

• **CHAPTER FOUR**

The Metaphysical Interpretation of the relationship between Language and Reality after Martin Heidegger

The main objective of this chapter is to show the relationship between language and reality with special reference to Martin Heidegger. Martin Heidegger actually invented a new dimension of the relationship between language and reality from metaphysical perspective. While elucidating the philosophical significance of language in knowing reality, Heidegger says that ‘language is the house (home) of Being’. In its (language) housing man is at home. Heidegger farther contends that his path of thinking language as the house of Being actually leads to an entirely new view of language. It is the home where man dwells. Heidegger in his “The Letter on Humanism” says, “Language is the house of Being. In its home man dwells. Those who think and those who create with words are the guardians of this home.”⁵²

Heidegger’s view of language as the house of being opens a new dimension in the domain of philosophical analysis of language. When linguistic revolution appeared in 20th century by way of devouring metaphysics as a meaningless entity (dead body), the very nature of language was definitely non-Heideggerian. When linguistic philosophers were involved in discussing the very nature of language in order to set up a realistic linguistic method, they were broadly classified into ordinary and ideal language philosophers. Their concern was to make language vivid, clear, distinct and precise. For them language, as a philosophical method, must be a ‘sharpen tool’ which would adequately reflect reality or ontology. In the previous sequels we have already explained the relationship between language and reality from the background of ideal and ordinary language perspective. The atomic interpretation

⁵² Heidegger, Martin, “The Letter on Humanism” in *Basic Writings*, ed., D.F.Krell, New York: Harper Collins 1993, pp. 217-218.

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of the relationship between language and reality is a mark of ideal language philosophy. The pragmatic interpretation of the relationship between language and reality is a mark of ordinary language philosophy. Whatever the nature of language that has been addressed by the so called linguistic philosophers as discussed above, it would definitely be non-Heideggerian in the true sense of the term.

Now the point is that in what sense language that has been addressed by the so called linguistic philosopher is non-Heideggerian? In this regard, it can be said that when Heidegger has claimed that language is the house of Being, he, thereby, has reflected on a kind of language which is neither ordinary language nor ideal language in any sense of the term. Heidegger was talking of a kind of language which is philosophically known as 'poetic language'.

It is interesting to point out here that poetic language, in general, has badly been dismantled by the logical positivists. Ayer in his celebrated book *Language, Truth and Logic*⁵³ conceived poetic language very similar to metaphysical language. According to Ayer and the whole host of logical positivists, *a poet is just like a metaphysician*. A metaphysical discussion is a closed door discussion and the same thing happens in the case of a poet. A poet is emotional, imaginary and creative. Therefore, the very content or matter a poet is thought of remained absence in the empirical world. The criterion of the principle of verification that has been adopted by the logical positivists stands against both metaphysicians as well as poets. According to the logical positivists, a sentence would be literally meaningful if it would either be completely verifiable or completely falsifiable by means of some observational data. Ayer says, "A sentence cannot be deemed literally meaningful unless it satisfies certain

⁵³Ayer, A. J., *Language, Truth and Logic*, London, Victor Gollancz LTD, 1936

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specified conditions.”⁵⁴ It seems clear that the language of poet and the language of metaphysician fail to fulfill the criteria of meaningfulness as given by the logical positivists. Therefore, just like the body of metaphysics, the body of poetic language would equally be meaningless because such language cannot be verified by means of observational data.

What we intend to say here is that the language that has been envisaged by the whole host of linguistic philosophers would certainly not be poetic even though they were non-committal regarding poetic language like logical positivists. However, it is appropriate to claim that the criterion of meaningfulness that has been proposed by different linguistic philosophers does not accommodate poetic language. Just think of the nature of ideal language that has been used by the semantists. The semantists in general are revisionists. They intend to revise language because of the ambiguity of the use of language. For them the vocabulary of ideal or formal language is proper name. A proper name either denotes or connotes an object. If this would be the very nature of language as favoured by the semantists then obviously we cannot accommodate poetic language within the domain of formal or ideal language. The same would be true in case of natural language as well. In fact poetic language as a distinctive aspect no other language can acquire. Our point of contention here is that poetic language in general has been neglected in the domain of linguistic philosophy while investigating the relationship between language and reality.

Considering the above philosophical perception of the very nature of language in general, what we can insist here is that Heideggerian nature of language *as the house of Being* is an attempt of reviving poetic language within the domain of philosophy of language or linguistic philosophy. Thus, Heideggerian metaphysical approach of language is unique in itself, because Heidegger approaches a kind of language which has been either rejected by the

⁵⁴ Ammerman, R.R., *Classics of Analytic Philosophy*, McGraw-Hill Publishing Company LTD., New York, 1965, Preface p.8

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previous analytic thinkers or which has not been incorporated in the domain of philosophy of language either in the form of ordinary language or in the form of ideal language. Our appraisal of poetic language is different from both ordinary and ideal language.

On the Way to Language:

The language, Heidegger envisages, is termed as “The Way to Language”. It is like the way or path that language makes as it traces out meaning. In this regard, Heidegger first sets out to question of the traditional understanding of the essence of language. It is very much the same picture that Wittgenstein intuits in his *Philosophical Investigations*. In the autobiographical description given by St. Augustin of his own process of learning language, Augustin says, “When they (my elders) named some object, and accordingly moved towards something, I saw this and I grasped that the thing was called by the sound they uttered when they meant to point it out. Their intention was shown by their bodily movements, as it were the natural language of all peoples: the expression of the face, the play of the eyes, the movements of other parts of the body, and the tone of voice which expresses our state of mind in seeking, having, rejecting, or avoiding something. Thus, as I heard words repeatedly used in their proper places in various sentences, I gradually learnt to understand what objects they signified; and after I had trained my mouth to form these signs, I used them to express my own desires.”⁵⁵. The significance of this passage is that a word or a sign stands for or represents a thing in virtue of that word or sign’s meaning. Each word means just one thing and it does so in virtue of a meaning that we can think of or understand. In this sense, language is the communication of meaning from one person to another in the package of a sign. To speak language is to feel dead signs with life. To speak language is to breathe air into the otherwise mute forms of signs.

⁵⁵ Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Philosophical Investigations*, translated by G.E.M. Anscombe, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1953, p.20.

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Heidegger was influenced with Augustinian position about Wittgenstein as cited above. Heidegger in his “The Letter on Humanism” draws attention to the traditional picture of language, where the sign stands for an object. It is also the sign for a concept or image in the speaker’s mind. The concept or mental image is a representation in the speaker’s mind or brain.

According to Heidegger, we can rethink language and meaning even from the outside of traditional picture. We rethink the essence of language in order to bring language as language to language. In order to bring the essence of language to itself, we have to speak in language its own essence. In this regard, Heidegger refers the words of the German poet Novalis: “Precisely what is peculiar to language – that it concerns itself purely with itself alone – no one knows.”⁵⁶. According to Heidegger, bringing language as language to language is just the way we will make our own way to language, that is, we place ourselves where we speak language in language. In this way we can bring our own essence. Our own essence is nothing but language. In fact, essence itself is language. Thus, Heidegger invents a new language and also invents new ways of using old words in order to bring language to itself to a new kind of consciousness of itself. For Heidegger, it is an explicit awareness of its own power of shaping world and revealing Being.

Nature of Language:

According to Heidegger, language is the house of Being. We do experience by means of language. When we experience, we experience with something, be it a thing, a person, or a God. This something perplexes us, strikes us, comes over us, transform us. In this regard, it can be said that experience is not our making. To say that one undergoes experience is to say that one ignores it, endures it, suffers it, and receives it. Experience is something transparent,

⁵⁶ Heidegger, Martin, *On the Way to Language*, translated by peter D. Hertz and Stambaugh, Newyork: Harper and Row, 1971, p.397.

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moving, dynamic, in the sense that it happens, comes and passes all times. Thus, following Heidegger, it can be said that to undergo an experience with language thus eventually leads us to assume that we are concerned of language by entering into it and submitting to it. Accordingly, language is relevant to philosophy, according to Heidegger, because man finds the proper abode of his experience in language. Language, in fact, touches the inner most nexus of our experience. Man can transform his experiences by means of language. This is made possible by virtue of making a relation to language.

It is a general opinion that language is the medium of communication. Nobody can deny it. In this direction one can speak our language. Accordingly, we cannot be closed to language except by speaking in terms of language even though we do exchange our thought with other by means of language. This does not, however, make sense to say that what we do communicate is authentic. Our relation to language is vague, obscure and almost speechless. According to Heidegger, every observation on the subject will at first sound, strange and incomprehensible. Perhaps this point of Heidegger may be similar to the *nirvikalpaka pratyaksa* of Naiyāyikas. One can, however, overcome such incomprehensibility just by making a habit of hearing only what we already understand. According to Heidegger, this would be true not only to the listeners; it would equally be true who tries to speak of language. In fact, this would allow us to become mindful of language and our relation to it. It makes sense to say that to undergo an experience with language is to gather information about language. But the point is that who would be the supplier of such information? Heidegger's answer, in this regard, is very specific. Heidegger says that linguists, philologist, psychologist and above all analytic philosophers would be the suppliers of this information. In this regard, Heidegger cites meta- language, super language.

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Heidegger, however, does not think that philosophical and scientific information about language is very similar to what one undergoes with language. Heidegger says, “In experiences which we undergo with language, language itself brings itself to language.”⁵⁷ However, in everyday speaking language does not bring itself to language but holds back because here any numbers of things are given voice in speaking. Here we are speaking about a set of facts, an occurrence, a question, a matter of concern and what not. Thus, in case of everyday speaking language one has to go ahead and speak a language in order to deal with something and negotiate something by speaking. In such a case, language does not speak itself as language.

The pertinent question that needs to be addressed at the juncture is: When does language speak itself as language? What sort of language is it? How does a language speak itself as language? According to Heidegger, language speaks itself as language. Language speaks as language when we cannot find the right word for something that concerns us, carries us a way, opposes or encourages us. In such a case, we leave *unspoken* that we have in mind without rightly giving a thought. In a situation like this language itself, Heidegger opines, has distinctly and ephemerally touched us with its essential Being (reality/ontology). When such unspoken issue is put into language, everything actually hinges on whether language gives or withholds the appropriate word. This is where the point of *creativity* comes into picture.

Language is Creative:

According to Heidegger, one has to create a suitable word which perhaps is not available in the ordinary or everyday language. Heidegger thinks that a poet is creative and only a poet can create something which is unspoken. A poet in his own way “to put into language the experience he undergoes with language.”⁵⁸

⁵⁷ Heidegger, Martin, *On the Way to Language*, op.cit. p.49

⁵⁸ Ibid., p.59

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In this regard, Heidegger mentions the name of the poet Stefan George. Stefan George sought to grasp the relationship of the poet to language which appeared in 1919 and was later included in the collection *Das Neue Reich*.

“Wonder or dream from distant land
I carried to my country’s strand

And waited till the twilit morn
Had found the name within her bourn –

Then I could grasp it close and strong
It blooms and shines now the front along...

Once I returned from happy sail
I had a prize so rich and frail,

She sought for long and tidings told:
“No like of this these depths enfold.”

And straight it vanished from my hand,
The treasure never graced my land...

So I renounced and sadly see:
Where word breaks off no thing may be.”⁵⁹

The first triad tells us about the power of the poet. He is able to bring home marvelous things and treasures seen in dream. It is through the name that the poet keeps hold of his vision unfolding itself by virtue of his retention. This can be made possible by virtue of poetic act. In contrast, the second triad speaks of an experience in which the poet brings for the purpose

⁵⁹ Heidegger, Martin, “The Nature of Language”, 1957, but I quoted it from *An Illustrated study by Walter Biemel*, translated by J.L.Mehta, R & K Paul, London and Henley, 1973, p. 153.

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of being given a name, what he calls it a jewel, a treasure. It is the jewel which makes the being of its bearer manifest.

Heidegger claims that with the absence of the word for it, the treasure disappears. The poet cannot retain it. A new mode of the word's being appears. The word can provide a name not merely for something that already is, "it is no longer just a name-giving grasp reaching for what is present and already represented."⁶⁰

The poem then ends with the verse:

So I renounced and sadly see:

Where word breaks off no thing may be.

The final line can be transformed into a statement, thus, "no thing is where the word breaks off."⁶¹ But how do we understand this conclusion? According to Heidegger what the poet learns to renounce is his formally cherished view regarding the relation of thing and word. If other contends that word avows itself to the poet as that which holds and sustains a thing in its being. The poet experiences himself as one who is entrusted with the word, who is its trustee. Here expression is given to a boundary experience for which no word is adequate. For which no one can find a name. In the mood of sadness, Heidegger discovers the mood of releasement into the nearness of what is withdrawn but at the same time held in reserve for an ordinary advent. This becomes clear in Heidegger's attitude towards metaphysics as the epoch of the oblivion of Being. These comments on language are not just incidentally problems to Heidegger, but his basic experience is gathering together and a chastened repetition of the question about Being occurs in them.

⁶⁰Ibid, p.155.

⁶¹Ibid., p.155.

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But what matters to Heidegger here is listening to the promise of language? Heidegger, as we noted above, observes that language must, in its own way “avow to us itself – its nature.”⁶² Once this happens, we become capable of understanding a thinking experience with language. According to Heidegger, experience with language consists in having a glimpse of the neighborhood of poetry and thinking, in our ability to establish ourselves in this neighborhood.

It has been reflected from the above observation that Heidegger’s interpretation is intended to show about language we find made in the realm of thought that has been composed in language. According to Heidegger, the essence or being of language “nowhere brings itself to word as the language of being.”⁶³ While speaking of language itself falls back, withdraws, in favour of what is said in it. This withdrawal might have its own ground in that language holds back its own origin and so denies its being to our usual notions. However, Heidegger here offers a conjecture as to why the essential nature of language denies itself to us. Heidegger in this regard claims that poetry and thinking have not been sought out in their proper habitat and neighborhood.

Heidegger, however, elsewhere has claimed that there may have something common between a poet and a thinker. What poets and thinkers have in common is the element of language. Even though we do not know how *element* is to be conceived and how it changes according to whether words are used poetically or as in thinking. However, from George poem as mentioned above, it has been revealed that we have reached what looked like the neighborhood of poetry and thinking. However, Heidegger now points out, something crucial is missing in this attempt, namely, a grasp of this neighborhood *as such*, the neighborhood in quest of which the interpretation started out.

⁶² Ibid., p.156

⁶³ Ibid., p.156

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Language is the house of Being because according to Heidegger, when we speak of language we already dwell in language. However, while interpreting the poem by George, Heidegger left as an open question in what sense the jewel is to be understood. Now he offers a suggestion. He says that the precious gem, for which the goddess is unable to find a word, is *nothing but the word itself*. This shows the limits of the poet. In the land of the poet, the word for the word cannot be found. The question then is: Can the word be achieved if we approach the matter from the side of thinking? For Heidegger, the word is not a thing. Accordingly, so long we look for it among things, we can never find it. The word is not the realm of entities; rather it is in a more pre-eminent sense than all things. In this regard, Heidegger says, "...we may never say of the word that it is, but rather that it gives..."⁶⁴ What the word actually confers is Being. This should not be understood, however, in the sense that the word generates the thing as God's thoughts originate all that is. Rather we must call back to find the concept of clearing in which all entities are able to appear without being themselves created by the clearing.

So far we are in search, after Heidegger, of the neighborhood of poetry and thinking altogether. We have, so far, arrived at the point seeing that it is out of language that their nearness can be grasped. According to Heidegger, for man is man only because he is granted the *promise of language, because he is needful to language, that he may speak it*. Our concern is the determination of man's proper nature. In this process we come upon language as the abode of man which as such remains hidden from man even though it is that which is closest to him. However, Heidegger opines that man suddenly recedes into the background and language comes to the forefront. We are at the very opposite pole of the concept

⁶⁴ Ibid., p.158

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according to which language is merely a means of communication. Heidegger farther contends that it is man who, in fact, appears here as the one used by language.

But the point is: In what way must we now understand language, if it is language that is the essential thing and man only serves it? Heidegger, in this regard, gives a specific answer. Heidegger says that the essential nature of language is to lie in “saying”. In order to give the guiding principle of the experience of language, Heidegger says, “The being of language: the language of being.”⁶⁵ Language belongs to being, which is the most distinctive property. But how are we to think of all moving, path generating being? In the later writings, Heidegger conceives it as the “fourfold”, as the four world-regions of earth, sky, man (mortals) and divinities, which in their interplay constitute the world. Thus, language is here understood as that on which the interplay of the four world regions is based. It is in this interplay that *nearness* comes about. For Heidegger, nearness and saying as letting appear constitute the essential mode of being of language. They are the same.

Thus, language as saying of the world’s fourfold, is no longer only such that we as speaking human beings are related to it in the sense of a nexus existing between man and language. Rather, Heidegger claims, *language is, as world moving saying, the relation of all relations. As the relation of all relations, language as a house of Being, relates, maintains, proffers and enriches the face-to-face encounter of the world’s region, holds and keeps them, in that it holds itself – saying – in reserve.*⁶⁶

Heidegger’s concept of Reality:

So far we have explained the nature of language after Heidegger. In this sequel we propose to explain the nature of reality after Heidegger. Heidegger understands reality in terms of *Being*. That is why, the only philosophical question that interests Heidegger is the question about

⁶⁵ Ibid., p.159

⁶⁶ Robert Mugerauer, *Heidegger and Homecoming*, University of Toronto Press, London, 2008, p. 402.

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Being (reality) and the truth of Being. Thus, Being for Heidegger is the ‘one star’ – the only one – that remains constant along the way. The word ‘Being’, the basic concept Heidegger’s philosophy is distinguished from the word ‘being’ which expresses a particular being which is the participle of the verb to be. According to Heidegger ‘Being’ will correspond to the German *Sein* and ‘being’ will correspond to the German *Seiendes*.

The problem of Being is the central problem to Heidegger, because all other problems are centered around with the same problem of Being approach differently and reveal in different aspects. In other words, they are concerned with different paths leading to the basic problem about Being. According to Heidegger, the history of philosophy is the history of the interpretations of the Being question. All philosophy in the West is metaphysical in nature and Being has been the subject of every metaphysical account of beings from Plato to Nietzsche. Thus, the concept of reality of Heidegger is metaphysical in nature.

But what does Being mean? In this regard, Heidegger says that what Being means has fallen into oblivion precisely because the difference between Being and beings which he calls ontological difference has been concealed. Heidegger often said, “the forgetfulness of Being is the forgetfulness of the difference between Being and beings.”⁶⁷ This difference was forgotten because of an ambiguity intrinsic in the expression commonly used to refer to beings as the subject matter of metaphysics. According to Heidegger, Being is everywhere reduced to the proportion of some being or other. Being is not a being though it is concealed in it as the Being of that very being. It is human thinking that unveils this Being.

Heidegger further contends that Being breaks forth as presence by which the being shows itself from itself. This experience of thinking leads to an understanding of the Being question.

⁶⁷ Heidegger, M., *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, translated by J.S.Churchill, Bloomington: Indiana university press, 1962, p.243

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Being is presence, the unending process of unveiling of Being from being. Being always reveals in a concealing manner.

In *Being and Time* Heidegger launches the investigation for Being with an analysis guided consistently, carefully and exhaustively towards the problem of Being. He continued his Being question in the post *Being and Time* works where he adopted profound approaches revealing Being in diverse contexts and aspects. As far as the Being question is concerned, Heidegger says that Being as being is always sought for in metaphysics. He has tried to understand being in the light of its Being. But how this very Being of being reveals itself in being has not been sufficiently investigated. It remains hidden because the difference between Being and being is forgotten by thinking Being as a being which throws being into beingness, itself comes to be considered as a being.

The question of Being of beings, Heidegger opines, is a twofold question, namely, (a) what is being in general? and (b) which one of the particular being is the highest being and how is it the highest? According to Heidegger, the twofoldness of the meaning of the question of the Being of being (*Seindes, Seienden*), i.e., of the question ‘what is being?’ accounts for the nature of onto-theological questioning. The metaphysical Being – question, therefore, according to Heidegger, is an onto-theological question. In this regard, Richardson⁶⁸ points out that it is in Plato’s metaphysics in the traditional sense takes its rise, for it is he who first conceives of thinking Being as a going “beyond” the beings to their being-ness, which he conceives as their what-ness, their *Idea*. However, unlike Plato and the Western tradition of metaphysics, Heidegger tries to think Being instead of the ‘beingness’ of beings. By questioning the nature of metaphysics Heidegger tries to *transcend metaphysics* and leads the

⁶⁸ Richardson, W.J., *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to thought*, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963, p. 104

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mind out of the subject-object level into the level of Being (pure object in Meinongian sense)⁶⁹, i.e., into a *trans-metaphysical level*.

Here we note a similarity between Heidegger and Meinong. Like Heidegger, Meinong also admitted pure object as a trans-metaphysical level. According to Meinong, there are three different levels of understanding of an object. These are real, ideal and pure. The table is a real object; the concept of the table is an ideal object and 'table-as-such' is a pure object. According to Meinong, the being of the table is metaphysical level. It deals with *being qua-being*. It is similar to what Heidegger terms as *subject-object level*. 'Table-as-such' is called pure object by Meinong. Such level is the outcome of transcending metaphysics (being qua-being) which is very similar to the term 'trans-metaphysical level' as used by Heidegger. Thus, as far as the understanding of the concept of Being, Heidegger holds the similar position of Meinong.

According to Heidegger, Being renders all beings possible. But what is Being? What meaning does it have? Even though Aristotle and Plato were struggling to find out suitable answers regarding the very question of being, but unlike the traditional metaphysics, Heidegger approached a different interpretation of Being. However Heidegger did not overlook the traditional interpretation of being and perhaps that is why, he referred *Plato's sophist*⁷⁰ in his book *Being and Time*.⁷¹

Plato understood being in terms of 'unity of being' and Aristotle's doctrine of being as a manifold of meanings of being is very similar to Plato. Heidegger revealed that even though a question of Being occupied an important position in the investigations of Plato and Aristotle, it was forgotten later on. Therefore, Heidegger attempted to reawaken and understanding of

⁶⁹ Das, Kantilal, "Meinong on Object, Existence and Ontological Commitment: A Critical Observation", *JICPR*, New Delhi, Vol. XXVII, 2010, pp. 121-124

⁷⁰ Plato, Seth Benardete (ed.), *Plato's Sophist*, University of Chicago Press, 1986.

⁷¹ Heidegger, M. Tr. Joan Stambaugh, *Being and Time: A Translation of Sein and Zeit*, Suny Press, 1996.

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the question of the meaning of Being in his *Being and Time*. In the first paragraph of *Being and Time* Heidegger speaks of the ‘*ontic and ontological priority of the Being question.*’ It has a twofold meaning. In one sense, it means that in philosophy the question about Being deserves priority about all other questions. In this regard, Heidegger says, “Being is the genuine theme, the only theme of philosophy.”⁷² Secondly, it also means that, as a question, the question about Being is the being par-excellence which must serve as the point of departure of the question about the *Being of beings*.

Thus, Heidegger approaches a different interpretation of Being (reality). His own understanding of Being actually transcends the sphere of traditional metaphysics. That means in order to think about Being, metaphysics has to be overcome, metaphysics has to be transcended. Thus the subject matter of Being is not about being-qua-being, rather it is the essence of man. Thus, in one sense, Heideggerian interpretation of Being is a *destruction* of the traditional interpretation of metaphysics. One should not interpret the term ‘destruction’ as mentioned above in terms of demolition of broken into parts. Rather it would be prudent to apprehend it in terms of ‘transcends’.

As a phenomenologist, Heidegger treated Being phenomenological perspective. Phenomenology, according to Heidegger, is “to let anything manifest itself in the very way it manifests itself from itself.”⁷³ This is the impartial approach to the things themselves. The other important sphere of Heideggerian phenomenology is its ontological dimension or ontological implication. According to Heidegger, phenomenology and ontology pertain to the one and the same philosophical discipline. Heidegger further contends that ontology is possible only as phenomenology. The very objective of phenomenological ontology,

⁷² Heidegger, M., *Die Grundprobleme der phänomenologie*, GA 24 (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1975), p. 15.

⁷³ Heidegger, M. *Being and Time*, op.cit. p.50.

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Heidegger claims, aims at *the very manifestation of Being itself. Revealing and concealing and concealing and revealing as it is.*

Accordingly, it can be said that the question of Being is fundamentally an ontological question, question concerning the Being of beings. As an ontological question of Being, Heidegger introduces the concept of *Dasein*, the There-being. Therefore, the fundamental enquiry at this juncture comes to its fullness when There-being achieves its authenticity. In this regard, Heidegger reveals an essential link between *thinking and opting, Dasein and Being.*

Dasein and Being and their relationship:

In *Being and Time* Heidegger claims that the discovery of Being (reality) is made possible by the right way of asking an authentic question. That means authenticity actually helps one to discover Being. But how do we come to the discovery of Being? In this regard, Heidegger says that the discovery of Being is made possible through the understanding of There-being (*Dasein*). For Heidegger *Dasein* is characterised by the potentiality of asking the Being question, by asking about the meaning of Being. *Dasein* from the point of view of its own way always has a relation of its Being. *Dasein* is privileged because *Da-sein* is *gifted with awareness* of its own Being. Therefore, he is the *Da* of *Sein*, the *Da* Being shines forth. Hence, *Dasein's* essence lies in its existence, in its 'drive-to-be' (*Zu-sein*). This is how one can distinguish *Dasein* from other beings as mere entities. Interestingly, for Heidegger the Being-of-beings is not something 'out there' all by itself, rather it implies a meaningful relatedness and the intelligible presentness of things too.

Heidegger draws an interesting relation both forward and backward between what is questioned (Being) and the questioning itself as mode of Being of a being (*Dasein*). In this regard, Heidegger in his "The way back into the ground of Metaphysics" says, "To

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characterize with single term both the involvement of Being in human nature and the essential relation of man to the openness (there) of Being as such, the name of 'being there' (*Dasein*) was chosen for that sphere of Being in which man as man stands."⁷⁴ In a nutshell, man as a questioning being is the way to the questioning of Being. Being, for Heidegger, is always Being as it enters into *Dasein's* understanding of Being. There is Being, Heidegger remarks, because this understood by *Dasein*. Thus, there is a horizontalism or parallelism between Being and *Dasein* because Being is always thought or projected in terms of *Dasein*. By *Dasein*, Heidegger actually means, the place of *the disclosure of Being, the openness of Being*.

What has been revealed from the above is that *Dasein* raises the question of Being, ask about Being. *Dasein* also is aware of and concerned about the very Being. Being is both ontically and ontologically prior to all other beings. Being is ontically prior because it is a being whose Being (*Sein*) has the determinate character of existence. It is also ontologically prior to all other beings because it is endowed with the privilege of understanding Being. For Heidegger, Being the *Da* (there) of its own *Sein* (Being). *Man is the Dasein*. Thus, for Heidegger, Being of *Dasein* is available only in a projected world. *Da* is the world itself because *Da* means 'there' *Da-sein* is the Being-in-the-world. Heidegger further contends that the essence of *Dasein* actually lies in *ek-sistence*. Heidegger makes use of the term *ek-sistence* in contrast to existence in order to point out the nature of man's existence. "It is the ecstatic 'standing-out' of man in the truth of Being"⁷⁵ Therefore, man's very existence is an *ek-sistence*, namely, *a going out of himself*. This going out signifies the fundamental character of *man's ek-sistence as openness to Being*. Thus, for Heidegger, Being offers itself to the openness of man and

⁷⁴ Heidegger, M., "The way back into the ground of Metaphysics" in *Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre* tr., W. Kaufmann (ed.), (NY: World- Meridian 1956), p. 213.

⁷⁵ Heidegger, M., "The Letter on Humanism" in *Basic Writings*, ed., D.F.Krell, New York: Harper Collins 1993, p. 228.

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only in this openness of man, in this *Da* of *Dasein* could Being essentialise itself as Being. The *ek-sist* means not only be what one is but also be the possibility of standing out into one's beyondness. According to Heidegger, the essence of man is to depend on Being. Being is never something fabricated by man. Rather Being produces man. Man cannot produce Being. Thus, in one sense man depends on Being: man stands within the relation of Being. In this sense, Being is prior to man and man in one sense a situation of receptivity. Man is above all *correspondence*.

Heidegger conceives the relationship between man and Being as a *summoning-hearing* relationship. Being is presence means it summons the essence of man.⁷⁶ That means in order to exist, man must carefully attend to the silent summoning of Being. Man is the preserver of the truth of Being and hence man is regarded as the shepherd of Being. In this sense, the essence of man lies in his openness to the address of Being. It is this openness man realises the 'thing' to be what it is. Heidegger understands openness in terms of "letting-lie-forth".

Is the relationship between Being and man a subject-object relation? Heidegger does not think so. If the relationship between Being and man is conceived as the subject-object relationship, then Being cannot transcend man. Being as coming-to-presence is a demand which summons and hails *Dasein* to its essence belongs to the summoning and evoking hail of Being. According to Heidegger, Being is fundamentally a lighting- process through which beings are lit up as what they 'are'.

Being and non-Being:

Is non-Being different from Being? Apparently, it seems to us that Being is different from non-Being, that is the negation of Being leads to non-being. Heidegger elsewhere interprets not-being in terms of 'Nothing'. Nothing is said to be nothing precisely because it is 'no-

⁷⁶ Vadakethala, F.J., *Discovery of Being*, Bangalore: Dharmaram Publications 1970, p. 69.

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thing'. Being is not a being, not the collection of beings. Rather Being is 'Non-being'. Thus, Heidegger understood Being in its contrast to Non-Being. Heidegger claims that every time Being is questioned, Nothing also is questioned with it.

The question then is: Why are there beings rather than Nothing? Reflecting upon Heidegger, Richardson commends, "Non-being is not an Absolute Nothing but Being itself... Non-being as the other to beings is the veil of Being."⁷⁷ For Heidegger, *Nothing* is not something apart from beings nor it can be regarded as the 'counter-concept' to the Being but rather belongs to the essence of the Being. Nothing, for Heidegger, is the same as Being itself. Nothing is the Being of beings, the negating of the Nothing come to pass. Indeed by Nothing Heidegger does not mean the simple denial of what is, the negation of all beings, but Being itself. Thus, the negating of the Nothing is the Being of beings. Nothing is Being as every being would fall into beinglessness, for a being never is without Being. Heidegger says Being is no way a being, but is rather not-a-being, it can only take place as nothingness in the reality. Being and nothingness belong together and one cannot be outside of other. Heidegger does not understand nothingness just negated something. For Heidegger, nothingness is prior to 'no' and the negation. In this sense, nothingness cannot be regarded as non-real. Nothingness is real as it belongs to the event of Being.

Heidegger farther contends that anxiety reveals Nothing. The world is no-thing and hence appears itself as Nothing. It is the world in which *Dasein* has to find its meaningful existence. To exist authentically, *Dasein* should understand the true nature of Being and to understand the true nature of Being, *Dasein* has to understand itself. In anxiety we have the real experience of Being. Nothing is only an attempt to understand Being through its opposite. Thus, while exploring the trans-metaphysical reality, Heidegger gives much emphasis on the

⁷⁷ Richardson, W.J., *Phenomenology to Thought*, Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963, p. 474.

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negativity of Being and in this connection he claims that the ontological meaning of Non-being implies that it can also be called Being. Heidegger understands Being not just as the Being of beings, but he also understands it as somewhat antecedent, prior to all beings. Thus, in the deeper sense Heidegger conceives Being both its negative as well as positive aspect. When Heidegger speaks about Being as the process of non-concealment, he takes both the positive and negative aspects of this process as a unity. According to Richardson, Being as the process of non-concealment is that this permits beings to become non-concealed. To think Being in its truth, then is to think it in terms of both positivity and negativity at once. Therefore, Heidegger's all important observation is that in the non-concealment of the Being, non-Being truth occurs.

Being and the Pursuit of Truth:

Just like Being and non-being Heidegger also enquires truth as the central theme of Being. When delving into the question of the truth of Being, Heidegger reveals a correspondence between *intellectus* and *res*. To reveal the truth of Being is to establish the closeness of Being and *Dasein*. Accordingly, the problem of truth and Being is one of the most important themes of his thought. In the traditional sense, truth is the correspondence between the intellect and the thing i.e. the approximation of the thing to the intellect. Truth means the *conformity of the knowledge to the thing*. To say that truth means the conformity of things to knowledge is to understand truth in the propositional sense; whereas to interpret truth as the conformity of knowledge is to interpret truth in the ontological sense. Heidegger uses the Greek term *orthotes* (truth as exactness) to refer to the notion of truth as propositional correctness to the already opened. In this sense, truth is conceived in the sense of non-concealment. *Dasein*, the 'there' of Being, the locus of the manifestation and concealment of the whole. In *Being and Time* Heidegger remarks that the Greek word *Aletheia* literally means "to pluck something

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out of its concealment, to make manifest or reveal.⁷⁸ It means the emergence into the open, a path, a gate through which things are brought into light. Thus, for Heidegger, Being true means Being unconcealed or unveiled. Being itself gives itself in its openness.

According to Kockelmans, when Heidegger uses the expression ‘the meaning of Being’, the word ‘meaning’ (*Sinn*) means the non-concealment by which Being appears as itself. In this sense, ‘the meaning of Being’ and ‘the truth of Being’ have the same meaning. Being is the process of truth brought-to-pass by the nature of man.

What we have observed above after Heidegger is that he conceives truth in the radical sense. While narrating the concept of truth of Heidegger, Richardson calls this as the ‘not’ character of Being ‘negativity’ and the manifestive power that shines forth in beings as beings positivity. According to Richardson, when we can sense the fusion of positivity and negativity into the unity of a single process, we begin to grasp what Heidegger understands by Being as the process of truth. Heidegger says, “... it hides itself in this (disclosure) and conceals itself (as) thus hiding.”⁷⁹ Heidegger continues by saying that concealing by Being of its own concealment is the ‘mystery’ of Being. In this process truth of Being comes-to-presence. Thus, in a sense the self-illuminating rise of Being comes-to-pass in such a way that Being itself actually hides in the background. More importantly, careful observation reveals that the truth of Being as envisaged by Heidegger is not something fixed, static, rather it is to be achieved and it comes to pass little by little. Accordingly, Being in unconcealment as truth presents itself in time.

Thus, the question of truth of Being is linked with time. For Heidegger, Being and Time and Time and Being are extremely elusive. The relationship between Time and Being is highly important. For Heidegger, Being (reality) is not a thing, not itself a being. Accordingly, one

⁷⁸ Heidegger, M., *Being and Time*, translated by J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, New York: Harper & Row, 1962, p.262.

⁷⁹Ibid., p.244.

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cannot say “Being is...”. Like Being, time is not a thing either. Ordinarily we claim that everything has its time but this is not some other thing that it has. Time is an infinite series of ‘nows’. The first consists of the ‘nows’ so as to the present as well as future. However, owing to fixing the relation between Time and Being, Heidegger gives importance on the *notion of presence*. For Heidegger, Being means the same as presencing.⁸⁰ Indeed, presence speaks of the present. Being is determined by time and vice-versa. That is where the relevance of the book entitled *Being and Time* lies. According to Heidegger, Being and Time actually reciprocal terms based on symmetric relation in the sense that Being determines time and time determines Being. As one can be determined by other, one cannot be former than the other. While evaluating and commenting on Heidegger on this point, Macquarrie in his book *Heidegger and Christianity*⁸¹ opines that to understand time not a thing, but as the medium in which things arise and pass away and in turn time itself passes away. In another sense, only the thing in time passes away while time remains as time.

Heidegger wanted to bring up for thought with respect to time which belongs to the sense of Being. For Heidegger, There-being is constantly coming to Being i.e. to itself. This coming of There-being to itself, is There beings’ ‘coming’, i.e. its future. When Heidegger speaks of Being and Time, this does not mean something which stands alongside Being. Being and Time are rather intertwined that one can be understood on the basis of other. Time is rather a primordial movement which Being itself, releases beings from out of itself.

We think that Heideggerian concept of Being and Time should be conceived in terms of world what Heidegger terms as “Being-in-the-world” describes the way of ‘to be’ of a human being. There is no question of doubt that the metaphysical standpoint of Heidegger is marked by the question of Being-in-the-world. It is revealed that the structure of Being in the world

⁸⁰ Heidegger, M., *On Time and Being*, translated by J. Stambaugh, New York: Harper & Row, 1972, p.2.

⁸¹ Macquarrie, J., *Heidegger and Christianity: The Hensley Henson Lectures 1993-94*, Continuum, 1999.

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belongs to the definition of the Being of the human being. Heidegger interpreted and conceived the world in terms of human *existence*. The term 'world' is understood not as the manifestation of a divine creative presence but as a "network of meanings", as a "system of total meaningfulness."⁸²

In Western Philosophy and particularly in the domain of linguistic philosophy we have a different interpretation of the term 'world'. According to Locke, the world is the totality of experience. According to Strawson, the world is the totality of particulars. Strawson interprets particular at par with object. Thus, it can be said, in other words, that the world is the totality of things or objects. Interestingly, Heidegger gives a different interpretation of the term 'world' which is unlike to the traditional interpretation of the term world. Heidegger understands world in terms of *Dasein* and Being. According to Heidegger *Dasein* is not just another item in the world designated by the 'person'. *Dasein* is the 'Being-in-the-world'. The multitude of things contained in the world is seen and understood in the context of world, within which they are connected in a network with each other and with *Dasein*. For Heidegger, *things are seen by Dasein* as ready-to-hand, available for the use by *Dasein* in its dealings with *world*. Thus, the things of the world becomes for *Dasein equipment* for leaving. That is why, Heidegger elsewhere remarks that the world is the totality of equipment. The world is a world of work where things are seen not as objects but are items of equipment for *Dasein's* task.

Heidegger, in this regard, brings the concept of hammer. Hammer we see it as a piece of equipment for hammering in human activities like building and furnishing. Things are ready-to-hand in the sense that we incorporate them into our activities. Something which merely confronts to us as an object is said to be present-at-hand, but increasingly we bring even such

⁸² Heidegger, M., *Being and Time*, op.cit. section 14.

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things into the realm of equipment. Thus, confining his analysis to ‘everyday’ existence, Heidegger speaks of the world as the *workshop* what he eventually attributed as being-in-the-world. Thus, in one sense, it can be said that human being is destined to the world and to itself. It transcends to the world as its ultimate meaning.

Thus, Heidegger’s concept of the world paves the way for a new understanding of the world which gets away from the same what exploitative attitude to the world expounded in *Being and Time*. The new view is ‘fourfold’. The fourfold means that everything has a fourfold reference or has the *four dimensions of being* which together constitutes the meaning of that thing. The four dimensions are: earth, sky, mortals and gods. In this regard, Heidegger chooses the example of a wine-jug to elucidate what he means by the term fourfold. The jug made of clay refers to earth. It refers to the sky from which both sun shine and rain come to swell and ripen the grapes used for making wine. It refers to the humans, the skilled craftsman who has given to it the form. The word ‘gods’ thus stands for what might be called a ‘divine factor’ in all reality, something holy in which everything participates.

Even though Heidegger thinks that *Dasein* and Being are intimately associated or related to each other but Being has primacy over the beings and over *Dasein* because Heidegger in his “The Letter on Humanism” tells us that thinking is the thinking of Being. Thinking is of Being is as much as thinking. Being itself proceeds over thinking and hence over the essence of humanity, i.e., over its relation to Being. By giving due attention ‘*ek-sistence*’ rather than ‘existence’, Heidegger stressing that it denotes a ‘standing out into the truth of Being’. Heidegger farther contends that Being needs thinking for its self-manifestation. Being is the Being which reveals itself in and through human thought. In this regard, Being *needs and uses man*.

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According to Heidegger, the essence of philosophy is questioning and thinking of Being. Philosophy is all about of thinking as the thinking of Being. Here Heidegger advocates *meditative thinking* rather than representational thinking. Representational thinking is related to metaphysics and hence is not essential thinking. Only meditative thinking is essential not on beings but on the truth of Being itself. The thinking of Being is also a thinking - original thinking. Original thinking is the echo of Being's favour. Heidegger investigates Being not as a philosopher but as a creative thinker. Heidegger believes that philosophical thinking has more in common with the thinking of the poet than it has with the thinking of the scientist. A poet is concerned to speak the truth, i.e., to uncover Being. Poet as a creative thinker utters Being. The poet names the holy.

Careful study, however, would reflect that Heidegger takes different approaches in his *Being and Time* and his later works regarding Being. In fact, Heidegger started with the concept of being and then attempted to transcend from being to Being. This change of emphasis from 'There' to Being could be regarded as the consequence of the meditative experiencing of the coming about the ontological difference and of the deepening of the question of Being on Heidegger's way. In fact, Heidegger referred to the change as a 'turn' and a 'completion' of the questioning that had begun with *Being and Time*. In *Being and Time* Heidegger mainly focuses 'man in relation to Being'. However, he characterises the turn as an approach to "Being and its truth in relation to man"⁸³. Thus, in a sense a later work of Heidegger brings new ideas, i.e., the idea of "Being and its truth in relation to man". Moreover, in his early thinking Heidegger conceives the world as an *instrumental system* where things lie ready-to-hand of the use of the *Dasein* in everyday concerns. But in the later writings he conceives the world *that has a dignity in its own right*. In his earlier writings Heidegger conceives things

⁸³ Waelhens, A.De. "Reflections on Heidegger's Development: Apropos of a Recent Book," *International Philosophical Quarterly*, 5 (1965), pp. 475-502.

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just as 'equipments'. He elsewhere remarks that reality is the totality of equipments. However in his later writings he gives us a different interpretation. Here he thinks that things are not just 'equipment' but are constituted by *fourfold of earth and sky, mortals and gods*.

It seems clear to us that the concept of reality of Heidegger takes different interpretations in his early and later works. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger claims that man plays the leading role in the relationship between Being and man; whereas in the later works, he thinks the other way round. Here he tells us that Being itself holds the primacy in its own self-disclosure. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger confesses that the total meaningfulness of the world is projected by *Dasein* and also stated that only as long as *Dasein* is, 'there Being', and only as long as *Dasein* is, 'is there' truth. But in his later works, he made it clear that *the Da* itself is thrown and that it is thrown by Being itself. In narrating the two phases of work of Heidegger, Lowith⁸⁴ concludes that Heidegger has subscribed not to one but two grounds in the course of his work. The first is *Dasein*, on the basis of which 'there is' Being. The second is Being itself, on the basis of which there is *Dasein*.

Nature of Being (Reality):

We have seen that Being (reality) for Heidegger is fundamentally a lighting process, by which beings are lit up as what they 'are'. Among them there is a domain where this lighting up process takes place. This is the *There of Being*. It is a process of *coming-to-pass* and Being maintains this initiative. For the *there* is 'thrown' and it is Being that does the 'throwing'.⁸⁵ Thus, the coming-to-pass takes place for the sake of Being and it does not depend on *There* but on the spontaneity of Being which *e-mits* itself among beings. Thus, e-mitted by Being is what makes history possible. History is that process by which being comes-to-pass by self-mittens.

⁸⁴ Lowith, Karl (9th January, 1897 – 26th May, 1973) was a German Philosopher, a student of Husserl and Heidegger.

⁸⁵ Heidegger, M., "The Letter on Humanism" in *Basic Writings, op.cit.* p. 234.

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In *Being and Time* i.e., the earlier work of Heidegger, Being appears as the *Being of beings*, whereas in the later work, Heidegger begins to place the stress on the coming-to-pass of the truth. He then maintains that Being is the Being of beings, in that Being is that by which being share, and Being is drawn towards being in which it must emerge in order that it be itself. Unlike *Being and Time*, Heidegger in his later works mainly focuses directly on the ontological difference between thought and the Being of beings, expressing that Being means Being of beings and beings mean what they are in terms of their Being.⁸⁶ Heidegger opines that Being can be thought by itself, independent of the beings. In this regard, Heidegger remarks, “It pertains to the truth of Being and Being indeed comes-to-presence without beings...”⁸⁷ Being is nothing but the Being of beings. Being never comes to presence without beings. Thus, according to Richardson, the Being-process of Heidegger is the emergence of beings. Being must be thought for itself in order to comprehend *the ontological difference*. Being can never be by itself. That means Being cannot be without beings.

Heidegger farther contends that Being must not be understood as something static, fixed, rather it is process, a clearing process by which beings are lighted up. This light is neither man nor the beings rather it is the ‘between’. Moreover, Being is not an existing quality of beings, nor can Being be conceived and established objectively. Rather Being is something non-entity that gives every entity the warrant to be. In his essay *Discourse on Thinking*, Heidegger uses the term *the open* to refer to Being. Here Being is understood as the open domain where all beings gathers together. Thus, Being here is understood primarily as the gathering process what Heidegger termed it as *logos*, the ‘expanse’. It is the open domain where beings gather together.

⁸⁶ Heidegger,M., *What is Called Thinking?*,tr., F.D.Wieck & J.G.Gray, New York: Harper & Row, 1968, pp. 226-227.

⁸⁷Heidegger.M, *Existence and Being*, Henry Regnery Company, Chicago, 1949, p.354.

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Elsewhere Heidegger understands Being *as a sphere*, as a process of coming-to-presence in all beings which is everywhere the same. Within this process beings can come to presence. In answering to the question: What is Being?, Heidegger replies, 'It is It itself'. He farther continues: "Being that is not God, and not a cosmic ground. Being is farther than all beings and is yet nearer to man than every being, be it a rock, a beast, a work of art, a machine, be it an angel or God. Being is the nearest, yet the near remains farthest from man."⁸⁸

Let us explain in what sense Being is nearest to man and in what sense Being is farthest from man. According to Heidegger, Being is nearest to man because it lets him be what he is and makes it possible for him to enter into comportsment with beings. On the other hand, Being is farthest from man in so far as it is itself not a being. In so far as man is structured in such a way that he can deal directly only with being. Thus, for Heidegger, Being is the mystery, because Being encompasses all beings just as a domain of openness encompasses what is found within it. This domain is not, of course, 'space' but a dimension out of which even space and time themselves come-to-presence. Being is the *domain of openness*. It is the lighting-process by which beings are lighted up. Being at once, 'in' man as 'in' every entity. According to Heidegger, man belongs to Being as its own. He is 'released' into Being. Being appropriates into itself whose proper task is to attend to it.⁸⁹ Even Heidegger elsewhere conceives Being as an event, a process of unveiling while it lets-be-present, namely, beings. In this sense, Being is a gift of the 'It gives' and that Being belongs to giving. 'It gives Being' means that there is presence, that *Dasein* is brought into the clearing. In this regard, Macquarrie compares Heidegger's concept of Being with Christian's concept of God. According to Macquarrie, in Christian theology, God is love. In Heidegger, 'It gives' as an act of giving or donation. The act of giving is also an act of self-giving and so not different in

⁸⁸ Heidegger, M., *Poetry, Language and Thought*, tr., A. Hofstadter, New York: Harper & Row, 1971, p. 123.

⁸⁹ Heidegger, M., *On Time and Being*, op.cit. p.141.

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any major respect from love.⁹⁰ Being itself is self-giving. The term ‘gives’ means the *essence of Being* which in turn means *granting its truth*. According to Heidegger, the self-giving into the open, is Being itself. In this sense, Being is not the product of man or *Dasein*, and that “man is not the lord of the beings, but the Shepherd of Being”.⁹¹

It seems clear that by considering or conceiving man as the shepherd of Being, Heidegger denies the modern anthropocentric standpoint that man is the measure or the master of the world. Being designates an event, a coming-to-pass, by which Being ‘sends’ itself into man affirming its own primacy. The truth of Being comes-to-pass in singular ways and each self-manifestation of Being in beings has the character of an *Ereignis*, an appropriating event, a binding process between Being and beings. It weaves Being, man, things and world together into an articulated and textured whole. It is a binding process through which man can reveal his essence. In this sense, *Ereignis* is an inter belonging of Being and man, as “the belonging together of call and obedience.”⁹² Being belongs as much to us as we belong to it. Since, “Being itself belongs to us; for only in us can it essence, i.e., presence as being.”⁹³ Being as an openness and truth reveals itself in its meaning. Thus, in a sense *Ereignis* determines the meaning of Being itself. It is a key concept of thought like the Greek word *logos* or the Chinese word *tao*.

While enquiring the ground of Being, Heidegger investigates its fundamental realm in many different ways. In this regard, he uses Leibnitz principle in tackling the problem. Heidegger thinks that the Leibnitzian principle is the basic principle of all principles. It is not a mere principle of being but also a principle of Being. Heidegger goes on to show that Being and

⁹⁰ Macquarrie, J., *Heidegger and Christianity*, London: SCM press 1994, p.99.

⁹¹ Heidegger, M., “*The Letter on Humanism*”, op.cit. p.234.

⁹² Heidegger, M., *The Question of Being*, tr., W. Kluback & J.T. Wilde, London: Vision Press, 1974, p. 77.

⁹³ Heidegger, M., *Identity and Difference*, tr., J. Stambaugh, New York: Harper & Row, 1974, p. 33.

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ground pertain to each other and thereby concludes “Being and ground: the same.”⁹⁴ Even though Heidegger reveals closeness between *Dasein* and Being but in his later works he gradually gives primacy Being over *Dasein*. In this regard, he says, it is not *Dasein* who invents the concept of Being, but rather Being that thinks in *Dasein*. In his postscript it is said, “Being may be without the beings, but never the beings without Being.”⁹⁵ However, Richardson in this regard in his *Phenomenology to Thought* disagrees with Heidegger. According to Richardson, Being needs the beings just as the beings need Being. While Being is ‘dispensationally’ identical with ground in itself it is groundless. Because every form of grounding would reduce Being to some kind of being. According to Heidegger, the true ‘ground’ of human existence is Being itself. In this sense, man is up rooted if he is pre-occupied with beings. He will arrive at a ground which is Being itself. In this way, we all human beings will attain a new way of thinking which is not confine to ‘giving reasons’. Heidegger in his *Der Satz Vom Grund*⁹⁶ tells us that Being and ground are to be understood in terms of one another. Being and ground belong together. In this sense, ground receives its essence out of its belonging together with Being as Being. Conversely, Being as Being holds sway out of the essence of ground.

Relationship between Language and Reality:

So far we have explained the nature of reality (Being) as well as the nature of language after Heidegger. In this section we propose to develop the relationship between language and reality after Heidegger. According to Heidegger, Being (reality) and language are intimately interrelated with each other. Being, for Heidegger, is always Being as it enters into *Dasein*’s understanding of Being. Being the *Da* (there) of *Sein* (Being) man is the *Dasein*. Man’s *ek-sistence* is *ek-static* openness to Being. This *ek-static* standing of *Dasein* is also a standing

⁹⁴ Heidegger, M., *Der Satz Vom Grund*, Pfullingen: Neske, 1957, p. 90.

⁹⁵ Richardson, W.J., *Phenomenology to Thought*, op.cit. pp. 562-565.

⁹⁶ Heidegger, M., *Der Satz Vom Grund*, Pfullingen: Neske 1957.

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out in the truth of Being. *Dasein* is the place of the truth of Being, the openness of Being, “the standing in the lighting process of Being.”⁹⁷ The human being dwells in the light of Being; the lighting process (Being) “grants the nearness to Being”.⁹⁸

Heidegger’s analysis of There-being was to serve the purpose of bringing to light Being which illumines beings. The ‘There’ of There-being only in the clearing, There-being transcends toward Being. Moreover, There-being and Being stand in a reciprocal relation. Being conceals and reveals itself in the world as what Heidegger calls man the ‘shepherd of Being’, he wants to indicate the special relation There-being has to Being.

However, Heidegger has developed his understanding of the nature of language in relation to his philosophical problematic of the question of Being. Language is related to reality in the sense that “Language is the clearing-and-concealing advent of Being itself.”⁹⁹ Language becomes the concrete presence of Being rather than mere articulation. Heideggerian language, we think, is not a separate entity like the pragmatists. While developing the referential theory of meaning it has been asserted that there must be a referential connection between the language and what it refers to. This clearly suggests that language and reality are separated from each other. However, unlike the semantists, Heidegger thinks the other way round. According to Heidegger, language is the house of Being i.e. Being lives within language, reveals by means of language and inseparated from language. In this sense, Heidegger asserts that *language becomes the concrete essence of Being rather than mere articulation.*

Heidegger further contends that language is “the foundation of human being.”¹⁰⁰ The essential being of language is the saying as that which shows. The showing of Saying takes

⁹⁷Heidegger, M., “The Letter on Humanism”, in *Basic Writings*, op.cit. p. 229.

⁹⁸Ibid., p.223.

⁹⁹Ibid., p.230.

¹⁰⁰Ibid., p.230.

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place when language breaks into speech. It is language itself which reaches into the regions of presencing and lets what comes to presence appear and disappear. According to Heidegger, the primal Saying of language is prior to all human speech. It is a monologue.¹⁰¹ This monologue characterizes as 'stillness'. Language needs a use the speaking of human in order to bring the primal saying to expression. Man belonging to Saying listens to it and its word and brings what it hears correspondingly into human-sounding words. Thus, language, for Heidegger, is attentive to the clearing of Being whenever it inserts it Saying into language. Thinking acts to the extent that it 'brings Being to language'. In this way the relationship between language and reality is made possible. In this regard, Heidegger says in his *On the Way to Language*, "language as Saying is the mode of appropriation."¹⁰²

According to Heidegger, language and reality are related with each other because the fundamental role of language is not "the means to portray what already lies before us," but rather language "grants presence- i.e. Being - wherein something appears as existent."¹⁰³ Since language is 'the house of Being,' one reaches Being (reality) by constantly going through this house. Metaphorically, it can be said that whenever we go to the well or walk through the wood, we are always already going through the word 'fountain' and the word 'wood', even though we are not saying these words or thinking of anything linguistic. In saying this, Heidegger means that language is correlative with experience of the world. Language and the world exist only when words exist. Language is that mode of the Being of man which permits him to be open to the beings that relate themselves to him. Heidegger understands language not only as a mere tool like the semantics rather language, for

¹⁰¹ Heidegger, M., *On the Way to Language*, op.cit., p. 134.

¹⁰² Ibid., p.135.

¹⁰³ Heidegger, M., *On the Way to Language*, op.cit. p. 146.

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Heidegger, first grants the possibility in general to stand in the “midst of the openness of beings.”¹⁰⁴

It seems clear from the above that Heidegger conceives that language and reality are inseparable. In this regard, Heidegger says that *thinking and language* are inseparable. The term ‘thinking’ is a part of reality or Being. We always, Heidegger opines, find ourselves in the midst of language what he terms as ‘language is the house of Being.’ We are attuned to language as reality rather than as a surrogate of reality. That means in Heideggerian sense there is *mutual inclusivity* or *mutual inclusiveness* between language and reality. Language is not something that can be used reality extra-linguistically; rather language is a house, a home, a locus where reality belongs to. Thus, to think of language, according to Heidegger, is to think of reality. Language makes possible man to think. It is by means of the possession of language that man is not close of from that which reveals itself but can come under influence and illumination.

It is also important to observe here, after Heidegger, that verbal constructions are in a position to communicate states of being is not an indication that communication is the basic function of language. The communicative function of language is a result of the fact that *Being reveals itself in language*. As Being reveals itself in language, language is, therefore, the ground in which the Being of man is founded. In this regard, Heidegger quotes Holderlin to the effect that man is a conversation. Here Heidegger makes a direct connection between language and Being according to which man is no longer to be thought of as disposing of language as he wills. Thinking accomplishes the relation of Being to the essence of man. Thinking brings the relation to Being solely as something handed over to it from Being. Accordingly, we can say, after Heidegger, that such offering consists in the fact that in

¹⁰⁴ Heidegger, M. “Holderlin and the Essence of Poetry”, in *Existence and Being, op.cit.*, p. 276.

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thinking Being comes to language. In this sense, Heidegger makes the celebrated remark that 'language is the house of Being'.

Language, according to Heidegger, is the house of Being because in language man dwells. Those who think and those who create with words are *the guardians of this home*. Thus in a sense Being is the owner of language. Being as the owner of language must take care of language (home). Without Being there is no language just like without the occupants there is no house in the material world. Without language Being is homeless. Being is meaningless without language because in such a case Being cannot find the way to open up. Thus, both language and Being (reality) are inseparable with each other and one cannot think of by forfeiting the other. Without Being language is empty, silence because there is no guardian of language. Without language Being cannot think. Being without language is homeless.

This guardianship accomplishes the manifestation of Being in so far as it brings the manifestation to language and maintain it in language through its speech. Being has the primacy over thought simply because it gives rise to it. In this regard, Heidegger in his "The Letter on Humanism" says, "Said plainly, thinking is the thinking of Being."¹⁰⁵ Thinking is of Being is as much as thinking, coming to pass from Being. At the same time thinking is of Being in so far as thinking belonging to Being, listens to Being. Accordingly, it makes sense to say that thought belongs to Being, for it is brought about by Being. For Heidegger thought attends to Being because it comes about in There-being. Thus, we observe a kinship relationship between language and reality after Heidegger.

Heidegger frequently speaks of the destiny of Being. For Heidegger, Being is *the process by means of which finite beings emerge from concealment*. However, in the process of thinking the Being, Heidegger seems to move towards mysticism. He has made his position clear that

¹⁰⁵ Heidegger, M., "The Letter on Humanism" in *Basic Writings*, op.cit. p.220.

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as a philosopher he is not concerned with religious problems. The only way to gain access to Being itself is to let Being be and to let it addressment. Being can be predicted of everything that is. This is the result of the all-pervasive character of Being. According to Heidegger, all things are and can be Being and a form of Being. Accordingly, they are unified by that which is common to all of them, that they are Being. It serves as a unifying aspect of everything. In this sense, Being constitutes the unity of everything. That is the question of Being amounts at the same time to a quest for a way of thought that can redeem our humanity by overcoming the oblivion of Being and also enable us to break the omnipotence of technology and we live in the world as truly our home, in the “neighborhood” of Being.

Language and Reality: A Comparative Study between Heidegger and Bhartṛhari

So far we have examined and explicated the nature of language and the nature of reality after Heidegger. We think Heidegger’s interpretation of language and reality is revolutionary in the sense that he offers us a sort of language and reality which remained susceptible to the whole host of semantists. The language Heidegger has chosen is poetic in nature and the very distinctive feature of such language is that it is creative in nature. Likewise, we have a different perception of reality in Heidegger. The nature of reality is metaphysical or ontological. It is metaphysical or ontological in the sense that it is associated with the *question of being*. Thus, from Heidegger’s point of view we can say that language matters to philosophy because language appears as the *house of Being*. More succinctly, it can be said that language matters to philosophy because language reveals reality or ontology for us.

In this section we propose to make a comparative study between Heidegger and Bhartṛhari. Interestingly, Martin Heidegger in the West and Bhartṛhari in the East have attempted to revive the relevance of metaphysical or ontological reality by means of language. Reality, for Heidegger, is Being and language, for Heidegger, is poetic in nature. Reality, for Bhartṛhari,

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is *Brahman* and language for Bharṭṛhari is *Śabda*. For both, the question of Being is essentially interwoven into the experience of the question of language. They equally contend that there is no philosophy of Being without a philosophy of language. Thus, in a sense to talk about or to think of Being is at par with to think of language. The experience of the truth of one is equally the same experience of the truth of the other. According to Bharṭṛhari, language is the medium of self-expression of the ultimate Reality communicated through all meaning-bearing words. It leads us across external appearance to the core of reality. Language is the covers everything what there is . Real or reality, according to Bharṭṛhari, is a gleaming Truth that needs to be re-discovered by every speaker and in every speech. Speech or *Śabda* is not merely a means to a truth or reality; rather it is the *Truth and Reality*. This awareness eventually leads one to the realization of the meaningfulness of Being.

We find the same philosophical position in Heidegger as well. Like Bharṭṛhari, Heidegger conceives language not as a human creation, but as a *saturating presence of Being* on the finite human being. He gives language an essential place in the structure of Being. For Heidegger, Being speaks to man. It hinges on the deep connection that language is alleged to provide between Being and being. Thus, careful study would reflect that the basic theme of Being and language as comprehended by Bharṭṛhari and Heidegger would remain almost the same.

While developing the relationship between language and reality both Heidegger and Bharṭṛhari have emphasized not only on the metaphysical reality but they also have conceived that language and reality are same. Each of them has agreed that even though language reveals reality but *language is reality* and *reality is language*. Language and reality are not separate entities. The *Śabdabrahman* of Bharṭṛhari is a case in point. Similar to this, Heidegger remarks that ‘language is the house of Being’. Here we make an East-West

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comparative study of the relationship between language and reality with reference to Heidegger and Bhartrhari.

What then is language according to Bhartrhari? By language, he means *Śabda* (word). He then finds a sort of identity between *Śabda and Brahman*. For him, Brahman is the essence, inner meaning or *sphoṭa* of every word what Bhartrhari termed as *Śabdatattva* (word-essence), an underlying unity beneath everything and pervading everywhere. It is considered the Supreme Reality. This Supreme Reality is one, non-dual. Like Bhartrhari, the only philosophical question that interests Heidegger is the question about Being and its truth. It is 'one star', non-dual, in the sense of Bhartrhari, that remains constant along the way. Like the Supreme-Reality, Being of Heidegger is pervading everywhere. Being is not a being though it is *concealed* in it as the Being of that very being. Being is divulges through the process of human thinking. As a result of that Being breaks forth as presence by which the being shows itself from itself. In short, Being is presence, the unending process of unveiling of Being from being. The question of Being is the question of Metaphysics because here one can understand being in the light of Being. On the basis of above discussion, we may spell out the similarities between Heidegger and Bhartrhari.

The important similarities between Heidegger and Bhartrhari are as follows:

- (a) Each of them has engaged in showing the relevance of metaphysical or ontological reality that has been completely forfeited by the semantists as well as the pragmatists. The semantic school in general was in favour of linguistic revision and instead of natural language; it prefers ideal or artificial language. Likewise, reality for them is external and the language is used to know about reality externally. Again, the language for pragmatists is ordinary or natural and they are against the revision of ordinary language. For them, ordinary or natural language is all right. Thus, the

inquiry of the relationship between language and reality is empirical to semantists as well as pragmatists. We have seen that Wittgenstein draws the limits of language and the limits of world. However, we find a different interpretation altogether in Heidegger and Bhartṛ hari because instead of empirical reality, they adhere to metaphysical or ontological reality. Their inquiry of the relationship between language and reality is associated with being question.

- (b) Each of them has shared the view that language reveals reality and language is reality. Language and reality are inseparable and mutually coheres with each other. Reality is not independent from language. This again is an important deviation from the earlier linguistic tradition. Linguistic philosophers have claimed that language and reality are independent with each other and language can be used extra-linguistically to map or to picture or to hook or to represent reality having its independent existence.
- (c) The ontological status of Being of Heidegger and *Śabdabrahman* of Bhartṛ hari remained the same. Each of them has emphasized on inner revelation of man, being in Heidegger philosophy and everyday reality in Bhartṛhari.

It seems clear from the above observation that language matters to philosophy because language is all about *of knowing reality*. This is equally true in the case of Heidegger and Bhartṛhari. It is further noted that question of Reality, Being and language are entwined with each other even in the philosophies of Bhartṛhari and Heidegger. Careful study would reflect that Bhartṛhari conceives reality along with his thinking of language just like as Heidegger reveals the question of Being to his understanding of language. They developed the ontological aspect of the relationship between language and reality. One should not be confused by finding out the subtle distinction between ‘reality’ and ‘ontology’. Ironically in

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the area of linguistic philosophy the terms ‘reality’ and ‘ontology’ are used almost synonymously. However, we think there remains a *subtle distinction between the term ‘reality’ and ‘ontology’*. We think linguistic philosophers who adhere to talk in favour of empirical world would like to show the relationship between language and reality. But some linguistic philosophers are in favour of metaphysical reality as well. Their understanding of reality is associated with the question of ‘being’. Both Bhatṛhari and Heidegger belong to this class. They talk in favour of metaphysical reality. We think when reality is conceived with regard to ‘being’, it should be conceived in terms of ontology. Thus, in a sense, ontology is conceptually higher concept than reality. This question has been raised during the pre-submission of my viva-voce. I am pleased to answer this question here because the relevance of ontology comes when we deal with Bhatṛhari and Heidegger.

As both Bhatṛhari and Heidegger deal with the ontological aspect of the relationship between language and reality each of them has attempted to transcend the boundary of human existence and in turn has moved towards universality of thinking in the process of confirming the universality of human concerns. Having said this, each of them differs because of their own *unique philosophical approach*. Unlike Heidegger, the approach that has been adopted by Bhatṛhari is *moksa-oriented*. As a result of that it springs from the practical interest of leading man out of *duḥkha* into a state of bliss, from inauthentic to authentic existence, from absorption in the object to self-realization. Contrary to Bhatṛhari, we find a different approach in Heidegger as he claims that through *Dasein* (There-being) one can surpass from being to *Being* by way of thinking. It is an onward movement begins from the realm of being and ends in the realm of Being. Being (*Sein*) as being is always sought for in Metaphysics and one can transcend being in the light of its Being. However, the most important aspect is that here the very Being of being reveals itself in beings and it remains hidden in being. The

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difference between Being and being, Heidegger opines, is forgotten by thinking Being as a being which throws being into beingness, itself comes to be considered as a being. Thus, the journey from being towards Being is a sort of journey through which one may acquire self-authenticated knowledge. It is a process of *becoming*.

Thus, it seems to us that authenticity counts the most in both Bhaṭṭhari and Heidegger. Bhaṭṭhari elsewhere goes on to say that the life of everyone is inauthentic. It is the real truth one has to realize. Since it is process of self-transcendence, one has to transcend it through the process of self-realisation. We observe the same even in Heidegger. Like Bhaṭṭhari, Heidegger also expresses his dissatisfaction over the ‘thrown fallenness’ of everyday life. He was no happier about inauthentic knowledge. In this regard, Heidegger inclines to say that Dasein understands its own being. Moreover, it attends and eventually transcends or moves towards Being. Likewise, Bhaṭṭhari’s man through action gets involved and absorbed into the objects of everyday reality. We intuit the same in Bhaṭṭhari as well. In this context, he claims that human condition as a fundamental alteration of attitude actually facilitates *awareness* of everyday life. A man must be aware. Individual awareness plays a significant role to identify the real from the unreal; the truth from the other than the truth. Awareness thus at the end of the day assists a man to realize the loopholes of everyday life and in turn helps him to advance from inauthentic to authentic life. We have observed the same in Vedanta philosophy. It states that the world is full of illusion or māyā. One has to overcome it to know about the *Absolute or Brahman*.

We are now in a better position to assess in what sense Heidegger comes closer to Bhaṭṭhari. It seems that Heidegger in re-experiencing for the West man’s belongingness to *Ereignis* and this sort of re-experiencing helps Heidegger to *come* closer to Bhaṭṭhari’s man who dissociates himself from untruth through *Vāgyoga* and achieves union with the real, what

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Bhartṛhari termed as *Śabdatattva*. Moreover, Heidegger reveals neighbourhood between man and being. In this regard he elsewhere says that ‘man is the neighbour of Being’. Accordingly, it can be said that ‘man of all beings stands in a privilege relation to Being’. Similarly Bhartṛhari goes on to say that an analysis and reflection on the nature of the self is nothing but a means of knowing Brahman, the *Śabdatattva*. Thus, it may be said that the Being (Reality) of Heidegger is *at par* with the *Śabdatattva* of Bhartṛhari.

The philosophical inquiry of the relationship between language and reality as comprehended by Heidegger and Bhartṛhari has a distinctive nature. For them one should strive for authentic knowledge. In short, authenticity is the hallmark of their inquiry about the ontological relationship between language and reality. What then is authentic knowledge according to Heidegger? According to Heidegger, *the question of Being is authentic*. Accordingly, we can come to the discovery of Being through the understanding of There-being (*Dasein*). There-being, Heidegger asserts, is not man as such but that ‘place’ where the essence of man has its abiding ground, i.e. the ultimate source out of which man comes-to-presence as man. In the real sense, *Dasein* has a relation to its Being because *Da-sein* is gifted with awareness of its own Being. Therefore, he is the *Da* of *Sein*, i.e. the *Da* where Being (*Sein*) shines forth. *Dasein*’s ‘essence’ lies in its existence, in its ‘drive-to-be’ (*Zu-sein*)¹⁰⁶. Accordingly, it can be assumed, after Heidegger, that the Being of beings is not something that is just ‘out there’ all by itself, or even ‘out there’ in beings, rather it implies the meaningful relatedness and the intelligible presentness of things for man understood as *Dasein*. Accordingly, the question of *Dasein* is conceived as a prologue to the question of Being. To make this standpoint more sharpen, Heidegger in his “The Way back into the ground of Metaphysics” says, “To characterize with single term both the involvement of Being in human nature and the

¹⁰⁶Ibid,p. 67.

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essential relation of man to the openness ('there') of Being as such, the name of 'being there' (*Dasein*) was chosen for that sphere of Being in which man as man stands."¹⁰⁷

The craving towards authenticity is very much present in Bharṭṛ hari. However, the inquiry of authenticity is being measured with regard to *human situation*. According to J. N. Mohanty, Indian philosophy at large is *mokṣa-oriented* and it was reflected almost all leading Indian schools, such as, Samkhya, Vedanta, Buddhist and Yoga systems. The basic or core metaphysical thesis of these systems actually springs from the practical interest of leading man out of *duḥkha* into the object of self-realization. It is a divine journey from inauthentic to authentic existence, from absorption in the object of self-realization.

Accordingly, it can be said that man as a questioning of being is the way to the questioning of Being. Thus, Being (reality) for Heidegger is always Being as it enters into *Dasein's* understanding of Being. Being is understood in terms of *Dasein* and there is Being only insofar as it is understood by *Dasein*¹⁰⁸. Thus, *Dasein*, for Heidegger, is the place of disclosure of Being. Like Heidegger, Bharṭṛhari characterises *Śabdātattva* as Being distinguishes from all beings. According to Bharṭṛ hari, Being is not one object amongst others; rather it is that in the light of which everything else is manifested and which is itself self-manifesting. In this regard, Bharṭṛhari conceives existence (*sattā*) as a universal substance (*dravya*), a timeless, simple substance underlying all things and permitting them to borrow their existence claiming from their 'association' with it. Thus, Bharṭṛhari interprets the nature of *Brahman* in terms of *Dravya*. *Dravya* or substance, for Bharṭṛ hari, is the universal in particular things which is at par with *Brahman* as existence. *Brahman* as substance is also called *tattva* (*thatness*) which is further referred to as *para* (the highest

¹⁰⁷ Heidegger, Martin. "The Way back into the ground of Metaphysics", tr., W.Kaufmann in *Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre*, op.cit. p.213.

¹⁰⁸ Heidegger, Martin, *Being and Time*, op. cit., p.225

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one).¹⁰⁹ The *tattva* of *Śabdatattva* actually means eternal existent and it is made known to us through non-existent forms (*ākāra*). As an eternal existent or the highest one the *tattva* of *Śabdatattva* transcends or excels all spatial and temporal determinations, differentiations based on the concepts like identity. Thus, like Heidegger, Bhartṛhari equally envisages transcendental and immanent aspects of reality by emphasising on the fact that *Brahman* as the basis of differentiated aspects is of the nature of *Śabda* which Bhartṛhari calls *Śabdatattva*, one undifferentiated reality, the whole. Whole cannot be identified. Such undifferentiated reality, the Absolute whole, the eternal existence whom Bhartṛhari considers as the great universal (*Mahāsāmānya*), the great Being (*Mahāsattā*) expresses itself in all words.

Both Heidegger and Bhartṛhari hold that reality (*Brahman* in Bhartṛhari and Being in Heidegger) is one. In his book *Being and Time*, Heidegger understands Being (reality) in terms of Time. Likewise, Bhartṛhari understands or interprets *Brahman* (reality) in terms of *Kāla*. According to Bhartṛhari, all objects and the whole cosmos are manifested from *Brahman* and according to Heidegger, all beings are manifested from Being. Being is self-reveler just as *Brahman* is self-reveler. Thus, the ontological locus of Being of Heidegger and *Brahman* of Bhartṛhari remains the same. The power of Being as a reveler of other beings and also as a self-reveler requires energy just as *Brahman* as the manifesting agent of all objects and the whole cosmos requires *Śakti*. Bhartṛhari treats *kālaśakti* as the supreme of all the powers of the Absolute *Brahman* because it controls all the powers of *Śabdatattva* by permitting them in a particular temporal order. Just like *śakti* or *kālaśakti* of Bhartṛhari, Heidegger also brings the relevance of Time as a power of Being. According to Bhartṛhari, *kāla* which he termed as *kālaśakti*, is not different from *Brahman* very similar to Heidegger

¹⁰⁹ Bhartrihari, *Vākyapadīya*, III.I.20.

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who claims that Time is not different from Being. According to both Heidegger and Bhartṛhari, time or *Kāla* is a manifestation in the sequence of coming into being. The journey from being to Being is a process of becoming, the manifestation or revealing Being (*Brahman*) through beings is an upward sequence that can be measured with regard to time (Heidegger) or *kāla* (Bhartṛhari). This does not, however, make sense to say that Time of Heidegger and *kāla* of Bhartṛhari limits Being or *Brahman*; rather the eternal timeless appears as changing owing to the working of time factor.¹¹⁰ As to the relation between Being and Time, Heidegger, in fact, fixes on the notion of presence. Being and Time, says Heidegger, determine each other reciprocally in such a manner that neither can be the former, being, be addressed as something temporal, nor can the latter, Time, be addressed as a being. Being is determined, as presence, by Time and therefore, Being and Time, Heidegger opines, are inseparable. Being and Time belong together just as *kāla* and *Brahman* belong together. As Being and Time are only there and given in *Ereignis*, it is this even that brings man in to his own as that being which grows aware of Being by standing in genuine Time.

The other notable similarity between Bhartṛhari and Heidegger is that the *Brahman* or the Being is revealed through language. According to Bhartṛhari, *Brahman* (Reality) transforms or manifests itself into speech without affecting the true essence of reality. That is why, Bhartṛhari uses the term *Śabdabrahman*. What is *Śabda* (speech) is Brahman. Here the verb 'is' is used in the sense of Identity. *Śabda* is One; *Brahman* is One. There is oneness relationship between the *Śabda* (Om) and the Brahman. Very similar to Bhartṛhari, Heidegger claims that 'language is the house of Being', Being dwells in language. However, language does not affect Being. Being is the guardian of language, Being takes care of language because Being is manifested by means of language, passing its time in the language as a

¹¹⁰ Raja, K. *Indian Theories of Meaning*, The Adyar Library and Research Centre, Adyar, Madras 20, 1963, pp.146-147.

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house. According to Bharṭṛ hari, all knowledge appears intertwined with *Śabda*¹¹¹. In this sense, the object is not different from the word because it is the word which has become the object. Similarly, all activity of consciousness has *śabda* as its medium. Bharṭṛhari, in this regard, brings the concept of *Vāgyoga* as a kind of meditation which ultimate objective is to raise the level of the consciousness of words to the highest stage of the Word-Principle. The *Vāgyoga* demands a kind of *Śabdasaṃskāra*, i.e. the purification of words consists in discarding the corrupt words (*apabhramsa*) and thereby adherence to correct words (*sādhu śabda*) which eventually culminate in the attainment of the ultimate reality what Bharṭṛ hari termed as *Śabdabrahman*. Thus, Bharṭṛhari does not rule out the purification of words. If we carefully examine the language of Heidegger, there we observe a similar sort of purification of language. When Heidegger talks about language, he thereby means a kind of language which is creative in nature. Language, for Heidegger, is creative. Creativity is the essence of language. Not all language fulfils this criterion. In this regard, Heidegger calls for poetic language which according to him is creative in nature. The *Da* in *Dasein* is being itself revealed or brought out of concealment into disclosure by means of creative language. For Heidegger, *Dasein* is the truth of Being because disclosure in Heideggerian thinking is truth. *Dasein* is the truth of Being; it is the place of the truth of Being. Heidegger says that There (presence) of Being; human existence is, in the final analysis, the openness to Being, “the standing in the lighting process of Being.”¹¹² For Heidegger, the human being dwells in the light of Being and the lighting process actually paves the way to grant ‘the nearness to Being’¹¹³ The light of Being is poetic language where Being dwells. It is Being’s house and the fundamental feature of this house is that it is creative in nature.

¹¹¹ Bhartrihari, *Vākyapadīya*, I.123.

¹¹² Heidegger, Martin. “The Letter on Humanism” in *Basic Writings*, op.cit., p.229.

¹¹³ Ibid., p.223.

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We think that contrary to the earlier tradition, both Bharṭhari and Heidegger, we think, conceived language at par with reality. For them language is reality. The other important aspect that needs to be taken care of is that linguistic philosophers, in general, have given importance of the external uses of language. Contrary to this, both Bharṭhari and Heidegger gave importance on the internal uses of language, i.e. the essence of language. Both of them adhered to the view that the essence of language is all about of reality. We think from an ontological perspective, *Brahman* stands for true Reality (Being). *Brahman* as true Being makes the truth of the world possible. Thus, we think that a reflection of the reality of *Brahman* eventually brings us closer to Heidegger's concept of Being. Because Being is no-being as it cannot be described as such or such. It is non-being as Radhakrishnan points out. It is not the being which we attribute to the world of experience. That is why, Heidegger considers Being as the groundless ground and Abyss of all human understanding. When Heidegger calls man the 'shepherd of Being', he wants to indicate the special relation There-being has to Being. From Bharṭhari's point of view we can say that man alone is endowed with the capacity to envision *Brahman* and thus raised beyond all living creatures.

As far as the causal nexus is concerned we find an insightful similarity between Heidegger and Bharṭhari as well. Bharṭhari denies the causal nexus between *Brahman* and the world on the ground that the effect, i.e., the world is a mere appearance (*vivarta*) of the cause. Heidegger also rejects the thought of Being as the cause of the world. Both Bharṭhari and Heidegger hold that cause and effect are intertwined just like as Being and Time belong together for Heidegger and *kāla* and *Brahman* belong together for Bharṭhari. Thus, language and reality is one and the same thing, they are not the two sides of the same coin but two different names of the same thing. Both Bharṭhari and Heidegger hold that language is reality or language itself is reality. We think that the reality of Bharṭhari (i.e. *Brahman*) and

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the reality of Heidegger (i.e. Being) are very much same or alike. However, we have a little bit of reservation as far as their understanding of language is concerned . According to Bharṭhari, language (word) is One creates within; but according to Heidegger language would be poetic in nature and the fundamental feature of language is that it would be creative. Creativity is the hallmark of language. Thus, we think that Heidegger was more specific than Bharṭhari as far as the interpretation of language is concerned. Having said this, it is language, or word through which reality is revealed and revealed not as a separate entity but as an integral part of language . In this sense, both Bharṭhari and Heidegger claimed that language is reality . However, Bharṭhari elsewhere in his *Vākyapadīya* talks about *speech-potency* as an essential trait of human consciousness which perhaps would be cognitive in nature. Speech-potency as an essential trait of human consciousness exists within. Very similar way, Heidegger claims that language becomes the concrete presence of Being rather than mere articulation. Language, for Heidegger, is the foundation of human being. The essential function of language is the *Sage* as that which shows. In short, language as Saying is the mode of commandeering (*Ereignis*). Language, for Heidegger, is not a mere tool rather language grants the possibility to stand in the midst of the openness of beings. We find ourselves in the midst of language. Thus, as a single line conclusion, we can say that the metaphysical interpretation of the relationship between language and reality as expounded by both Heidegger and Bharṭhari not only opens up a new dimension, but at the same time it shapes the concept of language and reality as a unified and non-dualistic manner which eventually nullifies or boils down the *problem of surrogacy* in the domain of linguistic philosophy. Having said this , one should be kept in mind that the language of Bharṭhari is much more abstruse than the language of Heidegger . Heidegger offers us poetic language , whereas Bharṭhari is non-committal about poetic language.