

• CHAPTER FIVE

Concluding Remarks

The main objective of this thesis is to show the relationship between language and reality. There is no question of doubt that language is all about of knowing reality or ontology. However, the terms language and reality are so fascinating and knotty concepts that even in the ongoing philosophical discussion these two concepts find an implacable influence to the mind of linguistic philosophers. We have deeply been involved in showing this relationship from *Four Different Pillars or Paradigms* namely, from semantic perspective, from pragmatic perspective, from mentalist perspective and from metaphysical or ontological perspective. Apparently, the title of the thesis appears *too large* because it is associated with as many as four different approaches developed by four different linguistic theorists. Therefore, at the very outset it would seem to be an imperative to justify *the relevance of the title of the thesis*. It is noted that linguistic philosophers over the years have conceived different types of language of different natures. As a result of that, there have been developed different paradigms of language through which various attempts have been made to reveal reality. As there are different natures of language and reality is supposed to be a matter of *linguistic decision*, we do not have a monistic or unified approach of the concept of reality. As reality is a matter of linguistic decision and as there are various types of language, naturally there has been developed various conception of reality. If we carefully go through the history of linguistic philosophy, there we find four different interpretations of language, such as the semantic interpretation of language; the pragmatic interpretation of language; the mentalist interpretation of language and the metaphysical or ontological interpretation of language. Each of these interpretations of language has been developed with the contribution

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of a group of linguistic philosophers. Under semantic approach we can mention the name of Russell, early Wittgenstein, Carnap, Tarski, Frege; under pragmatic interpretation we can mention the name of later Wittgenstein, Austin, Strawson, Ryle, Searle and others; under the mentalist interpretation we can mention the name of Noam Chomsky, J. J. Fodor, Katz etc., and under the metaphysical interpretation we can mention the name of Martin Heidegger, Meinong and others. Thus, each interpretation of language stands or appears as an independent philosophical school. Now if reality or ontology is revealed by language and language is supposed to be matter of *linguistic decision*, there we find different aspects of reality correspondence to different aspect of language.

We think that semantic approach of language appeared as a precursor of linguistic revolution because it gives over emphasize on *clarity and precision*. It stands against speculative metaphysics. Its main contention is clarity and precision. It tries to regulate the meaning of language by way of showing a correlation between language and fact. It emphasizes on the referential (denotation/connotation) aspect of the relationship between language and reality. In general it states that language refers reality externally. This approach may be broadly termed as the *externalist interpretation of language* where language refers something extra-linguistically. Semantic, as we have noted, is a broad linguistic approach and it would be very difficult to cover the whole approach. Within this approach, there are some leading proponents, such as, Russell, early Wittgenstein, Frege, Carnap and many more. However, we have developed the atomic approach of the relationship between language and reality after early Wittgenstein. We have chosen Wittgenstein's approach as a model or paradigm of the relationship between language and reality. Because we think Wittgenstein was an original thinker and no other linguistic philosopher belonging to semantic school has been as much as consistent like Wittgenstein as far as the development of the relationship between language and reality is concerned. Of course, Frege's position is equally important because he has been

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treated as the father of analytic movement. But we think that as far as precision and clarity is concerned, Wittgenstein's philosophy deserves worthy in the present context.

Contrary to semantic approach there develops the pragmatic approach of the relationship between language and reality. The pragmatic approach is *contrary to the semantic interpretation* on account of both the nature of language as well as the nature of reality. The semantic interpretation is based on *artificial language* whereas the pragmatic interpretation is based on *natural language*. Secondly, the semantic interpretation gives importance on the *referential theory* for knowing reality whereas the pragmatic interpretation actually hinges on the *use theory* for knowing reality. Thus, in a sense the nature of both language and reality are different in semantic and pragmatic approaches. Having said this, each school as linguistic philosophy offers us an external interpretation of the relationship between language and reality. Again, there are many leading proponents belonging to pragmatic approach, such as, later Wittgenstein, Strawson, Austin, Ryle and others. Having said this, as a model or paradigm of pragmatic approach, we have chosen Strawson's conceptualistic approach for showing the relationship between language and reality. Strawson was a pragmatist. He gives importance on ordinary or natural language. According to Strawson, ordinary language is adequate for showing the relationship between language and reality. We prefer the conceptualistic approach of Strawson for the simple reason that Strawson was a leading campaigner of conceptualism and the impact of his theory has been colossal in the later development of conceptualism. Strawson while developing conceptual scheme within the sphere of natural or ordinary language was profusely influenced by Kant's concept of categories. Following Kant, Strawson has developed *a unified core of conceptual scheme* on the basis of which inter-personal communication between the speaker and the hearer is made possible.

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It may be said that if the first linguistic turn is confined within the semantic and pragmatic interpretations of language, then surely the mentalist interpretation of language would be treated or conceived as the second linguistic turn in philosophy. Thus, the mentalist interpretation of language is another important dimension of the relationship between language and reality. It differs from the earlier tradition in the sense that unlike the earlier tradition it gives importance on the internal function of language. According to this approach, the external use of language that we notice in case of semantics and pragmatics are the secondary uses of language. The primary use of language is internal.

The metaphysical or ontological interpretation of language is another important dimension of showing the relationship between language and reality. Here language is poetic and reality is being or openness of being or transformation of being towards Being. It states that language is no longer separated from reality rather language is reality. On the basis of these approaches, we have developed the relationship between language and reality. Having said this, it should be kept in mind that the proposed inquiry is philosophically so tricky that it would be very difficult to draw a viable conclusion *without beginning questions*. As our main apprehension is to investigate the relationship between language and reality, we generally keep in mind various approaches of this issue so that *a comprehensive approach* of the relationship between language and reality can eventually be achieved. This is our main motto at the very outset and on the basis of this background the title of the thesis has been formulated.

There is no question of doubt that linguistic revolution or turn was primarily concerned with the semantic interpretation of language. More succinctly, it can be said that semantic was the womb of *linguistic revolution*. Semantic is a broad linguistic school functioning with the help of artificial or constructed language. Within semantic school some linguistic philosophers

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were treated as reductionists, some were treated as atomist. When we consider semantic approach we usually put emphasize on the referential aspect of meaning. It has been claimed by the referential theorists that the philosophical meaning of a sentence is determined on the basis of what the sentence under consideration refers something *extra-linguistically*. That means, the referential connection between the sentence and what it refers to actually make the sentence meaningful. Now a sentence or the element of the sentence (in my thesis the element is proper name) refers something either in terms of denotation or in terms of connotation; either in the form of *de-dicto* or in the sense of *de-re*. However, when we have engaged in exploring the relationship between language and reality, we predominantly confine ourselves, for the sake of brevity, only to the denotation aspect of reference. In this regard, we have discussed the view of Ludwig Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* as a model of the semantic approach of the relationship between language and reality.

We think that Bertrand Russell was a leading campaigner of the denotation or referential aspect of naming theory. In fact, the proposal of ideal language took an extreme structure or shape by Russell's ingenuity. When proper name, in general, has been accepted as a minimum vocabulary of ideal language, Russell with his outmost philosophical ingenuity explored an implicit default even within proper names. According to Russell the idea proper names as the minimum vocabulary of ideal or artificial language was problematic because of the disguised nature of language. Russell was very conscious about the grammatical and logical structure of language. He told that the grammatical or apparent structure of language may not be authentic because at times it does not match with its logical structure. He has claimed exactly the same when he was deeply engaged in formulating artificial language. Most referential semantists were satisfied about the general perception of proper names. Even Frege belongs to this camp. However, Russell thinks the other way round. He was very

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skeptical about the functional aspect of ordinary proper names. He has claimed that not all proper names are authentic in our desired sense.

Accordingly, Russell classified proper names as *logical as well as ordinary proper* names and conceived logical proper name as the authentic vocabulary of ideal language. We think that the semantists who have developed the denotation aspect of proper name were somehow or other influenced by Russell. Even early Wittgenstein, we think, was influenced by Russell. His theory of proper name as developed in the *Tractatus* was Russellian to a great extent. Even though like Russell, early Wittgenstein does not make any notable discussion between logical and ordinary proper name, however, his interpretation of naming theory actually is an underlying replica of Russell's logical proper name. When Wittgenstein says that a name denotes an object in logical space, he completely boils down or sets aside the possibility of a name failing to refer anything. In this regard Wittgenstein states that if a name fails to refer or denote an object, it would not be treated as a name. We think from linguistic philosophical perspective, Wittgenstein's interpretation of the relationship between language and reality holds the centrality of the issue what we promised to develop at the very outset. Moreover, unlike other linguistic philosophers belonging to the semantic school Wittgenstein would be treated as the original thinker. That is why, we have developed Wittgenstein's view as a model of the semantic relationship between language and reality.

We think that the semantic interpretation of the relationship between language and reality is one dimension or aspect in knowing the relationship between language and reality. It addresses reality from a particular point of view or from a particular aspect. As a result of that, one can know a particular aspect of reality. Certainly, it would set aside the other aspect of reality because the language it has taken into account does not allow the other aspect of reality as appropriate. This approach is narrow and it has been vehemently criticized because

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of its narrow based application. As a result of that there develops an alternative approach philosophically known as *pragmatic approach of language* which takes natural language as a tool or instrument for knowing reality. As a result of that we have discussed the pragmatic interpretation of the relationship between language and reality.

We think that unlike the semantists, the pragmatists have engaged in investigating the relationship between language and reality from different perspectives. They are not interested in revising natural language in a radical way. Later Wittgenstein, for example, was against any sort of linguistic revision. Even though Austin and Strawson were in favour of constant revision of ordinary language but in spite of that they confine themselves within the functional aspect of ordinary language. Moreover they are non-committal regarding the aspects of denotation and connotation of language. Instead of that they have given importance on the ordinary function of language used in our society or community. Thus, for them reality is not something that can be portrayed by language on the basis of structural similarity or isomorphism as we witnessed in Wittgenstein and others; rather reality can be grasped by using language *in our form of life* (later Wittgenstein) or through successful communication (P.F.Strawson) or through speech acts or language acts (J.L.Austin) or through the proper usages of language (Gilbert Ryle). Thus, the pragmatic interpretation of the relationship between language and reality has been developed by a good number of linguistic philosophers, namely, later Wittgenstein (through his use theory of meaning), P.F.Strawson (through his conceptualism based on successful communication), J.L.Austin (through his speech acts) etc. However, for the sake of brevity, we have developed the view of P.F.Strawson as a model or paradigm of the pragmatic interpretation of the relationship between language and reality. We have chosen Strawson's conceptualism as a model because we think Strawson through his *unified conceptual scheme* offers an innovative approach of

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the relationship between language and reality in his celebrated book *Individuals*. We think Strawson's conceptualism or conceptual scheme has created an enormous impact on the later development of conceptualism of Davidson, Putnam, Quine and others. Strawson conceptualism, we think, is *an integrated philosophical discourse* that has been linked with many great philosophical thinkers. Strawson was implicitly influenced by Immanuel Kant's idea of categories. We think in our interpersonal communication the role of categories is colossal. At times categories have been attributed as *categories of understanding*. For example, space and time are two categories without which our understanding of the world would be impossible. These are a priori concepts. What we can say here is that interpersonal successful communication between the speaker and the hearer is possible because both the speaker and the hearer are the owners of categories of understanding. It has been established by Kant and Strawson has extended its relevance while developing his conceptualism. Strawsonian conceptualism has been the central issue of the later development of the same. Davidson in his paper criticizes Strawson's idea of *unified conceptual scheme* and we notice a radical interpretation in Quine as well. In fact, Quine's naturalized epistemology does not allow us to admit any fixed and stringent unified concept shared by all.

We think that both the semantic and pragmatic interpretations have taken language externally. Each of these groups has emphasized, though differently, on the external use of language and also on the external use of reality. Moreover, the semantists as well as the pragmatists have thought, though differently, that both language and reality are separated entities and language as a tool can be used for knowing reality. Thus, if we compare between semantists as well as pragmatists, we find that their understanding of language is different. Semantists, in general, have emphasized on the artificial form of language; whereas pragmatists, in general, have emphasized on the ordinary form of language. Thus, the very

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nature of language for them is different. Having said this, even though they have disagreed about the very nature of language, but each of these philosophical schools has used language externally. This is where they share the same view. For them reality is something external and language and reality are different entities. Language in some sense or other would be the bearer of knowing reality.

Moreover, as far as reality is concerned semantists are more specific than the pragmatists. Even at times they are in favour of *brute facts*. Unlike the pragmatists, the semantists not only have specific idea of language, they have also the specific idea of reality. According to Wittgenstein, *reality is the totality of facts* pictured by propositions and the constituents of facts, i.e., objects are denoted by logically proper names. Therefore, anything other than the constituents of facts cannot be regarded as real according to early Wittgenstein. As the constituents of facts are denoted by name (logical proper name according to Russell and Wittgenstein), accordingly only logical proper names would be the vocabulary of ideal or propositional language. On the basis of it, Wittgenstein drew the limits of language as well as the limits of the world or reality. He then claimed that outside the limits of language we cannot say anything. It would be better for us to pass over in silence. Thus, for Wittgenstein, we have to have an authentic form of language on the basis of which true picture of the world can be grasped. In this regard, Wittgenstein gives importance on the pictorial representation and more importantly, on the pictorial form of language. Even though we have examined only Wittgenstein's position of the relationship between language and reality, but we think that the whole host of semantists by and large have given paramount importance on the very nature of language as well as on the very nature of reality. Their main intention was to cure philosophy from the womb of speculative metaphysics. In fact, the linguistic turn or

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revolution happened during 20th century because of the revolt of semantists against speculative metaphysics.

On the other hand, if we look at the philosophical position of pragmatists regarding reality, we find that they do not have specific idea as far as the nature of reality is concerned. According to later Wittgenstein, the use of language would determine reality within the *form of life*, or within the framework of the *custom* of society. This is a comprehensive approach of the concept of reality. If we carefully examine the position of Austin's theory of performative utterance, classified in terms of Speech Acts, such as, locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary, we find that Austin too perceives reality in a wide and comprehensive manner. For Austin nothing can be excluded from the domain of performative utterance manifested through different speech acts used or performed within the form of life or community or society. Thus, both language and reality are open to Austin. If we take care of the view of Ryle, we find the same position. In fact, Ryle gives importance on the actual *usage* of language in our ordinary life. We think that the pragmatic standpoint has perfectly been revealed through Strawson's philosophical position. Strawson in his celebrated book *Individuals* and the article like 'Analysis, Science and Metaphysics' included in *Linguistic Turn*¹¹⁴ of Richard Rorty clearly indicates the very nature of reality. He, in fact, has understood reality as the totality of *particulars* and he equally conceives the term particular in terms of object. Thus, for Strawson reality is the totality of objects. One can identify an object by means of ordinary language through successful communication. Successful communication, Strawson opines, is made possible between the speaker and the hearer because both the speaker and the hearer must possess *a unified conceptual scheme*. In this regard, we think Strawson was indebted to Kant.

¹¹⁴ Rorty, Richard (ed.), *The Linguistic Turn: Essays in Philosophical Method*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1967.

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Let us make a comparative study between semantics and pragmatic schools of thought regarding the relationship between language and reality. We have seen that the two approaches are contrary to one another with regard to the nature of language as well as the nature of reality. However, the only notable similarity that we foresee is that both schools of thought are externalists in a broad sense. They are externalists in the sense that they use language as an instrument for knowing external reality. The external interpretation in semantics is vivid and clear. Just think of referential theory where it has been presumed that a sentence is to be meaningful if it *refers something extra-linguistically* other than the sentence itself. This clearly suggests that the philosophical meaning of a sentence has its external implication. We think that the concepts, such as, denotation, connotation, picturing, mapping, representation, hooking, etc., are all at par with the term reference. Again we have observed that the language of semantics is proper names or logical proper names. Regarding logical proper names there developed two parallel theories, such as, no-sense theory of proper name and sense theory of proper name. Those who have advocated *no-sense* theory of proper name would like to say that a proper name denotes an object with which we are acquainted (Russell) or a proper name denotes the same object in every possible world (Kripke). For them proper names do not have sense or meaning. They are purely externalist in their application of language for knowing reality. Even those who have developed the sense-theory of proper name would like to say that the sense of a proper name is directed towards its reference. Frege's position is a case in point. Thus, for semantists, reference is the key to know about reality. Language must refer, there is no exception. If there is any problem, it would be the problem of identifying the locus in which language refers or pictures or maps or hooks or denotes or connotes. For example, those who adhere to no-sense theory of reference would like to say that there is no referential failure of language. However, those who adhere

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to the sense-theory of proper names would like to say that there is no scope of failure regarding the mode of presentation or sense of proper names. Frege is a leading proponent of this theory. This does not, however, make sense to say that the reference of a proper name would be a foregoing matter to Frege. Certainly, it would not be the case. What matters is the very nature of reality. Like Russell and Wittgenstein, Frege would certainly say that a proper name denotes or refers to an object. However, Frege differs from Russell and Wittgenstein on the ground that the reference of a proper name would be non-existential, or fictitious or non-empirical. It may not exist in the brute sense of the term. We sense external implication of language in the pragmatic interpretation of language. The use theory of later Wittgenstein, the speech-act theory of Austin and the mechanism of successful communication between the speaker and the hearer regarding the particulars of the world as developed by Strawson are cases in point.

Having said this, each school differs from others on account of language and reality. The debate over the legitimacy of language in linguistic philosophy is fascinating in the sense that it actually opens up two opposite philosophical quests for knowing reality. We think that as far as the proposal of logical proper name is concerned there is nothing wrong. However, the only problem with this proposal is that it would involve with a sort of inquiry about reality which is basically too *abstruse and narrow*. Even many would suspect about the legitimacy of proper name.

We think that the concept of language and the concept of reality are different in semantic and pragmatic interpretations. Language is different, because semantic interpretations work on the basis of formalized or artificial language whereas pragmatic interpretation functions on the basis of natural or ordinary language. The concept of reality equally finds different

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philosophical position. As far as semantic is concerned reality is conceived on the basis of reference or picture or denotation or connotation etc. On the contrary, according to pragmatic interpretation, reality is conceived on the basis of the use of natural language. The use of language is no longer structural or constructed. More importantly, while envisaging the concept of reality by means of natural language, the pragmatic in general were not vocal in favour of the referential aspect of language. Unlike, the referential theory of language, their use theory of language acts as a complicated and comprehensive network which in some sense or other touches the stream of human life in the real sense of the term. As a result of that it includes every sphere of human life and excludes nothing. We think in the pragmatic interpretation, we get the relevance of Locke. According to Locke, *reality is the totality of experience* because every word of language bears the sensible mark of ideas. Thus, in a loose sense, we can foresee the relevance of ideational theory of meaning in pragmatic interpretation of the relationship between language and reality. This is the real position of semantists as well as of pragmatists of the relationship between language and reality. Both of these schools have thought that *reality is different from language. Language has been used externally*. But the external use of language does not portrait or represent the whole aspect of reality rather it reflects the one aspect or the external aspect of reality. However, this view has been criticized by many other linguistic philosophers, namely, Noam Chomsky, Fodor, J.J. Katz and others. Reality may be internal as well. The internal aspect of reality has been completely forfeited by semantic school in particular and the pragmatic school in general. Here, following Chomsky, we have developed *the internal relation between language and reality*.

According to Chomsky, “language is the mirror of human mind.” There is no question of doubt that if the first linguistic turn was predominantly concerned with semantic and

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pragmatic interpretations, then Noam Chomsky's *Mentalistic Turn* would certainly be regarded as the *second linguistic turn* in philosophy. Thus, Noam Chomsky, to me, has occupied an important philosophical position as far as the nature and interpretation of language on one hand and their relationship on the other.

We have seen that Noam Chomsky advocates a new *innatism* and in this regard, he was indebted to Descartes. Descartes' *innatism* has been attributed as *old innatism* by Copper and Chomsky's *innatism* has been attributed as *new innatism*. According to Chomsky, every normal native speaker has preoccupied and innately possessed a linguistic organ placed in the left hemisphere of the brain at the time of his or her birth. It has been given and preoccupied biologically from where language generates. According to Chomsky, as language is the mirror of human mind one can know other, by means of language. A man is known by the language he or she uses.

Chomsky further contends, we think, that the proper use of language is not something external. The essential use of language is internal. The external use of language, as we have observed in semantics and pragmatics, is *secondary* and one should not give importance on the external use of language. Instead of that, the internal use of language what Chomsky termed as I-language is primary. Moreover, 'I-language' reflects the mirror or the essence of human. As language is the mirror of human mind, Chomsky, therefore, calls upon a grammar of language which is scientific in nature. Chomsky termed it as *Transformational Generative Grammar (TGG)*. Chomsky then classifies different levels of grammar prominently known as *Deep Structure* and *Surface Structure of Grammar*. According to Chomsky, the language that has been manifested in the surface structure of grammar is not authentic. Rather the deep structure of grammar reflects the true or real structure of language. Thus, Chomsky while developing his mentalistic interpretation of language has emphasized on the deep structure of

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grammar through which the nature of human being can be revealed. We have considered Chomsky's mentalistic turn of language because we think that it would reflect the internal aspect of language and the internal aspect of reality which we think, following Chomsky, is the fundamental or the primary aspect of the relationship between language and reality. Not only that Chomsky appears in the latter half of twentieth century as an authentic campaigner of linguistic philosophy but also his interpretation of the nature of language, the nature of reality, and the relationship between language and reality, we think, opens up a new dimension or new addition in the history of linguistic philosophy.

The reader, however, may raise a question: Why do we particularly confine ourselves within Noam Chomsky's views while developing the mentalistic position of the relationship between language and reality? The answer is very clear and simple. Even though a good number of linguistic philosophers, over the years, have developed the mentalistic interpretation of language, but I think Noam Chomsky has occupied the central position in this philosophical movement. That is why; I particularly have chosen the mentalistic interpretation of Noam Chomsky while developing the relationship between language and reality from internal perspective.

We are now in a position to make a contrast and compare between the mentalistic position of Noam Chomsky and the externalist interpretation of the relationship between language and reality. First, according to Chomsky, the primary use of language is internal; whereas the externalist (pragmatists as well as the semanticists) think the other way round. They use language externally. Secondly, as Chomsky gives emphasize on the internal use of language, his own understanding of reality as the mirror of human mind is internal as well. Therefore, by examining the mentalistic position of Noam Chomsky we thus enable to explore a new aspect of reality which was completely foreign in the externalist's interpretation of language.

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That is why, I have incorporated the mentalistic position of Noam Chomsky. Noam Chomsky offers us a scientific interpretation of language. He tells us how language is being generated from the left hemisphere. It is a scientific and biological process of creation. Language, for Chomsky, is creative in nature. Having said this, Chomsky does not make it clear the reason of spontaneous creation of language. We think the creation of language is required from the left hemisphere because of the need of the native speaker. Language is the instrument or tool through which a native speaker can make communication with his fellow beings on the basis of his desire or needs. A native speaker feels urgency for his own need to communicate regarding the worldly matters. This sort of implicit needs of the native speaker eventually generates language.

Chomsky says that language is the mirror of human mind. The mind of a person is known by the language. Language reflects that is happening internally of a person. Through language, the intended desire, feeling, motive of a native speaker can be grasped. In this regard, he brings the old innatism into a new crease. His theory is intricately associated with the innatism of Rene Descartes. According to Descartes, one can acquire knowledge on the basis of innate ideas. Thus, in the case of acquiring knowledge, the role of innate ideas is primary and the role of sense experience is secondary. Sense experience is external whereas reason is internal. Sense experience is based on sense organs that receive information externally; innate ideas are internal. Innate organs are biologically given. They are placed in the brain. They act scientifically. According to Chomsky, acquisition of language is internal creation; it is not at all associated with behavioral matter. Therefore, there is no point in using language externally to show the relationship between language and reality. Thus for Chomsky, it was a mistake on the part of semantic and pragmatic schools for considering language from external

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purpose owing to show the relationship between language and reality. The other important point is that Chomsky talks about the grammar of language like the later Wittgenstein. In the *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein presumes that language is rule-following and following a rule is a practice. Having said this, the grammar that we note in natural language is not the same Chomsky conceives while developing his internal language. According to Chomsky, his understanding of grammar is scientific grammar and he then termed it as 'scientific grammar'. The distinctive nature of this kind of grammar is that it is generative in nature. He then called it **Transformation Generative Grammar**. We can say that it is the need of the native speaker for which language is internally generated and transformed. It is a process where one can get the output or necessary data and then processing it internally and after that it will be manifested as the output. A native speaker after his or her birth is wondering for everything he or she comes to know, he needs language to communicate and this internal propensity creates language or generates language from the organ which is particularly given or preoccupied by the native speaker.

We are still lagging behind to have the complete picture of reality. There we have noticed a different though important aspect which has not been reflected in the externalist as well as the mentalistic interpretation of language. Accordingly, we feel urgency to incorporate this important aspect of reality within our investigation of the relationship between language and reality.

It would not be an exaggeration if we adhere to the view that the whole host of linguistic tradition started from logical positivists down to the semantic tradition directly or indirectly, consciously or unconsciously have boiled down the relevance of metaphysical reality. We have already stated that linguistic revolution or turn appeared as a revolt against the legitimacy of speculative metaphysics. It was the slogan of the philosophers of language that

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almost all traditional outstanding and unresolved philosophical problems were generated out of the misinterpretation of language. As a result of that these problems can be solved by proper analysis of the meaning of language. Thus, the meaning of language comes into the picture when we study philosophy of language or linguistic philosophy. The very or primary intention of linguistic revolution is to make philosophy a meaningful enterprise and in this direction the important thing that needs to be taken care of is to know about the meaning of language. If philosophy is all about the analysis of language, then to determine the meaning of language is the primary concern of philosophy of language. That is why, when linguistic philosophers were involved into the tug of war regarding the very nature of language, they were sharply divided on this issue. Some were dissatisfied about the functional aspect of ordinary or natural language and expressed their view in favour of ideal or constructed language. The same was equally reflected in Logical Positivism pioneering by Ayer and others. Logical positivists set out the criterion of meaningfulness of sentence along with the line of principle of verification where a sentence as an icon of language would be literally meaningful if it would be completely verifiable or completely falsifiable by means of some observational data. The linguistic phrase 'observational data' is important here. It brings the insight of empiricism of the seventeenth and eighteenth century. Now our point is that, if observational data is the hallmark of the meaningfulness of a sentence, this would singlehandedly boiled down the possibility of metaphysics in general. As a result of that, the language of ethics, theology, metaphysics, aesthetics which lies beyond the limits of language according to early Wittgenstein, would be treated as meaningless according to the principle of verification expounded by logical positivists.

Thus, the direction of linguistic turn or revolution has been strengthened and extended with the introduction of the criterion of principle of verification and this again continues with the

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contribution of semantics. As we know that semantics as a school of linguistic philosophy persists with linguistic revisionism and developed theories either in the form of logical analysis, logical reduction, or by offering us theory in terms of logical atomism. They are predisposed to conceive reality as empirical and metaphysical and in turn denied the possibility of metaphysical reality. For them language is not at all to reveal metaphysical reality because language cannot reach up to that or ineffable to reach up to that. Wittgenstein's early philosophy is a case in point. Thus, we have seen that linguistic philosophers have different choices about language and reality. Even though language matters to philosophy but linguistic philosophers within the realm of linguistic revolution have different tastes about the nature of language. Having said this, the general perception is that language matters to philosophy because language reveals reality or ontology for us. Even though the terms 'reality and ontology' are closed terms normally used in the realm of linguistic philosophy, but one must be very careful of considering these two terms as synonymous terms. The term reality is associated with brute facts which are in most general cases inquired with regard to space and time, with regard to their existence. The term 'ontology' is conceptually higher than the term 'reality'. The term 'ontology' is primarily concerned with 'being' question. When a proper name denotes an object, it denotes a real object and here the relationship is measured with regard to language and reality. However, when a term denotes 'the being of a table', the relationship is measured with regard to 'language and ontology'. To be precise, the concept of reality is usually associated with brute objects having existential import in the real sense of the term, but the concept of ontology deals with being-qua-being and in this sense, it would be metaphysical in nature.

We have seen that linguistic philosopher in most general cases, directly or indirectly, have distrusted regarding the metaphysical relevance of the relationship between language and

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reality. We think that the metaphysical aspect of reality (including metaphysician and poet) took the back foot in the linguistic turn particularly in the first half of linguistic turn. Therefore, when I have proposed the roadmap of this thesis, I have realized that the metaphysical interpretation of the relationship between language and reality is one of the important dimensions to assess the relationship as a whole. In this regard, I have taken the opportunity to discuss the view of one of the greatest original thinker, Martin Heidegger, who, I think, has done a breathtaking job in showing the metaphysical relationship between language and reality.

According to Heidegger, language is the house of Being. The Being is the guardian of language. As a guardian of language Being always takes care of language. Without Being there is no language and without language there is no other alternative ways of revealing Being. Being is revealed by means of language through *Dasein*, the representative of beings. 'Da' means there and 'Sein' means Being. Therefore, *Dasein* means There-being. Therefore, Being is revealed through *Dasein*. Being is the transformational or transient form of beings. According to Heidegger, Being is language and language is Being. Here we understand reality in terms of Being. Accordingly, we can say that reality is language and language is reality. This, in fact, opens up a new dimension as far as the relationship between language and reality.

We have seen that both semanticists and pragmatists have conceived language and reality as independent entity. However, Heidegger thinks the other way round. According to Heidegger, language and reality are two sides of the same coin. Both language and reality (Being) are one and same. One cannot be explained without other. However this does not make sense to say that both language and reality are the same. One can be revealed in terms

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of another. Language is the revealer of reality not as an independent or separate entity as pragmatists and semanticists have thought, but is an inseparable revealer of reality.

Thus, it seems clear to us that Heidegger not only develops the relationship between language and ontology from metaphysical perspective, but while developing the relationship between language and ontology, he takes different interpretation of language, of reality from the earlier tradition. His interpretation and his own understanding of language is different from earlier tradition because unlike the earlier tradition he understands language as *Poetic*. The very nature of poetic language is that it is *creative, unbiased*. His understanding to reality is metaphysical in nature. By reality he means Being which we think is very similar to or very near to the *Sabdabrahman* of Bharṭṛhari or of the *pure object* of Meinong. He stands against the dominant linguistic wave by making the relationship between language and reality from metaphysical point of view. His understanding of the relevance of poetic language had been demolished by the logical positivists. According to the logical positivists, the philosophical position of the metaphysicians as well as the poets remained the same. Thus, like metaphysician, the philosophy of poet or poetic language, in short, has been rejected.

The intension of semantists is at par with the position of the logical positivists. Even though semantists as well as pragmatists were not vocal regarding the meaninglessness of metaphysics as well as poetic language, but particularly semantists by way of proposing linguistic revisionism actually boiled down or devoid the significance of poetic language just like the position of metaphysics. Even though pragmatists comparatively take softer stance as far as the nature of language is concerned, but they equally have emphasized on the ordinary use of language within the *form of life* or through speech act or through successful communication where the relevance of metaphysics or poetic language has been minimal. Chomsky's mentalistic interpretation of language is somehow different.

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Even though I have examined the relationship between language and reality from *Four Different Pillars*, but at the same time I have emphasized a lot on the metaphysical interpretation of the relationship between language and ontology after Martin Heidegger. Readers, however, may raise question in this regard. But the reason behind this is that, I think, that the metaphysical relevance of the relationship between language and ontology has been sidelined by the whole host of linguistic philosophers. Fortunately, Heidegger in Western tradition and Bhartṛhari from Indian tradition had done a laudable job in reviving the relevance of metaphysical reality. Therefore, I have emphasized more on Heidegger's view of the relationship between language and reality.

After examining different aspects of the concept of reality, I have in a better position to assess the relationship between language and reality. At the very outset, I have claimed that the issue is very tricky as well as complex one. Philosophers, over the years, have engaged themselves to explicate the relationship between language and reality from different aspects. Till today, we do not have a well-accepted solution without begging question. In fact, this is the genesis of philosophy. If the journey of philosophical enquiry is ended at a certain point, then philosophy would not be regarded as philosophy in the true sense of the term. The path of philosophical enquiry is a non-ending issue. It goes on and on and in this process new issues will come up; new problems will appear; new proposals will come up to tackle these problems as well. Having said this, we should not be sacrosanct as an earnest reader of philosophy even if we come to know that what had been earned and applauded had subsequently boiled down as worthless. Wittgenstein himself was a glaring example in this regard.

So when I have involved myself in exploring the relationship between language and reality, I mainly, at the very outset, have sorted out four different aspects of the relationship between

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language and reality and accordingly I have developed all these aspects and have tried to have a sense of the relationship between language and reality in a comprehensive manner. The genesis of this thesis is that it tries to explore the relationship between language and reality from external point of view as well as from internal point of view. The thesis tells us that the relationship between language and reality is **multi-dimensional, multifaceted**. It would therefore wrong to suggest that the relationship between language and reality is one dimensional. It reminds the theory of Jaina *Syādvāda* where the term ‘*syat*’ means ‘may be’, ‘perhaps’, ‘somehow’ or ‘in some respect’. For example, instead of saying, “the elephant is like a pillar” it should be said “May be, or in some respect, the elephant is like a pillar.” According to the Jainas, every being has innumerable characters and omniscient being can only have *Kevalajñāna* and innumerable knowledge of an object in all its innumerable aspects.

What we can say at this juncture is that reality is a multifaceted concept and it would be wrong to understand reality in a particular aspect and think it in a conclusive manner. The concept of reality encompasses inside as well as outside. Therefore, we think different interpretation of the relationship between language and reality portrays different aspects of the concept of reality.

Even though linguistic philosophers, in most cases, have preferred empirical reality for making philosophy a dynamic and scientific enterprise, but I think the investigation of the relationship between language and reality must examine the metaphysical reality as well. Till today we notice a serious, though unresolved, dispute that whether *thought* is independent from language or not. If thought is independent from language then language may be used as an independent tool and also reality may be regarded as an independent entity. In this way, the investigation of the relationship between language and reality as expounded by semantists

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may be justified. But if it has been accepted that thought is not independent from language and what is language is thought then to consider language and reality as separated entity would be a mistake. Accordingly, it is very hard to come by which view is acceptable to us. I think it is very difficult for me to favour either one or disfavour the other. Rather, I would like to prefer the view that there are some aspects of reality that can be pictured or mirrored by language independently. At the same time, it is equally true to say that language is reality as Heidegger claimed or language is the mirror of human mind as Noam Chomsky has suggested. Therefore, we keep the option open and try to understand the relationship between language and reality from relative perspective as we notice in the Jaina theory of *Syādvāda*.

At the end of this thesis, we may extract some findings developed out of my own rationales on the basis of which the worthy of this thesis can partially be justified. Some of the insights are as follows:

(i) Language is a fascinating instrument of communication and the relationship between language and reality (ontology) is a philosophically debatable issue. Therefore, there is no point in saying that the problem has been solved. Early Wittgenstein had paid the penalty of claiming the same after the completion of *Tractatus*.

(ii) We think that reality is *a matter of linguistic decision* and as a result of that the nature of reality actually hinges on the **very nature of language**.

(iii) As reality is a matter of linguistic decision, there remains a multifaceted aspects of reality based on the multifaceted aspects of language.

(iv) Although linguistic philosophers were deeply involved to dig out the authenticity of language, but we do not think it so effective for establishing the underlying relationship between language and reality. Rather one should take a note from Locke that reality is the totality of experience and each word is a sensible mark of idea.