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HISTORY OF GREECE

PART II

HISTORICAL GREECE

(Continued)

CHAPTER XXXV

IONIC REVOLT

HITHERTO the history of the Asiatic Greeks has flowed in a stream distinct from that of the European Greeks. The present chapter will mark the period of confluence between the two.

At the time when Darius quitted Sardis on his return to Susa, carrying with him the Milesian Histiaëus, he left Artaphernês his brother as satrap of Sardis, invested with the supreme command of Western Asia Minor. The Grecian cities on the coast, comprehended under his satrapy, appear to have been chiefly governed by native despots in each; and Milêtus especially, in the absence of Histiaëus, was ruled by his son-in-law Aristagoras. That city was now in the height of power and prosperity—in every respect the leading city of Ionia. The return of Darius to Susa may be placed seemingly about 512 B.C., from which time forward the state of things above described continued, without disturbance, for eight or ten years—"a respite from suffering," to use the significant phrase of the historian.¹

¹ Herodot. v. 28. Μετὰ δὲ οὐ πολλὸν χρόνον, ἄνεως κακῶν ἦν—οἱ ἄνεως κακῶν—if the conjecture of some critics be adopted. Mr. Clinton, with Larcher and others (see *Fasti Hellen.* App. 13, p. 314), construe this passage as if the comma were to be placed after *μετὰ δὲ*, so that the historian would be made to affirm that the period of repose lasted only a short time. It appears to me that the comma ought rather to be placed after *χρόνον*, and that the "short time" refers to those evils which the historian had been describing before. There must have been an interval of eight years at least, if not of ten years, between the events which the

It was about the year 506 B.C. that the exiled Athenian despot Hippias, after having been repelled from Sparta by the unanimous refusal of the Lacedæmonian allies to take part in his cause, presented himself from Sigeium as a petitioner to Artaphernês at Sardis. He now doubtless found the benefit of the alliance which he had formed for his daughter with the despot Æantidês of Lampsakus, whose favour with Darius would stand him in good stead. He made pressing representations to the satrap, with a view of procuring restoration to Athens, on condition of holding it under Persian dominion; and Artaphernês was prepared, if an opportunity offered, to aid him in this design. So thoroughly had he resolved on espousing actively the cause of Hippias, that when the Athenians despatched envoys to Sardis, to set forth the case of the city against its exiled pretender, he returned to them an answer not merely of denial, but of menace—bidding them receive Hippias back again, if they looked for safety.¹ Such a reply was equivalent to a declaration of war, and so it was construed at Athens. It leads us to infer that the satrap was even then revolving in his mind an expedition against Attica, in conjunction with Hippias; but fortunately for the Athenians, other projects and necessities intervened to postpone for several years the execution of the scheme.

Of these new projects, the first was that of conquering the island of Naxos. Here too, as in the case of Hippias, the instigation arose from Naxian exiles—a rich oligarchy which had been expelled by a rising of the people. This island, like all the rest of the Cyclades, was as yet independent of the Persians.² It was wealthy, prosperous, possessing a large

historian had been describing (the evils inflicted by the attacks of Otanês) and the breaking out of the Ionic revolt; which latter event no one places earlier than 504 B.C., though some prefer 502 B.C., others even 500 B.C.

If indeed we admitted with Wesseling (ad Herodot. vi. 40; and Mr. Clinton seems inclined towards the same opinion, see p. 314 *ut sup.*) that the Scythian expedition is to be placed in 508–507 B.C., then indeed the interval between the campaign of Otanês and the Ionic revolt would be contracted into one or two years. But I have already observed that I cannot think 508 B.C. a correct date for the Scythian expedition: it seems to me to belong to about 515 B.C. Nor do I know what reason there is for determining the date as Wesseling does, except this very phrase *ὀ πολλὸν χρόνον*, which is, on every supposition, exceedingly vague, and which he appears to me not to have construed in the best way.

¹ Herodot. v. 96. Ὁ δὲ Ἀρταφέρνης ἐκέλευε σφεας, εἰ βουλοίατο σόου εἶναι, καταδέεσθαι ὀπίσω τὸν Ἰαπίην.

² Herodot. v. 31. Plutarch says that Lygdamis, established as despot at Naxos by Peisistratus (Herodot. i. 64), was expelled from this post by the Lacedæmonians (De Herodot. Malignitat. c. 21, p. 859). I confess

population both of freemen and slaves, and defended as well by armed ships as by a force of 8000 heavy-armed infantry. The exiles applied for aid to Aristagoras, who saw that he could turn them into instruments of dominion for himself in the island, provided he could induce Artaphernês to embark in the project along with him—his own force not being adequate by itself. Accordingly he went to Sardis, and laid his project before the satrap, intimating that as soon as the exiles should land with a powerful support, Naxos would be reduced with little trouble: that the neighbouring islands of Paros, Andros, Tênos, and the other Cyclades, could not long hold out after the conquest of Naxos, nor even the large and valuable island of Eubœa. He himself engaged, if a fleet of 100 ships were granted to him, to accomplish all these conquests for the Great King, and to bear the expenses of the armament besides. Artaphernês entertained the proposition with eagerness, loaded him with praise, and promised him in the ensuing spring 200 ships instead of 100. Messengers despatched to Susa having brought back the ready consent of Darius, a large armament was forthwith equipped under the command of the Persian Megabatês, to be placed at the disposal of Aristagoras—composed both of Persians and of all the tributaries near the coast.¹

With this force Aristagoras and the Naxian exiles set sail from Milêtus, giving out that they were going to the Hellespont: on reaching Chios, they waited in its western harbour of Kaukasa for a fair wind to carry them straight across to Naxos. No suspicion was entertained in that island of its real purpose, nor was any preparation made for resistance; so that the success of Aristagoras would have been complete, had it not been defeated by an untoward incident ending in dispute. Megabatês, with a solicitude which we are surprised to discern in a Persian general, personally made the tour of his fleet, to see that every ship was under proper watch. He discovered a ship from Myndus (an Asiatic Dorian city near Halikarnassus) left without a single man on board. Incensed at such neglect, he called before him Skylax, the commander of the ship, and ordered him to be put in chains, with his head projecting outwards through one of the apertures for oars in the ship's side.

hat I do not place much confidence in the statements of that treatise as to the many despots expelled by Sparta: we neither know the source from whence Plutarch borrowed them, nor any of the circumstances connected with them.

¹ Herodot. v. 30, 31.

Skylax was a guest and friend of Aristagoras, who on hearing of this punishment, interceded with Megabâtês for his release but finding the request refused, took upon him to release the prisoner himself. He even went so far as to treat the remonstrance of Megabâtês with disdain, reminding him that according to the instructions of Artaphernês, he was only second—himself (Aristagoras) being first. The pride of Megabâtês could not endure such treatment: as soon as night arrived, he sent a private intimation to Naxos of the coming of the fleet, warning the islanders to be on their guard. The warning thus fortunately received was turned by the Naxians to the best account. They carried in their property, laid up stores, and made every preparation for a siege, so that when the fleet, probably delayed by the dispute between its leaders, at length arrived, it was met by a stout resistance, remained on the island for four months in prosecution of an unavailing siege, and was obliged to retire without accomplishing anything beyond the erection of a fort, as lodgment for the Naxian exiles. After a large cost incurred, not only by the Persians but also by Aristagoras himself, the unsuccessful armament was brought back to the coast of Ionia.¹

The failure of this expedition threatened Aristagoras with entire ruin. He had incensed Megabâtês, deceived Artaphernês, and incurred an obligation, which he knew not how to discharge, of indemnifying the latter for the costs of the fleet. He began to revolve in his mind the scheme of revolting from Persia, and it so happened that there arrived near at the same moment a messenger; from his father-in-law Histiaëus, who was detained at the court of Susa, secretly instigating him to this very resolution. Not knowing whom to trust with this dangerous message, Histiaëus had caused the head of a faithful slave to be shaved—branded upon it the words necessary—and then despatched him, so soon as his hair had grown, to Milêtus, with a verbal intimation to Aristagoras that his head was to be again shaved and examined.² Histiaëus sought to provoke this perilous rising simply as a means of procuring his own release from Susa, and in the calculation that Darius would send him down to the coast to re-establish order. His message, arriving at so critical a moment, determined the faltering resolution of Aristagoras, who convened his principal partisans at Milêtus

¹ Herodot. v. 34, 35.

² Herodot. v. 35: compare Polyæn. i. 24, and Aulus Gellius, N. A. xvii. 9.

and laid before them the formidable project of revolt. All of them approved it, with one remarkable exception—the historian Hekataeus of Milêtus; who opposed it as altogether ruinous, and contended that the power of Darius was too vast to leave them any prospect of success. When he found direct opposition fruitless, he next insisted upon the necessity of at once seizing the large treasures in the neighbouring temple of Apollo at Branchidæ for the purpose of carrying on the revolt. By this means alone (he said) could the Milesians, too feeble to carry on the contest with their own force alone, hope to become masters at sea—while, if *they* did not take these treasures, the victorious enemy assuredly would. Neither of these recommendations, both of them indicating sagacity and foresight in the proposer, were listened to. Probably the seizure of the treasures—though highly useful for the impending struggle, and though in the end they fell into the hands of the enemy, as Hekataeus anticipated—would have been insupportable to the pious feelings of the people, and would thus have proved more injurious than beneficial:¹ perhaps indeed Hekataeus himself may have urged it with the indirect view of stifling the whole project. We may remark that he seems to have argued the question as if Milêtus were to stand alone in the revolt; not anticipating, as indeed no prudent man could then anticipate, that the Ionic cities generally would follow the example.

Aristagoras and his friends resolved forthwith to revolt. Their first step was to conciliate popular favour throughout Asiatic Greece by putting down the despots in all the various cities—the instruments not less than the supports of Persian ascendancy, as Histiaeus had well argued at the bridge of the Danube. The opportunity was favourable for striking this blow at once on a considerable scale. For the fleet, recently employed at Naxos, had not yet dispersed, but was still assembled at Myus, with many of the despots present at the head of their ships. Accordingly Iatragoras was despatched from Milêtus, at once to seize as many of them as he could, and to stir up the soldiers to revolt. This decisive proceeding was the first manifesto against Darius. Iatragoras was successful: the fleet went along with him, and many of the despots fell into his hands—among them Histiaeus (a second person so named) of Termera, Oliatus of Mylasa (both Karians),² Kôês of Mitylênê, and Aristagoras (also a second person so named)

¹ Herodot. v. 36.

² Compare Herodotus, v. 121 and vii. 98. Oliatus was son of Ibanôlis, as was also the Mylasian Herakleidês mentioned in v. 121.

of Kymê. At the same time the Milesian Aristagoras himself, while he formally proclaimed revolt against Darius, and invited the Milesians to follow him, laid down his own authority, and affected to place the government in the hands of the people. Throughout most of the towns of Asiatic Greece, insular and continental, a similar revolution was brought about; the despots were expelled, and the feelings of the citizens were thus warmly interested in the revolt. Such of these despots as fell into the hands of Aristagoras were surrendered into the hands of their former subjects, by whom they were for the most part quietly dismissed, and we shall find them hereafter active auxiliaries to the Persians. To this treatment the only exception mentioned is Kôês, who was stoned to death by the Mitylenæans.¹

By these first successful steps the Ionic revolt was made to assume an extensive and formidable character; much more so, probably, than the prudent Hekataëus had anticipated as practicable. The naval force of the Persians in the Ægean was at once taken away from them, and passed to their opponents, who were thus completely masters of the sea; and would in fact have remained so, if a second naval force had not been brought up against them from Phenicia—a proceeding never before resorted to, and perhaps at that time not looked for.

Having exhorted all the revolted towns to name their generals and to put themselves in a state of defence, Aristagoras crossed the Ægean to obtain assistance from Sparta, then under the government of king Kleomenês; to whom he addressed himself, "holding in his hand a brazen tablet, wherein was engraved the circuit of the entire earth, with the whole sea and all the rivers." Probably this was the first map or plan which had ever been seen at Sparta, and so profound was the impression which it made, that it was remembered there even in the time of Herodotus.² Having emphatically

¹ Herodot. v. 36, 37, vi. 9.

² Herodot. v. 49. Τῷ δὴ (Κλεομένει) ἐς λόγους ἦγε, ὡς Λακεδαιμόνιοι λέγουσι, ἔχων χάλκεον πῖνακα, ἐν τῷ γῆς ἀπάσης περιόδου ἐνετέμμητο, καὶ θάλασσά τε πᾶσα καὶ ποταμοὶ πάντες.

The earliest map of which mention is made was prepared by Anaximander in Ionia, apparently not long before this period: see Strabo, i. p. 7; Agathemerus, i, c. 1; Diogen. Laërt. ii. 1.

Grosskurd, in his note on the above passage of Strabo, as well as Larcher and other critics, appear to think, that though this tablet or chart of Anaximander was the earliest which embraced the whole known earth, there were among the Greeks others still earlier, which described particular countries. There is no proof of this, nor can I think it probable: the

entreated the Spartans to step forth in aid of their Ionic brethren, now engaged in a desperate struggle for freedom, he proceeded to describe the wealth and abundance (gold, silver, brass, vestments, cattle and slaves), together with the ineffective weapons and warfare, of the Asiatics. Such enemies as the latter (he said) could be at once put down, and their wealth appropriated, by military training such as that of the Spartans—whose long spear, brazen helmet and breastplate, and ample shield, enabled them to despise the bow, the short javelin, the light wicker target, the turban and trowsers, of a Persian.¹ He then traced out on his brazen plan the road from Ephesus to Susa, indicating the intervening nations, all of them affording a booty more or less rich. He concluded by magnifying especially the vast treasures at Susa—"Instead of fighting your neighbours (he concluded), Argeians, Arcadians, and Messenians, from whom you get hard blows and small reward, why do you not make yourself rulers of all Asia,² a prize not less easy than lucrative?" Kleomenês replied to these seductive instigations by desiring him to come for an answer on the third day. When that day arrived, he put to him the simple question, how far it was from Susa to the sea? To which Aristagoras answered with more frankness than dexterity, that it was a three months' journey; and he was proceeding to enlarge upon the facilities of the road when Kleomenês interrupted him—"Quit Sparta before sunset, Milesian stranger: you are no friend to the Lacedæmonians, if you want to carry them a three months' journey from the sea." In spite of this peremptory mandate, Aristagoras tried a last resource. Taking in his hand the bough of supplication, he again went to the house of Kleomenês, who was sitting with his daughter Gorgô, a girl of eight years old. He requested Kleomenês to send away the child, but this was refused, and he was desired to proceed; upon which he began to offer to the Spartan king a bribe for compliance, bidding continually passage of Apollonius Rhodius (iv. 279) with the Scholia to it, which is cited as evidence, appears to me unworthy of attention.

Among the Roman Agrimensores, it was the ancient practice to engrave their plans, of land surveyed, upon tablets of brass, which were deposited in the public archives, and of which copies were made for private use, though the original was referred to in case of legal dispute (Siculus Flaccus ap. Rei Agrariæ Scriptores, p. 16, ed. Goes: compare Giraud, Recherches sur le Droit de Propriété, p. 116, Aix 1838).

¹ Herodot. v. 49. δεικνὺς δὲ τὰυτὰ ἔλεγε ἐς τὴν τῆς γῆς περίοδον, τὴν ἐφέρετο ἐν τῷ πίνακι ἐντετημημένῃ.

² Herodot. v. 49. παρέχον δὲ τῆς Ἀσίας πάσης ἄρχειν εὐπειτέως, ἄλλο τι αἰρήσεσθε;

higher and higher from ten talents up to fifty. At length the little girl suddenly exclaimed, "Father, the stranger will corrupt you, if you do not at once go away." The exclamation so struck Kleomenês, that he broke up the interview, and Aristagoras forthwith quitted Sparta.¹

Doubtless Herodotus heard the account of this interview from Lacedæmonian informants. Yet we may be permitted to doubt whether any such suggestions were really made, or any such hopes held out, as those which he places in the mouth of Aristagoras—suggestions and hopes which might well be conceived in 450–440 B.C., after a generation of victories over the Persians, but which have no pertinence in the year 502 B.C. Down even to the battle of Marathon, the name of the Medes was a terror to the Greeks, and the Athenians are highly and justly extolled as the first who dared to look them in the face.² To talk about an easy march up to the treasures of Susa and the empire of all Asia, at the time of the Ionic revolt, would have been considered as a proof of insanity. Aristagoras may very probably have represented that the Spartans were more than a match for Persians in the field; but even thus much would have been considered, in 502 B.C., rather as the sanguine hope of a petitioner than as the estimate of a sober looker-on.

The Milesian chief had made application to Sparta, as the presiding power of Hellas—a character which we thus find more and more recognised and passing into the habitual feeling of the Greeks. Fifty years previously to this, the Spartans had been flattered by the circumstance that Croesus singled them out from all other Greeks to invite as allies: now, they accepted such priority as a matter of course.³

¹ Herodot. v. 49, 50, 51. Compare Plutarch. Apophthegm. Laconic. p. 240.

We may remark, both in this instance and throughout all the life and time of Kleomenês, that the Spartan king has the active management and direction of foreign affairs—subject however to trial and punishment by the ephors in case of misbehaviour (Herodot. vi. 82). We shall hereafter find the ephors gradually taking into their own hands, more and more, the actual management.

² Herodot. vi. 112. *πρῶτοί τε ἀνέσχοντο ἐσθῆτά τε Μηδικὴν δρέωντες, καὶ ἄνδρας ταύτην ἐσθμημένους· τῆως δὲ ἦν τοῖσι Ἑλλήσι καὶ τὸ ὄνομα τὸ Μήδων φόβος ἀκούσαι.*

³ Aristagoras says to the Spartans (v. 49)—*τὰ κατήκοντα γὰρ ἔστι ταῦτα· Ἰόνων παῖδας δούλους εἶναι ἀντ' ἐλευθέρων, ὄνειδος καὶ ἄλγος μέγιστον μὲν αὐτοῖσι ἡμῖν, ἔτι δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν ὑμῖν, ὅσῳ προεστῆτε τῆς Ἑλλάδος* (Herodot. v. 49). In reference to the earlier incident (Herodot. i. 70)—*Τουτέων τε ἂν ἔνεκεν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τὴν συμμαχίην ἐδέξαντο, καὶ ὅτι ἐκ πάντων σφέας προκρίνας Ἑλλήνων, αἰρέετο φίλους* (Croesus).

Rejected at Sparta, Aristagoras proceeded to Athens, now decidedly the second power in Greece. Here he found an easier task, not only as it was the metropolis (or mother-city) of Asiatic Ionia, but also as it had already incurred the pronounced hostility of the Persian satrap, and might look to be attacked as soon as the project came to suit his convenience, under the instigation of Hippias: whereas the Spartans had not only no kindred with Ionia, beyond that of common Hellenism, but were in no hostile relations with Persia, and would have been provoking a new enemy by meddling in the Asiatic war. The promises and representations of Aristagoras were accordingly received with great favour by the Athenians; who, over and above the claims of sympathy, had a powerful interest in sustaining the Ionic revolt as an indirect protection to themselves—and to whom the abstraction of the Ionic fleet from the Persians afforded a conspicuous and important relief. The Athenians at once resolved to send a fleet of twenty ships, under Melanthius, as an aid to the revolted Ionians—ships which are designated by Herodotus, “the beginning of the mischiefs between Greeks and barbarians”—as the ships in which Paris crossed the Ægean had before been called in the Iliad of Homer. Herodotus further remarks that it seems easier to deceive many men together than one—since Aristagoras, after having failed with Kleomenès, thus imposed upon the 30,000 citizens of Athens.¹ But on this remark two comments suggest themselves. First, the circumstances of Athens and Sparta were not the same in regard to the Ionic quarrel,—an observation which Herodotus himself had made a little while before: the Athenians had a material interest in the quarrel, political as well as sympathetic, while the Spartans had none. Secondly, the ultimate result of their interference, as it stood in the time of Herodotus, though purchased by severe intermediate hardship, was one eminently gainful and glorifying, not less to Athens than to Greece.²

When Aristagoras returned, he seems to have found the Persians engaged in the siege of Milêtus. The twenty Athenian

An interval of rather more than forty years separates the two events, during which both the feelings of the Spartans, and the feelings of others towards them, had undergone a material change.

¹ Herodot. v. 97. πολλοὺς γὰρ οἶκε εἶναι εὐπετέστερον διαβάλλειν ἢ ἓνα, εἰ Κλεομένηα μὲν τὸν Λακεδαιμόνιον μόνον οὐκ οἶδός τε ἐγένετο διαβαλέειν, τρεῖς δὲ μυριάδας Ἀθηναίων ἐποίησε τοῦτο.

² Herodot. v. 98; Homer, Iliad, v. 62. The criticism of Plutarch (De Malignitat. Herodot. p. 861) on this passage, is rather more pertinent than the criticisms in that ill-tempered composition generally are.

ships soon crossed the *Ægean*, and found there five Eretrian ships which had also come to the succour of the Ionians; the Eretrians generously taking this opportunity to repay assistance formerly rendered to them by the Milesians in their ancient war with Chalkis. On the arrival of these allies, Aristagoras organised an expedition from Ephesus up to Sardis, under the command of his brother Charopinus with others. The ships were left at Koréssus,¹ a mountain and seaport five miles from Ephesus, while the troops marched up under Ephesian guides, first along the river Kayster, next across the mountain range of Tmólus to Sardis. Artaphernês had not troops enough to do more than hold the strong citadel, so that the assailants possessed themselves of the town without opposition. But he immediately recalled his force near Milêtus,² and summoned Persians and Lydians from all the neighbouring districts, thus becoming more than a match for Charopinus; who found himself moreover obliged to evacuate Sardis owing to an accidental conflagration. Most of the houses in that city were built in great part with reeds or straw, and all of them had thatched roofs. Hence it happened that a spark touching one of them set the whole city in flame. Obligated to abandon their dwellings by this accident, the population of the town congregated in the market-place,—and as reinforcements were hourly crowding in, the position of the Ionians and Athenians became precarious. They evacuated the town, took up a position on Mount Tmólus, and when night came, made the best of their way to the sea-coast. The troops of Artaphernês pursued, overtook them near Ephesus, and defeated them completely. Eualkidês the Eretrian general, a man of eminence and a celebrated victor at the solemn games, perished in the action, together with a considerable number of troops. After this unsuccessful commencement, the Athenians betook themselves to their vessels and sailed home, in spite of pressing instances on the part of Aristagoras to induce them to stay. They took no further part in the struggle;³ a retirement at once so sudden and so complete, that they must probably have

¹ About Koréssus, see Diodor. xiv. 99 and Xenophon. Hellen. i. 2, 7.

² Charôn of Lampsakus, and Lysanias in his history of Eretria, seem to have mentioned this first siege of Milêtus, and the fact of its being raised in consequence of the expedition to Sardis: see Plutarch. de Herodot. Malignit. p. 861—though the citation is given there confusedly, so that we cannot make much out of it.

³ Herodot. v. 102, 103. It is a curious fact that Charôn of Lampsakus made no mention of this defeat of the united Athenian and Ionian force: see Plutarch. de Herodot. Malign. *ut sup.*

experienced some glaring desertion on the part of their Asiatic allies, similar to that which brought so much danger upon the Spartan general Derkyllidas, in 396 B.C. Unless such was the case, they seem open to censure rather for having too soon withdrawn their aid, than for having originally lent it.¹

The burning of a place so important as Sardis, however, including the temples of the local goddess Kybêbê, which perished with the remaining buildings, produced a powerful effect on both sides—encouraging the revolters, as well as incensing the Persians. Aristagoras despatched ships along the coast, northward as far as Byzantium, and southward as far as Cyprus. The Greek cities near the Hellespont and the Propontis were induced, either by force or by inclination, to take part with him: the Karians embraced his cause warmly; even the Kaunians who had not declared themselves before, joined him as soon as they heard of the capture of Sardis; while the Greeks in Cyprus, with the single exception of the town of Amathûs, at once renounced the authority of Darius, and prepared for a strenuous contest. Onesilus of Salamis, the most considerable city in the island, finding the population willing, but his brother, the despot Gorgus, reluctant, shut the latter out of the gates, took the command of the united forces of Salamis and the other revolting cities, and laid siege to Amathûs. These towns of Cyprus were then, and seem always afterwards to have continued, under the government of despots; who however, unlike the despots in Ionia generally, took part along with their subjects in the revolt against Persia.²

The rebellion had now assumed a character so serious, that the Persians were compelled to put forth their strongest efforts to subdue it. From the number of different nations comprised in their empire, they were enabled to make use of the antipathies of one against the other; and the old adverse feeling of Phenicians against Greeks was now found extremely serviceable. After a year spent in getting together forces,³ the Phenician fleet was employed to transport into Cyprus the Persian

¹ About Derkyllidas, see Xenophon, Hellen. iii. 2, 17-19.

² Herodot. v. 103, 104, 108. Compare the proceedings in Cyprus against Artaxerxês Mnêmon, under the energetic Evagoras of Salamis (Diodor. xiv. 98, xv. 2), about 386 B.C.; most of the petty princes of the island became for the time his subjects, but in 351 B.C. there were nine of them independent (Diodor. xvi. 42), and seemingly quite as many at the time when Alexander besieged Tyre (Arrian, ii. 20, 8).

³ Herodot. v. 116. *Κύπριοι μὲν δὴ, ἐναντὶν ἐλευθεροὶ γενόμενοι, αὐτὶς ἐκ νέης κατεδεοῦλωντο.*

general Artybius with a Kilikian and Egyptian army ;¹ while the force under Artaphernês at Sardis was so strengthened as to enable him to act at once against all the coast of Asia Minor, from the Propontis to the Triopian promontory. On the other side, the common danger had for the moment brought the Ionians into a state of union foreign to their usual habit ; so that we hear now, for the first and the last time, of a tolerably efficient Pan-Ionic authority.²

Apprised of the coming of Artybius with the Phenician fleet, Onesilus and his Cyprian supporters solicited the aid of the Ionic fleet, which arrived shortly after the disembarkation of the Persian force in the island. Onesilus offered to the Ionians their choice, whether they would fight the Phenicians at sea or the Persians on land. Their natural determination was in favour of the sea-fight, and they engaged with a degree of courage and unanimity which procured for them a brilliant victory ; the Samians being especially distinguished.³ But the combat on land, carried on at the same time, took a different turn. Onesilus and the Salaminians brought into the field, after the fashion of Orientals rather than of Greeks, a number of scythed chariots, destined to break the enemy's ranks ; while on the other hand the Persian general Artybius was mounted on a horse, trained to rise on his hind-legs and strike out with his fore-legs against an opponent on foot. In the thick of the fight, Onesilus and his Karian shield-bearer came into personal conflict with this general and his horse. By previous concert, when the horse so reared as to get his fore-legs over the shield of Onesilus, the Karian with a scythe severed the legs from his body, while Onesilus with his own hand slew Artybius. But the personal bravery of the Cypriots was rendered useless by treachery in their own ranks. Stêsênor, despot of Kurium, deserted in the midst of the battle, and even the scythed chariots of Salamis followed his example ; while the brave Onesilus, thus weakened, perished in the total rout of his army, along with Aristokyprus despot of Soli on the north coast of the island : this latter was son of that Philokyprus who had been immortalised more than sixty years before in the poems of Solon. No further hopes now remaining for the revolters, the victorious Ionian fleet returned home. Salamis relapsed under the sway of its former despot Gorgus, while the re-

¹ Herodot. vi. 6. Κίλικες καὶ Αἰγύπτιοι.

² Herodot. v. 109. Ἡμέας ἀπέπεμψε τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἰώνων φυλάξοντας τὴν θάλασσαν, &c. : compare vi. 7.

³ Herodot. v. 112.

maining cities in Cyprus were successively besieged and taken; not without a resolute defence, however, since Soli alone held out five months.¹

Meanwhile the principal force of Darius having been assembled at Sardis, Daurisês, Hymeas, and other generals who had married daughters of the Great King, distributed their efforts against different parts of the western coast. Daurisês attacked the towns near the Hellespont²—Abydus, Perkôtê, Lampsakus, and Pæsus—which made little resistance. He was then ordered southward into Karia, while Hymeas, who with another division had taken Kios on the Propontis, marched down to the Hellespont and completed the conquest of the Troad as well as of the Æolic Greeks in the region of İda. Artaphernês and Otanês attacked the Ionic and Æolic towns on the coast—the former taking Klazomenæ,³ the latter Kymê.

¹ Herodot. v. 112–115. It is not uninteresting to compare, with this reconquest of Cyprus by the Persians, the conquest of the same island by the Turks in 1570, when they expelled from it the Venetians. See the narrative of that conquest (effected in the reign of Selim II. by the Seraskier Mustapha-Pasha), in Von Hammer, *Geschichte des Osmannischen Reichs*, book xxxvi. vol. iii. p. 578–589. Of the two principal towns, Nikosia in the centre of the island, and Famagusta on the north-eastern coast, the first, after a long siege, was taken by storm, and the inhabitants of every sex and age either put to death or carried into slavery; while the second, after a most gallant defence, was allowed to capitulate. But the terms of the capitulation were violated in the most flagitious manner by the Seraskier, who treated the brave Venetian governor, Bragadino, with frightful cruelty, cutting off his nose and ears, exposing him to all sorts of insults, and ultimately causing him to be flayed alive. The skin of this unfortunate general was conveyed to Constantinople as a trophy, but in after times found its way to Venice.

We read of nothing like this treatment of Bragadino in the Persian reconquest of Cyprus, though it was a subjugation after revolt; indeed nothing like it in all Persian warfare.

Von Hammer gives a short sketch (not always very accurate as to ancient times) of the condition of Cyprus under its successive masters—Persians, Græco-Egyptians, Romans, Arabians, the dynasty of Lusignan, Venetians, and Turks—the last seems decidedly the worst of all.

In reference to the above-mentioned piece of cruelty, I may mention that the Persian king Kambysês caused one of the royal judges (according to Herodotus, v. 25), who had taken a bribe to render an iniquitous judgement, to be flayed alive, and his skin to be stretched upon the seat on which his son was placed to succeed him; as a lesson of justice to the latter. A similar story is told respecting the Persian king Artaxerxês Mnêmon; and what is still more remarkable, the same story is also recounted in the Turkish history, as an act of Mahomet II. (Von Hammer, *Geschichte des Osmannischen Reichs*, book xvii. ; vol. ii. p. 209; Diodorus, xv. 10). Ammianus Marcellinus (xxiii. 6) had good reason to treat the reality of the fact as problematical.

² Herodot. v. 117.

³ Herodot. v. 122–124.

There remained Karia, which, with Milêtus in its neighbourhood, offered a determined resistance to Daurisês. Forewarned of his approach, the Karians assembled at a spot called the White Pillars, near the confluence of the rivers Mæander and Marsyas. Pixodarus, one of their chiefs, recommended the desperate expedient of fighting with the river at their back, so that all chance of flight might be cut off; but most of the chiefs decided in favour of a contrary policy¹—to let the Persians pass the river, in hopes of driving them back into it and thus rendering their defeat total. Victory however, after a sharp contest, declared in favour of Daurisês, chiefly in consequence of his superior numbers. Two thousand Persians, and not less than ten thousand Karians, are said to have perished in the battle. The Karian fugitives, re-united after the flight in the grove of noble plane-trees consecrated to Zeus Stratius near Labranda,² were deliberating whether they should now submit to the Persians or emigrate for ever, when the appearance of a Milesian reinforcement restored their courage. A second battle was fought, and a second time they were defeated, the loss on this occasion falling chiefly on the Milesians.³ The victorious Persians now proceeded to assault the Karian cities, but Herakleidês of Mylasa laid an ambuscade for them with so much skill and good fortune, that their army was nearly destroyed, and Daurisês with other Persian generals perished. This successful effort, following upon two severe defeats, does honour to the constancy of the Karians, upon whom Greek proverbs generally fasten a mean reputation. It saved for the time the Karian towns, which the Persians did not succeed in reducing until after the capture of Milêtus.⁴

On land, the revolters were thus everywhere worsted, though

¹ Herodot. v. 118. On the topography of this spot, as described in Herodotus, see a good note in Weissenborn, *Beyträge zur genaueren Erforschung der alt. Griechischen Geschichte*, p. 116, Jena 1844.

He thinks, with much reason, that the river Marsyas here mentioned cannot be that which flows through Kelænæ, but another of the same name which flows into the Mæander from the south-west.

² About the village of Labranda and the temple of Zeus Stratius, see Strabo, xiv. p. 659. Labranda was a village in the territory of, and seven miles distant from, the inland town of Mylasa. It was Karian at the time of the Ionic revolt, but partially hellenised before the year 350 B. C. About this latter epoch, the three rural tribes of Mylasa—constituting, along with the citizens of the town, the Mylasene community—were, *Ταρκόνδαρα*, *Ὀρώρκονδα*, *Ἀδβρανδα*—see the Inscription in Boeckh's Collection, No. 2695, and in Franz, *Epigraphicæ Græca*, No. 73, p. 191. In the Lydian language, *ἰάβρρυς* is said to have signified a hatchet (Plutarch, *Quæst. Gr. c. 45*, p. 314).

³ Herodot. v. 118, 119.

⁴ Herodot. v. 120, 121; vi. 25.


at sea the Ionians still remained masters. But the unwarlike Aristagoras began to despair of success, and to meditate a mean desertion of the companions and countrymen whom he had himself betrayed into danger. Assembling his chief advisers, he represented to them the unpromising state of affairs, and the necessity of securing some place of refuge, in case they were expelled from Milêtus. He then put the question to them, whether the island of Sardinia, or Myrkinus in Thrace near the Strymon (which Histiaëus had begun some time before to fortify, as I have mentioned in the preceding chapter), appeared to them best adapted to the purpose. Among the persons consulted was Hekataëus the historian, who approved neither the one nor the other scheme, but suggested the erection of a fortified post in the neighbouring island of Leros; a Milesian colony, wherein a temporary retirement might be sought, should it prove impossible to hold Milêtus, but which permitted an easy return to that city, so soon as opportunity offered.¹ Such an opinion must doubtless have been founded on the assumption, that they would be able to maintain superiority at sea. It is important to note such confident reliance upon this superiority in the mind of a sagacious man, not given to sanguine hopes, like Hekataëus—even under circumstances very unprosperous on land. Emigration to Myrkinus, as proposed by Aristagoras, presented no hope of refuge at all; since the Persians, if they regained their authority in Asia Minor, would not fail again to extend it to the Strymon. Nevertheless the consultation ended by adopting this scheme, since probably no Ionians could endure the immeasurable distance of Sardinia as a new home. Aristagoras set sail for Myrkinus, taking with him all who chose to bear him company. But he perished not long after landing, together with nearly all his company, in the siege of a neighbouring Thracian town.² Though making profession to lay down his supreme authority at the commencement of the revolt, he had still contrived to retain it in great measure; and on departing for Myrkinus, he devolved it on Pythagoras, a citizen in high esteem. It appears however that the Milesians, glad to get rid of a leader who had brought them nothing but mischief,³ paid little obedience to his successor, and made their government from this period popular in reality

¹ Herodot. v. 125; Strabo, xiv. p. 635.

² Herodot. v. 126.

³ Herodot. vi. 5. Οἱ δὲ Μιλήσιοι, ἄσμενοι ἀπαλαχθέντες καὶ Ἀρισταγόρῳ, οὐδαμῶς ἐπίμοι ἔσαν ἄλλον τύραννον δέκεσθαι ἐς τὴν χώραν, οὐδ' ἐπεισέμενοι.

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as well as in profession. The desertion of Aristagoras with the citizens whom he carried away, must have seriously damped the spirits of those who remained. Nevertheless it seems that the cause of the Ionic revolters was quite as well conducted without him.

Not long after his departure, another despot—Histiaëus of Milêtus, his father-in-law and jointly with him the fomentor of the revolt—presented himself at the gates of Milêtus for admission. The outbreak of the revolt had enabled him, as he had calculated, to procure leave of departure from Darius. That prince had been thrown into violent indignation by the attack and burning of Sardis, and by the general revolt of Ionia, headed (so the news reached him) by the Milesian Aristagoras, but carried into effect by the active co-operation of the Athenians. “The Athenians (exclaimed Darius)—who are *they?*” On receiving the answer, he asked for his bow, placed an arrow on the string, and shot as high as he could towards the heavens, saying—“Grant me, Zeus, to revenge myself on the Athenians.” He at the same time desired an attendant to remind him thrice every day at dinner—“Master, remember the Athenians:” for as to the Ionians, he felt assured that their hour of retribution would come speedily and easily enough.¹

This Homeric incident deserves notice as illustrating the epical handling of Herodotus. His theme is, the invasions of Greece by Persia: he has now arrived at the first eruption, in the bosom of Darius, of that passion which impelled the Persian forces towards Marathon and Salamis—and he marks the beginning of the new phase by act and word both alike significant. It may be compared to the libation and prayer addressed by Achilles in the *Iliad* to Zeus, at the moment when he is sending forth Patroklos and the Myrmidons to the rescue of the despairing Greeks.

At first Darius had been inclined to ascribe the movement in Ionia to the secret instigation of Histiaëus, whom he called into his presence and questioned. But the latter found means to satisfy him, and even to make out that no such mischief would have occurred, if he (Histiaëus) had been at Milêtus instead of being detained at Susa. “Send me down to the spot (he asseverated), and I engage not merely to quell the revolt and put into your hands the traitor who heads it—but

¹ Herodot. v. 105. ὦ Ζεῦ, ἐκγενέσθαι μοι Ἀθηναίους τίσασθαι. Compare the Thracian practice of communicating with the gods by shooting arrows high up into the air (Herodot. iv. 94).

also not to take off this tunic from my body, before I shall have added to your empire the great island of Sardinia." An expedition to Sardinia, though never realised, appears to have been among the favourite fancies of the Ionic Greeks of that day.¹ By such boasts and assurances he obtained his liberty, and went down to Sardis, promising to return as soon as he should have accomplished them.² But on reaching Sardis he found the satrap Artaphernês better informed than the Great King at Susa. Though Histiaëus, when questioned as to the causes which had brought on the outbreak, affected nothing but ignorance and astonishment, Artaphernês detected his evasions, and said—"I will tell you how the facts stand, Histiaëus: it is you that have stitched this shoe, and Aristagoras has put it on."³ Such a declaration promised little security to the suspected Milesian who heard it; and accordingly, as soon as night arrived, he took to flight, went down to the coast, and from thence passed over to Chios. Here he found himself seized on the opposite count, as the confidant of Darius and the enemy of Ionia. He was released however on proclaiming himself not merely a fugitive escaping from Persian custody, but also as the prime author of the Ionic revolt: and he further added, in order to increase his popularity, that Darius had contemplated the translation of the Ionian population to Phenicia, as well as that of the Phenician population to Ionia—to prevent which translation he (Histiaëus) had instigated the revolt. This allegation, though nothing better than a pure fabrication, obtained for him the goodwill of the Chians, who carried him back to Milêtus: but before he departed, he despatched to Sardis some letters, addressed to distinguished Persians, framed as if he were already in established intrigue with them for revolting against Darius, and intended to invite them to actual revolt. His messenger, Hermippus of Atarneus, betrayed him, and carried his letters straight to Artaphernês. The satrap desired that these letters might be delivered to the persons to whom they were addressed, but that the answers

¹ Herodot. v. 107, vi. 2. Compare the advice of Bias of Priênê to the Ionians, when the Persian conqueror Cyrus was approaching, to found a Pan-Ionic colony in Sardinia (Herodot. i. 170): the idea started by Aristagoras has been alluded to just above (Herodot. v. 124).

Pausanias (iv. 23, 2) puts into the mouth of Mantiklus, son of Aristomenês, a recommendation to the Messenians, when conquered a second time by the Spartans, to migrate to Sardinia.

² Herodot. v. 106, 107.

³ Herodot. vi. 1. Οὐτῶ τοι, Ἰστιαίε, ἔχει κατὰ ταῦτα τὰ πρήγματα· ταῦτο τὸ ὑπόδημα ἐβράσας μὲν σὺ, ὑπεδήσατο δὲ Ἀρισταγόρης.

sent to Histiaëus might be handed to himself. Such was the tenor of the answers, that Artaphernês was induced to seize and put to death several of the Persians around him : but Histiaëus was disappointed in his purpose of bringing about a revolt in the place.¹

On arriving at Milêtus, Histiaëus found Aristagoras no longer present, and the citizens altogether adverse to the return of their old despot : nevertheless he tried to force his way by night into the town, but was repulsed and even wounded in the thigh. He returned to Chios, but the Chians refused him the aid of any of their ships : he next passed to Lesbos, from the inhabitants of which island he obtained eight triremes, and employed them to occupy Byzantium, pillaging and detaining the Ionian merchant-ships as they passed into or out of the Euxine.² The few remaining piracies of this worthless traitor, mischievous to his countrymen even down to the day of his death, hardly deserve our notice amidst the last struggles and sufferings of the subjugated Ionians, to which we are now hastening.

A vast Persian force, both military and naval, was gradually concentrating itself near Milêtus, against which city Artaphernês had determined to direct his principal efforts. Not only the whole army of Asia Minor, but also the Kilikian and Egyptian troops fresh from the conquest of Cyprus, and even the conquered Cypriots themselves, were brought up as reinforcements ; while the entire Phœnician fleet, no less than 600 ships strong, co-operated on the coast.³ To meet such a land-force in the field was far beyond the strength of the Ionians, and the joint Pan-Ionic council resolved that the Milesians should be left to defend their own fortifications, while the entire force of the confederate cities should be mustered on board the ships. At sea they had as yet no reason to despair, having been victorious over the Phœnicians near Cyprus, and having sustained no defeat. The combined Ionic fleet, including the Æolic Lesbians, amounting in all to the number of 353 ships, was accordingly mustered at Ladê—then a little island near Milêtus, but now joined on to the coast, by the gradual accumulation of land in the bay at the mouth of the Mæander. Eighty Milesian ships formed the right wing, one hundred Chian ships the centre, and sixty Samian ships the left wing, while the space between the Milesians and the Chians was occupied by twelve ships from Priênê, three from Myus, and seventeen from Teôs—the space between the Chians and

¹ Herodot. vi. 2-5.

² Herodot. vi. 5-26.

³ Herodot. vi. 6-9.

Samians was filled by eight ships from Erythræ, three from Phôkæa, and seventy from Lesbos.¹

The total armament thus made up was hardly inferior in number to that which, fifteen years afterwards, gained the battle of Salamis against a far larger Persian fleet than the present. Moreover the courage of the Ionians, on ship-board, was equal to that of their contemporaries on the other side of the Ægean ; while in respect of disagreement among the allies, we shall hereafter find the circumstances preceding the battle of Salamis still more menacing than those before the coming battle of Ladê. The chances of success therefore were at least equal between the two, and indeed the anticipations of the Persians and Phenicians on the present occasion were full of doubt, so that they thought it necessary to set on foot express means for disuniting the Ionians—it was fortunate for the Greeks that Xerxês at Salamis could not be made to conceive the prudence of aiming at the same object. There were now in the Persian camp all those various despots whom Aristagoras, at the beginning of the revolt, had driven out of their respective cities. At the instigation of Artaphernês, each of these men despatched secret communications to their citizens in the allied fleet, endeavouring to detach them severally from the general body, by promises of gentle treatment in the event of compliance, and by threats of extreme infliction from the Persians if they persisted in armed efforts. Though these communications were sent to each without the knowledge of the rest, yet the answer from all was one unanimous negative.² The confederates at Ladê seemed more one, in heart and spirit, than the Athenians, Spartans and Corinthians will hereafter prove to be at Salamis.

But there was one grand difference which turned the scale—the superior energy and ability of the Athenian leaders at Salamis, coupled with the fact that they *were* Athenians—that is, in command of the largest and most important contingent throughout the fleet.

At Ladê, unfortunately, this was quite otherwise. Each separate contingent had its own commander, but we hear of no joint commander at all. Nor were the chiefs who came from the larger cities—Milesian, Chian, Samian, or Lesbian—men like Themistoklês, competent and willing to stand forward as self-created leaders, and to usurp for the moment, with the general consent and for the general benefit, a privilege not

¹ Herodot. vi. 8.

² Herodot. vi. 9, 10.

intended for them. The only man of sufficient energy and forwardness to do this, was the Phòkæan Dionysius—unfortunately the captain of the smallest contingent of the fleet, and therefore enjoying the least respect. For Phòkæa, once the daring explorer of the western waters, had so dwindled down since the Persian conquest of Ionia, that she could now furnish no more than three ships, and her ancient maritime spirit survived only in the bosom of her captain. When Dionysius saw the Ionians assembled at Ladê, willing, eager, full of talk and mutual encouragement, but untrained and taking no thought of discipline, or nautical practice, or co-operation in the hour of battle—he saw the risk which they ran for want of these precautions, and strenuously remonstrated with them: “Our fate hangs on the razor’s edge, men of Ionia: either to be free-men or slaves,—and slaves too, caught after running away. Set yourself at once to work and duty. You will then have trouble indeed at first, with certain victory and freedom afterwards; but if you persist in this carelessness and disorder, there is no hope for you to escape the king’s revenge for your revolt. Be persuaded and commit yourself to me. I pledge myself, if the gods only hold an equal balance, that your enemies either will not fight, or will be severely beaten.”¹

The wisdom of this advice was so apparent, that the Ionians, quitting their comfortable tents on the shore of Ladê, and going on board their ships, submitted themselves to the continuous nautical labours and manœuvres imposed upon them by Dionysius. The rowers, and the hoplites on the deck, were exercised in their separate functions, and even when they were not so employed, the ships were kept at anchor, and the crews on board, instead of on shore; so that the work lasted all day long, under a hot summer’s sun. Such labour was new to the Ionian crews. They endured it for seven successive days, after which they broke out with one accord into resolute mutiny and refusal: “Which of the gods have we offended, to bring upon ourselves such a retribution as this? madmen as we are, to put ourselves into the hands of this Phòkæan braggart, who has furnished only three ships!”² He has now got us and is

¹ Herodot. vi. 11. Ἐπὶ ξυροῦ γὰρ ἀκμῆς ἔχεται ἡμῖν τὰ πρήγματα, ἄνδρες Ἴωνες, ἢ εἶναι ἐλευθέροισι ἢ δούλοισι, καὶ τούτοις ὡς δρηπέτησι νῦν ὄν ἡμέες, ἦν μὲν βούλησθε ταλαιπωρίας ἐνδέκεσθαι, τὸ παραχρῆμα μὲν πόνος ὑμῖν ἔσται, οἷοί τε δὲ ἔσεσθε, ὑπερβαλλόμενοι τοὺς ἐναντίους, εἶναι ἐλευθέροι, &c.

² Herodot. vi. 12. Οἱ Ἴωνες, οἷα ἀπαθέες ἐόντες πόνων τοιούτων, τετραμένοι τε ταλαιπωρήσιν τε καὶ ἡλίῳ, ἔλεξαν πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς τάδε—Τίνα δαιμόνων παραβάντες, τάδε ἀναπίπλαμεν; οἷτινες παραφρονήσαντες, καὶ ἐκπλώσαντες

ruining us without remedy ; many of us are already sick, many others are sickening. We had better make up our minds to Persian slavery, or any other mischiefs, rather than go on with these present sufferings. Come, we will not obey this man any longer." And they forthwith refused to execute his orders, resuming their tents on shore, with the enjoyments of shade, rest, and inactive talk, as before.

I have not chosen to divest this instructive scene of the dramatic liveliness with which it is given in Herodotus—the more so as it has all the air of reality, and as Hekataeus the historian was probably present in the island of Ladê, and may have described what he actually saw and heard. When we see the intolerable hardship which these nautical manœuvres and labours imposed upon the Ionians, though men not unaccustomed to ordinary ship-work,—and when we witness their perfect incapacity to submit themselves to such a discipline, even with extreme danger staring them in the face—we shall be able to appreciate the severe and unremitting toil whereby the Athenian seaman afterwards purchased that perfection of nautical discipline which characterised him at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. It will appear, as we proceed with this history, that the full development of the Athenian democracy worked a revolution in Grecian military marine, chiefly by enforcing upon the citizen seaman a strict continuous training, such as was only surpassed by the Lacedæmonian drill on land—and by thus rendering practicable a species of nautical manœuvring, which was unknown even at the time of the battle of Salamis. I shall show this more fully hereafter : at present I contrast it briefly with the incapacity of the Ionians at Ladê, in order that it may be understood how painful such training really was. The reader of Grecian history is usually taught to associate only ideas of turbulence and anarchy with the Athenian democracy. But the Athenian navy, the child and champion of that democracy, will be found to display an indefatigable labour and obedience nowhere else witnessed in Greece—of which even the first lessons, as in the case now before us, prove to others so irksome as to outweigh the prospect of extreme and imminent peril. The same impatience of steady toil and discipline, which the Ionians displayed to their own ruin before the battle of Ladê, will be found to characterise them fifty years afterwards as allies of Athens, as I shall have occasion to show when I come to describe the Athenian empire.

ἐκ τοῦ νόου, ἀνδρὶ Φωκαεῖ ἀλαζόνι, παρεχομένῳ νέας τρεῖς, ἐπιτρέψαντες ἡμέας αὐτοὺς ἔχομεν, &c.

Ending in this abrupt and mutinous manner, the judicious suggestions of the Phôkæan leader did more harm than good. Perhaps his manner of dealing may have been unadvisedly rude; but we are surprised to see that no one among the leaders of the larger contingents had the good sense to avail himself of the first readiness of the Ionians, and to employ his superior influence in securing the continuance of a good practice once begun. Not one such superior man did this Ionic revolt throw up. From the day on which the Ionians discarded Dionysius, their camp became a scene of disunion and mistrust. Some of them grew so reckless and unmanageable, that the better portion despaired of maintaining any orderly battle; and the Samians in particular now repented that they had declined the secret offers made to them by their expelled despot¹—Æakês son of Sylosôn. They sent privately to renew the negotiation, received a fresh promise of the same indulgence, and agreed to desert when the occasion arrived. On the day of battle, when the two fleets were on the point of coming to action, the sixty Samian ships all sailed off, except eleven whose captains disdained such treachery. Other Ionians followed their example; yet amidst the reciprocal crimination which Herodotus had heard, he finds it difficult to determine who was most to blame, though he names the Lesbians as among the earliest deserters.² The hundred ships from Chios, constituting the centre of the fleet—each ship carrying forty chosen soldiers fully armed—formed a brilliant exception to the rest. They fought with the greatest fidelity and resolution, inflicting upon the enemy, and themselves sustaining, heavy loss. Dionysius the Phôkæan also behaved in a manner worthy of his previous language, and captured with his three ships the like number of Phœnicians. But such examples of bravery did not compensate the treachery or cowardice of the rest. The defeat of the Ionians at Ladê was complete as well as irrecoverable. To the faithful Chians, the loss was terrible both in the battle and after it; for though some of their vessels escaped from the defeat safely to Chios, others were so damaged as to be obliged to run ashore close at hand on the promontory of Mykalê, where the crews quitted them, with the intention of marching northward through the Ephesian territory to the continent opposite their own island. We hear with astonishment, that at that critical moment, the Ephesian women were engaged in solemnising the Thesmophoria,—a festival celebrated at night, in the open air, in some uninhabited portion of the territory, and without the presence of any

¹ Herodot. vi. 13.

² Herodot. vi. 14, 15.

male person. As the Chian fugitives entered the Ephesian territory by night, their coming being neither known nor anticipated—it was believed that they were thieves or pirates coming to seize the women, and under this error they were attacked by the Ephesians and slain.¹ It would seem from this incident that the Ephesians had taken no part in the Ionic revolt, nor are they mentioned amidst the various contingents; nor is anything said either of Kolophon, or Lebedus, or Eræ.²

The Phôkæan Dionysius, perceiving that the defeat of Ladê was the ruin of the Ionic cause, and that his native city was again doomed to Persian subjection, did not think it prudent even to return home. Immediately after the battle he set sail, not for Phôkæa, but for the Phenician coast, at this moment stripped of its protecting cruisers. He seized several Phenician merchantmen, out of which considerable profit was obtained: then setting sail for Sicily, he undertook the occupation of a privateer against the Carthaginians and Tyrrhenians, abstaining from injury towards Greeks.³ Such an employment seems then to have been considered perfectly admissible. A considerable body of Samians also migrated to Sicily, indignant at the treachery of their admirals in the battle, and yet more indignant at the approaching restoration of their despot Æakês. How these Samian emigrants became established in the Sicilian town of Zankle,⁴ I shall mention as a part of the course of Sicilian events, which will come hereafter.

The victory of Ladê enabled the Persians to attack Milêtus by sea as well as by land; they prosecuted the siege with the utmost vigour, by undermining the walls, and by various engines of attack. Their resources in this respect seem to have been enlarged since the days of Harpagus. In no long time the city was taken by storm, and miserable was the fate reserved to it. The adult male population was chiefly slain; while such of them as were preserved, together with the women and children, were sent in a body to Susa to await the orders of Darius, who assigned to them a residence at Ampê, not far from the mouth of the Tigris. The temple at Branchidæ was burnt and pillaged, as Hekataëus had predicted at the beginning of the revolt. The large treasures therein contained must have gone far to defray the costs of the Persian army. The Milesian territory is said to have been altogether denuded of

¹ Herodot. vi. 16.

² Thucyd. viii. 14.

³ Herodot. vi. 17. *ληϊστῆς κατεστήκεε Ἑλλήνων μὲν οὐδενός, Καρχηδονίων δὲ καὶ Τυρσηνῶν.*

⁴ Herodot. vi. 22–25.

its former inhabitants—the Persians retaining for themselves the city with the plain adjoining to it, and making over the mountainous portions to the Karians of Pedasa. Some few of the Milesians found a place among the Samian emigrants to Sicily.¹ It is certain however that new Grecian inhabitants must have been subsequently admitted into Milêtus; for it appears ever afterwards as a Grecian town, though with diminished power and importance.

The capture of Milêtus, in the sixth year from the commencement of the revolt,² carried with it the rapid submission

¹ Herodot. vi. 18, 19, 20, 22.

Μίλητος μὲν νῦν Μιλησίων ἐρήμωτο.

² Herodot. vi. 18. *αἰρέουσι κατ' ἄκρις, ἐν τῷ ἕκτῳ ἔτει ἀπὸ τῆς ἀποστάσιος τῆς Ἀρισταγόρου.* This is almost the only distinct chronological statement which we find in Herodotus respecting the Ionic revolt. The other evidences of time in his chapters are more or less equivocal: nor is there sufficient testimony before us to enable us to arrange the events, between the commencement of the Ionic revolt and the battle of Marathon, into the precise years to which they belong. The battle of Marathon stands fixed for September 490 B.C.: the siege of Milêtus may probably have been finished in 496–495 B.C., and the Ionic revolt may have begun in 502–501 B.C. Such are the dates which, on the whole, appear to me most probable, though I am far from considering them as certain.

Chronological critics differ considerably in their arrangement of the events here alluded to among particular years. See Appendix No. 5, p. 244, in Mr. Clinton's *Fasti Hellenici*; Professor Schultz, *Beiträge zu genaueren Zeitbestimmungen von der 63^{en} zur 72^{en} Olympiade*, p. 177–183, in the *Kieler Philologische Studien*; and Weissenborn, *Beiträge zur genaueren Erforschung der alten Griechischen Geschichte*, Jena 1844, p. 87 *seqq.*: not to mention Reiz and Larcher. Mr. Clinton reckons only ten years from the beginning of the Ionic revolt to the battle of Marathon; which appears to me too short, though, on the other hand, the fourteen years reckoned by Larcher—much more the sixteen years reckoned by Reiz—are too long. Mr. Clinton compresses inconveniently the latter portion of the interval—that portion which elapsed between the siege of Milêtus and the battle of Marathon: and the very improbable supposition to which he is obliged to resort—of a confusion in the language of Herodotus between Attic and Olympic years—indicates that he is pressing the text of the historian too closely, when he states “that Herodotus specifies a term of three years between the capture of Milêtus and the expedition of Datis:” see F. H. ad ann. 499. He places the capture of Milêtus in 494 B.C.; which I am inclined to believe a year later—if not two years later—than the reality. Indeed as Mr. Clinton places the expedition of Aristagoras against Naxos (which was *immediately before* the breaking out of the revolt, since Aristagoras seized the Ionic despots while that fleet yet remained congregated immediately at the close of the expedition) in 501 B.C., and as Herodotus expressly says that Milêtus was taken in the sixth year after the revolt, it would follow that this capture ought to belong to 495, and not to 494 B.C. I incline to place it either in 496 or in 495; and the Naxian expedition in 502 or 501, leaning towards the earlier of the two dates: Schultz agrees with Larcher in placing the Naxian expedition in 504 B.C., yet he assigns the capture of

of the neighbouring towns in Karia; and during the next summer—the Phœnician fleet having wintered at Milêtus—the Persian forces by sea and land reconquered all the Asiatic Greeks, insular as well as continental.¹ Chios, Lesbos, and Tenedos—the towns in the Chersonese—Selymbria and Perinthus in Thrace—Prokonnêsus and Artake in the Propontis—all these towns were taken or sacked by the Persian and Phœnician fleet.² The inhabitants of Byzantium and Chalkêdôn fled for the most part, without even awaiting its arrival, to Mesembria; while the Athenian Miltiadês only escaped Persian captivity by a rapid flight from his abode in the Chersonese to Athens. His pursuers were indeed so close upon him, that one of his ships, with his son Metiochus on board, fell into their hands. As Miltiadês had been strenuous in urging the destruction of the bridge over the Danube, on the occasion of the Scythian expedition, the Phœnicians were particularly anxious to get possession of his person, as the most acceptable of all Greek prisoners to the Persian king; who however, when Metiochus the son of Miltiadês was brought to Susa, not only did him no harm, but treated him with great kindness, and gave him a Persian wife with a comfortable maintenance.³

Far otherwise did the Persian generals deal with the reconquered cities on and near the coast. The threats which had been held out before the battle of Ladê were realised to the full. The most beautiful Greek youths and virgins were picked out, to be distributed among the Persian grandees as eunuchs

Milêtus to 496 B. C.—whereas Herodotus states that the last of these two events was in the sixth year after the revolt, which revolt immediately succeeded on the first of the two, within the same summer. Weissenborn places the capture of Milêtus in 496 B. C., and the expedition to Naxos in 499—suspecting that the text in Herodotus—ἐκτω ἔτει—is incorrect, and that it ought to be τετάρτῳ ἔτει, the fourth year (p. 125: compare the chronological table in his work, p. 222). He attempts to show that the particular incidents composing the Ionic revolt, as Herodotus recounts it, cannot be made to occupy more than four years; but his reasoning is in my judgement unsatisfactory, and the conjecture inadmissible. The distinct affirmation of the historian, as to the entire interval between the two events, is of much more evidentiary value than our conjectural summing up of the details.

It is vain, I think, to try to arrange these details according to precise years: this can only be done very loosely.

¹ Herodot. vi. 25.

² Herodot. vi. 31–33. It may perhaps be to this burning and sacking of the cities in the Propontis and on the Asiatic side of the Hellespont that Strabo (xiii. p. 591) makes allusion; though he ascribes the proceeding to a different cause—to the fear of Darius that the Scythians would cross into Asia to avenge themselves upon him for attacking them, and that the towns on the coast would furnish them with vessels for the passage.

³ Herodot. vi. 41.

or inmates of the harems. The cities, with their edifices sacred as well as profane, were made a prey to the flames; and in the case of the islands, Herodotus even tells us that a line of Persians was formed from shore to shore, which swept each territory from north to south, and drove the inhabitants out of it.¹ That much of this hard treatment is well-founded, there can be no doubt. But it must be exaggerated as to extent of depopulation and destruction, for these islands and cities appear ever afterwards as occupied by a Grecian population, and even as in a tolerable, though reduced, condition. Samos was made an exception to the rest, and completely spared by the Persians, as a reward to its captains for setting the example of desertion at the battle of Ladê; while Æakês the despot of that island was reinstated in his government.² It appears that several other despots were reinstated at the same time in their respective cities, though we are not told which.

Amidst the sufferings endured by so many innocent persons, of every age and of both sexes, the fate of Histiaëus excites but little sympathy. He was carrying on his piracies at Byzantium when he learnt the surrender of Milêtus; he then thought it expedient to sail with his Lesbian vessels for Chios, where admittance was refused to him. But the Chians, weakened as they had been by the late battle, were in little condition to resist, so that he defeated their troops and despoiled the island. During the present break-up of the Asiatic Greeks, there were doubtless many who (like the Phòkæan Dionysius) did not choose to return home to an enslaved city, yet had no fixed plan for a new abode. Of these exiles, a considerable number put themselves under the temporary command of Histiaëus, and accompanied him to the plunder of Thasos.³ While besieging that town, he learnt the news that the Phœnician fleet had quitted Milêtus to attack the remaining Ionic towns. He therefore left his designs on Thasos unfinished, in order to go and defend Lesbos. But in this latter island the dearth of provisions was such, that he was forced to cross over to the continent to reap the standing corn, around Atarneus and in the fertile plain of Mysia near the river Kaïkus. Here he fell in with a considerable Persian force under Harpagus—was beaten, compelled to flee, and taken prisoner. On his being carried to Sardis, Artaphernês the satrap caused him to be at once crucified: partly no doubt from genuine hatred, but partly also under the persuasion that if he were sent up as a

¹ Herodot. vi. 31, 32, 33.

² Herodot. vi. 25.

³ Herodot. vi. 26–28. ἕγων Ἰώνων καὶ Αἰολέων συχνοῦς.

prisoner to Susa, he might again become dangerous, since Darius would even now spare his life, under an indelible sentiment of gratitude for the maintenance of the bridge over the Danube. The head of Histæus was embalmed and sent up to Susa, where Darius caused it to be honourably buried, condemning this precipitate execution of a man who had once been his preserver.¹

We need not wonder that the capture of Milétus excited the strongest feeling, of mixed sympathy and consternation, among the Athenians. In the succeeding year (so at least we are led to think, though the date cannot be positively determined) it was selected as the subject of a tragedy—The Capture of Milétus—by the dramatic poet Phrynichus; which, when performed, so painfully wrung the feelings of the Athenian audience, that they burst into tears in the theatre, and the poet was condemned to pay a fine of one thousand drachmæ, as “having recalled to them their own misfortunes.”² The piece was forbidden to be afterwards acted, and has not come down to us. Some critics have supposed that Herodotus has not correctly assigned the real motive which determined the Athenians to impose this fine;³ for it is certain that the subjects usually selected for tragedy were portions of heroic legend, and not matters of recent history; so that the Athenians might complain of Phrynichus on the double ground—for having violated an established canon of propriety, as well as for touching their sensibilities too deeply. Still I see no reason for doubting that the cause assigned by Herodotus is substantially the true one. Yet it is very possible that Phrynichus, at an age when tragic poetry had not yet reached its full development, might touch this very tender subject with a rough and offensive hand, before a people who had fair reason to dread the like cruel fate for themselves. Æschylus, in his *Persæ*, would naturally carry with him the full tide of Athenian sympathy, while dwelling on the victories of Salamis and Plataea. But to interest the audience in Persian success and Grecian suffering, was a task in which much greater poets than Phrynichus would have failed—and which no judicious poet would have undertaken. The sack of Magdeburg by Count Tilly, in the Thirty Years’ war, was not likely to be endured as the subject of dramatic representation in any Protestant town of Germany.

¹ Herodot. vi. 28, 29, 30.

² Herodot. v. 21. *ὡς ἀναμνήσαντα οἰκῆια κακά*: compare vii. 152; also Kallisthenês ap. Strabo. xiv. p. 635, and Plutarch, *Præcept. Reipubl. Gerend.* p. 814. ³ See Welcker, *Griechische Tragödien*, vol. i. p. 25.

CHAPTER XXXVI

FROM IONIC REVOLT TO BATTLE OF MARATHON

IN the preceding chapter, I indicated the point of confluence between the European and Asiatic streams of Grecian history—the commencement of a decided Persian intention to conquer Attica; manifested first in the form of a threat by Artaphernês the satrap, when he enjoined the Athenians to take back Hippias as the only condition of safety, and afterwards converted into a passion in the bosom of Darius in consequence of the burning of Sardis. From this time forward, therefore, the affairs of Greece and Persia come to be in direct relation one with the other, and capable of being embodied, much more than before into one continuous narrative.

The reconquest of Ionia being thoroughly completed, Artaphernês proceeded to organise the future government of it, with a degree of prudence and forethought not often visible in Persian proceedings. Convoking deputies from all the different cities, he compelled them to enter into a permanent convention for the amicable settlement of disputes, so as to prevent all employment of force by any one against the others. Moreover he caused the territory of each city to be measured by parasangs (each parasang was equal to thirty stadia, or about three miles and a half), and arranged the assessments of tribute according to this measurement; without any material departure, however, from the sums which had been paid before the revolt.¹ Unfortunately, Herodotus is unusually brief in his allusion to this proceeding, which it would have been highly interesting to be able to comprehend perfectly. We may however assume it as certain, that both the population and the territory of many among the Ionic cities, if not of all, were materially altered in consequence of the preceding revolt, and still more in consequence of the cruelties with which the suppression of the revolt had been accompanied. In regard to Milêtus, Herodotus tells us that the Persians retained for themselves the city with its circumjacent plain, but gave the mountain-portion of the Milesian territory to the Karians of Pêdasa.² Such a proceeding would naturally call for fresh measurement and assessment of tribute; and there may have been similar transfers of land elsewhere. I have already ob-

¹ Herodot. vi. 42.

² Herodot. vi. 20.

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served that the statements which we find in Herodotus, of utter depopulation and destruction falling upon the cities, cannot be credited in their full extent; for these cities are all peopled, and all Hellenic, afterwards. Yet there can be no doubt that they are partially true, and that the miseries of those days, as stated in the work of Hekatæus as well as by contemporary informants with whom Herodotus had probably conversed, must have been extreme. New inhabitants would probably be admitted in many of them, to supply the loss sustained; and such infusion of fresh blood would strengthen the necessity for the organisation introduced by Artaphernês, in order to determine clearly the obligations due from the cities both to the Persian government and towards each other. Herodotus considers that the arrangement was extremely beneficial to the Ionians, and so it must unquestionably have appeared, coming as it did immediately after so much previous suffering. He further adds that the tribute then fixed remained unaltered until his own day—a statement requiring some comment, which I reserve until the time arrives for describing the condition of the Asiatic Greeks after the repulse of Xerxês from Greece Proper.

Meanwhile the intentions of Darius for the conquest of Greece were now effectively manifested. Mardonius, invested with the supreme command, and at the head of a large force, was sent down in the ensuing spring for the purpose. Having reached Kilikia in the course of the march, he himself got on ship-board and went by sea to Ionia, while his army marched across Asia Minor to the Hellespont. His proceeding in Ionia surprises us, and seems to have appeared surprising as well to Herodotus himself as to his readers. Mardonius deposed the despots throughout the various Greek cities;¹ leaving the people of each to govern themselves, subject to Persian dominion and tribute. This was a complete reversal of the

¹ Herodot. vi. 43. In recounting this deposition of the despots by Mardonius, Herodotus reasons from it as an analogy for the purpose of vindicating the correctness of another of his statements, which (he acquaints us) many persons disputed; namely, the discussion which he reports to have taken place among the seven conspirators, after the death of the Magian Smerdis, whether they should establish a monarchy, an oligarchy, or a democracy—*ἐνθαῦτα μέγιστον θῶμα ἐρέω τοῖσι μὴ ἀποδεκομένοισι τῶν Ἑλλήνων, Περσέων τοῖσι ἑπτὰ Ὅτανεα γνῶμην ἀποδέξασθαι, ὡς χρεδν εἴη δημοκρατέεσθαι Πέρσας· τοὺς γὰρ τυράννους τῶν Ἰώνων καταπαύσας πάντας δὲ Μαρδόνιος, δημοκρατίας κατίστα ἐς τὰς πόλεις.* Such passages as this let us into the controversies of the time, and prove that Herodotus found many objectors to his story about the discussion on theories of government among the seven Persian conspirators (iii. 80–82).

former policy of Persia, and must be ascribed to a new conviction, doubtless wise and well-founded, which had recently grown up among the Persian leaders, that on the whole their unpopularity was aggravated more than their strength was increased, by employing these despots as instruments. The phenomena of the late Ionic revolt were well calculated to teach such a lesson ; but we shall not often find the Persians profiting by experience, throughout the course of this history.

Mardonius did not remain long in Ionia, but passed on with his fleet to the Hellespont, where the land-force had already arrived. He transported it across into Europe, and began his march through Thrace ; all of which had already been reduced by Megabazus, and does not seem to have participated in the Ionic revolt. The island of Thasus surrendered to the fleet without resistance, and the land-force was conveyed across the Strymon to the Greek city of Akanthus, on the western coast of the Strymonic Gulf. From hence Mardonius marched into Macedonia, and subdued a considerable portion of its inhabitants—perhaps some of those not comprised in the dominion of Amyntas, since that prince had before submitted to Megabazus. Meanwhile he sent his fleet to double the promontory of Mount Athos, and to join the land-force again at the Gulf of Therma, with a view of conquering as much of Greece as he could, and even of prosecuting the march as far as Athens and Eretria;¹ so that the expedition afterwards accomplished by Xerxes would have been tried at least by Mardonius, twelve or thirteen years earlier, had not a terrible storm completely disabled the fleet. The sea near Athos was then, and is now, full of peril to navigators. One of the hurricanes so frequent in its neighbourhood overtook the Persian fleet, destroyed three hundred ships, and drowned or cast ashore not less than twenty thousand men. Of those who reached the shore, many died of cold, or were devoured by the wild beasts on that inhospitable tongue of land. This disaster checked altogether the further progress of Mardonius, who also sustained considerable loss with his land-army, and was himself wounded, in a night attack made upon him by the tribe of Thracians called Brygi. Though strong enough to repel and avenge this attack, and to subdue the Brygi, he was yet in no condition to advance farther. Both the land-force and the fleet were conveyed back to the Hellespont, and from thence across to Asia, with so much shame of failure, that Mardonius was never again employed by Darius ; though we cannot make out that the fault was

¹ Herodot. vi. 43, 44. *ἐπορεύοντο δὲ ἐπὶ τῇ Ἐρέτρίῳ καὶ Ἀθήναις.*

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imputable to him.¹ We shall hear of him again under Xerxès.

The ill-success of Mardonius seems to have inspired the Thasians, so recently subdued, with the idea of revolting. At least their conduct provoked the suspicion of Darius ; for they made active preparations for defence, both by building war-ships, and by strengthening their fortifications. The Thasians were at this time in great opulence, chiefly from gold and silver mines, both in their island and in their mainland territory opposite. The mines at Skaptê Hylê in Thrace yielded to them an annual income of eighty talents ; their total surplus revenue—after defraying all the expenses of government so that the inhabitants were entirely untaxed—was two hundred talents (£46,000, if Attic talents ; more, if either Euboic or Æginæan). With such large means, they were enabled soon to make preparations which excited notice among their neighbours ; many of whom were doubtless jealous of their prosperity, and perhaps inclined to dispute with them possession of the profitable mines of Skaptê Hylê. As in other cases, so in this : the jealousies among subject neighbours often procured revelations to the superior power. The proceedings of the Thasians were made known, and they were forced to raze their fortifications as well as to surrender all their ships to the Persians at Abdêra.²

Though dissatisfied with Mardonius, Darius was only the more eagerly bent on his project of conquering Greece. Hip-pias was at his side to keep alive his wrath against the Athenians.³ Orders were despatched to the maritime cities of his empire to equip both ships of war and horse-transport for a renewed attempt. His intentions were probably known in Greece itself by this time, from the recent march of his army to Macedonia. Nevertheless he now thought it advisable to send heralds round to most of the Grecian cities, in order to require from each the formal token of submission—earth and water ; and thus to ascertain what extent of resistance his projected expedition was likely to experience. The answers received were to a high degree favourable. Many of the continental Greeks sent their submission, as well as all those islanders to whom application was made. Among the former

¹ Herodot. vi. 44-94. Charon of Lampsakus had noticed the storm near Mount Athos, and the destruction of the fleet of Mardonius (Charonis Fragment. 3, ed. Didot ; Athenæ. ix. p. 394).

² Herodot. vi. 46-48. See a similar case of disclosure arising from jealousy between Tenedos and Lesbos (Thucyd. iii. 2).

³ Herodot. vi. 94.

we are probably to reckon the Thebans and Thessalians, though Herodotus does not particularise them. Among the latter Naxos, Eubœa, and some of the smaller islands, are not included; but Ægina, at that time the first maritime power of Greece, is expressly included.¹

Nothing marks so clearly the imminent peril in which the liberties of Greece were now placed, and the terror inspired by the Persians after their reconquest of Ionia, as this abasement on the part of the Æginetans, whose commerce with the Asiatic islands and continent doubtless impressed them strongly with the melancholy consequences of unsuccessful resistance to the Great King. But on the present occasion their conduct was dictated as much by antipathy to Athens as by fear, so that Greece was thus threatened with the intrusion of the Persian arm as ally and arbiter in her internal contests—a contingency which, if it had occurred now in the dispute between Ægina and Athens, would have led to the certain enslavement of Greece, though when it did occur nearly a century afterwards, towards the close of the Peloponnesian war and in consequence of the prolonged struggle between Lacedæmon and Athens, Greece had become strong enough in her own force to endure it without the loss of substantial independence.

The war between Thebes and Ægina on one side, and Athens on the other—began several years before, and growing out of the connexion between Athens and Plateæ—had never yet been terminated. The Æginetans had taken part in that war from gratuitous feeling, either of friendship for Thebes or of enmity to Athens, without any direct ground of quarrel,² and they had begun the war even without the formality of notice. Though a period apparently not less than fourteen years (from about 506–492 B.C.) had elapsed, the state of hostility still continued; and we may readily conceive that Hippias, the great instigator of Persian attack upon Greece, would not fail to enforce upon all the enemies of Athens the prudence of seconding, or at least of not opposing, the efforts of the Persian to reinstate him in that city. It was partly under this feeling, combined with genuine alarm, that both

¹ Herodot. vi. 48, 49, viii. 46.

² Herodot. v. 81–89. See vol. iv. chapter xxxi. The legendary story there given as the provocation of Ægina to the war is evidently not to be treated as a real and historical cause of war: a state of quarrel causes all such stories to be raked up, and some probably to be invented. It is like the old alleged quarrel between the Athenians and the Pelasgi of Lemnos (vi. 137–140).

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Thebes and Ægina manifested submissive dispositions towards the heralds of Darius.

Among these heralds, some had gone both to Athens and to Sparta, for the same purpose of demanding earth and water. The reception given to them at both places was angry in the extreme. The Athenians cast the herald into the pit called the Barathrum,¹ into which they sometimes precipitated public criminals: the Spartans threw the herald who came to them into a well, desiring the unfortunate messenger to take earth and water from thence to the king. The inviolability of heralds was so ancient and undisputed in Greece, from the Homeric times downward, that nothing short of the fiercest excitement could have instigated any Grecian community to such an outrage. But to the Lacedæmonians, now accustomed to regard themselves as the first of all Grecian states, and to be addressed always in the character of superiors, the demand appeared so gross an insult as to banish from their minds for the time all recollection of established obligations. They came subsequently, however, to repent of the act as highly criminal, and to look upon it as the cause of misfortunes which overtook them thirty or forty years afterwards. How they tried at that time to expiate it, I shall hereafter recount.²

¹ It is to this treatment of the herald that the story in Plutarch's *Life of Themistoklēs* must allude, if that story indeed be true, for the Persian king was not likely to send a second herald, after such treatment of the first. An interpreter accompanied the herald, speaking Greek as well as his own native language. Themistoklēs proposed and carried a vote that he should be put to death for having employed the Greek language as medium for barbaric dictation. (Plutarch, *Themist.* c. 6.) We should be glad to know from whom Plutarch copied this story.

Pausanias states that it was Miltiadēs who proposed the putting to death of the heralds at Athens (iii. 12, 6); and that the divine judgement fell upon his family in consequence of it. From whom Pausanias copied this statement I do not know: certainly not from Herodotus, who does not mention Miltiadēs in the case, and expressly says that he does not know in what manner the divine judgement overtook the Athenians for the crime—"except (says he) that their city and country was afterwards laid waste by Xerxēs; but I do not think that this happened on account of the outrage on the heralds" (*Herodot.* vii. 133).

The belief that there must have been a divine judgement of some sort or other, presented a strong stimulus to invent or twist some historical fact to correspond with it. Herodotus has sufficient regard for truth to resist this stimulus and to confess his ignorance; a circumstance which goes, along with others, to strengthen our confidence in his general authority. His silence weakens the credibility, but does not refute the allegation, of Pausanias with regard to Miltiadēs—which is certainly not intrinsically improbable.

² *Herodot.* vii. 133.

But if, on the one hand, the wounded dignity of the Spartans hurried them into the commission of this wrong, it was on the other hand of signal use to the general liberties of Greece, by rousing them out of their apathy as to the coming invader, and placing them with regard to him in the same state of inexpiable hostility as Athens and Eretria. We see at once the bonds drawn closer between Athens and Sparta. The Athenians, for the first time, prefer a complaint at Sparta against the Ægians for having given earth and water to Darius—accusing them of having done this with views of enmity to Athens, and in order to invade Attica conjointly with the Persian. This they represented “as treason to Hellas,” calling upon Sparta, as head of Greece, to interfere. In consequence of their appeal, Kleomenês king of Sparta went over to Ægina, to take measures against the authors of the late proceeding, “for the general benefit of Hellas.”¹

The proceeding now before us is of very great importance in the progress of Grecian history. It is the first direct and positive historical manifestation of Hellas as an aggregate body, with Sparta as its chief, and obligations of a certain sort on the part of its members, the neglect or violation of which constitutes a species of treason. I have already pointed out several earlier incidents, showing how the Greek political mind, beginning from entire severance of states, became gradually prepared for this idea of a permanent league with mutual obligations and power of enforcement vested in a permanent chief—an idea never fully carried into practice, but now distinctly manifest and partially operative. First, the great acquired power and territory of Sparta, her military training, her undisturbed political traditions, create an unconscious deference towards her such as was not felt towards any other state. Next, she is seen (in the proceedings against Athens after the expulsion of Hippias) as summoning and conducting to war a cluster of self-obliged Peloponnesian allies, with certain formalities which give to the alliance an imposing permanence and solemnity. Thirdly, her position becomes

¹ Herodot. vi. 49. Ποίησασι δέ σφι (Αἰγινήταις) ταῦτα, ἰθέως Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπέκλειτο, δοκέοντες ἐπὶ σφίσι ἔχοντας τοὺς Αἰγινήτας δεδωκέναι (γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ), ὡς ἄμα τῷ Πέρσῃ ἐπὶ σφέας στρατεύονται. Καὶ ἕσμενοι προφάσιος ἐπελάβοντο· φοιτούντες τε ἐς τὴν Σπάρτην, κατηγοροῦν τῶν Αἰγινήτων τὰ πεποιήκοιεν, προδόντες τὴν Ἑλλάδα. Compare viii. 144, ix. 7. τὴν Ἑλλάδα δεινὸν ποιούμενοι προδοῦναι—a new and very important phrase.

vi. 61. Τότε δὲ τὸν Κλεομένηα, δόντα ἐν τῇ Αἰγίνῃ, καὶ κοινὰ τῇ Ἑλλάδι ἀγαθὰ προσεργαζόμενον, &c.

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recognised as first power or president of Greece, both by foreigners who invite alliance (Cæsus) or by Greeks who seek help, such as the Platæans against Thebes or the Ionians against Persia. But Sparta has not been hitherto found willing to take on herself the performance of this duty of Protector general. She refused the Ionians and the Samian Mæandrius, as well as the Platæans, in spite of their entreaties founded on common Hellenic lineage: the expedition which she undertook against Polykratês of Samos was founded upon private motives for displeasure, even in the estimation of the Lacedæmonians themselves: moreover, even if all these requests had been granted, she might have seemed to be rather obeying a generous sympathy than performing a duty incumbent upon her as superior. But in the case now before us, of Athens against Ægina, the latter consideration stands distinctly prominent. Athens is not a member of the cluster of Spartan allies, nor does she claim the compassion of Sparta, as defenceless against an overpowering Grecian neighbour. She complains of a Pan-Hellenic obligation as having been contravened by the Ægineans to her detriment and danger, and calls upon Sparta to enforce upon the delinquents respect to these obligations. For the first time in Grecian history, such a call is made; for the first time in Grecian history, it is effectively answered. We may well doubt whether it would have been thus answered—considering the tardy, unimpressible, and home-keeping, character of the Spartans, with their general insensibility to distant dangers¹—if the adventure of the Persian herald had not occurred to gall their pride beyond endurance—to drive them into unpardonable hostility with the Great King—and to cast them into the same boat with Athens for keeping off an enemy who threatened the common liberties of Hellas.

▶ From this time, then, we may consider that there exists a recognised political union of Greece against the Persian²—or at least something as near to a political union as Grecian temper will permit—with Sparta as its head for the present. To such a pre-eminence of Sparta, Grecian history had been gradually tending. But the final event which placed it beyond dispute, and which humbled for the time her ancient and only rival—Argos—is now to be noticed.

It was about three or four years before the arrival of these Persian heralds in Greece, and nearly at the time when Milêtus

¹ Thucyd. i. 70–118. ἄοκνοι πρὸς ὑμᾶς (i. e. the Spartans) μελλήτας καὶ ἀποδημητάς πρὸς ἐνδημοτάτους.

² Herodot. vii. 145–148. Οἱ συνωμόται Ἑλλήνων ἐπὶ τῷ Πέρσῃ.

was besieged by the Persian generals, that a war broke out between Sparta and Argos¹—on what grounds Herodotus does not inform us. Kleomenês, encouraged by a promise of the oracle that he should take Argos, led the Lacedæmonian troops to the banks of the Erasinus, the border river of the Argeian territory. But the sacrifices, without which no river could be crossed, were so unfavourable, that he altered his course, extorted some vessels from Ægina and Sikyon,² and carried his troops by sea to Nauplia, the seaport belonging to Argos, and to the territory of Tiryns. The Argeians having marched their forces down to resist him, the two armies joined battle at Sêpeia near Tiryns. Kleomenês, by a piece of simplicity on the part of his enemies which we find it difficult to credit in Herodotus, was enabled to attack them unprepared, and obtained a decisive victory. For the Argeians (the historian states) were so afraid of being over-reached by stratagem, in the post which their army occupied over against the enemy, that they listened for the commands proclaimed aloud by the Lacedæmonian herald, and performed with their own army the same order which they thus heard given. This came to the knowledge of Kleomenês, who communicated private notice to his soldiers, that when the herald proclaimed orders to go to dinner, they should not obey, but immediately stand to their arms. We are to presume that the Argeian camp was sufficiently near to that of the Lacedæmonians to enable them to hear the voice of the herald—yet not within sight, from the nature of the ground. Accordingly, so soon as the Argeians heard the herald in the enemy's camp proclaim the word to go to dinner,³ they went to dinner themselves. In this disorderly

¹ That which marks the siege of Milêtus, and the defeat of the Argeian by Kleomenês, as contemporaneous, or nearly so, is—the common oracular dictum delivered in reference to both: in the same prophecy of the Pythia one half alludes to the sufferings of Milêtus, the other half to those of Argos (Herodot. vi. 19-77).

Χρωμένοισι γὰρ Ἀργείοισι ἐν Δελφοῖσι περὶ σωτηρίας τῆς πόλιος τῆ σφετέρης, τὸ μὲν ἐς αὐτοὺς τοὺς Ἀργείους φέρον, τὴν δὲ παρενθήκην ἔχρησι ἐς Μιλησίου.

I consider this evidence of date to be better than the statement of Pausanias. That author places the enterprise against Argos immediately (*αὐτίκα*—Paus. iii. 4, 1) after the accession of Kleomenês, who, as he was king when Mæandrius came from Samos (Herodot. iii. 148), must have come to the throne not later than 518 or 517 B.C. This would be thirty-seven years prior to 480 B.C.; a date much too early for the war between Kleomenês and the Argeians, as we may see by Herodotus (vii. 149).

² Herodot. vi. 92.

³ Herodot. vi. 78; compare Xenophon, Rep. Laced. xii. 6. Order³ for evolutions in the field, in the Lacedæmonian military service, were n

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condition they were attacked and overthrown by the Spartans. Many of them perished in the field, while the fugitives took refuge in a thick grove consecrated to their eponymous hero Argus. Kleomenês, having enclosed them therein, yet thinking it safer to employ deceit rather than force, ascertained from deserters the names of the chief Argeians thus shut up, and then invited them out successively by means of a herald—pretending that he had received their ransom, and that they were released. As fast as each man came out, he was put to death; the fate of these unhappy sufferers being concealed from their comrades within the grove by the thickness of the foliage, until some one climbing to the top of a tree detected and proclaimed the destruction going on—after about fifty of the victims had perished. Unable to entice any more of the Argeians from their consecrated refuge, which they still vainly hoped would protect them—Kleomenês set fire to the grove and burnt it to the ground. The persons within it appear to have been destroyed either by fire or by sword.¹ After the conflagration had begun, he inquired for the first time to whom the grove belonged, and learnt that it belonged to the hero Argus. Not less than six thousand citizens, the flower and strength of Argos, perished in this disastrous battle and retreat. So completely was the city prostrated, that Kleomenês might easily have taken it, had he chosen to march thither forthwith and attack it with vigour. If we are to believe later historians whom Pausanias, Polyænus, and Plutarch had copied, he did march thither and attack it, but was repulsed by the valour of the Argeian women; who, in the dearth of warriors occasioned by the recent defeat, took arms along with the slaves, headed by the poetess Telesilla, and gallantly defended the walls.² This is probably a mythe, generated by a desire to embody in detail the dictum of the oracle a little before, about “the

proclaimed by the herald, but transmitted through the various gradations of officers (Thucyd. v. 66).

¹ Herodot. vi. 79, 80.

² Pausan. ii. 20, 7; Polyæn. viii. 33; Plutarch, De Virtut. Mulier. p. 245; Suidas, v. Τελέσιλλα.

Plutarch cites the historian Sokratês of Argos for this story about Telesilla; an historian, or perhaps composer of a *περιήγησις Ἀργούς*, of unknown date: compare Diogen. Laërt. ii. 5, 47, and Plutarch, *Question, Romaic*. p. 270–277. According to his representation, Kleomenês and Demaratus jointly assaulted the town of Argos, and Demaratus, after having penetrated into the town and become master of the Pamphyliakon, was driven out again by the women. Now Herodotus informs us that Kleomenês and Demaratus were never employed upon the same expedition, after the disagreement in their march to Attica (v. 75, vi. 64).

female conquering the male."¹ Without meaning to deny that the Argeian women might have been capable of achieving so patriotic a deed, if Kleomenês had actually marched to the attack of their city—we are compelled by the distinct statement of Herodotus to affirm that he never did attack it. Immediately after the burning of the sacred grove of Argos, he dismissed the bulk of his army to Sparta, retaining only one thousand choice troops—with whom he marched up to the Hêræum, or great temple of Hêrê, between Argos and Mykênæ, to offer sacrifice. The priest in attendance forbade him to enter, saying that no stranger was allowed to offer sacrifice in the temple. But Kleomenês had once already forced his way into the sanctuary of Athênê on the Athenian acropolis, in spite of the priestess and her interdict—and he now acted still more brutally towards the Argeian priest, for he directed his helots to drag him from the altar and scourge him. Having offered sacrifice, Kleomenês returned with his remaining force to Sparta.²

But the army whom he had sent home returned with a full persuasion that Argos might easily have been taken—that the king alone was to blame for having missed the opportunity. As soon as he himself returned, his enemies (perhaps his colleague Demaratus) brought him to trial before the ephors on a charge of having been bribed, against which he defended himself as follows. He had invaded the hostile territory on the faith of an assurance from the oracle that he should take Argos; but so soon as he had burnt down the sacred grove of the hero Argus (without knowing to whom it belonged), he became at once sensible that this was all that the god meant by *taking Argos*, and therefore that the divine promise had been fully realised. Accordingly, he did not think himself at liberty to commence any fresh attack, until he had ascertained whether the gods would approve it and would grant him success. It was with this view that he sacrificed in the Hêræum. There, though his sacrifice was favourable, he observed that the flame kindled on the altar flashed back from the bosom of the statue

¹ Herodot. vi. 77.

² Ἄλλ' ὅταν ἡ θήλεια τὸν ἄρσενα νικήσασα
Ἐφέλασθ, καὶ κύδος ἐν Ἀργείοισιν ἄρηται, &c.

If this prophecy can be said to have any distinct meaning, it probably refers to Hêrê, as protectress of Argos, repulsing the Spartans.

Pausanias (ii. 20, 7) might reasonably doubt whether Herodotus understood this oracle in the same sense as he did: it is plain that Herodotus could not have so understood it.

² Herodot. vi. 80, 81: compare v. 72.

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of Hêrê, and not from her head. If the flame had flashed from her head, he would have known at once that the gods intended him to take the city by storm;¹ but the flash from her bosom plainly indicated that the topmost success was out of his reach, and that he had already reaped all the glories which they intended for him. We may see that Herodotus, though he refrains from criticising this story, suspects it to be a fabrication. Not so the Spartan ephors. To them it appeared not less true as a story than triumphant as a defence, ensuring to Kleomenês an honourable acquittal.²

Though this Spartan king lost the opportunity of taking Argos, his victories already gained had inflicted upon her a blow such as she did not recover for a generation, putting her for a time out of all condition to dispute the primacy of Greece with Lacedæmon. I have already mentioned that both in legend and in earliest history, Argos stands forth as the first power in Greece, with legendary claims to headship, and decidedly above Lacedæmon; who gradually usurps from her, first the reality of superior power, next the recognition of pre-eminence—and is now, at the period which we have reached, taking upon herself both the rights and the duties of a presiding state over a body of allies who are bound both to her and to each other. Her title to this honour, however, was never admitted at Argos, and it is very probable that the war just

¹ Herodot. vi. 82. *εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τῆς κεφαλῆς τοῦ ἀγάλματος ἐξέλαμψε, αἰρέειν ἂν κατ' ἄκρης τὴν πόλιν· ἐκ τῶν δὲ στηθῶν λάμψαντος, πᾶν οἱ πεποιῆσθαι ὕσον ὁ θεὸς ἤθελε.*

For the expression *αἰρέειν κατ' ἄκρης*, compare Herodot. vi. 21 and Damm. Lex. Homer. v. *ἄκρος*. In this expression as generally used, the last words *κατ' ἄκρης* have lost their primitive and special sense, and do little more than intensify the simple *αἰρέειν*—equivalent to something like “de fond en comble:” for Kleomenês is accused by his enemies—*φάμενοι μιν δωροδοκῆσαντα, οὐκ ἐλέειν τὸ Ἄργος, παρὸν εὐπετέως μιν ἐλεῖν*. But in the story recounted by Kleomenês, the words *κατ' ἄκρης* come back to their primitive meaning, and serve as the foundation for his religious inference, from type to thing typified: if the light had shone from the head or *top* of the statue, this would have intimated that the gods meant him to take the city “*from top to bottom*.”

In regard to this very illustrative story—which there seems no reason for mistrusting—the contrast between the point of view of Herodotus and that of the Spartan ephors deserves notice. Herodotus, while he affirms distinctly that it was the real story told by Kleomenês, suspects its truth, and utters as much of scepticism as his pious fear will permit him: the ephors find it in complete harmony both with their canon of belief and with their religious feeling—*Κλεομένης δὲ σφί ἐλεξε, οὔτε εἰ ψευδόμενος οὔτε εἰ ἀληθῆα λέγων, ἕχω σαφηνῶς εἶπαι ἐλεξε δ' ἄν. . . Ταῦτα δὲ λέγων, πιστὰ τε καὶ οἰκία ἐδόκει Σπαρτιήτησι λέγειν, καὶ ἀπέφυγε πολλὸν τοὺς διώκοντας.*

² Compare Pausanias, ii. 20, 8.

described grew in some way or other out of the increasing presidential power which circumstances were tending to throw into her hands. Now the complete temporary prostration of Argos was one essential condition to the quiet acquisition of this power by Sparta. Occurring as it did two or three years before the above-recounted adventure of the heralds, it removed the only rival at that time both willing and able to compete with Sparta—a rival who might well have prevented any effective union under another chief, though she could no longer have secured any Pan-Hellenic ascendancy for herself—a rival who would have seconded Ægina in her submission to the Persians, and would thus have lamed incurably the defensive force of Greece. The ships which Kleomenês had obtained from the Æginetans as well as from the Sikyonians, against their own will, for landing his troops at Nauplia, brought upon both these cities the enmity of Argos, which the Sikyonians compromised by paying a sum of money, while the Æginetans refused to do so.¹ The circumstances of the Kleomenic war had thus the effect not only of enfeebling Argos, but of alienating her from her natural allies and supporters, and clearing the ground for undisputed Spartan primacy.

Returning now to the complaint preferred by Athens to the Spartans against the traitorous submission of Ægina to Darius, we find that king Kleomenês passed immediately over to that island for the purpose of inquiry and punishment. He was proceeding to seize and carry away as prisoners several of the leading Æginetans, when Krius and some others among them opposed to him a menacing resistance, telling him that he came without any regular warrant from Sparta and under the influence of Athenian bribes—that in order to carry authority, both the Spartan kings ought to come together. It was not of their own accord that the Æginetans ventured to adopt so dangerous a course. Demaratus, the colleague of Kleomenês in the junior or Prokleid line of kings, had suggested to them the step and promised to carry them through it safely.² Dissension between the two co-ordinate kings was no new phænomenon at Sparta. But in the case of Demaratus and Kleomenês, it had broken out some years previously on the occasion of the march against Attica. Hence Demaratus, hating his colleague more than ever, entered into the present intrigue with the Æginetans with the deliberate purpose of frustrating his intervention. He

¹ Herodot. vi. 92.

² Herodot. vi. 50. Κρίος—ἔλεγε δὲ ταῦτα ἐξ ἐπιστολῆς τῆς Δημαρήτου. Compare Pausan. iii. 4, 3.

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succeeded, so that Kleomenês was compelled to return to Sparta ; not without unequivocal menace against Krius and the other Æginetans who had repelled him,¹ and not without a thorough determination to depose Demaratus.

It appears that suspicions had always attached to the legitimacy of Demaratus's birth. His reputed father Aristo, having had no offspring by two successive wives, at last became enamoured of the wife of his friend Agêtus—a woman of surpassing beauty—and entrapped him into an agreement, whereby each solemnly bound himself to surrender anything belonging to him which the other might ask for. That which Agêtus asked from Aristo was at once given. In return, the latter demanded to have the wife of Agêtus, who was thunderstruck at the request and indignantly complained of having been cheated into a sacrifice of all others the most painful : nevertheless the oath was peremptory, and he was forced to comply. The birth of Demaratus took place so soon after this change of husbands, that when it was first made known to Aristo, as he sat upon a bench along with the ephors, he counted on his fingers the number of months since his marriage, and exclaimed with an oath—"The child cannot be mine." He soon however retracted his opinion, and acknowledged the child, who grew up without any question being publicly raised as to his birth, and succeeded his father on the throne. But the original words of Aristo had never been forgotten, and private suspicions were still cherished that Demaratus was really the son of his mother's first husband.²

Of these suspicions Kleomenês now resolved to avail himself, exciting Leotychildês, the next heir in the Prokleid line of kings, to impugn publicly the legitimacy of Demaratus—engaging to second him with all his influence as next in order for the crown—and exacting in return a promise that he would support the intervention against Ægina. Leotychildês was animated not merely by ambition, but also by private enmity against Demaratus, who had disappointed him of his intended bride. He warmly entered into the scheme, arraigned Demaratus as no true Herakleid, and produced evidence to prove the original doubts expressed by Aristo. A serious dispute was thus raised at Sparta, wherein Kleomenês, espousing the pretensions of Leotychildês, recommended that the question as to the legitimacy of Demaratus should be decided by reference to the Delphian oracle. Through the influence of Kôbon, a powerful native of

¹ Herodot. vi. 50-61, 64. Δημάρητος—φθόνῳ καὶ ἄγῃ χρεώμενος.

² Herodot. vi. 61, 62, 63.

Delphi, he procured from the Pythian priestess an answer pronouncing that Demaratus was not the son of Aristo.¹ Leoty-chidês thus became king of the Prokleid line, while Demaratus descended into a private station, and was elected at the ensuing solemnity of the Gymnopædia to an official function. The new king, unable to repress a burst of triumphant spite, sent an attendant to ask him in the public theatre, how he felt as an officer having once been a king. Stung with this insult, Demaratus replied that he himself had tried them both, and that Leoty-chidês might in time come to try them both also: the question (he added) shall bear its fruit—great evil, or great good, to Sparta. So saying he covered his face and retired home from the theatre—offered a solemn farewell sacrifice at the altar of Zeus Herkeios, and solemnly adjured his mother to declare to him who his real father was—then at once quitted Sparta for Elis, under pretence of going to consult the Delphian oracle.²

Demaratus was well known to be a high-spirited and ambitious man—noted, among other things, as the only Lacedæmonian king down to the time of Herodotus who had ever gained a chariot victory at Olympia. Hence Kleomenês and Leoty-chidês became alarmed at the mischief which he might do them in exile. By the law of Sparta, no Herakleid was allowed to establish his residence out of the country, on pain of death. This marks the sentiment of the Lacedæmonians, and Demaratus was not the less likely to give trouble because they had pronounced him illegitimate.³ Accordingly they sent in pursuit of him, and seized him in the island of Zakynthus. But the Zakynthians would not consent to surrender him, so that he passed unobstructed into Asia, where he presented himself to

¹ Herodot. vi. 65, 66. In an analogous case afterwards, where the succession was disputed between Agesilaus the brother, and Leoty-chidês the reputed son, of the deceased king Agis, the Lacedæmonians appear to have taken upon themselves to pronounce Leoty-chidês illegitimate; or rather to assume tacitly such illegitimacy by choosing Agesilaus in preference, without the aid of the oracle (Xenophon, Hellen. iii. 3, 1-4; Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 3). The previous oracle from Delphi, however, *φυλάξασθαι τὴν χαλκὴν βασιλείαν*, was cited on the occasion, and the question was, in what manner it should be interpreted.

² Herodot. vi. 68, 69. The answer made by the mother to this appeal—informing Demaratus that he is the son either of King Aristo, or of the hero Astrobakus—is extremely interesting as an evidence of Grecian manners and feeling.

³ Plutarch, Agis, c. 11. *κατὰ δὴ τινὰ νόμον παλαιὸν, ὃς οὐκ ἔσσι τὸν Ἡρακλείδην ἐκ γυναικὸς ἀλλοδαπῆς τεκνούσθαι, τὸν δ' ἀπελθόντα τῆς Σπάρτης ἐπὶ μεταοικίμῳ πρὸς ἑτέρους ἀπονήσκειν κελεύει.*

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Darius, and was received with abundant favours and presents.¹ We shall hereafter find him the companion of Xerxês, giving to that monarch advice such as, if it had been acted upon, would have proved the ruin of Grecian independence ; to which however he would have been even more dangerous, if he had remained at home as king of Sparta.

Meanwhile Kleomenês, having obtained a consentient colleague in Leotychildês, went with him over to Ægina, eager to revenge himself for the affront which had been put upon him. To the requisition and presence of the two kings jointly, the Æginetans did not dare to oppose any resistance. Kleomenês made choice of ten citizens eminent for wealth, station, and influence, among whom were Krius and another person named Kasambus, the two most powerful men in the island. Conveying them away to Athens, he deposited them as hostages in the hands of the Athenians.²

It was in this state that the affairs of Athens and of Greece generally were found by the Persian armament which landed at Marathon, the progress of which we are now about to follow. And the events just recounted were of material importance, considered in their interdict bearing upon the success of that armament. Sparta had now, on the invitation of Athens, assumed to herself for the first time a formal Pan-Hellenic primacy, her ancient rival Argos being too much broken to contest it—her two kings, at this juncture unanimous, employ their presiding interference in coercing Ægina, and placing Æginetan hostages in the hands of Athens. The Æginetans would not have been unwilling to purchase victory over a neighbour and rival at the cost of submission to Persia, and it was the Spartan interference only which restrained them from assailing Athens conjointly with the Persian invaders ; thus leaving the hands of the Athenians free, and their courage undiminished, for the coming trial.

Meanwhile a vast Persian force, brought together in consequence of the preparation made during the last two years in every part of the empire, had assembled in the Aleïan plain of Kilikia near the sea. A fleet of six hundred armed triremes, together with many transports both for men and horses, was brought hither for their embarkation : the troops were put on board and sailed along the coast to Samos in Ionia. The Ionic and Æolic Greeks constituted an important part of this armament, while the Athenian exile Hippias was on board as guide and auxiliary in the attack of Attica. The generals were Datis,

¹ Hérodote. vi. 70.

² Hérodote. vi. 73.

a Median¹—and Artaphernês, son of the satrap of Sardis so named, and nephew of Darius. We may remark that Datis is the first person of Median lineage who is mentioned as appointed to high command after the accession of Darius, which had been preceded and marked, as I have noticed in a former chapter, by an outbreak of hostile nationality between the Medes and Persians. Their instructions were, generally, to reduce to subjection and tribute all such Greeks as had not already given earth and water. But Darius directed them most particularly to conquer Eretria and Athens, and to bring the inhabitants as slaves into his presence.² These orders were literally meant, and probably neither the generals nor the soldiers of this vast armament doubted that they would be literally executed; and that before the end of the year, the wives, or rather the widows, of men like Themistoklês and Aristeidês would be seen among a mournful train of Athenian prisoners on the road from Sardis to Susa, thus accomplishing the wish expressed by queen Atossa at the instance of Dêmokêdês.

The recent terrific storm near Mount Athos deterred the Persians from following the example of Mardonius, and taking their course by the Hellespont and Thrace. It was resolved to strike straight across the Ægean³ (the mode of attack which intelligent Greeks like Themistoklês most feared, even after the repulse of Xerxês) from Samos to Eubœa, attacking the intermediate islands in the way. Among those islands was Naxos, which ten years before had stood a long siege, and gallantly repelled the Persian Megabatês with the Milesian Aristagoras. It was one of the main objects of Datis to efface this stain on the Persian arms and to take a signal revenge on the Naxians.⁴ Crossing from Samos to Naxos, he landed his army on the island, which he found an easier prize than he had expected. The terrified citizens, abandoning their town, fled with their families to the highest summits of their mountains; while the

¹ Herodot. vi. 94. *Δατίν τε, ἔδοντα Μῆδων γένος, &c.*

Cornelius Nepos (*Life of Pausanias*, c. 1) calls Mardonius a Mede; which cannot be true, since he was the son of Gobryas, one of the seven Persian conspirators (Herodot. vi. 43).

² Herodot. vi. 94. *ἐντειλάμενος δὲ ἀπέπεμπε, ἑξανδραποδίσαντας Ἐρέτριαν καὶ Ἀθήνας, ἕχειν ἑαυτῷ ἐς ὄψιν τὰ ἀνδράποδα.*

According to the Menexenus of Plato (c. 17, p. 245), Darius ordered Datis to fulfil this order on peril of his own head: no such harshness appears in Herodotus.

³ Thucyd. i. 93.

⁴ Herodot. vi. 95, 96. *ἐπὶ ταύτην (Naxos) γὰρ δὴ πρώτην ἐπέχον στρατεύεσθαι οἱ Πέρσαι, μεμνημένοι τῶν πρότερον.*

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Persians, seizing as slaves a few who had been dilatory in flight, burnt the undefended town with its edifices sacred and profane.

Immense indeed was the difference in Grecian sentiment towards the Persians created by the terror-striking reconquest of Ionia, and by the exhibition of a large Phœnician fleet in the Ægean. The strength of Naxos was the same now as it had been before the Ionic revolt, and the successful resistance then made might have been supposed likely to nerve the courage of its inhabitants. Yet such is the fear now inspired by a Persian armament, that the eight thousand Naxian hoplites abandon their towns and their gods without striking a blow,¹ and think of nothing but personal safety for themselves and their families. A sad augury for Athens and Eretria!

From Naxos Datis despatched his fleet round the other Cyclades islands, requiring from each, hostages for fidelity and a contingent to increase his army. With the sacred island of Delos, however, he dealt tenderly and respectfully. The Ælians had fled before his approach to Tênos, but Datis sent a herald to invite them back again, promised to preserve their persons and property inviolate, and proclaimed that he had received express orders from the Great King to reverence the island in which Apollo and Artemis were born. His acts corresponded with this language; for the fleet was not allowed to touch the island, and he himself, landing with only a few attendants, offered a magnificent sacrifice at the altar. As a portion of his armament consisted of Ionic Greeks, such respectful respect to the island of Delos may probably be ascribed to the desire of satisfying their religious feelings; for in their days of early freedom, this island had been the scene of their solemn periodical festivals, as I have already more than once remarked.

Pursuing his course without resistance along the islands, and demanding reinforcements as well as hostages from each, Datis at length touched the southernmost portion of Eubœa—the town of Karystus and its territory.² The Karystians at first refused either to give hostages or to furnish reinforcements against their friends and neighbours. But they were speedily compelled to submission by the aggressive devastation of the invaders. This was the first taste of resistance which Datis had yet experienced; and the facility with which it was overcome

¹ The historians of Naxos affirmed that Datis had been repulsed from the island. We find this statement in Plutarch, *De Malign.* Herodot. c. 36, p. 869, among his violent and unfounded contradictions of Herodotus.

² Herodot. vi. 99.

gave him a promising omen as to his success against Eretria, whither he soon arrived.

The destination of the armament was no secret to the inhabitants of this fated city, among whom consternation, aggravated by intestine differences, was the reigning sentiment. They made application to Athens for aid, which was readily and conveniently afforded to them by means of those four thousand kleruchs or out-citizens whom the Athenians had planted sixteen years before in the neighbouring territory of Chalkis. Notwithstanding such reinforcement, however, many of them despaired of defending the city, and thought only of seeking shelter on the unassailable summits of the island, as the more numerous and powerful Naxians had already done before them; while another party, treacherously seeking their own profit out of the public calamity, lay in wait for an opportunity of betraying the city to the Persians.¹ Though a public resolution was taken to defend the city, yet so manifest was the absence of that stoutness of heart which could alone avail to save it, that a leading Eretrian named *Æschinês* was not ashamed to forewarn the four thousand Athenian allies of the coming treason, and urge them to save themselves before it was too late. They followed his advice and passed over to Athens by way of Orôpus; while the Persians disembarked their troops and even their horses, in expectation that the Eretrians would come out and fight, at Tamynæ and other places in the territory. As the Eretrians did not come out, they proceeded to lay siege to the city, and for some days met with a brave resistance, though the loss on both sides was considerable. At length two of the leading citizens, Euphorbus and Philagrus, with others, betrayed Eretria to the besiegers; its temples were burnt, and its inhabitants dragged into slavery.² It is impossible to credit the exaggerated statement of Plato, which is applied by him to the Persians at Eretria as it had been before applied by Herodotus

¹ Herodot. vi. 100. *Τῶν δὲ Ἐρετριέων ἦν ἄρα οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς βούλευμα, οἱ μετεπέμποντο μὲν Ἀθηναίους, ἐφρόνεον δὲ διφασίας ἰδέας· οἱ μὲν γὰρ αὐτέων ἐβουλεύοντο ἐκλιπεῖν τὴν πόλιν εἰς τὰ ἄκρα τῆς Εὐβοίης, ἄλλοι δὲ αὐτέων ἴδια κέρδεα προσδεκόμενοι παρὰ τοῦ Πέρσῃ οἴσασθαι προδοσὶν ἐσκευάζοντο.*

Allusion to this treason among the Eretrians is to be found in a saying of Themistoklês (Plutarch, Themist. c. 11).

The story told by Hêrakleidês Ponticus (ap. Athenæ. xii. p. 536), of an earlier Persian armament which had assailed Eretria and failed, cannot be at all understood; it rather looks like a mythe to explain the origin of the great wealth possessed by the family of Kallias at Athens—the *λακκόπλουτος*. There is another story, having the same explanatory object, in Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 5.

² Herodot. vi. 101, 102.

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to the Persians at Chios and Samos—that they swept the territory clean of inhabitants by joining hands and forming a line across its whole breadth.¹ Evidently this is an idea, illustrating the possible effects of numbers and ruinous conquest, which has been woven into the tissue of historical statements, like so many other illustrative ideas in the writings of Greek authors. That a large proportion of the inhabitants were carried away as prisoners, there can be no doubt. But the traitors who betrayed the town were spared and rewarded by the Persians,² and we see plainly that either some of the inhabitants must have been left, or new settlers introduced, when we find the Eretrians reckoned ten years afterwards among the opponents of Xerxês.

Datis had thus accomplished with little or no resistance one of the two express objects commanded by Darius, and his army were elated with the confident hope of soon completing the other. After halting a few days at Eretria, and depositing in the neighbouring islet of Ægilia the prisoners recently captured, he re-embarked his army to cross over to Attica, and landed in the memorable bay of Marathon on the eastern coast—the spot betrayed by the despot Hippias, who now landed along with the Persians, twenty years after his expulsion from the govern-

Forty-seven years had elapsed since he had made as a young man this same passage, from Eretria to Marathon, in conjunction with his father Peisistratus, on the occasion of the restoration of the latter. On that previous occasion, Datis accompanying the father had been immeasurably inferior to that which now seconded the son. Yet it had been amply sufficient to carry him in triumph to Athens, with a feeble opposition from citizens alike irresolute and disunited.

¹ Plato, *Legg.* iii. p. 698, and *Menexen.* c. 10, p. 240; *Diogen. Laërt.* iii. 33; *Herodot.* vi. 31: compare *Strabo*, x. p. 446, who ascribes to Herodotus the statement of Plato about the *σαγήνευσις* of Eretria. Plato says nothing about the betrayal of the city.

It is to be remarked, that in the passage of the *Treatise de Legibus*, Plato mentions this story (about the Persians having swept the territory of Eretria clean of its inhabitants) with some doubt as to its truth, and as if it were a rumour intentionally circulated by Datis with a view to frighten the Athenians. But in the *Menexenus*, the story is given as if it were an authentic historical fact.

² *Plutarch, De Garrulitate*, c. 15, p. 510. The descendants of Gongylus the Eretrian, who passed over to the Persians on this occasion, are found nearly a century afterwards in possession of a town and district in Mysia, which the Persian king had bestowed upon their ancestor. *Herodotus* does not mention Gongylus (*Xenoph. Hellen.* iii. 1, 6).

This surrender to the Persians drew upon the Eretrians bitter remarks at the time of the battle of Salamis (*Plutarch, Themistoklês*, c. 11).

And the march of Hippias from Marathon to Athens would now have been equally easy, as it was doubtless conceived to be by himself, both in his waking hopes and in the dream which Herodotus mentions—had not the Athenians whom he found been men radically different from those whom he had left.

To that great renewal of the Athenian character, under the democratical institutions which had subsisted since the dispossession of Hippias, I have already pointed attention in a former chapter. The modifications introduced by Kleisthenês in the constitution had now existed eighteen or nineteen years, without any attempt to overthrow them by violence. The Ten Tribes, each with its constituent demes, had become a part of the established habits of the country; the citizens had become accustomed to exercise a genuine and self-determined decision, in their assemblies political as well as judicial; while even the senate of Areopagus, renovated by the nine annual archons successively chosen who passed into it after their year of office, had also become identified in feeling with the constitution of Kleisthenês. Individual citizens doubtless remained, partisans in secret, and perhaps corresponders of Hippias. But the mass of citizens, in every scale of could look upon his return with nothing but terror and awe. With what degree of newly-acquired energy the democratic Athenians could act in defence of their country and institutions has already been related in a former chapter. But unfortunately we possess few particulars of Athenian history, during the decade preceding 490 B.C., nor can we follow in detail the workings of the government. The new form, however, which Athenian politics had assumed becomes partially manifest when we observe the three leaders who stand prominent at this important epoch—Miltiadês, Themistoklês, and Aristeidês.

The first of the three had returned to Athens three or four years before the approach of Datis, after six or seven years' absence in the Chersonesus of Thrace, whither he had been originally sent by Hippias about the year 517-516 B.C., to inherit the property as well as the supremacy of his uncle the œkist Miltiadês. As despot of the Chersonese, and as one of the subjects of Persia, he had been among the Ionians who accompanied Darius to the Danube in his Scythian expedition. He had been the author of that memorable recommendation which Histiaïus and the other despots did not think it their interest to follow—of destroying the bridge and leaving the Persian king to perish. Subsequently he had been unable to remain

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permanently in the Chersonese, for reasons which have before been noticed; but he seems to have occupied it during the period of the Ionic revolt.¹ What part he took in that revolt, we do not know. He availed himself, however, of the period while the Persian satraps were employed in suppressing it, and deprived of the mastery of the sea, to expel, in conjunction with forces from Athens, both the Persian garrison and the Pelasgic inhabitants from the islands of Lemnos and Imbros. But the extinction of the Ionic revolt threatened him with ruin. When the Phœnician fleet, in the summer following the capture of Milêtus, made its conquering appearance in the Hellespont, he was forced to escape rapidly to Athens with his immediate friends and property, and with a small squadron of five ships. One of these ships, commanded by his son Metiochus, was actually captured between the Chersonese and Imbros; and the Phœnicians were most eager to capture Miltiadês himself,² inasmuch as he was personally odious to Darius from his strenuous recommendation to destroy the bridge over the Danube. On arriving at Athens, after his escape from the Phœnician fleet, he was brought to trial before the judicial popular assembly for alleged misgovernment in the Chersonese, or for what Herodotus calls "his despotism" there exercised.³ Probably the Athenian citizens settled in that peninsula may have had good reason to complain of him,—the more so as he had carried out with him the maxims of government prevalent at Athens under the Peisistratids, and had in his pay a body of Thracian mercenaries. However the people at Athens honourably acquitted him, probably in part from the reputation which he had obtained as conqueror of Lemnos;⁴ and he was one of the ten annually elected generals of the republic, during the year of this Persian expedition—chosen at the beginning of the Attic year, shortly after the summer solstice, at a time when Datis and Hippias had actually sailed, and were known to be approaching.

The character of Miltiadês is one of great bravery and decision—qualities pre-eminently useful to his country on the present

¹ The chapter of Herodotus (vi. 40) relating to the adventures of Miltiadês is extremely perplexing, as I have already remarked in a former note: and Wesseling considers that it involves chronological difficulties which our present MSS. do not enable us to clear up. Neither Schweighäuser, nor the explanation cited in Bähr's note, is satisfactory.

² Herodot. vi. 43-104.

³ Herodot. vi. 39-104.

⁴ Herodot. vi. 132. *Μιλτιάδης, και πρότερον εὐδοκιμῶν*—i. e. before the battle of Marathon. How much his reputation had been heightened by the conquest of Lemnos, see Herodot. vi. 136.

crisis, and the more useful as he was under the strongest motive to put them forth, from the personal hostility of Darius towards him. Yet he does not peculiarly belong to the democracy of Kleisthenês, like his younger contemporaries Themistoklês and Aristeidês. The two latter are specimens of a class of men new at Athens since the expulsion of Hippias, and contrasting forcibly with Peisistratus, Lykurgus, and Megaklês, the political leaders of the preceding generation. Themistoklês and Aristeidês, different as they were in disposition, agree in being politicians of the democratical stamp, exercising ascendancy by and through the people—devoting their time to the discharge of public duties, and to the frequent discussions in the political and judicial meetings of the people—manifesting those combined powers of action, comprehension, and persuasive speech, which gradually accustomed the citizens to look to them as advisers as well as leaders—but always subject to criticism and accusation from unfriendly rivals, and exercising such rivalry towards each other with an asperity constantly increasing. Instead of Attica disunited and torn into armed factions, as it had been forty years before—the Diakrii under one man, and the Parali and Pedieis under others—we have now Attica one and indivisible; regimented into a body of orderly hearers in the Pnyx, appointing and holding to accountability the magistrates, and open to be addressed by Themistoklês, Aristeidês, or any other citizen who can engage their attention.

Neither Themistoklês nor Aristeidês could boast a lineage of gods and heroes, like the Æakid Miltiadês.¹ Both were of middling station and circumstances. Aristeidês, son of Lysimachus, was on both sides of pure Athenian blood; but the wife of Neoklês, father of Themistoklês, was a foreign woman of Thrace or of Karia: and such an alliance is the less surprising, since Themistoklês must have been born during the dynasty of the Peisistratids, when the status of an Athenian citizen had not yet acquired its political value. There was a marked contrast between these two eminent men—those points which stood most conspicuous in the one being comparatively deficient in the other. In the description of Themistoklês, which we have the advantage of finding briefly sketched by Thucydidês, the circumstance most emphatically brought out is, his immense force of spontaneous invention and apprehension, without any previous aid either from teaching or gradual

¹ Herodot. vi. 35.

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practice. The might of unassisted nature¹ was never so strikingly exhibited as in him. He conceived the complications of a present embarrassment, and divined the chances of a mysterious future, with equal sagacity and equal quickness. The right expedient seemed to flash upon his mind extempore, even in the most perplexing contingencies, without the least necessity for premeditation. He was not less distinguished for daring and resource in action: when engaged on any joint affairs, his superior competence marked him out as the leader for others to follow, and no business, however foreign to his experience, ever took him by surprise, or came wholly amiss to him. Such is the remarkable picture which Thucydídēs draws of a countryman whose death nearly coincided in time with his own birth. The untutored readiness and universality of Themistoklēs probably formed in his mind a contrast to the more elaborate discipline, and careful preliminary study, with which the statesmen of his own day—and Periklēs especially, the greatest of them—approached the consideration and discussion of public affairs. Themistoklēs had received no teaching from philosophers, sophists and rhetors, who were the instructors of well-born youth in the days of Thucydídēs, and whom Aristophanēs, the contemporary of the latter, so unmercifully derides—treating such instruction as worse than nothing, and extolling, in comparison with it, the unlettered courage, with mere gymnastic accomplishments, of the victors at Marathon.² There is no evidence in the mind of Thucydídēs of any such undue contempt towards his own age. The same terms of contrast are tacitly present to his mind, but he seems to treat the great capacity of Themistoklēs as the more a matter of wonder, since it sprung up without that preliminary cultivation which had gone to the making of Periklēs.

The general character given by Plutarch,³ though many of

¹ Thucyd. i. 138. ἦν γὰρ ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς βεβαίωτατα δὴ φύσεως ἰσχυρὸν δηλώσας καὶ διαφερόντως τι ἐς αὐτὸ μᾶλλον ἐτέρων ἀξίως θανάσαι· οἰκεία γὰρ συνέσει καὶ οὔτε προμαθῶν ἐς αὐτὴν οὐδὲν οὔτ' ἐπιμαθῶν, τῶν τε παραχρήμα δι' ἐλαχίστης βουλῆς κράτιστος γνῶμων, καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἐπὶ πλείστον τοῦ γενησομένου ἄριστος εἰκαστής. Καὶ ἂ μὲν μετὰ χεῖρας ἔχοι, καὶ ἐξηγήσασθαι οἶός τε· ὧν δὲ ἄπειρος ἔη, κρίναι ἰκανῶς οὐκ ἀπῆλλακτο. Τό τε ἕμεινον ἢ χεῖρον ἐν τῷ ἀφανεί ἔτι προῶρα μάλιστα· καὶ τὸ ξύμπαν εἰπεῖν, φύσεως μὲν δυνάμει μελέτης δὲ βραχύτητι, κράτιστος δὴ οὗτος αὐτοσχεδιάσειν τὰ δέοντα ἐγένετο.

² See the contrast of the old and new education, as set forth in Aristophanes, *Nubes*, 957–1003; also Ranæ, 1067.

About the training of Themistoklēs, compared with that of the contemporaries of Periklēs, see also Plutarch, *Themistokl.* c. 2.

³ Plutarch, *Themistoklēs*, c. 3, 4, 5; Cornelius Nepos, *Themist.* c. 1.

his anecdotes are both trifling and apocryphal, is quite consistent with the brief sketch just cited from Thucydidês. Themistoklês had an unbounded passion—not merely for glory, insomuch that the laurels of Miltiadês acquired at Marathon deprived him of rest—but also for display of every kind. He was eager to vie with men richer than himself in showy exhibition—one great source, though not the only source, of popularity at Athens—nor was he at all scrupulous in procuring the means of doing so. Besides being assiduous in attendance at the Ekklesia and the Dikastery, he knew most of the citizens by name, and was always ready with advice to them in their private affairs. Moreover he possessed all the tactics of an expert party-man in conciliating political friends and in defeating political enemies. And though he was in the early part of his life sincerely bent upon the upholding and aggrandisement of his country, and was on some most critical occasions of unspeakable value to it, yet on the whole his morality was as reckless as his intelligence was eminent. He will be found grossly corrupt in the exercise of power, and employing tortuous means, sometimes indeed for ends in themselves honourable and patriotic, but sometimes also merely for enriching himself. He ended a glorious life by years of deep disgrace, with the forfeiture of all Hellenic esteem and brotherhood—a rich man, an exile, a traitor, and a pensioner of the Great King, pledged to undo his own previous work of liberation accomplished at the victory of Salamis.

Of Aristeidês we possess unfortunately no description from the hand of Thucydidês. Yet his character is so simple and consistent, that we may safely accept the brief but unqualified encomium of Herodotus and Plato, expanded as it is in the biography of Plutarch and Cornelius Nepos,¹ however little the details of the latter can be trusted. Aristeidês was inferior to Themistoklês in resource, quickness, flexibility, and power of coping with difficulties; but incomparably superior to him, as well as to other rivals and contemporaries, in integrity public as well as private; inaccessible to pecuniary temptations as well as to other seductive influences, and deserving as well as enjoying the highest measure of personal confidence. He is described as the peculiar friend of Kleisthenês, the first founder of the democracy²—as pursuing a straight and single-handed

¹ Herodot. viii. 79; Plato, Gorgias, c. 172. *ἄριστον ἄνδρα ἐν Ἀθήνῃσι καὶ δικάϊστατον.*

² Plutarch (Aristeidês, c. 1-4; Themistoklês, c. 3; An Seni sit gerenda respublica, c. 12, p. 790; Præcepta Reip. Gerend. c. ii. p. 805).

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course in political life, with no solicitude for party-ties, and with little care either to conciliate friends or to offend enemies—as unflinching in the exposure of corrupt practices, by whomsoever committed or upheld—as earning for himself the lofty surname of the Just, not less by his judicial decisions in the capacity of archon, than by his equity in private arbitrations and even his candour in political dispute—and as manifesting, throughout a long public life full of tempting opportunities, an uprightness without flaw and beyond all suspicion, recognised equally by his bitter contemporary the poet Timokreon¹ and by the allies of Athens upon whom he first assessed the tribute. Few of the leading men in any part of Greece were without some taint on their reputation, deserved or undeserved, in regard to pecuniary probity. But whoever became notoriously recognised as possessing this vital quality, acquired by means of it a firmer hold on the public esteem than even eminent talents could confer. Thucydidês ranks conspicuous probity among the first of the many ascendant qualities possessed by Periklês;² while Nikias, equal to him in this respect, though immeasurably inferior in every other, owed to it a still larger proportion of that exaggerated confidence which the Athenian people continued so long to repose in him. The abilities of Aristeidês—though apparently adequate to every occasion on which he was engaged, and only inferior when we compare him with so remarkable a man as Themistoklês—were put in the shade by this incorruptible probity; which procured for him, however, along with the general esteem, no inconsiderable amount of private enmity from jobbers whom he exposed, and even some jealousy from persons who heard it proclaimed with offensive ostentation. We are told that a rustic and unlettered citizen gave his ostracising vote and expressed his dislike against Aristeidês,³ on the simple ground that he was tired of hearing him always called the Just. Now the purity of the most honourable man will not bear to be so boastfully talked of as if he were the only honourable man in the country. The less it is obtruded, the more deeply and cordially will it be felt: and the story just alluded to, whether true or false, illustrates that natural reaction of feeling produced by absurd encomiasts, or perhaps by insidious enemies under the mask of encomiasts, who trumpeted forth Aristeidês as *The* Just man of Attica, so as to wound the legitimate dignity of every one else. Neither indiscreet friends nor artful enemies, however,

¹ Timokreon ap. Plutarch. Themistoklês, c. 21.

² Thucyd. ii. 65.

³ Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 7.

could rob him of the lasting esteem of his countrymen ; which he enjoyed, though with intervals of their displeasure, to the end of his life. He was ostracised during a part of the period between the battles of Marathon and Salamis, at a time when the rivalry between him and Themistoklès was so violent that both could not remain at Athens without peril ; but the dangers of Athens during the invasion of Xerxès brought him back before the ten years of exile were expired. His fortune, originally very moderate, was still further diminished during the course of his life, so that he died very poor, and the state was obliged to lend aid to his children.

Such were the characters of Themistoklès and Aristeidès, the two earliest leaders thrown up by the Athenian democracy. Half a century before, Themistoklès would have been an active partisan in the faction of the Parali or the Pedieis, while Aristeidès would probably have remained an unnoticed citizen. At the present period of Athenian history, the characters of soldier, magistrate, and orator, were intimately blended together in a citizen who stood forward for eminence, though they tended more and more to divide themselves during the ensuing century and a half. Aristeidès and Miltiadès were both elected among the ten generals, each for his respective tribe, in the year of the expedition of Datis across the Ægean, and probably even after that expedition was known to be on its voyage. Moreover we are led to suspect from a passage in Plutarch, that Themistoklès also was general of his tribe on the same occasion,¹ though this is doubtful ; but it is certain that he fought at Marathon. The ten generals had jointly the command of the army, each of them taking his turn to exercise it for a day. In addition to the ten, the third archon or polemarch was considered as eleventh in the military council. The polemarch of this year was Kallimachus of Aphidnæ.²

Such were the chiefs of the military force, and to a great degree the administrators of foreign affairs, at the time when the four thousand Athenian kleruchs or settlers planted in Eubœa—escaping from Eretria, now invested by the Persians—brought word to their countrymen at home that the fall of that city was impending. It was obvious that the Persian host would proceed from Eretria forthwith against Athens. A few days afterwards Hippias disembarked them at Marathon.

Of the feeling which now prevailed at Athens we have no details. But doubtless the alarm was hardly inferior to that which had been felt at Eretria. Opinions were not unanimous

¹ Plutarch, Aristeidès, c. 5.

² Herodot. vi. 109, 110.

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as to the proper steps to be taken, nor were suspicions of treason wanting. Pheidippidès the courier was sent to Sparta immediately to solicit assistance ; and such was his prodigious activity, that he performed this journey of 150 miles, on foot, in 48 hours.¹ Revealing to the ephors that Eretria was already enslaved, he entreated their assistance to avert the same fate from Athens, the most ancient city in Greece. The Spartan authorities readily promised their aid, but unfortunately it was now the ninth day of the moon. Ancient law or custom forbade them to march, in this month at least, during the last quarter before the full moon ; but after the full, they engaged to march without delay. Five days' delay at this critical moment might prove the utter ruin of the endangered city ; yet the reason assigned seems to have been no pretence on the part of the Spartans. It was mere blind tenacity of ancient habit, which we shall find to abate, though never to disappear, as we advance in their history.² Indeed their delay in marching to rescue Attica from Mardonius, eleven years afterwards, at the imminent hazard of alienating Athens and ruining the Hellenic cause, marks the same selfish dulness. But the reason now given certainly looked very like a pretence, so that the Athenians could indulge no certain assurance that the Spartan troops would start even when the full moon arrived.

In this respect the answer brought by Pheidippidès was mischievous, as it tended to increase that uncertainty and indecision which already prevailed among the ten generals, as to the proper steps for meeting the invaders. Partly, perhaps, in reliance on this expected Spartan help, five out of the ten generals were decidedly averse to an immediate engagement with the Persians ; while Miltiadès with the remaining four strenuously urged that not a moment should be lost in bringing the enemy to action, without leaving time to the timid and the treacherous to establish correspondence with Hippias and to take some active step for paralysing all united action on the part of the citizens. This most momentous debate, upon which the fate of Athens hung, is represented by Herodotus to have occurred at Marathon, after the army had marched out and taken post there within sight of the Persians ; while Cornelius Nepos describes it as having been raised before the

¹ Mr. Kinneir remarks that the Persian Cassids, or foot-messengers, will travel for several days successively at the rate of sixty or seventy miles a day (*Geographical Memoir of Persia*, p. 44).

² Herodot. ix. 7-10.

army quitted the city—upon the question, whether it was prudent to meet the enemy at all in the field, or to confine the defence to the city and the sacred rock. Inaccurate as this latter author generally is, his statement seems more probable here than that of Herodotus. For the ten generals would scarcely march out of Athens to Marathon without having previously resolved to fight: moreover, the question between fighting in the field or resisting behind the walls, which had already been raised at Eretria, seems the natural point on which the five mistrustful generals would take their stand. And probably indeed Miltiadês himself, if debarred from immediate action, would have preferred to hold possession of Athens, and prevent any treacherous movement from breaking out there, rather than to remain inactive on the hills, watching the Persians at Marathon, with the chance of a detachment from their numerous fleet sailing round to Phalêrum, and thus distracting by a double attack both the city and the camp.

However this may be, the equal division of opinion among the ten generals, whether manifested at Marathon or at Athens, is certain. Miltiadês had to await the casting-vote of the polemarch Kallimachus. To him he represented emphatically the danger of delay, with the chance of some traitorous intrigue occurring to excite disunion and aggravate the alarms of the citizens. Nothing could prevent such treason from breaking out, with all its terrific consequences of enslavement to the Persians and to Hippias, except a bold, decisive, and immediate attack—the success of which he (Miltiadês) was prepared to guarantee. Fortunately for Athens, the polemarch embraced the opinion of Miltiadês; while the seditious movements which were preparing did not show themselves until after the battle had been gained. Aristeidês and Themistoklês are both recorded to have seconded Miltiadês warmly in this proposal, while all the other generals agreed in surrendering to Miltiadês their days of command, so as to make him as much as they could the sole leader of the army. It is said that the latter awaited the day of his own regular turn before he fought the battle.¹ Yet considering the eagerness which he displayed to bring on an immediate and decisive action, we cannot suppose that he would have admitted any serious postponement upon such a punctilio.

While the army were mustered on the ground sacred to Hêraklês near Marathon, with the Persians and their fleet occupying the plain and shore beneath, and in preparation for

¹ Herodot. vi. 110.

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immediate action—they were joined by the whole force of the little town of Plataea, consisting of about 1000 hoplites, who had marched directly from their own city to the spot, along the southern range of Kithærôn, and passing through Dekeleia. We are not told that they had ever been invited. Very probably the Athenians had never thought of summoning aid from this unimportant neighbour, in whose behalf they had taken upon themselves a lasting feud with Thebes and the Bœotian league.¹ Their coming on this important occasion seems to have been a spontaneous effort of gratitude, which ought not to be the less commended because their interests were really wrapped up in those of Athens—since if the latter had been conquered, nothing could have saved Plataea from being subdued by the Thebans. Yet many a Grecian town would have disregarded both generous impulse and rational calculation, in the fear of provoking a new and terrific enemy. If we summon up to our imaginations all the circumstances of the case—which it requires some effort to do, because our authorities come from the subsequent generations, after Greece had ceased to fear the Persians—we shall be sensible that this volunteer march of the whole Platæan force to Marathon is one of the most affecting incidents of all Grecian history. Upon Athens generally it produced an indelible impression, commemorated ever afterwards in the public prayers of the Athenian herald,² and repaid by a grant to the Platæans of the full civil rights (seemingly without the political rights) of Athenian citizens. Upon the Athenians then marshalled at Marathon its effect must have been unspeakably powerful and encouraging, as a proof that they were not altogether isolated from Greece, and as an unexpected countervailing stimulus under circumstances so full of hazard.

Of the two opposing armies at Marathon, we are told that the Athenians were 10,000 hoplites, either including, or besides, the 1000 who came from Plataea.³ This statement is no way improbable, though it does not come from Herodotus, who is

¹ Herodot. vi. 108–112.

² Thucyd. iii. 55.

³ Justin states 10,000 Athenians, besides 1000 Platæans. Cornelius Nepos, Pausanias and Plutarch give 10,000 as the sum total of both. Justin, ii. 9; Corn. Nep. Miltiad. c. 4; Pausan. iv. 25, 5; x. 20, 2: compare also Suidas, v. Πρωτας.

Heeren (De Pontibus Trogi Pompeii, Dissertat. ii. 7) affirms that Trogus or Justin follows Herodotus in matters concerning the Persian invasions of Greece. He cannot have compared the two very attentively: for Justin not only states several matters which are not to be found in Herodotus, but is at variance with the latter on some particulars not unimportant.

our only really valuable authority on the case, and who mentions no numerical total. Indeed the number named may seem smaller than we should have expected, considering that no less than 4000 kleruchs or out-settled citizens had just come over from Eubœa. A sufficient force of citizens must of course have been left behind to defend the city. The numbers of the Persians we cannot be said to know at all, nor is there anything certain except that they were greatly superior to the Greeks. We hear from Herodotus that their armament originally consisted of six hundred ships of war, but we are not told how many separate transports there were; moreover, reinforcements had been procured as they came across the Ægean from the islands successively conquered. The aggregate crews on board of all their ships must have been between 150,000 and 200,000 men. Yet what proportion of these were fighting-men, or how many actually did fight at Marathon, we have no means of determining.¹ There were a certain proportion of cavalry, and some transports expressly prepared for the conveyance of horses. Moreover, Herodotus tells us that Hippias selected the plain of Marathon for a landing-place, because it was the most convenient spot in Attica for cavalry movements—though it is singular, that in the battle the cavalry are not mentioned.

¹ Justin (ii. 9) says that the total of the Persian army was 600,000, and that 200,000 perished. Plato (Menexen. p. 240) and Lysias (Orat. Funer. c. 7) speak of the Persian total as 500,000 men. Valerius Maximus (v. 3), Pausanias (iv. 25), and Plutarch (Parallel. Græc. ad init.), give 300,000 men. Cornelius Nepos (Miltiadês, c. 5) gives the more moderate total of 110,000 men.

See the observations on the battle of Marathon made both by Colonel Leake and by Mr. Finlay, who have examined and described the locality: Leake on the Demi of Attica, in Transactions of the Royal Society of Literature, vol. ii. p. 160 *seq.*; and Finlay on the Battle of Marathon, in the same Transactions, vol. iii. p. 360-380, &c.

Both have given remarks on the probable numbers of the armies assembled; but there are really no materials, even for a probable guess, in respect to the Persians. The silence of Herodotus (whom we shall find hereafter very circumstantial as to the numbers of the army under Xerxês) seems to show that he had no information which he could trust. His account of the battle of Marathon presents him in honourable contrast with the loose and boastful assertors who followed him. For though he does not tell us much, and falls lamentably short of what we should like to know, yet all that he does say is reasonable and probable as to the proceedings of both armies; and the little which he states becomes more trustworthy on that very account—because it is so little—showing that he keeps strictly within his authorities.

There is nothing in the account of Herodotus to make us believe that he had ever visited the ground of Marathon.

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Marathon, situated near to a bay on the eastern coast of Attica, and in a direction E.N.E. from Athens, is divided by the high ridge of Mount Pentelikus from the city, with which it communicated by two roads, one to the north, another to the south of that mountain. Of these two roads, the northern, at once the shortest and the most difficult, is twenty-two miles in length: the southern—longer but more easy, and the only one practicable for chariots—is twenty-six miles in length, or about six and a half hours of computed march. It passed between Mounts Pentelikus and Hymettus, through the ancient deme of Gargêttus and Pallênê, and was the road by which Peisistratus and Hippias, when they landed at Marathon forty-seven years before, had marched to Athens. The bay of Marathon, sheltered by a projecting cape from the northward, affords both deep water and a shore convenient for landing; while “its plain (says a careful modern observer¹) extends in a perfect level along this fine bay and is in length about six miles, in breadth never less than about one mile and a half. Two marshes bound the extremities of the plain: the southern is not very large, and is almost dry at the conclusion of the great heats; but the northern, which generally covers considerably more than a square mile, offers several parts which are at all seasons

¹ See Mr. Finlay on the Battle of Marathon, Transactions, &c., vol. iii. pp. 364, 368, 383, *ut supra*: compare Hobhouse (Lord Broughton), Journey in Albania, i. p. 432.

Colonel Leake thinks that the ancient town of Marathon was not on the exact site of the modern Marathon, but at a place called Vraná, a little to the south of Marathon (Leake on the Demi of Attica, in the Transactions of the Royal Society of Literature, 1829, vol. ii. p. 166).

“Below these two points,” he observes, “(the tumuli of Vraná and the hill of Ketróni) the plain of Marathon expands to the shore of the bay, which is near two miles distant from the opening of the valley of Vraná. It is moderately well cultivated with corn, and is one of the most fertile spots in Attica, though rather inconveniently subject to inundations from the two torrents which cross it, particularly that of Marathóna. From Lucian (in Icaro-Menippo) it appears that the parts about Cenoê were noted for their fertility, and an Egyptian poet of the fifth century has celebrated the vines and olives of Marathon. It is natural to suppose that the vineyards occupied the rising grounds; and it is probable that the olive-trees were chiefly situated in the two valleys, where some are still growing: for as to the plain itself, the circumstances of the battle incline one to believe that it was anciently as destitute of trees as it is at the present day.” (Leake, on the Demi of Attica, Trans. of Roy. Soc. of Literature, vol. ii. p. 162.)

Colonel Leake further says, respecting the fitness of the Marathonian ground for cavalry movements: “As I rode across the plain of Marathon with a peasant of Vraná, he remarked to me that it was a fine place for cavalry to fight in. None of the modern Marathonii were above the rank of labourers: they have heard that a great battle was once fought there, but that is all they know.” (Leake, *ut sup.*, ii. p. 175.)

impassable. Both however leave a broad, firm, sandy beach between them and the sea. The uninterrupted flatness of the plain is hardly relieved by a single tree ; and an amphitheatre of rocky hills and rugged mountains separates it from the rest of Attica, over the lower ridges of which some steep and difficult paths communicate with the districts of the interior."

The position occupied by Miltiadés before the battle, identified as it was to all subsequent Athenians by the sacred grove of Héraklès near Marathon, was probably on some portion of the high ground above this plain. Cornelius Nepos tells us that he protected it from the attacks of the Persian cavalry by felled trees obstructing the approach. The Persians occupied a position on the plain ; their fleet was ranged along the beach, and Hippias himself marshalled them for the battle.¹ The native Persians and Sakæ, the best troops in the whole army, were placed in the centre, which they considered as the post of honour,² and which was occupied by the Persian king himself, when present at a battle. The right wing was so regarded by the Greeks, and the polemarch Kallimachus had the command of it. The hoplites were arranged in the order of their respective tribes from right to left, and at the extreme left stood the Plateans. It was necessary for Miltiadés to present a front equal or nearly equal to that of the more numerous Persian host, in order to guard himself from being taken in flank. With this view he drew up the central tribes, including the Leontis and Antiochis, in shallow files and occupying a large breadth of ground ; while each of the wings was in stronger and deeper order, so as to make his attack efficient on both sides. His whole army consisted of hoplites, with some slaves as unarmed or light-armed attendants, but without either bowmen or cavalry. Nor could the Persians have been very strong in this

¹ Herodot. vi. 107.

² Plutarch, *Symposiac.* i. 3, p. 619 ; Xenophon. *Anab.* i. 8, 21 ; Arrian, ii. 3, 18 ; iii. 11, 16.

We may compare, with this established battle-array of the Persian armies, that of the Turkish armies, adopted and constantly followed ever since the victorious battle of Ikonium in 1386, gained by Amurath I. over the Karamanians. The European troops (or those of Rum) occupy the left wing ; the Asiatic troops (or those of Anatoli) the right wing ; the Janissaries are in the centre. The Sultan, or the Grand Visir, surrounded by the national cavalry or Spahis, is in the central point of all (Von Hammer, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reichs*, book v. vol. i. p. 199).

About the honour of occupying the right wing in a Grecian army, see in particular the animated dispute between the Athenians and the Tegeates before the battle of Plateæ (Herodot. ix. 27). It is the post assigned to the heroic kings of legendary warfare (Eurip. *Supplices*, 657).

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latter force, seeing that their horses had to be transported across the Ægean: but the elevated position of Miltiadês enabled them to take some measure of the numbers under his command, and the entire absence of cavalry in his army could not but confirm the confidence with which a long career of uninterrupted victory had impressed their generals.

At length the sacrifices in the Greek camp were favourable for battle. Miltiadês, who had everything to gain by coming immediately to close quarters, ordered his army to advance at a running step over the interval of one mile which separated the two armies. This rapid forward movement, accompanied by the war-cry or pæan which always animated the charge of the Greek soldier, astounded the Persian army. They construed it as an act of desperate courage little short of insanity, in a body not only small but destitute of cavalry or archers—but they at the same time felt their conscious superiority sink within them. It seems to have been long remembered also among the Greeks as the peculiar characteristic of the battle of Marathon, and Herodotus tells us that the Athenians were the first Greeks who ever charged at a run.¹ It doubtless operated beneficially in rendering the Persian cavalry and archers comparatively innocuous, but we may reasonably suppose that it also disordered the Athenian ranks, and that when they reached the Persian front, they were both out of breath and unsteady in that line of presented spears and shields which constituted their force.

¹ Herodot. vi. 112. Πρῶτοι μὲν γὰρ Ἑλλήνων πάντων τῶν ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν, δρόμῳ ἐς πολεμίους ἐχρήσαντο.

The running pace of the charge was obviously one of the most remarkable events connected with the battle. Colonel Leake and Mr. Finlay seem disposed to reduce the run to a quick march; partly on the ground that the troops must have been disordered and out of breath by running a mile. The probability is, that they really were so, and that such was the great reason of the defeat of the centre. It is very probable that a part of the mile run over consisted of declivity. I accept the account of Herodotus literally, though whether the distance be exactly stated, we cannot certainly say: indeed the fact is, that it required some steadiness of discipline to prevent the step of hoplites, when charging, from becoming accelerated into a run. See the narrative of the battle of Kunaxa in Xenoph. Anab. i. 8, 18; Diodor. xiv. 23: compare Polyæn. ii. 2, 3. The passage of Diodorus here referred to contrasts the advantages with the disadvantages of the running charge.

Both Colonel Leake and Mr. Finlay try to point out the exact ground occupied by the two armies: they differ in the spot chosen, and I cannot think that there is sufficient evidence to be had in favour of any spot. Leake thinks that the Persian commanders were encamped in the plain of Fricorythos, separated from that of Marathon by the great marsh, and communicating with it only by means of a causeway (Leake, Transact. ii. 3. 170).

On the two wings, where the files were deep, such disorder produced no mischievous effect: the Persians, after a certain resistance, were overborne and driven back. But in the centre, where the files were shallow, and where moreover the native Persians and other choice troops of the army were posted, the breathless and disordered Athenian hoplites found themselves in far greater difficulties. The tribes Leontis and Antiochis, with Themistoklēs and Aristeidēs among them, were actually defeated, broken, driven back, and pursued by the Persians and Sakæ.¹ Miltiadēs seems to have foreseen the possibility of such a check when he found himself compelled to diminish so materially the depth of his centre. For his wings, having routed the enemies opposed to them, were stayed from pursuit until the centre was extricated, and the Persians and Sakæ put to flight along with the rest. The pursuit then became general, and the Persians were chased to their ships ranged in line along the shore. Some of them became involved in the impassable marsh and there perished.² The Athenians tried to set the ships on fire, but the defence here was both vigorous and successful—several of the forward warriors of Athens were slain, and only seven ships out of the numerous fleet destroyed.³ This part of the battle terminated to the advantage of the Persians. They repulsed the Athenians from the sea-shore, so as to secure a safe re-embarkation; leaving few or no prisoners, but a rich spoil of tents and equipments which had been disembarked and could not be carried away.

Herodotus estimates the number of those who fell on the Persian side in this memorable action at 6400 men. The number of Athenian dead is accurately known, since all were collected for the last solemn obsequies—they were 192. How many were wounded we do not hear. The brave Kallimachus the polemarch, and Stesilaus one of the ten generals, were among the slain; together with Kynegeirus son of Euphorion, who, in laying hold on the poop-staff of one of the vessels, had his hand cut off by an axe,⁴ and died of the wound. He was

¹ Herodot. vi. 113. Κατὰ τοῦτο μὲν δὴ, ἐνίκων οἱ βάρβαροι, καὶ ῥήξαντες, ἐδίωκον ἐς τὴν μεσσηγαίαν.

Herodotus here tells us the whole truth without disguise: Plutarch (Aristeidēs, c. 3) only says that the Persian centre made a longer resistance, and gave the tribes in the Grecian centre more trouble to overthrow.

² Pausan. i. 32, 6.

³ Herodot. vi. 113-115.

⁴ Herodot. vi. 114. This is the statement of Herodotus respecting Kynegeirus. How creditably does his character as an historian contrast with that of the subsequent romancers! Justin tells us that Kynegeirus first

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brother of the poet Æschylus, himself present at the fight ; to whose imagination this battle at the ships must have emphatically recalled the fifteenth book of the Iliad. Both the slain Athenian generals are said to have perished in the assault of the ships, apparently the hottest part of the combat. The statement of the Persian loss as given by Herodotus appears moderate and reasonable,¹ but he does not specify any distinguished individuals as having fallen.

But the Persians, though thus defeated and compelled to abandon the position of Marathon, were not yet disposed to relinquish altogether their chances against Attica. Their fleet was observed to take the direction of Cape Sunium—a portion being sent to take up the Eretrian prisoners and the stores which had been left in the island of Ægilia. At the same time a shield, discernible from its polished surface afar off, was seen held aloft upon some high point of Attica²—perhaps on the summit of Mount Pentelikus, as Colonel Leake supposes with much plausibility. The Athenians doubtless saw it as well as the Persians ; and Miltiadês did not fail to put the right interpretation upon it, taken in conjunction with the course of the departing fleet. The shield was a signal put up by partisans in the country, to invite the Persians round to Athens by sea, while the Marathonian army was absent. Miltiadês saw through the plot, and lost not a moment in returning to Athens. On the very day of the battle, the Athenian army marched back with the utmost speed from the precinct of Hêraklês at Marathon to the precinct of the same god at Kynosarges close to Athens, which they reached before the arrival of the Persian

seized the vessel with his right hand : that was cut off, and he held the vessel with his left : when he had lost that also, he seized the ship with his teeth “like a wild beast” (Justin, ii. 9)—Justin seems to have found this statement in many different authors : “Cynegiri militis virtus, multis scriptorum laudibus celebrata.”

¹ For the exaggerated stories of the numbers of Persians slain, see Xenophon. Anab. iii. 2, 12 ; Plutarch, De Malign. Herodot. c. 26, p. 862 ; Justin, ii. 9 ; and Suidas, v. Ποικίλη.

In the account of Ktêsias, Datis was represented as having been killed in the battle, and it was further said that the Athenians refused to give up his body for interment ; which was one of the grounds whereupon Xerxês afterwards invaded Greece. It is evident that in the authorities which Ktêsias followed, the alleged death of Datis at Marathon was rather emphatically dwelt upon. See Ktêsias, Persica, c. 18–21, with the note of Bähr, who is inclined to defend the statement against Herodotus.

² Herodot. vi. 124. Ἀνεδέχθη μὲν γὰρ ἀσπίς, καὶ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστι ἄλλως εἰπεῖν· ἐγένετο γὰρ· ὅς μὲν τοι ἦν ὁ ἀναδέξας οὐκ ἔχω τὸ πρωτῶρα εἰπεῖν τοιούτων.

fleet.¹ Datis soon came off the port of Phalærum; but the partisans of Hippias had been so dismayed by the rapid return of the Marathonian army, that he did not find those aids and facilities which he had anticipated for a fresh disembarkation in the immediate neighbourhood of Athens. Though too late however, it seems that he was not much too late. The Marathonian army had only just completed their forced return-march. A little less quickness on the part of Miltiadês in deciphering the treasonable signal, and giving the instant order of march—a little less energy on the part of the Athenian citizens in superadding a fatiguing march to a no less fatiguing combat—and the Persians with the partisans of Hippias might have been found in possession of Athens. As the facts turned out, Datis, finding at Phalærum no friendly movement to encourage him, but, on the contrary, the unexpected presence of the soldiers who had already vanquished him at Marathon—made no attempt again to disembark in Attica, but sailed away, after a short delay, to the Cyclades.

Thus was Athens rescued, for this time at least, from a danger not less terrible than imminent. Nothing could have rescued her except that decisive and instantaneous attack which Miltiadês so emphatically urged. The running step on the field of Marathon might cause some disorder in the ranks of the hoplites; but extreme haste in bringing on the combat was the only means of preventing disunion and distraction in the minds of the citizens. Imperfect as the account is which Herodotus gives of this most interesting crisis, we see plainly that the partisans of Hippias had actually organised a conspiracy, and that it only failed by coming a little too late. The bright shield uplifted on Mount Pentelikus, apprising the Persians that matters were prepared for them at Athens, was intended to have come to their view before any action had taken place at Marathon, and while the Athenian army were yet detained there; so that Datis might have sent a portion of his fleet round to Phalærum, retaining the rest for combat with the enemy before him. If it had once become known to the Marathonian army that a Persian detachment had landed at

¹ Herodot. vi. 116. Οὔτοι μὲν δὴ περιέπλων Σούριον. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ, ὡς ποδῶν εἶχον, τάχιιστα ἐβοήθειον ἐς τὸ ἄστυ· καὶ ἐφθόσαν τε ἀπικόμενοι, πρὶν ἢ τοὺς Βαρβάρους ἤκειν, καὶ ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο ἀπικύμενοι ἐξ Ἡρακλῆϊο τοῦ ἐν Μαραθῶνι ἐς ἄλλο Ἡρακλῆϊον τὸ ἐν Κυνοσάργει.

Plutarch (Bellone an Pace clariores fuerint Athenienses, c. 8, p. 350. represents Miltiadês as returning to Athens on the *day after* the battle it must have been on the same afternoon, according to the account of Herodotus.

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Phalærum¹—where there was a good plain for cavalry to act in, prior to the building of the Phalæric wall, as had been seen in the defeat of the Spartan Anchimolius by the Thessalian cavalry, in 510 B.C.—that it had been joined by timid or treacherous Athenians, and had perhaps even got possession of the city—their minds would have been so distracted by the double danger, and by fears for their absent wives and children, that they would have been disqualified for any unanimous execution of military orders. Generals as well as soldiers would have become incurably divided in opinion—perhaps even mistrustful of each other. The citizen-soldier of Greece generally, and especially of Athens, possessed in a high degree both personal bravery and attachment to order and discipline. But his bravery was not of that equal, imperturbable, uninquiring character, which belonged to the battalions of Wellington or Napoleon. It was fitful, exalted or depressed by casual occurrences, and often more sensitive to dangers absent and unseen, than to enemies immediately in his front. Hence the advantage, so unspeakable in the case before us, and so well appreciated by Miltiadês, of having one undivided Athenian army—with one hostile army, and only one, to meet in the field. When we come to the battle of Salamis, ten years later, it will be seen that the Greeks of that day enjoyed the same advantage. But the wisest advisers of Xerxês impressed upon him the prudence of dividing his large force, and of sending detachments to assail separate Greek states—which would infallibly produce the effect of breaking up the combined Grecian host, and leaving no central or co-operating force for the defence of Greece generally. Fortunately for the Greeks, the childish insolence of Xerxês led him to despise all such advice, as implying conscious weakness. Not so Datis and Hippias. Sensible of the prudence of distracting the attention of the Athenians by a double attack, they laid a scheme, while the main army was at Marathon, for rallying the partisans of Hippias, with a force to assist them in the neighbourhood of Athens, and the signal was upheld by these partisans as soon as their measures were taken. But the rapidity of Miltiadês so precipitated the battle, that this signal came too late, and was only given “when the Persians were already in their ships,”² after the Marathonian defeat. Even then it might have proved dangerous, had not the movements of Miltiadês been as rapid

¹ Herodot. v. 62, 63.

² Herodot. vi. 115. Τοῖσι Πέρσησι ἀναδέξαι ἀσπίδα, εἰοῦσι ἤδη ἐν τῆσι νηυσί.

after the victory as before it. If time had been allowed for the Persian movement on Athens before the battle of Marathon had been fought, the triumph of the Athenians might well have been exchanged for a calamitous servitude. To Miltiadês belongs the credit of having comprehended the emergency from the beginning, and overruled the irresolution of his colleagues by his own single-hearted energy. The chances all turned out in his favour—for the unexpected junction of the Plataeans in the very encampment of Marathon must have wrought up the courage of his army to the highest pitch. Not only did he thus escape all the depressing and distracting accidents, but he was fortunate enough to find this extraneous encouragement immediately preceding the battle, from a source on which he could not have calculated.

I have already observed that the phase of Grecian history best known to us, and amidst which the great authors from whom we draw our information lived, was one of contempt for the Persians in the field. It requires some effort of imagination to call back previous feelings after the circumstances have been altogether reversed. Perhaps even Æschylus the poet, at the time when he composed his tragedy of the Persæ to celebrate the disgraceful flight of the invader Xerxês, may have forgotten the emotions with which he and his brother Kynegirus must have marched out from Athens fifteen years before, on the eve of the battle of Marathon. Again, therefore, the fact must be brought to view, that down to the time when Datis landed in the bay of Marathon, the tide of Persian success had never yet been interrupted, and that especially during the ten years immediately preceding, the high-handed and cruel extinction of the Ionic revolt had aggravated to the highest pitch the alarm of the Greeks. To this must be added the successes of Datis himself, and the calamities of Eretria, coming with all the freshness of novelty as an apparent sentence of death to Athens. The extreme effort of courage required in the Athenians, to encounter such invaders, is attested by the division of opinion among the ten generals. Putting all the circumstances together, it is without a parallel in Grecian history. It surpasses even the combat of Thermopylæ, as will appear when I come to describe that memorable event. And the admirable conduct of the five dissentient generals, when outvoted by the decision of the polemarch against them, in co-operating heartily for the success of a policy which they deprecated—proves how much the feelings of a constitutional democracy, and that entire acceptance of the pronounced decision of the majority on

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which it rests, had worked themselves into the Athenian mind. The combat of Marathon was by no means a very decisive defeat, but it was a defeat—the first which the Persians had ever received from Greeks in the field. If the battle of Salamis, ten years afterwards, could be treated by Themistoklēs as a hair-breadth escape for Greece, much more is this true of the battle of Marathon; ¹ which first afforded reasonable proof, even to discerning and resolute Greeks, that the Persians might be effectually repelled, and the independence of European Greece maintained against them—a conviction of incalculable value in reference to the formidable trials destined to follow.

Upon the Athenians themselves, the first to face in the field successfully the terrific look of a Persian army, the effect of the victory was yet more stirring and profound.² It supplied them with resolution for the far greater actual sacrifices which they cheerfully underwent ten years afterwards, at the invasion of Xerxēs, without faltering in their Pan-Hellenic fidelity. It strengthened them at home by swelling the tide of common sentiment and patriotic fraternity in the bosom of every individual citizen. It was the exploit of Athenians alone, but of all Athenians, without dissent or exception—the boast of orators, repeated until it almost degenerated into common-place, though the people seem never to have become weary of allusions to their single-handed victory over a host of forty-six nations.³ It had been purchased without a drop of intestine bloodshed—for even the unknown traitors who raised the signal shield on Mount Pentelikus, took care not to betray themselves by want of apparent sympathy with the triumph. Lastly, it was the final guarantee of their democracy, barring all chance of restoration of Hippias for the future. Themistoklēs ⁴ is said

¹ Herodot. viii. 109. ἡμεῖς δὲ, εὐρημα γὰρ εὐρήκαμεν ἡμέας τε καὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, νέφος τοσοῦτο ἀνθρώπων ἀνοσάμενοι.

² Pausanias, i. 14, 4; Thucyd. i. 73. φαρὲν γὰρ Μαραθῶνι τε μόνον προκινδυνεῦσαι τῷ βαρβάρῳ, &c.

³ Herodot. vi. 112. πρώτοι δὲ ἀνέσχοντο ἐσθῆτά τε Μηδικὴν δρέωντες, καὶ ἰσθρας ταύτην ἐσθήμενους· τέως δὲ ἦν τοῖσι Ἑλληνσι καὶ τὸ οὐνομα τὸ Μήδων ὄβδος ἀκούσαι.

It is not unworthy of remark, that the memorable oath in the oration of Demosthenēs, de Coronā, wherein he adjures the warriors of Marathon, occupies the phrase of Thucydides—οὐ μὰ τοὺς ἐν Μαραθῶνι προκινδυνεῦσαντας τῶν προγόνων, &c. (Demosthen. de Coronā, c. 60).

⁴ So the computation stands in the language of Athenian orators (Herodot. ix. 27). It would be unfair to examine it critically.

⁵ Plutarch, Themistoklēs, c. 3. According to Cicero (Epist. ad Attic. ix. 10) and Justin (ii. 9), Hippias was killed at Marathon. Suidas (v. Ἰππίας) says that he died afterwards at Lemnos. Neither of these statements

to have been robbed of his sleep by the trophies of Miltiadês, and this is cited in proof of his ambitious temperament. Yet without supposing either jealousy or personal love of glory, the rapid transit from extreme danger to unparalleled triumph might well deprive of rest even the most sober-minded Athenian.

Who it was that raised the treacherous signal shield, to attract the Persians to Athens, was never ascertained. Very probably, in the full exultation of success, no investigation was made. Of course, however, the public belief would not be satisfied without singling out some persons as the authors of such a treason. The information received by Herodotus (probably about 450-440 B.C., forty or fifty years after the Marathonian victory) ascribed the deed to the Alkmæônids. He does not notice any other reported authors, though he rejects the allegation against the Alkmæônids upon very sufficient grounds. They were a race religiously tainted, ever since the Kylonian sacrilege, and were therefore convenient persons to brand with the odium of an anonymous crime; while party feud, if it did not originally invent, would at least be active in spreading and certifying such rumours. At the time when Herodotus knew Athens, the political enmity between Periklês son of Xanthippus, and Kimon son of Miltiadês, was at its height. Periklês belonged by his mother's side to the Alkmæônid race, and we know that such lineage was made subservient to political manœuvres against him by his enemies.¹ Moreover the enmity between Kimon and Periklês had been inherited by both from their fathers; for we shall find Xanthippus, not long after the battle of Marathon, the prominent accuser of Miltiadês. Though Xanthippus was not an Alkmæônid, his marriage with Agaristé connected himself indirectly, and his son Periklês directly, with that race. And we may trace in this standing political feud a probable origin for the false reports as to the treason of the Alkmæônids, on that great occasion which founded the glory of Miltiadês; for that the reports were false, the intrinsic probabilities of the case, supported by the judgement of Herodotus, afford ample ground for believing.

When the Athenian army made its sudden return-march from Marathon to Athens, Aristeidês with his tribe was left to guard the field and the spoil; but the speedy retirement of Datis

seems probable. Hippias would hardly go to Lemnos, which was an Athenian possession; and had he been slain in the battle, Herodotus would have been likely to mention it.

¹ Thucyd. i. 126.

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from Attica left the Athenians at full liberty to revisit the scene, and discharge the last duties to the dead. A tumulus was erected on the field¹ (such distinction was never conferred by Athens except in this case only) to the one hundred and ninety-two Athenian citizens who had been slain. Their names were inscribed on ten pillars erected at the spot, one for each tribe : there was also a second tumulus for the slain Plataeans, a third for the slaves, and a separate funeral monument to Miltiadès himself. Six hundred years after the battle, Pausanias saw the tumulus, and could still read on the pillars the names of the immortalised warriors.² Even now a conspicuous tumulus exists about half a mile from the sea-shore, which Colonel Leake believes to be the same.³ The inhabitants of the deme of Marathon worshipped these slain warriors as heroes, along with their own eponymus, and with Hêraklês.

So splendid a victory had not been achieved, in the belief of the Athenians, without marked supernatural aid. The god Pan had met the courier Pheidippidês on his hasty route from Athens to Sparta, and had told him that he was much hurt that the Athenians had as yet neglected to worship him ;⁴ in spite of which neglect, however, he promised them effective aid at Marathon. The promise of Pan having been faithfully executed, the Athenians repaid it by a temple with annual worship and sacrifice. Moreover, the hero Theseus was seen strenuously assisting in the battle ; while an unknown warrior, in rustic garb and armed only with a ploughshare, dealt destruction among the Persian ranks : after the battle he could not be found, and the Athenians, on asking at Delphi who he was, were directed to worship the hero Echetlus.⁵ Even in the time of Pausanias, this memorable battle-field was heard to resound every night with the noise of combatants and the snorting of horses. "It is dangerous (observes that pious author) to go to the spot with the express purpose of seeing what is passing ; but if a man finds himself there by accident, without having heard anything about the matter, the gods will not be angry with him." The gods (it seems) could not pardon the inquisitive mortal who deliberately pryed into their secrets. Amidst the ornaments with which Athens was decorated during

¹ Thucyd. ii. 34.

² Pausan. i. 32, 3. Compare the elegy of Kritias ap. Athenæ, i. p. 28.

³ The tumulus now existing is about thirty feet high, and two hundred yards in circumference. (Leake on the Demi of Attica ; Transactions of Royal Soc. of Literat. ii. p. 171.)

⁴ Herodot. vi. 105 ; Pausan. i. 28, 4.

⁵ Plutarch, Theseus, c. 24 ; Pausan. i. 32, 4.

the free working of her democracy, the glories of Marathon of course occupied a conspicuous place. The battle was painted on one of the compartments of the portico called *Pœkilê*, wherein, amidst several figures of gods and heroes—*Athênê*, *Hêraklês*, *Theseus*, *Echetlus*, and the local patron *Marathon*—were seen honoured and prominent the polemarch *Kallimachus* and the general *Miltiadês*, while the *Plateans* were distinguished by their *Bœotian* leather casques.¹ The sixth of the month *Boëdromion*, the anniversary of the battle, was commemorated by an annual ceremony even down to the time of *Plutarch*.²

¹ *Pausan.* i. 15, 4; *Dêmosthen.* cont. *Næær.* c. 25.

² *Herodot.* vi. 120; *Plutarch,* *Camill.* c. 19; *De Malignit.* *Herodoti,* c. 26, p. 862; and *De Gloria Atheniensium,* c. 7.

Boëdromion was the third month of the *Attic* year, which year began shortly after the summer solstice. The first three *Attic* months, *Hekatombæon*, *Metageitnion*, *Boëdromion*, correspond (speaking in a loose manner) nearly to our July, August, September.

From the fact that the courier *Pheidippidês* reached *Sparta* on the ninth day of the moon, and that the 2000 *Spartans* arrived in *Attica* on the third day after the full moon, during which interval the battle took place—we see that the sixth day of *Boëdromion* could not be the sixth day of the moon. The *Attic* months, though professedly lunar months, did not at this time therefore accurately correspond with the course of the moon. See *Mr. Clinton,* *Fest. Hellen.* ad an. 490 B.C. *Plutarch* (in the *Treatise De Malign.* *Herodoti*, above referred to) appears to have no conception of this discrepancy between the *Attic* month and the course of the moon. A portion of the censure which he casts on *Herodotus* is grounded on the assumption that the two must coincide.

M. Boeckh, following *Fréret* and *Larcher*, contests the statement of *Plutarch*, that the battle was fought on the sixth of the month *Boëdromion*, but upon reasons which appear to me insufficient. His chief argument rests upon another statement of *Plutarch* (derived from some lost verses of *Æschylus*), that the tribe *Æantis* had the right wing or post of honour at the battle; and that the public vote, pursuant to which the army was led out of *Athens*, was passed during the prytany of the tribe *Æantis*. He assumes, that the reason why this tribe was posted on the right wing, must have been, that it had drawn by lot the first prytany in that particular year: if this be granted, then the vote for drawing out the army must have been passed in the first prytany, or within the first thirty-five or thirty-six days of the *Attic* year, during the space between the first of *Hekatombæon* and the fifth or sixth of *Metageitnion*. But it is certain that the interval, which took place between the army leaving the city and the battle, was much less than one month—we may even say less than one week. The battle therefore (*Boeckh* contends) must have been fought between the sixth and tenth of *Metageitnion*. (*Plutarch,* *Symposiac.* i. 10, 3, and *Ideler,* *Handbuch der Chronologie,* vol. i. p. 291.) *Herodotus* (vi. 111) says that the tribes were arranged in line *ὡς ἡριθμούντο*—"as they were numbered"—which is contended to mean necessarily the arrangement between them, determined by lot for the prytanies of that particular year. "In acie instruendâ (says *Boeckh,* *Comment. ad Corp. Inscript.* p. 299) *Athenienses* non constantem, sed variabilem secundum prytanias, ordinem

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Two thousand Spartans started from their city immediately after the full moon, and reached the frontier of Attica on the

secutos esse, ita ut tribus ex hoc ordine inde a dextro cornu disponderentur, docui in Commentatione de pugnâ Marathonîâ." *Proœmia Lect. Univ. Berolin. æstiv. a. 1816.*

The *Proœmia* here referred to I have not been able to consult, and they may therefore contain additional reasons to prove the point advanced, viz. that the order of the ten tribes in line of battle, beginning from the right wing, was conformable to their order in prytanising, as drawn by lot for the year; but I think the passages of Herodotus and Plutarch now before us insufficient to establish this point. From the fact that the tribe *Æantis* had the right wing at the battle of Marathon, we are by no means warranted in inferring that that tribe had drawn by lot the earliest prytany in the year. Other reasons, in my judgement equally probable, may be assigned in explanation of the circumstance: one reason, I think, decidedly *more* probable. This reason is, that the battle was fought during the prytany of the tribe *Æantis*, which may be concluded from the statement of Plutarch, that the vote for marching out the army from Athens was passed during the prytany of that tribe; for the interval, between the march of the army out of the city and the battle, must have been only very few days. Moreover, the deme Marathon belonged to the tribe *Æantis* (see Boeckh, ad *Inscript. No. 172, p. 309*): the battle being fought in their deme, the Marathonians may perhaps have claimed on this express ground the post of honour for their tribe; just as we see that at the first battle of Mantinea against the Lacedæmonians, the Mantineians were allowed to occupy the right wing or post of honour, "because the battle was fought in their territory" (*Thucyd. v. 67*). Lastly, the deme *Aphidnæ* also belonged to the tribe *Æantis* (see Boeckh, *l. c.*): now the polemarch *Kallimachus* was an *Aphidnæan* (*Herodot. vi. 109*), and Herodotus expressly tells us, "the law or custom *then* stood among the Athenians, that the polemarch should have the right wing"—*ὁ γὰρ νόμος τότε εἶχε οὕτω τοῖσι Ἀθηναίοισι, τὸν πολέμαρχον ἔχειν κέρας τὸ δεξιόν* (*vi. 111*). Where the polemarch stood, there his tribe would be likely to stand: and the language of Herodotus indeed seems directly to imply that he identifies the tribe of the polemarch with the polemarch himself—*ἡγεομένου δὲ τούτου, ἐξεδέκοντο ὡς ἀριθμούντο αἱ φυλαὶ, ἐχόμεναι ἀλλήλων*—meaning that the order of tribes began by that of the polemarch being in the leading position, and was then "taken up" by the rest "in numerical sequence"—*i. e.* in the order of their prytanising sequence for the year.

Here are a concurrence of reasons to explain why the tribe *Æantis* had the right wing at the battle of Marathon, even though it may not have been first in the order of prytanising tribes for the year. Boeckh therefore is not warranted in inferring the second of these two facts from the first.

The concurrence of these three reasons, all in favour of the same conclusion, and all independent of the reason supposed by Boeckh, appears to me to have great weight; but I regard the first of the three, even singly taken, as more probable than his reason. If my view of the case be correct, the sixth day of *Boëdromion*, the day of battle as given by Plutarch, is not to be called in question. That day comes in the second prytany of the year, which begins about the sixth of *Metageitnion*, and ends about the twelfth of *Boëdromion*, and which must in this year have fallen to the lot of the tribe *Æantis*. On the first or second day of *Boëdromion*, the vote for

third day of their march—a surprising effort, when we consider that the total distance from Sparta to Athens was about one

marching out the army may have passed; on the sixth the battle was fought; both during the prytany of this tribe.

I am not prepared to carry these reasons further than the particular case of the battle of Marathon, and the vindication of the day of that battle as stated by Plutarch; nor would I apply them to later periods, such as the Peloponnesian war. It is certain that the army regulations of Athens were considerably modified between the battle of Marathon and the Peloponnesian war, as well in other matters as in what regards the polemarch; and we have not sufficient information to enable us to determine whether in that later period the Athenians followed any known or perpetual rule in the battle order of the tribes. Military considerations, connected with the state of the particular army serving, must have prevented the constant observance of any rule. Thus we can hardly imagine that Nikias, commanding the army before Syracuse, could have been tied down to any invariable order of battle among the tribes to which his hoplites belonged. Moreover, the expedition against Syracuse lasted more than one Attic year: can it be believed that Nikias, on receiving information from Athens of the sequence in which the prytanies of the tribes had been drawn by lot during the second year of his expedition, would be compelled to marshal his army in a new battle order conformably to it? As the military operations of the Athenians became more extensive, they would find it necessary to leave such dispositions more and more to the general serving in every particular campaign. It may well be doubted whether during the Peloponnesian war *any* established rule was observed in marshalling the tribes for battle.

One great motive which induces critics to maintain that the battle was fought in the Athenian month Metageitnion, is, that that month coincides with the Spartan month Karneius, so that the refusal of the Spartans to march before the full moon is construed to apply only to the peculiar sanctity of this last-mentioned month, instead of being a constant rule for the whole year. I perfectly agree with these critics, that the answer given by the Spartans to the courier Pheidippidēs cannot be held to prove a regular, invariable Spartan maxim, applicable throughout the whole year, not to begin a march in the second quarter of the moon: very possibly, as Boeckh remarks, there may have been some festival impending during the particular month in question, upon which the Spartan refusal to march was founded. But no inference can be deduced from hence to disprove the sixth of Boëdromion as the day of the battle of Marathon: for though the months of every Grecian city were professedly lunar, yet they never coincided with each other exactly or long together, because the systems of intercalation adopted in different cities were different: there was great irregularity and confusion (Plutarch, Aristeidēs, c. 19; Aristoxenus, Harmon. ii. p. 30: compare also K. F. Hermann, Ueber die Griechische Monatskunde, p. 26, 27, Göttingen, 1844: and Boeckh, ad Corp. Inscript. t. i. p. 734).

Granting therefore that the answer given by the Spartans to Pheidippidēs is to be construed, not as a general rule applicable to the whole year, but as referring to the particular month in which it was given—no inference can be drawn from hence as to the day of the battle of Marathon, because either one of the two following suppositions is possible:—1. The Spartans may have had solemnities on the day of the full moon, or on the day before it, in *other months* besides Karneius; 2. or the full moon of the Spartan

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hundred and fifty miles. They did not arrive, however, until the battle had been fought and the Persians departed. Curiosity led them to the field of Marathon to behold the dead bodies of the Persians; after which they returned home, bestowing well-merited praise on the victors.

Datis and Artaphernês returned across the Ægean with their Eretrian prisoners to Asia; stopping for a short time at the island of Mykonos, where discovery was made of a gilt image of Apollo carried off as booty in a Phœnician ship. Datis went himself to restore it to Dêlos, requesting the Delians to carry it back to the Delium or temple of Apollo on the eastern coast of Bœotia: the Delians however chose to keep the statue until it was reclaimed from them twenty years afterwards by the Thebans. On reaching Asia, the Persian generals conducted their prisoners up to the court of Susa and into the presence of Darius. Though he had been vehemently incensed against them, yet when he saw them in his power, his wrath abated, and he manifested no desire to kill or harm them. They were planted at a spot called Arderikka, in the Kissian territory, one of the resting-places on the road from Sardis to Susa, and about twenty-six miles distant from the latter place. Herodotus seems himself to have seen their descendants there on his journey between the two capitals, and to have had the satisfaction of talking to them in Greek—which we may easily conceive to have made some impression upon him, at a spot distant by nearly three months' journey from the coast of Ionia.¹

Karneius may actually have fallen, in the year 490 B.C., on the fifth or sixth of the Attic month Boëdromion.

Dr. Thirlwall appears to adopt the view of Boeckh, but does not add anything material to the reasons in its favour (*Hist. of Gr.* vol. ii. Append. III. p. 488).

¹ Herodot. vi. 119. Darius—σφέας τῆς Κισσίας χώρας κατοίκησε ἐν σταθμῷ ἑωυτοῦ τῷ ὀνόματι Ἀρδέρικκα—ἐνθαῦτα τοὺς Ἐρετριέας κατοίκησε Δαρείος, οἳ καὶ μέχρι ἐμὲ εἶχον τὴν χώραν ταύτην, φυλάσσοντες τὴν ἀρχαίην γλῶσσαν. The meaning of the word σταθμὸς is explained by Herodot. v. 52, σταθμὸς ἑωυτοῦ is the same as σταθμὸς βασιλῆος: the particulars which Herodotus recounts about Arderikka, and its remarkable well or pit of bitumen, salt, and oil, give every reason to believe that he had himself stopped there.

Strabo places the captive Eretrians in Gordyênê, which would be considerably higher up the Tigris; upon whose authority we do not know (Strabo, xv. 747).

The many particulars which are given respecting the descendants of these Eretrians in Kissia, by Philostratus in his *Life of Apollonius of Tyana*, as they are alleged to have stood even in the first century of the Christian æra, cannot be solely quoted. With all the fiction there contained, some truth

Happy would it have been for Miltiadês if he had shared the honourable death of the polemarch Kallimachus—"animam exhalasset opimam"—in seeking to fire the ships of the defeated Persians at Marathon. The short sequel of his history will be found in melancholy contrast with the Marathonian heroism.

His reputation had been great before the battle, and after it the admiration and confidence of his countrymen knew no bounds. These feelings reached such a pitch, that his head was turned, and he lost both his patriotism and his prudence. He proposed to his countrymen to incur the cost of equipping an armament of seventy ships with an adequate armed force, and to place it altogether at his discretion; giving them no intimation whither he intended to go, but merely assuring them that if they would follow him, he would conduct them to a land where gold was abundant, and thus enrich them. Such a promise, from the lips of the recent victor of Marathon, was sufficient. The armament was granted, no man except Miltiadês knowing what was its destination. He sailed immediately to the island of Paros, laid siege to the town, and sent in a herald to require from the inhabitants a contribution of one hundred talents, on pain of entire destruction. His pretence for this attack was, that the Parians had furnished a trireme to Datis for the Persian fleet at Marathon; but his real motive (so Herodotus assures us¹) was vindictive animosity against a Parian citizen named Lysagoras, who had exasperated the Persian general Hydarnês against him. The Parians amused him at first with evasions, until they had procured a little delay to repair the defective portions of their wall, after which they set him at defiance. In vain did Miltiadês prosecute hostilities against them for the space of twenty-six days: he ravaged the island, but his attacks made no impression upon the town.² Beginning to despair of success in his military operations, he entered into some negotiation (such at least was the tale of the

may perhaps be mingled; but we cannot discriminate it (Philostratus, Vit. Apollon. i. c. 24-30).

¹ Herodot. vi. 133. ἔπλεε ἐπὶ Πάρων, πρόφασιν ἔχων ὡς οἱ Πάριοι ὑπῆρξαν πρότεροι στρατευόμενοι τριήρει ἐς Μαραθῶνα ἅμα τῷ Πέρσῃ. Τοῦτο μὲν δὴ πρόσχημα τοῦ λόγου ἦν· ἀτὰρ τινα καὶ ἔγκοτον εἶχε τοῖσι Πάριοισι διὰ Λυσαγόρῃα τὸν Τισίω, ἔοντα γένος Πάριον, διαβαλόντα μιν πρὸς Ἰδάρνεα τὸν Πέρσῃν.

² Ephorus (Fragm. 107, ed. Didot; ap. Stephan. Byz. v. Πάρος) gave an account of this expedition in several points different from Herodotus, which latter I here follow. The authority of Herodotus is preferable in every respect; the more so, since Ephorus gives his narrative as a sort of explanation of the peculiar phrase ἀναπαριάσειν. Explanatory narratives of that sort are usually little worthy of attention.

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Parians themselves) with a Parian woman named Timô, priestess or attendant in the temple of Dêmêtêr near the town-gates. This woman, promising to reveal to him a secret which would place Paros in his power, induced him to visit by night a temple to which no male person was admissible. Having leaped the exterior fence, he approached the sanctuary; but on coming near, he was seized with a panic terror and ran away, almost out of his senses. On leaping the same fence to get back, he strained or bruised his thigh badly, and became utterly disabled. In this melancholy state he was placed on ship-board; the siege being raised, and the whole armament returning to Athens.

Vehement was the indignation both of the armament and of the remaining Athenians against Miltiadês on his return.¹ Of this feeling Xanthippus, father of the great Periklês, became the spokesman. He impeached Miltiadês before the popular judicature, as having been guilty of deceiving the people and as having deserved the penalty of death. The accused himself, disabled by his injured thigh, which even began to show symptoms of gangrene, was unable to stand or to say a word in his own defence. He lay on his couch before the assembled judges, while his friends made the best case they could in his behalf. Defence, it appears, there was none; all they could do was to appeal to his previous services: they reminded the people largely and emphatically of the inestimable

¹ Herodot. vi. 136. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ ἐκ Πάρου Μιλτιάδεα ἀπονοστήσαντα ἔσχον ἐν στόμασι, οἳ τε ἄλλοι, καὶ μάλιστα Ξάνθιππος ὁ Ἀρίφρωνος· ὃς θανάτου ὑπαγαγὼν ὑπὸ τὸν δῆμον Μιλτιάδεα, ἐδίωκε τῆς Ἀθηναίων ἀπάτης εἶνεκεν. Μιλτιάδης δὲ, αὐτὸς μὲν παρεὼν, οὐκ ἀπελογέετο· ἦν γὰρ ἀδύνατος, ὥστε σηπομένου τοῦ μηροῦ. Προκειμένου δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐν κλίνῃ, ὑπεραπολογέοντο οἱ φίλοι, τῆς μάχης τε τῆς ἐν Μαραθῶνι γενομένης πολλὰ ἐπιμεμνημένοι, καὶ τὴν Λήμνον αἴρουν ὡς ἐλὼν Λημόν τε καὶ τισάμενος τοὺς Πελασγούς, παρέδωκε Ἀθηναίοισι. Προσγενομένου δὲ τοῦ δήμου αὐτῷ κατὰ τὴν ἀπόλοιον τοῦ θανάτου, ζημιώσαντος δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἀδικίην πεντήκοντα ταλάντοις, Μιλτιάδης μὲν μετὰ ταῦτα, σφακελισαντός τε τοῦ μηροῦ καὶ σαπέντος, τελευτᾷ· τὰ δὲ πενήκοντα τάλαντα ἐξέτισεν ὁ παῖς αὐτοῦ Κίμων.

Plato (Gorgias, c. 153, p. 516) says that the Athenians passed a vote to cast Miltiadês into the barathrum (ἐμβαλεῖν ἐψηφίσαντο), and that he would have been actually thrown in, if it had not been for the Prytanis, *i. e.* the president, by turn for that day, of the prytanising senators and of the Ἐκκlesia. The Prytanis may perhaps have been among those who spoke to the dikastery on behalf of Miltiadês, deprecating the proposition made by Xanthippus; but that he should have caused a vote once passed to be actually rescinded, is incredible. The Scholiast on Aristeidês (cited by Valckenaer ad Herodot. vi. 136) reduces the exaggeration of Plato to something more reasonable—Ὅτε γὰρ ἐκρίνετο Μιλτιάδης ἐπὶ τῇ Πάρῳ, ἠθέλησαν αὐτὸν κατακρημνίσαι· ὃ δὲ πρύτανις εἰσελθὼν ἐξήτησά τ' αὐτόν.

exploit of Marathon, coming in addition to his previous conquest of Lemnos. The assembled dikasts or jurors showed their sense of such powerful appeals by rejecting the proposition of his accuser to condemn him to death ; but they imposed on him the penalty of fifty talents "for his iniquity." Cornelius Nepos affirms that these fifty talents represented the expenses incurred by the state in fitting out the armament. But we may more probably believe, looking to the practice of the Athenian dikastery in criminal cases, that fifty talents was the minor penalty actually proposed by the defenders of Miltiadès themselves, as a substitute for the punishment of death.

In those penal cases at Athens, where the punishment was not fixed beforehand by the terms of the law, if the person accused was found guilty, it was customary to submit to the jurors, subsequently and separately, the question as to amount of punishment : first, the accuser named the penalty which he thought suitable ; next, the accused person was called upon to name an amount of penalty for himself, and the jurors were constrained to take their choice between these two—no third gradation of penalty being admissible for consideration.¹ Of

¹ That this was the habitual course of Attic procedure in respect to public indictments, wherever a positive amount of penalty was not previously determined, appears certain. See Platner, *Prozess und Klagen bei den Attikern*, Abschn. vi. vol. i. p. 201 ; Heffter, *Die Athenäische Gerichtsverfassung*, p. 334. Meier und Schömann (*Der Attische Prozess*, b. iv. p. 725) maintain that any one of the dikasts might propose a third measure of penalty, distinct from that proposed by the accuser as well as the accused. In respect to public indictments, this opinion appears decidedly incorrect ; but where the sentence to be pronounced involved a compensation for private wrong and an estimate of damages, we cannot so clearly determine whether there was not sometimes a greater latitude in originating propositions for the dikasts to vote upon. It is to be recollected that these dikasts were several hundred, sometimes even more, in number—that there was no discussion or deliberation among them—and that it was absolutely necessary for some distinct proposition to be laid before them to take a vote upon. In regard to some offences, the law expressly permitted what was called a *προστιμια* ; that is, after the dikasts had pronounced the full penalty demanded by the accuser, any other citizen, who thought the penalty so imposed insufficient, might call for a certain limited amount of additional penalty, and require the dikasts to vote upon it—*ay* or *no*. The votes of the dikasts were given, by depositing pebbles in two casks, under certain arrangements of detail.

The *ἀγὼν τιμητῶς*, *δίκη τιμητῶς*, or trial including this separate admeasurement of penalty—as distinguished from the *δίκη ἀτιμητος*, or trial where the penalty was predetermined, and where there was no *τιμῆσις*, or vote of admeasurement of penalty—is an important line of distinction in the subject-matter of Attic procedure ; and the practice of calling on the accused party, after having been pronounced guilty, to impose upon himself a *counter-penalty* or *under-penalty* (*ἀντιτιμᾶσθαι* or *ὑποτιμᾶσθαι*) in contrast

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course, under such circumstances, it was the interest of the accused party to name, even in his own case, some real and serious penalty—something which the jurors might be likely to deem not wholly inadequate to his crime just proved ; for if he proposed some penalty only trifling, he drove them to prefer the heavier sentence recommended by his opponent. Accordingly, in the case of Miltiadês, his friends, desirous of inducing the jurors to refuse their assent to the punishment of death, proposed a fine of fifty talents as the self-assessed penalty of the defendant ; and perhaps they may have stated, as an argument in the case, that such a sum would suffice to defray the costs of the expedition. The fine was imposed, but Miltiadês did not live to pay it : his injured limb mortified, and he died, leaving the fine to be paid by his son Kimon.

According to Cornelius Nepos, Diodorus, and Plutarch, he was put in prison, after having been fined, and there died.¹

with that named by the accuser, was a convenient expedient for bringing the question to a substantive vote of the dikasts. Sometimes accused persons found it convenient to name very large penalties on themselves, in order to escape a capital sentence invoked by the accuser (see Dêmosten. cont. Timokrat. c. 34, p. 743 R.). Nor was there any fear (as Platner imagines) that in the generality of cases the dikasts would be left under the necessity of choosing between an extravagant penalty and something merely nominal ; for the interest of the accused party himself would prevent this from happening. Sometimes we see him endeavouring by entreaties to prevail upon the accuser voluntarily to abate something of the penalty which he had at first named. The accuser might probably do this, if he saw that the dikasts were not likely to go along with that first proposition.

In one particular case, of immortal memory, that which Platner contemplates actually did happen ; and the death of Sokratês was the effect of it. Sokratês, having been found guilty, only by a small majority of votes among the dikasts, was called upon to name a penalty upon himself, in opposition to that of death urged by Melêtus. He was in vain entreated by his friends to name a fine of some tolerable amount, which they would at once have paid in his behalf ; but he would hardly be prevailed upon to name any penalty at all, affirming that he had deserved honour rather than punishment ; at last he named a fine so small in amount, as to be really tantamount to an acquittal. Indeed, Xenophon states that he would not name any counter-penalty at all ; and in the speech ascribed to him, he contended that he had even merited the signal honour of a public maintenance in the Prytaneium (Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 27 ; Xenoph. Apol. Sok. 23 ; Diogen. Laërt. ii. 41). Plato and Xenophon do not agree ; but taking the two together, it would seem that he must have named a very small fine. There can be little doubt that this circumstance, together with the tenor of his defence, caused the dikasts to vote for the proposition of Melêtus.

¹ Cornelius Nepos, Miltiadês, c. 7 ; and Kimon, c. 1 ; Plutarch, Kimon, c. 4 ; Diodorus, Fragment. lib. x. All these authors probably drew from the same original fountain ; perhaps Ephorus (see Marx ad Ephori Fragmenta,

But Herodotus does not mention this imprisonment, nor does the fact appear to me probable: he would hardly have omitted to notice it, had it come to his knowledge. Immediate imprisonment of a person fined by the dikastery, until his fine was paid, was not the natural and ordinary course of Athenian procedure, though there were particular cases in which such aggravation was added. Usually a certain time was allowed for payment,¹ before absolute execution was resorted to; though the person under sentence became disfranchised and excluded from all political rights, from the very instant of his condemnation as a public debtor, until the fine was paid. Now in the instance of Miltiadês, the lamentable condition of his wounded thigh rendered escape impossible—so that there would be no special motive for departing from the usual practice, and imprisoning him forthwith: moreover if he was *not imprisoned forthwith*, he would not be imprisoned at all, since he cannot have lived many days after his trial.² To p. 212); but we have no means of determining. Respecting the alleged imprisonment of Kimon, however, they must have copied from different authorities, for their statements are all different. Diodorus states, that Kimon put himself voluntarily into prison after his father had died there, because he was not permitted on any other condition to obtain the body of his deceased father for burial. Cornelius Nepos affirms that he was imprisoned, as being legally liable to the state for the unpaid fine of his father. Lastly, Plutarch does not represent him as having been put into prison at all. Many of the Latin writers follow the statement of Diodorus: see the citations in Bos's note on the above passage of Cornelius Nepos.

There can be no hesitation in adopting the account of Plutarch as the true one. Kimon neither was, nor could be, in prison, by the Attic law, for an unpaid fine of his father; but after his father's death, he became liable for the fine, in this sense—that he remained disfranchised (*ἄτιμος*) and excluded from his rights as a citizen, until the fine was paid: see Dêmosthen. cont. Timokrat. c. 46, p. 762 R.

¹ See Boeckh, Public Economy of Athens, b. iii. ch. 13, p. 390 Engl. Transl. (vol. i. p. 420 Germ.); Meier und Schömann, Attisch. Prozess, p. 744. Dr. Thirlwall takes a different view of this point, with which I cannot concur (Hist. Gr. vol. iii. Append. II. p. 488); though his general remarks on the trial of Miltiadês are just and appropriate (ch. xiv. p. 273).

Cornelius Nepos (Miltiadês, c. 8; Kimon, c. 3) says that the misconduct connected with Paros was only a pretence with the Athenians for punishing Miltiadês; their real motive (he affirms) was envy and fear, the same feelings which dictated the ostracism of Kimon. How little there is to justify this fancy, may be seen even from the nature of the punishment inflicted. Fear would have prompted them to send away or put to death Miltiadês, not to fine him. The ostracism, which was dictated by fear, was a temporary banishment.

² The interval between his trial and his decease is expressed in Herodotus (vi. 136) by the difference between the present participle *σηπομένου* and the past participle *σαπένης τοῦ μηροῦ*.

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carry away the suffering general in his couch, incapable of raising himself even to plead for his own life, from the presence of the dikasts to a prison—would not only have been a needless severity, but could hardly have failed to imprint itself on the sympathies and the memory of all the beholders ; so that Herodotus would have been likely to hear and mention it, if it had really occurred. I incline to believe therefore that Miltiadês died at home. All accounts concur in stating that he died of the mortal bodily hurt which already disabled him even at the moment of his trial, and that his son Kimon paid the fifty talents after his death. If *he* could pay them, probably his father could have paid them also. This is an additional reason for believing that there was no imprisonment—for nothing but non-payment could have sent him to prison ; and to rescue the suffering Miltiadês from being sent thither, would have been the first and strongest desire of all sympathising friends.

Thus closed the life of the conqueror of Marathon. The last act of it produces an impression so mournful, and even shocking—his descent, from the pinnacle of glory, to defeat, mean tampering with a temple-servant, mortal bodily hurt, undefended ignominy, and death under a sentence of heavy fine, is so abrupt and unprepared—that readers, ancient and modern, have not been satisfied without finding some one to blame for it : we must except Herodotus, our original authority, who recounts the transaction without dropping a hint of blame against any one. To speak ill of the people, as Machiavel has long ago observed,¹ is a strain in which every one at all times, even under a democratical government, indulges with impunity and without provoking any opponent to reply. In this instance, the hard fate of Miltiadês has been imputed to the vices of the Athenians and their democracy—it has been cited in proof, partly of their fickleness, partly of their ingratitude. But however such blame may serve to lighten the mental sadness arising from a series of painful facts, it will not be found justified if we apply to those facts a reasonable criticism.

What is called the fickleness of the Athenians on this occasion is nothing more than a rapid and decisive change in their estimation of Miltiadês ; unbounded admiration passing at once into extreme wrath. To censure them for fickleness is

¹ Machiavel, Discorsi sopra Tito Livio, cap. 58. “L’opinione contro ai popoli nasce, perchè dei popoli ciascun dice male senza paura, e liberamente ancora mentre che regnano : dei principi si parla sempre con mille timori e mille rispetti.”

here an abuse of terms ; such a change in their opinion was the unavoidable result of his conduct. His behaviour in the expedition of Paros was as reprehensible as at Marathon it had been meritorious, and the one succeeded immediately after the other : what else could ensue except an entire revolution in the Athenian feelings? He had employed his prodigious ascendancy over their minds to induce them to follow him without knowing whither, in the confidence of an unknown booty : he had exposed their lives and wasted their substance in wreaking a private grudge : in addition to the shame of an unprincipled project, comes the constructive shame of not having succeeded in it. Without doubt, such behaviour, coming from a man whom they admired to excess, must have produced a violent and painful revulsion in the feelings of his countrymen. The idea of having lavished praise and confidence upon a person who forthwith turns it to an unworthy purpose, is one of the greatest torments of the human bosom ; and we may easily understand that the intensity of the subsequent displeasure would be aggravated by this reactionary sentiment without accusing the Athenians of fickleness. If an officer, whose conduct had been such as to merit the highest encomiums, comes on a sudden to betray his trust, and manifests cowardice or treachery in a new and important undertaking confided to him, are we to treat the general in command as fickle, because his opinion as well as his conduct undergoes an instantaneous revolution—which will be all the more vehement in proportion to his previous esteem? The question to be determined is, whether there be sufficient ground for such a change ; and in the case of Miltiadês, that question must be answered in the affirmative.

In regard to the charge of ingratitude against the Athenians, this last-mentioned point—sufficiency of reason—stands tacitly admitted. It is conceded that Miltiadês deserved punishment for his conduct in reference to the Parian expedition, but it is nevertheless maintained that gratitude for his previous services at Marathon ought to have exempted him from punishment. But the sentiment, upon which, after all, this exculpation rests, will not bear to be drawn out and stated in the form of a cogent or justifying reason. For will any one really contend, that a man who has rendered great services to the public, is to receive in return a licence of unpunished misconduct for the future? Is the general, who has earned applause by eminent skill and important victories, to be recompensed by being allowed the liberty of betraying his trust afterwards, and

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exposing his country to peril, without censure or penalty? This is what no one intends to vindicate deliberately; yet a man must be prepared to vindicate it, when he blames the Athenians for ingratitude towards Miltiadês. For if all that be meant is, that gratitude for previous services ought to pass, not as a receipt in full for subsequent crime, but as an extenuating circumstance in the measurement of the penalty, the answer is, that it was so reckoned in the Athenian treatment of Miltiadês.¹ His friends had nothing whatever to urge, against the extreme penalty proposed by his accuser, except these previous services—which influenced the dikasts sufficiently to induce them to inflict the lighter punishment instead of the heavier. Now the whole amount of punishment inflicted consisted in a fine which certainly was not beyond his reasonable means of paying, or of prevailing upon friends to pay for him—since his son Kimon actually did pay it. Those who blame the Athenians for ingratitude, unless they are prepared to maintain the doctrine, that previous services are to pass as full acquittal for future crime, have no other ground left except to say that the fine was too high; that instead of being fifty talents, it ought to have been no more than forty, thirty, twenty, or ten talents. Whether they are right in this, I will not take

¹ Machiavel will not even admit so much as *this*, in the clear and forcible statement which he gives of the question here alluded to: he contends that the man who has rendered services ought to be recompensed for them, but that he ought to be punished for subsequent crime just as if the previous services had not been rendered. He lays down this position in discussing the conduct of the Romans towards the victorious survivor of the three Horatii, after the battle with the Curiatii—"Erano stati i meriti di Orazio grandissimi, avendo con la sua virtù vinti i Curiazi. Era stato il fallo suo atroce, avendo morto la sorella. Nondimeno dispiacque tanto tale omicidio ai Romani, che lo condussero a disputare della vita, non ostante che gli meriti suoi fossero tanto grandi e si freschi. La qual cosa, a chi superficialmente la considerasse, parrebbe uno esempio d'ingratitude popolare. Nondimeno chi lo esaminerà meglio, e con migliore considerazione ricercherà quali debbono essere gli ordini delle repubbliche, biasimerà quel popolo piuttosto per averlo assoluto, che per averlo voluto condannare: e la ragione è questa, che nessuna repubblica bene ordinata, non mai cancellò i demeriti con gli meriti dei suoi cittadini: ma avendo ordinati i premi ad una buona opera, e le pene ad una cattiva, ed avendo premiato uno per aver bene operato, se quel medesimo opera dipoi male, lo gastiga senza avere riguardo alcuno alle sue buone opere. E quando questi ordini sono bene osservati, una città vive libera molto tempo: altrimenti sempre rovina presto. *Perché se, ad un cittadino che abbia fatto qualche egregia opera per la città, si aggiunge oltre alla riputazione, che quella cosa gli arreca, una audacia e confidenza di potere senza temer pena, far qualche opera non buona, diventerà in breve tempo tanto insolente, che si risolverà ogni civiltà.*"—Machiavel, Discorsi sop. Tit. Livio, ch. 24.

upon me to pronounce : if the amount was named on behalf of the accused party, the dikastery had no legal power of diminishing it ; but it is within such narrow limits that the question actually lies, when transferred from the province of sentiment to that of reason. It will be recollected that the death of Miltiadès arose neither from his trial nor his fine, but from the hurt in his thigh.

The charge of ingratitude against the Athenian popular juries really amounts to this—that in trying a person accused of present crime or fault, they were apt to confine themselves too strictly and exclusively to the particular matter of charge, either forgetting, or making too little account of, past services which he might have rendered. Whoever imagines that such was the habit of Athenian dikasts, must have studied the orators to very little purpose. Their real defect was the very opposite : they were too much disposed to wander from the special issue before them, and to be affected by appeals to previous services and conduct.¹ That which an accused person at Athens usually strives to produce is, an impression in the minds of the dikasts favourable to his general character and behaviour : of course he meets the particular allegation of his accuser as well as he can, but he never fails also to remind them emphatically, how well he has performed his general duties of a citizen—how many times he has served in military expeditions—how many trierarchies and liturgies he has performed, and performed with splendid efficiency. In fact, the claim of an accused person to acquittal is made to rest too much on his prior services, and too little upon innocence or justifying matter as to the particular indictment. When we come down to the time of the orators, I shall be prepared to show that such indisposition to confine themselves to a special issue was one of the most serious defects of the assembled dikasts at Athens. It is one which we should naturally expect from a body of private, non-professional citizens assembled for

¹ Machiavel, in the twenty-ninth chapter of his *Discorsi sopra T. Livio*, examines the question, "Which of the two is more open to the charge of being ungrateful—a popular government or a king?" he thinks that the latter is more open to it. Compare chap. 59 of the same work, where he again supports a similar opinion.

M. Sismondi also observes, in speaking of the long attachment of the city of Pisa to the cause of the Emperors and to the Ghibelin party—"Pise montra dans plus d'une occasion, par sa constance à supporter la cause des empereurs au milieu des revers, combien la reconnaissance lie un peuple libre d'une manière plus puissante et plus durable qu'elle ne sauroit lier le peuple gouverné par un seul homme."—(*Histoire des Republ. Italiennes*, ch. xiii. t. ii. p. 302.)

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the occasion—and which belongs more or less to the system of jury-trial everywhere ; but it is the direct reverse of that ingratitude, or habitual insensibility to prior services, for which they have been so often denounced.

The fate of Miltiadês, then, so far from illustrating either the fickleness or the ingratitude of his countrymen, attests their just appreciation of deserts. It also illustrates another moral, of no small importance to the right comprehension of Grecian affairs ;—it teaches us the painful lesson, how perfectly maddening were the effects of a copious draught of glory on the temperament of an enterprising and ambitious Greek. There can be no doubt, that the rapid transition, in the course of about one week, from Athenian terror before the battle to Athenian exultation after it, must have produced demonstrations towards Miltiadês such as were never paid towards any other man in the whole history of the commonwealth. Such unmeasured admiration unseated his rational judgement. His mind became abandoned to the reckless impulses of insolence, and antipathy, and rapacity ;—that distempered state, for which (according to Grecian morality) the retributive Nemesis was ever on the watch, and which in his case she visited with a judgement startling in its rapidity as well as terrible in its amount. Had Miltiadês been the same man before the battle of Marathon as he became after it, the battle might probably have turned out a defeat instead of a victory. Dêmostenês indeed,¹ in speaking of the wealth and luxury of political leaders in his own time, and the profuse rewards bestowed upon them by the people, pointed in contrast to the house of Miltiadês as being no way more splendid than that of a private man. But though Miltiadês might continue to live in a modest establishment, he received from his countrymen marks of admiration and deference such as were never paid to any citizen before or after him ; and, after all, admiration and deference constitute the precious essence of popular reward. No man except Miltiadês ever dared to raise his voice in the Athenian assembly, and say—“Give me a fleet of ships : do not ask what I am going to do with them, but only follow me, and I will enrich you.” Herein we may read the unmeasured confidence which the Athenians placed in their victorious general, and the utter incapacity of a leading Greek to bear it without mental depravation ; while we learn from it to draw the melancholy inference, that one result of success was to make the successful leader one of the most dangerous men in

¹ Dêmostenês, Olynth. III. c. 9, p. 35 R.

the community. We shall presently be called upon to observe the same tendency in the case of the Spartan Pausanias, and even in that of the Athenian Themistoklès.

It is indeed fortunate that the reckless aspirations of Miltiadès did not take a turn more noxious to Athens than the comparatively unimportant enterprise against Paros. For had he sought to acquire dominion and gratify antipathies against enemies at home, instead of directing his blow against a Parian enemy, the peace and security of his country might have been seriously endangered. Of the despots who gained power in Greece, a considerable proportion began by popular conduct and by rendering good service to their fellow-citizens : having first earned public gratitude, they abused it for purposes of their own ambition. There was far greater danger, in a Grecian community, of dangerous excess of gratitude towards a victorious soldier, than of deficiency in that sentiment. The person thus exalted acquired a position such that the community found it difficult afterwards to shake him off. Now there is a disposition almost universal among writers and readers to side with an individual, especially an eminent individual, against the multitude. Accordingly those who under such circumstances suspect the probable abuse of an exalted position, are denounced as if they harboured an unworthy jealousy of superior abilities ; but the truth is, that the largest analogies of the Grecian character justified that suspicion, and required the community to take precautions against the corrupting effects of their own enthusiasm. There is no feature which more largely pervades the impressible Grecian character, than a liability to be intoxicated and demoralised by success : there was no fault from which so few eminent Greeks were free : there was hardly any danger, against which it was at once so necessary and so difficult for the Grecian governments to take security—especially the democracies, where the manifestations of enthusiasm were always the loudest. Such is the real explanation of those charges which have been urged against the Grecian democracies, that they came to hate and ill-treat previous benefactors. The history of Miltiadès illustrates it in a manner no less pointed than painful.

I have already remarked that the fickleness, which has been so largely imputed to the Athenian democracy in their dealings with him, is nothing more than a reasonable change of opinion on the best grounds : nor can it be said that fickleness was in any case an attribute of the Athenian democracy. It is a well-known fact, that feelings, or opinions, or modes of judging,

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which have once obtained footing among a large number of people, are more lasting and unchangeable than those which belong only to one or a few; insomuch that the judgements and actions of the many admit of being more clearly understood as to the past, and more certainly predicted as to the future. If we are to predicate any attribute of the multitude, it will rather be that of undue tenacity than undue fickleness. There will occur nothing in the course of this history to prove that the Athenian people changed their opinions, on insufficient grounds, more frequently than an irresponsible one or few would have changed.

But there were two circumstances in the working of the Athenian democracy which imparted to it an appearance of greater fickleness, without the reality:—First, that the manifestations and changes of opinion were all open, undisguised, and noisy: the people gave utterance to their present impression, whatever it was, with perfect frankness; if their opinions were really changed, they had no shame or scruple in avowing it: Secondly—and this is a point of capital importance in the working of democracy generally—the *present* impression, whatever it might be, was not merely undisguised in its manifestations, but also had a tendency to be exaggerated in its intensity. This arose from their habit of treating public affairs in multitudinous assemblages, the well-known effect of which is, to inflame sentiment in every man's bosom by mere contact with a sympathising circle of neighbours. Whatever the sentiment might be, fear, ambition, cupidity, wrath, compassion, piety, patriotic devotion, &c.;¹ and whether well-founded or ill-founded—it was constantly influenced more or less by such intensifying cause. This is a defect which of course belongs in

¹ This is the general truth, which ancient authors often state, both partially, and in exaggerated terms as to degree:—"Hæc est natura multitudinis (says Livy); aut humiliter servit aut superbe dominatur." Again, Tacitus—"Nihil in vulgo modicum; terrene, ni paveant; ubi pertimerint, impune contemni." (Annal. i. 29.) Herodotus, iii. 81. ὠθέει δὲ (ὁ δῆμος) ἐμπροσθεν τὰ πρήγματα ἕνευ νόου, χεϊμάρρῳ ποταμῷ ἕκελος.

It is remarkable that Aristotle, in his *Politica*, takes little or no notice of this attribute belonging to every numerous assembly. He seems rather to reason as if the aggregate intelligence of the multitude was represented by the sum total of each man's separate intelligence in all the individuals composing it (*Polit.* iii. 6, 4, 10, 12), just as the property of the multitude, taken collectively, would be greater than that of the few rich. He takes no notice of the difference between a number of individuals judging jointly and judging separately: I do not indeed observe that such omission leads him into any positive mistake, but it occurs in some cases calculated to surprise us, and where the difference here adverted to is important to notice: see *Politica*. iii. 10, 5, 6.

a certain degree to all exercise of power by numerous bodies, even though they be representative bodies—especially when the character of the people, instead of being comparatively sedate and slow to move, like the English, is quick, impressible, and fiery, like Greeks or Italians; but it operated far more powerfully on the self-acting *Démos* assembled in the *Pnyx*. It was in fact the constitutional malady of the democracy, of which the people were themselves perfectly sensible—as I shall show hereafter from the securities which they tried to provide against it—but which no securities could ever wholly eradicate. Frequency of public assemblies, far from aggravating the evil, had a tendency to lighten it. The people thus became accustomed to hear and balance many different views as a preliminary to ultimate judgement; they contracted personal interest and esteem for a numerous class of dissentient speakers; and they even acquired a certain practical consciousness of their own liability to error. Moreover the diffusion of habits of public speaking, by means of the sophists and the rhetors, whom it has been so much the custom to disparage, tended in the same direction—to break the unity of sentiment among the listening crowd, to multiply separate judgements, and to neutralise the contagion of mere sympathising impulse. These were important deductions, still further assisted by the superior taste and intelligence of the Athenian people: but still the inherent malady remained—excessive and misleading intensity of present sentiment. It was this which gave such inestimable value to the ascendancy of *Periklès*, as depicted by *Thucydidès*: his hold on the people was so firm, that he could always speak with effect against excess of the reigning tone of feeling. “When *Periklès* (says the historian) saw the people in a state of unseasonable and insolent confidence, he spoke so as to cow them into alarm; when again they were in groundless terror, he combated it, and brought them back to confidence.”¹ We shall find *Démostenês*, with far inferior ascendancy, employed in the same honourable task. The Athenian people often stood in need of such correction, but unfortunately did not always find statesmen, at once friendly and commanding, to administer it.

These two attributes, then, belonged to the Athenian democracy; first, their sentiments of every kind were manifested loudly and openly; next, their sentiments tended to a pitch

¹ *Thucyd.* ii. 65. ‘Ὅποτε γοῦν αἰσθητό τι αὐτοῦς’ παρὰ καιρὸν ἕβρει θαρσοῦντας, λέγων κατέπλησεν πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι’ καὶ δεδιότας αὐ ἀλόγως ἀντικαθίστη πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ θαρσεῖν.

of great present intensity. Of course, therefore, when they changed, the change of sentiment stood prominent and forced itself upon every one's notice—being a transition from one strong sentiment past to another strong sentiment present.¹ And it was because such alterations, when they did take place, stood out so palpably to remark, that the Athenian people have drawn upon themselves the imputation of fickleness: for it is not at all true (I repeat) that changes of sentiment were more frequently produced in them by frivolous or insufficient causes, than changes of sentiment in other governments.

CHAPTER XXXVII

IONIC PHILOSOPHERS—PYTHAGORAS—KROTON AND SYBARIS

THE history of the powerful Grecian cities in Italy and Sicily, between the accession of Peisistratus and the battle of Marathon, is for the most part unknown to us. Phalaris, despot of Agrigentum in Sicily, made for himself an unenviable name during this obscure interval. His reign seems to coincide in time with the earlier part of the rule of Peisistratus (about 560–540 B.C.), and the few and vague statements, which we find respecting it,² merely show us that it was a period of extortion and cruelty, even beyond the ordinary licence of Grecian despots. The reality of the hollow bull of brass, which Phalaris was accustomed to heat in order to shut up his victims in it and burn them, appears to be better authenticated than the nature of the story would lead us to presume. For it is not only noticed by Pindar, but even the

¹ Such swing of the mind, from one intense feeling to another, is always deprecated by the Greek moralists, from the earliest to the latest: even Demokritus, in the fifth century B.C., admonishes against it—*Αἱ ἐκ μεγάλων διαστημάτων κινεόμεναι τῶν ψυχῶν οὔτε εὐσταθεές εἰσίν, οὔτε εὐθυμοί.* (Democriti Fragmenta, lib. iii. p. 168, ed. Mullach ap. Stobæum, Florileg. i. 40.)

² The letters of Bentley against Boyle, discussing the pretended Epistles of Phalaris—full of acuteness and learning, though beyond measure excursive—are quite sufficient to teach us that little can be safely asserted about Phalaris. His date is very imperfectly ascertained. Compare Bentley, pp. 82, 83, and Seyfert, Akragas und sein Gebiet, p. 60: the latter assigns the reign of Phalaris to the years 570–554 B.C. It is surprising to see Seyfert citing the letters of the pseudo-Phalaris as an authority, after the exposure of Bentley.

actual instrument of this torture—the brazen bull itself¹—which had been taken away from Agrigentum as a trophy by the Carthaginians when they captured the town, was restored by the Romans, on the subjugation of Carthage, to its original domicile. Phalaris is said to have acquired the supreme command by undertaking the task of building a great temple² to Zeus Polieus on the citadel rock; a pretence, whereby he was enabled to assemble and arm a number of workmen and devoted partisans, whom he employed, at the festival of the Thesmophoria, to put down the authorities. He afterwards disarmed the citizens by a stratagem, and committed cruelties which rendered him so abhorred, that a sudden rising of the people, headed by Télémachus (ancestor of the subsequent despot Théron), overthrew and slew him. A severe revenge was taken on his partisans after his fall.³

During the interval between 540–500 B.C., events of much importance occurred among the Italian Greeks—especially at Kroton and Sybaris—events, unhappily, very imperfectly handed down. Between these two periods fall both the war between Sybaris and Kroton, and the career and ascendancy of Pythagoras. In connexion with this latter name, it will be requisite to say a few words respecting the other Grecian philosophers of the sixth century B.C.

I have, in a former chapter, noticed and characterised those distinguished persons called the Seven Wise Men of Greece, whose celebrity falls in the first half of this century—men not so much marked by scientific genius as by practical sagacity and foresight in the appreciation of worldly affairs, and enjoying a high degree of political respect from their fellow-citizens. One of them, however, the Milesian Thalés, claims our notice, not only on this ground, but also as the earliest known name in the long line of Greek scientific investigators. His life, nearly contemporary with that of Solon, belongs seemingly to

¹ Pindar. *Pyth.* 1 *ad fin.* with the Scholia, p. 310, ed. Boeckh; Polyb. xii. 25; Diodor. xiii. 99; Cicero cont. Verr. iv. 33. The contradiction of Timæus is noway sufficient to make us doubt the authenticity of the story. Ebert (*Σικελίω*, part ii. p. 41–84, Königsberg, 1829) collects all the authorities about the bull of Phalaris. He believes the matter of fact substantially. Aristotle (*Rhetoric*, ii. 20) tells a story of the fable whereby Stésichorus the poet dissuaded the inhabitants of Himera from granting a guard to Phalaris: Conon (*Narrat.* 42 ap. Photium) recounts the same story with the name of Hiero substituted for that of Phalaris. But it is not likely that either the one or the other could ever have been in such relations with the citizens of *Himera*. Compare Polybius, vii., 7, 2.

² Polyæn. v. 1, 1; Cicero, *de Officiis*, ii. 7.

³ Plutarch, *Philosophand. cum Principibus*, c. 3, p. 778.

the interval about 640–550 B.C.: the stories mentioned in Herodotus (perhaps borrowed in part from the Milesian Hekataëus) are sufficient to show that his reputation, for wisdom as well as for science, continued to be very great, even a century after his death, among his fellow-citizens. And he marks an important epoch in the progress of the Greek mind, as having been the first man to depart both in letter and spirit from the Hesiodic Theogony, introducing the conception of substances with their transformations and sequences, in place of that string of persons and quasi-human attributes which had animated the old legendary world. He is the father of what is called the Ionic philosophy, which is considered as lasting from his time down to that of Sokratês. Writers ancient as well as modern have professed to trace a succession of philosophers, each one the pupil of the preceding, between these two extreme epochs. But the appellation is in truth undefined and even incorrect, since nothing entitled to the name of a school, or sect, or succession (like that of the Pythagoreans, to be noticed presently) can be made out. There is indeed a certain general analogy in the philosophical vein of Thalês, Hippo, Anaximênês, and Diogenês of Apollonia, whereby they all stand distinguished from Xenophanês of Elea, and his successors the Eleatic dialecticians Parmenidês and Zêno; but there are also material differences between their respective doctrines—no two of them holding the same. And if we look to Anaximander (the person next in order of time to Thalês), as well as to Herakleitus, we find them departing in a great degree even from that character which all the rest have in common, though both the one and the other are usually enrolled in the list of Ionic philosophers.

Of the old legendary and polytheistic conception of nature, which Thalês partially discarded, we may remark that it is a state of the human mind in which the problems suggesting themselves to be solved, and the machinery for solving them, bear a fair proportion one to the other. If the problems be vast, indeterminate, confused, and derived rather from the hopes, fears, love, hatred, astonishment, &c., of men, than from any genuine desire of knowledge—so also does the received belief supply invisible agents in unlimited number and with every variety of power and inclination. The means of explanation are thus multiplied and diversified as readily as the phenomena to be explained. Though no event or state which has not yet occurred can be predicted, there is little difficulty in rendering a plausible account of everything which has

occurred in the past—of any and all things alike. Cosmogony, and the prior ages of the world, were conceived as a sort of personal history with intermarriages, filiation, quarrels, and other adventures, of these invisible agents ; among whom some one or more were assumed as unbegotten and self-existent—the latter assumption being a difficulty common to all systems of cosmogony, and from which even this flexible and expansive hypothesis is not exempt. Now when Thalès disengaged Grecian philosophy from the old mode of explanation, he did not at the same time disengage it from the old problems and matters propounded for inquiry. These he retained, and transmitted to his successors, as vague and vast as they were at first conceived ; and so they remained, though with some transformations and modifications, together with many new questions equally insoluble, substantially present to the Greeks throughout their whole history, as the legitimate problems for philosophical investigation. But these problems, adapted only to the old elastic system of polytheistic explanation and omnipresent personal agency, became utterly disproportioned to any impersonal hypotheses such as those of Thalès and the philosophers after him—whether assumed physical laws, or plausible moral and metaphysical dogmas, open to argumentative attack, and of course requiring the like defence. To treat the visible world as a whole, and inquire when and how it began, as well as into all its past changes—to discuss the first origin of men, animals, plants, the sun, the stars, &c.—to assign some comprehensive reason why motion or change in general took place in the universe—to investigate the destinies of the human race, and to lay down some systematic relation between them and the gods—all these were topics admitting of being conceived in many different ways, and set forth with eloquent plausibility ; but not reducible to any solution resting on scientific evidence or commanding steady adherence under a free scrutiny.¹

At the time when the power of scientific investigation was scanty and helpless, the problems proposed were thus such as

¹ The less these problems are adapted for rational solution, the more nobly do they present themselves in the language of a great poet : see as a specimen, Euripidès, Fragment 101, ed. Dindorf—

Ὀλβιος ὄστις τῆς ἱστορίας
 ἔσχε μάθῃσιν, μήτε πολιτῶν
 Ἐπι πημοσύνη, μήτ' εἰς ἀδίκους
 Πράξεις ὁρμῶν
 Ἄλλ' ἀβανάτων καθαρῶν φύσεως
 Κόσμον ἀγῆρω, πῆ τε συνέστη
 Καὶ ὄπη καὶ ὄπως.
 Τοῖς δὲ τοιοῦτοῖς οὐδέποτε' αἰσχροῶν
 Ἔργων μελέτημα προσίζει.

to lie out of the reach of science in its largest compass. Gradually indeed subjects more special and limited, and upon which experience or deductions from experience could be brought to bear, were added to the list of *quæsitæ*, and examined with profit and instruction. But the old problems, with new ones alike unfathomable, were never eliminated, and always occupied a prominent place in the philosophical world. Now it was this disproportion, between questions to be solved and means of solution, which gave rise to that conspicuous characteristic of Grecian philosophy—the antagonist force of suspensive scepticism, passing in some minds into a broad negation of the attainability of general truth—which it nourished from its beginning to its end; commencing as early as Xenophanês, continuing to manifest itself seven centuries afterwards in Ænesidêmus and Sextus Empiricus, and including in the interval between these two extremes some of the most powerful intellects in Greece. The present is not the time for considering these Sceptics, who bear an unpopular name, and have not often been fairly appreciated; the more so, as it often suited the purpose of men themselves more than half sceptical, like Sokratês and Plato, to denounce professed scepticism with indignation. But it is essential to bring them into notice at the first spring of Grecian philosophy under Thalês, because the circumstances were then laid which so soon afterwards developed them.

Though the celebrity of Thalês in antiquity was great and universal, scarcely any distinct facts were known respecting him: it is certain that he left nothing in writing. Extensive travels in Egypt and Asia are ascribed to him, and as a general fact these travels are doubtless true, since no other means of acquiring knowledge were then open. At a time when the brother of the Lesbian Alkæus was serving in the Babylonian army, we may well conceive that an inquisitive Milesian would make his way to that wonderful city wherein stood the temple-observatory of the Chaldæan priesthood. How great his reputation was in his lifetime, the admiration expressed by his younger contemporary Xenophanês assures us; and Herakleitus, in the next generation, a severe judge of all other philosophers, spoke of him with similar esteem. To him were traced by the Grecian inquirers of the fourth century B.C., the first beginnings of geometry, astronomy, and physiology in its large and really appropriate sense, the scientific study of nature: for the Greek word denoting nature (*φύσις*), first comes into comprehensive use about this time (as I have remarked in an

earlier chapter¹), with its derivatives *physics* and *physiology*, as distinguished from the *theology* of the old poets. Little stress can be laid on those elementary propositions in geometry which are specified as discovered, or as first demonstrated, by Thalès—still less upon the solar eclipse respecting which (according to Herodotus) he determined beforehand the year of occurrence.² But the main doctrine of his physiology (using that word in its larger Greek sense) is distinctly attested. He stripped Oceanus and Tethys, primæval parents of the gods in the Homeric theogony, of their personality, and laid down water, or fluid substance, as the single original element from which everything came and into which everything returned.³ The doctrine of one eternal element, remaining always the same in its essence, but indefinitely variable in its manifestations to sense, was thus first introduced to the discussion of the Grecian public. We have no means of knowing the reasons by which Thalès supported this opinion, nor could even Aristotle do more than conjecture what they might have been; but one of the statements urged on behalf of it—that the earth itself rested on water⁴—we may safely refer to the Milesian himself, for it would hardly have been advanced at a later age. Moreover Thalès is reported to have held, that everything was living and full of gods; and that the magnet, especially, was a living thing. Thus the gods, as far as we can pretend to follow opinions so very faintly transmitted, are conceived as active powers, and causes of changeful manifestation, attached to the primæval substance; ⁵ the universe being assimilated to an organised body or system.

Respecting Hippo—who reproduced the theory of Thalès with some degree of generalisation, substituting, in place of water, moisture, or something common to air and water⁶—we do not know whether he belonged to the sixth or the fifth century B.C.: but both Anaximander, Xenophanès, and Pherekydès

¹ Vol. ii. ch. xvi.

² Diogen. Laërt. i. 23; Herodot. i. 75; Apuleius, Florid. iv. p. 144, Bip.

Proclus, in his Commentary on Euclid, specifies several propositions said to have been discovered by Thalès (Brandis, Handbuch der Gr. Philos. ch. xxviii. p. 110).

³ Aristotel. Metaphys. i. 3; Plutarch, Placit. Philos. i. 3, p. 875. *ὅς ἐξ ὕδατος φησὶ πάντα εἶναι, καὶ εἰς ὕδωρ πάντα ἀναλύεσθαι.*

⁴ Aristotel. *ut supra*, and De Cælo, ii. 13.

⁵ Aristotel. De Animâ, i. 2-5; Cicero, De Legg. ii. 11; Diogen. Laërt. i. 24.

⁶ Aristotel. De Animâ, i. 2; Alexander Aphrodis. in Aristotel. Metaphys. i. 3.

belong to the latter half of the sixth century. Anaximander the son of Praxiadês was a native of Milêtus—Xenophanês, a native of Kolophôn; the former among the earliest expositors of doctrine in prose,¹ while the latter committed his opinions to the old medium of verse. Anaximander seems to have taken up the philosophical problem, while he materially altered the hypothesis, of his predecessor Thalês. Instead of the primæval fluid of the latter, he supposed a primæval principle, without any actual determining qualities whatever, but including all qualities potentially, and manifesting them in an infinite variety from its continually self-changing nature—a principle, which was nothing in itself, yet had the capacity of producing any and all manifestations, however contrary to each other²—a primæval something, whose essence it was to be eternally productive of different phænomena—a sort of mathematical point, which counts for nothing in itself, but is vigorous in generating lines to any extent that may be desired. In this manner Anaximander professed to give a comprehensive explanation of change in general, or Generation or Destruction—how it happened that one sensible thing began and another ceased to exist—according to the vague problems which these early inquirers were in the habit of setting to themselves.³ He

¹ Apollodorus, in the second century B.C., had before him some brief expository treatises of Anaximander (Diogen. Laërt. ii. 2): *Περὶ Φύσεως, Γῆς Περίοδον, Περὶ τῶν Ἀπλανῶν καὶ Σφαιρῶν καὶ ἄλλα τινά*. Suidas, v. Ἀναξίμανδρος. Themistius, Orat. xxv. p. 317: ἐθάρρησε πρῶτος ὧν ἴσμεν Ἑλλήνων λόγον ἐξενεγκεῖν περὶ Φύσεως συγγεγραμμένον.

² Irenæus, ii. 19 (14), ap. Brandis, Handbuch der Geschichte der Griech. Röm. Philos. ch. xxxv. p. 133: "Anaximander hoc quod immensum est, omnium initium subiecit seminaliter habens in semetipso omnium genesin, ex quo immensos mundos constare ait." Aristotel. Physic. Auscult. iii. 4, p. 203, Bek. οὔτε γὰρ μάτην αὐτὸ οἶόν τε εἶναι (τὸ ἄπειρον), οὔτε ἄλλην ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ δύναμιν, πλὴν ὡς ἀρχήν. Aristotle subjects this ἄπειρον to an elaborate discussion, in which he says very little more about Anaximander, who appears to have assumed it without anticipating discussion or objections. Whether Anaximander called his ἄπειρον divine, or god, as Tennemann (Gesch. Philos. i. 2, p. 67) and Panzerbieter affirm (ad Diogenis Apolloniat. Fragment. c. 13, p. 16), I think doubtful: this is rather an inference which Aristotle elicits from his language. Yet in another passage, which is difficult to reconcile, Aristotle ascribes to Anaximander the water-doctrine of Thalês (Aristotel. de Xenophane, p. 975, Bek.).

Anaximander seems to have followed speculations analogous to that of Thalês in explaining the first production of the human race (Plutarch. Placit. Philos. v. 19, p. 908), and in other matters (ibid. iii. 16, p. 896).

³ Aristotel. De Generat. et Destruct. c. 3, p. 317, Bek. ὃ μάλιστα φοβούμενοι διετέλεσαν οἱ πρῶτοι φιλοσοφῆσαντες, τὸ ἐκ μηδενὸς γίνεσθαι προὔπαρχοντος: compare Physic. Auscultat. i. 4, p. 187, Bek.

avoided that which the first philosophers especially dreaded, the affirmation that generation could take place out of Nothing ; yet the primæval Something which he supposed was only distinguished from Nothing by possessing this very power of generation. In his theory he passed from the province of physics into that of metaphysics. He first introduced into Grecian philosophy that important word which signifies a Beginning or a Principle,¹ and first opened that metaphysical discussion, which was carried on in various ways throughout the whole period of Grecian philosophy, as to the One and the Many—the Continuous and the Variable—that which exists eternally, as distinguished from that which comes and passes away in ever-changing manifestations. His physiology or explanation of nature thus conducted the mind into a different route from that suggested by the hypothesis of Thalês, which was built upon physical considerations, and was therefore calculated to suggest and stimulate observations of physical phænomena for the purpose of verifying or confuting it—while the hypothesis of Anaximander admitted only of being discussed dialectically, or by reasonings expressed in general language ; reasonings, sometimes indeed referring to experience for the purpose of illustration, but seldom resting on it—and never looking out for it as a necessary support. The physical explanation of nature, however, once introduced by Thalês, although deserted by Anaximander, was taken up by Anaximenes and others afterwards, and reproduced with many divergencies of doctrine—yet always more or less entangled and perplexed with metaphysical additions, since the two departments were never clearly parted throughout all Grecian philosophy.

Of these subsequent physical philosophers I shall speak hereafter : at present I confine myself to the thinkers of the sixth century B.C., among whom Anaximander stands prominent, not as the follower of Thalês, but as the author of an hypothesis both new and tending in a different direction. It was not merely as the author of this hypothesis, however, that Anaximander enlarged the Greek mind and roused the powers of thought : we find him also mentioned as distinguished in astronomy and geometry. He is said to have been the first to establish a sun-dial in Greece, to construct a sphere, and to explain the obliquity of the ecliptic ;² how far such alleged

¹ Simplicius in Aristotel. Physic. fol. 6, 32. *πρῶτος αὐτὸς Ἀρχὴν ὀνομάσας τὸ ὑποκείμενον.*

² Diogen. Laërt. ii. 81, 2. He agreed with Thalês in maintaining that the earth was stationary (Aristotel. de Cælo, ii. 13, p. 295, ed. Bek.).

authorship really belongs to him, we cannot be certain—but there is one step of immense importance which he is clearly affirmed to have made. He was the first to compose a treatise on the geography of the land and sea within his cognisance, and to construct a chart or map founded thereupon—seemingly a tablet of brass. Such a novelty, wondrous even to the rude and ignorant, was calculated to stimulate powerfully inquisitive minds, and from it may be dated the commencement of Grecian rational geography—not the least valuable among the contributions of this people to the stock of human knowledge.

Xenophanés of Kolophon, somewhat younger than Anaximander and nearly contemporary with Pythagoras (seemingly from about 570–480 B.C.), migrated from Kolophon¹ to Zanklê and Katana in Sicily and Elea in Italy, soon after the time when Ionia became subject to the Persians (540–530 B.C.). He was the founder of what is called the Eleatic school of philosophers—a real school, since it appears that Parmenidês, Zeno, and Melissus, pursued and developed, in a great degree, the train of speculation which had been begun by Xenophanês—doubtless with additions and variations of their own, but especially with a dialectic power which belongs to the age of Periklês, and is unknown in the sixth century B.C. He was the author of more than one poem of considerable length, one on the foundation of Kolophon and another on that of Elea; besides his poem on Nature, wherein his philosophical doctrines were set forth.² His manner appears to have been controversial and full of asperity towards antagonists. But what is most remarkable is the plain-spoken manner in which he declared himself against the popular religion, and in which he denounced as abominable the descriptions of the gods given by Homer and Hesiod.³ He is said to have controverted the doctrines both of Thalês and Pythagoras: this is probable enough; but he seems to have taken his start from the philosophy of Anaximander—not however to adopt it, but to reverse it—and to set forth an opinion which we may call its contrary. Nature, in the conception of Anaximander, consisted of a Something having no other attribute except the unlimited power of generating and cancelling phænomenal changes: in this doctrine the Something or Substratum existed only in and for those changes, and could not be said to exist at all in any other sense: the Permanent was thus merged and

¹ Diogen. Laërt. ix. 18.

² Diogen. Laërt. ix. 22; Stobæus, Eclog. Phys. i. p. 294.

³ Sextus Empiricus, adv. Mathem. ix. 193.

lost in the Variable—the One in the Many. Xenophanês laid down the exact opposite: he conceived nature as one unchangeable and indivisible Whole, spherical, animated, endued with reason, and penetrated by or indeed identical with God. He denied the objective reality of all change, or generation, or destruction, which he seems to have considered as only changes or modifications in the percipient, and perhaps different in one percipient and another. That which exists (he maintained) could not have been generated, nor could it ever be destroyed: there was neither real generation nor real destruction of anything; but that which men took for such was the change in their own feelings and ideas. He thus recognised the Permanent without the Variable¹—the One without the Many. And his treatment of the received religious creed was in harmony with such physical or metaphysical hypothesis; for while he held the whole of nature to be God, without parts or change, he at the same time pronounced the popular gods to be entities of subjective fancy, imagined by men after their own model: if oxen or lions were to become religious (he added), they would in like manner provide for themselves gods after their respective shapes and characters.² This hypothesis, which seemed to set aside altogether the study of the sensible world as a source of knowledge, was expounded briefly, and, as it should seem, obscurely and rudely, by Xenophanês; at least we may infer thus much from the slighting epithet applied to him by Aristotle.³ But his successors, Parmenidês and Zeno, in the succeeding century, expanded it considerably, supported it with extraordinary acuteness of dialectics, and even super-added a second part, in which the phenomena of sense—though considered only as appearances, not partaking in the

¹ Aristot. *Metaphys.* i. 5, p. 986, Bek. *Ξενοφάνης δὲ πρῶτος τούτων ἐνίστασθαι, οὐδὲν διεσαφήνισεν, οὐδὲ τῆς φύσεως τούτων (τοῦ κατὰ τὸν λόγον ἑνὸς καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὕλην) οὐδετέρας εἴκοι θεγεῖν, ἀλλ' εἰς τὸν ὕλον οὐρανοῦ ἀποβλέψας τὸ ἐν εἶναι φησι τὸν θεόν.*

Plutarch. ap. Eusebium *Præparat. Evangel.* i. 8. *Ξενοφάνης δὲ ὁ Κολοφώνιος ἴδιαν μὲν τινα ὄδον πεπορευμένος καὶ παρηλλαχίαν πάντας τοῦ προειρημένους, οὔτε φθορὰν ἀπολείπει, ἀλλ' εἶναι λέγει τὸ πᾶν αἰεὶ ὅμοιον.* Compare Timon ap. Sext. *Empiric. Pyrrh. Hypotyp.* i. 224 225. *ἐδογματίζε δὲ ὁ Ξενοφάνης παρὰ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων προλήψεις ἐν εἶναι τὸ πᾶν, καὶ τὸν θεὸν συμφυῆ τοῖς πᾶσιν· εἶναι δὲ σφαιροειδῆ καὶ ἀπαθῆ καὶ ἀμετάβλητον καὶ λογικόν* (Aristot. *de Xenoph.* c. 3, p. 977, Bek.)
² *Ἀδύνατον φησιν (ὁ Ξενοφάνης) εἶναι, εἴ τι ἐστίν, γενέσθαι, &c.*

One may reasonably doubt whether all the arguments ascribed to Xenophanês in the short but obscure treatise last quoted really belong to him.

³ Clemens Alexand. *Stromat.* v. p. 601, vii. p. 711.

⁴ Aristot. *Metaphysic.* i. 5, p. 986, Bek. *μικρὸν ἀγροικότερος.*

reality of the One Ens—were yet explained by a new physical hypothesis; so that they will be found to exercise great influence over the speculations both of Plato and Aristotle. We discover in Xenophanês, moreover, a vein of scepticism, and a mournful despair as to the attainability of certain knowledge,¹ which the nature of his philosophy was well-calculated to suggest, and in which the syllograph Timon of the third century B. C., who seems to have spoken of Xenophanês better than of most of the other philosophers, powerfully sympathised.

The cosmogony of Pherekydês of Syrus, contemporary of Anaximander and among the teachers of Pythagoras, seems, according to the fragments preserved, a combination of the old legendary fancies with Orphic mysticism,² and probably exercised little influence over the subsequent course of Grecian philosophy. By what has been said of Thalês, Anaximander, and Xenophanês, it will be seen that the sixth century B. C. witnessed the opening of several of those roads of intellectual speculation which the later philosophers pursued further, or at least from which they branched off. Before the year 500 B. C. many interesting questions were thus brought into discussion, which Solon, who died about 558 B. C., had never heard of—just as he may probably never have seen the map of Anaximander. But neither of these two distinguished men—Anaximander or Xenophanês—was anything more than a speculative inquirer. The third eminent name of this century, of whom I am now about to speak—Pythagoras, combined in his character disparate elements which require rather a longer development.

Pythagoras was founder of a brotherhood, originally brought together by a religious influence, and with observances approaching to monastic peculiarity—working in a direction at once religious, political, and scientific, and exercising for some time a real political ascendancy,—but afterwards banished from government and state affairs into a sectarian privacy with scientific pursuits, not without however still producing some statesmen individually distinguished. Amidst the multitude of false and apocryphal statements which circulated in antiquity respecting this celebrated man, we find a few important facts reasonably attested and deserving credence. He was a native of Samos,³ son of an opulent merchant named Mnêsarchus,—

¹ Xenophanês, Fr. xiv. ed. Mullach; Sextus Empiric. adv. Mathematicos, vii. 49-110; and Pyrrhon. Hypotyp. i. 224; Plutarch adv. Colôctên. p. 1114: compare Karsten ad Parmenidis Fragmenta, p. 146.

² See Brandis, Handbuch der Griech. Rôm. Philosophie, ch. xxii.

³ Herodot. iv. 95. The place of his nativity is certain from Herodotus,

or, according to some of his later and more fervent admirers, of Apollo : born, as far as we can make out, about the fiftieth Olympiad, or 580 B.C. On the many marvels recounted respecting his youth it is unnecessary to dwell. Among them may be numbered his wide-reaching travels, said to have been prolonged for nearly thirty years, to visit the Arabians, the Syrians, the Phenicians, the Chaldæans, the Indians, and the Gallic Druids. But there is reason to believe that he really visited Egypt¹—perhaps also Phenicia and Babylon, then Chaldæan and independent. At the time when he saw Egypt, between 560–540 B.C., about one century earlier than Herodotus, it was under Amasis, the last of its own kings, with its peculiar native character yet unimpaired by foreign conquest, and only slightly modified by the admission during the preceding century of Grecian mercenary troops and traders. The spectacle of Egyptian habits, the conversation of the priests, and the initiation into various mysteries or secret rites and stories not accessible to the general public, may very naturally have impressed the mind of Pythagoras, and given him that turn for mystic observance, asceticism, and peculiarity of diet and clothing, which manifested itself from the same cause among several of his contemporaries, but which was not a common phenomenon in the primitive Greek religion. Besides visiting Egypt, Pythagoras is also said to have profited by the teaching of Thalês, of Anaximander, and of Pherekydês of Syros :² amidst the towns of Ionia he would moreover have an opportunity of conversing with many Greek navigators who had visited foreign countries, especially Italy and Sicily. His mind seems to have been acted upon and impelled by this combined stimulus,—partly towards an imaginative and religious vein of but even this fact was differently stated by other authors, who called him a Tyrrhenian or Lemnos or Imbros (Porphyry, Vit. Pythag. c. 1–10), a Syrian, a Phlasiian, &c.

Cicero (De Repub. ii. 15 : compare Livy, i. 18) censures the chronological blunder of those who made Pythagoras the preceptor of Numa : which certainly is a remarkable illustration how much confusion prevailed among literary men of antiquity about the dates of events even of the sixth century B.C. Ovid follows this story without hesitation : see Metamorph. xv. 60, with Burmann's note.

¹ Cicero de Fin. v. 29 ; Diogen. Laërt. viii. 3 ; Strabo, xiv. p. 638 ; Alexander Polyhistor ap. Cyrill. cont. Julian. iv. p. 128, ed. Spanh. For the vast reach of his supposed travels, see Porphyry, Vit. Pythag. 11 ; Jamblic. 14, *segg.*

The same extensive journeys are ascribed to Dêmokritus, Diogen. Laërt. ix. 35.

² The connexion of Pythagoras with Pherekydês is noticed by Aristoxenus, ap. Diogen. Laërt. i. 118, viii. 2 ; Cicero de Divinat. i. 13.

speculation, with a life of mystic observance,—partly towards that active exercise, both of mind and body, which the genius of an Hellenic community so naturally tended to suggest.

Of the personal doctrines or opinions of Pythagoras, whom we must distinguish from Philolaus and the subsequent Pythagoreans, we have little certain knowledge, though doubtless the first germ of their geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, &c. must have proceeded from him. But that he believed in the metempsychosis or transmigration of the souls of deceased men into other men as well as into animals, we know, not only by other evidence, but also by the testimony of his contemporary, the philosopher Xenophanês of Elea. Pythagoras, seeing a dog beaten and hearing him howl, desired the striker to desist, saying—"It is the soul of a friend of mine, whom I recognised by his voice." This—together with the general testimony of Hêrakleitus, that Pythagoras was a man of extensive research and acquired instruction, but artful for mischief and destitute of sound judgement—is all that we know about him from contemporaries. Herodotus, two generations afterwards, while he conceives the Pythagoreans as a peculiar religious order, intimates that both Orpheus and Pythagoras had derived the doctrine of the metempsychosis from Egypt, but had pretended to it as their own without acknowledgment.¹ Pythagoras

¹ Xenophanês, *Fragm. 7*, ed. Schneidewin; Diogen. Laërt. viii. 36: compare Aulus Gellius, iv, 11 (we must remark that this or a like doctrine is not peculiar to Pythagoreans, but believed by the poet Pindar, *Olymp. ii. 68*, and *Fragment, Thren. x.*, as well as by the philosopher Pherekydês, *Porphyrius de Antro Nympharum*, c. 31).

Καί ποτέ μιν στυφελίζομένου σκύλακος παριόντα
 Φασίν ἐποικτεῖραι, καί τάδε φάσθαι ἔπος—
 Παῦσαι, μήδ᾽ ῥάπίς! ἔπειθ᾽ φίλου ἀνέρος ἐστὶ
 Ψυχὴ, τὴν ἐγνων φθεγξάμενης αἶων.

Consult also Sextus Empiricus, viii. 286, as to the *κοινωνία* between gods, men, and animals, believed both by Pythagoras and Empedoklês. That Herodotus (ii. 123) alludes to Orpheus and Pythagoras, though refraining designedly from mentioning names, there can hardly be any doubt: compare ii. 81; also Aristotle, *de Animâ*, i. 3. 23.

The testimony of Hêrakleitus is contained in Diogenes Laërtius, viii. 6, ix. 1. Ἡρακλείτους γοῦν ὁ φυσικὸς μονοноχι κέκραγε καὶ φησι· Πυθαγόρης Μνησάρχου ἱστορίην ἤσκησεν ἀνθρώπων μάλιστα πάντων, καὶ ἐκλεξάμενος ταύτας τὰς συγγραφαὶς, ἐποίησατο ἑαυτοῦ σοφίην, πολυμαθίην, κακοτεχνίην. Again, Πολυμαθίη νόον οὐ διδάσκει· Ἡσίωδον γὰρ ἂν εἶδαξε καὶ Πυθαγόρην, αὐθὶς δὲ Ξενοφάνεά τε καὶ Ἑκαταῖον.

Dr. Thirlwall conceives Xenophanês as having intended in the passage above cited to treat the doctrine of the metempsychosis "with deserved ridicule" (*Hist. of Greece*, ch. xii. vol. ii. p. 162). Religious opinions are so apt to appear ridiculous to those who do not believe them, that such a suspicion is not unnatural; yet I think, if Xenophanês had been so

combines the character of a sophist (a man of large observation, and clever, ascendant, inventive mind—the original sense of the word Sophist, prior to the polemics of the Platonic school, and the only sense known to Herodotus),¹ with that of an inspired teacher, prophet, and worker of miracles,—approaching to and sometimes even confounded with the gods,—and employing all these gifts to found a new special order of brethren bound together by religious rites and observances peculiar to themselves. In his prominent vocation, analogous to that of Epimenidês, Orpheus, or Melampus, he appears as the revealer of a mode of life calculated to raise his disciples above the level of mankind, and to recommend them to the favour of the gods; the Pythagorean life, like the Orphic life,² being intended as the exclusive prerogative of the brotherhood—approached only by probation and initiatory ceremonies, which were adapted to select enthusiasts rather than to an indiscriminate crowd—and exacting entire mental devotion to the master.³ In these lofty pretensions the Agrigentine Empedoklês seems to have greatly copied him, though with some varieties, about

disposed, he would have found more ridiculous examples among the many which this doctrine might suggest. Indeed it seems hardly possible to present the metempsychosis in a more touching or respectable point of view than that which the lines of his poem set forth. The particular animal selected is that one between whom and man the sympathy is most marked and reciprocal, while the doctrine is made to enforce a practical lesson against cruelty.

¹ Herodot. i. 29, ii. 49, iv. 95. Ἑλλήνων οὐ τῷ ἀσθεσεστάτῳ σοφιστῇ Πυθαγόρῃ. Hippokratês distinguishes the σοφιστής from the ἱητρός, though both of them had handled the subject of medicine—the special from the general habits of investigation. (Hippokratês, Περὶ ἀρχαίας ἱητρικῆς, c. 20, vol. i. p. 620, Littré.)

² See Lobeck's learned and valuable treatise, Aglaophamus, Orphica, lib. ii. pp. 247, 698, 900; also Plato, Legg. vi. 782, and Euripid. Hippol. 946.

³ Plato's conception of Pythagoras (Republ. x. p. 600) depicts him as something not unlike St. Benedict, or St. Francis, (or St. Elias, as some Carmelites have tried to make out: see Kuster ad Jamblich. c. 3)—Ἄλλὰ δὴ, εἰ μὴ δημοσίᾳ, ἰδίᾳ τισιν ἡγεμῶν παιδείας αὐτὸς ζῶν λέγεται Ὀμηρος γενέσθαι, οἱ ἕκωνον ἡγάπων ἐπὶ συνοσίᾳ καὶ τοῖς ὑστέροις ὁδὸν τινα βίου παρέδωσαν Ὀμηρικὴν ὥσπερ Πυθαγόρας αὐτὸς τε διαφερόντως ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἡγαπήθη, καὶ οἱ ὑστέροι ἐτι καὶ νῦν Πυθαγόρειον τροπὴν ἐπινομάζοντες τοῦ βίου διαφανεῖς πη δοκοῦσιν εἶναι ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις.

The description of Melampus given in Herodot. ii. 49, very much fills up the idea of Pythagoras, as derived from ii. 81-123, and iv. 95. Pythagoras, as well as Melampus, was said to have pretended to divination and prophecy (Cicero, Divinat. i. 3, 46; Porphyry. Vit. Pyth. c. 29; compare Krische, De Societate a Pythagorâ in urbe Crotoniatarum conditâ Commentatio, ch. v. p. 72, Göttingen, 1831).

half a century afterwards.¹ While Aristotle tells us that the Krotoniates identified Pythagoras with the Hyperborean Apollo, the satirical Timon pronounced him to have been "a juggler of solemn speech, engaged in fishing for men."² This is the same character, looked at from the different points of view of the believer and the unbeliever. There is however no reason for regarding Pythagoras as an impostor, because experience seems to show, that while in certain ages it is not difficult for a man to persuade others that he is inspired, it is still less difficult for him to contract the same belief himself.

Looking at the general type of Pythagoras, as conceived by witnesses in and nearest to his own age—Xenophanês, Hêrakkleitus, Herodotus, Plato, Aristotle, Isokratês³—we find in him chiefly the religious missionary and schoolmaster, with little of the politician. His efficiency in the latter character, originally subordinate, first becomes prominent in those glowing fancies which the later Pythagoreans communicated to Aristoxenus and Dikæarchus. The primitive Pythagoras is inspired by the gods to reveal a new mode of life⁴—the Pythagorean life—and to promise divine favour to a select and docile few as the recompense of strict ritual obedience, of austere self-control, and of laborious training, bodily as well as mental. To speak

¹ Brandis, Handbuch der Geschichte der Griechisch. Rom. Philosophie, part i. sect. xlvii. p. 191.

² Ælian, V. H. ii. 26; Jamblichus, Vit. Pyth. c. 31, 140; Porphyry, Vit. Pyth. c. 20; Diodorus, Fragm. lib. x. vol. iv. p. 56, Wess. :—Timon ap. Diogen. Laërt. viii. 36; and Plutarch, Numa, c. 8.

Πυθαγόρην τε γόητος ἀποκλίναντ' ἐπὶ δόξαν
Θήρη ἐπ' ἀνθρώπων, σεμνηγορίας δαριαστίν.

³ Isokratês, Busiris, p. 402, ed. Auger. Πυθαγόρας ὁ Σάμιος, ἀφικόμενος εἰς Ἀγυπτον, καὶ μαθητῆς τῶν ἱερέων γενόμενος, τήν τε ἄλλην φιλοσοφίαν πρῶτος εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἐκόμισε, καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς θυσίας καὶ τὰς ἁγιστείας ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς ἐπιφανέστερον τῶν ἄλλων ἐσπούδασε.

Compare Aristotel. Magn. Moralia, i. 1, about Pythagoras as an ethical teacher. Dêmokritus, born about 460 B.C., wrote a treatise (now lost) respecting Pythagoras, whom he greatly admired: as far as we can judge, it would seem that he too must have considered Pythagoras as an ethical teacher (Diogen. Laërt. ix. 38; Mullach, Democriti Fragmenta, lib. ii. p. 113; Cicero de Orator. iii. 15).

⁴ Jamblichus, Vit. Pyth. c. 64, 115, 151, 199: see also the idea ascribed to Pythagoras, of divine inspirations coming on men (*ἐπίπνοια παρὰ τοῦ δαιμονίου*). Aristoxenus apud Stobæum, Eclog. Physic. p. 206; Diogen. Laërt. viii. 32.

Meiners renders it probable that the stories respecting the miraculous powers and properties of Pythagoras got into circulation either during his lifetime, or at least not long after his death (Geschichte der Wissenschaften, B. iii. vol. i. pp. 504, 505).

with confidence of the details of his training, ethical or scientific, and of the doctrines which he promulgated, is impossible; for neither he himself nor any of his disciples anterior to Philolaus (who was separated from him by about one intervening generation) left any memorials in writing.¹ Numbers and lines, studied partly in their own mutual relations, partly under various symbolising fancies, presented themselves to him as the primary constituent elements of the universe, and as a sort of magical key to phænomena, physical as well as moral. Such mathematical tendencies in his teaching, expanded by Pythagoreans his successors, and coinciding partly also (as has been before stated) with the studies of Anaximander and Thalés, acquired more and more development, so as to become one of the most glorious and profitable manifestations of Grecian intellect. Living as Pythagoras did at a time when the stock of experience was scanty, the licence of hypothesis unbounded, and the process of deduction without rule or verifying test—he was thus fortunate enough to strike into that track of geometry and arithmetic, in which, from data of experience few, simple, and obvious, an immense field of deductive and verifiable investigation may be travelled over. We must at the same time remark, however, that in his mind this track, which now seems so straightforward and well-defined, was clouded by strange fancies which it is not easy to understand, and from which it was but partially cleared by his successors.

Of his spiritual training much is said, though not upon very good authority: we hear of his memorial discipline, his monastic self-scrutiny, his employment of music to soothe disorderly passions,² his long novitiate of silence, his knowledge of physiognomy which enabled him to detect even without trial unworthy subjects, his peculiar diet, and his rigid care for sobriety as well as for bodily vigour. He is also said to have

¹ Respecting Philolaus, see the valuable collection of his fragments, and commentary on them, by Boeckh (*Philolaus des Pythagoreers Leben*, Berlin, 1819). That Philolaus was the first who composed a work on Pythagorean science, and thus made it known beyond the limits of the brotherhood—among others to Plato—appears well-established (Boeckh, *Philolaus*, p. 22; *Diogen. Laërt.* viii. 15-55; *Jamblichus*, c. 119). Simmias and Kebès, fellow-disciples of Plato under Sokratès, had held intercourse with Philolaus at Thebes (*Plato, Phædon*, p. 61), perhaps about 420 B.C. The Pythagorean brotherhood had then been dispersed in various parts of Greece, though the attachment of its members to each other seems to have continued long afterwards.

² *Plutarch, De Isid. et Osirid.* p. 384, ad fin. *Quintilian. Institut. Oratt.* ix. 4.

inculcated abstinence from animal food ; a feeling so naturally connected with the doctrine of the metempsychosis, that we may well believe him to have entertained it, as Empedoklēs also did after him.¹ It is certain that there were peculiar observances, and probably a certain measure of self-denial, embodied in the Pythagorean life. Yet on the other hand, it seems equally certain that the members of the order cannot have been all subjected to the same diet, or training, or studies ; for Milo the Krotoniate was among them,² the strongest man and the unparalleled wrestler of his age—who cannot possibly have dispensed with animal food and ample diet (even setting aside the tales about his voracious appetite), and is not likely to have bent his attention on speculative study. Probably Pythagoras did not enforce the same bodily or mental discipline on all, or at least knew when to grant dispensations. The order, as it first stood under him, consisted of men different both in temperament and aptitude, but bound together by common religious observances and hopes, common reverence for the master, and mutual attachment as well as pride in each other's success. It must thus be distinguished from the Pythagoreans of the fourth century B.C., who had no communion with wrestlers, and comprised only ascetic, studious men, generally recluse, though in some cases rising to political distinction. The succession of these Pythagoreans, never very numerous, seems to have continued until about 300 B.C., and then nearly died out ; being superseded by other schemes of philosophy more suited to cultivated Greeks of the age after Sokratēs. But during the time of Cicero, two centuries afterwards, the orientalising tendency—then beginning to spread over the Grecian and Roman world, and becoming gradually

¹ Empedoklēs, ap. Aristot. Rhetoric. i. 14, 2 ; Sextus Empiric. ix. 127 ; Plutarch, De Esu Carnium, pp. 993, 996, 997 ; where he puts Pythagoras and Empedoklēs together, as having both held the doctrine of the metempsychosis, and both prohibited the eating of animal food. Empedoklēs supposed that plants had souls, and that the souls of human beings passed after death into plants as well as into animals. "I have been myself heretofore (said he) a boy, a girl, a shrub, a bird, and a fish of the sea."

*ἤδη γάρ ποτ' ἐγὼ γένεμην καὶ ἄνθρωπος τε κέρη τε,
θάμνος τ', οἰώσας τε καὶ ἐξ ἄλλος ἐμπυρος ἰχθύς.*

(Diogen. L. viii. 77 ; Sturz. ad Empedokl. Frag. p. 466.) Pythagoras is said to have affirmed that he had been not only Euphorbus in the Grecian army before Troy, but also a tradesman, a courtesan, &c., and various other human characters, before his actual existence ; he did not however extend the same intercommunion to plants, in any case.

The abstinence from animal food was an Orphic precept as well as a Pythagorean (Aristophan. Ran. 1032).

² Strabo, vi. p. 263 ; Diogen. L. viii. 40.

stronger and stronger—caused the Pythagorean philosophy to be again revived. It was revived, too, with little or none of its scientific tendencies, but with more than its primitive religious and imaginative fanaticism—Apollonius of Tyana constituting himself a living copy of Pythagoras. And thus, while the scientific elements developed by the disciples of Pythagoras had become disjoined from all peculiarity of sect, and passed into the general studious world—the original vein of mystic and ascetic fancy belonging to the master, without any of that practical efficiency of body and mind which had marked his first followers, was taken up anew into the Pagan world, along with the disfigured doctrines of Plato. Neo-Pythagorism, passing gradually into Neo-Platonism, outlasted the other more positive and masculine systems of Pagan philosophy, as the contemporary and rival of Christianity. A large proportion of the false statements concerning Pythagoras come from these Neo-Pythagoreans, who were not deterred by the want of memorials from illustrating, with ample latitude of fancy, the ideal character of the master.

That an inquisitive man like Pythagoras, at a time when there were hardly any books to study, would visit foreign countries, and converse with all the Grecian philosophical inquirers within his reach, is a matter which we should presume even if no one attested it; and our witnesses carry us very little beyond this general presumption. What doctrines he borrowed, or from whom, we are unable to discover. But in fact his whole life and proceedings bear the stamp of an original mind and not of a borrower—a mind impressed both with Hellenic and with non-Hellenic habits and religion, yet capable of combining the two in a manner peculiar to himself; and above all, endued with those talents for religious and personal ascendancy over others, which told for much more than the intrinsic merit of his ideas. We are informed that after extensive travels and inquiries he returned to Samos, at the age of about forty. He then found his native island under the despotism of Polykratês, which rendered it an unsuitable place either for free sentiments or for marked individuals. Unable to attract hearers, or found any school or brotherhood, in his native island, he determined to expatriate; and we may presume that at this period (about 535-530 B.C.) the recent subjugation of Ionia by the Persians was not without influence on his determination. The trade between the Asiatic and the Italian Greeks—and even the intimacy between Milêtus and Knidus on the one side, and Sybaris and Tarentum on the

other—had been great and of long standing, so that there was more than one motive to determine him to the coast of Italy; in which direction also his contemporary Xenophanês, the founder of the Eleatic school of philosophy, emigrated seemingly about the same time—from Kolophon to Zanklê, Katana and Elea.¹

Kroton and Sybaris were at this time in their fullest prosperity—among the first and most prosperous cities of the Hellenic name. To the former of the two Pythagoras directed his course. A Council of One Thousand persons, taken from among the heirs and representatives of the principal proprietors at its first foundation, was here invested with the supreme authority: in what manner the executive offices were filled, we have no information. Besides a great extent of power, and a numerous population, the large mass of whom had no share in the political franchise, Kroton stood at this time distinguished for two things—the general excellence of the bodily habit of the citizens, attested in part by the number of conquerors furnished to the Olympic games—and the superiority of its physicians or surgeons.² These two points were in fact greatly connected with each other; for the therapeutics of the day consisted not so much of active remedies as of careful diet and regimen; while the trainer, who dictated the life of an athlete during his long and fatiguing preparation for an Olympic contest—and the professional superintendent of the youths who frequented the public gymnasia—followed out the same general views and acted upon the same basis of knowledge, as the physician who prescribed for a state of positive bad health.³

¹ Diogen. Laërt. ix. 18.

² Herodot. iii. 131; Strabo, vi. p. 261; Menander de Encomiis, p. 96, ed. Heeren. Ἀθηναίους ἐπὶ ἀγαλματοποιίᾳ τε καὶ ζωγραφικῇ, καὶ Κροτωνιάτας ἐπὶ ἰατρικῇ, μέγα φρονῆσαι, &c.

The Krotoniate Alkmæon, a younger contemporary of Pythagoras (Aristotel. Metaph. i. 5), is among the earliest names mentioned as philosophising upon physical and medical subjects. See Brandis, Handbuch der Geschicht. der Philos. sect. lxxxiii. p. 508, and Aristotel. De Generat. Animal. iii. 2, p. 752, Bekker.

The medical art in Egypt, at the time when Pythagoras visited that country, was sufficiently far advanced to excite the attention of an inquisitive traveller—the branches of it minutely subdivided and strict rules laid down for practice (Herodot. ii. 84; Aristotel. Politic. iii. 10, 4).

³ See the analogy of the two strikingly brought out in the treatise of Hippokratês Περὶ ἀρχαίας ἰητρικῆς, c. 3, 4, 7, vol. i. p. 580–584, ed. Littré.

Ἐπι γούδν καὶ νῦν οἱ τῶν γυμνασίων καὶ ἀσκήσιων ἐπιμελόμενοι αἰεὶ τι προσεξευρίσκουσι, καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ὁδὸν ζητούντες ὃ, τι ἔδωκεν καὶ πίνων ἐπικρατήσῃ τε αὐτέων μάλιστα, καὶ ἰσχυρότερος αὐτὸς ἔωντοῦ ἔσται (p. 580); again, p.

Of medical education properly so called, especially of anatomy, there was then little or nothing. The physician acquired his

584 : Τί οὖν φαίνεται ἑτεροῖον διανοηθεὶς ὁ καλεόμενος ἱητρὸς καὶ ὀμολογοῦμενως χειροτέχνης, ὅς ἐξεύρε τὴν ἀμφὶ τοὺς κάμνοντας διαίταν καὶ τροφήν, ἢ κείνος ὁ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τοῖσι πᾶσι ἀνθρώποισι τροφήν, ἢ νῦν χρεώμεθα, ἐξ ἐκείνης τῆς ἀγρίας καὶ θηριώδους εὐρών τε καὶ παρασκευάσας διαίτης : compare another passage not less illustrative in the treatise of Hippokratēs *Περὶ διαίτης ὀξέων*, c. 3, vol. ii. p. 245, ed. Littré.

Following the same general idea, that the theory and practice of the physician is a further development and variety of that of the gymnastic trainer, I transcribe some observations from the excellent *Remarques Rétrospectives* of M. Littré, at the end of the fourth volume of his edition of Hippokratēs (p. 662).

After having observed (p. 659) that physiology may be considered as divided into two parts—one relating to the mechanism of the functions; the other, to the effects produced upon the human body by the different influences which act upon it and the media by which it is surrounded; and after having observed that on the first of these two branches, the ancients could never make progress, from their ignorance of anatomy—he goes on to state, that respecting the second branch they acquired a large amount of knowledge—

“Sur la physiologie des influences extérieures, la Grèce du temps d’Hippocrate et après lui fut le théâtre d’expériences en grand les plus importantes et les plus instructives. Toute la population (la population libre, s’entend) étoit soumise à un système régulier d’éducation physique (N. B. this is a little too strongly stated) : dans quelques cités, à Lacédémone par exemple, les femmes n’en étoient pas exemptées. Ce système se composoit d’exercices et d’une alimentation, que combinèrent l’empirisme d’abord, puis une théorie plus savante : il concernoit (comme dit Hippocrate lui-même, en ne parlant, il est vrai, que de la partie alimentaire), il concernoit et les malades pour leur rétablissement, et les gens bien portans pour la conservation de leur santé, et les personnes livrées aux exercices gymnastiques pour l’accroissement de leurs forces. On savoit au juste ce qu’il falloit pour conserver seulement le corps en bon état ou pour traiter un malade—pour former un militaire ou pour faire un athlète—et en particulier, un lutteur, un coureur, un sauteur, un pugiliste. Une classe d’hommes, les maîtres des gymnases, étoient exclusivement adonnés à la culture de cet art, auquel les médecins participoient dans les limites de leur profession; et Hippocrate, qui dans les Aphorismes, invoque l’exemple des athlètes, nous parle dans le *Traité des Articulations* des personnes maigres, qui n’ayant pas été amaigris par un procédé régulier de l’art, ont les chairs muqueuses. Les anciens médecins savoient, comme on le voit, procurer l’amaigrissement conformément à l’art, et reconnoître à ses effets un amaigrissement irrégulier : toutes choses auxquelles nos médecins sont étrangers, et dont on ne retrouve l’analogie que parmi les *entraîneurs* Anglois. Au reste cet ensemble de connoissances empiriques et théoriques doit être mis au rang des pertes fâcheuses qui ont accompagné la longue et turbulente transition du monde ancien au monde moderne. Les admirables institutions destinées dans l’antiquité à développer et affermir le corps, ont disparu : l’hygiène publique est destituée à cet égard de toute direction scientifique et générale, et demeure abandonnée complètement au hasard.”

See also the remarks of Plato respecting Herodikus, *De Republicâ*, iii. p. 406; Aristotel. *Politic.* iii. 11, 6; iv. 1, 1; viii. 4, 1.

knowledge from observation of men sick as well as healthy, and from a careful notice of the way in which the human body was acted upon by surrounding agents and circumstances : and this same knowledge was not less necessary for the trainer ; so that the same place which contained the best men in the latter class was also likely to be distinguished in the former. It is not improbable that such celebrity of Kroton may have been one of the reasons which determined Pythagoras to go thither. For among the precepts ascribed to him, precise rules as to diet and bodily regulation occupy a prominent place. The medical or surgical celebrity of Dêmokédês (son-in-law of the Pythagorean Milo), to whom allusion has been made in a former chapter, is contemporaneous with the presence of Pythagoras at Kroton ; and the medical men of Magna Græcia maintained themselves in credit, as rivals of the schools of the Asklepiads at Kôs and Knidus, throughout all the fifth and fourth centuries B.C.

The biographers of Pythagoras tell us that his arrival there, his preaching, and his conduct, produced an effect almost electric upon the minds of the people, with an extensive reform public as well as private. Political discontent was repressed, incontinence disappeared, luxury became discredited, and the women hastened to exchange their golden ornaments for the simplest attire. No less than two thousand persons were converted at his first preaching. So effective were his discourses to the youth, that the Supreme Council of One Thousand invited him into their assembly, solicited his advice, and even offered to constitute him their Prytanis or president, while his wife and daughter were placed at the head of the religious processions of females.¹ His influence was not confined to Kroton. Other towns in Italy and Sicily—Sybaris, Metapontum, Rhégium, Katana, Himera, &c., all felt the benefit of his exhortations, which extricated some of them even from slavery. Such are the tales of which the biographers of Pythagoras are full :² and we see that even the disciples of Aristotle, about the year 300 B.C.—Aristoxenus, Dikæarchus, Herakleidês of Pontus, &c.—are hardly less charged with them than the Neo-Pythagoreans of three or four centuries later. They doubtless heard these tales from their contemporary Pythagoreans,³ the last members of a declining sect, among

¹ Valerius Maxim. viii. 15, xv. 1 ; Jamblichus, Vit. Pyth. c. 45 ; Timæus, Fragm. 78, ed. Didot.

² Porphyry, Vit. Pythag. c. 21-54 ; Jamblich. 33-35, 166.

³ The compilations of Porphyry and Jamblichus on the life of Pythagoras,

whom the attributes of the primitive founder passed for god-like, but who had no memorials, no historical judgement, and no means of forming a true conception of Kroton as it stood in 530 B.C.¹ To trace these tales to a true foundation is impossible. But we may reasonably believe that the success of Pythagoras, as a person favoured by the gods and patentee of copied from a great variety of authors, will doubtless contain some truth amidst their confused heap of statements, many incredible, and nearly all unauthenticated. But it is very difficult to single out what these portions of truth really are. Even Aristoxenus and Dikæarchus, the best authors from whom these biographers quote, lived near two centuries after the death of Pythagoras, and do not appear to have had any early memorials to consult, nor any better informants than the contemporary Pythagoreans—the last of an expiring sect, and probably among the least eminent for intellect, since the philosophers of the Sokratic vein in its various branches carried off the acute and aspiring young men of that time.

Meiners, in his *Geschichte der Wissenschaften* (vol. i. b. iii. p. 191 *seq.*), has given a careful analysis of the various authors from whom the two biographers have borrowed, and a comparative estimate of their trustworthiness. It is an excellent piece of historical criticism, though the author exaggerates both the merits and the influence of the first Pythagoreans: Kiessling in the notes to his edition of Jamblichus has given some extracts from it, but by no means enough to dispense with the perusal of the original. I think Meiners allows too much credit, on the whole, to Aristoxenus (see p. 214) and makes too little deduction for the various stories difficult to be believed, of which Aristoxenus is given as the source: of course the latter could not furnish better matter than he heard from his own witnesses. Where the judgement of Meiners is more severe, it is also better borne out, especially respecting Porphyry himself, and his scholar Jamblichus. These later Pythagorean philosophers seem to have set up as a formal canon of credibility, that which many religious men of antiquity acted upon from a mere unconscious sentiment and fear of giving offence to the gods—That it was *not right to disbelieve any story* recounted respecting the gods, and wherein the divine agency was introduced: no one could tell but what it *might be true*: to deny its truth was to set bounds to the divine omnipotence. Accordingly they made no difficulty in believing what was recounted about Aristæus, Abaris, and other eminent subjects of mythes (Jamblichus, Vit. Pyth. c. 138–148)—*καὶ τοῦτό γε πάντες οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι ὄμως ἔχουσι πιστευτικῶς, ὅσον περὶ Ἀρισταίου καὶ Ἀβάριδος τὰ μυθολογούμενα καὶ ἄλλα ἕλλα τοιαῦτα λέγεται . . . τῶν τοιούτων δὲ τῶν δοκούντων μυθικῶν ἀπομνημονεύουσι, ὡς οὐδὲν ἀπιστοῦντες ὅτι ἂν εἰς τὸ θεῖον ἀνάγηται.* Also not less formally laid down in Jamblichus, *Adhortatio ad Philosophiam*, as the fourth Symbolum, p. 324, ed. Kiessling. *Περὶ θεῶν μηδὲν θαυμαστὸν ἀπιστεῖ, μηδὲ περὶ θείων δογμάτων.* Reasoning from their principles, this was a consistent corollary to lay down; but it helps us to estimate their value as selectors and discriminators of accounts respecting Pythagoras. The extravagant compliments paid by the Emperor Julian in his letters to Jamblichus will not suffice to establish the authority of the latter as a critic and witness: see the *Epistolæ* 34, 40, 41, in Heyler's edit. of Julian's letters.

¹ Aulus Gell. N. A. iv. 11. Apollonius (ap. Jamblich. c. 262) alludes to τὰ ὑπομνήματα τῶν Κροτωνιατῶν: what the date of these may be, we do not know, but there is no reason to believe them anterior to Aristoxenus.

divine secrets, was very great—that he procured to himself both the reverence of the multitude, and the peculiar attachment and obedience of many devoted adherents, chiefly belonging to the wealthy and powerful classes—that a select body of these adherents, three hundred in number, bound themselves by a sort of vow both to Pythagoras and to each other, adopting a peculiar diet, ritual, and observances, as a token of union—though without anything like community of property, which some have ascribed to them. Such a band of men, standing high in the city for wealth and station, and bound together by this intimate tie, came by almost unconscious tendency to mingle political ambition with religious and scientific pursuits. Political clubs with sworn members, under one form or another, were a constant phænomenon in the Grecian cities.¹ Now the Pythagorean order at its first formation was the most efficient of all clubs; since it presented an intimacy of attachment among its members, as well as a feeling of haughty exclusiveness against the public without, such as no other fraternity could parallel.² The devoted attachment of Pythagoreans towards each other is not less emphatically set forth than their contempt for every one else: in fact these two attributes of the order seem the best ascertained as well as the most permanent of all. Moreover, we may be sure that the peculiar observances of the order passed for exemplary virtues in the eyes of its members, and exalted ambition into a duty, by making them sincerely believe that they were the only persons fit to govern. It is no matter of surprise, then, to learn that the Pythagoreans gradually drew to themselves great ascendancy in the government of Kroton. And as similar clubs, not less influential, were

¹ Thucyd. viii. 54. τὰς ξυνωμοσίας, αἵπερ ἐτύγχανον πρότερον οἶσαι ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐπὶ δίκαις καὶ ἀρχαῖς, ἀπάσας ἐπελθὼν, &c.

On this important passage, in which Thucydides notes the political clubs of Athens as sworn societies, numerous, notorious, and efficient—I shall speak further in a future stage of the history. Dr. Arnold has a good note on the passage.

² Justin, xx. 4. “Sed trecenti ex juvenibus cum sodalitiū juris sacramento quodam nexi, separatam a ceteris civibus vitam exercebant, quasi cœtum clandestinæ conjurationis haberent, civitatem in se converterunt.”

Compare Diogen. Laërt. viii. 3; Apollonius ap. Jamblich. c. 254; Porphyry, Vit. Pyth. c. 33.

The story of the devoted attachments of the two Pythagoreans Damon and Phintias appears to be very well attested: Aristoxenus heard it from the lips of the younger Dionysius the despot, whose sentence had elicited such manifestation of friendship (Porphyry, Vit. Pyth. c. 59–62; Cicero, De Officiis, iii. 10; and Davis ad Cicero. Tusc. Disp. v. 22).

formed at Metapontum and other places, so the Pythagorean order spread its net and dictated the course of affairs over a large portion of Magna Græcia. Such ascendancy of the Pythagoreans must have procured for the master himself some real, and still more supposed, influence over the march of government at Kroton and elsewhere, of a nature not then possessed by any of his contemporaries throughout Greece.¹ Yet his influence was probably exercised in the background, through the medium of the brotherhood who revered him: for it is hardly conformable to Greek manners that a stranger of his character should guide personally and avowedly the political affairs of any Grecian city.

Nor are we to believe that Pythagoras came originally to Kroton with the express design of creating for himself an ascendant political position—still less that he came for the purpose of realising a great preconceived political idea, and transforming Kroton into a model-city of pure Dorism, as has been supposed by some eminent modern authors. Such schemes might indeed be ascribed to him by Pythagoreans of the Platonic age, when large ideas of political amelioration were rife in the minds of speculative men—by men disposed to forego the authorship of their own opinions, and preferring to accredit them as traditions handed down from a founder who had left no memorials. But it requires better evidence than theirs to make us believe that any real Greek born in 580 B.C. actually conceived such plans. We cannot construe the scheme of Pythagoras as going further than the formation of a private, select, order of brethren, embracing his religious fancies, ethical tone, and germs of scientific idea—and manifesting adherence by those observances which Herodotus and Plato call the Pythagorean orgies and mode of life. And his private order became politically powerful, because he was skilful or fortunate enough to enlist a sufficient number of wealthy Krotoniates, possessing individual influence which they strengthened immensely by thus regimenting themselves in intimate union. The Pythagorean orgies or religious ceremonies were not inconsistent with public activity, bodily as well as mental. Probably the rich men of the order may have been rendered even more active, by being fortified against the temptations of a life of indulgence. The character of the order as it first

¹ Plutarch, *Philosophand. cum Principib.* c. i. p. 777. *ἔν δ' ἔρχοντος ἀνδρὸς καὶ πολιτικοῦ καὶ πρακτικοῦ καθάψηται (ὁ φιλόσοφος) καὶ τοῦτον ἀναπλήρη καλοκἀγαθίας, πολλοὺς δὲ ἐνὸς ὠφέλησεν, ὡς Πυθαγόρας τοῖς πρωτεύουσι τῶν Ἰταλιωτῶν συγγενόμενος.*

stood, different from that to which it was afterwards reduced, was indeed religious and exclusive, but also active and domineering; not despising any of those bodily accomplishments which increased the efficiency of the Grecian citizen, and which so particularly harmonised with the pre-existing tendencies of Kroton.¹ Niebuhr and O. Müller have even

¹ I transcribe here the summary given by Krische, at the close of his Dissertation on the Pythagorean order, p. 101. "Societatis scopus fuit mere politicus, ut lapsam optimatum potestatem non modo in pristinum restitueret, sed firmaret amplificaretque: cum summo hoc scopo duo conjuncti fuerunt; moralis alter, alter ad literas spectans. Discipulos suos bonos probosque homines reddere voluit Pythagoras, et ut civitatem moderantes potestate suâ non abuterentur ad plebem opprimendam; et ut plebs, intelligens suis commodis consuli, conditione suâ contenta esset. Quoniam vero bonum sapiensque moderamen nisi a prudente literisque exculto viro expectari (non) licet, philosophiæ studium necessarium duxit Samius iis, qui ad civitatis clavum tenendum se accingerent."

This is the general view (coinciding substantially with that of O. Müller—Dorians, iii. 9, 16) given by an author who has gone through the evidences with care and learning. It differs on some important points from the idea which I conceive of the primitive master and his contemporary brethren. It leaves out the religious ascendancy, which I imagine to have stood first among the means as well as among the premeditated purposes of Pythagoras, while it sets forth a reformatory political scheme as directly contemplated by him, of which there is no proof. Though the political ascendancy of the early Pythagoreans is the most prominent feature in their early history, it is not to be considered as the manifestation of any peculiar or settled political idea—it is rather a result of their position and means of union. Ritter observes (in my opinion more justly), "We must not believe that the mysteries of the Pythagorean order were of a simply political character: the most probable accounts warrant us in considering that its central point was a mystic religious teaching" (*Geschicht. der Philosophie*, b. iv. ch. i. vol. i. p. 365–368): compare Hoeck. Kreta, vol. iii. p. 223.

Krische (p. 32) as well as Boeckh (*Philolaus*, p. 39–42) and O. Müller assimilate the Pythagorean life to the Dorian or Spartan habits, and call the Pythagorean philosophy the expression of Grecian Dorism, as opposed to the Ionians and the Ionic philosophy. I confess that I perceive no analogy between the two, either in action or speculation. The Spartans stand completely distinct from other Dorians; and even the Spartan habits of life, though they present some points of resemblance with the bodily training of the Pythagoreans, exhibit still more important points of difference, in respect to religious peculiarity and mysticism, as well as to the scientific element embodied with it. The Pythagorean philosophy, and the Eleatic philosophy, were both equally opposed to the Ionic; yet neither of them is in any way connected with Dorian tendencies. Neither Elea nor Kroton were Doric cities; moreover Xenophanês as well as Pythagoras were both Ionians.

The general assertions respecting Ionic mobility and inconstancy, contrasted with Doric constancy and steadiness, will not be found borne out by a study of facts. The Dorism of Pythagoras appears to me a complete fancy. O. Müller even turns Kroton into a Dorian city, contrary to all evidence.

supposed that the select Three Hundred Pythagoreans constituted a sort of smaller senate at that city¹—an hypothesis no way probable; we may rather conceive them as a powerful private club, exercising ascendancy in the interior of the senate, and governing through the medium of the constituted authorities. Nor can we receive without great allowance the assertion of Varro,² who, assimilating Pythagoras to Plato, tells us that he confined his instructions on matters of government to chosen disciples, who had gone through a complete training, and had reached the perfection of wisdom and virtue. It seems more probable that the political Pythagoreans were those who were most qualified for action, and least for speculation; and that the general of the order possessed that skill in turning to account the aptitudes of individuals, which two centuries ago was so conspicuous in the Jesuits; to whom, in various ways, the Pythagoreans bear considerable resemblance. All that we can be said to know about their political principles is, that they were exclusive and aristocratical, adverse to the control and interference of the people; a circumstance no way disadvantageous to them, since they coincided in this respect with the existing government of the city—had not their own conduct brought additional odium on the old aristocracy, and raised up an aggravated democratical opposition carried to the most deplorable lengths of violence.

All the information which we possess, apocryphal as it is, respecting this memorable club is derived from its warm admirers. Yet even their statements are enough to explain how it came to provoke deadly and extensive enmity. A stranger coming to teach new religious dogmas and observances, with a tincture of science and some new ethical ideas and phrases, though he would obtain some zealous votaries, would also bring upon himself a certain measure of antipathy. Extreme strictness of observances, combined with the art of touching skilfully the springs of religious terror in others, would indeed do much both to fortify and to exalt him. But when it was discovered that science, philosophy, and even the mystic revelations of religion, whatever they were, remained confined to the private talk and practice of the disciples, and were thus thrown into the background, while all that was seen and felt without was the political predominance of an ambitious fraternity—we need not wonder that Pythagorism in all its

¹ Niebuhr, *Römisch. Gesch.* i. p. 165, 2nd edit.; O. Müller, *Hist. of Dorians*, iii. 9, 16: Kriche is opposed to this idea, sect. v. p. 84.

² Varro ap. Augustin. *de Ordine*, ii. 30; Kriche, p. 77.

parts became odious to a large portion of the community. Moreover we find the order represented not merely as constituting a devoted and exclusive political party, but also as manifesting an ostentatious self-conceit throughout their personal demeanour¹—refusing the hand of fellowship to all except the brethren, and disgusting especially their own familiar friends and kinsmen. So far as we know Grecian philosophy, this is the only instance in which it was distinctly abused for political and party objects. The early days of the Pythagorean order stand distinguished for such perversion, which, fortunately for the progress of philosophy, never presented itself afterwards in Greece.² Even at Athens, however, we shall hereafter see that Sokratês, though standing really aloof from all party intrigue, incurred much of his unpopularity from supposed political conjunction with Kritias and Alkibiadês,³ to which indeed the orator Æschinês distinctly ascribes his condemnation, speaking about sixty years after the event. Had Sokratês been known as the founder of a band holding together intimately for ambitious purposes, the result would have been eminently pernicious to philosophy, and probably much sooner pernicious to himself.

It was this cause which brought about the complete and violent destruction of the Pythagorean order. Their ascendancy had provoked such wide-spread discontent, that their

¹ Apollonius ap. Jamblichum, V. P. c. 254, 255, 256, 257. *ἡγεμόνες δὲ ἐγένοντο τῆς διαφορᾶς οἱ ταῖς συγγενείαις καὶ ταῖς οἰκειότησιν ἐγγύτατα καθεστῆκότες τῶν Πυθαγορείων. Αἴτιον δ' ἦν, ὅτι τὰ μὲν πολλὰ αὐτοὺς ἐλύπει τῶν πραττομένων, &c. : compare also the lines descriptive of Pythagoras, c. 259. *Τοὺς μὲν ἐταίρους ἦγεν ἴσους μακάρεσσι θεοῖσι. Τοὺς δ' ἄλλους ἡγεῖτ' οὐτ' ἐν λόγῳ, οὐτ' ἐν ἀριθμῷ.**

That this Apollonius, cited both by Jamblichus and by Porphyry, is Apollonius of Tyana, has been rendered probable by Meiners (*Gesch. der Wissensch. v. i. p. 239-245*): compare Weicker, *Prolegomena ad Theognid. p. xlv. xlvi.*

When we read the life of Apollonius by Philostratus, we see that the former was himself extremely communicative: he might be the rather disposed therefore to think that the seclusion and reserve of Pythagoras was a defect, and to ascribe to it much of the mischief which afterwards overtook the order.

² Schleiermacher observes that "Philosophy among the Pythagoreans was connected with political objects, and their school with a practical brotherly partnership, such as was never on any other occasion seen in Greece" (Introduction to his Translation of Plato, p. 12). See also Theopompus, Fr. 68, ed. Didot. apud Athenæum, v. p. 213, and Euripidês, *Mêdêa*, 294.

³ Xenophon, *Memorab. i. 2, 12*; Æschines, cont. Timarch. c. 34. *ὑμεῖς, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, Σωκράτη τὸν σοφιστὴν ἀπεκτείνετε, ὅτι Κριτίαν ἐφάνη πεπαιδευκῶς, ἕνα τῶν τριάκοντα.*

enemies became emboldened to employ extreme force against them. Kylon and Ninon—the former of whom is said to have sought admittance into the order, but to have been rejected on account of his bad character—took the lead in pronounced opposition to the Pythagoreans; whose unpopularity extended itself further to the Senate of One Thousand, through the medium of which their ascendancy had been exercised. Propositions were made for rendering the government more democratical, and for constituting a new senate, taken by lot from all the people, before which the magistrates should go through their trial of accountability after office: an opportunity being chosen in which the Senate of One Thousand had given signal offence by refusing to divide among the people the recently-conquered territory of Sybaris.¹ In spite of the opposition of the Pythagoreans, this change of government was carried through. Ninon and Kylon, their principal enemies, made use of it to exasperate the people still further against the order, until they provoked actual popular violence against it. The Pythagoreans were attacked when assembled in their meeting-house near the temple of Apollo, or, as some said, in the house of Milo. The building was set on fire, and many of the members perished;² none but the younger and more vigorous escaping. Similar disturbances, and the like violent suppression of the order, with destruction of several among the leading citizens, are said to have taken place in other cities of Magna Græcia—Tarentum, Metapontum, Kaulonia. And we are told that these cities remained for some time in a state of great inquietude and commotion, from which they were only rescued by the friendly mediation of the Peloponnesian Achæans, the original founders of Sybaris and Kroton—assisted indeed by mediators from other parts of Greece. The cities were at length pacified, and induced to adopt an amicable congress, with common religious festivals, at a temple founded expressly for the purpose and dedicated to Zeus Homarius.³

¹ This is stated in Jamblichus, c. 255; yet it is difficult to believe; for if the fact had been so, the destruction of the Pythagoreans would naturally have produced an allotment and permanent occupation of the Sybaritan territory—which certainly did not take place, since Sybaris remained without resident possessors until the foundation of Thurii.

² Jamblichus, c. 255-259; Porphyry, c. 54-57; Diogen. Laërt. viii. 39; Diodor. x. Fragm. vol. iv. p. 56, Wess.

³ Polyb. ii. 39; Plutarch, De Genio Socratis, c. 13, p. 583; Aristoxenus, ap. Jamblich. c. 250. That the enemies of the order attacked it by setting fire to the house in which the members were assembled, is the circumstance in which all accounts agree. On all other points there is great discrepancy, especially respecting the names and date of the Pythagoreans who escaped:

Thus perished the original Pythagorean order. Respecting Pythagoras himself, there were conflicting accounts; some representing that he was burnt in the temple with his disciples;¹ others, that he had died a short time previously; others again affirmed that he was alive at the time, but absent, and that he died not long afterwards in exile, after forty days of voluntary absence from food. His tomb was still shown at Metapontum in the days of Cicero.² As an active brotherhood, the Pythagoreans never revived; but the dispersed members came together as a sect, for common religious observances and common pursuit of science. They were re-admitted, after some interval, into the cities of Magna Græcia,³ from which they had been originally expelled, but to which the sect is always considered as particularly belonging—though individual members of it are found besides at Thebes and in other cities of Greece. Indeed some of these later Pythagoreans sometimes even acquired great political influence, as we see in the case of the Tarentine Archytas, the contemporary of Plato.

It has already been stated that the period when Pythagoras arrived at Kroton may be fixed somewhere between B.C. 540–

Boeckh (Philolaus, p. 9 *seq.*) and Brandis (Handbuch der Gesch. Philos. ch. lxxiii. p. 432) try to reconcile these discrepancies.

Aristophanês introduces Strepsiadês, at the close of the Nubes, as setting fire to the meeting-house (*φροντιστήριον*) of Sokratês and his disciple: possibly the Pythagorean conflagration may have suggested this.

¹ "Pythagoras Samius suspicione dominatûs injustâ vivus in fano concrematus est" (Arnobius adv. Gentes, lib. i. p. 23, ed. Elmenhorst).

² Cicero, De Finib. v. 2 (who seems to have copied from Dikæarchus: see Fuhr. ad Dikæarchi Fragment. p. 55); Justin, xx. 4; Diogen. Laërt. viii. 40; Jamblichus, V. P. c. 249.

O. Müller says (Dorians, iii. 9, 16), that "the influence of the Pythagorean league upon the administration of the Italian states was of the most beneficial kind, which continued for many generations after the dissolution of the league itself."

The first of these two assertions cannot be made out, and depends only on the statements of later encomiasts, who even supply materials to contradict their own general view. The judgement of Welcker respecting the influence of the Pythagoreans, much less favourable, is at the same time more probable (Præfat. ad Theognid. p. xlv.).

The second of the two assertions appears to me quite incorrect; the influence of the Pythagorean order on the government of Magna Græcia ceased altogether, as far as we are able to judge. An individual Pythagorean like Archytas might obtain influence, but this is not the influence of the order. Nor ought O. Müller to talk about the Italian Greeks giving up the Doric customs and adopting an Achæan government. There is nothing to prove that Kroton ever had Doric customs.

³ Aristotel. de Cælo, ii. 13. *οἱ περὶ τὴν Ἰταλίαν, καλούμενοι δὲ Πυθαγόρειοι.* "Italici philosophi quondam nominati" (Cicero, De Senectute c. 21).

530. His arrival is said to have occurred at a time of great depression in the minds of the Krotoniates. They had recently been defeated by the united Lokrians and Rhegians, vastly inferior to themselves in number, at the river Sagra; which humiliation is said to have rendered them docile to the training of the Samian missionary.¹ As the birth of the Pythagorean order is thus connected with the defeat of the Krotoniates at the Sagra, so its extinction is also connected with their victory over the Sybarites at the river Traeis or Trionto, about twenty years afterwards.

Of the history of these two great Achæan cities we unfortunately know very little. Though both were powerful, yet down to the period of 510 B.C., Sybaris seems to have been decidedly the greatest. Of its dominion as well as of its much-denounced luxury I have spoken in a former chapter.² It was at that time that the war broke out between them, which ended in the destruction of Sybaris. It is certain that the Sybaritans were aggressors in the war; but by what causes it had been preceded in their own town, or what provocation they had received, we make out very indistinctly. There had been a political revolution at Sybaris (we are told) not long before, in which a popular leader named Têlys had headed a rising against the oligarchical government, and induced the people to banish five hundred of the leading rich men, as well as to confiscate their properties. He had acquired the sovereignty and become despot of Sybaris.³ It appears, too, that he, or his rule at Sybaris, was much abhorred at Kroton; since the Krotoniate Philippus, a man of splendid muscular form and an

¹ Heyne places the date of the battle of Sagra about 560 B.C.; but this is very uncertain. See his *Opuscula*, vol. ii. Prolus. ii. p. 53, and Prolus. x. p. 184. See also Justin. xx. 3, and Strabo, vi. p. 261-263. It will be seen that the latter conceives the battle of the Sagra as having happened after the destruction of Sybaris by the Krotoniates; for he states twice, that the Krotoniates lost so many citizens at the Sagra, that the city did not long survive so terrible a blow: he cannot therefore have supposed that the complete triumph of the Krotoniates over the great Sybaris was gained afterwards.

² See vol. iv. chap. xxii.

³ Diodor. xii. 9. Herodotus calls Têlys in one place *βασιλῆα*, in another *τύραννον* of Sybaris (v. 44): this is not at variance with the story of Diodorus.

The story given by Athenæus, out of Herakleidês Ponticus, respecting the subversion of the dominion of Têlys, cannot be reconciled either with Herodotus or Diodorus (Athenæus, xii. p. 522). Dr. Thirlwall supposes the deposition of Têlys to have occurred between the defeat at the Traeis and the capture of Sybaris; but this is inconsistent with the statement of Herakleidês, and not countenanced by any other evidence.

Olympic victor, was exiled for having engaged himself to marry the daughter of Têlys.¹ According to the narrative given by the later Pythagoreans, those exiles, whom Têlys had driven from Sybaris, took refuge at Kroton, casting themselves as suppliants on the altars for protection: it may well be, indeed, that they were in part Pythagoreans of Sybaris. A body of powerful exiles, harboured in a town so close at hand, inspired alarm, and Têlys demanded that they should be delivered up, threatening war in case of refusal. This demand excited consternation at Kroton, since the military strength of Sybaris was decidedly superior. The surrender of the exiles was much debated, and almost decreed, by the Krotoniates, until at length the persuasion of Pythagoras himself is said to have determined them to risk any hazard sooner than incur the dishonour of betraying suppliants.

On the demand of the Sybarites being refused, Têlys marched against Kroton at the head of a force which is reckoned at 300,000 men.² He marched, too, in defiance of the strongest religious warnings against the enterprise; for the sacrifices, offered on his behalf by the Iamid prophet Kallias of Elis, were so decisively unfavourable, that the prophet himself fled in terror to Kroton.³ Near the river Traeis or Trionto, Têlys was met by the forces of Kroton, consisting (we are informed) of 100,000 men, and commanded by the great athlete and Pythagorean Milo; who was clothed (we are told) in the costume and armed with the club of Heraklês. They were further reinforced by a valuable ally, the Spartan Dorieus (younger brother of king Kleomenês), then coasting along the Gulf of Tarentum with a body of colonists, intending to found a settlement in Sicily. A bloody battle was fought, in which the Sybarites were totally worsted, with prodigious slaughter; while the victors, fiercely provoked and giving no quarter, followed up the pursuit so warmly that they took the city, dispersed its inhabitants, and crushed its whole power⁴ in the short space of seventy days. The Sybarites fled in great part to Laos and Skidros,⁵ their settlements planted on the Mediterranean coast, across the Calabrian peninsula. So eager were the Krotoniates to render the site of Sybaris untenable, that they turned the course of the river Krathis so as to overwhelm and destroy it:

¹ Herodot. v. 47.

² Diodor. xii. 9; Strabo, vi. p. 263; Jamblichus, Vit. Pythag. c. 260; Skymn. Chi. v. 340.

³ Herodot. v. 44.

⁴ Diodor. xii. 9, 10; Strabo, vi. p. 263.

⁵ Herodot. vi. 21; Strabo, vi. p. 253.

the dry bed in which the river had originally flowed was still visible in the time of Herodotus,¹ who was among the settlers in the town of Thurii afterwards founded nearly adjoining. It appears however that the Krotoniates for a long time kept the site of Sybaris deserted, refusing even to allot the territory among the body of their own citizens: from which circumstances (as has been before noticed) the commotion against the Pythagorean order is said to have arisen. They may perhaps have been afraid of the name and recollections of the city. No large or permanent establishment was ever formed there until Thurii was established by Athens about sixty-five years afterwards. Nevertheless the name of the Sybarites did not perish: they maintained themselves at Laos, Skidros, and elsewhere—and afterwards formed the privileged Old-citizens among the colonists of Thurii; but misbehaved themselves in that capacity and were mostly either slain or expelled. Even after that, however, the name of Sybaris still remained on a reduced scale in some portion of the territory: Herodotus recounts what he was told by the Sybarites, and we find subsequent indications of them even as late as Theokritus.

The conquest and destruction of the original Sybaris—perhaps in 510 B.C. the greatest of all Grecian cities—appears to have excited a strong sympathy in the Hellenic world. In Milētus especially, with which it had maintained intimate union, the grief was so vehement, that all the Milesians shaved their heads in token of mourning.² The event, happening just at the time of the expulsion of Hippias from Athens, must have made a sensible revolution in the relations of the Greek cities

¹ Herodot. v. 45; Diodor. xii. 9, 10; Strabo, vi. p. 263. Strabo mentions expressly the turning of the river for the purpose of overwhelming the city—*ἐλόντες γὰρ τὴν πόλιν ἐπήγαγον τὸν ποταμὸν καὶ κατέκλυσαν*. It is to this change in the channel of the river that I refer the expression in Herodotus—*τέμενος τε καὶ νηὸν ἐόντα παρὰ τὸν ξηρὸν Κράθιν*. It was natural that the old deserted bed of the river should be called "*the dry Krathis*": whereas, if we suppose that there was only one channel, the expression has no appropriate meaning. For I do not think that any one can be well satisfied with the explanation of Bähr—"Vocatur Crathis hoc loco *ξηρὸς siccus*, ut qui hieme fluit, aestatis vero tempore exsiccatus est: quod adhuc in multis Italiæ inferioris fluviis observant." I doubt whether this be true, as a matter of fact, respecting the river Krathis (see my preceding volume, ch. xxii.); but even if the fact were true, the epithet in Bähr's sense has no special significance for the purpose contemplated by Herodotus, who merely wishes to describe the site of the temple erected by Dorieus. "Near the Krathis," or "near the dry Krathis," would be equivalent expressions, if we adopted Bähr's construction; whereas to say "near the deserted channel of the Krathis," would be a good local designation.

² Herodot. vi. 21.

on the Italian coast with the rustic population of the interior. The Krotoniates might destroy Sybaris and disperse its inhabitants, but they could not succeed to its wide dominion over dependent territory: and the extinction of this great aggregate power, stretching across the peninsula from sea to sea, lessened the means of resistance against the Oscan movements from the inland. From this time forward, the cities of Magna Græcia, as well as those of Ionia, tend to decline in consequence; while Athens, on the other hand, becomes both more conspicuous and more powerful. At the invasion of Greece by Xerxes thirty years after this conquest of Sybaris, Sparta and Athens send to ask for aid both from Sicily and Korkyra, but not from Magna Græcia.

It is much to be regretted that we do not possess fuller information respecting such important changes among the Greco-Italian cities. Yet we may remark that even Herodotus—himself a citizen of Thurii and dwelling on the spot not more than eighty years after the capture of Sybaris—evidently found no written memorials to consult; and could obtain from verbal conversation nothing better than statements both meagre and contradictory. The material circumstance, for example, of the aid rendered by the Spartan Dorieus and his colonists, though positively asserted by the Sybarites, was as positively denied by the Krotoniates, who alleged that they had accomplished the conquest by themselves and with their own unaided forces. There can be little hesitation in crediting the affirmative assertion of the Sybarites, who showed to Herodotus a temple and precinct erected by the Spartan prince in testimony of his share in the victory, on the banks of the dry deserted channel out of which the Krathis had been turned, and in honour of the Krathian Athênê.¹ This of itself forms a proof, coupled with the positive assertion of the Sybarites, sufficient for the case; but they produced another indirect argument to confirm it, which deserves notice. Dorieus had attacked Sybaris while he was passing along the coast of Italy to go and found a colony in Sicily, under the express mandate and encouragement of the oracle. After tarrying awhile at Sybaris, he pursued his journey to the south-western portion of Sicily, where he and nearly all his companions perished in a battle with the Carthaginians and Egestæans—though the oracle had promised him that he should acquire and occupy permanently the neighbouring territory near Mount Eryx. Now the Sybarites deduced from this fatal disaster of Dorieus and his expedition, combined with the

¹ Herodot. v. 45.

favourable promise of the oracle beforehand, a confident proof of the correctness of their own statement that he had fought at Sybaris. For if he had gone straight to the territory marked out by the oracle (they argued), without turning aside for any other object, the prophecy on which his hopes were founded would have been unquestionably realised, and he would have succeeded. But the ruinous disappointment which actually overtook him was at once explained, and the truth of prophecy vindicated, when it was recollected that he had turned aside to help the Krotoniates against Sybaris, and thus set at nought the conditions prescribed to him. Upon this argument (Herodotus tells us) the Sybarites of his day especially insisted.¹ And while we note their pious and literal faith in the communications of an inspired prophet, we must at the same time observe how perfectly that faith supplied the place of historical premises—how scanty their stock was of such legitimate evidence—and how little they had yet learnt to appreciate its value.

It is to be remarked, that Herodotus, in his brief mention of the fatal war between Sybaris and Kroton, does not make the least allusion to Pythagoras or his brotherhood. The least which we can infer from such silence is, that the part which they played in reference to the war, and their general ascendancy in Magna Græcia, was in reality less conspicuous and overruling than the Pythagorean historians set forth. Even making such allowance, however, the absence of all allusion in Herodotus, to the commotions which accompanied the subversion of the Pythagoreans, is a circumstance not easily explicable. Nor can I pass over a perplexing statement in Polybius, which seems to show that he too must have conceived the history of Sybaris in a way different from that which it is commonly represented. He tells us, that after much suffering in Magna Græcia from the troubles which followed the expulsion of the Pythagoreans, the cities were induced by Achæan mediation to come to an accommodation and even to establish something like a permanent league with a common temple and sacrifices. Now the three cities which he specifies as having been the first to do this, are, Kroton, Sybaris, and Kaulonia.² But according

¹ Herodot. v. 45. Τοῦτο δὲ, αὐτοῦ Δωριέος τὸν θάνατον μαρτύριον μέγιστον ποιεῦνται (Συβαρίται), ὅτι παρὰ τὰ μεμαντευμένα ποίεον διεφθάρη. Εἰ γὰρ δὴ μὴ παρέπηξε μὴδὲν, ἐπ' ᾧ δὲ ἐστάλη ἐποίηε, εἴλεε ἂν τὴν Ἐρκεκίην χώραν καὶ ἐλὼν κάτεσχε, οὐδ' ἂν αὐτὸς τε καὶ ἡ στρατὴ διεφθάρη.

² Polyb. ii. 39. Heyne thinks that the agreement here mentioned by Polybius took place Olymp. 80, 3; or indeed after the re-population of the Sybaritan territory by the foundation of Thurii (Opuscula, vol. ii. ; Prolus.

to the sequence of events and the fatal war (just described) between Kroton and Sybaris, the latter city must have been at that time in ruins; little, if at all, inhabited. I cannot but *infer from this statement of Polybius, that he followed different authorities respecting the early history of Magna Græcia in the beginning of the fifth century B.C.*

Indeed the early history of these cities gives us little more than a few isolated facts and names. With regard to their legislators, Zaleucus and Charondas, nothing is made out except their existence—and even that fact some ancient critics contested. Of Zaleucus, whom chronologists place in 664 B.C., I have already spoken; the date of Charondas cannot be assigned, but we may perhaps presume that it was at some time between 600–500 B.C. He was a citizen of middling station, born in the Chalkidic colony of Katana in Sicily,¹ and he framed laws not only for his own city, but for the other Chalkidic cities in Sicily and Italy—Leontini, Naxos, Zanklé, and Rhêgium. The laws and the solemn preamble ascribed to him by Diodorus and Stobæus, belong to a later day,² and we are obliged to content ourselves with collecting the brief hints of Aristotle, who tells us that the laws of Charondas descended to great minuteness of distinction and specification, especially in graduating the fine for offences according to the property of the guilty person fined³—but that there was nothing in his laws

x. p. 189). But there seems great difficulty in imagining that the state of violent commotion—which (according to Polybius) was only appeased by this agreement—can possibly have lasted so long as half a century; the received date of the overthrow of the Pythagoreans being about 504 B.C.

¹ Aristot. Politic. ii. 9, 6; iv. 9, 10. Heyne puts Charondas much earlier than the foundation of Thurii, in which I think he is undoubtedly right: but without determining the date more exactly (Opuscul. vol. ii.; Prologus. ix. p. 160), Charondas must certainly have been earlier than Anaxilas of Rhêgium and the great Sicilian despots; which will place him higher than 500 B.C.: but I do not know that any more precise mark of time can be found.

² Diodorus, xii. 35; Stobæus, Serm. xlv. 20–40; Cicero de Legg. ii. 6. See K. F. Hermann, Lehrbuch der Griech. Staatsalterthümer, ch. 89; Heyne, Opuscul. vol. ii. p. 72–164. Brandis (Geschichte der Röm. Philosophie, ch. xxvi. p. 102) seems to conceive these prologues as genuine.

The mistakes and confusion made by ancient writers respecting these law-givers—even by writers earlier than Aristotle (Politic. ii. 9, 5)—are such as we have no means of clearing up.

Seneca (Epist. 90) calls both Zaleucus and Charondas disciples of Pythagoras; that the former was so, is not to be believed; but it is not wholly impossible that the latter may have been so, or at least a contemporary of the earliest Pythagoreans.

³ Aristotel. Politic. ii. 9, 8. *Χαρόνδου δ' ἴδιον μὲν οὐθέν ἐστι πλὴν αἱ*

strictly original and peculiar, except that he was the first to introduce the solemn indictment against perjured witnesses before justice. The perjured witness in Grecian ideas, was looked upon as having committed a crime half religious, half civil. The indictment raised against him, known by a peculiar name, partook of both characters, approaching in some respects to the procedure against a murderer. Such distinct form of indictment against perjured testimony—with its appropriate name,¹ which we shall find maintained at Athens throughout the best known days of Attic law—was first enacted by Charondas.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

FROM THE BATTLE OF MARATHON TO THE MARCH OF
XERXES AGAINST GREECE

I HAVE recounted, in a preceding chapter, the Athenian victory at Marathon, the repulse of the Persian general Datis, and the return of his armament across the Ægean to the Asiatic coast. He had been directed to conquer both Eretria and Athens; an order which he had indeed executed in part with success, as the string of Eretrian prisoners brought to Susa attested—but which remained still unfulfilled in regard to the city principally obnoxious to Darius. Far from satiating his revenge upon Athens, the Persian monarch was compelled to listen to the tale of an ignominious defeat. His wrath against the Athenians rose to a higher pitch than ever, and he com-

δικαι τῶν ψευδομαρτύρων· πρῶτος γὰρ ἐποίησε τὴν ἐπίσηψιν· τῇ δ' ἀκριβείᾳ τῶν νόμων ἐστὶ γλαφυρότερος καὶ τῶν νῦν νομοθετῶν. To the fulness and precision predicated respecting Charondas in the latter part of this passage, I refer the other passage in Politic. iv. 10, 6, which is not to be construed as if it meant that Charondas had graduated fines on the rich and poor with a distinct view to that political trick (of indirectly eliminating the poor from public duties) which Aristotle had been just adverting to—but merely means that Charondas had been nice and minute in graduating pecuniary penalties generally, having reference to the wealth or poverty of the person sentenced.

¹ *Πρῶτος γὰρ ἐποίησε τὴν ἐπίσηψιν* (Aristot. Politic. ii. 9, 8). See Harpokration, v. Ἐπεσκήψατο, and Pollux, viii. 33; Dêmosthenês cont. Stephanum, ii. c. 5; cont. Euerg. et Mnêsibul. c. 1. The word *ἐπίσηψις* carries with it the solemnity of meaning adverted to in the text, and seems to have been used specially with reference to an action or indictment against perjured witnesses: which indictment was permitted to be brought with a less degree of risk or cost to the accuser than most others in the Attic dikasteries (Dêmosth. cont. Euerg. et Mn. l. c.).

menced vigorous preparations for a renewed attack upon them as well as upon Greece generally. Resolved upon assembling the entire force of his empire, he directed the various satraps and sub-governors throughout all Asia to provide troops, horses, and ships both of war and burthen. For no less than three years the empire was agitated by this immense levy, which Darius determined to conduct in person against Greece.¹ Nor was his determination abated by a revolt of the Egyptians, which broke out about the time when his preparations were completed. He was on the point of undertaking simultaneously the two enterprises—the conquest of Greece and the reconquest of Egypt—when he was surprised by death, after a reign of thirty-six years. As a precaution previous to this intended march, he had nominated as successor Xerxes, his son by Atossa; for the ascendancy of that queen ensured to Xerxes the preference over his elder brother Artabazanes, son of Darius by a former wife, and born before the latter became king. The choice of the reigning monarch passed unquestioned, and Xerxes succeeded without opposition.² It deserves to be remarked, that though we shall meet with several acts of cruelty and atrocity perpetrated in the Persian regal family, there is nothing like that systematic fratricide which has been considered necessary to guarantee succession in Turkey and other Oriental empires.

The intense wrath against Athens, which had become the predominant sentiment in the mind of Darius, was yet un-

¹ Herodot. vii. 3, 4.

² Herodot. vii. 1-4. He mentions—simply as a report, and seemingly without believing it himself—that Demaratus the exiled king of Sparta was at Susa at the moment when Darius was about to choose a successor among his sons (this cannot consist with Ktésias, Persic. c. 23); and that he suggested to Xerxes a convincing argument by which to determine the mind of his father, urging the analogy of the law of regal succession at Sparta, whereby the son of a king, born after his father became king, was preferred to an elder son born before that event. The existence of such a custom at Sparta may well be doubted.

Some other anecdotes, not less difficult of belief than this, and alike calculated to bestow a factitious importance on Demaratus, will be noticed in the subsequent pages. The latter received from the Persian king the grant of Pergamus and Teuthrania, with their land-revenues, which his descendants long afterwards continued to occupy (Xenoph. Hellen. iii. 1-6): and perhaps these descendants may have been among the persons from whom Herodotus derived his information respecting the expedition of Xerxes. See vii. 239.

Plutarch (De Fraternali Amore, p. 488) gives an account in many respects different concerning the circumstances which determined the succession of Xerxes to the throne, in preference to his elder brother.

appeared at the time of his death, and it was fortunate for the Athenians that his crown now passed to a prince less obstinately hostile as well as in every respect inferior. Xerxes, personally the handsomest¹ and most stately man amid the immense crowd which he led against Greece, was in character timid and faint-hearted, over and above those defects of vanity, childish self-conceit, and blindness of appreciation, which he shared more or less with all the Persian kings. Yet we shall see that even under his conduct, the invasion of Greece was very near proving successful: and it might well have succeeded altogether, had he been either endued with the courageous temperament, or inflamed with the fierce animosity, of his father.

On succeeding to the throne, Xerxes found the forces of the empire in active preparation, pursuant to the orders of Darius; except Egypt, which was in a state of revolt. His first necessity was to reconquer this country; a purpose for which the great military power now in readiness was found amply sufficient. Egypt was subdued and reduced to a state of much harder dependence than before: we may presume that not only the tribute was increased, but also the numbers of the Persian occupying force, maintained by contributions levied on the natives. Achæmenes, brother of Xerxes, was installed there as satrap.

But Xerxes was not at first equally willing to prosecute the schemes of his deceased father against Greece. At least such is the statement of Herodotus; who represents Mardonius as the grand instigator of the invasion, partly through thirst for warlike enterprise, partly from a desire to obtain the intended conquest as a satrapy for himself. There were not wanting Grecian counsellors to enforce his recommendation both by the promise of help and by the colour of religion. The great family of the Aleuadaæ, belonging to Larissa and perhaps to other towns in Thessaly, were so eager in the cause, that their principal members came to Susa to offer an easy occupation of that frontier territory of Hellas; while the exiled Peisistratids from Athens still persevered in striving to procure their own restoration at the tail of a Persian army. On the present occasion, they brought with them to Susa a new instrument, the holy mystic Onomakritus—a man who had acquired much reputation, not by prophesying himself, but by collecting, arranging, interpreting, and delivering out, prophetic verses

¹ Herod. vii. 187. The like personal beauty is ascribed to Darius Codomannus, the last of the Persian kings (Plutarch, *Alexand.* c. 21).

passing under the name of the ancient seer or poet Musæus. Thirty years before, in the flourishing days of the Peisistratids, he had lived at Athens, enjoying the confidence of Hipparchus, and consulted by him as the expositor of these venerated documents. But having been detected by the poet Lasus of Hermione, in the very act of interpolating them with new matter of his own, he was indignantly banished by Hipparchus. The Peisistratids however, now in banishment themselves, forgot or forgave this offence, and carried Onomakritus with his prophecies to Susa, announcing him as a person of oracular authority, to assist in working on the mind of Xerxes. To this purpose his interpolations, or his omissions, were now directed. When introduced to the Persian monarch, he recited emphatically various encouraging predictions, wherein the bridging of the Hellespont, and the triumphant march of a barbaric host into Greece, appeared as predestined ; while he carefully kept back all those of a contrary tenor, which portended calamity and disgrace. So at least Herodotus,¹ strenuous in upholding the credit of Bakis, Musæus, and other Grecian prophets whose verses were in circulation, expressly assures us. The religious encouragements of Onomakritus, and the political co-operation proffered by the Aleuadæ, enabled Mardonius effectually to overcome the reluctance of his master. Indeed it was not difficult to show, according to the feelings then prevalent, that a new king of Persia was in honour obliged to enlarge the boundaries of the empire.² The conquering impulse springing from the first founder was as yet unexhausted ; the insults offered by the Athenians remained still unavenged ; and in addition to this double stimulus to action, Mardonius drew a captivating picture of Europe as an acquisition—"it was the finest land in the world, produced every variety of fruit-bearing trees, and was too good a possession for any mortal man except the Persian kings."³ Fifteen years before, the Milesian Aristagoras,⁴ when entreating the Spartans to assist the Ionic

¹ Herodot. vii. 6 ; viii. 20, 96, 77. Ὀνομάκριτος—κατέλεγε τῶν χρησμῶν—εἰ μὲν τι ἐνέοι σφάλμα φέρον τῷ Πέρσῃ, τῶν μὲν ἔλεγε οὐδέν· ὁ δὲ τὰ εὐτυχέστατα ἐκλεγόμενος, ἔλεγε τὸν τε Ἑλλησποντον ὡς ζευχθῆναι χρεὸν εἶναι ὑπ' ἀνδρῶν Πέρσῃ, τὴν τε Ἑλασίω ἐξηγεβόμενος, &c.

An intimation somewhat curious respecting this collection of prophecies ; it was of an extremely varied character, and contained promises or threats to meet any emergency which might arise.

² Æschylus, Pers. 761.

³ Herodot. vii. 5. ὡς ἡ Εὐρώπη περικαλλῆς χώρα, καὶ δένδρεα παντοῖα ῥέροι τὰ ἡμέρα, βασιλεῖ τε μόνῃ θνητῶν ἀξίη ἐκτῆσθαι—χώραν παμφορωτέραν vii. 8).

⁴ Herodot. v. 49.

revolt, had exaggerated the wealth and productiveness of Asia in contrast with the poverty of Greece—a contrast less widely removed from the truth, at that time, than the picture presented by Mardonius.

Having thus been persuaded to alter his original views, Xerxes convoked a meeting of the principal Persian counsellors, and announced to them his resolution to invade Greece; setting forth the mingled motives of revenge and aggrandisement which impelled him, and representing the conquest of Greece as carrying with it that of all Europe, so that the Persian empire would become coextensive with the æther of Zeus and the limits of the sun's course.

On the occasion of this invasion, now announced and about to take place, we must notice especially the historical manner and conception of our capital informant—Herodotus. The invasion of Greece by Xerxes, and the final repulse of his forces, constitute the entire theme of his three last books, and the principal object of his whole history, towards which the previous matter is intended to conduct. Amidst those prior circumstances, there are doubtless many which have a substantial importance and interest of their own, recounted at so much length that they appear co-ordinate and principal, so that the thread of the history is for a time put out of sight. Yet we shall find, if we bring together the larger divisions of his history, omitting the occasional prolixities of detail, that such thread is never lost in the historian's own mind: it may be traced by an *attentive reader, from his preface and the statement immediately following it*—of Croesus as the first barbaric conqueror of the Ionian Greeks—down to the full expansion of his theme, "*Græcia Barbariæ lento collisa duello,*" in the expedition of Xerxes. That expedition, as forming the consummation of his historical scheme, is not only related more copiously and continuously than any events preceding it, but is also ushered in with an unusual solemnity of religious and poetical accompaniment, so that the seventh Book of Herodotus reminds us in many points of the second Book of the *Iliad*: probably too, if the lost Grecian epics had reached us, we should trace many other cases in which the imagination of the historian has unconsciously assimilated itself to them. The Dream sent by the gods to frighten Xerxes, when about to recede from his project—as well as the ample catalogue of nations and eminent individuals embodied in the Persian host—have both of them marked parallels in the *Iliad*: and Herodotus seems to delight in representing to himself the enterprise against Greece as an

antithesis to that of the Atreidæ against Troy. He enters into the internal feelings of Xerxes with as much familiarity as Homer into those of Agamemnon, and introduces "the counsel of Zeus" as not less direct, special, and overruling, than it appears in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*:¹ though the godhead in Herodotus, compared with Homer, tends to become neuter instead of masculine or feminine, and retains only the jealous instincts of a ruler, apart from the appetites, lusts, and caprices of a man: acting moreover chiefly as a centralised, or at least as a homogeneous, force, in place of the discordant severality of agents conspicuous in the Homeric theology. The religious idea, so often presented elsewhere in Herodotus—that the godhead was jealous and hostile to excessive good fortune or immoderate desires in man,—is worked into his history of Xerxes as the ever-present moral and as the main cause of its disgraceful termination. For we shall discover as we proceed, that the historian, with that honourable frankness which Plutarch calls his "malignity," neither ascribes to his countrymen credit greater than they deserve for personal valour, nor seeks to veil the many chances of defeat which their mismanagement laid open.²

¹ Homer, *Iliad*, i. 3. Διὸς δ' ἐτελεετο βουλή. Herodotus is characterised as Ὀμήρου ζηλωτῆς—Ὀμηρικώτατος—(Dionys. Halic. ad Cn. Pompeium, p. 772, Reiske; Longinus De Sublim. p. 86, ed. Pearce).

² While Plutarch (if indeed the treatise de Herodoti Malignitate be the work of Plutarch) treats Herodotus as uncandid, malicious, corrupt, the calumniator of great men and glorious deeds—Dionysius of Halikarnassus on the contrary, with more reason, treats him as a pattern of excellent dispositions in an historian, contrasting him in this respect with Thucydidēs, to whom he imputes an unfriendly spirit in criticising Athens, arising from his long banishment: Ἡ μὲν Ἡροδότου διάθεσις ἐν ἀπασι ἐπιεικής, καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς συνηδομένη, τοῖς δὲ κακοῖς συναλγοῦσα ἢ δὲ Θουκυδίδου διάθεσις ἀνθέκαστος τις καὶ πικρὰ, καὶ τῇ πατρίδι τῆς φυγῆς μνησικακοῦσα. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀμαρτήματα ἐπεξέρχεται καὶ μάλα ἀκριβῶς, τῶν δὲ κατὰ νοῦν κευχαρχικῶτων καθάπαξ οὐ μέμνηται ἢ ὥσπερ ἠναγκασμένους. (Dionys. Hal. ad Cn. Pompeium de Præcip. Historicis Judic. p. 774, Reiske.)

Precisely the same fault which Dionysius here imputes to Thucydidēs (though in other places he acquits him, ἀπὸ παντὸς φθόνου καὶ πάσης κολακείας, p. 824), Plutarch and Dio cast far more harshly upon Herodotus. In neither case is the reproach deserved.

Both the moralists and the rhetoricians of ancient times were very apt to treat history, not as a series of true matters of fact, exemplifying the laws of human nature and society, and enlarging our knowledge of them for purposes of future inference—but as if it were a branch of fiction, so to be handled as to please our taste or improve our morality. Dionysius, blaming Thucydidēs for the choice of his subject, goes so far as to say that the Peloponnesian war, a period of ruinous discord in Greece, ought to have been left in oblivion and never to have passed into history (σιωπῇ καὶ λήθῃ παραδοθεῖς, ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιγιγνομένων ἡγνοῆσθαι, *ibid.* p. 768)—and that

I have already mentioned that Xerxes is described as having originally been averse to the enterprise, and only stimulated thereto by the persuasions of Mardonius. This was probably the genuine Persian belief, for the blame of so great a disaster would naturally be transferred from the monarch to some evil counsellor.¹ As soon as Xerxes, yielding to persuasion, has announced, to the Persian chief men whom he had convoked, his resolution to bridge over the Hellespont and march to the conquest of Greece and Europe, Mardonius is represented as expressing his warm concurrence in the project, extolling the immense force² of Persia, and depreciating the Ionians in Europe (so he denominated them) as so poor and disunited that success was not only certain but easy. Against the rashness of this general—the evil genius of Xerxes—we find opposed the prudence and long experience of Artabanus, brother of the deceased Darius, and therefore uncle to the monarch. The age and relationship of this Persian Nestor embolden him to undertake the dangerous task of questioning the determination which Xerxes, though professing to invite the opinions of others, had proclaimed as already settled in his own mind. The speech which Herodotus puts into the mouth of Artabanus is that of a thoughtful and religious Greek. It opens with the Grecian conception of the necessity of hearing and comparing opposite views, prior to any final decision—reproves Mardonius for falsely depreciating the Greeks and seducing his master into personal danger—sets forth the probability that the Greeks, if victorious at sea, would come and destroy the bridge by which Xerxes had crossed the Hellespont—reminds the latter of the imminent hazard which Darius and his army had undergone in Scythia, from the destruction (averted only by Histæus and his influence) of the bridge over the Danube: such prudential suggestions being further strengthened by adverting to the jealous aversion of the godhead towards overgrown human power.³

The impatient monarch silences his uncle in a tone of insult and menace: nevertheless, in spite of himself, the dissuasions work upon him so powerfully, that before night they gradually

especially Thucydides ought never to have thrown the blame of it upon his own city, since there were many other causes to which it might have been imputed (*ἑτέροις ἔχοντα πολλαῖς ἀφορμαῖς περιάσαι τὰς αἰτίας*, p. 770). It will be found, however, if we read Thucydides with attention, that he does not throw the blame of the Peloponnesian war upon Athens, whatever may be thought of his strictures on her conduct in various particular cases.

¹ Herodot. viii. 99. *Μαρδόνιον ἐν αἰτίῃ τιθέντες*: compare c. 100.

² Herodot. vii. 9.

³ Herodot. vii. 10.

alter his resolution, and decide him to renounce the scheme. In this latter disposition he falls asleep, when a dream appears: a tall stately man stands over him, denounces his change of opinion, and peremptorily commands him to persist in the enterprise as announced. In spite of this dream, Xerxes still adheres to his altered purpose, assembles his council the next morning, and after apologising for his angry language towards Artabanus, acquaints them to their great joy that he adopts the recommendations of the latter, and abandons his project against Greece. But in the following night, no sooner has Xerxes fallen asleep, than the same dream and the same figure again appear to him, repeating the previous command in language of terrific menace. The monarch, in a state of great alarm, springs from his bed and sends for Artabanus, whom he informs of the twice-repeated vision and divine mandate interdicting his change of resolution. "If (says he) it be the absolute will of God that this expedition against Greece should be executed, the same vision will appear to thee also, provided thou puttest on my attire, sittest in my throne, and sleepest in my bed."¹ Not without reluctance, Artabanus obeys this order (for it was high treason in any Persian to sit upon the regal throne²), but he at length complies, expecting to be able to prove to Xerxes that the dream deserved no attention. "Many dreams (he says) are not of divine origin, nor anything better than mere wandering objects such as we have been thinking upon during the day: this dream, of whatever nature it may be, will not be foolish enough to mistake me for the king, even if I be in the royal attire and bed; but if it shall still continue to appear to thee, I shall myself confess it to be divine."³ Accordingly Artabanus is placed in the regal throne and bed, and as soon as he falls asleep, the very same figure shows itself to him also, saying, "Art thou he who dissuadest Xerxes, on the plea of solicitude for his safety, from marching against Greece? Xerxes has already been forewarned of that

¹ Herodot. vii. 15. *Εἰ δὲν θεός ἐστι ὁ ἐπιπέμπων καὶ οἱ πάντως ἐν ἡδονῇ ἐστὶ γενέσθαι στρατηλασίην ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, ἐπιπτήσεται καὶ σοὶ τῶντο τοῦτο ὄνειρον, ὁμοίως καὶ ἐμοὶ ἐντελλόμενον. Εὐρίσκω δὲ ὡδε ἂν γινόμενα ταῦτα, εἰ λάβοις τὴν ἐμὴν σκευὴν πάσαν, καὶ ἐνδύς, μετὰ ταῦτα ἴξοιο ἐς τὸν ἐμὸν θρόνον, καὶ ἔπειτα ἐν κοίτῃ τῇ ἐμῇ κατυπνώσειας. Compare vii. 8. θεός τε οὕτω ἄγει, &c.*

² See Brissonius, *De Regno Persarum*, lib. i. p. 27.

³ Herodot. vii. 16. *Ὅδ' γὰρ δὴ ἐς τοσαύτῳ γε εὐθελίης ἀνήκει τοῦτο, ὃ τι δὴ κοτὲ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπιφαινόμενόν τοι ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ, ὥστε δόξει ἐμὲ δρᾶν σε δρᾶν, τῇ σῇ ἐσθῆτι τεκμαίρομενον. . . . εἰ γὰρ δὴ ἐπιφοιτήσῃ ἐγε συνεχέως, φαίην ἂν καὶ αὐτὸς θεῖον εἶναι.*

which he will suffer if he disobeys, and thou too shalt not escape either now or in future, for seeking to avert that which must and shall be." With these words the vision assumes a threatening attitude, as though preparing to burn out the eyes of Artabanus with hot irons, when the sleeper awakens in terror, and runs to communicate with Xerxes. "I have hitherto, O king, recommended to thee to rest contented with that vast actual empire on account of which all mankind think thee happy; but since the divine impulsion is now apparent, and since destruction from on high is prepared for the Greeks, I too alter my opinion, and advise thee to command the Persians as God directs; so that nothing may be found wanting on thy part for that which God puts into thy hands."¹

It is thus that Herodotus represents the great expedition of Xerxes to have originated; partly in the rashness of Mardonius, who reaps his bitter reward on the field of battle at Plataea—but still more in the influence of "mischievous Oneiros," who is sent by the gods (as in the second book of the Iliad) to put a cheat upon Xerxes, and even to overrule by terror both his scruples and those of Artabanus. The gods having determined (as in the instances of Astyagés, Polykratés, and others) that the Persian empire shall undergo signal humiliation and repulse at the hands of the Greeks, constrain the Persian monarch into a ruinous enterprise against his own better judgement. Such religious imagination is not to be regarded as peculiar to Herodotus, but as common to him with his contemporaries generally, Greeks as well as Persians, though peculiarly stimulated among the Greeks by the abundance of their epic or quasi-historical poetry. Modified more or less in each individual narrator, it is made to supply connecting links as well as initiating causes for the great events of history. As a cause for this expedition, incomparably the greatest fact and the most fertile in consequences, throughout the political career both of Greeks and Persians, nothing less than a special interposition of the gods would have satisfied the feelings either of one nation or the other. The story of

¹ Herodot. vii. 18. Ἐπεὶ δὲ δαιμονίη τις γίγνεται ὄρμη, καὶ Ἑλλήνας, ὡς ἔοικε, φθορὴ τις καταλαμβάνει θεήλατος, ἐγὼ μὲν καὶ αὐτὸς τράπομαι, καὶ τὴν γνώμην μετατίθεμαι. . . . Ποίεε δὲ οὕτω ὄκως, τοῦ θεοῦ παραδιδόντος, τῶν σῶν ἐνδεήσεται μηδέν.

The expression τοῦ θεοῦ παραδιδόντος in this place denotes what is expressed by τὸ χρεὼν γίγνεσθαι, c. 17. The dream threatens Artabanus and Xerxes for trying to turn aside the current of destiny—or in other words, to contravene the predetermined will of the gods.

the dream has its rise (as Herodotus tells us¹) in Persian fancy, and is in some sort a consolation for the national vanity; but it is turned and coloured by the Grecian historian, who mentions also a third dream, which appears to Xerxes after his resolution to march was finally taken, and which the mistake of the Magian interpreters falsely construed² into an encouragement, though it really threatened ruin. How much this religious conception of the sequence of events belongs to the age, appears by the fact, that it not only appears in Pindar and the Attic tragedians generally, but pervades especially the Persæ of Æschylus, exhibited seven years after the battle of Salamis—in which we find the premonitory dreams as well as the jealous enmity of the gods towards vast power and overweening aspirations in man;³ though without any of that inclination, which Herodotus seems to have derived from Persian informants, to exculpate Xerxes by representing him as disposed himself to sober counsels, but driven in a contrary direction by the irresistible fiat of the gods.⁴

¹ Herodot. vii. 12. Καὶ δὴ κοῦ ἐν τῇ νυκτὶ εἶδε ὄψιν τοιήνδε, ὡς λέγεται ὑπὸ Περσέων.

Herodotus seems to use *δνειρον* in the neuter gender, not *δνειρος* in the masculine: for the alteration of Bähr (ad vii. 16) of *ἐώντα* in place of *ἐώντος*, is not at all called for. The masculine gender *δνειρος* is commonly used in Homer; but there are cases of the neuter *δνειρον*.

Respecting the influence of dreams in determining the enterprises of the early Turkish sultans, see Von Hammer, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reichs*, book ii. vol. i. p. 49.

² Compare the dream of Darius Codomannus. Plutarch, *Alexander*, c. 18. Concerning the punishment inflicted by Astyagès on the Magians for misinterpreting his dreams, see Herodot. i. 128.

Philochorus, skilled in divination, affirmed that Nikias put a totally wrong interpretation upon that fatal eclipse of the moon which induced him to delay his retreat, and proved his ruin (Plutarch, *Nikias*, c. 23).

³ Æschylus, *Pers.* 96, 104, 181, 220, 368, 745, 825: compare Sophoc. *Ajax*, 129, 744, 775, and the end of the *Œdipus Tyrannus*; Euripid. *Hecub.* 58; Pindar, *Olymp.* viii. 86; *Isthm.* vi. 39; Pausanias, ii. 33, 3. Compare the sense of the word *δεισιδαίμων* in Xenophon, *Agésilas*, c. 11, sect. 8—"the man who in the midst of success fears the envious gods"—opposed to the person who confides in continuance of success: and Klausem, *Theologumena Æschyli*, p. 18.

⁴ The manner in which Herodotus groups together the facts of his history in obedience to certain religious and moral sentiments in his own mind, is well set forth in Hoffmeister, *Sittlich-religiöse Lebensansicht des Herodotos*, Essen, 1832, especially sects. 21, 22, pp. 112 *seq.* Hoffmeister traces the veins of sentiment, running through, and often overlaying or transforming, the matters of fact through a considerable portion of the nine books. He does not, perhaps, sufficiently advert to the circumstance, that the informants from whom Herodotus collected his facts were for the most part imbued with sentiments similar to himself; so that the religious and moral

While we take due notice of those religious conceptions with which both the poet and the historian surround this vast

vein pervaded more or less his original materials, and did not need to be added by himself. There can be little doubt that the priests, the ministers of temples and oracles, the exegetæ or interpreting guides around these holy places—were among his chief sources for instructing himself: a stranger, visiting so many different cities, must have been constantly in a situation to have no other person whom he could consult. The temples were interesting both in themselves and in the trophies and offerings which they exhibited, while the persons belonging to them were (as a general rule) accessible and communicative to strangers, as we may see both from Pausanias and Plutarch—both of whom, however, had books before them also to consult, which Herodotus hardly had at all. It was not only the priests and ministers of temples in Egypt, of Hêraklês at Tyre, and of Bêlus at Babylon, that Herodotus questioned (i. 181; ii. 3, 44, 143), but also those of Delphi (Δελφῶν οἶδα ἐγὼ οὕτως ἀκούσας γενέσθαι, i. 20: compare i. 91, 92, 51); Dôddôna (ii. 52); of the Ismenian Apollo at Thebes (v. 59); of Athênê Alea at Tegea (i. 66); of Dêmêtêr at Paros (vi. 134—if not the priests, at least persons full of temple inspirations); of Halus in Achaia Phthiôtis (vii. 197); of the Kabeiri in Thrace (ii. 51); of persons connected with the Herôon of Protesilaus in the Chersonese (ix. 116, 120). The facts which these persons communicated to him were always presented along with associations referring to their own functions or religious sentiments, so that Herodotus did not introduce anything new when he incorporated them as such in his history. The treatise of Plutarch—"Cur Pythia nunc non reddat Oracula Carmine"—affords an instructive description of the ample and multifarious narratives given by the expositors at Delphi, respecting the eminent persons and events of Grecian history, to satisfy visitors who came full of curiosity—φιλοθεάμονες, φιλόλογοι and φιλομαθεῖς (Plutarch, *ib.* p. 394)—such as Herodotus was in a high degree. Compare pp. 396, 397, 400, 407, of the same treatise: also Plutarch *De Defectu Oraculorum*, p. 417—οἱ Δελφῶν θεολόγοι, &c. Plutarch remarks that in his time political life was extinguished in Greece, and that the questions put to the Pythian priestess related altogether to private and individual affairs; whereas, in earlier times, almost all political events came somehow or other under her cognisance, either by questions to be answered, or by commemorative public offerings (p. 407). In the time of Herodotus, the great temples, especially those of Delphi and Olympia, were interwoven with the whole web of Grecian political history. See the Dissertation of Preller, annexed to his edition of Polemonis *Fragmenta*, c. 3, p. 157–162; *De Historiâ atque Arte Periegetarum*; also K. F. Hermann, *Gottesdienstliche Alterthümer der Griechen*, part I. ch. 12, p. 52.

The religious interpretation of historical phenomena is thus not peculiar to Herodotus, but belongs to him in common with his informants and his age generally, as indeed Hoffmeister observes (p. 31–136): though it is remarkable to notice the frankness with which he (as well as the contemporary poets: see the references in Monk, *Euripid.* Alcestis, 1154) predicates envy and jealousy of the gods, in cases where the conduct which he supposes them to pursue, is really such as would deserve that name in a man,—and such as he himself ascribes to the despot (iii. 80). He does not think himself obliged to call the gods just and merciful while he is attributing to them acts of envy and jealousy in their dealing with mankind. But the religious interpretation does not reign alone throughout the narrative of

conflict of Greeks and barbarians, we need look no further than ambition and revenge for the real motives of the invasion. Considering that it had been a proclaimed project in the mind of Darius for three years previous to his death, there was no probability that his son and successor would gratuitously renounce it. Shortly after the reconquest of Egypt, Xerxes began to make his preparations, the magnitude of which attested the strength of his resolve as well as the extent of his designs. The satraps and subordinate officers, throughout the whole range of his empire, received orders to furnish the amplest quota of troops and munitions of war—horse and foot, ships of war, horse-transport, provisions, or supplies of various kinds, according to the circumstances of the territory; while rewards were held out to those who should execute the orders most efficiently. For four entire years these preparations were carried on, and as we are told that similar preparations had been going forward during the three years preceding the death of Darius, though not brought to any ultimate result, we cannot doubt that the maximum of force, which the empire could possibly be made to furnish,¹ was now brought to execute the schemes of Xerxes.

The Persian empire was at this moment more extensive than ever it will appear at any subsequent period; for it comprised maritime Thrace and Macedonia as far as the borders of Thessaly, and nearly all the islands of the Ægean north of Krete and east of Eubœa—including even the Cyclades. There existed Persian forts and garrisons at Doriskus, Eion, and other places on the coast of Thrace, while Abdêra with the other Grecian settlements on that coast were numbered among the tributaries of Susa.² It is necessary to bear in mind these

Herodotus: it is found side by side with careful sifting of fact and specification of positive, definite, appreciable causes: and this latter vein is what really distinguishes the historian from his age,—forming the preparation for Thucydides, in whom it appears predominant and almost exclusive. See this point illustrated in Creuzer, *Historische Kunst der Griechen*, Abschnitt iii. p. 150–159.

Jäger (*Disputationes Herodotæ*, p. 16, Göttingen, 1828) professes to detect evidences of old age (senile ingenium) in the moralising colour which overspreads the history of Herodotus, but which I believe to have belonged to his middle and mature age not less than to his latter years—if indeed he lived to be very old, which is no way proved, except upon reasons which I have already disputed. See Bähr, *Commentatio de Vita et Scriptis Herodoti*, in the fourth volume of his edition, c. 6, p. 388.

¹ Herodot. vii. 19. *χῶρον πάντα ἐρευνῶν τῆς ἠπείρου.*

² Herodot. vii. 106. *κατέστασαν γὰρ ἔτι πρότερον ταύτης τῆς ἐξελάσιος (i. e. the invasion by Xerxes) ὕπαρχοι ἐν τῇ Θρηάκῃ καὶ τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου πανταχῇ.* vii. 108. *ἐδεδοῦλωτο γὰρ, ὡς καὶ πρότερόν μοι δεδήλωται, ἡ μέχρι*

boundaries of the empire, at the time when Xerxes mounted the throne, as compared with its reduced limits at the later time of the Peloponnesian war—partly that we may understand the apparent chances of success to his expedition, as they presented themselves both to the Persians and to the *medising* Greeks—partly that we may appreciate the after-circumstances connected with the formation of the Athenian maritime empire.

In the autumn of the year 481 B.C., the vast army thus raised by Xerxes arrived, from all quarters of the empire, at or near to Sardis ; a large portion of it having been directed to assemble at Kritala in Kappadokia, on the eastern side of the Halys, where it was joined by Xerxes himself on the road from Susa.¹ From thence he crossed the Halys, and marched through Phrygia and Lydia, passing through the Phrygian towns of Kelænaë, Anaua and Kolossæ, and the Lydian town of Kallatêbus, until he reached Sardis, where winter-quarters were prepared for him. But this land force, vast as it was (respecting its numbers, I shall speak further presently), was not all that the empire had been required to furnish. Xerxes had determined to attack Greece, not by traversing the *Ægean*, as Datis had passed to Eretria and Marathon, but by a land force and fleet at once ; the former crossing the Hellespont, and marching through Thrace, Macedonia and Thessaly ; while the latter was intended to accompany and co-operate. A fleet of 1207 ships of war, besides numerous vessels of service and burthen, had been assembled on the Hellespont and on the coasts of Thrace and Ionia ; moreover Xerxes, with a degree of forethought much exceeding that of his father Darius in the Scythian expedition, had directed the formation of large magazines of provisions at suitable maritime stations along the line of march, from the Hellespont to the Strymonic Gulf. During the four years of military preparation there had been time to bring together great quantities of flour and other essential articles from Asia and Egypt.²

If the whole contemporary world were overawed by the vast assemblage of men and muniments of war, which Xerxes thus brought together, so much transcending all past, we might even say all subsequent, experience—they were no less astounded by

Θεσσαλίας πάντα, καὶ ἦν ὑπὸ βασιλῆα δασμοφόρος, Μεγαβάζου τε καταστρεφόμενον καὶ ὕστερον Μαρδονίου ; also vii. 59, and Xenophon, *Memorab.* iii. 5, 11. Compare *Æschylus*, *Pers.* 871–896, and the vision ascribed to Cyrus in reference to his successor Darius, covering with his wings both Europe and Asia (*Herodot.* i. 209).

¹ *Herodot.* vii. 26–31.

² *Herodot.* vii. 23–25.

two enterprises which entered into his scheme—the bridging of the Hellespont, and the cutting of a ship-canal through the isthmus of Mount Athos. For the first of the two there had indeed been a precedent, since Darius about thirty-five years before had caused a bridge to be thrown over the Thracian Bosphorus, and crossed it in his march to Scythia. Yet this bridge of Darius, though constructed by the Ionians and by a Samian Greek, having had reference only to distant regions, seems to have been little known or little thought of among the Greeks generally, as we may infer from the fact that the poet Æschylus¹ speaks as if he had never heard of it; while the bridge of Xerxes was ever remembered both by Persians and by Greeks as a most imposing display of Asiatic omnipotence. The bridge of boats—or rather the two separate bridges not far removed from each other,—which Xerxes caused to be thrown across the Hellespont, stretched from the neighbourhood of Abydos on the Asiatic side to the coast between Sestos and Madytus on the European, where the strait is about an English mile in breadth. The execution of the work was at first entrusted, not to Greeks, but to Phœnicians and Egyptians, who had received orders long beforehand to prepare cables of extraordinary strength and size expressly for the purpose; the material used by the Phœnicians was flax, that employed by the Egyptians was the fibre of the papyrus. Already had the work been completed and announced to Xerxes as available for transit, when a storm arose, so violent as altogether to ruin it. The wrath of the monarch, when apprised of this catastrophe, burst all bounds. It was directed partly against the chief engineers, whose heads he caused to be struck off,² but partly also against the Hellespont itself. He commanded that the strait should be scourged with 300 lashes, and that a set of fetters should be let down into it as a further punishment. Moreover Herodotus had heard, but does not believe, that he even sent irons for the purpose of branding it. “Thou bitter water (exclaimed the scourges while inflicting this punishment), this is the penalty which our master inflicts upon thee, because thou hast wronged him though he hath never wronged thee. King Xerxes *will* cross thee, whether thou wilt or not; but thou deservest not sacrifice from any man, because thou art a treacherous river of (useless) salt water.”³

¹ Æschylus, *Pers.* 731, 754, 873.

² Plutarch (*De Tranquillitate Animi*, p. 470) speaks of them as having had their noses and ears cut off.

³ Herodot. vii. 34, 35. *ἐνεέλλετο δὴ δὴν ῥαπίζοντας, λέγειν βάρβαρά τε*

Such were the insulting terms heaped by order of Xerxes on the rebellious Hellespont. Herodotus calls them "non-Hellenic and blasphemous terms," which, together with their brevity, leads us to believe that he gives them as he heard them, and that they are not of his own invention, like so many other speeches in his work, where he dramatises, as it were, a given position. It has been common however to set aside in this case not merely the words, but even the main incident of punishment inflicted on the Hellespont,¹ as a mere Greek fable rather than a real fact; the extreme childishness and absurdity of the proceeding giving to it the air of an enemy's calumny. But this reason will not appear sufficient, if we transport ourselves back to the time and to the party concerned. To transfer to inanimate objects the sensitive as well as the willing and designing attributes of human beings, is among the early and wide-spread instincts of mankind, and one of the primitive forms of religion. And although the enlargement of reason and experience gradually displaces this elementary Fetichism, banishing it from the regions of reality into those of conventional fiction—yet the force of momentary passion will often suffice to supersede the acquired habit: and even an intelligent man² may be impelled in a moment of agonising pain to kick or beat the lifeless object from which he has suffered. By the old procedure, never formally abolished, though gradually disused, at Athens—an inanimate object which had caused the death of a man was solemnly tried and cast out of the border. And the Arcadian youths, when they returned hungry from an unsuccessful day's hunting,³ scourged and pricked the god Pan

καὶ ἀπόσθαλα, Ἔοικρον ὕδωρ, δεσπότης τοι δίκην ἐπιτιθεὶ τήνδε, ὅτι μιν ἠδίκησας, οὐδὲν πρὸς ἐκείνου ἄδικον παθόν. Καὶ βασιλεὺς μὲν Ξέρξης διαβήσεται σε, ἣν τε σύ γε βούλη, ἣν τε καὶ μή· σοὶ δὲ κατὰ δίκην ἄρα οὐδεὶς ἀνθρώπων θύει, ὡς δόντι δολερῶ τε καὶ ἄλμυρῶ ποταμῶ.

The assertion—that no one was in the habit of sacrificing to the Hellespont—appears strange, when we look to the subsequent conduct of Xerxes himself (vii. 53): compare vii. 113, and vi. 76. The epithet *salt*, employed as a reproach, seems to allude to the undrinkable character of the water.

¹ See Stanley and Blomfield ad Æschyl. Pers. 731, and K. O. Müller (in his Review of Benjamin Constant's work *Sur la Religion*), *Kleine Schriften*, vol. ii. p. 59.

² See Auguste Comte, *Traité de Philosophie Positive*, vol. v. leçon 52, pp. 40, 46.

³ See Wachsmuth, *Hellenisch. Alterthümer*, 2, i. p. 320, and K. F. Hermann, *Griech. Staatsalterthümer*, sect. 104.

For the manner in which Cyrus dealt with the river Gyndés, see Herodot. i. 202. The Persian satrap Pharnuchés was thrown from his horse at Sardis, and received an injury of which he afterwards died: he directed his attendants to lead the horse to the place where the accident had happened,

or his statue by way of revenge. Much more may we suppose a young Persian monarch, corrupted by universal subservience around him, to be capable of thus venting an insane wrath. The vengeance exercised by Cyrus on the river Gyndês (which he caused to be divided into three hundred and sixty streamlets, because one of his sacred horses had been drowned in it), affords a fair parallel to the scourging of the Hellespont by Xerxes. To offer sacrifice to rivers, and to testify in this manner gratitude for service rendered by rivers, was a familiar rite in the ancient religion. While the grounds for distrusting the narrative are thus materially weakened, the positive evidence will be found very forcible. The expedition of Xerxes took place when Herodotus was about four years old, so that he afterwards enjoyed ample opportunity of conversing with persons who had witnessed and taken part in it: and the whole of his narrative shows that he availed himself largely of such access to information. Besides, the building of the bridge across the Hellespont, and all the incidents connected with it, were acts necessarily known to many witnesses, and therefore the more easily verified. The decapitation of the unfortunate engineers was an act fearfully impressive, and even the scourging of the Hellespont, while essentially public, appears to Herodotus¹ (as well as to Arrian afterwards), not childish, but impious. The more attentively we balance, in the case before us, the positive testimony against the intrinsic negative probabilities, the more shall we be disposed to admit without diffidence the statement of our original historian.

New engineers—perhaps Greek along with, or in place of, Phœnicians and Egyptians—were immediately directed to

cut off all his legs, and leave him to perish there (Herodot. vii. 88). The kings of Macedonia offered sacrifice even during the time of Herodotus, to the river which had been the means of preserving the life of their ancestor Perdikkas; after he had crossed it, the stream swelled and arrested his pursuers (Herodot. viii. 138): see an analogous story about the inhabitants of Apollonia and the river Aôus, Valerius Maxim. i. 5, 2.

After the death of the great boxer, wrestler, &c., Theagenês of Thasus, a statue was erected to his honour. A personal enemy, perhaps one of the 1400 defeated competitors, came every night to gratify his wrath and revenge by flogging the statue. One night the statue fell down upon this scourger and killed him; upon which his relatives indicted the statue for murder: it was found guilty by the Thasians, and thrown into the sea. The gods however were much displeased with the proceeding, and visited the Thasians with continued famine, until at length a fisherman by accident fished up the statue, and it was restored to its place (Pausan. vi. 11, 2). Compare the story of the statue of Hermês in Babrius, *Fabul.* 119, edition of Mr. Lewis.

¹ Herodot. vii. 35-54: compare viii. 109. Arrian, *Exp. Alex.* vii. 14, 9.

recommence the work, which Herodotus now describes in detail, and which was executed with increased care and solidity. To form the two bridges, two lines of ships—triremes and pentekonters blended together—were moored across the strait breastwise, with their sterns towards the Euxine and their heads towards the Ægean, the stream flowing always rapidly from the former towards the latter.¹ They were moored by anchors

¹ Herodot. vii. 36. The language in which Herodotus describes the position of these ships which formed the two bridges, seems to me to have been erroneously or imperfectly apprehended by most of the commentators: see the notes of Bähr, Kruse, Wesseling, Rennell, and especially Larcher: Schweighäuser is the most satisfactory.—*τοῦ μὲν Πόντου ἐπικαρίας, τοῦ δὲ Ἑλλησπόντου κατὰ ῥόον.* The explanation given by Tzetzes of *ἐπικαρίας* by the word *πλαγίας* seems to me hardly exact: it means, not *oblique*, but *at right angles with*. The course of the Bosphorus and Hellespont, flowing out of the Euxine sea, is conceived by the historian as meeting that sea at right angles; and the ships, which were moored near together along the current of the strait, taking the line of each from head to stern, were therefore also at right angles with the Euxine sea. Moreover Herodotus does not mean to distinguish the two bridges hereby, and to say that the ships of the one bridge were *τοῦ Πόντου ἐπικαρίας*, and those of the other bridge *τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου κατὰ ῥόον*, as Bähr and other commentators suppose: *δοτὴ* the predicates apply alike to *δοτὴ* the bridges,—as indeed it stands to reason that the arrangement of ships best for one bridge must also have been best for the other. Respecting the meaning of *ἐπικαρίας* in Herodotus, see iv. 101; i. 180. In the *Odyssey* (ix. 70: compare Eustath. *ad loc.*) *ἐπικάρσιαι* does not mean oblique, but headlong before the wind: compare *ἐπικαρ*, *Iliad*, xviii. 392. So in the position of the ships as described by Herodotus, if the wind blew from the Euxine, it would be right abaft of them.

The circumstance stated by Herodotus,—that in the bridge higher up the stream or nearest to the Euxine, there were in all 360 vessels, while in the other bridge there were no more than 314,—has perplexed the commentators and induced them to resort to inconvenient explanations—as that of saying, that in the higher bridge the vessels were moored not in a direct line across, but in a line slanting, so that the extreme vessel on the European side was lower down the stream than the extreme vessel on the Asiatic side. This is one of the false explanations given of *ἐπικαρίας* (*slanting, schräg*): while the idea of Gronovius and Larcher, that the vessels in the higher bridge presented *their broadside* to the current, is still more inadmissible. But the difference in the number of ships employed in the one bridge compared with the other, seems to admit of an easier explanation. We need not suppose, nor does Herodotus say, that the two bridges were quite close together: considering the multitude which had to cross them, it would be convenient that they should be placed at a certain distance from each other. If they were a mile or two apart, we may well suppose that the breadth of the strait was not exactly the same in the two places chosen, and that it may have been broader at the point of the upper bridge—which moreover might require to be made more secure, as having to meet the first force of the current. The greater number of vessels in the upper bridge will thus be accounted for in a simple and satisfactory manner.

head and stern, and by very long cables. The number of ships placed to carry the bridge nearest to the Euxine was three

In some of the words used by Herodotus there appears an obscurity: they run thus—*ἐξέγυρσαν δὲ ᾧδε· Πεντηκοντέρους καὶ τριήρεις συνθέντες, ὑπὸ μὲν τῆν (these words are misprinted in Bähr's edition) πρὸς τοῦ Εὐξείνου Πόντου ἐξήκοντά τε καὶ τριηκοσίας, ὑπὸ δὲ τῆν ἐτέρην τέσσερες καὶ δέκα καὶ τριηκοσίας (τοῦ μὲν Πόντου, ἐπικαρσίας, τοῦ δὲ Ἑλλησπόντου κατὰ ῥόδον), ἵνα ἀνακωχέη τῶν τόνων τῶν ὄπλων· συνθέντες δὲ, ἀγκύρας κατήκων περιμήκειας, &c.*

There is a difficulty respecting the words *ἵνα ἀνακωχέη τῶν τόνων τῶν ὄπλων*—what is the nominative case to this verb? Bähr says in his note, *sc. ὁ ῥόδος*, and he construes *τῶν ὄπλων* to mean the cables whereby the anchors were held fast. But if we read further on, we shall see that *τὰ ὄπλα* mean, not the anchor-cables, but the cables which were stretched across from shore to shore to form the bridge: the very same words *τῶν ὄπλων τοῦ τόνου*, applied to these latter cables, occur a few lines afterwards. I think that the nominative case belonging to *ἀνακωχέη* is *ἡ γέφυρα* (not *ὁ ῥόδος*), and that the words from *τοῦ μὲν Πόντου* down to *ῥόδον* are to be read parenthetically, as I have printed them above: the express object for which the ships were moored was, “that the bridge might hold up, or sustain, the tension of its cables stretched across from shore to shore.” I admit that we should naturally expect *ἀνακωχέωσι*, and not *ἀνακωχέη*, since the proposition would be true of *both* bridges; but though this makes an awkward construction, it is not inadmissible, since each bridge had been previously described in the singular number.

Bredow and others accuse Herodotus of ignorance and incorrectness in this description of the bridges, but there seems nothing to bear out this charge.

Herodotus (iv. 85), Strabo (xiii. p. 591), and Pliny (H. N. iv. 12; vi. 1) give seven stadia as the breadth of the Hellespont in its narrowest part. Dr. Pococke also assigns the same breadth: Tournefort allows about a mile (vol. ii. lett. 4). Some modern French measurements give the distance as something considerably greater—1130 or 1150 toises (see Miot's note on his translation of Herodotus). The Duke of Ragusa states it at 700 toises (Voyage en Turquie, vol. ii. p. 164). If we suppose the breadth to be one mile or 5280 feet, 360 vessels at an average breadth of $14\frac{2}{3}$ feet would exactly fill the space. Rennell says, “Eleven feet is the breadth of a barge: vessels of the size of the smallest coasting craft were adequate to the purpose of the bridge.” (On the Geography of Herodotus, p. 127.)

The recent measurements or estimates stated by Miot go much beyond Herodotus: that of the Duke of Ragusa nearly coincides with him. But we need not suppose that the vessels filled up entirely the whole breadth, without leaving any gaps between: we only know, that there were no gaps left large enough for a vessel in voyage to sail through, except in three specified places.

I avail myself of a second edition to notice some comments of Professor Dunbar upon this note, inserted in the critical remarks appended to the third edition of his Greek and English Lexicon, voc. Ἐπικάρσιος, Herodotus.

Mr. Dunbar differs from me, as well as from Liddell and Scott, in the meaning of the word *ἐπικάρσιος*, but I do not perceive that he brings any convincing arguments. He says, that this adjective signifies “in a cross

hundred and sixty; the number in the other, three hundred and fourteen. Over each of the two lines of ships, across from

direction, and is opposed by Herodotus to *ὄρθιος*, in a straight direction, and to *ἰθείας* (Herodot. iv. 101; i. 180)."

I have made reference in my note to both these passages, and they seem to me to bear out my meaning. In the latter of the two, it is not exact to say that *ἐπικαρσίας* is opposed to *ἰθείας*: on the contrary, the two epithets are applied to the very same streets: "All the streets of Babylon (says Herodotus) are cut straight; those streets which run directly down to the river, as well as the rest."

It is true that in iv. 101, Herodotus contrasts, in a certain sense, *ἐπικαρσίας* with *ὄρθιος*. Speaking of the figure of Scythia, he says that it is a parallelogram, of which two sides forming an angle with each other, are lines of coast; while the other two sides *run straight up into the interior* (*ὄρθια εἰς τὴν μεσόγειαν*) to a certain point of junction. To go from the coast into the interior is always conceived by a Greek as going *upward*—*ἄνω*; to come from inland to the coast, as coming *downward*, *κάτω*. Hence Herodotus says that these two sides go straight *up into the interior*. The other two sides of the parallelogram, which run along the coast, Herodotus calls *ἐπικαρσίας*, falling in a straight line, or directly, upon the other two which run *ὄρθια εἰς τὴν μεσόγειαν*. It is plain that if the two sides, which ran up into the interior and there joined each other, were straight, the other two sides of the parallelogram would be straight also: so that *ἐπικαρσίας* in this passage does not bear any sense inconsistent with straightness.

In construing the passage—*Ἐξέφυγαν δὲ ὧδε Πεντηκοντέρους καὶ τριήρεις συνθέντες, ὑπὸ μὲν τὴν πρὸς τοῦ Εὐξείνου Πόντου ἐξήκοντά τε καὶ τριηκοσίας, ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν ἑτέραν τεσσαρεσκαίδεκα καὶ τριηκοσίας (τοῦ μὲν Πόντου, ἐπικαρσίας, τοῦ δὲ Ἑλλησπόντου, κατὰ ῥέον), ἵνα ἀνακαχέῃ τὸν τόνον τῶν ὄπλων*, Mr. Dunbar says, "Mr. Grote and the editors of Herodotus supply *γέφυραν* with *ὑπὸ μὲν τὴν*, and *ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν ἑτέραν*. But I cannot conceive what rational meaning can be extracted from *ἐξέφυγαν*—*ὑπὸ μὲν τὴν (γέφυραν)*, when the pentekonters and the triremes formed the *γέφυραν*. There can (I imagine) be no doubt that *τὴν* or *χώραν* must be understood (which they very often are with the Greek writers); the *land*, namely, on each side of the strait: *ὑπὸ μὲν τὴν (γῆν)*, on the Asian side; *ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν ἑτέραν*, on the European side."

To deal first with Mr. Dunbar's objection to my meaning, which is the same as that of Bähr and others, I cannot admit his assertion, that "the pentekonters and the triremes *formed* the *γέφυραν*." They formed the *support* of the bridge; standing in the same relation to it, as the piles of Waterloo Bridge stand to the bridge itself. Speaking largely, or for common purposes, indeed, the bridge is understood to mean the whole construction, support and all: but the essential portion of the bridge is, the continuous way across from bank to bank, which, in the case of a narrow stream, may exist without any supports at all. Now the pentekonters and triremes did not of themselves form any continuous way across; this was formed by the row of tight parallel cables laid over them, resting upon them, and stretching across from bank to bank. And Herodotus uses the preposition *ὑπὸ* which expresses this relation: the pentekonters and triremes were put together side by side *under the bridge*; or rather, they were first put, and then the bridge of tightened cables was laid over or upon them.

shore to shore, were stretched six vast cables, which discharged the double function of holding the ships together, and of

Mr. Dunbar's supposition that the substantive belonging to ὑπὸ μὲν τῆν, &c. is γῆν—meaning the two opposite coasts, Asiatic and European—seems to me inadmissible. The words τῆν πρὸς τοῦ Εὐξείνου Πόντου, if you apply them to one of the two bridges, designate naturally enough the one which is highest up in the stream: but they cannot be employed to signify the Asiatic coast as distinguished from the European, for they have just as much reference to one as to the other. Nor can I think that the preposition ὑπὸ can be used to signify what Mr. Dunbar means. Assuming even that it could properly be used to mean those ships which were moored near or close to the land, we must recollect that what Herodotus is here describing, is a series of ships lying near each other across the whole breadth of the stream. Of the larger portion of these ships it could never be said with any propriety, that they lay ὑπὸ τῆν γῆν—either *under* the Asiatic or European coast. Besides, on Mr. Dunbar's construction, Herodotus would be only describing *one* bridge, whereas there were undeniably *two*.

Mr. Dunbar's conception of the structure of the bridge differs essentially from mine, but I should lengthen this note too much by commenting upon it.

He contests my supposition that the two bridges may have been at some distance from each other, on the ground that both of them terminated in an ἀκτὴ τραχέα ἐς θάλασσαν κατήκουσα, on the European side; and he translates ἀκτὴ *promontory* or *headland*. But ἀκτὴ, just as often, if not oftener—means a line of coast, stretching along for a considerable distance (see Herodot. iv. 38).

Again, he differs from me, and agrees with Bähr, in regard to the nominative case which is to be understood to the verb ἀνακωχέη. He thinks that δ ῥόος is understood, not ἡ γέφυρα—observing—

“How the bridge should keep the cables in a state of tension, I cannot comprehend. *Ἴνα* must be referred to a cause immediately preceding and well-ascertained; and this can only be the term ῥόος. From the statement which the historian gives of the different modes of anchoring the two divisions, it would appear that it was necessary for the triremes to be moored in the direction of the current, in order that it might by its force *keep the cables taut*, and not allow them to swing.” I confess that I do not feel the difficulty which strikes Mr. Dunbar, in translating the words ἴνα ἀνακωχέη τὸν τόνον τῶν ὕλων, in the way that I have proposed in an earlier part of this note. And I have already remarked that by the words τὸν τόνον τῶν ὕλων, Herodotus does not mean the anchor-cables, but the vast cables stretched across: as he himself again uses the phrase a few lines farther on—κόσμη ἐπέτιθεσαν κατόπερθε τῶν ὕλων τοῦ τόνου, where Bähr and Schweighäuser justly remark that it is equivalent to κατόπερθε τῶν ὕλων ἐντεταμένον. It might be possible to suppose ἡ σύνθεσις or τὰ συντιθέμενα (extracted out of the preceding participle συνθέντες) the understood nominative case to ἀνακωχέη, which would get rid of the awkward construction of γέφυρα in the singular number—Πεντηκοντέρους καὶ τριήρας συνθέντες ἴνα ἀνακωχέη (ἡ σύνθεσις τῶν τριήρων) τὸν τόνον τῶν ὕλων, ἀγκύρας κατήκαν περιμήκειας, &c. For cases in which an unexpressed nominative case is extracted out of the verb preceding, compare Matthiae, Gr. Gr. s. 295; and Kühner, Gr. Gr. s. 414.

Mr. Dunbar speaks “of the different modes of anchoring the two

supporting the bridge-way to be laid upon them. They were tightened by means of capstans on each shore: in three different places along the line, a gap was left between the ships for the purpose of enabling small trading vessels without masts, in voyage to or from the Euxine, to pass and repass beneath the cables.

Out of the six cables assigned to each bridge, two were of flax and four of papyrus, combined for the sake of increased strength; for it seems that in the bridges first made, which proved too weak to resist the winds, the Phœnicians had employed cables of flax for one bridge, the Egyptians those of papyrus for the other.¹ Over these again were laid planks of

divisions:” and Bähr holds the same opinion. But as I understand Herodotus, he speaks of no such difference: all the ships, in both bridges, were anchored both ahead and astern, with their heads down the stream. Συρθέντες δὲ ἀγκύρας κατήκταν περιμήκειας, τὰς μὲν πρὸς τοῦ Πόντου τῆς ἐτέρης, τῶν ἀνέμων εἵνεκεν τῶν ἕσωθεν ἐκπνεόντων, τῆς δὲ ἐτέρης, τῆς πρὸς ἑσπέρης τε καὶ τοῦ Αἰγαίου, εἵρου τε καὶ νότου εἵνεκα. Bähr construes τῆς ἐτέρης—τῆς δὲ ἐτέρης—as if they agreed with γεφύρας, and as if the anchors of the ships belonging to one bridge had been let down at the extremity towards the Euxine—the anchors of those belonging to the other bridge at the extremity towards the Ægean. Surely this explanation cannot be received. If a ship held by only one anchor, that anchor always must be at the extremity towards the Euxine; for the current of the Hellespont, which runs from the Euxine, would not permit it to be otherwise. Even if the anchor were originally let down at the head, when pointing to the Ægean, the force of the current would alter the position of the ship until the anchor came to be between the ship and the Euxine. Besides, it surely cannot be doubted, that the same mode of anchorage which was suitable for the ships of one bridge would also be suitable for those of the other. Moreover, the historian tells us that some anchors were intended to guard against the winds blowing out of the Euxine—others, to guard against those blowing out of the Ægean. Surely, each ship of each bridge would need to be made fast against both. Compare Pindar, Olymp. vi. 101, δὴ ἄγκυραι.

I construe the words τῆς ἐτέρης—τῆς δὲ ἐτέρης—differently from Bähr. It seems to me that they do not agree with γεφύρας, but with μέριδος, τελευτήης, or some word indicating direction, or relative bearing, on the one side; on the other side, equivalent to ἔνθεν μὲν, ἔνθεν δέ. Sufficient vindication may be found of the use of the genitive case ἐτέρης in Matthiæ, Gr. Gr. § 377; Kühner, Gr. Gr. § 523. And in this case it coincides with the fundamental conception which these authors give us of a Greek Genitive—as designing the whence, or source from which an action arises. The anchors are conceived as pulling from one side and from the other side, against the dangerous winds when they blow.

¹ For the long celebrity of these cables, see the epigram of Archimêlus, composed two centuries and a half afterwards, in the time of Hiero II. of Syracuse, ap. Athenæum, v. 209.

Herodotus states that in thickness and compact make (παχυτῆς καὶ καλλονῆ) the cables of flax were equal to those of papyrus; but that in

woods, sawn to the appropriate width, secured above by a second line of cables stretched across to keep them in their places. Lastly, upon this foundation the causeway itself was formed, out of earth and wood, with a palisade on each side high enough to prevent the cattle which passed over from seeing the water.

The other great work which Xerxes caused to be performed, for facilitating his march, was, the cutting through of the isthmus which connects the stormy promontory of Mount Athos with the mainland.¹ That isthmus near the point where it joins the mainland was about twelve stadia (not quite so many furlongs) across, from the Strymonic to the Toronaic Gulf; and the canal dug by order of Xerxes was broad and deep enough for two triremes to sail abreast. In this work too, as well as in the bridge across the Hellespont, the Phœnicians were found the ablest and most efficient among all the subjects of the Persian monarch; but the other tributaries, especially the Greeks from the neighbouring town of Akanthus, and indeed the entire maritime forces of the empire,² were brought together to assist. The head-quarters of the fleet were first at Kymê and Phokæa, next at Elæus in the southern extremity of the Thracian Chersonese, from which point it could protect and second at once the two enterprises going forward at the Hellespont and at Mount Athos. The canal-cutting at the latter was placed under the general directions of two noble Persians—Bubarês and Artachæus, and distributed under their measurement as task-work among the contingents of the various nations; an ample supply of flour and other provisions being brought for sale in the neighbouring plain from various parts of Asia and Egypt.

Three circumstances in the narrative of Herodotus respecting this work deserve special notice. First, the superior intelligence of the Phœnicians, who, within sight of that lofty island of

weight the former were superior; for each cubit in length of the flaxen cable weighed a talent: we can hardly reason upon this, because we do not know whether he means an Attic, an Euboic, or an Æginæan talent; nor, if he means an Attic talent, whether it be an Attic talent of commerce, or of the monetary standard.

The cables contained in the Athenian dockyard are distinguished as *σχοινία δεκάδακτυλα*, *εξάδακτυλα*—in which expressions, however, M. Bœckh cannot certainly determine whether circumference or diameter be meant: he thinks probably the former. See his learned book, *Das Seewesen der Athener*, ch. x. p. 165.

¹ For a specimen of the destructive storms near the promontory of Athos, see Ephorus, Fragment. 121, ed. Diodot; Diodor. xiii. 41.

² Herodot. vii. 22, 23, 116; Diodor. xi. 2.

Thasos which had been occupied three centuries before by their free ancestors, were now labouring as instruments to the ambition of a foreign conqueror. Amidst all the people engaged, they alone took the precaution of beginning the excavation at a breadth far greater than the canal was finally destined to occupy, so as gradually to narrow it, and leave a convenient slope for the sides. The others dug straight down, so that the time as well as the toil of their work was doubled by the continual falling in of the sides—a remarkable illustration of the degree of practical intelligence then prevalent, since the nations assembled were many and diverse. Secondly, Herodotus remarks that Xerxes must have performed this laborious work from motives of mere ostentation: “for it would have cost no trouble at all” (he observes¹) to drag all

¹ Herodot. vii. 24: ὡς μὲν ἐμὲ συμβαλλόμενον εὐρίσκειν, μεγαλοφροσύνης εἵνεκα αὐτὸ Ξέρξης ὀρύσσειν ἐκέλευε, ἐθέλων τε δύναμιν ἀποδείκνυσθαι, καὶ μνημόσυνα λιπέσθαι· παρεὼν γὰρ, μηδένα πόνον λαβόντας, τὸν ἰσθμὸν τὰς νέας διειρύσαι, ὀρύσσειν ἐκέλευε διώρυχα τῇ θαλάσῃ, εὖρος ὡς δύο τριήρας πλείων ἑκατὸν ἑλαστρομεύνας.

According to the manner in which Herodotus represents this excavation to have been performed, the earth dug out was handed up by man to man from the bottom of the canal to the top—the whole performed by hand, without any aid of cranes or barrows.

The pretended work of turning the course of the river Halys, which Grecian report ascribed to Cræsus on the advice of Thalés, was a far greater work than the cutting at Athos (Herodot. i. 75).

As this ship-canal across the isthmus of Athos has been treated often as a fable both by ancients (Juvenal, Sat. x.) and by moderns (Cousinéry, Voyage en Macédoine), I transcribe the observations of Colonel Leake. That excellent observer points out evident traces of its past existence: but in my judgement, even if no such traces now remained, the testimony of Herodotus and Thucydides (iv. 109) would alone be sufficient to prove that it *had* existed really. The observations of Colonel Leake illustrate at the same time the motives in which the canal originated: “The canal (he says) seems to have been not more than sixty feet wide. As history does not mention that it was ever kept in repair after the time of Xerxes, the waters from the heights around have naturally filled it in part with soil in the course of ages. It might, however, without much labour, be renewed, and there can be no doubt that it would be useful to the navigation of the *Ægean*: for such is the fear entertained by the Greek boatmen of the strength and uncertain direction of the currents around Mount Athos, and of the gales and high seas to which the vicinity of the mountain is subject during half the year, and which are rendered more formidable by the deficiency of harbours in the Gulf of Orfaná, that I could not, as long as I was on the peninsula, and though offering a high price, prevail upon any boat to carry me from the eastern side of the peninsula to the western. Xerxes, therefore, was perfectly justified in cutting this canal, as well from the security which it afforded to his fleet, as from the facility of the work and the advantages of the ground, which seems made expressly to tempt such an undertaking. The experience of the losses which the former expedition under Mardonius had suffered suggested the idea. The circum-

the ships in the fleet across the isthmus ; so that the canal was nowise needed. So familiar a process was it, in the mind of a Greek of the fifth century B.C., to transport ships by mechanical force across an isthmus ; a special groove or slip being seemingly prepared for them : such was the case at the Diolkus across the isthmus of Corinth. Thirdly, it is to be noted, that the men who excavated the canal at Mount Athos worked under the lash ; and these, be it borne in mind, were not bought slaves, but freemen, except in so far as they were tributaries of the Persian monarch ; perhaps the father of Herodotus, a native of Halikarnassus and a subject of the brave Queen Artemisia, may have been among them. We shall find other examples as we proceed, of this indiscriminate use of the whip, and full conviction of its indispensable necessity, on the part of the Persians¹—even to drive the troops of their subject-contingents on to the charge in battle. To employ the scourge in this way towards freemen, and especially towards freemen engaged in military service, was altogether repugnant both to Hellenic practice and to Hellenic feeling. The Asiatic and insular Greeks were relieved from it, as from various other hardships, when they passed out of the Persian dominion to become, first allies, afterwards subjects, of Athens : and we shall be called upon hereafter to take note of this fact when we appreciate the complaints preferred against the hegemony of Athens.

At the same time that the subject-contingents of Xerxes

navigation of the capes Ampelus and Canastræum was much less dangerous, as the gulfs afford some good harbours, and it was the object of Xerxes to collect forces from the Greek cities in those gulfs as he passed. If there be any difficulty arising from the narrative of Herodotus, it is in comprehending how the operation should have required so long a time as three years, when the king of Persia had such multitudes at his disposal, and among them Egyptians and Babylonians, accustomed to the making of canals." (Leake, *Travels in Northern Greece*, vol. iii. ch. 24, p. 145.)

These remarks upon the enterprise are more judicious than those of Major Rennell (*Geogr. of Herodot.* p. 116). I may remark that Herodotus does not affirm that the actual cutting of the canal occupied three years,—he assigns that time to the cutting with all its preliminary arrangements included—*προετοιμάζετο ἐκ τριῶν ἐτέων κού μάλιστα ἐς τὸν Ἄθων* (vii. 22).

¹ Herodot. vii. 22 : ὄρουσον ὑπὸ μαστίγων παντοδαποὶ τῆς στρατιῆς· διάδοχοι δ' ἐφοίτων.—vii. 56 : Ξέρξης δὲ, ἐπεὶ τε διέβη ἐς τὴν Εὐρώπην, ἐθελίτο τὸν στρατὸν ὑπὸ μαστίγων διαβαίνοντα :—compare vii. 103, and Xenophon, *Anabasis*, iii. 4-25.

The essential necessity, and plentiful use, of the whip, towards subject-tributaries, as conceived by the ancient Persians, finds its parallel in the modern Turks. See the *Mémoires du Baron de Tott*, vol. i. p. 256 *seqq.*, and his dialogue on this subject with his Turkish conductor Ali-Aga.

excavated this canal, which was fortified against the sea at its two extremities by compact earthen walls or embankments, they also threw bridges of boats over the river Strymon. These two works, together with the renovated double bridge across the Hellespont, were both announced to Xerxes as completed and ready for passage, on his arrival at Sardis at the beginning of winter 481-480 B.C. Whether the whole of his vast army arrived at Sardis at the same time as himself, and wintered there, may reasonably be doubted; but the whole was united at Sardis and ready to march against Greece, at the beginning of spring 480 B.C.

While wintering at Sardis, the Persian monarch despatched heralds to all the cities of Greece, except Sparta and Athens, to demand the received tokens of submission, earth and water. The news of his prodigious armament was well calculated to spread terror even among the most resolute of them. And he at the same time sent orders to the maritime cities in Thrace and Macedonia to prepare "dinner" for himself and his vast suite as he passed on his march. That march was commenced at the first beginning of spring, and continued in spite of several threatening portents during the course of it—one of which Xerxes was blind enough not to comprehend, though, according to Herodotus, nothing could be more obvious than its signification¹—while another was misinterpreted into a favourable omen by the compliant answer of the Magian priests.

On quitting Sardis, the vast host was divided into two

¹ Herodot. vii. 57. *Τέρας σφι ἐφάνη μέγα, τὸ Ξέρξης ἐν οὐδενὶ λόγῳ ἐποίησατο, καίπερ εὐσύμβλητον ἐὼν ἵππος γὰρ ἔτεκε λαγόν. Εὐσύμβλητον ὦν τῆδε ἐγένετο, ὅτι ἐμελλε μὲν ἔλθαι στρατιῆν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα Ξέρξης ἀγαυρότατα καὶ μεγαλοπρεπέστατα, ὁπίσω δὲ περὶ ἑαυτοῦ τρέχων ἤξειν ἐς τὸν αὐτὸν χώρον.*

The prodigy was, that a mare brought forth a hare, which signified that Xerxes would set forth on his expedition to Greece with strength and splendour, but that he would come back in timid and disgraceful flight.

The implicit faith of Herodotus, first in the reality of the fact—next, in the certainty of his interpretation—deserves notice, as illustrating his canon of belief and that of his age. The interpretation is doubtless here the generating cause of the story interpreted: an ingenious man, after the expedition has terminated, imagines an appropriate simile for its proud commencement and inglorious termination (*Parturient montes, nascetur ridiculus mus*), and the simile is recounted, either by himself or by some hearer who is struck with it, as if it had been a real antecedent fact. The aptness of this supposed antecedent fact to foreshadow the great Persian invasion (*τὸ εὐσύμβλητον* of Herodotus) serves as presumptive evidence to bear out the witness asserting it; while departure from the established analogies of nature affords no motive for disbelief to a man who admits that the gods occasionally send special signs and warnings.

nearly equal columns ; a spacious interval being left between the two for the king himself with his guards and select Persians. First of all¹ came the baggage, carried by beasts of burden, immediately followed by one-half of the entire body of infantry, without any distinction of nations. Next, the select troops, 1000 Persian cavalry with 1000 Persian spearmen, the latter being distinguished by carrying their spears with the point downwards, as well as by the spear itself, which had a golden pomegranate at its other extremity, in place of the ordinary spike or point whereby the weapon was planted in the ground when the soldier was not on duty. Behind these troops walked ten sacred horses, of vast power and splendidly caparisoned, bred on the Nisæan plains in Media : next, the sacred chariot of Zeus, drawn by eight white horses—wherein no man was ever allowed to mount, not even the charioteer, who walked on foot behind with the reins in his hand. Next after the sacred chariot came that of Xerxes himself, drawn by Nisæan horses ; the charioteer, a noble Persian named Patiramphês, being seated in it by the side of the monarch—who was often accustomed to alight from the chariot and to enter a litter. Immediately about his person were a chosen body of 1000 horse-guards, the best troops and of the highest breed among the Persians, having golden apples at the reverse extremity of their spears, and followed by other detachments of 1000 horse, 10,000 foot, and 10,000 horse, all native Persians. Of these 10,000 Persian infantry, called the Immortals because their number was always exactly maintained, 9000 carried spears with pomegranates of silver at the reverse extremity, while the remaining 1000, distributed in front, rear, and on each side of this detachment, were marked by pomegranates of gold on their spears. With them ended what we may call the household troops : after whom, with an interval of two furlongs, the remaining host followed pell-mell.² Respecting its numbers and constituent portions I shall speak presently, on occasion of the great review at Doriskus.

On each side of the army, as it marched out of Sardis, was seen suspended one-half of the body of a slaughtered man, placed there expressly for the purpose of impressing a lesson on the subjects of Persia. It was the body of the eldest son of the wealthy Pythius, a Phrygian old man resident at Kelænæ,

¹ Compare the description of the processional march of Cyrus, as given in the *Cyropædia* of Xenophon, viii. 2, 1-20.

² Herodot. vii. 41. Μετὰ δὲ τὴν ἵππων διελέλειπτο καὶ δύο σταδίου, καὶ ἔπειτα ὁ λοιπὸς ὄμιλος ἦε ἀναμίξ.

who had entertained Xerxes in the course of his march from Kappadokia to Sardis, and who had previously recommended himself by rich gifts to the preceding king Darius. So abundant was his hospitality to Xerxes, and so pressing his offers of pecuniary contribution for the Grecian expedition, that the monarch asked him what was the amount of his wealth. "I possess (replied Pythius), besides lands and slaves, 2000 talents of silver and 3,993,000 of golden darics, wanting only 7000 of being 4,000,000. All this gold and silver do I present to thee, retaining only my lands and slaves, which will be quite enough." Xerxes replied by the strongest expressions of praise and gratitude for his liberality; at the same time refusing his offer, and even giving to Pythius out of his own treasure the sum of 7000 darics, which was wanting to make up the exact sum of 4,000,000. The latter was so elated with this mark of favour, that when the army was about to depart from Sardis, he ventured, under the influence of terror from the various menacing portents, to prefer a prayer to the Persian monarch. His five sons were all about to serve in the invading army against Greece: his prayer to Xerxes was, that the eldest of them might be left behind, as a stay to his own declining years, and that the service of the remaining four with the army might be considered as sufficient. But the unhappy father knew not what he asked. "Wretch! (replied Xerxes) dost thou dare to talk to me about *thy* son, when I am myself on the march against Greece, with my sons, brothers, relatives, and friends? thou who art my slave, and whose duty it is to follow me with thy wife and thy entire family? Know that the sensitive soul of man dwells in his ears: on hearing good things, it fills the body with delight, but boils with wrath when it hears the contrary. As, when thou didst good deeds and madest good offers to me, thou canst not boast of having surpassed the king in generosity—so now, when thou hast turned round and become impudent, the punishment inflicted on thee shall not be the full measure of thy deserts, but something less. For thyself and for thy four sons, the hospitality which I received from thee shall serve as protection. But for that one son whom thou especially wishest to keep in safety, the forfeit of his life shall be thy penalty." He forthwith directed that the son of Pythius should be put to death, and his body severed in twain; of which one-half was to be fixed on the right-hand, the other on the left-hand, of the road along which the army was to pass.¹

¹ The incident respecting Pythius is in Herodot. vii. 27, 28, 38, 39.

similar, yet rather less revolting, has been respecting Darius, when undertaking his Pythia. Both tales illustrate the intense faith which the Persian kings regarded the universal personal service, when they were themselves in the field. They seem to have measured their strength in terms of men whom they collected around them, with no reference to quality: and the very mention of the idea that a subject and a slave should seek to escape from a risk which the monarch was about to encounter—was an offence not to be pardoned. In this as in the other acts of Oriental kings, whether grateful, munificent or ferocious, we trace nothing but the despotic force of personal will, translating itself into act without any thought of consequences, and treating subjects with less consideration than an ordinary Greek master would have shown towards his slaves.

From Sardis, the host of Xerxes directed its march to Abydos, first across Mysia and the river Kaikus—then through Cardessus, Karinë, and the plain of Thêbê. They passed through Dramyttium and Antandrus, and crossed the range of Ida, most part of which was on their left-hand, not without some loss from stormy weather and thunder.¹ From hence they reached Ilium and the river Skamander, the stream of which was drunk up, or probably in part trampled and rendered undrinkable, by the vast host of men and animals. In spite of the immortal interest which the Skamander derives from the Homeric poems, its magnitude is not such as to make this fact surprising. To the poems themselves even Xerxes did not disdain to pay tribute. He ascended the holy hill of Ilium,—viewed the Pergamus where Priam was said to have lived and reigned,—sacrificed 1000 oxen to the patron goddess Thênê,—and caused the Magian priests to make libations in honour of the heroes who had fallen on that venerated spot. He even condescended to inquire into the local details,² abundantly supplied to visitors by the inhabitants of Ilium, of that great real or mythical war to which Grecian chronologers had hardly yet learned to assign a precise date. And doubtless when he contemplated the narrow area of that Troy which the Greeks confederated under Agamemnon had been

place no confidence in the estimate of the wealth of Pythius; but in other respects, the story seems well entitled to credit.

¹ Herodot. vii. 42.

² Herodot. vii. 43. *θεησάμενος δὲ, καὶ πυθόμενος κείνων ἕκαστα, &c.*

unable for ten years to overcome, he could have made these same Greeks would fall an easy prey to a more able host. Another day's march between Rhoenium and Dardanus on the left-hand, and the Hellespont on the right-hand, brought him to Abydos, where two newly-constructed bridges over the Hellespont met him.

On this transit from Asia into Europe Herodotus dwells with peculiar emphasis—and well he might do so, since when we consider the bridges, the invading number, the unmeasured hopes succeeded by no less unmeasured calamity—it would appear not only to have been the most imposing event of his century, but to rank among the most imposing events of all history. He surrounds it with much dramatic circumstance not only mentioning the marble throne erected for Xerxes on a hill near Abydos, from whence he surveyed both his masses of land-force covering the shore and his ships sailing and racing in the strait (a race in which the Phœnicians of Sidon surpassed the Greeks and all the other contingents)—but also superadding to this real fact a dialogue with Artabanus, intended to set forth the internal mind of Xerxes. He further quotes certain supposed exclamations of the Abydenes at the sight of his superhuman power. “Why (said one of these horror-stricken spectators¹), why dost thou, oh Zeus, under the shape of a Persian man and the name of Xerxes, thus bring together the whole human race for the ruin of Greece? It would have been easy for thee to accomplish *that* without so much ado.” Such emphatic ejaculations exhibit the strong feeling which Herodotus or his informants throw into the scene, though we cannot venture to apply to them the scrutiny of historical criticism.

At the first moment of sunrise, so sacred in the mind of Orientals,² the passage was ordered to begin. The bridges were perfumed with frankincense and strewed with myrtle boughs, while Xerxes himself made libations into the sea with a golden censer, and offered up prayers to Helios, that he might effect without hindrance his design of conquering

¹ Herodot. vii. 45, 53, 56. ὦ Ζεῦ, τί δὴ ἀνδρὶ εἰδόμενος Πέρσῃ, καὶ ὄνομα ἀντὶ Διὸς Ξέρξης θέμενος, ἀνάστατον τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐθέλεις ποιῆσαι ἄγων πάντας ἀνθρώπους; καὶ γὰρ ἄνευ τούτων ἐξῆν τοι ποιεῖν ταῦτα.

² Tacitus, *Histor.* iii. 24. “Undique clamor, et orientem solem, ita in Syriâ mos est, consalutavêre”—in his striking description of the night battle near Cremona between the Roman troops of Vitellius and Vespasian and the rise of the sun while the combat was yet unfinished: compare also Quintus Curtius (iii. 3, 8, p. 41, ed. Mutzel).

Europe even to its farthest extremity. Along with his libation he cast into the Hellespont the censer itself, with a golden bowl and a Persian scimitar—"I do not exactly know¹ (adds the historian) whether he threw them in as a gift to Helios, or as a mark of repentance and atonement to the Hellespont for the stripes which he had inflicted upon it." Of the two bridges, that nearest to the Euxine was devoted to the military force—the other to the attendants, the baggage, and the beasts of burthen. The 10,000 Persians, called Immortals, all wearing garlands on their heads, were the first to pass over. Xerxes himself, with the remaining army, followed next, though in an order somewhat different from that which had been observed in quitting Sardis: the monarch having reached the European shore, saw his troops crossing the bridges after him "under the lash." But in spite of the use of this sharp stimulus to accelerate progress, so vast were the numbers of his host, that they occupied no less than seven days and seven nights, without a moment of intermission, in the business of crossing over—a fact to be borne in mind presently, when we come to discuss the totals computed by Herodotus.²

Having thus cleared the strait, Xerxes directed his march along the Thracian Chersonese, to the isthmus whereby it is joined with Thrace, between the town of Kardia on his left-hand and the tomb of Hellê on his right—the eponymous heroine of the strait. After passing this isthmus, he turned westward along the coast of the Gulf of Melas and the Ægean Sea—crossing the river from which that Gulf derived its name, and even drinking its waters up (according to Herodotus) with the men and animals of his army. Having passed by the Æolic city of Ænus and the harbour called Stentoris, he reached the sea-coast and plain called Doriskus covering the rich delta near the mouth of the Hebrus. A fort had been built there and garrisoned by Darius. The spacious plain called by this same name reached far along the shore to Cape Serreium, and comprised in it the towns of Salê and Zonê, possessions of the Samothracian Greeks planted on the territory once possessed by the Thracian Kikones on the mainland. Having been here joined by his fleet, which had doubled³ the southernmost promontory of the Thracian

¹ Herodot. vii. 54. *ταῦτα οὐκ ἔχω ἀτρεκέως διακρίναι, οὔτε εἰ τῷ Ἥλιῳ ἀνατιθεὶς κατήκε ἐς τὸ πέλαγος, οὔτε εἰ μετεμέλησέ οἱ τὸν Ἑλλησποντον μαστιγώσαντι, καὶ ἀντὶ τούτων τὴν θάλασσαν ἐδαρέετο.*

² Herodot. vii. 55, 56. *Διέβη δὲ ὁ στρατὸς αὐτοῦ ἐν ἑπτὰ ἡμέρησι καὶ ἐν ἑπτὰ εὐφρόνησι, ἐλινύσας οὐδένα χρόνον.*

³ Herodot. vii. 58-59; Pliny, H. N. iv. 11. See some valuable remarks

Chersonese, he thought the situation convenient for a general review and enumeration both of his land and his naval force.

Never probably in the history of mankind has there been brought together a body of men from regions so remote and so widely diverse, for one purpose and under one command, as those which were now assembled in Thrace near the mouth of the Hebrus. About the numerical total we cannot pretend to form any definite idea; about the variety of contingents there is no room for doubt. "What Asiatic nation was there (asks Herodotus,¹ whose conceptions of this expedition seem to outstrip his powers of language) that Xerxes did not bring against Greece?" Nor was it Asiatic nations alone, comprised within the Oxus, the Indus, the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, the Levant, the Ægean and the Euxine: we must add to these also the Egyptians, the Ethiopians on the Nile south of Egypt, and the Libyans from the desert near Kyrênê. Not all the expeditions, fabulous or historical, of which Herodotus had ever heard, appeared to him comparable to this of Xerxes, even for total number; much more in respect of variety of component elements. Forty-six different nations,² each with its distinct national costume, mode of arming, and local leaders, formed the vast land-force. Eight other nations

on the topography of Doriskus and the neighbourhood of the town still called Enos, in Grisebach, *Reise durch Rumelien und nach Brussa*, ch. vi. vol. i. p. 157-159 (Göttingen, 1841). He shows reason for believing that the indentation of the coast, marked on the map as the Gulf of Ænos, did not exist in ancient times, any more than it exists now.

¹ Herodot. vii. 20-21.

² See the enumeration in Herodotus, vii. 61-96. In chapter 76, one name has dropped out of the text (see the note of Wesseling and Schweighäuser), which, in addition to those specified under the head of the land-force, makes up exactly forty-six. It is from this source that Herodotus derives the boast which he puts into the mouth of the Athenians (ix. 27) respecting the battle of Marathon, in which they pretend to have vanquished forty-six nations—*ἐνίκησαμεν ἔθνεα ἕξ καὶ τεσσαράκοντα*: though there is no reason for believing that so great a number of contingents were engaged with Datis at Marathon.

Compare the boasts of Antiochus king of Syria (B.C. 192) about his immense Asiatic host brought across into Greece, as well as the contemptuous comments of the Roman consul Quinctius (Livy, xxxv. 48-49). "Varia enim genera armorum, et multa nomina gentium inauditarum, Dahas, et Medos, et Cadusios, et Elymæos—Syros omnes esse: haud paulo mancipiorum melius, propter servilia ingenia, quam militum genus;" and the sharp remark of the Arcadian envoy Antiochus (Xenophon, Hellen. vii. 1, 33). Quintus Curtius also has some rhetorical turns about the number of nations, whose names even were hardly known, tributary to the Persian empire (iii. 4, 29; iv. 45, 9) "ignota etiam ipsi Dario gentium nomina," &c.

furnished the fleet, on board of which Persians, Medes and Sakæ served as armed soldiers or marines. The real leaders, both of the entire army and of all its various divisions, were native Persians of noble blood, who distributed the various native contingents into companies of thousands, hundreds, and tens. The forty-six nations composing the land-force were as follows :—Persians, Medes, Kissians, Hyrkians, Assyrians, Baktrians, Sakæ, Indians, Arians, Parthians, Chorasmians, Sogdians, Gandarians, Dadikæ, Kaspian, Sarangæ, Paktyes, Utii, Myki, Parikanii, Arabians, Ethiopians in Asia and Ethiopians south of Egypt, Libyans, Paphlagonians, Ligyes, Matieni, Maryandyni, Syrians, Phrygians, Armenians, Lydians, Mysians, Thracians, Kabêlians, Mares, Kolchians, Alarodians, Saspeires, Sagartii. The eight nations who furnished the fleet were—Phœnicians (300 ships of war), Egyptians (200), Cypriots (150), Kilikians (100), Pamphylians (30), Lykians (50), Karians (70), Ionic Greeks (100), Doric Greeks (30), Æolic Greeks (60), Hellespontic Greeks (100), Greeks from the islands in the Ægean (17) : in all 1207 triremes or ships of war with three banks of oars. The descriptions of costumes and arms which we find in Herodotus are curious and varied. But it is important to mention that no nation except the Lydians, Pamphylians, Cypriots and Karians (partially also the Egyptian marines on shipboard) bore arms analogous to those of the Greeks (*i. e.* arms fit for steady conflict and sustained charge,¹—for hand combat in line as well as for defence of the person,—but inconveniently heavy either in pursuit or in flight). The other nations were armed with missile weapons,—light shields of wicker or leather, or no shields at all,—turbans or leather caps instead of helmets,—swords and scythes. They were not properly equipped either for fighting in regular order or for resisting the line of spears and shields which the Grecian hoplites brought to bear upon them. Their persons too were much less protected against wounds than those of the latter ; some of them indeed, as the Mysians and Libyans, did not even carry spears, but only staves with the end hardened in the fire.² A nomadic tribe of Persians, called Sagartii, to the number of 8000 horsemen, came armed only with a dagger and with the rope known in South America as the lasso, which they cast in the fight to entangle an antagonist. The Æthiopians from the Upper Nile had their bodies painted half red and half white, wore the skins of lions and panthers,

¹ Herodot. vii. 89–93.

² Herodot. vii. 61–81

and carried, besides the javelin, a long bow with arrows of reed, tipped with a point of sharp stone.

It was at Doriskus that the fighting-men of the entire land-army were first numbered; for Herodotus expressly informs us that the various contingents had never been numbered separately, and avows his own ignorance of the amount of each. The means employed for numeration were remarkable. Ten thousand men were counted,¹ and packed together as closely as possible: a line was drawn, and a wall of enclosure built, around the space which they had occupied, into which all the army was directed to enter successively, so that the aggregate number of divisions, comprising 10,000 each, was thus ascertained. One hundred and seventy of these divisions were affirmed by the informants of Herodotus to have been thus numbered, constituting a total of 1,700,000 foot, besides 80,000 horse, many war-chariots from Libya and camels from Arabia, with a presumed total of 20,000 additional men.² Such was the vast land-force of the Persian monarch: his naval equipments were of corresponding magnitude, comprising not only the 1207 triremes³ or war-ships of three banks of oars, but also 3000 smaller vessels of war and transports. The crew of each trireme comprised 200 rowers, and thirty fighting-men, Persians or Sakæ; that of each of the accompanying vessels included eighty men, according to an average which Herodotus supposes not far from the truth. If we sum up these items, the total numbers brought by Xerxes from Asia to the plain and to the coast of Doriskus would reach the astounding figure of 2,317,000 men. Nor is this all. In the farther march from Doriskus to Thermopylæ, Xerxes pressed into his service men and ships from all the people whose territory he traversed; deriving from hence a reinforcement of 120 triremes with aggregate crews of 24,000 men, and of 300,000 new land-troops, so that the aggregate of his force when he appeared at Thermopylæ was 2,640,000 men. To this we are to add, according to the conjecture of Herodotus, a number not at all inferior, as attendants, slaves, sutlers, crews of the provision-craft and ships of burthen, &c., so that the male

¹ The army which Darius had conducted against Scythia is said to have been counted by divisions of 10,000 each, but the process is not described in detail (Herodot. iv. 87).

² Herodot. vii. 60, 87, 184. This same rude mode of enumeration was employed by Darius Codomannus a century and a half afterwards, before he marched his army to the field of Issus. (Quintus Curtius, iii. 2, 3, p. 24, Mutzel.)

³ Herodot. vii. 89-97.

persons accompanying the Persian king when he reached his first point of Grecian resistance amounted to 5,283,220! So stands the prodigious estimate of this army, the whole strength of the eastern world, in clear and express figures of Herodotus,¹ who himself evidently supposes the number to have been even greater; for he conceives the number of "camp-followers" as not only equal to, but considerably larger than, that of fighting-men. We are to reckon, besides, the eunuchs, concubines, and female cooks, at whose number Herodotus does not pretend to guess; together with cattle, beasts of burthen, and Indian dogs, in indefinite multitude, increasing the consumption of the regular army.

To admit this overwhelming total, or anything near to it, is obviously impossible: yet the disparaging remarks which it has drawn down upon Herodotus are noway merited.² He takes pains to distinguish that which informants told him, from that which he merely guessed. His description of the review at Doriskus is so detailed, that he had evidently conversed with persons who were present at it, and had learnt the separate totals promulgated by the enumerators—infantry, cavalry, and ships of war great and small. As to the number of triremes, *his statement seems beneath the truth, as we may judge from the contemporary authority of Æschylus, who in the 'Persæ' gives the exact number of 1207 Persian ships as having fought at Salamis: but between Doriskus and Salamis, Herodotus³ has himself enumerated 647 ships as lost or destroyed, and only 120 as added. No exaggeration therefore can well be suspected in this statement, which would imply about 276,000 as*

¹ Herodot. vii. 185-186. *ἐπάγων πάντα τὸν ἡῶον στρατὸν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας.* (vii. 157.) "Vires Orientis et ultima secum Bactra ferens," to use the language of Virgil about Antony at Actium.

² Even Dahlmann, who has many good remarks in defence of Herodotus, hardly does him justice (Herodot. Aus seinem Buche sein Leben, ch. xxxiv. p. 176).

³ Only 120 ships of war are mentioned by Herodotus (vii. 185) as having joined afterwards from the seaports in Thrace. But 400 were destroyed, if not more, in the terrible storm on the coast of Magnesia (vii. 190); and the squadron of 200 sail, detached by the Persians round Eubœa, were also all lost (viii. 7); besides forty-five taken or destroyed in the various sea-fights near Artemisium (vii. 194; viii. 11). Other losses are also indicated (viii. 14-16).

As the statement of Æschylus for the number of the Persian triremes at Salamis appears well entitled to credit, we must suppose either that the number of Doriskus was greater than Herodotus has mentioned, or that a number greater than that which he has stated joined afterwards.

See a good note of Amersfoordt, ad Demosthen. Orat. de Symmoriis, p. 88 (Leyden, 1821).

the number of the crews, though there is here a confusion or omission in the narrative which we cannot clear up. But the aggregate of 3000 smaller ships, and still more that of 1,700,000 infantry, are far less trustworthy. There would be little or no motive for the enumerators to be exact, and every motive for them to exaggerate—an immense nominal total would be no less pleasing to the army than to the monarch himself—so that the military total of land-force and ships' crews, which Herodotus gives as 2,641,000 on the arrival at Thermopylæ, may be dismissed as unwarranted and incredible. And the computation whereby he determines the amount of non-military persons present, as equal or more than equal to the military, is founded upon suppositions no way admissible. For though in a Grecian well-appointed army it was customary to reckon one light-armed soldier or attendant for every hoplite, no such estimate can be applied to the Persian host. A few grandees and leaders might be richly provided with attendants of various kinds, but the great mass of the army would have none at all. Indeed, it appears that the only way in which we can render the military total, which must at all events have been very great, consistent with the conditions of possible subsistence, is by supposing a comparative absence of attendants, and by adverting to the fact of the small consumption, and habitual patience as to hardship, of Orientals in all ages. An Asiatic soldier will at this day make his campaign upon scanty fare, and under privations which would be intolerable to an European.¹ And while we thus diminish the probable consumption, we have to consider that never in any case of ancient history had so much previous pains been taken to accumulate supplies on the line of march: in addition to

¹ See on this point Volney, *Travels in Egypt and Syria*, ch. xxiv. vol. ii. pp. 70, 71; ch. xxxii. p. 367; and ch. xxxix. p. 435 (Engl. transl.).

Kinneir, *Geographical Memoir of the Persian Empire*, p. 22-23. Bernier, who followed the march of Aurungzebe from Delhi, in 1665, says that some estimated the number of persons in the camp at 300,000, others at different totals, but that no one knew, nor had they ever been counted. He says, "You are no doubt at a loss to conceive how so vast a number both of men and animals can be maintained in the field. The best solution of the difficulty will be found in the temperance and simple diet of the Indians." (Bernier, *Travels in the Mogul Empire*, translated by Brock, vol. ii. App. p. 118.)

So also Petit de la Croix says, about the enormous host of Genghis-Khan, "Les hommes sont si sobres, qu'ils s'accommodent de toutes sortes d'alimens."

That author seems to estimate the largest army of Genghis at 700,000 men. (*Histoire de Genghis*, liv. ii. ch. vi. p. 193.)

which, the cities in Thrace were required to furnish such an amount of provisions when the army passed by, as almost brought them to ruin. Herodotus himself expresses his surprise how provisions could have been provided for so vast a multitude, and were we to admit his estimate literally, the difficulty would be magnified into an impossibility. Weighing the circumstances of the case well, and considering that this army was the result of a maximum of effort throughout the vast empire,—that a great numerical total was the thing chiefly demanded,—and that prayers for exemption were regarded by the Great King as a capital offence—and that provisions had been collected for three years before along the line of march—we may well believe that the numbers of Xerxes were greater than were ever assembled in ancient times, or perhaps at any known epoch of history. But it would be rash to pretend to guess at any positive number, in the entire absence of ascertained data. When we learn from Thucydidês that he found it impossible to find out the exact numbers of the small armies of Greeks who fought at Mantinea,¹ we shall not be ashamed to avow our inability to count the Asiatic multitudes at Doriskus. We may remark, however, that, in spite of the reinforcements received afterwards in Thrace, Macedonia, and Thessaly, it may be doubted whether the aggregate total ever afterwards increased. For Herodotus takes no account of desertions, which yet must have been very numerous, in a host disorderly, heterogeneous, without any interest in the

¹ Thucyd. v. 68. Xenophon calls the host of Xerxes *innumerable*—*ἀναρίθμητον στρατιάν* (Anabas. iii. 2, 13).

It seems not to be considered necessary for a Turkish minister to know the number of an assembled Turkish army. In the war between the Russians and Turks in 1770, when the Turkish army was encamped at Rabadag near the Balkan, Baron de Tott tell us, "Le Visir me demanda un jour fort sérieusement si l'armée Ottomane étoit nombreuse. C'est à vous que je m'adresserois, lui dis-je, si j'étais curieux de le savoir. Je l'ignore, me repondit-il. Si vous l'ignorez, comment pourrais-je en être instruit? *En lisant la Gazette de Vienne*, me répliqua-t-il. Je restai confondu."

The Duke of Ragusa (in his Voyage en Hongrie, Turquie, &c.), after mentioning the prodigiously exaggerated statements current about the numbers slain in the suppressed insurrection of the Janissaries at Constantinople in 1826, observes, "On a dit et répété, que leur nombre s'étoit élevé à huit ou dix mille, et cette opinion s'est accréditée (it was really about 500). Mais les Orientaux en général, et les Turcs en particulier, n'ont aucune idée des nombres: ils les emploient sans exactitude, et ils sont par caractère portés à l'exagération. D'un autre côté, le gouvernement a dû favoriser cette opinion populaire, pour frapper l'imagination et inspirer une plus grande terreur." (vol. ii. p. 37.)

enterprise; and wherein the numbers of each separate contingent were unknown.

Ktêsias gives the total of the host at 800,000 men, and 1000 triremes, independent of the war-chariots: if he counts the crews of the triremes apart from the 800,000 men (as seems probable), the total will then be considerably above a million. Ælian assigns an aggregate of 700,000 men: Diodorus¹ appears to follow partly Herodotus, partly other authorities. None of these witnesses enable us to correct Herodotus, in a case where we are obliged to disbelieve him. He is in some sort an original witness, having evidently conversed with persons actually present at the muster of Doriskus, giving us their belief as to the numbers, together with the computation, true or false, circulated among them by authority. Moreover, the contemporary Æschylus, while agreeing with him exactly as to the number of triremes, gives no specific figure as to the land-force, but conveys to us in his 'Persæ' a general sentiment of vast number, which may seem in keeping with the largest statement of Herodotus: the Persian empire is drained of men—the women of Susa are left without husbands and brothers—the Baktrian territory has not been allowed to retain even its old men.² The terror-striking effect of this crowd

¹ Ktêsias, Persica, c. 22, 23; Ælian, V. H. xiii. 3; Diodorus, xi. 2-11.

Respecting the various numerical statements in this case, see the note of Bos ad Cornel. Nepot. Themistocl. c. 2, p. 75, 76.

The Samian poet Choerilus, a few years younger than Herodotus, and contemporary with Thucydîdês, composed an epic poem on the expedition of Xerxes against Greece. Two or three short fragments of it are all that is preserved: he enumerated all the separate nations who furnished contingents to Xerxes, and we find not only the Sakæ, but also the Solymi (apparently the Jews, and so construed by Josephus) among them. See Fragments, iii. and iv. in Næke's edition of Choerilus, p. 121-134. Josephus cont. Apion. p. 454, ed. Havercamp.

² Æschylus, Pers. 14-124, 722-737. Heeren (in his learned work on the commerce of the ancient world, *Über den Verkehr der alten Welt*, part 1, sect. 1, pp. 162, 558, 3rd edition) conceives that Herodotus had seen the actual muster-roll, made by Persian authority, of the army at Doriskus. I cannot think this at all probable: it is much more reasonable to believe that all his information was derived from Greeks who had accompanied the expedition. He must have seen and conversed with many such. The Persian royal scribes or secretaries accompanied the king, and took note of any particular fact or person who might happen to strike his attention (Herodot. vii. 100; viii. 90), or to exhibit remarkable courage. They seem to have been specially attached to the person of the king as ministers to his curiosity and amusement, rather than keepers of authentic and continuous records.

Heeren is disposed to accept the numerical totals, given by Herodotus as to the army of Xerxes, much too easily, in my judgement; nor is he correct

was probably quite as great as if its numbers had really corresponded to the ideas of Herodotus.

After the numeration had taken place, Xerxes passed in his chariot by each of the several contingents, observed their equipment, and put questions to which the royal scribes noted down the answers. He then embarked on board a Sidonian trireme (which had been already fitted up with a gilt tent), and sailed along the prows of his immense fleet, moored in line about 400 feet from the shore, and every vessel completely manned for action. Such a spectacle was well calculated to rouse emotions of arrogant confidence. It was in this spirit that he sent forth with for Demaratus the exiled king of Sparta, who was among his auxiliaries—to ask whether resistance on the part of the Greeks, to such a force, was even conceivable. The conversation between them, dramatically given by Herodotus, is one of the most impressive manifestations of sentiment in the Greek language.¹ Demaratus assures him that the Spartans most

in supposing that the contingents of the Persian army marched with their wives and families (p. 557–559).

¹ When Herodotus specifies his informants (it is much to be regretted that he does not specify them oftener) they seem to be frequently Greeks, such as Dikæus the Athenian exile, Thersander of Orchomenus in Bœotia, Archias of Sparta, &c. (iii. 55; viii. 65; ix. 16). He mentions the Spartan king Demaratus often, and usually under circumstances both of dignity and dramatic interest: it is highly probable that he may have conversed with that prince himself, or with his descendants, who remained settled for a long time in Teuthrania, near the Æolic coast of Asia Minor (Xenoph. *Hellenica*, iii. 1, 6), and he may thus have heard of representations offered by the exiled Spartan king to Xerxes. Nevertheless the remarks made by Hoffmeister, on the speeches ascribed to Demaratus, by Herodotus, are well-deserving of attention (*Sittlich-religiöse Lebensansicht des Herodotus*, 118).

“Herodotus always brings into connexion with insolent kings some man other through whom he gives utterance to his own lessons of wisdom. Crœsus, at the summit of his glory, comes the wise Solon: Crœsus himself, reformed by his captivity, performs the same part towards Cyrus and Kambyzes: Darius, as a prudent and honest man, does not require any such counsellor; but Xerxes in his pride has the sententious Artabanus and the sagacious Demaratus attached to him; while Amasis king of Egypt is employed to transmit judicious counsel to Polykratès, the despot of Samos. Since all these men speak one and the same language, it appears certain that they are introduced by Herodotus merely as spokesmen for his own criticisms on the behaviour and character of the various monarchs—criticisms which are nothing more than general maxims, moral and religious, ought out by Solon, Crœsus, or Artabanus, on occasion of particular events. The speeches interwoven by Herodotus have, in the main, not the same purpose as those of Tacitus—to make the reader more intimately acquainted with the existing posture of affairs or with the character of the agents—but a different purpose quite foreign to history: they embody

certainly, and the Dorians of Peloponnesus probably, will resist him to the death, be the difference of numbers what it may. Xerxes receives the statement with derision, but exhibits no feeling of displeasure : an honourable contrast to the treatment of Charidemus, a century and a half afterwards, by the last monarch of Persia.¹

After the completion of the review, Xerxes with the army pursued his march westward, in three divisions and along three different lines of road, through the territories of seven distinct tribes of Thracians, interspersed with Grecian maritime colonies. All was still within his own empire, and he took reinforcements from each as he passed : the Thracian Satræ were preserved from this levy by their unassailable seats amidst the woods and snows of Rhodopê. The islands of Samothrace and Thasus, with their subject towns on the mainland—and the Grecian colonies Dikæa,² Maroneia, and Abdêra—were successively laid under contribution for contingents of ships or men. What was still more ruinous—they were constrained to provide a day's meal for the immense host as it passed : on the day of his passage the Great King was their guest. Orders had been transmitted for this purpose long beforehand, and for many months the citizens had been assiduously employed in collecting food for the army, as well as delicacies for the monarch—in grinding flour of wheat and barley, fattening cattle, keeping up birds and fowls ; together with a decent display of gold and silver plate for the regal dinner. A superb tent was erected for Xerxes and his immediate companions, while the army received their

in the narrative his own personal convictions respecting human life and the divine government."

This last opinion of Hoffmeister is to a great degree true, but is rather too absolutely delivered.

¹ Herodot. vii. 101-104. How inferior is the scene between Darius and Charidemus, in Quintus Curtius ! (iii. 2, 9-19, p. 20, ed. Mutzel.)

Herodotus takes up substantially the same vein of sentiment and the same antithesis as that which runs through the Persæ of Æschylus ; but he handles it like a social philosopher, with a strong perception of the real causes of Grecian superiority.

It is not improbable that the skeleton of the conversation between Xerxes and Demaratus was a reality, heard by Herodotus from Demaratus himself or from his sons ; for the extreme speciality with which the Lacedæmonian exile confines his praise to the Spartans and Dorians, not including the other Greeks, hardly represents the feeling of Herodotus himself.

The minuteness of the narrative which Herodotus gives respecting the deposition and family circumstances of Demaratus (vi. 63 seq.), and his view of the death of Kleomenês as an atonement to that prince for injury done, may seem derived from family information (vi. 84).

² Herodot. vii. 109, 111, 118.

rations in the open region around : on commencing the march next morning, the tent with all its rich contents was plundered, and nothing restored to those who had furnished it. Of course so prodigious a host, which had occupied seven days and seven nights in crossing the double Hellespontine bridge, must also have been for many days on its march through the territory, and therefore at the charge, of each one among the cities, so that the cost brought them to the brink of ruin, and even in some cases drove them to abandon house and home. The cost incurred by the city of Thasus, on account of their possessions of the mainland, for this purpose was no less than 400 talents¹ (= £92,800) : while at Abdêra, the witty Megakreon recommended to his countrymen to go in a body to the temples and thank the gods, because Xerxes was pleased to be satisfied with one meal in the day. Had the monarch required breakfast as well as dinner, the Abderites must have been reduced to the alternative either of exile or of utter destitution.² A stream called Lissus, which seems to have been of no great importance, is said to have been drunk up by the army, together with a lake of some magnitude near Pistyrus.³

Through the territory of the Edonian Thracians and the Pierians, between Pangæus and the sea, Xerxes and his army reached the river Strymon at the important station called Ennea Hodoi or Nine-Roads, afterwards memorable by the foundation of Amphipolis. Bridges had been already thrown over the river, to which the Magian priests rendered solemn honours by sacrificing white horses and throwing them into the stream. Moreover, the religious feelings of Xerxes were not satisfied without the more precious sacrifices often resorted to by the Persians. He here buried alive nine native youths and nine maidens, in compliment to Nine-Roads, the name of the spot :⁴

¹ This sum of 400 talents was equivalent to the entire annual tribute charged in the Persian king's rent-roll, upon the satrapy comprising the western and southern coast of Asia Minor, wherein were included all the Ionic and Æolic Greeks, besides Lykians, Pamphylians, &c. (Herodot. iii. 90).

² Herodot. vii. 118-120. He gives (vii. 187) the computation of the quantity of corn which would have been required for daily consumption, assuming the immense numbers as he conjectures them, and reckoning one choenix of wheat for each man's daily consumption (= $\frac{1}{4}$ th of a medimnus). It is unnecessary to examine a computation founded on such inadmissible data.

³ Herodot. vii. 108, 109.

⁴ Herodot. vii. 114. He pronounces this savage practice to be specially Persian. The old and cruel Persian queen Amestris, wife of Xerxes, sought to prolong her own life by burying alive fourteen victims, children of illustrious men, as offerings to the subterranean god.

he also left, under the care of the Pæonians of Siris, the sacred chariot of Zeus, which had been brought from the seat of empire, but which doubtless was found inconvenient on the line of march. From the Strymon he marched forward along the Strymonic Gulf, passing through the territory of the Bisaltæ near the Greek colonies of Argilus and Stageirus, until he came to the Greek town of Akanthus, hard by the isthmus of Athos which had been recently cut through. The fierce king of the Bisaltæ¹ refused submission to Xerxes, fled to Rhodopê for safety, and forbade his six sons to join the Persian host. Unhappily for themselves, they nevertheless did so, and when they came back he caused all of them to be blinded.

All the Greek cities which Xerxes had passed by, obeyed his orders with sufficient readiness, and probably few doubted the ultimate success of so prodigious an armament. But the inhabitants of Akanthus had been eminent for their zeal and exertions in the cutting of the canal, and had probably made considerable profits during the operation: Xerxes now repaid their zeal by contracting with them the tie of hospitality, accompanied with praise and presents; though he does not seem to have exempted them from the charge of maintaining the army while in their territory. He here separated himself from his fleet, which was directed to sail through the canal of Athos, to double the two south-western capes of the Chalkidic peninsula, to enter the Thermaic Gulf, and to await his arrival at Therma. The fleet in its course gathered additional troops from the Greek towns in the two peninsulas of Sithonia and Pallênê, as well as on the eastern side of the Thermaic Gulf, in the region called Krusis or Krossæa, on the continental side of the isthmus of Pallênê. These Greek towns were numerous, but of little individual importance. Near Therma (Salonichi) in Mygdonia, in the interior of the Gulf and eastward of the mouth of the Axius, the fleet awaited the arrival of Xerxes by land from Akanthus. He seems to have had a difficult march, and to have taken a route considerably inland, through Pæonia and Krestônia—a wild, woody, and untrodden country, where his baggage-camels were set upon by lions, and where there were also wild bulls of prodigious size and fierceness. At length he rejoined his fleet at Therma, and stretched his army throughout Mygdonia, the ancient Pieria, and Bottiæis, as far as the mouth of the Haliakmôn.²

Xerxes had now arrived within sight of Mount Olympus, the

¹ Herodot. viii. 116.

² Herodot. vii. 122-127.

northern boundary of what was properly called Hellas ; after a march through nothing but subject territory, with magazines laid up beforehand for the subsistence of his army—with additional contingents levied in his course—and probably with Thracian volunteers joining him in the hopes of plunder. The road along which he had marched was still shown with solemn reverence by the Thracians, and protected both from intruders and from tillage, even in the days of Herodotus.¹ The Macedonian princes, the last of his western tributaries, in whose territory he now found himself—together with the Thesalian Aleuadæ—undertook to conduct him farther. Nor did the task as yet appear difficult : what steps the Greeks were taking to oppose him, shall be related in the coming chapter.

CHAPTER XXXIX

PROCEEDINGS IN GREECE FROM THE BATTLE OF MARATHON
TO THE TIME OF THE BATTLE OF THERMOPYLÆ

OUR information respecting the affairs of Greece immediately after the repulse of the Persians from Marathon, is very scanty.

Kleomenês and Leotychidês, the two kings of Sparta (the former belonging to the elder or Eurystheneid, the latter to the younger or the Prokleid, race), had conspired for the purpose of dethroning the former Prokleid king Demaratus : and Kleomenês had even gone so far as to tamper with the Delphian priestess for this purpose. His manœuvre being betrayed shortly afterwards, he was so alarmed at the displeasure of the Spartans, that he retired into Thessaly, and from thence into Arcadia, where he employed the powerful influence of his regal character and heroic lineage to arm the Arcadian people against his country. The Spartans, alarmed in their turn, voluntarily invited him back with a promise of amnesty. But his renewed lease did not last long. His habitual violence of character became aggravated into decided insanity, insomuch that he struck with his stick whomsoever he met ; and his relatives were forced to confine him in chains under a Helot sentinel. By severe menaces, he one day constrained this man to give him his sword, with which he mangled himself dreadfully and perished. So shocking a death was certain to receive a religious interpretation : yet which,

¹ Herodot. vii. 116.

among the misdeeds of his life, had drawn down upon him the divine wrath, was a point difficult to determine. Most of the Greeks imputed it to the sin of his having corrupted the Pythian priestess.¹ But the Athenians and Argeians were each disposed to an hypothesis of their own—the former believed that the gods had thus punished the Spartan king for having cut timber in the sacred grove of Eleusis—the latter recognised the avenging hand of the hero Argus, whose grove Kleomenês had burnt, along with so many suppliant warriors who had taken sanctuary in it. Without pronouncing between these different suppositions, Herodotus contents himself with expressing his opinion that the miserable death of Kleomenês was an atonement for his conduct to Demaratus. But what surprises us most is, to hear that the Spartans, usually more disposed than other Greeks to refer every striking phænomenon to divine agency, recognised on this occasion nothing but a vulgar physical cause: Kleomenês had gone mad (they affirmed) through habits of intoxication, learnt from some Scythian envoys who had come to Sparta.²

The death of Kleomenês, and the discredit thrown on his character, emboldened the Æginetans to prefer a complaint at Sparta respecting their ten hostages, whom Kleomenês and Leotychidês had taken away from the island, a little before the invasion of Attica by the Persians under Datis, and deposited at Athens as guarantee to the Athenians against aggression from Ægina at that critical moment. Leotychidês was the surviving auxiliary of Kleomenês in the requisition of these hostages, and against him the Æginetans complained. Though the proceeding was one unquestionably beneficial to the general cause of Greece,³ yet such was the actual displeasure of the Lacedæmonians against the deceased king and his acts, that the survivor Leotychidês was brought to a public trial, and condemned to be delivered up as prisoner in atonement to the Æginetans. The latter were about to carry away their prisoner, when a dignified Spartan named Theasidês, pointed out to them the danger which they were incurring by such an indignity against the regal person. The Spartans (he observed) had passed sentence under feelings of temporary wrath, which would probably be exchanged for sympathy if they saw the sentence executed.

Accordingly the Æginetans contented themselves with stipu-

¹ Herodot. vi. 74, 75.

² Herodot. vi. 84.

³ Herodot. vi. 61. Κλεομένεα, ἔδοντα ἐν τῇ Αἰγίνῃ, καὶ κοινὰ τῇ Ἑλλάδι ἀγαθὰ προσεργαζόμενοι, &c.

lating that Leotychildês should accompany them to Athens and redemand their hostages detained there. The Athenians refused to give up the hostages, in spite of the emphatic terms in which the Spartan king set forth the sacred obligation of restoring a deposit.¹ They justified the refusal in part by saying that the deposit had been lodged by the two kings jointly, and could not be surrendered to one of them alone. But they probably recollected that the hostages were placed with them less as a deposit than as a security against Æginetan hostility—which security they were not disposed to forego.

Leotychildês having been obliged to retire without success, the Æginetans resolved to adopt measures of retaliation for themselves. They waited for the period of a solemn festival celebrated every fifth year at Sunium; on which occasion a ship, peculiarly equipped and carrying some of the leading Athenians as Theôrs or sacred envoys, sailed thither from Athens. This ship they found means to capture, and carried all on board prisoners to Ægina. Whether an exchange took place, or whether the prisoners and hostages on both sides were put to death, we do not know. But the consequence of their proceeding was an active and decided war between Athens and Ægina,² beginning seemingly about 488 or 487 B.C., and lasting until 481 B.C., the year preceding the invasion of Xerxes.

An Æginetan citizen named Nikodromus took advantage of this war to further a plot against the government of the island. Having been before banished (as he thought unjustly), he now organised a revolt of the people against the ruling oligarchy, concerting with the Athenians a simultaneous invasion in support of his plan. Accordingly on the appointed day he rose with his partisans in arms and took possession of the Old Town—a strong post which had been superseded in course of

¹ Herodot. vi. 85; compare vi. 49–73, and chap. xxxvi. of this History.

² Herodot. vi. 87, 88.

Instead of *ἦν γὰρ δὴ τοῖσι Ἀθηναίοισι πεντήρης ἐπὶ Σούνῳ* (vi. 87), I follow the reading proposed by Schömann and sanctioned by Boeckh—*πεντετηρίς*. It is hardly conceivable that the Athenians at that time should have had any ships with five banks of oars (*πεντήρης*): moreover, apart from this objection, the word *πεντήρης* makes considerable embarrassment in the sentence: see Boeckh, *Urkunden über das Attische Seewesen*, chap. vii. pp. 75, 76.

The elder Dionysius of Syracuse is said to have been the first Greek who constructed *πεντήρεις* or quinquereme ships (Diodor. xiv. 40, 41).

There were many distinct pentaëterides, or solemnities celebrated every fifth year, included among the religious customs of Athens: see Aristoteles—*Πολιτ.* Fragm. xxvii. ed. Neumann; Pollux, viii. 187.

time by the more modern city on the sea-shore, less protected though more convenient.¹ But no Athenians appeared, and without them he was unable to maintain his footing. He was obliged to make his escape from the island, after witnessing the complete defeat of his partisans; a large body of whom, seven hundred in number, fell into the hands of the government, and were led out for execution. One man alone among these prisoners burst his chains, fled to the sanctuary of Dêmêtêr Thesmophorus, and was fortunate enough to seize the handle of the door before he was overtaken. In spite of every effort to drag him away by force, he clung to it with convulsive grasp. His pursuers did not venture to put him to death in such a position, but they severed the hands from the body and then executed him, leaving the hands still hanging to and grasping² the door-handle, where they seem to have long remained without being taken off. Destruction of the seven hundred prisoners does not seem to have drawn down upon the Æginetan oligarchy either vengeance from the gods or censure from their contemporaries. But the violation of sanctuary, in the case of that one unfortunate man whose hands were cut off, was a crime which the goddess Dêmêtêr never forgave. More than fifty years afterwards, in the first year of the Peloponnesian war, the Æginetans, having been previously conquered by Athens, were finally expelled from their island: such expulsion was the divine judgement upon them for this ancient impiety, which half a century of continued expiatory sacrifice had not been sufficient to wipe out.³

¹ See Thucyd. i. 8.

The acropolis at Athens, having been the primitive city inhabited, bore the name of *The City* even in the time of Thucydidês (ii. 15), at a time when Athens and Peiræus covered so large a region around and near it.

² Herodot. vi. 91. χεῖρες δὲ κείναι ἐμπεφυκνῖαι ἔσαν τοῖσι ἐπισπαστήρι. The word κείναι for ἐκείναι, "those hands," appears so little suitable in this phrase, that I rather imagine the real reading to have been κεναι (the Ionic dialect for κεναι), "the hands with nothing attached to them:" compare a phrase not very unlike, Homer, *Iliad*, iii. 376, κενῆ δὲ τρυφάλεια δμ' ἔσπετο, &c.

Compare the narrative of the arrest of the Spartan king Pausanias, and of the manner in which he was treated when in sanctuary at the temple of Athênê Chalkiækos (Thucyd. i. 134).

³ Herodot. vi. 91. Ἀπὸ τούτου δὲ καὶ ἄγος σφι ἐγένετο, τὸ ἐκθύσασθαι οὐκ οἰοί τε ἐγένοντο ἐπιμηχανώμενοι, ἀλλ' ἐφθησαν ἐκπεσόντες πρότερον ἐκ τῆς νήσου ἢ σφι ἴλεων γενέσθαι τὴν θεόν.

Compare Thucyd. ii. 27 about the final expulsion from Ægina. The Lacedæmonians assigned to these expelled Æginetans a new abode in the territory of Thyrea, on the eastern coast of Peloponnesus, where they were attacked, taken prisoners, and put to death by the Athenians, in the eighth

The Athenians who were to have assisted Nikodromus arrived at Ægina one day too late. Their proceedings had been delayed by the necessity of borrowing twenty triremes from the Corinthians, in addition to fifty of their own: with these seventy sail they defeated the Æginetans, who met them with a fleet of equal number—and then landed on the island. The Æginetans solicited aid from Argos, but that city was either too much displeased with them, or too much exhausted by the defeat sustained from the Spartan Kleomenês, to grant it. Nevertheless, one thousand Argeian volunteers, under a distinguished champion of the pentathlon named Eurybatês, came to their assistance, and a vigorous war was carried on, with varying success, against the Athenian armament.

At sea, the Athenians sustained a defeat, being attacked at a moment when their fleet was in disorder, so that they lost four ships with their crews: on land they were more successful, and few of the Argeian volunteers survived to return home. The general of the latter, Eurybatês, confiding in his great personal strength and skill, challenged the best of the Athenian warriors to single combat. He slew three of them in succession, but the arm of the fourth, Sôphanês of Dekeleia, was victorious, and proved fatal to him.¹ At length the invaders were obliged to leave the island without any decisive result, and the war seems to have been prosecuted by frequent descents and privateering on both sides—in which Nikodromus and the Æginetan exiles, planted by Athens on the coast of Attica near Sunium, took an active part;² the advantage on the whole being on the side of Athens.

The general course of this war, and especially the failure of the enterprise concerted with Nikodromus in consequence of delay in borrowing ships from Corinth, were well calculated to

year of the war (Thucyd. iv. 57). Now Herodotus, while he mentions the expulsion, does not allude to their subsequent and still more calamitous fate. Had he known the fact, he could hardly have failed to notice it, as a further consummation of the divine judgement. We may reasonably presume ignorance in this case, which would tend to support the opinion thrown out in a preceding chapter (c. xxxiii.) respecting the date of composition of his history—in the earliest years of the Peloponnesian war.

¹ Herodot. ix. 75.

² Herodot. vi. 90, 91, 92, 93. Thucyd. i. 41. About Sôphanês, compare ix. 75.

How much damage was done by such a privateering war, between countries so near as Ægina and Attica, may be seen by the more detailed description of a later war of the same kind in 388 B.C. (Xenophon, Hellenic. v. 1).

impress upon the Athenians the necessity of enlarging their naval force. And it is from the present time that we trace among them the first growth of that decided tendency towards maritime activity, which coincided so happily with the expansion of their democracy, and opened a new phase in Grecian history, as well as a new career for themselves.

The exciting effect produced upon them by the repulse of the Persians at Marathon has been dwelt upon in a preceding chapter. Miltiadês, the victor in that field, having been removed from the scene under circumstances already described, Aristeidês and Themistoklês became the chief men at Athens: and the former was chosen archon during the succeeding year. His exemplary uprightness in magisterial functions ensured to him lofty esteem from the general public, not without a certain proportion of active enemies, some of them sufferers by his justice. These enemies naturally became partisans of his rival Themistoklês, who had all the talents necessary for bringing them into co-operation. The rivalry between the two chiefs became so bitter and menacing, that even Aristeidês himself is reported to have said, "If the Athenians were wise they would cast both of us into the barathrum." Under such circumstances it is not too much to say that the peace of the country was preserved mainly by the institution called Ostracism, the true character of which I have already explained. After three or four years of continued political rivalry, the two chiefs appealed to a vote of ostracism, and Aristeidês was banished.

Of the particular points on which their rivalry turned, we are unfortunately little informed. But it is highly probable that one of them was, the important change of policy above alluded to—the conversion of Athens from a land-power into a sea-power,—the development of this new and stirring element in the minds of the people. By all authorities, this change of policy is ascribed principally and specially to Themistoklês.¹ On that account, if for no other reason, Aristeidês would probably be found opposed to it: but it was moreover a change not in harmony with that old-fashioned Hellenism, undisturbed uniformity of life, and narrow range of active duty and experience—which Aristeidês seems to have approved in common with the subsequent philosophers. The seaman was naturally more of a wanderer and cosmopolite than the heavy-armed soldier: the modern Greek seaman even at this moment is so to a remarkable degree, distinguished for the variety of

¹ Plutarch, Themist. c. 19.

his ideas, and the quickness of his intelligence.¹ The land-service was a type of steadiness and inflexible ranks, the sea-service that of mutability and adventure. Such was the idea strongly entertained by Plato and other philosophers:² though we may remark that they do not render justice to the Athenian seaman. His training was far more perfect and laborious, and his habits of obedience far more complete,³ than that of the Athenian hoplite or horseman: a training beginning with Themistoklés, and reaching its full perfection about the commencement of the Peloponnesian war.

In recommending extraordinary efforts to create a navy as

¹ See Mr. Galt's interesting account of the Hydriot sailors, *Voyages and Travels in the Mediterranean*, p. 376-378 (London, 1802).

² "The city of Hydra originated in a small colony of boatmen belonging to the Morea, who took refuge in the island from the tyranny of the Turks. About forty years ago they had multiplied to a considerable number, their little village began to assume the appearance of a town, and they had cargoes that went as far as Constantinople. In their mercantile transactions, the Hydriots acquired the reputation of greater integrity than the other Greeks, as well as of being the most intrepid navigators in the Archipelago; and they were of course regularly preferred. Their industry and honesty obtained its reward. The islands of Spezzia, Paros, Myconi, and Ipsara, resemble Hydra in their institutions, and possess the same character for commercial activity. In paying their sailors, Hydra and its sister islands have a peculiar custom. The whole amount of the freight is considered as a common stock, from which the charges of victualling the ship are deducted. The remainder is then divided into two equal parts: one is allotted to the crew and equally shared among them without reference to age or rank; the other part is appropriated to the ship and captain. The capital of the cargo is a trust given to the captain and crew on certain fixed conditions. The character and manners of the Hydriot sailors, from the moral effect of these customs, are much superior in regularity to the ideas that we are apt to entertain of sailors. They are sedate, well-dressed, well-bred, shrewd, informed, and speculative. They seem to form a class, in the orders of mankind, which has no existence among us. By their voyages, they acquire a liberality of notion which we expect only among gentlemen, while in their domestic circumstances their conduct is suitable to their condition. The Greeks are all traditionary historians, and possess much of that kind of knowledge to which the term *learning* is usually applied. This, mingled with the other information of the Hydriots, gives them that advantageous character of mind which I think they possess."

² Plato, *Legg.* iv. pp. 705, 706. Plutarch, Themistoklés, c. 19. Isokratés, Panathenaic. c. 43.

Plutarch, Philopœmen, c. 14. Πλὴν Ἐπαμεινώνδαν μὲν ἔτιοι λέγουσιν ἀνοῦντα γέσσαι τῶν κατὰ θάλασσαν ὠφελειῶν τοῖς πολίταις, ὅπως αὐτῷ μὴ λάθωσιν ἀντι μόνιμων ὀπλιτῶν, κατὰ Πλάτωνα, ναῦται γενόμενοι καὶ διαφθαρέντες, ἔπρακτον ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας καὶ τῶν νήσων ἀπελθεῖν ἐκουσίως: compare vii. p. 301.

³ See the remarkable passage in Xenophon (*Memorab.* iii. 5, 19), attesting that the Hoplites and the Hippias, the persons first in rank in the city, were also the most disobedient on military service.

well as to acquire nautical practice, Themistoklēs displayed all that sagacious appreciation of the circumstances and dangers of the time, for which Thucydidēs gives him credit: and there can be no doubt that Aristeidēs, though the honester politician of the two, was at this particular crisis the less essential to his country. Not only was there the struggle with Ægina, a maritime power equal or more than equal, and within sight of the Athenian harbour—but there was also in the distance a still more formidable contingency to guard against. The Persian armament had been driven with disgrace from Attica back to Asia; but the Persian monarch still remained with undiminished means of aggression as well as increased thirst for revenge; and Themistoklēs knew well that the danger from that quarter would recur greater than ever. He believed that it would recur again in the same way, by an expedition across the Ægean like that of Datis to Marathon;¹ against which the best defence would be found in a numerous and well-trained fleet. Nor could the large preparations of Darius for renewing the attack remain unknown to a vigilant observer, extending as they did over so many Greeks subject to the Persian empire. Such positive warning was more than enough to stimulate the active genius of Themistoklēs, who now prevailed upon his countrymen to begin with energy the work of maritime preparation, as well against Ægina as against Persia.² Not only were two hundred new ships built, and citizens trained as seamen—but the important work was commenced, during the year when Themistoklēs was either archon or general, of forming and fortifying a new harbour for Athens at Peiræus, instead of the ancient open bay of Phalêrum. The latter was indeed somewhat nearer to the city, but Peiræus with its three separate natural ports,³ admitting of being closed and fortified, was incomparably superior in safety as well as in convenience. It is not too much to say, with Herodotus—that the Æginetan “war was the salvation of Greece, by constraining the Athenians to make themselves a maritime power.”⁴ The whole efficiency of the resistance subsequently made to Xerxes turned upon this new movement in the organisation of Athens, allowed as it was to attain tolerable

¹ Thucyd. i. 93. ἰδὼν (Themistoklēs) τῆς βασιλέως στρατιᾶς τὴν κατὰ θάλασσαν ἔφοδον εἰσπορωτέραν τῆς κατὰ γῆν αὖσαν.

² Thucyd. i. 14. Herodot. vii. 144.

³ Thucyd. i. 93.

⁴ Herodot. vii. 144. Οὗτος γὰρ ὁ πόλεμος συστάς ἔσωσε τότε τὴν Ἑλλάδα, ἀναγκάσας θαλασσίους γενέσθαι Ἀθηναίους.

Thucyd. i. 18. ναυτικοὶ ἐγένοντο.

completeness through a fortunate concurrence of accidents; for the important delay of ten years, between the defeat of Marathon and the fresh invasion by which it was to be avenged, was in truth the result of accident. First, the revolt of Egypt; next, the death of Darius; thirdly, the indifference of Xerxes at his first accession towards Hellenic matters—postponed until 480 B.C., an invasion which would naturally have been undertaken in 487 or 486 B.C., and which would have found Athens at that time without her wooden walls—the great engine of her subsequent salvation.

Another accidental help, without which the new fleet could not have been built—a considerable amount of public money—was also by good fortune now available to the Athenians. It is first in an emphatic passage of the poet Æschylus, and next from Herodotus on the present occasion, that we hear of the silver mines of Laurium¹ in Attica, and the valuable produce which they rendered to the state. They were situated in the southern portion of the territory, not very far from the promontory of Sunium,² amidst a district of low hills which extended across much of the space between the eastern sea at Thorikus, and the western at Anaphlystus. At what time they first began to be worked, we have no information; but it seems hardly possible that they could have been worked with any spirit or profitable result, until after the expulsion of Hippias and the establishment of the democratical constitution of Kleisthenês. Neither the strong local factions, by which different portions of Attica were set against each other before the time of Peisistratus—nor the rule of that despot succeeded by his two sons—were likely to afford confidence and encouragement. But when the democracy of Kleisthenês first brought Attica into one systematic and comprehensive whole, with equal rights assigned to each part, and with a common centre at Athens—the power of that central government over the mineral wealth of the country, and its means of binding the whole people to respect agreements

¹ Æschylus, *Persæ*, 235.

² The mountain region of Laurium has been occasionally visited by modern travellers, but never carefully surveyed until 1836, when Dr. Fiedler examined it mineralogically by order of the present Greek government. See his *Reisen durch Griechenland*, vol. i. pp. 39, 73. The region is now little better than a desert, but Fiedler especially notices the great natural fertility of the plain near Thorikus, together with the good harbour at that place—both circumstances of great value at the time when the mines were in work. Many remains are seen of shafts sunk in ancient times—and sunk in so workmanlike a manner as to satisfy the eye of a miner of the present day.—p. 76.

concluded with individual undertakers, would give a new stimulus to private speculation in the district of Laurium. It was the practice of the Athenian government either to sell, or to let for a long term of years, particular districts of this productive region to individuals or companies; on consideration partly of a sum or fine paid down, partly of a reserved rent equal to one twenty-fourth part of the gross produce.

We are told by Herodotus that there was in the Athenian treasury, at the time when Themistoklés made his proposition to enlarge the naval force, a great sum¹ arising from the Laurian mines, out of which a distribution was on the point of being made among the citizens—ten drachms to each man. This great amount in hand must probably have been the produce of the purchase-money or fines received from recent sales, since the small annual reserved rent can hardly have been accumulated during many successive years. New and enlarged enterprises in mines must be supposed to have been recently begun by individuals under contract with the government: otherwise there could hardly have been at the moment so overflowing an exchequer, or adequate means for the special distribution contemplated. Themistoklés availed himself of this precious opportunity—set forth the necessities of the war with Ægina, and the still more formidable menace from the great enemy in Asia—and prevailed upon the people to forego the promised distribution for the purpose of obtaining an efficient navy.²

¹ Herodot. vii. 144. "Ὅτε Ἀθηναίοισι γενομένων χρημάτων μεγάλων ἐν τῷ κοινῷ, τὰ ἐκ τῶν μετάλλων σφι προσήλθε τῶν ἀπὸ Λαυρείου, ἐμελλον λάξεσθαι ὀρχηδὸν ἑκαστός δέκα δραχμάς."

² All the information—unfortunately it is very scanty—which we possess respecting the ancient mines of Laurium, is brought together in the valuable *Dissertation of M. Boeckh, translated and appended to the English translation of his Public Economy of Athens*. He discusses the fact stated in this chapter of Herodotus, in sect. 8 of that *Dissertation*: but there are many of his remarks in which I cannot concur.

After multiplying ten drachmæ by the assumed number of 20,000 Athenian citizens, making a sum total distributed of 33½ talents, he goes on—"That the distribution was made annually might have been presumed from the principles of the Athenian administration, without the testimony of Cornelius Nepos. We are not therefore to suppose that the savings of several years are meant, nor merely a surplus; but that all the public money arising from the mines, as it was not required for any other object, was divided among the members of the community" (p. 632).

We are hardly authorised to conclude from the passage of Herodotus that *all* the sum received from the mines was about to be distributed. The treasury was very rich, and a distribution was about to be made—but it does not follow that nothing was to be left in the treasury after the distribution. Accordingly, all calculations of the total produce of the mines, based upon this passage of Herodotus, are uncertain. Nor is it clear that

One cannot doubt that there must have been many speakers who would try to make themselves popular by opposing this proposition and supporting the distribution; insomuch that the power of the people generally to feel the force of a distant motive as predominant over a present gain, deserves notice as an earnest of their approaching greatness.

Immense indeed was the recompense reaped for this self-denial, not merely by Athens but by Greece generally, when the preparations of Xerxes came to be matured, and his armament was understood to be approaching. The orders for equipment of ships and laying in of provisions, issued by the Great King to his subject Greeks in Asia, the Ægean, and Thrace, would of course become known throughout Greece Proper; especially the vast labour bestowed on the canal of Mount Athos, which would be the theme of wondering talk with every Thasian or Akanthian citizen who visited the festival games in Peloponnesus. All these premonitory evidences were public enough, without any need of that elaborate stratagem whereby the exiled Demaratus is alleged to have secretly transmitted, from Susa to Sparta, intelligence of the approaching expedition.¹ The formal announcements of Xerxes all designated Athens as

there was any regular annual distribution, unless we are to take the passage of Cornelius Nepos as proving it: but he talks rather about the magistrates employing this money for jobbing purposes—not about a regular distribution (“*Nam cum pecunia publica quæ ex metallis redibat, largitione magistratum quotannis periret.*” *Corn. Nep. Themist. c. 2*). A story is told by Polyænus, from whomsoever he copied it—of a sum of 100 talents in the treasury, which Themistoklès persuaded the people to hand over to 100 rich men, for the purpose of being expended as the latter might direct, with an obligation to reimburse the money in case the people were not satisfied with the expenditure: these rich men employed each the sum awarded to him in building a new ship, much to the satisfaction of the people (*Polyæn. i. 30*). This story differs materially from that of Herodotus, and we cannot venture either to blend the two together or to rely upon Polyænus separately.

I imagine that the sum of 33 talents, or 50 talents, necessary for the distribution, formed part of a larger sum lying in the treasury, arising from the mines. Themistoklès persuaded the people to employ the *whole* sum in shipbuilding, which of course implied that the distribution was to be renounced. Whether there had been distributions of a similar kind in former years, as M. Boeckh affirms, is a matter on which we have no evidence. M. Boeckh seems to me not to have kept in view the fact (which he himself states just before) that there were two sources of receipt: into the treasury—original purchase-money paid down, and reserved annual rent. It is from the former source that I imagine the large sum lying in the treasury to have been derived: the small reserved rent probably went among the annual items of the state-budget.

¹ Herodot. vii. 239.

the special object of his wrath and vengeance.¹ Other Grecian cities might thus hope to escape without mischief: so that the prospect of the great invasion did not at first provoke among them any unanimous dispositions to resist. Accordingly, when the first heralds despatched by Xerxes from Sardis in the autumn of 481 B.C., a little before his march to the Hellespont, addressed themselves to the different cities with demand of earth and water, many were disposed to comply. Neither to Athens, nor to Sparta, were any heralds sent; and these two cities were thus from the beginning identified in interest and in the necessity of defence. Both of them sent, in this trying moment, to consult the Delphian oracle; while both at the same time joined to convene a Pan-Hellenic congress at the Isthmus of Corinth, for the purpose of organising resistance against the expected invader.

I have in the preceding chapters pointed out the various steps whereby the separate states of Greece were gradually brought, even against their own natural instincts, into something approaching more nearly to political union. The present congress, assembled under the influence of common fear from Persia, has more of a Pan-Hellenic character than any political event which has yet occurred in Grecian history. It extends far beyond the range of those Peloponnesian states who constitute the immediate allies of Sparta: it comprehends Athens, and is even summoned in part by her strenuous instigation: moreover, it seeks to combine every city of Hellenic race and language, however distant, which can be induced to take part in it—even the Kretans, Korkyræans, and Sicilians. It is true that all these states do not actually come,—but earnest efforts are made to induce them to come. The dispersed brethren of the Hellenic family are entreated to marshal themselves in the same ranks for a joint political purpose²—the defence of the common hearth and metropolis of the race. This is a new fact in Grecian history, opening scenes and ideas unlike to anything which has gone before—enlarging prodigiously the functions and duties connected with that headship of Greece which had hitherto been in the hands of Sparta, but which is about to become too comprehensive for her to manage—and thus introducing increased habits of co-operation among the subordinate states, as well as rival hopes of aggrandisement

¹ Herodot. vii. 8-138.

² Herodot. vii. 145. *Φρονήσαντες εἰ πως ἔν τε γένοιτο τὸ Ἑλληνικόν, καὶ εἰ συγκύψαντες ταῦτ' ἀπρήσοιεν πάντες, ὡς δεινῶν ἐπιόντων ὁμοίως πᾶσι Ἕλλησι.*

among the leaders. The congress at the Isthmus of Corinth marks such further advance in the centralising tendencies of Greece, and seems at first to promise an onward march in the same direction : but the promise will not be found realised.

Its first step was indeed one of inestimable value. While most of the deputies present came prepared, in the name of their respective cities, to swear reciprocal fidelity and brotherhood, they also addressed all their efforts to appease the feuds and dissensions which reigned among particular members of their own meeting. Of these the most prominent, as well as the most dangerous, was the war still subsisting between Athens and Ægina. The latter was not exempt, even now, from suspicions of *medising*¹ (*i. e.* embracing the cause of the Persians), which had been raised by her giving earth and water ten years before to Darius. But her present conduct afforded no countenance to such suspicions : she took earnest part in the congress as well as in the joint measures of defence, and willingly presented to accommodate her difference with Athens.² In the work of reconciling feuds, so essential to the safety of Greece, the Athenian Themistoklēs took a prominent part, as well as Cheileos of Tegea in Arcadia.³ The congress proceeded to send envoys and solicit co-operation from such cities as were not either equivocal or indifferent, especially Argos, Korkyra, and the Kretan and Sicilian Greeks ; and at the same time to despatch spies across to Sardis, for the purpose of learning the state and prospects of the assembled army.

These spies presently returned, having been detected, and condemned to death by the Persian generals, but released by express order of Xerxes, who directed that the full strength of his assembled armament should be shown to them, in order that the terror of the Greeks might be thus magnified. The step was well calculated for such a purpose : but the discouragement throughout Greece was already extreme, at this critical period when the storm was about to burst upon them. Even to intelligent and well-meaning Greeks, much more to the careless, the timid, or the treacherous—Xerxes with his countless host appeared irresistible, and indeed something more than human.⁴ Of course such an impression would be encouraged by the large number of Greeks already his tributaries : and we may even trace the manifestation of a wish to get rid of the Athenians.

¹ Herodot. viii. 92.

² Herodot. vii. 145.

³ Plutarch, Themistokl. c. 10. About Cheileos, Herodot. ix. 9.

⁴ Herodot. vii. 203. *οὐ γὰρ θεδν εἶναι τὸν ἐπιόντα ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, ἀλλ' ὑβραπον, &c.* : compare also vii. 56.

altogether, as the chief objects of Persian vengeance and chief hindrance to tranquil submission. This despair of the very continuance of Hellenic life and autonomy breaks forth even from the sanctuary of Hellenic religion, the Delphian temple; when the Athenians, in their distress and uncertainty, sent to consult the oracle. Hardly had their two envoys performed the customary sacrifices, and sat down in the inner chamber near the priestess Aristoniké, when she at once exclaimed—"Wretched men, why sit ye there? Quit your land and city, and flee afar! Head, body, feet, and hands are alike rotten: fire and sword, in the train of the Syrian chariot, shall overwhelm you: nor only *your* city, but other cities also, as well as many even of the temples of the gods—which are now sweating and trembling with fear, and foreshadow, by drops of blood on their roofs, the hard calamities impending. Get ye away from the sanctuary, with your souls steeped in sorrow."¹

So terrific a reply had rarely escaped from the lips of a priestess. The envoys were struck to the earth by it, and did not carry it back to Athens. In their sorrow they were encouraged yet to hope by an influential Delphian citizen named Timon (we trace here as elsewhere the underhand working of these leading Delphians on the priestess), who advised them to provide themselves with the characteristic marks of supplication, and to approach the oracle a second time in that imploring guise: "O lord, we pray thee (they said), have compassion on these boughs of supplication, and deliver to us something more comfortable concerning our country; else we quit not thy sanctuary, but remain here, until death." Upon which the priestess replied—"Athênê with all her prayers and all her sagacity cannot propitiate Olympian Zeus."² But this assurance I will give you, firm as adamant. When everything else in the land of Kekrops shall be taken, Zeus grants to Athênê that the

¹ Herodot. vii. 140—

'ἄλλ' ἴτον ἐξ ἀδύτου, κακοῖς δ' ἐπικίδνατε θυμόν.

The general sense and scope of the oracle appears to me clear, in this case. It is a sentence of nothing but desolation and sadness; though Bähr and Schweighäuser with other commentators try to infuse into it something of encouragement by construing *θυμόν*, *fortitude*. The translation of Valla and Schultz is nearer to the truth. But even when the general sense of an oracle is plain (which it hardly ever is), the particular phrases are always wild and vague.

² Herodot. vii. 141—

Οὐ δύναται Παιλλὰς Δε' Ὀλύμπιον ἐξελάσασθαι
Δισσομένη πολλοῖσι λόγοις καὶ μήτιδι πυκνῇ.

Compare with this the declaration of Apollo to Croesus of Lydia (i. 91).

wooden wall alone shall remain unconquered, to defend you and your children. Stand not to await the assailing horse and foot from the continent, but turn your backs and retire: you shall yet live to fight another day. O divine Salamis, thou too shalt destroy the children of women, either at the seed-time or at the harvest.”¹

This second answer was a sensible mitigation of the first. It left open some hope of escape, though faint, dark and unintelligible: and the envoys wrote it down to carry back to Athens, not concealing probably the terrific sentence which had preceded it. When read to the people, the obscurity of the meaning provoked many different interpretations. What was meant by “the wooden wall”? Some supposed that the acropolis itself, which had originally been surrounded with a wooden palisade, was the refuge pointed out; but the greater number, and among them most of those who were by profession expositors of prophecy, maintained that the wooden wall indicated the fleet. But these professional expositors, while declaring that the god bade them go on shipboard, deprecated all idea of a naval battle, and insisted on the necessity of abandoning Attica for ever. The last lines of the oracle, wherein it was said that Salamis would destroy the children of women, appeared to them to portend nothing but disaster in the event of a naval combat.

Such was the opinion of those who passed for the best expositors of the divine will. It harmonised completely with the despairing temper then prevalent, heightened by the terrible sentence pronounced in the first oracle. Emigration to some foreign land presented itself as the only hope of safety even for their persons. The fate of Athens,—and of Greece generally, which would have been helpless without Athens,—now hung upon a thread, when Themistoklēs, the great originator of the fleet, interposed with equal steadfastness of heart and ingenuity, to ensure the proper use of it. He contended that if the god had intended to designate Salamis as the scene of a naval disaster to the Greeks, that island would have been called in the oracle by some such epithet as “wretched Salamis:” but the fact that it was termed “divine Salamis,” indicated that the parties, destined to perish there, were the enemies of Greece, not the Greeks themselves. He encouraged his countrymen therefore to abandon their city and country, and to trust themselves

¹ Τείχος Τριτογενεῖ ξύλινον διδοὶ εὐρύσιπα Ζεὺς
Μούνον ἀπάρρητον τελέθειν, τὸ σὲ τέκνα τ' ὀνήσει.

* Ὁ θεὸς Σαλαμῖς, ἀπολεῖς δὲ σὺ τέκνα γυναικῶν, &c.—(Herodot. vii. 141.)

to the fleet as the wooden wall recommended by the god, but with full determination to fight and conquer on board.¹ Great indeed were the consequences which turned upon this bold stretch of exegetical conjecture. Unless the Athenians had been persuaded, by some plausible show of interpretation, that the sense of the oracle encouraged instead of forbidding a naval combat, they would in their existing depression have abandoned all thought of resistance.

Even with the help of an encouraging interpretation, however, nothing less than the most unconquerable resolution and patriotism could have enabled the Athenians to bear up against such terrific denunciations from the Delphian god, and persist in resistance in place of seeking safety by emigration. Herodotus emphatically impresses this truth upon his readers:² nay, he even steps out of his way to do so, proclaiming Athens as the real saviour of Greece. Writing as he did about the beginning of the Peloponnesian war—at a time when Athens, having attained the maximum of her empire, was alike feared, hated, and admired, by most of the Grecian states—he knows that the opinion which he is giving will be unpopular with his hearers generally, and he apologises for it as something wrung from him against his will by the force of the evidence.³ Not only did the

¹ Herodot. vii. 143. *Ταύτη Θεμιστοκλέους ἀποφαινομένου, Ἀθηναῖοι ταυτὰ σφι ἔγνωσαν αἰρετώτερα εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ τῶν χρησμολόγων, οἱ οὐκ ἔων ναυμαχίην ἀρτέεσθαι, ἀλλὰ ἐκλιπόντας χώραν τὴν Ἀττικὴν, ἕλλην τιὰ οἰκίσειν.*

There is every reason to accept the statement of Herodotus as true, respecting these oracles delivered to the Athenians, and the debated interpretation of them. They must have been discussed publicly in the Athenian assembly, and Herodotus may have conversed with persons who had heard the discussion. Respecting the other oracle which he states to have been delivered to the Spartans—intimating that either Sparta must be conquered or a king of Sparta must perish—we may reasonably doubt whether it was in existence before the battle of Thermopylæ (Herodot. vii. 220).

The later writers, Justin (ii. 12), Cornelius Nepos (c. 2), and Polyænus (i. 30), give an account of the proceeding of Themistoklès, inferior to Herodotus in vivacity as well as in accuracy.

² Herodot. vii. 139. *οὐδὲ σφέας χρηστήρια φοβερά, ἐλθόντα ἐκ Δελφῶν, καὶ ἐς δέσμα βαλόντα, ἔπεισε ἐκλιπεῖν τὴν Ἑλλάδα, &c.*

For the abundance of oracles and prophecies, from many different sources, which would be current at such a moment of anxiety, we may compare the analogy of the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war, described by the contemporary historian (Thucyd. ii. 8).

³ Herodot. vii. 139. *Ἐνθαῦτα ἀναγκαίῃ ἐξέργομαι γνῶμην ἀποδέξασθαι, ἐπιφθονοῦ μὲν πρὸς τῶν πλεόνων ἀνθρώπων ὄμωσ δὲ, τῇ γέ μοι φαίνεται εἶναι ἀληθές, οὐκ ἐπισχίσσω. Εἰ Ἀθηναῖοι, καταρῶδῆσαντες τὸν ἐπιόντα κίνδυνον, ἐξέλιπον τὴν σφετέρην, &c. . . . Νῦν δὲ, Ἀθηναίουσ ἂν τις λέγων σωτήρας γενέσθαι τῆς Ἑλλάδος, οὐκ ἂν ἀμαρτάνοι τὸ ἀληθές, &c.*

Athenians dare to stay and fight against immense odds : they, and they alone, threw into the cause that energy and forwardness whereby it was enabled to succeed,¹ as will appear further in the sequel.

But there was also a third way, not less deserving of notice, in which they contributed to the result. As soon as the congress of deputies met at the Isthmus of Corinth, it became essential to recognise some one commanding city. With regard to the land-force, no one dreamt of contesting the pre-eminence of Sparta. But in respect to the fleet, her pretensions were more disputable, since she furnished at most only sixteen ships, and little or no nautical skill ; while Athens brought two-thirds of the entire naval force, with the best ships and seamen. Upon these grounds the idea was at first started, that Athens should command at sea and Sparta on land : but the majority of the allies manifested a decided repugnance, announcing that they would follow no one but a Spartan. To the honour of the Athenians, they at once waived their pretensions, as soon as they saw that the unity of the confederate force at this moment of peril would be compromised.² To appreciate this generous abnegation of a claim in itself so reasonable, we must recollect that the love of pre-eminence was among the most prominent attributes of the Hellenic character ; a prolific source of their greatness and excellence, but producing also no small amount both of their follies and their crimes. To renounce at the call of public obligation a claim to personal honour and glory, is perhaps the rarest of all virtues in a son of Hellen.

We find thus the Athenians nerved up to the pitch of resistance—prepared to see their country wasted, and to live as

The whole chapter deserves peculiar attention, as it brings before us the feelings of those contemporaries to whom his history is addressed, and the mode of judging with which they looked back on the Persian war. One is apt unconsciously to fancy that an ancient historian writes for men in the abstract, and not for men of given sentiments, prejudices, and belief. The persons whom Herodotus addressed are those who were so full of admiration for Sparta, as to ascribe to her chiefly the honour of having beaten back the Persians ; and to maintain, that even without the aid of Athens, the Spartans and Peloponnesians both could have defended, and would have defended, the Isthmus of Corinth, fortified as it was by a wall built expressly. The Peloponnesian allies of that day forgot that they were open to attack by sea as well as by land.

¹ Herodot. vii. 139. *ἐλόμενοι δὲ τὴν Ἑλλάδα περιεῖναι ἐλευθέρην, τοῦτο τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν πᾶν τὸ λοιπὸν, ὅσον μὴ ἐμήδισε, αὐτοὶ οὗτοι ἔσαν οἱ ἐπεγείραντες, καὶ βασιλῆα μετὰ γε θεοῦ ἀνασάμενοι.*

² Herodot. viii. 2, 3 : compare vii. 161.

well as to fight on shipboard, when the necessity should arrive—furnishing two-thirds of the whole fleet, and yet prosecuting the building of fresh ships until the last moment¹—sending forth the ablest and most forward leader in the common cause, while content themselves to serve like other states under the leadership of Sparta. During the winter preceding the march of Xerxes from Sardis, the congress at the Isthmus was trying, with little success, to bring the Grecian cities into united action. Among the cities north of Attica and Peloponnesus, the greater number were either inclined to submit, like Thebes and the greater part of Bœotia, or were at least lukewarm in the cause of independence: so rare at this trying moment (to use the language of the unfortunate Plataeans fifty-three years afterwards) was the exertion of resolute Hellenic patriotism against the invader.²

Even in the interior of Peloponnesus, the powerful Argos maintained an ambiguous neutrality. It was one of the first steps of the congress to send special envoys to Argos, setting forth the common danger and soliciting co-operation. The result is certain, that no co-operation was obtained—the Argeians did nothing throughout the struggle; but as to their real position, or the grounds of their refusal, contradictory statements had reached the ears of Herodotus. They themselves affirmed that they were ready to have joined the Hellenic cause, in spite of dissuasion from the Delphian oracle—exactng only as conditions that the Spartans should conclude a truce with them for thirty years, and should equally divide the honours of headship with Argos. To the proposed truce there would probably have been no objection, nor was there any as to the principle of dividing the headship. But the Spartans added, that they had two kings, while the Argeians had only one; and inasmuch as neither of the two Spartan kings could be deprived of his vote, the Argeian king could only be admitted to a third vote conjointly with them. This proposition appeared to the Argeians (who considered that even the undivided headship was no more than their ancient right) as nothing better than insolent encroachment, and incensed them so much that they desired the envoys to quit their territory before sunset; pre-

¹ Herodot. vii. 144.

² Thucyd. iii. 56. *ἐν καιροῖς οἷς σπάνιον ἦν τῶν Ἑλλήνων τινὰ ἀρετὴν τῇ Ξέρξου δυνάμει ἀντιτάξασθαι.*

This view of the case is much more conformable to history than the boasts of later orators respecting wide-spread patriotism in these times. See Demosthen. Philipp. iii. 37, p. 120.

ferring even a tributary existence under Persia to a formal degradation as compared with Sparta.¹

Such was the story told by the Argeians themselves, but seemingly not credited either by any other Greeks, or by Herodotus himself. The prevalent opinion was, that the Argeians had a secret understanding with Xerxes. It was even affirmed that they had been the parties who invited him into Greece, as a means both of protection and of vengeance to themselves against Sparta after their defeat by Kleomenês. And Herodotus himself evidently believed that they *medised*, though he is half afraid to say so, and disguises his opinion in a cloud of words which betray the angry polemics going on about the matter, even fifty years afterwards.² It is certain that in act the Argeians were neutral, and one of their reasons for neutrality was, that they did not choose to join any Pan-Hellenic levy except in the capacity of chiefs. But probably the more powerful reason was, that they shared the impression, then so widely diffused throughout Greece, as to the irresistible force of the approaching host, and chose to hold themselves prepared for the event. They kept up secret negotiations even with Persian

¹ Herodot. vii. 147-150.

² The opinion of Herodotus is delivered in a remarkable way, without mentioning the name of the Argeians, and with evident reluctance. After enumerating all the Grecian contingents assembled for the defence of the isthmus, and the different inhabitants of Peloponnesus, ethnically classified, he proceeds to say: *Τουτέων ὄν τῶν ἑπτὰ ἔθνέων αἱ λοιπαὶ πόλεις, πᾶρες τῶν κατέλεξα, ἐκ τοῦ μέσου ἐκατέατο· εἰ δὲ ἐλευθέρως ἕξασσι εἰπεῖν, ἐκ τοῦ μέσου κατήμενοι ἐμήδιζον* (viii. 73). This assertion includes the Argeians without naming them.

When he speaks respecting the Argeians by name, he is by no means so free and categorical: compare vii. 152—he will give no opinion of his own, differing from the allegation of the Argeians themselves—he mentions other stories, incompatible with that allegation; but without guaranteeing their accuracy—he delivers a general admonition that those who think they have great reason to complain of the conduct of others would generally find, on an impartial scrutiny, that others have as much reason to complain of them—“And thus the conduct of Argos has not been *so much worse than that of others*”—*οὕτω δὴ οὐκ Ἀργείοισι ἀσχίστα πεποιήται*.

At the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, when the history of Herodotus was probably composed, the Argeians were in a peculiarly favourable position. They took part neither with Athens nor Lacedæmon, each of whom was afraid of offending them. An historian who openly countenanced a grave charge of treason against them in the memorable foregone combat against Xerxes, was thus likely to incur odium from both parties in Greece.

The comments of Plutarch on Herodotus in respect to this matter are of little value (*De Herodoti Malignit.* c. 28, p. 863), and are indeed unfair, since he represents the Argeian version of the facts as being universally believed (*ἔπαντες ἴσασιν*), which it evidently was not.

agents, yet not compromising themselves while matters were still pending. Nor is it improbable, in their vexation against Sparta, that they would have been better pleased if the Persians had succeeded,—all which may reasonably be termed, *medising*.

The absence of Hellenic fidelity in Argos was borne out by the parallel examples of Krete and Korkyra, to which places envoys from the Isthmus proceeded at the same time. The Kretans declined to take any part, on the ground of prohibitory injunctions from the oracle ;¹ the Korkyræans promised without performing, and even without any intention to perform. Their neutrality was a serious loss to the Greeks, since they could fit out a naval force of sixty triremes, second only to that of Athens. With this important contingent they engaged to join the Grecian fleet, and actually set sail from Korkyra ; but they took care not to sail round Cape Malea, or to reach the scene of action. Their fleet remained on the southern or western coast of Peloponnesus, under pretence of being weather-bound, until the decisive result of the battle of Salamis was known. Their impression was that the Persian monarch would be victorious, in which case they would have made a merit of not having arrived in time ; but they were also prepared with the plausible excuse of detention from foul winds, when the result turned out otherwise, and when they were reproached by the Greeks for their absence.² Such duplicity is not very astonishing, when we recollect that it was the habitual policy of Korkyra to isolate herself from Hellenic confederacies.³

The envoys who visited Korkyra proceeded onward on their mission to Gelon the despot of Syracuse. Of that potentate, regarded by Herodotus as more powerful than any state in Greece, I shall speak more fully in a subsequent chapter : it is sufficient to mention now, that he rendered no aid against Xerxes. Nor was it in his power to do so, whatever might have been his inclinations ; for the same year which brought the Persian monarch against Greece, was also selected by the Carthaginians for a formidable invasion of Sicily, which kept the Sicilian Greeks to the defence of their own island. It seems even

¹ Herodot. vii. 169.

² Herodot. vii. 168.

³ Thucyd. i. 32-37. It is perhaps singular that the Corinthian envoys in Thucydides do not make any allusion to the duplicity of the Korkyræans in regard to the Persian invasion, in the strong invective which they deliver against Korkyra before the Athenian assembly. (Thucyd. i. 37-42.) The conduct of Corinth herself, however, on the same occasion, was not altogether without reproach.

probable that this simultaneous invasion had been concerted between the Persians and Carthaginians.¹

The endeavours of the deputies of Greeks at the Isthmus had thus produced no other reinforcement to their cause except some fair words from the Korkyræans. It was about the time when Xerxes was about to pass the Hellespont, in the beginning of 480 B.C., that the first actual step for resistance was taken, at the instigation of the Thessalians. Though the great Thessalian family of the Aleuadæ were among the companions of Xerxes, and the most forward in inviting him into Greece, with every promise of ready submission from their countrymen—yet it seems that these promises were in reality unwarranted. The Aleuadæ were at the head only of a minority, and perhaps were even in exile, like the Peisistratidæ;² while most of the Thessalians were disposed to resist Xerxes—for which purpose they now sent envoys to the Isthmus,³ intimating the necessity of guarding the passes of Olympus, the northernmost entrance of Greece. They offered their own cordial aid in this defence, adding that they should be under the necessity of making their own separate submission, if this demand were not complied with. Accordingly a body of 10,000 Grecian heavy-armed infantry, under the command of the Spartan Euxenetus and the Athenian Themistoklēs, were despatched by sea to Alus in Achæa Phthiôtis, where they disembarked and marched by land across Achæa and Thessaly.⁴ Being joined by the Thessalian horse, they occupied the defile of Tempê, through which the river Peneius makes its way to the sea, by a cleft between the mountains Olympus and Ossa.

The long, narrow, and winding defile of Tempê formed then, and forms still, the single entrance, open throughout winter as well as summer, from Lower or maritime Macedonia into Thessaly. The lofty mountain precipices approach so closely as to leave hardly room enough in some places for a road: it is thus eminently defensible, and a few resolute men would be sufficient to arrest in it the progress of the most numerous host.⁵ But the Greeks soon discovered that the position was such as

¹ Herodot. vii. 158–167. Diodor. xi. 22.

² See Schol. ad Aristeid, Panathenaic. p. 138.

³ Herodot. vii. 172: compare c. 130.

⁴ Herodot. vii. 173.

⁵ Herodot. vii. 172. τὴν ἐσβολὴν τὴν Ὀλυμπικὴν. See the description and plan of Tempê in Dr. Clarke's Travels, vol. iv. ch. ix. p. 280; and the Dissertation of Kriegk, in which all the facts about this interesting defile are collected and compared (Das Thessalische Tempe. Frankfort, 1834).

they could not hold,—first, because the powerful fleet of Xerxes would be able to land troops in their rear; secondly, because there was also a second entrance passable in summer, from Upper Macedonia into Thessaly, by the mountain passes over the range of Olympus; an entrance which traversed the country of the Perrhæbians and came into Thessaly near Gonnus, about the spot where the defile of Tempê begins to narrow. It was in fact by this second pass, evading the insurmountable difficulties of Tempê, that the advancing march of the Persians was destined to be made, under the auspices of Alexander king of Macedon, tributary to them and active in their service. That prince sent a communication of the fact to the Greeks at Tempê, admonishing them that they would be trodden under foot by the countless host approaching, and urging them to renounce their hopeless position.¹ He passed for a friend, and probably believed himself to be acting as such, in dissuading the Greeks from unavailing resistance to Persia: but he was in reality a very dangerous mediator; and as such the Spartans had good reason to dread him, in a second intervention of which we shall hear more hereafter.² On the present occasion, the Grecian commanders were quite ignorant of the existence of any other entrance into Thessaly, besides Tempê, until their arrival in that region. Perhaps it might have been possible to defend both entrances at once, and considering the immense importance of arresting the march of the Persians at the frontiers of Hellas, the attempt would have been worth some risk. So great was the alarm, however, produced by the unexpected discovery, justifying or seeming to justify the friendly advice of Alexander, that they remained only a few days at Tempê, then at once retired back to their ships, and returned by sea to the Isthmus of Corinth—about the time when Xerxes was crossing the Hellespont.³

The description of Tempê in Livy (xliiii. 18; xlv. 6) seems more accurate than that of Pliny (H. N. iv. 8). We may remark that both the one and the other belong to times subsequent to the formation and organisation of the Macedonian empire, when it came to hold Greece in a species of dependence. The Macedonian princes after Alexander the Great, while they added to the natural difficulties of Tempê by fortifications, at the same time made the road more convenient as a military communication. In the time of Xerxes these natural difficulties had never been approached by the hand of art, and were doubtless much greater.

The present road through the pass is about thirteen feet broad in its narrowest part, and between fifteen and twenty feet broad elsewhere—the pass is about five English miles in length (Kriegk, p. 21-33).

¹ Herodot. vii. 173.

² Herodot. viii. 140-143.

³ Herodot. vii. 173, 174.

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This precipitate retreat produced consequences highly disastrous and discouraging. It appeared to leave all Hellas north of Mount Kithæron and of the Megarid territory without defence, and it served either as reason or pretext for the majority of the Grecian states, north of that boundary, to make their submission to Xerxes, which some of them had already begun to do before.¹ When Xerxes in the course of his march reached the Thermaic Gulf, within sight of Olympus and Ossa, the heralds whom he had sent from Sardis brought him tokens of submission from a third portion of the Hellenic name—the Thessalians, Dolopes, Ænians, Perrhæbians, Magnètes, Lokrians, Dorians, Melians, Phthiôtid Achæans, and Bœotians. Among the latter is included Thebes, but not Thespiæ or Plateæ. The Thessalians, especially, not only submitted, but manifested active zeal and rendered much service in the cause of Xerxes, under the stimulus of the Aleuadæ, whose party now became predominant: they were probably indignant at the hasty retreat of those who had come to defend them.²

Had the Greeks been able to maintain the passes of Olympus and Ossa, all this northern faction might probably have been induced to partake in the resistance instead of becoming auxiliaries to the invader. During the six weeks or two months which elapsed between the retreat of the Greeks from Tempé and the arrival of Xerxes at Therma, no new plan of defence was yet thoroughly organised; for it was not until that arrival became known at the Isthmus, that the Greek army and fleet made its forward movement to occupy Thermopylæ and Artemisium.³

CHAPTER XL

BATTLES OF THERMOPYLÆ AND ARTEMISIUM

It was while the northerly states of Greece were thus successively falling off from the common cause, that the deputies assembled at the Isthmus took among themselves the solemn engagement, in the event of success, to inflict upon these recusant brethren condign punishment; to tithe them in property, and perhaps to consecrate a tenth of their persons, for the profit of

¹ Diodor. xi. 3. *ἔτι παρουσίας τῆς ἐν τοῖς Τέμπεσι φυλακῆς, &c.*

² Herodot. vii. 131, 132, 174.

³ Herodot. vii. 177.

the Delphian god. Exception was to be made in favour of those states which had been driven to yield by irresistible necessity.¹ Such a vow seemed at that moment little likely to be executed. It was the manifestation of a determined feeling binding together the states which took the pledge, but it cannot have contributed much to intimidate the rest.

To display their own force, was the only effective way of keeping together doubtful allies. The pass of Thermopylæ was now fixed upon as the most convenient point of defence, next to that of Tempê—leaving out indeed, and abandoning to the enemy, Thessalians, Perrhæbians, Magnètes, Phthiôtid Achæans, Dolopes, Ænianes, Malians, &c., who would all have been included if the latter line had been adhered to; but comprising the largest range consistent with safety. The position of Thermopylæ presented another advantage which was not to be found at Tempê; the mainland was here separated from the island of Eubœa only by a narrow strait, about two English miles and a half in its smallest breadth, between Mount Knêmis and Cape Kênæum. On the northern portion of Eubœa, immediately facing Magnesia and Achæa Phthiôtis, was situated the line of coast called Artemisium; a name derived from the temple of Artemis, which was its most conspicuous feature, belonging to the town of Histiaæa. It was arranged that the Grecian fleet should be mustered there, in order to co-operate with the land-force, and to oppose the progress of the Persians on both elements at once. To fight in a narrow space² was supposed favourable to the Greeks on sea not less than on land, inasmuch as their ships were both fewer in number, and heavier in sailing than those in the Persian service. From the position of Artemisium, it was calculated that they might be able to prevent the Persian fleet from advancing into the narrow strait which severs Eubœa to the north and west from the mainland, and which between Chalkis and Bœotia becomes not too wide for a bridge. It was at this latter point that the Greek seamen would have preferred to place their defence: but the occupation of the northern part of the Eubœan strait was indispensable to prevent the Persian fleet from landing troops in the rear of the defenders of Thermopylæ.

Of this Eubœan strait, the western limit is formed by what

¹ Herodot. vii. 132; Diodor. xi. 3.

² Herodot. viii. 15-60. Compare Isokratès, Panegyric, Or. iv. p. 59.

I shall have occasion presently to remark the revolution which took place in Athenian feeling on this point between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars.

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was then called the Maliac Gulf, into which the river Spercheius poured itself—after a course from west to east between the line of Mount Othrys to the north and Mount Cæta to the south—near the town of Antikyra. The lower portion of this spacious and fertile valley of the Spercheius was occupied by the various tribes of the Malians, bordering to the north and east on Achæa Phthiôtis: the southernmost Malians, with their town of Trachis, occupied a plain—in some places considerable, in others very narrow—enclosed between Mount Cæta and the sea. From Trachis the range of Cæta stretched eastward, bordering close on the southern shore of the Maliac Gulf: between the two lay the memorable pass of Thermopylæ.¹ On the road from Trachis to Thermopylæ, immediately outside of the latter and at the mouth of the little streams called the Phœnix and the Asôpus, was placed the town of Anthêla, celebrated for its temples of Amphiktyon and of the Amphiktyonic Dêmêtêr, as well as for the autumnal assemblies of the Amphiktyonic council, for whom seats were provided in the temple.

Immediately near to Anthêla, the northern slope of the mighty and prolonged ridge of Cæta approached so close to the gulf, or at least to an inaccessible morass which formed the edge of the gulf, as to leave no more than one single wheel track between. This narrow entrance formed the western gate of Thermopylæ. At some little distance, seemingly about a mile, to the eastward, the same close conjunction between the mountain and the sea was repeated—thus forming the eastern gate of Thermopylæ, not far from the first town of the Lokrians, called Alpêni. The space between these two gates was wider and more open, but it was distinguished, and is still distinguished, by its abundant flow of thermal springs, salt and sulphureous. Some cells were here prepared for bathers, which procured for the place the appellation of Chytri or the Pans: but the copious supply of mineral water spread its mud, and deposited its crust over all the adjacent ground; and the Phokians, some time before, had designedly endeavoured so to conduct the water as to render the pass utterly impracticable, at the same time building a wall across it near to the western gate. They had done this in order to keep off the attacks of the Thessalians, who had been trying to extend their conquests southward and eastward. The warm springs, here as in other

¹ The word *Pass* commonly conveys the idea of a path enclosed between mountains. In this instance it is employed to designate a narrow passage, having mountains on one side only, and water (or marsh ground) on the other.

parts of Greece, were consecrated to Hêraklêś,¹ whose legendary exploits and sufferings ennobled all the surrounding region—Mount Cēta, Trachis, Cape Kenæum, the Lichades islands, the river Dyras. Some fragments of these legends have been transmitted and adorned by the genius of Sophoklêś, in his drama of the *Trachinian Maidens*.

Such was the general scene—two narrow openings with an intermediate mile of enlarged road and hot springs between them—which passed in ancient times by the significant name of Thermopylæ, the Hot Gates; or sometimes, more briefly, Pylæ—The Gates. At a point also near Trachis, between the mountains and the sea, about two miles outside or westward of Thermopylæ, the road was hardly less narrow, but it might be turned by marching to the westward, since the adjacent mountains were lower, and presented less difficulty of transit: while at Thermopylæ itself, the overhanging projection of Mount Cēta was steep, woody, and impracticable, leaving access, from Thessaly into Lokris and the territories south-east of Cēta, only through the straight gate;² save and except an unfrequented as

¹ According to one of the numerous hypotheses for refining religious legend into matter of historical and physical fact, Hêraklêś was supposed to have been an engineer or water-finder in very early times—*δεινός περὶ ζήτησιν ὑδάτων καὶ συναγωγῆν*. See Plutarch, *Cum principibus viris philosopho esse disserendum*, c. i. p. 776.

² About Thermopylæ, see Herodot. vii. 175, 176, 199, 200.

Ἡ δ' αὖ διὰ Τρηχίνος ἕσσοδος ἐς τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐστὶ, τῇ στενωπόταν, ἡμίπλεθρον· οὐ μέντοι κατὰ τοῦτό γ' ἔστι τὸ στενωπόταν τῆς χάρης τῆς ἕλλης, ἀλλ' ἐμπροσθὲ τε Θερμοπυλῶν καὶ ὕπισθε· κατὰ τε Ἀλπηνοῦς, ὕπισθε ἐόντας, εὐῖσα ἀμαξιτὸς μούνη· καὶ ἐμπροσθε κατὰ Φοίνικα ποταμὸν, ἀμαξιτὸς ἕλλη μούνη.

Compare Pausaniās, vii. 15, 2. τὸ στενὸν τὸ Ἡρακλείας τε μεταξὺ καὶ Θερμοπυλῶν: also Strabo ix. p. 429; and Livy, xxxvi. 12.

Herodotus says about Thermopylæ—*στενωτέρη γὰρ ἐφαίνετο εὐῖσα τῆς ἐς Θεσσαλίην, i.e.* than the defile of Tempê.

If we did not possess the clear topographical indications given by Herodotus, it would be almost impossible to comprehend the memorable event here before us; for the configuration of the coast, the course of the rivers, and the general local phenomena, have now so entirely changed, that modern travellers rather mislead than assist. In the interior of the Maliac Gulf, three or four miles of new land have been formed by the gradual accumulation of river deposit, so that the Gulf itself is of much less extent, and the mountain bordering the gate of Thermopylæ is not now near to the sea. The river Spercheius has materially altered its course: instead of flowing into the sea in an easterly direction considerably north of Thermopylæ, as it did in the time of Herodotus, it has been diverted southward in the lower part of its course, with many windings, so as to reach the sea much south of the pass, while the rivers Dyras, Melas, and Asôpus, which in the time of Herodotus all reached the sea separately between the mouth of Spercheius and Thermopylæ, now do not reach the sea at all, but fall

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well as circuitous mountain path which will be presently noticed. The wall originally built across the pass by the Phokians was now half-ruined by age and neglect; but the Greeks easily re-established it, determining to await in this narrow pass, in that age narrower even than the defile of Tempê, the approach of the invading host. The edge of the sea-line appears to have been for the most part marsh, fit neither for walking nor for sailing; but there were points at which boats could land, so that constant communication could be maintained with the fleet at Artemisium, while Alpêni was immediately in their rear to supply provisions.

Though a general resolution of the Greek deputies assembled at the Isthmus, to defend conjointly Thermopylæ and the Eubœan strait, had been taken seemingly not long after the retreat from Tempê, their troops and their fleet did not actually occupy these positions until Xerxes was known to have reached the Thermaic Gulf. Both were then put in motion; the land-force under the Spartan king Leonidas, the naval force under the Spartan commander Eurybiadês, apparently about the latter part of the month of June. Leonidas was the younger brother, the successor, and the son-in-law, of the former Eurystheneid king Kleomenês, whose only daughter Gorgo he had married. Another brother of the same family—Dorieus, older than Leonidas—had perished, even before the death of Kleomenês, in an unsuccessful attempt to plant a colony in Sicily; and room had been thus made for the unexpected succession of the youngest brother. Leonidas now conducted from the Isthmus to Thermopylæ a select band of 300 Spartans—all being citizens of mature age, and persons who left at

into the Spercheius. Moreover the perpetual flow of the thermal springs has tended to accumulate deposit and to raise the level of the soil generally throughout the pass. Herodotus seems to consider the road between the two gates of Thermopylæ as bearing north and south, whereas it would be more nearly east and west. He knows nothing of the appellation *alldromus*, applied by Livy and Strabo to an undefined portion of the stern ridge of Cæta.

Respecting the past and present features of Thermopylæ, see the valuable observations of Colonel Leake, *Travels in Northern Greece*, vol. ii. ch. x. 7-40; Gell, *Itinerary of Greece*, p. 239; Kruse, *Hellas*, vol. iii. ch. x.

129. Dr. Clarke observes, "The hot springs issue principally from two ouths at the foot of the limestone precipices of Cæta, upon the left of the useway, which here passes close under the mountain, and on this part of scarcely admits two horsemen abreast of each other, the morass on the ght, between the causeway and the sea, being so dangerous, that we were ry near being buried with our horses, by our imprudence in venturing a w paces into it from the paved road." (*Clarke's Travels*, vol. iv. ch. viii.

home sons to supply their places.¹ Along with them were 500 hoplites from Tegea, 500 from Mantinea, 120 from the Arcadian Orchomenus, 1000 from the rest of Arcadia, 400 from Corinth, 200 from Phlius, and 80 from Mykenæ. There were also doubtless Helots and other light troops, in undefined number, and probably a certain number of Lacedæmonian hoplites, not Spartans. In their march through Bœotia they were joined by 700 hoplites of Thespiæ, hearty in the cause, and by 400 Thebans of more equivocal fidelity under Leontiadês. It appears indeed that the leading men of Thebes, at that time under a very narrow oligarchy, decidedly *medised*, or espoused the Persian interest, as much as they dared before the Persians were actually in the country: and Leonidas, when he made the requisition for a certain number of their troops to assist in the defence of Thermopylæ, was doubtful whether they would not refuse compliance, and openly declare against the Greek cause. The Theban chiefs thought it prudent to comply, though against their real inclinations, and furnished a contingent of 400 men,² chosen from citizens of a sentiment opposed to their own. Indeed the Theban people, and the Bœotians generally, with the exception of Thespiæ and Platæa, seem to have had little sentiment on either side, and to have followed passively the inspirations of their leaders.

With these troops Leonidas reached Thermopylæ, whence he sent envoys to invite the junction of the Phokians and the Lokrians of Opus. The latter had been among those who had

¹ Herodot. vii. 177, 205. *ἐπιλεξάμενος ἄνδρας τε τοὺς κατεστειώτας τρηκοσίους, καὶ τοῖσι ἐτύγχανον παῖδες ἔδντες.*

In selecting men for a dangerous service, the Spartans took by preference those who already had families: if such a man was slain, he left behind him a son to discharge his duties to the state, and to maintain the continuity of the family sacred rites, the extinction of which was considered as a great misfortune. In our ideas, the life of the father of a family in mature age would be considered as of more value, and his death a greater loss, than that of a younger and unmarried man.

² Herodot. vii. 205; Thucyd. iii. 62; Diodor. xi. 4; Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 18.

The passage of Thucydidês is very important here, as confirming to a great degree the statement of Herodotus, and enabling us to appreciate the criticisms of Plutarch, on this particular point very plausible (*De Herodoti Malign.* pp. 865, 866). The latter seems to have copied from a lost Bœotian author named Aristophanês, who tried to make out a more honourable case for his countrymen in respect to their conduct in the Persian war.

The statement of Diodorus—*θηβαίων ἀπὸ τῆς ἐτέρας μερίδος ὡς τετρακῆσιοι*—is illustrated by a proceeding of the Korkyreean government (Thucyd. iii. 75) when they enlisted their enemies in order to send them away: also that of the Italian Cumæ (Dionys. Hal. vii. 5).

sent earth and water to Xerxes, of which they are said to have repented: the step was taken probably only from fear, which at this particular moment prescribed acquiescence in the summons of Leonidas, justified by the plea of necessity in case the Persians should prove ultimately victorious:¹ while the Phokians, if originally disposed to *medise*, were now precluded from doing so by the fact that their bitter enemies the Thessalians were active in the cause of Xerxes and influential in guiding his movements.² The Greek envoys added strength to their summons by all the encouragements in their power. "The troops now at Thermopylæ (they said) were a mere advanced body, preceding the main strength of Greece, which was expected to arrive every day: on the side of the sea, a sufficient fleet was already on guard. Moreover there was no cause for fear, since the invader was after all not a god, but a man, exposed to those reverses of fortune which came inevitably on all men, and most of all, upon those in pre-eminent condition."³ Such arguments prove but too evidently the melancholy state of terror which then pervaded the Greek mind. Whether reassured by them or not, the great body of the Opuntian Lokrians, and 1000 Phokians, joined Leonidas at Thermopylæ.

That this terror was both genuine and serious, there cannot be any doubt: and the question naturally suggests itself, why the Greeks did not at once send their full force instead of a mere advanced guard? The answer is to be found in another attribute of the Greek character—it was the time of celebrating both the Olympic festival-games on the banks of the Alpheius, and the Karneian festival at Sparta and most of the other Dorian states.⁴ Even at a moment when their whole freedom

¹ Diodor. xi. 4.

² Herodot. viii. 30.

³ Herodot. vii. 203. λέγοντες δι' ἀγγέλων, ὡς αὐτοὶ μὲν ἤκοιεν πρόδρομοι τῶν ἄλλων, οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ τῶν συμμαχῶν προσδοκίμοι πᾶσάν εἰσι ἡμέραν. . . . καὶ σφι εἶη θεῶν οὐδέν· οὐ γὰρ θεὸν εἶναι τὸν ἐπιόντα ἐπὶ τῇ Ἑλλάδι, ἀλλ' ἄνθρωπον· εἶναι δὲ θνητὸν οὐδένα, οὐδὲ ἔσσεσθαι, τῷ κακῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς γινόμενῳ οὐ συνεμίχθη, τοῖσι δὲ μεγίσταισι αὐτέων, μέγιστα δόφειλιν ἄν καὶ τὸν ἐπελαύνοντα, ὡς ἔόντα θνητὸν, ἀπὸ τῆς δόξης πεσέειν ἄν.

⁴ Herodot. vii. 206. It was only the Dorian states (Lacedæmon, Argos, Sikyon, &c.) which were under obligations of abstinence from aggressive military operations during the month of the Karneian festival: other states (even in Peloponnesus), Elis, Mantinea, &c., and of course Athens, were not under similar restraint (Thucyd. v. 54, 75).

I do not here mean to assert that these two festivals (the Karneia and the Olympia) took place so exactly at the same time, that persons could not attend both. It would seem that the Karneia came latest of the two. But the Grecian festival depended on the lunar months, and varied more

and existence were at stake, the Greeks could not bring themselves to postpone these venerated solemnities: especially the Peloponnesian Greeks, among whom this force of religious routine appears to have been the strongest. At a period more than a century later, in the time of Demosthenès, when the energy of the Athenians had materially declined, we shall find them too postponing the military necessities of the state to the complete and splendid fulfilment of their religious festival obligations—starving all their measures of foreign policy in order that the Theoric exhibitions might be imposing to the people and satisfactory to the gods. At present, we find little disposition in the Athenians to make this sacrifice—certainly much less than in the Peloponnesians. The latter, remaining at home to celebrate their festivals while an invader of superhuman might was at their gates, remind us of the Jews in the latter days of their independence, who suffered the operations of the besieging Roman army round their city to be carried on without interruption during the Sabbath.¹ The Spartans and their confederates reckoned that Leonidas with his detachment would be strong enough to hold the pass of Thermopylæ until the Olympic and Karneian festivals should be past, after which period they were prepared to march to his aid with their whole military force.² They engaged to assemble in Bœotia for the purpose of defending Attica against attack on the land-side, while the great mass of the Athenian force was serving on shipboard.

At the time when this plan was laid, they believed that the narrow pass of Thermopylæ was the only means of possible access for an invading army. But Leonidas, on reaching the spot, discovered for the first time that there was also a mountain path starting from the neighbourhood of Trachis, ascending the gorge of the river Asôpus and the hill called Anopæa, then crossing the crest of Cæta and descending in the rear of Thermopylæ near the Lokrain town of Alpêni. This path—then hardly used, though its ascending half now serves as the regular track from Zeitun, the ancient Lamia, to Salona on the Corinthian Gulf, the ancient Amphissa—was revealed to him

or less in reference to the solar year. The Karneia were annual; the Olympia quadrennial.

¹ Josephus, *Bell. Judaic.* i. 7, 3; ii. 16, 4; *ibid.* *Antiqq. Judaic.* xiv. 4, 2. If their bodies were attacked on the Sabbath, the Jews defended themselves; but they would not break through the religious obligations of the day in order to impede any military operations of the besiegers. See Reimar. *ad* Dion. Cass. lxi. 7.

² Herodot. vii. 206; viii. 40.

by its first discoverers, the inhabitants of Trachis, who in former days had conducted the Thessalians over it to attack Phokis, after the Phokians had blocked up the pass of Thermopylæ. It was therefore not unknown to the Phokians: it conducted from Trachis into their country, and they volunteered to Leonidas that they would occupy and defend it.¹ But the Greeks thus found themselves at Thermopylæ under the same necessity of providing a double line of defence, for the mountain path as well as for the defile, as that which had induced their former army to abandon Tempê: and so insufficient did their numbers seem, when the vast host of Xerxes was at length understood to be approaching, that a panic terror seized them. The Peloponnesian troops especially, anxious only for their own separate line of defence at the Isthmus of Corinth, wished to retreat thither forthwith. The indignant remonstrances of the Phokians and Lokrians, who would thus have been left to the mercy of the invader, induced Leonidas to forbid this retrograde movement: but he thought it necessary to send envoys to the various cities, insisting on the insufficiency of his numbers, and requesting immediate reinforcements.² So painfully were the consequences now felt, of having kept back the main force until after the religious festivals in Peloponnesus.

Nor was the feeling of confidence stronger at this moment in their naval armament, though it had mustered in far superior numbers at Artemisium on the northern coast of Eubœa, under the Spartan Eurybiadês. It was composed as follows:—100 Athenian triremes, manned in part by the citizens of Plataea, in spite of their total want of practice on shipboard, 40 Corinthian, 20 Megarian, 20 Athenian, manned by the inhabitants of Chalkis and lent to them by Athens, 18 Æginetan, 12 Sikyonian, 10 Lacedæmonian, 8 Epidaurian, 7 Eretrian, 5 Trœzenian, 2 from Styra in Eubœa, and 2 from the island of Keos. There were thus in all 271 triremes; together with 9 pente-konters, furnished partly by Keos and partly by the Lokrians of Opus. Themistoklês was at the head of the Athenian contingent, and Adeimantus of the Corinthian; of other officers we hear nothing.³ Three cruising vessels, an Athenian, an Æginetan, and a Trœzenian, were pushed forward along the coast of Thessaly, beyond the island of Skiathos, to watch the advancing movements of the Persian fleet from Therma.

It was here that the first blood was shed in this memorable

¹ Herodot. vii. 212, 216, 218.

² Herodot. vii. 207.

³ Herodot. viii. 1, 2, 3. Diodorus (xi. 12) makes the Athenian number stronger by twenty triremes.

contest. Ten of the best ships in the Persian fleet, sent forward in the direction of Skiathos, fell in with these three Grecian triremes, who probably supposing them to be the precursors of the entire fleet sought safety in flight. The Athenian trireme escaped to the mouth of the Peneius, where the crew abandoned her, and repaired by land to Athens, leaving the vessel to the enemy: the other two ships were overtaken and captured afloat—not without a vigorous resistance on the part of the Æginetan, one of whose hoplites, Pythês, fought with desperate bravery and fell covered with wounds. So much did the Persian warriors admire him, that they took infinite pains to preserve his life, and treated him with the most signal manifestations both of kindness and respect, while they dealt with his comrades as slaves.

On board the Trœzenian vessel, which was the first to be captured, they found a soldier named Leon, of imposing stature: this man was immediately taken to the ship's head and slain, as a presaging omen in the approaching contest: perhaps (observes the historian) his name may have contributed to determine his fate.¹ The ten Persian ships advanced no farther than the dangerous rock Myrmêx, between Skiathos and the mainland, which had been made known to them by a Greek navigator of Skyros, and on which they erected a pillar to serve as warning for the coming fleet. Still, so intense was the alarm which their presence, communicated by fire-signals² from Skiathos, and strengthened by the capture of the three look-out ships, inspired to the fleet at Artemisium, that they actually abandoned their station, believing that the entire fleet of the enemy was at hand.³ They sailed up the Eubœan strait to Chalkis, as the narrowest and most defensible passage; leaving scouts on the high lands to watch the enemy's advance.

Probably this sudden retreat was forced upon the generals by the panic of their troops, similar to that which King Leonidas, more powerful than Eurybiadês and Themistoklês, had found means to arrest at Thermopylæ. It ruined for the time the whole scheme of defence, by laying open the rear of

¹ Herodot. vii. 180. *τάχα δ' ἄν τι καὶ τοῦ οὐνόματος ἐπαύροιο.*

Respecting the influence of a name and its etymology, in this case unhappy for the possessor, compare Herodot. ix. 91; and Tacit. Hist. iv. 53.

² For the employment of fire-signals, compare Livy, xxviii. 5; and the opening of the *Agamemnon* of Æschylus and the same play, v. 270, 300; also Thucydides, iii. 22-80.

³ Herodot. vii. 181, 182, 183.

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the army at Thermopylæ to the operations of the Persian fleet. But that which the Greeks did not do for themselves was more than compensated by the beneficent intervention of their gods, who opposed to the invader the more terrible arms of storm and hurricane. He was allowed to bring his overwhelming host, land-force as well as naval, to the brink of Thermopylæ and to the coast of Thessaly, without hindrance or damage; but the time had now arrived when the gods appeared determined to humble him, and especially to strike a series of blows at his fleet which should reduce it to a number not beyond what the Greeks could contend with.¹ Amidst the general terror which pervaded Greece, the Delphians were the first to earn the gratitude of their countrymen by announcing that divine succour was at hand.² On entreating advice from their own oracle, they were directed to pray to the Winds, who would render powerful aid to Greece. Moreover the Athenian seamen, in their retreat at Chalkis, recollecting that Boreas was the husband of the Attic princess or heroine Oreithyia, daughter of their ancient king Erechtheus, addressed fervent prayers to their son-in-law for his help in need. Never was help more effective, or more opportune, than the destructive storm, presently to be recounted, on the coast of Magnesia, for which grateful thanks and annual solemnities were still rendered even in the time of Herodotus, at Athens as well as at Delphi.³

Xerxes had halted on the Thermaic Gulf for several days, employing a large portion of his numerous army in cutting down the woods, and clearing the roads, on the pass over Olympus from Upper Macedonia into Perrhæbia, which was recommended by his Macedonian allies as preferable to the defile of Tempê.⁴ Not intending to march through the latter,

¹ Herodot. vii. 184. μέχρι μὲν δὴ τούτου τοῦ χάρου καὶ τῶν Θερμοπυλῶν, ἀπαθὴς τε κακῶν ἔην ὁ στρατὸς, καὶ πλήθος ἔην τηνικαῦτα ἔτι τῶσον, &c.—viii. 13. ἐπαίετο δὲ πᾶν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὅπως ἂν ἐξισαθείη τῷ Ἑλληνικῷ τῷ Περσικῶν, μηδὲ πολλῶ πλέον εἴη. Compare viii. 109 and Diodor. xi. 13.

² Herodot. vii. 178. Δελφοὶ δὲ δεξάμενοι τὸ μαντήιον, πρῶτα μὲν, 'Ἑλλήνων τοῖσι βουλομένοισι εἶναι ἐλευθέροισι ἐξήγγειλαν τὰ χρησθέντα αὐτοῖσι' καὶ σφι δευῶς καταβῶδόνουσι τὸν βάρβαρον ἐξαγγείλαντες, χάριν ἀθάνατον κατέθεντο.

³ Herodot. vii. 189. The language of the historian in this chapter is remarkable: his incredulous reason rather gets the better of religious acquiescence.

Clemens Alexandrinus, reciting this incident together with some other miracles of Æakus, Aristæus, Empedoklés, &c., reproves his Pagan opponents for their inconsistency, while believing these, in rejecting the miracles of Moses and the prophets (Stromat. vi. pp. 629, 630).

⁴ The pass over which Xerxes passed was that by Petra, Pythium, and

he is said to have gone by sea to view it; and remarks are ascribed to him on the facility of blocking it up so as to convert all Thessaly into one vast lake.¹ His march from Therma through Macedonia, Perrhæbia, Thessaly, and Achæa Phthiôtis, into the territory of the Malians and the neighbourhood of Thermopylæ, occupied eleven or twelve days:² the people through whose towns he passed had already made their submission, and the Thessalians especially were zealous in seconding his efforts. His numerous host was still further swelled by the presence of these newly-submitted people, and by the Macedonian troops under Alexander; so that the river Onochônus in Thessaly, and even the Apidanus in Achæa Phthiôtis, would hardly suffice to supply it, but were drunk up, according to the information given to Herodotus. At Alus in Achæa, he condescended to listen to the gloomy legend connected with the temple of Zeus Laphysteus and the sacred grove of the Athamantid family. He respected and protected these sacred places: an incident which shows that the sacrilege and destruction of temples imputed to him by the Greeks, though true in regard to Athens, Abæ, Milétus, &c., was by no means universally exhibited, and is even found qualified by occasional instances of great respect for Grecian religious Oloosson—"saltum ad Petram"—"Perrhæbiæ saltum" (Livy, xlv. 21; xlv. 27.) Petra was near the point where the road passed from Pieria or Lower Macedonia into Upper Macedonia (see Livy, xxxix. 26).

Compare respecting this pass, and the general features of the neighbouring country, Colonel Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, vol. iii. ch. xviii. p. 337-343, and ch. xxx. p. 430; also Boué, La Turquie en Europe, vol. i. p. 198-202.

The Thracian king Sitalkês, like Xerxes on this occasion, was obliged to cause the forests to be cut, to make a road for his army, in the early part of the Peloponnesian war (Thucyd. ii. 98).

¹ Herodot. vii. 130, 131. That Xerxes, struck by the view of Olympus and Ossa, went to see the narrow defile between them, is probable enough; but the remarks put into his mouth are probably the fancy of some ingenious contemporary Greeks, suggested by the juxtaposition of such a landscape and such a monarch. To suppose this narrow defile walled up, was easy for the imagination of any spectator: to suppose that *he* could order it to be done, was in character with a monarch who disposed of an indefinite amount of manual labour, and who had just finished the cutting of Athos. Such dramatic fitness was quite sufficient to convert that which *might have been* said into that which *was* said, and to procure for it a place among the historical anecdotes communicated to Herodotus.

² The Persian fleet did not leave Therma until eleven days after Xerxes and his land-force (Herodot. vii. 183): it arrived in one day on the Sêpias Aktê or south-eastern coast of Magnesia (ibid.), was then assailed and distressed for three days by the hurricane (vii. 191), and proceeded immediately afterwards to Aphetæ (vii. 193). When it arrived at the latter place, Xerxes himself had been *three days* in the Malian territory (vii. 196).

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feeling.¹ Along the shore of the Malian Gulf he at length came into the Trachinian territory near Thermopylæ, where he encamped, seemingly awaiting the arrival of the fleet, so as to combine his further movements in advance,² now that the enemy were immediately in his front.

But his fleet was not destined to reach the point of communication with the same ease as he had arrived before Thermopylæ. After having ascertained by the ten ships already mentioned (which captured the three Grecian guardships) that the channel between Skiathos and the mainland was safe, the Persian admiral Megabates sailed with his whole fleet from Therma, or from Pydna,³ his station in the Thermaic Gulf, eleven days after the monarch had begun his land-march; and reached in one long day's sail the eastern coast of Magnesia, not far from its southernmost promontory. The greater part of this line of coast, formed by the declivities of Ossa and Pelion, is thoroughly rocky and inhospitable; but south of the town called Kasthanæa there was a short extent of open beach where the fleet rested for the night before coming to the line of coast called the Sêpias Aktê.⁴ The first line of ships were moored to the land, but the larger number of this immense fleet swung at anchor in a depth of eight lines. In this condition they were overtaken the next morning by a sudden and desperate hurricane,—a wind called by the people of the country Hellespontias, which blew right upon the shore. The most active among the mariners found means to forestall the danger by beaching and hauling their vessels ashore; but a large number, unable to take such a precaution, were carried before the wind and dashed to pieces near Melibœa, Kasthanæa, and other points of this unfriendly region. Four hundred ships of war, according to the lowest estimate, together with a countless heap of transports and provision craft, were destroyed: and the loss of life as well as of property was immense. For three entire days did the terrors of the storm last, during which time the crews ashore, left almost without defence, and apprehensive

¹ This point is set forth by Hoffmeister, *Sittlich-religiöse Lebensansicht des Herodotus*. Essen, 1832, sect. 19, p. 93.

² Herodot. vii. 196, 197, 201.

³ Diodor. xi. 12.

⁴ Diodorus (xi. 12), Plutarch (*Themistoklês*, 8) and Mannert (*Geogr. der Gr. und Römer*, vol. vii. p. 596), seem to treat Sêpias as a *cape*, the south-eastern corner of Magnesia: this is different from Herodotus, who mentions it as a line of some extent (*ἄπασα ἡ ἄκτῆ ἢ Σηπιάς*, vii. 191), and notices separately *τὴν ἄκρην τῆς Μαγνησίης*, vii. 193.

The geography of Apollonius Rhodius (i. 560–580) seems sadly inaccurate.

that the inhabitants of the country might assail or plunder them, were forced to break up the ships driven ashore in order to make a palisade out of the timbers.¹ Though the Magian priests who accompanied the armament were fervent in prayer and sacrifice—not merely to the Winds but also to Thetis and the Nereids, the tutelary divinities of Sêpias Aktê—they could obtain no mitigation until the fourth day:² thus long did the prayers of Delphi and Athens, and the jealousy of the gods against superhuman arrogance, protract the terrible visitation. At length on the fourth day calm weather returned, when all those ships which were in condition to proceed put to sea and sailed along the land, round the southern promontory of Magnesia to Aphetæ at the entrance of the Gulf of Pagasæ. Little indeed had Xerxes gained by the laborious cutting through Mount Athos, in hopes to escape the unseen atmospheric enemies which howl around that formidable promontory: the work of destruction to his fleet was only transferred to the opposite side of the intervening Thracian sea.

Had the Persian fleet reached Aphetæ without misfortune, they would have found the Eubœan strait evacuated by the Greek fleet and undefended, so that they would have come immediately into communication with the land-army, and would have acted upon the rear of Leonidas and his division. But the storm completely altered this prospect, and revived the spirits of the Greek fleet at Chalkis. It was communicated to them by their scouts on the high lands of Eubœa, who even sent them word that the entire Persian fleet was destroyed: upon which, having returned thanks and offered libations to Poseidon the Saviour, the Greeks returned back as speedily as they could to Artemisium. To their surprise, however, they saw the Persian fleet, though reduced in number, still exhibiting a formidable total and appearance at the opposite station of Aphetæ. The last fifteen ships of that fleet having been so greatly crippled by the storm as to linger behind the rest, mistook the Greek ships for their own comrades, fell into the midst of them, and were all captured. Sandôkês, sub-satrap of the Æolic Kymê—Aridôlis, despot of Alabanda in Karia—and Penthylus, despot of Paphos in Cyprus—the leaders of this

¹ Herodot. vii. 189-191.

² Herodot. vii. 191. On this occasion, as in regard to the prayers addressed by the Athenians to Boreas, Herodotus suffers a faint indication of scepticism to escape him: *ἡμέρας γὰρ δὴ ἐχέιμαζε τρεῖς· τέλος δὲ, ἐντομά τε ποιεῦντες καὶ καταβίδοντες γόησι τῷ ἀνέμῳ οἱ Μάγοι, πρὸς τε τούτοισι καὶ θεῖτι καὶ τῆσι Νηρηΐσι θύοντες, ἔπαυσαν τετάρτη ἡμέρῃ· ἢ ἄλλως κως αὐτὸς ἐθέλων ἐκόπασε.*

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squadron, were sent prisoners to the Isthmus of Corinth, after having been questioned respecting the enemy: the latter of these three had brought Xerxes a contingent of twelve ships, out of which eleven had foundered in the storm, while the last was now taken with himself aboard.¹

Meanwhile Xerxes, encamped within sight of Thermopylæ, suffered four days to pass without making any attack. A probable reason may be found in the extreme peril of his fleet, reported to have been utterly destroyed by the storm: but Herodotus assigns a different cause. Xerxes could not believe (according to him) that the Greeks at Thermopylæ, few as they were in number, had any serious intention to resist. He had heard in his march that a handful of Spartans and other Greeks, under a Herakleid leader, had taken post there, but he treated the news with scorn: and when a horseman—whom he sent to reconnoitre them, and who approached near enough to survey their position, without exciting any attention among them by his presence—brought back to him a description of the pass, the wall of defence, and the apparent number of the division, he was yet more astonished and puzzled. It happened too, that at the moment when this horseman rode up, the Spartans were in the advanced guard, outside of the wall: some were engaged in gymnastic exercises, others in combing their long hair, and none of them heeded the approach of the hostile spy. Xerxes next sent for the Spartan king Demaratus, to ask what he was to think of such madness: upon which the latter reminded him of their former conversation at Doriskus, again assuring him that the Spartans in the pass would resist to the death, in spite of the smallness of their number, and adding, that it was their custom, in moments of special danger, to comb their hair with peculiar care. In spite of this assurance from Demaratus, and of the pass not only occupied, but in itself so narrow and impracticable, before his eyes—Xerxes still persisted in believing that the Greeks did not intend to resist, and that they would disperse of their own accord. He delayed the attack for four days: on the fifth he became wroth at the impudence and recklessness of the petty garrison before him, and sent against them the Median and Kissian divisions, with orders to seize them and bring them as prisoners into his presence.²

Though we read thus in Herodotus, it is hardly possible to

¹ Herodot. vii. 194.

² Herodot. vii. 208, 210. *πέμπει ἐς αὐτοὺς Μήδους καὶ Κισσίουσιν θυμωθεὶς, ἐντεταλμένους σφεας ζωγήσαντας ἄγειν ἐς ὕψιν τῆν ἑωυτοῦ.*

believe that we are reading historical reality. We rather find laid out before us a picture of human self-conceit in its most exaggerated form, ripe for the stroke of the jealous gods, and destined, like the interview between Cræsus and Solon, to point and enforce that moral which was ever present to the mind of the historian; whose religious and poetical imagination, even unconsciously to himself, surrounds the naked facts of history with accompaniments of speech and motive which neither Homer nor Æschylus would have deemed unsuitable. The whole proceedings of Xerxes, and the immensity of host which he summoned, show that he calculated on an energetic resistance; and though the numbers of Leonidas, compared with the Persians, were insignificant, they could hardly have looked insignificant in the position which they then occupied—an entrance little wider than a single carriage-road, with a cross wall, a prolonged space somewhat widened, and then another equally narrow exit, behind it. We are informed by Diodorus¹ that the Lokrians, when they first sent earth and water to the Persian monarch, engaged at the same time to seize the pass of Thermopylæ on his behalf, and were only prevented from doing so by the unexpected arrival of Leonidas; nor is it unlikely that the Thessalians, now the chief guides of Xerxes,² together with Alexander of Macedon, would try the same means of frightening away the garrison of Thermopylæ, as had already been so successful in causing the evacuation of Tempê. An interval of two or three days might be well bestowed for the purpose of leaving to such intrigues a fair chance of success: the fleet meanwhile would be arrived at Aphetæ after the dangers of the storm. We may thus venture to read the conduct of Xerxes in a manner somewhat less childish than it is depicted by Herodotus.

The Medes, whom Xerxes first ordered to the attack, animated as well by the recollection of their ancient Asiatic supremacy as by the desire of avenging the defeat of Marathon,³ manifested great personal bravery. The position was one in which bows and arrows were of little avail: a close combat hand to hand was indispensable, and in this the Greeks had every advantage of organisation as well as armour. Short spears, light wicker shields, and tunics, in the assailants, were an imperfect match for the long spears, heavy and spreading shields, steady ranks,⁴ and practised fighting of the defenders.

¹ Diodor. xi. 4. ² Herodot. vii. 174; viii. 29-32. ³ Diodor. xi. 6.

⁴ Herodot. vii. 211; ix. 62, 63; Diodor. xi. 7: compare Æschyl. Pers.

Yet the bravest men of the Persian army pressed on from behind, and having nothing but numbers in their favour, maintained long this unequal combat, with great slaughter to themselves, and little loss to the Greeks. Though constantly repulsed, the attack was as constantly renewed, for two successive days: the Greek troops were sufficiently numerous to relieve each other when fatigued, since the space was so narrow that few could contend at once; and even the Immortals, or ten thousand choice Persian guards, and the other choice troops of the army, when sent to the attack on the second day, were driven back with the same disgrace and the same slaughter as the rest. Xerxes surveyed this humiliating repulse from a lofty throne expressly provided for him: "thrice (says the historian, with Homeric vivacity), did he spring from his throne, in agony for his army."¹

At the end of two days' fighting no impression had been made. The pass appeared impracticable, and the defence not less triumphant than courageous—when a Malian named Ephialtês revealed to Xerxes the existence of the unfrequented mountain-path. This at least was the man singled out by the general voice of Greece as the betrayer of the fatal secret. After the final repulse of the Persians, he fled his country for a time, and a reward was proclaimed by the Amphiktyonic assembly for his head; having returned to his country too soon, he was slain by a private enemy, whom the Lacedæmonians honoured as a patriot.² There were however other Greeks who were also affirmed to have earned the favour of Xerxes by the same valuable information; and very probably there may have been more than one informant—indeed the Thessalians, at that time his guides, can hardly have been ignorant of it. So little had the path been thought of, however, that no one in the Persian army knew it to be already occupied by the Phokians. At nightfall Hydarnês with a detachment of Persians proceeded along the gorge of the river Asôpus, ascended the path of Anopæa, through the woody region between the mountains occupied by the Cêtæans and those possessed by the Trachinians, and found himself at day-break near the summit, within sight of the Phokian guard of

¹ Herodot. vii. 212. Ἐν ταύτησι τῆσι προσόδοισι τῆς μάχης λέγεται βασιλῆα, θηρούμενον, τρίς ἀναδραμεῖν ἐκ τοῦ θρόνου, δεισαντα περὶ τῆ στρατιῆς. See Homer, *Iliad*, xx. 62; Æschyl. *Pers.* 472.

² Herodot. vii. 213, 214; Diodor. xi. 8.

Ktésias states that it was two powerful men of Trachis, Kalliadês and Timaphernês, who disclosed to Xerxes the mountain path (*Persica*, c. 24).

1000 men. In the stillness of day-break, the noise of his army trampling through the wood¹ aroused the defenders; but the surprise was mutual, and Hydarnês in alarm asked his guides whether these men also were Lacedæmonians. Having ascertained the negative, he began the attack, and overwhelmed the Phokians with a shower of arrows, so as to force them to abandon the path and seek their own safety on a higher point of the mountain. Anxious only for their own safety, they became unmindful of the inestimable opening which they were placed to guard. Had the full numerical strength of the Greeks been at Thermopylæ, instead of staying behind for the festivals, they might have planted such a force on the mountain-path as would have rendered it not less impregnable than the pass beneath.

Hydarnês, not troubling himself to pursue the Phokians, followed the descending portion of the mountain-path, shorter than the ascending, and arrived in the rear of Thermopylæ not long after midday.² But before he had yet completed his descent, the fatal truth had already been made known to Leonidas, that the enemy were closing in upon him behind. Scouts on the hills, and deserters from the Persian camp, especially a Kymæan³ named Tyrastiadas, had both come in with the news. And even if such informants had been wanting, the prophet Megistias, descended from the legendary seer Melampus, read the approach of death in the gloomy aspect of the morning sacrifices. It was evident that Thermopylæ could be no longer defended. There was however ample time for the defenders to retire, and the detachment of Leonidas were divided in opinion on the subject. The greater number of them were inclined to abandon a position now become untenable, and to reserve themselves for future occasions on which they might effectively contribute to repel the invader. Nor is it to be doubted that such was the natural impulse, both of brave soldiers and of prudent officers, under the circumstances. But to Leonidas the idea of retreat was intolerable. His own

¹ Herodot. vii. 217, 218. ἡώς τε δὴ διέφαινε—ἦν μὲν δὴ νημεμία, ψόφου δὲ γινόμενον πολλοῦ, &c.

I cannot refrain from transcribing a remark of Colonel Leake: "The *stillness of the dawn*, which saved the Phocians from being surprised, is very characteristic of the climate of Greece in the season when the occurrence took place, and like many other trifling circumstances occurring in the history of the Persian invasion, is an interesting proof of the accuracy and veracity of the historian." (Travels in Northern Greece, vol. ii. c. x. p. 55.)

² Herodot. vii. 216, 217.

³ Diodor. xi. 9.

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personal honour, together with that of his Spartan companions and of Sparta herself,¹ forbade him to think of yielding to the enemy the pass which he had been sent to defend. The laws of his country required him to conquer or die in the post assigned to him, whatever might be the superiority of number on the part of the enemy :² moreover we are told that the Delphian oracle had declared that either Sparta itself, or a king of Sparta, must fall victim to the Persian arms. Had he retired he could hardly have escaped that voice of reproach which, in Greece especially, always burst upon the general who failed ; while his voluntary devotion and death would not only silence every whisper of calumny, but exalt him to the pinnacle of glory both as a man and as a king, and set an example of chivalrous patriotism at the moment when the Greek world most needed the lesson.

The three hundred Spartans under Leonidas were found fully equal to this act of generous and devoted self-sacrifice. Perhaps he would have wished to inspire the same sentiment to the whole detachment : but when he found them indisposed, he at once ordered them to retire, thus avoiding all unseemly reluctance and dissension.³ The same order was also given to the prophet Megistias, who however refused to obey it and stayed, though he sent away his only son.⁴ None of the contingents remained with Leonidas except the Thespian and the Theban. The former, under their general Demophilus, volunteered to share the fate of the Spartans, and displayed even more than Spartan heroism, since they were not under that species of moral constraint which arises from the necessity

¹ Herodot. vii. 219. ἐνθαῦτα ἐβουλεύοντο οἱ Ἕλληνες, καὶ σφραγίσσοντο αἱ γνώμαι.

² Herodot. vii. 104.

³ Herodot. vii. 220. Ταύτη καὶ μᾶλλον τῇ γνώμῃ πλεῖστός εἰμι, Λεωνίδην, ἐπεὶ τε ἤσθετο τοὺς συμμάχους ἐόντας ἀπροθύμους, καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλοντας συνδιακινδυνεύειν, κελύσαι σφραγίσσασθαι· αὐτῷ δὲ ἀπιέναι οὐ καλῶς ἔχειν μένουσι δὲ αὐτοῦ κλέος μέγα ἐλείπετο, καὶ ἡ Σπάρτης εὐδαιμονίῃ οὐκ ἐξηλείφετο.

Compare a similar act of honourable self-devotion, under less conspicuous circumstances, of the Lacedæmonian commander Anaxibius, when surprised by the Athenians under Iphikratés in the territory of Abydus (Xenophon, Hellenic. iv. 3, 38). He and twelve Lacedæmonian harmosts all refused to think of safety by flight. He said to his men, when resistance was hopeless, Ἄνδρες, ἐμοὶ μὲν καλὸν ἐνθάδε ἀποθανεῖν· ὑμεῖς δὲ, πρὶν ξυμμίξει τοῖς πολεμίοις, σπεύδετε εἰς τὴν σωτηρίαν.

⁴ Herodot. vii. 221. According to Plutarch, there were also two persons belonging to the Herakleid lineage, whom Leonidas desired to place in safety, and for that reason gave them a despatch to carry home. They indignantly refused, and stayed to perish in the fight (Plutarch. Herodot. Malign. p. 866).

of acting up to a pre-established fame and superiority. But retreat with them presented no prospect better than the mere preservation of life, either in slavery or in exile and misery; since Thespiæ was in Bœotia, sure to be overrun by the invaders;¹ while the Peloponnesian contingents had behind them the Isthmus of Corinth, which they doubtless hoped still to be able to defend. With respect to the Theban contingent, we are much perplexed; for Herodotus tells us that they were detained by Leonidas against their will as hostages, that they took as little part as possible in the subsequent battle, and surrendered themselves prisoners to Xerxes as soon as they could. Diodorus says that the Thespians alone remained with the Spartans; and Pausanias, though he mentions the eighty Mykenæans as having stayed along with the Thespians (which is probably incorrect), says nothing about the Thebans.² All things considered, it seems probable that the Thebans remained, but remained by their own offer—being citizens of the anti-Persian party, as Diodorus represents them to have been, or perhaps because it may have been hardly less dangerous for them to retire with the Peloponnesians, than to remain, suspected as they were of *medism*. But when the moment of actual crisis arrived, their courage not standing so firm as that of the Spartans and Thespians, they endeavoured to save their lives by taking credit for *medism*, and pretending to have been forcibly detained by Leonidas.

The devoted band thus left with Leonidas at Thermopylæ

¹ The subsequent distress of the surviving Thespians is painfully illustrated by the fact, that in the battle of Plataea in the following year, they had no heavy armour (Herodot. ix. 30). After the final repulse of Xerxes, they were forced to recruit their city by the admission of new citizens (Herodot. viii. 75).

² Herodot. vii. 222. Ἡθηβαῖοι μὲν ἀέκοντες ἔμμενον, καὶ οὐ βουλόμενοι, κατέειχε γὰρ σφέας Λεωνίδης, ἐν ὁμήρων λόγῳ ποιούμενος. How could these Thebans serve as hostages? Against what evil were they intended to guard Leonidas, or what advantages could they confer upon him? Unwilling comrades on such an occasion would be noway desirable. Plutarch (De Herodot. Malign. p. 865) severely criticises this statement of Herodotus, and on very plausible grounds: among the many unjust criticisms in his treatise, this is one of the few exceptions.

Compare Diodorus, xi. 9; and Pausan. x. 20, 1.

Of course the Thebans, taking part as they afterwards did heartily with Xerxes, would have an interest in representing that their contingent had done as little as possible against him, and may have circulated the story that Leonidas detained them as hostages. The politics of Thebes *before* the battle of Thermopylæ were essentially double-faced and equivocal; not daring to take any open part against the Greeks before the arrival of Xerxes.

The eighty Mykenæans, like the other Peloponnesians, had the Isthmus of Corinth behind them as a post which presented good chances of defence.

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consisted of the 300 Spartans, with a certain number of Helots attending them, together with 700 Thespians and apparently 400 Thebans. If there had been before any Lacedæmonians (not Spartans) present, they must have retired with the other Peloponnesians. By previous concert with the guide Ephialtès, Xerxes delayed his attack upon them until near noon, when the troops under Hydarnês might soon be expected in the rear. On this last day, however, Leonidas knowing that all which remained was to sell the lives of his detachment dearly, did not confine himself to the defensive,¹ but advanced into the wider space outside of the pass; becoming the aggressor and driving before him the foremost of the Persian host, many of whom perished as well by the spears of the Greeks as in the neighbouring sea and morass, and even trodden down by their own numbers. It required all the efforts of the Persian officers, assisted by threats and the plentiful use of the whip, to force their men on to the fight. The Greeks fought with reckless bravery and desperation against this superior host, until at length their spears were broken, and they had no weapon left except their swords. It was at this juncture that Leonidas himself was slain, and around his body the battle became fiercer than ever: the Persians exhausted all their efforts to possess themselves of it, but were repulsed by the Greeks four several times, with the loss of many of their chiefs, especially two brothers of Xerxes. Fatigued, exhausted, diminished in number, and deprived of their most effective weapons, the little band of defenders retired, with the body of their chief, into the narrow strait behind the cross wall, where they sat altogether on a hillock, exposed to the attack of the main Persian army on one side, and of the detachment of Hydarnês, which had now completed its march, on the other. They were thus surrounded, overwhelmed with missiles, and slain to a man; not losing courage even to the last, but defending themselves with their remaining daggers, with their unarmed hands, and even with their mouths.²

¹ The story of Diodorus (xi. 10) that Leonidas made an attack upon the Persian camp during the night, and very nearly penetrated to the regal tent, from which Xerxes was obliged to flee suddenly, in order to save his life, while the Greeks, after having caused immense slaughter in the camp, were at length overpowered and slain—is irreconcilable with Herodotus and decidedly to be rejected. Justin however (ii. 11), and Plutarch (De Herodot. Malign. p. 866) follow it. The rhetoric of Diodorus is not calculated to strengthen the evidence in its favour. Plutarch had written, or intended to write, a biography of Leonidas (De Herodot. Mal. *ibid.*): but it is not preserved.

² Herodot. vii. 225.

Thus perished Leonidas with his heroic comrades—300 Spartans and 700 Thespians. Amidst such equal heroism, it seemed difficult to single out any individual as distinguished: nevertheless Herodotus mentions the Spartan Diênekês, Alpheus and Maron—and the Thespian Dithyrambus—as standing pre-eminent. The reply ascribed to the first became renowned.¹ “The Persian host (he was informed) is so prodigious that their arrows conceal the sun.” “So much the better (he answered), we shall then fight them in the shade.” Herodotus had asked and learnt the name of every individual among this memorable three hundred. And even six hundred years afterwards, Pausanias could still read the names engraved on a column at Sparta.² One alone among them—Aristodêmus—returned home, having taken no part in the combat. He, together with Eurytus another soldier, had been absent from the detachment on leave, and both were lying at Alpêni suffering from a severe complaint in the eyes. Eurytus, apprised that the fatal hour of the detachment was come, determined not to survive it, asked for his armour, and desired his attendant Helot to lead him to his place in the ranks; where he fell gallantly fighting, while the Helot departed and survived. Aristodêmus did not imitate this devotion of his sick comrade: overpowered with physical suffering, he was carried to Sparta—but he returned only to scorn and infamy among his fellow-citizens.³ He was denounced as “the coward

¹ Herodot. vii. 226.

² Herodot. vii. 224. *ἐπιθόμην δὲ καὶ ἀπάντων τῶν τριηκοσίων.* Pausanias, iii. 14, 1. Annual festivals, with a panegyric oration and gymnastic matches, were still celebrated even in his time in honour of Leonidas, jointly with the regent Pausanias, whose subsequent treason tarnished his laurels acquired at Platea. It is remarkable, and not altogether creditable to Spartan sentiment, that the two kings should have been made partners in the same public honours.

³ Herodot. vii. 229. *Ἀριστοδῆμον—λειποψυχέοντα λειφθῆναι—ἀλγῆσαντα ἀπονοστήσαι ἐς Σπάρτην.* The commentators are hard upon Aristodêmus when they translate these epithets “animo deficientem, timidum, pusillanimum,” considering that *λειποψύχῃσε* is predicated by Thucydides (iv. 12) even respecting the gallant Brasidas. Herodotus scarcely intends to imply anything like pusillanimity, but rather the effect of extreme physical suffering. It seems, however, that there were different stories about the cause which had kept Aristodêmus out of the battle.

The story of another soldier named Pantitês, who having been sent on a message by Leonidas into Thessaly, did not return in time for the battle, and was so disgraced when he went back to Sparta that he hanged himself—given by Herodotus as a report, is very little entitled to credit. It is not likely that Leonidas would send an envoy into Thessaly, then occupied by the Persians: moreover the disgrace of Aristodêmus is particularly explained by

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Aristodêmus ;” no one would speak or communicate with him, or even grant him a light for his fire.¹ After a year of such bitter disgrace, he was at length enabled to retrieve his honour at the battle of Plataea, where he was slain, after surpassing all his comrades in heroic and even reckless valour.

Amidst the last moments of this gallant band, we turn with repugnance to the desertion and surrender of the Thebans. They are said to have taken part in the final battle, though only to save appearances and under the pressure of necessity : but when the Spartans and Thespians, exhausted and disarmed, retreated to die upon the little hillock within the pass, the Thebans then separated themselves, approached the enemy with outstretched hands and entreated quarter. They now loudly proclaimed that they were friends and subjects of the Great King, and had come to Thermopylæ against their own consent ; all which was confirmed by the Thessalians in the Persian army. Though some few were slain before this proceeding was understood by the Persians, the rest were admitted to quarter ; not without the signal disgrace, however, of being branded with the regal mark as untrustworthy slaves—an indignity to which their commander Leontiadês was compelled to submit along with the rest. Such is the narrative which Herodotus recounts, without any expression of mistrust or even of doubt : Plutarch emphatically contradicts it, and even cites a Bœotian author,² who affirms that Anaxarchus, not Leontiadês, was commander of the Thebans at Thermopylæ. Without calling in question the equivocal conduct and

Herodotus by the difference between his conduct and that of his comrade Eurytus : whereas Pantitês stood alone.

¹ See the story of the single Athenian citizen, who returned home alone, after all his comrades had perished in an unfortunate expedition to the island of Ægina. The widows of the slain warriors crowded round him, each asking him what had become of her husband, and finally put him to death by pricking with their bodkins (Herodot. v. 87).

In the terrible battle of St. Jacob on the Birs, near Basle (August 1444), where 1500 Swiss crossed the river and attacked 40,000 French and Germans under the Dauphin of France, against strong remonstrances from their commanders—all of them were slain, after deeds of unrivalled valour and great loss to the enemy, except sixteen men who receded from their countrymen in crossing the river, thinking the enterprise desperate. These sixteen men on their return were treated with intolerable scorn and hardly escaped execution (Vogelin, Geschichte der Schweizer Eidgenossenschaft, vol. i. ch. 5, p. 393).

² Herodot. vii. 233 ; Plutarch, Herodot. Malign. p. 867. The Bœotian history of Aristophanês, cited by the latter, professed to be founded in part upon memorials arranged according to the sequence of magistrates and generals—*ἐκ τῶν κατὰ ἄρχοντας ὑπομνημάτων ἱστῶρησι*.

surrender of this Theban detachment, we may reasonably dismiss the story of this ignominious branding, as an invention of that strong anti-Theban feeling which prevailed in Greece after the repulse of Xerxes.

The wrath of that monarch, as he went over the field after the close of the action, vented itself upon the corpse of the gallant Leonidas, whose head he directed to be cut off and fixed on a cross. But it was not wrath alone which filled his mind. He was further impressed with involuntary admiration of the little detachment which had here opposed to him a resistance so unexpected and so nearly invincible. He now learnt to be anxious respecting the further resistance which remained behind. "Demaratus (said he to the exiled Spartan king at his side), thou art a good man: all thy predictions have turned out true: now tell me how many Lacedæmonians are there remaining, and are they all such warriors as these fallen men?" "O king (replied Demaratus), the total of the Lacedæmonians and of their towns is great; in Sparta alone there are 8000 adult warriors, all equal to those who have here fought; and the other Lacedæmonians, though inferior to them, are yet excellent soldiers." "Tell me (rejoined Xerxes), what will be the least difficult way of conquering such men?" Upon which Demaratus advised him to send a division of his fleet to occupy the island of Kythêra, and from thence to make war on the southern coast of Laconia, which would distract the attention of Sparta, and prevent her from co-operating in any combined scheme of defence against his land-force. Unless this were done, the entire force of Peloponnesus would be assembled to maintain the narrow isthmus of Corinth, where the Persian king would have far more terrible battles to fight than anything which he had yet witnessed.¹

Happily for the safety of Greece, Achæmenes the brother of Xerxes interposed to dissuade the monarch from this prudent plan of action; not without aspersions on the temper and motives of Demaratus, who (he affirmed), like other Greeks, hated all power, and envied all good fortune above his own. The fleet (added he), after the damage sustained by the recent storm, would bear no further diminution of number: and it was essential to keep the entire Persian force, on land as well as on sea, in one undivided and co-operating mass.²

A few such remarks were sufficient to revive in the monarch his habitual sentiment of confidence in overpowering number. Yet while rejecting the advice of Demaratus, he emphatically

¹ Herodot. vii. 235.

² Herodot. vii. 236.

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repelled the imputations against the good faith and sincere attachment of that exiled prince.¹

Meanwhile the days of battle at Thermopylæ had been not less actively employed by the fleets at Aphetæ and Artemisium. It has already been mentioned that the Greek ships, having abandoned their station at the latter place and retired to Chalkis, were induced to return by the news that the Persian fleet had been nearly ruined by the recent storm ; and that on returning to Artemisium, the Grecian commanders felt renewed alarm on seeing the enemy's fleet, in spite of the damage just sustained, still mustering an overwhelming number at the opposite station of Aphetæ. Such was the effect of this spectacle, and the impression of their own inferiority, that they again resolved to retire without fighting, leaving the strait open and undefended. Great consternation was caused by the news of their determination among the inhabitants of Eubœa, who entreated Eurybiadês to maintain his position for a few days, until they could have time to remove their families and their property. But even such postponement was thought unsafe and was refused. He was on the point of giving orders for retreat, when the Eubœans sent their envoy Pelagon to Themistoklês with the offer of thirty talents, on condition that the fleet should keep its station and hazard an engagement in defence of the island. Themistoklês employed the money adroitly and successfully, giving five talents to Eurybiadês, with large presents besides to the other leading chiefs. The most unmanageable among them was the Corinthian Adeimantus,—who at first threatened to depart with his own squadron alone, if the remaining Greeks were mad enough to remain. His alarm was silenced, if not tranquillised, by a present of three talents.²

However Plutarch may be scandalised at such inglorious revelations preserved to us by Herodotus respecting the underhand agencies of this memorable struggle, there is no reason to call in question the bribery here described. But Themistoklês doubtless was only tempted to do, and enabled to do, by means of the Eubœan money, that which he would have wished, and had probably tried, to accomplish, without the money—to bring on a naval engagement at Artemisium. It was absolutely essential

¹ Herodot. vii. 237. "The citizen (Xerxes is made to observe) does indeed naturally envy another citizen more fortunate than himself, and if asked for counsel will keep back what he has best in mind, unless he be a man of very rare virtue. But a foreign friend usually sympathises heartily with the good fortune of another foreigner, and will give him the best advice in his power whenever he is asked."

² Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. 7 ; Herodot. viii. 5, 6.

to the maintenance of Thermopylæ, and to the general plan of defence, that the Eubœan strait should be defended against the Persian fleet; and the Greeks could not expect any more favourable position to fight in. We may reasonably presume that Themistoklès, distinguished not less by daring than by sagacity, and the great originator of maritime energies in his country, concurred unwillingly in the projected abandonment of Artemisium. But his high mental capacity did not exclude that pecuniary corruption which rendered the presents of the Eubœans both admissible and welcome—yet still more welcome to him perhaps, as they supplied means of bringing over the other opposing chiefs and the Spartan admiral.¹ It was finally determined therefore to remain, and if necessary, to hazard an engagement in the Eubœan strait; but at any rate to procure for the inhabitants of the island a short interval to remove their families. Had these Eubœans heeded the oracles (says Herodotus²) they would have packed up and removed long before; for a text of Bakis gave them express warning: but having neglected the sacred writings as unworthy of credit, they were now severely punished for such presumption.

Among the Persian fleet at Aphetæ, on the other hand, the feeling prevalent was one of sanguine hope and confidence in their superior numbers, forming a strong contrast with the discouragement of the Greeks at Artemisium. Had they attacked the latter immediately, when both fleets first saw each other from their opposite stations, they would have gained an easy victory, for the Greek fleet would have fled, as the admiral was on the point of ordering, even without an attack. But this was not sufficient for the Persians, who wished to cut off every ship among their enemies even from flight and escape.³ Accordingly they detached 200 ships to circumnavigate the island of Eubœa, and to sail up the Eubœan strait from the south, in the rear

¹ The expression of Herodotus is somewhat remarkable: Οὔτοί τε δὴ πληγέντες δάροισι (Eurybiadès, Adeimantus, &c.) ἀναπεπεισμένοι ἔσαν, καὶ τοῖσι Εὐβοέεσι ἐκεχάριστο· αὐτός τε ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς ἐκέρδηνε, ἐλάνθανε δὲ τὰ λοιπὰ ἔχων.

² Herodot. viii. 20. Οἱ γὰρ Εὐβοέες παραχρησάμενοι τὸν Βάκιδος χρησμόν ὡς οὐδὲν λέγοντα, οὔτε τι ἐξεκομίσαντο οὐδὲν, οὔτε προσέβησαν, ὡς παροσόμενοι σφι πολέμου· περιπετέα δὲ ἐποίησαντο σφίσι αὐτοῖσι τὰ πρήγματα. Βάκιδι γὰρ ὡς εἶχε περὶ τούτων ὁ χρησμός·

Φράξο βαρβαρόφωνον· ἔταν ζυγὸν εἰς ἅλα βάλῃ
Βύβλινον, Εὐβοίης ἀπέχειν πολυμηκάδας αἶγας.

Τούτοις δὲ οὐδὲν τοῖσι ἔπεισι χρησαμένοις ἐν τοῖσι τότε παροῦσι τε. καὶ προσδοκίμοις κακοῖσι, παρῆν σφι συμφορῇ χρῆσθαι πρὸς τὰ μέγιστα.

³ Herodot. viii. 6. καὶ ἔμελλον δῆθεν ἐκφεύξεσθαι (οἱ Ἕλληνες): εἶδει δὲ μηδὲ πυρφόρον, τῷ ἐκείνων (Περσῶν) λόγῳ, περιγενέσθαι.

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of the Greeks ; postponing their own attack in front until this squadron should be in position to intercept the retreating Greeks. But though the manœuvre was concealed by sending the squadron round outside of the island of Skiathos, it became known immediately among the Greeks, through a deserter—Skyllias of Skionê. This man, the best swimmer and diver of his time, and now engaged like other Thracian Greeks in the Persian service, passed over to Artemisium, and communicated to the Greek commanders both particulars of the late destructive storm, and the despatch of the intercepting squadron.¹

It appears that his communications, respecting the effects of the storm and the condition of the Persian fleet, somewhat reassured the Greeks, who resolved during the ensuing night to sail from their station at Artemisium for the purpose of surprising the detached squadron of 200 ships, and who even became bold enough, under the inspirations of Themistoklês, to go out and offer battle to the main fleet near Aphetæ.² Wanting to acquire some practical experience, which neither leaders nor soldiers as yet possessed, of the manner in which Phœnicians and others in the Persian fleet handled and manœuvred their ships, they waited till a late hour of the afternoon, when little daylight remained.³ Their boldness in thus advancing out, with inferior numbers and even inferior ships, astonished the Persian admirals, and distressed the Ionians and other subject Greeks who were serving them as unwilling auxiliaries. To both it seemed that the victory of the Persian fleet, which was speedily brought forth to battle, and was numerous enough to encompass the Greeks, would be certain as well as complete. The Greek ships were at first marshalled in a circle, with their sterns in the interior, and presented their prows in front, at all points of the circumference.⁴ In this position, compressed into a narrow space, they seemed to be awaiting the attack of the enemy, who formed a larger circle around them : but on a second signal given, their ships assumed the aggressive, rowed out from the inner circle in direct impact against the hostile ships around, and took or disabled no less than thirty of them :

¹ Herodot. viii. 7, 8. Wonderful stories were recounted respecting the prowess of Skyllias, as a diver.

² Diodorus, xi. 12.

³ Herodot. viii. 9. *δείλην ὄψιν γινομένην τῆς ἡμέρης φυλάξαντες, αὐτοὶ ἐπ' ἀνέπλωον ἐπὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους, ἀπόπειραν αὐτέων ποιήσασθαι βουλόμενοι τῆς τε μάχης καὶ τοῦ διεκπλοῦ.*

⁴ Compare the description in Thucyd. ii. 84, of the naval battle between the Athenian fleet under Phormio and the Lacedæmonian fleet, where the ships of the latter are marshalled in this same array.

in one of which Philaon, brother of Gorgus despot of Salamis in Cyprus, was made prisoner. Such unexpected forwardness at first disconcerted the Persians, who however rallied and inflicted considerable damage and loss on the Greeks. But the near approach of night put an end to the combat, and each fleet retired to its former station; the Persians to Aphetæ, the Greeks to Artemisium.¹

The result of this first day's combat, though indecisive in itself, surprised both parties, and did much to exalt the confidence of the Greeks. But the events of the ensuing night did yet more. Another tremendous storm was sent by the gods to aid them. Though it was the middle of summer—a season when rain rarely falls in the climate of Greece—the most violent wind, rain, and thunder prevailed during the whole night, blowing right on shore against the Persians at Aphetæ, and thus but little troublesome to the Greeks on the opposite side of the strait. The seamen of the Persian fleet, scarcely recovered from the former storm at Sêpias Aktê, were almost driven to despair by this repetition of the same peril; the more so when they found the prows of their ships surrounded, and the play of their oars impeded, by the dead bodies and the spars from the recent battle, which the current drove towards their shore. If this storm was injurious to the main fleet at Aphetæ, it proved the entire ruin of the squadron detached to circumnavigate Eubœa, who, overtaken by it near the dangerous eastern coast of that island (called the Hollows of Eubœa), were driven upon the rocks and wrecked. The news of this second conspiracy of the elements, or intervention of the gods, against the schemes of the invaders, was highly encouraging to the Greeks; and the seasonable arrival of fifty-three fresh Athenian ships, who reinforced them the next day, raised them to a still higher pitch of confidence. In the afternoon of the same day, they sailed out against the Persian fleet at Aphetæ, and attacked and destroyed some Kilikian ships even at their moorings; the fleet having been too much damaged by the storm of the preceding night to come out and fight.²

But the Persian admirals were not of a temper to endure such insults—still less to let their master hear of them. About noon on the ensuing day, they sailed with their entire fleet near to the Greek station at Artemisium, and formed themselves into a half-moon; while the Greeks kept near to the shore, so that they could not be surrounded, nor could the Persians bring

¹ Herodot. viii. 11. πολλὸν παρὰ δόξαν ἀγωνισάμενοι—ἑτεραλλέως ἀγωνιζόμενοι, &c.

² Herodot. viii. 12, 13, 14; Diodor. xi. 12.

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their entire fleet into action ; the ships running foul of each other, and not finding space to attack. The battle raged fiercely all day, and with great loss and damage on both sides : the Egyptians bore off the palm of valour among the Persians, the Athenians among the Greeks. Though the positive loss sustained by the Persians was by far the greater, and though the Greeks being near their own shore, became masters of the dead bodies as well as of the disabled ships and floating fragments—still they were themselves hurt and crippled in greater proportion with reference to their inferior total : and the Athenian vessels especially, foremost in the preceding combat, found one-half of their number out of condition to renew it.¹ The Egyptians alone had captured five Grecian ships with their entire crews.

Under these circumstances, the Greek leaders—and Themistoklès, as it seems, among them—determined that they could no longer venture to hold the position of Artemisium, but must withdraw the naval force farther into Greece :² though this was in fact a surrender of the pass of Thermopylæ, and though the removal which the Eubœans were hastening was still unfinished. These unfortunate men were forced to be satisfied with the promise of Themistoklès to give them convoy for their boats and their persons ; abandoning their sheep and cattle for the consumption of the fleet, as better than leaving them to become booty for the enemy. While the Greeks were thus employed in organising their retreat, they received news which rendered retreat doubly necessary. The Athenian Abrônynchus, stationed with his ship near Thermopylæ, in order to keep up communication between the army and fleet, brought the disastrous intelligence that Xerxes was already master of the pass, and that the division of Leonidas was either destroyed or in flight. Upon this the fleet abandoned Artemisium forthwith, and sailed up the Eubœan strait ; the Corinthian ships in the van, the Athenians bringing up the rear. Themistoklès, conducting the latter, stayed long enough at the various watering-stations and landing-places to inscribe, on some neighbouring stones, invitations to the Ionian contingents serving under Xerxes ; whereby the latter were conjured not to serve against their fathers, but to desert, if possible—or at least, to fight as little and as backwardly as they could. Themistoklès hoped by this stratagem perhaps to detach some of the Ionians from the Persian side, or at any rate, to render them objects of mistrust,

¹ Herodot. viii. 17, 18.

² Herodot. viii. 18. *θησαυρον δὴ ἐβούλευον ἔσω ἐς τὴν Ἑλλάδα.*

and thus to diminish their efficiency.¹ With no longer delay than was requisite for such inscriptions, he followed the remaining fleet, which sailed round the coast of Attica, not stopping until it reached the island of Salamis.

The news of the retreat of the Greek fleet was speedily conveyed by a citizen of Histiaea to the Persians at Aphetae, who at first disbelieved it, and detained the messenger until they had sent to ascertain the fact. On the next day, their fleet passed across to the north of Eubœa, and became master of Histiaea and the neighbouring territory; from whence many of them, by permission and even invitation of Xerxes, crossed over to Thermopylae to survey the field of battle and the dead. Respecting the number of the dead, Xerxes is asserted to have deliberately imposed upon the spectators: he buried all his own dead, except 1000 whose bodies were left out—while the total number of Greeks who had perished at Thermopylae, 4000 in number, were all left exposed, and in one heap, so as to create an impression that their loss had been much more severe than their own. Moreover the bodies of the slain Helots were included in the heap, all of them passing for Spartans or Thespians in the estimation of the spectators. We are not surprised to hear, however, that this trick, gross and public as it must have been, really deceived very few.² According to the statement of Herodotus, 20,000 men were slain on the side of the Persians—no unreasonable estimate, if we consider that they wore little defensive armour, and that they were three days fighting. The number of Grecian dead bodies is stated by the same historian as 4000: if this be correct, it must include a considerable proportion of Helots, since there were no hoplites present on the last day except the 300 Spartans, the 700 Thespians, and the 400 Thebans. Some hoplites were of course slain in the first two days' battles, though apparently not many. The number who originally came to the defence of the pass seems to have been about 7000:³ but the epigram composed shortly afterwards and inscribed on the spot by order of the Amphiktyonic assembly, transmitted to posterity

¹ Herodot. viii. 19, 21, 22; Plutarch, Themistoklēs, c. 9.

² Herodot. viii. 24, 25. οὐ μὴν οὐδ' ἐλάνθανε τοὺς διαβεβηκότας Ξέρξης τὰυτα πρῆξας περὶ τοῦ νεκροῦ τοῦ ἑωυτοῦ· καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ γελοῖον ἦν, &c.

³ About the numbers of the Greeks at Thermopylae, compare Herodot. vii. 202; Diodorus, xi. 4; Pausanias, x. 20, 1; and Manso's Sparta, vol. ii. p. 308; Beylage 24th.

Isokratēs talks about 1000 Spartans, with a few allies, Panegyric, Or. iv. p. 59. He mentions also only sixty Athenian ships of war at Artemisium; in fact his numerical statements deserve little attention.

the formal boast that 4000 warriors "from Peloponnesus had here fought with 300 myriads or 3,000,000 of enemies."¹ Respecting this alleged Persian total, some remarks have already been made: the statement of 4000 warriors from Peloponnesus, must indicate all those who originally marched out of that peninsula under Leonidas. Yet the Amphiktyonic assembly, when they furnished words to record this memorable exploit, ought not to have immortalised the Peloponnesians apart from their extra-Peloponnesian comrades, of merit fully equal; especially the Thespians, who exhibited the same heroic self-devotion as Leonidas and his Spartans, without having been prepared for it by the same elaborate and iron discipline. While this inscription was intended as a general commemoration of the exploit, there was another near it, alike simple and impressive, destined for the Spartan dead separately: "Stranger, tell the Lacedæmonians that we lie here, in obedience to their orders." On the hillock within the pass, where this devoted band received their death-wounds, a monument was erected, with a marble lion in honour of Leonidas; decorated apparently with an epigram by the poet Simonidês. That distinguished genius composed at least one ode, of which nothing but a splendid fragment now remains, to celebrate the glories of Thermopylæ: besides several epigrams, one of which was consecrated to the prophet Megistias, "who, though well aware of the fate coming upon him, would not desert the Spartan chiefs."

CHAPTER XLI

BATTLE OF SALAMIS—RETREAT OF XERXES

THE sentiment, alike durable and unanimous, with which the Greeks of after-times looked back on the battle of Thermopylæ, and which they have communicated to all subsequent readers, was that of just admiration for the courage and patriotism of Leonidas and his band. But among the contemporary Greeks that sentiment, though doubtless sincerely felt, was by no means predominant. It was overpowered by the more pressing emotions of disappointment and terror. So confident were the Spartans and Peloponnesians in the defensibility of Thermopylæ and Artemisium, that when the news of

¹ Herodot. vii. 228.

the disaster reached them, not a single soldier had yet been put in motion; the season of the festival-games had passed, but no active step had yet been taken.¹ Meanwhile the invading force, army and fleet, was in its progress towards Attica and Peloponnesus, without the least preparations—and what was still worse, without any combined and concerted plan—for defending the heart of Greece. The loss sustained by Xerxes at Thermopylæ, insignificant in proportion to his vast total, was more than compensated by the fresh Grecian auxiliaries which he now acquired. Not merely the Malians, Lokrians and Dorians, but also the great mass of the Bœotians, with their chief town Thebes, all except Thespiæ and Platæa, now joined him.² Demaratus, his Spartan companion, moved forward to Thebes to renew an ancient tie of hospitality with the Theban oligarchical leader Attaginus, while small garrisons were sent by Alexander of Macedon to most of the Bœotian towns,³ as well to protect them from plunder as to ensure their fidelity. The Thespians on the other hand abandoned their city and fled into Peloponnesus; while the Platæans, who had been serving aboard the Athenian ships at Artemisium,⁴ were disembarked at Chalkis as the fleet retreated, for the purpose of marching by land to their city and removing their families. It was not only the land-force of Xerxes which had been thus strengthened. His fleet also had received some accessions from Karystus in Eubœa, and from several of the Cyclades—so that the losses sustained by the storm at Sêpias and the fights at Artemisium, if not wholly made up, were at least in part repaired, while the fleet remained still prodigiously superior in number to that of the Greeks.⁵

At the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, near fifty years after these events, the Corinthian envoys reminded Sparta that she had allowed Xerxes time to arrive from the extremity of the earth at the threshold of Peloponnesus, before she took any adequate precautions against him: a reproach true almost to the letter.⁶ It was only when roused and terrified by the

¹ Herodot. viii. 40, 71, 73.

² Herodot. viii. 66. Diodorus calls the battle of Thermopylæ a *Kadmeian victory* for Xerxes, which is true only in the letter, but not in the spirit; he doubtless lost a greater number of men in the pass than the Greeks, but the advantage which he gained was prodigious (Diodor. xi. 12); and Diodorus himself sets forth the terror of the Greeks after the event (xi. 13-15).

³ Plutarch, De Herodot. Malignit, p. 364; Herodot. viii. 34.

⁴ Herodot. viii. 44, 50.

⁵ Herodot. viii. 66.

⁶ Thucyd. i. 69. *τὸν τε γὰρ Μῆδον αὐτοὶ ἴσμεν ἀπὸ περᾶτων γῆς πρότερον ἐπὶ Πελοπόννησον ἐλθόντα, πρὶν τὰ πάρ' ὑμῶν ἀξίως προσηπαντήσασαι.*

news of the death of Leonidas, that the Lacedæmonians and the other Peloponnesians began to put forth their full strength. But it was then too late to perform the promise made to Athens of taking up a position in Bœotia so as to protect Attica. To defend the Isthmus of Corinth was all that they now thought of, and seemingly all that was now open to them. Thither they rushed with all their available population under the conduct of Kleombrotus king of Sparta (brother of Leonidas), and began to draw fortifications across it, as well as to break up the Skironian road from Megara to Corinth, with every mark of anxious energy. The Lacedæmonians, Arcadians, Eleians, Corinthians, Sikyonians, Epidaurians, Phliasiens, Trœzenians and Hermionians, were all present here in full numbers; many myriads of men (bodies of 10,000 each) working and bringing materials night and day.¹ As a defence to themselves against attack by land, this was an excellent position: they considered it as their last chance,² abandoning all hope of successful resistance at sea. But they forgot that a fortified isthmus was no protection even to themselves against the navy of Xerxes,³ while it professedly threw out not only Attica, but also Megara and Ægina. And thus arose a new peril to Greece from the loss of Thermopylæ: no other position could be found which, like that memorable strait, comprehended and protected at once all the separate cities. The disunion thus produced brought them within a hair's breadth of ruin.

If the causes of alarm were great for the Peloponnesians, yet more desperate did the position of the Athenians appear. Expecting, according to agreement, that there would be a Peloponnesian army in Bœotia ready to sustain Leonidas, or at any rate to co-operate in the defence of Attica, they had taken no measures to remove their families or property. But they saw with indignant disappointment as well as dismay, on retreating from Artemisium, that the conqueror was in full march from Thermopylæ, that the road to Attica was open to him, and that the Peloponnesians were absorbed exclusively in the defence of their own isthmus and their own separate existence.⁴ The fleet from Artemisium had been directed to

¹ Herodot. viii. 71. *συνδραμόντες ἐκ τῶν πολλῶν.*

² Herodot. viii. 74.

³ Herodot. vii. 139.

⁴ Plutarch, Themistoklēs, c. 9. *ἅμα μὲν ὀργῇ τῆς προδοσίας εἶχε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ἅμα δὲ δυσθυμία καὶ κατῆφεια μεμονωμένους.*

Herodot. viii. 40. *δοκέοντες γὰρ εὐρήσειν Πελοποννησίους πανδημεὶ ἐν τῇ ῥωιωτῇ ὑποκατημένους τὸν βάρβαρον, τῶν μὲν εἶδρον οὐδὲν ἐδν, οἱ δὲ ἐπυρθάροντο τὸν Ἴσθμὸν αὐτοὺς τειχέοντας ἐς τὴν Πελοπόννησον, περὶ πλείστου δὲ ποιευμένους περιεῖναι, καὶ ταύτην ἔχοντας ἐν φυλακῇ, τὰ τε ἕλλα ἀπιέναι.*

muster at the harbour of Trœzen, there to await such reinforcements as could be got together: but the Athenians entreated Eurybiadês to halt at Salamis, so as to allow them a short time for consultation in the critical state of their affairs, and to aid them in the transport of their families. While Eurybiadês was thus staying at Salamis, several new ships which had reached Trœzen came over to join him; and in this way Salamis became for a time the naval station of the Greeks, without any deliberate intention beforehand.¹

Meanwhile Themistoklês and the Athenian seamen landed at Phalêrum, and made their mournful entry into Athens. Gloomy as the prospect appeared, there was little room for difference of opinion,² and still less room for delay. The authorities and the public assembly at once issued a proclamation, enjoining every Athenian to remove his family out of the country in the best way he could. We may conceive the state of tumult and terror which followed on this unexpected proclamation, when we reflect that it had to be circulated and acted upon throughout all Attica, from Sunium to Orôpus, within the narrow space of less than six days; for no longer interval elapsed before Xerxes actually arrived at Athens, where indeed he might have arrived even sooner.³ The whole Grecian fleet was doubtless employed in carrying out the helpless exiles; mostly to Trœzen, where a kind reception and generous support were provided for them (the Trœzenian population being seemingly semi-Ionic, and having ancient relations of religion as well as of traffic with Athens)—but in part also to Ægina: there were however many who could not or would not go farther than Salamis. Themistoklês impressed upon the sufferers that they were only obeying the oracle, which had directed them to abandon the city and to take refuge behind the wooden walls; and either his policy, or the

Thucyd. i. 74. ὅτε γοῦν ἡμεῖς (we Athenians) ἐπι σωῶσι, οὐ παρεγένεσθε (Spartans).

Both Lysias (Oratio Funebr. c. 8) and Isokratês take pride in the fact that the Athenians, in spite of being thus betrayed, never thought of making separate terms for themselves with Xerxes (Panegyric, Or. iv. p. 60). But there is no reason to believe that Xerxes would have granted them separate terms: his particular vengeance was directed against them. Isokratês has confounded in his mind the conduct of the Athenians when they refused the offers of Mardonius in the year following the battle of Salamis, with their conduct before the battle of Salamis against Xerxes.

¹ Herodot. viii. 40-42.

² Plato, Legg. iii. p. 699.

³ Herodot. viii. 66, 67. There was therefore but little time for the breaking up and carrying away of furniture, alluded to by Thucydidês, i. 18—*διανοηθέντες ἐκλιπεῖν τὴν πόλιν καὶ ἀνασκευασάμενοι, &c.*

mental depression of the time, gave circulation to other stories, intimating that even the divine inmates of the acropolis were for a while deserting it. In the ancient temple of Athênê Polias on that rock, there dwelt, or was believed to dwell, as guardian to the sanctuary and familiar attendant of the goddess, a sacred serpent, for whose nourishment a honey-cake was placed once in the month. The honey-cake had been hitherto regularly consumed; but at this fatal moment the priestess announced that it remained untouched: the sacred guardian had thus set the example of quitting the acropolis, and it behoved the citizens to follow the example, confiding in the goddess herself for future return and restitution.

The migration of so many ancient men, women, and children, was a scene of tears and misery inferior only to that which would have ensued on the actual capture of the city.¹ Some few individuals, too poor to hope for maintenance, or too old to care for life, elsewhere—confiding moreover in their own interpretation² of the wooden-wall which the Pythian

¹ Herodot. viii. 41: Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. x.

In the years 1821 and 1822, during the struggle which preceded the liberation of Greece, the Athenians were forced to leave their country and seek refuge in Salamis three several times. These incidents are sketched in a manner alike interesting and instructive by Dr. Waddington, in his visit to Greece (London, 1825), Letters vi. vii. x. He states, p. 92, "Three times have the Athenians emigrated in a body, and sought refuge from the sabre among the houseless rocks of Salamis. Upon these occasions I am assured, that many have dwelt in caverns, and many in miserable huts, constructed on the mountain side by their own feeble hands. Many have perished too from exposure to an intemperate climate; many from diseases contracted through the loathsomeness of their habitations; many from hunger and misery. On the retreat of the Turks, the survivors returned to their country. But to what a country did they return? To a land of desolation and famine; and in fact, on the first re-occupation of Athens, after the departure of Omer Brioni, several persons are known to have subsisted for some time on grass, till a supply of corn reached the Piræus from Syra and Hydra."

A century and a half ago, also, in the war between the Turks and Venetians, the population of Attica was forced to emigrate to Salamis, Ægina, and Corinth. M. Buchon observes, "*Les troupes Albanaises, envoyées en 1688 par les Turcs (in the war against the Venetians) se jetèrent sur l'Attique, mettant tout à feu et à sang. En 1688, les chroniques d'Athènes racontent que ses malheureux habitants furent obligés de se réfugier à Salamine, à Egine, et à Corinthe, et que ce ne fut qu'après trois ans qu'ils purent rentrer en partie dans leur ville et dans leurs champs. Beaucoup de villages de l'Attique sont encore habités par les descendants de ces derniers envahisseurs, et avant la dernière révolution, on n'y parloit que la langue albanaise; mais leur physionomie diffère autant que leur langue de la physionomie de la race Grecque.*" (Buchon, *la Grèce Continentale et la Morée*. Paris, 1843, ch. ii. p. 82.)

² Pausanias seems to consider these poor men somewhat presumptuous

priestess had pronounced to be inexpugnable—shut themselves up in the acropolis along with the administrators of the temple, obstructing the entrance or western front with wooden doors and palisades.¹ When we read how great were the sufferings of the population of Attica near half a century afterwards, compressed for refuge within the spacious fortifications of Athens at the first outbreak of the Peloponnesian war,² we may form some faint idea of the incalculably greater misery which overwhelmed an emigrant population, hurrying, they knew not whither, to escape the long arm of Xerxes. Little chance did there seem that they would ever revisit their homes except as his slaves.

In the midst of circumstances thus calamitous and threatening, neither the warriors nor the leaders of Athens lost their energy: arm as well as mind was strung to the loftiest pitch of human resolution. Political dissensions were suspended; Themistoklês proposed to the people a decree, and obtained their sanction, inviting home all who were under sentence of temporary banishment: moreover he not only included, but even specially designated among them, his own great opponent Aristeidês, now in the third year of ostracism. Xanthippus the accuser, and Kimon the son, of Miltiadês, were partners in the same emigration. The latter, enrolled by his scale of fortune among the horsemen of the state, was seen with his companions cheerfully marching through the Kerameikus to dedicate their bridles in the acropolis, and to bring away in exchange some of the sacred arms there suspended, thus setting an example of ready service on shipboard, instead of on horseback.³ It was absolutely essential to obtain supplies of money, partly for the aid of the poorer exiles, but still more for the equipment of the fleet: yet there were no funds in the public treasury. But the senate of Areiopagus, then composed in large proportion of men from the wealthier classes, put forth all its public authority as well as its private contributions and example to others,⁴ and thus succeeded in raising the sum of eight drachms for every soldier serving.

This timely help was indeed partly obtained by the inexhaustible resource of Themistoklês, who, in the hurry of for pretending to understand the oracle better than Themistoklês—
Ἀθηναίων τοὺς πλέον τι ἐς τὸν χρησμὸν ἢ Θεμιστοκλῆς εἰδέναι νομίζοντας
 (i. 18, 2).

¹ Herodot. viii. 50.

² Thucyd. ii. 16, 17.

³ Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. 10, 11; and Kimon, c. 5.

⁴ Whether this be the incident which Aristotle (*Politic.* v. 3, 5) had in his mind, we cannot determine.

embarkation, either discovered or pretended that the Gorgon's head from the statue of Athênê was lost, and directing upon this ground every man's baggage to be searched, rendered any treasures, which private citizens might be carrying away, available to the public service.¹ By the most strenuous efforts, these few important days were made to suffice for removing the whole population of Attica—those of military competence to the fleet at Salamis,—the rest to some place of refuge,—together with as much property as the case admitted. So complete was the desertion of the country, that the host of Xerxes, when it became master, could not seize and carry off more than five hundred prisoners.² Moreover the fleet itself, which had been brought home from Artemisium partially disabled, was quickly repaired, so that by the time the Persian fleet arrived, it was again in something like fighting condition.

The combined fleet which had now got together at Salamis consisted of 366 ships—a force far greater than at Artemisium. Of these, no less than 200 were Athenian; twenty among which, however, were lent to the Chalkidians and manned by them. Forty Corinthian ships, thirty Æginetan, twenty Megarian, sixteen Lacedæmonian, fifteen Sikyonian, ten Epilaurian, seven from Ambrakia and as many from Eretria, five from Troezen, three from Hermionê, and the same number from Leukas; two from Keos, two from Styra, and one from Kythnos; four from Naxos, despatched as a contingent to the Persian fleet, but brought by the choice of their captains and seamen to Salamis;—all these triremes, together with a small squadron of the inferior vessels called pentekonters, made up the total. From the great Grecian cities in Italy there appeared only one trireme, a volunteer, equipped and commanded by an eminent citizen named Phayllus, thrice victor at the Pythian games.³ The entire fleet was thus a trifle larger than the combined force (358 ships) collected by the Asiatic Greeks at Ladê, fifteen years earlier, during the Ionic revolt. We may doubt however whether this total, borrowed from Herodotus, be not larger than that which actually fought a little afterwards at the battle of Salamis, and which Æschylus gives decidedly as consisting of 300 sail, in addition to ten prime and chosen ships. That great poet, himself one of the combatants, and speaking in a drama represented only seven years after the battle, is better authority on the point even than Herodotus.⁴

¹ Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. x.

² Herodot. ix. 99.

³ Herodot. viii. 43-48.

⁴ Æschylus, Persæ, 347; Herodot. viii. 48; vi. 9; Pausanias, i. 14, 4.

Hardly was the fleet mustered at Salamis, and the Athenian population removed, when Xerxes and his host overran the deserted country; his fleet occupying the roadstead of Phalærum with the coast adjoining. His land-force had been put in motion under the guidance of the Thessalians, two or three days after

The total which Herodotus announces is 378; but the items which he gives amount, when summed up, only to 366. There seems no way of reconciling this discrepancy except by some violent change which we are not warranted in making.

Ktésias represents that the numbers of the Persian war-ships at Salamis were above 1000, those of the Greeks 700 (Persica, c. 26).

The Athenian orator in Thucydides (i. 74) calls the total of the Grecian fleet at Salamis "nearly 400 ships, and the Athenian contingent somewhat less than *two parts* of this total (*ναὺς μὲν γε ἐς τὰς τετρακοσίας ἄλλῃσιν ἐλάσσους τῶν δύο μοιρῶν*)."

The Scholiast, with Poppo and most of the commentators on this passage, treat *τῶν δύο μοιρῶν* as meaning unquestionably *two parts out of three*: and if this be the case, I should agree with Dr. Arnold in considering the assertion as a mere exaggeration of the orator, not at all carrying the authority of Thucydides himself. But I cannot think that we are here driven to such a necessity; for the construction of Didot and Göller (though Dr. Arnold pronounces it "a most undoubted error") appears to me perfectly admissible. They maintain that *αἱ δύο μοῖραι* does not of necessity mean *two parts out of three*: in Thucyd. i. 10, we find *καίτοι Πελοποννήσου τῶν πέντε τὰς δύο μοῖρας νέμονται*, where the words mean *two parts out of five*. Now in the passage before us, we have *ναὺς μὲν γε ἐς τὰς τετρακοσίας ἄλλῃσιν ἐλάσσους τῶν δύο μοιρῶν*: and Didot and Göller command, that in the word *τετρακοσίας* is implied a quaternary division of the whole number—*four hundreds or hundredth parts*: so that the whole meaning would be—"To the aggregate *four hundreds* of ships we contributed something less than *two*." The word *τετρακοσίας*, equivalent to *τέσσαρας ἑκατοντάδας*, naturally includes the general idea of *τέσσαρας μοῖρας*: and this would bring the passage into exact analogy with the one cited above—*τῶν πέντε τὰς δύο μοῖρας*. With every respect to the judgement of Dr. Arnold on an author whom he had so long studied, I cannot enter into the grounds on which he has pronounced his interpretation of Didot and Göller to be "an undoubted error." It has the advantage of bringing the assertion of the orator in Thucydides into harmony with Herodotus, who states the Athenians to have furnished 180 ships at Salamis.

Wherever such harmony can be secured by an admissible construction of existing words, it is an unquestionable advantage, and ought to count as a reason in the case, if there be a doubt between two different constructions. But on the other hand, I protest against altering numerical statements in one author, simply in order to bring him into accordance with another, and without some substantive ground in the text itself. Thus, for example, in this very passage of Thucydides, Bloomfield and Poppo propose to alter *τετρακοσίας* into *τριακοσίας*, in order that Thucydides may be in harmony with Æschylus and other authors, though not with Herodotus; while Didot and Göller would alter *τριακοσίῳ* into *τετρακοσίῳ* in Demosthenes de Coronâ (c. 70), in order that Demosthenes may be in harmony with Thucydides. Such emendations appear to me inadmissible in principle; we are not to force different witnesses into harmony by retouching their statements.

the battle of Thermopylæ; and he was assured by some Arcadians who came to seek service, that the Peloponnesians were, even at that moment, occupied with the celebration of the Olympic games. "What prize does the victor receive?" he asked. Upon the reply made, that the prize was nothing more than a wreath of the wild olive, Tritantæchmês son of the monarch's uncle Artabanus is said to have burst forth, notwithstanding the displeasure both of the monarch himself and of the bystanders—"Heavens, Mardonius, what manner of men are these against whom thou hast brought us to fight! men who contend not for money, but for honour!"¹ Whether this be a remark really delivered, or a dramatic illustration imagined by some contemporary of Herodotus, it is not the less interesting as bringing to view a characteristic of Hellenic life, which contrasts not merely with the manners of contemporary Orientals, but even with those of the earlier Greeks themselves during the Homeric times.

Among all the various Greeks between Thermopylæ and the borders of Attica, there were none except the Phokians disposed to refuse submission; and they refused only because the paramount influence of their bitter enemies the Thessalians made them despair of obtaining favourable terms.² Nor would they even listen to a proposition of the Thessalians, who, boasting that it was in their power to guide as they pleased the terrors of the Persian host, offered to ensure lenient treatment to the territory of Phokis, provided a sum of fifty talents were paid to them.³ The proposition being indignantly refused, they conducted Xerxes through the little territory of Doris, which *medised* and escaped plunder, into the upper valley of the Kephisus, among the towns of the inflexible Phokians. All of them were found deserted; the inhabitants having previously escaped either to the wide-spreading summit of Parnassus called Tithorea, or even still farther, across that mountain into the territory of the Ozolian Lokrians. Ten or a dozen small Phokian towns, the most considerable of which were Elateia and Hyampolis, were sacked and destroyed by the invaders. Even Abæ, with its temple and oracle of Apollo, was no better treated than the rest: all the sacred treasures were pillaged, and it was then burnt. From Panopeus Xerxes detached a body of men to plunder Delphi, marching with his main army through Bœotia, in which country he found all the

¹ Herodot. viii. 26. Παπαὶ Μαρδόνιε, κοίους ἐπ' ἀνδρας ἤγαγες μαχησόμενους ἡμέας, οἳ οὐδὲν περὶ χρημάτων τὸν ἀγῶνα ποιεῖνται, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἀρετῆς.

² Herodot. viii. 30.

³ Herodot. viii. 28, 29.

towns submissive and willing, except Thespiæ and Plataea; both of them had been deserted by their citizens, and both were now burnt. From hence he conducted his army into the abandoned territory of Attica, reaching without resistance the foot of the acropolis at Athens.¹

Very different was the fate of that division which he had detached from Panopeus against Delphi. Apollo defended his temple here more vigorously than at Abæ. The cupidity of the Persian king was stimulated by accounts of the boundless wealth accumulated at Delphi, especially the profuse donations of Croesus. The Delphians, in the extreme of alarm, while they sought safety for themselves on the heights of Parnassus and for their families by transport across the Gulf into Achaia, consulted the oracle whether they should carry away or bury the sacred treasures. Apollo directed them to leave the treasures untouched, saying that he was competent himself to take care of his own property. Sixty Delphians alone ventured to remain, together with Akêratus, the religious superior: but evidences of superhuman aid soon appeared to encourage them. The sacred arms suspended in the interior cell, which no mortal hand was ever permitted to touch, were seen lying before the door of the temple; and when the Persians, marching along the road called Schisté up that rugged path under the steep cliffs of Parnassus which conducts to Delphi, had reached the temple of Athênê Pronæa,—on a sudden, dreadful thunder was heard—two vast mountain crags detached themselves and rushed down with deafening noise among them, crushing many to death—the war-shout was also heard from the interior of the temple of Athênê. Seized with a panic terror, the invaders turned round and fled; pursued not only by the Delphians, but also (as they themselves affirmed) by two armed warriors of superhuman stature and destructive arm. The triumphant Delphians confirmed this report, adding that the two auxiliaries were the Heroes Phylakus and Autonoiis, whose sacred precincts were close adjoining: and Herodotus himself, when he visited Delphi, saw in the sacred ground of Athênê the identical masses of rock which had overwhelmed the Persians.² Thus did the god repel these

¹ Herodot. viii. 32-34.

² Herodot. viii. 38, 39; Diodor. xi. 14; Pausan. x. 8, 4.

Compare the account given in Pausanias (x. 23) of the subsequent repulse of Brennus and the Gauls from Delphi: in his account, the repulse is not so exclusively the work of the gods as in that of Herodotus; there is a larger force of human combatants in defence of the temple, though

invaders from his Delphian sanctuary and treasures, which remained inviolate until 130 years afterwards, when they were rifled by the sacrilegious hands of the Phokian Philomêlus. On this occasion, as will be seen presently, the real protectors of the treasures were the conquerors at Salamis and Plataea.

Four months had elapsed, since the departure from Asia, when Xerxes reached Athens, the last term of his advance. He brought with him the members of the Peisistratid family, who doubtless thought their restoration already certain—and a few Athenian exiles attached to their interest. Though the country was altogether deserted, the handful of men collected in the acropolis ventured to defy him; nor could all the persuasions of the Peisistratids, eager to preserve the holy place from pillage, induce them to surrender.¹ The Athenian acropolis—a craggy rock rising abruptly about 150 feet with a flat summit of about 1000 feet long from east to west, by 500 feet broad from north to south—had no practicable access except on the western side:² moreover in all parts where there seemed any possibility of climbing up, it was defended by the ancient fortification called the Pelasgic wall. Obligated to take the place by force, the Persian army were posted around the northern and western sides, and commenced their operations from the eminence immediately adjoining on the north-west,

greatly assisted by divine intervention: there is also loss on both sides. A similar descent of crags from the summit is mentioned.

See for the description of the road by which the Persians marched, and the extreme term of their progress, Ulrichs, *Reisen und Forschungen in Griechenland*, ch. iv. p. 46; ch. x. p. 146.

Many great blocks of stone and cliff are still to be seen near the spot, which have rolled down from the top, and which remind the traveller of these passages.

The attack here described to have been made by order of Xerxes upon the Delphian temple, seems not easy to reconcile with the words of Mardonius, Herodot. ix. 42; still less can it be reconciled with the statement of Plutarch (*Numa*, c. 9), who says that the Delphian temple was burnt by the Medes.

¹ Herodot. viii. 52.

² Pausanias, i. 22, 4: Kruse, *Hellas*, vol. ii. ch. vi. p. 76. Ernst Curtius (*Die Akropolis von Athens*, p. 5. Berlin, 1844) says that the plateau of the acropolis is rather less than 400 feet higher than the town: Fiedler states it to be 178 fathoms or 1068 feet above the level of the sea (*Reise durch das Königreich Griechenland*, i. p. 2); he gives the length and breadth of the plateau in the same figures as Kruse, whose statement I have copied in the text. In Colonel Leake's valuable *Topography of Athens*, I do not find any distinct statement about the height of the acropolis. We must understand Kruse's statement (if he and Curtius are both correct) to refer only to the precipitous impracticable portion of the whole rock.

called Areopagus:¹ from whence they bombarded (if we may venture upon the expression) with hot missiles the wood-work before the gates; that is, they poured upon it multitudes of arrows with burning tow attached to them. The wooden palisades and boarding presently took fire and were consumed: but when the Persians tried to mount to the assault by the western road leading up to the gate, the undaunted little garrison still kept them at bay, having provided vast stones, which they rolled down upon them in the ascent. For a time, the Great King seemed likely to be driven to the slow process of blockade; but at length some adventurous men among the besiegers tried to scale the precipitous rock before them on its northern side, hard by the temple or chapel of Aglaurus, which lay nearly in front of the Persian position, but behind the gates and the western ascent. Here the rock was naturally so inaccessible, that it was altogether unguarded, and seemingly even unfortified:² moreover the attention of the little garrison was all concentrated on the host which fronted the gates. Hence the separate escalading party were enabled to accomplish their object unobserved, and to reach the summit in the rear of the garrison; who, deprived of their last hope, either cast themselves headlong from the walls, or fled for safety to the inner temple. The successful escaladers opened the gates to the entire Persian host, and the whole acropolis was presently in their hands. Its defenders were slain, its temples pillaged, and all its dwellings and buildings, sacred as well as profane, consigned to the flames.³ The citadel of Athens fell into the

¹ Athenian legend represented the Amazons as having taken post on the Areopagus and fortified it as a means of attacking the acropolis—*ἀντεπύργωσαν* (Æschyl. Eumenid. 688).

² Herodot. viii. 52, 53. . . . *ἔμπροσθε ἂν πρὸ τῆς ἀκροπόλιος, ὕπισθε δὲ τῶν πυλῶν καὶ τῆς ἀνάου, τῇ δὴ οὔτε τις ἐφύλασσε, οὐτ' ἂν ἤλπισε μὴ κοτέ τις κατὰ ταῦτα ἀναβαλῆ ἀνθρώπων, ταύτῃ ἀνέβησαν τινες κατὰ τὸ ἶρην τῆς Κέκροπος θυγατρὸς, Ἀγλαύρου, καίτοι περ ἀποκρήμνου ἐντος τοῦ χώρου.*

That the Aglaurion was on the north side of the acropolis, appears clearly made out; see Leake, Topography of Athens, ch. v. p. 261; Kruse, Hellas, vol. ii. ch. vi. p. 119; Forchhammer, Topographie Athens, pp. 365, 366; in Kieler Philologischen Studien, 1841. Siebelis (in the plan of Athens prefixed to his edition of Pausanias, and in his note on Pausanias, i. 18, 2) places the Aglaurion erroneously on the eastern side of the acropolis.

The expressions *ἔμπροσθε πρὸ τῆς ἀκροπόλιος* appear to refer to the position of the Persian army, who would naturally occupy the northern and western fronts of the acropolis; since they reached Athens from the north—and the western side furnished the only regular access. The hill called Areopagus would thus be nearly in the centre of their position. Forchhammer explains these expressions unsatisfactorily.

³ Herodot. viii. 52, 53.

hands of Xerxes by a surprise, very much the same as that which had placed Sardis in those of Cyrus.¹

Thus was divine prophecy fulfilled: Attica passed entirely into the hands of the Persians, and the conflagration of Sardis was retaliated upon the home and citadel of its captors, as it also was upon their sacred temple of Eleusis. Xerxes immediately despatched to Susa intelligence of the fact, which is said to have excited unmeasured demonstrations of joy, confuting seemingly the gloomy predictions of his uncle Artabanus.² On the next day but one, the Athenian exiles in his suite received his orders, or perhaps obtained his permission, to go and offer sacrifice amidst the ruins of the acropolis, and atone, if possible, for the desecration of the ground. They discovered that the sacred olive-tree near the chapel of Erechtheus, the especial gift of the goddess Athênê, though burnt to the ground by the recent flames, had already thrown out a fresh shoot of one cubit long: at least the piety of restored Athens afterwards believed this encouraging portent,³ as well as that which was said to have been seen by Dikæus (an Athenian companion of the Peisistratids) in the Thriasian plain. It was now the day set apart for the celebration of the Eleusinian mysteries; and though in this sorrowful year there was no celebration, nor any Athenians in the territory, Dikæus still fancied that he beheld the dust and heard the loud multitudinous chant, which was wont to accompany in ordinary times the processional march from Athens to Eleusis. He would even have revealed the fact to Xerxes himself, had not Demaratus deterred him from doing so: but he construed it as an evidence that the goddesses themselves were passing over from Eleusis to help the Athenians at Salamis. Yet whatever may have been received in after times, on that day certainly no man could believe in the speedy resurrection of conquered Athens as a free city; not even if he had witnessed the portent of the burnt olive-tree suddenly sprouting afresh with preternatural vigour. So hopeless did the circumstances of the Athenians then appear, not less to their confederates assembled at Salamis than to the victorious Persians.

About the time of the capture of the acropolis, the Persian fleet also arrived safely in the bay of Phalêrum, reinforced by ships from Karystus as well as from various islands of the

¹ Herodot. i. 84.

² Herodot. v. 102; viii. 53-99; ix. 65. *ἔδεε γὰρ κατὰ τὸ θεοπρόσιον πᾶσαν τὴν Ἀττικὴν τὴν ἐν τῇ ἡπείρῳ γενέσθαι ὑπὸ Πέρσῃσι.*

³ Herodot. viii. 55-65.

Cyclades, so that Herodotus reckons it to have been as strong as before the terrible storm at Sêpias Aktê; an estimate certainly not admissible.¹

Soon after their arrival Xerxes himself descended to the shore to inspect the fleet, as well as to take counsel with the various naval leaders about the expediency of attacking the hostile fleet, now so near him in the narrow strait between Salamis and the coasts of Attica. He invited them all to take their seats in an assembly, wherein the king of Sidon occupied the first place and the king of Tyre the second. The question was put to each of them separately by Mardonius, and when we learn that all pronounced in favour of immediate fighting, we may be satisfied that the decided opinion of Xerxes himself must have been well known to them beforehand. One exception alone was found to this unanimity—Artemisia, queen of Halikarnassus in Karia; into whose mouth Herodotus puts a speech of some length, deprecating all idea of fighting in the narrow strait of Salamis—predicting that if the land-force were moved forward to attack Peloponnesus, the Peloponnesians in the fleet at Salamis would return for the protection of their own homes, and that thus the fleet would disperse, the rather as there was little or no food in the island—and intimating, besides, unmeasured contempt for the efficacy of the Persian fleet and seamen as compared with the Greek, as well as for the subject contingents of Xerxês generally. That Queen Artemisia gave this prudent counsel, there is no reason to question; and the historian of Halikarnassus may have had means of hearing the grounds on which her opinion rested. But I find a difficulty in believing that she can have publicly delivered any such estimate of the maritime subjects of Persia; an estimate not merely insulting to all who heard it, but at the time not just—though it had come to be nearer the truth at the time when Herodotus wrote,² and though Artemisia herself may

¹ Herodot. viii. 66. Colonel Leake observes upon this statement (Athens and the Demi of Attica, App. vol. ii. p. 250), "About 1000 ships is the greatest accuracy we can pretend to, in stating the strength of the Persian fleet at Salamis: and from these are to be deducted, in estimating the number of ships engaged in the battle, those which were sent to occupy the Megaric strait of Salamis, 200 in number."

The estimate of Colonel Leake appears somewhat lower than the probable reality. Nor do I believe the statement of Diodorus, that ships were detached to occupy the Megaric strait: see a note shortly following.

² The picture drawn in the Cyropædia of Xenophon represents the subjects of Persia as spiritless and untrained to war (*ἀνδρακίδες καὶ ἀσύντακτοι*), and even designedly kept so, forming a contrast to the native Persians (Xenophon, Cyropæd. viii. 1, 45).

have lived to entertain the conviction afterwards. Whatever may have been her reasons, the historian tells us that friends as well as rivals were astonished at her rashness in dissuading the monarch from a naval battle, and expected that she would be put to death. But Xerxes heard the advice with perfect good temper, and even esteemed the Karian queen the more highly; though he resolved that the opinion of the majority, or his own opinion, should be acted upon. Orders were accordingly issued for the fleet to attack the next day,¹ and for the land-force to move forward towards Peloponnesus.

Whilst, on the shore of Phalêrum, an omnipotent will compelled seeming unanimity and precluded all real deliberation—great indeed was the contrast presented by the neighbouring Greek armament at Salamis; among the members of which unmeasured dissension had been reigning. It has already been stated that the Greek fleet had originally got together at that island, not with any view of making it a naval station, but simply in order to cover and assist the emigration of the Athenians. This object being accomplished, and Xerxes being already in Attica, Eurybiadês convoked the chiefs to consider what position was the fittest for a naval engagement. Most of them, especially those from Peloponnesus, were averse to remaining at Salamis, and proposed that the fleet should be transferred to the Isthmus of Corinth, where it would be in immediate communication with the Peloponnesian land-force, so that in case of defeat at sea, the ships would find protection on shore and the men would join in the land service—while it worsted in a naval action near Salamis, they would be enclosed in an island from whence there were no hopes of escape.² In the midst of the debate, a messenger arrived with news of the capture and conflagration of Athens and her acropolis by the Persians. Such was the terror produced by this intelligence, that some of the chiefs, without even awaiting the conclusion of the debate and the final vote, quitted the council forthwith, and began to hoist sail, or prepare their rowers, for departure. The majority came to a formal vote for removing to the Isthmus; but as night was approaching, actual removal was deferred until the next morning.³

Now was felt the want of a position like that of Thermopylæ, which had served as a protection to all the Greeks at once, so as to check the growth of separate fears and interests. We can hardly wonder that the Peloponnesian chiefs—the Corinthians

¹ Herodot. viii. 63, 63, 70.

² Herodot. viii. 70.

³ Herodot. viii. 49, 50, 56.

in particular, who furnished so large a naval contingent, and within whose territory the land-battle at the Isthmus seemed about to take place—should manifest such an obstinate reluctance to fight at Salamis, and should insist on removing to a position where, in case of naval defeat, they could assist, and be assisted by, their own soldiers on land. On the other hand, Salamis was not only the most favourable position, in consequence of its narrow strait, for the inferior numbers of the Greeks, but could not be abandoned without breaking up the unity of the allied fleet; since Megara and Ægina would thus be left uncovered, and the contingents of each would immediately retire for the defence of their own homes,—while the Athenians also, a large portion of whose expatriated families were in Salamis and Ægina, would be in like manner distracted from combined maritime efforts at the Isthmus. If transferred to the latter place, probably not even the Peloponnesians themselves would have remained in one body; for the squadrons of Epidaurus, Troezen, Hermionê, &c., each fearing that the Persian fleet might make a descent on one or other of these separate ports, would go home to repel such a contingency, in spite of the efforts of Eurybiadês to keep them together. Hence the order for quitting Salamis and repairing to the Isthmus was nothing less than a sentence of extinction for all combined maritime defence: and it thus became doubly abhorrent to all those who, like the Athenians, Æginetans, and Megarians, were also led by their own separate safety to cling to the defence of Salamis. In spite of all such opposition, however, and in spite of the protest of Themistoklês, the obstinate determination of the Peloponnesian leaders carried the vote for retreat, and each of them went to his ship to prepare for it on the following morning.

When Themistoklês returned to his ship, with the gloom of this melancholy resolution full upon his mind, and with the necessity of providing for removal of the expatriated Athenian families in the island as well as for that of the squadron—he found an Athenian friend named Mnêsiphilus, who asked him what the synod of chiefs had determined. Concerning this Mnêsiphilus, who is mentioned generally as a sagacious practical politician, we unfortunately have no particulars: but it must have been no common man whom fame selected, truly or falsely, as the inspiring genius of Themistoklês. On learning what had been resolved, Mnêsiphilus burst out into remonstrance on the utter ruin which its execution would entail: there would presently be neither any united fleet to

fight, nor any aggregate cause and country to fight for.¹ He vehemently urged Themistoklès again to open the question, and to press by every means in his power for a recall of the vote in favour of retreat, as well as for a positive resolution to stay and fight at Salamis. Themistoklès had already in vain tried to enforce the same view: but though he was disheartened by ill-success, the remonstrances of a respected friend struck him so forcibly as to induce him to renew his efforts. He went instantly to the ship of Eurybiadès, asked permission to speak with him, and being invited aboard, reopened with him alone the whole subject of the past discussion, enforcing his own views as emphatically as he could. In this private communication, all the arguments bearing upon the case were more unsparingly laid open than it had been possible to do in an assembly of the chiefs, who would have been insulted if openly told that they were likely to desert the fleet when once removed from Salamis. Speaking thus freely and confidentially, and speaking to Eurybiadès alone, Themistoklès was enabled to bring him partially round, and even prevailed upon him to convene a fresh synod. So soon as this synod had assembled, even before Eurybiadès had explained the object and formally opened the discussion, Themistoklès addressed himself to each of the chiefs separately, pouring forth at large his fears and anxiety as to the abandonment of Salamis: insomuch that the Corinthian Adeimantus rebuked him by saying—"Themistoklès, those who in the public festival-matches rise up before the proper signal, are scourged." "True (rejoined the Athenian), but those who lag behind the signal win no crowns."²

Eurybiadès then explained to the synod that doubts had

¹ Herodot. viii. 57. *Οὔτοι ἔρα ἦν ἀπαίρωσι τὰς νῆας ἀπὸ Σαλαμῖνος, περὶ οὐδεμιῆς ἔτι πατρίδος ναυμαχίσεις· κατὰ γὰρ πόλις ἕκαστος τρέψονται, &c.* Compare vii. 139, and Thucyd. i. 73.

² Herodot. viii. 58, 59. The account given by Herodotus, of these memorable debates which preceded the battle of Salamis, is in the main distinct, instructive and consistent. It is more probable than the narrative of Diodorus (xi. 15, 16), who states that Themistoklès succeeded in fully convincing both Eurybiadès and the Peloponnesian chiefs of the propriety of fighting at Salamis, but that, in spite of all their efforts, the armament would not obey them, and insisted on going to the Isthmus. And it deserves our esteem still more, if we contrast it with the loose and careless accounts of Plutarch and Cornelius Nepos. As Plutarch (Themist. c. 11) describes the scene, Eurybiadès was the person who desired to restrain the forwardness and oratory of Themistoklès, and with that view, first made to him the observation given in my text out of Herodotus, which Themistoklès followed up by the same answer—next, lifted up his stick to strike Themistoklès, upon which the latter addressed to him the well-known observation—"Strike, but hear me" (*Πάταξον μὲν, ἀκουσον δέ*). Larcher

arisen in his mind, and that he called them together to reconsider the previous resolve: upon which Themistoklēs began the debate. He vehemently enforced the necessity of fighting in the narrow sea of Salamis and not in the open waters at the Isthmus—as well as of preserving Megara and Ægina; contending that a naval victory at Salamis would be not less effective for the defence of Peloponnesus than if it took place at the Isthmus; whereas, if the fleet were withdrawn to the latter point, they would only draw the Persians after them. Moreover, he did not omit to add, that the Athenians had a prophecy assuring to them victory in this, their own island. But his speech made little impression on the Peloponnesian chiefs; who were even exasperated at being again summoned, to reopen a debate already concluded,—and concluded in a way which they deemed essential to their safety. In the bosom of the Corinthian Adeimantus, especially, this feeling of anger burst all bounds. He sharply denounced the presumption of Themistoklēs, and bade him be silent as a man who had now no free Grecian city to represent—Athens being in the power

expresses his surprise that Herodotus *should have suppressed* so impressive an anecdote as this latter: but we may see plainly from the tenor of his narrative that he cannot have heard it. In the narrative of Herodotus, Themistoklēs gives no offence to *Eurybiadēs*, nor is the latter at all displeased with him: nay, *Eurybiadēs* is even brought over by the persuasion of Themistoklēs, and disposed to fall in with his views. The persons whom Herodotus represents as angry with Themistoklēs are, the Peloponnesian chiefs, especially Adeimantus the Corinthian. They are angry too (let it be added), not without plausible reason: a formal vote has just been taken by the majority, after full discussion; and here is the chief of the minority who persuades *Eurybiadēs* to reopen the whole debate: not an unreasonable cause for displeasure. Moreover it is *Adeimantus*, not *Eurybiadēs*, who addresses to Themistoklēs the remark that “persons who rise before the proper signal are scourged:” and he makes the remark because Themistoklēs goes on speaking to, and trying to persuade, the various chiefs, *before* the business of the assembly has been formally opened. Themistoklēs draws upon himself the censure by sinning against the forms of business, and talking before the proper time. But Plutarch puts the remark into the mouth of *Eurybiadēs*, without any previous circumstance to justify it, and without any fitness. His narrative represents *Eurybiadēs* as the person who was anxious both to transfer the ships to the Isthmus, and to prevent Themistoklēs from offering any opposition to it; though such an attempt to check argumentative opposition from the commander of the Athenian squadron is noway credible.

Dr. Blomfield (ad Æschyl. Pers. 728) imagines that the story about *Eurybiadēs* threatening Themistoklēs with his stick grew out of the story as related in Herodotus, though to Herodotus himself it was unknown. I cannot think that this is correct, since the story will not fit on to the narrative of that historian: it does not consist with his conception of the relations between *Eurybiadēs* and Themistoklēs.

of the enemy. Nay, he went so far as to contend that Eurybiadês had no right to count the vote of Themistoklês until the latter could produce some free city as accrediting him to the synod. Such an attack, alike ungenerous and insane, upon the leader of more than half of the whole fleet, demonstrates the ungovernable impatience of the Corinthians to carry away the fleet to their Isthmus. It provoked a bitter retort against them from Themistoklês, who reminded them that while he had around him 200 well-manned ships, he could procure for himself anywhere both city and territory as good or better than Corinth. But he now saw clearly that it was hopeless to think of enforcing his policy by argument, and that nothing would succeed except the direct language of intimidation. Turning to Eurybiadês, and addressing him personally, he said—"If thou wilt stay here, and fight bravely here, all will turn out well; but if thou wilt not stay, thou wilt bring Hellas to ruin.¹ For with us, all our means of war are contained in our ships. Be thou yet persuaded by me. If not, we Athenians shall migrate with our families on board, just as we are, to Siris in Italy, which is ours from of old, and which the prophecies announce that we are one day to colonise. You chiefs then, when bereft of allies like us, will hereafter recollect what I am now saying."

Eurybiadês had before been nearly convinced by the impressive pleading of Themistoklês. But this last downright menace clenched his determination, and probably struck dumb even the Corinthian and Peloponnesian opponents: for it was but too plain, that without the Athenians the fleet was powerless. He did not however put the question again to vote, but took upon himself to rescind the previous resolution, and to issue orders for staying at Salamis to fight. In this order all acquiesced, willing or unwilling.² The succeeding dawn saw them preparing for fight instead of for retreat, and invoking the protection and companionship of the Æakid heroes of Salamis—Telamon and Ajax: they even sent a trireme to Ægina to implore Æakus himself and the remaining Æakids. It seems to have been on this same day, also, that the resolution of fighting at Salamis was taken by Xerxes, whose fleet was seen in motion, towards the close of the day preparing for attack the next morning.

¹ Herodot. viii. 61, 62. Σὺ εἰ μενέεις αὐτοῦ, καὶ μένων ἔσειαι ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀνατρέψεις τὴν Ἑλλάδα.

² Herodot. viii. 64. Οὕτω μὲν οἱ περὶ Σαλαμίνα, ἔπεισι ἀκροβολισάμενοι, ἐπεὶ τε Εὐρυβιάδῃ ἔδοξε, αὐτοῦ παρεσκευάζοντο ὡς ναυμαχίσοντες.

But the Peloponnesians, though not venturing to disobey the orders of the Spartan admiral, still retained unabated their former fears and reluctance, which began again after a short interval to prevail over the formidable menace of Themistoklēs, and were further strengthened by the advices from the Isthmus. The messengers from that quarter depicted the trepidation and affright of their absent brethren while constructing their cross wall at that point, to resist the impending land invasion. Why were *they* not there also, to join hands and to help in the defence,—even if worsted at sea,—at least on land, instead of wasting their efforts in defence of Attica, already in the hands of the enemy? Such were the complaints which passed from man to man, with many a bitter exclamation against the insanity of Eurybiadēs : at length the common feeling broke out in public and mutinous manifestation, and a fresh synod of the chiefs was demanded and convoked.¹ Here the same angry debate, and the same irreconcilable difference, was again renewed ; the Peloponnesian chiefs clamouring for immediate departure, while the Athenians, Æginetans,² and Megarians, were equally urgent in favour of staying to fight. It was evident to Themistoklēs that the majority of votes among the chiefs would be against him, in spite of the orders of Eurybiadēs ; and the disastrous crisis, destined to deprive Greece of all united maritime defence, appeared imminent—when he resorted to one last stratagem to meet the desperate emergency by rendering flight impossible. Contriving a pretext for stealing away from the synod, he despatched a trusty messenger across the strait with a secret communication to the Persian generals. Sikinnus his slave—seemingly an Asiatic Greek³ who understood Persian and had perhaps been sold during the late Ionic revolt, but whose superior qualities are marked by the fact that he had the care and teaching of the children of his master—was instructed to acquaint them privately in the name of Themistoklēs, who was represented as

¹ Herodot. viii. 74. ἕως μὲν δὴ αὐτέων ἀνὴρ ἀνδρὶ παρίστατο, θάμα ποιούμενοι τὴν Εὐρυβιάδω ἀβουλίην· τέλος δὲ, ἐξεβράγη ἐς τὸ μέσον, σύλλογός τε δὴ ἐγένετο, καὶ πολλὰ ἐλέγετο περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, &c. Compare Plutarch, Themist. c. 12.

² Lykurgus (cont. Leokrat. c. 17, p. 185) numbers the Æginetans among those who were anxious to escape from Salamis during the night, and were only prevented from doing so by the stratagem of Themistoklēs. This is a great mistake, as indeed these orators are perpetually misconceiving the facts of their past history. The Æginetans had an interest not less strong than the Athenians in keeping the fleet together and fighting at Salamis.

³ Plutarch (Themistoklēs, c. 12) calls Sikinnus a *Persian by birth*, which cannot be true.

wishing success at heart to the Persians, that the Greek fleet was not only in the utmost alarm, meditating immediate flight, but that the various portions of it were in such violent dissension, that they were more likely to fight against each other than against any common enemy. A splendid opportunity (it was added) was thus opened to the Persians, if they chose to avail themselves of it without delay, first to enclose and prevent their flight, and then to attack a disunited body, many of whom would, when the combat began, openly espouse the Persian cause.¹

Such was the important communication despatched by Themistoklēs across the narrow strait (only a quarter of a mile in breadth at the narrowest part) which divides Salamis from the neighbouring continent on which the enemy were posted. It was delivered with so much address as to produce the exact impression which he intended, and the glorious success which followed caused it to pass for a splendid stratagem: had defeat ensued, his name would have been covered with infamy. What surprises us the most is, that after having reaped signal honour from it in the eyes of the Greeks as a stratagem, Themistoklēs lived to take credit for it, during the exile of his latter days,² as a capital service rendered to the Persian monarch. It is not improbable, when we reflect upon the desperate condition of Grecian affairs at the moment, that such facility of double interpretation was in part his inducement for sending the message.

It appears to have been delivered to Xerxes shortly after he had issued his orders for fighting on the next morning: and he entered so greedily into the scheme, as to direct his generals to close up the strait of Salamis on both sides during the night, to the north as well as to the south of the town of Salamis, at the risk of their heads if any opening were left for the Greeks to escape.³ The station of the numerous Persian fleet was

¹ Herodot. viii. 75.

² Thucyd. i. 137. It is curious to contrast this with Æschylus, *Persæ*, 351 *seq.* See also Herodot. viii. 109, 110.

Isokratēs might well remark about the ultimate rewards given by the Persians to Themistoklēs—*Θεμιστοκλέα δ', ὃς ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος αὐτοῦς κατενανμάχησε, τῶν μεγίστων δωρεῶν ἤξιωσαν* (Panegyric, Or. iv. p. 74)—though that orator speaks as if he knew nothing about the stratagem by which Themistoklēs compelled the Greeks to fight at Salamis against their will. See the same Oration, c. 27, p. 61.

³ Æschylus, *Persæ*, 370.

Herodotus does not mention this threat to the generals, nor does he even notice the personal interference of Xerxes in any way, so far as regards the night-movement of the Persian fleet. He treats the communication of

along the coast of Attica—its head-quarters were in the bay of Phalærum, but doubtless parts of it would occupy those three natural harbours, as yet unimproved by art, which belonged to the deme of Peiræus—and would perhaps extend besides to other portions of the western coast southward of Phalærum; while the Greek fleet was in the harbour of the town called Salamis, in the portion of the island facing Mount Ægaleos in Attica. During the night,¹ a portion of the Persian fleet, sailing from Peiræus northward along the western coast of Attica, closed round to the north of the town and harbour of Salamis, so as to shut up the northern issue from the strait on the side of Eleusis; while another portion blocked up the other issue between Peiræus and the south-eastern corner of the island, landing a detachment of troops on the desert island of Psyttaleia near to that corner.² These measures were all taken

Sikinnus as having been made to the Persian generals, and the night-movement as undertaken by them. The statement of the contemporary poet seems the more probable of the two: but he omits, as might be expected, all notice of the perilous dissensions in the Greek camp.

¹ Diodorus (xi. 17) states that the Egyptian squadron in the fleet of Xerxes was detached to block up the outlet between Salamis and the Megarid; that is, to sail round the south-western corner of the island to the north-western strait, where the north-western corner of the island is separated by a narrow strait from Megara, near the spot where the fort of Budorum was afterwards situated, during the Peloponnesian war.

Herodotus mentions nothing of this movement, and his account evidently implies that the Greek fleet was enclosed to the north of the town of Salamis, the Persian right wing having got between that town and Eleusis. The movement announced by Diodorus appears to me unnecessary and improbable. If the Egyptian squadron had been placed there, they would have been far indeed removed from the scene of the action, but we may see that Herodotus believed them to have taken actual part in the battle along with the rest (viii. 100).

² Herodot. viii. 76. *Τοῖσι δὲ ὡς πιστὰ ἐγένετο τὰ ἀγγελέθοντα, τοῦτο μὲν, ἐς τὴν νησίδα τὴν Ψυττάλειαν, μεταξὺ Σαλαμῖνός τε κειμένην καὶ τῆς ἡπέριου, πολλοὺς τῶν Περσέων ἀπεβιβάσαντο· τοῦτο δὲ, ἐπειδὴ ἐγένοντο μέσαι νύκτες, ἀνήγον μὲν τὸ ἀπ' ἑσπέρας κέρας κυκλοῦμενοι πρὸς τὴν Σαλαμίνα· ἀνήγον δὲ οἱ ἀμφὶ τὴν Κέον τε καὶ τὴν Κυνόσουραν τεταγμένοι, κατέχον τε μέχρι Μουνηχίης πάντα τὸν πορθμὸν τῆσι νηυσί.*

He had previously stated Phalærum as the main station of the Persian fleet; not necessarily meaning that the whole of it was there. The passage which I have just transcribed intimates what the Persians did to accomplish their purpose of surrounding the Greeks in the harbour of Salamis: and the first part of it, wherein he speaks of the western (more properly north-western) wing, presents no extraordinary difficulty, though we do not know how far the western wing extended before the movement was commenced. Probably it extended to the harbour of Peiræus, and began from thence its night-movement along the Attic coast to get beyond the town of Salamis. But the second part of the passage is not easy to comprehend, where he states that "those who were stationed about Keos and Kynosura also

during the night, to prevent the anticipated flight of the Greeks, and then to attack them in the narrow strait close on their own harbour, the next morning.

Meanwhile that angry controversy among the Grecian chiefs, in the midst of which Themistoklês had sent over his secret envoy, continued without abatement and without decision. It was the interest of the Athenian general to prolong the debate, and to prevent any concluding vote, until the effect of his stratagem should have rendered retreat impossible. Such prolongation was nowise difficult in a case so critical, where the majority of chiefs was on one side, and that of naval force on the other—especially as Eurybiadês himself was favourable to the view of Themistoklês. Accordingly the debate was still unfinished at nightfall, and either continued all night, or was adjourned to an hour before daybreak on the following morning—when an incident, interesting as well as important, gave to it a new turn. The ostracised Aristeidês arrived at Salamis from Ægina. Since the revocation of his sentence—a revocation proposed by Themistoklês himself—he had had no

moved, and beset with their ships the whole strait as far as Munychia." What places are Keos and Kynosura, and where were they situated? The only known places of those names, are, the island of Keos, not far south of Cape Sunium in Attica—and the promontory, Kynosura, on the north-eastern coast of Attica, immediately north of the bay of Marathon. It seems hardly possible to suppose that Herodotus meant this latter promontory, too distant to render the movement which he describes at all practicable: even the island of Keos is somewhat open to the same objection, though not in so great a degree, of being too distant. Hence Barthélemy, Kruse, Bähr, and Dr. Thirlwall, apply the names Keos and Kynosura to two promontories (the southernmost and the south-easternmost) of the island of Salamis; and Kiepert has realised their idea in his newly-published maps. But in the first place, no authority is produced for giving these names to two promontories in the island, and the critics only do it because they say it is necessary to secure a reasonable meaning to this passage of Herodotus. In the next place, if we admit their supposition, we must suppose that *before this night-movement commenced*, the Persian fleet was already stationed in part off *the island of Salamis*; which appears to me highly improbable. Whatever station that fleet occupied before the night-movement, we may be very sure that it was not upon an island then possessed by the enemy: it was somewhere on the coast of Attica; and the names Keos and Kynosura must belong to some unknown points in Attica, not in Salamis. I cannot therefore adopt the supposition of these critics, though on the other hand Larcher is not satisfactory in his attempt to remove the objections which apply to the supposition of Keos and Kynosura as commonly understood. It is difficult in this case to reconcile the statement of Herodotus with geographical considerations, and I rather suspect that on this occasion the historian has been himself misled by too great a desire to find the oracle of Bakis truly fulfilled. It is from Bakis that he copies the name Kynosura (viii. 77).

opportunity of revisiting Athens, and he now for the first time rejoined his countrymen in their exile at Salamis; not uninformed of the dissensions raging, and of the impatience of the Peloponnesians to retire to the Isthmus. He was the first to bring the news that such retirement had become impracticable from the position of the Persian fleet, which his own vessel in coming from Ægina had only eluded under favour of night. He caused Themistoklēs to be invited out from the assembled synod of chiefs; and after a generous exordium, wherein he expressed his hope that their rivalry would for the future be only a competition in doing good to their common country, apprised him that the new movement of the Persians excluded all hope of now reaching the Isthmus, and rendered further debate useless. Themistoklēs expressed his joy at the intelligence; communicating his own secret message whereby he had himself brought the movement about, in order that the Peloponnesian chiefs might be forced to fight at Salamis even against their own consent. He moreover desired Aristeidēs to go himself into the synod, and communicate the news; for if it came from the lips of Themistoklēs, the Peloponnesians would treat it as a fabrication. So obstinate indeed was their incredulity that they would not accept it as truth even on the assertion of Aristeidēs: nor was it until the arrival of a Tenian vessel, deserting from the Persian fleet, that they at last brought themselves to credit the actual posture of affairs and the entire impossibility of retreat. Once satisfied of this fact, they prepared themselves at dawn for the impending battle.¹

Having caused his land-force to be drawn up along the shore opposite to Salamis, Xerxes had erected for himself a lofty seat or throne, upon one of the projecting declivities of Mount Ægaleos—near the Herakleion and immediately overhanging the sea²—from whence he could plainly review all the

¹ Herodot. viii. 79, 80.

Herodotus states, doubtless correctly, that Aristeidēs, immediately after he had made the communication to the synod, went away, not pretending to take part in the debate: Plutarch represents him as present and as taking part in it (Aristeidēs, c. 9). According to Plutarch, Themistoklēs desires Aristeidēs to assist him in persuading Eurybiadēs: according to Herodotus, Eurybiadēs was already persuaded: it was the Peloponnesian chiefs who stood out.

The details of Herodotus will be found throughout both more credible and more consistent than those of Plutarch and the later writers.

² Æschylus, Pers. 473: Herodot. viii. 90. The throne with silver feet, upon which Xerxes had sat, was long preserved in the acropolis of Athens—having been left at his retreat. Harpokration, Ἀργυρόπους δίφρος.

A writer, to whom Plutarch refers,—Akestodōrus—affirmed that the

phases of the combat and the conduct of his subject troops. He was persuaded that they had not done their best at Artemisium, in consequence of his absence, and that his presence would inspire them with fresh valour: moreover his royal scribes stood ready by his side to record the names both of the brave and of the backward combatants. On the right wing of his fleet, which approached Salamis on the side of Eleusis, and was opposed to the Athenians on the Grecian left,—were placed the Phœnicians and Egyptians; on his left wing the Ionians¹—approaching from the side of Peiræus, and opposed to the Lacedæmonians, Æginetans, and Megarians. The seamen of the Persian fleet, however, had been on ship-board all night, in making that movement which had brought them into their actual position; while the Greek seamen now began without previous fatigue, fresh from the animated harangues of Themistoklês and the other leaders. Just as they were getting on board, they were joined by the trireme which had been sent to Ægina to bring to their aid Æakus with the other Æakid heroes. Honoured with this precious heroic aid, which tended so much to raise the spirits of the Greeks, the Æginetan trireme now arrived just in time to take her post in the line, having eluded pursuit from the intervening enemy.²

seat of Xerxes was erected, not under Mount Ægaleos, but much farther to the north-west, on the borders of Attica and the Megarid, under the mountains called Kerata (Plutarch, Themistoklês, 13). If this writer was acquainted with the topography of Attica, we must suppose him to have ascribed an astonishingly long sight to Xerxes: but we may probably take the assertion as a sample of that carelessness in geography which marks so many ancient writers. Ktésias recognises the *Ἡρακλείον* (Persica, c. 26).

¹ Herodot. viii. 85; Diodor. xi. 16.

² Herodot. viii. 83; Plutarch (Themistoklês, c. 13; Aristeidês, c. 9; Pelopidas, c. 21). Plutarch tells a story out of Phantias, respecting an incident in the moment before the action, which it is pleasing to find sufficient ground for rejecting. Themistoklês, with the prophet Euphrantidês, was offering sacrifice by the side of the admiral's galley, when three beautiful youths, nephews of Xerxes, were brought in prisoners. As the fire was just then blazing brilliantly, and sneezing was heard from the right, the prophet enjoined Themistoklês to offer these three prisoners as a propitiatory offering to Dionysus Ômêstês; which the clamour by the bystanders compelled him to do against his will. This is what Plutarch states in his life of Themistoklês; in his life of Aristeidês, he affirms that these youths were brought prisoners from Psyttaleia, when Aristeidês attacked *it at the beginning of the action*. Now Aristeidês did not attack Psyttaleia until the naval combat was nearly over, so that no prisoners can have been brought from thence at the commencement of the action: there could therefore have been no Persian prisoners to sacrifice, and the story may be dismissed as a fiction.

The Greeks rowed forward from the shore to attack, with the usual pæan or war-shout, which was confidently returned by the Persians. Indeed the latter were the most forward of the two to begin the fight. The Greek seamen, on gradually nearing the enemy, became at first disposed to hesitate—and even backed water for a space, so that some of them touched ground on their own shore; until the retrograde movement was arrested by a supernatural feminine figure hovering over them, who exclaimed with a voice that rang through the whole fleet—“Ye worthies, how much farther are ye going to back water?” The very circulation of this fable attests the dubious courage of the Greeks at the commencement of the battle.¹ The brave Athenian captains Ameinias and Lykomédês (the former, brother of the poet Æschylus) were the first to obey either the feminine voice or the inspirations of their own ardour; though, according to the version current at Ægina, it was the Æginetan ship, the carrier of the Æakid heroes, which first set this honourable example.² The Naxian Demokritos was celebrated by Simonides as the third ship in action. Ameinias, darting forth from the line, charged with the beak of his ship full against a Phœnician, and the two became entangled so that he could not again get clear: other ships came in aid on both sides, and the action thus became general.

Herodotus, with his usual candour, tells us that he could procure few details about the action except as to what concerned Artemisia, the queen of his own city: so that we know hardly anything beyond the general facts. But it appears that, with the exception of the Ionic Greeks, many of whom (apparently a greater number than Herodotus likes to acknow-

¹ Herodot. viii. 84. *φανείσαν δὲ διακελεύσασθαι, ἔστε καὶ ἔπαν ἀκοῦσαι τὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων στρατόπεδον, ὀνειδίσασαν πρότερον τὰδε· ὦ δαιμόνιοι, μέχρι κόσου ἔτι πρὸ μνην ἀνακρούσθε;*

Æschylus (Pers. 396-415) describes finely the war-shout of the Greeks and the response of the Persians: for very good reasons, he does not notice the incipient backwardness of the Greeks, which Herodotus brings before us.

The war-shout here described by Æschylus, a warrior actually engaged, shows us the difference between a naval combat of that day and the improved tactics of the Athenians fifty years afterwards, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. Phormion especially enjoins on his men the necessity of silence (Thucyd. ii. 89).

² Simonides, Epigram 138, Bergk; Plutarch, De Herodot. Malignitate, c. 36.

According to Plutarch (Themist. 12) and Diodorus (xi. 17), it was the Persian admiral's ship which was first charged and captured: if the fact had been so, Æschylus would probably have mentioned it.

ledge) were lukewarm, and some even averse¹—the subjects of Xerxes conducted themselves generally with great bravery: Phoenicians, Cyprians, Kilikians, Egyptians, vied with the Persians and Medes serving as soldiers on shipboard, in trying to satisfy the exigent monarch who sat on shore watching their behaviour. Their signal defeat was not owing to any want of courage—but, first, to the narrow space which rendered their superior number a hindrance rather than a benefit: next, to their want of orderly line and discipline as compared with the Greeks: thirdly, to the fact that when once fortune seemed to turn against them, they had no fidelity or reciprocal attachment, and each ally was willing to sacrifice or even to run down others, in order to effect his own escape. Their numbers and absence of concert threw them into confusion and caused them to run foul of each other. Those in the front could not recede, nor could those in the rear advance:² the oar-blades were broken by collision—the steersmen lost control of their ships, and could no longer adjust the ship's course so as to strike that direct blow with the beak which was essential in ancient warfare. After some time of combat, the whole Persian fleet was driven back and became thoroughly unmanageable, so that the issue was no longer doubtful, and nothing remained except the efforts of individual bravery to protract the struggle. While the Athenian squadron on the left, which had the greatest resistance to surmount, broke up and drove before them the Persian right, the Æginetans on the right intercepted the flight of the fugitives to Phalærum:³ Demokritus the Naxian captain was said to have captured five ships of the Persians with his own single trireme. The chief admiral Ariabignês, brother of Xerxes, attacked at once by two Athenian triremes, fell gallantly trying to board one of them, and the number of distinguished Persians and Medes who shared his fate was very great;⁴ the more so, as

¹ Herodot. viii. 85; Diodor. xi. 16. Æschylus in the *Perseæ*, though he gives a long list of the names of those who fought against Athens, does not make any allusion to the Ionic or to any other Greeks as having formed part of the catalogue. See Blomfield ad Æschyl. Pers. 42. Such silence easily admits of explanation.

² Herodot. viii. 86; Diodor. xi. 17. The testimony of the former, both to the courage manifested by the Persian fleet, and to their entire want of order and system, is decisive, as well as to the effect of the personal overlooking of Xerxes.

³ Simonides, Epigr. 138, Bergk.

⁴ The many names of Persian chiefs whom Æschylus reports as having been slain, are probably for the most part inventions of his own, to please the ears of his audience. See Blomfield, *Præfat. ad Æschyl. Pers.* p. xii.

few of them knew how to swim, while among the Greek seamen who were cast into the sea, the greater number were swimmers, and had the friendly shore of Salamis near at hand.

It appears that the Phœnician seamen of the fleet threw the blame of defeat upon the Ionic Greeks; and some of them, driven ashore during the heat of the battle under the immediate throne of Xerxes, excused themselves by denouncing the others as traitors. The heads of the Ionic leaders might have been endangered if the monarch had not seen with his own eyes an act of surprising gallantry by one of their number. An Ionic trireme from Samothrace charged and disabled an Attic trireme, but was herself almost immediately run down by an Æginetan. The Samothracian crew, as their vessel lay disabled on the water, made such excellent use of their missile weapons, that they cleared the decks of the Æginetan, sprung on board, and became masters of her. This exploit, passing under the eyes of Xerxes himself, induced him to treat the Phœnicians as dastardly calumniators, and to direct their heads to be cut off. His wrath and vexation (Herodotus tells us) were boundless, and he scarcely knew on whom to vent the feelings.¹

In this disastrous battle itself, as in the debate before the battle, the conduct of Artemisia of Halikarnassus was such as to give him full satisfaction. It appears that this queen maintained her full part in the battle until the disorder had become irretrievable. She then sought to escape, pursued by the Athenian trierarch Ameinias, but found her progress obstructed by the number of fugitive or embarrassed comrades before her. In this dilemma she preserved herself from pursuit by attaching one of her own comrades; she charged the trireme of the Karian prince Damasithymus of Kalyndus, ran it down and sunk it, so that the prince with all his crew perished. Had Ameinias been aware that the vessel which he was following was that of Artemisia, nothing would have induced him to relax in the pursuit—for the Athenian captains were all indignant at the idea of a female invader assailing their city.² But knowing her ship only as one among the enemy, and seeing her thus charge and destroy another enemy's ship, he concluded her to be a deserter, turned his pursuit elsewhere, and suffered her to escape. At the same time, it so happened

¹ Herodot. viii. 90.

² Compare the indignant language of Demosthenês a century and a quarter afterwards, respecting the second Artemisia queen of Karia, as the enemy of Athens—*ὤμεις δ' ὄντες Ἀθηναῖοι βάρβαρον ἄνθρωπον, καὶ ταῦτα γυναῖκα, φοβηθήσεσθε* (Demosthenês, De Rhodior. Libertat. c. x. p. 197).

that the destruction of the ship of Damasithymus happened under the eyes of Xerxes and of the persons around him on shore, who recognised the ship of Artemisia, but supposed the ship destroyed to be a Greek. Accordingly they remarked to him, "Master, seest thou not how well Artemisia fights, and how she has just sunk an enemy's ship?" Assured that it was really her deed, Xerxes is said to have replied, "My men have become women; my women, men." Thus was Artemisia not only preserved, but exalted to a higher place in the esteem of Xerxes by the destruction of one of his own ships; among the crew of which not a man survived to tell the true story.¹

Of the total loss of either fleet, Herodotus gives us no estimate; but Diodorus states the number of ships destroyed on the Grecian side as forty, on the Persian side as two hundred; independent of those which were made prisoners with all their crews. To the Persian loss is to be added, the destruction of all those troops whom they had landed before the battle in the island of Psyttaleia. As soon as the Persian fleet was put to flight, Aristeidēs carried over some Grecian hoplites to that island, overpowered the enemy, and put them to death to a man. This loss appears to have been much deplored, as they were choice troops; in great proportion, the native Persian guards.²

Great and capital as the victory was, there yet remained after it a sufficient portion of the Persian fleet to maintain even maritime war vigorously, not to mention the powerful land-force, as yet unshaken. And the Greeks themselves—immediately

¹ Herodot. viii. 87, 88, 93. The story here given by Herodotus respecting the stratagem whereby Artemisia escaped, seems sufficiently probable; and he may have heard it from fellow-citizens of his own who were aboard her vessel. Though Plutarch accuses him of extravagant disposition to compliment this queen, it is evident that he does not himself like the story, nor consider it to be compliment; for he himself insinuates a doubt, "I do not know whether she ran down the Kalyndian ship intentionally, or came accidentally into collision with it." Since the shock was so destructive that the Kalyndian ship was completely run down and sunk, so that every man of her crew perished, we may be pretty sure that it was intentional; and the historian merely suggests a possible hypothesis to palliate an act of great treachery. Though the story of the sinking of the Kalyndian ship has the air of truth, however, we cannot say the same about the observation of Xerxes, and the notice which he is reported to have taken of the act: all this reads like nothing but romance.

We have to regret (as Plutarch observes, *De Malign.* Herodot. p. 873) that Herodotus tells us so much less about others than about Artemisia; but he doubtless *heard* more about her than about the rest, and perhaps his own relatives may have been among her contingent.

² Herodot. viii. 95; Plutarch, *Aristid.* c. 9; *Æschyl. Pers.* 454-470; Diodor. xi. 19.

after they had collected in their island, as well as could be done, the fragments of shipping and the dead bodies—made ready for a second engagement.¹ But they were relieved from this necessity by the pusillanimity² of the invading monarch, in whom the defeat had occasioned a sudden revulsion from contemptuous confidence, not only to rage and disappointment, but to the extreme of alarm for his own personal safety. He was possessed with a feeling of mingled wrath and distrust against his naval force, which consisted entirely of subject nations—Phœnicians, Egyptians, Kilikians, Cyprians, Pamphylians, Ionic Greeks, &c., with a few Persians and Medes serving on board, in a capacity probably not well-suited to them. None of these subjects had any interest in the success of the invasion, or any other motive for service except fear; while the sympathies of the Ionic Greeks were even decidedly against it. Xerxes now came to suspect the fidelity, or undervalue the courage, of all these naval subjects.³ He fancied that they could make no resistance to the Greek fleet, and dreaded lest the latter should sail forthwith to the Hellespont, so as to break down the bridge and intercept his personal retreat; for upon the maintenance of that bridge he conceived his own safety to turn, not less than that of his father Darius, when retreating from Scythia, upon the preservation of the bridge over the Danube.⁴ Against the Phœnicians, from whom he had expected most, his rage broke out in such fierce threats, that they stole away from the fleet in the night, and departed homeward.⁵ Such a capital desertion made future naval

¹ Herodot. viii. 96.

² The victories of the Greeks over the Persians were materially aided by the personal timidity of Xerxes, and of Darius Codomannus at Issus and Arbela (Arrian, ii. II, 6; iii. 14, 3).

³ See this feeling especially in the language of Mardonius to Xerxes (Herodot. viii. 100), as well as in that put into the mouth of Artemisia by the historian (viii. 68), which indicates the general conception of the historian himself, derived from the various information which reached him.

⁴ Herodot. vii. 10.

⁵ This important fact is not stated by Herodotus, but it is distinctly given in Diodorus, xi. 19. It seems probable enough.

If the tragedy of Phrynichus, entitled *Phanissæ*, had been preserved, we should have known more about the position and behaviour of the Phœnician contingent in this invasion. It was represented at Athens only three years after the battle of Salamis, in B.C. 477 or 476, with Themistoklēs as choregus, four years earlier than the Persæ of Æschylus, which was affirmed by Glaucus to have been (*παρὰπειρῆσθαι*) altered from it. The Chorus in the *Phœnissæ* consisted of Phœnician women, possibly the widows of those Phœnicians whom Xerxes had caused to be beheaded after the battle (Herodot. viii. 90, as Dr. Blomfield supposes, Præf. ad

struggle still more hopeless, and Xerxes, though at first breathing revenge, and talking about a vast mole or bridge to be thrown across the strait to Salamis, speedily ended by giving orders to the whole fleet to leave Phalérum in the night—not without disembarking, however, the best soldiers who served on board.¹ They were directed to make straight for the Hellespont, and there to guard the bridge against his arrival.²

This resolution was prompted by Mardonius, who saw the real terror which beset his master, and read therein sufficient evidence of danger to himself. When Xerxes despatched to Susa intelligence of his disastrous overthrow, the feeling at home was not simply that of violent grief for the calamity, and fear for the personal safety of the monarch: it was further embittered by anger against Mardonius, as the instigator of this ruinous enterprise. That general knew full well that there was no safety for him³ in returning to Persia with the shame of failure on his head. It was better for him to take upon himself the chance of subduing Greece, which he had good hopes of being yet able to do—and to advise the return of Xerxes himself to a safe and easy residence in Asia. Such counsel was eminently palatable to the present alarm of the monarch, while it opened to Mardonius himself a fresh chance not only of safety, but of increased power and glory. Accordingly he began to re-assure his master by representing that the recent blow was after all not serious—that it had only fallen upon the inferior part of his force, and upon worthless foreign slaves, like Phœnicians, Egyptians, &c., while the native Persian troops yet remained unconquered and unconquerable, fully adequate to execute the monarch's revenge upon Hellas—that Xerxes might now very well retire with the bulk of his army, Æsch. Pers. p. ix.), or only of Phœnicians absent on the expedition. The fragments remaining of this tragedy, which gained the prize, are too scanty to sustain any conjectures as to its scheme or details (see Welcker, Griechische Tragœd. vol. i. p. 26; and Droysen, Phrynichos, Æschylos, und die Trilogie, p. 4-6).

¹ Herodot. ix. 32.

² Herodot. viii. 97-107. Such was the terror of these retreating seamen, that they are said to have mistaken the projecting cliffs of Cape Zôstêr (about half-way between Peiræus and Sunium) for ships, and redoubled the haste of their flight as if an enemy were after them—a story which we can treat as nothing better than silly exaggeration in the Athenian informants of Herodotus.

Ktésias, Pers. c. xxvi.; Strabo, ix. p. 395; the two latter talk about the intention to carry a mole across from Attica to Salamis, as if it had been conceived *before* the battle.

³ Compare Herodot. vii. 10.

if he were disposed, and that he (Mardonius) would pledge himself to complete the conquest, at the head of 300,000 chosen troops. This proposition afforded at the same time consolation for the monarch's wounded vanity, and safety for his person. His confidential Persians, and Artemisia herself on being consulted, approved of the step. The latter had acquired his confidence by the dissuasive advice which she had given before the recent deplorable engagement, and she had every motive now to encourage a proposition indicating solicitude for his person, as well as relieving herself from the obligation of further service. "If Mardonius desires to remain (she remarked contemptuously¹), by all means let him have the troops: should he succeed, thou wilt be the gainer; should he even perish, the loss of some of thy slaves is trifling, so long as thou remainest safe, and thy house in power. Thou hast already accomplished the purpose of thy expedition, in burning Athens." Xerxes, while adopting this counsel and directing the return of his fleet, showed his satisfaction with the Halikarnassian queen by entrusting to her some of his children, with directions to transport them to Ephesus.

The Greeks at Salamis learnt with surprise and joy the departure of the hostile fleet from the bay of Phalærum, and immediately put themselves in pursuit; following as far as the island of Andros without success. Themistoklēs and the Athenians were even said to have been anxious to push on forthwith to the Hellespont, and there break down the bridge of boats, in order to prevent the escape of Xerxes—had they not been restrained by the caution of Eurybiadēs and the Peloponnesians, who represented that it was dangerous to detain the Persian monarch in the heart of Greece. Themistoklēs readily suffered himself to be persuaded, and contributed much to divert his countrymen from the idea; while he at the same time sent the faithful Sikinnus a second time to Xerxes, with the intimation that he (Themistoklēs) had restrained the impatience of the Greeks to proceed without delay and burn the Hellespontine bridge—and that he had thus, from personal friendship to the monarch, secured for him a safe retreat.²

¹ Herodot. viii. 101, 102.

² Herodot. viii. 109, 110; Thucyd. i. 137. The words ἦν ψευδῶς προσπειθήσατο may probably be understood in a sense somewhat larger than that which they naturally bear in Thucydides. In point of fact—not only was it false, that Themistoklēs was the person who dissuaded the Greeks from going to the Hellespont—but it was also false, that the Greeks had ever any serious intention of going there. Compare Cornelius Nepos, Themistokl. c. 5.

Though this is the story related by Herodotus, we can hardly believe that with the great Persian land-force in the heart of Attica, there could have been any serious idea of so distant an operation as that of attacking the bridge at the Hellespont. It seems more probable that Themistoklès fabricated the intention, with a view of frightening Xerxes away, as well as of establishing a personal claim upon his gratitude in reserve for future contingencies.

Such crafty manœuvres, and long-sighted calculations of possibility, seem extraordinary: but the facts are sufficiently attested—since Themistoklès lived to claim as well as to receive fulfilment of the obligation thus conferred. Though extraordinary, they will not appear inexplicable, if we reflect, first, that the Persian game, even now after the defeat of Salamis, was not only not desperate, but might perfectly well have succeeded, if it had been played with reasonable prudence: next, that there existed in the mind of this eminent man an almost unparalleled combination of splendid patriotism, long-sighted cunning, and selfish rapacity. Themistoklès knew better than any one else that the cause of Greece had appeared utterly desperate, only a few hours before the late battle: moreover, a clever man tainted with such constant guilt might naturally calculate on being one day detected and punished, even if the Greeks proved successful.

He now employed the fleet among the islands of the Cycladès, for the purpose of levying fines upon them as a punishment for adherence to the Persians. He first laid siege to Andros, telling the inhabitants that he came to demand their money, bringing with him two great gods—Persuasion and Necessity. To which the Andrians replied, that “Athens was a great city and blest with excellent gods: but that *they* were miserably poor, and that there were two unkind gods who always stayed with them and would never quit the island—Poverty and Helplessness.¹ In these gods the Andrians put their trust, refusing to deliver the money required; for the power of Athens could never overcome their inability.” While the fleet was engaged in contending against the Andrians with their sad protecting deities, Themistoklès sent round to various other cities, demanding from them private sums of money on condition of securing them from attack. From Karystus, Paros, and other

¹ Herodot. viii. III. ἐπεὶ Ἀνδρίους γε εἶναι γεωπέλους ἐς τὰ μέγιστα ἀνήκοντας, καὶ θεοὺς δύο ἀχρήστους οὐκ ἐκλείπειν σφέων τὴν νῆσον, ἀλλ’ αἰεὶ φιλοχωρεῖν . . . Πενίην τε καὶ Ἀμηχανίην.

Compare Alkæus, Fragm. 90, ed. Bergk, and Herodot. vii. 172.

places, he thus extorted bribes for himself apart from the other generals,¹ but it appears that Andros was found unproductive, and after no very long absence the fleet was brought back to Salamis.²

The intimation sent by Themistoklés perhaps had the effect of hastening the departure of Xerxes, who remained in Attica only a few days after the battle of Salamis, and then withdrew his army through Bœotia into Thessaly, where Mardonius made choice of the troops to be retained for his future operations. He retained all the Persians, Medes, Sakæ, Baktrians, and Indians, horse as well as foot, together with select detachments of the remaining contingents; making in all, according to Herodotus, 300,000 men. But as it was now the beginning of September, and as 60,000 out of his forces, under Artabazus, were destined to escort Xerxes himself to the Hellespont, Mardonius proposed to winter in Thessaly, and to postpone further military operations until the ensuing spring.³

Having left most of these troops under the orders of Mardonius in Thessaly, Xerxes marched away with the rest to the Hellespont, by the same road as he had taken in his advance a few months before. Respecting his retreat a plentiful stock of stories were circulated⁴—inconsistent with each other,

¹ Herodot. viii. 112; Plutarch, Themistoklés, c. 21—who cites a few bitter lines from the contemporary poet Timokreon.

² Herodot. viii. 112-121.

³ Herodot. viii. 114-126.

⁴ The account given by Æschylus of this retiring march appears to me exaggerated, and in several points incredible (Persæ, 482-513). That they suffered greatly during the march from want of provisions, is doubtless true, and that many of them died of hunger. But we must consider in deduction—1. That this march took place in the months of October and November, therefore not very long after the harvest. 2. That Mardonius maintained a large army in Thessaly all the winter and brought them out in fighting condition in the spring. 3. That Artabazus also with another large division was in military operation in Thrace all the winter, after having escorted Xerxes into safety.

When we consider these facts, it will seem that the statements of Æschylus even as to the sufferings by famine must be taken with great allowance. But his statement about the passage of the Strymon appears to me incredible, and I regret to find myself on this point differing from Dr. Thirlwall, who considers it an undoubted fact (Hist. of Greece, ch. xv. p. 351, 2nd ed.). "The river had been frozen in the night hard enough to bear those who arrived first. But the ice suddenly gave way under the morning sun, and numbers perished in the waters"—so Dr. Thirlwall states, after Æschylus—adding in a note, "It is a little surprising that Herodotus, when he is describing the miseries of the retreat, does not notice this disaster, which is so prominent in the narrative of the Persian messenger in Æschylus. There can however be no doubt as to the fact:

fanciful, and even incredible. Grecian imagination, in the contemporary poet Æschylus, as well as in the Latin moralisers Seneca or Juvenal,¹ delighted in handling this invasion with the maximum of light and shadow; magnifying the destructive misery and humiliation of the retreat so as to form an impressive contrast with the superhuman pride of the advance, and illustrating that antithesis with unbounded licence of detail. The sufferings from want of provision were doubtless severe, and are described as frightful and death-dealing. The magazines stored up for the advancing march had been exhausted, so that the retiring army were now forced to seize upon the corn of the country through which they passed—an insufficient maintenance, eked out by leaves, grass, the bark of trees, and other wretched substitutes for food. Plague and dysentery

and perhaps it may furnish a useful warning, not to lay too much stress on the silence of Herodotus, as a ground for rejecting even important and interesting facts which are only mentioned by later writers," &c.

That a large river such as the Strymon near its mouth (180 yards broad, and in latitude about N. 40° 50'), at a period which could not have been later than the beginning of November, should have been frozen over in one night so hardly and firmly as to admit of a portion of the army marching over it at daybreak—before the sun became warm—is a statement which surely requires a more responsible witness than Æschylus to avouch it. In fact, he himself describes it as a "frost out of season" (χέιμῶν ἄωρον) brought about by a special interposition of the gods. If he is to be believed, none of the fugitives were saved, except such as were fortunate enough to cross the Strymon on the ice during the interval between break of day and the sun's heat. One would imagine that there was a pursuing enemy on their track, leaving them only a short time for escape; whereas in fact, they had no enemy to contend with—nothing but the difficulty of finding subsistence. During the advancing march of Xerxes, a bridge of boats had been thrown over the Strymon: nor can any reason be given why that bridge should not still have been subsisting; Artabazus must have recrossed it after he had accompanied the monarch to the Hellespont. I will add, that the town and fortress of Eion, which commanded the mouth of the Strymon, remained as an important stronghold of the Persians some years after this event, and was only captured, after a desperate resistance, by the Athenians and their confederates under Kimon.

The Athenian auditors of the Persæ would not criticise nicely the historical credibility of that which Æschylus told them about the sufferings of their retreating foe, nor his geographical credibility when he placed Mount Pangæus on the hither side of the Strymon, to persons marching out of Greece (Persæ, 494). But I must confess that, to my mind, his whole narrative of the retreat bears the stamp of the poet and the religious man, not of the historical witness. And my confidence in Herodotus is increased when I compare him on this matter with Æschylus—as well in what he says as in what he does not say.

¹ Juvenal, Satir. x. 178—

*Ille tamen qualis rediit, Salamine relicta,
In Caurum atque Eurum solitus sævire flagellis, &c.*

aggravated their misery, and occasioned many to be left behind among the cities through whose territory the retreat was carried; strict orders being left by Xerxes that these cities should maintain and tend them. After forty-five days' march from Attica, he at length found himself at the Hellespont, whither his fleet, retreating from Salamis, had arrived long before him.¹ But the short-lived bridge had already been knocked to pieces by a storm, so that the army was transported on shipboard across to Asia, where it first obtained comfort and abundance, and where the change from privation to excess engendered new maladies. In the time of Herodotus, the citizens of Abdëra still showed the gilt scimitar and tiara, which Xerxes had presented to them when he halted there in his retreat, in token of hospitality and satisfaction. They even went the length of affirming that never since his departure from Attica had he loosened his girdle until he reached their city. So fertile was Grecian fancy in magnifying the terror of the repulsed invader! who re-entered Sardis with a broken army and humbled spirit, only eight months after he had left it as the presumed conqueror of the western world.²

Meanwhile the Athenians and Peloponnesians, liberated from the immediate presence of the enemy either on land or sea, and passing from the extreme of terror to sudden ease and security, indulged in the full delight and self-congratulation of unexpected victory. On the day before the battle, Greece had seemed irretrievably lost: she was now saved even against all reasonable hope, and the terrific cloud impending over her was dispersed.³ At the division of the booty, the Æginetans were adjudged to have distinguished themselves most in the action, and to be entitled to the choice lot; while various tributes of gratitude were also set apart for the gods. Among them were three Phœnician triremes, which were offered in

¹ Herodot. viii. 130.

² See the account of the retreat of Xerxes in Herodotus, viii. 115-120, with many stories which he mentions only to reject. The description given in the *Persæ* of Æschylus (v. 486, 515, 570) is conceived in the same spirit. The strain reaches its loudest pitch in Justin (ii. 13), who tells us that Xerxes was obliged to cross the strait in a fishing-boat. "Ipse cum paucis Abydon contendit. Ubi cum solutum pontem hibernis tempestatibus offendisset, piscatoriâ scaphâ trepidus trajecit. Erat res spectaculo digna, et, æstimatione sortis humanæ, rerum varietate miranda—in exiguo latentem videre navigio, quem paulo ante vix æquor omne capiebat: carentem etiam omni servorum ministerio, cujus exercitus propter multitudinem terris graves erant."

³ Herodot. viii. 109. ἡμεῖς δὲ, εὐρημα γὰρ εὐρήκαμεν ἡμέας αὐτοὺς καὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, μὴ διώκωμεν ἄνδρας φεύγοντας.

dedication to Ajax at Salamis, to Athênê at Sunium, and to Poseidon at the Isthmus of Corinth. Further presents were sent to Apollo at Delphi, who, on being asked whether he was satisfied, replied that all had done their duty to him except the Æginetans: from them he required additional munificence on account of the prize awarded to them, and they were constrained to dedicate in the temple four golden stars upon a staff of brass, which Herodotus himself saw there. Next to the Æginetans, the second place of honour was awarded to the Athenians; the Æginetan Polykritus, and the Athenians Eumenes and Améinias, being ranked first among the individual combatants.¹ Respecting the behaviour of Adéimantus and the Corinthians in the battle, the Athenians of the time of Herodotus drew the most unfavourable picture, representing them to have fled at the commencement and to have been only brought back by the information that the Greeks were gaining the victory. Considering the character of the debates which had preceded, and the impatient eagerness manifested by the Corinthians to fight at the Isthmus instead of at Salamis, some such backwardness on their part, when forced into a battle at the latter place, would not be in itself improbable. Yet in this case it seems that not only the Corinthians themselves, but also the general voice of Greece, contradicted the Athenian story, and defended them as having behaved with bravery and forwardness. We must recollect that at the time when Herodotus probably collected his information, a bitter feeling of hatred prevailed between Athens and Corinth, and Aristeus son of Adéimantus was among the most efficient enemies of the former.²

¹ Herodot. viii. 93-122; Diodor. xi. 27.

² Herodot. viii. 94; Thucyd. i. 42, 103. τὸ σφοδρὸν μῖσος from Corinth towards Athens. About Aristeus, Thucyd. ii. 67.

Plutarch (De Herodot. Malignit. p. 870) employs many angry words in refuting this Athenian scandal, which the historian himself does not uphold as truth. The story advanced by Dio Chrysostom (Or. xxxvii. p. 456), that Herodotus asked for a reward from the Corinthians, and on being refused, inserted this story into his history for the purpose of being revenged upon them, deserves no attention without some reasonable evidence: the statement of Diyllus, that he received ten talents from the Athenians as a reward for his history, would be much less improbable, so far as the fact of pecuniary reward, apart from the magnitude of the sum: but this also requires proof. Dio Chrysostom is not satisfied with rejecting this tale of the Athenians, but goes the length of affirming that the Corinthians carried off the palm of bravery and were the cause of the victory. The epigrams of Simonides, which he cites, prove nothing of the kind (p. 459). Marcellinus (Vit. Thucyd. p. xvi.) insinuates a charge against Herodotus, something like that of Plutarch and Dio.

Besides the first and second prizes of valour, the chiefs at the Isthmus tried to adjudicate among themselves the first and second prizes of skill and wisdom. Each of them deposited two names on the altar of Poseidon: and when these votes came to be looked at, it was found that each man had voted for himself as deserving the first prize, but that Themistoklès had a large majority of votes for the second.¹ The result of such voting allowed no man to claim the first prize, nor could the chiefs give a second prize without it; so that Themistoklès was disappointed of his reward, though exalted so much the higher, perhaps through that very disappointment, in general renown. He went shortly afterwards to Sparta, where he received from the Lacedæmonians honours such as were never paid, before nor afterwards, to any foreigner. A crown of olive was indeed given to Eurybiadès as the first prize, but a like crown was at the same time conferred on Themistoklès as a special reward for unparalleled sagacity; together with a chariot, the finest which the city afforded. Moreover, on his departure, the 300 select youths called Hippeis, who formed the active guard and police of the country, all accompanied him in a body as escort of honour to the frontiers of Tegea.² Such demonstrations were so astonishing, from the haughty and immovable Spartans, that they were ascribed by some authors to their fear lest Themistoklès should be offended by being deprived of the general prize: and they are even said to have excited the jealousy of the Athenians so much, that he was displaced from his place of general, to which Xanthippus was nominated.³ Neither of these last reports is likely to be true, nor is either of them confirmed by Herodotus. The fact that Xanthippus became general of the fleet during the ensuing year, is in the regular course of Athenian change of officers, and implies no peculiar jealousy of Themistoklès.

¹ Herodot. viii. 123. Plutarch (*Themist.* c. 17; compare *De Herodot. Malign.* p. 871) states that *each individual* chief gave his second vote to Themistoklès. The more we test Herodotus by comparison with others, the more we shall find him free from the exaggerating spirit.

² Herodot. viii. 124; Plutarch, *Themist.* c. 17.

³ Diodor. xi. 27; compare Herodot. viii. 125, and Thucyd. i. 74.

CHAPTER XLII

BATTLES OF PLATÆA AND MYKALE—FINAL REPULSE OF
THE PERSIANS

THOUGH the defeat at Salamis deprived the Persians of all hope from further maritime attack of Greece, they still anticipated success by land from the ensuing campaign of Mardonius. Their fleet, after having conveyed the monarch himself with his accompanying land-force across the Hellespont, retired to winter at Kymê and Samos; in the latter of which places large rewards were bestowed upon Theomêstor and Phylakus, two Samian captains who had distinguished themselves in the late engagement. Theomêstor was even nominated despot of Samos under Persian protection.¹ Early in the spring they were reassembled—to the number of 400 sail, but without the Phœnicians—at the naval station of Samos, intending however only to maintain a watchful guard over Ionia, and hardly supposing that the Greek fleet would venture to attack them.²

For a long time, the conduct of that fleet was such as to justify such belief in its enemies. Assembled at Ægina in the spring, to the number of 110 ships, under the Spartan king Leotychidês, it advanced as far as Delos, but not farther eastward: nor could all the persuasions of Chian and other Ionian envoys, despatched both to the Spartan authorities and to the fleet, and promising to revolt from Persia as soon as the Grecian fleet should appear, prevail upon Leotychidês to hazard any aggressive enterprise. Ionia and the eastern waters of the Ægean had now been for fifteen years completely under the Persians, and so little visited by the Greeks, that a voyage thither appeared, especially to the maritime inexperience of a Spartan king, like going to the Pillars of Hêraklês:³ not

¹ Herodot. viii. 85.

² Herodot. viii. 130; Diodor. xi. 27.

³ Herodot. viii. 131, 132: compare Thucyd. iii. 29-32.

Herodotus says, that the Chian envoys had great difficulty in inducing Leotychidês to proceed even as far as Delos—*τὸ γὰρ προσωτέρω πᾶν δεινὸν ἦν τοῖσι Ἕλλησι, οὔτε τῶν χώρων εὐοῦσι ἐμπείροισι, στρατιῆς τε πάντα πλέα ἐδόκει εἶναι τὴν δὲ Σάμον ἐπιστάτο δόξῃ καὶ Ἡρακλέως στήλας ἴσον ἀπέχειν.*

This last expression of Herodotus has been erroneously interpreted by some of the commentators as if it were a measure of the geographical ignorance, either of Herodotus himself, or of those whom he is describing. In my judgement, no inferences of this kind ought to be founded upon it:

less venturesome than the same voyage appeared, fifty-two years afterwards, to the Lacedæmonian admiral Alkidas, when he first hazarded his fleet amidst the preserved waters of the Athenian empire.

Meanwhile the hurried and disastrous retreat of Xerxes had produced less disaffection among his subjects and allies than might have been anticipated. Alexander king of Macedon, the Thessalian Aleuadæ,¹ and the Bœotian leaders, still remained in hearty co-operation with Mardonius: nor were there any, except the Phokians, whose fidelity to him appeared questionable, among all the Greeks northwest of the boundaries of Attica and Megaris. It was only in the Chalkidic peninsula, that any actual revolt occurred. Potidæa, situated on the Isthmus of Pallênê, as well as the neighbouring towns in the long tongue of Pallênê, declared themselves independent: and the neighbouring town of Olynthus, occupied by the semi-Grecian tribe of Bottiæans, was on the point of following their example. The Persian general Artabazus, on his return from escorting Xerxes to the Hellespont, undertook the reduction of these towns, and succeeded perfectly with Olynthus. He took the town, slew all the inhabitants, and handed it over to a fresh population, consisting of Chalkidic Greeks under Kritobulus of Torônê. It was in this manner that Olynthus, afterwards a city of so much consequence and interest, first became Grecian and Chalkidic. But Artabazus was not equally successful in the siege of Potidæa, the defence of which was aided by citizens from the other towns in Pallênê. A plot which he concerted with Timoxenus, commander of the Skiônæan auxiliaries in the town, became accidentally disclosed: a considerable body of his troops perished while attempting to pass at low tide under the walls of the city, which were built across the entire breadth of the narrow isthmus joining the Pallenæan peninsula to the mainland: and after three months of blockade, he was forced to renounce the enterprise, withdrawing his troops to rejoin Mardonius in Thessaly.²

Mardonius, before he put himself in motion for the spring

it marks fear of an enemy's country which they had not been accustomed to visit, and where they could not calculate the risk beforehand—rather than any serious comparison between one distance and another. Speaking of our forefathers, such of them as were little used to the sea, we might say—"A voyage to Bordeaux or Lisbon seemed to them as distant as a voyage to the Indies,"—by which we should merely affirm something as to their state of feeling, not as to their geographical knowledge.

¹ Herodot. ix. 1, 2, 67; viii. 136.

² Herodot. viii. 128, 129.

campaign, thought it advisable to consult the Grecian oracles, especially those within the limits of Bœotia and Phokis. He sent a Karian named Mys, familiar with the Greek as well as the Karian language, to consult Trophônus at Lebadeia, Amphiarus and the Ismenian Apollo at Thebes, Apollo at Mount Ptôon near Akræphiæ, and Apollo at the Phokian Abæ. This step was probably intended as a sort of ostentatious respect towards the religious feelings of allies upon whom he was now very much dependent. But neither the questions put, nor the answers given, were made public. The only remarkable fact which Herodotus had heard, was, that the priest of the Ptôian Apollo delivered his answer in Karian, or at least in a language intelligible to no person present except the Karian Mys himself.¹ It appears however that at this period, when Mardonius was seeking to strengthen himself by oracles, and laying his plans for establishing a separate peace and alliance with Athens against the Peloponnesians, some persons in his interest circulated predictions, that the day was approaching when the Persians and the Athenians jointly would expel the Dorians from Peloponnesus.² The way was thus paved for him to send an envoy to Athens—Alexander king of Macedon; who was instructed to make the most seductive offers—to promise reparation of all the damage done in Attica, as well as the active future friendship of the Great King—and to hold out to the Athenians a large acquisition of new territory as the price of their consent to form with him an equal and independent alliance.³ The Macedonian prince added warm expressions of his own interest in the welfare of

¹ Herodot. viii. 134, 135; Pausanias, ix. 24, 3.

² Herodot. viii. 141. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ, . . . ἀναμνησθέντες τῶν λογίων, ὡς σφέας χρεόν ἐστι ἅμα τοῖσι ἄλλοισι Δωριεῦσι ἐκπίπτειν ἐκ Πελοποννήσου ὑπὸ Μήδων τε καὶ Ἀθηναίων, κάρτα τε ἔδεισαν μὴ δολολογήσωσι τῷ Πέρσῃ Ἀθηναίοι, &c.

Such oracles must have been generated by the hopes of the *medising* party in Greece at this particular moment: there is no other point of time to which they could be at all adapted—no other, in which expulsion of all the Dorians from Peloponnesus, by united Persians and Athenians, could be even dreamt of. The Lacedæmonians are indeed said here “to call to mind the prophecies,”—as if these latter were old, and not now produced for the first time. But we must recollect that a fabricator of prophecies, such as Onomakritus, would in all probability at once circulate them as old; that is, as forming part of some old collection like that of Bakis or Musæus. And Herodotus doubtless himself believed them to be old, so that he would naturally give credit to the Lacedæmonians for the same knowledge, and suppose them to be alarmed by “calling these prophecies to mind.”

³ Herodot. ix. 7.

the Athenians, recommending them as a sincere friend to embrace propositions so advantageous as well as so honourable : especially as the Persian power must in the end prove too much for them, and Attica lay exposed to Mardonius and his Grecian allies, without being covered by any common defence as Peloponnesus was protected by its Isthmus.¹

This offer, despatched in the spring, found the Athenians re-established wholly or partially in their half-ruined city. A simple tender of mercy and tolerable treatment, if despatched by Xerxes from Thermopylæ the year before, might perhaps have gone far to detach them from the cause of Hellas : and even at the present moment, though the pressure of overwhelming terror had disappeared, there were many inducements for them to accede to the proposition of Mardonius. The alliance of Athens would ensure to the Persian general unquestionable predominance in Greece, and to Athens herself protection from further ravage as well as the advantage of playing a winning game : while his force, his position, and his alliances, even as they then stood, threatened a desolating and doubtful war, of which Attica would bear the chief brunt. Moreover the Athenians were at this time suffering privations of the severest character ; for not only did their ruined houses and temples require to be restored, but they had lost the harvest of the past summer together with the seed of the past autumn.² The prudential view of the case being thus favourable to Mardonius rather than otherwise, and especially strengthened by the distress which reigned at Athens, the Lacedæmonians were so much afraid lest Alexander should carry his point, that they sent envoys to dissuade the Athenians from listening to him, as well as to tender succour during the existing poverty of the city. After having heard both parties, the Athenians delivered their reply in terms of solemn and dignified resolution, which their descendants delighted in repeating. To Alexander they said : “ Cast not in our teeth that the power of the Persian is many times greater than ours : we too know *that*, as well as thou : but we nevertheless love freedom well enough to resist him in the best manner we can.

¹ Herodot. viii. 142.

² Herodot. viii. 142. Πιστευμένοισι μέντοι ὑμῖν συναχθόμεθα (say the Spartan envoys to the Athenians), καὶ ὅτι καρπῶν ἐστερήθητε διζῶν ἤδη, καὶ ὅτι οἰκοφθόρησθε χρόνον ἤδη πολλόν. Seeing that this is spoken before the invasion of Mardonius, the loss of *two crops* must include the seed of the preceding autumn : and the advice of Themistoklès to his countrymen—καὶ τις οἰκίην τε ἀπαλασάσθω, καὶ σπόρου ἀνακῶς ἐχέτω (viii. 109)—must have been found impracticable in most cases to carry into effect.

Attempt not the vain task of talking us over into alliance with him. Tell Mardonius that as long as the sun shall continue in his present path, we will never contract alliance with Xerxes: we will encounter him in our own defence, putting our trust in the aid of those gods and heroes to whom he has shown no reverence, and whose houses and statues he has burnt. Come thou not to us again with similar propositions, nor persuade us even in the spirit of good-will, into unholy proceedings: thou art the guest and friend of Athens, and we would not that thou shouldst suffer injury at our hands."¹

To the Spartans, the reply of the Athenians was of a similar decisive tenor; protesting their unconquerable devotion to the common cause and liberties of Hellas, and promising that no conceivable temptations, either of money or territory, should induce them to desert the ties of brotherhood, common language, and religion. So long as a single Athenian survived, no alliance should ever be made with Xerxes. They then thanked the Spartans for offering them aid during the present privations: but while declining such offers, they reminded them that Mardonius, when apprised that his propositions were refused, would probably advance immediately, and they therefore earnestly desired the presence of a Peloponnesian army in Bœotia to assist in the defence of Attica.² The Spartan envoys, promising fulfilment of this request,³ and satisfied to have ascertained the sentiments of Athens, departed.

Such unshaken fidelity on the part of the Athenians to the general cause of Greece, in spite of present suffering combined with seductive offers for the future, was the just admiration of their descendants and the frequent theme of applause by their orators.⁴ But among the contemporary Greeks it was hailed

¹ Lykurgus the Athenian orator, in alluding to this incident a century and a half afterwards, represents the Athenians as having been "on the point of stoning Alexander"—*μικροῦ δεῖν κατέλευσαν* (Lykurg. cont. Leokrat. c. 17, p. 186)—one among many specimens of the careless manner in which these orators deal with past history.

² Herodot. viii. 143, 144; Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 10. According to Plutarch, it was Aristeidês who proposed and prepared the reply to be delivered. But here as elsewhere, the loose, exaggerating style of Plutarch contrasts unfavourably with the simplicity and directness of Herodotus.

³ Herodot. ix. 7. *συνθέμενοι δὲ ἡμῖν τὸν Πέρσῃ ἀντιώσεσθαι ἐς τὴν Βοιωτήν, &c.*

Diodorus gives the account of this embassy to Athens substantially in the same manner, coupling it however with some erroneous motives (xi. 28).

⁴ Herodot. ix. 7. *ἐπιστάμενοί τε ὅτι κερδαλώτερόν ἐστι ὁμολογέειν τῷ Πέρσῃ μᾶλλον ἢ πολεμεῖν, &c.*

only as a relief from danger, and repaid by a selfish and ungenerous neglect. The same feeling of indifference towards all Greeks outside of their own isthmus, which had so deeply endangered the march of affairs before the battle of Salamis, now manifested itself a second time among the Spartans and Peloponnesians. The wall across the Isthmus, which they had been so busy in constructing and on which they had relied for protection against the land-force of Xerxes, had been intermitted and left unfinished when he retired: but it was resumed as soon as the forward march of Mardonius was anticipated. It was however still unfinished at the time of the embassy of the Macedonian prince to Athens, and this incomplete condition of their special defence was one reason of their alarm lest the Athenians should accept the terms proposed. That danger being for the time averted, they redoubled their exertions at the Isthmus, so that the wall was speedily brought into an adequate state of defence and the battlements along the summit were in course of being constructed. Thus safe behind their own bulwark, they thought nothing more of their promise to join the Athenians in Bœotia and to assist in defending Attica against Mardonius. Indeed their king Kleombrotus, who commanded the force at the Isthmus, was so terrified by an obscuration of the sun at the moment when he was sacrificing to ascertain the inclinations of the gods in reference to the coming war, that he even thought it necessary to retreat with the main force to Sparta, where he soon after died.¹ Besides these two reasons—indifference and unfavourable omens—which restrained the Spartans from aiding Attica, there was also a third: they were engaged in celebrating the festival of the Hyakinthia, and it was their paramount object (says the historian)² to fulfil “the exigencies of the god.” As the Olympia and the Karneia in the preceding year, so now did the Hyakinthia, prevail over the necessities of defence,

The orators are not always satisfied with giving to Athens the credit which she really deserved: they venture to represent the Athenians as having refused these brilliant offers from Xerxes on his first invasion, instead of from Mardonius in the ensuing summer. Xerxes never made any offers to them. See Isokratês, Or. iv. Panegyric, c. 27, p. 61.

¹ Herodot. ix. 10.

² Herodot. ix. 7. Οἱ γὰρ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ὕραζόν τε τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον καὶ σφι ἦν Ἑακίνθια· περὶ πλείστον δ' ἦγον τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ πορσάνειν· ἅμα δὲ τὸ τεῖχος σφι τὸ ἐν τῷ Ἴσθμῷ ἐτείχεον, καὶ ἤδη ἐπάλλεϊς ἐλάμβανε.

Nearly a century after this, we are told that it was always the practice for the Amyklæan hoplites to go home for the celebration of the Hyakinthia, on whatever expedition they might happen to be employed (Xenoph. Hellen. iv. 5, 11).

putting out of sight both the duties of fidelity towards an exposed ally, and the bond of an express promise.

Meanwhile Mardonius, informed of the unfavourable reception which his proposals had received at Athens, put his army in motion forthwith from Thessaly, joined by all his Grecian auxiliaries, and by fresh troops from Thrace and Macedonia. As he marched through Bœotia, the Thebans, who heartily espoused his cause, endeavoured to dissuade him from further military operations against the united force of his enemies—urging him to try the efficacy of bribes, presented to the leading men in the different cities, for the purpose of disuniting them. But Mardonius, eager to repossess himself of Attica, heeded not their advice. About ten months after the retreat of Xerxes, he entered the country without resistance, and again established the Persian head-quarters in Athens (May or June—479 B.C.).¹

Before he arrived, the Athenians had again removed to Salamis, under feelings of bitter disappointment and indignation. They had in vain awaited the fulfilment of the Spartan promise that a Peloponnesian army should join them in Bœotia for the defence of their frontier; at length, being unable to make head against the enemy alone, they found themselves compelled to transport their families across to Salamis.² The migration was far less terrible than that of the preceding summer, since Mardonius had no fleet to harass them. But it was more gratuitous, and might have been obviated had the Spartans executed their covenant, which would have brought about the battle of Plataea two months earlier than it actually was fought.

Mardonius, though master of Athens, was so anxious to conciliate the Athenians, that he at first abstained from damaging either the city or the country, and despatched a second envoy to Salamis to repeat the offers made through Alexander of Macedon. He thought that they might now be listened to, since he could offer the exemption of Attica from ravage, as an additional temptation. Murychidês, a Hellenistic Greek, was sent to renew these propositions to the Athenian senate at Salamis; but he experienced a refusal, not less resolute than what had been returned to Alexander of Macedon, and all but unanimous. One unfortunate senator,

¹ Diodor. xi. 28; Herodot. ix. 2, 3, 17. οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι πάντες παρείχον στρατιὴν καὶ συνεσέβαλον ἐς Ἀθήνας ὅσοι περ ἐμήδιζον Ἑλλήνων τῶν ταύτη οικημένων, &c.

² Herodot. ix. 4.

Lykidas, made an exception to this unanimity, venturing to recommend acceptance of the propositions of Murychidês. So furious was the wrath, or so strong the suspicion of corruption, which his single-voiced negative provoked, that senators and people both combined to stone him to death; while the Athenian women in Salamis, hearing what had passed, went of their own accord to the house of Lykidas, and stoned to death his wife and children. In the desperate pitch of resolution to which the Athenians were now wound up, an opponent passed for a traitor; unanimity, even though extorted by terror, was essential to their feelings.¹ Murychidês, though his propositions were refused, was dismissed without injury.

While the Athenians thus gave renewed proofs of their stedfast attachment to the cause of Hellas, they at the same time sent envoys, conjointly with Megara and Plataea, to remonstrate with the Spartans on their backwardness and breach of faith, and to invoke them even thus late to come forth at once and meet Mardonius in Attica; not omitting to intimate, that if they were thus deserted, it would become imperatively necessary for them, against their will, to make terms with the enemy. So careless, however, were the Spartan Ephors respecting Attica and the Megarid, that they postponed giving an answer to these envoys for ten successive days, while in the meantime they pressed with all their efforts the completion of the Isthmic fortifications. And after having thus amused the envoys as long as they could, they would have dismissed them at last with a negative answer—such was their fear of adventuring beyond the Isthmus—had not a Tegean

¹ Herodot. ix. 5. I dare not reject this story about Lykidas (see Lykurgus cont. Leokrat. c. 30, p. 222), though other authors recount the same incident as having happened to a person named Kyrtilus, during the preceding year, when the Athenians quitted Athens; see Demosthen. de Coronâ, p. 296, c. 59; and Cicero de Officiis, iii. 11. That two such acts were perpetrated by the Athenians is noway probable: and if we are to choose between the two, the story of Herodotus is far the more probable. In the migration of the preceding year, we know that a certain number of Athenians actually did stay behind in the acropolis, and Kyrtilus might have been among them, if he had chosen. Moreover Xerxes held out no offers, and gave occasion to no deliberation: while the offers of Mardonius might really appear to a well-minded citizen deserving of attention.

Isokratês (Or. iv. Panegyric. s. 184, c. 42) states that the Athenians condemned many persons to death for *medism* (in allusion doubtless to Themistoklês as one), but he adds—"even now they imprecate curses on any citizen who enters into amicable negotiation with the Persians"—*ἐν δὲ τοῖς συλλόγοις ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἀρὰς ποιοῦνται, εἰ τις ἐπικηρυκεῖται Πέρσαις τῶν πολιτῶν*. This must have been an ancient custom, continued after it had ceased to be pertinent or appropriate.

named Chileos, whom they much esteemed and to whom they communicated the application, reminded them that no fortifications at the Isthmus would suffice for the defence of Peloponnesus, if the Athenians became allied with Mardonius, and thus laid the peninsula open by sea.

The strong opinion of this respected Tegean, proved to the Ephors that their selfish policy would not be seconded by their chief Peloponnesian allies; and brought to their attention, probably for the first time, that danger by sea might again be renewed, though the Persian fleet had been beaten in the preceding year, and was now at a distance from Greece. It changed their resolution, not less completely than suddenly; so that they despatched forthwith in the night 5000 Spartan citizens to the Isthmus—each man with seven Helots attached to him. And when the Athenian envoys, ignorant of this sudden change of policy, came on the next day to give peremptory notice that Athens would no longer endure such treacherous betrayal, but would forthwith take measures for her own security and separate pacification—the Ephors affirmed on their oath that the troops were already on their march, and were probably by this time out of the Spartan territory.¹ Considering that this step was an expiation, imperfect, tardy, and reluctant, for foregoing desertion and breach of promise—the Ephors may probably have thought that the mystery of the night march, and the sudden communication of it as an actual fact to the envoys, in the way of reply, would impress more emphatically the minds of the latter; who returned with the welcome tidings to Salamis, and prepared their countrymen for speedy action. Five thousand Spartan citizens, each with

¹ Herodot. ix. 10, 11; Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 10. Plutarch had read a decree ascribed to Aristeidês, in which Kimon, Xanthippus, and Myrônidês, were named envoys to Sparta. But it is impossible that Xanthippus could have taken part in the embassy, seeing that he was now in command of the fleet.

Probably the Helots must have followed: one hardly sees how so great a number could have been all suddenly collected, and marched off in one night, no preparations having been made beforehand.

Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Gr. ch. xvi. p. 366) suspects the correctness of the narrative of Herodotus, on grounds which do not appear to me convincing. It seems to me that, after all, the literal narrative is more probable than anything which we can substitute in its place. The Spartan foreign policy all depended on the five Ephors: there was no public discussion or criticism. Now the conduct of these Ephors is consistent and intelligible—though selfish, narrow-minded, and insensible to any dangers except what are present and obvious. Nor can I think (with Dr. Thirlwall) that the manner of communication ultimately adopted is of the nature of a jest.

seven light-armed Helots as attendants, were thus on their march to the theatre of war. Throughout the whole course of Grecian history, we never hear of any number of Spartan citizens at all approaching to 5000 being put on foreign service at the same time. But this was not all: 5000 Lacedæmonian Pericæki, each with one light-armed Helot to attend him, were also despatched to the Isthmus, to take part in the same struggle. Such unparalleled efforts afford sufficient measure of the alarm which, though late yet real, now reigned at Sparta. Other Peloponnesian cities followed the example, and a large army was thus collected under the Spartan Pausanias.

It appears that Mardonius was at this moment in secret correspondence with the Argeians, who, though professing neutrality, are said to have promised him that they would arrest the march of the Spartans beyond their own borders.¹ If they ever made such a promise, the suddenness of the march, as well as the greatness of the force, prevented them from fulfilling it, and may perhaps have been so intended by the Ephors, under the apprehension that resistance might possibly be offered by the Argeians. At any rate, the latter were forced to content themselves with apprising Mardonius instantly of the fact, through their swiftest courier. It determined that general to evacuate Attica, and to carry on the war in *Bœotia*—a country in every way more favourable to him. He had for some time refrained from committing devastations in or round Athens, hoping that the Athenians might be induced to listen to his propositions; but the last days of his stay were employed in burning and destroying whatever had been spared by the host of Xerxes during the preceding summer. After a fruitless attempt to surprise a body of 1000 Lacedæmonians which had been detached for the protection of Megara,² he withdrew all his army into *Bœotia*, not taking either the straight road to Plataea through Eleutheræ, or to Thebes through Phylé, both which roads were mountainous and inconvenient for cavalry, but marching in the north-easterly direction to Dekeleia, where he was met by some guides from the adjoining regions near the river Asôpus, and conducted through the deme of Sphendaleis to Tanagra. He thus found himself, after a route longer but easier, in *Bœotia* on the plain of the Asôpus; along which river he next day marched westward to

¹ Herodot. ix. 12.

² There were stories current at Megara, even in the time of Pausanias, respecting some of these Persians, who were said to have been brought to destruction by the intervention of Artemis (Pausan. i. 40, 2).

Skólus, a town in the territory of Thebes seemingly near to that of Plataea.¹ He then took up a position not far off, in the plain on the left bank of the Asôpus: his left wing over against Erythræ, his centre over against Hysiaë, and his right in the territory of Plataea: and he employed his army in constructing forthwith a fortified camp² of ten furlongs square, defended by wooden walls and towers, cut from trees in the Theban territory.

Mardonius found himself thus with his numerous army, in a plain favourable for cavalry; with a camp more or less defensible,—the fortified city of Thebes³ in his rear,—and a considerable stock of provisions as well as a friendly region behind him from whence to draw more. Few among his army, however, were either hearty in the cause or confident of success:⁴ even the native Persians had been disheartened by the flight of the monarch the year before, and were full of melancholy auguries.

A splendid banquet to which the Theban leader Attagînus invited Mardonius along with fifty Persian and fifty Theban or Bœotian guests, exhibited proofs of this depressed feeling, which were afterwards recounted to Herodotus himself by one of the guests present—an Orchomenian citizen of note named Thersander. The banquet being so arranged that each couch was occupied by one Persian and one Theban, this man was accosted in Greek by his Persian neighbour, who inquired to what city he belonged; and upon learning that he was an

¹ Herodot. ix. 15. The situation of the Attic deme Sphendalê or Sphendaleis seems not certainly known (Ross, *Über die Deme von Attika*, p. 138); but Colonel Leake and Mr. Finlay think that it stood "near Aio Merkurio, which now gives name to the pass leading from Dekelia through the ridges of Parnes into the extremity of the Tanagrian plain, at a place called Malakasa." (Leake, *Athens and the Demi of Attica*, vol. ii. sect. iv. p. 123.)

Mr. Finlay (*Oropus and Diakria*, p. 38) says that "Malakasa is the only place on this road where a considerable body of cavalry could conveniently halt."

It appears that the Bœotians from the neighbourhood of the Asôpus were necessary as guides for this road. Perhaps even the territory of Orôpus was at this time still a part of Bœotia: we do not certainly know at what period it was first conquered by the Athenians.

The combats between Athenians and Bœotians will be found to take place most frequently in this south-eastern region of Bœotia,—Tanagra, Enophyta, Delium, &c.

² Herodot. ix. 15.

³ The strong town of Thebes was of much service to him (Thucyd. i. 90).

⁴ Herodot. ix. 40, 45, 67; Plutarch, *Aristeidês*, c. 18.

Orchomenian,¹ continued thus: "Since thou hast now partaken with me in the same table and cup, I desire to leave with thee some memorial of my convictions; the rather in order that thou mayest be thyself forewarned so as to take the best counsel for thine own safety. Seest thou these Persians here feasting, and the army which we left yonder encamped near the river? Yet a little while, and out of all these, thou shalt behold but few surviving." Thersander listened to these words with astonishment, spoken as they were with strong emotion and a flood of tears, and replied—"Surely thou art bound to reveal this to Mardonius, and to his confidential advisers:" but the Persian rejoined—"My friend, man cannot avert that which God hath decreed to come: no one will believe the revelation, sure though it be. Many of us Persians know this well, and are here serving only under the bond of necessity. And truly this is the most hateful of all human sufferings—to be full of knowledge and at the same time to have no power over any result."²—"This (observes Herodotus) I heard myself from the Orchomenian Thersander, who told me further that he mentioned the fact to several persons about him, even before the battle of Plataea." It is certainly one of the most curious revelations in the whole history; not merely as it brings forward the historian in his own personality, communicating with a personal friend of the Theban leaders, and thus provided with good means of information as to the general events of the campaign—but also as it discloses to us, on testimony not to be suspected, the real temper of the native Persians, and even of the chief men among them. If so many of these chiefs were not merely apathetic, but despondent, in the cause, much more decided would be the same absence of will and hope in their followers and the subject allies. To follow the monarch

¹ Herodot. ix. 16. Thersander, though an Orchomenian, passes as a Theban—Πέρσην τε καὶ Θηβαίων ἐν κλίῳ ἐκάστη—a proof of the intimate connexion between Thebes and Orchomenus at this time, which is further illustrated by Pindar, Isthm. i. 51 (compare the Scholia *ad loc.* and at the beginning of the Ode), respecting the Theban family of Herodotus and Asopodorus. The ancient mythical feud appears to have gone to sleep, but a deadly hatred will be found to grow up in later times between these two towns.

² Herodot. ix. 16, 17. The last observation here quoted is striking and emphatic—ἐχθροὶ δὲ ἰσχυροὶ ἐστὶ τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποισι αἰσθη, πολλὰ φρονέοντα μηδενὸς κρατέειν. It will have to be more carefully considered at a later period of this history, when we come to touch upon the scientific life of the Greeks, and upon the philosophy of happiness and duty as conceived by Aristotle. If carried fully out, this position is the direct negative of what Aristotle lays down in his Ethics as to the superior happiness of the βίος θεωρητικὸς or life of scientific observation and reflection.

in his overwhelming march of the preceding year, was gratifying in many ways to the native Persians: but every man was sick of the enterprise as now cut down under Mardonius: and Artabazus, the second in command, was not merely slack, but jealous of his superior.¹ Under such circumstances we shall presently not be surprised to find the whole army disappearing forthwith, the moment Mardonius is slain.

Among the Grecian allies of Mardonius, the Thebans and Bœotians were active and zealous, most of the remainder lukewarm, and the Phokians even of doubtful fidelity. Their contingent of 1000 hoplites, under Harmokydês, had been tardy in joining him, having only come up since he retired from Attica into Bœotia: and some of the Phokians even remained behind in the neighbourhood of Parnassus, prosecuting manifest hostilities against the Persians. Aware of the feeling among this contingent, which the Thessalians took care to place before him in an unfavourable point of view, Mardonius determined to impress upon them a lesson of intimidation. Causing them to form in a separate body on the plain, he brought up his numerous cavalry all around them; while the Phêmê, or sudden simultaneous impression, ran through the Greek allies as well as the Phokians themselves, that he was about to shoot them down.² The general Harmokydês, directing his men to form a square and close their ranks, addressed to them short exhortations to sell their lives dearly, and to behave like brave Greeks against barbarian assassins—when the cavalry rode up apparently to the charge, and advanced close to the square, with uplifted javelins and arrows on the string, some few of which were even actually discharged. The Phokians maintained, as enjoined, steady ranks with a firm countenance, and the cavalry wheeled about without any actual attack or damage. After this mysterious demonstration, Mardonius condescended to compliment the Phokians on their courage, and to assure them by means of a herald that he had been greatly misinformed respecting them. He at the same time exhorted them to be faithful and forward in service for the future, and promised that all good behaviour should be amply recompensed. Herodotus seems uncertain,—difficult

¹ Herodot. ix. 66.

² Herodot. ix. 17. διεξήλθε φήμη, ὡς κατακοντιεῖ σφέας. Respecting φήμη, see a note a little farther on, at the battle of Mykalê, in this same chapter.

Compare the case of the Delians at Adramyttium, surrounded and slain with missiles by the Persian satrap, though not his enemies—περιστήσας τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ κατηκόντισε (Thucyd. viii. 108).

as the supposition is to entertain,—whether Mardonius did not really intend at first to massacre the Phokians in the field, and desisted from the intention only on seeing how much blood it would cost to accomplish. However this may be, the scene itself was a remarkable reality, and presented one among many other proofs of the lukewarmness and suspicious fidelity of the army.¹

Conformably to the suggestion of the Thebans, the liberties of Greece were now to be disputed in Bœotia: and not only had the position of Mardonius already been taken, but his camp also fortified, before the united Grecian army approached Kithæron in its forward march from the Isthmus. After the full force of the Lacedæmonians had reached the Isthmus, they had to await the arrival of their Peloponnesian and other confederates. The hoplites who joined them were as follows: from Tegea, 1500; from Corinth, 5000, besides a small body of 300 from the Corinthian colony of Potidæa; from the Arcadian Orchomenus, 600; from Sikyon, 3000; from Epidaurus, 800; from Træzen, 1000; from Lepreon, 200; from Mykênæ and Tiryns, 400; from Phlius, 1000; from Hermionê, 300; from Eretria and Styra, 600; from Chalkis, 400; from Ambrakia, 500; from Leukas and Anaktorion, 800; from Palê in Kephallenia, 200; from Ægina, 500. On marching from the Isthmus to Megara, they took up 3000 Megarian hoplites; and as soon as they reached Eleusis in their forward progress, the army was completed by the junction of 8000 Athenian hoplites, and 600 Platæan, under Aristeidês, who passed over from Salamis.² The total force of hoplites or

¹ Οὐκ ἔχω ἀτρεκέως εἰπεῖν, οὔτε εἰ ἦλλον μὲν ἀπολέοντες τοὺς Φωκέας, δεηθέντων τῶν Θεσσαλῶν, &c. (Herodot. ix. 18).

This confession of uncertainty as to motives and plans, distinguishing between them and the visible facts which he is describing, is not without importance as strengthening our confidence in the historian.

² Compare this list of Herodotus with the enumeration which Pausanias read inscribed on the statue of Zeus, erected at Olympia by the Greeks who took part in the battle of Platæa (Pausan. v. 23, 1).

Pausanias found inscribed all the names here indicated by Herodotus, except the Palês of Kephallenia; and he found in addition the Eleians, Keans, Kythnians, Tenians, Naxians, and Melliens. The five last names are islanders in the Ægean: their contingents sent to Platæa must at all events have been very small, and it is surprising to hear that they sent any—especially when we recollect that there was a Greek fleet at this moment on service, to which it would be natural that they should join themselves in preference to land-service.

With respect to the name of the Eleians, the suspicion of Brøndstedt is plausible, that Pausanias may have mistaken the name of the Palês of Kephallenia for theirs, and may have fancied that he read ΠΑΛΕΙΟΙ when

heavy-armed troops was thus 38,700 men. There were no cavalry, and but very few bowmen—but if we add those who are called light-armed or unarmed generally, some perhaps with javelins or swords, but none with any defensive armour—the grand total was not less than 110,000 men. Of these light-armed or unarmed, there were, as computed by Herodotus, 35,000 in attendance on the 5000 Spartan citizens, and 34,500 in attendance on the other hoplites; together with 1800 Thespians who were properly hoplites, yet so badly armed as not to be reckoned in the ranks.¹

Such was the number of Greeks present or near at hand in the combat against the Persians at Plataea, which took place some little time afterwards. But it seemed that the contingents were not at first completely full, and that new additions² continued to arrive until a few days before the battle, along with the convoys of cattle and provisions which came for the subsistence of the army. Pausanias marched first from the Isthmus to Eleusis, where he was joined by the Athenians from Salamis. At Eleusis as well as at the Isthmus, the sacrifices were found encouraging, and the united army then advanced across the ridge of Kithæron, so as to come within sight of the Persians. When Pausanias saw them occupying the line of the Asôpus in the plain beneath, he kept his own army on the mountain declivity near Erythræ, without choosing to adventure himself in the level ground. Mardonius, finding them not disposed to seek battle in the plain, despatched his numerous and excellent cavalry under Masistius, the most distinguished officer in his army, to attack them. For the most part, the ground was so uneven as to check their approach; but the Megarian contingent, which happened to be more exposed than the rest, were so hard pressed that they were forced to send to Pausanias for aid. They appear to have had not only no cavalry, but no bowmen or light-armed troops of any sort with missile weapons; while the Persians,

it was really written ΠΑΛΕΙΣ, in an inscription at that time about 600 years old. The place in the series wherein Pausanias places the name of the Eleians strengthens this suspicion. Unless it be admitted, we shall be driven, as the most probable alternative, to suppose a fraud committed by the vanity of the Eleians, which may easily have led them to alter a name originally belonging to the Palæi. The reader will recollect that the Eleians were themselves the superintendents and curators at Olympia.

Plutarch seems to have read the same inscription as Pausanias (De Herodoti Malignit. p. 873).

¹ Herodot. ix. 19, 28, 29.

² Herodot. ix. 28. οἱ ἐπιφοιτῶντές τε καὶ οἱ ἀρχὴν ἐλθόντες Ἕλληνων.

excellent archers and darters, using very large bows and trained in such accomplishments from their earliest childhood, charged in successive squadrons and overwhelmed the Greeks with darts and arrows—not omitting contemptuous taunts on their cowardice for keeping back from the plain.¹ So general was then the fear of the Persian cavalry, that Pausanias could find none of the Greeks, except the Athenians, willing to volunteer and go to the rescue of the Megarians. A body of Athenians, however, especially 300 chosen troops under Olympiodorus, strengthened with some bowmen, immediately marched to the spot and took up the combat with the Persian cavalry. For some time the struggle was sharp and doubtful: at length the general Masistius,—a man renowned for bravery, lofty in stature, clad in conspicuous armour, and mounted on a Nisæan horse with golden trappings—charging at the head of his troops, had his horse struck by an arrow in the side. The animal immediately reared and threw his master on the ground, close to the ranks of the Athenians, who, rushing forward, seized the horse, and overpowered Masistius before he could rise. So impenetrable were the defences of his helmet and breastplate² however, that they had considerable difficulty in killing him, though he was in their power: at length a spearman pierced him in the eye. The death of the general passed unobserved by the Persian cavalry, but as soon as they missed him and became aware of the loss, they charged furiously and in one mass, to recover the dead body. At first the Athenians, too few in number to resist the onset, were compelled for a time to give way, abandoning the body; but reinforcements presently arriving at their call, the Persians were driven back with loss, and it finally remained in their possession.³

The death of Masistius, coupled with that final repulse of the cavalry which left his body in possession of the Greeks, produced a strong effect on both armies, encouraging the one as much as it disheartened the other. Throughout the camp of Mardonius, the grief was violent and unbounded, manifested by wailing so loud as to echo over all Bœotia; while the hair of men, horses and cattle, was abundantly cut in token of mourning. The Greeks, on the other hand, overjoyed at their

¹ About the missile weapons and skill of the Persians, see Herodot. i. 136; Xenophon, *Anab.* iii. 4, 17.

Cyrus the younger was eminent in the use both of the bow and the javelin (*Xenoph.* *Anab.* i. 8, 26; i. 9, 5: compare *Cyropæd.* i. 2, 4).

² See Quintus Curtius, iii. 11, 15; and the note of Müntz.

³ Herodot. ix. 21, 22, 23; Plutarch, *Aristeidés*, c. 14.

success, placed the dead body in a cart and paraded it round the army: even the hoplites ran out of their ranks to look at it; not only hailing it as a valuable trophy, but admiring its stature and proportions.¹

So much was their confidence increased, that Pausanias now ventured to quit the protection of the mountain-ground, inconvenient from its scanty supply of water, and to take up his position in the plain beneath, interspersed only with low hillocks. Marching from Erythræ in a westerly direction along the declivities of Kithæron, and passing by Hysiaë, the Greeks occupied a line of camp in the Plataean territory along the Asôpus and on its right bank; with their right wing near to the fountain called Gargaphia,² and their left wing near to

¹ Herodot. ix. 24, 25. οἰμωγῇ τε χρεώμενοι ἀπλέτῳ· ἅπασαν γὰρ τὴν Βοιωτίην κατείχε ἡχώ, &c.

The exaggerated demonstrations of grief, ascribed to Xerxes and Atossa in the Persæ of Æschylus, have often been blamed by critics: we may see from this passage how much they are in the manners of Orientals of that day.

² Herodot. ix. 25-30; Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 11. τὸ τοῦ Ἀνδροκράτους ἦρψον ἐγγύς ἄλσει πυκνῶν καὶ συσκίων δένδρων περιεχόμενον.

The expression of Herodotus respecting this position taken by Pausanias, Οὔτοι μὲν οὖν ταχθέντες ἐπὶ τῷ Ἄσωπῳ ἐστρατοπεδεύοντο, as well as the words which follow in the next chapter (31)—Οἱ βάρβαροι, πυθόμενοι εἶναι τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἐν Πλαταιῆσι, παρήσαν καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐπὶ τῶν Ἄσωπων τὸν ταύτη βέντα—show plainly that the Grecian troops were encamped along the Asôpus on the Plataean side, while the Persians, in their second position occupied the ground on the opposite or Theban side of the river. Which-ever army commenced the attack had to begin by passing the Asôpus (c. 36-59).

For the topography of this region, and of the positions occupied by the two armies, compare Squire, in Walpole's Turkey, p. 338; Kruse, Hellas, vol. ii. ch. vi. p. 9 *seq.*, and ch. viii. p. 592 *seq.*: and the still more copious and accurate information of Colonel Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, ch. xvi. vol. ii. p. 324-360. Both of them have given plans of the region; that at the end of this volume is borrowed from Kiepert's maps. I cannot but think that the fountain Gargaphia is not yet identified, and that both Kruse and Leake place the Grecian position farther from the river Asôpus than is consistent with the words of Herodotus; which words seem to specify points near the two extremities, indicating that the fountain of Gargaphia was *near* the river towards the right of the Grecian position, and the chapel of Androkratês also *near* the river towards the left of that position, where the Athenians were posted. Nor would such a site for a chapel of Androkratês be inconsistent with Thucydides (iii. 24), who merely mentions that chapel as being on the right-hand of the first mile of road from Plataea to Thebes.

Considering the length of time which has elapsed since the battle, it would not be surprising if the spring of Gargaphia were no longer recognisable. At any rate, neither the fountain pointed out by Colonel Leake (p. 332) nor that of Vergutiani which had been supposed by Colonel Squire and Dr. Clarke, appear to me suitable for Gargaphia.

the chapel, surrounded by a shady grove, of the Platæan hero Androkratês. In this position they were marshalled according to nations, or separate fractions of the Greek name—the Lacedæmonians on the right wing, with the Tegeans and Corinthians immediately joining them—and the Athenians on the left wing; a post, which as second in point of dignity, was at first claimed by the Tegeans, chiefly on grounds of mythical exploits, to the exclusion of the Athenians, but ultimately adjudged by the Spartans, after hearing both sides, to Athens.¹ In the field even Lacedæmonians followed those democratical forms which pervaded so generally Grecian military operations: in this case, it was not the generals, but the Lacedæmonian troops in a body, who heard the argument and delivered the verdict by unanimous acclamation.

Mardonius, apprised of this change of position, marched his army also a little farther to the westward, and posted himself opposite to the Greeks, divided from them by the river Asôpus. At the suggestion of the Thebans, he himself with his Persians and Medes, the picked men of his army, took post on the left wing, immediately opposite to the Lacedæmonians on the Greek right, and even extending so far as to cover the Tegean ranks on the left of the Lacedæmonians: Baktrians, Indians, Sakæ, with other Asiatics and Egyptians, filled the centre; and the Greeks and Macedonians in the service of Persia, the right—over against the hoplites of Athens. The numbers of these last-mentioned Greeks Herodotus could not learn, though he estimates them conjecturally at 50,000:² nor can we place any confidence in the total of 300,000 which he gives as belonging to the other troops of Mardonius, though probably it cannot have been much less.

In this position lay the two armies, separated only by a narrow space including the river Asôpus, and each expecting a battle, whilst the sacrifices on behalf of each were offered up. Pausanias, Mardonius, and the Greeks in the Persian army, had each a separate prophet to offer sacrifice, and to ascertain the dispositions of the gods: the two first had men from the most distinguished prophetic families in Elis—the

The errors of that plan of the battle of Platæa which accompanies the Voyage d'Anacharsis, are now well understood.

¹ Herodot. ix. 26–29. Judging from the battles of Corinth (B.C. 396) and Mantinea (B.C. 418), the Tegeans seem afterwards to have dropped this pretension to occupy the left wing, and to have preferred the post in the line next to the Lacedæmonians (Xenoph. Helen. iv. 2, 19).

² Herodot. ix. 31, 32.

latter invited one from Leukas.¹ All received large pay, and the prophet of Pausanias had indeed been honoured with a recompense above all pay—the gift of full Spartan citizenship for himself as well as for his brother. It happened that the prophets on both sides delivered the same report of their respective sacrifices: favourable for resistance if attacked—unfavourable for beginning the battle. At a moment when doubt and indecision was the reigning feeling on both sides, this was the safest answer for the prophet to give, and the most satisfactory for the soldiers to hear. And though the answer from Delphi had been sufficiently encouraging, and the kindness of the patron-heroes of Plataea² had been solemnly invoked, yet Pausanias did not venture to cross the Asôpus and begin the attack, in the face of a pronounced declaration from his prophet. Nor did even Hegesistratus, the prophet employed by Mardonius, choose on his side to urge an aggressive movement, though he had a deadly personal hatred against the Lacedæmonians, and would have been delighted to see them worsted. There arose commencements of conspiracy, perhaps encouraged by promises or bribes from the enemy, among the wealthier Athenian hoplites, to establish an oligarchy at Athens under Persian supremacy, like that which now existed at Thebes,—a conspiracy full of danger at such a moment, though fortunately repressed³ by Aristeidês, with a hand at once gentle and decisive.

The annoyance inflicted by the Persian cavalry, under the guidance of the Thebans, was incessant. Their constant assaults, and missile weapons from the other side of the Asôpus, prevented the Greeks from using the river for supplies of water, so that the whole army was forced to water at the fountain Gargaphia, at the extreme right of the position,⁴ near

¹ Herodot. ix. 36, 38. *μεμισθωμένους οὐκ ὀλίγους.*

These prophets were men of great individual consequence, as may be seen by the detail; which Herodotus gives respecting their adventures: compare also the history of Euenius, ix. 93.

² Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. xi.; Thucyd. ii. 74.

³ Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 13.

⁴ Herodot. ix. 40, 49, 50. *τὴν τε κρήνην τὴν Γαργαφίην, ἀπ' ἧς ὕδρευετο πᾶν τὸ στράτευμα τὸ Ἑλληνικόν—ἐρυκόμενοι δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἄσωπου, οὐτω δὴ ἐπὶ τὴν κρήνην ἐφοίτεον· ἀπὸ τοῦ ποταμοῦ γὰρ σφί οὐκ ἐξῆν ὕδωρ φορέεσθαι, ὑπὸ τε τῶν ἰππέων καὶ τοξευμάτων.*

Diodorus (xi. 30) affirms that the Greek position was so well defended by the nature of the ground, and so difficult of attack, that Mardonius was prevented from making use of his superior numbers. It is evident from the account of Herodotus that this is quite incorrect. The position seems to have had no protection except what it derived from the river Asôpus, and

the Lacedæmonian hoplites. Moreover the Theban leader Timegenidas, remarking the convoys which arrived over the passes of Kithæron in the rear of the Grecian camp, and the constant reinforcements of hoplites which accompanied them, prevailed upon Mardonius to employ his cavalry in cutting off such communication. The first movement of this sort, undertaken by night against the pass called the Oak Heads, was eminently successful. A train of 500 beasts of burden with supplies, was attacked descending into the plain with its escort, all of whom were either slain or carried prisoners to the Persian camp; so that it became unsafe for any further convoys to approach the Greeks.¹ Eight days had already been passed in inaction before Timegenidas suggested, or Mardonius executed this manœuvre; which it is fortunate for the Greeks that he did not attempt earlier, and which afforded clear proof how much might be hoped from an efficient employment of his cavalry, without the ruinous risk of a general action. Nevertheless, after waiting two days longer, his impatience became uncontrollable, and he determined on a general battle forthwith.² In vain did Artabazus endeavour to dissuade him from the step; taking the same view as the Thebans, that in a pitched battle the united Grecian army was invincible, and that the only successful policy was that of delay and corruption to disunite them. He recommended standing on the defensive, by means of Thebes, well fortified and amply provisioned: so as to allow time for distributing effective bribes among the leading men throughout the various Grecian cities. This suggestion, which Herodotus considers as wise and likely to succeed, was repudiated by Mardonius as cowardly and unworthy of the recognised superiority of the Persian arms.³

But while he overruled, by virtue of superior authority, the objections of all around him, Persians as well as Greek, he could not but feel daunted by their reluctant obedience, which he suspected to arise from their having heard oracles or prophecies of unfavourable augury. He therefore summoned the chief officers, Greek as well as Persian, and put the question to them whether they knew any prophecy announcing that the Persians were doomed to destruction in Greece. All the Greeks were ultimately forced to abandon it by the incessant attacks of the Persian cavalry. The whole account, at once diffuse and uninteresting, given by Diodorus of this battle (xi. 30-36), forms a strong contrast with the clear, impressive, and circumstantial narrative of Herodotus.

¹ Herodot. ix. 38, 39.

² Herodot. ix. 40, 41.

³ Herodot. ix. 42.

were silent : some did not know the prophecies, but others (Herodotus intimates) knew them full well, though they did not dare to speak. Receiving no answer, Mardonius said, "Since ye either do not know, or will not tell, I who know well will myself speak out. There is an oracle to the effect, that Persian invaders of Greece shall plunder the temple of Delphi, and shall afterwards all be destroyed. Now we, being aware of this, shall neither go against that temple, nor try to plunder it : on that ground therefore we shall not be destroyed. Rejoice ye therefore, ye who are well-affected to the Persians—we shall get the better of the Greeks." With that he gave orders to prepare everything for a general attack and battle on the morrow.¹

It is not improbable that the Orchomenian Thersander was present at this interview, and may have reported it to Herodotus. But the reflection of the historian himself is not the least curious part of the whole, as illustrating the manner in which these prophecies sunk into men's minds, and determined their judgements. Herodotus knew (though he does not cite it) the particular prophecy to which Mardonius made allusion ; and he pronounces, in the most affirmative tone,² that it had no reference to the Persians : it referred to an ancient invasion of Greece by the Illyrians and the Encheleis. But both Bakis (from whom he quotes four lines) and Musæus had prophesied, in the plainest manner, the destruction of the Persian army on the banks of the Thermôdon and Asôpus. And these are the prophecies which we must suppose the officers convoked by Mardonius to have known also, though they did not dare to speak out : it was the fault of Mardonius himself that he did not take warning.

The attack of a multitude like that of Mardonius was not likely under any circumstances to be made so rapidly as to take the Greeks by surprise : but the latter were forewarned of it by a secret visit from Alexander king of Macedon ; who, riding up to the Athenian advanced posts in the middle of the night, desired to speak with Aristeidês and the other generals. Announcing to them alone his name and proclaiming his earnest sympathy for the Grecian cause, as well as the hazard which he incurred by this nightly visit—he apprised them that

¹ Herodot. ix. 42.

² Herodot. ix. 43. Τοῦτον δ' ἔγωγε τὸν χρησμὸν τὸν Μαρδόνιος εἶπε ἐς Πέρσας ἔχειν, ἐς Ἰλλυριοῦς τε καὶ τὸν Ἐγγέλεων στρατὸν οἶδα πεποιημένον, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐς Πέρσας. Ἄλλὰ τὰ μὲν Βάκιδι ἐς ταύτην τὴν μάχην ἔστι πεποιημένα, &c.

Mardonius, though eager for a battle long ago, could not by any effort obtain favourable sacrifices, but was nevertheless, even in spite of this obstacle, determined on an attack the next morning. "Be ye prepared accordingly; and if ye succeed in this war (said he), remember to liberate me also from the Persian yoke; I too am a Greek by descent, and thus risk my head because I cannot endure to see Greece enslaved."¹

The communication of this important message, made by Aristeidês to Pausanias, elicited from him a proposal not a little surprising as coming from a Spartan general. He requested the Athenians to change places with the Lacedæmonians in the line. "We Lacedæmonians (said he) now stand opposed to the Persians and Medes, against whom we have never yet contended, while ye Athenians have fought and conquered them at Marathon. March ye then over to the right wing and take our places, while we will take yours in the left wing against the Bœotians and Thessalians, with whose arms and attack we are familiar." The Athenians readily acceded, and the reciprocal change of order was accordingly directed. It was not yet quite completed, when day broke and the Theban allies of Mardonius immediately took notice of what had been done. That general commanded a corresponding change in his own line, so as to place the native Persians once more over against the Lacedæmonians; upon which Pausanias, seeing that his manœuvre had failed, led back his Lacedæmonians to the right wing, while a second movement on the part of Mardonius replaced both armies in the order originally observed.²

No incident similar to this will be found throughout the whole course of Lacedæmonian history. To evade encountering the best troops in the enemy's line, and to depart for this purpose from their privileged post on the right wing, was a step well-calculated to lower them in the eyes of Greece, and could hardly have failed to produce that effect, if the intention had been realised. It is at the same time no mean compliment to the formidable reputation of the native Persian troops—a reputation recognised by Herodotus, and well sustained at

¹ Herodot. ix. 44-45. The language about the sacrifices is remarkable—λέγω δὲ ἄν ὅτι Μαρδονίῳ τε καὶ τῇ στρατιῇ οὐ δύναται τὰ σφάγια καταθύμια γενέσθαι· πάλαι γὰρ ἂν ἐμάχεσθε, &c.

Mardonius had tried many unavailing efforts to procure better sacrifices: it *could* not be done.

² Herodot. ix. 47; Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 16. Here, as on many other occasions, Plutarch rather spoils than assists the narrative of Herodotus.

least by their personal bravery.¹ Nor can we wonder that this publicly manifested reluctance on the part of the leading troops in the Grecian army contributed much to exalt the rash confidence of Mardonius : a feeling which Herodotus, in Homeric style,² casts into the speech of a Persian herald sent to upbraid the Lacedæmonians, and challenge them to a "single combat with champions of equal numbers, Lacedæmonians against Persians." This herald, whom no one heard or cared for, and who serves but as a mouthpiece for bringing out the feelings belonging to the moment, was followed by something very real and terrible—a vigorous attack on the Greek line by the Persian cavalry ; whose rapid motions, and showers of arrows and javelins, annoyed the Greeks on this day more than ever. The latter (as has been before stated) had no cavalry whatever ; nor do their light troops, though sufficiently numerous, appear to have rendered any service, with the exception of the Athenian bowmen. How great was the advantage gained by the Persian cavalry, is shown by the fact that they for a time drove away the Lacedæmonians from the fountain of Gargaphia, so as to choke it up and render it unfit for use. As the army had been prevented by the cavalry from resorting to the river Asôpus, this fountain had been of late the only watering-place ; and without it the position which they then occupied became untenable—while their provisions also were exhausted, inasmuch as the convoys, from fear of the Persian cavalry, could not descend from Kithæron to join them.³

In this dilemma Pausanias summoned the Grecian chiefs to his tent. After an anxious debate, the resolution was taken, in case Mardonius should not bring on a general action in the course of the day, to change their position during the night, when there would be no interruption from the cavalry ; and to occupy the ground called the Island, distant about ten furlongs in a direction nearly west, and seemingly north of the town of Plataea, which was itself about twenty furlongs distant. This island, improperly so denominated, included the ground comprised between two branches of the river Qeroê ;⁴ both of which flow from Kithæron, and after flowing for a certain time in channels about three furlongs apart, form a junction and

¹ Herodot. ix. 71.

² Compare the reproaches of Hektor to Diomêdes (Iliad, viii. 161).

³ Herodot. ix. 49, 50. Pausanias mentions that the Plataeans restored the fountain of Gargaphia after the victory (*τὸ ὕδωρ ἀνεσώσαντο*) ; but he hardly seems to speak as if he had himself seen it (ix. 4, 2).

⁴ See a good description of the ground in Colonel Leake, *Travels in Northern Greece*, ch. xvi. vol. ii. p. 358.

run in a north-westerly direction towards one of the recesses of the Gulf of Corinth—quite distinct from the Asôpus, which, though also rising near at hand in the lowest declivities under Kithæron, takes an easterly direction and discharges itself into the sea opposite Eubœa. When encamped in this so-called Island, the army would be secure of water from the stream in their rear ; nor would they, as now, expose an extended breadth of front to a numerous hostile cavalry separated from them only by the Asôpus.¹ It was further resolved, that so soon as the army should once be in occupation of the Island, half of the troops should forthwith march onward to disengage the convoys blocked up on Kithæron and conduct them to the camp. Such was the plan settled in council among the different Grecian chiefs ; the march was to be commenced at the beginning of the second night-watch, when the enemy's cavalry would have completely withdrawn.

In spite of what Mardonius is said to have determined, he passed the whole day without any general attack. But his cavalry, probably elated by the recent demonstration of the Lacedæmonians, were on that day more daring and indefatigable than ever, and inflicted much loss as well as severe suffering ;² insomuch that the centre of the Greek force (Corinthians, Megarians, &c., between the Lacedæmonians and Tegeans on the right, and the Athenians on the left), when the hour arrived for retiring to the Island, commenced their march indeed, but forgot or disregarded the preconceived plan and the orders of Pausanias in their impatience to obtain a complete shelter against the attacks of the cavalry. Instead of proceeding to the Island, they marched a distance of twenty furlongs directly to the town of Plataæa, and took up a position in front of the Heræum or temple of Hêrê, where they were protected partly by the buildings, partly by the comparatively high ground on which the town with its temple stood. Between the position which the Greeks were about to leave and that which they had resolved to occupy (*i. e.*, between the course of the Asôpus and that of the Oeroë), there appear to have been a range of low hills. The Lacedæmonians, starting from the right wing, had to march directly

¹ Herodot. ix. 51. Ἐς τοῦτον δὴ τὸν χρόνον ἐβουλεύσαντο μεταστῆναι, ἵνα καὶ ὕδατι ἐχῶσι χρᾶσθαι ἀφθόγῃ, καὶ οἱ ἵππεις σφέας μὴ σινοῖατο, ὥσπερ κατ' ἰθὺ ἐόντων.

The last words have reference to the position of the two hostile armies, extended front to front along the course of the Asôpus.

² Herodot. ix. 52. κείνην μὲν τὴν ἡμέραν πᾶσαν, προσκειμένης τῆς ἵππου, ἔχον πόνον ἄτρυτον.

ver these hills, while the Athenians, from the left, were to turn them and get into the plain on the other side.¹ Pausanias, apprised that the divisions of the centre had commenced their night-march, and concluding of course that they would proceed to the Island according to orders, allowed a certain interval of time in order to prevent confusion, and then directed that the Lacedæmonians and Tegeans should also begin their movement towards that same position. But here he found himself embarrassed by an unexpected obstacle. The movement was retrograde, receding from the enemy, and not consistent with the military honour of a Spartan: nevertheless most of the taxiarchs or leaders of companies obeyed without murmuring, but Amompharetus, lochage or captain of that band which Herodotus calls the lochus of Pitana,² obstinately refused. Not having been present at the meeting in which the resolution had been taken, he now heard it for the first time with astonishment and disdain, declaring "that he for one would never so far disgrace Sparta as to run away from the foreigner."³ Pausanias, with the second in command Euryanax, exhausted every effort to overcome his reluctance. But they could by no means induce him to retreat; nor did they dare to move without him, leaving his entire lochus exposed alone to the enemy.⁴

Amidst the darkness of night, and in this scene of indecision and dispute, an Athenian messenger on horseback reached Pausanias, instructed to ascertain what was passing, and to ask for the last directions. For in spite of the resolution taken after formal debate, the Athenian generals still mistrusted the Lacedæmonians, and doubted whether, after all, they would act as they had promised. The movement of the central division having

¹ Herodot. ix. 56. Πausανίης—σημήνας ἀπήγε διὰ τῶν κολωνῶν τοὺς λοιποὺς πάντας· εἶποντο δὲ καὶ Τεγεῆται. ἸΑθηναῖοι δὲ ταχθέντες ἦσαν τὰ ἔμπαλιν ἢ Λακεδαιμόνιοι. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν τε ὕχθων ἀντείχοντο καὶ τῆς ὑπωρείης τοῦ Κθαϊράνου. ἸΑθηναῖοι δὲ, κάτω τραφέντες ἐς τὸ πεδῖον.

With which we must combine another passage, c. 59, intimating that the track of the Athenians led them to turn and get behind the hills, which prevented Mardonius from seeing them, though they were marching along the plain:—Μαρδόνιος—ἐπέιχε ἐπὶ Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ Τεγεῆτας μόνους. ἸΑθηναῖους γὰρ τραπομένους ἐς τὸ πεδῖον ὑπὸ τῶν ὕχθων οὐ κατῶρα.

² There is on this point a difference between Thucydides and Herodotus: the former affirms that there never was any Spartan lochus so called (Thucyd. i. 20).

We have no means of reconciling the difference, nor can we be certain that Thucydides is right in his negative comprehending all past time—δὲ οὐδ' ἐγένετο πάποτε.

³ Herodot. ix. 53, 54.

⁴ Herodot. ix. 52, 53.

become known to them, they sent at the last moment before they commenced their own march, to assure themselves that the Spartans were about to move also. A profound, and even an exaggerated mistrust, but too well justified by the previous behaviour of the Spartans towards Athens, is visible in this proceeding; ¹ yet it proved fortunate in its results—for if the Athenians, satisfied with executing their part in the preconcerted plan, had marched at once to the Island, the Grecian army would have been severed without the possibility of reuniting, and the issue of the battle might have proved altogether different. The Athenian herald found the Lacedæmonians still stationary in their position, and the generals in hot dispute with Amompharetus, who despised the threat of being left alone to make head against the Persians, and when reminded that the resolution had been taken by general vote of the officers, took up with both hands a vast rock fit for the hands of Ajax or Hektor, and cast it at the feet of Pausanias, saying—“This is *my* pebble, wherewith I give my vote not to run away from the strangers.” Pausanias denounced him as a madman—desiring the herald to report the scene of embarrassment which he had just come to witness, and to entreat the Athenian generals not to commence their retreat until the Lacedæmonians should also be in march. In the meantime the dispute continued, and was even prolonged by the perverseness of Amompharetus until the morning began to dawn; when Pausanias, afraid to remain longer, gave the signal for retreat—calculating that the refractory captain, when he saw his lochus really left alone, would probably make up his mind to follow. Having marched about ten furlongs, across the hilly ground which divided him from the Island, he commanded a halt; either to await Amompharetus if he chose to follow, or to be near enough to render aid and save him, if he were rash enough to stand his ground single-handed. Happily the latter, seeing that his general had really departed, overcame his scruples, and followed him; overtaking and joining the main body in its first halt near the river Moloeis and the temple of Eleusinian Dêmêter.² The Athenians, commencing their movement at the same time with Pausanias, got round the hills to the plain on the other side and proceeded on their march towards the Island.

¹ Herodot. ix. 54. Ἀθηναῖοι—εἶχον ἀτρέμας σφέας αὐτοὺς ἵνα ἐτάχθησαν, ἐπιστάμενοι τὰ Λακεδαιμονίων φρονήματα, ὡς ἄλλα φρονούντων καὶ ἄλλα λεγόντων.

² Herodot. ix. 56, 57.

When the day broke, the Persian cavalry were astonished to find the Grecian position deserted. They immediately set themselves to the pursuit of the Spartans, whose march lay along the higher and more conspicuous ground, and whose progress had moreover been retarded by the long delay of Amompharetus: the Athenians on the contrary, marching without halt, and being already behind the hills, were not open to view. To Mardonius, this retreat of his enemy inspired an extravagant and contemptuous confidence which he vented in full measure to the Thessalian Aleuadae—"These are your boasted Spartans, who changed their place just now in the line, rather than fight the Persians, and have here shown by a barefaced flight what they are really worth!" With that he immediately directed his whole army to pursue and attack with the utmost expedition. The Persians crossed the Asôpus and ran after the Greeks at their best speed, pell-mell, without any thought of order or preparations for overcoming resistance: the army already rang with shouts of victory, in full confidence of swallowing up the fugitives as soon as they were overtaken.

The Asiatic allies all followed the example of this disorderly rush forward:¹ but the Thebans and the other Grecian allies on the right wing of Mardonius, appear to have maintained somewhat better order.

Pausanias had not been able to retreat farther than the neighbourhood of the Demetrium or temple of Eleusinian Démêtêr, where he had halted to take up Amompharetus. Overtaken first by the Persian horse and next by Mardonius with the main body, he sent a horseman forthwith to apprise the Athenians, and to entreat their aid. The Athenians were prompt in complying with his request: but they speedily found themselves engaged in conflict against the Theban allies of the enemy, and therefore unable to reach him.² Accordingly the Lacedæmonians and Tegeates had to encounter the Persians single-handed without any assistance from the other Greeks.

¹ Herodot. ix. 59. *ἐδίωκον ὡς ποδῶν ἕκαστος εἶχον, οὔτε κόσμησιν οὐδενὶ κοσμηθέντες, οὔτε τάξι. Καὶ οὗτοι μὲν βοῆ τε καὶ δμίλῳ ἐπήϊσαν, ὡς ἀναρπασόμενοι τοὺς Ἕλληνας.*

Herodotus dwells especially on the reckless and disorderly manner in which the Persians advanced: Plutarch, on the contrary, says of Mardonius—*ἔχων συντεταγμένην τὴν δύναμιν ἐπεφέρετο τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, &c.* (Plutarch, Aristeid. c. 17).

Plutarch also says that Pausanias *ἤγε τὴν ἄλλην δύναμιν πρὸς τὰς Πλαταιάς, &c.*, which is quite contrary to the real narrative of Herodotus. Pausanias intended to march to the Island, not to Plataea: he did not reach either the one or the other.

² Herodot. ix. 60, 61.

The Persians, on arriving within bowshot of their enemies, planted in the ground the spiked extremities of their gerrha (or long wicker shields), forming a continuous breastwork, from behind which they poured upon the Greeks a shower of arrows :¹ their bows were of the largest size, and drawn with no less power than skill. In spite of the wounds and distress thus inflicted, Pausanias persisted in the indispensable duty of offering the battle-sacrifice, and the victims were for some time unfavourable, so that he did not venture to give orders for advance and close combat. Many were here wounded or slain in the ranks,² among them the brave Kallikratês, the handsomest and strongest man in the army: until Pausanias, wearied out with this compulsory and painful delay, at length raised his eyes to the conspicuous Heræum of the Platæans, and invoked the merciful intervention of Hêrê to remove that obstacle which confined him to the spot. Hardly had he pronounced the words, when the victims changed and became favourable :³ but the Tegeans, while he was yet praying, anticipated the effect and hastened forward against the enemy, followed by the Lacedæmonians as soon as Pausanias gave the word. The wicker breastwork before the Persians was soon overthrown by the Grecian charge: nevertheless the Persians, though thus deprived of their tutelary hedge and having no defensive armour, maintained the fight with individual courage, the more remarkable because it was totally unassisted by discipline or trained collective movement, against the drilled array, the regulated step, the well-defended persons, and the long spears, of the Greeks.⁴ They threw themselves upon the

¹ About the Persian bow, see Xenoph. Anabas. iii. 4, 17.

² Herodot. ix. 72.

³ Herodot. ix. 62. Καὶ τοῖσι Λακεδαιμονίοισι αὐτίκα μετὰ τὴν εὐχὴν τὴν Πausανίῳ ἐγένετο θυσίῳσι τὰ σφέγια χρηστά. Plutarch exaggerates the long-suffering of Pausanias (Aristot. c. 17, ad finem).

The lofty and conspicuous site of the Heræon, visible to Pausanias at the distance where he was, is plainly marked in Herodotus (ix. 61).

For incidents illustrating the hardships which a Grecian army endured from its reluctance to move without favourable sacrifices, see Xenophon, Anabasis, vi. 4, 10-25; Hellenic. iii. 2, 17.

⁴ Herodot. ix. 62, 63. His words about the courage of the Persians are remarkable: λήματι μὲν νῦν καὶ βῶμῃ οὐκ ἔσσονες ἔσαν οἱ Πέρσαι· ἀνοπλοὶ δὲ ἔδντες, καὶ πρὸς, ἀνεπιστήμονες ἔσαν, καὶ οὐκ ὁμοῖοι τοῖσι ἐναντίοισι σοφίῳν . . . πλείστον γὰρ σφέας ἐδηλέετο ἢ ἐσθῆς ἐρήμιος ἐοῦσα ὑπλῶν, πρὸς γὰρ ὀπλίτας ἔδντες γυμνήτες ἀγῶνα ἐποιεῦντο. Compare the striking conversation between Xerxes and Demaratus (Herodot. vii. 104).

The description given by Herodotus of the gallant rush made by these badly-armed Persians, upon the presented line of spears in the Lacedæmonian ranks, may be compared with Livy (xxxii. 17), a description of the

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Lacedæmonians, seizing hold of their spears, and breaking them : many of them devoted themselves in small parties of ten to force by their bodies a way into the lines, and to get to individual close combat with the short spear and the dagger.¹ Mardonius himself, conspicuous upon a white horse, was among the foremost warriors, and the thousand select troops who formed his body-guard distinguished themselves beyond all the rest. At length he was slain by the hand of a distinguished Spartan named Aemnéstus ; his thousand guards mostly perished around him, and the courage of the remaining Persians, already worn out by the superior troops against which they had been long contending, was at last thoroughly broken by the death of their general. They turned their backs and fled, not resting until they got into the wooden fortified camp, constructed by Mardonius behind the Asôpus. The Asiatic allies also, as soon as they saw the Persians defeated, took to flight without striking a blow.²

The Athenians on the left, meanwhile, had been engaged in a serious conflict with the Bœotians ; especially the Theban leaders with the hoplites immediately around them, who fought with great bravery, but were at length driven back, after the loss of 300 of their best troops. The Theban cavalry however still maintained a good front, protecting the retreat of the infantry and checking the Athenian pursuit, so that the fugitives were enabled to reach Thebes in safety ; a better refuge than the Persian fortified camp.³ With the exception of the Thebans and Bœotians, none of the other *medising* Greeks rendered any real service. Instead of sustaining or reinforcing the Thebans,

Romans attacking the Macedonian phalanx,—and with the battle of Sempach (June, 1386), in which 1400 half-armed Swiss overcame a large body of fully-armed Austrians, with an impenetrable front of projecting spears ; which for some time they were unable to break in upon, until at length one of their warriors, Arnold von Winkelried, grasped an armful of spears, and precipitated himself upon them, making a way for his countrymen over his dead body. See Vogelín, *Geschichte der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft*, ch. vi. p. 240, or indeed any history of Switzerland, for a description of this memorable incident.

¹ For the arms of the Persians, see Herodot. vii. 61.

Herodotus states in another place that the Persian troops adopted the Egyptian breastplates (*θώρακας*) : probably this may have been after the battle of Plataea. Even at this battle, the Persian leaders on horseback had strong defensive armour, as we may see by the case of Masistius above narrated : by the time of the battle of Kunaxa, the habit had become more widely diffused (Xenoph. *Anab.* i. 3, 6 ; Brisson, *De Regno Persarum*, lib. iii. p. 361), for the cavalry at least.

² Herodot. ix. 64, 65.

³ Herodot. ix. 67, 68.

they never once advanced to the charge, but merely followed in the first movement of flight. So that in point of fact the only troops in this numerous Perso-Grecian army who really fought, were, the native Persians and Sakæ on the left, and the Bœotians on the right; the former against the Lacedæmonians, the latter against the Athenians.¹

Nor did even all the native Persians take part in the combat. A body of 40,000 men under Artabazus, of whom some must doubtless have been native Persians, left the field without fighting and without loss. That general, seemingly the ablest man in the Persian army, had been from the first disgusted with the nomination of Mardonius as commander-in-chief, and had further incurred his displeasure by deprecating any general action. Apprised that Mardonius was hastening forward to attack the retreating Greeks, he marshalled his division and led them out towards the scene of action, though despairing of success and perhaps not very anxious that his own prophecies should be proved false. And such had been the headlong impetuosity of Mardonius in his first forward movement,—so complete his confidence of overwhelming the Greeks when he discovered their retreat,—that he took no pains to ensure the concerted action of his whole army. Accordingly before Artabazus arrived at the scene of action, he saw the Persian troops, who had been engaged under the commander-in-chief, already defeated and in flight. Without making the least attempt either to save them or to retrieve the battle, he immediately gave orders to his own division to retreat; not repairing, however, either to the fortified camp or to Thebes, but abandoning at once the whole campaign, and taking the direct road through Phokis to Thessaly, Macedonia, and the Hellespont.²

As the native Persians, the Sakæ, and the Bœotians, were the only real combatants on the one side, so also were the Lacedæmonians, Tegeans, and Athenians, on the other. It has already been mentioned that the central troops of the Grecian army, disobeying the general order of march, had gone during the night to the town of Plataæa instead of to the Island. They were thus completely severed from Pausanias, and the first thing which they heard about the battle, was, that the Lacedæmonians were gaining the victory. Elate with this news, and anxious to come

¹ Herodot. ix. 67, 68. Τῶν δὲ ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων τῶν μετὰ βασιλῆος ἔθελουκακεόντων . . . καὶ τῶν ἄλλων συμμάχων ὁ πᾶς ὄμιλος οὔτε διαμαχέσμενος οὔδενί οὔτε τι ἀποδεξόμενος ἔφυγεν.

² Herodot. ix. 66.

in for some share of the honour, they rushed to the scene of action, without any heed of military order: the Corinthians taking the direct track across the hills, while the Megarians, Phliasians and others, marched by the longer route along the plain, so as to turn the hills, and arrive at the Athenian position. The Theban horse under Asôpodôrus, employed in checking the pursuit of the victorious Athenian hoplites, seeing these fresh troops coming up in thorough disorder, charged them vigorously and drove them back, to take refuge in the high ground, with the loss of 600 men.¹ But this partial success had no effect in mitigating the general defeat.

Following up their pursuit, the Lacedæmonians proceeded to attack the wooden redoubt wherein the Persians had taken refuge. But though they were here aided by all or most of the central Grecian divisions, who had taken no part in the battle, they were yet so ignorant of the mode of assailing walls, that they made no progress, and were completely baffled, until the Athenians arrived to their assistance. The redoubt was then stormed, not without a gallant and prolonged resistance on the part of its defenders. The Tegeans, being the first to penetrate into the interior, plundered the rich tent of Mardonius, whose manger for his horses, made of brass, remained long afterwards exhibited in their temple of Athênê Alea,—while his silver-footed throne, and scimitar,² were preserved in the acropolis of Athens, along with the breastplate of Masistius. Once within the wall, effective resistance ceased, and the Greeks slaughtered without mercy as well as without limit; so that if we are to credit Herodotus, there survived only 3000 men out of the 300,000 which had composed the army of Mardonius—save and except the 40,000 men who accompanied Artabazus in his retreat.³

Respecting these numbers, the historian had probably little to give except some vague reports, without any pretence of

¹ Herodot. ix. 69.

² Herodot. ix. 70; Demosthenês cont. Timokrat. p. 741, c. 33. Pausanias (i. 27, 2) doubts whether this was really the scimitar of Mardonius, contending that the Lacedæmonians would never have permitted the Athenians to take it.

³ Herodot. ix. 70: compare Æschyl. Pers. 805-824. He singles out "the Dorian spear" as the great weapon of destruction to the Persians at Plataea—very justly. Dr. Blomfield is surprised at this compliment; but it is to be recollected that all the earlier part of the tragedy had been employed in setting forth the glory of Athens at Salamis, and he might well afford to give the Peloponnesians the credit which they deserved at Plataea. Pindar distributes the honour between Sparta and Athens in like manner (Pyth. i. 76).

computation: about the Grecian loss his statement deserves more attention, when he tells us that there perished ninety-one Spartans, sixteen Tegeans, and fifty-two Athenians. Herein however is not included the loss of the Megarians when attacked by the Theban cavalry, nor is the number of slain Lacedæmonians, not Spartans, specified: while even the other numbers actually stated are decidedly smaller than the probable truth, considering the multitude of Persian arrows and the unshielded right side of the Grecian hoplite. On the whole, the affirmation of Plutarch, that not less than 1360 Greeks were slain in the action appears probable: all doubtless hoplites—for little account was then made of the light-armed, nor indeed are we told that they took any active part in the battle.¹ Whatever may have been the numerical loss of the Persians, this defeat proved the total ruin of their army: but we may fairly presume that many were spared and sold into slavery,² while many of the fugitives probably found means to join the retreating division of Artabazus. That general made a rapid march across Thessaly and Macedonia, keeping strict silence about the recent battle, and pretending to be sent on a special enterprise by Mardonius, whom he reported to be himself approaching. If Herodotus is correct (though it may well be doubted whether the change of sentiment in Thessaly and the other *medising* Grecian states was so rapid as he implies), Artabazus succeeded in traversing these countries before the news of the battle became generally known, and then retreated by the straightest and shortest route through the interior of Thrace to Byzantium, from whence he passed into Asia. The interior tribes, unconquered and predatory, harassed his retreat considerably; but we shall find long afterwards Persian garrisons in possession of many principal places on the Thracian coast.³ It will be seen that Artabazus subsequently rose higher than ever in the estimation of Xerxes.

¹ Plutarch, Aristeidés, c. 19. Kleidemus, quoted by Plutarch, stated that all the fifty-two Athenians who perished belonged to the tribe *Æantis*, which distinguished itself in the Athenian ranks. But it seems impossible to believe that *no* citizens belonging to the other nine tribes were killed.

² Diodorus indeed states that Pausanias was so apprehensive of the numbers of the Persians, that he forbade his soldiers to give quarter or take any prisoners (xi. 32); but this is hardly to be believed, in spite of his assertion. His statement that the Greeks lost 10,000 men is still less admissible.

³ Herodot. ix. 89. The allusions of Demosthenés to Perdikkas king of Macedonia, who is said to have attacked the Persians on their flight from Plataea, and to have rendered their ruin complete, are too loose to deserve attention; more especially as Perdikkas was *not then* king of Macedonia

Ten days did the Greeks employ after their victory, first in burying the slain, next in collecting and apportioning the booty. The Lacedæmonians, the Athenians, the Tegeans, the Megarians and the Phliasiens each buried their dead apart, erecting a separate tomb in commemoration. The Lacedæmonians, indeed, distributed their dead into three fractions, in three several burial-places: one for those champions who enjoyed individual renown at Sparta, and among whom were included the most distinguished men slain in the recent battle, such as Poseidonius, Amompharetus the refractory captain, Philokyon, and Kallikratês—a second for the other Spartans and Lacedæmonians¹—and a third for the Helots. Besides these sepulchral monuments, erected in the neighbourhood of Plataea by those cities whose citizens had really fought and fallen, there were several similar monuments to be seen in the days of Herodotus, raised by other cities which falsely pretended to the same honour, with the connivance and aid of the Plataeans.² The body of Mardonius was discovered among the slain, and treated with respect by Pausanias, who is even said to have indignantly repudiated advice offered to him by an Æginetan, that he should retaliate upon it the ignominious treatment inflicted by Xerxes upon the dead Leonidas.³ On (Demosthenês cont. Aristokrat. p. 687, c. 51; and *περὶ Συντάξεως*, p. 173, c. 9).

¹ Herodot. ix. 84. Herodotus indeed assigns this second burial-place only to the other *Spartans*, apart from the Select. He takes no notice of the Lacedæmonians not Spartans, either in the battle or in reference to burial, though he had informed us that 5000 of them were included in the army. Some of them must have been slain, and we may fairly presume that they were buried along with the Spartan citizens generally. As to the word *ἱρέας*, or *εἰρενας*, or *ἱππέας* (the two last being both conjectural readings), it seems impossible to arrive at any certainty: we do not know by what name these select warriors were called.

² Herodot. ix. 85. *Τῶν δ' ἄλλων ὄσοι καὶ φαίνονται ἐν Πλαταιῆσι ἐόντες τάφοι, τούτους δὲ, ὡς ἐγὼ πυνθάνομαι, ἐπαισχυνομένους τῇ ἀπειστοί τῆς μάχης, ἐκάστους χώματα χῶσαι κεινὰ, τῶν ἐπιγινόμενων εἵνεκεν ἀνθρώπων· ἐπεὶ καὶ Αἰγινητέων ἐστὶ αὐτόθι καλεόμενος τάφος, τὸν ἐγὼ ἀκούω καὶ δέκα ἔτεσι ὕστερον μετὰ ταῦτα, δεηθέντων τῶν Αἰγινητέων, χῶσαι Κλεάδην τὸν Αὐτοδίκου, ἄνδρα Πλαταιέα, πρόξεινον ἐόντα αὐτῶν.*

This is a curious statement, derived by Herodotus doubtless from personal inquiries made at Plataea.

³ Herodot. ix. 78, 79. This suggestion, so abhorrent to Grecian feeling, is put by the historian into the mouth of the Æginetan Lampρόν. In my preceding note I have alluded to another statement made by Herodotus, not very creditable to the Æginetans: there is moreover a third (ix. 80), in which he represents them as having cheated the Helots in their purchases of the booty. We may presume him to have heard all these anecdotes at Plataea: at the time when he probably visited that place, not long before the Peloponnesian war, the inhabitants were united in the most intimate

the morrow the body was stolen away and buried ; by whom, was never certainly known, for there were many different pretenders who obtained reward on this plea from Artyntès the son of Mardonius. The funereal monument was yet to be seen in the time of Pausanias.¹

The spoil was rich and multifarious—gold and silver in Darics as well as in implements and ornaments, carpets, splendid arms and clothing, horses, camels, &c., even the magnificent tent of Xerxes, left on his retreat with Mardonius, was included.² By order of the general Pausanias, the Helots collected all the valuable articles into one spot for division ; not without stealing many of the golden ornaments, which, in ignorance of the value, they were persuaded by the Æginetans to sell as brass. After reserving a tithe for the Delphian Apollo, together with ample offerings for the Olympic Zeus and the Isthmian Poseidon, as well as for Pausanias as general—the remaining booty was distributed among the different contingents of the army in proportion to their respective numbers.³ The concubines of the Persian chiefs were among the prizes distributed : there were probably however among them many of Grecian birth, restored to their families ; and one especially, overtaken in her chariot amidst the flying Persians, with rich jewels and a numerous suite, threw herself at the feet of Pausanias himself, imploring his protection. She proved to be the daughter of his personal friend Hegetoridès of Kos, carried off by the Persian Pharandatès ; and he had the satisfaction of restoring her to her father.⁴ Large as the booty collected was, there yet remained many valuable treasures buried in the

manner with Athens, and doubtless sympathised in the hatred of the Athenians against Ægina. It does not from hence follow that the stories are all untrue. I disbelieve, indeed, the advice said to have been given by Lampôn to crucify the body of Mardonius—which has more the air of a poetical contrivance for bringing out an honourable sentiment, than of a real incident. But there seems no reason to doubt the truth of the other two stories. Herodotus does but too rarely specify his informants : it is interesting to scent out the track in which his inquiries have been prosecuted.

After the battle of Kunaxa, and the death of Cyrus the younger, his dead body had the head and hands cut off, by order of Artaxerxes, and nailed to a cross (Xenoph. Anab. i. 10, 1 ; iii. 1, 17).

¹ Herodot. ix. 84 ; Pausanias, ix. 2, 2.

² Herodot. ix. 80, 81 : compare vii. 41–83.

³ Diodorus (xi. 33) states this proportional distribution. Herodotus only says—ἐλαβον ἕκαστοι τῶν ἄξιαι ἕσαν (ix. 81).

⁴ Herodot. ix. 76, 80, 81, 82. The fate of these female companions of the Persian grandees, on the taking of the camp by an enemy, forms a melancholy picture here as well as at Issus, and even at Kunaxa : see Diodor. xvii. 35 ; Quintus Curtius, iii. xi. 21 ; Xenoph. Anab. i. 10, 2.

ground, which the Plataean inhabitants afterwards discovered and appropriated.

The real victors in the battle of Plataea were the Lacedæmonians, Athenians and Tegeans. The Corinthians and others, forming part of the army opposed to Mardonius, did not reach the field until the battle was ended, though they doubtless aided both in the assault of the fortified camp and in the subsequent operations against Thebes, and were universally recognised, in inscriptions and panegyrics, among the champions who had contributed to the liberation of Greece.¹ It was not till after the taking of the Persian camp that the contingents of Elis and Mantinea, who may perhaps have been among the convoys prevented by the Persian cavalry from descending the passes of Kithæron, first reached the scene of action. Mortified at having missed their share in the glorious exploit, the newcomers were at first eager to set off in pursuit of Artabazus: but the Lacedæmonian commander forbade them, and they returned home without any other consolation than that of banishing their generals for not having led them forth more promptly.²

There yet remained the most efficient ally of Mardonius—the city of Thebes; which Pausanias summoned on the eleventh day after the battle, requiring that the *medising* leaders should be delivered up, especially Timægenidas and Attagînus. On receiving a refusal, he began to batter their walls, and to

¹ Plutarch animadverts severely (De Malign. Herodot. p. 873; compare Plut. Aristeid. c. 19) upon Herodotus, because he states that none of the Greeks had any share in the battle of Plataea except the Lacedæmonians, Tegeans, and Athenians: the orator Lysias repeats the same statement (Oratio Funebr. c. 9). If this were the fact (Plutarch asks) how comes it that the inscriptions and poems of the time recognise the exploit as performed by the whole Grecian army, Corinthians and others included? But these inscriptions do not really contradict what is affirmed by Herodotus. The actual battle was fought only by a part of the collective Grecian army; but this happened in a great measure by accident; the rest were little more than a mile off, and until within a few hours had been occupying part of the same continuous line of position: moreover, if the battle had lasted a little longer, they would have come up in time to render actual help. They would naturally be considered, therefore, as entitled to partake in the glory of the entire result.

When however in after-times a stranger visited Plataea, and saw Lacedæmonian, Tegean, and Athenian tombs, but no Corinthian nor Æginetan, &c., he would naturally enquire how it happened that none of these latter had fallen in the battle, and would then be informed that they were not really present at it. Hence the motive for these cities to erect empty sepulchral monuments on the spot, as Herodotus informs us that they afterwards did or caused to be done by individual Plataeans.

² Herodot. ix. 77.

adopt the still more effective measure of laying waste their territory ; giving notice that the work of destruction would be continued until these chiefs were given up. After twenty days of endurance, the chiefs at length proposed, if it should prove that Pausanias peremptorily required their persons and refused to accept a sum of money in commutation, to surrender themselves voluntarily as the price of liberation for their country. A negotiation was accordingly entered into with Pausanias, and the persons demanded were surrendered to him, excepting Attagînus, who found means to escape at the last moment. His sons, whom he left behind, were delivered up as substitutes, but Pausanias refused to touch them, with the just remark, which in those times was even generous,¹ that they were nowise implicated in the *medism* of their father. Timêgenidas and the remaining prisoners were carried off to Corinth and immediately put to death, without the smallest discussion or form of trial : Pausanias was apprehensive that if any delay or consultation were granted, their wealth and that of their friends would effectually purchase voices for their acquittal,—indeed the prisoners themselves had been induced to give themselves up partly in that expectation.² It is remarkable that Pausanias himself only a few years afterwards, when attained of treason, returned and surrendered himself at Sparta under similar hopes of being able to buy himself off by money.³ In this hope indeed he found himself deceived, as Timêgenidas had been deceived before : but the fact is not the less to be noted as indicating the general impression that the leading men in a Grecian city were usually open to bribes in judicial matters, and that individuals superior to this temptation were rare exceptions. I shall have occasion to dwell upon this recognised untrustworthiness of the leading Greeks when I come to explain the extremely popular cast of the Athenian judicature.

Whether there was any positive vote taken among the Greeks respecting the prize of valour at the battle of Platæa may well

¹ See, a little above in this chapter, the treatment of the wife and children of the Athenian senator Lykidas (Herodot. ix. 5). Compare also Herodot. iii. 116 ; ix. 120.

² Herodot. ix. 87, 88.

³ Thucyd. i. 131. *καὶ πιστεύων χρήμασι διαλύσει τὴν διαβολήν.* Compare Thucyd. viii. 45, where he states that the trierarchs and generals of the Lacedæmonian and allied fleet (all except Hermokratês of Syracuse) received bribes from Tissaphernes to betray the interests both of their seamen and of their country ; also c. 49 of the same book about the Lacedæmonian general Astyochnus. The bribes received by the Spartan kings Leotychnidês and Pleistoanax are recorded (Herodot. vi. 72 ; Thucyd. ii. 21).

be doubted: and the silence of Herodotus goes far to negative an important statement of Plutarch, that the Athenians and Lacedæmonians were on the point of coming to an open rupture, each thinking themselves entitled to the prize—that Aristeidês appeased the Athenians, and prevailed upon them to submit to the general decision of the allies—and that Megarian and Corinthian leaders contrived to elude the dangerous rock by bestowing the prize on the Plateans, to which proposition both Aristeidês and Pausanias acceded.¹ But it seems that the general opinion recognised the Lacedæmonians and Pausanias as bravest among the brave, seeing that they had overcome the best troops of the enemy and slain the general. In burying their dead warriors, the Lacedæmonians singled out for peculiar distinction Philokyon, Poseidonius, and Amompharetus the lochage, whose conduct in the fight atoned for his disobedience to orders. There was one Spartan however who had surpassed them all—Aristodêmus, the single survivor of the troop of Leonidas at Thermopylæ. Having ever since experienced nothing but disgrace and insult from his fellow-citizens, this unfortunate man had become reckless of life, and at Plataea he stepped forth single-handed from his place in the ranks, performing deeds of the most heroic valour and determined to regain by his death the esteem of his countrymen. But the Spartans refused to assign to him the same funereal honours as were paid to the other distinguished warriors, who had manifested exemplary forwardness and skill, yet without any desperate rashness, and without any previous taint such as to render life a burthen to them. Subsequent valour might be held to efface this taint, but could not suffice to exalt Aristodêmus to a level with the most honoured citizens.²

But though we cannot believe the statement of Plutarch that the Plateans received by general vote the prize of valour, it is certain that they were largely honoured and recompensed, as the proprietors of that ground on which the liberation of Greece had been achieved. The market-place and centre of their town was selected as the scene for the solemn sacrifice of thanksgiving, offered up by Pausanias after the battle, to Zeus Eleutherius, in the name and presence of all the assembled allies. The local gods and heroes of the Platean territory, who had been invoked in prayer before the battle, and who had granted their soil as a propitious field for the Greek arms, were

¹ Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 20; De Herodot. Malign. p. 873.

² Herodot. ix. 71, 72.

made partakers of the ceremony, and witnesses as well as guarantees of the engagements with which it was accompanied.¹ The Plataeans, now re-entering their city, which the Persian invasion had compelled them to desert, were invested with the honourable duty of celebrating the periodical sacrifice in commemoration of this great victory, as well as of rendering care and religious service at the tombs of the fallen warriors. As an aid to enable them to discharge this obligation, which probably might have pressed hard upon them at a time when their city was half-ruined and their fields unsown, they received out of the prize-money the large allotment of eighty talents, which was partly employed in building and adorning a handsome temple of Athênê—the symbol probably of renewed connexion with Athens. They undertook to render religious honours every year to the tombs of the warriors, and to celebrate in every fifth year the grand public solemnity of the Eleutheria with gymnastic matches analogous to the other great festival games of Greece.² In consideration of the discharge of these duties, together with the sanctity of the ground, Pausanias and the whole body of allies bound themselves by oath to guarantee the autonomy of Plataea, and the inviolability of her territory. This was an emancipation of the town from the bond of the Bœotian federation, and from the enforcing supremacy of Thebes as its chief.

But the engagement of the allies appears to have had other objects also, larger than that of protecting Plataea, or establishing commemorative ceremonies. The defensive league against the Persians was again sworn to by all of them, and rendered permanent. An aggregate force of 10,000 hoplites, 1000 cavalry, and 100 triremes, for the purpose of carrying on the war, was agreed to and promised, the contingent of each ally being specified. Moreover the town of Plataea was fixed on as the annual place of meeting, where deputies from all of them were annually to assemble.³

¹ Thucyd. ii. 71, 72. So the Roman Emperor Vitellius, on visiting the field of Bebricum where his troops had recently been victorious, “instaurabat sacrum Diis loci” (Tacitus, *Histor.* ii. 70).

² Thucyd. ii. 71; Plutarch, *Aristeidês*, c. 19–21; Strabo., ix. p. 412; Pausanias, ix. 2, 4.

The Eleutheria were celebrated on the fourth of the Attic month Boëdromion, which was the day on which the battle itself was fought; while the annual decoration of the tombs, and ceremonies in honour of the deceased, took place on the sixteenth of the Attic month Mæmaktérion. K. F. Hermann (*Gottesdienstliche Alterthümer der Griechen*, ch. 63, note 9) has treated these two celebrations as if they were one.

³ Plutarch, *Aristeidês*, c. 21.

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This resolution is said to have been adopted on the proposition of Aristeidês, whose motives it is not difficult to trace. Though the Persian army had sustained a signal defeat, no one knew how soon it might re-assemble, or be reinforced. Indeed, even later, after the battle of Mykalê had become known, a fresh invasion of the Persians was still regarded as not improbable;¹ nor did any one then anticipate that extraordinary fortune and activity whereby the Athenians afterwards organised an alliance such as to throw Persia on the defensive. Moreover, the northern half of Greece was still *medising*, either in reality or in appearance, and new efforts on the part of Xerxes might probably keep up his ascendancy in those parts. Now assuming the war to be renewed, Aristeidês and the Athenians had the strongest interest in providing a line of defence which should cover Attica as well as Peloponnesus; and in preventing the Peloponnesians from confining themselves to their Isthmus, as they had done before. To take advantage for this purpose of the new-born reverence and gratitude which now bound the Lacedæmonians to Platæa, was an idea eminently suitable to the moment; though the unforeseen subsequent start of Athens, combined with other events, prevented both the extensive alliance and the inviolability of Platæa, projected by Aristeidês, from taking effect.²

On the same day that Pausanias and the Grecian land army

¹ Thucyd. i. 90.

² It is to this general and solemn meeting, held at Platæa after the victory, that we might probably refer another vow noticed by the historians and orators of the subsequent century, if that vow were not of suspicious authenticity. The Greeks, while promising faithful attachment, and continued peaceful dealing among themselves, and engaging at the same time to amerce in a tithe of their property all who had *medised*—are said to have vowed that they would not repair or rebuild the temples which the Persian invader had burnt; but would leave them in their half-ruined condition as a monument of his sacrilege. Some of the injured temples near Athens were seen in their half-burnt state even by the traveller Pausanias (x. 35, 2), in his time. Periklês, forty years after the battle, tried to convoke a Pan-Hellenic assembly at Athens, for the purpose of deliberating what should be done with these temples (Plutarch, Periklês, c. 17). Yet Theopompus pronounced this alleged oath to be a fabrication, though both the orator Lykurgus and Diodorus profess to report it verbatim. We may safely assert that the oath, *as they give it*, is not genuine; but perhaps the vow of tithing those who had voluntarily joined Xerxes, which Herodotus refers to an earlier period, when success was doubtful, may now have been renewed in the moment of victory: see Diodor. ix. 29; Lykurgus cont. Leokrat. c. 19, p. 193; Polybius, ix. 33; Isokratês, Or. iv.; Panegyry. c. 41, p. 74; Theopompus, Fragn. 167, ed. Didot; Suidas, v. *Δεκατέθειν*, Cicero de Republicâ, iii. 9, and the beginning of the chapter last but one preceding, of this History.

conquered at Platea, the naval armament under Leotychidês and Xanthippus was engaged in operations hardly less important at Mykalê on the Asiatic coast. The Grecian commanders of the fleet (which numbered 110 triremes), having advanced as far as Delos, were afraid to proceed farther eastward, or to undertake any offensive operations against the Persians at Samos, for the rescue of Ionia—although Ionian envoys, especially from Chios and Samos, had urgently solicited aid both at Sparta and at Delos. Three Samians, one of them named Hegesistratus, came to assure Leotychidês, that their countrymen were ready to revolt from the despot Theomêstor, whom the Persians had installed there, so soon as the Greek fleet should appear off the island. In spite of emphatic appeals to the community of religion and race, Leotychidês was long deaf to the entreaty; but his reluctance gradually gave way before the persevering earnestness of the orator. While yet not thoroughly determined, he happened to ask the Samian speaker what was his name. To which the latter replied, "Hegesistratus, *i. e.* army-leader." "I accept Hegesistratus as an omen (replied Leotychidês, struck with the significance of this name), pledge thou thy faith to accompany us—let thy companions prepare the Samians to receive us, and we will go forthwith." Engagements were at once exchanged, and while the other two envoys were sent forward to prepare matters in the island, Hegesistratus remained to conduct the fleet, which was further encouraged by favourable sacrifices, and by the assurances of the prophet Deiphonus, hired from the Corinthian colony of Apollonia.¹

When they reached the Heræum near Kalamî in Samos,² and had prepared themselves for a naval engagement, they

¹ Herodot. ix. 91, 92, 95; viii. 132, 133. The prophet of Mardonius at Platea bore the name—Hegesistratus: and was probably the more highly esteemed for it (Herodot. ix. 37).

Diodorus states the fleet as comprising 250 triremes (xi. 34).

The anecdotes respecting the Apolloniate Euenius, the father of Deiphonus, will be found curious and interesting (Herodot. ix. 93, 94). Euenius, as a recompense for having been unjustly blinded by his countrymen, had received from the gods the grant of prophecy transmissible to his descendants: a new prophetic family was thus created, alongside of the Iamids, Telliads, Klytiads, &c.

² Herodot. ix. 96. *ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐγένοντο τῆς Σαμῆς πρὸς Καλάμοισι, οἱ μὲν αὐτοῦ ὀρμισάμενοι κατὰ τὸ Ἡραῖον τὸ ταύτη, παρεσκευάζοντο ἐς ναυμαχίην.*

It is by no means certain that the Heræum here indicated is the celebrated temple which stood near the city of Samos (iii. 80): the words of Herodotus rather seem to indicate that another temple of Hêrê, in some other part of the island, is intended.

discovered that the enemy's fleet had already been withdrawn from the island to the neighbouring continent. For the Persian commanders had been so disheartened with the defeat of Salamis that they were not disposed to fight again at sea : we do not know the numbers of their fleet, but perhaps a considerable proportion of it may have consisted of Ionic Greeks, whose fidelity was now very doubtful. Having abandoned the idea of a sea-fight, they permitted their Phœnician squadron to depart, and sailed with their remaining fleet to the promontory of Mykalê near Miletus.¹ Here they were under the protection of a land-force of 60,000 men, under the command of Tigranês—the main reliance of Xerxes for the defence of Ionia. The ships were dragged ashore, and a rampart of stones and stakes was erected to protect them, while the defending army lined the shore, and seemed amply sufficient to repel attack from seaward.²

It was not long before the Greek fleet arrived. Disappointed of their intention of fighting, by the flight of the enemy from Samos, they had at first proposed either to return home, or to turn aside to the Hellespont : but they were at last persuaded by the Ionian envoys to pursue the enemy's fleet and again offer battle at Mykalê. On reaching that point, they discovered that the Persians had abandoned the sea, intending to fight only on land. So much had the Greeks now become emboldened, that they ventured to disembark and attack the united land-force and sea-force before them. But since much of their chance of success depended on the desertion of the Ionians, the first proceeding of Leotychidês was, to copy the previous manœuvre of Themistoklês, when retreating from Artemisium, at the watering-places of Eubœa. Sailing along close to the coast, he addressed, through a herald of loud voice, earnest appeals to the Ionians among the enemy to revolt ; calculating, even if they did not listen to him, that he should at least render them mistrusted by the Persians. He

¹ Herodotus describes the Persian position by topographical indications known to his readers, but not open to be determined by us—Gæson, Skolopœis, the chapel of Dêmêtêr, built by Philistus one of the primitive colonists of Miletus, &c. (ix. 96) : from the language of Herodotus, we may suppose that Gæson was the name of a town as well as of a river (Ephorus ap. Athenæ. vi. p. 311).

The eastern promontory (Cape Poseidion) of Samos was separated only by seven stadia from Mykalê (Strabo, xiv. p. 637), near to the place where Glaukê was situated (Thucyd. viii. 79)—modern observers make the distance rather more than a mile (Poppo. Prolegg. ad Thucyd. vol. ii. p. 465).

² Herodot. ix. 96, 97.

then disembarked his troops, and marshalled them for the purpose of attacking the Persian camp on land: while the Persian generals, surprised by this daring manifestation, and suspecting, either from his manœuvre, or from previous evidences, that the Ionians were in secret collusion with him, ordered the Samian contingent to be disarmed, and the Milesians to retire to the rear of the army, for the purpose of occupying the various mountain roads up to the summit of Mykalê—with which the latter were familiar as a part of their own territory.¹

Serving as these Greeks in the fleet were, at a distance from their own homes, and having left a powerful army of Persians and Greeks under Mardonius in Bœotia, they were of course full of anxiety lest his arms might prove victorious and extinguish the freedom of their country. It was under these feelings of solicitude for their absent brethren that they disembarked, and were made ready for attack by the afternoon. But it was the afternoon of an ever-memorable day—the fourth of the month Boëdromion (about September) 479 B.C. By a remarkable coincidence, the victory of Plataea in Bœotia had been gained by Pausanias that very morning. At that moment when the Greeks were advancing to the charge, divine Phēmê or message flew into the camp. Whilst a herald's staff was seen floated to the shore by the western wave, the symbol of electric transmission across the Ægean—the revelation, sudden, simultaneous, irresistible, struck at once upon the minds of all, as if the multitude had one common soul and sense, acquainting them that on that very morning their countrymen in Bœotia had gained a complete victory over Mardonius. At once the previous anxiety was dissipated, and the whole army, full of joy and confidence, charged with redoubled energy. Such is the account given by Herodotus,² and doubtless universally accepted in his time,

¹ Herodot. ix. 98, 99, 104.

² Herodot. ix. 100, 101. *ἰοῦσι δὲ σφι ("Ελλησι) φήμη τε ἐσέπτατο ἐς τὸ στρατόπεδον πᾶν, καὶ κηρυκίον ἐφάνη ἐπὶ τῆς κυματωγῆς κείμενον· ἡ δὲ φήμη διήλθε σφι ὧδε, ὡς οἱ Ἕλληνες τὴν Μαρδονίου στρατὴν νικῶν ἐν Βοιωτοῖσι μαχόμενοι. Δῆλα δὴ πολλοῖσι τεκμηρίοις ἐστὶ τὰ θεῖα τῶν πρηγμάτων, εἰ καὶ τότε τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμέρης συμπιπτούσης τοῦ τε ἐν Πλαταιῆσι καὶ τοῦ ἐν Μυκάλῃ μέλλοντος ἔσσεσθαι τράματος, φήμη τοῖσι Ἕλλησι τοῖσι ταύτῃ ἐσαπίκετο, ὥστε θαρσῆσαι τε τὴν στρατὴν πολλὰ μᾶλλον, καὶ ἐθέλειν προθυμότερον κινδυνεύειν . . . γεγρονέαι δὲ νίκην τῶν μετὰ Πausανίῳ Ἑλλήνων ὀρθῶς σφι ἡ φήμη συνέβαινε ἔλθοῦσα: τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐν Πλαταιῆσι πρῶτ' ἔτι τῆς ἡμέρης ἐγένετο: τὸ δὲ ἐν Μυκάλῃ, περὶ δεῖλῃν . . . ἦν δὲ ἀρρωδίη σφι πρὶν τὴν φήμην ἐσαπίκεσθαι, οὐτὶ περὶ σφέων αὐτέων οὕτω, ὡς τῶν Ἑλλήνων, μὴ περὶ Μαρδονίῳ πταίσῃ ἢ Ἑλλάδι: ὡς μέντοι*

when the combatants of Mykalé were alive to tell their own story. He moreover mentions another of those coincidences

ἡ κληδὼν αὐτῆ σφι ἐσέπτατο, μᾶλλον τι καὶ ταχύτερον τὴν πρόσδοον ἐποιεῦντο : compare Plutarch, Paul. Emilius, c. 24, 25, about the battle of Pydna.—The *φήμη* which circulated through the assembled army of Mardonius in Bœotia, respecting his intention to kill the Phokians, turned out incorrect (Herodot. ix. 17).

Two passages in Æschines (cont. Timarchum, c. 27, p. 57, and De Fals. Legat. c. 45, p. 290) are peculiarly valuable as illustrating the ancient idea of *Φήμη*—a divine voice or vocal goddess, generally considered as informing a crowd of persons at once, or moving them all by one and the same unanimous feeling—the *Vox Dei* passing into the *Vox Populi*. There was an altar to *Φήμη* at Athens (Pausan. i. 17, 1) ; compare Hesiod. Opp. Di. 761, and the *Ἔσσα* of Homer, which is essentially the same idea as *Φήμη* : Iliad, ii. 93. μετὰ δὲ σφισιν Ἔσσα δεδέηι Ὀτρύνουσα Ἰέναι, Διὸς ἄγγελος ; also Odyssey, i. 282—opposed to the idea of a distinct human speaker or informant—ἦν τίς τοι εἶπῃσι βροτῶν, ἢ Ἔσσαν ἀκούσης Ἐκ Διὸς, ἥτε μάλιστα φέροι κλέος ἀνθρώποισι ; and Odysse. xxiv. 412. Ἔσσα δ' ἔρ' ἄγγελος ἄκα κατὰ πτόλιν ἔχετο πάντη, Μνηστήρων στυγερὸν θάνατον καὶ κῆρ' ἐνέπουσα. The word κληδὼν is used in the same meaning by Sophoklès, Philoktet. 255 : Κληδὼν at Smyrna had altars as a goddess, Aristeidès, Orat. xl. p. 507, ed. Dindorf, p. 754 (see Andokidès de Mysteriis, c. 22, p. 64) : Herodotus in the passage now before us considers the two as identical—compare also Herodot. v. 72. Both words are used also to signify an omen conveyed by some undesigned human word or speech, which in that particular case is considered as determined by the special intervention of the gods, for the information of some person who hears it : see Homer, Odysse. xx. 100 : compare also Aristophan. Aves, 719 ; Sophoklès, Œdip. Tyr. 43-472 ; Xenophan, Symposion, c. 14, s. 48.

The descriptions of *Fama* by Virgil, Æneid. iv. 176 seq., and Ovid, Metamorph. xii. 40 seq., are more diffuse and overcharged, departing from the simplicity of the Greek conception.

We may notice, as partial illustrations of what is here intended, those sudden, unaccountable impressions of panic terror which occasionally ran through the ancient armies or assembled multitudes, and which were supposed to be produced by Pan or by Nymphs—indeed sudden, violent and contagious impressions of every kind, not merely of fear. Livy, x. 28. "Victorem equitatum velut *lymphaticus* pavor dissipat." ix. 27. "Milites, incertum ob quam causam, *lymphatis* similes ad arma discurrunt"—in Greek *νυμφόληπτοι* : compare Polyæn. iv. 3, 26, and an instructive note of Müttel, ad Quint. Curt. iv. 46, 1 (iv. 12, 14).

But I cannot better illustrate that idea which the Greeks invested with divinity under the name of *Φήμη* than by transcribing a striking passage from M. Michelet's *Histoire de la Révolution Française*. The illustration is the more instructive, because the religious point of view, which in Herodotus is predominant,—and which, to the believing mind, furnishes an explanation pre-eminently satisfactory—has passed away in the historian of the nineteenth century, and gives place to a graphic description of the real phenomenon, of high importance in human affairs ; the common susceptibilities, common inspiration, and common spontaneous impulse, of a multitude, effacing for the time each man's separate individuality.

M. Michelet is about to describe that ever-memorable event—the capture of the Bastile, on the 14th of July, 1789 (ch. vii. vol. i. p. 105).

which the Greek mind always seized upon with so much avidity: there was a chapel of the Eleusinian Dêmêtêr close to the field of battle at Mykalê, as well as at Plataea. Diodorus and other later writers,¹ who wrote when the impressions of the time had vanished, and when divine interventions were less easily and literally admitted, treat the whole proceeding

“Versailles, avec un gouvernement organisé, un roi, des ministres, un général, une armée, n'étoit qu'hésitation, doute, incertitude, dans la plus complète anarchie morale.

“Paris, bouleversé, délaissé de toute autorité légale, dans un désordre apparent, atteignit, le 14 Juillet, ce qui moralement est l'ordre le plus profond, l'unanimité des esprits.

“Le 13 Juillet, Paris ne songeait qu'à se défendre. Le 14, il attaqua.

“Le 13, au soir, il y avoit encore des doutes, il n'y en eut plus le matin. Le soir étoit plein de troubles, de fureur désordonnée. Le matin fut lumineux et d'une sérénité terrible.

“*Une îde se leva sur Paris avec le jour, et tous virent la même lumière. Une lumière dans les esprits, et dans chaque cœur une voix: Va, et tu prendras la Bastille!*

“Cela étoit impossible, insensé, étrange à dire; . . . Et tous le crurent néanmoins. Et cela se fit.

“La Bastille, pour être une vieille forteresse, n'en étoit pas moins imprenable, à moins d'y mettre plusieurs jours, et beaucoup d'artillerie. Le peuple n'avoit en cette crise ni le temps ni les moyens de faire un siège régulier. L'eût-il fait, la Bastille n'avoit pas à craindre, ayant assez de vivres pour attendre un secours si proche, et d'immenses munitions de guerre. Ses murs de dix pieds d'épaisseur au sommet des tours, de trente et quarante à la base, pouvaient rire longtemps des boulets: et ses batteries, à elle, dont le feu plongeoit sur Paris, auroient pu en attendant démolir tout le Marais, tout le Faubourg St. Antoine.

“L'attaque de la Bastille ne fut un acte nullement raisonnable. Ce fut un acte de foi.

“*Personne ne proposa. Mais tous crurent et tous agirent.* Le long des rues, des quais, des ponts, des boulevards, la foule criait à la foule—À la Bastille—à la Bastille. Et dans le tocsin qui sonnoit, tous entendoient: À la Bastille.

“*Personne, je le répète, ne donna l'impulsion.* Les parleurs du Palais Royal passèrent le temps à dresser une liste de proscription, à juger à mort la Reine, la Polignac, Artois, le prévôt Flesselles, d'autres encore. Les noms des vainqueurs de la Bastille n'offrent pas un seul des faiseurs de motions. Le Palais Royal ne fut pas le point de départ, et ce n'est pas non plus au Palais Royal que les vainqueurs ramènèrent les depouillés et les prisonniers.

“Encore moins les électeurs qui siégeaient à l'Hotel de Ville eurent-ils l'idée de l'attaque. Loin de là, pour l'empêcher, pour prévenir le carnage que la Bastille pouvoit faire si aisément, ils allèrent jusqu'à promettre au gouverneur, que s'il retirait ses canons, on ne l'attaqueroit pas. Les électeurs ne trahissoient pas comme ils en furent accusés; mais ils n'avoient pas la foi.

“Qui l'eut? Celui qui eut aussi le dévouement, la force, pour accomplir sa foi. Qui? Le peuple, tout le monde.”

¹ Diodor. xi. 35; Polyæn. i. 33. Justin (ii. 14) is astonished in relating “tantam famæ velocitatem.”

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as if it were a report designedly circulated by the generals, for the purpose of encouraging their army.

The Lacedæmonians on the right wing, and the portion of the army near them, had a difficult path before them, over hilly ground and ravine; while the Athenians, Corinthians, Sikyonians and Træzenians, and the left half of the army, marching only along the beach, came much sooner into conflict with the enemy. The Persians, as at Plataæ, employed their *gerrha*, or wicker bucklers planted by spikes in the ground, as a breast-work, from behind which they discharged their arrows; and they made a strenuous resistance to prevent this defence from being overthrown. Ultimately, the Greeks succeeded in demolishing it; driving the enemy into the interior of the fortification, where they in vain tried to maintain themselves against the ardour of their pursuers, who forced their way into it almost along with the defenders. Even when this last rampart was carried, and when the Persian allies had fled, the native Persians still continued to prolong the struggle with undiminished bravery. Unpractised in line and drill, and acting only in small knots,¹ with disadvantages of armour such as had been felt severely at Plataæ, they still maintained an unequal conflict with the Greek hoplites; nor was it until the Lacedæmonians with their half of the army arrived to join in the attack, that the defence was abandoned as hopeless. The revolt of the Ionians in the camp put the finishing stroke to this ruinous defeat. First, the disarmed Samians—next, other Ionians and Æolians—lastly, the Milesians who had been posted to guard the passes in the rear—not only deserted, but took an active part in the attack. The Milesians especially, to whom the Persians had trusted for guidance up to the summits of Mykalê, led them by wrong roads, threw them into the hands of their pursuers, and at last set upon them with their own hands. A large number of the native Persians, together with both the generals of the land-force, Tigranês and Mardontês, perished in this disastrous battle: the two Persian admirals, Artayntês and Ithamithrês, escaped, but the army was irretrievably dispersed, while all the ships which had been dragged up on the shore fell into the hands of the assailants, and were burnt. But the victory of the Greeks was by no means bloodless. Among the left wing, upon which the brunt of the action had fallen, a considerable number of men were slain, especially

¹ Herodot. ix. 102. Οὔτοι δὲ (Πέρσαι), κατ' ὀλίγους γινόμενοι, ἐμάχοντο τοῖσι αἰεὶ ἐς τὸ τεῖχος ἐσπίπτουσι Ἑλλήνων.

Sikyonians, with their commander Perilaus.¹ The honours of the battle were awarded, first to the Athenians, next to the Corinthians, Sikyonians, and Trœzenians; the Lacedæmonians having done comparatively little. Hermolykus the Athenian, a celebrated pankratiast, was the warrior most distinguished for individual feats of arms.²

The dispersed Persian army, so much of it at least as had at first found protection on the heights of Mykalê, was withdrawn from the coast forthwith to Sardis under the command of Artayntês, whom Masistês, the brother of Xerxes, bitterly reproached on the score of cowardice in the recent defeat. The general was at length so maddened by a repetition of these insults, that he drew his scimitar and would have slain Masistês, had he not been prevented by a Greek of Halikarnassus named Xenagoras,³ who was rewarded by Xerxes with the government of Kilikia. Xerxes was still at Sardis, where he had remained ever since his return, and where he conceived a passion for the wife of his brother Masistês. The consequences of his passion entailed upon that unfortunate woman sufferings too tragical to be described, by the orders of his own queen, the jealous and savage Amêstris.⁴ But he had no fresh army ready to send down to the coast; so that the Greek cities, even on the continent, were for the time practically liberated from Persian supremacy, while the insular Greeks were in a position of still greater safety.

The commanders of the victorious Grecian fleet, having full confidence in their power of defending the islands, willingly admitted the Chians, Samians, Lesbians, and the other islanders hitherto subjects of Persia, to the protection and reciprocal engagements of their alliance. We may presume that the despots Stratitis and Theomêstor were expelled from Chios and Samos.⁵ But the Peloponnesian commanders hesitated in guaranteeing the same secure autonomy to the continental cities, which could not be upheld against the great inland

¹ Herodot. ix. 104, 105. Diodorus (xi. 36) seems to follow different authorities from Herodotus: his statement varies in many particulars, but is less probable.

Herodotus does not specify the loss on either side, nor Diodorus that of the Greeks; but the latter says that 40,000 Persians and allies were slain.

² Herodot. ix. 105.

³ Herodot. ix. 107. I do not know whether we may suppose Herodotus to have heard this from his fellow-citizen Xenagoras.

⁴ Herodot. ix. 108-113. He gives the story at considerable length; it illustrates forcibly and painfully the interior of the Persian regal palace.

⁵ Herodot. viii. 132.

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power without efforts incessant as well as exhausting. Nevertheless, not enduring to abandon these continental Ionians to the mercy of Xerxes, they made the offer to transplant them into European Greece, and to make room for them by expelling the *medising* Greeks from their sea-port towns. But this proposition was at once repudiated by the Athenians, who would not permit that colonies originally planted by themselves should be abandoned, thus impairing the metropolitan dignity of Athens.¹ The Lacedæmonians readily acquiesced in this objection, and were glad, in all probability, to find honourable grounds for renouncing a scheme of wholesale dispossession eminently difficult to execute²—yet at the same time to be absolved from onerous obligations towards the Ionians, and to throw upon Athens either the burden of defending or the shame of abandoning them. The first step was thus taken, which we shall quickly see followed by others, for giving to Athens a separate ascendancy and separate duties in regard to the Asiatic Greeks, and for introducing first, the confederacy of Delos—next, Athenian maritime empire.

From the coast of Ionia the Greek fleet sailed northward to the Hellespont, chiefly at the instance of the Athenians, and for the purpose of breaking down the Xerxeian bridge. For so imperfect was their information, that they believed this bridge to be still firm and in passable condition in September 479 B.C., though it had been broken and useless at the time when Xerxes crossed the strait in his retreat, ten months before (about November 480 B.C.).³ Having ascertained on their arrival at Abydos the destruction of the bridge, Leotychildēs and the Peloponnesians returned home forthwith; but Xanthippus with the Athenian squadron resolved to remain and expel the Persians from the Thracian Chersonese. This peninsula had been in great part an Athenian possession, for the space of more than forty years, from the first settlement of the elder

¹ Herodot. ix. 106; Diodor. xi. 37. The latter represents the Ionians and Æolians as having actually consented to remove into European Greece, and indeed the Athenians themselves as having at first consented to it, though the latter afterwards repented and opposed the scheme.

² Such wholesale transportations of population from one continent to another have always been more or less in the habits of Oriental despots, the Persians in ancient times and the Turks in more modern times: to a conjunction of free states like the Greeks they must have been impracticable.

See Von Hammer, *Geschichte des Osmannischen Reichs*, vol. i. book vi. p. 251, for the forced migrations of people from Asia into Europe directed by the Turkish Sultan Bajazet (A.D. 1390–1400).

³ Herodot. viii. 115, 117; ix. 106, 114.

Miltiadês¹ down to the suppression of the Ionic revolt, although during part of that time tributary to Persia. From the flight of the second Miltiadês to the expulsion of Xerxes from Greece (493-480 B.C.), a period during which the Persian monarch was irresistible and full of hatred to Athens, no Athenian citizen would find it safe to live there. But the Athenian squadron from Mykalê were now naturally eager both to re-establish the ascendancy of Athens, and to regain the properties of Athenian citizens in the Chersonese. Probably many of the leading men, especially Kimon son of Miltiadês, had extensive possessions there to recover, as Alkibiadês had in after days, with private forts of his own.² To this motive for attacking the Chersonese may be added another—the importance of its corn-produce, as well as of a clear passage through the Hellespont for the corn ships out of the Propontis to Athens and Ægina.³ Such were the reasons which induced Xanthippus and the leading Athenians, even without the co-operation of the Peloponnesians, to undertake the siege of Sestus—the strongest place in the peninsula, the key of the strait, and the centre in which all the neighbouring Persian garrisons, from Kardia and elsewhere, had got together under Ceobazus and Artayktês.⁴

The Grecian inhabitants of the Chersonese readily joined the Athenians in expelling the Persians, who, taken altogether by surprise, had been constrained to throw themselves into Sestus without stores of provisions or means of making a long defence. But of all the Chersonesites the most forward and exasperated were the inhabitants of Elæus—the southernmost town of the peninsula, celebrated for its tomb, temple, and sacred grove of the hero Protesilaus, who figured in the Trojan legend as the foremost warrior in the host of Agamemnon to leap ashore, and as the first victim to the spear of Hektor. The temple of Protesilaus, conspicuously placed on the sea-shore,⁵ was a scene of worship and pilgrimage not merely for the inhabitants of Elæus, but also for the neighbouring Greeks generally, inasmuch that it had been enriched with ample votive offerings and probably deposits for security—money, gold and silver saucers,

¹ See the preceding volume of this History, ch. xxx., ch. xxxiv., and ch. xxxv. of this volume.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i. 5, 17. τὰ ἑαυτοῦ τείχη.

³ Herodot. vii. 147. Schol. ad Aristophan. Equites, 262.

In illustration of the value set by Athens upon the command of the Hellespont, see Demosthenês, De Fals. Legat. c. 59.

⁴ Herodot. ix. 114, 115. Σηστὸν—φρούριον καὶ φυλακὴν τοῦ παντὸς Ἑλλησπόντου—Thucyd. viii. 62: compare Xenophon, Hellenic. ii. i. 25.

⁵ Thucyd. viii. 102.

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brazen implements, robes, and various other presents. The story ran that when Xerxes was on his march across the Hellespont into Greece, Artayktês, greedy of all this wealth, and aware that the monarch would not knowingly permit the sanctuary to be despoiled, preferred a wily request to him—“Master, here is the house of a Greek, who in invading thy territory, met his just reward and perished: I pray thee give his house to me, in order that people may learn for the future not to invade *thy* land”—the whole soil of Asia being regarded by the Persian monarchs as their rightful possession, and Protesilaus having been in this sense an aggressor against them. Xerxes, interpreting the request literally, and not troubling himself to ask who the invader was, consented: upon which, Artayktês, while the army were engaged in their forward march into Greece, stripped the sacred grove of Protesilaus, carrying all the treasures to Sestus. He was not content without still further outraging Grecian sentiment: he turned cattle into the grove, ploughed and sowed it, and was even said to have profaned the sanctuary by visiting it with his concubines.¹ Such proceedings were more than enough to raise the strongest antipathy against him among the Chersonesite Greeks, who now crowded to reinforce the Athenians and blocked him up in Sestus. After a certain length of siege, the stock of provisions in the town failed, and famine began to make itself felt among the garrison; which nevertheless still held out, by painful shifts and endurance, until a late period in the autumn, when the patience even of the Athenian besiegers was well nigh exhausted. It was with difficulty that the leaders repressed the clamorous desire manifested in their own camp to return to Athens.

Impatience having been appeased, and the seamen kept together, the siege was pressed without relaxation, and presently the privations of the garrison became intolerable; so that Artayktês and Œobazus were at last reduced to the necessity of escaping by stealth, letting themselves down with a few followers from the wall at a point where it was imperfectly blockaded. Œobazus found his way into Thrace, where however he was taken captive by the Absinthian natives and offered up as a sacrifice to their god Pleistôrus: Artayktês fled northward along the shores of the Hellespont, but was pursued by the Greeks, and made prisoner near Ægospotami, after a strenuous resistance. He was brought with his son in chains to

¹ Herodot. ix. 116: compare i. 4. Ἄρταυκτῆς, ἀνὴρ Πέρσης, δεινὸς δὲ καὶ ἀτάσθαλος· ὃς καὶ βασιλῆα ἐλαύνοντα ἐπ' Ἀθήνας ἐξηπάτησε, τὰ Πρωτεσίλειω τοῦ Ἰφίκλου χρήματα ἐξ Ἑλαιούντος ὑφελόμενος. Compare Herodot. ii. 64.

Sestus, which immediately after his departure had been cheerfully surrendered by its inhabitants to the Athenians. It was in vain that he offered a sum of 100 talents as compensation to the treasury of Protesilaus, and a further sum of 200 talents to the Athenians as personal ransom for himself and his son. So deep was the wrath inspired by his insults to the sacred ground, that both the Athenian commander Xanthippus, and the citizens of Elæus, disdained everything less than a severe and even cruel personal atonement for the outraged Protesilaus. Artayktês, after having first seen his son stoned to death before his eyes, was hung up to a lofty board fixed for the purpose, and left to perish, on the spot where the Xerxeian bridge had been fixed.¹ There is something in this proceeding more Oriental than Grecian: it is not in the Grecian character to aggravate death by artificial and lingering preliminaries.

After the capture of Sestus the Athenian fleets returned home with their plunder, towards the commencement of winter, not omitting to carry with them the vast cables of the Xerxeian bridge, which had been taken in the town, as a trophy to adorn the acropolis of Athens.²

¹ Herodot. ix. 118, 119, 120. Οἱ γὰρ Ἐλαιούσιοι τῷ Πρωτεσίλεω τιμωρόντες ἔδοντό μιν καταχρησθήναι, καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ ταύτην ὁ νόσος ἔφερε.

² Herodot. ix. 121. It must be either to the joint Grecian armament of this year, or to that of the former year, that Plutarch must attend his celebrated story respecting the proposition advanced by Themistoklês and condemned by Aristeidês, to apply (Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. 20; Aristeidês, c. 22). He tells us that the Greek fleet was all assembled to pass the winter in the Thessalian harbour of Pagasæ, when Themistoklês formed the project of burning all the other Grecian ships except the Athenian, in order that no city except Athens might have a naval force. Themistoklês (he tells us) intimated to the people, that he had a proposition, very advantageous to the state, to communicate; but that it could not be publicly proclaimed and discussed: upon which they desired him to mention it privately to Aristeidês. Themistoklês did so; and Aristeidês told the people that the project was at once eminently advantageous and not less eminently unjust. Upon which the people renounced it forthwith, without asking what it was.

Considering the great celebrity which this story has obtained, some allusion to it was necessary, though it has long ceased to be received as matter of history. It is quite inconsistent with the narrative of Herodotus, as well as with all the conditions of the time: Pagasæ was *Thessalian*, and as such, hostile to the Greek fleet rather than otherwise: the fleet seems to have never been there: moreover we may add, that taking matters as they then stood, when the fear from Persia was not at all terminated, the Athenians would have lost more than they gained by burning the ships of the other Greeks, so that Themistoklês was not very likely to conceive the scheme, nor Aristeidês to describe it in the language put into his mouth.

The story is probably the invention of some Greek of the Platonic age, who wished to contrast justice with expediency and Aristeidês with The-

CHAPTER XLIII

EVENTS IN SICILY DOWN TO THE EXPULSION OF THE GELONIAN
DYNASTY AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF POPULAR GOVERN-
MENTS THROUGHOUT THE ISLAND

I HAVE already mentioned, in a preceding volume of this History, the foundation of the Greek colonies in Italy and Sicily, together with the general fact, that in the sixth century before the Christian æra, they were among the most powerful and flourishing cities that bore the Hellenic name. Beyond this general fact, we obtain little insight into their history.

Though Syracuse, after it fell into the hands of Gelo, about 485 B.C., became the most powerful city in Sicily, yet in the preceding century Gela and Agrigentum, on the south side of the island, had been its superiors. The latter, within a few years of its foundation, fell under the dominion of one of its own citizens named Phalaris ; a despot energetic, warlike, and cruel. An exile from Astypalæa near Rhodes, but a rich man, and an early settler at Agrigentum, he contrived to make himself despot seemingly about the year 570 B.C. He had been named to one of the chief posts in the city, and having undertaken at his own cost the erection of a temple to Zeus Polieus in the acropolis (as the Athenian Alkmæônids rebuilt the burnt temple of Delphi), he was allowed on this pretence to assemble therein a considerable number of men ; whom he armed, and availed himself of the opportunity of a festival of Dêmêtêr to turn them against the people. He is said to have made many conquests over the petty Sikan communities in the neighbourhood : but exaction and cruelties towards his own subjects are noticed as his most prominent characteristic, and his brazen bull passed into imperishable memory. This piece of mechanism was hollow, and sufficiently capacious to contain one or more victims enclosed within it, to perish in tortures when the metal was heated : the cries of these suffering prisoners passed for the roarings of the animal. The artist was named Perillus, and is said to have been himself the first person burnt in it by order of the despot. In spite of the odium thus incurred, Phalaris maintained himself as despot for sixteen years ; at the end of which period, a general rising of the people, headed by a leading man named mistoklês—as well as to bestow at the same time panegyric upon Athens in the days of her glory.

Telemachus, terminated both his reign and his life.¹ Whether Telemachus became despot or not, we have no information: sixty years afterwards, we shall find his descendant Théro established in that position.

It was about the period of the death of Phalaris that the Syracusians reconquered their revolted colony of Kamarina (in the south-east of the island between Syracuse and Gela), expelled or dispossessed the inhabitants, and resumed the territory.² With the exception of this accidental circumstance, we are without information about the Sicilian cities until a time rather before 500 B.C., just when the war between Kroton and Sybaris had extinguished the power of the latter, and when the despotism of the Peisistratids at Athens had been exchanged for the democratical constitution of Kleisthenês.

The first forms of government among the Sicilian Greeks, as among the cities of Greece. Proper in the early historical age, appear to have been all oligarchical. We do not know under what particular modifications they were kept up, but probably all more or less resembled that of Syracuse, where the Gamori (or wealthy proprietors descended from the original colonising chiefs), possessing large landed properties tilled by a numerous Sikel serf population called *Kyllyrii*, formed the qualified citizens—out of whom, as well as by whom, magistrates and generals were chosen; while the Demos, or non-privileged freemen, comprised, first, the small proprietary cultivators who maintained themselves, by manual labour and without slaves, from their own lands or gardens—next, the artisans and tradesmen.

¹ Everything which has ever been said about Phalaris is noticed and discussed in the learned and acute Dissertation of Bentley on the Letters of Phalaris: compare also Seyffert, *Akragas und sein Gebiet*, p. 57–61, who however treats the pretended letters of Phalaris with more consideration than the readers of Dr. Bentley will generally be disposed to sanction.

The story of the brazen bull of Phalaris seems to rest on sufficient evidence: it is expressly mentioned by Pindar, and the bull itself, after having been carried away to Carthage when the Carthaginians took Agrigentum, was restored to the Agrigentines by Scipio when he took Carthage. See Aristot. *Polit.* v. 8, 4; Pindar, *Pyth.* i. 185; P. *Jyb.* xii. 25; Diodor. xiii. 90; Cicero in *Verr.* iv. 33.

It does not appear that Timæus really called in question the historical reality of the bull of Phalaris, though he has been erroneously supposed to have done so. Timæus affirmed that the bull which was shown in his own time at Agrigentum was not the identical machine: which was correct, for it must have been *then* at Carthage, from whence it was not restored to Agrigentum until after 146 B.C. See a note of Boeckh on the Scholia ad Pindar. *Pyth.* i. 185.

² Thucyd. vi. 5; Schol. ad Pindar. *Olymp.* v. 19: compare Wesseling ad Diodor. xi. 76.

In the course of two or three generations, many individuals of the privileged class would have fallen into poverty, and would find themselves more nearly on a par with the non-privileged ; while such members of the latter as might rise to opulence were not for that reason admitted into the privileged body. Here were ample materials for discontent. Ambitious leaders, often themselves members of the privileged body, put themselves at the head of the popular opposition, overthrew the oligarchy, and made themselves despots ; democracy being at that time hardly known anywhere in Greece. The general fact of this change, preceded by occasional violent dissensions among the privileged class themselves,¹ is all that we are permitted to know, without those modifying circumstances by which it must have been accompanied in every separate city. Towards or near the year 500 B.C., we find Anaxilaus despot at Rhegium, Skythês at Zanklê, Têrillus at Himera, Peithagoras at Selinus, Kleander at Gela, and Panætius at Leontini.² It was about the year 509 B.C. that the Spartan prince Dorieus conducted a body of emigrants to the territories of Eryx and Eggesta, near the north-western corner of the island, in hopes of expelling the non-Hellenic inhabitants and founding a new Grecian colony. But the Carthaginians, whose Sicilian possessions were close adjoining and who had already aided in driving Dorieus from a previous establishment at Kinyps in Libya,—now lent such vigorous assistance to the Eggestæan inhabitants, that the Spartan prince, after a short period of prosperity, was defeated and slain with most of his companions. Such of them as escaped, under the orders of Euryleon, took possession of Minoa, which bore from henceforward the name of Herakleia³—a colony and dependency of the neighbouring town of Selinus, of which Peithagoras was then despot. Euryleon joined the malcontents at Selinus, overthrew Peithagoras, and established himself as despot, until, after a short possession of power, he was slain in a popular mutiny.⁴

¹ At Gela, Herodot. vii. 153 ; at Syracuse, Aristot. Politic. v. 3, 1.

² Aristot. Politic. v. 8, 4 ; v. 10, 4. *Καὶ εἰς τυραννίδα μεταβάλλει ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας, ὥσπερ ἐν Σικελίᾳ σχεδὸν αἱ πλείους τῶν ἀρχαίων ἐν Λεοντίνοις εἰς τὴν Παναιτίου τυραννίδα, καὶ ἐν Γέλα εἰς τὴν Κλεάνδρου, καὶ ἐν Ἑλλάσι πολλαῖς πόλεσιν ὡσαύτως.*

³ Diodorus ascribes the foundation of Herakleia to Dorieus : this seems not consistent with the account of Herodotus, unless we are to assume that the town of Herakleia which Dorieus founded was destroyed by the Carthaginians, and that the name Herakleia was afterwards given by Euryleon or his successors to that which had before been called Minoa (Diodor. iv. 23).

A funeral monument in honour of Athenæus, one of the settlers who perished with Dorieus, was seen by Pausanias at Sparta (Pausanias, iii. 16, 4).

⁴ Herodot. v. 43, 46.

We are here introduced to the first known instance of that series of contests between the Phœnicians and Greeks in Sicily, which, like the struggles between the Saracens and the Normans in the eleventh and twelfth centuries after the Christian æra, were destined to determine whether the island should be a part of Africa or a part of Europe—and which were only terminated, after the lapse of three centuries, by the absorption of both into the vast bosom of Rome. It seems that the Carthaginians and Egestæans not only overwhelmed Dorieus, but also made some conquests of the neighbouring Grecian possessions, which were subsequently recovered by Gelo of Syracuse.¹

Not long after the death of Dorieus, Kleander despot of Gela began to raise his city to ascendancy over the other Sicilian Greeks, who had hitherto been, if not all equal, at least all independent. His powerful mercenary force, levied in part among the Sikel tribes,² did not preserve him from the sword of a Geloan citizen named Sabyllus, who slew him after a reign of seven years: but it enabled his brother and successor Hippokratês to extend his dominion over nearly half of the island. In that mercenary force two officers, Gelo and Ænesidêmus (the latter a citizen of Agrigentum, of the conspicuous family of the Emmenidæ, and descended from Telemachus the deposer of Phalaris), particularly distinguished themselves. Gelo was descended from a native of Têlos near the Triopian Cape, one of the original settlers who accompanied the Rhodian Antiphêmus to Sicily. His immediate ancestor, named Têlinês, had first raised the family to distinction by valuable aid to a defeated political party, who had been worsted in a struggle and forced to seek shelter in the neighbouring town of Maktorium. Têlinês was possessed of certain peculiar sacred rites (or visible and portable holy symbols, with a privileged knowledge of the ceremonial acts and formalities of divine service under which they were to be shown) for propitiating the Subterranean Goddesses, *Dêmêtêr* and *Persephonê*: “from whom he obtained them, or how he got at them himself (says Herodotus), I cannot say;” but such was the imposing effect of his presence and manner of exhibiting them, that he ventured to march into Gela at the head of the exiles from Maktorium, and was enabled to reinstate them in power—detering the people from resistance in the same manner as the Athenians had been overawed by the spectacle of *Phyê-Athênê* in the

¹ Herodot. vii. 158. The extreme brevity of his allusion is perplexing, as we have no collateral knowledge to illustrate it.

² Polyænus, v. 6.

chariot along with Peisistratus. The extraordinary boldness of this proceeding excites the admiration of Herodotus, especially as he had been informed that Têlinês was of an unwarlike temperament. The restored exiles rewarded it by granting to him, and to his descendants after him, the hereditary dignity of hierophants of the two goddesses¹—a function certainly honourable, and probably lucrative, connected with

¹ See about Têlinês and this hereditary priesthood, Herodot. vii. 153. *τούτους ἄν ὁ Τηλίνης καθήγαγε ἐς Γέλην, ἔχων οὐδεμίην ἀνδρῶν δύναμιν, ἀλλ' ἰερά ταυτέων τῶν θεῶν· ὅθεν δὲ αὐτὰ ἔλαβε, ἢ αὐτὸς ἐκτετασσο, τοῦτο οὐκ ἔχω εἶπαι· τούτοις δὲ ἄν πίσυρος ἔων, καθήγαγε ἐπ' ᾧ τε οἱ ἀπόγονοι αὐτοῦ ἱεροφάνται τῶν θεῶν ἔσονται*: compare a previous passage of this History, vol. i. chap. i.

It appears from Pindar that Hiero exercised this hereditary priesthood (Olymp. vi. 160 (95), with the Scholia *ad loc.* and Scholia ad Pindar. Pyth. ii. 27).

About the story of Phylê personifying Athênê at Athens, see vol. iv. ch. xxx. of this History.

The ancient religious worship addressed itself more to the eye than to the ear; the words spoken were of less importance than the things exhibited, the persons performing, and the actions done. The vague sense of the Greek and Latin neuter, *ιερά* or *σα ρα*, includes the entire ceremony, and is difficult to translate into a modern language; but the verbs connected with it, *ἔχειν*, *κεκτῆσθαι*, *κομίζειν*, *φαίνειν*, *ιερά*—*ιεροφάντης*, &c., relate to exhibition and action. This was particularly the case with the mysteries (or solemnities not thrown open to the general public, but accessible only to those who went through certain preliminary forms, and under certain restrictions) in honour of Dêmêtêr and Persephonê, as well as of other deities in different parts of Greece. The *λεγόμενα*, or things *said* on these occasions, were of less importance than the *δεικνύμενα* and *δρῶμενα*, or *matters shown and things done* (see Pausanias, ii. 37, 3). Herodotus says about the lake of Saïs in Egypt, *Ἐν δὲ τῇ λίμνῃ ταύτῃ τὰ δεικνύμενα τῶν παθέων αὐτοῦ* (of Osiris) *νυκτὸς ποιεῦσι, τὰ καλέουσι μυστήρια Αἰγύπτιοι*: he proceeds to state that the Thesmophoria celebrated in honour of Dêmêtêr in Greece were of the same nature, and gives his opinion that they were imported into Greece from Egypt. Homer (Hymn. Cerer. 476): compare Pausan. ii. 14, 2—

Δεῖξεν Τριπτολέμω τε, Διοκλεῖ τε πληξίεππῳ
Δρησμοσύνῃν ἱερῶν· καὶ ἐπέφραδεν ὄργια παισὶ
Πρεσβυτέρῃς Κελέιοι.
Ὀλβιος, ὅς τ' ἀδ' ὅπωπεν ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων· &c.

Compare Eurip. Hippolyt. 25; Pindar, Fragm. xcvi.; Sophokl. Frag. Ivi. ed. Brunck; Plutarch, De Profect. in Virtute, c. 10, p. 81; De Isid. et Osir. p. 353, c. 3. *ὡς γὰρ οἱ τελούμενοι κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐν θορύβῳ καὶ βοῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὠθούμενοι συνίασι, δρωμένων δὲ καὶ δεικνυμένων τῶν ἱερῶν, προσέχουσιν ἤδη μετὰ φόβου καὶ σιωπῆς*: and Isokratês, Panegyric, c. 6, about Eleusis, *τὰ ἱερά καὶ νῦν δεικνυμεν καθ' ἕκαστον ἐνιαυτόν*. These mysteries consisted thus chiefly of exhibition and action addressed to the eyes of the communicants, and Clemens Alexandrinus calls them a mystic drama—*Δρῶ καὶ Κόρη δρᾶμα ἐγενέσθη μυστικόν, καὶ τὴν πλάνην καὶ τὴν ἀρπαγὴν καὶ τὸ πένθος ἢ Ἐλευσίς δαδουχεῖ*. The word *ὄργια* is originally nothing more than a consecrated expression for *ἔργα*—*ιερά ἔργα* (see Pausanias, iv. 1, 4, 5), though it comes afterwards to designate the whole

the administration of consecrated property and with the enjoyment of a large portion of its fruits.

Gelo thus belonged to an ancient and distinguished hierophantic family at Gela, being the eldest of four brothers sons of Deinomenes—Gelo, Hiero, Polyzelus and Thrasylbulus : and he further ennobled himself by such personal exploits, in the army of the despot Hippokratês, as to be promoted to the

ceremony, matters shown as well as matters done—τὰ ἔργα κομίζων—ὄργων παντοίων συνθέτης, &c. : compare Plutarch, Alkibiad. 22-34.

The sacred objects exhibited formed an essential part of the ceremony, together with the chest in which such of them as were moveable were brought out—τελετῆς ἐγκύμονα μύστιδα κίστην (Nonnus, ix. 127). Æschines, in assisting the religious lustrations performed by his mother, was bearer of the chest κιστοφόρος καὶ λιανοφόρος (Demosthen. de Coronâ, c. 79, p. 313). Clemens Alexandrinus (Cohort. ad Gent. p. 14) describes the objects which were contained in these mystic chests of the Eleusinian mysteries—cakes of particular shape, pomegranates, salt, ferules, ivy, &c. The communicant was permitted, as a part of the ceremony, to take these out of the chest and put them into a basket, afterwards putting them back again—“Jejunavi et ebibi cyceonem : ex cistâ sumpsi et in calathum misi : accepi rursus, in cistulam transtuli” (Arnobius ad Gent. v. p. 175, ed. Elmenhorst), while the uninitiated were excluded from seeing it, and forbidden from looking at it “even from the house-top.”

Τὸν κάλαθον κατιόντα χαμαὶ θασεῖσθε βέβαλοι
Μηδ' ἀπὸ τῷ τέγους.

(Kallimachus, Hymn. in Cererem, 4.)

Lobeck, in his learned and excellent treatise, *Aglaophamus* (i. p. 51), says, “Sacrorum nomine tam Græci, quam Romani, præcipuè signa et imagines Deorum, omnemque sacram supellectilem dignari solent. Quæ res animum illuc potius inclinât, ut putem Hierophantas ejusmodi *ἱερά* in conspectum hominum protulisse, sive deorum simulacra, sive vasa sacra et instrumenta aliave priscae religionis monumenta ; quæ in sacrario Eleusinio asservata fuisse, etsi nullo testimonio affirmare possumus, tamen probabilitatis speciem habet testimonio similem. Namque non solum in templis ferè omnibus cimelia venerandæ antiquitatis condita erant, sed in mysteriis ipsis talium rerum mentio occurrit, quas initiati summâ cum veneratione aspicerent, non initiatis ne aspicere quidem liceret . . . Ex his testimoniiis efficitur (p. 61) sacra quæ Hierophanta ostendit, illa ipse fuisse *ἄγια φάσματα* sive simulacra Deorum, eorumque aspectum qui præbeant *δείξαι τὰ ἱερά* vel *παρέχειν* vel *φαίνειν* dici, et ab hoc quasi primario Hierophantæ actu tum Eleusiniorum sacerdotum principem nomen accepisse, tum totum negotium esse nuncupatum.”

Compare also K.† F. Hermann, *Gottesdienstliche Alterthümer der Griechen*, part ii. ch. ii. sect. 32.

A passage in Cicero de *Haruspicio Responsis* (c. 11), which is transcribed almost entirely by Arnobius *adv. Gentes*, iv. p. 148, demonstrates the minute precision required at Rome in the performance of the festival of the Megalesia : the smallest omission or alteration was supposed to render the festival unsatisfactory to the gods.

The memorable history of the Holy Tunic at Treves in 1845, shows what immense and wide-spread effect upon the human mind may be produced, even in the nineteenth century, by *ἱερά δεικνόμενα*.

supreme command of the cavalry. It was greatly to the activity of Gelo that the despot owed a succession of victories and conquests, in which the Ionic or Chalkidic cities of Kallipolis, Naxos, Leontini and Zanklê, were successively reduced to dependence.¹

The fate of Zanklê—seemingly held by its despot Skythês in a state of dependent alliance under Hippokratês, and in standing feud with Anaxilaus of Rhegium on the opposite side of the strait of Messina—was remarkable. At the time when the Ionic revolt in Asia was suppressed, and Milêtus reconquered by the Persians (B.C. 494, 493), a natural sympathy was manifested by the Ionic Greeks in Sicily towards the sufferers of the same race on the east of the Ægean sea. Projects were devised for assisting the Asiatic refugees to a new abode; and the Zanklæans, especially, invited them to form a new Pan-Ionic colony upon the territory of the Sikels, called Kalê Aktê, on the north coast of Sicily; a coast presenting fertile and attractive situations, and along the whole line of which there was only one Grecian colony—Himera. This invitation was accepted by the refugees from Samos and Milêtus, who accordingly put themselves on shipboard for Zanklê; steering, as was usual, along the coast of Akarnania to Korkyra, from thence across to Tarentum, and along the Italian coast to the strait of Messina. It happened that when they reached the town of Epizephyriân Lokri, Skythês, the despot of Zanklê, was absent from his city, together with the larger portion of his military force, on an expedition against the Sikels—perhaps undertaken to facilitate the contemplated colony at Kalê Aktê. His enemy the Rhegian prince Anaxilaus, taking advantage of this accident, proposed to the refugees at Lokri that they should seize for themselves, and retain, the unguarded city of Zanklê. They followed his suggestion, and possessed themselves of the city, together with the families and property of the absent Zanklæans; who speedily returned to repair their loss, while their prince Skythês further invoked the powerful aid of his ally and superior, Hippokratês. The latter, however, provoked at the loss of one of his dependent cities, seized and imprisoned Skythês, whom he considered as the cause of it,²

¹ Herodot. vii. 154.

² Herodot. vi. 22. 23. *Σκύθημ μὲν τὸν μόνναρχον τῶν Ζαγκλαίων, ὡς ἀποβαλόντα τὴν πόλιν, ὁ Ἴπποκράτης πεδήσας, καὶ τὸν ἀδελφεὸν αὐτοῦ Πυθαγόρην, εἰς Ἴνυκον πόλιν ἀπέπεμψε.*

The words *ὡς ἀποβαλόντα* seem to imply the relation pre-existing between Hippokratês and Skythês, as superior and subject; and punishment inflicted by the former upon the latter for having lost an important post.

at Inykus, in the interior of the island. But he found it at the same time advantageous to accept a proposition made to him by the Samians, captors of the city, and to betray the Zanklæans whom he had come to aid. By a convention ratified with an oath, it was agreed that Hippokratês should receive for himself all the extra-mural, and half the intra-mural, property and slaves belonging to the Zanklæans, leaving the other half to the Samians. Among the property without the walls, not the least valuable part consisted in the persons of those Zanklæans whom Hippokratês had come to assist, but whom he now carried away as slaves: excepting however from this lot, three hundred of the principal citizens, whom he delivered over to the Samians to be slaughtered—probably lest they might find friends to procure their ransom, and afterwards disturb the Samian possession of the town. Their lives were however spared by the Samians, though we are not told what became of them. This transaction, alike perfidious on the part of the Samians and of Hippokratês, secured to the former a flourishing city, and to the latter an abundant booty. We are glad to learn that the imprisoned Skythês found means to escape to Darius, king of Persia, from whom he received a generous shelter: imperfect compensation for the iniquity of his fellow Greeks.¹ The Samians however did not long retain possession of their conquest, but were expelled by the very person who had instigated them to seize it—Anaxilaus of Rhegium. He planted in it new inhabitants, of Dorian and Messenian race, recolonising it under the name of Messênê—a name which it ever afterwards bore;² and it appears to have been governed either by himself or by his son Kleophron, until his death about B.C. 476.

Besides the conquests above mentioned, Hippokratês of Gela was on the point of making the still more important acquisition of Syracuse, and was only prevented from doing so, after defeating the Syracusans at the river Helôrus, and capturing many prisoners, by the mediation of the Corinthians and Korkyræans, who prevailed on him to be satisfied with the cession of Kamarina and its territory as a ransom. Having repopled this territory, which became thus annexed to Gela, he was prosecuting his conquests further among the Sikels, when he died or was killed at Hybla. His death caused a

¹ Herodot. vi. 23, 24. Aristotle (*Politic.* v. 2, 11) represents the Samians as having been first actually received into Zankliê, and afterwards expelling the prior inhabitants: his brief notice is not to be set against the perspicuous narrative of Herodotus.

² Thucyd. vi. 4; Schol. ad Pindar. *Pyth.* ii. 84; Diodor. xi. 48.

mutiny among the Geloans, who refused to acknowledge his sons, and strove to regain their freedom; but Gelo, the general of horse in the army, espousing the cause of the sons with energy, put down by force the resistance of the people. As soon as this was done, he threw off the mask, deposed the sons of Hippokratēs, and seized the sceptre himself.¹

Thus master of Gela, and succeeding probably to the ascendancy enjoyed by his predecessor over the Ionic cities, Gelo became the most powerful man in the island; but an incident which occurred a few years afterwards (B.C. 485), while it aggrandised him still further, transferred the seat of his power from Gela to Syracuse. The Syracusan Gamori, or oligarchical order of proprietary families, probably humbled by their ruinous defeat at the Helôrus, were dispossessed of the government by a combination between their serf-cultivators called the Killyrii, and the smaller freemen called the Demos; they were forced to retire to Kasmenæ, where they invoked the aid of Gelo to restore them. That ambitious prince undertook the task, and accomplished it with facility; for the Syracusan people, probable unable to resist their political opponents when backed by such powerful foreign aid, surrendered to him without striking a blow.² But instead of restoring the place

¹ Herodot. vii. 155; Thucyd. vi. 5. The ninth Nemean Ode of Pindar (v. 40), addressed to Chromius the friend of Hiero of Syracuse, commemorates, among other exploits, his conduct at the battle of the Helôrus.

² Herodot. vii. 155. Ὁ γὰρ δῆμος ὁ τῶν Συρηκουσίων ἐπιόντι Γέλωνι παραδίδοι τὴν πόλιν καὶ ἑωυτόν.

Aristotle (Politic. v. 2, 6) alludes to the Syracusan democracy prior to the despotism of Gelo as a case of democracy ruined by its own lawlessness and disorder. But such can hardly have been the fact, if the narrative of Herodotus is to be trusted. The expulsion of the Gamori was not an act of lawless democracy, but the rising of free subjects and slaves against a governing oligarchy. After the Gamori were expelled, there was no time for the democracy to constitute itself, or to show in what degree it possessed capacity for government, since the narrative of Herodotus indicates that the restoration by Gelo followed closely upon the expulsion. And the superior force which Gelo brought to the aid of the expelled Gamori, is quite sufficient to explain the submission of the Syracusan people, had they been ever so well administered. Perhaps Aristotle may have had before him reports different from those of Herodotus: unless indeed we might venture to suspect that the name of *Gelo* appears in Aristotle by lapse of memory in place of that of *Dionysius*. It is highly probable that the partial disorder into which the Syracusan democracy had fallen immediately before the despotism of Dionysius, was one of the main circumstances which enabled him to acquire the supreme power; but a similar assertion can hardly be made applicable to the early times preceding Gelo, in which indeed democracy was only just beginning in Greece.

The confusion often made by hasty historians between the names of Gelo and Dionysius, is severely commented on by Dionysius of Halikarnassus

to the previous oligarchy, Gelo appropriated it to himself, leaving Gela to be governed by his brother Hiero. He greatly enlarged the city of Syracuse, and strengthened its fortifications : probably it was he who first carried it beyond the islet of Ortygia, so as to include a larger space of the adjacent mainland (or rather island of Sicily) which bore the name of Achradina. To people this enlarged space he brought all the residents in Kamarina, which town he dismantled—and more than half of those in Gela ; which was thus reduced in importance, while Syracuse became the first city in Sicily, and even received fresh addition of inhabitants from the neighbouring towns of Megara and Eubœa.

Both these towns, Megara and Eubœa, like Syracuse, were governed by oligarchies, with serf-cultivators dependent upon them, and a Demos or Body of smaller freemen excluded from the political franchise : both were involved in war with Gelo, probably to resist his encroachments : both were besieged and taken. The oligarchy who ruled these cities, and who were the authors as well as leaders of the year, anticipated nothing but ruin at the hands of the conqueror ; while the Demos, who had not been consulted and had taken no part in the war (which we must presume to have been carried on by the oligarchy and their serfs alone), felt assured that no harm would be done to them. His behaviour disappointed the expectations of both. After transporting both of them to Syracuse, he established the oligarchs in that town as citizens, and sold the Demos as slaves under covenant that they should be exported from Sicily. "His conduct (says Herodotus¹) was dictated by the conviction, that a Demos was a most troublesome companion to live with." It appears that the state of society which he wished to establish was that of Patricians and clients, without any Plebs ; something like that of Thessaly, where there was a proprietary

(Antiq. Roman. vii. 1. p. 1314) : the latter however, in his own statement respecting Gelo, is not altogether free from error, since he describes Hippokratês as *brother* of Gelo. We must accept the supposition of Larcher, that Pausanias (vi. 9, 2), while professing to give the date of Gelo's occupation of *Syracuse*, has really given the date of Gelo's occupation of *Gela* (see Mr. Fynes Clinton, Fast. Hellen. ad ann. 491 B.C.).

¹ Herodot. vii. 156. Μεγαρέας τε τοὺς ἐν Σικελίᾳ, ὡς πολιορκούμενοι ἐς δμολογίην προσεχώρησαν, τοὺς μὲν αὐτέων παχέας, ἀειραμένους τε πόλεμον αὐτῶν καὶ προσδοκόντας ἀπολέσθαι διὰ τοῦτο, ἔγων ἐς τὰς Συρηκούσας πολίτας ἐποίησε· τὸν δὲ δῆμον τῶν Μεγαρέων, οὐκ ἔντα μεταίτιον τοῦ πολέμου τούτου, οὐδὲ προσδεκόμενον κακὸν οὐδὲν πείσσειν, ἀγαγὼν καὶ τούτους ἐς τὰς Συρηκούσας, ἀπέδοτο ἐπ' ἐξαγωγῇ ἐκ Σικελίης. Τῶντὸ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ Εὐβοέας τοὺς ἐν Σικελίᾳ ἐποίησε διακρίνας. Ἐποίηε δὲ τὰ ταῦτα τούτους ἀμφοτέρους, νομίσας δῆμον εἶναι συνόικημα ἀχαριτώτατον.

oligarchy living in the cities, with Penestæ or dependent cultivators occupying and tilling the land on their account—but no small self-working proprietors or tradesmen in sufficient number to form a recognised class. And since Gelo was removing the free population from these conquered towns, leaving in or around the towns no one except the serf-cultivators, we may presume that the oligarchical proprietors when removed might still continue, even as residents at Syracuse, to receive the produce raised for them by others: but the small self-working proprietors, if removed in like manner, would be deprived of subsistence, because their land would be too distant for personal tillage, and they had no serfs. While therefore we fully believe, with Herodotus, that Gelo considered the small free proprietors as “troublesome yoke-fellows”—a sentiment perfectly natural to a Grecian despot, unless where he found them useful aids to his own ambition against a hostile oligarchy—we must add that they would become peculiarly troublesome in his scheme of concentrating the free population of Syracuse, seeing that he would have to give them land in the neighbourhood or to provide in some other way for their maintenance.

So large an accession of size, walls, and population, rendered Syracuse the first Greek city in Sicily. And the power of Gelo, embracing as it did not merely Syracuse, but so considerable a portion of the rest of the island, Greek as well as Sikel, was the greatest Hellenic force then existing. It appears to have comprised the Grecian cities on the east and south-east of the island from the borders of Agrigentum to those of Zanklé or Messênê, together with no small proportion of the Sikel tribes. Messênê was under the rule of Anaxilaus of Rhegium, Agrigentum under that of Thêro son of Ænesidêmus, Himera under that of Terillus; while Selinus, close on the borders of Eggesta and the Carthaginian possessions, had its own government free or despotic, but appears to have been allied with or dependent upon Carthage.¹ A dominion thus extensive doubtless furnished ample tribute, besides which Gelo, having conquered and dispossessed many landed proprietors and having recolonised Syracuse, could easily provide both lands and citizenship to recompense adherents. Hence he was enabled to enlarge materially the military force transmitted to him by Hippokratês, and to form a naval force besides. Phormis² the Mænaliant, who took service under him and

¹ Diodor. xi. 21.

² Pausan. v. 27, 1, 2. We find the elder Dionysius, about a century afterwards, transferring the entire free population of conquered towns

became citizen of Syracuse, with fortune enough to send donatives to Olympia—and Agésias the Iamid prophet from Stymphálus¹—are doubtless not the only examples of emigrants joining him from Arcadia. For the Arcadian population were poor, brave, and ready for mercenary soldiery; while the service of a Greek despot in Sicily must have been more attractive to them than that of Xerxes.² Moreover, during the ten years between the battles of Marathon and Salamis, when not only so large a portion of the Greek cities had become subject to Persia, but the prospect of Persian invasion hung like a cloud over Greece Proper—the increased feeling of insecurity throughout the latter probably rendered emigration to Sicily unusually inviting.

These circumstances in part explain the immense power and position which Herodotus represents Gelo to have enjoyed, towards the autumn of 481 B.C., when the Greeks from the Isthmus of Corinth, confederated to resist Xerxes, sent to solicit his aid. He was then imperial leader of Sicily: he could offer to the Greeks (so the historian tells us) 20,000 hoplites, 200 triremes, 2000 cavalry, 2000 archers, 2000 slingers, 2000 light-armed horse, besides furnishing provisions for the entire Grecian force as long as the war might last.³ If this numerical statement could be at all trusted (which I do not believe), Herodotus would be much within the truth in saying, that there was no other Hellenic power which would bear the least comparison with that of Gelo:⁴ and we may well assume such

(Kaulonia and Hipponium in Italy, &c.) to Syracuse (Diodor. xiv. 106, 107).

¹ See the sixth Olympic Ode of Pindar, addressed to the Syracusan Agésias. The Scholiast on v. 5 of that ode—who says that not Agésias himself, but some of his progenitors migrated from Stymphálus to Syracuse—is contradicted not only by the Scholiast on v. 167, where Agésias is rightly termed both Ἀρκάς and Συρακόσιος; but also by the better evidence of Pindar's own expressions—*συνοικιστήρ τε τῶν κλεινῶν Συρακοσσῶν—οἴκοθεν οἴκαδε*, with reference to Stymphálus and Syracuse—*δύ' ἄγκυραι* (v. 6, 99, 101 = 166–174).

Ergotelés, an exile from Knóssus in Krete, must have migrated somewhere about this time to Hímera in Sicily. See the twelfth Olympic Ode of Pindar.

² Herodot. viii. 26.

³ Herodot. vii. 157. *σὺ δὲ δυνάμιός τε ἦκεις μεγάλης, καὶ μοῖρᾴ τοι τῆς Ἑλλάδος οὐκ ἐλαχίστη μετὰ, ἔρχοντί γε Σικελίης*: and even still stronger, c. 163. *ἐὼν Σικελίης τύραννος*.

The word *ἔρχων* corresponds with *ἀρχή*, such as that of the Athenians, and is less strong than *τύραννος*. The numerical statement is contained in the speech composed by Herodotus for Gelo (vii. 158).

⁴ Herodot. vii. 145. *τὰ δὲ Γέλωνος πρήγματα μέγιστα ἐλέγετο εἶναι· οὐδαμῶν Ἑλληνικῶν τῶν οὐ πολλῶν μέζω*.

general superiority to be substantially true, though the numbers above mentioned may be an empty boast rather than a reality.

Owing to the great power of Gelo, we now for the first time trace an incipient tendency in Sicily to combined and central operations. It appears that Gelo had formed the plan of uniting the Greek forces in Sicily for the purpose of expelling the Carthaginians and Egestæans, either wholly or partially, from their maritime possessions in the western corner of the island, and of avenging the death of the Spartan prince Dorieus—that he even attempted, though in vain, to induce the Spartans and other central Greeks to co-operate in this plan—and that upon their refusal, he had in part executed it with the Sicilian forces alone.¹ We have nothing but a brief and vague allusion to this exploit, wherein Gelo appears as the chief and champion of Hellenic against barbaric interests in Sicily—the forerunner of Dionysius, Timoleon, and Agathoklès. But he had already begun to conceive himself, and had already been recognised by others, in this commanding position, when the envoys of Sparta, Athens, Corinth, &c., reached him from the Isthmus of Corinth, in 481 B.C., to entreat his aid for the repulse of the vast host of invaders about to cross the Hellespont. Gelo, after reminding them that they had refused a similar application for aid from him, said that, far from requiting them at the hour of need in the like ungenerous spirit, he would bring to them an overwhelming reinforcement (the numbers as given by Herodotus have been already stated), but upon one

¹ Herodot. vii. 158. Gelo says to the envoys from Peloponnesus—*Ἄνδρες Ἕλληνες, λόγον ἔχοντες πλεονέκτην, ἐτολήσατε ἐμὲ σύμμαχον ἐπὶ τὸν βάρβαρον παρακαλέοντες ἐλθεῖν. Αὐτοὶ δὲ, ἐμεῦ πρότερον δεηθέντος βαρβαρικοῦ στρατοῦ συνεπάψασθαι, ὅτε μοι πρὸς Καρχηδονίου νείκος συνήπτο, ἐπισκήπτοντός τε τὸν Δωριέος τοῦ Ἀναξανδρίδου πρὸς Ἐγέσταλον φόνοσ ἐκπρήξασθαι, ὑποτεινόντός τε τὰ ἐμπόρια συνελευθεροῦν, ἀπ' ὧν ὑμῖν μεγάλα ὠφελία τε καὶ ἑκαυρέσιαι γεγόνασιν οὐτε ἐμεῦ εἵνεκα ἤλθετε βοηθήσοντες, οὐτε τὸν Δωριέος φόνον ἐκπρηξόμενοι τὸ τε κατ' ὑμέας, τὰδε ἅπαντα ὑπὸ βαρβάρουσι νέμεται. Ἄλλὰ εὖ γὰρ ἡμῖν καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἄμεινον κατέστη· νῦν δὲ, ἐπειδὴ περιελήλυθε ὁ πόλεμος καὶ ἀπικταὶ ἐς ὑμέας, οὕτω δὴ Γέλωνος μῆστις γέγονε.*

It is much to be regretted that we have no further information respecting the events which these words glance at. They seem to indicate that the Carthaginians and Egestæans had made some encroachments and threatened to make more: that Gelo had repelled them by actual and successful war. I think it strange however that he should be made to say—“*Ὑμεῖς* (the Peloponnesians) have derived great and signal advantages from these sea-ports”—the profit derived from the latter by *the Peloponnesians* can never have been so great as to be singled out in this pointed manner. I should rather have expected—*ἀπ' ὧν ἡμῖν* (and not *ἀπ' ὧν ὑμῖν*)—which must have been true in point of fact, and will be found to read quite consistently with the general purport of Gelo's speech.

condition only—that he should be recognised as generalissimo of the entire Grecian force against the Persians. His offer was repudiated, with indignant scorn, by the Spartan envoy: and Gelo then so far abated in his demand, as to be content with the command either of the land-force or the naval-force, whichever might be judged preferable. But here the Athenian envoy interposed his protest—“We are sent here (said he) to ask for an army, and not for a general; and thou givest us the army, only in order to make thyself general. Know, that even if the Spartans would allow thee to command at sea, *we* would not. The naval command is ours, if they decline it: we Athenians, the oldest nation in Greece—the only Greeks who have never migrated from home—whose leader before Troy stands proclaimed by Homer as the best of all the Greeks for marshalling and keeping order in an army—we, who moreover furnish the largest naval contingent in the fleet—*we* will never submit to be commanded by a Syracusan.”

“Athenian stranger (replied Gelo), ye seem to be provided with commanders, but ye are not likely to have soldiers to be commanded. Ye may return as soon as you please, and tell the Greeks that their year is deprived of its spring.”¹

That envoys were sent from Peloponnesus to solicit assistance from Gelo against Xerxes, and that they solicited in vain, is an incident not to be disputed: but the reason assigned for refusal—conflicting pretensions about the supreme command—may be suspected to have arisen less from historical transmission, than from the conceptions of the historian, or of his informants, respecting the relations between the parties. In his time, Sparta, Athens, and Syracuse were the three great imperial cities of Greece; and his Sicilian witnesses, proud of the great past power of Gelo, might well ascribe to him that competition for pre-eminence and command which Herodotus has dramatised. The immense total of forces which Gelo is made to promise becomes the more incredible, when we reflect that he had another and a better reason for refusing aid altogether. He was attacked at home, and was fully employed in defending himself.

The same spring which brought Xerxes across the Hellespont into Greece, also witnessed a formidable Carthaginian invasion

¹ Herodot. vii. 161, 162. Polybius (xii, 26) does not seem to have read this embassy as related by Herodotus—or at least he must have preferred some other account of it. He gives a different account of the answer which they made to Gelo: an answer (not insolent, but) business-like and evasive—*πραγματικώτατον ἀπόκριμα*, &c. See Timæus, *Fragm.* 87, ed. Didot.

of Sicily. Gelo had already been engaged in war against them (as has been above stated) and had obtained successes, which they would naturally seek the first opportunity of retrieving. The vast Persian invasion of Greece, organised for three years before, and drawing contingents not only from the whole eastern world, but especially from their own metropolitan brethren at Tyre and Sidon, was well calculated to encourage them: and there seems good reason for believing that the simultaneous attack on the Greeks both in Peloponnesus and in Sicily, was concerted between the Carthaginians and Xerxes¹—probably by the Phœnicians on behalf of Xerxes. Nevertheless this alliance does not exclude other concurrent circumstances in the interior of the island, which supplied the Carthaginians both with invitation and with help. Agrigentum, though not under the dominion of Gelo, was ruled by his friend and relative Thêro; while Rhegium and Messênê under the government of Anaxilaus,—Himera under that of his father-in-law Terillus—and Selinus,—seem to have formed an imposing minority among the Sicilian Greeks; at variance with Gelo and Thêro, but in amity and correspondence with Carthage.² It was seemingly about the year 481 B.C., that Thêro, perhaps invited by an Himeræan party, expelled from Himera the despot Terillus, and became possessed of the town. Terillus applied for aid to Carthage; backed by his son-in-law Anaxilaus, who espoused the quarrel so warmly, as even to tender his own children as hostages to Hamilkar the Carthaginian Suffes or general, the personal friend or guest of Terillus. The application was favourably entertained, and Hamilkar, arriving at Panormus in the eventful year 480 B.C., with a fleet of 3000 ships of war and a still larger number of store ships, disembarked a land-force of 300,000 men: which would even have been larger, had not the vessels carrying the cavalry and the chariots happened to be dispersed by storms.³ These numbers we can only repeat as we find them, without trusting them any further than as proof that the armament was on the most extensive scale. But the different nations of whom

¹ Ephorus, Fragment III, ed. Didot; Diodor. xi. 1, 20. Mitford and Dahlmann (*Forschungen, Herodotus, &c.*, sect. 35, p. 186) call in question this alliance or understanding between Xerxes and the Carthaginians; but on no sufficient grounds, in my judgement.

² Herodot. vii. 165; Diodor. xi. 23: compare also xiii. 55, 59. In like manner Rhegium and Messênê formed the opposing interest to Syracuse, under Dionysius the elder (Diodor. xiv. 44).

³ Herodotus (vii. 165) and Diodorus (xi. 20) both give the number of the land-force: the latter alone gives that of the fleet.

Herodotus reports the land-force to have consisted are trustworthy and curious : it included Phœnicians, Libyans, Iberians, Ligyes, Helisyki, Sardinians, and Corsicans.¹ This is the first example known to us of those numerous mercenary armies which it was the policy of Carthage to compose of nations different in race and language,² in order to obviate conspiracy or mutiny against the general.

Having landed at Panormus, Hamilkar marched to Himera, dragged his vessels on shore under the shelter of a rampart, and then laid siege to the town ; while the Himerians, reinforced by Thêro and the army of Agrigentum, determined on an obstinate defence, and even bricked up the gates. Pressing messages were despatched to solicit aid from Gelo, who collected his whole force, said to have amounted to 50,000 foot and 5000 horse, and marched to Himera. His arrival restored the courage of the inhabitants, and after some partial fighting, which turned out to the advantage of the Greeks, a general battle ensued. It was obstinate and bloody, lasting from sunrise until late in the afternoon ; and its success was mainly determined by an intercepted letter which fell into the hands of Gelo—a communication from the Selinuntines to Hamilkar, promising to send a body of horse to his aid, and intimating the time at which they would arrive. A party of Gelo's horse, instructed to personate this reinforcement from Selinus, were received into the camp of Hamilkar, where they spread consternation and disorder, and are even said to have slain the general and set fire to the ships ; while the Greek army, brought to action at this opportune moment, at length succeeded in triumphing over both superior numbers and a determined resistance. If we are to believe Diodorus, 150,000 men were slain on the side of the Carthaginians ; the rest fled—partly to the Sikanian mountains where they became prisoners of the Agrigentines—partly to a hilly ground, where, from want of water, they were obliged to surrender at discretion. Twenty ships alone escaped with a few fugitives, and these twenty were destroyed by a storm on the passage, so that only one small boat arrived at Carthage with the disastrous tidings.³

¹ Herodot. vii. 165. The Ligyes came from the southern junction of Italy and France ; the Gulfs of Lyons and Genoa. The Helisyki cannot be satisfactorily verified : Niebuhr considers them to have been the *Volsci* : an ingenious conjecture.

² Polyb. i. 67. His description of the mutiny of the Carthaginian mercenaries, after the conclusion of the first Punic war, is highly instructive.

³ Diodor. xi. 21-24.

Dismissing such unreasonable exaggerations, we can only venture to assert that the battle was strenuously disputed, the victory complete, and the slain as well as the prisoners numerous. The body of Hamilkar was never discovered, in spite of careful search ordered by Gelo: the Carthaginians affirmed, that as soon as the defeat of his army became irreparable, he had cast himself into the great sacrificial fire wherein he had been offering entire victims (the usual sacrifice consisting only of a small part of the beast¹) to propitiate the gods, and had there been consumed. The Carthaginians erected funereal monuments to him, graced with periodical sacrifices, both in Carthage and in their principal colonies:² on the field of battle itself also, a monument was raised to him by the Greeks. On that monument, seventy years afterwards, his victorious grandson, fresh from the plunder of this same city of Himera, offered the bloody sacrifice of 3000 Grecian prisoners.³

We may presume that Anaxilaus with the forces of Rhegium shared in the defeat of the foreign invader whom he had called in, and probably other Greeks besides. All of them were now compelled to sue for peace from Gelo, and to solicit the privilege of being enrolled as his dependent allies, which was

¹ Herodotus, vii. 167. *σώματα ὅλα καταΐζων*. This passage of Herodotus receives illustration from the learned comment of Mövers on the Phœnician inscription recently discovered at Marseilles. It was the usual custom of the Jews, and it had been in old times the custom with the Phœnicians (Porphy. de Abstin. iv. 15), to burn the victim entire: the Phœnicians departed from this practice, but the departure seems to have been considered as not strictly correct, and in times of great misfortune or anxiety the old habit was resumed (Mövers, Das Opferwesen der Karthager. Breslau, 1847, p. 71-118).

² Herodotus, vii. 166, 167. Hamilkar was son of a Syracusan mother: a curious proof of *connubium* between Carthage and Syracuse. At the moment when the elder Dionysius declared war against Carthage, in 398 B.C., there were many Carthaginian merchants dwelling both in Syracuse and in other Greco-Sicilian cities, together with ships and other property. Dionysius gave licence to the Syracusans, at the first instant when he had determined on declaring war, to plunder all this property (Diodor. xiv. 46). This speedy multiplication of Carthaginians with merchandise in the Grecian cities so soon after a bloody war had been concluded, is a strong proof of the spontaneous tendencies of trade.

³ Diodor. xiii. 62. According to Herodotus, the battle of Himera took place on the same day as that of Salamis; according to Diodorus, on the same day as that of Thermopylæ. If we are forced to choose between the two witnesses, there can be no hesitation in preferring the former: but it seems more probable that neither is correct.

As far as we can judge from the brief allusions of Herodotus, he must have conceived the battle of Himera in a manner totally different from Diodorus. Under such circumstances, I cannot venture to trust the details given by the latter.

granted to them without any harder imposition than the tribute probably involved in that relation.¹ Even the Carthaginians themselves were so intimidated by the defeat, that they sent envoys to ask for peace at Syracuse, which they are said to have obtained mainly by the solicitation of Damaretê wife of Gelo, on condition of paying 2000 talents to defray the costs of the war, and of erecting two temples in which the terms of the treaty were to be permanently recorded.² If we could believe the assertion of Theophrastus, Gelo exacted from the Carthaginians a stipulation that they would for the future abstain from human sacrifices in their religious worship.³ But such an interference with foreign religious rites would be unexampled in that age, and we know moreover that the practice was not permanently discontinued at Carthage.⁴ Indeed we may reasonably suspect that Diodorus, copying from writers like Ephorus and Timæus long after the events, has exaggerated considerably the defeat, the humiliation, and the amerement of the Carthaginians. For the words of the poet Pindar, a very few years after the battle of Himera, represent a fresh Carthaginian invasion as matter of present uneasiness and alarm:⁵ and the Carthaginian fleet is found engaged in aggressive warfare on the coast of Italy, requiring to be coerced by the brother and successor of Gelo.

The victory of Himera procured for the Sicilian cities immunity from foreign war, together with a rich plunder. Splendid offerings of thanksgiving to the gods were dedicated in the temples of Himera, Syracuse, and Delphi; while the epigram of Simonidês,⁶ composed for the tripod offered in the latter temple, described Gelo with his three brothers Hiero, Polyzêlus, and Thrasybulus, as the joint liberators of Greece from the Barbarian, along with the victors of Salamis and Plataea. And the Sicilians alleged that he was on the point of actually sending reinforcements to the Greeks against Xerxes, in spite of the necessity of submitting to Spartan command, when the intelligence of the defeat and retreat of that prince reached him. But we find another statement decidedly more probable

¹ I presume this treatment of Anaxilaus by Gelo must be alluded to in Diodorus, xi. 66: at least it is difficult to understand what other "great benefit" Gelo had conferred on Anaxilaus.

² Diodor. xi. 26.

³ Schol. ad Pindar. Pyth. ii. 3; Plutarch, De Serâ Numinis Vindictâ, p. 552, c. 6.

⁴ Diodor. xx. 14.

⁵ Pindar, Nem. ix. 67 (= 28 B.) with the Scholia.

⁶ Simonidês, Epigr. 141, ed. Bergk.

—that he sent a confidential envoy named Kadmus to Delphi with orders to watch the turn of the Xerxeian invasion, and in case it should prove successful (as he thought that it probably would be) to tender presents and submission to the victorious invader on behalf of Syracuse.¹ When we consider that until the very morning of the battle of Salamis, the cause of Grecian independence must have appeared to an impartial spectator almost desperate, we cannot wonder that Gelo should take precautions for preventing the onward progress of the Persians towards Sicily, which was already sufficiently imperilled by its formidable enemies in Africa. The defeat of the Persians at Salamis and of the Carthaginians at Himera cleared away suddenly and unexpectedly the terrific cloud from Greece as well as from Sicily, and left a sky comparatively brilliant with prosperous hopes.

To the victorious army of Gelo, there was abundant plunder for recompense as well as distribution. Among the most valuable part of the plunder were the numerous prisoners taken, who were divided among the cities in proportion to the number of troops furnished by each. Of course the largest shares must have fallen to Syracuse and Agrigentum; while the number acquired by the latter was still further increased by the separate capture of those prisoners who had dispersed throughout the mountains in and near the Agrigentine territory. All the Sicilian cities allied with or dependent on Gelo, but especially the two last-mentioned, were thus put in possession of a number of slaves as public property, who were kept in chains to work,² and were either employed on public undertakings for defence, ornament, and religious solemnity—or let out to private masters so as to afford a revenue to the state. So great was the total of these public slaves at Agrigentum, that though many were employed on state-works, which elevated the city to signal grandeur during the flourishing period of seventy years which intervened between the recent battle and its subsequent capture by the Carthaginians—there nevertheless remained great numbers to be let out to private individuals, some of whom had no less than five hundred slaves respectively in their employment.³

¹ Herodot. vii. 163–165: compare Diodor. xi. 26; Ephorus, *Fragm.* III, ed. Didot.

² Diodor. xi. 25. *αἱ δὲ πόλεις εἰς πέδας κατέστησαν τοὺς διαιρεθέντας αἰχμαλώτους, καὶ τὰ δημόσια τῶν ἔργων διὰ τούτων ἐπεσκεύαζον.*

For analogous instances of captives taken in war being employed in public works by the captors, and labouring in chains, see the cases of Tegea and Samos in Herodot. i. 66; iii. 39.

³ Diodor. xi. 25. Respecting slaves belonging to the public, and let out

The peace which now ensued left Gelo master of Syracuse and Gela, with the Chalkidic Greek towns on the east of the island; while Thêro governed in Agrigentum, and his son Thrasydæus in Himera. In power as well as in reputation, Gelo was unquestionably the chief person in the island; moreover he was connected by marriage, and lived on terms of uninterrupted friendship, with Thêro. His conduct, both at Syracuse and towards the cities dependent upon him, was mild and conciliating. But his subsequent career was very short: he died of a dropsical complaint not much more than a year after the battle of Himera, while the glories of that day were fresh in every one's recollection. As the Syracusan law rigorously interdicted expensive funerals, Gelo had commanded that his own obsequies should be conducted in strict conformity to the law: nevertheless the zeal of his successor as well as the attachment of the people disobeyed these commands. The great mass of citizens followed his funeral procession from the city to the estate of his wife, fifteen miles distant: nine massive towers were erected to distinguish the spot; and the solemnities of heroic worship were rendered to him. The respectful recollections of the conqueror of Himera never afterwards died out among the Syracusan people, though his tomb was defaced first by the Carthaginians, and afterwards by the despot Agathoklês.¹ And when we recollect the destructive effects caused by the subsequent Carthaginian invasions, we shall be sensible how great was the debt of gratitude owing to Gelo by his contemporaries.

It was not merely as conqueror of Himera, but as a sort of second founder of Syracuse,² that Gelo was thus solemnly worshipped. The size, the strength, and the population, of the town were all greatly increased under him. Besides the number of the new inhabitants which he brought from Gela, the Hyblæan Megara, and the Sicilian Eubœa, we are informed that he also inscribed on the roll of citizens no less than 10,000 mercenary soldiers. It will moreover appear that these new-made citizens were in possession of the islet of Ortygia³—the interior stronghold of Syracuse. It has already been stated that Ortygia was the original settlement, and that the city did not overstep the boundaries of the islet before the enlargements

for hire to individual employers, compare the large financial project conceived by Xenophon, *De Vectigalibus*, capp. 3 and 4.

¹ Diodor. xi. 38, 67: Plutarch, *Timoleon*, c. 29; Aristotle, *Γελοῦν Πολιτεία*; *Fragm.* p. 106, ed. Neumann.

² Diodor. xi. 49.

³ Diodor. xi. 72, 73.

of Gelo. We do not know by what arrangements Gelo provided new lands for so large a number of new-comers : but when we come to notice the antipathy with which these latter were regarded by the remaining citizens, we shall be inclined to believe that the old citizens had been dispossessed and degraded.

Gelo left a son in tender years, but his power passed, by his own direction, to two of his brothers, Polyzélus and Hiero ; the former of whom married the widow of the deceased prince, and was named, according to his testamentary directions, commander of the military force—while Hiero was intended to enjoy the government of the city. Whatever may have been the wishes of Gelo, however, the real power fell to Hiero ; a man of energy and determination, and munificent as a patron of contemporary poets, Pindar, Simonidès, Bacchylidès, Epicharmus, Æschylus, and others ; but the victim of a painful internal complaint—jealous in his temper—cruel, and rapacious in his government¹—and noted as an organiser of that systematic espionage which broke up all freedom of speech among his subjects. Especially jealous of his brother Polyzélus, who was very popular in the city, he despatched him on a military expedition against the Krotoniates, with a view of indirectly accomplishing his destruction. But Polyzélus, aware of the snare, fled to Agrigentum, and sought protection from his brother-in-law the despot Théro ; from whom Hiero redemanded him, and on receiving a refusal, prepared to enforce the demand by arms. He had already advanced on his march as far as the river Gela, but no actual battle appears to have taken place. It is interesting to hear that Simonidès the poet, esteemed and rewarded by both these princes, was the mediator of peace between them.²

The temporary breach, and sudden reconciliation, between these two powerful despots, proved the cause of sorrow and ruin at Himera. That city, under the dominion of the Agrigentine Théro, was administered by his son Thrasydæus—a youth whose oppressive conduct speedily excited the strongest antipathy. The Himereans, knowing that they had little chance of redress from Théro against his son, took advantage of the quarrel between him and Hiero to make propositions to

¹ Diodor. xi. 67 ; Aristotel. Politic. v. 9, 3. In spite of the compliments directly paid by Pindar to Hiero (*πραῖς ἀστοῖς, οὐ φθονέων ἀγαθοῖς, ξείνοις δὲ θαυμαστὸς πατήρ*, Pyth. iii. 71 = 125), his indirect admonitions and hints sufficiently attest the real character (see Dissen ad Pindar. Pyth. i. and ii. p. 161–182).

² Diodor. xi. 48 ; Schol. Pindar, Olymp. ii. 29.

the latter, and to entreat his aid for the expulsion of Thrasydæus, tendering themselves as subjects of Syracuse. It appears that Kapys and Hippokratés, cousins of Théro, but at variance with him, and also candidates for the protection of Hiero, were concerned in this scheme for detaching Himera from the dominion of Théro. But so soon as peace had been concluded, Hiero betrayed to Théro both the schemes and the malcontents at Himera. We seem to make out that Kapys and Hippokratés collected some forces to resist Théro, but were defeated by him at the river Himera: ¹ his victory was followed up by seizing and putting to death a large number of Himeræan citizens. So great was the number slain, coupled with the loss of others who fled for fear of being slain, that the population of the city was sensibly and inconveniently diminished. Théro invited and enrolled a large addition of new citizens, chiefly of Dorian blood.²

The power of Hiero, now reconciled both with Théro and with his brother Polyzélus, is marked by several circumstances as noway inferior to that of Gelo, and probably the greatest, not merely in Sicily, but throughout the Grecian world. The citizens of the distant city of Cumæ, on the coast of Italy, harassed by Carthaginian and Tyrrhenian fleets entreated his aid, and received from him a squadron which defeated and drove off their enemies: ³ he even settled a Syracusan colony in the neighbouring island of Pithekusa. Anaxilaus, despot of Rhegium and Messênê, had attacked, and might probably have overpowered, his neighbours the Epizephyrian Lokrians; but the menaces of Hiero, invoked by the Lokrians, and conveyed by the envoy Chromius, compelled him to desist.⁴ Those heroic honours, which in Greece belonged to the Œkist of a new city, were yet wanting to him. He procured them by the

¹ Schol. ad Pindar. Olymp. ii. 173. For the few facts which can be made out respecting the family and genealogy of Théro, see Göller, *De Situ et Origine Syracusarum*, ch. vii. p. 19-22. The Scholiasts of Pindar are occasionally useful in explaining the brief historical allusions of the poet; but they seem to have had very few trustworthy materials before them for so doing.

² Diodor. xi. 48, 49.

³ The brazen helmet, discovered near the site of Olympia with the name of Hiero and the victory at Cumæ inscribed on it, yet remains as an interesting relic to commemorate this event: it was among the offerings presented by Hiero to the Olympic Zeus: see Boeckh, *Corp. Inscriptt. Græc.* No. 16, part i. p. 34.

⁴ Diodor. xi. 51; Pindar, i. 74 (= 140); ii. 17 (= 35) with the Scholia; Epicharmus, Fragment, p. 19, ed. Krusemann; Schol. Pindar. Pyth. i. 98; Strabo, v. p. 247.

foundation of the new city of Ætna,¹ on the site and in the place of Katana, the inhabitants of which he expelled, as well as those of Naxos. While these Naxians and Katanæans were directed to take up their abode at Leontini along with the existing inhabitants, Hiero planted 10,000 new inhabitants in his adopted city of Ætna; 5000 of them from Syracuse and Gela—with an equal number from Peloponnesus. They served as an auxiliary force, ready to be called forth in the event of discontents at Syracuse, as we shall see by the history of his successor: he gave them not only the territory which had before belonged to Katana, but also a large addition besides, chiefly at the expense of the neighbouring Sikel tribes. His son Deinomenês, and his friend and confidant Chromius, enrolled as an Ætnæan, became joint administrators of the city, whose religious and social customs were assimilated to the Dorian model.² Pindar dreams of future relations between the despot and citizens of Ætna, analogous to those between king and citizens at Sparta. Both Hiero and Chromius were proclaimed as Ætnæans at the Pythian and Nemean games, when their chariots gained victories; on which occasion the assembled crowd heard for the first time of the new Hellenic city of Ætna. We see, by the compliments of Pindar,³ that Hiero was vain of his new title of founder. But we must remark that it was procured, not, as in most cases, by planting Greeks on a spot previously barbarous, but by the dispossession and impoverishment of other Grecian citizens, who seem to have given no ground of offence. Both in Gelo and Hiero we see the first exhibition of that propensity to violent and wholesale transplantation of inhabitants from one seat to another, which was not uncommon among Assyrian and Persian despots, and which was exhibited on a still larger scale

¹ ἱέρων οἰκιστῆς ἀντὶ τυράννου βουλόμενος εἶναι, Καπάνη ἐξελὼν Αἴτνην μετωνόμασε τὴν πόλιν, ἑαυτὸν οἰκιστὴν προσαγορεύσας (Schol. ad Pindar. Nem. i. 1).

Compare the subsequent case of the foundation of Thurii, among the citizens of which violent disputes arose, in determining who should be recognised as Ækist of the place. On referring to the oracle, Apollo directed them to commemorate *himself* as Ækist (Diodor. xii. 35).

² Chromius ἐπίτροπος τῆς Αἴτνης (Schol. Pind. Nem. ix. 1). About the Dorian institutions of Ætna, &c., Pindar, Pyth. i. 60-71.

Deinomenês survived his father, and commemorated the Olympic victories of the latter by costly offerings at Olympia (Pausan. vi. 12, 1).

³ Pindar. Pyth. i. 60 (=117); iii. 69 (=121). Pindar. ap. Strabo. vi. p. 269. Compare Nemea, ix. 1-30, addressed to Chromius. Hiero is proclaimed in some odes as a Syracusan; but Syracuse and the newly-founded Ætna are intimately joined together: see Nemea, i. *ini*.

by the successors of Alexander the Great in their numerous new-built cities.

Anaxilaus of Rhegium died shortly after that message of Hiero which had compelled him to spare the Lokrians. Such was the esteem entertained for his memory, and so efficient the government of Mikythus, a manumitted slave whom he constituted regent, that Rhegium and Messênê were preserved for his children, yet minors.¹ But a still more important change in Sicily was caused by the death of the Agrigentine Thêro, which took place seemingly about 472 B.C. This prince, a partner with Gelo in the great victory over the Carthaginians, left a reputation of good government as well as ability among the Agrigentines, which we find perpetuated in the laureat strains of Pindar: and his memory doubtless became still further endeared from comparison with his son and successor. Thrasydæus, now master both of Himera and Agrigentum, displayed on a larger scale the same oppressive and sanguinary dispositions which had before provoked rebellion at the former city. Feeling himself detested by his subjects, he enlarged the military force which had been left by his father, and engaged so many new mercenaries, that he became master of a force of 20,000 men, horse and foot. And in his own territory, perhaps, he might long have trodden with impunity in the footsteps of Phalaris, had he not imprudently provoked his more powerful neighbour Hiero. In an obstinate and murderous battle between these two princes, 2000 men were slain on the side of the Syracusans, and 4000 on that of the Agrigentines: an immense slaughter, considering that it mostly fell upon the Greeks in the two armies, and not upon the non-Hellenic mercenaries.² But the defeat of Thrasydæus was so complete, that he was compelled to flee not only from Agrigentum, but from Sicily: he retired to Megara in Greece Proper, where he was condemned to death and perished.³ The Agrigentines, thus happily released from their oppressor, sued for and obtained peace from Hiero. They are said to have established a democratical government, but we learn that Hiero sent many citizens into banishment from Agrigentum and

¹ Justin. iv. 2.

² So I conceive the words of Diodorus are to be understood—*πλείστοι τῶν παραταξαμένων Ἑλλήνων πρὸς Ἑλλάδας ἔπεσον* (Diodor. xi. 53).

³ Diodor. xi. 53. *ἐκεῖ θανάτου καταγνωσθεὶς ἐτελεύτησεν*. This is a remarkable specimen of the feeling in a foreign city towards an oppressive *τύραννος*. The Megarians of Greece Proper were much connected with Sicily, through the Hyblæan Megara, as well as Selinus.

Himera, as well as from Gela,¹ nor can we doubt that all the three were numbered among his subject cities. The moment of freedom only commenced for them when the Gelonian dynasty shared the fate of the Theronian.

The victory over Thrasydæus rendered Hiero more completely master of Sicily than his brother Gelo had been before him. The last act which we hear of him, is, his interference on behalf of his brothers-in-law,² the sons of Anaxilaus of Rhegium, who were now of age to govern. He encouraged them to prefer, and probably showed himself ready to enforce their claim against Mikythus, who had administered Rhegium since the death of Anaxilaus, for the property as well as the sceptre. Mikythus complied readily with the demand, rendering an account so exact and faithful, that the sons of Anaxilaus themselves entreated him to remain and govern—or more probably to lend his aid to their government. This request he was wise enough to refuse: he removed his own property and retired to Tegea in Arcadia. Hiero died shortly afterwards, of the complaint under which he had so long suffered, after a reign of ten years.³

On the death of Hiero, the succession was disputed between his brother Thrasybulus, and his nephew the youthful son of Gelo, so that the partisans of the family became thus divided. Thrasybulus, surrounding his nephew with temptations to luxurious pleasure, contrived to put him indirectly aside, and thus to seize the government for himself.⁴ This family division—a curse often resting upon the blood-relations of Grecian despots, and leading to the greatest atrocities⁵—coupled with

¹ Diodor. xi. 76. Οἱ κατὰ τὴν Ἱέρωνος δυναστείαν ἐκπεπρωκότες ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων πόλεων—τούτων δ' ἦσαν Γελφοὶ καὶ Ἀκραγαντίνοι καὶ Ἱμεραῖοι.

² Hiero had married the daughter of Anaxilaus, but he seems also to have had two other wives—the sister or cousin of Thêro, and the daughter of a Syracusan named Nikoklês: this last was the mother of his son Deinomenês (Schol. Pindar. Pyth. i. 112).

We read of Kleophon son of Anaxilaus, governing Messênê during his father's life-time: probably this young man must have died, otherwise Mikythus would not have succeeded (Schol. Pindar. Pyth. ii. 34).

³ Diodor. xi. 66.

⁴ Aristotel. Politic. v. 8, 19. Diodorus does not mention the son of Gelo.

Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fasti Hellenici, App. chap. 10, p. 264 *seq.*) has discussed all the main points connected with Syracusan and Sicilian chronology.

⁵ Xenophon, Hiero, iii. 8. Εἰ τοίνυν ἐθέλεις κατανοεῖν, εὐρήσεις μὲν τοὺς ἰδιώτας ὑπὸ τούτων μάλιστα φιλουμένους, τοὺς δὲ τυράννους πολλοὺς μὲν παῖδας ἑαυτῶν ἀπεκτονηκότας, πολλοὺς δ' ὑπὸ παίδων αὐτοῦ ἀπολωλότας, πολλοὺς δὲ ἀδελφοὺς ἐν τυραννίσει ἀλληλοφόβους γεγενημένους, πολλοὺς δὲ

the conduct of Thrasybulus himself, caused the downfall of the mighty Gelonian dynasty. The bad qualities of Hiero were now seen greatly exaggerated, but without his accompanying energy, in Thrasybulus; who put to death many citizens, and banished still more, for the purpose of seizing their property, until at length he provoked among the Syracusans intense and universal hatred, shared even by many of the old Gelonian partisans. Though he tried to strengthen himself by increasing his mercenary force, he could not prevent a general revolt from breaking out among the Syracusan population. By summoning those cities which Hiero had planted in his new city of Ætna, as well as various troops from his dependent allies, he found himself at the head of 15,000 men, and master of the inner city; that is, the islet of Ortygia, which was the primitive settlement of Syracuse, and was not only distinct and defensible in itself, but also contained the docks, the shipping, and command of the harbour. The revolted people on their side were masters of the outer city, better known under its later name of Achradina, which lay on the adjacent mainland of Sicily, was surrounded by a separate wall of its own, and was divided from Ortygia by an intervening space of low ground used for burials.¹ Though superior in number, yet being no

καὶ ὑπὸ γυναικῶν τῶν ἐαυτῶν τυράννου διεφθαρμένους, καὶ ὑπὸ ἐταίρων γὰρ τῶν μάλιστα δοκούντων φίλων εἶναι: compare Isokratês, De Pace, Orat. viii. p. 182, § 138.

So also Tacitus (Hist. v. 9) respecting the native kings of Judæa, after the expulsion of the Syrian dynasty—"Sibi ipsi reges imposuere: qui, mobilitate vulgi expulsi, resumptâ per arma dominatione, fugas civium, urbium eversiones,—fratrum, conjugum, parentum, neces—aliâque solita regibus ausi," &c.

¹ Respecting the topography of Syracuse at the time of these disturbances, immediately preceding and following the fall of the Gelonian dynasty—my statements in the present edition will be found somewhat modified as compared with the first. In describing the siege of the city by the Athenian army under Nikias, I found it necessary to study the local details of Thucydides with great minuteness, besides consulting fuller modern authorities. The conclusions which I have formed will be found stated,—partly in the early part of chapter lix.—but chiefly in a separate dissertation annexed as an Appendix at the end of vol. vii., and illustrated by two plans. To the latter Dissertation with its Plans, I request the reader to refer.

Diodorus here states (xi. 67, 68), that Thrasybulus was master both of the Island (Ortygia) and Achradina, while the revolted Syracusans held the rest of the city, of which Itykê or Tychê was a part. He evidently conceives Syracuse as having comprised, in 463 B. C., substantially the same great space and the same number of four quarters or portions, as it afterwards came to contain from the time of the despot Dionysius down to the Roman empire, and as it is set forth in the description of Cicero (Orat. in Verr. iv. 53, 118–120) enumerating the four quarters Ortygia, Achradina,

match in military efficiency for the forces of Thrasylbulus, they were obliged to invoke aid from the other cities in Sicily, as well as from the Sikel tribes—proclaiming the Gelonian dynasty as the common enemy of freedom in the island, and holding out universal independence as the reward of victory. It was fortunate for them that there was no brother-despot like the powerful Théro to espouse the cause of Thrasylbulus. Gela, Agrigentum, Selinus, Himera, and even the Sikel tribes, all responded to the call with alacrity, so that a large force, both military and naval, came to reinforce the Syracusans; and Thrasylbulus, being totally defeated, first in a naval action, next on land, was obliged to shut himself up in Ortygia, where he soon found his situation hopeless. He accordingly opened a negotiation with his opponents, which ended in his abdication and retirement to Lokri, while the mercenary troops whom he had brought together were also permitted to depart unmolested.¹ The expelled Thrasylbulus afterwards lived and died as a private citizen at Lokri—a very different fate from that which had befallen Thrasydæus (son of Théro) at Megara, though both seem to have given the same provocation.

Thus fell the powerful Gelonian dynasty at Syracuse, after a continuance of eighteen years.² Its fall was nothing less than an extensive revolution throughout Sicily. Among the various cities of the island there had grown up many petty despots, each with his separate mercenary force; acting as the instruments, and relying on the protection, of the great despot at

Tychê, and Neapolis. I believe this to be a mistake. I take the general conception of the topography of Syracuse given by Thucydides in 415 B.C., as representing in the main what it had been fifty years before. Thucydides (vi. 3) mentions only the Inner City, which was in the Islet of Ortygia (*ἡ πόλις ἡ ἐντὸς*)—and the Outer City (*ἡ πόλις ἡ ἔξω*). This latter was afterwards known by the name of Achradina, though that name does not occur in Thucydides. Diodorus expressly mentions that both Ortygia and Achradina had each separate fortifications (xi. 73).

In these disputes connected with the fall of the Gelonian dynasty, I conceive Thrasylbulus to have held possession of Ortygia, which was at all times the inner stronghold and the most valuable portion of Syracuse; insomuch that under the Roman dominion, Marcellus prohibited any native Syracusan from dwelling in it. (Cicero cont. Verr. v. 32-84, 38, 98). The enemies of Thrasylbulus, on the contrary, I conceive to have occupied Achradina.

There is no doubt that this bisection of Syracuse into two separate fortifications must have afforded great additional facility for civil dispute, if there were any causes abroad tending to foment it; conformably to a remark of Aristotle (Polit. v. 2, 12), which the philosopher illustrates by reference to Kolophôn and Notium, as well as to the insular and continental portions of Klazomenæ.

¹ Diodor. ix. 67, 68.

² Aristotel. Politic. v. 8, 23.

Syracuse. All these were now expelled, and governments more or less democratical were established everywhere.¹ The sons of Anaxilaus maintained themselves a little longer at Rhegium and Messênê, but the citizens of these two towns at length followed the general example, compelled them to retire,² and began their æra of freedom.

But though the Sicilian despots had thus been expelled, the free governments established in their place were exposed at first to much difficulty and collision. It has been already mentioned that Gelo, Hiero, Thêro, Thrasydæus, Thrasybulus, &c., had all condemned many citizens to exile with confiscation of property; and had planted on the soil new citizens and mercenaries, in numbers no less considerable. To what race these mercenaries belonged, we are not told: it is probable that they were only in part Greeks. Such violent mutations, both of persons and property, could not occur without raising bitter conflicts, of interest as well as of feeling, between the old, the new, and the dispossessed proprietors, as soon as the iron hand of compression was removed. This source of angry dissension was common to all the Sicilian cities, but in none did it flow more profusely than in Syracuse. In that city, the new mercenaries last introduced by Thrasybulus, had retired at the same time with him, many of them to the Hieronian city of Ætna, from whence they had been brought. But there yet remained the more numerous body introduced principally by Gelo, partly also by Hiero; the former alone having enrolled 10,000, of whom more than 7000 yet remained. What part these Gelonian citizens had taken in the late revolution, we do not find distinctly stated: they seem not to have supported Thrasybulus as a body, and probably many of them took part against him.

After the revolution had been accomplished, a public assembly of the Syracusans was convened, in which the first resolution was, to provide for the religious commemoration of the event, by erecting a colossal statue of Zeus Eleutherius, and by celebrating an annual festival to be called the Eleutheria, with solemn matches and sacrifices. They next proceeded to determine the political constitution, and such was the predominant reaction, doubtless aggravated by the returned exiles, of hatred and fear against the expelled dynasty—that the whole body of new citizens, who had been domiciliated under Gelo and Hiero, were declared ineligible to magistracy or honour. This harsh and sweeping disqualification, falling at once upon

¹ Diodor. xi. 68.

² Diodor. xi. 76.

a numerous minority, naturally provoked renewed irritation and civil war. The Gelonian citizens, the most warlike individuals in the state, and occupying, as favoured partisans of the previous dynasty, the inner section of Syracuse¹—Ortygia—placed themselves in open revolt; while the general mass of citizens, masters of the outer city, were not strong enough to assail with success this defensible position.² But they contrived to block it up nearly altogether, and to intercept both its supplies and its communication with the country, by means of a new fortification carried out from the outer city towards the Great Harbour, and stretching between Ortygia and Epipolæ. The garrison within could thus only obtain supplies at the cost of perpetual conflicts. This disastrous internal war continued for some months, with many partial engagements both by land and sea: whereby the general body of citizens became accustomed to arms, while a chosen regiment of 600 trained volunteers acquired especial efficiency. Unable to maintain themselves longer, the Gelonians were forced to hazard a general battle, which, after an obstinate struggle, terminated in their complete defeat. The chosen band of 600, who had eminently

¹ Aristotle (*Politic.* v. 2, 11) mentions, as one of his illustrations of the mischief of receiving new citizens, that the Syracusans, after the Gelonian dynasty, admitted the foreign mercenaries to citizenship, and from hence came to sedition and armed conflict. But the incident cannot fairly be quoted in illustration of that principle which he brings it to support. The mercenaries, so long as the dynasty lasted, had been the first citizens in the community; after its overthrow, they became the inferior, and were rendered inadmissible to honours. It is hardly matter of surprise that so great a change of position excited them to rebel: but this is not a case properly adducible to prove the difficulty of adjusting matters with new-coming citizens.

After the expulsion of Agathoklés from Syracuse, nearly two centuries after these events, the same quarrel and sedition was renewed, by the exclusion of his mercenaries from magistracy and posts of honour (*Diodor.* xxi. *Fragm.* p. 282).

² *Diodor.* xi. 73. Οἱ δὲ Συρακοῦσιοι πάλιν ἐμπεσόντες εἰς ταραχὴν, τὸ λοιπὸν τῆς πόλεως ἀπέσχον, καὶ τὸ πρὸς τὰς Ἐπιπολάς τετραμμένον αὐτῆς ἐπετείχισαν, καὶ πολλὴν ἀσφάλειαν ἑαυτοῖς κατεσκεύασαν· εὐθὺ γὰρ τῆς ἐπὶ τὴν χάραν ἐξέδδου τοὺς ἀφεισηκώτας εὐχερῶς εἶργον καὶ ταχὺ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἐποίησαν ἀπορεῖν.

Diodorus here repeats the same misconception as I have noticed in a previous note. He supposes that the Gelonians were in possession both of Ortygia and of Achradina, whereas they were only in possession of the former, as Thrasylbulus had been in the former contest.

The opposing party were in possession of the outer city or Achradina: and it would be easy for them, by throwing out a fortification between Epipolæ and the Great Harbour, to straiten the communication of Ortygia with the country around; as may be seen by referring to the Plans of Syracuse at the end of vol. vii.

contributed to this victory, received from their fellow-citizens a crown of honour, and a reward of one mina per head.¹

The meagre annals, wherein these interesting events are indicated rather than described, tell us scarcely anything of the political arrangements which resulted from so important a victory. Probably many of the Gelonians were expelled: but we may assume as certain, that they were deprived of the dangerous privilege of a separate residence in the inner stronghold or islet Ortygia.²

Meanwhile the rest of Sicily had experienced disorders analogous in character to those of Syracuse. At Gela, at Agrigentum, at Himera, the reaction against the Gelonian dynasty had brought back in crowds the dispossessed exiles; who, claiming restitution of their properties and influence, found their demands sustained by the population generally. The Katanæans, whom Hiero had driven from their own city to Leontini, in order that he might convert Katana into his own settlement Ætna, assembled in arms and allied themselves with the Sikel prince Duketius, to reconquer their former home and to restore to the Sikels that which Hiero had taken from them for enlargement of the Ætnæan territory. They were aided by the Syracusans, to whom the neighbourhood of these Hieronian partisans was dangerous: but they did not accomplish their object until after a long contest and several battles with the Ætnæans. A convention was at length concluded, by which the latter evacuated Katana and were allowed to occupy the town and territory (seemingly Sikel) of Ennesia or Inessa, upon which they bestowed the name of Ætna,³ with monuments commemorating Hiero as the founder—while the tomb of the latter at Katana was demolished by the restored inhabitants.

These conflicts, disturbing the peace of all Sicily, came to be so intolerable, that a general congress was held between the various cities to adjust them. It was determined by joint resolution to re-admit the exiles and to extrude the Gelonian settlers everywhere: but an establishment was provided for these latter in the territory of Messênê. It appears that the exiles received back their property, or at least an assignment of other lands in compensation for it. The inhabitants of Gela were enabled to provide for their own exiles by re-establishing

¹ Diodor. xi. 72, 73, 76.

² Diodorus, xiv. 7.

³ Diodorus, xi. 76; Strabo, vi. 268. Compare, as an analogous event, the destruction of the edifices erected in the market-place of Amphipolis, in honour of the Athenian Agnon the Ekist, after the revolt of that city from Athens (Thucyd. v. 11).

the city of Kamarina,¹ which had been conquered from Syracuse by Hippokratês despot of Gelo, but which Gelo, on transferring his abode to Syracuse, had made a portion of the Syracusan territory, conveying its inhabitants to the city of Syracuse. The Syracusans now renounced the possession of it—a cession to be explained probably by the fact, that among the new-comers transferred by Gelo to Syracuse, there were included not only the previous Kamarinæans, but also many who had before been citizens of Gela.² For these men, now obliged to quit Syracuse, it would be convenient to provide an abode at Kamarina, as well as for the other restored Geloan exiles; and we may further presume that this new city served as a receptacle for other homeless citizens from all parts of the island. It was consecrated by the Geloans as an independent city, with Dorian rites and customs: its lands were distributed anew, and among its settlers were men rich enough to send prize chariots to Peloponnesus, as well as to pay for odes of Pindar. The Olympic victories of the Kamarinæan Psaumis secured for his new city an Hellenic celebrity, at a moment when it had hardly yet emerged from the hardships of an initiatory settlement.³

Such was the great reactionary movement in Sicily against the high-handed violences of the previous despots. We are only enabled to follow it generally, but we see that all their transplantations and expulsions of inhabitants were reversed, and all their arrangements overthrown. In the correction of the past injustice, we cannot doubt that new injustice was in many cases committed, nor are we surprised to hear that at Syracuse many new enrolments of citizens took place without any rightful claim,⁴ probably accompanied by grants of land. The reigning feeling at Syracuse would now be quite opposite to that of the days of Gelo, when the Demos or aggregate of small self-working proprietors was considered as “a troublesome yoke-fellow,” fit only to be sold into slavery for exportation. It is highly probable that the new table of citizens now prepared included

¹ Diodor. xi. 76. *μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα Καμάριναν μὲν Γελφοὶ κατοικίσαντες ἐξ ἀρχῆς κατεκληρούχησαν.*

See the note of Wesseling upon this passage. There can be little doubt that in Thucydides (vi. 5) the correction of *κατρκίσθη ὑπὸ Γελῶνων* (in place of *ὅπῃ Γέλωνος*) is correct.

² Herodot. vii. 155.

³ See the fourth and fifth Olympic odes of Pindar, referred to Olympiad 82, or 452 B.C., about nine years after the Geloans had re-established Kamarina. *Τὸν νέουκον ἔδραν* (Olymp. v. 9), *ἀπ' ἀμαχανίας ἄγων ἐς φάος τόνδε δᾶμον ἀστῶν* (Olymp. v. 14).

⁴ Diodor. xi. 86. *πολλῶν εἰκῆ καὶ ὡς ἔτυχε πεπολιτογραφημένων.*

that class of men in larger number than ever, on principles analogous to the liberal enrolments of Kleisthenés at Athens. In spite of all the confusion however with which this period of popular government opens, lasting for more than fifty years until the despotism of the elder Dionysius, we shall find it far the best and most prosperous portion of Sicilian history. We shall arrive at it in a subsequent chapter.

Respecting the Grecian cities along the coast of Italy, during the period of the Gelonian dynasty, a few words will exhaust the whole of our knowledge. Rhegium, with its despots Anaxilaus and Mikythus, figures chiefly as a Sicilian city, and has been noticed as such in the stream of Sicilian politics. But it is also involved in the only event which has been preserved to us respecting this portion of the history of the Italian Greeks. It was about the year B.C. 473, that the Tarentines undertook an expedition against their non-Hellenic neighbours the Iapygians, in hopes of conquering Hyria and the other towns belonging to them. Mikythus, despot of Rhegium, against the will of his citizens, despatched 3000 of them by constraint as auxiliaries to the Tarentines. But the expedition proved signally disastrous to both. The Iapygians, to the number of 20,000 men, encountered the united Grecian forces in the field, and completely defeated them. The battle having taken place in a hostile country, it seems that the larger portion both of Rhegians and Tarentines perished, insomuch that Herodotus pronounces it to have been the greatest Hellenic slaughter within his knowledge.¹ Of the Tarentines slain a great proportion were opulent and substantial citizens, the loss of whom sensibly affected the government of the city; strengthening the Demos, and rendering the constitution more democratical. In what particulars the change consisted we do not know: the expression of Aristotle gives reason to suppose that even before this event the constitution had been popular.²

¹ Herodot. vii. 170; Diodor. xi. 52. The latter asserts that the Iapygian victors divided their forces, part of them pursuing the Rhegian fugitives, the rest pursuing the Tarentines. Those who followed the former were so rapid in their movements, that they entered (he says) along with the fugitives into the town of Rhegium, and even became masters of it.

To say nothing of the fact, that Rhegium continues afterwards, as before, under the rule of Mikythus—we may remark that *Diodorus must have formed to himself a strange idea of the geography of southern Italy, to talk of pursuit and flight from Iapygia to Rhegium.*

² Aristotel. Polit. v. 2, 8. Aristotle has another passage (vi. 3, 5) in which he comments on the government of Tarentum: and O. Müller applies this second passage to illustrate the particular constitutional changes which were made after the Iapygian disaster. I think this

CHAPTER XLIV

FROM THE BATTLES OF PLATÆA AND MYKALÆ DOWN TO THE DEATHS OF THEMISTOKLES AND ARISTEIDES

AFTER having in the last chapter followed the repulse of the Carthaginians by the Sicilian Greeks, we now return to the central Greeks and the Persians—a case in which the triumph was yet more interesting to the cause of human improvement generally.

The disproportion between the immense host assembled by Xerxes, and the little which he accomplished, naturally provokes both a contempt for Persian force and an admiration for the comparative handful of men by whom they were so ignominiously beaten. Both these sentiments are just, but both are often exaggerated beyond the point which attentive contemplation of the facts will justify. The Persian mode of making war (which we may liken to that of the modern Turks,¹ now that the period of their energetic fanaticism has passed away) was in a high degree disorderly and inefficient. The men indeed, individually taken, especially the native Persians, were not deficient in the qualities of soldiers, but their arms and their organisation were wretched—and their leaders yet worse. On the other hand, the Greeks, equal, if not superior, in individual bravery, were incomparably superior in soldier-like order as well as in arms: but here too the leadership was defective, and the disunion a constant source of peril. Those who, like Plutarch (or rather the Pseudo-Plutarch) in his treatise on the Malignity of Herodotus, insist on acknowledging nothing but magnanimity and heroism in the proceedings of the Greeks throughout these critical years, are forced to deal harshly with the inestimable witness on whom our knowledge of the facts depends. That witness intimates plainly that, in spite of the devoted courage displayed, not less by the vanquished at Thermopylæ, than by the victors at Salamis, Greece owed her salvation chiefly to the imbecility, cowardice,

juxtaposition of the two passages unauthorised: there is nothing at all to connect them together. See History of the Dorians, iii. 9, 14.

¹ Mr. Waddington's Letters from Greece, describing the Greek revolution of 1821, will convey a good idea of the stupidity of Turkish warfare: compare also the second volume of the Memoirs of Baron de Tott, part iii.

and credulous rashness, of Xerxes.¹ Had he indeed possessed either the personal energy of Cyrus, or the judgement of Artemisia, it may be doubted whether any excellence of management, or any intimacy of union, could have preserved the Greeks against so great a superiority of force. But it is certain that all their courage as soldiers in line would have been unavailing for that purpose, without a higher degree of generalship, and a more hearty spirit of co-operation, than that which they actually manifested.

One hundred and fifty years after this eventful period, we shall see the tables turned, and the united forces of Greece under Alexander of Macedon becoming invaders of Persia. We shall find that in Persia no improvement has taken place during this long interval—that the scheme of defence under Darius Codomannus labours under the same defects as that of attack under Xerxes—that there is the same blind and exclusive confidence in pitched battles with superior numbers²—that the advice of Mentor the Rhodian, and of Charidemus, is despised like that of Demaratus and Artemisia—that Darius Codomannus, essentially of the same stamp as Xerxes, is hurried into the battle of Issus by the same ruinous temerity as that which threw away the Persian fleet at Salamis—and that the Persian native infantry (not the cavalry) even appear to have lost that individual gallantry which they displayed so conspicuously at Plataea. But on the Grecian side, the improvement in every way is very great: the orderly courage of the soldier has been sustained and even augmented, while the generalship and power of military combination has reached a point unexampled in the previous history of mankind. Military science may be esteemed a sort of creation during this interval, and will be found to go through various stages—Demosthenês and Brasidas—the Cyreian army and Xenophon—Agêsilaus—Iphikratês—Epaminondas—Philip of Macedon—Alexander:³ for the Macedonian princes are borrowers of Greek tactics, though extending and applying them with a personal energy peculiar to themselves, and with advantages of position such as no Athenian or Spartan ever enjoyed. In this comparison between the invasion of Xerxes and that of Alexander, we contrast the progressive spirit of Greece, serving as herald and

¹ Thucyd. i. 69. ἐπιστάμενοι καὶ τὸν βάρβαρον αὐτὸν περὶ αὐτῶ τὰ πλείω σφαλέντα, &c. : compare Thucyd. vi. 33.

² Thucyd. i. 142. πλήθει τὴν ἁμαθίαν θρασύνοντες, &c.

³ See a remarkable passage in the third Philippic of Demosthenês, c. 10, p. 123.

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stimulus to the like spirit in Europe—with the stationary mind of Asia, occasionally roused by some splendid individual, but never appropriating to itself new social ideas or powers, either for war or for peace.

It is out of the invasion of Xerxes that those new powers of combination, political as well as military, which lighten up Grecian history during the next century and more, take their rise. They are brought into agency through the altered position and character of the Athenians—improvers, to a certain extent, of military operations on land, but the great creators of marine tactics and manœuvring in Greece—and the earliest of all Greeks who showed themselves capable of organising and directing the joint action of numerous allies and dependents: thus uniting the two distinctive qualities of the Homeric Agamemnon¹—ability in command, with vigour in execution.

In the general Hellenic confederacy, which had acted against Persia under the presidency of Sparta, Athens could hardly be said to occupy any ostensible rank above that of an ordinary member. The post of second dignity in the line at Plataea had indeed been adjudged to her, yet only after a contending claim from Tegea. But without any difference in ostensible rank, she was in the eye and feeling of Greece no longer the same power as before. She had suffered more, and at sea had certainly done more, than all the other allies put together. Even on land at Plataea, her hoplites had manifested a combination of bravery, discipline, and efficiency against the formidable Persian cavalry, superior even to the Spartans. No Athenian officer had committed so perilous an act of disobedience as the Spartan Amompharetus. After the victory of Mykalê, when the Peloponnesians all hastened home to enjoy their triumph, the Athenian forces did not shrink from prolonged service for the important object of clearing the Hellespont, thus standing forth as the willing and forward champions of the Asiatic Greeks against Persia. Besides these exploits of Athens collectively, the only two individuals, gifted with any talents for command, whom this momentous contest had thrown up, were both of them Athenians: first, Themistoklês; next, Aristeidês. From the beginning to the end of the struggle, Athens had displayed an unreserved Pan-Hellenic patriotism which had been most ungenerously requited by the Peloponnesians; who had kept within their Isthmian walls, and betrayed Attica twice to hostile ravage; the first time, perhaps, unavoidably—but the

¹ Ἀμφότερον, βασιλεὺς τ' ἀγαθὸς κρατερός τ' αἰχμητής.

Homer, Iliad, iii. 179.

second time by a culpable neglect in postponing their outward march against Mardonius. And the Peloponnesians could not but feel, that while they had left Attica unprotected, they owed their own salvation at Salamis altogether to the dexterity of Themistoklēs and to the imposing Athenian naval force.

Considering that the Peloponnesians had sustained little or no mischief by the invasion, while the Athenians had lost for the time even their city and country, with a large proportion of their moveable property irrecoverably destroyed—we might naturally expect to find the former, if not lending their grateful and active aid to repair the damage in Attica, at least cordially welcoming the restoration of the ruined city by its former inhabitants. Instead of this, we find the same selfishness again prevalent among them. Ill-will and mistrust for the future, aggravated by an admiration which they could not help feeling, overlays all their gratitude and sympathy.

The Athenians, on returning from Salamis after the battle of Plataea, found a desolate home to harbour them. Their country was laid waste,—their city burnt or destroyed, so that there remained but a few houses standing, wherein the Persian officers had taken up their quarters—and their fortifications for the most part razed or overthrown. It was their first task to bring home their families and effects from the temporary places of shelter at Troezen, Ægina, and Salamis. After providing what was indispensably necessary for immediate wants, they began to rebuild their city and its fortifications on a scale of enlarged size in every direction.¹ But as soon as they were seen to be employed on this indispensable work, without which neither political existence nor personal safety was practicable, the allies took the alarm, preferred complaints to Sparta, and urged her to arrest the work. In the front of these complainants probably stood the Æginetans, as the old enemies of Athens, and as having most to apprehend from her might at sea. The Spartans, perfectly sympathising with the jealousy and uneasiness of their allies, were even disposed, from old association, to carry their dislike of fortifications still further, so that they would have been pleased to see all the other Grecian cities systematically defenceless like Sparta itself.² But while sending an embassy to Athens, to offer a friendly remonstrance

¹ Thucyd. i. 89.

² Thucyd. i. 90. τὰ μὲν καὶ αὐτοὶ ἥδιον ἂν ὄρωντες μῆτ' ἐκείνους μῆτ' ἄλλον μηδένα τεῖχος ἔχοντα, τὸ δὲ πλεόν τῶν συμμαχῶν ἐξοτρυνόντων καὶ φοβουμένων τοῦ τε ναυτικοῦ αὐτῶν τὸ πλῆθος, ὃ πρὶν οὐχ ὑπῆρχε, καὶ τὴν ἐς τὸν Μηδικὸν πόλεμον τόλμαν γενομένην.

against the project of re-fortifying the city, they could not openly and peremptorily forbid the exercise of a right common to every autonomous community. Nor did they even venture, at a moment when the events of the past months were fresh in every one's remembrance, to divulge their real jealousies as to the future. They affected to offer prudential reasons against the scheme, founded on the chance of a future Persian invasion; in which case it would be a dangerous advantage for the invader to find any fortified city outside of Peloponnesus to further his operations, as Thebes had recently seconded Mardonius. They proposed to the Athenians therefore, not merely to desist from their own fortifications, but also to assist them in demolishing all fortifications of other cities beyond the limits of Peloponnesus—promising shelter within the Isthmus, in case of need, to all exposed parties.

A statesman like Themistoklês was not likely to be imposed upon by this diplomacy: but he saw that the Spartans had the power of preventing the work if they chose, and that it could only be executed by the help of successful deceit. By his advice the Athenians dismissed the Spartan envoys, saying that they would themselves send to Sparta and explain their views. Accordingly Themistoklês himself was presently despatched thither, as one among three envoys instructed to enter into explanations with the Spartan authorities. But his two colleagues, Aristeidês and Abronichus, by previous concert, were tardy in arriving—and he remained inactive at Sparta, making use of their absence as an excuse for not even demanding an audience, yet affecting surprise that their coming was so long delayed. But while Aristeidês and Abronichus, the other two envoys, were thus studiously kept back, the whole population of Athens laboured unremittingly at the walls. Men, women and children, all tasked their strength to the utmost during this precious interval. Neither private houses, nor sacred edifices, were spared to furnish materials; and such was their ardour in the enterprise, that before the three envoys were united at Sparta, the wall had already attained a height sufficient at least to attempt defence. Yet the interval had been long enough to provoke suspicion, even in the slow mind of the Spartans; while the more watchful Æginetans sent them positive intelligence that the wall was rapidly advancing.

Themistoklês, on hearing this allegation, peremptorily denied the truth of it; and the personal esteem entertained towards him was at that time so great, that his assurance¹ obtained for

¹ Thucyd. i. 91. τῷ μὲν Θεμιστοκλεῖ ἐπέθοντο διὰ φιλίαν αὐτοῦ.

some time unqualified credit, until fresh messengers again raised suspicions in the minds of the Spartans. In reply to these, Themistoklēs urged the Ephors to send envoys of their own to Athens, and thus convince themselves of the state of the facts. They unsuspectingly acted upon his recommendation, while he at the same time transmitted a private communication to Athens, desiring that the envoys might not be suffered to depart until the safe return of himself and his colleagues, which he feared might be denied them when his trick came to be divulged. Aristeidēs and Abronichus had now arrived—the wall was announced to be of a height at least above contempt—and Themistoklēs at once threw off the mask. He avowed the stratagem practised—told the Spartans that Athens was already fortified sufficiently to ensure the safety and free will of its inhabitants—and warned them that the hour of constraint was now past, the Athenians being in a condition to define and vindicate for themselves their own rights and duties in reference to Sparta and the allies. He reminded them that the Athenians had always been found competent to judge for themselves, whether in joint consultation, or in any separate affair such as the momentous crisis of abandoning their city and taking to their ships. They had now, in the exercise of this self-judgement, resolved on fortifying their city, as a step indispensable to themselves and advantageous even to the allies generally. No equal or fair interchange of opinion could subsist, unless all the allies had equal means of defence: either all must be unfortified, or Athens must be fortified as well as the rest.¹

Mortified as the Spartans were by a revelation which showed that they had not only been detected in a dishonest purpose, but completely outwitted—they were at the same time overawed by the decisive tone of Themistoklēs, whom they never afterwards forgave. To arrest beforehand erection of the walls, would have been practicable, though not perhaps without difficulty; to deal by force with the fact accomplished, was perilous in a high degree. Moreover the inestimable services just rendered by Athens became again predominant in their minds, so that sentiment and prudence for the time coincided. They affected therefore to accept the communication without manifesting any offence, nor had they indeed put forward any pretence which required to be formally retracted. The envoys

¹ Thucyd. i. 91. Οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τ' εἶναι μὴ ἀπὸ ἀντιπάλου παρασκευῆς ὁμοῖόν τι ἢ ἴσον ἐς τὸ κοινὸν βουλευέσθαι. *Ἡ πάντας οὖν ἀτειχίστους ἔφη χρῆναι συμμαχεῖν, ἢ καὶ τὰδε νομίζειν ὁρθῶς ἔχειν.

on both sides returned home, and the Athenians completed their fortifications, without obstruction¹—yet not without murmurs on the part of the allies, who bitterly reproached Sparta afterwards for having let slip this golden opportunity of arresting the growth of the giant.²

If the allies were apprehensive of Athens before, the mixture of audacity, invention, and deceit, whereby she had just eluded the hindrance opposed to her fortifications, was well calculated to aggravate their uneasiness. On the other hand, to the Athenians, the mere hint of intervention to debar them from that common right of self-defence which was exercised by every autonomous city except Sparta, must have appeared outrageous injustice—aggravated by the fact that it was brought upon them by their peculiar sufferings in the common cause, and by the very allies who without their devoted forwardness would now have been slaves of the Great King. And the intention of the allies to obstruct the fortifications must have been known to every soul in Athens, from the universal press of hands required to hurry the work and escape interference; just as it was proclaimed to after-generations by the shapeless fragments and irregular structure of the wall, in which even sepulchral stones and inscribed columns were seen imbedded.³ Assuredly the sentiment connected with this work—performed as it was alike by rich and poor, strong and weak—men, women, and children—must have been intense as well as equalising. All had endured the common miseries of exile, all had contributed to the victory, all were now sharing the same fatigue for the defence of their recovered city, in order to counterwork the ungenerous hindrance of their Peloponnesian allies. We must take notice of these stirring circumstances, peculiar to the Athenians and acting upon a generation which had now been

¹ We are fortunate enough to possess this narrative, respecting the rebuilding of the walls of Athens, as recounted by Thucydides. It is the first incident which he relates, in that general sketch of events between the Persian and Peloponnesian war, which precedes his professed history (i. 89–92). Diodorus (xi. 39, 40), Plutarch (Themistoklēs, c. 19), and Cornelius Nepos (Themist. c. 6, 7) seem all to have followed Thucydides, though Plutarch also notices a statement of Theopompus, to the effect that Themistoklēs accomplished his object by bribing the Ephors. This would not be improbable in itself—nor is it inconsistent with the narrative of Thucydides; but the latter either had not heard or did not believe it.

² Thucyd. i. 69. *Και τῶνδε ὑμεῖς αἴτιοι* (says the Corinthian envoy addressing the Lacedæmonians), *τό τε πρῶτον ἔδσαντες αὐτοὺς* (the Athenians) *τὴν πόλιν μετὰ τὰ Μηδικὰ κρατῦναι, καὶ ὕστερον τὰ μακρὰ στήσαι τεῖχη, &c.*

³ Thucyd. i. 93. Cornelius Nepos (Themist. c. 7) exaggerates this into a foolish conceit.

nursed in democracy for a quarter of a century and had achieved unaided the victory of Marathon—if we would understand that still stronger burst of aggressive activity, persevering self-confidence, and aptitude as well as thirst for command—together with that still wider spread of democratical organisation—which marks their character during the age immediately following.

The plan of the new fortification was projected on a scale not unworthy of the future grandeur of the city. Its circuit was sixty stadia or about seven miles, with the acropolis nearly in the centre: but the circuit of the previous walls is unknown, so that we are unable to measure the extent of that enlargement which Thucydides testifies to have been carried out on every side. It included within the town the three hills of the Areopagus, Pnyx, and the Museum; while on the south of the town it was carried for a space even on the southern bank of the Ilissus, thus also comprising the fountain Kallirhoë.¹ In spite of the excessive hurry in which it was raised, the structure was thoroughly solid and sufficient against every external enemy: but there is reason to believe that its very large inner area was never filled with buildings. Empty spaces, for the temporary shelter of inhabitants driven in from the country with their property, were eminently useful to a Grecian city-community; to none more useful than to the Athenians, whose principal strength lay in their fleet, and whose citizens habitually resided in large proportion in their separate demes throughout Attica.

The first indispensable step in the renovation of Athens after her temporary extinction, was now happily accomplished: the city was made secure against external enemies. But Themistoklês, to whom the Athenians owed the late successful stratagem, and whose influence must have been much strengthened by its success, had conceived plans of a wider and more ambitious range. He had been the original adviser of the great maritime start taken by his countrymen, as well as of the powerful naval force which they had created during the last few years, and which had so recently proved their salvation. He saw in that force both the only chance of salvation for the future, in case the Persians should renew their attack by sea—

¹ For the dimensions and direction of the Themistoklean walls of Athens, see especially the excellent Treatise of Forchhammer—*Topographie von Athen*—published in the *Kieler Philologische Studien*. Kiel, 1841.

The plan of Athens, prepared by Kiepert after his own researches and published among his recent maps, adopts for the most part the ideas of Forchhammer as to the course of the walls.

a contingency at that time seemingly probable—and boundless prospects of future ascendancy over the Grecian coasts and islands. It was the great engine of defence, of offence, and of ambition. To continue this movement required much less foresight and genius than to begin it. Themistoklēs, the moment that the walls of the city had been finished, brought back the attention of his countrymen to those wooden walls which had served them as a refuge against the Persian monarch. He prevailed upon them to provide harbour-room at once safe and adequate, by the enlargement and fortification of the Peiræus. This again was only the prosecution of an enterprise previously begun; for he had already, while in office two or three years before,¹ made his countrymen sensible that the open roadstead of Phalêrum was thoroughly insecure, and had prevailed upon them to improve and employ in part the more spacious harbours of Peiræus and Munychia—three natural basins, all capable of being closed and defended. Something had then been done towards the enlargement of this port, though it had probably been subsequently ruined by the Persian invaders. But Themistoklēs now resumed the scheme on a scale far grander than he could then have ventured to propose—a scale

¹ Thucyd. i. 93. *ἔπεισε δὲ καὶ τοῦ Πειραιῶς τὰ λοιπὰ δ' Θεμιστοκλῆς οἰκοδομεῖν (ἐπιήρητο δ' αὐτοῦ πρότερον ἐπὶ τῆς ἐκείνου ἀρχῆς, ἧς κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν Ἀθηναίοις ἤρξε).*

Upon which words the Scholiast observes (κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν)—*κατὰ τινα ἐνιαυτὸν ἢ γε μὴν ἐγένετο πρὸ δὲ τῶν Μηδικῶν ἤρξε Θεμιστοκλῆς ἐνιαυτὸν ἕνα.*

It seems hardly possible, having no fuller evidence to proceed upon, to determine to which of the preceding years Thucydidēs means to refer this ἀρχή of Themistoklēs. Mr. Fynes Clinton, after discussing the opinions of Dodwell and Corsini (see *Fasti Hellenici*, ad ann. 481 B.C. and Preface, p. xv.), inserts Themistoklēs as Archon Eponymus in 481 B.C., the year before the invasion of Xerxes, and supposes the Peiræus to have been commenced in that year. This is not in itself improbable: but he cites the Scholiast as having asserted the same thing before him (πρὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν ἤρξε Θεμιστοκλῆς ἐνιαυτὸν ἕνα), in which I apprehend that he is not borne out by the analogy of the language: *ἐνιαυτὸν ἕνα* in the accusative case denotes only the duration of the ἀρχή, not the position of the year (compare Thucyd. iii. 68).

I do not feel certain that Thucydidēs meant to designate Themistoklēs as having been Archon Eponymus, or even as having been one of the nine Archons. He may have meant “during the year when Themistoklēs was Stratégus (or general),” and the explanation of the Scholiast, who employs the word *ἡγεμῶν*, rather implies that he so understood it. The Stratégi were annual as well as the Archons. Now we know that Themistoklēs was one of the generals in 480 B.C., and that he commanded in Thessaly, at Artemisium, and at Salamis. The Peiræus may have been begun in the early part of 480 B.C., when Xerxes was already on his march, or at least at Sardis.

which demonstrates the vast auguries present to his mind respecting the destinies of Athens.

Peiræus and Munychia, in his new plan, constituted a fortified space as large as the enlarged Athens, and with a wall far more elaborate and unassailable. The wall which surrounded them, sixty stadia in circuit,¹ was intended by him to be so stupendous, both in height and thickness, as to render assault hopeless, and to enable the whole military population to act on shipboard, leaving only old men and boys as a garrison.² We may judge how vast his project was, when we learn that the wall, though in practice always found sufficient, was only carried up to half the height which he had contemplated.³ In respect to thickness however his ideas were exactly followed: two carts meeting one another brought stones which were laid together right and left on the outer side of each, and thus formed two primary parallel walls, between which the interior space (of course at least as broad as the joint breadth of the two carts) was filled up, "not with rubble, in the usual manner of the Greeks, but constructed, throughout the whole thickness, of squared stones, cramped together with metal."⁴ The result was a solid wall, probably not less than fourteen or fifteen feet thick, since it was intended to carry so very unusual a height. In the exhortations whereby he animated the people to this fatiguing and costly work, he laboured to impress upon them that Peiræus was of more value to them than Athens itself, and that it afforded a shelter into which, if their territory should be again overwhelmed by a superior land-force, they might securely retire, with full liberty of that maritime action in which they were a match for all the world.⁵ We may even suspect that if Themistoklēs could have followed his own feelings, he would have altered the site of the city from Athens to Peiræus: the attachment of the people to their ancient and holy rock doubtless prevented any such proposition. Nor did he at that time, probably, contemplate the possibility of those

¹ Thucyd. ii. 13.

² Thucyd. i. 93.

³ Thucyd. i. 93. Τὸ δὲ ὕψος ἤμισυ μάλιστα ἐτελέσθη οὐ διανοεῖτο· ἐβούλετο γὰρ τῷ μεγέθει καὶ τῷ πάχει ἀφιστάναί τὰς τῶν πολεμίων ἐπιβουλὰς, ἀνθρώπων δὲ ἐνόμιζεν ὀλίγων καὶ τῶν ἀχρειστάτων ἀρκέσειν τὴν φυλακὴν, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους εἰς τὰς ναῦς ἐσβήσεσθαι.

⁴ Thucyd. i. 93. The expressions are those of Colonel Leake, derived from inspection of the scanty remnant of these famous walls still to be seen—Topography of Athens, ch. ix. p. 411: see edit. p. 293, Germ. transl. Compare Aristophan. Aves, 1127, about the breadth of the wall of Nephelokokkygia.

⁵ Thucyd. i. 93 (compare Cornel. Nepos, Themistok. c. 6). ταῖς ναυσὶ πρὸς ἅπαντας ἀντίστασθαι.

long walls which in a few years afterwards consolidated the two cities into one.

Forty-five years afterwards, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, we shall hear from Periklēs, who espoused and carried out the large ideas of Themistoklēs, this same language about the capacity of Athens to sustain a great power exclusively or chiefly upon maritime action. But the Athenian empire was then an established reality, whereas in the time of Themistoklēs it was yet a dream, and his bold predictions, surpassed as they were by the future reality, mark that extraordinary power of practical divination which Thucydides so emphatically extols in him. And it proves the exuberant hope which had now passed into the temper of the Athenian people, when we find them, on the faith of these predictions, undertaking a new enterprise of so much toil and expense; and that too when just returned from exile into a desolated country, at a moment of private distress and public impoverishment.

However, Peiræus served other purposes besides its direct use as a dockyard for military marine. Its secure fortifications and the protection of the Athenian navy, were well-calculated to call back those metics or resident foreigners, who had been driven away by the invasion of Xerxes, and who might feel themselves insecure in returning unless some new and conspicuous means of protection were exhibited. To invite them back, and to attract new residents of a similar description, Themistoklēs proposed to exempt them from the *Metoikion* or non-freeman's annual tax:¹ but this exemption can only have lasted for a time, and the great temptation for them to return must have consisted in the new securities and facilities for trade, which Athens, with her fortified ports and navy, now afforded. The presence of numerous metics was profitable to the Athenians, both privately and publicly. Much of the trading, professional, and handicraft business was in their hands: and the Athenian legislation, while it excluded them from the political franchise, was in other respects equitable and protective to them. In regard to trading pursuits, the metics had this advantage over the citizens—that they were less frequently carried away for foreign military service. The great increase of their numbers, from this period forward, while it tended materially to increase the value of property all throughout Attica, but especially in Peiræus and Athens, where they mostly resided, helps us to explain the extraordinary prosperity, together with the excellent cultivation, prevalent

¹ Diodor. xi. 43.

throughout the country before the Peloponnesian war. The barley, vegetables, figs, and oil, produced in most parts of the territory—the charcoal prepared in the flourishing deme of Acharnæ¹—and the fish obtained in abundance near the coast—all found opulent buyers and a constant demand from the augmenting town population.

We are further told that Themistoklēs² prevailed on the Athenians to build every year twenty new ships of the line—so we may designate the trireme. Whether this number was always strictly adhered to, it is impossible to say: but to repair the ships, as well as to keep up their numbers, was always regarded among the most indispensable obligations of the executive government.

It does not appear that the Spartans offered any opposition to the fortification of the Peiræus, though it was an enterprise greater, more novel, and more menacing, than that of Athens. But Diodorus tells us, probably enough, that Themistoklēs thought it necessary to send an embassy to Sparta,³ intimating that his scheme was to provide a safe harbour for the collective navy of Greece, in the event of future Persian attack.

Works on so vast a scale must have taken a considerable time, and absorbed much of the Athenian force: yet they did not prevent Athens from lending active aid towards the expedition which, in the year after the battle of Plataea (B.C. 478), set sail for Asia under the Spartan Pausanias. Twenty ships from the various cities of Peloponnesus⁴ were under his command: the Athenians alone furnished thirty, under the orders

¹ See the lively picture of the Acharnian demots in the comedy of Aristophanēs so entitled.

Respecting the advantages derived from the residence of metics and from foreign visitors, compare the observations of Isokratēs, more than a century after this period, *Orat. iv. De Pace*, p. 163, and Xenophon, *De Vectigalibus*, c. iv.

² Diodor. xi. 41, 42, 43. I mean, that the fact of such an embassy being sent to Sparta is probable enough—separating that fact from the preliminary discussions which Diodorus describes as having preceded it in the assembly of Athens, and which seem unmeaning as well as incredible. His story—that Themistoklēs told the assembly that he had conceived a scheme of great moment to the state, but that it did not admit of being made public beforehand, upon which the assembly named Aristeidēs and Xanthippus to hear it confidentially and judge of it—seems to indicate that Diodorus had read the well-known tale of the project of Themistoklēs to burn the Grecian fleet in the harbour of Pagasæ, and that he jumbled it in his memory with this other project for enlarging and fortifying the Peiræus.

³ Thucyd. i. 94; Plutarch, *Aristeidēs*, c. 23. Diodorus (xi. 44) says that the Peloponnesian ships were fifty in number: his statement is not to be accepted, in opposition to Thucydidēs.

of Aristeidês and Kimon: other triremes also came from the Ionian and insular allies. They first sailed to Cyprus, in which island they liberated most of the Grecian cities from the Persian government. Next they turned to the Bosphorus of Thrace, and undertook the siege of Byzantium, which, like Sestus in the Chersonese, was a post of great moment as well as of great strength—occupied by a considerable Persian force, with several leading Persians and even kinsmen of the monarch. The place was captured,¹ seemingly after a prolonged siege: it might probably hold out even longer than Sestus, as being taken less unprepared. The line of communication between the Euxine sea and Greece was thus cleared of obstruction.

The capture of Byzantium proved the signal for a capital and unexpected change in the relations of the various Grecian cities; a change, of which the proximate cause lay in the misconduct of Pausanias, but towards which other causes, deep-seated as well as various, also tended. In recounting the history of Miltiadês,² I noticed the deplorable liability of the Grecian leading men to be spoiled by success. This distemper worked with singular rapidity on Pausanias. As conqueror of Plataea, he had acquired a renown unparalleled in Grecian experience, together with a prodigious share of the plunder. The concubines, horses,³ camels, and gold plate, which had thus passed into his possession, were well calculated to make the sobriety and discipline of Spartan life irksome, while his power also, though great on foreign command, became subordinate to that of the Ephors when he returned home. His newly-acquired insolence was manifested immediately after the battle, in the commemorative tripod dedicated by his order at Delphi, which proclaimed himself by name and singly, as commander of the Greeks and destroyer of the Persians: an unseemly boast, of which the Lacedæmonians themselves were the first to mark their disapprobation, by causing the inscription to be erased, and the names of the cities who had taken part in the combat to be all enumerated on the tripod.⁴ Nevertheless he was still sent on the command

¹ Thucyd. i. 94.

² See ch. xxxvi. of this History.

³ Herodot. ix. 81.

⁴ In the Athenian inscriptions on the votive offerings dedicated after the capture of Eion, as well as after the great victories near the river Eurymedon, the name of Kimon the commander is not even mentioned (*Plutarch*, Kimon, c. 7; *Diodor.* xi. 62).

A strong protest, apparently familiar to Grecian feeling, against singling out the general particularly, to receive the honours of victory, appears in Euripid. *Andromach.* 694:—striking verses, which are said (truly or

against Cyprus and Byzantium, and it was on the capture of this latter place that his ambition and discontent first ripened into distinct treason. He entered into correspondence with Gongylus the Eretrian exile (now a subject of Persia, and invested with the property and government of a district in Mysia), to whom he entrusted his new acquisition of Byzantium, and the care of the valuable prisoners taken in it.

These prisoners were presently suffered to escape, or rather sent away underhand to Xerxes; together with a letter from the hand of Pausanias himself, to the following effect:—“Pausanias the Spartan commander having taken these captives, sends them back in his anxiety to oblige thee. I am minded, if it so please thee, to marry thy daughter, and to bring under thy dominion both Sparta and the rest of Greece: with thy aid I think myself competent to achieve this. If my proposition be acceptable, send some confidential person down to the seaboard, through whom we may hereafter correspond.” Xerxes, highly pleased with the opening thus held out, immediately sent down Artabazus (the same who had been second in command in Bœotia) to supersede Megabatês in the satrapy of Daskylium. The new satrap, furnished with a letter of reply bearing the regal seal, was instructed to promote actively the projects of Pausanias. The letter was to this purport:—“Thus saith King Xerxes to Pausanias. Thy name stands for ever recorded in my house as a well-doer, on account of the men whom thou hast saved for me beyond sea at Byzantium; and thy propositions now received are acceptable to me. Relax not either night or day in accomplishing that which thou promisest, nor let thyself be held back by cost, either gold or silver, or numbers of men, if thou standest in need of them; but transact in confidence thy business and mine jointly with Artabazus, the good man whom I have now sent, in such manner as may be best for both of us.”¹

Throughout the whole of this expedition, Pausanias had

falsely) to have been indignantly repeated by Kleitus, during the intoxication of the banquet wherein he was slain by Alexander (Quint. Curtius, viii. 4, 29 (viii. 4); Plutarch, Alexand. c. 51).

¹ These letters are given by Thucydides verbatim (i. 128, 129): he had seen them or obtained copies (*ὡς ἕτερον ἀνευρέθη*)—they were doubtless communicated along with the final revelations of the confidential Argilian slave. As they are autographs, I have translated them literally, retaining that abrupt transition from the third person to the first, which is one of their peculiarities. Cornelius Nepos, who translates the letter of Pausanias, has effaced this peculiarity. He carries the third person from the beginning to the end (Cornel. Nep. Pausan. c. 2).

been insolent and domineering; degrading the allies at quarters and watering-places in the most offensive manner as compared with the Spartans, and treating the whole armament in a manner which Greek warriors could not tolerate, even in a Spartan Herakleid and a victorious general. But when he received the letter from Xerxes, and found himself in immediate communication with Artabazus, as well as supplied with funds for corruption,¹ his insane hopes knew no bounds, and he already fancied himself son-in-law of the Great King as well as despot of Hellas. Fortunately for Greece, his treasonable plans were neither deliberately laid, nor veiled until ripe for execution, but manifested with childish impatience. He clothed himself in Persian attire (a proceeding which the Macedonian army, a century and a half afterwards, could not tolerate² even in Alexander the Great)—he traversed Thrace with a body of Median and Egyptian guards—he copied the Persian chiefs both in the luxury of his table and in his conduct towards the free women of Byzantium. Kleonikē, a Byzantine maiden of conspicuous family, having been ravished from her parents by his order, was brought to his chamber at night: he happened to be asleep, and being suddenly awakened, knew not at first who was the person approaching his bed, but seized his sword and slew her.³ Moreover his haughty reserve, with uncontrolled bursts of wrath, rendered him unapproachable; and the allies at length came to regard him as a despot rather than a general. The news of such outrageous behaviour, and the manifest evidences of his alliance with the Persians, were soon transmitted to the Spartans, who recalled him to answer for his conduct, and seemingly the Spartan vessels along with him.⁴

In spite of the flagrant conduct of Pausanias, the Lacedæmonians acquitted him on the allegations of positive and individual wrong; yet mistrusting his conduct in reference to collusion with the enemy, they sent out Dorkis to supersede him as commander. But a revolution, of immense importance for Greece, had taken place in the minds of the allies. The

¹ Diodor. xi. 44.

² Arrian. Exp. Alex. iv. 7, 7; vii. 8, 4; Quint. Curt. vi. 6, 10 (vi. 21, 11).

³ Plutarch, Kimon, c. 6; also Plutarch, De Ser. Numin. Vind. c. 10, p. 555. Pausanias, iii. 17, 8. It is remarkable that the latter heard the story of the death of Kleonikē from the lips of a Byzantine citizen of his own day, and seems to think that it had never found place in any written work.

⁴ Thucyd. i. 95-131: compare Duris and Nymphis apud Athenæum, xii. p. 535.

headship, or hegemony, was in the hands of Athens, and Dorkis the Spartan found the allies not disposed to recognise his authority.

Even before the battle of Salamis, the question had been raised,¹ whether Athens was not entitled to the command of the sea, in consequence of the preponderance of her naval contingent. The repugnance of the allies to any command except that of Sparta, either on land or water, had induced the Athenians to waive their pretensions at that critical moment. But the subsequent victories had materially exalted the latter in the eyes of Greece; while the armament now serving, differently composed from that which had fought at Salamis, contained a large proportion of the newly-enfranchised Ionic Greeks, who not only had no preference for Spartan command, but were attached to the Athenians on every ground—as well from kindred race, as from the certainty that Athens with her superior fleet was the only protector upon whom they could rely against the Persians. Moreover, it happened that the Athenian generals on this expedition, Aristeidēs and Kimon, were personally just and conciliating, forming a striking contrast with Pausanias. Hence the Ionic Greeks in the fleet, when they found that the behaviour of the latter was not only oppressivē towards themselves but also revolting to Grecian sentiment generally—addressed themselves to the Athenian commanders for protection and redress, on the plausible ground of kindred race;² entreating to be allowed to serve under Athens, as leader instead of Sparta.

Plutarch tells us that Aristeidēs not only tried to remonstrate with Pausanias, who repelled him with arrogance—which is exceedingly probable—but that he also required, as a condition of his compliance with the request of the Ionic allies, that they should personally insult Pausanias, so as to make reconciliation impracticable: upon which a Samian and a Chian captain deliberately attacked and damaged the Spartan admiral-ship in the harbour of Byzantium.³ The historians from whom Plutarch copied this latter statement must have presumed in the Athenians a disposition to provoke that quarrel with Sparta which afterwards sprung up as it were spontaneously: but the Athenians had no interest in doing so, nor can we credit the story—which is moreover unnoticed by Thucydidēs. To give

¹ Herodot. viii. 2, 3. Compare the language of the Athenian envoy, as it stands in Herodotus (vii. 155), addressed to Gelo.

² Thucyd. i. 95. ἤξιον αὐτοὺς ἡγεμόνας σφῶν γενέσθαι κατὰ τὸ ξυγγενὲς καὶ Παισιανὴ μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν, ἣν πον βιάσῃται.

³ Plutarch, Aristeidēs, c. 23.

the Spartans a just ground of indignation, would have been glaring imprudence on the part of Aristeidés. Yet having every motive to entertain the request of the allies, he began to take his measures for acting as their protector and chief. And his proceedings were much facilitated by the circumstance that the Spartan government about this time recalled Pausanias to undergo an examination, in consequence of the universal complaints against him which had reached them. He seems to have left no Spartan authority behind him—even the small Spartan squadron accompanied him home: so that the Athenian generals had the best opportunity for ensuring to themselves and exercising that command which the allies besought them to undertake. (So effectually did they improve the moment, that when Dorkis arrived to replace Pausanias, they were already in full supremacy; while Dorkis, having only a small force and being in no condition to employ constraint, found himself obliged to return home.¹)

This incident, though not a declaration of war against Sparta, was the first open renunciation of her authority as presiding state among the Greeks; the first avowed manifestation of a competitor for that dignity, with numerous and willing followers; the first separation of Greece (considered in herself one and apart from foreign solicitations such as the Persian invasion) into two distinct organised camps, each with collective interests and projects of its own. (In spite of mortified pride, Sparta was constrained, and even in some points of view not indisposed, to patient acquiescence.) She had no means of forcing the dispositions of the Ionic allies, while the war with Persia altogether—having now become no longer strictly defensive, and being without maritime as well as distant from her own territory—had ceased to be in harmony with her home-routine and strict discipline. Her grave senators, especially an ancient Herakleid named Hetemaridas, reproved the impatience of the younger citizens, and discountenanced the idea of permanent maritime command as a dangerous innovation. They even treated it as an advantage, that Athens should take the lead in carrying on the Persian war, since it could not be altogether dropped; nor had the Athenians as yet manifested any sentiments positively hostile, to excite their alarm.² Nay, the Spartans actually took credit in the eyes of Athens,

¹ Thucyd. i. 95; Diodorus, xi. 44-47.

² Thucyd. i. 95. Following Thucydidés in his conception of these events, I have embodied in the narrative as much as seems consistent with it in Diodorus (xi. 50), who evidently did not here copy Thucydidés, but probably

about a century afterwards, for having themselves advised this separation of command at sea from command on land.¹ Moreover, if the war continued under Spartan guidance, there would be a continued necessity for sending out their kings or chief men to command: and the example of Pausanias showed them the depraving effect of such military power, remote as well as unchecked.

The example of their king Leotychidês, too, near about this time, was a second illustration of the same tendency. At the same time, apparently, that Pausanias embarked for Asia to carry on the war against the Persians, Leotychidês was sent with an army into Thessaly to put down the Aleuadæ and those Thessalian parties who had sided with Xerxes and Mardonius. Successful in this expedition, he suffered himself to be bribed, and was even detected with a large sum of money actually on his person; in consequence of which the Lacedæmonians condemned him to banishment and razed his house to the ground. He died afterwards in exile at Tegea.² Two such instances

had Ephorus for his guide. The name of Hecæmaridas, as an influential Spartan statesman on this occasion, is probable enough; but his alleged speech on the mischiefs of maritime empire, which Diodorus seems to have had before him composed by Ephorus, would probably have represented the views and feelings of the year 350 B.C., and not those of 476 B.C. The subject would have been treated in the same manner as Isokratês, the master of Ephorus, treats it in his *Orat.* viii. De Pace, p. 179, 180.

¹ Xenophon. *Hellen.* vi. 5, 34. It was at the moment when the Spartans were soliciting Athenian aid, after their defeat at Leuktra. ὑπομνήσκοντες μὲν, ὡς τὸν βάρβαρον κοινῇ ἀπεμαχέσαντο—ἀναμνήσκοντες δὲ, ὡς Ἀθηναῖοί τε ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἠρέθησαν ἡγεμόνες τοῦ ναυτικοῦ, καὶ τῶν κοινῶν χρημάτων φύλακες, τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ταῦτα συμβουλευομένων αὐτοί τε κατὰ γῆν ὁμολογουμένως ὑφ' ἀπάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἡγεμόνες προκρίθεισας, συμβουλευομένων αὐτὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων.

² Herodot. vi. 72; Diodor. xi. 48; Pausanias, iii. 7, 8; compare Plutarch, *De Herodoti Malign.* c. 21, p. 859.

Leotychidês died, according to Diodorus, in 476 B.C.: he had commanded at Mykalé in 479 B.C. The expedition into Thessaly must therefore have been in one of the two intermediate years, if the chronology of Diodorus were in this case thoroughly trustworthy. But Mr. Clinton (*Fasti Hellenici*, Appendix, ch. iii. p. 210) has shown that Diodorus is contradicted by Plutarch, about the date of the accession of Archidamus—and by others, about the date of the revolt at Sparta. Mr. Clinton places the accession of Archidamus and the banishment of Leotychidês (of course therefore the expedition into Thessaly) in 469 B.C. I incline rather to believe that the expedition of Leotychidês against the Thessalian Aleuadæ took place in the year or in the second year following the battle of Plataea, because they had been the ardent and hearty allies of Mardonius in Bœotia, and because the war would seem not to have been completed without putting them down and making the opposite party in Thessaly predominant.

Considering how imperfectly we know the Lacedæmonian chronology of this date, it is very possible that some confusion may have arisen in the case

were well calculated to make the Lacedæmonians distrust the conduct of their Herakleid leaders when on foreign service, and this feeling weighed much in inducing them to abandon the Asiatic headship in favour of Athens. It appears that their Peloponnesian allies retired from this contest at the same time as they did, so that the prosecution of the war was thus left to Athens as chief of the newly-emancipated Greeks.¹)

It was from these considerations that the Spartans were induced to submit to that loss of command which the misconduct of Pausanias had brought upon them. Their acquiescence facilitated the immense change about to take place in Grecian politics.)

According to the tendencies in progress prior to the Persian invasion, Sparta had become gradually more and more the president of something like a Pan-Hellenic union, comprising the greater part of the Grecian states. Such at least was the point towards which things seemed to be tending; and if many separate states stood aloof from this union, none of them at least sought to form any counter-union, if we except the obsolete and impotent pretensions of Argos.

The preceding volumes of this history have shown that Sparta had risen to such ascendancy, not from her superior competence in the management of collective interests, nor even, in the main, from ambitious efforts on her own part to acquire it—but from the converging tendencies of Grecian feeling, which required some such presiding state—and from the commanding military power, rigid discipline, and ancient undisturbed constitution, which attracted that feeling towards Sparta. The necessities of common defence against Persia greatly strengthened these tendencies; and the success of the defence, whereby so many Greeks were emancipated who required protection against their former master, seemed destined to have the like effect still more. For an instant, after the battles of Plataea and Mykalé—when the town of Plataea was set apart as a consecrated

of Leotychidês from the difference between the date of his *banishment* and that of his *death*. King Pleistoanax afterwards, having been banished for the same offence as that committed by Leotychidês, and having lived many years in banishment, was afterwards restored: and the years which he had passed in banishment were counted as a part of his reign (Fast. Hellen. *l. c.* p. 211). The date of Archidamus may perhaps have been reckoned in one account from the *banishment* of Leotychidês—in another from his *death*; the rather, as Archidamus must have been very young, since he reigned forty-two years even after 469 B.C. And the date which Diodorus has given as that of the death of Leotychidês, may really be only the date of his banishment, in which he lived until 469 B.C.

¹ Thucyd. i. 18.

neutral spot for an armed confederacy against the Persian, with periodical solemnities and meetings of deputies—Sparta was exalted to be the chief of a full Pan-Hellenic union, Athens being only one of the principal members. And had Sparta been capable either of comprehensive policy, of self-directed and persevering efforts, or of the requisite flexibility of dealing, embracing distant Greeks as well as near,—her position was now such, that her own ascendancy, together with undivided Pan-Hellenic union, might long have been maintained. But she was lamentably deficient in all the requisite qualities, and the larger the union became, the more her deficiency stood manifest. On the other hand, Athens, now entering into rivalry as a sort of leader of opposition, possessed all those qualities in a remarkable degree, over and above that actual maritime force which was the want of the day; so that the opening made by Spartan incompetence and crime (so far as Pausanias was concerned) found her in every respect prepared.

But the sympathies of the Peloponnesians still clung to Sparta, while those of the Ionian Greeks had turned to Athens: and thus not only the short-lived symptoms of an established Pan-Hellenic union, but even all tendencies towards it, from this time disappear. There now stands out a manifest schism, with two pronounced parties, towards one of which nearly all the constituent atoms of the Grecian world gravitate: the maritime states, newly enfranchised from Persia, towards Athens—the land-states, which had formed most part of the confederate army at Platæa, towards Sparta.¹ Along with this

¹ Thucyd. i. 18. Καὶ μεγάλου κινδύνου επικρεμασθέντος οἱ τε Λακεδαιμόνιοι τῶν συμπολεμησάντων Ἑλλήνων ἠγήσαντο δυνάμει προύχοντες, καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, διανοηθέντες ἐκλιπεῖν τὴν πόλιν καὶ ἀνασκευασάμενοι, ἐς τὰς ναῦς ἐμβάντες ναυτικοὶ ἐγένοντο. Κοινῇ δὲ ἀπωσάμενοι τὸν Βάρβαρον, ὕστερον οὐ πολλῶς διεκρίθησαν πρὸς τε Ἀθηναίους καὶ Λακεδαιμονίους, οἳ τε ἀποστάτας βασιλέως Ἑλλήνων καὶ οἱ συμπολεμησάντες. Δυνάμει γὰρ πάντα μέγιστα διεφάνη ἰσχυροὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν κατὰ γῆν, οἱ δὲ ναυσί. Καὶ ὄλιγον μὲν χρόνον συνέμεινεν ἡ ὁμαιχμία, ἔπειτα δὲ διενεχθέντες οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπολέμησαν μετὰ τῶν συμμάχων πρὸς ἀλλήλους· καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων εἰ τινὲς ποὺ διασταίεν, πρὸς τοὺτους ἤδη ἐχώρουν. Ὅποτε ἀπὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν ἐς τὸνδε αἰὲ τὸν πόλεμον, &c.

This is a clear and concise statement of the great revolution in Grecian affairs, comparing the period before and after the Persian war. Thucydides goes on to trace briefly the consequences of this bisection of the Grecian world into two great leagues—the growing improvement in military skill, and the increasing stretch of military effort on both sides from the Persian invasion down to the Peloponnesian war. He remarks also upon the difference between Sparta and Athens in their way of dealing with their allies respectively. He then states the striking fact, that the military force put forth separately by Athens and her allies on the one side, and by Sparta

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national schism, and called into action by it, appears the internal political schism in each separate city between oligarchy and democracy. Of course the germ of these parties had already previously existed in the separate states. But the energetic democracy of Athens, and the pronounced tendency of Sparta to rest upon the native oligarchies in each separate city as her chief support, now began to bestow, on the conflict of internal political parties, an Hellenic importance, and an aggravated bitterness, which had never before belonged to it.)

The departure of the Spartan Dorkis left the Athenian generals at liberty; and their situation imposed upon them the duty of organising the new confederacy which they had been chosen to conduct. The Ionic allies were at this time not merely willing and unanimous, but acted as the forward

and her allies on the other, during the Peloponnesian war, were each of them greater than the entire force which had been employed by both together in the most powerful juncture of their confederacy against the Persian invaders—*Kal éγένετο αὐτοῖς ἐς τόνδε τὸν πόλεμον ἡ ἰδία παρασκευὴ μείζων ἢ ὡς τὰ κράτιστά ποτε μετὰ ἀκραϊφνοῦς τῆς ξυμμαχίας ἤνθησαν* (i. 19).

I notice this last passage especially (construing it as the Scholiast seems to do), not less because it conveys an interesting comparison, than because it has been understood by Dr. Arnold, Gölter, and other commentators in a sense which seems to me erroneous. They interpret thus—*αὐτοῖς* to mean the Athenians only, and not the Lacedæmonians—*ἡ ἰδία παρασκευὴ* to denote the forces equipped by Athens herself, apart from her allies—and *ἀκραϊφνοῦς ξυμμαχίας* to refer “to the Athenian alliance only, at a period a little before the conclusion of the thirty years’ treaty, when the Athenians were masters not only of the islands, and the Asiatic Greek colonies, but had also united to their confederacy Bœotia and Achaia on the continent of Greece itself” (Dr. Arnold’s note). Now so far as the words go, the meaning assigned by Dr. Arnold might be admissible; but if we trace the thread of ideas in Thucydides, we shall see that the comparison, as these commentators conceive it, between Athens alone and Athens aided by her allies—between the Athenian empire as it stood during the Peloponnesian war, and the same empire as it had stood before the thirty years’ truce—is quite foreign to his thought. Nor had Thucydides said one word to inform the reader, that the Athenian empire at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war had diminished in magnitude, and thus was no longer *ἀκραϊφνής*: without which previous notification, the comparison supposed by Dr. Arnold could not be clearly understood. I conceive that there are two periods, and two sets of circumstances, which throughout all this passage Thucydides means to contrast: first, confederate Greece at the time of the Persian war; next, bisected Greece in a state of war, under the double headship of Sparta and Athens.—*Αὐτοῖς* refers as much to Sparta as to Athens—*ἀκραϊφνοῦς τῆς ξυμμαχίας* means what had been before expressed by *δμαιχμία*—and *ποτε* set against *τόνδε τὸν πόλεμον*, is equivalent to the expression which had before been used—*ἀπὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν ἐς τόνδε αἰὲ τὸν πόλεμον*.

movers in the enterprise ; for they stood in obvious need of protection against the attacks of Persia, and had no further kindness to expect from Sparta or the Peloponnesians. But even had they been less under the pressure of necessity, the conduct of Athens, and of Aristeidês as the representative of Athens, might have sufficed to bring them into harmonious co-operation. The new leader was no less equitable towards the confederates than energetic against the common enemy. The general conditions of the confederacy were regulated in a common synod of the members, appointed to meet periodically for deliberative purposes, in the temple of Apollo and Artemis at Delos—of old the venerated spot for the religious festivals of the Ionic cities, and at the same time a convenient centre for the members. (A definite obligation, either in equipped ships of war or in money, was imposed upon every separate city, and the Athenians, as leaders, determined in which form contribution should be made by each. Their assessment must of course have been reviewed by the synod. They had no power at this time to enforce any regulation not approved by that body)

It had been the good fortune of Athens to profit by the genius of Themistoklês on two recent critical occasions (the battle of Salamis and the rebuilding of her walls), where sagacity, craft, and decision were required in extraordinary measure, and where pecuniary probity was of less necessity. It was no less her good fortune now,—in the delicate business of assessing a new tax and determining how much each state should bear, when unimpeachable honesty in the assessor was the first of all qualities—*not* to have Themistoklês ; but to employ in his stead the well-known, we might almost say the ostentatious, probit. of Aristeidês. This must be accounted good fortune, since at the moment when Aristeidês was sent out, the Athenians could not have anticipated that any such duty would devolve upon him. His assessment not only found favour at the time of its original proposition, when it must have been freely canvassed by the assembled allies—but also maintained its place in general esteem, as equitable and moderate, after the once responsible headship of Athens had degenerated into an unpopular empire.¹

¹ Thucyd. v. 18 ; Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 24. Plutarch states that the allies expressly asked the Athenians to send Aristeidês for the purpose of assessing the tribute. This is not at all probable : Aristeidês, as commander of the Athenian contingent under Pausanias, was at Byzantium when the mutiny of the Ionians against Pausanias occurred, and was the person to whom they applied for protection. As such, he was the natural person

Respecting this first assessment we scarcely know more than the single fact—the aggregate in money was 460 talents = about £106,000 sterling). Of the items composing such aggregate—of the individual cities which paid it—of the distribution of obligations to furnish ships and to furnish money—we are entirely ignorant. The little information which we possess on these points relates to a period considerably later, shortly before the Peloponnesian war, under the uncontrolled empire then exercised by Athens. Thucydidēs in his brief sketch makes us clearly understand the difference between *presiding* Athens with her autonomous and regularly assembled allies in 476 B.C., and *imperial* Athens with her subject allies in 432 B.C. The Greek word equivalent to *ally* left either of these epithets to be understood, by an ambiguity exceedingly convenient to the powerful states. From the same author, too, we learn the general causes of the change: but he gives us few particulars as to the modifying circumstances, and none at all as to the first start. He tells us only that the Athenians appointed a peculiar board of officers called the *Hellēnotamiæ*, to receive and administer the common fund—that Delos was constituted the general treasury, where the money was to be kept—and that the payment thus levied was called the *phorus*;¹ a name which appears then to have been first put into circulation, though afterwards usual—and to have conveyed at first no degrading import, though it afterwards became so odious as to be exchanged for a more innocent synonym.

Endeavouring as well as we can to conceive the Athenian alliance in its infancy, we are first struck with the magnitude of the total sum contributed; which will appear the more remarkable when we reflect that many of the contributing cities furnished ships besides. We may be certain that all which

to undertake such duties as devolved upon Athens, without any necessity of supposing that he was specially asked for to perform it.

Plutarch further states that a certain contribution had been levied from the Greeks towards the war, even during the headship of Sparta. This statement also is highly improbable. The headship of Sparta covers only one single campaign, in which Pausanias had the command; the Ionic Greeks sent their ships to the fleet, which would be held sufficient, and there was no time for measuring commutations into money.

Pausanias states, but I think quite erroneously, that the name of Aristeidēs was robbed of its due honour because he was the first person who *ἔραζε φόρους τοῖς Ἕλλησι* (Pausan. viii. 52, 2). Neither the assessment nor the name of Aristeidēs was otherwise than popular.

Aristotle employs the name of Aristeidēs as a symbol of unrivalled probity (Rhetoric. ii. 14, 2).

¹ Thucyd. i. 95, 96.

was done at first was done by general consent, and by a firm determining majority. For Athens, at the time when the Ionian allies besought her protection against Spartan arrogance, could have had no power of constraining unwilling parties, especially when the loss of supremacy, though quietly borne, was yet fresh and rankling among the countrymen of Pausanias. So large a total implies, from the very first, a great number of contributing states, and we learn from hence to appreciate the powerful, wide-spread, and voluntary movement which then brought together the maritime and insular Greeks distributed throughout the Ægean sea and the Hellespont.

The Phœnician fleet, and the Persian land-force, might at any moment re-appear, and there was no hope of resisting either except by confederacy : so that confederacy under such circumstances became with these exposed Greeks not merely a genuine feeling, but at that time the first of all their feelings. It was their common fear, rather than Athenian ambition, which gave birth to the alliance ; and they were grateful to Athens for organising it. The public import of the name *Hellênotamiæ*, coined for the occasion—the selection of Delos as a centre—and the provision for regular meetings of the members—demonstrate the patriotic and fraternal purpose which the league was destined to serve. In truth the protection of the Ægean sea against foreign maritime force and lawless piracy, as well as that of the Hellespont and Bosphorus against the transit of a Persian force, was a purpose essentially public, for which all the parties interested were bound in equity to provide by way of common contribution. Any island, or seaport, which might refrain from contributing, was a gainer at the cost of others. The general feeling of this common danger, as well as equitable obligation, at a moment when the fear of Persia was yet serious, was the real cause which brought together so many contributing members, and enabled the forward parties to shame into concurrence such as were more backward. How the confederacy came to be turned afterwards to the purposes of Athenian ambition, we shall see at the proper time : but in its origin it was an equal alliance, in so far as alliance between the strong and the weak can ever be equal—not an Athenian empire. Nay, it was an alliance in which every individual member was more exposed, more defenceless, and more essentially benefited in the way of protection, than Athens. We have here in truth one of the few moments in Grecian history wherein a purpose at once common, equal, useful, and innocent, brought together spontaneously many

fragments of this disunited race, and overlaid for a time that exclusive bent towards petty and isolated autonomy which ultimately made slaves of them all. It was a proceeding equitable and prudent, in principle as well as in detail; promising at the time the most beneficent consequences—not merely protection against the Persians, but a standing police of the Ægean sea, regulated by a common superintending authority. And if such promise was not realised, we shall find that the inherent defects of the allies, indisposing them to the hearty appreciation and steady performance of their duties as equal confederates, are at least as much chargeable with the failure as the ambition of Athens. We may add, that in selecting Delos as a centre, the Ionic allies were conciliated by a renovation of the solemnities which their fathers, in the days of former freedom, had crowded to witness in that sacred land.

At the time when this alliance was formed, the Persians still not only the important posts of Eion on the Strymon and Eion in Thrace, but also several other posts in that country¹ which are not specified to us. We may thus understand why the Greek cities on and near the Chalkidic peninsula—Eion, Stageirus, Akanthus, Skólus, Olynthus, Spartólus, which we know to have joined under the first assessment—were not less anxious² to seek protection in the arms of the new confederacy, than the Dorian islands of Rhodes and Kos, the Ionic islands of Samos and Chios, the Lesbian islands of Lesbos and Tenedos, or continental towns such as Byzantium and Byzantium: by all of whom adhesion to this alliance must have been contemplated, in 477 or 476 B.C., as the sole condition of emancipation from Persia. Nothing more was required, for the success of a foreign enemy against Greece generally, than complete autonomy of every Grecian city, small as well as great—such as the Persian monarch prescribed and endeavoured to enforce ninety years afterwards, through the Lacedæmonian Antalkidas, in the pacification which bears the name of the latter. Some sort of union, organised and obligatory upon each city, was indispensable to the safety of all. Indeed even with that aid, at the time when the confederacy of Delos

¹ Herodot. vii. 106. ὕπαρχοι ἐν τῇ Θρηίκῃ καὶ τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου πανταχῇ. Οὗτοι δὲ πάντες, οἳ τε ἐκ Θρηίκῃς καὶ τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου, πλὴν τοῦ ἐν Δορίσκῳ, ὑπὸ Ἑλλήνων ὕστερον ταύτης τῆς στρατηλασίης ἐξηρέθησαν, &c.

² Thucyd. v. 18. Τὰς δὲ πόλεις, φερούσας τὸν φόρον τὸν ἐπ' Ἀριστείδου, αὐτονόμους εἶναι . . . εἰσὶ δὲ Ἀργίλος, Στάγειρος, Ἀκανθος, Στῶλος, Ὀλονθος, Σπάρταλος.

was first formed, it was by no means certain the Asiatic enemy would be effectually kept out; especially as the Persians were strong not merely from their own force, but also from the aid of internal parties in many of the Grecian states—traitors within, as well as exiles without.

Among these traitors, the first in rank as well as the most formidable, was the Spartan Pausanias. Summoned home from Byzantium to Sparta, in order that the loud complaints against him might be examined, he had been acquitted¹ of the charges of wrong and oppression against individuals. Yet the presumptions of *medism* (or treacherous correspondence with the Persians) appeared so strong, that, though not found guilty, he was still not reappointed to the command. Such treatment seems to have only emboldened him in the prosecution of his designs against Greece; for which purpose he came out to Byzantium in a trireme belonging to Hermionê, under pretence of aiding as a volunteer without any formal authority in the war. He there resumed his negotiations with Artabazus. His great station and celebrity still gave him so strong an influence on men's opinions, that he appears to have established himself as a sort of mastery in Byzantium, from whence the Athenians, the recognised heads of the confederacy, were constrained to depart from him by force.² And we may be sure that the terror excited by his presence, as well as by his known designs, tended materially to accelerate the organisation of the confederacy under Artabazus. He then retired to Kolônæ in the Troad, where he continued for some time in the further prosecution of his schemes, till he was obliged to form a Persian party, despatching emissaries to distribute Persian gold among various cities of Greece, and probably employing the name of Sparta to impede the formation of a new confederacy:³ until at length the Spartan authorities

¹ Cornelius Nepos states that he was fined (Pausanias, c. 2), which is neither noticed by Thucydides, nor at all probable, looking at the subsequent circumstances connected with him.

² Thucyd. i. 130, 131. Καὶ ἐκ τοῦ Βυζαντίου βία ἦν Ἰωνῶν ἐκπελασθῆναι, &c.: these words seem to imply that he had acquired a strong position in the town.

³ It is to this time that I refer the mission of Arthmius of Zeleia (an Asiatic town, between Mount Ida and the southern coast of the Propontis) to gain over such Greeks as he could by means of Persian gold. In the course of his visit to Greece, Arthmius went to Athens: his purpose was discovered, and he was compelled to flee; while the Athenians, at the instance of Themistoklês, passed an indignant decree, declaring him and his race enemies of Athens, and of all the allies of Athens—and proclaiming that whoever should slay him would be guiltless; because he had brought in Persian gold to bribe the Greeks. This decree was engraven on

apprised of his proceedings, sent a herald out to him with peremptory orders that he should come home immediately along with the herald: if he disobeyed, "the Spartans would declare war against him," or constitute him a public enemy.

As the execution of this threat would have frustrated all the ulterior schemes of Pausanias, he thought it prudent to obey; the rather, as he felt entire confidence of escaping all the charges against him at Sparta by the employment of bribes,¹ the means for which were doubtless abundantly furnished to him through Artabazus. He accordingly returned along with the herald, and was, in the first moments of indignation, imprisoned by order of the Ephors—who, it seems, were legally competent to imprison him, even had he been king instead of regent. But he was soon let out, on his own requisition and under a private arrangement with friends and partisans, to take his trial against all accusers.² Even to stand forth as accuser against so powerful a man was a serious peril:

a brazen column, and placed on record in the acropolis, where it stood near the great statue of Athênê Promachos, even in the time of Demosthenês and his contemporary orators. See Demosthen. Philippic. iii. c. 9, p. 122, and De Fals. Legat. c. 76, p. 428; Æschyn. cont. Ktesiphont. ad fin. Harpokrat. v. Ἀτιμος—Deinarchus cont. Aristogeiton. sect. 25, 26.

Plutarch (Themistoklês, c. 6, and Aristeidês, t. ii. p. 218) tells us that Themistoklês proposed this decree against Arthmius and caused it to be passed. But Plutarch refers it to the time when Xerxes was on the point of invading Greece. Now it appears to me that the incident cannot well belong to that point of time. Xerxes did not rely upon bribes, but upon other and different means, for conquering Greece: besides, the very tenor of the decree shows that it must have been passed after the formation of the confederacy of Delos—for it pronounces Arthmius to be an enemy of Athens and of all the allies of Athens. To a native of Zeleia it might be a serious penalty to be excluded and proscribed from all the cities in alliance with Athens; many of them being on the coast of Asia. I know no point of time to which the mission of Arthmius can be so conveniently referred as this—when Pausanias and Artabazus were engaged in this very part of Asia, in contriving plots to get up a party in Greece. Pausanias was thus engaged for some years—before the banishment of Themistoklês.

¹ Thucyd. i. 131. Ὁ δὲ βουλόμενος ὡς ἤμιστα ὑσπτος εἶναι καὶ πιστεύων χρήμασι διαλύσει τὴν διαβολὴν ἀνεχώρει τὸ δεύτερον ἐς Σπάρτην.

² Thucyd. i. 131. Καὶ ἐς μὲν τὴν εἰρκτὴν ἐσπίπτει τὸ πρῶτον ὑπὸ τῶν ἐφόρων· ἔπειτα διαπραξάμενος ὑσπτερον ἐξῆλθε, καὶ καθίστησιν ἑαυτὸν ἐς κρίσιν τοῖς βουλομένοις περὶ αὐτῶν ἐλέγχειν.

The word *διαπραξάμενος* indicates first, that Pausanias himself originated the efforts to get free,—next that he came to an underhand arrangement: very probably by a bribe, though the word does not necessarily imply it. The Scholiast says so distinctly—*χρήμασι καὶ λόγοις διαπραξάμενος δηλονότι διακρουσάμενος τὴν κατηγορίαν*. Dr. Arnold translates *διαπραξάμενος* "having settled the business."

to undertake the proof of specific matter of treason against him was yet more serious: nor does it appear that any Spartan ventured to do either. It was known that nothing short of the most manifest and invincible proof would be held to justify his condemnation, and amidst a long chain of acts carrying conviction when taken in the aggregate, there was no single treason sufficiently demonstrable for the purpose. Accordingly Pausanias remained not only at large but unaccused, still audaciously persisting both in his intrigues at home and his correspondence abroad with Artabazus. He ventured to assail the unshielded side of Sparta by opening negotiations with the Helots, and instigating them to revolt; promising them both liberation and admission to political privilege;¹ with a view, first to destroy the board of Ephors and render himself despot in his own country—next, to acquire through Persian help the supremacy of Greece. Some of those Helots to whom he addressed himself revealed the plot to the Ephors, who nevertheless, in spite of such grave peril, did not choose to take measures against Pausanias upon no better information—so imposing was still his name and position. But though some few Helots might inform, probably many others both gladly heard the proposition and faithfully kept the secret: we shall find, by what happened a few years afterwards, that there were a large number of them who had their spears in readiness for revolt. Suspected as Pausanias was, yet by the fears of some and the connivance of others, he was allowed to bring his plans to the very brink of consummation; and his last letters to Artabazus,² intimating that he was ready for action, and bespeaking immediate performance of the engagements concerted between them, were actually in the hands of the messenger. Sparta was saved from an outbreak of the most formidable kind, not by the prudence of her authorities, but by a mere accident—or rather by the fact that Pausanias was not only a traitor to his country, but also base and cruel in his private relations.

The messenger to whom these last letters were entrusted was a native of Argilus in Thrace, a favourite and faithful slave of Pausanias; once connected with him by that intimate

¹ Aristotel. Politic. iv. 13, 13; v. 1, 5; v. 6, 2; Herodot. v. 32. Aristotle calls Pausanias *king*, though he was only *regent*: the truth is, that he had all the power of a Spartan king, and seemingly more, if we compare his treatment with that of the Prokleid king Leotyichidēs.

² Thucyd. i. 132. ὁ μέλλων τὰς τελευταίας βασιλεῖ ἐπιστολὰς πρὸς Ἀρτάβαζον κομῆιν, ἀνὴρ Ἀργίλιος, &c.

7 relation which Grecian manners tolerated—and admitted even to the full confidence of his treasonable projects. It was by no means the intention of this Argilian to betray his master. But on receiving the letter to carry, he recollected with some uneasiness that none of the previous messengers had ever come back. Accordingly he broke the seal and read it, with the full view of carrying it forward to its destination if he found nothing inconsistent with his own personal safety: he had further taken the precaution to counterfeit his master's seal, so that he could easily re-close the letter. On reading it, he found his suspicions confirmed by an express injunction that the bearer was to be put to death—a discovery which left him no alternative except to deliver it to the Ephors. But those magistrates, who had before disbelieved the Helot informers, still refused to believe even the confidential slave with his master's autograph and seal, and with the full account besides, which doubtless he would communicate at the same time, of all that had previously passed in the Persian correspondence, not omitting copies of those letters between Pausanias and Xerxes which I have already cited from Thucydides—for in no other way can they have become public. Partly from the suspicion which in antiquity always attached to the testimony of slaves, except when it was obtained under the pretended guarantee of torture—partly from the peril of dealing with so exalted a criminal—the Ephors would not be satisfied with any evidence less than his own speech and their own ears. They directed the Argilian slave to plant himself as a suppliant in the sacred precinct of Poseidon, near Cape Tænarus, under the shelter of a double tent or hut, behind which two of them concealed themselves. Apprised of this unexpected mark of alarm, Pausanias hastened to the temple, and demanded the reason: upon which the slave disclosed his knowledge of the contents of the letter, and complained bitterly that after long and faithful service—with a secrecy never once betrayed, throughout this dangerous correspondence,—he was at length rewarded with nothing better than the same miserable fate which had befallen the previous messengers. Pausanias, admitting all these facts, tried to appease the slave's disquietude, and gave him a solemn assurance of safety if he would quit the sanctuary; urging him at the same time to proceed on the journey forthwith, in order that the schemes in progress might not be retarded.

• All this passed within the hearing of the concealed Ephors; who at length, thoroughly satisfied, determined to arrest

Pausanias immediately on his return to Sparta. They met him in the public street, not far from the temple of Athênê Chalkiœkus (or of the Brazen House). But as they came near, either their menacing looks, or a significant nod from one of them, revealed to this guilty man their purpose. He fled for refuge to the temple, which was so near that he reached it before they could overtake him. He planted himself as a suppliant, far more hopeless than the Argilian slave whom he had so recently talked over at Tænarus, in a narrow roofed chamber belonging to the sacred building; where the Ephors, not warranted in touching him, took off the roof, built up the doors, and kept watch until he was on the point of death by starvation. According to a current story¹—not recognised by Thucydidês, yet consistent with Spartan manners—his own mother was the person who placed the first stone to build up the door, in deep abhorrence of his treason. His last moments being carefully observed, he was brought away just in time to expire without, and thus to avoid the desecration of the temple. The first impulse of the Ephors was to cast his body into the ravine or hollow called the Kæadas, the usual place of punishment for criminals: probably his powerful friends averted this disgrace, and he was buried not far off, until some time afterwards, under the mandate of the Delphian oracle, his body was exhumed and transported to the exact spot where he had died. However, the oracle, not satisfied even with this reinterment, pronounced the whole proceeding to be a profanation of the sanctity of Athênê, enjoining that two bodies should be presented to her as an atonement for the one carried away. In the very early days of Greece—or among the Carthaginians, even at this period—such an injunction would probably have produced the slaughter of two human victims: on the present occasion, Athênê, or Hikesius the tutelary god of suppliants, was supposed to be satisfied by two brazen statues; not however without some attempts to make out that the expiator was inadequate.²

Thus perished a Greek who reached the pinnacle of renown simply from the accidents of his lofty descent and of his being general at Plataea, where it does not appear that he displayed any superior qualities. His treasonable projects implicated and brought to disgrace a man far greater than himself—the Athenian Themistoklês.

The chronology of this important period is not so fully

¹ Diodor. xi. 45; Cornel. Nepos, Pausan. c. 5; Polyæn. viii. 51.

² Thucyd. i. 133, 134; Pausanias, iii. 17, 9.

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known as to enable us to make out the precise dates of particular events. But we are obliged (in consequence of the subsequent incidents connected with Themistoklēs, whose flight to Persia is tolerably well marked as to date) to admit an interval of about nine years between the retirement of Pausanias from his command at Byzantium, and his death. To suppose so long an interval engaged in treasonable correspondence, is perplexing; and we can only explain it to ourselves very imperfectly by considering that the Spartans were habitually slow in their movements, and that the suspected regent may perhaps have communicated with partisans, real or expected, in many parts of Greece. Among those whom he sought to enlist as accomplice was Themistoklēs, still in great power—though, as it would seem, in declining power—at Athens. The charge of collusion with the Persians connects itself with the previous movement of political parties in that city.

The rivalry of Themistoklēs and Aristeidēs had been greatly appeased by the invasion of Xerxes, which had imposed upon both the peremptory necessity of co-operation against a common enemy. And apparently it was not resumed during the times which immediately succeeded the return of the Athenians to their country: at least we hear of both, in effective service and in prominent posts. Themistoklēs stands forward as the contriver of the city walls and architect of Peiræus: Aristeidēs is commander of the fleet, and first organiser of the confederacy of Delos. Moreover we seem to detect a change in the character of the latter. He had ceased to be the champion of Athenian old-fashioned landed interest, against Themistoklēs as the originator of the maritime innovations. Those innovations had now, since the battle of Salamis, become an established fact; a fact of overwhelming influence on the destinies and character, public as well as private, of the Athenians. During the expatriation at Salamis, every man, rich or poor, landed proprietor or artisan, had been for the time a seaman: and the anecdote of Kimon, who dedicated the bridle of his horse in the acropolis as a token that he was about to pass from the cavalry to service on shipboard,¹ is a type of that change of feeling which must have been impressed more or less upon every rich man in Athens. From henceforward the fleet is endeared to every man as the ~~grand force~~, offensive and defensive, of the state, in which character all the political leaders agree in accepting it. We ought to add, at the same time, that this change was attended with no detriment either to

¹ Plutarch, Kimon, c. 8.

the land-force or to the landed cultivation of Attica, both of which will be found to acquire extraordinary development during the interval between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars. Still the triremes, and the men who manned them taken collectively, were now the determining element in the state. Moreover the men who manned them had just returned from Salamis, fresh from a scene of trial and danger, and from a harvest of victory, which had equalised for the moment all Athenians as sufferers, as combatants, and as patriots. [†]Such predominance of the maritime impulse, having become pronounced immediately after the return from Salamis, was further greatly strengthened by the construction and fortification of the Peiræus—a new maritime Athens as large as the old inland city—as well as by the unexpected formation of the confederacy at Delos, with all its untried prospects and stimulating duties.

The political change arising from hence in Athens was not less important than the military. “The maritime multitude, authors of the victory of Salamis,”¹ and instruments of the new vocation of Athens as head of the Delian confederacy, appear now ascendant in the political constitution also; not in any way as a separate or privileged class, but as leavening the whole mass, strengthening the democratical sentiment, and protesting against all recognised political inequalities. In fact during the struggle at Salamis, the whole city of Athens had been nothing else than “a maritime multitude,” among which the proprietors and chief men had been confounded, until, by the efforts of all, the common country had been reconquered. Nor was it likely that this multitude, after a trying period of forced equality, during which political privilege had been effaced, would patiently acquiesce in the full restoration of such privilege at home. We see by the active political sentiment of the German people, after the great struggles of 1813 and 1814, how much an energetic and successful military effort of the people at large, blended with endurance of serious hardship, tends to stimulate the sense of political dignity and the demand for developed citizenship: and if this be the tendency even among a people habitually passive on such subjects, much more was it to be expected in the Athenian population, who had gone through a previous training of near thirty years under the democracy of Kleisthenês. At the time

¹ Aristotel. Politic. v. 3, 5. Καὶ πάλιν ὁ ναυτικὸς ὄχλος, γενόμενος αἴτιος τῆς περὶ Σαλαμίνα νίκης, καὶ διὰ ταύτης τῆς ἡγεμονίας καὶ διὰ τὴν κατὰ βλάσσαν δύναμιν, τὴν δημοκρατίαν ἰσχυροτέραν ἐποίησεν.

[†] Ὁ ναυτικὸς ὄχλος (Thucyd. viii. 72 and *passim*).

when that constitution was first established,¹ it was perhaps the most democratical in Greece. It had worked extremely well, and had diffused among the people a sentiment favourable to equal citizenship and unfriendly to avowed privilege: so that the impressions made by the struggle at Salamis found the popular mind prepared to receive them.

Early after the return to Attica, the Kleisthenean constitution was enlarged as respects eligibility to the magistracy. According to that constitution, the fourth or last class on the Solonian census, including the considerable majority of the freemen were not admissible to offices of state, though they possessed votes in common with the rest: no person was eligible to be a magistrate unless he belonged to one of the three higher classes. This restriction was now annulled, and eligibility extended to all the citizens. We may appreciate the strength of feeling with which such reform was demanded, when we find that it was proposed by Aristeidès; a man the reverse of what is called a demagogue, and a strenuous friend of the Kleisthenean constitution. No political system would work, after the Persian war, which formally excluded "the maritime multitude" from holding magistracy. I rather imagine (as has been stated in a preceding chapter) that election of magistrates was still retained, and not exchanged for drawing lots until a certain time, though not a long time afterwards. That which the public sentiment first demanded was the recognition of the equal and open principle; after a certain length of experience it was found that poor men, though legally qualified to be chosen, were in point of fact rarely chosen: then came the lot, to give them an equal chance with the rich. The principle of sortition or choice by lot, was never applied (as I have before remarked) to all offices at Athens—never for example to the Stratêgi or Generals, whose functions were more grave and responsible than those of any other person in the service of the state, and who always continued to be elected by show of hands.

In the new position into which Athens was now thrown, with so great an extension of what may be termed her foreign relations, and with a confederacy which imposed the necessity of distant military service, the functions of the Stratêgi naturally tended to become both more absorbing and complicated; while the civil administration became more troublesome if not more difficult, from the enlargement of the city and the still greater enlargement of Peiræus—leading to an increase

¹ For the constitution of Kleisthenês, see ch. xxxi. of this History.

of town population, and especially to an increase of the metics or resident non-freemen. And it was probably about this period, during the years immediately succeeding the battle of Salamis—when the force of old habit and tradition had been partially enfeebled by so many stirring novelties,—that the Archons were withdrawn altogether from political and military duties, and confined to civil or judicial administration. At the battle of Marathon, the Polemarch is a military commander, president of the ten Stratêgi:¹ we know him afterwards only as a civil magistrate, administering justice to the metics or non-freemen, while the Stratêgi perform military duties without him: a change not unlike that which took place at Rome, when the Prætor was created to undertake the judicial branch of the large original duties of the Consul. I conceive that this alteration, indicating as it does a change in the character of the Archons generally, must have taken place at the time which we have now reached²—a time when the Athenian establishments on all sides required a more elaborate distribution of functionaries. The distribution of so many Athenian boards of functionaries, part to do duty in the city, and part in the Peiræus, cannot have commenced until after this period, when Peiræus had been raised by Themistoklês to the dignity of town, fortress, and state-harbour. Such boards were the Astynomi and Agoranomi, who maintained the police of streets and markets—the Metronomi, who watched over weights and measures—the Sitophylakes, who carried into effect various state regulations respecting the custody and sale of corn—with various others who acted not less in Peiræus than in the city.³ We may presume that each of these boards was originally created as the exigency appeared to call for it, at a period later than that which we have now reached; most of these duties of detail having been at first discharged by the Archons, and afterwards (when these latter became too full of occupation) confided to separate administrators. The special and important change which characterised the period immediately succeeding the battle of Salamis, was, the more accurate line drawn between the Archons and the Stratêgi; assigning the foreign and military department entirely to the Stratêgi, and rendering the Archons purely civil magistrates,—administrative as well as

¹ Herodot. vi. 109.

² Aristotel. Πολιτειῶν Fragm. xlvii. ed. Neumann, Harpokration, v. Πολέμαρχος; Pollux, viii. 91: compare Meier und Schömann, Der Attische Prozess, ch. ii. p. 50 seqq.

³ See Aristotel. Πολιτειῶν Fragm. ii. v. xxiii. xxxviii. l. ed. Neumann; Schömann, Antiqq. Jur. Publ. Græc. c. xli. xlii. xliii.

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judicial: while the first creation of the separate boards above named was probably an ulterior enlargement, arising out of increase of population, power, and trade, between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars. It was by some such steps that the Athenian administration gradually attained that complete development which it exhibits in practice during the century from the Peloponnesian war downward, to which nearly all our positive and direct information relates.

With this expansion both of democratical feeling and of military activity at Athens, Aristeidés appears to have sympathised. And the popularity thus ensured to him, probably heightened by some regret for his previous ostracism, was calculated to acquire permanence from his straightforward and incorruptible character, now brought into strong relief by his function as assessor to the new Delian confederacy.

On the other hand, the ascendancy of Themistoklês, though so often exalted by his unrivalled political genius and daring, as well as by the signal value of his public recommendations, was as often overthrown by his duplicity of means and unprincipled thirst for money. New political opponents sprung up against him, men sympathising with Aristeidés and far more violent in their antipathy than Aristeidés himself. Of these the chief were Kimon (son of Miltiadês) and Alkmæon: moreover it seems that the Lacedæmonians, though full of esteem for Themistoklês immediately after the battle of Salamis, had now become extremely hostile to him—a change which may be sufficiently explained from his stratagem respecting the fortifications of Athens, and his subsequent ambitious projects in reference to the Peiræus. The Lacedæmonian influence, then not inconsiderable in Athens, was employed to second the political combinations against him.¹ He is said to have given offence by manifestations of personal vanity—by continual boasting of his great services to the state, and by the erection of a private chapel, close to his own house, in honour of Artemis Aristobulê, or Artemis of admirable counsel; just as Pausanias had irritated the Lacedæmonians by inscribing his own single name on the Delphian tripod, and as the friends of Aristeidés had displeased the Athenians by endless encomiums upon his justice.²

But the main cause of his discredit was, the prostitution of his great influence for arbitrary and corrupt purposes. In the

¹ Plutarch, Kimon, c. 16; Scholion 2, ad Aristophan. Equit. 84.

² Plutarch (Themistoklês, c. 22; Kimon, c. 5-8; Aristeidés, c. 25); Diodorus, xi. 54.

unsettled condition of so many different Grecian communities, recently emancipated from Persia, when there was past misrule to avenge, wrong-doers to be deposed and perhaps punished, exiles to be restored, and all the disturbance and suspicions accompanying so great a change of political condition as well as of foreign policy—the influence of the leading men at Athens must have been great in determining the treatment of particular individuals. Themistoklēs, placed at the head of an Athenian squadron and sailing among the islands, partly for the purposes of war against Persia, partly for organising the new confederacy—is affirmed to have accepted bribes without scruple, for executing sentences just and unjust—restoring some citizens, expelling others, and even putting some to death. We learn this from a friend and guest of Themistoklēs—the poet Timokreon of Ialysus in Rhodes, who had expected his own restoration from the Athenian commander, but found that it was thwarted by a bribe of three talents from his opponents; so that he was still kept in exile on the charge of *medism*. The assertions of Timokreon, personally incensed on this ground against Themistoklēs, are doubtless to be considered as passionate and exaggerated: nevertheless they are a valuable memorial of the feelings of the time, and are far too much in harmony with the general character of this eminent man to allow of our disbelieving them entirely. Timokreon is as emphatic in his admiration of Aristeidēs as in his censure of Themistoklēs, whom he denounces as “a lying and unjust traitor.”¹

Such conduct as that described by this new Archilochus, even making every allowance for exaggeration, must have caused Themistoklēs to be both hated and feared among the insular allies, whose opinion was now of considerable importance to the Athenians. A similar sentiment grew up partially against him in Athens itself, and appears to have been connected with suspicions of treasonable inclinations towards the Persians. As the Persians could offer the highest bribes, a man open to corruption might naturally be suspected of inclinations towards their cause; and if Themistoklēs had rendered pre-eminent service against them, so also had Pausanias, whose conduct had undergone so fatal a change for the worse. It was the treason of Pausanias—suspected and believed against him by the Athenians even when he was in command at Byzantium, though not proved against him at Sparta until long afterwards—which first seems to have raised the presumption of *medism*

¹ Plutarch, Themist. c. 21.

against Themistoklēs also, when combined with the corrupt proceedings which stained his public conduct. We must recollect also, that Themistoklēs had given some colour to these presumptions even by the stratagems in reference to Xerxes, which wore a double-faced aspect, capable of being construed either in a Persian or in a Grecian sense. The Lacedæmonians, hostile to Themistoklēs since the time when he had outwitted them respecting the walls of Athens,—and fearing him also as a supposed accomplice of the suspected Pausanias—procured the charge of *medism* to be preferred against him at Athens; by secret instigations, and as it is said, by bribes to his political opponents.¹ But no satisfactory proof could be furnished of the accusation, which Themistoklēs himself strenuously denied, not without emphatic appeals to his illustrious services. In spite of violent invectives against him from Alkmæon and Kimon, tempered indeed by a generous moderation on the part of Aristeidēs,² his defence was successful. He carried the people with him and was acquitted of the charge. Nor was he merely acquitted, but as might naturally be expected, a reaction took place in his favour. His splendid qualities and exploits were brought impressively before the public mind, and he seemed for the time to acquire greater ascendancy than ever.³

¹ This accusation of treason brought against Themistoklēs at Athens, *prior to his ostracism*, and at the instigation of the Lacedæmonians—is mentioned by Diodorus (xi. 54). Thucydides and Plutarch take notice only of the second accusation, *after his ostracism*. But Diodorus has made his narrative confused, by supposing the first accusation preferred at Athens to have come after the full detection of Pausanias and exposure of his correspondence; whereas these latter events, coming after the first accusation, supplied new proofs before unknown, and thus brought on the second, after Themistoklēs had been ostracised. But Diodorus has preserved to us the important notice of this first accusation at Athens, followed by trial, acquittal, and temporary glorification of Themistoklēs—and preceding his ostracism.

The indictment stated by Plutarch to have been preferred against Themistoklēs by Leōbotas son of Alkmæon, at the instance of the Spartans, probably relates to the first accusation at which Themistoklēs was acquitted. For when Themistoklēs was arraigned after the discovery of Pausanias, he did not choose to stay, nor was there any actual trial: it is not therefore likely that the name of the accuser would be preserved—*Ὁ δὲ γραψάμενος αὐτὸν προδοσίας Λεωβότης ἦν Ἀλκμαίωνος, ἕμα συνεπατιωμένων τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν* (Plutarch, Themist. c. 23).

Compare the second Scholion on Aristophan. Equit. 84, and Aristeidēs, Orat. xlvii. *Ἐπὲρ τῶν Τεττάρων* (vol. ii. p. 318, ed. Dindorf, p. 243, Jebb).

² Plutarch, Aristeidēs, c. 25.

³ Diodor. xi. 54. *τότε μὲν ἀπέφυγε τὴν τῆς προδοσίας κρίσιν· διὰ καὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον μετὰ τὴν ἀπόλυσιν μέγας ἦν παρὰ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις· ἡγάπων γὰρ αὐτὸν διαφερόντως οἱ πολῖται· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, οἱ μὲν, φοβηθέντες αὐτοῦ.*

Such a charge, and such a failure, must have exasperated to the utmost the animosity between him and his chief opponents—Aristeidês, Kimon, Alkmæon, and others; and we can hardly wonder that they were anxious to get rid of him by ostracism. In explaining this peculiar process, I have already stated, that it could never be raised against any one individual separately and ostensibly; and that it could never be brought into operation at all, unless its necessity were made clear, not merely to violent party men, but also to the assembled senate and people, including of course a considerable proportion of the more moderate citizens. We may reasonably conceive that the conjuncture was deemed by many dispassionate Athenians well-suited for the tutelary intervention of ostracism, the express benefit of which consisted in its separating political opponents when the antipathy between them threatened to push one or the other into extra-constitutional proceedings—especially when one of those parties was Themistoklês, a man alike vast in his abilities and unscrupulous in his morality. Probably also there were not a few who wished to revenge the previous ostracism of Aristeidês: and lastly, the friends of Themistoklês himself, elate with his acquittal and his seeming augmented popularity, might indulge hopes that the vote of ostracism would turn out in his favour, and remove one or other of his chief political opponents. From all these circumstances we learn without astonishment, that a vote of ostracism was soon after resorted to. It ended in the temporary banishment of Themistoklês.

He retired into exile, and was residing at Argos, whither he carried a considerable property, yet occasionally visiting other parts of Peloponnesus¹—when the exposure and death of

τὴν ὑπερβολὴν, οἱ δὲ, φθονήσαντες τῇ δόξῃ, τῶν μὲν εὐεργεσιῶν ἐπελάθοντο, τὴν δὲ ἰσχὺν καὶ τὸ φρόνημα ταπεινοῦν ἔσπευδον.

¹ Thucyd. i. 137. ἦλθε γὰρ αὐτῷ ὕστερον ἕκ τε Ἀθηνῶν παρὰ τῶν φίλων, καὶ ἐξ Ἀργεῶς ἃ ὑπέξέκειτο, &c.

I follow Mr. Fynes Clinton in considering the year 471 B.C. to be the date of the ostracism of Themistoklês. It may probably be so; there is no evidence positively to contradict it: but I think Mr. Clinton states it too confidently, as he admits that Diodorus includes, in the chapters which he devotes to one archon, events which must have happened in several different years (see *Fast. Hellen.* B.C. 471).

After the expedition under the command of Pausanias in 478 B.C., we have no one date at once certain and accurate, until we come to the death of Xerxes, where Diodorus is confirmed by the Canon of the Persian kings, B.C. 465. This last event determines by close approximation and inference, the flight of Themistoklês, the siege of Naxos, and the death of Pausanias: for the other events of this period, we are reduced to a more vague approximation, and can ascertain little beyond their order of succession.

Pausanias, together with the discovery of his correspondence, took place at Sparta. Among this correspondence were found proofs, which Thucydidês seems to have considered as real and sufficient, of the privity of Themistoklês. By Ephorus and others, he is admitted to have been solicited by Pausanias, and to have known his plans—but to have kept them secret while refusing to co-operate in them.¹ Probably after his exile he took a more decided share in them than before; being well-placed for that purpose at Argos, a city not only unfriendly to Sparta, but strongly believed to have been in collusion with Xerxes at his invasion of Greece. On this occasion the Lacedæmonians sent to Athens publicly to prefer a formal charge of treason against him, and to urge the necessity of trying him as a Pan-Hellenic criminal before the synod of the allies assembled at Sparta.²

Whether this latter request would have been granted or whether Themistoklês would have been tried at Athens, we cannot tell: for no sooner was he apprised that joint envoys from Sparta and Athens had been despatched to arrest him, than he fled forthwith from Argos to Korkyra. The inhabitants of that island, though owing gratitude to him and favourably disposed, could not venture to protect him against the two most powerful states in Greece, but sent him to the neighbouring continent. Here however, being still tracked and followed by the envoys, he was obliged to seek protection from a man whom he had formerly thwarted in a demand at Athens, and who had become his personal enemy—Admêtus king of the Molossians. Fortunately for him, at the moment when he arrived, Admêtus was not at home; and Themistoklês, becoming a suppliant to his wife, conciliated her sympathy so entirely, that she placed her child in his arms and planted him at the hearth in the full solemnity of supplication to soften her husband. As soon as Admêtus returned, Themistoklês revealed his name, his pursuers, and his danger—entreatng protection as a helpless suppliant in the last extremity. He appealed to the generosity of the Epirotic prince not to take revenge on a man now defenceless, for offence given under such very different circumstances; and for an offence too, after all, not of capital moment, while the protection now entreated was to the suppliant a matter of life or death. Admêtus raised him up from the hearth with the child in his

¹ Thucyd. i. 135; Ephorus ap. Plutarch. de Malign. Herodoti, c. 5, p. 855; Diodor. xi. 54; Plutarch, Themist. c. 23.

² Diodor. xi. 55.

arms—an evidence that he accepted the appeal and engaged to protect him ; refusing to give him up to the envoys, and at last only sending him away on the expression of his own wish to visit the King of Persia. Two Macedonian guides conducted him across the mountains to Pydna in the Thermaic gulf, where he found a merchant-ship about to set sail for the coast of Asia Minor, and took a passage on board ; neither the master nor the crew knowing his name. An untoward storm drove the vessel to the island of Naxos, at that moment besieged by an Athenian armament. Had he been forced to land there, he would of course have been recognised and seized, but his wonted subtlety did not desert him. Having communicated both his name and the peril which awaited him, he conjured the master of the ship to assist in saving him, and not to suffer any one of the crew to land ; menacing that if by any accident he were discovered, he would bring the master to ruin along with himself, by representing him as an accomplice induced by money to facilitate the escape of Themistoklēs : on the other hand, in case of safety, he promised a large reward. Such promises and threats weighed with the master, who controlled his crew, and forced them to beat about during a day and a night off the coast without seeking to land. After that dangerous interval, the storm abated and the ship reached Ephesus in safety.¹

Thus did Themistoklēs, after a series of perils, find himself safe on the Persian side of the Ægean. At Athens he was proclaimed a traitor, and his property confiscated : nevertheless (as it frequently happened in cases of confiscation), his friends secreted a considerable sum, and sent it over to him in Asia, together with the money which he had left at Argos ; so that he was thus enabled liberally to reward the ship-captain who had preserved him. With all this deduction, the property which he possessed of a character not susceptible of concealment, and which was therefore actually seized, was found to amount to eighty talents, according to Theophrastus—to 100 talents, according to Theopompus. In contrast with this large sum, it is melancholy to learn that he had begun his political

¹ Thucyd. i. 137. Cornelius Nepos (Themist. c. 8) for the most part follows Thucydides, and professes to do so ; yet he is not very accurate, especially about the relations between Themistoklēs and Admētus. Diodorus (xi. 56) seems to follow chiefly other guides, as Plutarch does also to a great extent (Themist. c. 24-26). There were evidently different accounts of his voyage, which represented him as reaching, not Ephesus, but the Æolic Kymē. Diodorus does not notice his voyage by sea.

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career with a property not greater than three talents.¹ The poverty of Aristeidês at the end of his life presents an impressive contrast to the enrichment of his rival.

The escape of Themistoklês, and his adventures in Persia, appear to have formed a favourite theme for the fancy and exaggeration of authors a century afterwards. We have thus many anecdotes which contradict either directly or by implication the simple narrative of Thucydidês. Thus we are told that at the moment when he was running away from the Greeks, the Persian king also had proclaimed a reward of 200 talents for his head, and that some Greeks on the coast of Asia were watching to take him for this reward: that he was forced to conceal himself strictly near the coast, until means were found to send him up to Susa, in a closed litter, under pretence that it was a woman for the king's harem: that Mandanê, sister of Xerxes, insisted upon having him delivered up to her as an expiation for the loss of her son at the battle of Salamis: that he learnt Persian so well, and discoursed in it so eloquently, as to procure for himself an acquittal from the Persian judges, when put upon his trial through the importunity of Mandanê: that the officers of the king's household at Susa, and the satraps in his way back, threatened him with still further perils: that he was admitted to see the king in person, after having received a lecture from the chamberlain on the indispensable duty of falling down before him to do homage, &c., with several other uncertified details,² which make us value more highly the narrative of Thucydidês. Indeed Ephorus, Deinô, Kleitarchus, and Herakleidês, from whom these anecdotes appear mostly to be derived, even affirmed that Themistoklês had found Xerxes himself alive and seen him; whereas Thucydidês and Charon, the two contemporary authors (for the former is *nearly* contemporary), asserted that he had found Xerxes recently dead, and his son Artaxerxes on the throne.

According to Thucydidês, the eminent exile does not seem to have been exposed to the least danger in Persia. He presented himself as a deserter from Greece, and was accepted as such: moreover—what is more strange, though it seems true—he was received as an actual benefactor of the Persian king, and a sufferer from the Greeks on account of such dispositions—in consequence of his communications made to Xerxes

¹ Plutarch, Themist. c. 25; also Kritias ap. Ælian. V. H. x. 17: compare Herodot. viii. 12.

² Diodor. xi. 56; Plutarch, Themist. c. 24-30.

respecting the intended retreat of the Greeks from Salamis, and respecting the contemplated destruction of the Hellespontine bridge. He was conducted by some Persians on the coast up to Susa, where he addressed a letter to the king couched in the following terms, such as probably no modern European king would tolerate except from a quaker:—"I Themistoklēs, am come to thee, having done to thy house more mischief than any other Greek, as long as I was compelled in my own defence to resist the attack of thy father—but having also done him yet greater good, when I could do so with safety to myself, and when his retreat was endangered. Reward is yet owing to me for my past service: moreover, I am now here, chased away by the Greeks in consequence of my attachment to thee,¹ but able still to serve thee with great effect. I wish to wait a year, and then to come before thee in person to explain my views."

Whether the Persian interpreters, who read this letter to Artaxerxes Longimanus, exactly rendered its brief and direct expression, we cannot say. But it made a strong impression upon him, combined with the previous reputation of the writer—and he willingly granted the prayer for delay: though we shall not readily believe that he was so transported as to show his joy by immediate sacrifice to the gods, by an unusual measure of convivial indulgence, and by crying out thrice in his sleep, "I have got Themistoklēs the Athenian"—as some of Plutarch's authors informed him.² In the course of the year granted, Themistoklēs had learned so much of the Persian language and customs as to be able to communicate personally with the king, and acquire his confidence. No Greek (says Thucydidēs) had ever before attained such a commanding influence and position at the Persian court. His ingenuity was now displayed in laying out schemes for the subjugation of Greece to Persia, which were evidently captivating to the monarch, who rewarded him with a Persian wife and large presents, sending him down to Magnesia on the Mæander not far from the coast of Ionia. The revenues of the district round that town, amounting to the large sum of fifty talents yearly, were assigned to him for bread: those of the neighbouring sea-port of Myus, for articles of condiment to his

¹ "Proditionem *ultra imputabant* (says Tacitus, Hist. ii. 60, respecting Paullinus and Proculus, the generals of the army of Otho, when they surrendered to Vitellius after the defeat at Bebiacum), spatium longi ante prælium itineris, fatigationem Othonianorum, permixtum vehicalis agmen, ac *pleraque fortuita fraudi suæ assignantes*.—Et Vitellius credidit de perfidiâ, et fraudem absolvit."

² Plutarch, Themist. c. 28.

bread, which was always accounted the main nourishment : those of Lampsakus on the Hellespont, for wine.¹ Not knowing the amount of these two latter items, we cannot determine how much revenue Themistoklês received altogether ; but there can be no doubt, judging from the revenues of Magnesia alone, that he was a great pecuniary gainer by his change of country. After having visited various parts of Asia,² he lived for a certain time at Magnesia, in which place his family joined him from Athens.

How long his residence at Magnesia lasted, we do not know, but seemingly long enough to acquire local estimation and leave mementos behind him. He at length died of sickness, when sixty-five years old, without having taken any step towards the accomplishment of those victorious campaigns which he had promised to Artaxerxes. That sickness was the real cause of his death, we may believe on the distinct statement of Thucydidês ;³ who at the same time notices a rumour

¹ Thucyd. i. 138 ; Diodor. xi. 57. Besides the three above-named places, Neanthês and Phnias describe the grant as being still fuller and more specific : they state that Perkôte was granted to Themistoklês for bedding, and Palæskêpsis for clothing (Plutarch, Themist. c. 29 ; Athenæus, i. p. 29).

This seems to have been a frequent form of grants from the Persian and Egyptian kings, to their queens, relatives, or friends—a grant nominally to supply some particular want or taste : see Dr. Arnold's note on the passage of Thucydidês. I doubt his statement however about the land-tax or rent ; I do not think that it was a tenth or a fifth of the produce of the soil in these districts which was granted to Themistoklês, but the portion of regal revenue or tribute levied in them. The Persian kings did not take the trouble to assess and collect the tribute : they probably left that to the inhabitants themselves, provided the sum total were duly paid.

² Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. 31. *πλανώμενος περι τὴν Ἀσίαν* : this statement seems probable enough, though Plutarch rejects it.

³ Thucyd. i. 138. *Νοσήσας δὲ τελευτᾷ τὸν βίον· λέγουσι δὲ τινες καὶ ἐκούσιον φαρμάκῳ ἀποθανεῖν αὐτὸν, ἀδύνατον νομίσαντα εἶναι ἐπιτελέσαι βασιλεῖ ἃ ὑπέσχετο.*

This current story, as old as Aristophanês (Equit. 83, compare the Scholia), alleged that Themistoklês had poisoned himself by drinking bull's blood (see Diodor. xi. 58). Diodorus assigns to this act of taking poison a still more sublime and patriotic character, by connecting it with a design on the part of Themistoklês to restrain the Persian king from warring against Greece.

Plutarch (Themist. c. 31, and Kimon, c. 18) and Diodorus both state as an unquestionable fact, that Themistoklês died by poisoning himself ; omitting even to notice the statement of Thucydidês that he died of disease. Cornelius Nepos (Themist. c. 10) follows Thucydidês. Cicero (Brutus, c. 11) refers the story of the suicide by poison to Clitarchus and Stratoklês, recognising it as contrary to Thucydidês. He puts into the mouth of his fellow dialogist Atticus a just rebuke of the facility with which historical truth was sacrificed to rhetorical purpose.

partially current in his own time, of poison voluntarily taken, from painful consciousness on the part of Themistoklēs himself that the promises made could never be performed—a further proof of the general tendency to surround the last years of this distinguished man with impressive adventures, and to dignify his last moments with a revived feeling not unworthy of his earlier patriotism. The report may possibly have been designedly circulated by his friends and relatives, in order to conciliate some tenderness towards his memory; since his sons still continued citizens at Athens, and his daughters were married there. These friends further stated that they had brought back his bones to Attica at his own express command, and buried them privately without the knowledge of the Athenians; no condemned traitor being permitted to be buried in Attic soil. If however we even suppose that this statement was true, no one could point out with certainty the spot wherein such interment had taken place. Nor does it seem, when we mark the cautious expressions of Thucydidēs,¹ that he himself was satisfied of the fact. Moreover we may affirm with confidence that the inhabitants of Magnesia, when they showed the splendid sepulchral monument erected in honour of Themistoklēs in their own market-place, were persuaded that his bones were really enclosed within it.

Aristeidēs died about three or four years after the ostracism of Themistoklēs;² but respecting the place and manner of his death, there were several contradictions among the authors whom Plutarch had before him. Some affirmed that he perished on foreign service in the Euxine sea; others, that he died at home, amidst the universal esteem and grief of his fellow-citizens. A third story, confined to the single statement

¹ Thucyd. i. 138. τὰ δὲ ὅσα φασὶ κομισθῆναι αὐτοῦ οἱ προσήκοντες οἴκαδε κελεύσαντος ἐκείνου, καὶ τεθῆναι κρύφα Ἀθηναίων ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ· οὐ γὰρ ἐξῆν θάπτειν, ὡς ἐπὶ προδοσίᾳ φεύγοντος.

Cornelius Nepos, who here copies Thucydidēs, gives this statement by mistake, as if Thucydidēs had himself affirmed it: "Idem (sc. Thucydidēs) ossa ejus clam in Atticā ab amicis sepulta, quoniam legibus non concederetur, quod proditiōnis esset damnatus, memoriæ prodidit." This shows the haste or inaccuracy with which these secondary authors so often cite Thucydidēs is certainly not a witness *for* the fact: if anything, he may be said to count somewhat against it.

Plutarch (Themist. c. 32) shows that the burial-place of Themistoklēs, supposed to be in Attica, was yet never verified before his time: the guides of Pausanias, however, in the succeeding century, had become more confident (Pausanias, i. 1, 3).

² Respecting the probity of Aristeidēs, see an interesting fragment of Eupolis the comic writer (Δῆμοι, *Fragm.* iv. p. 457, ed. Meineke).

of Kraterus, and strenuously rejected by Plutarch, represents Aristeidês as having been falsely accused before the Athenian judicature and condemned to a fine of fifty minæ, on the allegation of having taken bribes during the assessment of the tribute upon the allies—which fine he was unable to pay, and was therefore obliged to retire to Ionia, where he died. Dismissing this last story, we find nothing certain about his death except one fact—but that fact at the same time the most honourable of all—that he died very poor. It is even asserted that he did not leave enough to pay funeral expenses—that a sepulchre was provided for him at Phalêrum at the public cost, besides a handsome donation to his son Lysimachus and a dowry to each of his two daughters. In the two or three ensuing generations, however, his descendants still continued poor, and even at that remote day some of them received aid out of the public purse, from the recollection of their incorruptible ancestor. Near a century and a half afterwards, a poor man named Lysimachus, descendant of the Just Aristeidês, was to be seen at Athens near the chapel of Iacchus, carrying a mysterious tablet, and obtaining his scanty fee of two oboli for interpreting the dreams of the passers-by: Demetrius the Phalerean procured from the people, for the mother and aunt of this poor man, a small daily allowance.¹ On all these points the contrast is marked when we compare Aristeidês with Themistoklês. The latter, having distinguished himself by ostentatious cost at Olympia, and by a choregic victory at Athens, with little scruple as to the means of acquisition—ended his life at Magnesia in dishonourable affluence greater than ever, and left an enriched posterity both at that place and at Athens. More than five centuries afterwards, his descendant the Athenian Themistoklês attended the lectures of the philosopher Ammonius at Athens, as the comrade and friend of Plutarch himself.²

¹ Plutarch, *Arist.* c. 26, 27; Cornelius Nepos, *Arist.* c. 3; compare *Aristophan. Vesp.* 53.

² Plutarch, *Themist.* c. 5-32.

CHAPTER XLV

PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFEDERACY UNDER ATHENS AS
HEAD—FIRST FORMATION AND RAPID EXPANSION OF THE
ATHENIAN EMPIRE

I HAVE already recounted, in the preceding chapter, how the Asiatic Greeks, breaking loose from the Spartan Pausanias, entreated Athens to organise a new confederacy, and to act as presiding city (Vorort)—and how this confederacy, framed not only for common and pressing objects, but also on principles of equal rights and constant control on the part of the members, attracted soon the spontaneous adhesion of a large proportion of Greeks, insular or maritime, near the Ægean sea. I also noticed this event as giving commencement to a new æra in Grecian politics. For whereas there had been before a tendency, not very powerful, yet on the whole steady and increasing, towards something like one Pan-Hellenic league under Sparta as president—from henceforward that tendency disappears, and a bifurcation begins: Athens and Sparta divide the Grecian world between them, and bring a much larger number of its members into co-operation, either with one or the other, than had ever been so arranged before.)

Thucydides marks precisely, as far as general words can go, the character of the new confederacy during the first years after its commencement. But unhappily he gives us scarcely any particular facts; and in the absence of such controlling evidence, a habit has grown up of describing loosely the entire period between 477 B.C. and 405 B.C. (the latter date is that of the battle of Ægospotami) as constituting “the Athenian empire.” This word denotes correctly enough the last part, perhaps the last forty years, of the seventy-two years indicated; but it is misleading when applied to the first part: nor indeed can any single word be found which faithfully characterises as well the one part as the other. A great and serious change had taken place, and we disguise the fact of that change if we talk of the Athenian hegemony or headship as a portion of the Athenian empire. Thucydides carefully distinguishes the two, speaking of the Spartans as having lost, and of the Athenians as having acquired, not empire, but headship or hegemony.

¹ Thucyd. i. 94. ἐξεπολιόρκησαν (Βυζάντιον) ἐν τῇδε τῇ ἡγεμονίᾳ, i. e. under the Spartan hegemony, before the Athenians were invited to

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The transition from the Athenian hegemony to the Athenian empire was doubtless gradual, so that no one could determine

assume the hegemony: compare ἡγησάμενοι, i. 77, and Herodot. viii. 2, 3. Next we have (i. 95) φοιτῶντές τε (the Ionians, &c.) πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἡξίουσαν αὐτοὺς ἡγεμόνας σφῶν γενέσθαι κατὰ τὸ ξυγγενές. Again, when the Spartans send out Dorkis in place of Pausanias, the allies οὐκέτι ἐφίεσαν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν. Then, as to the ensuing proceedings of the Athenians (i. 96)—παλαλαβόντες δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὴν ἡγεμονίαν τοῦτω τῷ τρόπῳ ἐκόντων τῶν ξυμμάχων διὰ τὸ Πανσανίου μίσος, &c.: compare i. 75—ἡμῖν δὲ προσελθόντων τῶν ξυμμάχων καὶ αὐτῶν δεσηθέντων ἡγεμόνας καταστήναι, and vi. 76.

Then the transition from the ἡγεμονία to the ἀρχή (i. 97)—ἡγοῦμενοι δὲ αὐτοῦμων τὸ πρῶτον τῶν ξυμμάχων καὶ ἀπὸ κοινῶν ξυνόδων Βουλευόντων, τοσάδε ἐπῆλθον πολέμῳ τε καὶ διαχειρίσει πραγμάτων μεταξὺ τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου καὶ τοῦ Μηδικοῦ.

Thucydides then goes on to say that he shall notice these "many strides in advance"—which Athens made, starting from her original hegemony, so as to show in what manner the Athenian empire or ἀρχή was originally formed—ἄμα δὲ καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀπόδειξιν ἔχει τῆς τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ἐν οἷῳ τρόπῳ κατέστη. The same transition from the ἡγεμονία to the ἀρχή is described in the oration of the Athenian envoy at Sparta, shortly before the Peloponnesian war (i. 75): but as it was rather the interest of the Athenian orator to confound the difference between ἡγεμονία and ἀρχή, so after he has clearly stated what the relation of Athens to her allies had been at first, and how it afterwards became totally changed, Thucydides makes him slur over the distinction, and say—οὕτως οὐδ' ἡμεῖς θαυμαστόν οὐδὲν πεποιθήκαμεν . . . εἰ ἀρχὴν τε διδομένην ἐδέξαμεθα καὶ ταύτην μὴ ἀνείμεν, &c.; and he then proceeds to defend the title of Athens to command on the ground of superior force and worth: which last plea is advanced a few years afterwards still more nakedly and offensively by the Athenian speakers. Read also the language of the Athenian Euphémus at Kamarina (vi. 82), where a similar confusion appears, as being suitable to the argument.

It is to be recollected that the word *hegemony* or headship is extremely general, denoting any case of following a leader, and of obedience, however temporary, qualified, or indeed little more than honorary. Thus it is used by the Thebans to express their relation towards the Bœotian confederated towns (ἡγεμονεύεσθαι ὑφ' ἡμῶν, Thucyd. iii. 61, where Dr. Arnold draws attention to the distinction between that verb and ἄρχειν, and holds language respecting the Athenian ἀρχή, more precise than his language in the note ad Thucyd. i. 94), and by the Corinthians to express their claims as metropolis of Korkyra, which were really little more than honorary—ἐπὶ τῷ ἡγεμόνες τε εἶναι καὶ τὰ εἰκότα θαυμάζεσθαι (Thucyd. i. 38): compare vii. 55. Indeed it sometimes means simply a guide (iii. 98; vii. 50).

But the words ἀρχή, ἄρχειν, ἄρχεσθαι, voc. pass., are more specific in their application, and imply both superior dignity and coercive authority to a greater or less extent: compare Thucyd. v. 69; ii. 8, &c. The πόλις ἀρχὴν ἔχουσα is analogous to ἀνὴρ τύραννος (vi. 85).

Herodotus is less careful in distinguishing the meanings of these words than Thucydides: see the discussion of the Lacedæmonian and Athenian envoys with Gelo (vii. 155–162). But it is to be observed that he makes Gelo ask for the ἡγεμονία and not for the ἀρχή—putting the claim in the least offensive form: compare also the claim of the Argeians for ἡγεμονία (vii. 148).

precisely where the former ends and the latter begins: but it had been consummated before the thirty years' truce, which was concluded fourteen years before the Peloponnesian war—and it was in fact the substantial cause of that war. Empire then came to be held by Athens—partly as a fact established, resting on acquiescence rather than attachment or consent on the minds of the subjects—partly as a corollary from necessity of union combined with her superior force: while this latter point, superiority of force as a legitimate title, stood more and more forward both in the language of her speakers and in the conceptions of her citizens. Nay, the Athenian orators of the middle of the Peloponnesian war venture to affirm that their empire had been of this same character ever since the repulse of the Persians: an inaccuracy so manifest, that if we could suppose the speech made by the Athenian Euphēmus at Kamarina in 415 B.C. to have been heard by Themistoklēs or Aristeidēs fifty years before, it would have been alike offensive to the prudence of the one and to the justice of the other.

The imperial condition of Athens, that which she held at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, when her allies (except Chios and Lesbos) were tributary subjects, and when the Ægean sea was an Athenian lake,—was of course the period of her greatest splendour and greatest action upon the Grecian world. It was also the period most impressive to historians, orators, and philosophers—suggesting the idea of some one state exercising dominion over the Ægean, as the natural condition of Greece, so that if Athens lost such dominion, it would be transferred to Sparta—holding out the dispersed maritime Greeks as a tempting prize for the aggressive schemes of some new conqueror—and even bringing up by association into men's fancies the mythical Minos of Krete, and others, as having been rulers of the Ægean in times anterior to Athens.

Even those who lived under the full-grown Athenian empire had before them no good accounts of the incidents between 479–450 B.C. For we may gather from the intimation of Thucydidēs, as well as from his barrenness of facts, that while there were chroniclers both for the Persian invasion and for the times before it, no one cared for the times immediately succeeding.¹ Hence, the little light which has fallen upon this

¹ Thucyd. i. 97. τοῖς πρὸ ἐμοῦ ἅπασιν ἐκλιπέε τούτο ἦν τὸ χωρίον, καὶ ἡ τὰ πρὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν ξυνηθίσαν ἢ αὐτὰ τὰ Μηδικὰ τούτων δὲ ὅσπερ καὶ ἤψατο ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ ξυγγραφῇ Ἑλλάνικος, βραχέως τε καὶ τοῖς χρόνοις οὐκ ἀκριβῶς ἐπεμνήσθη.

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blank has all been borrowed (if we except the careful Thucydidés) from a subsequent age; and the Athenian hegemony has been treated as a mere commencement of the Athenian empire. Credit has been given to Athens for a long-sighted ambition, aiming from the Persian war downwards at results, which perhaps Themistoklès¹ may have partially divined, but which only time and successive accidents opened even to distant view. But such systematic anticipation of subsequent results is fatal to any correct understanding, either of the real agents or of the real period; both of which are to be explained from the circumstances preceding and actually present, with some help, though cautious and sparing, from our acquaintance with that which was then an unknown future. When Aristeidés and Kimon dismissed the Lacedæmonian admiral Dorkis, and drove Pausanias away from Byzantium on his second arrival, they had to deal with the problem immediately before them. They had to complete the defeat of the Persian power, still formidable—and to create and organise a confederacy as yet only inchoate. This was quite enough to occupy their attention, without ascribing to them distant views of Athenian maritime empire.

In that brief sketch of incidents preceding the Peloponnesian war, which Thucydidés introduces as “the digression from his narrative,”² he neither gives, nor professes to give, a complete enumeration of all which actually occurred. During the interval between the first desertion of the Asiatic allies from Pausanias to Athens, in 477 B.C.—and the revolt of Naxos in 466 B.C.—he recites three incidents only: first, the siege and capture of Eion on the Strymon with its Persian garrison—

Hellanicus therefore had done no more than *touch* upon the events of this period: and he found so little good information within his reach, as to fall into chronological blunders.

¹ Thucyd. i. 93. τῆς γὰρ δὴ θαλάσσης πρῶτος ἐτόλμησεν εἰπεῖν ὡς ἀνθεκτέα ἐστὶ, καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν εὐθὺς ξυγκατεσκεύαζε.

Dr. Arnold says in his note “εὐθὺς signifies probably immediately after the retreat of the Persians.” I think it refers to an earlier period—that point of time when Themistoklès first counselled the building of the fleet, or at least when he counselled them to abandon their city and repose all their hopes in their fleet. It is only by this supposition that we get a reasonable meaning for the words ἐτόλμησε εἰπεῖν, “he was the first who dared to say”—which implies a counsel of extraordinary boldness. “For he was the first who dared to advise them to grasp at the sea, and from that moment forward he helped to establish their empire.” The word ξυγκατεσκεύαζε seems to denote a collateral consequence, not directly contemplated, though perhaps divined, by Themistoklès.

² Thucyd. i. 97. ἔγραψα δὲ αὐτὰ καὶ τὴν ἐκβολὴν τοῦ λόγου ἐποιησάμην διὰ τὸδε, &c.

next, the capture of Skyros, and appropriation of the island to Athenian kleruchs or out-citizens,—thirdly, the war with Karystus in Eubœa, and reduction of the place by capitulation. It has been too much the practice to reason as if these three events were the full history of ten or eleven years. Considering what Thucydidês states respecting the darkness of this period, we might perhaps suspect that they were all which he could learn about it on good authority: and they are all, in truth, events having a near and special bearing on the subsequent history of Athens herself—for Eion was the first stepping-stone to the important settlement of Amphipolis, and Skyros in the time of Thucydidês was the property of outlying Athenian citizens or kleruchs. Still, we are left in almost entire ignorance of the proceedings of Athens, as conducting the newly-established confederate force: for it is certain that the first ten years of the Athenian hegemony must have been years of most active warfare against the Persians. One positive testimony to this effect has been accidentally preserved to us by Herodotus, who mentions that “before the invasion of Xerxes, there were Persian commanders and garrisons everywhere in Thrace and the Hellespont,¹ all of whom were conquered by the Greeks after that invasion, with the single exception of Maskamês governor of Doriskus, who could never be taken, though many different Grecian attempts were made upon the fortress.”

Of those who were captured by the Greeks, not one made any defence sufficient to attract the admiration of Xerxes, except Bogês governor of Eion. Bogês, after bravely defending himself, and refusing offers of capitulation, found his provisions exhausted, and further resistance impracticable. He then kindled a vast funeral pile—slew his wives, children, concubines, and family, and cast them into it—threw his precious effects over the wall into the Strymon—and lastly, precipitated

¹ Herodot. vii. 106, 107. Κατέσταναν γὰρ ἔτι πρότερον ταύτης τῆς ἐλάσιος ὑπαρχοὶ ἐν τῇ Θρηκῆ καὶ τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου πανταχῆ. Οὗτοι δὲν πάντες, οἳ τε ἐκ Θρηκῆς καὶ τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου, πλὴν τοῦ ἐν Δορίσκῳ, ἐπὶ Ἑλλήνων ὕστερον ταύτης τῆς στρατηλασίης ἐξηρέθησαν· τὸν δὲ ἐν Δορίσκῳ Μασκάμην οὐδαμῶς καὶ ἐδυνάσθησαν ἐξελεῖν, πολλῶν πειρησαμένων.

The loose chronology of Plutarch is little to be trusted; but he, too, acknowledges the continuance of Persian occupations in Thrace, by aid of the natives, until a period later than the battle of the Eurymedon (Plutarch, Kimon, c. 14).

It is a mistake to suppose, with Dr. Arnold in his note on Thucyd. viii. 62, “that Sestus was almost the last place held by the Persians in Europe.”

Weissenborn (Hellen, oder Beiträge zur genaueren Erforschung der altgriechischen Geschichte, Jena, 1844, p. 144, note 31) has taken notice of

himself into the flames.¹ His brave despair was the theme of warm encomium among the Persians, and his relatives in Persia were liberally rewarded by Xerxes. This capture of Eion, effected by Kimon, has been mentioned (as already stated) by Thucydidés ; but Herodotus here gives us to understand that it was only one of a string of enterprises, all unnoticed by Thucydidés, against the Persians. Nay, it would seem from his language that Maskamés maintained himself in Doriskus during the whole reign of Xerxes, and perhaps longer, repelling successive Grecian assaults.

The valuable indication here cited from Herodotus would be of itself a sufficient proof that the first years of the Athenian hegemony were full of busy and successful hostility against the Persians. And in truth this is what we should expect. The battles of Salamis, Plataea, and Mykalé, drove the Persians out of Greece and overpowered their main armaments, but did not remove them at once from all the various posts which they occupied throughout the Ægean and Thrace. Without doubt the Athenians had to clear the coasts and the islands of a great number of different Persian detachments ; an operation neither short nor easy, with the then imperfect means of siege, as we may see by the cases of Sestus and Eion ; nor indeed always practicable, as the case of Doriskus teaches us. The fear of these Persians, yet remaining in the neighbourhood,² and even the chance of a renewed Persian invading armament, formed one pressing motive for Grecian cities to join the new confederacy ; while the expulsion of the enemy added to it those places which he had occupied. It was by these years of active operations at sea against the common enemy, that the Athenians first established³ that constant, systematic, and this important passage of Herodotus, as well as of that in Plutarch ; but he does not see how much it embarrasses all attempts to frame a certain chronology for those two or three events which Thucydidés gives us between 476-466 B. c.

¹ Kutzén (De Atheniensium Imperio Cimonis atque Periclis tempore constituto. Grimæ, 1837. Commentatio, i. p. 8) has good reason to call in question the stratagem ascribed to Kimon by Pausanias (viii. 8, 2) for the capture of Eion.

² To these "remaining operations against the Persians" the Athenian envoy at Lacedæmon alludes, in his speech prior to the Peloponnesian war — ὑμῶν μὲν (you Spartans) οὐκ ἐβελησάντων παραμείναι πρὸς τὰ ὑπόλοιπα τοῦ βαρβάρου, ἡμῖν δὲ προσελθόντων τῶν συμμάχων καὶ αὐτῶν δεηθέντων ἡγεμόνας καταστῆναι, &c. (Thucyd. i. 75) : and again, iii. 10. τὰ ὑπόλοιπα τῶν ἔργων.

Compare also Plato, Menexen. c. 12. αὐτὸς δὲ ἡγγέλλετο βασιλεὺς διανοεῖσθαι ὡς ἐπιχειρήσων πάλιν ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας, &c.

³ The Athenian nautical training begins directly after the repulse of the

laborious training, among their own ships' crews, which transmitted itself with continual improvements down to the Peloponnesian war. It was by these, combined with present fear, that they were enabled to organise the largest and most efficient confederacy ever known among Greeks—to bring together deliberative deputies—to plant their own ascendancy as enforcers of the collective resolutions—and to raise a prodigious tax from universal contribution. Lastly, it was by the same operations, prosecuted so successfully as to remove present alarm, that they at length fatigued the more lukewarm and passive members of the confederacy, and created in them a wish either to commute personal service for pecuniary contribution, or to escape from the obligation of service in any way. The Athenian nautical training would never have been acquired—the confederacy would never have become a working reality—the fatigue and discontents among its members would never have arisen—unless there had been a real fear of the Persians, and a pressing necessity for vigorous and organised operations against them, during the ten years between 477 and 466 B.C.

As to these ten years, then, we are by no means to assume that the particular incidents mentioned by Thucydides about Eion, Skyros, Karystus, and Naxos, constitute the sum total of events. To contradict this assumption, I have suggested proof sufficient, though indirect, that they are only part of the stock of a very busy period—the remaining details of which, indicated in outline by the large general language of Thucydides, we are condemned not to know. Nor are we admitted to be present at the synod of Delos, which during all this time continued its periodical meetings: though it would have been highly interesting to trace the steps whereby an institution which at first promised to protect not less the separate rights of the members than the security of the whole, so lamentably failed in its object. We must recollect that this confederacy, formed for objects common to all, limited to a certain extent the autonomy of each member; both conferring definite rights, and imposing definite obligations. Solemnly sworn to by all, and by Aristides on behalf of Athens, it was intended to bind the members in perpetuity—marked even in the form of the oath, which was performed by casting heavy lumps of iron into

Persians. Τὸ δὲ τῆς θαλάσσης ἐπιστήμονας γενέσθαι (says Periklēs respecting the Peloponnesians, just at the commencement of the Peloponnesian war) οὐ βραδίας αὐτοῖς προσγενήσεται· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡμεῖς, μελετῶντες αὐτὸ εὐθὺς ἀπὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν, ἐξείργασθέ πω (Thucyd. i. 142).

such was its real source, it did not the less fatally degrade the allies in reference to Athens, and extinguish the original feeling of equal rights and partnership in the confederacy, with communion of danger as well as of glory, which had once bound them together. The Athenians came to consider themselves as military chiefs and soldiers, with a body of tribute-paying subjects, whom they were entitled to hold in dominion, and restrict, both as to foreign policy and internal government, to such extent as they thought expedient—but whom they were also bound to protect against foreign enemies. The military force of these subject-states was thus in a great degree transferred to Athens by their own act, just as that of so many of the native princes in India has been made over to the English. But the military efficiency of the confederacy against the Persians was much increased, in proportion as the vigorous resolves of Athens¹ were less and less paralysed by the contentions and irregularity of a synod: so that the war was prosecuted with greater success than ever, while those motives of alarm, which had served as the first pressing stimulus to the formation of the confederacy, became every year further and further removed.

Under such circumstances, several of the confederate states grew tired even of paying their tribute—and averse to continuance as members. They made successive attempts to secede: but Athens, acting seemingly in conjunction with the synod, repressed their attempts one after the other—conquering, fining, and disarming the revolters; which was the more easily done, since in most cases their naval force had been in great part handed over to her. As these events took place, not all at once, but successively in different years—the number of mere tribute-paying allies as well as of subdued revolters continually increasing—so there was never any one moment of conspicuous change in the character of the confederacy. The allies slid unconsciously into subjects, while Athens, without any predetermined plan, passed from a chief into a despot.

ταλαιπωρεῖν προσάγοντες τὰς ἀνάγκας. Ἦσαν δὲ πως καὶ ἄλλως οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐκέτι ὁμοίως ἐν ἡδονῇ ἄρχοντες, καὶ οὔτε ξυνεστράτευον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου, βῆδιόν τε προσάγεσθαι ἢν αὐτοῖς τοὺς ἀφισταμένους· ἂν αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι ἐγγένοντο οἱ ἐξόμμαχοι· διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἀπόκνησιν ταύτην τῶν στρατειῶν οἱ πλείους αὐτῶν, ἵνα μὴ ἀπ' οἴκου ὦσι, χρήματα ἐτάξαντο ἀντὶ τῶν νεῶν τὸ ἐκνούμενον ἀνάλωμα φέρειν, καὶ τοῖς μὲν Ἀθηναίοις ἤβζετο τὸ ναυτικὸν ἀπὸ τῆς δαπάνης ἢν ἐκείνοι ξυμφέροισιν, αὐτοὶ δὲ ὅπως ἀποσταίειν, ἀπαράσκειν καὶ ἀπειροὶ ἐς τὸν πόλεμον καθίσταντο.

¹ See the contemptuous remarks of Periklēs upon the debates of the Lacedæmonian allies at Sparta (Thucyd. i. 141).

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By strictly enforcing the obligations of the pact upon unwilling members, and by employing coercion against revolters, she had become unpopular in the same proportion as she acquired new power—and that too without any guilt of her own. In this position, even if she had been inclined to relax her hold upon the tributary subjects, considerations of her own safety would have deterred her from doing so; for there was reason to apprehend that they might place their strength at the disposal of her enemies. It is very certain that she never was so inclined. It would have required a more self-denying public morality than has ever been practised by any state, either ancient or modern, even to conceive the idea of relinquishing voluntarily an immense ascendancy as well as a lucrative revenue: least of all was such an idea likely to be conceived by Athenian citizens, whose ambition increased with their power, and among whom the love of Athenian ascendancy was both passion and patriotism. But though the Athenians were both disposed, and qualified, to push all the advantages offered and even to look out for new—we must not forget that the foundations of their empire were laid in the most honourable causes: voluntary invitation—efforts both unwearied and successful against a common enemy—unpopularity incurred in discharge of an imperative duty—and inability to break up the confederacy, without endangering themselves as well as laying open the Ægean sea to the Persians.¹

There were two other causes, besides that which has been first adverted to, for the unpopularity of imperial Athens. First, the existence of the confederacy, imposing permanent obligations, was in conflict with the general instinct of the

¹ The speech of the Athenian envoy at Sparta, a little before the Peloponnesian war, sets forth the growth of the Athenian empire, in the main, with perfect justice (Thucyd. i. 75, 76). He admits and even exaggerates its unpopularity, but shows that such unpopularity was, to a great extent and certainly as to its first origin, unavoidable as well as undeserved. He of course, as might be supposed, omits those other proceedings by which Athens had herself aggravated it.

Καὶ γὰρ αὐτὴν τήνδε (τὴν ἀρχὴν) ἐλάβομεν οὐ βιασάμενοι . . . ἐξ αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ ἔργου κατηναγκάσθημεν τὸ πρῶτον προαγαγεῖν αὐτὴν ἐς τὸδε, μάλιστα μὲν ὑπὸ δέους, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τιμῆς, ὕστερον καὶ ὠφελίας. Καὶ οὐκ ἀσφαλὲς ἔτι ἔδοκεί εἶναι, τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀπηχθήμενος, καὶ τινων καὶ ἤδη ἀποστάντων κεχειρωμένων, ὑμῶν τε ἡμῖν οὐκέτι ὁμοίως φίλων ἀλλ' ὑπόπτων καὶ διαφόρων ὄντων, ἀνέντας κινδυνεύειν· καὶ γὰρ ἂν αἱ ἀποστάσεις πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐγίγνοντο· πᾶσι δὲ ἀνεπίφθονον τὰ ξυμφέροντα τῶν μεγίστων περὶ κινδύνων εὖ τίθεσθαι.

The whole speech well merits attentive study: compare also the speech of Periklēs at Athens, in the second year of the Peloponnesian war (Thucyd. ii. 63).

Greek mind, tending towards separate political autonomy of each city—as well as with the particular turn of the Ionic mind, incapable of that steady personal effort which was requisite for maintaining the synod of Delos on its first large and equal basis. Next—and this is the great cause of all—Athens, having defeated the Persians and thrust them to a distance, began to employ the force and the tribute of her subject-allies in warfare against Greeks, wherein these allies had nothing to gain from success—everything to apprehend from defeat—and a banner to fight for, offensive to Hellenic sympathies. On this head the subject-allies had great reason to complain, throughout the prolonged wars of Greek against Greek for the purpose of sustaining Athenian predominance. But on the point of practical grievances or oppressions, they had little ground for discontent, and little feeling of actual discontent, as I shall show more fully hereafter. Among the general body of citizens in the subject-allied cities, the feeling towards Athens was rather indifference than hatred. The movement of revolt against her proceeded from small parties of leading men, acting apart from the citizens, and generally with collateral views of ambition for themselves. The positive hatred towards her was felt chiefly by those who were not her subjects.)

It is probable that the same indisposition to personal effort, which prompted the confederates of Delos to tender money-payment as a substitute for military service, also induced them to neglect attendance at the synod. But we do not know the steps whereby this assembly, at first an effective reality, gradually dwindled into a mere form, and vanished. Nothing however can more forcibly illustrate the difference of character between the maritime allies of Athens and the Peloponnesian allies of Sparta, than the fact—that while the former shrank from personal service and thought it an advantage to tax themselves in place of it—the latter were “ready enough with their bodies,” but uncomplying and impracticable as to contributions.¹ The contempt felt by these Dorian landsmen for the military efficiency of the Ionians recurs frequently, and appears even to exceed what the reality justified. But when we turn to the conduct of the latter twenty years earlier, at the battle of Ladê, in the very crisis of the Ionic revolt from Persia²—we detect the same want of energy, the same incapacity of personal effort and labour, as that which broke up

¹ Thucyd. i. 141. *σάμασι δὲ ἐτοιμότεροι οἱ αὐτουργοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἢ χρήμασι πολεμεῖν, &c.*

² See Herodot. vi. 12, and chap. xxxv. of this History.

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the Confederacy of Delos with all its beneficial promise. To appreciate fully the indefatigable activity and daring, together with the patient endurance of laborious maritime training, which characterised the Athenians of that day—we have only to contrast them with these confederates, so remarkably destitute of both. Amidst such glaring inequalities of merit, capacity, and power, to maintain a confederacy of equal members was impossible. It was in the nature of things that the confederacy should either break up, or be transmuted into an Athenian empire.)

I have already mentioned that the first aggregate assessment of tribute, proposed by Aristeidês and adopted by the synod at Delos, was four hundred and sixty talents in money. At that time many of the confederates paid their quota, not in money, but in ships. But this practice gradually diminished, as the commutations above alluded to, of money in place of ships, were multiplied, while the aggregate tribute of course became larger. It was no more than six hundred talents¹ at the commencement of the Peloponnesian war, forty-six years after the first formation of the confederacy; from whence we may infer that it was never at all increased upon individual members during the interval. For the difference between four hundred and sixty talents and six hundred, admits of being fully explained by the numerous commutations of service for money as well as by the acquisitions of new members, which doubtless Athens had more or less the opportunity of making. It is not to be imagined that the confederacy had attained its maximum number at the date of the first assessment of tribute: there must have been various cities, like Sinopê and Ægina, subsequently added.²

Without some such preliminary statements as those just given, respecting the new state of Greece between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars, beginning with the Athenian hegemony or headship, and ending with the Athenian empire—the reader would hardly understand the bearing of those particular events which our authorities enable us to recount; events unhappily few in number, though the period must have been full of action—and not well-authenticated as to dates. The first known enterprise of the Athenians in their new capacity (whether the first absolutely or not we cannot determine) between 476 B.C. and 466 B.C., was the conquest of the important post of Eion on the Strymon, where the Persian governor Bogês, starved

¹ Thucyd. ii. 13.

² Thucyd. i. 108; Plutarch, Periklês, c. 20.

out after a desperate resistance, destroyed himself rather than capitulate, together with his family and precious effects—as has already been stated. The next events named are their enterprises against the Dolopes and Pelasgi in the island of Skyros (seemingly about 470 B.C.) and the Dryopes in the town and district of Karystus in Eubœa. To the latter, who were of a different kindred from the inhabitants of Chalkis and Eretria, and received no aid from them, they granted a capitulation: the former were more rigorously dealt with and expelled from their island. Skyros was barren, and had little to recommend it except a good maritime position and an excellent harbour; while its inhabitants, seemingly akin to the Pelasgian residents in Lemnos prior to the Athenian occupation of that spot, were alike piratical and cruel. Some Thessalian traders, recently plundered and imprisoned by them, had raised a complaint against them before the Amphiktyonic synod, which condemned the island to make restitution. The mass of the islanders threw the burden upon those who had committed the crime: and these men, in order to evade payment, invoked Kimon with the Athenian armament. He conquered the island, expelled the inhabitants, and peopled it with Athenian settlers.

Such clearance was a beneficial act, suitable to the new character of Athens as guardian of the Ægean sea against piracy: but it seems also connected with Athenian plans. The island lay very convenient for the communication with Lemnos (which the Athenians had doubtless reoccupied after the expulsion of the Persians¹), and became, as well as Lemnos, a recognised adjunct or outlying portion of Attica. Moreover there were old legends which connected the Athenians with it, as the tomb of their hero Theseus; whose name, as the mythical champion of democracy, was in peculiar favour at the period immediately following the return from Salamis. It was in the year 476 B.C., that the oracle had directed them to bring home the bones of Theseus from Skyros, and to prepare for that hero a splendid entombment and edifice in their new city. They had tried to effect this, but the unsocial manners of the Dolopians had prevented a search, and it was only after Kimon had taken the island that he found, or pretended to find, the body. It was brought to Athens in the year 469 B.C.,² and after being

¹ Xenophon, *Hellenic*. v. 1, 31.

² Mr. Fynes Clinton (*Fasti Hellenic*. ad ann. 476 B.C.) places the conquest of Skyros by Kimon in the year 476 B.C. He says, after citing a passage from Thucyd. i. 98, and from Plutarch, *Theseus*, c. 36, as well as a proposed correction of Bentley, which he justly rejects—"The island was actually conquered in the year of the archon Phædon, B.C. 476. This

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welcomed by the people in solemn and joyous procession, as if the hero himself had come back, was deposited in the interior

we know from Thucyd. i. 98, and Diodor. xi. 41-48 combined. Plutarch named the archon Phædon with reference to the *conquest* of the island: then, by a negligence not unusual with him, connected the oracle with that fact, as a contemporary transaction: although in truth the oracle was not procured till six or seven years afterwards."

Plutarch has many sins to answer for against chronological exactness; but the charge here made against him is undeserved. He states that the oracle was given in (476 B.C.) the year of the archon Phædon; and that the body of Theseus was brought back to Athens in (469 B.C.) the year of the archon Aphepsion. There is nothing to contradict either statement; nor do the passages of Thucydides and Diodorus, which Mr. Clinton adduces, prove that which he asserts. The two passages of Diodorus have indeed no bearing upon the event: and in so far as Diodorus is in this case an authority at all, he goes against Mr. Clinton, for he states Skyros to have been conquered in 470 B.C. (Diodor. xi. 60). Thucydides only tells us that the operations against Eion, Skyros, and Karystus, took place in the order here indicated, and at some periods between 476 and 466 B.C.: but he does not enable us to determine positively the date of either. Upon what authority Mr. Clinton states that "the oracle was not procured till six or seven years afterwards" (*i. e.* after the conquest), I do not know: the account of Plutarch goes rather to show that it was procured six or seven years *before* the conquest: and this may stand good until some better testimony is produced to contradict it. As our information now stands, we have no testimony as to the year of the conquest except that of Diodorus, who assigns it to 470 B.C., but as he assigns both the conquest of Eion, and the expeditions of Kimon against Karia and Pamphylia with the victories of Eurymedon, all to the same year, we cannot much trust his authority. Nevertheless I incline to believe him as to the date of the conquest of Skyros: because it seems to me very probable that this conquest took place in the year immediately before that in which the body of Theseus was brought to Athens, which latter event may be referred with great confidence to 469 B.C., in consequence of the interesting anecdote related by Plutarch about the first prize gained by the poet Sophoklés.

Mr. Clinton has given in his Appendix (No. vi.-viii. p. 248-253) two Dissertations respecting the chronology of the period from the Persian war down to the close of the Peloponnesian war. He has rendered much service by correcting the mistake of Dodwell, Wesseling and Mitford (founded upon an inaccurate construction of a passage in Isokratés) in supposing, after the Persian invasion of Greece, a Spartan hegemony, lasting ten years, prior to the commencement of the Athenian hegemony. He has shown that the latter must be reckoned as commencing in 477, or 476 B.C., immediately after the mutiny of the allies against Pausanias—whose command, however, need not be peremptorily restricted to one year, as Mr. Clinton (p. 252) and Dodwell maintain: for the words of Thucydides, ἐν τῇδε τῇ ἡγεμονίᾳ, imply nothing as to annual duration, and designate merely "the hegemony which preceded that of Athens."

But the refutation of this mistake does not enable us to establish any good positive chronology for the period between 477 and 466 B.C. It will not do to construe Πρώτον μὲν (Thucyd. i. 98) in reference to the Athenian conquest of Eion, as if it must necessarily mean "*the year after*" 477 B.C. If we could imagine that Thucydides had told us all the military operations

of the city. On the spot was built the monument called the Theseium with its sacred precinct, invested with the privilege of a sanctuary for men of poor condition who might feel ground for dreading the oppressions of the powerful, as well as for slaves in case of cruel usage.¹ Such were the protective functions of the mythical hero of democracy, whose installation is interesting as marking the growing intensity of democratical feeling in Athens since the Persian war.

It was about two years or more after this incident that the first breach of union in the Confederacy of Delos took place. The important island of Naxos, the largest of the Cyclades—an island which thirty years before had boasted a large marine force and 8000 hoplites—revolted; on what special ground we do not know: but probably the greater islands fancied themselves better able to dispense with the protection of the confederacy than the smaller—at the same time that they were more jealous of Athens. After a siege of unknown duration, by Athens and the confederate force, it was forced to surrender, between 477-466 B.C., we should be compelled to admit plenty of that “interval of inaction” against which Mr. Clinton so strongly protests (p. 252). Unhappily Thucydides has told us but a small portion of the events which really happened.

Mr. Clinton compares the various periods of duration assigned by ancient authors to that which is improperly called the Athenian “empire”—between 477-405 B.C. (pp. 248, 249). I confess that I rather agree with Dr. Gillies, who admits the discrepancy between these authors broadly and undisguisedly, than with Mr. Clinton, who seeks to bring them into comparative agreement. His explanation is only successful in regard to one of them—Demosthenês; whose two statements (forty-five years in one place and seventy-three years in another) are shown to be consistent with each other as well as chronologically just. But surely it is not reasonable to correct the text of the orator Lykurgus from *ἐνεθήκοντα* to *ἐβδομήκοντα*, and then to say that “Lykurgus may be added to the number of those who describe the period as seventy years” (p. 250). Neither are we to bring Andokidês into harmony with others, by supposing that “his calculation ascends to the battle of Marathon, from the date of which (B.C. 490) to the battle of Ægospotami, are just eighty-five years” (ibid.). Nor ought we to justify a computation by Demosthenês of sixty-five years, by saying “that it terminates at the Athenian defeat in Sicily” (p. 249).

The truth is, that there is more or less chronological inaccuracy in all these passages, except those of Demosthenês—and historical inaccuracy in all of them, not even excepting those. It is not true that the Athenians *ἤρξαν τῆς θαλάσσης—ἤρξαν τῶν Ἑλλήνων—προστάται ἦσαν τῶν Ἑλλήνων*—for seventy-three years. The historical language of Demosthenês, Plato, Lysias, Isokratês, Andokidês, Lykurgus, requires to be carefully examined before we rely upon it.

¹ Plutarch (Kimón, c. 8; Theseus, c. 36). *ἔστι δὲ φύξιον οἰκέταις καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ταπεινοτέροις καὶ δεδίοσι κρείττονας, ὡς καὶ τοῦ Θησεῦς προστατικού τινος καὶ βοηθητικοῦ γενομένου καὶ προσδεχομένου φιλανθρώπως τὰς τῶν ταπεινοτέρων δέσεις.*

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and reduced to the condition of a tributary subject ;¹ its armed ships being doubtless taken away, and its fortifications razed. Whether any fine or ulterior penalty was levied, we have no information.

We cannot doubt that the reduction of this powerful island, however untoward in its effects upon the equal and self-maintained character of the confederacy, strengthened its military force by placing the whole Naxian fleet with new pecuniary contributions in the hands of the chief. Nor is it surprising to hear that Athens sought both to employ this new force, and to obliterate the late act of severity, by increased exertions against the common enemy. Though we know no particulars respecting operations against Persia, since the attack on Eion, such operations must have been going on ; but the expedition under Kimon, undertaken not long after the Naxian revolt, was attended with memorable results. That commander, having under him 200 triremes from Athens, and 100 from the various confederates, was despatched to attack the Persians on the south-western and southern coast of Asia Minor. He attacked and drove out several of their garrisons from various Grecian settlements, both in Karia and Lykia : among others, the important trading city of Phasêlis, though at first resisting and even standing a siege, was prevailed upon by the friendly suggestions of the Chians in Kimon's armament to pay a contribution of ten talents and join in the expedition. From the length of time occupied in these various undertakings, the Persian satraps had been enabled to assemble a powerful force, both fleet and army, near the mouth of the river Eurymedon in Pamphylia, under the command of Tithraustês and Pherendatês, both of the regal blood. The fleet, chiefly Phœnician, seems to have consisted of 200 ships, but a further reinforcement of eighty Phœnician ships was expected, and was actually near at hand, so that the commanders were unwilling to hazard a battle before its arrival. Kimon, anxious for the same reason to hasten on the combat, attacked them vigorously. Partly from their inferiority of numbers, partly from discouragement at the absence of the reinforcement, they seem to have made no strenuous resistance. They were put to flight and driven ashore ; so speedily, and with so little loss to the Greeks, that Kimon was enabled to disembark his men forthwith, and attack the land-force which was drawn up on shore to protect them. The

¹ Thucyd. i. 98. It has already been stated in the preceding chapter, that Themistoklês, as a fugitive, passed close to Naxos while it was under siege, and incurred great danger of being taken.

battle on land was long and gallantly contested, but Kimon at length gained a complete victory, dispersed the army with the capture of many prisoners, and either took or destroyed the entire fleet. As soon as his victory and his prisoners were secured, he sailed to Cyprus for the purpose of intercepting the reinforcement of eighty Phœnician ships in their way, and was fortunate enough to attack them while yet they were ignorant of the victories of the Eurymedon. These ships too were all destroyed, though most of the crews appear to have escaped ashore on the island. Two great victories, one at sea and the other on land, gained on the same day by the same armament, counted with reason among the most glorious of all Grecian exploits, and were extolled as such in the inscription on the commemorative offering to Apollo, set up out of the tithe of the spoils.¹ The number of prisoners, as well as the booty taken by the victors, was immense.

¹ For the battles of the Eurymedon, see Thucyd. i. 100; Diodor. xi. 60-62; Plutarch, Kimon, 12, 13.

The accounts of the two latter appear chiefly derived from Ephorus and Kallisthenês, authors of the following century; and from Phanodemus, an author later still. I borrow sparingly from them, and only so far as consists with the brief statement of Thucydidês. The narrative of Diodorus is exceedingly confused, indeed hardly intelligible.

Phanodemus stated the number of the Persian fleet at six hundred ships; Ephorus, at three hundred and fifty. Diodorus (following the latter) gives three hundred and forty. Plutarch mentions the expected reinforcement of eighty Phœnician ships; which appears to me a very credible circumstance, explaining the easy nautical victory of Kimon at the Eurymedon. From Thucydidês we know that the vanquished fleet at the Eurymedon consisted of no more than two hundred ships. For so I venture to construe the words of Thucydidês, in spite of the authority of Dr. Arnold—*Καὶ εἶλον (Ἄθηναῖοι) τριήρεις φοινίκων καὶ διέφθειραν τὰς πάσας ἐς (τὰς) διακοσίας*. Upon which Dr. Arnold observes,—“Amounting in all to two hundred; that is, that the whole number of ships taken or destroyed was two hundred—not that the whole fleet consisted of no more.” Admitting the correctness of this construction (which may be defended by viii. 21), we may remark that the defeated Phœnician fleet, according to the universal practice of antiquity, ran ashore to seek protection from its accompanying land-force. When therefore this land-force was itself defeated and dispersed, the ships would *all* naturally fall into the power of the victors; or if any escaped, it would be merely by accident. Moreover, the smaller number is in this case *more* likely to be the truth, as we must suppose an easy naval victory, in order to leave strength for a strenuous land battle on the same day.

It is remarkable that the inscription on the commemorative offering only specifies “one hundred Phœnician ships with their crews” as having been captured (Diodor. xi. 62). The other hundred ships were probably destroyed. Diodorus represents Kimon as having captured three hundred and forty ships, though he himself cites the inscription which mentions only one hundred.

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A victory thus remarkable, which thrust back the Persians to the region eastward of Phasélis, doubtless fortified materially the position of the Athenian confederacy against them. But it tended not less to exalt the reputation of Athens, and even to popularise her with the confederates generally, from the large amount of plunder divisible among them. Probably this increased power and popularity stood her in stead throughout her approaching contest with Thasos, at the same time that it explains the increasing fear and dislike of the Peloponnesians.

Thasos was a member of the confederacy of Delos ; but her quarrel with Athens seems to have arisen out of causes quite distinct from confederate relations. It has been already stated that the Athenians had within the last few years expelled the Persians from the important post of Eion on the Strymon, the most convenient post for the neighbouring region of Thrace, which was not less distinguished for its fertility than for its mining wealth. In the occupation of this post, the Athenians had had time to become acquainted with the productive character of the adjoining region, chiefly occupied by the Edonian Thracians ; and it is extremely probable that many private settlers arrived from Athens, with the view of procuring grants, or making their fortunes by partnership with powerful Thracians in working the gold-mines round Mount Pangæus. In so doing, they speedily found themselves in collision with the Greeks of the opposite island of Mount Thasos, who possessed a considerable strip of land with various dependent towns on the continent of Thrace, and derived a large revenue from the mines of Skaptê Hylê, as well as from others in the neighbourhood.¹ The condition of Thasos at this time (about 465 B.C.) indicates to us the progress which the Grecian states in the Ægean had made since their liberation from Persia. It had been deprived both of its fortifications and of its maritime force, by order of Darius, about 491 B.C., and must have remained in this condition until after the repulse of Xerxes ; but we now find it well fortified and possessing a powerful maritime force.

In what precise manner the quarrel between the Thasians

¹ About Thasos, see Herodot. vi. 46-48 ; vii. 118. The position of Ragusa in the Adriatic, in reference to the despots of Servia and Bosnia in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, was very similar to that of Athens and Thasos in regard to the Thracian princes of the interior. In Engel's History of Ragusa we find an account of the large gains made in that city by its contracts to work the gold and silver mines belonging to these princes (Engel, Geschichte des Freystaates Ragusa, sect. 36, p. 163. Wien, 1807).

and the Athenians of Eion manifested itself, respecting the trade and the mines in Thrace, we are not informed. But it reached such a height that the Athenians were induced to send a powerful armament against the island, under the command of Kimon.¹ Having vanquished the Thasian force at sea, they disembarked, gained various battles, and blocked up the city by land as well as by sea. And at the same time they undertook—what seems to have been part and parcel of the same scheme—the establishment of a larger and more powerful colony on Thracian ground not far from Eion. On the Strymon, about three miles higher up than Eion, near the spot where the river narrows itself again out of a broad expanse of the nature of a lake, was situated the Edonian town or settlement called Ennea Hodoi (Nine Ways), a little above the bridge, which here served as an important communication for all the people of the interior. Both Histiaëus and Aristagoras, the two Milesian despots, had been tempted by the advantages of this place to commence a settlement there: both of them had failed, and a third failure on a still grander scale was now about to be added. The Athenians sent thither a large body of colonists, ten thousand in number, partly from their own citizens, partly collected from their allies; the temptations of the site probably rendering volunteers numerous. As far as Ennea Hodoi was concerned, they were successful in conquering it and driving away the Edonian possessors. But on trying to extend themselves farther to the eastward, to a spot called Drabêskus convenient for the mining region, they encountered a more formidable resistance from a powerful alliance of Thracian tribes, who had come to aid the Edonians in decisive hostility against the new colony—probably not without instigation from the inhabitants of Thasos. All or most of the ten thousand colonists were slain in this warfare, and the new colony was for the time completely abandoned. We shall find it resumed hereafter.²

Disappointed as the Athenians were in this enterprise, they did not abandon the blockade of Thasos, which held out more

¹ Thucyd. i. 100, 101; Plutarch, Kimon, c. 14; Diodor. xi. 70.

² Thucyd. i. 101. Philip of Macedon, in his dispute more than a century after this period with the Athenians respecting the possession of Amphipolis, pretended that his ancestor Alexander had been the first to acquire possession of the spot after the expulsion of the Persians from Thrace (see Philippi Epistola ap. Demosthen. p. 164, R.). If this pretence had been true, Ennea Hodoi would have been in possession of the Macedonians at this time, when the first Athenian attempt was made upon it: but the statement of Thucydides shows that it was then an Edonian township.

than two years, and only surrendered in the third year. Its fortifications were razed; its ships of war, thirty-three in number, were taken away:¹ its possessions and mining establishments on the opposite continent were relinquished. Moreover an immediate contribution in money was demanded from the inhabitants, over and above the annual payment assessed upon them for the future. The subjugation of this powerful island was another step in the growing dominion of Athens over her confederates.

The year before the Thasians surrendered, however, they had taken a step which deserves particular notice, as indicating the newly-gathering clouds in the Grecian political horizon. They had made secret application to the Lacedæmonians for aid, entreating them to draw off the attention of Athens by invading Attica; and the Lacedæmonians, without the knowledge of Athens, having actually engaged to comply with this request, were only prevented from performing their promise by a grave and terrible misfortune at home.² Though accidentally unperformed, this hostile promise is a most significant event. It marks the growing fear and hatred on the part of Sparta and the Peloponnesians towards Athens, merely on general grounds of the magnitude of her power, and without any special provocation. Nay, not only had Athens given no provocation, but she was still actually included as a member of the Lacedæmonian alliance, and we shall find her presently both appealed to and acting as such. We shall hear so much of Athens, and that too with truth, as pushing and aggressive—and of Sparta as home-keeping and defensive—that the incident just mentioned becomes important to remark. The first intent of unprovoked and even treacherous hostility—the germ of the future Peloponnesian war—is conceived and reduced to an engagement by Sparta.

We are told by Plutarch, that the Athenians, after the surrender of Thasos and the liberation of the armament, had expected from Kimon some further conquests in Macedonia—and even that he had actually entered upon that project with such promise of success, that its further consummation was certain as well as easy. Having under these circumstances relinquished it and returned to Athens, he was accused by Periklês and others of having been bought off by bribes from

¹ Plutarch, Kimon, c. 14. Galêpsus and Cœsymê were among the Thasian settlements on the mainland of Thrace (Thucyd. iv. 108).

² Thucyd. i. 101. οἱ δὲ δπέσχοντο μὲν κρύφα τῶν Ἀθηναίων, καὶ ἔμελλον, διεκωλύθησαν δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ γενομένου σεισμοῦ.

the Macedonian king Alexander; but was acquitted after a public trial.¹

During the period which had elapsed between the first formation of the confederacy of Delos and the capture of Thasos (about thirteen or fourteen years, B.C. 477-463), the Athenians seem to have been occupied almost entirely in their maritime operations, chiefly against the Persians—having been free from embarrassments immediately round Attica. But this freedom was not destined to last much longer. During the ensuing ten years, their foreign relations near home become both active and complicated; while their strength expands so wonderfully, that they are found competent at once to obligations on both sides of the Ægean sea, the distant as well as the near.

Of the incidents which had taken place in Central Greece during the twelve or fifteen years immediately succeeding the battle of Plataea, we have scarcely any information. The feelings of the time, between those Greeks who had supported and those who had resisted the Persian invader, must have remained unfriendly even after the war was at an end; while the mere occupation of the Persian numerous host must have inflicted severe damage both upon Thessaly and Bœotia. At the meeting of the Amphiktyonic synod which succeeded the expulsion of the invaders, a reward was proclaimed for the life of the Melian Ephialtês, who had betrayed to Xerxes the mountain-path over Ceta, and thus caused the ruin of Leonidas at Thermopylæ. Moreover, if we may trust Plutarch, it was even proposed by Lacedæmon that all the *medising* Greeks should be expelled from the synod²—a proposition which the more long-sighted views of Themistoklês successfully resisted. Even the stronger measure of razing the fortifications of all the extra-Peloponnesian cities, from fear that they might be used to aid some future invasion, had suggested itself to the Lacedæmonians—as we see from their language on the occasion of rebuilding the walls of Athens. In regard to Bœotia, it appears that the headship of Thebes as well as the coherence of the federation was for the time almost suspended. The destroyed towns of Plataea and Thespiæ were restored, and the latter in part re-peopled,³ under Athenian influence. The

¹ Plutarch, Kimon, c. 14.

² Plutarch, Themistokl. c. 20.

³ See the case of Sikinnus, the person through whom Themistoklês communicated with Xerxes before the battle of Salamis, and for whom he afterwards procured admission among the batch of newly-introduced citizens at Thespiæ (Herodot. viii. 75).

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general sentiment of Peloponnesus as well as of Athens would have sustained these towns against Thebes, if the latter had tried at that time to enforce her supremacy over them in the name of "ancient Bœotian right and usage."¹ The Theban government was then in discredit for its previous *medism*—even in the eyes of Thebans themselves;² while the party opposed to Thebes in the other towns was so powerful, that many of them would probably have been severed from the federation to become allies of Athens like Plataea, if the interference of Lacedæmon had not arrested such a tendency. Lacedæmon was in every other part of Greece an enemy to organised aggregation of cities, either equal or unequal, and was constantly bent on keeping the little autonomous communities separate:³ whence she sometimes became by accident the protector of the weaker cities against compulsory alliance imposed upon them by the stronger. The interest of her own ascendancy was in this respect analogous to that of the Persians when they dictated the peace of Antalkidas—of the Romans in administering their extensive conquests—and of the kings of Mediæval Europe in breaking the authority of the barons over their vassals. But though such was the policy of Sparta elsewhere, her fear of Athens, which grew up during the ensuing twenty years, made her act differently in regard to Bœotia. She had no other means of maintaining that country as her own ally and as the enemy of Athens, except by organising the federation effectively, and strengthening the authority of Thebes. It is to this revolution in Spartan politics that Thebes owed the recovery of her ascendancy⁴—a revolution so conspicuously marked, that the Spartans even aided in enlarging her circuit and improving her fortifications. It was not without difficulty that she maintained this position even when recovered, against the dangerous neighbourhood of Athens—a circumstance which made her not only a vehement partisan of Sparta, but even more furiously anti-Athenian than Sparta, down to the close of the Peloponnesian war.

The revolution, just noticed, in Spartan politics towards Bœotia, did not manifest itself until about twenty years after the commencement of the Athenian maritime confederacy. During the course of those twenty years, we know that Sparta

¹ τὰ τῶν Βοιωτῶν πατρία—τὰ κοινὰ τῶν πάντων Βοιωτῶν πατρία (Thucyd. iii. 61-65).

² Thucyd. iii. 62.

³ See among many other evidences, the remarkable case of the Olynthian confederacy (Xenophon, Hellen. v. 2, 16).

⁴ Diodor. xi. 81; Justin, iii. 6.

had had more than one battle to sustain in Arcadia, against the towns and villages of that country, in which she came forth victorious: but we have no particulars respecting these incidents. We also know that a few years after the Persian invasion, the inhabitants of Elis concentrated themselves from many dispersed townships into the one main city of Elis:¹ and it seems probable that Lepreum in Triphylia, and one or two of the towns of Achaia, were either formed or enlarged by a similar process near about the same time.² Such aggregation of towns out of pre-existing separate villages was not conformable to the views, nor favourable to the ascendancy of Lacedæmon. But there can be little doubt that her foreign policy after the Persian invasion was both embarrassed and discredited by the misconduct of her two contemporary kings, Pausanias (who though only regent was practically equivalent to a king) and Leotychildês—not to mention the rapid development of Athens and Peiræus.

Moreover, in the year B.C. 464 (the year preceding the surrender of Thasos to the Athenian armament), a misfortune of yet more terrific moment befell Sparta. A violent earthquake took place in the immediate neighbourhood of Sparta itself, destroying a large portion of the town, and a vast number of lives, many of them Spartan citizens. It was the judgement of the earth-shaking god Poseidon (according to the view of the Lacedæmonians themselves) for a recent violation of his sanctuary at Tænarus, from whence certain suppliant Helots had been dragged away not long before for punishment:³—not improbably some of those Helots whom Pausanias had instigated to revolt. The sentiment of the Helots, at all times one of enmity towards their masters, appears at this moment to have been unusually inflammable: so that an earthquake at Sparta, especially an earthquake construed as divine vengeance for Helot blood recently spilt, was sufficient to rouse many of them at once into revolt, together with some even of the Perioeki. The insurgents took arms and marched directly upon Sparta, which they were on the point of mastering during the first moments of consternation, had not the bravery and presence of mind of the young king Archidamus reanimated the surviving citizens and repelled the attack. But though repelled, the insurgents were not subdued. They maintained the field against the Spartan force, sometimes with

¹ Diodor. xi. 54; Strabo, viii. p. 337.

² Strabo, viii. pp. 337, 348, 356.

³ Thucyd. i. 101-128; Diodor. xi. 62.

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considerable advantage, since Aeimnêstus (the warrior by whose hand Mardonius had fallen at Platæa) was defeated and slain with 300 followers in the plain of Stenyklêrus, overpowered by superior numbers.¹ When at length defeated, they occupied and fortified the memorable hill of Ithômê, the ancient citadel of their Mæssenian forefathers. Here they made a long and obstinate defence, supporting themselves doubtless by incursions throughout Laconia. Defence indeed was not difficult, seeing that the Lacedæmonians were at that time confessedly incapable of assailing even the most imperfect species of fortification. After the siege had lasted some two or three years, without any prospect of success, the Lacedæmonians, beginning to despair of their own sufficiency for the undertaking, invoked the aid of their various allies, among whom we find specified the Æginetans, the Athenians, and the Platæans.² The Athenian troops are said to have consisted of 4000 men, under the command of Kimon; Athens being still included in the list of Lacedæmonian allies.

So imperfect were the means of attacking walls at that day, even for the most intelligent Greeks, that this increased force made no immediate impression on the fortified hill of Ithômê. And when the Lacedæmonians saw that their Athenian allies were not more successful than they had been themselves, they soon passed from surprise into doubt, mistrust, and apprehension. The troops had given no ground for such a feeling, while Kimon their general was notorious for his attachment to Sparta. Yet the Lacedæmonians could not help suspecting the ever-wakeful energy and ambition of these Ionic strangers whom they had introduced into the interior of Laconia. Calling to mind their own promise—though doubtless a secret promise—to invade Attica not long before, for the benefit of the Thasians—they even began to fear that the Athenians might turn against them, and listen to solicitations for espousing the cause of the besieged. Under the influence of such apprehensions, they dismissed the Athenian contingent forthwith, on pretence of having no further occasion for them; while all the other allies were retained, and the siege or blockade went on as before.³

¹ Herodot. ix. 64.

² Thucyd. i. 102; iii. 54; iv. 57.

³ Thucyd. i. 102. τὴν μὲν ὑποψίαν οἱ δηλοῦντες, εἰπόντες δὲ ὅτι οὐδὲν προσδέονται αὐτῶν ἔτι.

Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fast. Hellen. ann. 464-461 B.C.) following Plutarch, recognises two Lacedæmonian requests to Athens, and two Athenian expeditions to the aid of the Spartans, both under Kimon; the first in 464 B.C.,

This dismissal, ungracious in the extreme, and probably rendered even more offensive by the habitual roughness of Spartan dealing, excited the strongest exasperation both among the Athenian soldiers and the Athenian people—an exasperation heightened by circumstances immediately preceding. For the resolution to send auxiliaries into Laconia, when the

immediately on the happening of the earthquake and consequent revolt—the second in 461 B.C., after the war had lasted some time.

In my judgement, there is no ground for supposing more than one application made to Athens, and one expedition. The duplication has arisen from Plutarch, who has construed too much as historical reality the comic exaggeration of Aristophanês (Aristoph. *Lysistrat.* 1138; Plutarch, *Kimon*, 16). The heroine of the latter, *Lysistrata*, wishing to make peace between the Lacedæmonians and Athenians, and reminding each of the services which they had received from the other, might permit herself to say to the Lacedæmonians—"Your envoy Perikleidas came to Athens, pale with terror, and put himself as a suppliant at the altar to entreat our help as a matter of life and death, while Poseidon was still shaking the earth and the Messenians were pressing you hard: then Kimon with 4000 hoplites went and achieved your complete salvation." This is all very telling and forcible, as a portion of the Aristophanic play, but there is no historical truth in it except the fact of an application made and an expedition sent in consequence.

We know that the earthquake took place at the time when the siege of Thasos was yet going on, because it was the reason which prevented the Lacedæmonians from aiding the besieged by an invasion of Attica. But Kimon commanded at the siege of Thasos (Plutarch, *Kimon*, c. 14), accordingly he could not have gone as commander to Laconia at the time when this first expedition is alleged to have been undertaken.

Next, Thucydidês acknowledges no more than one expedition; nor indeed does Diodorus (xi. 64), though this is of minor consequence. Now mere silence on the part of Thucydidês, in reference to the events of a period which he only professes to survey briefly, is not always a very forcible negative argument. But in this case, his account of the expedition of 461 B.C., with its very important consequences, is such as to exclude the supposition that *he knew* of any prior expedition, two or three years earlier. Had he known of any such, he could not have written the account which now stands in his text. He dwells especially on the prolongation of the war, and on the incapacity of the Lacedæmonians for attacking walls, as the reasons why they invoked the Athenians as well as their other allies: he implies that the presence of the latter in Laconia was a new and threatening incident: moreover, when he tells us how much the Athenians were incensed by their abrupt and mistrustful dismissal, he could not have omitted to notice as an aggravation of this feeling, that only two or three years before, they had rescued Lacedæmon from the brink of ruin. Let us add, that the supposition of Sparta, the first military power in Greece, and distinguished for her unintermitting discipline, being reduced all at once to a condition of such utter helplessness as to owe her safety to foreign intervention—is highly improbable in itself; inadmissible except on very good evidence.

For the reasons here stated, I reject the first expedition into Laconia mentioned in Plutarch.

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Lacedæmonians first applied for them, had not been taken without considerable debate at Athens. The party of Periklēs and Ephialtēs, habitually in opposition to KIMON, and partisans of the forward democratical movement, had strongly discountenanced it, and conjured their countrymen not to assist in renovating and strengthening their most formidable rival. Perhaps the previous engagement of the Lacedæmonians to invade Attica on behalf of the Thasians may have become known to them, though not so formally as to exclude denial. And even supposing this engagement to have remained unknown at that time to every one, there were not wanting other grounds to render the policy of refusal plausible. But Kimon—with an earnestness which even the philo-Laonian Kritias afterwards characterised as a sacrifice of the grandeur of Athens to the advantage of Lacedæmon¹—employed all his credit and influence in seconding the application. The maintenance of alliance with Sparta on equal footing—peace among the great powers of Greece and common war against Persia—together with the prevention of all further democratical changes in Athens—were the leading points of his political creed. As yet, both his personal and political ascendancy were predominant over his opponents. As yet, there was no manifest conflict, which had only just begun to show itself in the case of Thasos, between the maritime power of Athens and the union of land-force under Sparta: and Kimon could still treat both of these phænomena as coexisting necessities of Hellenic well-being. Though noway distinguished as a speaker, he carried with him the Athenian assembly by appealing to a large and generous patriotism, which forbade them to permit the humiliation of Sparta. “Consent not to see Hellas lamed of one leg and Athens drawing without her yoke-fellow;”²—such was his language, as we learn from his friend and companion the Chian poet Ion: and in the lips of Kimon it proved effective. It is a speech of almost melancholy interest, since ninety years passed over before such an appeal was ever again addressed to an Athenian assembly.³ The despatch of the auxiliaries was thus dictated by a generous sentiment, to the disregard of what might seem political prudence. And we may imagine the violent reaction which took place in Athenian

¹ Plutarch, Kimon. c. 16.

² Plutarch, Kimon, c. 16. ‘Ο δ’ Ἴων ἀπομνημονεύει καὶ τὸν λόγον, ἃ μάλιστα τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐκίνησε, παρακαλῶν μῆτε τὴν Ἑλλάδα χωλὴν, μῆτε τὴν πόλιν ἐτερόζυγα, περιδεῖν γεγενημένην.

³ See Xenophon, Hellenic. vi. 3—about 372 B.C.—a little before the battle of Leuktra.

feeling, when the Lacedæmonians repaid them by singling out their troops from all the other allies as objects of insulting suspicion. We may imagine the triumph of Periklês and Ephialtês, who had opposed the mission—and the vast loss of influence to Kimon, who had brought it about—when Athens received again into her public assembly the hoplites sent back from Ithômê.

{ Both in the internal constitution, indeed (of which more presently), and in the external policy, of Athens, the dismissal of these soldiers was prègnant with results. The Athenians immediately passed a formal resolution to renounce the alliance between themselves and Lacedæmon against the Persians. They did more: they looked out for land-enemies of Lacedæmon, with whom to ally themselves. }

Of these by far the first, both in Hellenic rank and in real power, was Argos. That city, neutral during the Persian invasion, had now recovered the effects of the destructive defeat suffered about thirty years before from the Spartan king Kleomenês. The sons of the ancient citizens had grown to manhood, and the temporary predominance of the Periœki, acquired in consequence of the ruinous loss of citizens in that defeat, had been again put down. In the neighbourhood of Argos, and dependent upon it, were situated Mykenæ, Tiryns, and Midea—small in power and importance, but rich in mythical renown. Disdaining the inglorious example of Argos at the period of danger, these towns had furnished contingents both to Thermopylæ and Platæa, which their powerful neighbour had been unable either to prevent at the time or to avenge afterwards, from fear of the intervention of Lacedæmon. But so soon as the latter was seen to be endangered and occupied at home, with a formidable Messenian revolt, the Argeians availed themselves of the opportunity to attack not only Mykenæ and Tiryns, but also Orneæ, Midea, and other semi-dependent towns around them. Several of these were reduced; and the inhabitants, robbed of their autonomy, were incorporated with the domain of Argos: but the Mykenæans, partly from the superior gallantry of their resistance, partly from jealousy of their mythical renown, were either sold as slaves or driven into banishment.¹ Through these victories Argos was now more powerful than ever, and the propositions

¹ Diodor. xi. 65; Strabo, viii. p. 372; Pausan. ii. 16, 17, 25. Diodorus places this incident in 468 B.C.: but as it undoubtedly comes after the earthquake at Sparta, we must suppose it to have happened about 463 B.C. See Mr. Fynes Clinton, *Fasti Hellenici*, Appendix, 8.

existing generation, was in a much stronger degree the eyesore of Ægina.

The Athenians were at this time actively engaged in prosecuting the war against Persia, having a fleet of no less than two hundred sail, equipped by or from the confederacy collectively, now serving in Cyprus and on the Phœnician coast. Moreover the revolt of the Egyptians under Inarôs (about 460 B.C.) opened to them new means of action against the Great King. Their fleet, by invitation of the revolters, sailed up the Nile to Memphis, where there seemed at first a good prospect of throwing off the Persian dominion. Yet in spite of so great an abstraction from their disposable force, their military operations near home were conducted with unabated vigour: and the inscription which remains—a commemoration of their citizens of the Erechtheid tribe who were slain in one and the same year in Cyprus, Egypt, Phœnicia, the Halieis, Ægina, and Megara—brings forcibly before us that energy which astonished and even alarmed their contemporaries.

Their first proceedings at Megara were of a nature altogether novel, in the existing condition of Greece. It was necessary for the Athenians to protect their new ally against the superiority of Peloponnesian land-force, and to ensure a constant communication with it by sea. But the city (like most of the ancient Hellenic towns) was situated on a hill at some distance from the sea, separated from its port Nisæa by a space of nearly one mile. One of the earliest proceedings of the Athenians was to build two lines of wall, near and parallel to each other, connecting the city with Nisæa; so that the two thus formed one continuous fortress, wherein a standing Athenian garrison was maintained, with the constant means of succour from Athens in case of need. These "Long Walls," though afterwards copied in other places and on a larger scale, were at that juncture an ingenious invention, for the purpose of extending the maritime arm of Athens to an inland city.

The first operations of Corinth however were not directed against Megara. The Athenians, having undertaken a landing in the territory of the Halieis (the population of the southern Argolic peninsula, bordering on Trœzen and Hermionê), were defeated on land by the Corinthian and Epidaurian forces: possibly it may have been in this expedition that they acquired possession of Trœzen, which we find afterwards in their dependence, without knowing when it became so. But in a sea-fight which took place off the island of Kekryphaleia (between Ægina and the Argolic peninsula) the Athenians gained the

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victory. After this victory and defeat,—neither of them apparently very decisive,—the Æginetans began to take a more energetic part in the war, and brought out their full naval force together with that of their allies—Corinthians, Epidaurians, and other Peloponnesians : while Athens equipped a fleet of corresponding magnitude, summoning her allies also ; though we do not know the actual numbers on either side. In the great naval battle which ensued off the island of Ægina, the superiority of the new nautical tactics acquired by twenty years' practice of the Athenians since the Persian war—over the old Hellenic ships and seamen, as shown in those states where at the time of the battle of Marathon the maritime strength of Greece had resided—was demonstrated by a victory most complete and decisive. The Peloponnesian and Dorian seamen had as yet had no experience of the improved seacraft of Athens, and when we find how much they were disconcerted with it even twenty-eight years afterwards at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, we shall not wonder at its destructive effect upon them in this early battle. The maritime power of Ægina was irrecoverably ruined. The Athenians captured seventy ships of war, landed a large force upon the island, and commenced the siege of the city by land as well as by sea.¹

If the Lacedæmonians had not been occupied at home by the blockade of Ithômê, they would have been probably induced to invade Attica as a diversion to the Æginetans ; especially as the Persian Megabazus came to Sparta at this time on the part of Artaxerxes to prevail upon them to do so, in order that the Athenians might be constrained to retire from Egypt. This Persian brought with him a large sum of money, but was nevertheless obliged to return without effecting his mission.² The Corinthians and Epidaurians however, while they carried to Ægina a reinforcement of 300 hoplites, did their best to aid her further by an attack upon Megara ; which place, it was supposed, the Athenians could not possibly relieve without withdrawing their forces from Ægina, inasmuch as so many of their men were at the same time serving in Egypt. But the Athenians showed themselves equal to all these three exigencies at one and the same time—to the great disappointment of their enemies. Myrônides marched from Athens to Megara at the head of the citizens in the two extremes of military age, old and young ; these being the only troops at home. He fought the Corinthians near the town, gaining a slight, but debateable,

¹ Thucyd. i. 105 ; Lysias, Orat. Funerbr. c. 10 ; Diodor. xi. 78.

² Thucyd. i. 109.

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advantage, which he commemorated by a trophy, as soon as the Corinthians had returned home. But the latter, when they arrived at home, were so much reproached by their own old citizens, for not having vanquished the refuse of the Athenian military force,¹ that they returned back at the end of twelve days and erected a trophy on their side, laying claim to a victory in the past battle. The Athenians, marching out of Megara, attacked them a second time, and gained on this occasion a decisive victory. The defeated Corinthians were still more unfortunate in their retreat; for a body of them, missing their road, became entangled in a space of private ground enclosed on every side by a deep ditch, and having only one narrow entrance. Myrônidês, detecting this fatal mistake, planted his hoplites at the entrance to prevent their escape, and then surrounded the enclosure with his light-armed troops, who with their missile weapons slew all the Corinthian hoplites, without possibility either of flight or resistance. The bulk of the Corinthian army effected their retreat, but the destruction of this detachment was a sad blow to the city.²

Splendid as the success of the Athenians had been during this year, both on land and at sea, it was easy for them to foresee that the power of their enemies would presently be augmented by the Lacedæmonians taking the field. Partly on this account—partly also from the more energetic phase of democracy, and the long-sighted views of Periklês, which were now becoming ascendant in the city—the Athenians began the stupendous undertaking of connecting Athens with the sea by means of long walls. The idea of this measure had doubtless been first suggested by the recent erection of long walls, though for so much smaller a distance, between Megara and Nisæa: for without such an intermediate stepping-stone, the project of a wall forty stadia (= about $4\frac{1}{2}$ Engl. miles) to join Athens with Peiræus, and another wall of thirty-five stadia (= nearly 4 Engl. miles) to join it with Phalêrum, would have appeared extravagant even to the sanguine temper of Athenians—as it certainly would have seemed a few years earlier to Themistoklês

¹ Lysias, Orat. Funer. c. 10. ἐνίκων μαχόμενοι ἀπασαν τὴν δύναμιν τὴν ἐκείνων τοῖς ἤδη ἀπειρηκόσι καὶ τοῖς οὐπω δυναμένοις, &c.

The incident mentioned by Thucydidês about the Corinthians, that the old men of their own city were so indignant against them on their return, is highly characteristic of Grecian manners—κακίζόμενοι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει πρεσβυτέρων, &c.

² Thucyd. i. 106. πάθος μέγα τοῦτο Κορινθίοις ἐγένετο. Compare Diodor. xi. 78, 79—whose chronology however is very misleading.

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himself. Coming as an immediate sequel of great recent victories, and while Ægina, the great Dorian naval power, was prostrate and under blockade, it excited the utmost alarm among the Peloponnesians—being regarded as the second great stride,¹ at once conspicuous and of lasting effect, in Athenian ambition, next to the fortification of Peiræus.

But besides this feeling in the bosom of enemies, the measure was also interwoven with the formidable contention of political parties then going on at Athens. Kimon had been recently ostracised; and the democratical movement pressed by Periklês and Ephialtês (of which more presently) was in its full tide of success; yet not without a violent and unprincipled opposition on the part of those who supported the existing constitution. Now the long walls formed a part of the foreign policy of Periklês, continuing on a gigantic scale the plans of Themistoklês, when he first schemed the Peiræus. They were framed to render Athens capable of carrying on war against any superiority of landed attack, and of bidding defiance to the united force of Peloponnesus. But though thus calculated for contingencies which a long-sighted man might see gathering in the distance, the new walls were, almost on the same grounds, obnoxious to a considerable number of Athenians: to the party recently headed by Kimon, who were attached to the Lacedæmonian connexion, and desired above all things to maintain peace at home, reserving the energies of the state for anti-Persian enterprise: to many landed proprietors in Attica, whom they seemed to threaten with approaching invasion and destruction of their territorial possessions: to the rich men and aristocrats of Athens, averse to a still closer contact and amalgamation with the maritime multitude in Peiræus: lastly, perhaps, to a certain vein of old Attic feeling, which might look upon the junction of Athens with the separate demes of Peiræus and Phalêrum as effacing the special associations connected with the holy rock of Athênê. When to all these grounds of opposition, we add, the expense and trouble of the undertaking itself, the interference with private property, the peculiar violence of party which happened then to be raging, and the absence of a large proportion of military citizens in Egypt—we shall hardly be surprised to find that the projected long walls brought on a risk of the most serious character both

¹ Καὶ τῶνδε ὁμείεις αἴτιοι, τὸ τε πρῶτον ἐάσαντες αὐτοὺς τὴν πόλιν μετὰ τὰ Μηδικὰ κρατῦναι, καὶ ὕστερον τὰ μακρὰ στήσαι τείχην—is the language addressed by the Corinthians to the Spartans, in reference to Athens, a little before the Peloponnesian war (Thucyd. i. 69).

for Athens and her democracy. If any further proof were wanting of the vast importance of these long walls, in the eyes both of friends and of enemies, we might find it in the fact that their destruction was the prominent mark of Athenian humiliation after the battle of Ægospotami, and their restoration the immediate boon of Pharnabazus and Konon after the victory of Knidus.

Under the influence of the alarm now spread by the proceedings of Athens, the Lacedæmonians were prevailed upon to undertake an expedition out of Peloponnesus, although the Helots in Ithômê were not yet reduced to surrender. Their force consisted of 1500 troops of their own, and 10,000 of their various allies, under the regent Nikomêdês. The ostensible motive, or the pretence, for this march, was the protection of the little territory of Doris against the Phokians, who had recently invaded it and taken one of its three towns. The mere approach of so large a force immediately compelled the Phokians to relinquish their conquest, but it was soon seen that this was only a small part of the objects of Sparta, and that her main purpose, under instigation of the Corinthians, was, to arrest the aggrandisement of Athens. It could not escape the penetration of Corinth, that the Athenians might presently either enlist or constrain the towns of Bœotia into their alliance, as they had recently acquired Megara, in addition to their previous ally Plateæ : for the Bœotian federation was at this time much disorganised, and Thebes, its chief, had never recovered her ascendancy since the discredit of her support lent to the Persian invasion. To strengthen Thebes and to render her ascendancy effective over the Bœotian cities, was the best way of providing a neighbour at once powerful and hostile to the Athenians, so as to prevent their further aggrandisement by land: it was the same policy as Epaminondas pursued eighty years afterwards, in organising Arcadia and Messênê against Sparta. Accordingly the Peloponnesian force was now employed partly in enlarging and strengthening the fortifications of Thebes herself, partly in constraining the other Bœotian cities into effective obedience to her supremacy; probably by placing their governments in the hands of citizens of known oligarchical politics,¹ and perhaps banishing suspected opponents. To this scheme the Thebans lent themselves with earnestness; promising to keep down for the future their border

¹ Diodor. xii. 81; Justin, iii. 6. Τῆς μὲν τῶν Θεβαίων πόλεως μείζονα τὸν περίβολον κατεσκευάσαν, τὰς δ' ἐν Βοιωτίᾳ πόλεις ἠνάγκασαν ὑποτάττεσθαι τοῖς Θεβαίοις.

neighbours, so as to spare the necessity of armies coming from Sparta.¹

But there was also a further design, yet more important, in contemplation by the Spartans and Corinthians. The oligarchical opposition at Athens were so bitterly hostile to the Long Walls, to Periklēs, and to the democratical movement, that several of them opened a secret negotiation with the Peloponnesian leaders; inviting them into Attica, and entreating their aid in an internal rising for the purpose not only of putting a stop to the Long Walls, but also of subverting the democracy.) The Peloponnesian army, while prosecuting its operations in Bœotia, waited in hopes of seeing the Athenian malcontents in arms, and encamped at Tanagra on the very borders of Attica for the purpose of immediate co-operation with them. The juncture was undoubtedly one of much hazard for Athens, especially as the ostracised Kimon and his remaining friends in the city were suspected of being implicated in the conspiracy. But the Athenian leaders, aware of the Lacedæmonian operations in Bœotia, knew also what was meant by the presence of the army on their immediate borders—and took decisive measures to avert the danger. Having obtained a reinforcement of 1000 Argeians and some Thessalian horse, they marched out to Tanagra, with the full Athenian force then at home; which must of course have consisted chiefly of the old and the young, the same who had fought under Myrōnidēs at Megara; for the blockade of Ægina was still going on. Nor was it possible for the Lacedæmonian army to return into Peloponnesus without fighting; for the Athenians, masters of the Megarid, were in possession of the difficult high lands of Geraneia, the road of march along the isthmus; while the Athenian fleet, by means of the harbour of Pégæ, was prepared to intercept them if they tried to come by sea across the Krissæan Gulf, by which way it would appear that they had come out. Near Tanagra a bloody battle took place between the two armies, wherein the Lacedæmonians were victorious, chiefly from the desertion of the Thessalian horse who passed over to them in the very heat of the engagement.² But though the advantage was on their side, it was not sufficiently decisive to favour the contemplated rising in Attica. Nor did the Peloponnesians gain anything by it except

¹ Diodor. *l. c.* It must probably be to the internal affairs of Bœotia, somewhere about this time, full as they were of internal dissension, that the dictum and simile of Periklēs allude—which Aristotle notices in his Rhetoric. iii. 4. 2.

² Thucyd. i. 107.

an undisturbed retreat over the high lands of Geraneia, after having partially ravaged the Megarid.

Though the battle of Tanagra was a defeat, yet there were circumstances connected with it which rendered its effects highly beneficial to Athens. The ostracised Kimon presented himself on the field, as soon as the army had passed over the boundaries of Attica, requesting to be allowed to occupy his station as a hoplite and fight in the ranks of his tribe—the Enéis. But such was the belief, entertained by the members of the senate and by his political enemies present, that he was an accomplice in the conspiracy known to be on foot, that permission was refused and he was forced to retire. In departing he conjured his personal friends, Euthippus (of the deme Anaphlystus) and others, to behave in such a manner as might wipe away the stain resting upon his fidelity, and in part also upon theirs. His friends retained his panoply and assigned to it the station in the ranks which he would himself have occupied: they then entered the engagement with desperate resolution, and one hundred of them fell side by side in their ranks. Periklês, on his part, who was present among the hoplites of his own tribe the Akamantis, aware of this application and repulse of Kimon, thought it incumbent upon him to display not merely his ordinary personal courage, but an unusual recklessness of life and safety, though it happened that he escaped unwounded. All these incidents brought about a generous sympathy and spirit of compromise among the contending parties at Athens; while the unshaken patriotism of Kimon and his friends discountenanced and disarmed those conspirators who had entered into correspondence with the enemy, at the same time that it roused a repentant admiration towards the ostracised leader himself. Such was the happy working of this new sentiment that a decree was shortly proposed and carried—proposed too by Periklês himself—to abridge the ten years of Kimon's ostracism, and permit his immediate return.¹ We may recollect that under circumstances partly analogous, Themistoklês had himself proposed the

¹ Plutarch, Kimon, c. 14; Periklês, c. 10. Plutarch represents the Athenians as having recalled Kimon from fear of the Lacedæmonians who had just beaten them at Tanagra, and for the purpose of procuring peace. He adds that Kimon obtained peace for them forthwith. Both these assertions are incorrect. The extraordinary successes in Bœotia, which followed so quickly after the defeat at Tanagra, show that the Athenians were under no impressions of fear at that juncture, and that the recall of Kimon proceeded from quite different feelings. Moreover the peace with Sparta was not made till some years afterwards.

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restoration of his rival Aristeidês from ostracism, a little before the battle of Salamis :¹ and in both cases, the suspension of enmity between the two leaders was partly the sign, partly also the auxiliary cause, of reconciliation and renewed fraternity among the general body of citizens. It was a moment analogous to that salutary impulse of compromise, and harmony of parties, which followed the extinction of the Oligarchy of Four Hundred, forty-six years afterwards, and on which Thucydidês dwells emphatically as the salvation of Athens in her distress—a moment rare in free communities generally, not less than among the jealous competitors for political ascendancy at Athens.²

So powerful was this burst of fresh patriotism and unanimity

¹ Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. 10.

² Plutarch, Kimon, c. 17; Periklês, c. 10; Thucyd. viii. 97. Plutarch observes, respecting this reconciliation of parties after the battle of Tanagra, after having mentioned that Periklês himself proposed the restoration of Kimon—

Οὕτω τότε πολιτικά μὲν ἦσαν αἱ διαφοραί, μέτριοι δὲ οἱ θυμοὶ καὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν εὐανάκλητοι συμφέρον, ἢ δὲ φιλοτιμία πάντων ἐπικρατοῦσα τῶν παθῶν τοῖς τῆς πατρίδος ὑπεχώρει καιροῖς.

Which remarks are very analogous to those of Thucydidês in recounting the memorable proceedings of the year 411 B.C., after the deposition of the oligarchy of Four Hundred (Thucyd. viii. 97).

Καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα δὴ τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον ἐπὶ γε ἐμοῦ Ἀθηναῖοι φαίνονται εὖ πολιτεύσαντες· μετρία γὰρ ἦ τε ἐς τοὺς ὀλίγους καὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς ξύγκρασις ἐγένετο, καὶ ἐκ πονηρῶν τῶν πραγμάτων γενομένων τοῦτο πρῶτον ἀνήνεγκε τὴν πόλιν. Dr. Arnold says in his note—"It appears that the constitution as now fixed was *at first*, in the opinion of Thucydidês, the best that Athens had ever enjoyed within his memory; that is, the best since the complete ascendancy of the democracy effected under Periklês. But how long a period is meant to be included by the words τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον, and when and how did the implied change take place? Τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον can hardly apply to the whole remaining term of the war, as if this improved constitution had been first subverted by the triumph of the oligarchy under the Thirty, and then superseded by the restoration of the old democracy after their overthrow. Yet Xenophon mentions no intermediate change in the government between the beginning of his history and the end of the war," &c.

I think that the words εὖ πολιτεύσαντες are understood by Dr. Arnold in a sense too special and limited—as denoting merely the new constitution, or positive organic enactments, which the Athenians now introduced. It appears to me that the words are of wider import; meaning the general temper of political parties both reciprocally towards each other and towards the commonwealth; their inclination to relinquish antipathies, to accommodate points of difference, and to co-operate with each other heartily against the enemy, suspending those *ιδίας φιλοτιμίας, ιδίας διαβολὰς περὶ τῆς τοῦ δήμου προστασίας* (ii. 65) noticed as having been so mischievous before. Of course any constitutional arrangements introduced at such a period would partake of the moderate and harmonious spirit then prevalent, and would therefore form a part of what is commended by Thucydidês; but his commendation is not confined to them specially. Compare the phrase ii. 37. ἐλευθέρως δὲ τὰ τε πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύομεν, &c.

after the battle of Tanagra, which produced the recall of Kimon and appears to have overlaid the pre-existing conspiracy, that the Athenians were quickly in a condition to wipe off the stain of their defeat. It was on the sixty-second day after the battle that they undertook an aggressive march under Myrônidês into Bœotia: the extreme precision of this date—being the single case throughout the summary of events between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars wherein Thucydidês is thus precise—marks how strong an impression it made upon the memory of the Athenians. At the battle of Cœnophyta, engaged against the aggregate Theban and Bœotian forces—or, if Diodorus is to be trusted, in two battles, of which that of Cœnophyta was the last—Myrônidês was completely victorious. The Athenians became masters of Thebes as well as of the remaining Bœotian towns; reversing all the arrangements recently made by Sparta—establishing democratical governments—and forcing the aristocratical leaders, favourable to Theban ascendancy and Lacedæmonian connexion, to become exiles. Nor was it only Bœotia which the Athenians thus acquired: Phokis and Lokris were both successively added to the list of their dependent allies—the former being in the main friendly to Athens and not disinclined to the change, while the latter were so decidedly hostile that one hundred of their chiefs were detained and sent to Athens as hostages. The Athenians thus extended their influence—maintained through internal party-management, backed by the dread of interference from without in case of need—from the borders of the Corinthian territory, including both Megara and Pêgæ, to the strait of Thermopylæ.¹

These important acquisitions were soon crowned by the completion of the Long Walls and the conquest of Ægina. That island, doubtless starved out by its protracted blockade, was forced to capitulate on condition of destroying its fortifications, surrendering all its ships of war, and submitting to annual tribute as a dependent ally of Athens. The reduction of this once powerful maritime city marked Athens as mistress of the sea on the Peloponnesian coast not less than on the Ægean. Her admiral Tolmidês displayed her strength by sailing round Peloponnesus, and even by the insult of burning the Lacedæmonian ports of Methônê and of Gythium. He took Chalkis, a possession of the Corinthians, and Naupaktus belonging to the Ozolian Lokrians, near the mouth of the Corinthian Gulf—disembarked troops near Sikyon, with some advantage in a battle against opponents from that town—and either gained

¹ Thucyd. i. 108; Diodor. xi. 81, 82.

or forced into the Athenian alliance not only Zakynthus and Kephallênia, but also some of the towns of Achaia; for we afterwards find these latter attached to Athens without knowing when the connexion began.¹ During the ensuing year the Athenians renewed their attack upon Sikyon, with a force of 1000 hoplites under Periklês himself, sailing from the Megarian harbour of Pêgæ in the Krissæan Gulf. This eminent man, however, gained no greater advantage than Tolmidês—defeating the Sikyonian forces in the field and driving them within their walls. He afterwards made an expedition into Akarnania, taking the Achæan allies in addition to his own forces, but miscarried in his attack on Cœniadæ and accomplished nothing. Nor were the Athenians more successful in a march undertaken this same year against Thessaly, for the purpose of restoring Orestes, one of the exiled princes or nobles of Pharsalus. Though they took with them an imposing force, including their Bœotian and Phokian allies, the powerful Thessalian cavalry forced them to keep in a compact body and confined them to the ground actually occupied by their hoplites: while all their attempts against the city failed, and their hopes of internal rising were disappointed.²

Had the Athenians succeeded in Thessaly, they would have acquired to their alliance nearly the whole of extra-Peloponnesian Greece. But even without Thessaly their power was prodigious, and had now attained a maximum height from which it never varied except to decline. As a counterbalancing loss against so many successes, we have to reckon their ruinous defeat in Egypt, after a war of six years against the Persians (B.C. 460–455). At first they had gained brilliant advantages, in conjunction with the insurgent prince Inarôs; expelling the Persians from all Memphis except the strongest part called the White Fortress. And such was the alarm of the Persian king Artaxerxes at the presence of the Athenians in Egypt, that he sent Megabazus with a large sum of money to Sparta, in order to induce the Lacedæmonians to invade Attica. This envoy however failed, and an augmented Persian force, being sent to Egypt under Megabyzus, son of Zopyrus,³ drove the Athenians and their allies, after an obstinate struggle, out of Memphis into the island of the Nile called Prosôpîtis. Here they were blocked up for eighteen months, until at length Megabyzus turned the arm of the river, laid the channel dry, and stormed the island by land. A very few Athenians escaped by land to Kyrênê:

¹ Thucyd. i. 108–115; Diodor. xi. 84.

² Thucyd. i. 111; Diodor. xi. 85.

³ Herodot. iii. 160.

the rest were either slain or made captive, and Inarô's himself was crucified. And the calamity of Athens was further aggravated by the arrival of fifty fresh Athenian ships, which, coming after the defeat, but without being aware of it, sailed into the Mendesian branch of the Nile, and thus fell unawares into the power of the Persians and Phœnicians; very few either of the ships or men escaping. The whole of Egypt became again subject to the Persians, except Amyrtæus, who contrived by retiring into the inaccessible fens still to maintain his independence. One of the largest armaments ever sent forth by Athènes and her confederacy was thus utterly ruined.¹

It was about the time of the destruction of the Athenian army in Egypt, and of the circumnavigation of Peloponnesus by Tolmidês, that the internal war, carried on by the Lacedæmonians against the Helots or Messenians at Ithômê, ended. These besieged men, no longer able to stand out against a protracted blockade, were forced to abandon this last fortress of ancient Messenian independence, stipulating for a safe retreat from Peloponnesus with their wives and families; with the proviso that if any one of them ever returned to Peloponnesus, he should become the slave of the first person who seized him. They were established by Tolmidês at Naupaktus (recently taken by the Athenians from the Ozolian Lokrians),² where they will be found rendering good service to Athens in the following wars.

After the victory of Tanagra, the Lacedæmonians made no further expeditions out of Peloponnesus for several succeeding years, not even to prevent Bœotia and Phokis from being absorbed into the Athenian alliance. The reason of this remissness lay, partly, in their general character; partly, in the continuance of the siege of Ithômê, which occupied them at home; but still more, perhaps, in the fact that the Athenians, masters of the Megarid, were in occupation of the road over the high lands of Geranea, and could therefore obstruct the march of any army out from Peloponnesus. Even after the surrender of Ithômê, the Lacedæmonians remained inactive for three years, after which time a formal truce was concluded with Athens by the Peloponnesians generally, for five years longer.³ This truce

¹ Thucyd. i. 104, 109, 110; Diodor. xi. 77; xii. 3. The story of Diodorus in the first of these two passages—that most of the Athenian forces were allowed to come back under a favourable capitulation granted by the Persian generals—is contradicted by the total ruin which he himself states to have befallen them in the latter passages, as well as by Thucydides.

² Thucyd. i. 103; Diodor. xi. 84.

³ Thucyd. i. 112.

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was concluded in a great degree through the influence of Kimon,¹ who was eager to resume effective operations against the Persians ; while it was not less suitable to the political interest of Periklēs that his most distinguished rival should be absent on foreign service,² so as not to interfere with his influence at home. Accordingly Kimon, having equipped a fleet of 200 triremes from Athens and her confederates, set sail for Cyprus, from whence he despatched sixty ships to Egypt, at the request of the insurgent prince Amyrtæus, who was still maintaining himself against the Persians amidst the fens—while with the remaining armament he laid siege to Kitium. In the prosecution of this siege, he died either of disease or of a wound. The armament, under his successor Anaxikratēs, became so embarrassed for want of provisions, that they abandoned the undertaking altogether, and went to fight the Phœnician and Kilikian fleet near Salamis in Cyprus. They were here victorious, first on sea and afterwards on land, though probably not on the same day, as at the Eurymedon ; after which they returned home, followed by the sixty ships which had gone to Egypt for the purpose of aiding Amyrtæus.³

¹ Theopompus, *Fragm.* 92, ed. Didot ; Plutarch, *Kimion*, c. 18 ; Diodor. xi. 86.

It is to be presumed that this is the peace which Æschinēs (*De Fals. Legat.* c. 54, p. 300) and Andokidēs (*De Pacc.* c. 1) state to have been made by Miltiadēs son of Kimon, proxenus of the Lacedæmonians ; assuming that Miltiadēs son of Kimon is put by them, through lapse of memory, for Kimon son of Miltiadēs. But the passages of these orators involve so much both of historical and chronological inaccuracy, that it is unsafe to cite them, and impossible to amend them except by conjecture. Mr. Fynes Clinton (*Fasti Hellen.* Appendix, 8, p. 257) has pointed out some of these inaccuracies ; and there are others besides, not less grave, especially in the oration ascribed to Andokidēs. It is remarkable that both of them seem to recognise only *two* long walls, the northern and the southern wall ; whereas in the time of Thucydidēs there were *three* long walls : the two near and parallel, connecting Athens with Peiræus, and a third connecting it with Phalærum. This last was never renewed, after all of them had been partially destroyed at the disastrous close of the Peloponnesian war : and it appears to have passed out of the recollection of Æschinēs, who speaks of the two walls as they existed in his time.

² Plutarch, *Periklēs*, c. 10, and *Reipublic.* *Gerend.* Præcep. p. 812.

An understanding to this effect between the two rivals is so natural that we need not resort to the supposition of a secret agreement concluded between them through the mediation of Elpinikē sister of Kimon, which Plutarch had read in some authors. The charms as well as the intrigues of Elpinikē appear to have figured conspicuously in the memoirs of Athenian biographers : they were employed by one party as a means of calumniating Kimon, by the other for discrediting Periklēs.

³ Thucyd. i. 112 ; Diodorus, xii. 13. Diodorus mentions the name of the general Anaxikratēs. He affirms further that Kimon lived not only to

From this time forward no further operations were undertaken by Athens and her confederacy against the Persians. And it appears that a convention was concluded between them, whereby the Great King on his part promised two things : To leave free, undisturbed, and untaxed, the Asiatic maritime Greeks, not sending troops within a given distance of the coast : To refrain from sending any ships of war either westward of Phasélis (others place the boundary at the Chelidonean islands, rather more to the westward) or within the Kyanean rocks at the confluence of the Thracian Bosphorus with the Euxine. On their side the Athenians agreed to leave him in undisturbed possession of Cyprus and Egypt. Kallias, an Athenian of distinguished family, with some others of his countrymen, went up to Susa to negotiate this convention : and certain envoys from Argos, then in alliance with Athens, took the opportunity of going thither at the same time, to renew the friendly understanding which their city had established with Xerxes at the period of his invasion of Greece.¹

As is generally the case with treaties after hostility—this convention did little more than recognise the existing state of things, without introducing any new advantage or disadvantage on either side, or calling for any measures to be taken in consequence of it. We may hence assign a reasonable ground for the silence of Thucydidês, who does not even notice the convention as having been made : we are to recollect, always that in the interval between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars, he does

take Kitium and Mallus, but also to gain these two victories. But the authority of Thucydidês, superior on every ground to Diodorus, is more particularly superior as to the death of Kimon, with whom he was connected by relationship.

¹ Herodot. vii. 151 ; Diodor. xii. 3, 4. Demosthenês (De Falsa Legat. c. 77, p. 428 R : compare De Rhodior. Libert. c. 13, p. 199) speaks of this peace as *τὴν ὑπὸ πάντων θρολουμένην εἰρήνην*. Compare Lykurgus cont. Leokrat. c. 17, p. 187 ; Isokratês (Panegyri. c. 33, 34, p. 244 ; Areopagitic. c. 37, pp. 150, 229 ; Panathenaic. c. 20, p. 360).

The loose language of these orators makes it impossible to determine what was the precise limit in respect of vicinity to the coast. Isokratês is careless enough to talk of the river Halys as the boundary ; Demosthenês states it as "a day's course for a horse."

The two boundaries marked by sea, on the other hand, are both clear and natural, in reference to the Athenian empire—the Kyanean rocks at one end—Phasélis or the Chelidonean islands (there is no material distance between these two last-mentioned places) on the other.

Dahlmann, at the end of his Dissertation on the reality of this Kimonian peace, collects the various passages of authors wherein it is mentioned : among them are several out of the rhetor Aristeidês (Forschungen, p. 140-148).

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not profess to do more than glance briefly at the main events. But the boastful and inaccurate authors of the ensuing century, orators, rhetors, and historians, indulged in so much exaggeration and untruth respecting this convention, both as to date and as to details—and extolled as something so glorious the fact of having imposed such hard conditions on the Great King—that they have raised a suspicion against themselves. Especially, they have occasioned critics to ask the very natural question, how this splendid achievement of Athens came to be left unnoticed by Thucydidēs? Now the answer to such question is, that the treaty itself was really of no great moment: it is the state of facts and relations implied in the treaty, and existing substantially before it was concluded, which constitutes the real glory of Athens. But to the later writers, the treaty stood forth as the legible evidence of facts which in their time were past and gone: while Thucydidēs and his contemporaries, living in the actual fulness of the Athenian empire, would certainly not appeal to the treaty as an evidence, and might well pass it over even as an event, when studying to condense the narrative. Though Thucydidēs has not mentioned the treaty, he says nothing which disproves its reality, and much which is in full harmony with it. For we may show even from him,—1. That all open and direct hostilities between Athens and Persia ceased, after the last-mentioned victories of the Athenians near Cyprus: that this island is renounced by Athens, not being included by Thucydidēs in his catalogue of Athenian allies prior to the Peloponnesian war;¹ and that no further aid is given by Athens to the revolted Amyrtæus in Egypt. 2. That down to the time when the Athenian power was prostrated by the ruinous failure at Syracuse, no tribute was collected by the Persian satraps in Asia Minor from the Greek cities on the coast, nor were Persian ships of war allowed to appear in the waters of the Ægean,² nor was the Persian king

¹ Thucyd. ii. 14.

² Thucyd. viii. 5, 6, 56. As this is a point on which very erroneous representations have been made by some learned critics, especially by Dahlmann and Manso (see the treatises cited in the subsequent note, p. 424), I transcribe the passage of Thucydidēs. He is speaking of the winter of B.C. 412, immediately succeeding the ruin of the Athenian army at Syracuse, and after redoubled exertions had been making (even some months before that ruin actually took place) to excite active hostile proceedings against Athens from every quarter (Thucyd. vii. 25): it being seen that there was a promising opportunity for striking a heavy blow at the Athenian power. The satrap Tissaphernes encouraged the Chians and Erythræans to revolt, sending an envoy along with them to Sparta with persuasions and promises of aid—*ἐπήγετο καὶ ὁ Τισσαφέρνης τοὺς Πελοποννησίου καὶ*

admitted to be sovereign of the country down to the coast
 'Granting, therefore, that we were even bound, from the silence

ὑπιαχνεῖτο τροφήν παρέξειν. Ἐπὶ βασιλείᾳ γὰρ νεωστὶ ἐτύγχανε πεπραγμένους τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἀρχῆς φόρους, οὓς δι' Ἀθηναίους ἀπὸ τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων οὐ δυνάμενος πράσσειν ἐπαφείλησε. Τοὺς τε οὖν φόρους μᾶλλον ἐνόμιζε κομίσθαι, κακώσας τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, καὶ ἅμα βασιλεῖ ξυμμαχοῦς Λακεδαιμονίους ποιήσειν, &c. In the next chapter, Thucydides tells us that the satrap Pharnabazus wanted to obtain Lacedæmonian aid in the same manner as Tissaphernes for *his* satrapy also, in order that he might detach the Greek cities from Athens and be able to levy the tribute upon them. Two Greeks go to Sparta, sent by Pharnabazus, ὅπως ναὺς κομίσειαν ἐς τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον, καὶ αὐτὸς, εἰ δύνατο ἔπερ ὁ Τισσαφέρης προῦθυμείτο, τὰς τε ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ἀρχῇ πόλεις ἀποστήσειε τῶν Ἀθηναίων διὰ τοὺς φόρους, καὶ ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ βασιλεῖ τὴν ξυμμαχίαν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ποιήσειε.

These passages (strange to say) are considered by Manso and Dahlmann as showing that the Grecian cities on the Asiatic coast, though subject to the Athenian empire, continued nevertheless to pay their tribute regularly to Susa. To me the passages appear to disprove this very supposition; they show that it was essential for the satrap to detach these cities from the Athenian empire, as a means of procuring tribute from them to Persia: that the Athenian empire, while it lasted, prevented him from getting any tribute from the cities subject to it. Manso and Dahlmann have overlooked the important meaning of the adverb of time *νεωστὶ*—"lately." By that word Thucydides expressly intimates that the court of Susa *had only recently* demanded from Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, tribute from the maritime Greeks within their satrapies: and he implies that *until recently no such demand* had been made upon them. The court of Susa, apprised doubtless by Grecian exiles and agents of the embarrassments into which Athens had fallen, conceived this a suitable moment for exacting tributes, to which doubtless it always considered itself entitled, though the power of Athens had compelled it to forego them. Accordingly the demand was now for the first time sent down to Tissaphernes, and he "*became a debtor* for them" to the court (*ἐπαφείλησε*), until he could collect them: which he could not at first do, even then, embarrassed as Athens was—and which, *à fortiori*, he could not have done before, when Athens was in full power.

We learn from these passages two valuable facts. 1. That the maritime Asiatic cities belonging to the Athenian empire paid no tribute to Susa, from the date of the full organisation of the Athenian confederacy down to a period after the Athenian defeat in Sicily. 2. That nevertheless these cities always continued, throughout this period, to stand rated in the Persian king's books each for its appropriate tribute; the court of Susa waiting for a convenient moment to occur, when it should be able to enforce its demands, from misfortunes accruing to Athens.

This state of relations, between the Asiatic Greeks and the Persian court under the Athenian empire, authenticated by Thucydides, enables us to explain a passage of Herodotus, on which also both Manso and Dahlmann have dwelt (p. 94) with rather more apparent plausibility, as proving their view of the case. Herodotus, after describing the re-arrangement and re-measurement of the territories of the Ionic cities by the satrap Artaphernes (about 493 B.C. after the suppression of the Ionic revolt), proceeds to state that he assessed the tribute of each with reference to this new measurement, and that the assessment remained unchanged until his own (Herodotus's) time—καὶ τὰς χώρας σφένων μετρήσας κατὰ παρασάγγας . . . φόρους ἔταξε

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of Thucydides, to infer that no treaty was concluded, we should still be obliged also to infer, from his positive averments, that a state of historical fact, such as the treaty acknowledged and prescribed, became actually realised. But when we reflect further, that Herodotus¹ certifies the visit of Kallias and other Athenian envoys to the court of Susa, we can assign no other explanation of such visit so probable as the reality of this treaty. Certainly no envoys would have gone thither during a state of recognised war; and though it may be advanced as possible that they may have gone with the view to conclude a treaty, and yet not have succeeded—this would be straining the limits of possibility beyond what is reasonable.²

ἐκάστοισι, οἱ κατὰ χώραν διατελέουσι ἔχοντες ἐκ τούτου τοῦ χρόνου αἰεὶ ἔτι καὶ ἐς ἐμὲ, ὡς ἐτάχθησαν ἐξ Ἀρταφέρνηος ἐτάχθησαν δὲ σχεδὸν κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ τὰ καὶ πρότερον εἶχον (vi. 42). Now Dahlmann and Manso contend that Herodotus here affirms the tribute of the Ionic cities to Persia to have been continuously and regularly paid down to his own time. But in my judgement this is a mistake; Herodotus speaks not about the *payment*, but about the *assessment*: and these were two very different things, as Thucydides clearly intimates in the passage which I have cited above. The *assessment* of all the Ionic cities in the Persian king's books remained unaltered all through the Athenian empire; but the *payment* was not enforced until immediately before 412 B.C., when the Athenians were supposed to be too weak to hinder it. It is evident by the account of the general Persian revenues, throughout all the satrapies, which we find in the third book of Herodotus, that he had access to official accounts of the Persian finances, or at least to Greek secretaries who knew those accounts. He would be told that these assessments remained unchanged from the time of Artaphernes downward: whether they were *realised* or not was another question, which the "books" would probably not answer, and which he might or might not know.

The passages above cited from Thucydides appear to me to afford positive proof that the Greek cities on the Asiatic coast paid no tribute to Persia during the continuance of the Athenian empire. But if there were no such positive proof, I should still maintain the same opinion. For if these Greeks went on paying tribute, what is meant by the phrases, of their having "*revolted* from Persia," of their "*having been liberated* from the king" (οἱ ἀποστάντες βασιλέως Ἕλληνες—οἱ ἀπὸ Ἰωνίας καὶ Ἑλλησπόντου ἤδη ἀφεστηκότες ἀπὸ βασιλέως—ἄσσι ἀπὸ βασιλέως νεωστὶ ἠλευθέρωντο. Thucyd. i. 18, 89, 95)?

So much respecting the payment of tribute. As to the other point—that between 477 and 412 B.C., no Persian ships were tolerated along the coast of Ionia, which coast, though claimed by the Persian king, was not recognised by the Greeks as belonging to him—proof will be found in Thucyd. viii. 56: compare Diodor. iv. 26.

¹ Herodot. viii. 151. Diodorus also states that this peace was concluded by Kallias the Athenian (xii. 4).

² I conclude, on the whole, in favour of this treaty as an historical fact—though sensible that some of the arguments urged against it are not without force. Mr. Mitford and Dr. Thirlwall (ch. xvii. p. 474), as well as Manso and Dahlmann, not to mention others, have impugned the reality of the

We may therefore believe in the reality of this treaty between Athens and Persia, improperly called the Kimonian treaty: improperly, since not only was it concluded after the death of

treaty: and the last-mentioned author particularly has examined the case at length and set forth all the grounds of objection; urging, among some which are really serious, others which appear to me weak and untenable (Manso, Sparta, vol. iii. Beilage, x. p. 471; Dahlmann, Forschungen auf dem Gebiete der Geschichte, vol. i. Ueber den Kimonischen Frieden, p. 1-148). Boeckh admits the treaty as an historical fact.

If we deny altogether the historical reality of the treaty, we must adopt some such hypothesis as that of Dahlmann (p. 40):—"The distinct mention and averment of such a peace as having been formally concluded, appears to have first arisen among the schools of the rhetors at Athens, shortly after the peace of Antalkidas, and as an oratorical antithesis to oppose to that peace."

To which we must add the supposition, that some persons must have taken the trouble to cause this fabricated peace to be engraved on a pillar, and placed either in the Metröon or somewhere else in Athens among the records of Athenian glories. For that it was so engraved on a column is certain (Theopompus ap. Harpokration. Ἀττικοὶς γράμμασι). The suspicion started by Theopompus (and founded on the fact that the peace was engraved, not in ancient Attic, but in Ionic letters—the latter sort having been only legalised in Athens after the archonship of Eukleidês), that this treaty was a subsequent invention and not an historical reality, does not weigh with me very much. Assuming the peace to be real, it would naturally be drawn up and engraved in the character habitually used among the Ionic cities of Asia Minor, since they were the parties most specially interested in it: or it might even have been re-engraved, seeing that nearly a century must have elapsed between the conclusion of the treaty and the time when Theopompus saw the pillar. I confess that the hypothesis of Dahlmann appears to me more improbable than the historical reality of the treaty. I think it more likely that there *was* a treaty, and that the orators talked exaggerated and false matters respecting it—rather than that they fabricated the treaty from the beginning with a deliberate purpose, and with the false name of an envoy conjoined.

Dahlmann exposes justly and forcibly (an easy task indeed) the loose, inconsistent, and vain-glorious statements of the orators respecting this treaty. The chronological error by which it was asserted to have been made shortly after the victories of the Eurymedon (and was thus connected with the name of Kimon), is one of the circumstances which have most tended to discredit the attesting witnesses: but we must not forget that Ephorus (assuming that Diodorus in this case copies Ephorus, which is highly probable—xii. 3, 4) did not fall into this mistake, but placed the treaty in its right chronological place, after the Athenian expedition under Kimon against Cyprus and Egypt in 450-449 B. C. Kimon died before the great results of this expedition were consummated, as we know from Thucydidês: on this point Diodorus speaks equivocally, but rather giving it to be understood that Kimon lived to complete the whole, and then died of sickness.

The absurd exaggeration of Isokratês, that the treaty bound the Persian kings not to come westward of the river Halys, has also been very properly censured. He makes this statement in two different orations (Areopagitic. p. 150; Panathenæic. p. 462).

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Kimon, but the Athenian victories by which it was immediately brought on, were gained after his death. Nay more—the probability is, that if Kimon had lived, it would not have been concluded at all. For his interest as well as his glory led him to prosecute the war against Persia, since he was no match for his rival Periklēs either as a statesman or as an orator, and could only maintain his popularity by the same means whereby he had earned it—victories and plunder at the cost of the Persians. His death ensured more complete ascendancy to Periklēs, whose policy and character were of a cast altogether opposite:¹ while even Thucydidēs, son of Melēsiās, who succeeded Kimon his relation as leader of the anti-Perikleian party, was also a man of the senate and public assembly rather than of campaigns and conquests. Averse to distant enterprises and precarious acquisitions, Periklēs was only anxious to maintain unimpaired the Hellenic ascendancy of Athens, now at its very maximum. He was well aware that the undivided force and vigilance of Athens would not be too much for this object—nor did they in fact prove sufficient, as we shall presently see. With such dispositions he was naturally glad to conclude a peace, which excluded the Persians from all the coasts of Asia Minor westward of the Chelidoneans, as well as from all the waters of the Ægean, under the simple condition of renouncing on the part of Athens further aggressions against Cyprus, Phœnicia, Kilikia, and Egypt. The Great King on his side had had sufficient experience of Athenian energy to fear the consequences of such aggressions, if prosecuted. He did not lose much by relinquishing formally a tribute which at the time he could have little hope of realising, and which of course he intended to resume on the first favourable opportunity. Weighing all these circumstances, we shall find that the peace, improperly called Kimonian, results naturally from the position and feelings of the contracting parties.

Athens was now at peace both abroad and at home, under the administration of Periklēs, with a great empire, a great fleet, and a great accumulated treasure. The common fund collected from the contributions of the confederates, and originally deposited at Delos, had before this time been transferred to the acropolis at Athens. At what precise time such transfer took place, we cannot state. Nor are we enabled to assign the successive stages whereby the confederacy, chiefly with the freewill of its own members, became transformed from a body of armed and active warriors under the guidance of Athens, into disarmed

¹ Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 21–28.

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and passive tribute-payers defended by the military force of Athens: from allies free, meeting at Delos, and self-determining—into subjects isolated, sending their annual tribute, and awaiting Athenian orders. But it would appear that the change had been made before this time. Some of the more resolute of the allies had tried to secede, but Athens had coerced them by force, and reduced them to the condition of tribute-payers without ships or defence. Chios, Lesbos, and Samos were now the only allies free and armed on the original footing. Every successive change of an armed ally into a tributary—every subjugation of a seceder—tended of course to cut down the numbers, and enfeeble the authority, of the Delian syndod. And what was still worse, it altered the reciprocal relation and feelings both of Athens and her allies—exalting the former into something like a despot, and degrading the latter into mere passive subjects.)

Of course the palpable manifestation of the change must have been the transfer of the confederate fund from Delos to Athens. The only circumstance which we know respecting this transfer is, that it was proposed by the Samians¹—the second power in the confederacy, inferior only to Athens, and least of all likely to favour any job or sinister purpose of the Athenians. It is further said that when the Samians proposed it, Aristeidēs characterised it as a motion unjust, but useful: we may reasonably doubt, however, whether it was made during his lifetime. When the syndod at Delos ceased to be so fully attended as to command respect—when war was lighted up not only with Persia, but with Ægina and Peloponnesus—the Samians might not unnaturally feel that the large accumulated fund, with its constant annual accessions, would be safer at Athens than at Delos, which latter island would require a permanent garrison and squadron to ensure it against attack. But whatever may have been the grounds on which the Samians proceeded, when we find them coming forward to propose the transfer, we may fairly infer that it was not displeasing, and did not appear unjust, to the larger members of the confederacy; and that it was no high-handed and arbitrary exercise of power, as it is often called, on the part of Athens.

After the conclusion of the war with Ægina, and the consequences of the battle of Cœnophyta, the position of Athens became altered more and more. She acquired a large catalogue of new allies, partly tributary, like Ægina—partly in the same relation as Chios, Lesbos, and Samos; that is, obliged only to a

¹ Plutarch, Aristeidēs, c. 25.

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conformity of foreign policy and to military service. In this last category were Megara, the Bœotian cities, the Phokians, Lokrians, &c. All these, though allies of Athens, were strangers to Delos and the confederacy against Persia; and accordingly that confederacy passed insensibly into a matter of history, giving place to the new conception of imperial Athens with her extensive list of allies, partly free, partly subject. Such transition, arising spontaneously out of the character and circumstances of the confederates themselves, was thus materially forwarded by the acquisitions of Athens extraneous to the confederacy. She was now not merely the first maritime state in Greece, but perhaps equal to Sparta even in land-power—possessing in her alliance Megara, Bœotia, Phokis, Lokris, together with Achæa and Trœzen in Peloponnesus. Large as this aggregate already was, both at sea and on land, yet the magnitude of the annual tribute, and still more the character of the Athenians themselves, superior to all Greeks in that combination of energy and discipline which is the grand cause of progress, threatened still further increase. Occupying the Megarian harbour of Pêgæ, the Athenians had full means of naval action on both sides of the Corinthian Isthmus: but what was of still greater importance to them, by their possession of the Megarid and of the high lands of Geraneia, they could restrain any land-force from marching out of Peloponnesus, and were thus (considering besides their mastery at sea) completely unassailable in Attica.

Ever since the repulse of Xerxes, Athens had been advancing in an uninterrupted course of power and prosperity at home, as well as of victory and ascendancy abroad—to which there was no exception except the ruinous enterprise in Egypt. Looking at the position of Greece therefore about 448 B.C.,—after the conclusion of the five years' truce between the Peloponnesians and Athens, and of the so-called Kimonian peace between Persia and Athens,—a discerning Greek might well calculate upon further aggrandisement of this imperial state as the tendency of the age. And accustomed as every Greek was to the conception of separate town-autonomy as essential to a freeman and a citizen, such prospect could not but inspire terror and aversion. The sympathy of the Peloponnesians for the islanders and ultra-maritime states, who constituted the original confederacy of Athens, was not considerable. But when the Dorian island of Ægina was subjugated also, and passed into the condition of a defenceless tributary, they felt the blow sorely on every ground. The ancient celebrity, and eminent service

rendered at the battle of Salamis, of this memorable island, had not been able to protect it; while those great Æginetan families, whose victories at the sacred festival-games Pindar celebrates in a large proportion of his odes, would spread the language of complaint and indignation throughout their numerous "guests" in every Hellenic city. Of course, the same anti-Athenian feeling would pervade those Peloponnesian states who had been engaged in actual hostility with Athens—Corinth, Sikyon, Epidaurus, &c., as well as Sparta, the once-recognised head of Hellas, but now tacitly degraded from her pre-eminence, baffled in her projects respecting Bœotia, and exposed to the burning of her port at Gythium without being able even to retaliate upon Attica. Putting all those circumstances together, we may comprehend the powerful feeling of dislike and apprehension now diffused so widely over Greece against the upstart despot-city; whose ascendancy, newly acquired, maintained by superior force, and not recognised as legitimate—threatened nevertheless still further increase. Sixteen years hence, this same sentiment will be found exploding into the Peloponnesian war. But it became rooted in the Greek mind during the period which we have now reached, when Athens was much more formidable than she had come to be at the commencement of that war. We can hardly explain or appreciate the ideas of that later period, unless we take them as handed down from the earlier date of the five years' truce (about 451–446 B.C.).

Formidable as the Athenian empire both really was and appeared to be, however, this wide-spread feeling of antipathy proved still stronger, so that instead of the threatened increase, the empire underwent a most material diminution. This did not arise from the attack of open enemies; for during the five years' truce, Sparta undertook only one movement, and that not against Attica: she sent troops to Delphi, in an expedition dignified with the name of the Sacred War—expelled the Phokians, who had assumed to themselves the management of the temple—and restored it to the native Delphians. To this the Athenians made no direct opposition: but as soon as the Lacedæmonians were gone, they themselves marched thither and placed the temple again in the hands of the Phokians, who were then their allies.¹ The Delphians were members of the Phokian league, and there was a dispute of old standing as to the administration of the temple—whether it belonged to them separately or to the Phokians collectively. The favour of those

¹ Thucyd. i. 112: compare Philochor. Fragm. 38, ed. Didot.

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who administered it counted as an element of considerable moment in Grecian politics; the sympathies of the leading Delphians led them to embrace the side of Sparta, but the Athenians now hoped to counteract this tendency by means of their preponderance in Phokis. We are not told that the Lacedæmonians took any ulterior step in consequence of their views being frustrated by Athens—a significant evidence of the politics of that day.

The blow which brought down the Athenian empire from this its greatest exaltation was struck by the subjects themselves. The Athenian ascendancy over Bœotia, Phokis, Lokris, and Eubœa, was maintained, not by means of garrisons, but through domestic parties favourable to Athens, and a suitable form of government—just in the same way as Sparta maintained her influence over her Peloponnesian allies.¹ After the victory of Cœnophyta, the Athenians had broken up the governments in the Bœotian cities established by Sparta before the battle of Tanagra, and converted them into democracies at Thebes and elsewhere. Many of the previous leading men had thus been sent into exile: and as the same process had taken place in Phokis and Lokris, there was at this time a considerable aggregate body of exiles, Bœotian, Phokian, Lokrian, Eubœan, Æginetan, &c., all bitterly hostile to Athens, and ready to join in any attack upon her power. We learn further that the democracy² established at Thebes after the battle of Cœnophyta was ill-conducted and disorderly: which circumstance laid open Bœotia still further to the schemes of assailants on the watch for every weak point.

These various exiles, all joining their forces and concerting measures with their partisans in the interior, succeeded in mastering Orchomenus, Chæroneia, and some other less important places in Bœotia. The Athenian general Tolmidês marched to expel them, with 1000 Athenian hoplites and an auxiliary body of allies. It appears that this march was undertaken in haste and rashness. The hoplites of Tolmidês, principally youthful volunteers and belonging to the best families of Athens, disdained the enemy too much to await a larger and more commanding force: nor would the people listen even to Periklês, when he admonished them that the march

¹ Thucyd. i. 19. Λακεδαιμόνιοι, οὐχ ὑποτελεῖς ἔχοντες φόρου τοὺς ξυμμαχοὺς ἡγούντο, κατ' ὀλιγαρχίαν δὲ σφίσι αὐτοῖς μόνον ἐπιτηδείως ὅπως πολιτεύσουσι θεραπεύοντες—the same also i. 76-144.

² Aristotel. Politic. v. 2, 6. Καὶ ἐν Θήβαις μετὰ τὴν ἐν Οἰνοφύτοις μάχην, κακῶς πολιτευομένων, ἡ δημοκρατία διεφθάρη.

would be full of hazard, and adjured them not to attempt it without greater numbers as well as greater caution.¹ Fatally indeed were his predictions justified. Though Tolmidês was successful in his first enterprise—the recapture of Chæroneia, wherein he placed a garrison—yet in his march, probably incautious and disorderly, when departing from that place, he was surprised and attacked unawares, near Korôneia, by the united body of exiles and their partisans. No defeat in Grecian history was ever more complete or ruinous. Tolmidês himself was slain, together with many of the Athenian hoplites, while a large number of them were taken prisoners. In order to recover these prisoners, who belonged to the best families in the city, the Athenians submitted to a convention whereby they agreed to evacuate Bœotia altogether. In all the cities of that country the exiles were restored, the democratical government overthrown, and Bœotia was transformed from an ally of Athens into her bitter eneñny.² Long indeed did the fatal issue of this action dwell in the memory of the Athenians,³ and inspire them with an apprehension of Bœotian superiority in heavy armour on land. But if the hoplites under Tolmidês had been all slain on the field, their death would probably have been avenged and Bœotia would not have been lost—whereas in the case of living citizens, the Athenians deemed no sacrifice too great to redeem them. We shall discover hereafter in the Lacedæmonians a feeling very similar, respecting their brethren captured at Sphakteria.

The calamitous consequences of this defeat came upon Athens in thick and rapid succession. The united exiles, having carried their point in Bœotia, proceeded to expel the philo-Athenian government both from Phokis and Lokris, and to carry the flame of revolt into Eubœa. To this important island Periklês himself proceeded forthwith, at the head of a powerful force; but before he had time to complete the conquest, he was summoned home by news of a still more formidable character. The Megarians had revolted from Athens.

¹ Plutarch, Periklês, c. 18; also his comparison between Periklês and Fabius Maximus, c. 3.

Kleinias, father of the celebrated Alkibiadês, was slain in this battle: he had served thirty-three years before at the sea-fight of Artemisium: he cannot therefore be numbered among the youthful warriors, though a person of the first rank (Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 1).

² Thucyd. i. 113; Diodor. xii. 6. Platea appears to have been considered as quite dis severed from Bœotia: it remained in connexion with Athens as intimately as before.

³ Xenophon. Memorabil. iii. 5, 4.

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By a conspiracy previously planned, a division of hoplites from Corinth, Sikyon, and Epidaurus, was already admitted as garrison into their city: the Athenian soldiers who kept watch over the long walls had been overpowered and slain, except a few who escaped into the fortified port of Nisæa. As if to make the Athenians at once sensible how seriously this disaster affected them, by throwing open the road over Geraneia—Pleistoanax king of Sparta was announced as already on his march for an invasion of Attica. He did in truth conduct an army, of mixed Lacedæmonians and Peloponnesian allies, into Attica, as far as the neighbourhood of Eleusis and the Thriasian plain. He was a very young man, so that a Spartan of mature years, Kleandridês, had been attached to him by the Ephors as adjutant and counsellor. Periklês (it is said) persuaded both the one and the other, by means of large bribes, to evacuate Attica without advancing to Athens. We may fairly doubt whether they had force enough to adventure so far into the interior, and we shall hereafter observe the great precautions with which Archidamus thought it necessary to conduct his invasion, during the first year of the Peloponnesian war, though at the head of a more commanding force. Nevertheless, on their return, the Lacedæmonians, believing that they might have achieved it, found both of them guilty of corruption. Both were banished: Kleandridês never came back, and Pleistoanax himself lived for a long time in sanctuary near the temple of Athênê at Tegea, until at length he procured his restoration by tampering with the Pythian priestess, and by bringing her bought admonitions to act upon the authorities at Sparta.¹

So soon as the Lacedæmonians had retired from Attica, Periklês returned with his forces to Eubœa, and reconquered the island completely. With that caution which always distinguished him as a military man, so opposite to the fatal rashness of Tolmidês, he took with him an overwhelming force of fifty triremes and 5000 hoplites. He admitted most of the Eubœan towns to surrender, altering the government of Chalkis by the expulsion of the wealthy oligarchy called the Hippobotæ. But the inhabitants of Histiaæa at the north of the island, who had taken an Athenian merchantman and massacred all the crew, were more severely dealt with—the free population being all or in great part expelled, and the land distributed among Athenian kleruchs or out-settled citizens.²

¹ Thucyd. i. 114; v. 16; Plutarch, Periklês, c. 22.

² Thucyd. i. 114; Plutarch, Periklês, c. 23; Diodor. xii. 7.

Yet the reconquest of Eubœa was far from restoring Athens to the position which she had occupied before the fatal engagement of Korœneia. Her land-empire was irretrievably gone, together with her recently-acquired influence over the Delphian oracle; and she reverted to her former condition of an exclusively maritime potentate. For though she still continued to hold Nisæa and Pêgæ, yet her communication with the latter harbour was now cut off by the loss of Megara and its appertaining territory, so that she thus lost her means of acting in the Corinthian Gulf, and of protecting as well as of constraining her allies in Achaia. Nor was the port of Nisæa of much value to her, disconnected from the city to which it belonged, except as a post for annoying that city.

Moreover, the precarious hold which she possessed over unwilling allies had been demonstrated in a manner likely to encourage similar attempts among her maritime subjects; attempts which would now be seconded by Peloponnesian armies invading Attica. The fear of such a combination of embarrassments, and especially of an irresistible enemy carrying ruin over the flourishing territory round Eleusis and Athens, was at this moment predominant in the Athenian mind. We shall find Periklês, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war fourteen years afterwards, exhausting all his persuasive force, and not succeeding without great difficulty, in prevailing upon his countrymen to endure the hardship of invasion—even in defence of their maritime empire, and when events had been gradually so ripening as to render the prospect of war familiar, if not inevitable. But the late series of misfortunes had burst upon them so rapidly and unexpectedly, as to discourage even Athenian confidence, and to render the prospect of continued war full of gloom and danger. The prudence of Periklês would doubtless counsel the surrender of their remaining landed possessions or alliances, which had now become unprofitable, in order to purchase peace. But we may be sure that nothing short of extreme temporary despondency could have induced the Athenian assembly to listen to such advice, and to accept the inglorious peace which followed. A truce for thirty years was concluded with Sparta and her allies, in the beginning of 445 B.C., whereby Athens surrendered Nisæa, Pêgæ, Achaia, and Trœzen—thus abandoning Peloponnesus altogether,¹ and

¹ Thucyd. i. 114, 115; ii. 21; Diodor. xii. 5. I do not at all doubt that the word Achaia here used means the country in the north part of Peloponnesus, usually known by that name. The suspicions of Gôller and others, that it means, not this territory, but some unknown town, appear

leaving the Megarians (with their full territory and their two ports) to be included among the Peloponnesian allies of Sparta.

It was to the Megarians, especially, that the altered position of Athens after this truce was owing: it was their secession from Attica and junction with the Peloponnesians, which laid open Attica to invasion. Hence arose the deadly hatred on the part of the Athenians towards Megara, manifested during the ensuing years—a sentiment the more natural, as Megara had spontaneously sought the alliance of Athens a few years before as a protection against the Corinthians, and had then afterwards, without any known ill-usage on the part of Athens, broken off from the alliance and become her enemy, with the fatal consequence of rendering her vulnerable on the land-side. Under such circumstances we shall not be surprised to find the antipathy of the Athenians against Megara strongly pronounced, insomuch that the system of exclusion which they adopted against her was among the most prominent causes of the Peloponnesian war.

Having traced what we may call the foreign relations of Athens down to this thirty years' truce, we must notice the important internal and constitutional changes which she had experienced during the same interval.

to me quite unfounded. Thucydides had never noticed the exact time when the Athenians acquired Achaia as a dependent ally, though he notices the Achæans (i. 116) in that capacity. This is one argument, among many, to show that we must be cautious in reasoning from the silence of Thucydides against the reality of an event—in reference to this period between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars, where his whole summary is so brief.


In regard to the chronology of these events, Mr. Fynes Clinton remarks, "The disasters in Bœotia produced the revolt of Eubœa and Megara about eighteen months after, in Anthestêrion 445 B.C.; and the Peloponnesian invasion of Attica, on the expiration of the five years' truce" (ad ann. 447 B.C.).


Mr. Clinton seems to me to allow a longer interval than is probable: I incline to think that the revolt of Eubœa and Megara followed more closely upon the disasters in Bœotia, in spite of the statement of archons given by Diodorus: *ὁ πολλῶ ὑπερον*, the expression of Thucydides, means probably no more than three or four months; and the whole series of events were evidently the product of one impulse. The truce having been concluded in the beginning of 445 B.C., it seems reasonable to place the revolt of Eubœa and Megara, as well as the invasion of Attica by Pleistoanax, in 446 B.C.—and the disasters in Bœotia either in the beginning of 446 B.C. or the close of 447 B.C.

It is hardly safe to assume, moreover (as Mr. Clinton does ad ann. 450, as well as Dr. Thirlwall, Hist. Gr. ch. xvii. p. 478), that the five years' truce must have been actually expired before Pleistoanax and the Lacedæmonians invaded Attica: the thirty years' truce, afterwards concluded, may not run out its full time.

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