


**THE UNFINISHED
REVOLUTION
IN CHINA**

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THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION IN CHINA

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A. Epstein



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To the memory of men I knew:

CHIN PANG-HSEIN

CHOU TAO-PEN

T. T. FANG

NORMAN FRANCE

GEORGE HOGG

DWARKANATH KOTNIS

TOM LEE

LI KUNG-PO

LI SHAO-TANG

MIAO I-FAN

SHANG CHUNG-YI

JOSEPH W. STILWELL

AND

TENG FA

*whose origins and thoughts were different
but who all died looking forward.*

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Preface to the Indian Edition

WHY SHOULD THE INDIAN READER EMBARK ON A DEEP STUDY OF CHINA?

That the two countries are neighbours is only the most obvious answer. After all, even though the aerial conquest of the Himalayan "hump" has brought them closer together than ever before, it might be argued that the question of their relations will become important only after India is really free. And to make India truly free is properly the first concern of her people.

So a better answer is needed. An answer valid for today and today's struggle.

That answer exists. Whether or not they have been linked in the minds of many of their men and women, the modern histories and problems of China and India have long been linked in fact. It was the ships, opium and guns of the East India Company, swollen with the loot of its first conquest, that opened imperialism's long campaign to subjugate the Chinese. It was the spectacle of India's plight that led the Chinese people to make their earliest heroic efforts to avoid her fate. Sun Yat-sen, first great leader of the Chinese revolution, thought much of India's experience. Noble minds of India, like that of Rabindranath Tagore, took a deep interest in China. The individual thought of leaders is the probing searchlight of history illuminating the road ahead. But history is made only by the conscious movement of millions. The emancipators of men's minds have long seen the whole colonial and semicolonial problem as one in itself, and as one with that of the oppressed everywhere. Those who are called upon to free their own countries, and thus contribute to world freedom in practice, must understand what they understood.

Today India is no longer only a horrible example of what it means to be enslaved. She is fighting. And China is not merely fighting. Her people are winning their rightful place on their own soil and in the world. Defeats teach what must be avoided. Success teaches not only what can be done but how. Much blood saved China from complete colonization. But for a hundred years she has been dealing with the attempts of imperialism to dominate her, and to check her

progress by indirect means. Is not this a problem for the India of the immediate tomorrow?

The Chinese people learned that the struggle against imperialism is inseparable from that against feudal backwardness at home, which gives imperialism its soft spots and its levers. They learned that such a struggle cannot be waged in terms of sentimental memories of the past, but only by merciless criticism of the past's bad features, by beginning to build the future in the midst of the fight. Their mistakes and achievements in practising this belief are there to see. Is this of no value to India?

China thrilled, as India thrilled, when Japan first fought off a "superior" white imperialism in 1905. But she was soon to learn that, unless the people rule, an Asiatic imperialist could be as savage as a European one. She fought off Japanese militarism and thus helped to give the Japanese people the chance they have today to assert themselves—though many obstacles, domestic and foreign, still keep them from the better life. She also helped to save India the pain of learning that lesson for herself. Her experience teaches that the true national interests of once subject nations lie with the forces of progress everywhere, on both sides of the globe, and against fascism and reaction everywhere, on both sides of the globe.

The history of the Liberated Areas of China proves that millions move in Asia only for the same reasons that they do elsewhere. It shows that the slogan of national mastery at home turns into irresistible force only when it means mastery over his own plot of land, his own fragment of the nation, for every cultivator. The Liberated Areas are strong because they put that belief into practice.

The experience of China shows that national unity, which is essential to win national independence, consolidate it, and build on it, can be achieved only when every part of the population is given equal human and group rights. Chiang Kai-shek has tried to maintain his position as dictator over the nation, the position of every Chinese landlord as dictator over Chinese peasants, the position of every Chinese capitalist as dictator over Chinese workers, the position of Chinese landlords and capitalists as dictators over every minor nationality in the country. This is not equality of rights. To safeguard the inequalities to which he has tied his fate, Chiang has passed, again and again, from struggle against foreign domination to compromise with it and subservience to it. The democratic front against Chiang Kai-shek has grown and expanded to be a real national front because it follows not Chiang but Sun Yat-sen.

Sun Yat-sen had a principle of nationalism. He explained it fully when he said: "The nationalism of the Kuomintang (the original,

revolutionary Kuomintang that Sun founded) has two meanings: the first is that the Chinese nation should emancipate itself; the second is, that different nationalities within China should be equal." Chiang Kai-shek has paid lip-service to that principle. But his oppression has aroused the opposition, carried at times to the point of armed revolt, of Mongols, Tibetans, Miaos and China's Muslim peoples. In this way the emancipation of all China has been retarded: The democratic forces in China have granted home rule locally to all minorities within their areas. They stand unified as a rock against the new manoeuvres of foreign imperialism.

Sun Yat-sen had a principle of democracy. He explained this also when he said: "The so-called democratic system of the various modern nations is usually monopolised by the bourgeoisie and has become an instrument for oppressing the common people, while the principle of democracy of the Kuomintang is shared by the common people and is not permitted to be privately owned by a minority of the people." The Kuomintang departed from this principle. It forbade workers and peasants to form unions, students to study the truth, teachers to teach it, writers to write it. It drove those of its members who still adhered to Sun's principles, like his widow, Madame Sun Yat-sen, into a corner. The popular opposition, from the Communists to the Democratic League, retains Sun's revolutionary spirit. That is why even the safeguarding of nationalism has passed into its keeping. When and if a new Kuomintang, true to its own beginnings is born, it will take its place in a national coalition because it remembers what Chiang Kai-shek has forgotten.

Sun Yat-sen's third principle was the Principle of Livelihood. This too he explained: "The land to those who till it." In Chiang Kai-shek's China the landlord is also official, and the peasant's grievance against the landlord is suppressed as though it were revolt against the state. The democratic forces in China have the peasant with them because they satisfy his aspirations. In an agrarian country like China or India, where the peasants are 80 per cent of the population, this means the people. It means victory. And it means national strength after victory.

Sun Yat-sen's foreign policy was expressed in his Will. He said:

"My aim is to achieve the freedom of China and her equality among the nations. The experience accumulated in forty years has made me realize that to achieve this aim we must arouse the masses and co-operate with those nations which have treated us equally to struggle together."

Chiang Kai-shek has flattered only imperialists. In the extremity of World War II he descended from ally to vassal, because he was

afraid both of his own masses and of the Soviet Union, whose principles attracted them. As a result, no one regards him as an equal. The slave of one cannot be the equal of another. He has done great damage to his country.

The Liberated Areas of China and the democratic political forces in Chiang's own areas have observed the policies of Sun Yat-sen. When other nations fought against the main enemies of their freedom, the Japanese imperialists, they could offer their co-operation freely—because they felt strength in mass support. When the chief of their one-time allies tried to bend their country to its own purposes, they could resist—again leaning on the people and without foreign props. They could co-operate as free men, without being tied, and fight for equality as free men when a new effort was made to tie them. When they defeat the ambitions of the imperialists, as they will, they will do business with anyone—on equal and mutually profitable terms, again as free men. They will not provoke conflict among others for their own purposes. They will stand with friends as equals. They will not provide any vacuum for the ambitions of the predatory, endangering peace by weakness.

So far as this book itself is concerned, it deals mainly with the Sino-Japanese war and its aftermath. In those few years the whole hundred-year old pattern of the Chinese people's revolution changed. The forces shifted so that the main problem was no longer to avoid defeat but to use existing forces for winning equality abroad and organising development at home. To be sure, that too involved struggle. The struggle has been bloody and still goes on. But the die is cast. The Chinese people are no longer an "object." Their destiny is in their own hands. They have found the correct road and gone far along it. This book attempts to treat the war not in isolation but in its historic place.

The reader will recall that when the Japanese fascists were at the height of their conquests they talked of themselves as "the light of Asia." The light attracted some, including a few sincere patriots in countries subject to Japan's enemies. But the light was like the fire into which moths fly to their deaths. Intelligent patriots in colonial lands understood this, even those who were dazzled at first came to see it clearly. The fake light was blown out.

Today another light shines in China. It can scorch only the enemies of freedom. It does not aim to shine alone, in isolation, or as a greater over the lesser. It illuminates the road for others. It helps the fighting peoples of Indonesia, Viet Nam, the Philippines, Malaya and Burma to see their own way. The people of Japan, extricating themselves from the wreckage of false leadership, threatened with the role of cat's-paw

in a new alliance of homegrown oppressors with outsiders, have got true leaders who learned by it. The problems of Asia's nations differ in detail, and the differences must be studied and honoured. But the area of common ground is vast, and all differences operate within it. And no area of common ground is as extensive as that between great China and great India.

I am convinced that the light in China is the first of many equal lights, which together will bring bright day out of Asia's night.

So I have tried, humbly, to tell how that light was lit, and how it has been shielded from many storms by the bodies of the host that bears it forward.

New York

February 16, 1947.

ISRAEL EPSTEIN

PART ONE

A Billion People Move

I. WHAT'S GOING ON IN ASIA?

JAPAN HAD NO SOONER SURRENDERED THAN STRANGE THINGS BEGAN TO happen in Eastern Asia.

British and Dutch troops landing to "liberate" Java did not disarm the conquered enemy units but ordered them to co-operate in subduing the local population, which had formed a government to rule itself. It was only when the Indonesians stood up and fought that the British stopped shooting for a while and tried talking.

French forces in Indo-China, again with British support, employed Japanese soldiers against the independent Viet Nam government.

The British in Malaya allowed the Japanese garrisons to keep a considerable part of their arms for "self-defence" and began to hunt down the wartime anti-Japanese guerillas there. In Burma, friction developed between local antifascist forces and the victorious Allies.

In the Philippines, General MacArthur disarmed and deported the Japanese. But he became the protector of Filipino landlords, commercial magnates and politicians who had been Japan's quislings during the occupation. American troops collaborated with these forces in expeditions against the Hukbalahap, the Filipino peasant Maquis which had battled against the enemy and divided the estates of traitors among the tenants.

In China, Chiang Kai-shek threatened dire penalties to any Japanese who surrendered to the guerilla armies which had fought them for eight years in technically occupied territory. He hastily legalized former puppet forces and officials there so that the Chinese Communists could not take over their garrison posts. The United States Navy and Air Transport Command rushed Chiang's own troops to these areas, while landing parties of American Marines co-operated with the Japanese to guard bridgeheads and communications.

China's Communist-led peasant armies proved too strong to be cowed or beaten by this new and fantastic alliance. The United States realized that not fifty thousand Marines for six months but half a million for ten years might be needed to suppress them, and that even they might not succeed where an equal number of Japanese had failed. Moreover, American fighting men were not Japanese samurai. They thought the war was over when the Axis was licked and yearned to get back to civilian life instead of reforming the thinking of the Northern Chinese with bullets. Demonstrations of Chinese students carrying placards asking the G.I.'s, "Why don't you leave?" encountered parades of American soldiers who chanted, "We wanna go home."

As a result, Ambassador Hurley and sabre rattling gave way to General Marshall and negotiations. Chiang Kai-shek still enjoyed American support in diplomacy, money and arms, but was given to understand that Americans could not do his shooting for him. But while Marshall mediated, United States forces helped hundreds of thousands of Kuomintang troops to get to places where they could most advantageously break the truces he arranged.

This book is about China, but the problems it deals with are common to all Asia.

The Asiatic peoples want national freedom and progress from their own backwardness, which they acknowledge. Much bitter experience tells them that without freedom there will be no progress.

India is no richer, and no more literate, after two hundred years of British rule than she was when it started.

The Philippines, undoubtedly a model as far as colonies go, have an impoverished peasantry and only 40 per cent literacy after three centuries of misrule by Spain and forty years under the United States. Two quotations from the testimony of an American expert will make it clear that here, as elsewhere in colonial Asia, foreign rule strengthened local feudalism. "In Mindanao in 1939," Robert L. Pendleton writes in *Pacific Affairs*, "'big shots' who belonged to the socially and politically prominent families of Manila owned or leased most of the desirable land. These men almost invariably went well armed. . . . Numerous cases were reported of their scaring off onto poorer land, or back into the forest, settlers who had made good progress in developing lands which they expected to get title to under the homestead or other land laws. When making soil surveys in Occidental Negros Province, about 1925, [the writer] came upon instances of children being sold into bondage to large owners or operators of estates."

China has managed to avoid domination by any one imperialist

power but her freedom has been highly conditional. There has not been a day in the last three hundred years that there have not been foreign troops on her soil, first Manchu, then Western and Japanese. Until 1928 she did not even enjoy the right to fix her own import tariffs as an aid to home industry. She too has a long way to go before she is a modern nation.

Japan, alone of all East Asian nations, escaped any large degree of foreign control. She built a greater industry and achieved a higher level of education than the rest. But because her own peasantry remained feudally exploited and provided no market, her industry was used for overseas dumping and conquest, and her people were told that they could not be better off until they dominated half the world. Everybody knows what happened to imperialist Japan. The peoples of Asia helped it to happen. But this does not make them want freedom less. They are keenly aware that Japan, even though defeated, has more industrial development and skill with which to start on a new path, if she will, than they have. They did not fight her to remain or become the slaves of others.

Different elements in Asia have different aims in seeking freedom. The rich want to take advantage of uncontrolled rents and cheap labour reserves for industry without sharing their profits with foreign overlords. The poor peasants, tenants and share croppers, who comprise at least 80 per cent of the population of the continent, want land free of debt and crushing rentals. Workers want to be as well off as the workmen of more advanced countries.

The privileged groups among the Asiatic peoples desire freedom with themselves on top. Otherwise they are not sure they want it. They are keenly aware that if the sweated peasants fight for national independence and their own poor men's interests at the same time, the old structure of internal exploitation will not stand the strain. While the poor man's nationalism dreams of tolerable living quarters and a full stomach, the feudal rich man's nationalism in Asia dreams of the vanished glories of her ancient kings. It accuses domestic liberals, democrats and Communists of lack of culture and enslavement to "Western ideologies foreign to Asia's spiritual heritage." But when its own people rise it is often happy enough to call on the militarily stronger Westerner to quell them.

There is no record in Asia, on the other hand, of the poor calling for foreign rule in preference to that of home-grown oppressors. British liberals and labourites have often patiently explained to Indian peasants and workers that if they won freedom from England they would be kicked around by their own potentates, landlords and mill-owners without the benefit of British equality before the law. These

explanations never get them anywhere. Nobody but the white man in Asia believes in the "white man's burden," and nobody but the Japanese believed in the divine mission of Japan to free her Asiatic brothers.

Despite such colonial solicitude, the common people of the Far East believe that it will be easier to deal with their own reactionaries when free than while carrying the double weight of the native oppressor sitting on their necks and a foreign one sitting on his.

China is important because her people, in fighting off Japan, have carried this belief into practice. A struggle against national enslavement carries with it the arming and training of great numbers of the poor. This is especially true in many Asiatic lands whose richer sons have generally been happy to leave warfare to the lower orders. If the struggle is long and consistent, more and more of the poor learn how to fight and what is worth fighting for. In China, the national war has shifted the balance of power within the country and opened the road to progress more widely than it was ever opened before.

Now that the Japanese are gone China does not want to be the exclusive property of the foreign-supported Kuomintang. It would prefer to be a China of the Chinese people. India is not interested in being Britain's India just because she so narrowly dodged being Japan's. The Indonesians have as little use for a Dutch Indonesia as they had for a Japanese one. They want an Indonesians' Indonesia.

There has been much worry outside as to how China can get a government which the Chinese people will regard as representative. How to devise one or several in India which the Indians will accept? What type of rule best suits the Indonesians? These questions worry the Asiatic nations also, but they want to work them out for themselves. Once free of foreign occupation, they will welcome sympathy and even ask for technical and organizational aid. But they do not want any more "training for self-government." Madame Sun Yat-sen, widow of the founder of the Chinese Republic, summed this up in her criticism of the protracted "political tutelage" within her own country. "The best way to learn to swim is to get in the water," she said. "No one has ever done it any other way."

It is surprising that such things should need resaying and explaining. All this has happened before—and not in Asia. The United States too was born antifeudal and anti-imperialist. Its first settlers were lucky because they did not have to fight feudalism to get rid of its constrictions. They simply left it behind them in Western Europe where it was soon to receive its deathblow, and came to a new country where it had never existed. Most of them were plain working people, and of the rest very few were of the group that had profited from feudal-

ism at home. So except in the South they did not reproduce it in their new country.

But although they were not aware of it, those settlers brought colonialism on their backs. The North American Indians were not a settled and numerous people who could be squeezed for profit like those of Latin America, so the settlers drove them into the shrinking wilderness. Instead of becoming agents and employees of empire in authority over "natives," free-born Englishmen in America found that their own labour, pitted against nature, was expected to yield colonial tribute. The Parliament of Great Britain, in which they were not represented, imposed imperial taxes over and above those they paid for local needs. It restricted their growing shipping so that British shipping should not suffer. It forbade them to manufacture articles which competed with British manufactures, from ironware to hats. Instead of throwing the western lands open to free settlement by the colonial population, it tied them up in grants made to English companies. The United States would not have got very far if it had remained "the American colonies."

That is why the colonials rose against England. When they did, the big merchants and landed gentry of New York, and the proprietaries who owned all Pennsylvania by the King's charter, remained on the side of imperialism as Loyalists, even fighting against their fellow settlers. On the other hand, many New England traders and manufacturers, and Southern planters like George Washington, took the revolutionary side and provided it with illustrious leaders. But it was the "rough" farmers who fired the shot heard round the world and broke the scientific tactics of British redcoats unbeaten since Marlborough by guerilla "Indian fighting." With others, described by a wondering Europe as rude mechanics and half-savage, unlettered, skin-clad hunters from the frontiers, they provided the strength that weathered the bitter crisis of Valley Forge.

His knowledge of these people made Washington refuse the crown which Tories who happened to have stayed on the independence side pressed on him. The common folk put the Bill of Rights into the Constitution. They sustained America through the War of 1812, in which even the Boston merchants were pro-British. They produced Jacksonian democracy. Finally, when the menace of foreign subjection had faded, it was Abraham Lincoln, a poor, common man from the "primitive" West, who led the nation in overcoming the bid for control made by the proliferating domestic feudalism of the Old South.

These things were no more accepted by the respectable conservatives of the time than Asia's freedom movement is today. Even thirty years after the United States had won its independence, a noted British author was able both to despise and to "pity" the new republic which

had been so rash as to leave the protection of Britain's wealth and majesty. "The Americans," he wrote, justifying British naval seizures of their trading ships, "had made themselves foreigners with regard to England ; they had broken the ties of blood and language and acquired the independence which they had been provoked to claim, unhappily for themselves, before they were fit for it."¹

This brings up another question that is much debated nowadays. When is a subject nation "fit" for independence ? When its foreign masters conclude that it is sufficiently educated ? When is an oppressed people fit for democracy ? When its feudal rulers think it can be "trusted" with it ?

Speaking in moral terms one might say that no people is ever unfitted to rule itself. But history is not ethics and history gives a different answer. History says that peoples win independence and democracy only when they muster the strength to secure them. Fit or unfit, America began as one of those distant areas on the map that are coloured pink or green to show whose empire they belong to. She first stepped onto the firm soil of nationhood not when Patrick Henry cried, "Give me liberty or give me death!" and patriots protested against the Stamp Tax, but when the farmer Minutemen of Lexington and Concord proved that they were really willing to fight to get liberty.

Afterwards things moved much more quickly. More and more people were drawn into the battle. Organization was broadened. The contact between the colonies grew closer. Then came victory in the war, the Articles of Confederation, and years of negotiations, not with any master but among the states themselves, for the Constitution. That is the way a country ceases to be a prop on the stage of history and becomes an actor.

The American Revolution did not work out as Britain's loss, just as the French Revolution did not turn out to be Europe's. The new American nation did not make itself foreign to the "civilized world" but was to come in mighty useful to it on various occasions. In the same way a later outlaw called the Soviet Union was to provide the decisive force in crushing Hitler's effort to return Europe to medieval barbarism.

What happened in China during her war with Japan has removed her 450,000,000 people from the status of anonymous "teeming masses" somewhere on the map. It has brought China closer to modern nationhood than all the events of her previous history.

¹ Robert Southey, *The Life of Horatio, Lord Nelson*, London, 1813.

II. WHY ASIA REMAINED BACKWARD

WE SHALL NOT GET VERY FAR IN UNDERSTANDING IF WE LISTEN TO THE conscience-stricken white sentimentalists who speak of the East's "superior spirituality" and to Asiatic entertainers like Lin Yu-tang who conjure up the past magnificence of their philosophers and kings for our present admiration. The evidence of our own eyes, ears—and noses—is correct. Asia today is backward. She is squalid and poverty-stricken. Nine out of ten of her people cannot read. Modern technical development and hygiene are beyond their economic and mental horizons. The Far and Near East, colonial and semicolonial, are feudal and hundreds of years behind the times. Asiatics who do not themselves gain from the backwardness do not deny it. They only want to put a stop to it.

On the other hand, it is fatal to assume that we are "superior" on this account. Only three or four hundred years ago Europeans travelled to Asia not to sell their better goods and spread "civilization," but to bring back textiles and other manufactures which were far finer than anything produced in the West.

Europe overtook Asia only yesterday. Afterwards she robbed her, conspired with Asia's own feudal overlords to keep her down and finally carved up much of her territory into colonies. If we emerged from feudalism before she did, she emerged from barbarism long before we did. Recently I heard a former Roosevelt liberal defend American interference in China by saying that "the Chinese are still in the stone age" and need a firm, though friendly hand. His reasoning was that he had seen stone mill used to grind grain in Chinese farmhouses. I told him that the Chinese and Hindus were casting iron before Europe ever thought of it, and that he could see stone mills in New England today.

if he looked for them. The West may lead the world today, but the East led culturally and materially for millennia. My ex-liberal friend was talking not only historical nonsense but imperialist nonsense of the crassest "white man's burden" brand. One meets it in strange places nowadays.

Asia is retarded. But is she for that reason unfit to solve her own problems? She may be unprepared to solve ours but she is better equipped to solve her own than were our ancestors when they faced similar ones, because she has the experience of others to go by. The first task, however, is not technical, it is political. First she must destroy feudalism.

The people of Germany lost their peasant wars, so never achieved democracy. Germany's feudal *Junker* landlords cleverly banded together with the new industrialists in the middle of the nineteenth century while keeping control of the state and army; hence the savage efforts of Kaiserism and Hitlerism to push the world back to an up-to-date version of the old feudalism they longed for.

Spain had once been a great feudal-mercantile power, but she did not go forward with the rest of Europe. Despite desperate efforts at the time of Napoleon and again in the revolution and civil war of the 1930's, feudalism has kept her poor and backward. Russia shook off her old feudalism and new capitalism almost simultaneously in 1917, and today's powerful Soviet Union is the result. The feudal shackles were struck off Eastern Europe only the other day. In Asia it is not so important that the hour of nationhood has come late as that it has come.

Of Asiatic states China is the greatest and has tried the hardest to shake off feudalism. Her peasant wars started before Europe's and were often repeated. She got rid of institutionalized military feudalism before it even began in the West, by centralization from above. Her landlord gentry began to decay before Europe's. Yet they stayed in power.

What kept them there? Even before the West appeared on the scene they were maintained by the unholy alliance of China's effete rulers with foreign invaders who could provide armies better than they themselves possessed to crush her people. That is how China fell under the foreign Manchu emperors, who ruled her by force for almost three hundred years until the Republic was proclaimed in 1911.

A very graphic contemporary account in English is *Bellum Tartaricum, or the Conquest of the Great and Most Renowned Empire of CHINA By the Invasion of the TARTARS, who in these last seven years have wholly subdued that vast Empire*. It was written by a Catholic priest named Martin Martinius and published in London in 1655. Martinius had himself lived in China when it was taken over by the Manchus (or

Tartars, as contemporary Europe called them, the Mongols and the Central Asiatic peoples indiscriminately). He had put together a circumstantial firsthand report of the conquest that any war correspondent today would be proud of. What is more, with a few names left out, any of today's war correspondents might have written it, because the struggle in China still goes on against the backdrop of the same social and economic structure.

Martinius tells us that the fall of the Ming dynasty, immediate predecessor of the Manchus, was heralded by widespread rural "banditry," which in China, as in all feudal countries, has always acquired Robin Hood overtones which make the outlaws of the rich the heroes of the poor.

He writes (I have modernized the spelling and condensed the narrative) :-

Famine increased in Shensi and Shantung by reason of locusts. There then rose up a sedition, augmented by the notable avarice of the Emperor Chung Chen, who exhausted the people by imposts and taxes. Li Tzu-cheng, the Conductor of the Thieves, persuaded the soldiers and people that the heavens had decreed that he deliver the people. He used the people with humility, not permitting any soldier to wrong them, persecuting only the officers and fining the rich. In the places he subdued, he remitted all taxes.

The Emperor sent an army under the Lord Marshal of China but this army did nothing, nay more, most of the soldiers ran to the thieving party. In the meantime the Thieves' Conductor, who was no less quick and nimble in execution than witty in invention, caused many of his soldiers to creep into Peking in disguise and raise sedition there. Considering that they were a company of desperate fellows and of very low and base fortune, it is stupendous to think how they could keep so profound a secrecy in such great matters. In 1644 they entered the Metropolitan City.

Wu San-kwei (the highest Chinese commander guarding the Great Wall frontier) sent an ambassador to the king of the Tartars (Manchus) desiring his help to subdue the usurper. The Tartar King did not neglect such a good occasion but presently marched. Wu San-kwei, thinking nothing but revenge, admitted all conditions, little thinking (as the Chinese say) that he brought in tigers to drive out dogs.

Li Tzu-cheng, hearing of the march of the Tartars and Wu together, quitted Peking and marched away to Shensi. The Tartars pursued him for eight days, but could not, or would not, pass the

Yellow River, so that they might speedily return to amuse the trembling hearts in the capital.

Wu San-kwei now offered them their reward. He highly extolled their fortitude and fidelity in the kingdom's quarrel and finally desired them now to leave. But to this demand the Tartars returned a long and premeditated answer, far contrary to what he had expected. "We do not think it fit yet to leave unless, having heard our reasons, you still press it. We consider that many of the rebels are still extant and seem rather dispersed than extinguished, and we hear that their great general, Li Tzu-cheng, still possesses the richest and most populous provinces. He feared us Tartars. When he hears we are gone, he will doubtless make new invasions, when perchance we shall not be able to send new aid. We therefore resolve to prosecute the victory so that you may deliver the empire to your King. Be not solicitous about paying our promised rewards, which are as safe in your hands as in ours. That which requires no delay is that you, with part of our army and part of yours, march speedily to extirpate the thieves."

Wu San-kwei either did not understand the stratagem or did not dare to irritate an army that was in the bowels of the kingdom. Soon afterwards the Tartars proclaimed their own right to the empire, aided by fugitive Chinese magistrates who suggested excellent counsels against their own country and by these means advanced themselves. Then the Tartars proclaimed Wu San-kwei a tributary viceroy at Sian, so that he that had hitherto waged war for China against the rebels now was forced to march against China to subdue its provinces to the Tartar Empire.

Almost the same primitive state of social organisation, local communications and trade as existed then brings starvation in the wake of sectional crop failures in Asia today. The Bengal famine in India, and the Honan famine in China, each of which in 1942-1944 took a toll of three million lives, exemplify this. The rapacity of landlords and tax collectors is also unchanged.

As then, so now, such misfortunes cause peasant disorders, from riots to great uprisings. The Chinese peasant of modern times flowed into the ranks of the Taiping Rebellion in the 1850's and those of the Chinese Red Armies in the 1930's for the same reasons. When they gain control of any area, these popular revolts first of all alleviate the lot of the cultivator and curb his oppressors.

The fighting spirit, intelligence and guerilla warfare tactics of embattled peasants, "fellows of low and base fortune," have never ceased to amaze those who can only regard them as "thieves." Armies

of landlord-dominated governments, which are composed of the same kind of peasants as those in the "thieving" ranks, still prove unreliable when sent against the people. In the last battle of the civil war which preceded the united struggle against Japan, one of Chiang Kai-shek's best armies went over to the Reds en masse. When the civil war blazed again after V-J Day, divisions upon divisions of Kuomintang troops, many of them equipped with American arms, went over to the Communist-led forces.

Representatives of China's feudal ruling classes have called for foreign intervention on every modern occasion in which they have been threatened with internal revolt. The Taipings were smashed with the aid of outsiders. So was the revolution of 1927. Today, with American aid, the same sort of effort is being made.

The intervening powers, being stronger than those who called them in, have either plotted to establish their rule over the country from the beginning, or acquired an appetite in the process of eating, as is the case with many Washington officials who today are beginning to think of China not as a country belonging to its people but as a pawn in American economic and strategic calculations.

Those who call in foreign assistance never fail to earn the hatred of their own people. The name of Wu San-kwei is such a byword today that every Chinese spits without thinking when he mentions it. The Manchu dynasty, which later acquired Chinese trappings to such an extent that the people were getting used to it, signed its own death warrant (and very nearly that of the country's independence) when it brought in the British. Chiang Kai-shek, after gaining great prestige as a wartime leader against Japan, is now increasingly seen in the same light as Wu San-kwei.

Governments which intervene to keep down other peoples leave a frightful burden to their own. By assuming this odious role they wipe out all previous ties of friendship. Wendell Willkie used to speak of America's reservoir of good will in Asia. That good will was a result of the fact that, unlike many European peoples, Americans were not instinctively identified with any direct effort to impose their rule or will on others. Now it is being wasted.

To hark back to American history, at the time of the American Revolution, Great Britain was undoubtedly the most democratic nation in the world. The American colonists were proud that they themselves were free-born Englishmen. They revolted not because they did not admire British institutions, such as parliamentary representation and habeas corpus, but because they prized them so much that they could not stand being denied them.

The British earned a century of hatred in America when they

became identified in the mind of the colonists with the redcoats and Hessian mercenaries. The revulsion of Englishmen in America against Englishmen in England was so great that they were willing to accept the aid of the French, then regarded as generic enemies. What mattered to the Continental armies fighting for independence was not who was more democratic at home, but who was the enemy, and who the friend, of *their* democracy.

The French won a century and more of sentimental friendship because after they had helped both the colonists and themselves (they too were at war with Britain), they packed up and went home. If King Louis had set himself to decide which generals the defeated English had the right to surrender to, as General MacArthur did when he ordered the Japanese to yield to Chiang Kai-shek only ; if he had kept some of them under arms to guard the Americans until master nations should decide whose booty they were, as the Indonesians and Chinese guerillas were guarded ; or if he had kept his own forces in the country to make sure that the principles of government he most favoured might prevail, as the United States has done in China, the colonists would have forgotten that the French helped them and remembered suddenly that their language was different, their religion Popish and their morals strange. There would have been furious hatred and much bloodshed.

But the French of the period appear to have been sensible. Much as King Louis hated the idea of a republic anywhere, he knew it was better not to interfere after these ragged fellows had beaten so many British armies to get one. Much as he would have liked to make the new United States a base for the reconquest of Canada, which Britain had taken from him earlier, he managed to repress these desires.

"Hold on," the reader might say at this point. "The American revolutionists won, but these Chinese peasants you talk about seem to have lost out every time."

That was true, while the peasants were alone. Li Tzu-cheng's revolt in the seventeenth century, while it fought against the same evils that the Chinese peasant rises against today, had all the weaknesses, as well as the elemental power and passion for justice to the poor, of history's "pure and simple" peasant wars. Like Wat Tyler's revolt in England and the *jacqueries* of France, it was a terrific but short-lived explosion. It made few urban allies. It pyramided spontaneously from local famine protests to supreme power but lacked a programme of what to do with this power. It took no account of the threat of foreign conquest, and each of its soldiers probably considered his own war won when he had throttled an oppressor and compensated himself with booty from the rich for years of indignity and want. Like Antaeus, the pure

jacquerie dies when it leaves its native soil. While the terms of such struggles remain within the feudal framework, the ruling groups can win out in the end.

In Europe this feudal pattern was softened from within by the growth of trade, overseas conquest and industry. In Asia it was dented from without by imperialism, and by Western liberal and socialist ideas. In the West, theatre, props and actors have all changed since feudal times, and there is no real point of contact. Within Asia, as we have shown, feudalism still dominates. But though the props on the stage are still the same, the Asiatic theatre stands in a different city. There are many new actors beside the old ones, and even the old actors appear in new guise. The subsequent history of China, and especially the changes in China during the war, will make this clear. The fight against feudalism predated the anti-imperialist fight, but they could only come to fruition together. Now the time has arrived as a consideration of recent Chinese history, and especially wartime Chinese history, will show.

PART TWO

The Lesson of Chinese History

III. WHO IN CHINA IS “ANTIFOREIGN”?

IN THE BAD OLD DAYS OF NOT SO LONG AGO FOREIGN COUNTRIES WHICH wanted to get China into a proper frame of mind to talk concessions had a habit of first sailing one of their smaller navy boats up to her shores, unbuttoning their guns and perhaps lobbing over a few shells. This was known as Gunboat Diplomacy and in its time it seldom failed. Moreover, as a necessary preliminary to the whole business, those at whom the guns were pointed were accused of being “antiforeign,” which was apparently the greatest crime a Chinese could commit. Gunboat diplomacy went out of fashion when Chinese nationalism grew too big for it. The woodenheaded Japanese militarists who tried to use it in 1937 found that even a big piece of their army and navy was too little and too late. The accusation of antiforeignism as a shooting offence also faded after the Japanese had stolen it and tried to deck out their invasion as a “defence of the rights of all civilized nations.”

While nobody has been killed for this crime since V-J Day, the charge is still made. Old colonial shellbacks, sensitive to any kind of Asiatic nationalism, are convinced that every Chinese is antiforeign under the skin.

During the war, Field Marshal Sir Philip Chetwode, a retired Indian Army warrior, was chairman of the British Red Cross. In 1945 I visited him in London to see if his organization would give medical aid equally to all political parties and areas in China instead of just to the Kuomintang. He was quite sympathetic until I mentioned that such aid, besides satisfying humanitarian needs, would serve to show the concern of the British public for Chinese unity. Then the doughty and ancient Sir Philip sat bolt upright and said: “By Jove, aren’t there five hundred million of those people? It would be terrible

if they all united, it seems to me." Sir Philip's idea in helping two contending sides was not at all to get them together. He was afraid of Chinese "antiforeignism." The Asiatic peoples, who have had plenty of experience with the type, are certainly against foreigners like the Field Marshal.

Late in 1944, General Joseph Stilwell faced some very real Japanese in China, not a bogey like Sir Philip's. He was trying to promote, not avoid, greater unity in the country. He wanted to get the 500,000 soldiers the Kuomintang was using to blockade the Chinese Communists to fight Japan instead, so as to keep her from getting any more of the country. He also wanted to institute American co-operation with the Communist troops as well as Chiang Kai-shek's own, which were rather inadequate for the job. The General, who liked China, was removed for his pains, in addition to which the Kuomintang spread the story that he was anti-Chinese. The Kuomintang in turn was called antiforeign by American correspondents, and both anti-United Nations and unpatriotic by Chinese progressives, who had hoped Stilwell would succeed.

China remained disunited throughout the war and American aid remained one-sided. Stilwell had failed to get American arms and supplies into North China to fight the Japanese because Chiang stopped him. He had been called an interventionist in Chinese internal affairs whereas he had only wanted Chiang to intervene more energetically in the anti-Japanese war.

After V-J Day his successor, General Wedemeyer, did get men into North China with Chiang's blessing, and moved many of Chiang's troops in too. Along with the former quisling units and the Japanese who were still under arms, they guarded bridges, railways and towns against "illegal occupation" by Communist-led forces, who had alone fought the enemy in the area all through the war. Now the Communists charged intervention in Chinese business and incitement of civil war. They warned Admiral Barbey's Seventh U.S. Fleet off one of their coastal areas, and fired at trains full of Chiang's U.S.-equipped soldiers, who carried some American officers with them as a shield. The Americans shelled a village in retaliation, and many Chinese pointedly recalled Lidice. But Chiang was now America's champion. He approved of what was going on and the Communists, who did not, were described as antiforeign, especially by the Kuomintang.

There appear to be several types of foreign impact on China and several kinds of antiforeignism to match. Of course, it might be more profitable to examine how and why foreign countries have been anti-Chinese. But since it is the antiforeignism of a modern and independent Asia that many in the West fear, and since this book is for the West,

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ern readers, it is worth approaching the problem from this end. Let us look at the record.

I. The Backdrop of the New Drama (Early Nineteenth Century)

Every once in a while somebody gets up and says that "China is not a nation but a geographical expression."¹ This is nonsense, because the Chinese have been welded by a common government and culture for longer than any other surviving state. In the old days they were so proud of their common characteristics that they regarded their country as the whole civilized world, with only "barbarians" outside. There were times when they were not far wrong.

On the other hand, the old feudal absolutism of China was very different from any modern political system. The official name of the country was never China at all, but that of the dynasty. Under the Manchus, for instance, it was called *Ta Ching Ti Kuo*, which means the "Great Pure Empire." Great Pure was the name taken by the imperial line of Nurhachi, as families that attained the purple in those days were not content to remain plain Wangs or Chus in the pages of history. If British kings behaved the same way, they would call their Empire something like "The Windsor Royal Lion Estate" till some other dynasty succeeded. The Great Pure Empire, in its heyday included not only the Chinese but also the Manchus, the Mongols and Tibetans, the Uigurs of Sinkiang and the hunting tribes of Eastern Siberia. No one quite knew where it ended, but the Koreans, the Burmese, the Indo-Chinese and the Gurkhas of Nepal were among those who sent annual tribute to Peking.

Although the Chinese had been conquered, they considered themselves culturally superior to the other peoples of the empire. They had the most universal script, an established system of administration and a rich tradition. Their scholars were the only possible bailiffs to run the Great Pure estate, and they alone knew about taxes, irrigation, civil service examinations and other such matters. Their language was the only one for administrative use and, conquerors or not, the Manchus learned Chinese and forgot Manchu, instead of the Chinese learning Manchu and forgetting Chinese, or even acquiring Manchu as a second tongue. Civil service appointments continued to depend, as before, on degrees given for proficiency in the Chinese classics. Chinese man-

¹ In 1931 and 1937, the Japanese used these words to justify their invasion as a mission to introduce peace and order. At the height of World War II, Hanson Baldwin revived them to explain why China's front against Japan was so weak.

darins who ruled over their own people for the foreign emperor often managed to manipulate the emperor as well.

As distinct from the mandarins, the common people of China never forgot that outsiders were running the country. They never referred to themselves as the "Great Pure People" but, from time immemorial, as the Men of the Middle Kingdom or simply the Black-Haired Folk. The latter name is the older and may date from some remote period when the first tribes on the Yellow River dealt with men of some other colouring. I myself have seen gray-eyed Chinese with red, and occasionally even sandy, hair in the ancient northwestern provinces.

Additional names they sometimes used for themselves were the Han People or Tang People, after two of their own great dynasties early in the Christian era. The secret societies they organized for local defence against bandits and for a kind of masonic mutual aid almost invariably included an anti-Manchu plank in their principles.

For some reason which I have never seen satisfactorily explained, the Chinese, alone of all the feudal peoples of Asia, always escaped mental enslavement by gods or earthly potentates. In old India, superstition has had a terrible hold on the masses, acting as the cement of the caste system. The temples are revered and sacrosanct, and even the cows are holy to millions. By comparison, urban China is almost completely irreligious. In the Chinese countryside several creeds coexist peacefully, often in the mind of the same person, who generally only half believes in any of them. Village idols sit alone and rain-soaked under the leaking roofs of tumble-down shrines, and little boys, unrebuked, dig out the black marbles that serve them for eyes. When there is a long drought or other situation where divine intervention might help, they are refurbished and worshipped, but if they do not deliver, the peasants have been known to beat them with sticks. The heavenly hierarchy is supposed to parallel the terrestrial, and a village god is a pretty small peanut. After trying bribery as applied to petty officials on earth, the people often do things to these images that they seldom dare undertake against their living counterparts.

The same pragmatism used to permeate the attitude of the Chinese towards their emperors. Chinese emperors, like those of Japan, were supposed to be divinely appointed, but whereas the Japanese emperor was held to be a god by direct descent, the Chinese "Son of Heaven" was only adopted, subject to good behaviour. The Japanese imperial line was in theory inviolate and eternal. The Chinese considered that if great catastrophes occurred or the country was in a bad way, it was a sign that heaven had withdrawn its favour from the dynasty. It then ceased to be impiety, but became a virtuous act, to drive it out and find a more acceptable executor for the divine will.

As distinct from India and Japan also, hereditary nobility ceased to be important in China before the Christian era. All sorts of lowly characters ascended to the throne, and even to the pantheon of the worshipped. Liu Pang, who founded the great Han dynasty, was a peasant soldier. Kuan Kung, the famed general of the Three Kingdoms period, who was afterwards deified as the God of War, was an innkeeper. The originator of the Ming dynasty was an unfrocked monk. One of the greatest Chinese novels, which the officials never succeeded in suppressing, was *Shui Hu*, translated by Pearl Buck as *All Men Are Brothers*. Much read, and repeated by storytellers for centuries, it dealt with a band of jolly robbers, common men who spent their time punishing those who ground the faces of the poor.

By the time the external challenge to China really became serious, the Manchu dynasty had begun to suffer from the recurrent dry rot that had put an end to its predecessors. The countryside was in a bad state, and the peasants were beginning to take the anti-Manchu slogans of their secret societies as something to be acted upon instead of just hoped for. The scholar bureaucracy too began to turn away from the Manchus because they no longer represented stability, and Chinese feudalism always needed a "strong man" at the centre. The general situation of the dynasty was not too unlike that which had spelled the downfall of the Mings. It was fast becoming too effete to deal with either internal or external enemies.

In the fashion of Wu San-kwei, the Manchu Government and its Chinese officials began to manoeuvre between the two menaces. But this time more than shrewd nomads with superior cavalry stood at China's gates. The modern world, which had grown overnight while China slept, was unceremoniously kicking them down.

2. The Decisive Western Breakthrough (1839-1850)

Every previous invader of China had come in from her northern and northwestern land approaches, which had been her front door and chief defence problem for ages. The coastline, protected by the gigantic moat of the Pacific Ocean, had never experienced troubles worse than occasional piratic raids by the medieval Japanese, and somewhat later by single ships bearing Portuguese and Dutch adventurers. It was only in the early nineteenth century that Britain, the most advanced and powerful nation of the time, blew in this neglected back door with gunfire. China's old safe rear suddenly became her most vulnerable border. The back door became the front door.

Britain compelled China to open her territories to foreign emissaries and trade. It used force to seize Hong Kong and impose the

first of the "unequal treaties", which established a kind of diplomatic extraterritorial status for foreign trading settlements, made all Westerners (and later the Japanese) immune to Chinese law, and gave missionaries, who had formerly been present on sufferance, an inalienable right to preach and build churches where they pleased.

The effect of this breakthrough was cataclysmic. It immediately exposed the fact that China not only had ceased to be the "centre of the world" and the greatest fortress in Asia, but on the contrary was powerless against the fate that had overtaken India. Enforced Western imports, first of Indian opium and then of cheap manufactured goods, upset the country's financial structure and ruined its handicrafts.

Imaginative Chinese administrators, while hating the "barbarian" incursion, also saw that if they did not absorb Western science to make their country strong, it could not avoid complete Western domination. The decrepit Manchus still had power to obstruct any innovation. Despite their absorption of Chinese culture they still looked on the country as a family possession instead of a homeland. The cleavage between such officials and the dynasty therefore deepened. Some of them began to ponder Western political philosophy and productive forms and think how they could be applied at home.

What saved China from being completely colonized at that time was the fact that more than one Western power began to take an interest in the exploitation of her resources and weakness. The actions of Britain, France and Czarist Russia in various parts of her domain were governed, and to some extent limited, by their mutual relations in the European balance of power. In some cases they checkmated each other.

Representatives of what were then lesser powers also appeared on Chinese soil. The United States had its own frontier to develop and no desire for overseas possessions. It was also too weak to enter the contest for empire on the old terms. But its interests were involved, because ever since the Yankee Clippers set out from Boston to take advantage of the freedom of commerce won by the Revolution, America had been a pioneer in the China trade. To protect that trade the United States was gradually to evolve the elements of the "most favoured nation treatment" and the "open door and equal opportunity" which were later to become the basic principles of her Far Eastern policy.

This policy has been misunderstood much more often than it has been properly explained. Its aim was not to strengthen China or to give her the right to open or shut her doors as she pleased, but to make sure that those doors were open to all on equal terms. If Britain and France used their artillery to batter China into reducing imports on

their foods, or making new ports available to them, the Chinese Government was obliged to extend the privileges granted these "most favoured nations" to America. Owen Lattimore has described this as "hitch-hiking imperialism" and says its motto could be expressed in two words: "Me too."

Of course the United States was not then strong enough to back up such a thesis. One reason it came to be adopted was that the superpowers of the day—Britain, France and Russia—also saw that the mutual enjoyment of privileges wrested from China by any one of them was a useful alternative to conflict. In fact the later elaboration of the policy was the joint work of America and Britain. Foreign interests in China became a kind of cartel, and common foreign rights on her soil were often defended by joint notes from "the diplomatic corps" instead of single powers. However much the white world squabbled, it presented a joint front toward China for several decades thereafter.

The Manchu dynasty was, naturally, not altogether happy about this. But it saw, in its weakness, that the situation had certain advantages. The clashing interests of the Western powers did not allow any one of them to depose it and take over China completely. Since the Peking Government was the agent responsible for giving equal terms to all the co-operating contenders, all had an interest in its continued existence. If this was very expensive insurance, it also eliminated certain risks. There is no doubt that, in the long run, it preserved a certain minimum of China's sovereignty, even though the great Chinese leader Sun Yat-sen was to remark somewhat bitterly that instead of a colony or semicolony, it made the country a "hypo-colony"—a colony for everyone.

Incidentally, despite its origins, the policy won America a unique place in China's regard. Early United States envoys like Anson Burlingame always stressed that their country had been born of anticolonial revolt. The United States did not participate in land-grabbing and did not send armed forces to China until 1900. The British were wont to say sarcastically that it did not need to, since Americans always managed to share the trading and legal advantages for which England employed force, and collected the opprobrium. There was more truth than poetry in this. But not to the desperate Chinese of the time. If America did not fight for them, neither did anyone else. What mattered was that she did not come at them with a gun in her hand.

3. The Taiping Uprising and the First Intervention (1850-1865)

We have already noted that when the doors of China were battered down what entered was not only imperialistic aggression but the whole

modern world. The minute China's isolation ended she was threatened with new national slavery as a penalty for the backwardness which that isolation had produced. But at the same time, contact with the outside showed her people the wealth and strength which other countries had achieved by the overthrow of feudalism. If there was another revolt in China, it could no longer be a simple change of dynasty or a peasant war like Li Tzu-cheng's, merely reopening the oft-repeated cycle of stagnation. The political and technical tools which made it possible not only to rise against feudal oppression, but to move away from feudalism altogether, had been forged by the Western peoples. China did not have to think up new ones, but could borrow and adapt them for her own use.

This dual impact of the West gave rise to complex reactions. It planted the seeds of modern Chinese nationalism as a fight for self-preservation as distinguished from the old sense of unity and feeling of superiority over the various "outer barbarians." It linked this nationalism irrevocably with the striving for democracy. It also produced two varieties of what the West has been pleased to call antiforeignism.

The Manchu Government, and the feudal ruling groups of China which had made common cause with it, feared foreign guns. But they feared foreign ideas much more. They could compromise with foreign imperialism by bribing it with pieces of Chinese land and sovereign rights. But they hated all democratic tendencies unrelentingly, and were to wipe them out with fire, sword and torture chamber wherever they appeared. The antiforeignism of China's rulers was really a fierce resolve to continue their domination over the people and to isolate them from "dangerous thoughts." It was hatred of the whole modern world and its progress.

The new Chinese nationalism, on the other hand, was to battle for China's right to become a participant in the modern world and not its slave. It welcomed Western books and inventions as weapons that would help it to achieve this. It was neither antimodern nor antiforeign as such, but uncompromisingly pro-modern and anti-imperialist.

The first great popular upheaval in China after her locks had been forced was not an antiforeign uprising but an antifeudal one. It came not from the top-rank intellectuals who were thrilled by foreign books but from the peasants, who were again suffering intolerable oppression. Its leader was Hung Hsiu-chuan, a poorly educated common man of great energy and messianic vision, who had met an early Protestant missionary, the Reverend Issachar Roberts, in South China and become a Christian. Operating with Chinese slogans of justice and equality and New Testament texts concerning the righteousness of the poor, he asked the people to join him to overthrow the Manchus and establish Tai-

Ping Tien Kuo, the "Peaceful Kingdom of Heaven" on earth.

In 1850 Hung initiated a military revolt in obscure villages in Kwantung and Kwangsi provinces. As his forces snowballed, countless peasants, a few "righteous scholars" and some timeservers, flocked to join him. Before long he had developed tightly organized armies which, though composed of "fellows of base fortune," evolved clever tactics, an unprecedented spirit of sacrificial devotion, and a whole constellation of able guerilla commanders. Everywhere his armies went they destroyed the title deeds of landlords and set up governments solicitous of the poor. In a short time they had swept all China south of the Yangtze clean of the Manchu forces and established the capital of their Heavenly Kingdom at Nanking. Civil war raged for fifteen years and before it ended the Taiping standards were carried to the very outskirts of Peking in the north and the Tibetan marshes in the west. Twenty million people were said to have perished before the revolt was quelled.

The Taiping Uprising closed one chapter in the history of Chinese popular struggles and opened a new one, which we are still witnessing. It was the beginning of China's democratic revolution, the ancestor of both the original, militantly progressive Kuomintang and the Chinese Red Armies of the future. At the same time it was the last of China's purely peasant rebellions. Augustus F. Lindley, an English friend of the Taipings, who was so impressed by what he saw that he devoted great efforts to telling the outside world about it, as writers like Edgar Snow did for their modern successors, quoted their land laws :

Having fields, let them cultivate them together, and when they get any rice, let them eat it together. . . . so that everyone may share and share alike. Every family is required to grow mulberries, keep five hens and two pigs, and see that they breed. . . . As soon as the harvest arrives, every vexillary [lowest Taiping administrative official] must see to it that the twenty-five parishes under his charge have sufficient supply of food, and what is over and above he must deposit in the public granary. . . . Then the sovereign will have sufficient to use and all the families, in every place, will be equally provided for, while every individual will be well fed and well clothed.²

The phrase "well fed and well clothed" is a slogan of the present Eighth Route Army, but in other respects the Taiping scheme was traditionally paternalistic, leaning more on the virtue of public functionaries than on popular self-rule. Another eyewitness, the famous

² Ti Ping Tien Kwoh, by Lin Le (pen-name of Augustus Lindley), London, 1866.

missionary Dr. Bridgeman, has told us, however, of modern features. He noted that, by contrast to the Manchus, who were interested only in Western arms, the Taipings absorbed European ideas from the standpoint of their service to the people. Public posters on the walls of Taiping villages, which he saw and translated, carried notices of "distribution of food, clothes and medicines and injunctions to repair to certain quarters for vaccination." No less a person than Sir George Bonham, then British Minister to China, said that he had observed the Taiping troops "evincing an enthusiasm and unity of purpose that proved them something more than mere hirelings," and Henry Meadows, another noted English Far Eastern diplomat, sent a dispatch to Foreign Secretary Lord John Russell in London on April 19, 1861, urging "siding with the Taipings as the Manchus were moribund."

Despite such instinctive sympathy of individuals from the West for people who were turning from feudalism to freedom, Western attitudes soon changed. The course of the revolt had worked a great difference in the position of the foreign trading settlement in Shanghai. Its quasi-neutral status made it the haven of landlord refugees, who brought with them the accumulated rent-and-grain riches of the lower Yangtze valley. Much of this wealth was transferred to the pockets of foreign firms and individuals in Shanghai's first real-estate boom, in which land and houses, with the implied protection of foreign flags, were sold to the newcomers at fantastic prices. Moreover, when the Taipings approached the city, which was already growing into China's main centre of seaborne trade, the imperial authorities "provisionally" turned over the collection of customs duties to the British, thus hoping to retain the revenues of the port even if they had temporarily to leave it.

Enriched and strengthened, the foreign merchants and real-estate owners set up their own sovereign administration, the Shanghai Municipal Council, thus taking full control of the outlet to China's greatest commercial artery, the Yangtze. The Council assumed police and tax powers over Chinese as well as foreign residents and property. It was aided by the rights of extraterritorial consular jurisdiction—already written into China's international relations in previous treaties with Britain and the United States, and extended to others under the "most favoured nation" clause. Under these rights the only authority acknowledged by the merchant rulers of the Shanghai Municipal Council, and the only legal appeal against any action they might take, lay with their Consuls, who functioned as diplomatic representatives, promoters of trade, and judges in all cases involving Westerners as defendants, whatever the nationality of the plaintiffs. The better to enforce the privileges held by all foreigners in common, the Consuls banded themselves into a committee called the Consular Body, which had a

final say in everything.

Here was something worth defending. If Manchu weakness and corruptibility could yield such fruits, thought the foreign chancelleries, what point in flirting with the Taipings who, though Christian and progressive, were patriots who might create a strong China. So it was the foreigners, not the wavering imperial troops, who kept the surprised Taipings out of Shanghai.

This done, the Anglo-French armies and navies took advantage of a minor incident, the seizure of the opium-smuggling vessel *Arrow* that flew the Union Jack, to occupy Peking. The Manchus were taught who was master, and why anyone had bothered to save them. China was humiliated and the new status of Shanghai was written into treaty law. The imperial government was forced to grant concessions in other ports and give foreigners the right to engage in coastal and river navigation without legal or administrative control by any Chinese authority. China's foreign trade, through whatever point it might be conducted, was subjected to the condition that no more than 5 per cent of the value of any import from abroad might be collected as duty, thus removing the only possible safeguard for the growth of internal industry. Extraterritoriality was further defined and strengthened. The Chinese Maritime Customs, which collected the 5 per cent duty on behalf of the Chinese government, was itself put under foreign control, not only in Shanghai but elsewhere, not provisionally but indefinitely. Its higher officials were supplied on a quota basis by the chief "treaty powers"—Britain, France, Czarist Russia and the United States. Indemnities to Britain and France for the military expenses incurred in winning these privileges, and later interest payments on the money the Manchus began to borrow, were secured by customs receipts.

The effect on China's development can best be pictured if we imagine what English history would have been had the French established themselves on the English seaboard at the time of the wars of the Roses, set up their own municipality and taxing machine in London, with branches elsewhere, and held on to these "rights." In all probability there would have been no enclosures, no Elizabethan voyaging and accumulation of wealth, no Empire-wide shipping trade, and no industrial revolution. England would have remained like Ireland—or like China.

Having thus subjugated the Manchus to their own will, the foreign powers proceeded to assist them to put a quick end to the inconvenient Taipings throughout the nation. Here is Lindley's bitter and incisive description of the new alliance :

The growing dread the Manchus entertained of foreign intercourse had urged them to the adoption of the most repulsive beha-

viour... and it was just at the period this was becoming almost unbearable that the Taiping insurrection took place. It was therefore only natural that Europeans should regard the rising power favourably. Directly the organization and professions of the Taipings became fully known, it was almost universal practice to sound thrilling paeans to their praise. The clergy and religious world went half mad with joy... and the merchant part of the foreign world entered into the wildest speculations [excepting the opium smugglers].

All these benevolent and large-minded Europeans waited a little, and when they found the profitable change would probably take a long time to perfect, while in this interval their gain might be diminished, it was absolutely wonderful to see how their sympathy, like Bob Acre's courage, oozed out at their finger-ends. Events soon occurred that extinguished the last remnant of philanthropy... The seizure of the *Arrow* afforded a pretext for an appeal to arms, and this furnished all those favourable circumstances hitherto expected from the Taiping movement by a shorter and more direct road. It was sufficient for a portion of the body mercantile that they would get their nefarious opium traffic legalized and general trade would increase; it was sufficient for the body politic that they would... so humble the power of the Chinese government as to be able to do with it whatever they like, compelling it to do their will in every way.

The Taipings were at once thrown overboard. It mattered not that their cause was right and holy; it was no longer profitable to the British trader or his government; and with the usual error of mean selfishness they took it for granted that the Manchus would always remain powerless... neither could they perceive that though delays might interpose before the final success of the Taipings, yet that, after a short probation, the willing and unrestricted commerce the latter would encourage would be more profitable than the unwilling and forced trade the Manchus were coerced into. It is no less singular than true that the [Anglo-French] wars with the Manchus weakened them very little... In the first place the Europeans were always met with local forces, none being withdrawn from opposition to the internal danger, which was dreaded much more than any rising from the foreign expedition.

The American role throughout these events was highly equivocal. United States merchants in Shanghai participated in early anti-Taiping actions, and helped to fit out Ward, whose grave later became a place of pilgrimage for the American business community. The Navy, though

officially aloof, did a lot of shooting in the Anglo-French hostilities against China, which ended in the imposition of the outrageous Tientsin treaty. In 1856, the U.S.S. *Portsmouth* and *Levant*, insisting on their "neutral" right to sail past Canton river barriers set up by the Chinese to keep out the British, with whom they were at war, bombarded and captured a fort that stood in the way. A monument in the Brooklyn Navy Yard still celebrates this feat. In 1860, Commodore Tatnall, of Mexican War (*Vera Cruz*) fame, was anchored off the Paku Forts in North China. The forts were being attacked by the British Admiral Hope, who lost several vessels to Chinese coastal guns. It was on this occasion that Tatnall uttered, for the first time, the famous words, "Blood is thicker than water". Beginning by offering medical service to Hope's wounded, he ended by firing at the Chinese and towing British marines into action against them. The whole affair was finally rounded out by the occupation of an "American concession" in Tientsin, afterwards relinquished on the direct orders of President Lincoln, who did not believe in land-grabbing from nations at peace with the United States.

This bit of history is worth remembering. It throws into sharp focus the continuing tendency of the American military services when acting on their own among weaker peoples. It illuminates the connection of imperialism in the Orient with the key emotional slogans used by proponents of Anglo-American alliance. It explains the apprehension the idea of such an alliance arouses among Far Eastern nations. Also, it shows how American administrations that were really of the people have regarded such adventures—and the result. Abraham Lincoln's action was the root cause of almost a hundred years of American popularity among Chinese, who forgot to resent Tatnall because a greater American gave them a different view of his country.

The Anglo-French intervention against the Taipings was further expedited by the unwillingness of the latter to compete with the Manchus for the post of foreign tool. Hung Hsiu-chuan, the "Heavenly King," did not ask for European assistance, only for European neutrality. He showed no interest in London's offers to act as "honest broker" between the warring parties, saying that if he had to deal with the Emperor he would do so direct. The consequent throttling of the movement followed a pattern much like the one we are witnessing today.

At first the British disclaimed any intention of interfering in Chinese affairs. They assured the Taipings that, despite their landing in Shanghai, "they were taking no part in the civil war" while Admiral Hope of the British Navy, whom we have already encountered in the "blood is thicker than water" episode, announced that "Her Majesty's Government desire to maintain . . . neutrality between the two contending:

parties". But one of his subordinates, Captain Sherrard Osborne, was loaned as combat adviser to the Manchu Fleet. Major (later General) Gordon was sent to China to take charge of a modern-trained body of imperial troops known as the Ever Victorious Army, which had first been formed by three American adventurers financed by Shanghai's foreign merchants, Frederick Townsend Ward, Burgévine and Forrester. The British Government granted "liberty to officers to enter Chinese service, on half pay plus Chinese salary."³ Lindley informs us that the Manchus used "Enfield rifles and shot and shell (all fresh from the arsenals and paid for by British taxpayers)."

Through the efforts of Lindley and other foreign volunteers who had entered Taiping service (including a British ex-marine named Smith and Major Moreno, a Sardinian veteran of Italy's war of liberation), the alarm was given to the British public. There was a protest demonstration in Trafalgar Square and on May 31, 1864, the famous liberal statesman Cobden, who had fought successfully against the simultaneous tendency to intervene in the American Civil War on the Confederate side, demanded in Parliament that meddling in China stop immediately. But he failed, and the tragedy took its course. The appeals of the Taipings were censored. Reports of junior diplomats favourable to them were suppressed in a way later strikingly paralleled by U.S. Ambassador Hurley's suppression of his subordinates' reports when America intervened in China in 1945-6. Direct clashes took place outside of Shanghai.

In one, the Taipings were fired on by a Captain Cavanaugh, who burned a whole village in retaliation when their return fire killed a European. In another, Admiral Hope set his men out before Shanghai as "moral support to the Chinese government." He was wounded in the ensuing skirmish and, says Lindley :

To avenge the glaring insult and audacity of those rebels who had dared deposit a bullet in the calf of a British Admiral who was doing his utmost to kill them, the Allies brought their artillery to bear, killing some three hundred and burning and destroying large quantities of grain.

How Shanghai was held for the Emperor may be seen from the composition of the forces which repelled three Taiping efforts to take it. In the first, the "Chinese" imperial side was represented by 1497 English soldiers under General Stanley, 400 French under Admiral Portet and 300 Chinese under the American Ward, no regular government troops being present. In the second, there were 1700 British, 700

³ Ibid.

French and 400 of Ward's men. Only by the third attempt had 5,000 imperial troops arrived, but even then they were supported by an Anglo-French contingent of 1300 and 1000 men of Ward's command.

In the meantime, the British Premier, Lord Palmerston, got so irritated with his parliamentary critics that he dropped all denials that intervention was taking place. In majestic, and hypocritical, Victorian periods he declared :

We have interfered in other countries with great benefit to those countries. We interfered in the case of Greece and established the independence of the Greek state. We interfered in the case of Portugal and enabled the people of that country to obtain a free and parliamentary constitution [hear, hear]... We interfered in those events which led to the Crimean war. We interfered in the affairs of China and why? Because our treaty rights were endangered and our interests were at stake.

So the Taipings, whom no one ever accused of being antiforeign, were defeated. Foreign intervention tipped the scales against them, but they also suffered from inherent flaws. The programme of the uprising was mystical and abstract, and though it inspired great devotion, it still had the *jacquerie* weaknesses that disintegrate peasant armies when they arrive at the centres of urban wealth.

Anglo-French actions at the time were decisive because they gave Chinese feudalism the chance to muster its reserves. These came not from the decrepit court of Peking, but from the landlord squirearchy of the south central provinces. These elements had previously been regarded as of doubtful loyalty, and still cherished memories of the scions of the last purely Chinese dynasty, the Mings, the last of whom had taken refuge in their midst. But in the 1850's they suddenly woke up to the fact that the Manchus, and Western foreigners, were all that stood between them and the embattled tenants and share croppers. Brushing aside the shivering officials, sturdy country gentlemen like Tseng Kuo-fan and Tso Tsung-tang raised regiments among their household retainers and the more well-to-do peasants of their districts and sallied forth to do battle for Manchu legitimacy, the absolutist tradition and exorbitant rents. Because their own interests were immediately involved, they were as merciless to the "rebels" as a lynch mob in the American South when it smells a challenge to white supremacy. These elements afterwards remained in the Manchu service and laboured mightily to create an industrial-feudal China on the model of rising Japan. But they had sapped the strength of their own country, and the foreigners did not let them.

Slowly recovering from her double crisis, China got thoroughly

kicked around in the succeeding quarter-century. Even Japan cut herself in on the colonial deal by grabbing the Loo Choo Islands (including Okinawa) in 1874. France secured Indo-China by her own little war, in 1885, in which she sank most of the Manchu navy. In 1894, Japan attacked again to establish supremacy in Korea and pocket Formosa. She might have got South Manchuria as well if the other powers had not thought this too much for an upstart newcomer.

In the interim Western economy had moved forward. Capital exports, cartels and "development companies" outgrew trading interests. Imperialism came to consider markets less important than monopolized investment fields, sources of raw material and cheap native labour. The search for overseas territories was organized and speeded up. Africa was divided in record time. Hungrier eyes than ever before were turned towards China's riches.

In the later 1890's Czarist Russia made the first move. She bribed a Manchu viceroy to gain railway building rights in Manchuria, Talienswan (Dairen) and Port Arthur.

England countered by seizing a naval base at Weihaiwei, across the Gulf of Chihli from these towns, and also got railway contracts. She also added a piece of the mainland, thereafter called the "New Territories," to Hong Kong, on a ninety-nine-year lease.

France followed suit by taking a haven for her fleet in near-by Kwangchow Bay, plus, again, railway contracts. Japan declared Fukien Province, opposite Formosa, her "sphere of influence." Italy asked for a naval station at Sanmen Bay, south of Shanghai.

Ambitious Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany, then just feeling his oats, took advantage of the killing of two missionaries to grab Tsingtao and build his own railway through the Shantung peninsula.

Even America finally began to acquire Far Eastern territory as a result of the war with Spain which started far, far away in Cuba. Dewey smashed the Spanish Pacific fleet in Manila Bay, but he had no land forces. Aguinaldo's independence fighters forced the surrender of Spanish occupation forces ashore. Having enabled the Filipinos to rise for freedom and hailed them as heroes for doing it, the United States suddenly developed the well-known imperialist sticky fingers. Many more U.S. Army forces than had been used against Spain were landed to suppress the Filipino patriots, who were forthwith declared brutal and savage insurrectionists.

It is possible that if the McKinley administration had not felt the urge to take over "the little brown brother" some other power would have done so. Moreover the American public conscience soon began to operate sufficiently to give the Philippines a gilded and comparatively superior colonial cage. But this does not change the fact that what

happened in the Philippines in 1900 was exactly the same as what is happening, as this is being written, in Java. There is a very good account of it, written from previously unrevealed official documents long after contemporary passions had died down, by Colonel William Thaddeus Seton of the U.S. Army. It first appeared in the form of articles in the *Infantry Journal* in 1939 and was later made into a book, *Soldiers in the Philippines*.⁴ Its sponsors then described the book as "a contribution to the war effort." From what happened afterwards it looked more like a contribution to the postwar effort.

But we must get back to China. With new colonies being acquired all over the world, the loot so rich, and spheres of influence on her soil growing so rapidly, the gentlemen's agreement between the powers began to creak and groan. An English diplomat, Lord Charles Beresford, wrote a book called *The Break-Up of China*, and all the world began to talk of her imminent partition.

4. Chinese Resistance: Reformist, Elemental and Feudal (1870-1901)

We have already described how during the Taiping Uprising, the abler elements of the Central China landlord gentry, after first keeping aloof from the Manchu dynasty, led its defense against the peasants. They began to participate in the government and gave it a certain belated vigour. Tseng Kuo-fan became an efficient administrator. Tso Tsung-tang led his armies to crush the great Uigur national revolt of Yakub Beg in Sinkiang (Chinese Turkestan) and complementary Moslem risings in the northwestern provinces of China proper. All these men had been impressed with the necessity of modernization for national defense. They tolerated railway concessions to the foreigners because they looked forward to the day when China would control the lines. One of them, Chang Shih-tung, erected the Hanyehping Steel Works, still China's largest. Tso Tsung-tang crushed the Moslems by setting his troops to build modern roads, as well as fighting. He imported the most modern contemporary textile machinery for a big textile plant in far-off Lanchow, to process the northwest's abundant wool crops.

One inspiration for all these efforts was the phenomenal growth of near-by Japan. The Japanese aristocracy had succeeded in retaining both the emperor and the feudal land system while abolishing antiquated feudal organizational forms and getting industrialization under way. Japan had been "opened" after China, but forty years afterwards she already had an army and navy so strong that her independence was

⁴ *Infantry Journal* "Fighting Forces Series," 1944.

assured and she had become a recognized partner of the Western imperialists in their aggressions. Of course Japan had been lucky because she had not had to face the same foreign gang-up as China. Her growth had been aided by Great Britain, which saw a powerful Japanese military establishment, especially on the sea, as a necessary Far Eastern counterweight to Czarist Russia. None the less, China's new-type officials tried hard to follow her example.

The result was the Reform Movement of 1898, directed against the die-hards of the Manchu regime, who "had learned nothing and forgotten nothing". Scholars like Kang Yu-wei worked out blueprints for a constitutional monarchy which would be strong enough both to shake off Western tutelage and to prevent changes in the traditional social balance. They won the ear of the young Emperor Kuang Hsu himself, who was fairly long on brains but definitely short on will power. Although their models were Europe and the new Japan, they got no backing from either.

After a three-month run during which the Emperor issued a number of modernizing decrees, the movement was spectacularly smashed by his aunt, the Dowager Empress Tzu Hsi, the last sharp tooth of the aging Manchu dragon. This tough old lady was not new to supreme power. She had wielded it for many years as regent for her nephew during his minority. Now she mobilized the old court retinue to put her back on top. Striking quickly, she seized all the reformist "conspirators" that she could catch and had them chopped in half at the waist as traitors. The young Emperor himself was imprisoned for the remaining ten years of his life.

The Dowager was a real figure from the past. She hated new-fangled foreign ways and probably regarded even Japan's rulers as weak-willed fellow travellers of the West. She believed in the family estate theory of dynastic rule and would countenance no changes in it. The "Hatamen Octroi" tax on all goods entering Peking was earmarked to buy her cosmetics. During her regency, she had laid hands on a huge fund laboriously raised by the "new" officials to build up a Chinese navy and spent it on a great traditionally styled Summer Palace to replace the one burned by the Anglo-French forces in 1860, which had been a copy of Louis XIV's Versailles. One of the sights of this palace, still much beloved by Peking tourists, is the Marble Boat which stands on piles in the lake. It is the only ship China ever got for her naval appropriations. The Empress used it as a pavilion in which to drink tea and watch the sun set behind the pine-covered hills and golden roofs of her magnificent creation.

While the foreign powers once more sharpened their knives to cut the Chinese cake, a new peasant rising occurred. It was called the

Boxer Rebellion because the secret fraternity that initiated it, the Harmonious Fists, trained its members in the Chinese version of the manly sport. Ideologically it was something of a throwback, without the social programme of the Taipings or any plan of government. But in a way it was clear-sighted in seeing the major menace, a desperate effort of the Chinese people to get rid of every type of foreign invader, Manchus included.

The disturbances presented the Empress with what she most needed—a popular cause to bolster the regime. She cleverly manoeuvred the Boxers from their original aim of kicking out the dynasty and the Westerners together into becoming a tool of Manchu absolutism, which now posed as a fellow victim of the foreigners' wickedness.

The Boxers came into Peking and besieged the diplomatic quarter. They were only dispersed by an allied force consisting of British, American, Russian, German and Japanese contingents. This was the time when Kaiser Wilhelm was declaiming on the Yellow peril. He hastily equipped a big expeditionary army under Field Marshal Graf von Waldersee and shipped it to China. Arriving in China after the Boxers had been put down, the Field Marshal took over-all command as the highest ranking Western officer. With Teutonic thoroughness he sent punitive columns into the countryside, burning villages and killing the people for the crimes of the "rebels."

Though obscurantist in its thinking, the Boxer Rebellion probably helped China more than it hurt her. It taught Western powers that, weak though the country was, it might explode disastrously if they tried to make it an India. They therefore reverted to the old policy of careful joint encroachment instead of outright colonization.

It did not, however, lead them to abandon the support of the dynasty. They now needed a strong man to stand between them and the people—strong in relation to China, not to them. The only "strong man" in sight was that strong old lady, the Dowager. With a fine sense of self-preservation, Tzu Hsi turned a somersault and fell into the role. Like the Emperor Hirohito in 1946, she blossomed forth as a partisan of "moderation" and hunted down the Boxer leaders for the foreigners.

It was in this period that the "corporate" form of imperialist control was finally codified by the Open Door and Equal Opportunity policy in its twentieth-century form. In laying it down the American Secretary of State, John Hay, made specific mention of the integrity of China, decrying partition and spheres of influence. While revolutionaries were eschewed, the need for introducing more modern features into the country was recognized. America took the lead in applying the indemnity which China was forced to pay for the Boxers' deeds to the education of selected students in American universities. This example was later

followed by some of the other powers.

But at the same time new inroads were made on China's sovereignty. She was subjected to the final humiliation, the stationing of foreign troops in her capital and along the railway leading from the capital to the sea. Her coastal fortifications were dismantled. The 15th U.S. Infantry Regiment was among the "Boxer protocol" garrison which was to remain in the country until the Sino-Japanese War.

5. The Roots and Work of Sun Yat-sen (1866-1911)

While the Chinese state was being whittled down by Western imperialism, the contact of the Chinese people with Western progress was constantly expanding. A limited number of students went to study abroad and in schools in Hong Kong and the foreign concessions.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, many countries were being reconstructed on modern lines. Foreign companies in search of cheap contract labour indentured South China peasants under semi-serf conditions and transported them abroad. As early as the 1850's scores of thousands had been taken into the United States to help build the Union Pacific Railway. Much greater numbers went to work in Malayan and Javanese plantations and mines. As the years passed, many of them attained a degree of prosperity. A few railways and factories were also built by foreign capital in China herself. Technical skill began to spread.

It was an important coincidence that the greatest emigration took place from provinces in which the Taiping Uprising was a living tradition. Many of the first workers to go abroad were themselves Taiping survivors, who could be hired for practically nothing because it was dangerous for them to stay at home. The "overseas Chinese" settlements were therefore consciously and militantly anti-Manchu. They had had an anti-Manchu tradition even previously, being Ming dynasty survivors and followers of the great XVIIth century sea rebel. Subsequent comings and goings between men and the homelands implanted new ideas. They began to send back money for Western-style improvements in their old villages and an island of relative modernism grew in South China where the ground had already been broken by the region's long history of international trade.

Just after the Taiping Uprising ended, a boy named Sun Yat-sen was born into a middle peasant family in a village not far from Canton. He grew up close to the land and the people who cultivated it. As a child he spent endless hours listening to the older men as they sucked at their pipes and discussed how they had fought and almost overthrown the dynasty, how they had just missed creating a China of the common

man. Emigrant members of Sun's family sent him to school first in Honolulu and then in Hong Kong.

At first all that impressed Sun in these cities was the chance for a better life which Western knowledge had created. He resolved to become a doctor, studying first at the American-operated Canton Medical College and then at Hong Kong University, where he graduated. He read John Stuart Mill and Montesquieu and found that both instructors and students were discussing democracy and the rising European socialism. In controversies between democratic intellectuals, who wanted a republic, and the constitutional monarchist reformers, he took the Republican side.

Soon Sun began to stand out from the others. They approached the new theories in a bookish way or, inspired by contemporary Anarchism, devised bomb plots to assassinate Manchu officials. Sun thought over all he read in terms of his home village, the Taiping heritage, and the possible contributions of overseas countrymen.

Because his judgment was sound he was listened to as a leader. Practical and indefatigable, he organized as well as persuaded. The overseas Chinese gave him money. He used it to travel and write to every country where young Chinese were studying. Every group of graduate students that returned to China to practice the professions or enter civil and military service contained some adherents of his ideas. Two-way contact was established and maintained. Sun was patient. He did little but this for more than twenty years, before and after the Boxers. Thus China's first real political party, which after many changes of name became the Kuomintang, was born.

Sun Yat-sen knew that the dynasty was ramshackle and needed only a good spark to blow it up. But the first insurrectionary attempts by small "action groups" failed and their participants were executed. So the revolutionaries began to think in terms of a rising of the new army that the Manchus were attempting to form. This army was composed of Chinese and was officered by men who had studied outside the country.

The groundwork was well laid and the rest happened almost by itself. Sun was not on the spot at all, but lecturing in Denver, Colorado, when he heard in 1911 that a part of the Hankow garrison had risen against the dynasty. No one had expected this, least of all the foreign powers and their diplomats on the spot who, as always, could not see through the surface pomp of the government to which they were accredited to the growing upheaval beneath. Besides, that government still seemed, in the short view, "good for business." The United States, under the Republican administration of President Taft, had just underwritten a sizeable Wall Street loan to the Manchu government as a

paying concern, thus acquiring a vested interest in its survival. The ferment that culminated in the military revolt had begun as a spontaneous popular protest against this loan to a regime no Chinese wanted to see strengthened. Poo-h-pooed at first by all observers, it spread like wildfire through the country.

The Dowager Empress had died three years before. The Emperor was an infant in arms, who as Pu Yi was to become the puppet ruler of Manchukuo twenty years later. The high command of the army advised the imperial family to abdicate because the forces could no longer be trusted. Sun rushed to London and secured a promise from the British Government to keep its hands off and to prevent the Japanese from intervening. This helped the revolutionists.

The imperial structure that had governed China under many ruling families, for thousands of years, crumbled almost like the walls of Jericho, at the sound of trumpets alone. Long as the Western powers had shielded it, the example of the West destroyed it.

The American reaction to this event was interesting. The people of the United States, remembering their traditions, responded with enthusiasm. But Washington, then immersed in the first great period of Dollar Diplomacy, was frightened and uneasy. Subsequent folklore assumes vaguely that America supported Sun Yat-sen as a bearer of American ideals. The facts, which can be checked in any good history book, show that the government of world's greatest Republic was the last to abandon hope for the survival of the world's worst and oldest despotism.

6. Revolutionary Facade : Counterrevolutionary Reality (1911-1917)

The political change in China was not a revolution as we understand it. The first well-directed wind had blown away its moth-eaten imperial robes, but Chinese society remained exactly what it was. In the village sat the landlord. In the government office sat the old bureaucrat. There might be ferment on top, but through the length and breadth of the countryside there was not much more perturbation than had greeted a change of emperors.

Certainly no change of dynasties had ever been accomplished with so little bloodshed. After the first tentative flurry of shooting died down the most warlike sound to be heard was the click of scissors cutting off 400,000,000 Manchu-imposed queues. In 1644, Martinius tells us, the people had fought valiantly for their old hair-dos and against the Manchu style. No group in all China attempted to fight for its pig-tails in 1911.

Sun Yat-sen hurried home and his followers proclaimed him Presi-

dent at Nanking. But the "solid gentry" of China did not approve. The Diplomatic Corps in its guarded fortress looked coldly on the "doctrinaire demagogue." The peasant masses were unawakened. What strength Sun had was in central and southern provinces. Peking and the old Central Government machinery were in the hands of his unexpected ally, Yuan Shih-k'ai, the general whose armies the Manchus had considered their last prop.

Yuan was an ambitious timeserver, the kind that moves in on revolutions when it cannot smash them. He had been the military hope of the 1898 reformists, but had betrayed them to the Empress Dowager. Now he told Sun and his young men that they could have their republic, if he was made President. He had the troops. The foreign powers favoured him. He was the kind of official they could understand. Sun was afraid of civil war and resigned in his favour.

Seldom had revolution and counterrevolution followed each other with such smoothness. The old functionaries pulled in the Imperial Dragon Pennant and put out the five-barred flag of the Republic.⁵ After what were perhaps the most corrupt and fragmentary elections in history, a Parliament was formed, with a Senate and a House of Representatives. Most of the members of the two houses were feudal gentlemen who took bribes and did as they were told. The Kuomintang delegation soon withdrew and Sun took up his quarters in Canton—part rebel, part conscience.

World War I broke out shortly afterwards. Europe became too busy with her own bloodletting to put much pressure on China. Japan took advantage of the situation to claim exclusive concessions. Yuan acceded without much difficulty. He was dreaming of a throne and was willing to pay for any backing he could get.

The public relations job for the next episode was handled by an American Ph.D., Frank Goodnow, the first of a long line of foreign stooges for Chinese reaction. Goodnow wrote scholarly theses to prove that, after all, only a monarchy would suit Chinese traditions and temperament. His effusions impressed foreign interests and governments, which firmly believed that the best way to deal with a semicolonial population was to install a strong man who could keep his own people quiet and return favour for favour. This had long been standard practice in the Balkans and Latin America. And what man stronger than a king?

Goodnow's essays were also waved in the faces of the not inconsiderable number of Chinese, who were so impressed with the strength

⁵ A bar each for the constituent peoples—the Chinese, Manchus, Mongols, Moslems, and Tibetans. This flag was replaced by the present "white sun, blue sky, red ground" emblem in 1927.

of the West that they had come to believe in the words of a Chinese saying, that "the foreign mind is wiser, the foreign moon is brighter, and foreign water tastes sweeter."

But if the Chinese people as a whole still did not know what form of government they wanted, they had had thousands of years in which to learn what they did not want. When Yuan boldly declared himself Emperor in 1916, revolts sprang up everywhere. Within a few weeks his hopes were shattered and he himself was dead. While it was true that China was not yet a republic, it also became clear that nothing could push her back into the old imperial mould.

Not everyone understood this. Some thought Yuan had failed because he was an upstart, and that the experiment might succeed with a "legitimate" candidate. They were soon answered. The imperial restoration to end all restorations came in 1917. The new contender was the little Manchu heir, Pu Yi. The backing was Japanese. The whole pantomime was shooed away in a few days and the "Emperor" and his entourage sought shelter in the Dutch Embassy.

7. What Happened After World War I (1918-1924)

The next phase in China was the "war lord" decade. Those who point to the chaos in the country at the time are inclined to forget that the whole world was in considerably worse chaos.

The end of World War I brought changes in the international and internal position in China second only to those which accompanied the first Western impact.

The joint tutelage of the powers over China was seriously impaired. Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire were knocked out of it by defeat. Russia retired by revolution. During the war Japan made hay. Supposedly fighting on the Allied side, she had occupied herself chiefly with dictating her own terms to China and taking over the old German rights in Shantung. Despite misgivings, Britain backed Japan. Under the famous Lansing-Ishii agreement of 1917, the United States also recognized Tokyo's "special rights" in China. As an additional reward for her Allied status Japan received the German Pacific Islands which she was to use to such good advantage in World War II.

After the war, however, Japan was isolated. At the Washington Conference in 1921 the United States exercised its new power as the richest country in the world and ejected her from Shantung. It repealed the Lansing-Ishii agreement, and achieved the severance of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, which threatened United States naval supremacy in the Pacific. A nine-power agreement was signed eschewing "spheres

of influence" in China. But the international balance remained shaky. Plans for the joint investment in China, such as a new bankers' "consortium" for loans, never got beyond the paper stage.

One difficulty was that since Yuan Shih-k'ai's death, there was no strong man ruling all China through whom any joint front of powers could operate, even if it had existed. The whole country seemed to have disintegrated into a kaleidoscope of dogfights between provincial militarists contending for the job. Britain and Japan each backed its own favourite. Unknown adventurers hit the world's headlines and faded out. Huge armies grew and disappeared overnight. The war lords bought each other, and each other's subordinates, with funds advanced by native or foreign patrons. They hired Chinese peasants to kill other Chinese peasants with World War I weapons which enterprising arms dealers, with or without the support of their governments, collected throughout Europe and sold to anyone who could pay.

But this was only the facade. Behind the hubbub an important social and economic development was taking place. Previously almost all Chinese businessmen in the port cities had been merchants and compradors or agents for foreign buyers and sellers. But during the war many began to put up factories. Europe was too busy fighting to make enough light industrial goods for herself, much less to ship them abroad. Japan took up some of the slack, but China cashed in on it too. For the first time, she was able to export manufactured goods. She even sold some iron and steel, manufactured in the long-moribund Hanyehping works.

When the war ended China's industrialists faced a crisis, because the quality of much of their output was non-competitive and the purchasing power of the peasantry, which lived in unchanged conditions of feudalism, was very small. They were anxious to protect what market they had by raising tariffs against foreign imports, but such action was forbidden by one of the "unequal treaties" which fixed the maximum import duty China could charge at 5 per cent. They wanted a strong nationalist government to contest these treaties, and to put an end to the militarist wars. Many of them began to take a new interest in Sun Yat-sen and his Kuomintang in their Canton enclave, the only Chinese party that had no external backing or commitments.

The economic changes were attended by cultural ones. The children of the new urban groups who attended China's universities had launched China's first student movement as a protest against the award of Shantung to Japan at Versailles. The absence of a centralized government had one advantage. The militarists were jockeying for position with such intensity that they had no time to curb freedom of inquiry.

Not hundreds, but tens of thousands of young people studied Western philosophies, from liberalism to Marxism, which had just won in Russia. Translations filled the market. They read James and Dewey, Marx and Lenin, Mill and Lincoln, Romain Rolland, H. G. Wells, Emerson, Whitman, and Maxim Gorky.

A modern press developed. A group of Chinese educationalists launched the "literary revolution," putting down the common speech in writing for the first time. Previously book Chinese was as different from the spoken language as ancient from modern Greek, or Latin from Italian. While most Chinese remained illiterate, everyone could now understand something read aloud. An avenue of communications was opened for the new thought to flow from scholars to people.

Of course industry does not consist of owners alone. The building of factories brought the machine-operating working class for the first time to the million mark. It would be absurd to say that China was "industrialized." She still is not, and these workers composed only a four hundredth of her population. Also, they were probably the most underpaid workers in the world. But there were enough of them to organize and constitute a political factor.

In 1920 Marxist intellectuals and students in China formed the Communist Party, into which they soon brought militant trade-unionists. The big strikes that followed not only demanded better living conditions but spread antimilitarist and anti-imperialist slogans.

A further change in the scene was that the "White Man's Prestige" of the old days began to disappear. After seeing the European slaughter, the "Westernizers" among the Chinese began to examine foreign achievements critically.

World War I was not China's quarrel in any sense and many of her people, including Sun Yat-sen, had opposed entry into it. When she was pulled in, the northern militarists allowed British contractors to carry 140,000 coolies abroad, not to fight but to dig trenches for the Allies—which was considered about all a Chinese was fit for. But many Chinese were also sent to Europe to work in factories. They became a part of European labour in its postwar strikes and revolts. When they came home, they brought word that not all foreigners were arrogant and wealthy and that the life they led in China was not representative. Moreover, they were able to testify that many in Europe were oppressed, fought against their masters, and did not regard themselves as "superior" to any other folk who worked with their hands. These twin experiences of so many Chinese were a source of disquiet both to the foreign element in the concessions and to Chinese officialdom.

Interestingly enough many "old China hands" among the foreigners

had been opposed to China's participation for their own reasons. With true colonial arrogance, they objected on principle to bringing servants into their masters' differences. Although hating the "Hun" like true patriots, they were very upset when enemy nationals were deprived of extraterritorial privileges and came under Chinese law. Power over German whites today would give the "natives" the idea that they could push British and American white men around tomorrow, they murmured with deep foreboding.

The same people had of course no words at all for the "unspeakable" action of Soviet Russia, which voluntarily resigned extraterritorial privileges for her citizens. Moreover, they were directly affected by the influx of tens of thousands of "White" refugees into China after the civil war. The anti-Bolsheviks arrived in the country, poverty-stricken and defeated, in a state in which no yellow men should be permitted to see Europeans. At first old China hands tried to support the Whites as unfortunate victims of circumstances, but since there were too many to take care of, they soon became irritated with them. During the succeeding years the exiles worked for whatever they could get and brought down salary rates. They were manhandled, and many of their women sold their bodies to customers of all colours when they had sold everything else.

For many years the race superiority myth had been bolstered by a proud manner, fine clothes and the prompt repatriation of occasional foreign beachcombers and destitutes by their own governments. But these refugees, poor and prideless, had no government. And where could they be sent?

3. Why Sun Yat-sen Turned to the Soviets (1923)

China like all Oriental countries, had listened avidly to the pronouncements of President Wilson and the idealistic fanfare that heralded the advent of the League of Nations. The hopes that these aroused were not even dispelled by the questionable proceedings of the 1919 international conferences which simultaneously sanctioned wartime Japan's robberies in China and insulted all Asiatic peoples, Chinese and Japanese included, by refusing to make any pronouncement on racial equality. But despite the indignation that followed, there was still a tendency to discount such blemishes on the brave new world as temporary successes of foreign reactionaries over liberals of the Wilson type.

Sun Yat-sen and the new Chinese industrialists who began to look to him shared some of these attitudes. Sun believed that foreign influence could now express itself in a new way—by modernizing China instead of sucking her blood. His plans were contained in a book called

The International Development of China which proposed that the technically advanced powers should help China to set up a stable democratic government and make tremendous investment, on fair profit terms but with no impairment of Chinese sovereignty, to provide her with railways and industries. He pointed out that this would require no more capital than had been spent for a few months of mutual murder during the war. He argued that it would preserve Western economies from crisis and give employment, both at home and in China, to their technicians and workers. But Britain and the United States both turned Sun down as a powerless crank and strove to re-establish their positions along prewar lines. They confined their dealings, as before, to the feudal officials, the war lords and their compradors.

Sun therefore turned to Soviet Russia. The Russians had declared that they were prepared to treat the Chinese as equals in all respects. They were just emerging from their own civil war and had no capital to invest. But they sent advisers and some arms to Canton and put all the experience of their own struggle at Sun's disposal.

The nature of this arrangement was entirely obscured by the cries of "bolshevist infiltration" that immediately went up. Shanghai journalists like Rodney Gilbert (who now defends the Kuomintang as a writer on the *New York Herald Tribune*) manufactured tales in which both Sun and his military lieutenant, Chiang Kai-shek, were assailed daily as blood-stained anarchists, who had gone over to the enemies of mankind. Actually, nobody had gone over to anybody. Sun and the Russian representative, Joffe, made this clear in a joint declaration which read in part:

Dr. Sun Yat-sen holds that the communistic order or even the Soviet system cannot actually be introduced into China, because there do not exist here the conditions for the successful establishment of communism or sovietism. This view is entirely shared by Mr. Joffe, who is further of the opinion that China's paramount and most pressing problem is to achieve national unification and attain full national independence, and regarding this task he has assured Dr. Sun that China . . . can count on the support of Russia.

Seeing that the Kuomintang at this time leaned largely on Chinese industry, which interpreted independence as peace, freedom from feudal shackles, and a competitive chance against the West, there is no reason to doubt that Sun meant what he said. Russia too could have had no illusions that a few technical experts could create socialism out of Asiatic backwardness. Her willingness to help Sun do what he wanted was understandable. She had just beaten foreign intervention

at home and was concerned about the possible colonization of a country whose borders ran for several thousand miles along her own. The West had made her a present of the nationalist "bourgeois-democratic" elements in Canton while it continued to dandle the moribund Peking feudal regime as its own baby. A united, independent Canton-type China that would not gratuitously take part in any coalition against her was Russia's chief aim. If the Chinese people wanted to go further she would be glad, but she was not pushing them. Despite the subsequent urgings of political adventurers like Trotsky, Moscow was to hold to this line.

Randall Gould, now an American business executive in China, but then a United Press correspondent, recently wrote in his book *China in the Sun*:

This [the Sun-Joffe] statement can be taken as the basis on which Dr. Sun's collaboration with the Soviet Union began. It is a pity that it is not better known. Many who distrust Moscow are likely, of course, to insist that the adroit Joffe merely sold the gullible Dr. Sun a bill of goods. Yet in the rather close scrutiny which I was to keep over Soviet activities in China for some years to follow, I felt that Mr. Joffe expressed a common-sense view which was shared by his superiors in charge of policy.

Later I was to discuss China intimately with Borodin, who implemented Soviet co-operation in China. He made this attitude seem sincere, reasonable and realistic. To most Americans and to most Britons, Borodin was a mysterious fiend never seen and certainly never interviewed by respectable people. Thus it was easy for them to set up straw dummies by attributing idiotic, extreme programmes to Borodin, and then demonstrate their own acumen by proving how silly such programmes were. . . . A little more common ground on the part of all those interested in China of the period might have meant a great deal less trouble finally.

And he quotes Borodin directly⁸ saying:

In Canton may lie the future of all China. . . . There is really nothing sensational, despite misrepresentation. . . . Canton is not communistic; there is a hard struggle for political, economic and social progress such as other countries have already gone through several hundred years ago. Take the political side. Where else in the world could one have a political programme consisting only of the two words "good government."⁸

⁸ Published by Doubleday, New York, 1946.

It is puzzling in retrospect to make out why Canton was felt to be so Red, Mr. Gould comments.

9. A New Programme Is Born

The most valuable assistance that the Russians gave Sun was to suggest that if he wanted to defeat the old forces he could no longer play the game according to the traditional rules. China's political fights had always been at the top level—a contest to see who could manoeuvre his way into more posts, win over more officials and pay the largest army. The Russians argued that the only way to break this pattern was to throw the great "passive mass" of the people into the fight against reaction and foreign control. Sun Yat-sen had himself thought in these terms since his Taiping daydreams, but practically he had not found a way to do it. He accepted the new ideas gladly.

The resulting reorganization of the Kuomintang changed it into a joint coalition of everyone interested in modern development and national freedom. The Chinese Communists, who had already proved their strength among the workers, were admitted as a constituent group on an agreed common programme. Political work was begun among the peasants.

Sun Yat-sen died in 1925, shortly before the renewed party started on the historic campaigns that created the China of today. Later explainers tried to prove that, before his death, he "abandoned Communist ideas." But he could not abandon what he never had. He was simply convinced that his party, and Communists who knew that their ideal was a dream unless imperialism and feudalism were thrown back first, had a great deal of work to do together before their differences would have any importance. This conviction grew deeper and deeper. He left his followers the "Three People's Principles," a set of "Three Great Policies" for their realization and a Will.

The three principles were: National Independence, Democracy and Improvement of the People's Livelihood. Sun sometimes equated this last with socialism and sometimes not. But he invariably said that it must include the basic antifeudal principle: "The land must belong to the tillers."

The three policies were: effective anti-imperialism; co-operation with Soviet Russia; and encouragement of the workers' and peasants' movement.

The references to what Sun said rather than to what he wrote are due to the fact that he was always too occupied with practical organization to write much. Even the famous "Three People's Principles" are a transcript of lectures which were not finished, and which he himself never had time to edit completely.

The Will stated:

For forty years I have devoted myself to the cause of the people's revolution with but one end in view: the elevation of China to a position of freedom and equality among the nations. My experiences during these forty years have convinced me that to attain this goal we must bring about an awakening for our own people and ally ourselves in a common struggle with those peoples of the world who treat us as equals.

The Revolution is not yet finished. Let all our comrades follow my plan for National Reconstruction and the Manifesto issued by the First National Convention of our Party, and make every effort to carry them out. Above all, my recent declarations in favour of holding a National Convention of the People of China and abolishing the unequal treaties should be carried into effect as soon as possible.

The plan for National Reconstruction to which Sun referred made the government responsible for setting up an economy which would "provide for the four basic needs of the people: food, clothing, housing and transportation." As a stimulus to the participation of the people in government and a guard against the growth of bureaucracy, it advocated almost complete autonomy for elected district administrations. Revenue was to come from a tax assessed on the present value of land,⁸ but "all subsequent rises in value due to political improvement and social progress would be considered the public property of the people" through their local governments. All "products of the public domain, all yield from natural resources (such as mines, water power and forests)," were to be "the public property of local administrations to be used for public enterprises for the public benefit." The Central Government would give technical aid and capital only for enterprises too large to be handled by local power.⁹

This summary is from a lecture by Dr. Hu Shih, the conservative scholar who was Chinese Ambassador to the United States during some of the war years. Dr. Hu added that "a plank not included in the programme but often discussed by Dr. Sun was the idea of regulation of capital. Dr. Sun never advocated the abolition of private enterprise." A reading of the Three Principles makes it clear that he stood for state operation of railways, tele-communications, and basic industries such as steel and power "partaking of the nature of monopolies,"

⁸ Dr. Hu finds the influence of Henry George in this provision.

⁹ Reread in connection with later Kuomintang-Communist disputes on respective powers of central and local governments.

but not of light machine production, consumers' goods industries and distribution.

The First National Convention was held in 1924 and the programme it laid down embodied both the Three People's Principles and Three Great Policies. Organizationally, it provided the terms of co-operation between the Kuomintang and Communists within a common party.

The last two charges of the Will are self-explanatory.

No one can find any "Communism" here, but only a passion for democracy and progress. There is no antiforeignism, but only a determination that China should not be a second-class citizen in the world of nations.

Sun's testament on foreign policy shows that he worked with Russia because she was the only country to "treat us as equals," but did not exclude wider co-operation. He had offered, and stood for, friendship with any state that might take the same attitude, and with all people everywhere who worked for it, whether their governments did or not. This included the Communist Party within China and progressive groups abroad, with which Sun was in contact.

It remains only to add that the key sentence of the whole Will is "the Revolution is not yet finished." This is of course no less true today than it was in 1925. There has been advance along some of the lines Sun indicated and regression along others. The Sino-Japanese War has given China a greater measure of international equality in law, but not as yet in substance. Sun's local government programme has been largely implemented in some parts of the country, but not in others. The National Congress of the People he advocated as urgent twenty-one years ago has not yet been held at the moment of writing, the body summoned by Chiang Kai-shek in November 1946 not being even a reasonable facsimile. In both foreign policy and domestic measures, whether in the political or the economic sphere, his goals are still ahead. The reason for this slowness lies in the events of the next stage.

10. The Revolution Grows and Is Subverted (1925-1927)

In the year of Sun's death, the new programme became embodied in revolutionary practice. Mass mobilization replaced conspiracy and infiltration as the basic weapons in the arsenal of his followers. The sparse but strategically placed working class and the great sea of the feudal peasantry were encouraged to organise for economic demands and political action. The workers made the first use of the new power their affiliation gave the nationalist cause by completely paralyzing the port of Hong Kong, base of British colonialism and economic dominance in South China, in two great general strikes. They showed how

they could disarm the feudal war lords of North China by tying up their railways.

In the meantime Canton formed an army of an unprecedented type for China. Officers were trained from among patriotic students, workers and members of the two co-operating parties in the Whampoa Military Academy, in which Soviet civil war veterans acted as technical instructors. The President of the Academy was the rising young Kuomintang commander, Chiang Kai-shek. The dean was an even younger Communist named Chou En-lai, whose short experience included participation in the student movement and contact with left-wing tides sweeping Europe. The cadets were destined to fight together in the great Northern Expedition of 1925-1927, against each other in the bloody ten years that followed the subsequent split between the two parties, and later still on parallel fronts against Japan.¹⁰

In 1925 the armies started on their conquering march. The new "worker and peasant" policy consolidated their own base and disintegrated the rear of their enemies. Rallied by organizers, the peasants rose in the rural path of their advance. The labour unions prepared the cities for their occupation. Enemy soldiers went over to them. In an incredibly short time the South China war lords had disintegrated like a puff of smoke.

In less than two years the coalition forces were at the gates of Shanghai, the chief stronghold of foreign influence. Instead of trying to understand the Chinese upsurge and seeking to accommodate themselves to its historic inevitability, Britain, France and the United States poured troops into the country, hoping to cow it. Probably the only reason that they did not enter the military conflict directly was that while Shanghai business interests and local European commanders wanted such a course, their respective governments, and especially the American, were more cautious. They gave orders to protect foreign privileges and bases when they were attacked but could not agree on going further.

Shanghai was taken not from without but from within; by a rising of the workers led by Chou En-lai, who had gone into the city in disguise. The local militarists were driven from the Chinese-administered parts of the city even before the army approached.

The foreign interests now employed a new technique. They tried to find agents *inside* the revolutionary ranks. In doing so they showed a better understanding of the meaning of several budding conflicts in the coalition camp than many of those immediately concerned. The

¹⁰ See Chou En-lai's unity appeal to Whampoa graduates in 1943, Chapter XIV, Section 7.

Chinese industrialists were against foreign control, but they had begun to be even more afraid of the growing power of the organized workers, although it was not at that time directed against them. They and many Kuomintang officers were also frightened by the antifeudal upsurge of the peasants.

Just as the average Chinese worker and soldier was yesterday's peasant, so the industrialists and these officers were recent landlords and merchants who had paid for their factories and educations with the proceeds of feudal rents. The revolutionary programme that had looked good in the abstract and served their purposes well thus far now seemed a hindrance and a danger. They were willing to have the common people fight for them, but they wanted the fruits of victory for themselves exclusively.

Thus, at the very moment that a strong man among the old militarists became a forlorn hope, the foreigners were able to seek one in the upper Kuomintang camp. They found Chiang Kai-shek, who like his predecessors in the rôle was willing to compromise with imperialism to bridle the awakened "monster" of the people. But compared with the strong men of the past Chiang had much better bargaining power. The Western countries were really scared now and were willing to go a long way to secure a partner and policeman. The right-wing Kuomintang saw visions of what it could do with foreign financial and technical aid, once it had performed the requisite service. It is not every day that one gets paid for what one wants to do oneself. Besides, the job was not hard. The Shanghai workers had risen for, not against, Chiang Kai-shek and were unprepared for a blow from that quarter. The right wing had the advantage of the initiative.

John B. Powell, a fanatically pro-Chiang American writer, tells us what happened next in his book *My Twenty-five Years in China*.¹¹ The police of Shanghai's French concessions began negotiations with Chiang and with Tu Yueh-sen, a local Al Capone who had built his fortune on opium, to disarm and smash the workers' resistance groups which controlled the "native city." Shanghai's compradore bankers, acting for the foreigners and themselves, got Chiang to agree and made promises of immediate financial backing. Tu said he would throw in all his triggermen in return for five thousand rifles and other foreign equipment. He also wanted freedom of transit through the International Settlement (the joint base of foreign influence other than the French), from which Chinese armed forces were banned by treaty. The chairman of the Settlement Council was an American lawyer, Stirling Fessenden. On behalf of Anglo-American business, he sanctioned the plan.

¹¹ Published by Macmillan & Co., New York, 1945.

The gangsters surprised the workers and massacred thousands of them. At the same time, Chiang used his own forces elsewhere in the country to stage a sudden slaughter of thousands of local peasant and labour leaders, progressive intellectuals and Communists. He disarmed "unreliable" troops and served notice on the people's organizations by ruthless terror that their role in the revolution was over. Having helped him to power, their choice was to submit or die.

Mr. Powell has a bad conscience about the use of gangsters in Shanghai and the blood Chiang "was compelled" to shed, but consoles himself that one must fight fire with fire. He thus justifies suppression of labour with gunmen, peasants with punitive expeditions, Communists with execution, prison and torture. British and French elements in Shanghai, having had long colonial experience, probably concerned themselves more with the strategy of the situation, leaving ethics out of the picture as irrelevant. But Fessenden, like Powell, was an American, and we have the writer's word for it that he too rationalized mightily for the good of his soul.

As with all such episodes, the ugly reality was immediately sugar-coated with legend. How important the perpetuation of this legend is still considered I was recently to experience in a way that sheds interesting light on our freedom of the press. While in England last year, I was asked by *The Times* of London to do an article on the current situation in China, from which I had just arrived. In it I drew a parallel between certain wartime events and those of 1927, and remarked that the Kuomintang had then "massacred its leftist Allies" and suppressed the antifeudal movement on behalf of the landlords, a statement of historic Chinese political fact which was incomplete only because it failed to emphasize the imperialist factor sufficiently.

The Times, in the rewrite submitted for my consent, embellished my simple sentence to read:

After arriving in the Yangtze valley, *the Kuomintang reasserted the essentially Chinese character of the revolution as against Russian inspiration and made terms with the stabler elements of Chinese society.* Massacres of Communists took place....

This represented a complete distortion of actual events because it was precisely the Chinese elements of the revolution which suffered from the compromise with foreign domination. But as the article was only signed "A Correspondent" and I thought it was not worth jeopardizing what it had to say about more timely matters, I did not fight over this insertion.

As it happened, the article was never published because V-J Day came along, and its main content was military. But *The Times* was

kind enough to send me the final proof, to show that they had intended to print it and only events had interfered. These proofs contained a subsequent elaboration of the first "correction," which had not been shown me despite our express agreement. The passage on the origin of the split now read:

Unfortunately the disorders reached a pitch at which orderly government became impossible. The Kuomintang then made its peace with the stabler elements of Chinese society, and re-asserted the Chinese character of the revolution as against the Russian inspired movement organized by Borodin, the excesses of which had excited great opposition among all peaceful citizens. Many Chinese secret societies joined in the massacre of the leftists, and those Communists who survived went into a . . . temporary enclave [where] the Communist creed assumed an essentially Chinese form, compromising with Marxist principles . . .

It was a good thing that the article died, although that will not prevent the same version of events from being peddled again and again. But note the terms of the swindle, "Russian inspiration" as one factor in the revolution, which it was, though not in the *Times* sense, was replaced by "the Russian-inspired movement organized by Borodin," as if Canton had no roots in Chinese history. Now the Kuomintang had made terms "with the stabler elements," not for its own ends but under the pressure of "all peaceful citizens" who could no longer tolerate the "disorders." The people, in fact, had risen against the left (and slaughtered the people!). Where were Tu's gangsters, the French police and Mr. Fessenden?

Finally, to justify the subsequent course of the article, which praised the current war efforts of the Chinese Communists, it was carefully explained that, after a curative little bleeding in the old medical tradition, their red had paled and they too had become "national." What had the Chinese peasants and workers they led been when they continued to oppose imperialism after Chiang compromised with it?

Russians, by the definition of the *Times* editor who last tailored the manuscript.

I do not record this story out of any special animus against the British Press, or *The Times* of London which, especially during the late war years, had a better score of fairness and fact-facing than some newspapers which never cease boasting their liberalism. Similar and even cruder distortions may be read any day of the week in American dailies of equal standing, such as the *New York Times*, whose editorial writers seem to specialize in ignoring facts conscientiously printed in their own news columns—to say nothing of the Hearst and Scripps-Howard brand

of journal. The point I am making is that the truth on some subjects is considered unfit to be entrusted to the ordinary reader, and all manner of editorial hurdles, form suppression to garbling to unwarranted headlines, are erected to see that it isn't.

The history of the Chinese revolution is one of these subjects.

11. The Winner: Hirohito

In China herself, after 1927, the powers proceeded on the "Russian" pretext. Not because they believed it to be true, but because it suited their general plans. The intervention to crush the Soviet Revolution in Russia itself had failed. Instead a revolutionary wave had rocked Europe and Asia as well. Then the tide had turned. All over the world, the wave had been halted. Those it had terrified were closing in once more on "the base" where the first disturbance had occurred.

While the jealously preserved immunity of Shanghai's International Settlement had been waived to accommodate Tu Yueh-sen's thugs, an even more radical breach of the sacred code occurred in Peking, where the northern militarists were living their last days. With the consent of the Diplomatic Corps, Chinese police entered the foreign-guarded Legation Quarter and raided the Soviet Embassy. The raid was of a pattern with similar incursions into Russia's semidiplomatic trade delegations in London and New York. It was said at the time that documents found in Peking definitely established Russian efforts to "bolshelize" China. But Randall Gould tells us that these papers "were forgeries of the crudest sort, concocted by White Russians...and employing the old Russian alphabet instead of the simplified style invariably used by the Soviet regime."

A breach of diplomatic relations between China and Russia followed immediately. Even earlier, the Kuomintang had sent Borodin home and expelled consuls in other parts of the country. In Canton, where right-wing troops smashed a last-minute workers' revolt, some members of the Soviet Consulate were dragged out of their offices and killed, the women by having stakes driven into their sexual organs. The first phase of Sino-Soviet contacts came to an abrupt end, and the two countries were isolated from each other and no longer officially on speaking terms.

In the meantime, the powers were strengthening the new strong man. Just as the Boxer revolt, though it was smashed, had done much to frighten the boldest advocates of partition, so the 1924-1925 campaigns, though they did not achieve their goals, led to the disappearance of a few of the formal shackles on Chinese sovereignty. To consolidate the position of the right-wing Kuomintang, the restrictions of China's

freedom to set her own import tariffs were relaxed. The League of Nations sent Chiang Kai-shek advisers on highway construction and anti-epidemic measures. Retired American army men like Colonel Chennault, who later returned to the service and played such an important part in the war against Japan, came to train pilots for him with Washington's blessing.

The Kuomintang armies continued on their way to North China, leaving pockets of revolutionary troops, later to become the Chinese Red Armies, behind them. Now their progress was of a different character, with not much to distinguish it from the campaigns of the old militarist civil wars. With both the foreigners and Chinese feudal groups behind him, Chiang did not find the rest of the road difficult. He fought some of the demoralized old war lords and took in others as vassals. An ominous incident occurred in Shantung, where Japan, which did not like his Anglo-American backing, landed troops to bar his way for a while. But the business was smoothed over and Chiang was soon in control of the whole country.

What followed this national "unification"? The Chinese Government, which had ridden to power on the protest against Unequal Treaties with the West, now tried to show the West its "reliability" by attacking the only country which had voluntarily abolished them. Although the Soviets had given up extraterritoriality and concessions, they retained a commercial half interest in the Chinese Eastern Railway, built through Manchuria in the Czarist days. The status of the railway had been regulated by a mutual agreement, on equal terms. In 1929 the Chinese authorities tried to disrupt the agreement and began to arrest the Russian personnel. The U.S.S.R., alone of the powers, maintained no troops on Chinese soil. But after the arrests it sent units into Manchuria to guard the line, overcoming resistance along the border. The old terms were then reestablished and the troops withdrew at once.

Simultaneously, the "unity" under China's new strong man began to crack. Not only were the shattered popular forces reforming their ranks, but war-lordism reared its head once more. Chiang had been so elated by success that he had dealt unceremoniously with brother generals as well as the rank and file. Perhaps not appreciating the extent to which he had returned the country to foreign mercy, he also appeared somewhat "arrogant" to foreign eyes. In 1928 a section of his own right Kuomintang rebelled and established an autonomous preserve in the southern provinces, which the British in neighbouring Hong Kong regarded with some benevolence. In the north the Japanese gave encouragement to a revolt by Yen Hsi-shan and Feng Yu-hsiang, with the connivance of the self-styled "left" Kuomintang adventurer

Wang Ching-wei, who had also had a hand in the southern schism. Slowly but surely Chiang was being squeezed from his position of autocrat into one of a feudal king who is chief only among his barons and not much more powerful than some of them. There was imminent danger that the trend back to war-lordism would go the whole way, that Chiang would be reduced still further and become nothing more than the regional war lord of lower Yangtze, a sort of gatekeeper for Shanghai's back yard.

As China's old weaknesses reasserted themselves, things began to go badly in the West also. The prosperous twenties came to a sudden end with the great crash. All Europe and the United States were shaken. Chinese industry and trade, which had hoped for so much from its tariff emancipation, found itself involved in the common economic catastrophe. As in the rest of the world, factories closed in Shanghai, Tientsin, Mukden and Canton.

Suddenly manufactured crisis after manufactured crisis began to shake South Manchuria, where Japan had had the dominant power since she defeated the Czar's armies and navies in 1905 (the only remaining Russian railway interests were in the north). Although it was not clear at first, the meaning of these preliminary shocks was to unfold in the following years. We now know that China's great testing, delayed by various factors for a hundred years, was now upon her. For the first time in her modern history a foreign aggressor was so favoured by her weakness, and by the international climate, that he could launch a campaign for her complete conquest.

The winners of the lottery were the Japanese. When this combination of circumstances finally occurred they were on the spot, virtually unhampered, and both eager and organized for war.

12. Balance of a Century

Another thing which only a few unheeded "alarmists" predicted then, and which we all know by hindsight now, is that Japan's Manchurian aggression was the opening chapter of World War II. It initiated the train of events which forced not only China but the West and U.S.S.R. as well to fight on the same side for survival.

Against the background of that knowledge we can return to our original questions.

Were the forces striving to make China independent and strong antiforeign?

On the contrary, they were inspired by "foreign" ideas from the beginning. The Taipings believed in a kind of Christian equalitarianism. The constitutional reformers of 1898 had imbibed conservative Western

theories of government. Sun Yat-sen thought in terms of British and American liberalism and social progressivism. The Chinese Communists, who appeared at the very end of the period we have just considered, were Marxists but did not consider China ripe for socialism. All these groups were anti-imperialist but without exception they believed in friendship and co-operation with other nations. The West opposed all of them and was responsible for many of their defeats. Their gains were made in the teeth of foreign backing for their feudal enemies.

As a result, feudalism, under many successive labels, continued to dominate China's economy and her seats of power. But the political influence of the progressive movement, and the armies of a section of it, were sufficiently strong to carry the nation into resistance to Japan after 1937. Subsequently they kept China in the war, and the West, when it was itself attacked, had an ally.

Just as there is no telling who would have won the war if China had collapsed before Pearl Harbour, so there is no telling what would have happened if the protest movements of the Chinese people during the past century had not kept the country from being transformed into a colony that would have figured only as a passive prize in the West's war with Japan. But experience suggests the answer. Throughout World War II no Far Eastern colony, once penetrated, could be defended. It was because China was a nation, not a colony, that she was able to summon resources to stand the test.

Were the groups the foreign powers backed for a hundred years "pro-foreign"?

The answer is No. Feudalism had tried to keep the gates of China shut for centuries, and only opened them to foreign guns because it was too weak to resist. It never reconciled itself to the influence of outside ideas among the people, and used not only repressive measures but also obscurantist racialist arguments to oppose them. It was subservient to foreign imperialism because it feared its own subjects. At the same time the only kind of "popular movement" it dared call on to preserve itself against excessive foreign demands was a purely racial one. The Manchus suppressed the Taipings but tried to use the Boxers.

If Chinese reaction had succeeded in building real strength both nationally and internationally along these lines, as its Tokyo counterparts were able to do under the sponsorship of a foreign power that needed them, there might have been two Japans on the Axis side instead of one. As it happened, it remained weak and furnished the temptation for the Japanese attack. During the war China's rulers were to waver crazily between resistance and capitulation, the United Nations and the Axis. They revived the old racialist spirit to combat both their own progressives and the Western Allies at the very moment

when this was convenient to Japan and most dangerous to China's own freedom.

The first and only antifeudal gesture of the Western powers in their first century of contact with China was that of General Stilwell in 1944, which we mentioned at the beginning of the chapter. It came as an attempt to institute military co-operation between the United States and the Communist-led Chinese Maquis, because the armies of old China were neither a sufficient nor a dependable ally. In other words, it was directly dictated by America's necessities at the time. But even at the height of the war the alliance of Chinese feudalism and Western reaction reasserted itself. Stilwell and his policy were removed from the scene before the co-operation he sought had been implemented by a single Lend-Lease rifle.

Is it correct to call Chinese reaction "nationalist"? Were democratic-Communist coalitions of 1924-1927 and the present time "Russian created"?

History shows that the Western powers have always tried to find a strong man in the ranks of Chinese reaction. At the same time, Chinese feudalism, from Wu San-kwei on, has been wont to call in foreign strong men to help it when the people threatened. It operated this way under Manchu absolutism, the 1911 "Republic," the war lords and the right-wing Kuomintang. Britain's General Gordon was its first Western strong man. America's General Wedemeyer, after V-J Day, was the latest. The Chinese people have never liked their Wu San-kwei's, ancient or modern, and the nationalist credentials of their masters are highly suspect.

The modern, national, antifeudal revolution in China was no more created by the Russians than was the Taiping Uprising of 1850-1864, which tried to solve the same problems many decades before Soviet Russia existed. On the other hand it is quite true that the Soviets, since their emergence, have stimulated the hopes of national independence and antifeudal movements not only in China but throughout Asia. Marxism has strengthened itself in these movements by several roads. First there has been the prestige of the Russian example. Secondly, Marxist thought alone had treated Asia's problems from the viewpoint of the basic cultivator and the seeker for a key to change. Thirdly, the application of Marxism by the Chinese Communists has still further impressed the colonies and semicolonies, because it operated in a milieu strikingly like their own.

The trend towards the Soviets in the foreign relations of Asiatic revolutionary movements is also not difficult to explain. Besides ideological and racial equality factors, it must not be forgotten that the U.S.S.R., in only thirty years, has grown from a state not too different

from that of the larger Asiatic countries today to that of a great power. China and India, on the other hand, have not yet solved the basic problems of literacy and progress that faced them in the seventeenth century. Who should their peoples look to? To the countries that have put hurdles in the way of their progress? They will not regard these countries as friends until the record of obstruction is reversed. Meanwhile they only see that Britain, even under a labour government, behaves no differently from the past. And the United States, which they did not consider an active defender of colonialism, has begun to be one. This is a change, but hardly a favourable one in Asiatic eyes.

These are the lessons of history and the world situation. They are in no way rendered inoperative by the atomic bomb. Weapons have been matched against movements before. The British Army and the Hessians were staked against the American Revolution. The forces of all Europe were ranged against the French, brought Napoleon on themselves, defeated him, and still did not stop the ideas of 1789. The 1918-1922 intervention against Russia suffered a failure. What is needed is not a new bomb but the recognition of Asiatic independence and equality. The only way force could "succeed" where it has so often failed before would be if Asia's billion inhabitants were atomized off the face of the earth. This would be the logical conclusion of General Wedemeyer's remark, quoted by Drew Pearson in early 1946, that "the function of U.S. *military* power was to stop Soviet *political* expansion in China." It is doubtful if less would suffice because the days of the Gunboat Policy are over, and gunboats never scared an awakened people but only the feudal officials while the people still slept. Now the people are awake.

Moreover, the political expansion the General referred to is not Russian at all but the result of the interaction of two facts as hard as rock, the forward movement of the Asiatics themselves and the existing contrast between Western and Russian policies in Asia. Neither created the other. Since the combination of the two occurs inside people's heads, where armies cannot function, the General's task becomes formidable indeed.

But now we must return to our story and the Japanese attempt to conquer China, which was an even bigger attempt to destroy "politics" with the sword.

IV. CHINA'S ERA OF APPEASEMENT

IN 1931, WHEN AMERICA AND WESTERN EUROPE WERE IN THE WORST throes of the great depression, Japan seized Manchuria. Although several Chinese generals, with their troops, resisted heroically and the people of all China clamoured for resistance, Chiang Kai-shek's government in Nanking took no military action. Instead it contented itself with appealing to the League of Nations, which also did nothing.

The success of Japan, then a relatively weak power, in carrying off her grab with complete impunity was no accident. Long before Hitler it showed what an aggressor can do when favoured by internal and international disunity in rival ranks.

China was once more in the situation that had weakened her throughout the modern period. The national unity of 1925-1927 had been broken by Chiang Kai-shek, who turned on his own people and based his power on a small, foreign-backed minority of the old Chinese ruling class. As in the years of war-lordism, different sections of that class sought the aid of different foreign powers to gain supremacy, and the year 1930 had been marked by civil war between Chiang, who was favoured by Britain and America, and Wang Ching-wei and Yen Hsi-shan, whom the Japanese regarded with a hopeful eye.

The United States protested against the Manchurian invasion, but the Japanese no doubt noticed that the protests died to a whisper when they moved north toward the Siberian border and grew to a roar when their troops struck southward, toward the Tientsin-Peiping area. Moreover, they drew comfort from the fact that Washington's policy had been isolationist for a decade and America was not a member of the League of Nations.

Britain was the only leading power within the League which could possibly mobilize it to respond to the Chinese appeal and undertake even

the limited anti-Japanese measures advocated by U.S. Secretary of State, Stimson. Even if she could not swing the League she could act on her pledges as a co-signatory, with the United States, France, Japan, and others of the Nine-Power Treaty of 1921, which guaranteed China's integrity. But Britain's Tory government still remembered the old anti-Russian Anglo-Japanese alliance with regret and did not see Japan's invasion of Manchuria as an unmixed evil. On the contrary, it was relieved that Tokyo had chosen to strike where it threatened Russia rather than Britain's own sphere of influence in the Yangtze Valley. In China itself, the British saw the rising Chinese demand for the abolition of extraterritoriality and concessions, which America regarded with some indulgence, as a much graver menace than anything that came from Tokyo. Many in London felt that the new situation gave them the opportunity of seeking Japanese support for their own interests in return for a guarantee of non-intervention in Manchuria. At the same time they foresaw that a Chinese government forced to go begging for foreign support would be much less forward in its campaigns against Western privilege.

This attitude was well exemplified by Mr. L. S. Amery, a member of the Cabinet, who said at the time: "Who is there among us to say that Japan ought not to have acted with the object of...defending herself against...a vigorous Chinese nationalism? Our whole policy in India, our whole policy in Egypt, stands condemned if we condemn Japan." Britain's Foreign Secretary, Sir John Simon, carried the same outlook to the League of Nations debates. Along with expressions of sympathy for China, he advanced so many arguments in justification of the Japanese action that Mr. Matsuoka, the Tokyo delegate, declared afterwards that he could not have done better himself.

In defending her aggression, Japan made very liberal use of the red herring, posing as the defender of civilization against Russian Communism. Those who think all problems can be solved by isolating the U.S.S.R. today would do well to recall the situation at that time, when Russia was as isolated as anyone could possibly wish.

In 1931, fourteen years after the 1917 revolution, the United States had not yet recognised her government as legal. Only three months before the Manchurian invasion, President Hoover had said to an interviewer from the *San Francisco News*: "To tell the truth, the ambition of my life is to stamp out Soviet Russia." Britain was the centre of anti-Soviet activity in Europe. Chiang Kai-shek had severed diplomatic relations with Moscow in 1927, amid Western applause, and the rupture had not yet been healed.¹ Russia stood alone and everyone else

¹It was only in 1933 that both the U.S.A. and China instituted normal

was much less interested in enlisting her aid to check Japan than in diverting Japan so that she might come to blows with Russia and no one else.

The Soviet Union's first reaction to the Manchurian invasion was to condemn it in the sharpest terms in its press. Foreign Commissar Litvinoff declared officially that although his country would like to take part in a real effort to stop hostilities in China, the League powers showed no signs of united action to this end.

Izvestia did not spare Chiang Kai-shek and predicted that "this new and unheard-of degradation will doubtless reveal to the Chinese people the degree of weakness to which the country has been brought by Kuomintang feudal-bourgeois reaction, the shameful agents of Imperialism." But at the same time the U.S.S.R. gave shelter to Chinese forces retreating across the frontier from Manchuria² and disregarded Japanese protests against this action. To discourage Japanese attempts on its own borders it built up its Siberian defense and created the Special Far Eastern Army as a major part of its military establishment.

As a result Japan's next blow was aimed not at the mobilized north but into Britain's traditional sphere. In 1932 her forces attacked Shanghai. The Chinese Nineteenth Route Army, a semi-autonomous formation which did not belong to the Central Government, fought magnificently for two months. Students of every university in China held demonstrations to demand war. War against Japan was actually declared by the small Chinese Soviet state which Chiang Kai-shek was trying to suppress in the interior parts of Southeast China. But the government, instead of arousing the people, signed a truce agreeing to withdraw Chinese troops from Shanghai while permitting the Japanese garrison to remain. The drubbing administered to Chinese nationalism and the timely truce that followed were approved by foreign business interests in Shanghai, which did not like to see the "natives" get too big for their shoes. The intermediary in the truce negotiations was the British Ambassador.

In 1933 Japanese troops made irruptions inside the Great Wall—from Manchuria into "China Proper." Local resistance and nationwide indignation again followed and the government signed another armis-

relations with the U.S.S.R. The chief cause in both cases was the advance of Japanese aggression. But the chance to consolidate these relations into joint defense arrangements was not taken. In the next five years the Kuomintang proceeded with its civil war and the United States sold scrap to Japan and elaborated on "neutrality." So when the Japanese invaded China Proper in 1937 they were again favoured by an international vacuum.

²Some of these men were repatriated through Sinkiang. Others re-entered Manchuria with the Red Army in 1945.

tice, once more regularizing the position created by Japan's military aggression.

In 1935 Japanese penetrated still further. Ho Ying-chin, the fascist-minded War Minister who until just the other day was still Chief of Staff of China's armies, signed a truce with General Umetsu, then Tokyo's commander in North China. He agreed to withdraw not only Chinese troops but also Central Government civil organs and the local offices of China's ruling party—the Kuomintang—from the great cities of Peiping and Tientsin and to set up instead a kind of buffer area administered by officials, and garrisoned by local troops acceptable to Japan. He also guaranteed to suppress the anti-Japanese activities of the Chinese people—as “disturbing our relations with a friendly state.”³ Throughout China in this period it was a capital crime to maintain that resistance to Japan should precede “the total extermination of the Communist bandits,” or the complete victory of the Kuomintang in the civil war which had lasted for ten years and seemed likely to last forever.

In short, from 1931 to 1937 there was a war in China but only one side was fighting it—the Japanese. The Kuomintang Government did not even sever diplomatic relations with the aggressor who was making war on it. It met every new robbery with feeble protests followed by cease-fire orders to local resisters and agreements (the Japanese struck and threatened; only China “agreed”) to acquiesce in the robbery. Its primary method was appeasement. The hallmarks of the method will be familiar to readers because in the West too there was a war between 1935 and 1939 in which only one side fought—the Rome-Berlin gangster alliance—in which robber acts in the Rhineland, Abyssinia, Spain, Austria and Czechoslovakia were condoned and recognized, in which the Czech people not only were told to cease fire but were not even allowed to open fire in their own defense.

Eastern and Western fascism had another method in common. Both Japan and Germany pretended that they were not creeping up on their gullible next-marked victims, but that they were merely “securing their rear” for a battle against “the common enemy, Communism, and its home, the Soviet Union.” Everywhere they called their military alliances and preparations by such names as the Anti-Comintern Pact. One observer wrote of the League hearings that “the Japanese delegate in Geneva quickly realized that if only he could make his hearers see ‘Red’ they would be almost willing to believe that black was white.”⁴

³An instructive contrast to the Kuomintang's belligerency in every difference with Moscow, before or after.

⁴H. Vere Redman, who then advocated British recognition of a Japanese “Monroe Doctrine” for China and Manchuria, and during World War II headed the Far Eastern Division of the London Ministry of Information, in

The bait was happily swallowed by suckers in both East and West. In the Orient it prevented the democratic powers from really backing up China. But it is important to understand, despite Chinese official propaganda to the contrary, that this lack of external support was not the main reason for the Nanking government's own appeasement. Both the Western powers which appeased aggressors at the expense of peoples like the Czechs and Chinese, and the Kuomintang Government which appeased at the direct expense of its own people and territory, had forgotten the simple wisdom in the Chinese proverb which says that if you feed a hungry tiger breakfast he will come to the same place for his lunch and dinner.

The Japanese method in China during this period was progressive military aggression. The Chinese Government's reaction to it was progressive diplomatic appeasement.

But China is not only a government. What about the people?

We have already answered this question in part. The Chinese students, who have traditionally sounded the first bugle calls of national movements against foreign aggression and domestic reaction, protested, against each step of compromise and appeasement. In 1931 and 1932 they called for support of the local resistance in Manchuria and Shanghai, promoted and led a nationwide boycott of Japanese trade and commandeered trains to take delegations from all over the country to the then Chinese capital at Nanking. One group which failed to get a satisfactory explanation of government policy from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. C. T. Wang, gave him a beating in his own office which caused him to resign in terror.

In 1933 they made their voice heard again, despite the campaign of arrests and executions launched against them by a government which should have been devoting its energies to resisting the national enemy.⁵

Their demonstrations in December 1935 were unprecedented in scope and included among their slogans not only the declaration of war against Japan but the immediate cessation of civil war against the Chinese Red Army and the mobilization of every Chinese soldier, of whatever political complexion, for national resistance.

The students were followed by others. In 1936 and the earlier part of 1937 the demand for unity and resistance broadened to all strata of the people. Tens of thousands of textile workers in Japanese-owned mills walked out in political strikes. A committee of eminent liberals was formed to assist them, which included the president of

his book, *Japan in Crisis*, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1935.

⁵A student manifesto of this period estimated the number of youths arrested and killed between 1927 and 1935 at 300,000.

China's most important law university, a well-known industrialist and one of the country's chief publishers. Seven of its leading members were at once arrested in Shanghai for "undermining the safety of the Republic," a crime carrying the death penalty. When they were tried, Madame Sun Yat-sen, widow of the founder of the Chinese Republic and the Kuomintang Party, demonstratively attended the court hearings to show her solidarity with them. She emerged as a leader of the National Salvation Associations, composed of all classes of the population, which sprang up throughout the country with a programme similar to that of the students and the anti-Japanese strikers.

The Kuomintang Army also grew restive. The "simple and ignorant" peasant soldier could not divest himself of the idea that the army, when all was said and done, existed for the defense of the nation. As a result he fought very badly against the Communists, often going over to them in whole divisions, and very well in occasional clashes with the Japanese, the "friendly neighbours" of the Ho Ying-chin-Umetsu truce. At the two Great Wall passes of Hsifungkon and Kupeikow even inferior Chinese troops showed not only fortitude but high offensive spirit. The men of the feudal provincial forces who fought here had lived on the country as parasites and been accustomed to have everyone's hand against them. They were both surprised and moved when delegations of people of all classes came to visit them with gifts, orators praised them as national heroes, and medical students came voluntarily to the fronts to bind their wounds.

A new thing began to happen in ancient China. Military units fought the invader not only when he shot at them, and until orders came to stop, but on their own initiative and even in defiance of orders. In 1933 and successive years the army in Chahar, under the command of Generals Feng Yu-hsiang, Fang Chen-wu and Chi Hung-chang, carried on their own war against the Japanese, a "crime" for which General Chi was executed by the Kuomintang gendarmerie and General Fang had to flee abroad for his life.

In 1934-1935 the Chinese Red Army began its Long March from Southeastern to Northeastern China under the slogans "Chinese must not fight Chinese" and "Resist Japan." It cut deeply into Shansi province, coming close to the Japanese strongholds. Tokyo threatened and blustered, declaring to the Chinese Government that if it did not head off the Communists all the various truces and agreements would be torn up. Unless Chiang Kai-shek did the job the armed forces of Japan would themselves take over the job of controlling the perverted

⁶Chi Hung-chang, a Communist, was handed over to the Kuomintang by the police of the French Concession in Tientsin.

Chinese people, who could not see the advantage of Sino-Japanese cooperation on Japan's terms.

The Chinese Government then sent an expedition against the Communists, composed of both Central and Manchurian troops, and established a special Pacification Headquarters at Sian for the purpose of "exterminating the bandits." The expedition miscarried badly. One crack German-trained Central division deserted to the Reds on first contact, while others were smashed.

The Manchurians, who thought constantly of their lost homeland and nursed a fiery hatred for the Japanese who had seized it, could also not withstand the Red Army's argument that it was a strange time for Chinese to be fighting Chinese. A sort of non-aggression agreement was negotiated between the highest officers of "suppressors" and prospective suppresses. A "united front from below" had always existed to some extent between the common soldiers of the government and the Communists, and had found expression in clandestine fraternization and voluntary surrenders. Now, for the first time, it was reinforced by a united front at the top. Alarmed, Chiang Kai-shek himself rushed to Sian to exhort the Manchurian troops on their duty to smash his internal opponents before war against Japan could even be thought of. The Manchurians replied by taking him prisoner in the famous "Sian Incident." It was only the intervention of the "Red bandits" themselves, who really believed that Japan could only be resisted by all Chinese working together, that saved Chiang from the public trial and execution, which his own thoroughly exasperated subordinates demanded. Instead of shooting Chiang and bringing on a new and larger fratricidal war, Chiang's kidnappers issued a manifesto backing the demands of the students, workers and National Salvationists—war against Japan, cessation of civil strife, the release of anti-Japanese political prisoners and the granting of civil liberties. Then they let Chiang go.

The result dumbfounded the Japanese, who were happily offering "military help to the legal Chinese government in securing the release of the Generalissimo." It also disappointed many high Chinese officers, notably Ho Ying-chin, who had been in favour of immediately using the entire air force to bomb the rebel headquarters, despite the fact that "the indispensable leader of China" was inside. Chiang Kai-shek was forced to give up appeasing the Japanese and begin to accommodate himself to the popular will. To be appeased, instead of suppressed, requires strength, and the anti-Japanese movement had proved that it was indeed strong.

The civil war ceased. Political prisoners began to trickle out of the jails, concentration camps and torture chambers. Although the military force of the government was not yet thrown against the aggressor,

it ceased to be devoted to civil war against its own people in defence of the policy of appeasement.

The war with Japan had entered a new stage. It could no longer be fought by Japan alone. If she struck again, nothing could prevent the Chinese people and army from resisting. This was not accidental. The different streams in the anti-Japanese movement of the Chinese people had joined into a mighty river and forced this result on the Kuomintang Government.

Chiang Kai-shek was a stubborn man but a realistic one also. When the Japanese arranged a new provocation in North China with the intention of probing the extent of China's new unity and destroying it if it was real, he did not shilly-shally. Instead of repeating that internal opposition must be suppressed first, he declared that the limit of China's endurance had been reached.

The vision of Chinese unity in resistance had proved correct. China stood up to fight as one.

PART THREE

When China Stood Alone

V. ONE WAR: TWO FORCES; TWO BATTLEFIELDS

IT HAS BECOME ALMOST BROMIDIC TO QUOTE THAT ASTUTE OLD Prussian, Clausewitz, who said that "war is a continuation of politics by other and more violent means."

Seldom has it been possible to trace this truth as clearly as in the development of China's war, in which each political trend was encased in its own physical body. As we have seen, two internally antagonistic forces entered the war against Japan. One was the contemporary expression of the movement which for so many years had battered away at foreign control and internal feudalism. It comprised the Chinese Red Army, which had been born of the worker and peasant upsurge of the '20s and fought for ten years for agrarian reform, and the students and intellectuals who had spearheaded the anti-Japanese struggle. The other was the state machine built to defend the ruling groups of old China against the people, which had finally been pushed to take up arms against the Japanese invasion. This included the Kuomintang Party leadership, the industrialists and bankers of the cities, some semi-autonomous provincial rulers and the landlords of the countryside.

The united war against Japan came on the heels of civil war and found both forces with their own armies. The two armies faced the might of Japan in different parts of the country and operated in different ways dictated by their distinct composition, political traditions and military experience. Similar situations, of course, existed in Europe. The armies of prewar France were defeated by Germany in 1940, and the Maquis arose afterwards. The army of old Yugoslavia was also smashed, but Tito arose in the bowels of the Nazi occupation to create a new country. The peculiarity of the Chinese situation was that

there were two armies at the beginning of the war and still two at the end, although the balance of forces between them changed very radically.

In China, throughout her struggle with Japan, there were two fronts. Thorough understanding of this fact, which was obscured for a long time because Chungking censored all the outlets, is basic to an understanding of the military events of 1937-1945 and the political changes which they brought.

The first, or "regular," front was of the obvious, orthodox type, with the Chinese forces on one side and the Japanese on the other. The Chinese troops on this front belonged to the Central Government and the provincial generals standing in a position of feudal allegiance to it. Their only fighting experience, with very few exceptions, had been gained in punitive campaigns against the Communists and factional wars among themselves. They were based on the provinces, cities and communications arteries of the still unoccupied parts of the country.

Throughout the war on the regular front the Japanese were on the offensive, strategically, tactically and by "cold" methods of political and economic penetration. The Chinese on the regular front, except in the battle of Taiherhchung in 1938, spent the war on the defensive. Sometimes they retreated and sometimes they hung on and took whatever the Japanese had to dish out, as in the heroic stand in Shanghai in 1937 and the defense of Changteh in Hunan in 1943-1944. As the years dragged on, they were more and more given to sitting on stable lines, waiting for the enemy to undertake something, and hoping he wouldn't.

China's second front grew up in the enemy's rear, as did the Maquis and Tito's wartime bases. Its organizing core was formed by small units of the old Chinese Red Armies, which penetrated into the Japanese-held territory in the earliest stages of the occupation. Around this core were grouped much more numerous forces available locally, including people's resistance detachments which in many cases had arisen prior to the armies' arrival and remnants of the Chinese regular forces whose retreat had been cut off.

The front behind the enemy lines began as a series of pockets of anti-Japanese action in the wide meshes of the enemy-held communications network. Gradually, these pockets merged territorially or established contacts for co-ordinated action. *Here it was the Chinese forces who were constantly on the offensive, strategically, tactically and politically.* They recaptured territory from the Japanese where it was weakly held or denied them control of vast tracts behind their own lines which they had not had the opportunity to consolidate. Speaking technically, in the Chinese military situation as a whole this front represented a tactical offensive within the framework of a general strategic defense. Its forces were vanguards which initiated the reconquest of

Chinese territory even while the enemy was still strong enough to advance his main lines wherever he wanted. The liberated areas they established were advance bases for the hoped-for united strategic counteroffensive of all Chinese armies and the Allies who later joined them. This counteroffensive, of course, was never to materialize on Chinese soil.

There are certain other things to be remembered about these two fronts:

The main forms of warfare employed by the Chinese forces on the regular front were positional and mobile with the latter used very seldom. By contrast, warfare on the fronts behind the enemy lines was mainly guerilla and mobile, with the former predominating.

Apart from the battle of Taierhchuang, which was a notable victory, Chinese forces on the regular front were passive, holding or avoiding advancing Japanese columns when they struck. The front behind the enemy lines was constantly active, with even the smallest Chinese units constantly raiding Japanese garrisons nearest to them. If the separate resistance pockets did not constantly harass the enemy, and if the guerillas did not flow into every vacuum to form new pockets, the Japanese could very quickly concentrate forces to surround and annihilate them one at a time. The guerilla bases had to keep the enemy scattered and apprehensive of reducing his garrisons at any point, if they were to survive at all.

The regular front had a stable rear in which to recruit men. It could supply itself from industries which the Chinese Government had moved from threatened areas, or established newly and with whatever equipment could be imported from abroad. The front behind the enemy lines had to rely mainly on local man power, the economy of the guerilla pockets—which was rural and primitive—and equipment captured from the enemy.

This added economic to tactical reasons for constant efforts to enlarge the guerilla bases and to seek out and destroy the Japanese wherever they were at a disadvantage. It dictated close links with the population which could liquidate any guerilla force it did not like by denying it co-operation and refusing to keep its secrets from the Japanese, who were everywhere ready with reprisals against anyone helping the guerillas. It made it necessary not only to treat the people well but to organize and arm them to defend lives, homes and harvests against such enemy punitive action.

The fronts were interdependent. Throughout the war operations behind the enemy lines helped the regular front, by tying up and engaging an ever larger aggregate of Japanese troops. On the other hand, Chinese strategy on the regular front, which excluded offensive

activity, never prevented the Japanese from moving men against the guerilla bases when they wished to do so. As will be seen later, the Kuomintang authorities themselves soon began to impede the expansion of guerilla warfare.

But the fact that the two fronts were not always on speaking terms did not change their relationship as integral parts of the structure of Chinese resistance. Reactionary and progressive Chinese nationalists were similarly tied together. The anti-Japanese political spearhead of the era of appeasement became the anti-Japanese military spearhead of the war period. Just as its existence had aborted appeasement before the war, so it blocked capitulation and compromise with Japan in the war's later stages, because so long as China's "second front" existed, no one could enforce such capitulation on the country and people.

Now, however, we must examine the situation at the war's beginning, when Chinese unity was more real than it had ever been before. Just as the history of inner strife before and after teaches us what to expect if civil war in China becomes complete and irrevocable, so the happier interlude after Sian sheds some light on the problems of an alternative solution.

VI. UNITY ON THE REGULAR FRONT

THE FIRST TWO YEARS OF THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN WERE YEARS OF unity, both between the regular and guerilla fronts and between the old China and the new. The factor that welded them together was extreme Japanese pressure.

The names and faces in the government did not change, and executive and policy-making posts remained, as before, exclusively in the hands of the Kuomintang Party. But the Kuomintang Armies, deployed on the regular front, had stopped killing their own countrymen and begun to fight the Japanese invader.

The old oppressive laws remained on the statute books. But in practice the people were free, for the first time in a decade, to think as they pleased, talk as they pleased, and try to find a niche for themselves in the general national effort.

On the regular front students who had had their heads broken by Chinese police for daring to speak against Japan now accompanied the troops to explain the facts of Japanese aggression, and mobilize support for the army in front-line villages. Patriots who had spent years in Kuomintang prisons were employed in propaganda and what has lately become known as "psychological warfare." Chou En-lai, one of the most important leaders of the Chinese Communist Party, was appointed Vice-Director of the Political Department of the Chinese Army. Yeh Chien-ying, former Red Army Chief of Staff, was named dean of the Kuomintang Army's school of guerilla warfare. Kuo Mo-jo, well-known anti-Kuomintang writer, resumed charge of the army's propaganda department which he had held during the first United Front, 1924-1927. He had spent the ten intervening years in exile.

Several of the National Salvationist leaders jailed before the war

for supporting the anti-Japanese strikers in Shanghai and Tsingtao were made members of the new National Defence Advisory Council. While the Council was a purely consultative body with no actual powers, it at least represented recognition by the government of the necessity of giving an account of its actions to leaders of public opinion outside the Kuomintang.

The Communist Party, National Salvation group and other, smaller, independent political organizations began legally to publish newspapers, periodicals and pamphlets. Government-sponsored publications praising Hitler and Mussolini as "leaders of national Renaissance" in their respective countries began to disappear from the shelves of bookstores, probably because no one could any longer be found to read them. They were succeeded by translations of foreign democratic works, previously under censorship ban, and progressive descriptions and interpretations of China's own struggle.

The most popular song was the stirring "Chee Lai!" (March of the Manchurian Volunteers), proscribed before the war. The next most often heard was a Chinese composition called "Defend Madrid." The Chinese people felt as never before, and were allowed to express as never before, their kinship with the contemporary world-wide popular movement against fascism and aggression. They were conscious and proud of the fact that they, with the people of Spain, were the first to return blow for blow to a fascist invader.

The all-pervading prewar fear of the Kuomintang's Nazi-trained secret police was no longer evident. This organization was not disbanded, but was popularly supposed to have at last turned from hunting "Communists" (anyone suspected of dissatisfaction with the old government policy of appeasement) to ferreting out some at least of the Japanese spies for whom years of appeasement had provided such grateful soil. Its undercover assassins, who only a short time before had killed such outstanding liberal patriots as Yang Chien, President of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and Sze Liang-tsai, publisher of Shanghai's biggest newspaper, because it would have been too embarrassing to arrest them officially, were now knocking off numbers of puppets and traitors in the occupied cities—a legitimate occupation for the agents of a government at war.

The military courts no longer passed death sentences on men and women who loved their country in a different way from that prescribed by their rulers. Instead, they condemned generals who had bolted from the enemy, like Li Fu-ying, and militarists who had flirted with the enemy, like Han Fu-chu, the governor of Shantung province. One of the items in the indictment of Han Fu-chu was, even, unheard-of thing, that he had "oppressed and disarmed the people" whom the authori-

ties who framed the accusation had themselves so long oppressed, and executed for the possession of weapons. In short, if the Chinese Government was not yet representative of the people, or chosen by them, it had at least stopped beating them down and outraging their every instinct. It was even doing one or two of the things a democratically constructed government would have done had it existed, and the extreme reactionaries in its ranks, the old butchers of the people, lay low in their high-placed posts and made no protests.

The old Chinese and the new were not one, but they had ceased to fight each other and stood as allies against the common enemy. Old scores were wiped out and the people asked the Kuomintang dictatorship for only one thing, effective leadership in the war against Japan. The one-party government began to command what it had not been able to obtain in ten years of civil war and wholesale terror, the support of all groups in the country. No previous Chinese leader or government had ever enjoyed the opportunities now opened to Chiang Kai-shek and his associates, and none had ever been entrusted with such a grave responsibility.

How the new unity affected the Chinese troops on the regular front during these two years is a matter of history. The Japanese aggressors, with one of the best spy systems in the world at their disposal, had reckoned that the Chinese Army could not stand against them for more than three months. But these estimates were made on the basis of the way that army had fought for factional, and not national, interests. Now Japan's generals found to their surprise that the Chinese lines in Shanghai alone, which they not only attacked from the land but pounded with an overwhelming weight of aerial bombs and naval artillery which the defenders had no means of countering, held out for almost this length of time.

The Chinese garrison at Nanking was surrounded and smashed, and 30,000 soldiers and people in the city were massacred after its capture to convince the Chinese that to fight was to die. The harvest reaped was not fear but hatred. When Japan tried to initiate peace talks, through the German Ambassador in China as intermediary, Chiang Kai-shek, with the full backing of the people though not of all members of the government, turned the offer down.

The three-month pause in military operations after Nanking's fall was used to recruit and concentrate new military forces. When the enemy began to push forward again he got a drubbing at Taiierhchuang, which put new heart into the people of China and their friends everywhere. Realizing that they had underestimated Chinese resistance again, the Japanese brought in heavy reinforcements. Although desperate means were used to stop them, including the opening of the

Yellow River dykes, their superior war machine rolled on. By the fall of 1938 they held all the major Chinese ports and most of the country's railway network. All the Chinese cities commonly known abroad—Peiping, Tientsin, Tsingtao, Shanghai, Nanking, Hankow and Canton—were in their hands. But China still fought on and victory still eluded them.

With the exception of the battle of Taierhchuang, the tactical direction of China's resistance during this time did not shine. Officers and men can be fired to fight with courage and enthusiasm by knowledge of the rightness of their cause. But the function of command, and the proper organization of troops for specific as well as general tasks, are things that do not come of themselves. The unshrinking three-month ordeal of the Central Army in the Shanghai meat chopper made every Chinese proud and ready for sacrifice and served notice on Japan and the whole world that China was no push-over. But the very duration of the defense and its sequel in the unbroken race to Nanking, where the forces could not be properly rallied, represented serious weaknesses of leadership. Chinese soldiers in Nanking not only were put into an impossible position but were deserted at the critical moment by General Tang Sheng-chih, who commanded them. The "defense" of Canton was a military disgrace.

All these shortcomings flowed directly from China's heritage of backwardness, reaction and appeasement. Responsible commands were in many cases exercised by feudal militarists whose armies had traditionally been tax-collecting machines and pawns for private power rather than instruments of national defense. In the provincial armies especially, no such thing as a body of reasonably trained and educated junior and noncommissioned officers existed. There was no uniformity of organization, training and tactical thinking among the various bodies of troops. Ill-treatment of the common soldier and the absence of even the most elementary provisions for his welfare were the rule.

The Central troops were better equipped and organized, and had undergone training by German *Junker* officers. But they had been indoctrinated and used as a kind of Kuemintang super-police rather than a national army. The official military doctrine until the very outbreak of the war had been that the suppression of internal opposition must precede resistance to Japan. Even after the war began Chiang Kai-shek tried to fight Japan and weaken his Chinese rivals at the same time. He sent untrained units belonging to "marginal" generals to die at the front and hoarded his own privileged troops even when serious emergencies required their use.

But notwithstanding all this it was correct at the time, and is still

correct today, to describe the resistance on the regular front in 1937-1938 as a magnificent and promising feat of arms, a noble chapter in the book of man's fight for freedom. If the past disunity and faults of the forces engaged were not cancelled out, they really were transcended to an extent that confounded the enemy and amazed neutral military observers. Armies that had previously pursued different aims fought together. Armies that had policed militarist bailiwicks thousands of miles from the scene of action, such as the feudal forces of Szechuan and Yunnan, moved willingly to anti-Japanese fronts thousands of miles away. Armies that had been the guarantee of existence of autonomous regimes, aspiring to challenge the Central authorities for national power, such as those of Kwangsi province, plunged without murmur into the most fiercely fought campaigns, taking losses that destroyed their ambitions forever.

Often the provincial troops acquitted themselves better than the well-trained Central divisions. The national patriotism of the first stand of all China against a foreign aggressor superseded the provincialism of long tradition. Such great beginnings promised greater results.

The heartening atmosphere on the regular front in 1937-1938 did not, and could not, stem from the split prewar China. Where it drew on the past at all, it based itself on the proud, ancient tradition of resistance to the foreign aggressor which has been a recurrent theme in Chinese history. In contemporary terms it flowed from the memory of the great united anti-imperialist campaign of 1925-1927 and the people's movement against Japan. At first almost instinctively, and then more and more consciously, it built its military hopes not on the elaborately drawn blueprints of the German advisers but on the examples of popular struggle against great odds shown by the Chinese Soviets and the developing front behind the enemy lines.

Not only the people but the very officers who had fought them began to regard the survival of the Chinese Red Army through ten years of civil war, in which the Kuomintang had operated from the very cities and communications which the Japanese had now captured, as proof that forces based on the rural, interior could carry on resistance indefinitely.

The tactics of the Red Army during the preceding period furnished a model of how this was to be done. Literature on its campaigns which during 1937 and 1938 could be openly sold became universal and favourite reading. The theory of how to wage a protracted people's war against an initially stronger aggressor had been worked out in detail by Mao Tse-tung, leader of the Chinese Communist Party,¹ who

¹See prewar interviews with Edgar Snow.

spoke from a wealth of practical experience. Many of Mao's formulations were borrowed by Chiang Kai-shek in his early war speeches. He too began to point out that China should welcome, not fear, a war of long duration. How to carry on such a war was the theme of discussions between Chiang and Chu Teh, the Communist commander in chief. The necessities for the creation of a political and economic base for such a war were laid down in the "Programme of Armed Resistance and Reconstruction" adopted by the Emergency National Congress of the Kuomintang in Hankow in the spring of 1938 and supported by the Communist and all other patriotic parties and groups in China.

While the regular front was bearing the brunt of the first Japanese advances, the Chinese Communists proved that their old tactics were as applicable against the Japanese as they had been in civil conflict. The battle of Pinghsin Pass, which they fought in the Shansi mountains in the late fall of 1937, preceded Taierhchuang as the first Japanese defeat of the war. This demonstration of the efficacy of mobile and guerilla methods was noted not only by the Chinese but by foreign military observers. Major Evans Carlson,² of the United States Marines, visited the front behind the enemy lines to see just what sort of army could fight such battles. Carlson was later to employ the result of his studies in the organization of the "Gung Ho" Marine Raider Battalion which he led in successful lightning attacks against the Japanese on Makin Island and the Marshalls when the United States went to war.

By the end of 1937 the first Liberated Areas, the Northwest Shansi Base and the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Regions, had been solidly established in formerly occupied territory. In the first months of 1938 the Eighth Route Army was already interrupting railway transport feeding the main enemy forces, and tying down many divisions which would otherwise have been thrown against the regular front. Its operations were closely co-ordinated with the needs of the Kuomintang troops. Its planned attacks on the Peiping-Hankow and Tientsin-Pukow railways contributed a great deal, for instance, to the Taierhchuang victory.

Let us now look into the nature of these Liberated Areas, their political and military history and the aims and methods of the Chinese Communists who took the lead in establishing them.

²Now Brigadier-General Evans F. Carlson, USMC, Ret'd., chairman of the National Committee to Win the Peace and the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy, and an outspoken critic of postwar U.S. intervention in China.

VII. FRONTS BEHIND THE ENEMY

1. The Political Preparation

FOR SEVERAL YEARS BEFORE THE WAR WITH JAPAN, THE CHINESE Communist Party had administered four small Soviet districts. The most important one stretched across Kiangsi and Fukien provinces in Southeast China. The others were on the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei border in Central China, in Northern Szechuan province in West China and Northern Shensi in the northwest part of the country. Despite advancing Japanese aggression, the main military forces of the Kuomintang Government, with the aid of German strategic advisers, American and Italian airplanes and pilot instructors, and occasionally British, Japanese and American gunboats, had been engaged since 1929 in an effort to suppress these areas. The effort was unsuccessful but cost millions of Chinese lives—the lives not only of soldiers of both sides but of countless peasants in “contaminated” villages, who were massacred for giving aid and comfort to the “Red bandits.” The Chinese Soviet Republic was one of the secret places of the world. It had no outlet to the coast and no foreign traveller had visited it.

The Communist Party also had its network of underground members in other parts of China against whom the Kuomintang secret service, aided by the police of the foreign concessions and extraterritorial international settlements in China, waged unremitting war. So great was the Kuomintang's fear of Communism that it executed scores of thousands of people on mere suspicion. Countless students, workers and peasants—and some of China's most promising young novelists, poets and artists—perished in these holocausts. Jou Shih, a short-story writer who had won international fame, was among those shot at the time.¹

¹The work of Jou Shih and other writers of the period has been translated in Edgar Snow's *Living China*. Jou's most famous story, “Slave Mother,” may be found there.

Contrary to some ideas, the party never advocated the immediate introduction of Communism in China. Its leaders described its mission as the completion of the "national bourgeois-democratic revolution" against foreign domination without and feudal landlord exploitation within. They regarded this as the chief problem facing the country and said that without its solution no further progress could be thought of. In the Soviet areas landlords' estates were divided and people were forbidden to live on rent, but land was the private property of the peasants who tilled it. Private property in industry was permitted and co-operatives in both agriculture and industry were encouraged as indispensable to the ultimate peaceful transition of the existing economy to socialist forms. But socialism was seen as decades distant, and Communism in China as unattainable in anyone's lifetime. Though at war with the Kuomintang and calling for the abolition of its monopolistic dictatorship, the Chinese Communists had not themselves chosen the path of military struggle against it. They had taken up arms only after arms had been used against them.

The Chinese Communists staked everything on their ability to gain the support of the people. Cut off from the world and unable to count on any outside material assistance, they developed the habit of guiding themselves by hard facts, and doing anything the facts demanded. For understanding of the people's needs they went to the people themselves. For an appreciation of the internal and international situations they scrupulously collected and weighed every scrap of information available to them. At first they did not even possess a single radio and old Communist commanders speak with a smile of the times when they would attack and temporarily capture a district town for the sole purpose of securing late copies of the metropolitan newspapers. Having framed their policies on the basis of such studies, they stuck to them undeviatingly.

From the Japanese occupation of Manchuria onward the Chinese Communists subordinated all other activities to rallying the nation for all-out resistance. In the midst of a savage civil war, they offered to form a united front with any army turning its guns against the national enemy, regardless of its politics. Then they tore out of the pressing Kuomintang encirclement and set out on their renowned Long March to the northwest, where a base could be built for direct attacks on the Japanese. The hardships of the march led some of their own commanders to advocate a breakthrough to areas bordering on Soviet Russia, the only place, they felt, where they could rest their exhausted armies. But the leadership turned them back to the harder path with the incontrovertible argument that at a time when the Chinese people needed

anti-Japanese resistance above all else such escapism would lose the party all claim to confidence and leadership.

• Mao Tse-tung and the other leaders who took this line were convinced that exorbitant Japanese demands on the one hand, and popular pressure on the other, would inevitably create conditions under which the Kuomintang as a whole might be forced to abandon its policy of appeasement. After 1935 they issued many statements proposing unity not only with individual anti-Japanese armies but with their ancient enemies, Chiang Kai-shek and his government, on an anti-Japanese programme, and offering to subordinate themselves to a Government of National Defence. The first government military group to accept their contention that "Chinese must not fight Chinese" was the Manchurian Army, which, as already noted, had been moved to Northwest China to exterminate the "Red bandits" when they arrived there exhausted after the Long March. As already stated, they kidnapped Chiang Kai-shek and wanted to shoot him. But the Communists prevented this. Their slogan that Chinese must not fight Chinese meant exactly what it said, and they argued for, and achieved, the release of the man who had killed whole generations of their comrades. Chiang was set free after he had been held just long enough to be forced to listen to what the entire Chinese people hoped he would be made to hear, after he had been given a practical demonstration of the strength of the sentiment for a united anti-Japanese war and the impossibility of further standing in its way.

The Sian episode, which appeared to the world as a kind of inexplicable Chinese Gilbert and Sullivan extravaganza, was in reality an altogether consistent event under the existing relation of forces and policies. But these circumstances, and in particular the long-standing Communist proposal for a united front against Japan, had all been rigorously suppressed by the Kuomintang news blockade. So the outside world was not entirely to blame for its bewilderment.

The great Peiping student movement of 1935 and the Sian Incident led the Communists to conclude that the decisive turn of national affairs toward resistance had come. They therefore redoubled their efforts to come into contact with all patriotic elements on a democratic, anti-Japanese, united-front programme. In order to exclude no class of the population from adhering to it, they went so far as to modify their basic policy of dividing landlord estates among the peasants to one of reasonable rent reduction.

Even before Sian the chief military school of the Communists, the Red Army Academy, was rechristened the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University. Its curriculum was remodelled completely. It cut down theoretical Marxist studies and concentrated on teaching the Red

Army's experience of guerilla warfare and organization of the people in terms of its specific application to the coming national war. Anti-Japanese students from all over the country were invited to come and study there, with no questions asked about their politics. Despite the fact that to be caught trying to enter the Red territories meant immediate execution, numbers of young people, many of whom had participated in the student movement, smuggled themselves through.

The Red Army's 1936 foray, eastward across the Yellow River into Shansi, was a campaign different from any that had preceded it. Its aim was not to weaken Kuomintang control but to test the anti-Japanese feeling in provinces actually threatened by the enemy. It was a missionary expedition to make the united front policy known to the people and recruit patriots of all classes and parties for preparatory anti-Japanese training. When Edgar Snow, the first foreign journalist to visit the Chinese Communists, came to Northwest Shensi more than a year before the outbreak of the war with Japan, he found the university to be the only place in all China where a systematic study was made of the probable conditions of the future struggle, and where the strategy and tactics to be applied in it were being taught. The interviews with Mao Tse-tung recorded in his *Red Star Over China* show how much thought had been given to these matters by Communist leaders, and how remarkably accurate their forecasts have proved.

Snow also found that the Red Army-troops themselves were being thoroughly prepared for their forthcoming role, and that among the outsiders who were taking advantage of these preparations were officers of some government armies still formally at war with the Reds. Many had been captured in battle, some had come over voluntarily in the course of military operations, and a few had been sent by their own superiors, whose hearts were no longer in the civil war. Chang Hsueh-liang, the Manchurian "Young Marshal," had even asked for some Communist guerilla warfare instructors to come into his territory under safe-conduct, and put them into the uniforms of his forces. He had set up a school of his own in which these men taught the anti-Japanese curriculum. Such things were possible because, with the civil war still on and the Kuomintang's military schools training their students for it, the Communists were the only ones who had inaugurated a satisfactory study of the national enemy and how to fight him. Patriots who took the forthcoming war seriously could not find the necessary training anywhere else.

While the Communist Party and Red Army were thus busying themselves in the areas they controlled, orders were issued to Communist units and individuals working under cover in other parts of the country to reorient all their work in the same direction. It became the

first duty of such Communists to seek out and ally themselves with all other anti-Japanese groups and individuals, to help them recruit wide support among the masses of the people, and to move them to *practical* preparations for fighting Japan. They were also instructed to establish contact with foreign residents sympathetic to the Chinese people and antagonistic to Japan's designs, whose position as neutral nationals in the coming war would enable them to help the resistance forces.

Communists were told that if the enemy succeeded in occupying their areas, they must not evacuate on any account. Instead they were to use their prepared links with the peasants and workers, non-Communist patriots and friendly foreigners, to take the lead in the creation of islands of armed struggle against the enemy behind his own lines, allying themselves on the basis of mutual aid and equality with all other armed resistance groups that *might* arise, regardless of their origin. Throughout the subsequent years of war, these instructions of the Communist Party to its members were carried out in every place that the Japanese occupied, whether it was contiguous to regions in which Liberated Areas already existed or hundreds of miles away from them. For instance, after the fall of Canton in South China in late 1938, a new base arose between that city and Hong Kong. It was then, and still remains, physically isolated from all other Communist-led areas.

The terms of the Kuomintang-Communist agreement for anti-Japanese unity were largely negotiated between the Sian Incident of December 1936 and the outbreak of war on July 7, 1937, but not announced until September 22 of that year. The old Chinese Soviet Republic, which after the Long March comprised parts of the north-western provinces of Shensi, Kansu and Ninghsia, was made a self-governing "special district" under the National Administration, with a population of approximately 1,500,000. The Red Army, numbering some 80,000 at the time, was renamed the Eighth Route National Revolutionary Army under the National Military Council, which undertook to provide supplies and pay for 45,000 men. The Communist Party confirmed its new policy, already put into practice, of discontinuing armed struggle against the Kuomintang Government, land confiscation and class war propaganda.

These undertakings were not unconditional. They were given on the understanding that the Kuomintang also would devote all its forces to anti-Japanese warfare, release political prisoners, abandon repressive measures against anti-Japanese patriots of any party who would be allowed *freedom of expression and activity*, and allow such patriots to take their place in a democratically organized war effort. The agreement was of a very broad character and intentionally avoided the discussion of other points, however urgent and necessary, which might hold

up immediate anti-Japanese unity. Thus such necessities for China as the abandonment of one-party dictatorship, the form and extent of the participation of parties apart from the Kuomintang in the government, and even the official legalization of the Communists and other parties, were not even brought up, although they were essential to final settlement. Later these problems became crucial, and they remained unsolved throughout the war.

2. The Eighth Route Army in Shansi

In consonance with this agreement, and on the orders of the high command, the Eighth Route Army moved eastward into North China during the war's first months. Re-entering Shansi province, the scene of its first anti-Japanese reconnaissance in the previous year, a part of it fought alongside the Central and provincial troops there, winning the battle of Pinghsin Pass and participating in the defense of the crucial defiles of Niangtzekuan and Hsinkow. Commanders detached from it helped the provincial authorities found a united-front military and political guerilla school, on the model of the Yen-an Anti-Japanese University. Its dean was Li Kung-po, one of the Shanghai National Salvationist leaders, with whose prewar role in rallying anti-Japanese public opinion and consequent arrest by the Central Government we are already familiar, and who was to be slain by the Kuomintang's secret police in 1946. Communists also assisted Governor Yen Hsi-shan to recruit the "Dare to Die Corps," or the "Shansi New Army." In distinction from the old, feudally organized and inefficient provincial troops, this force had progressive local intellectuals and anti-Japanese students for officers, and peasants and workers who had volunteered for the specific purpose of fighting Japan as its rank and file. The "New Army," which was to go through many vicissitudes, fought on behind the Japanese lines throughout the war and proved a permanent and indestructible addition to China's anti-Japanese strength.

Contemporaneously with those events in the heart of Shansi, other units of the Eighth Route Army struck deeply into territory the Japanese had already occupied in its isolated mountains, going on to Hopei, Chahar and other provinces. They moved in separate columns at a forced pace, in the way they had learned so well on the Long March, travelling over the highest mountains and by the most out-of-the-way routes, by-passing enemy garrison points, enlisting the support of the people by good treatment and everywhere linking hands with the beginnings of local resistance.

When they reached points that were geographically favourable, such as the natural strongholds represented by the Wutai and Taihang

ranges, or where the higher level of development and anti-Japanese activity of the people made up for the lack of strong natural positions, as in the plain of Central Hopei, the columns stopped and established bases for future operations. This was the origin of the Liberated Areas, and these were the first Chinese lands wrested by Chinese troops from the control of the advancing invader. In the succeeding seven years of war the Japanese never regained supremacy in these areas, which were the nucleus of many others subsequently formed elsewhere. It was from them that the Eighth Route Army launched its major diversions against the Peiping-Hankow and Tientsin-Pukow railways to help the Kuomintang troops defend Hankow.

To understand the growth and nature of the Liberated Areas of China we must stop to examine how the first of them were born in the year 1937-1938. Some of the incidents that follow will seem rather insignificant to the reader, but they are worth recounting because it is from such "little acorns" that the great force of mass guerilla warfare was to grow. Most involved small units of troops, companies and regiments. Others stemmed from tiny groups of determined intellectuals, workers and peasants. The spark that lights a conflagration is always small. Lexington and Concord were small and the storming of the Bastille was only a riot in front of a jail.

The best known of the Liberated Areas, and the one most visited by Americans and Europeans,² was the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Base. Geographically and politically it included three distinct areas. The Wutai Mountains and their foothills on the northern border of the base, between Hopei and Shansi provinces, had many good defensible positions but a poor, completely feudal economy and an impoverished, socially backward and illiterate population. The Central Hopei plain is one of the most fertile and progressive regions of China and includes the immediate hinterland of the great cities of Peiping and Tientsin, but it offers no physical advantages for guerilla warfare. The third component of the base was the hill country north and west of Peiping. Each of these base areas had a distinct origin and history and it took them some time to merge.

Resistance in the Wutai Mountain region was initiated and organized by 2,000 men of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army

²For some early accounts see: *Twin Stars of China* by Major (now Brigadier-General) Evans F. Carlson; *Humane Endeavour* by Haldore Hanson (former correspondent of the Associated Press, now head of the Far Eastern Section of the U.S. State Department's Cultural Relations Programme); *I See a New China* by George Hogg (staff member of the Chinese Industrial Co-operatives); also the published letters of Dr. Norman Bethune, who worked in the area and died there in 1939; and *The People's War* by I. Epstein.

under Divisional Vice-Commander Nieh Yung-chen. Nieh, a Communist, was originally trained as a chemical engineer and studied and worked for some years in France. He is a man whose quiet modesty covers great courage and ability, and broad international culture. Sung Shao-wan, the patriotic Kuomintang magistrate of Wutai, who refused to run away like other officials when the Japanese made their first incursion into his country, helped a great deal in the establishment of this base.

In the hills west of Peiping, resistance was begun by groups of patriotic students and intellectuals. One of the most famous was a small handful of Manchurians, who went out into the countryside after the fall of Peiping and Tientsin, rallied straggling fragments of the regular armies, the main body of whom had retreated, and fought small puppet and Japanese units to acquire arms. Units of the Eighth Route Army, headed by Hsiao Ke, one of the best known Red guerilla commanders of civil war days, who had once been a star student of the Kuomintang's Whampoa Military Academy, came in afterwards and established their headquarters on the old Buddhist sacred mountain of Miao-fengshan.

On the Central Hopei plain also, many currents of anti-Japanese resistance flowed into one. A regiment of Manchurian garrison troops, under Colonel Lu Cheng-tsoo, did not follow the retreat of the Fifty-third Army, to which it belonged, but instead began local guerilla warfare with a force of 1,000 rifles. Communists in Paoting and other towns, who had worked secretly among the peasantry of the surrounding villages for years, put into effect the plans of resistance they had perfected before the war. National Salvationist and Communist students from the region who returned home after the fall of Peiping formed their own units. Detachments were formed by patriotic landlords, retired military officers and even, in some cases, local police.

Finally they too were joined by Eighth Route Army forces of the 120th Division. The united anti-Japanese army thus established, encrusting itself with the support of the people and the armed formations which they were encouraged to organize, began an epic fight for the rich, board-flat heart of Hopei. Here the enemy was able to use tanks and planes and glean all the advantages of his technical superiority which were not available to him in the mountainous guerilla bases. Yet the struggle lasted for seven years, and the Japanese did not win it. The fight for Central Hopei furnishes one of the most glorious—and the bloodiest—pages in the annals of the Chinese people's war of liberation.

Unity of command over the resistance forces in all three areas was forged in October 1937 at a conference of their representatives at the West Hopei town of Fuping. The Eighth Route Army had by this

time demonstrated in action that its ten-year apprenticeship in the civil wars had taught it the science of victory in anti-Japanese guerilla warfare, for lack of which many of the other patriotic detachments had been paying heavily. Its readiness to share this experience with the other groups had convinced them that it was not interested in monopoly, but only the maximum expansion and effectiveness of armed resistance behind the enemy lines. The thing that then mattered to the non-Communist patriots was not the political character of the Eighth Route, but the fact that it was *the first regularly organized Chinese army to reappear victoriously in the occupied areas*, where they had thought they would have to carry on a desperate struggle on their own.

All were eager to learn the Eighth Route Army's methods and to co-operate with it to mutual advantage. While retaining their autonomy in the internal affairs of their own units, they voted to adopt its guerilla tactics and its methods of securing and organizing the co-operation of the people. The Fuping conference elected Nieh Yung-chen commander in chief of all resistance forces in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Military area, to direct and co-ordinate the activities of all its components.

Two months later, in December, the patriot local governments of these resistance bases sent representatives to another conference, this time in Wutai, to co-ordinate their activities also and to work out a common administrative programme. On the motion of the Communists they agreed to the principle of government by election everywhere. All anti-Japanese parties were to enjoy legality. All men and women who were not working with the enemy were to be allowed to vote. The organization of peasants', workers', merchants', women's and youth National Salvation Associations whose members would help the army and the administration and participate in armed local defense formations was to be made universal.

Rents all over the area were lowered 25 per cent. The property of traitors who had gone over to the enemy was confiscated to finance local welfare and resistance. A bank and other organs were formed for the purpose of carrying on economic warfare against the Japanese, to stop outward smuggling of commodities on which the enemy was trying to lay his hands and to procure supplies necessary for resistance. Sung Shao-wan, Kuomintang magistrate of Wutai, was elected chairman of the united Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Liberated Area Government, composed of Kuomintang, Communist, National Salvationist and non-party leaders.

The formation of this administration was approved by General Yen Hsi-shan, Governor of Shansi and Commander in Chief of the Second War Zone, in his capacity as highest representative in North China of

the Central Government. Colonel Evans Carlson of the U.S. Marine Corps, the hero of Makin and the Marshalls, was present at the inauguration of the government and has given a good description of this and other things he saw in the area.³

Stories told me by the Manchurian regular officer Lu Cheng-tsaó and the Teachers' Training College graduate Sun Chi-yüan illustrate the two types of resistance activity that arose after the Japanese occupation in Central Hopei, one started by non-Communist patriots and one which flowed from Communist Party policy and methods. They explain also how and why they inevitably merged with each other and with the Eighth Route Army.

"In July 1937, I commanded a government regiment of the Fifty-third Army at Shihchiachuang," said the thoughtful-faced, erect General Lu. "A month later we were moved north. The high command at that time seemed to be undecided as to whether we were actually at war. It ordered us to dig deep ditches and miles of entrenchments, but we were expressly forbidden to attack or 'provoke' the enemy. Only after the Japanese had captured our divisional and brigade headquarters and my regiment was surrounded, we received orders to 'restore the original position.' So we took back a river crossing from the enemy, only to find that our main army had pulled out. We had to break through the enemy lines again to join what seemed an incessant succession of retreats in which our regiment was always the rear guard. Finally, in late October, 1937, we again found ourselves far behind the enemy lines. The question was whether to disperse, filter through to our own rear, or stay where we were. The people asked us to stay and help them fight off the Japs.

"My regiment had democratic traditions which a number of university students who joined us had helped to convert into institutions. Even before the war we had soldiers' committees to handle company messes and other matters, 'dangerous tendencies' in the eyes of the gendarmes who had even arrested some of my men before the war. So I called a general meeting to consider the question.

"My men voted to stay right where we were, which was what I wanted to. We decided to change the name of our regiment to the 'People's Self-Defence Army.' I remember that we first wanted to call it the 'North China People's Self-Defense Army,' but one of the soldiers got up and objected, saying that the war would be long and we might be called on to fight the Japanese anywhere.

"Then we reoccupied two district towns, Nanping and Ankuo, and abolished the puppet governments established there," Lu said. "From

³ *Twin Stars of China* by Major Evans F. Carlson.

talks with progressive intellectuals, and from what we had heard of the successful Communist programme, we knew that it was impossible to carry on guerilla war without democracy and without lightening the people's burdens. We called the village elders and asked them to elect men they trusted to take charge of the district administrations. We encouraged the organization of National Salvation Associations. Each village was authorized to raise its own People's Self-Defence Company and each district its own People's Self-Defence Regiment.

"Reduction of rents was announced, also the free sale of salt. The sale of salt had previously been a government monopoly and the high prices of this necessity were one of the chief hardships and complaints of the peasants," Lu explained.

"Learning that local Communists in the neighbouring district of Kaoyang had organized a guerilla group and done pretty well," he went on, "we sent a delegate to them proposing common action. Several detachments of police and landlord militia under Chang Yin-wu had also hoisted the anti-Japanese flag. We got in touch with them too. One of their young commanders, a landlord's son, Chang Chung-han, is now Colonel of the 719th Regiment of the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army.

"Soon the forces which had come to an agreement among themselves but still retained their different names, such as our People's Self-Defense Army, the Kaoyang Communist 'Third Detachment,' the Hopei Partisan Force, the Hopei Militia and others, felt the need of a combined headquarters. At a joint meeting held at Kaoyang they elected me War Area Commander because I had the most military experience. The Kaoyang meeting was the first time in my life that I set eyes on the Eighth Route Army, one of whose cavalry detachments had just penetrated into Central Hopei."

Sun Chi-yuan, a stocky and heavy-boned young man with steel-rimmed spectacles, had been a Communist before the war and had become a soldier only afterwards.

"When the war broke out," he told me, "the party sent me back to my native village near Paoting, with instructions to organize military resistance. There had been secret Communist work in this area for a long time. I knew which of the peasants were party members and met with them quietly in a cow house. The difficulty was that none of us, neither I nor the others, had had any experience of combat.

"Fortunately our peasant members were stubborn and resourceful. They were soon going out in small groups to take apart near-by sections of the Peiping-Hankow railway, tearing down Japanese telegraph wire and shooting at patrols. Seeing their success, the people as a whole got over their fear of the enemy. Going round the villages, one began

to see implements made out of steel from the rails we had removed. Many farmers were burning coal which we had captured in raids on the small railway stations.

"Before long the people started taking action themselves," Sun smiled in remembrance. "One big strong fellow used to carry fruit to the west of the railway to sell. Some Japanese soldiers ate his fruit and refused to pay. He brooded about this and the next day, when a lone Japanese soldier stopped to sample an apricot, he suddenly hit him in the mouth, knocked the fruit back into his gullet and bashed in his head with a stone while he choked. Then he took the dead man's gun and ran off. If we had not been active in the area, that peasant would have become a solitary, hunted outlaw. As it was, he joined our detachment, in which both he and his rifle were very welcome.

"By October 1937, the detachment had three hundred men," continued Sun. "The people had convinced themselves by observing our earlier successes, and the small price we paid for them, that our way was right. Many families brought out rifles and other weapons which they had got hold of during the militarist civil wars and kept hidden for use against the bandits. They gave them to the young men so that they might join us with their own arms.

"Up to this time the detachment's organization had been rather haphazard. Our men fought more or less when they felt like it and stayed at home whenever their personal affairs required. But soon there was a change. On December 1, 1937, I started across the Peiping-Hankow railway with a hundred men. We had just stopped for breakfast when suddenly a man ran in to say he had heard shooting in the distance. Another followed with the news that the Japanese had made a raid on our base, shot it up and set it afire. We ran out to lay an ambush for them on their way back but missed them."

Here Sun paused and his animated face hardened. You could see he did not like to remember the next phase of the story.

"When we got home," he said in a low voice, "we found the whole place destroyed. A few people were wandering around but you couldn't get them to say a word. Even the dogs had stopped barking. Finally one old man whispered that ninety villagers had been killed. Because there were not enough coffins for them, the people had wrapped the bodies in matting for burial. At night other peasants returned from hiding. No one blamed us for bringing this on them. Instead, the numbed village came alive with hatred of the Japs.

"Somebody remembered that a man named Wu Shen had been hobnobbing with the puppets and declared that only he could have told the enemy that the village harboured guerillas. The people went to his house but he was gone. They decided to apply the slogan 'Confiscate

the *Property of Traitors* and divided his effects among those whose homes had been burned. Scores of young fellows, many of them relatives of the killed, flowed into our ranks to seek vengeance. In deference to their wishes, we deferred all other tasks to the 'revenge battle.'

"A few days later we sawed across the rafters of a wooden high-way bridge and set a watch," said Sun. "Soon a caravan of sixteen enemy trucks came along and the first of them fell into the creek at once, taking the bridge with it. Our fighters dashed out, killed twenty of the enemy and captured many supplies. After this even more men came to us because everybody saw that those who went out to fight killed Japanese, while those who stayed at home could only wait till the Japanese came to kill them. Our unit became more stable. The men no longer looked on guerilla warfare as an occasional exercise. Our links with the people grew closer. The guerillas took care to be on the spot to protect places threatened by enemy raids and the people kept us informed of the enemy's every move.

"Soon afterwards Lu Cheng-tsao's troops and units of the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army appeared in our territory in force and we began to work closely with them. The party sent me to work in Lu Cheng-tsao's political department."

By the middle of 1938, the regular forces of the Shansi-Chahar-*Hopei* Liberated Area, composed of many different elements, numbered well over a hundred thousand. The organized volunteer militia amounted to several times that. Over thirty districts with a population of eleven millions were back under Chinese control. There were over two million members in the various mass organizations. Six or seven Japanese divisions—the Japanese had boasted that they could conquer all China with three—were kept busy trying to regain control of this one area, and thus made unavailable for the regular front.

3. Shansi-Honan-*Hopei* : The Headquarters Region

In the meantime the Taihang Mountains further to the south saw the birth of the Liberated Area of Shansi-Honan-*Hopei*.

This region had a great initial advantage, the fact that even before the enemy occupation the general headquarters of the Eighth Route Army, under Commander in Chief Chu Teh himself, was established there. When the Japanese captured Shansi's major towns and lines of communication, it did not evacuate but merely moved from the district town of Liaohsien into the surrounding mountains. But the presence of the directing centre also had its adverse effect. While the Japanese did not at first pay much attention to other areas of resistance, their attacks here were incessant and violent from the beginning.

Another distinguishing feature of the region was its large numbers of industrial workers. They came from the railways that converged on it, from the Taiyuan arsenal, and from the province's many coal mines. Because the resistance forces operated near the cities, the workers did not find it difficult to seek them out and join them. It was here that the Eighth Route Army recruited its famous railwaymen's regiment which operated consistently and successfully against the lines its own men had once run.

Here, too, workers' uprisings were organized and co-ordinated with military raids. In one of them, the Eighth Route Army captured and flooded the great Chingching anthracite mines. The aim of the revolts was not only to destroy industrial installations which the enemy was using but also to remove all possible portable equipment to build up an industrial base for resistance. Because of the full exploitation of such possibilities the Shansi-Honan-Hopei base became the richest of all the Liberated Areas in machinery and skilled technicians.

Three months after the beginning of the war, small plants hidden in isolated mountain villages behind the enemy lines were already producing. They not only turned out rifles, mortars, machine guns, ammunition, signal pistols, sulphuric acid, field radios, smokeless powder, some medical supplies and other war essentials, but also made lathes, textile machinery and printing presses. The productive units belonged to the army or were owned co-operatively by the workers.

At the end of 1937, the forces of the nuclear base in the mountains of Southeast Shansi pushed eastward into the plains of South Hopei and West Shantung. As in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Liberated Area, firm co-operation was instituted with local resistance groups and patriotic bodies. A civil government was elected with Professor Yang Hsiu-ling as chairman. Yang was not a Communist but a National Salvationist by political affiliation. He had once taught in the French Catholic Industrial and Commercial College in Tientsin. After the invasion, he had led a group of patriotic students to the Taihang Mountains to call the people to arms.

4. Shantung and the Breakthrough to the Sea

At the end of 1937 also, the Eighth Route Army pushed out a long feeler all the way to the seaboard to join with resistance groups working at the easternmost tip of China, establishing the important Shantung peninsular base. The story of this area was told us by Chu Jui, big, serious, political commissar of the area. Chu Jui had graduated from the Sun Yat-sen University and the Red Army Artillery Academy in

Moscow, then returned to China in 1929 to fight in the civil war for eight years and against the Japanese for eight more.

"Shantung is very good for a guerilla base strategically," Chu Jui said. "Topographically, it consists of mountains and plains intermingled. It is rich agriculturally and minerally, self-sufficient in grain, cotton and the raw materials for such industries as we can develop. The population is huge—thirty-eight millions. The people have been known for hundreds of years as good, hardy soldier material.

"In the coastal sections the anti-Japanese tradition goes back to the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries when they used to come as pirates and the villagers formed volunteer companies to beat them back to their ships. In modern times, the big battle of Pingyang in the first Sino-Japanese War in 1894 was fought by Shantung soldiers. You still meet old men all over the province who saw it.

"Besides, Shantung itself had one taste of Japanese occupation in 1916-1920, and another in 1928. Great numbers of its people emigrated to Manchuria and many returned home with experience of anti-Japanese guerilla warfare after 1931.

"Socially, the Shantung people have a long history of struggle against oppression of all kinds. The same pressure of population on the land which made them go into the army or emigrate in millions to Manchuria led them to band together in secret societies of all kinds against the Manchú dynasty, the landlords and the tax collectors. It is estimated that there were about 300,000 rifles in the villages in the hands of the Shantung peasants when the war started, so it was not too hard to organize resistance.

"In the province there were more than a thousand old Kuomintang revolutionaries who had worked with Sun Yat-sen in the early days of the party but had edged away from it when it took the reactionary path. Most of them lived in retirement or engaged in nonpolitical activities such as primary education and experiments in the improvement of agriculture and village handicrafts. Held in high reward by everyone, they represented a reserve of progressive anti-Japanese energy which could be activated if the right conditions were created. The Communists in the province numbered no more than fifty.

"The Japanese entered Shantung practically unopposed and Governor Han Fu-chu was shot for treason. After the occupation three companies of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army penetrated into the western part of the province for the purpose of making raids on the Tientsin-Pukow railway. This movement was authorized by the National Military Council.

"December 25, 1937, will be long remembered in Shantung because on that day the popular forces in several places attacked the enemy and

puppets, in many cases without knowledge of what was happening elsewhere. Over twenty different resistance groups, most of which had one or two Communist members, fought their first skirmishes in the last week of the year. One captured some rifles from the puppets. Another mined a road and blew up a Japanese truck, capturing only a telephone which the peasants took to pieces to see what kind of infernal machine it might be. A third attacked a railway station and wiped out a Japanese corporal's guard.

"These actions were not imposing in themselves. The important thing was that they occurred at many points and that everywhere they were like sparks set to tinder. People who heard of them said 'Resistance has begun' and pulled their guns out of their hiding places. Soldiers of the old armies flocked into the new detachments. The Shantung provincial army had not been defeated. It had been sold out. Its men were furious that the province had gone without a fight and wanted a crack at the enemy.

"Fed by all these sources the resistance forces grew at an unbelievable rate. One unit which started with a few rifles at the end of December had over a thousand men, six hundred of them armed, by January 10. Some of its guns were made in England and came from storehouses at Weihaiwei, which had once been leased to the British as a base and remained a calling station for the British fleet. At the outbreak of war the Chinese guards of the stores had got the arms away before the Japanese could lay their hands on them.

"It was in one such unit that our leading party workers in Shantung lost their lives at the very beginning of the struggle. Some of them were not killed by the enemy but by remnants of the old Chinese administration who were terrified at seeing the people take up arms on their own behalf. When the unit had only a few rifles, the magistrate of Wentang tried to use his police to disarm it and had four of its Communist members shot. But it grew in spite of this and over hundred men flowed into it every day.

"Its first attack was made on the puppet garrison at Muping. The guerrillas took ninety rifles and called all the people together for a mass trial of the traitor magistrate and chief of police, who were sentenced to death by popular vote. They were counter-attacked by six hundred Japanese on trucks, with two planes. Li Chi, the leader of the Communist Party in East Shantung, was the first to be mortally injured. Ten other commanders and political workers were killed. But the Japanese lost forty dead and wounded and one of their two planes was brought down by a lucky rifle shot.

"Within a few days, everyone on the area knew the story of the capture of Muping, the trial of the traitors, and the way the counter-

attack had been beaten off. Somehow the freak shooting down of a plane by rifle fire made a particularly deep impression. It was taken as proof that, even in the air, the enemy was not invulnerable to the people's arms. Nothing else could have helped the growth of resistance so much.

"In the meantime, the three Eighth Route Army companies along the Tientsin-Pukow railway far to the west of the province, had mobilized large numbers of volunteers. But no Eighth Route Army men came to the East Shantung peninsula till several months later. When they arrived, numbering two regiments, they found that a considerable base, with its own traditions, experience and leadership, had already developed. Thirty thousand men were under arms. The army did not need to initiate resistance as elsewhere. It needed only to build on the solid foundation already laid down by the fighting Shantung people."

5. The New Fourth Army on the Great River

The last base of anti-Japanese resistance to be established behind the enemy lines during the first period of the war was the New Fourth Army area in the lower Yangtze Valley. The New Fourth was organized in 1938 from old Chinese Red Army units which had not participated in the Long March but had been left behind in mountainous pockets of Kiangsi, Fukien, Hunan and Hupeh provinces, where inter-party bitterness was bone-deep from ten years of internecine strife. Although the civil war elsewhere stopped after the Sian Incident, it continued here, the Kuomintang believing that it could quickly finish wiping out these "remnants." When the fighting finally ceased, efforts were made to disarm the Red units and disperse them. Contrary to the countrywide practice, political and military prisoners of the civil war period were not released.⁴

Although the war with Japan was in full blast, months of negotiation were to pass before these guerillas were allowed to concentrate under their own commanders and be officially recognized as part of the national military strength. Their new name was adopted in memory of the famous Fourth Army of "Iron-sides" in which Kuomintang men and Communists had fought victoriously shoulder to shoulder during the campaigns of the National Revolution of 1925-1927—the period of the first united front. Chiang Kai-shek, as Supreme Commander, allotted the New Fourth Army an area of operations in Anhwei and Kiangsu provinces, and named Yeh Ting⁵ to be its chief.

⁴ They were still to be seen in camps at Ningtu and elsewhere as late as 1944.

⁵ Killed in a plane crash, 1946.

The political conditions under which the New Fourth Army worked were very different from those of the Eighth Route. The Eighth Route Army had its own rear base in the Communist-led Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region (Yenan Area) where the energies of the people had been released by political and economic reforms. The New Fourth Army operated from regions where the government was in the hands of the old landlords and Kuomintang officials and where the Communist Party, apart from its membership within the army, was not legally allowed to exist. The Eighth Route Army could freely apply its policy of democratic administration based on popular election and lowering of the burdens of the peasantry. The New Fourth Army had to operate purely as a military force within the framework of the existing political and economic structure. It could win the friendship of the people only by good treatment under the strict and simple rules of the old Red forces which had distinguished them so signally from all other Chinese soldiers :

1. Replace all doors taken down for use as bedboards.
2. If you borrow straw from the people for bedding, don't leave till you have tied it up in bundles and taken it back to where you found it. If you have moved anything, put it back. Sweep up your billets before you go.
3. Be modest, sincere and friendly.
4. No requisitions. Pay a fair price for what you buy.
5. Return everything you borrow.
6. Pay for anything you damage.
7. Don't dirty up the villages. Dig your own latrines.
8. Leave the women alone. Don't offend them by bathing naked where they can see you.

Topographically the conditions were also different. There were no mountains to hide in. The battle zone was flat and intersected by waterways.

As soon as it arrived at its new base, the New Fourth Army filtered through the battle front, harassing the enemy along the Nanking-Shanghai railway and reaching the seacoast immediately to the north. At the same time it reorganised itself from a collection of partisan units into a regular force whose operations, while still of a guerilla nature, were strictly co-ordinated under a central command. Contacts were made with Communist and other underground patriotic organizations in occupied Shanghai, which ran medicines and other supplies through the Japanese blockade and recruited students and workers from the city. Because of this proximity to the great urban centres of Central China, the New Fourth was able to set up technical services of a very high

order. Its medical work was soon being praised by visitors as the best on any Chinese front.

Although the New Fourth Army was not permitted to organize and arm the people, as the Eighth Route Army could do, its numbers swelled in the first year from 15,000 to more than double this figure. When the major rail centre of Hsuechow fell to the enemy it extended its activities in this direction, establishing contact with the Eighth Route and other resistance units in Shantung. When the Japanese drove on Hankow, Chiang Kai-shek's provisional capital, it impeded the drive by extensive train wrecking and attacks on road and water transport. When Hankow fell, it sent its columns westward and began operating in the environs of this city also.

* * * * *

The first period of the war was thus characterized militarily by two distinct processes—rapid Japanese acquisition of territory on the regular front and the beginning of the guerilla re-conquest of the occupied areas. Politically it was marked by unity and the growth of mutual help between the Chinese forces on either side of the Japanese lines.

By the winter of 1938, when it ended, four major anti-Japanese bases had been set up in parts of the country nominally held by the invaders, three in North and one in Central China. Each of the northern bases had a democratic Liberated Area government based on popularly elected local organs, the arming of the peasantry and the reduction of its burdens. Communists, National Salvationists and Kuomintang patriots who had stayed in these areas instead of retreating co-operated in the civil reform and military struggle. The regular armed forces of the anti-Japanese bases had grown to a total of more than 200,000. There were half a million peasants in the volunteer local defence, and the people's organizations which acted as civilian auxiliaries to the war effort counted from five to six million members.

On the regular front, positions had been established which were to remain substantially unchanged for the next five years. The Central Government had retired to Chungking, where its duty and declared intention was to muster the forces of the hinterland for the ultimate counteroffensive.

VIII. RETREAT IN SPACE AND TIME

1. Watershed in the Chinese Rear

BETWEEN THE LAST AGONIES OF NANKING AND THE EVACUATION OF Hankow, Chiang Kai-shek made a series of important speeches. In these he declared that:

1. China would continue to resist Japan despite the great initial losses of the war:

2. The new strategy would be "to exchange space for time." No position would be held at too great cost in casualties and equipment. Territory, of which the country had plenty, would be yielded gradually to reduce the intensity of warfare. The time and energy gained in this way would be used to build up man power and material reserves in the distant interior for the counteroffensive that would drive out the invader.

3. China need not cave in following the fall of her chief cities. Great reserves of strength existed in the vast agricultural hinterland. Instead of a few modern centres, China's hundreds of thousands of villages would become the base of the war effort.

The decision to keep on fighting after the reverses of 1937-1938 was the greatest positive act of Chiang Kai-shek's career. It ensured that the Central Government armies and the majority of the Kuomintang would not surrender to the enemy. It prevented the party from following the defeatists in its leading ranks, such as the quisling Wang Ching-wei. At the most critical period of the war, it minimized the influence of reactionary intrigues and waverers and prevented them too from capitulating.

The decision truly reflected the conviction of the Chinese people that their weaknesses, on which Japan counted for quick victory, were not as serious as they seemed; that their strength was greater; that the

fight had only begun and defeat was not necessary. This conviction was based on two positive facts of experience—the length of the first stand at Shanghai and the great growth of resistance behind the enemy lines, which showed that no Japanese occupation was final. The inter-party unity and bracing atmosphere of the succeeding few months, when the government was located in Hankow, were powered by pride in this conviction and by consciousness of these achievements.

The choice to fight on, though basic to all further developments, was a simple matter of Yes or No. The other propositions enunciated by Chiang Kai-shek were much more complicated. To turn them into factors of victory required hard thinking and hard work for millions of people. If they remained words without content the fight would fail. Moreover there was danger that the formulas would be used as an excuse for defeatism and inaction.

The theory of "exchanging space for time" posed several questions. How and at what price would territory be evacuated by the Central Army? What steps would the government take to help the organization of popular resistance in these territories after the main troops retired? Just how would the time gained be used to build reserves in the rear? Would these wait to accumulate great strength before the counteroffensive was undertaken, or would they build up to it from the beginning by continuous tactical attacks in a defensive strategy co-ordinated with growing guerilla resistance?

The retreat from the cities to the villages also involved a basic choice. Was village China to be left as she was—in which condition she could not be any more a source of strength than she had been in the past? Or were her potentialities in people and materials to be fully developed, in which she certainly could? Could Kuomintang China bring its millions of shrewd, fearless, hard-sinewed peasants into the struggle, as the Communist-led bases had done so well? Or would dependence on the village simply mean more taxes squeezed out of the villagers by the old landlord-official, multiplying the burdens of peasants already impoverished by rent and interest, and more reluctant conscripts torn away from their fields by brutal press gangs? Would the state use every resource to increase production, both agricultural and industrial? Or would it exact added tribute from the existing poverty, backwardness and arrested development?

It cannot be said that the country's rulers were unaware of this choice. In Hankow, in March 1938, an Emergency National Congress of the Kuomintang had promulgated the Programme of Armed Resistance and National Reconstruction, outlining a positive plan of strategy and reform to which all other parties had subscribed.

Nor would it be true to say that the government was for any

reason powerless to carry out this plan and act according to the needs of the war, overriding the opposition of selfishly obstructive minorities. The decision to fight on had consolidated the voluntary support of all patriotic groups and the entire Chinese people behind Chiang Kai-shek. It had cancelled out the last vestiges of his unpopularity and isolation in the prewar period when his group had imposed its will by force of arms and police terrorism. Even at the most desperate period of the fighting no progressive opposition elements had raised a hand to exploit previous grudges against the Central authorities. Nor any feudal separatist dared to.

Backed by the people, the government had been able to execute the powerful militarist Han Fu-chu for his bickerings with the enemy. It had weathered the desertion of Wang Ching-wei, Vice-Chairman of the Kuomintang and President of the People's Political Council, who had been second in party command to Chiang Kai-shek only. From each of these tests it had come out stronger instead of weaker. At the time of the fall of Hankow in October 1938, the Kuomintang and the Central Government of China enjoyed a position in their own country which any party and any government anywhere might have envied. They knew what had to be done. They had the power to do it. The only question was whether they really wanted to.

To understand what subsequently happened we must take account of the new situation which arose at the close of the first period of the war and which conditioned the developments of the next five years.

The first change was in the enemy's strategy. After 1938 the major Japanese advances on the regular front came to an end. Japan had occupied every first-class Chinese city, railway and water transport route and seized or blockaded the entire coast. Now she set about consolidating the hinterland of these conquests. An increasing part of her efforts, soon the main part, was directed towards the crushing of resistance behind her own lines.

In the meantime, Tokyo's general calculations began to centre on the broader ambitions of its imperialist plan—the preparation for war against either the Soviet Union or America and Britain, in co-ordination with Nazi aggression in Europe. In this context, China became an auxiliary or holding front. Land operations against the main Chinese armies were limited to occasional reconnaissances in force, employing no more than five or six divisions at a time. The objective was to stabilize existing lines, or at most to soften up the defenders without further deep penetrations. Japan now sought to paralyze the Kuomintang's will to fight by alternating peace offers with savage air raids on the capital, which finally ceased with the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941.

The second change was in the position of China herself. The retreat of her government to the western hinterland was a retreat not only in space but in time. The coastal and river cities from which it retired comprised all of "modern" China, industrially and socially. The rear provinces to which it now came were overwhelmingly rural and deeply feudal and backward. If the coast had stirred from China's sleep of many centuries, the western territories were still immersed in it. The administrative personnel, universities, and the few factories which the government brought with it, did not change the situation. Indeed they could not keep themselves from receding to the level of their new surroundings without taking energetic steps to stimulate general political and economic progress.

The third circumstance was political. Although the progressive united-front period of 1937-1938 had brought many changes, it did not in any way change the structure of power. The organization and key personnel of the government remained exactly what they had been during the period of appeasement. The popular movement had merely forced China's existing state machine into active opposition to Japanese aggression, to preserve its own mandate. Then the war crisis had pushed it into greater reliance upon unity with the people to save itself from Japanese vengeance.

The retreat to the west mitigated both the pressure of intolerable Japanese aggression and that of the people's movement. The government was now out of reach of the concentrations of workers, students and progressive intellectuals in the great cities of Eastern and Central China. The members of these groups who had followed it to the west were divorced from their bases and therefore weakened. Moreover, many of them did not stay in the deep interior for long but were quickly attracted to Yen-an. Active anti-Japanese elements which had remained in the occupied territories were engaged, in co-operation with the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies, in building areas of resistance behind the enemy lines. Here they were occupied not in gingering up the Central Government but in fighting the enemy directly, with altogether new forms of organization and with arms in their own hands.

Left thus to themselves in the deep hinterland, the ruling groups of the Kuomintang did not feel impelled to carry out the promises of the Programme of Armed Resistance and National Reconstruction. They began to divide their energies between the war against Japan and the attempt to restore that complete monopoly of power which had been compromised by the necessity of working with the people in 1937-1938. As enemy pressure slackened, China's masters began a campaign of revenge against the progressive elements which had seized the political initiative at that time. Anti-Japanese operations assumed the

form of a passive holding of quiet fronts, but the reactionary trend within free China took a more and more active character. By early 1939, the government had purged the Political Department of the National Military Council, which had been formed to unify all patriots, rally the people and explain the issues of the war. Chou En-lai, its Communist vice-chairman, was deprived of all real functions. The brilliant democratic writer Kuo Mo-jo¹ relinquished direction of its propaganda division (a sort of super-OWI). Morale-building agencies in the army became Kuomintang supervisory organs to ferret out "dangerous thoughts," promote the "loyal," and eliminate the "alien" elements. Student orientation teams working with the field forces were told to go home, and thank you very much, as the war could now be fought without their help. Kuomintang Party units were circularized with secret instructions on how to isolate members of other parties and groups doing anti-Japanese work and put an end to their influence.

The police began once more to raid bookshops. Literature on the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies was confiscated in bulk. Many branches of the National Salvationist "Life Bookstore" and the Communist Party's "New China Publishers" were closed. Secret agents returned to their old task of dogging the footsteps of writers, intellectuals and students. A watch stricter than any before the war was put on the universities, which had always beaten the tocsin for nationwide progressive patriotic movements. Academic control was made easier because most students were now separated from their families in the occupied areas and dependent on the government not only for diplomas but also for their food and lodging.

Free communication between Chungking and Yanan was gradually cut off. Young people making their way to the Anti-Japanese University were arrested and confined to special camps for "re-education." The supply of arms to the Communist-led armies, never up to the stipulations of the interparty agreement, was stopped altogether. Central Government units moved behind the enemy lines, not to assist in the anti-Japanese struggle there but to take over areas liberated by the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies. Agents travelled to guerilla units in the enemy rear which had no clear political complexion, and egged them on against the Communists with promises of monetary support and threats of retaliation if they did not obey the Central power.

Ugly incidents developed. In March 1939, in an old civil war area in Hunan, a Kuomintang army headquarters seized the New Fourth

¹In February 1946, Kuo, a delegate to the all-party Political Consultative Council on internal unity, was attacked and severely injured by rightist gangsters.

Army liaison officers accredited to it and buried them alive. Families of Eighth Route and New Fourth Army personnel travelling through Kuomintang territory under safe-conduct were detained and frequently killed.

The police cordon thrown around the Communist-led rear area in Shensi, Kansu and Ninghsia changed into a military siege. Fortifications grew along its border, stretching for hundreds of miles and manned with crack Central Government troops, soon to number half a million. There was also a blockade of news. No newspaper in Kuomintang China was permitted to write about events on the front behind the enemy lines. Foreign correspondents were not allowed to visit the Communist-led armies or to mention them in dispatches. Every effort was bent to create the impression that no one was fighting the enemy except the Kuomintang,² to make people in China and abroad forget that the guerilla regions existed. A curtain fell between the two fronts of China's war. It was not to be lifted for more than five years.

The two Chinas, the China of the semifascist dictatorship and the China of the popular movement for internal change and total anti-Japanese resistance, had shown promise of merging into one. Now a deep rift once more divided them. Geographically it followed the line of the new "anti-Communist" blockade. But politically it ran right through the country, separating the ruling Kuomintang group from liberals within the ranks of its own party, from National Salvationists, democrats and progressive students as well as Communists. In the Kuomintang's areas, it also separated peasants from landlords, soldiers from officers, government stooges in the schools from teachers and intellectuals who thought for themselves.

Yet even with all this it would be a major error to say that things had moved all the way back to the bad old prewar days. The historic changes of 1937 had pushed the country forward very quickly. It would take a long time to liquidate all of them and some could not be wiped off the slate at all. The people had pressed armed resistance to Japan and China was still at war. No one, however highly placed, dared to come out openly for capitulation, since those who had done so had been forced to flee. There was no general civil war as there had been for a decade. The united front was losing instead of gaining content, but it

²This tendency had been present for a long time. At the end of September, 1937, when the newspapers were full of the Pinghsin Pass Victory in Shansi, a group of correspondents interviewed Madame Chiang Kai-shek in Nanking. I asked her if it was not true that troops of the former Red Army, which had just become the Eighth Route, had won the battle. She looked annoyed and said "No." Madame Chiang herself was working hard and fearlessly at that time and it was not necessary for her to tell untruths to deprive others of credit. But she did.

still stood as a formal anti-Japanese alliance. The forces of old China were trying to turn the people's war to their own uses, but they could not abandon it. And the spirit of the people themselves was high.

New industries and strategic lines of communications were being built. To replace the maritime links with the outside world, cut off by the Japanese blockade of the coast, the great northwestern highway was constructed to link the country with the Soviet Union. To carry import from America, Britain and other countries, a new railway was being pushed through to Indo-China. The building of the Burma Road had begun. More railways were built in 1938-1940 than in the previous decade.

The technical potentialities of the regular front were still being developed for war. But the united-front enthusiasm of the people during 1937 and 1938 had not been made the basis for progressive changes in the backward provinces of unoccupied China. An adequate rear was not built up. Human and political resources for a long war were not developed but dissipated.

2. How Munich Damaged China

The causes of this retrogression were not purely internal. Nor was the relaxation of Japanese pressure the only contributing factor. The international situation also had undergone drastic changes and the effect on the Chinese situation was great.

When China began armed resistance to Japan, the Spanish Republic still lived. Popular anti-appeasement and antifascist movements were growing in Europe and America. While their governments traded with Japan, ordinary British and American people boycotted her goods and tied up ships carrying scrap iron to her munition factories. There was hope that an antifascist peace front of Britain, France, the Soviet Union, the United States and China would douse the embers of fascist aggression before they set the world on fire. The movements working for such an alliance welcomed the Chinese people's example of resistance to aggression. The name of China, like that of Spain, was blazoned on their banner. The Chinese Government knew that only the success of this camp would shorten the course of its own fight.

The efforts of the antifascist movement and the substantial military help received from the Soviet Union³ were the only real assistance that China got at this time. The governments of the Western democracies

³ The U.S.S.R. loaned the Kuomintang many military advisers at the very beginning of the war. Between 1937 and 1939 it maintained a Volunteer Air Corps of 500 fighter planes (with personnel) in China, which destroyed large numbers of enemy aircraft over Nanking and Hankow and at the fronts. It

gave none. They penned messages of sympathy to Chiang Kai-shek and mild protests to Tokyo with one hand while they strangled the Spanish Republic and supplied munitions to Japan with the other.

The Munich Pact signalized the triumph of the criminal wise fools of appeasement in the Western world, the cheapest and greatest victory of German fascism. Czechoslovakia was fed to the Nazi tiger. The Franco-Soviet military alliance was exploded. The French Government joyfully smashed the Popular Front. The Chamberlains, Daladiers and Laval dreamed of a titanic struggle in which Germany and Russia would annihilate each other like the Kilkenny cats. Lacking other safeguards, the Russians accepted the Nazi offer of a nonaggression pact. At the same time they set about preparing for a Nazi attack. Britain and France, still under their governments of appeasement, entered without the Soviet Union on the war they had expected would destroy it while leaving them unscathed.

When Russia sought to extend her strategic frontiers against Germany, she was lumped with Germany as an aggressor. Indignation over Finland was officially whipped to a frenzy by the same people who had deplored indignation against Japan for her invasion of China, and against Germany for the martyrdom of the Jews and Czechs, as dangerous sentimental meddling. There was more talk of how all moral men must fight Bolshevism than of the actually existing—though then inactive—war with Germany. It was only when the fascist tiger sprang on his victims as he had always wanted to spring on them, one at a time, that the bloody disasters which followed finally brought about the grand alliance that might have prevented them.⁴

This period of treason and idiocy, which was to cost the world so much, took some of its first instalments out of Chinese territory and unity. Immediately after Munich, the Japanese seized China's last remaining major port—Canton, which they previously left alone for fear of too great infringement of British interests in South China. With the British Government completely committed to appeasement, and actually boasting of its military weakness to justify it, they no longer

supplied the regular front with artillery and ammunition and, for the sake of unity, sent nothing to the Eighth Route.

⁴Winston Churchill said in a broadcast to America on October 16, 1938: "The American people have formed a true judgment in the disaster that has befallen Europe. . . . I hold to the conviction . . . that if in April, May or June, Great Britain, France and Russia had jointly declared that they would act together upon Nazi Germany if Herr Hitler committed an act of unprovoked aggression against this small state (Czechoslovakia), and if they had told Poland, Yugoslavia and Rumania what they meant to do in good time and invited them to join the combination . . . I hold that the German Dictator would have been confronted with such a formidable array that he would have been deterred from his purpose."

worried. Not only was Canton swallowed but Britain's Hong Kong border was violated without reprisals.

In internal politics, the inability of the popular forces in Europe to prevent Munich and their subsequent temporary defeat persuaded the Chinese Government that the concessions it had made to its own democrats had no international value. It concluded that militant anti-Communism was a better passport to the sympathy of foreign states, both Allied and Axis. It was certainly the best screen, considering the times, for an internal campaign against liberals and progressives of all descriptions. What is more, contemporary Europe provided many examples of governments which had undertaken a war against a fascist aggressor on their own terms, without sacrificing reactionary control internally.

Nazi diplomats and correspondents, then swarming over China, blew painstakingly on these fires. They spent their time visiting the many Chinese party, military and police officials who had been educated in Germany, and whispering in their ears that after finishing with France and Britain, the *Wehrmacht* would destroy the Soviet Union and then settle Japan's hash too. In encouraging the Kuomintang to break the internal political truce, they were of course helping Japan in the most direct way. But to the minds of Chinese reactionaries, bedeviled with the ambition to hold off the Japanese yet yield nothing to their people, all these propositions sounded reasonable and attractive. Heads we win, tails you lose. Whichever way the conflict of titans in Europe turned, the Chinese Government lost nothing by hounding its own progressives.

3. The Reaction Deepens: A Trip through Kuomintang China in 1940

Retrogressive tendencies were further deepened in the next two years. The virtual truce on the regular front began to produce examples of local trafficking with the enemy across quiet sectors. The reassertion of Kuomintang monopoly over all the affairs of unoccupied China was pursued relentlessly. Die-hard elements prepared for the first attempt to rekindle the civil war in the midst of the war against Japan.

In 1939 the secret police had merely reinstated their watch on progressives. A year later they had developed into a tremendous organization which devoted itself almost entirely to its prewar activities and carried out purges, arrests and hushed-up killings all over the country. On a long overland trip I made from Hong Kong to Chungking in early 1940 I saw their activity everywhere.

The first evidence hit me right on the Hong Kong border. A

group of patriotic Chinese students from Java and Malaya who had come back to help fight the Japanese in the East River area of Kwangtung discovered that a local general was smuggling tungsten, a valuable war material, to the enemy. They published their findings. The government arrested the students instead of the general. Their detention subsequently caused a great outcry from the rich overseas communities from which they had come and contributions from Malaya to the Kuomintang war chest fell off.

In the same region I saw Kuomintang troops capture anti-Japanese guerrillas under Communist leadership, rope them together like cattle and drive them to prison and execution.

In Shaokwan, wartime capital of Kwangtung, I found young people afraid to talk about any phase of national affairs.

In Kanchow, the Southeast China headquarters of the Chinese Industrial Co-operatives ("Indusco"), organizers and workers of this once promising body were being arrested and questioned on charges of sedition. The arrests were engineered by the Kiangsi Provincial Kuomintang which was promoting its own rival workshops. This went on under the nose of Chiang Ching-kuo, eldest son of Chiang Kai-shek, who was then Administrative Prefect of the area. Young Chiang prided himself on being progressive and really tried to encourage the co-operatives, but the provincial party overrode him. The Kanchow organization was infiltrated with Kuomintang spies, by the simple expedient of ordering the co-operative managers to give them jobs. One of the aims of the police raids was to frighten away the democratic elements working in the co-ops and make it easier for the Kuomintang to take them over. The Kuomintang failed to liquidate Indusco altogether only because it had received too much favourable international publicity.

Further north in Kiangsi, in the old civil war region, missionaries told us that the Kuomintang police had shot some Christians who had been "suspected of Communism" as far back as 1927 but had been cleared so completely that they had not been molested even during the fiercest internecine fighting. The jails at the former Soviet centres such as Ningtu and Juikin were chock-full of tortured, emaciated men and women, including many who had been there for years and should have been released under the terms of the 1937 united front. A big concentration camp at Taiho, the wartime provincial capital, contained new prisoners — mostly students. The provincial officials we met were almost without exception old landlords who had come back after the Red period. They seemed oblivious of the fact that the Japanese invaders were still in the country and held Nanchang, their own provincial capital. Instead, they were cheerful and happy that they had been

able to resume the work of revenge the united front had interrupted.

In neighbouring Hunan there were stories of arrests everywhere. Bookstores had been thoroughly cleansed of any but Kuomintang literature.

Only in Kwangsi province did we find a progressive patriotic newspaper, the *National Salvation Daily News*, still permitted by the independent-minded provincial government. It was to last just six months longer before being closed by central pressure.

But it was Kweiyang, capital of Kweichow province and headquarters of the Chinese Red Cross, that produced perhaps the most shocking and significant example of the way things were going. Here "political departments" had moved in on the famous Chinese Red Cross Medical Relief Corps led by Dr. Robert K. S. Lim.

Originally a nonpartisan organization, the Medical Relief Corps had been forced to stop medical assistance to the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies. To make sure that it would not repeat its sins it was being "co-ordinated" by a committee controlled by the well-known Shanghai opium gang chief, Tu Yueh-sen, who had long provided hired thugs, "labour fixers" and spies for the Kuomintang's war against progress. There had been arrests and purges among the self-sacrificing young people who had been the first to volunteer for front-line medical service in this once-fine organization while the bulk of China's doctors, who had never been mobilized, stuck to lucrative private practice in the cities.

A year previously, one of the proudest possessions of the Relief Corps had been a team of foreign doctors who had served in the International Brigade in Spain and had come to China as volunteers after the fall of Madrid. Now they were being removed from front-line jobs and concentrated as virtual prisoners at headquarters. China needed every medical man she could lay hold of but she could not use these "premature antifascists." Their request to be sent to the front behind the enemy lines if the Kuomintang did not want them to work in its own areas was flatly refused.

Director Robert Lim himself, an internationally known scientist, had plunged heart and soul into military medical work when the war began. In 1940 I found him confused, discouraged, and weakly surrendering the position on which he had built up his service—the allocation of supplies and personnel to fronts where operations were most active. Lim was so often forced to go to Chungking to explain that the Medical Relief Corps was not a conspiracy to overthrow the government, and did not threaten the interests of any Kuomintang group, that he had no time to do his own job of administration. The authorities forced him to take in "politically reliable" but medically and

morally unqualified employees who were soon thriving on the sale of foreign donations of drugs. Some of the older workers were corrupted by their example—and thefts increased because the appropriations for medical work came so seldom and so late that most of them had been unpaid for months. A great effort was being made to cut off Dr. Lim's direct correspondence with foreign relief bodies and prevent him from receiving supplies directly. This was later succeeded by a direct campaign to oust him and an inquisition was instituted into his accounts.

By 1944, Lim had been thoroughly broken and "disciplined." No one was attacking him and he had re-emerged as Surgeon General of the Chinese Army, but he shook with loyal trepidation, as all good Kuomintang men must, in the presence of high officials like Generalissimo and T. V. Soong. The great physiologist had spent months at the penitents' bench, as medical adviser to Tai Li's secret police. The humanitarian had been submerged in the careerist, the man who had been known for his forthright honesty was telling dictated lies in public and looking furtive while he did it.

But even in 1940 it was apparent that Lim's concessions would not save his organization but only demoralize it. Doctors and nurses formed into cliques and pointed to one another, saying, this person belonged to so-and-so, that one to so-and-so. The original *esprit de corps* was disappearing. Work was done in a wooden and bureaucratic manner. The wards of the Emergency Training Hospital, supported by foreign funds, were in a shockingly neglected state. Outside its gate, I came across a soldier dying of dysentery who told me that he had dragged himself to the hospital and had lain there, outside the gate, for three days. A lackadaisical young doctor informed me that the soldier was a new conscript and could not be taken in because he had as yet no individual insignia and had brought no entry order, which meant that the army would not pay for him. A civilian hospital would not accept him because he was not a civilian and had no money. Anyway, said the doctor, he wouldn't last long, which was true because a few hours later I saw his dead body, still outside the hospital door.

Madame Sun Yat-sen's China Defence League had formerly sent supplies from Hong Kong to the International Peace Hospitals in the guerilla-liberated areas through the Chinese Red Cross. In the summer of 1940, Dr. Lim was no longer able to handle them without embarrassment and eight tons of medicines specifically earmarked by American and British organizations were entrusted to Ewart Barger and Philip Wright of a British relief transport unit to be taken to Yen-an. Barger and Wright tried to get permission from the Kuomintang to move the drugs and were finally told that the Generalissimo had consented. But at Sanyuan, Shensi, a blockade point, they were prevented from going

further. Depositing their load at the English Baptist Mission in the town, they began negotiating again. The Kuomintang finally proposed to them that since the medicines could not go through to the guerilla hospitals, they should be handed over to the Central Army Medical Service. After all, they said, Chinese soldiers were Chinese soldiers anywhere.

But the supplies did not go to the Chungking Army Medical Service either. While the bickering was going on, the local authorities at Sanyuan forced the English Baptists to surrender them by threats to retaliate against their missionary activities. The medicines were next seen on sale at black market prices in private pharmacies in Sian.

This was the last effort to send drugs in quantity to the guerilla fronts until the end of 1944. It is no exaggeration to say that tens of thousands of men perished as a result of the medical blockade during the intervening years. When the foreign correspondents visited the Liberated Areas years later, they found that the Sanyuan confiscation had become a symbol. Everyone behind the enemy lines knew of it. Men whose comrades had died for want of a simple surgical instrument or a few sulfa pills trembled with rage and bitterness when it was referred to.

In most countries at war even enemy wounded are given the benefit of medical service. But the Kuomintang, as Madame Sun Yat-sen has so strikingly stated, drew an imaginary line across China, on one side of which Chinese soldiers fighting Japan were entitled to care when wounded, and on the other not. Volunteer personnel, like drugs, were prevented from going north. When that great Canadian fighter, Dr. Norman Bethune, died in his hospital in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Liberated Area at the end of 1939, his American supporters wished to replace him by Dr. Erwin Kisch, a Czech surgeon who had served in the Spanish Loyalist Army. Dr. Kisch was turned back by the Kuomintang authorities after he had started for his destination.

General Chiang Ting-wen, commander of a sector of the anti-Communist blockade, once said irritably to a touring American military attache who asked him about these obstructions: "Can't you understand? We don't care if they die. We want them to die." And even Dr. Robert Lim, the ex-humanitarian, was asking rhetorically towards the end of the war with Japan: "Why should we cure our government's foes?"

In actual fact, however, the callous indifference of China's rulers extended to their own armies also. The wrecking of the Chinese Red Cross Medical Relief Corps hit mainly at them. In 1937-1938 the soldier had become a national hero and Chinese citizens were allowed to try to help him. In 1939-1940 the bureaucrats no longer pretended,

and the attitude was, "China has millions of men. We can manage."

In Chungking, Chinese and foreign newspapermen told me many other stories gleaned on their travels. Liu Liang-mo, the remarkable Y.M.C.A. worker who had led one of the earliest volunteer war service corps and was a founder of the patriotic mass singing movement which had done so much in rousing China to resistance, had been arrested in Chekiang. It took all the energies of the foreign secretaries of the organization to get him released (his Chinese superiors were afraid to intervene) and he was shipped off to America, where he has remained since.

The war correspondent Jack Belden came from occupied Shanghai with the story that a part of the Kuomintang secret service organization had been uncovered by the Japanese and had subsequently gone to work for them, helping to seek out underground Communists. Their knowledge of the Communists came from the beginning of the war, when the Kuomintang and Communist undergrounds were working together against the enemy.

Finally, at the end of 1940 the whole country was shocked by the arrest of Professor Ma Ying-chu, leading Chinese economist and member of the Kuomintang's Legislative Committee. Dr. Ma was a graduate of Yale University and his economics were of the most orthodox character, deriving from Dr. Irving Fisher. He had gotten himself into trouble by saying that he thought that China's production and finance had not been put on a proper war basis. Worse than this, he had called attention to black market profiteering by members of the government and their families and listed the gains they had invested abroad.

The tactics of the secret police in this case were illuminating. First they had tried to shut Dr. Ma's mouth by warning. Then they decided to put him away for a while in a "quiet" manner, so they ordered him to tell his students that he was leaving for an economic investigation of the front-line areas. Instead Dr. Ma told his last class the facts. The plain-clothes "visitors" who accompanied him broke in to say that there was some misunderstanding, that Dr. Ma had been asked by the government to do some travelling. Several students spoke up to say they would like to go with him as field assistants. Then there was nothing left for the police to do but to cut the class short and lead the professor away.

The Chinese press and foreign correspondents were both forbidden to refer to this case, but Dr. Ma's students did not forget him. On his sixtieth birthday, some months later, they all appeared on the campus with enamel buttons inscribed, "To mark the jubilee of our teacher Ma Ying-chu." After this, Chungking University, previously a semi-private institution, was placed under the direct control of the Education Minis-

ter Chen Li-fu, the bloodthirsty inventor of Chinese "thought control," who flooded it with spies in the guise of new students. When even this did not help, the university was closed for "reorganization" and remained suspended for a long period.

Dr. Ma reappeared two years later, still under surveillance though technically "free." Few dared to speak to him or be seen in his company.

4. The Fight for a Constitution

The People's Political Council, which was founded in 1938 as a sort of preliminary parliament, composed of members of all parties but without any legislative powers, was also purged in 1940. Members of this body were not elected. Its seats were filled by a complicated procedure under which some councillors were appointed directly by the government and others were nominated by public organizations, also subject to government confirmation. When the list of members of the new session was announced in 1940, it was found that some of the outstanding progressive members, among them Shen Chun-ju, leader of the National Salvationists, had been omitted.⁵ The new Council was so constituted as to give the Kuomintang and its own nonparty appointees not only a preponderant majority but also the control of motions made from the floor (before a motion could be put up for discussion it had to be proposed by twenty-five members, more than the total number of independents allowed to sit). Instead of being progressively broadened and having its powers increased, as the 1938 Programme of Armed Resistance and Reconstruction had provided, the Council was being stripped of even the symbolic and strictly limited democratic content which its first session had possessed. Chou Tao-fen, National Salvationist chief editor of *Life*, China's most popular publishing firm, resigned in protest despite the fact that he had been left on the list to keep appearances.

At the same time, the Kuomintang went back on its promise to call the National People's Congress—a constituent assembly to pass a constitution and institute representative government. The election and convocation of such a body had been one of the charges left to the party by its founder, Sun Yat-sen, when he died in 1925.⁶ Since that time the promise to call it together had been the constantly postdated cheque

⁵Shen Chun-ju, former Dean of Shanghai Law College, and Chou Tao-fen were, it will be remembered, two of the seven National Salvationist leaders arrested for advocating anti-Japanese resistance before the war, whose trial had been picketed by Madame Sun Yat-sen.

⁶See the text of Dr. Sun's Will on page 44.

with which the Kuomintang had sought to buy off opposition to its dictatorial policies.

Originally scheduled to meet in 1937, the People's Congress had been postponed repeatedly, first on the pretext of the outbreak of war and then of the unstable military situation. Finally, popular demand led to the fixing of a definite date in 1940 and for many months people all over the country discussed the shape of the coming constitution. Then the government suddenly announced another postponement—because the hall prepared in Chungking had been bombed. The argument that there were dozens of other halls, equally commodious, which still stood was branded as both frivolous and mischievous. A series of hardly perceptible modifications was made in official statements until, at a time when the regular front was notably inactive, the dogma emerged that no one had the right to expect the calling of the Congress in the midst of the war at all.

This dogma ultimately crystallized into a new promise, as faithfully made as the previous ones with dates attached, that democratic government would be instituted one year after the closing of the hostilities that were languishing for lack of it. The new promise, like those of the past, was dutifully hailed by Kuomintang propagandists as conclusive proof of the party's devotion to progress, and so persistent and loud was the clamour they set up that it soon found echoes in the world press which is eager to think well of China but lacked both the materials and the will to understand the complex processes going on within her borders.⁷

All these steps could obviously not be taken without opposition, so the government set about sealing off every channel through which dissatisfaction could be expressed.

The control of newspapers, periodicals, books, short stories and plays was tightened to almost the prewar extent. China's premier novelist, Mao Tun, told Chungking foreign correspondents at an off-the-record meeting that neither he nor other Chinese writers were producing anything worth while. He complained that the creative awakening that followed the outbreak of the war had dried up because of the ferocious censorship. Honest writers, Mao Tun said, were now unable to get anything that mirrored reality past the censor. They had to choose between artistic prostitution, starvation and getting some other job to secure their livelihood—while they wrote for publication at some future date. Many who did this found that they had neither time nor incentive to work, and a number of promising young authors were lost to Chinese literature.

⁷Another modification of this decision will be discussed later.

The Kuomintang Cultural Commission was headed by Chang Tao-fan, a character who before the war used to harangue left-wing writers like Ting Ling on the advisability of changing their ideas after his party had put them behind bars. This prison-visiting gentleman now announced that poor writers would be given subsidies on acceptable work in progress contingent on prior submission and approval of an outline. Only one literary figure of repute applied for a subsidy—the liberal playwright, stage director and dramatic teacher, Hung Shen. Hung Shen did not intend to write to dictation but took the subsidy for a piece of work that had no political implications. Nevertheless he was so severely criticized by his students and by other writers, and felt their criticism to be so just, that he attempted to kill himself and his family by taking poison.

The reconstruction of the old prewar machine of suppression on the soil of "Free China" certainly did not have the more efficient prosecution of the war as its aim. After all, the fight against Japan owed its origin and all its subsequent major achievements to voluntary cooperation between Chinese patriots of all parties and the liberation of national energy that flowed from it. Neither was its sole object the crushing of criticism of the conduct of the war. The ruling groups were seeking not only the tranquil acceptance of the things already done but also a guarantee against opposition for what they were preparing to do in the future. This was the elimination of all leadership other than that of the Kuomintang everywhere in China, not only in the unoccupied rear but also in the areas behind the enemy lines.

5. The New Fourth Army Incident—First Blow of Civil War

In a functioning democracy, the struggle for the leadership of a nation takes the form of political competition, at best by performance which rallies popular support and at worst by electoral manoeuvres and demagogic promises. In China, ever since the founding of the Republic, the political power alike of the ruling party, of its main opposition, or of various autonomous and feudal elements, had been measured not by votes but by bayonets.

The task to which the Kuomintang now addressed itself was the piecemeal destruction of the Communist-led forces.

It was no accident that the first object of this effort was the New Fourth Army. The New Fourth Army was carrying on, expanding anti-Japanese resistance in the lower Yangtze Valley, the most modern and highly developed region of China and the economic and political base of the prewar Kuomintang domination. In doing so it was outstripping other elements, who had not been equally successful, in influence

and support among the people.

Besides being the centre of Kuomintang power, the Shanghai-Nanking-Hankow area had been the hub of the prewar anti-Japanese progressive movement of Chinese workers and intellectuals, which the government had for so long laboured mightily to suppress. Now this movement had merged with the New Fourth Army and was supporting it from its secret cells in the occupied cities.

As we have already seen, the government's geographical separation from the main masses of anti-Japanese workers and intellectuals had enabled it to adopt a reactionary course after the retreat to Chungking. The Kuomintang was thankful for this, but it would prove a very illusory advantage if the progressive movement worked with the New Fourth Army and created a situation which would make it impossible for the old police rule ever to reimpose itself there. It therefore came to the conclusion that the removal of the New Fourth Army would reduce the people's anti-Japanese movement in the lower Yangtze Valley to a controllable adjunct in wartime, easy to discard in peace, instead of a new political factor in its own right.

International considerations also played their part. A very few months would decide which way the cat would jump—whether the road of World War II would branch toward an Axis or an Allied victory. The Kuomintang wanted to be ready for both eventualities, and here too the existence of the New Fourth Army was a major hindrance. If the Axis was winning and the Chinese Government made terms with Germany and Japan, it would bar the way to a linkage with Nanking puppets and a joint drive against the Eighth Route Army in the north. If on the other hand, the Allies broke the back of Japan, what good would that be to the Kuomintang if the New Fourth Army, as the main fighting force in the Yangtze Valley, should participate in the Allied drive on the key Shanghai-Nanking area and consolidate itself there?

These waverings and the dilemma of attempting to preserve the rule of a fascist-minded minority during and after an all-national war led the Kuomintang to the classic "Mihailovich" position. If it was unable to fight and win on its own terms, it wanted no one to prevent it from capitulating. If victory was to come through outside agencies, no other Chinese force than that of the Kuomintang should be there to participate in it and benefit from its results. Chungking thus concluded that it was actually preferable for the enemy to control the lower Yangtze than for a Communist-led army to fight there. If the enemy sat solidly, his final defeat elsewhere would leave a vacuum into which the Kuomintang with its institutions could return. If guerilla resistance, with its attendant reforms, developed, the Kuomintang could not come back at all unless it pursued a popular policy.

Late in 1940 the super-landlord Ho Ying-chin, in his capacity of War Minister and Chief of Staff, ordered the New Fourth Army to leave its bases behind the enemy lines in the Yangtze Valley and move several hundred miles to the north bank of the Yellow River, there to join forces with the Eighth Route. The order was purely political and no military justification was advanced, then or afterwards, for this decision of the high command to abandon a liberated area to the enemy. In objections stated to Chungking, the New Fourth Army pointed out that it was being asked to march through large tracts of enemy territory, not yet undermined by guerilla resistance, bearing heavy losses and risking annihilation. The bases in North China, which were growing from local resources, had not asked for reinforcement. If it had been the objective of the high command to keep the bases in the lower Yangtze Valley in Chinese hands and strengthen the man-power resources of the Chinese army which held it, no such instruction could have been issued.

When Ho Ying-chin insisted, the New Fourth Army declared that a transfer to the north bank of the Yellow River was impracticable, but that it could concentrate all its forces north of the Yangtze, away from Nanking and Shanghai. Its commander, Yeh Ting, proposed that, to prevent the Japanese from taking immediate possession of the evacuated areas, other forces be sent to take up positions there. As a preliminary to the transfer, he asked for payment of appropriations in arrears, for the supply of winter uniforms which would be needed in the colder areas to the north, and for munitions sufficient to deal with enemy opposition to the transfer. Finally he requested assurances that the families of his men would not be molested after the army left.

After protracted negotiations, an agreement appeared to have been reached. Under its terms the main body of the New Fourth Army crossed the Yangtze. Early in January, 1941, only its rear, establishments, including the headquarters, Political Work Department, hospitals, Officer Candidate School and a small protective combat unit remained on the south bank, totalling 8000 persons in all. Approaching the river along the agreed line of march, this remnant was surrounded and attacked by Central Army units under General Shangkuan Yunhsiang. General Yeh Ting was taken prisoner, Vice-Commander Hsiang Ying disappeared, never to be heard from again, and most of the army's headquarters personnel, political and cultural workers, cadets, doctors and nurses were killed or captured.

But contrary to some contemporary accounts, the New Fourth Army was not destroyed. Even before the controversy, part of it had been operating on the north bank, and at the time of the attack most of the combat strength of the southern contingent had also crossed the

river. Though the rear service units were smashed, more than three quarters of the fighting strength of the army remained unimpaired. The organizational harm was also not as great as might appear because, like all forces engaged in guerilla warfare in the rear of the enemy, the New Fourth Army was divided into tactically autonomous detachments, each holding its own pocket of resistance and dependent on the headquarters only for general guidance, not for supplies and day-to-day direction.

The important feature of the attack was its effect on the war against Japan and on China's political unity. This was unmistakably elucidated by the developments that immediately followed. The government's aims were made plain by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, who declared that the New Fourth Army had revolted and attempted to establish itself in new positions south of the Yangtze, that he accepted responsibility for what had happened, and that in view of its disobedience to orders the army had been deprived of its designation and therefore ceased to exist as a national force. Why the New Fourth Army had not "revolted" when its fighting forces were on the scene, but only when there was no one left except headquarters people, doctors, journalists and students, Chiang did not explain.

The attitude of partisans of unity was voiced by such Kuomintang veterans as Madame Sun Yat-sen, Madame Liao Chung-kai and Liu Ya-tze, who protested against the return of civil war and placed the blame on Chungking. While Mmes. Sun and Liao, widows of the party's founders, were untouchable, Liu was expelled from his membership in the Kuomintang's Central Committee and the party itself.

The bearing of the incident on the world strategic balance at once became evident. The American, British and Soviet Ambassadors in Chungking—representatives of three countries which were then far from allied—officially expressed concern over the help a civil war in China would give to Tokyo's aggressive designs everywhere. The Japanese and their puppet Wang Ching-wei, on the other hand, rejoiced loudly. Their press praised their "enemy" Chiang Kai-shek for his "decisive spirit." The reaction of foreign public opinion friendly to China was keynoted by many telegrams of protest from organizations and individuals who had been most active on her behalf through many years.

6. The Communists Develop a Counterstrategy

The incident forced the Communist Party of China to take decisions as momentous as those made after the Sian "kidnapping" in 1936.

Then, in the midst of civil war, the Communists had been steadfast in their quest for unity against Japan. They had refused to be tem-

pted by the sudden opportunity to gain new war allies and eliminate Chiang Kai-shek, leader and chief cementing link of the forces ranged against them for ten years. Their forbearance put an end to the civil war and forged the common front of all Chinese armies against the invader.

Now, in the midst of the war against Japan, the first attack of a new civil war had been launched. If the Communists took up the challenge and threw their forces against the Kuomintang, all that had been achieved since the great Sian change would be undone. China would once more be torn asunder. The lull on the regular front would inevitably turn into Kuomintang capitulation to Japan. On the fronts behind the enemy lines the Japanese and Kuomintang forces would fight together against the Communists and the whole organization of people's resistance. If this happened, the internal situation would no doubt be more favourable to the Communists in a narrow sense. The Kuomintang could not keep its forces together in such a war and there would be many defections to the consistently anti-Japanese side. But the chaos, confusion and bloodshed would be a great and immediate strategic benefit to the enemy and internationally the whole Chinese issue would be clouded by the cry of anti-Communism. To gamble on the positive factors in such a situation would be the same as to have gambled on the apparently favourable factors of the Sian kidnapping. It would involve the abandonment of the whole fight for unity for which so many sacrifices had already been made and from which the Chinese nation and the Communists themselves had already gained so much.

On the other hand, simply to go on preaching unity when the civil war elements in the Kuomintang were in the saddle would be disastrous to them. If the attack on the New Fourth Army and its subsequent "abolition" were accepted as a mere "incident" in the course of the anti-Japanese struggle, the whole structure of the front behind the enemy lines would be placed in mortal danger. Chiang Kai-shek had tried to put things in this light by announcing that the New Fourth Army case did not affect the Communist or any other party but was simply a disciplinary measure taken against an insubordinate unit. Once such an interpretation was established, the Kuomintang could provoke new "incidents" at its convenience and liquidate the Communist armies and their anti-Japanese bases piecemeal. The united front, as a rallying point and charter of equal opportunity for all patriotic bodies to make their maximum contribution to the national war, would be a joke. The "unity" that remained would be an execution block for all non-Kuomintang elements and for the sectors of the resistance front on which they were active.

The answer of the Chinese Communists was to restate the principle

of national unity as they understood it but at the same time to denounce the attack on the New Fourth Army, refuse to recognize its disbandment and launch a sharp political campaign against its perpetrators.

The Kuomintang had destroyed the headquarters of the New Fourth Army. The Communists demanded the release and reinstatement of General Yeh Ting and other captured members of the army, compensation to the families of those killed and punishment of the Kuomintang commanders directly responsible.

The Kuomintang had abolished the New Fourth Army's designation. The Communist Party revived its own military organ, the Revolutionary War Council, which had gone into abeyance in 1937. It re-established the New Fourth Army under its own aegis and appointed a new commander and headquarters to head it.

The Generalissimo had announced that the position of the Communist party need not be affected by what had happened. The Communists rejected this as a subterfuge. They declared that they would not attend meetings of the People's Political Council until justice had been done in respect of the New Fourth Army and until all anti-Japanese parties were given legal and equal status.

The Kuomintang sought to suppress the Communist version of the situation. The Communists made it known by a series of bold steps. Their newspaper in Chungking submitted its final proofs, as usual, to censorship, then ripped out some unoffending articles on the front page and, right on the presses, put in its own account of the incident. When the gendarmes arrested the manager of the paper, the chief Communist delegate in Chungking, Chou En-lai, declared that he himself was responsible for the substitution and volunteered to stand trial. Since responsibility for the rupture of the formal united front was precisely what the Kuomintang wanted to avoid, the case was not pressed.

Younger workers of the Communist delegation, like the attractive Miss Kung Peng and Chen Chia-k'ang, who later attended the San Francisco Conference, took their lives in their hands and called on the well-guarded foreign embassies and correspondents to acquaint them with the views of their party. Some of the correspondents in an unprecedented demonstration, refused to use Chiang Kai-shek's own speech if they could not report both sides. Openly defying the censorship they smuggled out complete stories by way of the air line to British Hong Kong. As a result the world got the facts, not only the carefully doctored Kuomintang record. Despite the strongly anti-Communist Allied policy at the time, the American and British peoples and their governments saw the threat of civil war in relation to its effects on the fight against Japan—just as the Chinese people did. Despite the careful preparations, despite attempted suppression of home and out-

going news, the Kuomintang lost its battle for domestic and foreign opinion.

The Chinese Communists had fought back politically but they had refused to be provoked into civil war. Privately, Kuomintang spokesmen admitted that the Communists had observed the interparty truce faithfully. But both privately and publicly they charged that, in the course of anti-Japanese operations in the enemy rear, the political power of the Communists had grown greatly. The Communists did not deny this. Nor were they willing to renounce influence gained in this way, which was just as open, they said, to the Kuomintang if it fought the enemy as actively and served the people as well. Within the country they renewed the call for unity against Japan and democratic competition, instead of armed strife, between China's parties. While urging the punishment of those directly responsible for the attack on the New Fourth Army, they still refrained from criticizing Chiang Kai-shek, who had approved it. Although Chiang had slid back to renewed dabbling in civil war, they did not classify him with the conscious capitulationists, and regarded the difference as one to be exploited—not slurred over by lumping the two together. Despite the anti-Communism of the United States and Britain, on which the Kuomintang had relied heavily, they swung Western weight toward continued unity by representing the dangers of Japanese attack elsewhere if both Chinese fronts collapsed into internecine bloodletting. Again as at Sian, they taught Chiang Kai-shek a lesson as to what he could do and what he could not do and proved that they understood the basic tides agitating China and the world.

No one who was in Chungking at the time can doubt how deeply the people of Kuomintang China rejoiced when the crisis was weathered. Pounded by Japanese bombing, harried by inflation, watched by secret police, fleeced by highly placed profiteers against whose activities they were afraid to protest, and gradually losing interest in everything except keeping themselves and their children from starving, the people saw the risk of civil war as the ultimate blow—something that would not only set them once more to killing each other but would also let in the enemy and make all their past sacrifices meaningless. Deprived of accurate information and of all opportunity for self-expression, they had watched the storm descending on them as they would some great impersonal calamity that no one had the power to stop. After it passed, the relief could be felt in the air.

But the popular reaction also illustrated something else. The political regression had temporarily killed the detailed interest and participation in national affairs that had been so stimulating in the war's first period. The aftermath of the crisis was conditioned not only by a feel-

ing of great peril encountered and avoided but also by a shamed realization that the people had been completely helpless in the face of it. Its most important characteristic was that it awoke to new activity the intermediate elements in Chinese politics—elements belonging neither to the Kuomintang nor to the Communist Party but claiming a say, nevertheless, in the affairs of their country. And when they began to speak, it was for democracy and unity.

7. Middle Groups Fight for Unity: The Federation of Democratic Parties⁶

The chief victims of the campaign of police suppression in Kuomintang territory between 1939 and 1941 had not been the Communists, who had an army and bases of their own, but National Salvationists and other liberals and progressives who had none. Gradually they had been squeezed out of the political departments of the army, the civilian war aid organizations and the People's Political Council. Their journalistic and publishing activity had been placed under ever greater restraints.

The New Fourth Army crisis completed this process. The last survivor of what had once been a large progressive press, the *National Salvation Daily News* of Kweilin, was ordered closed. Among the Kweilin liberals whose arrest was ordered from Chungking were the well-known playwright Hsia Yen, editor of the suppressed newspaper, and Fan Chang-kiang, China's most famous war correspondent, who had chronicled the early battles of the war for the semiofficial *Ta Kung Pao*. They escaped imprisonment only because General Li Chi-shen, the patriotic local commander, sent them a warning and airplane tickets to Hong Kong, holding the warrants till after they had left.

Hsia and Fan were the forerunners of a great exodus. From all over the country, progressive politicians, writers, artists and newspapermen made their way to the British Colony. The National Salvationist publisher Chou Tao-fen, who had angered the Kuomintang by refusing to sit on the purged People's Political Council the year before, came in disguise. Among those who left openly were Liang Shu-ming, a leader of the Rural Reconstruction Group, appointed to the National Defense Advisory Council formed in 1937, and other highly respected figures. The faces and writings of the men who had stood up for resistance in the period of appeasement, led public opinion in the first year of the war, and been silenced in the second and third, began to be seen both in Hong Kong and among the rich and important Chinese settlements in Singapore, the Philippines and Java.

⁶ Now the Democratic League of China.

These "overseas Chinese" communities had always been noted for their patriotism because their position and prestige were directly dependent on the fortunes of the old country. Under the Empire, they had helped Sun Yat-sen and the Republican revolutionists who they hoped would make China a strong, modern and respected nation. In 1925 they backed the forces of the Great Revolution against foreign control and the feudal war lords. After the Japanese invasion, they sent great sums to the Chinese war chest, and the Kuomintang hoped they would supply much of the capital needed for reconstruction after the war.

The end of the civil war and the beginnings of united resistance had won their proud approbation and support. They sent their sons to volunteer against Japan on both the regular and the guerilla fronts and to send back reports of what they saw. Stories of the people's warfare behind the Japanese lines fired their imagination particularly, because they themselves, unlike the bureaucrats in Chungking, had gone across the water as illiterate contract labourers and raised themselves by bold initiative and back-breaking toil to a prosperity unknown in China. When rifts appeared in China's hard-won unity and new dangers to the war of national liberation appeared, the overseas communities were the first to show disquiet. They sent messages manifesting their concern and delegations to investigate the situation.

In 1940 the Chinese in Singapore dispatched Tan Kah-kee, a millionaire industrialist and one of their most respected leaders, to make a firsthand political, military and economic survey. Tan Kah-kee visited both the Kuomintang and Communist-led areas. He found a more consistent and co-ordinated war effort in the latter and reported accordingly. Through their many contacts and because their own newspapers were not Kuomintang-censored, the emigrants acquired a much fuller picture of happenings in China than the people within the country. Deeply patriotic but committed to no political grouping in China itself, they took a stand that was consonant with the general national interest.

It was these forces, tied by many links to their native villages and towns in Southern China, that the National Salvationist and liberal refugees from renewed Kuomintang despotism now began to ally themselves with. The overseas communities, suffering, like all emigres, from a dearth of cultural roots, welcomed them with open arms as leaders of progressive democratic sentiment at home. They gladly took them into the committees of their organisations, the editorial boards of their newspapers and the faculties of their schools. In this way, within a half year of the New Fourth Army Incident, the National Salvation movement had built up a new base of operations abroad. The Life Publishing Company group, virtually driven out of China, was bringing out

a series of dailies, weeklies and monthly magazines in Hong Kong and Singapore. The suppressed united-front Kuosin News Agency, with the war correspondent Fan Chang-kiang as editor, supplied the entire "overseas" press with news of China, and was reaching foreign opinion through the English-language *Far Eastern Bulletin* edited by Dr. Chen Han-señg, whose research work on Chinese farm economy (with the Institute of Pacific Relations and elsewhere) had won him an international reputation.

Hu Yu-tse, the National Salvationist publicist, co-operated with Tan Kah-kee in laying a new, progressive basis for the patriotic organizations in the East Indies. Chou Tao-fen's articles on the internal political situation were being printed wherever Chinese was read in the outside world. The new progressive press attracted democratically-minded writers from the Kuomintang publicity machine itself. Liu Cheng-chi, one of the outstanding correspondents of the official Central News Agency and later the head of the Chinese service of the United States Office of War Information in Chungking, was one recruit. The united-front publications that had sprung up overseas found their way back into China, giving new hope to wavering liberals there.

The Kuomintang worked hard to counteract their influence. It sent its leaders on foreign tours, and its Overseas Ministry (concerned with Chinese communities abroad) moved its personnel to Hong Kong for this purpose. Flying out of China in June 1941, I found myself among a planeload of well-dressed and determined-looking young men, with plenty of money and luggage. They confided to me that they were going to Manila, Singapore and other places after having received special training to "combat the Communist propaganda that had made headway there."

These missions were singularly unsuccessful because Kuomintang administrators, accustomed to driving criticism underground by police methods, found themselves unable to answer questions freely fired at them by their compatriots in other countries. Attempts to "co-ordinate" the press and schools of the overseas Chinese only aroused resentment. The secret-service agents and special trainees who had been exported in such great numbers found to their consternation that they were looked upon contemptuously as paid servants of an oppressive regime. The overseas Chinese regarded them as they had regarded the consuls and travelling emissaries of the Imperial Regime who had once tried to woo them from their support of Sun-Yat-sen.

Throughout 1941, the democratic arena outside the borders of China increased. All political minorities in the country took their principles and grievances to the bar of overseas opinion. Two were con-

ervative groups—the Chinese National Socialist (not Nazi) Party,⁹ an aggregation of university professors advocating a kind of state capitalism; and the China Youth Party, with a following among intellectuals and military officers in the province of Szechuan. Two more were reformist social service groups with a political programme—the Rural Reconstructionists and Vocational Education Association. Still another, a left-of-centré body called the “Third Party,” was formed in 1927 out of right-wing secessionists from the Chinese Communists and left-wing secessionists from the Kuomintang.

The ideas and positions of these groups differed widely. The National Socialists, China Youth Party and Vocational Education group still retained seats on the People's Political Council. The Rural Reconstructionists and the Third Party had been dropped, together with the National Salvationists, from the lists of the 1940 session. The National Socialists and China Youth Party had taken the Kuomintang side in the earlier wartime conflicts between the Kuomintang and Communists. The Third Party had been inclined to the Communist view. And the reform groups, beyond very general statements in favour of harmony, had taken no stand at all. But some things all the minorities had in common. Lacking any voice at all during the prewar Kuomintang dictatorship, they had taken advantage of the democratic atmosphere of 1937-1938 to state their views and secure participation in the war effort, only to find themselves once more silenced by the new drive of one-party rule after the retreat to the west. Without military force, which under the existing Chinese scheme of things was an absolute requisite for political activity, they all wanted a parliamentary system under which votes and arguments, rather than soldiers, were the weapons of political struggle. Most of them abhorred the thought of renewed civil war. They saw that the free political platform they desired for themselves was also essential for the nation, if it was not to die of internal bloodletting.

These common demands began to come to the forefront of national politics. Their increasing importance was not a product of party programmes but of wartime life itself. As the reactionary drive of the Kuomintang generated friction with the Communists, the minority parties sought to prevent this friction from aborting all hope for a democratic parliamentary structure. Political and not military settlement became their watchword and democracy, not dictatorship, the method they advocated. Because these aims were deeply rooted in the hopes of the people as a whole, the “little parties” lost their early confusion and soon became remarkable for the consistency with which they offered

⁹ This group changed its name, in 1946, to the Social Democratic Party.

their services as mediators in every new crisis. Gradually they began to make these declarations jointly instead of separately.

The results of these offers were also consistent. The Kuomintang, which claimed the right to run the country alone, turned them down one after the other—at first politely, then more and more abruptly. The Communists, on the other hand, expressed their sympathy. Since the Communist Party was not only the strongest opposition group but the only one with the armed power without which no dissident could get a hearing, minority elements of all colours soon began to lean on it as their only effective champion.

The alarm and mediatory offers of the small parties became most vociferous during the New Fourth Army crisis. The government had at first hoped that the more conservative minorities would serve as convenient auxiliaries against the Communists, but when they refused to play the role of catspaws it began to suppress them also. The National Socialist leader Carson Chang (Chang Chun-mei) was the brother of the Kuomintang Minister of Communications. In 1938, he had even been a mouthpiece for the first officially inspired demands for the abolition of the Communist-led areas. Now his clamour for a democratic solution grated on the Kuomintang to such an extent that it sent police to search his house and issued orders forbidding him to leave Chungking, either for any other city or for foreign parts. The National Socialist professor Lo Lung-chi was similarly confined to Kunming, where he taught political science in the Southwest Associated University. He was forbidden to write for publication (he had been editorialist for the Catholic *Yi Shih Pao*) and was soon afterwards ousted from his professorship.

By the middle of 1941 the right-wing minority leaders found themselves in a most anomalous position. Though they still sat in the People's Political Council, and even had members on its presiding body, they were at the same time constantly watched, restrained from travelling and raided by the gendarmes. What had pushed them into open opposition and made them "dangerous characters" was not any growing radicalism in their own principles but the decisive turn of the Kuomintang state toward untrammelled dictatorship. The government did not want allies, even in the conservative camp, but only subordinates. So even the rightist smaller parties were compelled to seek allies on the left or lose their identity. The arrogance of the Kuomintang ruling cliques was pushing all oppositions together.

In the autumn of 1941 the minority groups of right and left published a common manifesto in Hong Kong announcing that they had joined in a "Federation of Democratic Parties." Copies were smuggled

into the interior, and mailed to every Chinese organ of opinion abroad. The joint declaration of principles called for:

1. Abolition of one-party government;
2. All party armies to be turned over to a democratically organized state. The party forces referred to were not only the Communist troops but also the Kuomintang formations which had usurped the name "National Army" for themselves;
3. Elimination of the secret police;
4. Opening of positions in the administration and army to all men of ability regardless of their party affiliation;
5. No tax revenues to be used to swell the political funds of the party in power;
6. Investigation and punishment of all corruption and war profiteering, high or low.

As a basic charter for the nation, they reaffirmed the validity of the programme of Armed Resistance and National Reconstruction to which the Kuomintang had pledged itself during the heyday of the united front.

On October 10, 1941, China's national holiday and the anniversary of the founding of the Republic, the first issue of the Federation's daily organ, the *Kwang Ming Pao* ("Light") appeared in Hong Kong. The Rural Reconstructionist leader Liang Shu-ming was its editor. Shortly afterwards Carson Chang and other leaders of the Federation who had remained in China entertained Chinese liberals and National Salvationists and foreign pressmen and diplomats at a discreet tea party in Chungking itself. Here, secret police or no secret police, the declaration of principles was read aloud and circulated.

Besides the minority parties, another element re-emerged on the new "overseas" forum. These were the Manchurians who all over China, in the unoccupied rear and the guerilla bases, stood for the prosecution of the war until their far-off homeland was liberated. Ever since they kidnapped Chiang Kai-shek at Sian to make him stop fighting other Chinese, the Manchurians had recognized only one enemy—Japan. Only anti-Japanese unity, they preached, would prevent all China from sharing Manchuria's fate. Now they established a monthly magazine¹⁰ in Hong Kong which demanded active anti-Japanese operations on the regular front and democratic constitutional government in Free China. The monthly called on Chiang to release their own "Young Marshal" Chang Hsueh-liang, who had played so important and quixo-

¹⁰With Chou Ching-wen as editor.

tic a role in turning China to resistance. The Manchurians worked closely with the Federation of Democratic Parties and the National Salvationists.

During the crucial months which led up to Pearl Harbour, democratic China in exile numbered so many prominent figures, and represented so many elements in the country itself, that its attitude became an important factor in the international politics of the Far East. In the course of the fateful Hull-Kurusu negotiations, the U. S. State Department sought precise knowledge of whether China would hold out or collapse, accept a compromise at its expense or keep on fighting to the end. In doing this, it found it necessary to send representatives to sound out not only the Kuomintang and Chinese Communists, but also the exiles. The new bloc of democratic political exiles and overseas communities gave one answer to their questions. It stood for unity, and war until Japan's final defeat. If the Kuomintang collapsed or ratted it would support a continued fight by the Communists.

This answer was taken into account in evaluating the balance of forces in China. It had its due influence on the American rejection of the Japanese version of the situation, and the events that followed.

8. The Kuomintang Wavers between Allies and Axis

In the meantime, the international situation had taken still another turn. After June 1941 the Soviet Union, Britain and America stood together. Although the United States was not yet in the shooting war, it was clear that the grand alliance against Hitler fascism had finally arrived and that the whole Axis, having lost the great advantage of division among its rivals, could now be defeated. Within each Allied country, the left and right found wider common ground.

These events had cast shadows before. In China, six months earlier, America and Britain had been deeply alarmed by the New Fourth Army affair. They understood that any "anti-Communist" gains from a civil war in China would accrue to Japan, not to them, and would weaken their own position against her when the time came to try conclusions. Although they still had no common or parallel policy with the Soviet Union elsewhere in the world, they had taken a joint stand here. The internal plans of the Kuomintang had been built on the situation born of Munich, but even at the end of 1940, the situation born of Munich had begun to lapse.

The Kuomintang's ruling sections were united in their determination to consolidate the party dictatorship but split on international policy. The section represented by Chiang Kai-shek generally banked on an Allied victory. The other, including Ho Ying-chin, the "C.C.

clique" and the pro-German elements in the army, put its money on the Axis.¹¹ Until the fall of France these differences had been academic, but afterwards, and especially after the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union, they assumed real importance. The Ho Ying-chin crowd wanted an all-out military crusade against the Communists at once. Chiang wanted to proceed more carefully and by piecemeal methods until a better opportunity presented itself, perhaps in the form of postwar Allied aid. A general civil war in 1941 would have forced the Kuomintang into the position of a junior partner of the Japanese and finally a satellite in an attack on Russia. Ho was reconciled to this, but not Chiang. Every Axis success in Europe strengthened Ho's position. With every Axis failure and the strengthening of the Allied attitude in the Far East, the line he advocated suffered a setback.

There was no sharp struggle within the Kuomintang over this difference. Ho did not seek to oust Chiang, and Chiang did not dismiss Ho as War Minister. Both tendencies were opportunist, and neither group was averse to having irons in both fires. But the difference existed and the way it would be resolved was bound to have decisive internal and international effects. The Chinese Communists took account of this fact when, after the attack on the New Fourth Army, they called for the punishment of Ho Ying-chin but left Chiang, who was equally responsible, alone.

The German attack on Russia had the double effect of temporarily reviving the civil-war crisis and then very considerably allaying it. Early Nazi triumphs set the pro-Axis group in the Kuomintang shouting that the suppression of the Communists must not wait an instant. The line of reasoning cultivated among them by German diplomats before China "broke" with the Reich was that Japan would soon pounce on the Soviet Far East and be too busy to do the Kuomintang much mischief. In the meantime the *Wehrmacht* would plough through European Russia and wind up on the Chinese border. Then, the Nazis promised, they would warn Tokyo off further continental incursions. Germany and China would become allies, and the Japanese would have to agree or fight both. But this happy result could be achieved only if the Kuomintang cleansed its escutcheon of the stain that came from the toleration of Communism. Otherwise Japan would have an excuse for staying which the Germans could not dispute. The theory was very popular in some Kuomintang quarters, and Ho Ying-chin actually drew up tactical dispositions for an attack on the Eighth Route Army and the reconstituted New Fourth Army to coincide with the fall of Moscow.

¹¹ W. H. Donald, the Generalissimo's famous Australian adviser, told friends that he left China in 1941 because he felt sure that Chungking was going over to the Axis, and that Chiang also was inclining in this direction.

The end of the story is, of course, that Moscow did not fall. The international situation moved on toward greater co-operation between America, Britain and the U.S.S.R. and toward an American-British-Japanese instead of a Soviet-Japanese war. The threat of civil war in China did not disappear. But civil-war strategy based on co-ordination with Axis victories passed forever from the scene.

IX. RED STEEL IS TEMPERED

FOR THE FRONTS BEHIND THE ENEMY LINES THE YEARS 1939-1941 WERE a great testing time. The guerilla bases had been founded while the Japanese were busy with their initial advance on the regular front. Now the regular front was inactive, the Liberated Areas bore the main weight of the Japanese attack. At the beginning of guerilla resistance there had been unity in the country. Now there was no hope of getting supplies from the unoccupied hinterland. The Kuomintang, instead of helping, was trying to disintegrate the guerilla front by both political and military means.

To overcome these difficulties, the Liberated Areas had to counter every move of the enemy and improve the training and direction of their troops. They had constantly to extend their operations, to capture more arms and to keep the enemy busy in so many places that he could not concentrate against any one quarter. They had to find all the supplies they needed in the rural countryside, yet at the same time to win and retain the support of the peasants, not for a very short period but for many consecutive years of desperate guerilla warfare and blockade. It was imperative to keep other strata of the population in the occupied areas from aiding the Japanese and their puppet governments. These military, political and economic tasks were all equally pressing. If there was failure in any of them, resistance would sicken and collapse, if not one year then the next.

1. Tactics and Wits in the Wutai Mountains

The problem of meeting and countering Japanese annihilation drives came first. I got a good account of the succession of military and tac-

tical problems faced by the front behind the enemy lines from Nieh Yung-chen, commander in chief of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Liberated Area.

"At first," he said, "the Japanese had had no experience of guerilla warfare. In 1937 and 1938 they had tried to fight us just as they would fight regular troops. They would attack on a wide front with the object of taking some place from us. When we retreated they thought the battle was over. During the battle of Hsuechow on the regular front, for instance, we supported the Central Army by co-ordinated thrusts along a large stretch of the Peiping-Hankow railway. Troops in our area captured, briefly occupied and destroyed five big stations. The enemy saw that we were dangerous and sent a brigade to smash our general headquarters at Fuping. When they fought other Chinese forces, the capture of a headquarters generally meant the disappearance of a whole division or army. But with us it was different. That Japanese brigade battered Fuping with aircraft and artillery just like the book says, then entered it—to find it empty. Immediately afterwards our troops, which had withdrawn intact into the hills, hit their brigade in the rear and forced it to retire.

"The same thing happened again and again. Everywhere we avoided the main weight of the blows meant to crush us and, moving quickly, struck the enemy where he least expected it and made his position untenable. The Japanese armies in North China were not yet under a joint field command and had no common reserves. There was one area headquarters on the Peiping-Hankow railway, another in Shansi, and a third in Chahar. We operated on the border between these commands, which could not co-ordinate their activities without complicated liaison arrangements and paper work.

"But," Nieh went on, "the Japanese learn from mistakes like anybody else. After the fall of Hankow, they changed both their organization and their tactics. Control of all their forces was soon unified under a North China Expeditionary Force headquarters. Seeing that it was not enough to drive for individual points, they undertook an encirclement of the whole Wutai Mountain massif, our major base. Military commentators in Tokyo wrote happily that the Imperial Army, having proved that the Chinese could not hold a regular front by taking Hankow, would now dispose of the guerilla menace by new and revolutionary tactics.

"This was the first real trial of strength for the front behind the enemy lines. Everyone was worried or curious about its outcome. The Central Government was anxious to know if we could hold because it needed time to regroup the Kuomintang forces after the Hankow evacuation. Colonel Carlson came to our area for the U.S. Naval In-

telligence. Even the British Foreign Office made inquiries as to whether we could weather the storm. We passed the examination. The Japanese took Wutai city and other places but we slipped out of the encirclement and continued to operate.

"This," said Nieh, "was because we had the support of the people. They gave us the benefit of their local knowledge and kept the secret of our movements. Moreover, our troops were keen, and we had taught them correctly. They knew how to disperse quickly and regroup equally rapidly without avoidable loss of men, material or organisational coherence.

"In 1939 the Japs changed their methods again," Nieh continued. "They trained commando units of about a thousand men, not to take positions but to carry out quick, deep raids designed to annihilate our directing centres and separate detachments. The first such strokes were launched against the southeast Wutai mountain area in the spring and autumn. Here it was good mass intelligence that saved us. The local people's organizations warned us of enemy preparations in their vicinity, enabling us to avoid surprise and take countermeasures. Northwest of Wutai, our 359th Brigade wiped out one commando column completely. We ambushed another at Laiyuan, forcing it to break up into small groups which we chased into many small valleys and gullies. In short, we turned the weapon of surprise against the enemy. At Laiyuan the surprise was so complete that they had no time even to dismount their mountain artillery. We captured most of it still packed on its mules.

"Our bag that time wasn't limited to guns," Nieh recalled. "Lieutenant General Abe, the highest Japanese area commander, had devised the new tactics himself. When he heard that his commandos were trapped, he personally led a relief column, hoping to save the surviving groups and prove his theories. But the people told us this also. We opened our front to let him make a deep penetration, then closed in behind. Despite supplies and reinforcements parachuted to him by Japanese planes, he could not break out. At the end of two days' fighting, he was dead. Of both enemy columns only thirty men survived. Abe had been regarded as an outstanding strategist. A Japanese general declared at his memorial service that 'a bright flower of our army has withered in the North China mountains.'

"In their retaliatory campaign, the Japanese reverted to their previous tactics of wide area encirclement. Unable to pin us down, they vented their fury on the people, whose support they now saw meant success for our guerilla warfare and failure for theirs. The Japanese thought they could put an end to this by 'exemplary terror.' They burned hundreds of villages and brutally slaughtered thousands of peasants,

men, women and children. Most of the devastation in the Wutaï Mountains dates from that time."

Nieh's face darkened for a minute before he resumed: "In 1940 the enemy was once more working out new methods. Their press was full of discussions of how the North China 'bandits' could be eliminated. We had reports that the Japanese General Staff ordered all field forces to collect our military publications and field manuals for translation and careful study. On the basis of these investigations, the commander of the Japanese 110th Division worked out 'strangulation' tactics of fort blockade. The same principle had been applied against us by Chiang Kai-shek on the advice of German military experts, during the civil war. The idea was to capture a circle of places around each pocket of resistance, consolidate and fortify these into strongpoints manned by small permanent garrisons with high fire power, connect them with ditches and other barriers, and then push in to build a narrower ring. The Japanese called this Operation Boa Constrictor. We named it after a lowlier beast," Nieh smiled. "Our men called it Operation Silkworm, since the plan was to nibble around our bases and into them, as a silkworm consumes a mulberry leaf.

"Militarily," he reflected, "there was nothing wrong with any of the Japanese methods. Any of them could succeed if we sat still and fought back only when attacked. But our way was constantly to mix up the enemy's cards, to move quickly and attack first and unexpectedly. We were weaker, but we kept the initiative by taking care to always be stronger at the point of conflict. We not only forced the enemy to make his dispositions in accordance with our plans instead of his own, but increased our own areas, and the skill and confidence of our fighters.¹

"Just as the Japanese were beginning to put their fort blockade into effect, we gave them something quite different to think about—our 'Hundred Regiments Offensive.' This campaign was planned by Commander in Chief Chu Teh and Vice-Commander Peng Teh-huai. Eighth Route Army units in all the North China bases participated. It was launched simultaneously at the Peiping-Hankow, Tientsin-Pukow and Chengting-Taiyuan railways but the chief blow was directed at the last. Interrupting communications at scores of points, we isolated many enemy strongpoints and garrisons, destroying the weakest and preventing those which were stronger from sending reinforcements. The battles lasted through August and September, 1940. They ranged from Shansi

¹Napoleon once said: "The art of war consists in having, with an inferior army, a force always greater than the enemy's on the point to be attacked or the point which is attacked." (*Memoirs of Bourrienne*, Vol. 1)

in the west to Shantung in the east. The strategic aim was to confuse the enemy dispositions in North China and torpedo the new plans made against us. It put off by months the grand extermination campaign the Japanese had been about to let loose.

"Instead of 1940, as planned, the great Japanese drive, which was part of their preparation for Pearl Harbour, took place in mid-1941. Its slogan, in captured orders, was: 'Clean up North China, base of the Great Pacific War.' The enemy re-examined the Boa Constrictor in the light of experience. Instead of surface blockhouses, he built bunkers impervious to our mountain guns. They had underground chambers, so that the men in them could go on fighting even if the tops were reduced. Their outer fortifications were formidable. Counting from the outside in, they comprised two concentric lines of trenches, a barbed-wire barrier, a stockade of sharp-pointed logs and another line of wire. Bigger 'mother' strongpoints were placed three miles apart along all railways and motor roads, with smaller 'daughters' at each milestone. All were equipped with 75- or 37-mm. cannon. In the new plan, the fort blockade did not supplant the methods of mobile encirclement and commando penetration but was combined with them. By and large, encirclement and deep raids were more widely used in the plains and the Boa Constrictor in the hills.

"Between August and October, 1941, while smaller enemy forces were prying the Kuomintang Army loose from its last mountain positions north of the Yellow River, over 70,000 Japanese troops and 70,000 puppets were sent against the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Liberated Area. This time they were really out to finish us for good and all. It was bitter, but they failed again. The Japanese press," Nieh grinned, "explained that the Imperial Army was a lion and the Eighth Route Army was a rat. Naturally a rat was hard for such a majestic animal to catch.

"All through these developments, the Japanese never stopped trying to isolate us from the people by terror. They wanted to wreak such ruin that even if the people did not lose heart, there would be no men or resources left in the Liberated Areas to sustain resistance. Sample surveys taken by the elected local government in our Wutai Mountain villages showed that from 1937 to 1941 the population of an average community decreased by 11 per cent, livestock by over 40 per cent and grain production by approximately one third, in an area that was already very poor. But later the losses decreased, because the army helped the people. With our aid, the people learned to organize for increased production and to preserve their property by defense wherever possible and swift evacuation where there was no other way.

"We are proud," Nieh declared, "that we were not content to remain in the people's debt. The growing help we gave the peasants was

a very important factor in our success. When the enemy came, our men covered the flight of old men, women and children to the hills. In recently devastated areas each unit fed the peasants from its own rations. During lulls between active military operations, soldiers helped in the agricultural work, claiming nothing in return. We lent animals to the people for ploughing, and when we dismounted a cavalry regiment of a thousand men, all the horses were put at the disposal of village committees. Grain taxes were kept rigidly at the same proportion of the crop, not any absolute figure. In bad times the troops pulled in their belts with the rest. Within our own ranks everyone, officers and men, ate the same.

"One thing to be remembered is that our army was not a foreign growth," he concluded. "The great force that grew around the original couple of Eighth Route regiments that came from the outside was entirely composed of local men. The peasants called the forces 'Tze Ti Ping' (Son and Brother Troops) and this was literally true. As the years passed, army and people became one in suffering, in hatred of the enemy and in determination to drive him out. If this had not happened, the Japanese would have broken us. They were much stronger militarily. But no invading army can be stronger than the forces of resistance and the whole population fighting together in their own land."

2. War and Politics in the Hopei Plain

On the rich, populous plains the struggle was even more intense than in the mountain regions. It was made immensely more difficult by the Kuomintang's policy of repressing anything that might threaten its own monopoly power in the future, regardless of the effect on the current war effort. The result of the sharp conflict between the schemes of the dictatorship and the needs of the war was that many of its own units which were really interested in fighting Japan found their way to the Eighth Route Army.

One professional officer who had done this, General Wang Chang-kiang, told me a typical story. General Wang was a stocky, ruddy man of forty, a healthy, cheerful soldier doing, at last, what he wanted, and proud that he did it well. The road he had travelled was not simple. As he told of it, his expression often changed, and at times he became very angry.

"By the middle of 1938," Wang said, "the Eighth Route Army and local resistance units had established a Liberated Area on the Central Hopei plain. The united front was still real. Lu Chung-lin and Chang Yin-wu were sent by the Central Government to be Governor of

Hopei and Commissioner of Civil Affairs respectively. The Eighth Route Army received them well. As things were fairly quiet, the regiment of which I was then Colonel and some other Kuomintang troops were able to follow them into the area across the thin enemy line. Our orders were 'to recover lost territory,' and we flowed into Chang Yin-wu's People's Army of local police and landlord militia.

"Then Chang Yin-wu called the officers' corps to a meeting. To our surprise he spoke of everything except fighting the enemy. One of his phrases stuck in my mind. 'Formerly we retreated before the Japs,' he said, 'and now we give way to the Communists. Anyone here who is afraid of the Eighth Route Army will be treated as a traitor.' This shocked most of us deeply. We had all had a bellyful of civil war. We had all tasted defeat at the hands of the Japanese. Before the war we had heard all kinds of bad stories about the Reds. But now that we had seen the Eighth Route Army face to face, we were impressed with it. Its methods appeared worthy of imitation, and it seemed good to fight side by side with such men.

"Chang Yin-wu soon passed from words to action. On the one hand he edged the Eighth Route Army out of places it had liberated, smashed the elected governments there and replaced them with politicians from his entourage. On the other, he composed stirring reports to Chungking about great anti-Japanese battles which hadn't happened. Some of us told him that this was a strange way of recovering lost territory, but he laughed and said: 'I have seen people climb pretty high this way. Why not we?'

"When Chang ordered our regiment to attack the Eighth Route my men were unwilling and I agreed with them. We issued a public declaration that we would fight the Japanese alongside the Hopei people, the Communists or the devil himself," said Wang, flushing, "but nothing would make us fire a shot in civil war. Some other Kuomintang units followed suit. Chang Yin-wu denounced us in a circular which called me 'the bandit, traitor and Red fellow traveller Wang Chang-kiang.' The flush left Wang's face and his grin broke through.

"By next spring," Wang continued, "nobody pretended any more. The anti-Japanese war was forgotten and Chang Yin-wu appointed two puppets in enemy service as 'Central Government' garrison commanders of occupied points. By this sleight of hand, they became the patriots and the Eighth Routers around these places became traitors. The trick was acknowledged and justified by 'theory.' Chang made speeches contending that while the Communists had always been brigades, it was entirely wrong to call the arch-quisling Wang Ching-wei a traitor. He said that Wang was an old Kuomintang revolutionary and was no doubt doing what was best for China in his own way. He had gone

over to the enemy only to preserve forces for the future fight against Communism. This was really 'national salvation by a curved path' and would be so recognised by all patriots when the time came.

"Do you wonder," asked Wang Chang-kiang, "that we joined the Eighth Route Army and helped put an end to that scoundrel?"

After the events that General Wang described, the anti-Japanese war in the Central Hopei plain became extremely bitter. Because of the strategic importance of the area, enemy garrisons were very numerous. The flat terrain and well-developed communications gave the Japanese mobility and deprived the patriot forces of natural concealment. The new Chinese armies in Central Hopei grew as a solid amalgamation of Eighth Route units, patriotic remnants of the regular troops and local volunteer formations. The difficulty of the fight quickly exposed elements which had not the will or the method necessary to survive, leaving no choice other than capitulation to the enemy or wholehearted unity against him.

While the army fought for the people, the people, and the people alone, could offer concealment and aid to the army. Its chief asset was the high cultural level and anti-Japanese spirit of the Central Hopei population. Here, more than anywhere else, one could see the truth of the maxim coined by Peng Teh-huai, Vice-Commander of the whole Eighth Route Army, who said that "the people are the ocean and we are the fish that swim in it." But the variation of this proverb in flat Central Hopei was different. "The books say that guerilla warfare is impossible in the cultivated plains. But we can fight because the people are our mountains and forests."

During 1939-1941 the Central Hopei base maintained itself in the face not only of the enemy but also of very severe floods and famines. It increased its armed forces and set up many thousands of new elected village governments. Hundreds of schools and scores of hospitals were established. Central Hopei took an active part in the Hundred Regiments Offensive.

3. A Shansi War Lord Tires of Unity

The background of resistance in the main areas of Shansi was different from that in Hopei. The Eighth Route Army came here before the Japanese took the chief cities. It had begun by co-operating with the still largely intact provincial army and administration. The alliance made it possible for the National Salvationists and other democratic elements to make positive contributions to resistance, as in the growth of the Shansi New Army. On the other hand, the organization and:

mobilization of the peasants could be undertaken only within the narrow limits permitted by the feudal-minded provincial authorities.

When the Japanese wave engulfed Shansi, the provincial army was largely smashed and the old civil government retired west of the Yellow River. But the General Headquarters of the Eighth Route Army remained in its southeast quarter² along with resistance units composed largely of workers from this relatively industrialized area. In the mountains of Southwest Shansi some Central Army units still held positions. The progressively organized Shansi New Army and parts of the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army held a third island of Chinese rule in very poor and backward northwesternmost part of the province.

The military change was followed by a political one. By the end of 1939 the Shansi governor, Yen Hsi-shan, reconsidered his policy of co-operation with the Eighth Route Army and his enthusiasm for the United Front. Yen is the shrewdest, most unscrupulous and most long-lived of the old Chinese war lords. He has to his credit the unparalleled feat of retaining practically continuous control of the province since the fall of the Manchus in 1911. For a quarter century Yen had helped every winning side in China to win and every losing one to lose. In periods of uncertainty, he had always taken an attitude of coy and profitable indecision.

When the help of progressives promised to be the only thing that would save some portion of Shansi, Yen was for them. But when the Central Government turned its main energies to suppressing democrats, he judged that they might succeed and tried to settle the hash of his own "radicals" first. By zealously doing what both the Central Government and the Japanese considered essential, he hoped to prevent both from encroaching on his preserves.³

²This and the northwesternmost region were the nucleus of the future Shansi-Honan-Hopei Liberated Area and Shansi-Suiyuan Liberated Area respectively. In each case the mountain bases established military control over parts of the adjacent flat country. From Southeast Shansi the Eighth Route Army penetrated to the South Hopei-Shantung plain along the north bank of the lower Yellow River. From Northwest Shansi it descended to the Inner Mongolian grasslands.

³For those who know names and events in the complicated history of the civil war years in China, here is Yen Hsi-shan's record:

1912-1915. Yen supported Yuan Shih-kai as president but deserted him when he was losing his power.

1915-1919. Supported Tuan Chi-jui's pro-Japanese Anfu clique.

1920-1925. Supported the anti-Anfu militarist Wu Pei-fu. Marched against "Christian General" Feng Yu-hsiang when Feng deserted Wu to side with the Kuomintang-Communist United Front in the national revolution.

The result was the famous New Army Incident. This event preceded direct civil war against the Eighth Route Army in Shansi just as the suppression of middle-of-the-road united-front organizations preceded the attack on the New Fourth Army in the main Chinese rear.

Yen had hoped to make the New Army a pawn in his game, to use or discard as necessary. Its soldiers, however, saw themselves not as Yen's men but as patriots helping Yen to fight Japan. The New Army was against civil war and its existence began to be extremely embarrassing to Yen. It exposed him to the reproaches of the Kuomintang on the ground that he was sheltering elements which Chungking was purging, and prevented him from getting in on the ground floor of the Kuomintang's new anti-Communist policy. Also it kept Shansi an active anti-

- 1925-1927. Helped the Manchurian war lord, Chang Tso-lin, who had defeated Wu Pei-fu, to fight Feng.
- 1926-1927. Allied to Feng Yu-hsiang; helped victorious Kuomintang armies to fight against Chang Tso-lin.
- 1927-1929. Subordinate of Chiang Kai-shek.
- 1929-1930. Joined Feng Yu-hsiang and Wang Ching-wei to fight against Chiang Kai-shek, hoping to become President of China. Retired to Japanese colonial port of Dairen after defeat.
- 1930-1937. Submitted to Chiang Kai-shek again and resumed his position in Shansi; fought Chinese Red Army in 1936.
- 1937. Allowed Japanese representatives to remain in Shansi after the outbreak of war.
- 1937-1938. Saw that Japanese did not want to leave his province out of fighting but wished to occupy it. Turned against Japanese and allied himself with both Kuomintang and Communists, but kept a relative, Liang Hsi-chao, in occupied Tientsin so that he could make terms with enemy if resistance collapsed.
- 1939. Turned against New Army and Communists.
- 1940-1942. Resumed negotiations with Japanese, which he admitted to foreign correspondents, bargaining for buffer position on the basis of anti-Communist activity.
- 1942. Refused to join the Japanese openly because he did not believe they could win Pacific War. Fought off a Japanese attack, then made new nonaggression agreement under which they garrisoned some points against Eighth Route Army, and he others, but they left each other alone. Received back some of his property in occupied Shansi. Kuomintang began to make payments to him so that he would not join with Japanese or Eighth Route, and Japanese paid him not to come too close to Eighth Route or Kuomintang.
- 1944. Launched attacks on Communists to "prepare for victory."
- 1945. Re-entered Taiyuan, provincial capital, with Japanese help.
- 1946. On February 12, Henry Lieberman, N. Y. Times correspondent, wrote to his paper from Taiyuan: "Yen Hsi-shan, last of North China's powerful war lords, has returned to his governorship of Shansi, this time as a professed faithful servant of the Central Government, by lining 40,000 surrendered Japanese troops against the Communists.... Lieutenant General Rishiro Sumita, former Japanese commander in Shansi, still occupies his imposing headquarters and is one of General Yen's aides. General Yen and General Sumita were interviewed together." This was six months after V-J Day.

Japanese battlefield at a time when every part of the regular front was settling down to a comfortable lull.

The old war lord's moves to disintegrate the New Army were typical. He recalled many of its officers to his rear headquarters "for training," kept them there under virtual detention, and sent officers of the Old Army to fill their posts. At the same time entire Old Army units (under Kuo Tse-yang, Chao Shang-shou and Sun Chu) were sent back across the river into Southwest and Southeast Shansi. They peremptorily ordered the New Army to move out of its garrison areas, depriving it of a rear in its anti-Japanese operations.

When the New Army protested, the old forces cried "rebellion" and attacked it, inflicting heavy casualties. But a substantial part of the New Army broke through the Japanese lines into Northwest Shansi, garrisoned by the Eighth Route Army. Hsu Fan-ting, the New Army's commander and a Kuomintang member, then declared that he could no longer acknowledge Yen's authority and would henceforth carry on anti-Japanese operations independently. Many other prominent Kuomintang figures in the province grouped themselves around him.

In 1940 the New Army and the Eighth Route Army, after the Hundred Regiments Offensive, established a democratic anti-Japanese government of the Shansi-Suiyuan Liberated Area on the model of that already set up in Shansi-Chahar-Hopei. The defense of the area was undertaken jointly by the two forces. The policy of village and district elections and reduction of rent and interest was introduced. Ho Lung took command of both armies with Hsu Fan-ting as deputy. Hsu Fan-ting headed the civil government as chairman. The vice-chairman was Wu Hsin-yu, a schoolteacher, who had come into prominence after the war as an organizer of the "united front mobilization committees" which rallied the Shansi people during the Yen-progressive honeymoon. Of the twenty-four posts in the government, seven were held by Communists and seventeen by National Salvationists, Kuomintang members and others. Many Shansi cultural workers, journalists and others came to the newly organized region to set up schools, theatres and a newspaper. Their paper, the *Resistance Daily*, never missed an issue in the subsequent years of constant Japanese attacks and mobile warfare.

From this mountain base Eighth Route Army cavalry descended into the occupied Suiyuan grasslands of Inner Mongolia. Before the war the Mongols there had been ruled colonially by Kuomintang administrators who subordinated their interests to those of Chinese settlers, taxed them mercilessly and tried to force them to exchange their own national culture for Chinese customs. As a result many Mongols had fallen victim to the blandishments of the Japanese who promised to

revive the vanished glories of Genghis Khan. But when the Japanese actually arrived, Mongols saw that the promised glories added up to slavery worse than any they had yet suffered. They were forced to sell their animals and products at ruinous fixed prices in military scrip and brutally punished if they refused. The choice between the old Chinese administration and that of the Japanese rule seemed merely one between relative evils, and they fell into great despair.

When the Eighth Route Army arrived, however, the Mongols found it to be a totally new kind of Chinese force. Instead of giving orders, it called upon them to fight for their own homeland and let them run any area they recaptured themselves, by their own methods and in their own language. It brought liberation and opportunity to this colonial people, not merely another variety of slavery. The working Mongols were not alone in responding to the stimulus. Priests and tribal princes also began to fight. Several of the princelings sent their sons to study in Yanan to learn what could lie behind such an unheard-of Chinese policy.

4. The "Three Alls" and the "Consolidation of Peace and Order"

The spread of the new Liberated Area to the flanks of the strategic Inner Mongolian Peiping-Suiyuan railway forced the Japanese to try to wipe it off the map. Between June and December, 1940, the enemy penetrated the region no less than thirteen times. When they failed to destroy the defending armies, they took revenge upon the people, just as they had done in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei area.

"Kill all, burn all, loot all" was the slogan of their punitive expeditions, which the people dubbed the "Three Alls" campaigns. Travelling hundreds of miles through the region four years later, foreign newspapermen could not find a single village which had not been burned during the winter fighting of 1940-1941. Wu Hsin-yu, the gangling schoolteacher vice-chairman of the government, told us that the destruction had been cold-bloodedly systematic. Each Japanese punitive column had carried charts showing the villages to be destroyed. The peasants joked grimly about this. When any place was left intact, they said: "It must have been left off the map."

The Three Alls policy had terrible results. The labouring man power of Northwest Shansi was reduced by a third through slaughter or fight. The number of draft bullocks (used for ploughing) fell by 60 per cent. Four out of every five horses, mules and donkeys were killed or driven off. Cultivated farmland decreased by 16 per cent. The cotton crop in particular fell to almost nothing. Rural industries,

which supplied the people with textiles and other daily necessities, came to a standstill.

At the same time, a reign of terror under the name of "Consolidation of Peace and Strengthening of Order" was launched in the occupied towns that skirted the Liberated Area. In the rich and cultured valley city of Fenyang and the populous villages clustering thickly around it, thousands of people were arrested and hundreds executed. The Japanese rounded up every one who had been a community leader of any kind at any time and everyone with education or prestige, the modern-minded younger generation and the old classical scholars and gentry alike, giving them the choice of work for the enemy or death. Schools of all grades were regarded as breeding grounds of Chinese patriotism and of the 370 elementary schoolteachers in the town and suburbs, only four escaped arrest. About half of the seized teachers were shot. The rest, men and women, were tied to public "repentance poles" and flogged until they agreed to sign "confessions of Communist activity." Women patriots were raped by forty or fifty Japanese soldiers at a time before assemblies of four or five hundred citizens and villagers, driven to see what happened to anyone daring to act, speak or think against the "New Order."

Fenyang had not been a highly developed town politically and the Japanese measures were a kind of "preventive" repression. The drive, which imitated German methods in Poland and elsewhere, was defeated by its very ferocity. It led hundreds of people to decide that since docility would not save them, it was much better to act. That action was not hopeless, and that the anti-Japanese cause was not dead, the people knew from the frequent Eighth Route and New Army raids on the area. The growth of the guerilla movement of the Fenyang people themselves dated precisely from the Japanese "consolidation of peace and order."

Statistics are lifeless things. But the reader must pause and assimilate the few given here because they resound with the cries of slaughtered men and animals, reek with the choking smoke of tens of thousands of burning farmhouses and gnaw with the blunt teeth of cold, hunger and helpless humiliation. They show how nearly the paralysis of the region was achieved. The case of Fenyang was a sample of how the Japanese tried to drive a succession of wedges between the people of the occupied areas, the suffering population of the guerilla bases and the resistance armies which, enemy propaganda never tired of pointing out, had alone brought this curse upon both.

5. The Militia : North China's Minutemen

The people could have reacted to the Japanese campaign of terror, destruction and impoverishment in two ways. They could have disowned the anti-Japanese armies, which would then have perished from lack of support and sustenance. Or they could cleave to them until all difference between soldiers and civilians disappeared and the two became one. In this case, they would be forced to face in common not only the Japanese but the fight for life and food. And this is what happened.

The rather soft and colourless people of Shansi, with no previous reputation for war or resistance to oppression, took their place among the grimmest and most tenacious fighters behind the enemy lines.

As in all the Liberated Areas, the peasants started to help the army by carrying supplies and wounded, working as guides and intelligence scouts, standing sentry outside their own villages and local policing. Then, as elsewhere, the village youth was trained for direct self-defence. But it was in Northwest Shansi, under the stress of the Japanese Three Alls campaign, that the people's armed formations began to fight the enemy on a large scale, setting a new pattern for all the Liberated Areas.

In 1940, the Northwest Shansi village militia began to develop combat teams or "elite corps" composed of the strongest and bravest young men. The preparation of these combat teams was not an affair of marching along country paths and holding manoeuvres in the hills. The battle was already upon the people, and their training was practical apprenticeship in war. They were armed with whatever weapons could be found in the villages and all the weapons—not very many—that could be spared by the Eighth Route Army regulars. Garrison troops were given orders to instruct all the elite militia in their vicinity in quiet periods, and to take them into the field, regardless of whether their formal training was completed, when engaging the enemy.

The apprenticeship had three stages. First, the elite corps men were distributed individually in regular units which were given easy tasks, such as protecting the flanks of attacking forces. Each novice was attached to one experienced soldier. The soldier's job was to steady the trainee under fire, prevent him from doing anything foolish, and prove to him by the evidence of his own eyes that not everyone who goes into battle is killed.

Then, again individually, the best of the young men were assigned to the assault forces. Still later the elite corps went into battle in their own units. They elected as commanders those in their own midst who had proved bravest, most active and most deliberate in actual combat.

Now platoons of militia fought alongside regular troops. The orders of the regular army commander were conveyed to them through their own chosen leaders.

After some experience of this kind, the militia ceased to be pure auxiliaries and were ready to operate on their own. They fought when small Japanese patrols attempted to enter their villages or when the enemy was on the move and vulnerable to a short, sharp attack. They dealt adequately with puppet soldiers and police and occasionally even managed a strongpoint. In all joint operations the army gave them a share of captured weapons, proportionate to the number of militiamen engaged. For instance, if a fighting force consisted of three hundred troops and a hundred militia, a fourth of all captured equipment was made over to them. On the other hand, if a militiaman personally captured a weapon, he was allowed to keep it. If he was already sufficiently equipped, it went to his unit. No such arms had to be shared with the troops. In addition, a rifle with fifty rounds of ammunition was the standard army reward for militiamen who distinguished themselves in combat, scouting or proficiency tests. Winning units in area-wide competitions and inspections would sometimes get a score of rifles at a time as prizes.

The militiamen did not stop being farmers. They continued to work their fields and were not called upon to fight beyond a few hours' march of their own villages. Their structure of command was completely independent of the regular army. Each unit chose its own commander, who was confirmed in his post by the elected civil authorities of the village. Local commanders met among themselves to elect county co-ordinating committees. The Armed Mobilization Department of the Liberated Area Government kept contact with the county committees, rewarded good units and delegated training personnel to lagging ones. It also served as a clearinghouse of information on tactics and organisational matters, one of its main jobs being to publish descriptions and analysis of the experience of the most successful detachments, which was thus made available to all. But the department had no power of command.

It was only when a battle between the regular army and the Japanese took place in a militia unit's own area that it came under army operational orders. The regular commander on the spot then took the militia chief into his council. In this way he not only made sure that the militia completely understood its part in the over-all operation but could himself make full use of the wide local knowledge of the militia commanders. At all other times, the militia was completely independent, guiding itself by local defense needs only. Thus a maxi-

num of flexibility and initiative was achieved without prejudicing co-ordination.

The army, government, party and people's organizations gave the militia more than military help. Village governments worked with the Peasant Associations in special Militia Aid Committees to make sure that the men were fed while on duty and that their land was cultivated if they had to fight during the agricultural work season. If a militiaman was killed or incapacitated, it was the duty of these committees to see that his family got the same pensions as the family of a regular soldier.

The Eighth Route Army opened its casualty service and hospitals to all militiamen who were wounded.

Local organs of the Communist Party made militia-building a major task. They acted as a sort of vigilance committee to see that all other organizations did their share. For their own part, all party organizations were required to send one third of their members into the militia for combat duty. Party men were not permitted to leave their localities when they were attacked. They were expected to study tactics, participate in defense and distinguish themselves in action. But the party had no power to give orders to any militia formation or to put its people into top jobs. Its members could be elected and promoted to such positions only by demonstrating military ability and capacity for leadership to the satisfaction of their fellow militiamen.

Every means was used to lend militia service prestige and honour. Information on militia exploits was carefully collected and publicized in the newspapers, with the names and woodcut pictures of the commanders and men responsible. The government distributed rewards and citations. Grants were made for banquets and celebrations for victorious units. Men with good militia records were pushed by the Communist Party and people's organizations in village elections, while anyone who shirked duty could not hope to stand successfully or be re-elected if already in office. But there was no administrative compulsion of any kind to force anyone to join. The strength and morale of the militia stemmed from its volunteer character.

Gradually, local defense was organized in an intricate and effective system. Information of suspicious movements along roads and paths was relayed from village to village by lookouts posted on high ground, who used such simple methods as knocking down or propping up poles by day and lighting beacons at night. Where natural conditions allowed, particularly in the mountains, old paths leading to the village were blocked by artificially induced landslides or deep ditches, while new and more circuitous ones known only to the local people were opened. Sentries were posted at entrances and exits to villages.

No stranger could pass them if he could not produce a permit from the army or government authorities, or from the committee of the next village. The form of permits was changed very often to prevent forgery.

After the middle of 1941 the militia revolutionized its tactics and increased its effectiveness many times by developing land-mine warfare. The people called the mines *ti lei*—Earth Thunder—and the name was appropriate. Iron and the materials for black gunpowder—charcoal, sulphur and saltpetre—were available almost everywhere in Northwest Shansi. The army taught the peasants to make detonators and provided them with the necessary chemicals such as fulminate of mercury or lead azide. Every local blacksmith and militiaman had his own ideas about what a mine should be, and I myself was shown at least a hundred different varieties of trip, pressure and pull mechanisms for exploding them. Patterns for laying mines were everywhere worked beforehand and drills were held, so that they could be set in the minimum of time in case of need. Villages near enemy garrison points were permanently mined. If a village had, let us say, four paths leading into it, Earth Thunder was laid along a different three every day. The day's clear avenue, which was also mined after dark, was known only to the local peasants.

Homemade hand grenades were very widely distributed, even to women and striplings. Everyone was taught how to throw them in self-defense, and how to set booby traps by attaching them to doors, windows or furniture when houses were left to the enemy. At first there were many accidents, but soon the people learned to handle these weapons with no risk to themselves. Hidden positions for snipers were prepared in and around villages. Peasants who were good shots—and Northwest Shansi is a land of hunters—were posted to them whenever necessary.

The result of these measures was that villages with a "tough" reputation were left completely alone by the small enemy patrols and the groups of drunken, woman-seeking Japanese soldiers off duty which had terrorized villages in their old defenseless state. Japanese forces too large to stop were delayed long enough to get women, children, animals and grain out of the way. Fear of reprisals did not increase because the majority of these places had been sacked before, when they had done nothing in their own defense, and no one hoped for any indulgence from the enemy. On the contrary, the villages found by their own experience that while previously the Japanese had entered at will and very often, they now came only when there was a serious military operation on, once or twice a year.

For major enemy drives a very complete system of evacuation existed. The region as a whole, and the different localities, developed:

three "intelligence defense lines" in depth. The most advanced of these lines consisted of agents kept in larger, occupied towns, and sent into smaller ones daily from the surrounding country, to watch whether the enemy was preparing to move. The second was maintained by watchers placed at the outermost borders of the resistance bases to signal the strength and direction of movements already taking place. The third comprised local sentries and lookouts whose activities we have already described. The interest of the people themselves in this work made it possible to dispense with full-time agents for all but the first of these jobs. All the rest was done by the whole mass of the peasants and militia, who knew where to report what they saw.

Once the direction of an enemy advance was established, a state of "general alert" was announced by notices and criers in all villages likely to be threatened. Precautions, such as the hiding of grain stores, were immediately taken. At points immediately menaced, a state of "urgent alarm" was signalled by lookouts and relayed to the population by the ringing of village bells. All authority then passed to an Emergency Committee composed of delegates from the army, local government, people's associations, militia and Communist and other parties. The committee, which existed solely for this purpose, immediately began to execute previously practiced evacuation and defense measures, mobilizing all the resources of the represented organizations for the task. Every householder, through his own organization, knew exactly where he was to go and what he was to do.

If the approaching enemy could be engaged, the militia did this. It also ensured, by removing all food and beds, setting traps, and sealing or completely camouflaging the wells, that bigger forces could not stay long unless they brought all their own supplies. While the enemy remained the militia kept a careful watch on them and distracted their attention from the hiding places of the people.

The Emergency Committee, which kept in touch with neighbouring committees and headquarters, circulated notice when the threat was past. The people then returned. Since most of the Northwest Shansi villagers had changed their dwelling places from houses to caves dug in the hillsides after the first "Kill all, loot all, burn all" campaign, they usually found their dwellings little the worse.

In its offensive operations against Japanese troops on the march the militia laid mines or rolled them down from cliffs and hills, sniped from concealment, and made sudden assaults on the tails of Japanese columns to knock off stragglers and capture their arms. The Japanese tried to avoid the Earth Thunder by keeping away from the main traffic avenues of the Liberated Areas and advancing along bypaths, but the militia mined these also. After this all enemy movements were slow

and preceded by sappers with magnetic detectors. The people countered by casing their mines in thick pottery or stone instead of metal and by rigging mines with double detonators, so that they would blow up not only when stepped on, but by the pull on an underground ring if they were lifted. The Japanese then began to march carefully in each other's footsteps, and to wade along stream beds. The village warriors, observing this, made new mines to look like stepping stones and scattered them temptingly in the wet, wet water. One clever contribution to the Earth Thunder science was the scattering of fresh donkey dung over newly mined paths which, for good measure, were imprinted with hoofmarks from a severed donkey foot to make them look safe and much-travelled. Mined areas were almost always watched so that a unit disorganized by explosion or a truck that had just hit a mine could be attacked immediately.

The Japanese Army in Northwest Shansi devoted much attention to the militia's land mines both in its publications and in tactical planning. References to them in letters written home by enemy soldiers and captured by the Eighth Route Army were so frequent as to show that they really represented a problem. The same was true of the widespread development of sniping.

The militia also developed their own methods of dealing with the "boa constrictor" fort blockade. They surrounded enemy blockhouses with patrols and mines, freeing the regular forces for other tasks. They nursed them carefully for ultimate attack, and developed methods of stealing into the smaller ones and overpowering their garrisons. Stratagem was very important here. In Northwest Shansi, I saw one group of Japanese which the militia had captured without firing a shot. After besieging the blockhouse where these soldiers were stationed for a long time the militia had suddenly left it strictly alone and not appeared for weeks. The Japanese were wary at first but soon even went out for walks. Finally one day they came out on the hillside for a picnic, stacked their rifles, ate, drank and relaxed. The militia, who were all around working as peasants, had waited for such a moment. They pounced on the Japanese, tied them up, and took men and guns to the nearest regular garrison.

Puppet units and police especially were put in fear of their lives and a bold raid by armed peasants often resulted in the capture of fairly large bodies of these slave forces. Sometimes puppets were captured with only ten rounds of ammunition in their cartridge belts and sometimes without any at all. It was a Japanese practice to recall all their bullets when the situation was deemed "quiet" so that they could not revolt or sell them to the people. The fact that many of the puppets had been enlisted through poverty or terror made propaganda very

important. Militiamen attacking them always shouted the old anti-civil-war slogan: "Chinese must not fight Chinese." I myself saw an army unit take a blockhouse by assault, haul out a puppet captain and persuade him to order his subordinates in another to give up. They said they would if their families were removed from a near-by occupied village and so saved from reprisals. The army agreed, lent them carts and escorted them home, after which the puppets, followed by wives, children and household effects piled high on the carts, marched cheerfully to a "captivity" that was actually liberation from Japanese service.

The tearing up of communications was not only encouraged by citations and publicity but made profitable for the militia and people who engaged in it. The army bought steel rails and copper wire for its mobile arsenals to make into munitions. It paid for them either in money at a good rate or in weapons or agricultural implements which the arsenals also produced. The standard was weight for weight. For a hundred pounds of steel rails a militia unit could get a hundred pounds of ready manufactured mines or grenades and so increase its own fighting power. The form of payment was determined by consultation within the unit. Money income could be divided among the members or kept for unit expenses. Agricultural implements were much needed by the farmer fighters, not only because of the quantities confiscated by the Japanese but also because the suspension of normal economic activity in the war-torn villages had led to difficulties in the replacement of broken or worn-out tools. Railway ties and telegraph poles made good fuel and construction timber.

Under these conditions tearing up rails and tearing down communications wire became a combination of national sport and subsidiary source of income. None would pass by a rail or a hank of wire if no enemy was looking, and the enemy could not be everywhere, even along his main lines. Each time enemy communications were destroyed the Japanese suffered much inconvenience and had to make good the damage. The resistance army, on the other hand, gained military advantage and materials for its arms industry, and the militia villagers who had done the work were richer in various ways.

The growth of the people's defensive organization had striking results. In Hsinghsien County, which I visited, the combat force (elite corps) of the militia grew fourfold in a year. While thousands of people had been slaughtered in the Japanese "mopping up" campaign of 1940-1941, only 39 civilians were caught and killed by the enemy in the militarily equally violent campaigns of 1941-1942. The number of cattle captured fell from 1260 to 42, of pigs from 2587 to 62 and of agricultural implements from 11,058 to 74. The amount of grain seized was cut from 1,500 tons to less than 20. There were 900 counties in:

the Liberated Areas as a whole, and the same development was going on in all of them.

In offensive operations, the People's Militia throughout the Shansi-Suiyuan area in 1941-1942 killed several hundred Japanese and over 1,000 puppets and captured more than 3,000 puppets alive with their arms. In Hsinghsien County alone, the only one for which I have figures, the number of people who helped the army and militia in the actual combat by carrying supplies, stretchers and food to the firing line grew from just over 2,000 to 7,165.

But defense was not the only matter in which the people and army in the area had to co-operate to keep going. They also had to restore and expand the shaken economy.

The first step was to increase the cultivated area. Waste land was reclaimed and official organizations and garrison units of the army began to grow their own food, providing themselves, at the very least, with their requirements in vegetables. Peasants who opened up virgin land were given homestead rights. Cotton cultivation was encouraged by distribution of seeds and exemption of cotton growers from taxes. Military forces halting anywhere temporarily were obliged to lend a hand with the agricultural labour.

Credit was extended to the peasants both for farming and to build up the ruined handicrafts. Village women were organized to spin and weave. Refugees from the occupied regions were given allotments or put to work in small factory units. Local governments everywhere surveyed available resources and man power, making sure that they were utilized in the best possible way.

In 1941, the year following the greatest destruction, Hsinghsien district put 2,000 acres of new land under cultivation, increased the yield of over 1,000 acres by irrigation, and increased its cotton crops threefold, from less than 10,000 to more than 30,000 pounds. Three new oil pressing plants, a new wheat mill and an alcohol plant for medical needs were established in addition to the workshops set up by the army for its own needs.

At the end of 1941 the government, people and armies in Shansi-Suiyuan were still underfed and ragged, subsisting on a type of black bean which had previously been used for fodder. But they knew, by their own experience, that it was possible both to fight and to build even in circumstances of encirclement and constant attack by the enemy. Bedraggled and hunger-pinched, they walked proudly. Behung with self-made hand grenades the taciturn Shansi peasant smiled confidently instead of grinning sheepishly and slavishly. He sang more than he had ever sung before. Times were still hard but new prospects had opened.

In the following years, a much greater upsurge of productive effort

and organization gave the people a better life than had ever been seen in the region in the piping times of peace.

6. Shansi-Honan-Hopei Developments⁴

In the meantime the Southeast Shansi mountain base also grew greatly. Like the other bases it survived serious interparty conflict and brutal enemy extermination drives. It extended guerilla warfare from the mountains into the plains, founding a great and populous resistance area that stretched through several provinces along the north bank of the Yellow River.

The political history of the base involved friction with two provincial administrations and overlapped that of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei and Shansi-Suiyuan areas. Difficulties with Yen Hsi-shan, the venerable feudal fox who ruled Shansi, have already been described. In South Hopei, Governor Lu Chung-lin, who was sent in by the Central Government after the recovery of the area, dispersed the elected local administrations and brought back old-line officials, many of whom had discredited themselves hopelessly by fleeing from the same places at the first breath of danger. He disarmed the People's Militia and replaced it with a "Peace Preservation Corps" (in wartime!) composed of policemen. Rent and interest ceilings were abolished. Taxes were imposed even on funerals and the threshing and drying of grain. Lu raided the villages for soldiers, giving exemption to anyone who could pay \$3,000 for it. He also recruited local bandits, who were glad to fly his flag to legalize their exactions. Deeming that the defense of the region was fully secured by this restoration of "normal" procedures, he issued orders to the Eighth Route Army to return to Shansi.

Soon afterwards, Lu concluded an agreement with his Kuomintang neighbours on the west and east, Governors Yen Hsi-shan of Shansi and Shen Hung-lich of Shantung, for "inter-provincial joint defense." The real aim of this agreement was to dismantle the resistance coalition by the Eighth Route Army, the people, the Communists, National Salvationists and Kuomintang patriots, throughout the three provinces. The military part of the task was entrusted to General Shih Yu-san, a man with an old pro-Japanese history, who promptly revived the worst abuses and excesses of the civil war period. Communists were tortured and buried alive on capture. Patriots of other or no affiliation who had worked with them against Japan were threatened, arrested, and killed if they did not "recant." The Eighth Route Army finally struck

⁴For previous history see pp. 86-87.

back at Shih and expelled him from the area. Local government by election was restored and in 1940 the various district administrations joined to set up the Shansi-Honan-Hopei Liberated Area.

In the spring of 1939, South Hopei was the scene of a large-scale Japanese mopping-up campaign. Lu Chung-lin pulled back and only returned when the Japanese had left, but the Eighth Route Army stuck to the area throughout, retaining mastery over the countryside. To keep the Japanese from spreading, soldiers and people dug ditches across the highways and flanked them with snipers. By day the enemy would try to fill the ditches, but at night they were restored, either in the same places or elsewhere. Thus motorized Japanese forces were kept from operating freely and the pockets of resistance were more or less stabilized.

What resulted was known as "checkerboard warfare." The enemy would hold one area and the Eighth Route another, and sometimes when the enemy moved into a resistance pocket in force the Eighth Route cut around and created a new one in the places the Japanese had just come from. New liberated "squares" were also established away from currently active sectors, deep in territory the enemy had thought fully consolidated and guarded only with police. This technique made it possible to extend the total area of guerilla operations in the plain at the very height of the enemy offensive. While many of the new "squares" did not last long, the situation when the Japanese returned was very different from the one they had left because the people had been in contact with a fighting Chinese force and acquired both hope and militancy.

As elsewhere the Eighth Route Army tried to lessen the burden of the people by slashing its own requirements. Commanders and men ate like the poorest peasants. Traditional unit festival banquets were abolished. Instead of the regulation, two summer uniforms and one winter uniform a year, the fighters received one summer suit annually and one winter suit for two years.

Taxes were strictly limited and applied on a progressive scale, so that the rich had to pay more and the poor little or nothing at all. The liability of peasants for military transportation and construction was limited to three days of work a month. This was in striking contrast to the old Kuomintang policy, and still more to the ways of the Japanese, who requisitioned all they could lay their hands on and took peasants from their fields for months or forever. While other forces held on indefinitely to any workers they could impress, for fear they could not replace them, the organization here was voluntary and the order of rotation was fixed by the Peasant Associations themselves.

The people did not grudge help to an army which, even in its extremity, had such consideration for their interests.

7. Growing Pains of the Shantung Base

In the Shantung peninsula, which was to be so well known to U.S. Marines after V-J Day, things were very complicated. After the initial growth of resistance and the early Eighth Route Army penetration, the Central Government ordered larger bodies of both Communist and Kuomintang troops to re-enter the province. As soon as the Kuomintang forces arrived, they began to create detachments composed of policemen, local landlord guards and reorganized bandits to supplant the armed units of the peasantry. Chu Jui, who has already been quoted on the early history of the base,⁵ represented the Eighth Route in the subsequent negotiations, so we will let him tell the story.

"Not long after the Central Army turned up," Chu said, "Governor Shen Hung-lich called me in and proposed joint activity on three conditions. They were: (1) that the resistance forces under our leadership should not increase their numbers; (2) that we ourselves must come under his direct command; and (3) that we should discontinue dispersed guerilla warfare and concentrate all our men in one area.

"I replied at once that what he suggested would strangle resistance," Chu recalled. "I explained that experience, not anyone's preference, had shown the roads that led to success or failure in warfare behind the Japanese lines. To deny Shantung to the enemy entirely we would require 300,000 trained Chinese fighters seasoned to local war conditions. The combined number of Kuomintang and Communist-led regulars plus guerillas of various kinds did not nearly come up to this requirement in quantity or quality. The only way to amass such forces was to draw on the people everywhere. Rather than hold down our numbers it was necessary that both we and the Kuomintang armies should grow quickly and spread as widely as possible. There was plenty of room for both and overlapping could be avoided if they wished.

"As regards authority," Chu continued, "we were willing to accept the leadership of the provincial government on the condition that active operations were carried on against Japan. But we could not agree to concentrate in one area. The enemy could always bring greater fire power to any single spot than all the Chinese troops could muster and neither we nor the Kuomintang could survive if this policy was adopted. The guarantee of continuing resistance lay in mobility and the constant widening of guerilla operations in occupied territory.

⁵ See pp. 88-90.

"A few months later Governor Shen got the National Military Council to propose that the Eighth Route Army withdraw all its units in Shantung to the Peiping-Tientsin area. Without awaiting a reply, he began to throw one noisy farewell party after another for our liaison officers. The people were worried and asked us if we did not know that our departure would lead to the dissolution of their self-government organs, the disarmament of the peasant militia, and the eventual return of the enemy, whom the Kuomintang troops had failed to hold before. We assured them that we weren't going away.

"Shen now began posting slogans such as 'Drive Out the Eighth Route Army' and 'Destroy the Eighth Route Army.' The Kuomintang General Chin Chi-yung addressed an Officers' Training School and accused the Communists of 'nationalizing women,' 'corrupting the youth and using anti-Japanese phrases as a screen for 'forcible bolshevization of the province.' According to him, the war against Japan would have three phases: (1) Kuomintang retreat and Communist growth; (2) Kuomintang suppression of the Communists and (3) Kuomintang counteroffensive against Japan. The phase of anti-Communist operations was now at hand. To surrender territory to the Japanese is not as bad as to yield it to the Communists,' he declared.

"When we were attacked," Chu said, "we protested to General Yu Hsueh-chung of the Central Government's Fifty-seventh Army who, though he did not like our politics, was a true anti-Japanese patriot. Yu ordered Chin to fight the enemy and leave us alone. But General Li Hsien-chow, who commanded the other Central units in the province, helped Chin against us. The fighting went on. Chin was killed in one of the engagements of which we sent a full report to Chiang Kai-shek.

"The anti-Japanese military struggle was impeded more and more by civil war. From June to December 1939 alone we had 209 clashes with the enemy. We killed and wounded 4545 Japanese and 2245 puppets, captured 1037 rifles, 18 machine-guns and two field guns. The enemy's own losses in these engagements were 1243 killed. During the same period there were 90 clashes with Kuomintang troops. Because these were usually surprise attacks for which we were unprepared they cost us 1350 men, or more than the toll taken by the enemy. This situation not only split the camp of resistance but demoralized the Kuomintang troops themselves. The Peace Preservation Corps and other formations created to fight us went over to the enemy in droves.

"General Yu Hsueh-chung tried to restore unity to save Shantung from the Japanese, but Shen plotted to get rid of him also. First he had one of Yu's divisions—the 114th—transferred to his own command.

Then, in the summer of 1941, somebody tried to kill Yu with a grenade. Shen immediately blamed the Eighth Route Army, thus trying to turn Yu against us. We made great efforts to get at the truth and finally located the real assailant. A public trial was held at Chuanli, Shantung, and the assassin testified that the Governor himself had sent him. The scandal forced Chungking to withdraw Shen from Shantung. But instead of being punished he was made Minister of Agriculture in the Central Government."

In 1940 and 1941 the Eighth Route Army in Shantung increased very rapidly by local recruitment, growing to six brigades. Five administrative areas were established. Their population at the end of 1940 exceeded ten millions. The Japanese were alarmed by this development in the province closest to the sea and to Japan herself. In their great campaigns against the Eighth Route Army bases in preparation for the launching of the Pacific War the clearing of Shantung had first priority. Fifty thousand men were sent against it in 1941. Although the enemy's object was not achieved, the weight of the blow and the terrible reprisals taken against the people reduced the size of the base. In the following years, it grew again.

8. The New Fourth Army—Before and After "Disbandment"

In contrast to the stony mountains and dry plains of the Eighth Route Army bases north of the Yellow River, the New Fourth Army operated in the rich, green, humid valley of the Yangtze among flooded rice fields terraced along gentle slopes, blue fish-filled lakes, and countless rivers, streams and canals. Here the people are as different as the country. The Northern Chinese are tall, strong, quiet, stubborn and slow to anger. The people of the Yangtze are whiplash-slim, mercurial and ingenious, with minds that have been quickened, just as their economy has been revolutionized, by contact with the cosmopolitan metropolis of Shanghai.

We have already described the New Fourth Army Incident in the framework of the Chinese political changes in 1939-1941. Chen Yi, present commander of the New Fourth Army, told me of the incident as it appeared on the spot, and of its effect on local resistance. Chen is one of the old Chinese Red Army leaders who did not go on the Long March but stayed behind in the old Soviet areas. Like Chou En-lai, Nieh Yung-chen and other important Communists he belongs to the amazing group of students who went to France after the last war and came back to China to make such a mark on the history of their country. But apart from his intellectual face and the sharp logic and occasional flash of Gallic insouciance which they all brought back

with them, he bore the sun-baked, effort-hardened look of all Red veterans who had not stopped fighting and marching for sixteen years.

"Interparty friction in our sector began at the end of 1938, and grew rapidly from then on," Chen Yi said. "In March, 1939, Wang Ching-wei formed his puppet government in Nanking, and the Japanese started to use him as bait for capitulation. Wang took over all the outward panoply of the Kuomintang so that it was difficult to distinguish between the true and the false. Among his adherents were many who had been Kuomintang officials in the locality before the war. They made contact with their old colleagues who were still in the Chiang Kai-shek camp, neutralized some and bought over others. When the Chungking forces in our area began fighting Communist influence, Wang and the Japanese let it be known that no one would attack them so long as this policy was followed.

"There were three types of national forces along the lower Yangtze at the time. Our New Fourth Army, with only 10,000 men, was the smallest, but it had penetrated to the outskirts of Shanghai, Nanking, Chinkiang, Soochow and Wusih. The 'Loyal and Victorious Army,' which Kuomintang Secret Service chief Tai Li had organized among members of the Green and Red Gangs (Chinese feudal secret societies), had 80,000 men in the same area. About 50,000 soldiers of the regular Central forces under the over-all command of General Ku Chu-tung (commander in chief of the Third War Zone) and the field command of General Lung Hsing had re-entered the Kwangteh and Liyang districts close to Nanking. In 1937-1938 all three elements worked together.

"Differences in the Chinese camp began to arise when the enemy stopped his general offensive and began to consolidate," General Chen explained. "Tai Li's Loyal and Victorious Army immediately reacted by adopting what it called 'expectant tactics.' It stopped fighting in order, in its own words, to 'hold on, avoid destruction, and remain intact for the final counterattack.' Its commanders hated us for our continued offensive activity which they said 'only provoked the enemy.' After making local nonaggression agreements with various puppet units to 'keep the front quiet,' they complained to Chungking that our attacks on the quislings 'violated their strategy,' and described our capture of enemy-held towns as encroachments on their sphere of influence. Soon they began to tip off the enemy when we moved, to show that they were not implicated in such 'disturbances of the peace.'

"Although the fighting forces of the New Fourth were behind the enemy lines, our headquarters, with the main stores and base hospitals, was still located between the Kuomintang and enemy fronts. The Kuo-

mintang pressed us to move these establishments also to the enemy rear, where their protection would be a constant worry to the combat troops. To reinforce the demand, they blockaded our communications with unoccupied China, cutting off all supplies. From then on we were deprived completely of a strategic rear. The Kuomintang forces had the right to draw on the hinterland, but not we. I once visited a Central Army headquarters close to ours which had direct highway and telephone connections with Chungking. They had electric lights, good furniture, American canned food and foreign wines. All these things had been brought in by a route that was barred to our medicine, uniform cloth and other basic needs.

"The squeeze on our headquarters increased to the point where no Fourth Army personnel, not even the wounded, were allowed to pass through any Kuomintang territory," Chen Yi continued. "Since the Loyal and Victorious Army moved in behind us into every area we cleared, we could not manoeuvre and our positions were pin-pointed for convenience of the Japanese. Our policy was to keep our faces to the enemy and avoid conflict with other Chinese forces at all costs, so we made shift as best we could. When we had to get our wounded or staff members to headquarters we no longer even asked the Kuomintang for permission which we knew would be refused, but dressed them up as peasants and moved them secretly. Of course, this could not go on indefinitely.

"In the middle of 1939 the Japanese suddenly stopped coddling the Loyal and Victorious Army and put strong military pressure on it. Tai Li's officers had told their men that they would not have to fight till there was a general counteroffensive years later, so the force had no plans to meet the attack. The Japanese no sooner struck than Commander Yang Hsiu-chien capitulated with 50,000 men, the majority of the army's forces. The Wang Ching-wei puppet government then enrolled them under its own flag to fight the New Fourth. But since they had already been demoralized by the previous happenings we were able to disperse them completely.

"General Ku Chu-tung, Central Government commander of the Third War Zone, rebuked us for this. He said the fault for the Loyal and Victorious Army's treason did not lie with them but with us, because we always made the enemy angry," Chen Yi laughed ruefully. "One of his protests to our headquarters said: 'We are working to get these forces back into the Chinese camp. By attacking and disintegrating them you are sabotaging the war.' He reported the same thing to Chungking.

"It was then that, at Chungking's insistence, the main forces of

the New Fourth Army began transferring to the north bank of the Yangtze.

"But Chungking played a double game. While approving our plan of movement, the Generalissimo sent orders to Kuomintang forces north of the river to attack us as we passed. Before leading my own detachment across I advised General Han Teh-chin, the Kuomintang commander in Northern Kiangsu, of my arrangements for carrying out the movement agreed on in Chungking. General Han sent an aide-de-camp to say it was all right with him, but as soon as the aide left his troops opened fire on our columns. In October 1940, our new positions on the north bank were also attacked by 20,000 men of Han Teh-chin's Second Division, First Brigade and Peace Preservation detachments. We beat them off, and their commander, Li Shih-wei, was drowned in the retreat. This was the basis for the charge later made by the government that we had 'murdered' a Kuomintang general.

"In December General Yeh Ting personally visited the Third War Zone headquarters to fix the route of the final evacuation. He was promised \$200,000 in back pay for the army and ammunition for the operation. On January 4, he started north with the headquarters, three regiments of troops and a training detachment. At the same time the Kuomintang General Shangkuan Yun-hsiang, acting under War Zone orders, deployed 50,000 troops on his flanks. On January 7, 1941, he struck. Yeh Ting tried his best to stop the fighting. He sent a message to Shangkuan, in which he recalled that they had been classmates in the military academy and said that instead of fighting each other they should cooperate to defend the nation. In reply, Shangkuan invited Yeh to his headquarters under safe-conduct. Yeh had no sooner come than he was arrested, together with his guards and secretaries. It is not true that he was captured in battle. Shangkuan invented this story to cover up the disgraceful trick by which he lured Yeh into his power.

"The battle continued after Yeh's arrest. Two thousand of our soldiers were killed along with hundreds of headquarters and medical workers, including many women. Four thousand were taken prisoner. About a thousand men broke out of the encirclement and ultimately rejoined our main forces north of the river."

I asked about Chiang Kai-shek's statement on the incident, issued on January 17. "It was a lie from beginning to end," said Chen Yi flatly. "Chiang accused us of planning a coup on the south bank when we were actually moving to the north under his orders. He said the New Fourth Army had been 'dispersed,' whereas actually we had grown to 100,000 men of whom only 9000 were involved in the incident. He said we were 'disobedient,' but the real reason for the incident was the

sharp contradiction between our policy of active warfare and the Kuomintang's passive strategy, and Chungking's fear that our influence would spread in the important Shanghai-Nanking-Hangchow triangle. The Communist Party tried to allay the friction by concessions but Chungking used these concessions to try and smash us.

"In his speech on January 28 Chiang Kai-shek said that the New Fourth Army were traitors and that Yeh Ting should be brought to trial," Chen Yi said. "At the same time the traitor Wang Ching-wei broadcast to his pro-Japanese troops from Nanking that, 'the destruction of the New Fourth Army has been begun and it is our job to smash the remnants.' The puppets and Japanese immediately moved against us. Chungking also dispatched 200,000 troops under General Tang En-po against our forces on the north bank. Attacked on all sides, our whole army was really threatened with annihilation.

"Since we had been officially declared outlaws by the Kuomintang, the Revolutionary War Committee of the Communist Party at Yanan took us in tow and sent orders to regroup for active warfare against the Japanese and puppets, as well as for self-defense against any further Kuomintang attacks. I was appointed to deputize for Yeh Ting as commander of the whole army. A new headquarters was set up at Yen-cheng on the North Kiangsu coast. The army was divided into seven divisions all stationed in the rear of the enemy. The First Division was assigned to Central Kiangsu, the Second to Southern Anhwei, the Third to North Kiangsu, the Fourth to Northern Anhwei, the Fifth to the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei Border, the Sixth to Southern Kiangsu and the Seventh to Central Anhwei.

"So we did not collapse," Chen Yi said. "Instead the Kuomintang Army suffered. The patriots in its ranks were confused and demoralized at having to fight their own countrymen. Those without principles felt that since they were not fighting the Japanese anyhow there was no reason not to take shelter under the enemy's wing and draw his rations. In March 1941, 50,000 Kuomintang troops under Li Chang-hsiang and Yang Chen-hwa went over to the enemy in Central Kiangsu. The Japanese then moved these forces as well as the 113th and 17th Japanese Divisions against our new headquarters area, thinking we had had too little time to settle down to offer serious opposition. Our success in weathering this campaign, which lasted several months, was the ground-work of all the subsequent progress made by the army.

"In the meantime Tang En-po's Central troops began pressing our Fourth Division in Anhwei. While we held the Japanese we retreated from him so as to dampen the mounting danger of civil war. Tang took advantage of this to slaughter our more isolated units and 'punish' the people for helping us. Several months later, when we had again

enlarged our base at the expense of the enemy, many of our men demanded that we return to these areas because they wanted to avenge their comrades. But we did not believe in reopening old quarrels when it was so hard to avert new ones.

"Our policy proved correct," Chen Yi concluded. "A general civil war was avoided. After the Kuomintang 'outlawed' us we were free to carry on military operations in the way we thought would do most damage to the enemy. We could promote elected organs of people's power like those which had proved such a source of strength to the Eighth Route and stimulate the people to greater productive effort because they knew that they would not be robbed of its fruits. Because we gave the people something to defend, tens of thousands enlisted in our regular forces and millions of young men and women entered auxiliary services. This enabled us to extend our operations.

"Each of our seven divisions built both a front and its own stable 'strategic rear' in which headquarters organizations, civil governments, factories, hospitals, newspapers and educational institutions could function.

"On the eve of the Pacific War the New Fourth Army whose 'destruction' was announced at the beginning of the year had grown to 130,000 regulars supported by much greater armed detachments of the people."

9. Modern China: The Hong Kong-Canton Area

The southern province of Kwangtung, with its great cities of Canton and Hong Kong, is the cradle of modern China and of all the phases of the Chinese revolution. Because of the strength of the revolutionary tide, it was in Kwangtung also that feudal reaction, backed by near-by foreign interests, developed its greatest efficiency and virulence. The White Terror raged unabated here from 1927 to 1936 and nowhere in China did progressives have to go as deeply underground, or fight against more towering difficulties.

The Kwangtung Anti-Japanese Guerilla Base which arose after Canton fell to the enemy in 1938 drew on the militant traditions of the past. It was formed by the joint efforts of Canton workers and intellectuals, peasants from the East River region who had never forgotten the early Soviets, seamen from Hong Kong, and emigrant patriots returned from the South Seas. Militarily it resulted from the merging of two guerilla detachments, each with its own distinct history.

The first originated near the Hong Kong border as one of the many home-guard units set up at the call of the government when the war with

Japan began. This detachment differed from the others through the personality and ideas of its leader, Wang Tso-yao. Wang was not a bureaucratic official interested only in formal compliance with the latest administrative circular but a young, energetic village schoolteacher. He had had brief military experience in the provincial army and his political anti-Japanese activity dated back to the student movement of 1935, the nationwide demonstration for unity against the aggressor that served as a training ground for so many of the new figures of the people's war.

The detachment's first success took place during the Japanese march on Canton, when its peasant fighters ambushed and destroyed a small enemy unit. Finding itself behind the Japanese lines, it dispersed temporarily among the villages, soliciting aid from the people and buying arms from regular army stragglers for food and money obtained through the pooling of the resources of all members, including even the silver trinkets of their womenfolk.

In the next stage, regular army resistance collapsed altogether, the local Kuomintang generals ordering still undefeated regiments to cross the Hong Kong boundary and intern themselves in the British colony. I happened to be there at the time and saw hundreds of well-equipped men piling up their weapons at the barriers. But going a mile or so back into Chinese territory, where occasional rifle fire showed that some fighting was still going on, I met several bunches of soldiers from the surrendered Bocca Tigris forts who said they had refused to follow instructions. "We know the hills around here much better than the enemy does," they said. "There aren't too many of them around and there is no reason to run." The judgment of these corporals and privates differed radically from that of the high command, and some of them later found their way to Wang's detachment.

Months later, having got over their panic, agents of the provincial government came back to see what could be done. Wang got in touch with them and was regularly commissioned by General Hsiang Han-ping, who had been appointed to command the new Fourth Guerilla Region. But by then the general political recession had set in and the authorities were afraid of popular formations. As soon as they had brought enough of their own men in, they ordered Wang to disband. He refused, and punitive measures were undertaken. A commando column known as the "Ever Forwards" was sent against the detachment and the people who sheltered it. The whole population of the Pao An region was branded as "Red and criminal." The town of Lunghwa, as well as a number of villages, was burned to the ground. The biggest landlord in the region was shot for supplying the guerillas with food. A sixteen-year-old boy guilty only of having studied in Wang's school was

tortured to death, and many village elders, intellectuals and leaders of local defense units were executed. Peasants were robbed of their draft animals, bedding and clothes. The official excuse was that the "bandits" must be deprived of all opportunities for shelter. The Pao An farmers said sardonically that the Ever Forwards were "ever forward" in fighting the people and running from the enemy. They continued to support Wang, under whom their sons served, and the detachment never left the area.

Wang's unit now incorporated with another, composed of young men from the Canton and Waichow Y.M.C.A.'s and many boys and girls from Malaya and the Dutch East Indies, who had originally attached themselves as an auxiliary corps to the 106th Central Division. This detachment was led by Chin Sheng,⁶ a student who had had to go into hiding after the 1935 movement and had spent the two years before the war as a deck hand on coastal ships. During this time he became an outstanding organizer of the Chinese Seamen's Mutual Aid Association, a rank-and-file organization that existed parallel to the officially controlled Seamen's Union and had branches in ports all over the world, including New York and Liverpool.

Although their work with the Central troops was nonmilitary, the young people soon persuaded the commander to give them a few rifles and pistols for self-defence on night propaganda-and-intelligence sallies into areas already held by the Japanese. When the regulars retired to Hong Kong, forty of them stayed on in the district of Pingshan, where they rallied and organized two hundred stragglers. Some of the "overseas" boys were delegated to make their way back as delegates to their homes in Malaya and Java, where "Save the Home Town" meetings were held to raise money for the unit. Representatives of overseas organizations themselves journeyed secretly to Pingshan, bringing funds and returning with stirring reports. The Waichow Guild in near-by Hong Kong was a strong supporter.

Like Wang's detachment, the overseas unit was temporarily assimilated by General Hsiang Han-ping's command, and it too was later ordered disbanded and attacked. The killing of several of its members, including girls, brought indignant cables from Chinese communities in the Pacific Islands and the United States, which demanded Hsiang's dismissal. When their request was ignored by Chiang Kai-shek, many organizations stopped their contributions to the central war fund and gave their support instead to the joint detachment, which was reorganized into a single brigade headed by Chin, with Wang as second-in-

⁶ Chin joined the Communist Party before the war, and after beginning guerilla work became secretary of the party's East River Committee.

command. All resources, including overseas funds, were pooled.

By the end of 1940, the brigade was a fairly strong force, well tested, well disciplined and fortified by local and external support. When a large Japanese mopping-up force advanced on them with artillery and planes, they repelled it successfully, destroying 400 of the enemy in a mountain pass into which they had lured them. A serious attack from the Ever Forwards was repelled with the aid of new and growing farmer-militia auxiliaries. In the Tungkun district the brigade organized the Sun Yat-sen College to equip outstanding local fighters and overseas volunteers with the knowledge and techniques of political, economic and military struggle behind the enemy lines.

The East River base was consolidated, and village self-government and rent reduction were introduced. The brigade helped the people to plant, cultivate and harvest their crops and loaned them money and seed grain from its own stores. Co-operatives were organized for community reclamation work, irrigation and wholesale purchase of necessities. Fruit culture, for which the East River region is famous, was improved, and growers were encouraged to combine into sales co-operatives. These, with their joint resources, were able to find a market for their produce despite wartime disruption of normal channels.

To support local defense the guerillas collected taxes on all commercial goods in transit. These they kept for themselves. But the land tax, which was also collected, was remitted to the Central authorities, to show that, however it was regarded in Chungking, the Brigade considered itself a legal part of the Chinese forces.

The military role of the force was far from negligible. For three years after the fall of Canton it prevented the Japanese from re-establishing traffic on the Canton-Hong Kong railway. When the Japanese attacked Hong Kong, it was the first and only Chinese fighting unit to penetrate into the colony, in whose New Territories section it remained active until V-J Day. The assistance it gave to escaping British troops and prisoners of war will be described elsewhere.

10. Hainan Island

The island of Hainan is a major position in West Pacific naval strategy. Its extensive tracts of forest and fertile farmland, dominated by the majestic "Five Finger Mountains," are populated by more than 3,000,000 people. Hainan gave the Kuomintang the Soong family, to which Premier T. V. Soong, Madame Chiang Kai-shek and Madame Sun Yat-sen belong. Red guerillas had established a Soviet area in its inland parts during the the long civil war.

When hostilities against Japan began, these guerillas, like Com-

Communist-led units elsewhere, offered to enter a united front with the regular Kuomintang garrison. But Hainan was so far from the centres of national life that the latter never even bothered to reply. At the end of 1938, when the garrison was withdrawn, an arrangement for joint action was finally made with the local Peace Preservation Corps. The Hainan Joint Self-Defense Anti-Japanese Independent Detachment was formed, with Feng Pei-jo as commander.

After the Japanese landing on February 10, 1939, the detachment began guerilla warfare. There were fights at Lungpanpu, Yunghsing, west Chungshan, Nata (Nadoa) and Wenchang in which enemy soldiers were killed and weapons captured. Late the same year the Kuomintang sent an official named Wu Tao-nan to become administrative commissioner of districts still under Chinese control. Wu assumed command of the Peace Preservation Corps, cancelled the interparty agreement as unauthorized, and arrested many Communists and progressives. Both he and his forces melted away, however, when the enemy attacked again.

In the meantime, the Japanese Navy was busy developing Hainan as a base for the coming Pacific War. It established submarine havens at Yulin and Sanya Gulf, built several airfields, and stock-piled the island's production of timber, rubber, sugar, rice and salt. Marines and soldiers tried repeatedly to smoke out the guerillas and in May 1941 a full-scale mopping-up campaign against them was launched. It failed, and the Hainan Liberated Area, with a popularly elected government, grew to claim authority over 1,500,000 people. As in all Liberated Areas, the figure was reckoned by counting only those persons who paid taxes regularly to the patriot administration and received sufficient protection from its forces to prevent Japanese or puppet authorities from taxing them.

PART FOUR

Far Eastern Front of Global War

X. ALLIED WAR

1. What Pearl Harbour Meant to China

THE JAPANESE BOMBS THAT FELL ON PEARL HARBOUR COMPLETELY changed the international situation of China.

American and British policy towards Japan had not previously been co-ordinated. The two countries had moved in their separate ways from support and appeasement to hostile economic and political retaliation and back again. The United States often expressed verbal disapproval of Japan's aggression, but up to 1940 the invader had battered on oil, scrap iron and automotive vehicles from America and the huge dollar payments she made for imported silk. Britain was less of an economic crutch to China's enemy, but she had gone much further than the United States in diplomatic appeasement and accommodation to aggression.

Britain's support of Japan at the time she seized Manchuria has already been described. At the time of the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war, however, her policy had shifted a few degrees to the Chinese side. Since Japan had made herself so strong Britain no longer regarded Tokyo as a champion against "arrogant" native nationalism and hoped that Chinese resistance would hold. At the same time she hastened to make "realistic" adjustments to the existing situation in areas which the Japanese had already conquered. British police in the International Settlement of Shanghai arrested and extradited Chinese patriots. China was prevented from importing arms which she had bought and paid for through the nominally free port of Hong Kong. Chinese customs revenues, on which Britain had a lien as security for previous loans, were shared with the Japanese in the ports they held. British and American firms sold coal, oil and machinery to the occupying forces on the spot as well as to Japan proper.

The appeasement of the aggressor that began in the pre-Munich

period was continued, after the European War, under much stronger pressure than Japan had previously been able to apply. The studied insults at Tientsin when the Japanese took down the pants of Englishmen for all Asia to see¹ were accepted and swallowed. London issued an official declaration disclaiming all desire to interfere with, or in any way hamper, Japan's military operations in China. It agreed to close the Burma Road, China's only life line to the Western world, for a period of three months. In their endless perorations on "East Asiatic co-prosperity," the Japanese made no bones about announcing that the object of their operations was to "liquidate Anglo-American influence." But the prospective victims did little or nothing about it. Just as the war in Europe had begun long before it was declared, with only Hitler doing any fighting, so the war in the Pacific began long before Pearl Harbour with only Japan doing the shooting.

After December 7, 1941, all this belonged to the past. Japan, Britain and America were locked in mortal battle. China's armed resistance changed from a lone stand to a war of alliance with two of the great world powers. Japan was isolated from international aid. China was assured, sooner or later, of overwhelming international assistance. The Chinese people could hope for victory not through an endlessly prolonged period of attrition of the enemy's forces but by participation in the Allied counteroffensive that would ultimately overwhelm Japan's forces with an avalanche of men and machines.

As the first result of Pearl Harbour in China, the Chungking Government declared war not only on Japan (there had been no previous declaration) but also on Italy and Germany. This was the work of the then Foreign Minister Quo Tai-chi, who had become a believer in the antifascist Grand Alliance in his years as Ambassador to London. Although the parts of it directed against the European Axis partners were mainly demonstrative, since there was no place Chinese forces could fight either one, they nevertheless aroused the ire of Kuomintang rightists who had very close ideological and personal links with Rome and Berlin. Germans of known Nazi connections employed by the Chinese Government in military and other industries were not interned but ostentatiously allowed to stay on in their houses with the privilege of visiting the capital. It was said that General Ho Ying-chin, the

¹ This is not a figure of speech. In 1940 the Japanese blockaded the British concession in this city and forced all British subjects entering or leaving it to strip on the open street for purposes of "search". The idea was to destroy the white man's "prestige," which England had built up, and often defended with arms, throughout the colonial and semicolonial world.

² Quo Tai-chi later returned to political life as chief Chinese delegate to the United Nations Security Council and its first chairman.

War Minister, had offered the reserve officers among them safe passage to the borders of occupied territory so that they could go back to the service of their country. Internment camps were set up for Axis nationals but only a few German-Jewish refugees were put into them. There is no record of any containing a Nazi.

2. Hong Kong—a Study in Colonial Defense

The subsequent events were conditioned by the early course of the Pacific War. The successive fall of Hong Kong, Manila and Singapore shocked Chungking to the marrow of its bones. Hong Kong had served the Chinese Government as a kind of auxiliary capital from which its chief banking and purchasing institutions conducted their external business. Although military imports through the city were prohibited, many Chinese-owned factories there produced goods for the interior. A large proportion of China's bank notes were printed in Hong Kong and imported by air. Not only the state as such, but individual members of the government, had huge holdings within its supposedly inviolate borders. Men like H. H. Kung, T. V. Soong and the Kwangtung and Kwangsi generals owned large blocks of stock, tracts of real estate and palatial residences in the British colony.

When the threat of war became obvious, Chungking had offered its troops to help defend all these government and private enterprises. During a visit to Hong Kong, Madame Chiang Kai-shek had vainly proposed the dispatch of a division in plain clothes, to be disguised as auxiliary police and members of other local services until the time came to use it. The Chungking delegation had also compiled lists of Wang Ching-wei adherents and other Fifth Columnists against whom action should be taken before it was too late. Here too nothing was done. When the fighting actually broke out new efforts were made to secure arms for various groups of Chinese and to smuggle in soldiers in fishing boats to reinforce the garrison. But they met with formal excuses such as the difficulty of providing the men with proper uniforms. It was, of course, considered impossible to let men fight without them because this would constitute a breach of the laws of war (as though the Japanese ever observed them).

While the Kuomintang was making these proposals, other offers of aid came from democratic groups which had taken shelter in Hong Kong after the New Fourth Army Incident to escape the attention of the Kuomintang's censors and secret police. Intellectuals and writers who knew very well what would happen to them after the Japanese entry should they be discovered helping the British against the "Liberators of East Asia" volunteered their services in steadying, rallying and acti-

vising the Chinese population. Plans for direct military co-operation were advanced by Hong Kong representatives of the Chinese Communist Party who, in addition to a following within the colony, had for three years maintained the East River Anti-Japanese Guerilla Base in adjacent enemy-occupied territory.

The chief Kuomintang representative, Admiral Chen Chak, was finally allowed to make radio broadcasts, and some democratic intellectuals were permitted to publish a broadsheet called *Hong Kong War Express*. But nothing could persuade the British to make any real use of Chinese arms, organization and patriotic leaders in a fortress in which there were 2,000,000 Chinese against only 16,000 others, including all the British troops. The only Chinese given authority were a group of local trained seals who for years had been appointed by successive British governors to sit in their councils as "representatives of the Chinese community," which never elected them, and had been rewarded for this service with orders and knighthoods. After the enemy occupation these same worthies, again as "representatives of the Chinese community," welcomed the Japanese military governor and repudiated the once coveted "Sir" in front of their names, as a miserable hand-me-down from "the white imperialist enemies of East Asia." When this happened it surprised no one. Having always lived on the favour of foreign masters, these denationalized puppets saw no inconsistency in changing their allegiance when the power too changed hands. They were to turn their coats once more when the British returned and be fully reinstated, since their loyalty to the current boss could be counted upon, and they valued jobs above such dangerous ideas as freedom and self-government.

Speaking generally, the fall of Hong Kong was a result of the preponderance of Japanese military power at that time and place. But its speed and the form it took stemmed directly from the circumstances, outlook and traditions of colonial rule.

The prewar attitude of the British administrators towards the Japanese had been a mixture of three factors.

One was the philosophy of appeasement. The Japanese were playing a pressurè game and since Britain (as a result of earlier appeasement) was already in dire straits in other places they would have to be met halfway and kept quiet. In conformity with this policy, the government had acted on every protest by the Japanese Consul-General against expressions in the Chinese press and films which annoyed Tokyo, stopped arms supplies to China and so forth. No active measures were taken against Japanese and puppet espionage organizations and newspapers.

The second was a secret respect. Japan, after all, was another impe-

rial power. It was true that her soldiers had behaved abominably in China, but on the other hand this had kept the Chinese too busy to allow them to get nasty about British privileges there, previously a favourite and annoying pastime. The Japanese had grown big and important and could be admitted into the gentlemen's club of the great powers. While it was natural for them to try to expand their influence they would probably observe the gentlemen's code in dealing with an old-established rival firm like Britain-in-the-East.

The third was racial arrogance. If these Japs went too far it might be difficult for a while. But when all was said and done they were only yellow Asiatics who had not even been able to overcome Chinese resistance. The British themselves had never had any trouble getting the Chinese to see reason when things had come to gun play. No yellow men had ever defeated the British soldier and no yellow men ever would. More than one officer said to me over drinks in the Hong Kong Hotel lounge: "Sometimes we wish those fellahs would come in and get the thrashing that is waiting for them."

Their attitude toward the Chinese was similarly conditioned.

First, the Chinese had to be kept in order. It would not do to have them drag their messy quarrels with Japan into the Empire. While the Chinese Government should be given some assistance to prevent Tokyo from having everything its own way, anti-Japanese activities by the inhabitants of Hong Kong, like any other political activities by a subject people, were rather dangerous. Thus, Chinese newspapers were not allowed to use the word "enemy" instead of "Japanese" in writing about the war on the mainland to remind them that they lived under the King, and that this term could be used only for those on whom he warred.

Secondly, although charming and generally peace-loving, the Chinese were Asiatics too. Unlike the Japanese, who operated with the orthodox weapons of diplomatic pressure, espionage, armies and navies, they were given to those strange and unpredictable things called popular movements (directed, no doubt, from Moscow). Only fifteen years before British soldiers and police had had to fire at "mobs" of students and workers in Shanghai, Canton and Hankow. The trade of Hong Kong itself had been paralyzed by a general strike and boycott. The Chinese Seamen's Union had been proscribed in the colony as a "dangerous secret society" ever since, and old residents still spoke with horror of the days when they had been forced to do their own housework by a walkout of domestic servants. The same long-legged officers who were so confident of licking the Japanese said over and over: "Our chief worry if the balloon goes up will be these Chinese blighters. When things pop they might easily rise, massacre every white man and rape every white woman. At the very best, they'll panic at the first bomb,

tie-up traffic and make no end of bother. We'll have to keep a lot of troops back to watch them."

Underestimation of the Japanese led to the soldiers and volunteers of the garrison being poorly prepared for the kind of enemy they had to face. In the invasion, modern tactics of infiltration surprised and paralyzed the defenders—who had been trained to about the Boer War level. Instead of counter-infiltrating in a mobile battle in depth, the British fell back every time a line was pierced until they were finally bunched up first on the island and then in the prisoner-of-war camps. As always, the troops displayed great courage and did not leave their positions, whatever the casualties, until ordered. But this was not enough. If the local commanders had paid some attention to the lessons of the European War and to the judgment of their own more wide-awake subordinates, they might have broken through the enemy lines at the same time the enemy broke through theirs. The Japanese would have been engaged for a longer period on the Kowloon mainland and, when the colony finally fell, a good part of the garrison could have escaped to join the Chinese forces in the hinterland.

Fear and distrust of the Chinese both in Hong Kong and on its borders led to an incredible and suicidal failure to exploit the greatest politico-military opportunity that had ever come to British colonial authorities anywhere. For the first time, perhaps, in Empire history, Britain faced an antagonist who was also the hated national enemy of the people over whom she ruled. The total garrison of Hong Kong did not exceed a division, but at any time after 1937 several new divisions could have been raised and trained among the Chinese population. Since these people were technically British subjects, no breach of neutrality in the Sino-Japanese conflict would have been involved.

Yet nothing was done until the very eve of the invasion, when it was finally decided to form the "nucleus" of a Chinese regiment. The initial enlistment was fifty men. The recruitment literature ignored China's noble-hearted defense against aggression and its appeal to "fighting tradition" mentioned only a previous British Empire force consisting of Chinese—the defunct Weihaiwei Regiment whose members had fought only against their own countrymen and won an infamous reputation in the sack of Peking in 1900. It called for active young men of perfect physique and good education, but the inducement held out was pay on a much lower scale than that of white British troops and "advancement to the highest noncommissioned rank" for long and faithful service. A Chinese could actually aspire to a top sergeant or warrant officer if he stayed in the army for twenty years and made no mistakes!

During the retreat from Kowloon the fifty Chinese recruits, still

half trained, were given a tough rear-guard action to fight and acquitted themselves very well. There might have been 30,000 of them. Locally raised soldiers could have provided the perfect check and answer to the Japanese tactics of small-group infiltration. The weapons that might have equipped such forces were to be captured by the Japanese, still packed in warehouses for "lack of fighting men."

3. Guerillas, Commandos, Chungking and London

The depth of this error and the opportunities lost through it were made dramatically apparent by subsequent happenings. Seventy British and Kuomintang officials and military men who ran the gauntlet of Japanese fire in a motor torpedo boat at the moment of the surrender found the Communist-led East River guerillas on the beaches only a few miles away. These men led them to safety and the rear.

A few days after the surrender the guerillas had penetrated behind the Japanese, into Hong Kong's "New Territories." They picked up the weapons the British had been forced to abandon and secured bases which they held till the war's end. Fugitives from Hong Kong prisoner-of-war camps who struck across the border, hoping at best to slip through some quiet gap in the enemy lines and at worst to give up all their possessions to bandits and puppets, found something very different. Everywhere the villagers put them in contact with cheerful, open-faced young men, festooned with hand grenades and looking decidedly undefeated, who set them at ease by saying, often in excellent English: "We belong to Chin Sheng's guerilla detachment. Our headquarters has sent us to help you into China."

In the bases to which they were escorted, the refugees found not only shelter but organized anti-Japanese activity. Those who wanted to do so were able to resume immediately the fight that had been lost a few miles south. Escaped officers of the Hong Kong garrison were invited to teach classes in military subjects and the use of salvaged British Army equipment. Doctors found their assistance eagerly sought in clinics, nursing schools and the organizational problems of the guerilla medical service. Chinese political figures, writers and newsmen lectured for several hours each day on the antiaggression front in China and throughout the world.

No better tonic could have been devised for fugitives from a surrendered fortress. The refugee mood was dispelled entirely. The guests of the guerillas, whatever their nationality, were so impressed that many spoke of staying in the area. Some left their own equipment as a gift to their hosts, or promised to return with medicines and other supplies after reporting to the authorities in the interior.

The deadly incubus of backward vested interests on the battle of Hong Kong and its aftermath was vividly illustrated by the history of a small group of British commandos who had been trained for special tasks in the colony. Some of these young men, who were teachers, civil service cadets and business employees in ordinary life, had stood by at great peril to blow up the docks and other installations to prevent their capture. But at the very last moment, their orders were countermanded. It subsequently appeared that the governor was dissuaded from destroying this equipment by its owners, the British bankers and company executives who formed his council. Their argument was that it would be foolish to smash all this valuable property when "we shall soon be back in possession and needing it." The British did not return for three and a half years, but by the time of the battle of the Java Sea, a couple of months after Hong Kong's surrender, the enemy was refitting his naval vessels in the undamaged docks.

Thoroughly fed-up as a result of this experience, the *commandos*, acting under orders, escaped to the Chinese coast in motor torpedo boats. They landed in the territory of the East River guerillas and became interested in co-operating with them against the Hong Kong Japanese. One of their projects was to raid the prisoner-of-war camps on the mainland part of the colony (Kowloon). At that time the physique of the 6,000-odd British soldiers confined there had not yet been undermined by starvation. If contact had been established and arms smuggled to them by the guerillas, with planes sent to drop additional weapons at the zero hour, they and the raiders could easily have fought their way through the less than 2,000 Japanese who remained to garrison Hong Kong after the occupation had been completed. If Chinese regulars further back had co-operated such a venture might even have resulted in the temporary recapture of Kowloon, breaking the moral depression occasioned by ceaseless Japanese victories and embarrassing the flow of enemy troops for the Java and Burma campaigns.

But here again "high policy" intervened, this time in the shape of the Kuomintang General Yu Han-mou. Ever since losing Canton without a fight, General Yu had had a nice quiet front which he did not want disturbed by any madcap escapades. If the *commandos* and guerillas carried out such a raid, he felt, his troops might have to fight the retaliating enemy. Yu had been waiting patiently for years for the Japanese to be driven out by somebody or other, not for a new attack. Moreover, the Communist-led guerillas, even though they had brought his own wife out of Hong Kong to safety, had to be wiped out. The idea of the British working with them and adding to their strength and prestige was intolerable. In this matter, at least, Yu agreed perfectly

with the Central Government, to which in other respects he paid little enough attention.

The British commandos really wanted to fight the Japanese, liberate their comrades and work with the guerillas, whom they had learned to admire as fighters. But their own guerilla training had been limited to demolition, knifing and neck-breaking. They were given no clue to relations with the people apart from the necessity of carrying plenty of money to buy food and spies.³ While waiting for a decision in Yu Han-mou's capital, Shaokuan, some of them were far too free with women, their fists and the bottle. This suited Yu Han-mou's book perfectly and provided him with a pretext to demand their recall. The Central Government passed his complaints to the branch of the British Embassy under which the commandos operated and the Embassy ordered them out.

Yu Han-mou, who had been so immovable against the Japanese, immediately launched a new campaign to annihilate the guerillas. Instead of Japanese being killed and British prisoners freed, many Chinese young men fell to each other's bullets. The East River Region was so tight-pressed that it had to evacuate many of the intellectuals and other noncombatants who had come from Hong Kong to help it. Immediately after Yu Han-mou's troops had been repulsed, the Japanese closed in to finish the job. The guerillas survived as they had always done.

Thus the sabotage of an old-style militarist, the policy of the Kuomintang Government, the political backwardness of the commandos and the formalism of the British authorities combined to abort a perfectly feasible Allied operation for which the need was desperate.

4. Singapore and Malaya

In the great fortress of Singapore the same theme was repeated with variations. While the number of troops in Hong Kong had been totally inadequate to the need, Singapore's defenders far outnumbered the attacking Japanese. But the same fear of the people and political shortsightedness⁴ operated here too. Instead of a longer and fiercer

³ An example of this attitude was the appointment of a Count Bentinck to head the China commandos. Bentinck, a kind of Cecil Rhodes-Lawrence combination, had done well in raising Abyssinian levies in the campaign against Italy. He believed that "natives" would fight well if impressed by displays, kept in their place, and treated with seignorial fairness. His efforts to apply this theory in China were a tragic farce and he was sent home.

⁴ Exponents of British tory policy, *au naturel* or in Bevin guise, could argue that what seemed politically, shortsighted in wartime was really brilliantly long sighted from the point of view of the continued existence of the

resistance, 60,000 more men went into Japanese prison cages.

Politically the Singapore authorities ignored the great military potentialities of the Chinese population, which forms a majority in Malaya and has always been strongly anti-Japanese. As in Hong Kong, the government regarded this community with suspicion. Both the Kuomintang and the Communist Party had been under an official ban for fifteen years, but while the ban on the Kuomintang had become largely formal, Communists still filled the jails.

It was only when the Japanese were already halfway down the Malaya Peninsula that the authorities listened to the appeals of the Chinese to be allowed to share in the defense of the country in which they resided and worked. Besides forming the backbone of the civil defence services they were permitted to organize an armed detachment of over a thousand men, in which Kuomintang members and people of no party fought side by side with Communists released from prison, some of them veterans of the Red Army. All eyewitnesses pay homage to the heroism of this force which stood up to enemy dive bombers, artillery and infantry attacks until it was decimated. After the occupation the Japanese paid their own kind of tribute to the fighting qualities of the Malayan Chinese. In Singapore, Johore and Kuala Lumpur they slaughtered no less than 30,000 Chinese students, workers and other patriots.

Although security made it a secret during the war, the world knows today that from 1942 on a very large and effective guerilla force operated in the Malayan jungle, and that it had contact by submarine and other means with the Allied commands in the Far East. Among both commanders and rank and file there were Chinese, Indians, Malays, Englishmen and Australians. Chinese miners, shipyard fitters and other workers formed the majority of the troops and Chinese Communists were prominent in the leadership. The guerillas drove the Japanese civil administration from extensive areas, depriving the enemy of their resources. They destroyed small Japanese garrisons and columns, collected their arms, and planned and trained for more decisive operations when the Allies landed.

Here, as in Kuomintang China and in Hong Kong, the anti-Japanese armed forces of the people themselves could only be developed after the initial defeat. Their growth showed that the reserves of

Empire, in which the war with Japan was only an episode. In this sense it was much safer to hand over the colonial peoples, like a chattel, to the enemy and then receive them back uncorrupted by the experience of fighting for themselves. But the peoples found a way anyhow, and history is proving before our eyes the Pyrrhic postwar harvest that the victorious imperialists are reaping in Asia.

strength in the people, which had been neglected and repressed by the authorities responsible for the regular defence, might have made things much harder for the enemy at the start. The contrast between Malaya and Bataan, where the forces were smaller, and between Singapore and Corregidor, which was not nearly as much of a fortress, makes this clear. The Filipinos were not denied the right to fight for their homes.

5. The Anti-British Revulsion in China

The immediate result of the fall of Hong Kong and Malaya, and the subsequent defeat in Burma, was a great revulsion of Chinese feeling against the British. The Chinese considered that, having dominated these Asiatic territories for so long, Britain had at least incurred the duty of defending them with vigour and strength. Moreover, there had been unpardonable episodes in the midst of the calamity. In the retreats from Penang and Rangoon and the last-minute sea evacuations from Singapore, all the planes and most of the ships had been reserved for white men. Non-Europeans, whether British subjects or foreigners, had to go by the "black route," on little boats or on foot. Many of them died or were headed off by the Japanese. The overseas Chinese felt that their industry and enterprise was mainly responsible for the contributions of such places as Malaya to British imperial revenues and trade. Also, they had more to fear from the enemy than Englishmen, as was amply proved by the massacres that followed.

The anti-British reaction took different forms in different quarters.

Chinese progressives realized that whatever the problems of the past and future, the main immediate task was co-operation to defeat the Axis. They criticised the mistakes and crimes of the first stage of the Pacific War as lost opportunities, stressing what lessons must be learned if the defeats were not to be repeated.

Politically unconscious elements were laid open to Japanese pan-Asiatic propaganda. Many were simply neutralized for the anti-Japanese struggle, because their resentments against the whites and hatreds of Japan began to balance one another.⁵

Chinese fascists and reactionaries in the Kuomintang exploited the anti-British feeling for their own purpose, which was to fight "foreign ideologies" such as liberalism, democracy and Communism. They sang paeans to the virtues of China's old feudal order (which had really facilitated China's first defeats at the hands of the foreigner), and poured

⁵ An interesting case study of these factors in post-occupation Hong Kong is *Asia for the Asiatics* by Robert Ward, a U.S. consular official there (University of Chicago Press, 1945).

scorn on the contention of the progressives that the interests of the Chinese people lay parallel with those of all fighters against fascism, of whatever nationality. Such retreat to mystical nationalism and the denunciation of everything foreign as a substitute for the hard work of solving China's own problems was very convenient for the Chungking authorities. It provided an easy emotional outlet for many well-meaning but not very hard-thinking people and harnessed them firmly to the chariot of the dictatorship. Some came to it out of despair and war weariness, others out of cynicism and lack of real faith in their own people, and still others through deliberate calculation.

An early wartime example of such escapism may be found in the writings of Lin Yutang. This soft-bodied and nimble-witted philosophical hedonist lived comfortably abroad throughout the Chinese people's eight years of trial, during which he made only two butterfly-like visits home. On his first trip he announced grandiloquently that he would stay with "his country and his people," come hell or high water. But the Chungking bombings sent him scurrying back to New York.⁹ An absentee warrior thereafter, Lin passed rapidly from liberal criticism of the contemporary Chinese scene to glorification of the feudal past, the view that the foreigners were responsible for every evil, and apologetics for Kuomintang concentration camps. In America, he joined the "Pacific first" chorus of the isolationists and Roosevelt-haters who wanted to keep U. S. strength from being thrown against the Nazi Reich, main pillar of the Axis.

Lin's second tourist trip to wartime China was marked by receptions from officials and expressions of disgust from outstanding writers and publicists.

The degeneration of Lin Yutang's thinking paralleled almost exactly the ideological development of the Kuomintang's ruling circles. In 1943 Chiang Kai-shek himself fathered a book, *China's Destiny*, which crystallized all the tendencies described above. Issued under Chiang's name, the work was really "ghosted" by Tao Hsi-sheng, a turncoat professor who had tried everything from pretensions of Marxism to participation in Wang Ching-wei's Japanese quisling regime. *China's Destiny* shamelessly rewrote history. It dreamed up a Chinese "race" to include all the country's non-Chinese peoples, thus denying the right of Mongols, Turkis and Miaos to their own language, culture and local self-government. Assailing Western democracy, Communism

⁹ An interesting sidelight on the reaction of Chungking residents to this performance may be found in the "Who's Who" section of the official wartime *China Handbook*. Despite the fact that Lin is a Kuomintang partisan, the compilers could not restrain themselves from sarcasm in the paragraph devoted to him.

and socialism as unsuited to the spirit of this Chinese race, it kept discreetly silent on the subject of fascism. The progressive nationalism of Sun Yat-sen, who drew on world democratic thought and hated feudalism, was tortured to coincide with the feudal Confucianism which the emperors had cherished and Sun himself had fought.

With disarming frankness, *China's Destiny* repudiated the descent of the Kuomintang and the "new China" from the Taiping revolution of the 1850's in which the great peasant majority had made its first modern claim to human rights and dignity. Sun Yat-sen, steeped from boyhood in the tales of old Taiping veterans in his village, had said repeatedly that his party must complete what they began. Chiang Kai-shek, on the other hand, condemned the Taipings as disorderly rebels and made heroes and models of Tseng Kuo-fan and other Chinese landlord generals who, with outside aid, had crushed them and preserved the Manchu despotism.

Chiang Kai-shek's book was printed in millions of copies and made a basic political textbook in military academies, universities and schools. All administrative officials, candidates for government positions and applicants for government scholarships to study abroad were put through intensive courses in its principles. Among other exercises, they were required to write "reflections" on each day's reading in their diaries. These were afterwards scrutinized for orthodoxy by party instructors who passed on the writers' fitness for office and preferment.

Foreign correspondents in China were forbidden to translate *China's Destiny* or cable excerpts abroad. Dr. Wang Chung-hui, an international lawyer who had been a judge of the Hague World Court, was assigned the duty of producing an expurgated English version that would not blister the eyes of the Allied peoples in the midst of an anti-fascist war. After seventeen texts had been prepared even he gave up. To date, no authorized translation has been published.⁷

Chiang's book was relevant to more than the internal situation. When it was first published the Nazis were pounding at Stalingrad and probing the Caucasus. Japan was at the height of her conquests in the Pacific. *China's Destiny* provided an ideological bridge to civil war within the country and a place among the fascist nations if the Axis should win.

⁷ The Kuomintang's sensitivity over this book was matched, after the war, by the U. S. State Department, which was supporting its fight for continued power. When Representative Hugh De Lacy (Washington) asked to see the official American translation, he was told that it was a "top secret" document. If Mr. De Lacy knew Chinese, however, he could buy a copy of the original in any Chinese bookstore in this country and read it for himself.

To their undying credit progressive patriots of the country fought against this police-imposed version of Chinese history and aims just as they had ridiculed the effusions of Lin Yutang.

XI. THE WAR ECONOMY OF CHINESE FEUDALISM

THE ISOLATION OF CHINA FROM HER ALLIES IN THE FIRST MONTHS OF joint war threw her once more on her own resources. Since the Japanese were not seriously active on the Chinese regular front at this time, the first effect of this isolation was to cast a spotlight on economic conditions in the rear.

1. China's Rich Safeguard Their Interests

Eighty per cent of China's people are peasants and live in villages. The soldier China sent against Japan was a peasant. The food he ate had to be produced by peasants who supplied it by paying taxes and requisitions in kind. His uniform was frequently made of cloth woven by village women on hand-operated wooden looms. He was billeted on villages. The transportation columns of his detachments were composed of peasant men and women who carried ammunition and food on their own backs; or peasant horses, bullocks and carts rounded up for the same purpose.

Industries moved into the Chinese rear from the occupied coastal ports, or built up there afterwards, made some of his munitions and a few simple medicines, but otherwise played no part in his life. They gave him no canned rations or automotive transport. If he belonged to the lucky few who had a truck to ride in, it was one imported from abroad before the Pacific War or rushed in before the Burma collapse. It ran on charcoal gas or alcohol, its brakes were worn out and it constantly blew its tires.

The question of China's wartime economy and its postwar rehabilitation was and is the question of how the village can shoulder its many burdens. The wartime and postwar economic policy of the Chinese Government must be judged by what it has done and is doing to shift as

much of the burden as possible from the village to other sources, and what it has done to strengthen the village itself and develop its productivity so that it can carry its overwhelming load without exhaustion and collapse.

In the first phase of the stalemate, between 1939 and the end of 1941, China was still able to import. One would think that the government would then have bought many arms, and much machinery for the building up of its own rear industries. One would think that no price or effort would be considered too great for the building up of stock-piles and production capacity behind the regular front, just as no cost was considered too high for the development of the war economies of other belligerent nations.

For imports, a nation must have foreign exchange. For the upkeep of the army and the building of industries it must, if it is to avoid terrible inflation, take in money already available in the country by means of taxation and borrowing. This burden must be equally distributed. In a feudal country like China, the poor are generally so poor that they have no money at all but only debts. This was recognized in one of the most popular slogans of the war which was written into the Programme of Armed Resistance and National Reconstruction approved by all parties in 1938: "Those who have money give money. Those who have strength give strength."

Moreover, if everything is to be done to promote the building of new industries, industrial investment cannot be taxed too highly. It is obvious, therefore that what had to be totally mobilized for the war was unused capital; the rent income of landlords and the hoardings of merchants and speculators. This was not a question of morality, or revolutionary radicalism, or abstract justice. It is a basic necessity of wartime and reconstruction finance.

Did the Chinese rich do their share in the period when funds were most needed, when foreign as well as domestic supplies could be bought? Everyone knows that they did not. The first period of the war was characterized by a terrific flight of capital abroad. Wartime China was considered too "risky" a place to keep money. Most of the exported riches, when they did not remain completely idle, were invested in America and Britain or in real estate in Hong Kong and the Shanghai International Settlement. At best they were put into factories safely located in these places—some of whose products at least trickled back to help the war effort.

Foreign exchange regulations of various kinds were framed but they applied only to the middle and small man. The supermillionaires, such as Dr. H. H. Kung, escaped them because they were also the bureaucrats in charge of national finance and did not separate their

private funds from those of the state. As in the story about Louis XIV., the moneybags of China could say, "*L'etat, c'est moi.*" I.

Under these circumstances it was natural that the smaller men too should try to dodge the regulations, and that the government did not undertake too close and complete investigations for fear of revealing much larger secrets. The rich, in the government and out, became a mutual-protection society of privileged lawbreakers. All were equally determined to come out well even if the people's resistance, in which they did not have too much faith, should fail. All were equally interested in keeping the truth from the people.

By 1941 the flight of capital from China, and Chinese holdings outside the country, had become so great that Washington, not Chungking, froze Chinese holdings in United States banks. The freezing order was not fully effective because the biggest holders were government officials who had previous knowledge of it. Many of them dodged its provisions by transferring their money to American individuals and corporations. Nevertheless the order was a good thing for the Chinese people because at least part of the Chinese funds abroad were registered and frozen, and could be used, if sufficient pressure was applied, to buy necessities for war. But a few months after the order went into effect, the Pacific War broke out. Money was no longer of much immediate use because the channels along which goods could be imported were cut off. Chinese-owned factories and real estate in Shanghai and Hong Kong came under the direct domination of the enemy, who was of course glad to have them.

The complete blockade of China after Pearl Harbour therefore found her with only a very small stock of imported armaments, and fewer factories than she could have built in the 1939-1941 period. Only a few thousand trucks were running on her roads instead of the hundreds of thousands she needed and might have bought. During her last breathing spell she had imported almost as many luxurious private cars as trucks, because they served the comfort of the rich directly. A few of her magnates had private foreign holdings estimated at U. S. \$1,000,000,000, but within the country there was rocketing inflation.

Nor did the rich who were not officials and could not export their wealth behave any better. They too were obsessed with security for their fortunes until a "better" day. Instead of lending their savings to the government or investing them in industry, the rich tried to avoid the depreciation of their money through inflation by using it to buy up real estate and commodities for hoarding. Nothing escaped their attention, neither grain which was the people's food, nor textiles which the people needed to clothe them, nor iron which might have made machinery, nor medicines such as quinine and the sulfa drugs which, being

small, portable and expensive, were regarded as a particularly suitable repository of value. The peasant or rural handicraftsman could no longer buy tools and materials at the old price, or secure a loan at the old interest. Businessmen considered it far more profitable to hoard materials than to manufacture or sell. Banks and moneylenders were much more interested in changing capital into commodities and land than in lending it to producers.

What matter if production went down? The hoarded goods would go up in value all the faster. What matter if the peasant, unable to farm without credit, had to sell his land cheap, or the bankrupt small manufacturer had to get rid of his machines to settle his debts? Land and machines both would be bought up by some speculator who had the reserves to hang on until they could be resold on a much higher market. Not only did the government fail to erect barriers but the government's own banks entered the game. "To protect themselves" they preferred commodities in their warehouses to notes in their vaults. High officials and their families established "corners" in various supplies. Even the state monopolies of raw materials essential for production, such as cotton, proudly published figures showing how their accumulated stocks had grown in value and made a money profit for the budget. They seemed oblivious of the fact that by impeding the circulation of these goods instead of promoting it, they were contributing to the breakdown of the economy.

Since the purchasing value of money fell almost to nil, salaried employees were not only tempted but compelled to go into small-scale speculation and hoarding themselves. Corruption gained a terrible hold, not only among officials who had never been honest, but among groups formerly more or less free from it, such as university professors, doctors, students and transport personnel. Military supplies moving over China's slender transport network were dumped to make room for speculative cargoes on which the owners and drivers of trucks stood to profit handsomely. Trucks, spare parts and tires¹ were themselves hoarded instead of being used.

Inflation brought with it the need for more, more and more money. Once I asked the then Vice-Minister of Finance, Dr. Y. C. Koo, what China needed most from America. He said, cynically or despairingly, I could not tell which, "Bigger, better and faster presses to print more bank notes." Since nothing so heavy as a press could now be brought into China, the notes themselves were flown in, taking up plane tonnage desperately wanted for other things.

¹ In Kweilin new tires were used to make shoe soles, since they fetched a higher price that way.

2. "Scorched Earth" in Reverse

The creeping paralysis of finance, production and internal trade led to a change in the whole economic aspect of the Sino-Japanese War of which the enemy was not slow to take advantage.

The dumping of cheap manufactures on the China market and the smuggling in of goods without paying customs duties were old and tried instruments of Japanese aggression. For many years the effort to keep out such goods, and to build up her own manufactures against their competition, had been China's chief form of economic defence. But by the outbreak of the Pacific War, this situation had changed. China was in no condition to produce her own necessities, and her dependence on smuggled enemy goods, especially textiles, had become almost complete. Now it was the Japanese who tried to stop the flow of their goods across the lines. They permitted the export only of useless luxuries which would encourage Chinese profiteers to extravagance and ostentation without easing any real needs.

In previous years the Japanese had tried to lay their hands on as many Chinese dollars as possible. Part of them had been used to buy up strategic necessities such as tungsten and antimony, and because Chinese currency still had an international exchange value, the rest formed Japan's "bridge" to the acquisition of United States dollars and sterling in the pre-Pearl Harbour international market. Here too there had been an about turn. After 1941 China was in the throes of a great inflation which the Japanese stoked merrily by dumping their great reserves of notes back on the Chinese money market. By paying much higher prices for materials she required than the ceilings the Chinese Government had fixed, Japan bought up the major part of China's home-mined gold and strategic metals as well as other products. When she was sure that such a course would make trouble on the other side, she also bought up food. The Chinese authorities along the borders, allured by the high profits of the traffic, not only did not stop it but participated as middlemen.

In past years, retreating Chinese armies had burned cities and fields behind them. The celebrated "scorched earth" policy had been designed to prevent the Japanese from easily and quickly consolidating their hold on captured territory and turning its resources to their own profit. But now it was the enemy who was scorching China's earth. The Japanese attacks on the Changsha plain and other key economic regions in 1939-1944 had this "scorched earth policy in reverse" as their main purpose. Invading enemy columns collected and removed all manufactured goods, cotton and grain that they could find stored and destroyed what they could not remove. They trampled and set fire to harvests, killed the farmers' cattle, broke up agricultural implements

and drove away able-bodied men for forced labour before retiring to their original positions.

In the rich "rice bowl" of Hunan province at the end of 1943, the advancing Japanese took the clothes off the backs of the people and the bedding from their houses and, after painstakingly ripping them up, trampled both into the muddy country roads to provide a better footing for their artillery. They befouled grain stores by using them as army latrines and thoroughly mixing up the resulting mess. They carefully smashed every machine and tool, however primitive, used in local rural industry. Even the little wooden looms of a school for blind orphans run by Spanish Catholic nuns did not escape. An inspecting enemy patrol splintered each one with a big stone. Changteh, with a population of 160,000, and numerous towns like Taoyuan, Tehshan, Shihmen and Lihsien, had been burned to the ground. They had hardly an intact building between them, although there had been fighting in only two of the towns. It was doubtful whether the enemy had had any current intention of occupying such regions. The whole picture was one of the deliberate use of military force to accelerate the crisis of Chinese economy, which, under the prevailing policy, was incapable of healing such wounds.

While the enemy was thus adapting his tactics to the new situation, Chungking admitted its failure to develop the productive possibilities of the rear and its lack of faith in these possibilities. The government was composed of men out of contact with the daily work of their people. Its key members had lived on rent, trade or official emoluments all their lives and had never played a part, even as capitalists, in the organization of production. To their minds, the only solution when anything was lacking was to buy it. Moreover, since they themselves always used foreign goods, and had purchased even their educations abroad, their habit was not to buy at home but to import. As they had not imported from the Allies while it was possible and communications were open, the only salvation they now saw was to buy goods from China's neighbour and enemy, Japan.

Early in 1942 the United States, eager to keep Chungking in the war, had announced that it was lending the Chinese Government U.S. \$500,000,000. Britain also volunteered, on certain conditions, to lend £50,000,000. A few months later, Dr. H. H. Kung, the Chinese Finance Minister, reported that after thinking of the best way to use the American funds, his experts had come to the conclusion that a sum of U. S. \$200,000,000 should be allotted to pay for Japanese commodities and to ensure the "patriotic merchants" who smuggled them in of the profit necessary to justify their arduous and dangerous efforts. That government bureaucrats had a habit of participating in these profits in their

private capacities was a detail. Despite the hue and cry of Chinese manufacturers, who were now thoroughly disgusted with the government, hardly any of the loan went to help domestic industry.

The enrichment of top officials whetted the appetites of military commanders. Since Chungking strategy did not call for any offensive action, they had no incentive to keep up the nutrition and equipment of their troops. Profiteering on ration money and medical supplies became common. Soldiers languished and died from underfeeding or untreated disease, and desertion became the only escape for those who did not want to face this prospect. Many generals who had lost half or more of their troops from illness or flight continued to report that their divisions were at full strength, so that they could draw rations and pay in proportion.

On the quiet fronts, trade with the enemy flourished. Men conscripted to defend their country were given carrying poles and wheelbarrows instead of rifles and spent their time moving the officer merchants' stock across the lines. Others were set to building fine houses for generals who had used their smuggling profits to buy up farms and become very considerable local landlords.

The wives of the landlord generals moved to and fro between the front and Shanghai, deep in enemy territory, where they shopped for clothes and wines, cigarettes and rare foods for their husbands' tables. Lower officers did their best to imitate the upper. The dividing line in the army lay less between different ranks than between those who had opportunities for profiteering and took advantage of them and those who either had no such opportunities or did not choose to exploit them. Toward the end of the war junior officers who belonged to the latter categories were deserting in almost as great numbers as their men. At the very bottom of the ladder were the soldiers. Robbed and exploited themselves, they in turn robbed and exploited the people.

The resulting deterioration of the armies along the regular front was the chief reason for their utter failure to stand up to the Japanese when they resumed their major strategic advance, after a five-year lapse, early in 1944.

3. The People Pay in Both Money and Strength

What about the people's part of the slogan? Did "those who have strength give strength"? They gave strength and lives and money, and the last morsels out of their mouths. The peasants of the Kuomintang rear raised the harvests which alone kept the orgy of speculation and profiteering at the top from bringing about the total collapse of China's economy. They paid not only for the war but for the swollen war pro-

fits of the rich. If they could present a war bill to the Allies and their own rulers, it would go something like this:

Work. Unaided by any machinery or often even any animal transport, conscripted and generally unpaid, millions of peasant men and women laid down the great Northwest Highway to Russia, the Burma Road, and thousands of miles of less-known highways. At the height of the war they built the Hunan-Kwangsi railway, the Kwangsi-Kweichow railway and the roadbeds of the Kwangsi-Indo-China and Yunnan-Burma lines. When most of these land routes were captured by the enemy, they built hundreds of square miles of airfields to which supplies were flown over the Himalayan "hump" and from which American airmen flew to wrest air supremacy from the enemy. Both roads and airfields were built on their own farmland, for which the peasants were seldom paid at all and never compensated adequately.

Lives. Between 1937 and 1944 the Kuomintang Army conscripted 12,000,000 men. Perhaps 3,000,000 became battle casualties directly or indirectly. None were demobilized. Yet in the latter year the army numbered only 3,000,000. (No one believes the official figure of 5,000,000.) Six million had "disappeared." We can see why, if we trace a soldier from the beginning to the end of his career.

At the beginning of hostilities there was some volunteering, but afterwards men were taken into the army by press-gang methods. Local authorities, such as the landlord village headmen, were told that on a certain day they must have so many young men ready. The landlord never sent his own family. Almost every villager above the middle peasant (owner cultivator) standard could buy exemption or hire a substitute. The young men assembled were poor peasants or tenant farmers. On the long march to base areas, the recruits were roped together like cattle. They had to sleep out of doors and were given hardly any food because the recruiting squad wanted to pocket the ration allowance, and because underfeeding was a recognized method of keeping conscripts so weak that they could not run away. Those who could not make the grade through illness were first beaten and then untied from the line and left to die. There was no medical attention.

Often less than half the recruits who started arrived at the muster points. Every traveller in wartime China saw them, dead and dying, along the roads. Despite the brutal "precautions" many managed to escape. They deserted not because they were reluctant or afraid to fight Japan. The suspension of mass anti-Japanese propaganda and the stalemate on the fronts made their knowledge of the enemy hazy and their chances of ever engaging him problematic. But the prospect of death from hunger or disease before they ever saw the enemy was

something they could convince themselves of at every step, and it was this that drove them to desperate fear.

The fact is that the attitude of the Chinese ruling group to its own man-power resources was cynical, frivolous and criminally wasteful. It was common to hear elegant and cultured gentlemen who had carefully kept out of the army themselves saying, "Whatever we lack, we have plenty of people. Four hundred and fifty millions—what's a few million more or less?" Actually, quite apart from the light such statements cast on the type of comfortable "patriot" that held sway in Chungking, the notion that China has endless reserves of man power is profoundly erroneous.

Farming throughout most of the country is not so much farming as gardening. Its productivity depends directly on the number of men on the soil. With no farm machinery, over 100 man-days of work are needed for each acre of rice. Manufactures are also produced by handicraft methods. There were probably eight or ten million handicraft workers in wartime "Free China," all of whom had to keep on turning out goods if people were to be clothed. Roads were built by hand. The porter and boatman were the chief movers of transportation and there are certainly ten million of them.

The weight of conscription fell precisely on these productive groups. Far from China's having "people to spare," her impressment for the army and war labour was one of the most serious strains on the economy. It deprived millions of acres of land of cultivators and added millions of men to the number the remainder had to feed. Ultimately it led to serious famine.

The wastage of human power was a crime not only from the moral but also from the national standpoint. Yet even this would have been forgivable if it produced a strong, well-fed army. The final Japanese attacks in 1944 found no such army in existence. The counteroffensive of which Chiang Kai-shek had spoken was a bad joke. And the people, who had paid the price, were beginning to ask for an accounting.

Finance. In money too, the people paid for the war. The land tax gave the government more than 40 per cent of its unborrowed wartime income. It was always passed on to the tenant by the landlord because no limitation on rents operated. Other revenue was raised mainly by inflationary banknote issues and indirect taxation, internal transport taxes and government monopolies on articles of common use such as salt, cigarettes and matches. All of these raised the prices of necessities bought by the people.

Direct taxes on incomes and profits existed in theory, but the way they were collected in practice was a farce. Government employees paid by a withholding deduction from their small official salaries. This

deduction fell most heavily on downtrodden junior clerks because upper civil servants had all sorts of special allowances which exceeded their salaries many times and were not taxed at all.

Factories whose output could be checked paid more than their share. The rates rose with percentage profit and as their basic capital was still quoted in prewar dollars, while turnover and income were in fantastically inflated wartime currency, the nominal profit was tremendous. In actual fact, however, even a tenfold money profit often did not bring in enough to buy raw materials for a new operation because of interim price rises. Added to the difficulty of getting credit and the other risks of production, conditions of war and currency chaos, this burden was often more than they could bear. The tax structure thus played its part in the creation of an industrial crisis.

In vivid contrast to productive industry, the income of hoarders and profiteers went untaxed because there were no books to go by and generally no methods of measuring it. Very, very rarely the police arrested a profiteer who had somehow got across an official monopoly. Yet if the government had really been concerned with putting a stop to profiteering it would not have needed super-sleuths to pick out the offenders. Enough to walk through the restaurants of Chungking and investigate everyone who sported fine clothes, ate and drank sumptuously, and threw money around with fine careless gestures. But if this had been done, the government would have been hard put to it to restaff many administrative departments and military units, to say nothing of posts in the cabinet itself.

Grain and Land. One of the arguments used by Kuomintang ruling group apologists to excuse the inflation and minimize its dangers was that it did not hurt the peasant but on the contrary benefited him. When the currency fell, they said, the price of rice and other agricultural products rose. Since the peasant could sell his produce on a rising market, he must be richer than before, or at any rate no poorer.

No more barefaced lie, and no more cynical exploitation of foreign credulity, can be imagined. The vast majority of China's peasantry are tenants, share croppers, or "owners" so deeply in debt to the village usurer that their title to the land they till has no reality. Rents in China are almost universally paid in grain, not money. The proportion of the crop given to the landlord varies from 40 to 70 per cent. After 1940, government land taxes were also collected in kind, and moneylenders protected themselves against inflation loss by insisting on grain rather than cash to cover debts and interest. Finally, the wartime law obliged the peasant to make certain grain sales to the government. Since the price he received had no relation to the open market and did not

rise in the same degree that currency depreciated, such sales represented a further forced contribution.

After meeting these obligations and feeding his family the average peasant had nothing whatsoever to sell on the market even in a good year. In a bad year he had to go deeper into debt even to eat. The only way the rising prices affected him was that he had to pay more when he wanted to buy clothes, matches, agricultural implements, animals or other common necessities. Few were able to purchase such things during the last five years of the war. Old clothes were patched, implements were not replaced, and the death of a horse or a bullock was enough to wipe out the owner.

Whatever benefit there was from higher food prices began at the point in the agricultural scale where the peasant was rich enough to be left with something to sell after paying all taxes and requisitions. The small minority of peasants with such surpluses grew wealthier along with the landlords and grain merchants. Some, by successful speculations, rose very high on the crests of the inflationary sea. But for every one so promoted to fortune, twenty went down to ruin in the stormy waters.

The destruction of the "middle peasants," the most characteristic process of agricultural crisis, proceeded with breakneck speed in war-time China. In many districts sampled, investigators found that the average proportion of the peasantry belonging to this layer—that is of cultivators who owned their land in fact as well as in title—fell from 40 to 20 per cent in the three years between 1939 and 1942. Of those who changed their status only a few entered the rich peasant and landlord class. The great majority were reduced to debt or landless beggary.

The squeezing out of the middle peasantry was accompanied by unprecedented concentration of land ownership. By the middle of 1944 even the Kuomintang *Szechwan Economic Quarterly* reported with some misgivings the rise of land values due to inflation and speculative buying. It stated that the price of a mow (1/6 acre) of prime rice field had risen five-hundredfold during the seven war years. Here are the figures:

1937	1938	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944
\$45	\$45	\$70	\$100	\$120	\$500	\$5000	\$25,000

These figures did not bring joy to the peasants by showing how much they could get for their property. No one in his senses sold land for paper if he was not forced to. They indicated only how impossible it would be to buy a new farm once they were compelled to part with the one they originally possessed.

A writer in the right-wing *Chungking Commercial Daily News* went into the matter further:

To whom [he asked] do the needy peasants sell their land? Undoubtedly to landowners, capitalists, war profiteers, political and military officers and so forth. Landlords and capitalists who possessed some land in normal times have aggravated land concentration by new purchases. China's rural economy, extremely lean even in prewar years, has deteriorated seriously from years of war, drought, flood, famine and rising prices.

Besides recording the fact that war profiteers were buying, this writer cast some light on why the people were forced to sell:

The first fruit of the war [he explained] was an increase in rural debts. Figures for twenty villages in Hunan province, collected by the Central University in September 1943, show that 63 per cent of all the peasant households there had run into debt. This points to the situation throughout the nation. Usury has become prevalent. Creditors insist on repayment of principal and interest in grain even in the sowing season. As a consequence, wealthy farmers become richer and the needy ones poorer. Land concentration naturally results.

Many abuses prevail with regard to interest and the legal rate of 20 per cent is often exceeded. Village headmen and landlords not only lend out their own grain for seed at high interest but use the public stocks in the village granaries in the same way. This is well known but nobody dares revolt because protests would mean the conscription of their brothers or kinsmen. Where there is famine, the big men can get land cheap and it passes even more quickly from the hands of the poor into theirs.

The *Chungking Ta Kung Pao* for July 25, 1944, said:

Idle capital flows to the land. The mayor of one Szechuan town said that he made \$100,000 a year simply by arranging sales.

The periodical *Men and Land* (1944, Vol. 3) reported from Kansu, Northwest China:

Before 1939 there were no absentee landlords in the investigated district of Yungteng. Even in the provincial capital, there were only seven people of this description. A survey made this year shows that 40 per cent of the land is now in the hands of absentee masters.

The new purchasers of the people's land regarded it simply as a

safeguard for their capital until currency stabilization should allow them to resell. They did not care whether it kept on producing or not. Evictions of defaulters on even one rent payment became frequent.

Toward the end of the war nobody within China, not even the kept press, could disregard the disastrous effects on agricultural production. Many newspapers played safe by blaming "administrative difficulties," "greedy individuals" and "war weariness." Some said the peasants should be helped. But no publication placed the responsibility where it belonged, on the economic policies of the ruling groups who regarded political power as their own exclusive perquisite.

In the meantime, the propaganda line that "only the salaried urban groups suffer from inflation and the Chinese agriculturists are not harmed" was still trumpeted abroad. Lucky for its promoters that most Chinese peasants do not read.

4. The Great Famine in Honan

The cost of war to the people was made apparent by the three great famines of 1942 and 1943 when millions perished in Honan and other provinces.

The populous Honan plain, with its hardy people, is the ancient centre and strategic heart of China. The beginners of Chinese civilization overran it from the great Yellow River bend four thousand years ago. Then it saw the glories of the Chou and Han dynasties. In medieval times Tartar and Mongol invaders from west and north fought battles here to secure dominance over the whole country. In 1927 the Kuomintang forces took it from the south and made their power nationwide.

In 1938-1940 the Japanese penetrated the province from the south and east and the Central Government sent strong forces, under Tang En-po and other top-rank generals, to garrison the still unoccupied sections. Until 1944 these Kuomintang troops and the adjacent enemy lived comfortably side by side, trading across the lines and fighting only sporadically to settle minor quarrels. The chief mart and centre of the trade was the little "no man's land" town of Chiehshou, which flourishing merchants and military officers soon embellished with streets of stone residences, shops, warehouses, hotels, restaurants and houses of prostitution more elegant and opulent than anything to be seen in Chungking. War was all but forgotten and commerce reigned supreme. So, of course, did Japanese espionage, with which nobody dreamed of interfering, here on neutral ground.

Driven by lust for easy profits and the need for more trading capital, Honan landlords raised their rents, and General Tang En-po's

officers and the provincial civil authorities constantly increased their taxes and requisitions. New imposts were invented and the peasants had to pay every time they slaughtered a pig, sold a cow, or even dried fruit on their farmhouse roofs. No exemptions were allowed for any cause. The peasants of Honan made up two jingles as a tribute to the commander in chief entrusted with the defense of their province.

Here is the first one:

Easier bear the enemy who loot and kill
Than for Old Tang's troops to pay the bill.

And the second:

Four scourges make up Honan's woe,
Flood, drought, locusts and Tang En-po.

Then the crops in Honan failed. Drought, frost and flood hit different parts of the province, and the peasants began to pull in their belts because the exactions to which they were subject had left them no reserves from the previous year's harvest. In many districts the agricultural yield was not more than 20 per cent of normal. The people calculated that if they ate just enough to keep them alive they would be able to survive until the next year.

Yet when the time came the tax collectors appeared as usual, with instructions to collect taxes at an even higher rate than in previous years. The peasants argued. The tax collectors said orders were orders, there was a war on, and if they couldn't pay with what they had on hand, why couldn't they sell something? The peasants went to the moneylenders and landlords for loans of rent grain. The landlords, moneylenders and grain merchants all said that they were unable to make loans but would buy land outright. For an acre of land they offered less wheat than it would produce in a single year.

Some peasants took this price, hoping that they could settle their accounts and go elsewhere to find work. But others threw the offer in the faces of those who made it and marched to the government offices to "pay their taxes." Instead of grain, they brought their ploughs, rakes and hoes to the revenue officials. They said, "Take these. They aren't any more use to us." Some groups of young men broke into the government and landlords' grain stores and attacked convoys of tax grain moving along the roads from other districts. Their wives and children were hungry. The soldiers shot them down.

The people of Honan began to starve. They made cakes and gruel out of grain husks for food. They ate grass and stripped the leaves from the trees. In many villages, leaves sold at a dollar a pound. Remembering the stories of other famines, the village women looked

for "mercy earth," a type of soil which at least gave a feeling of satiety when eaten. Men took their young daughters and their wives to the towns and sold them as slaves and concubines to the rich.

Then they ate the farm animals, the bullocks and asses which pulled their ploughs. If the menfolk could manage to stay alive and the next crop was normal, the shaken households might somehow be maintained, new cattle obtained on credit, womenfolk redeemed after a few years. This was the only hope, but many saw that it was a forlorn one. Hundreds of thousands of peasants dragged themselves to the Lunghai railway, whose administration was humane enough to let them ride free, on the roofs of the cars, into near-by Shensi province. The journey took only twelve hours. Many of the enfeebled people lost their grip and fell off on the way.

The new crops finally came up, bright and green. The feebler of will ate the unripe grain as soon as it appeared. But most, with superhuman patience, nourished themselves with straw and tree bark and waited. Then, before the crop was ready to harvest, a new plague appeared. Locusts devastated the previously affected districts and some others. Hundreds of square miles of fields were completely stripped. The great trek to the west started again.

Two American newspapermen, Theodore H. White and Harrison Forman, visited Honan at this time, with a Catholic bishop, Thomas Megan. The roads they travelled were covered with corpses and crawling living skeletons. Trees on either side were stripped of bark as high as a man could reach. Some of the local officials confessed the whole extent of the disaster. Others tried to divert the visitors with fine banquets, to prove that there was really plenty of food in the province and that the trouble was "purely local." From their own investigations, and the stories of peasants and missionaries, the correspondents came to the conclusion that 3,000,000 people had died between the summer of 1942 and the spring of 1943.²

They also found that the authorities of neighbouring provinces, frightened by the endless influx of hungry refugees, had set out cordons of troops to turn the people back. Since the men of Honan are brave and stubborn, shooting was frequent. The Communist-led Liberated Areas in North Honan and of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Yanan Border Region had announced that they would receive refugees, give them some food to tide them over, and set them up with seeds and implements on waste land. But General Chiang Ting-wen, the commander along the Shensi border, did not want the "Red bandits" to get additional popu-

²A very full report is contained in *Thunder Out of China*, by Theodore H. White and Annalee Jacoby, William Sloane Associates, New York, 1946.

lation. His pickets turned machine guns on the hungry crowds trying to break through.

When Forman and White returned to Chungking, they sent a detailed report of what they had seen and heard to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. Convinced that he would act if he knew the magnitude of the disaster, they asked and received a private audience. When Chiang heard their story he replied politely that while it was true that there was hardship in Honan, their account did not check with the one he had received from his own officials. Deputations which came from the province to demand punishment of local generals and officials were given the same run-around.

The *Ta Kung Pao*, China's most influential newspaper, printed a blistering editorial called "Look at Chungking and Think of Honan," contrasting what was going on there with the flaunted luxury of profiteers in the capital. The profiteers were not interfered with and the people of Honan continued to die, but the newspaper was temporarily banned.

Foreign relief funds began to pour in but their effectiveness was limited by the fact that they were exchanged by the government banks at Chinese \$40 to the American dollar, which was about one tenth of the actual purchasing power relationship between the two currencies at the time. Dr. H. H. Kung, then China's Premier and Minister of Finance, dismissed proposals that relief contributions from abroad should be exchanged at real value by pointing out that if this was done all funds would claim to be relief funds and China's credit would be undermined. Correspondents suggested that the official rate need not be compromised if American funds were paid into the Bank of China in New York and an amount of grain, equivalent to what the money would buy in America, were turned over to the sufferers in China from the government stores. This amused Dr. Kung very much. "Suppose I paid Chinese dollars into an American bank here and you gave me grain in America on the basis of the official exchange rate," he said. "That would be a pretty good deal for me, don't you think? But you wouldn't do it. You wouldn't recognize my rate. Why should I recognize yours?"

Madame Chiang Kai-shek, Dr. Kung's sister-in-law, was in America at that time, making many speeches and buying many fur coats. She was rather upset by the effect the famine stories were having on her public appearances and, like the Chungking Government at home, was guilty of trying to minimize the greatest disaster that had befallen her people during the war. Madame Chiang's brother, the "liberal" Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. T. V. Soong, protested to Chungking from Washington, not against the handling of the famine but against

the negligence of the censorship in letting such "damaging" news get to America.

Belatedly, the Chinese Government announced that it would remit taxes in the province *for the following year*. This could not bring back a single one of the dead millions who would have lived through somehow if their meagre reserves had not been requisitioned when they were most needed. The government also appropriated a few million dollars for relief. The total sum was less than the Chinese treasury's profits on the exchange differential from foreign relief funds during the year, and money was not what the sufferers wanted. Eventually, even these funds did not arrive until all was over, the official explanation being that there was no transport available to carry the bank notes.

Still later another regulation was passed, entitling anyone who had sold his land cheap to buy it back at the same price. Since land is the last thing a peasant parts with, most of the sellers were already dead of hunger. For those who survived, it would be an endless task to establish the fact of the initial transaction since the peasants are illiterate and in the extremity of the hour no formal records were made. The chief land buyers were the same local landlords, officials and officers who held supreme power in the villages. No ordinary peasant could make such a claim on them if he valued his life, no matter what the Central Government ordained.

The full effect of the famine became apparent only in the summer of 1944, when the Japanese resumed their advance on the Honan plain after a five-year lull. The troops of Tang En-po, which in the 1937-1938 period had a fine fighting record, melted away before the enemy. The corrupt officers fled and the men, rusty from lack of training, dispersed into the neighbouring hills. As small groups retreated the people of Honan set upon them, took away their guns and beat them to death.

"When Tang's troops were billeted on us they spent all their time trading and making money," a Honan peasant told me. "They took the food and let our people die because they said there was no other way to keep themselves in shape to fight off the enemy. But when the Japanese devils came, they all ran. We saw that all the suffering had been for nothing so we killed the robbers wherever we could find them. Then, with the arms we got from them, we defended ourselves."

5. The Famines in Kwangtung and Chekiang

In the meantime, another great famine raged in the southern province of Kwangtung, at the other end of the country. It began in the district of Toishan, the homeland of most Americans of Chinese descent. A

million people died, not in poverty-stricken farms as in Honan, but in neat white brick settlements invariably dominated by fine school buildings with spacious playgrounds, the gift of American townsmen. Meihsien and Swatow, which used to send great numbers of emigrants to Siam and Malaya, were also badly hit. Here too it was a literate population, living in modern towns, that starved to death.

As in Honan, natural causes were immeasurably aggravated by hoarding and profiteering by officials, army officers and merchants working with them. The hoarders and profiteers sold food to the Japanese, who offered attractive prices. The young men of Meihsien and the Swatow hinterland organized their own vigilante brigades which patrolled roads leading to the occupied areas to prevent such sales, but they could not withstand the soldiers and gangsters who escorted the grain.

Hordes of starving people then moved north into the neighbouring province of Kiangsi, where the government set up road blocks to stop them. Huge signs outside the major cities of Kanhsien and Kian proclaimed that any refugees attempting to enter would be shot. Turning back to Kwangtung, the people began to sell their women and children. This is a recurrent last-resort phenomenon in Chinese disasters and does not reflect any Oriental lack of feeling. There is simply no other way to keep families alive and to enable the husbands and fathers, devoid of any burden, to try to find earnings elsewhere, perhaps ultimately reclaiming them.

In the tobacco district of Namyung, on the Kwangtung-Kiangsi border, growers bought women in batches. Although the purpose of the purchase was ostensibly the traditional one—for concubinage or domestic service—the women were actually sent out into the fields to work. In the thirty-first year of the Chinese Republic slavery returned to the country in a form not seen for centuries.

In Chekiang province, scene of the third great wartime famine, the troops of General Ku Chu-tung traded with the enemy through Kinhua and other major transit points. As in Honan, their need for capital led to unconscionable squeezing of the people. Such great calls were made on the peasants for compulsory labour service that they could not work their own fields. Large numbers sold their land to official and military profiteers who had enriched themselves by the smuggling trade and went elsewhere.³ The fall in agricultural produc-

³Smuggling control in China (apart from levying of duties, which was done by the customs) was vested in the secret police under Tai Li. In practice Tai's organization came to "control" a large part of the growing trade with the enemy as its own monopoly, other operators only being allowed to participate if they paid a cut. While many Tai men got rich,

tion was aggravated by the collapse of silk-spinning and other handicrafts which had served as a subsidiary source of income in the villages. Crop failures due to weather in some sections completed the process and caught the peasants without any reserves. Starvation followed, and the people again fled the land, this time not stopping to sell.

6. The Revolt of the Underprivileged

Under these circumstances it was not surprising that peasant uprisings took place everywhere. After 1942 it was impossible to travel through the Chinese countryside without hearing, at each step, of armed disputes among peasants, landlords and officials. The causes were generally the same: rents, taxes and conscription. Since the uprisings were unorganized and the Communist Party and progressive groups gave no leadership to armed revolts or strikes in wartime, the movements were sometimes demagogically utilized by local feudal gentry to back their claims for a greater share of loot from the people than the Central Government's tax gatherers were willing to leave them. In places near the front, enemy and puppet agents also fished in the troubled waters, exploiting the indignation caused by Kuomintang oppression and deluding the peasants with prophecies and mystical slogans.

The two biggest uprisings took place on the Kwangsi-Kweichow border and in the southeastern part of Kansu province. The first involved non-Chinese Miao tribes and the Moslem peasantry of mixed Turki-Chinese origin. Both were extremely stubborn and lasted for many months, throwing back punitive expeditions sent against them.

In the Miao revolt, local officials were all killed or driven out and the strategic Hunan-Kweichow highway was cut for a considerable period. In the Moslem revolt, Central Government bureaucrats were hunted, but those of local origin were left alone and often joined the rebels. Scholars and gentry participated, and there were sympathetic disturbances among officer cadets of a branch of the Central Military Academy which drew upon local landlords' sons for its students. The Kansu rebels were bombed and machine-gunned from the air. One method used by Chungking's pilots was to destroy crowded market towns on fair days and thus disrupt the normal functioning of rural exchange. American Lend-Lease planes were employed. Central Government authority in the two areas was finally reasserted by force and

the organization itself collected hundreds of millions of dollars which it used to finance and extend its sinister network. The "trade" became its chief source of funds, which were so great that in 1944 it was estimated that Tai had 500,000 officers, agents and informers on his payroll.

terror, without conciliation, investigation of grievances or subsequent reform.

In both cases a contributory cause of the revolts was resentment against the national policy of the Kuomintang Government, which rides roughshod over minority beliefs and customs and is afraid to allow local self-rule to peoples whom it regards as colonial subjects rather than equal partners in the Chinese Republic.⁴

This national resentment was the main factor in a third major disturbance, which arose among the Mongols. For many years, various Chinese governments mishandled relations with these people, encroaching on their pastures and humiliating their high national pride. The result was that the majority of the tribes and princes of Eastern Inner Mongolia fell prey to illusions fostered by Japanese promises, which it took years of actual experience of Japanese domination and exploitation to destroy.

Prince Sha of Suiyuan headed the Mongol minority that cast its lot with the Chinese Government. A liberal and intelligent policy in relation to his tribe could have convinced the entire Mongol nation that the Chinese people were really their friends and inevitable allies, and that the two could co-operate in a spirit of mutual respect. Such a policy too could have laid the ground for the resumption of relations with Outer Mongolia much earlier than it actually took place. The Outer Mongols, since 1924, had had their own republic, which leaned on a treaty of mutual aid and close political and commercial relations with Soviet Russia. They had not only built up a new society but successfully resisted a full-dress Japanese tank invasion in the summer of 1940.

Instead, the old policy was continued. If the Kuomintang's war-time exactions from the Chinese peasantry were inhuman and merciless, the treatment of the Mongols was more unjust still. Camels, horses and cattle were requisitioned without any regard for the needs of their pastoral economy. The only thing that kept any Mongols at all in the Chinese fold was that Japanese rule had proved itself much worse.

Finally even the pro-Chinese princes, whose regard for their own poor was none too tender, could stand the situation no longer. When Prince Sha objected to new and excessive demands, General Fu Tso-yi's Chinese troops surrounded and attacked his encampment. After some

⁴We have already mentioned Chiang Kai-shek's attempt, in *China's Destiny*, to deny the national identity of the Mongols, Tibetans, Turkis and Miaos. Sun Yat-sen, whom Chiang pretends to follow, had resolutely opposed the subordination or "sinification" of the country's minorities. In his "Three Principles" he said: "The Nationalism of the Kuomintang has two meanings: the first is that the Chinese nation should emancipate itself; the second is that different nationalities within China should be equal."

fighting, the Prince took refuge for a time in the Shansi-Suiyuan Liberated Area. But the Eighth Route Army did not wish to risk a civil war over this quarrel, so he went back to Kuomintang territory.

Instead of convincing the tribe under Japan to change their allegiance, the government misused its first opportunity in years to show the Mongol people that their interests and those of China could not be divided. Instead of virile and enthusiastic allies, it had made even the pro-Chinese Mongols into sullen and mistrustful slaves.

7. Fin de Siecle

Apart from these more spectacular manifestations, the classic hallmarks of social collapse were all-pervading.

The contrast between rich and poor had always been striking in China, but now, in the course of the war, it had become much more so. The profiteer was no longer, as in the early years of resistance, afraid to show himself. He was having a good time while it lasted. The peasants were more wretched and more ragged than anybody remembered them. The gulf between the people and their rulers was wider. Concrete machine-gun emplacements dominated every street corner in Chungking and Kunming, hundreds of miles in the rear. The front against Japan boasted no such fortifications.

Standards were disappearing. Government control regulations lost all reality and everyone who could get into the black market did so without any shame. At the beginning of the war, the honest, the self-sacrificing and the hard-working had been admired. In its eighth year they were regarded as something between dangerous revolutionaries and incorrigible fools, while the clever fellow who feathered his own nest was fawned on and envied. Under the influence of the great patriotic wave of 1937-1938, the tendency had been for the worst elements in Chinese life to become better, for the indifferent to become good and active workers, and for the best to set the example and rise to leadership. Now this trend was reversed. The backward became even more backward; the indifferent were carried with the current and became corrupt; the best were isolated and hounded.

In 1937-1938 the armies, whatever their origin, had become the shield of the nation. They had been respected and the soldiers themselves had felt that the hope of the nation was centred in them. In battles with a stronger enemy new bonds were forged between men and officers and between different military forces.

Now one could see soldiers dragging themselves, ragged, hungry and discontented, along the roads. No one looked at them, no one

needed them, and the defenseless villagers feared them like the plague. Officers did nothing for their men and the men regarded their commanders with a mixture of hatred and fear. Front-line armies felt that those kept in the rear for garrison duty were getting the cream of the arms. Provincial forces sent against the enemy were convinced that the Central troops were hogging the supplies while they were kept short in a premeditated plot to expend them totally by the time the war ended.

The armies lived on the country, and their generals clashed over the possession of productive areas. The Sixth War Zone under Chen Cheng exchanged fire with the First, under Chiang Ting-wen. Yen Hsi-shan fought Hu Chung-nan over the possession of a toll bridge across the Yellow River.

The chief concern of the government was not to remedy these tendencies but to keep them from the people and from world public opinion. As a result, no one trusted the press or government announcements. The Minister of Information in 1943 and 1944 was an official named Liang Han-chao, known for his facile pen and the number of times he had turned his political coat. Liang devoted his press-conferences for foreign correspondents to assurances that the East and West could never understand each other and that they should therefore not trust their own impressions of what they saw in China. He volunteered, however, to interpret the ultimate bases of Chinese thought so that this inborn difficulty could, at least to some extent, be overcome.

On one such occasion a newspaperman got up and said: "We don't pretend to understand everything, but we do want the truth about what is happening today." The Minister replied, "The truth? It is plain that you have never studied philosophy. No one has yet been able to define what the truth is. I don't know what it is. Neither do you." No better epitome could be found of the attitude of China's rulers, their detachment from what was really going on within the country, and the principles on which they conducted their foreign and domestic propaganda.

XII. THE NEW DEMOCRACY BUILDS A REAR

1. Two Policies in China at War

THE CONTINUED EXISTENCE OF THE FRONT BEHIND THE ENEMY LINES demonstrated not only the unconquerable and tenacious patriotism of the people but also rural China's potentialities for war and reconstruction.

The Kuomintang Government which ruled the country behind the regular front blamed insufficient international aid for the economic crisis, military defeats and the inability of its armies to take any offensive action. Yet Kuomintang China had land and sea contacts with the world throughout the first years of war and never ceased to receive a trickle of supplies over the "hump". It controlled cities as well as villages. It had factories and arsenals that had been moved from the coast as well as agriculture and handicrafts. After 1943 American air forces scoured its skies clean of Japanese planes, wiping out the chief military advantage of the enemy.

The Liberated Areas, by contrast, were not supplied with a single bullet by any foreign power. They had no air force. A double blockade—Kuomintang on one side, Japanese on the other—cut them off not only from foreign imports but also from the rear industries of unoccupied China herself, which should have been a common reservoir for all Chinese armies. They leaned exclusively on the villages and the strength they were able to develop there, on villages that were not substantially intact like those in the Kuomintang rear but were generally ravaged and looted by repeated enemy raids.

Yet it was precisely these regions which became the scene not of regression but of development; not of defeats but of many, though small-scale, victories; not of retreat but of constant offensive

action; not of continued loss of territory but of its reconquest from the Japanese. The enemy retained cities and lines of communication that could not be wrested from him without heavy arms which the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies did not have. But, in contrast to the regular front, control of the roadless agricultural hinterland was recovered.

Kuomintang China included the rich and culturally better developed grain and cotton provinces and commanded foreign credits and great currency holdings abroad. Yet it became the scene of unprecedented economic disintegration and of paralyzing poverty among the people. The Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region and the Liberated Areas were much less favourably situated with regard to climate and soil fertility. They began with no modern industries at all, with less productive handicrafts, and with a population much more backward and feudally organized than that under the Kuomintang. They had no foreign exchange or credits and their commerce with the rest of China was almost completely cut off for over five years. Yet they managed to expand agricultural, handicraft and industrial production. By 1943 the people were not only much better off than they had been in 1939 or 1935, but had also attained a higher standard of living than the people of the Kuomintang rear.

These are the facts and it is necessary to investigate them not in order to damn one part of the country and extol the other; not for the purpose of denouncing one party and showing the other as a paragon of virtue; but to discover which line of development was right and which wrong for China at war. The answer will tell us also which is the correct road and which the blind alley for the country's postwar progress. The purpose of such an analysis is not to divide China into two. There are not two Chinas but one, and the wartime differentiation of her parts will lead, perhaps through temporary partition, to a new unity. Apart from minor differences of education and conditions of livelihood, the people of the two sections of wartime China were the same. Their abilities and potentialities were the same. There was no reason to assume any inborn difference between them in endurance, ingenuity, patriotism or courage. They were at war for the same period of time. Their initial backwardness and handicaps varied, but the regions which solved the same problems most successfully were the more heavily handicapped. If the eight war years produced very different changes in their economy and vitality, the way this happened can be traced step by step in each case. The same trials tested both. Only the methods used to cope with them were as poles apart.

Any policy must answer a number of questions. Who is responsible

for carrying it out? To whose benefit does it operate? What aims does it pursue? What are its actual results?

Kuomintang policy, as we have seen, was executed by a bureaucratic government which reflected more and more closely the feudal social structure that has dominated China for centuries. It protected and enriched a small minority of higher officials, militarists, landlords, usurers, big merchants and speculative hoarders, with their agents and hangers-on, whom it helped to pile all the burdens of the war, inflation and administrative corruption on the common people. It dispossessed and ruined an ever greater part of the peasantry, starved soldiers of equipment and food, and inflicted great hardships on the salaried middle class. By subjecting industry to capital starvation and an unfair tax load, it restricted commodity production, both co-operative and private, and injured the workers, in both handicrafts and factories.

The record of Chungking's policies, not only as promulgated but also as applied, shows clearly that they aimed at collecting revenue and tribute from farm and workshop, not at stimulating their output. The result was the disintegration of the strategic rear of China's armies, a desperate war weariness, widespread famine, and such an increase of social and political tensions that the Kuomintang Government devoted an ever-greater proportion of its attention and remaining military strength to policing and holding down its own people.

Let us apply these same tests to the policy of the Liberated Areas as we wartime visitors saw them.

Who made policy there?

Its broad principles were fixed by the Communist Party in such a way as to release the energies of all groups for war and to minimize friction between them. General policy conformed to the Programme of Armed Resistance and Reconstruction which the Kuomintang itself passed in 1938 but never carried out in its areas. Detailed application in the shape of laws differed in each of the Liberated Areas at the discretion of local government organs.

Who administered it?

The 90,000,000 people of Liberated China and the Border Region elected their administrations of various grades. All men and women over eighteen had the vote and used it in the place where it most intimately touched their own lives, to choose the headman and committee who ran the village. They voted also for delegates to district, sectional and regional People's Councils which, unlike the appointed and purely consultative bodies in Kuomintang China, actually legislated and governed. No one could be a member of a local or regional government without first having been elected to these councils. Every hundred adults could send a delegate to councils of the lowest grade, the section.

By 1944, sectional council members for the fourteen chief districts of the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region alone, with a population of about a million, numbered no less than 9,967. The classification of these representatives by social status accurately reflected the composition of the population.

Here are the figures :

<i>Economic Position</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Landlords and gentry	174	1.8%
Rich peasants	690	7.0
Middle peasants	2,435	24.4
Poor peasants	5,549	55.6
Tenant farmers	46	0.5
Hired labourers	502	5.1
Workers	394	3.9
Merchants	177	1.7
	9,967	100.0%

Among these 9967 delegates, 2,477 or 24.4 per cent were Communists; 352 or 3.7 per cent were Kuomintang members; and 7,138 or 71.7 per cent were nonparty.

The revolution this represents can be understood when we bear in mind that Sun Fo, one of the major Kuomintang leaders, reproached his own party in 1944 with the fact that throughout the parts of China it controlled there was not a single elected official on any level of administration. That is still true. Though the composition of the population in both areas is the same, all officials in Kuomintang-ruled provinces come from the landlord, gentry, merchant and rich peasant classes, which in the Liberated Areas account for only one local official in ten. There practically all officials are Kuomintang members and every one is a Kuomintang appointee. In the Liberated Areas seven out of every ten officeholders are, like most of the people, of no party at all. The poor peasants group alone constitutes an absolute majority in the parts of government that abut directly on the individual. Power has passed to the common people and is exercised in their interest.

At the risk of repetition, we must return once more to the village, the home of the Chinese "everyman." In the typical village of old China, which has remained unchanged in rural Kuomintang areas despite apparent progress in the cities, the landlord or rich man is king. The land and debt pledges he holds make him master of the local economy. His social and other links with the higher authorities, and the fact that he is frequently the only literate person in the village, invariably make him political boss, who represents the government in

the village and is alone recognized as "representing" the village in dealings with the government. He has full control over the local police and Peace Preservation Corps, to whose support he often contributes. If the peasants rise against him as a landlord, he can use his official face to brand the protest as "sedition" or "banditry" to be suppressed in the name of order by all the resources of the state.

If the Kuomintang Government needs taxes or conscripts from the village, it goes to the landlord headman and he provides them, sparing his own pockets and sons and those of his associates. This is the sole responsibility that goes with his power, and it is to those above, not to those below. So long as he discharges it, he can rule as he likes in his own bailiwick. Only the lack of codification disguises the real nature of his position—which in mediaeval Europe was called lordship of the manor—the enjoyment of autocratic local authority in return for the payment of tribute to the suzerain in the capital. The one difference is that his European counterpart owed not only tribute but military vassalage and on troublous times had to muster and equip a company and ride out at its head to serve his liege. The luckier Chinese landlord stays peacefully at home, packing his peasants off to war by themselves without equipment of any kind.

This is the shape of Chinese feudalism. For the decoration of its law codes, the virtuous self-satisfaction of its legislators and the admiration of comparative jurists, the Chinese Central Government has at various times passed enlightened land laws. But because these laws have to descend to the village through the structure we have just described, they have remained a dead letter, unknown not only to the peasant whom they are supposed to help but often to the landlord and local official, to whose life and age-old customary practice they are completely irrelevant. But even if the peasant did know the law, it would not help him. "The Emperor," they used to say in China, "is far away." The Kuomintang Government is still a long way off. The landlord is near and powerful. Empire or republic, the village in most of China has remained unchanged under his rule.¹

In Liberated China the landlord still existed and his property rights were respected. But the war years took political and military power out of his hands and he was no longer the master of the village. In

¹ The persisting identification of landlord and official in China was strikingly typified by a statement made by Dr. T. F. Tsiang, the able and smooth-tongued Harvard-trained professor who was Chungking's representative on the ruling body of UNRRA (!). While in America, he happened to be at a party where China's ills were attributed to the land system and the need of agrarian reform. Dr. Tsiang declared that the trouble lay elsewhere. "Besides," he said, "my family have been landlords for a thousand years and we don't intend to change."

the election of the headman and committee the landlord, like the poorest of his tenants, has only one vote. The chief the people choose may not know how to read and write, but he is always a man that the poor peasant majority respects for his knowledge of farming and trusts to defend its interests. Although a landlord with a good local record is sometimes chosen, as the best-educated resident, this is very rare.

The rural police and Peace Preservation Corps whom the peasants once feared have disappeared altogether. The only armed force in the village is the people's militia or Home Guard, a volunteer force of the peasants themselves responsible to their elected representatives.

In the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies themselves not only the rank and file (as in all Chinese forces) but also the majority of the commanders are of tenant or poor peasant origin. They have fought for the interests of the peasants, as the Red Army and under their present designations, for seventeen years.

The new village administrations are responsible not only to Yen an for carrying out the over-all policy but also to the peasants on the spot for carrying it out fairly and well. Their peasant electors not only put them in power but can recall them at any time. Under Kuomintang domination it is impossible for the interests of the peasants to be safeguarded. Under the system in the Liberated Areas it is impossible for them to be ignored. Feudalism as a political form has been succeeded by democracy in the basic unit of Chinese life.

2. Revolution, New Style, in the Countryside

The agrarian policy of the Chinese Communists in the Liberated Areas of North, Central and South China has not affected basic property forms. Big estates have not been divided except in the case of pro-Japanese quislings and land continues to be privately owned.² But the excessive Chinese rents, amounting to from half to three quarters of the tenant's crop, have been reduced by at least 25 per cent and are in no case permitted to exceed 37 per cent of the year's yield.

Debt slavery, the hidden landlordism which holds so many nominally freeholding farmers in thrall, has been made less onerous by setting the maximum interest at 10 per cent a year instead of the old

² During the civil war after Japan's surrender peasants were allowed to claim compensation from landlords' estates for proved past extortions and held—with tenants as plaintiff, landlords given full opportunity to dispute charges, and the whole village as jury. Damages, if any, were then adjudged mistreatment. Public hearings, known as settling accounts meetings, were by majority vote. This further equalised land distribution and was a step in the orderly abolition of landlordism, which is the goal.

30 to 100 per cent. Tenancy is regulated not by the vagaries of feudal custom but by a standard contract. This contract is signed by the peasant and the landlord, witnessed by the Peasant Association, the strongest organization in the village, and registered with the village government. The landlord is forbidden to raise the rent or to evict. On the other hand, the tenant is obliged by law to pay the reasonable rent charged under the new contract, and the landlord can claim government assistance in collecting it if it is not paid.

Rural taxation has been reduced. The crop levy is the only tax the villager pays. The levy is designed to place 15 per cent of the total annual yield in the hands of the government, for the army and other revenue needs. Under a progressive schedule, the poorest pay nothing, a small owner cultivator pays only about 5 per cent of what he raises, and the richest landlord pays up to 30 per cent of the grain he collects as rent. The incidence of taxes was made to conform to the principle of the Programme of Armed Resistance and National Reconstruction, which was "Those who have money give money." But even the tax on the landlord is not a high one, and he pays no others. The government is run economically, corruption losses have been eliminated, and direct requisition by the army, from either landlords or peasants, is prohibited altogether. Many landlords told me themselves that their life under new regime was in many respects more secure than under the old.

The antifeudal revolution has been completed in its political phase. Power has passed from one class to a coalition of others. But there has been no full-scale social or economic revolution, only a readjustment of the burden borne by the landlords and the peasants.

That the peasant should have come to rule himself is amazing and unprecedented in Chinese history. But that the consequences of this change should have "stopped halfway" is even stranger. How is it that the empowered poor did not confiscate the property of their ancient oppressors, wipe out all debts altogether and put an end to the landlord?

Here is the answer given to me by Teng Fa,³ who in 1944 headed the Mass Movement Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Teng himself was a worker by origin, and served as chairman of the Liberated Area trade-unions. Before he became a professional revolutionary, he had sailed the seas as a ship's cook. His main job during the war was to keep his finger on the pulse of the peasant upsurge, so his testimony is valuable.

³ Teng Fa represented the Federation of Trade-Unions of the Chinese Liberated Areas at the first conference of the World Federation of Trade-Unions in Paris in February 1946 and visited Britain and the Philippines. He was killed in a plane crash after his return to China.

Teng became serious. "I want to tell you without qualification that we consider these demands by the people to have been completely just. They had been oppressed all their lives and their fathers and grandfathers before them. Who could blame even those who man-handled the rich, of whom they had been so afraid only a few weeks before? But in places where this occurred the merchants took their stocks and moved secretly to the Japanese-occupied cities. The landlords, who were now themselves frightened, tried to sell their land and run, or even ran without selling their land. Small manufacturers who depended on them for credit closed down their workshops. In peacetime you can adjust these things. In war you can't fight on two fronts.

"How could we check this 'leftness'? To arouse the people to realize their strength and use it in their own interest is our own policy. If we used our power against the very first things they did, we would dampen and destroy their dawning confidence. Again the only way was to argue and educate, to make the poor themselves understand that ultra-leftist action at this time were not merely incorrect, but injurious to the people.

"To make things more difficult, many Communists had gone overboard on this tide. After all, they were peasants themselves and there were cases when, after being called to arbitrate between landlords and peasants, they received the landlords with a pistol and said: 'What do you mean, you bloated parasites, standing in the way of the people!' So first of all we organized discussions among the cadres, who could certainly not do a good job of carrying out a line they disagreed with. We explained that an all-out class struggle would force every landlord and merchant into the arms of the enemy, who was already stronger than we were materially. Japan's chief weakness was her inability to get the support of any Chinese with a spark of patriotism. If we did not make this fact our foundation, our areas would suffer militarily and economically. A new form of society and economy is not built in a day, and meanwhile production and the circulation of commodities would decrease precisely when we needed them most.

"We told our cadres that the New Democratic governments made it possible to create a real united front in which the masses would not suffer yet all classes could have a share. No one need be afraid that our government would again fall into the hands of the old ruling groups, because it belonged to the people. Only by the broadest unity could we isolate the enemy and the reactionaries, instead of ourselves. The peasants were already bettering their lot. It was only by ensuring anti-Japanese victory today that we could preserve those gains and open the door to still better things in the future.

"After this," said Teng Fa, "we changed our practice into codified

"We do not want to set class against class either during the war or in the postwar reconstruction period," said Teng Fa. "We have not tried to divide society but to weld it together. Since we ask for such unity throughout China, we can't very well not practice it here, where we are the leaders. Without it, we could not have won all groups for the anti-Japanese fight in the rear of the enemy, with its heavy sacrifices.

"To gain everyone's help," he elaborated, "it is necessary to treat everyone fairly. In Chinese rural society the first requirement of fairness is to relieve the overloaded peasants. Our army's victories have given political authority to the people. Therefore we can readjust class relations by conference and negotiation, without the normal class battles. When the peasant is no longer powerless, he does not have to hit the landlord over the head to get justice; he can call him in for a talk.

"As soon as our armies come to a place, they announce that peasants and workers are free to organize. If the people have had no experience, we tell them what has been done elsewhere. At the same time we inform them of their right to secure reduced rents and better wages. The new organizations, once formed, call upon the landlords to negotiate. The army and government do not interfere. They neither order the landlord around nor give him the official backing he formerly enjoyed. When there is a deadlock, our policy is to arbitrate it if asked."

Teng spoke in terms of earthy fact: "This is an unusual situation in the history of revolutions,"⁴ he said. "The people in many areas did not gain the new rights by their own struggles but as a result of our victories. They had never got the better of the landlords before, because the landlords, so far as the village was concerned, had been the state. So at the start they were often scared to do what we suggested. Long experience told them that armies came and went, slogans were posted and the rain washed them off, but the landlords were always there. Quite often the peasants would pass rent reduction resolutions at a meeting and then go to the big house and give private assurances that they would pay the old rent just the same. Sometimes, after signing new-type contracts with the landlords, they did not press for their observance. The heritage of feudal fear could not be wiped out in a day.

"Our first problem was to make the people bolder, to give them self-confidence. We found that no amount of preachment had the effect of one successful example in each district. So our method was to pick a likely village, concentrate experienced and persuasive mass workers

⁴Not so unusual now, since the developments in Eastern Europe.

there, and talk to the braver and more intelligent peasants. Then these talked to others who knew and trusted them but still had their fingers crossed about us. Finally we would explain the new position to the landlords and bring the two groups together to negotiate to collective contract.

"After success in one place we circulated posters which did not deal in generalities but gave the news: 'The people of the Wang village have organized, made demands on the landlords, and won such and such concessions. The village is near by and anyone who wants to check on the facts can go over and look. Men from reconstructed villages often volunteered to tour the area and tell others. Our propagandists kept such examples before the eyes of all peasants in the vicinity. When they asked at meetings: 'What do you think of trying the same thing here? Do you think it would work?' we knew we had won.

"That," said Teng good-humouredly, "was just how it was. It wasn't easy and you couldn't learn it from a book. Some of our men railed at the people for their 'backwardness' and wanted to short-cut the process with administrative orders. We pulled that kind out in a hurry because lasting change never comes from above; it has to be the act of the people. An official can issue a lot of wonderfully radical regulations and think he is way ahead of everyone else, but all he has to do is go away and after a while things slip back to where they started. But if the people take a single step forward by their own effort and organization, they are there to stay. Even if an enemy cancels their gains with fire and sword, he can't kill the memory and they'll try again when they have a chance.

"When we worked right it turned out that the people weren't so backward after all," Teng laughed, his black eyes snapping. "In fact, many peasants were soon far to the 'left' of us. Seeing that they were strong enough to gain concessions from the old bosses, they began to ask: 'Why not push them to the wall and right out? They've bled us long enough.' When we tried to apply brakes, they thought up dodges that would do credit to the smartest lawyer. In one place, I remember, the tenants advanced twenty-three different demands, one after the other. 'We've always been told the revolution dates from 1911, when we got rid of the Emperor,' they said, and proposed to make all rent and interest reductions retroactive from that time. They also asked moneylenders to refund excess interest paid since 1911 in silver dollars instead of paper, since that was the way it was formerly paid. Inflation had brought the value of a silver coin to 400 in notes. Even if the landlords sold their land and the moneylenders cancelled the loans altogether, they could not meet these conditions."

Teng became serious. "I want to tell you without qualification that we consider these demands by the people to have been completely just. They had been oppressed all their lives and their fathers and grandfathers before them. Who could blame even those who manhandled the rich, of whom they had been so afraid only a few weeks before? But in places where this occurred the merchants took their stocks and moved secretly to the Japanese-occupied cities. The landlords, who were now themselves frightened, tried to sell their land and run, or even ran without selling their land. Small manufacturers who depended on them for credit closed down their workshops. In peacetime you can adjust these things. In war you can't fight on two fronts.

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law. Definite standards for reduction of rent and interest were fixed. The new law did not sanction revision of interest from the Year One, but slashed current rates sharply. Hours of agricultural and industrial labour could not be lightened when the people needed every ounce of production to save themselves from slavery. But the returns of labour were redistributed with the poor getting much more and the rich much less. We prohibited the automatic confiscation of the estates of absentee landlords on the assumption that any landlord who had run away was an enemy tool. Some had gone as a result of our own mistakes. Where there was no proof of active collaboration with the Japanese, such as holding a quisling post, we left the land in the hands of their relatives and asked them to return. If no family members remained, the law required local governments to keep their land in cultivation and give it back to them with only management expenses deducted from the rent accrued. But if the landlord really worked with the enemy, we took over his property by legal process, under the law for the confiscation of the effects of traitors.

"Our field organizers had the most complex job of all, to secure not only the submission but the active support of the peasants for this policy. They had to educate the people to think in wider terms than the village, but never to scold and denounce. Our main slogan was—'Don't pour cold water on the enthusiasm and initiative of the people.' If we did this we would lose everything. That the people were merely subjects was the root of China's weakness. We had to make them conscious citizens.

"Our men talked from morning to night," Teng Fa continued. "They asked the people to think why shops had closed and capital had left their areas and where they had gone. Could it be right to thus increase our own troubles and aid the enemy? If we lost today, would there be any future?"

"On the other hand, we communicated the new laws to landlords and merchants who had fled or were preparing to flee. We told them that the people's demands were understandable, but that we had persuaded them to accept legal limits, to hold the interests of the war paramount, and to admit that landlords and merchants could also be patriots. Would the runaways deny that the peasants had had a hard time? Would they serve the brutal enemy who robbed all Chinese, rather than make a few concessions to their own people? The new law required the government to guarantee that the revised contracts between landlord and peasant would be honoured by both sides. It established the merchant's right to trade and invest, and the fact that the peasant was better off as a result of rent reductions would give him a bigger market. We would keep small manufacturers supplied with orders.

How could the rich expect the people to tolerate them if they ran off to the enemy, instead of helping to fight him?

“After seeing that we meant what we said about national unity, the relatives of the fugitives began to write them to come back. Those who returned wrote to the others and told them of how conditions had shaken down, and since it was not pleasant to bow to every Japanese sentry, many came after that. I know of one district in Northwest Shansi where a hundred landlord families, who had been away since the start of the war, returned from as far away as Tientsin and Peiping, bringing their money with them. After a couple of years you could see many landlords actively helping in the technical work of the government. We had proved that we could keep the hated enemy away and that, although they could never again expect supremacy, we could give them a square deal.”

3. Officials and Soldiers “Soil Their Hands”

“But the new laws could not of themselves settle the whole problem of providing an economic base for our armies,” Teng Fa said. “Nor could the adjustment of class interests be stabilized for long by rules and exhortations alone. Really to achieve anything, we had to increase production itself.”

The expansion of the village economy was the second phase of the development of the New Democracy as a stable way of life. Every forward stride of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies brought stronger Japanese efforts to exterminate them. The effects of the blockade had to be countered. The people had to live. Patriotism, fair dealing and good treatment can keep guerilla war going for one, two or three years, but to make people fight on and brave reprisals for six, seven or eight years, much more is required. Enough must be produced to supply the increasing demands of the armies, to repair the ravages of the enemy and to keep up the general level of livelihood. If this is not done, it becomes harder and harder to persuade the ordinary man that he has any stake in the war.

In the Liberated Areas it was done. Here too, the first step was the reduction of rents, interest and taxes. For the first time in living memory the people, after paying all these, still had reserves in their hands. They enabled the peasants to buy new implements and cattle and they gave them an impetus to work harder which did not exist so long as they knew that any surplus they might produce would somehow be filched from them. With tax percentage rates fixed, with all additional requisitions forbidden by laws administered by local officials he

himself elected and could recall, every cultivator knew that more output would mean more grain in his own barn.

The second step was something unheard of. First in the Yen-an rear-base region and then in all the Liberated Areas, garrison units, government institutions and schools were ordered to produce as much as possible of their own food and clothing. Each group was given a tract of waste land which the peasants could not economically cultivate. Every officer, soldier, official, teacher and student had to spend at least two hours a day in reclaiming or cultivating such tracts, or on other productive labour. It was made compulsory for every institution to raise all its own vegetables, a part of the grain and meat it needed, and cotton, which its own workers and their families spun, wove and made into clothes.

The only exemption from such labour was on grounds of ill health. Even Chairman Mao Tse-tung, Commander in Chief Chu Teh and the members of the Border Region Government worked regularly on allotments and their output was recorded in the production schedules. Mao, a heavy smoker, used his tract to grow tobacco for himself and other "chimneys" in the Central Committee Secretariat. General Chu raised lettuce, a crop new to Northwest China, for the officers and men at Eighth Route Army Headquarters. He made up all kinds of salads himself and constantly urged its addition as a health food to the prevailing grain diet of the people. To provide animals, all riding horses were mobilized for the ploughing. These were either used on institutional land or hired out to peasants who lacked them. The Commander in Chief once complained to me, tragicomically, that his favourite mount had been ruined in this way. But here too there were no exceptions.

Official, medical and educational personnel in the Yen-an Border Region, the directing and training centre for all Liberated China, amounted to over 100,000 persons. When they began to supply their own needs, the burden of feeding them was lifted off the 1,500,000 people of the area. As the war progressed, the local grain tax was scaled down by several per cent. The people could see that when the authorities asked them to produce more, it was not for the purpose of keeping more and more parasites. That had been the only meaning of government to the peasants in the recent feudal past. Now it had changed.

I will never forget an old farmer we came across in one of the Border Region counties who thumped the back of the grinning young country magistrate, a poor boy from his own village, and said: "You should have seen the number of baskets of manure this fellow carried to our fields. Who ever saw such an official before? In the old days

they used to smell of their concubine's perfume, not of honest shit." The young magistrate protested at these graphic revelations to a foreign "honoured guest," but the old man had his own idea of what was noteworthy and would not be stopped from saying it. Such officials had not existed, and such scenes had never previously been witnessed, in all China's thousands of years of history.

Army self-supply in the Border Region was begun in 1940 by 10,000 soldiers of the 359th Brigade of the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army, under the command of 37-year-old General Wang Chen. Wang, originally a railway engine fireman, was famous for his inability to keep away from the thick of any battle in which his men were engaged. His veteran brigade had just returned to garrison duty after three years of active warfare behind the Japanese lines. They brought with them a full complement of artillery, machine guns, mortars and rifles captured from the enemy, and almost every one of the whipcord-keen, battle-hardened fighters sported a trophy pistol or samurai sword he himself had wrested from a Japanese. The brigade was brought back during the 1940-1941 civil crisis and its mission was to protect the region against the Japanese across the Yellow River as well as against any assault by Kuomintang blockading troops from the south. If it was not attacked, it would have no military work to do apart from maintaining and improving its training.

The blockade was then at its worst and Mao Tse-tung had sounded a new alarm. If the people of the Border Region and Liberated Areas were to survive, he declared, they must win not only the military war against the enemy but also the economic battle against the double blockade. The only resources available for this battle were the land and its potentialities, the strength of the people in the fields and under arms, and the quality of the leadership given by the government and party.

Mao called for the achievement of basic self-sufficiency in food, clothing and other first essentials. He advanced two slogans—"Organize for Production" and "Move Your own Hands." Summoning Wang Chen, he told him that the men of the 359th Brigade must lead the way. They must prove that the land had unrealised possibilities, that correctly integrated effort could make it produce more for the war and the people. The brigade was sent to the extensive valley of Nanniwan, which, after the great Mohammedan uprising in the 1860's, had reverted from rich and populous farmland to a thorny wilderness inhabited only by leopards, bears, wolves and pheasants. The job was to return the valley to its original state as one of the granaries of the region.

"Before we could plough an inch," Wang Chen told me, "we had to cut down the woods, uproot stumps and build our own quarters. Com-

rade Mao had said: 'To fight we must have guns, to produce we must lengthen our arms with good tools.' But we came to Nanniwan with no tools except our bayonets. There was plenty of wood around for hoe handles and plough frames but no iron for blades or shares. One of our company commanders solved this problem by taking the bells from the ruined and overgrown temples. We asked blacksmiths to come and help us forge the implements we needed but they were afraid to come to the wild valley. Finally we got one old fellow, paid him well and gave him soldiers for helpers.

"I knew something about war but nothing about agriculture, especially on the local loess soil. My men came from parts of the country where conditions were very different. I referred my difficulties to Chairman Mao, who replied in a message of only sixteen characters—'Remember you work for the people. Enlist their enthusiasm. Learn from their experience. Develop mutual benefits.' I called the soldiers and near-by villagers together and told them: 'Those who hold rank do not necessarily have knowledge. This work is for all of us. Whatever their position, those who have skill must lead, and the rest must follow.' Soldiers who could make implements came forward, and we commanders often became their apprentices. But the peasants were still skeptical and responded slowly.

"We did not have any animals at first and men harnessed themselves to the ploughs as all poor farmers do if their beasts die. Almost everyone understood the necessity, but some soldiers who had come to us from the Kuomintang armies in North China became very indignant. 'We joined to fight the Japs, not to be oxen,' they shouted. 'Send us back to the front.' A few deserted but there was no punishment for those caught.⁵ They were good men who had fought well and instead we shamed them by the example of such comrades as a colonel who did not stop working even when his palms were worn to a bloody mass. I worked with the men every day myself and all my staff did the same. See the calluses on my hands." And Wang Chen showed some beauties.

"The peasants would sneak around to look at us. The sight of soldiers doing the work of cattle did more than our explanations. One day a few of them spoke to me: 'You are really a good army. Who ever heard of a soldier working? But forgive us if we say that you are wasting a lot of energy. See, you are doing this wrong and that wrong.' Soon we were laughing together at our mistakes and the peasants said, to save our feelings, 'Well, maybe your way is good in other provinces.'

⁵ We saw successful deserters in Kuomintang territory on our way to Yen-an. One of the things that impressed us about Wang was that he readily admitted that the men were his.

"The ice was broken. Old men not needed at home began to come and spend whole days with us, teaching the soldiers how to put blades suitable to the local soil on their hoes and how to swing them. Passing young men would stop by and help in the work. I appointed some, both young and old, as instructors, with good pay and full authority. The whole neighbourhood took an interest and gave much volunteer aid. That made our soldiers feel very good.

"By the end of the first year we had built permanent quarters, in earth caves or out of wood, for all the men. We had some vegetables, pigs and good kitchens. Each man had reclaimed, planted and harvested an acre of land. We were drawing only a part of our food and seed from government tax stores, instead of all as before. The government had supplied us with some livestock and now we were approaching self-sufficiency.

"Well, we kept on for nearly four years and now I can tell you the results," declaimed Wang Chen proudly. "Last year, 1943, we had raised 4,500,000 pounds of millet, 450,000 pounds of pork and 1,000,000 pounds of potatoes and pumpkins. We increased rations in accordance with a Japanese Army dietary chart we captured in North China, after our doctors checked it and found it good. Sickness in the brigade went down. After feeding the brigade, we still had 900,000 pounds of grain left. We paid back the government what it had advanced to us and allotted some of the surplus for unit recreation and education. What was left after this was invested in a co-operative. Each man was credited with capital proportional to the number of work days he had put in. To manage the farm work and also the co-operative, economic committees were set up in each company and for the brigade as a whole. The committees were elected, and privates and officers sat side by side. Their accounts were opened to inspection by any soldier.

"The first thing we did when we became prosperous," Wang Chen said, "was to vote that every peasant who had lent us an iron farm implement should have a new one, made in the military arsenal out of steel from Japanese railways. When we brought the peasants these tools, they refused to have them and said: 'They are not ours.' We replied that their help had made us rich and insisted. You should have seen it. Soldiers and peasants thumped each other on the back in an excess of feeling. Some of the old farmers blubbered like kids.

"Under this year's production plan, each soldier will cultivate five acres, yielding a harvest of 1830 pounds of grain. He will eat 450 pounds, hand 600 pounds to the brigade for general improvements and a donation to government stores, and pay 90 pounds into a uniform fund for the purchase of cotton and wool. The remaining 690 pounds will be his to do with as he likes. He can sell it for money to send to

his family or keep himself, or invest it in the co-op. In stock raising we aim to have one cow or bullock for each ten men in the brigade, one pig for every two men, and one sheep or goat for every soldier. We have no plan for chickens, ducks and rabbits, but there are plenty around, as you can see."

After our talk with Wang Chen we went through the valley and talked to soldiers and to the peasants. It was all true. The brigade was not only farming on a large scale but had its own smithies, spinning and weaving factories, tailor shops, oil pressing mills and food preserving plants. All were worked by the soldiers themselves, and all had been capitalized out of their initial effort. Just as the co-op was storing up capital for each man to draw on demobilization, so these shops were giving him a skill. They had just succeeded in supplying every man with a new woollen blanket and a woollen homespun winter uniform coat of a type which, in most Kuomintang armies, was worn only by officers.

One question worried us. How had these worker soldiers preserved their military skill? Soon we learned the answer. Instead of route marches, the men went out to their farming in full equipment. For an hour or two a day they practiced grenade throwing and shot at targets in the wheat fields. During the five winter months they had regular manoeuvres, and classroom work based on developments in enemy tactics and ways of countering them. Japanese engineer prisoners had erected a replica of the latest "antiguerrilla" fortification system in Nanniwan and the brigade was constantly "besieging" or "capturing" it.

One of the companies gave us a demonstration. Here is their record:

Rifle range: 369 hits out of 372 rounds fired at one-metre-square target 100 metres distant.

Grenade throwing: 40 metre average for whole company.

Assault course: average of one minute to cover 150 metres beginning with three rounds fired from pit. At points along the course three grenades are thrown, hurdles and ditches are jumped, and seven defended targets are attacked with the bayonet.

I checked this with Colonel David B. Barrett of the U.S. Army, who said: "That would be excellent anywhere in the world."

The Kuomintang forces took strong young peasants from the fields and in a few months of ill-treatment and underfeeding changed them into emaciate, trembling ghosts. The 359th Brigade, operating behind the blockade that was supposed to reduce the Communist-led areas to destitution, had taken nothing from the people. Yet its men were tough, hard-muscled, sun-browned and keen. They put zest not only

into work and training but also into education, an hour in class each day. All were literate. This too the army had given its men as post-war capital.

By its own labour, supplemented by the proceeds of the grain allotted for cultural needs, each of the brigade's three regiments had built a theatre and meeting hall large enough to accommodate its entire strength. Each had a dramatic company. Each had athletic fields and teams. This army, like the Kuomintang Army, had its "economic activities." But instead of trade for the profit of the officer, it was production for the soldier and the people.

"What if you are ordered away?" we asked Wang Chen, after looking over the wild valley which his men had made a home.

Wang Chen said: "We are soldiers, not farmers. If we go to the front, we hand over to the next garrison. If a garrison is no longer necessary and all troops go forward, the people take over." When I spoke separately to his soldiers they said the same thing. A few months later Wang Chen and many of his men went back to war and penetrated in an epic march, to his far-off home province of Hunan.

After 1942 the "Nanniwan system" was adopted by all stationary-garrisons in the Liberated Areas. Its result in the Yen-an (Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border) Region alone during 1944 was that troops and functionaries produced by their own labour about 30,000,000 pounds of grain, or 8 per cent of the total regional production. This was greater than the proportion of the total population which they represented.

As a consequence of their work, the Yen-an Government had progressively lowered the grain tax paid by the people. The tax collected in 1944 was 18,000,000 pounds less than in 1940. In other words, the annual tax burden of each of the region's 300,000 families was reduced by sixty pounds of grain, the equivalent of one month's food for an adult person. This was over and above the original reduction which had brought taxes in the Eighth Route Army areas below those in any other part of China.

4. Co-operation Enriches the Peasant

The Nanniwan project proved to the people of the Border Region that the army and other former nonproducers were not content to live on their backs. After demonstrating this the Communists began to stimulate the peasants themselves to reclaim virgin and waste land and increase agricultural production.

The Border Region was a good place for such an experiment. It is one of the few parts in China in which there is a great excess of land

over people. The loess soil is extremely fertile in a good season but every three or four years, on the average, much of the crop is lost through drought or flood. Under the old social system this was extremely risky farming for an individual cultivator who lived from hand to mouth and whom rents and taxes left without the necessary slack. Generation after generation had tried it, and every few years thousands had died of hunger or been forced to migrate after one or two crop failures. For over a hundred years the population had been going down till a territory the size of France contained less than 2,000,000 people.

The Chinese Communists realized that the crucial problem in such a country was to increase the yield in the good years so the people could weather lean periods. This could not be done by mechanization because the blockade cut off imports. The working capacity of men and draft animals was the only source. Analyzing the farm economy, they found that many a peasant had a small patch of land and four or five strong sons, for whose energies there was no outlet. This was a waste of labour. Others had bigger farms but no sons at all, and no money to hire anyone, so they could only cultivate them partially. This was a waste of land. Large tracts were not farmed at all. The losses incident to these disproportions were not only the result of local conditions but an inescapable consequence of the small-scale farming generally. They were harmful to the war, the region and the people themselves. The first job was to eliminate them.

The method used was the promotion of farm-work co-operatives, or, as they are called in the Border Region and Liberated Areas, "Labour Exchange Groups." A Labour Exchange Group is formed voluntarily of a dozen or so neighbours who elect a chairman and pool their strength, animals and tools for the working season. The land itself is not collectivized—each plot remains the property of its owner. But the adjacent plots of the co-operators are ploughed from end to end instead of separately. They are subdivided only by boundary marks, not by paths or ridges as before.

In this way much working time is saved. One group of eleven farmers told me that previously each man had had to drive a partly full oxcart out to his field for manuring and seeding, but now two of them, with five oxen, did the haulage for all. Formerly each man took time off in the precious daylight hours during the planting and harvesting to build a fire and cook his food. Now one peasant did it for all eleven, with a total saving for the group equivalent to a man-day daily.

Efficiency too is easily maintained. In the fields the entire group follows a pacemaker. Is not incentive lost with the exclusive contact between a man and his own land? I asked one peasant and he denied it. "When the group is working on my patch," he said, "I set the pace

and style of work so that everything is done right. When we get to the next patch, my neighbour does the same because it is his. After he has done a good job on my farm, how can I do less?"

When the harvest is gathered each man's grain is piled on his own land, after which a general meeting decides what adjustments must be made in cases where more labour was put into any given plot than the owner could have given it himself. Widespread surveys had established that, under the labour exchange system, it takes two men, on the average, to do the work which required three before.

What has been done with the saving? The Border Region has its own Homestead Act which gives the title to waste or virgin land to anyone reclaiming it. The first crops of such land are exempt from all taxes. Labour Exchange Groups find it both possible and profitable to go into reclamation, and in fact have done so on a large scale. But while the original plots of the members are individual property, the new tracts become the property of the whole group, the products being divided according to the labour put in. Since it takes more work to reclaim land than to cultivate it the following season, a group can expand its property for two or three successive years before it reaches the limit of its working capacity.

Like the new political reorganization of the village, the Labour Exchange has been propagated by example rather than decree. The earliest successes were widely publicized. Wu Man-you, who thought up the type of group now regarded as model, came to the Border Region ten years ago as a homeless and illiterate, famine refugee from Suiyuan, where his family had died of starvation. After 1940 he became as famous among the 100,000,000 people of the Liberated Area as Henry J. Kaiser did in wartime America, and, like Henry Kaiser, was consulted on production policy. The spreading fields and full granaries of co-operative villages convinced not only working peasants but also many unproductive rural characters. Quack doctors, gamblers and fortunetellers, too ambitious to grub about in the old poverty, found that agriculture could give them a better living than their parasitic occupations, which the improvement in general education was already undermining.

By 1944 half the cultivators of Yen-an had been organized into such groups. The effect was equivalent to adding a couple of hundred thousand able-bodied men to the population, but the number of mouths to feed remained the same. Between 1940 and 1944 the planted area increased 500,000 acres and the grain crop by over 60,000,000 pounds. The average property of every co-operator grew by two and a half acres and his income by 300 pounds of grain. Taking the region as a whole, one and two-thirds more acres were cultivated and 200 more pounds of

grain (eight months' basic food for an able-bodied man) were harvested for every household, whether organized into a Labour Exchange or not.

Fortunately rain was adequate throughout the period. The government set the goal of "three years' crop every two years" and "a year's food reserve in every barn after two years' work," and in 1944 these goals were realized. The average peasant in the Border Region, long known as one of the poorest parts of China, had more than the average peasant in the richest provinces—enough laid by to tide his family over a bad year without starving or plunging into debt. The people had won a round against "nature." The loess earth, a cruel stepmother under the old regime, became a dependable provider under the new. Organization had laid the spectre of famine that had dogged the footsteps of countless generations of peasants.

The battle for food is only the first battle of a war economy, and it was only the first battle of the blockade. When the Kuomintang sealed the frontiers of the Border Region, it cut off the supply of raw cotton which previously had been grown only in more southerly places, and of cotton yarn and fabrics to clothe the people and the army. With the passing of years this problem became extremely urgent. But it was not easy to solve because no cotton had previously been planted in the region and the climate made it a gamble whether the crop or the killing frosts arrived first.

Until the food supply was secured, cotton cultivation could not be attempted on any large scale. But afterwards every inducement was offered to peasants to attempt it. Government propaganda made it clear that there would be no more clothing unless it was grown on the spot. Demonstration farms were started to show that it could be. Would-be growers were given seed, total exemption from all taxation, good prices (the crop of an acre of cotton fetched five times that of an acre of grain) and compensation for failures due to weather. Although the frosts destroyed some crops every year, the area under cotton increased tenfold from less than 3000 acres in 1940 to 29,000 acres in 1943. This yielded 60 per cent of the region's needs. It produced valuable by-products such as cottonseed oil and mash for fertilizer. The plan for 1945 called for full self-sufficiency in cotton on the basis of two suits of clothing a year per person for the population and the army.

To spin the cotton the women of the region were mobilized through the network of consumers' co-operatives which exist in every village. The co-ops, supported by the government banks and cotton stocks, loaned the women raw material and simple wheels. For every two pounds of cotton issued, they asked a pound of yarn in return. The rest was spun by the women for the use of their own families. Under the same arrange-

ment, much yarn was woven into cloth. Thus the village housewife, by her own work alone, could keep the family in clothes, one of the chief items in the peasant's budget, without any outlay at all. In 1944 over 200,000 women, or two individuals for every three families in the region, were working on this basis. Cloth was also produced by government and privately owned factories, army workshops and industrial co-operatives.

In 1940 only 55 per cent of the cotton yarn used in the region was locally produced, the rest being smuggled through the blockade lines at great trouble and expense. In 1943 much more cloth was being woven, but not a single yard of yarn came from the outside. The second part of the Border Region slogan—"Well fed: well clad"—was being fulfilled like the first.

The transportation problem, vital here as elsewhere, was particularly pressing because the blockade had cut off the import of motor vehicles. The Border Region possessed only twenty old trucks for all its needs. Yet it had to move food, commodities for the use of soldiers and peasants, and salt from mines in its northwest corner, which was the chief item of trade with the outside world. Salt was the only article that the neighbouring Kuomintang areas had to buy whether they liked it or not, because there was no other near-by place to get it from.

Here again the Labour Exchange Groups served their turn. In the winter, they functioned as Transportation Co-operatives, entrusting one or two of their men with the horses, mules, donkeys and bullocks of the whole outfit. The animals were formed into caravans and made good prices on the ten-day salt-mine haul and other jobs. Often, too, they carried the products of their own villages for sale and brought back needed things from other places. In 1943, these co-operatives handled 530,000 loads, on each one of which the members made a profit. Formerly the peasant had had to feed his draft animals through the winter. Now they were helping to feed him.

These measures changed the whole face of the Border Region. When we visited it in 1944 we found it more intensively and extensively cultivated than any other part of Northwest China. Instead of the single peasant walking behind his plough, the people everywhere were working in groups and singing as they did so. The peasant in other parts of the northwest is usually ragged. Here we sometimes saw patches, never rags. Beggars are everywhere in China. But in five months in the Border Region and Liberated Areas, during which we rode a thousand miles through perhaps a hundred towns and villages, we did not see a single one. Nor, throughout our trip, did we see a single peasant or soldier who looked undernourished.

These outward changes reflected basic alterations in the village society.

In the Kuomintang areas only three types of social and property relations exist among the peasantry: the landlord-tenant complex; the individual cultivator, more or less burdened with debt; and the agricultural hired man. The war there led to a very rapid increase in tenantry and debt and a very rapid decrease in relatively debt-free working small holders, or "middle peasants."

In the Border Region and Liberated Areas, after eight years of war, two new types of social and property relations have arisen on the land. One is co-operative labour based on the individual small holding, rented or freehold—the Labour Exchange Group; the second is co-operative labour on commonly owned land—waste or virgin soil, that the groups have reclaimed and acquired.

Not only are the new forms quickly outstripping the old, but the place of the old ones relative to one another is changing. Strengthened by interest limitations and greater reserves, peasants in debt are paying off the principal of their loans. Landless labourers are joining Labour Exchange Groups, receiving government and co-operative credit and becoming freeholders. Government credit has helped both.

In Kuomintang China such loans are given against security, but here all the security that is needed is the word of the applicant's branch of the Peasant Association, composed of poor men like himself, that he is a good worker and not a loafer.

Helped by their savings and easily available credit, tenants are asking the landlords to sell them the holding they work. The landlord's willingness to do so is growing for two reasons. In the first place, the government taxes rent income but makes investment in industry tax free. Secondly, the calling of landlord is not popular in a productive society and the younger rural gentry, especially, feel keenly the urge to be useful.

A Yen-an landlord who had sold off most of his estate and started a wool factory said to me towards the end of the war: "I feel that if a rich man just sits by in wartime and takes the cream of existing production without adding anything to it, he is nothing but a parasite and a drag on the nation. But if he uses his money to start a plant, he is adding to the general wealth and serving the country." The Border Region Government agreed with him and favoured those who made the change.

Statistics for a fairly typical Border Region village show that in the war years the number of rich and middle peasant households has increased from 68 per cent to 88 per cent of the whole, while poor peasants and labourers have dropped from 32 per cent to 12 per cent.

Moreover, the reclamation of waste land around the village increased its cultivated fields from 2,300 to 5,200 acres and almost doubled the crop (some of the new land was hilly and less productive). Per capita property in all categories increased as follows:

Average Property of	Land		Cattle	
	1936	1942	1936	1942
Labourer	0 acres	1.3 acres	0	0
Poor Peasant	4.7 acres	6.7 acres	0.2	0.3
Middle Peasant	7 acres	17 acres	0.33	0.48
Rich Peasant	10 acres	18 acres	0.5	0.8

Revealing also are the statistics on the capacity of individual peasants and Labour Exchange Groups respectively to take advantage of the free land thrown open by the government and their relative efficiency in developing it. A hundred and ten peasants organized in Labour Exchange Groups reclaimed 70 per cent of the free land available in one village, while the 334 individual peasants who had not yet formed groups were able to spare time and energy to reclaim only 30 per cent. The incentive was the same. The land was free to all who could bring it under cultivation, and no preference was given to groups over men working alone.

Co-operation in agriculture has won out in the Border Region and Liberated Areas and so provided a model for the whole country. But Kuomintang China, burdened with absentee landlordism and feudal supremacy, must change in many ways before it can follow suit. Before the Liberated Areas could transform their economy, political reform had shifted power from the minority to the majority. This was the key that opened the door to the road away from feudalism.

5. Birth of Industry

Besides increased agricultural yield and welfare, the agrarian policy of the New Democracy has made both landlord capital and peasant man power available for industry. Apart from handicrafts, the industry of the Border Region was totally undeveloped before 1937. The single large enterprise, the Yenchang oil wells, had been derelict since the civil war period. The total number of industrial workers on the job throughout the area in 1937 was less than 300.

In 1944 the labour force of Border Region factory industries, government-owned, co-operative and private, numbered 12,000. The oil wells were once again producing. The wrecked refinery had been restored under an old ship's engineer from Shanghai. Its output included gasoline, kerosene and by-products such as candles, which could be

exported because they were much better than anything obtainable in the rear. There were wool and cotton mills employing several hundred workers apiece with machinery that was mounted on wooden frames but power driven. Matches, formerly an important import, were now made at home.

The arsenals made explosives, small-arms ammunition, rifles, trench mortars, machine-gun parts and, characteristically for this area where agriculture and war were so closely linked, thousands of agricultural implements and brass syringes for inoculating cattle against indigestion. A few coke ovens and iron smelting units were working. The region had not trained metallurgists at all, so its first blast furnace was built by a mechanical engineer, an electrical engineer and an expert in short-wave beam radio transmission with the aid of one German book. After three failures and reconstructions, this furnace began to produce good gray iron. The plan for 1945 provided for the first steel, supplementing the torn-up rails which were the only former source.

When the blockade was imposed in 1939 the region had only a few machine tools, bought during the short-lived Kuomintang-Communist "honeymoon." By the war's end there were many machine shops using locally made lathes, drills and stampers. Power came from dismantled truck engines, mill races, and even animals. In one place we were surprised to see a machine shop operating on horsepower—on the hoof! Transmission belting was being woven out of local wool, impregnated with beeswax. Improvisation was the watchword. The number of ingenious local substitutes for previous imported articles was endless.

Against difficulties unknown in the Kuomintang rear, the Border Region was compelled to recapitulate for itself, out of its own resources and the scraps of machinery the army had been able to capture, the earliest beginnings of the industrial revolution. As in agriculture, it was helped by the clearness of aim and down-to-earthness of Chinese Communist policy, and the care taken to provide an incentive for workers, technicians and investors alike. Besides material rewards, the party appealed to common sense, political conviction and national and local patriotism. Its persistent educational campaigns made it perfectly plain to everyone in the region that heightened industrial production was essential to stave off blockade starvation and military collapse.

For small-scale plants, workers had been encouraged to form co-operatives to which credit is extended with the minimum of formality. The Chinese Industrial Co-operatives in the Kuomintang rear, with a population of over 200,000,000, numbered less than 1,000 in 1945, despite support from abroad. Inflation, governmental obstruction and clique struggles for control had stifled the rest. But the Yen-an (Shensi-

Kansu-Ninghsia) Border Region, with a population of only 1,500,000, had developed almost 400 "Indusco" units from the ten founded before it was cut off from all outside help in 1939.

Government industry grew through liberal financing and the recall of specialists and workers from the army and administrative positions, in which they were often found early in the war. Private investment in industry was encouraged by complete exemption from taxation. Technicians were paid higher salaries than the heads of government officials of ministerial rank.

Workers were protected from fluctuations in the cost of living by a system under which all wages included rent-free premises, food equivalent to the army ration, an annual supply of winter and summer clothing, and a money balance which was based on the open-market price index for millet, the staple food, on the day of payment. Trade-unions bargained collectively with management in both private and government plants, participating in factory administration and the drawing up of production schedules. They ran clubs, creches and medical schemes to sustain which they received, under law, 3 per cent of the money turnover of every enterprise.

The trade-unions had duties as well as rights. They were responsible for labour discipline and the maintenance of output and were required to do everything possible to increase productivity. They were charged with providing not only general education but also technical courses for all workers. In this way they helped smash the old craft "mysteries" which, as a legacy of the old feudal guild tradition, have for so long divided the Chinese working class. They also conducted campaigns against the old territorial jealousies which, again as a heritage of feudalism, had often made it impossible for men from more than one province to work in the same shop.

Workers and managers who exceeded production goals received extra pay. Inventiveness and the discovery of production short cuts were stimulated by government rewards and the creation of the title "labour hero." It was legally compulsory for labour-management production councils in each plant to examine carefully and try out experimentally every suggestion for improvement whether it came from the chief engineer or the lowliest unskilled workman. The industrial laboratory of Yen-an University, another heritage of the foresight that made the Border Region Government buy all the supplies it could while the buying was still good, was available to the whole of industry for testing, consultation and research.

One of the blights on industry in the Kuomintang rear was the terrible gap between theory and practice. The Chungking Government had the services of many good and brilliant engineers, and could have

had many more, but its officials, when they thought of industry at all, did so in terms of the great plants they would buy "after the war."⁸ As a result, while some absolutely unpostponable wartime necessities, such as alcohol for motor fuel, were met with the materials at hand, many technicians were employed in endless planning experimental construction of pilot plants "on the most modern lines"—precisely the lines that made it impossible to duplicate them on a production scale during wartime.

The melancholy discouragement of government-employed engineers faced on every hand with officials who were at once penny pinchers and grandiose dreamers was one of the commonest features of the Kuomintang scene. Many technicians sought refuge from it by going into politics themselves, by getting out of the government altogether to teach in colleges, or setting up their own workshops, which generally failed from lack of capital. A good number pulled wires until they got government assignments to go to America or England "for further study," leaving wartime China altogether.

The technicians we saw in the Border Region, who had heart-breaking primitive conditions to cope with, were not discouraged. They were assured of support in any project contributing to production, and a full measure of responsibility from a government which recognized that to trammel their initiative was to hurt the war effort. When they were successful in developing a new industry, the honour went to them by name. They were optimistic and unjaded. The solution of immediate problems seemed to them far more important than blueprints for the future. While seeking these solutions, they were learning the basic problems of creating industry in the Chinese village, not in the abstract but from actual practice. Their attitude was all the more impressive because they were not some peculiar breed of men, but exactly the same kind as their despairing counterparts in Kuomintang-ruled China. They had gone to the same schools and worked in the same prewar factories.

Like the peasants, soldiers, workers and intellectuals of the Border Region, they had merely been reconditioned by eight years of a different environment, a different policy and different scale of values. In industry, too, new frontiers had opened for China and other nations in the same condition.

⁸When Donald Nelson came to Chungking to help organize a War Production Board, an official Chinese Ministry of Information reporter opened his first press conference by asking: Will American business invest in China after the war?" Nelson flushed angrily and answered that he was interested in strengthening the current war effort, not in what would happen in the future.

XIII. THE VILLAGE FIGHTS BACK

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEW DEMOCRACY, BOTH POLITICAL AND economic, in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningshia (Yenan) Border Region did more than show how the whole Chinese rear could have withstood the ruinous material strains of war. It also provided a model for the un-freezing of the feudal ice-pack that has impeded the development of all Asiatic village economies—in China or India, the Philippines or Korea, Burma or Iran.

But the million and a half people of the laboratory, known as the Shensi-Kansu-Ningshia Border Region were better off than those of the other New Democratic bases in that they lived in relative tranquillity. The people of the others, the Liberated Areas, lived on the battlefield behind the enemy lines. By the end of the war they numbered over one hundred million, a quarter of all China, spread over territories characterized by widely different topography, climate, crops and development.

Yenan's experience certainly goes far to answer whether Asia can begin catching up with Western material advance by paths different from those taken in Europe, but it does not in itself settle another and more important problem. Even if they have the "know how," can the Asiatic peoples muster the strength to apply it? Can they overcome the repeated and inevitable resistance of foreign imperialist interests and their own feudal groups whose alliance has so often thwarted progress in the past? Can they sustain a protracted "total" military struggle in which the enemy holds all the main economic centres if that becomes necessary to win their right to mould their own destinies? Coming down to cases, now that Japan has been defeated, can China's New Democracy defend itself indefinitely in a civil war against domestic

reaction with foreign backing, the civil war that has once more been forced on it? If other wars of national liberation arise in Asia, what can they learn from it?

While the experience of the Yen-an region shows how progress can be made in China if she can return from civil war to peaceful democratic unity, and in the colonial countries if pledges to free them are really honoured, it does not give enough information on their chances if they have to open their own doors as all other peoples have done throughout history—by a trial of strength. Such data can only be obtained from the record of the Liberated Areas, which were themselves a battlefield. The Liberated Areas were pitted for eight years against Japanese forces which never numbered less than three or four hundred thousand, with aircraft, tanks and other modern equipment. It is doubtful whether there was a single village in their territory which was not, at one time or another, razed to the ground. How did the New Democracy function here? How did the people eat, work, trade and supply their own armies? How did a primitive countryside that was not merely poor but repeatedly devastated find strength within itself to keep on fighting?

1. The Battle for Grain

The first battle of the Liberated Areas, war economy was the fight for food. Basically the methods were the same as those applied in the Yen-an area. But in their details they were rewritten in letters of fire, reeking with the smoke of battle and streamlined to the rigours of a stubborn, long-drawn war.

As in the Border Region, the armies of the Liberated Areas reclaimed waste land and contributed to their own support. But since few of them were stationary, the methods they used were different. In the Shansi-Suiyuan Liberated Area, for instance, the crop sowed by one unit was sometimes harvested by another that happened to be on the spot, or by the people, who received a portion of it for their labour. Each detachment aimed at producing enough food for two months of the year, and as high as possible a proportion of its own cloth and uniforms. Troops who spent any length of time in a place were also required to build their own barracks, and to rebuild them if destroyed by the enemy.

In the Shansi-Honan-Hopei Liberated Area soldiers reclaimed large stretches of land in the gaunt Taihang Mountains. One much admired and much publicized regiment not only restored its quarters after the Japanese had burned them down, but put up a theatre, classrooms, athletic fields and swimming pool in intervals of active campaigning.

In Shantung the army, in 1943, supplied its own needs to the value of Chinese \$56,156,000 or about \$1,000 for each regular soldier. This made it possible to lighten the tax load of the people. The tax reduction in one area averaged nineteen dollars for every inhabitant.

In the plains of Central Hopei where mobile warfare was constant everywhere and there were no mountains in which to hide, each soldier was obliged to cultivate a mow (one sixth of an acre) of land annually. He did not ordinarily gather his own crop, but was credited with it in view of the addition to the food stocks of the region as a whole. The custodians of such army-reclaimed land could be other detachments or the civil authorities of near-by villages.

In the New Fourth Army, production methods varied with the locality. In 1943 one of its brigades won fame by reclaiming 5,000 acres and growing almost 4,000,000 pounds of rice. All troops on the move obligated themselves to help the villages on which they were quartered by working in their fields for at least three days of each agricultural month.

The labour exchange system too was different in areas of active warfare. It emerged there not only as an economic method but also as a military weapon; as a means not only of increasing and gathering the harvest, but of defending it from the enemy.

The Japanese usually timed their major campaigns and punitive forays against the Liberated Areas to coincide with the planting or the harvest. In this way they hoped to starve both army and people and to force the troops into requisitions to maintain themselves, which would inevitably destroy the soldier-peasant solidarity without which guerilla warfare is impossible. They also considered that attacks at harvest time would neutralize the military power of the people's militia, since there would be conflict in the mind of every militiaman as to whether to go out and fight or stay behind to try to get in the crop which fed his family.

On my visit to the Shansi-Suiyuan Liberated Area, I found that the Labour Exchange Groups had been successful in foiling these enemy aims. Before they were introduced, a local peasant working on his own farm had taken an average of six weeks to complete his harvest labour. He had had to reap, thresh and store his grain, finishing one operation before he could start the next. The front-line Labour Exchange Group, which at harvest time included not only the men but also the women and children of the whole village, made it possible for one gang of peasants to reap while another threshed and a third stored. Some of the grain was hidden in secret caches, safe from enemy raids, from the very first moment. The entire harvest operation for the village was reduced from six weeks to a fortnight.

During this time the regular army and, when necessary, the militia were deployed around the borders of each liberated pocket to hold or divert the enemy wherever he might be planning a blow. The tactics employed were not passive but active. All enemy garrisons around the perimeter were harassed to prevent them from concentrating. At critical points the Eighth Route Army itself attacked, so that any fighting that had to be done took place in occupied territory, not in the fields of the liberated peasants. Where the enemy was quiet, and showed no signs of moving, the troops added their labour power to that of the peasantry to get in the harvest even faster. Then they proceeded to other sectors where they were more needed.

The militiaman too could go out on duty without any worries. He knew that whether he was there or not, the other members of his group would take care of the harvest, and that if there was any loss all would bear it equally. Under these circumstances the defense of the common crop became just as much a part of harvest labour as removing it from the fields. No peasant had to choose between his own interest and that of the general security. The village had acquired flexibility. It could alternate between labour and defense, or carry on both simultaneously without hopelessly disrupting the economy.

By saving the harvest, the new village not only made continued resistance possible. It also denied grain to the Japanese Army and disrupted the fiscal basis of puppet governments which rested on the grain tax in kind.

The labour exchange system not only helped to protect the peasants from the ravages of war. It also assisted in repairing war losses. This was done by labour exchange between neighbouring villages as well as individuals. Often a Japanese punitive attack destroyed some of the man power of one village and some of the working cattle of another, so that neither could go on farming by itself. The pooling of the labour and livestock resources of several neighbouring communities enabled them all to plant and harvest.

Within each village, labour exchange not only freed men for temporary militia duty but, if they were killed or joined the permanent military forces, made it easy for the village to take care of their dependents. Work on their land was kept up, and their families were given the crop. Not only were the soldier's wife and children fed, but his farm was kept in full production and repair against his return. If one group had too many absent members to carry and another none, the village could direct the second to share the burden. The labour contribution was thus spread evenly over the whole community and did not weigh too heavily on individuals. Because the responsibility for such insurance fell on the fighter's own friends it was much more efficient

than any centralized scheme could have been. The effect of this arrangement on the willingness of men to fight was very great.

Finally the system helped the people to arm themselves. In several places we found that tracts reclaimed by Labour Exchange Groups had been earmarked by the members as "armament fields." The entire produce of such fields was sold to finance a permanent workshop in which blacksmiths made grenades, mines, pikes and other weapons. The materials for metal canisters and for black powder (sulphur, saltpetre and charcoal) are available almost everywhere in North China. The army had taught the people to make detonators and supplied them with the ingredients such as fulminate of mercury or lead azide. A shop we saw in a small pocket behind the Japanese lines turned out 10,000 mines and grenades a month, and this was only one of hundreds.

2. Role of the Communist Party

The unifying thread in all these developments was undoubtedly the Communist Party. The party's earlier role in stimulating political and economic reforms and in the promotion of popular military organization has already been described. Lin Feng, the dour, thick-set Manchurian Political Director of the Shansi-Suiyuan Military Headquarters, told me in 1944 how it helped to bind together and direct the subsequent integration of military, political, economic and educational effort into the contemporary structure of the Liberated Areas.

"The party's aims behind the enemy lines are simple," Lin Feng said. "They are expressed in the slogan: 'Everything for the war; everything for victory.' To us 'everything' means what it says—any and every form of social activity.

"Our detailed tasks are divided into three parts: military struggle, war-production and cultural advance. The last two are as important as the first because their success makes it impossible for the Japanese to smash us economically or to poison our minds. Even outside of broad strategy, economic and cultural work has its immediate military effects. It can be made to hamper individual enemy operations and to support and fertilize the ground for our own.

"The army leads in the fighting," Lin said, "but our party persuades the people to help themselves and guides them in doing it. The whole form of organization in the rear of the enemy can be encompassed in the words 'labour exchange,' taken in their widest sense—labour exchange not only among the people but between the people and the army, the people and their own militia. The link between production and war is indissoluble and reciprocal. It is true that the people would not and could not fight unless they had improved their

livelihood and produced enough to support the struggle. But the converse is also true. They could not improve their livelihood without fighting. It has been our job to raise this principle from an objectively existing truth to a consciously understood conviction, and from conviction to institutional reality.

"Patriotism alone may excite but productive achievements raise self-confidence and enthusiasm," Lin explained. "So we organize the people beginning from production. We arm the people beginning from production. The militia grows with the rationalization of production. Relations between the army and people improve as production improves. The more widespread the new form of productive organization, the more universal becomes the actual participation of the people in resistance.

"Today we are reaching the stage of total armed organization. At the beginning our army fought, and the people produced to feed themselves. Now they recognise the necessity of producing in order to fight. The Labour Exchange Group and militia unit here have become two-faces of the same coin. Starting from voluntary agricultural and commodity co-operatives, we have arrived at voluntary war industry co-operatives for making all kinds of simple weapons in great numbers for the people themselves to carry.

"In this process," Lin Feng continued, "the political and cultural level of the people rises also. A peasant who has mastered labour exchange and militia organization through his own experience has to think much more, and in more complex terms, than when he was merely trying to keep alive by his individual efforts, in an 'eternal' environment. Today he is changing his environment and understands influence of external events. He tries to figure out the general picture of the war. He wants to know what will happen next, what guides our leaders and those of the Kuomintang, what the plans of the enemy are, what people elsewhere are doing and how they are doing it.

"This changes his attitude to literacy. We no longer have to tell the peasant that if he learns to read and write he might rise in the world. He has already gone forward. Tens of thousands of plain farmers elected to executive jobs in productive groups, the militia or local government feel keenly their own need for education and how the lack of it handicaps their work. Previously our teachers and propagandists spent much time convincing the people that education was worth while. Now we are swamped with demands for teachers from thousands of scattered villages. Supplying them has become a serious problem, because there is a limit to the number of qualified men we take from other important work for this purpose.

"The party therefore tries to create new forces, new organizers and new teachers," Lin Feng said. "Our method is to find the quickest, keenest and most active men in each village, militia unit and co-operative, and to teach them first so that they can pass on what they have learned. If we tried to work by 'administrative' methods, from above, if we simply gave orders instead of activating local resources, we could never have accomplished what we have.

"The party does not operate local governments or any type of mass organization, armed or productive," he explained. "Its influence is exercised through members who join these organizations, gain the confidence of the people and prove their ability to lead and to give advice by example. Members of local party units must participate in the militia and Labour Exchange Groups. They must demonstrate their worth not to upper party organs but to their own fellow workers and fellow fighters. If they are not of the calibre to do this, they are no use to the party or to the people, however wise they may be or may think themselves. We teach our members that a good party man is one who devotes himself entirely to the problems of the people in his locality. Wiseacres who do not enjoy the personal respect of the people, try to hold themselves above the people, or are severed from the people in any other way, do no good, only harm. Any Communist who tries to use his party card as a passport to office instead of working so well that others want him to take authority is thrown out as soon as we catch up with him. It is because the Kuomintang has made its party a self-perpetuating trade-union of officeholders that it has failed.

"Our class policy too is based on 'Everything for the war.' The current task of both army and party is to defend the lives, homes and property of all Chinese against the enemy and to get all Chinese to take part in their own defense. To give the peasants a stake in the war, we have cut into landlord rents. But we give the landlords, like everyone else, defense against Japanese and bandits and clean, fair government." Although we have deprived them of their monopoly of political power, we have not in any way infringed on their equality of rights as citizens. We cannot deny that many landlords have experience and knowledge that is of value to the people, and that some have been honest, upright and patriotic. These are given scope for the investment of their capital in industry, for the use of their education in teaching, government accounting and other specialized jobs. No less than that of Communists, their position depends, in the last analysis, on how the people who live with them regard them as individuals.

"Under the old society the landlords in different parts of the province and the country had much closer contact with each other than the oppressed and illiterate peasants could have," Lin Feng concluded.

"This circumstance too has begun to work for us instead of against us. The Japanese had hoped that the landlords in the occupied territories could enlist the landlords in the Liberated Areas on their side. Instead of that, our landlords have found ways of letting those on the other side of the lines know that we really carry out our stated policies in action. The Japanese, who have come to expropriate all Chinese, make many promises but keep none of them. Thus we have won many friends not only among the people, but among the upper classes on the other side of the lines. I can assure you that Japan has no friends at all here, although she has sent in some paid spies and agents."

3. The Battle of Water

Just as the co-operative method in production increased the flexibility and output of village China in respect of war materials and man power, so it provided possibilities for region-wide public works. Much of Chinese agriculture is only made possible by widespread irrigation schemes, and large areas on the banks of the great Yellow River depend on the upkeep of dikes for their very existence. There is a theory that China came under one government very early in her history because the control of her rivers was beyond the strength of scattered local kingdoms. It is certainly true that the people turned out many dynasties as soon as they began to neglect this vital function and ceased to think of ways to make more land available for the growing population.

One of the serious effects of the Japanese war was the deterioration of canals and dikes that resulted from military operations and the reckless diversion of man power. The enemy were the worst offenders. But Kuomintang officials, some from cupidity and some from indifference, also frequently disregarded the critical periods in the farm and dike economy, when they rounded up conscripts for the army and work projects. The harm done was often incalculable.

In New Democratic China, where so many of the functions of government are performed by the peasants themselves, this cannot occur. Labour can only be diverted from the village during the slack season. When most needed there, labour is actually sent to the village by the mobilization of near-by army, government and urban reserves rallied through their mass organizations. Rural man power generally is saved and made mobile by labour exchange. During the war, dikes and irrigation in the Liberated Areas were maintained in better condition than elsewhere, and many new projects were undertaken.

The Peiyao region of the Shansi-Honan-Hopei Liberated Area, one of the most active fighting bases behind the Japanese lines, irrigated

over 800,000 acres of new land in 1940-1941 alone, digging 2272 water courses. In the mountain sector of the Shensi-Chahar-Hopei Liberated Area, refugees brought 30,000 acres under cultivation and were loaned 600,000 pounds of seed grain with which to plant it. During the same period, 344,229 agricultural implements were produced by arsenals and co-operative workshops there. In the Central Hopei plain, where floods competed with constant Japanese incursions as a major menace, 197 major dike breaches were mended, 190 miles of new embankments built and fifty miles of river deepened, all with muscle and pickaxe.

Populous Central Hopei, indeed, was the most spectacular instance of the release of constructive energy and the willingness of the Chinese peasant to work for his own defense. Flood-fighting achievements there were dwarfed by much greater efforts in the demolition of highways and the construction of thousands of miles of counter-blockade ditches and underground "subways" from village to village—necessary in a country which has no natural barriers to enemy operations. The work in this base alone was more than that put into the Burma Road and the great Northwest Highway combined. After the surrender it was seen by many foreign visitors both on the ground and from the air. Viewing it from a plane, one could see how it had changed the whole configuration of the country.

It was in Central Hopei too that gangs driven by the Japanese to build new highways or repair old ones would come back at night and destroy what they had constructed during the day. When the enemy came back the following morning, the peasants would blame the destruction on the Eighth Route Army and say: "They had guns; what could we do?" This would go on for weeks on end, seriously hampering Japanese movements. Such things cannot be done by compulsion. They show the unlimited devotion and resourcefulness of the Chinese common man when he is given a sense of dignity, purpose and ownership.

4. The Battle of Industry

Wartime industrial development in the liberated bases has already been referred to briefly. Like the agricultural organization, it was a tautened front-line version of the work done in the Border Region.

Military production was naturally the centre of effort. Each of the nineteen Liberated Areas had at least one base arsenal employing from 200 to 1,000 workers. The base arsenals could manufacture rifles and trench mortars by gunsmith craft methods, repair arms of all kinds, reload and sometimes make small arms ammunition, produce smokeless

powder for cartridges and detonators for hand grenades and mines. Subsidiary repair and reloading shops in all resistance pockets numbered more than ninety. Casings for grenades and mines were not generally made in these plants but by blacksmiths and peasant "arms co-operatives."

The industries were organized for rapid mobility and self-defense. In one shop I visited with other foreign correspondents and U.S. officers, all machinery was rapidly dismantable. Completed munitions were stored in baskets permanently attached to pack frames that could be thrown over a mule's back and evacuated in a few minutes time. The mules, big, sure-footed beasts, were always there and ready.

Not all arms were evacuated, however, in time of danger. The workers of the unit had received full military training and constituted a defense company to cover the movements of the shop. The defense organization was run by the workers themselves through their trade-union local. It trained the younger, stronger men in quick movement, guerilla company tactics, sniping and the use of mines. For our benefit, an alarm signal was given while production was in full swing. Forty minutes later the whole factory was well on its way up the mountain side. All approaches to it had been thoroughly mined and defense pickets were in position. The "abandoned" buildings themselves were littered with concealed booby traps set to go off if a door was opened or a stool or bench was shifted.

Raw material for arms production came from the war itself. Japanese rails were torn up for steel and Japanese communications wire for the guerilla telephone network and other copper needs. As already described, army, militia and people all engaged in this. The stockpile of raw materials available in some bases was greater than the available productive plant could handle. During our visit to the Shansi-Suiyuan Liberated Area, we saw great heaps of such scrap, including Krupp rails that had been supplied to Japan by the Germans.

Next in importance to firearms was the military communications industry. Capture and repair had provided the Liberated Areas with a fine telephone system. The Japanese had given up trying to conceal their wires from the watchful eyes of the people and strung them in plain view, relying on threats and reprisals to keep them as intact as possible. The guerilla lines, on the contrary, were carefully hidden by camouflage and the people's silence. While travelling in Northwest Shansi we were amazed to find telephones in primeval villages at the back of beyond, with no sign of how they were connected. We were surprised also to see the extent of radio communication between guerilla units and the number of trained operators in their midst. The radio industry

and the training of its personnel owed much to Michael Lindsay,¹ a British university professor who escaped from Peiping after Pearl Harbour and remained with the Eighth Route Army till late in 1945. In 1944 he came down to Yen-an and set up an international short-wave transmitter, XNCR, which helped break through the news blockade that kept knowledge of the Liberated Areas from the outside world.

Textiles, as in the Border Region, were produced largely by co-operatives of village women. Each military headquarters also maintained its own uniform factories. Strict economy was practised. Everything possible was salvaged from the old uniforms turned in when new ones were issued. Intact pieces of cloth were reused for padded soft shoes which formed part of the winter equipment. Torn rags were plaited into sturdy rope soles both for this footwear and for the open sandals worn in summer. Cotton wadding was reffuffed, disinfected by long exposure to the hot sun and used for quilted jackets and overcoats. The worn fur lining of the leather coats and robes used by the Eighth Route Army cavalry in Inner Mongolia had good pieces cut out for cold weather boots and shoes. To save metal, uniform buttons were made of hardwood instead of brass. Enamelled metal insignia was replaced by glazed earthenware which took as much punishment and did not tarnish.

How much attention was paid to the needs of the army and people could be gauged from the very widely developed, although primitive, medical industry. Every major base had factories to manufacture sterile dressings, glassware, plaster of Paris, simple instruments and drugs from local plants and minerals. Much work had been done with Chinese herbal remedies. Traditional medicines were analyzed, their active principles isolated and standard dosages fixed. As in all other phases of the social and material effort, modern scientific knowledge and skill was prized and applied wherever possible.

On the other hand, the high standard of education for directing personnel was not allowed to stand in the way of getting right down to work with the primitive resources available. Nieh Yung-chen told me once: "We had experts who came to help us, took one look at the conditions, threw up their hands and cried: 'What good is our education here?' We replied: 'Remember that all industry and science faced the same medieval handicaps. The people who started them in Europe lived hundreds of years ago and lacked the knowledge you have been able to acquire through their experience. Of course some things are impossible here. But others are not, and they must be

¹Michael Lindsay is the son of a scholar peer, Baron Lindsay of Birker, the Master of Balliol College, Oxford.

done. When the blockade is broken and the war is won, no one will ask you to go back to A.B.C. Nothing will be grudged to acquire the most modern equipment so that China may march with the foremost. But tomorrow is not today. Today we must do what we can by combining your knowledge with what you find here. Otherwise we will perish, and then there will be no future at all, scientific or otherwise.'"

The scientists and engineers in the Liberated Areas soon absorbed this spirit. Their ingenuity and achievements impressed all visitors to guerilla laboratories, industrial enterprises and hospitals. The government and party, in their turn, publicized and rewarded all victories over the Chinese environment. Moving about, we would often ask whether there were any notable people in a district. The answer was generally not the name of a rich landlord, traditional scholar or military chief, but that of a worker "labour hero" who had improved a wooden machine to double its output, or a scientist "labour hero" who had developed some product locally that was always imported before.

Liberated Area doctors, technicians and chemists were vital individuals full of strength, joy and pride in "epic victories" over nature which repeated the early history of man's material advance in Europe and America. Their methods were as simple and ingenious as those of the labour exchange organizers who improved agricultural productivity without machines. Their approach to every problem was that of pioneers. Not only they, but all the local peasants and soldiers had watched, step by step, the sprouting local grass roots of industry. Together, in hundreds of little villages, they had seen hopes turn into facts and the foundations of new and greater hopes.

5. The Battle of Currency

People's organization for war and production and reliance on popular initiative and self-management in every field provided the basis for ingenious and effective methods of economic warfare.

In the sphere of finance the first successful action against Japanese penetration took place in Central Hopei in 1938. Prior to the war the chief currency circulating in this area had been the notes of the Hopei Provincial Bank issued under authority of the Central Government. When the Japanese overrun Peiping they captured the dies from which these bank notes were printed. They immediately began to turn them out in great numbers and pump them into the Liberated Areas to buy up produce.

The authorities of the Central Hopei base undertook countermeasures at once. They announced that a new currency would be put out in the area and that after a certain date only this currency would circulate. For

Central Government notes of all kinds other than those of the Hopei Provincial Bank, a fixed and fair rate of exchange was instituted. But for Hopei Provincial Bank notes the Liberated Area was divided into zones, each with a different rate of exchange, the lowest rates in the depths of the area and the highest in the places immediately adjoining the Japanese. At the same time a strict watch was kept to prevent any additional notes coming from enemy territory.

Holders of Hopei notes naturally tried to get them to the places where the best rate was available, so that soon they were all attracted to the border. The regional authorities then announced that all exchange would cease at a certain date. People who still had the notes either cashed them at once or used them to buy goods in the occupied area for import into the liberated zone. Export-import control, which was carried out not only by officials but by the people's associations, permitted entry only to goods that were useful to resistance—such as metals, medicines and radio supplies. In a short time there were no Bank of Hopei notes in the area at all. The tide of the bank-note invasion was pushed back without harming the area economy or bringing loss to the people. Similar struggles, modified by local conditions, later took place in all the bases. Chungking attacked the Liberated Areas for issuing their own local currencies, but without such issues they could not have defended their economies, which were an important part of the anti-Japanese war economy of China as a whole.

6. The Battle of Cotton

Japan's plan to make North China replace the Southern United States and India as a cotton source for its great textile industry began as a measure of war preparation some years before the outbreak of hostilities. In 1935 and 1936 travelling agents of the Kanegafuchi concern made one-week stands in hundreds of South and Central Hopei villages, persuading the peasants to grow cotton instead of grain. They promised a guaranteed market, and distributed seeds for long-staple American varieties free of charge. In a number of places land was bought outright and small demonstration farms were set up to show just how to grow, grade and pack the strains Japanese industry required.

To supplement these efforts, local authorities and police were bribed to hurry the process by administrative pressure. The textile agents themselves always travelled with a few armed bullies who put the fear of God into peasants and "agitators" who expressed too many doubts. The villagers were stubborn, not because they understood the over-all economic policy of aggression but because they had a very healthy and well-founded suspicion of anything the Japanese tried to

promote. A serious prewar Sino-Japanese incident occurred when a group of young peasants raided and destroyed one enemy-sponsored experimental farm, killing some overseers who resisted.

As Japanese influence increased, the prices paid for cotton were brought down. Aided by students, cotton-growing peasants formed co-operatives to bargain for better terms and to set up domestic spinning and weaving units to provide a Chinese market for their crops. Their experience of Japanese unscrupulousness put the co-operators into the forefront of local movements demanding that enemy penetration be checked.

After North China was conquered, enemy military decrees forced the people to grow cotton and make fixed deliveries. Owners of blooming cotton fields found themselves unable to buy sufficient food for their families for the prices they received.

When the Eighth Route Army moved into the area it found a furiously resentful population already organizing its own armed resistance. It had no difficulty in mobilizing the peasants to change back to food crops in all areas within the reach of Japanese garrisons. The people were all the more ready to do it because they knew that every acre of growing cotton would be a standing invitation to the textile-hungry enemy to raid their fields at harvest time.

But the production of cotton was not completely discontinued. Instead, it was kept down to the amounts needed by the resistance armies and the people for their own use. Its location too was shifted to places which were furthest from major enemy strongpoints and easiest to defend.

Statistics and complaints published by the Japanese press through the war years showed how effective this policy became. After 1942 Japan was entirely cut off from her old sources of cotton imports, but she was still unable to exploit the potential production of North China on which she had banked so heavily in the preliminary blueprints of her Pacific War economy.

7. The Battle of Markets

China is a rural country and the centre of exchange in the countryside is the market town to which the peasants of the surrounding villages bring their produce. The invading Japanese kept their garrisons and strongpoints in district and sub-district towns which were not only administrative and communications centres but had ruled the local economy from time immemorial.

The Liberated Areas had to undertake measures to meet this threat. To recapture and hold the larger towns was beyond their powers

because of insufficient armament. The armies and local patriotic governments therefore isolated the occupied markets so that enemy control would not extend beyond their walls. The troops severed the main roads that ran between these points. The vital minor paths and cart tracks that fed them from the countryside were cut by the people's militia, which had a unit in every village and was the only organization in the position to exercise such control.

The second step was to provide alternative trading centres where the peasant could take his yield and buy whatever he required. Easily defended villages were designated as "anti-Japanese" markets and new paths were built radiating from them to the surrounding settlements. Apart from government and co-operative financing, every effort was made to attract merchants with money to buy and household goods such as cloth, ironware and cooking oil to sell. Attractive hostels were built, safe-conduct guaranteed and business taxes lowered. Where local production could not supply necessary manufactured goods, merchants were encouraged to smuggle them in from the enemy areas. But the importation of luxuries and of anything that was being made locally was forbidden.

The task of the military in the battle of the markets was to raid enemy fairs and guard their own, so that not only patriotism but relative security was on the side of the Liberated Areas. In some cases these raids resulted in temporary possession of the enemy town. Then the market was held in the old place also, but on the Eighth Route Army's terms.

Social policy also played a part. In this aspect the battle of the markets was a battle for the loyalty and co-operation of merchants and peddlers. As with the landlord, new conditions for profitable business were created for these elements. They no longer had carte blanche to exploit the people, but they were relieved of the extortionate levies and official corruption which made life difficult in both enemy-occupied and Kuomintang territories. Those who traded honestly and in accordance with law were protected in unsafe territory and given state credit on low terms to finance their operations. The wide connections of loyal merchants were utilized for underground work and intelligence, just as those of the landlords had been.

That avowed Communists would refrain from severe pressure on private merchants might seem strange. That private businessmen acquired enthusiasm for Communist-led policies and administration may appear even stranger. But the "incongruity" disappears upon analysis. Just as China's New Democracy could not have grown if the landlords and merchants had held their old supremacy in government, so it could not have survived the war if it had left no room for the patriotic mer-

chant as a unit of economic life. For better or worse, existing Chinese society could not get along without him. The Chinese Communists have used him "for better." They allowed him the fullest scope where his activity benefited the people and their fight, and no scope at all for speculations harmful to it.

Trade depends not only on commercial methods but on productive strength. Behind the markets, the industries of the Border Region and Liberated Areas worked hard to improve their exchange position. The Shansi-Suiyuan Liberated Area, for example, had long been compelled to import its matches either from the occupied territories or from Yen Hsi-hsan. But when I was there in 1944 such imports had stopped entirely because the match factory in Yen-an had grown to supply the needs not only of the Border Region but of Shansi-Suiyuan as well. Its matches were fully competitive with those the Japanese make, both in quality and in price. Moreover, the Eighth Route Army had solicitously destroyed the enemy-owned Fenyang plant, previously the main supplier, as soon as an alternative source became available. I had the pleasure of witnessing this raid.

Fenyang, by the way, was for many years the scene of the medical-missionary labours of Representative Walter Judd of Minnesota, who for reasons best known to himself has proclaimed to the American people that the Chinese Communists did not fight in the war. I take pleasure in reporting that the Fenyang guerillas, simple people who did not distort facts to suit their politics, took a much more charitable view of Dr. Judd than he did of them. They recalled how he had served the population, were delighted to hear that he had gone to Congress, and asked us to forward their regards and their hope that he would tell Americans how the Chinese people were fighting.

8. What It all Meant

Examples of the Chinese people's effort under the New Democracy are endless, and this account of the economic aspects of their struggle could also be extended indefinitely. For it was here that China, her people, the great mass, really began to move.

The wartime Kuomintang areas, despite the disintegration that resulted from the policies imposed on them, produced interesting men and well-meaning experiments, affecting thousands of people. In the Liberated Areas they did not consider a thing begun until it could be expressed in millions. The rear had its Industrial Co-operatives, with 1000 units and 25,000 members still not completely strangled by bureaucracy. No one has yet counted all the Labour Exchange Groups and co-operatives set up in the resistance bases, but each village we

saw, and we saw hundreds, had more than the average Kuomintang city. The Chungking rear had men anxious to do something for the people's progress, but all they could do was to write up their ideas circumspectly in censored publications, meet their friends for semi-secret discussions and keep out of the way of secret police. Here the way was closed only to those who wanted to push China back.

Among these liberated people, it was rare to find a man who did not have a hand grenade or two in his belt to throw at a Japanese soldier or anyone else who tried to push him around. These people had started on their own road. Guy Martell Hall, no leftist but the manager of the Peiping Branch of the National City Bank of New York, escaped from the Japanese through their territory. He said of them that he had seen in the flesh the counterparts of America's own beginners, the embattled farmers asserting mastery of their own fate, the Minutemen of 1775. As in America, he felt that this great popular assertion would be followed by gigantic productive development.

The shots fired in the far interior of China will also be "heard round the world." They marked not only the frustration of the Japanese invader but the systematic liberation of a hundred million Chinese peasants from the trammels of the past. They advanced China a long way toward the release of her great latent energies for which forerunners like Sun Yat-sen had hoped and planned. Unquestionably they lighted new beacons along the road that all colonial and semicolonial Asia must take away from bondage and feudalism.

In its years of struggle, China's New Democracy forged the key to progress for many lands and peoples, and the sword of victory if opportunity to go forward does not come peacefully.

PART FIVE

End and Beginning

XIV. THE LAST LAP OF THE WAR

1. Problems of the Belligerents

THE HAPPENINGS OF THE LAST PHASE OF THE WAR, FROM MID-1943 TO V-J Day, are important because they brought all previous developments to a focus.

There had been two Chinas socially from time immemorial, two Chinas in modern political terms since the Taiping Uprising, and two Chinas territorially and militarily since the great split of 1927. As Japan made her last efforts, the great problem was not their respective merit but what each had to contribute to the ability of the country as a whole to weather the storm. Moreover, China had to provide answers for world anti-Axis strategy. Could she be preserved as a base in the general United Nations counteroffensive against Japan? What part could she play in the counteroffensive?

For the first time both sides of the international front were present on Chinese territory. The Japanese Army was there in force as an enemy. The United States Army, relying on airborne communications only, was trickling in as a friend. On the periphery, the amphibious forces of Nimitz and MacArthur were nosing their way toward China's coast, and the Soviet Far Eastern Red Army stood poised on her Manchurian border. The great showdown was approaching.

Japan wanted to make China into a last great bastion, or at least a battlefield for a long war of attrition, so as to avoid final and complete defeat. Even if she was forced to capitulate, she was interested in leaving a weak and disunited China in her wake. Defeat does not last forever, and in ten years she might once more find a neighbouring vacuum convenient to expand into.

America's aim in China was to prevent this. She had already established predominance in sea and air power, but Japanese land power

continued to rule the continent. The only way for Americans to enter China was the hazardous "hump" route. Even an ultimate naval landing would not solve the problem of quickly getting large numbers of troops and supplies into the roadless interior. It was by no means certain that a sea and air superiority alone would suffice for complete victory. The Japanese Army in China was showing that it could nullify U. S. air strength by seizing airfields which Chungking's troops were unable to defend. To save her own men and end the war as soon as possible, America needed a stronger China. This involved both the reform of Chiang Kai-shek's forces, which were debilitated by inactivity, and the release of the half-million troops he used to blockade the Communists. It also required co-ordination with the Communist-led strength in the north, but this was blocked by a contradiction between basic U. S. policy and immediate war needs. Chiang Kai-shek was partly America's creation and she was committed to keeping him in power, but militarily he was a liability and a saboteur. American officers had a high opinion of the Chinese Communists as a fighting force, but Washington feared them politically. Although Russia always pops up in this connection, this fear was actually a continuation of the old tradition of support for the *status quo* in China, which had antedated the appearance of the Soviets by sixty years.

For the Chungking Government and the Kuomintang the problem was to retain their grip on the country. They were willing to let others fight the battle against Japan while they prepared for the reconquest of areas in which the New Democracy had grown. If Chungking had to lose territory, it preferred to have the Japanese to control it totally. Should the Japanese lose the war, lands they had held firmly would be recovered in their old state. But if the Communists had been at them, the former feudal power would inevitably face popular resistance. Hence the Kuomintang's conflicts with the United Nations strategy which enabled Brooks Atkinson to write in his famous dispatch to the *New York Times* that "the difference between Stilwell and the Generalissimo is that the United States wants to fight Japan and the Generalissimo would prefer not to."

For the Liberated Areas the situation stood quite differently. Their experience had proved that antifeudal reforms and popular mobilization were indispensable for successful warfare against Japan, and that active anti-Japanese struggle of any kind made such progress inevitable. Internationally they were anxious to end the century-old isolation of the Chinese progressive movement. They had much to offer the Allied cause in the way of military aid, and they asked for very little in return. In the last stage of the war they hoped to be able to assist the projected Nimitz landing on the China coast. Such joint action, they

believed, would not only quicken Japan's end but also change the nature of foreign co-operation with China which had hitherto been with feudalism alone.

Beyond the war, the resolution of this situation was important for the future of all China, as distinct from temporary divisions. It was also important for the United Nations as distinct from individual member states.

Would China be merely a battlefield in the counteroffensive or an active participant? This would decide whether she would enter the peace as a prize or a co-victor in fact as well as in name.

Would a new, democratic unity emerge from the stimulus of the final war effort and the unique combination of events that made it strategically necessary to the whole anti-Axis camp? Such unity could remain after the war to strengthen China as a keystone of Asiatic progress, checkmate any further resurgence of Japanese fascism, and stabilize the peace.

Or would imperialist manoeuvres and internal social strains disintegrate the country at the last moment, initiating a new cycle of the sad history of the past hundred years? If so, China would continue to be an international football, the liberation of Asia would be impeded, and titanic interpower struggles to control both would reopen.

Having posed the problem, we will examine what actually occurred.

2. Japan Faces the Consequence of Her Errors

The main feature of Japan's position in China in 1943-1945 was that, although her armies were the strongest in the field, her strategy had already suffered defeat. Tokyo's original timetable had called for the "liquidation of the China Incident" before any larger war could be embarked upon, but on Pearl Harbour day China still stood. Japan had plunged into her campaigns in Indo-China, Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, the Philippines and Burma with unfinished business in her rear.

This was not serious while the Axis had hopes of winning the war. But when Germany was thrown back at Stalingrad, the naval initiative in the Pacific passed to the United States, and Japan's reach proved too short to extend to India, it assumed the proportions of a menace. In late 1942 American aircraft flying over the Himalayan hump were able to establish bases in the Kuomintang rear. At the same time the growth of the front behind the enemy lines in North China engaged many Japanese divisions. This boded very ill for Japan if the Americans should land on the Central China coast or the U.S.S.R. should strike at her North China positions. In either case the Liberated Areas promised to provide the invading forces with very effective allies.

How had this situation come about? The answer can be found in the history of all conquerors who have attempted to subdue large and populous countries. To defeat such nations it is not enough to have greater striking power. Their leading centres must be forced to capitulate and their people's will to fight smashed. Otherwise their tremendous and loosely linked territories, beyond the power of any invader to garrison fully, can always provide opportunities and bases for liberationist warfare. Such opportunities, if properly exploited, can lead to continued resistance and the ultimate exhaustion and expulsion of the aggressor. It was such enduring determination to resist and its growing military mobilization, turning peoples into armies, that won the American Revolution and drove Napoleon out of Russia in 1812.

War against armies is mainly military. War against a people's resistance is political in its aims and strategy, even though it is conducted with arms. An attempt that is always used but seldom successful is the demoralization of resistance by mass terror. The Japanese tried this in the slaughter and rape of Nanking, in the indiscriminate bombings of Canton and Chungking and in their "Kill all, loot all, burn all" policy in the guerilla areas—but they failed.

Less spectacular but much more frequently successful is the utilization of existing political differences in the invaded country. With this old imperialist technique, Japan had made many gains between the invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and the beginning of nationwide resistance in 1937. She had postponed the war by manoeuvring the Chinese Government into appeasing her and at the same time having to defend this appeasement by police measures against patriotic protests. For six years the Kuomintang regime had served as a buffer between the people's anger and the people's real enemy. The Japanese scheme finally failed because the growth of the popular movement faced Chiang Kai-shek with the alternative of leading resistance or becoming an isolated quisling appendage of Japan's invasion while the people fought by themselves. Of the two pressures, Japanese and patriotic, the second won.

In the first phase of the ensuing war the Japanese forces were "punishing" the Chinese Government for its temerity in joining the people instead of restraining them. At the same time they seized the great trading cities which were at once the chief centres of Kuomintang power, the strongholds of the Western interests, and the physical link between the two. By this means, Tokyo hoped to prove to China's rulers that their decision had been hasty, and to Britain and America that any hope that China could check Japan was vain. If the West was convinced of this, Japan believed, it would be willing to sell China down the river and save what it could of its own interests by negotiation.

The results in each case had tended partly to justify these hopes. Wang Ching-wei and an important section of the Kuomintang surrendered and other groups began to waver. America and Britain, though encouraging Chinese resistance for whatever it might be worth, took very good care to go on trading with Japan, and to recognize Japanese domination *de facto* wherever it had been established.

Therefore Japan thought once again that she would not have to finish the job by military means at all. The fall of both Nanking and Hankow was followed by temporary lulls along the front while she tried to entice Chiang into a negotiated peace. These bids were rejected because, despite apparent successes, Japan had let loose two forces which would inexorably spell her defeat—the national rising of the Chinese people and the development of conflicts with the Western powers to the point where, whatever the temporary situation, they could be resolved only by war. When the initial blitzkrieg failed to achieve her aim, it became clear that the only way China could be subjugated was by purely military victory in a protracted war over the entire territory of this great country.

This was no longer a “blitz” job and could not be done “on the cheap.” It is doubtful whether Japan’s industrial capacity has ever been sufficient simultaneously to equip such an effort, quickly develop the communications and resources of the conquered territory and prepare reserves for the larger war she still had to win if the conquest was to be secured.

Digging still deeper we see that Japan’s fundamental mistake was to see China as changeless. Because the material face of China was the same as before, she thought that all she had to beat was a weak government and army in a feudal country poisoned by corruption and torn by internal dissension. In the war years China’s unoccupied hinterland did indeed become a stewpot of political and economic disintegration. But by that time the Kuomintang rear was no longer decisive. The world strategic balance had shifted against Japan and the centre of gravity of China’s war effort had moved to the front behind the enemy lines. Hopes for a successful “peace offensive” were thus doomed once more.

While Japan had been right to believe that her forces were sufficient to smash the old China, what she invaded was old China pregnant with the new. Between 1938 and 1942 the new China was not only born but grew to adult size. After a five-year lull, the “liquidation of the China Incident” was both harder than at the beginning, and a much more desperate necessity.

3. Last Blow at the Liberated Areas

Correctly recognizing that the Liberated Areas were the key to resistance, Japan began from them. She made only a halfhearted effort to attack Yenan itself, because the strength of the New Democracy's resistance lay not in any centre but in the increased will, organization and confidence of the people. The Border Region overrun would just be another trouble spot behind Japan's own lines. Moreover, it would eliminate the only common boundary between the Communist-led forces and the Kuomintang rear. That boundary was most useful to Japan because it was a line of friction and not of co-operation. It took up the attention of many armies, produced constant incidents dangerous to Chinese unity, and held the only remaining hope of a major civil war.

After the great mopping-up campaigns which preceded Pearl Harbour the Liberated Areas had a brief breathing spell while Japan regrouped for the new war. Instead of lying low and licking their wounds they recovered all that they had lost and extended their boundaries further. Local actions were co-ordinated to impede the withdrawal of Japanese troops to the Pacific fronts as much as possible, and this aim was explained to every fighter.

These were "sacrifice actions" undertaken to give the Allies a chance to consolidate their defenses. When the Allied positions in Southeast Asia collapsed anyhow, Japan took her revenge. Instead of removing troops from North China, she brought more in. The ensuing fighting was a win-all or lose-all struggle for survival.

The Eighth Route Army was temporarily driven out of Central Hopei altogether. In the Southeast Shansi mountains its general headquarters was itself surrounded and the chief of staff, Tso Chuan, was killed. Casualties were high among both officers and rank and file and highest of all among the people. The Japanese used gas, sometimes with diabolic deliberateness, as when they pumped it into caves and tunnels in which the civilian population hid. Liberated Area officials strongly suspect that they also spread bubonic plague. Lack of scientific facilities made this impossible to prove, but it is certain that the disease appeared, after the enemy's passage, in many areas where it had never been seen before.

At the same time Japanese political warfare reached levels previously unknown. Exemplary terror, like the "Consolidation of Peace and Order" and the "Three Alls," was now supplemented by a new system of "Village Purging," first applied in the middle Yangtze in late 1942. This method was the creation of the Japanese and their quisling Wang Ching-wei. It was patterned on a type of activity developed by the Kuomintang during the ten-year civil war, but elaborated in many details.

Chen Yi, commander of the New Fourth Army, told me how it worked. "In place of spreading their forces over our whole area so as to achieve the maximum intimidation and devastation as before," he explained, "the enemy began to saturate small designated areas with heavy garrisons accompanied by large numbers of puppet gendarmes, officials, policemen and spies. They would settle down for three months and 'process' village after village, questioning every man, woman and child to ferret out our plain-clothes guerillas, militiamen, underground workers, wounded, and generally anyone who had helped us.

"During this three-month period no one was allowed to move and a daily roll call was taken. 'Dangerous Characters' who had had dealings with us were executed or imprisoned. 'Doubtful' ones who showed any patriotic feeling were placed under restraint. Japanese stooges and those considered 'harmless' were provided with certificates of good behaviour which gave them immunity, if not from humiliation, at least from punishment."

"How did you deal with this?" I asked.

"Mainly by military action," he replied. "We mobilized all our units and struck at every possible weak spot of the enemy both near and far, thus forcing him to spread out again. At the same time we sent small armed groups of native-born guerillas back into the areas that were being purged to hide in woods, copses and the farms of braver peasants. These men came out at night and shot the most virulent and active puppet gendarmes, without whose local knowledge the enemy could not carry on this work. They made contact with the people and told them what we were doing and why. Such activities had the double effect of frightening the traitors into a go-slow policy and making the people feel that, despite the overwhelming concentration of enemy strength, we were still there to strike at their oppressors.

"As a result, the pattern of the purge began to break down," Chen Yi continued. "The enemy would seem to have everything more or less his own way during the first fortnight or month. Then some of his troops had to leave to answer urgent alarms elsewhere. Then the puppets got more and more scared. Then our people got bolder and rallied around the guerilla units in attacks on small parties of Japanese. Finally a broad political campaign was carried into the ranks of the puppet troops, who if things had gone well had by then replaced a large part of the Japanese garrisons. Our peasants told them boldly that, as they could see for themselves, the New Fourth Army was unconquerable. They asked them what interest they, as Chinese, could have in serving the national enemy who could not even protect them.

"By the third month, larger bodies of our guerillas were able to come in. The puppets had begun going over to us in whole units. Our

regular army also came back, and the enemy had the whole thing to do over again, with the disadvantage that the people have already seen him fail once."

4. Neutralization on the Regular Front

On the regular front, the new situation began to shake the five-year stalemate and finally broke it down. It was indicative that the first major Japanese move in Kuomintang China after Pearl Harbour was a campaign in the coastal province of Chekiang where American fliers had bailed out following General Doolittle's carrier raid on Tokyo in April 1942, after failing to find the fields prepared for their reception.

Chekiang had been the calmest sector of the front for several years. It was under the command of General Ku Chu-tung, whose outstanding example of military ardour had been the attack on the New Fourth Army. Trade between the Chinese and Japanese areas developed here earlier and more strongly than anywhere else. The town of Kinhua, the point of exchange in this trade, was in a state of perpetual boom, and fortunes undreamed of before the war were made overnight by Chinese and Japanese officers.

With the outbreak of Pacific hostilities, however, Chekiang became the obvious backstop point for carrier shuttle bombings of Japan. The U. S. forces asked Chungking for airfields here and got them constructed. Why the guide beacons to these airfields did not work for Doolittle's fliers has never been satisfactorily explained. The reason could either have been direct Japanese fifth-column activity or sabotage on the part of local officers who did not want the existing favourable business conditions disturbed.

When the Tokyo high command ordered a punitive expedition, Ku Chu-tung's rusty armies offered no opposition. The airfields built to receive American aircraft were captured and ploughed up. Enemy units went out to the villages which had given shelter to Doolittle's fliers, burned them to the ground and killed their people. The Japanese garrison troops, enraged by the disruption of trade, took Kinhua, with its warehouses full of goods on whose previous sale to the Chinese they had collected fat fees.

After the Chekiang campaign had demonstrated the impossibility of keeping bases safe in such proximity to the enemy lines there was no further attempt to carrier-bomb Tokyo. The Japanese retired from some of the places they had occupied, keeping only Kinhua and leaving a great scar of devastation where the "punished" villages had been. Quiet returned to Chekiang and the old smuggling traffic and other contacts were gradually resumed.

Quite apart from local truces, Ku Chu-tung's headquarters became the greatest nucleus of "informal" contacts between Kuomintang elements in Free China and those under Wang Ching-wei. Through them Chungking and Tokyo explored fields in which peaceful coexistence suited them better than clashes that "would not effect the final outcome of the war but would drain the strength of both."

Kuomintang politicians in Chungking told their friends privately that such arrangements really did no harm to China but were evidences of high wisdom, because the Japanese would lose anyhow in the long run. This was not only morally obtuse but strategically nonsense. Japan had the means to redress such "balances" in her own immediate favour whereas China did not. Although Chinese reaction bought itself immunity and profit, Japan obtained much more precious assets. At every point where truces existed she could enjoy the certainty that local Chinese commanders would try their best to keep Allied military installations from working. She preserved a hundred per cent degree of military initiative, and could be certain that there would be no fighting on China's regular front except where she herself chose to provoke it for her own purposes.

The West Hupeh and Hunan "rice bowl" campaigns, which took place in the summer and winter of 1943 respectively, typified the results. The decrepit Sixth War Zone was the first to be attacked by the Japanese. Its vice-commander, the Szechuan provincial war lord Wang Chen-hsiu, retreated precipitately, robbing the people on the way. His demoralized soldiers looted indiscriminately and officers practised such tricks as decreeing the immediate evacuation of a town for "military reasons" and then charging civilians who wanted to pass back through the lines to pick up their belongings a fat fee. The collapse of the Sixth War Zone laid open the flank of the Ninth, commanded by General Hsueh Yoh from Changsha, which was in much better fighting condition. The enemy advance was finally stemmed by the combined efforts of one of the best Central divisions, the 57th, and the Fourteenth United States Air Force. The 57th Division lost about nine tenths of its effectives in the heroic defense of the city of Changteh. Its sacrifice would have been unnecessary if the other troops in the sector, who far outnumbered the Japanese, had done their part.¹

Yet here again the guilty were not punished nor the worthy rewarded. The infamous Wang Chen-hsiu, whose name the people could not speak without spitting, continued in his post. The commander of the decimated 57th Division was placed under arrest for "deserting his trust" because he made a withdrawal when only 200 men

¹The economic warfare aspects of this campaign have been discussed elsewhere in this book.

of his original 6000 were left. The reasons for this seemingly insane action by the highest military authorities neatly summed up the contradiction of Chungking's situation. Wang Chen-hsiu was not touched, because he represented important Szechuan landlords whom the government did not wish to annoy. The government had thrown in one of its finest units, the kind it usually hoarded, to plug the Changteh hole, because Chiang Kai-shek was at that very moment conferring with Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill in Cairo and needed to prove the quality of his armies which was being gravely questioned abroad. Allied contact with the front behind the enemy lines was already in the air, and Chiang had to show that his forces alone could handle the situation. The luckless general who was cashiered paid for the discrepancy between local facts and the Kuomintang's international propaganda because Chungking publicity organs had already announced on his behalf that, in keeping with the noblest traditions, he would hold his position or perish in its ruins. And when Changteh fell, Chiang had demonstratively ordered a grant of \$200,000 to be made to his widow.

These tactical battles heralded the breakdown of the strategic stalemate on the regular front. It must be noted that the passive attitude of the Kuomintang did not mean that there was no fighting. There was fighting and there were losses. Soldiers and peasants died or were enslaved in temporary "adjustments" without China and the Chinese people as a whole gaining anything by it. The price of immunity from full-scale Japanese attacks, the price of continued support of America and Britain, and the avoidance of popular mobilization which not only could hit Japan harder but make it necessary to consider the interests of the people were nicely balanced. The worst "enemies," in the eyes of China's rulers, were not the Japanese but Chinese patriots who did not approve of such juggling, exposed it politically and tried to upset it militarily by attacking the enemy themselves. The jails and concentration camps were full of such people, and the Kuomintang feared most of all that they would get recognition from the Allies.

The only news agency permitted to report events at first hand was the government's "Central News," which proclaimed every Japanese march and countermarch a "grave menace smashed by a victory."² The advantages gleaned by the enemy in his "book-keeping strategy" were minimized or ignored. The annihilation of unsupplied and unsupported rear guards was known only to those on the spot. Of the cynical abandonment of both soldiers and people by the generals and the politicians, nothing was said at all.

²Foreign correspondents were never allowed in battle areas till the fighting was over.

5. Kuomintang-Japanese Contacts Grow

In 1943 the plague of truces and contacts with the enemy which had sprung up on almost all sectors of the regular front ceased to be a local phenomenon. While the headlines spoke of war, these tendencies extended to Kuomintang policy at the Centre.

Tokyo radio broadcasts ceased to attack Chiang Kai-shek and promised Chungking immunity if it "drove out the American aggressors." Behind the propaganda barrage other events took place which were much more concrete and important. The Japanese preparations for defeat and the Kuomintang preparations for a "bloodless" victory for its dictatorship began to coincide. The Kuomintang wanted tranquillity on the regular front so that it could hoard its military forces for the civil war "reconquest" of the Communist-led Liberated Areas at a convenient time. The Japanese wanted the same tranquillity so that they would not be distracted from their war against British and American forces on other fronts. Secret offers came from Tokyo, whose existence Kuomintang officials admitted privately but never publicized. While the details of what actually went on at this time are still shrouded in mystery, events that were open and could be seen by everyone suggested very strongly that Tokyo and Chungking had begun to do business directly.

The Eleventh Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang brought victory to the party's reactionary anti-United Nations "C.C. clique," one of whose chief members, Chou Fu-hai, had gone over to the Japanese to become an important member of the puppet government. Soon afterwards Wu Kai-hsien, a C.C. leader who had headed the Kuomintang headquarters at Shanghai, appeared suddenly in Chungking with a story that the Japanese had arrested him, handed him over to the Nanking puppet authorities, and then released him and allowed him to go back to Free China. Instead of being detained and investigated as a possible fifth columnist, Wu was met at the airfield by high-ranking government functionaries and taken to see the chiefs of the party and government. Circulating freely in Chungking he made no bones about the fact that before returning he had had long conversations with the arch-traitor Wang Ching-wei. He said candidly that he did not consider Wang Ching-wei a traitor at all, and that if the truth were told it would be discovered that most of the puppets-whom the entire Chinese people had come to execrate were in fact high-minded patriots.

Chang Tao-fan and Liang Han-chao, two successive Ministers of Information who were also appointed by the C.C., declined at press-conferences to make any comment on Wu's activities. They evaded questions as to whether puppet officials would be tried after the war.

Denunciations of traitors disappeared from the Chinese press, and the Catholic-owned *Yi Shih Pao* daily wrote boldly that Wang Ching-wei himself should be forgiven "if he repented." This proposal brought such a storm of protest that the paper was temporarily suspended. But the general trend continued.

I myself had a very striking experience of the indulgence with which enemy agents were viewed. After Hong Kong fell to the Japanese I had been imprisoned in the Stanley Internment Camp, from which I later escaped. In Chungking in 1943 a friend told me that she had met a young man who knew me and who would like to see me again. He turned out to be one of the quisling overseers of the Japanese prisoner stockade. I asked him how he had got to Chungking and whether he was not afraid of exposure. He said he "just came," no one had asked him any questions, and that he felt no apprehension. His purpose in wanting to meet me was that, as an "old acquaintance," I might want to help him find a job!

I reported the man's presence to Chinese Ministry of Information officials who assured me that they would put the matter in the hands of security organs. But the next time I heard of the fellow he was working at a high salary in a concern engaged in government contracts. I then brought the subject up in an open press conference, at which government spokesmen had just sworn till they were blue in the face that every entrant from Japanese-held zones was thoroughly investigated. The Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs³ was present. He looked grave and asked for details as "little things like this lead to great discoveries." I supplied them, but the young man continued holding his job and, so far as I know, was never even interrogated.

Another strange meeting I had was with Emery An, a former Chinese United Press correspondent who had come out openly as a quisling in Shanghai after Pearl Harbour. In 1944 he turned up as an English language instructor at the Chinese Government Military Academy, in Sian, the great centre of the anti-Communist blockade and of Tai Li's Gestapo.⁴ An was officially detailed to act as interpreter for the foreign correspondents passing through on their way to Yen-an, a clear sign that he was highly trusted by military, political and secret service officials.

6. The Kuomintang's "Trojan Horse"

In his observations of the Manchu conquest of China in 1644, the

³Dr. K. C. Wu, now Mayor of Shanghai.

⁴In a middle school auditorium near Sian at the same time we saw portraits of Hitler, Mussolini and Goering on the wall. Accompanying officers declared that the teachers had "forgotten to take them down" when war was declared three years before.

Catholic priest Martinius mentioned an interesting feature of the arrangement between General Wu San-kwei and the invaders he called in to crush Li Tzu-cheng's peasant revolt. At that time, it seems, the "Tartarian king" was happy to accept Wu's invitation but somewhat embarrassed by the small number of men he had on hand at the moment. So he made the following proposal to the traitor Wu, whose soldiers were to march with his own: "To the end to make our Victory undoubted, I counsell you to cause all your Army to be clad like Tartars, for so the Thief will think us all Tartars, seeing I cannot call greater forces out of my Kingdom so soon as required."⁵

Just three hundred years later, tactics differing very little from these were employed by the Kuomintang Government to safeguard its power over the people. Before there was any great increase of Japanese pressure on the regular front to account for it, whole armies and divisions of troops stationed along it began to go over to the enemy. These defections were not at all accidental. The Kuomintang troops involved in them were, in effect, loaned to the Japanese so that the latter could equip them for use against the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies.

In the eyes of Chinese reaction, this method had a great deal to recommend it. First, its soldiers could carry on a civil war without Chungking's having to feed them or bear internal and international responsibility for their actions. Secondly, the Allies could not ask for these troops to be used against Japan and so wasted for postwar purposes, since China seemed no longer to control them. Thirdly, in the event of a Japanese defeat they would immediately "repent" and revert to the Central command, along with any territory they might have cleared of guerilla activities.⁵

The fact that the surrenders made it possible for the Japanese to throw men against the Allies on other fronts did not constitute a drawback. One of the chief assets of certain Chungking factions was the cry that America and Britain did not aid China sufficiently on her own soil. They saw the new "Trojan horse" technique as merely passing the buck to the West elsewhere. Meanwhile, the less Japanese troops there were in the country, and the greater the task of garrisoning that fell to their puppets, the less was the likelihood of a last-minute offensive by Japan against Chiang Kai-shek's regular front.

In earlier stages of the war, the main "political defections" of this kind had been confined to Kuomintang forces stranded behind the enemy lines, such as Shih Yu-san's Hopei forces and Tai Li's "Loyal and Victorious Army" in the lower Yangtze. Previous waves of surrenders on

⁵This subsequently occurred.

the main front had also been local in nature and involved smaller numbers. One had come at the beginning of the war, when the Japanese advance was like a steam-roller, and another when Axis fortunes as a whole were at their highest, following the fall of France. This new phase was different. High officers went over with intact units "on the eve of victory." The number of Kuomintang commanders above the rank of major general who put their troops under Japanese command was twelve in 1941, fifteen in 1942 and forty-two in the peak year, 1943. By early 1944 more than 60 per cent of the puppet armies, then numbering about 425,000, was composed of former Kuomintang elements. And over nine tenths of the entire puppet army was being used by the Japanese against the Liberated Areas.

With regard to all these commanders, the official spokesmen in Chungking maintained an attitude that was more than tolerant. When foreign correspondents asked about General Pang Ping-hsun, a nationally known figure, they reacted as though their own honour were being called into question. Far from being a traitor, they declared, General Pang was in reality a great national martyr and hero. He had fallen into the hands of the enemy wounded and unconscious, only after his whole force had been destroyed because wicked Communists near by had attacked them from the rear instead of supporting their operations. No one but heartless mischief-makers could cast slurs upon this venerable and doughty warrior and cheapen the most epic and tragic chapter of the war. The National Military Council and War Minister Ho Ying-chin then repeated the story and sanctified it with the seal of supreme military approval.

Not long afterwards these dramatic utterances received an answer from the "martyred" General Pang himself. While the Chungking spokesmen had been busy clearing his name, the old man had been attending a conference in Peiping under the chairmanship of General Okamura, the Japanese Commander in Chief in North China. The conference concerned a new campaign against the Eighth Route Army. The official communique on it was issued by *Domei* and was accompanied by a special declaration in which the maligned patriot assumed his new puppet command and let it be known that the only road to "peace in East Asia" lay through the "elimination of Communism and Anglo-American imperialism from China." As in other similar cases, the enemy had made this new recruit to his cause issue a statement bolstering the main Japanese propaganda theses. Yet even after this the Chungking spokesmen stuck to their original tale and angrily asked the foreign correspondents whether they chose to believe "us or the Japs."

More than a year after the press conference disputes over General Pang, Harrison Forman of the *New York Herald Tribune*, Maurice

Votaw of the *Baltimore Sun* and I were travelling with the Eighth Route Army in Northwest Shansi. On one of our stops we happened to see a group of smart-looking troops well equipped with Czechoslovak rifles (the famous Skoda "Zbrojovka" model sold to China under the brand "Chung Cheng," the personal name of Chiang Kai-shek in 1938) and Stokes mortars from Central Government arsenals. Intrigued, we engaged them in conversation. They told us that they had once belonged to Pang Ping-hsun and had learned of their changed status not from any fierce battle but from orders, issued by the General himself, altering their insignia. Indeed they had not been clear about the whole business until Japanese officers suddenly came to inspect them, to their great mortification and amazement. Shortly afterwards they had been moved against the Communist-led troops, who shouted across the lines that "Chinese must not fight Chinese!" This seemed like such good sense that they no longer waited for anybody's orders but went over to the other side themselves. Many of their immediate officers had come with them, including the commander of the battalion we encountered.

One mortar-crew sergeant put it very simply. "For years," he said, "we had been told that our mission was to drive out the Japanese devils, and for this we had borne all hardships gladly. We had fought the Communists too, because the government said they were opposing the Generalissimo and sabotaging the war. Then one day we woke up to find the devils telling us what to do. When they ordered us to attack the Communists we felt sure that we had been fooled and decided that our place was with our own people, Red or otherwise. That wasn't so long ago but we have certainly learned a great deal since. Now we are really fighting the Japanese and we know why and for what."

An Eighth Route Army man who saw us examining their arms came up at the end of the conversation. "These are the first guns we have had from the Central Government in five years," he laughed, "but they have come by a roundabout way."

All in all, the pattern of what happened in China at the time is not unfamiliar. The Yugoslav Government directed General Mihailovich in much the same way. It was unfortunate for the Kuomintang and the Japanese, as for their European counterparts, that such combinations work only for the highest ranks. Ordinary soldiers who think that they are fighting for their homes, and must do the dying in both international or civil war, are apt to develop their own views in such situations. In China, the exhaustive answer to the problem was given not by the doings of General Pang Ping-hsun but by the mortar-crew sergeant we talked to and thousands like him. Their aims were simple, to fight a real enemy or not to fight at all.

These lessons hold especially true in civil wars, in which two sides compete for the soldier's allegiance, and he has to think and choose the one closest to his interests. Where ballots do not exist, changes of military allegiance are a kind of voting. That is something to remember in connection with all Chinese internal warfare.

7. On the Brink of Civil War

Although China had two fronts against Japan and the two fronts were at odds, their bad relations did not make them any less interdependent. The Japanese concentration on the regular front during 1937-1938, and the good fight put up by the Kuomintang troops at that time, had facilitated the task of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies in penetrating the lightly garrisoned enemy rear. The efforts the Japanese were subsequently forced to make in the Liberated Areas gave the regular front, which they now regarded as a lesser menace, its long period of quiet. While the difficulties Japan found in "liquidating the China Incident" stemmed from the increasing resistance behind her own lines, the ease with which she kept the whole situation under control, even though she could not put China out of the war, resulted from the failure of the two resistance fronts to co-ordinate their activities. So long as inner friction continued, the Japanese Army could strike at them one at a time.

Chungking did not subordinate its actions to this truth. Every time Japanese pressure upon it relaxed, which meant that the enemy was busying himself with "mopping up" in his own rear, the reactionaries who controlled the government returned to their anti-Communism like a dog to its vomit. Surviving their own weakened position, they did not try to strengthen their economy and troops against the Japanese but invariably worried over the increasing power of the New Democratic bases. This led to a situation in which Kuomintang and enemy attacks on the Liberated Areas coincided not only in intention but in time.

The Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies, on the other hand, saw the picture in its entirety. Although they did not harbour the illusion that a stronger Kuomintang would be more friendly to them, they never ceased to reproach the government for neglecting its own armies as well as for failing to help and co-operate with non-Kuomintang, anti-Japanese forces. In a declaration on the new outlook after Pearl Harbour they had pointed out that Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union were at last all united against the Nazis and held this up as an example for all China to follow. To facilitate a reconsideration the Communists re-entered the People's Political Council, which they

had boycotted since the New Fourth Army affair. Simultaneously they shelved their political demands on Chiang Kai-shek, which had included the punishment of those responsible for the incident, compensation to the sufferers and a wide range of democratic reforms.

A year later a dramatic appeal by Chou En-lai, Yen-an's delegate to the capital, high-lighted both the unimproved contemporary situation and the tangled and recent roots of the Chinese revolution. The appeal was in the form of an article written in the Communist newspaper in Chungking⁶ after he had received news of the death in battle of Tso Chuan, Assistant Chief of Staff of the Eighth Route Army. Chou recalled that the dead officer, like so many commanders of both Kuomintang and Communist forces, had graduated from the Whampoa Military Academy in Canton, where all studied together in the days of the first united front in 1924-1927. He listed the names of members of Tso's class who had been killed in the joint Northern Expedition against the feudal militarists and imperialist control, of others who had been sacrificed in the civil war, and of those who had died fighting Japan.

"There are some," he wrote, "referring to current Kuomintang propaganda, "who spread the fairy tale that the troops behind the enemy lines stand with folded arms and do not fight. Let every honest patriot think. How could they remain there without fighting, for a day or a month, much less these many years?"

"Others hold," he continued, "that the enemy might fight against some Chinese troops and leave others alone. This is dangerous thinking. It is true that Japan tries to disunite us and stir mutual strife. But the enemy is the enemy and Chinese are Chinese. No matter what party we belong to, his attitude towards us is that we must either surrender to him or be crushed. Don't make any mistake about this. The enemy himself has no choice. None of us can avoid his blows, and only those who have lost their conscience will try to deflect them to others."

But Chungking had already set its course. Chiang Kai-shek's *China's Destiny*, with its Nazi-like emphasis on racial wisdom, denounced the corrupting influence of "foreign" ideologies like "Anglo-American liberalism and Russian communism," but did not attack fascism. An article listing Hitler as one of the great figures of history unaccountably appeared in the official *Central Weekly*. A government expert announced that Chinese trade-unions should not model themselves on British, American or Soviet ones, because "the method of labour control adopted by Italy and Germany suits us best." The ruling groups of the Kuomintang unerringly picked from the rag bag of ideologies the one best adapted to the resumption of civil war.

⁶ *Sinhua Rhbao* (New China Daily); Chungking.

And civil war moves were not long deferred. In July 1943, the fascist-minded General Hu Chung-nan withdrew three armies from the Yellow River defenses, where they had faced the Japanese, and sent them to reinforce the anti-Communist blockade. Eighth Route Army garrisons promptly dug in for defense. A blow at Yen-an itself seemed imminent. It did not appear as though either the opposition of domestic opinion or the alarm of the Western allies could head off an explosion.

What averted the attack was the failure of a secret military conference held in Chungking to lay down the order of battle. At it, Generalissimo Chiang asked Hu Chung-nan how soon he thought he could wipe out the Eighth Route Army. Hu first said three months, but when pressed admitted that he could not guarantee any time limit. General Teng Pao-shan, whose post was directly north of the Border Region at Yulin, spoke frankly against civil war because he had seen the Eighth Route Army and did not share Hu's low opinion of its strength. Moreover, Teng was dependent on the region for communications and food. The Communists had won his friendship by letting his supplies cross their territory unhindered even when they themselves were in need and by treating his sick in their International Peace Hospital. So long as he was still allowed a voice, Teng said, he would oppose hostilities against them.

General Fu Tso-yi, commanding Kuomintang forces in West Suiyuan, also hedged. He said he could not handle the Eighth Route unless Chungking helped him to build up a munition reserve and guaranteed reinforcements in case of need. Behind his objections lay the fear that if the first "exploratory" operations did not succeed, he would be left holding the bag. Like Teng, Fu faced the danger of having nowhere to withdraw to, since the Liberated Areas were on one of his flanks and the Japanese on the other.

The greatest surprise to Chiang Kai-shek, however, was the opposition of the provincial militarists of Yunnan and Szechuan. These men had sent troops to the anti-Japanese fronts and lost many divisions, both by enemy action and through discriminatory treatment and non-support in desperate situations. They were beginning to feel that Chiang considered their forces as expendable and did not want to bear the brunt of his civil war. While they feared the social doctrines of Communists, their own provinces were very far from where these doctrines operated. On the other hand, the Communist formula of autonomy in local affairs for all parts of China seemed like a safeguard against new Central raids on their revenues and resources.

While its promoters pursued "unification," the very effort to knock together a civil war front developed new cleavages in Chinese unity.

The country had just experienced two great famines, local defeats which demonstrated the bankruptcy of regular front strategy, flirtations with the enemy and mass desertions of government troops. That the government should occupy itself with military plans against other Chinese at such a time raised widespread doubts of its patriotism. Alienation of public opinion was accompanied by alienation of local officials, who felt that if the centre was wavering it was time for them to look out for themselves.

8. Japan's Hits at the Kuomintang

At the height of this situation the Japanese strategy in China changed radically. The Americans were approaching the Philippines. The U. S. Fourteenth Air Force was pounding Japan's sea communications. Facing encirclement, the enemy was bound to try a breakthrough at the weakest link, and the weakest link was the Chinese regular front.

Slow disintegration and neutralization of the Chinese rear was no longer enough now because that previously innocuous area was a growing Allied base. Alongside of the tactical Fourteenth Air Force, fields were being built for the strategic Twentieth, whose B-29's were charged with hammering Japan herself. No halfway methods such as local truces could deal with the emergency.

Less than a year after the 1943 civil war attempt, Chou En-lai's prediction was fulfilled. He had said that Japan's current actions might take one form or another, but that ultimately every Chinese group would have to choose between full submission and extinction. Events now proved him right and the long-somnolent regular front was put to the test.

With the Honan campaign in early 1944 the long stalemate came to an end, and Japan resumed her strategic advance. In Honan, as we already know, a whole province was lost when Tang En-po's armies fell apart at the first impact and were finished off by the people.⁷

Next came the turn of Central China. Having launched a serious effort, the enemy had no difficulty at all in taking Changsha, of whose defense the Kuomintang had so often boasted.⁸ He moved from that city down to Hengyang, meeting columns which had come north from Kwangtung. This gave him possession of the entire Canton-Hankow railway and cut China in two.

⁷ See p. 190.

⁸ The history of the four Changsha campaigns which took place between 1939 and 1944, when the city finally fell, provides a good study in the slow degeneration of the fighting capacity of the regular front and of the increasing untruthfulness of the high-command communiques, which as time went

Then South China. The enemy first sealed off the few coastal points that remained in Chungking hands and might be used for American landings. Afterwards, disembarking troops in Kwangchowan, he swung up through Kwangsi to Kweilin, eliminating the U.S. airfields closest to the sea. The great forward base at Kweilin was blown up by the Americans themselves before the enemy came in. Subsidiary fields at Hengyang, Liuchow, Lingling, Shaokwan, Kanhsien and a number of other towns were also lost. Precious equipment that had been flown over the hazardous "hump" at the cost of months of effort and hundreds of lives was abandoned. Land based Allied air power was pushed with the Chinese Army to the westernmost parts of the country. By the fall of 1944 no Allied landing on the coast could any longer count on its help and it was only the capture of Saipan and the Philippines that kept the U.S. air umbrella over the China Sea at all. Apart from its military importance, Kweilin had been one of unoccupied China's few industrial cities. Now all its factories were gone. Before the new Japanese attack China had still operated about a thousand miles of railway in free territory. By early 1945 less than a hundred were left to her, and practically all her rolling stock and locomotives had gone to swell Japan's reserves. Her richest rice lands, previously subject to sporadic Japanese raids, were now taken over completely.

Everywhere the Chinese armies reeled back, often without resistance. Every weakness that had developed on the regular front during the stalemate and been carefully obscured by official propaganda was now exposed. Divisions that had been reported as full strength proved to be hollow shells. Men who had been counted as "soldiers" appeared on the battle lines as hungry wrecks who could not shoulder a gun even when they had one.

Confusion gripped the Chungking Military Council. As the fronts fell apart, a few divisional commanders who had given up their posts were shot, but commanders with wider responsibility were not replaced. Chiang Kai-shek had "built" his army from the top down, giving troops

on had more and more facts to conceal. The distortions of the truth began with incompetent local commanders. They grew at each level at which anyone had an interest in presenting himself as a hero and received their finishing touches at the top.

In two of the campaigns the enemy actually entered the city and then withdrew, but Chungking, in its effort to supply "victories" to the world, did not have the courage to admit the fact until it was exposed by independent observers. Ultimately, this damaged China's international credit and, as all lying propaganda does, raised such a dust that her own leaders and people could not see through it to the defects of the situation and the drastic remedies that were required. No free press or system of war correspondents existed to pierce the seven veils.

to men who would pay him back in the coin of political loyalty. He did not dare make drastic shifts, because they would upset the carefully constructed politico-military structure that had kept him in power for so long. And indeed, although he had had years in which to utilize the anti-Japanese enthusiasm of the healthier elements, it was now too late. If he ditched his office-seeking friends now, they might go over, without authorization, to the enemy.

So the only "reform" Chiang undertook was to pyramid the commands, sending new "strategists" from the capital to superimpose themselves on the existing organisation of the fronts for the duration of the fighting. Many of these men had good military reputations but had been kept in desk jobs throughout the war because they did not belong to the right cliques. In appointing them to take charge of the cracking lines at the last moment, Chiang hoped only to forestall criticism and involve these rivals in responsibility for the failure.

The new commanders arrived at their headquarters with a few subordinates they trusted, but with no assurance of support from above or co-operation from below. Pai Chung-hsi, the famous Kwangsi Moslem general, was dispatched to guard his home province, surveyed the situation, and asked Chungking for ten divisions of reinforcements. Chungking told him he could have two. Shortly afterwards his sector collapsed.

General Chang Fa-kwei, one of the heroes of the 1924-1927 Northern Expedition, was sent to plug the hole at Liuchow. He got plenty of support from the Fourteenth Air Force, which was fighting for its own *pied-a-terre*, but the troops he had to work with had been reduced to uselessness. One day he stormed into his headquarters and told U.S. liaison officers: "We have complained for a long time that our weakness is due to insufficient Allied help. Today, for the first time since the war, we have air superiority. But we are in such a state that we can't use it. This is our fault. Instead of trying to pass it to others, we should be ashamed."

Still another old Northern Expedition commander, Marshal Li Chai-sum,⁹ decided to set up a guerilla base behind the Japanese lines after Kweilin-fell. He enlisted some progressive intellectuals to rouse the people. The movement was treated as illegal and Chungking even spread rumours that Marshal Li had gone over to the enemy. This was a plain lie, broadcast to discredit both him and his example.

Once again, as when the war started, millions were on the move

⁹ "Marshal" is a courtesy title. It does not exist in the present Chinese Army, but the few leaders who had borne it previously continued to be popularly known by it, as, for instance, the Manchurian "Young Marshal" Chang Hseuh-liang, the "Christian General" Marshal Feng and others.

and refugees clogged every road. But in 1937-1938 there had been unity and determination, to see the business through, no matter what it cost. Chinese leaders had spoken of resistance and matched their actions to their words. Shanghai had stood for three months. The great victory at Taierhchuang had rallied hope after the initial withdrawal. Chiang Kai-shek had spoken of building new forces in the rear, of a constructive stalemate followed by a counteroffensive, and the people had believed him.

Now five years of stalemate had passed and instead of unity there was disunity, instead of strength a terrifying helplessness. Through those five years the people had not been blind to what was happening, but they had held on to Chiang Kai-shek as a national symbol. His advisers might be corrupt and keep things from him, they reasoned, but he himself must be sound. Whatever one might think of his past, he had refused to give in to Japan at the darkest hour. The most striking change in 1944 was that the soldiers and people began to complain openly against Chiang. "How could he not know?" they asked. "Endlessly we were told to support the leader, to trust the leader. What was he doing all this time?"

And every once in a while there was more savagery than disappointment in the voices: "What was the son of a turtle up to, sitting there and preaching, preaching, while this was brewing under his nose?"

As city after city was given up a new rumour cropped up repeatedly. "Chu Teh has come to Chungking to help with strategy," people said. "The Eighth Route Army is being flown down on American planes and the Japanese have been stopped." The story was never printed or put on the radio, but one heard it both in the towns and from illiterate peasants in out-of-the-way places. "We remember the Red Army from long ago," one of them would suddenly reminisce. "Its men were ragged like we are, but they could fight. They took from the rich and gave to the poor. They were a *lao pai hsing* [common folks] army and no one could beat them."

All fantasy, of course. Chu Teh sat in Yen-an, a thousand miles away, directing the campaign in the Liberated Areas. He was not conferring with anyone in Chungking because nobody had asked him. I met him at about this time and asked where he thought such tales came from.

"Came from?" he said, with a smile on his plain, broad face. "They came from the hope of the people."

This was the real answer. China needed unity and a fighting army, more than ever before and more than anything else in the world. Lacking the reality, the fugitives behind the regular front invented a legend. Officials may panic but peoples never quite believe that

anyone can beat them. Defeat first comes to all peoples as an incomprehensible surprise. But hope of victory must have a foundation. Where could the people turn for one but to the Liberated Areas? Although everybody at that time and place was hazy about the Eighth Route Army, the name of which could not even be printed, they also knew that it existed and was still fighting.

9. Liberated Areas' Counteroffensive

Anyone who imagines that the Communist-led Liberated Areas rejoiced at the discomfiture of the government armies is wrong. I was in Kuomintang China for part of the great Japanese counteroffensive, and in Yen-an and the Shansi-Suiyuan region the rest of the time. The reaction there was a mixed one of anger and distress.

While the people behind the regular front dreamed of succour, the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies bombarded Chungking with new demands that they be allowed to help. The Eighth Route Army offered to send its own units to the Honan battle line and the New Fourth Army asked to go to Hunan. While it was hard for them to withdraw great numbers of men from their own areas, they felt that even a few brigades would make a big difference. Their men were physically fit and well trained and knew how to mobilize popular resistance. Experience had shown that they were capable of expanding their strength while fighting.

On Hunan especially many of the old Red Army veterans had deep personal feelings. Mao Tse-tung and many other Communist leaders were natives of this province. Not a few of the commanders and soldiers had left families in its villages and towns. In the middle of 1944, radio accounts of the fighting there were more avidly discussed in Yen-an than events in areas for which it was itself responsible. When I talked to Ho Lung, legendary chief of the Eighth Route Army's 120th Division, about the Hunan defeats, he roared like a caged tiger. "I fought all through that country in the civil war," he said. "Above Changsha, on the lakes, one of my regiments tied up a whole Kuomintang Army for years. Now the Kuomintang there has superiority in numbers, better arms than we could ever hope for, and Allied planes. And yet they are letting the Japs in. The bastards. The bastards."

On another and more organized level Yen-an's response to the great emergency was codified in the slogans promulgated on the seventh anniversary of China's war, on July 7, 1944. These were read in every village and painted on every wall in the Liberated Areas. Here are some of them:

Let us greet the people of the entire country; the troops on

the regular fronts; and the antifascist allies—the United States, the Soviet Union and Britain.

The Southwest and Northwest of the country are in danger. Countrymen! Rise to defend them. Do not let the enemy seize the Canton-Hankow and Hunan-Kwangsi railways!

Demand that the National Government in Chungking improve the treatment and education of all soldiers, raise their discipline and fighting qualities, and repel the enemy!

Demand that the National Government protect the rising people's movement in its own rear, which will give added strength to the war!

Demand that the National Government lower the blockade; give pay, equipment and supplies to the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies on a level with others; and send them to Honan and Hunan to smash the enemy encirclement!

Demand that the National Government free the prisoners of the New Fourth Army and all other patriots in its jails; that it realize Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles with freedom of speech, assembly, publication and association for the people; that it legalize all anti-Japanese parties and groups and strengthen their unity.

Demand that the National Government do away with speculation, restrictive monopolies, profiteering and hoarding; that it develop agriculture and encourage private initiative in industry and useful commerce; that it take steps to overcome the economic crisis and lay a healthy foundation for the war economy of the whole country.

Armies and people of the Liberated Areas! Strike the enemy more effectively in co-ordination with the regular front! Increase guerilla activity! Strengthen democracy and co-operative production! Prepare for a vanguard role in the counteroffensive!

People of the occupied areas! Your liberation is near! Continue its struggle in all its forms. Prepare for risings to assist the anti-Japanese counterattack.

Let all the people give aid to Allied troops fighting in China. Protect Allied fliers. Support the decisions of the Allies at Moscow, Cairo and Teheran for the overthrow of fascism and Japanese imperialism. Let the whole country prepare for the counteroffensive and for the founding of an independent, free and united new China in a world of democracy and peace.

These were not just phrases. Apart from sending concrete proposals of co-operation to Chungking, and even getting in touch with the blockading forces for joint action to defend the anti-Communist bastion of Sian if the enemy attacked it, the military authorities and elected

local governments discussed in great detail just how they would supply what might be demanded of them.

The feeling of the people of Yen-an themselves was well expressed by Kao Sung-shan, a popularly elected delegate whom I heard speaking at this time in the Border Region Council. Turning to Chiang Kai-shek's picture on the wall, Kao said in a burst of rough eloquence: "I have something to say to you, Generalissimo. Once you declared that while any Chinese remains enslaved you yourself will feel as though you are in prison. We in the Border Region have the same feeling. We don't say much, but we have worked at it. What we have done here is an honour to you. If all China produced the same results, your glory would be greater. There are millions and millions of people here and elsewhere who want to help you be the great leader of a strong democratic China, one of the Big Four in fact, not just by courtesy.

"Is this a crime, Mr. Chiang? How can China advance except by giving rights to the people and encouraging them to work so we can catch up with other lands? Do you prefer loafers and parasites for your followers, with a lot of slaves under them and nothing getting better anywhere? That's the way to lose the country. We want to help you and ourselves. Why do you fight us when you ought to thank us?"

While nothing came of the proposals for interfront co-operation, the Liberated Areas passed to the offensive.

The new drive of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies was the first co-ordinated attack by all bases behind the enemy lines since the Hundred Regiments Offensive in 1940. Taking both fronts together, it was the biggest Chinese offensive since the battle of Tai erh-chuang in 1938. In form, however, it still consisted of separate guerilla actions. Because of weakness in armament the forces of the Liberated Areas were still compelled to avoid the big cities and major Japanese centres.

One aim of the drive was to engage the enemy in as many places as possible and so help the regular front. A second was to destroy the net of blockhouses with which he had enmeshed North and Central China, driving the Japanese from as many as possible and breaking the will to fight of their puppet auxiliaries. A third was to extend the Liberated Areas along the coast, so as to afford facilities for Allied landings in place of those surrendered by the Kuomintang. The reason why such landings were considered desirable politically as well as militarily has already been explained.

Simultaneously with the widespread attacks, all the bases were put in a state of mobilization in anticipation of the much greater battles that were certain to come with the general Allied counteroffensive. Even

before that time, another trial might be faced. If the Japanese succeeded in knocking the Kuomintang out of the war, the New Democracy would become the sole fighting centre remaining in all China. Not only would the self-denying ordinance that had kept it from trying to expand into Kuomintang areas lapse, but inability to operate in all parts of the country would be the equivalent of suicide.

Throughout 1944 both armies were steadily expanded by enlistments from the ranks of the "elite" militia, which, owing to the good groundwork previously laid, now constituted an extremely substantial trained reserve. In March of that year, the regular forces of the Liberated Areas totalled 470,000. By late summer they stood at 600,000, and by late fall at 800,000.

But the situation with regard to knowledge of these facts was probably the most fantastic ever seen anywhere. The Japanese knew them well enough. The military reviewer of the great Tokyo daily *Asahi Shimbun* wrote just before the Honan-Hunan battles that "our major enemy is now the Communist forces. Seventy per cent of our engagements in North China are fought against them. The Chungking Army has lost the will to combat. The main task of our North China garrisons is to deal with the Communists who instigate national consciousness and seek decisive battles." At the same time, China's own government at Chungking continued to deny the very existence of the Liberated Areas. Its censorship kept the story of the struggle behind the enemy lines both from its own people and from the public of the Allied world.

XV. HOW STILWELL FOUGHT AND LOST

1. The Allied Military Problem •

SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THESE DEVELOPMENTS ON BOTH FRONTS, THE dilemma of the American forces in the China Theatre (then the China section of the China-Burma-India Theatre) became acute.

Strategically, all Allied operations boiled down to a converging encirclement of the inner fortress in which the Tokyo militarists might be expected to make their final stand. The inner fortress consisted of the home islands, Korea, Manchuria and China north of the Yellow River.

The watery wastes that constituted the eastern approaches to the fortress were being bridged as a result of three years of building Allied amphibious strength and brilliant new departures in supply techniques, strategic planning and tactical art. The theoretically "impossible" obstacle of lack of established bases near the scene of action had been overcome by fleets that carried their bases with them. On the Pacific side, the United Nations were almost within striking distance of Japan.

But the land approaches, on which General Stilwell had to create conditions for attack, were in a different situation. The advantage this gave the enemy over U.S. air operations has been described. In addition, the success of Japan's 1944 advances made it possible for her to establish north-south land connections from Manchuria to the Indo-Chinese and Malay peninsulas. With the building of a few railway links she could save coastwise shipping and assign the naval units previously used to convoy it to other tasks.

While none of these achievements could save Japan from ultimate defeat, they gave her military flexibility, provided her with timely victories to stimulate her home front and encouraged her rulers to hang on. The Tokyo Cabinet hoped that once the German war ended, the United Nations would be preoccupied with internal reconstruction and differences among themselves. It judged that Chinese disunity could not fail to stimulate such conflicts, affording Japan a chance to survive as a military power, albeit a curtailed one.

Looking back today we may forget that a basis for these hopes really existed. Suppose Nimitz had lost part of his fleet in the Philippines. Suppose Japan had obtained the surrender of the Chinese Government or driven it into exile. Suppose there had been no atomic bomb and it had been necessary to conquer Japan herself mile by mile. Even the Philippines and Burma took a year each to clear. Suppose the entry of the Soviet Union had not destroyed the strength and hopes of Japan's greatest aggregation of land power, the Kwantung Army in Manchuria, and it had fought on regardless of the fortunes of the battle elsewhere, with much of China already conquered and the rest on the point of, or actually torn by, civil war. All these possibilities were a nightmare to Allied planners, who estimated that even with favourable conditions it would take eighteen months after victory over Hitler to finish the Japanese.

Stilwell was thrown on the defensive soon after he came to China, but defence was not his job. His function was to attack Japan's fortress from the west and south when the final squeeze came. It was for this that he had spent precious months trying to reopen the Burma Road and build alternative routes through some of the most difficult country in the world. But suppose the road was open and all the American troops it would carry moved into China over it. What then? The Chinese hinterland offered heart-breaking obstacles even in places where there were no Japanese to deal with. It could not be crossed, like the Pacific, in ships. If American forces wanted to bring in the heavy equipment that made them superior to the Japanese, they would have to build roads for it as they advanced, and carry their own gas, and hospitals, and food. And airfields were not aircraft carriers. They would need permanent defences, much stronger than those that had already failed. If American soldiers were to guard them, how many would be left over for a striking force, given the very thin line of supplies? There were no alternatives to building up China herself.

China's strength was divided into two. The decrepit Kuomintang armies controlled the periphery of Japan's fortress. If they were to be the main force storming it from the outside, as they would have to be, it was necessary to fit them for the task. The Liberated Areas were inside the fortress, gnawing at its defences. If they were really to damage it, they needed more arms. The Nimitz-MacArthur amphibious techniques were the "secret weapon," and the only weapon to crack Japan's sea defences. Equally, the unity of the Chinese people, if it could be achieved, was the only weapon with which the United Nations could crack her land walls. It was in recognition of this fact that President Roosevelt not only put Stilwell in charge of U.S. forces in the C-B-I Theatre but also arranged for him to become Chief of Staff to

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in the latter's capacity as Allied Commander in Chief in China.

The appointment was a good one. Stilwell was a G. I. general, a man who was not afraid of rough conditions and had no superiority complex, the "white man's burden" or any other kind. Those who knew him called him affectionately "the poor man's MacArthur." He had a fighting heart. Some have charged that he was a little behind these super-streamlined times militarily. But this is belied by the fact that he had gained his rapid promotions by strikingly modern and inventive leadership of the Seventh Division and Third Army Corps, whose showing in prewar manoeuvres laid the pattern for the most strikingly successful battle techniques of the U.S. Army.

In any case, what Stilwell had to fight in China was an old-fashioned war. And any failings he may have had were compensated for by one great asset—he liked and believed in the Chinese people. He knew the language and history¹ of the country and had seen much of it at first hand in his long previous service as a military attache there. In this capacity he had moved with the Chinese Army in its first anti-Japanese campaigns. Following the Chinese Army is something one does on foot, which is one reason why so many foreign military observers in those days preferred to invite us foreign correspondents in for drinks and compose their reports from our remarks. Not so Stilwell. His short, springy figure, wiry gray hair and steel-rimmed glasses were familiar to Chinese in out-of-the-way places long before Americans became acquainted with them. On his long tramps Stilwell developed deep respect for the fighting qualities and endurance of the Chinese soldier. He also came to understand the harsh treatment and bad leadership which so often led those qualities to be wasted.

2. Obstacles — Chinese and American

The China to which General Stilwell returned to fight was different from the China seen as an observer in her most glorious hour. Her latent strength was again out of sight and all her weaknesses to the fore.

Although some success was achieved in training Chinese units

¹The General was, among other things, a sympathetic student of the antifeudal democratic revolution, and his rough, soldierly exterior concealed a disapproving historical knowledge of the way that revolution had been repeatedly subverted by foreign intervention. One of his chief fields of interest was the Taiping Uprising, and he owned and often read a copy of a rare and comprehensive description of its course by an English participant, Augustus Lindley.

in India, where they were isolated from the demoralization that had set in at home, prospects for military reform within the country were bad. American officers sent to staff training centres in Kunming and Kweilin found it very difficult to teach the Chinese commanders who came to them. Students of higher rank were much more interested in developing "international friendship" by giving feasts for their instructors than in learning anything. Small unit commanders were willing to do book work, but not to handle heavy arms themselves, as "this was a job for coolies." They were unimpressed with the idea that an officer who did not know his weapons at first hand could not instruct others, because they had always taught by ordering, not showing how.

With rank-and-file troops the situation was even worse. First of all, they were hungry, weak and diseased. Their feeding, a responsibility of the Chinese Government, was so inadequate and corruptly administered that without drastic improvement neither training nor arms would be any use. The U. S. Army itself had to issue subsidies and rations to Chinese divisions whose battle worthiness was of immediate importance, even in areas like Yunnan where there was plenty of local food available.

To improve the troop health, American medical supplies and teams were assigned to Chinese units. But even in this field, the disintegration of the regular front was clearly mirrored. Officers were found disposing of medicine on the black market. One bunch substituted chalk tablets for quinine, which it sold, at a time when malaria on the Salween front was knocking out ten times as many men as died from Japanese bullets. The soldier patients themselves frequently sold the pills with which they were dosed, though they did it from poverty, not greed. Finally, the American medical contingents were compelled to supervise supplies as well as do clinical work, and even to insist that prescriptions be taken in their presence.

When the condition and training of the troops that passed through the centres was ameliorated, further troubles came up. Various generals wanted to hoard Lend-Lease arms for their own future glory, and the Kuomintang as a whole wanted to hoard them for civil war. As with arms, so with men. When a unit became really good, the tendency of the Chinese command was to consider it too valuable to throw away against the Japanese when there was so much provincial "rag, tag and bobtail" to be got rid of.

Besides Chinese obstructionism, Stilwell had to fight American opposition to his plans. Much of this came from the Fourteenth Air Force, under General Chennault, which far outnumbered Stilwell's ground troops. Although subordinate to Stilwell, it had a semi-

autonomous status, and considered that every ounce of hump-flown cargo space should be devoted to supplies for its operations.

Chennault was possibly the most brilliant air tactician developed in World War II, but he was no strategic or political thinker. Early successes in the air blinded him to the possibility, which afterwards materialized, that they could not continue without ground consolidation. Close friendship with the Chungking Government, his old employer, led him to endorse its passive ground strategy and plans guided solely by its desire to maintain power. In Chennault's entourage General Stilwell was assailed constantly and intemperately. One could hear such gibes as "Uncle Joe is the only four-star regimental commander in the U. S. Army." More serious than this, Chennault's headquarters staff attracted many individuals who, long before World War II was won, were thinking in terms of support for the Kuomintang, whatever the current military cost, as a preparation for World War III against Russia. One of the most rabid and dangerous of these was Captain Joseph W. Alsop, who now exerts such a great influence on U.S. public opinion as a top political writer for the *N. Y. Herald Tribune*, with a fine pipe line to the State Department.

Chennault himself was far from anti-Chinese. But many of his men developed a demoralizing cynicism toward China and everything connected with it. They were embittered by feudal profiteering in air-field construction, and by life-endangering rackets like the watering of gasoline and theft of plane parts. Out of the cynicism grew corruption. Services of Supply and Fourteenth Air Force fliers worked with Chinese swindlers to move currency and smuggled goods from India, making tidy fortunes. Chennault appears to have shut his eyes to much of this. He was fiercely loyal to his men and pardoned a buccaneer if he was also a good fighter. Stilwell battled against both the strategic ideas of the Fourteenth Air Force and the malpractices that grew within it. The friction between the two commands turned into hate.

But the airmen were not the only ones to be affected by the Chinese scene as they found it. A deep pessimism developed in Stilwell's own training outfits. The firm faith of the General and some of his immediate collaborators that it was both possible and necessary to tap China's latent strength seemed mad to these disheartened young men, who only saw her current weaknesses. Honest and technically competent, they existed in a vacuum so far as an understanding of the country, people and history was concerned. Army orientation courses were as miserably inadequate as on other fronts. But American soldiers elsewhere were busy fighting, and this weakness was not to become apparent till the postwar period. In China, where the problem was to change a bad

politico-military situation into a good one during the war itself, the results told at once.

Stilwell himself was a plain, stubborn man, anxious to win the war quickly. He saw his job as making contact with millions of other plain, stubborn men in China who wanted the same thing. Between the two lay a jungle of obstacles: Chinese ruling class attitudes ranging from corruption to treason, American resistance born of everything from ignorance to sabotage, and, on the Burma flank, the time-honoured British imperial opposition to giving too great a role to "lesser breeds without the law."

The jungle was political, the kind in which many good soldiers have come to grief throughout the centuries and which careful careerists leave strictly alone. But Stilwell tried to hack a way through it, as he hacked a way through the physical jungle of North Burma. Once circumstances favoured him. He had supporters as well as opponents. His immediate entourage included several young officers and civilian attaches who knew China as few other Americans have ever known her, and respected her people as highly as Stilwell. The Chungking Embassy at the time had more such men. And in Washington there was Franklin Roosevelt, a President who grew with his responsibilities.

Thus strengthened, Stilwell took bold steps to 'ginger up the Kuo-mintang front. He began from Lend-Lease arms, which he insisted on keeping under his own control for issue to forces which required them against the Japanese, instead of turning them over to Chungking to distribute as it pleased. Then he made his voice heard in the selection of front-line commanders in sectors where Chinese troops fought cheek by jowl with Americans, or where American and Chinese operations were directly complementary. Finally he began to work patiently to make the hoarded divisions along the anti-Communist blockade line available for use against Japan.

3. Stilwell and Sovereignty

Since this involved not only changes in the existing pattern of command but also support of "activist" Chinese officers as against the ruling "passivist" group, Stilwell was soon being accused of intrigue and undermining Chinese sovereignty. This is a serious suspicion and one fully warranted by the long-standing Western policy trends in China. The Chinese people certainly could not be blamed for examin-

²Stilwell backed military figures like General Chen Cheng and Marshal Wei Li-huang against the "sit the war out" clique of War Minister Ho Ying-chin, an old appeaser of Japan and fomenter of civil strife.

ing every new phase of their foreign relationships, even with wartime allies, for signs of any attempt to push them back from positions already gained in their long pull toward full independence.

But Stilwell passed muster with the Chinese people, and it was not they who questioned him. In the course of his tussle with the Kuomintang High Command no criticism of his stand came from the democratic forces which had always been jealous of China's integrity, and had compelled their government to stand up and fight against Japanese enslavement. Instead, he was assailed by the quarters responsible for many of China's past retreats before Western pressure, for the disgraceful prewar appeasement of Japan and for the wartime truces along the regular front.

The hue and cry these elements raised against Stilwell was echoed by the British interests that most feared Chinese nationalism, by proponents of the "American Century" in the United States, and by certain missionaries in China (to their honour very few) who devoted themselves as avidly to apologies for the Kuomintang's every act as Dr. Frank Goodnow had done to the propagation of Yuan Shih-kai's monarchic dreams thirty years before.³ Almost immediately the strange chorus of latter-day defenders of Chinese sovereignty was joined by Tokyo radio commentators, who wore out their vocal chords in daily admonitions to "true Chinese patriots" to stand against the new "Western aggression." The enemy stations appealed to Chiang Kai-shek, whom they had previously proclaimed a traitor to the principle of "Asia for the Asiatics" (meaning for the Japanese). Now he could see, they said, that alliance with the United Nations really meant the humiliation of China. It was true, they admitted regretfully, that he still did not realize who his country's real friends were. Nonetheless, he was to be congratulated for his strong attitude, and he could be sure that anytime he saw the light the doors of Japan's East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere, where everyone was free and equal, would be wide open to welcome him.³

All these amazing circumstances entitle us to inquire into the true status of China's sovereignty at that particular juncture. The main substance of sovereignty is the integrity of a nation's territory. More than half of China Proper, along with the whole of Manchuria and sections of Inner Mongolia, was in Japanese hands. The prime duty of any government is to recover territorial losses and prevent new ones.

³Shortly before this situation developed, the Japanese took Chiang's birthplace, Fenghua, Chekiang province. Instead of gloating over the capture, their commander in chief in Central China paid a ceremonial visit to the Chinese leader's ancestral home and burned incense to the memory of his forbears. Every detail of this fantastic pilgrimage, with appropriate moral homilies, was broadcast to China by Domei, the official Japanese news agency.

Chungking did not meet these elementary tests, but kept its fronts passive, made accommodations with the enemy and failed to strengthen the country's defenses. Many high officials were busy assessing the relative benefits to themselves of token resistance and actual capitulation to Japan. Critics of such tendencies were ruthlessly eliminated from participation in the war effort and positions in which they could influence public opinion.

When things had looked darkest for the anti-Japanese forces in the Pacific, in the months following Pearl Harbour, it was not the Allies who reverted to their long tradition of appeasement of Japan but China's own ruling clique. In a series of famous interviews, some of its members sent up trial balloons, then described as "distress signals," by stating that China might have to stop fighting if aid did not come. The Russians, when hard-pressed in Europe, asked for a second front, not more British and American supplies. The Chinese Government, by contrast, pretended that the tying up of increasing Japanese forces in the Pacific was no help at all. It was mollified only when the United States came through with a \$500,000,000 loan, which blockaded China could not use for war at the moment, and which her highest officials carefully hoarded as future trading credit.

Fearful of being deserted, the Allies went further and made a real contribution to China's freedom by renouncing extraterritorial rights and administrative "concessions" on her soil. But it is a sidelight on the essential continuity of Western attitudes as well as the unchanging characteristics of the Chinese ruling class that this truly important forward step did not flow from a recognition of China's inherent right to equality. That right had been there for a long time. Nor did it seek to recompense the Chinese for taking up arms against Japan to the Allies' benefit as well as their own. If it had, it would have come immediately after Pearl Harbour, when Japan became Britain's and America's enemy.

The renunciation of special privileges in 1942 was made to "keep China in the war." Such a formulation would be absurd if applied to the Chinese people, who had begun to fight Japan alone and would continue to fight her until the invader was driven out or they themselves were crushed. There is no example in all history of an embattled people, once having taken up arms against an aggressor, laying them down because of international changes alone. It applied only to the Chinese Government, which in effect had put itself up for sale to the highest bidder. The step was taken to prevent the Kuomintang from capitulating, to raise its internal prestige and to bribe it with reserves that would help it to reassert control over the whole country once the war was over.

The abolition of extraterritoriality and the concessions was in itself good, an act which was long overdue and restored a great measure of alienated sovereignty to China. But it is also necessary to call things by their right names, especially now that American aid to the Kuomintang against its own opposition is played up as the discharge of a holy debt due to "the Generalissimo for his long and heroic struggle." The elements that really organized and led the people's fight, the only unremitting and active one, are those Chiang and America now want to crush. The people who bore the burden of the war on both the regular and guerilla fronts are China's peasants, who want the better life that domestic feudalism, with foreign assistance, has always denied them. The anti-Japanese "struggle" of the upper crust was a fitful thing, full of waverings, blackmail and carefully preserved loopholes. It was endlessly complicated by other struggles against the Chinese groups which called for more action against the enemy.

Stilwell's pressure for greater authority to promote such action held no menace to China's territorial integrity. On the contrary, it was designed to restore it. The only "sovereignty" he challenged in wanting really to fight the war was the self-arrogated right of the Kuomintang to pursue objects inconsistent with this basic aim but necessary to the preservation of feudalism. Petain tried to use "French sovereignty" to cover up similar manoeuvres by Vichy. Franco was to appeal to Spanish "sovereignty" to keep his yoke on the people of that country after the war. Although Chiang was not exactly a Petain or a Franco, all three were alike because there was much more in common between their peoples and foreign armies really fighting the Axis than between their peoples and themselves.

4. First Americans in the Liberated Areas

This is confirmed by the facts of the "crime" for which Stilwell was ultimately displaced. When the Honan and Hunan defeats descended on China, it seemed too late to save the situation by slow patching of Kuomintang strength alone. Although he never abandoned that effort, Stilwell now had to go beyond asking for reforms on the regular front and the redeployment of the blockade forces. Like the refugees fleeing from the advancing enemy, he had to look to the blockaded Liberated Areas themselves. With the proof that the Kuomintang could not hold the Japanese independently, he was forced not only to urge it to unity but to explore the possibility of working with both fronts directly if they could not be got together. Moreover, Chungking's complete collapse as a national centre had become an imminent threat. To guard against such an eventuality, it became Stilwell's inescapable military

duty, quite apart from any personal preference, to make contact with the only centre of resistance that would then remain.

It was such contact that Chungking feared above all things, as Mihailovich must have feared the penetration of his "heroic" smoke screen and Allied co-operation with Tito. To impede it, it went to fantastic and unbelievable lengths. Long before the regular front reached its extremity, Stilwell's headquarters had asked, preparatory to strategic bombing of North and Central China points, how pilots forced to bail out over nominally occupied country could find assistance. General Ho Ying-chin, Chungking's War Minister and Chief of Staff, supplied a map which marked territories held by various "Trojan horse" quislings as friendly. The Liberated Areas were described as solidly held by the Japanese and therefore "dangerous."

Fortunately U.S. Army Intelligence had the initiative to check with the Communist representatives. But because of the tendency of certain American officers to believe what their Kuomintang confreres told them, the Communists' information was regarded as unconfirmed, and probably designed to exaggerate their real area of operations for political prestige. It is hard to say how many pilots lost their lives before the maps were finally adjusted to the facts, but the number must have been considerable.

The real facts soon came out. As bombing flights over occupied targets increased in frequency, airmen who had to bail out whether they wanted to or not were repeatedly saved by Liberated Area forces. The Eighth Route Army began to report that it was picking up Americans in the vicinity of Peiping and Taiyuan, in Shantung and South Manchuria. The New Fourth Army rescued more in the Yangtze Valley, in places ranging from two or three miles outside Hankow to the immediate environs of Shanghai. The South China Anti-Japanese Brigade saved men shot down over Canton and Hongkong.

When the men came back, new stories spread among the American air base contingents in the Kuomintang rear, who were ready to curse all things Chinese because the version of China's fight they had been fed at home diverged so sharply from the conditions they found upon arriving. The sun-browned eyewitnesses of the struggle behind the enemy lines, who often reached their home fields only after months of tramping from one guerilla pocket to another, reported that some Chinese were "really on the ball" after all. They told of officials who were not hypocritical, corrupt, cowardly or tyrannical; of troops who were not too hungry or ill-organized to fight; of peasants who were not ragged or cowed into servility, but on the contrary themselves defended their villages against enemy units strong enough to take whole cities on the regular front. They attested that they had seen Chinese forces holding

their ground instead of retreating, and attacking as well as shooting back when shot at.

These facts gained currency in long bull sessions, in billets and operations shacks, they were carried from base to base by pilots who were in Chungking today, Kunming tomorrow, Assam or Calcutta the next day, with nothing to do between flights except put up their feet and talk. As a result, American soldiers throughout the theatre began to think more highly of China and of the usefulness of their own activity, which they had frankly doubted. They were less critical of Washington for having told them "fairy tales" about China's stand. But they also discovered that the really active fight was on a different front from the one they were trying to hold up.

The commonest question asked by these rank-and-file Americans, with not the foggiest previous idea of China's internal line-ups, was: "Do you think we're backing the wrong horse in this country?"

5. Gropings for a New Policy

Edgar Snow quotes Franklin D. Roosevelt as saying, shortly before his death, that he favoured "dealing with both sides in China until they get together."

If Mr. Roosevelt meant by this that Lend-Lease and other aid should go to both of China's fronts, his wishes were never carried out. Throughout the war all American Government assistance went to the Kuomintang exclusively. Despite the desire of General Stilwell and his officers, and the urgings of a considerable section of American opinion, the Maquis of China, unlike the politically similar Maquis of France and Yugoslavia, was not given any American weapons.

It is not unlikely, however, that Mr. Roosevelt's meaning was much more limited. Perhaps he was saying that the United States would no longer be deterred from sending representatives to the front behind the enemy lines, and that while it would continue to supply the Central Government only, it would push for an interparty agreement within China under which Chungking itself would apportion U.S. arms to all anti-Japanese fronts. This would save the position of Chiang Kai-shek, whom America had done so much to build up, reduce inner strains and increase China's fighting power to the greatest degree possible without upsetting the existing balance of power. In this direction, United States policy did take some initiative.

In the third year of America's war and the eighth of China's, the road to Yen-an was opened for a small U.S. mission by Vice-President Henry Wallace, who came to Chungking after visiting Moscow. Wallace secured consent to its dispatch from Chiang Kai-shek personally, after

the Generalissimo had refused several similar requests by Stilwell.

Although the mission was limited in authority and described as an "Observer Group," Yen-an greeted it enthusiastically. General Chu Teh acceded to its requests to provide facilities for pilot rescue work and arrange for Air Force meteorological posts in the resistance pockets—very important because Japan's weather is made in North China. Members of the group were taken to all parts of the Liberated Areas to which they wanted to go, familiarizing themselves on the spot with possibilities of Eighth Route help for projected U.S. operations, including a future land advance against Reiping and naval invasion of the Shantung and Kiangsu coasts. Order of Battle Intelligence officers and Psychological Warfare personnel obtained unfettered access to information on Japanese dispositions and morale. One of them told me there was more to be learned on these matters in Yen-an in a week than in Chungking in a year.

Generally, the Americans were greatly impressed with what they saw. The degree of mobilization, atmosphere of confidence and total absence of war weariness exhilarated them as it had the airmen who had landed inadvertently in guerilla territory. The contrast with the regular front was so great that it hardly seemed the same country. A young officer who saw a picture of Chiang Kai-shek in a Yen-an reception hall said: "My God, do we have to think about that so-and-so here too? What we could do with these people if he didn't interfere." Colonel Barrett, head of the mission, declared in a talk that "we want to learn from those who have fought successfully behind the enemy lines for seven years." These remarks expressed a gradually crystallizing and unanimous conviction that the Liberated Areas held the key to shortening the suspected long war on the China front.

Accordingly, in their free and frequent contact with Eighth Route Army leaders, members of the mission began to develop lines of inquiry which may have exceeded their competence but flowed inevitably from their desire to beat the enemy and get home. One of them, after a talk with Chu Teh, said: "I'd never have believed it. Today I met a Chinese general who didn't open the conversation by begging for American planes, tanks and heavy artillery." Apparently he had asked the Communist Commander in Chief what U. S. aid his armies could use, were it available. Chu mentioned small arms, bazookas and mule-pack guns to smash enemy blockhouses, and explosives to blow up railways and bridges—nothing beyond the immediate needs of the moment, nothing to hoard or be put away.

Major Casberg of the U.S. Medical Corps, who accompanied our correspondents' group, found that guerilla care for the wounded was far superior to that behind the regular front. While criticizing many

techniques as unnecessarily primitive, he convinced himself that the Communist-led troops, alone of all Chinese armies, never abandoned their casualties. "What has been done here with so little is a challenge to us who have so much," he said.

Casberg was also tremendously struck by the way the army was fed and its fitness maintained in the face of grim difficulties. He might well have been, because the 250 men who accompanied us (we rode on horseback) marched at the rate of thirty miles a day, in full equipment, over very rough and mountainous country. In our three weeks in the Shansi-Suiyuan Liberated Area we kept up this pace, for eighteen days and a couple of nights, sometimes rising and dropping 5000 feet twice in a single lap. In all the time only three men of the escort had dropped out from illness or fatigue. This is a commando level of training in any army. Major Casberg said that the better Kuomintang units he had seen would have finished such a test with only half their men and the average ones could not have kept it up for more than two or three days.

There were other notable things about these troops. Their officers walked with them, as all Eighth Route commanders below Brigadier General had been dismounted to provide the peasants with plough horses. Both on the march and afterwards, classes in literacy and current events were held—for an hour a day at least. The men swung along easily, chatting about what they saw on the way and comparing the crops and farming methods seen along the route with those at home—as peasant soldiers will. They sang often and lustily. On one very steep slope I heard a platoon laughing and talking very strangely as it sweated upward. I asked one of its men what it was all about and he replied: "We're rehearsing a new play our drama unit will put on in the villages."

The Americans in the Observer Group were all of junior rank, with a colonel in command. It was no part of their business to make policy. But all of them, in reporting what they had seen, stuck their necks out in a way rarely seen in the service. They risked rebukes and deferred promotions by urging that the Liberated Areas be given supplies at once, and that military co-operation with them be instituted.

These were the fruits of the first extensive contact of Americans with China's second front. The presence of these young men in the Liberated Areas was policy, but the recommendations they made were their own.

Meanwhile, back in Chungking, the other half of Mr. Roosevelt's concept began to operate. American diplomats and soldiers took an active interest in the new Kuomintang-Communist negotiations initiated there. The idea seemed to have been to build up the Kuomintang and

push it toward reform, to manoeuvre it into some sort of minimal agreement with other parties but at the same time to assure it of so much American assistance that no rival tendency could overwhelm it. The new, positive side to all this was that America made it clear that the Kuomintang was expected to democratize its structure, acquire wider support to strengthen its rear and fight the war. The negative side, which reflected the unbroken thread of traditional policy, was the effort to give rulers who had lost their hold on the people outside sources of strength, thus encouraging intrigue and resistance to the very reforms that had been suggested.

Progressive, "win the war" steps included Stilwell's unremitting pressure and the activities of Henry Wallace during his brief presence in China. Besides launching the Observer Group, Wallace outspokenly advocated a better deal for the country's peasants. Internationally, he advised Chungking to improve relations with Soviet Russia and hinted that bids for U.S. political support on the basis of resistance to the "Russian bogey" would fail. This was a rebuke to the Kuomintang for its repeated efforts to foment Soviet-American suspicion and capitalize upon it: President Roosevelt must have known at this time, although very few others did, when and how the Soviet Union would come in against Japan. He sought not only to create a China that would hold together in the last stage of the war, but also to make Chinese unity a cornerstone of Soviet-American postwar co-operation.

To strengthen the regular front economically, Donald Nelson brought a group of experts to set up a War Production Board and put the Kuomintang's industries in order. But industrial revival was considered purely technically, without reference to political and social factors such as the roots of industrial impotence in the antiquated land system. Nelson's assistants, who included a former president of the National Association of Manufacturers, were conservative businessmen who might criticize the Kuomintang's inefficiency but had no quarrel with its social views. Some of them looked beyond the immediate wartime task to large-scale corporation business with it in the future.

Wallace represented the liberal wing of the American effort and Nelson the centre. But there was also an adventure far to the right which smelled bad from the beginning, and which I believe Americans will be ashamed of for years to come. This was the SACO (Sino-American Co-operation Group), headed on the U.S. side by Captain (later Rear Admiral) Milton Milés, of the Naval Intelligence. At first associated with the China work of the Office of Strategic Services but later separated from it, SACO had the job of infiltrating the Japanese side of the regular front, gathering information, organizing a system of coast-watching to report on enemy ship movements, and preparing

for future U.S. landings. All these functions were of course legitimate and necessary: SACO's evil side, which later perverted it completely, lay in its organization. Its over-all commander, under whom Miles served nominally as deputy, was General Tai Li, the hated Himmler of the Kuomintang Gestapo, butcher of everything progressive in Chinese life, grand master of the quisling Trojan horses that had been sent into the Japanese camp.

Since Tai's many functions included that of chief of Chiang's military intelligence, partial technical co-operation with him may have been unavoidable. Miles, however, appears to have gone far beyond this. He became Tai's great friend and advocate in the American camp and brought him arms over the hump which Tai used to fight New Fourth Army and other patriotic guerillas. Miles' men tried to whitewash Tai's political reputation. One such effort, in *Colliers'* magazine, paused in its praises of Tai to remark that he tried to make SACO Americans comfortable wherever they went by providing concubines, which was more of a security scandal than a moral one, because Tai Li's "horizontal" girl operatives were trained to extend his influence and information.

Worst of all, it was freely said in Chungking that Miles and Tai exchanged news of the doings of "politically unreliable" Chinese and Americans, including U.S. officials who dealt with Chinese progressives in the line of duty and personally believed in a fair united front settlement to unite the country. Tai, whose party secret police would expire if the Kuomintang yielded an inch of its monopoly of power in the government, fought such a settlement with every means at his command. His American information must have helped him greatly in arranging the miscarriage of U. S. policy as practised by Stilwell and Roosevelt.

6. Negotiations, Hurley and Wedemeyer

Having sketched the Chinese background and the American actors on the scene we can examine the content and progress of the Kuomintang-Communist talks of late 1944, which reflected the new balance of power in the country, as well as the military emergency.

The Communists based themselves on the strength developed by the Liberated Areas, the support of the Democratic League⁴ and other progressive elements, the new nationwide desire for unity and the Allied military need for a united China. They demanded democratic government by an all-party coalition, recognition of the elected administrations of the Liberated Areas as legal local organs under such a

⁴Formerly the Federation of Democratic Parties.

government, consolidation of the armies through equal treatment for all Chinese forces, and their joint representation in a reformed high command.

The Kuomintang relied on the support of Chinese reactionaries, its monopoly of current foreign assistance, and its belief that America might admonish it but would never ditch it, whatever it did. It was playing for time, not agreement. To meet demands for a coalition government it proposed that representatives of other parties take up minor posts in a cabinet still overwhelmingly Kuomintang in composition. With regard to local self-rule, it refused to recognize the Liberated Area governments in any shape or form, demanding the dissolution of all but the Yen-an Border Region. In the military field, it agreed to supply the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies if they cut their numbers down by two thirds, concentrated in one place for orders and dissolved the People's Militia. In the midst of the war, it proposed to disarm a major portion of the resistance behind the Japanese lines and destroy the pattern of widespread guerilla warfare that had proved itself so effective against the enemy.

After negotiations deadlocked, General Stilwell handed Chiang Kai-shek an American proposal that he, Stilwell, become the chief Allied commander in the theatre. He asked for authority over both Chinese and American troops, on the model of Eisenhower in Europe and MacArthur in the Southwest Pacific, because the Chinese parties themselves had failed to agree on a mutually acceptable structure of command. Only thus could the best co-ordination and anti-Japanese use of all the national armies be assured.

Washington had given Stilwell a fourth star, making him equal in rank to other Allied Supreme Commanders and thus fitting him for the post. All democratic elements in China favoured his taking it. Chu Teh, with the Communist armies, agreed to serve under him. Many provincial generals took the same attitude. They did not think that China's national dignity would be derogated any more than Britain's was when Montgomery served under Eisenhower. What China needed was a wartime command that would enjoy the confidence of all subordinate components and not be suspected of furthering the separate interests of any. Stilwell filled the bill.

But the plan threatened all the intricate arrangements which the reactionaries in the Kuomintang found necessary to keep themselves in power—the entrusting of armies to loyal vassals only, the stationing of troops according to where they were needed on the internal political chessboard, and the careful isolation of the Liberated Areas prior to their destruction. To abort it Chungking mobilized all its resources, both in China and abroad.

At home the main method was the stimulation of racist antiforeignism. In Washington, the other key centre in the fight, Kuomintang representatives laboured mightily, by pleas and threats in turn, to shift the administration from the course it had set. At the same time, with the 1944 Presidential elections only a couple of weeks away, they supplied Republican campaigners with ammunition to attack the Roosevelt policies. Henry Luce's mighty *Time-Life-Fortune* publicity machine, which only a year previously had exposed the Honan famine and the faults which it was necessary to remedy in China, now disregarded the reports of its own correspondents. Week after week it ground out material that was different from the releases of the Kuomintang Ministry of Information only by being better written and easier for millions of Americans to swallow.

As luck would have it, President Roosevelt's current roving emissary in China was Patrick J. Hurley, of the Republican Party and Oklahoma oil. Why he picked this character for the China job it is hard to say. But American politics, like Chinese, have their contradictions, and the President was famous for harnessing all kinds of horses to his chariot, perhaps to keep them from drawing anyone else's. Hurley's advent further added to the confused picture of American representation in China, which already embraced as many attitudes and activities as the coalition on which President Roosevelt rested at home, ranging from Henry Wallace and Sidney Hillman to John Rankin of Mississippi. Managing such teams involves constant tussles between the ability of the driver to head them where he wants them to go and the desire of their components to drag him somewhere else. Inevitably, they are subject to strange aberrations.

Hurley was one of these. His presence in China supplied Chiang Kai-shek with the opportunity for a great and successful gamble.

The full story of what happened next is not yet known, but certain facts are established. It appears that while Stilwell was presenting his demands, Dr. T. V. Soong reported from Washington that an administration preparing for an election would not push them to the point of international crisis. Chiang Kai-shek then decided to create the crisis on his own terms. He told Hurley that he was willing to accept the American programme, but could not tolerate Stilwell as commander in chief because of his personal bluntness and "rudeness." As a preliminary to detailed negotiations he drafted a cable to Roosevelt demanding Stilwell's removal, which he got Hurley to countersign. He appears also to have promised the removal of War Minister Ho Ying-chin, whose activities impeded military operations, as an immediate return for Stilwell's transfer.

Next President Roosevelt committed a strange blunder, for a man

so astute. Instead of insisting on Chiang's signature to the arrangements for military co-ordination first, and removing Stilwell afterwards if the Generalissimo would not be mollified, he ordered the General's transfer. By doing so he pulled the rug out from under the whole American effort of the previous months. This was the view held by Ambassador Gauss, who resigned immediately.⁵ The President appointed Hurley to replace him.

Chiang made full use of the resulting situation. He reneged on every promise he had made, even the one to oust Ho Ying-chin. Although Ho was deprived of the War Ministry, which in China is little more than a kind of quartermaster general's office, he retained his concurrent job as Chief of Staff. Subsequently he was given important field commands as well and ended the war, only seven months later, as Commander in Chief of all Chinese ground forces.

An American favourite, Ho's deadly rival, General Chen Cheng, got the job of War Minister. But here too the United States was outwitted. The switch was manoeuvred in such a way that it only perpetuated the departmental situation that had paralyzed the active employment of Chinese troops in the past. When Chen Cheng had been commander of the Chinese Expeditionary Force fighting with the Americans in Yunnan, Ho Ying-chin, as War Minister, had kept him immobilized by withholding supplies. Now the situation was reversed. Chen, who had been willing to work with Americans in the field, was put in a job where he controlled war materials but could not order a single soldier to move. Ho, whose chief interest in the counteroffensive was to keep all good Chinese troops out of it, was given supreme authority in the field.

The same thing happened in the political sphere, where the C.C. clique of the Kuomintang had become as obnoxious to the United Nations as it already was to the Chinese people. A government reorganization removed one of its leaders, the notorious Chen Li-fu, from his post as Minister of Education, which he had used to propagate fascist doctrines and suppress all free thought in the schools. But the new position given him was much more important. He became head of the Organization Board of the Central Kuomintang Headquarters, with authority over all party personnel, including Ministers. Meanwhile, his brother Chen Kuo-fu became the Kuomintang's Secretary

⁵ Gauss, like many another U.S. diplomats, bitterly resented the President's practice of sending "special envoys" to conduct business over his head. Hurley was the fourth, coming after Currie, Wilkie and Wallace. Although his resignation was on a policy matter, this resentment also seems to have played a part in it.

General, making the C.C. grip on the party that ruled China firmer than ever.

The '44 elections resulted in a fourth term for President Roosevelt. The distress of the Kuomintang was embalmed in a story that made the rounds in Chungking. It was to the effect that Madame Chiang Kai-shek, then in the United States, had cabled her husband, "Sorry, we lost," when the results came through. This anecdote was too neat to be literally true, but it certainly represented the real feelings of Chinese reactionaries.

With home political considerations in abeyance for a time, Roosevelt could turn his attention to retrieving the situation in China, which had now slipped back to where Stilwell picked it up two years before. The American demand for an internal political agreement in China and corresponding military reforms was advanced again, although the appointment of General Wedemeyer, a lower ranking officer, to succeed Stilwell made it clear that the Allied Commander-in-Chief idea would no longer be pushed.

The new pressure on the Kuomintang was not as severe as the old. For one thing, the American representatives on the spot were now greater assets to its own cause than to the policy they were supposed to promote. Hurley went through the motions of seeking Chinese unity and travelled extensively between Chungking and Yen-an, but his actions were, to say the least of it, peculiar. In Yen-an he assured Mao Tse-tung that the Communist minimum demands seemed to him quite reasonable and that he would work for their acceptance. He even put his signature to them, without solicitation, to prove it. But after bringing Chou En-lai back to Chungking to negotiate on this basis, Hurley informed Chiang Kai-shek that while Washington expected him to compromise, he should make up his own mind because he would be backed in whatever he decided.

General Wedemeyer, the new U.S. military chief, was not a soldiers' general like Stilwell but an officers' officer, a general-staff man who had had part of his training in the German War College. His personal bias was bitterly anti-Communist. Ignoring the political aspect of the problem of the Chinese front, he left all negotiations to Hurley. This "nonpolitical" pose was deeply political in reality. It meant that Wedemeyer was willing to let the particular interests of the Kuomintang override the interests of the war against Japan, by contrast to the "political" Stilwell, who had been pushed into action outside the immediate military field by his determination that nothing should stand in the way of fully mobilizing China's strength.

By this time the Pacific campaigns were considerably ahead of schedule, Soviet participation had been arranged, the China coast

landing was no longer key strategy, and the postwar trends of U.S. policy were becoming apparent.⁸ Hurley was busy "purging" the embassy of all advocates of Chinese democratic unity, which meant every foreign-service officer who had had long experience in China and knew the situation. He even issued an order, surely unprecedented in diplomatic history, that no member of his staff should put anything in reports to the State Department that reflected unfavorably on the Chungking regime. Thus blinkers were put on Washington itself, which was now allowed to see only what Hurley wanted it to.

General Wedemeyer conducted a corresponding purge of army officers who had supported the Stilwell policy. Both the Ambassador and the General put obstacles in the way of American correspondents trying to get through the blockade to Yen-an, with whom Gauss and Stilwell had sympathized. The "iron curtain" between the two Chinese fronts, pierced for the first time by a group of newsmen some months before, now redescended with a vengeance, and with American help. Most correspondents were accredited to Wedemeyer's headquarters and could only travel north by army plane, so it was easy to keep them under control.

With the about-face completed and the Kuomintang reinforced in its determination to give nothing away, Chiang Kai-shek made a new proposal to Yen-an. Instead of an Allied commander in chief over the troops of both parties, Chiang suggested that the Communist-led armies alone be put under a three-man committee composed of one Kuomintang officer, one Communist and one American. Since Chiang retained the over-all command, this committee would be subordinate and responsible to him alone. The Communists refused the formula, as a step toward their liquidation. They were thereupon accused of being "anti-Allied" and "insincere" in their original offer to serve under Stilwell, which had been made under totally different circumstances.

7. The Sting in Japan's Tail

In the meantime, the Japanese advance continued. Enemy troops penetrated into Kweichow province, threatening both Chungking and Kuming, the main American base. To check them, Chiang finally sent about 10 per cent of the anti-Communist blockade troops into the field, a small proportion by U.S. air transport and the rest overland.

⁸ Mao Tse-tung in Yen-an warned that "certain Allied generals were looking forward to playing in China the role of Scobie in Greece" (Scobie was the British officer who helped crush the Greek resistance forces and re-establish the rightist government). Mao's remark was aimed at Wedemeyer. It foreshadowed clearly what was to happen some months later.

Kuomintang propagandists promptly seized on this belated transfer, made under extreme enemy pressure after five years of mulelike obstinacy, to prove the whole "blockade story" a lie.

I travelled toward the front with these troops. All of them seemed amazed at being shoved against the Japanese after having been so long held in reserve and indoctrinated for internal "police" purposes. But there were also significant changes in their outlook. They began to develop the gripes of all front-line troops against the government. One truckload of men protested bitterly that they had been waiting for equipment, but had suddenly been ordered forward, on somebody or other's insistence, without it. The commander of a battalion which had been marching for five weeks on foot told me that no arrangements had been made anywhere along the way to feed or house his men. Many had dropped from weariness and exposure, and he could see "no hope." I asked him his rank, and he said "major", but quickly added, "This means nothing because as you see yourself we haven't a real army like other countries." When I said I was a reporter he commented: "Maybe there are real newspapermen abroad, but ours are all phonies. Why didn't the papers tell us about the conditions we've seen here? They couldn't have come about all of a sudden."

This came from an officer of Chiang's most trusted janissary corps who had sat snugly in Sian throughout the war believing everything that he was told. The whole experience made me realize that the cream of the Kuomintang Army had been reduced to a state in which it was not only useless against the enemy but would crack in a civil war also. It made it clear too that many even of the most "fascist" troops were honest Chinese who had been made to believe they had somehow been serving the nation, and who, though now disillusioned, would still be capable of fighting for their country under the right leadership.

That the demoralization stemmed from the top was confirmed at Kweiyang. The city was to be the scene of a much advertised "last ditch stand," but everyone was evacuating. Right in the middle of China, the military authorities seemed to have no information at all as to where the Japanese were, and believed every rumour, including one that they were surrounded. The soldiers were afraid of the poverty-stricken local people, whom they had always kicked around in the past, and who were said to be guiding the enemy through the mountains. The Kweichow gentry were rumoured to have sold out. The egregious Ho Ying-chin, himself the biggest landlord in the province, had been rushed down to handle the defense on the theory that he could win them back, or anyhow would either fight for his own possessions or find some way to dissuade the enemy from overrunning them.

The breakdown of Chinese intelligence on the regular front was the most convincing sign of the extent of the collapse. Through all the other vicissitudes of past years, that was one phase of Kuomintang organization that had remained good. Chungking's air-raid warning net, stretching for hundreds of miles, had justly become world famous. But now, as a result of widespread use of "double spies" who naturally inclined to favour the winning side, and of alienation from the people, the Chinese Army was completely blind. Again the contrast with the Communist-led forces was fantastic. Only a month before I had marched with the Eighth Route Army within a mile of many Japanese garrisons, with perfect confidence in their information as to the enemy's every move and their ability to camouflage their own whereabouts.

The movement along the roads was also indicative. Always in the past a great proportion of the population of threatened cities had preferred to leave all its possessions rather than stay on and live under the enemy. In a sense, the determination of the civilians to move away had been equivalent, in morale terms, to the resolve of soldiers to stick to their positions. Now many of the refugees, who had travelled hundreds of miles since the spring, had given up hope. They were trying to make their way back home to occupied territory, hoping that the Japanese would let them.

Lack of confidence and information "snafued" Allied military movements as well. On the Kwéichow border U.S. planes, acting on erroneous Chinese intelligence, bombed a mass of fleeing civilians whom they took to be Japanese troops, at a point to which the enemy had not yet penetrated at all. On the highway between Kweiyang and Kunming long caravans of American trucks were hauling supplies forward while others hauled the same stuff back and drivers called to each other in confusion to see who had the latest orders. Before leaving Kweiyang I said to some officials who had dropped every duty to arrange the evacuation of their families and furniture, "If one man walked down the street in a Japanese uniform, the city might surrender to him." The officials thought so too.

In Kunming, hundreds of miles away, things were no better. Scuttlebutt was endless and alarming. It seemed to be accepted that nothing would stop the enemy, and U. S. civilian personnel in the OWI and other agencies were being issued revolvers against no one knew what eventuality.

The panic had an interesting result in Chungking itself. Some one circulated a rumour that Tai Li and other heads of the Secret Service were preparing to flee to India. Immediately, progressives who had been hounded by the police for years began to be accosted by

unfamiliar individuals who said, more or less: "You may not know me, but I've been assigned to cover you for years. But for goodness' sake don't think I'm your enemy. On the contrary, I've torn many bad pages out of your dossier and contradicted some pretty terrible reports about you. If you'd like to see your record, I'll bring it."

These were Gestapo agents who still had some national feeling and were trying to find some way out of working for the enemy. They, like everyone else, assumed that if the government fled, opposition elements would lead any resistance that continued. So they were reinsuring themselves in a hurry.

As it happened, the Japanese took neither Chungking nor Kunming. The elements that had appeared briefly around Kweiyang and scared everyone to death were a few thousand cavalry who, in the absence of opposition, had moved much further than expected and outrun their supplies. It was going on December (1944) and they were still in summer uniforms, so they turned back. But before they did so, they collected most of China's remaining rolling stock and great stores of evacuated machinery which had piled up at the unguarded terminus of the Kwangsi-Kweichow railway. As they drove the trains back south they picked up the rails behind them and piled them on the empty cars. Most of the railroad disappeared from the map, rolled up like a Chinese picture.

Those who knew the situation had held all along that Chungking itself was safe. Its elimination, like that of the northern blockade, would only have put an end to the duality of control in China from which the Japanese benefited so greatly. It would have removed the Kuomintang as a buffer between the enemy and the people. Kunming was a different story. If the enemy had had the time to make another effort, he would certainly have done so. Time, however, was running short. The clouds of defeat were gathering over Japan from other directions.

8. Strange Triumph

By the summer of 1945 President Roosevelt was dead and all the horses in his team were free to go their own way, both at home and abroad. In China Hurley and Wedemeyer wielded the power of Roman proconsuls in an outpost of empire, since they were the Kuomintang's last hope as well as its ardent partisans. The country was no nearer unity, despite its parlous state. American contacts with Liberated Areas had never developed beyond the Observer Group.

China had become a subsidiary theatre in global attack strategy. Land operations on the regular front were once more in abeyance. The

U.S. Fourteenth Air Force and the Tenth, which had joined it, had no forward bases for direct blows at Japan. The B-29 strategic bombers of the Twentieth Air Force had been shifted from Chengtu, in West China, to Saipan in the Pacific, where they were closer to Tokyo and could depend on seaborne supplies. Yet the American effort to train the Kuomintang armies was stepped up, and some thirty divisions had been improved with more food, U.S. field teams and large supplies of arms. These divisions were now called the "New Army." It was common talk that, after the war, Chiang would make them the base of his military power. In other words, this New Army was the vanguard for the Kuomintang's political comeback.

"After the war" was the key phrase. When the Japanese, as had been expected for some months, began to pull out of South and Central China for a last stand north of the Yangtze, the Chinese moved in behind them. Their marches were much touted in the press as "great victories," but the fact is that they seldom entered a town until days after the enemy had gone, and rearguard skirmishes were the only fighting. However, General Wedemeyer's public relations organization helped the Kuomintang to build up the significance of these "offensives." The General was soon to refer to the war effort's old enemy, Ho Ying-chin, as the "Eisenhower of China"—a grotesque and immoral defiance of the truth and an insult to the Chinese and American fighters who had died in the real fight while he skulked and schemed.

There was another interesting feature in these "triumphs." In return for the compliments lavished on its worst generals, the Chinese Government tried to make it appear that they reflected the success of U.S. training. This might have been refreshing after the brickbats hurled at Stilwell when he had tried to fight Japan, but it did not happen to be true. All correspondents attested that the New Army was not yet in the field at all, and that the troops filling the vacuum were the same bedraggled ill-fed men who had been employed, and often so shamefully abandoned, in earlier campaigns.

What was the New Army being saved for? Shortly before the Japanese surrender, press dispatches reported that General Wedemeyer had made a tour of the North China front, where action, it was said, might be expected at any moment. The most flagrant thing about the General's inspection trip was that he touched all the main jumping-off places of the anti-Communist blockade, surrounding the Yenan Border Region in a great half-moon from Sian in the south, through Pingliang in the west, to Yulin and Suiyuan in the north. He did not go to see the Eighth Route Army, which operated in the bowels of the enemy Inner Fortress, which he was supposedly planning to crack, or even his own Observer Group at its Yenan headquarters. The Border

Region lay in the path of whatever advance the blockading troops would make "against the enemy," and this omission was—but the reader can supply his own adjective.

Soon after the Wedemeyer tour, the civil war thunder began to rumble again. The northern Kuomintang offensive against Japan remained a myth, but the blockading units penetrated the Border Region at Yehtaishan and other points. After they were thrown back, Yeh Chien-ying, Eighth Route Army Chief of Staff, announced that many American weapons had been captured from them. His charge was documented by a long list, with numbers and the names of U.S. manufacturers. The Communist-led forces had at last acquired some American arms—by the roundabout route by which they had acquired Central supplies in the days of the Trojan horse.

At China Theatre press conferences, General Wedemeyer was urbane and unperturbed as usual. He denied that U.S. equipment had been made available for civil war but said that it was quite possible some had been "stolen" and diverted to such uses. Similar things, he declared, had happened before. He did not say whether he would protest to the Chinese Government or "China's Eisenhower" Ho Ying-chin, or what else he proposed to do, in the face of the proofs produced.

Then came Potsdam, the atom bomb which drew a cross through further defense of the Japanese islands, and the Soviet thrust into Manchuria which smashed the enemy army's dream of continued resistance on the continent. Japan capitulated.

Immediately, Chiang Kai-shek issued orders to Japanese commanders in China to surrender only to the troops he designated. He told them that they would be held responsible if any units failed to resist unauthorized calls to lay down their arms. While they were thus commanded to continue fighting the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies, he permitted them to give up to a number of quisling divisions, which now proclaimed that they had been loyal to Chungking all along. The surviving Trojan horse units returned happily to the Kuomintang fold. Shortly thereafter Chiang's manoeuvres were given Allied sanction. General Douglas MacArthur inserted similar terms into the Interallied surrender document.

Only now the American-trained New Army was finally employed. U. S. planes and ships sped it to various points in North and Central China to "accept Japanese capitulation," while one component proceeded, under its own power, to Canton, to see that no enemy surrendered to the South China Brigade. Soon almost the whole New Army was engaged in civil war against the forces of the Liberated Areas, who were declared to be illegally occupying territories where

they had fought throughout the war, territories in which no Central troops had been seen for many years.

China had weathered the great test of an all-out attempt to conquer her. Would she now revert to semicolonialism and disunity, or would victory reward her people with peace, full independence and the opportunities for progress which they had so long sought?

No ready-made answer was possible, but the road was still hard and tortuous. Along with the great advances of the people's struggle, the old classic situation was once more reasserting itself. Again the domestic defenders of China's backwardness were stretching out their hands to gather the fruits of the fight for themselves. Again they were calling for foreign aid against their own people.

The foreign power on which they leaned was the United States. America had been a friend, not an enemy, during the war. Her foe had been the same as China's. She had even departed, briefly and uncomfortably, from the tradition of a century of Sino-Western relations, to stand on the side of the Chinese people's real interests. Great hopes had been raised.

Her last-minute reversal not only cancelled wartime advances but also the old differential between U. S. policy and that of colonial powers like Britain, in the eyes of the Chinese people. America may have strung along with previous aggressors, but she enjoyed unparalleled good will through the negative fact of abstaining from armed action to impose her will, or her choice of government, on the Chinese nation. Now she too was playing the old interventionist game, but with a new excuse—to "stop Russia."

XVI. THE U. S. S. R., AMERICA AND MANCHURIA

1. Origin of the Sino-Soviet Treaty

AT THE END OF THE WAR WITH JAPAN, THE SOVIET RED ARMY WAS IN Manchuria, where it had quickly overrun that last formidable aggregation of enemy land power whose continued resistance even after the fall of Japan herself had been considered possible. The Soviet Union entered the conflict in accordance with the schedule planned at Yalta many months before. All serious authorities agree that it did not do it helter-skelter, just because of the atomic bomb. However, the devastating effect of the atom bomb, and the sense of strength that came with its exclusive possession, were already leading some American groups to believe that the United States should consolidate the Pacific victory alone.

The original Roosevelt-Stalin scheme for ending the Japanese War had called for both American and Soviet operations against the enemy's China strongholds. Americans were to push up from the south and the coast and Russian forces were to come down from the north, each cooperating with the Chinese fighting on the spot. But since the native anti-Japanese troops in North China were Communist-led, both Washington and Chungking feared that joint operations with the Red Army would strengthen them inordinately in the internal balance of power, in which already, and without an ounce of outside aid, they had made such strides through military successes against Japan and political successes among the peasants.

It was desirable for rapid victory and a stable peace to lay such fears, assure that all efforts be directed against Japan alone as Stilwell had tried to direct them, and create a basis for the reconstruction of the existing Chinese Government to permit democratic political competi-

tion instead of armed conflict between the two great parties. Most of all, it was necessary to avoid the international disruption bound to result from the creation of two rival national governments on Chinese soil. The objects General Stilwell had pursued in the interests of local strategy thus became an essential cornerstone for the tranquilization of the shaken world.

This was the aim of the Moscow-Chungking Treaty of 1945, concluded in consultation with the United States. The treaty was mainly a military alliance to smash Japanese aggression and provide assurance that it would not revive. The armed resurgence of Japan was no idle fear, because even after defeat she would remain the greatest Asiatic industrial power, surrounded by a virtual vacuum of economically backward lands. Germany after Versailles had shown the way. Given political opportunities such as internal strife in China or a repetition of the Soviet-Western tension that had nurtured the Axis between World Wars I and II, a Japanese comeback was not only possible but probable. It could only be averted by extirpating the social and political roots of Mikado fascism in Japan herself, and by making sure that her neighbour nations had a chance of matching or outstripping her in industrial development. Nothing less than a consistent effort in this direction, spread over a number of years, could establish a natural balance in which 70,000,000 Japanese could never again threaten domination of 450,000,000 people in China and the 100,000,000 inhabitants of Southeast Asia's coastal and island countries.

That the Sino-Soviet Treaty was devised in this spirit can be seen from its most important section, which pledged "co-operation in the war against Japan until its unconditional surrender [and] . . . in upholding peace and security for the good of the peoples of both countries." The signatories promised mutual help in case of future Japanese aggression against either and agreed "not to take part in any coalition whatsoever directed against the other." They undertook to provide reciprocal "assistance in the postwar period with a view to lightening and speeding up the national rehabilitation of both countries." The Soviet Union, in one annex, stated its readiness "to render China moral support and assistance with military equipment¹ and other material resources, this support and assistance given fully to the National Government as the Central Government of China."

Despite subsequent misinterpretations of its provisions for propaganda purposes, the phrasing of the treaty was perfectly clear.

It was absurd to say that Russia "let down the Chinese Commun-

¹There is nothing in this annex to suggest that military supplies meant anything other than weapons for use in the still continuing war against Japan.

ists," because she had never recognized Yenán as the government of China. Yenán had never claimed such a status or anyone's recognition of it.

Nor is it true that Russia offered to help Chiang Kai-shek against his domestic opposition "just like the United States." The aid to be given was precisely defined and did not include assistance for civil war, which had nothing to do with either the defeat of Japan or rebuilding after victory. The nonaggression provisions of the pact meant not only that Russia would not intervene against the Kuomintang (any more than for it) within China, but that the Chungking Government too would drop its habit of stimulating and dabbling in anti-Soviet blocs. The treaty was not between parties but between states. Whether the Kuomintang retained monopoly control of the Chinese Government or lost it, or whether the Communist Party of the Soviet Union remained paramount in its country, was totally irrelevant. Such questions were for the respective peoples to settle themselves. In the United States a Democratic administration does not renounce international obligations assumed by a Republican predecessor. Nor one has ever suggested that an international treaty signed by a government belonging to one of the major parties implies an obligation on the part of the foreign nation with which it was concluded to back the continuance of that party's power in Washington.

While no treaty between sovereign and allied states can contain requirements as to their respective forms of government, no government or nation can be stopped from holding opinions on political situations beyond its borders. With regard to China, it was clear as a pike-staff that continued civil strife would both prevent her recovery and menace Pacific peace. Both the American Government and the American people had acknowledged this, through official pronouncements and through the press. The U.S.S.R. did the same, both before the conclusion of the treaty and after it. Perhaps the most significant reaffirmation of its position was printed in the Soviet Army organ *Red Star* immediately the pact was announced. *Red Star* wrote editorially:

China can no longer be a backward, semifeudal country; she has great tasks before her. Any attempt to lead China along the path of reaction will be opposed by the democratic forces of China. The only path for her is progressive democratic development in co-operation with the other great democratic powers. . . .

Throughout the Stilwell period and the months immediately following, the Soviet press had many words of approval for American efforts to help China unite. It even turned a friendly face to Ambassador Hurley, giving his policy the benefit of every doubt until it exposed

itself and was bitterly castigated by other Americans. Although the Russians are very sensitive to such proceeding, the spectacle of Chungking diplomats consulting their American confreres in every step of the treaty negotiations passed unremarked and uncriticized. It is hard not to conclude that, in making the pact, Moscow hoped to activate pro-unity tendencies in both China and the United States, hoping thus to check the already obvious opposite current represented by renewed Kuomintang-Communist battles, and openly one-sided American intervention.

2. The New-Old Manchurian Problem

The part of the Sino-Soviet Pact that dealt with postwar subjects was devoted largely to Manchuria, a name that ever since its appearance in modern diplomacy has been bracketed with the painful word "problem." Newspapermen and publicists, with less restraint, have been referring to this area for forty years as a "cockpit" or "trouble spot." Whichever term is more appropriate, it is an undeniable fact that, in this short historical period, Manchuria has been the womb of two major wars and the scene of battles and "incidents" without number.

The reason is that, ever since the end of the nineteenth century, Manchuria had served as a base and pawn in interimperialist rivalries. It was first penetrated by Russian, Czarism, backed by French financial investments, under an arrangement which would give the paramount political influence to St. Petersburg and the major profits of large-scale railway construction to Paris bankers. For both countries, Manchurian development then represented a counterweight to British mastery of the rich Yangtze Valley. But the British in their turn encouraged military penetration of Manchuria by the new Japan, hoping to keep both her and Russia occupied with conflicts that would leave no slack for efforts by either, in the direction of India. The British knew very well that Tokyo, which lacked capital, could not exploit any gains it made in China's northeast without the profitable participation of the City of London. The Anglo-Japanese alliance was concluded in 1902, and Field Marshal Lord Kitchener made the use of it clear by speaking of Mukden as the "predestined" possession of Japan. This British calculation culminated in Japan's victory in her war with Russia in 1904-1905, the establishment of her domination over a South Manchurian buffer belt between the Russian and British spheres of influence, and her ultimate unforeseen growth into a menace to Britain herself.

In the meantime the United States emerged as a major financial power, having already become a Far Eastern military power through the conquest of the Philippines from Spain. New York bankers, who

had just finished the lucrative business of building the modern American railway system, were looking for new investment opportunities. Willard Straight, an expansionist disciple of Admiral Mahan and Theodore Roosevelt, was at that time U. S. Consul at Mukden. According to the well-known historian, Professor A. Whitney Griswold of Yale, Straight "made his consulate a high pressure agency for American commerce. With the Harriman railway interests he schemed to build in Manchuria a link of a round-the-world American railway system." Returning to Washington in 1908, he "became the link between the State Department and the bankers who were to become the official instruments of its policy in Eastern Asia. As acting chief of its Far Eastern Division he worked for Harriman, and as Harriman's representative he worked for the Department of State."

In 1909, Straight and Harriman together tried to get Russia and Japan to sell their competing interests in the Manchurian railways to a United States combine. After failing in this they persuaded the Chinese imperial government in Peking to grant them concessions for parallel lines, in accordance with the well-known competition-killing system used by railway barons in this country. Peking, being weak itself, was glad to introduce a new contender into the field, hoping that this would keep any single power from becoming paramount in the area. The Harriman-Straight combination was then expanded to include the Morgan interests and Kuhn, Loeb and Company (the National City Bank and First National Bank), which bought favours from the tottering empire.

In diplomatic strategy, Manchuria is also an old American concern. The Russo-Japanese War made Japan the only naval power sufficiently strong and free from other involvements to threaten America's new, distant and relatively undefended outposts in the Philippines and Guam. Washington immediately began to manoeuvre to safeguard these at the expense of the Russo-Chinese borderlands, as Britain safeguarded India. President Theodore Roosevelt concluded the Root-Takahira Agreement with Japan and broke a treaty with the then nominally independent government of Korea to recognize a Japanese protectorate over her. Retiring from the White House, he wrote his successor, President Taft :

Our vital interest is to keep the Japanese out of our country [a reference to the current quarrel over Japanese immigration to California] and at the same time to preserve the goodwill of Japan. The vital interest of the Japanese, on the other hand, is in Korea and Manchuria. It is therefore peculiarly our interest not to take any steps regarding Manchuria which will give Japan cause to feel . . . that we are hostile to her.

President Taft followed this advice, interpreting the doctrine of

"open door and equal opportunity" to mean recognition of Japanese political concessions extorted from China on the condition that they were not used to cut profits for American business. America and Japan thus entered into a sort of partnership in Manchuria, with one hoping to supply the money and the other the "intangible assets," just as Britain and Japan had done.

At the same time, since the Peking Government still enjoyed sovereignty, loans to the imperial authorities were used to ensure their support for U. S. economic rights in Manchuria and elsewhere. Secretary of State Knox announced that, regardless of current diplomatic arrangements, "the nations that finance the Chinese railways will be foremost in the affairs of China, and the participation of American capital . . . will give the voice of the United States more authority in political controversies within the country." The President wrote to Prince Chun, the Manchū Foreign Minister, in 1909, that he had "a personal interest in making use of American capital in the development of China," and his statement was propped up with political credits. Although both Knox and Taft mentioned "guaranteeing the administrative integrity of China" as being among their objects, the Chinese people resented Washington's connivance with Japanese aggression and its support of a moribund regime they themselves were trying to throw off, a regime that was using American money to suppress the contemporary democratic nationalist movement of Sun Yat-sen.

The situation had results worth remembering today. The outbreak of the Chinese Revolution in 1911 witnessed the anomaly of the United States being the last to abandon hope for the Manchū despotism. The pattern of American aid to Chinese reaction to ensure the delivery of promised favours has never changed since, though succeeding beneficiary governments invariably disappointed their backers by their inability to withstand the pressure of the people and history. Internationally, American policy served for twenty years to strengthen Japan and keep China so occupied with her own internal quarrels that mobilization of her strength for national defence was impossible. This policy began where it was ultimately to face its disastrous culmination—in Manchuria.

Before that time, however, many more events took place. During World War I, as in the rest of China, Western influence in Manchuria was relatively quiescent and Japanese power advanced. After the Russian Revolution and the armistice, the situation changed again. The Soviet Government renounced special administrative rights in the country, and the Chinese wanted to resume full sovereignty. But the Allies reaffirmed the local authority of the Czarist General Horvath, who continued to operate the Chinese Eastern Railway, act as ruler

of its adjacent zone and conscript Russians on Chinese territory for the "White" armies. At the same time they repeatedly denied the fact that Manchuria was being made a base for intervention in Russian internal affairs in Siberia, which was already being attacked by the bloodthirsty General Semenov, backed by British, French and Japanese arms and money and using Manchurian railways which the United States, prompted by the ever-watchful Harriman interests, was at last running, nominally for General Horvath as the representative of "legitimate Russian authority."

The question might be asked: If the Allies were not interfering in the home affairs of both China and Russia, what were they doing? The official answer at the time was that they were fighting Germany. Contemporary British and American newspapers were full of "reliable proofs" not only that Lenin and his Bolsheviks were all German agents, but that German prisoners in Siberia had been liberated and formed into an army to fight the pro-Allied Czech troops, Semenov and Horvath. The *New York Times* was particularly fertile in these inventions, which were afterwards exposed by two young American journalists, Walter Lippmann and Charles Merz, both now solid conservatives. It obscured the fact that reactionary failures were due to the opposition of the Russian people themselves, not of mercenary "Huns," and encouraged greater American intervention in Russia then just as it now encourages greater American intervention in China.

Because of the democratic honesty of General Graves, an earlier Stilwell who chose to stick to the letter of his innocuous sounding instructions rather than their reactionary inner sense, the American troops in Siberia did more to check the Japanese than to help them and the British against Russia's revolution. But the Allied intervention as a whole, basing itself on Manchuria, was not thrown off Russian soil until 1924, long after there were any Germans to worry about.

The whole subsequent development of Manchuria was conditioned by attempts to make it a base for new anti-Soviet attacks. This was the root of the complacency of both foreign and Chinese reactionaries to increasing Japanese inroads. The Russians of Siberia, remembering the immediate postwar years when their side of the border was drenched with the blood of worker guerillas and Jews, concentrated on the building of defence industries. Instead of making consumer goods to ease their own life, they had to worry about survival and turn out shells, which no one can eat. After the Japanese conquest of Manchuria, its Chinese inhabitants were harnessed to the invader's war economy. They laid down railways that had little economic significance but were needed for the projected Russian campaign. They erected factories which turned out arms, not clothes and farm tools. They cultivated crops but

did not eat them—because the crops were necessary to the Japanese Army's food stocks and, through soya-bean exports, for Tokyo's foreign-exchange reserves. Manchuria became by far the most developed part of China in industry and communications, yet her people were poorer than they had ever been before. Many of them revolted, and went to the mountains as partisans. And all whose ability to think had not been battered out of them yearned for the time when their land would no longer be a battlefield for others.

3. The Manchurian People and What They Want

To understand the provisions of the Sino-Soviet Treaty regarding Manchuria, and the events that afterwards occurred there, it is necessary to ask, and answer, several questions.

Who lives in Manchuria today?

Of the area's 40,000,000 people more than nine tenths are Chinese peasant settlers who came there during the past fifty years. The remainder are Mongols (in the western part), Koreans (in the east), Japanese and Russians. The never-numerous Manchus have practically disappeared as a separate people, mainly through cultural assimilation. Ethnically, Manchuria is Chinese, and the Japanese pretence of a separate "Manchukuoan" nationality had no basis.

Does Manchuria differ in any way from the rest of China?

Yes, it does. In China proper, land relations are based on immemorial feudal custom. Today's Manchuria is a fruit of imperialism, where foreign railway building preceded large-scale agricultural settlement. Land-grabbing by officials and war lords created huge estates with a large tenantry, as distinct from the small landlordism elsewhere in the country. There is less subsistence farming. A great proportion of the crop has been raised for export, with soya beans a major item. Light industries grew side by side with agriculture, but they processed its products for foreign sale instead of domestic use. Manchuria's transport network was built by Czarist Russia and Imperial Japan for strategic purposes and colonial exploitation. Japan, as we have said, created its heavy industries, metallurgy and mining, for war only.

After Japan's defeat, Manchuria continued to be different from other parts of China, but this time she was ahead politically as well as technically. Formerly the most imperialist-dominated, she became the most thoroughly cleansed, so far as Japanese troops, economic control and quislings were concerned, because the Red Army and peasant guerillas did not turn the puppets to their own use, as did America and the Kuomintang. In fact there was no Kuomintang there

at all to reimpose tight control and save feudalism, so she could get rid of this also. Since most of the big Manchurian landlords had been collaborationists, whose property was liable to confiscation, the agrarian reform here was even more thorough than in China's Communist-led areas, with actual division of estates instead of just rent reduction. No one prevented the enemy from surrendering to units of the people themselves. The tenant farmers turned property owners were free to defend their gains and give the means of doing so.

Is there any feeling for independence or autonomy?

For independence from China, definitely not. For a greater degree of internal home rule, definitely yes.

The people of Manchuria, threatened for forty years and dominated for fifteen by Japanese aggression, are deeply conscious of their Chinese nationality. They are violent Chinese patriots. It was Manchurian soldiers exiled within the Great Wall who kidnapped Chiang Kai-shek at Sian in 1936 to force him to quit the civil war and fight Japan.

On the other hand, the Manchurians are jealous local patriots also. Like the men of the American West in the last century, they are new people in a new territory and do not want local arrangements to be dictated from a distant capital. Moreover, they have had bitter experiences with recent Chinese Central Governments, which never helped them against foreign encroachments but on the contrary often made concessions at their expense. In American terms, they want to be treated as a constituent state, not a territory with no voice in its own affairs. The new social advance represented by the land reform will strengthen this tendency until all China goes forward in the same way.

How do the Manchurian people stand on the Kuomintang-Communist issue?

It was Manchuria's hatred of civil war, and insistence on all-Chinese unity to fight the national enemy, which led her Young Marshal to stage the Sian coup and sign a truce with the Communists, against whom he had been sent. For this he was arrested and held a prisoner by Chungking throughout the course of the war against Japan which followed. His continued detention was probably one of Chiang Kai-shek's greatest blunders, because it antagonized propertied Manchurian patriots as well as the peasants, who had no use for either the Kuomintang or their own landlords anyhow. One instalment of the pay-off came in 1946, when Chiang needed the Young Marshal once more and offered to release him if he would use his prestige to swing the Manchurian balance in the Kuomintang's favour. The Young Marshal refused, preferring to stay in confinement.

As for the Communists, they are no newcomers to the Manchurian

scene. From 1931 on, they were the backbone of the guerilla forces, later merged into the United Anti-Japanese Volunteer Army, which fought the occupying forces. After 1937, many professional officers from Manchuria, including such men as General Lu Cheng-tsao² and General Chang Hsueh-shih, the Young Marshal's younger brother, joined the Communist-led Eighth Route Army in North China. From 1942 on, units of the Eighth Route Army themselves penetrated into South Manchuria through the Great Wall.

How do the Manchurians feel about civil war?

The Manchurians know that civil strife within China has always opened the way for foreign control, and ultimately cost them their own provinces. The very first national united front, with all political factions co-operating as equals against Japan, was achieved in the ranks of the Manchurian guerillas in 1934, three years before the same thing happened elsewhere. Today the Manchurians, who have spent so long under the enemy yoke, do not want Chinese to fight Chinese again. They are especially averse to seeing conflict develop on their own soil. But they are also determined that the quislings and traitor landlords must not return, and they will not allow the authority of the Central Government, which they recognize, to be misused for this purpose. They know that the restitution of the old order means endless unrest, both internal and international, and if a fight is forced on them they would rather get it over with now. Because they do not want such a fight, they have a deep interest in negotiations for democratic solution at the centre.

What can Manchuria do for the rest of China, and the rest of China do for Manchuria?

Manchuria is the most industrialized part of the country. It is self-sufficient in food and minerals and has ample trade outlets, by railway to the Soviet Union and the rest of China, and by sea to all world ports. It has more to give the other provinces than they have to give it, if China is at peace and devotes her energies to internal economic development.

Economics apart, the rest of China has more to give Manchuria, which Japanese occupation isolated for so long from the main national currents. The Japanese did not allow Manchurians the privilege of higher education, except in a very few technical categories, for a period of fifteen years. They destroyed many Manchurian intellectuals and patriots and kept politics and administration in their own hands.

² See p. 81.

³ This is the root of the early identification of Manchurian intellectuals in Kuomintang China with the Democratic League.

Manchuria badly needs contact with the cultural advances, the democratic movement and the progressive developments, which, alongside the retrogressive ones, grew in the rest of China after 1937. It does not need any lessons in authoritarian control and feudal exploitation, of which it had quite enough under Japan's puppet Manchukuo. Here again we see the seeds of greater integration with the rest of China than ever existed before if all China moves forward in a democratic way; and the seeds of a determined separatism if she does not.

4. Manchuria, Russia and the 1945 Settlement

Now we can pass to Manchuria's relations with the Soviet Union, its great neighbour. What are the legitimate interests of the Soviet Union in the territory?

The Soviet Union's paramount interest is the security of its borders, which involves concern over any tendency to make Manchuria once more into a base for anti-Soviet threats. In this respect Manchuria stands to the Soviet Union as Mexico to the United States, or rather as Mexico would stand to the United States if she were a historic breeding ground of wars and a hostile occupying power had spent the last fifteen years developing the border as a jumping-off place for the invasion of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona and California.

The second interest is uninterrupted transit of goods over the east-west line of the Chinese Eastern (now Changchun) Railway, which shortens by five-hundred miles the travelling distance between the two Soviet cities of Chita, in the Baikal region, and Vladivostok in the Maritime Province. The third is free access to the port of Dairen, the only ice-free outlet available to the great Siberian land mass that is roughly the size of the whole United States. This interest is analogous to, but more vital than, that of the United States in the St. Lawrence Seaway project, which it shares with Canada. It also has points of similarity with United States' interest in the Panama Canal which, running through another country, provides the shortest water link between the American Atlantic and Pacific Coasts, and between the Eastern industrial area and Asiatic markets. Throughout diplomatic history, such interests have been secured either by aggression or by equal arrangements between friendly neighbours. Pre-revolutionary Russia, like the United States in Panama, took the first course. The Soviet Union, like the United States in its arrangements with Canada, took the second.

Both the Russia's experienced setbacks. The Czarist Empire lost both the use and the physical possession of Dairen and Port Arthur to Japan in 1905. The Soviet Union, in 1935, found itself compelled to choose between sacrificing its share in the Chinese Eastern Railway

and a new war with the Japanese. It then sold its half-share in the line to Japan's straw man, Manchukuo (which it nonetheless never recognized diplomatically). Thus it gained time to complete the Second and Third Five-Year Plans, and try to develop the framework of world security that finally crashed at Munich.

If the Soviet Union also claims interests in Manchuria, how does its policy with regard to this area, and to all China, differ from that of the Czars? Has it, as some charge, abandoned the tradition of Lenin and gone back to that of the Russian Empire?

Czarism, which laid down Manchuria's first railways, made inroads on Chinese sovereignty at the same time. It extorted the right, not only to develop a transportation short cut important to the Russian nation, but also to rule Dairen and Port Arthur. It stationed troops along the whole railway zone, which it administered colonially, much as the United States does the Panama Canal Zone. Like the other foreign powers in China, it also claimed extraterritorial rights for its subjects whether in the railway area or out of it.

The Soviet Government has followed another course. It voluntarily renounced extraterritoriality, administrative concessions, and the imposed treaty right of stationing troops in China in 1919—twenty-two years before Britain and the United States did. It has never tried to restore these privileges, and the treaty of 1945, denounced as “neo-Czarist” by the historically ignorant, did not seek to re-establish them. In the new agreement the Soviet Union even undertook not to transport troops *through* Manchuria, from one Russian city to another, except in time of war against Japan. The Soviet Union is also unable to use the railway to deliver weapons to any Chinese group in Manchuria, since the agreement provides that any arms carried on the railway must travel in sealed cars between Soviet points. The “railway zone” garrisoned by the Czar, and abolished in 1919, was not set up anew, even though Russia suffered badly through Chiang Kai-shek's utter failure to defend it against Japan. There is no “Panama Canal Zone” through Chinese territory. Under the treaty, both the civil administration and the military protection of the jointly owned railway are exclusively in Chinese hands. The treaty has been kept when civil war flared up in 1946, as Soviet railway personnel withdrew from both Kuomintang and Communist-held stretches of the line.

With regard to the railway there has been no departure from previous Soviet policy nor any reversion to that of pre-Soviet times. When the U.S.S.R. renounced the Czar's unequal treaty rights soon after the revolution, it did not at the same time renounce economic investment in the Chinese Eastern (Changchun) line, which was entirely Russian built! It gave up only the special political and military privi-

leges previously attached to this investment. The railway became a co-operative Sino-Soviet commercial enterprise, subject to Chinese laws, liable to complete repurchase by China and involving no derogation of sovereignty. In 1929, the Chinese provincial authorities, relying on the anti-Soviet sentiments of all foreign governments, attempted to eliminate the Soviet commercial interest by force. The Soviet Union used force to restore it, moving its troops across the border. But having done so it claimed no indemnity and no new rights whatsoever, evacuating Manchuria to the last man as soon as the mutually agreed previous arrangement was restored. This was entirely unprecedented in Far Eastern history, since other foreign powers which have used force to restore treaties imposed by military action in the first place have never failed both to claim new privileges and to make China pay the costs of their armed action against her.

A Soviet naval garrison in the joint fleet base of Port Arthur is allowed by the new treaty. Here the Soviet interest, and the maintenance arrangements, are comparable to those of the United States in its offshore Atlantic bases on British owned islands. The expenses of all installations and personnel are borne by the U.S.S.R. and not paid by the Chinese Government, or by the local people out of taxes and levies—as was the case under the Czar and the Japanese and is still the practice in Hong Kong. The civil administration of Port Arthur remains Chinese. The treaty provides that these rights terminate in 30 years when “all equipment and public property put up by the U.S.S.R. . . . be handed over *without compensation* and become the property of the Chinese Government.” Within that time, presumably, China will become strong enough navally to ensure the safety of her shores, or the development of the United Nations will make bases and navies altogether unnecessary.

Returning to the question of border security—is the situation of Soviet Russia as regards Manchuria different from that of her predecessor?

Yes, it is. Czarist Russia entered the scene with the aim of sharing in what appeared to be the imminent inter-imperialist partition of China. At that time Manchuria was a completely undeveloped area, not yet penetrated by either foreign investment or substantial Chinese colonization. In the succeeding half century Manchuria grew into a battleground of foreign influences and outstripped the adjacent Soviet Far East in industry, transport and population. As such, as we have seen already, it was utilized first to impede the consolidation of the Russian Revolution and later as an outpost of anti-Soviet intrigue. From 1931 on Japan undertook tremendous strategic construction. She matched her resultant offensive strength against the defenses of the

Soviets on the Sungari islands in 1937, at Changkufeng in 1938 and at Nomonhan on the Mongolian border in 1939. Only the hard work of the Soviet population and the power of the Red Army ensured the defeat of these sorties, and discouraged Japan from larger adventures. Today, while there is no evidence that the Soviet Union seeks territory in Manchuria, from which its last soldier withdrew in April 1946, it certainly does seek safety guarantees which will preclude renewed danger to the border and make possible the undistorted peaceful development of East Siberian economy.

Has the Soviet Union ever dealt with autonomous Manchurian regimes rather than the Chinese Central Government?

The whole record of Soviet foreign policy shows that it wishes to see China united, and does not claim the right to dictate the form of her national or local governments. Whenever Chinese central control has been effective in Manchuria and channels have existed in dealing with the Central Government, the Soviet Union has dealt with it alone. Thus, the Soviet Union has never accorded diplomatic recognition to any separatist regime in Manchuria. But it has dealt with such regimes on local questions when there was no one else to deal with. It conducted trade talks and concluded a railway convention with the semi-independent warlord Chang Tso-lin and parleyed with the Young Marshal, Chang Hsueh-liang, and the Japanese occupying authorities when it had no diplomatic relations with the Chinese Republic as a whole (prior to 1924 and between 1927 and 1932) and after China lost control of Manchuria in 1931. But such dealings never concerned Chinese sovereign rights, being confined to arrangements regarding existing Soviet interests and the welfare of Soviet citizens. Why did the Soviet Union remove machinery from Manchuria? Did it have the right to do so? What, and how much, did it take away?

The Red Army removed no industrial equipment that was Chinese property prior to the Japanese occupation. It did take to Russia what is variously estimated at between 10 and 25 per cent of the plant installed by Japan afterwards. As already stated, the overwhelming bulk of such industry (including steel, armaments, aircraft plants, oil refineries, synthetic rubber plants and automobile factories) was founded and owned by the Japanese Army to supply its projected "Operation Siberia." This never came off, but the threat of it forced Moscow to spend billions on its own Far Eastern installations, keep a million men under arms in a region with less than ten million inhabitants, and finally launch a major military campaign. The Soviet Union therefore claimed the right to dismantle Japanese arsenals, fortifications and airfields and remove, or have a voice in the use of, strategic industries built by Japan. The quest for safeguards of this kind was natural because of

the origin and nature of the industries and because of the long-standing anti-Soviet attitude of Chiang Kai-shek. It would certainly have involved no friction, and a less drastic military deindustrialization of border areas would have been ended, if China had a democratic government which was neither interested in civil war nor given to exacerbating Soviet-Western frictions for its own political ends.

How do the people of Manchuria feel about the U.S.S.R.?

The Soviet Union liberated Manchuria after a decade and a half of servitude. It put an end to puppet administrations in record time. While unreservedly acknowledging the right of the Central Government to administer the area, it did not get in the way of post-liberation measures by the people themselves. Its armies evacuated completely after delaying their withdrawal twice, curiously enough, because Chiang Kai-shek asked them to. Chiang wanted of the Red Army not only to hand over the towns it held to his administrators, which it did, but to disarm and check popular guerilla formations throughout Manchuria. The Red Army refused the latter job, which it considered none of its business. In revenge, the Kuomintang developed large-scale anti-Soviet agitation throughout China, first because the Russians "would not leave," and then, when they did go, because "they pulled out without making sure that the Chinese Communists did not move in afterwards." The people of Manchuria, however, were grateful both because the Red Army drove out the Japanese and because it left without giving them over, bound hand and foot, to the landlords and feudalists.

But even before their subjugation by Japan, the Manchurian people had had a good opinion of Soviet citizens and Soviet enterprises. In the previous period of joint Russo-Chinese railway control, the Soviet side of the administration always tried to ensure equal wages for Russian and Chinese workers of equal qualifications, and the equal allotment of funds from railway income for workers' social services, hospitals, clubs and schools. No other foreign enterprise in China has ever given equal pay for equal work, or equal privileges to both nationalities. This would have violated the basic principle of colonial relations: to take advantage of cheap labour and strengthen, instead of removing, barriers between "native" and "homeside" staffs. Tens of thousands of workers and clerks who benefited from the Chinese Eastern Railway's employment practices spread its fame throughout the country. Manchurian Chinese will value such policies all the more, after years of slavery to the Japanese "master race." They are well aware that, despite much talk of a "New Deal" in the East, neither American nor British capital participation as yet offers similar practical proof to the rank-and-file Chinese that he is considered the peer of any white man with the same work-output.

In reading this survey, it will not escape the reader that the Manchurian problem has plagued China at times when her Central Governments have been unable to unify the people by satisfying them, and have instead resorted to invariably unsuccessful "unification by force." Manchuria has disordered world relations when such unpopular Chinese governments have allowed themselves to be bullied by imperialist powers, served as their cat's-paws, or tried to evade their own difficulties by tempting contending foreign forces to do battle on the Manchurian plains. Nothing has shown more clearly than the history of Manchuria the necessity of a strong, united, federal, democratic China both for China's own welfare and for the world's peace. Given at last the approach to such a China, the Manchurian question too could have been solved forever by a truly democratic reconstruction of Soviet-Chinese-American relations after Japan was knocked out. The Sino-Soviet Treaty provided one cornerstone of such an arrangement. But it did not come off.

XVII. ARE WE BACK WHERE WE STARTED?

1. An Old Stage is Reset

THE REASON IT DID NOT COME OFF LAY IN WORLD AS WELL AS LOCAL politics. On every continent, in the year that followed victory, the task of peace-making was accompanied by a race for new strategic positions, and by trumpet-calls for a holocaust more horrible than the last. The alliance against the Axis had comprised many different elements. Capitalist, feudal and socialist states, empires and their subject peoples, conservatives, liberals and Communists within each nation, had briefly stood together against the common menace of conquest. Now the peoples looked to a new world arising out of the defeat of fascism and asked delivery on the promises so lavishly uttered in the course of the war. But many in the seats of power wanted only to return to the world that existed before the Axis arose. As we have seen from our excursions into history—and the toilers of all lands and the oppressed colonial peoples on whose back it rested had always known—that world was a bad one. It had carried fascism and war in its womb, spawned them on the earth, and could do so again.

Before the bodies of the men who died for victory in United Nations armies, national liberation guerilla forces and underground movements had been gathered up, their hopes were being flouted and the banners under which they had fought replaced by the four standards of the past. Men and parties were judged not on what they had done in World War II but on how useful they might be in World War III—a war to cancel the future and chastise slaves who had dared to dream of freedom. Already in evidence before V-E and V-J Days, these ideas were openly proclaimed by Churchill in his Fulton, Missouri, speech. President Truman stood beside him as he elaborated them; in the traditional "blood is thicker than water" pose.

A Germany not too different from the old was being built up. Her "displaced person" victims, Jewish and otherwise, lived on in camps. Hirohito's palace was guarded against his own awakened people (how we would have greeted anti-imperial demonstrations in Tokyo during the war) by armed Americans. Goering was hanged, but Schacht and Von Papen of German Big Business, who had laid the way for him, were declared innocent. Some quarters even argued for amnesty for Goering and the destruction of Tito.

In America, officials, writers and broadcasters who had exposed fascism were hunted from government posts, the big press, and the radio networks. At the same time traitors who had spoken for the enemy were accorded tender clemency. "Tokyo Rose," "Axis Sally," and Donald Day were U.S. citizens who had mocked the blood of American fighters at Guadalcanal, Tarawa and the Rapido River. They had twisted the jagged knife of homesickness in the hearts of their countrymen so that Germans and Japanese might kill them more easily. Now they were cleared of responsibility before the law and allowed once more to spread fascist poison. Nazi scientists who had built Hitler's horror weapons were brought to the United States, where the army tried to get them posts in the universities and even promised them citizenship. Antifascist American scientists like Dr. Harlow Shapley of Harvard were humiliated by the Rankin "un-American" committee.

Among the Far Eastern and coloured peoples, United Nations' armies that had been expected to bring liberation were turned by their leaders to the tasks of imperialism. The extent to which men's hopes were betrayed can be seen from the words of General Stilwell, a model fighter in democracy's cause. In a private letter on July 21, 1945, Stilwell had written:

"I'm for the little fellow, the inarticulate bird, the guy without backing. I am wholly sold on this generation of Americans, and I am quite at home among them. I find truck drivers more interesting and more real than bankers. I sympathize with the average GI, who is making a greater sacrifice in relation to his resources and his future than anyone else."

No other Western or war leader had spoken in a voice so close to the people and it was this that the men who served under Stilwell, whether Americans or Chinese, saw in the general they would go through hell for. It was also this that feudalists like Chiang Kai-shek and imperialists of the Mountbatten stripe had hated in him.

On October 8, 1945, a few weeks after V-J Day, the same Stilwell, who now held a command under MacArthur at Okinawa, decided that

he no longer wanted to return with the U.S. Army to the country which he loved most next to his own. He wrote:

"Things did not work out over here the way I had been led to expect. I ran into policies and prejudices which reconcile me to going home, and I am particularly relieved at not being sent to China. Under the circumstances it would be very trying."

A close friend of General Marshall's, Stilwell at first hoped that mediation in China would substitute democratic decency for reactionary intervention. But what he saw in the inner circles of the Pentagon and the Washington administration disillusioned him. On April 16, 1946, he wrote:

"George Marshall can't walk on water. It makes me itch to throw down my shovel and get over there and shoulder a rifle with Chu Teh."

Chu Teh is a Communist. Stilwell was not. Chu Teh is the Commander in Chief of the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the Democratic Joint Army of Manchuria, the forces of China's Liberated Areas. His was the side that Stilwell, champion of the ordinary American, wanted to win in China. But it was the side Stilwell's government was helping to wipe out.

Was Stilwell being "un-American"? Yes, if George Washington was un-American, and if Abraham Lincoln was un-American when he stood firm against colonial grabbing in China and interference in her internal affairs in the 1860's. Yes, if Commodore Tatnall who wanted to be Britain's partner in conquest and Frederick Townsend Ward, who took money from the Shanghai merchants and the Manchu-landlord rulers to shoot Chinese peasants, were the true Americans of their day. But if Lincoln was more American than the Tatnalls and Wards of the middle nineteenth century and the Wall Street diplomats of the early twentieth, then Stilwell was more American than the pied pipers of the "American century" today.

2. U.S. Policy in 1945-46: Words Vs. Action

The policies that led Stilwell to his last stated position were branded in stinging words by Brigadier-General Evans F. Carlson, U.S. Marines (retired), another outstanding figure of the Pacific War. "It is my considered opinion that future generations will regard the betrayal of the Chinese people by the American government during the Truman administration as one of the greatest errors ever made in American diplomacy."

Carlson wrote on November 17, 1946.¹

Madame Sun Yat-sen, widow of the founder of the Chinese Republic and universally respected symbol of the strivings of her countrymen for unity and progress, had said in an appeal to the United States the previous summer:

"The present crisis is not a question of who wins, the Kuomintang or the Communists. It is a question of the Chinese people, their unity and livelihood. . . . Not party rights but human rights hang in the balance.

"The American people, who are our allies and have long been our friends, must be told that this is the road to disaster. They must be told that the presence of United States armed forces on Chinese soil is not strengthening peace and order among the Chinese people. They must be warned that loans should be given only to a reorganized and truly representative government. . . . that if America makes it plain that she will not supply munitions or military equipment, there will be no spreading Chinese civil war."²

These statements and appeals notwithstanding, American aid to Chiang Kai-shek's civil war went on.

It continued despite President Truman's own policy message of December 15, 1945, which declared that the United States was "cognizant that the present National Government of China is a one-party government. In that document, the President announced solemnly that "the achievement of political unity in China must be worked out by the Chinese themselves and that intervention by any foreign government would be inappropriate." He advocated an immediate cease-fire and a broadened Chinese government with all parties represented, pledged that there would be no "United States military intervention to influence the course of any Chinese civil strife" and promised that China would receive credits only as she "moves toward peace and unity." But things went on as before.

It continued despite the Moscow Big Three Conference decisions of the same month, which stressed the need for "participation by all democratic elements in all branches of the (Chinese) National Government" and put America, Russia and Britain on record as affirming "adherence to the policy of noninterference in the internal affairs of China." U.S. Secretary of State Byrnes and Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov announced "complete accord of the desirability of the withdrawal of Soviet and American forces from China at the earliest practi-

¹ Statement to the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy, New York.

² New York Times, July 22, 1946.

eable moment consistent with the discharge of their obligations and responsibilities." But while the Russians pulled back into their treaty enclave in the Port Arthur-Dairen area, U.S. forces remained in all parts of the country.

President Truman's speech and the Moscow decisions were stated to be the directives binding General Marshall's mediatory activity. But when Chiang Kai-shek went back on the political and military agreements which he, Marshall and the Chinese opposition parties had signed, the United States still went on helping him and him alone. If Marshall had been honest, as Stilwell expected him to be, he could have resigned when the policy of his own government made a mockery of his supposed role. Instead, he became the executor of that policy, besmirching his fine record as a military organizer in the antifascist war.

At the very time Marshall's Executive Headquarters arranged armistice, the U.S. army and navy increasingly supplied Chiang's men and moved them to strategic civil war positions. This enabled the Kuomintang to use truce periods merely as convenient pauses in military operations, while it prepared new attacks. Instead of aiding China's peaceful rehabilitation, United States policy actually hindered it both directly and indirectly. Chiang Kai-shek, encouraged in his civil war effort, committed all his resources to military mobilization. His V-J Day promise to the peasants that he would remit taxes for one year and stop conscription were forgotten. American as well as Chinese transport was diverted from carrying relief and rehabilitation supplies to feeding the fronts with material and men. Instead of grain to save Chinese lives in famine areas, U.S. ships shifted soldiers and arms to kill Chinese men and women.

Even UNRRA was harnessed to the task. Its China operations were perverted to the pattern of the notorious Hoover food missions to Europe after World War I, which were used not to alleviate suffering but to starve popular movements and reward reaction. Over the protests of 300 American UNRRA employees in China, 98 per cent of all aid went to the Kuomintang, and less than 2 per cent to the Liberated Areas. The Liberated Areas comprised over a third of the country's population and the great majority of Chinese living in actual war devastated regions, which were supposed to be UNRRA's exclusive concern.

U.S. aid to Chiang ran the whole scale from a gift of 271 naval ships to the provision of special silent pistols used by American cloak-and-dagger outfits during World War II. It was given not as China "moved toward peace and unity" but as she moved into civil war and ruin.

U.S. correspondents in the Liberated Areas had the dubious plea-

sure of being bombed and shelled with Chinese civilians, by American-made planes which could not stay in the air for five minutes if they were not continually supplied with American high octane gas and armament, and serviced by American technicians. The silent pistols developed by the Navy acquired a particularly melancholy significance. They were used by Chiang's secret police to assassinate American-trained liberal intellectuals, leaders of the Democratic League like Professors Wen I-to and Li Kung-po.

The American-owned Shanghai *China Weekly Review* expressed the question in the minds of many people on the spot when it editorialized:

"For our part we are still attempting to figure out whether General Marshall has come here as an American mediator or as the commander of the combined American-Nationalist forces in the crusade against Yen-an."

3. What was Bought and Who Paid?

By the end of 1946, fifty-seven Kuomintang divisions, totalling 707,200 men, had been trained and equipped by Americans, *two thirds of them after V-J Day*. A U.S. Navy training school at Tsingtao was graduating amphibious units at the rate of 1,000 men every three months. Chinese air cadets were being trained both in the United States and in China. The training of secret agents, carried on by the Navy during the war was continued by FBI (American federal police instructors). Thirteen Kuomintang armies, totalling 473,000 men, had been moved to civil war fronts by sea and air. Of these eight armies and 12 regiments of engineers had gone to Manchuria, the part of China lying adjacent to Russia. President Truman later reported, officially that the air transport of four armies alone had cost the United States \$300,000,000.

In money aid to Chiang, including loans and discounts on surplus materials, cost the American tax-payer some \$3,600,000,000—or over \$23 for each man, woman and child in the United States in the year 1946. Hugh Bryson, a West Coast labour leader, worked out what it meant to American wage-earners:

"If the three or four billion dollar expenditures to China had been eliminated from the national budget, the ten million lowest

¹*China Weekly Review*, June 22, 1946. This magazine is owned by J. E. Powell, a foremost partisan of Chiang Kai-shek in American controversies, and edited by his son, John William Powell in Shanghai. The divergence between what Powell says in the United States and what his own magazine writes in Shanghai marks the distinction between "official" picture given to the American people and reality as seen on the spot.

income tax-payers could have saved more than \$300 each in taxes. The single worker who earns \$50 a week is today paying a tax \$6.50 a week or more than \$350 a year. To put it another way, the same single worker, if he received a 17 cent hourly wage increase since V-J Day has had to turn the whole amount of the increase back in taxes to finance the China programme along."

Even if we do not count the lives and damage due to civil war, Chinese people paid more for Chiang's battles than the Americans. Even the Kuomintang government admitted that 80 per cent of its 1946 budget went for civil war, and that nine tenths of that budget was already exhausted by the middle of the year. China is an agricultural country, and the land tax is her main item of revenue. Since large sections of her rural countryside were in the Liberated Areas, and thus inaccessible to Kuomintang tax-collectors, and peasants had risen in armed revolt in many places against the inordinate burden they were being forced to bear within Chiang's own sphere of control, this financial resource was largely unavailable. Chiang's treasury therefore passed some of the burden on to Chinese private industry, which was already having a hard enough time. But most of all it covered its expenses by running bank notes off the press. Inflation soared to heights that were fantastic, even for China, rocketing far more rapidly after V-J Day than before.

Neither the American nor the Chinese people were given all these facts, but they did not like the little they knew. U.S. servicemen in the China Theatre were among the most enthusiastic participants in the "We Want to Go Home" demonstrations at the end of the war, and the files of the Mead Committee, which investigated the situation, bulged with their complaints. A nationwide poll conducted by the National Broadcasting Company after one of its network forums showed that Americans were opposed to keeping troops in China, the negative vote running 3 to 1 on the East Coast, 5 to 3 in the Midwest, and 2 to 1 in the South and West. Symbolically, one parade of homesick GI's in Shanghai actually encountered another of Chinese students who carried slogans asking them to leave. A "Get the Troops Out of China" week in America in October 1946 occurred simultaneously with one in China. An attempt was made to brand both as "Red." In reality the American campaign was supported by such elements as businessmen and preachers, as well as labour. And in China it was a nationwide mass movement, embracing millions of patriots.

Chinese soldiers, like Americans, did not want to be kept under arms for civil war. No less than 300,000 of them went over to the Liberated Areas or declared themselves "neutral" in whole divisions.

during 1946. By the end of the year, the Communist-led armies, which Chiang was fighting, announced that they had equipped six of their own divisions completely with U.S. arms—taken in battle or brought over by surrendering elements. American newspapermen confirmed this by eyewitness accounts and photographs. But whoever got the arms, the Chinese people would much rather wish they had not been there at all.

4. The Profits of Intervention

As had happened in all past interventions, even when undertaken for "ideological" motives, opportunities for profit were not neglected. Just as the imperial Manchu government had paid its foreign backers with surrenders to Chinese sovereignty and mortgages on China's future, Chiang was constrained to pay for the U.S. policy of "assistance to China" in the same coin. Fearful that American corporations might tire of supporting a seemingly endless civil war, he tried to whet their appetite by promises of big killings once he got the country under his control.

A new American-Chinese trade treaty announced on November 4, 1946, professed to give "equal rights" to American commerce and investment in China and Chinese commerce and investment in the United States. Such a treaty between the world's most advanced industrial power and an undeveloped country like China is of course not equal at all. The United States now espouses the principle of international free trade, because it can afford it. But it built up its own industries throughout the nineteenth century behind the wall of a high protective tariff. Economic self-defence is an essential part of national independence. In competitive, profit-ruled world it is imperative to any nation whose industries are young. The only way to build factories at home is by controlling imports—making sure that machines that cannot be made domestically are admitted in greater quantity than consumer's goods. Until home industries grow strong, the latter compete with local production, drive existing plants out of business, and discourage native industrialists.

In postwar China's first trade year, the great majority of imports were quick profit items such as high-grade American cigarettes, textiles, nylon stockings, canned foods and drugs, which only the rich in China can afford and which merchants imported for speculative purposes. Machines did not make up even a tenth of the total, although they were what China needed most of all. Since the rich in China are few, and it does not take much to satisfy their need for automobiles and foreign luxuries, such trade cannot expand. It leaves China's

"400,000,000 customers" a myth. While it wrecks Chinese light industry, it is of no long-range advantage to America's, or the world's, economy.

If, on the other hand, the great land of China were industrializing, the market for heavy goods would be tremendous. In due course, as industry brought better incomes to her workers, millions instead of thousands of people would be able to buy imported consumption goods also. Once again it must be said that agriculture is China's main industry. Its modernization would mean immediate purchases of hundreds of thousands of the farm machines America makes so well, and where the appropriate machines do not exist, as for wet rice cultivation, they could be devised. China would need them for a long period and by the time she could make her own, her country would be big enough and people prosperous enough to buy many other things.

What stood in the way was the imperialist appetite of ruling U.S. capitalist groups, which preferred domination even to commercial profits, and the landlord government that the United States so ardently supported. Under it, China's miserable sharecroppers must remain too poor, and their plots too small, for any farm machinery or even chemical fertilizers to be bought and used. China's landlords, who can charge whatever rents they please, consider themselves well enough off as they are, and also have no urge to engage in large-scale modern farming.

The Liberated Areas, with their "labour exchange" groups have produced well-to-do peasants. These already farm their land in large tracts and could buy tools to use in common. But in 1946-47 they were blockaded. Their example could not be followed in the rest of China so long as the Central Government was a landlord monopoly. America continued to help that landlord monopoly in an effort to destroy that example where it already exists.

While the new trade treaty caters to monopoly greeds and encourages big-time U.S. operators to think that they, rather than the Chinese, can somehow industrialize China when peace and order are restored, it really perpetuates this hopeless situation. From the very start it aroused the ire of Chinese businessmen, formerly notably pro-American.

A New York Herald Tribune correspondent reported that Shanghai "sidewalk comment compares the rights given by the treaty to equal rights given an automobile and a ricksha to the use of the street. The street belongs to both of them, but there is no question which can seize the bigger share."

The Shanghai business organ *Ta Kung Pao* had called attention to the fact that "even a highly developed industrial and trading nation

like Great Britain dares not engage in free trade with the United States. . . . We cannot understand why our government has not sought some protection for our domestic industries, our economy and the livelihood of our people."

In fact the new treaty was not even equal in the formal sense, but resembled much more an "arrangement" with a colonial satellite. Negotiations leading up to it did not even touch the fact that the immigration of Chinese to the United States is subject to a discriminating limit of 100 individuals a year, while Americans have no difficulty in going to China. U.S. State legislation, especially on the West Coast, abridges the commercial rights of foreigners and the human as well as economic rights of Asiatics. The new pact allows American ships to navigate in China's internal waters, but no foreign ships of any kind are allowed to engage in coastal or river trade between American ports which independent countries quite properly regard as a national preserve. Moreover, the United States has a big merchant marine while China has none, and can only acquire what America is willing to sell her on credit.

An Air Navigation agreement signed subsequently is equally dubious. China does not manufacture a single plane, yet the Kuomintang gave America the virtual freedom of China's air in return for "reciprocal" rights to fly routes to America. The scramble for the internal air-routes of China has already started, with Kuomintang connivance. One particularly scandalous episode was exposed in the American-owned *Shanghai China Weekly Review* on September 28:

"About nine months ago, ex-Flying Tiger General Claire L. Chennault brought up his Mercy Squadron scheme to rush aid to Honan's starving. He conjured up a great humanitarian project. Today, however, the same squadron will have about as much humanitarianism behind it as the facade of a Shanghai banking institution. . . . In plain words, Chennault is angling for the creation of a commercial airline.

"If General Chennault desires . . . to help Chinese famine victims . . . why not have him work on a salary basis? . . . CNRRA (the official Kuomintang organisation for relief distribution) may have to wind up, as soon as all UNRRA supplies have been delivered sometime in the early part of 1947. What is Chennault going to do with his airline then. Scrap it? Or go into regular business on the profits he has made hauling 'mercy' supplies. . . ."

Early in February 1947 the Chinese Communists, who already controlled a third of China's population, announced that neither they nor any coalition in which they might participate would recognize the

Sino-American Trade Treaty. The same applied to the Air Pact and all loan or other obligations, assumed by Chiang's one-party Kuomintang regime after January 19, 1946. The Democratic League endorsed this attitude.

This was not surprising. The treaty represented payment by Chiang for aid to his military effort to wipe out the opposition. The loans made to him after that date were also used for civil war.

The reason for the January 1946 deadline was that, under agreements then reached, the all-party People's Consultative Council became the trustee of national power. The agreements reached by the Council would have led to a democratic coalition government if Chiang had not violated them. It was American aid to Chiang that had encouraged the violation. From the point of view of other groups, the continuance of the one-party government after that date was illegal, as so were its actions in the field of foreign affairs.

As it became clear that Chiang was not going to win the civil war, the U.S. State Department found itself in a predicament. If the Kuomintang survived at all, it would only be by sharing power. But a shared government would not honour civil war commitments.

The diplomatic plums garnered in the course of aid to Chiang Kai-shek began to look dangerously like lemons.

5. The Popular Movement, Prestige and Imperialism

All these converging tendencies led to an explosion—the anti-American student movement that began in January 1947. We have explained what student movements in China have signified, and why. Chinese students regard themselves as the administrators and leaders of the country in the future. They do not rise in a body merely because the peasants and workers are oppressed, because, whatever their sympathies, they represent an upper group. They go out into the streets only when they feel the whole country is being sold out from under them. They begin to act when the Chinese middle class sees no hope in things as they are and has become just as dissatisfied as the peasants and city poor.

The student movement of 1919, directed at the award of Shantung to Japan at Versailles, was followed, in a short space, by the emergence of modern Chinese nationalism. The student movement of 1925 was a prelude to the first united front, and the great military effort of 1926-27 that would have rid China of her colonial shackles if Chiang Kai-shek and his crowd had not feared their own people so much that they split the movement and sold out to imperialism on the very threshold of victory. The anti-Japanese student movement of 1935 was followed in

a year by the Sian Incident, which forced Chiang Kai-shek into war with Japan. Now the target of student hatred became the United States, so long regarded as a friend.

The immediate cause of the demonstrations was an accusation of rape brought against a U. S. Marine. It climaxed a series of incidents involving the American forces, to whom Chiang Kai-shek had granted immunity from Chinese law, and whom his censorship forbade the Chinese press to criticise. By all accounts, including those of American correspondents, the soldiers and Marines in China were really acting disgracefully. The combat men who had gone through the discipline of war had returned home. The new contingents could not see why they were in China at all. They were demoralized by inaction, and failed to understand why the people whom they were told they were "helping" did not want them around. They knew, as they could not help knowing, that China's government itself could not stand without U.S. propping. So they felt like masters among an inferior race—and behaved accordingly.

But this was only the spark that set the tinder on fire. Rapes and killings by U.S. army personnel had occurred even during the war, but had not caused mass protest while America was fighting the common enemy. Now Americans were facilitating a civil war that no Chinese wanted and supporting a regime which most Chinese found intolerably oppressive. Some of the slogans carried by parades in Shanghai, Peiping, Nanking and Tientsin were purely vituperative—as was to be expected when many a hungry, outraged student with a brush and a placard, wrote his own. Some were objectively unjust, declaring that America was worse than Japan, but nonetheless worthy of attention because resentment leading to such statements must be deep indeed. But the main slogans, and the demands of the representative student committees, touched the essence of the problem. They said: "GI Get Out;" "GI Go Home to Your Wife;" and "We Want a New U.S. Policy toward China."

The reaction of many Americans was one of offense or contempt. The latter especially was dangerous. The prewar Japanese too had been attacked by student demonstrations when their China policy got into military hands, as American policy had now done. Japan's rulers, strong beyond comparison with the apparent fighting potential of the Chinese, had discounted them. Yet the spirit the demonstrations represented had thrown all China, the people as well as the army, into a struggle against them. And all this time, no doubt, Mr. Suzuki, the average Japanese, must have felt pretty much as most American newspaper readers did. Not understanding imperialism or wanting to believe ill of his own people, he had listened willingly when told that

Chinese denunciations were the work of "Red agitators stirring up immature minds." We all know that Mr. Suzuki let himself in for plenty of trouble. The world held him equally guilty with his ambitious military officers because he had not curbed them in time and took no excuses.

Though the comparison with previous aggressions against the Chinese people may fall down in detail, it is basically correct. Once again, the old classic pattern of imperialism was working. American help to Chinese reaction had become a commitment to Chinese reaction—and identification of interests.⁴ American diplomacy acquired privileges from Chiang Kai-shek for which the rest of China did not feel any moral responsibility. It therefore had to protect the privileges by defending Chiang even more zealously than before. Having reached this position, it was naturally anxious to think well of him and his chances, against all contrary evidence, and even to sell the democratic pretences of the dictator to the American people. Where the treasure is, there is the heart.

Moreover, the factor of prestige, that good old handmaid of imperialism everywhere, had come into play. Was a mistaken policy to be recognised as such after so many millions of dollars had been expended on it? Were the American forces, which had acquired victory and the atom bomb to run before a "mob" of skinny students? Russian writers had criticized U.S. troops in China. Was America to retreat from a *Pravda* editorial? U.S. newspapers which had steadily demanded the withdrawal of troops in China, began to say that it would be a Chinese Boston Massacre, with Americans in the role of the cials explained sagely that retirement at the moment would be interpreted abroad as government weakness before domestic critics such as Henry Wallace and people to the left of him. Error has its own logic.

But the Chinese people would not wait. They had had enough of U.S. arms killing their brothers and U.S. soldiers walking around their country as if they owned it. They had had enough of Americans sleeping with their women, whether by duress or because American young men had full pockets and could feed a famished girl, whereas Chinese young men could not.

Would it come to American troops "getting tough", and being ordered to fire on Chinese who only wanted them to go? Would there be a Chinese Boston Massacre, with Americans in the role of the

⁴ The Kuomintang, whose real control takes in less and less of China all the time, is falling into something of the same position in relation to the United States and China striving against feudalism and for true national freedom as the princely states have so long occupied in relation to Britain and the people's movement in India.

Redcoats—in Amritsar massacre by U.S. forces in an "independent" country? Would there be a new phase of the shooting "gunboat diplomacy," and a new legacy of historic hatred? There has not been, up to the time of this writing. But it may happen before these words appear in print.

The events that unfolded in January, 1947, were what Stilwell feared. Perhaps it is a good thing that he did not live to see them.

6. Chiang's Ace-in-the-Hole: the Russian Bogey

We have already had occasion to note how a Japanese diplomat, wittily explaining his defence of aggression against China in the halls of the League of Nations, said that you had only to make Western diplomats see Red (Russia) to make them forget the difference between black and white. The same technique had been used by Hitler and Franco in their time, and after V-J Day it began to be used by Chiang Kai-shek.

Madame Sun Yat-sen was among the many authoritative Chinese to expose these tactics, for anyone who cared to listen.

"We are threatened," she said, "by a civil war into which reactionaries hope to draw America, thus involving the whole world. Civil war cannot bring unity, liberation or livelihood.

"The peasants will support the Communists, who give them land and lower taxes. . . . Why then do the reactionaries inflame a war which they cannot win? Because they hope that civil conflict in China will incite a war between America and the U.S.S.R., and thus at last crush the Chinese Communists. . . . The first flame of a world conflagration is burning in our land."

Despite the lessons that should have been thoroughly learned from World War II, Chiang's technique worked. It worked largely because many U.S. political and military groups had the same idea themselves. By V-J Day, fighting Russia had become a constant theme of talk in the entourage of MacArthur, Wedemeyer and Hurley, as well as in Washington.

From there, it went on step by step. General Stilwell, as his letters show, believed that Russia's removal of Manchurian machinery was a defensive reaction to the beating of war drums by Kuomintang and American officers. Yet this reaction was presented to the American and world public as an offensive move. Under the propaganda barrage, few used their heads to ask why, if Russia wanted to fight, she did not stay in Manchuria and operate its war industries, instead of simply dismounting them to prevent their use for attack.

The argument that Soviet base facilities at Port Arthur implied

aggressive action also falls down. Russia has a tiny fleet. Even if she builds madly for twenty years she can hardly match America and Britain because her ships must be spread over three oceans and the Caspian and Black seas, one of which is completely landlocked and the other hemmed in by the Dardanelles. And the whole Port Arthur arrangement is for thirty years. Manchuria's plains and factories, on the other hand, would have given both striking power and a battlefield to Russia's land forces which at the end of World War II were the largest in the world—if her ambitions had lain that way.

Yet before the victory year was out, the United States was putting in its own installations in ports close to Manchuria and Russia and six thousand miles from its own shores. When Chiang's troops had been transported and the Japanese evacuated (America's "only duties", according to her spokesmen), the installations remained. By December 18, 1946, President Truman was saying that American troops had to be kept in North China to protect the shore establishments at Tsingtao. The State Department made such a fuss when newspapers termed Tsingtao a "base" instead of an "anchorage", that everyone naturally suspected that the Kuomintang had really given America a long-time base there.

In big Manchurian cities that Chiang occupied, he sanctioned the opening of U.S. Consulates that had many more employees than there were American citizens in all Manchuria. The Chinese Communists suspected the Consulates of serving as co-ordination centres for Kuomintang-American strategy and refused to allow the opening of others in their own areas which could communicate with those on the Kuomintang side under diplomatic immunity. The Russians became more and more uneasy. They pulled many of their residents, and all their railway technicians, out of areas on both sides of the lines from which their army had already gone. Their wariness made it a little more difficult for Chiang to promote a clash. But he could draw a profit from this also by pointing out to Washington that being tough paid, and being tougher would pay still more.

When the Russians brought up the question of American participation in China's civil war in the United Nations Assembly late in 1946, they were accused of propaganda. Surely it is an indication of their will to peace that they tried to have the matter out in the international forum instead of on the spot. After all they had much stronger forces available on their own side of the Manchurian border than America had in all China. With America helping the Kuomintang, they could have helped the Chinese Communists in equal or greater measure without incurring too much censure from fair minded people. Finally they, no less than America, could bring diplomatic pressure on

Chiang Kai-shek that he would find very difficult to resist. Up to the moment of writing they have done none of these things. If their words at Lake Success were blunt, their actions in the Far East showed that they wanted to return to the working basis arrived at in Yalta.

The result was that the Russians were pressed still more. As the United Nations Assembly broke up, an American naval vessel engaged in routine transport of a diplomatic courier tied up at Dairen for a 48-hour stay. When the stay expired it requested not only an extension but the right to land a Standard Oil man, for whom no diplomatic clearance had previously been given. The Russian commander stated that he had no authority to allow this, and asked the ship to leave. The whole proceeding was reported by a correspondent of the "hate Russia" Scripps-Howard newspaper chain who, appropriately enough, had been taken along by the Navy to represent the combined U.S. press on the trip.

The correspondent, William H. Newton, later declared that the Russians had given the Navy an ultimatum to get out. This was denied by the State Department, which said officially that the Russians had been within their rights, although the United States considered their occupation of Dairen as too literal an interpretation of the clause in the Soviet-Chinese treaty that they could keep men there so long as a state of war with Japan existed (the peace treaty was still unsigned). The Scripps-Howard press hotly disputed the State Department version of the matter, and shouted "INSULT TO THE FLAG" in banner headlines from coast to coast. Robert P. Martin, *New York Post* reporter in Shanghai, then took the unprecedented step of denouncing a colleague by name. He accused Newton of being "notoriously anti-Soviet", called the journey a "loaded junket", and characterized the whole business as one of the most fantastic episodes this correspondent has seen to magnify Soviet-American diplomatic imbroglios. Martin himself is far from pro-Soviet. He was among the newsmen who had stingingly condemned Russia's dismantling of Manchurian industry.

Despite the squelching of Newton's ultimatum story, the Dairen incident was followed, on January 6, 1947, by a State Department note to both Russia and China dealing with conditions in the port and in Manchuria in general. The note characterized the existing situation as unsatisfactory. It asked that Dairen be immediately reopened to civilian shipping and American business enterprise under the civil administration of Chiang Kai-shek's government, in line with the conditions stipulated in the Sino-Soviet Treaty for the period following formal signature of peace with Japan. It further requested Chinese and Russian authorities to come to an understanding that would reopen the jointly owned Chinese Changchun (Chinese Eastern) railway.

to normal traffic. While stating that the question was one between the Soviet Union and China, it declared that Washington had "a responsibility to American interests in general to raise the question."

The American note drew applause from Kuomintang government officials, but up to this writing it has been answered by neither of the countries to which it was addressed. Impartial observers pointed out, however, that Russia was unlikely to accede until certain matters were cleared up. While her troops in Dairen were not treaty-bound to withdraw until the peace negotiations with Japan were concluded, U.S. forces remained in Tsingtao, only a day's sail away, in what she regarded as a violation of the Moscow agreements and by the request of Chiang Kai-shek alone—who wanted them there to guard one of his civil war bases and for the purpose of stimulating Soviet-American friction. Tsingtao was also closed to civilian shipping, though American businessmen could travel there by courtesy of the Navy. The only kind of arrangement that would open the Changchun railroad to traffic would involve Russian intervention on the side of Chiang Kai-shek against the Chinese Communists, who held a large part of the line and whom Chiang's military forces had proved unable to dislodge with their own strength and American supplies. Russia was therefore likely to refuse to consider this question apart from the general issues of which she held it to be a part: the withdrawal of U.S. intervention in the Chinese civil war and the fulfilment of the Moscow decisions. She did not claim any right to garrison Dairen after the peace. On the other hand, so long as she could legally stay, her relinquishment of a very useful bargaining counter in the general settlement could not be expected.

The State Department later fell into line and followed the journalistic preparation with formal action, demanding that Russia leave and Chiang take over Dairen, so that U.S. businessmen could pursue their avocations there.

Whatever the Russians may or may not be, it is well known that they study their history thoroughly. They knew that American policy in the Far East had always been aggressive when the armed services had been allowed to run away with it. They also read the American newspapers, and had presumably noted a hot accusation by Harold L. Ickes that Secretary of the Navy Forrestal, not the State Department, had succeeded Wedemeyer and Hurley as the director of American actions in China. Admiral Halsey had just said the American navy would go where the hell it pleased in the world. One has only to imagine the uproar if Soviet naval craft made a practice of cruising where they pleased in the Caribbean and hanging about U.S. outposts.

there, to see why the Russians would not go beyond the letter of agreements in accommodating U.S. ships. Neither is it surprising that they reacted skeptically to Secretary Byrnes' assurances that the U.S. sought no bases, profit or advantage anywhere in the postwar world.

While the United Nations Assembly at Lake Success ended on a more hopeful note for world peace than had recently been witnessed, there is no doubt of the fact that Chiang was successful in stirring up Soviet-American trouble in the Far East to a degree far beyond any conflict of the basic interests of the two countries, or even of their sharply contradictory current foreign policies.

7. Marshall Fails and Chiang Totters

A particularly striking phrase in Madame Sun Yat-sen's message to the American people said that the reactionaries "cannot win" China's civil war. Such a statement might seem rash, with one side getting all the arms and all the foreign aid. But the history of human progress everywhere, and the history of the two areas of China during the war, shows that weapons have not always been decisive.

The real shaping factor in the situation was the Chinese people, who wanted reconstruction, not more destruction; food, not bullets; democratic unity, not civil war; an independent country, not a battlefield for others. They understood that the Chinese Communists might be the immediate target, but it was all of them who would be the victims, as they had been in the gang-up of domestic feudalism and foreign incursion for a hundred years. Intellectuals who had been silent through the war years spoke up, and were shot in the streets. Workers in the coastal industrial towns forced even official Kuomintang-sponsored "labour front" leaders to stand and be counted against intervention or lose every vestige of influence. And the Chinese GI—the U.S.-trained Kuomintang GI—voted for peace, in that marvellously apt phrase "with his feet."

This began in the immediate civil war clashes after V-J Day, when two armies ordered against the Communists laid down their arms on the Peiping-Hankow railway. But it was in distant Manchuria that the process really developed. Visiting the Democratic Joint Army there, composed of Eighth Route men and local guerillas, Robert Shaplen of *Newsweek* was surprised to see in the spring of 1946 that many of its members had American arms. How? They had gone over with them from the Kuomintang, as the Trojan-horse puppets had once done with Chungking and Japanese rifles. As America's allies against Japan the people's armies had received nothing from "the arsenal of democracy." As America's indirect foes, a position they had neither

expected nor asked for, they secured some of its products by easy capture because there was no strength, or life, or hope in the cause America backed.

The more Kuomintang forces were taken north, the more deserted. Take the case of the 184th Division, which marched from semi-tropical Yunnan at the other end of the country to still more remote Indo-China, and was there stuffed into storm-tossed American LST's for the fortnight's sea voyage to Manchuria, cheek by jowl with the Siberian snows. These South China peasants, like the American Marines, had wanted to go home, not to Manchuria, when the war ended. Chiang Kai-shek announced that they were being sent to "re-establish Chinese sovereignty," which sounded imposing when they started, and looked fine to Kuomintang propagandists when they smuggled the formula into the headlines of willing foreign newspapers. But when the soldiers got to Manchuria it ceased to make sense. They were ordered to shoot not foreign enemies but other Chinese peasants who had fought the enemy through the war and achieved reforms the soldiers themselves would have liked to see in their own villages. The Japanese and puppets had been more thoroughly disarmed than in the Kuomintang areas. The Russians were gone. If sovereignty meant a people master in its own home, it was already there. What they were fighting for was the rule of the Kuomintang, which they themselves did not like, and they suspected that the Americans who armed them were much less concerned with Chinese sovereignty than their own influence in the country. Boldly, newspapermen in the Kuomintang's own rear put the idea into words. The *Peiping News Review* wrote: "From the standpoint of the common people the taking over of sovereignty should not be used as a banner of civil war." In Chungking itself, the *Democratic Daily* commented: "The life of our government troops is no better than that of foreign watchdogs. Victory has come, but they are still expected to kill their own brethren."

The soldier of the 184th Division, and of a dozen others which followed in its footsteps, probably arrived at the same conclusion in more elementary terms. Any solidarity he had had with his landlord-born officers when they had resisted Japan together was dissipated in what was clearly a war of rich against the poor. In the complicated game, in which fighting and negotiations alternated weekly, he could not be made to see any sense in getting killed today if the shooting was going to stop again tomorrow. As a prisoner he had the hope of ultimately getting home in one piece if the truce became permanent, and was at least sure of staying alive if it did not. So the whole 184th Division also gave itself up.

With the people's armies the same motives did not operate. They

were fighting in their own homes for tangible gains, democratic self-management, recognition of the dignity of even the poorest, and above all land allotments from divided estates.⁵ For them negotiations and resistance were alternative methods of defending these gains. They preferred to have them recognised peacefully, but were ready to defend them with their lives.

The military situation that subsequently developed not in Manchuria alone but throughout China was conditioned by two facts. The Communist-led forces did not have enough arms. The government armies did not have the people. The Communists did not attempt to hold large cities. This was common sense because in pitched battles the army with the most fire power is bound to win.

The Kuomintang, because of its unpopularity, had to garrison each city, it occupied rather heavily, leaving less and less troops to guard its communications, and act as a striking force. With their enemies extended and tied down even more than the Japanese had been, the Communists were able to control the countryside and cut the railways behind every Kuomintang spearhead. It was the isolation of such advance-guards that resulted in most of the surrenders and captures.

In the meantime, serious trouble began in the Kuomintang's deep rear. Alongside the political weakening of the regime through disorders in the cities, and the economic weakening consequent on the inflation, peasants far from the front began to revolt. The revolts, like those in wartime, were against press-gang conscription and extortionate taxes. But something was added: During the war and during the subsequent negotiations, the Chinese Communists had refrained from agitating in the Kuomintang's villages, or bringing their programme and leadership there. Now they brought their tactics and experience to every local protest they could reach. Peasant risings no longer died down. Instead they solidified into new bases like those once established behind the Japanese lines.

The Kuomintang's writ quickly ceased to run in enclaves with a population of several millions and organized armed forces amounting to over 200,000. Such insurgent areas began to dot provinces unaffected by civil war for the past decade. Among them were Szechuan, where the Central Government had taken its wartime refuge, Kwangsi, Kweichow and Yunnan in the far southwest. Many of the new rebels had run away from the Kuomintang armies. They brought their arms—American-made rifles, machine-guns, bazookas and even artillery.

⁵ As we have pointed out, while the land-reform in China proper was limited to rent reduction, the great holdings of the predominantly collaborationist Manchurian landlords were split up among their tenants.

Unable to consolidate his power and fearful of increasing exposure in the eyes of the American public, Chiang called together the National Assembly and proceeded to give democratic trimmings to his regime. The Communists and Democratic League, the two main opposition parties, refused to attend. Chu Hsueh-fan, head of the Chinese Association of Labour, was ordered to take his seat to represent the workers of China but he fled to Hong Kong, a British colony, rather than participate in this facade for civil war. Chiang's secret police followed him there and wounded him, to demonstrate the penalties of disobedience. A new Constitution was duly adopted.

While the Constitution was being gravely debated, the Kuomintang army killed Chinese who differed from it politically. A police dragnet arrested over a thousand alleged oppositionists in Canton. The government censorship, which had officially ceased to exist, celebrated the occasion by banning countless Chinese publications and two foreign books whose authors were animated by real respect for the Chinese people, *The Challenge of Red China* by Gunther Stein and the best-selling *Thunder Out of China* by Theodore White and Annalee Jacoby.

U.S. Ambassador John Leighton Stuart did his duty by telling the press that Chiang had really undergone a change of heart in the direction of democracy. At the same time, American mediation began to fold up. It was now clear that something had been started that no one could finish, and "respectable" American correspondents were at long last reporting home that "you can't shoot an idea."

On January 7, 1947, Marshall returned to America to report on his achievements and assume his new post as Secretary of State. Apart from the fake Constitution, the only harvest reaped from two years of misguided U.S. policy was a new torrent of Chinese blood. The war looked like a protracted fight to the finish, but there was still some faint hope of stopping it half way. One way would be the withdrawal of the intervention. Another possibility was the crystallization of unrest in the Kuomintang areas into a bid for power by the party's saner and more liberal elements, and the resumption of talks for a democratic coalition government.

Some influential Americans proposed another solution to undo the harm that had been done. Senators Murray and Flanders, one a Democrat and the other a Republican, wanted the scope of mediation to be enlarged to include Britain and the Soviet Union. A tripartite mediation board, it was felt, might sit with all Chinese parties and regain the confidence of all parties and the Chinese people. Chinese democrats, who felt that they could take care of themselves if left alone, reacted coolly. Against the background of deepening reaction in America, however, such an arrangement took the aspect of at least a

brake on intervention and on U.S.-Soviet war trends. The idea was endorsed by outstanding American academic experts on the Far East like Professors Owen Lattimore, Harley McNair and Foster Rhèa Dulles, and supported as a minimum step by progressives.

8. The Marshall Report on China

January 7, 1947 marked the departure of General Marshall to become Secretary of State in Washington. As he left, he issued a report on his thirteen months as conciliator in China. The report might have been entitled "Failure of a Policy." It sounded frank and plain-spoken at the first reading, sparing neither the Kuomintang nor the Communists from sharp criticism. But, as many Chinese and some U.S. commentators were quick to point out, it allotted no responsibility to the strongest and perhaps most important actor on the Chinese stage—the United States itself. Neither did it explain certain features of General Marshall's own conduct during the negotiations, which were no more consistent than the actions of his government with his role of impartial referee.

The most remarkable feature of the long pronouncement was that it did not devote a single sentence to the existence of American help to one side in the Chinese quarrel, much less to its scope or the reasons why it was extended. U.S. aid was mentioned only once in passing, when the Kuomintang reactionaries were censured for presuming on it too much, and the Communists for resenting it too vociferously. The ethics and results of the intervention itself were nowhere weighed. The advisability of its continuance was nowhere questioned. No notice at all was taken of the fact that Chinese protests against it had involved hundreds of thousands of people and assumed a national rather than partisan character—that they had come from nonpolitical Chinese groups as diverse as manufacturers' associations and labour unions, the Christian Temperance Association and organizations of painters and musicians. The American people were given an account of some negotiations, but not of the great military and financial commitments made in their name. Neither were they told of the draining dry of the "reservoir of goodwill" (as Willkie once called it) that had been their chief asset in a hundred years of relations with China.

In fact, General Marshall's report sounded remarkably like the flood of official statements put out in London to explain the troubles of India. These have always claimed that India's independence is impeded by the "unreasonableness" of Hindus or Muslims, or the inability of both to agree. They invariably leave out the simple fact that Indian national freedom does not exist because British domination does. In

similar fashion the Marshall report skirted America's role in Chinese events after V-J Day. It represented the United States only as an Olympian mother striving to make unruly children behave.

While we have nowhere in this book paused to interpret documents, the Marshall statement is worth considering in great detail. That is because it did more than go over the past. It expressed attitudes that seemed likely to dominate the next stage of U.S. policy—a stage that might last for some years. If General Marshall's mission had to an extent been the victim of Washington's policy, Secretary Marshall could now make and voice policy himself. What the new stage would bring could be guessed from grouping his main pronouncements under relevant questions, and comparing them in each case with the facts.

Question: What is the chief obstacle to peace in China?

General Marshall: "The greatest obstacle to peace in China has been the complete, almost overwhelming suspicion with which the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang itself regard each other. . . . The leaders of the Government are convinced in their minds that the Communist-expressed desire to participate in a government of the type endorsed by the (interparty) Political Consultation Conference last January (1946) had for its purpose only a destructive intention. The Communists felt, I believe, that the Government was insincere in its apparent acceptance of the PCC resolution for the formation of the new (coalition) government, and intended by coercion of military force and the actions of secret police to obliterate the Communist Party.

Comment: The suspicions of the two sides may have been stated accurately enough. General Marshall's words also made it clear that the Kuomintang government did not sign the January 1946 pacts in good faith, since it had had no confidence in them from the start. Nonetheless, the Kuomintang did agree to a peace based on the sharing of political power between the parties and the merging of party armies (both Kuomintang and Communist) into a single national army removed from party control. Suspicion alone had not impeded these important concessions, *because the balance of forces in the country allowed no other solution.* But later the military balance changed. The Kuomintang got arms while the Communists did not. The liberal groups, which had none to start with, never acquired any. The peace was then broken. General Marshall did not make it clear who received arms from the United States during the negotiations, and for what purpose. But there was no doubt that the outside resources at the disposal of one side, and not simply mutual suspicion, were then, and remained afterwards, "the greatest obstacle to peace."

Question: What was the nature of the January 1946 agreements, and who actually violated them?

General Marshall: "The agreements reached by the Political Consultative Conference a year ago were a liberal and forward-looking charter, which then offered China a basis for peace and reconstruction."

"The irreconcilable Communists. . . . I must state, did not appear so last February.

"On the side of the National Government, which is in effect the Kuomintang party, there is a dominant group of reactionaries who have been opposed, in my opinion, to almost every effort I have made to influence the formation of a genuine coalition government. This has usually been under the cover of political or party action, but since the party was the Government, this action, though subtle or indirect, has been devastating in its effect. They were quite frank in publicly stating their beliefs that co-operation by the Chinese Communist Party in the Government was inconceivable and that only a policy of force could definitely settle the issue.

"This group includes military as well as political leaders. . . . Though I speak as a soldier, I must here also deplore the dominating influence of the military. Their dominance accentuates the weakness of civil government in China. At the same time, in pondering the situation in China, one must have clearly in mind not the workings of small Communist groups or committees, to which we are accustomed in America, but rather of millions of people and an army of 1,000,000 men."

"I must say that the quite evidently inspired mob actions of last February and March, some within a few blocks of, where I was then engaged in completing negotiations, gave the Communists good ground for (their) suspicions."

Comment: General Marshall certainly did not mince words in stating who sabotaged the unity agreements in the critical period of February and March 1946. The "mob actions" he mentioned were strong-arm attacks by gangs organized by the Kuomintang secret police on meetings and publications which supported the pacts. Prominent democrats like Kuo Mo-jo were severely beaten. Communist and Democratic League organs were raided. The purpose of these typically fascist tactics was to intimidate the opposition and create the illusion of popular resentment against the interparty agreements. They were of a piece with the actual assassinations of leading Democratic League members, which took place later. But these were not the only proofs General Marshall adduced. He tells us that the dominant elements of Kuomintang, who also control the government, said outright that they planned force to break the pacts Marshall himself had put his name to, and that they included leading military figures who could put the plans into effect.

This section of the Marshall's report placed the stamp of authority on many facts concerning the Kuomintang which independent observers had repeatedly urged on the American public, and whose circulation the U.S. government had long deprecated. But their main feature was to illuminate the nature of U.S. policy even more than they did conditions in China.

Here the things left unsaid were more significant than those put on paper. If General Marshall was convinced that the Kuomintang reactionaries wanted civil war instead of fair conciliation, why did he not use his authority to halt the U.S. aid going to them? Why did he allow the use of American military transport to deploy their forces to battle positions? If he was unable to dissuade Washington from continuing a course bound to cause bloodshed, was it consistent with honour for him to remain as mediator? Finally, why did General Marshall announce his conclusions nine months after the event instead of when the truce was broken—nine months during which Chinese were being killed by American arms? Why, particularly, did he not speak up in April 1946? In that month the United States transferred surplus war materials that had been piled up for the invasion of Japan, materials that had originally cost the American taxpayer \$ 2,000,000,000, to the Kuomintang militarists for whom Marshall had not a good word to say.

Only one phrase in the statement gives us a clue. It is the proviso that the Communists were considerably stronger in China than in America. Does this mean that General Marshall, even while mediating, was concerned with building up the Kuomintang to the point where they could smash them militarily? Were the Chinese Communists so dangerous to America that such diplomatic guise was appropriate in dealing with them?

Let us see what Marshall had to say about the Communists themselves? His statement declared that, in distinction to the Kuomintang reactionaries who "were interested in the preservation of their own feudal control of China and...evidently counted on substantial American support regardless of their actions," the Communists "frankly state that they are Marxists and intend to work toward establishing a Communistic form of government in China, though first advancing through the medium of a democratic form of government of the American or British type." He further noted that the party included "many young men who have turned to the Communists in disgust at the corruption of (Kuomintang) local governments," rather than from previous political conviction. In Honolulu, four days later, General Marshall told pressmen that he knew of no evidence whatsoever that the Chinese Communists were receiving aid from Russia.

The only point in this formulation with which a student of political science might quarrel was the phrase "Communist form of government." Communism is not a form of government but of society. Its administrative institutions can vary in relation to various factors, such as the danger of military attack from the outside. Otherwise General Marshall's impression confirmed that brought back by other observers. The Chinese Communists do not disguise their ultimate aims. But they do not regard them as rapidly attainable (Mao Tse-tung has estimated that fifty years of democracy, with strong capitalist features, might be necessary before the next stage). What they ask now is a chance to put their aims before the people of the entire country, and to compete with other political parties at the polls. (In their own areas, they do not monopolise elective posts.) Moreover, they are willing to give up their army provided no other political party maintains one. Their readiness to do this was not only contained in the January 1946 agreements, which General Marshall believed they supported sincerely, but also indicated by concrete facts. American observers who were in their areas when the agreements were signed, notably Mr. Lawrence K. Rosinger of the Foreign Policy Association and Edward C. Rohrbough, a United Press Correspondent, reported that the Communists immediately demobilized a part of their forces and set up classes on a huge scale to prepare discharged soldiers for civilian life. These reports were doubtless matched by others submitted by direct U.S. government representatives. They are impressive because they came simultaneously from many Liberated Areas, at different ends of China.

It is certainly true that the prospects of the Chinese Communists in free political competition were better than average, since their opponents had forfeited popular support and depended mainly on external assistance. But did the interests of the United States demand forcible interference with any such choice by the Chinese people? If so the American democratic tradition, and the foreign policy tradition of noninterference in the affairs of other peoples, must be regarded as dead.

The above quotations and analysis refer to the events of early 1946. The rest of General Marshall's statement dealt with the events of the civil war brought on by Kuomintang's treaty-breaking. In this section General Marshall lashed out at the Communists on four counts—their propaganda; their military tactics; their responsibility for the death of several U.S. Marines in a clash, and the position they took in relation to resumed negotiations.

Of Communist pronouncements in the latter part of 1946, General Marshall had this to say:

"A very harmful and immensely provocative phase of the Chi-

nese Communist Party procedure has been in the character of its propaganda. I wish to state to the American people that, in the deliberate misrepresentation and abuse of the action, policies and purposes of our Government, this propaganda has been. . . . without any regard whatsoever for the facts, and has given plain evidence of a determined purpose to mislead the Chinese people and the world and to arouse a bitter hatred of Americans."

The wording used here showed more evidence of bitterness, irritation and anger than any of the charges made against the Kuomintang, though the latter were intrinsically more serious. No allowance was made for the naturally violent verbal reaction of people who were being shot down with bullets, not words, made in the United States. The Chinese Communists were given no credit for their exceedingly cordial welcome to General Marshall and U.S. mediation at the outset or for that matter for their standing invitation to American educators, newspapermen, missionaries, merchants and investors. No mention was made of the equally great resentment at America's course among elements which were neither Kuomintang nor Communist.

It was undoubtedly true that the Chinese Communists tried to arouse protest elsewhere against U.S. policies which placed their very existence in jeopardy. But General Marshall's denunciation gained nothing in fairness from his silence regarding the real effects of the policies which he accused them of misrepresenting.

In attacking Communist military measures, General Marshall declared:

"The dyed-in-the-wool Communists do not hesitate at the most drastic measures to gain their end as, for instance, the destruction of communications in order to wreck the economy of China and produce a situation that would facilitate the overthrow or collapse of the Government without any regard to the immediate suffering of the people involved."

Considering his own testimony that the Communist-led areas were the victims of aggression, such charges from an experienced soldier seem strange. One might make out an exactly similar case against the U.S. strategic bombing of Japan which resulted from Pearl Harbour, or against the destruction of cities by the Chinese armies themselves in the path of the advancing Japanese. The Communists tore up railways because the Kuomintang was better supplied with fire-power through its possession of American arms. It was imperative for their survival that these should not be brought, by railways or other means, to the battle areas. The Kuomintang itself had destroyed many miles of rail-

ways, scores of locomotives and hundreds of railway cars in Communist hands—by bombing from U.S.-supplied planes. But the Kuomintang was not reproved for it.

To accuse the Communists of voluntarily bringing suffering to the people was also unfair. Whatever the other merits of the quarrel, there is absolutely no doubt of the fact that the 130,000,000 inhabitants of the Liberated Areas had bettered their livelihood and prospects to a degree unprecedented in the country. This indeed was the basis of the support the Communists had succeeded in winning. To ignore a fact so important showed definite bias against the Communists simply as Communists. While General Marshall probably shares such a bias with many other Americans, and would certainly himself disdain to conceal it as a personal attitude, it should have found no place in a supposedly impartial statement. His phrasing on these matters was probably what rankled most violently with the Communist leaders who had sat around the table with him. Chou En-lai characterized it as "an insult to the party."

The third of General Marshall's charges referred to the skirmish between an Eighth Route Army outpost and U.S. Marines at Anping, in North China, where casualties were suffered on both sides. The General maintained firmly that the Marines had been ambushed and accused the Communists of lying to conceal the fact. He did not mention, however, that the Anping affair was only one of over thirty direct clashes between American and Communist-led soldiers. That Americans were the aggressors in cases which antedated Anping was frankly reported by U.S. eyewitnesses. One described how bored Marines went out "hunting Communists" in jeeps through the countryside. The "hunting" consisted of taking pot-shots at peasants in the fields. When asked how they knew those people were Communists, a Marine said that his Chinese acquaintances (Kuomintang officials) had told him they were common in the vicinity. All the clashes referred to were numerically insignificant in relation to the scope of the civil war and the total U.S. personnel in China. Brawls in the streets of Kuomintang-held towns had probably cost as much in lives and injuries. They had no place in a general statement on mediation but mention of them, if made, should at least have taken in the whole situation. The real question, of course, was why armed Americans should have been present on civil war fronts at all. These Americans were not members of mediation teams.

Finally there is the problem of whether the Chinese Communists were indeed seeking, by any and all means, to achieve the collapse of the government. Though General Marshall says so in anger at two separate points, his own report made it clear that this was not the case.

In recording the last Communist action of which cognizance is taken, the General said:

“Now the Communists have broken off negotiations by their last offer which demanded the dissolution of the National Assembly and a return to the military positions of January 13 (1946) which the Government could not be expected to accept.”

In other words, the Communists did not want to talk any further unless the January 1946 truce, which the Kuomintang had broken, was re-established on the old lines. Their demand for the dissolution of the National Assembly—called by the Kuomintang unilaterally and packed with its nominees in violation of the accompanying political conditions, which had stipulated that an Assembly be called by a coalition regime—likewise referred to the January agreements. General Marshall had called that agreement “liberal and forward-looking.” The demand that it be observed was also made by the Democratic League, which had boycotted the fake Assembly. He himself had indicted the Kuomintang for not entering on it honestly. Why did General Marshall blame the Communists for the final rupture when all they asked was to get back to it? Why did he cease to expect the Government to stand by its obligations? If this was what the Communists wanted, how could he say that their aim was the collapse of the government rather than its reform on the lines then laid down? Here again the bias stands out a mile. But bias is merely an attitude and General Marshall was certainly not speaking for himself alone. We perceive a much more serious fact. Not only the Kuomintang, but the United States as well, was getting out from under the January pacts.

The positive recommendations of General Marshall’s statement confirmed this. They lost sight completely of the original aim of a coalition government negotiated on equal terms between all political parties. We will let the General take the floor again:

“The salvation of the situation, as I see it, would be the assumption of leadership by the liberals in the Government and in the minority parties, a splendid group of men, but who as yet lack the political power to exercise a controlling influence.”

One clause cancels the other. Regardless of their undoubted qualities and courage, China’s liberals were powerless in the midst of civil war unless they could ally themselves to one of the armed parties. They could hold a balance between the two only in peace. So what did General Marshall advise?

“Successful action on their (the liberals’) part *under the leadership of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek* would, I believe, lead to

unity through good government. In fact, the National Assembly has adopted a democratic Constitution which in all major respects is in accordance with the principles laid down by the all-party Political Consultative Conference of last January. It is unfortunate that the Communists did not see fit to participate in the Assembly since the Constitution that has been adopted seems to include every major point that they wanted."

Plainly, China's liberal leaders were being asked to join with the Kuomintang and to bring their followers along as well. But their view of Chiang's Constitution was very different from General Marshall's. The Democratic League had already denounced it, specifying that it did not measure up to the January agreements either in the unilateral method of its adoption, or in respect to civil liberties, or with regard to the freedom of local governments from what Americans would call federal interference, or in the control of the people's representatives over the executive. Some passages from the Constitution will show the basis for their attitude.

Civil liberties: After outlining a fairly comprehensive bill of rights, the Constitution nullifies them all in the following provision:

Article 23: No one of the liberties and rights enumerated in the preceding articles may, except as warranted by reason of preventing infringement of the liberties of other persons, averting an imminent crisis, maintaining social order or advancing public interest, be restricted by law.

Local governments: Foreign affairs, defence, currency, nationality laws, international trade and the demarcation between local and national revenue are included in the powers of the National Government. This is customary. But the Constitution also includes as national powers, to be delegated to the provinces only at the discretion of the central authorities, the following fields: rules governing provincial and district self-government, forestry, mining, local trade, education, banking, public utilities, registration, ranking and appointment of local officials, land legislation, labour legislation, police system, etc. This would make it legal for a central government in which the Kuomintang is dominant to destroy the progressive local laws of the Liberated Areas on democratic elections, rents and wages.

The extremely circumscribed powers of locally elected bodies are

⁶All direct quotations from the Constitution are from a translation issued by Chinese (Kuomintang) Ministry of Information in Nanking and distributed by its agency, the Chinese News Service, in New York.

further cut down by the article quoted below:

Article 111: Should there occur any matter not enumerated (in previous articles—*I.E.*) the same shall fall within the jurisdiction of the Central Government if it is of national nature. . . . Any dispute over jurisdiction shall be settled by the Legislative Yuan.

Article 115: If, in its enforcement, the provincial self-government law encounters serious obstacles. . . . the Judicial Yuan shall first summon the parties. . . . and then the presidents of the Executive Yuan, Legislative Yuan, Examination Yuan and Control Yuan shall form a committee. . . . to propose formulas for settlement.

That the balance is shifted in favour of the Central Government still more may be seen from the fact that all the organs which are charged with decisions in such matters are parts of its machinery. Moreover, of the five officials mentioned in Article 115, three are not elected but appointed by the President.

Executive and Legislature: The President of the Republic is not elected by the people but by the National Assembly. The Assembly meets regularly only once in six years but may hold extraordinary sessions. It alone has power to control or impeach him. It alone can amend the Constitution. To summon this body between sessions is impossible without government aid, since it has over 2,000 members who must come together from all parts of the world. The actual Legislature (the Legislative Yuan) sits more often but has limited powers.

The President of the Republic (now Chiang Kai-shek) is commander in chief of the armed forces. He can declare war and make peace. He can rule by decree during emergencies, and call a state of emergency on his own responsibility submitting his action to the Legislature only afterwards, but within one month. A lot can happen in a month, especially in a country accustomed to dictatorship, under a President who has been a dictator for twenty years.

The President may also appoint the President of the Executive Yuan (Premier of the Cabinet), submitting his appointment for the approval of the Legislature.

The Legislature is elected and meets for six or seven months of every year, in two sessions. A two thirds vote is required for it to overrule policies initiated by the Executive Yuan (Cabinet), in which case the Premier must concur or resign. The Cabinet, on the other hand, can decline to carry out (veto) any law passed by a simple majority of the Legislature. In this case two thirds vote is required to uphold the law.

All this does not even begin to happen for another year. In the meantime a civil war is being fought.

Nothing could make Chinese liberals regard this document as anything but a straitjacket and a blind for civil strife. The Democratic League formally expelled Carson Chang, chairman of one of its constituent parties, for accepting it. To further cement its ranks, in the fight ahead, the League changed its own organizational form. Instead of a federation of affiliated bodies, as previously, it became an individual membership body—in fact a single political party. Carson Chang's former associate in the Social Democratic Party, Dr. Chang Tung-sung of Yenching University, became its new Secretary-General.

One can hardly believe that Secretary Marshall was surprised at the liberals' action. The concluding paragraphs of his report make it clear that, had he been in their shoes, he too would have balked at joining Chiang Kai-shek's one-man, one-party "democracy." These paragraphs read:

"Now that the form for a democratic China has been laid down by the newly adopted Constitution, practical measures will be the test. It remains to be seen to what extent the government will give substance to the form by a genuine welcome of all groups actively to share in the responsibility of government. . . . It has been stated officially and categorically that the period of political tutelage under the Kuomintang is at an end. If the termination of one-party rule is to be a reality, the Kuomintang should cease to receive financial support from the government."

9. Mediation Ends—Intervention Continues

The first major foreign policy act of Secretary of State Marshall was to terminate mediation in China. This occurred on January 29, 1947, only three weeks after he had issued his report. At the same time it was made clear, though not specifically stated, that United States Marines in China would be sent home. The recall, however, affected only units whose work was done after they had assured control of a number of civil war areas to Chiang Kai-shek. For many weeks these units had done nothing but sit around in barracks, haul personal supplies for U.S. mediation teams, and rub the Chinese the wrong way. Their departure would nevertheless be important because it would lessen the possibility of renewed incidents of the Anping type, and end Chiang Kai-shek's hope of getting American soldiers to actually fight on his side.

On the other hand, it would be an error to suppose that America was pulling out of China—or for that matter out of the civil war. It was declared that personnel actually engaged in aiding Chiang's operations would stay. This applied to over a thousand army officers and

men of MAGIC (Military Assistance Group in China)—a fine name for punsters—who acted as instructors with the Kuomintang forces. Their position was extra-legal since the China Military Assistance Bill which sought to legalize the project had not reached the floor of the previous Congress. But they were there just the same.

A similar number of Marines was also scheduled to remain in the "training base at Tsingtao," to whip Chiang's navy and amphibious troops into shape. The U.S. Fleet based on Tsingtao made no motion to withdraw.

Secretary Marshall's personal opinion of the Kuomintang may have influenced his action in holding up a \$ 500,000,000 Export-Import Bank loan to Chiang as a form of pressure upon him. But it was not evident how the pressure would be used. The record showed that the United States had never gotten really tough with Chiang on civil war issues—but China reports said that very hard words indeed had been used to Chiang to make him sign the inequitable Sino-American Trade Treaty.

Moreover, Secretary Marshall himself was under strong pressure from "get tough" elements in Congress and elsewhere to aid Chiang even more than before. Senator Vandenberg, the foreign policy chief of the Republican majority, made a speech to that effect in Cleveland immediately after Marshall assumed office. He made it perfectly plain that only such a course would have the support of his party. His statement was at once echoed by John Foster Dulles, another architect of foreign relations in the Republican camp, *The New York Times*, representing right-wing Democrats of the Byrnes bipartisan foreign policy school, found its own kind of merit in the abandonment of mediation. It rejoiced that the United States was no longer compelled to confer with Chinese opposition groups and, therefore, by implication, to recognize them. All these voices represented what might be called "the Russian approach" to China, and to changing societies everywhere. Another word for it would be "the two worlds school." The idea was that any group that upset the prewar *status quo* anywhere, was an advance guard of Russia against America. Whatever the Chinese people might want for themselves, they had to be beaten down if they opposed Chiang—who was in America's pocket. This view had already led to extremely serious American diplomatic defeats, and loss of prestige, not in China alone. But the die-hards were bemused by "the American century", the atom bomb and their own closed minds. They did not seem to care whom they alienated, or how they isolated their own country in a changing world and in the minds of men.

In March 1947, Secretary Marshall was due to go to Moscow. While the main subject of discussion there would be the German peace treaty, it was virtually certain that the Far East would come up. This

too may have explained the withdrawal of troops from China. Secretary Byrnes and Foreign Minister Molotov had pledged such withdrawal, and nonintervention in China, at a previous Moscow Conference—in 1945. It would have been bad to go with even the more-obvious part of the pledge unfulfilled.

If international agreement on the China issue was really to be achieved, Moscow was the place, and Marshall was the man. In Moscow one could see Stalin, who had just told Elliott Roosevelt, in a newspaper interview, that he saw no reason for conflict in China or elsewhere. Marshall stood very well with the Russians. They had seen eye-to-eye with him on the global strategy of World War II. Their respect for him as an organizer of Allied victory was very great. One could believe that they were more upset than angry at the role in which America's Chinese policy had placed him. While *Pravda* exposed the latter stages of mediation in China day in and day out, Marshall himself had not been strongly criticised.

There was a measure of hope, in these circumstances, of allaying friction and really, isolating the Chinese problem—letting the Chinese people settle it for themselves as they wanted to do. But the obstacles too were formidable.

Within China, the civil war went on and Chiang was losing it—despite all the American aid he had received.

10. Things Look Up for Old Japan

Even earlier, these developments in China had started a historically familiar trend of events elsewhere in the Far East. As it became clear that Chiang's regime was not much of a barrier against "Russian influence" (or anything else) something happened that neither the American people nor Chiang Kai-shek had bargained for. The new candidate for the role was Japan, whom high-ranking U.S. army brass-hats had long considered more suitable for the purpose because she had more industries, and people who made better soldiers in the professional meaning of the term.

General MacArthur carried out a "soft" policy towards the former enemy country (towards the Japanese ruling class, that is, not those who opposed it). He once remarked, as revealed by the *New York Herald Tribune*, that Japan was the best possible "springboard to the future", while China could be no more than the battlefield. Major-General Charles A. Willoughby, his Chief of Intelligence, told newsmen that the Japanese must be regarded not as defeated foes but as future allies. Korea fitted into the scheme as a bridge to the continent, and General Hodge, head of the U.S. occupation zone there, did his part

by setting up an essentially colonial administration, retaining ex-Japanese quislings in power, and cracking down on labour. In China, bodies of Japanese still had their arms in the middle of 1946. John Hersey reported in the *New Yorker* in June that he had attended a joint conference of U.S. and Japanese officers called to plan anti-Communist operations, and been told that they anticipated fighting on the same side in a bigger war before too long.

While MacArthur kept domestic leftists under tight control, Japanese reactionaries bided their time. Economic assistance to get them back on their feet was discussed more and more as the idea of patching up China lapsed. Kuomintang representatives on the Allied Council in Tokyo found to their distress that their claims for Japanese factories, to replace those the Japanese army had destroyed in China, were being politely shelved. Even an application for silk cocoons to improve the Chinese strain was rejected because it might make too much competition for Japan's exporters. A very ugly situation was created in Shanghai when the enemy flag reappeared in the harbour, flying over an American ship lent to the Japanese for trading purposes. Kuomintang newspapers began to discuss a sad question. If Japan was to be America's ally what payment would she claim? Probably a slice of a weak China. The idea sobered many, and a U. S.-Soviet war seemed less of an ideal solution than it had done before. Kuomintang delegates to the Allied Council even found themselves on the same side as the Russians in arguing against measures tending to restore Japan's military power. However much Chiang might plot, the basic national interests of China and the U.S.S.R. lay close, and even the Kuomintang, where it retained a shred of concern for its country's security, had to recognise this. We can see that, whatever the form of government in China, the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945 had a real basis.

11. And the Future ?

The United States was allowing itself to be cast in the role played first by Britain and then Japan. In the Pacific even more than on a world scale it had become the paramount single power, seeking to dictate to others how they should live, whose strategic bastion they should be, and whose goods they should buy. The role was assumed at a time when 450,000,000 people in China and a billion in colonial and semicolonial Asia stood where America had stood in 1776 at the time of her own revolution.

Are we back where we started? Will the sanguinary history of the past century be repeated, with variations introduced by the atom bomb and the even more lethal weapons being developed ?

So far as China is concerned, things will never be the same. China can no longer be kept down. The upsurge of her people has gone too far to be reversed, whatever the trials ahead. The men of 1776, in their generation, won out against odds no less great.

But can the world have peace?

The United Nations Organisation exists and is beginning to function, however hesitatingly, in the business of averting war. The people of many countries that have known World War II on their own soil are working and fighting for the right to build their own future, and peace for their children. Under the gathering clouds of the past something new is happening. All peoples are beginning to understand that agreed decisions among the great powers, which alone are capable of worldwide conflict, are all-important today. They alone can lead to disarmament and demobilisation soon, and give the time for a search for better ways. To achieve this, however, one thing is essential. The people's will to peace must grow into organized forms. The common folk of each nation must curb their own warmongers and hold their representatives accountable for what they do. If the people are beaten down, or allow themselves to be deceived, the United Nations Organisation can follow the lead of the old League, which was flouted by the warmakers and distorted into a screen for their purposes. An organization is only an instrument. The use of any tool is determined by the hands that wield it.

Here the problem of Asia, and of the colonial world, arises again. It is not enough for the peoples of the great powers to be solicitous of their own freedom. Where oppressed nations are asserting their right to run their own affairs and live like human beings, they must be helped, and governments so inclined prevented from hindering them. This is the only way to abridge slavery and extend freedom. To neglect it would be treason to ourselves. If we allow such peoples to be subjugated, we ourselves will have to fight their battle over again, as we had to fight once again the battles of the betrayed men and women of Spain, Abyssinia and Czechoslovakia.

The place of the oppressed peoples themselves in the creation of one peaceful world is no less great. Their job is to cease to be oppressed peoples. Rightly regarded, their struggle is no longer one for justice for themselves alone. By striking at the warmakers at their most vulnerable spot they fight for peace, freedom and prosperity for everyone. If we fail in our duty to prevent violence from being used against them, it is their duty to return blow for blow. Nor should any one be misled into regarding such struggles as the seed of world bloodshed. It is the struggle of the enslavers and slave raiders which leads to recurrent world wars. The fight of men for mastery of their own

fate is part of the battle for peace. Where the common man becomes master in his own homeland, there is no thirst for war. There is no treachery and weakness born of decay to tempt the aggressor, nor tendency to seek profit from setting others at odds. The more such countries there are, the more they will band together for the common objective of peace.

The opportunities of a peaceful world are greater than ever before. Poverty and economic exploitation, the ancient roots of strife and conquest, can today themselves be conquered. For the first time in history the technical means at our disposal are mighty enough to do this. They are also mighty enough to destroy untold millions of people and the accumulated wealth produced by the labour of man, if left to those who would use them for individual gain, war and dominations.

If our hands fail, there will be another world slaughter. And in it, and after it, people will still reach in toil and blood for their heritage.

It need not be so expensive. But that is up to all of us, and to the people of the strongest nations most of all.

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