

CHAPTER 5

LEADERSHIP AND MOVEMENT DYNAMICS: MOVEMENTS COMPARED

INTRODUCTION

Social movements move by transforming identities and emotions, by focusing attention and by directing and coordinating actions. Movements are often spurred into existence by cognitively framed emotions, anger, frustration, shame, guilt, which move individuals and groups to protest, to publicly express and display discontent, engaging in what McAdam, Tilly and Tarrow (2001) call 'contentious' actions. This sequence of events can set in motion a process of collective will formation whereby individual identities and biographies are fused into a collective characterized by feelings of group belongingness, solidarity, common purpose and shared memory, a 'movement' in other words. A central mechanism here is a set of ritual practices which are performed as part of collective protest. Public displays of commitment and solidarity, often build around collective voicing and parading, ritual practices which are also transformative in that they help blur the boundaries between individual and collective, between the private and public, and help fuse a group through creating strong emotional bonds between participants. "The repeated experience of ritual participation produces a feeling of solidarity--'we are all here together', 'we must share something', and finally, it produces collective memory--'we were all there together' (Berezen 2001:93). A collective story emerges, linking places and events together and a metaphor, the

movement, is applied. This act of collective self presentation ---the process of collective identity formation, and, the articulation and objectification of the movement is performed by movement leadership in the time-space context of a given movement. In the light of this understanding, we shall explore and compare in the two movements, the role played by the movement leadership, touching upon various aspects of the movements in the following sections.

Arun K. Jana (2009) argues that even though ethnic minorities, linguistically and culturally distinct from the Bengali's are spread throughout the state but are numerically more prominent in the northern region of the state. The two most distinct minorities in the North Bengal region are the Nepali's mostly inhabitants of the Darjeeling hills and the Rajbansis who inhabit the plains of Darjeeling and the adjoining North Bengal districts of the state. There have been discontents in the two communities - the Rajbansis and the Nepalis, which have been ventilated in the form of identity politics in the region. It is economic underdevelopment of the region and the consequent poverty of the ethnic communities that is crucial for an understanding of the movements for separate states by the two communities. However, despite a seeming proximity in the nature of the two movements, it needs to be stressed here that the two movements differ significantly in terms of the history of origin of the movements, the issues and objectives of the movement, the nature and character of the movement, and finally, the nature and character of the leadership leading the movement, which determine the dynamics of the movements. In the sections below, we present a brief

comparative analysis of the two movements in question, with a particular focus on the role of leadership in the dynamics of the two movements.

THE CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND OF THE ORIGIN OF THE MOVEMENTS: A COMPARISON

Location:

The area and population of Gorkhaland are quite small: about 3.5% of the area and 2% of the population of West Bengal. Those of Kamtapur are much larger: about % of the area and % of the population of West Bengal. The former occupies most of one district in northern West Bengal, Darjeeling, while the latter occupies three districts in North Bengal districts of West Bengal and parts of Assam, Most leaders of the Gorkhaland movement would like to extend its boundaries to encompass the plains areas of Darjeeling District, including the city of Siliguri, but this aspiration is opposed by the government of West Bengal. Moreover, it is interesting to note that a large part of the North Bengal region in the Dooars has become a hotbed of tension. This is because of the fact that it embraces areas which fall under the proposed maps of both the state of Kamtapur and Gorkhaland.

NATURE OF THE MOVEMENTS: MOVEMENT OBJECTIVES AND ISSUES COMPARED

Movement Objectives:

Advocates of both the Kamtapur and Gorkhaland movements have laid out why people should support their efforts in terms of lists of problems/aspirations autonomy would solve/achieve. These are aggregates of popular aspirations. Each aspiration may appeal more to one segment of the population than to other segments. These lists change somewhat over time, but a general sense of the formal and persistent reasons would include the following:

The following objectives are common to both the movements:

- Respect and preservation of identity, e.g., full recognition of language (Nepali language in case of Gorkhaland Movement; and, recognition of the Kamtapuri language in case of the Kamtapur movement).
- Economic development, e.g., the tea gardens should be assisted, tourism, encouraged, and investment fostered.
- Equitable extraction and return of revenue.
- Fair distribution of resources, e.g., land should be given to the landless, government offices should not be shifted to Siliguri.
- Ecological balance, e.g., denuded forests should be replaced.

Of course, as seen above, a lot of objectives are shared in common by the two movements; the two movements differ in subtle ways in terms of some other objectives as discussed below:

- Security, e.g., removal of the uncertainties associated with Nepali citizenship is central to the Gorkhaland movement which is conspicuously absent in case of the Kamtapur movement.
- Education, e.g., a university should be developed for hill people alone.
- Job opportunities, e.g., "Sons of the soil" should be employed in the Gorkhaland area.
- End backwardness and unequal distribution of state resources (in case of the Kamtapur movement).

Movement Issues

The two movements are built up on such issues which are common to both. This commonality owes to their similarities in terms of their geographical location, that is, North Bengal, which is characterised by economic underdevelopment, unemployment, land alienation of the indigenous communities, around which the politics of identity is weaved. Although there is a multiplicity of these and such like issues concerning the movements, the two issues which are central to both of them are (a) the issue of identity; and, (b), the issue of development. Let us briefly see the two issues in the two movements in a comparative perspective.

Identity: In both cases, leaders have cultivated a common identity among people in the Kamtapur and Gorkhaland regions. That does not mean that the regional identity always trumps the many other identities individuals have (McHenry, 2006). In the Kamtapur case, a

Kamtapuri/Rajbanshi identity has been persistently reinforced by political leaders, although with an equally stronger attempt on the part of the mainland Bengali intelligentsia to deconstruct the possibility of such an identity. In the Gorkhaland case too, identity constitutes the primary concern. The movement recurs with renewed vigour time and again on the issue that Gorkhas in India are maltreated because of being deterritorialised. Since they do not have a homeland of their own in terms of a separate Gorkhaland state within the Indian federal framework, the Gorkhas feel that all political, social, cultural and economic jeopardies confronting them emanate out of this. However, most scholars argue that the many cleavages within the dominant Nepali community in the area have been submerged into a common Nepali or Gorkha identity. But, circumstances may lead to challenges to such an identity. T. B. Subba, a well-respected scholar, points out that the strength of this Nepali identity is not as great as others suggest:

"Their ethnicity is actually much weaker than what is made out to be. The historical, racial, cultural, spatial, and now, class and occupational, diversities have been successful in acting as a deterrent to the emergence of a strong ethnic solidarity among them. This could not emerge even in Darjeeling. Otherwise there would not occur so many fratricidal clashes and killings between the supporters of the GNLF and the Communist party of India (Marxist), and

between the former and the Gorkha Volunteer Cell members..." (Subba, 2003, p. 65).

Although as pointed out by Subba, there have been clashes within the Gorkha community in Darjeeling Hills, the leaders of the Gorkhaland movement have been able to place the Gorkha Identity as primary before other smaller identities; and this has worked sufficiently effectively in terms of movement mobilisation.

An analysis of the issue of 'identity' in the two movements reveals one difference. Whereas in case of the Gorkhaland movement the Nepali/Gorkha language has been recognised under the VIII Schedule of the Indian Constitution in 1992, the Kamtapuris/Koch-Rajbanshis in North Bengal are still pressing for the recognition of the Kamtapuri Language. The earlier GNLFF led Gorkhaland Movement pressed for the recognition of the Gorkha/Nepali language under the VIII Schedule as one of its prime issues¹. However, conspicuously, the new phase of the movement under the GJMM is silent about it; it has been conveniently shelved aside as a 'non-issue' by the movement, although there are avenues of further development of the language as a philosophy of life and mode of expression of the community. Hence, it is seen that whereas in case of

¹ After the then Prime Minister Morarji Desai labeled the Nepali Language as a foreign language during a meeting with the All India Nepali Bhasa Samiti in Darjeeling, the movement for the recognition of the language further intensified. Further, the then leaders of the Gorkhaland movement could capitalize on this to mobilize the masses for the movement as the statement of the Prime Minister hit the Nepali/Gorkhali sentiment. For details, see Gorkha Janamukti Morcha, The Case for Gorkhaland: Creating a New State out of Darjeeling District and Dooars, a Case Paper presented at the Tripartite Talks between Government of India, Government of West Bengal and Gorkha Janamukti Morcha held in New Delhi on September 8th, 2008.

the Kamtapur movement that language still remains a central focus in the politics of recognition, in case of the Gorkhaland movement language does not anymore constitute a central concept in the politics of identity. Here, the prominence is given a pan-Gorkha ethnic distinctiveness and geographical territory.

Development: Yasin and Dasgupta (2003) propose that the origin of a protest movement owes to the feeling of a sense of deprivation in the minds of the elites of the deprived classes. The entire of the region of North Bengal excepting a small pocket of Siliguri town, has been witnessing a fast deteriorating economy. The economic underdevelopment of the region owes to a plurality of factors, both economic and political. The specificities of the economy of North Bengal characterised by land alienation, declining agricultural productivity, dwindling tea industry, unproductive cinchona plantations, rising unemployment, pressing poverty and absence of livelihood diversification opportunities has affected various social groups and classes in significant ways and have left the imprints on a series of protest movements unfolding in the region. In Darjeeling, poor tea production over the years, closure of tea gardens, problem with cinchona plantations, inadequate supply of power, and inadequate water supplies, etc, among others, has left the entire region in economic shambles. Similarly, in the plains, absence of land rights to tea plantation workers, land alienation, absence of major industries, unemployment are major issues confronting the people. Subalterns cannot speak. The grievances spiral. The two

dominant communities- the Nepalis/Gorkhas in Darjeeling hills and the Koch-Rajbanshis in the plains do not have a strong educated middle class which can compete with the vast Bengali middle class. Therefore, the ventilation of their grievances can offer only through the political elites of the region who too feel neglected and deprived vis-à-vis the political elites in the state. It is, therefore, the elites of these deprived classes who manufacture the politics of protest movements around the issues of economic underdevelopment and backwardness. However, the political articulation in the form of protest movements have not confined to the elitist sections of the society. In both the cases, since the protest is articulated around the basic necessities of life and the issues and concerns of the everyday, it has been deeply internalise by the masses who are the victims of economic backwardness and underdevelopment. Hence, the strength of the movements reflect the strength of the masses wherein the protest movements have been taking deeper roots not easily uprootable. In other words the political leadership of the movements have efficiently framed the movements and mobilised mass supports on the issue of development in the region.

ROLE OF LEADERSHIP AND MOVEMENT DYNAMICS: A COMPARISON

According to the theory of collective action advanced by Sidney Tarrow (1998) and his research cohort, movements operate within a complex context of changing political opportunities and constraints. Movement leadership utilizes opportunities in order to advance movement goals and

are set back by constraints. This understanding portrays movements as shifting back and forth from offensive to defensive political positions depending on both internal and external political forces. Hence, movements move and transform, and in this process, ideological orientations of the movement leadership, leadership's choice of resources and methods of mobilisation and struggle, conflicts in leadership, among others affect the movement in terms of its objectives, nature, character and content. We shall briefly explore and compare how different factors and forces as opportunities and constraints have shaped the two movements under study.


Ideological Orientations of the Leadership and Movement Dynamics

Ideology is considered as one of the most important components of protest movements (Yasin and Dasgupta, 2003). This, according to Padam Nepal (2009), is because ideology is the legitimising force of a movement, and it is the ideological orientation of a movement, that determines the objective of protest, and the strategy it needs to adopt to secure the goal so defined. Hence, a social movement is characterised by a set/sets of ideologies based on which it develops the strategy of protest. It implies that a protest movement may be determined of its nature and character by the ideological orientations of the actors involved in the movement. Sometimes a movement may have more than one set of, and quite often than not conflicting ideological orientations. This impinges on the nature and course of the movement. In the following sections we shall delineate the different actors involved in the movements

under scrutiny, their ideological premises and the consequent impact on the respective movement dynamics.

The figure below illustrates the various actors involved in the two movements under study and their ideological orientations, from which, the nature of movement and its dynamics could be analysed.

Figure 5.1: Ideological Orientations of the Leadership of the Two Movements under Study



As revealed from the above figure, both the movements under study have been influenced by multiple ideological shades represented by the diverse actors involved in the movement. Whereas the major actors in the Gorkhaland Movement have been the All India Gorkha League (AIGL),

the Gorkha National Liberation Front (GNLF) and the Gorkha Janamukti Morcha (GJMM), the Kamtapur Peoples' Party (KPP) and the Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO) are the primary actors in the Kamtapur Movement.

While Kamtapur Peoples' Party (KPP) and the All India Gorkha League (AIGL) shared some similarities in terms of their ideological orientations, KLO and GNLF too shared some amount of similarity. Both the AIGL and the KPP believed primarily in legal constitutional method of protest by way of adopting strategies like petitioning, submission of memoranda, demonstrations, etc. On the other hand, both the movements came under, at least in one of their phases strongly and intermittent entry and exit at other times, the influence of radical ideological fringes. GNLF in the Gorkhaland Movement and the KLO in the Kamtapur Movement represented the radical ideological fringe in the movements under study. Under the influence of the radical ideological premises, both these organisations espoused violent protest strategies. However, the GJMM in the Gorkhaland Movement adopted Gandhism as its avowed ideological premise although not without criticisms and allegations, no prominent actor in Kamtapur Movement has espoused Gandhian ideology.

The strategies adopted by the various organisations involved in the movement based on their ideological groundings contributed to movement dynamics in each of the movements, sometimes weakening the movement, and yet at other times, strengthening it. For instance, the

tacit legal constitutional mechanisms adopted by KPP in Kamtapur Movement and by the AIGL in Gorkhaland Movement conspicuously failed to evoke any meaningful response from the state. Since Kamtapur Movement is led primarily by the KPP, the result has been such that it has failed to produce any landmark difference in favour of the movement participants as yet. Similarly, the AIGL could hardly attract supporters from the grassroots. The party at best could supply meaningful opposition to the dominant parties in the agitation, specially since the movement in the 1980s. The multiple levels of the complex processes of interactions between and amongst these movement actors too contributed to the changes in strategies, objectives and issues of the movement, quite often than not weakening the movement. For instance, Guljit Kumar Arora (2004, p. 138) has criticized the leaders of the Gorkhaland movement for their lack of consistency in the means they have advocated to achieve the avowed objectives of the movement: Arora contends, "One finds shifting stands—from independent nation to a separate state to the demand for getting this region included in the sixth schedule of the constitution. Ghising justified the demand for the inclusion of the region, 'a stepping stone towards statehood'".

Strategies and Tactics Adopted by the Leadership and Movement Dynamics

Movements make leaders as much as they are made by them. In the case of both the movements under study, various strategies have been used to achieve the objectives of the movement. However, such

strategies have varied from leader to leader, often leading to discontinuities of actions at some phases of the movement. The strategies range from passive resistance to violent rebellion to armed struggle. In the following sections we shall explore the movement strategies adopted by a particular leadership at a particular space-time context; and also make a comparative analysis of such strategies and their overall impact on movement dynamics.

Let us begin with the Gorkhaland Movement. The Gorkhaland movement has a long history since 1907, passing through several stages – under the League leadership, the GNLF leadership, and finally, the GJMM leadership. At each of the stages, the objectives of the movement have either been altered, modified or replaced by a new one. The changes in the goals and objectives of the movement have impacted on the nature of the strategies and tactics adopted by the movement leadership. Whereas the League (ABGL/AIGL) leadership adopted mostly legal constitutional methods and mechanisms for the realisation of the movement's objectives, which primarily constituted of identity issues pertinent to an Indian Gorkha, the recognition of language and access to development opportunities. The movement was carried on via submissions of petitions and memoranda to the government, peaceful demonstrations, and moves in legislative assemblies, among others.

In the 1980s, with the Pranta Parishad breaking off to give birth to a new political (GNLF) party, the movement transformed radically in terms of

goals, objectives, issues and strategies. During this time the movement was an exclusive privilege of the GNLF. The prime leader of the new party, with his military background adopted a radical movement strategy for the realisation of its prime objective – the creation of a separate Gorkhaland state within the Indian constitutional framework, which supposedly had the potential to address the issue of identity crisis confronting the Indian Gorkhas. To this effect, he mobilised the supporters and prepared them for a violent armed struggle. However, given the context of politico-administrative set up in Darjeeling wherein protests were usually met with dire consequences,² initially he had to resort to less censored media to communicate his political messages to the mass of people. The soft media to communicate was the popular songs. He employed 'sorrow' songs, as central signifier of the Gorkha culture, as a central aspect of the Gorkha identity, as a '*deterritorialised Gorkha*' nation in India. The sorrow songs reflected the wariness of the Gorkhas in India, and generated in them a feeling of alienation and oppression for which only a 'Gorkha homeland' within the Indian federal structure would give them a political space---a space defining their identity (Nepal, 2008). Hearing such songs is hearing history for them. They constituted a part of the collective memory that when recalled connected the present hearer with his past. The mapping out of the Indian Nepali/Gorkha heritage acted as an essential part of the Gorkha cultural nationalism, which formed an important resource for the

² In the past, many leaders in the Pranta Parishad were arrested and imprisoned for attempts to call protest demonstrations and strikes in Darjeeling. See for details, Jiwan Labar, *Darjeeling Ko Rajnitik Sandarva ma Dawa Bomzon Ani Tarun Sangh*, Chandmari, Darjeeling: Yugal Prakashan, 1999.

Gorkhaland movement. Music provided a basis of common understanding and common experience for a generation in revolt (ibid). The later songs made overwhelming presence of blood (*ragaat*) in them, most often associated with the land (*maato*) and introduced the theme of sacrifice. As for instance in *Sahid ko Samjhana* (a song used during the movement), it says, “ *Ragat ko puraskar chadai gaye birle yo mato ma/ Sahid le bhagya banai gaye hamro yo dharti ma*”. By giving their lives, the martyrs create unity among the people who remember them, praise them, and worship them as sacred. Despite their deaths, the martyrs are shown to play a decisive role in the future course of the movement (Nepal, 2011). Moreover, a protest movement required strategies of unification of people from different walks of life, divided in terms of religion, language, culture and other socio-economic privileges. Partly, this cementing of the bond was fulfilled through the political messages in the songs. However, other mechanisms of unification were equally important. Under the leadership of Subhas Ghising, the GNLFF Supremo and the chief architect of the Gorkhaland Movement of the 1980s, Gorkha category has been more statutorily used to represent the community sentiments and cementing the bond between them. Having served in Gorkha battalion, his strategies were unique in the sense that they amalgamated culture with politics. For example, he stressed on the use of Khukri (curved knife, the traditional weapon of the Nepalese) so as to symbolize martial prowess and the use of typical Nepali cap as a symbol of Gorkha culture. It is under his leadership that political platform for women (Gorkha National Women Organisation), students (All Gorkha

Student Union) started emerging up. The term Gorkha in its present political manifestation stood for a community composed of people from the hills, ignoring the religious, linguistic and other such barriers (Middleton and Sneiderman, 2008).

However, Ghisingh was averse to passive methods of struggle; and therefore questioned the applicability and relevance of such strategies. For instance, in his speech delivered at Dr Graham's Homes, Kalimpong on 19th September 1986, Ghising held that 'Everyone around us says, 'our well wishes are there', but I answer them saying that well wishes nowadays are meant only for the newly married couples, not for the revolutionaries' (Gorkha, 1996). Further, Ghising held that people can be explosive like volcano to fight for their rights and bring justice back in. Through this, Ghising intended to give a violent, revolutionary strategy to the movement. To quote Ghising, "People means a cyclone...a volcano..." (Ghising's Speech on December 07, 1987, in Gorkha, 1996, p. 61). Thus Ghising believed that the movement gained significance and reached its climax because of the use of violent strategies and tactics. Ghising held that '...this movement have reached to a climax because of the 'Blood' sacrificed by our people' (ibid). Ghising was not averse to using 'threat' as a movement tactic along with his other radical strategies. For instance, to quote Ghising again, "If the Demand of Gorkhaland is not considered by the Central Government of India, then the whole other Indian community will be treated as foreigner" (Speech by Subhash Ghising on June 2, 1985 in Gorkha, ibid. p. 20). It is evident from this that

Ghising even made use of the 'threat of secession' if his 'legitimate' demand for the creation of the state of Gorkhaland was not met by the Union Government of India.

Ghising's strategy of violent armed struggle did not disappoint him.³ It resulted in the creation of Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council (DGHC), an autonomous council for the three hill subdivision of Darjeeling district in 1988.⁴ He became an undisputed leader of the Gorkha community, and was unanimously elected to head the council. Coming to power was easy but the newly formed council had much to deliver. Bountiful of promises for the development and welfare of the Gorkha community were not easy to be fulfilled; but the failure to meet the promises had the potential to tumble down the newly held position of power. As the council matured, it paradoxically failed more and more to address the aspirations of the people. The strategy of the party in power (GNLF) had to change. Ghising's leadership had no option but to divert the attention of the people from their fast disappearing livelihood opportunities and the manifest contradictions of development failure. The leadership in its attempt to retain power made several attempts to digrate people's

³ Strategy of violent movement espoused by Ghising finally resulted in the creation of the DGHC, a territorial council for the Gorkhas in West Bengal. For the first time in Indian history, such an arrangement was conceded for the Gorkhas, which reflects the achievement of Ghising's method of protest. However, the arrangement was far from the avowed objective of the creation of a separate state for the Gorkhas. Hence, Ghising's strategy, with his settling for the Council is seen both as an achievement and as a failure.

⁴The DGHC was created by way of the Tripartite Agreement between Subash Ghising (GNLF), the Government of West Bengal and the Union Government dated 22nd August, 1988. Subsequently, the DGHC came into being with the Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council Act, 1988.

attention through his several acts of insanity.⁵ Ultimately the strategy weakened the GNLFF stronghold in the hills to give birth to a new messiah.

The Gorkhaland Movement took a new turn with the formation of a new political party, the Gorkha Janamukti Morcha (GJMM) in September 2007 under the leadership of Bimal Gurung, who had been the right hand of Subash Ghising in the earlier movement. The new leadership closely followed the footsteps of GNLFF in its definition of the issues and objectives of the movement, but conspicuously differed widely in terms of the strategies and methods for the realisation of the movement objectives. Whereas the GNLFF led movement of the 1980s concentrated on issues like the citizenship and identity of the Indian Gorkhas, creation of Indian Gorkha regiment and the inclusion of the Gorkha language in the VIII Schedule of the Indian Constitution, the new phase of the movement concentrated on the issue of identity alone and held that only the creation of Gorkhaland state within the Indian federal structure would address the identity crisis of the Indian Gorkhas. Hence, the movements' prime objective was the establishment of Gorkhaland. It conveniently dropped the other issues which were a part of the earlier movement like the Gorkha Regiment and the recognition of language, probably because the new leadership did not feel the necessity, for instance, of the development of language in the aftermath of its constitutional recognition within the VIII Schedule, to serve as effective medium of expression of

⁵ See for instance the contents of various speeches made by Shri Subsh Ghising between early 2000s to 2007, up to the formation of the GJMM.

the philosophy of life by its adherents. With the single agenda in mind, the leadership designed movement strategy, which radically differed from what was adopted by the earlier movement. Grounded on the Gandhian ideological premises, the new movement espoused a non-violent, satyagrahic Gandhian model of strategy, however, with few tactics still sharing commonalities with the previous radical phase of the movement. The GJMM's adoption of the Gandhian methods of protest can be understood with reference to the GJMM's *Aachar Samhita* (the model code of conduct) of the party, thus:

"Ahimsa (Non-Violence) is humanity's biggest power. Gandhism and Ahimsa constitute the main mantra of the Gorkha Jana Mukti Morcha. What we have achieved and what we lost in our violent movement of the past is self explanatory. Let us understand that Ahimsa is our avowed religion. Let us refrain from violent activities; to fight amongst ourselves is antithetical to Gandhian principles. Our objectives can be achieved through constitutional mechanisms. Since the Constitution provides for such provisions, we can invoke the constitutional provisions to achieve our goals. It is futile to adopt violent strategies..." (Gorkha Janmukti Morcha, *Aachar Samhita*, p. 3)

Hence, in case of the Gorkhaland movement, what is discernible is the fact that the movement strategies have changed along with the

continuous definition and redefinition of goals and objectives of the movement. With each redefinition of the movement objectives and consequent alteration of the movement strategies, the movement has moved and transformed. However, with the change in leadership, there have also been changes in objectives and strategies of the movement, thereby giving the movement a dynamic nature.

Moving on to the Kamtapur Movement, one finds similar changes in terms of strategies adopted by movement leadership at different points of time in the history of the movement. Whereas the KPP confined its strategy of protest to legal constitutional methods, it was the radical wing of the movement, the KLO leadership which, with its commitment to armed struggle in the lines of the method adopted by the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) that impacted the movement much. Since the KLO espoused a violent revolutionary method, it was declared as a terrorist outfit, banned, and finally even a joint operation was done by the Royal Bhutan Army (RBA) and the Indian security forces to wipe the cadres out of their haven in the Indo-Bhutan border forests. This was a big blow to the entire movement. The radical strategy of the KLO invited an unbecoming setback for the Kamtapur movement.

Leadership Conflicts and Movement Dynamics

The differences and consequent splits in political leadership, the leaderships craving for power and the inevitable power competition have characterised both the movements under study. In case of the

Gorkhaland movement, the first discernible differences in leadership and its styles can be traced to Pranta Parishad led by Indra Bahadur Rai. The differences of opinions of the members of the Parishad later on became manifest in the wake of mass eviction of the Gorkhas from the north eastern states of India. as a consequence, the Parishad split to give birth to a new organisation, the Gorkha National Liberation Front. This split, although rendered the pranta Parishad functionless and inactive and relegated it to the backyard, yet it strengthened the demand for a separate state of Gorkhaland under the leadership of Subash Ghising. All leaders were not in favour of a violent armed struggle as a movement strategy as espoused by Ghising. Ghising faced oppositions from leaders who advocated peaceful, legal-constitutional methods of protests. One of the protagonists of such strategy was the ABGL leader, Madan Tamang the movement under Ghising could not tolerate political opposition, and hence, resulted in clashes of leadership with consequences like the burning of a wooden bungalow, an ancestral property of Madan Tamang in Meghna in Darjeeling. This conflict too had no adverse impact on the Gorkhaland movement; the movement continued till the formation of the DGHC in 1988. Another major leadership conflict resulted out of Ghising's political arrogance. Bimal Gurung, an erstwhile close associate of Ghising was ousted from Ghising's GNLF for his political ambitions. The frustrations of the ousted leader could find a safe haven in people's discontent resulting from massive corruption and mal development in the hills under Ghising's regime. Gurung mobilised the popular sentiment against Ghising's complacency towards underdevelopment and

calculated ignorance of corruption. Ultimately, the conflict escalated into the second wave of the Gorkhaland movement since Sept. 2007. The Ghising-Bimal conflict had a positive contribution towards the movement as it emerged from its deteriorating position to a renewed one with popular support from not only Darjeeling but by the Gorkhas in the entire of India. However, the movement suffered a huge setback owing to a conflict between GJMM chief Bimal Gurung and the ABGL leader Madan Tamang. The conflict between the two leaders ultimately led to the murder of ABGL chief Madan Tamang on May 21, 2010, which derailed, at least for the time being, the entire movement. Although the GJMM could show off its mass support against the state's allegation that it had no popular support, the movement entered a phase of confusion, weakening the movement itself. In a bid to strengthen the movement, the GJMM attempted to play with the nomenclature, rechristening the proposed state as Gorkha-Adivasi Pradesh instead of Gorkhaland and renaming the movement as the movement for Gorkha-Adivasi Pradesh. However, the movement still appears to be in a weakened state since then, and specially more so with the change of government in the state wherein the Trinamul Congress has come to power of which the GJMM is an ally.

Although the Kamtapur movement also has a long history, it is characterised by negligible incidence of leadership conflicts. The most prominent conflict of leadership in case of the Kamtapur movement took place with the formation of the Kamtapur Progressive Party by the breakaway faction of the Kamtapur People's Party. The two prominent

leaders of the Kamtapur People's Party- Atul Roy and Nikhil Roy differed in terms of strategies and tactics of the movement. The difference led to the forming of Kamtapur Priogressive Party by Atul Roy. With the two competing political parties under two strong leaders did nothing good for the movement. The movement weakened as a result of political competition between the two strong leaders. Further, another radical group of the Rajbanshis could neither fit themselves within the frameworks of Nikhils Kamtapur Peoples Party, nor of Atul's Progressive party. The emergence of the armed organisation under the leadership emerging Kamtapuri youths further contributed in paralysing the movement. It was an oportune moment for the government to suppress it as a terrorist organisation. In nutshell, it can, therefore, be said that both the instances of conflicts, unlike in the Darjeeling Gorkhaland movement, produced only negative externalities for the movement. However, the Mainaguri merger of the KPP (Atul) and the KPP (Nikhil) reinvigorated the movement, giving its aspirants a new lease of life.

Role of the State Leadership, State Responses to the Movement, and Movement Dynamics

The State of West Bengal has adopted a confrontationist method in handling the two movements under study. For instance, the Gorkhaland movement of the 1980s was dubbed as being 'secessionist, anti-people and anti-national'.⁶ Further, the state used force and coercion to repress

⁶ Jyoti Basu, the then Chief Minister of West Bengal called an All Party Meeting on Tuesday, August 19, 1986 at Writers' Building, Calcutta to deliberate and delineate strategies to handle the Gorkhaland movement under Subash Ghising. The meeting adopted a resolution declaring the GNLf led movement as secessionist, a nti-people

the movement. It mobilised a huge number of companies of the military including the CRPF and BSF to subdue the movement.⁷ Consequently, the movement gained more currency to counter state coercion, which led to the strengthening of the movement. The ultimate consequence was the series of transformations in the character and content of the movement, rejuvenating each time with a new vigour. The peoples' representatives like the MPs and MLAs opposed such moves by the state. Renulina Subba, the then MLA in the State Legislative Assembly from the Hills categorically stated that the Gorkhaland movement in Darjeeling Hills cannot be suppressed with the help of bullets.⁸

Several other methods were adopted by the state leadership to weaken the movement and ease its suppression. As in case of any other social movement, 'Fund' is an essential component necessary for movement organizations. Sufficiency or otherwise of the fund is likely to determine the effectiveness of movement mobilizations and hence its nature and course (Nepal, 2010). The state even tried to weaken the movement by pointing out to its alleged foreign funding.⁹ The movement had to respond to such threats as investigations etc of its fund sources for which the movement had to develop a counter discourse and a material basis for

and anti-national. This has been reported in *Himalchuli*, dated August 21, 1986, p. 2, paragraph 2.

⁷ *Amrita Bazar Patrika* dated 28th August 1986 reported that the state mobilised nine companies of the CRPF and the BSF in the different pockets of the Darjeeling Hills to tackle the movement. The state's response was coercive and not democratic, which in turn compelled the movement to design methods to become strong.

⁸ See *Himalchuli*, dated 26th September 1986 for details.

⁹ See Subash Ghising's interview with Monideep Banerjee of *Onlooker*, New Delhi 9 October 1-15), 1986 for details.

the justification that it is not supported by any outside agency with nefarious designs that would hinder national security and sovereignty, but sustained on small contributions made by local grassroots participants of the movement. The state government and the state leadership dubbed the new phase of the Gorkhaland movement in Darjeeling Hills beginning 2007 under the leadership of Shri Bimal Gurung too on similar lines with similar strategies and tactics.

Similar confrontationalist response was adopted by the government towards the Kamtapur Movement. According to Mukhopadhyay (2011), from the beginning the state of west Bengal From Jyoti Basu to Ashok Bhattacharya, all held the movement as an 'anti people forces', restricted to a handful of disgruntled people with no popular support (ibid.). Of course the government time and again reiterated the availability of space for dialogue to address the issues raised by the movement, paradoxically, however, the movement was time and again suppressed with the use of force, branding it to be a law and order problem. In a nutshell, the response of the state was confrontational and was characterized by a conspicuous absence of judicious statecraft in handling the movement.

Hence, the two movements, having similar issues and objectives and located in a similar geo-physical space met similar treatment by the state. The commonality of treatment owes to the fact that the state of West Bengal is against carving out a new state from within it. Since both the movements are movements for the creation of new states within West

Bengal, the response of the state and state political leadership has been similar, similarly affecting the movements under study in terms of their character, content and course.

Movement, Media and Leadership:

In chapters 3 and 4 we have discussed the two movements under study in detail. One of the concerns had been to evaluate as to how leadership in each of the movements has mobilised the media for achieving the objectives of the movement. Whereas in case of Kamtapur movement it was found that the leaders took no special initiative to mobilise the media for the sake of the movement, just the contrary situation was observed in case of the Gorkhaland movement. The study revealed that in case of the Gorkhaland movement, media was mobilised by the leadership since the inception of the movement during the colonial period. Both the active phases of the movement- 1980s and the post 2007 made extensive use of media for movement mobilisation. The leadership in the Gorkhaland movement resorted even to electronic media for mobilisation. Obviously, because of the contributions of the media, the Gorkhaland movement which has extensively mobilised the media has emerged as a stronger movement in the region vis-à-vis the Kamtapuri movement which has, to an equal extent, failed to mobilise the media.

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

Within protest movement literature, there has been a call for further research into the causal mechanisms and processes that shape episodes

of contentious politics. Social movement analysts often respond to this call with the study of tactics and strategies utilized by movement actors and their opponents, the marking of pivotal moments that dictate a movement's ebb and flow and the impact of internal and external political opportunities and constraints on a movement's direction. In the case of the two movements under investigation, the issue of 'identity' and the 'political space', a 'territorial marker' of a nationalist/ethnic identity in the form of a 'separate state' has been deemed the spark that invigorates the movement. Some studies of the past have focused on the leadership change that occurs during the course of a given movement. Blumer (1969) posited that leaders must shift roles acting as prophets during the first stages of protests, then as official representatives during the formalization of the movement, and finally as administrators as the movement institutionalizes. Rothman (1974) argued that different types of leaders may become prominent at various phases of protest, for instance, militant leaders dominating during the initial phases of protest while more accommodationist leaders coming to the forefront as the movement negotiates with its opponents. However, the study presented here reveals that Bloomer's argument of different types of leadership at different phases of movement is sometimes provided by same leader or group of leaders of a movement which traverses different levels of protest politics from emergence to institutionalisation. For instance, in case of the Gorkhaland movement, in both its active phases, i.e., the 1980s and the post 2007, has seen the protest movement germinating, maturing and institutionalising. For instance, an active Gorkhaland movement sprouted

out of years of hibernation, grew and institutionalised with the formation of the DGHC under the GNLF leadership. Similarly, in the second phase under GJMM, the movement arose after a couple of decades of recess, grew and is finally institutionalising with the new arrangement in the form of Gorkhaland Regional Authority (GRA) under GJMM's leadership. In both these cases, leadership, more particularly the prominent in the movement, have assumed militaristic role in the initial phase of the movement and a more accommodationist role at the later stages. Similar evidences are discernible in case of the Kamtapur movement as well. Hence, they have played multiple roles in multiple styles in multiple contextual settings, with differing strategies and techniques, giving a dynamic nature to the movements.

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