

***LANGUAGE AND REALITY WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO
EARLY WITTGENSTEIN, STRAWSON, CHOMSKY AND
HEIDEGGER***

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DECLARATION

I declare that the thesis entitled "LANGUAGE AND REALITY WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO EARLY WITTGENSTEIN, STRAWSON, CHOMSKY AND HEIDEGGER" has been prepared by me under the guidance of Dr. Kantilal Das, Professor of Philosophy, University of North Bengal. No part of this thesis has formed the basis for the award of any degree or fellowship previously.

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
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This is to certify that the thesis entitled LANGUAGE AND REALITY WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO EARLY WITTGENSTEIN, STRAWSON, CHOMSKY AND HEIDEGGER submitted by Smt Baishali Majumdar bearing Regd. No: *PhD/Phil.(26)/ 3911/R-2012* in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy is a bona fide work carried out by her under my supervision and guidance.

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ABSTRACT

LANGUAGE AND REALITY WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO EARLY WITTGENSTEIN, STRAWSON, CHOMSKY AND HEIDEGGER

The relevance of language in philosophy as a philosophical method seems to be an absorbing issue. Its main contention is to show the relationship between language and reality (ontology). Language is all about revealing reality or ontology for us. It is supposed to be a straightforward philosophical assertion. However, within this assertion there we find extreme philosophical complexity as far as the relationship between language and reality is concerned. Linguistic philosopher over the years involve into a tug of war regarding the very nature of language as well as the very nature of reality. As a result of that there we notice various overlapping and contrary philosophical inquiries developed by various linguistic philosophers. We have outlined four different paradigms in this regard. These are the semantic, the pragmatic, the mentalist and the metaphysical or ontological approaches.

We think that reality or ontology is *a matter of linguistic decision*. The very nature of reality would be determined on the basis of the very nature of language. Accordingly, we have four different types of language, such as, artificial, natural, cognitive and poetic. Now if reality is supposed to be the matter of linguistic decision then certainly there we conceive four different aspects of reality. Considering this philosophical background in mind the title of the thesis has been fostered.

On the basis of different nature of language there develops different philosophical school within the horizon of linguistic philosophy. These are the semantic, the pragmatic, the mentalist and the metaphysical. Each school contains a group of linguistic philosophers. We have chosen the view of one linguistic philosopher from each group on the basis of originality and philosophical implication. Under semantics, we have chosen early Wittgenstein, under pragmatic Strawson, under mentalist Noam Chomsky and under

metaphysical Martin Heidegger. Our main contention is to synthesis the views of each philosophy and eventually to have a complete picture of reality. We think this may not be required if we have a *monistic approach* of the concept of language as well as the concept reality.

We think the role of semantists was colossal in linguistic turn. Semantics is a big philosophical school and here we have discussed the early Wittgenstein's philosophical position of the relationship between language and reality. According to Wittgenstein language is propositional and reality is the totality of facts. A proposition pictures a fact in logical space on the basis of pictorial relationship or one to one correspondence between each element of proposition and each element of fact. A proposition gets its sense by way of picturing a fact. That is why, Wittgenstein says that a fact makes a proposition as either true or false. Wittgenstein's interpretation of the relationship between language and reality is atomistic and logical. According to Wittgenstein, language can be anatomized into names and reality can be anatomized into object. Names are the ultimate constituents of language and objects are the ultimate constituents of reality. A name denotes an object without exception.

After semantics we have developed the pragmatic approach and in this regard we have discussed the conceptualist approach of P. F. Strawson. According to Strawson language is natural and reality is the totality of particulars (objects). The relationship between language and reality can be established by way of making successful communication between the speaker and the hearer. For Strawson, successful communication between the speaker and the hearer is made possible because each of them has a unified conceptual scheme. In this regard, Strawson was indebted to Kant. Thus for Strawson the relationship between language and reality actually hinges on successful communication between the speaker and the hearer. As every communicator possesses a unified core of human thinking or unified conceptual scheme, it is natural in most general case that the communication would be successful. Of

course Strawson does not rule out the possibility of unsuccessful communication. In this regard, Strawson classifies particulars as basic and non-basic and then says that non-basic particulars are intimately linked with the basic particulars of which there is no scope of unsuccessful communication. We think Strawson's conceptualism holds a unique position in the later development of conceptualism and his conceptualism may be considered as an integrated philosophical concept.

It is thought that if the semantics and pragmatics are said to be the first linguistic turn then Noam Chomsky's philosophical interpretation of language and reality may be conceived as the second linguistic turn. Thus, the debate between the semantics and pragmatics schools on one hand and Chomsky's mentalist interpretation on the other is philosophically interesting because the formers give importance on the external uses of language and the later gives importance on the internal use of language. According to Chomsky, the primary function of language does not depend on its external uses but on its internal uses. Chomsky is indebted to Descartes because he has borrowed the concept of innatism, although for different purpose, from Descartes. Descartes' innatism may be thought as old innatism and Chomsky's innatism may be comprehended as 'new innatism'.

Finally, Martin Heidegger developed the metaphysical or ontological relationship between language and reality and his interpretation may be attributed as the fourth important dimension of the said relationship. For Heidegger, language is poetic and reality of the totality of equipments or the openness of being. Poetic language differs from natural and ideal languages because unlike the later the former is creative. Thus, creativity is the hallmark of poetic language. Language is the house of Being in the sense that being relentless opens up by means of language. The openness of being leads to Being through creativity. Thus, the journey from being to Being is a creative journey.

Our conclusion is that reality or ontology is a matter of linguistic decision and as there are different types of language, there are different approaches of reality. Our ultimate objective is to have a comprehensive aspect of reality.

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PREFACE

The preface of a thesis is in some sense or other a sort of the blueprint. The proposed thesis, of course will be guided by what has been made in the preface. The present thesis is entitled as “Language and Reality with special reference to early Wittgenstein, Strawson, Chomsky and Heidegger” will propose to explicate the relationship between language and reality from four different perspectives, such as, the semantics, the pragmatics, the mentalists and the poetic. These four aspects in short have been termed as **Four Pillars of the Relationship between Language and Reality**.

The thesis is proposed to begin with an introduction which is supposed to explicate the historical and philosophical development of the very nature of language, reality and their relationship. Then we propose to subsequently develop the four pillars of the relationship between language and reality with regard to four different linguistic philosophers as mentioned in the title of the thesis. The thesis at the end will try to develop a comprehensive outlook of the relationship between language and reality.

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• **GENERAL INTRODUCTION**

The relationship between language and reality is one of the prime concerns of linguistic philosophy that has been witnessed in the twentieth century. In fact, the question that why does language matter to philosophy, actually hinges on in finding out the answer that language matters to philosophy because language helps us to know reality. There is no question of doubt that whatever the nature of language may be, whether it would be ordinary or artificial language, sign or tribal language, one thing must remain the same that language does refer. That means the referential function of language is the chief function. Again what does language refer? Language refers reality which is there in the world. Therefore, the relationship between language and reality appears as one of the important tasks of the so-called linguistic turn appeared in the twentieth century.

An immediate question then arises: How is language related to reality? Is language a suitable medium for knowing reality? So long we do not spell out the very nature of language as well as reality; it would be very difficult to answer these questions.

Nature of Language:

As far as language is concerned there we find divergence of opinions. In fact, linguistic philosophers of twentieth century were involved into a tug of war regarding the very nature of language. A section of leading linguistic thinkers at that time expressed serious doubt about the nature of ordinary or everyday language. According to them ordinary language by its very nature is ambiguous, vague. Therefore, ordinary language cannot be regarded as the genuine method of knowing reality. Instead of this, an artificial or ideal language must be constructed in such a way so that the structure of language can map or represent or picture the

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structure of reality. This is what we call the semantic interpretation of language. According to this view reality is independent of language. Language hooks or maps reality and in this process language in some sense or other gets its philosophical meaning.

Contrary to this view, the proponents of ordinary language philosophers hold that ordinary or natural language is all right or sufficient for knowing reality. For them, ordinary language is not responsible for generating philosophical ambiguity. If there would be any ambiguity arising out of ordinary language, ordinary language itself is not responsible for this; rather the users of ordinary language who actually fail to understand the very meaning or logic of ordinary language would be responsible for the ambiguity of ordinary language. Therefore, there is no need for constructing an artificial language. According to these philosophers there is no need for revisionism in favour of artificial language. Ordinary language is sufficient for knowing reality. Our important observation is that whatever the language may be, it would be true to say that language helps one to know reality. Therefore, reflection upon language is pivotal for doing philosophy. In fact, reflection upon language is not something new appeared only in the twentieth century. If we look back to the history of philosophy, we notice that philosophers in the past were very much concerned about the functional aspect of language. Hegel once says that *our culture is actualized through language*. Even in the *Upanishads* we are told to mediate on speech. This is justified by saying that if there were no speech; neither right nor wrong would be known, neither true nor false, neither the pleasant nor the unpleasant. Speech makes us understand all this. Therefore mediate on speech. What has been said in *Upanishads* was reflected in the remark of Locke. According to Locke, meditation upon language must be the constant accompaniment of philosophical reflection. Locke confesses, “When I first began this discourse of the understanding and a good while after, I had not the least thought that my consideration of words was necessary to it. But

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when, having passed over the original and composition of our ideas, I began to examine the extent and certainty of our knowledge, I found it had so near a connection with words that unless their force and manner of signification were well understood, *there could be very little said pertinently and clearly concerning knowledge*; which being conversant about had constantly to do with propositions: and though it terminated in things, yet it was, for the most part, so much by the invention of words, that they seemed scarce separable from our general knowledge.”¹ It seems clear from Lockean interpretation that words are inseparable from knowledge. Like Locke, von Humboldt also makes the same remark. According to Humboldt, language and cognition are inseparable. He further contends that language is not merely the means by which truth is more or less adequately expressed, but is rather the means by means of which the not yet known is discovered. Humboldt’s remarks are particularly relevant here. He not only conceives that reflection upon language is important for doing philosophy, but also stresses on the view how does language help us to know reality.

The empirical philosophy of language subsequently becomes the basis for a theory of knowledge which eliminates the universal. Berkeley seeks to show the impossibility of abstract ideas and he traces them to the source from which they flow, namely, language. In the mind of the empiricist this principle of the inseparability of knowledge and its expression in language becomes the final argument against innate principles and the extension of knowledge beyond the empirically observable. In fact, the philosophy of language of empiricism precipitated a crisis in culture as its theory of knowledge precipitated a similar crisis in the sphere of technical philosophy. As Hume woke Kant from the so-called dogmatic slumber, so the critique of language indirectly is connected with what is called *Romantic Movement*.

¹ Locke, John: *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, W. Swan Sonnenschein & Co., London, 1882, Book 111, Chapter 1X, p.189.

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What has been observed above is that preoccupation with language or reflection upon language was not the philosophical event appeared only in the twentieth century. Even philosophers before the twentieth century were deeply involved with language and found difficulties in language. For the Sophist, no less than for Plato and Aristotle, for Locke no less than for Descartes and Leibniz, even for the idealism of von Humboldt and Hegel, we notice a considerable reflection upon language and it is at this point that the problems of the philosophy of language arise. Therefore, there is nothing hidden to say that the revival interest in philosophical problems of language is one of the outstanding feature of the present cultural situation. Meditation on language at any point actually helps one to develop his own thought and culture. The only notable aspect is that language did not appear as the philosophical method before the linguistic revolution. The insight was there but they did not think that analysis of language or so to speak clarification of language was all about of doing philosophy.

The appearance of *linguistic turn or revolution* in the twentieth century established language as the house of doing philosophy. It has been said that language is philosophy and philosophy is language where the term *is* is conceived in terms of identity. That means what is language is philosophy and what is philosophy is language. Language has, so to speak, become the *Brennpunkt* of present day philosophical discussion. This is justified by saying that philosophy of language or linguistic philosophy has become a special and relatively distinct department of philosophical activity which helps one to actualize his or her own culture.

Nature of Reality:

Like language, reflection upon reality is an age old phenomenon. In fact, the genesis of philosophy is to know reality in any form. If we forego the empirical tradition as well as the semantic interpretation of language, then we can say that the concept of reality as understood

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by philosophers is metaphysical or transcendental in nature. In the past, metaphysicians first explored or investigated the nature of reality and they usually conceived reality, though unreflectively, as 'real'. Austin says, "Many philosophers, failing to detect any ordinary quality common to real ducks, real cream, and real progress, have decided that Reality must be an a-priori concept apprehended by reason."² Bradley again was a leading campaigner of metaphysical reality and he made a contrast 'reality' with 'appearance'. In his book *Appearance and Reality*, Bradley goes on to say that what is real is Absolute; it is the whole. Accordingly, anything which is mere appearance would be unreal. He says, "...to know reality as against mere appearance ...or...the effort to comprehend the universe, not simply piecemeal or by fragments, but somehow as a whole."³ Bradley does not equate reality with existence for although it is true to say that what is real exists, but at the same time what is not real, namely appearance, also exists. Therefore, existence cannot be the mark of reality. If we compare Bradley's view in terms of modern context, we find a considerable philosophical debate regarding this issue. Linguistic philosophers, particularly, belonging to semantic completely rule out the possibility of metaphysical reality as expounded by Bradley. However, Meinong's view of reality goes in favour of Bradley.

Contrary to Bradley, we can point out Quine's observation regarding reality. Quine in his paper "On Mental Entities" says, "I suggest that it is a mistake to seek an immediately evident reality, somehow more immediately evident than the realm of external objects. Unbemused by philosophy, we would all go along with Dr Johnson, whose toe was his touchstone of reality. Sheep are real, unicorns are not. Clouds are real, the sky (as a solid canopy) not. Odd numbers are perhaps real, but prime even numbers other than 2 not. Everything, of course is real; but there are sheep and there are no unicorns, there are clouds

² Austin, J.L. *Sense and Sensibilia*, Oxford University Press, 1962, p.64.

³ Bradley, F.H., *Appearance and Reality: A Metaphysical Essay*, Clarendon, 1946, p.198.

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and there is (in the special sense of the term) no sky, there are odd numbers and there are no even primes other than 2. Such is the ordinary use of the word 'real', a separation of the sheep from the unicorns. Failing some aberrant definition which is certainly not before us, this is the only usage we have to go on."⁴ If we carefully look after the remarks of Quine from the above passage, it seems clear to us that Quine just holds a contrary position of Bradley. Thus, an apparent conflict is visible. Quine equates 'real' with 'existing', while for Bradley what is not real, namely, appearance, also exists. Secondly, unlike Bradley, Quine gives much importance on the ordinary or everyday usage while cognizing reality. For him ordinary usage 'is the only usage we have to go on.'

One use of reality is to explain what happens in the mental model by reference to what lies outside it. For example, discussions of how the nervous system processes its incoming information regularly refer to the external source of information as 'reality'. In this sense, reality is what exists independently of how it is perceived or conceived. Another use is to adjust the model, at the level either of perception or of understanding, by constructing the world as we have taken it to be with 'reality'. The second use is far more fundamental than the first one as metaphysicians aim to fiddle with the model so that our overall understanding conforms to how things are. In this sense, reality is conceived as 'reality is how things are'. Although reality as such is broadly classified as either empirical or metaphysical, but within this broad classification, there we conceive various sub-classifications or sub-divisions. For example, a Kantian nominalist, a New-Berkeleyan phenomenalist, a perceptual realist and a scientific reductionist may have very different views of the nature of reality. Even in modern times many philosophers belonging to different philosophical branches have conceived the nature of reality differently. For example, early Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus* says that the

⁴ Quine, W.V. "On Mental Entities", in *The Ways of Paradox*, Random House, 1966, p.208.

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world is the totality of facts (reality). Some other would say that reality is the totality of experience. Kant's interpretation in this regard is very relevant. According to Kant, both empirical and metaphysical realities are interchangeable even though they are distinguished in nature. Kant calls our ordinary way of conceiving the world 'empirical reality'. He also contrasts empirical reality with the absolute reality of noumena. Besides these, he had a notion of 'objective reality' which means 'real in the sense of being properly thought of as an object independent of us'. For Kant we have objective reality at the empirical level and also at the noumenal level. However, considering all these, Kant's final observation is that ultimate reality will be the final viewpoint presented by our metaphysics.

The relationship between Language and Reality:

So far we have outlined the historical background of language and reality. Now let us examine the relationship between language and reality from the viewpoint of linguistic philosophy. We have already seen that the term 'reality' is broadly conceived as either empirical or metaphysical. J.N. Mohanty one says, "By 'reality' is sometimes meant the real things, events, facts and persons which go to constitute what we in common parlance call the real world. But 'reality' is also sometimes, especially in metaphysical discourse, taken to mean ultimate or metaphysical reality in which case it denotes something that stands behind and beyond the world of things and persons which is but its appearance." Accordingly, the relationship between language and reality can be examined by finding a suitable answer to the questions, such as: (1) How is language related to the real; things and persons constitute the real world? And (2) how is language related to the ultimate metaphysical reality, to the Absolute or Brahman? These questions can alternatively be framed as: Is language a suitable medium for knowing the nature of the empirical world of things and persons? And again is language a suitable medium for knowing or conceiving the nature of the ultimate

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metaphysical reality? We think that the question whether language is a suitable medium for knowing reality is not difficult to answer. In fact empiricists and realists both in East and West have viewed that language is a suitable medium for knowing reality. Even philosophers belonging to semantic as well as pragmatic are of the opinions that language does of course refer empirical reality. However, as far as metaphysical reality is concerned, a considerable, debate both from East as well as from West, has been witnessed.

As far as metaphysical reality is concerned, two philosophical difficulties may come into consideration. In the first place, it can be said that reality would be a matter of linguistic decision if it can be assumed that language refers to metaphysical reality. A question then immediately crops up our mind: How can we discuss the relation between language and reality, if giving a meaning to 'reality' is a matter of linguistic decision? Professor J.N. Mohanty himself once raised this question. The second problem is that while investigating the relationship between language and reality, we have to go beyond the limits of language. As a matter of fact, in order to gain a vantage point, we have to go beyond language to some non-linguistic experience in order to correlate the relationship between language and reality. As metaphysical reality is *unspeakable* or something lies beyond words, language could have no meaningful relation to it. In Indian tradition we also notice the same view. For example, an extreme form of *Madhyamikas* has said that reality is wholly unspeakable. Therefore, the attitude concerning reality for the wise man is to adopt the path of silence. Similar view is being witnessed in *Advaita Vedantists*. Commenting on Sankara's statement that the *Brahman* can never become an object of speaking, Vacaspati Misra observes, "No proposition whatever can point out the characteristics of objects directly as 'this and this'. Thus, the differences in the tasted sweetness of sugarcane, milk and guda cannot be spoken

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of. Similar situation prevails everywhere.”⁵ Therefore, it can be said that metaphysical reality cannot be drawn from a formal study of language. Metaphysical answers are wrong answers to ill-formulated questions at the hand of the metaphysically inclined philosopher of language. Accordingly, it can be assumed that there is no ultimate reality in the metaphysical sense and hence it is unrewarding for the philosophers to enter into an investigation for the relation of language to any such reality.

We do not, however, think that this is true without begging question. The view that reality is something that exists independent of language should not be the final verdict as far as reality is concerned. Meinong one says that it is the philosophers’ prejudice or chauvinism that to talk of an object is to talk of in terms of existence. Distinguishing *existence* from *subsistence*, Meinong enables us to show that there are some objects such as ideal objects or even pure objects which are real in the metaphysical sense. According to Meinong, an object is not determined only in terms of its existence, but in terms of logical *being*. An object may exist (real object) or may subsist (ideal object). However, irrespective of its existence or subsistence, what remains common is its logical being, i.e. *the concept of that object*. In this sense, it can be said that reality is nothing but the logical being of an object what is philosophically known as the concept of an object. In this regard, metaphysical reality may be intuited by means of language. Besides Meinong, we can also mention the phenomenological point. Heidegger in his book *Being and Time* once says that “Language is the house of Being”. According to Heidegger language is the locus and vehicle of the arrival, i.e. the self-revelation of Being itself. Language is the house or temple of Being. Language is enabled to be aware of Being. It is the word that gives its being to everything. Heidegger further contends that the relationship between word and thing is not an external relation between two

⁵ Bhamati on Brahmasutrabhayyas, 1.1.4.

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independent entities; rather the word itself is the relationship which sustains the thing in its being. This reflects that Heidegger's account of the relationship between language and reality has metaphysical relevance. In this project, we shall, explore Heideggerian account of the relationship between language and reality.

As far as empirical reality is concerned, there we find two philosophical dimensions of which one is purely logical and the other is descriptive. When Wittgenstein says that a proposition pictures a fact (reality) in the sense that they possess the same structure, his interpretation is far more logical than descriptive. According to Wittgenstein, the world is the totality of facts and a fact is something which makes a proposition as either true or false. Language is constituted by propositions and a proposition is constituted by logically proper names. For Wittgenstein proper names are the minimum vocabulary of ideal language by means of which the so-called language is formulated. A name, Wittgenstein says, denotes an object and the meaning of the object is the meaning of the name under consideration. His own interpretation of language as well as reality is logical and that is why Wittgenstein in his *Tractatus* never cites any example. Thus, Wittgenstein's model of language is a well-known philosophical method through which the relationship between language and reality can be established in the logical sense.

There is another important view, namely the descriptive view, through which the relationship between language and reality can be established. If we say that the world is not the totality of facts, but events, things and persons, then instead of saying that language pictures facts, we rather contend that language can describe them. In this sense, reality is to be understood in terms of *our experience of the real*. If reality is conceived in terms of our experience of the real, then the true problem is the relation of language not to reality, but to our experience of the real. Believers of this proposal are of the opinions that there is no experience of the real

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that falls beyond the purview of linguistic framework. According to this view, there is no non-linguistic apprehension of the real. This view clearly goes against the view that language and reality are independent with each other and language pictures reality.

It is important to point out here that the very essential function of language is to refer and the function of referring is different from the other function of meanings. The meaning function of language, unlike the referential function of language, derives from the rules of formation and transformation of a language, whereas the referring function of language relates language to extra-linguistic reality. While talking about the referential function of language, one thing should be kept in mind that the so-called *reference* is intrinsic to language what may be called, rather contingently, the dispositional power of language. Accordingly, it can be said that this intrinsic property of language constitutes an essential function of language- qua language known as merely intended reference. Having said this, the problem still remains whether the intended reference of language does foothold on reality or not. Again linguistic philosophers were disagreed regarding this point. Some would like to say that language has intended reference and the reference of language does foothold on to reality. Russell's theory of *knowledge by acquaintance* is a case in point. However, this theory fails to cope up with the massive participation as it has a limited application. Even many would like to say that Russell was wrong in thinking that the sense or meaning of a name is its designation. Language qua language refers, but whether the intended reference does foothold on reality is another question.

The thesis will address four important dimensions as far as the relationship between language and reality is concerned. In the *First Chapter* of this thesis, we propose to analyze and examine the semantic interpretation of the relationship between language and reality from early Wittgensteinian point of view and it would be entitled as: *The Atomic Interpretation*

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of the relationship between language and reality after early Wittgenstein. It should be kept in mind that the term semantics is a brought concept and many linguistic philosophers in one sense or other can be regarded as semanticists. Therefore, for the sake of brevity, we particularly confine ourselves on the atomic interpretation of the relationship between language and reality as has been developed in the semantic tradition. I think that with the influence of Bertrand Russell's 'Logical Atomism', Wittgenstein has developed the atomic interpretation of the relationship between language and reality through his celebrated Picture theory of Meaning.

It is important to point out here that semantists, in general, have proposed *Linguistic Revisionism*. They, in general, have favoured artificial or logical language due to the shortcomings of ordinary or natural language. According to them, even though ordinary language is alright for descriptive sciences, but in order to handle formal sciences ordinary language is inadequate. Moreover, ordinary language does not reflect all without exception the true nature of language. Therefore, semantists in general and Wittgenstein in particular, of course, with the influence of Russell had introduced logical proper name while developing his atomic interpretation of the relationship between language and reality in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. We think the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* is a semblance of the atomic interpretation of the relationship between language and reality.

Then, we pass on to the pragmatic interpretation of the relationship between language and reality. Again like the semantics, the pragmatic is a broad linguistic school. Many linguistic philosophers have been regarded as pragmatists. In this regard, we can particularly call upon the name of later Wittgenstein, J.L. Austin, P.F. Strawson, Gilbert Ryle and many others. Therefore, it would not be possible to explain and incorporate the views of all these philosophers. In this regard, we particularly explain the view of P.F. Strawson, which we

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think, is central in understanding the relationship between language and reality from pragmatic standpoint. Therefore, in the *Second Chapter* of this thesis we propose to choose Strawson's view and it would be entitled as: *The Conceptualistic Interpretation of the relationship between language and reality after P.F. Strawson.*

We think that both the semantists as well as pragmatists have tried to understand the relationship between language and reality from external point of view. According to them, both language and reality are separated entity and independent from each other. Language is a tool that can be used *secondarily* for knowing reality. According to them, language is relevant or language matters to philosophy because language reveals reality or ontology for us as a separate tool. Thus, in summing up, they have given an external use of the relationship between language and reality. The only notable difference between the semantists and the pragmatists is that they have approached different nature of language as well as different nature of reality. Semantists, in general, have proposed logical language; whereas pragmatists, in general, have proposed natural or ordinary language. But we think the *external interpretation of the relationship between language and reality does not reveal the whole aspect of reality.* In fact, their interpretations may reveal the external aspect of reality. But it is wrong to suggest that the external aspect of reality is *all about of reality.* Therefore, in the *Third Chapter* of this thesis, we propose to analyse and examine the internal aspect of the relationship between language and reality from Noam Chomsky's mentalistic standpoint and it would be entitled as: *The Psycho-linguistic Interpretation of the relationship between language and reality after Noam Chomsky.*

There is no question of doubt that Noam Chomsky as a living philosopher of U.S.A has introduced a new dimension in linguistic philosophy what may be called the *Second Linguistic Revolution in philosophy.* It has been claimed by many that if the first linguistic

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revolution has been centered within the semantics as well as the pragmatics traditions, then Chomsky's mentalistic interpretation is supposed to the second linguistic revolution in philosophy. The question then is: Why is Chomsky so important in developing linguistic philosophy? The most possible answer is that Chomsky alone brings back the relevance of the internal use of language and the internal aspect of reality. According to Chomsky, language is the mirror of human mind. Therefore, the study of language is a part of human biology. As language is the reflection of human mind, understanding language actually helps one to understand human mind. Language, for Chomsky, is supposed to the eternally repeated labour of the spirit to make articulated sound capable of thoughts. It has been farther held that language is not merely a means of exchanging thought, rather a true world (reality) which the spirit has it force. In this sense, language is conceived not as an instrument or a mere tool, but as a product of the *spirit of human subjectivity*. Therefore, to know language is to know the problem of other mind. One can know the mental states of other mind and knowing other's mind is a form of reality. Reality lies within. Thus, in this Chapter we propose to analyse with special reference to Noam Chomsky the psycho-linguistic interpretation of the relationship between language and reality, which, we think, would reflect a new aspect of reality.

Historically the relevance of metaphysical reality has been rejected or intentionally forfeited, of course, on some basic grounds by the logical positivists in particular and the whole host of semanticists in general. According to a dominant linguistic wave, the relevance of metaphysical reality is nil because language by no means can reach up to metaphysical reality. In precise, it has been claimed by many that language is ineffable to reach up to metaphysical reality. Therefore, metaphysical reality has not been examined in the domain of linguistic philosophy. But, we think that one should not ignore the relevance of metaphysical reality when we examine the relationship between language and reality. In this regard, Martin

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
Heidegger from the West and Bhartrhari from the East had done a commendable job in reviving the relationship between language and reality from metaphysical perspective. Therefore, in the *Fourth Chapter* of this thesis we propose to analyse and examine Heidegger's point of view in this regard and it would be entitled as: *The Metaphysical Interpretation of the relationship between language and reality after Martin Heidegger*.

According to Heidegger, language is the house of Being. Language is the locus and vehicle of the arrival that is the self-revelation of being itself. Language is the temple of Being. Being is the guardian of Language. As the guardian of language, Being must take care of language because it is language through which Being has been manifested or revealed. Therefore, according to Heidegger, language and Being (reality) are inseparable. Language is reality and reality is language. Here the verb 'is' is used in the sense of identity. This interpretation of Heidegger actually opens up a new dimension as far as the investigation of the relationship between language and reality is concerned. We have already noted that when the semantists as well as the pragmatists have engaged themselves in exploring the relationship between language and reality they have considered both language and reality as separated entities. Whereas, here we come to know after Heidegger that both language and reality is the same thing. Thus, we have a different interpretation of language as well as a different interpretation of reality. By language, Heidegger means poetic language and the essence of poetic language is that it is creative unlike other languages. By Being, Heidegger means metaphysical reality and Being as a metaphysical reality is not independent from language. It lies within language; it dwells within language; it is the guardian of language. Thus, we think that the metaphysical interpretation of the relationship between language and reality as has been addressed by Heidegger actually occupies an important position in order to know the *other* aspect of reality. Thus, in the *Fourth Chapter* I propose to incorporate this important aspect of the

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relationship between language and reality after Martin Heidegger. In the same *Chapter* we also propose to make an East-West comparative study between two original thinkers one from the East and other from the West i.e., from the East Bharṭṛ hari and from the West Heidegger, as far as their understanding of the relationship between language and reality.

The main thrust of this thesis is to explicate the relationship between language and reality. Accordingly, we propose to analyse and examine four different aspects of such relationship what I have termed as *Four Pillars of the relationship* between language and reality. Therefore, in the *Fifth Chapter* which is entitled as *Concluding Remarks*, we propose to outline the rational and philosophical implication of the outcome of the thesis.



• CHAPTER ONE

The Atomic Interpretation of the relationship between Language and Reality after early Wittgenstein

There is no question of doubt that early Wittgenstein holds an important position in the history of linguistic philosophy. No other philosopher retains consistency as far as the development of linguistic philosophy as a method of philosophy. Even though Wittgenstein in some sense or other was influenced by Russell and others, but his philosophical ingenuity was unparalleled in compare to others linguistic philosophers. It is indeed true to say that within the domain of linguistic philosophy; there we observe several methods through which the relationship between language and reality can be established. Semantic approach is one of them. One should be kept in mind that the term *semantic* is a broad concept. Therefore, before delving into this approach, it is prerequisite for us first to explain what we actually mean by the term *semantics*? So long the term semantics remains unspecified; there is no point of talking about the relationship between language and reality from this perspective. Semantics is a very far-reaching and diverse field. It does not to promote any single current approach, but to give the reader access to some of the central ideas in the field of linguistic philosophy. Generally speaking, *semantics is the study of meaning communicated through language*. One of the insights of modern linguistics is that speakers of a language have different types of linguistic knowledge, including how to pronounce words, how to construct sentences, and about the meaning of individual words and sentences. Thus, linguistic description has different *levels of analysis*. There are three available and well known levels of analysis, such as, *Phonology, Syntax and Semantics*. *Phonology* is the study of what sounds a

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language has and how these sounds are combined to form words; *syntax* is the study of how words can be combined into sentences; and *semantics* is the study of the meanings of words and sentences. One can study of the meanings of words and sentences in different ways. Accordingly, there we find different methods and approaches within semantics. Therefore, it has to be specified in what sense we interpret the semantic approach of the relationship between language and reality.

Our main concern is to show the relationship between language and reality. Therefore, when we deal with semantics, we certainly look at the basic question how it is that we can use language to describe the world. In semantics the action of picking out or identifying with words is often called *referring or denoting*. Thus, one can use the word Paris to refer to or denote the city. The entity referred to, in this case the city, is usually called the *referent* or *denotatum*. Some linguistic philosophers, like John Lyons, separate the terms refer and denote. For them, the term *denote* is used for the relationship between *linguistic expression and the world*, while the term *refer* is used for the action of a speaker in picking out entities in the world. Simplistically, it can be said that referring is what speakers do, while denoting is the property of words. Secondly, unlike reference, denotation is a stable relationship in a language which is not dependent on any one use of a word. Reference, on the contrary, is a moment by moment relationship. Semantic as a school of linguistic philosophy in general prefers proper names as the nominees of language which fundamental function is to denote or to refer. In this sense, there develops referential theory of meaning. Referential theory determines the meaning of linguistic expression. It states that a name or a linguistic expression would be meaningful if it refers something other than the expression under consideration. More succinctly, it can be said that a sentence is to be meaningful if it refers something other than the sentence itself. This clearly reflects that when we deal with

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semantics, the meaning of the sentence is determined on the basis of the relationship of two independent entities, one belongs to language and the other belongs to world. In language, it would generally be a proper name or the sentence constructed on the basis of proper name and in the world or reality so to speak, it would be an object. Thus, in a sense, semantic theory of language is external. It is external in the sense that here language normally refers to some non-linguistic entity having its independent or separate existence.

The pertinent question is: how semantic approach ensures the relationship between language and reality? Of course, referential theory has been developed in this regard and within the analytic tradition it has been treated as the leading theory as far as the relationship between language and reality is concerned. Even considering the loopholes of referential theory, there develops two versions of referential theory, such as, naive version and sophisticated version. Naive version is the general version of referential theory. Sophisticated version offers stringent relationship between language and reality. We think if we confine ourselves within the form of naive version, we cannot overcome the problem of metaphysics. Let us explicate this point. There is no question of doubt that language does refer. Language, according to Frege, is associated with thought. Even though Frege conceives that thought is independent from human, but at the same time he claims that every sentence expresses thought. In a sense, language is the bearers. We sense that language refers indisputably, but whether the reference of language footholds on reality is a matter of serious philosophical questions. Many would say that language refers but the reference of language does not foothold on reality in the real sense of the term. Accordingly, if we say that a sentence is meaningful if it refers something other than the sentence itself, then whether its reference does foothold on reality or not would be a serious philosophical question. Owing to overcome this philosophical jolt, sophisticated version of referential theory has been proposed. It states that a sentence is to be meaningful if

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it refers something other than the sentence itself and there must be a *referential connection* between the sentence and what it refers to. That means, the *referential connection constitutes the meaning of the sentence under consideration*. Thus, the sophisticated version of referential theory ensures an extreme form of realism because the attribute ‘referential connection’ eventually nullifies any sort of speculative referential entities that may be treated as the entities of the world or reality.

Of course, there are different views of how semantic even though each of them approaches the ability to talk about the world. Two of these are particularly important in current semantic theories. One approach is known as *referential approach* and the other approach is known as *representational approach*. We have already outlined the practice of referential semantic. Thus, to provide a semantic description for a language, one has to show how the expression of the language can ‘hook onto’ the world. More specifically, it can be said that here we can give the meaning of words and sentences by showing how they relate to situations. Nouns, for example, are meaningful because they denote entities in the world. Names or proper names stand for nouns. Even though linguistic philosophers are involved into a tug of war regarding the very nature of proper names, but one thing is clear to all of them that every name is a name of something. To be a name is to be a name of something. A name denotes an object, but whether the object as denoted by a name footholds on reality or not is a matter of sustained serious philosophical debate.

According to the proponents of representational approach, our ability to talk about the world depends on our *mental models* of it. In this regard, language represents a theory about reality, i.e. about the types of things and situations in the world. Thus, theories of meaning can be called representational. Even though both referential and representational approaches are semantics in nature, they actually focus on different aspects of the same process. Both

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approaches talk about the world, but their way of talking is different. According to the referential theorists meaning derives from language are eventually grounded in reality. On the other hand, according to representational theorists, meaning derives from language being a reflection of our *conceptual structures*. Thus, even though both the approaches are dealing with semantics, the present chapter *will address exclusively on the referential approach of semantics*.

Referential approach of Semantics:

When we say that language communicates, what does language communicate? Language actually communicates our thoughts. How does language communicate our thoughts? Language communicates our thoughts in terms of reference or denotation. Even though there are other means through which language communicates thoughts, but the referential aspect is one of the important aspects of semantics. However, there are different types of reference. Even though language communicates in terms of reference, but not all linguistic items are referential in nature. There are both *referential as well as non-referential expressions*. There are some linguistic expressions which can never be used to refer. For example, the words, *so, very, maybe, if, not, all etc.* Such words do, of course, contribute meaning to the sentences they occur in and thus help sentences to denote, but they do not themselves identify entities in the world. We consider these words as *intrinsically non-referring items*. By contrast, when someone says that the noun *cat* in a sentence like *That cat looks vicious*; the noun is a referring expression since it is being used to identify an entity. Thus, we can say that *nouns* are potentially referring expressions. The second use of the distinction between *referring and non-referring* is that there are some instances when the speakers use them to refer and there are some other instances when the speakers use them not to refer. When the word *cholecystectomy* is used in the sentence: He performed a cholecystectomy this morning; the

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speaker is referring to an individual operation. However, instead of this sentence, if the speaker utters the sentence: A cholecystectomy is a serious procedure; the speaker is not referring to an individual operation. Here the nominal has a generic interpretation.

There are some referring expressions which are constant and fixed. Some expressions will have the same referent across the range of utterances, e.g. *the Eiffel Tower* or *the Pacific Ocean*. Others have their reference totally dependent on context. For example, I wrote to you. In this sentence to identify the referents of *I* and *You*, we need to know who is speaking to whom. Expressions like the *Pacific Ocean* are sometimes described as having *constant reference*, while expressions like *I*, *you*, *she*, etc. are said to have variable reference. Variable reference is also named as *dexis*, a term from Greek meaning roughly ‘pointing’ as a label for words whose denotational capability requires contextual support.

Here we shall exclude non-referential terms completely and confine ourselves within the nominals, i. e. names. Names after all are labels for people, places, etc. and often seem to have little other meaning. As names sometimes require context for identifying its referent what may be called the descriptive content, we exclude such nominals or names while investigating the relationship between language and reality from the semantic aspect. Here we admit the Russellian distinction between logically proper name and ordinary proper name. As ordinary proper names are descriptive or in most cases contextual, we exclude ordinary proper names from our investigation. Here we particularly confine ourselves with logically proper names and in this context we select Wittgensteinian model of *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*.

Wittgenstein while developing his atomic or logical interpretation of the relationship between language and reality in his celebrated book *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* took insights from Russellian concept of logical proper name. Thus, in one sense, it can be said

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that Wittgenstein's atomistic interpretation of the relationship between language and reality is pro-Russellian atomistic interpretation of the relationship between language and reality. We think that the relationship between language and reality as comprehended by Wittgenstein actually hinges on three key concepts, such as, language, reality and the relationship between language and reality. As an original thinker, Wittgenstein gives insightful explanation of each of these concepts. In this Chapter, we propose to develop the atomic interpretation of the relationship between language and reality after early Wittgenstein. This *Chapter* would be classified into three different sections. In the first section we propose to analyze after Wittgenstein, *the nature of language*. In the second section, we propose to analyze *the nature of reality* and in the third section; we propose to analyze *the relationship between language and reality* after Wittgenstein.

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The Nature of Language:

It should be kept in mind that language is a fascinating tool that can be used as a medium of communication. However, to declare language as a mere medium of communication is not the main concern of linguistic philosophers in particular and philosophers of language in general. At the very outset of linguistic revolution, it was resolved that all philosophical problems are linguistic in nature and they were created out of misinterpretation or misapprehension of language. Philosophy is all about of clarification of language, to know about the underlying meaning or logic of language. On the basis of this perception, metaphysics had generally been nullified as meaningless because of its mystical philosophical outlook. The logical positivist interpretation of the criterion of meaning appeared through the Principle of Verification is a case in point. Thus, with the appearance of

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linguistic turn, philosophy and language tangled together. In this regard, resolution had been made on the ground that language is philosophy and philosophy is language. However, a debate among linguistic philosophers was cropped up immediately regarding the nature of language. Philosophy is all about of clarification of language. But what should be the nature of language? There are numerous types of language as there are numerous types of linguistic community. Each and every linguistic community has definite and unique language. Therefore, it would be very pertinent to know about the nature of language for investigating or knowing the *true nature of reality*. We have already stated that linguistic philosophers have involved in *a tug of war* for determining the true nature of reality. In this regard, linguistic philosophers have been divided into two broad groups; philosophically known as *ideal language philosophers* and *ordinary language philosophers*. Ordinary language philosophers are in favour of natural language. They proclaim that natural or ordinary language is adequate for doing philosophy and one may employ ordinary language as a philosophical method. On the contrary, those who adhered in favour of ideal or logical language would like to say that ordinary language by its very nature is ambiguous, vague. As a result of that ordinary language cannot be comprehended as an authentic method of linguistic philosophy. They therefore have called for *linguistic revision* on the basis of which an artificial or constructed or logical form of language may be formulated by selecting minimum non-ambiguous vocabularies from ordinary language. The semantic school represents ideal or ordinary language and therefore, the proponents of semantics are called linguistic revisionists.

Early Wittgenstein has been regarded as a leading campaigner of ideal language philosopher. Like many other proponents of ideal language, in fact, Wittgenstein was in favour of accurate symbolism because the language he anticipated is logical in nature. The distinctive feature of

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symbolism is that it always without exception portrays something 'definite'. While narrating Wittgenstein's position about logical perfect language, Russell says, "A logically perfect language has rules of syntax which prevents non-sense, and has single symbols which always have a definite and unique meaning."⁶ Wittgenstein seems to have conceived that ordinary language fails to address the meaning of language. He claims that proper or ideal language would be one that will adequately address on meaning. In this regard, he claims that the essential aspect of language is to assert or deny facts. Thus, when Wittgenstein talks of language, he puts emphasize more on the authentic aspect of language. Language refers. We have already stated it. But the reference or picturing or mapping or representing or hooking must be authentic. Natural language has been rejected by early Wittgenstein because like others philosophers belonging to semantic tradition he conceives that ordinary language because of its ambiguity can never be authentic to give us meaning. Thus, early Wittgenstein has expressed serious reservation regarding the authenticity of ordinary language. In this regard, early Wittgenstein has been influenced by Russell's concept of logical proper name. Thus, when we propose to consider the nature of language after early Wittgenstein, we have to analyze the nature of language within the perspective of ideal language or logical language. The language Wittgenstein anticipated in his *Tractatus* is known as propositional language.

The Nature of Proposition:

What then is the nature of proposition? Why does Wittgenstein prefer propositional language instead of other form of language? The term proposition again is a very dubious concept as many philosophers in the past have engaged to equate proposition with thought or judgment or the meaning of sentence. However, Wittgenstein understands or so to speak was desired to

⁶Russell., Bertrand, *Introduction: Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, translated by D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness, London and New York, p. x.

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interpret proposition in the logical sense. We know that logic deals with proposition. In this regard, one may start with propositional or truth-functional logic. Even though, Frege has been treated as the founder of modern elementary logic, such as, propositional and Predicate logic, but Wittgenstein in his celebrated book *Tractatus* has offered us the schema of truth-functional logic. In philosophers, the term proposition has been interpreted at least in three different contexts. Ordinary laymen in the most general sense find no serious gulf between sentence and proposition. So they use these two terms inter-changeably. However, in the real philosophical sense, proposition is being comprehended as the *meaning of sentence*. If proposition is said to be the meaning of sentence, then in a sense, sentence would differ from proposition. Sentence would be physical because they can be written on the black-board, but the meaning of sentence, i.e., proposition cannot be written on the black-board because proposition is non-physical. Proposition is mental. One may compare proposition with thought as comprehended by Frege or with judgment as eliminated long back by Immanuel Kant. However, Wittgenstein's interpretation of proposition is logical. A logical proposition must be either true or false. According to Wittgenstein, every proposition has two senses, the positive or negative, i.e., true or false. Thus, by language, Wittgenstein means the totality of propositions. That is why, Wittgenstein explicates the language of *Tractatus* in terms of propositions. In this regard, Wittgenstein says the whole *Tractatus* is constituted by only *seven propositions*, such as:

P1: The world is all that is the case.

P2: What is the case – a fact – is the existence of states of affairs.

P3: A logical picture of facts is a thought.

P4: A thought is a proposition with a sense.

P5: A proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions.

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P6: The general form of a truth -function is $[\bar{P}, \bar{\epsilon}, N(\bar{\epsilon})]$. This is the general form of a proposition.

P7: What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.

We think that every proposition bears a lot of philosophical insight. To explicate the meaning of proposition is really a difficult task. More importantly, if we carefully try to understand the sense of these propositions (P1 – P7), it seems clear to us that the seventh proposition (P7) is a warning or a strict guideline to the readers of the *Tractatus*. It states that if anybody is not in a position to speak authentically or in terms of proposition, it is better for him to pass over in silence. The theme of this proposition clearly suggests the severity of the relationship between language and reality of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. Thus the language of *Tractatus* would not certainly be the language of sentences, because Wittgenstein says that not all sentences would be propositions, but all propositions must be sentences. According to Wittgenstein, all propositions are sentences; but not all sentences are propositions. In fact, this is the general interpretation of the logical sense of the term proposition. As not all sentences are propositions and the sum total of sentences is language, language, in general, according to early Wittgenstein, can be expressed in terms of proposition. *Language in general cannot be regarded as propositional language*. Therefore, when Wittgenstein tries to understand his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* in terms of propositions, cited above, he actually wants to address propositional language. A proposition always expresses something either in the form of ‘to be the case’ or ‘not to be the case’. Sentences falling sort of expressing anything in this way would not be regarded as proposition. Thus, propositional language has a distinctive feature or identification on the basis of which one can identify whether a sentence is to be a proposition or not. What is your name?- is a sentence, but certainly is not a proposition because it is not associated with ‘to be the case’ or ‘not to be the

case'. The question then arises, how do we have propositional language? This is where the relevance of revisionism comes into being.

Linguistic revisionism

Like Russell and many other revisionists, Wittgenstein equally favours linguistic revisionism in a rigorous manner. According to Wittgenstein, revisionism is a must for constructing artificial language or logical language or in precise, the language of *Tractatus*. Thus, one can formulate *Tractatarian* form of language, i.e., propositional language by way of revising natural or ordinary language. This is made possible by eradicating the non-referential expression as well as expression relating to descriptive content. In this regard, Wittgenstein was hugely influenced by Russell. According to Wittgenstein, real or authentic language must be symbolic in nature. Symbols do not have a determine 'genus' in natural language. Ordinary or natural language is erroneous and in order to overcome the errors, one must employ symbolic language. The genesis of symbolic language, according to Wittgenstein, is that it always obeys the rules of logical grammar – of logical syntax. In this regard, Wittgenstein says that the ideography of Frege and Russell is such a language, which, however, still does not exclude all errors. Thus, it seems to us that Wittgenstein introduces the idea of a logical syntax as a kind of syntax which a 'perfect language' should possess in opposition to ordinary language, the syntax which is not logical. Russell says that in order to understand Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, it is necessary to realize his theory which deals with symbolism which would have to be fulfilled by a logically perfect language.

When revisionist in general were satisfied with the vocabulary of proper name as the suitable candidates of ideal language, Russell revealed that there was a problem in considering proper names as such as the minimum vocabulary of ideal language. In this regard, Russell classified

proper names into *logically proper name known by acquaintance* and *ordinary proper name known by description*⁷.

Wittgenstein takes the clue from Russell. He was indebted to Russell in this regard. Thus, when he was talking about propositional language, he actually wanted to accumulate only logically proper name from the domain of ordinary or natural language. Propositional language is a sort of logically perfect language. The constituents of propositions are proper names and relations.

Thus, Wittgenstein's propositional language is truth functional in nature.

The Constituents of Proposition:

What then are the constituents of proposition? It is a matter of fact that the atomists, the reductionists have developed the system on the basis of some basic constituents. Or in other words, it can be said that on the basis of some primitive constituents, the language is being formulated. We notice the same in Wittgenstein as well. Even though Wittgenstein says that the language is the totality of propositions, but the propositions he anticipated are constructed out of names and relational terms. Thus, in this sense his understanding of proposition is *atomic in nature*. It is atomic in the sense that there are some unique and basic elements of proposition which can be identified by anatomizing the proposition under consideration in a logical manner. That means, every proposition can be farther analyzed into atomic proposition and an atomic proposition can again be farther analyzed into basic elements, i.e., names. That is why; his interpretation of proposition is called *atomic interpretation*. According to Wittgenstein, a complex proposition can be further anatomized into simple proposition what Wittgenstein termed as *elementary proposition*. Elementary proposition can again be analyzed into names. Names cannot be farther analyzed. Names are the atomic,

⁷ See Russell, B., "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description", in *The Problems of Philosophy*, London: Home University Library, 1912, chapt. V, pp. 31-41.

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unanalyzable forms of proposition, i.e., language. Even though in one sense names can farther be broken into alphabets; but Wittgenstein does not think so. Because the alphabets of a name cannot, in isolation, refer anything. The alphabet of a name lacks referential credibility. As every name denotes an object, name, according to Wittgenstein, is the atomic form of proposition or language. Here Wittgenstein understands names as logically proper names having no descriptive content.

Let us explain this point by citing an example. However, it should be kept in mind that the example we propose to discuss here is not Wittgensteinian. Wittgenstein does not offer us any example to understand his theory. His interpretation of the relationship between language and reality is purely based on logical analysis where there is no room for descriptive content. Wittgenstein tries to develop his theory in logical space or simplistically in truth-functional space. Having said this, though Wittgenstein has never ever cited any example in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, but for the sake of making his theory clear to the readers, commentators elsewhere have often taken examples in order to understand Wittgenstein. The proposition: “The cat is on the mat” – is constituted by two proper names, namely, ‘the cat’, ‘the mat’ along with the relational term ‘one is on the other.’ The proposition is analyzed in two parts, such as, ‘the cat’ and ‘the mat’. ‘The cat’ and ‘the mat’ are two names. They are the basic elements or the atomic elements of the proposition under consideration. ‘The cat’ and ‘the mat’, in fact, cannot formulate the original proposition without the help of relational term ‘one is on the other.’ Even though *relation* or relational term plays significant role in formulating atomic proposition, but Wittgenstein does not consider relational term as a proper name. The question then naturally arises: why does Wittgenstein not consider *relational term* such as, ‘one is on the other’ as a name? According to Wittgenstein, although the relational term immensely helps to formulate *Tractatarian* form of proposition, but

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relation, in general, cannot be regarded as a name because like name, relational term does not *refer* anything. As relational term like name does not refer anything, therefore, relational term cannot be regarded as name. Thus, reference counts the most while considering the semantic model of the relationship between language and reality. Of course, different linguistic philosopher belonging to semantics has introduced various names to address the relationship between language and reality. Wittgenstein while developing this relationship also introduced the picture theory of proposition (meaning) instead referential theory of meaning. The same is being observed in the case of other philosopher as well. It thus seems to us after Wittgenstein that names only with the help of relational term can constitute logical proposition. In the above case the names, such as, ‘the cat’, ‘the mat’ along with the help of the relational term ‘one is on the other’ one can formulate the proposition “The cat is on the mat.” Names, for Wittgenstein, are the vocabularies of propositional language and names along with relational terms constitute elementary proposition, complex general proposition and thus language. Thus, the nature of language of Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus* is propositional. Propositional language is atomic as it can be analyzed into names which are unanalyzable. Moreover, the very nature of propositional language is that it is truth-functional and can be analyzed, without exception, in terms of truth and falsity in logical space.

Section – Two

The Nature of Reality (World):

So far we have discussed about proposition as the nominee of language, the basic constituents of proposition and the mechanism of formulating or constructing proposition as well. We think that Wittgenstein’s atomic approach of proposition is stringent in nature unlike others philosophers belonging to the camp of semantic tradition where meaning count the most. Let

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us examine after Wittgenstein the nature of reality (world). As far as the nature of reality is concerned Wittgenstein's position is unique and radical in nature. Even though different linguistic philosophers, over the course of the history of the literature, have given us different perceptions of the term reality but Wittgenstein's position is philosophically revolutionary in nature. While explaining the nature of reality, Wittgenstein, at the very outset of his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, says: "The world is all that is the case"⁸ (P1). This remark of Wittgenstein eventually makes him a distinctive thinker. We think the underlying significance of this remark actually sets the tone of his atomic interpretation of language. It reflects that Wittgenstein understands reality in terms of the phrase 'that is the case'. But the question is: What is the case? Immediately in replying to this question Wittgenstein in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* 1.1 says, "The world is the totality of facts, not of things."⁹ We think these remarks of Wittgenstein bear a lot of philosophical significance which is exclusively Wittgensteinian in nature. These two remarks of Wittgenstein actually draw the limits of the world or the limits of the reality. Here he intends to say that anything other than fact cannot be the part of reality. Anything can be a part of reality if it would be expressed either in the form of 'to be the case' or 'not to be the case'. We have already stated that every proposition has two senses, either the proposition is true (to be the case) or the proposition is false (not to be the case). Thus, the concept of fact and the two senses of propositions are the hallmark of reality to be understood.

The question then is: Why does Wittgenstein claim that the world is the totality of facts? Why does he not think that the world is the totality of things? Does it make sense to assume that Wittgenstein was not concerned about things? There is no question of doubt that by adopting the view that the world is the totality of facts, but not things, Wittgenstein actually has

⁸ Wittgenstein, L., *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, translated by D.F.Pears and B.F. McGuinness, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., London, 1961, p.5.

⁹Ibid., p.5.

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deviated himself from the general perception regarding the concept of the world (reality). Our common sense view is that the world is the totality of things. Even Locke claimed that the world is the totality of experience. We equally sense a familiar view in Strawson. Strawson in his *Individuals* claims that the world is the totality of particulars and he, in fact, understands particulars in terms of objects. Thus, Wittgenstein by claiming the world (reality) as the totality of facts takes a different standpoint which does not go along with other linguistic philosophers as well as with the common sense view. Why does then, Wittgenstein claim that the world is totality of facts? We think that Wittgenstein does not fail to realize the commonsensical position that the world (reality) is the totality of things. Having said this Wittgenstein prefers to know the world (reality) as the totality of facts simply for the sake of clarity of the world (reality). Wittgenstein actually, as a firm believer of atomism, tries to interpret reality (world) meaningfully. He conceives the term meaningful with the background of truth-functional logic. Accordingly, the term meaningfulness is conceived by Wittgenstein truth-functionally, i.e., in terms of, truth and falsity. According to Wittgenstein, what is a fact *is a fact* and a fact is something which makes a proposition as either true or false. That means language, i.e., proposition pictures a fact (an item of reality) and a fact, in turn, makes the proposition as either true or false. As Wittgenstein understands language in terms of proposition and reality for Wittgenstein is something known by proposition, the representative of proposition, i.e., reality must be a fact. Precisely, we can say that in order to conceive reality i.e., the world truth-functionally, Wittgenstein prefers to say that the world is the totality of facts; but not things.

Let us make this point clear by citing an example. For example, the classroom of M.A. part 1 of the department of Philosophy of the University of North Bengal may be described *in terms of things* as well as *in terms of facts*. If we describe the classroom in terms of *the totality of*

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things then the description of the classroom does not create a *mental picture* to the hearers of the description. On the contrary, if we describe the classroom not in terms of *the totality of things*, but in terms of the *totality of facts*, as Wittgenstein does, then it would create a clear *mental picture* to the hearers. By hearing the description the hearer in the first case cannot draw the *mental picture of the classroom* because he does not have a *mental picture* of the classroom. On the other hand, by hearing the description in the second case the hearer can draw the picture of the room because in such a case the hearer does have a *mental picture*. To describe the room as *the totality of things*, the speaker just describes the room by uttering abruptly the catalogue of thing available in the room. Whereas, to describe the room as *the totality of facts*, the speakers describe the room in terms of elementary propositions where each and every thing of this room has been described *in terms of relation* to other things.

Suppose, I being the student of M.A. part 1 of the department of Philosophy, describe the classroom to my mother who did not know anything about this classroom beforehand. I may describe this classroom from common sense perspective, i.e., in terms of *the totality of things* or may describe the classroom to my mother as *the totality of facts* as Wittgenstein does in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. If I describe the classroom to my mother in terms of *totality of things* then I can describe it just by mere cataloguing or abruptly uttering the objects available in the room. In such a description, my mother would no longer be in a position to draw the *mental picture*. She just hears the description of my classroom knowing the fact that my classroom contains such and such objects. Instead of this, if I take Wittgensteinian approach then I may describe the classroom to my mother just by uttering it in terms of elementary propositions where one name is related to another name and it, in turn, pictures a fact where one object is related to another object. After hearing the description in this sense, my mother would be in a position to have a *mental picture* of the room and on the basis of

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this *mental picture* she enables to draw the *picture of the room* which would reflect the actual room, i.e., the classroom of M.A. in which I used to take part.

The above example, at least, gives us a sense why does Wittgenstein prefer to say that the world is the totality of facts. He conceives the world as the totality of facts from a particular philosophical interest. However, this does not lead us to say or assume that Wittgenstein has not realized that the world is the totality of objects. There is no point of denying the fact that the world is the totality of objects from descriptive point of view as we noticed in the common sense view. But the only problem is that if we assume that the world as the totality of objects then we can only *describe the world*, but we cannot *picture the world*. Wittgenstein's intention was not to give a mere description of the world or rather to say about the world. His philosophical intention is *to show* or *to picture* the world in a logical space. Wittgenstein actually wants to picture the world in terms of *showing*, in terms of mapping; but not in terms of *saying*, nor in terms of description. The description of the world or *the saying of the world* may not be in the form of *to be the case* or *not to be the case*. Therefore, describing or saying the world requires a kind of language which would not be propositional language or truth-functional language. But Wittgenstein, we have claimed, desires propositional or truth-functional language. According to Wittgenstein, every proposition has two senses, either the proposition would be true or the proposition would be false or either the proposition is conceived in terms of *to be the case* or the proposition is to be conceived in terms of *not to be the case*. A proposition, for Wittgenstein, pictures a fact (reality) and a fact in turn makes the proposition expressible either in terms of *to be the case* or *not to be the case*. A proposition is true if it pictures something in terms of *to be the case* and the same proposition is false if it pictures something as *not to be the case*. That is why, Wittgenstein in

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2.13 of *TLP* says, “The facts in logical space are the world.”¹⁰ He then says, “The world (reality in our sense) divides into facts”¹¹ (*TLP* 1.2).

Thus, the very nature of reality, according to Wittgenstein, is that it must be expressed or pictured in terms of proposition and reality is to be conceived in terms of *to be the case* or *not to be the case*. In the second proposition of the *Tractatus*, while explicating the nature of reality, Wittgenstein says, “What is the case – a fact – is the existence of states of affairs”¹² (*TLP* 2). We have already outlined the concept of fact (reality). Here we can say that a fact can farther be anatomized in terms of *states-of-affairs*. A *state-of-affairs*, according to Wittgenstein, is a combination of objects or things. A thing or an object cannot farther be analyzed. Thus, from the reality side, we have objects as the ultimate constituents of the world which has been expressed in common sense view as the *totality of objects*. Wittgenstein then claims that when things are combined to form a *state-of-affairs*, this would ensure that the possibility of forming a particular *state-of-affairs* must be there in them. In Wittgensteinian *Tractatus* nothing is accidental. Everything is logical and everything should be conceived in terms of *logical space*. Every object or thing is independent, but this form of independence is a form of dependence when one thing is connected with other to form a *state-of-affairs*. As everything is conceived in logical space and logical space, in turn, incorporates all possibilities, then no new possibility will discover later. That is why, Wittgenstein has rightly pointed out that objects contain the possibility of all situations and the possibility of its occurring in *state-of-affairs* is *the form of an object*. While illuminating the nature of reality, Wittgenstein in his *Tractatus* says, “Objects are simple”¹³ (*TLP* 2.02). We have already stated that in reality side objects are the ultimate constituents or furniture of

¹⁰ Ibid., p.5.

¹¹ Ibid, p.5

¹² Ibid, p.5.

¹³ Ibid., p.7.

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the reality (world). Here Wittgenstein makes it clear why he conceives object as simple. He says that objects make up the *substance of the world* and as a constituent of substance, *object cannot be composite*.

What then is the philosophical perseverance of admitting substance? In this regard, Wittgenstein says that if the world has no substance, then the sense of a proposition would depend on the sense of another true proposition and in a situation like this one cannot sketch or draw any picture of the world. This position of Wittgenstein is ontological in nature. One can make a contrast Wittgenstein with Frege in this regard. Frege while illuminating the distinction between sense and reference brings the concept of thought. He then says that thought is independent of human. However, thought is being expressed by means of language. A sentence being an integral part of language expresses thought. If thought is not admitted, then one mode of presentation depends of another mode of presentation very similar to the case of Wittgenstein. According to Wittgenstein, any world, whatever it may be, must have a form common with the real world. The real form is unalterable and objects which are simple, constitutes this unalterable form, i.e., substance. The substance of the world can only determine a form. The other important feature of *Tractarian* objects is that they are *colourless*. An object is colourless in the sense that it cannot, in isolation, bear a sense in the form of *to be the case* or *not to be the case*. For example, mere utterance of a table as table does not bear any sense. If one utters in successive occasion table, table...table, it does not bear any sense and hence it is colourless. As objects are colourless, i.e., as objects do not bear any sense, that is why, Wittgenstein instead of saying that the world is *the totality of objects*, prefers to say that the world is *the totality of facts*.

An object is represented through space, time and colour. These are the forms of object. The unalterable form ensures that there must be objects in the world. Object, being simple and

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colourless, is unalterable and subsistent. Only the configuration of objects produces states-of-affairs in logical space. In a state-of-affairs (i.e., a form of reality) objects are linked into one another just like the links of a chain in a determinate relation and such determinate relation, in turn, actually portrays the structure of the *state-of-affairs*. According to Wittgenstein, the structure of the *state-of-affairs* is made possible because of the unalterable form. That is why, Wittgenstein elsewhere in the *Tractatus* remarks that *form* is the possibility of the structure. Every *state-of-affairs* (i.e., an icon of reality) existence or non-existence, finds specific structure because of its unalterable form. The totality of existing *states-of-affairs* is the world (reality). The totality of existing *states-of-affairs* equally determines which *states-of-affairs* do not exist. That's why, Wittgenstein has rightly pointed out that the existence and non-existence *states-of-affairs* are reality and the sum total of reality i.e., the sum total of facts is the world.

Thus, in the second proposition of the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein has outlined the concept of object as the constituents of world or reality. He equally has emphasized on the concept of substance, i.e., the unalterable form of the world. It seems to us that the idea of states of affairs is more fundamental. A state of affairs or a state of things is a combination of objects or things. Wittgenstein's elucidation of the role of objects in states of affairs is *atomic* in the traditional sense of this world. Wittgenstein shows a remarkable grasp of the inner structure of an atomic theory. Even Wittgenstein very often defenses of his atomic ontology. The main concern of Wittgenstein's atomic ontology is to set up the underlying relationship between the structures of language to the structure of the world. While explaining how objects constitute states of affairs, Wittgenstein elsewhere in his *Tractatus* has grasped the fundamental consequences of an atomic ontology. In this regard, in TLP:2.011, Wittgenstein says, "It is essential to things that they should be possible constituents of states of

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affairs.”¹⁴ If we think that it is not essential feature of objects that they are possible constituents of states of affairs, then it would actually mean that it is possible for an object A to be a constituent in states of affairs and in such a case some further combination of objects, would have to obtain. Then in such a situation, A would not count as an object in the sense demanded by atomic theory. Wittgenstein says, “It would seem to be a sort of accident, if it turned out that a situation would fit a thing that could already exist entirely on its own” (TLP:2.0121.). We think this position certainly goes against a natural way of viewing an atomic theory. In a situation like this, we tend to think of atoms moving about freely, combining and separating again. Wittgenstein, of course, denies such possibility of an object having a potential for both a combined and uncombined status. To make it clear, Fogelin remarks, “There are no eligible bachelors in the *Tractarian* world.”¹⁵

We think in order to understand Wittgenstein; one has to understand his concept of logical space. We have already stated that Wittgenstein actually tries to establish the relationship between language and reality in logical space. In this regard, Wittgenstein might have developed a *purely combinatory theory* of meaning that all objects are alike in being fit to enter into combination with any other objects. The logical space of the world would be all the possible ways in which its objects can combine. Logical space is truth-functional space where the possibility of every combination of objects in different possible situations is given. In this regard, Wittgenstein in his TLP 2.0123 says, “If I know an object I also know all its possible occurrences in states of affairs.”¹⁶ In this sense, it is generally assumed that every possibility of combination of an object in logical or truth-functional space must be part of the nature of the object. Since the possibility of combination of object is based on the very nature of the

¹⁴ Wittgenstein, L., *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, op.cit., p.5.

¹⁵ Fogelin, R. J. *Wittgenstein*, Routledge and Kehan Paul, 1976, P.6.

¹⁶ Wittgenstein, L., *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, op.cit., p.6.

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object under consideration, one may not ignore the ontological aspect or what Wittgenstein calls the substance. On the basis of this ontological foundation, one may come to know the internal properties of an object. Wittgenstein in various occasions in *Tractatus* says that if something is a possible constituent in states of affairs, then it is necessarily a possible constituent in states of affairs or some states of affairs. Or if something is a possible constituent of a certain kind of states of affairs, then it is necessarily a possible constituent of that kind of state of affairs. Even Wittgenstein does not deny the possibility of combination of object with regard to *dependence and independence*. Wittgenstein in his TLP: 2.0122 says, “ Things are independent insofar as they can occur in all possible situations, but this form of independence is a form of connexion with states of affairs, a form of dependence.”¹⁷ Objects, in virtue of their form, determine the structure of the logical space of possible states of affairs. Since logical space is a space where all possible states of affairs are given, the dependence relationship between objects and states of affairs is in equilibrium. Even though Wittgenstein tries to understand the possible combinations of objects with regard to logical space, but this does not make sense to say that logical space cannot be imagined without the combination of objects. According to Wittgenstein, one can imagine empty logical space, but one cannot a thing or an object without logical space.

It thus seems to us that the basic entities of the world are atoms (objects in our case). An atom is an object that is neither the result of combining constituent entities nor the potential victim of dissolution through the separation of constituent entities. In this sense, objects are simple. An object, being an atom, is unalterable. What is unalterable is subsistent. Thus, it can be said after Wittgenstein that objects are what unalterable and subsistent, only their configuration is changing and unstable. Objects are the constituents of reality or world. An object is correlated

¹⁷ Ibid., p.6.

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with language, i.e., proper name. According to Wittgenstein, a name means an object. The object is its meaning. (TLP: 3.203). Names along with relational terms constitute proposition. In this sense, we can say after Wittgenstein that through proposition a name is the representative of an object. Objects can only be named; signs or names are their representatives. In this regard, Wittgenstein says, “Objects can only be *named*. Signs are their representatives. I can only speak *about* them: I cannot *put them into words*. Propositions can only say *how* things are, not *what* they are.”¹⁸ (TLP:3.221). Since a name according to Wittgenstein is a primitive or fundamental sign, a name cannot be dissected any further by means of a definition. Names, Wittgenstein opines, cannot further be anatomized by means of definitions.

Section Three

The relationship between Language and Reality:

So far we have explained after early Wittgenstein the nature of language as well as the nature of reality. Wittgenstein clearly specified the limits of language as well as the limits of reality or world. Beyond the limits of language, nothing can be shown and it is advisable to pass over in silence. His understanding of the nature of language as well as the nature of reality is atomic in nature. We have seen that Wittgenstein understands language in terms of proposition which can be further anatomized down to names. Names are the supposed minimum vocabularies of language. Thus, his understanding of language in terms of name is atomic in nature. Likewise, he understands reality in terms of facts and facts can farther be analyzed down to objects which are the atomic elements of fact. Thus, from language side names are the unalterable form of language and from reality side objects are the unalterable

¹⁸ Ibid., p.13.

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form of facts. Thus, his interpretation of language as well as reality i.e., facts are atomic in nature.

The pertinent question is: how is the relationship between language and reality made possible? Let us examine, after early Wittgenstein, the relationship between language and reality. Wittgenstein draws the relationship between language and reality through his celebrated picture theory of meaning or proposition. According to Wittgenstein, a proposition pictures a fact. Proposition stands as a representative of language and fact stands as a representative of reality. Wittgenstein uses the idea of picturing in a broad sense. For him a picture is a model of reality, because a proposition pictures a fact and a fact in turn makes the proposition as either true or false. For something to be a model of reality, it must be of reality first and secondly, it should be a model of it. A picture relates to reality because objects in the world have the elements of the picture corresponding to them'. In this regard Wittgenstein says, "What constitutes a picture is that its elements are related to one another in a determinate way."¹⁹ (TLP:2.14) It is because of the determinate structure that a picture appears as a model of reality. The elements of a picture, i.e., the constituents of proposition are related to one another in a determinate way represents that the things are related to one another in the same way. In this regard, Wittgenstein speaks of *pictorial relationship*.

But how does a proposition picture a fact? What are the conditions of making successful picturing? When a proposition pictures, where does it picture? These are the important questions that need to be taken care of. A proposition pictures a fact in *logical space*. But what does Wittgenstein mean by logical space? In what sense does a logical space differ from empirical space? According to Wittgenstein, logical space is a kind of space where truth-functional logic can be applied. The domain of truth-functional logic is the domain of logical

¹⁹ Ibid., p.9.

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space. Logical space covers empirical space and at the same time goes beyond the empirical space. That is why, it is said that *what is empirically impossible is logically possible*. Moreover, logical space is a space beyond which nothing can be conceived. In this sense, logical space is the conceivable space where one can be in a position to draw the mental picture.

According to Wittgenstein, a proposition pictures a fact under certain specific conditions. There must be similarity between the structure of the proposition and the structure of the fact. A proposition is constituted by names along with the help of relational term. Relational term identifies the order of the elements of the proposition. Thus, there must be a systematic order of the elements of the proposition and in this regard, the relational term plays the all-important role. Similarly, a fact is constituted by objects and there is also a systematic order of the objects of the fact. Now, a proposition can picture a fact only if there is a one-to-one correspondence between each element of the proposition with each element of the fact. That means, there must be a *pictorial relationship* between the elements of the proposition and the elements of the fact. In such a situation we can say, after Wittgenstein, that a proposition pictures a fact. In this regard, Wittgenstein in his *Tractatus* says, “In a picture objects have the elements of the picture corresponding to them. In a picture the elements of the picture are the representatives of objects.”²⁰ (*TLP* 2.13, *TLP* 2.131)

It seems clear that every element of the proposition represents an object of the fact. An element of a proposition is known as a name and an element of fact is known as an object. A name denotes an object. Thus, it seems clear that an element of a proposition, i.e., name denotes an element of fact, i.e., an object in logical space. A picture is made possible because its elements are arranged to one another in a determinate way. That is why, Wittgenstein has

²⁰Ibid., p. 8.

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rightly claimed, “A picture is a fact”²¹ (*TLP* 2.141). As a defense, Wittgenstein immediately in his *Tractatus* 2.15 says, “The fact that the elements of a picture are related to one another in a determinate way represents that things are related to one another in the same way.”²² In this regard, Wittgenstein brings the concept of *pictorial form*. Pictorial form is the possibility that things are related to one another in the same way as the elements of the picture. That is how, opines Wittgenstein, *a picture is attached to reality*. A picture reaches right up to reality. Thus, it can be said, after Wittgenstein, that in order to make the relationship between language and reality through picture theory of proposition, one has to give over emphasis on the *pictorial relationship* consists of the co-relations of the picture’s element with things. These co-relations are, according to Wittgenstein, the feelers of the picture’s element, with which the picture touches reality. Thus, with the help of pictorial relationship, we can say that there must be something identical in a picture and what it depicts. In a picture there must have in common with reality what Wittgenstein terms as *pictorial form*. However, Wittgenstein claims in *TLP* 2.172 that a picture cannot depict its pictorial form rather it displays it. Thus, every picture, according to Wittgenstein, must have its representational form without which a picture cannot be placed. This representational form of picture is called the logical form of the picture, i.e., the form of reality. A picture whose pictorial form is logical form is called a logical picture. In fact, Wittgenstein, as we have repeatedly mentioned, understands the relationship between language and reality in logical space with the background of logical picture. Thus, for Wittgenstein by making a relationship between language and reality one can have a sense that a logical picture can depict the world. A picture having logico-pictorial form is common with what it depicts.

²¹Ibid., P.9.

²²Ibid., P.9.

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Thus, according to Wittgenstein, a picture agrees with reality or fails to agree with reality. In this sense, a picture can be designated as correct or incorrect, true or false. What does a picture represent? It represents independently of its truth or falsity, by means of its pictorial form. Accordingly, the agreement or disagreement of its sense with reality constitutes its truth or falsity. Thus, to know whether a picture is true or false we have to compare it with reality. In this sense, there are no pictures that are true a-priori.

While developing the internal and atomic relationship between language and reality, early Wittgenstein in his *Tractatus* equally gives us the sense of the ontological picture based on internal structure between language and reality. Thus, there may be both internal as well as external structure of the relationship between language and reality. Wittgenstein advocates not only a *descriptive* but also an ontological picture theory in the *Tractatus*. In fact, both are interrelated. Let us examine in what sense descriptive as well as ontological picture theory are interrelated with each other.

According to Stenius²³ the difference between the descriptive and ontological picture theory is closely connected with the distinction made in the *Tractatus* between what can be ‘shown’ and what can be ‘said’. According to Wittgenstein, what can be *shown* in language cannot be *said*²⁴ (TLP 4.1212). However, Stenius observes that this statement of Wittgenstein apparently seems to be contradictory with respect to the statement of *Tractatus* 4.002, according to which a sentence *shows* how things stand, if it is true, and says that they do so stand. Perhaps, Wittgenstein uses the word ‘show’ in two different senses. In one sense of ‘show’ sentences say what they show, in another sense they *cannot* say what they ‘show’. Stenius observes that in the second sense the word ‘show’ is synonymous with ‘exhibit’. What a sentence *exhibits* but cannot say is the ‘logical form of reality’. According to

²³ Stenius, Erik, *Wittgenstein's Tractatus*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1960, p. 178.

²⁴ See Wittgenstein, L., *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, op.cit., p. 26.

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Tractatus 4.12, this is something that a sentence must have in common with reality to be capable of representing it.

According to Wittgenstein, every picture must be what we called a logically ‘adequate picture’. In order to be capable of representing a prototype either truly or falsely, a picture must already have something in common with the prototype. This is the ‘logical form of representation’, which consists in the identity in *internal structure* between the systems of elements in the picture and the prototype.

On this background, Stenius then goes on to distinguish between two different kinds of ‘showing’ with regard to picture. On the one hand, a picture ‘shows’ by the external structure of the picture field and on the other hand, it ‘shows’, according to Wittgenstein, by the internal structure of its element of the prototype. What it ‘shows’ in latter sense it cannot ‘show’ in the former sense, because the possibility of ‘showing’ in the former sense *presupposes* that the element of the prototype have the internal structure ‘shown’ in the latter sense. If we take the word ‘show’ in the latter sense we may therefore state what Wittgenstein has claimed in his *Tractatus* 2.172: “A picture can only ‘show’ or exhibit the internal structure of reality but not depict it.”²⁵


It seems clear that the internal structure of the system of element consists of the ‘logical form’ of the different elements. A sentence *shows* by its external structure how things stand ‘if it is true’ and *says* that they do so stand. It *describes* reality as having the same external structure as the sentence itself. But what a sentence shows by its external structure must be distinguished from what it ‘shows’ by the external structure of its elements. We thus arrive at the following thesis:

²⁵ Stenius, Erik, *Wittgenstein’s Tractatus*, op.cit. p. 179.

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- (i) The internal structure of reality can only be shown or exhibited by language, not described in sentences.
- (ii) The internal structure of language exhibits the internal structure of reality.

On the basis of the above consideration, we can summarize it by saying that the whole atomic interpretation of the relationship between language and reality is all about structural isomorphism (both internal as well as external) between the elements of the proposition and the elements of the fact. In this regard, we by following the book *Philosophical Relevance of Language: A Methodological Reflection*²⁶ by K.L. Das, has drawn the structural aspect of the relationship between language and reality. The structure is as follows:




The above picture clearly suggests in what sense language pictures reality after early Wittgenstein.

The above structure draws the limits of language as well as the limits of the world. Wittgenstein conceives the relationship between language and reality within the limits of

²⁶ Das, Kantilal, *Philosophical Relevance of Language: A Methodological Reflection*, Northern Book Centre, New Delhi, 2006, p. 95.

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language and also within the limits of the world. Outside the limits of language, nothing can be shown. Of course, within the limits, he emphasizes on the internal structure of language and reality. The internal structure of reality cannot be described in sentences. All meaningful sentences are descriptive actually means to say that all statements on the internal structure of reality are in effect non-sensical. In this regard, Wittgenstein intends to say that ‘ontological’ statements are always nonsensical because what they state can only be shown but not said. This clearly reflects after Wittgenstein that ontological statements about reality are not disguised ordinary statements about language. More importantly, it can be said that if one of two corresponding statements about language and reality is ontological the other is also ontological. Wittgenstein’s ontological statements about reality may in part be founded on the analysis of language. However, this does not make sense to say that they are in any sense translations of the corresponding statements about language. Corresponding ontological statements about language and reality have mutually independent import. This leads us to assume after Wittgenstein that if an ontological statement is valid for reality the corresponding statement is valid for language as well. This is how one may conceive the relationship between language and reality after Wittgenstein.



• CHAPTER TWO

The Conceptualistic Interpretation of the relationship between Language and Reality after P.F. Strawson

In the first chapter we have examined the relationship between language and reality from semantic perspective and in this regard, we have chosen Wittgenstein's *Tractarian* model as the atomic interpretation of the relationship between language and reality. We think that the atomic interpretation, even though very charming and distinctive in nature, is narrow as far as its application is concerned. It undertakes a kind of language which is artificial and private in nature. It is limited in scope and application and it has attempted to find out or locate a kind of reality which does not represent the world in general. Thus, we think that the atomic interpretation of the relationship between language and reality has been narrowed down both from the nature of language as also from the nature of reality.

The pragmatic interpretation of the relationship between language and reality is an alternative proposal of the semantic approach of the relationship between language and reality. However, we do not examine it as an alternative approach; rather we consider it as a *different* approach of the relationship between language and reality. Like semantists, the pragmatic school is comprehensive in nature because many great philosophical thinkers over the history of literature have been recognized as pragmatists. Therefore, it is very difficult to incorporate the views of all those great thinkers in a particular sequel. That is why; we have chosen the view of one particular philosopher as a *model* of the pragmatic interpretation of the relationship between language and reality. In this regard, we do prefer the pragmatic interpretation of P.F.Strawson. We think that Strawson's conceptualistic interpretation of the relationship between language and reality holds the central position of pragmatic approach.

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Therefore, in this section, we propose to analyze and examine Strawson's conceptualism as the model of the relationship between language and reality from pragmatic point of view.

We think that the pragmatic interpretation takes different approach from the semantics both in terms of language and also in terms of reality. The pragmatic interpretation of language is different from the semantic interpretation of language, because unlike semantists, the pragmatists do prefer natural language instead of artificial language. Even though like semantists, some pragmatists, including Strawson and Austin, acknowledge revision of natural language, but unlike the semantists, Strawson does not find any relevance for constructing artificial language instead of natural language. According to Strawson, there persists a constant revision even in ordinary language but such revision does not require us to divorce ordinary language and thereby to construct a different form of language known as ideal or artificial form of language. Not only that, the nature of reality is different from semantic interpretation. When we have examined Wittgensteinian interpretation of reality, we have seen that Wittgenstein has understood language as the totality of facts. Even if we go outside early Wittgenstein, we notice that the nominalist interpretation of reality has a different ontological status in compare to the pragmatic interpretation of reality. Those who advocate ideal language have tried to understand reality either in terms of denotation or in terms of connotation. Those who have attempted to understand reality in terms of denotation are called nominalists and those who have conceived reality in terms of connotation are called descriptivists. However, pragmatists are neither nominalist nor descriptivist. They have questioned reality in a different sort of environment which is very much unlikely to the semantists.

Later Wittgenstein is a leading campaigner of pragmatist. His understanding of language is ordinary language. According to Wittgenstein, ordinary language is alright and there is no

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scope for revising ordinary language. Reality, for later Wittgenstein, is something known by means of ordinary language within the *form of life*. That means, reality is nothing but *stream of life* reveals in the form of life, or custom or society by means of ordinary language. Thus, it seems clear that reality is something, according to later Wittgenstein, that has been manifested by the use of ordinary language in the form of life. Thus, we have a different interpretation and approach in later Wittgenstein that has been manifested by the use of ordinary language in the form of life. Thus, we have a different interpretation and approach in later Wittgenstein where both language and reality differ from his earlier account revealed in *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. In fact, the later Wittgenstein does not mention logical names and was no way interested to look at the application of formal or propositional language. Even unlike the other pragmatists, later Wittgenstein does not anticipate any linguistic revision of ordinary language. His consistent philosophical position is that ordinary language is adequate and alright for fulfilling the needs of the community or society.

J.L.Austin is another leading campaigner of pragmatic interpretation of the relationship between language and reality. Like Strawson, Austin in his *A Plea for Excuses*²⁷ claims that there is a *constant revision in ordinary language*. But like Strawson and unlike the semantists, Austin claims that revisionism does not require of divorcing ordinary language. Ordinary language is adequate. Thus, for Austin natural language is alright. As far as reality is concerned, Austin brings the concept of *Speech Acts*. According to Austin, reality would be something revealed through or by means of speech acts. Austin classifies speech acts into three different categories, such as, locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary. According to Austin, any meaningful utterance from the speaker is regarded as locutionary. The locutionary act generates or creates illocutionary act when the utterance of the speaker is

²⁷ Austin, J.L., "A Plea for Excuses", in *PAS*, Vol. LVII, 1956- 57.

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being communicated to the hearer. Austin gives utmost importance on illocutionary act and at times he calls it *illocutionary force* on the basis of which the hearer has prompted to do a certain action according to the desire of the speaker and thereby pass on to perlocutionary act. What Austin claims here is that reality is nothing but the outcome of speech acts performed with the collaboration between the speaker as well as the hearer. All speech acts are acts through which action can be performed. That is why; Austin conceives speech acts as performative utterances. Thus, language is ordinary or natural and language is communicated for performing acts in terms of either locutionary or illocutionary or perlocutionary. Thus, for Austin reality is not something identified by means of denotation or by means of connotation; rather reality is something conceived by means of performative utterances. Performative utterances are nothing but utterances functioning in ordinary language.

We noticed the same force in Gilbert Ryle's philosophical writings. Ryle too is a believer of ordinary language. He claims that misunderstanding of ordinary language actually occurs because of mishandling the *usage of ordinary language*. Ryle's famous concept *categorical mistake* is a case in point. According to Ryle, categorical mistake arises when one fails to understand the very nature of category and thereby uses it mistakenly in place of another category.

Having said this, we think that Strawson's position is unique in nature, as far as the understanding of the relationship between language and reality from pragmatic standpoint is concerned. That is why; we propose to choose Strawson's conceptualism as the model of the pragmatic interpretation of the relationship between language and reality.

Strawson's Conceptualism

We think that Strawson's best known book *Individuals*²⁸ actually brings a new idea as far as the relationship between language and reality is concerned. It states that any concern with logical language must include a concern with the basic operation of reference and predication.²⁹ According to Strawson, nothing could be more fundamental in speech or thought than the operation of picking out some individual item - referring to it by name or description. Therefore, one has to know about the basic or more primitive or fundamental objects or reference or subject of predication. According to Strawson, whatever the primitive or fundamental object may be, it must be spatio-temporal. That means, spatio-temporality is the essence of object. In this regard, Strawson was highly influenced by Kant.³⁰ According to Strawson, we can predicate only about spatio-temporal individuals. Spatio-temporal individuals are belonging to certain general categories and they possess certain general qualities or properties.

There is no question of doubt that Strawson's conceptualism is philosophically unique because by means of conceptualistic approach, Strawson actually brings a radical interpretation of the relationship between language and reality. In his celebrated book *Individuals*, Strawson approaches a completely different story about the nature and function of language. In this regard, Strawson envisages the phenomenon of language and discovers a world interior to us. According to Strawson, the function of language has a dual dimension of which one is the covers of other. Strawson shapes his conceptual scheme just like as a pointer which points *to the structure of the world outside as well as the structure of the world inside*.

²⁸ Strawson, P.F., *Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics*, London and New York, 1959.

²⁹ Strawson, P.F., "My Philosophy", in *The Philosophy of P.F. Strawson*, edited by P.K. Sen & R.R. Verma, ICPR, New Delhi, 1995, p.3

³⁰ Kant, Immanuel, *Critique of Pure Reason*, palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010, 1929, pp. 67-82.

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Thus, we can say that the conceptual scheme as conceived by Strawson is comprehensive in the sense that it would reflect the world as an organic whole.

The immediate question that immediately crops up is that how does conceptual scheme relate itself to reality and our experience of it? In this regard, Strawson says that the concepts have to be related to facts in the world. According to Strawson, concepts have an application in the world and definitely concepts do represent the true picture of the world by identifying particulars through successful interpersonal communication between the speaker as well as the hearer.

According to Strawson, language is a pointer to a scheme of reality or an ontological structure. By language, Strawson means, ordinary or everyday language. Strawson does not think that ideal language is necessary for showing the relationship between language and reality. Even though he believes that ordinary language is ambiguous up to a certain level. Therefore, he shares the view with other pragmatists that ordinary language needs to be revised. Strawson says that there is a constant revision in ordinary language. However, this does not make sense to say that such revisionism leads us to a different kind of language known as artificial language. Thus, as far as the nature of language is concerned, Strawson is a firm believer of natural language. Strawson, being a pragmatist, has full faith on ordinary language. Like other ordinary language philosophers, such as, later Wittgenstein, J.L.Austin, Gilbert Ryle, Strawson believes that ordinary language is alright and sufficient for reflecting the *world or reality interior to us*.

What does, then, Strawson mean by reality? According to Strawson, reality is the totality of *particulars*.³¹ Strawson understands particulars in terms of objects. Thus, we can say, after Strawson, that reality is the totality of objects. Interestingly, Strawson here takes the common

³¹ See Strawson, P.F., *Individuals*, op.cit., p.15.

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sense view of reality. He, in this regard, differs from early Wittgenstein who in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* has claimed that reality is the totality of facts.³² According to Strawson, particulars are two types, basic as well as non-basic. As the world is the totality of particulars – basic and non-basic, identification of particular by means of language is at par with the identification of reality. Therefore, identification plays the all important role in knowing the relationship between language and reality.

The question then is: How does identification is made possible? Even if there is a process of identification, but in what sense identification can be attributed as successful identification? Is any form of identification could be successful? If it would not then on what accounts one can claim that identification is made successful? In case of identification, language is the medium and reality is the end. Identification is made possible between the speaker and the hearer. Thus, in the process of identification we do require, in Strawsonian conceptual scheme, language as a tool, the users of language, i.e., the speaker and the hearer. Here Strawson claims that if the hearer can successfully identify what the speaker being referred to, then, in such a situation successful identification is made possible and accordingly the relationship between language and reality can be established. But how does Strawson assures us that successful communication between the hearer and the speaker would be made possible all without exception? If the hearer fails to identify the particular, basic or non-basic, being referred to by the speaker, then how does the relationship between language and reality is made possible? In such a situation how can we still claim about successful communication? Strawson, however, does not rule out the failure of communication between the speaker and the hearer. In fact, it is a common phenomenon in our form of life that communication may not be successful all without exception. However, this does not hamper us in grasping reality.

³² See Wittgenstein,L., *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, op.cit., p.5.

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According to Strawson, there is a fair amount of possibility of failure of making successful communication between the speaker and the hearer. And that is where the relevance of revisionism comes into being. It may be the case that at times the hearer fails to identify the particular being referred to by the speaker. Keeping this possibility in mind, Strawson has classified particulars into basic as well as non-basic. According to Strawson, there are strong philosophical presuppositions on the basis of which we can claim that the hearers in most general cases successfully identify the particulars being referred to by the speakers. Strawson, in this regard, has claimed that even though the hearer, at times, fails to identify *non-basic particular* being referred to by the speaker but such non-basic particulars in some sense or other are being co-related with *the basic particulars about which the hearer cannot fail to identify*. That means, Strawson boils down or nullifies unsuccessful communication between the speaker and the hearer in case of basic particulars.

The question again raises on what basis or on what ground Strawson claims that in case of basic particulars identification between the speaker and hearer in most general cases would be successful? In this regard, Strawson would like to say that both the speaker and the hearer do possess same conceptual structure. That means, both the speaker as well as the hearer have a unified core of conceptualism. On the basis of unified conceptual structure successful identification between the speaker as well as the hearer is made possible. Strawson farther claims that even though there is a possibility of not identifying non-basic particular, but every non-basic particular is co-related with some basic particulars which can be successfully identified by the speakers. As both the speaker as well as the hearer possesses a unified conceptual scheme, they do share almost the same knowledge about the world of particulars. Thus, for Strawson, on the basis of successful identification between the speaker and the hearer the relationship between language and reality is made possible.

Call for Universal and Unified Conceptual Scheme

Strawson advocates unified core of conceptual scheme. In this regard, Strawson was indebted to Kant. In fact, Kant brings an *epistemological revolution* in the domain of philosophy by introducing the view that *understanding makes nature*. According to Kant, materials data collected by the faculty of sensibility are well-arranged by the categories of understanding and thereby makes our world possible. Strawson, in this regard, takes clues from Kant. According to Kant, the world is composed of categories.³³ In the similar way, Strawson advocates that the world is the totality of particulars. According to Kant, every individual has the fixed notion of categories. Because of the preconceive notion of categories, every rational agent can develop the knowledge of external world. Following Kant, Strawson has analyzed the phenomenon of linguistic communication through which the universal conceptual scheme has finally been displayed.

Strawson interprets his universal core of conceptual scheme with regard to two types of metaphysics, such as, descriptive metaphysics and revisionary metaphysics.³⁴ In fact, the concept of descriptive metaphysics emerges in Strawson's *Individuals* in contrast with what he calls revisionary metaphysics. To find out the distinction between descriptive and revisionary metaphysics, Strawson in his *Individuals* says, "Descriptive metaphysics is content to describe the actual structure of our thought about the world, revisionary metaphysics is concerned to produce a better structure."³⁵

Even though, Strawson characterizes descriptive metaphysics, but in real sense, it is an enquiry of our *cognitive apparatus*, because it will show how the fundamental categories of our thought hand together and how they relate, in truth, to those formal notion which range

³³See Kant, Immanuel, *Critique of Pure Reason*, op.cit., pp. 111-119.

³⁴ See Strawson, P.F., *Individuals*, op.cit., p.9.

³⁵Ibid., p.9...but I quoted it from *Language and Conceptual Framework*, by Kantilal Das, IPQ, Vol. XXVII, No. 1 & 2, January – April, 2000, p.3.

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through all categories. Thus, for Strawson descriptive analysis, unlike revisionary analysis, is nothing but a close examination of the actual use of words. Strawson, in this regard, says, "... the claim to clarify will be seen empty unless the results achieved have some bearing on the typical philosophical problems and difficulties which arise concerning the concepts to be clarified. Now these problems and difficulties have their roots in ordinary and constructed concept, in the illusive, deceptive moods of functioning of un-formalize linguistic expression."³⁶ Strawson farther contends that descriptive analysis is the attempt to bring out the natural foundation of our conceptual apparatus. In this regard, Strawson heavily relies on the use of ordinary language. According to Strawson, the actual use of linguistic expressions is the sole and essential point of contact with the reality what he termed as *conceptual reality*. Strawson, farther contends that the use of words in ordinary language not only discloses our conceptual scheme in terms of conceptual reality; it equally determines our ontology interior to us. In this regard, Jack Kaminsky says, "P.F.Strawson has been one of few to elaborate our ontology which involves a serious ontological commitment."³⁷ The use of words in ordinary language determines our ontology by identifying particulars. In this sense it can be said, after Strawson, that particulars compose ontology. Strawson has been established this theory with the help of reference and communication and also by means of the concept of identification. Like early Wittgenstein, Strawson, however, does not think that here underlies a structural isomorphism between the structure of language and the structure of particulars. Even though Strawson with the influence of Kant admits categories as preconceive notion but like early Wittgenstein he does not claim any structural shape regarding language as well as reality. His idea is rather that the inclusion of a particular within our ontology is determined by linguistic phenomenon. In this regard, Strawson emphasizes on successful communication. According

³⁶Ibid., p.4.

³⁷ Ibid., p.4

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
to Strawson, success in this context is determined by fruitful communication in terms of identification of particular between the speaker and the hearer. Communication in Strawsonian opinion could be fruitful only when the hearer can identify the particular which is referred to by the speaker. Strawson claims that when the hearer is successful to identify a particular being referred to by the speaker, the speaker thereby earns the right to include this particular in his ontology. This is made possible simply because of the fact that the *same sector* has been occupied by both the speaker as well as the hearer. That means, it can be said alternatively, that the sector occupied by the particular should be uniquely related to the sector which the speaker and the hearer themselves occupy.

We have already stated that identification of particular is made possible because there is a single, unified, core system of relation in which everything or event has a place. Strawson, in this regard, has claimed that there is a system of spatial and temporal relation in which every particular is uniquely related to other particular. But, there must be a *process of arrangement* of particulars in space and time. The disorganized isolated data, according to Kant, collected through sensibility would not produce knowledge unless they are categorized by the active faculty of understanding. Very similar to Kant, one may notice a similar idea when the spatio-temporal framework is discovered as a passive scheme through which we receive our experience of particulars. Strawson's point is that knowledge in the true sense requires identification. He discovers that there is a relation of dependence between the identification of one class of particular with another. In fact, Strawson does not forget to remember that one cannot identify a class of particulars without a prior identification of another class of particulars. In this sense, he brings the division of basic and non-basic particulars. According to Strawson, one class of particular may be far more basic than another class of particular. This amounts to an epistemic arrangement done by our cognitive apparatus. In this regard, it

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has been observed, “The active imposition of the category of understanding which we find in Kant is here conceived as a process of arrangement according to identifiability dependence in Strawson philosophy.”³⁸

What then are the basic particulars according to Strawson? *Material bodies and person, according to Strawson, are considered basic particulars.* They are basic in the sense that they can be identified independently. Moreover, they are called basic because they can answer perfectly to the character of the unified spatio-temporal framework. When Strawson inclines to say about spatio-temporal framework he does not take it to be a system where all particulars find their homes. His understanding of spatio-temporal conceptual scheme is predominantly linked with basic particulars by virtue of their fundamental characteristics. The framework is admitted spatio-temporal and material objects are three dimensional endured through time. Thus, according to Strawson, only material bodies meet the condition of three dimensionality can constitutes the framework. Accordingly Strawson conclude by saying that only material bodies are basic particulars (basic reality). Thus we can say that the relationship between language and reality; after Strawson, is made possible through successful communication between the speaker and the hearer. Only in the basis of successful communication the hearers can identify the particulars, basic or non-basic, which are the nominees of reality. In such a situation, the speaker can include this particular in his ontology.



³⁸Ibid., p. 6.

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The Psycho-linguistic Interpretation of the relationship between Language and Reality after Noam Chomsky

In the previous sequels, we have examined the relationship between language and reality from two different perspectives, namely, from the atomic perspective and from the pragmatic perspective. From atomic perspective we have chosen the view of early Wittgenstein as a model of semantic and from pragmatic perspective, we have examined the view of Strawson as a model of pragmatic interpretation of the relationship between language and reality. We think that these two approaches actually give us the sense of reality from external point of view. The similarity between these two approaches is that language and reality are separate entities and language is used as a tool for knowing reality. Having said this, they differ on the nature of language and also about the nature of reality.

Interestingly, linguistic revolution is predominantly associated with semantics as well as pragmatics. But we witness a different interpretation of the relationship between language and reality in Noam Chomsky. In fact, Noam Chomsky gives us a *mentalist interpretation* of the relationship between language and reality. Even many commentators have thought that if the first linguistic revolution was centered on semantists as well as pragmatists, then Noam Chomsky's philosophical contribution is said to be the second linguistic revolution in philosophy. The question then naturally arises, why does Chomsky's contribution to linguistic philosophy has been attributed as the second linguistic revolution in philosophy? This has been justified by saying that unlike the first linguistic revolution; Noam Chomsky brings a different interpretation of the meaning of language. In fact, Noam Chomsky differs

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from the earlier traditions, namely, semantics and pragmatics on an important account. He criticizes both semantic and pragmatic interpretations of language. Semantics and pragmatics have over emphasized on the external uses of language. But Chomsky thinks the other way round. According to Noam Chomsky, the primary use of language is internal. External use is the secondary use of language. Thus, Noam Chomsky not only criticizes the standpoint of both semantics as well as pragmatics regarding the interpretation of language; he at the same time introduces a new interpretation of language which is philosophically known as the mentalist interpretation of language and thereby tries to show the relationship between language and reality from internal or mentalist perspective. That is why, Noam Chomsky's linguistic philosophy has been attributed as the *Second Linguistic Turn* in philosophy.

While developing the mentalist interpretation on linguistic turn Chomsky brings back the 18th century concept of innate idea. In this regard, Noam Chomsky was indebted to Descartes. While finding out the answer to the question: Why we study language, Chomsky says, "One reason for studying language – and for me personally, the most compelling reason - is that it is tempting to regard language, in the transitional phrase, as the mirror of mind."³⁹ Chomsky in his book *Language and Mind* says that language is the mirror of human mind. A man is known by the language he or she uses. Understanding of language in proper is equal to understanding other mind. According to Chomsky, every normal human being at the time of his or her birth biologically acquired an innate organ placed in the left hemisphere from where language has been spontaneously generated. In this regard, Chomsky calls back the relevance of Rene Descartes' concept of innate idea. However, Chomsky gives a different interpretation of innate idea. Descartes interpreted the relevance of innate idea from epistemological angle; whereas Noam Chomsky interprets innate idea in linguistic. That is

³⁹ Chomsky, Noam, *Reflection on Language*, Fontana/Collins, 1976, p. 4.

why; Copper has attributed Descartes' innate idea as *old innatism* and Chomsky's innate idea as *new innatism*.

Transformational Generative Grammar:

Noam Chomsky within the orbit of mentalism brings the concept of Transformational Generative Grammar (henceforth TGG). In this regard, Professor Sen Gupta says, "Chomsky's transformational grammar will surely provide great nourishment to those who would like to see a philosophy of language emerging within the horizon of mentalism."⁴⁰ His understanding of TGG is also called scientific grammar. For Chomsky grammar is a theory of *mental state* underlying the production and comprehension of utterances. It is a system of rules that a speaker knows unconsciously, that he has internalized, and the linguist constructing a grammar of a language is an effect proposing a hypothesis concerning this internalize system. Thus, for Chomsky grammar or language has no existence independent of the speaker unconscious knowledge or beliefs about it, independent of the speaker's mental representation of it. In this regard, language may be said subjectively constituted entities having no existence apart from its mental representation. According to Chomsky, "The properties of language must be those that are given to it by the innate mental processes of the organization that has invented it and that invents it anew with each succeeding generation."⁴¹ What Chomsky claims here is that the so-called mentally represented grammar invoked to account for creativity in language. This position of Chomsky actually detaches him from the corpus-based methodology and mechanical discovery procedure as witnessing in Bloomfield; an School and behavioural approach as developed by Quine and many others. In fact, Chomsky's linguistic mentalism actually prevents the mechanism of acquisition of language from behavioristic point of view. In this sense, Noam Chomsky's mentalism is a

⁴⁰ Sen Gupta, K., *Mentalistic Turn*, K.P. Bagchi and Company, 1990, p.1.

⁴¹Chomsky, Noam, *Language and Mind*, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1972, p.95.

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philosophical prescription that stands against behaviourism in general as far as the acquisition of language is concerned.


The other important aspect of Chomsky's linguistic mentalism is that it is *structurally oriented*. It is rooted in the belief or intuition that speakers have about it. The structure, of course, is subjectively objective. It is objective in the sense that it is biological in nature and it is subjective in the sense that every individual has a different approach as far as his understanding of language is concerned. That's why, it can be said that language is embodied in the mental reality underlying actual linguistic behaviour.

According to Chomsky, the structure of grammar is a kind of verbal botany directed to a grammatical description of an uttered sentence along with a hierarchical classification of the elements of the sentence into phonological and syntactic categories. In this regard, Katz says, "The taxonomic theorists conceive of linguistic description as the phonological and syntactic level as segmentation and classification beginning from a catalogue of speech sounds, and a proceeding through various stages of re-classification of syntactic constituents."⁴² These hierarchical stages of linguistic development first start with a collection of data, a collection of a large number of utterances. These utterances form a *corpus* which again be classified in different elements at different linguistic levels, such as, *phonemes*, *morphemes*, word and word classes. Chomsky classifies the smallest functioning units of sounds, the *phonemes*. Then, he moves on to classify the morphemes. *Morphemes* are the minimally significant bearers of meaning that are built out of the phonemes. According to Chomsky, *morphemes* join together to form word and word classes, subsequently, culminates in sentences. The syntactical components of a sentence go on hierarchically from the sentence down to the

⁴² Katz, J.J., *Linguistic Philosophy: The Underlying Reality of Language*, George Allen and unwin, London, 1972, p.37.

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morphemes. Let us consider the following structure of the sentence: The man enjoyed a beautiful picture.



The diagram of the sentence as shown above is analyzed into the individual *morphemes*, namely, the, man, enjoy, ed, a, beautiful, picture. Such sentential diagram which represents the complete sense of the sentence is called *phrase marker* by Chomsky. It reveals from the above that a grammatical description of a sentence is dependent on a hierarchical classification of linguistic elements. However, Chomsky does not rule out the limitation of structural linguistics. In fact, he is against any grammar which indulges in the study of a corpus because the study of corpus can hardly describe a language that consists of an infinite number of sentences. According to Chomsky, in most general cases a corpus is nothing but an arbitrarily and accidentally selected set of utterances of languages which may leave out many interesting features of the language. Thus, Chomsky concludes by saying that a description of a corpus is hardly a description of a complete language. Once the conception of the corpus is rejected, the mechanical method of discovering the *phonemes*, *morphemes* etc. of a language equally loses its significance. As Phrase Structure Grammar is generated out of the constituent of phrase marker through different corpus, Phrase Structure Grammar will equally be extremely complex, adhoc and unrevealing.⁴³ According to Chomsky, phrase

⁴³See Lyons, J., *Chomsky*, Fontana, 1970, p. 62.

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structure grammar enables to generate a large number of sentences, but it will require more rules for generating grammatical sentences in proper. Chomsky finds a few shortcomings in Phrase Structure Grammar.

First, it is unnecessarily and absurdly complex.

Second, its verbs must be intransitive one.

Third, the noun phrase in the passive sentence must be one that can appear as the object of a transitive verb.

Due to these inadequacies Chomsky alternatively calls for Transformational Rules in order to have the *deep structure of sentence*. Thus, there are two structures of sentences, namely, the Surface Structure or the Phrase Structure and the Deep Structure. The deep structure of sentence actually exemplifies the true form of language what Chomsky termed as internal aspect or mentalist aspect of language. In his recent publication Chomsky introduces deep structure of language as I-language and surface structure of language as E-language where the term 'I' stands for internal and the term 'E' stands for external. Thus, I-language is called internal and E-language is called external language. When Chomsky engages himself in giving the mentalist interpretation of language he actually gives over emphasis on I-language instead of E-language because Chomsky claims that I-language is the actual form of language through which the innate acumen of the human mind is being reflected. In fact, linguistics should determine the universal and essential properties of human language by means of I-language.

The Creativity, Competence and Performance:

According to Chomsky, language is the innate reflection of human mind and acquisition of language is made possible because of the inner internal grammatical structure. The grammatical structure of Noam Chomsky is biological in nature. As it is biological, it is

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creative. If we carefully look at the literature of linguistic philosophy, we notice that there are other philosophers, namely, Heidegger and Bhartṛhari who have recognized the creative aspect of language. According to Heidegger, language is creative (we shall discuss this issue later on). By language Heidegger means poetic language. Likewise if we carefully read *Vākyapadīya* of Bhartṛhari we also sense that the concept of creativity is very much present in Bhartṛhari's interpretation of language (*Śabda*). Moreover, the language of Bhartṛhari is inner, indivisible which is somehow or other is similar to Noam Chomsky. However, this does not make sense to say that the language of Noam Chomsky is at par with the language of Bhartṛhari and the language of Noam Chomsky is at par with the language of Heidegger. Even though, Noam Chomsky claims that language is the mirror of human mind and language is creative but Chomsky does not mention poetic language at all as Heidegger did. In the same way we can say that Chomsky's own interpretation of language is by no means similar to Bhartṛhari's concept of *Śabdabrahman*. What we can say here is that the creative aspect of language, of course, in different ways, has been accepted by Noam Chomsky and the same has been witnessed even in the philosophy of Heidegger⁴⁴ as well as in the philosophy of Bhartṛhari⁴⁵.

According to Noam Chomsky, language is a verbal botany. He tries to understand TGG within the horizon of mentalism. His own interpretation of grammar is scientific, possessing two important characteristics, such as, *transformational* and *generative*. It is called transformational because with the help of this grammar the native user of language can be able to transform one sentence in terms of another. It is generative because transformation of one sentence into another is a process of generation and a native speaker can generate

⁴⁴Heidegger, M., *Being and Time*, translated by J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, New York: Harper & Row, 1962.

⁴⁵Bhartṛhari, *Vākyapadīya*, Parts I-III, ed. Sarma, R. Varanasi: Sarasvati Bhavana Granthamala, 1963.

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innumerable sentences spontaneously with which he is not previously acquainted. Thus, the process of transformation and generation is a recursive process through which one can acquire language within a very short span of time. A native speaker, opines Chomsky, can generate innumerable sentences and at the same time can transform one sentence into another without knowing any grammatical rules found in natural language. If there be any grammatical rules, it lies in the deep structure of human mind from which language has been spontaneously generated. That's why transformational generative grammar is intimately related to what Chomsky calls *the creative aspect of language*.

According to Chomsky, the creative aspect of language is the ability of the native speaker to understand and produce sentences not encountered before. Therefore, one of the essential aspect of grammar, i.e., I-language, opines Chomsky, is its creativity. That is why, Chomsky in his book *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax* has claimed that the very essence of language may be called *the creativity of language*⁴⁶. According to Chomsky, creativity is not something that can be acquired; rather creativity is something that has been *innately possessed* by every native speaker. In this sense, creativity is a kind of dignified ability of the speakers to produce new sentences.

Thus it appears after Chomsky that creativity is triggered by competence. Competence is nothing but the speaker-hearer's knowledge of his language. Competence again is linked with *performance*, i.e., the actual use of language in concrete situations. Precisely, it can be said after Chomsky that linguistic competence can be equated with the speaker-hearer's knowledge of language, his mastery or internal representation of a system of rules. Chomsky elsewhere has claimed that the creativity of language is guaranteed by competence and performance of the language user. Competence is manifested by TGG. It is the speaker-

⁴⁶ See Chomsky, N., *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax*, Mass, MIT press, Cambridge, 1965, p.4.

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hearer's knowledge of his language. Contrary to this, performance is the actual use of language in concrete situation. As competence is at par with the speaker-hearer's knowledge of language, it is supposed to be the internal representation of a system of rules of the user.

If someone doubts whether there can be pure knowledge of a language without having any non-linguistic dimension that will by no means unsettle Chomsky's position. Surely, one cannot hope to know the laws of physics unless one breaths. However, from this it does not follow that the laws of physics can be distinguished from the laws of biology. Likewise, there may be non-linguistic pre-condition for having the knowledge of a language, but from this it does not follow that knowledge of language cannot be purged of non-linguistic condition. According to Chomsky, even one can judge whether a particular sentence is appropriate to the context or acceptable among a certain community. However, this does not make sense to say that one has knowledge of language. These are governed by socio-cultural rules and principles and also at the same time connected with one's non-linguistic behaviour. All these belong to what Chomsky would call the level of *performance*.

According to Chomsky, knowledge of language is the knowledge of rules and principles governing sentence. It is the knowledge that enables the speaker-hearer to produce and identify grammatical sentences. It is the knowledge of grammar where people can assess whether a sentence is grammatical or not. It is the knowledge of grammar where people can assess whether it is in keeping with the rules of sentence construction and interpretation as specified by transformational grammar. These constitute his competence. Thus, by the term competence, Chomsky means *knowledge of language*. Knowledge of language helps one to assess whether a sentence is acceptable or not, but that is connected with the actual occasion of utterance. All such things come into the realm of *performance*. Thus, following Chomsky, we can say that a sentence is an abstract object following the rules and principles as presented

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by transformational grammar that can be unified to any context and occasion. Thus, a sentence is produced and understood by a native speaker independently of its role in communication. However, an alternative of the sentence actually demands a particular context always associated with a particular *communicative situation*.

Thus, we can say after Chomsky that transformational grammar is an account of competence which is different from many things that people can know about their language. In fact, Chomskian understanding of TGG actually overlooks the pragmatic distinction of speech and thereby ignores that people have knowledge of socio-cultural norms. Should we then restrict ourselves within the notion of competence to only what is specified by transformational grammar? Here Chomsky's preference to this question would receive adequate confirmation from another realm, that of arithmetic knowledge. However, arithmetic knowledge is a matter of performance and it does not in any way characterize what we shall call competence. Very similar way, following Chomsky, we may eliminate all socio-cultural reference from our knowledge of language and formulate it in terms of rules and principles which are mutually represented and which in turn contribute to the well foundedness of sentences and structural descriptions assign to them.⁴⁷

Thus, Chomsky has emphasized on competence because his account on competence brings out that language is fundamentally a structure rooted in inner represented rules. Thus, by narrowing concern to independently and readily structural data, Chomskian grammar, in fact, enjoys the prestige of an advance science. Just by focusing on what is internal to language, Chomsky enables to find something that is of the deepest or intrinsic human significance. In the words of Hymes, here Chomsky is able to retain "the prestige of dealing with something fundamental to human life."⁴⁸ Here Chomsky desires to undertake a descriptive study of

⁴⁷ See Chomsky, N., *Language and Mind*, op.cit., p. 30.

⁴⁸ Das, Kantilal, *Philosophical Relevance of Language: A Methodological Reflection*, op.cit., p. 207.

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language by eliminating all performance factors at the behavioural level that contribute to ungrammatically and by formulating a system of rules that projects all and only grammatical sentences what Chomsky claims is a part of the internal equipment of the speaker-hearer. Thus, Chomsky while developing his internalization of language takes a calculative mode different from socio-cultural element what Hymes points out, “a Golden of Eden view”⁴⁹ Where human life seems divided between grammatical competence and performance and thereby thrusting the speaker-hearer out into a fallen world. Thus, it seems clear to us that competence or knowledge of rules alone come to grips with the creative aspect of language. It is ability, Chomsky opines, to form and understand previously unheard sentences. It is the creativity of human language that he constantly invokes in his unwavering campaign against behaviourism as has been developed by Quine and many others.

The question then arises: How does Chomsky interweaves the relationship between competence and creativity? Even though Chomsky explicates the concept of competence and the concept of creativity in terms of the concept of performance, but it is not sufficiently clear in what sense competence is linked with creativity? Of course, we come to know from Chomsky that a speaker can understand new sentences only because he has internalized the abstract generative grammar of his language on the basis of similarity. But this similarity is due to the possession of the same abstract feature of mentally represented grammar which is abstract and unobservable in nature. In this regard, Chomsky claims that it is the knowledge of deep structure on the basis of which the co-relation between competence and creativity is made possible. In this regard, Chomsky says, “The most striking aspect of linguistic competence is what we may call the ‘creativity of language’, that is, the speaker’s ability to

⁴⁹ Hymes, D.H., “On Communicative Competence”, *Sociolinguistics*, J.B. Pride and Jenet Homes (eds.), Penguin, 1979, p. 272.

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produce new sentences, sentences that are immediately understood by other speakers although they bear no physical resemblance to sentences which are ‘familiar.’⁵⁰

Chomsky also tries to explain the co-relation between competence and creativity in terms of generative grammar. By ‘generative grammar’, Chomsky actually means a kind of grammar which is the description of the tacit competence of the speaker-hearer that underlies his actual performance in production and perception of speech. Thus, for Chomsky, a generative grammar ideally specifies a pairing of *phonetic* and semantic representations over an infinite range. Thus, a generative grammar, Chomsky opines, constitutes a hypothesis as to how the speaker-hearer interprets utterances, abstracting a way from many factors that interweave with tacit competence to determine actual performance. Thus, for Chomsky competence has a direct reflection on performance. In this sense competence is an idealized model of linguistic performance. According to Chomsky, competence is an *ability* arising out of creativity. It is an ability i.e., directly reflected in performance under a certain idealization. Thus, competence, for Chomsky is a model of what a native speaker can produce and comprehend under ideal conditions. Thus, the relation between competence and linguistic performance is very intimate. Competence directly refers to performance or alternatively, it can be said that linguistic competence is idealized production. Linguistic performance includes not only the ability to produce grammatically well-formed sentences, but also the ability to use language correctly in a variety of socially determined situation. According to Chomsky, linguistic performance is not only the ability to produce new grammatical sentences; it is also the ability on the part of the speaker to produce them on the appropriate occasion.

Thus, it seems clear to us that Chomsky has attempted to justify his mentalist or internalized slogan: Language is the mirror of human mind by bringing the concept of TGG along with

⁵⁰ Chomsky, N., *Topics in the Theory of Generative Grammar*, Mouton, 1966, p. 4.

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the three key concepts, such as, creativity, competence and performance. He understands grammar as transformational and generative. Generation and transformation of grammar is made possible by virtue of creative ability of the native speaker. Creativity leads to competence with the help of performance. That means, the performance of the native speaker actually reflects whether the native speaker can acquire mastery over his or her language. Thus, creativity, competence and performance jointly manifest the internalization of language of grammar what Chomsky termed as TGG.

It should be kept in mind, after Chomsky, that any reasonable model of language will incorporate the generative grammar that express the speaker-hearer's knowledge of the language. But, from this it does not follow that the generative grammar in itself prescribed the character or a model of speech production. In fact, in order to make actual linguistic performance we have to rely on more than one internal primary factor, out of which linguistic competence is the most important one. Competence, as we have already asserted, after Chomsky, is the ability to speak and understand the language with which we are yet to introduce. Competence, thus, is supposed to be the mastery of the generative grammar of the language speaker. But, competence again is not sufficient to gain the mastery over language. There are other factors that need to be taken care of. In this regard, every speaker of a language has mastered and internalized a generative grammar that expresses his knowledge of the language. In this process, he is aware of the rules of the grammar. Any interesting generative grammar will be dealing with mental processes that are far beyond the level of actual or even potential consciousness. Accordingly, it can be said, after Chomsky, that competence is not what we look it to be in the beginning. It is not an ability that is manifested in performance, nor even a *model* of performance, but rather a component in the model of performance. As competence is no longer identical with its manifestation in performance, the

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notion of *ability* is discarded in favour of competence or tacit knowledge of the rules of language.⁵¹

The point that needs to be taken care of at this juncture: Does it lead us to say after Chomsky that competence and performance are different entities? Is it necessary to observe the difference in logical character between performance and competence? If performance and competence are logically different, then how can they fit together within one theory? Is it then not a better alternative to think that competence is an independent abstract entity from linguistic performance?

In responding to these quips, Chomsky seems to move in that direction when he gives the following neutral definition of competence. In this regard, Chomsky says that transformational grammar is not a model for a speaker or a hearer, and with this he comes upon another shift in the notion of competence. Therefore, the notion of competence finds different variation in Chomsky's mentalist interpretation. He at times says that performance is a reflection of competence or competence is an ability manifested in performance. Therefore, the relation between competence and performance is, therefore, very intimate. Secondly, he also claims that competence is not an ability manifested in performance, but tacit knowledge of the rules of language that can effectively lead to performance. This makes the relation between the two not so close as it was before. Thirdly and finally, Chomsky opines that the distance between the two becomes complete. Competence is only unconscious knowledge of rules remote from the activities of actual speakers. It represents only a non-empirical axiomatization of sentences and their structural descriptions. Transformational Generative Grammar is reduced only to a mere formal and frozen abstraction.

⁵¹ Searle, J.R. *Speech Acts*, Cambridge University Press, 1969.

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Along with competence, creativity also, Chomsky opines, undergoes various transformations we were already wondering how generative grammar that represents competence can explain creativity of language. While explicating the goals of linguistic theory Chomsky in his “Current Issues in Linguistic Theory”, goes on to say that normal mastery of a language involves the ability to understand immediately an infinite number of entirely new sentences. It is thus clear that a theory of language that neglects this ‘creative’ aspect of language is of only marginal interest. These remarks of Chomsky reveal adequately in what sense creativity is a matter of linguistic competence. The creative aspect of language use has been described by Chomsky as the ability to form and understand previously unheard sentences. So, creative aspect of language and creative aspect of language use have been used interchangeably to mean the same ability of producing and comprehending novel sentences. Transformational Generative Grammar represents competence that encompasses this ability, i.e., the creative aspect of language. Even Chomsky elsewhere claims that a person’s linguistic knowledge (competence), unlike that of the linguist, is not a case of *knowing that*; rather it is a kind of *knowing how*, i.e., an ability to be acquired of.

Language, for Chomsky, is in essence, *a structure*, mentally represented in the human brain and not a matter of use including sociological context, intensions of speakers, and so on. Chomsky says that if one wants to find out something significant about the nature of language, it is important to look not at its uses, but rather at its structure. They reveal that the human mind is such as to be able to form representation of objects other than those merely represented by senses. The computational complexity of language provides the basis for the minimal computational ability of the human mind. It is in this way that language is encored in mentalism and one has to understand his mentalist turn voiced in the slogan: “Language is the mirror of human mind.”

• **CHAPTER FOUR**

The Metaphysical Interpretation of the relationship between Language and Reality after Martin Heidegger

The main objective of this chapter is to show the relationship between language and reality with special reference to Martin Heidegger. Martin Heidegger actually invented a new dimension of the relationship between language and reality from metaphysical perspective. While elucidating the philosophical significance of language in knowing reality, Heidegger says that ‘language is the house (home) of Being’. In its (language) housing man is at home. Heidegger farther contends that his path of thinking language as the house of Being actually leads to an entirely new view of language. It is the home where man dwells. Heidegger in his “The Letter on Humanism” says, “Language is the house of Being. In its home man dwells. Those who think and those who create with words are the guardians of this home.”⁵²

Heidegger’s view of language as the house of being opens a new dimension in the domain of philosophical analysis of language. When linguistic revolution appeared in 20th century by way of devouring metaphysics as a meaningless entity (dead body), the very nature of language was definitely non-Heideggerian. When linguistic philosophers were involved in discussing the very nature of language in order to set up a realistic linguistic method, they were broadly classified into ordinary and ideal language philosophers. Their concern was to make language vivid, clear, distinct and precise. For them language, as a philosophical method, must be a ‘sharpen tool’ which would adequately reflect reality or ontology. In the previous sequels we have already explained the relationship between language and reality from the background of ideal and ordinary language perspective. The atomic interpretation

⁵² Heidegger, Martin, “The Letter on Humanism” in *Basic Writings*, ed., D.F.Krell, New York: Harper Collins 1993, pp. 217-218.

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of the relationship between language and reality is a mark of ideal language philosophy. The pragmatic interpretation of the relationship between language and reality is a mark of ordinary language philosophy. Whatever the nature of language that has been addressed by the so called linguistic philosophers as discussed above, it would definitely be non-Heideggerian in the true sense of the term.

Now the point is that in what sense language that has been addressed by the so called linguistic philosopher is non-Heideggerian? In this regard, it can be said that when Heidegger has claimed that language is the house of Being, he, thereby, has reflected on a kind of language which is neither ordinary language nor ideal language in any sense of the term. Heidegger was talking of a kind of language which is philosophically known as ‘poetic language’.

It is interesting to point out here that poetic language, in general, has badly been dismantled by the logical positivists. Ayer in his celebrated book *Language, Truth and Logic*⁵³ conceived poetic language very similar to metaphysical language. According to Ayer and the whole host of logical positivists, *a poet is just like a metaphysician*. A metaphysical discussion is a closed door discussion and the same thing happens in the case of a poet. A poet is emotional, imaginary and creative. Therefore, the very content or matter a poet is thought of remained absent in the empirical world. The criterion of the principle of verification that has been adopted by the logical positivists stands against both metaphysicians as well as poets. According to the logical positivists, a sentence would be literally meaningful if it would either be completely verifiable or completely falsifiable by means of some observational data. Ayer says, “A sentence cannot be deemed literally meaningful unless it satisfies certain

⁵³Ayer, A. J., *Language, Truth and Logic*, London, Victor Gollancz LTD, 1936

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specified conditions.”⁵⁴ It seems clear that the language of poet and the language of metaphysician fail to fulfill the criteria of meaningfulness as given by the logical positivists. Therefore, just like the body of metaphysics, the body of poetic language would equally be meaningless because such language cannot be verified by means of observational data.

What we intend to say here is that the language that has been envisaged by the whole host of linguistic philosophers would certainly not be poetic even though they were non-committal regarding poetic language like logical positivists. However, it is appropriate to claim that the criterion of meaningfulness that has been proposed by different linguistic philosophers does not accommodate poetic language. Just think of the nature of ideal language that has been used by the semantists. The semantists in general are revisionists. They intend to revise language because of the ambiguity of the use of language. For them the vocabulary of ideal or formal language is proper name. A proper name either denotes or connotes an object. If this would be the very nature of language as favoured by the semantists then obviously we cannot accommodate poetic language within the domain of formal or ideal language. The same would be true in case of natural language as well. In fact poetic language as a distinctive aspect no other language can acquire. Our point of contention here is that poetic language in general has been neglected in the domain of linguistic philosophy while investigating the relationship between language and reality.

Considering the above philosophical perception of the very nature of language in general, what we can insist here is that Heideggerian nature of language *as the house of Being* is an attempt of reviving poetic language within the domain of philosophy of language or linguistic philosophy. Thus, Heideggerian metaphysical approach of language is unique in itself, because Heidegger approaches a kind of language which has been either rejected by the

⁵⁴ Ammerman, R.R., *Classics of Analytic Philosophy*, McGraw-Hill Publishing Company LTD., New York, 1965, Preface p.8

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previous analytic thinkers or which has not been incorporated in the domain of philosophy of language either in the form of ordinary language or in the form of ideal language. Our appraisal of poetic language is different from both ordinary and ideal language.

On the Way to Language:

The language, Heidegger envisages, is termed as “The Way to Language”. It is like the way or path that language makes as it traces out meaning. In this regard, Heidegger first sets out to question of the traditional understanding of the essence of language. It is very much the same picture that Wittgenstein intuits in his *Philosophical Investigations*. In the autobiographical description given by St. Augustin of his own process of learning language, Augustin says, “When they (my elders) named some object, and accordingly moved towards something, I saw this and I grasped that the thing was called by the sound they uttered when they meant to point it out. Their intention was shown by their bodily movements, as it were the natural language of all peoples: the expression of the face, the play of the eyes, the movements of other parts of the body, and the tone of voice which expresses our state of mind in seeking, having, rejecting, or avoiding something. Thus, as I heard words repeatedly used in their proper places in various sentences, I gradually learnt to understand what objects they signified; and after I had trained my mouth to form these signs, I used them to express my own desires.”⁵⁵. The significance of this passage is that a word or a sign stands for or represents a thing in virtue of that word or sign’s meaning. Each word means just one thing and it does so in virtue of a meaning that we can think of or understand. In this sense, language is the communication of meaning from one person to another in the package of a sign. To speak language is to feel dead signs with life. To speak language is to breathe air into the otherwise mute forms of signs.

⁵⁵ Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Philosophical Investigations*, translated by G.E.M. Anscombe, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1953, p.20.

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Heidegger was influenced with Augustinian position about Wittgenstein as cited above. Heidegger in his “The Letter on Humanism” draws attention to the traditional picture of language, where the sign stands for an object. It is also the sign for a concept or image in the speaker’s mind. The concept or mental image is a representation in the speaker’s mind or brain.

According to Heidegger, we can rethink language and meaning even from the outside of traditional picture. We rethink the essence of language in order to bring language as language to language. In order to bring the essence of language to itself, we have to speak in language its own essence. In this regard, Heidegger refers the words of the German poet Novalis: “Precisely what is peculiar to language – that it concerns itself purely with itself alone – no one knows.”⁵⁶. According to Heidegger, bringing language as language to language is just the way we will make our own way to language, that is, we place ourselves where we speak language in language. In this way we can bring our own essence. Our own essence is nothing but language. In fact, essence itself is language. Thus, Heidegger invents a new language and also invents new ways of using old words in order to bring language to itself to a new kind of consciousness of itself. For Heidegger, it is an explicit awareness of its own power of shaping world and revealing Being.

Nature of Language:

According to Heidegger, language is the house of Being. We do experience by means of language. When we experience, we experience with something, be it a thing, a person, or a God. This something perplexes us, strikes us, comes over us, transform us. In this regard, it can be said that experience is not our making. To say that one undergoes experience is to say that one ignores it, endures it, suffers it, and receives it. Experience is something transparent,

⁵⁶ Heidegger, Martin, *On the Way to Language*, translated by peter D. Hertz and Stambaugh, Newyork: Harper and Row, 1971, p.397.

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moving, dynamic, in the sense that it happens, comes and passes all times. Thus, following Heidegger, it can be said that to undergo an experience with language thus eventually leads us to assume that we are concerned of language by entering into it and submitting to it. Accordingly, language is relevant to philosophy, according to Heidegger, because man finds the proper abode of his experience in language. Language, in fact, touches the inner most nexus of our experience. Man can transform his experiences by means of language. This is made possible by virtue of making a relation to language.

It is a general opinion that language is the medium of communication. Nobody can deny it. In this direction one can speak our language. Accordingly, we cannot be closed to language except by speaking in terms of language even though we do exchange our thought with other by means of language. This does not, however, make sense to say that what we do communicate is authentic. Our relation to language is vague, obscure and almost speechless. According to Heidegger, every observation on the subject will at first sound, strange and incomprehensible. Perhaps this point of Heidegger may be similar to the *nirvikalpaka pratyaksa* of Naiyāyikas. One can, however, overcome such incomprehensibility just by making a habit of hearing only what we already understand. According to Heidegger, this would be true not only to the listeners; it would equally be true who tries to speak of language. In fact, this would allow us to become mindful of language and our relation to it. It makes sense to say that to undergo an experience with language is to gather information about language. But the point is that who would be the supplier of such information? Heidegger's answer, in this regard, is very specific. Heidegger says that linguists, philologist, psychologist and above all analytic philosophers would be the suppliers of this information. In this regard, Heidegger cites meta- language, super language.

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Heidegger, however, does not think that philosophical and scientific information about language is very similar to what one undergoes with language. Heidegger says, “In experiences which we undergo with language, language itself brings itself to language.”⁵⁷ However, in everyday speaking language does not bring itself to language but holds back because here any numbers of things are given voice in speaking. Here we are speaking about a set of facts, an occurrence, a question, a matter of concern and what not. Thus, in case of everyday speaking language one has to go ahead and speak a language in order to deal with something and negotiate something by speaking. In such a case, language does not speak itself as language.

The pertinent question that needs to be addressed at the juncture is: When does language speak itself as language? What sort of language is it? How does a language speak itself as language? According to Heidegger, language speaks itself as language. Language speaks as language when we cannot find the right word for something that concerns us, carries us a way, opposes or encourages us. In such a case, we leave *unspoken* that we have in mind without rightly giving a thought. In a situation like this language itself, Heidegger opines, has distinctly and ephemerally touched us with its essential Being (reality/ontology). When such unspoken issue is put into language, everything actually hinges on whether language gives or withholds the appropriate word. This is where the point of *creativity* comes into picture.

Language is Creative:

According to Heidegger, one has to create a suitable word which perhaps is not available in the ordinary or everyday language. Heidegger thinks that a poet is creative and only a poet can create something which is unspoken. A poet in his own way “to put into language the experience he undergoes with language.”⁵⁸

⁵⁷ Heidegger, Martin, *On the Way to Language*, op.cit. p.49

⁵⁸ Ibid., p.59

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In this regard, Heidegger mentions the name of the poet Stefan George. Stefan George sought to grasp the relationship of the poet to language which appeared in 1919 and was later included in the collection *Das Neue Reich*.

“Wonder or dream from distant land
I carried to my country’s strand

And waited till the twilit morn
Had found the name within her bourn –

Then I could grasp it close and strong
It blooms and shines now the front along...

Once I returned from happy sail
I had a prize so rich and frail,

She sought for long and tidings told:
“No like of this these depths enfold.”

And straight it vanished from my hand,
The treasure never graced my land...

So I renounced and sadly see:
Where word breaks off no thing may be.”⁵⁹

The first triad tells us about the power of the poet. He is able to bring home marvelous things and treasures seen in dream. It is through the name that the poet keeps hold of his vision unfolding itself by virtue of his retention. This can be made possible by virtue of poetic act. In contrast, the second triad speaks of an experience in which the poet brings for the purpose

⁵⁹ Heidegger, Martin, “The Nature of Language”, 1957, but I quoted it from *An Illustrated study by Walter Biemel*, translated by J.L.Mehta, R & K Paul, London and Henley, 1973, p. 153.

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of being given a name, what he calls it a jewel, a treasure. It is the jewel which makes the being of its bearer manifest.

Heidegger claims that with the absence of the word for it, the treasure disappears. The poet cannot retain it. A new mode of the word's being appears. The word can provide a name not merely for something that already is, "it is no longer just a name-giving grasp reaching for what is present and already represented."⁶⁰

The poem then ends with the verse:

So I renounced and sadly see:

Where word breaks off no thing may be.

The final line can be transformed into a statement, thus, "no thing is where the word breaks off."⁶¹ But how do we understand this conclusion? According to Heidegger what the poet learns to renounce is his formally cherished view regarding the relation of thing and word. If other contends that word avows itself to the poet as that which holds and sustains a thing in its being. The poet experiences himself as one who is entrusted with the word, who is its trustee. Here expression is given to a boundary experience for which no word is adequate. For which no one can find a name. In the mood of sadness, Heidegger discovers the mood of releasement into the nearness of what is withdrawn but at the same time held in reserve for an ordinary advent. This becomes clear in Heidegger's attitude towards metaphysics as the epoch of the oblivion of Being. These comments on language are not just incidentally problems to Heidegger, but his basic experience is gathering together and a chastened repetition of the question about Being occurs in them.

⁶⁰Ibid, p.155.

⁶¹Ibid., p.155.

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But what matters to Heidegger here is listening to the promise of language? Heidegger, as we noted above, observes that language must, in its own way “avow to us itself – its nature.”⁶² Once this happens, we become capable of understanding a thinking experience with language. According to Heidegger, experience with language consists in having a glimpse of the neighborhood of poetry and thinking, in our ability to establish ourselves in this neighborhood.

It has been reflected from the above observation that Heidegger’s interpretation is intended to show about language we find made in the realm of thought that has been composed in language. According to Heidegger, the essence or being of language “nowhere brings itself to word as the language of being.”⁶³ While speaking of language itself falls back, withdraws, in favour of what is said in it. This withdrawal might have its own ground in that language holds back its own origin and so denies its being to our usual notions. However, Heidegger here offers a conjecture as to why the essential nature of language denies itself to us. Heidegger in this regard claims that poetry and thinking have not been sought out in their proper habitat and neighborhood.

Heidegger, however, elsewhere has claimed that there may have something common between a poet and a thinker. What poets and thinkers have in common is the element of language. Even though we do not know how *element* is to be conceived and how it changes according to whether words are used poetically or as in thinking. However, from George poem as mentioned above, it has been revealed that we have reached what looked like the neighborhood of poetry and thinking. However, Heidegger now points out, something crucial is missing in this attempt, namely, a grasp of this neighborhood *as such*, the neighborhood in quest of which the interpretation started out.

⁶² Ibid., p.156

⁶³ Ibid., p.156

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Language is the house of Being because according to Heidegger, when we speak of language we already dwell in language. However, while interpreting the poem by George, Heidegger left as an open question in what sense the jewel is to be understood. Now he offers a suggestion. He says that the precious gem, for which the goddess is unable to find a word, is *nothing but the word itself*. This shows the limits of the poet. In the land of the poet, the word for the word cannot be found. The question then is: Can the word be achieved if we approach the matter from the side of thinking? For Heidegger, the word is not a thing. Accordingly, so long we look for it among things, we can never find it. The word is not the realm of entities; rather it is in a more pre-eminent sense than all things. In this regard, Heidegger says, "...we may never say of the word that it is, but rather that it gives..."⁶⁴ What the word actually confers is Being. This should not be understood, however, in the sense that the word generates the thing as God's thoughts originate all that is. Rather we must call back to find the concept of clearing in which all entities are able to appear without being themselves created by the clearing.

So far we are in search, after Heidegger, of the neighborhood of poetry and thinking altogether. We have, so far, arrived at the point seeing that it is out of language that their nearness can be grasped. According to Heidegger, for man is man only because he is granted the *promise of language, because he is needful to language, that he may speak it*. Our concern is the determination of man's proper nature. In this process we come upon language as the abode of man which as such remains hidden from man even though it is that which is closest to him. However, Heidegger opines that man suddenly recedes into the background and language comes to the forefront. We are at the very opposite pole of the concept

⁶⁴ Ibid., p.158

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according to which language is merely a means of communication. Heidegger farther contends that it is man who, in fact, appears here as the one used by language.

But the point is: In what way must we now understand language, if it is language that is the essential thing and man only serves it? Heidegger, in this regard, gives a specific answer. Heidegger says that the essential nature of language is to lie in “saying”. In order to give the guiding principle of the experience of language, Heidegger says, “The being of language: the language of being.”⁶⁵ Language belongs to being, which is the most distinctive property. But how are we to think of all moving, path generating being? In the later writings, Heidegger conceives it as the “fourfold”, as the four world-regions of earth, sky, man (mortals) and divinities, which in their interplay constitute the world. Thus, language is here understood as that on which the interplay of the four world regions is based. It is in this interplay that *nearness* comes about. For Heidegger, nearness and saying as letting appear constitute the essential mode of being of language. They are the same.

Thus, language as saying of the world’s fourfold, is no longer only such that we as speaking human beings are related to it in the sense of a nexus existing between man and language. Rather, Heidegger claims, *language is, as world moving saying, the relation of all relations. As the relation of all relations, language as a house of Being, relates, maintains, proffers and enriches the face-to-face encounter of the world’s region, holds and keeps them, in that it holds itself – saying – in reserve.*⁶⁶

Heidegger’s concept of Reality:

So far we have explained the nature of language after Heidegger. In this sequel we propose to explain the nature of reality after Heidegger. Heidegger understands reality in terms of *Being*. That is why, the only philosophical question that interests Heidegger is the question about

⁶⁵ Ibid., p.159

⁶⁶ Robert Mugerauer, *Heidegger and Homecoming*, University of Toronto Press, London, 2008, p. 402.

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Being (reality) and the truth of Being. Thus, Being for Heidegger is the ‘one star’ – the only one – that remains constant along the way. The word ‘Being’, the basic concept Heidegger’s philosophy is distinguished from the word ‘being’ which expresses a particular being which is the participle of the verb to be. According to Heidegger ‘Being’ will correspond to the German *Sein* and ‘being’ will correspond to the German *Seiendes*.

The problem of Being is the central problem to Heidegger, because all other problems are centered around with the same problem of Being approach differently and reveal in different aspects. In other words, they are concerned with different paths leading to the basic problem about Being. According to Heidegger, the history of philosophy is the history of the interpretations of the Being question. All philosophy in the West is metaphysical in nature and Being has been the subject of every metaphysical account of beings from Plato to Nietzsche. Thus, the concept of reality of Heidegger is metaphysical in nature.

But what does Being mean? In this regard, Heidegger says that what Being means has fallen into oblivion precisely because the difference between Being and beings which he calls ontological difference has been concealed. Heidegger often said, “the forgetfulness of Being is the forgetfulness of the difference between Being and beings.”⁶⁷ This difference was forgotten because of an ambiguity intrinsic in the expression commonly used to refer to beings as the subject matter of metaphysics. According to Heidegger, Being is everywhere reduced to the proportion of some being or other. Being is not a being though it is concealed in it as the Being of that very being. It is human thinking that unveils this Being.

Heidegger further contends that Being breaks forth as presence by which the being shows itself from itself. This experience of thinking leads to an understanding of the Being question.

⁶⁷ Heidegger, M., *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, translated by J.S.Churchill, Bloomington: Indiana university press, 1962, p.243

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Being is presence, the unending process of unveiling of Being from being. Being always reveals in a concealing manner.

In *Being and Time* Heidegger launches the investigation for Being with an analysis guided consistently, carefully and exhaustively towards the problem of Being. He continued his Being question in the post *Being and Time* works where he adopted profound approaches revealing Being in diverse contexts and aspects. As far as the Being question is concerned, Heidegger says that Being as being is always sought for in metaphysics. He has tried to understand being in the light of its Being. But how this very Being of being reveals itself in being has not been sufficiently investigated. It remains hidden because the difference between Being and being is forgotten by thinking Being as a being which throws being into beingness, itself comes to be considered as a being.

The question of Being of beings, Heidegger opines, is a twofold question, namely, (a) what is being in general? and (b) which one of the particular being is the highest being and how is it the highest? According to Heidegger, the twofoldness of the meaning of the question of the Being of being (*Seindes, Seienden*), i.e., of the question ‘what is being?’ accounts for the nature of onto-theological questioning. The metaphysical Being – question, therefore, according to Heidegger, is an onto-theological question. In this regard, Richardson⁶⁸ points out that it is in Plato’s metaphysics in the traditional sense takes its rise, for it is he who first conceives of thinking Being as a going “beyond” the beings to their being-ness, which he conceives as their what-ness, their *Idea*. However, unlike Plato and the Western tradition of metaphysics, Heidegger tries to think Being instead of the ‘beingness’ of beings. By questioning the nature of metaphysics Heidegger tries to *transcend metaphysics* and leads the

⁶⁸ Richardson, W.J., *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to thought*, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963, p. 104

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mind out of the subject-object level into the level of Being (pure object in Meinongian sense)⁶⁹, i.e., into a *trans-metaphysical level*.

Here we note a similarity between Heidegger and Meinong. Like Heidegger, Meinong also admitted pure object as a trans-metaphysical level. According to Meinong, there are three different levels of understanding of an object. These are real, ideal and pure. The table is a real object; the concept of the table is an ideal object and ‘table-as-such’ is a pure object. According to Meinong, the being of the table is metaphysical level. It deals with *being qua-being*. It is similar to what Heidegger terms as *subject-object level*. ‘Table-as-such’ is called pure object by Meinong. Such level is the outcome of transcending metaphysics (being qua-being) which is very similar to the term ‘trans-metaphysical level’ as used by Heidegger. Thus, as far as the understanding of the concept of Being, Heidegger holds the similar position of Meinong.

According to Heidegger, Being renders all beings possible. But what is Being? What meaning does it have? Even though Aristotle and Plato were struggling to find out suitable answers regarding the very question of being, but unlike the traditional metaphysics, Heidegger approached a different interpretation of Being. However Heidegger did not overlook the traditional interpretation of being and perhaps that is why, he referred *Plato’s sophist*⁷⁰ in his book *Being and Time*.⁷¹

Plato understood being in terms of ‘unity of being’ and Aristotle’s doctrine of being as a manifold of meanings of being is very similar to Plato. Heidegger revealed that even though a question of Being occupied an important position in the investigations of Plato and Aristotle, it was forgotten later on. Therefore, Heidegger attempted to reawaken and understanding of

⁶⁹ Das, Kantilal, “Meinong on Object, Existence and Ontological Commitment: A Critical Observation”, *JICPR*, New Delhi, Vol. XXVII, 2010, pp. 121-124

⁷⁰ Plato, Seth Benardete (ed.), *Plato’s Sophist*, University of Chicago Press, 1986.

⁷¹ Heidegger, M. Tr. Joan Stambaugh, *Being and Time: A Translation of Sein and Zeit*, Suny Press, 1996.

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the question of the meaning of Being in his *Being and Time*. In the first paragraph of *Being and Time* Heidegger speaks of the ‘*ontic and ontological priority of the Being question.*’ It has a twofold meaning. In one sense, it means that in philosophy the question about Being deserves priority about all other questions. In this regard, Heidegger says, “Being is the genuine theme, the only theme of philosophy.”⁷² Secondly, it also means that, as a question, the question about Being is the being par-excellence which must serve as the point of departure of the question about the *Being of beings*.

Thus, Heidegger approaches a different interpretation of Being (reality). His own understanding of Being actually transcends the sphere of traditional metaphysics. That means in order to think about Being, metaphysics has to be overcome, metaphysics has to be transcended. Thus the subject matter of Being is not about being-qua-being, rather it is the essence of man. Thus, in one sense, Heideggerian interpretation of Being is a *destruction* of the traditional interpretation of metaphysics. One should not interpret the term ‘destruction’ as mentioned above in terms of demolition of broken into parts. Rather it would be prudent to apprehend it in terms of ‘transcends’.

As a phenomenologist, Heidegger treated Being phenomenological perspective. Phenomenology, according to Heidegger, is “to let anything manifest itself in the very way it manifests itself from itself.”⁷³ This is the impartial approach to the things themselves. The other important sphere of Heideggerian phenomenology is its ontological dimension or ontological implication. According to Heidegger, phenomenology and ontology pertain to the one and the same philosophical discipline. Heidegger further contends that ontology is possible only as phenomenology. The very objective of phenomenological ontology,

⁷² Heidegger, M., *Die Grundprobleme der phänomenologie*, GA 24 (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1975), p. 15.

⁷³ Heidegger, M. *Being and Time*, op.cit. p.50.

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Heidegger claims, aims at *the very manifestation of Being itself. Revealing and concealing and concealing and revealing as it is.*

Accordingly, it can be said that the question of Being is fundamentally an ontological question, question concerning the Being of beings. As an ontological question of Being, Heidegger introduces the concept of *Dasein*, the There-being. Therefore, the fundamental enquiry at this juncture comes to its fullness when There-being achieves its authenticity. In this regard, Heidegger reveals an essential link between *thinking and opting, Dasein and Being.*

Dasein and Being and their relationship:

In *Being and Time* Heidegger claims that the discovery of Being (reality) is made possible by the right way of asking an authentic question. That means authenticity actually helps one to discover Being. But how do we come to the discovery of Being? In this regard, Heidegger says that the discovery of Being is made possible through the understanding of There-being (*Dasein*). For Heidegger *Dasein* is characterised by the potentiality of asking the Being question, by asking about the meaning of Being. *Dasein* from the point of view of its own way always has a relation of its Being. *Dasein* is privileged because *Da-sein* is *gifted with awareness* of its own Being. Therefore, he is the *Da* of *Sein*, the *Da* Being shines forth. Hence, *Dasein's* essence lies in its existence, in its 'drive-to-be' (*Zu-sein*). This is how one can distinguish *Dasein* from other beings as mere entities. Interestingly, for Heidegger the Being-of-beings is not something 'out there' all by itself, rather it implies a meaningful relatedness and the intelligible presentness of things too.

Heidegger draws an interesting relation both forward and backward between what is questioned (Being) and the questioning itself as mode of Being of a being (*Dasein*). In this regard, Heidegger in his "The way back into the ground of Metaphysics" says, "To

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characterize with single term both the involvement of Being in human nature and the essential relation of man to the openness (there) of Being as such, the name of 'being there' (*Dasein*) was chosen for that sphere of Being in which man as man stands."⁷⁴ In a nutshell, man as a questioning being is the way to the questioning of Being. Being, for Heidegger, is always Being as it enters into *Dasein's* understanding of Being. There is Being, Heidegger remarks, because this understood by *Dasein*. Thus, there is a horizontalism or parallelism between Being and *Dasein* because Being is always thought or projected in terms of *Dasein*. By *Dasein*, Heidegger actually means, the place of *the disclosure of Being, the openness of Being*.

What has been revealed from the above is that *Dasein* raises the question of Being, ask about Being. *Dasein* also is aware of and concerned about the very Being. Being is both ontically and ontologically prior to all other beings. Being is ontically prior because it is a being whose Being (*Sein*) has the determinate character of existence. It is also ontologically prior to all other beings because it is endowed with the privilege of understanding Being. For Heidegger, Being the *Da* (there) of its own *Sein* (Being). *Man is the Dasein*. Thus, for Heidegger, Being of *Dasein* is available only in a projected world. *Da* is the world itself because *Da* means 'there' *Da-sein* is the Being-in-the-world. Heidegger further contends that the essence of *Dasein* actually lies in *ek-sistence*. Heidegger makes use of the term *ek-sistence* in contrast to existence in order to point out the nature of man's existence. "It is the ecstatic 'standing-out' of man in the truth of Being"⁷⁵ Therefore, man's very existence is an *ek-sistence*, namely, *a going out of himself*. This going out signifies the fundamental character of *man's ek-sistence as openness to Being*. Thus, for Heidegger, Being offers itself to the openness of man and

⁷⁴ Heidegger, M., "The way back into the ground of Metaphysics" in *Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre* tr., W. Kaufmann (ed.), (NY: World- Meridian 1956), p. 213.

⁷⁵ Heidegger, M., "The Letter on Humanism" in *Basic Writings*, ed., D.F.Krell, New York: Harper Collins 1993, p. 228.

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only in this openness of man, in this *Da* of *Dasein* could Being essentialise itself as Being. The *ek-sist* means not only be what one is but also be the possibility of standing out into one's beyondness. According to Heidegger, the essence of man is to depend on Being. Being is never something fabricated by man. Rather Being produces man. Man cannot produce Being. Thus, in one sense man depends on Being: man stands within the relation of Being. In this sense, Being is prior to man and man in one sense a situation of receptivity. Man is above all *correspondence*.

Heidegger conceives the relationship between man and Being as a *summoning-hearing* relationship. Being is presence means it summons the essence of man.⁷⁶ That means in order to exist, man must carefully attend to the silent summoning of Being. Man is the preserver of the truth of Being and hence man is regarded as the shepherd of Being. In this sense, the essence of man lies in his openness to the address of Being. It is this openness man realises the 'thing' to be what it is. Heidegger understands openness in terms of "letting-lie-forth".

Is the relationship between Being and man a subject-object relation? Heidegger does not think so. If the relationship between Being and man is conceived as the subject-object relationship, then Being cannot transcend man. Being as coming-to-presence is a demand which summons and hails *Dasein* to its essence belongs to the summoning and evoking hail of Being. According to Heidegger, Being is fundamentally a lighting- process through which beings are lit up as what they 'are'.

Being and non-Being:

Is non-Being different from Being? Apparently, it seems to us that Being is different from non-Being, that is the negation of Being leads to non-being. Heidegger elsewhere interprets not-being in terms of 'Nothing'. Nothing is said to be nothing precisely because it is 'no-

⁷⁶ Vadakethala, F.J., *Discovery of Being*, Bangalore: Dharmaram Publications 1970, p. 69.

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thing'. Being is not a being, not the collection of beings. Rather Being is 'Non-being'. Thus, Heidegger understood Being in its contrast to Non-Being. Heidegger claims that every time Being is questioned, Nothing also is questioned with it.

The question then is: Why are there beings rather than Nothing? Reflecting upon Heidegger, Richardson commends, "Non-being is not an Absolute Nothing but Being itself... Non-being as the other to beings is the veil of Being."⁷⁷ For Heidegger, *Nothing* is not something apart from beings nor it can be regarded as the 'counter-concept' to the Being but rather belongs to the essence of the Being. Nothing, for Heidegger, is the same as Being itself. Nothing is the Being of beings, the negating of the Nothing come to pass. Indeed by Nothing Heidegger does not mean the simple denial of what is, the negation of all beings, but Being itself. Thus, the negating of the Nothing is the Being of beings. Nothing is Being as every being would fall into beinglessness, for a being never is without Being. Heidegger says Being is no way a being, but is rather not-a-being, it can only take place as nothingness in the reality. Being and nothingness belong together and one cannot be outside of other. Heidegger does not understand nothingness just negated something. For Heidegger, nothingness is prior to 'no' and the negation. In this sense, nothingness cannot be regarded as non-real. Nothingness is real as it belongs to the event of Being.

Heidegger farther contends that anxiety reveals Nothing. The world is no-thing and hence appears itself as Nothing. It is the world in which *Dasein* has to find its meaningful existence. To exist authentically, *Dasein* should understand the true nature of Being and to understand the true nature of Being, *Dasein* has to understand itself. In anxiety we have the real experience of Being. Nothing is only an attempt to understand Being through its opposite. Thus, while exploring the trans-metaphysical reality, Heidegger gives much emphasis on the

⁷⁷ Richardson, W.J., *Phenomenology to Thought*, Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963, p. 474.

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negativity of Being and in this connection he claims that the ontological meaning of Non-being implies that it can also be called Being. Heidegger understands Being not just as the Being of beings, but he also understands it as somewhat antecedent, prior to all beings. Thus, in the deeper sense Heidegger conceives Being both its negative as well as positive aspect. When Heidegger speaks about Being as the process of non-concealment, he takes both the positive and negative aspects of this process as a unity. According to Richardson, Being as the process of non-concealment is that this permits beings to become non-concealed. To think Being in its truth, then is to think it in terms of both positivity and negativity at once. Therefore, Heidegger's all important observation is that in the non-concealment of the Being, non-Being truth occurs.

Being and the Pursuit of Truth:

Just like Being and non-being Heidegger also enquires truth as the central theme of Being. When delving into the question of the truth of Being, Heidegger reveals a correspondence between *intellectus* and *res*. To reveal the truth of Being is to establish the closeness of Being and *Dasein*. Accordingly, the problem of truth and Being is one of the most important themes of his thought. In the traditional sense, truth is the correspondence between the intellect and the thing i.e. the approximation of the thing to the intellect. Truth means the *conformity of the knowledge to the thing*. To say that truth means the conformity of things to knowledge is to understand truth in the propositional sense; whereas to interpret truth as the conformity of knowledge is to interpret truth in the ontological sense. Heidegger uses the Greek term *orthotes* (truth as exactness) to refer to the notion of truth as propositional correctness to the already opened. In this sense, truth is conceived in the sense of non-concealment. *Dasein*, the 'there' of Being, the locus of the manifestation and concealment of the whole. In *Being and Time* Heidegger remarks that the Greek word *Aletheia* literally means "to pluck something

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out of its concealment, to make manifest or reveal.⁷⁸ It means the emergence into the open, a path, a gate through which things are brought into light. Thus, for Heidegger, Being true means Being unconcealed or unveiled. Being itself gives itself in its openness.

According to Kockelmans, when Heidegger uses the expression ‘the meaning of Being’, the word ‘meaning’ (*Sinn*) means the non-concealment by which Being appears as itself. In this sense, ‘the meaning of Being’ and ‘the truth of Being’ have the same meaning. Being is the process of truth brought-to-pass by the nature of man.

What we have observed above after Heidegger is that he conceives truth in the radical sense. While narrating the concept of truth of Heidegger, Richardson calls this as the ‘not’ character of Being ‘negativity’ and the manifestive power that shines forth in beings as beings positivity. According to Richardson, when we can sense the fusion of positivity and negativity into the unity of a single process, we begin to grasp what Heidegger understands by Being as the process of truth. Heidegger says, “... it hides itself in this (disclosure) and conceals itself (as) thus hiding.”⁷⁹ Heidegger continues by saying that concealing by Being of its own concealment is the ‘mystery’ of Being. In this process truth of Being comes-to-presence. Thus, in a sense the self-illuminating rise of Being comes-to-pass in such a way that Being itself actually hides in the background. More importantly, careful observation reveals that the truth of Being as envisaged by Heidegger is not something fixed, static, rather it is to be achieved and it comes to pass little by little. Accordingly, Being in unconcealment as truth presents itself in time.

Thus, the question of truth of Being is linked with time. For Heidegger, Being and Time and Time and Being are extremely elusive. The relationship between Time and Being is highly important. For Heidegger, Being (reality) is not a thing, not itself a being. Accordingly, one

⁷⁸ Heidegger, M., *Being and Time*, translated by J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, New York: Harper & Row, 1962, p.262.

⁷⁹Ibid., p.244.

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cannot say “Being is...”. Like Being, time is not a thing either. Ordinarily we claim that everything has its time but this is not some other thing that it has. Time is an infinite series of ‘nows’. The first consists of the ‘nows’ so as to the present as well as future. However, owing to fixing the relation between Time and Being, Heidegger gives importance on the *notion of presence*. For Heidegger, Being means the same as presencing.⁸⁰ Indeed, presence speaks of the present. Being is determined by time and vice-versa. That is where the relevance of the book entitled *Being and Time* lies. According to Heidegger, Being and Time actually reciprocal terms based on symmetric relation in the sense that Being determines time and time determines Being. As one can be determined by other, one cannot be former than the other. While evaluating and commenting on Heidegger on this point, Macquarrie in his book *Heidegger and Christianity*⁸¹ opines that to understand time not a thing, but as the medium in which things arise and pass away and in turn time itself passes away. In another sense, only the thing in time passes away while time remains as time.

Heidegger wanted to bring up for thought with respect to time which belongs to the sense of Being. For Heidegger, There-being is constantly coming to Being i.e. to itself. This coming of There-being to itself, is There beings’ ‘coming’, i.e. its future. When Heidegger speaks of Being and Time, this does not mean something which stands alongside Being. Being and Time are rather intertwined that one can be understood on the basis of other. Time is rather a primordial movement which Being itself, releases beings from out of itself.

We think that Heideggerian concept of Being and Time should be conceived in terms of world what Heidegger terms as “Being-in-the-world” describes the way of ‘to be’ of a human being. There is no question of doubt that the metaphysical standpoint of Heidegger is marked by the question of Being-in-the-world. It is revealed that the structure of Being in the world

⁸⁰ Heidegger, M., *On Time and Being*, translated by J. Stambaugh, New York: Harper & Row, 1972, p.2.

⁸¹ Macquarrie, J., *Heidegger and Christianity: The Hensley Henson Lectures 1993-94*, Continuum, 1999.

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belongs to the definition of the Being of the human being. Heidegger interpreted and conceived the world in terms of human *existence*. The term 'world' is understood not as the manifestation of a divine creative presence but as a "network of meanings", as a "system of total meaningfulness."⁸²

In Western Philosophy and particularly in the domain of linguistic philosophy we have a different interpretation of the term 'world'. According to Locke, the world is the totality of experience. According to Strawson, the world is the totality of particulars. Strawson interprets particular at par with object. Thus, it can be said, in other words, that the world is the totality of things or objects. Interestingly, Heidegger gives a different interpretation of the term 'world' which is unlike to the traditional interpretation of the term world. Heidegger understands world in terms of *Dasein* and Being. According to Heidegger *Dasein* is not just another item in the world designated by the 'person'. *Dasein* is the 'Being-in-the-world'. The multitude of things contained in the world is seen and understood in the context of world, within which they are connected in a network with each other and with *Dasein*. For Heidegger, *things are seen by Dasein* as ready-to-hand, available for the use by *Dasein* in its dealings with *world*. Thus, the things of the world becomes for *Dasein* *equipment* for leaving. That is why, Heidegger elsewhere remarks that the world is the totality of equipment. The world is a world of work where things are seen not as objects but are items of equipment for *Dasein*'s task.

Heidegger, in this regard, brings the concept of hammer. Hammer we see it as a piece of equipment for hammering in human activities like building and furnishing. Things are ready-to-hand in the sense that we incorporate them into our activities. Something which merely confronts to us as an object is said to be present-at-hand, but increasingly we bring even such

⁸² Heidegger, M., *Being and Time*, op.cit. section 14.

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things into the realm of equipment. Thus, confining his analysis to ‘everyday’ existence, Heidegger speaks of the world as the *workshop* what he eventually attributed as being-in-the-world. Thus, in one sense, it can be said that human being is destined to the world and to itself. It transcends to the world as its ultimate meaning.

Thus, Heidegger’s concept of the world paves the way for a new understanding of the world which gets away from the same what exploitative attitude to the world expounded in *Being and Time*. The new view is ‘fourfold’. The fourfold means that everything has a fourfold reference or has the *four dimensions of being* which together constitutes the meaning of that thing. The four dimensions are: earth, sky, mortals and gods. In this regard, Heidegger chooses the example of a wine-jug to elucidate what he means by the term fourfold. The jug made of clay refers to earth. It refers to the sky from which both sun shine and rain come to swell and ripen the grapes used for making wine. It refers to the humans, the skilled craftsman who has given to it the form. The word ‘gods’ thus stands for what might be called a ‘divine factor’ in all reality, something holy in which everything participates.

Even though Heidegger thinks that *Dasein* and Being are intimately associated or related to each other but Being has primacy over the beings and over *Dasein* because Heidegger in his “The Letter on Humanism” tells us that thinking is the thinking of Being. Thinking is of Being is as much as thinking. Being itself proceeds over thinking and hence over the essence of humanity, i.e., over its relation to Being. By giving due attention ‘*ek-sistence*’ rather than ‘existence’, Heidegger stressing that it denotes a ‘standing out into the truth of Being’. Heidegger farther contends that Being needs thinking for its self-manifestation. Being is the Being which reveals itself in and through human thought. In this regard, Being *needs and uses man*.

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According to Heidegger, the essence of philosophy is questioning and thinking of Being. Philosophy is all about of thinking as the thinking of Being. Here Heidegger advocates *meditative thinking* rather than representational thinking. Representational thinking is related to metaphysics and hence is not essential thinking. Only meditative thinking is essential not on beings but on the truth of Being itself. The thinking of Being is also a thinking - original thinking. Original thinking is the echo of Being's favour. Heidegger investigates Being not as a philosopher but as a creative thinker. Heidegger believes that philosophical thinking has more in common with the thinking of the poet than it has with the thinking of the scientist. A poet is concerned to speak the truth, i.e., to uncover Being. Poet as a creative thinker utters Being. The poet names the holy.

Careful study, however, would reflect that Heidegger takes different approaches in his *Being and Time* and his later works regarding Being. In fact, Heidegger started with the concept of being and then attempted to transcend from being to Being. This change of emphasis from 'There' to Being could be regarded as the consequence of the meditative experiencing of the coming about the ontological difference and of the deepening of the question of Being on Heidegger's way. In fact, Heidegger referred to the change as a 'turn' and a 'completion' of the questioning that had begun with *Being and Time*. In *Being and Time* Heidegger mainly focuses 'man in relation to Being'. However, he characterises the turn as an approach to "Being and its truth in relation to man"⁸³. Thus, in a sense a later work of Heidegger brings new ideas, i.e., the idea of "Being and its truth in relation to man". Moreover, in his early thinking Heidegger conceives the world as an *instrumental system* where things lie ready-to-hand of the use of the *Dasein* in everyday concerns. But in the later writings he conceives the world *that has a dignity in its own right*. In his earlier writings Heidegger conceives things

⁸³ Waelhens, A.De. "Reflections on Heidegger's Development: Apropos of a Recent Book," *International Philosophical Quarterly*, 5 (1965), pp. 475-502.

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just as 'equipments'. He elsewhere remarks that reality is the totality of equipments. However in his later writings he gives us a different interpretation. Here he thinks that things are not just 'equipment' but are constituted by *fourfold of earth and sky, mortals and gods*.

It seems clear to us that the concept of reality of Heidegger takes different interpretations in his early and later works. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger claims that man plays the leading role in the relationship between Being and man; whereas in the later works, he thinks the other way round. Here he tells us that Being itself holds the primacy in its own self-disclosure. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger confesses that the total meaningfulness of the world is projected by *Dasein* and also stated that only as long as *Dasein* is, 'there Being', and only as long as *Dasein* is, 'is there' truth. But in his later works, he made it clear that *the Da* itself is thrown and that it is thrown by Being itself. In narrating the two phases of work of Heidegger, Lowith⁸⁴ concludes that Heidegger has subscribed not to one but two grounds in the course of his work. The first is *Dasein*, on the basis of which 'there is' Being. The second is Being itself, on the basis of which there is *Dasein*.

Nature of Being (Reality):

We have seen that Being (reality) for Heidegger is fundamentally a lighting process, by which beings are lit up as what they 'are'. Among them there is a domain where this lighting up process takes place. This is the *There of Being*. It is a process of *coming-to-pass* and Being maintains this initiative. For the *there* is 'thrown' and it is Being that does the 'throwing'.⁸⁵ Thus, the coming-to-pass takes place for the sake of Being and it does not depend on *There* but on the spontaneity of Being which *e-mits* itself among beings. Thus, e-mitted by Being is what makes history possible. History is that process by which being comes-to-pass by self-mittens.

⁸⁴ Lowith, Karl (9th January, 1897 – 26th May, 1973) was a German Philosopher, a student of Husserl and Heidegger.

⁸⁵ Heidegger, M., "The Letter on Humanism" in *Basic Writings, op.cit.* p. 234.

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In *Being and Time* i.e., the earlier work of Heidegger, Being appears as the *Being of beings*, whereas in the later work, Heidegger begins to place the stress on the coming-to-pass of the truth. He then maintains that Being is the Being of beings, in that Being is that by which being share, and Being is drawn towards being in which it must emerge in order that it be itself. Unlike *Being and Time*, Heidegger in his later works mainly focuses directly on the ontological difference between thought and the Being of beings, expressing that Being means Being of beings and beings mean what they are in terms of their Being.⁸⁶ Heidegger opines that Being can be thought by itself, independent of the beings. In this regard, Heidegger remarks, “It pertains to the truth of Being and Being indeed comes-to-presence without beings...”⁸⁷ Being is nothing but the Being of beings. Being never comes to presence without beings. Thus, according to Richardson, the Being-process of Heidegger is the emergence of beings. Being must be thought for itself in order to comprehend *the ontological difference*. Being can never be by itself. That means Being cannot be without beings.

Heidegger farther contends that Being must not be understood as something static, fixed, rather it is process, a clearing process by which beings are lighted up. This light is neither man nor the beings rather it is the ‘between’. Moreover, Being is not an existing quality of beings, nor can Being be conceived and established objectively. Rather Being is something non-entity that gives every entity the warrant to be. In his essay *Discourse on Thinking*, Heidegger uses the term *the open* to refer to Being. Here Being is understood as the open domain where all beings gathers together. Thus, Being here is understood primarily as the gathering process what Heidegger termed it as *logos*, the ‘expanse’. It is the open domain where beings gather together.

⁸⁶ Heidegger, M., *What is Called Thinking?*, tr., F.D. Wieck & J.G. Gray, New York: Harper & Row, 1968, pp. 226-227.

⁸⁷ Heidegger, M., *Existence and Being*, Henry Regnery Company, Chicago, 1949, p.354.

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Elsewhere Heidegger understands Being *as a sphere*, as a process of coming-to-presence in all beings which is everywhere the same. Within this process beings can come to presence. In answering to the question: What is Being?, Heidegger replies, 'It is It itself'. He farther continues: "Being that is not God, and not a cosmic ground. Being is farther than all beings and is yet nearer to man than every being, be it a rock, a beast, a work of art, a machine, be it an angel or God. Being is the nearest, yet the near remains farthest from man."⁸⁸

Let us explain in what sense Being is nearest to man and in what sense Being is farthest from man. According to Heidegger, Being is nearest to man because it lets him be what he is and makes it possible for him to enter into comportment with beings. On the other hand, Being is farthest from man in so far as it is itself not a being. In so far as man is structured in such a way that he can deal directly only with being. Thus, for Heidegger, Being is the mystery, because Being encompasses all beings just as a domain of openness encompasses what is found within it. This domain is not, of course, 'space' but a dimension out of which even space and time themselves come-to-presence. Being is the *domain of openness*. It is the lighting-process by which beings are lighted up. Being at once, 'in' man as 'in' every entity. According to Heidegger, man belongs to Being as its own. He is 'released' into Being. Being appropriates into itself whose proper task is to attend to it.⁸⁹ Even Heidegger elsewhere conceives Being as an event, a process of unveiling while it lets-be-present, namely, beings. In this sense, Being is a gift of the 'It gives' and that Being belongs to giving. 'It gives Being' means that there is presence, that *Dasein* is brought into the clearing. In this regard, Macquarrie compares Heidegger's concept of Being with Christian's concept of God. According to Macquarrie, in Christian theology, God is love. In Heidegger, 'It gives' as an act of giving or donation. The act of giving is also an act of self-giving and so not different in

⁸⁸ Heidegger, M., *Poetry, Language and Thought*, tr., A. Hofstadter, New York: Harper & Row, 1971, p. 123.

⁸⁹ Heidegger, M., *On Time and Being*, op.cit. p.141.

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any major respect from love.⁹⁰ Being itself is self-giving. The term ‘gives’ means the *essence of Being* which in turn means *granting its truth*. According to Heidegger, the self-giving into the open, is Being itself. In this sense, Being is not the product of man or *Dasein*, and that “man is not the lord of the beings, but the Shepherd of Being”.⁹¹

It seems clear that by considering or conceiving man as the shepherd of Being, Heidegger denies the modern anthropocentric standpoint that man is the measure or the master of the world. Being designates an event, a coming-to-pass, by which Being ‘sends’ itself into man affirming its own primacy. The truth of Being comes-to-pass in singular ways and each self-manifestation of Being in beings has the character of an *Ereignis*, an appropriating event, a binding process between Being and beings. It weaves Being, man, things and world together into an articulated and textured whole. It is a binding process through which man can reveal his essence. In this sense, *Ereignis* is an inter belonging of Being and man, as “the belonging together of call and obedience.”⁹² Being belongs as much to us as we belong to it. Since, “Being itself belongs to us; for only in us can it essence, i.e., presence as being.”⁹³ Being as an openness and truth reveals itself in its meaning. Thus, in a sense *Ereignis* determines the meaning of Being itself. It is a key concept of thought like the Greek word *logos* or the Chinese word *tao*.

While enquiring the ground of Being, Heidegger investigates its fundamental realm in many different ways. In this regard, he uses Leibnitz principle in tackling the problem. Heidegger thinks that the Leibnitzian principle is the basic principle of all principles. It is not a mere principle of being but also a principle of Being. Heidegger goes on to show that Being and

⁹⁰ Macquarrie, J., *Heidegger and Christianity*, London: SCM press 1994, p.99.

⁹¹ Heidegger, M., “*The Letter on Humanism*”, op.cit. p.234.

⁹² Heidegger, M., *The Question of Being*, tr., W. Kluback & J.T. Wilde, London: Vision Press, 1974, p. 77.

⁹³ Heidegger, M., *Identity and Difference*, tr., J. Stambaugh, New York: Harper & Row, 1974, p. 33.

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ground pertain to each other and thereby concludes “Being and ground: the same.”⁹⁴ Even though Heidegger reveals closeness between *Dasein* and Being but in his later works he gradually gives primacy Being over *Dasein*. In this regard, he says, it is not *Dasein* who invents the concept of Being, but rather Being that thinks in *Dasein*. In his postscript it is said, “Being may be without the beings, but never the beings without Being.”⁹⁵ However, Richardson in this regard in his *Phenomenology to Thought* disagrees with Heidegger. According to Richardson, Being needs the beings just as the beings need Being. While Being is ‘dispensationally’ identical with ground in itself it is groundless. Because every form of grounding would reduce Being to some kind of being. According to Heidegger, the true ‘ground’ of human existence is Being itself. In this sense, man is up rooted if he is pre-occupied with beings. He will arrive at a ground which is Being itself. In this way, we all human beings will attain a new way of thinking which is not confine to ‘giving reasons’. Heidegger in his *Der Satz Vom Grund*⁹⁶ tells us that Being and ground are to be understood in terms of one another. Being and ground belong together. In this sense, ground receives its essence out of its belonging together with Being as Being. Conversely, Being as Being holds sway out of the essence of ground.

Relationship between Language and Reality:

So far we have explained the nature of reality (Being) as well as the nature of language after Heidegger. In this section we propose to develop the relationship between language and reality after Heidegger. According to Heidegger, Being (reality) and language are intimately interrelated with each other. Being, for Heidegger, is always Being as it enters into *Dasein*’s understanding of Being. Being the *Da* (there) of *Sein* (Being) man is the *Dasein*. Man’s *ek-sistence* is *ek-static* openness to Being. This *ek-static* standing of *Dasein* is also a standing

⁹⁴ Heidegger, M., *Der Satz Vom Grund*, Pfullingen: Neske, 1957, p. 90.

⁹⁵ Richardson, W.J., *Phenomenology to Thought*, op.cit. pp. 562-565.

⁹⁶ Heidegger, M., *Der Satz Vom Grund*, Pfullingen: Neske 1957.

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out in the truth of Being. *Dasein* is the place of the truth of Being, the openness of Being, “the standing in the lighting process of Being.”⁹⁷ The human being dwells in the light of Being; the lighting process (Being) “grants the nearness to Being”.⁹⁸

Heidegger’s analysis of There-being was to serve the purpose of bringing to light Being which illumines beings. The ‘There’ of There-being only in the clearing, There-being transcends toward Being. Moreover, There-being and Being stand in a reciprocal relation. Being conceals and reveals itself in the world as what Heidegger calls man the ‘shepherd of Being’, he wants to indicate the special relation There-being has to Being.

However, Heidegger has developed his understanding of the nature of language in relation to his philosophical problematic of the question of Being. Language is related to reality in the sense that “Language is the clearing-and-concealing advent of Being itself.”⁹⁹ Language becomes the concrete presence of Being rather than mere articulation. Heideggerian language, we think, is not a separate entity like the pragmatists. While developing the referential theory of meaning it has been asserted that there must be a referential connection between the language and what it refers to. This clearly suggests that language and reality are separated from each other. However, unlike the semantists, Heidegger thinks the other way round. According to Heidegger, language is the house of Being i.e. Being lives within language, reveals by means of language and inseparated from language. In this sense, Heidegger asserts that *language becomes the concrete essence of Being rather than mere articulation.*

Heidegger further contends that language is “the foundation of human being.”¹⁰⁰ The essential being of language is the saying as that which shows. The showing of Saying takes

⁹⁷Heidegger, M., “The Letter on Humanism”, in *Basic Writings*, op.cit. p. 229.

⁹⁸Ibid., p.223.

⁹⁹Ibid., p.230.

¹⁰⁰Ibid., p.230.

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place when language breaks into speech. It is language itself which reaches into the regions of presencing and lets what comes to presence appear and disappear. According to Heidegger, the primal Saying of language is prior to all human speech. It is a monologue.¹⁰¹ This monologue characterizes as 'stillness'. Language needs a use the speaking of human in order to bring the primal saying to expression. Man belonging to Saying listens to it and its word and brings what it hears correspondingly into human-sounding words. Thus, language, for Heidegger, is attentive to the clearing of Being whenever it inserts it Saying into language. Thinking acts to the extent that it 'brings Being to language'. In this way the relationship between language and reality is made possible. In this regard, Heidegger says in his *On the Way to Language*, "language as Saying is the mode of appropriation."¹⁰²

According to Heidegger, language and reality are related with each other because the fundamental role of language is not "the means to portray what already lies before us," but rather language "grants presence- i.e. Being - wherein something appears as existent."¹⁰³ Since language is 'the house of Being,' one reaches Being (reality) by constantly going through this house. Metaphorically, it can be said that whenever we go to the well or walk through the wood, we are always already going through the word 'fountain' and the word 'wood', even though we are not saying these words or thinking of anything linguistic. In saying this, Heidegger means that language is correlative with experience of the world. Language and the world exist only when words exist. Language is that mode of the Being of man which permits him to be open to the beings that relate themselves to him. Heidegger understands language not only as a mere tool like the semantics rather language, for

¹⁰¹ Heidegger, M., *On the Way to Language*, op.cit., p. 134.

¹⁰² Ibid., p.135.

¹⁰³ Heidegger, M., *On the Way to Language*, op.cit. p. 146.

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Heidegger, first grants the possibility in general to stand in the “midst of the openness of beings.”¹⁰⁴

It seems clear from the above that Heidegger conceives that language and reality are inseparable. In this regard, Heidegger says that *thinking and language* are inseparable. The term ‘thinking’ is a part of reality or Being. We always, Heidegger opines, find ourselves in the midst of language what he terms as ‘language is the house of Being.’ We are attuned to language as reality rather than as a surrogate of reality. That means in Heideggerian sense there is *mutual inclusivity* or *mutual inclusiveness* between language and reality. Language is not something that can be used reality extra-linguistically; rather language is a house, a home, a locus where reality belongs to. Thus, to think of language, according to Heidegger, is to think of reality. Language makes possible man to think. It is by means of the possession of language that man is not close of from that which reveals itself but can come under influence and illumination.

It is also important to observe here, after Heidegger, that verbal constructions are in a position to communicate states of being is not an indication that communication is the basic function of language. The communicative function of language is a result of the fact that *Being reveals itself in language*. As Being reveals itself in language, language is, therefore, the ground in which the Being of man is founded. In this regard, Heidegger quotes Holderlin to the effect that man is a conversation. Here Heidegger makes a direct connection between language and Being according to which man is no longer to be thought of as disposing of language as he wills. Thinking accomplishes the relation of Being to the essence of man. Thinking brings the relation to Being solely as something handed over to it from Being. Accordingly, we can say, after Heidegger, that such offering consists in the fact that in

¹⁰⁴ Heidegger, M. “Holderlin and the Essence of Poetry”, in *Existence and Being, op.cit.*, p. 276.

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thinking Being comes to language. In this sense, Heidegger makes the celebrated remark that 'language is the house of Being'.

Language, according to Heidegger, is the house of Being because in language man dwells. Those who think and those who create with words are *the guardians of this home*. Thus in a sense Being is the owner of language. Being as the owner of language must take care of language (home). Without Being there is no language just like without the occupants there is no house in the material world. Without language Being is homeless. Being is meaningless without language because in such a case Being cannot find the way to open up. Thus, both language and Being (reality) are inseparable with each other and one cannot think of by forfeiting the other. Without Being language is empty, silence because there is no guardian of language. Without language Being cannot think. Being without language is homeless.

This guardianship accomplishes the manifestation of Being in so far as it brings the manifestation to language and maintain it in language through its speech. Being has the primacy over thought simply because it gives rise to it. In this regard, Heidegger in his "The Letter on Humanism" says, "Said plainly, thinking is the thinking of Being."¹⁰⁵ Thinking is of Being is as much as thinking, coming to pass from Being. At the same time thinking is of Being in so far as thinking belonging to Being, listens to Being. Accordingly, it makes sense to say that thought belongs to Being, for it is brought about by Being. For Heidegger thought attends to Being because it comes about in There-being. Thus, we observe a kinship relationship between language and reality after Heidegger.

Heidegger frequently speaks of the destiny of Being. For Heidegger, Being is *the process by means of which finite beings emerge from concealment*. However, in the process of thinking the Being, Heidegger seems to move towards mysticism. He has made his position clear that

¹⁰⁵ Heidegger, M., "The Letter on Humanism" in *Basic Writings*, op.cit. p.220.

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as a philosopher he is not concerned with religious problems. The only way to gain access to Being itself is to let Being be and to let it addressment. Being can be predicted of everything that is. This is the result of the all-pervasive character of Being. According to Heidegger, all things are and can be Being and a form of Being. Accordingly, they are unified by that which is common to all of them, that they are Being. It serves as a unifying aspect of everything. In this sense, Being constitutes the unity of everything. That is the question of Being amounts at the same time to a quest for a way of thought that can redeem our humanity by overcoming the oblivion of Being and also enable us to break the omnipotence of technology and we live in the world as truly our home, in the “neighborhood” of Being.

Language and Reality: A Comparative Study between Heidegger and Bhartṛhari

So far we have examined and explicated the nature of language and the nature of reality after Heidegger. We think Heidegger’s interpretation of language and reality is revolutionary in the sense that he offers us a sort of language and reality which remained susceptible to the whole host of semantists. The language Heidegger has chosen is poetic in nature and the very distinctive feature of such language is that it is creative in nature. Likewise, we have a different perception of reality in Heidegger. The nature of reality is metaphysical or ontological. It is metaphysical or ontological in the sense that it is associated with the *question of being*. Thus, from Heidegger’s point of view we can say that language matters to philosophy because language appears as the *house of Being*. More succinctly, it can be said that language matters to philosophy because language reveals reality or ontology for us.

In this section we propose to make a comparative study between Heidegger and Bhartṛhari. Interestingly, Martin Heidegger in the West and Bhartṛhari in the East have attempted to revive the relevance of metaphysical or ontological reality by means of language. Reality, for Heidegger, is Being and language, for Heidegger, is poetic in nature. Reality, for Bhartṛhari,

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is *Brahman* and language for Bharṭṛhari is *Śabda*. For both, the question of Being is essentially interwoven into the experience of the question of language. They equally contend that there is no philosophy of Being without a philosophy of language. Thus, in a sense to talk about or to think of Being is at par with to think of language. The experience of the truth of one is equally the same experience of the truth of the other. According to Bharṭṛhari, language is the medium of self-expression of the ultimate Reality communicated through all meaning-bearing words. It leads us across external appearance to the core of reality. Language is the covers everything what there is . Real or reality, according to Bharṭṛhari, is a gleaming Truth that needs to be re-discovered by every speaker and in every speech. Speech or *Śabda* is not merely a means to a truth or reality; rather it is the *Truth and Reality*. This awareness eventually leads one to the realization of the meaningfulness of Being.

We find the same philosophical position in Heidegger as well. Like Bharṭṛhari, Heidegger conceives language not as a human creation, but as a *saturating presence of Being* on the finite human being. He gives language an essential place in the structure of Being. For Heidegger, Being speaks to man. It hinges on the deep connection that language is alleged to provide between Being and being. Thus, careful study would reflect that the basic theme of Being and language as comprehended by Bharṭṛhari and Heidegger would remain almost the same.

While developing the relationship between language and reality both Heidegger and Bharṭṛhari have emphasized not only on the metaphysical reality but they also have conceived that language and reality are same. Each of them has agreed that even though language reveals reality but *language is reality* and *reality is language*. Language and reality are not separate entities. The *Śabdabrahman* of Bharṭṛhari is a case in point. Similar to this, Heidegger remarks that ‘language is the house of Being’. Here we make an East-West

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comparative study of the relationship between language and reality with reference to Heidegger and Bhartrhari.

What then is language according to Bhartrhari? By language, he means *Śabda* (word). He then finds a sort of identity between *Śabda and Brahman*. For him, Brahman is the essence, inner meaning or *sphoṭa* of every word what Bhartrhari termed as *Śabdatattva* (word-essence), an underlying unity beneath everything and pervading everywhere. It is considered the Supreme Reality. This Supreme Reality is one, non-dual. Like Bhartrhari, the only philosophical question that interests Heidegger is the question about Being and its truth. It is 'one star', non-dual, in the sense of Bhartrhari, that remains constant along the way. Like the Supreme-Reality, Being of Heidegger is pervading everywhere. Being is not a being though it is *concealed* in it as the Being of that very being. Being is divulges through the process of human thinking. As a result of that Being breaks forth as presence by which the being shows itself from itself. In short, Being is presence, the unending process of unveiling of Being from being. The question of Being is the question of Metaphysics because here one can understand being in the light of Being. On the basis of above discussion, we may spell out the similarities between Heidegger and Bhartrhari.

The important similarities between Heidegger and Bhartrhari are as follows:

- (a) Each of them has engaged in showing the relevance of metaphysical or ontological reality that has been completely forfeited by the semantists as well as the pragmatists. The semantic school in general was in favour of linguistic revision and instead of natural language; it prefers ideal or artificial language. Likewise, reality for them is external and the language is used to know about reality externally. Again, the language for pragmatists is ordinary or natural and they are against the revision of ordinary language. For them, ordinary or natural language is all right. Thus, the

inquiry of the relationship between language and reality is empirical to semantists as well as pragmatists. We have seen that Wittgenstein draws the limits of language and the limits of world. However, we find a different interpretation altogether in Heidegger and Bhartṛ hari because instead of empirical reality, they adhere to metaphysical or ontological reality. Their inquiry of the relationship between language and reality is associated with being question.

- (b) Each of them has shared the view that language reveals reality and language is reality. Language and reality are inseparable and mutually coheres with each other. Reality is not independent from language. This again is an important deviation from the earlier linguistic tradition. Linguistic philosophers have claimed that language and reality are independent with each other and language can be used extra-linguistically to map or to picture or to hook or to represent reality having its independent existence.
- (c) The ontological status of Being of Heidegger and *Śabdabrahman* of Bhartṛ hari remained the same. Each of them has emphasized on inner revelation of man, being in Heidegger philosophy and everyday reality in Bhartṛhari.

It seems clear from the above observation that language matters to philosophy because language is all about *of knowing reality*. This is equally true in the case of Heidegger and Bhartṛhari. It is further noted that question of Reality, Being and language are entwined with each other even in the philosophies of Bhartṛhari and Heidegger. Careful study would reflect that Bhartṛhari conceives reality along with his thinking of language just like as Heidegger reveals the question of Being to his understanding of language. They developed the ontological aspect of the relationship between language and reality. One should not be confused by finding out the subtle distinction between ‘reality’ and ‘ontology’. Ironically in

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the area of linguistic philosophy the terms ‘reality’ and ‘ontology’ are used almost synonymously. However, we think there remains a *subtle distinction between the term ‘reality’ and ‘ontology’*. We think linguistic philosophers who adhere to talk in favour of empirical world would like to show the relationship between language and reality. But some linguistic philosophers are in favour of metaphysical reality as well. Their understanding of reality is associated with the question of ‘being’. Both Bhaṭṛhari and Heidegger belong to this class. They talk in favour of metaphysical reality. We think when reality is conceived with regard to ‘being’, it should be conceived in terms of ontology. Thus, in a sense, ontology is conceptually higher concept than reality. This question has been raised during the pre-submission of my viva-voce. I am pleased to answer this question here because the relevance of ontology comes when we deal with Bhaṭṛhari and Heidegger.

As both Bhaṭṛhari and Heidegger deal with the ontological aspect of the relationship between language and reality each of them has attempted to transcend the boundary of human existence and in turn has moved towards universality of thinking in the process of confirming the universality of human concerns. Having said this, each of them differs because of their own *unique philosophical approach*. Unlike Heidegger, the approach that has been adopted by Bhaṭṛhari is *moksa-oriented*. As a result of that it springs from the practical interest of leading man out of *duḥkha* into a state of bliss, from inauthentic to authentic existence, from absorption in the object to self-realization. Contrary to Bhaṭṛhari, we find a different approach in Heidegger as he claims that through *Dasein* (There-being) one can surpass from being to *Being* by way of thinking. It is an onward movement begins from the realm of being and ends in the realm of Being. Being (*Sein*) as being is always sought for in Metaphysics and one can transcend being in the light of its Being. However, the most important aspect is that here the very Being of being reveals itself in beings and it remains hidden in being. The

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difference between Being and being, Heidegger opines, is forgotten by thinking Being as a being which throws being into beingness, itself comes to be considered as a being. Thus, the journey from being towards Being is a sort of journey through which one may acquire self-authenticated knowledge. It is a process of *becoming*.

Thus, it seems to us that authenticity counts the most in both Bhaṭṭhari and Heidegger. Bhaṭṭhari elsewhere goes on to say that the life of everyone is inauthentic. It is the real truth one has to realize. Since it is process of self-transcendence, one has to transcend it through the process of self-realisation. We observe the same even in Heidegger. Like Bhaṭṭhari, Heidegger also expresses his dissatisfaction over the ‘thrown fallenness’ of everyday life. He was no happier about inauthentic knowledge. In this regard, Heidegger inclines to say that Dasein understands its own being. Moreover, it attends and eventually transcends or moves towards Being. Likewise, Bhaṭṭhari’s man through action gets involved and absorbed into the objects of everyday reality. We intuit the same in Bhaṭṭhari as well. In this context, he claims that human condition as a fundamental alteration of attitude actually facilitates *awareness* of everyday life. A man must be aware. Individual awareness plays a significant role to identify the real from the unreal; the truth from the other than the truth. Awareness thus at the end of the day assists a man to realize the loopholes of everyday life and in turn helps him to advance from inauthentic to authentic life. We have observed the same in Vedanta philosophy. It states that the world is full of illusion or māyā. One has to overcome it to know about the *Absolute or Brahman*.

We are now in a better position to assess in what sense Heidegger comes closer to Bhaṭṭhari. It seems that Heidegger in re-experiencing for the West man’s belongingness to *Ereignis* and this sort of re-experiencing helps Heidegger to *come* closer to Bhaṭṭhari’s man who dissociates himself from untruth through *Vāgyoga* and achieves union with the real, what

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Bhartṛhari termed as *Śabdatattva*. Moreover, Heidegger reveals neighbourhood between man and being. In this regard he elsewhere says that ‘man is the neighbour of Being’. Accordingly, it can be said that ‘man of all beings stands in a privilege relation to Being’. Similarly Bhartṛhari goes on to say that an analysis and reflection on the nature of the self is nothing but a means of knowing Brahman, the *Śabdatattva*. Thus, it may be said that the Being (Reality) of Heidegger is *at par* with the *Śabdatattva* of Bhartṛhari.

The philosophical inquiry of the relationship between language and reality as comprehended by Heidegger and Bhartṛhari has a distinctive nature. For them one should strive for authentic knowledge. In short, authenticity is the hallmark of their inquiry about the ontological relationship between language and reality. What then is authentic knowledge according to Heidegger? According to Heidegger, *the question of Being is authentic*. Accordingly, we can come to the discovery of Being through the understanding of There-being (*Dasein*). There-being, Heidegger asserts, is not man as such but that ‘place’ where the essence of man has its abiding ground, i.e. the ultimate source out of which man comes-to-presence as man. In the real sense, *Dasein* has a relation to its Being because *Da-sein* is gifted with awareness of its own Being. Therefore, he is the *Da* of *Sein*, i.e. the *Da* where Being (*Sein*) shines forth. *Dasein*’s ‘essence’ lies in its existence, in its ‘drive-to-be’ (*Zu-sein*)¹⁰⁶. Accordingly, it can be assumed, after Heidegger, that the Being of beings is not something that is just ‘out there’ all by itself, or even ‘out there’ in beings, rather it implies the meaningful relatedness and the intelligible presentness of things for man understood as *Dasein*. Accordingly, the question of *Dasein* is conceived as a prologue to the question of Being. To make this standpoint more sharpen, Heidegger in his “The Way back into the ground of Metaphysics” says, “To characterize with single term both the involvement of Being in human nature and the

¹⁰⁶Ibid,p. 67.

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essential relation of man to the openness ('there') of Being as such, the name of 'being there' (*Dasein*) was chosen for that sphere of Being in which man as man stands."¹⁰⁷

The craving towards authenticity is very much present in Bharṭṛ hari. However, the inquiry of authenticity is being measured with regard to *human situation*. According to J. N. Mohanty, Indian philosophy at large is *mokṣa-oriented* and it was reflected almost all leading Indian schools, such as, Samkhya, Vedanta, Buddhist and Yoga systems. The basic or core metaphysical thesis of these systems actually springs from the practical interest of leading man out of *duḥkha* into the object of self-realization. It is a divine journey from inauthentic to authentic existence, from absorption in the object of self-realization.

Accordingly, it can be said that man as a questioning of being is the way to the questioning of Being. Thus, Being (reality) for Heidegger is always Being as it enters into *Dasein's* understanding of Being. Being is understood in terms of *Dasein* and there is Being only insofar as it is understood by *Dasein*¹⁰⁸. Thus, *Dasein*, for Heidegger, is the place of disclosure of Being. Like Heidegger, Bharṭṛhari characterises *Śabdātattva* as Being distinguishes from all beings. According to Bharṭṛ hari, Being is not one object amongst others; rather it is that in the light of which everything else is manifested and which is itself self-manifesting. In this regard, Bharṭṛhari conceives existence (*sattā*) as a universal substance (*dravya*), a timeless, simple substance underlying all things and permitting them to borrow their existence claiming from their 'association' with it. Thus, Bharṭṛhari interprets the nature of *Brahman* in terms of *Dravya*. *Dravya* or substance, for Bharṭṛ hari, is the universal in particular things which is at par with *Brahman* as existence. *Brahman* as substance is also called *tattva* (*thatness*) which is further referred to as *para* (the highest

¹⁰⁷ Heidegger, Martin. "The Way back into the ground of Metaphysics", tr., W.Kaufmann in *Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre*, op.cit. p.213.

¹⁰⁸ Heidegger, Martin, *Being and Time*, op. cit., p.225

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one).¹⁰⁹ The *tattva* of *Śabdatattva* actually means eternal existent and it is made known to us through non-existent forms (*ākāra*). As an eternal existent or the highest one the *tattva* of *Śabdatattva* transcends or excels all spatial and temporal determinations, differentiations based on the concepts like identity. Thus, like Heidegger, Bharṭṛhari equally envisages transcendental and immanent aspects of reality by emphasising on the fact that *Brahman* as the basis of differentiated aspects is of the nature of *Śabda* which Bharṭṛhari calls *Śabdatattva*, one undifferentiated reality, the whole. Whole cannot be identified. Such undifferentiated reality, the Absolute whole, the eternal existence whom Bharṭṛhari considers as the great universal (*Mahāsāmānya*), the great Being (*Mahāsattā*) expresses itself in all words.

Both Heidegger and Bharṭṛhari hold that reality (*Brahman* in Bharṭṛhari and Being in Heidegger) is one. In his book *Being and Time*, Heidegger understands Being (reality) in terms of Time. Likewise, Bharṭṛhari understands or interprets *Brahman* (reality) in terms of *Kāla*. According to Bharṭṛhari, all objects and the whole cosmos are manifested from *Brahman* and according to Heidegger, all beings are manifested from Being. Being is self-reveler just as *Brahman* is self-reveler. Thus, the ontological locus of Being of Heidegger and *Brahman* of Bharṭṛhari remains the same. The power of Being as a reveler of other beings and also as a self-reveler requires energy just as *Brahman* as the manifesting agent of all objects and the whole cosmos requires *Śakti*. Bharṭṛhari treats *kālaśakti* as the supreme of all the powers of the Absolute *Brahman* because it controls all the powers of *Śabdatattva* by permitting them in a particular temporal order. Just like *śakti* or *kālaśakti* of Bharṭṛhari, Heidegger also brings the relevance of Time as a power of Being. According to Bharṭṛhari, *kāla* which he termed as *kālaśakti*, is not different from *Brahman* very similar to Heidegger

¹⁰⁹ Bhartrihari, *Vākyapadīya*, III.I.20.

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who claims that Time is not different from Being. According to both Heidegger and Bhartṛhari, time or *Kāla* is a manifestation in the sequence of coming into being. The journey from being to Being is a process of becoming, the manifestation or revealing Being (*Brahman*) through beings is an upward sequence that can be measured with regard to time (Heidegger) or *kāla* (Bhartṛhari). This does not, however, make sense to say that Time of Heidegger and *kāla* of Bhartṛhari limits Being or *Brahman*; rather the eternal timeless appears as changing owing to the working of time factor.¹¹⁰ As to the relation between Being and Time, Heidegger, in fact, fixes on the notion of presence. Being and Time, says Heidegger, determine each other reciprocally in such a manner that neither can be the former, being, be addressed as something temporal, nor can the latter, Time, be addressed as a being. Being is determined, as presence, by Time and therefore, Being and Time, Heidegger opines, are inseparable. Being and Time belong together just as *kāla* and *Brahman* belong together. As Being and Time are only there and given in *Ereignis*, it is this even that brings man in to his own as that being which grows aware of Being by standing in genuine Time.

The other notable similarity between Bhartṛhari and Heidegger is that the *Brahman* or the Being is revealed through language. According to Bhartṛhari, *Brahman* (Reality) transforms or manifests itself into speech without affecting the true essence of reality. That is why, Bhartṛhari uses the term *Śabdabrahman*. What is *Śabda* (speech) is Brahman. Here the verb 'is' is used in the sense of Identity. *Śabda* is One; *Brahman* is One. There is oneness relationship between the *Śabda* (Om) and the Brahman. Very similar to Bhartṛhari, Heidegger claims that 'language is the house of Being', Being dwells in language. However, language does not affect Being. Being is the guardian of language, Being takes care of language because Being is manifested by means of language, passing its time in the language as a

¹¹⁰ Raja, K. *Indian Theories of Meaning*, The Adyar Library and Research Centre, Adyar, Madras 20, 1963, pp.146-147.

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house. According to Bharṭṛ hari, all knowledge appears intertwined with *Śabda*¹¹¹. In this sense, the object is not different from the word because it is the word which has become the object. Similarly, all activity of consciousness has *śabda* as its medium. Bharṭṛhari, in this regard, brings the concept of *Vāgyoga* as a kind of meditation which ultimate objective is to raise the level of the consciousness of words to the highest stage of the Word-Principle. The *Vāgyoga* demands a kind of *Śabdasaṃskāra*, i.e. the purification of words consists in discarding the corrupt words (*apabhramsa*) and thereby adherence to correct words (*sādhu śabda*) which eventually culminate in the attainment of the ultimate reality what Bharṭṛ hari termed as *Śabdabrahman*. Thus, Bharṭṛhari does not rule out the purification of words. If we carefully examine the language of Heidegger, there we observe a similar sort of purification of language. When Heidegger talks about language, he thereby means a kind of language which is creative in nature. Language, for Heidegger, is creative. Creativity is the essence of language. Not all language fulfils this criterion. In this regard, Heidegger calls for poetic language which according to him is creative in nature. The *Da* in *Dasein* is being itself revealed or brought out of concealment into disclosure by means of creative language. For Heidegger, *Dasein* is the truth of Being because disclosure in Heideggerian thinking is truth. *Dasein* is the truth of Being; it is the place of the truth of Being. Heidegger says that There (presence) of Being; human existence is, in the final analysis, the openness to Being, “the standing in the lighting process of Being.”¹¹² For Heidegger, the human being dwells in the light of Being and the lighting process actually paves the way to grant ‘the nearness to Being’¹¹³ The light of Being is poetic language where Being dwells. It is Being’s house and the fundamental feature of this house is that it is creative in nature.

¹¹¹ Bhartrihari, *Vākyapadīya*, I.123.

¹¹² Heidegger, Martin. “The Letter on Humanism” in *Basic Writings*, op.cit., p.229.

¹¹³ Ibid., p.223.

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We think that contrary to the earlier tradition, both Bharṭhari and Heidegger, we think, conceived language at par with reality. For them language is reality. The other important aspect that needs to be taken care of is that linguistic philosophers, in general, have given importance of the external uses of language. Contrary to this, both Bharṭhari and Heidegger gave importance on the internal uses of language, i.e. the essence of language. Both of them adhered to the view that the essence of language is all about of reality. We think from an ontological perspective, *Brahman* stands for true Reality (Being). *Brahman* as true Being makes the truth of the world possible. Thus, we think that a reflection of the reality of *Brahman* eventually brings us closer to Heidegger's concept of Being. Because Being is no-being as it cannot be described as such or such. It is non-being as Radhakrishnan points out. It is not the being which we attribute to the world of experience. That is why, Heidegger considers Being as the groundless ground and Abyss of all human understanding. When Heidegger calls man the 'shepherd of Being', he wants to indicate the special relation There-being has to Being. From Bharṭhari's point of view we can say that man alone is endowed with the capacity to envision *Brahman* and thus raised beyond all living creatures.

As far as the causal nexus is concerned we find an insightful similarity between Heidegger and Bharṭhari as well. Bharṭhari denies the causal nexus between *Brahman* and the world on the ground that the effect, i.e., the world is a mere appearance (*vivarta*) of the cause. Heidegger also rejects the thought of Being as the cause of the world. Both Bharṭhari and Heidegger hold that cause and effect are intertwined just like as Being and Time belong together for Heidegger and *kāla* and *Brahman* belong together for Bharṭhari. Thus, language and reality is one and the same thing, they are not the two sides of the same coin but two different names of the same thing. Both Bharṭhari and Heidegger hold that language is reality or language itself is reality. We think that the reality of Bharṭhari (i.e. *Brahman*) and

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the reality of Heidegger (i.e. Being) are very much same or alike. However, we have a little bit of reservation as far as their understanding of language is concerned . According to Bharṭṛhari, language (word) is One creates within; but according to Heidegger language would be poetic in nature and the fundamental feature of language is that it would be creative. Creativity is the hallmark of language. Thus, we think that Heidegger was more specific than Bharṭṛhari as far as the interpretation of language is concerned. Having said this, it is language, or word through which reality is revealed and revealed not as a separate entity but as an integral part of language . In this sense, both Bharṭṛhari and Heidegger claimed that language is reality . However, Bharṭṛhari elsewhere in his *Vākyapadīya* talks about *speech-potency* as an essential trait of human consciousness which perhaps would be cognitive in nature. Speech-potency as an essential trait of human consciousness exists within. Very similar way, Heidegger claims that language becomes the concrete presence of Being rather than mere articulation. Language, for Heidegger, is the foundation of human being. The essential function of language is the *Sage* as that which shows. In short, language as Saying is the mode of commandeering (*Ereignis*). Language, for Heidegger, is not a mere tool rather language grants the possibility to stand in the midst of the openness of beings. We find ourselves in the midst of language. Thus, as a single line conclusion, we can say that the metaphysical interpretation of the relationship between language and reality as expounded by both Heidegger and Bharṭṛhari not only opens up a new dimension, but at the same time it shapes the concept of language and reality as a unified and non-dualistic manner which eventually nullifies or boils down the *problem of surrogacy* in the domain of linguistic philosophy. Having said this , one should be kept in mind that the language of Bharṭṛhari is much more abstruse than the language of Heidegger . Heidegger offers us poetic language , whereas Bharṭṛhari is non-committal about poetic language.

• CHAPTER FIVE

Concluding Remarks

The main objective of this thesis is to show the relationship between language and reality. There is no question of doubt that language is all about of knowing reality or ontology. However, the terms language and reality are so fascinating and knotty concepts that even in the ongoing philosophical discussion these two concepts find an implacable influence to the mind of linguistic philosophers. We have deeply been involved in showing this relationship from *Four Different Pillars or Paradigms* namely, from semantic perspective, from pragmatic perspective, from mentalist perspective and from metaphysical or ontological perspective. Apparently, the title of the thesis appears *too large* because it is associated with as many as four different approaches developed by four different linguistic theorists. Therefore, at the very outset it would seem to be an imperative to justify ***the relevance of the title of the thesis***. It is noted that linguistic philosophers over the years have conceived different types of language of different natures. As a result of that, there have been developed different paradigms of language through which various attempts have been made to reveal reality. As there are different natures of language and reality is supposed to be a matter of *linguistic decision*, we do not have a monistic or unified approach of the concept of reality. As reality is a matter of linguistic decision and as there are various types of language, naturally there has been developed various conception of reality. If we carefully go through the history of linguistic philosophy, there we find four different interpretations of language, such as the semantic interpretation of language; the pragmatic interpretation of language; the mentalist interpretation of language and the metaphysical or ontological interpretation of language. Each of these interpretations of language has been developed with the contribution

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of a group of linguistic philosophers. Under semantic approach we can mention the name of Russell, early Wittgenstein, Carnap, Tarski, Frege; under pragmatic interpretation we can mention the name of later Wittgenstein, Austin, Strawson, Ryle, Searle and others; under the mentalist interpretation we can mention the name of Noam Chomsky, J. J. Fodor, Katz etc., and under the metaphysical interpretation we can mention the name of Martin Heidegger, Meinong and others. Thus, each interpretation of language stands or appears as an independent philosophical school. Now if reality or ontology is revealed by language and language is supposed to be matter of *linguistic decision*, there we find different aspects of reality correspondence to different aspect of language.

We think that semantic approach of language appeared as a precursor of linguistic revolution because it gives over emphasize on *clarity and precision*. It stands against speculative metaphysics. Its main contention is clarity and precision. It tries to regulate the meaning of language by way of showing a correlation between language and fact. It emphasizes on the referential (denotation/connotation) aspect of the relationship between language and reality. In general it states that language refers reality externally. This approach may be broadly termed as the *externalist interpretation of language* where language refers something extra-linguistically. Semantic, as we have noted, is a broad linguistic approach and it would be very difficult to cover the whole approach. Within this approach, there are some leading proponents, such as, Russell, early Wittgenstein, Frege, Carnap and many more. However, we have developed the atomic approach of the relationship between language and reality after early Wittgenstein. We have chosen Wittgenstein's approach as a model or paradigm of the relationship between language and reality. Because we think Wittgenstein was an original thinker and no other linguistic philosopher belonging to semantic school has been as much as consistent like Wittgenstein as far as the development of the relationship between language and reality is concerned. Of course, Frege's position is equally important because he has been

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treated as the father of analytic movement. But we think that as far as precision and clarity is concerned, Wittgenstein's philosophy deserves worthy in the present context.

Contrary to semantic approach there develops the pragmatic approach of the relationship between language and reality. The pragmatic approach is *contrary to the semantic interpretation* on account of both the nature of language as well as the nature of reality. The semantic interpretation is based on *artificial language* whereas the pragmatic interpretation is based on *natural language*. Secondly, the semantic interpretation gives importance on the *referential theory* for knowing reality whereas the pragmatic interpretation actually hinges on the *use theory* for knowing reality. Thus, in a sense the nature of both language and reality are different in semantic and pragmatic approaches. Having said this, each school as linguistic philosophy offers us an external interpretation of the relationship between language and reality. Again, there are many leading proponents belonging to pragmatic approach, such as, later Wittgenstein, Strawson, Austin, Ryle and others. Having said this, as a model or paradigm of pragmatic approach, we have chosen Strawson's conceptualistic approach for showing the relationship between language and reality. Strawson was a pragmatist. He gives importance on ordinary or natural language. According to Strawson, ordinary language is adequate for showing the relationship between language and reality. We prefer the conceptualistic approach of Strawson for the simple reason that Strawson was a leading campaigner of conceptualism and the impact of his theory has been colossal in the later development of conceptualism. Strawson while developing conceptual scheme within the sphere of natural or ordinary language was profusely influenced by Kant's concept of categories. Following Kant, Strawson has developed *a unified core of conceptual scheme* on the basis of which inter-personal communication between the speaker and the hearer is made possible.

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It may be said that if the first linguistic turn is confined within the semantic and pragmatic interpretations of language, then surely the mentalist interpretation of language would be treated or conceived as the second linguistic turn in philosophy. Thus, the mentalist interpretation of language is another important dimension of the relationship between language and reality. It differs from the earlier tradition in the sense that unlike the earlier tradition it gives importance on the internal function of language. According to this approach, the external use of language that we notice in case of semantics and pragmatics are the secondary uses of language. The primary use of language is internal.

The metaphysical or ontological interpretation of language is another important dimension of showing the relationship between language and reality. Here language is poetic and reality is being or openness of being or transformation of being towards Being. It states that language is no longer separated from reality rather language is reality. On the basis of these approaches, we have developed the relationship between language and reality. Having said this, it should be kept in mind that the proposed inquiry is philosophically so tricky that it would be very difficult to draw a viable conclusion *without beginning questions*. As our main apprehension is to investigate the relationship between language and reality, we generally keep in mind various approaches of this issue so that *a comprehensive approach* of the relationship between language and reality can eventually be achieved. This is our main motto at the very outset and on the basis of this background the title of the thesis has been formulated.

There is no question of doubt that linguistic revolution or turn was primarily concerned with the semantic interpretation of language. More succinctly, it can be said that semantic was the womb of *linguistic revolution*. Semantic is a broad linguistic school functioning with the help of artificial or constructed language. Within semantic school some linguistic philosophers

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were treated as reductionists, some were treated as atomist. When we consider semantic approach we usually put emphasize on the referential aspect of meaning. It has been claimed by the referential theorists that the philosophical meaning of a sentence is determined on the basis of what the sentence under consideration refers something *extra-linguistically*. That means, the referential connection between the sentence and what it refers to actually make the sentence meaningful. Now a sentence or the element of the sentence (in my thesis the element is proper name) refers something either in terms of denotation or in terms of connotation; either in the form of *de-dicto* or in the sense of *de-re*. However, when we have engaged in exploring the relationship between language and reality, we predominantly confine ourselves, for the sake of brevity, only to the denotation aspect of reference. In this regard, we have discussed the view of Ludwig Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* as a model of the semantic approach of the relationship between language and reality.

We think that Bertrand Russell was a leading campaigner of the denotation or referential aspect of naming theory. In fact, the proposal of ideal language took an extreme structure or shape by Russell's ingenuity. When proper name, in general, has been accepted as a minimum vocabulary of ideal language, Russell with his outmost philosophical ingenuity explored an implicit default even within proper names. According to Russell the idea proper names as the minimum vocabulary of ideal or artificial language was problematic because of the disguised nature of language. Russell was very conscious about the grammatical and logical structure of language. He told that the grammatical or apparent structure of language may not be authentic because at times it does not match with its logical structure. He has claimed exactly the same when he was deeply engaged in formulating artificial language. Most referential semantists were satisfied about the general perception of proper names. Even Frege belongs to this camp. However, Russell thinks the other way round. He was very

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skeptical about the functional aspect of ordinary proper names. He has claimed that not all proper names are authentic in our desired sense.

Accordingly, Russell classified proper names as *logical as well as ordinary proper* names and conceived logical proper name as the authentic vocabulary of ideal language. We think that the semantists who have developed the denotation aspect of proper name were somehow or other influenced by Russell. Even early Wittgenstein, we think, was influenced by Russell. His theory of proper name as developed in the *Tractatus* was Russellian to a great extent. Even though like Russell, early Wittgenstein does not make any notable discussion between logical and ordinary proper name, however, his interpretation of naming theory actually is an underlying replica of Russell's logical proper name. When Wittgenstein says that a name denotes an object in logical space, he completely boils down or sets aside the possibility of a name failing to refer anything. In this regard Wittgenstein states that if a name fails to refer or denote an object, it would not be treated as a name. We think from linguistic philosophical perspective, Wittgenstein's interpretation of the relationship between language and reality holds the centrality of the issue what we promised to develop at the very outset. Moreover, unlike other linguistic philosophers belonging to the semantic school Wittgenstein would be treated as the original thinker. That is why, we have developed Wittgenstein's view as a model of the semantic relationship between language and reality.

We think that the semantic interpretation of the relationship between language and reality is one dimension or aspect in knowing the relationship between language and reality. It addresses reality from a particular point of view or from a particular aspect. As a result of that, one can know a particular aspect of reality. Certainly, it would set aside the other aspect of reality because the language it has taken into account does not allow the other aspect of reality as appropriate. This approach is narrow and it has been vehemently criticized because

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of its narrow based application. As a result of that there develops an alternative approach philosophically known as *pragmatic approach of language* which takes natural language as a tool or instrument for knowing reality. As a result of that we have discussed the pragmatic interpretation of the relationship between language and reality.

We think that unlike the semantists, the pragmatists have engaged in investigating the relationship between language and reality from different perspectives. They are not interested in revising natural language in a radical way. Later Wittgenstein, for example, was against any sort of linguistic revision. Even though Austin and Strawson were in favour of constant revision of ordinary language but in spite of that they confine themselves within the functional aspect of ordinary language. Moreover they are non-committal regarding the aspects of denotation and connotation of language. Instead of that they have given importance on the ordinary function of language used in our society or community. Thus, for them reality is not something that can be portrayed by language on the basis of structural similarity or isomorphism as we witnessed in Wittgenstein and others; rather reality can be grasped by using language *in our form of life* (later Wittgenstein) or through successful communication (P.F.Strawson) or through speech acts or language acts (J.L.Austin) or through the proper usages of language (Gilbert Ryle). Thus, the pragmatic interpretation of the relationship between language and reality has been developed by a good number of linguistic philosophers, namely, later Wittgenstein (through his use theory of meaning), P.F.Strawson (through his conceptualism based on successful communication), J.L.Austin (through his speech acts) etc. However, for the sake of brevity, we have developed the view of P.F.Strawson as a model or paradigm of the pragmatic interpretation of the relationship between language and reality. We have chosen Strawson's conceptualism as a model because we think Strawson through his *unified conceptual scheme* offers an innovative approach of

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the relationship between language and reality in his celebrated book *Individuals*. We think Strawson's conceptualism or conceptual scheme has created an enormous impact on the later development of conceptualism of Davidson, Putnam, Quine and others. Strawson conceptualism, we think, is *an integrated philosophical discourse* that has been linked with many great philosophical thinkers. Strawson was implicitly influenced by Immanuel Kant's idea of categories. We think in our interpersonal communication the role of categories is colossal. At times categories have been attributed as *categories of understanding*. For example, space and time are two categories without which our understanding of the world would be impossible. These are a priori concepts. What we can say here is that interpersonal successful communication between the speaker and the hearer is possible because both the speaker and the hearer are the owners of categories of understanding. It has been established by Kant and Strawson has extended its relevance while developing his conceptualism. Strawsonian conceptualism has been the central issue of the later development of the same. Davidson in his paper criticizes Strawson's idea of *unified conceptual scheme* and we notice a radical interpretation in Quine as well. In fact, Quine's naturalized epistemology does not allow us to admit any fixed and stringent unified concept shared by all.

We think that both the semantic and pragmatic interpretations have taken language externally. Each of these groups has emphasized, though differently, on the external use of language and also on the external use of reality. Moreover, the semantists as well as the pragmatists have thought, though differently, that both language and reality are separated entities and language as a tool can be used for knowing reality. Thus, if we compare between semantists as well as pragmatists, we find that their understanding of language is different. Semantists, in general, have emphasized on the artificial form of language; whereas pragmatists, in general, have emphasized on the ordinary form of language. Thus, the very

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nature of language for them is different. Having said this, even though they have disagreed about the very nature of language, but each of these philosophical schools has used language externally. This is where they share the same view. For them reality is something external and language and reality are different entities. Language in some sense or other would be the bearer of knowing reality.

Moreover, as far as reality is concerned semantists are more specific than the pragmatists. Even at times they are in favour of *brute facts*. Unlike the pragmatists, the semantists not only have specific idea of language, they have also the specific idea of reality. According to Wittgenstein, *reality is the totality of facts* pictured by propositions and the constituents of facts, i.e., objects are denoted by logically proper names. Therefore, anything other than the constituents of facts cannot be regarded as real according to early Wittgenstein. As the constituents of facts are denoted by name (logical proper name according to Russell and Wittgenstein), accordingly only logical proper names would be the vocabulary of ideal or propositional language. On the basis of it, Wittgenstein drew the limits of language as well as the limits of the world or reality. He then claimed that outside the limits of language we cannot say anything. It would be better for us to pass over in silence. Thus, for Wittgenstein, we have to have an authentic form of language on the basis of which true picture of the world can be grasped. In this regard, Wittgenstein gives importance on the pictorial representation and more importantly, on the pictorial form of language. Even though we have examined only Wittgenstein's position of the relationship between language and reality, but we think that the whole host of semantists by and large have given paramount importance on the very nature of language as well as on the very nature of reality. Their main intention was to cure philosophy from the womb of speculative metaphysics. In fact, the linguistic turn or

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revolution happened during 20th century because of the revolt of semantists against speculative metaphysics.

On the other hand, if we look at the philosophical position of pragmatists regarding reality, we find that they do not have specific idea as far as the nature of reality is concerned. According to later Wittgenstein, the use of language would determine reality within the *form of life*, or within the framework of the *custom* of society. This is a comprehensive approach of the concept of reality. If we carefully examine the position of Austin's theory of performative utterance, classified in terms of Speech Acts, such as, locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary, we find that Austin too perceives reality in a wide and comprehensive manner. For Austin nothing can be excluded from the domain of performative utterance manifested through different speech acts used or performed within the form of life or community or society. Thus, both language and reality are open to Austin. If we take care of the view of Ryle, we find the same position. In fact, Ryle gives importance on the actual *usage* of language in our ordinary life. We think that the pragmatic standpoint has perfectly been revealed through Strawson's philosophical position. Strawson in his celebrated book *Individuals* and the article like 'Analysis, Science and Metaphysics' included in *Linguistic Turn*¹¹⁴ of Richard Rorty clearly indicates the very nature of reality. He, in fact, has understood reality as the totality of *particulars* and he equally conceives the term particular in terms of object. Thus, for Strawson reality is the totality of objects. One can identify an object by means of ordinary language through successful communication. Successful communication, Strawson opines, is made possible between the speaker and the hearer because both the speaker and the hearer must possess *a unified conceptual scheme*. In this regard, we think Strawson was indebted to Kant.

¹¹⁴ Rorty, Richard (ed.), *The Linguistic Turn: Essays in Philosophical Method*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1967.

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Let us make a comparative study between semantics and pragmatic schools of thought regarding the relationship between language and reality. We have seen that the two approaches are contrary to one another with regard to the nature of language as well as the nature of reality. However, the only notable similarity that we foresee is that both schools of thought are externalists in a broad sense. They are externalists in the sense that they use language as an instrument for knowing external reality. The external interpretation in semantics is vivid and clear. Just think of referential theory where it has been presumed that a sentence is to be meaningful if it *refers something extra-linguistically* other than the sentence itself. This clearly suggests that the philosophical meaning of a sentence has its external implication. We think that the concepts, such as, denotation, connotation, picturing, mapping, representation, hooking, etc., are all at par with the term reference. Again we have observed that the language of semantics is proper names or logical proper names. Regarding logical proper names there developed two parallel theories, such as, no-sense theory of proper name and sense theory of proper name. Those who have advocated *no-sense* theory of proper name would like to say that a proper name denotes an object with which we are acquainted (Russell) or a proper name denotes the same object in every possible world (Kripke). For them proper names do not have sense or meaning. They are purely externalist in their application of language for knowing reality. Even those who have developed the sense-theory of proper name would like to say that the sense of a proper name is directed towards its reference. Frege's position is a case in point. Thus, for semantists, reference is the key to know about reality. Language must refer, there is no exception. If there is any problem, it would be the problem of identifying the locus in which language refers or pictures or maps or hooks or denotes or connotes. For example, those who adhere to no-sense theory of reference would like to say that there is no referential failure of language. However, those who adhere

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to the sense-theory of proper names would like to say that there is no scope of failure regarding the mode of presentation or sense of proper names. Frege is a leading proponent of this theory. This does not, however, make sense to say that the reference of a proper name would be a foregoing matter to Frege. Certainly, it would not be the case. What matters is the very nature of reality. Like Russell and Wittgenstein, Frege would certainly say that a proper name denotes or refers to an object. However, Frege differs from Russell and Wittgenstein on the ground that the reference of a proper name would be non-existential, or fictitious or non-empirical. It may not exist in the brute sense of the term. We sense external implication of language in the pragmatic interpretation of language. The use theory of later Wittgenstein, the speech-act theory of Austin and the mechanism of successful communication between the speaker and the hearer regarding the particulars of the world as developed by Strawson are cases in point.

Having said this, each school differs from others on account of language and reality. The debate over the legitimacy of language in linguistic philosophy is fascinating in the sense that it actually opens up two opposite philosophical quests for knowing reality. We think that as far as the proposal of logical proper name is concerned there is nothing wrong. However, the only problem with this proposal is that it would involve with a sort of inquiry about reality which is basically too *abstruse and narrow*. Even many would suspect about the legitimacy of proper name.

We think that the concept of language and the concept of reality are different in semantic and pragmatic interpretations. Language is different, because semantic interpretations work on the basis of formalized or artificial language whereas pragmatic interpretation functions on the basis of natural or ordinary language. The concept of reality equally finds different

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philosophical position. As far as semantic is concerned reality is conceived on the basis of reference or picture or denotation or connotation etc. On the contrary, according to pragmatic interpretation, reality is conceived on the basis of the use of natural language. The use of language is no longer structural or constructed. More importantly, while envisaging the concept of reality by means of natural language, the pragmatic in general were not vocal in favour of the referential aspect of language. Unlike, the referential theory of language, their use theory of language acts as a complicated and comprehensive network which in some sense or other touches the stream of human life in the real sense of the term. As a result of that it includes every sphere of human life and excludes nothing. We think in the pragmatic interpretation, we get the relevance of Locke. According to Locke, *reality is the totality of experience* because every word of language bears the sensible mark of ideas. Thus, in a loose sense, we can foresee the relevance of ideational theory of meaning in pragmatic interpretation of the relationship between language and reality. This is the real position of semantists as well as of pragmatists of the relationship between language and reality. Both of these schools have thought that *reality is different from language. Language has been used externally*. But the external use of language does not portrait or represent the whole aspect of reality rather it reflects the one aspect or the external aspect of reality. However, this view has been criticized by many other linguistic philosophers, namely, Noam Chomsky, Fodor, J.J. Katz and others. Reality may be internal as well. The internal aspect of reality has been completely forfeited by semantic school in particular and the pragmatic school in general. Here, following Chomsky, we have developed *the internal relation between language and reality*.

According to Chomsky, “language is the mirror of human mind.” There is no question of doubt that if the first linguistic turn was predominantly concerned with semantic and

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pragmatic interpretations, then Noam Chomsky's *Mentalistic Turn* would certainly be regarded as the *second linguistic turn* in philosophy. Thus, Noam Chomsky, to me, has occupied an important philosophical position as far as the nature and interpretation of language on one hand and their relationship on the other.

We have seen that Noam Chomsky advocates a new *innatism* and in this regard, he was indebted to Descartes. Descartes' *innatism* has been attributed as *old innatism* by Copper and Chomsky's *innatism* has been attributed as *new innatism*. According to Chomsky, every normal native speaker has preoccupied and innately possessed a linguistic organ placed in the left hemisphere of the brain at the time of his or her birth. It has been given and preoccupied biologically from where language generates. According to Chomsky, as language is the mirror of human mind one can know other, by means of language. A man is known by the language he or she uses.

Chomsky further contends, we think, that the proper use of language is not something external. The essential use of language is internal. The external use of language, as we have observed in semantics and pragmatics, is *secondary* and one should not give importance on the external use of language. Instead of that, the internal use of language what Chomsky termed as I-language is primary. Moreover, 'I-language' reflects the mirror or the essence of human. As language is the mirror of human mind, Chomsky, therefore, calls upon a grammar of language which is scientific in nature. Chomsky termed it as *Transformational Generative Grammar (TGG)*. Chomsky then classifies different levels of grammar prominently known as *Deep Structure* and *Surface Structure of Grammar*. According to Chomsky, the language that has been manifested in the surface structure of grammar is not authentic. Rather the deep structure of grammar reflects the true or real structure of language. Thus, Chomsky while developing his mentalistic interpretation of language has emphasized on the deep structure of

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grammar through which the nature of human being can be revealed. We have considered Chomsky's mentalistic turn of language because we think that it would reflect the internal aspect of language and the internal aspect of reality which we think, following Chomsky, is the fundamental or the primary aspect of the relationship between language and reality. Not only that Chomsky appears in the latter half of twentieth century as an authentic campaigner of linguistic philosophy but also his interpretation of the nature of language, the nature of reality, and the relationship between language and reality, we think, opens up a new dimension or new addition in the history of linguistic philosophy.

The reader, however, may raise a question: Why do we particularly confine ourselves within Noam Chomsky's views while developing the mentalistic position of the relationship between language and reality? The answer is very clear and simple. Even though a good number of linguistic philosophers, over the years, have developed the mentalistic interpretation of language, but I think Noam Chomsky has occupied the central position in this philosophical movement. That is why; I particularly have chosen the mentalistic interpretation of Noam Chomsky while developing the relationship between language and reality from internal perspective.

We are now in a position to make a contrast and compare between the mentalistic position of Noam Chomsky and the externalist interpretation of the relationship between language and reality. First, according to Chomsky, the primary use of language is internal; whereas the externalist (pragmatists as well as the semanticists) think the other way round. They use language externally. Secondly, as Chomsky gives emphasize on the internal use of language, his own understanding of reality as the mirror of human mind is internal as well. Therefore, by examining the mentalistic position of Noam Chomsky we thus enable to explore a new aspect of reality which was completely foreign in the externalist's interpretation of language.

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That is why, I have incorporated the mentalistic position of Noam Chomsky. Noam Chomsky offers us a scientific interpretation of language. He tells us how language is being generated from the left hemisphere. It is a scientific and biological process of creation. Language, for Chomsky, is creative in nature. Having said this, Chomsky does not make it clear the reason of spontaneous creation of language. We think the creation of language is required from the left hemisphere because of the need of the native speaker. Language is the instrument or tool through which a native speaker can make communication with his fellow beings on the basis of his desire or needs. A native speaker feels urgency for his own need to communicate regarding the worldly matters. This sort of implicit needs of the native speaker eventually generates language.

Chomsky says that language is the mirror of human mind. The mind of a person is known by the language. Language reflects that is happening internally of a person. Through language, the intended desire, feeling, motive of a native speaker can be grasped. In this regard, he brings the old innatism into a new crease. His theory is intricately associated with the innatism of Rene Descartes. According to Descartes, one can acquire knowledge on the basis of innate ideas. Thus, in the case of acquiring knowledge, the role of innate ideas is primary and the role of sense experience is secondary. Sense experience is external whereas reason is internal. Sense experience is based on sense organs that receive information externally; innate ideas are internal. Innate organs are biologically given. They are placed in the brain. They act scientifically. According to Chomsky, acquisition of language is internal creation; it is not at all associated with behavioral matter. Therefore, there is no point in using language externally to show the relationship between language and reality. Thus for Chomsky, it was a mistake on the part of semantic and pragmatic schools for considering language from external

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purpose owing to show the relationship between language and reality. The other important point is that Chomsky talks about the grammar of language like the later Wittgenstein. In the *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein presumes that language is rule-following and following a rule is a practice. Having said this, the grammar that we note in natural language is not the same Chomsky conceives while developing his internal language. According to Chomsky, his understanding of grammar is scientific grammar and he then termed it as 'scientific grammar'. The distinctive nature of this kind of grammar is that it is generative in nature. He then called it **Transformation Generative Grammar**. We can say that it is the need of the native speaker for which language is internally generated and transformed. It is a process where one can get the output or necessary data and then processing it internally and after that it will be manifested as the output. A native speaker after his or her birth is wondering for everything he or she comes to know, he needs language to communicate and this internal propensity creates language or generates language from the organ which is particularly given or preoccupied by the native speaker.

We are still lagging behind to have the complete picture of reality. There we have noticed a different though important aspect which has not been reflected in the externalist as well as the mentalistic interpretation of language. Accordingly, we feel urgency to incorporate this important aspect of reality within our investigation of the relationship between language and reality.

It would not be an exaggeration if we adhere to the view that the whole host of linguistic tradition started from logical positivists down to the semantic tradition directly or indirectly, consciously or unconsciously have boiled down the relevance of metaphysical reality. We have already stated that linguistic revolution or turn appeared as a revolt against the legitimacy of speculative metaphysics. It was the slogan of the philosophers of language that

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almost all traditional outstanding and unresolved philosophical problems were generated out of the misinterpretation of language. As a result of that these problems can be solved by proper analysis of the meaning of language. Thus, the meaning of language comes into the picture when we study philosophy of language or linguistic philosophy. The very or primary intention of linguistic revolution is to make philosophy a meaningful enterprise and in this direction the important thing that needs to be taken care of is to know about the meaning of language. If philosophy is all about the analysis of language, then to determine the meaning of language is the primary concern of philosophy of language. That is why, when linguistic philosophers were involved into the tug of war regarding the very nature of language, they were sharply divided on this issue. Some were dissatisfied about the functional aspect of ordinary or natural language and expressed their view in favour of ideal or constructed language. The same was equally reflected in Logical Positivism pioneering by Ayer and others. Logical positivists set out the criterion of meaningfulness of sentence along with the line of principle of verification where a sentence as an icon of language would be literally meaningful if it would be completely verifiable or completely falsifiable by means of some observational data. The linguistic phrase 'observational data' is important here. It brings the insight of empiricism of the seventeenth and eighteenth century. Now our point is that, if observational data is the hallmark of the meaningfulness of a sentence, this would singlehandedly boiled down the possibility of metaphysics in general. As a result of that, the language of ethics, theology, metaphysics, aesthetics which lies beyond the limits of language according to early Wittgenstein, would be treated as meaningless according to the principle of verification expounded by logical positivists.

Thus, the direction of linguistic turn or revolution has been strengthened and extended with the introduction of the criterion of principle of verification and this again continues with the

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contribution of semantics. As we know that semantics as a school of linguistic philosophy persists with linguistic revisionism and developed theories either in the form of logical analysis, logical reduction, or by offering us theory in terms of logical atomism. They are predisposed to conceive reality as empirical and metaphysical and in turn denied the possibility of metaphysical reality. For them language is not at all to reveal metaphysical reality because language cannot reach up to that or ineffable to reach up to that. Wittgenstein's early philosophy is a case in point. Thus, we have seen that linguistic philosophers have different choices about language and reality. Even though language matters to philosophy but linguistic philosophers within the realm of linguistic revolution have different tastes about the nature of language. Having said this, the general perception is that language matters to philosophy because language reveals reality or ontology for us. Even though the terms 'reality and ontology' are closed terms normally used in the realm of linguistic philosophy, but one must be very careful of considering these two terms as synonymous terms. The term reality is associated with brute facts which are in most general cases inquired with regard to space and time, with regard to their existence. The term 'ontology' is conceptually higher than the term 'reality'. The term 'ontology' is primarily concerned with 'being' question. When a proper name denotes an object, it denotes a real object and here the relationship is measured with regard to language and reality. However, when a term denotes 'the being of a table', the relationship is measured with regard to 'language and ontology'. To be precise, the concept of reality is usually associated with brute objects having existential import in the real sense of the term, but the concept of ontology deals with being-qua-being and in this sense, it would be metaphysical in nature.

We have seen that linguistic philosopher in most general cases, directly or indirectly, have distrusted regarding the metaphysical relevance of the relationship between language and

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reality. We think that the metaphysical aspect of reality (including metaphysician and poet) took the back foot in the linguistic turn particularly in the first half of linguistic turn. Therefore, when I have proposed the roadmap of this thesis, I have realized that the metaphysical interpretation of the relationship between language and reality is one of the important dimensions to assess the relationship as a whole. In this regard, I have taken the opportunity to discuss the view of one of the greatest original thinker, Martin Heidegger, who, I think, has done a breathtaking job in showing the metaphysical relationship between language and reality.

According to Heidegger, language is the house of Being. The Being is the guardian of language. As a guardian of language Being always takes care of language. Without Being there is no language and without language there is no other alternative ways of revealing Being. Being is revealed by means of language through *Dasein*, the representative of beings. 'Da' means there and 'Sein' means Being. Therefore, *Dasein* means There-being. Therefore, Being is revealed through *Dasein*. Being is the transformational or transient form of beings. According to Heidegger, Being is language and language is Being. Here we understand reality in terms of Being. Accordingly, we can say that reality is language and language is reality. This, in fact, opens up a new dimension as far as the relationship between language and reality.

We have seen that both semanticists and pragmatists have conceived language and reality as independent entity. However, Heidegger thinks the other way round. According to Heidegger, language and reality are two sides of the same coin. Both language and reality (Being) are one and same. One cannot be explained without other. However this does not make sense to say that both language and reality are the same. One can be revealed in terms

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of another. Language is the revealer of reality not as an independent or separate entity as pragmatists and semanticists have thought, but is an inseparable revealer of reality.

Thus, it seems clear to us that Heidegger not only develops the relationship between language and ontology from metaphysical perspective, but while developing the relationship between language and ontology, he takes different interpretation of language, of reality from the earlier tradition. His interpretation and his own understanding of language is different from earlier tradition because unlike the earlier tradition he understands language as *Poetic*. The very nature of poetic language is that it is *creative, unbiased*. His understanding to reality is metaphysical in nature. By reality he means Being which we think is very similar to or very near to the *Sabdabrahman* of Bharṭṛhari or of the *pure object* of Meinong. He stands against the dominant linguistic wave by making the relationship between language and reality from metaphysical point of view. His understanding of the relevance of poetic language had been demolished by the logical positivists. According to the logical positivists, the philosophical position of the metaphysicians as well as the poets remained the same. Thus, like metaphysician, the philosophy of poet or poetic language, in short, has been rejected.

The intension of semanticists is at par with the position of the logical positivists. Even though semanticists as well as pragmatists were not vocal regarding the meaninglessness of metaphysics as well as poetic language, but particularly semanticists by way of proposing linguistic revisionism actually boiled down or devoid the significance of poetic language just like the position of metaphysics. Even though pragmatists comparatively take softer stance as far as the nature of language is concerned, but they equally have emphasized on the ordinary use of language within the *form of life* or through speech act or through successful communication where the relevance of metaphysics or poetic language has been minimal. Chomsky's mentalistic interpretation of language is somehow different.

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Even though I have examined the relationship between language and reality from *Four Different Pillars*, but at the same time I have emphasized a lot on the metaphysical interpretation of the relationship between language and ontology after Martin Heidegger. Readers, however, may raise question in this regard. But the reason behind this is that, I think, that the metaphysical relevance of the relationship between language and ontology has been sidelined by the whole host of linguistic philosophers. Fortunately, Heidegger in Western tradition and Bhartṛhari from Indian tradition had done a laudable job in reviving the relevance of metaphysical reality. Therefore, I have emphasized more on Heidegger's view of the relationship between language and reality.

After examining different aspects of the concept of reality, I have in a better position to assess the relationship between language and reality. At the very outset, I have claimed that the issue is very tricky as well as complex one. Philosophers, over the years, have engaged themselves to explicate the relationship between language and reality from different aspects. Till today, we do not have a well-accepted solution without begging question. In fact, this is the genesis of philosophy. If the journey of philosophical enquiry is ended at a certain point, then philosophy would not be regarded as philosophy in the true sense of the term. The path of philosophical enquiry is a non-ending issue. It goes on and on and in this process new issues will come up; new problems will appear; new proposals will come up to tackle these problems as well. Having said this, we should not be sacrosanct as an earnest reader of philosophy even if we come to know that what had been earned and applauded had subsequently boiled down as worthless. Wittgenstein himself was a glaring example in this regard.

So when I have involved myself in exploring the relationship between language and reality, I mainly, at the very outset, have sorted out four different aspects of the relationship between

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language and reality and accordingly I have developed all these aspects and have tried to have a sense of the relationship between language and reality in a comprehensive manner. The genesis of this thesis is that it tries to explore the relationship between language and reality from external point of view as well as from internal point of view. The thesis tells us that the relationship between language and reality is **multi-dimensional, multifaceted**. It would therefore wrong to suggest that the relationship between language and reality is one dimensional. It reminds the theory of Jaina *Syādvāda* where the term ‘*syat*’ means ‘may be’, ‘perhaps’, ‘somehow’ or ‘in some respect’. For example, instead of saying, “the elephant is like a pillar” it should be said “May be, or in some respect, the elephant is like a pillar.” According to the Jainas, every being has innumerable characters and omniscient being can only have *Kevalajñāna* and innumerable knowledge of an object in all its innumerable aspects.

What we can say at this juncture is that reality is a multifaceted concept and it would be wrong to understand reality in a particular aspect and think it in a conclusive manner. The concept of reality encompasses inside as well as outside. Therefore, we think different interpretation of the relationship between language and reality portrays different aspects of the concept of reality.

Even though linguistic philosophers, in most cases, have preferred empirical reality for making philosophy a dynamic and scientific enterprise, but I think the investigation of the relationship between language and reality must examine the metaphysical reality as well. Till today we notice a serious, though unresolved, dispute that whether *thought* is independent from language or not. If thought is independent from language then language may be used as an independent tool and also reality may be regarded as an independent entity. In this way, the investigation of the relationship between language and reality as expounded by semantists

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may be justified. But if it has been accepted that thought is not independent from language and what is language is thought then to consider language and reality as separated entity would be a mistake. Accordingly, it is very hard to come by which view is acceptable to us. I think it is very difficult for me to favour either one or disfavour the other. Rather, I would like to prefer the view that there are some aspects of reality that can be pictured or mirrored by language independently. At the same time, it is equally true to say that language is reality as Heidegger claimed or language is the mirror of human mind as Noam Chomsky has suggested. Therefore, we keep the option open and try to understand the relationship between language and reality from relative perspective as we notice in the Jaina theory of *Syādvāda*.

At the end of this thesis, we may extract some findings developed out of my own rationales on the basis of which the worthy of this thesis can partially be justified. Some of the insights are as follows:

(i) Language is a fascinating instrument of communication and the relationship between language and reality (ontology) is a philosophically debatable issue. Therefore, there is no point in saying that the problem has been solved. Early Wittgenstein had paid the penalty of claiming the same after the completion of *Tractatus*.

(ii) We think that reality is *a matter of linguistic decision* and as a result of that the nature of reality actually hinges on the **very nature of language**.

(iii) As reality is a matter of linguistic decision, there remains a multifaceted aspects of reality based on the multifaceted aspects of language.

(iv) Although linguistic philosophers were deeply involved to dig out the authenticity of language, but we do not think it so effective for establishing the underlying relationship between language and reality. Rather one should take a note from Locke that reality is the totality of experience and each word is a sensible mark of idea.

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
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WITTGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE AND RELIGION: A BRIEF STUDY

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Abstract

Philosophers – the lovers of wisdom – are concerned to make the world more and more predictable. It is easy to say but difficult to do as there are countless stumbling blocks in the form of language, propositions, religions and so on. Very often the logical space is lost. To set aside the hindrances a true philosopher does not bother to contrive a new set of vocabularies. He even does not bother to be contradictory, if needed. Ludwig Wittgenstein is observed in two incarnations. He is shown from the Tractarian point of view and from the point of Philosophical Investigations. The two points contradict but in the end the world of Wittgenstein is described. He faced the problem to picture the world in a logical space. He intended to represent the world in terms of showing, not in terms of saying. For this his early philosophy is meticulously empirical. But there was a transition. We cannot be oblivious of this change to understand Wittgenstein. In his later philosophy, he describes the world by ordinary language and he also observes that anything whatever it may be we can describe it through the language game. Being a member of the Vienna circle he also took part in the crusade to free philosophy from being metaphysical. Undoubtedly, Wittgenstein was a logical empiricist. How come that he became a religious at least morally? It was perhaps that there was a religious streak in him for being tutored by Catholic instructions in his childhood and for having an encounter with the question of life and death in the front of the Great War.

Key words: *Formal language, ordinary language, structural relationship, logical form, language game, rules of language, form of life, God, religion.*

WITTGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE AND RELIGION: A BRIEF STUDY

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Introduction

Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein (1889-1951) was a twentieth-century Austrian-British philosopher and his whole philosophy of language is a dramatic transition from atomic to holistic theory of meaning. Wittgenstein's conception of religion is more or less dependent on his nature of philosophy or on his conception of language. So before delving deep into his conception of religion it will be helpful for us if we examine the basic tenets of his philosophy of language. Wittgenstein started his philosophical career in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (1921) which is atomistic in nature, and gave emphasis on logical language. Wittgenstein, in this book, contended that the structure of language reveals the structure of the world. His later work in philosophy is *Philosophical Investigations* (1953), which is holistic in nature, and in this publication he is concerned with ordinary language and with the usage of theory of meaning, language game and family resemblance, rule-following and private language, and so on. So, the tenets of his philosophy are, therefore, known as the 'philosophy of early Wittgenstein' and 'the philosophy of later Wittgenstein'.

The purpose of this essay is principally to explore Wittgenstein's conception of religion depending on his philosophy of language. As Wittgenstein's philosophy divided into two parts as early and later, so we have to elaborate this point in two perspectives. At first we can describe religion following the *Tractarian* point of view, then we elaborate it following his later philosophical works particularly *Philosophical Investigations*.

Religion deals with myths, faith, unobservable entity, and so on. As we cannot observe these things so it cannot be described by the logical or formal language. Once, in his early life, Wittgenstein said, "The limits of my language mean the limits of my world" (TLP5.6). He also added, "What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence" (TLP7). It follows from these statements that which is not empirically observable is not 'showable'. The question therefore follows – could Wittgenstein's philosophy be at all correlated with religion? Interestingly, Wittgenstein once said, "I am not a religious man, but I cannot help

seeing every problem from a religious point of view" (qtd. in Malcolm vii). The writer of the present paper personally feels that if not in his early-life, Wittgenstein in his later-works dealt at length with the concept of religion.

The Early Wittgenstein – *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*:

The book *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* mainly deals with the issues of the principles of symbolism and the relations which are necessary between words and things in any language. The author said that because of our misunderstanding of the everyday or ordinary language the traditional philosophical problems have been raised. In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein represents the logical structure of propositions and the nature of logical inference. He showed us the atomistic view about language as well as the world. The world is represented by thought, which is a proposition with sense. Since, world, thought and proposition share the same logical form. Hence, the thoughts and the propositions are the pictures of the facts.

In the first proposition of the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein says, "The world is all that is the case" (*TLP*: 1). While responding to the question 'what is the case?', Wittgenstein again says that the world is the totality of facts, but not things. The world is determined by facts and by their beings of all facts. These few remarks of *Tractatus* actually give enormous philosophical insights from where one can assume the very philosophical intention of the early Wittgenstein. At the very outset, it can be said that by assuming the world as the totality of facts, Wittgenstein actually deviated from the common sense interpretation. The common sense view of the world is that it is the totality of objects. Even P.F. Strawson, in his critically-acclaimed *Individuals*, remarks that the world is the totality of particulars. Strawson, in fact, conceives particulars in terms of objects. Therefore, special attention should be given on the very remark of early Wittgenstein that the world is the totality of facts.

A few questions need to be addressed here. What was the philosophical objective of early Wittgenstein of making such remark that the world is the totality of facts? Why does he prefer to say that the world is the totality of facts, but not things? Or by making such remark does Wittgenstein actually detach from the commonsensical standpoint?

The philosophical objective of early Wittgenstein is to picture the world in the form of to be the case or not to be the case. In this regard, he conceived language in terms of proposition and the world or reality in terms of facts and then drew the relationship between proposition and fact by means of his picture theory. That is why, Wittgenstein's picture theory is philosophically known as 'the picture theory of meaning' or 'the picture theory of proposition'. Furthermore, even though Wittgenstein conceived the world as the totality of facts, but from this it does not make sense to say that he did not realise the very fact that the world is the totality of objects. There is no point of denying the fact that the world is the

totality of objects. However, if we assume the world as the totality of objects, then we can only **describe the world**, but we cannot picture the world. Wittgenstein's intention was not to give a mere description of the world or rather to say about the world. His philosophical intention is **to show or to picture** the world in a logical space. He actually wanted to picture the world in terms of **showing**, but not in terms of **saying**. The description of the world may not be in the form of 'to be the case' or 'not to be the case'. But his understanding of the world would always be in the form of 'to be the case or not to be the case'. This is made clear when he conceived language in terms of propositions. According to Wittgenstein, every proposition has its two senses, either the proposition would be true or the proposition would be false. A proposition pictures a fact and a fact in turn makes the proposition as either true or false. That is why, Wittgenstein says, "The facts in logical space are the world" (TLP: 1.13), and also adds, "The world divides into facts" (TLP: 1.2).

In the second proposition of the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein says, "What is the case – a fact – is the existence of states of affairs" (TLP: 2). We have already outlined the concept of fact. Here we can say that a fact can further be anatomised in terms of state of affairs. A state of affairs is a combination of objects or things. A thing or an object cannot further be analysed. Thus, from the reality side, we have objects as the ultimate constituents of the world. Wittgenstein claims that when things are combined to form a state of affairs, this would ensure that the possibility of forming a particular state of affairs must be there in them. In Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, nothing is accidental. Everything is logical and everything should be conceived in terms of logical space. Every object or thing is independent, but this form of independence is a form of dependence when one thing is connected with other to form a state of affairs. That means to know an object, one has to know all its possible occurrences in state of affairs. As everything is conceived in logical space and logical space incorporates all possibilities, no new possibility will be discovered later. That is why, Wittgenstein has rightly pointed that objects contain the possibility of all situations and the possibility of its occurring in state of affairs is the *form of an object*.

The Austrian-British philosopher has explained his celebrated picture theory in second proposition. In 2.1 of *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein says, "We picture facts to ourselves". We picture facts to ourselves in *logical space* and what we picture to ourselves are the existence or non-existence of states of affairs. That is why Wittgenstein claims that a picture is a model of reality. As a picture is a fact and reality is the sum total of positive and negative facts, then there is no point of departing ourselves in claiming that a picture is a model of reality. The question then arises: How does a picture make the reality possible? What are the requirements of making a picture possible? In this regard, Wittgenstein says that *pictorial form* is the possibility of making a picture possible. A pictorial form is kind of unalterable form through which things are related to one another in the same way as the

elements of the picture. Pictorial form thus makes the pictorial relationship or structural isomorphism between the elements of proposition and the elements of fact. In this process a picture touches reality. As every picture, according to Wittgenstein, is a logical one, a picture whose pictorial form is logical form is called a logical picture. Only logical picture can depict the world in logical space. What a picture depicts or represents is called its sense. The agreement or disagreement of its sense with reality constitutes its truth and falsity. That is why, Wittgenstein says that a proposition is either true or false and a fact actually makes the proposition as either true or false. The other important point here is that even though we picture facts to ourselves, but no picture is true a priori.

In the fourth proposition of *Tractatus* Wittgenstein attempts to show how does a proposition attach to a thought. Here Wittgenstein says, "A thought is a proposition with a sense" (TLP: 4). He then claims that the totality of proposition is language. Thus, it can be said in the Wittgensteinian sense that a thought is a language with a sense. Wittgenstein like many other revisionists qualifies language in terms of proposition or in terms of sense. His interpretation of sense is strictly logical in nature. For Wittgenstein many propositions (sentences) found in philosophical works are not false but nonsensical. Accordingly, in such a case we are not in a position to give any answer to questions of this kind, but can regard them as nonsensical. Wittgenstein in this regard claims that 'most of the propositions and questions of philosophers arise from our failure to understand the logic of our language.' Thus, philosophy is a critique of language because the apparent logical form of proposition need not be real one. Thus, what can be said here is that since a thought is a proposition with a sense, the *Tractarian* form of proposition is a system of idealization of language, a revised and refined form of language where the non-referential linguistic entities do not find any place. His understanding of proposition is based on the logical presupposition that it must have a sense. In this regard, Wittgenstein has assumed that a proposition is a picture of reality, i.e. a model of reality because a proposition with a sense pictures a fact. This is how the relationship between language and reality is made possible. Accordingly, it can be said that a gramophone record, the musical idea, the written notes, the sound-waves, all stand to one another in the same internal relation of depicting that holds between language and the world. Wittgenstein further contends that to understand a proposition means to know what the case is if it is true. Anybody can understand a proposition if he can understand its constituents. As a proposition is a model of reality, a proposition can be true or false only in virtue of being a picture of reality; only in virtue of representing the existence and non-existence of states of affairs.

In the fifth proposition, Wittgenstein introduces the truth-function of elementary propositions. A proposition can be analysed into elementary proposition and the truth-value of a proposition is determined on the basis of the truth-value of elementary

propositions. But an elementary proposition cannot be further analysed into elementary propositions. Therefore, an elementary proposition is a truth-function of itself. Therefore one elementary proposition cannot be deduced from another. To say that one elementary proposition follows from another is to say that the later says more than the former and the former says less than the latter. But this would not be the case. According to Wittgenstein every proposition is the result of truth-operation on elementary propositions and the sense of a truth-function of proposition is a function of the sense of proposition.

Thus, the correct method of philosophy according to Wittgenstein is to say nothing except what can be said, i.e. proposition of natural science. Therefore, one must transcend these propositions and then he will see the world aright. In this direction Wittgenstein ends up his book by citing his last, that is, the seventh proposition by saying, "What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence" (*TLP*: 7). So, it can be said that Wittgenstein understands language in terms of propositions and propositions are constituted out of logical names having the *constant denotational or referential status* in the strict logical sense. In fact, after the completion of this book, Wittgenstein himself declared that all traditional back-logs, philosophical muddles have been solved with the publication of this book.

The early Wittgenstein and Religion:

In the twentieth century there was a revolution in Philosophy. Linguistic philosophers, grammarians, lexicographers tried to bring a revolution; their aim was to free philosophy from the domination of metaphysics and directed its interest towards language. They have the scientific background, they revolt and philosophy was turned into linguistic philosophy which may be called linguistic turn in philosophy. Being the twentieth century philosopher and having the scientific background Wittgenstein tried to show the relationship between language and reality by his picture theory of meaning. He was the philosopher who can be considered as the founder of the analytic philosophical tradition. As conceiving ambiguity in ordinary language, Wittgenstein at the very outset of his *Tractatus* constructed a logical language which is atomistic in nature. According to early Wittgenstein, language is the sum total of propositions which would be constituted by names. Names are the atomic form of language, which cannot farther be analysed into names. A name denotes an object. Names along with relational term would constitute elementary propositions and from elementary propositions we have propositions and thereby language. Wittgenstein tries to show the relationship between language and reality in terms of the relationship between proposition and fact by his picture theory. For him, a proposition pictures a fact. A fact is something which makes a proposition as either true or false. That is why Wittgenstein says that the world is the totality of facts, but not things. Names are the ultimate constituents of the proposition or language and objects are the

ultimate constituents of facts or reality. Thus, it is clear that *Tractatus* form of language is atomistic in nature through which Wittgenstein logically analysed the relationship between language and reality through his picture theory of meaning and thereby solve all the traditional philosophical puzzles. However, religious language does not refer to observable, empirical facts. The religious objects go beyond the limits of language. This type of language is also like the metaphysical language. God is not perceivable in our empirical world. Although religion makes itself manifest, it cannot be talked about. So, following early Wittgenstein we can say that for him religion is non-scientific, meaningless and nonsensical.

The Later Wittgenstein: *Philosophical Investigations*

The *Philosophical Investigations* is a transition or deviation from *Tractatus*. In *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein addresses a different kind of language, which is holistic in nature. Instead of ideal language, here Wittgenstein introduces natural or ordinary language. Natural or ordinary language is holistic in the sense that in such a language a massive participation of the members of our society or community is made possible. Here Wittgenstein tells us that ordinary language is alright. The meaning of ordinary language is determined by the common participation of the members of our community or society. Ordinary language is therefore relevant as a philosophical method of language which is attached to our form of life. Here Wittgenstein tells us, "Don't ask for meaning, ask for the use" (qtd. in Wisdom 258).

So, the philosopher demonstrates a different direction in his later work. We observe that there are two principle differences between his early and later works. At the early stage, in *Tractatus*, he said that the structure of language determines the structure of reality. However, in *Philosophical Investigations* he opined that our language determines our view about reality. Secondly, he said in the *Tractatus*, there has uniformity in the structure of language, but in the *Philosophical Investigations* he said that language has no common essence. Instead of seeking the meaning of the proposition in terms of truth and falsity, Wittgenstein in *Philosophical Investigations* said about the use of language.

According to Wittgenstein, the task of Philosophy is to clarify language. Philosophical puzzles arise because of the misinterpretation and misunderstanding of language. So, the function of philosophy is to teach the correct usage of language. Whatever the malady, it is the job of philosophy to clear up the puzzle, to cure the ills of the understanding (Pitcher 196). He has once remarked, "What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday usage.... when philosophers use words - 'Knowledge', 'being', 'object', 'I', 'proposition', 'name', and try to grasp the essence of the word, we must always ask: is the word ever actually used in this way in the language which is its original home. For philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday" (*Philosophical Investigations*,

Sections 39, 40 – 41). The solution of the puzzles is to be obtained by the examination of our ordinary use of language. He was of against revision, he criticizes those philosophers who want to revise ordinary language and want to form the vocabulary of ideal language. He says that ordinary language is all right. Ordinary language has multiple uses. But the philosophical problems, misconceptions arise due to the misapplication of the rules of ordinary language. Later Wittgenstein comments that if picturing were to be the basic function of language, then the so-called metaphysical sentences were meaningless because this type of sentences cannot picture the fact of the world. He said, "What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use" (*Philosophical* 116). Later Wittgenstein does not support to revise language or its syntax. For him, the meaning of a sentence should be determined by the rules of language. Language is always a part of a form of life. Language can be used differently in different situations. For example, describing objects, playing, solving riddles, guessing, telling jokes, asking questions etc. There are different ways of using language, he has called it language games. So, here the meaning of language is not determined by its reference but it is determined through its use, it is determined by the rules of use. It can be said that, there need not be any rule, which can determine language irrespective of human needs and purposes. Here the term 'use' means the role it plays in a language game. For him, language is a social function; it is used to communicate each other in a society. So, it cannot be employed for private use. Language has meaning through the concept of language game. The term, 'language game', he says, "is meant to bring into prominence the fact that speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life" (*Philosophical*, Section 23, 11). We can say that a language game guides us to attain an appropriate use of language. Language has multifarious uses, so there are different types of language games. The relationship between language and game can be expressed by the analogy of family resemblance. In a family we know that some brothers and sisters of a family have the same eyebrow, or eye, others have the same nose, and some others have the same hair. As like a game there is also criss-cross relationship. Similarities and dissimilarities are there. Both in *The Blue and Brown Book* and *Philosophical Investigations* he says that language forms a family, the members of it share family resemblances.

Following Wittgenstein we can say that the ordinary language is associated with our form of life. The religious practices, rituals, the daily exchange of greetings, these are all the form of life. So, language is not a personal or private property, it is used for exchanging our thoughts, feelings, emotions etc., it is a public property. Malcolm, in this regard, says, "It seems clear to me, however, that Wittgenstein in saying that the concept of following a rule is 'essentially social' in the sense that it can have its roots only in setting where there is a people, with common life and common language" (*Wittgenstein: On* 23). Form of life is

connected with the language game and the meaning of language is determined by the use or the practice of language.

The Later Wittgenstein and Religion:

Following Wittgenstein's lectures on religious belief we can say that according to him religion is language game and practice. In this respect, I think that his religious concepts fit with his later philosophy. In his religious lecture he raises the question how we can know whether a believer believes on the Last Judgement. Wittgenstein argues "Asking him is not enough. He will probably say he has no proof. But he has what you might call an unshakeable belief. It will show, not by reasoning or by appeal to ordinary ground for belief but rather by regulating for in all his life" (Barrett 53). Belief is not based on any scientific ground and it cannot be refuted by any counter-evidence. Wittgenstein argues that in a religious discourse we use such religious expressions differently; we cannot relate it with the empirical world. These statements are something different as the statements that we use them in science. Religious statements are not unreasonable, but science and religion describe the same thing by their different criterion of meaning. God does not reveal himself in the world, but we believe in God. God or any spiritual object cannot correlate with reality. However, religion and its linguistic activities can be regarded as language games which are also a form of life. It is religious practice and anyone can engage in it. The religious concepts and the trueness or falseness of it depends on the context of dependent agreement. A religious discourse exists with an own criterion of meaning, its trueness depends on the agreement among the believers.

Conclusion:

After examining Wittgenstein's early and later philosophy and his conception of religion we can come to the conclusion that at his early life he was concerned about structural or formal language. However, in his later philosophy he opined that our language determines our view of reality. In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein affirms a uniform structure of language that can be disclosed only by logical clarification, but in the *Philosophical Investigations* he admits that language has no common structure or essence, this is ordinary language that we can use it in our day-to-day life. So, according to his early philosophy, language is ineffable to reach up to the religious objects or the spiritual things. On the other hand, following his later philosophy we can say that religious languages are language games or forms of life. Its meaning can be disclosed by the believers of religion through its religious pictures.

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