus or *adhiṣṭhāna* is never contradicted (*avādhita*) by the subsequent cognition. In the case of snake-rope illusion the locus i.e., rope is not contradicted but the superimposed object or *adhyasta* i.e., snake is contradicted by the cognition of the locus i.e., rope. In the like manner the Advaitins believe that Brahman or Self in the locus on which all the objects are superimposed. For this reason the cognition of the phenomenal objects are contradicted, because they are sublated by the Ultimate Reality. Keeping the above clarifications in view it may be said that in the case of the perceptuality of an object (*viśayagatapratyakṣatva*) the object is not vanished, but it is known as the form of self, which remains always uncontradicted. Any type of love presupposes the extension of self to the object of love. Our love will know no bound if self is extended to the all corners of the world. If we can extend it to the neighbours, countrymen, distressed and downtrodden people, we acquire required ability to love them selflessly. In this way an individual can turn into a philanthropic one and he can think of welfare of all human beings. A person can turn into a real patriot and sacrifice his own life for the sake of the country if and only if he can extend his self to the Nation. For this reason the patriotism is called *deśātmabodha* i.e., the feeling of identity between self and the country. In this case also the Nation or country does not remain as isolated from the knower (*pramātā*), but the knower brings it within his own self-giving rise to the perceptuality of object.

At the stage of perceptuality of an object there is the absence of the existence of other objects excepting the existence of knower (*pramātā*). Is it not a state of liberation? Such a situation is found temporally at the time of aesthetic enjoyment (*rasa*). Abhinavagupta has explained this state of ‘*subjectified object*’ as the melting of the state of the knower or *pramātā* (*pramāṭṛbhāvavigalana*).⁴⁷ Just as an object when liquidified covers many areas, in the like manner the knower can expand itself in such a way so that all objects are included in him. At this time he is not confined within himself but expanded himself to all the objects and hence objects have no other existence other than that of the knower. That is why; an individual can enjoy aesthetic pleasure (*rasa*) as he considers the pathos etc. belonging to characters of the novel or drama as his own due to emotional involvement. This sharing of others feeling is called by Abhinavagupta as *tanmayībhavana* i.e., becoming one with other.⁴⁸ Actually the feeling existing in an individual is transmitted to all the spectators. If each and every reader receives the same sensitivity or feeling, there is a corresponding fact, which is going on in all the hearts of the spectators (*sakala-sahṛdaya-samvāda-śālitā*). Such a phenomenon is otherwise known as ‘absorption of all the audiences towards a particular object’ (*sarvasāmājīkānām ekaghanatā*).⁴⁹ To Viśvsnātha also the subject i.e., *pramātā* sees himself being identified with it (*pramātā tadabhedena svātmānām pratipādyate*).⁵⁰ In fact, self exists everywhere including the art-object. Hence the Aestheticians are of the opinion that the relishment itself is *rasa* (*rasanīyah raṣah*). It is the relishment of the bliss arising out of self-knowledge (as reflected in the characters of the drama), which is called *svavidānanda* (pleasure arising from self-cognition), as if we have undertaken an activity of chewing (*carvaṇavyāpāra*) the bliss generating from self-knowledge. To Abhinavagupta who is chiefly influenced by the Advaitins such a chewing activity of the bliss of the self-

knowledge is called *Rasa*.⁵¹ This interpretation of aesthetic experience would not have been possible, had there been no solid foundation of the perceptuality of object (*Viṣayagatapratyakṣatva*). In fact the aesthetic enjoyment is nothing but the extension of self to the object, which is called *Viṣayagatapratyakṣa*. A question may be raised whether such *viṣayagatapratyakṣa* is equivalent to the Advaita concept of liberation or not. In reply, it can be said that such perception and the aesthetic enjoyment is qualitatively same but quantitatively different. When a jar is perceived, there is the feeling of the non-duality of the self and the jar until the absorption breaks up. When such absorption does not break, an individual will see the whole world as his own self. This non-dual experience will remain forever and such situation is described as liberation according to the Advaitins. The perceptual experience of the phenomenal objects like a jar etc. occurs temporally and hence it is, though qualitatively same, it is quantitatively different. Both the experiences – the *viṣayagatapratyakṣa* and aesthetic experience contain disinterested pleasure arising out of self-relishment-*ātmānananda*. In fact a human being's mind is dominated by the *sattvaguna* at this situation and hence it is touched by *rajah* and *tamoguna*. Due to the prominence of *sattvaguna* an individual can enjoy the self-knowledge identified with him and hence he is not touched by any other knowledge (*vedyāntaraparśasūnya*). This bliss is a highest type of *ānanda* arising from self-revelation (*svaprasānananda*), which is qualitatively equivalent to the taste of Brahman, but not quantitatively, as the former is transitory and the latter is eternal. That is why, such pleasure is described as *Brahmāsvādasahodara*⁵² (i.e., the smaller manifestation of the taste of Brahman).

The aesthetic experience, which is very much common in each and every man's life. Can be a live testimony of the existence of the perception of an object. Such an experience may be an instance to an enquirer to the fact how an object can come under the purview of the subject spontaneously through such perception. If it is possible in the aesthetic world, why not is it possible in other fields?

The indeterminate perception or *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* is accepted in the case of the recognitive cognitions like 'This is that Devadatta' (so 'yam devadattah) or 'that art thou' (*tattvamasi*) on account of the fact that it does not reveal the relation between the two i.e., this and that Devadatta or That and thou. It has been interpreted by the Advaitins that the sentence conveys the sense that Devadatta exists in Devadatta himself or an individual self exists in him in the form of Brahman. But they do not admit relation between two by the term – '*vaiśiṣṭyānavagāhī*'. If the meaning of the aforesaid sentences is pondered upon, it will be revealed that these are not actually relation-free. In other words, like other components the relation is also revealed in such cases due to the following reasons. First, how do we know that Devadatta exists in himself without the assumption of the relation of identity between them? Any type of recognitive cognition presupposes the relation identity (at least in the sense of similarity) between two existing earlier or at present time. To the Advaitins identity or *tādātmya* is the vital relation in the phenomenal cognition. In fact, they admit *tādātmya* in the places where there is a part and whole relation (*avayava-avayavi-bhāva-sambandha*) etc. In fact, the Vaiśeṣikas would accept *samavāya* or inherence as a relation in these cases. Hence *tādātmya* has very often been accepted as a relation. In the cases cited above there must be a relation of identity (*tādātmya*) in the sense of similarity between them. That is why, the recognitive knowledge is possible.

Secondly, though there is no absolute identity between this Devadatta and that Devadatta or an individual being and Brahman, there must be an essential identity (*svarūpatādātmya*) between them. Otherwise, the sentences could not have provided the intended meaning. Lastly, the cognition coming through the sentences are called relational in character, as it is sentential in nature. A sentence becomes meaningful if there is a word, its meaning and their relation. It may be asked in the words and their meaning there is *vācya-vācaka-bhāva* (i.e., expresser-expressed relationship) or not. If the answer is in positive, relation is accepted between them. If not, the sentences cannot provide the desired meaning due to the lack of *vācakatva* (expressive character) of the words. In fact, Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra has accepted the meaningfulness of the sentences, which entails the existence of the relation in them. Hence the definition of *nirvikalpaka* perception as formulated by the Advaitins is hardly adequate. At least this type of definition fails to justify *nirvikalpaka* cognition. The problem has been well taken by the Advaitins. To them the meaning of the sentences likes ‘*so’yam devadattah*’ or ‘*Tat tvamasi*’ etc is indivisible (*akhandārtha*). When the sentences produce right cognition without being related to the relation among the words, it is called indivisible meaning. Only the *prātipadikas*, which are free from the suffixes causing relation, can give rise to indivisible meaning. In the case of the *nirvikalpaka* sentence there is no relation between the meanings of the terms, but it gives an indivisible meaning after ignoring the individual ones. (*Idamevatattvamasi ityādivākyaṅnām akhandārtham yat samsargānavagahi-yathārthajñānanakatvam iti*’).

Two types of perception, apart from the previously mentioned one, are *jīvasāksī* and *īśvarasāksī*. It has been mentioned that the distinction between an individual being (*jīva*)

and witness in self (*jīvasākṣī*) lies on the status of internal sense-organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*). If it remains in an individual being as an adjective or *viśeṣana*, it is called *jīva*. If the same *antaḥkaraṇa* remains as a limiting adjunct or *upādhi* in a *jīva*, it is called *jīvasākṣī*. In the same way, the consciousness qualified by *māyā* is called *īśvara* or God (*māyāvaccinnam caitanyam parameśvarah*). When the same *māyā* remains as a limiting adjunct (*upādhi*), it is called witness in God (*īśvarasākṣī*). The property, which is related to the predicate (*kāryānavayi*), distinguisher (*vyayarttaka*) and present (*vartamāna*), is called *viśeṣana* while something, which cannot be related to the predicate (*kāryānanvayi*), distinguisher (*vyavarttaka*) and present (*vartamāna*) is called *upādhi*. Though the distinction between *viśeṣana* and *upādhi* has been shown clearly, it is very difficult to understand the exact position whether the inner organ or *antaḥkaraṇa* remains in an individual being as an adjunct or limiting adjunct. In the same way the position or status of *māyā* in consciousness (*caitanya*) cannot be known with the help of the reason. Without the help of intuition it is very difficult to have an idea about the status of mind in an individual being or the status of *māyā* in a consciousness. It needs vision to know the same. If these are known transcendently, why are they called the forms of perception? The phenomena of *jīvasākṣī* and *īśvarasākṣī* are more metaphysical in character than epistemological. Hence the Advaitins cannot do ‘pure epistemology’ without the help of metaphysics.

In connection with the immediate awareness (*aparokṣajñāna*) Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra has pointed out that such perceptual awareness may sometimes arise from the testimony also, which is called perceptual awareness generated through verbal testimony (*śābdajanyapratyakṣa*).

It has been argued by the Advaitins that, when an individual comes to know of his happiness through the utterance of the sentence – ‘You are happy’ (*tvam sukhī*) by somebody else, would it be considered as perceptual? The answer is in the positive, as it is always desired by the Advaitins. They have put forward an example of perceptual awareness through some testimonial cognition. A leader of a team is counting the members of his team to confirm that nobody is left behind. Among the ten members every time he is counting nine members but not ten. Being pointed out by somebody else he comes to know that he has not counted himself. Ultimately the person pointed him out as the tenth person and said – ‘You are the tenth’ (*daśamastvamasi*). This is a case of perception, no doubt, which is generated through the utterance of the sentence by somebody else.⁵³ Actually this type of awareness suggests a great domain of the Advaita philosophy. To the Advaitins as individual being is always free, but he does not know it. When it is pointed out that he is free from suffering through the injunction of the *Śāstra* or *Āgama* or through *śravaṇa* (hearing), *manana* (reflection) and *nididhyāsana* (meditating), he suddenly sees himself free. This freedom is not new to him, but it is acquirement of what is acquired (*prāptasya prāptih*). An individual’s liberation or freedom is not at all a new achievement, but awareness of something, which is already known. This knowing of the known is possible through the testimonial statement as found in different *Śruti*. The function of the testimony in the form of *Śruti* is to make someone aware about his own position and status. It provides the true picture of human being like his freedom etc. about which he did not know. Hence, perception in the field of freedom or liberation is generated through the agamic statement, which is very much significant in Indian Philosophical systems.

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bhojanam hi ca amattaññum kusīta hīnavīriyam
tam ve pasahati māro vāco rukkham ’va dubbalam/*”

*“Asubhanupassing viharantam indriyesu susamvutam
bhojanam hi ca mattaññum saddham ārabdhavīriyam
tam ve napasahāli māro vāto selam’va pabbatam/”*

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caksurādidvārā nirgatya ghatādiviṣayadeśam gatvā ghatadiviṣayākārena
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