

**THE CONCEPT OF MIND AND ITS ROLE
IN INDIAN EPISTEMOLOGY:
A CRITICAL STUDY**

**A Thesis submitted to the University of North Bengal
For the award of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy**

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January, 2015

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The idea of my present topic for my Ph.D Thesis occurred to me during some discussions with my teacher Prof. Raghunath Ghosh. I convey my sincere thanks and deep gratitude to my respected teacher and supervisor Prof. Raghunath Ghosh. It would have been impossible for me to complete such a complicated task without his wise guidance, encouragement and full co-operation. In this connection I am expressing my sincere gratitude to all the faculty members of Department of Philosophy, North Bengal University.

I am very much indebted to Mr. Partha Basu who had carried out the typing work. I have no words to thank him.

I am deeply grateful to my parents and also to my mother-in-law and father-in-law as they helped me in many ways in writing this thesis. I do believe that if my father-in-law was still alive he would have been very pleased and delighted to see my academic accomplishment.

In conclusion my special thanks are to my husband Sri Prabal Bhattacharyya whose constant inspiration helped me to reach my goal. He had painstakingly seen through the entire proof of the thesis. No words of gratitude are enough to acknowledge his help. Last but not the least, my little daughter Mamai (Oindrila) has always been by my side enjoying every moment as she finds her mother struggling through her books and papers and encouraging me to complete the job as soon as possible so that I have more time left to spend with her.

ABSTRACT

In Indian Philosophical systems the existence of mind or *manas* and its role in acquiring cognition has been admitted. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas admitted *manas* as one of the categories, i.e. one of the nine substances (*padārthas*), which is inferred as a locus of the non-simultaneous cognition (*yugapajjñānānutpattih*). The Naiyāyikas and other systems accept mind as an instrumental factor of acquiring cognition.

Just as external perception depends on the external senses, internal perception depends on an internal sense called *manas*. Again the mind is also a condition of external perception. The external senses can perceive objects only when they are in contact with the mind. To perceive an object the mind must attend to it through the senses. We do not perceive things in a state of absent - mindedness, even though our senses are in physical contact with them. The mind also is a condition of such subjective states and processes. Again it is also said that though memory involves in inference etc, they are not cases of perception. From this it does not follow that inference etc are not caused by mind.

In the introductory portion of the thesis the above-mentioned theories have been discussed apart from some new observations done by certain philosophers- classical and modern. The classical systems differ among themselves about the acceptance of mind as a sense organ, the distinction among *manas*, *citta*, and *ahaṅkāra*, different levels of mind like over mind, illumined mind, super mind, mind full of desire and desireless mind, the Yoga concepts of five levels of mind like *kṣipta*, *vikṣipta*, *mūḍha*, *niruddha* etc.

The middle portion of the thesis deals with the important role of mind in epistemology. The Naiyāyikas believe that without the operation of mind no knowledge is possible. Perception requires attention, which again is active turning of the mind towards the object of perception. So the co-operation of the *manas* is a necessary condition of all knowledge whether it refers to external objects or internal states. We do not perceive colour, touch, taste, smell and sound simultaneously, even though all the external senses may be in contact with their objects, if there is no contact between *manas* and the sense - organ. In case of perception there are three stages of contact first between *ātman* and mind, second between mind and sense - organ and lastly sense - organ with the object (*Ātmā manasā samyujyate manah indriyena indriyam arthena*). *Manas* must be in contact with the object through the medium of the sense organ on the one hand, and with the self or the *Ātman* on the other hand. For example; sometimes we purposely look at a watch, but we do not yet see the time, for our *manas* has meanwhile come to be otherwise occupied. And that object on which the *manas* is concentrated or attending only that object is cognized by the soul.

The Advaitins also feel that perception occurs due to the function of *antahkaraṇa* in different way. If *antahkaraṇa* goes to object and assumes its shape, it is called *antahkaraṇa-vṛtti* where there is an inherent consciousness. In the knowable object also there is the same consciousness. When these two forms of consciousness are amalgamated, it is called perception of cognition (*jñānagatapratyakṣa*). But there arise two epistemological troubles against this theory of perception. First, it is the out-going mental *vṛtti* that goes to the object and takes the form of the object at the place in which the object is and at the time in which the object is. But if this is so then perception of

distant objects like star cannot be explained. But according to the Advaitin, in perception there is an identity of object defined consciousness (*Viṣayacaitanya*) with the cognitive consciousness (*pramāṇa caitanya*), and hence no doubt would occur in such cases. The basic principle of Advaita is that the self alone is real. Hence both the object and the *antahkaraṇa* are only empirically existent. But the difference between the *antahkaraṇa* and the object is transparent enough to reflect the conscious principal because of the predominance of the *sattva* element. But when three types of consciousness, i.e., *pramāṭṛ-caitanya*, *pramāṇa-caitanya* and *viṣayacaitanya* are amalgamated leaving no room for duality, it is called *viṣayagata pratyakṣa*. In such case also the role of *antahkaraṇa* is prominent.

The external environment is seriously polluted because of the pollution of the internal environment in the mind. The excessive greed is one of the reasons for the internal pollution. This disease may be eradicated if an individual finds some satisfaction and contentment through the Buddha's teaching. That the external pollution is related to our internal one is evidenced in the *Dhammapada*. It is said that just as the maker of an arrows makes the end of it straight, so an individual should simplify his mind, which is wavering, fickle, uncontrolled and unprotected.

While critically evaluating the role of mind the following philosophical issues can be raised, which is followed by probable solutions.

It has been shown that the non-simultaneous origin of knowledge is the mark of mind (*'yugapajjñānānutpattir manaso lingam'*). To the Naiyāyikas mind is having atomic dimension (*aṇuparimāṇa*). Due to having such dimension mind does not have capacity of

unfolding two cognitions simultaneously. Though the Naiyāyikas have used non-origination of two cognitions simultaneously, it should be interpreted as ‘two or more than two’. If the term ‘simultaneous cognition’ means ‘simultaneity of only two’, one might think that more than two cognitions can be grasped by mind simultaneously, which is not the case.

In response to the above one may raise a problem. If mind cannot grasp the simultaneous cognition, how we experience a kind of cognition called ‘collective cognition’ or ‘cognition apprehending many things collectively’, which is technically called ‘*samūhālabana – jñāna*’. Though the simultaneous cognition by mind is denied, our experience shows a different picture. When we see a heroin in a film, we perceive various aspects of her, viz. the dress she is wearing, ornaments she is using, song she is singing along with her physical features. In this case multiple objects become the content of our cognition. Such *samūhālabana* cognition is also grasped by mind, which is not covered in the earlier definition. When a lady is knitting wool, she is knitting; talking with others, looking at the knot, design etc. this is also a case of ‘collective cognition’, which is very common in our life. How is it possible? The Naiyāyikas will answer in the following way. Though in these cases experience of many objects is found, yet it can be said that these objects are not having simultaneous occurrence. When we see a hero or lady in a film, we see his/her dress, his/ her song, enjoy the beauty, but they are not simultaneous, but successive. When we concentrate to song, we are not concentrating to her dress or ornaments. In this way, it can be said that all the experiences are successive, but not simultaneous. The experiences happen so quickly that they seem to be simultaneous, but actually not. Just as a ring with fire if handled speedily seems as ‘fire-circle’ called

alātacakra, the successively occurred cognitions are mistakenly taken as simultaneous. Hence the definition of mind as the cause of non-simultaneous origination of cognition is not defective as claimed by the opponents.

The Buddhists in general believe in double status of existence of an object -unique particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) and universality or generality (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*). The latter is purely mental and hence it is not ultimately real (*paramārthasatya*), but empirically or phenomenally real (*samvṛtisatya*), which has got a secondary status in Buddhist epistemology due to its pure mental character. Should we accept such view on Reality by the Buddhist?

In reply, it may be said that though the empirical world or world known through concepts is purely mental, our day to day behaviour is possible through this and hence the role of mind cannot be ignored. Though mental concepts or ascriptions cannot fully catch hold of reality as endorsed by Buddhists, the picture received through the conceptual eye is inevitable for our day to day transaction or behaviour. Even in the case of perception there are different stages depending on the function of mind. We can perceive an object in a very gross way or subtle way. If our concentration is of superior form, we can perceive many aspects in an object which cannot be seen through our gross eye. This type of subtle perception is called *paṭutara pratyakṣa* or subtler perception.

I beg to differ from the Naiyāyikas that they have admitted the atomic nature of mind on account of the fact that it is not capable of producing simultaneous cognition. To me from the fact of its non-production of simultaneous cognition it is not rational to infer its atomicity. If mind is made powerful through its concentrative capacity and proper

training, it can reveal much cognition at a time, even the past and future. This is due to power of mind enhanced through meditative exercise. That is why, it can safely be said that mind may be endowed with the power of generating non-simultaneous cognitions.

PREFACE

My aim is to explain The Concept of Mind and its Role in Indian Epistemology: A Critical Study. In Indian philosophy mind has got a prominent role in providing cognition to others and in communication. In fact, mind is such an entity that it cannot be avoided in any case. It is essential not only in the field of epistemology, but in metaphysics also. All systems of Indian philosophy deal with the concept of mind.

In the introductory portion of the thesis I explain the Naiyāyikas and other systems in Indian philosophy accept mind as an instrumental factor of acquiring cognition. Apart from that I have been discussed some new observations done by certain philosophers classical and modern.

In the second chapter I try to explain the concept of mind in different systems of Indian philosophy. I also explain here the concept of mind as found in Western philosophy. In Western point of view there are various 'isms' that try to answer a cluster of questions regarding mental events.

In the third chapter of the thesis deals with the important role of mind in epistemology. The Naiyāyikas believe that without the operation of mind no knowledge is possible. So the co-operation of the *manas* is a necessary condition of all knowledge whether it refers to external objects or internal states. The advaitins also feel that perception occurs due to the function *antakharana* in different way. In the fourth and last chapter while critically evaluating the role of mind there are some philosophical issues can be raised which is followed by probable solutions.

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CHAPTER – 1

INTRODUCTION

The *Vedas* and The *Upaniṣads* are fundamental sources of philosophical knowledge. The concept of transcendental consciousness and the mind are the central themes of *Upaniṣads*. The concept of self and self-knowledge occupies central points of discourse in the *Upaniṣadic* text as well as in Indian philosophical system. For instance, *who am I ?* The search for self knowledge has been the major concern for the Indian philosophers. The answer to the above question is – '*aham brahmāsmi*'- I am the manifestation of *Brahman*. It is pure conscious. The *ātman* is the individual soul or the self is a part of *Brahman*. Human beings are not merely the bodily beings, rather conscious beings. The *Upaniṣadic* notion of mind addresses to the issue of the very conception of realization of one's identity (self-knowledge) as part of epistemic activities of life. The realization of the self as pure consciousness or *Brahman* is a revelation; it is because the *Brahman* is *prakāśa svarūpa*. It has no form. Thus, it can be conceptualized with the theoretical framework of transcendental mind. The *ātman* is free from the spatio-temporal order of the Universe. The *ātman-conscious* mind is immortal, eternal and infinite. It is immortal in the sense that it neither decays nor takes birth; rather it is eternal to be conceived beyond the causal order of the universe. The changes that occur in objects and facts in the world are causally determinable. The origin of things in the world and their ends make them finite. The knowledge about the world is sense-experiential whereas the knowledge

about the *Ātman* is not derived through any sense experience; rather it is immediate knowledge. Nevertheless there must be a desire to know (*jiñāsā*) ‘Who am I?’ Unless there is any inclination to know its true nature, it does not ever reveal its true nature. The revealed knowledge is ‘*tat tvam asi*’- ‘*thou art that*’. In other words, the true nature of being is referred to one’s identity with the Universal consciousness. The individual *Ātman* is associated with the body, but *Ātman* as consciousness can transcend the body.

The *Upaniṣads* maintain a harmony between *ātman* (soul), *manas* (mind) and *śarīra* (the body). The *Jīva*, the individual represents the whole of these. The *indriyas* (sense - organ) are coordinated by the mind. These are gross and subtle sense - organs. Thinking, experiencing, remembering and knowing are performed by the sense - organs. The *manas* is one of the finest-*indriyas*. The sense-organs being part of the body are not merely instruments of experiencing pleasure and lust, rather to be used as a field of spiritual realization. So the whole *sādhana* is to control and overcome the basic nature of the mind and other *indriyas*. The activities of the mind are being witnessed. The soul or the *ātman* in this connection is described as the *sākṣin* – the witness consciousness. The *ātman* is not affected by the activities of the body and the mind. The mind which is in close proximity with the soul-the *ātman*, can only be controlled and co-ordinated by the *ātman*. ‘The finite mind is capable of receiving the experiences but cannot conceptualize them without the soul which is the seat of thinking and the other creative activities’¹. The soul has the power of transforming the nature of the mind. This transformation is co-ordinated highlighting the harmony between the soul and the mind, which is explained through the metaphor of chariot in *Kathopaniṣad*. In famous metaphor of the chariot, the soul is the

owner of the chariot, the intellect the charioteer, the mind the reins, the sense - organs the horse and the body the chariot².

As per Hinduism, mind is a finer body within this gross body. The physical body is, as it were, only the outer crust of the mind. The mind being the finer part of the body, the one affects the other. And therefore, physical illness often affects the mind and mental illness or tension often affects the body. Behind the mind is the *Ātman*, the real self of men. Body and mind are material, *Ātman* is pure spirit. Mind is not the *Ātman*, but distinct from the *Ātman*.

The difference between matter and mind is only in the rate of vibration. Mind at low rate of vibration is called matter; matter at a high rate of vibration is known as mind. Both matter and mind are governed by the same laws of time, space and causation. Matter is convertible into mind, though we may not have realized that this is so. For example, if a person does not eat for two weeks, then not only his body becomes weak, his mind also becomes blank. If he fasts for a few days more, he cannot even think. Even he does not remember his name. When he takes food, his memory revives. Therefore food, which is a matter, becomes mind.

In the *Upaniṣad* Uddālaka is found teaching his son Śvetaketu by experiment how food is converted into mind:

“That, my dear, which is the subtlest part of curds rise, when they are churned, and becomes butter. In the same way, my dear, that which is the subtlest part of the food that is eaten rises and becomes mind. The subtlest part of water that is drunk rises and

becomes *prāṇa*. Thus the mind consists of food, *prāṇa* consists of water, and speech consists of fire.”

The son Śvetaketu said, “Please tell me again”.

Uddālaka said, “My dear, a person consists of sixteen parts. Do not eat (any food) for fifteen days, but drink as much water as you like. Since the *prāṇa* consists of water, it will not be cut off if you drink water”.

Śvetaketu did not eat (any food) for fifteen days. Then he came to his father and said: “What shall I say”?

His father said: “*The Ṛg, Yajur and Sāma verses,*”

He replied, “I cannot remember the *Vedas*.”

His father said to him, “My dear, of your sixteen parts only one part is left; and therefore with that one part you do not remember the *Vedas*. Now go and eat and you will understand my word”.

Śvetaketu ate and then he showed that he knew it whatever his father asked him.

Then his father said to him – “My dear of your sixteen parts only one part was left, and that, when strengthened by food, blazed up. You now remember the *Vedas* with it. Therefore, my dear, the mind consists of food, the *prāṇa* consists of water, and speech consists of fire”. After that he understood what his father said³. If someone doubts this, then he is invited to fast for fifteen days living only on water and see what happens to their mind!

Man is not the mind but the self or *Ātman*. The *Ātman* is free, infinite and eternal. It is pure consciousness. In man the free agent is not the mind but the self. Mind is, as it were, an instrument in the self, through which the self apprehends and responds to the external world. This instrument with which the self comes in contact with the external world is itself constantly changing. When the changing instrument is made motionless, it can reflect the *Ātman*. Though the mind is not a free agent, its powers are simply incalculable. If man has smashed the invisible atom and released its power, if man has realized the unseen *Ātman* and become illumined, it is possible through the power of the mind. In fact the mind is omnipresent. Each mind is a part of the universal mind. Each mind is connected with every other mind. Therefore each mind, wherever it may be, can be in communication with the whole world.

The *Upaniṣad* teaches: “God shining all these shine. Through his radiance all these become manifest in various ways”⁴. To understand the Hindu view of the mind this teaching of the *Upaniṣad* is to be remembered. The source of all light is *Brahman*, the supreme spirit, pure consciousness. What is known as *Ātman*, the knowing self of the living being, is identical with *Brahman*, pure consciousness. It is the radiance of this pure consciousness which manifests all things at all times.

The mind, composed of subtle matter is the *antaḥkāraṇa* of the knowing self. There is no consciousness inherent in the mind. The mind receives the radiance of consciousness from the knowing self and illuminates all things. Though having no light of its own the mind appears to be luminous. Again it seems to cognize, the mind is not the cognizer, but only an instrument of cognition. From our own experience we can know that mind is distinct from the organs and the body. We can think, feel, will, imagine, remember

without our ten organs, which prove that there is a distinct inner instrument, i.e. mind for which all these functions are possible.

In order to prove whether the mind is a distinct inner instrument the *Upaniṣad* gives the following argument:

People say “I was absent-minded, I did not see it, I was absent-minded, I did not hear it.”

It is through the mind that one sees and hears. Desire, doubt, faith, shame, intelligence, fear – all these are but the mind. Therefore the mind exists⁵. The mind has the power of looking back into itself. With the help of the mind we can analyse the mind, and see what is going on in the mind.

The dichotomy between Mind and Matter, Mind and Self, has been the subject of many a controversy down the ages and philosophers have been divided among themselves on the relative importance of Mind and Matter, Mind and self, giving rise to a number of schools of thought. For the physicalists, ‘matter’ is the most basic, and ‘mind’ and ‘consciousness’ are the latter evolutes, others who take ‘consciousness’ as the most fundamental and ‘matter’ as the derived evolutes, are antitheticalists. Again the dualists plead either in favour of body-mind dualism or matter-spirit dualism. These schools discuss the origin and nature of ‘mind’ by way of expounding their views about evolution.

Cārvāka substantiates the physicalist’s model by the analogy that, just as red colour appears as an emergent phenomenon when beetle leaves, beetle nuts and lime are put together whereas redness is not the property of any of the constituents, ‘consciousness’, though not the original property of any of the fundamental elements, appears as an

emergent property when the fundamental elements come into particular configuration. To him 'mind' is a function of the 'body' and consciousness is the emergent property of 'matter'. The concept of consciousness is rejected on account of the fact that it is not available through sense-perception. Hume denies the existence of self precisely on this ground: When I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception⁶.

The physicalists and the atomists argue that perception is the only valid means of knowledge. Anything non-sensuous is constructed as non-existent and unreal. Similarly, causal explanation is the only valid mode of explanation. Every phenomenon is explained in terms of the casual antecedents. Given the antecedent the effect follows and given the consequent, the antecedent can be inferred retrospectively. So there is no room for choice. The present is the result of the past and the future is the result of the present.

However, the essence of mechanical explanation, is to regard the future and the past as the calculable functions of the present and thus to claim that all is given. On this hypothesis, past, present and future would be open at a glance to a super human intellect capable of making the calculation⁷. According to the mechanist's view the "free will" of an individual is considered as a myth. The mind is said to be a function of matter. Mental functions are understood as the neural events in the nervous system.

According to the Sāṃkhya school of Indian Philosophy, the mental entity, rendered as the internal sense-organ is the '*Manas*', and aspect of the '*antaḥkaraṇa*' the internal

instrumental organ of knowledge and action. 'Antaḥkaraṇa' is the three-fold inner organ - *Buddhi*, *ahamkāra* and *Manas*. The faculty of determinate or decisive expression which helps in the perception of right or wrong, determines what is to be done and what not, is *buddhi*. The function of *ahamkāra* is the continuity of the feeling of 'I' the ego-ness -I am the person who studied in the college; 'I am the person who was an under-graduate student in the Raiganj University College,' 'I am the person who is now recollecting those memorable events of my life.' The feeling of 'I-ness' or *abhimāna* in all these events is the work of *ahamkāra*. Certainly, desire and doubt (*saṃkalpa-vikalpa*) are the function of *manas*. To Sāṃkhya *manas* is the internal organ of perception (*antarindriya*) through which we directly know, for instance, pleasure and pain and other mental states. Again the internal sense-organ *manas* acts as an auxiliary to both the five organs of knowledge (*Jñānendriya*) viz., *cakṣu* (the visual organ), *śrotra* (the auditory organ), *ghrāṇa* (the gustatory organ), *rasanā* (the olfactory organ), *tvak* (the tactual organ), and the five organs of action (*karmendriya*) viz. *Vāk* (the organs of speech or larynx), *pāṇi* (*the hand*), *pada* (feet), *pāyu* (the excretory organ), *upastha* (the male or female reproductive organ). Along with all these organs the *manas* is also material in nature. They also agree in considering *manas* as unconscious. To the Indian thinkers consciousness is an attribute of, or identical with, the *ātman*. Like the eyes, the ears and the nose etc. *manas* also is an instrument, unconscious, but very subtle, and through its instrumentality the *ātman* obtains the knowledge of objects.

In this context the self is referred to as *Puruṣa*. It is absolutely a distinct non-material entity which is in essence pure, enlightened and consciousness as such. The *manas* is considered as an evolutes of *Prakṛti*, the hypothesized ultimate material principle of

creation besides the conscious principle of creation, the *Puruṣa*. *Prakṛti* is believed to be constituted of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, the three constituting elements or substances. *Prakṛti* undergoes a process of evolution and gradually evolves this diverse material universe. In this process evolves *buddhi*, *ahaṃkāra* and *manas*, and each of the evolutes is also composite of the three elements, any one predominating the other two. Again the body is also formed from the evolutes of *Prakṛti*. The body is regarded just as a medium through which the self i.e. *Puruṣa* enjoys the material *Prakṛti*. Here *manas* cannot be equated with the body.

What ‘Sāṃkhya’ achieves through ‘knowledge’, Yoga achieves through control of the mental status by actions. In Yoga philosophy mind indeed is the ‘king’ among the sense-organs. In this philosophy the term ‘*Citta*’ is used to denote the mind and *buddhi*. The ‘*Vṛttis*’ are the disturbance that the mind is subjected to the ideas, thoughts and other forces of the mind. *Vṛtti* literally means whirlpool and ‘*nirodha*’ signifies restraint or control.

There are varieties of Yoga and the one that is well known is Patañjali’s *Rāja Yoga*. This school maintains that the inner power of the mind can never be enhanced by any external means but by their own exercise. The *Rāja Yoga* also means that one who practices this *Yoga* becomes a ‘king’ of faculties or their master.

According to Yoga philosophy *tapas*, *svādhyāya* and *Īśvara praṇidhāna* are the essential pre requisites before proceeding to Yoga practices. The *tapas* of the mind consists in ‘calmness of thinking, coolness, quietness, self-control and purity of subject matter’

(XVII 14-16). *Svādhyāya* is the study of the relevant books and a full appreciation of everything as divine gift is *Īśvara praṇidhāna*.

Yoga refers to an important characteristic of mind. It sometimes tends towards good and sometimes towards bad. It is like a river, which flows both ways towards ill as well as towards good. Again the individual has an innate power ‘*śakti*’ stored up in the *citta* and one has to use it in such a way to lead on to the path of *śreyas*- good. This is the ultimate spiritual goal⁸. Yoga brings harmony of the body, mind and the spirit. Yoga to be precise is the way of life aimed at self realization with a meditative mind.

According to the Nyāya - Vaiśeṣikas *manas* or mind is a sense like the senses of taste, smell, etc. It is an internal sense having its locus in the heart (*hṛdayān -tarvarti*)⁹.

Mind is not perceptible but its presence is inferred. Mind is material in nature and serves as an instrument for external as well as internal sensations but the self is the ultimate substrate of knowing¹⁰. For the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, mind is an eternal substance which is different from the physical substance. Unlike the external senses, mind is non-physical (*abhautika*), i.e. it is not constituted by any of the physical elements of earth, water etc. Like the external senses, mind is not possessed of any specific attribute of the physical elements, nor was it limited to the perception of any particular class of objects. As an internal sense it is concerned in all knowledge in different ways. It is atomic and exists in contact with the soul (*aṅvātmasamyogi*). The mind as a sense cannot be perceived, but is known by inference (*na pratyakṣamapi tvanumānagamyam*)¹¹.

Just as external perception depends on the external senses, so internal perception depends on an internal sense, called *manas*. Again the mind is also a condition of external

perception. The external senses can perceive objects only when they are in contact with the mind. To perceive an object the mind must attend to it through the senses. We do not perceive things in a state of absent - mindedness, even though our senses are in physical contact with them¹². So the mind also is a condition of such subjective states and processes. Again it is also said that though memory, inference are not cases of perception, they are also dependent on the function of the mind as a sense¹³. Because it may be said that in the memory and inference the mind gives us a knowledge of objects, not by its contacts with them, but through some other knowledge, as a past experience and the understanding of a universal relation (*vyāpti*).

According to most of the Vedāntins, particularly Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra are of the opinion that *manas* is not an *indriya* or sense-organ and it is the locus of the properties like fear (*bhaya*), respect (*śraddha*), intellect (*dhī*) etc. Again it is not an independent reality. It is not regarded as an invisible, infinitesimal substance (as in the Nyāya system), but is considered to be medium dimension¹⁴. The Advaitins have admitted two types of mind – one related to desire and another unrelated to the same. When an individual possesses a mind, it is connected with desire etc. but through *sādhanā* mind get refined reducing the burden of desire which can alone grasp the Ultimate Reality.

Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra has clearly pointed out that no perceptual or inferential experience is possible without the assumption of the shape of an object through the inner-organ (*antaḥ-karaṇa*) i.e. another name of mind. Our inner organ assumes the shape of an object which is called mental mode (*antaḥ-karaṇa-vṛtti*) which is inevitable in any type of experience.

The body-mind relationship also goes back to the Āyurveda which is the five thousand years old Indian systems of medical science. Āyurveda upholds the concept that man is a miniature universe in the sense that whatever is present in the universe is reflected in man-‘*Yat pinde tat brahmande*’. It further holds that the universe with all its constituents had emerged from a common ground and hence shares a common origin.

All the four Vedas – *R̥g, Yajur, Sama, Atharva* – contain several references to the digestive system, metabolism, anatomy and descriptions of diseases along with concept of *Tridoṣa* or three *doṣas*. The *doṣas* according to the *Vedas* are subtle elements in the human body responsible for all its functions. According to the dictates of Āyurveda, illness occurs due to an imbalance in the equilibrium between the three *doṣas* – *Vāyu, pitta* and *kapha*. Roughly translated, *Vāyu* is wind; *pitta* can be represented by bile and *kapha* by phlegm. We are all made up of unique proportions of *Vāyu, pitta* and *kapha*. These ratios of *doṣas* vary in each individual, and because of this, Āyurveda sees each person as a special combination that accounts for our diversity.

Just as the body is governed by the three *doṣas*, the mind is also governed by three attributes (*guṇa*) mental *doṣas*. They are called *sattva, rajas* and *tamas*. *Sattva* is responsible for righteous and kind thoughts and feelings. *Rajas* is for arrogance, desire, love and passion. *Tamas* is for sleep, stupidity, ignorance. All food, behavior, thoughts and medicine will increase, decrease or neutralize the mental and physical *doṣas*.

Āyurveda implies that whatever affects the body has its effects on the mind. So the performance of the body is closely associated to the mind and soul of the individual. It can be said that if the body should be free from disease, the mind should be happy.

According to Āyurveda, all psychological problems are nothing more than the wrong use of mind. Practicing the right use of mind not only solves the psychological problems, but also directs us to our higher potential of self realization.

Āyurveda is largely indebted for its philosophical ideas on the Sāmkhya and the Vaiśeṣika systems, but it admits *manas* or mind - organ as a separate sense (*indriya*). Āyurveda differs from the ordinary senses by reason of the fact that it has many functions which are not possessed by any of the other senses (*cakṣur – ādibhyo' dhika-dharma yogitayā*)¹⁵.

In Āyurveda, *manas* is described as transcending the senses (*atīndriya*). Cakrapāni, in explaining the *atīndriya* character of *manas*, says that it is called *atīndriya* because it is not a cause of external objects like the other senses. The mind is treated as the sixth sense - organ with a control over the other five sense-organs taking a place higher than them (*sarvendriya param*). Besides controlling and co-ordinating the sense impressions from the external worlds, the mind functions as a motor organ enabling activities through speech and other actions. Thus mind is both a sensory as well as a motor organ¹⁶.

The *Caraka-Samhitā* however states that the *manas* is atomic. Both *ātman* and *manas* are substances (*dravya*) and *manas* is instigated by the *ātman*. The *manas* is not conscious (*acetana*) in nature and *ātman* on the other hand is without any action (*niṣkriya*). *Manas* acts as the intermediary for the relation between the self and the body. The bodily states influence the *manas* and the various conditions of *manas* (states of peace, content etc.) helps in maintaining the body health. One's behavior is regulated by the activity of *manas*. A complete relation of *manas*, *ātman* and the body is what gives a human being

living. But here also the 'I' stands for the conscious self who stands in relation with the body via the *manas*, the individual being referred to as *puruṣa*. Here is the compendium state of *manas*, *ātman* and *śarīra* (the body)¹⁷.

Āyurveda explains that psychological problems are nothing more than the wrong use of mind. Practicing the right use of mind not only solves the psychological problems, but also directs us to our higher potential of self realization. So the concept of mind in Āyurveda is more practical and realistic in the areas of health and healing and hence touching the day to day life of people.

Indian philosophy had long been inculcated by man like Swami Vivekananda and Sri Aurobindo who have not only preached the ideal of the Vedāntas but also translated that ideal into reality.

Swami Vivekananda explains: The mind manifests itself in the five conditions” “Scattering, darkening, gathering one-pointed and concentrated”¹⁸. The ordinary conditions of the mind are ‘darkened’ and ‘scattered’. In the darkened state a man feels dull and passive. In the scattered state he feels restless. Though practicing the disciplines of *yoga* the same mind can be ‘gathered’ and made ‘one pointed’. The whole purpose of mind-control is to make the mind one-pointed. When such a mind is applied to sphere of activity, in that case it shines. Though the practice and development of one - pointed, the mind reaches the fifth or highest condition, called ‘concentrated’. In this condition super conscious is attained.

A strong will is necessary to control the mind. Sri Kṛṣṇa says in the *Gīta*¹⁹ in addition to strong will, faith in oneself is also necessary to control the mind. The mind will have to

be controlled by the mind itself. Mind cannot be controlled by artificial means. Deliberate, patient, intelligent, systematic hard work and suitable discipline is needed.

To Swami Vivekananda, the control of the mind depends on its purity. Perfect morality is necessary for control of the mind. The man who is perfectly moral has nothing more to do, he is free²⁰. We are unable to control our mind because it is impure. The impurities of the mind are the urges, impulses, and emotions like envy, hatred, anger, fear, jealousy, lust, greed, conceit, temptation etc. So we should practice disciplines for the purification of the mind. The impurities of the mind can be gradually removed by providing the mind with pure food. When the food is pure, the mind becomes pure, when the mind becomes pure, memory becomes firm. And when a man is in possession of firm memory, all the bonds which tie him down to the world are loosed²¹.

According to the commentary of Śankarācārya, the word ‘food’ means anything that is taken in by the senses, such as, sounds, sights, smells etc. and ‘the mind becomes pure’ means that it becomes free from aversion, attachment or delusion, which makes it difficult to control mind. According to the *Gītā*, *rājasika* and *tāmasika* food cause attachment, aversion and delusion. *Sāttvika* food helps a person to reduce attachment, aversion and delusion. Therefore our object should be to bring about a preponderance of *sattva* in our inner nature, and then to transcend *sattva* by purifying it.

The most effective way of controlling the mind is meditation and meditation by mind control. These who do not believe in God can control the mind by transcending the *guṇas* through self-effect. Mind-control is most important because it leads to the highest blessing the illumined state of being.

Sri Aurobindo's philosophy can be called idealistic, in a broad sense. It is idealistic firstly because it conceives reality as spiritual; it is idealistic also because it fixes up an ideal for mankind towards which all our efforts have to be directed. But his idealism cannot properly be called 'Monism' of an abstract type or 'Theism' of a personality variety. The best name that can be given to Sri Aurobindo's philosophy is the one given to it by Haridas Choudhary. He says, "The philosophy of Sri Aurobindo may aptly be described as integral non-dualism (*Pūrṇa-advaita*), or integral idealism (*Pūrṇa-vijñana*) or just integralism (*Pūrṇavāda*)²². But this non-dualism of Aurobindo is totally different from the Advaita theory of Śankara.

Sri Aurobindo is also one of the greatest metaphysicians of the world. As a metaphysician, he sees no contradiction between materialism and spiritualism, and relativism and absolutism. He evolves a grand synthesis of all apparently contradicting metaphysical systems. Sri Aurobindo is aware that Materialism and Spiritualism are the two prevalent and rival theories which have attempted to explain the world in their own ways. He says, "The affirmation of a Divine Life upon earth and an immortal sense in mortal existence can have no base unless we recognize not only eternal spirit as the inhabitant of this bodily mansion, the wearer of the mutable robe, but accept matter of which it is made, as a fit and noble material out of which He weaves constantly His garbs, builds recurrently the unending series of his mansions"²³.

According to Sri Aurobindo, in the universe there are not only material bodies but also mental beings so that *prima facie* there is not one reality called matter. He finds that mind has a great role to play in the universe, especially in the evolutionary scheme of things. "As soon as we begin to investigate the operations of the mind and super mind," says Sri

Aurobindo, “in themselves and without prejudgement that is determined from the beginning to see in them only a subordinate term of matter, we come into contact with a mass of phenomena which escape entirely from the rigid hold, the limiting dogmatism of the materialist formula²⁴.” These phenomena are those of mind and supermind to satisfy our reason in explaining the universe because it cannot explain the very basis of our reasoning about the Universe. The Universe is itself intelligible only to the mind and therefore any doctrine that denies mind must be an incomplete and inconsistent doctrine.

Sri Aurobindo argues for the reality of the mind which lies beyond the realm of matter. He provides a new world-picture in which mind is taken to be prior to matter in the sense that mind is already involved in matter. That mind is higher than matter is proved by the fact that mind has consciousness in it which is not in matter except in the latent form. If mind would not have been already in matter, then it would not have been possible to explain how life and mind would come into existence. If matter would have been ontologically closed within the physical laws, then under no circumstances can we show how mind comes into existence in a purely material universe²⁵.

The main objective of Sri Aurobindo’s is to provide an ontology that makes room for the existence of both material universe and the conscious beings like the human beings. He conceives reality as supremely spiritual and yet he manages to assign to matter a place in it. He admits, “Since, then, we admit both the claim of the Pure Spirit to manifest in us its absolute freedom and the claim of Universal Matter to be the mould and condition of our manifestation, we have to find a Truth that can entirely reconcile these antagonists and can give to both their due portion in life and their due justification in thought”²⁶. According to him, Reality is essentially one, but creation depends upon the two-fold

principles of unity and multiplicity. According to Sri Aurobindo, as for the ancient Upanishadic Rishis, the realm of the mind is finite, limited and surrounded by the Nescience. Mind is therefore steeped in the depth of Ignorance regarding the ultimate nature of Reality. The Brahman is vaguely recognized by the mind. As Sri Aurobindo observed: “Mind is not sufficient to explain the existence of the Universe. Infinite consciousness must first translate itself into infinite faculty of Knowledge or, as we call it from our point of view, omniscience. But Mind is not a faculty of knowledge nor an instrument of omniscience...Even when it finds, it does not possess; it only keeps a certain fund of the current coin of Truth – not Truth itself – in the bank of memory to draw upon according to its needs. For Mind is that which does not know which tries to know and which never knows except in a glass darkly. It is the power which interprets truth of Universal existence for the practical uses of certain order of things”²⁷.

Thus the mind is limited in its cognitive capacity and therefore cannot get hold of the Truth that lies far beyond its conceptual powers.

To Aurobindo, Truth is the knowledge aspect of the metaphysical reality of the Brahman. Truth - Consciousness is the Consciousness that constitutes Reality itself. In this sense Truth does not stand apart from Reality; in this metaphysical system Truth and Being are one. Sri Aurobindo Writes:

The Truth-Consciousness is everywhere present in the universe as an ordering self-knowledge by which the one manifests the harmonies of its infinite operational multiplicity²⁸.

The Truth-Consciousness cannot, however, be grasped through the reason or the finite mind because the latter is limited in its cognitive powers. Therefore, Sri Aurobindo proposes a higher faculty called the Supermind which can have direct access to the Truth-consciousness. This he calls²⁹ the knowledge by identity which means that in this case the Knower and the Known become identical.

According to Sri Aurobindo Supermind is *The Real idea* and the *Supreme Truth-consciousness*. The difference between mind and Supermind consists in the difference between their manners of apprehending reality. The transition of mind to Supermind is not sudden. Mind, after all, belongs to the lower hemisphere and it has to ascend to the higher sphere. Therefore, there must be some inter- mediatory steps through which this transition will be brought about. Through the following intermediary steps the order of ascent from mind to Supermind: (Mind), *Higher Mind*, Illumined Mind, Intuition, over mind.

To Aurobindo, mind and its higher form Super mind dominate the world process. Here it is important to say that the mental and the spiritual planes of existence are ontologically prior to the physical universe. The physical universe is only a manifestation of the super mental Consciousness-Force. Sri Aurobindo writes:

“Mind in its turn, when it emerges, becomes dominant; it uses Life and Matter as means of its expression, a field for its own growth and sovereignty, and it begins to work as if it were a true reality and the creator even as it is the witness of existence. But Mind also is a limited and derivative power; it is an outcome of Overmind or it is here a luminous shadow thrown by the divine Supermind³⁰.”

Mind is described as of diverse nature to different philosophers. Some think it is eternal, some non-eternal, some sense - organ, some non – sense – organ, some atomic and some non – atomic. Whatever may be its nature, mind is the pillar of each and every human action. Hence mind is to be admitted as a substance which is inevitable in ordinary life and epistemology.

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CHAPTER - 2

THE CONCEPT OF MIND IN DIFFERENT SYSTEMS OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

For a longer period of time we concern ourselves about the nature of mind. But we cannot understand its nature completely. In Western philosophy there are various points of view about the relation between mind and body. As a result, many problems have been raised there. The basic difficulty arises because of the fact that all these entire thinkers differentiate mind from body on the one hand and equate mind with the self on the other hand¹. The problem of will cannot be solved if mind is pure body. Again the problem of physical perception remains unsolved if mind is pure self.

To avoid such problem Indian philosophers recognize mind as something distinct from the self, though intelligence is a quality of the soul through association with mind.

The concept of mind is found since the Vedic time. In the *Vājasaneyā Saṁhitā*, mind is described as a psychological entity. Again here mind is characterized as something “Which goes out afar”². It is not a gross physical sense - organ nor can it be the soul or self. In their view mental activities have three fold divisions, viz. intelligence, feeling, and resolution.

In the *Aitareya Āraṇyaka*, it is explained that man has various psychological qualities, such as *saiṁjñā* (awareness), *ajñānam* (comprehension), *vijñānam* (understanding) *prajñānam*

(knowledge), *medhā* (retentiveness), *dr̥ṣṭiḥ* (insight), *dhṛtiḥ* (resolution), *matiḥ* (opinion), *smṛtiḥ* (memory), *manīṣā* (reflection), *jutiḥ* (impulse), *samikalpaḥ* (will), *kratuḥ* (Purpose), *asuḥ* (life), *kāmaḥ* (desire), *vaśaḥ* (control). Thus man has the ability to anticipate the future and remember the past³.

The main thesis of the *Upaniṣad* is that mind is a subtle matter. So it is very difficult to look into the truth through the mind. In knowledge mind plays a secondary role. And therefore, in *Upaniṣad* the inner self, the knower, is more important than the mind. For whatever was secondary was not attended with the same way. In this respect it is important to say that, in the *Kena Upaniṣad* we find the question rose, “By whom impelled soars the mind projected?”, and we get the answer, “That which is the hearing of the ear, the thought of the mind.... There the eye goes not, nor the mind. We know not, we understand not, how one would teach it⁴.” But here interesting points have been found regarding *manas*, because mind binds the self to the world. The *Upaniṣad* says:

The mind, in truth, is for mankind

The means of bondage and release

For bondage, if to objects bound;

From objects free – that’s called release⁵.

The *Upaniṣad’s* view in the respect of (cosmology) creation is that *manas* is a created part. It is not the spiritual element of the human body. It is material like other senses. But the materiality of mind is of different types, since it is capable of reflecting the self. Mind is reflected by the pure intelligence of *Ātman*, and thus mind has intelligence.

In the *Chāndogya* - mind is made up of the finest particles of food or matter⁶. So there can be no difficulty to accept mind as matter. And therefore, mind, being material is described as that which governs the sense - organs. Thus any perceptual knowledge is possible when mind is in conjunction with the sense-organ. Again in the *Chāndogya*, we find that mind is something superior to sense-organs, since mind perceives not only the objects all other senses but it also perceives supersensible objects.

In the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* we have the following verse:

People say my mind was elsewhere, I did not see.

My mind was elsewhere, I did not hear. It is with the mind,

Truly that one sees. It is with the mind that one hears.....⁷

Here a doubt is raised about the existence of mind. The reason for this doubt is due to the diversion of the mind from that sense – organs to other things. Hence apart from mind's existence it is also the most important requisite for knowledge.

But the *Upaniṣads* maintain that the individual self is the highest thing, which is the foundation of all knowledge. The self is often called either *prāṇa* (breath) or *prajñā* (intelligence). The self is the cause of all bodily and mental functions. Because all functions of the body and mind may cease without *prāṇa* or *Ātman*. So *Ātman* is the cause of all bodily and mental functions. Mind is the internal sense-organ directed by the *Ātman* and itself directing the other sense-organs. In this respect there is a comparison drawn between the chariot and man in the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*⁸. The Lord of the chariot, the enjoyer of the fruits of activity is the *Ātman*. But for the *Ātman* the body has no meaning.

This body is drawn into various channels of activity by the senses which are comparable to the horses. But the chariot driver, who is *buddhi* or intellect, holds the reins which is *manas* and thus controls the horses. Here the word *manas* is used to mean only the characteristics of volition and doubt and *buddhi* is used to mean intelligence.

Here, two things have to be cleared. *Manas* guides the senses. Secondly, mind is capable of determining, valuing, attending, doubting etc. we can infer the existence of mind through its action such as will, desire etc. From very early times Indian thinkers have realized that *manas* is only an instrument of knowledge for the self. The *Upaniṣads* maintain that the heart and the mind are fundamentally one. Without the heart there is no life, and similarly without mind there is no knowledge.

It is true that at a time man is capable of attending more things than one. But the Naiyāyikas and vaiśeṣikas object to this and say that the feeling of simultaneity is due to the rapidity of transition of the internal sensory. The *Nyāya-sūtra* says: “The non-simultaneity of cognition is the indicative of mind”⁹. Vātsyāyana in his *Bhāṣya* says that here non-simultaneity means the non-simultaneity of the cognitions of several things through several sense-organs¹⁰.

The next *sūtra*, raises the objection that this does not happen in practice and that we do experience simultaneity of cognitions. The *Bhāṣya* cites this with an example, i.e. if a pupil perceives his teacher going in the forest, he has the following notions:

‘This teacher reads-walks-holds the water pot-looks at the path-hears the sounds proceeding from the forest-becomes frightened-keeps on the lookout for signs of serpents or tigers – remembers the place of destination’.

In support of the simultaneity of cognitive experience it seems to be a very strong argument. But the next *Sūtra* gives the counter argument. “This perception is like the perception of fire-circle and is due to the rapidity of motion.” The illusory experience of simultaneity is caused by the rapidity of succession. Hence *manas* is essential for perceptual knowledge. It is also proved by this that there must be one *manas* only for each body, for otherwise, simultaneity of cognitions would be possible.

There are three reasons for the existence of *manas* is given in the *Prāśastapāda-Bhāṣya* on the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras*. They agree with the Naiyāyika and mention no simultaneity of cognitive knowledge as first reason. Secondly, there arise reminiscences or remembered experiences, where as the organ through which the original impression entered, is inactive (*Jñāna-lakṣaṇa-pratyāsatti*). For example, perception of the colour of an object also brings about the perception of its smell. The perception through the eye cannot sure rise to perception by the organ of smell, “because we find it appearing in the deaf and the blind also, in whose case there could be no operation of the organs of hearing or of vision.”¹¹ So if there is a correlation between two perceptions, it must be a constant correlation. Hence the *Bhāṣyakāra* maintains that *manas* is necessary for memory. In this respect a question has been raised by both Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika whether the mind is one or many for one person¹².

And the same answer as was given that there is only one mind for one person. “If there were several minds it would be possible for several sense - organs to be in contact with several minds simultaneously; whereby there should be several cognitions appearing (through these contacts) at one and the same time;.... but this never happens... there is a single mind (in one body)¹³.” The *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras* also say that not only non-

simultaneity of cognitions, but also volition is indicative to the fact that mind is one for one body. The efforts of man appear only one after the other. Western psychology also has proved with the help of the form-board and manipulation tests carried out in the investigation of the process of learning that attention is always singly present and that attending to two or more things at the same time is not usual¹⁴. The so-called manifold attention of the mind from one to another is an illusion. In this respect, the *Praśastapāda-Bhāṣya* poses a very interesting question; viz., how would we explain the simultaneous actions of moving and supporting one's own body? The answer is that "the moving and supporting of one's body also are accomplished by a *single* effort"¹⁵. From all these arguments both the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas declare that *manas* is atomic in nature¹⁶.

Again *manas* is also a substance. Substance is that in which qualities in here. *Manas* has qualities and hence it, as the internal organ which is not all pervading, comes into contact with the material cause of cognition. Hence, being the bearer of qualities, *manas* is a substance. Again *manas* is material, as it possesses priority, posteriority and speed like other material objects. In this respect, Śrīdhara maintains that if *manas* is material, then like material objects it must be an object of touch but it cannot be touched *asparśavattvāt* – i.e., there is an absence of touch in it. So it is difficult to understand that which is atomic and that which is beyond the reach of touch, how such a *manas* produce cognition of all things through its conjunction Again it is said that *manas* moves very quickly, so activity is a quality of the *manas*.

Now the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas prove what *manas* is not. *The Bhāṣya* on *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*, iii, ii 22 says "it must be regarded as unconscious; as otherwise the whole body would be the common ground (of all experiences or sensations)." So mind is

not conscious. It is not and cannot be the cognizer. If mind were to be both an organ of perception – as it undoubtedly is – and conscious, then the functions of perception and memory would be constantly active.

Śrīdhara in his *Nyāya-kandalī* says that consciousness may be a quality of the mind. It is not and cannot be the cognizer. If mind were the cognizer, then it would not need the instrument. For the experience of anything we require an instrument. Such as for the experience of pleasure and pain there must be some internal instrument. Though it is true that as an instrument mind is employed by others i.e. soul, for their own purposes. Here it is proved that mind is different from soul, and cognition (*buddhi*) is a quality of the soul and not the mind. From the *Bhāṣya*¹⁷ we know that mind as considered as the internal organ or *antaḥkaraṇa*. Throughout the comment on this *sūtra* it is known that the words *manas* and *antaḥkaraṇa* are used interchangeably.

Uddyotakara says that apprehension or *jñāna* is a quality of the “cognitive agent, who is the controller.” The self is the conscious person who is also the cognitive agent as well as the controller. The mind and the sense - organs are on unconscious by nature must all be controlled by the self. For the cognition of the perceptible objects the sense-organs are the instruments of the cognizer. Similarly for the thought of the person, *manas* is the instrument of thinking. Still according to Naiyāyika if both mind and soul were conscious (cognitive) entities, it would be difficult to say which act of cognition belongs to which.

But the opponent of the Nyāya maintains that soul is also unconscious and is not intelligent like mind. For soul is all-pervading and therefore is in contact with the senses, there would be cognition of all things at once. This is not so.

Now we find the location of the mind. It has already been stated that the *Upaniṣads* place the *manas* in the heart. According to Naiyāyikas, the mind lies within the body¹⁸.

The Prābhākara Mīmāṃsaka proves the existence of mind by pointing out that the qualities of the self such as *buddhi*, pleasure, pain etc, would never become manifest but for the activity of the mind¹⁹. Before cognition the contact of the mind with the soul is necessary. The Mīmāṃsaka proves that the mind is atomic by arguing in the following way. Every action requires two kinds of cause – the material and the immaterial or the effective cause. The immaterial or effective cause always takes the form of either circumstances or qualities which by contact with the material cause produces the given effects. In the case of cognition, soul is the material cause because cognition is a specific quality of the soul. To bring about cognition, the soul must come into contact with another substance. This other substance must be atomic, for all cognitions are unitary and occur one at a time. This atomic substance must also reside in the body, as otherwise no contact with the soul is possible. Mind is such an atomic substance. It by itself has no colour or smell, but can bring into existence these things by contacting the organs such as the eye and nose on the one hand and the *Ātman* on the other hand. Then the cognition of the *Ātman* becomes the perceptual cognitions of smells and colours. Thus the Mīmāṃsaka view of mind resembles that of the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika view.

The Sāṃkhya philosophers contend that neither pure matter nor pure consciousness alone can explain the evolutionary phenomena in their totality. They postulate two ultimate principles to explain change and evolution, i.e. the conscious principle (*puruṣa*) and the material principle (*Prakṛti*) according to Sāṃkhya, *Prakṛti* is the ultimate source of all objects of cognition including both physical objects such as pots and stones and internal

states such as pleasure and pain. It is the uncaused cause. *Puruṣa*, the conscious principle, is conceived as neither the cause nor the effect but without it *Prakṛti* cannot evolve into the world. *Puruṣa* is pure consciousness that never becomes the object of cognition (*aviṣaya*) and never undergoes any change (*apariṇāmī*). It is the witnessing subject (*sākṣin*) and the knower (*draṣṭā*) and free (*mukta*) and aloof (*udāsīna*) forever²⁰. *Prakṛti*, being material, is unconscious but it is constantly changing (*pariṇāma*) and active. *Prakṛti* contains three kinds of substance called *sattva* (literally, being; essence, vitality, inherent power, courage etc.), *rajas* (literally, dust; any small particles, menstrual discharge, passion, etc.) and *tamas* (literally, darkness; error, grief etc.)²¹. These are called *guṇas* or *constituents*. A *guṇa* for the Nyāya signifies a quality inhered in a substance. But it would be a mistake to take the word *guṇa* in this sense here. *Sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* are called *guṇas* because they are the common constituents or natures of all non-eternal things. *Sattva* is of the nature of pleasure, *rajas* of pain and *tamas* of perplexity and confusion (*moha*). *Sattva* is bright light and white and needed for revelation; *rajas* is red and needed for mobility, change and effort; while *tamas* is dark and heavy and is responsible for inertia and ignorance²². *Prakṛti* refers to a state when *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* exist in a state of harmony. In this state no substance can dominate the other two though each continues to change independently into its own kind by itself and in complete isolation from the other two. That is, in this condition *sattva* transforms only into *sattva*, *rajas*, only into *rajas* and *tamas*, only into *tamas*. So nothing particular evolves in this condition. Creation or the origin of particular things beings when *Puruṣa*, in accordance with the law of *karma*, comes into contact with *Prakṛti*. In this state there is no conflict but there is a continual motion (change). The change is

homogeneous because in this state the *guṇas* change into their own types. The evolution begins when each *guṇa* tries to predominate over the others. In other words, creation begins when there is a transition from homogeneous transformation (*svarūpa-pariṇāma*) to heterogeneous transformation (*virūpa-pariṇāma*). Since *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* are the constituents of *Prakṛti*, everything that evolves has these three *guṇas*. The differences among the created particulars depend upon the relative dominance of the *guṇas* on them.

The first thing to evolve with the preponderance of *sattva* is called *mahat* or great because it is prior to and greater than all other non-eternal things²³

The next thing to evolve is the sense of egotism (*ahaṃkāra*) which is represented in the awareness of I and mind to the exclusion of others²⁴.

As one thinks oneself to be the doer of actions, one remains bound to the results of actions, good or bad. It is on account of *Ahaṃkāra* that one remains subject to the karmic bondage, i.e. dualities of pleasure and pain. When *Mahat*, which contains the reflection of *puruṣa* identifies itself with '*Ahaṃkāra*'. *Puruṣa* appears to be moving just as the moon appears to be moving in clear moving water. To Sāṃkhya the state of *Ahaṃkāra* is alternatively predominated by *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamaḥ*. Dominance of *sattva* results in *sāttvika* or *vyavahārika Ahaṃkāra* which in turn gives rise to five sensory organs, five motor organs and mind. The dominance of *tamaḥ* gives rise to *bhūtādi*. As a result, five subtle essences, *tanmātras* (the essence of sight, smell, taste, touch and sound) are created which, in turn, give rise to five gross elements. The dominance of *rajas* in *Ahaṃkāra* results in *taijasa* which do not give rise to any evolute in particular but help *vaikārika* and *bhūtādi* to give rise to different evolutes. In the scheme of Sāṃkhya, mind,

being an evolute of *Prakṛti*, is subject to the influence of *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*. The evolution of mind is very crucial in the sense that it is not only the internal sense organ by which the individual comes to know the state of happiness and sorrow but also regulates the function of five sensory-motor organs. But the external organ cannot function as a cognitive organ at all. The external organ can only come into contact with an external object, but cognition is possible only when the internal organ is activated. Again each external organ is restricted to a particular kind of object. For example, the eye can grasp colour but not smell. The nose can grasp smell but not colour and so on. But the internal organ is not restricted in this way. Every mind is unique due to the relative dominance of the *guṇas*. And therefore the personalities of two persons are not same. As long as the *guṇas* have sway on the mind, the action of the individual lead to bondage. The karmic bondage is nothing but the bondage due to the *guṇas* of *Prakṛti*. Liberation is possible only when through the power of discrimination (*vivekajñāna*), one discriminates between self and not self. As bondage is the result of wrong identification, liberation is the result of proper discrimination. Knowledge helps one to discriminate and discrimination helps one to attain liberation. Liberated individual is one whose mind functions not by the prompting of the *guṇas* but the nature of consciousness (*Puruṣa*).

Sāṃkhya and Yoga are allied disciplines in so far as Sāṃkhya develops the metaphysics and Yoga develops the practice. Sāṃkhya system contains a theoretical explanation of the nature of the self (individual *Puruṣa*), the transcendental self (cosmic *Puruṣa*), and the causes of bondage and means of liberation. Yoga philosophy devotes itself to explication of the ways of attaining the highest state. Like Sāṃkhya, Yoga, explains bondage as the result of wrong identification of *Puruṣa* with *Prakṛti*. In the state of

bondage, *Puruṣa* appears to undergo the experience of pleasure and pain depending on the modification of *citta*. In Yoga system, *citta* refers the three internal organs of Sāṃkhya – *buddhi* (intellect), *Ahaṃkāra* (ego), and *Manas* (mind). *Citta* plays a vital role in all cases of cognition. *Citta* takes the form of the object, in every case of cognition. This form is called *vr̥tti* or modification. *Citta vr̥tti* is nothing but the modification of *citta*, which impels one to action. On account of *citta*, the individual appropriates the same of pleasure and pain to oneself. Since, *citta* is an evolute of *Prakṛti*; it is inherently unconscious but appears to be conscious on account of the *Puruṣa*'s reflection in it. As a result, *Prakṛti* which is unconscious appears as conscious and *Puruṣa* which is inactive appears as active. Yoga enumerates the five fundamental *vr̥ttis*, modification of *citta*, viz., *pramāṇa* (veridical cognition), *viparyaya* (wrong cognition or illusion), *vikalpa* (imagination), *nidrā* (sleep), and *smṛti* (memory). Besides *citta* being the evolute of *Prakṛti*, is subject to the relative dominance of *guṇas*. Yoga advocates five different states of mind which arise because of the influence of the *guṇas*. The lowest level is called *Kṣipta* or restless where mind is extremely unstable on account of the predominance of *rajas*. The second is called *Mūḍha* or torpid, where mind tends to be inert, indolent and ignorant on account of the predominance of *tamas*. The third is called *Vikṣipta* or distracted, wherein *sattva* is dominant but *rajas* continues to have its sway. The fourth is called *Ekāgra* or concentrated where mind is relatively composed on account of the dominance of *sattva*. In this state the mind becomes concentrated on the object of meditation. The fifth and the highest level is called *Niruddha* or restricted. The first three stages are not at all conducive to *yogic* life whereas last two are conducive. Yoga is construed as a state where there is absolute cessation of modification of *citta*.

In other words, Yoga conceives of a state where mind continues to exist without any modification whatsoever. Yoga philosophy conceives of eightfold limbs of yoga (*aṣṭāṅga yoga*), viz. *yama*: it includes the five vows of Jainism-non-killing, truthfulness, non-stealing, continence, and non-receiving of any gifts. Next are *Niyama*- cleanliness, contentment, austerity, study and self surrender to God. Then come *Āsana* or posture – which makes the body and mind congenial for practice of Yoga. *Prāṇāyama* or control of *Prāṇa* – which is a basic prerequisite for mind control. *Pratyāhāra* restraint of the senses from their objects. *Dhāraṇā* or the flow of mind in singular direction. *Dhyāna* or contemplation on the object of ideation. *Samādhi* or the state of absolute concentration, where the *citta* becomes one with the object, and loses its identity in the objects of ideation. Again the state of *samādhi* is attained in two stages. In the initial stage *citta* retains the consciousness of the object. As a result, the sense of duality is not altogether transcended. It is the state of determinate trance (*samprajñāta samādhi*). In the state of indeterminate trance (*asamprajñāta samādhi*), the consciousness of the object is completely done away with. There is nothing before *citta* to take its form. As a result, there is no modification arise. It is the highest form of Yoga where self is restored in its own nature and is immune to the influence of the *guṇas* of *Prakṛti*.

The Vedāntic view of *manas* is different from others in very important respects. It bears a close correspondence to its metaphysical outlook.

Gouḍapāda is regarded as Śamkara's *paramaguru*. The *Māṇḍūkya Kārikā*, an exposition of the *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad* is the main work of Gaudapāda from which we derive his Advaita views. It is considered one of the most important sources of Advaita. Another important source book for the *kārikā* is the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*²⁵

The central thesis of all advaitic literature is that the ultimate reality is *Brahman*, the self; there is nothing other than the self. *Īśvara* is *Brahman*, the ultimate reality who is regarded as the creator of this world of plurality. But there is a question raised who creates this manifold world, if everything else is illusory. In answering to this question actually there is no world created. The whole manifested and unmanifested world of things and ideas is but the imagination (*kalpanā*) of the mind of this cosmic self. “*Cittaspanditam eva.*”²⁶ To explain creation it is said that all the things and ideas are destroyed during *pralaya*. They remain as potencies in the mind of *Īśvara* and during creation; these again take form and shape. The individual *jīva* is also then created; he is a “product of imagination and competent to effect further imagination.”²⁷ This individual *Jīva* is enclosed with many coverings called sheaths (*kośas*). In *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*,²⁸ there are five sheaths (*kośas*.) They are *annamaya*, made up of food and matter; *prāṇamaya*, vital breath which is subtler than the physical; *monomaya*, mental sheath being subtler than the breath; *Vijñānamaya*, intellectual sheath, which is responsible for all empirical knowledge; *ānandamaya*, which is made up of bliss. All these *kośas* can be regrouped into three. The first one *annamaya* is the gross body. Next the three sheaths of *prāṇa*, *manas* and *vijñāna* can be grouped together to refer to the psychical principles; and lastly the *ānandamaya*, indicating happiness. From this division of the self it is clear that the psychical states are only subtler forms of the physical, and it is to be inferred that Gauḍapada accepts that mind is material and is only an aspect of the perishable body.

The waking self comes into contact with the external world has its cosmic counterpart which is called the *vaiśvānara* self. In dream the self is also active and is conscious of

what is within (*antahprajñah*), and this self is known as *taijasa*. It is also said to be *svapnasthāna*. To Samkara ²⁹ this *Taijas* self is related to the *Vaiśvānara* self as effect and cause, because the impressions, left by the mind in the waking consciousness are those which are the objects of dream consciousness. Therefore the dream self is called *antahprajñah*. In explaining this Śamkara says, “From the standpoint of the sense - organs, the mind is internal”.³⁰

Here it is suggested that *manas* along with *buddhi*, *ahamkāra*, and *citta* is an instrument of knowledge for the self and that all these make up the internal organ of knowledge for the dream self. The mind is acting as an *antahkāraṇa*, an internal cause; it may be counted as an integrating instrument of knowledge. There are many places in the *kārikās*, “mind” is used to mean “self”. To some Western thinkers this should not mean that mind and consciousness are one. Here mind means the *Ātman* which is not born and which is without end. “Mind in this sense is the ground of the world conditioned by *Māyā*”³¹ and this is known as *jiva*, which is responsible for empirical knowledge. When mind and the external sense- organs function, this empirical knowledge arises. It is necessary to have an internal organ “Through whose attention and non-attention, perception and non-perception take place”.³² In support of this view Śamkara quotes the *Upaniṣadic* text which says, “My mind was elsewhere, I did not here; for a man sees with his mind and here with his mind”.³³ It is clear from this that Śamkara accepts the *Upaniṣadic* statement that *manas* is a necessary instrument of cognition.

According to the Advaita *Brahman* alone is real, and all other things are non-different from it. But this ultimate truth cannot be grasped by the mind of man which is limited in its capacities. In this case we remember the Śruti words³⁴ it is maintained that all these

originate from *Brahman* and go back into *Bharman* (*yato va imāni bhūtāni jayante*). To Śamkara, the two words *manas* and *antaḥ- karaṇa* are interchangeable, but due to division of functions, the same *manas* is referred to by various names as *manas*, *buddhi*, *ahaṃkara* and *citta*.³⁵ *Manas* or *antaḥkaraṇa* by itself is that which refers to the past, present and the future. This internal organ controls the other organs of sense perception. To Śamkara mind is minute. But *aṇutva* of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas is not the same as this minuteness. It is subtle and limited in size,³⁶ because it is not perceived at death when mind leaves the physical body. So, it is *sūkṣma* or subtle. Again, *manas* should be limited in size, since unless it is so; it cannot pass in and out of a body.³⁷

But though mind is an instrument of knowledge, yet it is not the agent of knowledge, *Manas* or *buddhi* can never be an agent (*kartā*). Śamkara says, the self is definitely different from the *buddhi* or intellect and though the former alone is the agent of action, still it is dependent on *buddhi* and *indriyas* to provide knowledge of it. “An agent requires some assistance in his work. A cook remains the agent in the action of cooking, although he requires fuel, water and so on.”³⁸ *Manas* is conceived as the central functionary on which the *karmendriyas* and *buddhi indriyas* are dependent. These eleven *indriyas* make up for the whole conscious life of the individual.

Now we consider the problem whether *manas* is an *indriya* or not in post-Śamkara literature on Advaita. And so we must consider what a sense- organ is. To the question a possible answer can be given. To Buddhists view it may be said that the sense-organs are merely the peripheral organs – the *goḷakas*. This view is rejected because certain animals can hear, although they have no ears, e.g. serpents. Secondly, it may be argued by Mīmāṃsakas that sense - organ consists of the *śakti* or potency that resides in the end

organs. This view of potency is not also correct. The third possibility is that the sense - organs are not distinct substances, not to be confused with either the orbs or their powers. Both an agent and instruments are required when we cut a piece of wood. Similarly cognition requires the self which is an agent, and the sense-organ which is an instrument.

Now we find the Naiyāyika making a starting modern differentiation between conceiving and cognizing.³⁹ It is maintained that the act of conceiving needs no instrument, while the act of cognizing needs an instrument.⁴⁰ But conceiving and cognizing cannot be differentiated. Uddyotakara, commenting on this *sūtra* raises an objection; if both cognizing and conceiving are done with the help of an instrument, and that every cognition must be through an instrument, then the cognition of mind (i.e., self cognition of mind) also must be through an instrument. Vācaspati Miśra says, the mind cannot be an instrument of its own cognition for no instrument can operate on itself. Hence it is maintained that the postulation of an instrument for the cognition of pleasure and pain is not right. Here the Naiyāyika replies that the existence of mind is cognized not by perception but by inference. Again in the case of the *yogin*, who has direct perception of the mind, the instrument of perception is the mind-soul contact aided by the powers divided by yogic practice. Later Naiyāyikas like Udayanācārya (in his *Parisuddhi*) maintain that this is not true because no yogic powers cannot make the *yogin* go against nature. Therefore, Udayanācārya says, the object of cognition is mind, whereas the instrument of cognition is the mind aided by the faculties born of *yoga*. Since these are not the same there is no question of self operation. He maintains that there is no incompatibility of one thing being both “instrument” and “object”. When it is acted on by the agent it is an instrument and it is an object when it is subjected to effects of actions

that do not belong to it. Vācasapati Miśra says that this position does not involve any incongruity, because it is by its own existence that mind is capable of having its own cognition. Mind as an existent is cognized by mind in its capacity as an instrument, just like the light of the lamp which is instrumental in revealing itself.⁴¹ Here we use the words of D. M. Datta we are here “required to distinguish between mind as a term of the relation and mind as the medium of relation, which latter along can be called an *indriya*”⁴². But a question may be raised here: Both these accept of the mind are mental, and if one can be conceived as an *indriya*, why not the other?

The direct causes for psychological states known as desire and aversion (*icchā* and *dveṣa*) are pleasure and pain. To Praśastapāda *icchā* consists in wishing for something not already obtained either for one’s own sake or for the sake of another. It proceeds from the contact of mind and the soul, through pleasure or remembrance. It is the source of effort, or remembrance, virtue and vice.⁴³ After this, Praśastapāda goes on to give a list of the different forms of desire. (1) Lust – desire for sexual experience; (2) Hunger – desire for food, (3) Affection – desire for the repeated experience of an object; (4) Aspiration – desire for bringing about something not near at hand; (5) Compassion – disinterested desire for removal of others’ troubles; (6) Dis-inclination – desire for renunciation of an object after finding something wrong with it. (7) Disposition – desire to impose or deceive others; (8) Inclination – Unexpressed desire.

These different forms of desire are followed by a list of effects of *dveṣa* or aversion. Aversion proceeds from “The contact of the soul and the mind by pain or by remembrance (of pain).”

(1) *Krodha* - anger is the first evolute of aversion. It also produces certain physical changes. (2) *Droha* – ill-will. This is not perceptible outwardly as anger, but is a deep seated inclination. (3) *Manyu* - resentment. When retaliation is impossible, aversion is hidden in the mind. (4) *Akṣamā* – Jealously. (5) *Amarṣa* – indignation.

All these mental states arise out of pleasure and pain primarily and out of desire and aversion secondarily. Like Jung, the Vaiśeṣika also says that from the dual qualities of pleasure and pain all other emotive experiences can be derived and understood.

According to the Sāṃkhya theory of perception, perception is a cognition which takes the form of the object because it is brought into contact with it.⁴⁴ Thus the *manas* conjoins the external objects through the sense-organs. To Naiyāyikas this process of contacting is not difficult one, because the senses are themselves of the same nature as the object which they are capable of perceiving. But the Sāṃkhya thinkers do not accept this, because the sense-organs are the first evolutes of *ahaṃkāra* and not the elements. Again there are differences between the composition of the sense - organs and the composition of the elements out of which the gross objects are evolved. Here the mind is not material in the sense in which the Naiyāyikas mean. The *indriyas* being psycho physical in nature are capable of motion and hence they go out, reach the object, and establish contact. If the *antaḥkāraṇa* internal sensory, is to have knowledge of the external object, the sense organ that is involved must reach out to the object. Because the Sāṃkhya thinkers maintain that sense-organs do not apprehend objects which they do not reach.⁴⁵ Here Aniruddha comments that the sense of sight cannot reveal things that are either too far from it for it to reach, nor can it reveal objects that are obstructed by impenetrable objects like a wall. So the *vṛtti* or the function of the sense-organs is limited. According to

Sāṃkhya thinkers, the senses are capable of motion because of their particular *Śakti*. In this respect the Naiyāyika points out that if the sense of sight is made up of light and if they can apprehend objects without moving to them, the whole universe could be perceived at the same time, which is impossible.

In this situation Vijñāna-Bhikṣu says that the sense-organ by itself never leaves the body, but only its particular modification known as its *vṛtti* or function. That is how the eye is capable of seeing light which is far off. According to Sāṃkhya thinkers the proof of the existence of the *Vṛtti* lies in the fact that knowledge is gained of such an object existing outside the sense -organ.

But there is still the problem of the arising of knowledge in the individual. So the internal sensory has to be examined. *Mahat, ahaṃkāra, and manas* are jointly known as the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*). In the process of gaining knowledge they have separate functions. *Mahat* is characterised by its judging capacity, *ahaṃkāra* by its conceit, and *manas* by its capacity for its resolution and doubt (*Samkalpa and Vikalpa*). Apart from these distinctive features, they also have a common function, viz. the circulation of the five forms of vital airs.

Manas is said to be characterised by *samkalpa and vikalpa*. That activity of *manas* called *samkalpa* is that “Which co-ordinates the indeterminate percepts into determinate perceptual or conceptual forms as class-notions with particular characteristics...”⁴⁶

Vijñāna-Bhikṣu says that the only characteristics of *manas* are *samkalpa* and *vikalpa*, thus ruling out any determinative activity for *manas* with regard to knowledge. Determination or *niścaya* is the function of *buddhi* or intellect. The two *vṛttis* of *manas*

are *samkalpa* and *vikalpa*. According to Vijñāna-Bhikṣu *samkalpa* means *cikīrṣā* or desire to act and *vikalpa* can be either a doubt or *bharman viśeṣa*.

Vācaspati Mīśra says that the function of *manas* is selective attention which analyzes and synthesizes at the same time. It assimilates and discriminates. At this stage of knowledge process *Ahaṃkāra* intervenes and appropriates the experiences as belonging to itself; thus “I see the Chair”. At the level of the *manas*, cognition is still impersonal and objective, but at the level of *Ahaṃkāra* it assumes the shape of subjective experiences.

But the process of acquiring knowledge of the object is not complete after the *Ahaṃkāra* refers the perceived object to the self. Every experience involves the act of will or determination. So in this situation the perceptive content is taken charge of by the *buddhi* or intellect (*mahat*) who’s characteristic is *adhyavasāya*. Due to the conative nature of the intellect it resolves how to act towards the cognitive element. Vācaspati Mīśra, discussing the process of perception supports the view of Sāṃkhya⁴⁷ and says *buddhi* or intellect is the supreme of all organs both internal and external. He compares the process to that of the “Village account collecting taxes from the house holder, remitting them to the mayor, who in turn remits them to the Governor who looks to their reaching the king’s treasury.

⁴⁸ The external sense-organs perceive the objects immediately. *Manas* reflects upon them, sorts them out and pigeon – holes them as it were, and presents them to *Ahaṃkāra* and judged by the *buddhi* for the eternal *Puruṣa* who is self. Therefore the process of perception involves not only the external sense-organs but also the internal sensory *antaḥkaraṇa*. It is important to note that though the one internal organ of the Naiyāyika is here split into three organs, viz. *Manas*, *Ahaṃkāra*, and *buddhi*. But all these three are only modifications or different aspects of an *antaḥkaraṇa*. Again the Naiyāyikas believe

that the senses never function simultaneously. But the *Sāṃkhya* thinkers believe that internal sense-organ along with the external senses may function either simultaneously or successively. Aniruddha gives the following examples in support of this. “A thief is perceived in a faint light, the sense of sight reaches the object of perception; and by the internal sense (*manas*) it is clear that ‘this is a thief’; then it is referred to *Ahaṃkāra* (*abhimanyate*) as ‘ he will take my money away’; then *buddhi* determines ‘I will catch the thief’”. Here the sense- organs are functioning one by one. But in other case, such as seeing a tiger in the night by the flash of a lightning, a man runs away instantly. In thus experience all the four organs functions simultaneously.

According to Yoga, the forms of mental activity have been divided into five types. They are *kṣipta* (restless wandering), *mūḍha* (infatuated, forgetful), *vikṣipta* (distracted), *ekāgra* (one pointed, single-in-intent) and *niruddha* (restricted, restrained). These five different attitudes of mind are normally found in man. *Kṣipta* is the wandering mind. When the mind is unable to settle on any one thing due to the excess of *rajas*, its attention is always shifting and it does not tend to be steady. The second condition is *mūḍha*, which is being either forgetful or being, infatuated is the state of *tamas* when the mind is full of deep sleep or unawareness of the right course of action because of deep passions like love or anger. The third state of the mind, *vikṣipta*, is that which is found in the average man when the mind is tossed about between evil and good. Occasionally it is steady. When the mind is in these three states it is not fit for contemplation. Contemplation is possible only in the next two, *ekāgra* and *niruddha*. *Ekāgra* is that state where the mind is entirely dominated by *sattva* and *rajas* and *tamas* are subdued. The mind becomes concentrated on one thing. This in turn removes ignorance, thus making

the mind ready for the next stage. Where even this mental concentration on one thing is restricted and the *manas* turns towards *puruṣa* realizing its own nature.

Citta means the three internal organs of Sāṃkhya – *buddhi* or intellect, *ahaṃkāra* or ego and *manas* or mind. *Citta* is the same as *antaḥkaraṇa*. It is *mahat* or *buddhi* which includes *ahaṃkāra* and *manas*. *Citta* is the first evolutes of *Prakṛti* and has the predominance of *sattva*. It is in itself *unconscious*. But being fines and nearest to *puruṣa*, it has the power to reflect the *puruṣa* and therefore appears as if it is *conscious*. When it goes related to any object, it assumes the ‘form’ of the object. This form is called *vṛtti* or *modification*. The modifications of the *citta* or *vṛtti* are of five kinds: *pramāna*, *viparyaya*, *vikalpa* *nidrā* and *smṛti*.⁴⁹ According to Vācaspati Miśra the cognition is defined as that which brings about *pramā* or true knowledge. *Pramā* is “an illumination of a thing not already presented and is caused by the operation of the self.”⁵⁰ *Pramāṇa* is the means of giving rise *pramā*. According to Sāṃkhya - Yoga thinkers there are three such *pramāṇas*, here our interest lies in *pratyakṣa*, because *pratyakṣa* is not only a basis *pramāṇa* but also it is that where there is contact between *manas* and the sense - organ.

Perception is defined as “that source of valid ideas which arises as a modification of the inner organ when the mind-stuff has been affected by some external thing through the channel by some external thing through the channel of the sense -organs.”⁵¹ We know that perception depends in the first instance on the mental modification, *citta - vṛtti*, and secondly, that the contact between the object and the mind is carried out through the sense - organs. The Naiyāyika holds that in the *nirvikalpaka* stage of perception, only the bare universal without the qualities of the particular is seen. But Vācaspati Miśra says it is impossible for the mind to see either the universal or the particular alone at any stage

of perception. “The object consists of a genus and of a particular. The object does not have these two as its properties, but it consists of these two by a relation of identity.”⁵²

Puruṣa who is the real cognizer and who is of the nature of intelligence illumines the *citta - vṛtti*. Again self-perception is possible. A question is raised here how it is possible? The self infers its own existence from its reflection in the cognitive instruments. Just as the existence of the original can be inferred from the copy or the reflection, the self realizes its existence because of its reflection. This very realization is through the mental mode which assumes the form of self. But this seems to be contradictory. It may be asked, how can the self cognize itself if the act of cognition does not belong to itself? It is because the nature of the self is self-luminosity and it can illumine both itself as well as the object. This also leads to the problem of self-perception: at the same time how can the self be both object and subject? This possibility cannot be denied. Vyāsa and Vācaspati Mīśra say that the pure self is the subject in self apprehension and the empirical self is the object. The above stated self - cognition is not possible if *Puruṣa* is only one. If it is many, then the original tenets of the theory are contradicted. Again the self is always the knower or the spectator (*draṣṭṛ*) and hence it can never make itself an object of knowledge. As James Ward has said. “To identify I and me is logically impossible... The I cannot be the me, nor the Me the I. At the same time the objective me is impossible without the subjective I”.⁵³ In this situation Patañjali says, the self can be perceived by intuition which is yogic perception attained by yogic practices.

The next mental mode, according to Yoga thinkers, is *viparyaya*. It is *mithyā Jñānam*. It “knows of the unreal possessing a form not of its own”.⁵⁴ The *Bhāṣya* explains the meaning of the word *mityā*. The characteristic of valid knowledge is that it is

unsublatable. Here the knowledge that is derived through *Viparyaya* is sublated by a later cognition. Vācaspati Mīśra adds a rider to this, that sublation is possible because *viparyaya* “cognition is contradicted by the common knowledge of all mankind”. For example, the perception of two moons in the place of one real moon. This type of misconception is ordinarily known as erroneous perception. But there are some psychic erroneous cognitions which are the products of *māyā* or *avidyā* or nescience and whose removal alone can give peace to the individual.

Vikalpa is also another way through which knowledge is gained by the mind. It is knowledge gained through imagination “without any corresponding perceptible object”⁵⁵ or “is devoid of objective substratum”,⁵⁶ and it is the result of verbal expressions of knowledge. It is abstract imagination based on language. It cannot be a *pramāṇa* because it is devoid of objective substratum. And it is not *viparyaya* for it is not sublatable, nor proved by further knowledge. In the *Bhāṣya* it is said that, “*Puruṣa* is of the nature of consciousness”. This type of relation between consciousness and *Puruṣa* can neither be proved by any *pramāṇa* nor can it be brushed aside as an erroneous cognition. It is purely abstract thought. If *Vikalpa* is not accepted, no abstract thinking would be possible.

Sleep is defined as that state (*Vṛtti*) of the mind, which has nothing for its object. The commentator, however, explains that in sleep also a kind of perception must take place, because, otherwise, we could not say that we had slept well or badly.

Remembering is the not wiping out of an object that has once been perceived. While true perception, false perception, and fancy take place in a waking state, a dream, which is a perception of vivid impressions, takes place in sleep, while sleep itself has no perceptible

object. Remembering may depend on true or false perceptions, on fancy, and even on dreams.

The Vedānta view of mind is different from those of other schools in certain important respects.

First according to the Vedāntins, *manas* is not an independent reality. It is not regarded as a fundamental substance. It is only one of the many aspects or functions of *antaḥkaraṇa* (inner organ) which is the generic term that would correspond to the word mind.

Secondly, according to most of the Vedāntins, *manas* is not an *indriya* or sense- organ.

Thirdly, it is not regarded as an invisible, infinitesimal substance (as in the *Nyāya system*), but is considered to be of medium dimension.

According to some vedāntins like the authors of the *Vivarana*, the *Vedānta – paribhāsā* etc., *antaḥkaraṇa* has four different aspects or functions such as (1) *manas* (2) *buddhi* (3) *ahaṃkāra* (4) *citta*. *Manas* represents the indecisive state of *antaḥkaraṇa* or mind as found, for instance, when we cannot ascertain whether an object is this or that. *Buddhi* stands for *antaḥkaraṇa* in its state of decision, as when we decisively know a thing as “this”. *Ahaṃkāra* is the state of *antaḥkaraṇa* having some reference to the self, as in the judgement “*I am happy*”. *Citta* is *antaḥkaraṇa* in its state of remembering, i.e, referring to past event.⁵⁷

The author of the *Pañcadasī*,⁵⁸ however, distinguishes only two functions of *antaḥkaraṇa*, namely *manas* and *buddhi* = (*vijñāna*) and it is thought by subsequent writers that in his opinion *citta* is included in *manas*, and *ahaṃkāra* in *buddhi*. The author

of the *Vedāntasāra* also supports this twofold division, but according to him *Ahaṃkāra* is subsumed under *manas* and *citta* under *buddhi*.

The mechanism of knowledge according to the Advaitin can only be understood when the Advaitic theory of perception is understood well. According to the vedāntins, in the perception of an external object the *mind* (*manas* or *antaḥkaraṇa*) goes out to the object through the sense- organs and, after establishing identity of consciousness defined by the internal organ and consciousness defined by the object, gives rise to knowledge. The non-Advaitic schools say that it is the sense-organ itself that goes out to the object, whereas according to the Advaitin, it is the mind that goes out, and the difference in perceptual knowledge such as seeing, hearing, touching etc, is said to be because of the difference in the instruments which are required for those type of knowledge. These are called *citta vṛttis*. To the question if *antaḥkaraṇa* is responsible for knowledge what for are the sense- organs, it is replied that these sense-organs serve as the cause for the mental modes or *vṛttis*. For the mental mode to arise sense object relation is necessary.

The Advaita view that the mind goes to the object, seems to be more plausible than the accepted theory that light from the physical object strikes the eyes and creates impressions in the brain. Here the movement of the mind is not meant in any metaphorical sense, but in the sense of an actual going forth; the mind moves out and after reaching the object envelops it. The view expressed by the Advaitin that the mind goes out for collecting the raw materials for sense perception is not acceptable to the Western thinkers. Because, ordinarily, one believes that the senses act first and then the mind, because the senses are usually identified with the physiological organs and when these are impressed, sensations are said to arise for the mind to action. But this is not so.

According to Naiyāyika, mere sense affection can never give rise to knowledge. The senses are recognized and treated as senses only in so far as they are the channels through which the mind apprehends the objects. Even if the brain is considered as being adequate to combine the different senses, still how such purely cerebra-spinal vibrations in a particular nerve centre can produce mental activity is not explained. The purely neural explanation and the fact of psychological reaction do not tally. “Physico-chemical explanations of the behavior of bodies can be pushed to a point where they make nonsense. We cannot in any way understand why mentality should emerge in certain physico-chemical conditions and disappeared in others. We cannot understand why mentality should be exhibited only in bodies of a certain sort. For a parrot to exhibit mentality is perfectly conceivable; it just does not seem to occur”.⁵⁹ William James says, “The general law of perception is this: That whilst part of what we perceive comes through our senses from the object before us, another part (and it may be the larger part) always comes out of our own mind”⁶⁰ Hence it is right that the Advaitin emphasizes the outgoing of the mind. No doubt, the mind is material, but a very subtle material and is analogous to light and hence can go out to the object and assume its form.

Let us consider some views on the concept of mind as found in Western Philosophy. In Western point of view there are various ‘isms’ that try to answer a cluster of questions. What is the ultimate nature of the mental? At the most general level, the question is what makes a mental state mental? Recently at the more specific level the focus has been: What do thoughts have in common in virtue of which they are thoughts? What makes a thought a thought? What makes a pain a pain? So we explain here the various theories that try to answer the questions regarding mental events.

Naturally before studying philosophy of mind we shall have to clear about the definition of mental phenomena. Jerome A. Shaffer in his '*Philosophy of Mind*'⁶¹ defines mental phenomena as all phenomena that exclusively involve beings capable of consciousness. However it would be useful if we could say that all mental phenomena fall into some manageable number of categories. It has been proposed that the mind has three basic capacities or 'faculties'. These are cognition, affection and volition, or in other words knowing, feeling and willing. Each mental phenomenon is supposed to be result of the operation of these faculties.

In the context of everyday relationships, we often make statements about the thoughts, feelings and actions of people. So the word 'minds' or mental is used here.

Now the question arises about the mind. What is the real nature of mental states and processes? How are they related to the physical world? Is the mind distinct from body?

To answer these questions, there are various theories of mind. Now let us look at these alternative theories.

Dualism is the most common theory of mind for most of Western philosophy. It is thus an appropriate place to begin our discussion. The most systematic dualistic theory was propounded by the French philosopher Rene Descartes. To him, each mind is a distinct non-physical thing; a thing whose identity is independent of any physical body to which it may be temporarily 'attached'. He said the essence of the mind is consciousness. Consciousness means thinking, feeling, memories etc. on the other hand, the essence of the body is extension, i.e. having shape, size, and location in space; and it has no consciousness. Therefore the two cannot be the same.

Descartes said that the mind can exist without the body and, in the same way; the body can exist without the mind. He said that the mind is immortal. Minds continue to exist even after the body perishes.

Spinoza, who had been a follower of Descartes, first pointed out that there is an important gap in Descartes' account. The essence of the mind is consciousness, and the essence of the body is extension. But from this we cannot say that the mind and the body are two separate entities. Spinoza realized that "although two attributes may be distinct", yet a man can be both a thinking thing and an extended physical thing.

Nevertheless, Descartes held that extension and thinking are so basically different that the same thing could not have both. But we have not a reason for thinking that thinking things could not be extended and vice-versa. Again, P.M. Churchland says in his book "*Matter and consciousness*"⁶² that if mind stuff is different from matter stuff then how my mind to make any causal affect on my body. How can two such different things be in any sort of causal contact? In this context Descartes proposed a very subtle material substance – 'animal spirits' – to make known that the mind can affect the body. Here again the same problem arises: how something spatial can interact with something entirely non-spatial.

Here the dualistic approach to mind embodies several quite different theories. Descartes believed in interactionism. He believed that the mind can affect the body as the body can affect the mind. The other oldest version of dualism is epiphenomenalism. In this view only body can affect mind not vice-versa. Finally, there is the dualist theory known as parallelism. According to parallelist, there is no casual connection between the mind and

the body. The two are like two clocks. Both the clocks show the same time though there is no causal connection between the two, in the same way, mental events and physical events are keeping parallel positions and there is no causal connection.

Now let us see how do we support dualism? Churchland⁶³ emphasizes that there are at least three reasons. We can first point to the argument from introspection. When we focus our attention on the content of our consciousness, we feel a constant change in our thoughts, sensations, desires and emotions. We can only understand mental states and properties with the help of introspection. But physical things and states cannot be known through introspection. So mind and matter are different.

The second is argument from irreducibility. It might be, thought that because of our variety of mental phenomena, no purely physical explanation can explain them. Descartes says our faculty of Reason must surely be beyond the capacity of any physical system. Again the introspectible qualities of our sensations and the meaningful content of our thoughts and beliefs can never be reduced to any physical system. According to the dualist, though a physicist or chemist might know everything about the molecular structure of the rose, and of the human brain, yet the quality of these inexpressible experiences cannot be predicted by physical theories.

Finally, in support of dualism, Para psychological phenomena would be relevant too. Within the limitation of psychology and physics it is not easy to explain some mental phenomena, such as, telepathy (mind reading), precognition (seeing the future), telekinesis (thought control of material objects) and clairvoyance (knowledge of distant

objects). Suppose, they are also forever beyond physical explanations. So some mental phenomena must be irreducibly non-physical.

But, unfortunately the argument from introspection is deeply suspect. Because it assumes that by introspection or inner observation the real nature of thing is revealed. But our other forms of observation – sight, hearing, touch – do no such thing. For example, the warmth of the summer air does not feel like the mean kinetic energy of millions of tiny molecules, but that is what it is.

Again, the argument from irreducibility is weak. Descartes could not imagine how a purely physical system could ever use language in a relevant way or engage in mathematical reasoning, as any normal human can. But, now electronic computers are doing mathematical reasoning.

In support of dualism, it is also said that the existence of para -psychological phenomena such as telepathy and telekinesis beyond purely physical explanation. But Churchland emphasizes that it is not entirely clear that such phenomena must forever be free from a purely physical explanation.

Now, in this respect we try to understand the meaning of ‘Intentionality’. Brentano says⁶⁴ that when we are conscious we are always conscious of something or about something. Therefore, consciousness is always directed towards something. Consciousness, in other words leads us to objectivity. According to Brentano, this aboutness or directness is the essential characteristic of consciousness. All mental states have these characteristics. On the other hand no physical states can have it. Different attitudes may have the same content. Consider, for example, a person X thinks that P,

believes that P, desires that P, and so on. But, interestingly different attitudes have different directions of it. Believes, e.g., have the mind to world direction and attitudes like sorrow and happiness have no direction to it. Here X has a propositional attitude to P, because X expresses a distinct attitude about P. Such states are said to display intentionality in that X's beliefs, thoughts, desires are about things.

Now, the intentionality of these propositional attitudes distinguishes the mental from the merely physical; no purely physical system can display intentionality. But there is an important gap in this claim. Though intentionality has occasionally been cited as the 'mark of mental', it need not constitute a presumption in favour of any form of dualism.

Jerome A. Shaffer⁶⁵ claims that there are difficulties with dualism. Firstly, the dualists believe that the mind is an entity like the physical entities. Yet at the same time mind is different from physical things. Now the question arises, what is a mind? Is the mind then a kind of peculiar matter?

Secondly, the dualists cannot tell us anything about the internal constitution of mind-stuff or the mind's structural connections with the body or the manner of its operation. Again the dualists cannot explain human capacities and pathologies in terms of its structures and its defects. No detailed theory of mind-stuff has ever been formulated, so the dualists can do more of these things.

Thirdly, many philosophers say that everything that happens in the world can be explained without using the mind. Therefore dualism is an unsatisfactory theory of mind.

Materialism is one of the oldest theories of reality. Democritus was a materialist. According to him, only material atoms and the void exist. Materialism does not give ontological status to mind. Mind is there, but it evolved out of matter.

But there are other materialistic philosophers who deny the existence of mind. They say that even the word 'mind' is unintelligible. Again other materialists say that mental terms are nothing but 'bits of behaviour'.

Our main problem as regards materialism are two:

- i) How do we explain the phenomenon of mind and
- ii) How do we explain the relation of mind and body?

Regarding the origination of mind, materialism explicitly says that mind evolves out of matter. The primal being is matter and only matter has the ontological status. Mind has a secondary existence. It is subservient to matter, matter is a substrate and mind is its attribute.

Regarding the relation between mind and body, there are four types of materialistic explanations:

- i) The Unintelligibility thesis
- ii) The Avowal Theory
- iii) Behaviourism
- iv) Identity Theory

According to the Unintelligibility thesis mental phenomena such as thoughts, feelings, wishes etc. have no real meaning at all and these words should be vanished from the

language. They say that all these are non sensical words that, entered into the language due to our ignorance and superstition. On this view mentalistic terms should be allowed to suffer the fate of the language of witchcraft and demonic possession ⁶⁶.

The Unintelligibility thesis has not gained much support among contemporary philosophers. Because according to the unintelligibility thesis mentalistic terms are meaningless like the terms of witchcraft. But it is clear why the notions of witchcraft and demonic possession died out. It has been proved by science that no such phenomena in fact exists. On the contrary it is impossible to prove that in fact there are no thoughts feelings, wishes etc.

And, secondly the unintelligibility theorists say that there are really no thoughts, feelings or wishes. They say that these terms should be replaced by physicalistic terms but this contention has not been accepted by psychologists and others.

Some materialists say that mental terms are not used to make any statements. They are not used to describe anything or report anything or assert anything. Those materialists are called the Avowal Theorists. According to them mental terms are simply 'bits of behaviour'. When, for example, one says "Ho hum", one does not make and express any statement. These two sounds (Ho, hum) are rather the result of certain inner physical conditions of that person. In the same way certain states of the person which is neither true nor false. Thus the expression "I feel bored" is neither true nor false. And for the same reason, "God, I am board" is also neither true nor false.

But, we must say that this theory fails in two important respects. First, when we say "He is bored". Certainly this statement is not the expression of our inner physical condition or

feeling. Therefore, such statement must be taken to be mental statements. Second, the avowal theorists say that mental statements do not report anything. But suppose I am feeling bored and looking at my watch. Now if somebody asks I may say “Because I am bored”. Here certainly the sentence is reporting something.

Behaviourism has played an important role in recent psychology. And most psychologists today are greatly indebted to it. According to the behaviourist, mental terms can be replaced by physicalistic terms. So the meanings of mentalistic terms such as emotions, sensations, beliefs, desires, etc., can be analyzed in terms of actual and potential patterns of behaviour. Thus instead of saying that I am thinking, I should say that the cells of my brain are operating in a certain way. They say this because mental terms cannot be verified, but the physicalistic terms can be verified or there is a possibility that they may be verified.

Introducing the concept of dispositional property, behaviourists claim that a person in a particular mental state may not be behaving in any particular way. Dispositions are properties of things. To possess a dispositional property is not to be in a particular state or to undergo a particular change; it is to be liable to be in a particular state or to undergo a particular change, when a particular condition is realized. For example, brittleness is a dispositional property. A thing is brittle if, and only if, under suitable circumstances it will shatter. However, a brittle thing may never in fact shatter.

According to behaviourist, the so-called internal states and processes are nothing but behavioural dispositions analyzable in terms of the behavioural hypothetical. For if, we define thoughts, feelings, wishes etc., in terms not of behaviour but of dispositions to

behave, then the man who secrets his thoughts, feelings and wishes behind an expressionless face and an expressionless behaviour would still have dispositions to behave in certain ways. For example, Mr. X's disposition, pain, is analyzed with the help of the behavioural hypothetical: If 'X' were pricked with pains, then 'X' would make loud noises.

Therefore on this view, there is no problem about the relation between the mind and the body, e.g. when we talk about some one's mind, we talk not about 'something' that she possesses; but we talk about certain extraordinary capacities and dispositions which belong to her. To the behaviourist, the mind-body problem is a pseudo-problem.

But unfortunately, philosophical behaviourism has major difficulties. It evidently ignores and even denies the 'inner' aspect of our mental states. Such as, to have a pain seems to be not merely a matter of being inclined to moan, to wince, to take medicine, and so on. But pains have an intrinsic qualitative nature which is revealed in introspection, any theory of mind that denies such qualia is simply failure in one's duty. So the major problem for behaviourism is that it assigns the insignificant role to the qualia of our mental states. But to solve this problem, Ludwig Wittgenstein, had a further argument against the standard view: the private language argument.

According to this standard view, in sensations, when someone use the word 'pain' is purely private. Wittgenstein attempted to show that a purely private language was completely impossible. Suppose, at the time someone says "I am in Pain". When someone uses the word "pain", he is referring to his sensation and telling other people.

But at a later time, again he may say “I am in pain”. Here the nature of his pain is completely different from his first sensation. Therefore, private language is impossible.

So, the behaviourists claim that mental terms can be defined in terms of their connections with publicly observable circumstances and behaviours.

But in our common sense view, it is important to say that no term can be meaningful in the absence of systematic connections with other terms. So terms will connect to one another by means of general statements that contain them.

Again behaviourist fails to state the necessary and sufficient behavioural conditions for the application of even a single psychological term.

So it is important to note that if we accept philosophical behaviourism, then folk psychology does not appear to be true. For according to folk psychologist, we can explain and predict psychological states of other humans by appeal to their beliefs and desires.

Now, the philosophical behaviourism is to sharply distinguish from the methodological behaviourism.

Over the past half century, behaviourism has been the most influential school of psychology. Methodological behaviourism represents a very strong reaction against the dualistic and introspective approaches to psychology.

By “behaviour” the behaviourists mean the publicly observable, measurable and recordable activity of the animals. No doubt it is admitted that there must be objective reality of these phenomena. The aim of psychology is that it takes animal behaviour as its

primary explanatory target. But on the other hand, according to the earlier view the elements and contents of internal consciousness are the proper explanatory target of psychology.

Especially in the case of non-human animals, the familiar mentalistic notions are ill-defined and there are no clear objective criteria for their application.

Even in the case of humans individual introspection does not provide a uniform or reliable ground for their application.

Now, we explain how any organism's behaviour can be explained in terms of dispositions. For example, solubility is a dispositional property. To say that a sugar cube is soluble is to say that if the sugar cube were put in water, then it would dissolve. So explanations of any organism's behaviour are to be based on either publicly observable or operational definition. Here we explain the notion of an operational definitional definition with the help of an example.

“X is water soluble”

Is equivalent by definition to

“If X were put in water, X would dissolve.”

The above example is called an “operational definition”. The term soluble is defined in terms of certain operations of tests from which it is clear to us whether or not the term actually applies.

It was thought if the familiar mentalistic notions really do have integrity then the behaviourist methodology will lead us back to them, or to suitably defined versions of them. And if they have no explanatory integrity then there is no real loss rejecting them.

Certain philosophers of science belonging to “logical positivism” school claimed that any meaningful theoretical term had to possess an operational definition in terms of observables.

Methodological behaviourism also faces some difficulties. According to some other schools of philosophy and psychology, behaviourism tended to dehumanize human beings.

Secondly, there is no scientific reason to deny the existence of internal phenomena. We have at least some introspective access which plays some role. In so far as behaviourism urged us to ignore such phenomena. So it is unsatisfactory.

In this respect most thinkers have simply tried to reject behaviourism. But one of the behaviourists, B. F. Skinner has recently proposed a version of behaviourism in which the reality of internal phenomena is asserted, and as well as our introspective access to them, and in which internal phenomena plays a perfectly legitimate role in psychology. To him... “What is felt or introspectively observed is not some non-physical world of consciousness mind or mental life, but the observers own body”⁶⁷.

Identity theory is the most common materialistic theory of the mind. This theory is being very much discussed now. According to this theory, all mental phenomena such as

thoughts, feelings, wishes etc. are numerically identical with the states and processes of the body or the nervous system or the brain.

According to Jerome A. Shaffer⁶⁸ in one respect the identity theory is very close to behaviourism. Because both behaviourism and identity theory identify mental states with bodily states. But there is an important way in which they differ. The behaviourists identify mental states with the changes in the body in certain circumstances. On the other hand, the identity theorists identify mental states with the identifiable structures of the body, or the on going processes and states of the bodily organs, and, in the last analysis, with the very cells which go to make up those organs. Again the behaviourists intend to analyse the meaning of mentalistic terms, but the identity theorists do not analyse the meaning of mentalistic terms.

Now let us try to understand the word “identity” from a different angle. When we say that the morning star is “identical” with the evening star, we mean that there is just one planet, namely, venus, which in the morning is called the morning star and in the evening is called the evening star. So they are one and the same object.

But when the identity theorists say that mental states are identical with the bodily states he means that the mental states may be identical but certainly not synonymous with the bodily states. Here the word “identical” is used in the sense that the actual events recognized by mentalistic terms are one and the same events as those recognized by physicalistic terms.

It is important to know that whenever a mental event occurs, a physical event of a particular sort occurs and vice-versa. Again the identity theorists not only hold that

mental and physical events are co-related in a particular way but that they are one and the same events, e.g., it is not like lightning and thunder, (which are co-related in lawful ways but not identical) but like lightning are electrical discharges. (Which always go together because they are one and the same).

In the identity theory, there is duality of terminology, but no duality of entities, events or properties.

Now let us see what the difficulties of the identity theory are. Churchland says that we can first point to the argument from introspection. We can only understand mental states and properties with the help of introspection. They are radically different from any neurophysiological states and properties.

J.J.C. Smart holds that we can easily substitute physicalistic terms for mentalistic terms. But Shaffer does not admit this. Suppose a man is reporting about his experience of a red after-image. But while reporting he certainly is not aware about physical condition.

Another important objection is the identity of the mental with the physical is literally unintelligible. Therefore many philosophers say that the identification is a case of “category mistake”. Here, we can imagine the most important law concerning numerical identity. According to Leibniz’ law if A is identical with B then every property that A has B has, that too and vice-versa: in logical notation,

$$(A) (B) [(A=B) \supset (F(A) \supset F(B))]$$

In view of this law identity theory is impossible. For properties of brain states are not properties of mental states. Again if there is to be identity then there must be co-existence

in time and space. Here the question arises, Do they? It is impossible to say that the physical events in the brain and the mental events occur at precisely the same time & space.

Again it is important to note that brain states are processes are located in the brain as a whole or in some part of it. If mental states are identical with brain states then mental states have also the same specific location. But it is literally meaningless because I cannot say that my feeling of pain is located in my ventral thalamus. So it is meaningless to claim that the number 9 is red.

Some have argued that our thoughts and beliefs have a meaning, a specific propositional content they are either true or false. But it is impossible to say that some resonance in my association cortex is true, or logically entails some other resonance close by, or has the meaning that Q. So the two are not same.

Now according to Shaffer, we can say that for all three difficulties, materialist philosophers have made a mixed theory. According to the mixed theory although mental and physical events are different sorts of events and in no sense identical, nevertheless the subjects to which they both occur are material objects. Thus we have a theory which preserves materialism and at the same time makes a departure from it in accepting a dualism of events which happen to material objects.

Functionalism is currently the most popular and well-known theory of mind. It is one of the major theoretical developments of twentieth-century analytic philosophy and provides the conceptual underpinnings of much work in cognitive science. Functionalism tries to move beyond both Behaviourism and Identity theory by taking elements from both. Like

those two theories, Functionalism is generally taken to be a materialist theory. According to functionalism, the essential feature of any type of mental state is specified in terms of its causal relation to sensory stimuli, behavioural responses and other mental states. The essential or defining feature of any type of mental state is its causal role. So, according to the functionalist, the essential characteristic of pain is its causal role. Similarly other types of mental states (sensations, fears, beliefs and so on) are also defined by their unique causal role. It is important to note that functionalism is concerned with mental state types, not tokens, e.g. with pain and not with particular pains.

In this respect, this view is very close to behaviourism, but there is one fundamental difference between two theories. We know that the behaviourist defines each type of mental state solely in terms of environmental and behavioural output. But the functionalist claims that this is impossible. And says that the characterization of any mental state involves to a variety of other mental states with which it is causally connected.

According to functionalism, there are two descriptions of the same state may both be appropriate and insightful, namely – functional description and physical description. For example, not only the essential characteristic of anger is its causal role, but that anger is most probably a complex of hormonal activity and arousal of aspects of the nervous system. In this context Sterelny⁶⁹ says that the importance of functionalism as a theory of mind is that it is consistent with physicalism, so there is nothing but physical systems with folk psychology.

P.M. Churchland suggests that folk psychology is known as belief-desire psychology. We are conscious beings. Our actions have intentional, belief desire explanations. Even we can explain and predict psychological states of other humans by appeal to their beliefs and desires.

Now many functionalists take folk psychology as a functional description of the mind, which is a partial and only partially correct. Only partial because there is much in human psychology beyond our knowledge. And only partially correct because sometimes the folk have many of the details wrong.

According to Sterelny,⁷⁰ there are two general features of functionalist positions. One important feature of functionalism is that the theory of the mind is relatively independent of the theory of the brain, though brain states realize mental states. Secondly, two systems or organisms can be in the same mental state, irrespective of the differences in their physical constitution. For example, Human and other animas can be in the same psychological state for fear, despite their very different brains, This procedure for the type identification of mental state is better elucidated with the notion of the Turing machine.

In the early 1960s, Putnum proposed a version of scientific functionalism, machine state functionalism: according to this view, mental states are types of Turing machine table states. Turing machines are mechanical devices consisting of a tape with squares on it that either are blank or contain symbols, and an executive that can move one square to the left, or one square to the right, or stay what it is. And it can write a symbol on a square,

erase a symbol on a square or leave the square as it is. According to the Church-Turing thesis, every computable function can be computed by a Turing Machine⁷¹.

Some versions of functionalism are expressed in terms of the notion of a Turing machine, while others are not. A Turing machine is an amazingly simple device, yet which is, in principle extraordinarily powerful. A Turing has a finite number of machine states, inputs and outputs. Now there are two functions specifying such a machine. Out of the two functions one is from inputs and states to outputs and the other is from inputs and states to states. And the two functions specify a set of conditionals, one for each combination of state and input. The conditionals are of this form : if the machine is in state 'S' and receives input I, then it will go to the state 'S' emit the output 'O'.

A Turing machine must be able to control its input in certain ways. In standard formulations, the output of a Turing machine is regarded as having two components. It prints a symbol on a tape, and then moves the tape, thus bringing a new symbol into the view of the input reader. The machine to have full power, the tape must be infinite in at least one direction and movable in both directions.

We often express a Turing machine in the form of a machine table. One very simple version of machine functionalism states that each system that has a mental state in terms of its relation to inputs, outputs and other states is described by at least one Turing machine table of a certain specifiable sort. The programme specifies the relational structure for each mental state. However, the machine version of functionalism does not explain the nature of relation that exists among states, inputs and outputs. The functionalists construe these relations as causal relation.

But this formulation of functionalism, according to Block⁷² is very vague and would not help characterize mental states. Again P. M. Churchland concluded that it is not important to make a functional claim about the mind. Block and Hinckfuss proposed that functional claims are trivial. So human mind might be a Turing machine leads to a very weak conception of functional systems and functional properties. But we need a full and rich conception of functional properties.

A functional system is more than causally in interrelated activities. It is not that the behaviour of a functional system can be described only in terms of a set of inputs, internal states and outputs. For in the case of solar system planets take as input gravitational and inertial information (Their own mass and velocity detect there inputs) and produce as output an orbit. But the solar system is not a functional system. In this respect, it is important to say that functional systems are systems whose existence and structure have a Teleological explanation. But the interrelation of the solar system have not such an explanation. Human body clearly does have such an explanation, with its components. For instance, the design of our eye. For it is composed of parts related to each other functionally and not just causally. It has many parts: Lens, Retina, Focusing, mechanism, light meter, shield, plus lubrication, maintenance and movement subsystems. And it is composed of functionally not just casually with its parts. So it is a functional system within a functional system. According to Sterelny functionalist should hold that the mind too is a functional system within a larger one. The mind stores information in long and short term memory.

Sterelny claims⁷³ that functional systems have a design, according to functionalists. To support a functional theory of the mind he (Sterelny) assumes that mind also has a design.

He assumes from natural selection that it (mind) has an internal organization designed to carry out various perceptual, cognitive and action-guiding tasks. So it has a Teleological explanation.

We have already seen that there are two relatively independent descriptions of the human mind, i.e., a functional theory, and a physical theory. But it is not that there is a single functional, and a single physical theory. Psychological kinds differ in respect different physical realizations. Some psychological kinds are very independent of their physical implementation. For example thoughts, that is beliefs, desires, fear and the like. Sterelny says that one's particular array of perceptual organs does not matter. He also says Helen Keller was a physically disbalanced person but he was more intelligent than many people. We know that dolphins are intelligent, but their beliefs are very different from ours. They (dolphin) don't act like people. And it is not that like human mind their intentional systems have to be built using the same biochemistry.

An intentional agent acts on its beliefs and goals, though there is some debate about the degree of rationality and some perception like flow of information from the external world to the mind. In this respect Sterelny says that an intentional system must have (i) some perpetual systems, and through this system some informations flow from the external world to the mind, (ii) a reasonably rich system of internal representation, (iii) to use perceptual information to update and modify its internal representations of the world there must have cognitive mechanisms and (iv) to translate its internal representations into behaviour, there must have mechanisms.

Therefore, on the basis of this we can say that intentional systems could be psychologically very different. Language users and non-language users can all be intentional systems. But there are differences between human desire and other animal desire. There is good reason to suppose that humans sexual psychology and physical nature, perhaps to their sense of smell and touch.

Functionalists try to explain mental states in terms of their causal role and they claim that this function can be specified without bringing in any question of their physical realization. The same function can be realized in different physical organizations. But we should remember that if a function is so specified that it cannot be realized in a physical organization of a certain type then the claim of functionalism would be weakened. There are various degrees of independence of functions we must pass from simple functionalism to homuncular functionalism.

Teleological explanation of mind or “homuncular” functionalism, associated with William G. Lycan and early Dennett. According to homuncular functionalism, a human being is analogous to a large corporation, made up of co-operating departments, each with its own job to perform; these departments interpret stimuli and produce behavioural responses. Each department (at the highest sub personal level) is in turn constituted by further units (at a sub personal level) and so on down until the neurological level is reached.

Sterelny says that it (homuncular functionalism) has three elements⁷⁴. The first is the idea of functionalism itself: The essence of a mental state is what it does, not what it is. The second is that mind is modular, Minds are ensembles. Our general and flexible

intelligence comes from the interactions of lesser and more specialized intelligences that compose us. A complex function is broken into interacting less complex ones. The third and the most important element is to apply the first two ideas recursively. That is, each homunculus is in turn seen as a whole of more specialized and hence simpler homunculi. And in this way we reach a level where the task the homunculi must carry out so simple that they are psychologically primitive.

Dennett and Lycan develop and defend homuncular functionalism. To them, face recognition is a nice example. Face recognition is the most important to social creatures like us. And we concentrate on it with the help of our cognitive mechanism. For in many cases even in a faint light, an unknown or an indistinct photo, we are able to recognize faces and pictures of faces.

Functionalism which is a blend of behaviourism and central state identity theory is subjects to an objection from the same view-point. It appears in the form of absent or inverted qualia argument initially raised by Block and Fodor.

The first of these is the 'inverted qualia argument' and the second is absent qualia argument.

Functionalism avoids the 'inner' or qualitative nature of our mental states. But the qualitative nature is the essential features of the various kinds of mental state (pain, sensations of colour, of temperature and so on). Therefore functionalism is false. It is true that every person does, in fact, have different qualia. Suppose, you and I correctly say that we have the same sensation, say toothache, but pains feel quite different to every person (you and I). But, functionalism says that since we have no way of comparing our

inner qualia; and since apparently there are no differences between our pains, so there is no way to tell whether my pain is inverted relative to yours. Therefore, they are the very same type of state and it is not reasonable to say pain is 'really' a different type of pain from yours.

Another qualia related fatal flaw for functionalism is the so-called "absent qualia problem". Functionalism seems an incomplete account of the nature of mental states. Because to functionalism, it may be that a given functional state can exist without having a given "intrinsic qualia". And if a state which have intrinsic qualia can be functionally identical with a state without itself having a intrinsic qualia, then functionalism would seem to be untenable.

The functionalist can meet the inverted-qualia and the absent-qualia argument in two ways. Let us try to understand the inversion problem first. The qualitative character of your sensation of pain might be different from the qualitative character of my sensation of pain. But these two states are caused by pain. So two states are sensations-of-pain, whatever their intrinsic qualitative character. In this respect the functionalist claims that phenomenal or qualitative properties are irrelevant for the type identification of mental states. Two functionally identical psychological states are type-identical, independent of their qualitative content, it follows that qualitative characteristics are not essential to mental states. This also suggests a solution to the absent qualia problem. Functionalism considers qualitative content of the mental states to be an accidental property.

We are intentional agents. Our behaviour exhibits our intelligent nature. And such behaviour requires thought. In this respect, it is important to note that though according to

materialists, people and certain higher animals do not contain any immaterial substance, nonetheless they have certain mental states that are completely unexplainable in physical terms, e.g., thought. Now the question arises what is the function of our mental states. According to the representational theory of the mind, our mental states are representational states. There are two very different pictures of our mental life. One of these two pictures is the picture of folk psychology and the other is the physicalist picture. According to folk psychology we are conscious beings. Our actions have intentional, belief – desire explanations. We have hopes, fears, plans, beliefs etc. As a result we can explain and predict the psychological states of other humans in terms of their beliefs and desires, hope and fears. And our actions are explained also by these mental facts. On the other hand there is the physicalist picture. According to this picture, we are physical entities. We do not differ from the biological world. However, we are sentient and conscious beings, and so we are not mere physical systems.

We cannot deny the scientific image of ourselves. And the scientific and folk picture combine to produce the idea that representation is central to human minds. Let us try to understand the scientific picture.

We are different from many other animals in our behavioural capacities. For example, robins feed their young. And they sometimes feed young cuckoos, though young cuckoo look nothing like robin young. But cuckoo heaves the robin chicks out of the nest. Indeed they grow to be bigger than the adult robins that feed them. So they are unable to learn to use information that shows that they are feeding not their chicks but the killer of their chicks. But many animals can learn to avoid the new problems. Chimps behave excellently and are adapted to their life ends.

Again men have this capacity to a very high degree. Our behavioural informations in modifiable by experience. Plasticity is a consequence of our sentience. Our intelligent behavior can solve the new problems. Especially adaptive flexibility requires representing the world. Since adaptability is a central part of intelligence, intelligence essentially involves representation.

It has been thought that our intelligent behaviour is informationally sensitive. Suppose, on hearing an alarm bell from a building that reliably indicates fire, we will attempt to escape from that building. Here it is important to note that since our behaviour is adaptively flexible and informationally sensitive; it must be directed by representation. For there can be no informational sensitivity and flexible adaptability without representation. In this way physicalist try to show that mind is a builder and user of representations.

Folk psychology ('FP') is a 'conceptual framework' and 'network of principles'.

Again it is also that folk psychologist admits that representation is central to human minds. This idea is clear to us with the example of folk – psychological explanation. Folk psychology is also known as intentional, propositional attitude, or belief desire explanation, e.g. X voted for Y because X feared crime and believed Y would reduce it. Here the representational content of the intentional states seems to play a central role.

The 'content' of folk psychology can be regarded as the particular concepts and practices employed by an ordinary person in understanding, explaining and predicting humans psychology, whether his or her own or someone else's.

Now we explain the content of folk-psychology. Firstly, it consists of concepts relating to our various propositional attitude states (especially the attitudes of belief and desire). Secondly, it consists of principles connecting these mental attitudes to each other, to perceptual stimuli, and to actions.

The conceptual apparatus of folk-psychology encompasses not only concepts of mental states such as the propositional attitudes but also a vast array of concepts relating to a person's personality traits and dispositions.

But we cannot assume that folk-psychology is the right psychology. According to the eliminative materialists, our common-sense psychological framework is a false and radically misleading conception of the cause of human behaviour and the nature of cognitive activity. So our common sense psychological framework does not enjoy universal acceptance. In this respect we must say that folk psychology is not just an incomplete representation of our inner states; it is also a complete misrepresentation of our internal states and activities. In this view the central terms of folk psychology – belief, desire, fear, sensation, pain, and joy and so on – are empty; they apply to nothing. Consequently, it is likely that folk psychology is a hopelessly primitive and deeply confused conception of our internal states. Here, the eliminative materialist raises three points about folk psychology.

Firstly, the central feature of folk psychology remains a complete mystery to us. The eliminative materialist's point to the widespread explanatory, predictive and manipulative failure of folk psychology. We do not know how memory works. We have no idea what mental illness is, nor how to remove it.

Secondly, now, we try to draw an inductive view from our conceptual history. Our past folk conceptions have been refuted. Similarly, our folk theories of the nature of fire and the nature of life were shown to be mistaken. For most of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, according to the caloric theory of heat, heat is a fluid substance. But by the end of the last century it had become clear that heat was not a substance at all, but a high mean molecular kinetic energy. Here the new theory-kinetic of heat was much more successful than the old theory.

And finally, the eliminative materialist expects that the old theory (folk psychology) will fail to reduce to a new theory (matured neuroscience).

Again Paul Churchland has argued that though folk psychology is a theory, it is quite likely to be a radically false theory. Like eliminativists, Churchland also argues that there are no intentional states. And the central terms of intentional psychology – ‘belief’ and ‘desire’ – are empty; they apply to nothing. In this respect, Churchland claims the following three points⁷⁵

Firstly, Churchland emphasizes that intentional psychology fits badly into the rest of our picture of our mind.

Secondly, In accordance with his semantic views, Churchland’s ontological conclusion is that there probably are no beliefs or desires. Sometimes we can refer to object without understanding the nature of it. Ptolemaic astronomy wrongly misunderstood the nature of the planets and stars. Similarly, we are right in recognizing the existence of beliefs and desires, but wrong about their nature.

Thirdly, Churchland says that the accounts of cognition and representation closely related to the neurosciences, so there are important alternatives to the view that mind is a sentential machine.

Again Churchland thinks that folk psychology is a degenerating research program. It is failing to solve new problems. But it is not that Churchland rejects folk psychology. Churchland says that there is a considerable variety of central psychological phenomena – mental illness, sleep, creativity, memory, intelligence differences, and the many forms of learning – on which our folk theory is silent.

The most important of its failures is that folk theory fails to integrate with the rest of our self-knowledge.

Now by studying the relationship between propositional attitudes psychology and cognitive psychology we can assess the validity of Churchland's critique. Sterelney puts forward the following argument:⁷⁶

P1 – Folk psychology is a central part of cognitive science.

P2 – Cognitive psychology does not fail to integrate with the physical science.

C1 – So folk psychology is probably approximately true.

But there arises some problems about the exact nature of the relations between folk and cognitive psychology. Fodor and Pylyshyn both suggest that the central role of cognitive psychology is to explain how internal processes are computationally implemented. Sterelney claims that cognitive psychology includes folk psychology.

Folk theory might be a part of cognitive psychology. In this respect Churchland says that it would have played a role in the development of theories that do address perception, memory and language use. For example, from folk psychology we obtain the central notion, viz. thought. We may do say that folk theory is the most abstract level of the mind.

Jackson and Pettit⁷⁷ points to the epistemic strength of folk psychology. Like Churchland and Fodor they accept that folk theory is a theory, in particular, a functionalist theory. But they claim folk theory, like other theories does outrun its empirical base. Suppose on a pocket calculator we punch 8, then 7 and 15 appears. Here, this hypothesis goes beyond the evidence, but ultimately the hypothesis would be credible, however, doubt remained about how 4 was stored. In their view, there is a matter of chance that people behave as if they had beliefs and desires. And they say the chance hypothesis is incredible.

Now, to understand how internal states can simultaneously have the function of representing the world, and how internal representational structures can direct behavior. We have to explain 'The Language of Thought' hypothesis.

The main task of language depends on mutual communication of it. When someone successfully transmit his thought to someone by his language and the other can understand and express which the former speaker intended then the function of language is fulfilled. The environment around us is always changeable and we gather knowledge from it. The gathered knowledge is transformed one to other by language. The process is not possible without our mental representation of objects of environment. According to Jerry Fodor external things from which we acquire knowledge through representation is

possible only because mind has its own language, i.e. language of thought. The framework of this language is already given to human. Man accepts the content as a form of representation which he/she gets from experience and he/she places this representation in his structure of language of thought. As a result language takes a special form and becomes Natural Language, which is used as the language of communication.

Now let us try to understand how Jerry Fodor supposed that there is an “inner language” of thought that corresponds to the “outer-language” which one speaks. According to him⁷⁸, thoughts are sentence like. And there are semantic parallels and syntactic parallels between our language of thought and language of sentence.

Firstly, we consider semantic parallels between thoughts and sentences. Let us try to understand these similarities with the help of an example. Suppose, some one believes that dolphins are intelligent, and one utters the sentence. “Dolphins are intelligent”. Here the belief and the sentence have the same truth value. And they also refer to the same elements, such as, dolphin and intelligence. So they have the same meaning. From this similarity we can explain that thoughts have language like sentences. According to Fodor our thought sentences are not English or sentences of other languages. We think in a special inner language, mentalese. Mentalese is organized by words and sentences.

Now let us see the syntactic parallels between thoughts and sentences. It is important to say that here the similarities are on the basis of productivity and systematicity. Thought is productive and systematic. To say that thought is productive is to say that we are forever thinking new things, which are complex. We can think chimpanzees like a tailless monkey and four footed animal, that Gorillas and Chimps are tailless monkey and four

footed animals, that Baboons and Gorillas and Chimps are tailless monkey and four footed animals. And so on. Again thought is also systematic. For example, if someone thinks that cows are mammals, and if also she has the concept of a goat, then she has the capacity to think that goats are mammals.

In the same way language which one speaks (sentence) is productive and systematic. There is no limitation of the length of a sentence. Again if thought is systematic then our speaking language must be systematic. Systematicity (like productivity) is a property of sentences but not of words.

So the relationship between an inner language of thought and the outer language which one speaks is relatively more likely the relationship between spoken and written language.

And finally, according to Fodor, language of thought involves the nature of mental processing. He argued that rational choice, perception, and concept learning are the three examples of processes through which he tries to show that mental processing has characteristics that help us to accept language of thought. We try to consider here rational choice. To understand a player's move we must rank her preference. Perhaps she wants a draw or she really needs a win. So she recognizes a set of options. Again her expectations depend on the outcomes of various possible moves. Now we compromise between most desired outcome and most likely outcome on the basis of her preferences, options, and expectations. Again to learn a language is to acquire a certain concept. No language can be acquired unless the learning mind already has a representational system. We cannot learn to say anything if we cannot already think. Suppose there are some cards. And

someone is asked among this cards what are blangular? (A card is blangular if it is blue and triangular). Here someone can say that they are blangular and they are not blangular if she has a concept of blangularity. Therefore Fodor concluded that cognition involves an inner sentential code.

According to Sterelney we can naturalize the representational theory of mind if there is a language of thought. No doubt all intentional agents could not have the exactly the same language of thought, but all would have some language like system of mental representation.

It is also said that without mentalese no public language is known to us, but we understand public language through our special purpose equipment though mentalese does not require any further system in its background.

But what mechanisms are required to understand our inner sentences, i.e. sentences of the language of thought? Another question is : If there any criteria to comprehend what an individual understands about his own language of thought ?

In order to answer those questions we must compare the language of thought hypothesis with the computational theory of mind. It is not easy to know how a man actually thinks with the help of computational models of cognitive process. But we can only say that human thought is partly computational. Sometimes computer and intelligent creatures have the same capacities, such as both seem to be symbolizing devices. But there is also difference between computer and intelligent creatures, such as at a time computer must have only in one state, and carry out only one operation. On the other hand, human

beings are in many psychological states at any one moment. Moreover, our mental operation does change over time.

Connectionists' offer a view of the nature of mental representation that is explicitly opposed to the language of thought hypothesis. So there is a connectionist account of the architecture of the mind, the nature of mental representation, and the nature of operations on these representations.

Connectionist account of thinking is encumbered with various technical details. In this view human brain consists of a network of simple electrical processing units which stimulate and inhibit each other. These networks consist of large numbers of units or nodes. These nodes are simple input-output devices capable of being excited or inhibited by electrical currents. These nodes are interconnected.

Let us explain connectionism with the help of an example. Suppose we are to recognize a pattern. A network can recognize a pattern with the help of a sonic echo. The problem is to determine whether something is a rock or a mine by throwing at it sounds waves. The network which does this function has three layers. The first layer consists of input nodes. Each node is tuned to a particular frequency of sound. If that frequency is present in the total incoming signal then it will fire either strongly or weakly or not at all. The first layer of input nodes is connected to a hidden layer. Each input node is connected to all the hidden nodes, the hidden layer is connected to the third layer of output nodes. Each hidden is connected to two output nodes. An incoming signal first excites the input nodes. These input nodes excite some and inhibit others of the hidden nodes. Each hidden node

excites one of the output nodes and inhibits the other. From the network we learn the following.

If one of the output nodes fire then there is a mine from which the echo has bounced off, and if the other output nodes is fired then we shall learn that the echo has bounced off a rock.

Against the claims of connectionist, Fodor and Pylyshyn argue⁷⁹ that connectionist models of mental representation and mental processing are impoverished. So, there is no satisfactory explanation of the central features of cognition. Fodor and Pylyshyn⁸⁰ characterize the connectionist theory in the following way. First, in the view of the connectionist mental representations have no constituent structure. They are not built from elements that themselves represent. Second, sententialist theories offer complex representations. They recognize richer structural relations that are relevant to cognitive processes between representations. But the connectionists recognize that only psychologically relevant relations between mental representations are those of excitation and inhibition between nodes. So, they require simple representations and simple processing. According to Fodor and Pylyshyn, simple representations and associationist relations between mental representations are too simple. Here we cannot get a natural account of the differences between thinking that someone hates everyone, and thinking that everyone is hated by someone.

Fodor and pylyshyn appeal to properties of language such as productivity and systematicity and argue that these are also characteristics of thought. Productivity is the fact that additional sentences can always be added to the corpus of a language.

Productivity requires compositionality. And systematicity is the fact that for any sentence of a language there are systematically related expressions that are also sentences of the language. This notion of systematicity is clear to us through examples.

Such as –

John loves Mary

Can also understand the systematically related sentence

Mary loves John.

And if someone can think that tigers are beautiful and he has the concept of leopards, he can also think that leopards are beautiful.

They argue that like languages, classical symbol systems naturally exhibit systematicity since they employ operations upon symbolic representations which are built up via a compositional syntax that supports compositional semantics. But connectionist architectures do not employ symbolic representations with a compositional syntax (though they can be used to implement such systems) and hence are themselves inadequate as cognitive models.

In Sterelny's view, Fodor and Pylyshyn have missed alternative explanations of systematicity. In this respect, to Sterelny⁸¹ we argue that systematicity is a fundamental fact of our cognitive life. Sometimes cognitive psychology claims the view that human active short-term memory seems to hold about seven (unrelated) items. But no one would what to claim that it is a fundamental feature of our cognitive organization. Perhaps, that

fact is very likely a consequence of the amount of neural tissue dedicated to short-term memory.

Systematicity is a functional feature of our mental organization if our minds are systematic. Thought it is not a consequence of our basic mental organization. Now from the claim that systematicity is a functional, rather than an implementational, feature of our mental life we come to the idea that systematicity is to be explained by the basic architecture of our cognitive system. Braddon-Mitchell and Fitzpatrick⁸² argue against this claim. They agree that mental representation is not punctuated. For a punctuate mind is incapable of having some thoughts, including, survival and reproduction enhancing ones. So natural selection will tend to build a no punctuate mind. Minds are typically systematic but the explanation is selective rather than architectural. No connectionist believes that the systematicity of intelligence is a chance by-product, or any personal peculiarity.

But as we move our attention away from the famous three Fs (feeding, feeling and fighting), so we should expect only a rough approximation to a non-punctuate mind. Again there is no reason to accept the view that cognitive representation is systematic. In this respect Fodor and Pylyshyn raise a question whether nonverbal minds, and the nonverbal parts of our minds, are systematic. However, it is not plausible that only the verbal minds are systematic.

Sterelny doubts that animal representation is systematic. For separation of form and content is a necessary part of systematicity, but we cannot assume that other creatures except human have achieved the radical separation of form and content. There also raises

a question whether perceptual representation is systematic or not. According to ethological literature, apparently behaviour patterns are realized by perceptual gestalts of some kind, for example, ducklings' new-born imprint on anything that moves.

But in the absence of an explicit definition of systematicity, it is difficult to assess this guess.

Fodor and Pylyshyn argue in favour of the language of thought hypothesis. That is there is an "inner language" of thought that corresponds to the "outer language" which one speaks. In their view language is productive and systematic. And mental representation is also prima facie a productive and compositional symbol system. If so, it is language like on the other hand connectionists argue that mental representation is not punctuate, but they can give no explanation of why mental lives are not punctuate, for connectionist architecture can be arbitrarily punctuated. Perhaps, not only an architectural explanation will do, but also there are other reasons to accept that mental representation is systematic.

Before coming to any conclusion we need to clarify Searle's well-known skeptical challenge.

John Searle, in his paper on Minds, Brains, and programs (1980)⁸³, argues that computational theories in psychology are essentially worthless. He makes two main claims: those computational theories, being purely formal in nature, cannot possibly help us to understand mental processes; and the computer hardware – unlike neuroprotein – obviously lacks the right causal power to generate mental processes.

According to Searle, all mental phenomena are part of our natural biological history, as much a part of biology as growth, digestion, enzyme secretion or reproduction. So, to express the relation between mind and body he proposed that all mental states, from the profoundest philosophical thoughts to the most trivial itches and tickles are caused by neurobiological processes in the brain. Generally, this sort of relation is quite common in nature⁸⁴.

Searle rejects the possibility of cognitive science and artificial intelligence. Cognitive science is mistaken in thinking that the mind is a computer program. In his view minds cannot be identical with computer programs, because programs are defined syntactically in terms of the manipulation of formal symbols, whereas minds have mental or semantic contents. Searle has explained this point with the help of his famous Chinese Room Argument. He illustrated it with the following story.

He imagines himself locked in a room, in which there are a lot of Chinese symbols in boxes; a window through which people can pass bunches of Chinese symbols to him, which are called questions, and through which he can pass out the answers to the questions; and a book of rules in English for matching Chinese symbols with other Chinese symbols. To him the boxes of symbols are called a database, and the instruction book in English is called a program. The people who give questions to him and designed the instruction book are called the programmers, and he is clearly a computer. We imagine that he gets so good at shuffling the symbols, and the programmers get so good at writing the program, that eventually his 'answers' to the 'questions' are indistinguishable from those of a native Chinese speaker. He passes the Turing test. But all the same, he does not understand a word of Chinese and – this is the point of the story

– if he does not understand Chinese on the basis of implementing the program for understanding Chinese, then neither does any digital computer solely on that basis because no digital computer has anything that he does not have.

The logical structure of this argument as follows:

- (a) Computer programs are purely syntactic. So what a computer does in processing information is nothing but meaningless symbol manipulations.
- (b) Minds have contents (semantics).
- (c) Syntax can never give us semantics.
- (d) Hence computer programs are not minds.

“There are several common misunderstandings of the Chinese Room Argument and of its significance. Many people suppose that it proves that no machine can think. Searle’s point here is that humans can think, and human are machines; even he adopts the materialist credo that only machines can think. He is not saying that human and programs are utterly incommensurable. He grants that, at some highly abstract level of description, people like everything else are instantiations of digital computer. Searle argues that no system can understand anything solely in virtue of its instantiating a computer program”⁸⁵.

Various attempts have been made to reply to the points raised by Searle. Understanding is not explained by postulating an “understanding centre” within a black box. Understanding is to be attributed to the organization as a whole. The Chinese Room understands Chinese, even though no proper part of it does. Searle is right in thinking that thinking or understanding is not a mere manipulation of symbols. For thought to have

content it must be appropriately connected with the thinker's environment. The symbols are given content by their causal connections with world. The connections to the environment are not within the computer.

The problem remains however that intelligence cannot be regarded as mechanizable reasoning. Unless this problem is solved satisfactorily a computational theory of the mind will not be acceptable.

Some kind of physicalism in philosophy of mind seems to be inescapable. There cannot be two things mind and matter. Computers have given us some idea about how mind can function. However, the precise character of the functioning of the mind still remains a mystery and the representationist theory appears only as a research program. We cannot decide whether it is ultimately true without further philosophical reflection buttressed by empirical research to be undertaken in the next thousand years.

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CHAPTER – 3

The Role of Mind in Epistemology

Although the *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtras* lay their emphasis on the ontological aspect and the *Nyāya Sūtras* on the epistemological aspect but their theories of *manas* may be said to be almost identical. Like the *Upaniṣads*, we find the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems also maintain that *manas* is something distinct from Soul or *Ātman* and so that *manas* is material. Both Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems rely on the important factor of “attention” in their proof for the existence of *manas*. Perception requires attention, which again is active turning of the mind towards the object of perception. So the co-operation of the *manas* is a necessary condition of all knowledge whether it refers to external objects or internal states. We do not perceive colour, touch, taste, smell and sound simultaneously, even though all the external senses may be in contact with their objects, if there is no contact between *manas* and the sense - organ. In case of perception there are three stages of contact first between *ātman* and mind, second between mind and sense - organ and lastly sense - organ with the object (*Ātmā manasā samyuyate manaḥ indriyena indriyam arthena*). *Manas* must be in contact with the object through the medium of the sense- organ on the one hand, and with the self or the *Ātman* on the other hand. For example; sometimes we purposely look at a watch, but we do not yet see the time, for our *manas* has meanwhile come to be otherwise occupied. And that object on which the *manas* is concentrated or attending only that object is cognized by the soul.

In the respect of proof for the existence of *manas* Śrīdhara says in his *Nyāyakaṇḍalī*: “The contacts of the objects, the sense - organ and the soul, depended upon some other cause, in the bringing about of the due effect, - because even when the former contacts exist, the necessary effect does not appear.... and this instrumentality upon which they depend is that of the Mind.”¹

In the *Praśastapāda – bhāṣya*, *manas* is explicitly mentioned as a sense - organ which is instrumental in bringing about direct experience of pleasure and pain, and acts as the mediating organ in the experience of direct perceptual knowledge. In the case of perception, besides sense - object contact, mind must be in conjunction with sense. If the mind is not engaged then objects are not perceived though they have contact with the senses. Again *manas* is atomic and cannot come into contact with more than one thing at a time and therefore acts of perception can only by one at a time. Bosanquet also says the same thing. At one time what is given to the sense is only one unitary piece of knowledge because perception requires not only sense-object contact, but also mind and sense must be in conjunction. Even so, according to Kant the categories of the understanding are responsible for the systematization of knowledge. The Naiyāyika says that the systematization of knowledge occurs in the soul which has *buddhi* as its quality. Mind is only organ like the sense – organs.

The Naiyāyika maintains that the *manas* is a sense – organ. Before doing so, they go on telling us about the nature of a sense – organ and sensation. Usually the two terms are interdependent. Russell says, “Sensations are what is common to the mental and physical worlds; they may be defined as the intersection of mind and matter.... it is not itself knowledge, but it supplies the data for our knowledge of the physical world.”² Hence a

sense - organ is that which is responsible for the receiving of sensations. Sensations are those which make the object intelligible to the mind through the sense - organ. In the *Upaniṣads* we saw how *manas* is sometimes said to be the internal organ of sense and sometimes to be something more which controls the actions of all *indriyas*. In the *Nyāya Sūtras* both these ideas are also present. Gaṅgeśa in his *Tattvacintāmaṇi* enumerates six senses, the traditional five and the mind.³ But there are some epistemological difficulties in this position of the Naiyāyika. A sense - organ epistemologically would mean the special and instrumental cause of perceptual knowledge only. In this context an *indriya* is one which gives direct and immediate knowledge. In this sense, since mind is the cause of the direct awareness of pleasure and pain, we may consider mind to be a sense-organ. But there are other activities in which mind is involved, such as perception, where the function of mind is no more direct but indirect. What is directly conjoined with the senses is received and presented by the mind to the self. It is a *sādhāraṇa kāraṇa* (common causes) to all perceptual knowledge and not a special cause or instrumental cause (*asādhāraṇa kāraṇa*). Then mind seems to be a mediator between the objects and sense on the one hand and self on the other. In this sense mind cannot be an *indriya*. But mind must be described as an instrument in inference, memory and imagination because of its direct activity as a special cause (*asādhāraṇa kāraṇa*). Therefore sometimes the mind is an instrument, and other times mind is not an instrument. According to such contradiction if we characterize perception as a direct knowledge only, Gaṅgeśa adds a corollary to his definition of perception: “it is knowledge that is not derived through the instrumentally of other knowledge”.⁴ (*Jñānākaraṇakam jñānam pratyakṣam*). In the light of this definition

of perception it can be concluded that the mind acts as a special instrument in the direct perception of pleasure and pain.

The *Bhāmatī* School led by Vācaspati Miśra claims that the mind is a sense - organ like other sense - organs because it is the instrument of internal perception of pleasure and pain. Again according to the *Vivaraṇa* view of Advaita, *manas* need not be considered a sense-organ. The sense - organs are never self-revealing. Then if *manas* is a sense-organ, it cannot be the object of *pratyakṣa*. In this context the *Vedānta - pari bhāṣā* says “There is no evidence for this that the internal organ is a sense-organ”⁵ and goes on to show that the verse from the *Gītā* saying that the “sense-organs with the mind as the sixth”⁶, cannot be interpreted to mean that *manas* is also an *indriya* along with the other sense-organs. There cannot be any contradiction in the mind being made the sixth, although it is not included in the list of the *indriyas*. *Śruti text*⁷ claims the mind as something other than the sense - organs and superior to them. Professor Hiriyanna says, in his translation of the *Śankara bhāṣya* on these two verses of the *Kaṭhapaniṣad*,⁸ “the object of these two mantras is merely to indicate that the person is beyond everything else, for there is nothing to be gained by knowing that anyone of the others among the series is subtler than the other. Consequently not much value need be attached to the exact place which any of the phenomenal entities ought to take in series”⁹ By these two verses taken together it is not proved that *manas* is not sense-organ, but that it is more subtle than the external senses.

To *Vivaraṇa* School there are some more arguments to prove that *manas* need not be a sense - organ. If *manas* is taken to be an *indriya* it becomes an instrument along with the other instruments of perception and its functions must be limited to direct experience of

perceptual things. But *manas* also acts in other means of valid knowledge like *anumāna* etc., where it does not function as a sense-organ. Hence *manas* cannot be a sense - organ. Knowing a thing with the mind does not make the mind an *indriya*. “Mind is an auxiliary to *pramāṇa*. It is not the instrument of valid knowledge, it is the locus”¹⁰

According to the Advaitin, mind or *antaḥkaraṇa* is only a name for the totality of conscious states of which pleasure and pain are but two different aspects. The sensations such as touch, taste, sound and sight are presented to the mind in the ordinary way. Again the sensations such as pleasurable and painful are because of the apperceptive nature of the mind. Hence no *inner sense* is necessary. Like the modern introspectionists, the Advaitin believes that the mind is capable of looking on itself and knowing its subjective states without the aid of an internal sense. These psychological states of pleasure, pain, desire, are all mental and so do not require any other sense to perceive them. Again pain and pleasure are felt, but we cannot point to anything and say that it is painful or pleasurable. Thus pain and pleasure are more feelings than sensations,¹¹ and therefore mind is not the internal sense - organ producing the sensations of pain and pleasure.

According to the Naiyāyika, *manas* is not only material but also the internal sense - organ for the experiences of pleasure, pain and other such internal states. The materiality of *manas* is clearly emphasized in the Sāṃkhya-yoga where it is derived from *prakṛti*. According to Advaitin mind along with all other things is only a creation of *ajñāna*. But empirically, mind is subtle matter and also limited in size. Advaitin believes that though mind is an instrument of knowledge but it is not a sense-organ. Almost all the āstika darśans prove that mind exists and all of them believe that mind is material and unconscious. When knowledge arises in the self, then either activity of the mind and the

sense - organs or at least of the mind alone acting by itself. All living beings are able to react to their environment because of their knowledge. So knowledge is the basis of all intelligent activity. All systems of Indian philosophy believe that knowledge or *jñāna* is a quality of the self and self acts through the mind. Now we explain the characteristics of mind.

First, manas makes the *Ātman* aware of objects. So *samjñāna* is the first function of *manas*. The self gains knowledge of objects through *manas*.

Secondly, the second function of *manas* is not only to be aware of an object but also to perceive it through the senses. So *ajñāna* or *perception* is the second function of *manas*. *Samjñāna* and *ajñāna* or perception are not identical, because one can be aware of objects which are not directly be perceived.

Thirdly, *vijñāna* is the power of discrimination, which discrimination is the result of knowledge acquired by a study of different branches of knowledge,

Fourthly, *medhas* or *wisdom* comes next. *Wisdom* is that which is had when a person is able to remember the knowledge which is acquired.

Thought or *mati* and thoughtfulness or *manīṣā* are the next in the list. These show the particular content of mind. A man might have knowledge, but without thought, there will be no value for his knowledge.

Again man is also a creature of impulse. *Jūti*, distress of mind, is produced because of impulsive activities. Hence, *Jūti* is described as a mental quality. Memory or *smṛti* is different from the capacity which is required to remember studied knowledge (*medhas*).

Practical life would be impossible without *smṛti*, although life is possible without *medhas*. The continuity of life is possible because of *smṛti*.

Though *asu* or life is not a important mental characteristic, but without life there can be no *manas*.

Kāma and *vaśa* are the last two terms. *Kāma* is the desire for a thing. But mere desire is not enough. When this is backed up by will for possession or desire for company ¹² (*vaśa*), then overt behaviour issues. They are comparable to wish and will respectively as used by Mackenzie.

In the *Chāndogya*, *manas* is used to mean the “internal organ endowed with reflection” and mind is greater than speech because unless *manas* reflects, speech cannot function.

In *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* there is another list given and quoted in the *Maitrī Upaniṣad*, without the mention of which an account of the characteristics of mind in its search for knowledge as given in the *Upaniṣads* would not be complete. The mind is responsible for all perceptions in these texts. So mind exists. The nature of mind is expressed by some mental status. These are *kāma* (desire), *samkalpa* (determination), *vicikitsā* (doubt), *śraddha* (belief) *aśraddhā* (disbelief), *dhṛti* (steadiness) and *adhṛti* (unsteadiness), *hrīḥ* (shame), *dhīḥ* (meditation) and *bhīḥ* (fear). In the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*. The mind always leads the self to the object known.

Where one's mind is attached

- the inner self

Goes thereto with action being

Attached to it alone. ¹³

These different characteristics of mind given in the *Upaniṣads* is only to maintain that in the acquiring of knowledge the mind is instrumental, but it is only for the sake of the self that mind acts. From the epistemological point of view it is important to note that mind is not only conceived of as an *indriya or sense - organ* but also as that which determines the nature of the knowledge.

According to Naiyāyika, *manas* is definitely a sense-organ. Without *manas* no knowledge is possible for the self. It is the *antahkaraṇa*, the special cause which is internal. So, the uses of mind in the Nyāya theory of perception in both external perception and internal perception. The definition of perception given by the Naiyāyikas in various ways. To Gautama knowledge is derived between *indriya* (sense-organ) and *artha* (object). ¹⁴ But Gaṅgeśa says “Perception is immediate knowledge” (*Sākṣāt pratitīḥ pratyakṣam – Tattvacintāmaṇi*).

But it is important that the contact of the mind with the sense - organ and the contact of the mind with the soul is necessary in the process of perceptual which is not indicated in the definition of perception. These two are the *sādhāraṇa kāraṇas* (common causes) of all perception. We can know the importance of mind in perception with an example which is given in the *Nyāya-Bhāṣya* when a man is in sound sleep called *susupti*, there is no contact between the self and the sense-organ. Still when there is a sudden pain, the person wakes up. Here it is possible for the sleeping mind to function and provide knowledge to the self. Similarly also in the case of the preoccupied mind.¹⁵ There is an

interesting point about the Nyāya theory of perception is knowledge is never self-illuminative (*sva-prakāśaka*) but manifests only other thing (*paraprakāśaka*). So, to them no cognition can be directly apprehended. Knowledge is always secondary as reflected in the *anuvyavasāya* stage (i.e. apperceptive stage) where mind is operational. To produce this *anuvyavasāya* ((apperception) perception is the primary source of all knowledge. Without perceptual knowledge inference, comparison and verbal testimony would be impossible. According to Nyāya pleasure (*sukha*) and pain (*duḥkha*), desire (*icchā*) and aversion (*dveṣa*), cognition (*jñāna*) and volition (*prayatna*) are the qualities of the soul. But these qualities are not always evident. When the *manas* as a sense - organ comes into conjunction with the self then the self knows that it has these qualities.

In Nyāya Darśana the definition of pain is given a ‘*Bādhānā – lakṣaṇam duḥkham*’ - the characteristic of pain is to create obstruction. In other words that which is disagreeable to our sense - organs or body causes pain. When this is removed and agreeability is introduced, we have pleasure. Pleasure is *anukūla* (favourable to a person) and pain is *pratikūla* (non-favourable to a person). Everything that opposes mind is pain and everything that is opposite to this is pleasure. But this should not be interpreted to mean that the Naiyāyikas are pure hedonists. According to Naiyāyikas spiritual pleasure are more lasting and valuable than worldly pleasures. To the Naiyāyika pleasure is not a thing separate from pain, because every act of pleasure involves pain and the *vice-versa*. But the *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtras* maintain ¹⁶ that since the causes of pleasure and pain are different, these must be two different things and not the two aspects of one and the same thing as the Naiyāyika holds. To Praśastapāda, the effects of pleasure are *anugraha* (a feeling of pleasure or favourable pleasure), *abhiṣvaṅga* (attachment or attraction towards

an object), and *nayanādi-prasāda* (brightness of the eyes and the face etc.). And that condition of the mind which gives rise to anger, ideas of harm and depression of spirit are the effects of pain.

Praśastapāda says, pleasure and pain can be with reference to the past as well as to the future objects. Past objects are remembered as objects of pleasure and this brings about present pleasure. About future objects, pleasure is produced by reflection. The *Bhāṣya* says, even when there is no object of pleasure nor memory of such an object wise men feels pleasure, “because of their knowledge, the peaceful nature of their mind”. Here knowledge means the knowledge of the self, and peaceful nature of the mind means the control of the senses and the consequent tranquility.

The *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtras* maintain that *Jñāna* is always characterized by doubt (*saiṃśaya*) and assurance (*nirṇaya*) and these are absent from the experience of pleasure and pain. One is never doubtful whether an experience is pleasurable or not. Pleasure and pain are also not forms of cognitions. They are not either perception, inference or other forms of knowledge which are given to the individual. For pleasure and pain are not causally, (i.e. invariably) connected with the antecedents of perceptual and inferential forms of knowledge.¹⁷ Again *manas* is *asādhāraṇa kāraṇa* (uncommon causes) conjunction with the soul for both cognition and emotive experience of pleasure and pain. *Manas* or internal perception is direct knowledge about mental or subjective facts. In self perception, where the soul or the self comes to have knowledge of its own states, the mind acts as the instrument and the self as the conceiver. Otherwise, all sense experience which is instrumental in nature will have to be denied, and then no conception is possible.

The vedāntic view, in particular the Advaitic view, is that the mind goes to the object. Dharmaraja Adhvarindra has clearly pointed out that no perceptual or inferential experience is possible without the assumption of the shape of an object through the inner-organ (*antaḥ-karaṇa*) that is another name of mind. It may appear that not only should the mind go out to the object but also assume the shape of the object. Every object has parts and these parts come into contact with the sense-organ as unitary parts. But this is not accepted by philosophers and psychologists. According to them the form of the object is perceived as a whole structure, and later on there is an analysis of this concept into its constituent parts. Psychologists like stout and Brentano maintain that this function can only be done by a mind. There is a difference between the Vedāntic theory and the Gestalt theory is that to the Advaitin the *Vṛtti* is the result of the activity of both mind and the senses, whereas according to the Gestalt, there is no such interaction, as in perception the mind knows at once immediately the whole of the object. But there arises two epistemological troubles against this theory of perception. First, it is the out-going mental *vṛtti* that goes to the object and takes the form of the object at the place in which the object is and at the time in which the object is. But if this is so then perception of distant objects like star cannot be explained. How can we be sure that the likeness are of the object that we are seeing? This leads to a postulation of a series of *Vṛttis ad infinitum*. But according to the Advaitin, in perception there is an identity of object defined consciousness (*Viśayacaitanya*) with the cognitive consciousness (*pramāṇa caitanya*), so this doubt will be dispelled. The basic principle of Advaita is that the self alone is real. Hence both the object and the *antaḥkaraṇa* are only empirically existent. But the difference between the *antaḥkaraṇa* and the object is that the *antaḥkaraṇa* is transparent

enough to reflect the conscious principal because of the predominance of the *sattva* element and the object is not capable of this reflection. But the consciousness that is determined by the object takes the essence of the object as its nature.

The Naiyāyika says perception has been divided into two broad classes, namely *laukika* or the ordinary and *alukika* or the extra ordinary. Ordinary perception again, has been divided into six kinds of olfactory, gustatory, visual, tactual, auditory and mental perceptions. According to another classification, ordinary perceptions are of two kinds, namely *nirvikalpaka* or the indeterminate and *savikalpaka* or the determinate. According to the Naiyāyikas, *pratyabhijñā* or the recognition as a special form of determinate perception. To recognize a thing is to know it as a definite object, so recognition is a *savikalpaka pratyakṣa*, in a broad sense. But in a narrow sense, the recognition as a complex psychosis of presentative and representative of process. Therefore, recognition is dependent on memory, and is a complex process. But the Naiyāyikas believe that it is not a case of a complex psychosis, but a case of a single qualified psychosis as in recognition the present object is qualified by a distinct recollection of its past experience. To the Naiyāyika recognition is perceptual and direct, because for him whatever is caused by the stimulation of the external sense-organs is directly perceptual¹⁸

In the *Tarkasamgrah smṛti* or memory is defined as that knowledge which is caused by residual impressions or *samskāra* only¹⁹. Memory is caused when *manas* comes into contact with *samskāras* and thus it is a direct cognition. To Naiyāyikas *pratyabhijñā* is not identical with *smṛti*. Memory (*smṛti*.) is knowledge of one's own past. It is a representative cognition of past experience due solely to the impressions produced by them. It is thus different from recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) which, according to the Nyāya,

is a form of qualified perception and has reference to the direct presentation of some object, although it involves an element of representation²⁰. We may say that memory is knowledge arising solely out of the impressions of previous experiences and pertaining to a permanent soul. Memory has a number of specific causes. Now we explain them as enumerated in the *Nyāya Bhāṣya*²¹.

- 1) Attention (*prañidhāna*). This is fixing the mind on the thing to be remembered.
- 2) Association (*nibandha*). This connects different experiences and makes them suggestive of one other.
- 3) Repetition (*abhyāsa*). By repeated exercise, one is able to recollect easily.
- 4) Sign (*līnga*). This leads the mind to the thing signified. This is divided into four kinds.
 - a) Where there is conjunction between two things such as smoke and fire, seeing smoke always recalls the existence of fire.
 - b) Inherent indicative where, because of causal relation, one recalls the other as the horns of a bull.
 - c) Co-inherent indicative where, because the two things in here in the same thing, each recalls the other like hands serving to recall the feet.
 - d) Contradictory indicative, where the thing mentioned like light and darkness.
- 5) Characteristic mark (*lakṣaṇa*). This recalls the class to which object belongs. If the universal is seen, the special qualities of the particular are also recalled.
- 6) Similarity (*Sādṛśya*). When the image is seen, the original is recalled.

- 7) Ownership (*Parigraha*). It is suggestive of the owner or thing owned.
- 8) Supporter (*āśraya*) and
- 9) Supported (*āśrita*). These two mutually recall each other.
- 10) Relationship (*sambandha*). One term suggests the order.
- 11) Contiguity (*ānantaryya*). This binds together successive phenomena.
- 12) Separation (*Viyoga*). This frequently reminds one of what he is separated from.
- 13) Identity of functions (*ekakārya*). This recalls similar agents.
- 14) Enmity (*Virodha*). This suggests rivals in any sphere.
- 15) Superiority (*atiśaya*). This reminds us of what it is due to.
- 16) Acquisition (*prāpti*). This is reminding us of one from whom something has been or will be received.
- 17) Covering (*vyavadhāna*). This suggests what is covered.
- 18) Pleasure and pain (*sukhaduḥkha*). This is reminding us of that which caused them.
- 19) Desire and aversion (*icchā* and *dveṣa*). This is reminding us of one whom we liked or hated.
- 20) Fear (*bhaya*). This is reminding us of that which caused it.
- 21) Need (*ārthitva*). That which is wanted or prayed for.
- 22) Profession (*kriyā*). That is suggestive of the agent. Chariot reminding us of the charioteer.
- 23) Affection (*rāga*). That often reminds us of its objects.

- 24) Merit (*dharma*) and
- 25) Demerit (*adharma*). Through which there is recollection of joy and sorrow experienced in a previous life. These causes of memory cannot be simultaneously operative but successive.

Memory is of two kinds, namely true (*yathārtha*) and false (*ayathārtha*). It is true when it has its basis in some valid presentation (*pramājanya*) and is in agreement with the real nature of the remembered objects. On the other hand, memory is false when it arises out of such original cognitions as were erroneous (*apramājanya*) and so does not associate with the nature of the objects recalled in it.

According to the Nyāya, memory (*smṛti*) is not valid knowledge (*Pramā*). *Pramā* has been defined by the Nyāya as presentational cognition (*yathārthānubhava*), it is a definite and an assured (*asamdigdha*) cognition of an object, which is also true and presentational in character. Hence it is that *pramā* excludes all kinds of non-valid knowledge, such as memory, doubt error, hypothetical argument (*tarka*) etc. Memory or *smṛti* is made to depend entirely on the truth or falsity of the *anubhava* from which it originates. *Smṛti* is not directly in connection with the objects, since it is only a mediate knowledge and it depends on prior perceptual knowledge. We can speak of true and false memory. But even true memory, which gives us a true cognition of some past object, cannot be called *pramā* or valid knowledge. On this point Indian systems of philosophy are divided in their opinion. Some of them consider memory to be as valid as perception and inference, and look upon it as the source of our knowledge of past facts. The Vaiśeṣika accepts memory as valid knowledge distinguished from all forms of wrong cognition²². Again it

is also said that if memory is not valid, all inference would also be invalid, for *parāmarśa*, the corner stone of all inference, is dependent on memory. The Sāṃkhya-Yoga philosophy maintains that *smṛti* or memory is a form of a mental mode *citta Vṛtti*. *Smṛti* is responsible for the continuity of knowledge and experience. All activities of the mind leave behind their impressions. These are called subliminal impressions or *samskāras*. In the yoga theory of mental restraint, these *samskāras* play a very important part. When a particular mental state passes away and another takes places, the first one is never completely lost but is present in the form of latent impressions. According to Yoga these *samskāras* are the potencies which generate activities. As Ganganath Jha says, “The *samskāras* are like the roots stuck deep in the soil which grow with the growth of the plant above, but even when the plant above is destroyed, the roots remain undisturbed and may again shoot forth as plants whenever they may get a favourable season”²³, it is fact that the mind can never be absolutely empty. If some *vṛttis* are to be removed, then something else must take their place. Every activity is based, on the one hand, on sense-impressions caused by the sense coming into contact with the object and on the other hand, on the *samskāras* of the *citta* which have been stored up and which are associated with these sense impressions. So it is not only the individual perceptual differences that modify the resultant knowledge, but also these *samskāras* or memory that colours knowledge. We say that knowledge means awareness or apprehension of objects. Knowledge is said to be the property of illumination or manifestation that belongs to the self. Without this luminous light of knowledge we lose the ground of all rational practice and intelligent activity. Mind being material, it can reach the object which is also material, but the mind is saturated with *sattva guṇa* which is capable of reflecting the

Jñāna of the self. Whereas the object is being predominantly *tāmasic*, is not capable of doing so. The mind, as it were, forms the liaison between the self on the one hand and object on the other hand. Mind determines the nature of knowledge and gives rise to either valid knowledge or invalid knowledge. Recognition and memory are possible because the mind being material in nature is capable of retaining traces or *samskāras* of all its activities.

According to the Nyāya, dream-cognitions are all memory-cognitions and untrue in character²⁴. They are brought about by the remembrance of objects experience in the past, by organic disorders and also by the imperceptible influences of past desires and actions (*adr̥ṣṭa*)²⁵. Hence dream cognitions have sometimes moral value in so far as they produce pleasurable or painful experiences in the self. However, dream -knowledge is intrinsically false. It is no doubt related to certain objects of the real world. But they are either past or remote. Still in dream, objects are actually represented as present. Dreams sometimes turn out to be true and tally with the subsequent experiences of waking life. But such correspondence between dream- cognitions and waking experience is neither normal nor invariable. Hence dream can never be called *pramāṇa*. Dreams are called perceptions. But they are false perceptions because they are contradicted by our waking experiences. The Vaiśeṣika considers dream to be a kind of internal perception due to the inner sense (*manas*) as aided by impressions of past experiences. It is felt as if coming by way of the external senses²⁶. The advaita Vedānta finds in dream a phenomenon of some philosophical significance. In it there is the mental creation of a world under the influence of *avidyā* as aided by the impressions of waking experiences.

All invalid knowledge is because of some defect in the conditions of perception, e.g., wrong functioning of the sense-organs or wrong associated by the mind. The validity of knowledge leads to the implied question of the invalidity of knowledge. All schools of Indian philosophy give a psychological as well as epistemic logical explanation of erroneous cognition. Whether knowledge is ontologically valid or invalid, there must arise in the mind of the person the doubt as to the validity of the knowledge first received.

According to the *Nyāya-Bhāṣya*²⁷ doubt may arise out of five causes. **First**, it may arise from the perception of such properties as are common to many things, as when we perceive a tall object at a distance and are not sure if it be a man or a post or a tree trunk, because tallness is common to them all. **Secondly**, it arises from the cognition of any peculiar and unique property, as when the cognition of sound makes us doubt if it is eternal or non-eternal, since it is not found in eternal objects like the soul and the atom, nor in non-eternal things like water and earth. **Thirdly**, it may be due to conflicting testimony, as when the different philosophical theories of the soul leave us in doubt as to the real nature of the soul. **Fourthly**, it is caused by the irregularity of perception, as when we doubt if the perceived water really exists or not, since there is a perception of water both in a tank and a mirage. **Lastly**, doubt springs from irregularity of non-perception, as when we are not sure if the thing we cannot see now really exists or not, since the existent also is not perceived under certain conditions. According to the later Naiyāyikas such as Uddyotakara, Vacāspati and others, there are not five but only three or two kinds of doubt²⁸. Irregularity of perception or non-perception is not by itself a cause of doubt. So also conflict of testimony is not an independent cause, but only an auxiliary condition of doubt. In all cases of doubt there is either the perception of

common properties or the cognition of something quite new and uncommon. According to Gangeśa there are only two sources of doubt, namely, the suspicion of *Upādhi* or condition, and the perception of a property common to many things without any presentation of their differentiating attributes²⁹.

According to the Vaiśeṣika, there is fundamentally only one kind of doubt since it is always due to perception of properties common to many familiar objects³⁰. Here it should be noted that some of the writers on the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika include conjecture (*ūha*) and indefinite cognition (*anadhyavasāya*) under doubt.

Doubt or *samśaya* is not valid knowledge (*pramā*). It has the character of *anubhava*, but it is neither definite (*asamdigdha*) nor is it true (*yathārtha*) and hence there is no fruitful activity. Nevertheless doubt is not error (*Viparyaya*). For doubt as a form of cognition, is neither true nor false, whereas error is definitely wrong knowledge. The value of doubt is the starting point of a critical knowledge of objects. In this sense it may be said to be the beginning of philosophy.

In the view of Nyāya doubt gives us some important truths. As a mental state doubt is neither affirms nor denies anything, but only raises a problem for thought. Doubt is different from both belief and disbelief. In doubt, there are two or more alternatives in regard to the same thing. When we are in doubt about anything we do not really know nor do we claim to know what it is. We cannot even say that 'it must be either this or that'. We can say: 'is it this or that?' Therefore doubt is neither true nor false. It is not a judgment at all. It does not assert anything. According to Nyāya³¹, doubt is never a definite cognition (*avadhāraṇa*), but an indecisive questioning attitude towards an object.

The Sanskrit rendering of the term 'peace' is *Śānti*, which is derived from the root *Śam* meaning 'restraining of the sense-organ'. In Buddhism and Hindu tradition the root of the absence of peace is 'thirst' (*tanha*) or cravings for getting more and more consumable objects. The thirst is an unending phenomenon. The more we get, the more we urge for it. In order to get rid of such thirst we have to search for self-satisfaction, which ultimately leads to the world of peace affecting environment also.

Buddhism in general represents the way of compassion. The Buddha is an embodiment of compassion and hence he is regarded as the compassionate protector of all beings. As such thirst has been taken as the root cause of all worldly diseases (*bhava-roga*), the path as shown by Buddha is to be resorted to and hence he is called a physician of all worldly diseases (*bhava-roga-vaidya*). To him the individuals following his path should practice loving kindness, which implies not to harm the life of all beings. It is advised always to protect mankind as well as animals and vegetations. It is his wisdom through which he can see all human beings in the universe as equal in nature. The well being of human being and animals is interrelated and mutual.

To ignore such instructions is to invite our environmental crisis. In the modern time we find that human beings have misused their power and destroyed the animals, forests and mountains resulting in environmental crisis. The greedy minds of mankind lead to such changes and destructions of the ecological balance.

The external environment is seriously polluted because of the pollution of the internal environment in the mind. The excessive greed is one of the reasons for the internal pollution. This disease may be eradicated if an individual finds some satisfaction and

contentment through the Buddha's teaching. That the external pollution is related to our internal one is evidenced in the *Dhammapada*. It is said that just as the maker of an arrow makes the end of it straight, so an individual should simplify his mind, which is wavering, fickle, uncontrolled and unprotected³².

The contentment in the context of Buddhism does not mean the eradication of all desires but to live in harmony with all beings and nature. It is said in the *Dhammapada* that a pure and developed mind alone can understand others mind (Panditavagga, verse no. 3). It is further emphasized that when the world is burning (*prajjalite*) there is no opportunity for adopting laughter (*hāso*) and joy (*ānanda*). In the like manner, if our mind is covered with darkness, would we not seek for light? (Jaravagga, verse no. 1). Those who believe in the teaching of Buddha will control their desire and live in harmony with nature keeping the environment in healthy condition. It is rightly mentioned in the *Dhammapada* that one who sees only the apparent beauty, who is not self-restraint in enjoying consumable things, who is lazy and weak is always attacked by one's enemies just like a weak tree. On the other hand, an individual refraining from seeing apparent beauty becomes self-controlled and respectful and hence he is not overpowered by the enemies just like a firm and stony mountain.³³

The historical account of Buddhism shows that for thousand years the Buddhist monasteries have developed a harmonious living with nature and hence they are established in the mountains and forests. The calm and cool atmosphere of the forest and mountain helps the Buddhist practitioners to develop their inner mind, which ultimately makes them 'feel' for the protection of animals. With loving and tolerant heart the

Buddhists live with natural vegetation, wild animals in the forest in harmony and for mutual survival.

In Buddhism we find a great celebration of the richness and diversity of the earth and the lotus is only one among many plants of great symbolic significance. In the Buddhist literature it is found that the Buddha was born in the forest surrounded by *Sal* and other trees having large leaves. The Buddha is found to achieve enlightenment under the trees Peepul or *Bodhi*, which is admitted as sacred in Buddhism and Hinduism.

In the *Sutta-nipāta* we find a deep appreciation of nature's beauty and diversity. Buddha says – “Know ye the grasses and the trees ... Then know ye the worms, and the moths and the different sort of ants ... Know yet also the four-footed animals small and great ... the serpents ... the fish which range in the water ... the birds that are borne along with on wings and move through the air ...”

The consideration for other individuals as a matter of moral obligation is not limited to other human beings alone but to other species. Buddhism seeks to transform in the way through which an individual conceives himself. The environmental ethics in Buddhism is not totally a matter of identifying and securing rights, but it is a matter of undertaking a practice of affirming and realizing the trans-human potential for enlightenment as an effect. The deeper insight in an individual is generated through the cultivation of it in human and trans-human species and hence it can become potential for enlightenment. This can express itself as a compassionate environmental sustaining altruism. Such an idea has been expressed by Shantideva in the following manner:

“Just as the body which is constituted with hands and other limbs should be protected as a single entity, the whole world divided into so many parts should be treated as undivided one so far as its nature is concerned. If it is taken as divided, it would suffer no doubt. I should remove suffering of others because it is suffering like my own. I should help others too because they exist as I exist.”

Shantideva adds that if someone is reluctant to remove sufferings of others, it would like refusing to use one’s hand to remove the thorn of one’s foot, because the pain of the foot is not the pain of the hand.³⁴

To get an ecological balance we should develop an ecological sensibility and actualize that sensibility in practice. So in Buddhism the phenomenon of interrelatedness is deeply felt and hence a comprehensive developmental path is sought. In the *Dhammapada* it is stated that the house-holders may belong to different professions like students, lecturers, labourers, executives etc, but they should not preclude themselves from following the path of truth, purity, lustlessness, angerlessness etc and should practice the virtues like love, compassion, affection etc. If these virtues are practiced in a balanced way, there would be less confrontation and conflict (Buddha-vagga). On proper analysis it is found that tensions and conflicts arise out of desire, cravings and attachment. We can shed desire, cravings and attachment if we understand the true nature of things and life. The control of body may be achieved by controlling the sense of sight, touch, smell etc and organs like hand and feet. For regulation of mind right thought and observance of ethical code of conduct is necessary. The *Dhammapada* gives us an insight into the mysteries and true nature of life and existence, and indicate how we can reduce the range of our attachment, cravings and desire (Bala-vagga, verse no. 3 and Maggavagga, verse no. 16).

It is clearly prescribed in the same text that he who seeks refuge in the Buddha, the Dhamma and the Sangha, he who sees with right knowledge the Four Noble Truths, sorrow, the causes of sorrow, the transcending the sorrow and the Eight-fold path can get rid of sorrow. (Buddha-vagga, Verse nos. 12-14).

Though the Buddhism talks about the protection of the environment, it gives emphasis on the three-fold training of human mind and seven factors of the enlightenment, which are the basis ethical sensibility to the environment. The *Mahāparinibbānasutta of the Dīghanikāya* discusses about the three-fold course of training like cultivation of ethical conduct (*śīla*) meditation (*samādhi*) and wisdom (*pañña*). These three are interconnected in the sense that the first is left behind when the second is undertaken. Without the development of these it is possible for one to lead happy and peaceful life. Wisdom (*prajñā*) goes beyond knowledge attained through reading books or hearing the tales. The practice of morality (*śīla*) and mental development (*samādhi*) develops a penetrative insight and realization into the nature of everything in its proper perspective. When the realization (wisdom) appears, the trained mind becomes an unshakable dynamic force that can handle any human problem without anxiety and thereby can remove the worldly problems. When the ethical conduct is firmly established, the meditation becomes effective. Through effect of meditation the transformative power of wisdom becomes possible.³⁵

The above mentioned three-fold practice has a tremendous influence on the Buddha's doctrine of seven factors of enlightenment viz. mindfulness (*sati*), discrimination of principles (*dhamma-vicaya*), energy in pursuit of the food (*vīrya*), rapture (*piiti*), tranquility (*passaddhi*), concentration (*samādhi*) and equanimity (*upekkhā*). It is

mentioned in the *Samyuttanikāya* that these seven are essential for any kind of social or moral development. When a monk remaining secluded recollects and reasons about the doctrine, he adheres to the mindfulness factor of enlightenment, which is followed by other steps. After mindful he can discriminate, reflects on and investigates the doctrine with understanding. In this way he can reach to the path of perfection, which includes rapture (*pitti*), tranquility (*passaddhi*), concentration (*Samādhi*) and equanimity (*upekkhā*). The latter four are connected with the phenomenon of meditation, which is available through the cognitive and affective refinement.³⁶

An individual having such moral qualities would be able to have sensitivity towards our environment. It is rightly mentioned in the *Tanhabaggo* chapter of the *Dhammapada* that the thirst for enjoyable object makes a man blind of his own future and hence he can go to any extent for his enjoyment adopting injury to human and non-human beings including environment. This thirsty person is compared to a monkey desiring fruits (*so pravati hurāhuram phalamiccham va vanasming vānaro*).³⁷ It is so dangerous that it is metaphorised as poison (*visattikā*).³⁸ Hence it is advisable to eradicate the root of such thirst through the weapon of wisdom (*paññacchindatha*), which is dependent on the paths mentioned above.³⁹

An individual having such freedom can have ‘real sympathy’ towards nature, environment and non-human beings. An individual possessing such a mental state cannot do harm to others. If he cuts trees, injures animals etc. he will be condemned as found in the *Vinayapiṭāka*. It has also mentioned in the *Bhaiṣajya-skandhaka* that how different trees serve us as medicines in our everyday life.⁴⁰

From the above discussion we may draw the following conclusions. Only advice to protect environment or to adopt *ahimsā* will fall flat upon others until and unless they are enlightened with wisdom. The true solution of the environmental crisis will be neither technological nor legal. It must be stereological. It must involve the evolution of a significant number of human beings to a higher level of awareness, to a higher ethical sensibility. It does not mean that the technological and legal efforts to safeguard the environment are pointless, but we think there is at least a stopgap measure but not the ultimate solution. To Buddhism there is a potentiality in human being to evolve into a higher ethical sensibility. This will happen through the concerted practice and discipline. The whole Buddhist tradition consists precisely in a sustained effort to devise effective methods for undertaking this transformation. The tradition says that we have our own resources though the task is very difficult. If we can master over the method, the energy in pursuit of the good, patience, the living kindness, the concentration and the wisdom to bring these substantial resources to bear evolve automatically in a man. With this inner tranquility alone outer tranquility, free from pollution, may come into being.

First, in order to arrive at such stage it is essential to go through some rigorous meditative training so that we can control our sense-organs including the inner one (*antaḥ-karaṇa*) or mind. To the Buddhists the Eight-fold path (*aṣṭāṅgika-mārga*) is the correct path to know the right knowledge of reality, which ultimately leads to the control of sense-organs. If it is realized that each and every object is transitory or momentary, essenceless (*śūnya*), our mind, being controlled, can reduce the thirst for enjoyment. As individual, being free from mental pollution, can achieve peace. That is why; Buddha himself is

called an embodiment of peace and an aesthetic pleasure called *śāntarasa*. By virtue of worthy of it he is called *śantātmā* and *śānta-manas*.

Secondly, proper counseling is an alternative way through which a man can be made free from the clutch of thirst. Human beings can be convinced through arguments and examples that no one in this world is found happy through his wish-fulfillment. Because the fulfillment of one desire gives rise to another one leading us to the path of *Infinite Regress*. The logic of counseling (sravana) has been admitted by Sankara also who advised an individual not to boast of wealth, man-power and youth, because all might be taken away within a moment by the Time. Our life is as transitory as the water in the lotus-leaf (“*Mā kuru dhana-jana-yauvana - garvam/ harati nimeṣāt kālah sarvam // Nalinī-dala-gata-jalavat-taralam / tadvajjīvanamatiśayacapalam //*” if a human being is convinced with these, he will start minimizing his cravings or thirst, which ultimately leads him to the world of mental balance and thereby environmental balance,.

The last method of reducing one’s thirst is to encourage him to engage in the enjoyment of fine arts like film, drama, music, dance painting etc. It is a well - known fact that while enjoying aesthetic pleasure a human being can bracket his day to day problems and engross himself in some non-pathological enjoyment. It is non – pathological in sense that this type of enjoyment has no connection with the fulfillment of our this-worldly matter. Through such non-pathological enjoyment one can easily reduce one’s this-worldly interested pathological desires arising out of cravings.

To the Advaitins the whole world is nothing but the manifestation of Brahman or *Ātman* or Consciousness (*Caitanya*). Keeping this presupposition in view Dharmaraja

Adhvarindra, a philosopher belonging to the Advaita School, thinks that mere connection (*sannikarsa*) between sense-organ and an object is not the cause of perceptual cognition. If the whole world is covered by the Consciousness (*Caitanya*), an object ontologically cannot remain without being covered by the said Consciousness. If the Consciousness were taken as an all-pervading entity, it would logically follow that nothing is left uncovered by this. Hence all the objects including sense-organ etc are covered by this. Though the Reality or the Consciousness is one, it may have some limited forms which are called limiting adjuncts (*upādhis*) for our phenomenal necessity. The *Upādhi* or limiting adjunct experienced in our life is called constitutive while the main entity, which is free from limiting adjuncts (*niravacchinna or nirupādhika*) is called regulative. In the Dialectic part of the *Critique of the Pure Reason* Kant institutes a distinction between regulative and constitutive ideas in the context of cosmological ideas. By 'ideas' Kant means a set of *a-priori* ideas such that are derived from Reason, the highest human faculty. One feature of these ideas is that there can never be intuitions or facts corresponding to them. But they do regulate the ways in which certain other ideas are to be used. Freedom, ought, Immortality of the soul, God etc. are regulative notions. The constitutive ideas always have intuitions corresponding to them, and together they render knowledge possible. The *a-priori* categories of understanding are constitutive notions. They are *a-priori* but intentional, and it is with their help that we can organize the world as and when we come to know it. The result of the application of constitutive ideas is verifiability. But the application of the regulative ideas is never verifiable, but they can be dispensed with. They are unalienable presuppositions of human state of affairs. The limiting adjuncts like *ghatākāśa* (space limited by a jar), month, week, day, night etc. are constitutive in the sense that they have intuitions corresponding to them through which

our phenomenal purpose is served while the absolute entities like Time (*kāla*), Space (*ākāśa*) etc. that are free from limiting adjuncts (*nirupādhika*) are accepted as regulative on account of the fact that they are accepted ontologically but not verifiable through experience or there we do not find intuitions or facts corresponding to them. That is why; *upādhi* is called an introducer (*paricāyaka*) by the Naiyāyikas.⁴¹

The Advaitins also accept three types of Consciousness though it is ontologically one. These limiting adjuncts are Consciousness limited by an object (*viśayāvacchinnacaitanya*), Consciousness limited by the mental mode in the form of an object (*antaḥkaraṇavṛtavyacchinnacaitanya*) and Consciousness limited by mind (*antaḥkaraṇāvacchinnacaitanya*). These limiting adjuncts of the Consciousness are technically called *viśayacaitanya*, *pramāṇacaitanya* and *pramāṭṛcaitanya* respectively⁴² just as Time, though one in number, has got various limiting adjuncts like hour, month, week, fortnight etc. Keeping these metaphysical presuppositions in view Dharmaraja Adhvarindra has accepted two criteria of perceptuality – *Jñānagata* (existing in cognition) and *viśayagata* (existing in an object). To him when there is a union between *pramāṇacaitanya* (Consciousness limited by mental mode-*antaḥkaraṇavṛtti*) and *viśayacaitanya* (Consciousness limited by an object), there is the perceptuality of knowledge or cognition (*jñānagatapratyakṣatva*).⁴³ It is to be born in mind that he has made a clear distinction between perception of the knowledge of a jar and perception of a jar. In the case of the perception of the knowledge of a jar there is a unity between *viśayacaitanya* and *pramāṇacaitanya*, but *pramāṭṛcaitanya* remains isolated under such situation. How is such union of these *caitanyas* possible? Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra had made an effort to convince about the logic of such description. When our mind goes out

of the body with the help of the sense-organ and assumes the shape of the object then it called mental mode (*vṛtti*) which is also a limited form of the Consciousness. To them mind or *antaḥkaraṇa* has no shape of its own just as a liquid substance but it can assume the shape of the object just as water assumes the form of the container. If this were the case, the *viśayacaitanya* (Consciousness limited by an object) becomes identified with its corresponding mental mode (*antaḥkaraṇavṛtti*). The union of these two limited forms of consciousness gives rise to the perception of the knowledge of an object. The *Pramāṭṛcāitanya* (Consciousness limited by mind) who, being a knower, remains isolated and perceives the knowledge of an object (*jñānagatapratyakṣatva*)⁴⁴, after retaining its character of being a knower. In this case there is the distinction between a knower (*jñātā*) and a known object (*jñeya*). That is why; it is the perceptuality of knowledge of an object (*jñānagatapratyakṣatva*). In this case the cognition of an object is perceived.

In the case of inference etc. the mind does not go to the space occupied by fire etc. on account of the fact that the latter is not in connection with the eye etc. In the same way, in the perceptual cognition of a jar in the form-‘This jar’, the jar etc., and their corresponding mental states in the form of those are united in the same space outside the body, and hence the Consciousness limited by both is one and the same. For, the mental states and objects like jar etc. do not produce any difference due to their occupation of the same space. On account of this the ether limited by a jar existing in a temple is not different from the ether limited by temple. In the like manner, in the perception of a jar as ‘This jar’, the mental state in the form of the jar being in contact with the jar, the Consciousness limited by that mental state is not different from the Consciousness limited by the jar and hence in the knowledge of a jar there is a perception so far as the

jar is concerned. One can perceive the Cognition – ‘I am happy’, because the Consciousness limited by the happiness etc. and the Consciousness limited by the mental state in the form of that are invariably limited by two adjuncts occupying the same space. It may be argued that when an individual recollects happiness etc. of the past, he may have perceptual experience of the happiness remaining in the past. In reply it can be said that perception is not possible in such cases. Because the happiness that is recollected from the past is a past event and the mental state in the form of the recollection of the same is a present event. As these two limiting adjuncts in the mind remain in two different times, the criterion of the unification of the two is not maintained. Hence in such cases the perceptual awareness is not possible.

It may again argued that when someone realizes the righteousness etc. existing in him through verbal testimony, it may be taken as perceptual due the identification of the Consciousness in the form of righteousness and its corresponding mental state. This is not acceptable, because any object cannot come under the purview of perception. In this case the righteousness is not capable of being perceived. Hence the question of its perception does not arise at all. In the case of the cognition in the form – ‘The Mountain is fiery’ there is perceptuality so far as the mountain is concerned, because there we find the amalgamation of the two forms of Consciousness i.e., the Consciousness in the form of mountain and its corresponding mental state. So far as the cognition of fire is concerned, it is inferential due to not fulfilling the above-mentioned criterion. Applying the same principle it can be said that in the case of the cognition in the form: ‘The sandal wood is fragrant’, the knowledge of the sandalwood is perceptual while the cognition of fragrance is inferential.

There is another type of perception, which is called the perceptuality of an object (*viṣayagatapratyakṣatva*). By virtue of being cognition of an object in the previous case there is a knower; otherwise the knowledge of an object becomes meaningless. If it is said that there is the perceptuality of an object, it should be treated as different from the earlier one. It is not knowledge, which is perceived, but the object only. Such a situation cannot give rise to knower-known relationship (*jñātr-jñeya-bhāvasambandha*). Hence Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra opines that in such cases there is only the knower in the form of consciousness (*pramātracaitanya*); but the other two i.e. consciousness limited by mental mode (*antaḥkaraṇavṛtti*) and consciousness limited by an object are united in the knower (*pramā*) and are absorbed in it. It is described by him as ‘*pramātrṣattātiriktasattākatvabhāvah*’ i.e., there will be an absence of the existence of the other forms of consciousness excepting the existence of *pramātā* or knower.⁴⁵ It has been said that the amalgamation of the three into one is not the real intention (*natāvadaikyam*), but it is the awareness of the existence of the *Pramātracaitanya* in which other forms of Consciousness and subsumed. Therefore, the *pramātracaitanya* would be an object of our awareness, but other forms of the same are the manifestations of the *pramātracaitanya* and hence their existence does not come to our awareness.

When a person thinks himself identified with the world, it is the stage of liberation due to the absence of more than one Reality (*Advaita*). At this stage an object is ‘*not merely an object*’, but ‘*subjectified object*’. Though there is no difference between the expressions ‘*subjectified object*’ and ‘*objectified subject*’ as evidenced in the *Bhagavadgīta*-‘*Sarvabhūtasthamātmānam sarvabhūtāni cātmani*’.⁴⁶ (i.e., extension of self to others and bringing others under self), Dharmarāja preferred to use ‘*subjectified object*’, since

pramātā (knower) only remains at this stage being identified with others. In this case an object or *viṣaya* is engulfed by the *pramātā* or knower. As the knower (*pramātā*) sees himself in the object, it may be called self-perception (*ātmagatapratyakṣa*). Moreover, self is the locus (*adhiṣṭhāna*) on which the object is superimposed in the phenomenal stage. To the Advaitins locus or *adhiṣṭhāna* is never contradicted (*avādhita*) by the subsequent cognition. In the case of snake-rope illusion the locus i.e., rope is not contradicted but the superimposed object or *adhyasta* i.e., snake is contradicted by the cognition of the locus i.e., rope. In the like manner the Advaitins believe that Brahman or Self in the locus on which all the objects are superimposed. For this reason the cognition of the phenomenal objects are contradicted, because they are sublated by the Ultimate Reality. Keeping the above clarifications in view it may be said that in the case of the perceptuality of an object (*viṣayagatapratyakṣatva*) the object is not vanished, but it is known as the form of self, which remains always uncontradicted. Any type of love presupposes the extension of self to the object of love. Our love will know no bound if self is extended to the all corners of the world. If we can extend it to the neighbours, countrymen, distressed and downtrodden people, we acquire required ability to love them selflessly. In this way an individual can turn into a philanthropic one and he can think of welfare of all human beings. A person can turn into a real patriot and sacrifice his own life for the sake of the country if and only if he can extend his self to the Nation. For this reason the patriotism is called *deśātmabodha* i.e., the feeling of identity between self and the country. In this case also the Nation or country does not remain as isolated from the knower (*pramātā*), but the knower brings it within his own self-giving rise to the perceptuality of object.

At the stage of perceptuality of an object there is the absence of the existence of other objects excepting the existence of knower (*pramātā*). Is it not a state of liberation? Such a situation is found temporally at the time of aesthetic enjoyment (*rasa*). Abhinavagupta has explained this state of ‘*subjectified object*’ as the melting of the state of the knower or *pramātā* (*pramāṭṛbhāvavigalana*).⁴⁷ Just as an object when liquidified covers many areas, in the like manner the knower can expand itself in such a way so that all objects are included in him. At this time he is not confined within himself but expanded himself to all the objects and hence objects have no other existence other than that of the knower. That is why; an individual can enjoy aesthetic pleasure (*rasa*) as he considers the pathos etc. belonging to characters of the novel or drama as his own due to emotional involvement. This sharing of others feeling is called by Abhinavagupta as *tanmayībhavana* i.e., becoming one with other.⁴⁸ Actually the feeling existing in an individual is transmitted to all the spectators. If each and every reader receives the same sensitivity or feeling, there is a corresponding fact, which is going on in all the hearts of the spectators (*sakala-sahṛdaya-samvāda-śālitā*). Such a phenomenon is otherwise known as ‘absorption of all the audiences towards a particular object’ (*sarvasāmājīkānām ekaghanatā*).⁴⁹ To Viśvsnātha also the subject i.e., *pramātā* sees himself being identified with it (*pramātā tadabhedena svātmānām pratipādyate*).⁵⁰ In fact, self exists everywhere including the art-object. Hence the Aestheticians are of the opinion that the relishment itself is *rasa* (*rasanīyah raṣah*). It is the relishment of the bliss arising out of self-knowledge (as reflected in the characters of the drama), which is called *svavidānanda* (pleasure arising from self-cognition), as if we have undertaken an activity of chewing (*carvaṇavyāpāra*) the bliss generating from self-knowledge. To Abhinavagupta who is chiefly influenced by the Advaitins such a chewing activity of the bliss of the self-

knowledge is called *Rasa*.⁵¹ This interpretation of aesthetic experience would not have been possible, had there been no solid foundation of the perceptuality of object (*Viṣayagatapratyakṣatva*). In fact the aesthetic enjoyment is nothing but the extension of self to the object, which is called *Viṣayagatapratyakṣa*. A question may be raised whether such *viṣayagatapratyakṣa* is equivalent to the Advaita concept of liberation or not. In reply, it can be said that such perception and the aesthetic enjoyment is qualitatively same but quantitatively different. When a jar is perceived, there is the feeling of the non-duality of the self and the jar until the absorption breaks up. When such absorption does not break, an individual will see the whole world as his own self. This non-dual experience will remain forever and such situation is described as liberation according to the Advaitins. The perceptual experience of the phenomenal objects like a jar etc. occurs temporally and hence it is, though qualitatively same, it is quantitatively different. Both the experiences – the *viṣayagatapratyakṣa* and aesthetic experience contain disinterested pleasure arising out of self-relishment-*ātmānananda*. In fact a human being's mind is dominated by the *sattvaguna* at this situation and hence it is touched by *rajah* and *tamoguna*. Due to the prominence of *sattvaguna* an individual can enjoy the self-knowledge identified with him and hence he is not touched by any other knowledge (*vedyāntarasparśasūnya*). This bliss is a highest type of *ānanda* arising from self-revelation (*svaprasakananda*), which is qualitatively equivalent to the taste of Brahman, but not quantitatively, as the former is transitory and the latter is eternal. That is why, such pleasure is described as *Brahmāsvādasahodara*⁵² (i.e., the smaller manifestation of the taste of Brahman).

The aesthetic experience, which is very much common in each and every man's life. Can be a live testimony of the existence of the perception of an object. Such an experience may be an instance to an enquirer to the fact how an object can come under the purview of the subject spontaneously through such perception. If it is possible in the aesthetic world, why not is it possible in other fields?

The indeterminate perception or *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* is accepted in the case of the recognitive cognitions like 'This is that Devadatta' (so 'yam devadattah) or 'that art thou' (*tattvamasi*) on account of the fact that it does not reveal the relation between the two i.e., this and that Devadatta or That and thou. It has been interpreted by the Advaitins that the sentence conveys the sense that Devadatta exists in Devadatta himself or an individual self exists in him in the form of Brahman. But they do not admit relation between two by the term – '*vaiśiṣṭyānavagāhī*'. If the meaning of the aforesaid sentences is pondered upon, it will be revealed that these are not actually relation-free. In other words, like other components the relation is also revealed in such cases due to the following reasons. First, how do we know that Devadatta exists in himself without the assumption of the relation of identity between them? Any type of recognitive cognition presupposes the relation identity (at least in the sense of similarity) between two existing earlier or at present time. To the Advaitins identity or *tādātmya* is the vital relation in the phenomenal cognition. In fact, they admit *tādātmya* in the places where there is a part and whole relation (*avayava-avayavi-bhāva-sambandha*) etc. In fact, the Vaiśeṣikas would accept *samavāya* or inherence as a relation in these cases. Hence *tādātmya* has very often been accepted as a relation. In the cases cited above there must be a relation of identity (*tādātmya*) in the sense of similarity between them. That is why, the recognitive knowledge is possible.

Secondly, though there is no absolute identity between this Devadatta and that Devadatta or an individual being and Brahman, there must be an essential identity (*svarūpatādātmya*) between them. Otherwise, the sentences could not have provided the intended meaning. Lastly, the cognition coming through the sentences are called relational in character, as it is sentential in nature. A sentence becomes meaningful if there is a word, its meaning and their relation. It may be asked in the words and their meaning there is *vācya-vācaka-bhāva* (i.e., expresser-expressed relationship) or not. If the answer is in positive, relation is accepted between them. If not, the sentences cannot provide the desired meaning due to the lack of *vācakatva* (expressive character) of the words. In fact, Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra has accepted the meaningfulness of the sentences, which entails the existence of the relation in them. Hence the definition of *nirvikalpaka* perception as formulated by the Advaitins is hardly adequate. At least this type of definition fails to justify *nirvikalpaka* cognition. The problem has been well taken by the Advaitins. To them the meaning of the sentences likes ‘*so’yam devadattah*’ or ‘*Tat tvamasi*’ etc is indivisible (*akhandārtha*). When the sentences produce right cognition without being related to the relation among the words, it is called indivisible meaning. Only the *prātipadikas*, which are free from the suffixes causing relation, can give rise to indivisible meaning. In the case of the *nirvikalpaka* sentence there is no relation between the meanings of the terms, but it gives an indivisible meaning after ignoring the individual ones. (*Idamevatattvamasi ityādivākyaṅnām akhandārtham yat samsargānavagahi-yathārthajñānanakatvam iti*’).

Two types of perception, apart from the previously mentioned one, are *jīvasāksī* and *īśvarasāksī*. It has been mentioned that the distinction between an individual being (*jīva*)

and witness in self (*jīvasākṣī*) lies on the status of internal sense-organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*). If it remains in an individual being as an adjective or *viśeṣana*, it is called *jīva*. If the same *antaḥkaraṇa* remains as a limiting adjunct or *upādhi* in a *jīva*, it is called *jīvasākṣī*. In the same way, the consciousness qualified by *māyā* is called *īśvara* or God (*māyāvaccinnam caitanyam parameśvarah*). When the same *māyā* remains as a limiting adjunct (*upādhi*), it is called witness in God (*īśvarasākṣī*). The property, which is related to the predicate (*kāryānavayi*), distinguisher (*vyayarttaka*) and present (*vartamāna*), is called *viśeṣana* while something, which cannot be related to the predicate (*kāryānanvayi*), distinguisher (*vyavarttaka*) and present (*vartamāna*) is called *upādhi*. Though the distinction between *viśeṣana* and *upādhi* has been shown clearly, it is very difficult to understand the exact position whether the inner organ or *antaḥkaraṇa* remains in an individual being as an adjunct or limiting adjunct. In the same way the position or status of *māyā* in consciousness (*caitanya*) cannot be known with the help of the reason. Without the help of intuition it is very difficult to have an idea about the status of mind in an individual being or the status of *māyā* in a consciousness. It needs vision to know the same. If these are known transcendently, why are they called the forms of perception? The phenomena of *jīvasākṣī* and *īśvarasākṣī* are more metaphysical in character than epistemological. Hence the Advaitins cannot do ‘pure epistemology’ without the help of metaphysics.

In connection with the immediate awareness (*aparokṣajñāna*) Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra has pointed out that such perceptual awareness may sometimes arise from the testimony also, which is called perceptual awareness generated through verbal testimony (*śābdajanyapratyakṣa*).

It has been argued by the Advaitins that, when an individual comes to know of his happiness through the utterance of the sentence – ‘You are happy’ (*tvam sukhī*) by somebody else, would it be considered as perceptual? The answer is in the positive, as it is always desired by the Advaitins. They have put forward an example of perceptual awareness through some testimonial cognition. A leader of a team is counting the members of his team to confirm that nobody is left behind. Among the ten members every time he is counting nine members but not ten. Being pointed out by somebody else he comes to know that he has not counted himself. Ultimately the person pointed him out as the tenth person and said – ‘You are the tenth’ (*daśamastvamasi*). This is a case of perception, no doubt, which is generated through the utterance of the sentence by somebody else.⁵³ Actually this type of awareness suggests a great domain of the Advaita philosophy. To the Advaitins as individual being is always free, but he does not know it. When it is pointed out that he is free from suffering through the injunction of the *Śāstra* or *Āgama* or through *śravaṇa* (hearing), *manana* (reflection) and *nididhyāsana* (meditating), he suddenly sees himself free. This freedom is not new to him, but it is acquirement of what is acquired (*prāptasya prāptih*). An individual’s liberation or freedom is not at all a new achievement, but awareness of something, which is already known. This knowing of the known is possible through the testimonial statement as found in different *Śruti*. The function of the testimony in the form of *Śruti* is to make someone aware about his own position and status. It provides the true picture of human being like his freedom etc. about which he did not know. Hence, perception in the field of freedom or liberation is generated through the agamic statement, which is very much significant in Indian Philosophical systems.

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bhojanam hi ca amattaññum kusīta hīnavīriyam
tam ve pasahati māro vāco rukkham ’va dubbalam/*”

*“Asubhanupassing viharantam indriyesu susamvutam
bhojanam hi ca mattaññum saddham ārabdhavīriyam
tam ve napasahāli māro vāto selam’va pabbatam/”*

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pariṇamate. Sa eva pariṇāma ucyate.’*

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Also: Ghosh, Raghunath: 2000 *Knowledge, Meaning and Intuition*. New Delhi:
New Bharatiya Book Corporation, PP 105 – 130.

50. *Sāhityadarpaṇa* – 3/42-43.

Also: Ghosh, Raghunath: 2000 *Knowledge, Meaning and Intuition*. New Delhi:
New Bharatiya Book Corporation, PP 105 – 130.

51. *Śabdasaṃskṛtyamāna ...svasamvidānanda-carvaṇavyāpāra-rasaṅīyārūporasah'*
Locana on Dhvanyāloka, 1/1.

Also: Ghosh, Raghunath: 2000 *Knowledge, Meaning and Intuition*. New Delhi:
New Bharatiya Book Corporation, PP 105 – 130.

52. “*Sattvodrekād akhanda-svapprakāśāndacinmayah/
Vedyāntarasparśasūnyo branmasvādasahodarah//
Lokottaracamatkāraprānāh kaiścit pramāṭṛbhih//
Svakārāvad abhinnatvenāyamāsvādyate rasah //
Rajastamobhyāmasprṣtam manah sattvamihocyate //”*
Sāhityadarpaṇa-3/35.

Also: Ghosh, Raghunath: 2000 *Knowledge, Meaning and Intuition*. New Delhi:
New Bharatiya Book Corporation, PP 105 – 130.

53. ‘*na caivamapi bartamanādaśāyām tvam sukhī ityādivākyajanyajñānasya
Pratyakṣāpattih syāt iti vācyam. Istatvāt. ‘Daśsamastvamasi ityādau
sannikṣṭaviṣaye Śabdādapi aparokṣajñānābhyupagamāt’.*
Vedāntaparibhāṣā (Pratyaksapariccheda).

CHAPTER – IV

SOME CRITICAL AND EVALUATIVE REMARKS

While critically evaluating the role of mind the following philosophical issues can be raised, which is followed by probable solutions.

The phenomenon of knowledge (epistemic knowledge) is possible through the instrumentality of mind. *Pramāṇa* can yield cognition if and only if the mind acts in a correct way. While discussing the role of mind in Indian epistemology it has been shown how it is important in *pramā*-yielding means. In a nutshell, we can show its importance in perception; inference etc. Three tier methods have been admitted by the Naiyāyikas who believe that cognition arises in the self. Our sense-organs first come in contact with object which is again connected with mind. Mind is again connected with self where cognition arises finally (*ātmā manasā samyujyate, manah indriyeṇa, indriyamarthena*). Any type of cognition presupposes the existence of mind. Otherwise inferential, testimonial and other forms of knowledge would not have been possible. That is why each and every epistemic experience is mind -centric. The Naiyāyikas have admitted that the properties like desire, aversion, volition, happiness, misery and cognition are the marks of self (“*ichhā-dveṣa-prayatna-sukha-duhkha-jñānāni ātmano lingam*”- *Nyāyasūtra*-1.1.15). The existence of self is known in terms of the qualities like desire etc that are possible through the instrumentality of mind. Hence any type of cognition

presupposes the instrumentality of mind. For the any epistemic cognition two things are essential- the locus of it, i.e., self and the instrument of the same, i.e., mind.

Secondly, it has been shown that the non-simultaneous origin of knowledge is the mark of mind (*'yuga pajjñānānutpattir manaso lingam'*). To the Naiyāyikas mind is having atomic dimension (*anuparimāṇa*). Due to having such dimension mind does not have capacity of unfolding two cognitions simultaneously. Though the Naiyāyikas have used non-origination of two cognitions simultaneously, it should be interpreted as 'two or more than two'. If the term 'simultaneous cognition' means 'simultaneity of only two', one might think that more than two cognitions can be grasped by mind simultaneously, which is not the case.

In response to the above one may raise a problem. If mind cannot grasp the simultaneous cognition, how we experience a kind of cognition called 'collective cognition' or 'cognition apprehending many things collectively', which is technically called '*samūhālabana – jñāna*'. Though the simultaneous cognition by mind is denied, our experience shows a different picture. When we see a heroin in a film, we perceive various aspects of her, viz. the dress she is wearing, ornaments she is using, song she is singing along with her physical features. In this case multiple objects become the content of our cognition. Such *samūhālabana* cognition is also grasped by mind, which is not covered in the earlier definition. When a lady is knitting wool, she is knitting; talking with others, looking at the knot, design etc. this is also a case of 'collective cognition', which is very common in our life. How is it possible? The Naiyāyikas will answer in the following way. Though in these cases experience of many objects is found, yet it can be said that these objects are not having simultaneous occurrence. When we see a hero or lady in a

film, we see his/her dress, his/ her song enjoys the beauty, but they are not simultaneous, but successive. When we concentrate to song, we are not concentrating to her dress or ornaments. In this way, it can be said that all the experiences are successive, but not simultaneous. The experiences happen so quickly that they seem to be simultaneous, but actually not. Just as a ring with fire if handled speedily seems as ‘fire-circle’ called *alātacakra*, the successively occurred cognitions are mistakenly taken as simultaneous. Hence the definition of mind as the cause of non-simultaneous origination of cognition is not defective as claimed by the opponents.

Thirdly, it may be asked whether mind is instrumental to valid cognition (*pramā*) only or not. It has been shown earlier that mind plays a vital role in the field of attaining epistemic cognition. Is it essential for *apramā* also? The answer would be taken as positive. The phenomenon of doubt (*samśaya*), illusion (*viparyaya*) and memory – cognition (*smṛti*) is also possible through the instrumentality of mind. If there is a skeptical doubt, there are two alternatives e.g., *sthāṇurvā puruṣo vā* (whether the object is a trunk of a tree or a man). Here our mind is roaming with two alternatives, not other organs. That is why, Nagarjuna, a famous Buddhist logician, does not believe in the existence of doubt. To him anything which is mental does not exist really in the external world. The Buddhists in general believe in double status of existence of an object -unique particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) and universality or generality (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*). The latter is purely mental and hence it is not ultimately real (*paramārthasatya*), but empirically or phenomenally real (*samvṛtisatya*), which has got a secondary status in Buddhist epistemology due to its pure mental character. Should we accept such view on Reality by the Buddhist?

In reply, it may be said that though the empirical world or world known through concepts is purely mental, our day to day behaviour is possible through this and hence the role of mind cannot be ignored. Though mental concepts or ascriptions cannot fully catch hold of reality as endorsed by Buddhists, the picture received through the conceptual eye is inevitable for our day to day transaction or behaviour. For this reason the role of mind is an important factor for acquiring knowledge or communication. To the Buddhist the entity known through the conceptual eye is purely mental and hence it has got secondary status in epistemology. It is correct if emphasis is given to their idealistic character. Whatever is right in realistic philosophy may not be the same in idealism due to having different set of metaphysical and ontological presuppositions.

Fourthly, why is the primacy of mind taken into account in acquiring cognition? In reply, it can be said that mind has been admitted as an inanimate object which can move towards an object being guided by a conscious principal i.e. self. From this one might think that mind does not have any autonomy for regulating itself. It always depends on the self which guides it. For this reason it is self who must control the mind and hence mind as an instrument and self is the guiding principal. That is why, it moves towards an object without being controlled by us. In order to control mind we need certain procedures like *śama, dama* etc. Through the control of our sense-organs we can control our mind. First, our external sense- organs move towards the objects which are followed by mind. One sees the enjoyable object, thinks about its enjoyment has a mental attachment to that which gives rise to desire, anger, infatuation, loss of memory and at last loss of everything which is endorsed in the *Bhagavadgītā*. It is said, “*Dhyāyato viṣayān pumsaḥ sangasteṣūpajāyate / saṅgāt sañjāyate kāmah kāmāt krodho ’bhijāyate /*

krodhād bhavati sammohah sammohāt smṛtivibhramah / smṛtibhramsāt buddhināśo buddhināśāt praṇasyati.” Mind is the root cause of one’s cravings. In Buddhism also thirst for enjoyment (*tanhā*) which is connected with mind is taken as the root of all bondages leading to this worldly involvement. Hence control over mind is the primary factor in our life.

Fifthly, in the Advaita Vedānta mind is described as inner organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) which plays a vital role in perceptual cognition. It has been told that our inner organ, issuing through the sense- organ goes to the object and assumes the shape of an object. From this one may think how mind can go to the object like a liquid substance and assume the form of an object. Can mind goes to the object and assumes the corresponding shape? It seems to be inconceivable to believe that it can move like conscious object towards a certain direction.

In reply it can be said that this liquidification of inner organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) may be taken as a metaphor. If the meaning is taken literally, it would lead us to the world of misunderstanding. Just as water goes to different place and assumes the shape of the substratum, mind goes towards object and assumes the form. In this context ‘mind goes to the object and assumes the shape’ means ‘mind illumines the object through its operation’. This expression has been conveyed to us metaphorically. In Sanskrit literature we often come across many metaphorical expressions which are called implicative meaning (*lakṣaṇā*).

Sixthly, there is a diversity of opinion among the philosophers belonging to different schools of Indian philosophy regarding the status of mind as a sense-organ. The

Naiyāyikas think that mind is a sense organ which is guided by a conscious principal, self. Just as an axe can cut a piece of wood being guided by a conscious agent, inner-organ also works being guided by a conscious agent. Hence it has got instrumental value in epistemology. If it is instrument, it must be sense-organ. But the Advaitins, particularly Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra, are of the opinion that mind is not at all a sense-organ. Though they are committed to this view, they could not provide any independent view based on reasoning in their favour. In support of their statement they have quoted *Śruti*; mainly *Śrīmadbhagvādgītā*. They have taken a clue from the *Gītā* in which it is said that the subtle elements producing sense-organ are subtler than the sense-organs. Mind much subtler than the materials producing sense-organs (“*Indriyebhyaḥ parāḥ hyarthāḥ arthebhyasca param manaḥ*”). From this they try to justify that mind is not enumerated as a sense-organ. Though in the same text it is said ‘*Manaḥ ṣaṣṭhāni indriyāni*’ (‘mind is the sixth sense-organ’), the interpretation of the same has been given in a different way. It is told that though mind is sixth in the serial yet it is not a sense organ. Because mind has been added as a sixth member with five more. The number six is filled in by something which is other than sense-organ.

Now a problem may be raised which view is to be taken as justified. So far as my understanding goes, it is more logical and convincing to admit mind as a sense - organ, which is supported by *Kenopanīśad* also. In this *Upanīśad* we find the disciple to ask the question: ‘who is the impeller of mind?’ (*‘Keneṣitam patati preṣitam manaḥ*’). From this it follows that mind automatically cannot go towards an object unless it is impelled by a conscious being. Whatever our *Śruti* says is immaterial for us, because *Śruti* is always a matter of interpretation. It can be interpreted as per our own understanding as done by

Sankara, Ramanuja, Sayana, Dayananda, Sri Aurobindo etc. If mind is taken as an instrument or karana, it must be guided by certain conscious principle. The famous metaphor of an axe can be taken into consideration. An axe can produce cutting (*chidājanaka*), if it is properly operated by a conscious being. In the like manner, mind can rush towards an object being guided by self. Hence it is more rational to admit mind as a sense-organ.

Lastly, it may be asked: what is exactly the role of mind in epistemology? To know anything through perception, inference, testimony or any other means mind is the instrument and hence it is an inevitable tool in the field of epistemology. The Advaita Vedāntins have given much emphasis on the role of mind in the phenomenon of epistemic knowledge. To them consciousness limited by mind (*antahkaraṇāvachhinna caitanya*) is called *pramātrī-caitanya* and the consciousness limited by mental mode (*antahkaraṇa-vṛttiyavachhinna caitanya*) is called *pramāṇa caitanya*. Two positions are dependent on the position of the mind. When these two are amalgamated and maintain a distance with the object, it called *jñānagata pratyakṣa* (perception of knowledge). On the other hand, if these two are totally amalgamated without maintaining any dichotomy with the object, there is no subject-object-relationship, as object is identified with the subject resulting in *viśayagata pratyakṣa* (perception of the object). In fact, there is novelty in Advaita epistemology due to the fact that they have clearly maintained a distinction between perception of knowledge and perception of object, which is due to different role of mind (*antahkaraṇa*), played in epistemology. A knower (*pramātā*) is defined as a consciousness limited by inner organ while *pramāṇa* is defined as the consciousness limited by mental mode (*antahkaraṇavṛtti*). Mind can take a shape of the object which is

called mental mode. We can claim some object as known if and only if some corresponding mental mode is formed. Without it no object is really known. This role of mind is applicable not only in the case of objects capable of being perceptually known but to the objects which are super sensuous in nature, as in the case of knowledge of self etc. Even the inferential objects which are not perceived can be known through the corresponding mental mode or *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti*. The grammarians also endorse that the utopian ideas like sky-flower, barren woman's son etc are taken to be meaningful as they capable of producing some sort of corresponding mental image in the form of *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti*, which are called 'ideational meaning' or *buddhyartha* arising from mental mode. Hence no cognition is possible without the help of mind. Moreover, without 'one-pointed concentration' called *samādhi* no creative work is possible. The cognition arising from the study of literature, from the enjoyment of music, dance and painting are called *prātibha-jñāna*, which is also possible through one-pointed concentration. In these cases there is no room for absentmindedness. If there is any absentmindedness, it would lead to the break of *tāla*, *laya* in music and dance particularly leading to the non-melodious world. For this we need uninterrupted concentration. Even in the case of perception there are different stages depending on the function of mind. We can perceive an object in a very gross way or subtle way. If our concentration is of superior form, we can perceive many aspects in an object which cannot be seen through our gross eye. This type of subtle perception is called *paṭutara pratyakṣa* or subtler perception.

I beg to differ from the Naiyāyikas that they have admitted the atomic nature of mind on account of the fact that it is not capable of producing simultaneous cognition. To me from

the fact of its non-production of simultaneous cognition it is not rational to infer its atomicity. If mind is made powerful through its concentrative capacity and proper training, it can reveal much cognition at a time, even the past and future. This is due to power of mind enhanced through meditative exercise. The mind *aṇutva* does not remain when there is a transcendental perception as we get more than two objects simultaneously. It is also not true that mind can grasp all the objects of the world. It indicates that it neither has *aṇutva* (that is atomic magnitude) nor *vibhutva* i.e. all-pervasive character. It seems to me that it must have some character of medium magnitude (*madhyama parimāṇa*).

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