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THE CHINESE REVOLUTION


1926-27

A RECORD OF THE
PERIOD UNDER COMMUNIST CONTROL AS
SEEN FROM THE NATIONALIST
CAPITAL, HANKOW

by

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TO ALL THOSE
WHO STRIVE FOR INTERNATIONAL UNDERSTANDING
AND GOOD FELLOWSHIP
IN
THE FAR EAST

PREFACE

DURING the last few years a number of books have been written on the developments taking place in China, incontestably the most momentous events in the history of the present-day world.

Apart from specialised technical works dealing with narrowly limited subjects, these may be roughly divided into two classes. One deals with the intellectual, religious, and philosophical developments in the life of the Chinese people, and accordingly refers only incidentally to political and military events. The books of the other class, written generally by publicists of considerable experience in the modern life of Peking and the great seaports, and frequently suggesting an intimate acquaintance with the leading public men in China and the hidden springs of their actions, in most cases deal especially with the outstanding political and diplomatic events in the country from the point of view of their relation to foreign interests.

This volume belongs to neither of the above two classes. I have endeavoured to give a clear and coherent outline of the course of the Nationalist Revolution from the beginning of the Cantonese invasion of Central China in August, 1926 to the termination of the Communist control of the Nationalist Government which led to the approximate reconciliation of the Nanking and Hankow factions of August 1927. Though the impact of the Revolution on foreign interests; and the relations of the Nationalists with foreign countries and their subjects, have of necessity been continually dealt with, being an integral part of the movement, it is the progress and development of the Revolution itself which has throughout been treated as the theme of primary interest and importance.

But little space has been given to theories of secret policies, speculations as to hidden intrigues, or prophecies of future developments; but I have honestly endeavoured impartially to assemble and state the salient facts, social, religious and industrial as well as military and political, from amongst the events and phenomena of these portentous twelve months, believing that the arrangement is sufficiently clear to require but little comment. Special care has, however, been taken to elucidate the part that the Russian Communist factor has played in the Revolution.

In the course of my work I have had considerable opportunities for observing the Revolution in action. After watching the development of the Nationalist occupation in some of the country districts, I arrived in January 1927 in Hankow, where I remained throughout the period of the zenith of the Nationalist power and prestige. I was throughout associated with a number of the business men of the port: in the earlier part of the period I met, amidst the stream of refugees that poured steadily through, people of many nationalities from the most widely separated up-country areas; and from March till the end of May I went out every day to work with the Chinese staff of a hospital in the centre of the native city. The daily issues of *The People's Tribune*, the official organ of the Nationalist Government, were an invaluable source of information, containing as they did the edicts, regulations and manifestos of the various Government Departments, and a comprehensive presentation of the current policy and propaganda. In addition to this we were in touch by letter, or flying visit to Hankow, with representatives from amongst our Chinese fellow-workers stationed all over Hunan and Hupeh, and thus able to check up for ourselves many of the glib promises and declarations of the Government offices, and of the official publications in the newspapers.

The principal part of this book thus consists of facts of my own observation, or which I was able to verify for

myself on the spot. For what was necessary to make clear its historical setting and relations, and for other parts of the narrative itself, I am indebted to several original sources of information in Nanking, Shanghai and Canton, and to various authorities whose publications are acknowledged as they occur in the text. I am under a deep obligation to the Royal Institute of International Affairs for granting me the use of its unique specialised library in London, and allowing me freely to use material from the accurate and comprehensive 1926 "Survey of International Affairs" and the 1927 "Journal," while still in manuscript form.

My warmest thanks for valuable criticism and advice on the manuscript are hereby tendered to Professor K. H. Bailey of Melbourne University, to Mr. Fred W. Eggleston of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and also, especially in regard to the last chapter, to my brother, Mr. B. B. Chapman of the Central China Teachers' College, Wuchang.

It will be seen that, although the Revolution has been democratic and profoundly social and economic in its aims, it has not in any wide sense been a revolution by the people, but rather by a great political society: it is for the people, but not from the people.

Its fate is still in doubt as this book goes to press; but there are few lovers of the country, Chinese or foreign, even among those who have suffered most at the hands of the Revolution, who do not look eagerly for the day when it will vindicate itself by establishing a united, well-governed and independent China. Even among those whose prime concern in Chinese affairs is their effect on foreign interests, an "enlightened imperialism" is rapidly supplanting the "gunboat policy" of the past, and a conviction is growing that in the speedy success of the Revolution lies the surest hope of a solution of the problems which now confront them.

H. O. C.

Shanghai, 1927.

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MAP

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THE NATIONALIST CONQUEST OF
CENTRAL CHINA

CHAPTER I

THE SETTING OF THE STAGE

THE FARCE OF 1911

EARLY in the year 1927 an old boy of Wesley College, one of the principal secondary schools in Wuchang, the capital of the province of Hupeh in Central China, was talking to a foreigner who had formerly been headmaster of the school, and expressed himself to the following effect:—"In 1911, when we members of the Nationalist Party had at last completed our arrangements for the overthrow of the Manchus and the establishment of a democracy, the flag of revolution was raised here in Wuhan,¹ and in a very short time the Chinese Republic was created. We then said to the people, 'Now that we are a republic we must have a Parliament and establish representative government'; and all the leading people, members of the old-established families, agreed. 'Yes! By all means let us have a Parliament.' But what happened here in the Hupeh Provincial Assembly is typical of what happened all over China. The old hands worked the elections, bribed shamelessly; and so, when it was all over, we had just the same gang in power as before, just the same official corruption, the same callousness and neglect of the crying needs of the people and the interests of the country, and the same exploitation of both by the capitalist and privileged classes; Chinese and foreign, for their own selfish interests. The Revolution had failed, and ever since it and the Republic have been but empty names. We saw that something more fundamental was required; and that's what we are doing now."

¹ "Wuhan" is the collective name given to the three cities, Wuchang, Hanyang and Hankow, grouped round the Y-shaped junction of the Yangtze and the Han River.

•
THE DICTATORSHIP OF YUAN SHIH KAI¹

When the Revolution of 1911 had established a Republic at Nanking under the presidency of Sun Yat Sen, and the Manchu Dynasty had abdicated in Peking, a compromise was made with Yuan Shih Kai, a statesman and military leader of pre-eminent ability in the North; and Sun resigned in his favour. But Yuan, though pledging his loyalty to the Republican Constitution, had little conception of, or liking for, democracy. From the beginning in indirect ways he intimidated the official delegates of the Republic. On 7th April, 1913, when he could no longer prevent it even by the assassination of the leading Southern delegate, the first Parliament of the Republic met in Peking.

No sooner had the speakers of the two houses been elected than Yuan stabbed in the back the whole theory and practice of popular government by ordering, on the authority of the Provisional National Council which had now been superseded by the Parliament, the signature of a huge loan of £25,000,000, that had been under negotiation for some months with a group of six foreign Powers.² The Provisional Nanking Constitution of the Republic laid down clearly and precisely in Article XIX that all measures affecting the National Treasury must receive the assent of Parliament; and this body, recognising Yuan's action as a direct challenge to its existence, did everything possible to have the loan first submitted for its approval, so that this vital function of the sovereignty of the country should not be placed under the heel of one man.

The foreign Powers, however, with the exception of the United States of America, had not yet recognised

¹ For a dramatic and vivid narration of the period of Yuan Shih Kai's administration, with reprints of relevant official documents, see Putnam Weale's *The Fight for the Republic in China*, Hurst and Blackett, London, 1918.

² For the history of the loan negotiations see *The China Year Book*, 1914, George Routledge & Sons, London, p. 379 et seqq.

the new Republic. Yuan claimed to derive his authority essentially from the abdication edict of the late Emperor rather than from the Nanking Provisional Constitution; and the Foreign Ministers were inclined to take this view. He was undoubtedly the strongest man who had appeared in Chinese political life in that generation, and at that time foreigners were looking for a "strong man" to save China rather than to any popular movement, and were backing Yuan for this rôle.

Not realising the significance of what they did, the Ministers of five foreign Powers signed the loan agreement in the face of the protests from the members of the Chinese embryo Parliament. With this in his pocket Yuan now had the whip hand.

Exasperated to desperation, the Central and Southern provinces rose gallantly against this tyranny in what has been called the Second Revolution. But, ill-armed and penniless, Yuan made short work of their forces with the well-trained troops and ample money now at his disposal. In two months the risings had been dispersed, and every leader had fled with a price on his head.

On 4th November, seven months after its convocation, Yuan prorogued the Parliament and expelled the members from Peking. Thenceforward he rapidly established his position as a dictator. He built up strong army formations in strategic centres throughout the country, under officers of whose personal loyalty he was assured; and all attempts at revolt were promptly crushed by ruthless executions or political assassinations. In Peking an infamous military court, resembling the Star Chamber of English history, was kept continuously busy despatching men suspected of conspiracy.

In spite of increasing financial stringency and steadily deepening administrative chaos, Yuan was careful to keep on good terms with the legations in Peking by carefully avoiding any encroachment on their prerogatives, and granting contracts for huge projects in railroad

6 THE CHINESE REVOLUTION 1926-27

construction¹—the only kind of interests to which they appear to have been alive. Japan alone was keenly interested in the extraordinary political developments of these days, untiringly active behind the scenes, ready and waiting to turn the occasion to her advantage when the chance came with the Great War.

After the presentation of Japan's twenty-one demands (*q.v. infra* p. 221, footnote) and their signature on 9th May, 1915, two co-ordinated series of developments rushed forward converging towards the climax. Yuan Shih Kai, feeling that he was now securely established, subtly and anonymously, in flat contradiction of his own public attitude, by devious ways that must be studied in detail (*vide op. cit.*) before they can even be imagined by the Western mind, began to prepare and develop in Peking and the provinces public and official support for his own enthronement as Emperor.

As this purpose was gradually realised by the people a great tide of deep resentment and opposition silently began to rise throughout the land. The feeling presently became vocal among the literati of new China under the leadership of Liang Chi Chao, the most finished scholar of his day, who wrote and published a brilliant and powerful pamphlet in defence of the Constitution, which has since become a treasured classic in the archives of the Republic. Inspired by this and by the magnetic presence of Liang himself, who darted from province to province, the patriots throughout the South and Centre began again to organise and arm under the old Republican leaders. This was no flash in the pan like the second Revolution of 1913, but the consolidation of a deliberate and steady nation-wide purpose. It was in far Yunnan that the standard of revolt was first raised; the other Southern provinces one by one declared for the confederacy; and some of Yuan's hitherto most faithful generals gave their support to the movement.

¹ Contracts for over 3000 miles of railroad construction were signed with foreign organisations in 1913 (*China Year Book*, 1926, Tientsin Press, Tientsin, p. 271).

Encouraged by his family, Yuan still persisted feverishly with his preparations in the face of the rising tide; but he postponed the actual enthronement ceremony for fear of Japan, which for many years had been his inveterate foe. On learning that the trusted governor of Szechuan had declared against him and captured the finest of his armies in a trap, he surrendered himself to a fit of ungovernable fury, and in his insensate rage snatched a sword and hacked to death his favourite concubine and her new-born baby lying beside her on the bed. This was early in May. Within several weeks the tide of revolt had covered the country, and Yuan's authority extended no further than the walls of Peking. Finally, in a spasmodic but vain attempt to save himself from being engulfed, he offered to resign; but fate was kind to him, and on 6th June, 1916, he died of uræmia.

THE PARLIAMENTARY PERIOD

The third President of the Republic, General Li Yuan Hung, a scholarly man of wide administrative experience, showed a whole-hearted loyalty to the Republic, and was beloved and trusted by the people of China. He immediately summoned Parliament, which set to work in Peking to draft a Constitution, at which it sat steadily until 13th June, 1917, when Li Yuan Hung was driven by threats from the militarists again to dissolve it.

There is evidence from competent foreigners of sound judgment, who attended sittings of this Parliament, that the members worked earnestly with a strong sense of responsibility; and their opinion is that, though it was obvious that it would take years for firm precedent and tradition to be established, yet in these early years it gave promise of becoming an efficient deliberative and legislative body.

But since this time it has had no opportunity for such development. Li, the champion of the Constitution, was forced out of office by the generals in control of Yuan Shih Kai's former armies, the only organisation of his administration which had survived him intact. The

Parliament for several years sought vainly to re-establish its authority and resume its work, first in one part of the country, then in another. But the military party steadily gained power, and before long president, prime minister, and executive all held office at their pleasure. The wandering Parliament meanwhile was pushed farther and farther into the background, one of its last acts being to assemble again at Peking and give a semblance of constitutional standing to the position of one of the many presidents by passing a vote endorsing his appointment in October 1923, for which service all the delegates had been shamelessly and heavily bribed. For the last three or four years the Parliament has altogether ceased to function, and been lost to sight.

THE PERIOD OF THE WAR LORDS

The conspicuous features of the period intervening between the forced prorogation of Parliament in June 1917 and the beginning of the Revolution of 1926 have been the emergence of certain of the generals of the Chinese armies to relatively independent positions of pre-eminence and power over their contemporaries, the manner in which these men, as "war lords," have completely eclipsed the old-fashioned provincial governors, and their respective intrigues and endless campaigns against each other. Now this one and now that has gained and held the control of one or other of the groups of contiguous provinces; but all alike have cost the people dear either for pay for their troops or for personal profit for the high officers in command, and few indeed have given any service of value in return, not even the extermination of the bandits who terrorise so many districts, and of whom the armies of some of these generals are to a considerable extent composed.

In the summer of 1926 the great outstanding leaders among a number of subsidiary ones were Chang Tso Lin in Manchuria and Chihli in the North-east, with some authority over the general controlling Shantung;

Feng Yu Hsiang in the North-west controlling Kansu, Shensi and Inner Mongolia; Wu Pei Fu in the centre along the Peking-Hankow railway in control of North Hunan, Hupeh, Honan and South Chihli, with his base at Loyang; Sun Chuan Fang along the lower Yangtze valley with Kiangsi, Fukien, Chekiang, Anhwei and Kiangsu under his authority; and Chiang Kai Shek, the young Cantonese general in the South, supported by Kuangtung, Kuangsi, South Hunan, and at least part of Kweichow. They had only reached these positions of supremacy after a most complicated series of campaigns and intrigues during the previous few years, to-day allied with this man or that, and to-morrow undermining his influence secretly, betraying him at a critical moment, openly cursing him by long public telegrams throughout the length and breadth of the country, or even fighting his forces in the open field. During this time it was never possible to make even a probable guess as to what the dispositions were likely to be six months ahead: men who seemed stable and strong unexpectedly collapsed; men who seemed finally down and out gradually gathered strength and came to the fore again; they lost at one end of the country and established themselves at the other.

But whatever vicissitudes a war lord might meet in his career, however the people under him might be neglected, or despoiled, however many months he kept his soldiers in arrears for their pay, one thing could be counted on with certainty—if such a war lord should be able to keep his position for a few years, he would be a dollar millionaire and his higher officers would be wealthy in a degree corresponding to their rank. Even crushing and final defeat on the field could not rob him of this solace, for, when the blow fell he would slip away, leaving his army to its fate, and retire to some safe place, perhaps a foreign Concession, perhaps Japan, there to use his accumulated wealth. Avarice was the inspiration from which the majority of these war lords, great and small, drew their

strength, the principle which guided their politics and diplomacy; and behind their high-sounding proclamations and patriotic appeals lay the sordid motive of callous selfishness.¹

The story of these days would take a small volume to write, and recalls the China of long ages ago in the unsettled periods between one dynasty and another. Several features, however, are worth noting. The war lord who for the time was in control of Peking supported the Peking Government on the understanding that it carried on according to his wishes; and the others with one exception never challenged the claim that this Government of Peking, though reduced to a shadow, was the Government of China. This was necessary to satisfy the Chinese instinct for preserving at least the appearance of order and decorum, and enabled relations to be continued with the foreign Powers. On the whole, throughout all the wars and disturbances each of the factions alike was very courteous to foreigners and careful of the security of their persons and property, what few affronts did occur being due to the action of irresponsible guerrilla corps or bandits. Foreign business, and Christian missionary and Chinese Church work of all kinds, went on with very little disturbance except from the general backwardness of inland transport and communications, and the curse of banditry, which was steadily spreading its blight over larger and larger areas of the more remote districts.

CANTON AND THE EARLY PROPAGANDA THROUGH THE SCHOOLS

Canton and the adjoining territory alone in the whole of China, following the lead of its revolutionary hero,

¹ To this generalisation there are a few exceptions to be made. In Wu Pei Fu ambition rather than avarice was the ruling passion (see p. 212); Feng Yu Hsiang was a war lord *sui generis* (see Chapters XVII and XVIII); Yen Hsi Shan confined his attention strictly to governing and protecting his province of Shansi (see p. 237); and Chiang Kai Shek more than any other fought loyally under the direction of his Government.

Dr. Sun Yat Sen, dared to raise the standard of open defiance to the war lords' usurpation of the government of the country; and in November 1920 a "Constitutional Government" was established at Canton, the "Parliament" of which on 7th April elected Dr. Sun "President of China." Time and again we heard that an expedition from the North was to be organised to crush this stout little rebel; but it never materialised. The Southern Government itself was torn with dissensions, and more than once for considerable periods Sun has been forced to flee before the victorious army or the political intrigues of a rival faction; but, whether in power in Canton or a fugitive wandering abroad, he retained in an extraordinary way the loyalty and devotion of his own followers.

Years before, in 1905, he had founded a secret society known later as the Nationalist Party or Kuo Min Tang; and this ever since from its headquarters in Canton has been, in spite of all political and military disturbances, steadily and unobtrusively spreading its network throughout the country. Its members have been confident that the awakening of a spirit of nationalism and patriotism among the people, as it had sufficed to overthrow the Manchu dynasty, would also prove a more potent force than the military power of the war lords.

For such propaganda work the schoolboys of China as a class are peculiarly suitable. They are, more than any other social group, nationally self-conscious: they have an inflated conception of their own importance, are generally responsive and enthusiastic, and have an extraordinary facility for making speeches; and, finally, protected by a false analogy which ranks them with the old-time Chinese scholars,¹ their persons are regarded by all classes of the people as almost sacred,² and their

¹ *Vide infra*, p. 283.

² The shooting incident in Shanghai on 30th May, 1925 (*vide infra*, p. 13), undoubtedly aroused much fiercer indignation throughout the country because "students" were among those shot, the deaths being thereby automatically raised to the plane of martyrdom.

opinions as entitled to peculiar respect, so that they are able to engage in seditious propaganda or even mild rioting for which others would be imprisoned or shot.)

This peculiar prestige held by the student class is the more readily understood when we consider the political inertia of the great commercial and business community of China, and the colossal illiteracy of the great mass of the people and their dense ignorance of and apathy towards national affairs. The business community, which is the only other really powerful educated class, is gagged and bound by its wealth as capital always is, and thus hindered from taking part in a movement which might endanger its security; while the student class, having little material wealth to lose, is free to champion any cause which appeals to its enthusiasm and patriotism.

Another factor that applies more to returned students from abroad than to those educated in their own land is that, through the lack of developmental work and industry in China due to the misgovernment of these latter years, men trained in many skilled avocations such as engineering can find practically no opening for their abilities; in other cases the training has not been practically thorough enough to command a job; and in yet others the student is too impatient to endure the drudgery requisite to make his skill effective. From these and other causes there is always a relatively large number of "students" in China who have no work or uncongenial work, disappointed, restless young men, to whom such an opening as this Revolution was a veritable godsend in

When a little later in the year the Japanese shot down a much larger number of striking mill-hands in a riot at their Tsingtao cotton mills, it was passed over by the Chinese Press with very little comment, partly, it is true, because the aggressors were Japanese and not British, but also partly because the slain were after all only coolies. Similarly the Hankow shooting of 11th June, 1925 (*vide infra*, p. 14), caused much less resentment than had been expected.

supplying them with patriotic, interesting, exciting and sometimes profitable employment.

The pioneers and builders of the Revolution early saw the great opportunity that was here offered them, and were not slow to grasp and develop it.¹ Before the Revolution of 1911 little groups were meeting to study and plan for the awakening of a spirit of nationalism. Text-books were prepared with care; teachers were enlisted and educated in their schools for the teaching of nationalism; quietly, methodically and thoroughly the preparatory work was done. During the last five years it has been inculcated in the schools all over the land. It was noticed that in the frequent changes of Government school teachers in widely separated areas of China the new-comer was always a member of the Kuo Min Tang. When, as in the case of some missionary schools, it was not possible to introduce members of the Kuo Min Tang as teachers, secret committees were formed amongst the scholars to carry on the work. The tiny flame which at first was nurtured in secret had by 1925 been spread far and wide until it was burning steadily in every considerable school centre in the country.

THE ROUSING OF CHINA

If we except the anti-Japanese boycott of 1919,² which though largely spontaneous had served as a preliminary trial of strength—a demonstration to those coming after of what may be accomplished by vigorous nationalist propaganda—it was in Shanghai on 30th May, 1925, that this fire, burning quietly and unobtrusively in every corner of the land, first burst out into an open and fierce conflagration. A procession in which “students” were taking part was held up by the Shanghai international police, the officers of which are chiefly British, and several of the demonstrators were arrested. A large mob

¹ See an article by Dr. E. Humé, President of Hunan-Yale Medical School in Changsha, published in the *Baltimore Sun* in March 1927.

² *Vide infra*, p. 223, footnote.

quickly gathered, was worked up into a state of excitement by the propagandists, and attacked the police station to which their leaders had been taken, and which had been sacked by a mob a few years previously. Finally, a number, including students, were shot by a volley from the small and hard-pressed police force defending. Four were killed outright, and at least five subsequently died of wounds.

There is reason to believe that the leaders of the Kuo Min Tang had not planned this incident, and indeed were not yet quite ready to take the offensive. But it is a basal principle of Communist tactics to take advantage of every occasion of popular discontent and resentment, or civil disturbance, and energetically to develop and exploit it to the maximum extent.¹ The Kuo Min Tang therefore (under Communist leadership, as will be shown later) decided not to miss this opportunity which fortune had placed in its hands; and it was then that the extensiveness and thoroughness of its organisation became evident. Anti-foreign riots unchecked by the Government authorities quickly followed in Hankow on 11th June,²

¹ This principle of working has been found explained in detail in many orders issued from the Communist headquarters to their agents in different countries. Such directions were included in the correspondence seized in Chang Tso Lin's Peking raid (*vide infra*, pp. 102, 111).

² The news from Shanghai had caused suppressed excitement among a certain section of the local Kuo Min Tang, who were strenuously exerting themselves to stir up indignation and resentment amongst the people. On the day in question, shortly after dark, a mob several thousand strong was gathered on the northern border of the British Concession, and after driving back the Chinese police force of the Municipality, who had tried to hold them on the boundary road, it advanced on the Volunteer Force, which had been called out and flung across the entrances of the cross streets leading into the Concession.

The boundary street was by this time filled with the mob, which looted a row of Japanese shops standing there, and killed one of the Japanese in the street. They were howling and yelling with excitement, and armed with poles and brickbats and broken pieces of iron gutter gratings, as they surged forward against the line of volunteers. These, though armed with bayonets, did not use them; but were slowly pushed back by the crowd along a cross street towards barricades which had been erected just in front of the first

and in Canton on 23rd,¹ where they were beaten off by naval guards and foreign volunteers only at the cost of a few more Chinese lives. A general strike was run in Hongkong for over seven months and a boycott of British trade in Canton for fifteen months.² Kuo Min

street intersection, behind which lay the Volunteer Force's drill hall and munition store. Here another attempt was made to hold up the attack by sweeping the road with water from a fire hose; but to no purpose. When the mob had nearly reached the barricades a squad of machine-gunners from a British warship, who had been lying ready behind, fired a round into them at point-blank range, wounding some dozen men and killing eight. The mob instantly broke and fled; and its scattered units were eventually cleared out of the streets adjoining the Concession boundary by the Chinese authorities, who, it should be noted, had persistently refused to comply with the British Consul's urgent requests that they should do so before the rioters attacked.

I personally verified nearly all the above facts early the next morning by inquiry from actors in the scene who were still on duty, and by investigation of the position of the barricades, the missiles lying in the road, the marks of the hose water, and the blood-stains from the volley in the cross street and from the murder of the Japanese in the boundary road.

Foreigners from the Chinese city and from Hanyang were called into the Concession the same night, and the volunteers continued on guard for about a week; but the attempt was not repeated.


¹ *Vide infra*, p. 107, note.

² The Canton boycott, though narrowly localised instead of on a nation-wide scale, was enforced with a rigidity and thoroughness that was never even approached by the anti-Japanese boycott in 1919. Its efficiency "was maintained by the terrorism of the army of pickets working under the Strike Committee, which the Nationalist Government of Canton was unable or unwilling to control, and which almost constituted an *imperium in imperio*. The Strike Committee arrogated to itself powers of police, arrest and imprisonment, and enriched itself by the sale of permits to leave Canton for Hongkong, and by fining ships for calling at Hongkong or persons found in possession of British goods."

During 1926 there were various intermittent and futile attempts at negotiating a settlement, while the damage to Canton trade became more and more serious. Finally, after skirmishes in Canton harbour between strike pickets and passenger and cargo boats, causing annoyance and danger to foreign nationals working in the harbour, a British naval force on 4th September cleared the harbour of strike picket boats, expelled the pickets from the British wharves, and placed a guard in the boycott examination shed. This forced, or assisted, the Nationalist Government to take action against the pickets, and on 10th October the boycott was declared off. At the same time the Nationalist Government announced that it would thenceforth collect a surtax of 2½ per cent. on ordinary imports, 5 per cent. on luxuries, and 2½ per cent. on exports. A protest was

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Tang committees, suddenly appearing among the scholars, broke up missionary schools all over China, opened up intensive and violent propaganda, and in some cases attacked hospitals and Church meetings and workers.

The conflagration died down; but from then onwards the propaganda has never ceased. The schools one by one resumed; the shaken hospital staffs settled down; the whole round of missionary work or trade was carried on outwardly much as before. But there was a sense of tenseness in the air which was new. Foreign lives and property were as safe as ever, and the great mass of the common people just as friendly; but there were the frequent posters on the walls with their anti-foreign exhortations and their crude or bloody pictures of foreign atrocities, there were more frequent and troublesome strikes in the business world, and there were ever-recurring indications and hints of the propaganda work, especially in the schools.

made in November by the Foreign Ministers of the various Powers in Peking; but the surtaxes have been collected ever since.

The Hongkong strike was managed by the same Strike Committee in Canton, which also supported the strikers and their families. It is memorable as being the first efficiently managed and complete general strike that has been known in China in modern times. It embraced every class of worker serving the foreign residents, from household servants to business and municipal employees. There had been no previous dispute or dissatisfaction between employers and employees; but the strike was decreed and rigidly enforced by the Kuo Min Tang, and the workers helplessly acquiesced. Law and order were splendidly maintained by the British authorities governing the Colony, and all essential work was carried on by the well-organised and distributed labour of the foreigners, who practically unanimously volunteered for the different kinds of work of which they were capable. By February the great majority of the strikers had returned to work.

“The effect of this prolonged struggle was to demonstrate the power of labour, to show the Kuo Min Tang the efficacy of this weapon of the strike and boycott, and to secure a great access of strength to the extremist section under its Bolshevik advisers: the methods of agitation and intimidation that had been perfected by the Strike Committee and its picket army became an essential part of the machinery of the Kuo Min Tang.” (For further details of this strike and boycott see the *Survey of International Affairs* published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Oxford Press, London, 1925, Vol. II. pp. 387, 388.)

CHAPTER II

THE NATIONALIST TIDE

CHIANG KAI SHEK AND THE SOUTHERN INVASION

EARLY in 1926, in the naïve manner which is almost universal in Chinese military strategy, the Southern Government began to announce a coming military expedition northwards. Because of the great distances and the tremendous difficulties of transport, no one in Central China took this threat very seriously; but presently it became apparent that out of the confused fighting and intrigue in Kuangtung there had emerged a definite and purposive invasion under the personal leadership of Chiang Kai Shek driving hard and fast up into Hunan. Surprising news came through to the summer gathering of foreigners at Kuling of the readiness with which this province was being captured and the welcome that was everywhere being given to the troops: Changsha was taken on 12th July, and by 18th August they had reached the Hupeh border; but even then the significance of the movement was not guessed. Wu Pei Fu, the most renowned of all the war lords, who was engaged for the time in putting the finishing touches to a campaign which was driving Feng Yu Hsiang away out into the far North-west, had his Central China stronghold well garrisoned and protected, and was supported by his alliance with Sun Chuan Fang and all his splendid armies of the lower Yangtze and the eastern provinces. Hunan might be captured by the revolutionaries: the Hunanese were always a wild and turbulent crowd anyhow; but Hupeh had nothing to fear from a little expeditionary force from Canton. So we all thought; and in company with other foreigners from all over China I went up in the last days of August

to attend a conference of the China Medical Association in Peking.

Then came the dramatic *dénouement*, as the news was brought day by day over the wires to the northern capital. Wu Pei Fu had inexplicably delayed his personal return to organise the resistance on his southern front until it was too late. Some of his units of trusted soldiers retreated persistently without making any attempt to stand: others betrayed him and went over to the enemy *en masse* at the most critical stage of the battle. Sun Chuan Fang, although definitely anti-Southern, preferred to wait and watch Wu Pei Fu being crushed rather than lift a finger or waste a man to do anything that might bring honour, success or riches to another war lord. With the exception of the walled city of Wuchang, which held out gallantly for over a month, Wu's front crumpled up; and the Southerners captured Hankow, overran the eastern half of Hupeh, and by the middle of September had pushed up along the Peking railway nearly to the northern border of the province.

THE NATIONALIST METHOD OF CAMPAIGN

My station is at an old-established hospital in Teian, twenty miles west of the railway line in the central part of Hupeh; and being anxious not to be absent any longer in these unsettled times I made a dash for it, travelling light down along the Peking-Hankow line, passed through the fighting line at Chikungshan, and reached home, completing in ten days the journey which should have taken only thirty-six hours.

This fine old walled country town is the seat of civil authority and the garrison town for a wide district, is less than twenty-four hours from Hankow, and yet stands somewhat secluded and aloof from the present-day fields of trade, of banditry and of war, which surround it on all sides. It proved an admirable vantage-point from which quietly to study the Nationalist offensive for the next four months, as it developed under our very eyes

amongst our own townsfolk and country people, and as it was reported in the daily papers from the surrounding provinces.

It quickly became very evident that what we were watching was a process and a method in no way resembling any of the fighting or wars in China of the last few years, or indeed anything that has taken place in China since the dim beginnings of its ancient history. The characteristics of this Hupeh campaign are just the same as those of the previous Hunan invasion, and the subsequent extensive and successful operations along the lower Yangtze. From the purely military point of view the calculated recklessness of Chiang Kai Shek's lightning drive from Kuan tung through Hunan up to the northern borders of Hupeh, with a small army against greatly superior forces, and with an extraordinarily difficult problem of communications, as a glance at the map will show, ranks as a notable achievement unsurpassed by the famous march of the Taipings along the same route or by anything else that has been done or is likely to be done in modern Chinese warfare; but it is understandable when we consider the non-military contributing factors. The whole of this drive, nearly 700 miles long, was made through country in which most careful and thorough preparations had been made in advance by the ramifications of the Kuo Min Tang in all classes of society. As a rule the generalship of the Nationalists has been good, particularly in outflanking operations. But an even more valuable adjunct has been the successful circumventing of their opponents by treachery within their ranks. When it has been unavoidable, the Nationalist soldiers have shown that they can fight fiercely and persistently, as in the bloody battles for Nanchang, the capital of Kiangsi, and later in May 1927 the desperate and sustained drive in the face of much superior artillery resulting in the capture of Chenchow on the Yellow River.¹ But there have been very few important engage-

¹ *Vide infra*, pp. 195, 196.

ments in the original northward drive, or since, in which the Nationalist army has not been assisted in, or presented with victory by the treachery of troops either in the actual fighting army of the enemy or in its rear.

Any soldiers who have been long in occupation of a district in China are generally sullenly disliked or hated by the poor people who have been subject to their high-handedness and exactions, so that it was only to be expected that there would be a welcome for those who were driving out the Northerners. But it was found that the Nationalist soldiers never looted, and broadly speaking paid for everything they wanted at the market rate, and that only in urgent necessity did they impress the labour of carrying coolies, and even in such a case usually paid for it. The villagers and townspeople rubbed their eyes in amazement: the propaganda was true after all that these men were "one with the common people." The people reciprocated this attitude with open cordiality, and it was not uncommon to see, a few hours after the occupation of a town or village, the soldiers fraternising and chatting in a most friendly way with the shopkeepers and families on the street front. An indigenous intelligence service was thus ready waiting to assist the incoming army: reliable guides were available to serve whenever wanted: in some cases, days before the army arrived, towns and cities were taken possession of by little groups of enthusiasts, perhaps with the aid of a handful of local militia, in the name of the Nationalist Government.

But the most vital necessity asked for from the common people was recruits. China could not be conquered by the little expeditionary army that had marched northwards from Canton: nor was such a prodigy required of it. Wherever the dragon's teeth of the Revolution were sown, recruits sprang from the soil, sometimes ready armed and trained as in legendary Greece, for it is surprising how many irregular bodies of armed men of one kind or another can be found in the quiet Chinese countryside. The troops that overran Hupeh were largely

Hunanese, though the cream of the army, the veteran troops, were those from Canton. They brought with them a good supply of young officers from the Whampoa Officers Training School in Canton,¹ and as soon as a new area in Hupeh was occupied, recruiting began and was generally quite successful. The work of training and drilling these raw or irregular levies was taken in hand in a very thorough and careful way, so that a few months later they were able to be used in turn for offensives further afield.

THE PROPAGANDA CORPS

It is the systematic use of propaganda amongst the people which has been the most remarkable and characteristic feature in the progress of the Revolution. It was laid down long ago by the Kuo Min Tang that this Revolution was to be accomplished in three stages. The first stage was to be one of military conquest, during which militarism, capitalism and imperialism were to be overthrown by the soldiers of the national army, and the country occupied was to be governed by military law. The second stage was to be a preparatory period of education and training of the people in the principles and practice of democracy, during which the country was to be governed by one party, the Kuo Min Tang or Nationalist Party, in absolute control. The third stage was to be one of democracy, in which the people would govern directly through their elected representatives.

In practice the feature of the second stage—the education of the people in the principles of democracy and of the Revolution as understood by the Kuo Min Tang—began, as has been shown, long before the military conquest was undertaken; but that was for the most part in a secret and unobtrusive way. With every body of revolutionary soldiers, however, came official propagandists, men who had been specially selected in advance by the Kuo Min Tang and trained in propaganda colleges

¹ *Vide infra*, p. 48.

instituted for the purpose. They were young fellows from the upper forms of Government or missionary middle schools, and from universities and colleges of various sorts, and among them were returned students from abroad. They had the rank of officers and wore military uniform, were generally better turned out than their combatant colleagues, and had a definite standing in whatever body of troops they were accredited to. Their duties were firstly to their own units of soldiers, who were systematically schooled from the date of their first enlistment in the principles of the Revolution, their own combatant officers assisting.

But the more strenuous obligations of the propagandists were to the people amongst whom their military units happened to be stationed, and towards these their activities were twofold. From any vantage point in the street, or in indoor or outdoor meetings specially convened, they tirelessly expounded the revolutionary principles, or vehemently and fiercely arraigned the persons and peoples, the principles and practices, against which as a permanent policy or for the passing occasion the attack of the Revolution was being directed. Until it has been actually witnessed it is not easy to conceive the tremendous demand made by the language on the physical and nervous energy of a Chinese orator on such subjects.

The second means of propaganda was the sticking up along the street of bills and posters of every size, colour and design. The value attributed to words by the Chinese mind is peculiar and characteristic, one feature being that, when a statement has been publicly or officially made, it is regarded as equivalent to the corresponding fact being established, or act accomplished: for this reason derogatory or threatening statements and manifestos have an unusual power to hurt. Hence we frequently see rival generals sending far and wide over the country long defamatory telegrams recounting the sins of their opponents. And hence it is that, when the

propagandists covered the walls with such bills as "Down with Wu Pei Fu," "Down with British Imperialism," it was felt that a very effective blow had been struck at the man and the country respectively; and when the slogan was "Down with the foreigners' tame dogs," or "Down with the unpatriotic slaves," even stout-hearted Chinese who were in any way associated with foreigners were apt to wince or falter. Though most of the placards consisted of similar or longer statements and exhortations, pictorial productions also early made their appearance. The earlier pictures were very crude, with plenty of blood splashed about as British soldiers or sailors were shown laying low helpless Chinese, occasionally even impaling infants on their bayonets; but later more subtle and sometimes quite clever placards appeared in increasing numbers. These were of the familiar style of the political cartoon of the Western world, and used such regular conventional figures as John Bull and Uncle Sam and the usual symbolic paraphernalia. A considerable number of the cartoons in Hankow, particularly the large coloured pictures of the bloodiest and most malicious nature, were obviously the work of no Chinese, but a foreign hand, without doubt Russian.

Some of the propagandists were pleasant friendly young chaps who would chat and eat together with foreigners, fellow-travellers on the road, with no more sign of animosity than is felt between opposing counsel after the day's court session is over. Others were sour-faced scowling fellows into whose being the hatred of foreigners had evidently bitten deep.

ADVANCED METHODS OF PROPAGANDA

As the Nationalist grip on the various districts became firmer, their nominees assumed office and gathered the reins into their hands, the army steadily gathered in its recruits, and the Kuo Min Tang enrolled its members and established new branches, so the propaganda became more specialised. In the large towns the workmen and

artisans were given special attention; and in the country districts very patient and painstaking work was put into the campaign for the farm labourers, tenants and small landholders. They were hard to move; but as the peasants' union began to grow it was able to exert an increasing pressure in the good cause. Their "wrongs and oppressions" were tirelessly urged on their attention, bigger and bigger meetings were organised under high official patronage, enthusiastic speeches made, resolutions carried and levies made for expenses.

PROCESSIONS

Perhaps the most mature kind of propaganda, which obviously can only be commenced after a certain amount of enthusiasm has been already aroused, is the street procession in which the people themselves participate. Because the village and town street plays a much more important part in the Chinese social structure and life than in Western countries, the street procession has from time immemorial been dear to the Chinese heart; and funeral processions, wedding processions, processions of welcome and farewell; processions to make presentations or to present petitions, processions for worship or prayer at temples, processions for rain, dragon processions, processions staged as political demonstrations for one purpose or another—these all and others are in the ordinary routine of Chinese life. It was therefore only to be expected that the method would be widely used by the Nationalists.

Sometimes processions were composed of the general mass of the people; but more frequently they consisted of some one class or other, such as schoolboys, ricksha-coolies, shop-assistants, or foreign employees. There were always flags with writing indicating in a few forceful words the purpose of the demonstration: sometimes there would be one or two large or elaborate flags at the head of the column, but more often each member carried a little paper flag over his shoulder. Very often brief

slogans, were yelled in unison at short intervals as they marched, and sometimes a long litany of hate would be rehearsed, a preceptor declaiming solo phrase by phrase from a sheet in his hand while the rank and file yelled the responses in concert. It was not practicable to sustain a very continuous series of processions in most of the country towns; but the long succession that was maintained in Hankow was astonishing. Travelling daily from March to May 1927 along the wide arterial road leading from the foreign concessions some mile and a half into the Chinese city, I soon came to accept processions as a regular feature of the street life, and on some occasions there have been four or five in one trip.

The attendance of the demonstrators at many of these processions was compulsory: for example, it might be ordered that all the shops in a district should send 20 per cent. of their employees, or that the whole of the scholars of certain schools should attend on a particular day. Under intimidation from the pickets the shopkeepers would be compelled to pay their men as if they had been working, and the school-teachers to grant leave; and the individual who failed to attend the parade would be liable to a beating or other punishment. By the time the hot weather in May began it was obvious that the Government had overdone this method of propaganda. The processions had become such a commonplace that hardly anyone in a crowded street even turned his head to look; the demonstrators themselves began to appear rather spiritless; and more and more of this work was left to boys, they being evidently more easily procured than their elders. At last even schoolboys themselves, and many of them, began to complain that they were spending far more time in processions than in school classes and that they were tired of it.

THE ENLISTMENT OF THE PROLETARIAT

The avowed object of all these methods of propaganda was to enlist the mass of the people, especially the manual

labourers and wage-earners, under the banner of the Revolution.

On 12th March, 1927, the first issue appeared in Hankow of a bilingual newspaper, *The People's Tribune*,¹ the official organ of the Nationalist Government; and thenceforward its Chinese and English editions appeared daily except on those not infrequent occasions when a Government holiday or an important procession left the office without workmen. A study of the files of this paper reveals a tremendous emphasis on the importance of the two classes of "workers" and "peasants" (alluded to collectively as the "proletariat") as the foundation on which the Revolution was to be built, the raw material out of which it was to be fashioned. And this emphasis is seen not only in the leading articles of the newspapers: we find it in the official edicts and manifestos of the Nationalist Government, and those of the Hupeh General Labour Union, the industrial organisation of mushroom growth which yet often had more power than the Government through which it had been created. In the reported speeches of the leading members of the Government to the great mass meetings in Hankow there is the same insistence that the Revolution must be founded on the proletariat ("deepened" and "broadened" are favourite phrases used), and that therefore the workers and peasants must rouse themselves and unite to see the Revolution through. Even the foreign visiting delegates from the extreme left wing of their respective national labour parties, Tom Mann from England, Jacques Doriot from France and Earl Browder from the United States of America, in their triumphal and enthusiastic two months' lecturing tour under the auspices of the Nationalist Government, urged the same policy.

Compared with Russia we find this difference, that in

¹ This paper was first published in Peking in 1926, where it was the organ of the Nationalist Party, and the lineal descendant of the *Min Pao* published there in 1925 by Mr. Eugene Chen. It was suppressed by Chang Tso Lin in January, two months before it resumed publication in Hankow.

that country there was a deep-lying and sullen discontent and resentment of many years' standing already existing in the heart of the proletariat, whereas in China amongst the masses of the people these sentiments were almost entirely absent until the last few years, and had to be assiduously worked up and cultivated by the Nationalist Government and its subsidiary agencies. This is frankly admitted in more than one issue of the *Tribune*, where the bovine unimaginative contentment of the masses is deplored, and the duty enjoined of stirring them to a divine discontent.

CHAPTER III

FORGING AND HANDLING THE ECONOMIC WEAPON

THE FORGING OF THE WEAPON

THIS is an apt and expressive phrase of Mr. Eugene Chen,¹ the able and versatile Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Nationalist Government. The weapon is one which this Government and people have shown an astonishing ability and readiness in constructing, and a wonderful skill and finesse in handling. It is that of the strike and boycott, reinforced when necessary by intimidation and riot.

The anti-Japanese boycott, the Hongkong general strike, and the Canton anti-British boycott have been previously alluded to. These served as object lessons to demonstrate to the Chinese the power of organised labour. In their train workmen's strikes, which for several years had begun to appear in China, became more and more frequent in a wide variety of occupations, of which the Japanese cotton-mill operatives at Tsingtao, the Chinese Government Post Office employees, the Canton Hospital employees, and the Hankow rickshaw pullers may be taken as types. Shanghai had far more than any other city, and following the shooting of 30th May, 1925, there was a vigorous but incomplete and short-lived general strike. Following this, strikes in various occupations rapidly spread to the other treaty ports, most of which suffered to a greater or less extent. But, it was only after the Nationalist drive up into Peking that the full possibilities of this weapon were utilised. Especially in Hankow, whither the seat of the Nationalist Government was quickly moved from Canton,

¹ *Vide infra*, p. 117.

additional Labour Unions, under the all-pervasive suasion of the propagandists, sprang up like mushrooms, sometimes two or three new ones being announced in one morning's newspaper.

There was no beating about the bush; bold and definite aims were emphatically stated; and even when, as in the case of some of the strikes against foreign enterprises or that of the Japanese household servants, the motive was undeniably and obviously political, it was still in nearly every case industrial aims which were advertised. Most extravagant promises were made by the agitators and believed by the workmen; and within several days of the formation of the Union the corresponding set of demands would be formulated by the little group of moving spirits, passed at a mass meeting without discussion, and served on the employers. It was quick work and pushed with energy and resolution. When the workmen's lack of interest necessitated it, the requisite attendance at meetings was ensured by threats and intimidation.

STRIKES AND PICKETS

For this purpose it early became necessary to provide special machinery in the form of a large army of pickets. They were dressed in a distinctive uniform not unlike that of the police, armed with wooden staves and a business-like air of authority, and soon became one of the most noticeable revolutionary features on the streets. They were not only used for rounding up attendances at meetings, but also for collecting members' dues, generally set at a very substantial figure, and for rigidly enforcing strike orders. There were many occasions when it was quite obvious that the great majority of the workers had no wish whatever to strike; but, except in one or two notable cases in which they fought a definite pitched battle with the pickets in the streets, they seemed quite unable to resist them although outnumbering them many times. This was partly because Chinese are tempera-

mentally easily intimidated by threats, and partly because behind the threats was very real danger. Men were flogged with the pickets' staves or haled off bound to the Labour Union Headquarters; and the danger even extended to the wives and children in their homes, whose addresses were often noted and recorded. And for all this there was no redress, because although the Government, that is the Kuo Min Tang, might not openly endorse it, it was part of its programme and had its passive approval. The influence of the pickets can be illustrated by the fact that when, at a later stage, the Government found it necessary to guard against excesses and violence by the populace in the streets, they frequently used pickets in preference to the police, whose power was of quite an inferior order.

A REDUCTIO AD ABSURDUM

In spite of the initial indifference to the Labour Union and strike propaganda, the imagination of the people presently began to catch fire, and before long an air of expectancy and excitement developed, reminiscent of a goldfields township when a mining rush is at its height. In the delirium of this new fervour nothing was felt to be too extravagant. The boys at the David Hill School for the Blind, a charitable institution of the Wesleyan Mission, went on strike for nothing in particular. The prostitutes of Hankow struck, marched in a procession through the streets with banners, and invaded the Municipal Council Chambers, when the Council was in session, so that the board room door had to be locked and barricaded against them. The demands displayed on their banners were for exemption from taxation, because their work, though little esteemed, was of considerable value in the general scheme of the business world, and because their trade was very dull, on account of so many of their patrons having left the port in the general exodus of refugees. A Pay-no-rent Society fixed its own scale of rents that should be paid the landlords

by the tenants in the native city. And, finally, the Buddhist priests published a manifesto that in future further prayers for the dead would not be made until a more adequate rate of fees was established than that obtaining.

The most extravagant claims were made by employees of foreigners or foreign organisation, whether business or missionary. These included such features as not only short hours, but an excessive number of holidays on full pay, at the discretion of the Union, wages increase of two or three hundred per cent., and conditions of control and dictation by the Union which would make management utterly impossible. The servants of a missionary hospital in Hunan, where the optimistic and resourceful doctor in charge was determined to do everything possible to keep the institution running, after progressively and relentlessly driving him into a situation where the pretence of carrying on work was only a ghastly farce, finally demanded three years' wages per man, all round, if the hospital should be closed.

DISASTERS TO CHINESE BUSINESS

But it would be quite erroneous to imagine that this movement was directed only at foreign enterprise. The first of all to flee before the coming storm were the wealthy Chinese, who made for Shanghai; and later all kinds of Chinese businesses employing labour were affected along with their foreign competitors. In many cases businesses and industries had to close down, a course sometimes resulting in imprisonment of the principals; generally a compromise was arranged giving a very substantial increase of pay to the workers; very occasionally an effective counter-move was managed, as when the Association of Small Shopkeepers in the huge native city threatened, unless the employees came to reason, to close down all their institutions on the ground that it was preferable to be ruined at one stroke rather than gradually; in almost every case prices went up steeply, and except in the absolutely essential local supply industries and businesses trade steadily dwindled.

THE HANDLING OF THE WEAPON

It is in the use of this weapon that the Kuo Min Tang has shown such remarkable skill and finesse. The Government always disclaims any responsibility for what the Labour Unions and the crowds do. "Of course, there is a revolution in progress," they say. "It's only natural that the common people, after their repression in the past, in their enthusiasm should get rather over-excited at times. The Government is sorry if business has been dislocated or inconvenience caused, and will make representations to the Union officials; but after all the people are free agents and cannot be repressed and bullied as they used to be in the past." And so the agitation would continue. The propagandists in little groups, or in huge prearranged meetings, would continue their fiery and impassioned denunciations and incitements to revolt; on every wall the posters would repeat the story; the crowds would learn to yell aloud their slogans, "Down with the capitalists," "Down with the British Imperialists," etc., etc.

Sometimes the attack would be pressed further and foreigners would be imprisoned in their Mission compounds or business premises by Labour Union pickets or their own servants or employees until negotiations had been concluded to their satisfaction, or perhaps they would be besieged by a yelling crowd demonstrating outside. In Hunan there were cases where murder was openly threatened by furious mobs, and missionaries had to flee at short notice for their lives. And yet, in spite of it all, hardly a life was lost, and only in a few isolated instances did a foreigner get even a scratch or a bruise.

THE SEIZURE OF THE BRITISH CONCESSION

The most extraordinary example of this feature was the seizure of the British Concession at Hankow on January 3rd and 4th, 1927. Feeling had been rising among the crowds in the Chinese city which adjoins this

Concession, until on the afternoon of the 3rd the storm broke, and thousands of yelling Chinese—coolies with carrying poles and others of all sorts and conditions—worked up to frenzy by the desperate efforts of the agitators among them, stood facing a thin line of British marines with fixed bayonets, drawn up across the end of the British Bund.¹

On one side the mob, reinforced by the most turbulent spirits from the water-front of the native city, became more and more threatening. As the hours passed and the British withheld their fire, they not unnaturally concluded that their opponents feared to go to such a length; and the seething mass pressed ever forward with wild yells, fusillades of stones, and brandished poles, until they were actually engaged in places in hand-to-hand struggles with the marines and attempting to run through the gaps in the sparsely held line.

On the other side of the string of bayonets, several score paces back, were machine-gun squads, and supporting them the warships in the stream with their guns trained on the scene of action.

The Chinese authorities, on being appealed to time and again by the British, promised to send Chinese troops, of which they had an ample supply available, to take the responsibility of holding the crowd back within the Chinese city; promised—and yet somehow forgot. As the tension rose, and the British still held their fire with a forbearance and steadiness that would have been impossible for any except such a finely disciplined and self-reliant body of men led by officers of unusual coolness and judgment, everyone knew that one shot fired would have precipitated an attack and resulted in a slaughter amongst that crowd.

Such was the foreground of the scene. But the background of the drama staged that winter afternoon

¹ A "bund" is the stone-faced embankment made to prevent erosion along the foreshore of large riverine towns in China. In foreign Concessions there is usually a spacious esplanade or drive laid out along the top.

stretched for a thousand miles along all the roads and waterways of inland China; and it was this factor beyond the horizon which was uppermost in the minds of the men in control on both sides. As so often in the international crises of this Revolution, the verdict was to be won or lost on fields far removed from the concrete emergency of the moment. As we have seen in Chapter I, the shooting in Shanghai eighteen months previously had reverberated in riots, and in some cases in fierce attacks against foreigners and foreign institutions, up and down the whole country; and it was clearly understood that now the anti-foreign feeling had been so augmented and intensified that any similar incident might easily provoke a series of massacres amongst the foreigners, especially the British, at that time isolated in lonely out-back missionary stations or in up-river trading ports.

As dusk fell at last the tension eased, and the crowd began to dwindle: presently it was possible to withdraw the marines to their ships and leave the Hankow Volunteers to guard the street entrances. But it was only a momentary respite. On the next afternoon the mob was mustered a second time, the previous day's scene again staged, and the marines landed as before. The Chinese military authorities, after a definite undertaking of the previous evening to post troops outside the Concession boundary to hold back the crowd, again forgot. The crowd passed on. It had evidently been determined to force the incident to the point of bloodshed and slaughter.

Finally, towards evening came an offer (or was it a courteous Oriental ultimatum?) that if the British authorities would withdraw their naval forces on to the ships alongside the Bund and dismiss the Hankow Volunteers, the Chinese would, as a temporary expedient to meet the emergency, occupy, garrison, and undertake full responsibility for the protection of the British Concession. It seemed on the whole better to leave the Chinese soldiers to deal with the crowd than for the British sailors to undertake to fight the crowd with possibly the Chinese soldiers added; and the offer was accepted.

Chinese soldiers replaced the marines and volunteers in control of the Concession, sentries were placed in the streets, and the crowd admitted. They were riotously excited and jubilant in the Concession thoroughfares for a day or two, and there were some instances of insolence and threats towards foreigners; but no personal violence was done, and no houses were entered. The naval authorities felt the gravest anxiety as to the result, and most of the women and children were evacuated at once to Shanghai. For several weeks British men were concentrated in buildings facing the Bund so that if necessary they could be promptly evacuated under the protection of the warships' fire, but three or four days after the commencement of the incident the streets had become very quiet. The Chinese troops remained in occupation until the day when, negotiations with the British Representative having been completed, the Concession was formally handed over by the British Municipal Council.

Surely a masterly handling, this, of an economic weapon tipped with steel. A dangerous weapon to use, horribly clumsy, and casual enough to curdle the blood of the onlookers: and yet—again not a life lost, civil or naval, and the coveted Concession occupied at the cost of a few bruises and scratches on either side, three British sailors felled to the ground, and two Chinese with bayonet wounds.

THE FOREIGN EVACUATION OF THE PROVINCES

And so it was throughout. From the date of this incident the evacuation of the foreign inland stations began in earnest. The consular authorities decided on a policy of withdrawal of all their up-country nationals, and their advice to this effect became much more peremptory. As the pressure, especially in Hunan, grew stronger, and the propaganda fiercer and more vindictive, the stream of refugees passing through Hankow swelled and rose like the rising of the great river itself as the summer sun beats more and more fiercely on the high snow mountains of Thibet, and sends the floods rolling down.

the valleys towards the sea. Schools were dismissed, churches left in charge of native preachers or occupied by the local Labour Unions, hospitals deserted and left for the Chinese staff to run if they could, foreign houses and missionary compounds abandoned, business places and plants closed down.

Different motives and causes operated in different localities and among the various national, denominational and business groups. It was more often on orders or urgent advice from Hankow than on the individual judgment of the people in the country centres that the withdrawals were made in the provinces of Szechuan, Honan and Hupeh. But in Hunan, where the agitation and opposition were much more intense, and sometimes accompanied by a boycott, the local conditions in most of the foreigners' stations had gradually become such as to make the positions untenable. Either to save their associated Church people from unnecessary persecution on their behalf, or for fear lest their line of communications should be cut, or even because of imminent danger to their own lives, the foreigners evacuated station after station and made their way as best they could to Hankow. I with the remaining foreigners on our station came down about this time towards the end of January, and took up quarters in a large hostel in the middle of the ex-Russian Concession in Hankow, whence for the next four and a half months we watched the further development of the drama.

THE WORKING OF A HIDDEN HAND

This situation proved an excellent vantage point. Early in December the leaders of the Nationalist Government had arrived here from Canton; and on 1st January Wuhan was proclaimed by Government mandate the capital of Nationalist China. Thenceforward it was the theatre in which were staged all the monster demonstrations, processions and public meetings, the location of the principal training and propaganda schools, the

headquarters for most of the Labour Unions and associated organisations, and the main base of the Nationalist armies. In addition to the Chinese and foreign news of the local newspapers there came through the warships that steadily gathered daily wireless bulletins containing reports of the situation in other parts of China, especially along the lower Yangtze valley.

It was a wonderful drama, there at the centre of the world's interest, in the heart of the Chinese Revolution. But while we watched act and scene follow each other, often with kaleidoscopic suddenness, as the purpose and trend of events began to take shape and stood out more clearly, and above all as I saw the attitude of my Chinese friends and acquaintances change from eager hope and patriotic enthusiasm to perplexity, misgiving, and in some cases finally to resentful antagonism and despair for the immediate future, a vague feeling of foreboding and apprehension began to hang over me in spite of myself—it oppressed us all. It was a sense of a purposeful force, planning, directing and driving on the movement, which steadily became more and more convincing. And the ideal which inspired this sinister activity, the methods employed, the origin, and the ultimate purpose were none of them Chinese. To unravel these threads we must trace them back to the loom on which they were woven—Canton in the last five or six years.

PART II

THE PERIOD OF COMMUNIST CONTROL.

CHAPTER IV

THE TWO PARTIES

DISILLUSIONMENT AND DIFFICULTIES IN CANTON

WHEN Sun Yat Sen conceived the vision of an emancipated China, and while through the long years, with his life in his hands, he devoted his heart and soul to developing and realising this ideal, it was from the civilisations of England and America that he mainly drew his inspiration. It was at the British University at Hongkong that he graduated in medicine; it was Britons and Americans who were his foreign friends, his teachers, his advisers, and together with the Japanese his protectors; and on at least one occasion it was to the intervention of a Briton that he owed his life.¹

But after the Versailles Treaty it is not surprising that we find a change of attitude. China had entered the war trusting in the international idealism of President Wilson's manifesto, confidently expecting that she was making a long step towards freedom and independence: at the end came the granting of Tsingtao to the Japanese, tantamount to the endorsement by the Allies of Japan's twenty-one demands² on China, which had constituted the most unprovoked and deadly assault for several centuries on her sovereignty and integrity. China felt that her allies and friends had betrayed and deceived her, and she refused to sign the Peace Treaty.

For twenty-five years Dr. Sun had been working and organising strenuously for the Revolution. He had founded the Nationalist Party, and its ramifications as

¹ Dr. Cantlie rescued him when kidnapped by the Manchu Legation in London in 1896.

² *Vide infra*, p. 221, footnote.

already described were spreading to the remotest parts of China; the secret propaganda and educational work had been thoroughly done and was well advanced; the scene was set for the second act of the great drama: but the curtain did not rise. To raise the standard of revolt and make headway against the ruling powers was a very different proposition at this time from the problem presented to the revolutionaries of 1911. They had to deal with the effete and decrepit organisation of the tail end of the Manchu Dynasty; but in the eight or ten years that had since elapsed, strong and virile military governors or war lords had, as shown in Chapter I, established control over their respective spheres in the country; and the Canton revolutionaries, in spite of regular contributions from Chinese merchants abroad, had no effective striking force, financial, military, or political, strong enough to make headway against their power.

Dr. Sun had many British and American friends and sympathisers; but these were not inclined to support an insurrection against a friendly Government in Peking which was recognised by their own, besides which most of them regarded Sun as an unpractical visionary.

RUSSIA'S OFFER TO CHINA IN PEKIN

There was, however, one country which had been vehemently proclaiming its sympathy and fellowship with all oppressed nations and peoples; and this country alone in China had made a dramatic gesture in support of its declaration of friendship. What more natural than that Dr. Sun, in his exasperation at the Allies' treatment of China at Versailles, his disappointment at the failure of Great Britain and America to come to his assistance, and his anxiety, now becoming desperate, at the long-drawn-out immobility and impotence of the revolutionary movement, should turn hopefully and eagerly towards Russia?

Russian prestige had never for seventy years fallen so

low in the Far East as in 1919, the Japanese sphere of influence stretching far into Siberia, and her outposts reaching the shores of Lake Baikal. The dominating feature of the Far Eastern policy of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics was therefore twofold, to reassert the sovereignty which had been exercised by the former Czarist Empire as far as the Pacific coast, and generally to re-establish the standing of the Republic in North-eastern Asia.

Because of the post-war international situation, it was found practicable, during the next five or six years, to push Japan steadily back step by step to her former pre-war position. This secured the first aim of foreign policy.

The second object was more difficult to achieve. The Russian Government was at this time isolated, an outcast among the nations of the world, and was prepared to pay a very high price for official recognition from even such a shadow Government as that of China. All diplomatic relations between Czarist Russia and China had ceased in 1920; and although the existing Russo-Chinese treaties had not been formally denounced, Russians in China had, in fact, been deprived of most of their extra-territorial rights, and the Russian Concessions had been taken over by the Chinese. This seemed to suggest the line of action to be taken; and in 1920 the first official communication from Soviet Russia to China arrived in Peking in the form of an offer to relinquish unconditionally every special privilege and interest in the country. China in her wildest dreams had never envisaged such treatment from a great World Power, and she was dumbfounded.¹ Her reaction was that of Vergil's hero—*Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes*—and she refused to permit a Soviet representative to enter Peking.

Nothing daunted by this rebuff, the Soviet's repre-

¹ For a fuller description of the situation created in Peking see Upton Close's *The Revolt of Asia*, G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York and London, 1927.

sentatives promptly came—but in the guise of journalists; and by their hail-fellow-well-met fraternisation with Chinese of all classes outflanked in this extraordinarily caste-less land the prepared positions of the more stately diplomats of the other nations. In 1922, when they had prepared the way, M. Joffe, one of the ablest diplomats in Russia, arrived at Peking: he was allowed to reside in the city, but was not officially received by the Government. During his term of residence he did not achieve any decisive results in official circles; but he lectured in the National University of Peking, and was very successful in convincing large numbers of students and the intelligentsia that Russia was the herald of a new era of freedom, alike from the tyranny of convention, class and creed, and from national and racial domination and oppression.

In September 1923, M. Karakhan, head of an Extraordinary Mission from Russia to China, replaced Joffe at Peking. As Russia's international position had now improved, it was realised that China's recognition of Russia would not have as great a value as it would have had in 1920. Karakhan therefore withdrew from the all-embracing and generous abandon of Russia's first offer, and there were very keenly fought negotiations regarding the Chinese Eastern Railway and Mongolia. Each side used the threat of co-operation with Japan to coerce the other. Karakhan alternately threatened and bullied the Chinese Government and made astonishing offers and boasts that Russia would champion China in cancelling all her international obligations in defiance of the other nations represented at Peking. At last, on 31st May, 1924, China accorded *de jure* recognition to the Soviet Government and signed a treaty with Karakhan. This treaty contained, *inter alia*, the following provisions:

(a) The cancellation of all previous treaties with Russia and the annulment of Russia's special privileges, including extraterritorial rights, the Boxer indemnity, and her treaty port Concessions.

(b) The evacuation by Russia of Outer Mongolia¹ and her recognition of China's sovereignty therein.

(c) The transference of all Russian missionary property to a Chinese organisation.

(d) The dismissal by China of all White Russians in her employ.

(e) The management of the Chinese Eastern Railway by a Russo-Chinese diarchy, and the right of China to buy out Russia's share at any time.

In September of the same year the former Czarist Russian Legation in Peking was handed over to the Soviet envoy, who was now raised to the status of Ambassador, thus taking precedence over the Ministers of all other nations, none of whom held this rank.

All these developments of Russian policy and progress in Peking were naturally carefully watched and noted in the South.

EARLY PROGRESS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

In 1917 or 1918 sporadic Communist literature and propaganda were irregularly reaching China, chiefly from Japanese sources. (If before this time there were any individual Communists among the people, at least there was no evidence of any working organisation in the country.) But in 1919 M. Popoff arrived in Shanghai, having been sent out from Russia for the definite purpose of exploring the situation and its possibilities, and reporting to headquarters. After a few months' investigation he returned, and in 1920 agents from Russia thoroughly organised the Communist Party of China, which in 1921 was definitely affiliated with the Third International.

In the same year, as the result of a Russian delegation to Canton, all members of the Chinese Communist Party were admitted *ad eundem gradum* to membership

¹ In practice this clause has been dishonoured. Russia has succeeded, on the same model as in the Far Eastern Republic and those of Central Asia and Europe, in transforming Mongolia into an independent Socialist Soviet Republic under her influence, and with its own diplomatic representative at Moscow.

of the Nationalist Party (Kuo Min Tang), an event pregnant with the most decisive and far-reaching consequences for that party.

In January 1923, when Sun Yat Sen was in exile in Shanghai, he met M. Joffe and spent several days in consultation with him. Joffe, without much trouble, succeeded in reassuring Sun as to Russia's aims in North China; and a joint declaration¹ was issued by them at the conclusion of the consultations, expressing the warmest mutual sympathy between the two parties, and recording Russia's readiness to afford assistance to the Nationalists, while recognising that neither the Communist order nor the Soviet system could actually be introduced into China because the essential prerequisite conditions did not exist.

Early in the same year there came to Canton, in the humble guise of a representative of the Rosta News Agency, a member of the Russian Communist Party, M. Michael Borodin. He had previously been engaged as foreign agent in party work in other countries, but was not at that time a very prominent member of the Party. He had done well for them in Turkey, assisting in the movement, which resulted in 1922 in that country denouncing her treaties of extraterritoriality, relying on Russian support: he had also assisted in the foundation of the Nationalist Party in Persia. But he had done badly in Scotland, where under the alias of Brown he was arrested and deported; and he was now sent out by the Russian Communist Party to Canton on their own initiative, and not under engagement to anyone in China. He took up his quarters in a hotel near Dr. Sun's residence, and the two men quickly became intimately acquainted and formed the highest opinion of each other.

Very shortly after his arrival in Canton Borodin was able to offer the doctor from Russia the urgently needed rifles, ammunition and aeroplanes which he had previously sought in vain, and also Russian instructors and

¹ See *China Year Book*, 1924, Tientsin Press, Tientsin, p. 863.

the salaries to pay some of them. And not only did Borodin promise these things; he delivered the goods in large quantities from ships which soon sailed up the Pearl River to their anchorage off the city.

As long as Dr. Sun lived Borodin took no active part in politics; but, as was only natural after the assistance Borodin had rendered, the doctor very frequently sought his advice, and Borodin's influence with him steadily grew. He pointed out that, as an aggressive striking force, the organisation of the Chinese Nationalist Party was pitifully weak and inadequate; and explained to him the organisation of the Russian Soviet Government. He told him the history of the Communist Party's activities, not only in Europe, but also in Turkey and Central Asia; and taught him carefully all the details of its party discipline, propaganda and other work.

In 1924 it was decided to radically reorganise the Kuo Min Tang on the pattern of the Russian Communist Party, though it was not until three months after Sun's death that the transformation was completed; (but by this time the relations between the Kuo Min Tang and the Nationalist Government had been put on the same footing as those between the Russian Communist Party and the Soviet Government.)

THE RISE OF BORODIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF WHAMPOA ACADEMY.

(On 12th March, 1925, Sun Yat Sen died,) leaving as one of the injunctions in his brief will that the Party should work in close co-operation with Russia. Borodin was now the only man left in Canton who thoroughly understood the Soviet method of organisation and procedure, and there was no natural and competent successor to the doctor to take over the leadership of the Government. There were, however, some three or four competitors for the position—Wang Ching Wei, Hu Han Ming, Liao Chung Kai, and later Tang Chi Yao. Borodin, however, not only had the advantage over these of his

mastery of all the details and principles of the Soviet method of organisation which had been adopted, but it was through his instrumentality that the continuation of the supplies of munitions and money¹ from Russia were secured.

It was Borodin who planned the organisation of the Whampoa Cadet College at Canton, an institution which, although only opened in June 1924, was destined to exert a decisive influence on the Nationalist campaigns shortly to commence. Educated young radicals were chosen from all over China, enthusiastic supporters of the Kuo Min Tang, and sent to this Academy, which combined an officers training school with an intensive course in the Soviet principles and political methods. Borodin rightly saw that for the purpose of the Nationalist conquest of China it was essential to have an army, not only of military efficiency, but also imbued with genuine revolutionary fervour. Before the Central China expedition started in 1926 several thousand such young officers had been turned out by this Academy, and had transformed the Nationalist fighting machine.

It was Borodin's Russian instructors in the Academy (some forty or fifty) who made this possible; and he also assisted in obtaining officers of higher rank as strategists and advisers to be attached to the staff of the Chinese generals and assist in planning and carrying through the campaigns. Chief of these was General Galens, or Gallents, a former Austrian staff officer who since 1918 had served with the Bolshevik army. Chiang Kai Shek, who is said to have first met him in Vladivostok, was much impressed with his ability, and appointed him his Chief of Staff; and there are some who consider that it was his undoubted strategic ability which was chiefly responsible for Chiang's later military successes.

Borodin was not slow to see the strength of his unique position, and used it to play off one aspirant for the leadership against another, for all needed to depend on

¹ There is no evidence or probability that large sums of money were sent; but large quantities of munitions sent were not charged for.

him for advice. Wang Ching Wei was exiled to Paris, Hu Han Ming was sent to Russia, and Liao Ch'ung Kai was presently assassinated. This left only Tang Chi Yao, and eventually Borodin succeeded in practically eliminating him also. Meanwhile he had been steadily pushing forward into positions of influence and responsibility. Dr. Sun's widow, Madame Sun, with her relations of the Soong family, and his son, Sun Fo; and at the same time he was strengthening the influence of the Communist members of the Nationalist Party.

THE NATIONALIST PARTY (KUO MIN TANG)

It is very important that the rôles of these two parties should be clearly distinguished and their relations to each other understood. This is the key to the whole subsequent history of the Revolution, without which it would remain an insoluble puzzle of contradictory cross-currents. The patriotic Chinese Society which was founded by Dr. Sun twenty-two years ago went in its early years under the name of the Tung Men Hui. For many years working in secret, its activities have honey-combed the whole of China and gained strong support amongst the wealthy Chinese communities scattered overseas, until to-day its actual membership, exclusive of many millions of supporters and sympathisers, is estimated at over three-quarters of a million. Its members have always been advanced radicals, or at least liberals, with a definite progressive policy.

It was this society which organised the Revolution of 1911 that overthrew the Manchu dynasty; and at this time it was reorganised as the Kuo Min Tang, or Nationalist Party. On finding its achievement of 1911 abortive, it organised and is now carrying through the Revolution of 1926, which is engaged in overthrowing the degenerate shadow of a Peking Government, maintained at the whim of the various war lords. With the emergence of this revolution, the party came into the open as the director and controller of the military campaigns. In accordance

with the principle ¹ of the three progressive stages in the Revolution, the Central Executive Committee of this party assumed the control of all the growing territory which was steadily conquered by its armies. The seat of Government has been situated at different places: but wherever it may have been, it has always been the Central Executive Committee of the Kuo Min Tang or Nationalist Party, or some section of it acting for the whole, which has allotted the various portfolios of Foreign Affairs, Justice, Labour, Finance, etc., amongst its members, and appointed the councils and committees which have exercised the functions of government and administration. When "the Nationalist Government" is alluded to, it must be understood that *the Central Executive Committee of the Kuo Min Tang is the Government.*

Within the wide membership of the Nationalist Party, and even within the Nationalist Government, there have been, at least within the last few years, men of widely differing political beliefs, from Communists, or "Reds," to those of such conservative tendencies that they have again and again been denounced in the Party newspapers by their Communist associates as being of such a light pink shade that they do more harm to the Party by their half-hearted compromise than its imperialistic and capitalistic enemies.

The Central Executive Committee of thirty-six members is elected at a general congress of delegates from all the provincial organisations of the Kuo Min Tang. There have been only two such congresses in recent years, the latter meeting at Canton early in 1926, when three hundred delegates attended.

THE COMMUNIST PARTY

The other organisation which has had a most powerful influence in directing the course of the 1926 Revolution is the Kung Tsan Tang, or Communist Party. The founding of this Chinese Communist Party has just been described (p. 45). Though it has been organised in

¹ *Vide supra*, p. 21.

China with a membership predominatingly Chinese, the principles which inspire it are those of Marxian Communism, modified by vital transmission through the body politic of Soviet Russia. A considerable portion of its leaders are either Russians, or Chinese who have received their inspiration in Russia, sometimes at the University School of Revolutionary Studies in Moscow.

This is a very young party compared with the Nationalist Party, and, like the Communist parties in Russia and every other country, has quite a small membership. This is, however, more than compensated for by the spirit of its members. Its threshold is closely guarded, and within its ranks are found no half-hearted or lukewarm followers. It might be said perhaps of a majority of these Communists that their faith burns with the zeal or even fanaticism of a religious fervour, a statement which could be made of only a very much smaller percentage of the members of the Nationalist Party. Party discipline is strict, and unhesitating obedience is exacted.

When the Nationalist Party was reorganised in 1924-1925 along Soviet lines, the Chinese Communists had already been included within its membership for three or four years; and it is easy to understand how influential they would now become owing to the enhanced prestige of Russian theories and methods naturally resulting from the reorganisation. Though few in numbers, they distributed their influence widely, and as individuals or in tiny groups secured a voice in all branches of the party's organisation. On Dr. Sun's death in March 1925, Borodin still for some time had little or no direct participation in the work of the Nationalist Party, or Government, as such. He worked chiefly through the Communists included within the party. They on their part, at least in the earlier years of their membership in the larger party, refused to accept any Government appointments, but gradually came to exercise a very powerful indirect influence on the Party policy, especially through the thorough propagandist work which they organised amongst the masses of the people.

CHAPTER V

THE POLARISATION OF THE PARTIES

THE RISE OF CHIANG KAI SHEK AND THE BEGINNING OF THE PARTY SPLIT

ANOTHER person whom Borodin's influence had done a great deal to elevate was Chiang Kai Shek, the young Cantonese general. Born in the Province of Chekiang in 1886, he early joined the Kuo Min Tang; and so is a trained party man, versed in politics. In 1923 he went to Russia to study the Soviet army organisation and the methods of training in their military Staff College. On his return to Canton he was appointed principal of the newly organised Whampoa Academy. He has the magnetic gift of leadership, and he succeeded in winning and holding the loyalty and devotion of these young cadets, and through them of most of the Nationalist armies.

Sun Yat Sen, in reorganising the Kuo Min Tang and introducing strict party discipline, had turned some of his doubtful supporters into rivals and enemies, by whom he presently began to be hard pressed. Chiang took the field against them as the champion of the Party and defeated them, destroying their armies of Yunnan and Kuangsi mercenaries in June 1925: he thus rapidly reached the position of the outstanding leader of the Nationalist armies.

After Sun's death in March of this year there were only two men who stood out head and shoulders above the rest of the party in Canton—Chiang Kai Shek and Borodin. Chiang, finding that he was the only Chinese in the Government who really counted, began to take steps to strengthen his position and push himself forward

at the expense of Borodin and the Russian influence. It was for this purpose that he published a collection of complimentary letters from Dr. Sun to himself. On 20th March, 1926, he brought off an almost bloodless *coup d'état* in Cantón, as a counter-measure to an attempt to assassinate him, expelling the Russians and many other Communists. At the time this attitude and action of his was largely a matter of personal interest. Later on, after the invasion of Central China, when he had come into contact with the public opinion of the Yangtze valley and saw the widespread dismay¹ and deep-seated resentment that were being caused by the Government's industrial policy, he realised that the Communist programme could not be successfully carried out in China, so that his anti-Communist attitude now became a matter of conviction and public policy.

Although it is Chiang Kai Shek who has stood out prominently as the anti-Communist champion within the Nationalist Party, there have throughout been many of the old members of the right wing of the Party who have been steadily opposed to, and have stoutly fought, the Russian influence. In the *coup d'état* in March, this deep cleavage within the party first became evident, but because of the exigencies of the situation, and for the sake of preserving the unity of the Party, the differences were for the time ignored and preparations pushed forward for the Northern invasion.

THE RIVAL GOVERNMENTS—HANKOW AND NANCHANG

In November, soon after Hankow was taken, the Central Executive Committee of the party in Cantón sent thither Sun Fo, Hsu Chien, T. V. Soong, Eugene Chen, and several others of their members, with Borodin as adviser, to establish a Government. This Government was, in fact, established in the second week in December, the various portfolios allotted, and authority assumed over the direction of Nationalist activities in that part of China.

¹ *Vide supra*, p. 31, *infra*, p. 130.

On 1st January they announced that the Nationalist Government had been transferred from Canton to Wuhan, which henceforward was to be the capital of China.

Meanwhile fierce and persistent fighting was going on in the neighbouring province of Kiangsi, lying south-east, for the possession of the capital city Nanchang. It was here that Sun Chuan Fang made his stand, and fought desperately with the cream of his troops. But just as he had abandoned Wu Pei Fu to his fate, so now Chang Chung Chang, Chang Tso Lin's deputy on the Tientsin-Pukow railway, refused him either support or security in his rear, and treachery began to appear among the military and civil authorities of his own provinces. His command of the Yangtze River was of little use to him, as he had consequently to immobilise many of his troops on the lower river. The Southerners, though outnumbered, were in a mood that would not be denied; Sun Chuan Fang's front was smashed; and his troops were so demoralised by this defeat and the loss of Kiangsi Province that, although his resistance lasted for some months more on the lower river, his soldiers never in any engagement put up a determined resistance again.

Chiang Kai Shek established his headquarters in Nanchang, and in December the remainder of the Central Executive Committee of the party in Canton moved thither and presently called on the members carrying on as the Nationalist Government in Hankow to come down and join them. This the Hankow Government refused to do. In the Hankow group, with Borodin as adviser, the Communist influence predominated, while in the Nanchang group the Anti-Communists were in power, with Chang Kai Shek as leader.

The explanation of the situation here described varies according as the informant's sympathies lie with one or other of these two parties. The position of the Hankow group was that the Nationalist Government of China was regularly established by them, in accordance with the decision of the party, in Hankow now the capital of

China; but that Chiang Kai Shek, being ambitious to usurp the civil power in addition to the military and thus dominate the party, so far led astray a few of the leaders that they were persuaded to set up a rival Government at Nanchang. The Anti-Communists contend that the members sent to Hankow from the Central Executive Committee in Canton were only commissioned to form a provisional Government at Hankow to carry on during the transitional period of military operations in Central China. They say that when the remainder of the Central Executive Committee moved to Nanchang it was with the purpose of going on to Hankow to establish the permanent Government as soon as the military situation was settled enough to warrant it, and that the refusal of the Hankow members to come to Nanchang meanwhile was a disobedience of party orders.

Whichever way the truth lies, a compromise was eventually reached, the Hankow Committee being recognised as a branch of the Nanchang Executive. The next step was that the Hankow Committee called a National Congress of the party, which the Nanchang members, including Chiang Kai Shek, were invited to attend. This they in turn refused to do, stigmatising the conference as irregular and illegal. The cleft in the party had now become wide and deep, the leaders on either side being afraid to trust themselves in the opposite camp.

But again a tacit *modus vivendi* was established based on the obvious facts of the situation. Hankow had a *de facto* Government established in the city which all had agreed to designate the capital, and Nanchang could not compete with it as headquarters for the Ministries of Finance, Labour, Justice, etc., while Eugene Chen had no rival as Minister of Foreign Affairs. The *locus standi* of the Hankow Government was therefore not challenged, and Eugene Chen negotiated with the foreign Powers as representative of the whole of Nationalist China. The Nanchang party, on the other hand, had in Chiang Kai

Shek incomparably the ablest military leader, and also had under their control most of the Southern armies: to them, therefore, was left the task of clearing up all the rest of the territory under Sun Chuan Fang's control and advancing down the river on Shanghai.

THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL AND RUSSIA

An inquiry that is often made in regard to the material assistance supplied from time to time to the Nationalist Government from Russia, is as to whether this is, or is not, an official act of the Russian Government. The important point to realise is that all such foreign affairs as the upheaval in China are, in Russia, under the supervision of the Third International, essentially a Russian organisation, but with a number of foreign members, including Chinese and other Asiatics, and that whether the members of the Executive Committee of this organisation happen to be associates of, or identical with, those of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Government or whatever support financial or otherwise the Third International receives from the Soviet Government, it is nevertheless itself responsible for managing its own business. That business is the world revolution as foretold by Karl Marx and modified by Lenin, involving the complete and violent disruption of the present order of society and the destruction of the capitalistic system, and followed by the universal rule of the proletariat in Communist States. After the establishment of the Soviet Government in Russia, the leaders of the Third International issued world-wide manifestos and sent out numerous secret agents, calling confidently on the labouring classes of the most highly capitalised countries such as Germany and Great Britain to rise and bring in the world revolution. They called, but called in vain; and their manifestos presently showed a naïve note of surprised reproachfulness that these peoples, the very nations which Marx had counted on most surely, should not rise to their opportunities. Russia herself was held to the rigid chapter and

verse of the Marxian programme—the abolition of private property, the prohibition of private trade and enterprise, until Lenin, even Lenin, was moved with compassion for the starving, hopeless misery and ruin of the Russian masses, and rose to the greatest moral height of his life when, in the face of fierce opposition from his doctrinaire colleagues of the Third International, he revoked some of the most important Communist edicts, and publicly announced that it had been found that for the present the full Communist programme could not be carried out in Russia, and must therefore be deferred.

THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL AND ASIA

Foiled in the more advanced countries of Europe and in the United States, and curbed in the execution of their programme in Russia itself, the zealous enthusiasts of the Third International looked further afield. Their secret agents and their propaganda reach to most parts of the world, even in Australia appearing as such a grave menace to industry that a Commonwealth Government recently fought and won an election on the straight-cut issue of gaining control of these activities; but it was towards Asia that they directed their maximum effort and oriented their highest hopes. And naturally towards Asia, the playground of the mighty conquerors of bygone days who have swept across it age after age with their barbaric hordes, the scene of the phenomenal expansion of the Russian Empire during the last three centuries, the source whence the Russian nation has drawn its strong infusion of Tartar blood, the mightiest and at the same time the most vulnerable link in Britain's world-wide chain of Empire.

We have already alluded briefly to Russian activities in Turkey and Persia; but it is in Central Asia that we must search for the key to their Asiatic strategy.

Peter the Great wrote in his will, "There is only one heir to Central Asia; and no Power in all the world will

be able to prevent him from taking possession of his inheritance." In fulfilment of this prophecy Russia during the last three and a half centuries expanded from the duchy of Muscovy, with an area of 784,000 square miles, to a mighty empire with an area of 8,300,000—well over one-seventh of the total land surface of the globe. This Empire stretched from Behring Straits to the Baltic, from the Arctic Ocean to Afghanistan: it contained 170 million people of an extraordinary number of different nationalities and tribes, of which fifty-nine were comprised in Siberia, thirty-four in the Caucasus and Transcaucasia, and forty-two in Central Asia.

The conquest of the Central Asian block was the last to be accomplished, taking place chiefly in the nineteenth century, and the story forms a wild and fascinating romance.¹ By the steady extension of lines of trading and military posts out among the tribes of wild nomads or into the heart of ancient and wealthy civilisations such as those at Bokhara and Samarkand, by the valour and endurance of their hardy Cossack horsemen, by bribery and intrigue, by ruthless slaughter, treaties, secret understandings or deceit, by constant vigilance, by a study and understanding of the ways of these peoples such as no other European nation has ever attempted, and above all by the changeless determination of the ruling house of Russia and the bureaucracy of the noble families, the Empire was pushed further and further out, until at the beginning of this century its frontiers lay along the northern borders of Persia, Afghanistan and India, and the western marches of China.

Law and order were established; railways were built; industry prospered to a certain extent; but these new rulers took little interest in the welfare of the people and interfered but little with their ways of life, being content to appoint Russian governors, to hold the country in subjection with their military garrisons, to extend their

¹ For a detailed and scholarly account of this imperial conquest see N. D. Harris' *Europe and the East*, Allen & Unwin, London, 1927, Chapter V.

railway trunk lines throughout the Empire, and to exact tribute, taxes and trading privileges.

When the Czar abdicated in March 1917 and the imperial officers were withdrawn or fled, authority was assumed by the local officials in the various scattered centres, which still remained loyal to the Empire. But when the Bolsheviki seized the Government in November all the subject nations and tribes reasserted their independence; and either alone or in alliance with their neighbours set up Governments of their own. The Soviet Government thus found itself faced with the problem of reconquering the Empire.

In Transcaucasia most promising independent republics such as Georgia were crushed by military force and ruthless slaughter, and Soviet Governments set up instead. But in Central Asia more insidious methods were used. Propaganda centres were established at Orenburg and Tashkent; and from here propaganda and intrigue were so skilfully and successfully directed that by the end of 1924 the various independent native Governments had been overthrown and replaced by Soviet republics, grouped in varying relationships with each other, but all obeying the mandates of, and enacting the legislation ordered by, the Central Executive Committee in Moscow. There were several causes of this subservience, notably the extraordinarily efficient Communist organisation acting from within each State, the fear of similar cruel and bloody reprisals to those which had been meted out to the brave little republics in Transcaucasia which had dared to defy the Bolsheviki, and lastly economic dependence on Russia.

It is Tashkent which was the principal propaganda centre, one of the largest cities in the Russian Empire in Asia, of first-class commercial importance, and an ancient seat of Moslem learning.

Of this centre Mr. P. T. Etherton, formerly British Consul-General at Kashgar in Chinese Turkestan, writes as follows: ¹

¹ *China—The Facts*, Benn, London, 1927, p. 224 et seqq.

"A special department for propaganda, and instruction therein, has been set up in Tashkent, and this new element in peace and war has been highly developed by the Soviet. . . .

"Schools have been established, and representatives from the races and tribes of Asia selected to undergo a course in the principles and practice of Bolshevism, with the benefits to be derived therefrom, special stress being laid on the part Great Britain has always played in the degradation of the human race.

"The schools are staffed by Russians and natives of proved ability, assisted by a motley collection of Indians attracted to Tashkent to fill the rôle of trained agitators. When the pupils are thoroughly soaked in Bolshevism they are sent out to spread the new 'gospel.'

"In addition to the schools a number of propaganda trains has been formed, fitted with kinema apparatus for showing the alleged horrors of our rule in India and the extent to which the British yoke is pressing upon all Oriental peoples. They are equipped with literature to meet the requirements of the various races—all are catered for, whether Kirghiz, Sart, Afghan, Mongol, or Turkoman. Trained spokesmen, with a fluent grasp of the vernacular, discourse much false and irrelevant matter to their native audiences, and prepare the way for the fiery demagogues of Moscow. The trains comprise dining and sleeping cars fitted up for the revolutionary staff, who certainly do not believe in forgoing luxury and creature comforts.

"In their plans the Bolsheviks consider that by a general conflagration in the East the British can be burnt out of India, and the world revolution can then continue unchecked. At the same time there is method in their madness, for they appreciate the danger involved in an Asiatic flare, and realise that only by continually directing its force against the British can they prevent it turning and burning themselves."

From this Central Asian base, and from the University of Revolutionary Studies in Moscow, the apostles of Communism have spread and penetrated to nearly every corner of Asia. And these travelling delegates belong to different orders. There are more or less trained Russian diplomats who seek political relations and influence with the Governments of such countries as Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan and Mongolia, and others who under the cloak of journalist and commercial representative seek similar opportunities. And wherever there is an uprising of nationalism among the people and a spirit of independence towards the restrictions or fetters of foreign control, wherever there is resentment and revolt against industrial conditions or social injustice or the misery of grinding poverty, whether in India, the

Straits Settlements or Japan, there, at least in the big cities, there are apt to be found trained native Communists seeking to exploit and direct the movement to their own ends, to spread their insidious propaganda, and to establish Communist "cells" among the disaffected.

THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL AND THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

It is not generally realised how naturally and as a matter of course the Russians have turned now to China, just as several years earlier they did to Central Asia. In the middle of the seventeenth century, in the early days of the Manchu conquest of China, the Russians, spreading steadily and rapidly eastwards across Siberia, came into conflict with the outposts of the Chinese Empire on the Amur River. There was some fighting with varying success on either side, and in 1689 the Treaty of Nerchinsk¹ was concluded, establishing the boundaries of the two Empires at this river, and giving increased reciprocal facilities for trade.

For the next 150 years, during the latter part of which the other European nations came knocking and clamouring at the south coast seaports for the admission of their traders and the recognition of their national dignity and prestige, Russian trade flowed back and forth in peace and friendliness along the caravan routes of China's northern marches. A Russian market was established in Peking, and a Russian church. Russian embassies were received at the Manchu Court, and at least one Chinese embassy was sent to the Court of the Czar; and it is noteworthy that, in striking contrast with her contemptuous treatment of other nations, China conducted these diplomatic relations with Russia on a basis of equality and reciprocal respect.

There is on record the experience of a band of Russian

¹ See Sir F. Whyte's *China and the Foreign-Powers*, Oxford Univ. Press, London, 1927, p. 2.

soldiers who, in these earliest days, were established by the Emperor Kang Hsi, who had captured them, as favoured bannermen in Peking. They intermarried and eventually became entirely incorporated with the Chinese population.¹ In the present day in the case of many thousands of the White Russian refugees the same process is beginning to repeat itself in China. They have formed a brigade in Chang Chung Chang's army: they have even been able to compete with Chinese coolie labour. If we turn to the peasant class, that great conservative basis and spring of national life, we find here that the economic standards and living conditions of the Russian peasant, and the social standing of his women, have much in common with those of the Chinese villagers.

It is not suggested that the ancient distinction made by the Chinese between Russians and other foreigners remains clear-cut as before; but it is not only through the treaty of reciprocity and equality of 1924² that Russians secured their special standing in China. That only revived and emphasised a feeling which the Chinese have had for over three centuries, that the Russians are nearer akin to themselves than the other men of the West. This made the way easy for the strategy of the Third International.

The brief consideration of its activities and purposes in the preceding few pages is necessary for an understanding of a number of the phenomena exhibited by the Nationalist Government's regime in Hankow, which otherwise seem strangely incongruous in form and senseless in their effect. The purport of these pages is clear. From the point of view of the Russians influencing the Chinese Revolution, this Revolution has not been in itself the objective, but a means towards the great end, the World Revolution, and an unexpectedly favourable opportunity for them to further its progress. Though, as

¹ See Upton Close's *The Revolt of Asia*, G. P. Putman's Sons, New York—London, 1927, p. 130 et seqq.

² *Vide supra*, p. 44.

they believed, China doubtless stood to gain heavily in the long run, she was nevertheless but one piece on the board, to be played as the exigencies of the game might require; and the methods to be used were not methods in any way native to China or arising out of Chinese necessities and characteristics, but methods which had been elaborated in the revolutionary schools of Russia, tested and proved there in the 1917 Revolution and under the Soviet regime, and adopted by the Third International as the *modus operandi* of the World Revolution.

These are grave and significant statements, but can be amply substantiated from the newspapers issued day by day in Hankow during the Nationalist rule, and from common knowledge of the people, Chinese and foreign, who lived there throughout that period.

CHAPTER VI

PREDOMINANT DOCTRINES OF PROPAGANDA

THE THREE PRINCIPLES

THE methods used by the Nationalist propagandists in the country districts have been described already. The chief difference in Hankow was one of quantity. Mass meetings were much larger, and the little groups surrounding street preachers more numerous, occasionally as many as four or five in one mile of a main street.

The central theme of the propaganda was without doubt the *Three Democratic Principles* (San Min Chu I), a book published by Dr. Sun Yat Sen which has rapidly become the text-book, or rather the Bible, of the Revolution. The book contains much irrelevant material, and gives evidence that the author was either himself warped in judgment by anti-foreign prejudice, or else deliberately wished to use it as a means of stimulating and consolidating the sense of Chinese nationalism. The Three Principles are, as stated by him, somewhat vague in their connotation; but may be briefly summarised as follows:

(1) *The Principle of Nationality*.—The freedom and independence of China as a nation, and the equality of the various races comprised within the Republic.

(2) *The Principle of Democracy*.—The people's rights of suffrage, initiative, referendum and recall, and the rights of women.

(3) *The Principle of Socialism, or the People's Livelihood*.—The equalisation of land ownership by a heavy land-tax, and the control of capitalism by nationalisation of the public utility services.

SUN YAT SEN—THE NATIONAL HERO

The bare statement that these three principles formed the central theme of the Nationalist propaganda is, however, an inadequate presentation of the position. At the heart of the propaganda lay the idealised concept from which a great part of the devotion and enthusiasm of the Revolution sprang, at least among the better educated classes, viz. the personality of Dr. Sun Yat Sen. In his lifetime, though in many ways unpractical, inefficient, and a poor judge of men, he had yet shown, in the pre-eminent way that is typical of the great national champions and leaders of history, his ability to win and hold the personal devotion of his associates and followers; but after his death in March 1925 this sentiment, previously confined to the South and the small Nationalist groups working in secret throughout the provinces, rapidly rose in intensity and extent until, when the Revolution burst out in August 1926, it swept like a wave across the country. The human heart seeks a personal hero as the object of its warmest loyalty and the inspiration for its finest achievement; and Dr. Sun met this need in the Chinese Revolution.

His portrait was in the place of honour in every Government office, and commonly adorned the bedrooms of members of the Nationalist Party. It was carried in the front of the street processions. Not only at the opening of all official functions and public meetings, but at the first morning drill in the armies, and the beginning of the day's work in the schools throughout the land, the first act was the reading of Dr. Sun's Will, and public obeisance before his portrait with the same simple ceremonial used in the veneration of ancestors before the family tablets in nearly every home in China.

That this sentiment and propaganda was encouraged and prescribed by the Central Executive Committee, almost to the extent of canonisation of the hero, is simply

an evidence that they understood their own countrymen and the psychology of popular movements.

In the six months during which I daily traversed the busiest streets in Hankow I two or three times saw a portrait of Lenin displayed at the main traffic centre where the most important posters and cartoons used to be exhibited. But he obviously had not even an outside chance against the popular hero; and it may well be that veneration for and loyalty to the latter, characteristically Chinese in spite of his later Russian sympathies, was one of the strongest of those instinctive and deep-lying reactions which successfully resisted the final triumph of the process of Russianisation of the Revolution.

CAPITALISM, IMPERIALISM AND MILITARISM

Apart from Dr. Sun's *Three Democratic Principles*, a few special phrases and themes stood out from the mass of propaganda, and occur over and over again in the pages of the *Tribune*.¹

"Capitalism" is fiercely denounced, and the driving out of the capitalist and destruction of his whole system decreed. Chinese and foreign capitalists are alike held up as objects of detestation; but whereas in the speeches and cartoons the foreign capitalists, such as the bankers, loom largest, in action it is the Chinese capitalists who have been chiefly affected, who have been driven out of their possessions, whose wealth has been confiscated, and who themselves have in many cases been seized and held to ransom.

"Imperialism" respecting foreign nations, and "Militarism" respecting both foreign nations and Chinese war lords, are coupled together as perhaps the prime favourite of all propagandist themes. English-speaking Chinese have chosen the term "Imperialism" to carry a special and restricted meaning quite different from that in ordinary usage. They define it as "the use by any other nation of its political and military ascendancy for

¹ *Vide supra*, p. 26.

subjecting to its economic encroachment a foreign country or territory or race." History shows that whenever any nation has a genuine and weighty grievance against its social conditions or the administration of its own Government, and at the same time suffers from the encroachment, however slight, of another nation, there is an almost inevitable tendency to throw the whole blame for their misfortunes on to the oppression of this foreign nation.¹ For this reason, and because hatred towards foreigners is so much more easy to arouse than hatred towards a people's own nationals, and because, once aroused, it is such an extraordinarily powerful weapon to weld together and unite a nation and stimulate patriotic feeling, this theme seems to have been singled out above others for an emphasis otherwise hard to understand. Also the association of the leading war lords with the foreign nations, especially their military and naval forces, served in the street cartoons to discredit both. Some propagandists were careful to distinguish between the attitude that should be adopted towards British and American imperialism, for example, and individual British and American citizens; but most took little pains to draw such fine distinctions.

By April and May the Hankow population seemed to have had rather a surfeit of this propaganda, so that it had but little power to stir them: certain it is that several times about this period, on my way home from the Chinese city, I mingled with a street crowd, gazing at some atrocious and gaudy hoarding showing the butchering of helpless Chinese citizens by British soldiers or sailors; and my presence excited nothing more than a little cursory and tolerant amusement.

² See A. Ransome's *The Chinese Puzzle*, Allen & Unwin, London, 1927, pp. 36, 143.

THE ONE-SIDED TREATIES

Associated as a corollary of this idea of Imperialism is the conception of the "oppressed peoples." Foremost amongst these is, of course, China, not allowed to decide her own customs tariff, forced to tolerate on her soil foreign courts administering foreign laws for the benefit of their own nationals, with the most prosperous and flourishing quarters of her great commercial ports built up and administered by foreigners and under practically perpetual lease to them as foreign Concessions, with her business and commerce held in a strangle-hold by foreign banks, shipping and railroads, and great foreign oil, tobacco, mining and other interests exploiting the wealth of the country, and finally with all her great waterways perpetually policed by foreign gunboats. Such was the picture of China *vis-à-vis* the foreign Powers as presented to her people by the propagandists, and the root of all this injustice was found in the "One-sided treaties" (pu p'ing Teng ti T'iao yoh) which had been forced on the country decades ago at the mouths of foreign cannon.

THE OPPRESSED PEOPLES

But the list of "Oppressed peoples" did not begin and end with China. The three delegates¹ from England, France, and America vied with one another in confessing before excited and cheering audiences, and in newspaper articles, the injustices and oppressions perpetrated by their respective Governments. Tom Mann came an easy first with his fierce invective against the oppression of the English labourers and the Indian races. Earl Browder ran a good second in his inveighing against American "imperialism" in Haiti, Cuba, the Philippines and above all in Nicaragua. Jacques Doriot made rather

¹ *Vide supra*, p. 26. Their propaganda helped rather than damaged the position of their nationals in China by tending to turn Chinese rancour to political and class channels rather than racial.

a weak case for France as a third. But the Chinese propagandists drew a much wider circle than this: Africa, Ireland, Egypt, Australia, Canada were all described as "oppressed peoples" groaning under the British Imperialistic yoke.

A story runs the round of the Treaty ports of two Australians who several years ago were arrested as British spies by Cantonese near the Canton-Kowloon border. But when an officer began to cross-examine them and discovered that they were Australians, he turned to his men indignantly. "Set these men free at once," he said. "They are our comrades, fellow-sufferers under the vile oppression of England."

When casual travelling acquaintances have seen on exchanging Chinese visiting cards with me that I was an Australian, they have commonly asked me with great solicitude as to the precise political relationship between my country and Great Britain, and have been interested and obviously rather surprised to hear details of our status as a self-governing dominion freely and gladly owning allegiance to the King.

A chubby-faced pleasant young officer, a member of the propagandist corps who had been speaking in our country town of Teian, and doubtless cursing England according to instructions, happened to be returning to Hankow at the same time as we were; and we found him a pleasant and helpful travelling companion. Over lunch, when the subject of Egypt came up in conversation over the dessert of dates we offered him, he told us that he knew that now, as a result of England's rule, Egypt as a country had ceased to exist; and it was with some difficulty that we disabused his mind of the idea.

It is worth noting that, through the whole period of Nationalist propaganda in Hankow, French imperialism in North or West Africa, or even in Annam and Tongking, has practically never been alluded to, though France is one of the only two remaining foreign Powers which has retained her Concession in Hankow, and it is guarded by

Annamese police, whose grandparents were doubtless all Chinese subjects. Naturally too the Russian encroachments¹ in Mongolia, where the Soviet Government has made such far-reaching extensions of its influence in recent years, have been absolutely ignored.

“DOWN WITH BRITISH IMPERIALISM”

One of the most striking features of the propaganda has been the selection of Britain as distinguished from all other foreign Powers for an extraordinarily specialised focussing of the antagonism of the people. In a few of the speeches, and in the newspapers, the United States had its share of vituperation, especially after the Nanking incident, but this was in a more restrained and reproachful tone as a man might expostulate with a friend who had sadly disappointed and grieved him. But in the regular street posters and the slogans of the crowd the cry was ever “Down with *British* Imperialism.” However this may be explained, no one who has lived in China and mixed with the Chinese people will be able to persuade himself that it is due in any appreciable degree to a racial and instinctive difference in the incidence of the hatred of the Chinese people, though doubtless the bearing and demeanour of the average American citizen in China are more on a standing of equality and better suited to disarm hostility than those of his more unbending British contemporary.

It is true that in extorting from China the privileges recorded in the one-sided treaties, which opened up China to foreign trade, traders and missionaries in the middle of last century, Great Britain took the leading part; but all the other nations followed suit, and Great Britain has now again taken the lead in offering very substantially to revise all these treaties and in actually, even during the course of the recent troubles, handing back two of her port Concession districts. In the Tariff

¹ See Upton Close's *The Revolt of Asia*, G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York and London, 1927, pp. 142, 143.

Conference of 1926¹ Britain stood out for a more liberal treatment of China which Japan stubbornly resisted. It might have been expected that these facts would have told at least to some extent in Great Britain's favour: let us see whether or not this was so.

After the Nanking incident on March 24th 1927,² when far more American citizens were involved than British, and American gunboats were before the British in opening fire, the Hankow *Tribune* explained that it was reported that the shells from the American guns were air shells, and on falling made merely a tiny hole in the ground, doing no damage!

¹ The Washington Conference of the Great Powers in 1921 had agreed to grant China as an interim arrangement a surtax of 2½ per cent. over the existing 5 per cent. customs duty on all ordinary imports, and a surtax of 5 per cent. on all luxuries, and specified that a Tariff Conference was to be called to make arrangements for the change. Owing largely to France's long delay to ratify the agreement, this Conference did not meet until October 1925. When deliberations began in Peking, delay now arose from factors on both sides. The Japanese and United States delegates insisted that the proposed surtaxes should only be agreed to on condition that the service of China's foreign loans should be the first charge on the increased revenue. The Chinese delegates absolutely refused to entertain any proposals for foreign control, and put forward a counter-claim for complete tariff autonomy.

Meanwhile, owing to the war raging between rival war lords round Peking, civil authority in the capital was steadily crumbling; and towards the middle of 1926 Government officials and Ministers were vacating their posts, making it more and more difficult for the Conference to carry on. Great Britain had by this time finally relinquished all idea of trying to impose any extension of foreign control over China's customs revenues or even to insist on the abolition of the system of *likin* or inland tolls on merchandise. She on 28th May, 1926, memorialised the United States to this effect, declaring that any reasonably satisfactory assurances of the Chinese Government as to the proposed use of the new revenues should be accepted, and the levying of the surtaxes authorised forthwith without any other guarantees or restrictions. Unfortunately, shortly after this the office of President fell vacant in Peking, and the Conference had to be adjourned *sine die*. The lead given by Great Britain was however so effective that it became impracticable for other Powers to maintain an unyielding attitude, and presently at one Treaty port after another (*vide supra*, p. 15, footnote) the Chinese authorities began to collect the duties suggested, without waiting for the signing of a treaty.

(For further particulars see Sir Frederick Whyte's *China and Foreign Powers*, Oxford Univ. Press, 1927, pp. 40, 56, 57.)

² *Vide infra*, Chap. IX, p. 104.

On 3rd April a Japanese in Hankow in a fracas arising from a dispute in the street stabbed a ricksha coolie, killing him and causing a serious riot, in which two Japanese were killed and two or three buildings burned down. As the situation rapidly became very threatening and dangerous, the Japanese, who up to this date had shown marked restraint under long-continued provocation, replied by promptly landing armed patrols and firing several machine-gun rounds into the crowd, killing a number of Chinese estimated at about twelve and wounding others. They evacuated most of their women and children the same night, closed their Concession with barbed wire entanglements, and manned its boundaries with armed bluejackets for several weeks, with the guns of their warships, including two or three additional cruisers that were rushed up to Hankow in the next few days, trained along every cross street. Although the British Concession had been handed over to the care of the Chinese soldiers three months before, and formally transferred to the Chinese Government only three weeks previously,¹ though the British men-of-war crews were all kept on board their ships, and though the Chinese are without doubt more afraid of Japanese aggression than of British, the incidence of the propaganda in Hankow² remained as before, ignoring Japan and threatening British Imperialism.

¹ *Vide infra*, p. 124.

² A significant contrast can be drawn between the attitude of the Nationalist Government towards the Chinese casualties inflicted in these two incidents at Nanking and Hankow respectively.

When the British Consul at Hankow applied to Mr. Eugene Chen, the Nationalist Foreign Minister, for satisfaction for the outrages on British subjects at Nanking, he replied that his advice was that the foreign warships' fire had killed and wounded over 1000 Chinese, and that this would have to be investigated, *and this was published in the Nationalist newspaper*. Later on he admitted that after investigation the number had turned out to be not over 1000 but under 10.

Several days after the shooting by Japanese marines in Hankow the same newspaper published the names of four Chinese who had been killed and four more who had been wounded by Japanese bullets: but at the same time an explanation was made that these casualties had been caused by ricochet of bullets from the ground, as the Japanese had aimed to avoid casualties; and an edict was published that the people were to take no notice of the matter as the Government had it in hand.

THE WORLD REVOLUTION

More particularly during the visit of the three foreign delegates, Mann, Browder, and Doriot, but always included in the propaganda programme, has been the emphasis, already referred to, on the movement in China as an organic part of the concerted "world revolution." This is amply illustrated in the pages of the *Tribune*, both in the reports of speeches at the mass meetings, in editorial comment, and in quotations and special articles culled from abroad.

These all represent the Labour movements of the various foreign countries, and the Socialist or Left Wing parties of their legislatures as supporting, heart and soul, the Chinese Revolution, eagerly watching its every move, and ready at any moment by a general strike or other means to paralyse their own national Government should it attempt anything to hamper or obstruct the Revolution.

One of these draws attention to the demand in Scotland for freedom from the English yoke. India especially is to rise in revolt and together with China to form a Pan-Asian Union. To assist this propaganda some Indians formerly employed in the Hankow Municipal Police, but now sympathising with the Nationalists, were used again and again either to speak at meetings or at least to occupy seats on the platform. They were welcomed as brothers in distress, and generally received with enthusiasm by the leaders, if not by the crowds.

"DOWN WITH RELIGION"

The attitude of the Nationalists towards Christianity demands careful treatment and will be dealt with later, as it is complicated by the fact that Christianity is still considered by the mass of the Chinese as a foreign organisation, and therefore in these days shares in the general prejudice and hatred directed against most things foreign. But apart altogether from its foreign complexion, Christianity has been banned simply because it is a religion, and from this aspect is treated in much

the same way as Buddhism, Taoism and "Confucianism." Occasionally against all these religions feeling has run high, as when, in one of the country towns¹ in Hunan, all the Buddhist temples were destroyed or looted. But generally the propaganda is of a general nature, stigmatising all religions as degrading superstitions which enslave and mislead the people. It has been recognised, however, that religious faith cannot be eradicated from an entire population in a few months; nor was this attempted. But at least the younger and more enthusiastic of those who were actually members of the Nationalist Party, and probably the entire membership of the Communist Party, were expected to, and actually did, abjure whatever religious faith they had, or imagined they had. But that this was not by any means uniformly observed may be illustrated by the facts that Feng Yu Hsiang still remained a Christian after appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the Honan Expeditionary armies, and Tang Shen Chih, the General commanding the famous "Iron Army," remained a devout Buddhist, and had Buddhist instruction classes in his army as Feng had Christian prayer-meetings in his, while there have been several Christians among the civilian leaders of the Nationalist Party.

THE CONFISCATION OF LAND

In Canton there had been confiscation and redistribution of land on a large scale; but very little was seen or heard of this in the early months of the revolutionary invasion of Central China. It began first in Hunan, the first province invaded, and it was only later on that it began to be practised in Hupeh. In this latter province late in April the posters began to execrate the land sharks (T'ou hao) and depict them as fat and unwieldy allegorical animals being chased off their estates by peasants and Nationalist soldiers. Regula-

¹ Liling.

tions of the Government and of the Hupeh General Labour Union began to be published in the Nationalist newspaper laying down the causes for which a landlord or large holder might be dispossessed of his land, and the proper method for its confiscation and redistribution; and in some, probably not many, cases in the country areas lands were actually so dealt with.

CONFISCATION IN PRACTICE

The more turbulent and revolutionary-minded populace of Hunan had embarked on a much more vigorous campaign for dispossessing the large landholders. Here there was no regard for any formal procedure: simply the peasant committees in many country districts decided to drive away certain of the landholders and to confiscate their land, and forthwith did so, the landlord sometimes being massacred, and sometimes escaping with his bare life. This habit, once started, grew so strong and uncontrolled among the Hunanese that at times they attacked the relations or friends of soldiers fighting at the front with the Nationalist armies, thereby causing considerable embarrassment in Government circles. It was for this amongst other causes that the above-mentioned restrictive regulations were promulgated in the capital.

These acts of violence against "land sharks" were chiefly in the country towns and surrounding districts of Hunan; but in Changsha, the provincial capital, corresponding irresponsible excesses occurred, reminiscent at one stage of the French Revolution. They reached their height early in May, when various Labour Unions in the city were holding open courts of summary jurisdiction. The judge was the President of the Union, and the jury whoever of the members chose to attend the meeting. Any member of the Union might drag a person into court on the charge of being an "anti-revolutionary" (Fan Ke Min), and give his own account of the offence in laying the charge. The accused was not

allowed to say anything on his own behalf. The verdict would be taken for granted, and the sentence on being suggested to the meeting carried by popular vote. If, as often, it was death, the accused was immediately led out and shot. This particular orgy was stopped sharply by a Nationalist general, Ho Chien, who at this time acquired the post of Commandant of Changsha, the garrison consisting of his own troops. He had no patience with this and other exhibitions in the city of Labour unionism running riot, and after a short but sanguinary little struggle shot a number of the Labour leaders out of hand.

CONSTRUCTIVE PROGRAMME OF THE KUO MIN TANG

It may well be asked why no account has been given of the constructive proposals of the Nationalist Government. The answer is that this book is an account of what actually happened in the life of the people and the administration of the Government in Central China, and not of the ambitious platform adopted by its Canton Congress or of the dreams and ideals of some of its leaders.

It is true that at the plenary session of the Kuo Min Tang held at Canton in October 1926, which was attended by delegates from all the Provinces, an excellent and most comprehensive Programme was adopted, including provisions under the following heads: General Policy (political, in foreign affairs, economic), Education, Administrative (general, military, position of women), Industry, Commerce, Educational Workers, Government Service, Agriculture, Labour, Soldiers, and Chinese Emigrants Abroad. This Programme is significant and momentous to the extent, and only to the extent, to which it is actually the dominating ideal and earnest purpose of the leadership of the Kuo Min Tang; and this only the future can declare.

Although the complete schedule was once published in the *Tribune*, actually we did not see 10 per cent. of the lauses put into practice or even attempted in Central

China. This was inevitable in the case of a Government which was forced to use perhaps 80 per cent. or 85 per cent. of its scanty revenue in military operations, and was often fighting a desperate political and diplomatic battle to maintain its own position. If and when that position becomes established and secure, and its authority extends undisputed over China, it will become evident, as the administration develops in act and achievement, how much of the "Programme" is genuine, and how much is waste paper.¹

¹ For the full text of the Programme, and an account of the attitude and ideals of the Kuo Min Tang as stated by some of its leaders to a friendly and sympathetic Englishman, see A. Ransome's *The Chinese Puzzle*, Allen & Unwin, London, 1927.

CHAPTER VII

THE EMANCIPATION OF WOMEN

SOCIAL STATUS OF WOMEN—THE OLD ORDER

THE right of woman to dispose of herself, body and soul, as she chooses, to wend her own way where she pleases in the world without fear of interference, and to manage her own affairs unfettered by man's control—all this is implicit in the *Three Democratic Principles* of the Revolution, and has been enthusiastically preached far and wide in the revolutionary propaganda. Even at a casual glance it is obvious that these are tremendous and fundamental postulates which have by no means yet been thoroughly met in our Western civilisations; but their full significance for China can only be grasped if some short account is given of the previous social status of woman in that country.

At birth, if she is unwanted owing to there being already several girls in the family, she may be strangled by her mother or other relations; for, though perhaps not as common as criminal abortion in Western countries, infanticide is very prevalent, especially in some of the larger cities.

Foot-binding, as is well known, has been almost universally practised on girls, thus emphasising the principle that a woman's place is in the home, by making it difficult for her to walk abroad. In most provinces of China it is only in the case of the very poor that it is omitted because of stark economic pressure; and even then there may be an attempt to preserve some claim to gentility by "making a lady" of at least one of the girls by binding her feet. Even among the influential and wealthy classes girls are not taught to read, education not being considered necessary for a lady, who is much more

naturally employed doing the beautiful needlework and embroidery at which nearly all Chinese women are adept.

Some time during her infancy or childhood she will be betrothed by her parents to a boy whom she has never spoken to—very likely never seen—and whom she will not meet until he lifts the veil from her face on the wedding night. There are several features of the betrothal period to be noticed. At least among the poor, a sum of money is usually paid down by the fiancé or his people on clinching the betrothal, and if her family is very poor, the girl may be adopted by the fiancé's family and reared among their own children until the wedding day. In all other cases the task of chaperonage is regarded very seriously, and very faithfully carried out, by the girl's family, involving very narrow restrictions on her freedom to move about. If the phrase may be properly used of a system where there is very little individual liberty or play for free-will, the standard of morality for the unmarried girl in China is very high, the illegitimate birth-rate being remarkably low.¹ In times of civil disturbance such as war, or especially banditry, that widespread curse splashed like a foul stain over the fair countryside of China, kidnapping of women and girls and rape are common. When threat of such danger arises, it is usual for the parents of an affianced girl to call on the fiancé to marry her immediately and relieve them of the responsibility of safe-guarding her; and if he should delay, the girl may be delivered at his home without further ceremony. If all other means fail, a Chinese girl not infrequently preserves her honour by committing suicide. Formerly it was extremely rare and was considered very dishonourable to break off a betrothal, and it could only be done by paying heavy compensation: but in recent years it is becoming more frequent among the educated classes, at least at the instance of the man.

¹ There are no Government statistics, but this much is clear from hospital records.

After marriage it would be unpardonably bad form for a wife publicly to show any trace of disagreement with her lord's will; but it must not be assumed that this is always the private and personal relationship between husband and wife. While the husband still resides in the ancestral home his wife is under the tutelage of his mother, a position which may be anything between that of a daughter and a slave. When the husband has acquired a home of his own, either by inheriting the ancestral home or by leaving it for an independent residence, the wife becomes head of his household. She is in charge of the domestic finances, manages the children and the servants if there are any, receives all family guests, and is generally treated with the respect and honour due to her station. On the other hand, she being in a position of honour, her husband's honour is very closely involved with hers. As a corollary, except among the poorer classes, she is expected practically to remain within her house or garden walls. If she should have occasion to go abroad to visit some lady friend she must travel in a closed-in chair. She must not dishonour her husband by exposing herself to the public gaze in the streets, in public places of amusement, or at banquets outside the home where there are gentlemen guests.

If the husband should for the sake of obtaining offspring, or for companionship, or merely because his position of importance is felt to demand it, decide to take one or more concubines into his home, his wife will, as head of the household, receive them in conformity with her lord's wishes whatever her own private feelings on the subject may be; and they will be, to a certain extent at least, under her authority. If they should bear children, these too come under the wife's authority, and are left behind as part of the household if the concubine should be dismissed. A concubine, being chosen by the husband himself when he has reached years of discretion, will probably have either good looks and vivacity, or general intelligence and education. In either case

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she may well be a more congenial companion than the wife, and her position is much more suitable for this rôle. As she has no social standing, the man's honour cannot easily be compromised by her. She may travel about freely in public and accompany him to pictures or theatre. He may take her to banquets with his friends whatever may be the company, and as his companion when he travels abroad.

A wife may be divorced at the pleasure of her husband with much the same simple procedure as is laid down in the ancient Mosaic law,¹ and among the poorer classes she is occasionally sold. In certain instances where the wife has been compromised with another man, the sale is arranged with the mutual consent of all parties concerned, the price paid representing a kind of fine levied on the co-respondent. Except in case of severe famine, it is unlikely that the number of divorces and sales of wives would be relatively as great as the incidence of divorce in the United States of America. But in China the wife has no recourse, the ordinary Chinese mind being simply unable to conceive such an idea as that of a wife divorcing her husband, while the husband may in theory divorce his wife for any trifle, though in practice, as divorce is considered a serious disgrace to a woman, the husband would have to reckon with his wife's relations.

In times of famine there is quite a traffic carried on in the sale of children, chiefly little girls, whom their parents dispose of in preference to watching them starve; and in the great cities there is always a certain amount of such traffic being carried on clandestinely. Some are sold for immoral use; but quite a large number as maids-of-all-work in households. From here they would probably be again sold as wives on reaching a marriageable age. The traffic is regarded as disreputable, but many respectable middle-class people, and those highly placed in society, purchase such servant-girls for their households.

As for the daily routine of the Chinese woman's life,

¹ See Deut. xxiv. 1-3.

in the case of the poor, who, of course, form the great mass of the population, the wife has plenty to fill her laborious days, what time remains over from the care of the children and the cooking and sewing for the household being frequently employed in one or other of the many home industries, such as cotton spinning or weaving. Wives of the wealthy, after filling in what time they can in the care of their hair and complexion, in the ordering of their household, and in gossip, often resort to gambling from sheer ennui.

Such briefly has been the social position of women in China, fixed and unchangeable for countless generations; and it is against this background that recent changes and movements must be evaluated. One very important qualification of the above outline must here be made. Such, it has been stated, the social position was; and such it still is, quite unchanged in all except one or two particulars, throughout the vast majority of the country villages and the poorer classes of China, *i.e.* in a large majority of the population. And yet the minority is very significant—more significant than the whole traditional mass ranged against it.

MODERN EDUCATION

The beginning of the change was considerably over half a century ago, when the Chinese Christian Church under the tutelage of the foreign missionaries first began to educate girls. The movement began in the co-educational primary schools in the towns and villages. Presently in the cities, girls' day schools for older children were opened under missionary auspices, and these were followed by girls' high schools and colleges for boarders, by nurses' training schools in the women's hospitals, and more recently by the opening of the various faculties of the Christian Universities, Arts, Science, Medicine and Education, to women students. With the renewed enthusiasm for education following the introduction of the colloquial¹ as the medium of instruction in the State

¹ *Vide infra*, p. 286.

schools, the education of girl children in these schools has rapidly advanced, and has already been carried so far that in the numerous colleges affiliated with the great amorphous Government University of Wuchang there are many hundreds of young women students; and young women from the Wuchang teachers training schools are year by year going out to teach in the State schools. A similar situation is found in Peking and Nanking, the two other great national educational centres. Whether in primary school, high school and college, nurses' training school, or university, education under missionary auspices is, with a few outstanding exceptions, generally of a much higher quality than that in the various provincial and national institutions; but the quantity of the various forms of Government education of girls and women has been increasing by leaps and bounds, and the quality had been steadily approximating to the high standard that has been set by the Christian institutions until two or three years ago, since which time school strikes and the general breakdown of discipline have caused an increasing deterioration in Government school work. A small though valuable reinforcement to the body of women's education is the contingent of young women who have gone abroad, chiefly to America, for their education and returned to China. Among these are doctors, teachers, nurses, and wives of some of the leading young men of new China.

There has thus been created a new class of women, numerically small, but influentially placed, who have already to a considerable extent thrown off the age-long yoke. These are the educated women, those of the well-to-do classes, and those more or less in touch with foreign people, and foreign ways and fashions, in the great cities. Among these concubinage is generally condemned in the abstract though too often condoned or practised in fact, infant betrothal is viewed with increasing disfavour and resentment as antiquated and enslaving, foot-binding has already been largely discontinued, and strict confinement to the home is a thing of the past.

CHRISTIANITY IN THE SCHOOL

The composition of this nascent educational mass has been thus analysed in some detail because it is through it chiefly that the women's movement has been steadily and unobtrusively progressing in the years prior to the Revolution, and through it also that its startling developments during the Revolution have been staged. There is no doubt that it is Christianity in China, as in all other lands, which has been the prime agent by its steady quiet moral suasion in raising the status of women. This has functioned partly through the services in the Christian Churches and the family life of the members, but very largely through the above-mentioned Christian schools. It is here that the campaign against foot-binding has been most effective, because it has been possible to enforce the practice as well as preach the principle. It is here that the practice of sports and gymnastic exercises for girls has been firmly established with all the implications that are latent therein. It is only through the avenue afforded by education in such schools as these that a girl can become economically independent; and not a few have seized eagerly on this release from the necessity of marrying for a livelihood.

Perhaps the greatest contribution that the schools have made has been to provide an environment in which, amidst the free play and exercise of young life and intellect in the joyous give and take of a school community, the cramping repression and numbing self-control of ages have been thrown off and exchanged for eager self-expression. Is it any wonder that, when the blazing fires of the Revolution broke out, they found these girls, though perhaps even further than their boy contemporaries from an adequate and reasoned understanding of what was happening, yet no whit behind them in fervid enthusiasm and patriotic zeal to work or sacrifice for their native land?

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THE NEW PROPAGANDA AND THE PROPAGANDISTS

The Communist Party was quick to take advantage of this enthusiasm, and soon after the conquest of Hupeh began to send the most promising of the girls to the propagandist training schools. A little later a beginning was made with the organisation of the Women's Movement, and on 24th March the first meeting was held of the Executive Committee of the Hupeh Women's Union. Madame Sun, widow of the doctor, gave a strong lead to the group, and on 19th April made a most eloquent and inspiring public speech on the wrongs of Chinese women and the aims of the movement, gratefully acknowledging that the Nationalist Government had made their aims one of its main planks.

The young women propagandists in the early months of the year were seen here and there in the streets of Hankow, sometimes dressed in the usual Chinese woman's skirt and coat, and occasionally in a well-cut officer's military uniform with breeches and putties similar to those of the British army. At the same time they were also spreading far out among the country towns. They were usually fluent and effective speakers with a gift for invective more incisive than that of the men propagandists. In addition to their special work of rousing and organising the women, they did their share of the general propaganda work. Without exception they had bobbed their hair, an act which branded them unalterably as revolutionaries, and so was equivalent to the nailing of a ship's colours to the mast, not to be done except by people of courage and resolution. But, this lead having once been given, later on, when the Nationalist Government seemed more securely established, the fashion began to be followed more widely by girls with no strong political bias, as a symbol of revolt against old restrictions and an assertion of their independence.¹

¹ It is worthy of note that the queue, formerly worn by Chinese men, was the sign of subjection to their Manchu conquerors, and that its abolition was contemporaneous with and symbolical of the throwing off of the Manchu yoke.

A new spirit was abroad: many more Chinese ladies than formerly, young and old, walked freely in the streets or rode in open rickshas. The extraordinary sight was seen of ladies on the Bund chatting freely and easily to their gentlemen companions, walking abreast or, in the evening, even arm in arm. In a large missionary girls' boarding school in Hanyang, after the lady teachers and matron had all been withdrawn owing to political disturbances, an effort was made to close the school; but a small group of the elder girls, enthusiastic revolutionaries, refused to leave the precincts. Hearing a few days later that these girls were receiving gentlemen visitors in the afternoon and evening, the school authorities sent over to seek to make some more decorous arrangement; but they were told with the greatest sang-froid that they need not make themselves in the least uneasy, that we were now living in a new China, and that the girls in question knew what they were about and were quite able to look after themselves. This is a typical instance of what was happening everywhere.

SEXUAL EXTRAVAGANCES AND INDIVIDUAL RESTRAINT

But it would have been strange if the reaction from the old regime now, when the elemental forces of the Revolution were fermenting in the blood, had swung no further than this. The doctrine of "free love" as propagated in Russia in the early years of the Revolution of 1917 was now widely preached in Hankow, to the utter disgust of the great bulk of the steady citizens. In some of the propagandist schools, where students of both sexes were in training, men and women slept in the same dormitories, and there seems little doubt but that the doctrine of the "common wife" (*kung ch'i*), taught in such places, fell on willing ears.¹ After a while, it is a rigidly logical though extreme extension of the Communist doctrine.

Of all the extravagances of sexual bravado that which

¹ This phenomenon may be compared with a feature of the psychology of the Great War, which was observed in more than one of the principal nations engaged. In these cases a section of the young womanhood of the country had risen to a patriotic and self-sacrificing

attracted the greatest notice was the Naked Women's Parade. The particulars were first published early in April, calling for applications from women willing to participate in a naked parade through the Hankow streets on 1st May. Only women of perfect physique were eligible, and proponents were to undergo a physical examination on application. The purpose of the parade was to make a passionate and defiant gesture in an arresting way, asserting woman's right to conduct herself entirely as she chose without let or hindrance from anyone. The news created a great sensation in Hankow, most Chinese receiving it with the gravest misgiving and with vicarious shame. Reporters were sent up from Shanghai to make inquiries: the world was waiting to see whether in this feature too the Government would precisely follow the Russian precedent of a few years ago. The parade never took place. On 2nd May, after the whole of Hankow had been talking of it for a month, three Chinese were arrested and punished for "maliciously spreading a false rumour" that such a parade was to take place; and the next day the Hupeh Women's Union published a denial that there was any intention of holding the parade, and the Government organ (*The People's Tribune*) poured the greatest scorn on the whole "fabrication." But as the newspaper itself admits that for several weeks it had been inundated with inquiries about the Parade, how comes it that it waited until two days after the date fixed for it to deny what was the talk of the whole people? Everything points to the explanation that the Nationalist Government, fearing to face the world-wide scandal that they rather tardily realised would result, cancelled the fixture at the last moment.¹

fervour of a similar intensity to that of the leaders of Young China in the Revolution. Their respectable and steady-going elders were at times startled and horrified at the abandon with which some of these girls from nice homes threw all thought of moral restraint to the winds under the urge of their feeling that nothing they had was too sacred to give to the boys on leave from the Front.

¹ Chinese legend has its counterpart of the English story of Lady Godiva, and perhaps gives us some clue to the psychology of this

In judging the excesses of this Women's Movement, it should be remembered that they have been as a rule committed by people acting under an enthusiasm of the nature of a religious fanaticism; and that the young women concerned were pupils of the propagandist schools, whence many offered for service as spies and political agents amongst the Northern armies, a work in which they carried their lives in their hands, and for which a certain number laid their lives down. The wonder, as so often in this country of China, is not that there were excesses, but that, when all the usual restraints had been removed, excesses should have been so few. It seems that the young women concerned have, for the most part, kept their heads in the giddy whirl, and that, as they claim, they are quite competent to look after themselves.

WOMEN'S REFORM LEGISLATION

In other directions there have been very definite and substantial gains. The very effective contribution made for some decades towards the emancipation of women by contact with the foreign civilisation of the port cities and of foreign countries has already been alluded to; but this has affected to any great extent only a relatively small group of the well-to-do classes. Education, from the village school to the university, has had a much more widespread influence. But the only considerable organisation in China steadily and consciously, year in year out, creating public opinion and working for the Women's Movement has been the Christian Church, and especially its Protestant ¹ branch, comprising in 1925 a community of 700,000 people, amongst China's four hundred millions;

extraordinary project in Hankow. A high-born maiden, naked, at the behest of the Gods offered sacrifices on the newly-built walls of Chinchew on behalf of her city; and then, overcome by her shame, threw herself over the battlements and was killed on the rocks below before the eyes of the assembled multitudes. (C. Campbell Brown's *China in Legend and Story*, Oliphant, Anderson & Ferrier, London, 1907.)

¹ *Vide infra*, p. 293, footnote.

and though its influence is several times greater than the ratio of its numbers would indicate, it is yet, estimated on a national scale, rather a potential than an effective force. Now for the first time we have the women's cause championed by a Government which bids fair some day to rule China, which represents all classes and creeds of the people, and which has the power to express its purpose in the laws of the land.

As we have seen, the Government Women's Department of Hupeh Province was formed at the end of March, and it was not long in initiating reforms. On 9th April regulations were passed providing that women should be included amongst the jurors on all cases where female prisoners were tried. On 19th April a very representative organisation was created to eradicate foot-binding. On 30th April the Women's Department drafted and promulgated regulations instituting astonishingly comprehensive and radical reforms. They provided amongst other things for giving a wife the right to petition for divorce, and to claim alimony in the event of her husband divorcing her; for protecting maid-servants, and young wives in their mother-in-law's home, from cruel treatment, and prostitutes from the oppression of procuresses; for prohibiting the selling of women as either wives or prostitutes; for granting women the right of inheritance; and for the widespread education of ignorant women. Here surely is a Magna Charta of the women of China.

EVALUATION OF THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT

It must not be supposed that all or any of these laws will have been immediately enforced: indeed it is certain that at the best it would be possible only gradually and slowly to extend their sway, even over that part of the vast area of China which has already come under the control of the Nationalist armies. But none of those who have watched the development of the Women's Movement of these early months of 1927 in Wuhan

have any doubt whatever that it has come to stay. We have seen the age-long system of bondage and suppression of Chinese women; and we have watched the quiet but confident advance of the vanguard of modern young womanhood, that during these few decades has been trained and educated in freedom and self-determination. Now in these last months they have drunk deeply, sometimes recklessly, of the blended draught of patriotism and personal freedom—a fiery nectar; and pledged themselves in the cup. The young womanhood of modern China is second to none in the world in potential ability and native resource, and is itself a guarantee of the advance that has been made. The success of the Nationalist Revolution is not yet by any means assured, and the progress of the Women's Movement will surely be hindered; at intervals it may be temporarily arrested; but it cannot be reversed—the ideals conceived cannot be obliterated. Whatever the fate in store for the Nationalist Government, it may be that historians of the future will find that the greatest and most permanent achievement to its credit has been the promotion of the Women's Movement.

CHAPTER VIII

EVIDENCES OF RUSSIAN COMMUNIST CONTROL

IN Chapter V it was stated that a careful study of the facts on the spot at Hankow would give overwhelming proof that the Nationalist Government was under Russian Communist influence: in Chapter VI and certain sections of Chapter VII a brief account has been given of the most prominent doctrines and practices of this Government; and it is now necessary to consider whether these and certain other relevant facts bear out the above statement.

THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT ¹

If we glance over the preceding chapters from this point of view we get a long array of evidence. The tremendous emphasis laid on the importance of the proletarian control of the Revolution, the insistence that, whether they wished to or not, the "workers" and "peasants" must rise and take the leading part in carrying it through—this whole conception ² of the "rule

¹ On this subject Mr. Arthur Ransome, making the mistake of relying on the accounts of Chinese politicians rather than observing the facts for himself, states:—"Here in China it was not a question of setting up 'a workers' and peasants' Government.'" (*The Chinese Puzzle*, Allen & Unwin, London, 1927, p. 86.)

² This was not only a theory: it was practised. The Executive Committees of large Labour Unions in Hankow, such as the Hupeh General Labour Union, were practically Government Departments with full administrative authority over their own people. They promulgated edicts and regulations, and used to arrest, try and punish their members. In Hankow they used pickets armed with staves to carry out their decisions: in Shanghai they were armed with rifles until Chiang Kai Shek disarmed them. In many of the country towns of Hupeh, as I myself saw in Teian and heard from Chinese and foreign colleagues and friends in other towns, the Governor of the town, holding his appointment direct from the Nationalist Government in Hankow, and having Nationalist troops quartered in the town, was yet unable to take any action contrary to the wishes of the two or three leading Labour Unions.

of the proletariat " is quite foreign to all Chinese thinking and philosophy. It will be sought in vain throughout the whole range of Chinese literature previous to 1918, when it began to be introduced by Communists from Japan.¹

It did not until 1923 become the policy even of the Kuo Min Tang, which, like the early Russian Revolution in the days of Miliukoff and Kerensky, had been founded amongst the intelligentsia of the country, had been built up and organised by the patriots amongst them, and had previously been working for a democracy—not for class rule by the manual labourers. It is, however, one of the Marxian principles which was made a foundation stone of the Russian Revolution by Lenin and the other Communists, his companions, as soon as they had captured and assumed control of it in 1917.²

Furthermore, in China as in Russia this " dictatorship of the proletariat," though a very real dictatorship, was actually not directed by the proletariat at all.³ The conception that the masses of workers governed through the agency of their committees made splendid propaganda for the street platforms, and served to stimulate the imagination and enthusiasm of the people. But the fact is that the leaders of a Labour Union committee were chosen or approved by the higher organisation before ever the Labour Union was formed. They put a definite programme before the initial meetings of the newly-formed Unions, and arranged for the election of suitable additional members of committee. From then on they took their orders from the General Labour Union or the Central Executive Committee, and in turn through their Union committee enforced them on the Union members. To a foreigner's mind the accounts given by Chinese, who had attended such Union meetings, of the utter helplessness of the members to assert themselves or resist

¹ *Vide supra*, p. 45.

² See Dukes' *Red Dusk and the Morrow*, Williams and Norgate, London, 1922, pp. 139, 191.

³ See L. Lawton's *The Russian Revolution*, Macmillan, London, 1927, p. 148 et seqq.

the initiative of the tiny groups of leaders who were imposed on them were almost incomprehensible, though indubitably true. The effect of this rule by "soviets" or committees was to establish an iron "dictatorship of (*i.e.* over) the proletariat" by the Central Executive Committee, or, more accurately, by the predominant Communist faction of the Central Executive Committee. The proletariat obediently enforced a dictatorship that was imposed on them by others.

PROPAGANDIST DOCTRINES

Of the leading doctrines and slogans preached by the propagandists the central doctrine of the "Three Democratic Principles" is Chinese in conception, just as Dr. Sun's book expounding them is in form; but of the rest hardly one is of Chinese origin.

The most important of the foreign treaties have been in force for over half a century, and with the exception of those controlling the customs tariff have, for the greater part of the time, caused but little annoyance or irritation, and appear to have been working smoothly for all concerned. The opening of the great ports to foreign trade, though forced on China at the cannon's mouth, and naturally causing great resentment at the time, has gradually approved itself to the commercial sense of the nation, and there is no responsible party in China to-day that would suggest reverting to the ancient policy of exclusion. The foreign Concessions were originally set apart at the suggestion of the Chinese authorities for the segregation of the foreign traders.¹ Extraterritoriality has as a corollary the responsibility of each foreign consul to the Chinese Government for the good behaviour of all the nationals under his jurisdiction.

It is true that, when attention is directed towards these old treaties, it is obvious that in many respects they are now hopelessly out of date, and need very thorough revision; and it is also true that within the last several

¹ *Vide infra*, p. 149.

years a shrill and passionate outcry has arisen against their injustice, which has been spread by the propagandists throughout the land. But the point is that until six or seven years ago the Chinese people, including the patriotic Nationalist Party which has existed for twenty years, appears to have been unaware of, or indifferent to, their anachronistic incongruities; and when the Nationalists came into power in the first Revolution of 1911, the foreign treaties did not figure in their policy.

Similarly no one who was acquainted with the temper of the Chinese people two or three decades ago would have imagined that it was possible for them to be brought to describe themselves as one of the oppressed peoples of the earth: it is not in such terms as this that the citizens of the "Central Kingdom"—the hub of the universe—have been accustomed to think of themselves. It is not disputed that the Sino-Japanese war, and more recently the enslaving twenty-one demands¹ made by Japan in 1915, which they had no means of resisting except by a trade boycott, brought home to the consciousness of their leaders a humiliating sense of their own impotence in the face of foreign aggression. But this does not account for the sudden and widespread discovery that they were being oppressed by *all* the foreign nations, nor does it account for the sudden re-orientation of their policy *vis-à-vis* other Asiatic races such as the Indians, a people whom several short years ago they despised, but now professed to welcome with enthusiastic brotherly love as fellow-victims of the common oppressors. This whole conception of a fellowship of oppressed nations banding themselves together in the "world revolution" will be recognised at once as that which the Russian Third International has been assiduously urging on the peoples of Central Asia and the labour movements of the various nations of the world with but little success during the last eight or nine years.

To anyone who is intimate with the Chinese people

¹ *Vide infra*, p. 221, footnote.

the suggestion that they should wish to abolish "capitalism" is purely ludicrous. The instinct for creating and using capital is innate in every Chinese, from the urchin who peddles peanuts to the multi-millionaire. Probably in no nation in the world has private enterprise and trade such minute ramifications, and the only Chinese who does not lend money or otherwise invest it is he who is too deeply in debt to obtain it.

As for "Imperialism," the very word became current in common speech for the first time on the advent of the Nationalist propagandists, and the people had to be patiently and carefully taught in what sense France and the U.S.A. were "Imperialists" while China¹ was not. Here again the conception is Russian and not Chinese.

So it is with the campaign against the various religions. What could be more foreign to the Chinese mentality, which is so extraordinarily tolerant that a man may be a devotee of both Taoist and Buddhist temples at the same time, Confucianism still supplying the background for his life, and which in the last few years has produced a number of branches of a "Five Religion Society," which actually makes a place in its veneration for Christianity amongst the others? But in the Russian Revolution we find an exact parallel: here religion was generally condemned on the ground that it "anæsthetises" the people (the very phrase used in the propaganda in China); and the members of the Communist Party were compelled as in China to renounce all religious faith as a superstitious weakness.

THE ATTACK ON BRITAIN

One of the prettiest pieces of evidence of the foreign control and orientation of Chinese foreign policy in this Revolution has been the extraordinary intensity with which Great Britain has been singled out for attack beyond all other Powers. From the point of view of

¹ China has asserted and maintained her dominance over foreign races in Thibet and Turkestan by military force.

China, as is shown in Chapter XIX, it is Japan which, far more than Great Britain, has in these years given cause for fear or hatred; but from the point of view of the Third International and the "World Revolution" no blow, however effective, against any other country would have a value approaching that of a successful attack on the prestige, trade and integrity of the British Empire. It is obviously the latter, rather than the former, point of view from which the Nationalist policy has been directed.

RUSSIAN METHODS AND DEVICES

In Russia the process of confiscation and redistribution of land and stock, beginning with the large landowners, was extended to the larger farms of the more well-to-do peasant proprietors. In China it was only practised in the case of large and wealthy landholders, and considering the population of the provinces concerned, probably on relatively very few of these. This should be co-related with the fact that in China, as contrasted with pre-revolutionary Russia, the great majority of the people are landowners: it is estimated that in the case of between 70 per cent. and 80 per cent. of the population of China, either the individual himself or his family owns more or less land.

In the Women's Movement the doctrine of free love and the "common wife," and the scheme for a naked parade will all be recognised as direct importations from Moscow. There is, however, in this connection the very significant difference that as far as can be estimated at the present time, it seems likely that the propaganda of these doctrines is not going to be attended with anything approaching even the partial success that was achieved in Russia.

Many other details of method, organisation and political subterfuge could be quoted. The propagandist training schools were a direct importation from Russia¹ and the Russian institutions in Central Asia. There was

¹ Cf. p. 60; see also Dukes' *Red Dusk and the Morrow*, Williams & Norgate, London, 1922, p. 267.

a propaganda train which toured across Hupeh, like its Russian prototype and that produced at the Russian base in Tashkent, covered with printed slogans and posters, and filled with propagandist speakers. The old Russian device of making a retreat by drawing a distinction between the immediate and the ultimate objective has done yeoman service here in China again and again. At one time it would be carefully explained in the Government newspaper that a temporary truce with capitalism must be made and capitalists used for the present; and at another the middle class would be confidentially assured that they had been needlessly alarmed by rumours of Communism, for Communists recognised that China was not yet ripe for a fully developed form of Communist government, and that at the least it would take a good many years before this could be established.

SECRET POLICE AND THE CHEKA

Only one other piece of organisation will be described: the system of espionage and secret police. Espionage is common enough in China and secret information is always being sought and obtained; but the elaborately organised system of the Nationalist Government is new to the country. Every official of any importance right up to Borodin himself has had secret service men told off to watch and report on him. Even in the army every higher officer has a non-combatant "Commissar" appointed to watch and check his actions. This is the Russian method of control, and there is not wanting evidence of a secret and formidable authority at its head corresponding with the Moscow Cheka. Quite early in the foreign exodus from Hunan, before most of the British had moved, a party of Finnish missionaries were seen who had just reached Hankow. "But why," we asked, "are you Finns moving now? Has your country been incurring Chinese hatred because of its imperialistic designs, and gunboats in Chinese waters?" "China,"

said one of them, "takes no interest in our country, which hardly has even trading relations with her, and we have simply been carrying on our Christian work and have nothing to fear from the Chinese. But we understand the Communist movement as none of you British and Americans do. In our own land we have had reason to hate and fear it: some of us are marked men; and now that it is gaining control in Hunan it would be more than our lives are worth to stay. Our Chinese friends laughed at us when we told them of the terror of the Russian menace which would surely come with the Canton revolutionaries: perhaps now that they have seen us leave our possessions and flee for our lives they will believe us."

We at least did,¹ especially two days later, when his portmanteau disappeared from the boat in which he was about to set sail for Shanghai, and was subsequently found lying in the street empty and with all the leather and lining carefully ripped up by some searcher.¹

The arrest of Chinese was a common occurrence, to be followed by indefinite imprisonment without trial, but sometimes with torture, as a means of extorting money, or by summary execution with or without a brief mock trial. The usual charge was that the accused was an anti-revolutionary, and this included every grade of offence, from espionage and intrigue as agents of the enemy to unwillingness displayed by a wealthy man to hand his wealth over to fill the Nationalist coffers.

In Hankow executions were comparatively rare—perhaps two or three dozen in six months: but in Changsha in Hunan they were common. But even in Hankow there was an intangible nameless apprehension, almost terror, hanging over the people, so that sitting quietly in his own home with one foreigner, an old and trusted colleague, as the sole guest and the servants out of ear-shot, a Chinese host would sometimes be noticed instinc-

¹ Ordinary theft of the luggage of foreigners travelling in China is very rare.

tively to lower his voice to a soft whisper when criticising the actions of the Government.

THE CHINESE ESTIMATE

One of the most illuminating views of the position of the Communist Party (Chinese and Russian) within the Nationalist Government was to be obtained in conversation with intelligent Chinese of moderate and responsible attitude who were keen sympathisers with the Revolution. Borodin in Hankow, as he himself has explicitly stated several times, held no executive appointment within the Nationalist Government: he only gave them advice when desired. But through his sheer personal ability and political insight, and by virtue of his absolute authority as leader of the Communist Party (*q.v.* Chap. IV); his "advice" carried a weight incomparably greater in the Nationalist Government than the influence of any of the responsible Ministers. When Chinese such as those just alluded to would themselves in conversation refer to this ascendancy of Borodin in the Government, or to some of its acts of Communist complexion contrary to all Chinese tradition and sentiment, or when their attention was drawn to some such feature, their response in the first three months of the year 1927 was generally quick and confident—"Yes! It is true the Russians have a very strong directive influence in the Government, and to judge by appearances you would say that the whole Nationalist Party lay helpless in their hands. But wait a while, and you will see. The Chinese leaders are only using them, using their military talents to build up our army, their unique skill in organisation, their experience of the theory and practice of revolutionary politics, and their valuable financial assistance; but when they have finished with them, they will turn the Russians out, and pack them all off to Russia again."

But in April and May when these same men had themselves sensed the iron hand of this Communist

control and propaganda, reaching down into every activity of the people, their confident optimism had wilted; and there were times when some of the truest patriots, whose ideals and hopes were the highest and purest, despaired—despaired utterly of their countrymen being able to throw off these unaccustomed shackles which they had riveted on themselves. At such a time it has fallen to me, a sojourner in the land, because of my wider knowledge of the Bolshevik propaganda and intrigue in other countries, and its results and failures, to comfort and reassure my host as to his own people—that the Communist regime, by its very violence and repugnance to Chinese ideals and nature, was self-limited, and would eventually certainly be repudiated by the nation.

EVIDENCE FROM OUTSIDE

If the above evidence from the Nationalist capital itself still leaves any doubt as to the reality of the Russian Communist domination of the Government during the autumn of 1926 and the winter and spring of 1927, there is even more direct and unmistakable evidence available from outside.

As we shall see later,¹ Feng Yu Hsiang and other leaders within the Nationalist Party, although in the past they had received invaluable assistance from the Russians, and in the future their success would seem to depend very largely on a continuance of this help, nevertheless found the Russian domination so irksome and intolerable that they were constrained to expel the Russian leaders.

Both Eugene Chen and Madame Sun, on the expulsion of the Russians, made public statements that the Nationalist Government and the Revolution were ended.² The inference to be drawn as to the importance of the Russian control and direction is obvious, and no one was in a better position to estimate it than these.

Two more Chinese witnesses should suffice, one an

¹ *Vide infra*, Chap. XX.

² *Vide infra*, p. 236.

anti-Communist, and the other a Communist leader, but both having no connection with the Nationalist Government. Dr. T. Z. Koo, one of the ablest Chinese delegates to the Honolulu Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations in the latter half of July 1927, and a man of sound international standing, declared in his speech¹ that the Chinese have no illusions in regard to Russian assistance rendered to the Revolution, and understand that its purpose is merely to use China to forward their own aims of world revolution, but that the Chinese themselves are past masters in such matters.

Comrade Tan Peng Siang, of the Chinese section of the Third International, in a speech at Moscow in December 1926, declared²:

“The real Chinese revolution began after the proletariat of Russia became the master of the country and was able to extend a helping hand to all oppressed nationalities. It is under the guidance and with the help of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics that the Chinese Revolution has undertaken to attain the following results: (1) to clear the country of all foreigners, (2) to repudiate all the agreements, (3) to make the Customs independent of foreigners, (4) to clear our waters of foreign vessels, (5) to return all foreign Concessions to China, (6) to do away with all extraterritorial rights. All our victories are due to the help we have received from the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, and it is with your help that we shall sweep all the imperialists into the sea.”

The most detailed and incontrovertible evidence that the Communist leaders in China, and through them many of the leaders of the Nationalist Party, worked under the guidance and sometimes the peremptory orders of Moscow, and that the Third International was intimately employed in directing the Revolution as well as supplying it with men and munitions, is contained in a huge mass of

¹ See contemporary Press cables.

² P. T. Etherton in *China—The Facts*, Benn, London, 1927, pp. 178, 179.

documents seized by Chang Tso Lin in the quarters of the Russian Embassy in Peking on 6th April, 1927.¹

The Executive of the Communist International at Moscow immediately denounced these documents as gross forgeries inspired by anti-Bolshevik malice and hatred. But the fact that there were thousands of these papers of all kinds in several languages, including Russian and Chinese, the intimate knowledge they predicate of the organisation, personalities and procedure of the Communist machinery of Moscow as well as of China, and other strong internal evidence of authenticity, absolutely preclude any such explanation. A number of these have already been published with reproductions of photographs of the originals in White Papers by the Peking Government, and the work of classification and translation is still in progress. A preliminary report by one of the Russian translators has just been published in book form,² and copious examples can there be seen of all kinds of these documents; from this publication some conception can be obtained of the overwhelming nature of the case against the Third International and members of the Russian Government.

¹ *Vide infra*, p. 111.

² *World-wide Soviet Plots*, by N. Mitarevsky, Tientsin Press, Tientsin.

CHAPTER IX

THE LOWER YANGTZE CAMPAIGN AND NANKING

THE DRIVE TO SHANGHAI

AFTER Chiang Kai Shek had spent one or two months in reorganising and consolidating his position in the province of Kiangsi, which he had wrested from Sun Chuan Fang, he energetically pushed his attack north-eastwards through the country lying to the south of the Yangtze River, with Shanghai as his objective; and in Central China the Hankow Government began to make preparations for a great Northern military expedition along the railway line to Peking.

The main trunk railway from Tientsin strikes the northern bank of the Yangtze at Pukow, whence ferry boats ply across the river to the great walled city of Nanking. This famous city, once the capital of ancient China, is connected along the southern bank of the river by a railway some 160 miles long with Shanghai on the sea. Chiang Kai Shek's armies struck along the whole length of this railway almost simultaneously: Shanghai was taken on 22nd March, and Nanking after only a show of resistance on 24th, Sun Chuan Fang's troops being decisively routed.

General Chang Chung Chang, the ally of Chang Tso Lin in the North, was waiting on the Tientsin-Pukow line, and so came next in order of the Nationalists' enemies after Sun Chuan Fang. He had, because of jealousy and an old-standing grudge, stood by inactive in the Province of Shantung until Sun's defence was broken, hoping then deftly to secure Shanghai, the great commercial and financial prize of China, for himself: but Chiang Kai Shek was too quick for him.

THE NANKING OUTRAGES

The taking of Nanking was a milestone in the history of the Revolution, and the events connected therewith have had such a powerful and decisive influence on its subsequent course that the essential details need to be clearly set forth. There are always a good many foreigners resident in Nanking, chiefly Americans, but also British, Japanese, and a few of other nationalities; and a large number of these against their consuls' advice had preferred to remain in the city awaiting the advent of the Southerners. They knew that in all the previous fighting these soldiers had never taken any foreigners' lives, and they wished by this gesture to show their confidence in them. When the city was taken on 24th March, seven foreign men were killed, including American, British, Japanese, French and Italian—deliberately shot in cold blood; some half-dozen or more, including the British Consul-General, were wounded; and several foreign women were assaulted, one or two sustaining bullet wounds, and at least two attempts at rape.

But this catalogue gives no adequate conception of the situation. A systematic looting of all the foreigners' houses began early in the morning and continued all day. Their lives were threatened again and again, the reason given being that all foreigners were to be killed. Many, including the Japanese consul, were fired at more than once, poor marksmanship alone saving their lives. As the afternoon wore on the situation became more and more tense, the foreigners' Chinese friends beginning to give up hope of saving them. A large number of foreign refugees (chiefly business people) were collected on a small isolated hill just inside the city wall with a handful of American marines, and many more of these would have been killed had not the American and British gunboats at 5 p.m. laid down a barrage across the open ground between them and the Chinese who were seeking their lives. By this barrage several¹ Chinese were

¹ Not more than six.

killed, but very little damage was done to property. The Chinese attack on the hill ceased immediately and they were safely evacuated to the boats. All the other foreigners, chiefly missionaries, were saved by the devoted and courageous efforts of their Chinese colleagues, servants, pupils, and friends resident in the city, who interceded for them, bought off their attackers, stood guard over them, and concealed them in all sorts of hiding-places until the sound of the firing at 5 p.m. called a halt to the looting. Finally, they arranged for them to be conducted to places of safety. The next afternoon they were all evacuated to the gunboats in the river.

INVESTIGATION AND DIPLOMACY

In the whole century during which there have been foreign women resident in China there has practically never been an attempt at rape against them recorded, and the Southern armies, or at least the disciplined troops that formed the backbone of the armies, had hitherto held a good reputation for their treatment of the civilian population. Not only the members of the Nationalist Government therefore, but also the great majority of Chinese, could not at first believe that such outrages had been committed by Nationalist soldiers, and charged them to the retreating Northerners, who were considered to be very poorly disciplined. But it soon appeared that there was overwhelming evidence that the aggressors were actually Southern soldiers, and that at least a considerable number of them had entered Nanking with the definite purpose, which they frankly stated, of killing foreigners quite aside from any consideration of loot.

The American, British, Japanese, French and Italian Government representatives in China immediately took up the question with Mr. Eugene Chen, the Nationalist Minister of Foreign Affairs, demanding satisfaction in strictly moderate but firm terms. An evasive response

was made, so unsatisfactory that the British Government had under consideration a resort to more drastic measures. But as the American and Japanese views did not entirely coincide with the British there was a delay of over a month. On 7th May, in a memorable speech in the House of Commons, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs announced that Great Britain would not push her demands any longer, as the outrage at Nanking had already, with a dramatic suddenness seldom seen in the field of international relations, brought its own punishment on its perpetrators.

A COMMUNIST PLOT

Let us examine how this had been brought about. In China the solution of the most inexplicable and paradoxical enigmas generally begins to appear not long after the event which raised them has passed by; and so it was in regard to this Nanking mystery. Included amongst the troops under Chiang Kai Shek which attacked and captured Nanking was the Sixth Army, a body recruited from among the Hunanese, and known previously as being of a particularly disorderly and turbulent character. It was subsequently discovered that the killing of the Nanking foreigners had been secretly planned, and was actually carried out, by the Communists within this army, as a deliberate step in the policy of the Communist Party to break the power and influence of Chiang Kai Shek by compromising him with the foreign Powers.

When we consider the independent position of the Communist Party ramifying like a scarlet thread through the whole fabric of the Nationalist organisation, and the strict control exercised by the Party over its members, it is not necessary to assume that all the responsible members of the Government had knowledge of this Nanking Plot. However that may be, the Communist leaders in Hankow had by this time reached the conclusion that Chiang Kai Shek's antagonism to their Party was irreconcilable,

though he was in far too impregnable a position as the idol of the army and the champion of the very large moderate section of the Nationalist Party for any frontal attack. This plot was therefore conceived with the cool calculation, and detachment from the general drift of the Nationalist policy, which has been a characteristic of the genius of Borodin, as seen *par excellence* in his individualistic direction of the Shameen affair in 1925.¹

THE FATE OF THE PLOTTERS

The plot was cunningly conceived; but for once the Communist strategy failed, and the perpetrators were

¹ As part of the general agitation which sprang up in China after the Shanghai shooting incident of 30th May, 1925, arrangements were made in Canton to stage a monster demonstration of protest to pass along the border of the foreign Concessions in Shameen on 23rd June.

The foreign consuls protested to the Chinese authorities, pointing out the grave danger of such a proceeding leading to serious incidents. These authorities, however, persisted in their plans; but gave absolute assurances that the procession would be unarmed, and that no attack of any sort would be launched against Shameen; and it is still the opinion of the foreign consuls that this assurance was given in good faith. The foreigners manned the boundaries of their settlement with what few troops and volunteers they could muster: the procession, many thousands long, and unarmed as promised, passed slowly along the front with its provocative banners and threatening slogans yelled in unison: finally, the rear-guard appeared, some two thousand soldiers from the Whampoa Academy, armed with rifles. When the latter had drawn level with the Shameen garrison, a shot from an unseen rifle startled the air, and in a few moments the peaceful procession was changed into a sharp battle between the opposing bodies of riflemen. Eventually the Chinese were driven off with a number of casualties, those chiefly engaged on the foreign side being the French. It was discovered several weeks later that the initial shot was fired by a Russian from an upper storey window overlooking the procession. That evening a number of Chinese officers met in a small room in a council of war. One after the other urged the advisability and ease of attacking under cover of darkness and driving the foreigners into the sea. Sitting in the shadow silent until they had all finished, Borodin then stood up, and said, "Yes, gentlemen! Shameen is yours for the asking, to-night, if you want it. But take Shameen to-night, and within a month you will have lost the whole Province; and then where will you find a base for the Revolution?" That night the attack was not made; but within several days a flood of fierce anti-British (not anti-French) propaganda was loosed over the whole country.

hoist with their own petard. While Eugene Chen was carrying on negotiations with Great Britain and the other Powers in a way which was shortly to lead to a rupture of relations with the Hankow Government, Chiang Kai Shek was taking the opposite course. A number of the soldiers who had been involved in the outrages in Nanking were executed, the Sixth Army being treated so severely that a little later they deserted, and made their way painfully overland up the river, eventually arriving, a bedraggled and decimated unit, at Hankow. Up to the time of the taking of Nanking and Shanghai the standing of the Nationalist Government of Hankow with the foreign Powers, and the influence of the Communist Party within that Government, had both been strongly in the ascendant. But here they reached their zenith, and henceforward the power of both Government and Party rapidly decline. While this change was dependent on causes wider and deeper than the Nanking episode, this certainly had a strong influence in determining the incidence of the change, as will be shown later.

CHAPTER X

THE WAR BETWEEN CHIANG KAI SHEK AND THE COMMUNISTS

CENTRAL VERSUS EASTERN ARMY COMMAND

On 7th April the Hankow Government made the next move against Chiang. A mandate was published abolishing the post of Generalissimo of the Nationalist forces, a position which he had held since the beginning of the Southern invasion in 1926, and appointing him instead as Commander-in-Chief only of the 1st Nationalist Army Group which was to attack from the Shanghai-Nanking region northwards along the Tientsin-Pukow line towards Pekin; and Feng Yu Hsiang, who all this time had been quietly waiting with his armies in the Western province of Shensi, was by the same mandate appointed to the post of Commander-in-Chief of the 2nd Army Group which was to be the name of the combined expeditionary forces moving northwards along the Pekin-Hankow line. Chiang Kai Shek's supreme authority in the army having thus been split in twain, on 9th April a further mandate was issued, and promulgated in the Government newspaper in Hankow, stating that the Nationalist Government was forthwith to be moved from Hankow and established at Nanking: this was obviously with the purpose of ensuring that in his remaining Eastern Army command Chiang should be under the control of the civil authority of the Government.

SUPPRESSION OF SHANGHAI AND CANTON COMMUNISTS

Just about this time the Communist activity, which had failed in its purpose in Nanking, was seriously threatening Chiang Kai Shek again by stirring up the Labour Union in the Chinese city of Shanghai adjoining the foreign settlement, and known as Chapei. When they continued truculent, maintaining with the aid of armed

pickets an authority independent of that established by Chiang, on the model of the Soviet methods in force at Hankow, he had all their pickets disarmed by the military at the cost of a good many casualties. A general strike was at once called, and a large unarmed deputation besieged the army headquarters on 13th April. The soldiers opened fire, killing and wounding a considerable number; all the Labour Unions' headquarters were closed, and a series of arrests and executions began.

Chiang now appears to have become thoroughly aroused to the Communist menace and to have determined to deal ruthlessly with it. On 15th April under his orders an all-night raid¹ was made in Canton, two thousand arrests in all being made, and of these a certain number, including girl students and Whampoa cadets, were subsequently executed. A number of Labour Union headquarters and the Kuo Min Tang headquarters were closed and sealed as being nests of Communist intrigue. All Communists in the city were ordered to report themselves within ten days, in default of which they would be shot. All the Russian advisers were arrested.

CHIANG KAI SHEK EXCOMMUNICATED

After this it was impossible any longer to keep up the pretence of Chiang's adherence to the Hankow Government, and all talk of moving the seat of government from Hankow to Nanking was discontinued. Wang Ching Wei, President of the Kuo Min Tang and an old associate of Chiang, who had previously been practically exiled to France,² had at this time returned to China, and passing through Shanghai interviewed Chiang, trying to effect a reconciliation. On arriving at Hankow, however, and assuming his position as Chairman of the Central Executive Committee, he reported that this was

¹ This is the second time Chiang Kai Shek carried out a clean-up of Communists and Russians in Canton. It must not be confused with his *coup d'état* of 20th March, 1926, *q.v.* (p. 53 *supra*).

² *Vide supra*, p. 49.

hopeless; and on 17th April the Government published an edict dismissing Chiang from all his Government positions and expelling him from the Nationalist Party, and statement after statement, was made in public meetings and in the Press branding him as an anti-revolutionary and traitor.

There was indeed little else left for them to do, for on 15th April, the same date as the raid at Canton, Chiang had called a Party Convention which established a rival Nationalist Government at Nanking.

RAIDS ON SOVIET HEADQUARTERS AT PEKIN AND SHANGHAI

Just about this time another important attack was made on the Communist organisation. On 6th April, with the consent of the foreign representatives in the Legation Quarter in Peking, Chang Tso Lin's soldiers made a raid on buildings within the Russian Embassy and found many records of the Communist activities in that city, including evidence of its direction and payment from Russia, lists of names, and detailed instructions for the conduct of revolutionary agitation among the masses. As a result of this there were many arrests and twenty executions, including that of Li Ta Chao, a well-known patriot and scholar; and what was clearly a very extensive organisation was broken up. Had this not been done Chang Tso Lin's Peking base might well have been undermined from within in the same way that Hankow and Shanghai had been prepared beforehand to fall an easy prey to Southern conquest. About the same time, at the instance of Chiang Kai Shek, the Soviet Consulate in the International Settlement at Shanghai was placed under rigid police surveillance. We thus have the peculiar situation of Chiang Kai Shek and Chang Tso Lin, though preparing to fight each other to a finish for the possession of Peking, yet taking the same attitude towards the Communists' organisation and propaganda.

THE HANKOW GOVERNMENT ISOLATED

As a result of the widespread anti-Communist activity just described, the Hankow Government now found itself completely cut off from the sea by a broad belt of hostile country stretching from Canton through Shanghai and Peking into Manchuria. Chang Tso Lin's soldiers under his son Chang Hsueh Liang had, since the break-up of Wu Pei Fu's command, gradually pushed their way down the Peking-Hankow railway, and crossing the Yellow River at the northern border of Honan had to a certain degree extended their authority nearly to the southern border of the Province. Here and in south-western Honan were the troops still owing allegiance to Wu Pei Fu with his base at Nanyang. In western Hupeh, holding the higher reaches of the Yangtze and intermittently approaching and retiring from the Hankow region, was Yang Sen, the most famous of the independent Szechuan generals, who had completely disorganised the up-river shipping by commandeering the steamers as transports for his troops.¹ His attitude had on the whole been distinctly hostile to the Nationalist Government.

¹ It was through the action of Yang Sen's troops that the Wanh sien incident occurred at the end of August 1926. Yang Sen, not by any means for the first time, had commandeered two British merchant steamers at Wanh sien, a port on the upper Yangtze, for the transport of his troops. Feeling rose high due to the accidental drowning of a number of Chinese soldiers who had been attempting to board another British boat; and for several days H.M.S. *Cockchafer*, a British gunboat, was immobilised under the rifles and machine-gun batteries of strong Chinese forces stationed in posts throughout the town, and on the captured boats. Yang Sen informed the commander of H.M.S. *Cockchafer* that he intended to arrest every British ship until reparation had been made for the drowning of the Chinese soldiers. On 1st September the nearest British Consul proceeded to Wanh sien, and spent three days in fruitless negotiations for the release of the two ships.

All attempts at a solution of the impasse by conciliatory measures having failed, finally, on 25th September, another British gunboat and an armed transport with marines arrived off Wanh sien, and attempted to cut out the two captured vessels. An engagement ensued lasting for about an hour, the British endeavouring to confine their fire as far as possible to the military posts on the banks and in the town. They failed to secure the ships, but with the assistance

Thus they found themselves surrounded on three quarters of a circle, from south through east and north round to west, leaving open to them only the south-west leading towards the French border of Tongking and the mountains of North Burma. The only provinces on which they could certainly rely for support in men, money and supplies were Hunan, East and Central Hupeh, and perhaps most of Kiangsi and the nearer parts of Kweichow and Kuangsi.

of the *Cockchafer*, which had now secured freedom of action, effected the release of five out of the six officers who had been imprisoned on board. The British had eight killed and fifteen wounded. On the Chinese side the Chinese claimed that 1000 houses were destroyed and thousands of civilians killed; but the British estimate, based on subsequent investigations on the spot, was that twenty houses were destroyed, less than 100 civilians killed, and many machine guns put out of action. The British steamers were restored on 28th September as a result of negotiations initiated by Yang Sen.

The British (Tory) newspaper in Hankow proudly reported and commented on the incident as the "Wanhsien Epic" adding fresh lustre to the annals of the British Navy, and referred with satisfaction to the Japanese report that 2000 people in all had been killed in the densely populated town, welcoming the whole incident as being a very salutary and needful lesson for the Chinese people. Most educated Chinese regarded it as an outburst of barbarism, akin perhaps to the actions of their own bandit hordes. Foreign Christian sentiment in Hankow, while profoundly regretting the incident, realised that, from the military standpoint, some such action as that taken was required when a British warship had been imprisoned and British merchant shipping and its officers were being held under threat by force of arms. If the necessity of the action being fought at that spot be granted, civilian casualties were inevitable.

PART III
FOREIGNERS AND THE REVOLUTION

CHAPTER XI

THE NATIONALIST GOVERNMENT AND FOREIGN RELATIONS—EARLY PERIOD

THE FOREIGN MINISTER—EUGENE CHEN

It would surely not be easy to find in English a record of diplomatic correspondence to match that of the "Nationalist Government of China" with the British Government during the first three months of the year 1927. Mr. Eugene Chen, the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs, was born a British subject in Trinidad in 1878. He qualified as a solicitor in London, where he practised successfully until he joined the Government service in Peking in 1912. Here for several years he edited and finally owned a liberal newspaper, the *Peking Gazette*. In 1918 he joined the Southerners, being one of their representatives on a mission to the United States the same year and to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. From 1922 to 1924 he was foreign adviser to the Canton Government, and in 1925 he was again editing a newspaper in Peking, a bilingual Kuo Min Tang organ, the *Min Pao*. In April 1926 he received his portfolio in the Nationalist Government.

He is one of the Nationalist leaders whose personal integrity in an atmosphere thick with scandal and suspicion has never been questioned. As a patriot he has a record for intrepidity, conducting each of his former Peking newspapers in such an outspoken and fearless manner as to land himself eventually in prison, on the second occasion only narrowly escaping with his life. Neither he nor the members of his family can speak a word of Chinese; but he is a master in the use of English, and has shown outstanding ability as a diplomat.

In all international affairs and relations, as opposed to purely internal politics in China, he stands head and shoulders above all other members of the Nationalist Government. It required qualities of a high order so thoroughly to understand and represent the new spirit which had entered into Chinese politics with the Revolution that he retained the confidence and steady support of his colleagues, and at the same time to express this spirit and purpose and to carry on negotiations thereanent in such a way as to secure a hearing and maintain his Government's prestige with the diplomats and peoples of foreign countries, used for generations to traditional and conservative methods of diplomacy. It is easy to point out certain incongruities in his statements; but for many of these the Government, and not he, was responsible, as will shortly be shown. If, however, we wish to estimate his success *vis-à-vis* foreign diplomats, we have only to compare it with the failure so commonly seen in the standing and relations with other countries of the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Republic of Russia, a country whose Government has been in a relationship with other nations similar in some ways to that of China.

THE BRITISH POSITION AT THE BEGINNING OF THE REVOLUTION

Since throughout the course of this Revolution it is Great Britain which has been singled out above all other nations for a concentrated attack, it has naturally followed that most of the important and outstanding diplomatic correspondence of the Nationalist Government has also been directed towards the same country. And since British trade, British property and British institutions and traditions in China are generally speaking more valuable and powerful than those of any other foreign country, it is chiefly to British statesmen that the extremely intricate and difficult task has fallen of unravelling the threads and weighing the significance of these portentous and unprecedented phenomena of the Revolution, and giving

a strong and independent lead in a new policy oriented to the changed situation.

For several years the attitude of Great Britain towards all the privileges secured to her nationals in China by old treaties, which are now repugnant to the Chinese, has been that she is prepared to enter into friendly discussion and negotiation regarding all points of difference as soon as there is a Government with authority and power to act for the whole of China. This attitude has, however, been generally regarded by the Chinese as disingenuous procrastination. "For," they have said, "it is obvious that, weak and inefficient as the Peking Government has been, any treaty made by it with a Foreign Power, to the distinct improvement of China's international position, would nevertheless gladly be accepted by all other authorities or Governments in China."

THE NATIONALIST DEMAND FOR RECOGNITION

As soon, however, as the Nationalist Government had established itself at Hankow it took a much bolder and more dramatic stand than this. Not a third of China had yet come under its sway; it did not control even one of the three great arteries of communication (the lower Yangtze River and the two railways running northwards); Shanghai the great metropolis and trade emporium of the East, and Peking the ancient capital and present seat of Government and of the foreign Legations, were alike far beyond its grasp; and there were not only the effete Peking Government, but also three great army groups in the country waiting to dispute its further progress. Despite this situation Eugene Chen, the Minister for Foreign Affairs at Hankow, demanded not only that Great Britain should recognise his Government as a *de facto* Government of China, but also that she should recognise it as the *only* Government in China, withdrawing her diplomatic recognition from Peking.

The demand sounds preposterous to foreign ears; but when interpreted according to the canon of Chinese

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thinking previously enunciated (*vide supra*, p. 22), the Nationalist attitude is understandable. This was *The Revolution*; it had achieved amazing and rapid success in the previous few months; it had the whole of the invincible spirit of Young China behind it, and would shortly have also the countless millions of the manual labourers; in front there lay arrayed against it nothing more formidable than an effete and powerless Government, half-hearted and mutinous soldiery, bribery, corruption, self-seeking and inefficiency, which must and would crash like a pack of cards at a resolute touch. At most there wanted but a few months for the sway of the Nationalist Government to be supreme and unchallenged from the steppes of Siberia to the mountains of Armenia, from the ocean on the East to the deserts of Turkestan in the West. In concept the achievement was already accomplished: why then waste time and thought in the pretence of nursing the embers of a fire in Peking which was already burnt out? ¹

This is splendid optimism or huge and absurd bluff according to the point of view of the reader; but in either case it is typical of the spirit of the Nationalist leaders and their propagandists, and had a high suggestive value, maintaining their own morale, impressing others in spite of their reasoned conclusions, and correspondingly impressing their enemies. It proved its power to sustain them in the face of difficulties and beneath disasters which would otherwise have crushed the movement.

THE BRITISH ATTITUDE

The occupation of the British Concession in Hankow by Nationalist troops on 4th January and the means by which it was accomplished have already been described.² It is unfortunate that it occurred just at the time when an

¹ To Mr. A. Ransome in these days Eugene Chen "described the Peking Government as 'fictitious because it was without any power lent to it by generals who would not dream of obeying it.'" (*The Chinese Puzzle*, Allen & Unwin, London, 1927.)

² *Vide supra*, p. 32 et seqq.

entirely new policy towards China had been adopted by Sir Austen Chamberlain, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, on behalf of the British Government. He, however, maintaining that this new policy was a carefully considered constructive step towards the permanent improvement of Anglo-Chinese relations in the future and no mere measure of expediency to meet a present emergency, decided to ignore the Concession incident and to proceed with the policy. In pursuance of this purpose, Sir Miles Lampson, the new British Minister *en route* to Peking, had come first to Hankow and spent from 8th to 17th December in a close study of the situation and in conversations with Mr. Eugene Chen; and after he had passed on to Peking, a permanent representative, Mr. O'Malley, was appointed by him to reside at Hankow and represent him to the Nationalist Government.

CHAMBERLAIN'S NEW POLICY

On 18th December Sir Miles Lampson, before his return to Peking, announced,¹ through his representative, to the Ministers of other foreign Powers the intention of the British Government to adopt a new policy towards China, in particular to withdraw all opposition to the immediate imposition of the Customs surtaxes which had been suggested at the Washington Conference, and had failed of a final settlement at the Peking Tariff Conference in 1925-26.² Great Britain invited the other Powers to associate themselves with her in this action.

On 27th January, 1927, a definite offer was made by the British Representative to the Governments at Peking and Hankow respectively. In the case of Hankow the proposals were to be proceeded with as soon as a satisfactory settlement in regard to the change of status of the Hankow and Kiukiang³ Concessions had been reached, and the

¹ For the full text of this note see Sir F. Whyte's *China and Foreign Powers*, Oxford Univ. Press, London, 1927, Appendix V, p. 51.

² *Vide supra*, p. 71.

³ This Concession, about 130 miles down the river from Hankow, had also to be evacuated by all British residents on 7th January,

Nationalist Government had given an assurance that it would not in the future countenance any alteration, except by negotiation, in the status of any other British Concessions. The text¹ of this offer is as follows:

Measures for Treaty Modification as communicated to the Chinese Authorities on January 27th, 1927.

1. His Majesty's Government are prepared to recognise the modern Chinese law courts as the competent courts for cases brought by British plaintiffs or complainants and to waive the right of attendance of a British representative at the hearing of such cases.

2. His Majesty's Government are prepared to recognise the validity of a reasonable Chinese nationality law.

3. His Majesty's Government are prepared to apply as far as practicable in British courts in China the modern Chinese Civil and Commercial Codes (apart from Procedure Codes and those affecting personal status) and duly enacted subordinate legislation as and when such laws and regulations are promulgated and enforced in Chinese courts and on Chinese citizens throughout China.

4. His Majesty's Government are prepared to make British subjects in China liable to pay such regular and legal Chinese taxation, not involving discrimination against British subjects or British goods, as is in fact imposed on and paid by Chinese citizens throughout China.

5. His Majesty's Government are prepared as soon as the revised Chinese Penal Code is promulgated and applied in Chinese courts to consider its application in British courts in China.

6. His Majesty's Government are prepared to discuss and enter into arrangements, according to the particular circumstances at each port concerned, for the modification of the municipal administrations of British Concessions so as to bring them into line with the administration of the special Chinese administrations set up in former Concessions at Hankow or for their amalgamation with neighbouring Concessions or former Concessions now under Chinese control or for the transfer of police control of the Concession areas to the Chinese authorities.

7. His Majesty's Government are prepared to accept the principle that British missionaries should no longer claim the right to purchase land in the interior, that Chinese converts should look to Chinese law and not to treaties for protection, and that missionary, educational and medical institutions will conform to Chinese laws and regulations applying to similar institutions.

Note 1.

When communicating these proposals to Mr. Chen at Hankow on the 27th January Mr. O'Malley prefaced them with the following paragraph:

"When a satisfactory settlement has been reached in respect to the British Concessions at Hankow and Kiukiang, and when

and left in charge of Chinese troops, who did some looting and damage to buildings, including the British Consulate.

¹ *Vide op. cit.*, Appendix VII, pp. 67, 68.

assurances have been given by the Nationalist Government that they will not countenance any alteration, except by negotiation of the status of the British Concessions and international settlements, His Majesty's Government will be prepared to concede at once and on the lines indicated in the enclosure hereto a great part of what is desired of them by the Chinese Nationalist Party. So liberal and generous a step cannot in their view be regarded otherwise than as an earnest of the fair and conciliatory spirit with which they are animated."

Note 2.

"The words in italics in paragraph 6 were omitted from Mr. Lampson's communication to Dr. Koo, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Peking Government."

THE CHINESE RESPONSE AND THE TRANSFER OF CONCESSIONS

No other country except Russia had hitherto made such a liberal offer to China. Such an advance in policy as this two years earlier would have had a powerful effect for good on the relationship of the two countries; but now, when feeling had been raised to the present pitch, the most obvious response from the Chinese side was indignant protest at the condescending tone of the British Note. It was not now a question, Eugène Chen said, of Britain granting favours to satisfy "China's legitimate national aspirations,"¹ and the sooner Britain realised the changed relationship the better. China was now mistress in her own house, and simply would not tolerate any longer the obsolete one-sided treaties which had been imposed on her by force of arms in the days of her weakness. She was prepared, however, freely to negotiate in their stead reciprocal treaties with other nations on a basis of equality.²

¹ A favourite phrase in the mouths of British statesmen.

² The most striking passage in Mr. Chen's declaration of 22nd January, protesting against the despatch of British military and naval forces, is the following:

"To-day the effective protection of foreign life and property in China does not stand, and can no longer rest, on foreign bayonets and foreign gunboats, because 'the arm' of Chinese Nationalism—the economic weapon—is more puissant than any engine of warfare that a foreigner can devise.

"It is, however, the view of the Nationalist Government that the liberation of China from the yoke of foreign imperialism need not

In spite of this attitude, however, Eugene Chen agreed to legalise the new status of the British Concessions at Hankow and Kiukiang, and to give the assurance required regarding other British Concessions. On 19th February, 1927, the first treaty that the Nationalist Government has made with any foreign nation—the Chen-O'Malley Agreement—was signed at Hankow, specifying the terms for the transfer of these Hankow and Kiukiang Concessions. The new regulations having been agreed upon at a meeting of the ratepayers, the Nationalist soldiers on 15th March handed back the control of the Hankow Concession to the old Municipal Council, which then formally transferred its authority to the new Council representing equally Chinese and British ratepayers, the chairman being a Chinese "Director" nominated by the Government. Shortly afterwards the British Concession area at Kiukiang was similarly transferred.

DESPATCH OF FOREIGN NAVAL AND MILITARY FORCES TO CHINA

Perhaps the action of Great Britain which aroused the keenest resentment at this time was the despatch of armed forces to China. Week by week the number of warships of all nationalities, and all classes, from river gunboats to battle-cruisers, which steamed into port at Hankow and anchored off the Bund, steadily grew until on 22nd April there was a line—a mile and a half long of thirty-five vessels, consisting of eleven British, ten Japanese, nine American, three French, and two Italian; and the total was a little later brought up to forty-two. At Shanghai at the above date there were fourteen Japanese warships,

necessarily involve any armed conflict between Chinese nationalism and the foreign Powers. For this reason the Nationalist Government would prefer to have all questions outstanding between Nationalist China and the foreign Powers settled by negotiation and agreement.

"To prove that this is no idle statement of policy, the Nationalist Government hereby declares its readiness to negotiate separately with any of the Powers for a settlement of treaty and other cognate questions on the basis of economic equality and mutual respect for each other's political and territorial sovereignty."

thirteen American, eight British, three French, one Italian, one Spanish, one Portuguese, and one Dutch—a total of forty-two; and including these figures there were at this time in Chinese waters, either on the coast or in the rivers, 171 warships of all foreign nations, the British quota being the largest.

In land forces too Great Britain took the lead. The United States had forces available a few days' sail distant in the Philippines, and two weeks away on her Pacific Coast, while Japan could at any time rush any required number of troops into Shanghai at three or four days' notice; both countries too preferred to leave the odium of taking the lead in such action to fall on Great Britain, so that at one time it was published throughout China that the United States of America would withdraw every one of her nationals from the country rather than land troops to defend them.

Great Britain, however, is so situated geographically that it was impracticable to temporise; and after her experience of the seizing of the Concession at Hankow she was not inclined to risk a repetition of the process at Shanghai. In January, therefore, an expeditionary force was prepared, and was sent to the East, consisting of English and Indian infantry, with very complete quotas of auxiliary forces, including Indian cavalry, tanks, aeroplanes, artillery and hospital units. The force when completed numbered in all over 20,000 men, the greater part of whom established themselves in Shanghai, while a few thousand were, in deference to Nationalist protests and assurances, held at Hongkong in reserve. The numbers of the Japanese, American and French land forces at Shanghai were never comparable with those of the British; but after the Nanking incident¹ they were

¹ In the early months of 1927 the great majority of the Americans resident in China, on account of the peculiar way in which the Nationalist propaganda was concentrated on the British to the exclusion of other nationalities, and because of their personal conviction that their own country took a higher ethical attitude towards China than Great Britain, felt that they were entitled to, and

considerably reinforced. The British policy was to concentrate on Shanghai, the greatest number of troops kept at Hankow for any considerable time being about 1000 men quartered on board various warships at the end of April. At Shanghai three-year leases were taken of suitable blocks of land and substantial military huts erected, establishing permanent camps.

NATIONALIST PROTESTS

These military and naval preparations were the occasion of fierce and sustained protest from the Ministers, officials and propagandists of the Hankow Government. The propagandists day after day hammered into the crowd the conception that such forces as those above enumerated could have no other meaning than that Great Britain was about to make war on China and the Nationalist Government, first by opening an offensive against it at Hankow, and secondly by supporting the Northern armies in occupation of Shanghai, and so preventing the Nationalist armies from capturing and gaining control of the city. As the crowds became stirred by these recitals, they were drilled again and again into yelling their slogan, "Down with British Imperialism!"

The Minister for Foreign Affairs in his representations to British officials in China and in public pronouncements¹

could still confidently count on receiving, the favourable preferential treatment which had hitherto been accorded them.

Hence it was that at Nanking, when soldiers burst into American houses and announced to the inmates that they were about to kill the foreigners, not a few answered with confidence: "You've made a mistake; we are Americans." In every case the answer was: "That makes no difference; Americans are to be killed just the same as British or other foreigners."

This realisation that their supposed privileged position could not be depended on to protect them undoubtedly made a profound impression and caused grave consternation among the Americans, not only in Nanking, but throughout China, especially as several Americans, including the Consul, were actually assaulted, wounded, or killed. Thenceforward, in Hankow at least, the Americans and their Consul appeared generally more apprehensive of trouble than the British.

¹ Recorded in the issues of *The People's Tribune*, Hankow, March-April 1927.

emphasised that these warlike preparations were quite unnecessary for the protection of British nationals and property, as the Hankow Government absolutely guaranteed the safety of both: he reiterated his guarantee in spite of the fact that Concession areas in other places than Hankow had been seized by mob violence, and large numbers of the churches, schools and even dwellings belonging to Foreign Missionary Societies up and down the provinces had been occupied by Nationalist organisations and in a good many cases looted; and finally he offered to absolutely guarantee the persons and property of all foreigners in Shanghai at a time when the town was still in the hands of the Northerners and the Southerners had not yet even begun to attack it.

He further urged that, not only were these warlike preparations unnecessary, but even positively provocative and dangerous. If all troops and warships were withdrawn the Nationalist Government would have no difficulty in maintaining order as already promised; but these flagrant insults to Chinese sovereignty, this threat of the mailed fist, so irritated and maddened the patriotic spirit of the Chinese masses that it became extremely difficult for the Government to restrain them from outbursts of violence.

Where there had been regrettable incidents of foreigners suffering in this way, these were to a very large degree the natural psychological result of the complex that was created in the mind of the Chinese crowd by the foreign display of force; and British rather than Chinese policy must be held responsible.

THE BRITISH REPLY

The British¹ attitude *vis-à-vis* this Chinese argument dealt with definite events rather than with psychology. Without questioning the *bona fides* of the Nationalist Government, it was obvious that it was not able to adequately

¹ See *Times* reports of contemporary speeches of British Ministers in England as well as British communications to Nationalist authorities in China, reported in *The People's Tribune*, Hankow.

protect foreign persons and property. Many foreign buildings had been seized by the mobs or labour organisations, who had also again and again threatened foreigners with violence. As a matter of cold fact the crowds were continually being incited to fresh acts of violence by official propaganda. In Hankow, the Nationalist capital, with the Government in supreme control, ample military forces in occupation, and no threat of attack from hostile troops within a hundred miles, a riotous mob thousands strong had actually been allowed in broad daylight to make a fierce attack on the British Concession, forcing the alternative on the British authorities of opening fire on the crowd or handing over the Concession to be occupied by Chinese soldiery. In Kiukiang a similar incident had occurred, accompanied by setting fire to the British Consulate. This being so, it would be unthinkable to depend on any Nationalist guarantees of Chinese protection for the foreign persons and property of Shanghai, a city rolling in wealth, the richest prize for looters in the Far East, where the Nationalist Government had no control, and where it was expected that war between rival Chinese armies would presently be waging. Neither did the British Government consider it safe to leave Hankow and the other river ports without adequate naval forces available. The Government considered it to be its first duty to secure the lives and property of its citizens, wherever they might reside, and would at all costs perform this duty. At the same time it gave an absolute assurance that any naval or military forces despatched to China would be used for this purpose alone, and were in no way intended to participate or take sides in any war being waged in China, or to make any kind of attack against the Nationalist Government.

Such briefly were the Nationalist Government's and the British official conceptions of the naval and military forces despatched to China; and that of the other foreign nations with naval or military forces along the Yangtze River was similar to that of Britain. The Chinese Govern-

ment maintained that the large size and complete equipment of the Shanghai expeditionary force, and the heavy calibre ¹ of such cruisers as the *Vindictive* and *Carlisle* could have no other significance than war; while the British position was that to despatch weak and inefficient forces was to invite, perhaps even provoke disaster,² and that the stronger and more powerful such forces were within reason, the less likely was any disturbance or bloodshed.

THE EARLY PERIOD IN FOREIGN RELATIONS

There are two quite distinct periods in the relations of the Nationalist Government with the foreign Powers and their nationals in Central China. The first period extends from the establishment of the Nationalist Government in Hankow early in December, 1926 until the middle of April 1927, during which time its prestige was in the ascendant. The second period extends from the middle of April onwards, and is the period of its decline in prestige.

The spirit which animated and inspired, not only the Nationalist Government, but the whole Party in Central China during this first period, has already been described in the early chapters. It was one of youthful optimism, superb confidence and bold aggressiveness. The Government's policy was to protect the persons and property of foreigners and it had no animosity towards individuals; but its point of view was that a great revolution was rapidly advancing, and if occasional inconveniences or regrettable incidents occurred, that was simply an inevitable concomitant of life in China at such a time. Foreigners who had dealings with the officials in the Foreign Office during these months felt that there was a real friendliness and willingness to protect their interests

¹ *Vide infra*, p. 133.

² It is the almost universal opinion of Chinese and foreigners in regard to the Shanghai incident of May 1925 (see p. 13) that if it had been foreseen sufficiently early to reinforce the two or three dozen police to a hundred or more, no bloodshed would have occurred.

as far as practicable, but that the Foreign Office was practically powerless to influence the Government to arrest or even restrain the destructive and disorderly forces that they had deliberately let loose for the purpose of arousing the people and pushing forward the Revolution. In spite of Foreign Office assurances, and official caveats issued by them, the seizing and occupying of foreign Missionary Societies' property in the country, and the paralysing of foreign business in Hankow by unreasonable strikes and intimidation continued.

During this time Chinese opinion amongst the substantial classes was hardening against the Government. It is true that nearly all the really wealthy Chinese had fled at the beginning of the trouble; but the middle-class shopkeepers, and men engaged in the factories and other industries, still remained. Many of these, through loss of trade, the large increase in expenditure for wages, and the commandeering of their workmen on full pay for picket duty or processions and meetings, were ruined; and others were thrown into prison for closing down their shops. The Chinese cotton mills in Wuchang, large well-managed concerns employing thousands of workmen, made a gallant fight for life, and rather than throw all their workmen out of employment carried on at a loss for some time in the face of the disabilities just mentioned; but most of them, by the unreasoning excesses of all kinds of labour demands, were eventually forced to close.

At the same time the more responsible members of the Government were very anxious that the foreign population should not withdraw from Wuchang; for this would entail a still further decrease in the Customs revenue, already greatly depleted, and, a consideration of equal importance to them, the incontrovertible discrediting before the whole world of their rule in this their capital city. As evidence of the two opposing principles interacting within the Government, a Gilbertian episode was occasionally to be seen on the Hankow streets. Some morning, bands of official bill-stickers from one of the

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Government departments would plaster the walls of the principal thoroughfares with abusive and inflammatory anti-foreign posters: a few hours later other bands from another Government department would go round and carefully tear them all down.

CHAPTER XII

THE NATIONALIST GOVERNMENT AND FOREIGN RELATIONS—LATTER PERIOD

THE TURN OF THE TIDE—WEAKENING OF THE COMMUNISTS

It was the Communist plot at Nanking on March 24th, and the insubordinate attitude of the Shanghai Labour Unions, which had brought to a head the split between Chiang Kai Shek and the Hankow Government with its Communist associates and controllers. When Chiang finally completed the split by establishing his anti-Communist Government at Nanking and raiding the Canton Communists, he not only completely isolated the Hankow Government, as has been shown in Chapter X, but also sequestered the main bullion reserves in Canton of the Central Bank of China, the newly organised Government financial institution, thus very seriously undermining their credit.

But the Nanking episode had another and quite unexpected effect. Instead of discrediting Chiang Kai Shek with the Powers, as it was intended to do, it hardly implicated him owing to his prompt and energetic anti-Communist action. All the foreign Powers' demands for satisfaction, *i.e.* of Great Britain, Japan, the United States, France and Italy, were on the contrary presented to the Government at Hankow, and some of these demands it was powerless to meet, even if it had the will to do so, as it now had no authority over Chiang or any of his officers and troops.

THE NANKING CORRESPONDENCE

The unsatisfactory and evasive nature of the Nationalist replies to these demands, which were studiously moderate and reasonable, caused a growing distrust abroad, so that

America and Japan as well as Britain strengthened their already considerable naval forces off Hankow. The five Powers had presented an identical Note on the subject: in fact at one time it appeared as if the first three were about to unite in one common policy *vis-à-vis* China. This was a consummation which the Nationalists had been straining every nerve to avert, and the Nationalist newspaper was now full of reproaches to America for allowing herself to be led astray and made a tool of by British imperialism contrary to the high opinion and close friendship in which China had held her. In reply to the identical Notes presented by the five countries, Eugene Chen had despatched Notes, of different wording in each case, suggesting an impracticable International Commission of Inquiry, agreeing to certain of the demands, and in the case of Britain, America and France making counter-claims.

FOREIGN NAVAL REINFORCEMENTS

The correspondence was prolonged for some time; but there was less delay in the arrival of the warships. On account of the riot in the Japanese Concession on 3rd April (see p. 71) Japan had already sent three or four heavy cruisers to Hankow with a considerable complement of marines and on 21st April the British armoured cruisers *Vindictive* (9,750 tons) and *Carlisle* (4,190 tons), and the American armoured cruiser *Cincinnati* (7,500 tons) also arrived and dropped anchor.

The arrival of these vessels made some little stir in the town, especially in the Chinese city. The next day, in discussing it with an intimate Chinese friend who had suffered severely through the 'Revolution, I deplored the action. "The British and Americans have an ample number of warships already here," I said, "to meet any emergency; and this action in sending such armoured cruisers is quite unnecessary to protect foreigners; it would be useless for offensive purposes, as the Government is housed in the heart of the

reign Concessions in valuable buildings which the navy would be loath to demolish; and it will only serve to cause fresh irritation and anti-foreign demonstrations." To me as a Chinese it is irritating, very irritating," he replied, "but I know my own people; and it will not result, as you think, in renewed demonstrations and anti-foreignism; but within several days there will be a great diminution in anti-foreign propaganda, and a much more reasonable and conciliatory attitude will be shown by the Government: just wait and see."

THE LATTER PERIOD IN FOREIGN RELATIONS

It is probable that the envelopment and isolation of the Hankow Government by Chiang Kai Shek had more effect than the foreign Powers' policy represented by these cruisers; but, however this may be, the first period in the relations of the Nationalist Government with the foreign Powers and their nationals now came to an end, and on 23rd April a Government mandate was issued in Hankow which may be taken to inaugurate the second period in these relations—a period contemporaneous with the decline in prestige of the Hankow Government.

GOVERNMENT AND LABOUR UNION EDICTS

The mandate¹ or manifesto of the Central Executive Committee, or Hankow Government, began by emphasising and denouncing the imperialistic attitude of the foreign Powers, especially of Britain. According to their century-old tradition, in accordance with which they had heaped indignities and injustice on China in the past, they were again aiming at humiliating China with their warships. Even now these great engines of destruction were lying at anchor off Hankow, eagerly looking for some opportunity of making war on the young Nationalist Government. Therefore it was the duty of every member and supporter of the Government to take the most scrupulous care not to irritate these foreigners. Nothing

¹ For the text of this and the following edicts see contemporary files of *The People's Tribune*, Hankow.

must be done that could be in any way construed as a pretext or excuse for the foreigners to make war on China, or for any other kind of aggression. Their persons and property must be carefully safeguarded, and especially everything possible must be done to assist and forward their trade interests.

On the next day, 24th April, an even more significant publication was made. Hitherto the Labour Unions had been permitted very largely to go their own way irrespective of any declared policy of the Government towards foreigners. On this day, however, the Hupeh General Labour Union, the controlling body of all the special occupational unions in the Province, not only published a manifesto recapitulating and emphasising the instructions of the Government's proclamation, but also issued a detailed series of regulations specifying the penalties that were to be enforced against any trade union members disobeying them.

A hint as to one of the motives actuating this very significant change in policy is contained in another edict published on the same day (24th April). This constituted a very representative Committee of Public Safety, for the purpose of investigating and suppressing any counter-revolutionary activities. For this purpose regulations were appended giving the Committee summary powers up to and including the infliction of the death penalty. It was at this time too that there were published the regulations (also issued in duplicate by the Government and the Hupeh General Labour Union) prescribing the procedure for dispossessing large landholders¹ and specifying and restraining the power of Labour Unions to inflict penalties, especially the death penalty.

The publications in the Nationalist Press described on p. 97 explaining the principle of the temporary use of capitalists, and reassuring the people against rumours of the imminent establishment of a thorough-going Communist regime, also belong to this period.

¹ *Vide supra*, p. 75.

PROTECTION AND RESTORATION OF FOREIGN
PROPERTY

The above paragraphs give some account of the edicts and Press publications which ushered in the new era in the foreign relations of the Nationalist Government; but there were more substantial results than these to follow. Before long, to the representatives of the various Missionary Societies gathered in Hankow word came down of a changed attitude towards the distant up-country Mission stations and Chinese churches in Hupeh. In a good many cases schools, churches and missionaries' houses, which had been forcibly seized and occupied by various revolutionary committees, were restored to the custody of the church officials; and the local opposition and persecution of Christians were very considerably mitigated.

The Foreign Office, instead of being merely courteous and sympathetic, had now become energetic and even decisive in foreigners' difficulties. In and around Wuhan, in several cases where bodies of troops had occupied foreign-owned buildings (not in the Concession areas), the Office, on being appealed to, quickly secured their evacuation, though in some cases this involved it in a strenuous contest with other factions within the party.

The man who had first been appointed Police Commissioner of the ex-British Concession when this came under Chinese control in January had proved himself so energetic in maintaining order, and especially in dealing with foreigners' troubles with carrying coolies referred to him, that he had become unpopular, and had been dismissed. It is a sign of the times that he was now reinstated in his old position.

RECALL OF BRITISH REPRESENTATIVE

As the weeks passed, and satisfaction for the Nanking outrages could not be obtained from Eugene Chen by the foreign Powers, the situation became more and more tense. Rumour had it that both Japan and America

were inclined to relinquish their claim rather than take action against the Nationalist Government, but that Great Britain was in favour of a joint insistence on their demands, backed up by force if necessary. It was further said that Britain was temporising in the hope of bringing the other two Powers into harmony with her views, but was prepared to take action alone if necessary.

Eventually on 14th May, like a high explosive shell from a distant battery, came the request of the British Representative at Hankow to Mr. Chen for his papers, and at the same time a notable speech by Sir Austen Chamberlain in the House of Commons announcing the rupture of diplomatic relations.

CHAMBERLAIN'S SPEECH ON RUPTURE OF RELATIONS

The speech refers scathingly to the breach of international ethics in the Nationalist Government's failure to offer satisfaction for the Nanking incident. It draws attention to the forcible seizure by Nationalists of the British Concession at Chinkiang, a Lower Yangtze treaty port, and of other places, in direct contravention of the solemn assurances given by the Nationalist Foreign Minister at the time of the handing over of the Hankow Concession; and also stigmatises the repeated firing by Nationalist soldiers on British vessels passing up and down the Lower Yangtze during the previous few months. Chamberlain then points out the irresponsibility of a Government acting, or permitting its nationals and soldiers to act, in these ways. He states that his Government had considered the advisability of resuming control of the Hankow Concession in view of the above facts, and was in a position to do so; but it had at length decided to take no action. The reason for this decision was partly that, in spite of extreme provocation, it was still desirous in pursuance of the policy announced several months previously to meet Chinese aspirations in a friendly spirit, and partly that, with regard to the demands made in respect of the Nanking outrages, punishment had already been inflicted on the guilty parties. Since,

however, the Nationalist Government, so far from representing the whole of China as it claimed, appeared to control very little outside the confines of Wuhan, and Mr. Chen apparently represented few people beside himself, the British Representative at Hankow would be withdrawn.

EUGENE CHEN'S REPLY

Eugene Chen, considering his weakening position and the overwhelming difficulties confronting his Government, and the acute crisis¹ which was just developing in the military situation, made a remarkably spirited and dignified reply, deploring that, as usual in its Chinese relations, the British Government had so completely misunderstood the position and prospects of his Government. He acknowledged the breach in relations with Great Britain, until the time, now close at hand, when he would speak from Peking for a united China with a voice that Sir Austen Chamberlain would no longer be able to ignore.

In passing over this episode it is worth observing that the British notification of rupture of relations was made only three days before the attempted *coup d'état* of Hsia Tao Yin²—a time when not only foreigners, but also many Chinese in Hankow, were very apprehensive of the imminent collapse of the Government, and that four days later news reached Hankow of the first of the brilliant Nationalist victories³ in Honan that made Peking tremble with apprehension of the early fulfilment of Eugene Chen's prophecy. It is also worth recording that eleven days after the British representative handed in his papers at Hankow, the British Minister was recalled from Moscow following on the "Arcos" raid⁴ in London.

¹ *Vide infra*, pp. 197, 198.

² *Vide infra*, p. 197.

³ *Vide infra*, p. 198.

⁴ A raid made by the London police on the headquarters of the Association of Russian Co-operative Societies. Evidence was found of anti-British intrigue, which led to the withdrawal of special privileges previously granted by the British Government.

CHAPTER XIII

REVIEW OF BRITAIN'S NEW POLICY

CRITICISM BY THE MILITARISTS

IN reviewing the relations of Great Britain with the Nationalist Government there are two opposite lines of criticism to be met and considered, which for our purposes may be respectively characterised as militarist and pacifist. To the first class of critics belong a considerable number of the present-day British writers and speakers on international affairs residing in China.

Such men are of the number of "old China hands" who like to tell you that they "know their China." They deplore the weak-kneed and timid vacillation of British policy in China to-day. They long for a return to the "stronger" policy of the good old days when Britain's prestige was maintained by Britain's might, and when any encroachment on her rights or "insult to her flag" was promptly followed by drastic retribution. It was such as these who could not conceal their satisfaction at the Wanh sien incident,¹ to other men deplorable, however inevitable it may have been. To them it is unthinkable that Britain should continue to tolerate the conditions to which her nationals are now subjected in China. If the British Government instead of listening to sentimental theorists would only be guided by the advice of some of them, who understand from long experience how to deal with these Chinamen, we might make some headway out of the morass into which we are sinking. Some of them have even published outline plans for the conquest of China at a very reasonable cost by a relatively small but highly efficient foreign military and naval force,

¹ *Vide supra*, p. 112, footnote.

the outlay to be secured by subsequent foreign administration and management of the most important public services of the country.¹

They do not realise, these gentlemen, that it is just because they are "old China hands" that they are so hopelessly out of joint with the times in "Young China" to-day, and that their very familiarity with the China of the old days—a familiarity of perhaps thirty or forty years which has bred in them a certain sense of superiority and just a touch of unconscious swagger—has rendered it impossible for them to make the necessary readjustment of their mental outlook, now irrevocably set in the old mould.

It would be a more practicable proposition to put back the clock in India to-day to the autocracy of a Warren Hastings than that Great Britain in the year 1927, either with or without the assistance of allied nations, should undertake the responsibility for conquering, pacifying and administering China.

THE CHINESE PRACTICE OF THE MORAL OFFENSIVE

The policy of the British Government towards China has on the contrary shown a surprisingly intimate comprehension of the mentality of the Chinese people, and the ever-changing developments in the internal politics and prospects within the country; and it has been marked by a far-seeing statesmanship often lacking in international affairs. To appreciate this it is necessary to understand a principle which is widely employed in disputes in China, but which finds little scope and is very imperfectly comprehended in Western lands.

In the former country it is a common method in all kinds of quarrels or contests, and one which many an unsuspecting foreigner has to his cost discovered only by practical experience, for one party to irritate and provoke the other by every means at his disposal to some act of

¹ Putnam Weale specifies the details of such a scheme in *Why China Sees Red* (Macmillan, London, 1926), p. 263 et seqq., but admits that international jealousy would be an obstacle.

violence or overt aggression. But instead of using this violent act of his opponent as an excuse or justification for attacking in turn with all the force at his disposal, as would be done in any Western land, he becomes suddenly passive; all attempt even at self-defence ceases; and from that moment he wages the contest with quite different weapons, which his enemy has thus so opportunely placed in his hands.

If the aggression consists of some cut or wound, the wounded man will see to it that what blood can be obtained from the bleeding place is well smeared over his body and clothes, as he lies groaning in the dust of the street, a pitiable object, exciting the compassion and arousing the indignation of all his neighbours. If it is the case of some act gravely prejudicing the family's reputation or prospects, the injured party may even go so far as to commit suicide on the aggressor's doorstep, thus scoring a tremendous hit which can neither be parried nor dodged. If the violence inflicted is the firing of soldiers on a Chinese mob, the casualties will be magnified tenfold or a hundredfold, and the news will rapidly be flashed by uncharged telegrams all over China, the points emphasised being that the people shot were unarmed and defenceless and had no intention of injuring the soldiers or anyone else, probably that they were making a peaceful patriotic demonstration, if possible that some at least of them were "students," and finally, that the soldiers or volunteers who fired deliberately intended to kill, and to kill because the demonstrators were patriots.

On such bases as the above the most strenuous efforts will then be made to create a wave of resentment against the aggressor among the neighbours, throughout the surrounding countryside, or throughout the nation, as the case may be; and commonly enough, in this land where so much is decided and governed by apparently inarticulate public opinion, the resulting discomfiture of the enemy is very much greater than would have been achieved if the injured party had fought out his battle with his own unaided natural resources.

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SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF THE MORAL OFFENSIVE

Most illuminating examples of the successful application of this principle were seen in the attack on Shameen on 23rd June and the Shanghai shooting on 30th May in 1925. The steadily rising tide of provocation culminating in the incident in the Hankow British Concession on 3rd and 4th January, 1927, was certainly planned for a similar purpose; but it was foiled by the wonderful steadiness and self-restraint of the British marines on guard. At that time the temper of the people, as has already been pointed out in Chapter III, was such that, had the attempt to draw their fire succeeded, the results to the foreigners scattered all over their country stations might well have been disastrous.

THE SILENT VICTORY OF THE FOREIGN NAVIES

But the most striking success during the whole period, in this typically Eastern game of manœuvring for position and public opinion, was secured by the foreign warships at Hankow. There they lay, crouched low in the water, with the sun glinting off the muzzles of their guns in the day and the signal lights twinkling from the mastheads at night, silent except for the distant tramp of changing watches or the sudden notes of a bugle, with crews that for months never set foot ashore, changeless except that time and again another sinister grey form would slip out from the down-river haze, swing into place beside her companions and become as motionless as they, ever watchful, ever ready, force and striking-power personified, yet never striking.

Amidst the teeming hundreds of thousands in the Chinese city, on the river bank near by, the propagandists pleaded and stormed, and the ghastly coloured posters instilled their poison into the people's blood. Even the erstwhile sacred streets of the ex-British Concession were invaded by processions yelling their slogans of hate and defiance; and on the night of the Feast of Lanterns

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Chinese dragons, huge fiery reptiles sixty or eighty feet long, wound their sinuous length along its dim highways, raging and plunging to the accompaniment of gongs and drums in such an orgy as Hankow had surely never known before. Several months earlier bodies of Chinese troops on the march had time and again been held up on the Concession boundary by Sikh policemen and refused admittance; now the area was garrisoned by Nationalist soldiers. And on two or three occasions I heard the roar of a Nationalist aeroplane and caught the flash of its wings in the afternoon sun as, flying low, it skimmed the tops of the Concession buildings and swooped up and down over the long line of warships in the river.

The foreigners' business had been paralysed; most of them had already fled; and now, as the Government announced, here were these cruel fighting ships come to take their revenge on the people. Then let them do their worst. "But there was no voice, nor any that answered." Month by month the curiosity and wonder grew. Such patience, coupled with latent power, which was never paraded! Such eternal vigilance, governed by unwavering purpose and an iron restraint! Ominous, eerie, impressive! These were not warlike methods such as they had ever seen or conceived of. At last a light dawned—a solution was found for the mystery—and up and down the native city each man, with a twinkle in his eyes, passed the word on to his fellows. These ships were "Yang pu sa"—the foreigners' idols—for it is a shrewd and favourite by-word of these people that an idol is one that sits motionless day after day on its dais,—sits, and never does anything. Long after the last of them has left the port, the lesson of these little "idols of the foreigner" will remain with the people.

And the lesson of the land forces in Shanghai was the same—perfect discipline,¹ sleepless vigilance, ample power

¹ The British expeditionary force was a picked body of men, containing such troops as the Coldstream Guards, the flower of the British Army.

with tireless patience, and an inflexible purpose to maintain security and good order within the Foreign Settlement and to abstain from any interference with what went on outside its boundaries.

THE VINDICATION OF THE BRITISH POLICY

Chamberlain's declaration of Great Britain's liberal policy towards China, and his disavowal of aggressive intention towards any Chinese Government or party, though well conceived and finely phrased, probably carried conviction to very few Chinese minds. They have had so many manifestos and declarations of their own Government; but, as has been shown, when the declaration has been publicly made, that settles the matter, and it may be considered as ended. No one would expect that weeks or months afterwards the Government would feel itself bound literally to carry out every detail of the policy enunciated. Hence, in regard to Chamberlain's declaration, though the courtesy and consideration of the phrasing would be appreciated, many Chinese would see in it little else. But it is perhaps not too much to say that the people of China have already begun to see a genuine steady, peaceful, friendly purpose in the use and restraint of the foreign naval and military forces in Hankow and Shanghai, especially those of Great Britain. In June the anti-British propaganda in Hankow, the persistent declarations that Britain was about to wage war on China, were obviously wearing a little threadbare and frayed at the edges: the people were beginning to tire of them. If the British policy is steadily persisted in with its spirit unchanged, there cannot fail to be a change in the tide of popular feeling which will restore Britain to her former position of high estimation and good standing, and at the same time more and more completely discredit the slanders and malice of her detractors.

CRITICISM BY THE PACIFISTS

The second criticism that has been levelled at the British policy in China has come from a body of opinion diametrically opposite to that already discussed—the pacifist. In China since the Great War there has been a small but steadily growing body of foreigners,¹ chiefly among the missionary community, who on Christian grounds have, for themselves, renounced all support of, or participation in, war of any kind or for any purpose: and they are eagerly endeavouring to secure the wider acceptance and application of this principle. This is not yet the attitude of the Christian Church as a whole, or with one exception of any of its denominational branches; but the interdenominational group of Christians just referred to prefer to take their stand literally on the Prayer-book declaration that “There is none other that fighteth for us, but only Thou, O God”; and they are quite content to take all the consequences of such an attitude in China or elsewhere. Some of these have criticised the despatch of naval and military forces to China. In England, on the other hand, the most considerable protest has come from certain sections of the Labour Party, and has been inspired by political and social rather than distinctively religious ideals. But all such criticism is based on a misconception of the nature and responsibilities of the British Government.

It has been amply demonstrated² many times that, whether in the relations of individuals or communities, a spirit of love and a policy which, according to Christ's teachings, earnestly strives for the advantage and benefit of all with whom there are any dealings, can and does protect the individual or the community from assault or violence. This protection is not absolute, but is more effective and reliable than that of any armed force.

¹ There is also a similar movement among Chinese Christians.

² For historical evidence of this see H. T. Hodgkin's *The Christian Revolution*, Allen & Unwin, London, 1923, pp. 79, 115, 272.

Livingstone habitually went unarmed in his dealings with all classes of wild tribes in Africa, and the spirit in him which prompted this method not only carried him unharmed through the most savage districts, but secured for him as well warm-hearted friendship and assistance in these places. The Quaker colonies of Pennsylvania, alone among the early British colonies in North America, lived unarmed amidst the warlike tribes of Indians all round them; and these Quaker colonies, alone amongst all the others, lived in perpetual friendship with the Indians, and were never attacked by them. Those then who have this faith will naturally strive to propagate it, and must for themselves refuse any participation in military action or preparations, irrespective of the attitude of their own nations on the subject.

But it would be an idle jest to pretend that in the past the foreign policy in the Far East of the British Government and nation as such has been governed and directed by the above spirit, though at times it has been faintly suffused and irradiated by it. British national interests, therefore, at present do not and cannot enjoy the protection of universal friendship and love which only the practice of these principles can produce. Not having this protection available in the present crisis in China, the British Government naturally and, judged by the national and international standards it works to, quite properly has turned for protection to its time-honoured defender, the British Navy. The great majority of British nationals in China have gone thither in the confident assurance that in any such crisis the protection of the Navy would be available for them; and the British Government by the mere fact of maintaining a Navy and taxing its subjects for its support, has tacitly guaranteed that its protection should be available when they require it.

It is true that a new spirit is growing in the world to-day, and is stirring mightily among the nations, and of this nothing could be clearer evidence than the new British policy towards China. But as long as armaments are

maintained by the nations they will and must be available for use; and it would be ridiculous to expect physical disarmament of a Government to be achieved before the moral disarmament of its people. Before this can be accomplished, those who hold these ideals will need to do much preaching and living out of the principles for which they stand amongst their fellow-countrymen and those of other lands.

THE TRIUMPH OF GERMAN DISARMAMENT

It is interesting to note in the above connection the situation of the German community and the ex-German Concession at Hankow throughout the Revolution. All German Concessions in Chinese port cities, and German extraterritorial and all other special rights in China, were lost in the Great War, as was also the German Navy. Owing to China's refusal to sign the Versailles Treaty she was for two years without any treaty relations at all with Germany. But on the 20th May, 1921, a treaty of complete equality was signed with Germany, wherein extraterritorial rights were relinquished on the understanding that German subjects were only to appear in the modern courts which have been established in China, and were to have the right to appeal. Germany was thus the first European Power to acknowledge the absolute sovereignty of China. As a result all Germans in China, engaged in either business or missionary pursuits, have ever since been living under Chinese law, subject to Chinese law-courts, and have known that in time of danger it was impossible for their country to afford them military or naval protection. The German Concession at Hankow was the first to pass out of its Government's control (followed successively by the Russian and the British); and its management has accordingly been for a number of years chiefly in Chinese hands.

The result of these conditions, under which the Germans have perforce lived, is that when British, Americans,

Swedes, White Russians, Finns, Norwegians and later Japanese and smaller numbers of many other nations, were pouring in hundreds out of Hankow down to the coast by every boat, the Germans alone of all the foreign groups sat relatively firm and unmoved in the general uproar. Their business, of course, suffered as all business in Hankow suffered; but it suffered relatively less than that of other nationalities, Chinese banking accommodation being more available for it. Towards the end of May, when every British and American woman and child had been sent down to Shanghai or overseas, and the men of these nationalities were only a fraction of the numbers usually resident in the port, the German community of 240 was still living and carrying on as usual, not a woman or child having left. When British and Americans were all sleeping on board their ships or in buildings facing the Bund under their admiral's orders, there were Germans living and peacefully sleeping at night in their homes one or two miles outside the Concession boundaries and across the river in Wuchang. When the China Inland Mission withdrew all its other workers from Hunan, it left its German missionaries in Changsha, the provincial capital, to supervise and carry on the work.

The Germans were thus comparatively favourably placed for trade, for missionary work, and as regards their ordinary living conditions. But their advantages extended to practically every interest of life. The greater part of the foreign women and children of Central China migrate every year for the heat of the summer to Kuling, a mountain resort some fifteen miles from Kiukiang. Here there lives all the year round a small foreign community, including officers and agents who look after the interests of the landholders and the settlement with its twelve hundred houses. Early in 1927 these foreigners fled almost to a man, leaving a German in charge of the whole settlement. Up to the beginning of June no other foreigners had ventured to make arrangements for their usual Kuling trip, either from Hankow or Shanghai;

but the German and Russian women and children were arranging to go as usual, and the Nationalist Government had made arrangements for an escort to ensure that there should be no inconvenience on the journey, the first party being timed to leave Hankow on 15th June.

THE CHANGE OF STATUS OF BRITISH CONCESSIONS AND ITS EFFECT

A great deal of the excitement and resentment felt in British circles over the "surrender of the British Concessions in China" has been due simply to ignorance of the actual facts involved in the change.

When China during the last century was compelled by foreign military pressure progressively to open treaty ports to overseas commerce, the treaties made at the time specified *inter alia* that the Chinese authorities should grant facilities at these treaty ports for foreign merchants to acquire land and houses for the purposes of their trade. In some of the treaty ports such land and houses have been acquired by the members of the foreign business community in various scattered sites in different parts of the Chinese city, and they live there to this day; but in others it was found more convenient for the merchants to congregate in certain areas, and in some of these areas they were granted the right to set up their own municipal administration; the "foreign Concessions" belong to this last type. The conditions of foreign residence in the various treaty ports thus vary from place to place, having been settled by special agreements to meet the circumstances and needs at each port. Although in some cases, as at Hankow and Canton, the tracts set apart were merely mud flats, at the cost of much time and expense they have now been converted into little model cities of fine appearance, well laid out, and excellently administered.

At the beginning of the 1926 Revolution there were some thirty foreign Concessions, Settlements, and Leased

Territories in China.¹ The nationals of any country wishing to reside at a town where their own Government has no Concession freely avail themselves of Concessions of any other foreign country at that place.

The status of the former British Concession at Hankow may be taken as a good example of a foreign Concession in China. It was held under a lease dated 21st March, 1861, "which stipulated for the payment of ground rent to the Chinese Government, and contained a clause that as long as the rent was paid the British Consul should exercise sole control in allotting land, constructing roads, erecting buildings and other matters." The city blocks were allotted on ninety-nine year leases, originally to British subjects; and in the course of years a number of these have come into the possession of other nationals, including Chinese and Americans. The control and management of the Concession have for many years been in the hands of a Municipal Council elected by the leaseholders; and the councillors have usually been British subjects, occasionally American, never Chinese. This Council, in addition to exercising the usual functions of such a body, has maintained order within its boundaries by means of an efficient police force consisting of Chinese and Sikh constables under Sikh officers with an English

¹ *Concessions and Foreign Settlements in China*, 1925.

International Settlements at Amoy, Hangchow, Soochow, Changsha, Wuhu, Nanking, Tsinanfu, and Shanghai (formed by amalgamation of former British and U.S.A. Concessions).

British Concessions at Amoy, Tientsin, Hankow, Canton, Kiukiang, Chinkiang.

Japanese Concessions at Amoy, Tientsin, Hankow, Hangchow, Soochow, Chunking (Jap. Settlement).

French Concessions at Tientsin, Hankow, Canton, Shanghai.

(*Ex-Russian Concessions* at Tientsin, Hankow.)

(*Ex-German Concessions* at Tientsin, Hankow.)

(*Ex-Austro-Hungarian Concession* at Tientsin.)

Italian Concession at Tientsin.

Belgian Concession at Tientsin.

Leased Territories: *British*. The new territories at Kowloon, Weihaiwei,

Japan. Dairen and territory (called by Japanese Kwantung).

French. Kwangchouwan.

(See *China Year Book*, 1924, Tientsin Press, Tientsin, pp. 112, 684, 685.)

superintendent. For additional protection when necessary in times of civil commotion or riot, as in June 1925, reliance was placed on the British Volunteer Corps, which had its counterpart in the other Foreign Concessions, and as a last resort on landing parties from the British warships, as on 3rd and 4th January, 1927.

The principal changes that have been or are to be effected by the "surrender" of the British Concession on 15th March, 1927, are four in number:—(a) Great Britain's perpetual lease of the Concession area is to be transferred to the individual leaseholders of the various blocks. (b) The new Municipal Council consists of equal numbers of British and Chinese subjects under a Chinese Chairman. (c) The Municipal police have been increased in number by about 50 per cent., and are now a purely Chinese force under a Chinese superintendent. (d) The British Government's special privileges and responsibility in respect of the Concession area having been surrendered, the Nationalist Government is now responsible for providing military forces if necessary for additional protection in time of danger. The landing of parties from British warships is not now contemplated.

It will thus be seen that the residents in the ex-British Concession and the businesses domiciled there are not likely to be fundamentally affected by its change in status. The greatest danger, *i.e.* of illegal exactions and levies, is provided against by a condition of the transfer that, apart from the regular Chinese Government ground rent, all monies raised in the Concession shall be levied under the authority of its Municipal Council and spent within its boundaries. In the present eddying whirl of Revolution in Hankow many Chinese (but not foreign) leaseholders have had their houses occupied by military officers, whom it has so far proved impossible to dislodge; and in respect of these properties there has been a large sum of money due for municipal, electric light, and water rates which could not be collected: as a result there has been a default in the payment of interest on the municipal

debentures. At first there were frequent changes of the Chinese Director which were detrimental to efficient working; but the Government has now nominated as Director and Chairman a Chinese lawyer of energy and initiative, a man who has travelled and studied in other countries, and with experience in municipal administration in China; and there is no question but that he is doing his best under the difficult circumstances. The Council has worked harmoniously; and with the exception above-mentioned, the police have done admirably in preserving order. Although there are already signs of a coming improvement in the administration, it is not likely that for some years at least the municipal administration will be as economical as previously, or the various municipal services be maintained quite at their previous high level; but it is significant that in the neighbouring ex-German and ex-Russian Concessions, which passed from the control of those countries eleven and three years ago respectively, there has been on the whole no marked discrepancy between the conditions obtaining now and those under the previous administration.

It must also be remembered that the Chinese members of the Municipal Councils of the future are likely to be usually men of wealth, culture and modern business ability, such men as have succeeded during the last few years in creating, adjacent to the ex-British Concession but enjoying none of its special privileges, a model Chinese city on modern lines. The British reactionary newspaper in Hankow, already referred to in an earlier part of the book¹ in deploring the surrender of the British Concession, admitted that, if it should lead eventually to similar action in the case of the two remaining Concessions of France and Japan, and so to the organisation of a Greater Hankow as a unified self-governing modern city, the gains would probably outweigh the losses.

¹ *Vide supra*, p. 113.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND ITS
PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS

Extraterritorial rights, or capitulations as they have been sometimes called in other countries, have become for many Chinese a sign of foreign nations' contempt, not only for their administration of justice, but for China's sovereign rights and her civilisation. They know that such privileges were relinquished by the foreign Powers in Japan towards the end of last century as a result of the complete reorganisation of the Japanese Department of Justice, and were cancelled by Turkey in 1922 practically in defiance of the foreign Powers, with the aid of Russian support.

The case of Siam is particularly instructive.¹ For some twenty years this country has been making rapid progress on modern lines, especially in the promulgation of modern legal codes and in the administration of justice. She too, like China, was disappointed at the time of signing the Versailles Treaty, when her allies refused to modify the "one-sided treaties" by which she was bound. But in 1920 the United States of America set a memorable example, signing a treaty relinquishing without compensation her extraterritorial rights and her control over the Customs tariff. In 1924 Japan made a similar renunciation. In 1925 similar treaties were made with France, Holland, and on 14th July with Great Britain. This last was the more significant because 50-75 per cent. of Siam's trade is with the British Empire, whose interests also predominate within the country. The remaining nations with such treaty rights quickly followed these examples; and by the middle of 1926 the last foreign extraterritorial rights in Siam had been relinquished, and she had regained almost complete tariff autonomy.

Chinese are apt to lose sight of the fact that it was by the good government of her country, and especially by the excellent administration of justice throughout the law-

¹ See article by F. B. Sayre in *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 22, No. 1, p. 70 et seqq.

courts of the land, that Siam secured this freedom from foreign control. The conception that, through the continuance of these privileges to foreign Powers, China "loses face" in the eyes not only of the great, but even of the small nations of the world, is a side of the question that they, and perhaps not unnaturally, are inclined to dwell on to the exclusion of all other aspects of the situation.

The Foreign Governments gladly recognise ¹ that China now has adopted a good modern code of laws, though this code is as yet far from complete; that she has 139 modern courts, and well-trained modern judicial officials sufficient to staff most of them; and that there are now seventy-four modern prisons, in a good number of which the conditions are not unsatisfactory. But they cannot overlook the naked facts that over by far the greater part of China the judiciary has not the most elementary experience, or even conception, of the impartial administration of justice in the modern sense, that the military are habitually over-riding and abrogating the authority of the law-courts, and that the prison system, with the above few exceptions, is still characterised by the crude barbarity of Europe's later Middle Ages. Extraordinarily limited though the opportunities were for the recent International Commission on Extraterritoriality to get evidence of these facts as they exist in inland China, its conclusions, couched in milder and more courteous phrase, were to this effect.

In view of these facts it would appear to be unreasonable to expect any foreign country at the present juncture to go further than the recent British declaration of policy; ² but if Britain wishes to demonstrate her good faith in making this declaration and her earnest goodwill towards China, she will be glad to show her appreciation of future improvements in the Chinese administration of justice

¹ See Report of the Commission on Extraterritoriality in China British Parliamentary Paper, Cmd. 2774 + of 1926, H.M. Stationery Office, London.

² *Vide supra*, p. 122.

by progressively and voluntarily relinquishing her privileges of extraterritorial jurisdiction *pari passu* with further improvements as they occur in the Chinese administration.

Having thus briefly considered the attitude of China and of the foreign Governments, the reader should further note that the danger to life and liberty which the foreigner in China would incur as a result of the abolition of extraterritorial privileges would not, even at the present time, be nearly as great as is popularly supposed.

Now as always, if a foreigner wishes to seek legal redress from a Chinese subject, he must do so through a Chinese court of law. Extraterritorial rights only apply in cases where a Chinese wishes to prosecute a foreigner. Foreigners in China should, and as a matter of fact in most cases do, so conduct themselves that such occasions seldom arise. Of course it is possible that, if they were subject to Chinese courts of law, foreigners might be more frequently prosecuted on false charges; but as long as they maintain the reputation for honourable and fair dealing which is still theirs throughout the greater part of the country, and exercise the consideration and carefulness towards local prejudices which may reasonably be looked for in China's guests from abroad, such malicious charges would also be rare.

It must also be remembered that, if and when extraterritorial privileges are relinquished, there has not been, and will not be, any suggestion from either side that British consuls should be withdrawn; and they would always be available to institute inquiries, and make the necessary representations, in case of any gross injustice to their nationals.

CHAPTER XIV

FOREIGN LIFE IN HANKOW UNDER THE NATIONALISTS

MISCONCEPTIONS AND EXAGGERATIONS

THERE is perhaps no feature of the Revolution that has been so greatly distorted and misunderstood by both Chinese and foreigners in China and abroad as the living conditions of the foreigners in Hankow under the Nationalist Government. These were days when no rumours were too extravagant to gain a hearing, and once started spread like wildfire. As the groups gathered nightly round the dinner-tables in the Concessions, it was felt to be a dull day indeed that did not supply at least one or two fresh yarns to stimulate the indignation or apprehension of the diners. But that which in Hankow was readily enough discounted or dissipated within a day or two was too often seized on by the Shanghai newspapers as valuable copy, and from Shanghai was rapidly distributed over the world. The Shanghai mental and emotional environment too, throughout these months, was abnormal and disturbing. Again and again it was noticed, until it was accepted as the rule, that men and women, who living in Hankow had remained cool and steady, a few weeks after arrival in Shanghai became far more nervous and apprehensive as to the course of events and the prospects in Central China than those who continued to live there. The ennui of the Shanghai refugees loosed their imaginations to run riot, while the residents remaining in Hankow had too much responsibility and food for thought in the facts of their daily work to waste very much time in worrying over fanciful or unrealised troubles.

Another source of distortion and error in the general impression of Hankow affairs was provided by some of the people who made trips up from Shanghai of several days or a week or two to report on the situation. Such a person coming unexpectedly on an excited political meeting, thousands strong, on the borders of the Concession, or a procession yelling its defiant slogans along the streets within its boundaries, would naturally get a very different impression from that of the resident to whom such demonstrations had been among the scarcely noticed commonplaces of the previous few months, and who had learned by experience that they seldom caused any direct harm or inconvenience. The traveller who on landing at the Bund with a number of pieces of baggage was besieged by a crowd of starving and fierce-looking carrying coolies, and constrained to pay them from \$2 to \$5 per piece, gained a different impression of the labour situation from that of the resident who, on reaching Hankow, would slip ashore unimpeded by his luggage, and knowing the ropes arrange for it to be sent along later at fifty cents a piece. In some cases, again, reports in Shanghai newspapers written by Hankow correspondents were so utterly at variance with well-known facts that it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that they were deliberately intended to deceive.¹

It was in these ways that a false and exaggerated picture of the situation of the foreigners and their interests in Hankow and Central China was built up in Shanghai;

¹ As an example of this mischievous inaccuracy in current literature a passage in Upton Close's *Revolt of Asia* (G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, London, 1927) may be cited. On p. 14 he writes: "And so we go to Hankow, their new capital. We ride in through the half-wrecked buildings of the expropriated British Concession."

There is one small row of Chinese shops on the north border of the ex-British Concession which have been progressively vacated, have their shutters up, and are apparently waiting to be pulled down. But there is not one wrecked or half-wrecked building in the Concession except where a building has been demolished to make room for the fine new buildings under construction, as described further on in this chapter. The Revolution has not been responsible for the wrecking of any buildings in the British Concession.

and what was true of Shanghai was true to an even greater extent of more distant parts of the world. At a time when there were still over 500 foreign civilians remaining in Hankow, inclusive of 70 or 80 British but exclusive of 900 Japanese, it was commonly believed in many quarters that the last of the foreigners had fled.¹ In the case of certain missionary institutions, while they were still being carried on vigorously and energetically, their grants of money were being held back by the Home Board on the ground that the institutions had been closed and so no longer needed the money. In more than one case instructions were sent out by Missionary Societies that certain workers, urgently needed for work being carried on uninterruptedly, should be returned to their home base or transferred to other fields in distant parts of the world, on the ground that their enforced idleness in China was wasteful and demoralising.

THE FIRST EXODUS FROM HANKOW

The flood of foreigners that poured in an unending stream down the river from Hankow in January and February has already been described.² Even the normal passenger shipping of the Yangtze would have been quite inadequate to deal with this unprecedented volume of traffic; but at this time one of the three greatest steamship companies on the river, the China Merchants' Steamship Company, had laid up all its vessels and paid off the crews, owing to the impossibility of carrying on under the exactions of the military leaders in the lower reaches, who for some time had been commandeering the boats at their pleasure for the transport of troops.

The British Navy, therefore, chartered several of the

¹ A flagrant instance is found in P. T. Etherton's *China—The Facts* (Benn, London, 1927). The author, under date April 1927, writes on p. 113: "Conditions on the Yangtze are now so precarious that a complete withdrawal of all British subjects from the treaty ports on the river has taken place, with the severance, at least until the present anti-foreign agitation has ceased, of all trading relations laboriously built up by British, American, French and other business men in the region." ² *Vide supra*, pp. 35, 36.

vessels belonging to the other two shipping companies, which were British, and had them specially fitted up and rearranged for the transport of many times their usual number of foreign passengers. In the first few boats, as a special inducement to the foreign populace to comply with their consuls' and admirals' urgent advice, free passages were given to all who would leave Hankow. Later on a charge on a reduced scale was made. During these two months both consular and naval officials did everything possible to encourage and expedite the evacuation of their nationals, especially taking care to forward on any who came down to Hankow from up-country, some of whom indeed were not allowed to set foot ashore on arrival, but were trans-shipped and despatched the same evening to Shanghai.

The Japanese and Germans alone sat tight, the White Russians naturally being amongst those who early began to move. By the middle of March most of the foreigners in Hankow who intended to leave had already left. These included most of the women and nearly all the children, those men whose work owing to the industrial and political situation had ceased or was not important enough to detain them, and not a few who had been carried away by the contagion of the early panic and had since regretted their precipitancy. From the country districts the Hunan people had mostly passed through, as had also the majority of the Americans and British from the Hupeh and Honan stations.

The seat of war was steadily moving further and further away from Wuhan, down towards the mouth of the Yangtze and up towards Peking. The British Concession had been formally handed over by its authorities on 15th March without any untoward incident resulting; and it was hoped that the lull in the local unrest might presage a gradual though tedious improvement in the situation, and that perhaps it might not be necessary for the evacuation, even of the few remaining women-folk, to be carried any further.

NANKING AND THE SECOND EXODUS

Then, on the afternoon of 24th March, with startling unexpectedness, came the news of the Nanking outrages. Foreigners had been deliberately killed in cold blood: foreign women had been outraged.

Those whose imaginations still retain the memory of certain of the darker features incidental to the Great War may find it hard to understand the peculiar thrill of apprehension and indignation that ran through the foreigners up and down the length and breadth of China at this news. "Dastardly," they will say, "and abominable; but are not such outrages on non-combatants the inevitable concomitants of all wars? Is there anything surprising in the fact that some dozen people suffered in this way in the Chinese civil war?" The extraordinary and startling feature of this incident was just this—that it was unique. The war had been waged for six months in half a dozen different theatres, in some with unprecedented fierceness. The tides of battle had ebbed and flowed above the heads of foreigners all over the country. And this was true, not of this war alone, but of every one of the innumerable wars of the last twenty years. Yet never in all this time had foreigners been murdered, except in a few cases by isolated individuals or irresponsible bandits: always had their women been respected. The dumbfounded consternation caused by the Nanking outrages is a measure of the extraordinary immunity and security which foreigners are accustomed to enjoy amidst the ever-recurring turmoil and bloodshed in this country.

But on the evening of 24th March, in Hankow as everywhere else in China, little groups of foreigners with anxious faces were asking each other what the significance of this portent was. No explanation of the plot that lay behind the outrage was forthcoming until weeks later; so that it appeared like the omen of a new era in

treatment of foreigners, which might sweep the country and result in a foreign war with China.

Next morning practically every British and American woman remaining in Hankow left for Shanghai, and a few more of the men; and the same evening peremptory orders were sent by wire or post recalling the foreigners of all nationalities who still remained scattered through the country out-back. Thus began the second wave of the evacuation. The exodus of refugees, which had dwindled to a tiny stream, within a few days rose again nearly to its former dimensions, composed this time almost entirely of country residents. Hunan had already been almost completely evacuated and now the remaining foreign residents of Northern and Western Hupeh came down, and the large bodies of American and Scandinavian Lutherans from Honan; and Hankow hostels were again crammed to overflowing. The die-hards, who had hitherto hoped to weather the storm in the fastnesses of one or two of the foreigners' summer hill resorts, at length gave in and withdrew; by 20th April, the entire French population from Szechuan, with some people of other nationalities, had passed through on their way to Shanghai; and by the end of April, outside of Hankow, there were very few foreigners indeed remaining in Central and West Central China.

THE JAPANESE CONCESSION AND THE THIRD EXODUS

On the evening of 3rd April, overlapping the second wave of emigration, but distinct from it, there was suddenly set in motion a third wave amongst the Japanese, who as a group had hitherto declined to move. Although for the ten days since the Nanking incident they had been subject to considerable annoyance from the Chinese coolies about the Concession, they had borne it with patience; and had studiously minimised all appearance of armed intervention. When, however, the riot¹ on the above date occurred, followed by the

¹ *Vide supra*, pp. 71, 72.

shooting down of rioters, they acted with remarkable promptitude, and it became perfectly clear that they would fight in defence of their Concession rather than evacuate it. After their refugee ships had left for Shanghai with 1400 passengers there were still kept in Hankow some hundred women and children, and eight hundred men as volunteers reinforcing the marines landed from their warships.

Coming as it did so soon after Nanking, it is not surprising that this incident created considerable apprehension amongst the other nationalities in Hankow; and for several weeks afterwards British and Americans were ordered to sleep every night either on boats in the stream or in houses immediately on the water-front.

In fact, however, such precautions turned out to be quite unnecessary. The Japanese Concession, it is true, was a fortified camp, completely shut off from the rest of Hankow, and bristling with machine guns and wire entanglements. But the Chinese regarded the incident as a purely Japanese affair, having nothing whatever to do with Europeans and Americans, and it did not in any way affect their relations with people of these nationalities. From May onwards there was very little further reduction in the foreign population in Hankow, and here and there odd people even began to return from the coast.

FOREIGN TRADE AND SHIPPING

As has been already indicated in the earlier chapters, there was a steady slump in foreign trade under the Nationalist Government. During the First Diplomatic Period, *i.e.* until the middle of April, this was more or less in accordance with the policy of the Government, which at least connived at the factors producing the result. During the Latter Diplomatic Period, although the Government actively endeavoured to assist in resuscitating foreign trade and to suppress disturbing factors, there was very little improvement that could be effected.

Export trades such as the egg pulp and frozen pork and game business, depending on a highly organised system of country collecting, were temporarily ruined by the breakdown of railway and other country communications. Cotton and wood oil, less perishable articles, continued to move down-river though in reduced quantities, and a certain amount of brick tea was still exported. Of the imports, the cigarette trade was very severely hit, having been singled out by the Labour Unions from the very first for a most determined onslaught. Kerosene oil continued to come in, but also in reduced quantity, owing to difficulties of distribution. Foreign groceries, tinned milk, butter, etc., were practically stagnant, owing to the demand having ceased. The demand for chemicals was also much reduced. A paradoxical feature was a lively demand for foreign clothing and soft goods by the hosts of Government officials and employees, the fiercest denunciations of foreign nations frequently coming from young dandies wearing foreign clothes.

Previous to the incident in the Japanese Concession, the vessels of the Japanese shipping line were running with full cargoes, being given the preference over the British; but the British lines did very well with abnormally heavy bookings of Chinese passengers, refugees from Hankow, at abnormally high rates. Of the trade of the various foreign nations that of Germany, though much less in volume than the British, maintained itself better under existing conditions. Altogether the weekly arrivals and departures of shipping at the port of Hankow had dropped in May to less than a third, perhaps less than a quarter of the pre-Nationalist period.

DISORGANISATION OF CHINESE AND FOREIGN BANKING

One of the contributing factors to the trade stagnation was the breakdown of banking facilities. Early in 1926, before the Nationalist invasion, an extensive paper issue of the Hupé Provincial Government had within a few months unexpectedly depreciated to almost zero value,

causing widespread losses especially in the hoarded savings of the poor. This was not due to the coming of the Nationalist Government, but it left a certain aftermath of financial instability and nervousness affecting its prospects.

In December, as part of the Nationalist programme of commercial demolition, the employees of the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank in Hankow struck work, causing the bank to close its doors. As the institution is the foundation of Chinese as well as foreign business throughout the Province, this caused a profound sensation in country business circles, the popular and not unnatural explanation of cheques returned from Hankow unpaid being that the bank could not meet its liabilities. Since this bank, with its wide power and control over Chinese business up and down the land, had been chosen as one of the outstanding examples of British Imperialist exploitation to be destroyed by the Nationalists, and as they were at this time making a strenuous effort to establish as a competitor the Central Bank of China, the new Government institution, it is not surprising that the strike, though settled, was again revived.

It was on 15th April that the reserves of this new bank which were at Canton had been seized by Chiang Kai Shek.¹ On 18th April an edict was promulgated forbidding the export from Hankow of specie or silver coin² in any form, constituting the notes of two strong Chinese banks and the Central Bank legal tender, and forbidding all banks to issue any silver to cash either cheques or their own notes. The exchange value of the Central Bank dollar note was fixed and penalties were imposed on anyone exchanging at a lower figure. It was explained that these measures were necessitated by the attempts of unscrupulous people to destroy the credit of the Central Bank by causing a run on its reserves, and that their effect was to stabilise the institution.

¹ *Vide supra*, p. 132.

² China has a silver, not a gold, standard currency.

So great was the disturbance that the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank and the American Bank had both to keep their doors closed for some time to the general public.¹

Fear lest the Government should appropriate the reserves of the Chinese banks in Hankow made Shanghai banks chary of honouring their drafts; and this, combined with the embargo on the shipment of specie, made transactions with Shanghai extremely difficult to arrange. Thus there was the twofold obstruction to trade, of difficulty in Shanghai exchange and impairment of country credit; and for a time even the money order function of the post office was suspended.

POST OFFICE, TELEGRAPHS AND NEWSPAPERS.

Throughout all the vicissitudes of Chinese national life, the Chinese Post Office has for many years remained a marvel of efficiency and reliability. Through flood- or famine-stricken areas the mailmen travel on foot, on bicycle, or by boat with surprising regularity: even bandits sacking a town usually respect the post office, and when any war happens to be in progress the letter-carriers are free to go unharmed on their daily beats even when these lie across the contending battle lines.

But Nationalist propaganda has shown its power to corrupt what neither war nor banditry could crush. Formerly the post office staff stood clear of politics, above all party disputes: but in the early months of 1927 the delivery of letters became more and more irregular and uncertain; and owing to the knowledge that there were enthusiastic members of the Nationalist Party among the clerks and officials in many of the post offices, both Chinese and foreigners very largely lost faith in the integrity of the management and the inviol-

¹ In this account special attention has been given to the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank corresponding with the emphasis of the Chinese themselves at this time. But there are many other banks in Hankow—three Japanese, seven of Western nations, and twenty-seven Chinese; and the business of all these was also disorganised to a greater or less extent.

ability of mail matter, so that many people, particularly Chinese, preferred to send a special messenger long distances up to a hundred miles or more with an important letter rather than trust it to the post, if the contents were such as might in any way be of interest to the Kuo Min Tang.

The telegraph administration stood the test better; and especially on the up-country lines was generally reliable and of the greatest service to foreigners inland in transacting the urgent correspondence of these anxious months. The Shanghai trunk line would at times refuse or delay messages of public moment which might adversely affect the Government; but this amounts to nothing more than a censorship which would be operative at such a time in any other country. In any case this deficiency was largely supplied by the wireless installations of the warships.

Of English language newspapers both the British and American publications were suppressed soon after the appearance of the Nationalist newspaper, *The People's Tribune*, because of their continued hostile criticism of the Government or its associated organisations—again merely a precaution which is usually adopted in other countries in war-time.

TAXES

In an earlier chapter it was noted that when the Nationalist forces invaded Central China one of their distinguishing characteristics was that they did not loot the people, and this reputation has been on the whole maintained, although there have been many exceptions to the rule.

But the Government has been under the necessity of raising large sums of money; and all the more so because the soldiers, not being allowed to loot, have had to be paid. In country towns this has generally been done simply and directly by the military leaders in occupation striking a graduated levy on the local tradespeople, and collecting it forthwith.

In Wuhan there were naturally much more varied resources to be drawn on. The first and largest source of regular revenue was the Maritime Customs, though this, as has been pointed out, fell far short of its former volume. A number of additional taxes were now imposed, such as the stamp duty tax and the landlords' tax. The latter was collected in an ingenious Oriental manner. Each tenant was required to pay to the Government one month's rent, the receipt for which the landlord was obliged under heavy penalties to accept from the tenant in lieu of payment. This tax was first collected in the Chinese city. Later on an attempt was made to levy a similar tax in the foreign Concessions; but as these properties, even in the case of those ex-Concessions which have been already handed over, are only taxable by their governing Councils, and taxes may only be raised for use within the Concession boundaries, the demand was everywhere resisted.

FORCED CONTRIBUTIONS

Apart from taxes there was another source of revenue, the amount of which it is impossible to estimate, but which may well have been very large indeed. This consisted of the forced loans, fines or levies from wealthy institutions or persons, which were extorted by the Government's agents. If the amount demanded was not paid, the individual concerned, or in the case of a firm someone representing it, was thrown into prison, as already described,¹ to be kept there until payment was made. It was fear of this kind of thing—fear for themselves and for their property—which drove the wealthy Chinese from Hankow down to Shanghai, beginning with the dollar millionaires before the Southern invasion actually reached Wuhan, and month by month descending lower down the scale of wealth as the need for money pressed more urgently on the Government.

¹*Vide supra*, p. 98.

• THE BUILDING INDUSTRY

In spite, however, of all the hindrances and crippling handicaps on trade and industry there was one industry, building, which in June 1927, nine months after the arrival of the Nationalist forces in Hankow, was apparently still being pushed ahead as vigorously as ever. In fact, in the British Concession area and on its boundary road I saw more buildings under construction during this period than I had seen in any similar period during the previous few years. It is true that in most of these cases the contract had been let and the building commenced before the advent of the Southerners; but this is not true of several of the largest. It is also true that owing to rise in wages, the high price of materials, and political and labour union interference with the men's work, the jobs were unduly protracted and the contractors were losing heavily on their undertakings, the complicated system of sub-contracting making it difficult and expensive to cancel a contract. But the fact that this amount of building work was being carried out as above, especially as the principals were in some cases Chinese, was a reassuring feature of the local situation.

PERSONNEL OF FOREIGN POPULATION

The foregoing pages constitute a description of the political background and the business and industrial environment of the foreigners' lives in Hankow. After the third and final tide of refugees had flowed away down the river there were left in the city the German community practically intact, most of the Japanese men but few of their women or children, Red Russian advisers, associates and workers connected with the Government, a few French, very unobtrusive, odd individuals of other nationalities, and of the British and Americans only skeleton staffs carrying on their various business and missionary enterprises on a restricted scale or watching over their interests in cases where activities had been suspended.

THE HANKOW STREETS AND POLICE CONTROL

It is true that in these days the streets of the ex-Concessions seemed strangely empty of foreigners, and rang a trifle mournfully to the footsteps of the passer-by. Some shops and places of business were closed and others were carrying on in an apathetic way. At the main ricksha stands there stood in long patient lines, or hovered eagerly to and fro across the road braving the policemen's batons, from two to four times the normal number of gaunt, bright-eyed, starving runners, fiercely fighting for the chance of any prospective passenger, ready to ask any extortionate fare if he appeared a fool, but glad enough to pull him for a poor little sum rather than miss the chance of a meal. Duped and betrayed by the propagandists, they were already beginning to suspect the truth:

The streets were never covered with anything even faintly resembling the vile collections of filth and rubbish that made such picturesque nonsense for the Shanghai newspapers; but at times they fell somewhat short of the spotless and well-groomed condition to which residents had been accustomed.

The police control was more efficient than had been expected. The waterside workers and baggage coolies, as in other countries, proved the most troublesome, sometimes intimidating their fellows and practising the most extravagant extortion in spite of the police, and occasionally pilfering cargo; but generally good order was preserved on the streets, and there were very few instances of robbery or burglary and none of murder—a remarkable contrast with what has for some time been the normal state of affairs in Shanghai.

THE FOREIGN NUCLEUS—A PICKED BODY

There is no doubt that one reason why foreigners during this period had really so little trouble personally in their relations with the Chinese is that in the succes-

sive waves of exodus the more "nervy," the "raw hands," and the hotheads had been largely eliminated from among them. Many a time, especially in the Early Diplomatic Period, the temper of the people on the street was resentful and high strung, and employees in the various institutions were difficult to handle. At these times, as several instances demonstrated, an unguarded word, a display of ignorance or timidity, an ill-considered exhibition of temper or violence, or the misjudging of a situation, could easily have provoked the most serious trouble. But it was seldom that the foreigners made such mistakes. These were by now a hand-picked body of men, mostly of considerable experience in dealing with Chinese affairs, the more senior men of the firms, patient, steady and self-reliant; and those who did not correspond with this description had at least learned the wisdom of quietness and self-restraint. Generally speaking the business men had more personal difficulties and uneasiness than the missionaries because of their handicap—a grave one in such times as these—of ignorance of the language, their intercourse normally being very largely confined to English-speaking Chinese.

SOCIAL LIFE

Social life and sport were dull. There were few dinner-parties, most men living in groups in bachelors' messes. But some of these messes maintained quite a jovial spirit of camaraderie; and the various fleets provided their own distinctive contribution to the social life. The clubs were open; the picture theatres nightly drew their motley crowds, and horse-racing and other sports were available on a reduced scale for those who could detach themselves sufficiently from their daily responsibility and anxieties to indulge in them.

CHAPTER XV

MISSIONARY WORK AND THE CHINESE CHRISTIAN CHURCH

EARLIER ANTI-CHRISTIAN PROPAGANDA

ANTI-CHRISTIAN propaganda has been fairly active and aggressive in China for the last three or four years, not throughout the rank and file of the people, but amongst a large section of the young intelligentsia of the country, including a number who have studied abroad. Articles attacking the Church and the Christian religion have been a regular feature in certain of the numerous magazines and periodicals that have sprung up as a result of the modern renaissance in literature and the New Thought Movement; and some of the universities and big educational centres have been strongholds of the attackers. The prime motive in so far as it is genuinely Chinese in origin has probably been jealousy—jealousy that this foreign religion has been making such headway in competition with Confucian philosophy and Buddhism and Taoism, now well-established Chinese religions, jealousy at the very successful competition of the Christian schools and universities with the national and provincial institutions, and above all jealousy that through their standing as founders, supporters and leaders of the Christian Church foreigners should have gained the widespread influence wielded by them in shaping and moulding public opinion and the life of the people wherever the Church and its institutions extend. It is uncertain to what extent, if any, this earlier anti-Christian propaganda was inspired by Communists, but in so far as it may have been so inspired the motive would be similar to that of all their other propaganda.

Whatever the varied motives¹ actuating the attack, the gravamen of the charge was that Christianity was a "foreign religion," managed and subsidised by foreigners, a huge system of imperialistic propaganda elaborately organised with its extensive literature, its churches, schools, hospitals and universities, for the purpose of dominating and controlling the Chinese people. Adherents of the Church were thus "slaves who had forgotten their native land." Church members, pupils and teachers in the schools, and nurses in the hospitals were "the foreigners' tame dogs."

ANTI-CHRISTIAN PROPAGANDA OF THE REVOLUTION

The Nationalist Revolution, coming after three or four years of such attacks as the above, had a twofold effect. In the first place these sentiments and antagonisms, hitherto practically confined to a section of the educated classes, were disseminated by the propagandists amongst the proletariat. In the second place another purely Russian Communist line of attack was opened against Christianity that, in common with the other Chinese religions, it was a degrading superstition enslaving the minds of the people, "anæsthetising" all their higher patriotic and virile instincts (cf. Tennyson's "Lotus Eaters"), and filling them with doctrines and prejudices

¹ There are among the Chinese student body many honest agnostics, as well as atheists and those intellectually indifferent to Christianity. But doubt and intellectual objections do not as a rule inspire determined anti-Christian attacks.

In *China To-day through Chinese Eyes* (S.C.M., London, 1927), pp. 99, 100, T. Z. Koo states: "Under the influence of the Kuo Min Tang students have thrown themselves into the Citizens' Revolution Movement, which has a Nationalistic and an anti-Christian programme. . . . The anti-Christian programme consists of the following:

- Christmas anti-Christian week.
- Close or take over Christian schools.
- Urge students to leave Christian schools.
- Organise students for vacation anti-Christian work.
- Disrupt Christian organisations from within.
- Forbid participation of Christian students in national undertakings."

which were a bar to their acceptance of the pure milk of Communism. This second offensive against Christianity as a religion made very little impression on the people. The Chinese have been for too many centuries convinced of the propriety of worshipping the gods, and the necessity for religion in our lives, to be in any danger of adopting towards it the attitude of the Russian Communists. But the first offensive against Christianity as a foreign and denationalising institution did have a very tangible and widespread effect; this may best be considered under the three heads of schools, hospitals, and churches.

THE DISASTER TO CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES

There is no doubt that Christian educational work has suffered more disastrously than any other form of missionary activity. In the last fifty years a very well-organised and comprehensive system of education has been created by the Protestant missionaries in China, as already outlined, at least as far as it was concerned with girls, in Chapter VII. The corresponding provision for boys' education is much more extensive and has gone a step further in the institution of fine teachers' training schools. To-day over the whole of that part of China which has come under Nationalist control the great majority of Christian educational institutions, from primary schools to universities with staffs of thirty and forty professors and lecturers, have been closed down, those still carrying on being chiefly village schools in remote country districts too isolated to have been reached by the destructive tide.

ADMINISTRATION OF THE SCHOOLS

It should be clearly understood that this result can be attributed at most only to a slight extent to faults peculiar to the educational policy and practice. Established in the first place to meet the needs of Chinese Christians who naturally desire such facilities and environment for

their children, the schools have for many years attracted a large number of pupils from non-Christian homes, whose parents recognised the value of the training given. Thus it comes about that many of the leaders in Young China to-day, even Nationalist leaders such as Dr. Sun Yat Sen himself, have been trained in Christian schools. It is the urgent demand of the scholars themselves which has emphasised the teaching of English in the schools, the foreigners, often against their pupils' inclinations, insisting on the Chinese classics in the curriculum. Broadly speaking, though not invariably, Chinese teachers have been used to the extent to which properly qualified men could be found, and the ratio of Chinese to foreign teachers has been increasing; but general missionary policy, it must be confessed, has been at fault in too long delaying the establishment of teacher training schools.

THE CAUSE OF THE DISASTER

The cause of the disaster will not be found in this direction; but lies in the fact that, as already explained, the preliminary organisation and propaganda of the Kuo Min Tang was largely by and through schoolboys and students. In all the big schools, amongst these bright young boys, studious at their work, keen on the playing fields, well behaved and respectful, were secret groups with their plans laid long in advance for the smashing of the school; and what could not be effected by this treachery from within was completed by intimidation and intrigue from without. This came chiefly from neighbouring Government schools, which were worked up to a high pitch of patriotic fervour, and jealous at the splendid progress of the Christian schools, and at their manifest superiority over their own in buildings and equipment, teaching, scholarship, discipline and sport.

A line of attack which has only been developed since the Nationalist Government has gained political control is the publication of new Government regulations for the registration of all schools teaching in China. These,

as at present drafted, contain such stringent clauses regarding the propagation of Christianity in schools, and the Government control and direction of the school work and the property, that a very difficult problem lies awaiting the educationists of the various missionary societies and churches, when the time arrives to open.

It is probable that these regulations also had an anticipatory effect, tending to cause discontent and insubordination amongst the pupils of missionary schools, as their menace overshadowed the institutions in advance. A weapon which has in the past been used with telling effect against Christian education in Japan has been Government registration under rigid and objectionable conditions, coupled with regulations specifying that, in the case of unregistered schools, leaving certificates or diplomas are not recognised as qualifying for admittance to institutions of higher learning, or for Government and other employment. As Chinese schoolboys set a very high value on such certificates, the fear that from this point of view all their work in the Christian schools would be nullified by coming legislation naturally tended to make them reckless.

CHRISTIAN HOSPITALS AND CHINESE DOCTORS

Christian medical and hospital work has probably made a more successful stand against the tide than any other form of missionary activity. This may be attributed first to the obvious fact that its appeal to the common people of Christian love in action is so plain that "he who runs may read," and so direct to the human heart that it is not easily evaded or traduced by slanderers. Again, Western medicine has so successfully and firmly established itself amongst the people, and its results and methods are so well known beyond all cavil, that it is very difficult to revive to-day the old superstitions and fables about the stealing of children's eyes, and the killing of patients to obtain their hearts, which caused many a riot in days gone by. Perhaps that which has

done most to steady and preserve the hospitals in the present testing period has been the fact that, from early days in China, foreign doctors, more than any other group of missionary workers, have purposefully undertaken, and steadfastly devoted themselves to, the task of training up Chinese successors. As a result of this policy there are in China to-day two first-class missionary medical schools turning out graduates comparable with those of foreign countries, and four others with a good course of instruction turning out capable useful men and women practitioners. Beside these there are the Pekin Union Medical School and that at Hongkong University, two schools that any country might well be proud of and to whose work missionary societies contribute, and two small missionary schools giving a restricted training. Some of the graduates from these schools are in private practice; but the majority are working in the Christian hospitals throughout the length and breadth of the land.

THE HOSPITALS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY STORM

In spite of these advantages the casualties among the Christian hospitals have been heavy. The following is a table¹ of the conditions as ascertained up to the end of May for the twelve Central and Southern Provinces which by that time had come under Nationalist control.

(a) More or less normal, running under permanent foreign or Chinese staff, or under frequent foreign supervision	35 hospitals.
(b) Running under temporary arrangement with Chinese staff	71 "
(c) Closed	55 "
(d) Seized by military and run by army "doctors"	4 "
(e) No particulars available (far inland places)	5 "
<hr/>	
Total number of registered Missionary Hospitals in twelve Provinces	<u>170</u> "

Of the 126 hospitals included in (b) and (c) which have been left without any foreign medical staff, in many

¹ See *China Medical Journal*, May 1927, p. 479 (Presbyterian Mission Press, Shanghai).

cases the foreigners were driven out by the hostile environment outside the hospital, and only in a small minority by trouble arising amongst the staff, while in a number of other cases they withdrew only in obedience to consular orders, failing which they would have carried on their work. Of the 71 hospitals in (b), the Chinese staff, although in many cases inadequate for the abnormal demand on them, have loyally stepped into the breach, and are doing their best to carry on; while most of the 55 hospitals in (c) have been closed because they normally employed no Chinese doctors and were in this extraordinary emergency unable to obtain any.

THE HOSPITAL NURSES

In those cases where a hospital was closed because of treachery (or, looked at from the Nationalist point of view—patriotism) amongst the staff, it usually had its origin amongst the nurses, individuals again who belong to the student class. In some cases a men's hospital staff was disorganised and shaken, but not beyond recovery, by certain of its nurses¹ leaving to take up commissions as medical officers in the Nationalist armies. Not only graduate nurses, but third-year and even second-year probationers were frequently given such appointments. One hospital employing twenty-eight nurses and probationers lost nine during the first five months of the year in this way, and some smaller hospitals lost a much higher ratio of their staff. It is understandable, of course, that the Nationalist armies, when they were growing rapidly by recruiting, should be glad to employ nurses as army medical officers, if none better were available; but it is extraordinary, and at the same time an evidence of the popular estimation of Christian nurses' training, that, sometimes at least, they preferred such quack doctors even when qualified men could have been secured.

¹ In China the great majority of men's hospitals still use male nurses; but this Revolution is likely to accelerate the transition to the employment of women.

Nurses' training is a much newer enterprise in missionary hospitals than the training of doctors; and in hardly any case so far have Chinese nurses, at least in men's hospitals, reached the position of nursing superintendent. It is interesting to speculate whether the result would not have been different had the Chinese nursing profession, at the time the storm broke, reached a similar stage of development and assured standing to that of the Chinese Medical profession.

HOSPITALS AND THE HANKOW BOARD OF HEALTH

In February, when the largest Protestant Missionary hospital in Hankow was in imminent danger of disruption from the effects of propagandist and industrial attacks from within and without, the Nationalist Government made an offer to it and the three other Protestant hospitals in Hankow that is probably unique in the history of the Revolution.

The published platform of the Nationalist Party and the official policy of the Government had been such a perfect model¹ of reform and progress, but its performances so entirely dominated by the political and military needs of the day, that it was a surprise as well as a relief to receive such a tangible and practical suggestion. As principal medical officer of the Hankow Municipal Board of Health there had been engaged a Chinese doctor from Peking who was a leader in preventive medicine and a man of international reputation; and in order to assist in the development of the Government's public health programme in Hankow it was asked that these hospitals should work under the unified direction of this Board. The hospital staffs were to carry on their regular work as before, but also to assist in public health measures; as municipal institutions they would no longer be considered as "foreign" hospitals, and so they would automatically be freed from disturbance by propagandists and labour pickets, and the

¹ *Vide supra*, p. 76.

municipality would defray any additional expenses incurred on account of their new responsibilities.

The missionary doctors on the one hand and the Board of Health officials on the other were genuinely in earnest, even enthusiastic, over the scheme, which was very carefully and thoroughly worked out. Taken as it stood, it promised to be one of the most complete little bits of constructive public utility work done by the Nationalist Government, and the first piece of real co-operative work between it and the Christian Church. But there were long delays: then suddenly the Board of Health was abolished and health matters were relegated to a subdivision of the Police Department. It became clear that the Central Executive Committee had no intention at all of doing or allowing anything constructive, and that the entire direction of the Board of Health was a matter of political jobbery. The newly-appointed Principal Medical Officer, who had given up the highest appointment in Peking for his faith in this work, resigned in bitter disillusionment and despair, and only managed to escape from the city, which had become hateful to him, by leaving his luggage behind him.

This man, a friend whose character and work I know well, is typical of many other patriots in the Nationalist Party, whose souls were afire with the vision of a strong united China, free alike from domination without and corruption within, men who for the hope that was set before them gladly faced danger and personal hardship and loss. Their idealism is that which echoes through Blake's ringing lines:

"I will not cease from Mental Fight,
Nor shall my Sword sleep in my hand,
Till we have built Jerusalem
In England's green and pleasant land."

But the Communists, now that they were in control, with a cynical smile crushed them and swept them aside: this purpose was no part of their plan. What they sought—what they always seek with the grim

purpose of a bulldog—was no dream of a strong, happy and prosperous China, but the World Revolution. The statesmanship, idealism and technical ability of such men had no chance to make a stand against the ignorant illiterate tyranny of the Labour Unions, which, drunk with new-found power, were deliberately allowed and encouraged to dominate the Government departments.

CHRISTIAN HOSPITALS AND THE NATIONALIST WOUNDED

Towards the end of May the Government again came into touch with the Christian hospitals in Wuhan. At this time very heavy casualties had been sustained by the Nationalist armies in a campaign in Honan,¹ and their army medical organisation was absolutely unable to cope with the thousands of wounded that were pouring into the city. A big Red Cross drive was launched, headed by Madame Sun, appealing to the people for money and service for the care of the wounded; but, though they could improvise arrangements for the lighter cases, they had neither hospital equipment nor personnel capable of dealing with those dangerously injured.

As always in such emergencies, the Christian hospitals had done their utmost to assist by dealing with the most serious cases; but by stretching their accommodation to the utmost they could not take in more than five hundred patients. An international committee was therefore formed consisting of Chinese and foreign doctors and representatives of the local missionary societies, which sent an appeal abroad for funds to be used under its own control; and the hospitals took over neighbouring buildings, to be used as annexes to increase their accommodation. At the same time parties were being organised in Shanghai of very considerable numbers of Chinese and foreign doctors and nurses who went up-river to Hankow to reinforce the staffs of the hospitals there, by this time overworked and under-manned to the point of exhaustion. Thus, by strengthening and using to the maximum

¹ *Vide infra*, p. 195.

capacity the existing hospitals, and establishing other emergency institutions as a powerful auxiliary to the Government's efforts, the Christian forces played a great part in seeing the city through this calamity, and gave to those who had sought their destruction a fresh demonstration of their aggressive vitality, their essential value to the community, and their spirit triumphant over all consideration of enmity, or party, or race.

MANAGEMENT OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCHES

The churches and organised congregations of Christians, not being concentrated within definite institutions as in the case of schools and hospitals, but living scattered in their own homes and mingling constantly and freely with the life all round them, on the one hand did not present such an easy sitting shot for the Nationalist marksmen, and on the other were more open and sensitive to the daily criticism of their acquaintances and neighbours. In the great majority of at least the larger missionary societies working in China steady progress has been made, and more rapidly during the last decade, towards the self-government of the Chinese Church. The ratio of Chinese ministers and pastors to their foreign colleagues is rising fairly rapidly, and Chinese bishops are beginning to appear in both the Protestant Episcopal and Roman Catholic Churches. In the highest Church councils more and more responsibility is being thrown on to the joint sessions of Chinese and foreigners, and less and less business is entrusted to the committees of foreign missionaries. In the National Christian Convention at Shanghai in 1922, consisting of 1139 church leaders and representing every section of the Protestant Christian Movement in the land, there were equal numbers of Chinese and foreign delegates under a Chinese chairman.

This Convention appointed a National Christian Council, a permanent representative body of some hundred leaders of the Christian Church with a strong

Executive Committee. Even if in certain of the Chinese Christian Churches the foreign missionary society or foreign denominational prejudices still take too great a share in the direction and management, this Council at least stands for the Christian Church of China, envisages it and its interests and progress as a whole, and from this standpoint since its inception has been giving a strong lead to all the various Christian activities in the land (except the Roman Catholic). Under its guidance, especially in dealing with social and industrial problems, the Christian Church has been developing a far more truly national policy and outlook than it had a few years ago.

SELF-GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH CHINA

But in South China, the first to feel the strong urge of the spirit of independence, it had been realised for some time by Chinese and foreigners alike that this steady progress was not sufficient, and that a much more rapid and comprehensive move would have to be made. This was well under way years before the Nationalist expedition set out for Central China in 1926; and in many churches ¹ it has now been completed. In these the denominational distinctions that were necessarily introduced by the missionary societies of the various foreign churches, but which have little or no significance for Chinese, have been all swept away, all the Christian work of these areas being now under the direction of district committees or councils of the "Christian Church of China." This Church manages its own affairs, appointing as "advisers" such foreign missionaries as it approves, and is able to obtain from the foreign missionary societies which formerly supported the denominational churches in each district. The administration of the Church funds is also in its hands, and it receives such contributions as the

¹ Even in South China there are still strong branches of the Christian Church, such as the Episcopal and Methodist, which retain their original denominational form.

missionary societies choose to supply, subject to any conditions for their use that may be specified. By this means they have managed very largely to slip from under the reproach of being a "foreign Church," and in most cases are carrying on their Christian work with very little molestation.

REORGANISATION IN CENTRAL CHINA

In Central China the urgent need for more radical readjustment had not been foreseen so clearly, with the result that the Nationalist shock shook the Church more severely, and some congregations were scattered, while many individuals with little or no real faith fell away from the "foreign religion," and in the remoter country districts even set up their household idols again.

In Hunan, where the persecution was fiercest in accordance with the long-established tradition of this Province, many members were driven to the choice expressed by one lay preacher in the words: "I am prepared to die as a Christian martyr if it is necessary, but not as a 'foreign slave.'" In such crises occurring with unexpected suddenness in Hunan, sometimes unreasonable and ill-considered local reorganisations of the Church were made as a *modus vivendi* beneath the storm of popular fury. But the outstanding feature of the Hunan persecution has been the loyalty and devotion of the Christians to their faith, many of them, rather than renounce it, losing their possessions and their homes, and some even life itself.

In Hupeh and other provinces also, committees chosen *ad hoc* were everywhere at work drafting new and more advanced schemes of organisation, sometimes such as would fundamentally affect the management of the Church, and sometimes such as would effect little real alteration, but be a useful paper organisation to demonstrate more clearly to critics and opponents the genuine degree of independence which has been already achieved by the Chinese Church.

THE NATURALISATION OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH

Nowhere throughout the country has there been any idea that the Chinese Church no longer needs foreign missionaries: it is merely a question as to what their future relation to the Church should be. Some few foreigners will not be prepared to accept appointment under the changed conditions, and these will not return to China. But the great majority of the foreign missionaries are ready, even eager, to resume their work under the new regime with all that may be implied therein.

The reflex effect of the whole process on the native Church has already begun to appear. Where the foreigners were withdrawn the administration was necessarily left in the Chinese leaders' hands. Where they were formerly used to depend on the foreigner for guidance, inspiration and protection, they have been very largely thrown back on their own resources; and generally, though sometimes in ways not like the foreigners' ways, they have risen to and shouldered the responsibility. When the storm has blown over, and the damage been repaired, it will be found that it has developed a degree of independence in the Church which otherwise it would have taken many years to achieve; and that the ideal of self-support, as well as self-government, has been brought well into the forefront of its purpose and policy. The tree has been shaken; its dead leaves have fallen and some branches have been broken; but its fibres have toughened, and its roots struck more deeply into its native soil.

NOTE ON THE FOREIGN ARMS TRAFFIC IN CHINA.

An activity which has for years been causing ill-feeling and resentment in China is the international traffic in arms.

Each military party in the country in turn becomes righteously indignant because this or that foreign nation has been supplying their opponents with fire-arms or other munitions of war, or loans for their purchase, though each party in turn is naturally equally ready and glad to avail itself of similar facilities in its time of need. Whenever such charges are brought forward, the foreign Government concerned is roundly accused of being false to its undertakings and of conspiring to promote anarchy and civil war in China; and the Nationalist Party and Press have naturally made many such charges during this Revolution.

The foreign Powers took up a definite attitude towards this traffic in 1919. In order to put some restriction on the interminable wars of the Chinese militarists, and at the instance of the United States Minister at Peking, an agreement was signed¹ by which Great Britain, the United States, France, Spain, Japan, Russia, Portugal and Brazil undertook to prohibit, until the establishment of a stable Government over the whole of China, the export into that country of arms, ammunition and material for their manufacture; and to this agreement the Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium and Italy subsequently adhered.

When such charges are made against these Governments, in most cases the reply is that they do not meddle in any way with Chinese party strife, and that they do not allow any such alleged illicit traffic.

The problem is, however, not as simple as the above statement would indicate. The munitions industry throughout the world has in modern times always been extraordinarily international and cosmopolitan.² It is very largely in the hands of private firms who are eager for business wherever it can be picked up, so that British or German firms, for example, just as readily fill contracts for their country's potential enemies as for her friends. At the end of the Great War most of the belligerent countries had on hand enormous stocks of arms and ammunition of all kinds which were very largely disposed of to private contractors at prices much below cost. These parties would naturally be eager to realise on their purchases as early as possible; but, unfortunately for them, since the Armistice there has not been fighting on any considerable scale anywhere in the world except in China; and even here the consumption of warlike supplies cannot yet have been nearly sufficient to exhaust the world's surplus stocks. From this elementary sketch of the state of the world's armament market, whether the new manufacture of the world's great armament firms or the large second-hand lots held by speculative buyers, it is evident how attractive a customer China must have been during these years of civil war.

¹ See *The China Year Book*, 1924, Tientsin Press, Tientsin, p. 957.

² See *The War of Steel and Gold*, by H. N. Brailsford, Bell and Sons, London, 1914, Chap. II.

The British Government has made a genuine attempt to stop this traffic by an extensive system of frontier supervision, not only on the seaboard but even on the land frontiers of India, and Britain is the only nation which has made it a legal offence for her nationals to engage in the trade. Most of the other Governments adhering to the embargo agreement have also taken measures to enforce it, and there is no doubt that it has been a valuable check on importations. But where the profits are high there will always be men to face the risks; and when the practicability is considered of transhipment or resale through the nationals of some third country not hampered by treaties with China, the possibilities of the trade are seen to be immense. Though the nationals of each foreign country in China protest that their own countrymen are innocent, they agree that the nationals of other countries are involved, and there is no doubt that the supplies steadily pour in.

When several years ago newspapers in China published the news item that bodies of Wu Pei Fu's soldiers had been seen wearing the familiar British Tommies' tin helmet, the extraordinary explanation was proffered that they had been sold to the Chinese, not for use in fighting, but for decorative and parade purposes only. Germans, their country not having been included in the arms embargo agreement, have imported through Tsingtao and sold in Tsinanfu large quantities of small-arms, mostly the Allies' surplus war stock; and the Customs returns for 1924 show that 32 per cent. of the arms traffic to China was conducted by Germans. Norwegians, being similarly unrestricted, have done a large trade in high explosives. A great deal of machinery for the equipment of arsenals has been brought into the country, not being specifically interdicted in the embargo. Vickers, Ltd., supplied 140 aeroplanes to Peking specifically for civilian use, and these were after a time all seized by the army: French aeroplanes and instructors have also been supplied to the Northern forces. A large quantity of war material, including field-guns, was sold to the Northerners by Italians in 1924. Japanese have engaged in a considerable arms traffic, notably supplying Chang Tso Lin with trench mortars and shells; and at the time of the Nationalist capture of Shanghai it came out in court that a United States official in a position of high responsibility and trust in China had been an agent in a transaction for the sale of arms to the same General. But the Russian traffic in arms and ammunition is greater than that of any of these countries. Whether overland down the railway to Kalgan, north of Peking, or by motor transport over the long trek across the Gobi desert of Mongolia to Feng Yu Hsiang's north-western base, or from Vladivostok by sea to Canton, in large quantities and with no attempt at concealment the war material has been poured into China; and for much of it no price has been asked except the whole-hearted championship of the Communist cause. It is this that in the last two or three years has discouraged the other Powers from any attempt to make the embargo more explicit and effective.

PART IV

DIVISION AND REUNION IN THE NATIONALIST
PARTY—THE DECLINE OF COMMUNIST
INFLUENCE

CHAPTER XVI

THE HONAN CAMPAIGN

THE MILITARY SITUATION IN THE PROVINCE

IN the last section of Chapter X we have seen how completely the Hankow Government had been isolated by Chiang Kai Shek's action on 15th April in establishing the Nanking Government and overthrowing the Communists in Canton; and in Chapter XII we have traced how rapidly its prestige with the foreign Powers was falling. To meet this twofold menace there was only one thing to do; and though it demanded a boldness of strategy which might well have daunted weaker hearts, they set about it with a fine gesture of confidence and defiance—to take Peking, and that without delay.

Even a cursory glance at the map is sufficient to reveal some of the formidable difficulties in the way; but there were several weighty factors favouring them in the enterprise. Although the Northern troops under General Chang Hsueh Liang, a son of Chang Tso Lin, had some kind of authority in the Province of Honan, it was of a very uncertain and ephemeral nature. They had fought their way down the railway line to Chumatién or a little further; but this had been at the cost of many casualties, and on either side of the line they were still hampered by the extraordinarily heterogeneous collection of units, which has for several years made all campaigning in Honan an inscrutable and incalculable quantity. It is the worst bandit-ridden province of China; and in some parts of the Province there are bandit chiefs who within several days could muster ten, twenty, and in one case over thirty thousand armed men to their banners. There were two or three generals, each with his own little army of soldiers loosely attached to a more or less definite

district, who had helped to ruin Wu Pei Fu by supporting him with an enthusiasm so damp that he was never sure that it had not been bought by the opposite side. Finally, as a result of these conditions of anarchy, there has spread far and wide over the Province the organisation of a secret society—"The Red Spear Society"—a kind of irregular but armed peasant militia which is opposed to bandits and soldiers, regular and irregular alike; it has again and again annihilated isolated bodies of soldiers, and has in turn suffered from their cruel and bloody reprisals.

The bandit organisations and little armies of professional soldiers were generally prepared to rank themselves as subordinates or auxiliaries of any large regular army occupying the railway line, in return for supplies and immunity within their own districts. The secret and invisible "Red Spears," while not daring to attack a regular army while in strong occupation anywhere, were apt to rise against the administration or the occupying force if its main body of troops were drafted abroad and its home communications only held by a thin line. Nothing would succeed with all these people so well as a striking military success; and the Nationalists also had, in their highly developed secret service and propaganda agency ramifying throughout the Province, a factor more likely to secure them support than any agency in the hands of the Northerners.

One other force there was amidst this bewildering welter of soldiers, militia and bandits, which three short years before had been the greatest military power in China. But now Wu Pei Fu, isolated and friendless with little left him save his scholarship, was hardly a force to be taken very seriously. Broken as we have seen by the Nationalist invasion of Central China in September 1926, and rapidly driven out of Hupeh over the Honan border, his power had since then steadily declined. He was cut off by the Nationalist occupation of Wuhan from the source alike of his munitions and his revenue; and his

prestige, that had once served to rally the nondescript hordes of Honan to his banner, had now been trampled in the mud. Chang Hsueh Liang, pushing down the railway to Chumatien, had simply ignored him, leaving him to guard his west flank; but Wu maintained a shadowy authority between their southernmost advance and the Nationalist vanguards on the Hupeh border, only to be pushed aside into the Nanyang district of Western Honan when they began their northern drive into the province along the railway.

THE NATIONALIST STRATEGY

The troops available for use included the famous Fourth Army¹ and one or two other units of excellently disciplined and first-class fighting men who had come up with the original expeditionary force from Canton, as well as many others recruited from Hunan and Hupeh who had been assiduously trained by tolerably efficient instructors. There was the arsenal at Hanyang, one of the best in China, working night and day to keep them supplied, and there were Russian Staff officers, especially General Galen, to advise on the strategy of the campaign. When once they should have fought (and bought) their way as far as the Yellow River, there was Feng Yu Hsiang,

¹ This body, called the "Iron Army," was the idol of the Nationalist Party, the spear-head of the expeditionary force. It was their boast as they said farewell to the citizens when embarking on the North-bound train at Hankow that they would not return until Peking had been taken. It was hard enough for hospitals to get forty cents a day from the Government for the treatment of ordinary wounded soldiers; but it readily paid a dollar a day for soldiers of the Iron Army. It was a soldier from this army who, having been brought back in the great tide of wounded from the Honan campaign, was lying in the hospital at Hankow to which I was attached. A foreign visitor, noticing that he had a badly smashed leg, expressed sympathy at the seriousness of the injury. "Tell me," said the soldier, "what is the latest news of the fighting." "I'm afraid there'll be no more fighting for you," said the visitor, remembering sadly that he would have no Repatriation Department or pension to fall back on when he would be discharged a cripple from the hospital. "What does my leg matter?" answered the soldier. "The newspapers say that our men have crossed the Yellow River and are on the way to Peking: tell me, is it true?"

now theoretically commander-in-chief of the whole expedition, waiting with an army of over 100,000 men to come in from his stronghold in Shensi in the West; and when this combined army had pushed its way a hundred miles or so further North, General Yen Hsi Shan from Shansi would join the grand final onslaught, and Peking would fall.

This is the programme that was published with confident detail in the Government newspaper, and three months was the maximum time allowed for its accomplishment. However fanciful it may look in retrospect, there were many foreigners in Hankow who regarded it as a reasonable possibility; and certain it is that, when the invading force was nearing the Yellow River, foreign women and children in large numbers began hastily to evacuate Peking, and the Americans made tentative arrangements for the withdrawal of their Legation to Tientsin.

FIGHTING THE CAMPAIGN THROUGH

On 22nd April the first battalions of the Fourth Army left Hankow by train for the North; and a week later the remaining battalions with the Eleventh Army and other units were all on the road, while even in such a serious business as this expedition time was found at the towns *en route* for propaganda work and labour organisation.

During the first two weeks great delay and difficulty were caused by guerilla warfare carried on against the lines of communication by the various bodies of irregular troops from either side of the railroad. When their vanguards by 7th May had established contact with the Northerners at Chumatien, these irregulars cut the line behind them near the Hupeh border, isolating their advanced forces for a time, and compelling the withdrawal of the Nationalist headquarters into Hupeh.

Feng Yu Hsiang was to have assisted at this stage; but before he could debouch effectively through the Tungkuan Pass into the Honan plain there was heavy fighting to be

done to capture the railhead west of Loyang. He was heavily in debt to Russia for munitions, as documents taken in the raid in the grounds of the Russian Embassy have shown, and at the same time the Communist authorities in Moscow were doubtful of his whole-hearted support of their principles. The trans-Mongolian motor route is obviously one of almost prohibitive difficulty; and it is not likely that at this time Feng was receiving any appreciable quantity of Russian supplies. The Hankow authorities attempted to make good this deficiency by despatching munitions by boats up the Han River and its northern tributaries; but these were captured either by Wu Pei Fu or bodies of the irregular Honan soldiery. Wu, on the other hand, could and did appeal to Peking for munitions to enable him to meet Feng's attack.

It became clear to General Tang Shen Chih, who was in command of the Hankow expeditionary forces, that they could not take the Province with a rush; but he was not lacking in strategic ability. The Hankow troops deployed widely in the eastern districts of Honan, by military and propagandist force defeating, neutralising or enlisting the local troops; and on the 14th May, attacked, thirty miles north of Chumatien, the Northerners' left flank, including one of their own armies which had turned traitor and ranged itself against them. After three days' fierce fighting he registered a costly victory, claiming to have killed 8000, and captured 5000 prisoners with machine guns and ammunition. In spite of their heavy casualties the Hankow forces pressed their attack; and on 21st their vanguard was seventy miles north-east of Chumatien, aiming at Kaifeng on their enemies' eastern line of railway communications.

Feng Yu Hsiang meanwhile had been pressing his attack, not only along the railway against Chang Hsueh Liang's troops at Loyang, but also across the Shensi border towards Wu Pei Fu's headquarters at Nanyang, thus immobilising him and preventing him from attacking Tang Shen Chih's left flank.

The Northerners, however, rallied, and on the 26th inst. Chang Hsueh Liang launched a heavy attack down the railway in an attempt to retake Chumatien. But on the 28th the Nationalist troops again determinedly counter-attacked their left flank and, although they were decimated by the Northerners' superior weight of artillery and machine-gun fire, compelled them to retreat.

Feng on 24th had already crossed the Yellow River higher up, and was attacking along the branch line north of the river, aiming at the Northerners' line of communications. On 26th he captured Loyang on the railway south of the river, and on 30th he was advancing against Chenchow. This was decisive, and transformed the Northerners' defeat into a rout, made the more complete by two of Wu Pei Fu's generals, who had hitherto been co-operating with them, going over to the Nationalist side. Feng claimed to have captured 20,000 prisoners and six train-loads of munitions; and the main part of the Northern Army was withdrawn north of the river. All this time the attitude of Yen Hsi Shan, the Governor of Shansi, had been in doubt; but now, true to his promise to declare himself as soon as Chenchow should have fallen, he hoisted the Nationalist flag at Taiyuanfu on 5th June and moved a division of troops up to the Chihli border.

Chenchow was actually captured by Feng Yu Hsiang on the 1st June, and by the 8th he had moved his headquarters to Kaifeng. As will be shown later, this Honan campaign by wresting the Chenchow-Hsuchow connecting railway out of the hands of Chang Hsueh Liang was of the greatest assistance to Chiang Kai Shek, who was at this time advancing northwards in Anhwei, for it was now no longer possible for the two Northern Army groups on their respective trunk railway lines to co-operate with each other.

THE CASUALTIES AND THEIR SIGNIFICANCE

Though more efficient than a few years ago, the medical corps of any Chinese army is still quite incompetent to

deal effectively with even a moderate stream of casualties; but when there is a large and continuous stream from heavy fighting the inefficiency is pitiful and appalling.¹

This was convincingly demonstrated by the Honan campaign. By 2nd June 9000 wounded had been transported to Wuhan, and they were still arriving at the rate of 500 daily in a most deplorable state of neglect. These were nearly all Nationalists, hardly any Northerners having been brought in up to this date. A peculiar characteristic of the casualties which came to the metropolis during the early weeks was that they included a large number of lightly wounded, such as clean through and through bullet wounds of the limbs, which under a proper organisation would have been kept in casualty clearing stations or local hospitals near the front, while, on the other hand, there was a very small proportion of head and abdominal wounds, which there could have been no means of treating there. It is true that there are Christian hospitals dotted here and there at stations along the railway; but they are few, and their average accommodation would be little more than fifty beds. The evidence confirms the *a priori* assumption which Chinese experience suggests, that there were large numbers of the seriously wounded who never reached Hankow, but were abandoned on the field as hopeless. These considerations give some conception of the severity and extent of the fighting. It is known that Chang Hsueh Liang had under his command some of the picked troops of the Northern forces (known as the Fengtien Army). This army had had no serious fighting since 1924; but during this time it had been well drilled and disciplined, and it had long been known as the best equipped army in China. At the

¹ In the present case it was probably more marked than it would otherwise have been because, on account of the rapid expansion of the Nationalist armies, they had been able to get comparatively few doctors even from the low-grade provincial medical schools, a large number of the present army "doctors" being merely male nurses who have deserted from missionary hospitals at the call of the Revolution (*vide supra*, p. 177).

battle of Chumatien these troops were well entrenched astride the railway, where they had been for some months; and they had a marked superiority in artillery, trench mortars, and machine guns over the Southern attacking forces. In spite of this they were completely routed within three weeks of their first contact with the Southerners' vanguards. The Southern victory was one of which their armies might well be proud; but they had paid dearly for it. It ended the Hankow Government's hopes of taking Peking in 1927, as a considerable delay to reorganise and recruit was inevitable; and it seems probable that the losses in their finest troops were so serious as to temporarily destroy their initiative.

THE WUHAN BASE BESET BY ENEMIES

The Nationalist Government carried through this Honan campaign under conditions of peculiar embarrassment and difficulty. As we have seen, the fighting in that province was of such a severe and critical nature as to necessitate every available unit being pushed up to the front. At the great Hanyang arsenal the shifts were double-banked, and thousands of workmen fed the machines and furnaces night and day without ceasing, current propaganda heard in the streets and seen on the posters holding them up for public eulogy as, equally with the men at the front, helping to win the war. So hard pressed were the authorities that by 17th May a large number (said to be 80 per cent.) of the Hankow pickets, a most essential factor in the industrial organisation, had been enlisted for military service; and their police duties, in a way that could surely only occur in China, were largely taken over by boy scouts, who were at this time mobilised in large numbers for the purpose.

Taking advantage of this depletion of the Hankow defence forces, enemies rose up on all sides. Yang Sen¹ the Szechuan general, had been for some months in Western Hupeh, his political attitude vacillating from

¹ *Vide supra*, p. 112.

one party to the other. Early in May he definitely allied himself with Wu Pei Fu, his old chief, and began to descend the Yangtze towards Hankow with 40,000 men. By 31st May he was a hundred miles above Hankow, and on 3rd June was reported only fifty miles away. Wu Pei Fu himself, who had been reported as about to retire to a monastery for the second time in his career, changed his mind at this opportunity, and began to reorganise between Nanyang and the Han River in co-operation with Yang Sen.

In the middle of May Cantonese and Kiangsi divisions in support of Chiang Kai Shek were making their way up from South Hunan with Hankow as their objective; and early in June policy in Changsha swung rapidly in favour of Nanking, and Communists in that city began to be rounded up.¹ Still other bodies of troops from Chiang Kai Shek's Nanking command were moving up the river from the east, and on 28th May had reached Kiukiang, some 130 miles below Hankow.

The most immediate threat came from Hsia Tao Yin, a general in command of the 2nd Division of the Nationalist Army in Northern Hunan. On 17th May news came through that he had gone over to Chiang Kai Shek's faction and was rapidly advancing against Wuchang, and within two days he was encamped ten miles away. During these two days we saw wealthy Chinese all day long and far into the night moving their portable wealth into the French Concession, at this time considered the most secure haven of refuge. The smallness of Hsia Tao Yin's numbers was taken by them as a clear indication that he had already arranged for traitors to co-operate from inside the city, for otherwise, they said, he would not be such a fool as to attack.

There is no doubt that during these few days the Hankow Government passed through an acute crisis, to which the British rupture of relations on 14th inst.² had contributed its quota, and that the leaders realised that

¹ *Vide supra*, p. 76.

² *Vide supra*, p. 137.

its fate was hanging by a thread; but they carried on through it with a fine nerve and a steady hand. On 19th martial law was proclaimed and detachments were sent a few miles out of the city to entrench in protection of the Concessions. The day after Hsia Tao Yin arrived within striking distance of Wuchang, the news of the first victory at Chumatien came through and was exploited to the utmost by handbills and the native Press; but that same day it transpired that the Eighth Army, which was stationed on guard over the Hanyang arsenal, had been disarmed by the Government over-night—a sinister though silent comment on the instability of the situation.

Had Chang Hsueh Liang's counter-attack of 26th inst. been successful, the Nationalist morale must have broken, and Wuhan would have been lost, together with the Honan campaign. As it was, the casualties pouring in from the north, such as Hankow had not seen within living memory, were a severe strain on the Nationalist prestige amongst the populace. But instead there came the news of the smashing victory of the second battle of Chumatien, followed by the capture of Chenchow on 1st June and the resumption of railway passenger traffic thither on 20th. Feng Yu Hsiang took over the military defence of Honan, and the Hankow armies were quickly withdrawn for the defence of the capital. Yang Sen was defeated on 14th June by part of the "Iron Army"; Tang Shen Chih was sent to Changsha on 28th June to control Honan, and the threat from Hsia Tao Yin's forces and of those from Nanking rapidly melted away.

CHAPTER XVII

THE MAKING OF GENERAL FENG AND THE CITIZENS' ARMY

EARLY LIFE AND CHRISTIAN INFLUENCES

THE most arresting and unique figure among the war lords who have risen to prominence in China during the last decade is Feng Yu Hsiang, who at this time comes into close and decisive relations with the Nationalist Government. Because of the steadily growing influence on the country and the course of the Revolution wielded by his strong personality in the past, and the even greater influence that he seems destined to exert in the future, it is essential to obtain a clear conception of his character and at least the outlines of his life and work.

It has become the fashion with a certain class of foreigner during the last two or three years to sneer and gibe at this "Christian General" because some of his actions have been diametrically at variance with the accepted military code of the West. There are also those amongst his earlier Christian friends who have been grieved and disappointed at his affiliations with Communist Russia, and at some aspects of the anti-foreign propaganda. And yet no apology is here offered for devoting several pages to the factor of Christianity in his life and work. There are many public men to-day in all countries in whom this factor, when it exists at all, exerts apparently such a negligible influence that it would be an absurd affectation to emphasise it in any account of them. In Feng Yu Hsiang, on the contrary, Christianity has for many years produced such an extraordinary and determinative effect, not only on his personal life, but also on his military organisation and civil administration, that it is impossible to ignore it in writing of the

man. It is to be presumed that the reader, whatever his personal predilection on this subject may be, is desirous of knowing the relevant facts.

Born in Anhwei in 1880, Feng Yu Hsiang in his boyhood was involved with his family in ruin by floods, and trekked with them to the great military centre of Paotingfu, where at the age of eighteen he enlisted in the army. He had had but little education; but, inured to hardship and privation, he stood over six feet in height, was a man of splendid physique, and had an unusual capacity for sustained work, the two latter being essential characteristics for any great military leader in China.

In June 1900, when on sentry duty at Paotingfu, he witnessed the brutal massacre by the Boxers of some Christian missionaries, and the fearlessness displayed by some of them made a deep impression on him. Later on, under treatment in missionary hospitals in Peking and Manchuria, his attention was again arrested by the, to him, unprecedented spirit in which it was carried out. When, having risen to the rank of major, he was on a recruiting campaign in Honan in 1911, he again came into close touch with missionaries and Chinese Christians, and began to study Christian literature and to pass it on to his subordinate officers. Finally, at one of Mr. J. R. Mott's meetings in Peking in 1913, he was converted to Christianity, and shortly afterwards was baptised.

At this time he was in command of the 3rd Infantry Brigade, consisting of some five hundred men; and he immediately set himself to win them also to Christianity. From this date he began a career of public evangelistic effort and Christian work in his army which surely stands without parallel. Chinese Gordon and Havelock of India were outstanding Christian leaders; but we must go back to Oliver Cromwell, who indeed is Feng's beau-ideal and has been quoted in some of his army orders, to find an officer who approached Feng Yu Hsiang in intense and active interest in the spiritual life of his men; and it is only in Cromwell's Ironsides that we shall find another

army where Christianity was similarly regarded as a fundamental and vital element in the routine and training of a soldier.

ADMINISTRATIVE EXPERIENCE IN THE PROVINCES¹

As Feng steadily rose in rank he had in the course of his duty a wide experience in various provinces. In 1914 he was transferred to the command of the 16th (National) Mixed Brigade. In 1915 as Brigadier-General he was sent to Szechuan to suppress banditry and repel invasion from Yunnan. It was while engaged in this work that he received telegraphed instructions in December to hold the Province for the new dynasty which Yuan Shih Kai had just announced in Peking. He immediately wired back refusing to obey this order—a significant assertion of his individuality and republican spirit.

In 1916 he was in Hupeh on the Yangtze River, and later in the year in his native province of Anhwei. In 1918 he was sent as Defence Commissioner to West Hunan, where he repelled an invasion from the South, and maintained order for two years. In 1920, when stationed in a large town near Chikungshan in Hupeh, he attracted some notice by holding up a train carrying Government funds to Peking, and appropriating them for the payment of his army.

In 1921 he was promoted to the rank of general, and sent in command of the 11th Division of 10,000 men to take possession of Shensi. This was accomplished with very little fighting, and Feng by mandate from Peking was then made military governor of the Province, and established his headquarters at the provincial capital, Sianfu, the first Christian to hold such a position in any province of China. It was while he was here that the first traces of propaganda against foreign militarism and imperialism were noticed in his army.

¹ For fuller details under this and the following two sections see Broomhall's *General Feng*, R.T.S., London, 1923.

EARLY RELATIONS WITH WU PEI FU

At this time Feng held his appointment under Marshal Wu Pei Fu, who, with his headquarters at Paotingfu, was paramount chief of a great block of country comprising more than half the provinces of China, and the power behind the Peking Government. In the spring of 1922 Wu summoned Feng to his aid against an attack that Chang Tso Lin was making against Peking. Feng promptly moved his headquarters in to Chenchow on the railway and despatched reinforcements as ordered. They found a battle in progress near Peking and Wu's men beginning to be pressed back, and in the action which followed a Christian brigade of Feng's received special mention for its brilliant achievement in turning the enemy's flank and materially contributing to the victory which ensued.

Feng himself at the same time had to defend his depleted headquarters garrison at Chenchow against an almost overwhelming surprise attack from Honan. When this was beaten off, however, he was appointed governor of that Province, a most important strategic centre. Here he set himself to stabilise the currency and to suppress the bandits, raising his army to 20,000 for the latter purpose.

Towards the end of the year he had some disagreement with Wu about the raising of revenue, and so in November was transferred to Peking as Inspector-General of the Forces. Though ostensibly a promotion, and entailing the increase of his army to 30,000 men, this appointment, unlike a provincial governorship, carried with it no dependable source of income; and as a result Feng had the greatest difficulty in obtaining even a tithe of the money required to pay his troops, and it was only by practising the most rigid economy that he was able to maintain them in charge of the capital, until in two years' time the next crisis arose.

CHRISTIANITY AND DISCIPLINE IN THE ARMY

Through all the vicissitudes of these ten years, while the number of the troops under his command increased from 500 to 30,000 men, Feng Yu Hsiang maintained in his army unchanged the Christian attitude that he had adopted at his conversion. He never put pressure individually on his subordinates to accept Christianity, and it was clearly understood that every member of his army was free to accept or reject any religion as his conscience dictated. At the same time Feng himself and many of his officers were constantly preaching Christianity in public to the men. Throughout the army classes were held to teach the soldiers to read; and when they could read, regular study of the Bible was encouraged. Frequently special periods were set apart for prayer meetings and religious instruction. At times, as in West Hunan in 1918 and in Peking in 1923, the co-operation of foreign missionaries and Chinese ministers was sought and obtained for special series of evangelistic services, where there were remarkable experiences comparable with those of the Moody and Sankey revivals of Western lands. The special feature of these meetings was the powerful spiritual lead given to the soldiers through General Feng and others of their senior officers. Careful religious instruction was given to the converts, and there have been as many as five hundred, after due preparation and examination, baptised in one day. Some units in the army are reported to have contained 80 per cent. of Christians.

It must not be imagined that this emotional form of religion produced any slackening in military efficiency. Whether we judge by cleanliness and order in camp life, smartness in turn out of the men, speed in mobilisation and transport, forced marching, cheerfulness under long-continued shortage in rations and pay, or actual fighting efficiency on the battle-field, the testimony is practically unanimous that the discipline and spirit of Feng's armies

were far superior to those of other armies in any part of the country at this time.

Feng and his officers set an example to the men in living the simple life. Coarse uniforms, plain fare, and generally Spartan conditions were the usual routine. Opium, alcohol and sexual vice were interdicted for officers and men alike, Feng on one occasion personally thrashing one of his colonels for going to a house of ill fame. When appointed Governor of Shensi in 1921 he was in the provincial capital, Sianfu. He immediately moved to outside the city under canvas, afraid lest he and his entourage should be enervated by living in the Yamen. Looting by his soldiers was rigidly forbidden, and thrift encouraged. On the other hand, Feng, unlike most other commanders, made it a cardinal point of his administration whenever possible to see that his men were regularly paid, and on occasion did not scruple to seize public funds for this purpose. In Peking during 1923, when all ranks were many months in arrears, the extraordinary spectacle was seen of the money available for the army being used to pay the privates first and the higher officers last.

Fully aware that Chinese armies are the mills in which bandits are manufactured, Feng instituted a system of industrial training for his troops to prepare them for self-support when eventually demobilised. Each battalion as a rule practised a separate craft. Most of the goods manufactured were used by the army itself; the remainder was sold and part of the proceeds distributed to the men.

Feng's public administration showed the same concern for the welfare of the people. Wherever he has been in authority there have been the same activities shown,—in Szechuan, Shensi, Hunan, or Honan. The bandit curse has been energetically, sometimes ferociously, suppressed; opium-smoking has been at least reduced; roads have been made in the country, and cities cleaned up and drained; in some towns prostitutes have been expelled, and brothels and gambling dens closed; beggars have

been segregated and suitably provided for, or made to work, and temples have been transformed and used for schools instead of for idolatry.

Most Chinese officials and governors, on leaving their post at the termination of the appointment, used to be accompanied by a long retinue of coolies carrying their spoils of office. In this particular also Feng's behaviour was in contrast with the usual custom. It is recorded of him that he left his Szechuan appointment as poor as when he entered into the office, and that when he vacated his governorship in Shensi he left the common people mourning the ruler and the army that they had learned to love.

CHAPTER XVIII

FENG YU HSIANG AND THE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NORTH

THE PEKIN COUP D'ÉTAT OF 1924

IN October 1924, after General Feng had been in command of Peking for nearly two years, a great battle was staged in the country east and north of the metropolis between the forces of Marshal Wu Pei Fu, hastily mobilised from his bases in Honan and South Chihli and transported thither, and those of Marshal Chang Tso Lin with Japanese backing in Manchuria. Feng was at length persuaded to march out with his troops and take up his position as the left wing of Wu Pei Fu's battle line. After the battle had opened and been waged indecisively for several days he suddenly deserted his front and by a lightning forced march on 23rd October, 1924, took possession of Peking in Wu Pei Fu's rear, causing the utter collapse of his armies and dramatically ending the war, which was his professed purpose. The story¹ of this extraordinary and bloodless *coup d'état* and the reasons for carrying it out are too long to narrate *in extenso*: it is one of those narratives of secret intrigue, so common in China, which, though difficult or impossible to prove, are generally accepted as authentic. From the standpoint of the foreign military code the action was dastardly treachery, and there are many Chinese who criticise him fiercely for disloyalty to a superior in his own faction; yet, considered by a Chinese patriot from the point of view of motive, it might well be regarded with warm approbation as a necessary measure to save the Fatherland from threatened Japanese military intervention, which it seems was being provoked by Wu Pei Fu's diplomacy.

¹ See Putnam Weale's *Why China Sees Red*, Macmillan, London, 1926, Chap. II.

For Wu the *débâcle* was irretrievable. His army of a quarter of a million, although one of the greatest that has ever been deployed in one battle in the history of China, was an ill-assorted collection of commands from different provinces: there was internal jealousy, and loyalty of too doubtful a character to stand the strain of a reverse; and now, as at a touch, the whole organisation broke up into its component parts.

Wu himself, broken and disgraced, embarked on two small warships at Tientsin with a bodyguard of some two thousand trusted troops, and sailed round by sea and river to Wuhan.

DEVELOPMENT OF FENG'S REPUBLICAN BIAS

Feng, now in unchallenged control of Peking, imprisoned the President of the Republic and had another appointed in his place. Chang Tso Lin easily extended his control down the railway as far as Nanking; but he did not disturb the peace of the capital, which for the next year was broken only by increasing Communist activity and intrigue. Feng had for some time been an ardent anti-Imperialist. At one time he exacted from his soldiers daily at their morning drill a pledge that they would slay any man, even if Feng himself, who attempted to make himself Emperor; and now on assuming control in Peking he destroyed the last vestige of Imperialist tradition by expelling the so-called Boy Emperor from his asylum in the Forbidden City. There had never been any serious movement to restore him to the throne; but there, a lonely and pathetic figure, shut in amidst the tarnished glory of the imperial palace which yet reflected at every turn the great traditions of the vanished past, he had still maintained a phantom Court as the head of the group of old Manchu nobility living in Peking, and a place in the imagination and devotion of the rapidly dwindling body of old Conservative scholars throughout the land.

A significant sign of the new regime which Feng represented was displayed when his soldiers seized Peking on

the night of 23rd October, and it was noticed that every man wore an armlet inscribed "The Citizens' Army." During the following twelve months Feng had ample opportunity to confer with the Russian Soviet emissaries, who by this time were as active in Peking¹ as in South China, and the result shows that he fully availed himself of these facilities.

CHANG TSO LIN'S OFFENSIVE AND KUO SUNG LIN'S REBELLION

Early in November 1925 an extraordinarily complicated series of military and political movements began in North China, centring round Feng Yu Hsiang. By this time his own troops had been expanded to an army corps of 58,000 men of such training, discipline and morale, officers and men, that they could be depended on in any emergency; and he had some 50,000 men of other units associated under his command. The base of this army was on the Kalgan railway above the Nankow Pass, which guards the approaches to Peking from Mongolia and the great North-West; and the territory held extended eastwards for some twenty or thirty miles along the Tientsin railway.

On 6th November Chang Tso Lin's Manchurian army opened an attack on Feng's outposts from the Nankow Pass to the Tientsin line. But no sooner had he opened his campaign than his own precarious hold along the Tientsin-Pukow railway was attacked by military force and intrigue from the provinces to the south. So effective was this counter-attack that by the middle of the month he had lost both Kiangsu and Shantung, all his troop movements against Peking had been reversed, and his armies were retreating towards Manchuria. By the end of the month a group of his own generals had sent in a demand to him at Mukden calling on him to resign, and a rebel army of 40,000 of his own troops under General Kuo Sung Lin, one of his officers, was moving up against him

¹ *Vide supra*, p. 43 et seqq.

with every likelihood of success. Meanwhile Russian agents in North Manchuria were bringing strong pressure to bear on his army leaders there to march on Mukden in support of Kuo Sung Lin, and to assist the latter in shaking off the Japanese grip on Manchuria.

FENG YU HSIANG'S INDICTMENT AND ITS VINDICATION

In Peking there was a rising instigated by members of the left wing of the Kuo Min Tang, and an attempt to overthrow the Government by workmen's and students' riots: this, however, was put down without bloodshed by the garrison commander.

Just at this juncture the military governor of Tientsin entered the lists with a most scathing and virulent denunciation of Feng Yu Hsiang, which was published in the newspapers throughout China. It detailed a long list of his alleged political and social crimes, including murders and assassinations, declaring the writer's own determination to crush Feng and all other Bolsheviks, and calling on all military leaders in China to combine in this effort against the arch-traitor to prevent him from Bolshevising China.

Feng promptly attacked Tientsin and was severely defeated on 15th December, suffering 6000 casualties, the heaviest blow his army had ever sustained. A week later he again attacked and retrieved his position by a brilliant victory, capturing the city and driving the defending army down into Shantung.

THE JAPANESE INTERVENTION ¹

The decisive move in the game was made by the Japanese. Informed of the Russian threat in Northern Manchuria, they decided to support Chang Tso Lin, rushed troops across from Korea to Mukden, bringing their garrison in this town up to 20,000 men, and warned

¹ For a fuller account of this episode and of the events in Peking during the next six months, see a diary published by Putnam Weale in *The Vanished Empire*, Macmillan, London, 1926, Part III.

the rebel army that they would advance into the six-mile-wide strip of neutral territory of the South Manchurian Railway (which includes Mukden) at their peril. It also appears that the rebels were held up, at least at one point, outside the railway zone by Japanese infantry, and that Japanese artillery was used to assist Chang Tso Lin in the battle which was fought. The net result was that the rebel army was delayed until a force of 12,000 loyal cavalry was able to come down from the north and outflank it. The army broke and fled, and its leader, Kuo Sung Lin, and his wife, a fellow-conspirator, were captured and shot: thus at the last moment Chang Tso Lin was saved.

Reviewing this episode, Baron Shidehara, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, in a speech in the Diet concluded as follows:—"It will thus be observed that throughout the recent civil strife in China . . . the Japanese Government has consistently followed the definite and settled policy announced in the last session of the Diet. That policy has in view (a) absolute non-interference in China's domestic affairs, and (b) the safeguarding of Japan's rights and interests by all legitimate means at our disposal."

It should be noted that, according to Japanese interpretation, to turn the course of a civil war by the open threat of a formidable military force transported into Chinese territory appears not to be incompatible with "absolute non-interference in China's domestic affairs."

FENG AND THE RUSSIAN PLOT IN MONGOLIA

The most significant feature of this rebellion is Feng Yü Hsiang's connection with it. There is evidence that he was in alliance with Kuo Sung Lin, whom he was only prevented from effectively supporting by the unexpected resistance put up by the military governor of Tientsin. The strongest piece of evidence is a manifesto¹ issued on 20th December by the "Central Committee of the People's Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia," and

• ¹ For full text see Putnam Weale, *op. cit.*, p. 273 et seqq.

addressed to all their "Brother Mongols." It begins by stating that Chang Tso Lin is being defeated by military forces from many sides, and that shortly the Mongol princes, who have enslaved their people, will also follow him to the same fate. It exhorts them nevertheless to be of good cheer, because the People's Party has been organised to come to their help and secure their rights, and for this purpose has raised "People's Troops" of Inner Mongolia, and entered into relations with the Mongolian parties [*i.e.* of Outer Mongolia, an independent Soviet Republic under Russian influence], and with the Citizen's Army of China [*i.e.* Feng Yu Hsiang's]. The Mongols should therefore, the manifesto states, everywhere organise meetings and take over the local power into their own hands.

As is shown below, Feng was in close relations with and had the substantial support of Russia; and if Chang Tso Lin had fallen, the result might well have been that the Russian Soviet sway would have extended across Inner Mongolia to the borders of China as well as into Manchuria. As it was, Feng, to whom Kuo Sung Lin's success had been essential, issued a manifesto that he was about to leave his army in the hands of his generals and retire into private life.

For the next two or three months there was an ominous quiet while all sides gathered their resources and laid their plans for the next move. Echoes of the Tientsin governor's manifesto began to be heard, and public opinion to harden against Feng as a supporter of the Russians and the Soviet doctrines. Whispers of an alliance against him between Chang Tso Lin and Wu Pei'Fu were passed round. Feng remained in Kalgan, improving his relations with Russia and Outer Mongolia and steadily accumulating Russian ammunition from across the Mongolian steppes, while his generals directed operations in the Peking plain below.

THE RECOVERY OF WU PEI FU

It was now fifteen months since Wu Pei Fu, his reputation destroyed and his army shattered, had fled to Wuhan for sanctuary. Few men in such a case would have cared to try another throw with fortune; but Wu was a man of indomitable ambition. Through the year 1925 he had steadily been opening up communications with his old supporters and making fresh alliances in the neighbouring provinces; but his progress was hindered by the provincial governor at Wuchang, who, though willing to afford asylum to his old chief, was not prepared to put the resources of the Province at his disposal for further military adventures. The death of this governor early in 1926 gave Wu the opportunity that he was waiting for, and he quickly made himself paramount on the Yangtze in Central China; and then, resolutely addressing himself to the situation in Honan, he had by the end of February established himself on the Yellow River, with his base at Loyang. By the middle of March he had practical control of the whole Province with 100,000 men under his command.

Co-operation in the field had by this time been established with Chang Tso Lin for the mutual purpose of eliminating Feng Yu Hsiang, to whom both leaders were now resolutely antagonised, not only on personal grounds, but also because he was for practical purposes allied with Russia. In accordance with this understanding the old Manchurian war lord, who had consolidated his position again after the mutiny, now made a great advance from the North towards Peking.

At the end of March the Citizens' Army, having thrown in all its reserves from the Western Hills, was forced to withdraw on all fronts to within a circle about seventeen miles from Peking. Wu pressed on, declining all offers to come to terms with them, and on the night of 15th April the whole Citizens' Army, 100,000 strong, evacuated the capital, rolling up through the Nankow Pass to their

mountain stronghold, against which Wu's army now pressed its attack.

The final adjustment of relations between Wu and Chang not unnaturally proved a very delicate and tedious business; and for over two months neither entered Peking. Wu at length moved his base up to Paotingfu, and finally, on 28th June, 1926, met Chang in conference in the capital. A unanimous resolve having been here registered as to the necessity for crushing the Red movement, and an agreement having been arrived at as to the Cabinet, to which were to be entrusted the insignia of government, the conduct of the military campaign was left in Wu's hands and Chang retired again to the North.

Wu Pei Fu had thus made a complete circuit in the provinces north of the Yangtze. Fleeing from Peking in October 1924 through Tientsin and Shanghai to Wuhan, he had later on made his way to Loyang and so through Paotingfu back to Peking again. And the cycle in his political and military fortunes through which he had passed *pari passu* was even more surprising, since his final position, in view of the alliance in which he was bound to Chang Tso Lin by a mutual fear and hatred of the Red menace, might well be considered to be stronger than before his downfall.

RETIREMENT OF THE CITIZENS' ARMY, AND THE DEFENCE OF THE NANKOW PASS

Nothing illustrates better the discipline, efficiency and loyalty of Feng's officers and men than the confidence he showed in them during the operations referred to in the preceding paragraph, and the manner in which they justified his trust in them then and subsequently. As stated, Feng himself remained at first at the Kalgan base. Towards the middle of March he despatched his wife and children by motor transport across Mongolia to Urga, the capital of the Republic, where he himself joined them at the end of the month. After staying here another month,

he again moved westwards along the trans-Siberian railway, arriving with his family on 9th May at Moscow.

Feng's staff was thus left with a front extending northwards far into the mountains, eastwards to Tientsin, and southwards to the Yellow River; and this extended line had to be defended against a steadily increasing pressure of superior numbers from the north-east and south. The retirement to within a seventeen-mile radius at the end of March was a difficult operation, but it was completed in perfect order in less than forty-eight hours. On 10th April the Citizens' Army, in an effort to conciliate Wu Pei Fu, deposed the President of the Republic, who had been installed by them eighteen months earlier, and liberated the former President, Tsao Kun, a nominee of Wu's, who had been imprisoned ever since the installation of his successor. But as Wu proved irreconcilable, and the surrounding pressure increased, it became necessary to make the final evacuation of 15th April. This again was a most efficient piece of staff work, being completed within twenty-four hours, and, it is said, at the cost of only four casualties.

The army, having retired into the mountains, held the railway at Nankow Pass; and from the positions here taken up all Wu's efforts to dislodge them proved futile, the attackers sustaining several thousand casualties before the end of the month. Up till the beginning of July the defences still proved impregnable, the enemy having even been pressed out into the plain by smart artillery work from the foot-hills.

Wu's alliance which had just been made with Chang Tso Lin now put fresh vigour and confidence into the attack, which early in September at last began to show some promise of success. It was just at this juncture, as we have seen in Chapter II, that the Southern invasion, under Chiang Kai Shek broke into the opposite extremity of Wu's territory in Hupeh; and it was because he was so deeply involved here in the north that he made the fatal mistake of delaying too long to meet the new menace.¹

¹ *Vide supra*, pp. 17, 18.

Thus a second time were the forces of Feng Yu Hsiang a prime factor in the breaking of Wu Pei Fu.

THE NEW NORTH-WEST BASE

It must not be supposed that the activities of the Citizens' Army were confined to the defensive campaign in Peking's Western Hills. Its proclivities in road-making and its general reputation for care of the people's interests and for sound administration, wherever it has been stationed in the provinces, have already been described in the previous chapter. These qualities stood it in good stead in the year 1926, during which it extended its influence and assumed control over the western provinces of Shensi and Kansu and the great dependency of Inner Mongolia.

A glance at the map will show the strategic strength of this position, provided only that the army occupying it has the support of Russia. Along its northern and north-western boundaries, over a thousand miles in length, lie the Soviet Republic of Outer Mongolia and Central Asian dominions under the influence of Russia. To the west, and south lie Thibet and Szechuan, through which no considerable enemy attack is practicable. Lying in a solid strip two hundred miles wide along the middle of the eastern front is the mountainous province of Shansi, across which no army from outside has been permitted to march for the last sixteen years.¹

Thus it is only at the north-east and south-east corners that this huge block of the north-west is exposed to attack; and here like the horns of a crescent it extends forwards past the two opposite extremities of Shansi. The south-eastern crescent is entered or defended by the narrow Tung Kuan Pass; and through this an army debouching into Honan has excellent railway connections enabling it to strike south into Hupeh, north into Chihli, or east to cut the Tientsin-Pukow line.

The north-eastern crescent is longer and lies for the most

¹ *Vide infra*, p. 237.

part along the wild mountain country of Manchuria, a region almost impracticable for campaigning; but near the boundary of Shansi the mountain ramparts abut far out into the plains of Chihli, and it is here that the railway from Kalgan runs down through the Nankow Pass, a short forty miles from Peking. Many a time in bygone ages have the hardy Tartar and Mongol invaders poured down through this historic pass to attack the Northern Capital and the armies of the plain; and it is not for nothing that the key to this gateway of Peking now lies in the hand of Feng's no less hardy armies of the Northwest.

RUSSIAN MUNITIONS AND FENG'S RETURN TO SIANFU

The fatal weakness of this territory as an army base was its absolute isolation from all industrial areas whence supplies of munitions might be obtained. Chang Tso Lin in Manchuria had the great Mukden arsenal, on which it is said that millions sterling have been spent, and could also draw on Japan for munitions and arms; Sun Chuan Fang on the lower Yangtze had the Shanghai arsenal, and the opportunity of buying military supplies from all over the world; the Nationalists in Canton had an arsenal of less account, but had been receiving supplies by sea from Russia; Wu Pei Fu in Wuhan had the Hanyang arsenal and the famous Hanyang ironworks at his disposal; and besides these there were all over China a number of little arsenals of less account. Feng alone had no arsenal adequate to his needs nor facilities for establishing one.

We have already seen how this deficiency was met in the operations in the Peking area by supplies from Russia. It was doubtless to assure himself of a continuance of these supplies, as well as to study the Soviet method of government and the Communist teachings at their source, that Feng went to Russia. At the same time he had a motor road fifteen hundred miles long made from the trans-Siberian railroad via Urga in Outer Mongolia,

down through Inner Mongolia and Northern Shensi to Sianfu, the provincial capital in the South, where he himself had been governor five years previously.

Returning from Russia via Kansu towards the end of 1926, he collected what units of his army were available in this province, and by forced marches reached Sianfu at the end of November, just in time to raise a siege of six months and rescue an army of his which had put up a most desperate resistance against a beleaguering force under one of Wu Pei Fu's generals. The extremity to which the townspeople had been reduced by the time the relief force arrived, and the resolution of the defenders, may be gathered from the fact that, as in the siege of Samaria by the Syrians some three thousand years earlier, the flesh of babies had begun to be used as an article of diet.¹ Feng now made Sianfu his headquarters, reorganised his resistance, and finally drove Wu's forces out through the Tung Kuan Pass, accumulated what reserves of ammunition he could by motor transport along the road just opened, and thus was ready, waiting and watching, when the Nationalist offensive described in Chapter XVI burst its way up into Honan in May 1927.

¹ See 2 Kings vi, 25 et seqq.

CHAPTER XIX

CHIANG KAI SHEK AND THE SHANTUNG CAMPAIGN

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NANKING NATIONALIST GOVERNMENT

ON 15th April, the same day that Chiang Kai Shek signalled his final break with the Hankow Government by the seizure of Canton and clean-up of its Communists, a Nationalist Party convention called by him established a rival Nationalist Government at Nanking. Hitherto, in spite of his antagonism to the Communist party controlling the Hankow Government, he had, theoretically at least, acknowledged the authority of that Government as supreme in Nationalist China. Now that he had split the party, the cleft was rendered deeper and more serious by the fact that several prominent party men, members of the Central Executive Committee, took sides with Chiang. T. V. Soong, the Minister of Finance in Hankow, and one or two other leaders had managed to slip away a few days previously down-river to Nanking to assume office in the new Government. Others in Hankow who would have preferred to follow suit were prevented by a stringent edict which was issued at this time by the Government in that city, prohibiting any officials from leaving their posts without first obtaining the permission of the Central Executive Committee. An interesting appointment to one of the principal portfolios in the Nanking Government was that of Hu Han Ming, who in 1925 had been expelled¹ from Canton to Russia to make way for Borodin and Chiang Kai Shek, in those days working side by side. It is significant that after his study of the Communist system

¹ *Vide supra*, p. 47 et seqq.

in Russia at first hand he became on his return to China one of the most determined of the Anti-communist leaders. But in spite of the co-operation of these influential party men, there is no doubt that Chiang held a dominating and determinative place in the new organisation, which as a civil Government has at no time attained an authority and prestige comparable with that which was wielded by the Government at Hankow.

EARLY MILITARY INTERACTIONS BETWEEN HANKOW AND NANKING

Though the Nanking and Hankow Governments were now rivals for the hegemony of China, they wasted no time or resources in attacking each other at this time. Either would have been at a disadvantage in attacking the other, well established five hundred miles away on a strong base; and it is very doubtful whether either army would have had any heart for such a conflict. Both groups still considered themselves heirs of the Nationalist Party, and both still regarded the "militarists" of the North with their friends the foreign "imperialists" as their arch enemies. It was clear that whichever army group first took Peking would not only win undying glory for itself as the champion of the Nationalist Party, but would also by the same stroke hopelessly eclipse its rival.

Chiang Kai Shek spent the next month in consolidating his position on the lower river, organising the new Government, arranging for money and supplies for his troops and initiating his Northern campaign. Meanwhile the Hankow Government had already opened its "drive to Peking" as described in Chapter XVI. Despatching the first troops of the expeditionary forces from Hankow on 22nd April, they had fought their way across the Province of Honan; and Feng Yu Hsiang, co-operating with them, had on 1st June captured Chenchow, the railway junction some sixteen miles from the Yellow River. He then, by virtue of his previous appointment

under the Hankow Government, assumed the supreme control of the military operations in Honan; and from his headquarters, which had on 8th inst. been moved to Kaifeng, began to move troops against the right flank of the Northerners who were opposing Chiang Kai Shek's drive. Within a day or two his men were in touch with Chiang Kai Shek's armies at the railway junction of Hsuehchow, and on 24th June Feng himself made a great speech at Hsuehchow, pledging his whole-hearted support with an army of 200,000 men "to assist Chiang Kai Shek to march to Peking."

CHIANG KAI SHEK'S DRIVE TOWARDS PEKIN

It was under these auspices that Chiang Kai Shek's Northern drive was begun along the railway from Pukow northwards. Sun Chuan Fang's defeated and demoralised troops were scattered in the Province of Kiangsu lying to the east along the sea, and Sun himself early in June was actually driven out of the country, leaving his army and taking ship from Haichow. Chang Chung Chang, the ally of Chang Tso Lin, held the railway line in front with his Shantung soldiers. Chiang rapidly pushed up two hundred miles along the railway to Hsuehchow, and in the first week of June he was invading Shantung, making for Tsinanfu on the bank of the Yellow River.

The ascendancy that was established and maintained by the Nationalist armies in this victorious advance may be gathered from its effect on other parties implicated. At a conference of the foreign Ministers in Peking the United States Minister announced that his orders were that no shot was to be fired in defence of his Legation; but the other nations decided that if necessary theirs would be defended, and began to prepare accordingly. The Americans, in spite of their pacific resolve, moved a regiment of men from Shanghai to Peking; and British troops were also brought up to the capital. In the city itself all kinds of rumours were current, presaging the

imminent collapse of Chang Tso Lin's defence and his withdrawal to Manchuria. Foreigners and Chinese alike accepted the conquest of Peking by the Nationalist armies as a foregone conclusion, the only question remaining being how soon they would arrive. Being further from the theatres of war than Shanghai, the foreigners' imagination magnified its terrors the more, and Nanking had illumined these with a lurid light that lingered always in the mind. First they had heard of the rout of the Fengtien troops in Honan, and now Chiang Kai Shek was sweeping all before him in Shantung. With household goods and furnishings ready packed, those who remained waited with anxious apprehension for news of the forcing of the Yellow River, which was to be the signal for the evacuation.¹

One result of the panic, reminiscent of a crisis in the Great War, was that at last, driven to their inner line of defences, the anti-Nationalist generals agreed to set on one side their personal jealousies and unify their effort under Chang Tso Lin as generalissimo.

THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION OF TSINGTAO AND THE SHANTUNG RAILWAY

The action of Japan at this juncture is of great significance. To adequately appraise it and understand the feeling that it produced throughout China, it is necessary to examine the record of her former activities in this area. The ex-German port of Tsingtao and the Shantung railway leading thence to Tsinanfu, the provincial capital, had been seized by Japan during the Great War, and confirmed in her possession by the Treaty of Versailles.²

¹ See Putnam Weale's letter of 29th June, 1927, in *Sydney Morning Herald*, Sydney, N.S.W.

² On 18th January, 1915, the Japanese Government, taking advantage of the desperate preoccupation of the European Powers with the Great War, presented to China twenty-one demands constituting as a whole the most deadly and unprovoked assault upon Chinese sovereignty that has been made since the Manchu conquest. Summarised, these demands were as follows:—

But this caused such undying resentment throughout China and injury to their trade that after the Wash-

Group I re Shantung (4 articles). All German rights and interests in the Province to be transferred to Japan. Additions to the Tsinan-Tsingtao railway to be built by her. No rights in Shantung to be granted to any other foreign nation. More treaty ports to be opened by China.

Group II re Southern Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia (7 articles). Control of practically all the railways, and Port Arthur and Dairen to be left in Japanese hands for ninety-nine years. Japanese to have the right to trade in these districts, to carry on any business, mining, or farming, and to own land for any purpose. No new railway concessions to be granted or loans raised on the guarantee of Manchurian revenue without Japan's consent. Civil or military advisers or instructors of all kinds only to be appointed after consultation with Japan.

Group III re Middle Yangtze Mineral Wealth (2 articles). The company controlling the iron and coal mines centring round Wuhan to be made into a joint Sino-Japanese company. This company to have the control of all mines in the vicinity of those now worked by it, and the right to veto any other industrial undertaking likely to affect its interests.

Group IV re Chinese Coast-line (1 article). No harbour, bay or island on the Chinese coast to be leased to any other Power.

Group V re Fukien, Kiangsi and General Claims (7 articles).

Article 1. China to employ influential Japanese advisers in political, financial and military affairs.

Article 2. Japanese churches, hospitals and schools to have the right to own land in the interior.

Article 3. The police departments of important places in China to be jointly administered by Japanese and Chinese, or to employ numerous Japanese.

Article 4. China to purchase 50 per cent. or more of her munitions of war from Japan, or else a joint Sino-Japanese arsenal to be established in China using Japanese experts and materials.

Article 5. Japan to construct railways, one from Wuchang via Kiukiang to Nanchang and two from Nanchang to the South China coast.

Article 6. Japan to have first offer for supplying money for any public works in Fukien.

Article 7. Japan to have the right of missionary (*i.e.* Buddhist) propaganda in China.

The Chinese were staggered with dismay at these demands, and well they might have been, as a reference to the map will show; for they proposed to split China with three daggers driven deep into her vitals. Eastern Inner Mongolia curves round the northern border of Chihli to join South Manchuria. Group II of the demands proposed to establish Japan permanently and unshakably in control of this area, thus cutting China off from the whole of Manchuria to the North. Group I established Japan in Shantung on the lower reaches of the Yellow River, astride the middle of the great arterial railway from Peking to Shanghai. Group III, with Articles 5 and 6

ington Disarmament Conference of 1921 the Japanese deemed it best to return them to China, only reserving certain rights in connection therewith.

There is a considerable community of Japanese at Tsingtao and also at Tsinanfu; and when Chiang Kai Shek's armies approached Shantung, Japan announced her intention of landing troops at Tsingtao for the protection of her nationals, and in the last days of May, 1927,

of Group V, made a Japanese enclave reaching from Formosa to the centre of Hupeh, giving her a lien on the trade, and a stranglehold on the future development of the manufacturing industries, of Central China. Group IV secured her from any foreign interference with this scheme. Group V, Articles 1-4 and 7, gave her control of Chinese finance, the supply of munitions, the political and military administration and the police; and provided for an army of Japanese propagandists in the form of school teachers, doctors and Buddhist missionaries, with bases all over the land from which to work.

The Chinese representatives stretched out the negotiations for over three months. In spite of the Japanese desire for secrecy, news of the details became known to the various foreign Ministers at Peking; and direct representations of protest were made by the ambassadors of their countries at Tokio. Violent resentment began to spread throughout China. Eventually Japan withdrew the whole of Group V, modified several of the others, and on 7th May presented a forty-eight hours' ultimatum. The other Powers being too pre-occupied to interfere, China capitulated and signed.

China entered the Great War with the hope of getting some of these injustices, especially in Shantung, redressed in the post-war settlement. When it became known in 1919 that the terms of the Versailles Treaty confirmed Japan in her possession of these privileges, the students and schoolboys of China organised a remarkable nation-wide boycott of Japanese goods, and stirred up so much feeling on the matter that three Chinese Ministers concerned had to be dismissed, and China refused to sign the Peace Treaty.

Since then, 7th May of each year has been observed throughout China by various patriotic bodies and groups, especially schoolboys, as a day of humiliation in memory of their country's shame and in hatred of Japan. The loss of trade, and generally unfavourable position of Japan in China due to this treaty, began to cause very serious misgivings in Japan; and after the Japanese leaders had had an opportunity to estimate the international attitude on the subject at the Washington Disarmament Conference in 1921, they were thoroughly convinced that they had made a grave mistake; and Tsingtao in Shantung was handed back to China with certain of the privileges, though some were still retained.

(For a very interesting history of these twenty-one demands, and the diplomacy associated with them, see Putnam Weale's *The Fight for the Republic in China*, Hurst and Blackett, London, 1918, Chaps. VI, VII.)

did so land 2000 soldiers from Manchuria. On 15th June Japanese refugees from Haichow in the Nationalist line of advance were reported to have reached Tsingtao, bringing a story of the Southerners looting the town, burning their houses, and even committing several "outrages" on board their refugee boat. Chang Tso Lin just at this time issued a statement that he was unable to protect Japanese nationals, and next day 1500 Japanese troops were sent to Tsinanfu. Towards the end of June, when the Nationalist soldiers were approaching both Tsingtao and Tsinanfu in their victorious advance, the Japanese in Tsingtao built a barbed wire barricade on a front of several miles, which they announced as a neutral zone within which Chinese soldiers were not to be allowed.

THE JAPANESE GARRISONING OF TSINANFU

The occupation of Tsingtao, which after all is an ex-treaty port that has been occupied by foreign soldiers before, did not excite a great deal of comment; but the despatch of soldiers to Tsinanfu in the heart of the Province, in the centre of the Tientsin-Pukow railway and in the direct line of the Nationalists' advance, was a much more striking and arresting gesture. Strong protests from the Nationalist Headquarters were naturally made, and forwarded to the Japanese authorities, against the violation of China's sovereignty involved in the frequent Japanese excursions into the interior of Shantung, the assumption of military control of the Shantung railway, and the military occupation of a section of the provincial capital of Tsinanfu. In reply to these protests Baron Tanaka, the newly-appointed Premier of Japan, stated that, after unusual forbearance during the previous few months, now "Japan's positive policy in China is protection before and not after the fact." It was also semi-officially announced that Japan would join with the other Great Powers in protecting her national rights, even if it caused a boycott.

In support of this policy Japanese troops were steadily poured into Tsingtao during the first two weeks of July, raising the garrison to many thousands strong, and of these a further contingent was despatched inland to reinforce the Tsinanfu forces. Two popular effects of this strong military action of Japan may be noted. On the one hand, a boycott against Japanese trade began to make itself felt and daily strengthened among the Chinese; and on the other, foreigners from Peking and other parts of China confidently flocked to Tsingtao in hundreds for their annual summer holiday.

CHANG TSO LIN'S COUNTER-ATTACK

The course of the fighting at this period is difficult to follow. Chang Chung Chang's Shantung soldiers, poorly equipped, ill-disciplined and underpaid troops, had steadily retreated before the Nationalist advance for a month with very little show of resistance and no decisive battle. In the first two weeks in June, when the war was nearing their provincial capital, they began to desert.

In the previous Nationalist campaigns, when their advance had reached this stage, it had in every case marked the beginning of the end. As they had approached Wuhan, and the Nanking-Shanghai line, Wu Pei Fu's and Sun Chuan Fang's troops respectively had broken and fled before them or deserted in large bodies to the Nationalist side. As they had fought their way through a series of fierce battles to Nanchang and Chenchow against Sun Chuan Fang and Chang Hsueh Liang respectively, although in each case they were confronted with the flower of the opposing armies, both sides being exhausted with previous fighting, the morale of the Nationalists had proved itself superior and carried them through to final victory.

In this case, when the penultimate stage had apparently been reached, and the provincial capital and the bridge of the Yellow River were almost within their

grasp, for the first time in their experience a new factor, a second army group, appeared arrayed against them. Chang Tso Lin, having been made generalissimo of the anti-Nationalist forces in the middle of June, immediately despatched reinforcements of his Northern soldiers, fresh, well-disciplined, and well-equipped, to reinforce Chang Chung Chang's Shantung men. These on 18th June made a counter-attack on the Nationalists south of Tsinanfu, inflicting heavy losses and compelling them to retreat.

STALEMATE

For the next month the campaign pursued a see-saw course. Early in July, according to the usual precedent, the Northern commander at Tsingtao went over to the Nationalist side, but this time the defection was robbed of its usual effect by the fact that the rebel general was immediately heavily attacked by the loyal Northerners sent by Chang Tso Lin.

On 5th July, Sun Chuan Fang, who had been gathering together and reorganising the remnants of his demoralised army on the coast, made an attack with 20,000 men against Chiang Kai Shek's line of communications in Southern Shantung and a victory was claimed. It must, however, have been of a very evanescent nature, for on 7th July Chiang was advancing northwards again. At this point a great public outcry was again raised for the Japanese to withdraw their troops, assurances being given that these would not be necessary for the protection of their nationals.

EFFECT AND PURPOSE OF THE JAPANESE INTERVENTION

The purpose and the result of the Japanese military occupation in Tsingtao and Tsinanfu, and of their control of the intervening Shantung railway, will doubtless be hotly disputed; but certain facts cannot be gainsaid. In the background of the scene we find the following.

Japan's most vital territorial interest in China is her colonisation, industry and trade in Manchuria, a wonderfully rich and undeveloped province of huge extent. Chang Tso Lin's long and unchallenged supremacy here has been of the greatest benefit to Japan by assuring stability and freedom from war. Chang Tso Lin and the Japanese have for many years worked in close partnership and co-operation. Chang Tso Lin has assured them of the privileges and opportunities for expansion that they require; and the Japanese have served as his constant insurance and guarantee against Russian encroachment, have freely supplied him with arms and ammunition, and once at least, when he was in imminent danger from the mutiny of a large body of his own soldiers, intervened to save him.¹

The facts in the foreground are equally indisputable. The Nationalist armies, who during the campaigns of the previous twelve months had scored an uninterrupted series of triumphs, and some of whom only one month previously had defeated the finest Northern troops, driving Chang Tso Lin's son back to the Yellow River bridgehead north of Chenchow on the Hankow railway, were in June in a parallel drive approaching Tsinanfu. They had made extraordinarily rapid and successful progress during the previous month, and were expected by most people quickly to capture the town, which is the gate of the Yellow River bridge on that railway. Many people believed that if they succeeded in crossing the river Chang Tso Lin would be forced to retreat into Manchuria, perhaps without even fighting. The Japanese did, just at this juncture, throw several thousand soldiers into Tsinanfu astride the line of the Southerners' advance, with larger forces in reserve at Tsintao, only one or two days' sail from Japan. At Tsinanfu there is a foreign quarter, or international settlement; but no other nation despatched any troops thither, although some, such as Britain and America, have large interests there, and

¹ *Vide supra*, pp. 209, 210.

Britain appears to have had troops available in China.¹ The Nationalist advance was abruptly brought to a halt south of Tsinanfu, where for the next month they had varying success and failure.

The opinion of a leading Peking publicist, who made a personal investigation of the situation at the time in both Tsingtao and Tsinanfu, is that the Japanese deliberately prevented the Nationalist conquests from extending farther north.²

THE ARMISTICE

Whatever the degree to which various factors contributed to this month's delay in the Nationalist advance, it created a very serious problem for Chiang Kai Shek. Funds were now running so low that it was becoming more and more difficult to carry on the campaign. On 19th July there were published in Tokio the terms of an armistice which was expected to be shortly signed between the two armies. The main clauses were that the Shantung troops under Chang Chung Chang were to be withdrawn; Chang Tso Lin was to retire to Manchuria, adopting a democratic slogan; Japan was not to be interfered with in that Province, and foreigners were to be protected by the officials of whatever province they resided in.

THE HANKOW ATTACK ON NANKING

As we have seen, when the Honan expedition of the Hankow Government began to involve it in serious difficulty, Chiang Kai Shek had contributed a body of troops to co-operate with those of the other leaders who were closing in from every side on the Central China

¹ On 24th July the Indian Infantry Brigade, 3000 strong, which was the first to arrive in Shanghai, was sent back to India.

² "From a political standpoint Japan has virtually let down a fire-screen running from the sea to Tsinanfu, and the chances are now a million to one against any fire getting across. In other words, along the Tientsin-Pukow railway, half-way to Peking, a halt has been called to the civil war." (Letter from Putnam Weale to *Sydney Morning Herald* of 10th Sept. 1927, dated from Peking, 13th July.)

capital. This reached Kiukiang at the end of May and by the middle of June was co-operating with Hsia Tao Yin; but it got no further. The troops from Honan, returning to Hankow just at this time, made short work of the jackals that had been snarling round the wounded tiger.

But this did not end the menace to the Government; the threat from within was perhaps more serious than the open attack from without. In the middle of June large numbers of Chiang Kai Shek's soldiers were entering Hankow in disguise; there were frequent clashes between soldiers and police and hundreds of executions of "spies."

When Chiang in the early part of July was in serious difficulty in Shantung, 350 miles from his base, and negotiating for the armistice, the Communists in control at Hankow saw their opportunity and despatched the "Iron Army" down river to take him in the rear. By the 19th July it had reached Kiukiang and a week later was pressing on towards Nanking.

Chiang had to despatch considerable bodies of his troops southwards to meet this menace; and the Northerners opposed to him put off signing the armistice until his forces were depleted and Sun Chuan Fang had had time to more thoroughly reorganise his army. On 21st July all question of an armistice was ended by Sun Chuan Fang, who heavily attacked Chiang Kai Shek and inflicted a severe defeat, causing him to fall back fifty miles on the vital strategic centre of Hsuehchow. Here he made a determined stand, but after a desperate struggle was again defeated two days later.

THE RETREAT TO THE YANGTZE

There was now no choice but a precipitate retreat. Feng made a diversion in his favour against the Northerners' right flank in southern Shantung, but this was too late to be of much assistance. Harassed on the north and east by the advancing armies of Sun Chuan Fang, Chiang protected his retreating rear as best he

could, while despatching other troops rapidly ahead to occupy and hold Nanking and the Nanking-Shanghai railway against the menace of the Hankow troops, who were now racing down-stream to forestall the Northerners on the lower Yangtze. Foreign military opinion in Shanghai at this time was that he would be too late to avoid outflanking by these Hankow forces, and that the city would again change hands either to them or to the Northerners. In this retreat he is said to have lost 30,000 men as against 6000 lost by the enemy; but the rest of his army was transported safely across the Yangtze River, Nanking and the Shanghai railway were occupied in strength, and in a few days the menace from the Hankow troops had passed, though Sun Chuan Fang still pressed on threateningly towards the northern bank of the river.

NANKING FINANCE AND THE FOREIGN POWERS

At the time when Chiang Kai Shek established the Nanking Government and assumed the control of Shanghai, he was regarded by the foreigners generally, if not with enthusiasm, at least with tolerance and an open mind. He was known to be no lover of foreigners and to subscribe to the usual Nationalist articles of faith in regard to capitalism, imperialism, etc.; but he was also known to have been the victim of a Communist plot at Nanking, and his ruthless suppression of the Shanghai Communists was considered to be a valuable piece of work.

But as Chiang's northern expedition proceeded and money was more and more urgently needed to meet his growing expenses, the regular sources of income available to him from the port of Shanghai soon proved inadequate. On 12th July the Nanking Government put forward a proposal to raise a loan of \$60,000,000 on the security of the salt gabelle, the income of which is already hypothecated to the service of other loans. The Powers protesting against this, the Government on 16th July

dismissed all foreigners from the offices of the Salt Gabelle in its territory.

In addition to this a new schedule of Customs taxation, including import and export duties, was drawn up and promulgated to take effect as from 1st September. The moderate surtaxes which had been proposed at the Washington Conference and discussed at the Tariff Conference in Peking, but not yet authorised by any treaty, had already been instituted by the Nanking Government at Shanghai; and though they were *ultra vires*, the foreign Powers, following the lead of Great Britain in the historic Memorandum¹ of 18th December, 1926, to the Washington Treaty Powers, had winked at their imposition. But as the increases which were now proposed were in excess of the "Washington Surtaxes," and markedly so, strong opposition from the whole mercantile community was aroused and official protests forwarded to the Government.

The most powerful newspaper combination in Japan published a demand, believed to be inspired, for war on China unless her intention of levying these taxes were abandoned, and stated that, failing an "immediate cessation of China's arrogance," Japan would be compelled to forcibly assert her treaty rights independently of the other Powers, unless their co-operation were secured.

THE "ANTI-COMMUNIST" TERROR IN SHANGHAI

But that which created a greater sensation in Shanghai was the extension and abuse of the anti-Communist campaign. There is no doubt it was started, and originally used with success, for the purpose of rooting out Communism in Shanghai, and breaking up the Communist organisation; and hundreds of Communists were beheaded or shot. There was usually no trial and no appeal. It was done very thoroughly and ruthlessly; and a very real anti-Communist terror was quickly established.

¹ *Vide supra*, p. 121.

When later on it became necessary to raise forced "loans" and contributions from the wealthy classes, it was convenient to use machinery which had already been created. The charge of "Communist" was used in the same manner as "anti-revolutionary" had been by the Hankow Government: it obviated all awkward questions or criticisms. Wealthy Chinese would be arrested in their homes or mysteriously disappear from the streets; and those who reappeared came back as poorer men, but could in no case be induced to open their mouths to inform on their oppressors. A sense of insecurity and foreboding was in men's minds, which they feared to speak of to their nearest friends. Millionaires were arrested as "Communists"! Chiang is estimated to have raised in all by this means some \$50,000,000. Under no previous regime in modern times had Shanghai known such a reign of terror; and the pressure became heavier as the military situation became more desperate. It was with a sigh of relief that foreigners and Chinese alike looked forward to the prospect of a change in the administration.

CHAPTER XX

OVERTHROW OF THE COMMUNISTS AND REUNION OF THE NATIONALIST PARTY

THE ANTI-COMMUNIST SWING THROUGHOUT THE NATIONALIST PARTY

THE military actions described in Chapters XVI and XIX between the rival Hankow and Nanking army groups, maintained throughout the period during which each was continuing to wage war against the common enemy in the North, were merely the outward and visible signs of a fierce political struggle which was rapidly approaching a crisis within the Party. We have seen in Chapter V how it split on the question of Communist control; and yet both branches remained loyal Nationalist Party organisations, the Nanking Government including six of the members of the Central Executive Committee and the Hankow Government twenty-six.

Both sides felt that this was a temporary adjustment of unstable equilibrium. The determination throughout the Party to rid itself of the divisive Communist element rapidly spread and hardened, while the Communists on their part fought a losing battle with spirited energy. Feng Yu Hsiang in military force held the balance of power, and his political attitude had hitherto been such that the balance was remarkably even. At the end of May, when the rout of the Northerners enabled his army to effect a junction with the Hankow troops, thus rendering effective his appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the Northern expeditionary armies, a Government edict was issued from Hankow, and published in the Press, that all political propaganda of every sort was to cease in the Province of Honan, where it had just been¹ so assiduously

¹ *Vide supra*, pp. 190, 192.

begun. The wording was curt and definite; and, contrary to custom, no explanation was given.

In the first half of June middlemen were passing backwards and forwards between all the military leaders, Nationalist and Northern, and the air was full of rumours of every conceivable alignment and basis of combination between them: especially the emissaries of the Hankow party and of Chiang Kai Shek were angling unremittingly for Feng's support of their respective factions. Feng sent his official notification of the victory of May 26th in identical form to both the Hankow and the Nanking Governments.

On 14th June a momentous conference was held at Chenchow attended by Feng, Tang Shen Chih and other Hankow generals, Borodin, and representatives of Yen Hsi Shan. As a result of this conference Feng was appointed chairman of the Sub-Political Council for Honan, Shensi and Kansu, and also chairman of the Honan Committee, and his army was absolutely incorporated with the Kuo Min Tang and pledged to obey the Central Executive Committee (whether the six at Nanking or the twenty-six at Hankow not being specified).

A week later Feng was at Hsuchow conferring with Chiang Kai Shek, and as a result of this conference, not only did he make the speech of 24th inst. pledging the support of his army to Chiang Kai Shek, but he also sent a public telegram to the Hankow Government recommending that Borodin should go to Russia, that certain of the Chinese leaders in Hankow should be permitted to go abroad for their health¹ in order to unite the whole Nationalist movement, and that the remaining Hankow leaders should join the Nanking Government. Chiang Kai Shek with more bluntness followed this up several

¹ There are no resignations within the Nationalist Party. At times the situation becomes so strained that it is felt by all concerned advisable, or even urgently necessary, for certain leaders to leave headquarters. These then go abroad, or to some more congenial locality in China, until a change in political grouping or in policy makes it practicable for them to return and resume their interrupted responsibilities.

days later with an ultimatum to the Hankow Government, demanding the disbanding of all Labour Unions and the dismissal of twenty Russian advisers and certain Chinese Communists.

HO CHIEN'S HANKOW COUP D'ÉTAT

Feng Yu Hsiang's diplomatic advice to the Hankow Government and Chiang's ultimatum having alike been disregarded, the same suggestion was presently to be made in a cruder and rougher way. Within a day or two of Chiang's ultimatum, the Eighth Army, which had previously been suspected of disloyalty to the Hankow Government,¹ enforced at least half of his demands. They broke up the various picket corps in the city, occupied the headquarters of all the Labour Unions, and forced the labour leaders to flee.

By the middle of July the Fourth Army, on which the Hankow Government had always been able to depend, was far on its way down river to attack Nanking. This opened the way for the carrying out of the remainder of Chiang's demands. In command at this time of the Nationalist forces in Changsha, the capital of Hunan, was General Ho Chien, who in May had executed a number of Communist labour leaders.² He now descended on Hankow and carried out a *coup d'état*, expelling Eugene Chen and Borodin to Kuling, and a day or two later General Galens, the Russian Chief of Staff who had planned the Nationalist military strategy. The anti-Red movement in Hankow rapidly gained ground and established itself; many of the men on the Central Executive Committee of the Government and in lower positions were deserting their posts; and it soon became clear to the exiles waiting in Kuling that the Communist regime was over. Madame Sun, on realising this, made a public declaration that the social and political revolution had come to an end.

¹ *Vide supra*, 198.

² *Vide supra*, p. 76.

THE BANISHMENT OF THE RUSSIAN COMMUNISTS

With Chiang Kai Shek in control in the south and east and Chang Tso Lin in the north, the only way of escape left for them was by the motor transport route¹ opened up by Feng Yu Hsiang over a year before across inner Mongolia to the trans-Siberian railway. A special train was prepared for them at Hankow, laden with motor-cars and plentifully provisioned for the two-thousand-mile cross-country journey; and before the end of July they had left. They were to rendezvous in Eastern Kansu with other Russian political and military advisers who had also been dismissed, and thence to proceed in one party to Russia.

There is evidence from Moscow that here also the *dénouement* at Hankow was regarded as conclusive and final. The following proclamation was issued on 13th July by the Soviet Comintern (Third International) Executive:—"The Revolutionary rôle of the Government at Hankow is finished. It is now counter-revolutionary and must be thwarted. Therefore Communists must spread an agrarian revolution and arm workers and peasants." Two months later Eugene Chen, on his arrival in Moscow, made a statement that the changes which had occurred since he had left China had made it impossible for him any longer to refrain from declaring that the Nationalist Government in China as a real political factor no longer existed.

YEN HSI SHAN OF SHANSI

Another factor in the military and political situation, hitherto latent, it is true, but one which nevertheless must be taken account of, is Yen Hsi Shan, the Commander-in-Chief and "model Governor" of Shansi. This man holds a unique record in modern China. Of all the military governors who have been in power throughout the country within the last sixteen years, Yen Hsi Shan is the only

¹ *Vide supra*, p. 216.

one who has exercised an uninterrupted rule from the 1911 revolution to the present day. He owes this extraordinary immunity from the usual vicissitudes of a Chinese war lord's life to two outstanding facts. One is that, while stoutly opposing with a well-disciplined army any attempt on the part of his neighbours to encroach on his Province, he has as resolutely rejected every temptation to seek to increase his power by conquest or intrigue outside its boundaries. The second factor which has preserved him is that Shansi is ringed round with mountains, a natural fastness, and is entered from the main trunk railway through a pass in this range by a narrow-gauge branch line, for which there is no rolling stock outside the Province. Within the Province his rule has been strong and enlightened, and he has undoubtedly sought the good of his people.

When the Nationalists announced in May that Yen as well as Feng Yu Hsiang had joined their party, and that he would co-operate with Feng and their Northern expedition in the drive on Peking, sceptics remembered that the two men had been enemies in the past, and doubted whether Yen would allow himself to be drawn now into the net of political entanglements for the sake of assisting his erstwhile rival. The question was answered early in July. After Chang Tso Lin had attained the position of generalissimo of the Northern armies in the middle of June, he not only opened an offensive against Chiang Kai Shek down the Eastern Railway, but also about 3rd or 4th July launched an attack down the Hankow line against Feng Yu Hsiang's troops. He crossed the Yellow River bridge and forced them to fall back before him in Honan. Now at last Yen Hsi Shan showed his hand. He moved six divisions of his army eastwards from Shansi towards the Peking-Hankow line, thus threatening the Northerners' line of communications; and their offensive past the Yellow River was promptly arrested. A simple and direct act, this, on Yen's part, and more eloquent than many words.

FENG'S WORK FOR REUNION OF THE PARTY

In this summer of 1927 we see Feng Yu Hsiang in a new rôle. Leaving his isolated base in the north-west, he enters Honan, the grave of many an army leader's ambitions, the cockpit of China. It was through his co-operation that the Hankow offensive in this province turned out a splendid, though costly, success. Having been made Nationalist "Chairman of the Provincial Committee," he appears in a very short time to have gained at least sufficient control of the Province to give his armies a very serviceable degree of mobility. He used this immediately to give what aid he could to the Nanking offensive in Anhwei and Shantung, throwing his forces two or three times against the Northerners' right flank; but this was naturally fruitless in the face of the collapse of Chiang Kai Shek's own armies.

Politically too he occupies the centre of the stage. Forsaking his former position of individualistic aloofness, he proclaims himself and his armies as whole-heartedly devoted to the Nationalist cause. But at the same time he demands that the divisions in the party should be healed, even if operation is necessary to a cure.

Having by now himself relinquished the support he was formerly getting from Russia, he demands that the Nationalist Party should do likewise by parting with its Russian advisers. But the demand is made as from a middleman, not in the rôle of a bitter antagonist of the Russians. Contrary to expectations, he succeeded in uniting with him on this moderate Nationalist platform Yen Hsi Shan, his former enemy.

Borodin after passing through Loyang seems to have remained for a period of about two months at Sianfu; but it is not clear whether this was in order to assist Feng by his advice, or as a hostage held by Feng until some of his own relations who were in Moscow should have returned to China. But after September both Borodin and Galens appear to have left the country.

CHIANG KAI SHEK'S RETIREMENT

There still remained one very serious barrier to the reunion of the party in the person of Chiang Kai Shek. He had taken such an outstanding and aggressive part, not only in the suppression of the Communists and expulsion of the Russians, but also in the dissolution of Labour Unions, that it appeared impossible for the Hankow leaders to unite with the Nanking faction while it still remained under his powerful influence. As usual in China, middlemen had been busily passing backwards and forwards between the Nanking leaders and the Hankow army coming down-river ostensibly to attack them. Hankow pressed very strongly a demand that Chiang should retire. His Northern campaign had failed badly, and the failure was largely due to the antagonism raised in the Hankow faction by his personality—everybody knew that. Finally, on 13th August there was a stormy council of war at Chiang's headquarters in Nanking. The erstwhile most trusted supporters on his staff openly defied him and refused to fight further under his leadership, ostensibly on the ground that their wages and those of their men were in arrears.

Chiang without more ado resigned, leaving the army in their hands: he reached Shanghai the next day, and that evening, accompanied by a strong bodyguard, left secretly by steamer for Ningpo in his native province of Chekiang, the third great war lord to be removed from the stage within twelve months.

There was a similar demand by the Nanking faction for the retirement of Tang Shen Chih on the ground that he was becoming a dictator in Central China; but his political influence had never equalled that of Chiang, and the demand was not pressed. Feng Yu Hsiang was now the most influential military leader in the Nationalist Party, and at the end of August, presumably in recognition of his services as well as on grounds of seniority, he was raised to the rank of Field-Marshal.

THE SECOND ROUT OF SUN CHUAN FANG

Towards the middle of August Nanking began to be heavily attacked by Sun Chuan Fang's troops, who were pursuing the retreating Southerners. On 17th inst. they occupied Pukow and the northern bank of the Yangtze; and from there with their superior artillery they opened up a steadily increasing bombardment on Nanking directly across the river.

But no sooner had Chiang Kai Shek retired than the various factions of both the Hankow and Nanking opposing armies began earnestly to collaborate plans for a combined attack on Sun Chuan Fang, their common enemy. The Hankow troops were transformed from "enemies" into "allies" and "reinforcements."

On 26th August 10,000 Northerners crossed the river, and were all promptly killed, wounded or made prisoners by the Nationalists. On 29th inst. 10,000 more effected a crossing, lured on by a Nationalist stratagem, and again with the help of some warships which had been held in ambush they were instantly attacked by land and water and compelled to retire.

Just at this point Tang Shen Chih arrived with further reinforcements from up-river, enabling the Nationalists to take the offensive. The Hankow troops attacked Sun's flank in Anhwei and the Nanking forces crossed the river in turn on 1st September, capturing Pukow, silencing the artillery which had been causing serious damage and panic in Nanking, and pressing on northwards. In the first few days of September Feng's forces opened an attack along the railway against the Northern communications further north at Hsuchow. The net result of these concerted movements was that Sun Chuan Fang's forces were again decisively defeated, tens of thousands of soldiers being killed, wounded or captured, and the rest disarmed or scattered.

THE NATIONALIST GOVERNMENT REUNITED

At the end of August the political leaders of the Hankow and Nanking factions began a series of consultations, which were carried on simultaneously in both capitals, seeking a basis for the reunion of the Nationalist Party, now that the chief obstacles had been removed and a favourable atmosphere created. A few days before the end of September they had completed their task. The Nanking Government was entirely reorganised on a representative basis as *The Nationalist Government of China*.

They had established their boundary as far as the northern bank of the Yangtze on the lower river, and as far North as the Yellow River in Central China. North of the river as far as the Mongolian border, Yen Hsi Shan held the country as their ally in Shansi, a little west of the Pekin-Hankow railway. To the Northern Command under Chang Tso Lin, with its headquarters at Pekin, there were thus left only the two north-eastern provinces of Chihli and Shantung, with the major parts of Kiangsu and Anhwei, in addition to the stronghold of the great outer dominion of Manchuria. The vast territories under the Nationalists, comprising the whole of the rest of China and Inner Mongolia, included such provinces as Szechuan and Yunnan, which at the most could only be considered as within the Nationalist sphere of influence; but this is also as much as could have been said of their former relation to the Pekin Government. Nationalist China was not yet under one centralised military control; but at least was under generals between whom there were no great and dangerous rivalries. There were still political jealousies and rivalries; but the two great political factions which had each been striving for the hegemony of the Party had, in spite of these, consolidated the civil authority under one Government at Nanking. Most significant of all, the Russian Communists, who had at first organised and strengthened, and afterwards split the

Party, had now been rejected and expelled to Russia; and although there were still dangerous Communist plots, the Chinese Communist domination of the Government had been shattered and overthrown. This is not the end of the Revolution; but it is the end of a very definite and distinct phase of the Revolution—that under Communist control.

INTERNATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF COMMUNIST PERIOD

It is this period alone which comes within the immediate purview of the present work, a period of momentous significance on the one hand for the future development of China, and on the other as the only indication yet given to the world as to what may be expected from the Third International of Russia when its activities secure free play in another great nation. The results in such a country will necessarily be conditioned by the social and industrial status of its population. Had these conditions in China been similar to those that used to obtain in France and Russia, then, instead of the story set forth in these pages, we should have had the extravagant horrors of a French or a Russian Revolution. Contrary to Karl Marx's prophecy that the World Revolution would first triumph in the most highly capitalised and industrialised countries such as Britain and Germany, China adds most weighty evidence to that of European Russia and Siberia, the trans-Caucasian and Central Asian kingdoms and dependencies, and Outer Mongolia, that it finds its most fertile soil in countries which are under-capitalised, and whose manual labourers are unorganised, ignorant, illiterate and credulous. It is for such countries as these that the demonstration which has been given in China should be of the greatest value, though there would be few amongst them where such a decisive and prompt reaction could be looked for as that produced by the sound common-sense and sturdy though latent independence of the Chinese people.

PART V
FACTORS OF THE FUTURE

As we leave the story of the Revolution at the end of the period of Communist control, the prospect for the new period now opening is full of the uncertainty of incalculable factors, whose interaction in the near and the distant future it is impossible to foreknow and but futile to guess at. It is possible, however, to state what some of these factors are and to describe certain of the conditions which in any case must determine the locus of their action.

CHAPTER XXI

IMMEDIATE CHINESE FACTORS

THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL

THOUGH the leading Russian Communists and a number of the subordinate Russian advisers have been expelled, and the rule of the Chinese Communists within the Nationalist Government has been shattered, many of them having been killed, it would be a fundamental mistake to assume that Communist activity in China is at an end and may be disregarded as a factor of importance in the future. No characteristic of the disciples of Communism is more extraordinary than their unwavering faith and their indomitable courage and enthusiasm. In these qualities, and in their determination to impose their faith on the nations of the world regardless of the will of their peoples, they may well be compared with the followers of Mohammed in the heyday of their early militant missionary expansion. As evidence that this spirit has been maintained undaunted, nothing could be clearer than the edict of the Third International previously quoted.¹ While the train repatriating the Russian leaders had scarcely yet steamed out of sight of Hankow, and the earth was still freshly heaped over the graves of hundreds of Chinese Communists who had been killed for their faith as a result of Ho Chien's *coup d'état*, simple and peremptory orders were issued to the Communists who remained, from now on to thwart the Nationalist Government, which they had formerly supported, by stirring up revolt against it among the workers and peasants.

¹ *Vide supra*, p. 236.

After the severe rebuff they have just received it is hardly likely that at present they will be able to make much headway; but it must be remembered that the expulsion and killing of Communists in July and August was only carried out in Central China, and that even there, although the Government and administration was purged of this faction and liberated from its control, the Communists have by no means been completely rooted out from among the populace. Their membership is not large, but it is wonderfully well distributed; and they understand how, themselves unseen, to extend their influence widely through industrial circles. They have made good progress among the membership of the Kuo Min Tang throughout China in a process which by certain radical sections of the Australian Labour Party has been described, referring to their own activities amongst industrial Labour Unions, as "white-anting." In Shanghai their organisation is known to be still active, although it is forced underground by the strong control that is exercised by the administration. In Kuangtung, on the other hand, and parts of the neighbouring southern provinces, they are undoubtedly in a very strong and influential position.

A factor of great value to the Chinese Communist Party in its work is the extensive organisation throughout the land of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, consisting of consulates in the various provinces and a number of State commercial agencies. Although officially these have no connection with the work of the Third International and so have been accorded diplomatic immunity by the Chinese, actually it is well known that they are used as bases for Communist activities.

Since these resources in morale and organisation are still available in China, it may be taken for granted that they will be used, and used boldly and powerfully. Communism is still a grave menace with which the Nationalist Government will have to reckon. If we are to judge by the history of its development in Russia,

bloodier' and more extensive holocausts than have yet occurred may be expected from it as it ferments and matures in districts where Government authority is weak; and the Nationalists may yet be driven to meet its challenge by a ruthless process of extermination.

It is a fact which must not be forgotten that large masses of the people in many parts of China are living in frightful misery and desperation; and if the suppression of Communism is followed, as it has been in some districts, by the oppression and extortion of reactionary anti-Communists, it may defeat its own ends. This danger is well illustrated in recent Russian history. After the Bolsheviks had seized the government of the country, British assistance was given to one after another of the White Russian generals who attacked them. Denekin, Wrangel, Kolchak, and others, though at first some of them made great and spectacular advances and were received with open arms by the people, all presently were beaten by the opposition hardening against them as they advanced. The chief of the British Secret Service living in disguise in the country at this time records¹ his own observations as to the reason for this. These leaders were so devoid of political sense, and reactionary in the administration of the country they occupied, that the very peasants, who had at first welcomed them as saviours from the Bolsheviks, eventually turned against them.

There is also still the possibility of the Chinese Communist Party receiving substantial aid from abroad. Although the Russian leaders have been expelled, there is no reason to suppose that from the point of view of Russia and the Third International this is anything more than a strategic retreat. No one understands better than they the principle "Reculer pour mieux sauter." Official prestige and international reputation among the other "capitalistic" and "imperialist" nations of the

¹ See Dukes in *Red Dusk and the Morrow*, Williams & Norgate, London, 1922, pp. 225, 226.

world are to them empty and idle conceptions. They have already, actually succeeded in bringing China appreciably nearer to that state of disorganisation and chaos which Marx lays down as the final stage before the establishment of the "Rule of the Proletariat," though it is true that they have attempted to make a short-cut in the process by omitting the preliminary stage of over-capitalisation and industrialisation specified in his procedure. If it seemed likely further to advance their cause, the Third International could readily, when circumstances required it, ignore its losses and rebuffs, and again send men, munitions and money to any quarter in China where they seemed most likely to be effective.

THE PRINCIPLE OF THE SUPREMACY OF THE CIVIL POWER

The most permanent and indestructible achievement of a revolution is not its military conquests, nor the form of government established at any particular time, but the evolution and fixation of certain principles and ideals in the hearts and minds of the people. One such fundamental principle was established by the Revolution of 1911, viz. that, China being a republic, no man may now assume the position of hereditary ruler, either as king or emperor. Yuan Shih Kai in 1915 attempted¹ to do this; but such a surging tide of popular resentment against his purpose rose over the whole face of the country, reinforced also by Japanese intrigue, that he hesitated actually to cross the Rubicon until death opportunely removed him from the scene. According to Chinese instinct and age-long precedent it is the proper, and in fact the only, course for a victorious war lord to follow: as soon as he has consolidated his position he founds a dynasty. It is a *dénouement* which a number of foreigners in China have been subconsciously hoping for; and several war lords in turn have reached a position whence

¹ *Vide supra*, p. 6.

such a step might have been contemplated. But, as in the case of Yuan Shih Kai, there was the same popular feeling that such things are now "not done"; there were also Feng Yu Hsiang's soldiery, drilled and pledged to slay any such aspirant; and no Roman general feared more to hear the fateful charge, "Regnum petit," than did these Chinese war lords the accusation that they were trying to make themselves emperor. Chang Tso Lin has for some time, with Peking in his hands, been in this false and rather ridiculous position suggestive of a boy playing kiss-in-the-ring, who, when he has chased and caught his girl, is too bashful to kiss her.

A second principle which has been laid down by the Revolution of 1926-27 is one over which many a fierce struggle has been fought out in Europe, viz. that every military officer, however exalted his position, is subservient to, and must fight under the direction of, the civil authority. The principle that feudal princes and barons, military governors and generals, own allegiance to an emperor was in the past well understood; but loyalty, subservience and implicit obedience to a parliament, a president, or an executive committee—this is yet too new a conception to have been thoroughly established.

In the early months of 1927 Chiang Kai Shek protested that he did recognise this authority, but it is noteworthy that the principal attacks made against him again and again at this time in the Nationalist Press in Hankow were just on this point, that he, a military man, was arrogating to himself civil power. It was a momentous constitutional struggle right at the threshold of the young Government's life; and yet perhaps it has been to its ultimate advantage that it was forced thus early upon it. For the antagonism between Chiang and the Communist clique in the Government, as it could not, for reasons of policy, be openly admitted at this time, compelled it to concentrate instead on the constitutional issue, and take up a bold and unmistakable

position in the eyes of all China, which may well stand it in good stead as a strong precedent in the days to come.

To realise what an advance in constitutional theory and practice was involved in the insistence on the principle it is only necessary to consider the situation in Peking, where the president is still appointed or deposed according to the whim of the paramount war lord, and where the president and his executive, when there happen to be such in office, carry on the administration under his directions.¹

It is a significant sign of the times and an indication of the growth of a constitutional spirit that, when Chiang Kai Shek had come to the point of an absolute break with the Hankow Government and a repudiation of its jurisdiction, he still found it necessary, or at least advisable, to found a second Nationalist Government at Nanking under which to hold his commission, and from which formally to derive his authority. Brilliant leader though he was, and strong though his following, he did not desire, or did not dare, to face the loss of support that would have resulted if, according to precedent, he had claimed allegiance for himself as an independent conqueror rather than as the servant of a People's Party.

CHIANG KAI SHEK

Chinese war lords have a habit, when they have been smitten by some catastrophic stroke of fortune, of making a dramatic gesture of retirement into private life. A circular telegram, usually verbose and lengthy, is published and distributed uncharged all over China, setting forth the treachery and malice of those who have caused the disaster, and explaining the determination of the writer, a disappointed and disillusioned man, to withdraw from further strife and turmoil in this restless world to the quiet and seclusion of some temple or

¹ For illustrations of this see Putnam Weale in *The Vanished Empire*, Macmillan, London, 1926, Part III.

monastery, or to the peace of his own country village, far from all connection with any public affairs. After such an official retirement the leader is considered to have taken sanctuary; and it would be a breach of etiquette for his opponent to kill him, or interfere with his liberty. Wu Pei Fu took this step when he met crushing defeat in 1924; so did Feng Yu Hsiang when he was driven back into Shensi and retired for a sojourn in Russia after the failure of the hopes that had been founded on Kuo Sung Lin's rebellion; and so, precisely in the above form, did Chiang Kai Shek, when on 13th August he abdicated from his command and retired to Ningpo.

But just as this is considered the fitting and decorous course for a great public man to take in the face of misfortune, so it is regarded as only natural that, after a due period of seclusion and the cultivation of the higher life of the soul or of the domestic virtues, the recluse should, when a favourable opportunity occurs, emerge again from his retirement and, rested and recuperated, plunge again into his former activities. Both Wu Pei Fu and Feng Yu Hsiang followed this course also; and there is every reason to expect that, when he deems the time ripe, Chiang Kai Shek will in like manner emerge from his retreat and again take the field.

He is a man with a magnetic personality who has enjoyed an enormous prestige in the revolutionary armies; and in the event of his resuming his military career his attitude will be a matter of the greatest importance to the Nationalist cause. The expulsion of the Communists from Hankow should make it easy¹ for him to co-operate with the Nationalist Government of the future, whether its seat be eventually at Hankow or at Nanking. If, on the other hand, he should be guided by aspirations for personal predominance, it is not inconceivable that he might, when a suitable opportunity presented itself, attack Feng Yu Hsiang and his army. As Chiang,

¹ Subject to the usual handicaps of generalship as described in a later section.

though he is only forty-one years of age and has had a very short career, is the most distinguished and experienced fighting general in China to-day, at least as regards modern tactics; it is clear that his weight, thrown into the scales on one side or the other, might easily be the decisive factor in carrying the Nationalist Government to triumphant supremacy in China, or in hopelessly disrupting it.

FENG YU HSIANG

In Marshal Feng Yu Hsiang we have a man of very different qualities and experience. Forty-seven years of age, he has had twenty-nine years' training in the regular army, during which he has steadily risen to his present position. He has seen service in eight of the eighteen provinces of China, as well as in Thibet, Inner Mongolia and Manchuria, though most of these campaigns did not involve major battles of a desperate nature. No officer in China can compare with him in the patience and thoroughness with which he has built up and trained his army, and the care that he takes of the welfare of his men. His tactics show that he can strike quickly and decisively; but his strategy is safe and sure rather than brilliant and daring.

He has twice before this Revolution of 1926 held the post of provincial governor;¹ and in these, as in his previous appointments of less importance, he left a fine record of sound, disinterested and progressive administration. But when his military *coup d'état* of 23rd October, 1924, left him in control of Peking, he did not appear to have the ability to build up a political party to support him, as Wu Pei Fu would have done in a similar position. It seems that, though an excellent administrator within the scope of a province or group of provinces, he is neither well versed nor naturally adept at politics on the national scale. He is fond of calling himself a plain soldier: perhaps he does not care to enter seriously the field of high politics.

¹ *Vide supra*, pp. 201, 202, 205.

His training has been that of a war lord, for which rôle his strong individuality and masterful disposition have well fitted him. Since his break with Wu Pei Fu in 1924 he has been the supreme and unfettered ruler of North-western China. On the other hand, from an early stage in his career he has repeatedly laid down the principle, and followed it in his practice, that he and his army are the servants of the people. Years before the Nationalist armies invaded Central China he called his command "The People's Army": as soon as the soldiers of the Revolution began to approach his territory through Honan he announced his allegiance to the Nationalist cause; and he has since become the leading officer of their armies.

It is well known, however, that he strongly disapproves of the dislocation of labour and industry which has been a prominent feature of the Nationalist procedure, and when Honan came directly under his control, he peremptorily suppressed the labour agitation and organisation, which had just been industriously worked up by the propagandists. Now that the Communist ascendancy has been destroyed, it is likely that the Nationalist policy and methods will be greatly modified; but the question will still remain whether Feng will be content to serve the people according to the directions and dictation of a Committee or Government in Hankow or Nanking, or will insist that he himself is the sole judge as to what form his service should take.

By the Northern group of war lords he is the most hated and feared of all the leaders arrayed against them. This is doubtless partly because he who holds the North-west has in his hands the key of Peking, as pointed out in Chapter XVIII, and no covering movement by Japan will be able to shelter the defenders when he is ready to attempt the forcing of the gate; but it is also because they know that Feng is uncompromising, and can neither be bought with money nor bribed with offers of honours and office.

Feng is often spoken of as the most distrusted of all the high military officers in China; and not without reason, since time and again he has betrayed or failed men who counted on him to support their party or policy. But here again he is consistent with his own professions. He has declared ¹ openly and categorically that he will support any man and any party that is seeking the good of China, and will similarly cease to support any such man or party when acting against the country's interests.

A dangerous licence, this, for the man to arrogate to himself, and apt to lead him both in his politics and his religion into ill-judged aberrations, or to degenerate into mere wilful egotism. But when there is no precedent in all China for the conduct of either a Christian provincial governor or a Christian field-marshal, and when a patriotic war lord has no friendly colleagues with whom he may consult, and on whose genuinely disinterested counsel, co-operation and sympathy he may rely in shaping his course, nothing less than the rugged, sturdy, uncompromising individualism of a Feng Yu Hsiang would appear to have much chance of blazing such new trails through the matted forests of old conventions and customs.

THE HANDICAPS OF GENERALSHIP

To appreciate fairly the methods of Chinese generals, and to judge their failures, a consideration of several special factors which control all campaigns in China is essential, for they have little or no counterpart in European warfare.

The financing of the campaigns in China during recent years has been on an entirely different basis from that to which foreigners are accustomed. In nearly every case the general officer directing the campaign can get no regular and adequate supply of funds from his Government to meet the necessary expenses; and

¹ See Feng's speech before the North China Union Language School in 1923 reported by Broomhall in *General Feng*, R.T.S., London, 1923, p. 73.

consequently the soldiers, and to a less extent the subordinate officers, are habitually in arrears, it may be three months, or it may be twelve or more. In the case of Northern armies on the Peking pay rolls, accounts were often settled by letting the arrears due to each regiment steadily accumulate until one by one the bodies of troops in various parts of the country in desperation began to loot. As soon as these cases were reported to Peking the accounts of each such regiment were marked "paid in full."

It is obvious that if, as has been the case in many of the Nationalist armies, looting were not allowed, the general in command would be under the necessity of raising money himself if he intended to carry on the campaign. The levies and exactions of Chiang Kai Shek and other generals must be considered in the light of this necessity. Again, should it be planned to build up any financial reserve to provide for the urgent and fluctuating demands of war, it is hard to see where these funds could be lodged except in the personal custody, or at the call, of the general commanding; for if they were left in the hands of any Government to which he owed allegiance, nothing is more certain than that, when the urgent call came, they would have already been diverted to other channels.¹ This consideration must be taken into account when weighing the charges made against war lords, and truly enough, of amassing huge fortunes.

There is a special feature also in the spending of army funds in China. In many cases a battle may best be won by previously bribing some more or less disaffected leader on the opposite side; and this is a routine method which has been largely used in the recent campaigns. On the whole the Northerners have proved far more corruptible than the Nationalists, having no principle or ideal for which they were fighting except self-interest.

¹ There have been some campaigns for which the funds were steadily supplied by the Nationalist Government in Hankow.

But not only is money required for buying over the enemy: it is also frequently necessary for the encouragement of allies. Although an allied commander may be definitely friendly, and have promised his support, it is hardly to be expected that he will march out and join battle without receiving a *quid pro quo*; and this will often take the form of a lump sum of money, especially if his soldiery happen at the time to be so deeply in arrears for their pay that they refuse to fight without it. For these two purposes very considerable sums of money may be required, if a general is to advance rapidly, husbanding his men and ammunition.

Perhaps the feature which to the Western mind is the most confusing and mystifying of all is the disloyalty, or partial and conditional loyalty, which is often found amongst a Chinese general's subordinates as well as in the camps of his allies. Examples of this have been already quoted in this book from the Nationalist campaigns in Hupeh in September 1926, in Honan in May 1927, in Shantung in July 1927, and in the campaigns in Chihli in October 1924 and in November 1925. It is (to Westerners) a strange, but an undoubted, fact that, where large bodies of troops are concerned, a Chinese general is commonly obliged to undertake a campaign, or even to join battle, without knowing beforehand to what extent he holds the loyalty of those on whom he is depending for victory.

But not only has the Chinese general to wrestle with these difficulties on the field: his problems are at least as urgent and baffling with the War Office and his own Government in the capital. Clan and provincial loyalties¹ cause strong undercurrents of favouritism and jealousy in every Chinese Government, and these, augmented by the ordinary personal motives of envy in a country where ambition and competition in every walk of life are extraordinarily keen, constitute a force which no general can afford to ignore. Even to speak of a War Office is apt

¹ *Vide infra*, p. 288.

to give the Westerner with preconceptions from his own land an entirely misleading impression of the situation in a Chinese Government department. It is quite necessary for the general officer conducting any military campaign, while he is away at his distant field base, to have a clique of supporters, a little party of his own who will look after his interests, at the seat of Government; and his success on the field may depend as much on his skill in organising this Government support as on his professional ability.

To these factors is due a great deal of the incomprehensibility of Chinese military campaigns; and in the stages of the Revolution which yet remain to be fought out, they will doubtless continue to exert a strong controlling influence, as they have done in the past.

THE DICTATORSHIP OF A PARTY

In the Nationalist programme¹ the second of the three stages of government in China during the progress of the Revolution was to be government by the dictatorship of a single Party. As we have seen, an autocracy is now impracticable; and it is very difficult to come to any other conclusion than that this programme is a wise one, and indeed inevitable if China is to have peace, and to be united and governed at all.

The Nationalist standpoint is entirely right in its insistence that China is not capable at present of functioning as a democracy, and that the people need first to be educated and trained for such a responsibility. The essential requirement for a democracy is not the creation of a Parliament, but that this Parliament should be responsible to the people and should, in fact, govern the country; in this respect the Parliament of the so-called Chinese Republic of 1911 demonstrated a perfect *reductio ad absurdum*.

The Constitution of the Republic of China provides for a Senate of 274 members elected by Provincial bodies

¹ *Vide supra*, p. 21.

for six years, and a House of Representatives of 596 elected for three years by the indirect vote of some four million electors, the suffrage being on a property and educational basis. Such a franchise is far removed from democracy, and may be contrasted with that of Japan, which, by a series of reform bills, has now at length nearly reached manhood suffrage. But it is probably as wide as is advisable for China at the present stage of her development, and might have worked serviceably enough if the electors had regarded their responsibility seriously. Unfortunately this was not the case. When the first Chinese Parliament was elected, only a small percentage of even these four million electors took the trouble to go to the polling booths.

It is likely that the interest would be keener now than it was fifteen years ago; but in a country where 80 per cent. of the population is still illiterate,¹ and where the majority of those who can read, in spite of the rapid increase in the circulation of newspapers, still have no accurate knowledge even of the rudimentary affairs of the nation, anything resembling a genuine democracy is still impossible. We may therefore exclude from our calculations both democratic and autocratic government in China as being equally impracticable. This leaves as the only alternative to chaos, or regional independence and rivalry, government of the country by some group or party organisation.

In the whole of China there have been only two bids for this position of power and responsibility, that of the Nationalist Party founded twenty-two years ago by a Chinese patriot, which has worked for the emancipation and consolidation of China and has already freed the country from the Manchu despotism, and that of the Communist Party founded in 1920 by Russian zealots, which has worked for the World Revolution and has now, after a fair trial of four years' control, been discredited and overthrown by the Nationalist Party. It would thus appear

¹ See *The China Year Book*, 1926. Tientsin Press, Tientsin, p. 426.

that the complete success of the Nationalist Government is the only solution at present in sight for the problem of organising and ruling a united China.

To many people the aims of the Nationalist Party seem extreme, its methods unpractical, and its demands unreasonable and ill-timed. In each country in the Western system of civilisation which has been governed by a Labour Party, such as Great Britain, and the Commonwealth and the various States of Australia, when its first Labour Government took office similar fears were felt, and similar criticisms levelled at the new regime. But in every case such a Labour Party in office has been a very different force from the same party fighting for place and power. Charged with the administration of the country and brought face to face with the cold facts of the situation, they have been compelled to endorse and repeat some of the very acts, and to perpetuate some of the policies, for which they have most fiercely accused their predecessors. Many of the sensational and revolutionary planks and slogans which have done yeoman service in the committees and congresses of the Party, and in arousing the enthusiasm and enlisting the support of the crowds around the electioneering platforms, have been discarded as impracticable or useless by the same Party, when it has perforce addressed itself to the serious business of governing a nation and balancing its Budget.

The Kuo Min Tang numbers among its membership, even its leadership, an unusually large proportion of doctrinaire, arm-chair politicians: that is typical of the Chinese temperament, which tends to spend more energy and to take more pleasure in the formulation of a set of rules, or a curriculum of studies, than in enforcing them and carrying them out. These are the men who make the slogans: and the Chinese love slogans even more than our Western people—that is saying a great deal. They have made, and doubtless will continue to make, many absurdly impossible policies. But there is no room for doubt that the Nationalist Party in China, though

encumbered by many self-seekers and opportunists, and most seriously deficient in political experience and judgment, has nevertheless the interests and progress of the country at heart; and for this reason the prospects of its accession to power may be awaited in the confidence that, as in the history of other countries so here also, the responsibilities of office will inevitably modify a great deal that is now unreasonable, and teach in the hard school of experience the needed lessons of legislative and administrative wisdom.

CHAPTER XXII

FOREIGN FACTORS

JAPAN

THOSE who prophesy that Japan, because of her own meteoric progress from the Middle Ages to a seat among the great modern nations, is inevitably fated to be the chosen leader of her huge and helpless neighbour along the same shining path, are entirely unaware of China's attitude towards Japan, and her estimate of the national characteristics and culture of the Japanese people. At the same time the life of the two nations is so closely bound together that they must react strongly on each other's destiny; but it is rather Japan that depends on China than vice versa.

Apart from Japan's antagonism to Russia, which for many years has been a constant feature of the diplomacy of Peking and the North, but lies outside the scope of this study, the great controlling factor of Japan's Asiatic policy is her present and prospective China trade; and it is worth while carefully to estimate the place this takes in her industrial and commercial life.

The table on page 262 shows the total imports and exports of Japan's trade with China for 1925 and 1926 as against that with all her best customers among the other nations, which has been included because of the interesting light it throws on her international affiliations.

The general and considerable drop in both exports and imports shown between the two years in the table was caused by an acute financial crisis through which Japan passed in 1925-26, post-war deflation not yet having been satisfactorily effected. It will be noticed, however, that, in spite of this financial depression in Japan, and the grave industrial and commercial disturbances of the 1926 Revolution in China, Japan's exports to China

TABLE SHOWING DISTRIBUTION OF JAPAN'S FOREIGN TRADE.¹
(Figures in Yen 1000.)

Country.	Exports.			Imports.		
	1925.	1926.	Per cent.	1925.	1926.	Per cent.
China (proper)	468,439	421,861	20.6	214,658	239,410	10.1
Manchuria	101,647	99,607	4.9	176,595	157,034	6.6
China (total)	570,086	521,468	25.5	391,253	396,444	16.7
United States	1,006,253	860,881	42.1	664,992	680,186	28.6
India	173,413	155,952	7.6	573,564	391,136	16.5
Great Britain	59,716	59,498	2.9	237,292	170,275	7.1
Australia	47,496	51,611	2.5	149,999	128,396	5.4
Dutch Indies	85,557	74,754	3.7	103,373	103,077	4.3
Germany	11,844	8,131	0.4	123,619	145,221	6.1
Straits Settlements	40,905	41,497	2.0	37,004	39,872	1.7
France	58,855	42,412	2.1	33,377	24,545	1.0
Canada	20,838	24,754	1.2	37,132	63,929	2.7
Hongkong	73,629	52,973	2.6	476	1,426	0.1
Other countries	156,998	150,797	7.4	220,377	232,977	9.8
Grand total	2,305,590	2,044,728	100.0	2,572,658	2,377,484	100.0

¹ Extracted from table in the *Japan Year Book*, 1927, Japan Year Book Office, Tokio, pp. 602, 603.

have only dropped 8.5 per cent., and her imports from that country actually show a slight increase.

If we take the figures for 1926, we see that of Japan's total exports 25.5 per cent. go to China, 42.1 per cent. to the United States and only 7.6 per cent. and 3.7 per cent. to India and the Dutch Indies respectively, her two next best customers. Of the imports, 16.7 per cent. are derived from China, 28.6 per cent. from the United States, and 16.5 per cent. from India; and again the next highest country on the list, Great Britain, only supplies her with 7.1 per cent.

Japanese capital invested in China also represents a very high stake, claimed by Japanese to be larger than that of Great Britain. It has been estimated by the *North China Daily News* of Shanghai at £245,900,000, of which £70,000,000 consists of loans to the Central and Provincial Governments. About half of the total is invested in Manchuria.

The table below¹ shows the relative value of their China trade to the United States of America and Great

TABLE SHOWING THE RELATIVE VALUE TO THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN, OF THEIR TRADE IN CHINA

	Exports, 1926.	Imports, 1926.	Total of Imports and Exports.	Per cent.
<i>Great Britain.</i> (Figures in £ million.)				
Trade with China	16	12	28	1.4
Trade with other countries	761	1231	1992	98.6
Total trade	777	1243	2020	100.0
<i>United States of America.</i> (Figures in G \$ million.)				
Trade with China	193	150	253	2.7
Trade with other countries	4651	4317	8968	97.3
Total trade	4754	4467	9221	100.0

¹ Based on statistics of *The Statesman's Year Book*, 1927, Macmillan, London, pp. 53, 55, 469, 472.

Britain, the two other greatest trading nations in China.

From this we see that, whereas in the case of Japan her China trade accounts for 25 per cent. of the total exports and 17 per cent. of the imports, of Great Britain's and the United States' total trade the China moiety is only 1.4 and 2.7 per cent. respectively. It is true that British policy has to consider the oversea Dominions as well as Great Britain; and their trade with China is considerable. The complete figures for 1926 are not available; but roughly the direct trade of the British Empire with China is divided amongst the various constituent members as follows: ¹

	Per cent.
Great Britain's trade with China (import and export)	23
Hongkong's	62
Trade of India, Straits Settlements, Canada and Australia (import and export)	15
Total China trade of British Empire	100

It will thus be seen that the total value of the Empire's interest in the China trade is about four times that of Great Britain; but if this is set against the total trade of the British Empire, it is not likely that the China percentage of the Empire's trade will be appreciably greater than that in the case of America.

If we assume this figure, 2½ per cent. of the total trade of such organisations as the United States of America and the British Empire is yet no small item; and its interests must naturally be treated with the gravest care and sense of responsibility. If such a volume of trade were seriously dislocated or drastically diminished the loss would cause great inconvenience, even serious hardship in certain British and American industries; but it would cause no financial crisis in these countries; there would be no occasion for panic; the life of the nations concerned would as a whole be but little disturbed.

¹ Based on statistics in *The China Year Book*, 1926, Tientsin Press, Tientsin, p. 861.

But such damage to her China trade would spell for Japan nothing short of disaster, and disaster which in her present financial position she is in no way prepared to meet. There is the difference. Great Britain and America are detached enough to take a long view: they can afford to be generous: Mr. Baldwin, in justifying the present British policy in China in view of the anxiety of British trading interests, stated that the British Government was thinking of Britain's relations with China in the next century. Japan at present feels that she can ill afford to take any chances.

If we turn to the future there is the same contrast. The United States and Great Britain are both great World Powers; one dominates a continent, the other has colonised a fifth of the globe; the trade of both runs to the ends of the earth. Japan has not reached this position; as the statistics of her foreign trade suggest, she should rather be regarded as a great Pacific Power. She has a tiny island home, poor in natural resources; her people are not apt at colonising;¹ and she has already found that to win a place in the great markets of the world means fierce and relentless competition; but with China open to her, her future would be absolutely secure and she could snap her fingers at the world.

Japan's present need explains why she is unwilling to give China the opportunity to put a high import duty on Japanese exports of cotton fabrics, the second most valuable single item in her export trade to any one country in the world (Yen 194,000,000 in 1926). It also explains why it was Japan alone of all the Great Powers which began to talk of war against China when the Nanking Government promulgated a schedule of higher Customs charges at Shanghai.² Anxiety to provide for her future explains her wild aggression of the Twenty-one Demands.³ Her realisation that they were likely to defeat

¹ See Upton Close in *The Revolt of Asia*, Putnam's Sons, London and New York, 1927, p. 208 et seqq.

² *Vide supra*, p. 231.

³ *Vide supra*, p. 221, footnote.

their own ends, and that a persistence in them would be likely to lose her more trade than it would gain, was the reason for her cancellation of most of the remaining clauses after the Washington Conference.

Her arrest of the Nationalist advance by military intervention in Tsinanfu ¹ in July 1927 was dictated by a desire to secure Chang Tso Lin in undisturbed supremacy in Manchuria, that province of boundless wealth in the southern half of which her trade, her railways, and her industries have been making such wonderful strides under the preferential treatment granted her by the war lord. This intervention was made safer by the way in which at that time the Communists had concentrated their fire of anti-Imperialist propaganda and hate on the British. But it was noticeable that it was not only the Nationalists who protested with indignant heat against Japan's action; Peking also lodged at least a formal complaint.

When Chamberlain's new policy begins in time to have its due effect on the Chinese attitude, and a reaction to arise in favour of the British, any repetition of such an action by Japan would be considerably more dangerous to her interests. In regard to the tariff also, the liberal lead that has now been given by Great Britain will make it increasingly difficult and dangerous for Japan to maintain her attitude: a boycott might well be more destructive to her trade than a tariff, and there would be a danger of this if international opinion supported the Chinese demands.

Finally, there is no doubt that a strong and independent China, united under the Nationalists, would not allow Japan to continue in some of the privileges which she now enjoys and values in Manchuria; and for this reason she would probably still be prepared to do a good deal in a quiet and unobtrusive way to preserve the *status quo* in the North. But it would not pay her openly and forcibly to obstruct the Nationalist cause. She would have to accept, if necessary, present hardship and

¹ *Vide supra*, pp. 227, 228, et seqq.

loss for the sake of the large and opulent share which she surely intends to have in the trade of the united and prosperous China of the future.

There is another factor of Japanese policy which has of recent years steadily been gathering momentum. By the peculiar features of the Japanese Constitution the administrative and executive power is vested in the Emperor and his Ministers, rather than in Parliament; but it is becoming more and more necessary for the Government to take the opinion of Parliament seriously into its calculations. Successive reform bills have been enlarging the electorate, and it is expected shortly to reach the ambit of full manhood suffrage. Organised labour is already a power in the land; and Communism, although as usual it numbers only a few adherents, is causing no little anxiety, and is necessitating widespread and elaborate police surveillance. A representative from some section of the Japanese Labour Party spoke on the public platform in Hankow in the early part of the year in support of the Nationalist Party and condemnation of "Imperialism." It is not suggested that the force beneath these phenomena is at present able to control Japanese foreign policy; but any student of international affairs of the last few years will realise that, in the event of the Japanese Government contemplating an openly aggressive and "Imperialistic" policy towards China, it would have to be seriously reckoned with.

Japan's policy towards China in recent years has shown signs of bewilderment and vacillation: she does not know exactly where she stands; and this is not surprising in view of the very great difficulty of the problems that confront her in Eastern Asia and at home. But it is not to be expected that a nation whose intuitions have been keen enough to adapt her life so rapidly to that of the modern world will remain for long at a loss as to how to rise to the demands of the China situation.

• THE WESTERN NATIONS

The contribution of the civilisation of the West to the Chinese Revolution will be discussed in the last chapter. The contribution likely or proper to be made by the Governments of the Western nations would seem to be in the main of a passive nature, and to consist largely of dealing with the demands of the Revolution as they arise, progressively adjusting their own policy and its form of expression to the changing scenes, and avoiding any aggressive action or dominating interference with China's internal affairs likely to further complicate a task which is already of Herculean dimensions.

The foreign nations' post-office services in China were withdrawn five or six years ago, and in regard to the restoration of China's Customs autonomy,¹ the relinquishment of extraterritorial rights, and the rendition of Concessions, Great Britain has given a notable lead on lines with which the United States' popular sentiment was already in sympathy, and which most of the other foreign Powers seem disposed to support. These questions have been discussed in the preceding chapters; and it seems likely that, although China will not for a time secure all that she has claimed, yet within the next few years, provided the country progresses towards order rather than towards chaos, a great advance will be made towards their final settlement.

One matter in which in the past foreign nations have very seriously, even disastrously,² disturbed the course of Chinese national life has been in allowing or encouraging their nationals to make loans to Chinese leaders for unproductive purposes. This prejudices the interests of the country in at least three different ways. Chinese leaders are often only too ready to pledge the nation's assets as security for such loans, and sometimes cheerfully

¹ *Vide supra*, pp. 121, 122.

² *Vide supra*, p. 5.

agree to high rates of interest, whence it comes about that to-day most of the revenue of China is pledged to the service of foreign loans. In the second place, such loans have often been used for purposes which are not only unproductive, such as the personal indulgence of the Chinese party arranging the loan, but even positively damaging, such as unnecessary campaigns or wars for the aggrandisement of war lords. Finally, behind all such large loans provided by the nationals of any country, impalpable and never openly paraded in Parliament or in the glare of the public Press, but exerting a silent and menacing pressure on the debtor country, lies ultimately the power of the creditor country's navy or army.¹ This kind of thing is the core of what the Chinese mean by "Imperialism."

About ten years ago Chinese officials were in this way recklessly contracting loans with Japan, in return for which she was demanding special privileges and concessions in China. It was felt that this created such an urgent danger that, at the instance of the United States in 1920, a Consortium was created of the four Powers, the United States, Great Britain, France and Japan, for the control and restriction of foreign loans to China. It was intended that loans should be shared equally between the four Powers, and only made for productive purposes, and on the authority of the Consortium. "The justification for it was to be found in the weakness of the Central Government and the division of the provinces. If there were no Consortium, at once indiscriminate and profligate borrowing would revive and put an end for ever to the financial reconstruction of China, which it is the special function of the Consortium to achieve. The battle of the Concessions would be resumed. Vested foreign interests would be created, and in case of default, aggression, or unfair competition, it would become increasingly difficult for the Powers, acting separately, to refrain from

¹ See H. N. Brailsford's *The War of Steel and Gold*. Bell & Sons, London, 1914, pp. 78, 85, 86.

recognising the interests claimed by their nationals and from interfering for their protection. Foreign interference in that sense would be tantamount, in effect, if not in name, to a resumption of international spheres. The end of China would be foreign tutelage. She would have ceased to exist as a sovereign Power. In the present politically weak state of China the Consortium is almost the only remaining bulwark of her political integrity. As soon as a strong and stable Central Government has been restored, and as soon as the country has shown ability to maintain financial equilibrium, the Consortium will have done its work, and its privileges should be withdrawn. Until then the Consortium is a necessary, it is hoped a passing and temporary necessity, but still a necessary international instrument for preventing the breakdown of China.”¹

To any Westerner these words of Sir Frederick Whyte seem obvious and incontrovertible common-sense and sound statesmanship. But it is a fact that the Consortium has been very unpopular in China, and to this day has never been officially recognised by her. It is, however, not unnatural that persons and parties, struggling desperately against their rivals, should find it difficult or impossible to take the long view, when this means living from hand to mouth on a revenue hopelessly inadequate for their purposes. When the struggle is over, against the perspective of a united China the great negative value that the Consortium has conferred on her people will be better appreciated.

Perhaps one of the greatest foreign factors likely to influence the future course of the Revolution is the mutual rivalry of the Great Powers, coupled with the genuine shrinking they all have at present from the idea of another great war. Their rivalry would inspire the concert of Powers to resist the efforts of any one of themselves to secure for itself exclusive and special privileges: the dread

¹ Sir F. Whyte's *China and Foreign Powers*, Oxford University Press, London, 1927, p. 23.

of leading up to another great conflagration would restrain any Power from pushing too stubbornly its designs against the opposition of the others. This situation of tense and watchful equilibrium is undoubtedly a strong factor tending to prevent further territorial or economic aggression in China. Its chief protagonist is the United States, proud of her own refusal to seek special privileges, and determined not to acquiesce in any other nation doing so: hence her initiation of the four-Power Consortium.

It is this relationship between the foreign Powers, as well as the passionate resentment of the Chinese themselves, which makes it very difficult to envisage the application of a means which has often been suggested of rehabilitating essential services in China, such as the railways or even the entire financial system, *i.e.* the plan of placing them under foreign control. But although this would seem out of the question for any one foreign nation, it may not be permanently impracticable for the League of Nations. The League has hitherto been chiefly preoccupied with the affairs of Europe, Africa, and the Near East; and has done comparatively little to establish confidence in the Far East. China indeed has had reason to regard with the greatest misgiving a decision¹ regarding herself made by the Treaty which established the League. But the day may yet come, as the power of the League steadily grows and its reputation and prestige become more and more securely established, that China will be willing and glad, as other nations have been, to avail herself of its good offices.

THE NATIONS OF ASIA

Upton Close in a recent publication² gives a popular account of "twenty thousand miles of investigation in every country from Japan to Palestine" into the awaken-

¹ *Vide supra*, p. 41.

² *The Revolt of Asia*, Putnam's Sons, London and New York, 1927, Chaps. II and III.

ing of nationalism in the nations of Asia and the movements towards independence. He concludes his account with a section entitled "The Movements Tie Up," in which he summarises all the instances he has observed of "a tendency towards co-ordination" of these movements, and concludes with the words: "The synthesis has begun, it will continue until the white man is completely forced out of his special privileges in Asia and compelled to admit . . . the . . . equality of the Asian peoples . . . the one question on which the diverse peoples of Asia are united in common action." The rest of the book is calculated to deepen this impression that the whole of Asia will shortly be co-operating for this purpose. There has been a good deal of journalism to this effect since the beginning of the Chinese Revolution; and the conception is worth examining, because, if it is correct, such co-operation would necessarily be an important factor in influencing its further development.

We may readily admit the service Upton Close has rendered in calling attention to the widespread manifestations of nationalism in the different countries of Asia and their deep and epochal significance; but we must beware lest we draw a false inference from these scattered data.

The educated classes of the various countries, as they emerge into the currents of the modern world, naturally take a keener interest in the nations round them; and countries struggling for political freedom watch sympathetically, and draw encouragement and inspiration from the struggles of other nations in a similar stage of development. If the methods of other nations are not applicable in their own country, at least they may learn from others' mistakes. As Upton Close points out, a few links of trade and industry are also beginning to be forged between the Asian countries, and this applies especially to Indo-Japanese trade.¹

Japan certainly stands in a unique position, especially towards China, as has been described in a preceding

¹ *Vide supra*, p. 262.

section of this chapter. But to speak of present-day cultural links between China and India, or Siam, or Afghanistan, or Persia, or Turkey as if they were of any strength or significance is to fall into a fundamental, even an absurd error. One might almost as well speak of cultural links with the negroes of British West Africa because of the progressive development of nationalism and a sturdy independence there, which educated Chinese have read of with interest and approval. During some of the great Chinese dynasties of bygone ages there were such links with India and even Persia; and, especially in the early centuries of the Christian era, a rich Indian culture was introduced with Buddhism, which strongly stimulated native Chinese civilisation and thought; and one sees many traces of it still in the weather-worn stone carvings of ancient temples, and of course in the Buddhist religion itself. But this, culturally, is a spent force which, in spite of sporadic efforts at revival, has long been gradually fading out. It cannot be too strongly emphasised that, except for Japan, the Chinese renaissance of to-day with all that it implies owes nothing to the other nations of Asia, and nearly everything to a vital contact with the civilisation, culture and learning of the West.

The term "Asiatic," as applied to people, is purely a concept and figment of the European's imagination. As I hear it commonly used, it reminds me of the sort of questions I am often asked by Chinese villagers about the "Foreign Land" when, a rare visitant on some out-back trail, I stop for lunch at a wayside inn. "And so you are a foreigner, sir, and you can speak Chinese?—splendid." "Do foreigners eat rice in their own land?" "And what is the climate like in the foreigners' land—hot or cold?" When I tell them that some foreigners eat rice, some meat, and others blubber, that some of their skins are white, some brown and some black, and that in some parts the climate is scorching hot, but in others the ice never melts, they look at me dubiously and

say to each other that it must be a strange land that these foreigners come from beyond the seas, and that it is funny they are not a little more uniform and settled in their appearance and habits, as Chinese are. You may perhaps speak of a European, and there is such a thing as European culture; but there is no such thing as being an Asiatic—he simply doesn't exist, as becomes obvious at once if one seeks words in which to describe him.

The great geographical barriers and the gulfs of civilisation, culture, philosophy, religion and racial instincts which divide and insulate the nations of Asia from each other are too readily overlooked. The peoples of the West are tardily beginning to recognise their own race prejudices: few of them realise that the race prejudices of the Chinese are at least as strong. The prejudice against the Japanese is as strong as that against any nation of Europe, and the Chinese is at least as convinced as the Briton of the inferiority of the Turk or even the Indian, when he comes across him.

It is true, as has been pointed out, that Rabindranath Tagore came to China several years ago: his visit but demonstrated the gulf between the two races. He visited us in Wuhan; but even in Wuchang, one of the greatest centres of learning in China, only a little crowd gathered to hear him, attracted by his literary fame: in Nanking, another great centre of learning, he drew huge crowds. But his philosophy, in these as in all other parts of the country that he visited, was generally rejected as entirely unsuited to the needs of China.

There have been some attempts in Central Asia to create alliances between different races for common action, defensive and offensive; but here again the principal result has been to show the impossibility of achieving their object. On the recent attempt to form a Moslem confederation between the States of Afghanistan, Bokhara, Khiva and Ferghana, Lieut.-Col. P. T. Etherton reports:¹

¹ *China—The Facts*, Ernest Benn, Ltd., London, 1927, pp. 220, 221.

“The idea was not well received, the basic reason for its cold reception being the politically independent factors dividing the various Moslem races and sects, amongst whom jealousy, intrigue and conspiracy are rife.”

On the recent reported *rapprochement* between the Moslem races in Asia and the Buddhists in Mongolia for general action, but primarily intended as a move against India, he reports as follows: ¹

“The scheme has not materialised; it never could, for Moslems and Buddhists do not fraternise, and an atmosphere of hostility characterises relations between the opposing religions. . . .

“I made exhaustive inquiries, the result of which was to confirm the view already expressed.”

- There has been, however, as described in the last two sections of Chapter V, one great force stirring insidiously and untiringly to weld into one cultural unity and political federation all the nations of Asia. In view of the abysmal and primeval gaps sundering many of these races from each other, there is a splendid audacity, and a magnificence that staggers the imagination, about this undertaking of Russia, conceived and initiated while she was still struggling desperately to maintain and establish herself. Nor is the concept as wildly impossible as at first sight it appears. The fusion of the purpose and effort of these diverse races, which was impossible and unthinkable by their own indigenous and self-centred nationalist movements, would be achieved if they could be brought effectively under the play of such a white heat as that of Communism. This has already been done in North, North-west, and Central Asia, where we have huge groups of federated and associated Soviet Republics in Transcaucasia and Transcaspia (or Turkestan) as well as over the whole stretch of Siberia, with the common culture and philosophy of Communism superseding and subliming

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 223.

their national differences, and the common link of deference and loyalty to Russia,¹ the great mother of Communism, linking them in a kind of loose brotherhood.

There is nothing strange in this. Nothing can supersede the old-established prejudices, loyalties and devotion of a nation except some stronger loyalty, some more ardent devotion. Such an inspiration has sometimes been supplied by a world-wide religion; the ideal has been achieved by science; the international labour movement seems to be working towards it, but failed to prove it under the acid test of the Great War. Pan-Asianism practically does not exist in this sense except in the brains of a few Westerners;² but it is because Communism is just such a force³ that it has already achieved the considerable measure of success which has been described.

It has been shown to what a negligible extent the nations of Asia have influenced the Chinese Revolution, or seem likely to influence it; but because Communism is such a unique and pervasive force in Asia to-day, China's

¹ It is not suggested that this is the attitude of the general populace of these nations, but only that of the small minority of Communists, which under the Soviet system controls the State.

² It is significant that when the Nationalist Government was endeavouring to demonstrate to the proletariat of Hankow and Central China that their Revolution was merely a part of the great all-embracing World Revolution, the foreign delegates who were produced before the people on the platforms of the great public meetings, to assure them of the warm sympathy and practical co-operation of their brothers and sisters oppressed like themselves under the capitalist and imperialist yoke, were not drawn from the other countries of Asia. A few Indians (see p. 73) were used, ex-policemen from the British Concession, as they happened to be on the spot; but they cannot have been very successful, as they were dropped after a month or two. One or two Japanese Communists spoke. But not a single Annamese was used of all those available in the French Concession; nor did a Turk, an Afghan, a Persian, an Arab, a Siamese, a Burman, or even a Malay or Mongol ever appear. On the other hand, an Englishman, an American, and a Frenchman (see p. 68) were undoubtedly among their star speakers, not only addressing huge meetings in Wuhan, but carrying out a triumphal lecturing tour in the provinces; and there was great disappointment expressed in the Government newspaper at the action of the Commonwealth Government in preventing Australian delegates also coming to assist.

³ *Widely supra*, pp. 51, 179, 245, 246.

experience of it, and the treatment she is meting out to it in the Revolution, may be expected conversely to have a profound effect on the nations of Asia. The history of Russian Communist propaganda and diplomacy in Asia, especially Central and Northern Asia, during the last ten years has been one of rapid and almost uninterrupted success. If they had been able to follow this up by adding China to the loose confederation of allied Soviet Socialist Republics it would have been indeed a signal triumph, and one justifying a very great effort and expenditure. It was with something of this conception in the background that publicists in China treaty ports, on the "surrender of the British Concession at Hankow," declaimed that this "blow to British prestige would resound through the corridors of Asia."

Actually it is a far different message from this that is now going forth, beside which the Hankow Sino-British agreement is an inconsiderable trifle. And the news that is being passed along the whispering galleries of the East is this: that China accepted Russian help, adopted the doctrines of Communism, instituted the Soviet organisation and methods, and even delivered herself for over a year to the control and direction of her Russian advisers of the Third International; that after a full and fair trial of this regime she found that Russia was seeking, not the good of China, but the World Revolution, and that China was being broken and ruined in the process; and that finally¹ the Chinese patriots, to save their country, have themselves without any coercion from other nations rejected Communism, expelled the Russian agents, and slaughtered every Chinese Communist they could lay their hands on. This will soon be the talk in the bazaars of India, round the camp fires in the valleys of Afghanistan, along the caravan routes of Mongolia, and wherever Chinese traders penetrate in the East; and is it too much

¹ Provided the Chinese actually complete the expulsion of the Russians and suppression of the Communists, which they have commenced so vigorously.

to predict that it will mark a turning-point in the trend of Asian affairs? Just as the nations of Asia would have over-estimated^d Russia's contribution if she had succeeded, so they will underrate the very great value¹ that her assistance has been to China now that she has failed.

¹ A dispassionate survey of the facts points to the conclusion that, without the Russian Communist contribution in revolutionary morale, organisation, methods of propaganda, military training and ammunition, the Revolution of 1926-27 could not have been carried through.

CHAPTER XXIII

ULTIMATE FACTORS

THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

THE first and fundamental fact to be recognised in regard to the industrial revolution in China is that it is almost entirely a factor in the future of the political revolution, over the past and present course of which it has exerted only a very small influence, despite the exaggerated importance which has been attributed to it by political parties in Great Britain and other countries.

The industrialisation of China, in the sense of the introduction of power machinery and of the factory system of production, is only in its infancy. It is reliably estimated¹ that the number of workers at present employed in such institutions is still only a few hundred thousand; and certainly, including men, women and children, it does not reach a million.

All the other manufactures and trades of China are carried on, as they have been for long ages, in little domestic workshops under the general control of the great trade guilds. The work is done in the employer's home, either in a workroom open to the village street or in some ill-lighted, badly-ventilated room at the back, or even in the interior of the house. Apprentices are bound to their employer in their boyhood for a definite number of years and work for their food; or his own children will be set to work as soon as they are able to be of use. The employer himself works in the shop; and if he is well-to-do he will have one or more paid journeymen, who are expected later on as a matter of course to set up in business for themselves in the neighbourhood. The employer, the journeyman and the apprentice all belong

¹ See *The China Year Book*, 1924 Tientsin Press, Tientsin, p. 652.

to a guild which controls that particular trade, settles the conditions of the industry, such as wages and sometimes prices, decides disputes in the trade, and provides certain benefits for the members.

It is impossible to ascertain with any approach to accuracy the number of workers employed in such old-style industries throughout the country; but the following is an approximate estimate ¹ of the proportion of China's four hundred million people belonging to the various occupational groups:

	Per cent.
Police, soldiers, riff-raff, bandits, etc.	2½
Artisans, traders, bankers, officials, transport workers, labourers, etc.	15-25
Agricultural workers	82½-72½
	100

At least it is clear that, on any computation, the factory workers form numerically an insignificant little group among the great mass of the artisans of China. The factories are grouped almost entirely in the various treaty ports, Shanghai having by far the largest number. Of these the cotton industry is much more important than any of the others—probably more valuable than the total of all the rest. In May 1924 there were 127 cotton mills in China, of which 79 were under Chinese, 43 under Japanese and 5 under British ownership.² A good deal of interest has been taken in the conditions of the workers in these mills; but it can be broadly stated that as a whole, though the conditions are bad as to hygiene, hours of labour, female and child labour, and wages, yet in all these particulars they represent a substantial improvement over the conditions in the old guild industries, and the conditions in the British and Japanese mills are better than those in the Chinese.

The many strikes and labour troubles in this small group of modern factories and mills during the last few years

¹ *Vide op. cit.*, p. 652.

² See *Journal of Associated British Chambers of Commerce in China and Hongkong*, May 1924.

have been only a symptom of the general unrest of the more alert section of the nation. The reason why it has shown itself more prominently and effectively in this particular national activity is because of the readiness with which propaganda can be carried on among such large groups of workers in the towns, and the ease with which they can be organised and set against employers to whom they are not closely bound, either by apprenticeship or by common membership in guilds, as in the ancient form of industry.

To the great mass of artisans and manual workers in China, the urgent questions and interests that concern them are far more primitive than those which absorb the attention of the workers of highly organised and well-governed countries. The question is not whether the hours of work are to be eight or nine or ten or twelve per day, nor the rate of overtime remuneration. Neither does sanitation interest them, nor the danger of industrial accidents and disease appal. These are mere trivialities compared with their problems.

In many districts the really urgent question is whether workman and employer alike may be involved in the general ruin of a drought or famine, or the trade stagnation of a war, or perchance the hovel they work in swept away by a flood; whether the currency in which the worker is paid, and out of which he tries to save a tiny hoard, may depreciate until it is worthless or be seized by bandits; or even whether he himself may be impressed by soldiers as a carrying coolie, and suddenly without warning driven to some distant part of the country, not to be allowed to return to his work for three months or perhaps six, or to drop and die by the way, as many do.¹ It is in basic matters like these that the life of the great mass of Chinese labourers will need stabilising and secur-

¹ For the most illuminating and convincing report in recent years on the real factors controlling Chinese industry and affecting the Chinese labourer see the report of J. W. Clennell, H.M. Consul at Foochow, published in *China No. 1* (1925). *Papers respecting Labour Conditions in China*, H.M. Stationery Office, London.

ing before they can have either leisure or energy even to think about the industrial demands with which their brothers of Western lands are concerned.

In regard to Chinese Government factory regulations, the interest that has been taken by certain labour parties of Western countries has missed the whole crux of the problem. It is not the question whether the standard set is as high as it should have been, but rather whether the Government has not been absolutely incapable of enforcing throughout the country or even in a single industrial centre any standard at all.

When eventually China has a Government with some degree of control over the industrial conditions of the country, it may be expected that the industrial revolution of power machinery and factories will advance with rapid strides, and will in time in China, as in Western lands, come to wield a controlling influence on the development and organisation of the nation. There are indications that, when this day arrives, there will be a steady effort amongst the Chinese, assisted by the example of foreign institutions in the land, to improve the working conditions of the labourers; but even then some of the greatest obstacles to be overcome will lie, as recent experience in Shanghai has shown, in the refusal of the labourers themselves to accept or permit these beneficial innovations.¹

THE CHINESE RENAISSANCE

To appreciate the nature and significance of this movement let us recall the European Renaissance and Reformation, that rebirth of a continent after the long centuries of the Middle Ages, springing from a vivifying contact of the awakening spirit of the peoples with the rediscovered and rich culture of ancient Greece. Its great outstanding features rise clear before our minds, the uncompromising challenge to all authority and dogma,

¹ *Vide op. cit.*, p. 55.

the scientific spirit with its insistence on research, the revolt against moral and social conventions,* and the unconditional demand made by individualism for its free expression.

In a recent lecture before the League of Nations Union, Sir Frederick Whyte stated that the great problem of the Pacific to-day "is essentially that of Western ideas influencing Eastern peoples." There has been much in the static phase of Chinese thought and civilisation in the two thousand years of the Christian era resembling that of Europe in the Middle Ages. During this time the entire body of the canon of classical literature has consisted of works attributed to Confucius¹ and his disciples, either as editor or author. He has thus for more than twenty centuries been the supreme authority on religion, ethics and politics. For this period literally the whole education of the Chinese has been in this literature; and their thought has been bounded by it and the commentaries based on it. By the huge machine of the civil service examination system the whole government and administration of the country has been fixed in the hands of this body of literati. The Confucian system, with the much more ancient State religion, of which it was a staunch supporter, has thus been entrenched in an impregnable position.

Other systems of philosophy and religion—Taoism from China itself, Buddhism from India, Mahommedanism from Arabia and Central Asia, Christianity from Syria and later from Europe—have swept in great tides over the land, or beaten in waves on its coasts. But the two former never seriously challenged the national system, to which their relation in the hearts of their own devotees has been largely that of an additional but not conflicting aid to the religious life; and the two later, exclusive and jealous in their demands on their followers, never grew

¹ Confucius (551-478 B.C.) revised, edited and systematised the teachings of the ancient philosophers, who were in his day in danger of being forgotten. He founded a school which insistently urged the acceptance of these teachings on the people.

to a size to excite serious anxiety for the prestige of the Confucian scholars of the Empire.

Suddenly, after two millenniums of unquestioning confidence in the authority of the classics as an all-sufficient guide for the life and activities of the individual and the organisation of the State, China has awakened—that is, thinking educated China—to Western thought and civilisation. This era may be considered to have begun effectively with the defeat of Russia by Japan in 1904-5, which made a profound impression throughout the East, and the abolition of the civil service examinations in 1906. At first it was those Chinese who had studied overseas who realised the significance and value of modern thought and philosophy, and were convinced of China's need of that knowledge and skill which has advanced and established the great nations and civilisations of the world to-day; but during the last ten or fifteen years this conviction has been sweeping with the acceleration of a great conflagration over the mind and thought of the whole intelligentsia of young China.

There are two watchwords¹ of this movement, and the first of these is science. This it is, Young China is convinced, which lies at the root of the greatness of the nations of the West. Hence we find in the schools and colleges of the educational centres of China during the last few years that the physical sciences—physics and chemistry, and in some even botany and zoology—are being more and more widely and thoroughly taught. There is a steadily growing number of young men who are going abroad to study such applied sciences as engineering, and who in China itself, in the universities and colleges, in the hospitals and Government departments, are studying medicine with special emphasis on public health and preventive work.

The eagerness and enthusiasm for science have far outstripped the facilities for sound grounding and teaching.

¹ See *China To-day through Chinese Eyes* (Second Series), S.C.M., London, 1927, p. 50 et seqq.

The word is on the lips of every student; every popular newspaper of the scores that are springing up all over the country does its best to publish scientific articles; but in too many cases these very enthusiasts have as yet no conception of the true nature of the scientific spirit which they profess—they worship an unknown God.

The second watchword of the Chinese Renaissance is a colloquial literature and the education of the masses. At the head of this movement stand Professor Hu Shih of the National University in Peking, and the group of scholars, philosophers and writers, there and at other centres in China, who are associated with him. Ignoring all claims of traditional authority, these men are subjecting the Chinese classics to a fundamental and searching criticism precisely similar in its methods and aims to that of the higher critics of the Christian Bible. Not only is their authenticity, date, authorship and textual accuracy being examined and sifted; but their teachings and philosophy are being weighed and estimated in the light of those of the great thinkers of the ancient and modern world; and a definite effort is being made to assess their practical value for the world to-day, and especially for New China. What is found to be of value will eventually be retained, and the obsolete and worthless discarded.

At the other end of the educational system we find the boys and girls in the schools refusing to study the classics as pedantic and out of date, and demanding English instead.

The progress of a positive nature has been equally striking. Until well into the twentieth century all indigenous Chinese literature, and even the education of the children, was in an archaic, obscure and extremely difficult form of the language, which could not be used in common speech. Missionaries and their Chinese assistants, since the middle of the nineteenth century, have been translating foreign books in rapidly increasing numbers into a much clearer and more easily understood style of Chinese. But now we have a large school of Chinese

writers and thinkers definitely creating an indigenous Chinese literature in the colloquial; and the old classical style, except for official and formal uses, is being abandoned.

It would be difficult to over-estimate the significance of this change. Previously the education of the masses was impossible; and any attempt at making it easier would have been resented by the ranks of the literati. Now it is the genuine policy of the Nationalist Government; and it is easy to teach the most ignorant coolie at least the rudiments of reading. The teaching throughout the primary schools of China is being rapidly reorganised, the children being taught in the new schools from easy illustrated primers in the colloquial.

There is a growing movement among the students of all kinds throughout the country freely to give of their spare time to teach the illiterate round them. During the last few years, under the auspices of the Young Men's Christian Association, an influential and popular body in China, and under other organisations created *ad hoc*, whole systems of classes have been arranged in the big towns, in which the poorest workmen and even women have been taught within a three or four months' course of evening study to read specially written simple books.

To give any adequate account¹ of the Renaissance is beyond the scope of this book; but even from this brief sketch it will be evident that of the three great revolutionary movements in China to-day—the political revolution, the industrial revolution and the Renaissance—it is by far the most fundamental and important. And the whole movement in literature, science, philosophy, religion and politics is yet only in its early spring. The wide variety of magazine literature circulating so freely among the student body shows all the wild enthusiasm and reckless adventurousness of youth. China is alive and awake. It is the rising of the sap; and spring will

¹ For a fuller account see Professor Hu Shih in *China Year Book*, 1924, Tientsin Press, Tientsin, p. 633 et seqq.

blossom into summer. We, who have felt her spirit abroad in the land in the wild winds and drenching showers, know that there is no force on earth that can make it return whence it came. And the new-found energy liberated by the Renaissance is beneath the Nationalist Revolution; and it is the tide which is sweeping it onward. What form this Revolution may eventually take no man knows; but that it will live, that it will develop and progress whatever fortune it may meet, this is certain.

THE ETHICAL PROBLEM

In the preceding chapter quotations were made from Lieut.-Colonel Etherton's account of recent attempts at united action between certain nations of Central Asia. After pointing out the obstacles to such a union caused by the jealousy, intrigue and conspiracy dividing the various Moslem races and sects, and the necessity of their first attaining a higher cultural and political-economic level, he goes on to say: ¹

"Then again [before it could eventuate] there must be a change of ideals; Western ideas are being imitated, but to profit from the political wisdom of Europe and America they must inculcate the theory and practice of administration, commercial integrity, and similar secrets of Western predominance. There are other keynotes to strike, truth, confidence and honesty in all dealings."

This considered and judicial opinion as to the prerequisites for a union of Central Asian States is equally true of the conditions required to make possible the achievement of a united, strong, efficiently administered and prosperous Chinese Republic. The great majority of the failures seen in the Government administration in China, when traced to their source, are individual moral failures. The Chinese is not lacking in organising and administrative ability: he often has it in a high degree. Neither is he mentally incapable of appreciating ethical con-

¹ *Vide op. cit.*, p. 221.

ceptions in the realm of either public or private life, as the writings of the sages and philosophers bear eloquent testimony. The failure is not here: it is simply that the individual, especially in Government employ, deliberately works to a low ethical standard; and that this, though opposed to the teaching of their venerated philosophers, is sanctioned by universal and ancient usage.

Though there are exceptions to the generalisation, it would be approximately correct to say that every public appointment is regarded both by the holder and everybody else as an opportunity for him to enrich himself. Irrefutable proof of this may be found, if indeed proof is required for such a matter of common knowledge, in the fact that in the case of most of these appointments the salary actually paid is ridiculously inadequate, and in many no salary at all is paid, but the officer pays down a large sum in cash for the privilege of being appointed. This is to say that a Government official, whether he be a district magistrate, a railway station-master, or a ganger in charge of river conservancy work, is not only expected, but required to live on the profits accruing from his position; and these consist of direct bribes, and of "squeeze," *i.e.* the appropriation of a small percentage from all monies passing through his hands.

There is another public abuse which arises out of one of the fundamental Chinese conceptions of society—that of loyalty to the family or clan. Not only must the individual's own interests and wishes be subordinated to the requirements of his relations, but also those of any business or organisation with which the individual is connected; and loyalty to the clan is felt by the great majority of Chinese to be a much more binding obligation than patriotism, which is a very novel conception, provincial loyalty being much older and ranking next in order to devotion to the clan. Hence a business, or a Government department, is apt to be overloaded by the appointment of a number of incompetent or unnecessary relatives or distant connections of the manager.

For old China, whether of the bygone ages or of the out-back districts of to-day, with industry organised on a family basis, and no governor ever appointed to the province in which his own clan lived, this is a practicable method of working; but it is obviously quite impracticable for modern business, industrialised institutions and Government departments, with their emphasis on the actual working efficiency and the unitary responsibility of the individual, and on the importance of team work, esprit de corps, and the wider loyalties. For this and other reasons which there is not space to develop, modern thought and progress are certain seriously to weaken the old conception of the clan, one of the strongest and most fundamental factors hitherto binding together and conserving Chinese society.

Another mighty factor which has for ages moulded China is to-day rapidly crumbling before our eyes, viz. the Confucian system of philosophy and the State religion which it supported. In the preceding section a brief outline was given of the unchallenged supremacy which has been exercised by this system, and of the way in which it is being disrupted by the intellectual forces of the Renaissance to-day. But it is on the religious side that the developments of the last sixteen years have been the most dramatic and startling.

The whole system of the ancient State religion, often alluded to incorrectly as "Confucianism,"¹ turned on one pivot, which was the Emperor, the Son of Heaven, the one and all-sufficient link between the Supreme Ruler of the universe (Shang Ti), sometimes referred to as Heaven (Tien), and the graduated ranks of the subordinate deities, the living people of China, and the long line of spirits of the dead. He alone had the right and the obligation to offer sacrifices and pray to Heaven on behalf of his people at the great marble Altar of Heaven

¹ For a very illuminating and terse account of the State Religion, see G. F. Moore's *History of Religions*, T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1914, Vol. I, Chap. i.

outside the South Gate at Peking. For any even of his highest nobles to make such an offering or prayer would have been impious sacrilege as well as treason.

When the Emperor was forced to abdicate in 1911 in favour of the Republic, this sacred link, which for thousands of years had bound together Heaven and earth, and had ensured the due course of the seasons, the harmonious order of Nature, the prosperity and ordered well-being of the Empire, and the happiness and contentment of the people was snapped asunder. For sixteen years now the wonderful and exquisitely beautiful Altar of Heaven has lain out there beneath the blue vault of the Chihli plains, a useless and obsolete ruin with grass and weeds slowly spreading up its steps; and one sees curious tourists and globe-trotters strolling over it with chatter and laughter, leaving behind the greasy paper and crusts from their luncheon baskets, and clandestinely carrying away with them broken bits of its glowing tiles.

Seventeen years ago the great sacrifice to Heaven was offered with all the gorgeous ritual and the reverence befitting its importance in the life of the nation. To-day it is a relic of a bygone age; for that which it symbolised has disappeared beyond recall. And what has happened to the worship of Heaven is true to a greater or less degree of that of all the lesser deities and spirits. They are not dead; but humans have got strangely out of touch with them, and the whole elaborate system of their worship is sadly disorganised. This was the effect of the Revolution of 1911: that of 1926 has made it impossible even to conceive a return to the old ways. Sun Yat Sen, on the consummation of the 1911 Revolution, went in solemn procession to the tombs of the great Ming Emperors outside the walls of Nanking, and announced to their spirits that the Manchu usurpers had been cast out and the sceptre returned again to the hands of the Chinese people. We can even to-day just imagine some old-time scholarly provincial governor still sacrificing to the God of War when he fears invasion; but we cannot imagine Eugene Chen

doing so. Nor can we imagine one of the recent magistrates of Teian, a man educated in literature, history and science at the English-speaking Central China University, making the traditional sacrifices to the river that runs by his city gates.

In every large town in China there is a temple of Confucius, where the tablets of the sage are kept in his honour, and where his spirit is venerated in a simple memorial service at stated seasons. In only a small percentage of these Confucian temples are these services now continued; all the others are as deserted as the Altar of Heaven. They are beautiful still, and peaceful; but it is not now the peace of the quiet confidence and faith of a people in its past, but the peace of oblivion and decay.

Buddhism, the other great religion of China, whither it was introduced by missionary monks from India over two thousand years ago, has as yet been but little shaken in its hold on the common people; and in any case its decline is, for various reasons, sure to be much more gradual than that of the State religion has been. It would be out of place to give here any systematic account of this religion,¹ and there is no wish to belittle the valuable contributions which it has made to the spiritual life of China; but it may be stated categorically that anyone who will study at first hand in China to-day Buddhism as it exists and is practised in the temples throughout the land will be convinced that it must inevitably give way in time before the advance of modern science. It should be clearly understood that Buddhist philosophy as expounded by a handful of its highly intellectual exponents is a different world from that of the idol temples in the villages, the ignorant and often immoral priesthood, and the superstitious devotion of the common people.

But it is not necessary to await the future in order to learn what the fate of Buddhism will be: it is already

¹ For a brief but valuable account of Buddhism in China see G. F. Moore's *History of Religions*, T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1914, Vol. I. Chap. v.

epitomised in advance in the student body of China. Of the religious attitude of this class Mr. T. Z. Koo, a former travelling secretary of the World's Student Christian Federation, writes as follows: ¹

“The vast majority of students to-day are indifferent to religion. They can see no connection between life in school and religion. Others are frankly atheists. They do not believe in the spiritual basis of life. Many others take what is termed in China ‘the scientific attitude of mind’ and maintain an attitude of rational doubt towards religion. On the whole, students to-day consider religion as something for the uneducated mass, whose minds need the supernatural in their outlook upon life. Only a very small number of students have any faith in religion to-day.”

Another estimate of a Chinese student leader is that of the quarter of a million Chinese students 75 per cent. are atheist or agnostic, and 25 per cent. religious, but that only 10 per cent. (of the whole number) are men or women whose religion is a matter of strong personal conviction. He adds the significant comment that of this 10 per cent. the great majority are Christians, very few being Buddhists.

This suggests a solution to the problem propounded by P. T. Etherton with which this section opens. It is a stark historical fact that, after being nurtured for five thousand years in the ancient State religion, and after two thousand years of the growth of Buddhism throughout the land, China is found at the present day with still “other keynotes to strike, truth, confidence and honesty in all dealings,” before she can achieve her dream of a Republic. Opinions will differ as to the precise degree to which the Western civilisations are indebted, for such of these virtues as they possess, to the Christianity in which they have all been cradled and brought up; but every thoughtful man will estimate the contribution made thereto by their Christian heritage as a factor of very great importance.

It is not of much help to point out that Japan has relied for the ethical bases of her modern civilisation on the strong native patriotism of her people, and the

¹ *China Christian Year Book*, 1926, C.L.S., Shanghai, p. 272.

high traditions of her nobility who put honour before wealth, rather than on Christianity; for these particular ethical resources of Japan are unfortunately not available in China.

When Sun Yat Sen had carried through the Revolution of 1911, he found that he had not the men available of a character on which he could rely to consolidate the achievement; during the intervening sixteen years the same lack has been continually and appallingly obvious; and to-day it is still the same difficulty of finding men of disinterestedness, integrity and loyalty which is one of the most serious hindrances to the progress and consolidation of the Revolution.

Amidst the crumbling or defective ethical factors in China to-day, and the convulsions which are shaking the country, Christianity has already in an outstanding manner demonstrated its vitality and strength; and it can and does in this and other lands inspire men to the practical achievement of just such ethical standards as are here required. The proportion of Chinese who are Christians is still very small;¹ and it is not suggested that the Nationalist Government must wait until the Christianisation of China before it can be securely established. But the influence of the Chinese Christians has always been proportionately greater than their numbers, and the existence of such a national body acts as a strong stimulus to other social and religious groups, which are increasingly reflecting its spirit and reproducing its activities.

The founder of the Kuo Min Tang was a Christian, and a number of Christians have already been appointed to office in various capacities in the Nationalist Govern-

¹ The *China Year Book*, 1926 (Tientsin Press, Tientsin), states on p. 656: "To-day there are at work some 18,000 Protestant missionaries and Chinese evangelists; there are full communicants to the number of 350,000; and a Protestant Christian community in China of some 700,000 people. At this moment the Christian religion is without doubt the most powerful influence at work for the uplift of China." On p. 667 the number of Roman Catholics in China 1923-24 is given as 2,277,421.

ment. The rapidity with which Christianity progresses in the future, and the extent to which it transforms the national life, must obviously be a very real factor in the gradual evolution and consolidation of the Government of China.

PAX SINICA

For many years foreigners and Chinese alike, seeing the country torn by rival war lords, devoured and disorganised by their predatory armies, and harried by bandits, have prayed for the advent of some strong man who should unite the country and heal its divisions. One or two who seemed to have qualifications for such a rôle, notably Wu Pei Fu, were welcomed and watched with a wistful eagerness and hope. "Perhaps," the people thought, "this is the man who is going to be our deliverer, the saviour of the country." But in each case their hero failed, and their hopes were dashed to the ground. To-day, in place of the "strong man," the Nationalist Party has stood forth, and addressed itself to the Herculean task; but in some quarters, instead of rejoicing, there is misgiving as to what the results are likely to be.

On this question there is room for wide differences of opinion; but surely there is ground also for a common agreement on at least one count. If the Nationalist Government succeeds, it will, whatever else it may or may not do, bring the whole eighteen provinces under one rule, reduce the armies from well over two million¹ men down to a reasonable number, exterminate banditry and remove the fear of military looting from the Chinese countryside, restore communications throughout the land, and thus enable the normal life of the country to follow its natural course in peace and quiet. The recuperative power of China and its people is so remarkable that a few years of such peace is sufficient to

¹ See estimated number at end of 1925 in the *China Year Book*, 1926, Tientsin Press, Tientsin. This number has undoubtedly been substantially increased by the campaigns of the Revolution.

restore its prosperity. Whatever may be the ultimate form of the Constitution or the administrative methods of the Government, given such an abiding prosperity, its blessings would inevitably be shared by Chinese and foreigners alike in every avenue of life and effort; and such a reign of peace is itself one of the essential prerequisites for the realisation of many of the highest aims and ideals of the Revolution.

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