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The Reform Movement in China 1898–1912

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TO

PAYSON J. TREAT

PREFACE

The reform movement in China, lasting from 1898 to 1912, inaugurated by Kuang Hsu, temporarily eclipsed by the "Boxer madness," and revived and directed by the great Empress Dowager, Tzu Hsi, until her death in 1908, gave way to revolution in 1911. Thereafter it became fashionable to decry the reforms begun under imperial auspices as the half-hearted, insincere attempts of a tyrannical dynasty to deceive and placate rising liberal opposition. The purpose of this study has been to examine the critical years before the collapse of the dynasty in an effort to discover whether the imperial protestations of reforming zeal were sincere, to what degree they were carried out, and, if they failed of realization, what reasons were responsible for that failure. The question arises whether, had the revolution not come and had the Manchus retained the throne, China could have been transformed into a modernized state gradually and comparatively peacefully, as Japan had been. In other words, was the uprising of 1911, in so far as it was political rather than economic, a "premature iconoclastic expression," or was it a necessary if drastic preliminary to any effective reform of the Chinese body politic? The answer which has been tentatively formulated here is largely in terms of the earnestness and energy of Tzu Hsi and certain of her advisers as against the increasing debility of the ruling group, the corrupt state of the administrative machine, and the inflammatory nature of certain of the ideas which came to China from the Occident. In Japan the need for reform and Westernization was realized just when the dynasty was awakening to a renewed popularity and strength; in China it was recognized at a time when the ruling house was already far sunk in lethargy and decadence. This fact explains many of the startling differences between Japan and China in their attempts to assimilate and adapt to their needs the civilization of the West.

The writer wishes to express gratitude to Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, then of Harvard University, who first suggested the possibility of such a study and who read the opening chapters in manuscript. Her greatest thanks, however, are due to Dr. Payson J. Treat, under whose direction this work, originally submitted as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at Stanford University, was carried on and whose guidance and criticism have been of the utmost value.

M. E. C.

Reed College
Portland, Oregon
December 15, 1930

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I. THE BEGINNINGS OF REFORM

At the opening of the nineteenth century, the Chinese Empire, a state of vast territory and numerous people with more than two millenniums of civilized existence behind it, was the dominant power of Asia. When the twentieth century dawned, the Chinese Goliath had been defeated by tiny Japan, the Occidental powers had secured Chinese leaseholds, concessions, and "spheres of influence," and the debility of a once-great power was visible to all. The changes which China experienced in the nineteenth century made necessary the reform movement which is the subject of this work and constitutes the background for the revolutionary movement in progress in China today.

In the eighteenth century, China was truly the "Middle Kingdom." Around her were dutifully obedient vassal states which sent tribute to Peking. Her civilization was the model for eastern Asia. Her government, her classical learning and the system of official examinations on which that government was based, and the patriarchal family system, which was the fundamental social grouping, had stood the test of centuries. True, the emperor who occupied the Dragon Throne was an alien, for in the seventeenth century the Manchu tribesmen had conquered China and were to rule in Peking until the fateful year of 1911. But the Manchu conquerors had wisely taken over the civilization of the conquered Chinese with but few changes. The earlier rulers of the dynasty, especially Kang Hsi and Chien Lung, were men of remarkable ability, under whom the empire had prospered. With the nineteenth century came decline. The rulers were weaklings, their vitality sapped by palace life, or puppet emperors taken from the schoolroom to the throne. The efficiency of the administration had declined and the corruption of the official class was a byword. Anti-Manchu feeling grew, and minor rebellions in the first years of the century were followed by the Taiping rising, one of the greatest rebellions of history. The rebellion failed, but the dynasty was dangerously weakened and in the eyes of many of its subjects had suffered an almost irremediable loss of face. Foreign relations constituted a source of additional difficulty. In 1793 Chien Lung could address a British envoy as a Western barbarian, representative of a remote vassal state eager to secure the products of the great Middle Kingdom. Foreign trade was restricted to Canton for seafarers and to Kiakhta for the Russians, and was carefully regulated. The attempt of the government to stop opium smuggling and the desire of the British to be treated as diplomatic equals led to armed conflict in 1840–1841, in which the Chinese troops were decisively defeated. Almost twenty

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years later, when the dynasty was harassed by the Taipings, a second war with the foreigners occurred. After each of these conflicts the imperial government was forced to grant to the foreigners by treaty valuable rights, which included extraterritoriality, a conventional tariff, the opening of additional ports to trade, and the residence at Peking of foreign diplomatic representatives.

Disaster was pursuing the Manchu dynasty. Another of the successful rebellions which have occurred periodically throughout Chinese history seemed imminent. Chinese political theory held the Emperor responsible to Heaven for his conduct of government. If the country prospered, Heaven approved his rule; if not, his heavenly mandate was exhausted and the people, as agents of Heaven, were justified in rebelling and elevating to the Dragon Throne a better-qualified ruling house! Heaven was obviously losing patience with the Ta Ching ("Great Pure") dynasty. Even if there had been no conflicts with foreigners, the dynasty would have had to face the urgent need of reforming and revitalizing the government. Yet it was the impact of the foreign powers which led to attempts to reform China by imitation of Western institutions and eventually in 1911 transformed what would otherwise have been an anti-dynastic rising of the traditional sort into a true revolution destined to work great changes in Chinese life. China's defeats at the hands of the Westerners were hardly known to the mass of the people, but those of the official class who had contact with foreigners and realized the significance of the treaty concessions which they had wrung from China began to experiment with Western ideas and devices. The idea spread, although very slowly, that the best protection for the indigenous institutions of China was a buttress of institutions borrowed from the Occident. Armies and navies on the Western model, railways, and telegraphs could be used to fortify Chinese civilization against more sudden and drastic change.

The first conspicuous outcropping of reform zeal came in 1898, when the Emperor himself tried to save his Empire from the depredations of the foreign powers by a rapid and indiscriminate borrowing of the methods and institutions which seemed to give the foreigners their strength. The conservatives soon terminated his brave but ill-advised effort. But looking back on the reform attempt of 1898 one can see it as the result of a long seepage of Western ideas into China and as the precursor of the valiant effort to revitalize the Empire which the Empress Dowager Tzu Hsi led in the years after the Boxer uprising. Ever since the coming of the foreigners there had been a steady infiltration into China of Occidental conceptions and methods, carried chiefly through the media of missionary activity and commerce. These exotic ideas made sl[illegible] progress. Here and there a scholar became interested in European l[illegible]ning, or an open-

minded official was willing to experiment with the inventions of the industrial age. The first significant signs of Westernization, few as they are, can be found in the period between the closing years of the Taiping rebellion and the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, i.e., from 1860 to 1894.

One Chinese observer has divided early reform into three periods. At first the main current was toward industrialism; after the Sino-Japanese War, army and navy reorganization took the center of the stage; and, with the conclusion of the Boxer outbreak, the Westernization of education became the chief feature.[1] This classification is, of course, not "watertight." Yet a conspicuous phase of the period before 1894 was the initiation of industrial and mechanical enterprises by prominent members of the official class, that group ordinarily thought of in the West as composed of arch-conservatives. Their attitude was due to the fact that such reforms were in the nature of additions to, rather than alterations of, Chinese culture. China already had educational and governmental systems of her own, and any attempt to alter them in favor of Western practice would no doubt have raised sharp opposition at that time. But railways, telegraphs, and factories were novelties, and their advantages were fairly obvious, at least to the educated. The reorganization of the Chinese defense forces was also a reform of a seemingly superficial nature, designed to strengthen China against the West rather than to remodel her on Western lines, and as such won the approval of many who would have stiffly resisted innovations of a more obviously destructive character.

This does not mean that railways made their way in China without murmurs and more than murmurs from the conservatives. In China the laying of a railway was almost certain to disturb either the ancestral graveyards scattered through the country or the ubiquitous spirits of the land (*feng shui*), which inhabited all salient natural features. Both piety and superstition were inimical to the new means of transport. Not till the utility of railroads for defense purposes was realized did the government really lend its backing to them despite local objections.

The first move toward the introduction of railways into China was made in 1863, when foreign firms petitioned Li Hung-chang for the right to build a railway between Shanghai and Soochow. They were refused permission, both because the people would undoubtedly object to having their land taken for such a purpose and because Li considered that if China were to have railways she herself should build them. Sir MacDonald Stephenson, who had been prominent in railway building in India, soon

(1852:

[1] Ku Hung Ming, *The Story of a Chinese Oxford Movement*, p. 23.

after drew up a plan for a comprehensive railway system for China. It was received with appropriate thanks by the imperial government, but was pigeonholed. At last work was undertaken on a line from Shanghai to Woosung by a British firm in 1876. Regular traffic was opened and all went well till a Chinese flung himself under the wheels of the engine in the supreme form of appeal to public opinion prevailing in China—suicide. Popular indignation was then aroused against the railway. Soon arrangements were made to sell the line to the imperial government, which, on completing payment, in October 1877, transported both rails and rolling stock to Formosa. The last sign of this first railway enterprise in China was obliterated by the erection of a temple on the site of the erstwhile railway station. However, the materials transported to Formosa were put to good use by an enlightened and able governor-general, Liu Ming-chuan, who in the 'eighties built with them a line from the capital to the coast.[2]

In the meantime, railway construction was progressing on the mainland and had received imperial approval, thanks to the zeal of Li Hung-chang, perhaps the best known to Westerners of all Chinese officials. Li had first gained prominence as one of the loyal Chinese generals who did much to stop the threatening progress of the Taipings. He had by the 'seventies attained the dignity of viceroy of the metropolitan province, Chihli. In 1878 he was approached by Tong King-sing, a product of missionary schools in China and the organizer of the China Merchants' Steam Navigation Company, one of the most important commercial ventures of this period.[3] Tong wished to develop the Kaiping coalfields in northern Chihli to supply coal for the company's ships and desired a railway connection from the coalfields to Pehtang, where the coal would have to be shipped. Li supported the scheme and obtained imperial sanction, but because of the superstitious opposition of the populace only a horse tramway was at first projected. Later, in 1881, Li secured permission to operate a bona fide railway. Step by step, the line was extended, first to Lutai, and finally as far as Tientsin by October, 1888. By this time, the opponents of this novel venture had organized and were dominant at court, and the whole scheme was threatened with failure.[4]

In the end the railway idea was bound to triumph, and it had already won over many of the most noted mandarins of the time. One of the first to memorialize in favor of railway development for China was Liu Ming-

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[2] Kent, *Railway Enterprise in China*, pp. 1–21.

[3] Morse, *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire*, hereafter referred to as *International Relations*, II, 315–316.

[4] Kent, *op. cit.*, chapters iv, v.

chuan, whom we have mentioned above in connection with the Shanghai-Woosung line. In 1883, after the war scare with Russia, he advocated to the Throne the advisability of a network of railway communications to facilitate the transportation of troops to any part of China's far-flung borders. In reporting on this memorial, two liberal viceroys, Li Hung-chang and Liu Kun-yi, reiterated the arguments employed by Liu Ming-chuan, attributing the flourishing growth of America and England to their possession of these bringers of wealth and prosperity. The military argument was the decisive one, however, and converted no less a person than the redoubtable conservative and military hero, Tso Tsung-tang, who in his valedictory memorial of 1885 advocated the introduction of railways and arsenals as needful means of strengthening the empire.[5]

In 1889 the question of the further extension of the Kaiping line was put before the Grand Council and the high provincial authorities and led to a number of memorials, the best received being that of the famous scholar and well-beloved official, Chang Chih-tung. The character of this man, who played an important rôle in the development of the reform movement, presented obvious contradictions. At times he showed a receptiveness to foreign ideas, at others he returned to dyed-in-the-wool Confucianism. To judge from Chang's famous book, *Learn*, the pressure of circumstances finally drove him to advocate Confucian morality for the individual but Westernization for the nation. One Western commentator has said of him: "a distinguished scholar, famed for the classical style of his state papers, exceeding honest and devoted to the welfare of his people, in public life he was a trimmer."[6] The proposal which he put forth in 1889 was typical of the protean schemes which from time to time filled the head of this "scholarly bungler," as he was often called. Rejecting the idea of further extension of the line in Chihli, he advocated the prompt construction of trunk lines and suggested that work be started at once on a line from Hankow to Lukouchiao, outside Peking. This ambitious project, beyond the ability of China to carry out unaided at that time, nevertheless was received favorably. That it might be advanced more rapidly, Chang himself was shifted to the Hukuang viceroyalty, where he would be in charge of the southern terminus of the proposed line. There he showed his zeal by erecting factories to turn out rails and by employing foreign engineers. During his administration, Hankow also became the seat of a modern cotton mill, the first of its sort in China. It had previously been in operation in Canton, but when Chang was transferred to Wuchang the

[5] Wilson, *China, Travels and Investigations in the "Middle Kingdom,"* pp. 119–149.

[6] Morse, *International Relations*, III, 361–362.

plant was moved to Hankow.[7] The Lu-Han (or Peking-Hankow) line did not make great progress under Chang's direction, owing principally to a lack of funds, and in the days of the "battle of concessions" the concession for the line was given to a Belgian company, in reality the mask for the ambitions of France and Russia.

Other means of communication were taken up in the period before the Sino-Japanese War. Telegraphs soon demonstrated their usefulness to a government which was eager to exercise more rapid control over distant provinces. The first line, from Shanghai to Tientsin, was established in 1881, and a few years later Peking was connected by wire with Canton and Chungking.[8] A postal system on the Occidental model was first introduced into China under the direction of the Imperial Maritime Customs, which established a few postal depots in the 'sixties to care for the mails of the legations and customs and grew to such an extent that in 1878 China was asked to join the Postal Union. At last in 1896 an Imperial Post for all China was set up, to be managed by Sir Robert Hart, who thus came to serve the Chinese government as Inspector of both Customs and Posts.[9] These ventures in facilities for rapid communication owed their existence to the determination of a few individuals and not to any popular demand. The mass of the Chinese people felt no need for, and little confidence in, such changes. Yet telegraphs, posts, and railways all contributed to the wider spread and interchange of ideas and thus wore down the wall of prejudice and procured an entry for innovations more fundamental.

The story of army and navy reorganization from 1860 to 1894 is disheartening, viewed with a knowledge of the ineffectiveness of the "reformed" forces against the Japanese. The leader in the endeavor to create for China a fighting force comparable to those of Western powers was Li Hung-chang, and when the resulting military and naval machine proved all but useless the disgrace of China was visited upon his head. The first fiasco came in connection with the measures against the Taipings. H. N. Lay, head of the then recently organized Imperial Maritime Customs, was asked by the Chinese government in 1862 to secure for it a small fleet of European ships to be used in cutting off the rebels from their sources of supply. Lay executed this commission in high-handed fashion, for, to him, "the notion of a gentleman acting *under* an Asiatic

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[7] Douglas, *Europe and the Far East*, pp. 286–287; Wen Ching, *The Chinese Crisis from Within*, p. 21. Wen Ching is the pseudonym of Lim Boon-keng (Bland, *Recent Events and Present Policies in China*, p. 52).

[8] Morse, *International Relations*, II, 337; Douglas, *op. cit.*, p. 249.

[9] *China Year Book, 1912*, pp. 195–196.

barbarian" was "preposterous."[10] In England he obtained seven steamers, one supply ship, crews, and the services of Captain Sherard Osborn. Lay assured Osborn that he would be commander-in-chief of the navy, serving directly under the Emperor. On their return to China they received word that "the high Chinese officer already nominated by the Viceroy of the Two Kiang [Tseng Kuo-fan] and the Governor of Kiangsu [Li Hung-chang] was appointed commander-in-chief of the fleet." Osborn refused to be subordinate to provincial officials and insisted that the fleet be disbanded, which was done.[11] The Chinese government had no reason to be satisfied with this dénouement, for which Lay was generally blamed. He was dismissed from the office of Inspector-General of Customs, in which he was succeeded by Sir Robert Hart, the best known of all the foreign officials who in recent times have served the Chinese government.

The ignominious failure of this first attempt to acquire a modern navy dampened the enthusiasm of the central government for some time. However, Li Hung-chang and a few other enterprising officials instituted a number of enterprises designed to improve China's defense forces. A considerable amount of military and naval equipment was purchased, but it was of all sorts and varieties. A number of arsenals were established, the pioneer being in Foochow.[12] The Foochow arsenal contained an extensive school for marine engineering and navigation, which was not very successful, however.[13] Li Hung-chang saw to the establishment at Tientsin of a naval school with English instructors, a military school with German instructors, and a medical school. A number of students went to Europe to study naval affairs, and the British Navy received as cadets young Chinese, who subsequently proved competent officers.[14]

It was 1885 before the imperial government made its next move. China's difficulties with France in 1884–1885 resulted in a desire on the part of the more progressive officials for effective navy reform. Accordingly, in 1885 a Board of Admiralty was formed, although it had almost nothing in the way of a navy over which to exercise jurisdiction. At the head of this body was Prince Chun, the father of the young Emperor, and its most interested members were Li Hung-chang and Marquis Tseng.[15] Li was now able to take more definite steps toward the creation of a navy worthy of the name. Warships were purchased in Europe, arrangements

[10] Lay, *Our Interests in China*, p. 19.

[11] Morse, *International Relations*, II, 37–42.

[12] Wen Ching, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

[13] Fryer, "Chinese Education—Past, Present, and Future," in *Chinese Recorder*, August 1897.

[14] Michie, *The Englishman in China*, II, 393–395.

[15] Bland and Backhouse, *China under the Empress Dowager*, p. 99.

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were made for foreign instructors, and further dock and harbor works were built. In all, the navy consisted of two ironclads, a considerable number of cruisers, and sundry other craft.[16] It was divided into two sections, the Nanyang, or Southern Squadron, directed by Captain Tracy, with headquarters at Foochow, and the Peiyang, or Northern Squadron, under Captain Lang, in the Gulf of Pechihli. The latter officer proved particularly successful in organizing and directing his squadron. Had he been with the Chinese navy in the struggle with Japan, it might have come through more creditably. Unfortunately he found it necessary in 1890 to resign. Intrigue and jealousy among the Chinese officers made it impossible for him to keep on. The trouble had its source in provincial loyalty, for most of the officers were Foochow men and the Chinese admiral was not.[17] Lang's experience was an indication of one of the evils which weakened the navy—family, local, or provincial feeling. The navy possessed no *esprit de corps*, a fact which was lamentably illustrated in the battle of the Yalu. Many of the officers and men had courage and good training, but "there was no tradition to render them fruitful, no martial spirit, no disgrace for the coward, no honour for the valiant."[18] In the China of that day, the defense forces did not enjoy much respect. The army or navy afforded no career for a promising youth; instead he was almost certain to set foot on the ladder of examinations which led to the civil service. It was not till after the Boxer Rebellion, when a spirit of nationalism began to spread in China, that the army and navy acquired anything like the prestige and morale which such bodies possessed in the Occident.

The defects in China's naval forces, which were apparent even before the test of battle, were due in part to two events which occurred in 1889. In that year Marquis Tseng died, and the navy lost one of its greatest helpers in Peking. And it was also in 1889 that the Emperor decreed the reconstruction of the Summer Palace, destroyed by the foreigners in 1860. Between this decision and the condition of the navy, there was a connection of a most unfortunate sort. The chief difficulty in the reconstruction of the palace was a lack of funds. As a solution of the difficulty, Li Lien-ying, the chief eunuch, who had great influence with the Empress Dowager, proposed that her projected residence be built with the naval appropriations, a suggestion which was acted upon.[19]

On army reform, less was done. The only part of the army which ever

[16] Michie, *op. cit.*, II, 398.

[17] *Ibid.*, II, 400; Douglas, *op. cit.*, p. 288; King, *In the Chinese Customs Service*, p. 89.

[18] Michie, *op. cit.*, II, 412.

[19] Bland and Backhouse, *op. cit.*, p. 99.

attained modern organization was a corps under the direction of Li Hung-chang, as viceroy of Chihli. This force, comprising some 50,000 men and drilled by German officers, was the only thing of its kind in China.[20] For the most part, the army remained a sort of feudal levy, which was totally unable to cope with the well-disciplined Japanese. Li had done his best to procure an adequate system of defenses but had failed, and the net result for China was a crushing defeat at great cost, not only in money but in the prestige which had helped to shield her from the predatory instincts of the foreign powers.[21]

The changes in education which appeared at this time were more truly the beginnings of a new China than any number of factories or modern army corps. In the old China, the scholar ruled. The officials of the empire were chosen from the successful candidates in the great series of examinations based on the traditional Confucian literature. Not until after the Boxer rising did classical learning as the way to government office give way to an educational system on the Occidental model. During the nineteenth century, however, knowledge of the science and literature of the West was being spread by the Christian missionaries. It has been declared that the efforts of the missionaries in propagating foreign science and philosophy were largely abortive, since their converts were of the lower classes, who had nothing to lose by a change of faith, and their activities gained opposition from the official classes and the greater part of the population, as the long tale of anti-foreign outbreaks evidenced.[22] To subscribe without reservation to this view would be to overlook the important connection which existed between the Christian teachers and many of the pioneers of reform in China. The picture of Western culture which the missionaries presented may have been warped and distorted in some features, but that does not alter the fact that for Chinese who were eager to learn about the West the missionary schools and publications offered the easiest means of access to that knowledge.

The Protestant missionaries began their educational work early in the nineteenth century. At Canton in 1833 a printing-press was established with S. Wells Williams in charge, and a similar enterprise was soon opened in Shanghai.[23] In 1839 the Morrison Society School was opened in Canton in memory of the famous missionary, Dr. Robert Morrison, and among its most notable students were Yung Wing and Tong King-sing.[24] Other early missionary institutions were Tengchow College, St.

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[20] Boulger, *A Short History of China,* p. 370.

[21] Michie, *op. cit.,* II, 401–402.

[22] Wen Ching, *op. cit.,* pp. 13–15.

[23] Martin, *The Awakening of China,* p. 283.

[24] Fryer, "Chinese Education—Past, Present, and Future," in *Chinese Recorder,* August 1897.

Paul's in Hong Kong, St. John's in Shanghai, the Methodist Episcopal University in Peking, and an American Board College in Tungchow.[25] The question of conversions to Christianity quite aside, the importance of these schools in opening the path to Western learning was great. For this reason Tungwen College, the school of Western learning under the auspices of the Chinese government, may be grouped with the mission schools, since, except for the omission of Christian teachings, its course of study, directed by missionaries, closely resembled those of the mission institutions. It was started in 1862 as a school for interpreters. The British in the Treaty of Tientsin had declared that thereafter their official communications would be in English, though accompanied, for a time, by Chinese translations.[26] Three schools of Western languages were therefore established, one in Canton, one in Shanghai, and one in Peking. Five years later a translation department for the publication of scientific books was installed in the Kiangnan arsenal.[27]

About 1864 a missionary, Dr. W. A. P. Martin, took over the teaching of English in the school for interpreters in Peking and thus started on the path which ultimately led him to the presidency of the Imperial University. The school was then a very small affair indeed, consisting of one class in French, one in English, and one in Russian. The Chinese had tried to start the institution without foreign assistance, but there were no Chinese suitably equipped to teach foreign languages and Europeans had had to be employed.

In 1865 Prince Kung memorialized the Throne, proposing that a department of modern science be added to the Tungwen Kwan, or "School of Combined Learning." In a second memorial he declared it no disgrace to borrow from the wisdom of the West: "When a small nation like Japan knows how to enter on a career of progress, what could be a greater disgrace than for China to adhere to her old traditions and never think of waking up?"[28] Even the Empress Dowager herself, a few years later, responded in no uncertain terms to a memorialist who suggested that astronomy and mathematics were properly to be confined within the province of the Imperial Board of Astronomy:

> The Throne has established this College because it is incumbent on our scholars to learn the rudiments of mathematics and astronomy. These are not to be regarded, as the Memorialist suggests, as cunning and mechanical branches of knowledge. Let

[25] Martin, *The Awakening of China*, pp. 285–290.

[26] *Treaties, Conventions, etc., between China and Foreign States* (The Maritime Customs), I, 418.

[27] Fryer, "Chinese Education—Past, Present, and Future," in *Chinese Recorder*, August 1897.

[28] Douglas, *op. cit.*, p. 264; Martin, *A Cycle of Cathay*, pp. 301–303.

our officials study them earnestly, and they will soon acquire proficiency; at the same time let them avoid that undesirable specialisation which comes from concentrated study of the classics. We are now borrowing educational methods from foreign countries with a view to broadening our own and increasing its accuracy, but we have no intention of abandoning the teachings of the Sages. How, then, can our action prove detrimental to the minds of scholars?[29]

Yet with all this encouragement from high places, the new departure did not win many converts. Dr. Martin admitted that the college was not at first viewed with respect, and that the president of the Hanlin Academy, an arch-obstructionist, even accused it of being responsible for a prolonged drought.[30] The turning-point in its fortunes came when one of its graduates attained to the highest place in the Chinese scholastic hierarchy, membership in the Hanlin Academy. From that time on, the quality of its clientèle improved and its influence increased. Dr. Martin credits the success of the college with being responsible to some degree for the inclusion of mathematics in the official examinations, which was decreed in 1887.[31] This provision proved futile in the face of inertia, for very few papers in mathematics were presented, the classics furnishing the older and more certain route to success, backed as they were by the strong sanction of custom.

In 1897 Tungwen College had a faculty of thirteen and offered instruction in international law, physics, astronomy, anatomy and physiology, chemistry, mineralogy, mathematics, French, Russian, German, English, and Chinese. The student body was limited to 120, their expenses being paid by scholarships. The full course covered eight years, with official rank as a prize for those who did well. A decree making those who obtained the doctorate in the official examinations fellows of Tungwen College increased the prestige of that institution.[32] The work given in Tungwen College was not very advanced, but whether called college or secondary school it strove to give the students enrolled in it something worthy of the name of education. Most of the graduates of the institution went into the consular diplomatic service. Wang Fung-tsao, the academician before mentioned, served as minister to Japan before the Sino-Japanese War and later became president of Nanyang College.[33] Three Tungwen students accompanied the Manchu Pinchun on his semi-official mission to Europe in 1866, and one of them, Chang Teh-yi, years

[29] Bland and Backhouse, *op. cit.*, pp. 493–494.

[30] Martin, *A Cycle of Cathay*, p. 312.

[31] Douglas, *op. cit.*, pp. 264–265.

[32] Martin, *A Cycle of Cathay*, pp. 311–312, 318.

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 318; also *North-China Herald*, June 4, 1902, hereafter referred to as *NCH*.

later, in 1901, was made Chinese minister to England.[34] In 1893, when His Imperial Majesty, Kuang Hsu, decided to study English, the teachers chosen for him were Tungwen graduates.[35]

The influence of the missionary schools and Tungwen College was perhaps exceeded by that of the missionary publications. Their most important periodical was the *Wang Kwoh Kung Pao*, or *Review of the Times*, a monthly magazine founded in 1889. They also did good work in the translation into Chinese of Western works. The chief center of this activity was the Christian Literature Society, or, to give it its other name, the Society for the Diffusion of Christian and General Knowledge (S.D.K.). In 1891 the headship of this society passed to Dr. Timothy Richard,[36] an important figure in the history of reform. Richard, who had been in China since 1869, had seized every opportunity to discuss with high officials the causes of China's weakness and the most feasible remedies. Among those whom he thus approached were Li Hung-chang, Chang Chih-tung, Chang Yin-huan, and Weng Tung-ho. In 1890 this energetic missionary and reformer had accepted the offer made to him by Li Hung-chang and others to become the editor of a daily paper in Chinese, the *Shih Pao*, and had used this periodical for the propagation of his ideas. On being chosen editor of the S.D.K., however, Richard gave up his post with the *Shih Pao* and left Peking for Shanghai. Under his direction the S.D.K. carried on its work vigorously. Prizes were offered for the best essays by Chinese M.A. candidates on such subjects as the benefits of the Imperial Maritime Customs and the bettering of China's relations with the West. The holding of provincial and prefectural civil service examinations served as an excellent opportunity to distribute tracts and pamphlets.[37] A fair cross-section of this missionary literature may be obtained from the titles of the works given to all students who attended the Changsha examinations in 1902. Each potential mandarin was given a packet including a copy of the Gospel, a copy of *The Gate of Wisdom and Virtue*, an eighty-page book prepared by Dr. Griffith John, an article on religious toleration drawn from Chang Chih-tung's *Learn*, a tract against foot-binding, an article on the nature of God, and a sermon on creation and redemption.[38] In addition to such works, the S.D.K. and also the Educational Association, which started life as the School and Text-Book Series Committee, published books on science and history,

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[34] Morse, *International Relations*, II, 187.

[35] Martin, *A Cycle of Cathay*, p. 316.

[36] Richard, *Forty-five Years in China*, pp. 217–218.

[37] *Ibid.*, pp. 215–217, 221–224.

[38] *NCH*, October 1, 1902.

some of them translations from Western works but the majority written by the missionaries themselves.[39] To Chinese desirous of gaining a knowledge of Western thought and institutions these works were indispensable, since most of them knew no Western language and had therefore to rely either on translations into the Japanese or those made by the missionaries.

The only other important symptom of Westernization was the sending to America of the first Chinese educational mission under the direction of Dr. Yung Wing.[40] After receiving his elementary education in mission schools in Macao and Canton, he was taken to the United States and there attended preparatory school and later Yale, from which in 1854 he received the first A.B. granted to a Chinese by an American college. After his return to China he formulated a scheme for sending more young Chinese to America for education. He at last succeeded in persuading a group of prominent officials, including the great Tseng Kuo-fan, conqueror of the Taipings, to memorialize on behalf of the project.

They wisely incorporated in their proposal, as a sop to the conservatives, the nomination of Chin Lan-pin, a Hanlin Academician and thus representative of Confucian learning, to share with Yung Wing the control of the proposed mission. The maneuver was successful; in the winter of 1870 the imperial approval was granted. The atmosphere in Peking was comparatively auspicious. Under the leadership of Prince Kung, Wen Siang, and Tseng Kuo-fan the metropolitan government had been dabbling with educational reform by giving patronage to Tungwen College and discussing alterations in the examinations for office. Yung Wing and Chin Lan-pin were chosen to be joint commissioners to head the mission. In all, 120 students between the ages of twelve and fifteen were to go. In the summer of 1871 a preparatory school was opened in Shanghai to give preliminary training to the first group of thirty, who went to the United States in 1872. Yung Wing, remembering his own pleasant schooldays in New England, chose Hartford, Connecticut, as the center of the mission. All went satisfactorily for several years, the annual installments of youths arriving as had been arranged. But unfortunately for the enterprise its firm supporter, Tseng Kuo-fan, had died in 1871, and the dominant position in Peking had passed to Li Hung-chang, who, while not a conservative, was more concerned with military reorganization than with the sending to America of Chinese students. The new educational commissioner who was chosen to succeed Chin as Yung Wing's

[39] For lists of books published by the missionary presses, see Fryer, *Educational Directory for China, 1895,* and *Report of the Society for the Diffusion of Christian and General Knowledge, 1900.*

[40] Yung Wing, *My Life in China and America.* The account of his educational mission given here is drawn from this work.

colleague was an ultra-conservative and a talebearer, who sent home alarming reports of how New England education was ruining the Confucian morals of the young Chinese, and in 1881 all the students were recalled from the United States. They were viewed with some suspicion on their return and were not given official posts of any importance, but in time the prejudice against them wore off. The anti-foreign elements had terminated the mission, but they could not stamp out its influence. After spending the most impressionable years of their lives in the West, it was only to be expected that these returned students would be somewhat critical of China upon their return, especially in view of the treatment which was accorded them. They were thus a factor to be reckoned with in the interpenetration of liberal ideas. Among the members of Yung Wing's mission who subsequently attained prominence were Tang Shao-yi, who served the Manchus in many capacities and was premier of the Republic; Liang Tun-yen, at one time president of the Waiwupu; and Jeme Tien-yew, who won note as a railway engineer.[41]

These evidences of reform, few as they were, seemed sufficient to convince many Chinese and Westerners that China was on the way to renewed vitality. Anson Burlingame, when he served as China's representative to the Occident in 1868–1869, spoke glowingly of China's receptivity to Western inventions, learning, trade, and religion.[42] Marquis Tseng declared in 1887 that "though China may not yet have attained a position of perfect security, she is rapidly approaching it."[43] It is true that in the years after the Taiping Rebellion a portion of the Chinese literati began to take an interest in Western institutions, which formerly they had been inclined to view as the curious ways of a barbarian people, unworthy of imitation by the Middle Kingdom. But to all those who thought that the inauguration of a few railway lines, the formation of one modern army corps and a small navy, and a tentative interest on the part of the government in Western learning constituted an adequate reformation of the Empire the Sino-Japanese War was a rude awakening.

[41] Bland, *Recent Events and Present Policies in China,* p. 81.

[42] Williams, *Anson Burlingame,* pp. 138–139.

[43] Marquis Tseng, "China, The Sleep and the Awakening," in *Asiatic Quarterly Review,* January 1887.

II. THE "HUNDRED DAYS" OF REFORM

It was China's disastrous and dramatic defeat by Japan in 1894 and 1895 which first aroused a considerable number of the educated class to the realization that China's very existence might depend on the acquisition of the Occidental methods and institutions which Japan had studied to such good effect. The defeat at Pingyang, the disaster of the naval battle at the mouth of the Yalu, the northward retreat of the Chinese forces, the loss of the Liaotung Peninsula, and the surrender of Weihaiwei were grave shocks to those who believed that China had sufficiently modernized her army and navy. The news of the unfavorable terms of the peace of Shimonoseki was the last drop of bitterness. Among the younger literati there were signs of unrest and of desire to rejuvenate China so that she might wipe out the great humiliation of her defeat by diminutive Japan. Missionary literature was eagerly read.[1] Many memorials urging reform were submitted to the Throne. Among the memorialists was Sun Yat-sen, one of the group of Cantonese radicals who united to advocate the need of constitutional government. This proposal having been denounced as treasonable, Sun took part in a foolhardy attempt to capture Canton and set up a liberal régime there. When the venture failed, he fled from China with a price on his head and in time became the leader of the revolutionary party.[2] Far more conspicuous among the memorialists in 1895 and for many years thereafter was Kang Yu-wei, the "Modern Sage."

That both Sun and Kang were Cantonese is significant, for Kwangtung Province had long been the center of advanced thought in China. Its people were traditionally anti-Manchu and resentful of control by Peking. "Rebellion makers in ordinary to the Chinese people," J. O. P. Bland has called them.[3] The fact that Canton had for generations been the only port open to foreigners, the proximity of the Portuguese territory of Macao and the British holdings of Hong Kong and Kowloon, and the steady stream of returning Chinese who from Kwangtung and Fukien had gone abroad as emigrants—all these factors made Western ideas more current in Canton than in almost any other part of the empire. A typical product of this liberal milieu was Kang Yu-wei, born in Canton in 1858. He received a classical education of the approved variety, eventually

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[1] Richard, *Forty-five Years in China,* pp. 230–232.

[2] Cantlie and Jones, *Sun Yat Sen and the Awakening of China,* pp. 108–109; Kent, *The Passing of the Manchus,* p. 11.

[3] Bland, *Recent Events and Present Policies in China,* pp. 196–197.

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winning the degree of *chin shih,* or Doctor of Philosophy, a distinction sufficient to guarantee the scope of his classical knowledge.[4] At the age of twenty-nine he started a six-year tour of China, and was greatly impressed by the cleanliness, efficiency, and good order prevailing at Hong Kong and in the model settlement at Shanghai. His interest thus awakened in Western civilization, Kang lost no time in acquiring further knowledge of the Occident through Japanese works and missionary writings and translations.[5] His classical studies brought him to view the works of the sage Confucius in a light radically different from that dictated by the standard commentary of Chu Hsi. Soon the literati were startled by a new commentary on Confucius, which, casting aside the traditional view of the sage as the main prop of conservatism, pictured him as an advocate of progress and change. Like those in the West who have subjected the Bible to the process of literary criticism, Kang passed over the accretion of commentaries on Confucius which more than two thousand years had produced and proceeded to examine, unhampered by the customary views, the original group of writings by and about the sage. These studies convinced him that, while Confucius had declared himself an admirer of virtuous antiquity in a decadent age, his true aim was to lead China away from barbarism and toward civilization according to the means best suited to the times, and that therefore he was in essence not a reactionary but a progressive.[6] Kang also commented afresh on Mencius, the most democratic of ancient Chinese philosophers in his insistence on the right of the people to revolt against the sovereign who had ceased to rule them well.[7]

These liberal interpretations of the classics produced a veritable storm of comment and led to the formation of a new literary party, which claimed Kang Yu-wei as master. Because of his novel views of the classics he received the sobriquet of the "Modern Sage," applied ironically by his opponents but in all sincerity by his disciples. In 1891 he opened in Canton a school for the teaching of the new learning, which included in its curriculum four main divisions—the Confucian classics, Buddhistic literature, Chinese history, and Western learning. Many scholars of eminence enrolled in the school, the best known in after years being

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[4] Richard, *op. cit.,* p. 253.

[5] Tsur, "Kang Yu-wei, the Great Reformer," in *National Review,* July 3, 1915.

[6] Wen Ching, *The Chinese Crisis from Within,* pp. 34 ff. Bland and Backhouse describe this writer as "one of Kang Yu-wei's most ardent disciples," so that his account of the reformer's views may be considered reasonably exact.

[7] Legge, *The Life and Works of Mencius* (*The Chinese Classics,* Vol. II), pp. 143, 151, 305.

Liang Chi-chao, one of the most voluminous and able of Chinese writers on political topics.[8]

The fact that Kang taught Western learning indicates that his interest in the Occident had persisted. After studying through translations the history and philosophy of foreign nations, he produced a group of books to indicate to the educated class in China the state in which their country would soon be if she did not awaken and the examples in Western history on which she should model herself.[9] A glance at the titles of these works is sufficient to show that the scope of Kang's reading had been amazingly extensive, and that his resulting knowledge must of necessity have been superficial. The most sweeping of his efforts was *The Study of Fundamental Principles,* in which he essayed to trace the whole course of modern thought. Another on a similarly vast scale dealt with *The Rise and Fall of the Nations of the World,* which included a considerable study of European colonization of America and Africa, for reasons sufficiently obvious. Kang was not doing research; he was writing propaganda, to convert China to the necessity of reform. It was for this purpose also that he composed *The History of the Glory and Downfall of Turkey.* To Kang, the decline of the Ottoman power had a parallel in the waning of China. Turkey, once so feared by her neighbors, had become the sick man of Europe; China was in a fair way to become the sick man of the Far East.

Kang was never an advocate of republicanism except as an ideal as yet unrealizable for China, and always remained in the right wing of the liberals, in contrast to those like Sun Yat-sen who preached the overthrow of the Manchus and the establishment of popular government. In the English constitution as he understood it Kang believed that he had found the government best suited for China at the time, and to urge its adoption he wrote *A History of the Constitutional Changes in England.* In his *History of Continental Europe* he endeavored to sketch the outline of European history with particular reference to three phases which had value as object lessons—the unification of Germany, the history of France since 1879, and the career of Peter the Great. The Chinese reformer was greatly attracted by the character of the forceful ruler who had persisted in his determination to Europeanize Russia. The moral, for China, of Peter's career was patently one of the benefits which she might obtain from a ruler of similar perception and energy. As we shall see, the

[8] Tsur, "Kang Yu-wei, the Great Reformer," in *National Review,* July 3, 1915; Reinsch, *Intellectual and Political Currents in the Far East,* p. 159.

[9] This account of Kang's literary work is drawn from Wen Ching, *op. cit.,* pp. 31 ff., and to a lesser extent from Tsur's article in the *National Review,* July 3, 1915, also referred to above.

sovereign who then occupied the Dragon Throne, His Imperial Majesty Kuang Hsu, was far indeed from resembling in active qualities the Russian whom Kang put before him as an example.

There was one phase of history which had a more immediate significance for China than all the vicissitudes of European development—the story of the opening and modernization of Japan. Here was ready to Kang's hand a pattern so near in space and time that it was already familiar to his readers. On Japan he wrote two works. The first dealt with the recent literature of Japan, to which Kang was so greatly indebted for his knowledge of the West. The second treatise, which dealt with reform in Japan, was greatly to augment Kang's fame and influence in later years. In it he qualified as a political prophet of no mean ability by making the shrewd statement that if China remained inert it would not be many years before the possession of Liaotung and Formosa passed to her more alert neighbor. The fulfillment of this prediction in 1895 led to Kang's connection with Weng Tung-ho, tutor to the Emperor, who in 1898 recommended Kang to his imperial pupil and thus gave the "Modern Sage" his great opportunity.[10]

Kang was especially eager that the government should take notice of his teachings. His first chance came at the end of the Sino-Japanese War, when the loss of the Liaotung Peninsula and Formosa had come to pass and the air was full of proposals for the revitalizing of China. The agitation was especially acute among the crowd of holders of the *chu jen* or Master of Arts degree who were then in Peking to take the metropolitan examination. After a number of memorials submitted by members of this group had failed to receive official notice, they chose Kang Yu-wei, as one of the most conspicuous figures in the academic world, to draft a grand memorial protesting against the hated treaty of Shimonoseki and proposing reform measures.[11]

The resulting document, submitted early in December 1895, advocated nothing less than the thoroughgoing Westernization of the empire, to be effected at once by imperial decree. The changes to be introduced included: a house-cleaning and reform of the official system; the stimulation of patriotic spirit; the promotion of young and energetic officers to improve the morale of the forces; the removal of the capital inland to Sian; the encouragement of banks, railways, postoffices, machinery, mines, better coinage, and improved methods of agriculture; the establishment of reformatories, a system of poor relief, and patent laws; the develop-

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[10] Kang Yeu Wei, "The Reform of China and the Revolution of 1898" in *Contemporary Review,* August 1899.

[11] An account of this memorial will be found in *NCH,* December 6, 1895.

ment of public libraries, newspapers, and magazines; the sending of Chinese abroad to study foreign countries; and, in the political field, the extension of the right to memorialize the Throne directly (only officials of high rank could then address the Throne without previous censorship of their proposals) and the formation of an advisory council to the Throne to be composed of delegates elected by the people, one for every 500,000. It is especially noteworthy that this memorial, representing the views of candidates for the highest degree under the old system, asked that the same subjects be taught in China as in the West, that technical education be stressed, and that the examinations be revised to fit the new curriculum. The memorial endorsed one native institution, namely, Confucianism, looked upon as a source of national strength and a counterpoise to Christianity. China's state was desperate, Kang declared in conclusion, and required such desperate remedies as the memorial embodied.

Such was Kang's cure for a powerless China. When he had his day of power in 1898 these were the measures which he induced Kuang Hsu to promulgate. The memorial of 1895 indicates the content of the reforms of three years later, but also betrays their weaknesses. Kang's knowledge of the West which he was so anxious to imitate was inadequate. His faith in the efficacy of imperial fulminations was excessive; experience was to demonstrate that to issue a reform edict was one thing and to render it effective another. Above all, Kang failed to consider the important factor of time. So conscious was he of the imperative need of a new order in China that he was prone to disregard the ancient maxim, *festina lente,* which has special applicability when one proposes to alter the whole structure of a most ancient empire. This over-eagerness, natural enough under the circumstances, was one of the chief reasons for the failure of 1898.

The grand memorial was void of results, for the more conservative of the imperial advisers deemed it too radical in tone. Weng Tung-ho asked Kang's co-operation in the drafting of edicts on railways and mining development and the extension of the study of foreign languages, but they never saw the light of the imperial gazette.[12] Perhaps Kang's connection with all these attempts militated against their success, for his radical interpretations of Confucian literature had already been singled out by the government as heretical.[13]

However, Kang was not without high-placed friends in Peking. A number of the chief officials were kindly disposed toward reform if pursued with proper decorum. The younger men in Peking were stirred by

[12] Wen Ching, *op. cit.,* p. 52.

[13] Richard, *op. cit.,* p. 253; *NCH,* November 22, 1895.

the happenings of the immediate past, and a safety valve was desirable. The autumn of 1895, therefore, saw the establishment of the *Kiang Hsueh Hui* or Reform Club, as it was called by Europeans, centering at Peking, but with affiliated societies at Shanghai, Hankow, Nanking, Wuchang, and Tientsin. The moving spirit in the organization was Kang Yu-wei. The Peking group included members of the Hanlin Academy and of the Board of Censors, and undersecretaries of various metropolitan boards. Among its principal members were Liang Chi-chao, Kang's enthusiastic disciple; Weng Ting-shih, a Hanlin member of the family of Weng Tung-ho; Tseng Chung-peh, grandson of the famous Tseng Kuo-fan; Yuan Shih-kai, later to prove Kang's arch-enemy; and Chang Chih-tung's eldest son. These young men turned for advice to Dr. Timothy Richard. They brought him the rules of the society for suggestions and established a paper which took the same title as the missionary publication, *Wang Kwoh Kung Pao* or *Review of the Times,* and consisted chiefly of reprints from that periodical. Reform, for a time, was fashionable, and such well-known officials as Chang Chih-tung and the imperial tutors, Weng Tung-ho and Sun Chia-nai, gave the club their patronage.[14]

The Peking Reform Club succumbed to attack with an ease which showed clearly how tenuous was its hold on life. The post-war sentiments which had afforded it protection inevitably weakened with time. The radicalism of Kang's grand memorial of December 1895 did much to arouse those officials who had never viewed reform schemes with enthusiasm. On January 22 it was denounced to the Throne by a newly admitted member, and was promptly banned.[15] Its members were vigorous in memorializing for its revival, and it was finally reopened, but in an emasculated form.[16]

The failure of the grand memorial and the fading out of the Reform Club did not mean that the reform movement had spent itself or been effectively curbed. Richard, who left for England in February 1896, found on his return that the reformers were hard at work. Undeterred by the closing of the Peking Reform Club, Kang and his disciples were busy encouraging similar associations throughout the southern provinces.[17] Liang Chi-chao had founded in Shanghai the *Chinese Progress,* which became the organ of the reform party, and even, for a brief period in 1898, of the government itself. So pervasive was the new spirit that the hitherto conservative province of Hunan had asked Liang to become the

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[14] *NCH,* November 22, 1895; Richard, *op. cit.,* pp. 253–255.

[15] Richard, *op. cit.,* p. 255. [16] *NCH,* April 7, 1896.

[17] Kang Yeu Wei, "The Reform of China and the Revolution of 1898," in *Contemporary Review,* August 1899.

head of a college on the modern order to be opened in Changsha. One important symptom was the great spread of newspapers. There had been about nineteen in China in 1894; at the end of 1897 Richard set the figure at seventy.[18]

This continued eagerness for reform on the part of a small but active group was partly the reflection of political events. China's humiliation was not limited to her defeat at the hands of the Japanese. The powers who had intervened to lighten for China the severity of the Shimonoseki treaty did not give their services gratis, and China was forced to pay a heavy price for the retrocession of Liaotung. Russia arranged for her reward when Li Hung-chang was in St. Petersburg in 1896 as Chinese representative at the coronation of Nicholas II. Li, in exchange for an alliance with Russia, agreed on behalf of China that Russia should have the right to carry the Trans-Siberian Railway to Vladivostok across North Manchuria. The French, not to be deprived of their deserts, had already asked for and received "rectification" of the Indo-Chinese frontier. The murder of two missionaries in Shantung in November 1897 gave Germany her excuse, and using this act as a provocation she obtained from China in March 1898 a ninety-nine-year lease of the Kiaochow Bay region, plus certain railway, mining, and preferential rights in Shantung Province. The idea of leaseholds was seized upon with avidity by other powers. Russia, who had been eyeing Port Arthur covetously as a desirable ice-free port, procured a twenty-five-year lease of the Liaotung Peninsula and the right to build a railway from Port Arthur to connect with the Chinese Eastern line. On April 19, 1898, France requested a ninety-nine-year lease of Kwangchow-wan, in southern Kwangtung, and a railway concession from Tongking into Yunnan, and received them soon after. Great Britain then entered the lists and secured leases on Kowloon, on the mainland near Hong Kong, and Weihaiwei. Not content with virtual annexation of portions of Chinese territory, the powers next won from China promises not to alienate certain portions of her territory except to the power concerned in the particular non-alienation agreement. Thus, the Chinese government promised Great Britain, on February 11, 1898, that she would never part with the Yangtze Valley, by lease, cession, or any other means, to any power other than Great Britain. Similarly, France staked out the provinces near her Indo-Chinese possessions as her "sphere of influence," Japan marked Fukien as hers in case of eventualities, while Russia regarded the north with a hopeful eye. What with the crop of leaseholds and the ominous non-alienation agreements, it seemed to many early in 1898 that the break-up of China was impending.

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[18] Richard, *op. cit.*, pp. 260–261.

China's impotence in the face of the demands of the foreign powers brought reform zeal to fever heat. "It may fairly be said that, in the spring of 1898, all the younger members of the mandarinate and the gentry were reformers—some of them, perhaps, with a confused idea of what reform meant, but all ready to support moderate reform, and some resolved on radical measures."[19] Just when the campaign of foreign aggression was getting under way, Kang Yu-wei had come to Peking to take up a position as under-secretary to the Board of Works and, moved by the spectacle of China's increasing weakness, he wrote an "Appeal to the Emperor on Behalf of the Nation and the Empire," in which he bitterly described the decay of the dynasty and the people of China and again cited the cases of Russia under Peter the Great and of modern Japan as the models which China must follow. He urged the calling of a council to discuss the measures advisable in the crisis, and pleaded for administrative reform. The conclusion of the appeal stated:

> If Your Majesty will not decide, or will prefer to remain in the old grooves of the Conservatives, then your territories will be swallowed up, your limbs will be bound, your viscera will be cut out, and Your Majesty will scarcely manage to retain your throne or to rule over more than a fragment of your ancient Empire![20]

The appeal was not in vain. The time was at hand when the Emperor would exert himself on behalf of his people, for in June 1898 was to begin the "Hundred Days" of reform.

The Emperor who thus came forward as the protagonist of reform was His Imperial Majesty Kuang Hsu, then a young man in the "late twenties." He owed his imperial position chiefly to the determination and ambition of his aunt, the Empress Dowager Tzu Hsi. When the Emperor Hsien Feng had died in 1861, during the troublous times of the Taiping rebellion, he had left as his heir a boy of five, the son not of the imperial consort but of his secondary wife. During the minority of the new Emperor, who assumed the reign name of Tung Chih, China was thus under the control of a co-regency, the power being shared between the consort of the late Emperor, Tzu An, and the mother of Tung Chih, who now became known as Tzu Hsi. In 1872 the Emperor came of age. He did not live to enjoy his power long. He died in 1875 and was soon followed to the grave by his widow and their unborn child.[21] Tung Chih's successor

[19] Morse, *International Relations,* III, 132. [20] Wen Ching, *op. cit.,* pp. 53–54.

[21] It has often been intimated that Tzu Hsi put her son out of the way so that she might continue to control the state (see Bland and Backhouse, *China under the Empress Dowager,* p. 119). Princess Der Ling rejects this story, stating definitely that Tung Chih died of smallpox. She does assert, however, that Tzu Hsi urged Tung Chih's widow to commit suicide as an act of marital piety and in order to avoid having to surrender to her the regency (Der Ling, *Old Buddha,* pp. 171–173).

For a personal sketch of Emperor Kuang Hsu in 1898. See Boulger - History of China, p. [illegible]

was his cousin, Tsai Tien, also a grandson of the Emperor Tao Kuang, but possessing as his most valuable qualification the fact that he was Tzu Hsi's nephew. His selection was in violation of immemorial custom, for being of the same generation as Tung Chih, he was unable to render proper filial reverence to the spirit of his predecessor, and this aspect of the succession aroused many protests.

From the very outset then, the Emperor Kuang Hsu (his reign name, meaning "Brilliant Succession") was simply a tool in the hands of the Empress Dowager. His minority was passed under her control, especially after the death of the co-regent, Tzu An. Even when in 1889 Tzu Hsi surrendered the nominal control of the government, she kept the reality of power, appointing and dismissing officials and reading all state documents.[22] She also arranged the marriage of Kuang Hsu to her niece, so that she might have first-hand reports on all his doings. Outwardly at least, the Emperor exhibited proper respect for his august aunt. But it is not to be wondered at that he came to desire the reality and not the mere semblance of power.

Unfortunately for his aspirations and hopes, Kuang Hsu was not of the material which makes successful autocrats. Frail, delicate, and sensitive, he was no match for the shrewd woman who, while apparently in retreat after her long regency, still watched the course of affairs with a wary eye. Kuang Hsu had his moments of decision and his flashes of temper, but they were not indicative of a very stern and resisting quality. Emotionally he was intense, intellectually he was diffuse. One cannot read the story of his struggle with the powers which in the end overcame him without feeling a profound sympathy for him as a man of fine impulses and intentions, hampered by the enervating conditions which surrounded him and by some deficiency which made him incapable of grappling successfully with practical problems.[23] He possessed an abundance of that quality that the sage Mencius had declared to be the very essence of the true imperial ruler, benevolence embracing all within his kingdom; yet had it not been for his contact with the "Modern Sage," Kang Yu-wei, these humanitarian and patriotic impulses would probably have remained half-formed, nebulous ideas destined to have no definite expression.

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[22] Bland and Backhouse, *op. cit.*, p. 162; Wen Ching, *op. cit.*, p. 112.

[23] For an illuminating description of Kuang Hsu, see Boulger, *A Short History of China*, p. 353. It has sometimes been declared that Kuang Hsu was mentally deficient. Princess Der Ling, who used to see him regularly in the days after he had become a prisoner, rebuts these accusations. She declares that she always found him intelligent and very well informed about the Occident (Der Ling, *Two Years in the Forbidden City*, pp. 113–115).

As a child, Kuang Hsu had shown a great interest in Western mechanical toys, and as he grew older he secured a small telegraph, a steam launch, and a narrow-gauge railway, which were employed in the Forbidden City for his amusement and that of the court.[24] The men who directed his education, men such as Marquis Tseng and Weng Tung-ho, were liberal in their inclinations. When in 1893 the Emperor desired to learn English, two Tungwen graduates were chosen to instruct him, though there is no record that he made remarkable progress.[25] On the sixtieth birthday of the Empress Dowager a handsome copy of the New Testament was presented to her by a large number of Chinese Christian women. Whether or not the gift had any effect on Tzu Hsi, it at least aroused the interest of the Emperor, who at once procured missionary literature of all sorts. China's losses in the Sino-Japanese War still further directed the interest of the Emperor toward the West and he read eagerly all the books relating to the foreigners that he could obtain.[26]

Japan's victory and the opening episodes of the "battle of concessions" filled Kuang Hsu with a great desire to take the lead in the regeneration of his empire. Yet it was impossible for him to be a free agent. He might wish to disregard his aunt, but the wish did not automatically eliminate her as a power in the administration. Moreover, all around Kuang Hsu moved the drama of court intrigue, in which he himself was inevitably involved as the figure upon which one faction pinned its hopes of power. Most of the officials at the capital were allied with one or the other of two groups, the northern, or Manchu, party, or the southern, or Chinese, group. Such a division was natural enough. The Manchus had originally established their supremacy by conquest, and many native Chinese felt a certain sentiment against their preponderant influence, while the Manchus tended to draw together to strengthen their own interests. There was also a line of cleavage between the younger and more enthusiastic men and the older and more conservative. There was no hard and fast division, but the liberals and younger Chinese, many of whom came from the southern provinces, tended to gather about Weng Tung-ho and Pan Tsu-yin, while the Manchus and those of a more conservative turn of mind looked to Hsu Tung and Li Hsung-tsao. As far as the Emperor was concerned Weng was in a very advantageous position, for he had seen many years' service as imperial tutor, with free access to the sovereign's person. His relations with the Empress Dowager were not so fortunate, for she shared the dislike felt toward him by her lifelong friend

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[24] Headland, *Court Life in China*, pp. 115–122.

[25] Martin, *A Cycle of Cathay*, p. 316.

[26] Richard, *op. cit.*, p. 224; Headland, *op. cit.*, pp. 123, 126–128.

and adviser, Jung Lu. The Empress thus supported the Manchu aggregation and the Emperor the southerners, so that the groups came to be popularly known as "Old Mother's set," and "Small Lad's set."[27] An interesting comment on the state of affairs is to be found in the report of an interview with Kang Yu-wei in 1898, after the coup d'état had terminated his brief career as *deus ex machina.*

According to K'ang's account the relations between the Empress-Dowager and the Emperor have never been anything but strained. She has resented all attempts on his part to exercise real power, and he has felt deeply the position of inferiority and subjection in which she has until recently succeeded in keeping him. Until the Emperor became an ardent convert to the cause of reform this struggle seems to have been mainly one for power generally, without any striking difference in the ends for which power was to be used, and high officials sought the favour of the Emperor or Empress according to their belief in the probability of the one or the other obtaining or keeping the upper hand, the opinions of these officials as to the necessity of reform or their contrary determination to keep to the old ways, not entering into the question. It was, in short, a conflict involving no difference of principle.[28]

The year 1898 had scarcely begun before there were indications of the unprecedented events which it was to witness. On January 3, Kang Yu-wei was given an audience with the Tsungli Yamen, thanks to the influence of his advocate, Weng Tung-ho. He expounded to that body his views on reform, which were reported to Kuang Hsu, who called on Kang to submit them in the form of a memorial. The resulting document reiterated the suggestions made in the grand memorial of 1895. Kang also sent to the Emperor his works on England and Continental Europe, a comparative diagram of all nations, Timothy Richard's *History of the Nineteenth Century,* and translations of Western books.[29] Thus was laid the basis for the later co-operation between the Emperor and the scholar.

The decrees of June 11 are usually taken as having begun the "Hundred Days of Reform," but from January on appeared a number of decrees on military reform, inspired by the northern leaders, Hsu Tung and Kang Yi, a demonstration that the Manchu group was not uncompromisingly opposed to change *per se.* The decree of January 17 contained these significant words:

Since our war with Japan we have received successively a number of memorials from both our Metropolitan as well as Provincial officials of all grades, recommending methods by following which our Empire could be strengthened and our integrity

[27] Bland and Backhouse, *op. cit.,* pp. 180–181.

[28] *China No. 1 (1899),* inclosure 2 in No. 401, *Memorandum of Conversation with Kang Yu-wei on Voyage from Shanghai to Hong Kong,* September 27–29, 1898.

[29] Kang Yeu Wei, "The Reform of China and the Revolution of 1898," in *Contemporary Review,* August 1899.

maintained. This sort of thing has gone on for quite two years, yet whenever questions of vital importance arise with Foreign Powers, these very men who sought to advise us were ever found wanting and powerless to do anything, as if their hands were firmly tied. This is the case with them now, in a crisis where we are beset on all sides by powerful neighbours who craftily seek advantage from us and who are trying to combine together in overpowering us. This is because they see our defensive preparations in a state of neglect and decay and our fleet small and insignificant. In our opinion, therefore, the question of the present day is that we begin in reforming ourselves and diligently reorganize our defences.[30]

The measures decreed to achieve this end were the elimination of peculation, especially in regard to the insertion of dummy names on the regimental rolls and the graft involved in the collection of internal transit dues (*likin*); the formation of volunteer corps to "strengthen the defenses of the Empire with a human bulwark of brave and loyal hearts"; and permission to officials to recommend for posts the men best qualified, regardless of official rank.

This edict inspired a number of reform memorials. Jung Lu himself advocated the inclusion in the military examinations of subjects on the intercourse of China with foreign nations. Another memorial suggested that in the future candidates for military rank be tested in their skill with the rifle rather than the traditional but useless bow and arrow. One official went so far as to propose the disbandment of all troops trained in the old manner and the establishment of modern military schools throughout the empire.[31] These memorials were considered by the Grand Council and Board of War, which decided that henceforth candidates for military degrees would be tested in the use of firearms and that the old practice of reproducing by heart passages from the classical books on military tactics would be abolished.[32]

Not much was done to carry out the imperial commands for the abolition of "skeleton" battalions and similar devices which redounded to the financial benefit of the officers involved and the weakening of the empire. A few officials reported on the methods which they had used in reforming the troops under their jurisdiction.[33] On the whole, however, the

[30] *The Emperor Kuang Hsu's Reform Decrees, 1898* (reprinted from the *North-China Daily News*, January 17), referred to hereafter as *Reform Decrees.* As the reader will observe, the English translations of imperial edicts which appeared in the *North-China Herald* in these years are often neither idiomatic nor grammatical. The writer has, however, deemed it better to quote them exactly rather than to make changes which might in some cases make the meaning less close to that of the original.

[31] *Reform Decrees,* January 28, February 16.

[32] *Ibid.,* March 19.

[33] *Ibid.,* February 11, March 7.

Emperor was blocked by the same force which was to contribute immensely to his ultimate failure—the inertia of the provincial administrators.

A few novel suggestions on other subjects than military affairs were received during this period. A scheme was sanctioned for the raising of a national loan from the people of China by the sale of so-called "Chao Hsin" bonds. The imperial edict declared that in the sale of the bonds "neither force nor coercion would be allowed" on the part of officials, but numerous memorials soon made it plain that in many provinces the bonds were used as a means of extorting money from the people, and on September 7 their sale was ordered stopped.[34] On February 16 a memorial from Wang Peng-yun, a censor, proposed the establishment in Peking of a college of foreign literature and science, an idea which was embodied in the great edict of June 11.[35]

In late May, an event occurred which both hastened the reform effort and made its failure more certain—the death of Prince Kung. This experienced statesman, wise, moderate, and of sound judgment, had been perhaps the one person at court to whom all deferred. His death left the Emperor with no experienced guide except Weng Tung-ho. But with the death of his patron, Prince Kung, Weng felt sure that his days in office were numbered. Early in June he applied for a week's leave on account of illness, as a step preparatory to saving face if the crash came. He also took this occasion to recommend Kang Yu-wei to the Emperor, in the hope that Kang would take his place as an opponent of the faction of the Empress Dowager and the Manchus. Weng's expectations were fulfilled. He was dismissed from office on June 15. The prime mover in this act was not, of course, the Emperor, but the Empress Dowager; to put it briefly, the dismissal of Weng was the price which the "Old Buddha" demanded for her sanction of the famous edicts of June 11. The Emperor had prudently submitted the draft decrees to his aunt, who had no objections to the policy therein outlined provided that it did not lessen the time-honored privileges of the Manchus; but, at the same time, she insisted on the dismissal of Weng, and Kuang Hsu had to agree.[36]

Thus, with the Empress Dowager's approval, Kuang Hsu set out on his endeavor to awaken and strengthen China by copying the methods of her potential destroyers, the powers of the West. The first of the two decrees of June 11, which proclaimed the opening of a new era, empha-

[34] For decrees regarding the Chao Hsin Bonds, see *Reform Decrees*, February 4, 27, May 18, July 5, August 22, September 7.

[35] *Ibid.*, February 15.

[36] Bland and Backhouse, *op. cit.*, pp. 184–185; *China No. 1, (1899)*, No. 268.

sized the need of having able diplomatic representatives, and ordered the officials of the realm to recommend

. . . . the men they think best qualified for such posts, who, by their general conduct, have shown their education and abilities to be of a practical and high order, and who are not enveloped in the narrow circle of bigoted conservatism, and a clinging to obsolete and unpractical customs.[37]

In the second decree the Emperor opened his heart to his people. After summarizing the measures which had already been taken "for starting our country on the great road of Progress," Kuang Hsu uttered his plea for the co-operation of the whole nation in the establishment of the new order.

Some of our aged ministers who have grown grey in the service of the State and whose fidelity is unquestioned, in their anxiety for the Empire, have argued that we ought to stick to the very letter of our ancient institutions and cast away from us the suggestions in favour of a new régime. In fact, all sorts of suggestions have been made by any number of memorialists most of which are empty and vain and impracticable. Let us ask what other country except our own is there that is labouring under such difficulties because of being behind the times? What would our condition be if we do not set about at once to drill and arm our armies after modern methods? Will we be able to cut down such expenses? Our scholars are now without solid and practical education; our artisans are without scientific instructors; when compared with other countries we soon see the glaring difference between our strength and the strength of others; and when we compare the ready wealth of this Empire with those of other countries the difference is still greater, to our detriment. Does any one think that in our present condition he can really say with any truth that our men are as well drilled and well led as any other foreign army; or that we can stand successfully against any of them? We are conscious of the fact that, unless we in our own person decide firmly and strongly, our commands will not go far in execution, while the greatest dangers lie in the allowing of ignorant persons to meddle and talk and argue amongst themselves upon subjects they know not of. It is like applying water to quench fire—all to no purpose.

The methods of government inaugurated by the Sung and Ming dynasties, upon investigation, reveal nothing that is of any practical use or that may be of advantage to us. In China, for instance, we have the ethics and doctrines of the sects of Taoism and Buddhism; do they at all agree with the tenets compounded by our five ancient Imperial Sages and three Kings? They are like summer to winter, at opposite extremes to one another. Changes must be made to accord with the necessities of the times. It is apparent that we must issue a plain and unvarnished decree on the subject so that all may understand our wishes. Let this therefore be made known to one and all in the four corners of this Empire, from Prince to Duke, from highest to lowest among the officials of the capital and the provinces, from Court Minister to the most humble of our subjects—let them know that it is our earnest and sincere desire that one and all bend energetically to the duty of striving for higher things, to show all that they are men ambitious to succeed and to advance their country; let us, keeping in mind the morals of our sages and wise men, make them the basis on which

[37] *Reform Decrees*, June 11.

> to build on newer and more advantageous foundations. We must also select such subjects of Western knowledge as will keep us in touch with the times and diligently study them and practise them in order to place our country abreast with other countries. Let us cast off from us the empty, unpractical, and deceiving things which obstruct our forward progress, and strive with one-heartedness and energy to improve upon all things that we have learned; let us eliminate the crust of neglect that has accumulated on our system, and cast away the shackles which bind us. In a word, let us evolve useful things out of those which hitherto have been useless, and let us seek by able instructors to fashion the materials in our possession. With these objects in view let us strive toward advancement and progress.

After this earnest declaration, the Emperor decreed the establishment of a new university in Peking, to be open to all, in order to "have many able and willing helpers in the great and arduous work before us, of putting our country on the level with the best of the Western powers."[38]

The new policy was accepted with some show of enthusiasm and a number of young men were recommended to the Emperor as well fitted to assist him in his plan of reform. As in 1895, reform became for the time the fashion. Even Jung Lu, strong partisan of the Empress Dowager, urged military reform and recommended Chen Pao-chen, well-known as a radical.[39] The edict of June 13 contained the names of the most important of the new men who had been brought to the notice of the Emperor. Kang Yu-wei himself and Chang Yuan-chi, a third-class secretary of the Board of Punishments, "men of deep learning and exceptional abilities and progressive ideas," were ordered to appear before the Emperor on June 16.[40] Also mentioned in the edict was Tan Sze-tung, the son of the Governor of Hupeh, and later to be one of the "martyrs" executed after the coup d'état. Even before becoming a disciple of Kang Yu-wei, Tan had been well known as a writer, lecturer, and reformer of educational methods.[41] The other new advisers whom the Emperor took unto himself in June were Liang Chi-chao, Kang's most notable disciple, and Huang Chun-hsien, who as Chinese Consul-General at Singapore had had considerable contact with foreigners.[42] Later Yang Jui, Liu Kuang-ti, Lin Hsio, and Tan Sze-tung were formed into a special council to advise the Emperor on reform measures. All of them paid for the service with their lives when the Empress Dowager resumed power.[43]

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[38] *Reform Decrees,* June 11.

[39] *Ibid.,* October 8; Bland and Backhouse, *op. cit*, p. 197.

[40] *Reform Decrees,* June 13.

[41] For an account of the career and writings of Tan Sze-tung see Reinsch, *op. cit.,* pp. 140–147.

[42] *Reform Decrees,* June 13.

[43] *Ibid.,* September 5.

It is said that Kang Yu-wei refused a place on the Grand Council, preferring to avoid the increased jealousy and hatred which would result if he thus suddenly attained high official preferment.[44] After his audience of June 16, Kang Yu-wei had complete ascendancy over the mind of Kuang Hsu. The official gazette records this audience as the only one which the reformer received, but as a matter of fact hardly a day passed that Kang and some of his associates did not meet with the Emperor for long discussions in which they evolved the startling series of edicts which aimed to revolutionize the life of China.[45]

Even a brief examination of the decrees of this period will reveal their vast scope and the variety of innovations which they were intended to introduce. Education, agriculture, manufacturing, trade, administration, army and navy—hardly one possible field for change escaped the diligence of the reformers during their brief hegemony, the imperial prerogative excepted; the fact that the movement was being carried on under imperial auspices and through the exercise of the autocratic power of the sovereign limited it in the latter regard.

It was not without reason that the Emperor had decided on the establishment of a university as the first visible sign of his new policy. He and his young advisers were firmly convinced of the necessity of a different and more widely diffused education than that then in vogue. As long as the mass of the people were ignorant of the reformers' purposes and admission to official life was still the reward of an accumulation of Confucian lore, the innovators at the capital were in a precarious position. It may almost be said that their chief aim was the creation of a public opinion to support their projects. Kang Yu-wei, after his fling at statecraft was over, declared that his failure had been due in good part to the general ignorance of the ends for which the Emperor and he had striven.[46] The reformers made all possible speed to arouse a national spirit in favor of reform, but the three months vouchsafed them proved wholly inadequate to the task.

The new educational system was outlined in the decree of July 11. At the head was to stand the Imperial University and below it a group of middle schools based on grade schools. Until this plan could be realized, existing schools and colleges were to be used, after some modernizing of their curricula. The problem of funds was a stumbling-block in the way of this as of every other innovation in China. The Emperor's edict pre-

[44] Wen Ching, *op. cit.*, pp. 62–63.

[45] Bland and Backhouse, *op. cit.*, p. 189; *Reform Decrees*, September 17, translator's note.

[46] Beresford, *The Break-up of China*, p. 194. From an account of an interview with Kang Yu-wei, September 30, 1898.

sented a number of expedients—the taking over of the surplus of the China Merchants' Steam Navigation Company, the Telegraph Administration, and a Canton lottery; inducements to private individuals to donate funds and facilities; and the conversion of temples into schools to save the expense of erecting new buildings. When the Empress Dowager faced the need of money for her great educational program of 1904 she could find no better means than those hit upon in 1898. The problem of textbooks was a considerable one, which was met for the time being by an order that local officials at once set up translation bureaus to prepare the necessary books,[47] a scheme which could not be productive of good results in view of the paucity of trained translators. Nothing was said as to the source of the teachers for the new schools, though there were not in all China more than a few men competent to instruct in the new subjects. A later edict provided for a sort of school board of learned scholars in each locality to take charge of the initiating of preparatory schools.[48]

The direction of these educational changes was in the hands of Sun Chia-nai, who had aided the Reform Club in 1895. Although a conservative, Sun was notably loyal to the Emperor. Fortunately for his future career, he was also highly thought of by the Empress Dowager and thus passed unscathed through the days which saw the degradation of so many of Kuang Hsu's supporters. Early in August he presented to the Emperor the proposed regulations for Peking University, which the Emperor approved, declaring, "The memorialist has apparently combined and harmonised for the University the most valuable and feasible of the regulations and rules observed in Japanese and European Universities with the learned suggestions of high officials both in Peking and in the provinces."[49] Dr. W. A. P. Martin of Tungwen College was chosen to serve as the head of the new institution.

Upon the change in the school system was based a revision of the content of the civil service examinations. Kang and his followers had determined on the abolition of the "eight-legged" essay (*wen chang*), skill in the composition of which had so long been the open sesame to official life. The edict of June 23 effected this change.[50] A month later the Emperor gave his approval to the proposal of Chang Chih-tung and Chen Pao-chen, Jung Lu's protégé, that hereafter the examinations for the degrees of *chu jen* and *chin shih* (M.A. and Ph.D., to give Western equivalents) include essays on (1) the history and government of China, (2) "modern practical subjects," such as scientific problems and the governments of foreign countries, and (3) the Confucian classics. The

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[47] *Reform Decrees*, July 11.
[48] *Reform Decrees*, July 29.
[49] *Ibid.*, August 9.
[50] *Ibid.*, June 23.

new conception of closer correlation between the officeholder's duties and his preparation meant the dethronement of elegant calligraphy, heretofore an essential part of a mandarin's training. Candidates were no longer to be graded on their penmanship, and the palace examination, at which calligraphy had done much to win for certain Ph.D.'s the crowning honor of membership in the Hanlin Academy, was abolished.[51]

The newspaper was another agency on which the reformers relied to hasten their intellectual renaissance. One of the most interesting of the reform edicts is that which pleads with almost Miltonian fervor the benefits of a free press. The inspiration for this pronouncement is attributed to Sun Chia-nai, but its sentiments are such that it seems likely that he was merely a mouthpiece for some more radical member of the reform clique. The memorial in question led off tactfully enough by comparing the service of the press to the "ancient custom of officials calling upon the people for poems and literary essays in order to find out the thoughts filling the minds of the masses"; so much for the potent argument from tradition. The passage dealing with newspapers is worth quoting:

> The memorialist therefore suggests that it will be most important to grant liberty and license to newspapers to write freely and succinctly on all topics whether advantageous or disastrous to the country, thereby giving warning notes and assisting those in power how to remedy matters and the like. These newspapers, moreover, could translate the news and editorials of foreign newspapers for the enlightenment and knowledge of officials and merchants, students and people, of what is going on in other countries. Such newspapers would then be more than valuable not only to local administrations but also to enlighten all as to what is proper in regard to foreign intercourse. . . . . Now all newspapers must make it their aim to write broadly and plainly and in a liberal spirit on all subjects affecting the welfare of the Empire; they should not be circumscribed in their efforts to enlighten their readers, nor should they refrain from writing boldly against all frauds and misgovernment thereby preventing us from learning the exact truth and facts.

As a beginning the *Chinese Progress,* which Liang Chi-chao had been editing in Shanghai, was chosen as the official organ of the government. Kang Yu-wei was made director of the enterprise, subject to the duty of consulting with Sun Chia-nai in all matters regarding state subsidized papers, such as the *Chinese Progress* was now to be. This meant the probable removal of Kang to Shanghai, where the paper had its offices.[52]

Liang, replaced in the *Chinese Progress* office by Kang Yu-wei, was to superintend the translation of Occidental literature and the preparation of works suitable for use in schools, a work of vast importance in view

[51] *Reform Decrees,* July 20, August 19.

[52] *Reform Decrees,* August 9; and Bland and Backhouse, *op. cit.,* 511, say that Sun, "peace-loving and prudent," favored the plan as a means of getting the troublesome Kang into a less central location.

of the impending educational reorganization of the country. Despite his undoubted intelligence and zeal, his qualifications were not of the best, for he knew no other languages than Japanese and his own.[53] Liang, realizing his own shortcomings, turned for aid to Jesuit missionaries, whom he proposed to make directors of a college of translators to be established in Shanghai.[54]

Chang Chih-tung's *Learn* (known in English as *China's Only Hope*) was adopted as a sort of party platform by the reformers. The Emperor ordered its distribution to all officials and students for the purpose of acquainting them with the ideas which were to guide the China of the future. The influence of *Learn,* both during and after the ill-fated venture of 1898, was great and its contents deserve notice. It is a valuable statement of the conceptions of Western civilization held by one of the best-informed men in China and of the manner in which he hoped to harmonize Chinese and Western ways so as to give new vitality to the ancient institutions by the introduction of reanimating elements. There are in the book strange misconceptions of Occidental life, the inevitable result of a wide and somewhat uncritical reading, but there are also many shrewd judgments and a liberal attitude which compels respect. The whole work resounded with ardent loyalty to the Manchu dynasty, charging China's backwardness to the blind and prejudiced official class. The panacea which Chang had to offer was a fusion of Confucian morality with Western military and industrial methods.[55] This blending was to be effected by methods similar to those being essayed by Kuang Hsu at the time. The literati were to be awakened by travel, schools which taught subjects of practical use, and the spread of newspapers, all following the course already pursued by Japan. Chang also urged the advance of religious toleration and the suppression of the use of opium, two reforms which did not make up part of Kang's scheme, at least so far as the enactments of the "Hundred Days" can witness. In the midst of all this change, the indigenous culture of China was not for a moment to be forgotten. The service to be performed by the added Western elements was merely the strengthening of China against the dangers of attack and partition.[56] Chang wisely noted the uselessness of talking in Mencian fashion of the all-compelling force of benevolence and of pinning faith on disarmament conferences.

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[53] Vinacke, *Modern Constitutional Development in China,* p. 39.

[54] De la Servière, "Une Université française en Chine" in *Relations de Chine,* July–October, 1918, pp. 72–73, quoted in d'Elia, "Un Maître de la jeune Chine: Liang K'i-tch'ao" in *T'oung Pao,* XVIII, 254.

[55] Chang Chih-tung, *China's Only Hope,* translated by S. I. Woodbridge, p. 122.

[56] Chang Chih-tung, *op. cit.,* p. 63.

> . . . . if we talk of disarmament to the other countries, without the force to back up our words, we will become the laughing-stock of the world. . . . . If countries are evenly matched, then International Law is enforced; otherwise, the law is inoperative.[57]

His study of the West had not been in vain! He declaimed against the folly of inaugurating a parliament before education had paved the way, and opposed republicanism, as did Kang Yu-wei.[58]

Ku Hung Ming, conservative disciple of Chang Chih-tung, has asserted that *Learn* was meant as propaganda against Kang and his followers. He has described a nocturnal conference held on the roof of Chang's cotton mill at Shanghai during the "Hundred Days," at which Chang gave vent to his distress at the precipitancy with which Kang Yu-wei was rushing into a course but half-understood and expressed his resolve to formulate a saner program of reform, which he embodied in *Learn*.[59]

Yet any study of *Learn* and of the reform decrees of 1898 shows a very considerable resemblance between the views of Chang and those of Kang, a similarity which in part may have been due to personal contact, for Kang was at one time a protégé of Chang.[60] They differed chiefly in tempo; Chang insisted on the necessity of preparing the ground by education before attempting other changes, while Kang was leading in the rapid production of a swarm of radical reform decrees. Nevertheless both were members of a group which wished, while preserving intact Confucianism, the essence of Chinese civilization, to buttress that civilization by borrowings from the West. Ku Hung Ming, strict Confucian as he was, deplored the conversion of his chief, Chang Chih-tung, to moderate liberalism, and was eager to differentiate between Chang's doctrines and those of Kang Yu-wei, for whom he had no love; he may also have desired to find a reason in extenuation of Chang's *volte face* after the coup d' état when he telegraphed the Empress Dowager to make all haste in punishing those very men with whom he had been in co-operation not long before.[61]

To return to the further summary of the enactments which the reformers sponsored, Kuang Hsu's solicitude on behalf of his people led him not only to provide for their education but to desire better conditions for agriculture, trade, and industrial development. The most pretentious move was the establishment of a special Chief Bureau of Agriculture, Arts, and Commerce, charged with the inauguration throughout the empire of agricultural schools and newspapers, scientific farming methods, and modern labor-saving machinery. It was to be assisted in its Herculean

[57] Chang Chih-tung, *op. cit.*, pp. 140–142.

[58] *Ibid.*, pp. 58, 62.

[59] Ku Hung Ming, *The Story of a Chinese Oxford Movement*, p. 28.

[60] *Ibid.*, p. 27.

[61] Bland and Backhouse, *op. cit.*, p. 220.

labors by provincial branch offices.[62] A later decree shows the rather naïve ideas of the Emperor's advisers on the introduction of the great mechanical inventions:

> We command the Bureau of Arts and Commerce . . . . to purchase models of the various kinds of machinery in modern use so as to educate the masses and that the latter may learn to manipulate the machinery for their own benefit and use.[63]

Official rank, ennoblement, or decorations were to be the rewards of those who "write practical and useful books, invent articles of use, machinery," and the like. Patent and copyright regulations were also promised. Similar signs of favor were to be bestowed on those who established "schools, foundries, big guns and small arms factories."[64] The first sign of any voluntary organization which would contribute to the work in hand was greeted with approval; an agricultural association which had been formed at Shanghai was to serve as a model for such organizations all over the Empire, and a proposal for the establishment of commercial societies in the chief coast cities was passed on to Chang Chih-tung and Liu Kun-yi as the viceroys best situated to carry it into effect.[65] The building and ownership of Chinese railways by her own people was to be encouraged by the establishment of schools to train young men in such work. A similar arrangement was ordered for mining.[66] A peremptory order that the work on the Lu-Han line be hastened was issued, and sanction was given to the building of a short connection between Peking and the Western Hills.[67] The roads in Peking were to receive attention such as they had needed for years. Even the characteristically Chinese industries of tea-growing and silk-manufacturing were to be brought up to date, for the decline in their export had begun to raise fears in the minds of some of the more Westernized, who saw their country threatened with a so-called "unfavorable balance of trade."[68]

Somewhat less attention was given in the edicts to army and navy reorganization than might have been expected, although the subject had been on the boards for many years and progress had been mainly illusory. The emendation of the military examinations continued.[69] A pronouncement of August 10 directed the organization of naval colleges and training

[62] *Reform Decrees,* August 21.

[63] *Ibid.,* September 8.

[64] *Ibid.,* July 7.

[65] *Ibid.,* July 4, August 29.

[66] *Ibid.,* August 10.

[67] *Ibid.,* June 26, September 10.

[68] *Ibid.,* September 11.

[69] *Ibid.,* July 6, September 12.

ships throughout the maritime provinces.[70] The only really noteworthy decree apropos of national defense was one approving the formation of a sort of national militia, with universal military training. The experiment was to be tried first in Kwangsi and Kwangtung, and if it proved effective there, was to be extended. The outline of the system, suggested by Chang Yin-huan, one of the most prominent of the reformers, was:

> . . . . that each city of the Empire should invite a certain proportion of its citizens to give up part of their time and train as soldiers, that those having received their training be allowed to return to their avocations giving place to another fresh body of citizens, and so on until every male inhabitant of the city and district shall have had a soldier's training and thus enable him to be called out at any time, either to keep the peace or to fight hostile invaders. This National Army will only be an auxiliary force to supplement the regular forces in time of war.[71]

The grave need of modern judicial machinery in China had been one of Kang's chief preachments, but in the "Hundred Days" little was accomplished in that direction. On July 29 Kuang Hsu ordered the courts of the various boards in Peking to make a clean sweep of the cases on their dockets, some of which had apparently been awaiting decision for a length of time hardly surpassed by the Court of Chancery in its most dilatory days. This done, new modes of procedure would be instituted.[72] The only further development of the idea of an improved judiciary appeared in the memorial of one Tsai Chen-fan, who supported the appointment of "special judges to try civil and criminal cases, on a similar basis to those of the West, for no reform can be said to be complete unless this branch of the public service be also thoroughly reformed and remodeled." Most of his suggestions were turned over to the great administrative bodies in Peking for a "grand deliberation."[73]

In fiscal affairs, the chief adoption from the West was the device of an annual budget.[74] This innovation was assuredly not welcome to the rank and file of Chinese officialdom, for of the sums collected from the people only a comparatively small amount was ever applied to the actual expenses of government, while a much larger part went to supply the officials up and down the line with their inevitable "squeeze." But if the introduction of a budget was disturbing to the ordinary official, the decree of August 30 brought news that was positively alarming. The Emperor had launched a strenuous campaign against sinecure posts—and their name

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[70] *Reform Decrees,* August 10.

[71] *Ibid.,* September 5.

[72] *Ibid.,* July 29.

[73] *Ibid.,* September 16.

[74] *Ibid.*

was legion. Among the highly honorary positions which were cut off in the prime of their uselessness were those of the Supervisorate of the Heir Apparent, a pleasant occupation when there was, as in 1898, no heir apparent to supervise, the Office of Transmission for Imperial Edicts, the Court of Banquets, the Court of State Ceremonial, the Court of the Imperial Stud, and the Court of Revision. Nor did the elimination stop there, for governorships of the provinces of Kwangtung, Hupeh, and Yunnan were to be abolished, since these provinces also had over them a viceroy who could very well take over the duties once performed by the governor. The Directorate-General of the Yellow River too was to vanish, and its functions were to pass to the Governor of Honan. The grain and salt services were found to be prolific of posts which imparted honor rather than obligation; hence a wholesale abolition of all grain and salt taotaiships which had ceased to have any concern with grain and salt. Even smaller fry were attacked. A great reduction was ordered in the ranks of petty officials who had been nominally engaged in river conservation and the capture of salt-smugglers. The officials who were thus deprived of their posts were assured that they would be given employment elsewhere in the governmental system,[75] but this was small solace, since the positions to which they would be transferred would almost certainly be more arduous than those which had been taken from them.

The decree of August 30 did not quench the Emperor's eagerness for retrenchment, for not long afterward he issued a rescript which boded no good to the occupants of Grand Canal captaincies, also posts which had outlasted their usefulness.[76] If things were to go on at this rate the good old times would soon be gone forever and an officeholder's lot would cease to be a happy one. Many an official who had at first viewed the Emperor's reform efforts with equanimity now began to see in them a threat to the established and comfortable ways which had acquired the powerful sanction of custom and were not to be broken without profoundly affecting the whole fabric of Chinese life Therefore there was almost no protest or regret on their part, and less on the part of the people, who had glimpsed only imperfectly what was under way, when there appeared on September 21 an edict by which the Emperor suddenly renounced all active control of the government in favor of his august aunt, the Empress Dowager, Tzu Hsi.

> Kuang Hsü's reign was over; there remained to him only the Imperial title. He had had his chance; in the enthusiasm of youth and new ideas he had played a desperate game against the powers of darkness in high places, and he had lost.[77]

[75] *Reform Decrees,* August 30. [76] *Reform Decrees,* September 10.

[77] Bland and Backhouse, *op. cit.,* p. 211.

For a brief time the Emperor had failed to walk warily among the intrigues, ambitions, and jealousies with which Peking was rife. New men were exalted, old officials were threatened with disgrace. The members of the imperial clan were ordered to give up their comfortable existences in Peking for the hazards of foreign travel.[78] Vested interests and long-countenanced perquisites were endangered by the imperial zeal. And to focus the general dissatisfaction there occurred two incidents which showed beyond the shadow of a doubt that the Emperor's new policy meant death to the old order.

On June 20 the imperial gazette proclaimed that two censors had accused Hsu Ying-kuei, President of the Board of Rites, of being an obstructor of progress.[79] In response to these charges, Hsu sent in a vitriolic memorial denouncing Kang Yu-wei as a charlatan and revolutionary. The Emperor, greatly angered, would gladly have dismissed Hsu but for the protection accorded him by the Empress Dowager, who was impressed by his warning against "The Modern Sage."[80] The episode had a sequel in the petition of the censor, Wen Ti, who declared that Hsu had been attacked for reasons of personal spite and called for the degradation of his accusers. Wen Ti was promptly dismissed by the Emperor, the Empress Dowager refusing to intercede for him. She was biding her time.[81]

The commotion resulting from these charges and countercharges was surpassed by the furore raised by the case of Wang Chao, third-class secretary of the Board of Rites. Late in August he submitted a memorial proposing changes certain to outrage the conservative—the abolition of the queue, the adoption of Western dress, the proclamation of Christianity as the state religion, the formation of a parliament, and a visit to Japan by the Emperor and Empress Dowager.[82] The heads of the Board of Rites kept this document from Kuang Hsu on the theory that such impious proposals should not be allowed to offend the imperial wisdom. On September 1 appeared an edict pouring on them the wrath of their sovereign, who declared himself competent to judge the worth of all memorials and demanded that Wang Chao's suggestions be handed up at once.[83] Three days later the two presidents of the Board of Rites (one of them was Hsu Ying-kuei) and its four vice-presidents were dismissed from office,

[78] *Reform Decrees,* June 15.

[79] *Ibid.,* June 20.

[80] Bland and Backhouse, *op. cit.,* pp. 192–194.

[81] *Ibid.,* p. 195; *Reform Decrees,* July 8.

[82] Smith, *China in Convulsion,* I, 145; Headland, *op. cit.,* p. 143.

[83] *Reform Decrees,* September 1.

and Wang Chao was raised in rank as the reward of his efforts on behalf of enlightenment.[84]

From that time on, the peace of the "Old Buddha's" retreat was gone. The dismissed officials and all who sympathized with them importuned her daily to exert herself and save the empire from the danger of ill-considered reform. The tenseness of the situation was increased by the decree of September 14 which proposed that Manchu bannermen, who had long enjoyed state-subsidized leisure, should enter some useful employment.[85] The Emperor was going too far; he had violated his promise of June to leave the Manchu privileges untouched. Even then the Empress Dowager did not move. Not till her personal safety was threatened did she intervene.

Kang and his followers realized that they stood on the edge of a volcano. At any moment the conservatives might win over Tzu Hsi to activity and the reformers would be lost. They resolved to chance everything on a coup d'état. Kang had long been very bitter against the Empress Dowager and had insistently urged upon the Emperor the wisdom of rendering her powerless to check the growth of a reorganized China.[86] The essential prerequisite to any such step was control of the northern army, but its commander was Jung Lu, old and faithful servant of Tzu Hsi. Before she could be reduced to impotence, he must be put out of the way. The first move came on September 16 with the elevation of Yuan Shih-kai, erstwhile provincial judge of Chihli, to the vice-presidency of a metropolitan board and the post of Inspector-General of Army Organization and Drills for the Peiyang Army. The edict effecting this change contained the significant sentence:

> We trust that Yuan Shih-kai, bearing in his mind the importance of the period we are now passing and the crisis of the moment, will use his best endeavours to deserve his promotion which is given as a token of the great trust and confidence we intend to repose in him.[87]

Yuan, once a member of Kang's reform club of 1895, had been selected by the reformers as their tool.

The Empress Dowager got wind of what was going on, through private sources of information, and ordered Kuang Hsu to arrest Kang Yu-wei for calumniating her.[88] Kang was warned of his danger and fled, but his adherents realized that prompt action was necessary to save themselves

[84] *Ibid.*, September 4.

[85] Bland and Backhouse, *op. cit.*, p. 195; *Reform Decrees*, September 14.

[86] Bland and Backhouse, *op. cit.*, p. 197–198.

[87] *Reform Decrees*, September 16.

[88] Bland and Backhouse, *op. cit.*, pp. 203–204.

and their projects. Exactly what took place on September 20 it is impossible to say. The usually accepted account is that given by Bland and Backhouse in their life of Tzu Hsi. A second version is that of the chief actor, Yuan Shih-kai, who gave out a statement during the revolution when his "betrayal" of the Emperor in 1898 was being used against him; it is therefore open to criticism as an *ex parte* account.[89] To add to the difficulty, Timothy Richard, who was intimate with the young reformers, and Princess Der Ling, who talked with Kuang Hsu during his subsequent captivity, have given additional details. Richard asserts that the reformers had no intention of killing Jung Lu, who had co-operated with them, and that subsequent reports to that effect were untrue.[90] Princess Der Ling states that Kuang Hsu instructed Yuan to go directly to the Summer Palace and to imprison Tzu Hsi there, doing her no injury, but that Yuan, deciding to use the whole affair for his personal advancement, went instead to Jung Lu, Tzu Hsi's faithful adviser, told him that he (Yuan) had been ordered to kill the Empress Dowager, and thus precipitated the long incarceration of Kuang Hsu.[91] The two more commonly accepted versions, however, agree in stating that the reform clique desired Yuan to go first to Tientsin and do away with Jung Lu, after which, with the army, he was to imprison the Empress Dowager in the Summer Palace. It is usually said that Kuang Hsu himself gave these instructions to Yuan in an audience held early and with greatest secrecy on the morning of September 20. Yuan, however, later declared that he got his orders not from the Emperor but from one of the reformers, who insisted that such was Kuang Hsu's wish but had no edict in vermilion pencil to bear out his assertion. In any case, Yuan went to Tientsin during the day and revealed the plot to Jung Lu, to whom he was bound by the bonds of blood brotherhood. What reception did his revelation receive? Yuan stated that Jung Lu greeted the announcement with equanimity, and informed him that the scheme was already known to Tzu Hsi through a leakage of information from the palace and that steps were being taken to topple Kuang Hsu from power and dispose of his rash advisers. The other tale is that Jung Lu, horrified by the danger which threatened Tzu Hsi, hastened to her presence and divulged the news given him by Yuan, and that there followed a grand council of all her supporters, who besought her to save herself and the Empire. This version is borne out by the honors showered on Jung Lu after the coup d'état, which may well have been the Empress Dowager's repayment for great service rendered. Whatever the preliminary events,

[89] *Ibid.*, pp. 205–207; *The Times*, November 21, 1911. Both these versions are summarized in Kent, *The Passing of the Manchus*, pp. 17–22.

[90] Richard, *op. cit.*, p. 265.

[91] Der Ling, *Old Buddha*, chapter xxvi.

the outcome stands in no doubt. The next morning Kuang Hsu was seized and conveyed to the island in the lake in the Winter Palace grounds, never again to figure actively in state concerns. The fate which he had planned for his august aunt had fallen upon himself.

Tzu Hsi's triumphant return to power was announced on September 21 in a decree redolent with the suave irony of which Chinese state papers furnish many examples. In the name of the captive Emperor, it declared:

> The nation is now passing through a crisis, and wise guidance is needed in all branches of the public service. WE ourselves have laboured diligently, night and day, to perform OUR innumerable duties, but in spite of all OUR anxious energy and care WE are in constant fear lest delay should be the undoing of the country. WE now respectfully recall the fact that Her Imperial Majesty the Empress Dowager has on two occasions since the beginning of the reign of H. M T'ung-Chih, performed the functions of Regent, and that in her administrations of the Government she displayed complete and admirable qualities of perfection which enabled her successfully to cope with every difficulty that arose. Recollecting the serious burden of the responsibility WE owe to OUR ancestors and to the nation, WE have repeatedly besought Her Majesty to condescend once more to administer the Government. Now she has graciously honoured Us by granting OUR prayer, a blessing indeed for all OUR subjects. From this day forth Her Majesty will transact the business of Government in the side hall of the Palace, and on the day after to-morrow WE ourselves at the head of OUR Princes and Ministers shall perform obeisance before Her in the Hall of Diligent Government. The Yamêns concerned shall respectfully make the arrangements necessary for this ceremonial. The words of the Emperor.[92]

Thus ended Kuang Hsu's valiant effort at national regeneration. Brooding over his failure in the following years, he himself saw only one reason for it, the treachery of Yuan Shih-kai.[93] In reality, Yuan's action merely hastened a debacle which was inevitable. Kuang Hsu was unfitted to serve as leader in the movement he so strongly desired. Despite his dreams and visions, he was essentially passive. Only the disgrace of his country and the urging of the impetuous Kang Yu-wei spurred him for a brief time into feverish action. As to Kang himself, his qualifications for the task in hand were hardly better than those of his patron. He, too, was fired with an ardor born of desperation but was lacking in any experience of practical politics. It is impossible to read some of the edicts issued during the "Hundred Days" without being stirred to admiration of the fine patriotic and humanitarian zeal which inspired these men.[94] Yet their three months of dominance closed with nothing more tangible than a noble

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[92] Bland and Backhouse, *op. cit.*, p. 208. A slightly different and less polished translation will be found in *Reform Decrees*, September 21.

[93] *Ibid.*, p. 460.

[94] See *Reform Decrees*, September 12, an edict which particularly shows the fine idealism back of the attempt.

but inoperative series of paper reforms. What militated most against them was the inability of Kuang Hsu to inspire the official class with confidence. In 1898 he was an untried factor in politics, and his rash explosive outburst was not calculated to win the support of wary and experienced officials. Kang himself later admitted that the Emperor had forfeited the backing of the very class on which he had every need to depend.

> Whereas any given official might previously have felt assured that if he adhered to the Emperor's side and the Emperor ousted the Empress from power he would have the reward of comfortable continuance in office on the old lines, it was now evident that supporting the Emperor meant acquiescence, if not zealous co-operation, in changes that might seriously affect the whole position of the official class, curtailing their authority and diminishing their pecuniary gains, besides exposing them to the risk of being removed to make place for younger men in fuller sympathy with the Sovereign's ideas.[95]

Had there been a great popular desire for reform, the officials, between the upper and nether millstones, might have done their part. As yet, however, the lethargic mass of the people was not stirred. Kuang Hsu's appeal to a widespread spirit of patriotism came too soon. That spirit did not yet exist. All during the summer of 1898, Kuang Hsu and Kang Yu-wei spent themselves in the formulation of the mass of decrees flung forth from Peking at almost incredible speed. The Emperor proposed, but the local officials throughout the empire disposed. Into the placid routine of their existences, hitherto so little troubled by direct commands from Peking, had now intruded an alarmingly active central government which ordered them to action—and such action! To men steeped in Confucianism, the proposed changes were astounding. Even had they been disposed to carry out the imperial commands, sheer ignorance would have handicapped them. The average mandarin, faced with orders to buy machinery, start newspapers, open public schools, organize agricultural bureaus, confiscate temples, and the like, saw only one prudent course—to watch and wait. Peking was far away, and there was no use of being in too great haste to upset the old order. The imperial gazette was full of pathetic edicts, calling on the officials to exert themselves to fulfill their sovereign's will.[96] These appeals had no result. The officials did nothing, sure that the pyrotechnic display at Peking could not go on forever. Their inaction was justified by the coup d'état, which in reinstating Tzu Hsi seemed to foretell years of comfortable conservatism.

The leaders of the 1898 reform movement have often been blamed for failing to enlist the co-operation of the foreign powers. It was perhaps

[95] *China No. 1 (1899)*, Inclosure 2 in No. 401.

[96] For such edicts, see *Reform Decrees*, June 26, July 16, 24, August 24, 26, 27, 30, September 12.

the last expedient which would have occurred to them. The "battle of concessions" was the background for the "Hundred Days"; the powers seemed to leer at China, waiting like ogres to devour her.[97] It was in the face of this menace that the reformers worked with furious haste to inject into China before it was too late some of the force in which the barbarians excelled. What Kang said later of Kuang Hsu held good for the attitude of the group about him:

> . . . . he saw his country about to sink in the earth, about to be buried in ruins, about to burst like an egg, about to be divided up, about to mortify, about to be torn in shreds, about to become like India or Anam, or Burmah—a dependent of another Power! . . . . If one had but the slightest knowledge of this, at every thought of it one would get so anxious as to burst into perspiration, and be so angry as to make one's hair stand on end, one's eyes stare out of their sockets, and not be able to endure it for a single day. How much more one of our Emperor's sacred intelligence, who saw the prosperity of other nations as clear as the sun in the heavens, and thought of all his people in dust and ashes![98]

With reaction back in the saddle Kuang Hsu's advisers paid dearly for having abetted him. Reform in China had its first martyrs in Yang Sheng-hsiu, Yang Jui, Tan Sze-tung, Liu Kuang-ti, Lin Hsio, a descendant of the Lin of opium fame, and Kang Kuang-jen, the younger brother of Kang Yu-wei. These young men were arrested after the coup d'état, and received summary execution, due to the importunities of the violent reactionary, Kang Yi. The chief object of Tzu Hsi's hate was Kang Yu-wei, but he had escaped her. The Empress Dowager's demand for his arrest some days before the coup d'état had convinced Kuang Hsu that his favorite was in imminent danger. Warning was conveyed to Kang through the decree of September 17 telling him to hasten to Shanghai at once to take up his duties in connection with the *Chinese Progress*.[99] Tzu Hsi, restored to power, lost no time in sending telegraphic orders for Kang's arrest and decapitation, but through a series of fortunate chances he made his way to Tientsin, on the same train with Yuan Shih-kai on his way to reveal the reformers' plot to Jung Lu. At Tientsin he took ship for Shanghai, but before he arrived there the British authorities had learned of the harsh measures proposed against him and had arranged, unofficially, his transfer to a P. & O. steamer, which carried him safely to Hong Kong.[100] There he could view with security the philippics launched against

[97] For a discussion of the interrelation between the policies of the foreign powers and the 1898 reform attempt, see Steiger, *China and the Occident*, chapter iv.

[98] Kang Yeu Wei, article cited, *Contemporary Review*, August 1899.

[99] *Reform Decrees*, September 17, 26.

[100] *China No. 1 (1899)*, No. 401; inclosure in No. 401, inclosure in No. 379; Richard, *op. cit.*, pp. 264–266.

him by the Empress Dowager but in the name of his friend and patron, Kuang Hsu. Fortunate for Kang that he was safe in Hong Kong; he was pilloried as arch-deceiver of his sovereign and an intended revolutionary, death by "slicing" was pronounced upon him, spies were sent to seek him out, his writings were ordered burned, and his property was confiscated.[101] Liang Chi-chao was also sentenced to death, but like his teacher gained his way to safety. Thus had two more liberals joined Sun Yat-sen in exile.

Others of the Emperor's supporters suffered dismissal or great loss of rank. Space permits but the mention of a few of them—Chen Pao-chen, who had recommended Kang Yu-wei;[102] Chang Yin-huan, whose life was saved only by the representations of the British Minister;[103] and Weng Tung-ho, who though he had been out of office since June, was cashiered in a remarkable edict purporting to be the words of Kuang Hsu and accusing him of having steadily corrupted his sovereign by wrong training in youth and of having committed an unforgiveable offense by his approval of Kang Yu-wei.[104] Some, seeing the writing on the wall, hastened to petition that punishment be meted out to them, hoping thus to appeal to the imperial clemency, which had been much vaunted in the edicts after the coup.[105] Among those who thus asked a fitting penalty was Jung Lu, who had recommended Chen Pao-chen.[106] He could do so with no apprehensions, for he was already marked as that man above all others whom Tzu Hsi delighted to honor. Soon after the overthrow of Kuang Hsu, Jung Lu was made a member of the Grand Council, commander of all armies and fleets in the Peiyang administration, and Comptroller-General of the affairs of the Board of War. So little effect did his self-accusation have that even before sentence had been pronounced on him he received the additional office of commander of all forces in the neighborhood of Peking, and the penalty which he ultimately received was only a nominal one.[107] Many other officials who had not obeyed Kuang Hsu's orders too briskly were given increases in prestige and power.

Kuang Hsu seemed for a time on the verge of "mounting the Dragon" for his last journey on high. The imperial gazette made ominous references to the decline of "Our" health, which were generally received as indica-

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[101] *Reform Decrees,* September 29, October 1, November 19, December 28.

[102] *Ibid.,* October 6.

[103] *Ibid.,* December 4.

[104] *Ibid.,* September 29, October 4.

[105] *Ibid.,* October 8.

[106] *Ibid.,* September 28, 29, October 11, 16.

[107] *Ibid.,* September 25.

tions of his approaching demise. In Peking there was much talk that Kuang Hsu would surely pass out with the old year, if not before.[108] Yet he lived to spend ten years in duress. He owed his survival in part to the insistence of the foreign representatives that he be given proper medical examination.[109] But even more was he indebted for the doubtful blessing of longer life to the Empress Dowager's fear of active protest in the southern and liberal provinces, which had been more attached to the reform movement. All six of the martyrs were Chinese, and indeed Cantonese, and after their deaths Tzu Hsi found it necessary to insist by edict that she had no intention of practicing discrimination in favor of her fellow Manchus.[110] Moreover, Kuang Hsu, now rendered entirely harmless, continued to serve as a decorous cloak for the fact that China was once more ruled by a woman. Just as Kuang Hsu's advocates disappeared from the scene, so did his projected reforms. For a time the empire was edified by the spectacle of the Empress Dowager offering reform sentiments with one hand and rescinding reform decrees with the other. On September 26, a blanket decree repealed most of her nephew's paper reforms. The sinecure posts which he had threatened were restored, to set at rest the fluttering dovecotes of the official class; the greater freedom of memorializing which he had instituted was given up in favor of the old regulations governing petitions to the throne; the *Chinese Progress* was banned as a potential source of restlessness; of the projected school system, only Peking University and such institutions as had already been established in provincial capitals were allowed to survive. At the same time, the decree emphasized the desire of the government for certain reforms especially suited to the time, these being the encouragement of trade, the arts, and better agriculture, and, especially, an extension of military drill.[111]

The proposed encouragement of agriculture and trade was rendered illusory by a decree abolishing the central bureau established by Kuang Hsu and leaving the direction of such improvement to the provincial mandarins.[112] Suggestions to commute the annual rice tribute to a money payment were met by insistence on the greater virtue of the good old way.[113] The eight-legged essay was once more enthroned as the *pièce de résistance*

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[108] *Ibid.*, September 25; Bland and Backhouse, *op. cit.*, pp. 215–216; Conger, *Letters from China*, pp. 24–25.

[109] *China No. 1 (1899)*, Nos. 363, 373.

[110] *Reform Decrees*, October 8.

[111] *Ibid.*, September 26.

[112] *Ibid.*, October 9.

[113] *Ibid.*, October 2.

of the literary examinations;[114] no one then could foresee that three years later Tzu Hsi herself was to give it its death-blow. The literati and all who aspired to that status were assured that the old examination system would go on unchanged. Even the tests for aspirants to military rank were to resume their old form.[115] Tzu Hsi expressed fear that the duties of the abolished governorships might be weighing too heavily on the viceroys who had inherited them, and this solicitude was soon confirmed by an announcement that the posts in question, and also that of Director-General of the Yellow River, were to be restored.[116] Such sinecures often were most convenient rewards to the loyal but not over-gifted. The Empress Dowager seemed especially apprehensive of any spread of sentiment in favor of the abortive effort of Kuang Hsu. Newspapers were suppressed, with the assertion that they were the scheme of the dregs of the literati to excite the masses.[117] China seemed to be settling back easily and quickly into the old ways.

The Empress Dowager never ceased to protest her zeal for any good and needful change.[118] The decree of October 7 urged all officials to continue to search for talented men able to better the condition of the people. Edicts counseled special kindness to soldiers. Moreover, Tzu Hsi seemed in her old age to have developed an almost pathological sympathy for bandits and robbers. Officials were urged to use leniency in dealing with those who took only a minor part in bandit raids, and the laws of the empire were combed for precedents for kind treatment of mere accomplices. The real object of these maneuvers was made apparent in a decree urging all such men to repent and change their life of lawlessness for one of military service for the empire.[119] The only trace of reforming energy left alive in governmental circles was the Empress Dowager's desire to recruit the defense forces of the realm, and even then the methods she approved were dubious and the results more dubious still, as the Boxer movement showed.

The year 1898 left as a residue a distinct anti-foreign impetus. This was the natural outcome of the policy pursued in China throughout the nineteenth century by the powers and, more specifically, of their depredations during the time since the German action in Shantung. To the feeling of dislike thus engendered the unsuccessful reform experiment added its

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[114] *Reform Decrees,* November 13.

[115] *Ibid.,* October 11, November 1.

[116] *Ibid.,* October 9.

[117] *Ibid.,* November 16.

[118] *Ibid.,* October 7.

[119] *Ibid.,* October 7, 24, 25, November 6, 7, 8.

increment. Kang Yu-wei had drawn on the West for the devices by which he hoped to save China from disaster, and his victorious opponents readily extended their hatred for Kang to his preceptors.[120] As time went on the Empress Dowager's tender interest in military augmentation came to have unpleasant possibilities for the foreigners resident in China. Yet Tzu Hsi herself knew well the wisdom of *suaviter in modo, fortiter in re*. To demonstrate her conciliatory attitude toward all things and persons of Western origin, she deigned to receive in audience the wives of the diplomats in Peking. It was a pleasant social occasion, and "The Dowager-Empress made a most favourable impression, both by the personal interest she took in all her guests and by her courteous amiability."[121] Tzu Hsi's affability did much to turn diplomatic opinion in her favor. It was the fashion even among the Occidentals in Peking to decry Kuang Hsu's misguided zeal.[122] To all outward seeming, the 'Hundred Days" had achieved nothing. But here and there the imaginations of individuals had been stirred, and the day when a more pretentious and hopeful effort at regeneration was to take the stage was brought perceptibly nearer. Reform soon was to have a greater and more forceful advocate than Kuang Hsu—Tzu Hsi herself.

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[120] *China No. 1 (1899)*, No. 401.

[121] *Ibid.*, No. 426.

[122] *Ibid.*, No. 401.

III. THE EMPRESS DOWAGER'S CONVERSION

When Tzu Hsi again "dropped the curtain" and assumed control of the state, reaction seemed enthroned and reform a forgotten interlude. But in 1900 came the Boxer rising, with its futile effort to drive the foreigners into the sea and restore China to her ancient calm and isolation. There is no need to deal here with the events of that "midsummer madness,"[1] but its consequences are of transcendant importance in this exposition. For the second time in her life the Empress Dowager perforce went on her travels, and few journeys in all history have had such a profound educational value as the westward tour of Her Majesty Tzu Hsi in the years 1900 and 1901. In her exile the "Old Buddha" had to endure conditions which were harsh beyond anything dreamed of in the Summer Palace, though only too comparable to the ordinary lot of most of her subjects. "We [the Empress Dowager and the Emperor] were both clad in the meanest of garments, and to relieve our hunger we were scarcely able to obtain a dish of beans or porridge. Few of our poorest subjects have suffered greater hardships of cold and hunger than befell us in this pitiful plight" she later declared, perhaps not without a self-congratulatory exaggeration of past trials.[2] While she faced privation, her mind was filled with thought of the vengeance which the enraged powers might work on China and especially on the woman who had done so much to support the Boxers. This dread was shared by many of her advisers, such as Chang Chih-tung, and expressed itself in agitated discussion of the wisdom of removing the capital from Peking to a less vulnerable spot. Such proposals won the prompt negative of Jung Lü, however, and that statesman's advice was at a premium,[3] in view of the fact that he had earlier given Tzu Hsi the wise—and unheeded—warning that to give ear to the Boxers was folly. Disquiet among the exiled court was allayed by intimations that the foreigners had no intention of dismembering China or of punishing her *de facto* ruler, and in time word came that the Court was to be allowed to return to Peking.[4]

The Tzu Hsi who was thus permitted to resume her regency for the helpless Kuang Hsu was no longer the conservative woman who had

[1] For the events of the Boxer Rebellion, see Clements, *The Boxer Rebellion;* Smith, *China in Convulsion;* Steiger, *China and the Occident.*

[2] Bland and Backhouse, *China under the Empress Dowager,* p. 379.

[3] *Ibid.,* pp. 353–354; *The Times,* July 1, 1901.

[4] See *United States Foreign Relations, 1901,* Appendix, pp. 34–35.

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given countenance to the activities of the Boxers. She had left Peking as the discredited patron of reaction; she was to return as the leader of reform. She had not learned to admire the foreigners; there was little in their conduct in China during the nineteenth century which entitled them to respect or affection. In her eyes they were still worthy of the epithet, "foreign barbarians." But she had come to realize that the foreign powers were strong, stronger by far than the Chinese Empire, despite its more venerable civilization, and that for the sake both of the Chinese people themselves and of the enfeebled Manchu dynasty China must borrow from the West the institutions and ideas which seemed to be the secrets of its power. Tzu Hsi faced the issue squarely, and throwing overboard her conservative prejudices of a few short months before, came forth as the advocate of what was in substance (though she took pains to deny the fact) the policy which Kuang Hsu had put forward in 1898. It was a remarkable demonstration of educability on the part of an elderly woman long accustomed to the atmosphere of a palace, an environment notoriously not conducive to open-mindedness.

A decree of August 20 issued in the name of the luckless Kuang Hsu, but expressing the sentiments of his aunt, marked the official début of the new policy. In it the Emperor, in accordance with Chinese political theory, accepted responsibility for the disasters which had befallen his people and called on high provincial and metropolitan officials to come to his side to aid in the formulation of a progressive policy suited to the times.[5] This document was followed on January 8, 1901, by a decree issued from Sian which was virtually the charter of the reform movement under imperial auspices which filled the remaining years of Tzu Hsi's dominance. Speaking again in the name of the Emperor, she expatiated on the desirability of change to meet the exigencies of the time but carefully foreswore any intention of following the treacherous and anarchical policy of Kang Yu-wei. There are times when, to save one's face, it is not expedient to call a spade a spade. Following this disclaimer came the real meat of the edict:

We have to-day received Her Majesty's orders, and learn that she is now thoroughly bent on radical reform. Nevertheless, whilst we are convinced of the necessity of blending in one harmonious form of administration the best customs and traditions of Chinese and European Governments, there is to be no talk of reaction or revolution. The chief defect in our system of administration is undoubtedly too close an adherence to obsolete methods, a too slavish devotion to the written word; the result is a surfeit of commonplace and inefficient officials, and a deplorable lack of men of real talent. The average commonplace man makes a god of the written word, whilst every bureaucrat in the land regards it as a talisman wherewith to fill

[5] Bland and Backhouse, *op. cit.*, pp. 393–395.

his purse, so that we have huge mountains of correspondence eternally growing up between one government office and another, the value of which is absolutely *nil* so far as any good to the country is concerned. On the other hand, men of real ability lose heart and give up the public service in disgust, prevented from coming to the front by the mass of inefficiency that blocks the way. Our whole system of government has come to grief through corruption, and the first steps of progress in our Empire are clogged by the fatal word "Precedent."

Up to the present the study of European methods has gone no further than a superficial knowledge of the languages, literature and mechanical arts of the West, but it must be evident that these things are not the essentials upon which European civilisation has been founded. The essential spirit of that civilisation is to be looked for in the fact that real sympathy and understanding exists between rulers and people, that officials are required to be truthful in word and courageous in action. The teachings handed down to us by our sacred ancestors are really the same as those upon which the wealth and power of European countries have been based, but China has hitherto failed to realise this and has been content to acquire the rudiments of European languages or technicalities, while changing nothing of her ancient habits of inefficiency and deep-rooted corruption. Ignoring our real needs we have so far taken from Europe nothing but externals; how can we possibly hope to advance on such lines? Any reforms to be effective and permanent must be made with a real desire for efficiency and honesty.

We therefore hereby decree and command that the officials concerned shall now make close enquiry and comparison as to the various systems of government in force in European countries with special reference to those which obtain in China to-day, not only as regards the constitution of the Court and central government, but also concerning those things which make for the prosperity of our subjects, such as the system of examinations and education, the administration of the army and the regulation of finance. They will be required to report as to what changes are advisable and what institutions should be abolished; what methods we should adopt from abroad and what existing Chinese institutions should be retained. The things we chiefly need are a constant supply of men of talent, a sound basis of national finance, and an efficient army. . . . .

The first essential, however, more important even than the devising of new systems, is to secure men of administrative ability. Without talent no system can be made to succeed. If the letter of our projected reforms be not illuminated and guided by this spirit of efficiency in our officials then must all our hopes of reforming the State disappear into the limbo of lost ideals. We fully recognize that foolish adherence to the system of promotion by seniority has been one of the main factors in bringing about a condition of affairs that is almost incurable. If we would now be rid of it, our first step evidently is to think no more of selfish interests, but to consider the commonwealth only and to secure efficiency by some new and definite method, so that competent persons only may be in charge of public affairs. But if you, our officials, continue to cling to your ancient ways, following the ruts of procrastination and slothful ease; should you persist in evading responsibility, serving the State with empty catchwords while you batten on the fruits of your misdeeds, assuredly the punishment which the law provides stands ready and no mercy will be shown you! Let this Decree be promulgated throughout the land.[6]

[6] For the full text of this decree, quoted here in part, see Bland and Backhouse, *op. cit.*, pp. 419–424.

The critique of Chinese officialdom contained in this plain-speaking document was a just one based on long experience, and the reforms designated as most needful were worthy of their selection. But again there arose the problem which had baffled Kuang Hsu—how to transmute imperial decrees into facts. Before making any definite move to carry out the intentions she had announced, Tzu Hsi first turned to the disposal of certain problems which were pending. The son of Prince Tuan, the Boxer leader, who had been proclaimed as heir apparent to Kuang Hsu in 1900, was degraded from that high estate, as an indication that the party of which his father had been leader was definitely out of favor.[7] On February 13, 1901, an illuminating pair of edicts appeared, in one of which the Empress Dowager, with a weather eye to posterity, ordered the rectification of the dynastic records of the Boxer period. The other was a formal penitential decree, in which the Throne again acknowledged its guilt but also pointed out that it had been in part the dupe of bad advisers and disloyal officials.[8] These matters disposed of, Tzu Hsi then turned to the problem of making the much-needed changes in the Chinese governmental machine. April 23 saw the appointment of a very important body, the Board of State Affairs, charged with the task of collecting reform proposals and separating the wheat from the chaff. To this board were appointed such men as Prince Ching, Jung Lu, and Li Hung-chang, while Liu Kun-yi and Chang Chih-tung, who had done much to earn the Throne's gratitude by preserving peace in the Yangtse region, were to serve as advisory members.[9] Decrees were then issued designed to make a start toward procuring for China the "constant supply of men of talent" and the "efficient army" which the edict of January 28 had set as prime desiderata.[10]

On October 6, 1901, the court began the long journey from Sian to Peking. En route Tzu Hsi issued decrees to assure the foreigners of her intended good behavior, promising that the Emperor would promptly receive the diplomatic representatives on his return, while she herself would condescend to entertain the wives of the ministers as she had in pre-Boxer days. Far more radical than these proffers of hospitality was the invitation to the members of the diplomatic group to witness the

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[7] Bland and Backhouse, *op. cit.*, pp. 381–382.

[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 375–381.

[9] *The Times,* April 24, 1901. On August 20, 1901, this body issued a series of regulations to govern its conduct, which contained, *en passant,* some very acute observations on the needs of China at the time. (*United States Consular Reports,* January 1902.)

[10] These decrees will be discussed together with the other changes in educational and military arrangements of the period 1901–1911.

ceremony of the return of the court to Peking.[11] While the ministers did not attend, not all of them having presented their credentials, their wives surveyed the entry of the court from a vantage point, and so much attention did Tzu Hsi pay to these unaccustomed spectators that, in the eyes of one observer, "the chief significance of the day's events was the complete setting aside of the traditional deification of Chinese Royalty."[12]

Tzu Hsi had need to court support and affection wherever she could. She was back in her capital, but on every side there were to be heard hostile voices. A few spoke in her favor, giving her credit for genuine change of heart; but the burden of the refrain was that nothing good could be expected from the old woman who had suppressed Kuang Hsu and befriended the Boxers. Some were so bold as to declare that the only hope for China was the restoration of the Emperor to real power.[13] Whatever hopes Kuang Hsu may have entertained that the powers would require his restoration, he was doomed to disappointment, for in the end both foreigners and Chinese acquiesced in the continuation of Tzu Hsi's régime. Her government showed itself fairly competent in dealing with uprisings and thus mollified the foreign representatives, and, though there were many signs of unrest, they did not come to a head.[14] Moreover, Tzu Hsi presented to those interested in the personalities of the great a touching picture of penitence and amiability. No doubt with inward scorn and distaste, but with outward aplomb she repeated with undiminished success the maneuver of receiving the ladies of the diplomatic set, who thoroughly enjoyed the opportunity to extend magnanimous forgiveness to the imperial penitent.[15] As Tzu Hsi had told Jung Lu, condescending courtesy was an unfailing method of handling barbarians.[16] While she practiced suavity and friendliness toward the wives of the ministers, she chose at the first formal audience for the ministers themselves to appear herself on the Dragon Throne, with the Emperor seated below her. There was to be no possible doubt as to who was ruler of the Middle Kingdom.[17]

Jung Lu came in for his share of obloquy. At first this man who had done much to mitigate for the imprisoned foreigners the full force of the siege of the legations was popularly regarded as the leader of the pro-Boxer party,[18] and only the determined declarations of Liu and Chang that Jung Lu had personally directed them to disregard the orders for

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[11] Bland and Backhouse, *op. cit.*, pp. 400–401.

[12] *United States Foreign Relations, 1902,* pp. 142–143; *The Times,* January 9, 1902.

[13] For examples of this type of criticism, see *NCH,* February 5, April 30, 1902.

[14] *United States Foreign Relations, 1902,* pp. 159–181.

[15] *NCH,* February 12, 1902.

[16] Bland and Backhouse, *op. cit.*, pp. 412–413.

[17] *United States Foreign Relations, 1902,* p. 205.

[18] *NCH,* January 8, 1902.

the extermination of foreigners ultimately rehabilitated him in the eyes of Occidentals.[19] Whatever the foreigners might think of him, the Empress Dowager had no doubt of his worth, and from the return of the court to Peking to the end of his life, his influence was dominant. Unfortunately, his moderate and wise counsels were ended by his early death in April 1903. Indeed the period after the Boxer rising saw the disappearance of some of the most conspicuous of the older advisers of the Throne. Li Hung-chang, wily and corrupt but able, died in November 1901, after having been sent as peace delegate to reap what the Boxers had sown. Less than a year later came the death of Liu Kun-yi, long regarded as one of the most honest and capable of Chinese officials;[20] after a long career as a government servant, he had risen to be Viceroy at Nanking, where during the Boxer days he exercised a restraining hand with respect to anti-foreign demonstration.

The stage was cleared for the sensational rise of Yuan Shih-kai. Few statesmen of any country have passed through such vicissitudes as Yuan was destined to experience. In his youth he was known as the arrogant representative of China in Korea at the time when friction between Japanese and Chinese rose to fever heat; in 1895 he appeared as a member of the Peking Reform Club; in 1898 he "betrayed" Kuang Hsu; during the Boxer rising he suppressed Boxerism in the province of Shantung, of which he was then governor; and when the new era of reform dawned, he was established as viceroy of the metropolitan province of Chihli. Stranger adventures were ahead. After yeoman service for the Empress Dowager as the pattern of what a reforming official should be, he was cast aside by her successor the Regent, Prince Chun; little more than two years later he reappeared as the last prop of the same dynasty which had rejected him but was then tottering to its end; a few months later this representative of the old order was metamorphosed into President of the Chinese Republic, and before the end of his life, he aspired to the Dragon Throne.

The Empress Dowager in the days when she was trying to renovate China had no better servant than Yuan Shih-kai. Of his great accomplishments in the Chihli viceroyalty in educational and army reforms we shall have much to say; the special mark which set him apart from the rank and file of officials was that he gave Tzu Hsi, in return for her commands, deeds and not words. Even in 1902, just after the return of the court he had her ear and was busy advocating measures of many sorts designed to better the condition of the realm. His rise to favor brought to the front a number of his protégés, most of them foreign-

[19] *The Times*, January 22, 1902.

[20] *United States Foreign Relations, 1902*, pp. 267–269.

educated men. Prominent among them were Wu Ting-fang and Tang Shao-yi, the former trained in England, the latter in America. Also in the ascendant at this time was Tuan Fang, the ablest of the younger Manchu officials.[21]

When Tzu Hsi first proclaimed her conversion to reform many officials considered her professed zeal only a trick to hoodwink the powers, and for some time after her return to the capital foreign observers continued to characterize any incident savoring of reaction as no more than was to be expected. Signs of corruption among the mandarins, extravagance in the expedition to the Western Mausolea, the suppression of too critical newspapers, even the proposed taking over by the central government of the telegraph system, all were hailed as testimony that the old order continued and flourished.[22] The correspondents of *The Times* in China sent home most discouraging pictures of a country where talk about reform far exceeded action.[23]

Events were to confound their prophecies. Looking back, one can discover in the period of 1902–1903 symptoms of the great changes to come. Any extended reference to army improvement and the new system of education will be omitted in this chapter, but these very important changes also were under way at this time.

Perhaps the most striking of the decisions of the period were those embodied in the edicts of February 1, 1902. One of the conditions which militated most against the security of the dynasty was the sharp racial line between Manchus and Chinese, fortified by a ban on intermarriage between the two races. Tzu Hsi cannily concluded that it was better to sacrifice the racial purity of the Manchus than to prolong their existence as an alien element among the vastly more numerous Chinese. Accordingly the imperial gazette bore word that the prohibition on intermarriage had been removed. The Empress Dowager next turned her attention to a strictly Chinese custom, that of foot-binding. Here she was on difficult ground. The practice had never been a Manchu one. To prohibit it meant to court the danger of sharp opposition among the Chinese. Therefore, on the theory that a halfway measure is better than no measure at all, the edict declared:

> Also as the custom of footbinding amongst Chinese women is injurious to health, the gentry and notables of Chinese descent are commanded to earnestly exhort their families and all who come under their influence to abstain henceforth from that evil practice and by these means gradually abolish the custom forever.

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[21] *United States Foreign Relations, 1902,* p. 268.

[22] For such items, see *The Times,* January 3, December 17, 1902; January 29, April 6, 1903; *NCH,* January 15, 1902.

[23] *The Times,* April 17, 1903; January 2, 1904.

The edict also stated that the practice of drawing the palace attendants exclusively from those of Manchu descent would be continued without change,[24] a decision which won the approval of the Chinese who had no particular desire to participate in this privilege. To crown the day's work, another edict ordered the selection of intelligent Manchus to study abroad at government expense. No doubt Tzu Hsi hoped thus to develop among the Manchus themselves a group of able and enlightened young men capable of giving the Throne such support as it had lately received almost exclusively from loyal Chinese officials, such as Chang and Yuan.[25]

There was considerable agitation in favor of the abolition of sinecures, which produced, in the end, not much greater effect than Kuang Hsu's ill-starred attempts in the same direction. An edict of February 23, 1902, decreed the abolition of the Directorate-General of the Yellow River and certain posts connected with the Grand Canal Tribute Grain Transport, which had received imperial proscription in 1898 but had found a way back to life again.[26] Later Yuan Shih-kai won Tzu Hsi's approval of the worthy sentiment that officials should not receive presents from their subordinates and should surrender their perquisites to the Imperial Treasury,[27] but for obvious reasons no results were observed. The problem of purifying the official system and its means of support was the most ticklish of all in the calendar of reform, and in the end the Manchus were forced to content themselves with inveighing in noble edicts against circumstances which they were unable to remedy.

There were many other manifestations of reform. Not the least notable was the selection of Prince Su, one of the most popular with foreigners of the Manchu clansmen, to reorganize the Peking gendarmerie and to repair the roads of the capital, a troublesome task from which he soon tried to resign.[28] Police forces on the Western or, rather, Japanese model came into favor as a result of the example set by Yuan in Chihli, and every province was ordered to organize a similar body of men.[29] In 1903 a new Board of Commerce was formed, among its members being Wu Ting-fang as vice-president.[30] A move was made toward the elimination of the eunuch system, but the memorial advocating this salutary

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[24] *NCH*, February 5, 1902. Another translation will be found in *United States Foreign Relations, 1902*, pp. 208–209.

[25] *NCH*, February 5, 1902; Bland and Backhouse, *op. cit.*, p. 429.

[26] *NCH*, March 5, 1902.

[27] *Ibid.*, September 17, 1902.

[28] *Ibid.*, February 5, July 30, 1902.

[29] *Ibid.*, October 22, 1902.

[30] *The Times*, October 20, 1903.

change was quashed, partly owing to the intrigues of the immensely influential chief eunuch, Li Lien-ying, but possibly also to a feeling that Tzu Hsi would prefer to have this particular modification wait till after her death.[31]

These then are the beginnings of reform, small enough, yet the precursors of an effort on a grander scale. In time the policy which when guided by the weak and visionary Kuang Hsu had been blandly disregarded revived under the aegis of Tsu Hsi and won consideration and respect. "The keynote of her policy was the maintenance of the prestige and position of the Manchu dynasty, and its hold, unimpaired, on the magnificent inheritance which the great founder of the dynasty, Nurhachi, had won by the sword."[32] This could be achieved only by remodeling the institutions of China. In the next chapters we shall trace the great lines of reform which were intended by Tzu Hsi to attain that consummation. The outcome was the destruction of the Manchus; but during Tzu Hsi's lifetime the struggle for a strong, unified state under the control of the Manchu house was a gallant one.

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[31] Bland and Backhouse, *op. cit.*, pp. 107–108.

[32] Kent, *The Passing of the Manchus*, pp. 30–31.

IV. EDUCATIONAL REFORM

The people of China had long been imbued with profound respect for learning, but learning in the sense of a mastery chiefly of those writings of and about the sage Confucius comprehended under the name of the "Four Books" and the "Five Classics." For centuries the scholars of the empire had been engaged in a retrospective contemplation of the great precepts laid down in the fifth century, B.C., and elaborated by later commentators, and the school boys of the land had busied themselves with learning by rote the lore of the sage. For centuries there had existed an intimate alliance between learning and civil office. The one royal road to government employment (at least in the better times when money would not procure entry) was through a series of civil service examinations based squarely on the classical books. All who aspired to office must steep themselves in the classics, and the product of the system, the average mandarin, shared with all of his kind a mental equipment which owed its distinctively conservative color to prolonged and exclusive study of the Confucian books. No matter what the particular task to which an official might be assigned, almost no professional training was required, for, according to the prevailing theory, the essential of an official's preparation was the infusion of right principle rather than of specialized knowledge. The fact that the curriculum which was the key to power was restricted in its scope did not mean, however, that the knowledge of it was widespread. Indeed, looked at in the mass, the Chinese people presented an almost unrelieved spectacle of illiteracy. In this country of general ignorance the scholar was viewed with greatest awe, and even paper bearing the precious written word was treasured as of especial merit.

Despite its interest in the Confucian knowledge secured by candidates for governmental position, the government concerned itself little with the method by which that knowledge was obtained. There was no public school system in the Occidental sense. Women, as a group, were free from any trace of education. Only those youths who showed evidences of talent and could thus secure patronage on their hopes of a future career or those whose families could afford to give them schooling could even start on the way to the metropolitan degree which was the crown of scholarship. These fortunate ones received their initiation into learning from a pedagogue hired by a group of families, or in a school founded by some philanthropic citizen. The teachers were often sad illustrations of the proverb that those who cannot do a thing teach it, for they were frequently men who, although they had displayed commendable zeal in going

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again and again to the examinations, had failed except perhaps in the local tests. This display of effort gave them good title as educators, and the bulk of the people were glad to secure their services as instructors for their children.

The arrival of the "foreign devils" with their strange learning marked the beginning of the end for the pedagogue of the strong voice and the strong cane, the conservative and Confucian-trained mandarin, and the whole system of private education regulated by public examinations which they represented. At first only a few young Chinese enrolled in missionary schools. The great majority, even if they had felt any impulse to attend these institutions, would have hesitated from motives of self-interest, for to products of such schools the road to civil office, the objective of every ambitious Chinese, was closed. As time passed, however, the Westerners had ample opportunity to demonstrate that they were possessed of certain secrets of power against which China was waging a losing battle. To the evidence furnished by military engagements was added experience with such devices as the railway and telegraph, which showed possibilities of great usefulness to China. Missionary schools, slowly growing, served as a leaven. After the Boxer fiasco there was a remarkable popular swing toward the adoption of the learning of the West. Everywhere it was talked of, not as a thing worthy in itself, but as a sort of magic elixir which would bring China strength and security. When the Empress Dowager issued at Sian the first of the long series of decrees destined to alter beyond recall the educational system of China, she was demonstrating the truth of the verdict that the chief function of the Dragon Throne was to crystallize public opinion in the form of imperial edicts. Her changed attitude was in line with that of many who realized that China, in order to continue to exist in the new world in which she found herself, must adopt its methods and standards, at least in externals. "Let us learn their tricks before they make an end of us."[1]

The conclusion of the Boxer episode left in existence three universities, Peking, Peiyang (at Tientsin), and Nanyang (at Shanghai). To feed them there were only the scattered missionary schools, and the universities themselves were under missionary influence.[2] The missionaries were not slow to realize that circumstances had given them an excellent opportunity to press the cause of their schools and of Occidental learning in general. Few did more in the cause of educational reform along Western lines than the veteran educator and friend of Chinese reformers, Dr. Timothy Richard. After the Boxer troubles he was asked to act as mediator be-

[1] Kendall, *A Wayfarer in China*, p. 28.

[2] Morse, *International Relations*, III, 414–415.

tween the foreign powers and the province of Shansi, where he had labored for years. He proposed that Shansi pay for her offenses against the foreigners by allocating 50,000 taels a year to the maintenance of a college of Western learning. The Chinese willingly accepted this easy way out of their difficulties, and despite opposition from the provincial governor, the institution was soon in operation with a staff of foreign educators.[3] Richard's example was reinforced by the provision of the protocol of 1901, which suspended for five years the examinations in those cities where foreigners had been maltreated, and thus made a great breach in the old system.[4] The chief factor in influencing the government to revise the time-honored educational methods, however, was the genuine and widespread interest in a Westernized curriculum which was manifested by the Chinese themselves. Yuan Shih-kai, then governor of Shantung, approached Richard for a list of the best books in Chinese on Western affairs, planning that all his expectant officials should acquire some knowledge of Occidental subjects before appointment. Hunan, long the stronghold of anti-foreign feeling, was swept by a liberal movement and students by the thousands consulted missionaries for information which would aid them in passing the new examinations instituted late in 1901. The literature of the various missionary publishing concerns took a bound into public favor, and Chang Chih-tung's *Learn* enjoyed great popularity.[5] The change which Kuang Hsu had tried to effect from above was making itself felt from below, a short three years later.

The Empress Dowager soon sensed the change of the popular mind, and in July and August, 1901, issued a series of edicts designed to provide her with servants better fitted to cope with the problems of the times. Special provincial examinations were decreed to discover men of ability. Chinese representatives in foreign countries were ordered to send back to China Chinese youths raised abroad and conversant with Western studies, with the promise that they would be granted official rank after special examination. Another edict ordered provincial authorities to send abroad at provincial expense young Chinese of talent who, after receiving a foreign education, would be admitted to a special examination for civil office.[6]

Such schemes would supply only a few officials with modern training; the great bulk would necessarily continue to be products of the traditional system. The edict of August 29, 1901, went closer to the heart of the

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 415; *NCH*, July 23, 30, 1902; *The Times*, November 15, 1901.

[4] MacMurray, *Treaties*, No. 1901/3.

[5] *The Times*, November 15, 1901; Sites, "The Educational Edicts of 1901" in *NCH*, April 30, 1902.

[6] This account is drawn from Sites, "The Educational Edicts of 1901" in *NCH*, April 23, 1902.

matter. It opened with a preamble deploring the degeneration of the examination system and urging that "we widen our thought to all lands in order to develop latent abilities." Then followed a new plan for testing the acquisitions of aspirants for office. Hereafter the Confucian books must share their pre-eminence with two other branches of knowledge, the government and history of China and the government and sciences of foreign nations, the three divisions to be given equal weight in judging the fitness of candidates. The eight-legged essay, the *pièce de résistance* of the old-style scholar, was banned. The edict also declared that military rank was no longer to be based in part on tests of strength.

These first alterations in the educational scheme were far surpassed in the edict of October 10, the most remarkable of those issued by the court in exile. It broke with tradition by providing for a national school system, and thus extending government control over the method and extent of instruction. Provincial examining agencies were to be transformed into colleges, middle schools were to be set up in every prefecture and department and elementary schools in every district, and primary schools were to be increased in number. Instruction was to be chiefly in the Confucian classics, but with attention also to the history, science, and government of China and of the West, i.e., the subjects called for by the new examination arrangements. A later decree endorsed the new college established at Tsinan under the leadership of Yuan Shih-kai as a model for the Empire, and on December 5 the Board of State Affairs was directed to draft a regular plan of promotion and examination in the new schools so that students might attain ranks parallel to the established degrees in the old examination system.

Thus China was within the space of a few months supplied with the outline of a national school system, liberalized civil and military examinations, and provision for the sending abroad for study of those young men who seemed most likely to repay the government by able service on their return. No one familiar with Kuang Hsu's plans can fail to be struck by the practical identity of these projects with those he had previously announced. It remained to be seen whether the same program in different hands and under changed conditions would go farther toward realization than in 1898.

The educational system of 1901 remained in force till 1904, when it was superseded by a more complete proposal. In the intervening years educational reform under governmental auspices went through its first struggles, and varying verdicts were passed on its chances of survival. Activity in fulfillment of the new orders was most noticeable in Peking, under Chang Po-hsi, a former disciple of Kang Yu-wei, who in 1902 was appointed Chancellor of the Imperial University. His program was set

forth in a memorial to the Empress Dowager soon after his appointment. In it he advocated the development of secondary education, the establishment of a bureau to translate Japanese works into Chinese, the dismissal of "priests (missionaries) who have come to China to preach, or dismissed officials taken from the Customs service," and the hiring in their place of competent foreign educators.[7] Under his direction Tungwen College, that pioneer of Western learning institutions, was merged into the Imperial University, and a more suitable site for the resulting institution was selected outside the walls of the city. He inspired an order of December 1, 1902, requiring all successful candidates in the metropolitan examinations and all members of the Hanlin Academy to take a course of modern study at Peking University as a prerequisite to officeholding.[8] The aspect of Chang's policy which received most notice from foreigners was undoubtedly his dismissal of the Western faculty of the university. Kuang Hsu had placed at its head Dr. W. A. P. Martin, who had seen long service as the head of Tungwen College. Chang, however, was determined to have a faculty of foreigners with no religious connections. Soon the foreign press was carrying stories of the impending ruin of the university by the removal of Dr. Martin and his colleagues, who were replaced by a group of Japanese professors.[9] The opposition to this move was heightened by a similar incident in Shantung, where the missionary who had been chosen as the head of Tsinan College resigned in protest against the regulation that all students do veneration to Confucius.[10] The government plainly intended that the new education movement, though it owed much to the past work of missionaries, should not remain under their guidance.

Outside Peking itself new-style schools were established, especially in the central and southern parts of the Empire.[11] Students went abroad, not from any great respect for governmental command, but because many young Chinese were eager to taste for themselves the learning of the West. Early in 1902 there were in Japan 271 young men and 3 young women, of whom the provincial governments maintained 151.[12] On October 31, 1902, the Chinese government recognized the growing importance of this student migration by appointing a special commissioner to supervise the interests of the Chinese students in Japan.[13]

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[7] *United States Foreign Relations, 1902,* pp. 181–182; *NCH,* March 12, 1902.

[8] *United States Foreign Relations,* 1902, p. 182; *NCH,* January 15, December 3, 1902.

[9] *NCH,* February 12, 26, 1902.

[10] *Ibid.,* April 9, May 21, 1902; Fu Lan, "The Chi-nan-fu College" in *Chinese Recorder,* May 1902.

[11] Sites, "The Educational Edicts of 1901" in *NCH,* April 30, 1902.

[12] *NCH,* February 19, 1902. [13] *Ibid.,* November 5, 1902.

So much for evidences of progress. The other side of the balance sheet was more formidable. The great changes projected had been announced to the Empire in the briefest of fulminations. How were the new schools to be financed? Whether from oversight or utter lack of inspiration, the edicts preserved silence on this vital point. They were equally uncommunicative on the problem of securing teachers. For the elementary schools, especially, hardly an instructor competent to elucidate the new subjects was to be found. Textbooks were few and poor. The officials, trained in the studies which were now being crowded into the background, naturally felt a conservative prejudice against the change. Most of them were ignorant of the nature of the institutions which they were called on to establish. There lingered in the minds of many of them, also, a very natural doubt of the genuineness of the Empress Dowager's conversion to reform, since a short time before she had been full of assurances that the old ways would not be altered. A certain ambiguity in the wording of the edicts led to the convenient assumption that one school of each variety in each governmental division would be ample to gratify the imperial desire, and many of the new schools were produced by a wave of the official wand over an existing Chinese college by which it became a school of Chinese and Western learning with a few indigent and unqualified relatives of officials as teachers.[14] There were symptoms of unrest among the students; for example, in 1902 the students of Nanyang College went home in protest against having been forbidden to read the writings of the exiled Liang Chi-chao.[15] There was also discontent among the scholars of the old dispensation, who saw the learning to which they had given so much time subordinated to studies of a new sort; at Sian there came into being an anti-foreign society made up of literati who despaired of being able to pass through the new schools of Western learning and the examinations based upon them.[16] They had little cause for concern, for it was soon apparent that the new examination system was almost a dead letter. Even when papers in accordance with the new specifications were turned in, there was no one competent to judge them. The frequent result was that the forbidden eight-legged essay was still submitted and accepted.[17] Even Peking seemed to fall under the sway of more conservative counsels and the Imperial University went into a decline.[18] Many foreigners, chief among them the missionaries, accepted these indications of failure as no more than could have been expected at the outset.[19] A more just verdict was that of E. T. Williams, then Chinese secretary to the American Lega-

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[14] *The Times*, January 7, 1903.

[15] *NCH*, November 19, 1902.

[16] *Ibid.*, January 29, 1902.

[17] *Ibid.*, July 2, September 3, 1902.

[18] *The Times*, August 28, 1903.

[19] *NCH*, May 28, 1902.

tion, who recognized the astounding magnitude of the task, the sincerity of the Empress Dowager and her chief advisers, and the fact that the progress made was all that could reasonably be hoped for.[20]

The government did not intend that the loosely worded edicts of 1901 should continue to direct the educational system, and Chang Chih-tung and Chang Po-hsi were chosen to draft a set of regulations at full length. On January 13, 1904, they presented to the Throne their report, which was subsequently issued in eight volumes. This compendious document was based on the Japanese educational system, with modifications and omissions to suit Chinese conditions.[21] Much as Occidental nations might flatter themselves that China in her regenerative process would copy them direct, she turned instead to Japan, a strange reversal of the process by which centuries before Japan had taken China as her teacher. As the report of the Board of State Affairs in 1901 stated:

> Japan is of the same continent with ourselves; her change of methods is quite recent, and she has attained to strength and prosperity. Her experience has been so nearly like our own that we may derive instruction from it.[22]

The school system approved in 1904, with alterations made up to 1911, may be outlined[23] as follows:

Kindergartens (or Lower Primary Schools).—At first one for every community of 100 or more families, the aim being to have ultimately an average of one for each 200 families in the country. Boys up to the age of seven were to be admitted free. The chief subjects of study were to be Chinese classics and literature, supplemented by morals, reading and writing, arithmetic, geography, history, and gymnastics. Private persons were urged to found schools of this and the following types to supplement those opened by the government, such private schools being allowed to charge fees.

Higher (or Second-Grade) Primary Schools.—One of these was to be provided for every district (*hsien*), with a maximum of 400 families to any one such school. The five-year course of study was to be a continuation of that in the kindergarten, plus drawing and the learning of patriotic songs. A small tuition was to be charged, even in government schools. Where desirable, the kindergarten and higher primary school might be united to form a double primary school.

Middle (or First-Grade Primary) Schools.—The system provided for one in each prefecture (*fu*). Here the chief emphasis was to be placed on foreign languages during the four-year course, Japanese or English being compulsory. The degree of *hsiu tsai* (B.A.) was to be conferred on students who completed this course and passed the final examination.

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[20] *United States Foreign Relations, 1905,* pp. 198–199.

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 199; Richard, *Forty-five Years in China*, p. 304.

[22] *United States Consular Reports,* January 1902, p. 3[illegible].

[23] This acount is drawn from E. T. Williams' "Report on Recent Educational Reforms in China" in *United States Foreign Relations, 1905,* inclosure in No. 180, and *China Year Book, 1912,* pp. 315–319.

Provincial Colleges (or High Schools).—Of these there was to be one in each provincial capital. They were to offer a three-year course, with a choice of three courses of study—arts, sciences, or medicine. English, French, and German were to be taught. Those who finished the course and passed the examination were to be given the degree of *lin sheng* (distinguished B.A.).

The Imperial University at Peking.—The work here was to be divided into a three-year course of study for the degree of *chu jen* (M.A.) and a four- or five-year post-graduate course at the end of which or after the imperial examinations the degree of *chin shih* (Ph.D.) would be granted. There were to be eight faculties—classics, jurisprudence, arts, medicine, science, agronomy, civil engineering, commerce. Tuition was to be charged for the three-year course but not for the post-graduate.

Special Courses.—There were to be industrial schools, schools of agriculture, a special school of foreign languages to train interpreters and translators, special schools of law and political science for prospective officials, and a three-year course for those who had just won the *chin shih* degree under the old system. Every departmental city was to establish a second-grade normal school, and every provincial capital a first-grade one.

Certain special regulations for the conduct of teachers and pupils were also set forth. No instructor was to be permitted to teach his religious views, the ethics taught to be those of Confucianism. This eliminated the missionaries per se. The students were forbidden to use opium and to interfere in governmental affairs, which latter prohibition was not too strictly obeyed. In all schools uniforms were to be worn and military drill taught, a most significant indication of the rise of things military in general estimation.

There were certain omissions in this grandiose plan. Small regard was paid to the education of women. For them no more training was provided than elementary schools and first-grade normal schools could supply.[24] In this, the commissioners did not copy the Japanese, who had arranged for the education of both boys and girls. Perhaps it was well that the government did not contemplate any greater degree of education for women at the time, as the task of setting up adequate schools for men alone was extremely difficult. No effort was made to introduce compulsory education; any such fiat would have produced a throng of students out of all proportion to the institutions then prepared to receive them. The criticism was brought that the courses planned were unduly long in view of the need of the rapid dissemination of knowledge,[25] but thoroughness is likely to require time. The new educational structure also failed to include the mission schools, whose graduates were apparently to have no place in the official plan.

It was well enough to outline this great system of schools, but as long as the civil service examinations held sway, many were inclined to cling to the old ways. The 1904 regulations provided for the gradual elimination of the examinations during a three-year period, but even this short lease

[24] *China Year Book, 1912,* p. 319. [25] Richard, *op. cit.*, p. 305.

on life left the examination system with sufficient strength to cripple the new plan.[26] The final proclamation of its abolition came in September 1905, when the Russo-Japanese War had inflamed reform ardor in China. Soon afterwards the Empress Dowager announced the appointment of a traveling commission to study the governments of foreign nations with an eye to remodeling that of the Middle Kingdom itself. Yuan Shih-kai led the agitation to do away with the venerable examinations, and his petition had the support of the strongest officials of the realm, all of them products of the method which they now united to condemn as no longer desirable.[27] The resulting edict stigmatized the system of examinations as a hindrance to the spread and progress of the new educational design, harked back to the perfect monarchs of antiquity for examples of the selection of officials from the products of schools, and declared that the examinations would cease in 1906. This important enactment was supplemented by the order that the provincial chancellors, thus relieved of their former duties, should assume those of inspecting schools in the regions under their jurisdiction and consulting with viceroys and governors on educational affairs.[28]

Ambitious reform projects could not be made effective under the very loose control which Peking was accustomed to exert over the provinces, and the proposed changes in the school system soon proved no exception. Centralized, unified control must be instituted. The abolition of the examination system led to a great access of interest in the school system, and the central government was deluged with suggestions for its improvement. The most influential of these memorials was that of the Manchu, Pao Hsi, who advocated the abolition of the Board of Rites, which had formerly been in control of the now defunct examinations, and the formation of a board of education on the Japanese model, with which were to be amalgamated the Hanlin Academy and the Imperial Academy of Learning. Prince Ching, reporting on this proposal for the Board of State Affairs, refused to part with the Board of Rites or the Hanlin Academy but approved the rest of the proposition. On December 26, 1905, the Board of Education was created, to control the system of education, maintain a standard, and direct the course of study, its president being the young Manchu, Jung Ching. In it was merged the Imperial Academy of Learning, in consequence of which the Board acquired a handsome office building.[29]

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[26] "Foreign Schools and the Chinese Government" in *Chinese Recorder,* March 1906.

[27] *NCH,* September 15, 1905.

[28] *United States Foreign Relations, 1905,* pp. 181–182.

[29] *Ibid.,* pp. 199–200, 204.

Such, then, was the great design on paper—at the head the Board of Education; in each province a literary chancellor, now become provincial commissioner of education; and a hierarchy of schools ranging from the university in Peking down to kindergartens. As in the case of the 1901 regulations, Yuan Shih-kai set the example for zeal. By 1905 that paragon of reforming officials could point to the existence under his charge of a well-trained army and a thriving school system, the two chief desiderata of China at that time. Yuan had as his educational adviser Dr. C. D. Tenney, a missionary who had been head of Tientsin University. By 1905 the modern schools of Chihli contained 86,000 pupils, of whom 84,520 were in schools of less than collegiate grade.[30] The educational pyramid was wisely being given a broad base, in contrast to the procedure common in other parts of China of establishing a few schools of higher rank and neglecting almost entirely the necessary substructure of elementary institutions. Chang Chih-tung demonstrated the sincerity of his statements in favor of modern education in *Learn* by the opening of a considerable number of schools in his viceroyalty of Hunan and Hupeh. Shantung was also a center of progress, thanks in part to the start made when Yuan was governor of the province. In 1905 even the far southwestern province of Yunnan had a normal school with two Japanese professors.[31]

In general, however, progress was fitful and uneven. Educational reform had to face a host of problems, chief among them lack of finances and of teachers, obstructionism or indifference of officials, intransigeance of students, and vacillations of government policy. The wave of reaction which smote Peking late in 1906 is an instance of the latter difficulty. For a time court circles had been favorably inclined toward the great innovations in education. The Empress Dowager gave patronage to a school for girls at the instance of Tuan Fang, the leading proponent of education for women, and even curtailed her theatrical entertainments to secure money for the erection of schools.[32] Peking underwent quite an epidemic of the conversion of temples into schools. Then reaction, in the persons of Chang Chih-tung and Tieh Liang, became dominant at court. Chang, author of the educational plan of 1904, now appeared in the rôle of a devout Confucianist, and his views were reflected in an edict of

[30] These figures are taken from those sent by Dr. Tenney to E. T. Williams, and printed in *United States Foreign Relations, 1905,* p. 203. Borel, *The New China,* p. 122, also gives figures on educational progress in Chihli, drawn from the report of the provincial educational authorities. He sets the number of students in 1905 at 88,000 and in 1907, at 173,352, an indication that progress continued.

[31] *United States Foreign Relations, 1905,* p. 201.

[32] *NCH,* September 15, 1905; *United States Foreign Relations, 1905,* p. 203.

December 30, 1906, which raised the sage to a rank equal with that of heaven and earth in the official hierarchy. This was followed by the decree of January 14, 1907, which stressed the superiority of Chinese studies to those of the West and ordered schools and colleges to inculcate loyalty to the Throne, reverence for Confucius, and martial spirit, this last an indication of how far new attitudes had invaded even professedly conservative thought.[33] At the same time Yuan's efforts to develop a modern army underwent sharp criticism and he was forced to surrender most of his troops to Tieh Liang. His chief disciple, Tang Shao-yi, was made governor of Mukden, a move which was variously interpreted as a bona fide promotion and as a device to shift him from the capital to a spot where his advocacy of reform would be less troublesome.[34] Fortunately for the cause of reform, the wave of conservatism soon passed, thanks to a shrewd memorial which pointed out that the practical Confucius would not have been too appreciative of deification, and to the stout liberalism of the "Holy Duke," the descendant of the sage.[35]

The interruptions which the development of the school system suffered from such outbreaks of conservatism in high places were few in comparison with the difficulties caused by local officials. Centralization was infinitely more easily decreed than effected. The Board of Education, despite the duties with which it was charged, did not come to exercise much positive control.[36] The success or failure of the reform rested with the local mandarins. That they were hardly fitted by training and attitude to be leaders in such a change is sufficiently obvious not to require amplification. Many confined their efforts to the erection of handsome buildings in Occidental style—it was a common conviction that Western education would flourish better in its natural architectural habitat[37]—but were little concerned when these buildings remained unused for lack of teachers and students. In most localities elementary education was neglected, the officials preferring the greater prestige which came from the setting-up of colleges. The weakness of this method is well illustrated by the course of technical education up to 1911. A number of schools professed to offer engineering courses but soon had to give preparatory work of several years' duration, finding that they could procure no pupils competent to receive advanced technical training. The railway school at Chengtu at the end of its fourth year had not yet taught any technical subjects for lack of pupils prepared to study them.[38]

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[33] *NCH*, January 11, 18, 1907.

[34] *The Times*, January 18, April 2, 12, 1907. [35] *NCH*, January 5, 1907.

[36] Reinsch, *Intellectual and Political Currents in the Far East*, p. 198.

[37] Cecil, *Changing China*, p. 144.

[38] *NCH*, August 21, 1909; *United States Consular Reports*, April 8, 1911.

To scatter schools broadcast over the land was certain to necessitate additional governmental expenditure. A new national tax was out of the question; the alien Manchu dynasty was not securely enough entrenched in the hearts of its subjects. To persuade the officials to devote part of their "squeeze" to the cause was also impossible. In consequence the problem of school finance was passed on to the local officials, with appropriate suggestions, such as the conversion of temples and monasteries into school buildings and the use of funds formerly employed for such diverse purposes as provincial examinations and village theatricals.[39] In Chihli, Yuan secured the funds of his schools by a combination of taxes on certain articles of local consumption, the endowments of old schools and temples, and a tax on all deeds for the transfer of real estate.[40] The methods most commonly used to secure support for the new school system are well described in a comment written in 1906:

> The matter of support is left to the officials of the several Provinces to pass upon as best they may. The provincial officials in turn leave the matter to the officials of the several districts and subdistricts. What schools now exist in line with this plan of education are supported largely by tuition charged pupils, by special local taxes, by gifts from wealthy people, and by any other means which may be possible. In some Provinces a certain portion of the general taxes are set aside for the establishment and maintenance of these schools. Tuition is charged in practically all schools, however, and the support of nearly all these institutions is more or less precarious and unsatisfactory.[41]

The learning in fashion before the changes of the post-Boxer period had not been such as to produce teachers capable of imparting the information called for under the new system. The old-fashioned pedagogues were useless. The only groups in China likely to be of service were the missionaries and the graduates of mission schools. The rule against the teaching of religion deterred the missionaries from service in the government schools, and the number of their former pupils was not enough to provide more than a very small part of the many teachers now needed. One way of filling the void was by bringing in teachers from abroad. Again the influence of Japan on China's reforms was demonstrated, this time by the importation of Japanese teachers, who were more acceptable to the Chinese than instructors of other nationalities. Teachers could be brought from Japan cheaply and asked smaller salaries than did Europeans and Americans, a potent argument to the ordinary official desirous of producing something resembling reform without too great cost. Lin-

[39] *United States Foreign Relations, 1905,* p. 202.

[40] *United States Foreign Relations, 1905,* p. 202; "Education in Chihli" in *Chinese Recorder,* September 1906.

[41] *United States Consular Reports,* June 1906, pp. 134–135.

guistically and racially the Japanese were at an advantage. Their written language was derived in good part from the Chinese, and as fellow Asiatics they more easily adapted themselves to Chinese ways of living.[42] That the Japanese were clearly conscious of their opportunity to be the teachers of China is shown by the establishment at Shanghai of a college where young Japanese might learn English and Chinese.[43] By 1905 this institution had an enrollment of 320, and its 150 graduates were either teaching in China or engaging in the Chinese government service in some other capacity. The Chinese government had also made an agreement with the Department of Education in Tokyo for fifteen Japanese professors to serve in China, three of whom were placed in Peking University and the rest in normal schools. However great may have been the influence exerted by the Japanese educators in China, numerically they were hopelessly inadequate to the situation; in 1904 they totaled only 174.[44]

Shortage of teachers was not the only instructional problem. The quality of the teaching in the new schools was very poor. As usual, the elementary schools suffered most. With teachers at a premium, who would labor in a kindergarten when he could command a larger stipend and improved social position as "professor" in a provincial college? China was inevitably the victim of educational adventurers, deliberate or otherwise. Many of the officials in charge of the new schools were unwilling to pay the salaries necessary to secure competent men, and so were imposed on by many who made a show of Western learning but were far from possessing the reality. "Unlike the Japanese, who engaged the best teachers that money could procure, the Chinese are contented if the teachers are a little superior to the taught."[45] Some colleges were very pretentiously equipped with foreign instructors; the university at Chengtu boasted a professor from Cambridge, two English assistants, and a Dane.[46] Often, however, foreigners thus employed would be asked to leave at the end of a year or two; there was no need of retaining them longer when their pupils were ready at much lower salaries to reproduce what had been taught them.[47]

The Throne's main object in promoting Westernized education was to develop a class of public servants able to strengthen China's resistance to

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[42] *United States Foreign Relations, 1905,* p. 199; Parker, "A New Japanese Invasion of China" in *Chinese Recorder,* July 1901.

[43] *Ibid.*

[44] Harada, "Japanese Educational Influence in China" in *Chinese Recorder,* July 1905.

[45] *The Times,* March 8, 1910.

[46] Kemp, *The Face of China,* p. 140.

[47] Rodes, *Le Céleste empire avant la révolution,* pp. 97–98.

foreign pressure and to maintain the supremacy of the Manchu dynasty. With the new educational system still in a formative state, thanks to the difficulties just mentioned, the government came to believe that education abroad would be the most effective method of training leaders for the government and the new hierarchy of schools. From the days of Yung Wing, a few Chinese had sought education in foreign lands. The Sino-Japanese War made the need of Western-trained men more obvious, and such viceroys as Chang Chih-tung and Liu Kun-yi sent groups of students to Japan at the expense of the provincial exchequer.[48] Japan was near, she had shown herself the successful pupil of the West, and she was willing enough to act as teacher to China. Edicts of 1901 and 1903 ordered the sending abroad of young Chinese and Manchus, and, as the years passed, more and more students, even a few women, made the journey to the Island Empire. Not until the Russo-Japanese War did the great migration start. Japan's victories over Russia stirred all Asia profoundly, and among those who looked eagerly to her as a pattern worthy of imitation were most of the students of China, dissatisfied with the sort of education which they could get at home. The Empress Dowager and her advisers caught the spirit of the times. Hitherto, students returning from abroad had been required to go through the examination mill (not till September 1905 was that system abolished), but in August 1905 the degrees of *chin shih* and *chu jen* were conferred on fourteen students who had studied in Japan, and as concrete evidence of the value which the government was now inclined to place on foreign education, they were one and all assigned to official posts.[49] On September 1, 1905, Tzu Hsi made her attitude even clearer by a decree urging students to go abroad and there master definite branches of study, and ordering Chinese ministers abroad to superintend these students and treat them with all kindness. The edict made the suggestion that since there were already a great number of students in Japan, more should go to Europe and America.[50] It was unheeded; Japan was the mecca for nearly all young aspirants for Western learning.

How many students responded to the appeal of Japanese training in these years is not entirely certain. It has been stated that at one time as many as 40,000 Chinese students were in Japan,[51] but the more usual and credible figure is 15,000.[52] Even this number taxed the educational facilities of Japan, with the result that many of these young pilgrims fell into

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[48] Chang Chih-tung, *China's Only Hope*, footnote on p. 93.

[49] *United States Foreign Relations, 1905*, pp. 179–180.

[50] *Ibid.*, pp. 180–181.

[51] *United States Consular Report*, April 8, 1911.

[52] Brown, *The Chinese Revolution*, pp. 79–80; Clinton, "Chinese Students in Japan" in *Chinese Recorder*, October 1909.

the hands of charlatans and received a much diluted form of Western learning. Many of the Chinese students themselves belonged in the category of adventurers, having come to Japan simply to obtain the prestige of being "foreign-trained students." Two or three months' residence in Japan was sufficient to supply this glamor, and indeed in some cases, if one were personally disinclined to go to Japan, a needy relative would act as proxy.[53] In most cases the chief fruit of a stay in Japan was the acquisition of a few ideas calculated to inflame rather than inform the mind. In short, Japan had become a center of revolutionary propaganda. It was the haven, on the one hand, of Liang Chi-chao and Kang Yu-wei, who, after their exile from China in 1898, spent their time in other lands advocating constitutional government under the imprisoned Kuang Hsu. On the other hand, Tokyo was headquarters for a group destined to have far greater influence than the moderate organization of Kang and Liang. In that city Sun Yat-sen, after wandering about the world in the effort to collect funds and support for a revolution against the Manchus, had centered his operations. *The People,* his organ, far eclipsed in popularity *The New People,* published by Liang, attaining at one time a circulation of 150,000. In this publication the young Chinese who came to Japan read highly colored accounts of the political philosophy of Voltaire, Montesquieu, Rousseau, *et al.* On every hand they heard talk of the virtues of revolution as a purge for a decadent and effete land, such as France had once been and China had now become. Republicanism was exalted, and monarchy, especially that of the Manchus, denounced. Many of these young men, enjoying for the first time government support, a sufficiency of time for discussion, and release from family control, quickly acquired the catchwords of this milieu and became themselves vigorous proponents of republicanism for China. All this was grist to Sun's mill. He had formed some years earlier an organization known as the *T'ung Meng Hui* (Alliance Society) as a liaison agency to bring into co-operation the multifarious secret societies of an anti-Manchu character which existed among the Chinese, and in this society he enrolled many of the students who came to Japan. Thus a considerable number of the students sent abroad to acquire learning which should make them the Throne's chief aides in the building of a new China were transformed into vindictive critics of the imperial government.[54]

The Manchus soon perceived that education in Japan was not a success

[53] Bland, *Recent Events and Present Politics in China,* p. 84; *NCH,* February 21, 1908.

[54] This account of Chinese students in Japan is drawn from Reinsch, *op. cit.,* pp. 216–217, and Tsao, "The Relation of the Returned Students to the Chinese Revolution," in Blakeslee, *Recent Developments in China.*

so far as their interests were concerned. In 1906 the Chinese government called on the educational authorities of Tokyo to exercise strict control over the Chinese students there, and the threat of such restraint caused more than half of them to take their departure.[55] Their return to China was followed in 1907 by constant reports of revolutionary activity throughout the Empire. Sun Yat-sen was credited with being the guiding force in these disturbances, and his agents in almost all cases were young Chinese who had studied in Japan.[56] *The People* was finally suppressed by the Japanese government at the request of China, and Sun Yat-sen was expelled from Japan.[57] Nevertheless the students remaining in Japan were still so mutinous a group that in July 1907 the Chinese minister to Japan resigned because he could not get on in peace with the young men who were supposed to be his charges.[58] Japan's influence over China waned as the admiration aroused by the Russo-Japanese War faded and her policy in Manchuria aroused against her the same spirit of Chinese patriotism to which her success had given such an impetus.[59] In the meantime, the Chinese government had found a means of sending students to a more distant and less dangerous spot.

In June 1907 the Chinese government was informed of the American government's intention to release China from all payments on the Boxer indemnity beyond what was necessary for actual reimbursement to the United States and its citizens, a tacit recognition that the original bill, like those of all the powers involved in the protocol of 1901, had been considerably inflated.[60] Almost a year later, Congress passed a joint resolution authorizing President Roosevelt to reduce the indemnity from $24,440,000 to $13,655,492.69 with interest at 4 per cent, with the possibility of a further reduction of $2,000,000 unless that sum were needed to satisfy private claims.[61] China's payments by 1907 had amounted to $6,010,931.91.[62] The Chinese government was asked to express its opinion as to times and method of remission. Prince Ching, representing the Waiwupu, answered that China had no such suggestions to make, but gave a statement of intention on the part of the Chinese government which finally determined the form which remission was to take:

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[55] Bland, *op. cit.*, pp. 84–85.

[56] *NCH,* January 25, May 31, June 28, 1907.

[57] Tsao, in Blakeslee, *op. cit.*, p. 167; *NCH,* March 28, 1907.

[58] *Ibid.*, April 12, July 19, 1907.

[59] *Ibid.*, May 15, 1909.

[60] *United States Foreign Relations, 1907,* Part I, pp. 174–175.

[61] *Ibid., 1908,* pp. 64–65.

[62] *Ibid., 1907,* Part I, p. 174.

Mindful of the desire recently expressed by the President of the United States to promote the coming of Chinese students to the United States to take courses in the schools and higher educational institutions of the country, and convinced by the happy results of past experience of the great value to China of education in American schools, the Imperial Government has the honor to state that it is its intention to send henceforth yearly to the United States a considerable number of students there to receive their education.

From the time that the indemnity returns should begin, one hundred students were to be sent to the United States every year for the first four years, and thereafter fifty a year during the period of the indemnity payments.[63] Regulations were issued providing for the support of the students out of the remitted indemnity, and for their selection on the basis of general character, social standing, and knowledge of Chinese and English; they were to be chosen after a special examination and were to be given a preliminary course in a school established for the purpose.[64] In the United States most of them were to specialize in industrial, mechanical, scientific, and financial studies, and only a fifth in law and government. On their return they were to undergo a government examination for official rank.[65] The American government fell in readily with this proposal and agreed that China should continue to make her payments on the indemnity as before, with the difference that hereafter $539,588.76 a year would suffice toward her indebtedness to the United States, and the remainder would be returned for the support of the students sent to America.[66]

Even before this arrangement was made there were in the United States some 395 Chinese students, of whom 30 were women. The provision for the support of students by the remitted indemnity payments meant a steady increase in this number.[67] The group thus formed was more likely to prove serviceable to the imperial government than the larger but less controllable group in Japan. The work required in American institutions, coupled with the difficulty of mastering English, made Chinese students in the United States more industrious than their fellows in Japan. Whereas the latter were exposed to a wave of revolutionary propaganda, the young Chinese in America, more widely scattered and among people who knew little or nothing of Chinese history, were more apt to escape this influence.

[63] *United States Foreign Relations, 1908,* pp. 67–68.

[64] Tsing Hua College was founded for this purpose in 1911 and in 16 years sent 1,100 students to the United States. (*China Year Book, 1926–1927,* p. 419.)

[65] *United States Foreign Relations, 1908,* pp. 71–72.

[66] *Ibid.,* p. 75.

[67] Merrill, "The Chinese Student in America," in Blakeslee, *China and the Far East,* p. 200.

The same was true in the case of Chinese students in Europe, who just before the revolution numbered 400, as compared with 800 in the United States at that time. These students were on the whole of a better social class than those who went to Japan and therefore had much to lose and little to gain by revolution.[68] Had more students been diverted from Japan to points farther from China and more thoroughly Occidental, the Manchus might have been spared some of the force of the blow of 1911.

The foreign-trained students, on their return, proved a dubious blessing. Most of them were disinclined to enter the teaching profession, to which there still clung a faint aroma of failure as the fitting career of those unable to attain the joys of civil office. They considered themselves fitted for something more conspicuous than the hard task of teaching children to read and write. The old idea that education was undertaken with civil office in mind was not easily downed, and the government found it necessary to beguile students into teaching by making the positions of high-school teachers and college professors substantive official appointments.[69] The majority of those who did become teachers had been "trained" in Japan, and the superficiality of their learning, their penchant for graft, and their revolutionary tendencies soon discredited them in the eyes of the more solid sections of the nation.[70] The government tried to hold them to some standard of attainment by examinations, on the passing of which official rank would be granted. The first was held in October 1906; 360 competed, five received the Ph.D. degree, and twenty-seven the M.A. Among those in charge were Tang Shao-yi, who had been educated in the United States; Yin Chang, later to be minister of war just before the revolution; Yen Fu, famous for his Confucian and Western scholarship; and Jeme Tien-yew, engineer-in-chief of the Peking-Kalgan Railway. Candidates were graded on their foreign degrees, their achievements since graduation, and the papers submitted to the examiners. Of the twelve highest places, eleven were taken by students from the United States. Many who received the Master's degree had studied in Japan. The candidates were allowed to write their papers in any language. The fact that many of them proved unable to write creditable Chinese was symptomatic.[71] The process of education abroad was tending to produce a class of exotics who had acquired some modicum of Western knowledge but had been

[68] Tsao in Blakeslee, *Recent Developments in China,* pp. 171–173.

[69] *NCH,* June 20, 1908.

[70] Bland, *op. cit.,* p. 86. For a confirmatory statement, see Clinton, "Chinese Students in Japan," in *Chinese Recorder,* October 1909.

[71] *NCH,* October 26, 1906; Reinsch, *op. cit.,* pp. 211–212; Bland, *op. cit.,* pp. 81–82; Yen, "The Recent Metropolitan Examinations," in *Chinese Recorder,* January 1907.

cut off from gaining an understanding of China, for whose benefit that knowledge was supposedly secured. The Chinese government, displeased by this state of affairs, declared that thereafter an essay in Chinese would be required. In the second examination, held under the supervision of the Japanophile, Chang Chih-tung, the Japanese students emerged ahead, amid a chorus of accusations of favoritism.[72] The device of examinations proved unsatisfactory; those who passed did not always receive appointment, and those who failed became more dissatisfied than ever. The government redoubled its efforts, however, ordering that all returned students be required to take an examination before receiving government or other employment, the object being to prevent them from drifting into revolutionary careers.[73] Education abroad had produced results contrary to that loyal support of the evolutionary reform movement for which the Throne had hoped.

In the meantime, the education of women, neglected in the government plan, was making headway. The pioneer work in this direction had been done by missionaries, in the face of stubborn conservative opposition. Girls, it was presumed, were not worth educating; they were mentally incapable of appreciating the riches of learning, and the custom of early marriage meant that any great degree of education would be waste from the father's point of view. The first conspicuous school for girls established by the Chinese themselves was opened in Shanghai in 1897, with the co-operation of Dr. and Mrs. Timothy Richard.[74] It was closed during the wave of reaction which followed the Hundred Days. It was not until after the Boxer Rebellion that education for women really began to win attention. Although the official school system practically excluded women, the movement for their education went on under private patronage. Thanks to Tuan Fang, the Empress Dowager was prevailed upon to order that a large lamasery in Peking be transformed into a school for girls.[75] Several princesses founded so-called gentry schools for girls of good family, in which the subjects taught were arithmetic, needlework, Japanese, music, calisthenics, drawing, and Chinese language and history. The Board of Education was stirred to action, and in 1907 drew up regulations for the establishment of primary and normal schools for girls throughout the Empire, emphasizing simplicity of dress and the abandonment of foot-binding.[76] By 1907 there were in Shanghai 12 girls' schools under the

[72] Reinsch, *op. cit.*, p. 213.

[73] *NCH*, June 19, 1909.

[74] This sketch of the development of education for women is drawn unless otherwise indicated, from Burton, *The Education of Women in China.*

[75] *United States Foreign Relations, 1905*, p. 203.

[76] *The Times*, April 20, 1907.

control of Chinese. In 1908 Peking and Tientsin each had 26 such schools and the province of Chihli outside of Tientsin possessed in 1907 121 government and gentry schools for girls with a total of 2,523 pupils. These schools faced the same problems which confronted government schools in general, but suffered especially from the dearth of competent teachers. There were only a few Chinese women fitted to teach, and the Japanese imported in the first few years of the movement were unsatisfactory. The normal schools soon began to turn out teachers in record time but with very scanty preparation. It was doubtful if any of the gentry or government schools were fitting young women to go on to work of more than high-school grade. Despite the defects of these schools, their very existence was an amazing change. Chinese women began to make themselves heard. As early as 1903 the Chinese women students in Tokyo had formed themselves into a Red Cross corps and offered their services to the government in case of war, a proposal which must have been enough to gray the hair of many an old-fashioned Chinese gentleman.[77] During the boycott on American goods in 1905 many women attended political meetings. In 1906 a Mrs. Chang founded in Peking a daily paper for women which gave general news, plus information of special interest to women.

The relation of the missionaries and their schools to the government system is worthy of notice. The government, when it took over the direction of educational reform, was not disposed to allow the missionaries to continue as leaders of the movement toward Western learning. The missionaries on the faculty of Peking University, pioneers in the introduction of modern education in China, were called on to resign in 1902. In 1904 the teaching of religious views other than the ethical concepts of Confucius in public schools was forbidden. Since the primary purpose of the missionaries in China was to propagate Christianity, this order effectively excluded them from service in the public schools. The mission schools were not accorded recognition in the general educational plan and their graduates were barred from the examinations for office given at Peking and were excluded from the lists of those privileged to vote for the provincial assemblies which were inaugurated in 1909. The missionaries realized that such handicaps plus the increased competition offered by government schools would soon lessen their influence, even though the general level of instruction in their institutions was above that in the schools under government control. In 1905 missionary educators attempted through Rockhill, the American minister to China, to secure governmental recognition of mission schools, but obtained no results.[78] In fact, the

[77] *The Times*, August 13, 1903.

[78] *United States Foreign Relations, 1906*, Part I, pp. 341-3[illegible]5.

policy of the Board of Education had already been stated in response to an application from Fukien for the registration of mission schools there. No school, mission or otherwise, which was controlled by foreigners was to be registered nor were its graduates to be accorded recognition, since China was desirous of minimizing foreign interference in her educational system, viewing it as a possible hindrance to the abolition of extraterritoriality.[79] The missionaries were inclined to view the government's policy as a direct attack on Christianity, but in reality the chief objections to the mission schools were that they were controlled by foreigners and that the standards which they observed varied from one another and were not in agreement with those set by the Board of Education.[80] In the end, the Christian educators realized the necessity of conforming to the specifications set by the government, and in 1911 it was quite noticeable that certain missionary educational bodies were trying to obtain a greater uniformity of curriculum. That the Chinese government was willing to approve such efforts was evidenced by the official recognition of the Union Medical College at Peking and the Y.M.C.A. middle school at Tientsin and the announcement that the Peiyang University would thereafter receive graduates of mission schools.[81]

The inauguration of the extensive program of educational expansion and change was faced with such great difficulties as lack of finances, paucity of trained teachers, and the restive attitude of the students. Perhaps the best evidence of the results achieved in the face of these problems is to be found in the number of schools and students which this valiant attempt at reform produced. The Board of Education from time to time issued general reports on the growth of the school system, and from the figures thus collected we can form some estimate of the progress, quantitatively speaking, of the new schools. At the beginning of the last year of Kuang Hsu's reign there were in Peking 206 schools with 11,417 pupils; in the rest of the Empire the government schools numbered 35,597, with an enrollment of 1,013,571. Two years later the schools in Peking had increased to 252, with 15,774 students; and in the whole Empire there were 42,444 government schools, with 1,284,964 students.[82] For 1909–1910, the last period reported on, we have quite full figures which may be summarized as follows:[83]

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[79] "Foreign Schools and the Chinese Government" in *Chinese Recorder,* March 1906; "The Government and the Schools," *ibid.,* February 1907.

[80] *NCH,* November 13, 1909.

[81] *United States Consular Reports,* April 8, 1911.

[82] *NCH,* March 3, 1911.

[83] These figures in full, giving the reports for individual provinces, will be found in *China Year Book, 1912,* pp. 322–324.

Type of School	No. of Schools	No. of Students
Universities	3	549
High schools	21	3,287
Colleges of literature	17	1,983
Colleges of chemistry and physics	4	211
Law colleges	46	111,641
Medical colleges	8	336
Industrial colleges	7	485
Normal schools and colleges	415	27,573
Middle schools	429	37,611
Higher primary schools	2,035	111,510
Two-grade primary schools	3,487	199,019
Lower primary schools	44,549	1,148,297
Elementary schools	92	2,674
Half-day elementary schools	965	25,251
Girls' schools	298	13,489

The gross totals for the Empire for government schools alone, which include the figures above, plus those for a few industrial and other special schools, were as follows: schools, 57,267; students, 1,626,529; teachers, 89,362; revenue (taels), 24,698,639; expenditures (taels), 24,334,305. In addition to the schools under government control, there were very many private institutions of the old type, but of their exact number it is difficult to find any record.[84] Before one disparages too much the results obtained, even from the quantitative point of view, one must consider the immensity of China in size and population, her lack of teachers and funds, and the difficulties which Peking encountered in enforcing its will in the provinces. The population of China in 1910 was estimated at 438,000,000, out of which number there were, as a rough guess, perhaps 65,000,000 children of school age. It was hardly to be expected that in less than ten years this immense group could be rendered literate, especially when the government was trying not only to extend education but to change its content. Even so, when set off against the total number of potential pupils, the 1,626,529 actually enrolled in government schools in 1910 is disappointingly few. Even the much-lauded achievements of Chihli province amounted to 242,247 students in school out of a population of 29,400,000. In Shantung, with an estimated population of 39,000,000, the schools contained only 60,765. It is interesting to note by way of comparison that Japan, two years after the reorganization of her educational system in 1872, had in schools 1,590,115 out of her 4,923,272 children of school age.[85] The difference may be accounted for by a cumulation of factors of a political and social nature which aided the Japanese, such as the great sentiment of

[84] *United States Consular Reports,* January 1910, p. 238.

[85] *United States Foreign Relations, 1876,* p. 382.

loyalty to the restored government and the energy in the cause of reform of the samurai class, nothing comparable to which was to be found in China. The Empress Dowager and her advisers judged well the slowness with which educational change would come in China when they set a 5 per cent literacy as all that could be hoped for in 1917, the year in which the constitution was to be proclaimed.

In estimating the qualitative results obtained in the ten years after the Boxer outbreak we are on more uncertain ground. Figures give at least the appearance of certainty, but here we must leave them behind and resort to generalizations. From the caliber of teachers available it should be evident that much of what was passed out to young Chinese as Western learning was but a flimsy imitation. In the learning even of purely Chinese subjects there intervened the barrier of the very difficult Chinese written character, which necessitated that the student spend a much longer time in the mastery of the instrument of language than would be necessary for Occidental schoolboys. The general state of affairs is indicated by a report sent in from Mukden by Willard Straight, American consul general there, in which he declared that the majority of teachers were known for their energy rather than their erudition and that far more time had been spent in inaugurating the system, erecting buildings, and developing military drill than on the more solid fare of book-learning.[86] In the new government schools the new spirit of militant patriotism found its most vigorous expression. By 1911, reports of student strikes had become commonplace. Students took the lead in the boycott movements, such as that against the United States in 1905 and in the "rights recovery" agitation over railways. They incessantly clamored for a strong foreign policy and for more rapid reform at home, and in these pleas they were inspired and encouraged by the returned students from Japan. If the government seemed slow in granting a constitution, students would give up all pretense at school work and spend their time in agitation. When Great Britain and China were attempting to arrange for the gradual abolition of the importation of Indian opium into China, the students came out in vigorous demonstrations in favor of immediate cessation of the traffic, demonstrations as futile as they were ill-timed. All these incidents, which have place in other parts of this account, are mentioned here simply to indicate that when the Manchu sponsors of the new education surveyed its products, they could not but realize that a little learning is a dangerous thing. Education, instead of creating a group of moderate liberals willing to support the ruling house in an attempt at gradual reform, had produced a group of vehement agitators, the sacrifice to whose zeal was to be the weakened dynasty itself.

[86] *United States Consular Reports*, December 1907, p. 224.

V. THE NEW ARMY AND NAVY

> Nails were hammered out of scrap iron, and soldiers gathered from the human scrap-heap. Before the war with Japan the Chinese army, for the most part, was a rabble. To a considerable extent it existed on paper only. When the inspector was about to visit a camp he sent notice in advance, so that the commanding officer would have time to send out into the highways and hedges and, for a few cents a day, line up a sufficient number of idle men to fill the ranks. A military jacket was loaned to each one and a musket or spear placed in his hands. He could then stand up and be counted. After the inspection many were discharged, and the monthly pay of the missing found its way into the pockets of the officers.
>
> Often prior to the war between China and Japan I watched the drilling of the troops. Every fifth man carried a long bamboo spear decorated with a red pennon. The rest were armed with muzzle-loading muskets. When these had fired their guns they would fall back a few paces to give place to the spearmen, who rushed forward with blood-curdling yells and brandished their weapons to hold off the enemy until the muskets were re-loaded. The Manchu bannermen formed a separate organization. They were descendants of the conquerors of China, and prided themselves on their horsemanship and archery, but they were as unfit for modern warfare as the bowmen that followed the Black Prince would have been.[1]

Thus E. T. Williams has described the old-style Chinese army. In Japan the military men were the flower of the land; in China the soldier was viewed askance. In every family those sons who showed promise of ability were dedicated to the civil service, and as a rule only men of lesser endowment or inferior parentage entered upon a military career. The army suffered from a total lack of spirit, natural enough considering the low regard in which military service was held and the fact that there was no unified control, each province raising its own levies and arming and paying them as it saw fit. Officers were chosen by a system of examinations in which the main requirements were detailed knowledge of manuals centuries old and skill in archery. In 1841 the Chinese military forces, undisciplined and poorly accoutered, often conscripted for the day only, were brought face to face with the trained fighting forces of the West. Courage, unsupported by proper armament and drill, proved a fruitless virtue. To the encounters with European armies was added the disastrous Taiping Rebellion, which all but swept the Ta Ching dynasty from the Dragon Throne. If the descendants of the Manchu conquerors were to maintain their control of China, they must have at their command a well-drilled and loyal army to combat both the aggression of the foreign powers and possible risings of the restless elements in China who were feeling the force of the slogan, "Down with the Manchus!"

[1] Williams, *China Yesterday and Today,* pp. 446–447.

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Under the leadership of Li Hung-chang, who had been one of the chief imperialist generals in the Taiping Rebellion, an effort was made, between 1860 and 1894, to provide China with a better army and with a navy of some sort. These beginnings of a modern defense force went to defeat in the Sino-Japanese War, and the real helplessness of China was made apparent to the Western powers, who promptly acquired all they could in the way of concessions and spheres of influence. The Boxer episode added one more bit of evidence to the mounting testimony of the dynasty's incapacity. Its Heavenly mandate was all but exhausted. Only the energy of Tzu Hsi and the support of such able and loyal Chinese viceroys as Liu Kun-yi, Li Hung-chang, Chang Chih-tung, and Yuan Shih-kai enabled it to prolong its grip on the supreme power till the fatal year of 1911.

The man who showed the way to a better army was Yuan Shih-kai, the inveterate reformer. His first opportunity to show his ability in military organization came in January 1896, when he was made head of the modern brigade which had been formed during the war by Hu Yu-fen, the Director-General of the Tientsin-Peking Railway.[2] At that time the force consisted of 5,000 men, and was being drilled by a German, Schaller, and a Norwegian, Munthe, who later became aid-de-camp to Yuan.[3] Under Yuan's direction this force prospered and when he was chosen as governor of Shantung it accompanied him there. During the Boxer trouble it had an opportunity to show its metal and performed creditably enough. When Yuan was elevated to the highest of provincial posts, the viceroyalty of Chihli, his army again went with him.[4] In 1901 and 1902, after the lesson of the Boxer rising, the Empress Dowager was full of interest in army reform. China's integrity would be better observed if it were better defended. Among the first reform decrees to be issued in 1901 was one ordering viceroys and governors to reorganize on more modern lines the troops under their control.[5] The military examinations were to be modernized and military schools established.[6] Only Chang and Yuan obeyed to any appreciable extent the imperial behest, and the zeal of the latter in reform, educational, military, and otherwise, soon made him the chief adviser to Tzu Hsi. All during the year 1902 Yuan busily put forward suggestions of one sort or another for the improvement of China's military forces and for the bettering of financial and educational conditions. The scope of his plans is illustrated by the project which he submitted to the Empress Dowager in February 1902. The hitherto

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[2] *NCH*, January 24, 1896.

[3] McKenzie, *The Unveiled East*, p. 214.

[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 215-216.

[5] *China Year Book*, 1912, p. 244.

[6] *NCH*, April 23, 1902.

autonomous provincial forces were to be put under the central control of a director-general of all armies in Peking; all able-bodied men were to be liable for military service; each province was to have an army and each prefecture a volunteer corps, though under unified control; and military colleges were to be set up in Peking and Wuchang with German and Japanese instructors.[7] The plan was not adopted, but Yuan, not daunted, continued his efforts. Chinese military graduates and officers of provincial armies were ordered to modernize their military knowledge by study at the Peiyang or Hanyang military academies.[8] Three thousand Manchu bannermen were to be selected and turned over to Yuan for training which would make them soldiers in fact as well as in name.[9] Yuan secured a number of Japanese advisers for the Peiyang army, but this move brought a protest from Russia on the ground of agreements which she had reached with Li Hung-chang, and for the time being Yuan gave up the idea.[10] Altogether, the year 1902 was one of agitated even if somewhat ineffective interest in military affairs, and not without reason, for the Boxer leaders, Prince Tuan and Tung Fu-hsiang, were reported as massing forces in the west for a hostile move in favor of Tuan's son, who had been removed from his position as heir apparent after the collapse of the movement of which his father had been so prominent a supporter.[11]

However, as long as the army depended for its development on the interest and energy of individual viceroys, no truly national reform could be expected. The curiously decentralized state of affairs is exemplified by the fact that at the German maneuvers of 1905 China was represented by three delegations, one from Yuan Shih-kai, one from Chang Chih-tung, and one from the Army Reorganization Department in Peking, which was nominally in charge of the formulation of projects for army reform.[12] Indeed, Yuan, Chang, and the officials of the Peking office were the only persons who took a vital interest in the bettering of China's defense forces. Yuan was hard at work in Chihli, exerting his customary energy to make the Peiyang army a force worthy to be compared with European troops. Although a product of the old methods and standards, Yuan proved an admirable military leader. He was a strict disciplinarian,[13] but nevertheless was popular among his troops, and chose to consider himself one of them to the extent of appearing in the modern uniform which they wore, a proceeding which would have definitely declassed him in the China of the past. The real secret of his hold over the soldiers of the Peiyang army was that

[7] *NCH*, February 19, 1902.

[8] *Ibid.*, October 15, December 17, 1902.

[9] *Ibid.*, December 10, 1902.

[10] *Ibid.*, January 15, 1902.

[11] *Ibid.*, December 24, 1902.

[12] *Ibid.*, July 14, 1905.

[13] McKenzie, *op. cit.*, pp. 216 ff.

he paid them adequately and regularly, a near-miracle in a country where soldiers' pay had always been small and hopelessly in arrears.[14] In 1906 Yuan's force consisted of 80,000 men,[15] very nearly the same figure as the enrollment of the Chihli schools at the time. The province of Chihli was not required to meet all the expenses of this achievement. Other provinces were called on to send to Peking money for the support of Yuan's army, a practice which brought forth a remarkable protest in 1904, when a group of high provincial officials united to petition the Throne that each viceroy or governor be made responsible for the creation and maintenance of his own troops, since the country was being bled to supply funds for the development of the army in Chihli. Local autonomy died hard, in army as in other matters.[16]

With the army maneuvers of October 1905 Yuan's influence reached its high mark. The Peiyang army went through its paces before critical foreign observers and most of those who witnessed the performance were pleased with the equipment and discipline displayed.[17] The first wave of praise soon passed over. Before long Yuan's troops were being compared with those of the great powers to the obvious disadvantage of the former. A sample of this style of criticism was afforded by an interview given to the *Times* correspondent by one of the Japanese advisers to the Peiyang army, who complained that praise was tending to make both officers and men only too well satisfied with themselves. He declared that there had been little real progress except in numbers, that corruption was as rife as ever, that there was even yet no real uniformity of armament, and that if the cohesive influence of the Japanese advisers (of whom be it noted, he was one) were removed, the whole sham would crumble.[18] In consequence of this change in the general attitude, the maneuvers of 1906 were received without great enthusiasm, and Yuan had reason to feel that his star was waning. His fears were borne out by events, for early in 1907 he was required to turn over to the president of the Board of War, Tieh Liang, the direction of the greater part of the army to which he had given so much care.[19]

This unfortunate development was hastened by the peculiar state of affairs in Peking. The latter part of 1906 had witnessed the most remarkable outburst of reform edicts. The Empress Dowager had pro-

[14] Eliot, *Letters from the Far East,* p. 107.

[15] Swift, "The Chinese Army, Its Development and Present Strength," in Blakeslee, *China and the Far East,* p. 177.

[16] *The Times,* September 5, 1904.

[17] *NCH,* November 3, 1905.

[18] *The Times,* August 14, 1906.

[19] *NCH,* January 18, 1907.

claimed her intention to grant her people a constitution in a few years; opium cultivation and smoking had been given a brief ten years of grace; and there was great agitation in Peking over the proposed reform of the official organization, which would rearrange Peking officialdom to suit the new functions which the government was extending itself to perform. This unwonted zeal for reform soon had its natural consequence in a wave of reaction. The vested interests, threatened by the planned improvements, were growing genuinely alarmed, and the swing of court sentiment was well indicated by the movement for the deification of Confucius. Yuan, as the liberal leader, was the object of intrigue and jealousy fostered by his old enemy and rival, the Manchu, Tieh Liang. Tieh Liang's ambitions fell in well with the policy of centralization which was the government's most ardent desire. In September the Council on Army Reorganization had called on the viceroys and governors to turn over to its control all arsenals and arms and powder factories.[20] Logically, the next step was the taking over by the central government of the troops which hitherto had been raised and drilled by the provinces, and of such forces that of Yuan was easily first in size and discipline. The break between Tieh Liang and Yuan came during a series of military conferences held at Eho Park in the latter part of 1906, after the second maneuvers. Tzu Hsi gave her support to Tieh Liang. It may have been that she both feared and distrusted Yuan as her accomplice in 1898 and was alarmed at his growing power. He had come to occupy the predominant place which had formerly been held by Jung Lu. There was talk that he was using the power which he possessed as viceroy of Chihli, head of the Peiyang army, director of northern railways and mines, and so on, to strengthen himself against the day of Tzu Hsi's death, when Kuang Hsu would resume the imperial power and have opportunity to vent his long-accumulating hatred of the man whom he considered responsible for his downfall. Whether Yuan's growing strength and influence aroused Tzu Hsi's apprehension—and this seems somewhat unlikely in the light of the excellent service he had always given her—or whether it was deemed advisable for the sake of greater centralization to relieve this most powerful of provincial satraps of the control of so considerable a military force, the fact remains that in January 1907 Yuan was required to give over to the Board of War, of which Tieh Liang was president, the control of four of the six divisions of the Peiyang army.[21] To limit Yuan's power still more, his revenues were reduced by the transfer to the Peking administration of the annual subsidies of the China Merchants' Steam Navigation Company, the telegraphs, and other administrations. Later in the year he received a sop to his pride by appointment as

[20] *NCH,* September 28, 1906.

[21] *NCH,* January 18, 1907.

president of the Waiwupu and member of the Grand Council, but these dignities were commonly considered insubstantial, as in both bodies he was sure to suffer from the obstructionism of conservative colleagues who had the advantage of seniority.[22]

The Peiyang army was not too well pleased at the change to Tieh Liang's administration and the prospect of a Manchu commander. There was fear that the Board of War would abjure Yuan's custom of paying the troops promptly and that dissatisfaction would grow to dangerous proportions.[23] However, despite the fact that Yuan had ceased to be the guiding genius in things military, interest in the army reached high point in the year after his displacement. The first achievement of the Board of War, at last in charge of an army worthy of the name, was the formulation of an ambitious plan for the organization of the Luchün, or National Army.

This project provided for the creation of thirty-six divisions, each comprising from 12,368 to 12,512 officers and men in times of peace and in times of war about 20,900, or, in other words, a force which on a peace footing would amount to nearly 450,000 men. Its control was to be the Board, or, as it was more appropriately called after the reorganization of the official system, the Ministry of War, and the General Staff. As usual, the desire for centralization far exceeded the fulfillment. Finances were left in the hands of the provincial officials and only a few of the divisions formed were in reality directly under the ministry itself. For example, of the divisions existing prior to 1908, only the four taken over from Yuan were controlled from Peking; Yuan himself retained direction of two, and the viceroys of Liangkiang and Hukuang were each in charge of one. The date set for the completion of the new army was 1916, but this was soon, with undue optimism, advanced to 1912.[24] In the new army, service was to be voluntary; and conscription was not to be resorted to unless it proved impossible to get sufficient recruits without it. It was soon introduced in a few provinces. Enlistment was for a period of three years. The soldier next passed into the first reserve for another three years, during which time he was supposed to put in one month's drill per annum. He then served a three-year term in the second reserve, with drill only one month every other year. With the army at full strength, the reserve would receive about 150,000 men a year. Those eligible for service were men of between twenty and twenty-five, in good health, residents of the locality

[22] *Ibid.*, September 6, 20, 1907.

[23] *The Times*, February 9, 1907; Eliot, *op. cit.*, p. 107.

[24] *China Year Book, 1912*, pp. 244–246, 251; Swift in Blakeslee, *op. cit.*, pp. 1[illegible]–178.

where they enlisted, of satisfactory family, and of good character. The government humanely provided for payment of a certain portion of the soldier's stipend direct to his family and a pension to them in case of his death, or to the soldier himself after long service or if wounded. Families of soldiers on service were to be exempt from certain taxes and to be the objects of special care by local officials.[25] Elaborate provision was made for the education of officers. In theory each commissioned officer was first to complete a three-year course at a primary military school, one of which was to be opened in each provincial college. Next came two years at a military middle school, of which four were finally established; then six months with an army division. Finally, the prospective officer was to go to the military high school, which was to be opened in 1912 at Paoting with a staff of German officers. Special advanced training was to be supplied at the preparatory staff college, also at Paoting.[26] Orders also went forth for the establishment of machine shops and cartridge factories in each province and for the establishment of three new arsenals. The ministry was already planning for the day when all the materials of war would be manufactured in China.[27]

There was the usual discrepancy between proposal and performance. The formation of thirty-six divisions by 1912 proved an impossibility. In 1909 about nine divisions had been completed. Major Eben Swift, U.S.A., estimated that at that time a little more than half the infantry expected had been recruited, somewhat less than half the cavalry, and only a small part of the engineering, telegraph, transport, and medical services. He put the number of well-trained men in 1909 at 120,000; about 80,000 more had received training of some sort. In 1910, only two years before the date set for the completion of the thirty-six division plan, twelve divisions and nineteen mixed brigades had been formed, each of the latter consisting of an infantry brigade, a battalion of artillery, a squadron of cavalry, and a company of engineers' army service corps, amounting in all to between 5,000 and 6,000 men. One division of the Imperial Guard had been formed, enlistment in it being thrown open to Chinese as well as Manchus in November 1910. Undaunted by failure to complete thirty-six divisions in the time set, those in authority already looked forward to an army of forty-five divisions full strength.[28]

The system of military schools was fairly well carried out. By 1912 twenty-seven primary schools, fifteen surveying schools, four middle schools, one nobles' military college, and the staff preparatory school were

[25] *China Year Book, 1912*, p. 246; Swift in Blakeslee, *op. cit.*, p. 178.

[26] *China Year Book, 1912*, pp. 246–247. [27] Swift in Blakeslee, *op. cit.*, p. 179.

[28] *China Year Book, 1912*, pp. 245–246, 253; Swift in Blakeslee, *op. cit.*, p. 180.

in existence. The majority of the teachers in these schools were Chinese who had had some military training abroad, but there were also a few German and Japanese instructors, representative of the two nations on which China was most eager to model herself in her military renaissance. The chief source of foreign-trained Chinese officers and instructors was Japan, where in 1909 there were still in military schools some 700 young Chinese.[29] In addition there were fifteen Chinese being trained in the French army, permission for them to get this instruction having been secured through the efforts of Tieh Liang.[30] Education was not confined to officers. The common soldiers were required to attend school for two hours a day, to be taught elementary studies, and to be drilled in patriotism.[31]

The equipment of the troops was far from uniform. The last minister of war under the Empire, the Manchu, Yin Chang, as Chinese minister at Berlin had enjoyed the personal advice of Wilhelm II on things military, had married a German woman, and was a determined supporter of the house of Krupp.[32] He was distressed to discover that the armament of the National Army varied from division to division and that many of the rifles, which had been carelessly purchased, were practically useless. He had patterns of proper weapons prepared and sent to the arsenals at Hanyang and Shanghai with instructions for them to turn out products in imitation. These two arsenals had a capacity of 30,000 rifles and 100 guns a year, and it was planned to supplement them with two or three other arsenals.[33] The revolution came before these schemes could be carried out.

Whatever criticism there may have been of the progress of the army under Yuan's régime, there was more after the troops passed out of his hands. It was asserted that the officers were incompetent, the troops without enthusiasm, and the whole machine handicapped by a lack of money. Tieh Liang himself came in for his share of criticism on the ground that, while an able executive, he had no military training.[34] The new system had failed to eliminate the old provincial troops, who were to serve as second line of defense until the reserves were full and, in addition, were to perform the duties of constabulary.[35] Yet despite these strictures, the Manchus seemed to have acquired at last an army in which they could

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[29] *China Year Book, 1912,* p. 247; Swift in Blakeslee, *op. cit.,* p. 18

[30] *NCH,* April 19, 1907.

[31] Swift in Blakeslee, *op. cit.,* p. 182.

[32] Thomson, *China Revolutionized,* p. 320; Rodes, *Le Céleste empire avant la révolution,* p. 206.

[33] *NCH,* June 10, 1911; Swift in Blakeslee, *op. cit.,* p. 181.

[34] Swift in Blakeslee, *op. cit.,* pp. 184–185. [35] *China Year Book 1912,* p. 248.

place some fair amount of confidence. Subsequent events were to show to what extent this hope was well-founded. The Peiyang army served as the bulwark of the dynasty against the revolutionists chiefly because Yuan Shih-kai was recalled to act as its commander, while the most conspicuous contribution of the troops trained under Chang Chih-tung was the giving of a generalissimo to the rebels, the well-known Li Yuan-hung.

The true significance of army reform cannot be expressed in a mere discussion of projects and their operation. The great result of this revived interest in national defense was in a sense a by-product. In a word, the military spirit appeared in China. Earlier the soldier had been a contemptible creature, and people of any real standing would have disdained to appear in military garb; but in the days of reform young China went to school in uniform and sons of good families did not hesitate to enter the military service. The ardent nationalism of the time was closely bound up with this increased respect for the military. China, long too weak to resist her enemies, must be strengthened. Even conservatives were willing to acknowledge the necessity of a better system of national defense as a protection against Westernization of other sorts.[36] The great officials of the realm, such as Yuan and Chang, were glad to appear as the leaders and exponents of this most popular reform. The greatest move to increase the prestige of the army was the occupation of the position of commander-in-chief by the Son of Heaven himself. The principles of the constitution which appeared in 1908 had declared that the command of the national forces should be vested in the Emperor, and on July 15, 1909, a decree made effective this provision.[37] By that time, both the unfortunate Kuang Hsu and the powerful Tzu Hsi were dead, and the Emperor who thus became the titular head of the army and navy was the child Pu Yi, reigning under the name of Hsuan Tung, and with his father Prince Chun, brother of Kuang Hsu, as regent. This assumption by the Throne of the headship of the national forces was repeated in a remarkably declamatory and tactless edict of April 1911. It opened with a long preamble in the best official manner, reviewing the history of the world to the conclusion that only those nations progressed where monarch and people were of one mind. Then, unwisely enough, came a rehearsal of the military exploits of the Manchus in their conquest of China. The high point of the edict, the supreme appeal to the loyalty of the inhabitants of the kingdom, was the proclamation in due form that the Emperor himself would assume the position of commander-in-chief, which would during his minority be exercised for him by Prince Chun. The closing statements stressed militarism as the only way to save China and urged all to remember that their

[36] Cecil, *Changing China*, p. 14. [37] *NCH*, July 17, 1909.

ancestors had served former emperors as soldiers and to come forward and do likewise.[38] These sentiments were hopelessly ill-timed presented as they were to a country whose nationalism and military spirit were already too prone to take the form of resentment against an alien dynasty which had won its position by force. "No occasion less favourable could well have been chosen for insistence on Manchu virtues."[39] The Empress Dowager had made an effort to allay anti-Manchu feeling by a series of decrees urging the elimination of racial differences, but the edict of April 3, 1911, did much to neutralize her efforts.

Another phase of Prince Chun's army policy also served to arouse popular dislike. Every new army or navy body served as a happy haven for imperial princes in need of comfortable positions, and from time to time, some Manchu princeling was given a trip abroad, supposedly to investigate military or naval affairs. In 1910 Prince Tsai Tao, a brother of the Regent, went to the United States and Europe at the head of a mission to investigate army affairs.[40] Shortly before this Prince Tsai Hsun together with Admiral Sah, the chief naval officer in China, journeyed to Europe for observation of naval conditions.[41] The Military Council, set up by the decree of May 8, 1911, had as one of its heads Tsai Tao, while the Navy Bureau which had been formed in 1909 was under Tsai Hsun.[42] The ubiquity of these young and not too competent princes may have served to increase the prestige of the army and navy, but it also did much to raise the cry of nepotism.

Grandiose schemes for the creation of a navy occupied much paper but bore few concrete results. China's first "modern" navy had been destroyed in the war with Japan, and from then until 1906 nothing was done to replace it. In that year, inspired by the great naval victories of Japan over Russia, the government again took steps toward the formation of a fleet. The usual device of a mission abroad under the leadership of a Manchu prince was arranged. In this case the titular head was Prince Pu Lun. Most of his companions were foreign-trained naval students, for a few young Chinese had been allowed to study with the British navy. At the same time, discussions were undertaken with Yuan Shih-kai as to the reopening of the Tientsin Naval College, which had been destroyed in the time of the Boxers.[43] A naval department was created within the Ministry of War in 1907, with Wang Shih-keng, a graduate of the naval college

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[38] *NCH*, April 8, 1911.

[39] *Ibid.*, April 15, 1911.

[40] For items regarding this journey see *The Times*, May 17 to August 2 1910, and *United States Foreign Relations, 1910*, pp. 338–339.

[41] *NCH*, November 27, 1909.

[42] *Ibid.*, May 13, 1911, September 4, 1909.

[43] *Ibid.*, November 16, 1906.

at Tientsin, at its head. Four squadrons were planned, those of the Gulf of Chihli, the Yellow Sea, the Chusan Archipelago, and the South China Sea.[44] There were reports that China even hoped to repurchase Weihaiwei from Great Britain for use as a naval station, but such a step was out of the question with the national treasury in its chronically lean state.[45] Actual progress was confined to the sending to England of eight members of the imperial clan and twenty Chinese to train as midshipmen in the British navy, and the conclusion of a contract with the Japanese Dock Company for the construction of ten or twelve light gunboats for patrolling service along the Yangtze.[46] In 1909 there was another epidemic of ambitious proposals. Naval reform was popular with many of the people, even to the extent of voluntary contributions such as the offer of 3,000,000 taels from a Chinese in Singapore on the significant condition that a detailed account of the way the money was spent should be issued.[47] The government determined to establish a national navy under central control; in the past government vessels had been under the control of the provincial officials. As earnest of its intention a commission consisting of Prince Su, Duke Tsai Tse, Tieh Liang, and Admiral Sah Chen-ping was appointed to draw up plans for the nucleus of a navy.[48] Before long they had presented a program calling for an expenditure of 27,000,000 taels, emphasizing unity of command over ships, reform in naval education, encouragement of ship building and arms manufacture, the improvement of communications, and the construction of coast defenses.[49]

The ever-troublesome question of finances was answered, in theory, by the determination to increase the salt and land taxes, impose an inland navigation duty, and draw a certain portion of the funds needed from the privy purse.[50] In September 1909 the navy was withdrawn from the control of the Ministry of War and placed under a Navy Bureau, to the headship of which was appointed Tsai Hsun, a brother of the Regent.[51] This prince, in company with Admiral Sah, had made a tour of the Chinese ports in August, and the two soon left for England, where they were given opportunity to observe the greatest navy of the world.[52] On their return they were full of plans for sending many naval students abroad, and establishing naval schools in China. Considering this more necessary than the construction or purchase of many large ships at the time, they were willing to limit the quantity of actual vessels to a few cruisers and

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[44] *NCH*, January 18, 1907.
[45] *Ibid.*, July 19, 1907.
[46] *Ibid.*, April 12, July 19, 1907.
[47] *Ibid.*, March 6, 1909.
[48] *Ibid.*, February 27, 1909.
[49] *Ibid.*, August 7, November 27, 1909.
[50] *Ibid.*, August 28, 1909.
[51] *Ibid.*, September 4, 1909.
[52] *Ibid.*, November 27, 1909.

torpedo boats.[53] An edict of December 4, 1910, recognized the importance of naval plans and expectations by the creation of a separate Ministry of the Navy.[54]

In 1911 China had accumulated a navy of 45,070 tons counting every sort of war vessel. Of the three squadrons into which it was organized the most important was an amalgamation of the Peiyang and Nanyang squadrons and comprised four cruisers and a few destroyers gunboats, and torpedo boats. The Yangtze squadron contained twelve gunboats for river service, and the training squadron had two cruisers and ten gunboats. This brief muster roll was but a small part of the whole design as it existed in the minds of those in control. In 1915 China was to possess eighty-one first-class battleships, twenty or more cruisers, twenty or more gunboats, and two flotillas of torpedo boats, a total tonnage of 250,000 or so. The cost of this equipment was to be about 158,400,000 taels, no small item. In addition there would be an outlay for naval bases. The yearly cost from 1911 to 1915 inclusive was to be 25,222,679 taels, plus costs of maintenance, rising from 36,245,925 taels to 46,109,650 taels in the same period. Prior to 1911 the expenditure on both old and new naval accounts was only about 40,000,000 taels annually. The new program was apt to mean a considerable strain on the treasury, but the financial problem, despite various paper solutions, was left in the old status, the source of support for the navy being provincial contributions, which were only too often very slow in arriving.[55]

The plans for naval reorganization were the butt of a great deal of well-founded criticism from foreigners. The chief argument against this particular innovation was the impossibility of China's developing in a short time a navy vast enough to meet her needs. In the meantime, while her naval force was small, it would be only a juicy tidbit for the larger fleet of a predatory power. Money, which was none too plentiful in Peking, could well have been expended on some more useful if less spectacular and "patriotic" reform. As it happened, time was not vouchsafed to the imperial government to carry out its high-reaching schemes and to spend the funds thus optimistically allotted to naval construction. In 1911 the blow against which the dynasty had been trying to accumulate forces of defense fell, and in the ensuing struggle the new army and navy demonstrated once again the bitter truth that in many cases the reforms begun under imperial auspices were veritable Frankenstein creations which turned against the authors of their being.

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[53] *NCH,* February 18, 1910.

[54] *Ibid.,* December 9, 1910.

[55] *NCH,* March 3, 1911; *China Year Book, 1912,* p. 259.

VI. CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM

Four phases of Western civilization were calculated to make the greatest impression on the Chinese mind as differing radically from anything to be found in the Middle Kingdom. The mechanical devices of the Occident were striking and useful and before long had won for themselves an opening in China; the great armies and navies of the West, a contrast to the disdained troops of China, soon served as the model for a reorganized defense force; the learning of the foreigners was in time grafted on the ancient Confucian curriculum. There remained the governmental systems characteristic of Europe and America; and in 1905 the Empress Dowager took the first step toward the renovation of the imperial government after the models of the West. No phase of her reform is more amazing than her appearance as sponsor of constitutionalism, considering the inherent absolutism of her character and her long acceptance of paternal despotism as the ideal of government. In China from time immemorial the people had been the subjects of the Throne's compassion, but by no means its assistants and advisers in the art of government; only superior men, those who had improved themselves by conscientious study of the Confucian principles, were fitted for that task. Consequently the prevalence of popular participation in government in the West was provocative of much thought among those at the helm of the Chinese government. A few years before, any proposal for the diminution of the imperial prerogative would have been viewed as heinous, but China enfeebled by foreign aggression and internal rebellion must rejuvenate herself by any methods which seemed likely to promise success.

Japan was the pattern, the strongest of all Asiatic powers; what was the secret of her newly found strength and indeed of the puissance of Occidental nations with which China had had such unhappy contacts? Pondering this question, many were inclined to answer that the formula was Western education and based on it a new method of governmental organization—constitutionalism. By some coincidence all the powers which were flourishing and great had constitutions, while those which were sickly and unimportant had not. Of the major nations with whom China had extensive dealings, the only one which had resisted the tide of political liberalism in the nineteenth century was Russia, and in 1905 that mighty Goliath had fallen before the attacks of Japan. China wished to be strong. Very well, she too must have a constitution.[1]

That the Empress Dowager was willing in 1905 to welcome alterations

[1] Bland, *Recent Events and Present Policies in China,* p. 110.

in the government did not mean that she had been converted to democracy or even to limited monarchy. She was far too canny and too tenacious of power to support radical changes for which China was not prepared. But Japan held forth a pleasing prospect, for there "a despotism strict combined with absolute equality" had all but been achieved. The Japanese constitution seemed to combine an almost unimpaired imperial prerogative with the institutions characteristic of Western government. Under such a system, the Throne could summon to its aid the opinion of its people without sacrificing its own power of final decision. Here was the prototype of the Chinese governmental reforms of the years 1905 to 1911, and how closely it was imitated even in details we shall see as we take up the steps by which the imperial intention to liberalize the government was divulged.

The outcome of the Russo-Japanese War aroused those elements in all Asiatic countries which wished for a more liberalized or more independent régime, as the case might be. China could not hope to escape this epidemic. To forestall such agitation it was proposed that the government promptly grant a parliament, a suggestion which was referred to Yuan Shih-kai, Chang Chih-tung, and Tsen Chun-hsuen. Their reply declared China unready for a parliament, but favored the formation, on the Japanese example, of provincial assemblies to advise the viceroys and governors, the course which was ultimately followed.[2] The ball thus set rolling, the edict of July 15, 1905, gave imperial approval to the trend toward a revision of the governmental machinery. It opened with the customary and justified complaint that though the Throne had decreed reforms of many sorts the officials on whom their execution devolved had from ignorance done nothing to carry them out. The decree ordered that a commission be sent abroad to various foreign countries to determine what form of government would best suit the needs of China. Four commissioners were named, but the composition of the party was changed several times before its departure. The two most important members, who were also among the original appointees, were Duke Tsai Tse and Tuan Fang, both Manchus, but liberal and enlightened men. The group was divided into two sections, one, under Tsai Tse, to visit Japan, Great Britain, France, and Belgium; the other, under Tuan Fang, to go to Germany, Russia, Austria, and the United States.[3] September 24, 1905, was the day set for the departure of the delegates, but when they were assembled at the station, a bomb injured Tsai Tse and Shao Ying, two of the commissioners, and Wu Ting-fang, who had come to see the party off, and killed three bodyservants.[4] The departure of the commission was delayed until the end of the year.

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[2] *NCH*, July 7, 1905.

[3] *United States Foreign Relations, 1905*, p. 179; *NCH*, September [illegible], 1905.

[4] *NCH*, September 29, 1905.

During the months of the commissioners' absence the government was not idle. An edict of November 25, 1905, ordered the establishment of a department for examining foreign political conditions with an eye to determining which were most suitable for China.[5] In the capital there was much discussion of the proposed changes. In August 1906 the commissioners returned to Peking, with very sanguine views as to the value of Western political institutions for China. Their admiration had been aroused particularly by the British and German governments, a strange enough pair, but both monarchies which had been able to assimilate popular institutions. They wisely recommended, however, that the Japanese constitution serve as the model, conditions in that country being far more comparable to those in China. As in Japan, so in China, the liberalizing of the government was to be the result of imperial abnegation, not of popular demand.[6]

That the commissioners' study of Western institutions had not been in vain is indicated by the supposed memorial of Tsai Tse, published in October 1906, in which he defended constitutionalism on the ground that it would perpetuate the power of the dynasty by shifting responsibility to ministers responsible to the people while the Throne remained outside criticism; that it would remove the reproach of semi-civilization which absolutism incurred and would thus lessen the aggressiveness of the foreign powers toward China; and that by strengthening the internal administration of the country it would help to prevent disturbances—a penetrating and cogent set of arguments. Not even this firm advocate of limited monarchy desired these changes to come at once, however; China was not yet prepared.[7]

On August 27 a royal commission was chosen to examine and report on the memorials submitted by Tsai Tse, Tuan Fang, and their colleagues. At the head of this imposing body was placed a young and inexperienced Manchu, Prince Chun, the brother of Kuang Hsu. This appointment was not dictated wholly by favoritism or bad judgment. Chun was one of the few princes who had been abroad, having gone to Germany in 1901 to present the formal apology for the murder of Baron von Ketteler in 1900. More significant for the future was the fact that he was married to the daughter of Tzu Hsi's old friend and servant, Jung Lu, and that in the event of Kuang Hsu's death their infant child would be almost certain to have the Empress Dowager's support as a candidate for the Throne, in which case, Prince Chun would assume the regency. Such was the actual course of events in 1908. The experience which Chun would gain as head of the commission to report on governmental reform might serve him well

[5] *NCH*, December 1, 1905.

[6] *Ibid.*, August 10, 1906.

[7] *Ibid.*, August 17, 1906.

in the future. Among the other members of th s body were Pri ce Ching, Yuan Shih-kai, Hsu Shih-chang, Tieh Liang, Sun Chia-nai, tl .t veteran of the 1898 reforms, and others to the number of twelve.[8]

Four days after the announcement of this commission, an probably prompted by the advice and urgings of many of its members Tzu Hsi issued one of the greatest of the reform edicts cf her reign, the] :onouncement of September 1, 1906, which proclaimed the Throne's ad erence to the principle of constitutionalism while postponing the procla nation of definite constitutional institutions until the cou ntry was ready o receive them. This edict follows:

From the founding of our dynasty to the present time the wise meas es adopted by the holy monarchs who have succeeded one anothe upon the throne ave always without exception been taken with due regard to the ex igencies of the tim s and have been embodied in the Statutes of the Empire.

At present all nations are in free communication with each other, id in their methods of government and their laws are influenced one by another. (ır political institutions, however, remain as of old, a condition of affairs which threa ens danger and disaster, day by day becoming more imminent. Un ess we broaden ou knowledge by a more comprehensive study of the institutions of other lands, and i ıprove our laws accordingly we shall fail to keep the path of progress marked ut by our imperial ancestors, and there will be no hope of sec ıring that just ad ıinistration which the welfare of ministers and people alike demand.

Some time ago, therefore, we appointed certain m inisters to visit fc eign countries to inquire into their methods of government, and D uke Tsai-tse and h associates have now returned and made their reports. All are agreed that the lack o prosperity in the state is due to the separation between the officials and the peo e and the lack of co-operation between the capital and the provir ces. The officials e ignorant of the needs of the people, and the people do not understand what is r cessary to the safety of the state. The wealth and strength of o her countries are ıe to their practice of constitutional government, in which public questions are det rmined by consultation with the people. The ruler and his people are as one body ıimated by one spirit, as a result of which comprehensive consideration is given to he general welfare and the limits of authority are clearly defined. Even in securing and appropriating funds for public use, as well as in all political measures, there is nothing which is not made the public concern of the people. Moreover, these ıations all learn from one another, and are constantly improving their methods so to attain the highest degree of prosperity. The success of government and the con ord of the people have their origin here.

Under these circumstances we can but consider carefully the form f government best suited to the needs of the times, and adopt a constitutional poli in which the supreme authority shall be vested in the crown, but all questions of overnment shall be considered by a popular assembly.

These are the foundation principles upon which the perpetuity of the state is to rest. As yet, however, the constitution is not prepared, and the people, t o, are not properly equipped with the necessary knowledge. If we adopt hasty me sures and

[8] *United States Foreign Relations, 1906;* Part I, pp. 348–349; *NCH,* August 31, 1906.

simply issue specious and pretentious documents, how can we secure the confidence of the people?

If, therefore, we would get rid of accumulated evils and fix responsibility, we must first of all begin with the official organization. The first thing imperatively necessary is that the regulations relating to official functions be taken up and considered one by one and successively amended, and that the various classes of laws likewise be carefully arranged.

We must extend education, put the finances in order, improve the military system, establish a police organization throughout the Empire, cause the gentry and people to thoroughly understand political affairs, and thus by such preparation lay the foundations of constitutional government.

Let the ministers and officials in the capital and the Provinces give thorough attention to these matters and exert themselves to insure success.

In a few years, when the system shall have been roughly outlined, we can, after due consideration of the circumstances, collate and compare the methods of other nations and adopt a satisfactory form of constitutional government as well as fix a date for putting it into operation. That date will depend upon the rate of progress being made, and will be proclaimed accordingly to the Empire.

Let all the Tartar generals, viceroys, and governors of the Provinces instruct the literary classes and the common people to rouse themselves to earnest efforts in behalf of education, in the hope that everyone may come to understand the real meaning of patriotism, and comprehend those principles by which the nation is to be united for the promotion of civilization, that private interests are not to be pursued to the injury of the public welfare, that petty jealousies must not be allowed to defeat national policies, and that respect for authority is the preservation of peace.

Thus we may hope that the people will accumulate the stores of wisdom needed for the establishment of a constitutional form of government.[9]

This edict well illustrates the curious mixture of naïveté and shrewdness in many borrowings from the West made during the last years of the Manchus. There was no evidence in this or later edicts that Tzu Hsi had more than a most general knowledge of the institutions and conditions which the adoption of constitutionalism would bring. She cherished the hope that a parliament, once established, would not attempt to infringe on the authority of the Throne, and that when a constitutional régime was instituted China would somehow attain to a sort of millenium in which ruler and ruled would live in complete harmony. Combined with these sanguine conceptions were a number of very sound ideas. Very properly the establishment of the new order was delayed till the essential prerequisites of education and proper finances should have been dealt with. The whole plan of a constitution and a parliament seemed to blend harmoniously with the veritable *leit motif* of the reforms of this period—the desire for greater centralization. Gone were the days when freedom from foreign complications and domestic restlessness made the comparative independence of the provincial and local authorities a matter of little moment. In the new

[9] *United States Foreign Relations, 1906,* Part I, pp. 349–350.

era, Peking must be able to exercise a more immediate and unified control, and a parliament, representing the whole nation and obedient to the Throne's final command, might assist in the attaining of this objective. The policy of centralization, essential as it was for the continuance of the central authority, was certain to arouse sharp opposition from the hitherto semi-autonomous provinces and especially from the officials who saw their freedom of action in danger of being diminished. Nevertheless, the proclamation of the Throne's benevolent intention to grant to its subjects participation in the task of government met with a friendly reception. All over the country there were celebrations and speeches.[10] All those genuinely interested in evolutionary reform were gratified by the decision. Among the disaffected, however, were those to whom no promise of reform was valid and acceptable provided it had on it the damning mark, "Manchu made."

The edict of September 1, 1906, had promised a revision of the official system, and the Peking boards were the first to undergo this process. The day after the appearance of the great edict on constitutional government the Throne appointed a commission for the revision of regulations as to officials. Its membership consisted in the main of the same men who had been chosen to pass on the reports of the returned commissioners, and the results of its deliberations were to receive the final inspection of Prince Ching, Chu Hung-chi, and Sun Chia-nai.[11]

The proposed modernization of Peking and provincial officialdom aroused stubborn opposition from officials of all ranks, but particularly from the Hanlin Academy. The contagion spread even to the commissioners themselves, and two refused to serve.[12] This effort to protect personal interests at the expense of public welfare reached its culmination in a stormy scene in the Grand Council, where four of the six members, Lu Chuan-lin, Jung Ching, Hsu Shih-chang, and Tieh Liang, pitted themselves against the "Old Buddha" and were dismissed from their positions as councilors as a result.[13]

The opposition thus bludgeoned into silence, the revised regulations for the metropolitan administration were published on November 6, 1906. The six boards which, with the addition of a Board of Foreign Affairs in 1901, of Commerce in 1903, and of Education in 1905, had so long constituted the mainstays of the central administration were reorganized as ten ministries.[14] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Civil Appoint-

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[10] *NCH,* September 21, 1906.

[11] *United States Foreign Relations, 1906,* Part I, p. 351

[12] *NCH,* September 28, 1906. [13] *Ibid.,* November 9, 16, 1906.

[14] The Chinese term, *pu,* which may be translated "board" or "ministry," was used in both cases, but to call the reformed departments "ministries" may serve to indicate their somewhat modernized character.

ments remained as before. Constabulary affairs and other civil matters were placed under a newly created Ministry of Civil Affairs. The old Board of Revenue, rechristened the Ministry of Finance, absorbed the Council of Finance. The Board of Rites was expanded to include the Courts of Sacrificial Worship, Banquets, and Court Ceremonies. The Ministry of Education, created in 1905, was not altered. The old Board of War became the Ministry of War, including among its duties those formerly performed by the Board of Army Reorganization, and the Court of Imperial Stud. It was also given control of naval affairs until the setting up of a special Navy Department not long after. The Ministry of Justice was the new form of the Board of Punishments, and the Grand Court of Revision was renamed the Court of Cassation. Two of the old boards, those of Works and of Commerce, were fused to form a Ministry of Agriculture, Industry, and Commerce. A new organization, the Ministry of Communications, was brought into being to deal with affairs concerning railways, telegraphs, steamships, and posts. To conclude the list, the Mongolian Superintendency was renamed the Ministry of Colonies. The edict also made brief reference to a Court of Auditors to audit revenues and expenditures, and to a new Tzu Cheng Yuan or Government Council where prominent officials were to assist in state affairs. This latter proposal proved to be the germ of the National Assembly.

This rearrangement of organizations and functions was most necessary, for until this time, the government, when some new line of innovation was hit upon, had been content to create impromptu some species of board of commission to care for it, the members thereof usually being members of a large number of other bodies besides. The consolidation of minor departments with ministries was an excellent step, but one unfortunately not carried far enough, for many decorative and outworn institutions, such as the Imperial Board of Astronomy, the Imperial Clan Court, the Imperial Equipage Department, and others of their ilk, were pronounced not in need of reform. The edict, in addition to its rearrangement of posts, announced certain principles to which the government would thereafter adhere. Distinction between Manchus and Chinese in the making of appointments was to cease and the old system of having two presidents and four vice-presidents for each board was abandoned except in the case of the Waiwupu or Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[15] Despite this declaration, the actual appointments made after the reorganization followed the old system of a half-and-half division of office between Manchus and Chinese, with the significant exception of the Ministry of War, which was placed almost exclusively in

[15] The text of this edict will be found in *NCH*, November 9, 1906, and in Morse, *The Trade and Administration of the Chinese Empire*, pp. 395–397.

the hands of the Manchus.[16] The Throne also condemned pluralism, but the only one who took this sentiment seriously, the government itself not excluded, was Yuan Shih-kai, who resigned seven posts in order to concentrate upon his work as viceroy of Chihli.[17] The other pluralists retained their extra positions, and in subsequent edicts the Throne continued to appoint to important tasks those officials who were already overburdened with office and honor.

The promulgation of the scheme for metropolitan official reform was followed by a grand reshuffling of posts in Peking. The government had promised that those removed from office by the changes should be shifted to positions in the provinces, and after the new ministries had been officered there was a residuum of no less than 1,400 unemployed. The new appointments did not arouse much enthusiasm among observers. An undue number of Manchus was chosen. Moreover, all except two of those named as vice-ministers were men trained in the old classical educational system. It was deplored that the problems of the eunuch system, the Hanlin Academy, and the Manchu banners had not been discussed.[18] The Japanese press was particularly stringent in its criticism, pointing out that, while the departments in Peking had been rearranged, their power was still hampered by the great freedom remaining to the provincial heads, especially in finance and military affairs.[19] The whole situation was made more discouraging by the prompt appearance of a conservative reaction which owed much of its impetus to the dissatisfaction of those who had lost their posts and the apprehension of others who feared that their sinecures would be the next to go.[20] Fearing to arouse intense opposition the Throne had taken halfway measures, and had thus pleased no one. In extenuation of its timorousness, the alarmist reports from the Chinese minister in St. Petersburg on the difficulties which the Russian government was then facing must also be noted.[21] The edict of reorganization admitted its own partial and tentative character. In a matter where so many vested interests were concerned, the Throne had to move with caution. The wave of reaction which followed even this incomplete reform and the great pronouncement on the elimination of the production and use of opium which came at about the same time, showed the wisdom of making haste slowly.

The special commissioners next turned to the problem of reshaping the provincial governments. Manchuria was chosen as the field for experi-

[16] Hsieh, *The Government of China (1644–1911)*, p. 350.

[17] *NCH*, November 23, 1906.

[18] *The Times*, November 10, 1906; *NCH*, October 19, November 16, 1906; Hsieh, *op. cit.*, p. 350.

[19] *The Times*, November 12, 1906.

[20] *NCH*, January 18, 1907.

[21] *The Times*, November 10, 1906.

mentation. The real value and importance of this homeland of the dynasty had been brought sharply to its notice by the Russo-Japanese War and by the increasing interests of Japan as well as Russia there. The government of the region had long been a Manchu monopoly and had been notably unsatisfactory until the appointment of the Chinese bannerman, Chao Erh-hsun, as governor-general in 1905. Late in 1906 Prince Tsai Chen and Hsu Shih-chang were chosen to investigate conditions in Manchuria, and on their return in January 1907 they recommended the reorganization of the finances of the region, the dissemination of education, the creation of military forces on the model of the Peiyang army, and in general any steps which would tend to counteract the power of Russia and Japan.[22] In April 1907 the first step in governmental reform was taken by the metamorphosis of the old governor-generalship (or Tartar-generalship) of Fengtien into the viceroyalty of the three Manchurian provinces, with Hsu Shih-chang as the first incumbent of the post. Under him were to be the three governors of Fengtien, Kirin, and Heilungkiang. To the post of governor of Fengtien with headquarters at the city of Mukden, Tang Shao-yi was appointed. These two selections promised well for the success of the project.[23]

In the meantime the commission on the reorganization of the provincial administration was hard at work. In July, Prince Ching and Sun Chia-nai submitted its report in the form of a critique on a previous plan of Duke Tsai Tse.[24] This document was one of the most thoughtful and judicious state papers of this period. It recognized the cardinal necessity of beginning reform with the officials at the bottom of the ladder. It mattered little who sat in Peking and delivered pronunciamentos if the local officials, incompetent and overburdened with duties of all sorts, turned a deaf ear. Morse has thus described the traditional theory of official competence:

> Every Chinese official is supposed to be able to undertake every branch of human enterprise, from railway engineering to street scavenging, from the interpretation of the law to the execution of criminals, and to accept full responsibility for the consequences of his acts or the acts of his subordinates.[25]

With the changing order of things, the prefects, department magistrates, subprefects, and district magistrates must be given limited and

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[22] *NCH*, January 11, 1907.

[23] *United States Foreign Relations, 1907,* Part I, pp. 178–179. For a more extended discussion of the reorganization of Manchuria, see Hsü, *China and Her Political Entity,* chapter vi.

[24] Its text will be found in *United States Foreign Relations, 1907,* Part I, pp. 181–184.

[25] Morse, *op. cit.,* p. 68.

stated duties. For the old principle of versatility the new one of specialization was to be substituted; indeed, if one of the watchwords of the reform campaign was centralization, specialization was the other. The plan provided for the retention of two commissionerships already in existence in each province, those of justice and of education, the latter created in 1905.[26] The control of judicial administration and courts was to be concentrated in the hands of the provincial judge, a step which it was hoped might aid in the removal of extraterritoriality. The multifarious functions which appertained to the *taotais,* or officers on circuit, were to be reapportioned. Henceforth, there was to be at each capital a taotai of police affairs and one of industries, the latter in charge of agriculture, industries, commerce, communication, and the courier service. The taotaiships of the salt gabelle, grain transport, customs, and river conservancy were to be retained, but all others were to be abolished, except in outlying districts where the provincial authorities might deem them necessary. The memorialists themselves analyzed their proposal, noting the especial significance of the establishment of a separate judiciary. Until this time, there had been two commissionerships in each province, one of justice and one of civil administration, but the department and district magistrates had united in their persons both these functions. Relieved of the necessity of hearing lawsuits by the transfer of this task to the judicial commissioner, the local officials might at last have time to discover the precise nature of the innovations they were being called upon to introduce and to see to their inception. Deliberative councils were advocated to advise the local magistrates as to the desires of those under their jurisdiction, and certain changes in the list of assistant officials in local *yamens* were made to prepare the way for local self-government. The commissioners observed that reports on the progress of reform had run to words rather than facts. Their plan, combining specialization of functions and the beginnings of local self-government, was proposed as a way to "escape the present evil of merely pretending to discharge the public business." The memorial closed with the advice that the higher provincial officials "must extend the benefits of education everywhere, that a generation of able men may appear." Only thus would it be possible to make ready for a constitutional government. An edict of July 7 accepted these excellent suggestions, with the exception of the provision for local deliberative bodies, which were not decreed till later. Following the suggestion of the memorialists, the new organization was to be applied first in Manchuria, which was already in a state of governmental transition, and in Chihli and Kiangsu, where intercourse with foreigners

[26] Later, provincial commissioners of foreign affairs were added—an anomaly in a government which aspired to centralization. Chang, "The Provincial Organs for Foreign Affairs," in *Chinese Social and Political Science Review,* October 1916.

and the spread of new ideas had prepared the way.[27] The changes to be instituted were embodied in one of the sets of prolix regulations which so often served as monuments of clerical industry but administrative inaction.[28]

The proposal for the formation of advisory bodies, while not adopted at once, was not forgotten. To the Empress Dowager the chief benefit which government of the Occidental variety could confer was the better opportunity afforded the Throne to learn what was in the minds of the people. The great edict of September 1, 1906, had lauded the supposed unanimity of ruler and ruled in countries which possessed constitutional government. The introduction in China of a parliament and subordinate representative bodies might well bring about this consummation by putting the Throne in closer touch with the pulse of public opinion. The only organ of the government which had been performing functions of organized public opinion was the Censorate, and its members were critics of the regular officials rather than channels for the *vox populi.* On July 8, 1907, the Throne granted to all its subjects the privilege of preparing suggestions as to the future government of the state, which they were to submit, through certain specified channels, to the Throne, a step reminiscent of the extension of the right to memorialize which Kuang Hsu had granted in 1898.[29] Whether this step was unproductive of results or was the conscious preliminary of a more definite device for the gathering of the popular will, on September 28, 1907, an edict appeared in the following terms:

> The first thing to do in establishing a representative government is to get a consensus of opinion in the matter. Upper and lower houses of representatives are certainly essential factors in governmental administration. China cannot establish such houses of representatives in a moment. We should immediately, however, establish a "constitutional assembly" (*Tzu Cheng Yuan*) that a foundation may be laid for a parliament.[30]

Thus, in language which resembled in clearness that of the Delphic oracle, the Throne proclaimed the creation of the first deliberative assembly in the Empire. The edict announced the selection of Prince Pu Lun and Sun Chia-nai as its presidents and directed them, with the Grand Council, to prepare detailed regulations for it. To prevent confusion as to the intention of the Throne, an edict of September 30 emphasized the fact that the aim of all these preparations was the attainment of a constitutional monarchy.

> This is the form of government which is especially suited for China, and the officials and people throughout the Empire should most carefully distinguish between that and other forms, in order to avoid confusion.[31]

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[27] *United States Foreign Relations, 1907,* Part I, pp. 179–180.

[28] For the text of these regulations see *ibid.,* pp. 184–189.

[29] *NCH,* July 12, 1907.

[30] *United States Foreign Relations, 1907,* Part I, p. 192.

[31] *Ibid.,* p. 196.

In Japan, during the period of preparation for constitutionalism, various assemblies of assorted composition had been formed all serving to train in parliamentary methods the men who later took their part in the Diet proper. This preliminary assembly in China was likewise to act as a training-school for a number of future parliamentary leaders. However, it could not furnish much experience to any adequate number of men. Therefore, the next edict of importance, that of October 19, 1907, declared:

> . . . . the provinces should also have some means whereby an expression of public opinion could be obtained. The people should be given an opportunity to point out and explain in what way the province is weak and in what way it is strong; they should discuss means of maintaining the public peace; and they should have some organization that would serve as a stepping stone to the imperial constitutional assembly.
>
> Therefore it is hereby ordered that the viceroys and governors immediately establish deliberative assemblies (*Tzu-i-chü*) in their respective provincial capitals, selecting honest and admittedly clever officials and gentry to assist in the organization thereof. These officials and gentry selected from various places for their honesty and ability shall elect competent and efficient men to act as members of the deliberative assemblies; and under no circumstances shall men of evil reputation or local "bosses," who seek only their own advantage, be chosen by them.

These carefully chosen bodies were to discuss matters relating to the new institutions and to present their decisions to the provincial authorities, who were to take them into consideration or memorialize the Throne regarding them. Members of these provincial assemblies were to be chosen to serve in the National Asembly, the first indication of the composition of that body. There were also to be councils for deliberation in prefectures, departments, and districts.[32] In this plan the old blended with the new. The Confucian belief in moral superiority as the one meet qualification for governmental power was conspicuous. Desirous as the Throne was of giving the "people" an opportunity to express themselves, the "people" were to be only those of undoubted substance and worth.

The inspiration for the greater development of local self-government came from the quarter where reform of all sorts flourished best, the viceroyalty of Yuan Shih-kai. Tientsin had become the leading example of a Chinese city with a municipal organization on the Western model. The first elections for the new city council had been held July 24, under the system of indirect election which had been adopted in the regulations drawn up to control this new arrangement. Early in August, Yuan himself memorialized the Throne recommending that the Tientsin regulations be copied throughout the Empire. Provincial heads were therefore instructed to set up self-government bureaus for the study of local self-government,

[32] *United States Foreign Relations, 1907,* Part I, pp. 197–198.

with the Tientsin regulations recommended as a model,[33] and the edict of October 19, 1907, approved local government councils. Although the year 1907 saw the official proclamation of this whole series of assemblies, local, provincial, and national, not till 1908 and 1909 were detailed regulations for their formation and operation ready, and the bodies themselves were organized in the years from 1909 on.

The edict of December 24, 1907, is a most enlightening commentary on the atmosphere surrounding these imperial plans and projects for the liberalizing of the patriarchal régime. The government was constrained to admit that it was between the horns of a dilemma. Should the Manchu dynasty confine its reforms to paper promises, all the student class and revolutionary agitators would rise in denunciation; should it attempt reforms, every increase in education and in opportunities for the expression of opinion would increase the group who looked on the Manchus as hypocrites or laggards. Indeed, in these last years of their hegemony, the Manchus were engaged in a most delicate and hazardous game. Reform either too slow or too rapid would mean their destruction, and unfortunately only reform which was in reality far too precipitate would satisfy the most vocal and active group of their subjects. All the dangers which the increased talk of constitutions and assemblies and popular government were raising were described by the Throne itself in these terms:

> The Throne is most sincere in attempting these reforms. There have, of late, been not a few among the governing classes, the merchants, the literari [*sic*], and the populace who have intelligently performed their individual duties; but there have been also many fickle, deceitful, ignorant ones entirely lacking in insight. People have made these constitutional reforms a pretext for meddling with the internal and foreign concerns of the Government. When one has raised his voice a hundred have flocked to him and added their quota to the general chorus of interference. . . . . The national ideals begin to be shaken. This all serves to interrupt the laying of the foundations for a constitutional government. The peaceful rule of the country is disrupted and, most important of all, the real establishment of a constitutional government is postponed to an indefinite date, as is also the day when the Empire will regain its strength.
>
> The people must be allowed to understand these things and express themselves, but they must not indulge in disorderly discussions. Under constitutional forms of government ministers and people are mindful of distinctions of rank and maintain peaceful relations.[34]

The place for discussion, urged the Throne, was in the national and provincial assemblies, and a set of regulations controlling unruly public discussion was promised. The government was beginning to taste the difficulties of a period of transition, when restlessness and truculence seized many of its subjects. Already the controversy over provincial control of

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[33] *United States Foreign Relations*, 1907, Part I, pp. 189–190; *NCH*, August 2, 9, 1907.

[34] *United States Foreign Relations, 1908*, p. 177.

railways as against central control and foreign loans was in full swing. Nationalism was becoming stronger and, as it grew, constituted an increasing threat to the alien dynasty. "China for the Chinese" was a cry which could be turned not only against foreign enterprise but against Manchu rule.

Despite these ominous symptoms of intransigeance, the government on August 27, 1908, proclaimed the so-called "Principles of the Constitution."[35] In July a body consisting of the bureau for the collation of administrative methods and the constitutional commission had been ordered to present to the Throne the basic principles of a constitution, the methods for election to the projected parliament and its powers, and the proper measures to be taken each year in carrying out a comprehensive program of reform. The next month their report on these veritable labors of Hercules was ready. No phase of the reform efforts of the later years of the Empire is more open to criticism than the hasty and uncritical copying of Western, and especially Japanese, institutions, which in many cases took the place of hard study of Chinese requirements and needs. It had taken Ito, the great constitutional reformer of Japan, some seven years to formulate a constitution for his country. The Chinese commissioners, called on to perform a task of even greater magnitude, briskly reported in a few weeks, for the "principles" which they submitted were drawn, with minor changes, from the very constitution which had cost Ito so much thought.[36] The resulting document was strongly monarchic in tone. Rockhill, the American minister to China, said of it:

> The principle [*sic*], the only preoccupation of the memorialists has been to preserve undiminished the autocratic powers of the Sovereign, while bringing him in closer relation with the people through the medium of the provincial assemblies and the Imperial Parliament, which are to be purely consultative bodies without any power whatsoever, not even that of choosing the subjects of their debates.[37]

Because of its conservative and anti-democratic tone, this outline of a constitution has served as the basis for accusations that the Manchus, insincere in their promise of constitutionalism, were attempting to deceive the people with paper promises.[38] It must be remembered, however, that in none of the edicts relating to constitutionalism had there ever been a promise to transform China into a democratic monarchy on the English model. To the Empress Dowager and her advisers, constitutionalism did not mean relinquishment of power by the Throne. As the edict of September 1, 1906, had declared, the new government was to be "a constitu-

[35] *Ibid.*, 1908, pp. 191–196; also given in part in Hsieh, *op. cit.*, pp. 371–37

[36] For a tabulation of the similarities between this set of principles and the Japanese constitution see Hsieh, *op. cit.*, pp. 353–354.

[37] *United States Foreign Relations, 1908*, pp. 189–190.

[38] Hsieh, *op. cit.*, pp. 353–355.

tional polity in which the supreme authority shall be vested in the crown, but all questions of government shall be considered [but not decided] by a popular assembly." The authors of the "principles" of 1908 adhered to this conception. The aim of the constitution was stated to be "to conserve the power of the sovereign and protect the officials and people." They divided the constitutions of the world into two classes, those granted from above and those won by pressure from below. That of China was to be of the former class. In short, "The parliament must grow out of the constitution, not the constitution out of the parliament." The "principles" set three fundamental axioms for the proposed constitution: (1) that the sacred majesty of the Throne may not be offended against; (2) that the sovereign has absolute power, which he chooses to exercise in constitutional forms; and (3) that officials and people, according to the laws, have privileges to which they are entitled and duties which they owe. Such "principles" were, of course, unsatisfactory to the radicals in that they promised no limitation of the Throne's prerogative. However, a constitution on paper and in practice are often different matters. In Japan the great powers of the Throne have been exercised through the ministers and parliament, and it was conceivable that such a development might take place in China.

The "principles" did not comprise the total of the suggestions submitted to the Throne on August 27, 1908. In their memorial the commissioners emphasized the necessity of careful preparation for the inauguration of a parliament, stressing the need of census statistics as an aid in elections, the codification of laws, the extension of education, and practice in local self-government. Such tasks would necessitate time; the question was how much. There had been agitated discussions on this point. A considerable number in the nation at large wanted a parliament at once, and in time this urgency was to spread. But in 1908 the members of the body for the examination of the principles of the constitution were not so hasty. A number favored five years as a sufficient time, a greater number considered ten years advisable, and one voted for a twenty-year period.[39] The result was a compromise on a nine-year interval, during which the country could be made ready to receive constitutionalism. On August 27, 1908, this nine-year period was approved by the Empress Dowager, together with a detailed program of the special progress to be made during each year of that time.[40] It was a remarkable piece of official optimism, considering that the Throne found it chronically necessary to reproach its servants for their delay in putting into effect the reforms which had already been decreed.

[39] *NCH*, July 4, 1908.

[40] For the nine-year program, the best evidence of how much China had to do, see Appendix A.

During the first year, corresponding approximately to the calendar year of 1908, *inter alia,* provincial assemblies were to be decreed the rules for local self-government and for the reorganization of the financial system, municipal laws, mercantile laws, and court procedure, were to be published, and easy lesson books for the compulsory use of the people were to be prepared. The greater part of the first year's program was eventually carried out, perhaps because it consisted largely of the formulation of rules and regulations, that comparatively sterile phase of reform in which the government attained its greatest success. In the following year elections for the provincial assemblies were to take place, local self-government bureaus were to be established in every place of importance a census was to be taken in every province, and in addition a vast amount of definition of functions and drawing up of rules and regulations was to be accomplished. Thus the plan went on, each year supposedly to witness great strides, chiefly in the extension of deliberative bodies in provinces and smaller units, the spread of education, the codification of laws, and the formation of an adequate judicial system. The last of the nine years was to see the culmination of this process, for then the constitution was to be promulgated and elections for parliament were to be held. It has been noted before, but it is worthy of further emphasis here, that in 1916, at the end of the period of preparation, literacy was to reach the high-water mark of one out of every twenty.

In 1908 critics of the government's efforts could look with scorn at its progress to date, declaring that grandiloquent decrees and circumstantial regulations did not constitute reform, and even intimating that the dynasty had no intention of converting its paper reforms into facts. Yet the cause of constitutionalism had progressed between 1906, when it was supported only by an edict promising its installation in "a few years," and the latter part of 1908, when plans for its inception had attained to the detail and extent indicated above. Future events were to evidence the sincerity of the Throne's intention to carry out the nine-year program, and its inability to do so. After the almost feverish activity of July and August, 1908, in the work of formulation and planning, the stage was set for the actual inauguration of such novelties in China as the provincial and national assemblies.

Bland and Backhouse, in their life of the Empress Dowager, suggest that there may have been a special reason for this haste in reform—the illness of the Empress Dowager. In the summer of 1908, her health began to fail, and in August she suffered a slight paralytic stroke.[41] It was

[41] This account of the illness of the Empress Dowager and the Emperor and the choice of an heir is drawn from Bland and Backhouse, *China under the Empress Dowager,* pp. 443–463.

apparent also that Kuang Hsu had not much longer to live; indeed, intimations were not lacking that more than mere coincidence accounted for the parallel between his state of health and that of his aunt. He was a victim of Bright's disease and, owing to the sacredness of the imperial person, had never received proper care. But it has often been asserted that his death was due not so much to that disease as to poison administered with Tzu Hsi's consent, an assertion which has recently been supported by Princess Der Ling in her work, *Old Buddha*. Tzu Hsi recovered from her stroke, but Kuang Hsu grew steadily worse. The choice of an heir became imperative. On November 13, Tzu Hsi summoned to her presence the chief advisers of the Throne. Prince Ching and Yuan Shih-kai backed the claim of Prince Pu Lun, but others supported the infant son of Prince Chun. The Empress Dowager made the final decision; indeed, her mind had been made up for more than five years. She cast her deciding lot in favor of the child Pu Yi, Prince Chun's son, because he was the grandson of Jung Lu and his elevation would be a posthumous recognition of the great services of that councilor to China in general and to Tzu Hsi herself. Yuan ventured again to push Pu Lun's claims but was silenced by the Empress Dowager. What if the new Emperor, not three years of age, would be incapable of conducting the government for many years? His father, Prince Chun, and, more important still, Tzu Hsi herself, would tend to that for him.

On November 14 Kuang Hsu died. The appropriate valedictory decree, praising the virtues of his reign and rehearsing the reforms which he had instituted for the good of his country was drafted by Tzu Hsi, the last of many documents in which the Emperor's name had cloaked her own actions. That unfortunate and thwarted ruler thus removed, Pu Yi assumed the Throne with the reign name of Hsuan Tung, and became heir by adoption to both Tung Chih and Kuang Hsu, thus settling at last the old question of the sacrifices to the former. Prince Chun was made Regent with control over ordinary affairs but with the obligation of consulting the Empress Dowager on all important concerns of state. The next day Tzu Hsi herself became severely ill, and this time it was her own farewell decree which must be drafted. In it were sketched the strange vicissitudes in China's history which she had witnessed and in many of which she had played so significant a part—the Taiping rebellion, her regency for Tung Chih, the elevation of Kuang Hsu, her "inevitable and bounden duty to assume the regency," and of late her adoption of the constitutional principle. She died soon after the completion of this last word to her people.

This sudden clearing of the stage brought a general sense of stupefaction and apprehension. The strong hand in Peking was gone. Who henceforth would be the chief advocate of reform? There was little sense of

loss at the passing of Kuang Hsu, unless it might be among K'ang Yu-wei, Liang Chi-chao, and their followers, who had long urged the removal of the Empress Dowager and the restoration of the imperial reformer of 1898. For years Kuang Hsu had been a mere shadow; the real driving force in the administration had been the domineering and able woman who had snatched from him the supreme power. In her place now stood Prince Chun, young, reasonably enlightened, but inexperienced and unfitted for the great responsibility which, contrary to Tzu Hsi's intentions, had thus devolved on him. It soon became only too plain that with the accession of the infant Hsuan Tung the twilight of the dynasty had begun in earnest. With the steadily growing anti-dynastic sentiment, fostered by every sign of dilatoriness on the part of the Manchus, Chun needed wise advisers if he wished to succeed in carrying on the great work of Tzu Hsi; yet it was not two months before the ablest of all the councilors of the Throne was summarily dismissed.

In September 1908 Yuan Shih-kai had celebrated his fiftieth birthday, amid a shower of presents and felicitations. Prince Chun alone paid no congratulatory visit and sent no gifts.[42] Why? For the reason we must go back to the time ten years before when Yuan had "betrayed" Kuang Hsu and won the eternal hatred of that sovereign. This bitterness was shared by Kuang Hsu's less cloistered brother, Prince Chun, who now in 1908 became Regent. It was hoped that whatever his personal feeling toward Yuan, Chun would be forced by the exigencies of the times to retain him in office.[43] But Kuang Hsu had left behind him a will, which declared:

> We were the second son of Prince Ch'un when the Empress Dowager selected Us for the Throne. She has always hated Us, but for Our misery of the past ten years Yüan Shih-k'ai is responsible, and one other (the second name is said to have been illegible). When the time comes I desire that Yüan be summarily beheaded.[44]

Unhappily for the dynasty Prince Chun allowed brotherly piety to triumph over the necessities of state. He did not decapitate Yuan, but did dismiss him from office in the edict of January 2, 1909, a model for state papers in the ironic vein:

> Yuan Shih-kai, Grand Councillor and President of the Waiwupu, having been repeatedly promoted and appointed to high office in the last reign, We have on our ascension to the throne bestowed a reward on him for his useful abilities and in order that he may exert himself. Unexpectedly he is suffering from leg disease and walks only with difficulty. He is, therefore, incapacitated for office. Let him vacate his post and return to his native place for treatment of his disease. This is to show Our compassion and consideration of him.[45]

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[42] Bland and Backhouse, *op. cit.*, p. 451. [43] *NCH*, November 21, 1908.

[44] Bland and Backhouse, *op. cit.*, p. 460. [45] *NCH*, January 9, 1909.

Yuan had received warning of his imminent downfall when he had been refused admittance to the Grand Council, and had thereupon fled to Tientsin. He soon was assured of his personal safety and left Tientsin for his home in Honan, there to remain till the last act of the drama of the fall of the Manchus.[46] Tang Shao-yi, Yuan's disciple, then in the United States on an important financial mission, was unable to carry his negotiations to a successful conclusion, largely because the expulsion of Yuan made it uncertain that Tang himself would be supported by the new régime.[47] In China, Yuan's forced retirement was followed by the resignation of a few of his followers; but, contrary to the old custom, many of them remained in office, and Liang Tun-yen, for example, even assumed one of the posts vacated by his former patron.[48] The foreign representatives, considerably exercised by the removal of the chief reformer, were quick in making friendly representations to the Chinese government, not to secure Yuan's recall, for that was outside their competence, but to urge that the policy which he represented should not fall with him. They were met by assurances from Prince Ching that reform on the lines laid down under Tzu Hsi was still the policy of the administration.[49] It was problematic, however, how well reform would succeed without its chief exponent. Kuang Hsu had been avenged, but at an exorbitant price. Chun, like another monarch, had indeed "dropped the pilot."

Tzu Hsi was dead and Yuan Shih-kai in disfavor. The next to disappear was Chang Chih-tung, that veteran servant of the state, who died on October 5, 1909. Enigmatic and variable as he had shown himself, on the whole he had been a proponent of modernization and especially diligent in connection with the changes in education and the extension of railway facilities. With the exception of Yuan, most of the Grand Councilors in the last years of Tzu Hsi's life had been old men, more accustomed under her strong hand to take orders than to make suggestions.[50] The Throne's best advisers were now gone; only a few elderly gentlemen, not astonishingly able, but in some cases amazingly corrupt, were left. The Empress Dowager's state funeral in November 1909 was indeed an occasion for gloomy reflections. It was made more so by the second great blunder of the Prince Regent. The funeral ceremonies supplied the pretext for the removal of the ablest of the Manchu officials, Tuan Fang. The reason for his dismissal may seem to Westerners better fitted to adorn a farce by W. S.

[46] *NCH*, January 16, 1909.

[47] Straight, "China's Loan Negotiations" in Blakeslee, *Recent Developments in China*, p. 127.

[48] *NCH*, January 9, 1909; Tsao, "The Relation of the Returned Students to the Chinese Revolution" in Blakeslee, *op. cit.*, p. 165.

[49] *The Times*, January 4, 16, 1909.

[50] *NCH*, September 25, 1909.

Gilbert than a serious state document, for the decree of November 20, 1909, referred Tuan Fang to the Ministry of Civil Office:

> . . . . for determination of a penalty for taking photographs on the way, for moving about in his sedan chair with undue freedom and for making use of the trees at the Mausolea for telegraph poles.[51]

The punishment was dismissal. In reality these irrelevant and flimsy excuses cloaked the animus of the new Empress Dowager, the niece of Tzu Hsi and widow of Kuang Hsu, who was eager to gain the power as well as the title of her deceased aunt. The Regent, entangled in the mesh of court intrigue, was forced to sacrifice his protégé, Tuan Fang.[52] A series of deaths within the next few months stripped the Throne of other experienced advisers, as Sun Chia-nai, Tai Hung-tze, and Lu Chuan-lin one after another vanished from the scene.

With the passing of most of the conspicuous figures in Chinese official life, the personality and policy of the young Regent became of great importance. Time did not dispel the impression that Prince Chun was pleasant, accessible, and desirous of pursuing a liberal policy, but it did demonstrate that he was devoid of both ability and tact. Moreover, with the end of the Empress Dowager's long control, party politics in Peking flourished vigorously. Against the Regent was soon pitted a faction under the young Empress Dowager.[53] By the terms of Chun's regency he was in control of all ordinary affairs, but a provision, originally designed to benefit Tzu Hsi, now served to give her niece a claim to supremacy, for Chun was not to decide matters of great importance without reference to the Empress Dowager.[54]

The Empress' faction was strengthened by the adherence of all who disliked the pronounced preference shown by Chun for the members of his immediate family. Honors and posts of importance were showered on the young princes, to the dismay of other aspirants for preferment. This nepotistic policy was widely denounced by all the opponents of the dynasty; it had a more general and more serious phase in the favoritism shown to Manchus as against Chinese.[55] Chun was prolific in protestations of earnest determination to follow in the footsteps of Tzu Hsi, but his inexperience and his racial bias made it impossible for him to obtain from the rank and file of officialdom even that limited obedience which the Empress Dowager had been able to command. Even under her strong

[51] *Ibid.*, November 27, 1909.

[52] *Ibid.*, September 30, 1910. [53] *Ibid.*

[54] *United States Foreign Relations, 1909*, p. 126.

[55] *NCH*, August 21, 1909; September 30, 1910.

[56] *United States Foreign Relations*, 1909, p. 125.

hand, the reform program had not been carried out as scheduled, and in the first year of the Regent's administration the disparity between reform on paper and in practice was great. By June the commission on constitutional reform had discovered that only in Chihli, Shantung, and Kiangsu was the reform program anywhere nearly up to schedule. Later in the year the Throne itself reviewed the reports sent in on the progress of the nine-year program, and referred in scathing terms to the attempts of many officials to cloak under a plethora of words an insufficiency of achievement.[57]

One of the least successful reforms was the foundation of bureaus for local self-government. Regulations for these institutions had been approved on January 18, 1909.[58] Participation in these new councils and boards of supervisors was limited to "reputable literati," who usually became tools of the local mandarins. Neither local nor central officials seemed much concerned by the failure of these "stillborn regulations."[59] Other phases of reform, such as the elimination of opium and the increase of education, were more successful during the regency, but it was largely their own impetus which carried them on. Many edicts on army and navy affairs and that will-of-the-wisp, currency reform, were issued. But Prince Chun's first significant effort to carry on the plans of Tzu Hsi was the summoning of the provincial assemblies.

These bodies had first been decreed in October 1907, but so vague were the provisions then made that for the time being nothing was done. By the middle of 1908, however, the necessary set of regulations was ready. The draftsmen were two Chekiang students educated in Japan, who based their production to some extent on the Japanese regulations for prefectural assemblies.[60] The regulations were approved on July 22, 1908, and in August the Throne announced that the provincial assemblies would convene within a year. The regulations at the outset made plain to these new bodies just what their rôle was to be.

> The provincial assemblies, while concerned with local government and designed to voice popular opinion, can not be held to diminish the supreme authority of the Central Government. It must not be forgotten that all deliberative bodies are restricted in their functions to debate. They have absolutely no executive powers. . . . . The provincial deliberative assemblies shall conform with the imperial edicts and act as places where the public opinion of the respective Provinces may be ascertained; they shall also deliberate as to what would seem to be beneficial for the Province and shall advise their superiors of their opinions. The above shall be their principal function.[61]

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[57] *NCH*, June 19, 1909; *United States Foreign Relations, 1910*, pp. 328–329.

[58] *United States Foreign Relations, 1909*, pp. 129–144.

[59] Bland, *op. cit.*, pp. 127–128.

[60] *The Times*, October 15, 1909.

[61] The text is given in *United States Foreign Relations, 1908*, pp. 182–188.

Following this general statement, the number of members for each assembly was specified, apportioned on the basis of the figures for the old literary examinations and the tax rolls, in lieu of any census statistics. Elections were to be indirect, as in the case of the Tientsin municipal government regulations; that is, the voters were to choose an electoral college, which would select the members of the assembly. The qualifications for suffrage and officeholding were also reminiscent of those used in Tientsin. Males of twenty-five years or over and natives of the province in question might vote, on meeting one of the following requirements: three years spent in some occupation for the public good, such as teaching; graduation from a middle school or better in China or abroad; possession of a literary degree under the old examination system; past tenure of government office; ownership of a business or property worth $5,000. If the would-be elector was not a native of the province he must have lived there at least ten years and have a business or property valued at $10,000. Men of bad character, opium-smokers, lunatics, and other undesirable groups were excluded from the franchise. Only males of thirty or over were eligible for election. Certain employments debarred men from voting or holding office, among them being public office (voting), military service, police service, priesthood in the Buddhist or Taoist churches or work as a religious teacher in any other creed, and enrollment as student in any school, these being viewed as pursuits worthy in themselves but not consonant with political privilege. Teachers in primary schools were entitled to vote but not to serve. The considerable powers and duties allotted to these assemblies were offset by the provision that none of their acts could become official without the approval of the viceroy or governor. In case of dispute between the assembly and the provincial head either party might lay the matter before the National Assembly, which, as we shall see, however, had no more independent power of decision than the provincial bodies. The viceroys and governors were given the power to dissolve the assemblies if they transgressed the limits of their power and proved disobedient, if they arrived at decisions of an illegal character, or if they lapsed into disorder too serious to be controlled by the chairmen. For a variety of reasons, such as lese majesty or refusal to adjourn on order, the viceroy might appeal to the Throne to order dissolution.

Such were the rules to govern the first real deliberative bodies in China. The assemblies were obviously meant to be conservative in tone, as the "silk-gowned" franchise indicated, and were restricted in their functions to debate. In placing such limitations on these new organizations the central government was acting not without wisdom. An unrestricted electorate was out of the question, considering the ignorance of the bulk of the people, while the members of the new bodies would need training in

parliamentary procedure and the affairs of provincial government before they could be considered competent to exercise a more extensive control. Yet despite these precautions designed to secure for the Throne decorous and helpful counsel, as the *North-China Herald* stated:

> The first session of these bodies can hardly have increased the feeling of security in the capital. Their attitude towards the Central Government was in many instances more than merely critical; they denounced the stamp tax in such unmistakable terms that its enforcement has had to be postponed, and generally speaking they find more subject matter for debate in the actions of the provincial and central authorities than in abstract principles of constitutional government.[62]

How did it happen that these members chosen by indirect election by an electorate made up of the propertied and literate classes proved distinctly importunate and truculent? Bland has suggested an answer for this seeming paradox. Many of the gentry and merchants were disinclined to enter the new game of politics, so that often the candidates were from the returned-student class, many of whom were politicians by profession.[63] In most of the provinces only a small part of those entitled to exercise the suffrage did so, owing to indifference toward or distrust of the innovation, which served still more to throw the control of the new organs into the hands of the politically minded returned students. In some provinces, however, such as Shantung, Shansi, and Yunnan, the voters were prepared for their task by lecturers sent through the country to explain the purpose of the new institutions. How small a number used the franchise is shown by the fact that in Shantung with a population of 38,000,000 only 119,549 went to the polls, and in Hupeh, with 34,000,000 inhabitants, the voters numbered 113,233.[64]

October 14, 1909, was the date set for the opening of the provincial assemblies. On the 13th, the Throne made suggestions for their conduct, recommending that:

> They should not entertain selfish motives to the detriment of public welfare, or adhere to obstinate views to subvert the established order of things. Neither should they under-rate any measure and give way to clamour in discussion, nor should they misunderstand the limits of authority and establish regulations which overstep the proper bounds.[65]

The assemblies conformed to the imperial admonition to the extent of carrying on their deliberations with a dignity and good order which surprised foreign observers. Members received pay for their services, rules of order like those prevalent in the West were followed, and the debates were open to the public. In general the same subjects came up for dis-

[62] *NCH*, December 11, 1909.
[63] Bland, *op. cit.*, p. 125.
[64] *NCH*, February 18, 1910.
[65] *Ibid.*, October 16, 1909.

cussion in every province, among them local self-government, education, trade and industry, police affairs, opium, the simplification of the written character, and societies to spread among the people the principle of constitutionalism. The assemblies showed no tendency to bow before the commands of the provincial heads and in a few cases came into conflict with them, as in Kwangsi, Kwangtung, and especially Szechwan, where many of the members were returned students from Japan.[66] In general they kept within the letter of the edict, but transgressed the spirit in that "their efforts were clearly directed, not towards the elevation of the masses, but towards curtailment of the powers of the metropolitan administration."[67] In part this was the result of tension between the central government and the provinces resulting from the policy of railway centralization, which had roused provincial loyalty and self-interest. Moreover, these new assemblies, composed in part of returned students, had been impregnated with the eagerness and haste characteristic of that class. If provincial assemblies had been so successful, what reason was there, they argued, why China should not at once have a parliament and all the other appurtenances of constitutionalism? Their animus against the Peking administration therefore showed itself chiefly in agitation for the immediate granting of a parliament.

Obviously the best way to force the government to this step was through co-operation among the provincial assemblies themselves. At the end of 1909 there was an informal gathering in Shanghai of delegates from many of the assemblies, with the result that in January 1910 there were in Peking delegates from seventeen provincial assemblies with a petition asking the establishment of a parliament in 1911. They insisted on seeing the Regent in person, a request as unprecedented as was their business.[68] The Regent refused to receive them, but the petitioners did secure interviews with the chief officers of the government. Only Prince Pu Lun and Li Chia-chu were positively in their favor,[69] and their request was formally refused by the Regent in an edict of January 30, 1910, in which he said:

> But our Empire is of large extent. The measures of preparation are not complete. The intelligence and attainments of the people have not been made uniform. If the parliament should be hastily opened confusion and dissension might result, which would hinder the success of constitutional government in its early stages. . . . We are acting in a straightforward manner, without any concealment or pretense. Constitutional government shall be established, a parliament shall be opened. But care must be taken about the preparation and impatience restrained about the successive steps to be taken. Those who aim to travel far must tread firmly. Those who aspire to great things must not wrangle over small gains . . . . We only desire our officials and people

[66] *Ibid.*, February 18, 1910.
[67] Bland, *op. cit.* p. 128.
[68] *NCH*, January 6, 1911, January 21, 28, 1910.
[69] *Ibid.* February 4, 1910.

to be zealous in fulfilling their duties day by day, not losing the substance in clutching at the shadow.[70]

The Regent's fair promises and counsels of slow and steady progress were unavailing to stop the agitation, however. In June there was another attempt to win a prompt grant of constitutionalism. The imperial edict in response was in the same strain as that of January 30.[71] Again the representatives of the provincial assemblies prepared to plead their cause. Not much longer could the enfeebled administration hold out against the attacks of those whom it had at one time hoped would be its helpers in the task of government. The faction led by the young Empress Dowager, losing all sense of the danger to the dynasty in the joy of inter-clique struggle, took this chance to countenance any move calculated to embarrass the Regent.[72] And to swell the chorus of those who were unwilling to wait for the consummation of the nine-year program, the National Assembly met in Peking.

The regulations for this body had first been published in 1908, but on August 23, 1910, a revised set was approved. It was to consist of 200 members, of whom 100 were to be chosen by the provincial assemblies from among their own membership but subject to the approval of the provincial heads. The remaining 100 were to be chosen by the Throne, as follows: imperial princes and nobles, 16; Manchu and Chinese nobles, 12; Mongol, Tibetan, and Mohammedan princes and nobles, 14; imperial clansmen and collateral relatives of the imperial house, 6; officials of boards, 32; distinguished scholars, 10; those paying the heaviest taxes, 10. All members, no matter of what group, were to have equal powers and privileges. As a body they were to be competent to take action on the following matters if proposed by the Throne for discussion: provisional and final national budgets; taxes or loans; and new codes of laws. The Assembly was expressly barred from discussing the adoption of a constitution. In no case was it given final power of decision; all its proposals must be presented to the Throne for endorsement. In regard to the provincial assemblies, the National Assembly was given certain powers, such as the ability to hear disputes between provincial assemblies and the authorities, but even here the final word rested with the Emperor.[73] Its first meeting was the occasion for the edict of October 1, 1910, expressing the imperial pleasure at the formation of this new organ of government and advising the members to act in a public spirit and aid the Throne in carrying out the policy to which

[70] *United States Foreign Relations, 1910,* p. 330. This same edict will be found in *NCH,* February 4, 1910, given, through some error, under the date of January 20, 1910.

[71] *United States Foreign Relations, 1910,* pp. 336–337.

[72] *The Times,* November 2, 1910.

[73] *United States Foreign Relations, 1910,* pp. 331–336.

it was committed.[74] The Assembly was faced with an agenda p posed by the central government and comprising insurance and transport ion regulations, press laws, education, copyright laws, and industrial deve pment in Manchuria. There were also a number of problems submitted t the provincial assemblies. The first to be dealt with was the quarrel b ween the governor and assembly of Kwangsi, where, when the governor h d lengthened the period for the suppression of poppy-cu ltivation, the ass mbly had resigned *en bloc*. The National Assembly decided in favor of its rovincial counterpart and won from the government an edict rebuking the governor of Kwangsi and telling the provincial assembly to resume its ities. At first so exemplary and pacific was the conduct of the new Ass nbly that the administration was encouraged to submit to it the very sub ct which had been interdicted by the regulations, the question of the speed granting of a parliament.[75] With half of its membership imperial appoi tees, and the rest approved by the viceroys and governors, the Throne mig t reasonably expect it to be conservative in its attitude and indisposed to grant the demands of the hotheads who were vigorously advocating faster terations in the government. History repeated itself, however. Just as the rovincial assemblies, chosen in a manner which seemed to guarantee their onservatism, proved to be distinctly radical, so the National Assembly, nade up to a large extent of representatives of privilege, on October 24, 1 0, voted unanimously in favor of the telescoping of the nine-year progra .[76] The whole affair was a bitter farce in view of the situation of the go rnment. The nine-year program was hopelessly in arrears; only one of th changes scheduled for 1910, the calling of the National Assembly itself, ad been carried out effectively;[77] yet the administration was faced with ehement agitation which would necessitate the acceleration of the alread delayed program, or the omission of any preparation for constitutionali n whatsoever, either alternative being most unfortunate from the standp int both of the dynasty and of the nation. Even had a genuine attempt b n made to carry out the nine-year scheme, who was to foot the bills? The imperial finances had become a subject of grave concern. The first effort to prepare a budget had revealed deficits all along the line, and the Regent as compelled to summon to the capital for a conference a number of e chief provincial officials. Bankruptcy would be the result of the sche led reforms. Foreign loans, which might have helped the situation, we anathema to all the nationalists, the very group who were already hec ling the government over the question of the parliament.[78]

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[74] *NCH*, October 7, 1910.
[75] *NCH*, October 14, 21, 1910
[76] *Ibid.*, October 28, 1910.
[77] *Ibid.*, January 6, 1911.
[78] *Ibid.*, September 9, 1910.

With the realization that reform was lagging and dissatisfaction was on the increase, the Throne had issued edicts inveighing against corruption among the mandarins and ordering more care in the supervision of those officials who came in direct contact with the people, but these documents, excellent in intent, were too patriarchal in tone to meet with the approval of the class then in the ascendant.[79] Moreover, the drama of court intrigue went on in Peking. On October 26, Duke Tsai Tse, head of the Ministry of Finance, declared himself in favor of the immediate granting of a parliament as a step calculated somehow to straighten out the imperial finances. His attitude was taken in some quarters as a move on the part of the young Empress Dowager's group to annoy the Regent. To cap the climax, public demonstrations of a very disturbing order had become part of the campaign for increased political rights. When the third petition for an immediate formation of a parliament was presented, a throng of its supporters assembled before the palace, threatening to remain there until their demand was accepted; some of the crowd even cut off their fingers and wrote petitions in their own blood.[80] One embittered foreign observer declared:

> It is indeed safe to say that no greater danger has ever threatened modern China than that to which she is now exposed—on the one hand a Government weak, corrupt, and torn by internal factions; on the other, a class of untrained politicians clamouring forthwith for the right to exercise powers for which they could only be fitted by years of patient preparation. . . . . It seems to matter little or nothing that the Constitutional Party is as ignorant as it is noisy. The one thing needful is a Parliament, which, as a panacea for China's present ills, promises to be about as useful as a pantechnicon.[81]

The hard-pressed government yielded in the decree of November 4, 1910. It announced the rather pathetic doctrine that "The Throne should examine and ascertain the wishes of the officials and people, and adopt the public view of what is good and bad." The dynasty therefore gave in to the importunities of those who viewed themselves as the veritable *vox populi* and altered the date for the granting of a parliament to 1913, the intervening three years to be spent in somehow completing the preparations which had been originally planned to occupy nine years.[82] The new assembly, called to give the Throne respectful advice, in a month had proved itself the master.

Surrender did not stop the agitation. Outside the Assembly, demonstrations for the elimination of even a three-year preparatory period continued. For example, on December 20, 2,000 students paraded to the viceregal *yamen* in Tientsin to testify to their desire for a parliament with-

[79] *NCH,* August 5, 12, 1910.

[80] *The Times,* November 2, 1910. [81] *Ibid.*

[82] *China Year Book, 1912,* pp. 372–373; *NCH,* November 11, 1910.

out delay.[83] As to the National Assembly, it now turned its attention to a concerted attack on that venerable and influential institution the Grand Council. On November 9, the Assembly condemned the councilors for their approval of the Hunan loan, which had been contracted without consulting the Assembly. Later, other decisions of the Grand Council as to provincial matters further roused the Assembly's wrath, and a memorial was prepared asking that the Grand Council either be made responsible to the people (i.e., the National Assembly) or replaced by a cabinet. Some move was made toward the impeachment of the councilors but this fell to the ground when the Throne overruled the councilors on the point in dispute. Nevertheless the Assembly continued to advocate the formation of a responsible cabinet, until the Council, in exasperation, resigned *en bloc*. The Throne, in great dismay, refused to accept the resignation, and in an edict of December 18, 1910, accused the National Assembly of exceeding its powers.[84] The Assembly's answer was the appointment of a committee to draw up a memorial impeaching the Grand Council members individually. On December 22 the Throne insisted that the edict of November 4 contained the utmost concession which it was willing to make. Again the Assembly passed a memorial urging the installation of a responsible government. This document was held up by the President, Prince Pu Lun, who saw that the government could resist no longer. On December 25 the government ordered that the preparations for constitutional government be hastened and that the regulations for a cabinet be framed and submitted.[85]

After this surrender the Assembly completed its session fairly peacefully. It occupied itself with a variety of topics, such as the abolition of the queue, the regulations for public gatherings, and the press laws. Perhaps the most important matter brought before it was the budget. The estimates sent in by the provincial authorities were gone over by a committee of the Assembly, which proceeded, on paper at least, to transform a deficit of about 3,600,000 taels to a surplus of 3,500,000 taels.[86] On January 11, 1911, it was at last dissolved, with excellent advice from the Throne:

> You members shall, of course, endeavor to foster your patriotism and truthfulness; to increase and extend what you have heard and seen; to view the present situation with thorough intelligence and to watch public opinion with taciturnity. . . .[87]

Taciturnity, however, was not a trait in which the Assembly members chose to excel. Their triumphant career had made them consider them-

[83] *NCH,* January 6, 1911.

[84] *China Year Book, 1912,* p. 374; *NCH,* December 9, 23, 1910.

[85] *NCH,* December 23, 30, 1910; January 6, 1911.

[86] *Ibid.,* January 13, 1911. [87] *Ibid.*

selves essential to the functioning of the government and they showed a distinct aversion to remaining dissolved. Soon agitation was on foot for a special session, on the plea that the difficulties of China's foreign relations, particularly with Russia and Great Britain, required the advice and energy of the Assembly.[88] The administration, which undoubtedly had been only too glad to see the last of the Assembly in January, resisted this demand, but toward the close of 1911, the National Assembly convened again, to take its part in the last months of the Manchu dynasty.

Soon after the dissolution of the National Assembly the Throne issued a revised constitutional program compressing into the period before 1914 the reforms necessary in preparation for constitutionalism.[89] That this program would be carried out was of course impossible; if a nine-year schedule had proved too great a strain, a three-year program was beyond all hope of fulfillment. On May 8, the Grand Council, the Supreme Council, and the Government Council, the three bodies which for years had advised the Throne, were abolished, and in their place the promised Cabinet and a Privy Council were set up. The regulations for the Cabinet were carefully ear-marked "provisional," and its likeness to the old Grand Council was noticeable. The Cabinet was to be composed of the heads of the ministries in Peking, with a prime minister at their head, and was to assist the Emperor, assuming responsibility, though to whom was not stated. The Privy Council, a larger advisory body, was to consist of the cabinet members, and ten others chosen for special political qualifications.[90] These regulations proved very unsatisfactory to the members of the National Assembly, who desired cabinet responsibility on the European model. The suspicious resemblance of the new cabinet to the old Grand Council was increased by the appointment of Prince Ching as Premier. As Dr. Morrison wrote to *The Times*, "Whether Constitutional development can be guided satisfactorily by a decrepit old man, irresolute, wily, corrupt, and inefficient, is a question which may be disputed."[91] Yet whom else could the Throne select? Of the advisers whom Chun had retained none was of transcendant ability, and Ching, despite his vices, had at least the merit of long experience. Ching's appointment was not the only one to arouse resentment. The Cabinet members included a goodly proportion of Manchus, and as usual the imperial princes and nobles got more than their share. The Regent was showered with complaints, particularly from the Chihli Assembly, which repeatedly memorialized him urging the exclusion of imperial princes from the cabinet. He made a sharp reply, claiming the appointment of officials as a prerogative of the Throne.[92] Yet there were

[88] *NCH*, April 8, 1911. [89] For the three-year program, see Appendix B.
[90] *China Year Book, 1912*, pp. 222–226; *NCH*, May 13, 1911.
[91] *The Times*, May 17, 1911. [92] *NCH*, July 1, 8, 1911.

signs that Prince Chun was beginning to realize the folly of his policy. On May 18, Tuan Fang, out of office since his dismissal over the Mausolea episode in 1909, was recalled to the governmental services as Director-General of the Canton-Hankow and Chengtu-Hankow railways.[93] The press carried reports that the government had made approaches to Yuan Shih-kai asking his return with the hope that he would counterbalance the rising and rather ominous power of Sheng Kung-pao (or, to give him his name rather than his title, Sheng Hsuan-huai), who was then engaged in enforcing the theoretically excellent policy of railway centralization at a time when practical considerations made it unwise to do so.[94] Yuan, however, did not resume office at this time. Presumably, his leg was still bothering him. Not until October 14 was he willing to come to the aid of the Throne, and then only because by that time the plight of the government was desperate.

In September the rising in Szechwan broke out, occasioned largely by Sheng's policy of central government control of railways. The outbreak at Wuchang followed. Revolution against the Manchu authority had begun in earnest. Later we shall have more to say of these events; here we are concerned chiefly with their effect upon the governmental system. When the revolution began, the government reforms planned in the days of Tzu Hsi had given China a set of provincial assemblies and a National Assembly, intended by the dynasty as training-schools for a parliament to be opened when the nation at large had been prepared for such an innovation. These bodies had already shown themselves unwilling to remain in the subordinate position allotted them. The revolution gave the recalcitrant Assembly the courage to demand fresh concessions and to refuse obedience to the limitations set upon it at its creation.

The first conspicuous recognition by the Throne of the gravity of the situation created by the rising in Hupeh was the recall of Yuan Shih-kai, who, on October 14, was made viceroy of Hunan and Hupeh and officer in charge of punitive and pardoning affairs.[95] It was no small humiliation for the Regent to be forced to accept as his chief aide the very man whom he had cast out of the government in 1909. Greater trials were ahead, however. On October 22 the National Assembly convened in Peking for its second session. It was in an even more imperious mood than before, for it now viewed itself as the mouthpiece of a people in arms against an oppressive dynasty. The focus of its wrath was the offending minister Sheng Kung-pao. In endeavoring to bring the railway system of China under the control of the Peking administration he had interfered with all sorts of provincial aspirations and interests, and by advocating extensive

[93] *Ibid.*, May 27, 1911. [94] *Ibid.*
[95] *Ibid.*, October 21, 1911.

foreign loans for railways, currency reform, and economic development had brought upon himself the hatred of all those who regarded borrowing from the foreigner as a betrayal of China's national integrity. On October 25 the National Assembly asked that he be severely punished as the true author of the troubles then dividing the nation. On October 27 the Throne sacrificed Sheng in an edict which accused him of having misapplied a policy meant for the good of the people. Sheng, in danger of assassination, fled to the American Legation, and was later conveyed to safety in Tientsin.[96] As before, the more the Throne yielded, the more was demanded of it. The National Assembly next discussed the best means of ending the revolution and decided that the Throne must appoint to the Cabinet officials of a different sort, give the people a voice in the framing of the constitution, punish the oppressive officials who had forced the people to revolt, issue a general pardon to all political offenders, and possibly open a parliament in 1912, one year earlier than the date set in 1910.[97] Then an incident occurred which served to enforce the demands of the Assembly, if indeed it was not the result of connivance with that body. A brigade of troops at Lanchow, ordered south to fight the rebels, refused to go to the front unless the government agreed to consult the National Assembly in the formulation of a constitution, to exclude imperial princes from the Cabinet and to grant an amnesty to such exiles as Kang Yu-wei and Liang Chi-chao.[98] The result was an amazing revelation of the weakness of the dynasty. With rebels in the south and troops of uncertain loyalty nearer at hand, and with an Assembly in Peking which had come to realize its strength, the Throne capitulated, granting all that had been demanded, in the hope of avoiding abdication. There are few documents more dramatic and pathetic than the penitential decree of October 30, 1911, in which the five-year-old Son of Heaven was made to take upon himself the blame for all the errors and faults of his relatives and advisers.

> I have reigned for three years and have always acted conscientiously, in the interests of the people. But I have not employed men properly, not having political skill. I have employed too many nobles in political positions, an act which has contravened constitutionalism. On railway matters someone whom I trusted fooled me. Thus public opinion was opposed to this policy.
>
> When I urge reform, officials and gentry seize the opportunity to embezzle. When old laws are abolished high officials serve their own ends. Much of the people's money has been taken, but nothing to benefit the people has been achieved. On several occasions edicts have promulgated laws, but none have been obeyed. The people are grumbling, yet I do not know of it. Disasters loom ahead, but I do not see them.
>
> In Szechuan trouble first occurred, the Wuchang rebellion followed; now alarming reports come from Shensi and Honan. In Canton and Kiangsi riots appear. The

96 *NCH,* November 4, 1911.

97 *Ibid.*

98 *The Times,* October 30, 1911.

> whole Empire is seething, the minds of the people are perturbed and the spirits of our nine late Emperors are not able properly to enjoy the sacrifices made to them, while it is feared that the people will suffer grievously.
>
> All of these things are my own fault. Hereby I announce to the world that I swear to reform and with Our soldiers and people to carry out the constitution faithfully, modifying legislation, developing the interests of the people and abolishing their hardships, all in accordance with the wishes and interests of the people.
>
> Old laws that are unsuitable will be abolished. The union of Manchus and Chinese, mentioned by the late Emperor, I shall carry out.
>
> As regards Hupeh and Hunan, for their grievances, though precipitated by the soldiers and caused by Jui Cheng, I only blame Myself because I had mistakenly appointed him. The soldiers and people are innocent. If they return to their allegiance, I will excuse the past.
>
> Being a very small person standing at the head of My subjects I see that My heritage is nearly falling to the ground. I regret My fault and repent greatly. I can only trust that My subjects will support the soldiers in order to support Me, to comfort the millions of My people, to hold firmly the eternity of the Dynasty and to convert danger into tranquillity. The patriotism of the Empire's subjects will be appreciated and trusted forever.
>
> Now finances and diplomacy have reached bed-rock. Even if all unite, there is still fear of falling. But if the Empire's subjects will not regard nor honour the State, and are easily misled by outlaws, then the future of China is unthinkable. I am most anxious by day and night. I only hope My subjects will thoroughly understand.

Having admitted its guilt, the Throne then acceded to all the proposals of the National Assembly and the troops. The preparation of the constitution was made a part of the work of the National Assembly. The Throne promised that when conditions became more settled, a cabinet composed of competent officials would be chosen. The regulations for that body would be made definite rather than provisional, and no more imperial princes or nobles would be selected for ministerial posts. Amnesty was granted to all political offenders exiled since 1897, a classification which included Kang Yu-wei and Liang Chi-chao but not the more radical Sun Yat-sen.[99] A supplementary decree of November 4, also issued at the instance of the National Assembly, permitted revolutionists to form political parties according to law "so as to cultivate the accomplished faculty to be employed for the benefit of the government,"[100] a rather amazing and optimistic provision if the translation faithfully reproduces the sense of the original.

The National Assembly, sure that the enfeebled Throne would not dare to resist, on November 3, 1911, hastened to submit for approval a new set of "principles of the constitution."[101] The Assembly was eager to wring

[99] *NCH,* November 4, 1911. For another translation of the edicts of October 30, 1911, see *China Mission Year Book, 1912,* Appendix C, pp. 5–9.

[100] *NCH,* November 11, 1911.

[101] For the "principles" see *NCH,* November 4, 1911; Hsieh, *op. cit.,* pp. 374–375; and *China Mission Year Book, 1912,* Appendix C, pp. 10–11.

concessions from the Throne with all speed possible, in order to restore peace by satisfying the revolutionaries that the government's future good behavior was guaranteed. The new "principles," which gave evidence of having been drafted even less carefully and with greater haste than those of 1908, differed radically from the latter in that they greatly increased the power of the proposed parliament and decreased that of the Throne. The British government was named as the model for this new project for a constitution, but a careful reading of the nineteen principles leaves considerable doubt as to whether any system based on them would have resembled its British prototype. The principles of cabinet responsibility, the union in the Cabinet of executive and legislative functions, and the rôle of the party system, all essential to any faithful reproduction of the British scheme, were only vaguely indicated, if at all. The chief resemblance of the "principles" to the British parliamentary scheme was the reduction of the monarch to the position of formal and decorative head and the exaltation of the legislature. Despite the Assembly's hopes this plan of limited monarchy failed to enlist the support of the revolutionaries. After all, little confidence could be placed in promises which the dynasty had been compelled to make by *force majeure.*

On November 1, after the penitential edict and the acceptance by the Throne of the demands of the Assembly and the troops at Lanchow, Peking witnessed a wholesale resignation of the old advisers of the Throne. Those who were imperial princes were plainly *persona non grata,* while the others realized that their service to the Throne undoubtedly made them also undesirable to the Assembly. Many of them were given consolation appointments to the Privy Council, of which body the ubiquitous Ching was made President,[102] but their real influence had passed with the passing of the power of the Emperor. The next day Yuan Shih-kai, the one bulwark of the Manchus against rebellion and insubordination, was chosen Premier and ordered to return to Peking. His response, announced by the Throne on November 5, was that the duties and responsibilities were more than he was capable of bearing. Again the Throne urged upon him the task.[103] The National Assembly, which by this time, according to the "principles," possessed the right to elect the Premier, chose Yuan for the position, and on November 9 this selection received the requisite imperial approval. Yuan was still shy, however, of assuming the task of chief scapegoat for the group which had once rejected him, and replied, "As my health is very feeble, I am unable to come to Peking to take up the Premiership."[104] The indisposition with which Prince Chun had credited Yuan in 1909 was a most difficult one to cure. At last, however, Yuan accepted the honor and

[102] *NCH,* November 11, 1911.

[103] *Ibid.,* November 4, 11, 1911.

[104] *Ibid.,* November 18, 1911.

thus assumed that central position in Chinese political affairs which he retained till his death in 1916. On November 16 his cabinet was announced, and included such liberals as Liang Tun-yen as President of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Chiang Chien as President of the Ministry of Agriculture, Industry, and Commerce; and Liang Chi-chao, now pardoned for his 1898 offenses, as Vice-President of the Ministry of Justice. With this announcement, the Throne receded still more from power, declaring that thereafter memorials were to be addressed to the Cabinet, which only in matters of special import would report to the Throne.[105]

On November 26 came the last scene in the humiliation of the Throne at the hands of its own creation, the National Assembly. On that day the Regent, in the name of the Emperor, swore before the imperial ancestral tablets to uphold the nineteen constitutional articles and to obey the advice of the National Assembly, and once more assumed responsibility for the dissensions which had divided the Empire.[106] The Throne, dragged at breakneck speed along the way to reform by an Assembly suddenly intoxicated with the sense of its own power as the spokesman for a rebellious nation, made a desperate effort to conciliate its subjects by abject submission to each and every innovation presented to it. The effort failed utterly. By the end of November the Assembly itself had faded into oblivion. Even when it had assembled in October 1911 only 117 of its members had been present, and before long, only 60 were active.[107] Its dream of leading China along the path to constitutional monarchy was frustrated by the opposition of the rebellious provinces where those in control were determined on republicanism and intended themselves to be leaders in the millennium to come. Even the summoning to Peking of Yuan Shih-kai would not avail; the Cabinet he chose did not materialize, for most of those appointed refused to serve and a number took posts in the republican government at Nanking instead. The Prince Regent made a last effort to obtain peace through conciliation by tendering his resignation on December 6.[108] It was futile; abdication was the only way. The young Empress Dowager, at last possessed of the primacy which she so long had intrigued to secure, could only declare republicanism and constitutional monarchy as the two possible alternatives and advocate a constituent assembly to decide between them.[109] The republicans did not agree to this proposal. The Manchus must go, and on February 12, 1912, the dynasty which had ruled China for almost three hundred years came to an end.

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[105] *Ibid.*

[106] *The Times*, November 27, 1911.

[107] McCormick, *The Flowery Republic*, p. 160.

[108] *The Times*, December 7, 1911. [109] *NCH*, January 6, 1912.

These last scenes in the drama of the fall of the Manchus have been briefly sketched to show the ultimate disastrous failure of all the imperial attempts to introduce a liberalized form of government by a process of gradual reform. In the attempt to strengthen the nation and to render more assured the position of the dynasty Tzu Hsi and her advisers had been willing to adopt the conception of a régime in which the people should be better enabled to give voice to their desires and should even ultimately come to share in the responsibility of government. That they had a very clear idea of the essential nature of many of the reforms which they proclaimed is not evident. Certain great principles they had grasped, however. First, China must be welded into a governmental unit instead of a group of semi-independent "satrapies."[110] For that reason a policy of centralization was adopted which had its most conspicuous and unfortunate application in regard to railway affairs. Second, a new type of public servant was necessary, and education, particularly the sending of young men abroad for training, became a part of the government's method. Officials hereafter were to be given definite and limited duties for which they had received definite preparation, i.e., specialization as an ideal was to replace the versatility which had been expected of mandarins in the past. Third, China must have a constitutional government, that magical system which had spread over the Western world. Since, to the eyes of the Empress Dowager's commissioners and advisers, the chief and most desirable feature of such a system was the closer harmony between ruler and ruled, the way must be prepared by a number of deliberative bodies designed to give representatives of the best classes in the nation an opportunity to express themselves. In addition, before full-fledged constitutionalism could exist in China, education, codification of law, the formation of police forces, the institution of local self-government bodies, and a thousand and one other measures must be carried out. Such was the imperial program. Why did it collapse?

The responsibility for the failure of reform has often been charged to the dynasty with the accusation that its aim was to deceive the people with fair promises.[111] Such talk is of a piece with the republican propaganda of the days of the Revolution, when all of China's ills, even to plague and famine, were laid at the doors of the Manchus. There was reason for dislike of the dynasty. The Manchus were alien conquerors; they had taken steps to maintain their racial integrity; they preserved for themselves about half of the chief governmental posts in Peking and a smaller proportion of those in the provinces; the Manchu "bannermen" were pensioners of the government; the imperial family had by the nineteenth

[110] The term is used by Morse, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

[111] For such criticism, see Hsieh, *op. cit.*, pp. 357, 360, 369.

century gone through the usual process of degeneration, resulting in the elevation to the Throne of men of weak character, with the final necessity of a long regency by the resourceful and strong-minded Empress Dowager; moreover, according to Chinese political theory, domestic rebellion and defeat by foreign powers were signs that the time had come for one of the periodic anti-dynastic risings which have been a feature of Chinese history for centuries. But to charge the Manchus with a Machiavellian desire to deceive their subjects is unjust. The Throne could and did issue really exalted and noble edicts, which went forth from Peking to the provinces. What then became of them? In many cases they were inoperative because the local officials, the real rulers of China, from inertia, or prejudice, or ignorance, did not put them into effect. When the time came to put through a new and radical policy, the central government did not possess the actual and immediate authority to make its wishes obeyed. Not duplicity but feebleness was the chief reason for the ineffectiveness of reform.

We must not neglect the usual claim that the nine-year program was merely a design on the part of the Manchus to postpone the evil day when they must surrender the reality of power. Events in China since the collapse of the dynasty in 1912 provide the best answer to such accusations. China was not ready for a constitution. As one edict after another had declared, preparation must come first, especially in a country engaged in trying to rènovate herself in so many ways at the same time. The Manchus may have been not unwilling to see changes in the government postponed for a time, but there is no good warrant for declaring such a policy wholly selfish when it had wisdom and prudence on its side. The best evidence of the Throne's sincerity is the formation of the provincial assemblies and the National Assembly. But the conduct of those very bodies showed plainly that the most active and vocal portion of the Chinese people refused to accept reform at so measured and sober a pace. The nationalism which had been rising in China was turning against the Manchus. To sharp critics of the ruling house, prudence was but a cloak for self-interest, and noble edicts which failed of their purpose did so because of deliberate design. It was hard for many to believe that any real good could come out of Peking, from a group of elderly, corrupt, and intriguing politicians. But necessity is a hard teacher, and Tzu Hsi and some of those who aided her had learned their lesson. The weakness of the central administration and the mounting hatred of the Manchus did much to foil their good intentions. But the greatest single blow to pre-revolutionary reform and indeed to the hope of peaceful evolution for China was the death in 1908 of the one person universally respected and feared to such an extent as to be able to secure some modicum of obedience, the Empress Dowager Tzu Hsi.

VII. THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST OPIUM

The most successful of all the Manchu reforms was the eradication of the cultivation and use of opium. The poppy from which the drug is prepared was introduced into China by the Arabs in the eighth century. For many years the plant was employed only for medicinal purposes, but with the arrival of Europeans in the East the habit of tobacco-smoking appeared and soon a mixture of opium and tobacco was being used for smoking purposes. In time, opium alone was employed. This vice became peculiar to China, and soon aroused the righteous concern of the Throne. In 1729 and again in 1796 imperial edicts forbade the sale of opium and the opening of opium dens. The edicts were ineffective; not till 1800 did the Chinese government, too late, take the one step which perhaps might have stopped the spread of the habit, the prohibition of importation. Little opium was raised in China, and the source of supply was the Ganges Valley. For many years the Portuguese had controlled the Indian opium trade, but in 1773 it passed from their hands to those of the British East India Company. The result of the change was a better quality of drug, a resultant increase of demand, and an augmented export to China. Production in China itself was on the increase, but then, as later, the Indian article proved superior to that which the Chinese could produce at home. The effort of the Chinese government in 1800 to end the opium trade was a failure. The British East India Company ceased to ship the drug to China in its own name but sold opium at auction in Calcutta, whence it was almost without fail carried by the purchasers to the China ports. What profit did the dealers in the drug expect if its entry into China was forbidden? The answer is in terms of the habitual venality and greed of many Chinese officials. Despite orders from Peking, the mandarins were willing, for the sake of a requisite amount of "squeeze," to permit the landing of the drug. The foreigners had few compunctions about their part in this illegal traffic. They were primarily interested in trade and profits, and had found in opium the one product brought by the Westerners for which the Chinese felt a great need. Unless opium continued as the staple of trade, the foreigners would be forced to pay in specie for nearly all the desirable wares which they could secure from China. Hence they reasoned that if the traffic in opium went on against the wishes of the imperial government, it had only itself, or rather the corruptibility of its servants, to blame. Smuggling on a large scale under official auspices went on until 1839 when Lin Tze-su, sent to Canton as imperial commissioner, made a determined attempt to stamp out the contraband trade by destroying the opium held in

stock by the foreign traders there. As a result of this and other sources of disagreement, China and Great Britain were soon engaged in the conflict popularly known as the "Opium War," a term to which the British have always objected as a misnomer. Be that as it may, the treaty of Nanking of 1842 required of China a payment of $6,000,000 for the opium which had been destroyed, although it had been smuggled into China. For sixteen years more the wholesale smuggling of opium went on, until in 1858, by the revised tariff under the treaty of Tientsin, the trade was legalized with the low duty of 30 taels a picul (133⅓ pounds). This provision was modified by the Chefoo Convention of 1876 by which opium brought to a port was to be placed in bond until there was a sale for it, when the importer should pay the customs duties of 30 taels a picul and the purchasers a sum amounting to 80 taels a picul in lieu of *likin* (internal transit dues), after which it would be exempt from further levies in its travels in China.

Thus Great Britain assumed the obloquy of having forced on China a traffic which was considered noxious in the extreme. In justice the British government should be allowed to share this ill fame with those Chinese officials who for so many years disregarded the laws which they were employed to enforce. After legalization the opium habit spread rapidly. The importation of opium into China reached its high point in 1888, when 77,966 piculs were admitted to the mainland of China,[1] and thereafter declined until in 1906, the year in which the Empress Dowager launched her campaign against the drug, the importation amounted to 4,117 piculs.[2] This decrease did not mean a similar falling-off in the use of the drug but rather that the foreign supply was being replaced to some extent by increased production in China. The Chinese government continued its opposition on moral grounds and made from time to time a number of half-hearted attempts to persuade the British government to give up its share in the traffic.[3] The Chinese government was in a very difficult position. To prohibit the cultivation of opium in China was useless, since any reduction thus achieved would quickly be made up for by an increased import from India. And since the Indian opium trade was secured in its position by treaty, the Chinese government was powerless to free itself from that means of supply. Moreover, despite its moral dislike of the habit, the Chinese government could hardly forego the revenue derived both from the duty on foreign opium and the taxes on the domestic product, even though the bulk of the latter went to fill the coffers of the

[1] *United States Foreign Relations, 1906,* Part I, "Opium in China," a report by E. T. Williams, p. 354.

[2] China Imperial Maritime Customs, *Returns of Trade and Trade Reports, 1909,* Part I, p. 30.

[3] *Parliamentary Debates,* Vol. 158 (1906), pp. 495–496.

provincial officials, a circumstance which led them to encourage the growing of opium as much as possible.[4] The whole matter was in an impasse. The Indian government saw no reason to stop the cultivation of the poppy in India only to enrich the Chinese opium-growers, while the Chinese government was unwilling to check domestic cultivation, realizing that such a step would redound to the benefit of the Indian opium-farmers. The Chinese authorities were right in saying in 1881 that the only solution of the problem lay in the development of a real sentiment against the drug among the Chinese people.[5]

There were few signs of any such moral awakening. Domestic production of opium continued to increase, even to the extent of agitating the Indian government, which feared a reduction of its income, owing to the increased competition of Chinese opium.[6] The crop had proved a veritable bonanza to many farmers in China, since it possessed the characteristics of great value and small bulk so necessary where trade is by slow and cumbersome means. In some of the Western provinces, Szechwan for example, the poppy was a very important crop. It is most difficult to get satisfactory figures as to just what dimensions the cultivation of the poppy in China had reached by 1906. Statistics were nonexistent in old China and we are dependent for our figures on a number of estimates. The problem of reducing these assorted "statistics" to unity is illustrated by comparison of the 173,759 piculs given by E. T. Williams, Chinese Secretary of the American Legation, as the annual production of the eighteen provinces in about 1906 with the figure of 330,000 piculs arrived at by Stephen Leech, Councilor of the British Legation, in his report to the British government in 1907.[7] Even though Williams' figure is admittedly a minimum estimate, the disparity is great. Difficulties multiply when one compares the estimates for individual provinces. Williams, employing a report made by the viceroy of Szechwan and the customs figures on export from the province, set the annual production of Szechwan at about 52,489 piculs; Leech stated that Szechwan produced probably 200,000 piculs. Williams gave Manchurian production at 10,000 piculs; Leech, at 150,000. Where the truth actually lies, it is impossible to say; both pretend to be no more than careful guesses based on data of very uneven value. The same dubiousness attaches to figures relating to the consumption of opium. Williams, using his own figures for native production and the customs figures on the importation of opium, after a mathematical process which involved a number of other

[4] *Accounts and Papers,* 1882, XLVIII (C. 3378), 12.

[5] *Ibid.,* p. 11.

[6] *Ibid.,* p. 7.

[7] For these figures see *United States Foreign Relations, 1906,* Part I, pp. 355–356, and *China No. 1 (1908),* p. 33.

estimates as uncertain as the first, reached the conclusion that about one man out of forty was an opium-smoker, disregarding entirely the use of the drug by women, which was not uncommon.[8] Considering the impossibility of securing any really accurate and satisfactory statistics, we shall have to be content, in the last analysis, with saying merely that both the growing of the poppy in China and its use in the form of opium had reached large dimensions.

The Chinese government, with the opening of the twentieth century, still cherished the project of somehow combating the spread of the opium habit.[9] It had come to realize, however, that before the powers would relieve China of her treaty obligations to accept opium as a legal import China must first take definite steps to curb domestic production and consumption. The imperial government was helped just at this time by the development of a public opinion in China condemning the drug. Chinese feeling against opium was greatly stimulated by the circulation of the report of the American Committee of 1904 which had studied the opium problem in the Far East as an aid to devising workable regulations for the Philippines. Further encouragement came from Great Britain, the very country which was looked on as guilty of foisting the opium trade on China. Tang Shao-yi, on a visit to India in 1904, secured the impression from conversations with leading officials there that Great Britain might perhaps forego her Indian opium revenue if there should be signs in China of a genuine attempt to stamp out the vice.[10] This inclination to surrender the profits of the Indian trade was due in good measure to the pressure of an increasing body of public opinion in Great Britain which condemned the British government's support of the opium trade on moral grounds.[11]

Heartened by these signs of support, the Chinese government undertook the extension to the whole Empire of a new consolidated tax on the drug, designed not so much to increase the imperial revenue as to discourage the cultivation of the poppy by heavy taxation.[12] The consolidated tax had first been employed by Chang Chih-tung in his viceroyalty of Hupeh and Hunan from 1900 on and in 1904 and 1905 had been extended to include also Anhwei, Kiangsi, Fukien, Kwangtung and Kwangsi. On May 7, 1906, the Throne ordered that this system, which had succeeded well in the seven provinces, should be extended to all China. The new regu-

[8] *United States Foreign Relations, 1906,* Part I, p. 356.

[9] See *China No. 2 (1908)*, pp. 5–6.

[10] *China No. 1 (1908),* pp. 1–2.

[11] For a statement of this position as early as 1881 see *Hansard's Parliamentary Debates,* CCLX, 1451–1478.

[12] This account of the consolidated tax is drawn from *United States Foreign Relations, 1906,* Part I, pp. 357–359.

lations provided for a consolidated tax of 100 taels a picul on native raw opium, plus 15 taels a picul for administrative costs. Prepared opium was to pay double this rate; opium dross, one-half. No other taxes of any sort were to be levied on the drug. The proceeds were to be divided between the provincial and central governments, the former to receive an annual amount equal to that reported as received in 1904 by the provincial treasury from duties on native opium. Williams calculated that at this rate the total collection would amount to 17,360,000 Haikwan (customs) taels, of which about 8,000,000 would go to the imperial government. This sum the Peking authorities proposed to use for army reform. Only a few months after the inauguration of this policy of taxing opium out of existence it was overshadowed by the proclamation of a plan to stamp out both the cultivation and the use of opium by the method of gradual prohibition.

There were a number of reasons for this change to a policy more difficult of execution. In the first place, the dynasty was showing a wise sensitiveness to public opinion, which increasingly denounced opium. Returned students, after their experience in Japan and other nations where the vice was shunned, inveighed against it as a habit which brought on China the contempt of other nations. Missionaries also raised their voices in protest against the opium evil.[13] One of the most influential factors in arousing distaste for the habit was the report of the American Opium Committee, which was circulated in Chinese translation throughout the Empire.[14] The committee studying the use of opium in the Far East in order to determine the best way of handling the problem in the Philippines, had no hesitation in pronouncing its use harmful and recommended a system of gradual abolition. For the Chinese, the most notable part of the report was that which dealt, in no gentle terms, with the prevalence of opium-smoking in China. The committee was inclined to blame the spread of the habit there to the feebleness of the government, whose enactments against opium had fallen into desuetude, and to the greed for gain of many individual Chinese, who, while not users of the drug themselves, felt no hesitation in selling it to others. The report stated that there were signs of a moral awakening in China against the vice, but declared it very doubtful that the nation as a whole would move against the habit for many years.[15] Such statements stung the newly-aroused sense of nationalism among certain portions of the Chinese population.

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[13] Morse, *International Relations,* III, 436.

[14] *United States Foreign Relations, 1906,* Part I, p. 362.

[15] United States Senate Document No. 265, 59th Congress, 1st Session, *The Report of the Committee Appointed by the Philippine Commission to Investigate the Use of Opium and the Traffic Therein,* pp. 28–35 (hereafter referred to as *Philippine Opium Report).*

The report selected the regulations in force in Formosa as worthy of imitation. The population of Formosa was composed largely of Chinese, who totaled more than 2,500,000, as against 40,000 Japanese and 113,569 aborigines. The Japanese were forbidden to use the drug, the aborigines had not acquired the habit, and the problem therefore was one of eliminating the smoking of opium among the large Chinese group. The method was a system of regulation looking to ultimate suppression. The preparation of opium for use in Formosa was made a government monopoly, and the drug was sold only to licensed dealers, who in turn were allowed to sell it only to physicians, apothecaries, and licensed smokers. A smoker's license was issued on the presentation of a doctor's certificate testifying that the applicant was a habitual opium-user, and had to be renewed each year, no new applicants to be given licenses after 1900. Extensive measures were taken to provide free facilities for those who wished to be cured of the habit. The evils resulting from the use of opium were taught in the public schools. The whole force of the effort to do away with smoking was increased by the fact that the Japanese, who as the ruling group were the champions of the policy, themselves were non-smokers. There were many criticisms to be made of the system, but the American Committee nevertheless endorsed it as an effective arrangement for achieving the complete elimination of the habit without unnecessary difficulty or dislocation. Should the Chinese themselves embark on an anti-opium crusade, Japan, so often the model in reform, could again furnish a profitable example.

Just as the agitation in China, stimulated by the American report, attained considerable volume, help came to the Chinese government from the most unexpected quarter, the British Parliament itself. In the past the British official attitude had been one of solicitude for the Indian revenue and doubt as to the genuinely harmful effects of the use of opium.[16] As long as such doctrines controlled the counsels of the British government, China could not hope for the requisite aid in checking the Indian opium traffic.

When the Liberal party secured an overwhelming majority in the House of Commons in 1906, the growing sentiment against the participation of the British government in the Indian opium traffic at last became dominant in that body. On May 30, 1906, a resolution was passed:

> That this House reaffirms its conviction that the Indo-Chinese opium trade is morally indefensible, and requests His Majesty's Government to take such steps as may be necessary for bringing it to a speedy close.[17]

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[16] For statements of this attitude see *Accounts and Papers*, 1895, XLII, "Final Report of the Royal Commission on Opium," p. 19; *Philippine Opium Report*, p. 49.

[17] *Parliamentary Debates*, Vol. 158 (1906), p. 515.

However, British righteousness in this respect would have to be obtained at the expense of the Indian opium-farmer and the Indian administration. The Secretary of State for India, Lord Morley, in commenting on the motion, pointed out the practical difficulties involved but declared that if China herself showed a disposition to move against the opium habit the Indian government would be glad to co-operate, even in the face of a considerable financial loss.[18]

The Chinese government was not slow in seizing this opportunity to take definite action to eliminate the vice which it had so long condemned in theory. The latter part of 1906 was the time when reform zeal in Peking reached perhaps its highest pitch, thanks to the inspiration of Japan's success against Russia and the return from abroad of the constitutional commission. Together with the great edicts on constitutionalism and official reform came the decree of September 20, which inaugurated the stupendous and costly campaign for the abolition of the cultivation and use of opium. The Throne pointed to the failure of its past attempts, indicated the harmful effects of the drug, urged all to foreswear it as a necessary step in the regeneration of China, and declared that "within a period of ten years the injurious practice of using opium, whether foreign or native, must be entirely abolished."[19] Regulations to make clear the imperial intent were approved on November 21, 1906.[20] In some respects they owed a considerable debt to the Japanese system in Formosa, but China was faced by one problem which the Japanese had been spared: in Formosa the poppy was not grown, but in China it was cultivated in vast quantities. To insure the gradual elimination of cultivation the regulations provided for a system of licenses for poppy-farmers, to be renewed from year to year on the condition that each year a proportion of the land should be changed from poppy to some other crop, until at the end of the ten-year period the poppy would be altogether abandoned. To eliminate smoking, the Chinese government adopted a licensing system on the Formosan model. It was unable to set up a government monopoly, for the effort was blocked by the foreign powers, so far as foreign opium was concerned, on the ground that the treaties of Nanking and Tientsin forbade such a practice.[21] The compulsory licensing of smokers was decreed, with a gradual reduction of the quantity to be allowed and no granting of licenses to new smokers after the first issuing of them. Those over sixty years of

[18] *Parliamentary Debates,* Vol. 158 (1906), pp. 507–514.

[19] *United States Foreign Relations, 1906,* Part I, p. 360.

[20] For the text of these, see *United States Foreign Relations, 1906,* Part I, pp. 366–369.

[21] For the treaty provisions in question, see *Treaties between China and Foreign States* (The Maritime Customs), I, 353, 821; also *China No. 1 (1908)*, pp. 32–33.

age, of which group, be it noted, Tzu Hsi herself was one, were not to be required to reduce the amount to which they had been accustomed. When any smoker was cured of the habit he was to report to the magistrate and surrender his license. To aid in releasing people from the habit the regulations provided for the preparation on a large scale of anti-opium pills. Opium dens, that is, places where opium was sold for consumption on the premises, were banned, but retail shops for the sale of opium were to be allowed to remain during the ten-year period, provided they secured licenses and sold only to licensed smokers. As a spur to public opinion, the formation of anti-opium societies was encouraged but with the warning that they must not take up the discussion of political problems. Responsibility for the enforcement of these regulations was placed upon the provincial officials, who were promised rewards should they succeed in clearing their territory of the habit before the end of the ten-year period. The official class was to set an example to the population by giving up the habit in short order on pain of punishment. The earlier orders forbidding opium-smoking among students, teachers, and members of the army and navy were reiterated. The regulations concluded with the important declaration that the government would undertake negotiations with Great Britain and with all other countries with whom China had treaties and from whom she received any opium in order to stop the import of the drug from abroad. Action was also to be taken to bring into effect the dormant treaty provisions against morphia.[22]

The use of opium could not be eliminated, however, as long as the stream of opium from India continued. In India the manufacture of opium from the poppy grown by licensed farmers was a government monopoly, and the drug, when prepared, was sold at auction, most of it finding its way to China.[23] Despite the moral dubiousness of the business, the production of opium was a source of government revenue and a means of livelihood to many British subjects, and the British government was unwilling to surrender it until assured that China would do her part. And surprisingly enough, considering the fitful progress of many other reforms, the crusade against opium met with amazing success. During 1907 the Throne continued to show its sincerity by a number of decrees exhorting officials to see to the restriction of poppy-cultivation, that phase of the reform which lagged somewhat, and by a series of proclamations against the use of opium by officials, which resulted in the resignation of a number of high-placed

[22] A second set of regulations was issued May 23, 1908, and differed from those of 1906 chiefly in the omission of the clause regarding negotiation with foreign powers and the inclusion of a scheme, doomed to failure, for the establishment of government monopolies. *United States Foreign Relations, 1908*, pp. 89–92.

[23] *Parliamentary Debates*, Vol. 158 (1906), pp. 505–507.

opium-users and the dismissal of others.[24] More significant were the signs of general progress throughout the country. As usual, Yuan Shih-kai led the way and Chihli became a model province in opium reform as in modernization of schools and army.[25] The British government, as the party most interested in the real progress made, was careful to secure adequate reports of the real extent of the reform. The first of these was that submitted in November 1907.[26] The details we shall take up later, but in general it presented a picture of activity and progress. The closing of dens was the most flourishing phase of reform, with the establishment of anti-opium societies and the distribution of anti-opium pills not far behind. Other sections of the regulations were being given varying effectiveness according to the energy of the officials concerned in each locality. At the time the report was submitted, it was difficult to tell much about the measures being taken against poppy-cultivation, as the seed was not sown till November.

Such signs of activity were sufficient to encourage the British government to undertake the reduction of the Indian opium traffic. The Chinese government had opened negotiations on January 25, 1907, by submitting through the Chinese minister in London six proposals. The first and most important was that, taking the importation of Indian opium in the years 1901 to 1905 as a basis, Great Britain should consent to a one-tenth reduction each year of the amount of Indian opium imported into China, so that the Indian opium trade and the domestic cultivation in China would both cease in 1916. Great Britain was also asked to permit the stationing at Calcutta of a Chinese official to check up on the quantity of opium shipped to China. Then, as a result of the new consolidated tax on opium of 115 taels a picul, the Chinese government requested the doubling of the duty on that imported from India, which was twice as strong as the Chinese article, to make the same effective burden on both, the aim being not increase of revenue but discouragement of the drug. The question of the raw and prepared opium which found its way from Hong Kong to China was also raised. China requested that in foreign concessions the same steps against opium dens and the sale of instruments be taken as had been decreed for the rest of China. The last item concerned the exclusion of morphia, with which we will deal separately. The negotiations thus opened lasted for almost a year before a final agreement was reached on

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[24] *United States Foreign Relations, 1907*, Part I, pp. 149, 152, 161; *NCH*, October 18, 1907, May 1, 1908.

[25] *United States Foreign Relations, 1906*, Part I, p. 366; *ibid., 1907*, Part I, p. 151.

[26] *China No. 1 (1908)*, No. 28, inclosure.

all points. Their mutations cannot be discussed here.[27] The report of the India office on the Chinese proposals determined to great extent the final form of the agreement. The Indian government favored as more feasible a restriction of the amount of opium exported from India instead of a limitation on the amount imported into China. Not wishing to commit itself in advance to a ten-year schedule of decrease, it also advocated a three-year trial period, after which, if the Chinese government still continued its campaign against opium, the agreement between the two countries would be renewed for the remainder of the ten-year period. The Chinese proposal that the duty on Indian opium be doubled was not well received and a subsequent report by Sir Alexander Hosie confirmed that attitude, declaring that the new tax was not applied everywhere in China, that Indian opium was only 10 or 15 per cent stronger than the Chinese article, and that to double the tax on the former would simply give an advantage to the latter. To the stationing of a Chinese officer at Calcutta the Indian government acceded, provided that he should not have power of interference. These ideas were presented to the Chinese government on August 12, 1907, with the additional statement that the British government had instructed its consuls to take steps against opium dens in concessions if such had been done by Chinese officials for dens outside the concession. By December 2, 1907, the Chinese government had agreed to the British proposals except the figure to be taken as a basis for the annual reductions. Agreement on this last point was reached in January 1908. The two governments arranged that for three years Great Britain should decrease the amount of opium shipped from India to China by 5,100 chests annually, that being 10 per cent of the average annual export from India during the years 1901 to 1905.[28] A Chinese official was to be stationed at Calcutta to observe the shipment of opium to China. The prohibition of import and export of prepared opium between Hong Kong and China was agreed to, and both countries promised to take measures to prevent smuggling. China was forced to defer to some future date the plan for the doubling of the duty on Indian opium, but expressed her satisfaction with the orders sent out regarding the opium houses in concessions. The arrangement thus consummated was to run for three years, when, if China was still effectively combating the opium evil, it would be carried on for seven years more. The agreement was announced in an edict of March 2, 1908, praising the co-operation of Great Britain and urging all, high and low, to

[27] For the correspondence between the two governments see *China No.* *(1908)*, from which the summary here given is drawn.

[28] The Chinese had wished to use 42,357 chests, the average annual import to China, a figure which would have been less favorable to them, as the annual reductions would have been smaller.

exert themselves during the next three years so as to insure the renewal of the arrangement.[29] Relatively small amounts of opium came to China from Turkey and Persia, but since neither were treaty powers, China by imperial edict established a system of licenses for opium from those countries, the amount licensed to be decreased one-tenth a year.[30]

We must now turn to the actual steps being taken in China in fulfillment of the edict of 1906. Thanks to the interest of the British government in the progress of this reform, we are able to construct a fairly coherent account of the spread of the crusade against opium. The British government was unwilling to rely entirely on Chinese government reports, knowing, no doubt, the usual exaggeration in all statements sent in to the Throne. To be sure that a renewal of the 1907 agreement was justified, it collected evidence from its consuls and from missionaries throughout China. The resulting reports, mosaics, as it were, of these local findings, are of uneven value. A consul or missionary, encouraged by the rooting up of the poppy crop in one small region, might proclaim the existence of a wholesale campaign against the drug, whereas over the next hill there might well be a field of poppy undisturbed; that such situations often existed Sir Alexander Hosie, commercial attaché of the British Legation, demonstrated in his journey in search of the poppy in 1910 and 1911. Yet despite such almost unavoidable errors, we are enabled to secure a clearer idea of the struggle against opium than of any of the other reforms of the Manchu period.

To bring order out of the chaos of detail presented by the various reports submitted to the British government is not easy. The best method of showing the endless local variations of the reform and yet its constantly increasing force and success has seemed to the writer to be the presentation of a very brief sketch of the vicissitudes of opium reform in each province in the period from 1907 to about the end of 1909.[31] In 1910 and 1911 Hosie made important journeys of observation in western China; his findings will be discussed later in connection with the Anglo-Chinese agreement of 1911. During this period the Throne was still issuing hortatory pronouncements urging zeal in anti-opium work and threatening officials with dire punishment if they did not forego the habit. With the

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[29] *United States Foreign Relations, 1908,* pp. 82–83.

[30] *China No. 2 (1908)*, p. 4.

[31] *China No. 1 (1908)*, No. 28, inclosure; *China No. 2 (1908)*; *China No. 1 (1909)*; and *China No. 3 (1909)* are the chief of the British reports. The details given here have been culled from these reports and from "The Progress of the Anti-opium Movement among the Chinese" in *Chinese Recorder,* March 1908 and Dr. Morrison's report in *The Times,* May 20, 1907. When other sources have been used they are indicated.

details of this imperial activity we must, for lack of space, dispense, turning our attention to the more important question of the actual enforcement of the regulations of 1906 and 1908. Again the commonplace that the real success of reform rested with the local officials holds true but on this occasion that somewhat venal and conservative group was pushed along the path to reform by a growing public opinion and the example of a few of the most public-spirited of their number.

The northernmost region of the Empire, Manchuria, was the scene of a very vigorous campaign, thanks to the presence there of such officials as Chao Erh-hsun, Hsu Shih-chang, and Tang Shao-yi. Opium dens were soon shut, and by 1909 the smoking of the drug had been reduced about one-third. Tang saw to the eradication of poppy-cultivation in the south, but in the greater poppy-growing regions of the north less progress was made.

In the metropolitan province of Chihli, there was great activity in the closing of dens, but the regulations for the registration of smokers were not enforced at first. The anti-opium bureau of the province was vigorous in sending out questionnaires of all sorts. In 1909 smoking in Peking had almost disappeared and the license system was operating well. Cultivation was ordered reduced under Yuan's régime but in some regions the decree was not well carried out, and his successor ordered a complete stoppage of cultivation for the spring of 1909.

In Shansi little was done until 1909, when an energetic governor began an assault on the habit which resulted in the closing of all opium shops and wholesale establishments, the opening of many refuges, and an almost complete elimination of both smoking and cultivation.

Shensi during the first years of the reform was apathetic, and not until 1909 were there signs of any progress, despite the tendency of the governor to submit to the Throne very optimistic reports of his achievements.

Kansu had the reputation of being one of the most opium-sodden provinces, and continued to be so; the extensive sale of anti-opium medicines here was not a good sign, as most of these contained either opium or morphia. The officials were opposed to the reform, and told the people that the cultivation of opium was against the wishes of the Emperor, who disdained to collect taxes on the drug, with the result that the area under cultivation was promptly increased.

Shantung was slow in taking steps against the opium-smoking, but a reduction of from 50 to 75 per cent in cultivation was reported in 1908 and 1909 and apparently was the case, although part of the credit was to be given to drought rather than to official effort.

Kiangsu soon became the leading province in measures against the

smoking of opium. In Shanghai shops and dens were closed, an increased tax was levied on prepared opium, cures were given gratis, and smoking was greatly reduced among students and troops. Most noticeable was the existence in Shanghai of a general sentiment condemning the habit as undesirable.[32] Comparatively little opium was produced in the province, so that reduction of cultivation was not a great problem.

If Kiangsu was a shining example, the neighboring province of Anhwei was a horrible one. The first attempt to check cultivation resulted in violent rioting, in which the governor lost his life, and for some time thereafter opium held sway undisturbed by the proclamations which were the only sign of official activity. Indeed, many of the official *yamens* bore an intimate resemblance to opium dens. In 1909 a new governor made a bona fide attempt to effect a decrease in cultivation, but again the farmers proved refractory.

Chekiang at first was no more enthusiastic over the new edicts than Anhwei. The gentry favored the reform, but the officials were inactive, declaring that until new sources of revenue could be devised they were unwilling to stop the cultivation of opium and thus eliminate the taxes secured from it. Dens were nominally closed but actually in use, and anti-opium medicines of the usual harmful sort enjoyed a large sale. By 1909 conditions had changed for the better, production was being fast reduced, and officials were making a real effort to stop the prevalence of smoking.

In Kiangsi there was considerable popular support of the reform, but the measures taken were more effective in the cities than in the rural districts. Here, as elsewhere, the rising price of the drug, due to the decreased supply, was forcing many of the poor to give up the habit. Unfortunately for such as these, the anti-opium pills furnished an even more harmful way of satisfying the craving.

Fukien at first showed its approval of the anti-opium move more by bonfires of opium apparatus than by any other methods of reform, but a vigorous anti-opium league succeeded in bringing about an almost complete elimination of cultivation and a great decrease of smoking by 1909.

In Honan in 1907 a few dens were closed and one poppy-field uprooted as evidence of good intentions, but further activity was prevented by a combination of popular dislike of the reform and financial considerations. By 1908 and 1909 more effective measures were in force, especially in the region near the provincial capital.

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[32] There was much criticism of the dilatoriness of the Shanghai municipality in closing dens within the foreign settlement. The date was finally set for 1910. The British government refused to take responsibility, noting that many of the rate-payers were not British subjects (*China No. 2* [*1909*], p. 21).

One of the most ironic spectacles in the drama of opium reform was the halting and unsatisfactory progress made in Hupeh the very province in which Chang Chih-tung, once so loud in his denunciations of opium, had his viceregal seat. From the proclamation of the anti-opium edict in 1906 down through 1909 reports from Hupeh continually emphasized the lack of any real progress in checking smoking. The poppy-crop was actually on the increase. The missionaries in the province combined to ask Chang to push the reform, but, perhaps because of his preoccupation with railway matters, he did not do much to fulfill their request.

In the other province under Chang's control, Hunan, little opium was grown and less was smoked, and since many of the provincial officials were non-smokers and opponents of the habit many cures were reported, dens were closed, licensing was in effect, troops were employed to stop smuggling, and offenders were punished.

The two Kwang provinces dispensed with the cultivation of the poppy fairly easily, since the amount grown there had never been great, but had more difficulty in eliminating smoking. In Canton, as in Shanghai, public sentiment developed, but although a licensing system was employed, the rich still found it easy to continue the habit by distributing bribes to the officials. In the other parts of Kwangtung, conditions were less satisfactory than in Canton. The population of Kwangsi favored the reform, but the apathetic and opium-smoking officials delayed the campaign against the drug. Kweichow, like Kansu long notorious as a center of opium consumption, continued to grow and use the drug almost without interference, for Hsi Liang, the viceroy of Yunnan and Kweichow, was primarily interested in the eradication of opium in Yunnan. Not content to wait for the end of the ten-year period, he ordered that no more opium should be sold in Yunnan after 1908 and that poppy-cultivation should cease in 1909. The area under poppy in Yunnan was soon greatly reduced, owing to the use of military force.

There remains for consideration the great opium-growing province of Szechwan, said to produce 200,000 piculs, 180,000 of which were consumed in the province itself. To all observers of the anti-opium effort, the situation in Szechwan was the focus of interest. Yet Szechwan, perhaps from the very magnitude of the problem there, at first made rather slow progress. Since it proved inexpedient to shut the dens in the capital the officials gave a liberal interpretation to the edict of 1906, a course to which the imperial government made no objection, and replaced dens by divans where opium could be smoked under official supervision, a compromise step which was applauded as a wise initiatory move. The province soon set up an official monopoly of prepared opium which continued to exist without much objection from foreign powers, since, as Szechwan consumed its own

production, foreign opium was not involved. The first wave of activity soon spent itself. The opium-farmers of the district, who actively opposed the measures which threatened to deprive them of a livelihood, forced the reduction of the uniform tax to the old level of about thirty-two taels. Smoking went on openly and without much official objection. It was largely due to the efforts of the two brothers, Chao Erh-feng and Chao Ehr-hsun, who successively held the viceroyalty of the province from 1907 to 1911, that the poppy at last began to disappear. A 50 per cent reduction had been ordered for the winter of 1907 and 1908 and in the latter year complete prohibition was decreed, but in 1909 there were still many fields of poppy to be found.

Of the great campaign to stamp out the poppy which began in 1910 we shall speak later. By the time for the renewal of the Anglo-Chinese agreement in 1910, the crusade against opium had made considerable though sporadic and uneven progress. As Hosie stated in his report to the British government late in 1908:

> . . . . public opinion, backed by a young but growing patriotism, is gradually but surely branding opium smoking as an evil that must be eradicated. Two years have elapsed since the issue of the anti-opium decree and the promulgation of the anti-opium regulations, and, although reports recently received from the provinces are somewhat conflicting in regard to the execution of the measures devised for suppression, there can be no doubt that, in spite of the absence of any well-organized uniform scheme for accomplishing the task, much is being done, and, in some cases, perhaps too much is being attempted in too short a time with the machinery available for the purpose.[33]

But this picture of progress had its darker side, for in proportion as opium tended to disappear, certain problems which its elimination created came more and more to the front. Morphia came into use to fill the vacuum of unsatisfied desire created by the increased price and the decreased use of opium, just as in the United States "bootleg" has appeared since the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment. Much of it was employed in the preparation of the so-called anti-opium pills which were so generously distributed in many provinces to aid in the curing of the opium-smoking habit and which served to implant a more dangerous craving, the desire to eat opium and morphia.[34] That many of the supposed cures contained opium and morphia could not but have been known to the provincial authorities,[35] but no adequate attempts were made to get the co-operation of trained Western physicians in devising really effective and non-harmful methods of curing smokers.

[33] *China No. 1 (1909)*, p. 1.

[34] *China No. 1 (1908)*, p. 42; *China No. 1 (1909)*, p. 5.

[35] See Bland, "The Opium Abolition Question" in Blakeslee, *Recent Developments in China*.

In addition to its consumption in the form of pills, morphia was increasingly used in subcutaneous injections. At first it was cheap and, as the price of opium soared, it was employed by the class which could no longer afford to purchase the old opiate. The Chinese government, exercised by the threatened replacement of opium by morphia, determined to close its doors to morphia and the instruments for its use. The treaties of 1902 and 1903 with Great Britain and the United States contained provisions for the exclusion of morphia except for medicinal purposes, provisions to be put into effect as soon as all the treaty powers should agree. At the same time China had promised to take steps to prevent the manufacture of morphia in her own borders.[36]

Until the anti-opium edict stimulated the use of morphia the Chinese government made no attempt to bring into effect these provisions. In January 1907, however, it approached Rockhill, the United States Minister, asking that his government give immediate effect to the article prohibiting the sending of morphia into China, without waiting for the agreement of the other powers. Rockhill pointed out that as the United States shipped little morphia into China, its action would do little good, and advised China to take the steps against Chinese manufactured morphia promised in the 1902 and 1903 treaties before trying to persuade the powers to surrender their right of importation.[37] The Chinese government, nevertheless, in March and April, 1907, set about the attainment of its object by the means provided in the 1902 and 1903 treaties, that of procuring the consent of the treaty powers. All agreed fairly readily except Japan, the nation most concerned in the shipment of morphia to China.[38] In July 1908 the Chinese government at last issued regulations against morphia, prescribing drastic punishments for manufacturing and distributing the drug.[39] Probably influenced by this step, which meant that Chinese-made morphia would not be permitted to flourish at the expense of the Japanese article, the Japanese government fell in line in September 1908 and the prohibition of the importation of morphia except for medicinal purposes was put into effect in January 1909.[40] Thereafter the consumption of morphia declined, owing to the increase in price which followed its exclusion.[41] Later steps were taken to check in a similar fashion the importation of cocaine.[42]

The danger of the spread of the morphia habit was not the only problem contingent on the elimination of opium. Diminution of poppy-growing

[36] MacMurray, *Treaties and Agreements with and concerning China*, No. 1902/7; No. 1903/5.

[37] *United States Foreign Relations, 1907,* Part I pp. 140–142.

[38] *Ibid., 1908,* p. 84.

[39] *Ibid.*, pp. 100-102.

[40] *Ibid.*, pp. 103–104.

[41] *China No. 3 (1909)*, p. 5.

[42] *United States Foreign Relations, 1910,* pp. 298–299.

meant a profound economic dislocation. Many farmers, especially in the west, had found in the poppy a product which by its high price and great portability suited their needs precisely, for with a shortage of rapid transportation facilities a crop of small bulk and great value was a necessity.[43] No crop which could be substituted so well filled these requirements; moreover, when, as in Yunnan, the farmers did shift to barley, wheat, cotton, or other crops, the result was a local oversupply, there being no way of transporting the surplus to regions where there was a demand; a consequent drop in price, and hard times for many.[44] Realizing that the edict against opium meant their ruin, many farmers opposed any attempt to make them give up poppy-cultivation and there were armed conflicts between the poppy-growers and provincial soldiery in many parts of the country before the farmers were convinced that the poppy was doomed. The imperial government had tried to provide for an easy transition by setting the ten-year period with gradual reduction of cultivation. This plan was not well carried out, however. It necessitated, as a preliminary, a careful survey of the land under poppy, and none such was made.[45] Moreover, any system which gradually restricted cultivation would favor some farmers at the expense of others.[46] The more effective, if harsh, method was to order immediate and complete cessation of cultivation, a course adopted in many provinces with success. By 1911 almost unbelievable progress had been made in poppy-suppression, but at the expense of the livelihood of a group which, as a result, became one of the elements in that general chorus of dissatisfaction which culminated in the Revolution.

Far more disturbing at the time was the problem of finding some source of revenue to replace the opium taxes, which would cease to flow into the imperial and provincial coffers with the stamping out of the drug. The government showed courage of no mean order in persisting in the anti-opium campaign when revenue was desperately needed to carry on the many reform projects of one sort or another then on foot. The traditional aversion of the dynasty to the opium habit triumphed even over pecuniary necessity, however, and the Throne often proclaimed its attitude in such words as:

> The Throne desires earnestly to begin a new life with the people, and will not feel loth to sacrifice the revenue from such a source although Our finance is in a stress.[47]

Just what the financial loss involved amounted to is a question which leads us again into the quicksands of "statistics" regarding imperial China.

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[43] *United States Foreign Relations, 1906,* Part I, p. 353.

[44] Hosie, *On the Trail of the Opium Poppy,* II, 44–45.

[45] *China No. 3 (1909),* p. 22.

[46] *China No. 1 (1911),* p. 16.

[47] *NCH,* May 13, 1911.

The Waiwupu, in a memorial of 1908, set the revenue on Indian opium at about 1,200,000 taels.[48] *The Times* at about the same time chronicled a guess that the central government stood to lose, by the disappearance of opium, about £1,500,000.[49] All agreed that whatever the loss to the central administration, the provincial exchequers would be the chief sufferers. The realization by provincial mandarins that drastic steps against opium would cripple the provincial treasury (and their own pockets) led to the delay of reform in many regions. Increased taxes on opium such as the consolidated tax of 1906 were better calculated to decrease revenue than to increase it, since they served as a deterrent to further cultivation and use. This was demonstrated in 1908 when the official at Wuchang in charge of the consolidated tax reported that he would no longer be able to furnish to the imperial treasury the amount expected of him.[50] Any new tax would fall on a group which had not borne the opium tax and would thus serve only to increase discontent. The Throne soon began to ask for suggestions as to the best means of recouping the deficit, but no really satisfactory solution was forthcoming. Indeed, none was to be expected; the finances of the Empire had already reached a lamentable state. A few expedients were proposed. Yunnan, for example, tried increasing the tax on salt, which was a government monopoly,[51] and one hopeful official suggested the further development of provincial economic resources as a possible source of profit.[52] But this particular phase of the great financial riddle remained, like its other aspects, unsolved.

Whatever problems the attempt to stop the use of opium had engendered, the crusade itself was making excellent progress, and China's first opportunity to set her case before the powers as a group and to attempt to secure their co-operation came with the meeting of the Opium Commission of 1909 at Shanghai. The Commission, first proposed by the United States in 1906, was to include representatives of all the powers interested in the traffic, and was authorized to investigate the opium problem but not to take binding action.[53] The inclusion of China was essential to the success of any such gathering, yet the Chinese government was slow in promising to send delegates, fearing that the Commission might in some way interfere with Chinese domestic concerns and especially that some sort of a traveling delegation of foreigners to investigate opium might be sent through the

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[48] *United States Foreign Relations, 1908,* p. 84.

[49] *The Times,* April 4, 1908.

[50] *China No. 1 (1909),* p. 16. [51] *Ibid.,* pp. 15–16.

[52] *United States Foreign Relations, 1909,* pp. 104–106.

[53] The diplomatic correspondence preceding the meeting of the Commission will be found in *United States Foreign Relations, 1906,* Part I, pp. 360–365; *ibid.,* 1907, Part I, pp. 140–174; *ibid.,* 1908, pp. 74–116.

country. An explicit statement that the Commission was purely for purposes of investigation, that each country was to make the preliminary survey of conditions within its own borders, and that the decisions reached would not be obligatory on any of the nations involved, at last secured China's accession, July 23, 1907. The agenda included reports by delegates on the regulations and restrictions as to opium in force in their own countries and any amendments to them advisable; a discussion of the opium traffic in the Far East, based on preliminary study; and definite proposals for the remedying of the situation.

The death of both the Emperor and the Empress Dowager in November 1908 caused the postponement of the meeting from January 1, 1909, to February 1, 1909, when it convened in Shanghai. The report which China presented to this body was decidedly sanguine. By imperial command, returns on the suppression of the cultivation and sale of opium had been gathered in 1907 and 1908 and submitted to the Throne in a memorial from the Board of Finance, October 4, 1908, which declared that production had been suppressed in five provinces, including Yunnan, as well as part of Manchuria, that during the coming year eight more would eliminate it, and that a 20 per cent reduction in Szechwan, Kweichow, Kansu, and Shensi was expected. Shansi was to be purged of the drug by its governor, who had just petitioned to be allowed summarily to forbid all cultivation. The petition also gave figures to indicate that native opium was rapidly decreasing in amount while the quantity coming in from abroad remained nearly stationary. The figures for production in terms of piculs were given as 142,698 in 1905, 148,103 in 1906, and 119,983 in 1907, thus showing a 20 per cent reduction. Figures for sales showed a similar falling-off. The figures given for the importation of foreign opium were from the reports of the Imperial Maritime Customs, and showed a gradual increase from 51,290 piculs in 1905 to 54,117 in 1906 and to 54,584 in 1907.[54] That the Chinese figures for production and sales were far too low was evident on the face of them. At least one Manchu official declared so to the Throne, citing the province of Kansu as an example.[55] The figures, when presented

[54] *China No. 1 (1909)*, pp. 18–21; *The Times*, October 14, 1908. It must be remembered that the Anglo-Chinese agreement for the reduction of the export of Indian opium was not made until the end of 1907. In 1908 the importation of opium to China dropped to 43,397 piculs (China, Imperial Maritime Customs, *Returns of Trade and Trade Reports, 1909,* Part I, p. 30).

[55] The Tartar-General of Kansu declared to the Throne: "Unfortunately, the officials sent by the Board of Revenue to investigate Kansu province arrived at Ning-hsia in the middle of the eighth moon, by which time the poppy harvest was over and the only available source of information was found in the statistics of the local officials and the tax-collectors, which are absolutely untrustworthy evidence." *The Times,* January 28, 1909.

to the conference, were criticized by Sir Alexander Hosie, who pointed out their real character as guesses but declared that he had no intention of denying that real progress had been made in China.[56]

If the Chinese had hoped that the Commission would free them at once from the necessity of receiving foreign opium, they were disillusioned. As had been carefully explained beforehand, its intention was only to conduct an investigation of the opium traffic, and its recommendations had no binding force. However, the resolutions which finally received unanimous endorsement by the delegates included a recognition of the sincerity and progress of China in her anti-opium campaign and recommendations to the governments concerned that in concessions and settlements in China dens still open be closed, steps be taken to stop the manufacture of anti-opium remedies containing opium, and national pharmacy laws be applied.[57]

Many feared that with the death of the Empress Dowager in November 1908 the attack on opium, the preparations for constitutionalism, and all the other reforms would gradually fade into oblivion. Ultimate events tended to confirm this prognostication, but for the time being there seemed hope for the continuance of the reform program under the well-intentioned Regent. Prince Chun declared Tzu Hsi's policy his own, and in the field of opium reform showed zeal comparable to hers. Edicts appeared threatening those officials who did not give up the opium habit and punishing those who had failed to do so; a code of penalties for violators of the anti-opium regulations was promulgated; and provincial authorities who were detected in falsification of their reports to the Throne were punished.[58] With imperial support and an increasing backing from the public the elimination of opium went on apace.

That the drug was fast disappearing no one, not even the most interested party, Great Britain, seemed to doubt; but to make sure that the production of opium was being suppressed as rigorously as reports indicated, Sir Alexander Hosie in the winter of 1910–1911 made a journey of investigation in those provinces which had formerly been the great centers of poppy-growing. Following the less-traveled roads, where the poppy was apt to persist even when it had disappeared along the highways, he traversed Shansi, Shensi, Szechwan, Kweichow, and Yunnan and submitted reports which demonstrated that this one, at least, of the reforms attempted under the Empire had been a conspicuous success.

Hosie's findings served to indicate the untrustworthiness in detail of the earlier reports made up of collections of scattered observations but also

[56] *China No. 3 (1909)*, p. 24.

[57] *United States Foreign Relations, 1909*, pp. 109–110.

[58] *NCH*, January 20, September 23, 1911; *United States Foreign Relations, 1911*, pp. 294–296.

gave ample support to the general view that the anti-opium crusade was making astounding progress. Shansi, where progress had been very feeble until 1909 or so, had been purged of the poppy by the vigor of the governor, Ting Pao-chuan. Hosie saw no poppy-growing in the province and was told that license fees had ceased for lack of anything to license. In Shensi the governor claimed a 60 to 80 per cent reduction, which Hosie was inclined to consider an overestimate, though reduction there had undoubtedly been. One of the best testimonials to the fact was that the price of the drug had risen to four times what it had been in the days before 1906. In Kansu, where the poppy had so long flourished unchecked, Hosie estimated a reduction of perhaps 25 per cent even though the governor seemed inclined to wink at evasion of the law and protested guileless innocence of the existence of poppy-fields under the very walls of the capital.[59] But the high point of Hosie's investigations came with the discovery that in Szechwan, once pre-eminent in production of the drug, the poppy had vanished.[60] When such success could be obtained there the ultimate disappearance of the poppy elsewhere was all but certain. In Kweichow, once opium-sodden beyond all other provinces, various proclamations ordering cessation of cultivation had been posted, but not until shortly before Hosie's arrival in 1911 were drastic steps taken, soldiers sent, and crops uprooted. The reduction of 70 to 80 per cent claimed by the governor was perhaps not much too high.[61] In Yunnan, Hosie estimated a reduction from 60,000 piculs to one-fourth of that amount, the elimination of the poppy in the former great poppy districts in the west having been particularly successful. In the regions occupied by aboriginal tribes less effective steps had been taken.[62]

Success such as this was sufficient to convince the British government that China was carrying out her part of the 1907 agreement, which came up for renewal in the latter part of 1910. Great Britain was willing to waive proof from China of the progress made provided that the latter would agree to another three-year probationary period, but the Chinese government protested that the full seven-year period should be observed.[63] The question of the 18,000 chests of opium in bond also proved difficult. This accumulation was due to the fact that although the amount shipped

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[59] Hosie's report on poppy-cultivation in Shansi, Shensi, and Kansu is to be found in brief form in *China No. 1 (1911)*, No. 1, and at greater length in his *On the Trail of the Opium Poppy.*

[60] Hosie, *On the Trail of the Opium Poppy*, II, 21. See also *China No. 1* (*1911*), No. 2.

[61] Hosie, *op. cit.*, pp. 165, 279–287.

[62] *China No. 1* (*1911*), No. 3.

[63] Hosie, *op. cit.*, II, 220.

from Calcutta had been reduced according to promise, more of it had come to China than heretofore, attracted by the higher prices which the drug commanded there. Indeed, the import of opium into China in 1909 exceeded that in 1908 by 570 piculs, owing to the scarcity of the native article and to speculation on the chance of greater scarcity in the future.[64]

To check this difficulty, Max Müller, the British chargé in Peking, proposed that all opium leaving India for China be marked and only that so indicated be admitted.[65] Negotiations on those lines were begun in the middle of 1910 but were terminated without result, owing to the wave of feverish agitation for immediate cessation of importation which seized the student class and the National Assembly. In this reform, just as in the case of constitutionalism, these groups were possesed with a mania for quick results. The church bodies in Great Britain also denounced the existence of the treaty provisions which bound China to accept opium. Both groups, Christian leaders and Chinese agitators, centered their attacks on the revised tariff under the treaty of Tientsin which had legalized the opium traffic. April 24, 1911, was the last day for the denunciation of that document, a fact which gave special impetus to the campaign against it.[66] In the face of this clamor, the Chinese government was forced to abandon the negotiations on December 5, 1910.[67]

Negotiations were later resumed, however, and an agreement was finally arrived at on May 8, 1911.[68] By it the British government, recognizing China's sincerity and success in reducing the cultivation of opium, agreed to the continuation of the agreement between the two countries until 1917, China each year to diminish the production of opium in her borders in the same proportion as the reduction of the export from India for that year. If in less than seven years China should effect the complete cessation of poppy-cultivation, the British government would stop the exportation of opium from India to China. In any case, any province which could prove that it had suppressed cultivation and importation of native opium would be at once released from accepting Indian opium.

Canton and Shanghai, however, were not to be closed to Indian opium except as a final measure. During the seven-year period Great Britain was to be allowed to gather information by the sending through China of British officials, accompanied, if the Chinese government so desired, by Chinese representatives. The old proposal of the Chinese government to

[64] China, Imperial Maritime Customs, *Returns of Trade and Trade Reports, 1909*, Part I, pp. 45–46.

[65] *The Times*, April 18, 1911.

[66] *The Times*, December 22, 1910, April 18, 1911.

[67] Hosie, *op. cit.*, II, 220.

[68] For the text, see Great Britain, *Treaty Series, 1911*, No. 13.

raise the tax on British opium was at last agreed to; China was to be allowed to increase it to 350 taels a chest, but only on condition that she first raise the tax on all native opium to an equivalent figure. The Chinese official whose presence at Calcutta had been sanctioned in 1907 was to be allowed to watch the packing of opium as well as the sales, and every chest destined for China was to receive an export permit, the number to be gradually reduced to none in 1917. The question of the uncertified opium being held in bond was settled by Great Britain's taking responsibility for it and agreeing that, if it should be allowed entry into China, she would in 1912, 1913, and 1914 reduce her export to China by the scheduled 1,500 chests plus one-third of the amount of the opium in bond at the time of the signature of the agreement.

This agreement was almost the last stage in the struggle against opium under the Manchus. The International Opium Conference, sequel to the Commission of 1909, met at The Hague, December 1, 1911.[69] In the Convention finally agreed on, the powers having treaties with China agreed to take action to stop the smuggling to China of opium, morphine, and cocaine; to stop opium-smoking; to close opium dens and shops in concessions, leases, and settlements in proportion as similar action should be taken by China; to prevent the shipment through post offices under their control of the forbidden drugs; and to apply to their nationals in China pharmacy laws to be drawn up by China, if such laws proved satisfactory.[70]

Before these decisions could be made effective, political upheaval ended the Manchu dynasty. In the troubled years which followed, the campaign against opium faded into the background. The poppy bloomed once more in regions where it had once been stamped out, and opium-smokers might again puff their pipes in peace. But of all the reforms attempted in the closing years of the Manchu period, the effort to eradicate the cultivation and use of opium was the most noteworthy, both from the point of view of its effectiveness and from that of its political and moral significance. It was a sovereign demonstration of the fact that the decadent governmental machine in Peking could enforce its will only when that will was also the general desire. In this instance, Throne and people were in harmony. Constitutionalism, the gold standard, reforestation, and many other Western-style innovations might have only the vaguest significance to the ordinary Chinese, but one and all were familiar with the effects of

[69] The diplomatic correspondence preceding the conference is to be found in *United States Foreign Relations, 1909,* pp. 111–115; *ibid., 1910,* pp. 292–328; *ibid., 1911,* pp. 54–56; *ibid., 1912,* pp. 182–193. The report of the Ameiican delegates will be found in *ibid., 1912,* pp. 207-221.

[70] For the terms of the Convention in full, see *United States Foreign Relations, 1912,* pp. 196–204.

opium-smoking. In the years from 1906 to 1911 the dynasty was enabled at last to put into effect its traditional anti-opium policy, thanks to the conjunction of a number of favorable circumstances—the growth of anti-opium sentiment among the mass of the people, the *volte face* of the British government in the matter of Indian opium, and the widespread enthusiasm for reform engendered by the outcome of the Russo-Japanese War. Thus when imperial edicts denounced the habit and ordered its abandonment, a movement began which, starting with rather perfunctory action against opium dens, reached its climax with the razing to the ground of the immense poppy-crops of the greatest opium-growing districts in the Empire.

It is evidence of the government's sincerity, if not of its prudence, that this result was obtained at the expense of a considerable revenue, just at the time when the administration could ill afford to forego any source of income whatsoever. Those who delight in comparisons will find that the Manchu anti-opium campaign and the American legislation against intoxicating beverages furnish a multitude of parallels—and of contrasts. But, leaving aside the question of whether the Manchu government unwarrantably interfered with the personal liberty of opium-smokers, we may fairly list the elimination of opium as one of a group of ameliorative measures which were perhaps more necessary at the time than up-to-date governmental machinery which China was as yet unable to operate. Educational reform, the systematization and purification of the sadly involved finances, some method of dealing with famine, and the eradication of the opium habit were reforms calculated to produce in time an honestly governed, adequately fed, intelligent, and enlightened populace. That these innovations should have been allowed to do their work before republicanism or even constitutionalism seized the stage, subsequent events have demonstrated; but the prophets of the new era of "free government" could not wait.

VIII. OTHER ASPECTS OF THE REFORM MOVEMENT

The campaign against opium, the renovation of the army, the preparation for constitutionalism, and the institution of a modernized school system were the great reforms of the period before 1912. In addition to these changes, which to some extent attained realization, there was a whole host of reforms which progressed little farther than the pages of the imperial gazette. Among the list of stillborn improvements were some of those most necessary for the strengthening and enlightenment of China. Perhaps the chief of these neglected reforms was that of the imperial finances, which implied first and foremost the inculcation of ordinary principles of public honesty among the official class.

On September 11, 1909, there appeared in the columns of the *North-China Herald* a letter containing a trenchant criticism of the post-Boxer reforms. Its author, who signed himself merely "An Old China Hand,"[1] incurred the angry rebuttals of "Young China," but got no real answer to his challenge. The letter set forth a typical "reform" in its progress from imperial edict to actual performance, the example chosen being afforestation,[2] and is worthy of quotation in good part as showing better than any amount of pious generalization the fate of many of the eloquent edicts which blazoned the pages of the imperial gazette:

> . . . . the first thing is to organize a Board or a branch of a Board in Peking. Then officials and clerks must be appointed, both in the capital and in the provinces. All goes swimmingly so far, because there are plenty looking for employment, especially in posts where there is a chance of robbing the public. The first duty of the various offices will be to draw up innumerable, mostly impracticable, and very complicated and contradictory regulations. In China, as soon as you have drawn up your regulations, you wash your hands of the whole affair; it is considered a going concern. This is only natural, as experience has shown that no one ever obeys regulations, and it is impossible to enforce them. However, the regulations are decided upon after much correspondence and without reference to expert advice, the Throne is memorialized, and approving Edicts are published. Now we must really get to work. Where are the forests? They have mostly disappeared, except in mountainous districts impossible of cultivation, where there are no inhabitants to burn them up, and where the difficulty of transport makes destruction unprofitable. Anyhow, we must have forests or we shall get no salary and no squeeze. Certain districts, where a few bushes and stunted trees lead a precarious existence, must be marked off as forest tracts, and these must be rigorously preserved. The next step is to appoint our forest guards or rangers, upon which the whole success of the undertaking will depend. It will not be

[1] From the style and sentiments the writer is inclined to attribute the letter to J. O. P. Bland.

[2] Just at that time afforestation was interesting the official mind, as witness *United States Consular Reports,* February 1910, pp. 137–138.

> necessary to give them any pay, because the post will be lucrative and unattended by work. At the same time it will be advisable to have their names entered in a salary sheet because the clerks in the office have but small incomes. The rangers will then proceed to make contracts with the people of the neighbouring villages, each of which will have a certain tract marked out as its monopoly. The guardian of the tract will be paid so much to keep his eyes shut, and will only stipulate that something must be left growing for the sake of appearances. Meanwhile he will have the leisure to employ his honorarium in some congenial form of commerce. Probably he will open a gambling hell, or perhaps a small pawnshop, while the villagers will keep watch for him and drive all trespassers off their tract.
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> All this may read like an ungenerous piece of exaggerated sarcasm, but anyone intimately acquainted with the Chinese and their ways will admit that it is a literal and true picture of what always happens in this country. . . . . It is this defective sense of duty, this want of personal honour, and the sordid spirit that puts money before everything else, that are responsible for the rapid decadence of a nation that was once great. All talk of reform in China, until the morale of the people is changed, may be entirely disregarded as empty verbiage, for when you get down to the actual *doing* you will not find the men to *do*. The idea of a Constitutional Government in this country, when each man's ambition is to serve his own ends, is a huge joke. The Government in Peking know this quite well, but they are very anxious about revolution, and the talk of a Constitution is a piece of opportunism adopted to keep the discontented quiet.

Embittered as it is, this description contains considerable truth. In the cases of opium reform and educational modernization, results were achieved because the officials found themselves caught between imperial earnestness and public enthusiasm. But on the whole the Empress Dowager and the Regent had to face the same forces which had frustrated Kuang Hsu's reform attempts, the indifference and opposition of conservative and venal officials who by passivity could render nugatory the best of imperial intentions.

The whole financial system under which China operated at the beginning of the twentieth century was a strange farrago of practices which to the Occidental mind made up a picture both comic and tragic.[3] A veil of mystery perhaps providentially hid the details of this system from the eyes of even the most interested foreigners. In its broad outlines the scheme can be comprehended. The central government did not until the period of reform attempt any immediate control over local administration, and local mandarins were left very much to their own devices so long as peace in the territory under them indicated that their rule was not too oppressive. The finances were run on a sort of gentleman's agreement that Peking would not expect more than a certain customary amount from a particular region; what became of the rest collected from the people may easily be guessed from the inevitable connection between the terms "mandarin" and "squeeze." Government was a comparatively simple affair,

[3] For a general discussion of Chinese finances see Wagel, *Finance in China.*

unencumbered by any semi-socialistic enterprises. As Morse has put it,

> The Chinese official is nowadays less an administrator than a tax-collector; but an infinitesimal portion of his revenue is wasted on such heads of expenditure as police, justice, roads, education, fire prevention, sanitation, or others of the numerous expenses falling on the official purse in the West; so far as we, with our limited Occidental mind, can see, he exists solely for his own maintenance and that of his fellow-officials, his superiors and his subordinates.[4]

Few indeed were the officials who were not sticky-fingered; moreover, even if an official were disinclined to graft too extensively, he had always to reckon with the exactions of his superiors. The surest sign of widespread corruption was the exalted estimate placed on the honesty of such men as Chang Chih-tung; what is common is not often so highly praised. The imperial government lent countenance to the custom; it paid inadequate salaries on the understanding that it was the perquisites which counted. Morse has set the sources of revenue on which the Manchus relied in the last years of their sway at seven—land tax, tribute, customs, salt gabelle, *likin,* foreign customs, and miscellaneous devices such as licenses, fees, and tenures.[5] Statistics, however, were for obvious reasons, nonexistent and for any estimate of how much was collected and what became of the greater part of it in transit to the Dragon Throne, we are left to guesswork. Only the duties collected by the foreign-staffed Imperial Maritime Customs under Sir Robert Hart were honestly gathered and submitted, and it is a palpable score against the Confucian theory of the power of good example that almost no Chinese officials were moved to imitate the excellent example thus set them. The "I.M.C." was an oasis in a sea of financial confusion and dishonesty.

The opportunities for peculation afforded by a system of cumulative replacements, commutations, and exactions needs no comment. In the palmy pre-Taiping days expenditures did not equal revenue, however, and a rule-of-thumb scheme would serve. By far the largest items of expense were the maintenance of officials and the pay of provincial troops, which latter were apt to have no existence except on the regimental rolls. But with the costly Taiping Rebellion, *likin* (internal transit dues) became necessary; lost wars and injuries to foreigners brought indemnities; large foreign loans were assumed. Expenses began to pass income, until in 1910 they were double what income had been in 1900.[6] This was due in considerable part to the cost of underwriting reform, which even when ineffective was expensive. Observers pointed out that to many of the

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[4] Morse, *The Trade and Administration of the Chinese Empire,* p. 81.

[5] *Ibid.,* p. 85; see also Wagel, *Finance in China,* chapter xiii.

[6] Parker, *China, Her History, Diplomacy, and Commerce,* p. 218.

people reform in practice looked only too much like a scheme to increase the ranks of parasites. What if the new codes of laws were not put into effect and the new judicial system were a farce? The scribes who worked on the codifications and the new underlings associated with the "modern" courts had to have their pay and "squeeze." What if the navy were useless—except in revolution against the dynasty? Expenses of the students sent abroad, the pay of instructors, and the costly pleasure trips of imperial princes in the interests of this "reform" were a drain on the treasury. The only hope was to force into service some of the "free resources" which went to line official pockets.

It was a bleak prospect for the Manchus. Had they been Chinese, a national and popular dynasty such as the Japanese royal house, they might have been able to reorganize the financial system. In the exciting days of the Revolution, the whole structure of graft was charged to the Manchus as their especial contribution to the art of misgovernment, with calm disregard for the fact that the great majority of the dishonest officials were Chinese in race. The Manchus were not the initiators of corruption, but, one may ask, does not considerable blame attach to them for continuing to practice and to countenance it at a time when they were loud in declarations of their intention to reform their Empire? The ruling house was between Scylla and Charybdis. If the Throne made no attempt to "reform" beyond the issue of high-sounding edicts, "young China" would fling at it the charge of insincerity. If, on the other hand, it tried to make reform a reality, more funds would be necessary. There were two ways to secure more funds. One was to collect new taxes—but such a course would inevitably lead to unrest and rebellion. The other was to shut down on peculation—and that would arouse against the Throne the deadly opposition of all who were officials, all whose relatives were officials, and all who hoped to be officials themselves or to see their children and relatives in that class. One must not forget the democracy of the official system which gave to any bright boy a chance to win admission to the charmed circle of those able to dip their hands in the public purse. The whole system from top to bottom was involved in a circle of self interest. In Peking itself dwelt Prince Ching, awarded by acclaim of all and sundry the palm for quintessential corruption, yet numerous attempts of censors to obtain his degradation failed. When even the Throne's most conspicuous servants were steeped in corruption, what hope was there for a financial housecleaning? That Tzu Hsi knew the joys of metamorphosing public moneys into private hoardings is indicated by the considerable treasure collected by her and over which her successors quarreled long and heatedly.

The Throne received much advice urging the purification of the official system. The Board of State Affairs, appointed while the Court was still

at Sian in 1901, wisely advised economy in expenditure as a step which would win adherence of the people to the new policy of reform.[7] Jung Lu's valedictory memorial in 1903 declared that the essential reforms were a better method of selecting those officials who came in close contact with the people and an improved system of levying and collecting taxes.[8]

Few documents can have merited more serious consideration from Tzu Hsi than those last words of her most faithful henchman; yet to slay the hydra-headed monster of corruption was too hazardous an undertaking. Yuan Shih-kai attempted a practical solution of the financial riddle by the imposition of a stamp tax, a method by which honest returns could be secured; but the scheme was vetoed in 1903, probably because it threatened that blessed elasticity of the taxation system, so dear to the hearts of most office-holders.[9] Sir Robert Hart, the foreigner who possessed the most intimate knowledge of China's problems, evolved a scheme for an additional land tax which would bring in a revenue of 400,000,000 taels to finance reform. However excellent economically the plan might have been, it was not "practical politics," as the comments it occasioned soon showed.[10] To levy new impositions would be, for the Manchus, suicide. If they were to reform the nation, they must do it without cost. The only tangible result of the Throne's realization of the need for economy was the abolition of a few sinecure posts.[11]

So matters dragged on; the reform of the finances, that fundamental step on which the ultimate success of all the other reforms depended, was neglected because the government dared not attempt it. At last, in 1909, regulations for a revised financial program were approved by the Throne, in an edict ordering the elimination of abuses and the preparation of a budget. The regulations, confused and incomplete as they were, made an effort to distinguish between national and local charges, and to provide for provincial and national budgets of expenses and revenue.[12] Later the control of all financial transactions, whether imperial or provincial, was put into the hands of the Minister of Finance, assisted by representatives throughout the Empire, a belated attempt at that centralization which was so essential to the success of the reform movement and so difficult to achieve without producing fatal opposition.[13] Within the provinces them-

[7] *United States Consular Reports,* January 1902, p. 31.

[8] Bland and Backhouse, *China under the Empress Dowager,* pp. 441–442.

[9] *The Times,* April 13, 1903.

[10] *Ibid.,* April 14, 26, 1904; for the text of this scheme, see *Far Eastern Review,* April 1915.

[11] *The Times,* September 15, 1904.

[12] *China Year Book, 1912,* p. 365; *The Times,* January 17, 1910.

[13] *NCH,* January 6, 1911.

selves the provincial treasurers were to unite in their persons t e control of all phases of provincial finance, a provision which meant alm st certain conflict between the national financial agents and the provincial officials.[14]

Needless to say, the new policy was unpopular with the provincial authorities, and although the first set of provincial budgets was submitted on time, every one showed a deficit, whether from necessity o from intention.[15] The imperial budget was submitted to the first sess n of the National Assembly, which met from October 1910 to January 911, and by some species of high finance that body, after examining 3,2) pamphlets, discovered enough aditional revenue, in theory at least, to ransform a deficit of 3,600,000 taels to a surplus of 3,!00,000.[16] The es imates in 1911 were even more discouraging, the provinces submitting defi its almost without exception and the Peking boards alone facing a sl rtage of 21,969,282 taels.[17] There is little use of giving more detailed co sideration to these figures; their seeming accuracy was as illusory as that all "statistics" on affairs Chinese. Moreover, the preparation of budge estimates did not mean that they received the slightest attention from the local officials.[18] Even the higher provincial officials openly protested their opposition to economy, especially in the field of official salaries, declaring th the scale set by the National Assembly (Viceroys, by it, were to receive fr m 20,000 to 24,000 taels) was too low and that by involving its servants financial difficulties (!) the Throne ran the risk of losing the ablest f them.[19] What hope was there for more than paper retrenchment? All t at we can say in summary of financial reform in the last years of the M anchus is that though no reform was more necessary, none achieved less uccess.

Closely allied to the question of finances was the problem of th currency. China was far from possessing any simple and uniform coinag . Copper cash, of insignificant individual value and often used in string , was the medium of exchange of the common people. Chang Chih-tung l d opened at Canton and Hankow provincial mints to produce silver d llars and fractional coins to rival the Spanish and Mexican dollars in co mon use. By the end of 1898 ten provincial mints were busy adding to the monetary confusion. Silver *sycee,* i.e., in bars, was also employed. For aper currency there were the notes of bankers and money changers, curr nt locally. To crown this chaos, large transactions were reckoned in taels, a uncoined unit of value, which moreover possessed several different for s. There were the Kuping or treasury tael; the Hailwan or customs tael; the Shanghai tael, used in international trade; and various other ocal taels,

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[14] *Ibid.,* May 29, 1909. [15] *NCH,* January 6, 1911.

[16] *Ibid.,* January 13, 1911; for the budget, see *China Year Book, 1912* p. 265.

[17] *China Year Book, 1912,* pp. 266–271.

[18] *NCH,* April 8, 1911. [19] *NCH,* January 6, March 17, 1911.

each differing from the other in value. No fixed ratio subsisted among these various species of currency, and China was a money-changers' paradise. The possibility of turning a penny or two in exchange manipulations was also welcomed by the rank and file of officials. Here was another case where powerful vested interests would block the way to reform.[20]

The necessity for some better ordering of the currency was obvious. In the flare of reform enthusiasm which followed the Sino-Japanese War, Sheng Hsuan-huai (Sheng Kung-pao, as he was later known) formulated a system for the unification of the currency and the setting up of a national bank, but it was not put into effect. In 1901 the government ordered the closing of all of the provincial mints except those of Wuchang and Canton, and declared that henceforth 30 per cent of the contributions due from the provinces to the central government should be paid in the dollars of these two establishments. The order was calmly disregarded by the eight condemned mints, which went about their business as usual. In 1902 the government, reversing the policy of the year before, gave permission to the provinces along the Yangtze and on the seaboard to coin copper to make up the noticeable lack of cash.[21] These coins promptly depreciated, thus adding to the already chaotic state of the currency.

In 1902 and 1903 China found herself in sad straits financially. She was in effect a silver-standard country, and these were the years when silver was in a decline in value in relation to gold. Not only was China's trade at a great disadvantage; during the years from 1895 on she owed large sums for annual interest payments on indemnities and loans, most of which had to be made on a gold basis. On January 22, 1903, a joint memorandum was presented to the American government, by the governments of China and Mexico, both silver-standard countries suffering from the drop of that metal. The memorandum, a cogent document, pointed out that the situation threatened serious injury to silver-using countries and would cripple them as markets for the products of the gold-standard nations, which would thus also be adversely affected. If the great gold-using powers would co-operate with those where silver was standard in formulating a definite relation between the two, China, for example, could continue to employ a silver standard and yet remain a consumer of foreign goods.[22]

Soon after the presentation of this proposal, the ever-present Prince Ching was chosen to set a monetary standard for the whole country and

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[20] For discussions of currency in China see Morse, chapter v; Wagel, *Chinese Currency and Banking;* Wei, *The Currency Problem in China,* pp. 290–311; United States Senate Document No. 128, 58th Congress, 3d Session, *Report on the Introduction of the Gold-Exchange Standard into China* (hereafter referred to as *Gold Standard Report),* pp. 210–282.

[21] Wei, *op. cit.,* 312–316.

[22] *Gold Standard Report,* pp. 75–78.

open a mint at Peking to turn out the new coins decided upon.[23] Nothing much was to be hoped for from this move. The arrival of Professor Jenks of Cornell University, as representative of the United States, to investigate currency conditions in China and to recommend a feasible plan for bringing order out of the currency chaos, was the first sign of real reform in this direction. Jenks, who traveled through China to observe conditions and gather opinion, found a substantial body of sentiment in support of the introduction of a new and better-ordered system.[24] Nevertheless, difficulties stood in the way of a change. The Chinese people were accustomed to a currency of varying value and dependent on a standard unit which was to be weighed rather than counted. Reform would require a complete change in their habits. A uniform system would also necessitate a more centralized and immediate control over the provincial authorities than Jenks was inclined to believe was possible. There were sure to be objections from the bankers and officials, classes who turned a neat profit from exchange manipulations. The new system, to succeed, must meet with the approval of the foreign powers and of foreign business men, and in consequence they were consulted before the formulation of the plan which Jenks put forward.

By his support of a gold-exchange standard, Jenks opened a controversy between the advocates of the silver and the gold basis for China which continued for years. It may be well to summarize here the chief arguments employed by those on each side. One writer has briefly classified the pleas of the silver advocates under four headings: (1) that the declining value of silver in terms of gold would benefit China's foreign trade by stimulating exports; (2) that China possessed no supply of gold with which to initiate a gold system and would have to start the new policy by the assumption of another foreign loan; (3) that even if she did obtain a stock of gold the inexorable laws of economics would rob her of it, for as long as her balance of trade was "unfavorable" the gold would be exported; and (4) that the life of the people of the Empire was based on a silver standard, with copper cash as the ordinary coin in use, and the substitution of gold would work great hardship.[25] Jenks and his followers pointed out that to set the new coins on a parity with gold at once would give Chinese finances a stability which would greatly encourage commerce. The gold basis would encourage foreign investment, and thus benefit many by giving

[23] *The Times,* April 23, 1903.

[24] To spread the American plan among the Chinese Jenks prepared two pamphlets which were translated into Chinese by E. T. Williams and S. K. Sze. The summaries of Jenks's plan given here are drawn largely from these, which are found in *Gold Standard Report,* pp. 80–176.

[25] Wang, "The New Chinese Currency," in *North American Review,* June 1911.

employment on railways, etc., and would save the government from loss in its revenues, which, it was estimated, had declined in effective value 50 per cent since 1882. A widely discussed compromise scheme which received the support of Russia and Great Britain was that temporarily China should operate on a silver basis, eventually changing to gold,[26] but Jenks himself and the majority of the nations and individuals consulted preferred the immediate inauguration of a gold-exchange plan as obviating the danger of speculation and giving at once the benefits of a thoroughgoing reorganization.

Whatever the rights and wrongs of the controversy, the plan which Jenks submitted was carefully organized and supported by international interests. It called for a direct control by the central government of all the provincial mints and the issue of a uniform imperial coinage, eventually to be made legal tender for all debts. These coins were to be on a decimal relationship to each other with a gold unit as the standard. This unit was to be coined in small quantities if at all, but was to serve as a standard for the whole system, various devices being recommended to keep the lesser coins up to par. China was to acquire enough of a gold reserve to maintain the new coins at a fixed gold value, but was not necessarily to put much gold in circulation. The surplus was to be obtained by a loan, by the seigniorage which would accrue to the government from the coinage of the new currency, or through the agreement of the powers to accept China's payments of her international obligations for the time being on a silver basis. A national bank was to be set up, and a number of subordinate treasury agencies. China was strongly urged to employ as advisers foreigners trained in the problems of finance and currency. The plan was to be tried first in treaty ports and large cities, or in Chihli Province alone. To mollify the bankers, their employment as government agents to change the multitudinous coins of the old order for the new standardized ones was proposed.

This plan was never put into effect as a whole, although in time certain of its provisions were adopted. Indeed, in no matter did the government show itself so vacillating as in that of currency reform. The dissensions between the advocates of gold and of silver, the conflicts between the supporters of the tael and of the *yuan* (dollar) as standard coins, and the rather technical nature of the whole problem prevented any consistent and determined action. The scheme proposed by Jenks failed of acceptance largely through the opposition of Chang Chih-tung, who submitted a vigorous memorial opposing the gold standard on the ground that China was in effect a copper-using country and that a coinage on a gold basis would be in contravention of all the habits of the nation. He advocated,

[26] *Gold Standard Report*, pp. 103–104.

instead, the adoption of the tael as the standard coin and, with the approval of the imperial government, began experiments in the minting of silver coins of that denomination at Wuchang.[27] An enthusiastic but poorly conceived memorial from Hu Wei-te, Chinese minister to Russia,[28] emphasizing the imperative need of obtaining a gold reserve, next influenced the government, which endeavored to achieve that end by a scheme which indicated only too well the barriers which stood in the way of all real reform of finances and currency; the desired gold was to be secured by requiring all who wished to purchase restoration of lost rank or to be advanced on the list of expectant officials to make one-half of the necessary payments in gold. At about the same time a national bank was decreed, and construction work was started on a mint at Tientsin to turn out new coins.[29]

In 1905 the gold-standard scheme was thrown over in favor of a plan representing the ideas of Chang Chih-tung and Yuan Shih-kai, both believers in the silver basis.[30] It was evidently intended to fulfill the stipulations in the commercial treaties of 1902 and 1903 that China was to set up a uniform system of currency. By it gold was to be the nominal standard, but its introduction was postponed until silver coins were effectively in circulation, so that in fact silver was to be the working basis, with the Kuping tael, selected at the instance of Chang Chih-tung and Yuan Shih-kai, as the standard of value. One central mint and four subsidiary mints were to turn out these silver coins, but the provincial mints were to be allowed to go on making copper coins, provided that their quantity was regulated carefully to meet the demand for them. When a sufficient number of new silver coins were in use an equal amount of paper money was to be put in circulation, but the edicts were very vague as to security for this issue. Until it was possible to replace all other coins by the new series, the very assorted coinage in use was to remain current side by side with the new issue, so that confusion promised to be even greater than before. Such a scheme was not likely to inspire and did not inspire the confidence of the foreign powers.

This plan also was never put into effect. Three years later the government decided to set up a silver basis and put into circulation the Kuping tael and subsidiary coins.[31] However, before anything more than the promulgation of edicts could be accomplished, money was necessary, and

[27] Wagel, *Chinese Currency and Banking,* pp. 102–106.

[28] For its text see *Gold Standard Report,* pp. 190–200.

[29] *Gold Standard Report,* pp. 201–203.

[30] This system, as embodied in a set of edicts and regulations, will be found in *United States Foreign Relations, 1905,* pp. 186–197.

[31] *NCH,* October 10, 1908.

in 1908 Tang Shao-yi was sent to the United States ostensibly to thank that country for the remission of the Boxer indemnity but really to discuss the question of a loan for currency reform, industrial development, and support of the administration when *likin* was abolished, an act to which China had pledged herself in the 1902 and 1903 commercial treaties. The fall of Yuan Shih-kai early in 1909 and the subsequent weakening of Tang's mandate from the administration brought the discussions to a close.[32]

In May 1910 the Peking government produced yet another currency reform plan,[33] this time retaining the silver standard but rejecting the tael in favor of the *yuan* or dollar, with lesser coins bearing a decimal ratio to the yuan. The amount of subsidiary coins was to be limited, to prevent depreciation. Officials were instructed to receive these coins in payment of all taxes; indeed, when enough of the new coins were struck they alone were to be acceptable in payment of all sorts of government dues. There was to be a national bank with control of the issuing and redemption of paper money against a 50 per cent cash reserve, and a Bureau of Printing and Engraving to print the new paper currency. All firms wishing to conduct a banking business were to get permission before starting operations and to submit thereafter semiannual statements to the Ministry of Finance.

The real object of this scheme was to impress the powers with China's sincere desire for currency reform, to the end that the desired loan might be more readily forthcoming. The question of currency reform had wider implications than the mere regularizing of the moneys in use in China. The powers looked on it as a necessary preliminary to the grant to China of tariff autonomy. When the United States government was again approached on the subject of a loan, it advised the Chinese government to engage a foreign expert to supervise the new currency system, as the best way of reassuring the powers. On August 17, 1910, the State Department was informed that China was eager to secure a loan for currency reform and that she would be willing to employ an American adviser. Soon after, the proposed currency loan was fused with the projected loan for the development of Manchuria, and the Chinese government suggested that American financiers float a loan of $50,000,000 for these two purposes. The American bankers desired to associate with them European financial interests, but the Chinese government did not seem disposed to agree. It was pointed out that by including other powers in the loan China would be far more likely to win their support to an eventual abolition of the

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[32] Straight, "China's Loan Negotiations" in Blakeslee, *Recent Developments in China*, pp. 126–127.

[33] *China Year Book, 1912*, pp. 277–288.

conventional tariff, and in February 1911 the Chinese government agreed that the loan should be a four-power affair, and that it should engage an American adviser in currency affairs, and the contract was signed April 15, 1911.[34] An additional $10,000,000 was also secured from Japanese bankers for the same uses. The official in charge of the disposal of these funds for currency reform was Sheng Kung-pao, the same official who pushed the policy of railway centralization. In May he was busy formulating still another set of regulations for the currency.[35] But not much time was vouchsafed him in which to apply them, for the revolution soon broke and before many months the Manchus no longer ruled in Peking. The long and agitated discussions of the currency had been productive of much sound and no substance.

This omnibus chapter must further contain a short discussion of the attempted remodeling of China's judicial and legal system. The motive impelling this reform was a desire for the abolition of extraterritoriality. However, as China adopted certain phases of Western civilization, she found her legal equipment inadequate to deal with the problems which they raised. In her desire to revise her laws so as to meet the standards of the Western powers China was heartened by the commercial treaties of 1902 and 1903, in which Great Britain, the United States, and Japan promised to relinquish their extraterritorial rights "when the state of Chinese laws, the arrangement for their administration, and other considerations" warranted such action.[36]

The first step toward the renovation of the Chinese codes of law was taken even before the signature of the commercial treaty with Great Britain. On March 11, 1902, an imperial edict called on Chinese diplomatic representatives abroad to send back to China works on the laws of foreign powers regarding mines, railways, and commerce, whereupon Chang Chih-tung, Liu Kun-yi, and Yuan Shih-kai would select men versed in Chinese and foreign law to translate these laws and select such of them as suited Chinese conditions.[37] The fruit of this edict was the compilation by Prince Tsai Chen, Yuan Shih-kai, and Wu Ting-fang, who had received his legal training in England, of a draft code concerning merchants and company law. This work, which showed very definitely the influence of English commercial law, was approved by the Throne and became part of Chinese law.[38] Draft regulations as to mining, approved in 1904, met

[34] *United States Foreign Relations, 1912*, pp. 88 ff.

[35] *NCH*, May 13, 1911.

[36] MacMurray, *Treaties and Agreements with and concerning China*, No. 1902/7, 1903/4, 1903/5.

[37] *NCH*, April 2, 1902.

[38] Wang, "Law Reform in China" in *Chinese Social and Political Science Review*, June 1917.

the sharp opposition of the United States and Great Britain, who insisted that they were in contravention of the 1902 and 1903 treaties in that they would tend to discourage rather than attract foreign capital. They were not put into effect.[39] Similarly, the regulations for trademarks issued in 1904 were withdrawn owing to the objections of the powers.[40]

In the meantime Wu Ting-fang and Shen Chia-pen, a noted student of Chinese law, were at work upon a revision of the criminal code. The old system of justice was full of abuses. Few cared to go to law, even in civil concerns, for fear of falling into the hands of the extortionate *yamen* runners. Prisons, which were wretched places, were used for the detention not only of the accused but of witnesses, prison sentences as a punishment not being customary. The use of torture to obtain testimony was an evil which the Throne had often denounced but without much effect. From the Western standpoint at least, the punishments imposed were unduly hard and savored of barbarism. In the case of certain serious crimes rigorous punishments were visited on the relatives of the accused and the family's property was confiscated. There was no lawyer class and the work of court advocate was done by the law-secretary of the court. As we have noted before, not until the government took the reform of the official system in hand were there signs of a separate judiciary. Until that time, the magistrate, among his multifarious duties, had numbered that of acting as judge.

The commissioners began their reform of the criminal law by proposing the mitigation of the rigorous punishments prescribed by the old system, and on April 24, 1905, the Throne sanctioned their suggestions, declaring that on investigation it was apparent that these punishments were "not in harmony with the original intention of the Imperial House to temper justice with mercy."[41] Henceforth the most severe form of punishment was to be immediate decapitation; dismemberment ("slicing") and decapitation, with subsequent exposure of the head and the beheading of the corpse (in case the criminal should die before the date of execution) were to be abandoned. For cases where immediate decapitation had been the penalty, immediate strangling was henceforth to be employed. For the next grade of offenses the punishment had been immediate strangling or decapitation after the autumn assize, the latter implying an opportunity to have the case reviewed by the Board of Punishments. For these, strangling after the autumn assize was to be substituted. Branding as a punishment for accessories to crime was abolished. Wu and Shen had

[39] For the dispute over the draft mining regulations, see *United States Foreign Relations, 1904,* pp. 150–167; *ibid., 1905,* pp. 234–238; *ibid., 1906,* Part I, pp. 261–273.

[40] *Ibid., 1906,* Part I, p. 260.

[41] *United States Foreign Relations, 1905,* pp. 176–178.

also asked that torture to secure evidence be forbidden, that the system of whipping with the light and heavy bamboo be reformed, that jails be inspected, and that prisoners be given more considerate treatment. These requests received the imperial approval. Other changes which were promised were the establishment of a school of law in each province and the abolition of the practice of punishing the relatives of the criminal.

In 1906 the commissioners on legal reform received a severe setback with the rejection of the draft code of criminal procedure. The radical nature of the changes advocated was well shown in a memorial announcing the completion of this document.[42] In it the usual effort was made to claim tradition as ally by declaring that the new rules for court procedure were based on those of the Tang and Ming dynasties, but no amount of pious appeal to antiquity could disguise the novel character of the chief proposals, the use of juries and of lawyers. The jury was likened to the custom under the Chou dynasty of taking the opinion of the people, and was also recommended on the ground that a jury would be less open to bribery than a single man, a revealing argument. The jurors were to be drawn from the gentry and the literati; should a district possess none qualified to serve, the use of jury trial was to be postponed until education had made more headway there. Wu and Shen pointed out that in treaty ports foreign lawyers had been allowed to practice and even Chinese officials had employed them, and urged that every effort be made in the provincial law schools to develop Chinese lawyers competent to plead cases. This recommendation was in line with the whole intent of the plan, which, as the memorialists stated, was to facilitate the abolition of extraterritoriality.

Whether this promiscuous borrowing from the legal systems of the West could have produced good results in China at that time is doubtful. The government, motivated by conservatism, nevertheless adopted what was perhaps the wisest course in rejecting the draft code. Wu Ting-fang, greatly chagrined, withdrew from public life for the time being, and although he later accepted the post of minister to the United States it is probable that his revolutionary activity in 1911 was due in part to his resentment against the dynasty for its rejection of his pet proposals.[43]

Shen Chia-pen remained at his post, and under his direction during the next few years laws as to bankruptcy, mining, the press, associations, nationality, police offenses, and transportation were drawn up. In addition, regulations for a whole new system of courts were approved, and a criminal code was compiled which was later retained in effect under the Republic. Many of these enactments showed a trend away from the

[42] *United States Foreign Relations, 1906,* Part I, pp. 345-348.

[43] Bland, *Recent Events and Present Policies in China,* p. 213.

imitation of British legal institutions and toward the copying of those of Japan and continental Europe. As Wang Chung-hui, chairman of the codification commission under the Republic, stated:

> Anglo-American law emphasizes the individual as against the family, while the Continental system inherits something of the old Roman *familia.* The unit of Chinese society being the family, reform naturally seeks to preserve this institution and to modernize it as far as possible after the Continental idea. Another reason why China turns from English jurisprudence is the prevalence of case law. To imitate a law, developed by judicial interpretation is difficult, if not impracticable.[44]

The ascendant influence of Japanese law, which reflected that of continental Europe, was due also to the presence in China of the large body of students who had studied in Japan.

The new system of courts was sanctioned in 1907, its chief importance being the final separation of judicial functions from the others pertaining to government and their unification in the hands of an independent judiciary. The plan provided for four grades of courts: A high court of justice (*Taliyuan*) in Peking was to be the supreme court of appeal for the Empire, competent to deal with all serious political offenses; this court comprised four criminal courts and two civil courts, each to deal with a special type of case, including those regarding imperial clansmen. Each province was to have a high court to decide in first instance important civil and criminal cases and to hear appeals from the district courts. Each district was to have a court, and throughout the Empire in smaller units were to be courts of first instance. Regulations for these courts were also approved, their most interesting feature being the adoption of a system of procurators, or prosecuting attorneys.[45]

The last action taken in regard to legal reform under the Manchus was the submission to the National Assembly in 1910 of the draft criminal code, which it passed, section by section, until its session came to an end before the work of approving the code was completed. Early in 1911 the code as a whole was promulgated, it being one of the reforms scheduled for the Chinese year ending January 29, 1911.[46] The criminal code was based to a great extent upon Japanese law, with due regard for Chinese customs. When the Manchus were overthrown and China became a republic under Yuan Shih-kai, it was retained in force, with the elimination of articles concerning the royal family.[47] Certain principles

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[44] Wang, "Legal Reform in China," in *Chinese Social and Political Science Review,* June 1917.

[45] *China Year Book, 1912,* pp. 325–344. [46] *NCH,* February 3, 1911.

[47] For the text of the criminal code as enforced under the Republic, see *The Provisional Criminal Code of the Republic of China,* translated by T. T. Yuen and Tachuen S. K. Loh.

embodied in it represented radical changes from the old legal usages.[48] No act was to be an offense unless so designated by the laws, so that no longer, as under the old system, could the judge decide on his own discretion whether a given act was or was not criminal. New offenses were added to the old, and the offenses were more minutely classified. Punishments were much changed and lightened, and the characteristic Chinese doctrine of "mutual responsibility" was abandoned.

Under the Manchus the attempted reforms in the judicial system were not an unqualified success in practice. The use of torture continued, and when new courts were set up, they tended to take over the abuses of the old, while adding to the expense of the already overburdened government. One of the most promising phases of this reform was the amelioration of prison conditions, a change which was earnestly supported by the government, as the sending of delegates to the International Prison Conference in Washington in 1910 showed.[49] Reports from travelers contained references to an occasional modern and well-kept prison, and in one district in Shantung prisoners were put to work repairing government buildings or were taught trades and given work on the prison farm.[50] The cause of law and order was also promoted by the establishment here and there of police forces on the Western model. Peking was the first city to enjoy a modern police force, which was formed there under the direction of Na Tung, assisted by Japanese.[51] Manchuria, and particularly Mukden, later acquired a police force which was especially praised for its efficiency in suppressing bandits. It was drilled by Japanese and was one of the many innovations in Manchuria fostered by Hsu Shih-chang and Tang Shao-yi.[52] Other cities followed suit. The police were not an unmixed blessing in all places where they made their appearance, for they developed the usual official trait of a desire for "squeeze" and levied private exactions on householders before they would give protection.[53]

The elimination of the distinction between Manchus and Chinese was a politico-social measure to which considerable attention was paid in theory but little in practice. The privileged position of the Manchus was

[48] These distinctions between the old law and the new are drawn from Lo, "The Administration of Criminal Justice in China," in *Chinese Social and Political Science Review,* July 1916.

[49] Wang, "Legal Reform in China," in *Chinese Social and Political Science Review,* June 1917; *NCH,* January 2, 1909.

[50] *United States Consular Reports,* April 1908, pp. 215.

[51] *NCH,* August 11, 1905.

[52] *United States Consular Reports,* December 1907, p. 36; *The Times,* December 17, 1910.

[53] Rodes, *Le Céleste empire avant la révolution,* p. 67.

a constant source of irritation to the Chinese and thus of danger to the dynasty. The rank and file of the Manchus were pensioned by the state as hereditary fighting men, though for that purpose they were practically useless. The plums of office in the higher ranks were equally divided between Chinese and Manchus, despite the great numerical inferiority of the latter. The Empress Dowager, once she had embarked on a program of reform, was wise enough to realize that obliteration of the line between Chinese and Manchus was one of the steps most essential to the continued peace and stability of the Empire. Accordingly she soon issued an edict removing the prohibition on intermarriage between the two races.[54] Memorials continued to come in urging the removal of all distinctions between the Chinese and the Manchus, and in 1905 an edict proclaimed Tzu Hsi's intention to act according to this policy, as an earnest of which she had appointed a number of Chinese to posts which had formerly been held by Manchus.[55] In the 1906 edict on the reform of the official system this pledge was reiterated, but in the reallotment of posts which followed not much was done to carry it out in practice.[56] Manchus continued to occupy many of the most strategic or decorative posts at the capital and in the provinces, but it must be recalled that the great advisers to whom Tzu Hsi turned for counsel on all the important concerns of state were the Chinese viceroys, Chang Chih-tung and Yuan Shih-kai. Under the Regent it was not so; real power passed to a crowd of incompetent princelings and the wary but corrupt Prince Ching.

The abolition of race discrimination also involved an alteration in the position of the Manchu "bannermen," who lived in encampments throughout the country, subsisting on a government dole. Increasing anti-dynastic activity was manifest in the attempt to kill the traveling commissioners in 1905 and the murder of several officials, and the Throne, to allay this agitation, called for memorials as to the best way of amalgamating Chinese and Manchus. A number were submitted, the most notable being that of the liberal Manchu, Tuan Fang, who recommended that both races should be equally subject to local laws, that no special preference be shown Manchus in official appointments, that the banner corps should be gradually abolished and their pensions commuted, and that the imperial domain in Manchuria should be thrown open to settlement.[57] These suggestions were accepted in substance in the imperial edict of September 27, 1907, which commented on the indolence and uselessness of the Manchu garrisons and ordered that the lands formerly used by the garrison as a

[54] See above, p. 62.

[55] *NCH*, August 18, December 8, 1905.

[56] See above, p. 106.

[57] *United States Foreign Relations, 1907*, Part I, pp. 192–193.

whole be apportioned in individual lots. When a bannerman had received his share of land his pension was to cease and the money formerly used for that purpose was to be devoted to the founding of educational and industrial institutions for the Manchus and to giving them a start as farmers. The Throne's declared intention was the complete leveling of all barriers between Manchus and Chinese, who henceforth were to stand on an equality before the law.[58] This decree was reinforced by another ordering the preparation of a set of social rules and of regulations for punishment to apply to both races.[59] The chief result of this latter command, as far as the writer has been able to ascertain, was an order lengthening the Manchu period of mourning to twenty-seven months, the customary Chinese period. This change was not without its importance, as formerly bereaved Manchus had held the advantage of being able to return to active service far sooner than could Chinese.[60] Unfortunately this "reform" was in the wrong direction; a more sensible but very ticklish step would have been to shorten the Chinese term of mourning to conform with the Manchu.

The Regent, Prince Chun, was most unwise in his open preference for men of his own race. No edict is more symptomatic of the real significance of the passing of power from Tzu Hsi to Prince Chun than that of December 6, 1908, in which the apprehensive Manchus were soothed by the assurance that no one meant to take from them their pensions, for the present at least, and that the only object of the reorganization of the banner corps was to teach their members some useful trades.[61] In short, the Regent had no intention of pushing the change inaugurated by his predecessor. Thus collapsed a reform which, if faithfully carried out, would have done more than perhaps any other to win for the Throne a general belief in its good faith.

Another important social reform was the abolition of slavery, which was effected in part by the edict issued in 1910. By it the slaves of Chinese, persons who had been sold into slavery by their parents or the descendants of such persons, were set free. The serfs and retainers of the Manchus were not freed from the obligation of cultivating the soil, however. The edict forbade the sale and purchase of maidservants or concubines. Servants were to be hired, while men were to be allowed to have more than one wife only by secondary marriage. Parents were still allowed to lease out their children for a term of years. This proviso was made necessary by the prevalence of famine, a condition which had so often led in the past to the sale of superfluous children in order to save the remainder of the family from starvation.[62]

[58] *Ibid.*, pp. 194–195.
[59] *Ibid.*, p. 197.
[60] *NCH*, October 18, 1907.
[61] *Ibid.*, January 2, 1909.
[62] *Ibid.*, March 25, 1910; Williams, *China, Yesterday and Today*, pp. 457–458.

The edict against slavery admitted that concubinage had disappeared elsewhere in the civilized world. There was another custom which seemed the product of a barbarous age, that of foot-binding. The custom was a most difficult one to suppress, for it had become a sign of race (the Manchu women did not bind their feet) and a species of insurance that a daughter would marry, the prevailing theory being that tiny feet were a great adornment and that no self-respecting young man would marry a girl whose feet were of normal size. As in the case of the campaign for education for women, the credit for the inception of the anti-foot-binding movement belongs not to the government but to the missionaries. As the number of schools for girls increased and they refused to receive as students those whose feet were bound, the custom received a check; but the deathblow came when a growing number of Chinese men took up the campaign and societies were formed, the members of which pledged themselves not to marry girls whose feet were bound. By 1906, the anti-foot-binding society, in which such Westerners as Mrs. Archibald Little had been leaders, was transferred to the hands of the Chinese themselves, so rapid had progress been.[63]

If bound feet were a sign of race imposed by the Chinese upon the women of their own race, the queue was another such sign imposed upon Chinese men at the order of the conquering Manchus. The traditional Occidental conception of China was that of a country where women hobbled about on distorted feet and men wore dangling from their heads long "pig-tails"; but as China came in contact with the West the Chinese themselves became critical of these customs, and especially of the latter, which appeared to them a badge of servitude. As a spirit of nationalism, with its inevitable concomitant of anti-dynastic feeling, arose, the queue came in for more and more criticism, and among those who denounced it were Manchus as well as Chinese. The first vigorous advocate of its removal was Wu Ting-fang, who in 1902 while serving as minister to the United States reported to the Waiwupu that Chinese students in the United States were dispensing with the queue and with native dress. The Waiwupu, while willing to admit the change of dress, insisted that the queue should be retained.[64] The Manchu, Duke Tsai Tse, on his return from a trip abroad as head of one wing of the commission to investigate constitutional government, also urged the abandonment of the queue and the national costume, as usages unsuited to the energetic life necessary in the modern world.[65] During his second term at Washington, Wu Ting-fang again pressed the question, though suggesting that the people follow the example of the Japanese in retaining their national dress. This

[63] *NCH*, August 10, 1906.
[64] *Ibid.*, July 9, 1902.
[65] *Ibid.*, August 31, 1906.

suggestion was supported by Prince Tsai Tao, another Manchu, who, having had a trip to Europe, like Tsai Tse returned convinced of the advisability of doing away with the queue.[66] The National Assembly took up the question during its first session, and passed a motion for the abandonment of the queue. The Throne, however, disapproved, and declared, ostensibly to calm the agitated commercial classes in Peking, that no change in the form of dress or in the wearing of the queue was contemplated for the present except among the members of the military, naval, and police forces.[67] In these cases it was largely the fact that the queue was ludicrous and inconvenient beneath a Western military cap that led to its abandonment. The officers of Yuan's model army had early protested against it.[68] A later decree allowed members of the Chinese diplomatic service to cut their hair in the Occidental style.[69] When the Revolution broke out, the Throne had not yet consented to a general abandonment of the pig-tail, and one of the first and distinguishing actions of those who espoused the republican cause was the removal of this symbol of the Manchu conquest. The National Assembly in its second session again advocated the cutting of the queue, and this time the Throne consented; but the decree did little or nothing to placate the opponents of the dynasty.[70]

An attempt was made to bring order out of the confusion which reigned as to weights and measures, a chaos reminiscent of that which existed in regard to the currency. The Japanese treaty of 1903 had provided that the provincial authorities should investigate existing conditions and recommend standards to be adopted by the Throne and enforced first in places open to foreign trade and then elsewhere.[71] Imperial standards were in existence but were used only in certain official concerns. In all ordinary matters the weights and measures used were those of the locality in question, a state of affairs which produced many annoying inconveniences. In September 1908 the imperial government at last presented its plan, which proposed the retention of the old Chinese standards, which were decimal in nature, plus certain necessary additions from the West. The scheme finally adopted provided for a gradual spread of the use of these new standards over a period of ten years.[72]

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[66] *Ibid.*, August 5, September 30, 1910.

[67] Williams, *op. cit.*, pp. 478–479; *NCH*, December 23, 1910.

[68] Eliot, *Letters from the Far East*, p. 107.

[69] Wang, "The Abolition of the Queue" in *Atlantic Monthly*, June 1911.

[70] *Japan Weekly Mail*, November 25, December 9, 16, 1911.

[71] MacMurray, *op. cit.*, No. 1903/4.

[72] *United States Consular Reports*, February 1909, pp. 210–211; *ibid.*, June 1909, pp. 206–207.

The many reforms and projected reforms of the last years of the Manchus could not but leave their mark. They were in part the cause, in part the result, of a profound mental change. Their more tangible effects were sufficiently obvious. New schools, a modern army, provincial assemblies, and a National Assembly made their appearance. A few Chinese cities became distinctly modernized in their more patent features, with the introduction of electric lights, paved streets, water works, police, better prisons, and even street-cleaning corps, so that travelers commented on the progress of the material benefits of Western civilization.[73] Another most powerful mechanical agency for transforming the country, one which was still in the early stages of introduction, despite years spent in discussion, was the railway, of which more will be said in connection with railway centralization. Symptomatic of the change in attitude was the project for a model city, Heungchow, the construction of which was undertaken by Chinese not far from Macao in 1909.[74] The next year the first national exposition ever witnessed in China took place at Nanking under governmental auspices.[75] It was to be hoped that as the leaven of reform spread the ideal to which not only the dynasty but many of the people aspired, a strong, unified, and enlightened China, would come steadily nearer. Such had been the imperial design; quite otherwise was the result obtained. In 1911 the reform movement under imperial auspices terminated in a great uprising which brought the Manchu rule to an end and started China on the path of chronic unrest which she was to follow for years to come. Why was it that "reform," instead of proving a solidifying force and welding the Empire into a centralized and peaceful whole, was a prelude to revolution? That is the fundamental question in regard to the post-Boxer reform and to it an answer will be attempted in the following chapters.

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[73] For examples, see a set of three articles on Canton, Peking, and Mukden in *Chinese Recorder,* July 1911, as well as Kendall, *A Wayfarer in China,* pp. 175–177, 208–211.

[74] *United States Consular Reports,* February 6, 1911 p. 491.

[75] *Ibid.,* March 1910, pp. 246–247; *NCH,* July 1, 1910.

"The Revolution of 1911 was a bourgeois affair. The revolution of the peasants has still to come. If their rulers continue to exploit them, or to permit them to be exploited, as remorselessly as hitherto, it is likely to be unpleasant. It will not, perhaps, be undeserved." R. H. Tawney, Land & Labour (1931), p. 74

IX. REFORM AND REVOLUTION

Ever since legendary times when Tang, the first recorded rebel in Chinese history, rose against the wicked representative of the Hsia dynasty, Chinese history had been punctuated by revolutions, resulting in the unseating of one dynasty and the enthronement of another. The outbreak of 1911 which terminated the rule of the Manchu house was in essence another of these periodic upheavals, the result of certain basic causes which from time to time have impelled the Chinese people to rise against their rulers. The contact with the West in the later years of the Manchu rule and the consequent acquaintance with governmental ideas other than those which had prevailed in China since time immemorial gave this particular rising a twist toward republicanism, for the leadership of the movement fell into the hands of a class of utopian thinkers determined to put into practice the theories and ideals of the West. But underneath all the talk of republicanism and parliaments lay the fundamental causes of this, as of other revolutions—over-population, natural disaster, official exactions, and a decadent dynasty.

The nation-wide observance of the Confucian doctrine of veneration of ancestors placed every Chinese under a solemn obligation to have progeny by whom the ancestral rites of the house could be carried on. As a result, China was called on to support a population which was excessive, considering the state of agriculture and the development of natural resources, and hordes of people eked out an existence perilously near the starvation point.[1] Famine and flood were endemic; lack of transportation facilities made it impossible to transport food to regions in need, and despite efforts all through Chinese history no effective means had ever been devised to check the disastrous floods, especially those of the Yellow River, which from time to time caused great misery. When, as in 1911, famine, flood, and plague appeared concurrently, there were sure to be thousands of people to whom life could not well look more discouraging and who would willingly follow anyone who promised them relief from their sufferings.

The Manchus had passed the zenith of their power. The nineteenth century had produced no emperor who was a worthy descendant of Kang Hsi or Chien Lung. The "Opium War"; the great Taiping Rebellion; the second European war and lesser conflicts with Occidentals in which China emerged the loser; the humiliating defeat at the hands of Japan; the "battle

[1] See Bland, *Recent Events and Present Policies in China,* chapter i. The discussion of the Revolution contained in this volume is a sharp criticism of the republican propaganda, but subsequent events have done much to justify its strictures.

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of concessions," which seemed the prelude to a partition of the Empire; and the Boxer uprising which had failed so miserably in its effort to drive the foreigners into the sea—all these events had served to associate the dynasty in the minds of most of its subjects with humiliation and failure. Anti-dynastic feeling was increased by the fact that the Manchus were descendants of an invading force which had conquered China and that, despite the futile and belated efforts of Tzu Hsi, they had retained their racial integrity and a privileged position in the body politic. The Japanese imperial house, in the troublous days of incipient reform which followed the opening of Japan to the West, was supported by a great wave of loyalty and patriotism. But as national feeling rose in China it was almost inevitably directed against the ruling house, on whose shoulders was laid the blame for China's manifest weakness. Too late, the Manchus realized that their rule was nearing its end, and made an effort to reform and strengthen their hold on their heritage. The Taiping Rebellion had sapped the real vitality of their administration, however, and they were too feeble to enforce the policy to which they committed themselves.

The chief barrier to the achievement of their liberal intentions was the official class, made up for the most part of Chinese, trained in the ancient classics, and with a confirmedly conservative outlook. Time-honored custom sanctioned the use of public office as a source of private profit to the holder, and when the Manchus demanded the institution of reform, the officials often made the required innovations an excuse for further exactions from the populace, until to the average observer the much-vaunted reform policy seemed simply a cloak for new extortion and parasitism. Had the Manchus possessed an efficient administrative machine capable of demonstrating the real benefits of reform, they might have postponed their fall; as it was, they confessed their weakness by their avoidance of the most necessary but most difficult reforms—the reshaping of the official system so that not only the form but the spirit should be altered, and the substitution for peculation and graft of a straightforward and accurate system for managing the national finances.

From 1860 until 1908 the real ruler of China was the Dowager Empress Tzu Hsi. Only her indomitable energy kept life in the dynasty after the Taiping Rebellion had brought it perilously near its end. Her regency was in general a period of decline, but had she not occupied the position of power that decline would have been more rapid and disastrous than it was. In the closing years of her life, she adopted a policy of modernization on Western lines, and by sheer force of character compelled a partial observance of her commands. On her death, the administration passed into the hands of a child Emperor, a well-intentioned but stupid Regent, and an intriguing Empress Dowager. With Tzu Hsi's strong hand removed,

there was little hope for the dynasty. As Bland has summed up the situation:

> . . . . if the Manchus have lost the Dragon Throne, it is not because they were tyrants and despots, but because they were inefficient, ignorant, and effete; because the tribute which they consumed, and the power and patronage which they exercised by tradition of sovereignty was coveted by a body of men better organized, more intelligent and more determined than themselves; because the advance of popular education, the work of the vernacular Press, and, above all, repeated foreign encroachments and invasions, had impressed upon the restless intelligence of the Cantonese the fact that the Manchus were no longer to be feared.[2]

Who were these men "better organized, more intelligent, and more determined" than the Manchus? They were the followers of the two political exiles, Kang Yu-wei and Sun Yat-sen. Kang, the more moderate of the two, had eventually found refuge in Japan, where his most eloquent disciple, Liang Chi-chao, was also in residence. Kang was never a republican, but advocated instead a constitutional régime with Kuang Hsu at its head. To promote the removal of the Empress Dowager and the restoration of the Emperor, he organized the "Pao Huang Tang" or Empire Reform Association. Liang, a brilliant journalist, aided materially in the spreading of Kang's propaganda.[3]

But the more influential and more radical group was that which formed about Sun Yat-sen.[4] Ever since his exile from China in 1895 after the ill-starred attempt to set up a republic at Canton, Sun had been gathering funds and support for a republican revolution against the Manchus, and the Chinese students who came to Japan proved most receptive to his propaganda. The halfway measures proposed by Kang had no such appeal for them as the out-and-out republicanism of Sun. A reading of Rousseau and Thomas Paine in translation produced the belief that "blood must flow before any improvement can come." Gradually the Chinese students in Japan formed a number of revolutionary secret societies, which, added to the many groups of an anti-dynastic character already in existence in China itself, made up a substantial and dangerous opposition to Manchu rule. The great work of Sun Yat-sen was the uniting of these various societies into one organization, the "Tung Meng Hui," or Alliance Society, thus

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[2] Bland, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

[3] Tsur, "Kang Yu-wei, the Great Reformer," in *National Review,* July 3, 1915; Thomson, "The Genesis of the Republican Revolution in China from a South China Standpoint" in Blakeslee, *Recent Developments in China,* p. 75. For an exposition by Kang himself of his political ideas, see Kang Yu-wei, "A Study of Constitutionalism" in *National Review,* August 30 to September 27, 1913.

[4] For an account of Sun Yat-sen's career, see Cantlie and Jones, *Sun Yat Sen and the Awakening of China,* and Linebarger, *Sun Yat Sen and the Chinese Republic.*

assuring co-operation and unity of effort.[5] The death of Kuang Hsu in 1908 robbed Kang Yu-wei's party of its object. Had the Regent been wise enough to pardon Kang and Liang as supporters of his brother, a considerable group of the disaffected might have been won back to the aid of the Manchus. But Prince Chun, with his usual lack of political acumen, failed to seize this opportunity, and the majority of Kang's followers passed into the camp of Sun Yat-sen, while the "Modern Sage" himself devoted his energies to the reform of Confucianism.[6]

The pronounced anti-dynastic propaganda in Japan was matched by a rising tide of opposition to the Manchus at home, part of it instigated by Sun Yat-sen's organization. The closing years of Manchu rule saw an ominous renaissance of secret societies. In the Boxer Rebellion, the animus of such groups was turned against the foreigners, but with the realization that it was impossible to drive the "barbarians" into the sea, the cry changed to "Down with the Manchus." From 1901 to 1911 newspapers were filled with accounts of risings and attempted risings, many of them definitely revolutionary in intention, others the result of such causes as famine or extortion, but all grist to the mill of Sun and his supporters. A new sense of nationalism, the result of sharp contact with foreign powers and Western ideas, was rapidly developing and, while professedly loyal, nevertheless might easily tend not only to the lessening of foreign influence in China but to the removal of the alien dynasty. The first outflaring of this new spirit was the boycott of 1905, stimulated without doubt by the victory of Oriental Japan over Occidental Russia. The occasion was the question of the renewal of the Sino-American immigration treaty of 1894, denounced by the Chinese minister in 1904 because of the treatment accorded to Chinese coming to the United States and especially to the Chinese exhibitors at the St. Louis Exposition.[7] Soon city after city in China had endorsed a movement to boycott all American goods until satisfactory arrangements for the treatment of Chinese by the United States should have been made.[8] Rockhill, the American Minister, asked the Waiwupu that action be taken to stop this agitation; but Prince Ching and his colleagues were half-hearted in their responses, and indeed a proclamation posted in the Chinese quarter in San Francisco containing a telegram from the Waiwupu indicated that the Chinese government was not opposed to the movement. Before long the boycott began to weaken,

[5] Reinsch, *Intellectual and Political Currents in the Far East,* pp. 170–173; Kent, *The Passing of the Manchus,* pp. 35–36; *China Year Book, 1913,* pp. 663–666.

[6] *The Times,* November 28, 1911; Tsur in *op. cit.*

[7] Coolidge, *Chinese Immigration,* pp. 281–299, 469.

[8] For documents regarding this incident see *United States Foreign Relations, 1905,* pp. 204 ff.

for the merchants had discovered that it was cutting into their profits; ıe Shanghai piece-goods dealers on August 23 asked Yuan Shih-kai to do ıll possible to prevent the spread of the movement to Chihli and to encour ge free trade so that they might sell the goods of American origin which tl ey already had on hand or had contracted for. What life remained in ıe boycott came from the hot-headed and nationalistic students.[9] Not ui il August 31, 1905, after the movement had all but spent itself, did n imperial edict denouncing it appear. A subsequent attempt to revive it ıt Canton was unsuccessful.

This incident gave a taste of the sweets of agitation to the politica y minded, most of them returned students or unsuccessful candidates r office, and thereafter the dynasty was heckled by an energetic, impetuo s, and impractical group of critics. The nationalistic and, as it proved, an - dynastic agitation was greatly aided by the development of the native pre s. The power which newspapers could exert soon dawned upon the minds f all those dissatisfied with the existing order, and a crop of papers appear l, first in the treaty ports, and later in other cities. These publications, as a whole, were excellent examples of yellow journalism, conspicuous for th r "explosive tones and hardly tempered language."[10] Few Chinese cou l read, but those who could told others and, in the process of telling ai l retelling, chauvinistic and importunate newspaper articles lost nothing f their inflammatory character. No longer could the debility of the Manch s be concealed from their subjects. The press spread every failure of the foreign and domestic policy from one end of the Empire to the other. Tl Throne realized the danger of this new development and attempted stamp out newspaper radicalism by the prosecution of offending editors, . celebrated case of this sort being that of the *Supao*, a Shanghai paper. However, since prosecution of Chinese papers published in foreign settl ments—and a large number of them were published there—tended to brin the Chinese government into conflict with the foreign authorities, it decide to employ regulation and government subsidy to curb the outspokenne of the press. In 1909 press laws were issued. One of their provisions re quired that all newspapers must submit their proofs to the authoritie before publication, but after violent opposition from the journalists i Peking this article was withdrawn.[12] By 1910 the Chinese newspaper

[9] *North-China Daily News,* August 17, 1905, quoted in *United States Forei Relations, 1905,* p. 219.

[10] *The China Mission Year Book, 1912,* p. 348. For other discussions of t Chinese press in this period see Colquhoun, *China in Transformation,* pp. 109 ff., ar *NCH,* August 11, 1905.

[11] For the *Supao* case, see the files of *The Times* from July 1, 1903, to May 2 1904.

[12] *NCH,* August 14, 21, 1909.

were notably quieter in tone, for the press was gradually passing under official control, one paper after another accepting a government subsidy rather than fight the regulations which required registration before the use of the mails would be allowed. This situation was thoroughly aired in connection with the case of the Shanghai taotai, Tsai Nai-huang, who was accused of using the funds of the Whangpu conservatory for the subsidizing of the press;[13] and after this scandal the newspapers again adopted a more independent tone.

The Manchus were in a bad plight. Despite their tentative efforts at reform, they were as weak in the face of internal unrest and foreign aggression as ever, and their decadent condition was better known to the rank and file of their subjects than before. Somehow the dynasty must gain a tighter hold over the administration and achieve a centralized control of the governmental machine, or its rule would be at an end. When a weak government tries to enforce a strong policy in the face of hysterical opposition, there is sure to be trouble, and that is what occurred when the Manchus attempted to bring into the hands of the central government the control of the railway system of the country.

In the years before the Revolution, "China for the Chinese" was a slogan which had its chief application to the problem of who was to build China's railways. Patriotism, the desire for profit and also, it is to be feared, for graft, guided the Chinese in a movement against the use of foreign capital or advice in railway ventures. Not only did they desire a minimizing of foreign interests; each province wished to go its own way in the matter without interference from the central government, perhaps because provincial profit would then line provincial pockets rather than those of the men higher up in Peking.

At first the central government was inclined to acquiesce in the movement for provincial autonomy in railway affairs. The American concession for the Canton-Hankow line having been withdrawn, the enterprise was turned over to a company in which Hunan gentry were the chief stockholders. The merchants and gentry of Anhwei were assured that they would be given a monopoly of railway construction in the province, and in Szechwan work was begun on the Chengtu-Hankow line in the fear that it might pass to foreign capital.[14] When this pronounced provincial feeling came into conflict with foreign loans for railway development already assumed by the central government, a difficult situation resulted. The Shanghai-Hangchow-Ningpo line and the Canton-Kowloon Railway both

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[13] *The Times,* February 19, March 10, May 3, 1910.

[14] *The Times,* January 30, 1906; *NCH,* September 1, 1905. Most of the activity in Szechwan consisted of posting signs calling for money for the railway the province intended to build. *NCH,* February 7, 1908.

were centers of sharp conflict between provincial investor and foreign interests.[15]

The case which best illustrates the difficulties involve in building China's railways is that of the Tientsin-Pul ow loan contra Realizing the inexperience of the Chinese in railway affairs and the evalence of corruption in public enterprises in China, foreign financiers le ling money for railway construction had been accustomed, through the ap intment of managers and in other ways, to make sure that the funds w e properly expended. But in the case of the Tientsin-Pukow contrac signed on January 13, 1908, between the Chinese government and British d German capitalists, no mortgage on the line was give, the banks wer to receive no share in its profits, the principle of joint management was s aside, and in other ways the terms were more generous than any granted eretofore. The line soon had an unenviable reputation for scandal and cor ption, and "Tientsin-Pukow terms" became a synonym for undue leniency nd insufficient care for the safety of foreign investors. In connectic with this loan, the much-vaunted patriotism of the provincial "Nationalis ' was put to the test and found wanting. Before the contract was er red into, Chihli and Shantung gentry were loud in protestations of their bility and desire to construct the line, but when later they were asked by t governmment to subscribe to the bonds only a small sum was offered for purpose and Peking had to explain that the London market wanted ca and not paper promises.[16] Willard Straight, commenting on the Tient n-Pukow contract, indicated that the real issue was not whether fore capital should be employed but whether railways should be imperial or ovincial undertakings:

> Its signature marked the first recognition by the banks of the increasir efficiency of the "Young China" party. These men demanded the radical modifica n of the old loan terms. They considered "control" subversive of China's sover n rights and, flattered by the blandishments of rival foreign interests, they were de mined to exact from the world a consideration similar to that accorded Japan aft years of patriotic self-practice and conscientious endeavor. The avowed purpos of these officials to weaken the hold of the foreigner on China was heartily applaude throughout the provinces. It served as a patriotic issue on which an appeal coul be made to the masses and a cloak under which the provincial gentry could cover eir real purpose, which was to restrict the extension of the Peking government's au ority by railways built with foreign loans, or otherwise, and their determination that foreign loans were made, the chances for peculation should not be monopolized by metropolitan mandarins.[17]

[15] *The Times,* November 6, December 31, 1907; *United States Foreign lations, 1908,* pp. 201–202.

[16] *The Times,* July 1, 1909.

[17] Straight, "China's Loan Negotiations" in Blakeslee, *Recent Develop nts in China,* p. 132.

The Chinese were taking increasing offense at every attempt by the central government to secure railway facilities for China by the employment of foreign money and direction. There were many declarations from provincial patriots of intentions forthwith to raise money to construct the needed lines, but few of these facile assertions led to more than the formation of companies which absorbed money endlessly without producing many visible signs of their *raison d'être*. *The Times* of July 1, 1909, contained an indictment of these provincial railway companies which is worthy of quotation in part:

> In almost every province there is evidence, in the abortive enterprises organized, with much flourish of patriotic trumpets, by officials and gentry, that the new-born enthusiasm is being used by these classes for the exploitation of the masses. Special taxes are levied (as in Sze-chuan and An-hui), and public subscriptions raised, for railway schemes whose loudly proclaimed object is to guard the country against the alleged dangers of a foreign loan; Boards of Directors are appointed (usually to be accused of incompetence, and to resign after a brief term of office); swarms of sinecure posts are created in connection with these enterprises, and their scanty capital is eventually squandered in salaries and futile experiments. In many cases the Central Government's permission is granted to a provincial Bureau or body of merchants, to build a railway or open mines, upon the express understanding that the necessary funds have been locally subscribed; the subscription, on paper, is a fact, but the funds are rarely forthcoming, and the promoters of these companies generally endeavour therefore to obtain foreign capital *sub rosa*, and in violation of their charter. So long as the Imperial Government's guarantee is recognized by foreign financiers as a necessary condition for loans, these tactics are without result, and the so-called Railway Bureaus continue to exist, without justifying their existence further than by collecting taxes and subscriptions to defray their administration expenses.[18]

With this picture of professed patriotism and actual corruption as a background, we may turn to the affair of the Canton-Hankow and Hankow-Chengtu lines, the *cause célèbre* of this period. The concession for the Canton-Hankow line had been granted to the American China Development Company, an American concern, in 1898, probably as a counterbalance to the interests obtained by other powers during the "battle of concessions."[19] Work on the line went slowly, for the Spanish-American war absorbed much American energy and capital. By 1904 enough of the shares of the company had passed into Belgian hands to make Belgian interest predominant, and Belgians were being sent out to replace Americans in the

[18] For confirmatory evidence see *NCH*, April 15, 1910; Anderson, "Railway Situation in China," *United States Special Consular Reports*, No. 48. For an account of one of the few Chinese-built and Chinese-managed lines which was effective and prosperous, the Sunning line in Kwangtung, see *United States Consular Reports*, January 30, 1911.

[19] The history of the American concession for the Canton-Hankow line is well given in Kent, *Railway Enterprise in China*, chapter xii.

principal positions in connection with the railway. The Chinese protested violently, declaring that the alienation of shares to Belgians had violated a supplementary agreement of 1900 and that the concession was thus invalidated. The difficulty was temporarily resolved by the effort of J. P. Morgan, who raised enough money to restore the control of the company to American hands. The American interests then decided to surrender the concession, and sold it back to China for $6,750,000.[20]

After this dénouement, the Chinese government turned a receptive ear to the gentry of Hunan, Hupeh, and Kwangtung who declared their eagerness to pay the sum required by the American company and to undertake the construction of the railway. The money for repurchase did not materialize, however, and "in consequence of this rather typical default" Chang Chih-tung found it necessary to secure a loan on September 9, 1905, from the colony of Hong Kong to repurchase the concession.[21] At the same time, Chang gave to the British Consul-General at Hankow a note promising the British preferential rights in regard to the railway if foreign capital were needed for its construction.[22] Germany, however, was not content that the Yangtze Valley should be developed by British enterprise exclusively and there was an ominous increase of German activity and interest in what was supposed to be the British preserve in China.[23] In October 1908 Chang Chih-tung, a convert to the necessity of foreign capital for the Hukuang lines (Canton-Hankow and Hankow-Chengtu) which had fared so badly under Chinese control, was made director-general of the Canton-Hankow Railway. In accordance with his promise, he twice approached the director of the British and Chinese Corporation for an offer of a loan but received replies which he considered unsatisfactory. Feeling himself absolved of his obligations in that direction, Chang then accepted a German loan for the Canton-Hankow line, to the immense chagrin of the British and the delight of the Germans.[24] A British protest against this arrangement resulted in negotiations between capitalists of Britain, Germany, and France, the last-named having reached an agreement with the British for a share in the loan in 1905. The three groups agreed not to grant "Tientsin-Pukow terms." Soon after, the Germans nearly disrupted the negotiations by making a preliminary agreement to give the Chinese government a loan for the northern third of the Canton-Hankow line on terms even more moderate than those of the Tientsin-Pukow con-

[20] Kent, *Railway Enterprise in China*, chapter xii; *The Times*, June [illegible], 1904; *United States Foreign Relations, 1905*, pp. 124–135; MacMurray, *Treaties*, No. 1905/7.

[21] Kent, *op. cit.*, p. 120; MacMurray, *op. cit.*, No. 1905/9.

[22] MacMurray, *op. cit.*, No. 1905/7; *Die Grosse Politik*, XXXII, 3.

[23] *The Times*, January 4, 1905.

[24] *Die Grosse Politik*, XXXII, 3–4.

tract.[25] At last, discussions were resumed and were brought to a successful conclusion in May 1909. The loan was extended to cover the Hunan section of the Canton-Hankow line and the Hankow-Chengtu line, for which latter Chang had previously considered a loan from the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank. The loan of £5,500,000 and the supply of materials were to be divided equally among the three groups. The British were to appoint the chief engineer for the Canton-Hankow line, the Germans for the Hankow-Ichang section, and the French for the Ichang-Chengtu section, should that portion be built, which was somewhat doubtful. This agreement was initialed on June 6, 1909.[26]

At this juncture the United States made its appearance upon the scene, a little late, but not at all abashed. In 1904 the Chinese government had promised that, if foreign capital were needed for the Hankow-Chengtu (Hankow-Szechwan) Railway, British and American capital would be given first chance. Twice in 1905 the British government had asked if American capitalists were desirous of sharing in such a loan, but had been told by the United States government that it had no intimation that American financiers so desired. The sudden revival of American interest in Chinese railways in 1909 was due in part to the desire of President Taft for greater American economic participation in the Far East, and was urged in the name of the policy of equality of opportunity (the "open door").[27]

The bankers already in agreement on the loan were willing enough to accept American participation in future loans but were inclined to feel that it was somewhat too late to alter the terms of the Hukuang loan.[28] The German government, however, eager to insert itself into financial operations in the Yangtze region and willing to accept any aid which it could obtain, adopted a friendly attitude toward the American proposal and advised its banks to support American participation.[29] The other governments also favored American co-operation in the loan, and negotiations to that end were begun after China, as the result of much prodding, had informed the other groups that American participation was necessary.[30] Then came more difficulties. The British bankers seemed inclined to grant the American financiers only a 20 per cent share in the loan, while the American government protested, demanding 25 per cent. The bankers were unable to come to terms, and negotiations adjourned *sine die*. This con-

[25] *The Times*, April 5, May 10, 1909; *NCH*, April 17, May 1, 15, 1909.

[26] *Die Grosse Politik*, XXXII, 5–7.

[27] *United States Foreign Relations, 1909*, pp. 144–159.

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 157.

[29] *United States Foreign Relations*, p. 158; *Die Grosse Politik*, XXXII, 8–18.

[30] *United States Foreign Relations, 1909*, pp. 158–160, 166.

summation was probably due in part to the attitude of Chang Chih-tung, who had had painful experience with American capital in the Canton-Hankow line in the days of the American China Development Company and was unwilling to see it make its appearance there again.[31] The British, French, and German bankers and Chang Chih-tung all seemed eager to secure an imperial edict ratifying the agreement initialed on June 6, 1909.[32] This probably would have been done had not President Taft, on July 15, 1909, sent to Prince Chun a telegram expressing great surprise at the rumors that China was opposed to equal American participation and pointing out that the United States had a legal right to share in the loan and attached great importance to it.[33] This unusual and rather drastic maneuver was backed up by instructions to the American chargé to warn China that since the bankers would probably admit equal American participation and the governments of the three other powers concerned recognized the justice of the American demand:

> . . . . if the reasonable wishes of this Government should now be thwarted the whole responsibility would rest upon the Chinese Government, which in return for the uniform friendliness of the United States, disregarding its obligation and its true interests, would have evaded by petty excuses its true duty and would have acted with singular unfriendliness to the United States.[34]

Plainly China had no course but to accept American participation with as good grace as possible. Chang Chih-tung's death in October 1909 delayed the conclusion of negotiations, but by May 27, 1910, the groups reached an agreement by which the loan, now increased to £6,000,000, and orders for material were to be divided equally, the British were to choose the chief engineer for the Canton-Hankow line, the Germans for the Ichang-Hankow line, with an American sub-engineer for a portion of this section, and the Americans, British, and French in the order named for sections of the extension from Ichang to Chengtu.[35]

Not until May 20, 1911, was this agreement, with some minor changes, acceded to by the Chinese government. The reason given for this delay was the significant one that the state of public feeling in China was such that the government lacked the courage to approve the hated foreign loan.[36] Indeed, the whole course of negotiations had been carried on in the midst of a chorus of protests from disgruntled provincials who themselves wished to build, or more precisely, to collect and control the money intended for

[31] *Ibid.*, pp. 167, 169–172.

[32] *Ibid.*, pp. 171–172.

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 178.

[34] *Ibid.*, p. 179.

[35] *Ibid.*, pp. 280–283.

[36] *United States Foreign Relations, 1910*, pp. 290–291.

building, the chief lines of railway needed by China. Chinese management often proved unsatisfactory enough to Chinese stockholders,[37] yet the bulk of those interested seemed to prefer to be cheated by their own people rather than benefited through the agency of foreigners. The objections to foreign loans were greatly increased by the action of the Chinese government in embarking on a policy of centralization, for the struggle thus defined itself as primarily between the provincials and the metropolitan administration. The appointment of Chang Chih-tung in 1908 as director-general of railways, superseding decentralized provincial control, was the first step toward concentrating in the hands of the Peking government the control of trunk lines. As long as Chang lived, agitation was somewhat restrained, but with his death late in 1909 the gentry of Hunan and Hupeh broke into loud denunciations of the impending foreign loan. Provincial delegates went up to Peking to insist on cancellation of the preliminary loan agreement. The provincial assemblies which held their first sessions in 1909 also brought pressure upon the central government, which could ill afford not to listen to the voice of the "popular" will, especially when among the discontented were the gentry of Hunan, whose loyalty to the Manchus had been proverbial since Taiping days.[38]

The year 1911 opened under most unfavorable auspices. It took no special prophetic powers to see that the Manchus were nearing the end of their régime.[39] In 1910 there had been a number of risings, the principal being at Changsha, and the constant agitation of the press and the radical politicians of the new school over railway problems, the quicker granting of a parliament, and other such matters had served greatly to arouse the public mind. Late in 1910 Chinese newspapers were full of wild tales of an impending partition of China by the powers, and the Pien Ma boundary dispute with Great Britain and Russia's ultimatum in regard to Mongolia brought patriotic feeling to fever heat.[40] The government's policy was stigmatized as vacillating and weak, and volunteer societies for the protection of the nation sprang up everywhere.[41] To political troubles, natural disasters added their quota. Plague in the north and flood in the Yangtze

[37] For a denunciation, by the stockholders, of the Chinese Company which attempted to construct the Canton-Hankow line, see *NCH,* January 23, 1909.

[38] *United States Foreign Relations, 1909,* p. 206; *The Times,* March 28, 1910; *NCH,* January 7, 21, February 25, 1910; Rodes, *Le Céleste empire avant la révolution,* pp. 129–137.

[39] *The Times* on December 17, 1910, published an excellent, if gloomy, description of the plight in which China found herself, together with a plea for the recall of Yuan Shih-kai as the only man able to save the situation.

[40] *NCH,* January 7, April 15, 1911; *The Times,* February 9, 17, 20, 23, 1911.

[41] *NCH,* April 29, May 20, July 1, 1911.

region reduced hundreds of thousands of people to a most desperate plight.[42] Early in April, the Tartar-General at Canton was murdered by a Chinese, who, on arrest, admitted that his motives were anti-Manchu. The government at once took vigorous measures against all suspected of opposing the dynasty. Canton, however, was not thus to be quieted. On April 27 a crowd of radicals and discontented soldiers stormed the governor's *yamen* and for a time it looked as if the long-dreaded revolution had come at last. The trouble passed over, but left southern China in a dangerous state of mind.[43] The Middle Kingdom was ripe for violence and upheaval, and it needed only the railway centralization policy of Sheng Hsuan-huai to bring on the disaster.

In January Sheng was made President of the Ministry of Communications, and in May the final agreement for the Hukuang loan was consummated. It was obvious that before the loan could be effectively used, the government must assert a firmer hold upon the railways for which it was destined. Sheng, who now held the dominant position in railway affairs, was a firm believer in centralized control and the use of foreign capital and, accordingly, on May 9, 1911, the Throne issued an edict which stated in part:

> The area of the Chinese Empire is very extensive and its frontier territories are far apart. . . . . Whenever the Throne's attention is brought to the frontier defence, We are troubled night and day. To control the defence effectively, the only means is the speedy construction of railways. Moreover, for advices and consultations in constitutional government, for transfer and mobility in Military affairs, and for transport and delivery of native produce, all these are dependent upon the facilities in communication. . . . . Nevertheless, for several years, the capital for the Kwangtung line has been half obtained, yet no great progress in its construction has been made. As for Szechuan, enormous funds were bankrupted, and impeachment and pressure have failed to recover them. In respect of Hunan and Hupeh, the offices have been opened for a number of years, only wasting money by inactivity. Thus, in exhausting the fat of millions of Our people, We find only waste and extravagance in some cases, and misappropriation and pocketing in others, so that it is feared the longer that time passes, the heavier will be the burden of the people. . . . . Therefore, We desire to proclaim explicitly to the world that all the trunk railways shall be State owned, this shall be the fixed policy.[44]

This decree, which threatened an airing of the corruption which had characterized so many provincial railway schemes, and the removal of this lucrative source of perquisites in the future, called forth a storm of "patriotic" utterances from the provincials, especially of Hunan, Hupeh, Kwangtung, and Szechwan. Meetings were held, threats of violence were

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[42] China, The Maritime Customs, *Returns of Trade and Trade Reports, 1911,* Part I, pp. 45–46.

[43] *NCH,* April 15, 22, May 6, 1911. [44] *NCH,* May 20, 1911.

made, and there was much cutting-off of fingers and like demonstration of fervor. Yang Wen-ting, governor of Hunan, telegraphed to Peking that he was unable to cope with the situation, but received a firm statement from the government of its determination to continue the hated policy.[45] On May 18, Tuan Fang was named Director-General of the Canton-Hankow and Hankow-Chengtu lines, to direct the work of centralization. An edict of May 22 pointed out the benevolent intention of the Throne in relieving the people of the exactions imposed on them by the provincial railway companies, forbade the collection of "capital per rental" shares (subscriptions on the basis of landholdings which had been collected as a tax) in Hunan and Hupeh, and appointed a committee of officials to consider the financial arrangements necessarily entailed in the taking over of the enterprises.[46] On June 17, 1911, the scheme for buying out the provincial interests was published. The plan was an eminently fair one; all the shares of the provincial companies, whether subscribed voluntarily or by taxation, were to be redeemed by an issue of government bonds. In Hunan, Hupeh, and Kwangtung the original amount subscribed was to be repaid. In Szechwan, only 4,000,000 out of 11,000,000 taels were to be repaid; the rest had been lost by the president of the provincial railway organization in rubber speculation during the panic of 1910 in Shanghai, and the Peking government refused to foot the bill for this unusually patent case of mismanagement.[47] The anouncement that the government meant to take over the Chengtu-Hankow line and build it with foreign capital and to repay only 4,000,000 taels out of the 11,000,000 which had somehow been consumed in building twenty miles of road,[48] provoked the Szechwan gentry first to resistance, then to rebellion. The question of provincial versus imperial control was one which called forth all the provincial loyalty and states-rights feeling engendered in generations when the distant government in Peking had never essayed to exercise immediate control over its subjects. The rising became more than a struggle against the new railway scheme. The poorer people, weary of extortion and overtaxation, revolted blindly without too much concern for why and by whom the taxes had been imposed. The railway company held meetings and objected to Peking's policy. Inflammatory posters pictured Sheng and his colleagues as traitors betraying China to the foreign powers. Candles were burnt before the tablet of Kuang Hsu, in whose

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[45] *NCH,* May 20, 27, June 10, 1911; Kent, *The Passing of the Manchus,* pp. 52–54.

[46] *NCH,* May 27, 1911.

[47] *Ibid.,* June 24, 1911; Kent, *The Passing of the Manchus,* p. 59; Williams, *China Yesterday and Today,* p. 472.

[48] *United States Special Consular Reports,* No. 48, p. 17.

reign the provincial company had been chartered.[49] The Throne ordered the viceroy, Chao Erh-feng, to arrest the ringleaders; but on September 7 a mob stormed the *yamen,* and soon the revolt was spreading throughout the province and Tuan Fang and Tsen Chun-hsun were ordered to Szechwan to aid in suppressing it.[50] Tsen, perhaps more wary than loyal, delayed his departure on the ground of illness; but Tuan Fang, with a small force, entered Szechwan, and in a proclamation declared the purpose of his mission to reconcile with the Throne the people of Szechwan, who had been deceived into acts of resistance, not understanding the magnanimous policy of the dynasty.[51]

Tuan Fang's efforts as peacemaker were useless, and, indeed, were to end in his murder by his own troops. Only a few days after his proclamation, and while the unrest in Szechwan still remained untamed, the real revolution, the revolution for which Sun Yat-sen and his followers had planned so long, broke out impromptu when a chance bomb explosion in the Russian concession at Hankow revealed the existence of the revolutionary plot. Lack of space forbids more than the mention of the chief events which ensued.[52] On October 10, the revolutionary movement won over a part of the troops at Wuchang. Three days later a new government was proclaimed there with Li Yuan-hung, formerly second in command of the Hupeh troops, as President. The Regent, alarmed at this new turn of affairs, ordered two divisions of troops under Yin Chang and the navy, such as it was, under Admiral Sah, to the scene of action, and on October 14 recalled Yuan Shih-kai, appointing him Viceroy of the two Hu provinces and Generalissimo of the imperial forces. There was some delay, for Yuan was not eager to accept a most difficult post from the man who had dismissed him from office in 1909; but on October 27 an edict gave him practically complete control of the government's policy and soon afterward he left for the front.

The military campaign was not decisive. At first the revolutionary forces scored some successes, but on October 28, the imperial troops captured Ten Kilometer Station on the Peking-Hankow line and the following day entered Hankow, which they destroyed to a great extent on November 3. A month later the revolutionary troops were forced to surrender Hanyang. The campaign in Hupeh was going in favor of the Manchus.

[49] *NCH,* September 9, 16, 30, 1911; Williams, *op. cit.,* p. 473.

[50] *NCH,* September 9, 16, 23, 1911.

[51] *Ibid.,* November 7, 1911.

[52] There are numerous accounts of the revolution; among them may be mentioned: Kent, *The Passing of the Manchus;* Dingle, *China's Revolution;* McCormick, *The Flowery Republic;* Farjenel, *A Travers la révolution chinoise;* Rottach, *La Chine en révolution;* and Rodes, *La Fin des Mandchous.*

General Chang Hsun held Nanking loyal to the imperial house until December 2, when it fell into the hands of the revolutionaries. In the meantime, province after province had declared in favor of revolution, with scarcely any serious opposition.

The revolutionists were not united among themselves. The government set up under Li Yuan-hung did not meet with the favor of the revolutionary party in Shanghai, where another régime was established with Chen Chi-mei as General of the Military Government of the Chinese Republic and Wu Ting-fang, once a prominent official under the Manchus, as Secretary for Foreign Affairs. After the fall of Hanyang, Li Yuan-hung was ready to open negotiations with Yuan Shih-kai. The Shanghai group, however, insisted that they would not endorse any arrangements so arrived at, and negotiations were moved to Shanghai, where Wu Ting-fang and Tang Shao-yi, as delegates of the republican and the imperial governments, met on December 18.

In the meantime, the authority of the ruling house had all but disappeared in the face of the attacks of the National Assembly, which convened for its second session early in October. We have described elsewhere how the Throne was compelled first to sacrifice Sheng Hsuan-huai, then to accede to the demands of the troops at Lanchow and of the Assembly and issue the penitential edict and other renunciatory documents of October 30; how on November 26 the Regent took the oath to the new principles of the constitution and on December 6, as a desperate effort to conciliate the opposition, resigned, leaving the semblance of power in the hands of the Lung Yu Empress Dowager, niece of Tzu Hsi and widow of Kuang Hsu. The position of the ruling house was rendered even more difficult by the *volte face* of Tang Shao-yi, who, as imperial peace delegate at Shanghai, openly expressed his approval of a republican régime. The unity and strength of the republican cause was made more apparent when Sun Yat-sen, soon after reaching China on December 25, was chosen President of the Provisional Republic by a convention, representing fourteen provinces, which met at Nanking. The ruling house, its back to the wall, proposed that a constituent assembly be summoned to decide whether republic or monarchy was to be the future form of political organization. The republican government, willing enough to concede the principle of popular decision, was convinced that the people had already spoken and that the régime at Nanking represented the general will. Tang Shao-yi, unfitted by his republican beliefs to act as imperial delegate, resigned his position early in January, and from that time on, negotiations of a sort were carried on between Yuan Shih-kai in Peking and the Republican authorities in Nanking. Some of the fiery younger princes, egged on by the inveterate conservative, Tieh Liang, refused to accept abdication, and

all through January there were agitated conferences among the members of the imperial house as to the course to be followed, a state of affairs which vastly increased the difficulties of Yuan's dealings with the revolutionaries. Toward the middle of the month, Sun Yat-sen offered Yuan the presidency, provided the Manchus abdicated. But the royal family, just at that time, was inclining toward the opposite course, and Yuan therefore declined. Soon after, Yuan was offered the title of Marquess, a rare honor for one of Chinese blood; but he declined the honor, not once but thrice. On January 28, the Throne received a memorial from its generals urging abdication on the terms offered by the Nanking leaders, the future form of government to be left to the decision of the constituent assembly. When its generals and soldiers refused further support, declaring the imperial cause hopeless, the Throne had to recognize that its cause was lost. By February 3 abdication had been definitely decided upon and the only question remaining was the future status of the imperial house and its retainers, which was finally settled on February 7. On February 12 appeared the formal edicts of abdication, pathetic documents in which the Lung Yu Empress Dowager and the boy Emperor gave up the imperial power which Tzu Hsi had tried so desperately to conserve and reinforce. Of the three edicts of February 12, the first, appointing Yuan Shih-kai to confer with the revolutionaries as to the future form of government, is perhaps best representative of the dignity with which, at the end, the Manchus surrendered their dominion.

. . . . an Edict from the Lung Yu Empress Dowager which states that owing to the uprising of the people's army, supported by the provinces as a sound is by its echo, the whole empire seethed and smoked, whereby the people have been plunged into miserable sufferings. Yuan Shih-kai was specially commanded to appoint Commissioners to discuss the situation with the representatives of the people's army, with a view to the convention of a National Assembly, in order to decide the form of Government. Two months have elapsed without yet reaching a suitable settlement. Great distance separates the South from the North, each upholds its own against the other and the result is the stoppage of merchants on the road and the exposure of scholars in the field, all because, should the form of Government be undecided, so must the people's lives be thrown out of gear.

Now, the majority of the people of the whole nation are leaning towards Republicanism; the provinces in the South first took the pioneer step, then the officers in the North also desired to follow their example; and in the universal desire of the heart of the people may be discernible the will of Heaven How could we then persist in opposing the desire and hatred of millions for the nobility and glory of one name [family]. Surely the general position abroad should be examined and popular opinion should be weighed. I, hand in hand with the Emperor, hereby transfer the power of Sovereignty to be the public property of the whole nation, and decide that the form of Government shall be Republican constitutional to satisfy the present feeling within the seas, the detestation of disturbance and the expectation of peace, as well as to follow the ancient sages in regarding the world as public property.

Yuan Shih-kai, having been formerly elected Premier by the Tszechêngyuan stands at this juncture between the new and the old régimes, and has surely devised a plan for unifying the South and the North. Let Yuan Shih-kai organize with full powers a Provisional Republican Government and confer with the people's army as to the methods of procedure for the union, so that peace may be assured to the people and the nation, but still with the complete integrity of the territories of the five races of Manchus, Chinese, Mongols, Mohammedans and Tibetans combined, forming a great Republic of China, and I and the Emperor may retire into a leisured life and spend our years pleasantly, enjoying courteous treatment from the citizens, and seeing with our own eyes the completion of an ideal government. Would this not be a grand feat? Respect this.[53]

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[53] *NCH,* February 17, 1912.

X. CONCLUSION

Thus the Manchus fell and with them their program of gradual reform. It was their misfortune, and China's as well, that when the aggressions of the foreign powers made the need of radical reform obvious they were too debilitated to effect the needed changes in the state. The administration had become clogged with corruption, the rulers were weaklings, and the attacks of foreigners and Taiping rebels had accentuated the decadence of the imperial house. When the young Monarch, Kuang Hsu, moved by the humiliation of China's defeat by Japan and spurred to action by the "Modern Sage," Kang Yu-wei, poured forth in the summer of 1898 a series of startling reform edicts, he found it impossible to enforce his commands. After a short "Hundred Days" in which the imperial gazette proclaimed astonishing changes in all phases of Chinese life, almost none of which took place, Kuang Hsu was swept from the scene by his competent, if conservative aunt, Tzu Hsi. Kuang Hsu's efforts to strengthen China against Western incursions by the use of Western methods had failed from too great impetuosity and too little real comprehension; next came the Boxer rising, a desperate effort to expel the barbarians and thus end China's troubles, an attempt to which the usually shrewd Empress Dowager, for once led aside from the path of practical politics, gave her support.

If Tzu Hsi paid dearly for that temporary aberration she also gained greatly in wisdom, and in 1901 even before her exile from the capital was ended, she had proclaimed herself a convert to reform. China was to be modernized so that she could take her place as a truly independent and sovereign state. Japan, who so shortly before had passed through the process of adapting to her needs the institutions of the powerful nations of the West, was the obvious model. The first essential was the extension and alteration of education, to the end that the Throne might have the support of mandarins of a new sort and, in time, of an enlightened populace. In 1904 a school system on the Japanese model was proclaimed, and in 1905 the old system of official examinations, based on the Confucian books, was abandoned. When the Revolution came in 1911, the school system was making uneven progress. Primary schools languished, while the higher institutions, founded in greater numbers because they were more spectacular, were being dragged below their nominal level by the lack of supporting institutions. A significant feature of the educational scene was the steady exodus of students to foreign countries, especially to Japan, where many of them acquired ideas of government and society in which the dynasty could have no place.

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The other chief desideratum of China at the time was an effective defense force. The leading figure in the creation of a nucleus for a modern army was the great viceroy of Chihli, Yuan Shih-kai. In 1906 these troops were removed from his control to that of the metropolitan authorities, but at the time of the Revolution it was apparent that the army's loyalty was not to the Throne but to its creator, Yuan himself. Plans for naval expansion came to comparatively little. Indeed, a navy was a luxury which the government, hard put for money, could well do without.

In 1906 the most successful of the reforms, because it was the most popular with and best understood by all classes, the elimination of opium-smoking, was put under way, and with the co-operation of Great Britain, from whose Indian possessions had come much of the opium smoked in China, a surprising reduction in the cultivation and use of the drug took place.

The most novel and spectacular of the promised reforms, because it was the most alien to the whole course of Chinese history, was the promise of constitutional government, not at once, but after nine years of preparation should have fitted the nation to operate institutions to which it was totally unused.

In addition, a vast number of other possible fields for change and renovation were touched upon.

But even more significant than the reforms which the Throne attempted were those which it omitted. In its avoidance of financial reform and of the elimination of corruption in the administration, the Throne exhibited not wilful disregard of China's chief needs but such weakness as made it impossible to deal with problems which involved many vested interests and might be productive of great opposition. Circumstances were demanding of the dynasty a policy which it was too feeble to carry out. It realized the exigencies of the times, but could not enforce its will upon a people long accustomed to view it as ill-starred and alien. For a hundred years, nothing to which the Manchus had turned their hand had prospered. Surely, argued their subjects, Heaven had withdrawn its mandate and their time was near its end. The bulk of the people could not believe that the effete and decadent imperial house, under the leadership of its one remaining vigorous member, Tzu Hsi, had grasped what was needful to be done and was sincerely trying to carry it out.

The universal tacit feeling that the Tsing dynasty had all but run its course was immensely strengthened by the death of the respected Empress Dowager and the ascendancy of the foolish Prince Chun. The propaganda of Sun Yat-sen and his followers made great progress. These men, most of them educated abroad and thus somewhat divorced from the realities of

China's condition, were eager to oust the Manchus and to introduce at once institutions which the West had developed only after years of conscious or unconscious preparation. Monarchy was to go, and China was to be a republic—such was their plan. As the Regent showed himself ill-advised and tactless, the attacks on the dynasty increased. Its plans for the reasonable postponement of a parliament and constitution till China was in some way prepared to receive them were scorned as insincere and its protestations of earnestness were denounced as disingenuous. Yet, with portents on every hand that the dynasty had not much longer to rule, the unwise Regent embarked on a policy of centralization bound to aggravate the already considerable opposition of the provinces, which had so long been unused to interference from Peking. The result was revolution.

On the one hand, then, was the imperial house, aroused from what had seemed its last coma to an effort to revitalize the Empire and thus renew its hold upon its heritage. On the other hand was a group of doctrinaire irreconcilables, who believed that no good could be expected from the Manchu house and were facile proponents of China's need for governmental changes for which, in reality, she was not ready. These revolutionists would not co-operate in the reform campaign under imperial auspices. Between these two parties, each bent on what it considered reform, were the bulk of the people, who lacked understanding of many of the innovations projected by the ruling house and who, because of the dynasty's alien origin and the reputation for incapacity which it had acquired since the days of the first European war, felt toward it no great loyalty. The Throne might proclaim with all earnestness its compassion for its people and its hopes for a renovated régime, but it failed to decrease taxes, stop official corruption, and end the aggressions of foreigners; and when the Revolution broke, the dynasty passed from the scene, unsupported by a people for whose good as well as for its own interest it had made efforts which were at times misguided, nearly always misunderstood, but on the whole sincere. With the dynasty passed the possibility that the modernizing of China might be orderly and reasoned rather than tempestuous and violent.

Nearly twenty years have elapsed since the collapse of the Manchu rule, years in which China has undergone—indeed, she is still undergoing—violent revolutionary transition. In 1912 nothing would satisfy the revolutionary enthusiasts but the elimination of the imperial government, a government which, feeble though it was, nevertheless was a cohesive force, and the substitution of a republic based on Western formulas. The "Republic" set up under Yuan Shih-kai soon ceased to deserve the name. Yuan, capable, ambitious, wily, and contemptuous of the new "popular" government, soon dispensed with the doctrinaire republicans, who had no

real backing, since the mass of the people had no comprehension of republicanism. Yuan retained the title of President of the Republic, but in reality governed China through a group of military mandarins. He had once been the chief servant of the Dragon Throne. He now aspired to be its occupant. But the foreign powers opposed this ambition, other support was lacking, and in 1916 this "strong man" of China died of chagrin. After his death the Republic dragged on a nominal existence in Peking while militarists battled for supremacy. No one of the candidates for dictatorship, however, possessed power to subdue more than a portion of the Empire. In the meantime a new force in Chinese politics was developing in the south, a revitalized Kuomintang or Nationalist party made up of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and his followers. Sun, the "Father of the Chinese Revolution," died in 1925, leaving behind him plans for the development of China on the basis of the famous "three principles of the people," freely translated as nationalism, democracy, and socialism. Although not a believer in communism, Sun had entered into an alliance with Soviet Russia. Russian advisers drilled the Nationalist troops, reorganized the Nationalist party machinery, and trained its members in the arts of propaganda. Thus strengthened, the Nationalists swept north, taking first the Wuhan cities (Hankow, Hanyang, and Wuchang), then Shanghai and Nanking. Finally, with the aid of the northern generals, Feng Yu-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan, they drove from Peking the old-style war lord, Chang Tso-lin. This great military success was not achieved without an internal transformation of the Kuomintang. The communists, whose activity in arousing peasants and urban proletariat seemed to be compromising the party in the eyes of other sections of the nation, were expelled and when the National government was proclaimed at Nanking in 1928 it was a government of moderates under the presidency of the military leader Chiang Kai-shek, pledged to carry out the plans of Sun Yat-sen. Today the National government, having defeated its rebellious erstwhile allies, Yen and Feng, appears to be the most stable régime which China has had in years, but there is still a communist movement of considerable dimensions with which it must deal.

During all these years of confusion, what has become of the reforms begun during the Manchu period? For the most part there has been no government both willing and able to carry out a nation-wide, comprehensive scheme of reform. Even Yuan Shih-kai, reformer-in-chief to the Manchus, as president showed little interest in any species of change except military augmentation. Despite the lack of government direction, many of the reforms begun before the Revolution have made some progress, carried along by their own momentum. The system of education, based on a mixture of Western science and Confucian ethics, which Tzu Hsi initiated, has made fitful progress, and education abroad and in modernized

institutions in China is producing a new type of official very different from the mandarin of the old dispensation and better suited to the modern world. The Manchus proposed to modernize their government by the introduction of elective institutions on the Western model; the enthusiasts of the Revolution of 1911 went still further by copying from the Occident their whole scheme of government. The ultimate failure of the attempt to govern China by borrowed institutions has demonstrated the necessity of a form of government related to the tradition and experience of the Chinese people. The formulation of new legal codes was performed by the Republic in Peking and again by the National government but the instituting of a new judicial system has proved more difficult. Extraterritoriality is still in force; however, there are signs that before long the powers may surrender extraterritorial jurisdiction. The growth of China's military forces has exceeded the plans of the Manchus, and the desires of most of the Chinese people. Many of the armies of the civil war period can hardly be called "reformed" forces in any commendatory sense, for although better armed and equipped than the old-fashioned imperial troops, they have too often been mercenary and parasitic and the line between soldier and bandit has been hard to draw. The expense of supporting enlarged military forces has greatly complicated the problem of government finance, which still awaits solution. The railway system is still inadequate, although additional loans have been contracted for and new lines have been constructed Many of the existing railways have suffered from hard use as troop transports. The development of factories and Western industrial methods has been rapid and has brought with it the same problems of economic adjustments and of relations between capital and labor which have accompanied it in the West. There has been a revival of the growing and the use of opium, encouraged by unscrupulous militarists eager for revenue, and China's attempts to secure restriction of the opium traffic at international conferences have not been successful.

In short, the National government is now having to reinstate or resume many of the reforms which had their inception under the Manchus. Its task should be easier than was that confronting the Manchus, chiefly because the revolutionary leaven is working great changes in the ideas and attitudes of the Chinese people as a whole and especially of the aspirants for civil office and is thus preparing the way for the inauguration of a new reform program such as is afforded by the writings of Sun Yat-sen. To the apostles of the doctrine of the "clean sweep," this will compensate for all the misery, fumbling, and chaos of the transition period. The proponents of evolutionary change, however, cannot but speculate on what might have been the course of events if the Manchus had been able to retain control and to prosecute their reform program. The Manchus had

little chance to retain their heritage after Tzu Hsi's death. They lacked leaders capable of realizing the dynasty's faults and weaknesses and of winning back the loyalty of its subjects, and the revolutionists could see no reason for delay in sweeping away the old system in order to inaugurate the millennium, which, unfortunately, did not materialize. Yet while the imperial government endured, it gave to China a measure of peace and order in which new ideas and institutions could develop. Had it been able to extend its Heavenly mandate for even a decade or two, much might have been done to ease the inevitable transition from the old China to the new.

'Prosperity is a condition not of acres, but of human beings." R. H. Tawney: Land & Labour in China, (1931), p. 50

"The theory that agitation is produced by agitators not agitators by agitation, is among the western doctrines which certain circles in China have absorbed without much difficulty. But no reference to Communist propaganda is required to explain the no-rent campaign and peasants' revolts which have taken place in parts of the country. It is surprising, indeed that they have not been more frequent." Tawney: Land & Labour in China, (1931), p. 69

APPENDIX

A. THE NINE-YEAR PROGRAM OF CONSTITUTIONAL PREPARATION[1]

First Year, 1908–9.

(*a*) Organization of Provincial Assemblies.
(*b*) Issue of Local Administrative regulations.
(*c*) Issue of census regulations.
(*d*) Issue of regulations for financial reform.
(*e*) Establishment of a Bureau for the reform of the Manchu system, particularly as regards the treatment of Bannermen, and the fusion of Manchu and Chinese.
(*f*) Preparation of elementary lesson-books for teaching reading.
(*g*) Preparation of books for general reading.
(*h*) Revision of the Penal Code.
(*i*) Drafting of Civil, Commercial and Criminal Laws.

Second Year, 1909–10.

(*a*) Inauguration of Provincial Assemblies.
(*b*) Issue of Regulations for the National Assembly.
(*c*) Elections for same.
(*d*) Organization of Local Administrative Councils.
(*e*) Taking of census of the whole Empire.
(*f*) Investigation of Provincial Budgets.
(*g*) Reform of Metropolitan Official system.
(*h*) Drafting of Civil Service Examination regulations, and of regulations for official salaries.
(*i*) Issue of regulations for Judicial Courts.
(*j*) Organization of Judicial Courts.
(*k*) Drafting of new Criminal Laws.
(*l*) Organization of Elementary Schools.
(*m*) Inauguration of modern constabulary system.

Third Year, 1910–11.

(*a*) Inauguration of the National Assembly.
(*b*) Local administrative system to be extended to townships.
(*c*) Report by Viceroys and Governors on census in the provinces.
(*d*) Consideration of Provincial Budgets.
(*e*) Drafting of local tax regulations.
(*f*) Endeavour to carry out Provincial Budgets.
(*g*) Reorganization of Provincial Official system.
(*h*) Issue of regulations for Civil Service Examinations.
(*i*) Establishment in all Capitals and Treaty Ports of Judicial Courts (Shen-panting).
(*j*) Issue of new Criminal Laws.
(*k*) Extension of Primary Education.
(*l*) Organization of Police in hsiens.

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[1] *China Year Book, 1912,* pages 361–363. Another translation will be found in *United States Foreign Relations, 1908,* pages 196–199.

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Fourth Year, 1911–12.

(*a*) Organization of system for auditing Government Accounts.
(*b*) Investigation of the Budget for the Empire.
(*c*) Issue of Government tax regulations.
(*d*) Enforcement of Civil Service and Official Salaries regulations.
(*e*) Establishment of Judicial Courts in Fu's.
(*f*) Organization of Elementary Schools in all townships.
(*g*) Organization of Rural Police.
(*h*) Consideration of the Revised Commercial, Civil and Criminal Laws.
(*i*) Extension of Local Government system to townships.
(*j*) Investigation of the census.

Fifth Year, 1912–13.

(*a*) Local Government system to be carried out this year.
(*b*) Issue of new Metropolitan and Provincial Official systems.
(*c*) Judicial Courts in all cities, towns and townships must be in working order this year.
(*d*) Extension of Elementary Education.
(*e*) Extension of Police system.

Sixth Year, 1913–14.

(*a*) Endeavour to carry out Budget for the whole Empire.
(*b*) Organization of Judicial Courts to deal with political matters.
(*c*) Complete organization of all Judicial Courts in the provinces.
(*d*) Inauguration of Village Courts.
(*e*) Enforcement of new Criminal Laws.
(*f*) Issue of Civil and Commercial Laws.
(*g*) Police forces shall be established this year in all towns and villages.

Seventh Year, 1914–15.

(*a*) Strict adherence to the Imperial Budget.
(*b*) One per cent. of the population should be able to read and write in this period.

Eighth Year, 1915–16.

(*a*) Budget for Imperial Household.
(*b*) Abolition of all distinction between Manchu and Chinese.
(*c*) Organization of a Statistical Department.
(*d*) Enforcement of new Civil and Commercial Laws.
(*e*) Organization of Police throughout the Empire to be completed.
(*f*) Two per cent. of the population should be able to read and write in this period.

Ninth Year, 1916–17.

(*a*) Issue of Constitutional Laws.
(*b*) Issue of Imperial House Laws.
(*c*) Issue of Parliamentary Laws.
(*d*) Issue of regulations for the election of an Upper and a Lower House.
(*e*) Elections for the Upper and Lower Houses.
(*f*) Preparation of Budget for the following year for discussion in Parliament.
(*g*) Organization of a Privy Council, and of Advisory Ministers.
(*h*) Five per cent. of the population should be able to read and write in this period.

B. THE THREE-YEAR PROGRAM OF CONSTITUTIONAL PREPARATIONS[2]

Fourth Year, 1911–12.

(*a*) Establishment of a Cabinet.
(*b*) Formation of a Privy Council.
(*c*) Promulgation of the new official system.
(*d*) Issue of laws and regulations to be obeyed by officials.
(*e*) Inauguration of a system of Government book-keeping.
(*f*) Issue of rules and regulations relating to likin and taxes.
(*g*) Investigation of expenditure of Imperial Household.
(*h*) Establishment of judicial courts in towns and cities.
(*i*) Issue of a system of audit.
(*j*) *Promulgation of civil, commercial, and criminal laws.*
(*k*) Issue of rules of procedure for the trial of civil and criminal cases.
(*l*) Publication of a census system.
(*m*) Preparation of census statistics.

Fifth Year, 1912–13.

(*a*) Promulgation of Constitutional Laws.
(*b*) Issue of Imperial House Laws.
(*c*) Issue of Parliamentary Laws.
(*d*) Issue of election regulations for both Houses.
(*e*) Elections for both Houses.
(*f*) Introduction of the Budget system.
(*g*) Establishment of an Audit Office.
(*h*) Enforcement of all new laws.
(*i*) Opening of courts of justice throughout the Empire.

Sixth Year, 1913–14.

(*a*) Members of Parliament summoned to Peking.
(*b*) Edict relating to same.
(*c*) Opening of Parliament.

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