

LEADERSHIP AND PROTEST MOVEMENT DYNAMICS:

**A Study in the Context of Gorkhaland and
Kamtapuri Movements in West Bengal**

**Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D)
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Preface

The present thesis *Leadership and Protest Movement Dynamics: A Study in the Context of Gorkhaland and Kamtapuri Movements in West Bengal* is a qualitative research about significance of historical practices of leadership in determining the objectives, goals, ideological grounding, strategies, and tactics of the movement. In other words, it is about how leadership influences protest movement dynamics. The work examines the nature of leadership in the two protest movements in North Bengal region of West Bengal: the Gorkhaland Movement in Darjeeling Hills and the Kamtapur Movement in Terai and Dooars region of North Bengal, both of which are fighting for territory based recognition by way of creation of separate states. It is also interesting to note that both the movements under study have a fairly long history having traversed a long journey, involving multiplicity of actors, with frequent changes in objectives, strategies and techniques of protest, led at different times by different types of leadership. This long history permits us to evaluate the role played by the movement leadership in defining the objectives of the movement and designing its protest framework and strategies. Such a study is desirable as it enables a rereading of the political leadership involved in the movement and helps analyse the ways and means of addressing the issues by the state for political stability and development.

I am indebted to several scholars and teachers from whom I have benefited in course of the present study. First and foremost, I acknowledge my indebtedness to all learned scholars whose works I have referred to in the study. I would also like to thank my revered teacher Professor Md. Yasin of the Department of Political Science for encouraging me in the present endeavour and providing me with his valuable guidance and supervision. I would also like to thank all my colleagues, both teaching and non teaching in the Department of Political Science, North Bengal University for their support and cooperation. I also owe my gratitude to faculty members of other Departments of the University who have supported me directly or indirectly in the preparation of my thesis. I also thank the staff members of the Central Library, North Bengal University, Library of the Centre for Himalayan Studies, North Bengal University, the District Library Darjeeling, among others, for their support. The present work would not have come to shape without the support and help of those who have made the aforesaid protest movements a 'lived experience', with whom I had the opportunity to consult, interview and gather information for the present study. Finally, I thank all my family members and particularly my wife Smriti and daughter Akshada who had been a constant source of inspiration in my academic pursuits.



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ABBREVIATIONS

AASU:	All Assam Students' Union
ABGL:	Akhil Bharatiya Gorkha League
AGP:	Asom Gana Parishad
AIGL:	All India Gorkha League
AKSU:	All Kamtapur Students' Union
CPI (M):	Communist Party of India (Marxist)
CPI:	Communist Party of India
CPRM:	Communist Party of Revolutionary Marxists
DGHC:	Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council
GDNS:	Gorkha Dukkha Niwarak Sammelan
GJMM:	Gorkha Janamukti Morcha
GNLFF:	Gorkha National Liberation Front
JMM:	Jharkhand Mukti Morcha
KLO:	Kamtapur Liberation Organisation
KPP:	Kamtapur Peoples' Party
KPP:	Kamtapur Progressive Party
KVSP:	Kamtapur Vasha Sahitya Parishad
MLA:	Member of Legislative Assembly
NEBULA:	Nepali Bhutia Lepcha Association
PDF:	Peoples' democratic Front
UKD:	Uttarakhand Dal
ULFA:	United Liberation Front of Assam

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Since the 1970s, the Indian State has been witnessing the erosion in authority and stability, owing to the existence of a host of factors like the perceptions of socio-cultural alienation, structural and operational imbalances in society (Yasin and Dasgupta 2003), and a sense of 'otherisation' and deprivation. This situation has culminated in the eruption and proliferation of protest movements with the pronounced aims of expressing dissent from conditions of powerlessness, deprivation, injustice or loss of identity; and seeking various remedial empowerments and entitlements (Yasin and Dasgupta 2003), creating a situation of 'governability crisis' (Kohli 1981). With the multiplication of such protest movements, a simultaneous proliferation of the literature on protest movements has also taken place in India (Bailey 1969 ; Dhanagare 1976; Malik 1977; Badrinath 1977; Shah 1977 and 1990; Rao 1979; Calman 1985; Frank and Fuentes 1987; Desai 1990; Chaube and Chakraborty 1999; Singh 1991). However, almost all of these studies have adopted an institutional or a neo-institutional theoretical position to comprehend the protest movements in India. Hence, they have ignored the role of the 'strategic agency' (Giddens 1984) of the heterogeneous actors involved in such protest movements, of which movement leadership is the most prominent. Yasin and Dasgupta are of the opinion that leadership occupies an important place in the protest movements as the leaders are instrumental in translating the objective causes into subjective

consciousness articulating causes of deprivation of which the mass that is being mobilized may have little or no knowledge. It is further contended that leadership is responsible for organising a protest movement. Nepal (2007 and 2009) further elaborates the role of leadership in protest movements. The study which focuses specifically on the Chipko Movement and the Narmada Bachao Andolan establishes that leadership plays a crucial role in producing dynamism and transformations in protest movements. Therefore, understanding of a protest movement dynamics warrants a study of the role of leadership in such movements. In this context, the present work is designed to explore the role of leadership in protest movement dynamics in India through a study of the Gorkhaland Movement in Darjeeling Hills and the Kamtapuri Movement in the terai area of North Bengal, in West Bengal.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Leaders are central to social movements, yet scholars have devoted relatively little attention to understanding the concept of leadership or its effects on movements. There are numerous ways in which leaders generate social change and create the conditions for the agency of other participants. Leaders play a critical role in collective action, shaping movements in numerous ways. They define goals and advance strategies. They mobilize followers, galvanize indigenous organizations, and forge coalitions. They influence responses to external repression, and their action, rhetoric, and style affect conflict outcomes. Yet, despite leadership's significance, it remains an understudied topic among

collective action researchers, because of the recent emphasis on structures of opportunity. The two movements taken for the present study, the Gorkhaland and the Kamtapuri movements are the movements located in the periphery of the Indian federal structure, expressing dissent from conditions of powerlessness, deprivation, injustice or loss of identity; and seeking various remedial empowerments and entitlements. On the one hand, they have attracted little attention of the scholars on protest movements, and on the other, they reveal recurring waves of protests under different leadership (seen at least, for example, in case of the Gorkhaland Movement). Despite such instances in these movements, whatever studies have been made on these movements so far have conspicuously paid no serious attention to the role of leadership in determining the fate of the movement. Hence, there is a need to examine both the structural limitations and opportunities for social movements and the ways in which leaders make a difference within structural contexts. This constitutes the problem of the present study.

We also believe that comparative methods offer the best basis for hypothesizing about leadership's role in movements. Accordingly, we have used a variety of comparisons involving two different movement sets: the Movement for Gorkhaland in Darjeeling Hills; and the Kamtapuri Movement in the Terai of North Bengal, i.e., movements seeking similar goals at the same time in the same state under near equivalent structural conditions. In such cases, the role of agency stands out sharply, distinguishing those leaders who were able—or unable—to take

advantage of these conditions. A second methodological rationale for selecting our cases is the leverage they give us in making cross-case comparisons. We argue that through the present study, the social movement theory would benefit greatly from an examination of the leadership dynamics in protest movements.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Early studies of social movement leadership (e.g., Blumer 1951; Lang and Lang 1961; Roche and Sachs 1955) identified the functional roles filled by different types of movement leaders at different stages in movement development (Wilson 1973:195-196). Gusfield (1966), points to the conflicting requirements for a leader to function both within the movement as a *mobilizer*, inspiring participants, and outside the movement as an *articulator*, linking the movement to the larger society. More recent work further analyzes the complexity of leadership roles at different levels within movements, the conflicts between different leadership tasks, and changes over time in movement leadership (see Aminzade et al. 2001; Goldstone 2001; Herda-Rapp 1998; Klandermans 1989; Marullo 1988; Melucci 1996; Nelson 1971; Robnett 1997; Staggenborg 1988; Turner and Killian, 1987). Beyond analyzing the various roles and functions of leaders in social movements, researchers have also examined the ways in which leaders gain legitimate authority in social movements. Many draw on Weber's theory of charismatic leadership, a relational approach that assigns a key role to followers in imputing charisma to leaders (Platt and Lilley 1994). Weber (1968)

elaborates the movement forms associated with charismatic leadership, including the emotional character of the community and the appointment of officials based on loyalty to the charismatic leader. Despite Weber's focus on the interactional nature of leadership, however, the notion of charisma is commonly used to refer to a personality type, and Weber's insight into the effects of leadership on movement characteristics has been neglected. Melucci (1996) argues that the Weberian theory of charisma lends itself to neglect of the social relationship between leaders and followers; viewed as giving themselves up to a charismatic leader, followers lack agency.

In Robert Michels's (1962) theory of political leadership, followers willingly cede agency to their leaders. The masses are grateful to leaders for speaking and acting on their behalf, even though leaders become political elites whose interests conflict with those of their followers. Large bureaucratic organizations, in Michels's view, are necessary to large-scale movements and parties, but they inevitably become oligarchical as leaders are motivated to preserve their own power and positions. Leaders become part of the power elite (Yasin and Dasgupta 2003), more concerned with organizational maintenance than the original goals of the movement. The masses allow this to happen through apathy and a lack of competence in comparison to their skilled leaders. Numerous theorists have disputed Michels's argument regarding the inevitable transformation of organizations into oligarchy, arguing that we need to examine the variety of organizational forms that actually constitute movements and the

processes that allow some organizations to operate democratically (Barker 2001; Lipset, Trow, and Coleman 1956). Zald and Ash (1966) argue that movement organizations change in a variety of ways in response to external environmental factors as well as internal processes. Member apathy, when it occurs, does allow leaders to transform the goals of members, but in some instances leaders transform organizations in a radical rather than conservative direction (Zald and Ash 1966:339). Other theorists have detailed both the ways in which leaders influence movement organization and how movement characteristics shape leadership. Expanding on Weber's relational approach, Wilson (1973) distinguishes among charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic types of leaders and associated types of movement organization. Leadership type affects centralization of decision-making, division of labour, and the extent to which the organization is subject to schism. Eichler (1977) similarly associates bases of leadership with organizational characteristics and outcomes.

Collective behaviour theorists have argued that social structural conduciveness is necessary but not sufficient for movement mobilization; leaders create the impetus for movements by providing examples of action, directing action, and defining problems and proposing solutions (Lang and Lang 1961). Smelser (1962) argues that leaders are essential to mobilization and can play a role in creating other conditions in the value-added process of collective behavior, but they also need structural strain and conduciveness, generalized beliefs, and precipitating factors to

generate collective behaviour. Resource mobilization theorists have viewed leaders as political entrepreneurs who mobilize resources and found organizations in response to incentives, risks, and opportunities; supporters are seen as rational actors who follow effective leaders (McCarthy and Zald 1973, 1977; Oberschall 1973). Factors such as the availability of outside support and the operation of social control affect the emergence of leaders (Oberschall 1973). Political process theorists have analyzed the impacts of structures of political opportunity, but in doing so they have paid little attention to leadership—a problem acknowledged in recent discussions of the role of leaders in recognizing and acting on opportunities (Goldstone 2001; Aminzade et al., 2001).

The relative neglect of leadership in social movement theory results from a failure to adequately address the importance and limitations of both structure and agency. The political process approach emphasizes structures of political opportunity to the neglect of human agency (Goodwin and Jasper 1999). The entrepreneurial-organizational version of resource mobilization theory (McCarthy and Zald 2002) actually overemphasizes agency in arguing that issue entrepreneurs can manufacture grievances. The theory neglects agency in its treatment of mobilizing structures. Although resource mobilization theory implicitly assumes that leaders are directing movement organizations, analysts have generally not examined the emergence of leadership and the ways in which leaders affect movement strategy and outcomes. Therefore, we argue that social movement theory would benefit greatly from an

examination of the numerous ways in which leaders influence social movements and thus generate social change and create the conditions for the agency of other participants.

A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF LITERATURE

Review of literature is an integral part of social science research. Accordingly it has significance to justify the area of research that has been undertaken. At the theoretical level, we have abundant literature on the notion and theoretical underpinnings of leadership in protest movement dynamics.

- **Burns (1978)** presents a theory of leadership as a dynamic reciprocity between ordinary people or followers and the political and ideological leaders. His argument is that mutual need, empathy, and growth characterize all genuine leadership.
- **Eichler (1977)** associates bases of leadership with organizational characteristics and outcomes.
- **Welsh (1979)** attempts to analyse the concept of political elites and their leadership behaviour, drawn from a variety of political settings. He also attempts to clarify the notions of elite and leadership, while illuminating the relationship between substance and method, i.e., between what we know and how we find out.
- **Smelser (1962)** argues that leaders are essential to mobilization and can play a role in creating other conditions in the value-added process of collective behaviour, but they also need structural strain

and conduciveness, generalized beliefs, and precipitating factors to generate collective behaviour.

- **Northouse (2007)** analyses leadership theories and examines how theoretical approach can be applied to the real world organizations. He also examines how leadership varies across cultures and which specific leadership attributes are universally endorsed as desirable and undesirable. Further, he also makes an analysis of the Team Leadership and emphasises on the Team Leadership Model to illustrate how this can be used in organisations.
- **Yasin and Dasgupta (2003)** are of the opinion that leadership occupies an important place in the protest movements as the leaders are instrumental in translating the objective causes into subjective consciousness articulating causes of deprivation of which the mass that is being mobilized may have little or no knowledge

The review of literature on the study of 'Leadership and Protest Movement Dynamics: A Study in the context of the Gorkhaland and Kamtapuri Movements in West Bengal' necessitates the review of literature at least from two different perspectives. Firstly, the literature on the Gorkhaland Movement and secondly, on the Kamtapuri Movement. The Gorkhaland Movement and the Kamtapuri Movement are the two most important sub-regional movements in North Bengal. However, these

two movements have received very little scholarly attention. Most of the available literature on these two movements have focussed on the movements as they happened, and, conspicuously enough, there is no literature produced as yet on the role played by the movement leadership in movement dynamics. The two movements may be taken separately for survey of the existing literature on these two movements. We shall take up the review of these two set of literature in the following sections.

On the Gorkhaland Movement, we have some academic literatures, which have been reviewed below:

- **Mishra (1986)** analyses the Gorkhaland movement as a reflexive agitation. He holds the view that the unjust treatment meted out to the Indian Nepalis elsewhere in India is the primary cause of the movement and believes that the movement therefore reflects the 'transferred anger'. The focus of the study is on the causal aspect of the movement. His thesis, however, has been refuted by many including an 'insider' scholar Subba (1992) who has seriously objected to the thesis with strong evidences against it.
- **Chakrabarti (1988)** also dwells on the causes of the Gorkhaland Movement and traces its evolution, labelling it as a 'segregationist' movement. He locates the evolution of the movement basically to the administrative failure.

- **Milindo Chakraborti (1988)**, yet another work attempting to clarify the causes of the movement from a political economic perspective, attributes the origin of the movement to the failure of the proper implementation of the rural development schemes in general and the IRDP in particular. He contends that wherever there was a successful implementation of the IRDP, it had least support to the movement and cites the example of the Bijanbari Block which he refers to as 'Bijanbari Syndrome' in his work. This work also pays no heed to the role of the political leadership in shaping the movement.
- **Subba (1992)** analyses the movement as a peoples' struggle for political space within the constitutional framework of Indian federalism. He analyses the movement in its historical context touching upon the political, economic and ethnic history of the people of Darjeeling district. Despite being an ethno-political analysis, the work too ignores the contributions of leadership to the origin, development and dynamics of the said movement.
- **Timsina (1992)** is a descriptive history of the causes, origin, and evolution of the Gorkhaland movement, well presented with statistical inferences on the relative deprivation of the people of the Darjeeling Hills vis-à-vis the plainsmen in West Bengal. No analysis has been made about the leadership's role in the movement.

- **Dasgupta (1999)** also has dealt with the historical evolution of the Gorkhaland movement up to the Darjeeling Accord (1988) and the consequent formation of the Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council (DGHC).
- **Sarkar and Bhaumik (2000)** is a work of a different kind, wherefrom some aspects pertaining to the development of the movement could be understood. It neither deals with the movement per se, nor with the leadership and its role.
- **Sarkar (2001)** is a sociological analysis of the movement as an ethnic movement. The study dwells on the process of ethnic mobilisation and the creation of ethnic identity of the Gorkhas following a constructivist approach to the study of ethnicity. This work also fails to take in to account the role of leadership in the protest movement.
- **Chaklader (2004)** studies the Gorkhaland Movement as a sub regional movement like the Bodoland Movement of Assam. The study unfolds the different phases of the Gorkhaland Movement beginning from the language movement to the formation of Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council. The study concludes with a note that it is not economically viable to grant Gorkhaland as a state

or a Union Territory for its size. However, it does not account for any factor lending dynamism to the movement.

- **McHenry Jr. (2007)** attempts to show that economic inequality is not a sufficient condition for the development of a secessionist movement. Of many examples cited, Gorkhaland movement is one where he shows that the economic factor does not constitute the reason for mobilisation for protest. This is not a work focussed directly on Gorkhaland Movement, and hence, other aspects of the movement have not been touched upon.
- **Bomjan (2008)** is not a work that specifically deals with the movement. The work attempts to unearth the injustice perpetrated by the 'progressive Marxist community of Bengal on the minority and underdeveloped Gorkha community'. A brilliant piece of composition, the work is a historiographical account of the Gorkha community in Darjeeling, touching the areas of society, economy and polity of the community.
- **Ganguly (2005)** makes an analysis of the genesis of the movement, its aftermath and the settlement of the problem and also its future prospects. He looks into the movement eruption as a result of persistent underdevelopment, and poverty combined with serious malgovernance.

- **Patra (2007)** scrutinises the movement as vociferous, not merely linked to the economic development of the Darjeeling hills, but issues of Identity being the prime concern.
- **Jana (2010)** views the movement as the articulation of backwardness in the form of agricultural and industrial backwardness, poverty, poor infrastructure facilities as health and education in the region. He argues that the backwardness in the region had affected different ethnic groups adversely which is the cause of the movement, and the Gorkhas of the hills of Darjeeling is no exception.

It is surprising to note that only a few academic studies have been done on the Kamtapuri movement. The available literature on the said movement has been reviewed in the following sections:

- **Basu (1994)** has studied the Kamtapuri Movement as an identity based movement. Despite labelling it as an ethnic movement, Basu has ignored the leadership aspect of the movement and its contributions to movement dynamics.
- **Karlsson (1997)** is a sort of an ethnographic study of the Koch and Rajbanshi tribes. It views the Movement as a subaltern resistance built on ethnic mobilisation. However, the study is silent on the dynamic aspect of the movement.

- **Barman (2007)** views the Kamtapuri Movement as a site of contested regionalism. Primarily a historical work, it explores the annals of Koch-Rajbanshi history and briefly presents the nature and content of the Kamtapuri Movement.
- **Halder (2000)** makes an attempt to look into the movement as mobilisation of people by the leaders on the problems of cultural and linguistic identity of the Koch- Rajbanshis, the danger of the original inhabitants being outnumbered by the outsiders and illegal migrants, economic backwardness of the people, poverty, lack of education and employment, and the neglect of the government. She contends that a combination of historical, demographic, cultural and economic elements create a situation favourable for ethnic-regional mobilization.
- **Mukhopadhyay (1987)** provides a sociological analysis of the movement by locating the genesis of the movement in the dynamics of the Rajbanshi community. He further argues that the sense of distrust among the Rajbanshi community against the Bhadrakalok is a result of transformation that has taken place in the recent years and has contributed to the eruption of the movement.
- **Mukhopadhyay (2005)** also examines the movement from a cultural perspective. He dwells into the existing cultural differentiation between the indigenous Rajbanshis and the

outsiders (Bengalis) and the consolidation of the lingo-cultural identity of the Rajbanshi community.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Review of literature has revealed certain information gaps. The area of our present concern has however been left largely unexplored. The following research questions have been designed to bridge the gap. The identified research questions are:

1. What are the general factors that account for the dynamics of the protest movements?
2. How does leadership affect the emergence, mobilising patterns, the 'framing' process, media coverage, and outcomes of the protest movements?
3. What attributes of the leader (such as social background, personality, psychological characteristics, charisma, programmatic ideas, etc.) affect the protest movement dynamics relatively at a higher magnitude?

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

From the review of literature presented above, it is revealed that all the studies have paid little or inadequate attention to the role of leadership in movement dynamics in the two movements proposed for the present study. More so, the scholars have conspicuously left the dynamic aspects

of the movements unexplored, lest the role of leadership in movement dynamics. Hence, there is a visible gap in the available literature on the proposed area of the present study. Therefore, the present work attempts to bridge this research gap through the study of the role of leadership in protest movement dynamics. The present study thus opens the possibility of formulating a broad conceptual framework to understand the role of leadership in the emergence, organization, strategy and outcomes of protest movement dynamics. The findings of the present study are envisaged to provide information about how leadership influence movements by setting goals and developing strategies, creating movement organizations and shaping their structures, and forging connections among activists, organizations, and levels of action. Therefore, the subject of the present study constitutes a matter of utmost significance.

LIMITATION OF THE STUDY

The present research is based on an exploratory method which includes interviews with some of the leaders of the movement. The present study could have been more intensive if the researcher could have become a participant observer and could include the on going processes of the movement. Moreover, the limitations with the present study have also been due to non availability of enough literatures, particularly in the case of Kamtapur movement where very little academic exercise has been made so far. The present study therefore, with these limitations, intends

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to map the role played by the leadership in the protest movement dynamics of the Gorkhaland movement and the Kamtapur movement.

METHODOLOGY

Considering the nature of the research problem as stated above, we have adopted an analytical exploratory and descriptive method of study. To this end, an extensive analysis of the documents, reports, newspaper clippings, movement newsletters, and fliers were done. We also conducted field survey. For the collection of primary data, the following tools and techniques were used: in-depth interviews (semi-structured and structured), non-participant observation, story narration, and informal discussions with primacy. To increase the validity of our observations, we used four methods to gather data on the mobilizing process: participant observation, interviews with leaders and organisers, surveys of protest movement participants, and the collection of written documents. This is because we adopted a '*mixed*' method, a sort of a hybrid methodology, synthesizing the merits of both qualitative and quantitative methodologies. The mixed research design generally employs three techniques for conducting interviews: structured, semi-structured and unstructured or informal (Morse and Field: 1995). We however, focussed more on semi-structured interview both to control the nature and extent of vagueness as well as to focus on the area of our concern. According to Chambers (1994) semi-structured interviews entail having a mental or written checklist, but being open-minded and following upon the unexpected. The respondents were asked a set of prepared questions in

the structured and semi-structured interviews, whereas, the interview followed a more flexible approach. Apart, the non-participant observation method of data collection was followed as because, the non-participant observation is a method of data collection whereby an investigator attempts to attain some kind of membership despite a degree of detachment from the group under study, and thereby, attempts to adopt perspective of the people in the situation being observed (Frankfort, Nachmias and Nachmias: 1999). Despite living amongst the community, the researcher adopted a non-participant observer's role in order to avoid subjective bias from creeping into the data. Transect walk/ Field mapping were undertaken for the verification of the respondents' responses through personal observations. We were participant observers in these movement organisations, assuming the role of insiders or members as we attended planning meetings and demonstrations.

We also used the inductive grounded theory approach in our coding (Strauss and Corbin 1990). We inductively derived an extensive coding list, including categories for characteristics of events, organisations, leaders, and political context. We also added some categories deductively, after discussing possible explanations for our field observations. Then we coded our data into the complete list of categories by creating a separate coding template for each event and bringing together information from each of our sets of field of notes on that specific event. This enabled us to compare characteristics of each of the protest movement organisation under study.

CHAPTERISATION SCHEME

The present study is intended to map the role played by the leadership in the protest movement dynamics. To this end, we have developed the present work in 6 chapters as under:

Chapter 1: Introduction

Chapter 2: Leadership and Protest Movement Dynamics: Theoretical Explorations

Chapter 3: Leadership and the Gorkhaland Movement

Chapter 4: Leadership and the Kamtapuri Movement

Chapter 5: Leadership and Movement Dynamics: Movements Compared

Chapter 6: Summary and Conclusion.

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CHAPTER 2

LEADERSHIP AND PROTEST MOVEMENT DYNAMICS: THEORETICAL EXPLORATIONS

In classical writings, no distinction was made between 'elites' and 'leaders'. However, not all political elites are leaders. Conversely, many leaders are not elites, in that they do not hold elite position. Rather, leadership is a relational term- it describes the most important characteristic of relationship between leaders and followers (Welsh, 1973, pp. 120-26). Thus, the concept of leadership has implied the need to examine patterns of interaction among elites, between elites and non-elites, and between elite and potentials or non active elites (Welsh, 1997, p.18). Hence, there are almost as many different definitions of leadership as there are people who have tried to define it (Stogdill, 1974, p.7). We shall dwell on some prominent definitions for the sake of conceptual clarity, with particular reference to the Western and Indian traditions on the understanding of the concept of leadership, however, only with reference to prominent representative works from each tradition.

CONCEPTUALISING LEADERSHIP: WESTERN AND INDIAN TRADITIONS IN PERSPECTIVE

Generally leadership in western writings is defined as "action over human beings that is exercised when persons with certain motives and purposes mobilize, in competition of conflict with others, institutional, political, psychological, and other resources so as to arouse, engage, and satisfy the motives of followers" (Burns, 1978, p. 12). It is closely related to the use of power "...The probability the one actor within a social relationship

will be in position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability exists" (Weber, 1947, p. 17); and authority – the right or the capacity or both to have proposals of perceptions or instructions accepted without recourse of persuasion, bargaining or force (McLean, 1996). Western scholars in their studies analyze leadership as a concept linked to their theoretical position. All leaders exercise their leadership in certain time and in certain place. That is what to large extent determines the way and the success of the leadership. There are scholars that stand for the importance of the personality; others claim that the leadership environment determines the success. Elgie (1995, pp. 9-23), an interactionist, claims that both of the two components matter. The leader's personality works through the ambitions of the leader and the leadership style. Leadership environment is further divided into two broad categories: first, the institutional settings, and second, needs of the society. The division between the two factors (personality of the leader and leadership environment) is strictly set as well as the distinction between leader and the led.

Thomas Carlyle in his *The Leader as a Hero* (1907) claims that the personality of a man is what determines the leadership and is crucial in whole process. He says that everything we see in the world is rationally accomplished and is done by one rational person. People like the person more if the person is more heroic and people are attracted by his capability. He claims that great men transform the environment when they come to power to improve their leadership. They make themselves

famous and make the followers follow. That is the nature of human society.

Sigmund Freud talks about the importance of the personality as a *Great Man* and as a *Leader as a Group Ideal*. Freud talks about the inevitability of one person as a leader going back in history when one despotic and powerful male led a horde. He bases his ideas on leadership on his understanding of human psychology. He distinguishes between two types of psychology: the psychology of the leader – one person, and, the psychology of member of a group. These categories can also be understood as of a leader and a follower. According to Freud leadership is a natural image of society. Leader is admired and trusted, but he might also be feared and hated. What really matters only the fact that he is followed. According to Freudian understanding of leadership, there are two parts of leadership that concern the leader. They are: the personal features of a leader; and, the idea promoted by a leader. Each of these features is important and forms the characteristics and the style of the leadership. The focus on the idea promoted by leader was an important tendency and factor in the writings of Freud. He tried to scientifically explain the human nature and types of psychology, but the first half of 20th century indicated the democratic norms and following the idea rather than a person. It became rational to explain personal interests by collective benefits and ideas. Interpretation and argumentation was a part of leader's success. But the psychologies still remained two and each

individual, according to Freud, could have one – the individual (leaders) or group psychology.

James Macgregor Burns distinguishes between *Power Wielders* and *Leaders*. "Power Wielders" refer to the legal or rational authority (Weber). It means that a person has an office and is granted a certain legitimate power, but that does not mean that the individual exercises the influence and would have many followers. It leads to the assumption that such person would not be a leader, but an authority. The environment – the existing institutional system, can grant that. Leader is the one who makes the change and has the influence over other people that are known as his followers. The main difference between *power wielders* and *leaders* is that leaders have the resources according to their motives, but *power wielders* have their purposes according to their resources (Burns, *ibid.* p.12-22). Motivation and reasoning is seen as essential part of leadership that determines not only the success of a leader in terms of followers, but also in terms of implementing the leader's idea or motive. The followers in this case determine if person is a leader or a power wielder. The nature of the human society or the order of the world then determines that either the leader has resources to fulfill their motives or the person has purposes or motives according to the resources available. It is a system based on a balance of resources.

The division of leaders and people with authority is not consistent in writing of Western scholars. For example Max Weber writes about

bureaucracy as a form of governing. Leaders are an integrative part of bureaucracy; in fact, bureaucracy is an element of leadership environment. Therefore the authority given to a individual is treated as a beneficial leadership environment rather than factors that makes leader less likely to practice leadership. Max Weber distinguishes between three types of legitimate authority. They can be also taken as three bases or reasons of why people have become the leaders (Weber, 1947, pp. 328-363). They are: First, *Rational or Legal Base* –wherein people become leaders according to the legal structure of the state, they have fulfilled all the formal requirements. This base gives them a legal right to take the office and be a formal leader with all the attached rights and duties; Second, *Traditional Base* – wherein people become the leaders according to a belief or traditions and customs. This gives the power and influence, but since it is based on the belief and tradition in minds of the followers, it can change according to the change in the environment; and Finally, *Charismatic Base* – wherein the belief is in the qualities of a person, and the followers have a persistent trust and will to follow the leader. Ann Ruth Willner (1984, pp. 3-8) goes on analyzing these types of influence, especially focusing on the charismatic authority. She says that the legal authority is based on the right and the belief in the right to give certain commands. The traditional authority depends on the status of a person. She claims that these two types of authority therefore give the power and refer to the certain office or status, giving the frame for the power. The leadership becomes framed by granted authority, that is, status. Charismatic leadership still exists, but it is rather an exception. By

giving power on rational or traditional bases, legitimacy is the factor of following. Binding or legitimate norms are the ones that are followed by people. Therefore the one issuing the norms has exercised a good leadership.

Robert Tucker (1982, pp. 71-75) talks about non-constituted leadership, which is hard to be applied to any frames, as they are not constituted. These are leaders that have no legal authority. They deal not that much with the power as with the influence. As they do not hold a legal position they do not have to restrict themselves to any frame or follow any norms as there is no contract between them and the leadership environment. People follow them not because of legal grounds, but beliefs. Usually the idea of the leader is what makes one the leader and the charisma what keeps one a leader. On one hand the non-constituted leadership is weaker as it lacks the legal and traditional authority and can rely only on charisma. On the other hand this type of leadership is much more flexible and cross-discursive. It involves higher risk of not succeeding, but has the capacity to achieve more effective result in case of success.

As described elsewhere in the present chapter, influence is the factor that allows leadership to be exercised. Talcott Parsons has divided leaders according to the types of influence they exercise. He distinguishes between four main types of influence. They are: (a) Political influence – influence that gives the power to have the person's political decisions binding to the public; (b) Fiduciary influence – influence from the right to

allocate resources in the situation of plural interests; (c) Influence through appeal to different loyalties; and, (d) Influence orientated to the interpretation of norms which provides the balance between value commitments and particular interests in certain situations (Parsons, 1969, p. 419) . By coming up these types of influence Parsons gives the idea of flexible set of resources. There are several options of what balance of types of influences should have to be to make a change or exercise leadership. There is no certain or absolute model of what a successful leader is of who the person is. Diversity in leadership qualities implies also diversity of leadership personalities. If one option is not optimal, the other can be chosen. Leader is not perceived as an absolute figure. He or she is associated with certain time, place and leadership style. Leaders can be *changed* if the necessary qualities or resources for successful leadership are known. By defining the types of influence, the defined image of a leader is created.

However, the recent works on leadership may be obtained from Aldon Morris and Suzanne Staggenborg (2002) in their *Leadership in Social Movements* define movement leaders as strategic decision-makers who inspire and organize others to participate in social movements. Peter G Northhouse (2007, p.3) defines leadership as "a process whereby an individuals influence a group of individual to achieve a common goal." Hence, leadership permits multitudes of definitions. Despite the multitudes of ways in which leadership is conceptualised, the following components are discernible in the phenomenon of leadership: (a)

leadership as a process; (b) leadership involves influence; (c) leadership occurs in a group contexts; and (d) leadership involves goal attainment.

As mentioned above, the Western scholars tend to use the techniques of classifications and segmentation to study leaders. The concept of leadership involves a certain status and means that allow a person to hold the position. The success of the leader is determined by the extent to which he/she is followed. Every individual can be placed on the leadership - follower scale.

Asian value system differs radically from the western one. The Asian notions of leadership are, therefore, different in terms of their orientations vis-à-vis their western counterparts. Asian view of leadership is *spiritual*. The notion of leadership is understood as 'walking behind people. It believes that in order to guide people, the leader must put himself behind them. Contrarily, the western understanding of leadership style is '*hands-on*', walking ahead of people. Leadership is performed in front. However, Asian notions of leadership is not a holistic concept: the notion further varies from country to country, shaped by its own socio-philosophical groundings. Indian Philosophical tradition from Vedic philosophy to *Bhagawat Gita* to Upanishads and to the writings of Kautilya, is replete with references to the notions of leadership and leadership styles.

Thirukkural, one of the oldest Indian treatise, is regarded as a Tamil Vedanta, an acclaimed original Indian work on management that is more than 2000 years old. Thirukkural deals with the leadership theory in its chapter-39 entitled 'leadership excellence.' Thirukkural's leadership theory represents a composite model of Traits theory, Behavioral theory, Social Cognitive Resource theory, and Ethical theory of leadership. According to Thirukkural the 'big' four qualities of a leader are: never failing daring courage, magnanimity, intelligence and enthusiasm. This couplet emphasizes the behavioral aspect of the leader and the ethical aspects of the behavior as well. Thirukkural states that the whole world will celebrate the leader if only he is simple looking and easily accessible and devoid of harshness in all his words

The *Bhagavad-Gita on Effective Leadership: Timeless Wisdom for Leaders* by Pujan Roka (2006), specifically addresses the leadership lessons contained in the *Bhagavad-Gita*, one of the primary sources of Vedic philosophical thought. While much of the Bhagavad Gita is filled with references to God and other spiritual matters, strong moral advice and leadership lessons can be drawn from the text. When Arjuna questions his actions as a soldier, Krishna explains to him that each position, including soldier has a role to play in the cosmos. Leaders must be aware of that role and be prepared to respond to the responsibilities imposed by their position. As stated in the Gita, *Perfection is attained when each attends diligently to his duty* (18:45). Leaders have a duty to effectively influence others, and this duty can manifest itself in a number

of different approaches, however, the leader must maintain his/her values and not waver from those duties, and values. *The wise man who has conquered his mind and is absorbed in the Self is a lamp which does not flicker, since it stands sheltered from every will (6:19).*

Kautilya's view on leadership is derived from a holistic point of view. His view is built on deeper human values that ameliorate the connection between citizens and their leaders. Servant leadership is an approach to leadership development, coined and defined by Robert Greenleaf. However, the concept is thousands of years older than this. Chanakya or Kautilya, the famous strategic thinker from ancient India, wrote about servant leadership in his 4th century book Arthashastra. He clearly stated that the king [leader] shall consider as good, not what pleases himself but what pleases his subjects [followers]. He argued that the king [leader] is a paid servant and enjoys the resources of the state together with the people.

Hind Swaraj, written by Gandhi in 1938, before Indian independence, deals with how India should be governed (or led). In it, Gandhi contrasts the British style of colonialism with how he feels an independent India would rule itself, and he provides a plan for getting there: *satyagraha*, variously translated as soul-force, truth-force, or love-force. Key to Gandhi's vision of independent India is the idea of individual leadership and self-reliance. In this way, Gandhi describes *satyagraha* as a type of individual leadership.

As revealed, Western leadership tends to be much more task-oriented contrary to the Asian leadership which is a much more holistic model focusing on trust, harmony and interrelationships among people. Today's contemporary Asian leadership paradigms reflect the deeply rooted philosophical aspects of Indian and Chinese thought

THEORIES AND MODELS OF LEADERSHIP

Leadership is the ability to influence a group towards the achievement of goal. Leadership has been discussed and analysed from different theoretical perspectives, models and approaches. They are:

- **Traits Theory** (See Brymen, 1992; Kirkpatrick and Locke, 1991; Lord, DeVader and Allizer, 1986; Mann 1959; Zaccro, Kemp and Bader, 2004 for details), which holds that "it is the personal qualities and characteristics that differentiate leaders from non-leaders" (Robbins, p.332). The traits that make for leadership are "ambitions and energy, the desire to lead, honesty and integrity, self-confidence, intelligence, high self-monitoring and the relevant knowledge (Ibid.) The basic assumption of traits theory is that leaders are born rather than made. "Most of the dozens of traits that emerged in various leadership reviews could be subsumed under one of the Big Five and that this approach results in consistent and strong support for traits as predictors of leadership (Ibid, p-333). The *Big Five Model* of personality lists five traits

namely extroversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability and openness to experience as the leadership personality.

- To **Situation Theory** (Blanchard 1985; Fernandez and Vecchio 1997; Graeff 1983 and 1997), the effective behaviour depends on the follower ability and motivation and they listed four follower situations namely: unable and unwilling, unable and willing, able and unwilling and able and willing (Robbins, Ibid. pp-342-343).
- **Contingency Theory** (Fielder 1964; Strub and Gracia 1981) of leadership states that the effective group performance depends on the proper match between the leader's style and the degree to which the situation gives control to the leader. Situation refers to leader-member relation, task structure and position power and that the situation required a particular type of leadership style namely relationship oriented style or task oriented style.
- As per **Path-Goal Theory** (Evans 1996; House 1996; House and Mitchell 1974; Indvik 1986; Schriesheim and Neider 1996; Stinson and Johnson 1975; Wofford and Liska 1993) it is leader's job to assist followers in attaining their goals and to provide the necessary direction and support to ensure that their goals are compatible with the overall objectives of the group or organization.

- In **Leader-Member Exchange theory** (Harter and Evanecy 2002; Liden, Wayne and Stilwewl 1993; Scandura 1999; Schriesheim, Castro and Koglisier 1999), the leader differentiates among followers as 'in-groups' and 'out-groups'.
- **Transformational Theory** (Evalio and Gibbon 1988; Bass 1990 and 1998; Bass and Evalio 1993; Konger 1999; Kuhnert 1994; kunhert and Lewis 1987; Yukl 1999) argues that transformational leaders shift the values, beliefs and needs of their followers through charisma, inspiration, intellectual stimulation, individualized consideration (Luthan, p-561-562). Social cognitive approach treats that 'leaders are causal determinants and that influence subordinates independent of followers' behaviour or the situation (Ibid, p-563). "The leader and the subordinates have a negotiable, reciprocal, interactive relationship and are consciously aware of how they can modify (influence) each others' behaviour through cognitions and the contingent environment" (Ibid, p-564).
- **Charismatic Leadership Theory** states that charismatic leaders are those who by the force of their personal abilities are capable of having profound and extraordinary effect on followers (Luthan, p. 560). Charismatic leaders are characterized by self-confidence and confidence in the subordinates, ideological vision, and the use of personal example," (Ibid.); "Vision and articulation, personal

risk, environmental sensitivity, sensitivity to followers needs, unconventional behaviour (Robbins, p. 363).

- In the **Cognition Resource Theory**, the stress unfavorably affects a situation and that intelligence and experience can lessen the influence of stress on the leader.
- **Leader Participation Model** provides a set of rules to determine the form and amount of participation in decision-making in different situation. There have been modern theoretical processes of leadership.
- The **Substitutes for Leadership Theory** tries to point out that some things are beyond leaders' control; leaders do not have mystical powers over people. The situation plays a role. However the substitutes idea does not negate the leadership; but it may put a more realistic boundary on what leadership is capable of achieving from substitutes. The neutralizers are subordinate characteristics (experience, ability and training); task characteristics (structured and routine work; feedback within the task, intrinsically satisfying task), organization characteristics (cohesive work groups, low position power of leader, formalization, inflexibility, leader physically isolated from subordinates).

- **Authentic Leadership Model** is a process that draws from both positive psychological capabilities and a highly developed organizational context, which results in both greater self-awareness and self-regulated positive behaviour on the part of leaders and associates, fostering positive development. The authentic leader is confident, hopeful, optimistic, resilient, transparent, moral /ethical, future oriented, and gives priority to developing associates to be leaders.
- **Self-Leadership Model** refers to a set of processes through which individuals control their own behaviour. They do this by developing leadership capacity in others and nurturing followers so they no longer need to depend on formal leaders for direction and motivation (Robbins, p. 372). This is done through model self leadership, encouraging followers to create self-set goals, encourage the use of self-rewards to strengthen and increase desirable behavior, create positive thought patterns, create a climate of self-leadership and encourage self-criticism (Ibid, p.372).
- **Ethical leadership Model** refers to the leadership model wedded with ethical behavior (i.e. the means used by the leader to achieve the goals and the moral contents of the goals). Unethical leaders are more likely to use their charisma to enhance power over followers, directed towards self-serving ends.

Other important theories, approaches and models of leadership may include, skills approach (Mamford, 2000; Katz 1955; Mamford, Zaccaro and Connelly and Marx 2000; Yammarino, 2000), style approach (Likert 1967; Missumi 1985; Stogdill 1963), team perspective (Chambers and Aimen (eds) 1993; LaFasto and Larsen 1987; Parker 1990; Steward and Manz 1995; Zaccaro, Rattman and Marx 2001), psychodynamic approach (Schiffer 1973; Weiner, Jobe and Ferrnor 1985), women and leadership (Bartol and Buterfield 1976; Beirnet and Wortmen 1991; Copper and Lewis 1999; Dubbins and platz 1986; Eagly and Carly 2003; Eagly and Johnson 1990; Eagly and Kario 1991; Engen, Ledeen and Williams 2001; Hoyt and Blascovich 2006 and Wirth 2001), culture and leadership (House et al, 2004), and the perspective of leadership ethics (Arosen 2001; Ciulla, 1998 and 2003; Dalala Costa 1998; Gini 1998; Johnson 2005) .

However, it is not to suggest that the leadership theories are limited to these theories and models. There may be many more models and theories of leadership developed as heuristic devices in the study of leadership depending upon the time-space contexts.

TYOLOGIES OF LEADERSHIP STYLES

Different Types of leadership styles include the following:

- **The Laissez-faire** “leave it be” leadership (Lewin, Liippit, & White, 1939) is the leadership style that gives no continuous feedback or supervision because the employees are highly experienced and needs little supervision to obtain the expected outcome. On the other hand, this type of style is also associated to leaders that don’t lead at all, failing in supervising its team members, resulting in lack of control and higher costs, bad service or failure to meet deadlines.
- **The Bureaucratic Leader** (Weber, 1905) is very structured and follows the procedures as they had been established. This type of leadership has no space to explore new ways to solve problems and is usually slow paced to ensure approval of the ladders stated by the company. Leaders ensure that all the steps had been followed prior sending it to the next level of authority. Universities, hospitals, banks and government usually requires this type of leader in its organizations to ensure quality, increase security and decrease corruption. Leaders that try to speed up the process will only lead to frustration and anxiety.
- **The Charismatic Leader** (Weber, 1905) leads by infusing energy and eagerness into to their team members. This type of leader has to be committed to the organization for the long run. Otherwise, charismatic leaders are a risk for the company when they decide

to resign for other opportunities because his/her staff only saw the success of the division or project thanks to the leader and not the team. It takes time and hard work to gain the employees confidence back with other type of leadership.

- In the case of **Autocratic Leadership** (Lewin, Liippit, & White, 1939) we could say that is when the it has been given the power to take decisions based solely on his person, having total authority to its. This leadership style is good for employees that needs close supervision to perform certain tasks. Creative employees and team players resent this type of leadership, not being able to enhance processes or decision making, resulting in job dissatisfaction.
- **The Democratic Leader** (Lewin, Liippit, & White, 1939) means that even though you want to hear your team's ideas, the leader will study those ideas and will take the final decision. Team players contributes to the final decision thus increasing employee satisfaction and ownership, feeling their input was considered when the final decision was taken. When changes arises, this type of leadership help the team assimilate the changes better and rapidly than other styles, knowing they were consulted and contributed to the decision making process, minimizing resistance and intolerance. It's important to highlight that this type of style is

not recommended when decisions are needed in a short period of time or at the moment.

- **People-Oriented Leader** (Fiendler, 1967) is the one that in order to comply with effectiveness and efficiency, supports, train and develop his personnel increasing job satisfaction and genuine interest to do a good job.
- **Task Oriented Leaders** (Fiendler, 1967) are those who focus on the job, and concentrate in the specific tasks assigned to each employee to reach goal accomplishment. This leadership style suffers the same motivation issues as autocratic leadership, showing no involvement in the teams needs. It requires close supervision and control to achieve expected results.
- **A Servant Leader** (Greenleaf, 1977) is the leader that facilitates goal accomplishment by giving its team members what they need in order to be productive. Is an instrument employees uses to reach the goal rather than an commanding voice that moves to change. This leadership style, as well as democratic leadership tends to achieve the results in a slower motion than other styles, although employee engagement is higher.

- **A Transaction Leader** (Burns, 1978) is the power given to a certain person to perform certain tasks and reward or punish for the team's performance. It gives the opportunity to manager to lead the group and the group agrees to follow his lead to accomplish a predetermined goal in exchange of something else. Power is given to the leader to evaluate, correct and train his subordinates when productivity is not up to the desired results and reward effectiveness when expected outcome is reached.
- **A Transformation Leader** (Burns, 1978) is the one who motivates his team to be effective and efficient. Communication is the base for goal achievement focusing the group in the final desired outcome or goal attainment. This leader is highly visible and uses chain of command to get the job done. Transformational leaders focus on the big picture, needing to be surrounded by people who take care of the details. The leader is always looking for ways to ideas that moves the organization to reach the company's vision.
- **The Environment Leader** (Carmazzi, 2005) is the one who nurtures group or organisational environment to affect the emotional and psychological perception of an individual's place in that group or organisation. An understanding and application of group psychology and dynamics is essential for this style to be effective. The leader uses organisational culture to inspire

individuals to and develop leaders at all levels. This leadership style is relies on creating an education matrix where groups interactively learn the fundamental psychology of group dynamics and culture from each other. The leader uses this psychology, and complementary language, to influence direction through the members of the inspired group to do what is required for the benefit of all.

- **The Situation leader** (Joseph Praveen Kumar, Hersey, Blanchard, & Johnson, 2008) is the leader that uses different leadership styles depending on the situation and the type of employee that is been supervised.

LEADERSHIP AND PROTEST MOVEMENT DYNAMICS

Leadership is a process by which a person influences others to accomplish an objective and directs the organization in a way that makes it more cohesive and coherent. Leaders carry out this process by applying their leadership attributes, such as beliefs, values, ethics, character, knowledge, and skills. Therefore, leaders are responsible for mobilizing individuals to act collectively and in accordance with organizational guidelines. The leadership of a protest movement mobilizes individuals through its structure, connectivity to local networks, and framing of its ideology. The study of leadership within protest movements remains slim despite its importance to social movements

themselves. Although a host of scholars feel that leadership in protest movements has yet to be adequately theorized (see for instance, Aminzade et al., 2001; Barker et al., 2001; Klandermans, 1989; Melucci, 1996; Morris 1999; Zurcher and Snow, 1981), yet Aldon Morris and Suzanne Staggenborg (2002) hold that leaders are critical to protest movements: they inspire commitment, mobilize resources, create and recognize opportunities, devise strategies, frame demands, and influence outcomes. A key theoretical issue the present research indulges in is the study of the extent to which the characteristics and actions of leaders, as opposed to structural conditions, matter in protest movement dynamics. Hence, there have been recent attempts to understand the role of leadership in protest movement dynamics in the West. However, such a study is still wanting in India.

In this context, the present study attempts to analyse the leadership in Indian protest movement, analyze their leadership styles and techniques and how each of these influences movement objectives, ideologies and strategies, and evaluate their role in protest movement dynamics. This shall be done by way of analysis of leadership and their role in influencing the nature, character and content of the two movements under study in the following sections.

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CHAPTER 3

LEADERSHIP AND THE GORKHALAND MOVEMENT


1. INTRODUCTION

Protest movements have a life-course; they emerge, evolve, grow, mature and in this process, change and transform in terms of its components. Padam Nepal (2009a and 2009b) contends that the components of movements are not *apriori* and *static*. They are rather dynamic and get changed and transformed in the course of the movement. For instance, sometimes the objectives of the movements emerge on a narrow, particular local issue, which, in course of time, evolve to broad aims for social transformation and vice versa. Ideologies of the protest movements also undergo change, providing direction for the evolution of new strategies and programmes. Actors, and for that matter, the leadership which initiates or emerges in the course of the growth of the movement plays a crucial role in articulating ideologies and objectives, and also in determining the nature and type of the movement organization. Competition among movement members in general and leaders in particular for social, economic, political and psychological rewards, the ideological differences amongst the movement participants in general and leadership in particular lead to the development of factions and compel new recruitments to broaden the support base of the movement and give it its dynamism. For this reason, the protest movements can at best be comprehended by way of locating and analyzing the dynamism and transformations of the movements produced

by the dialectical interaction of the various components and parameters of the movement over a span of time. However, for the present purpose, we shall dwell on the role of leadership in producing movement dynamics, with special reference to the Gorkhaland Movement, one of the prominent autonomy movements in the North Bengal region of West Bengal, India.

2. PROFILE OF THE STUDY AREA

The total area of the proposed state of Gorkhaland state comprising the Darjeeling district and the contiguous area of Dooars in the Jalpaiguri district is approximately 6450 square kilometers. It includes 1060 mouzas out of which 718 are in Darjeeling district and 342 in the areas of Dooars (Jana 2010). It includes 21 police stations out of which 13 lie in Darjeeling district and 8 in the Dooars area. The following map is suggestive of the proposed Gorkhaland state.



The total population of the proposed Gorkhaland state is approximately 30 lakhs as per 2001 census. The majority of population in the proposed state consists of Gorkhas, besides; there are Lepchas, Bhutias, Biharis, Marwaris, Bengalis and others consisting the total population. The three sub-division of Darjeeling district, i.e., Darjeeling, Kalimpong and Kurseong are the areas in the hilly areas whereas Siliguri sub-division is in the plains. The district lies between 26° 31" and 27° 13" North latitude and between 87° 89" and 88° 53" East longitude (Bomjan, 2008). The contiguous areas of Dooars fall in the Terai.

Tea Gardens constitute a major industry in the Darjeeling hills and have survived more than 150 years. This industry was established by the British in the 1850s and produces the World's best tea, the best of qualities fetching prices as high as Rs.25, 000 per kg. Tea can be called the 'Brand Ambassador' of the Darjeeling hills. Presently, there are 87 functioning tea gardens encompassing an area of 17,500 hectares and producing world class tea amounting to 10 – 12 million kilograms of tea per annum. It is roughly estimated that 15 – 20% of the total population residing in the tea garden areas are employed in the tea industry. Approximately 45,000 people are involved in the tea industry and around 200,000 people dependent (i.e. around 30 -35% people) on it. Of the total workforce, nearly 60% are women.

After the tea industry, the Directorate of Cinchona and Other Medicinal Plants is the major plantation industry in the Darjeeling hills covering an

area of 26,000 acres of land and employing more than 6000 workforce including labourers, officers and other staff. This industry was established by the British in 1865. The Directorate of Cinchona & Other Medicinal Plants, West Bengal which has its headquarters at Mungpoo, Darjeeling, is virtually the only concern in the whole of India, producing the essential Medicinal compounds – Quinine, Emetine and Diosgenin on a large scale i.e. commercially. Apart from the above mentioned medicinal plants, Aromatic plants as well as subsidiary crops of great commercial value are grown in the plantations. It has four major plantations under it at Mungpoo (10023 acres), Munsong (9600 acres), Rongo (4222 acres) and Latpanchar (2440 acres). An experimental plantation is at Ambootia (177 acres). The main plantations are for Cinchona, Ipecac and Dioscorea. The plantation also grows rubber, mushrooms and other Medicinal & Aromatic plants like Lemongrass, Rawolfia serpentina etc.

The district contains valuable mineral deposits. The coal bearing rocks were reported for the first time by Sir J.D. Hooker in 1849 from Pankhabari and Gorubathan (Dalimkot). During 1896-1900 A.D. a total of 7231 tonnes of coal was raised from Gorubathan until the enterprise was closed (Banerjee 1980).

Among the minerals, copper occurs in Kalimpong Peshok, Mirik and Gorubathan, Graphite occurs as embedded in mica schist along Darjeeling-Peshok ridge, Ghaiyabari, Mungpoo, Rakti valley, lower Singalila range and Labha. Iron ores varying from strong ferruginous clay to an impure hematite are reported from Samalbong and Seokbir

(Kalimpong) and Lohagarh (Kurseong Terai). Three Iron ores varying from strong ferruginous clay to an impure hematite are reported from Samalbong and Seokbir (Kalimpong) and Lohagarh (Kurseong Terai). Three sources of lime viz. Dolomite, limestone buds and calcareous tufa have been reported from numerous zones, chiefly the junctions of Gondwana and Tertiary. Senchale ridges, Pankhabari, Yangmakum and Great Rangit are important among these. The positive indications of occurrence of uranium have been traced by the Geological Survey of India in 1980-82, from Yangmakum-Tik ridge.

Darjeeling has rich resources of Tourism as it is known as the "Queen of Hills", a tourist paradise. It has the potential of power generation as some of the perennial rivers flows from the region like the Rangit, the Balasan, the Teesta, Jaldhaka, Neora Nala and the Mahananda. Darjeeling is strategically located in the North East corner of the country sharing international borders with Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal and Tibet. Dooars, which is contiguous to Darjeeling areas, is in the foothills of the eastern Himalayas bordering Bhutan.

3. THE GORKHALAND MOVEMENT: CHARACTER, CONTENT AND COURSE

Darjeeling, a small Hill Station in the lap of Kanchenjunga and inhabited by Gorkhas has a contested history. Gorkha as a nation had been demanding a homeland within India for last hundred years or so, and the demand for the creation of a separate state of Gorkhaland within the framework of Indian federation has its history ever since India's

independence. The Hills saw a bloody agitation for separation from West Bengal and for the creation of a separate Gorkhaland state within the federal structure of India in the 1980's after which a Hill council was formed as a separate development agency for the Darjeeling Hills (Ganguly, 2005). The developmental benefits, however, seem to have failed to percolate down to the people even after twenty years of anxious wait, creating in the minds of the nation a sense of deprivation and of being marginalized. Second wave of protest movement has begun since 2007, albeit with the same demand of the creation of Gorkhaland. However, both in the 1980s and in the second wave of the movement, use of popular music to mobilize for the movement has been popular and a deluge of songs of protests and expressions of nationalism have flooded the Hills. Hence, the chapter describes how party politics has appropriated performances of popular art to create and entrench oppressive political culture in Darjeeling. Performances of popular culture were already used during the struggle for Indian independence, and such practice is in wide use even today, in the struggle of the ethnic Nepalis in Darjeeling Hills. Songs of protest conveying nationalist sympathies have been common in the Gorkhaland movement. However, a proper analysis of the role of songs in the movement can be understood only with a prior contextualization of the movement under study. Therefore, we begin with a short introduction on the Gorkhaland movement itself. However, we shall just give a brief overview of the movement because the movement itself does not form the part of the present study.

Golay (2006) contends that the '*life-world*' of the Gorkhas in India is located both literally and figuratively on the margins of the imagined nation. This 'marginality' is not merely a location but a byword for the oppressed and dispossessed. It is characterised by the dispossession of narratives, the cannibalistic appropriation and the continuing colonisation of their epistemological grid. For the most part, it occupies a peripheral location in relation to the metropolitan academic research. The process of formation of a strong cultural identity in the shape of Nepali identity was again unsettled as it was relocated within the matrix of the national culture and identity of the Indian nation. The Gorkha identity has been treading a difficult path in which it has tried to strike a fine balance between its cultural identity and the demands of citizenship and national culture of India. Hence, the lexical juggleries like Indian–Nepali, Bharatiya-Gorkhali or Bhargoli.etc. Ultimately it boiled down to the Gorkhaland agitation in the mid 1980s.

The Gorkha agitation for separate status within the Indian federation has a long and chequered history. However, as an organized and serious political movement that called for separate statehood and was willing to indulge in violent agitations, it only emerged in the 1980s under the astute leadership of Subhas Ghising and his Gorkha National Liberation Front (GNLF) The GNLF-led agitation for the creation of a separate state of Gorkhaland took place at a time when the Communist Party of India (Marxist) was firmly in power in the state of West Bengal. Given the CPI (M)'s pro-poor ideology, stellar achievements in land reforms, rural

development, and community empowerment in West Bengal, and prior public commitments to grant autonomy to the Gorkhas, it was surprising that sentiments for a separate Gorkhaland grew steadily in the Darjeeling district. On 13 March 1986, in a meeting held in Ghoom, the GNLF kicked off its agitation for Gorkhaland by deciding on the following 11-point program of action

- Observe a *Black Flag* day on 13 April 1986 in protest against atrocities and discrimination perpetrated on Indian Nepalis;
- Organize a 72-hour *bandh* from 12th to 14th May 1986 to highlight the constitutional and just demand for Gorkhaland;
- Burn the States Reorganization Commission Report of 1955, which had increased the area of West Bengal by unconstitutionally annexing the areas of Darjeeling, Kurseong, Kalimpong, Mirik, Siliguri and the Dooars that have different culture and language;
- Burn Article 7 of the Indo-Nepal Treaty of 1950 as it has relegated the Indian Nepalis to the status of immigrants;
- Launch a movement against the indiscriminate felling of trees in the hill areas and their transshipment to the plains by the West Bengal Forest Corporation;
- Boycott elections.
- Boycott MLAs, ministers and parties who opposed the demand for Gorkhaland;
- Launch a movement to stop all vehicles taking boulders from Dudhia to the plains;

- Launch a *Do or Die* movement in protest against Gorkhas being treated as domiciles;
- Not observe or celebrate important national celebrations such as Independence Day, Republic Day, Gandhi Jayanti, Netaji Jayanti, etc., until and unless the Government of India concedes the demand for Gorkhaland; and
- Launch a movement to convince people not to pay their taxes and loans to protest against the colonial attitude towards the Gorkhas by the Indian and West Bengal governments.

In September 1987 serious discussions were held in Delhi between Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, Union Home Minister Buta Singh, West Bengal Chief Minister Jyoti Basu and the GNLF President Subhas Ghising. The contours of a political solution seemed to emerge out of these discussions when all sides accepted in principle that Darjeeling should be granted autonomous status and agreed to hold further discussions to work out the exact nature of that autonomy. Subsequently, the Left Front unanimously approved the setting up of a Hill Council for Darjeeling to resolve the Gorkhaland problem. The Hill Council plan also received the support of the West Bengal Congress (I) party. Finally, on 10 July 1988, the GNLF officially accepted the proposed Hill Council plan for Darjeeling and authorized Ghising to enter into final negotiations with the West Bengal government and the Centre in order to resolve a few issues on which the parties still disagreed. The GNLF also agreed to keep its agitation suspended as long as the discussions proceeded forward. On

25 July 1988, a tripartite agreement was finally signed between the GNLF, the West Bengal state government, and the Indian government on 22 August 1988. Under this agreement, the GNLF agreed to drop the demand for a separate state of Gorkhaland. In return, for the social, economic, educational, and cultural advancement of the Gorkha people residing in the hill areas of the Darjeeling district, the West Bengal government and the Indian government agreed to set up an autonomous Hill Council under a West Bengal State Legislative Act. The Hill Council was to be called the Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council (DGHC).

The developmental benefits, however, seem to have failed to percolate down to the people even after twenty years of anxious wait after the formation of the DGHC, creating in the minds of the nation a sense of deprivation and of being marginalized. Second wave of protest movement has begun since 2007, albeit with the same demand of the creation of Gorkhaland under the leadership of Bimal Gurung, who developed differences with Ghising as a GNLF leader.

4. ROLE OF LEADERSHIP IN GORKHALAND MOVEMENT

Historically, the Gorkhaland movement can be traced to have its origin to 1907. Since then, it has been led by various political parties and organisations. In 1907, under the leadership of Sonam Wangel Ladenla, the Hill people demanded a separate administrative unit for Darjeeling. In 1917 the Hillmen's Association came into being and petitioned for the administrative separation of Darjeeling in 1917 and again in 1928 and

1942. In 1943 the All India Gorkha League was formed in the lines of the Akhil Bharatiya Gorkha League, which was formed earlier in 1928 in Dehradun. The trend continued. During the 1940s, the Communist Party of India (CPI) organized Gorkha tea workers. In presentations to the States Reorganisation Commission in 1954, the CPI favoured regional autonomy for Darjeeling within West Bengal, with recognition of Nepali as a Scheduled Language. The All India Gorkha League preferred making the area a union territory under the Central government. However, the movement became active and radical in the second half of the 1980s. Therefore, our present study shall focus primarily on the leadership of Subhash Ghising and Bimal Gurung in the two phases of the movement, that is, 1980s and 2000s respectively, however, with cursory references to the Gorkha League leadership in a historical perspective as the League was responsible for providing opposition during these phases in the Hill politics..

4.1. The All India Gorkha League and Its Leadership in Relation to the Status of Darjeeling: A Pre-Independence Scenario

The AIGL came into existence in the 1940s as the first political party in the Darjeeling hills. It was Damber Singh Gurung who formed it in 1943. The AIGL was established in the hills of Darjeeling after a series of meetings and conferences held at different places of Darjeeling in the 1940s. It was represented by the leading residents of Darjeeling then, like Damber Singh Gurung, Rupnarayan Sinha, Shib Kumar Rai, Randhir Subba, Ari Bahadur Gurung, and others, who unanimously consented to

name the association of the hill people as All India Gorkha League. Damber Singh and Randhir Subba were chosen as the President and General Secretary of the party respectively.

The objective behind the formation of AIGL was basically to address the issues and problems of the people of Darjeeling and to protect their rights. At the initial stage of its inception, the AIGL was concerned with the recognition and consolidation of the scattered Gorkhas throughout India, preservation of the civilization, tradition and culture of the Gorkhas, development of Nepali language, establishment of political rights of the Gorkhas in India, etc.

4.2. AIGL Leadership and the Status of Darjeeling: Between Independence to the Emergence of GNLFF

It was at the dawn of independence that the AIGL, under the leadership of Damber Singh Gurung, enunciated the idea of merger of Dajeeling with Assam. Rupnarayan Sinha, the then President of Hillmens Association, put forward the idea of making Darjeeling a Chief Commissioners' Province outside Bengal. Damber Singh Gurung opposed the idea of Chief Commisioners' Province and instead offered an alternative to it, i.e., the inclusion of Darjeeling with that of Assam popularizing the slogan "Assam Chalo". During this period, Damber Singh could expand the activities of AIGL to Assam and Shilong taking up the issues and problems of the Gorkhas living in the region. Soon it was able to establish its branches in different parts of Assam and Shilong. N.B.Gurung took

over as the President of the League after the demise of D.S.Gurung in 1948. He submitted a memorandum to the then prime Minister, Jawaharla Nehru on 29th April, 1949, regarding the abolition of the system of nomination of members of District Boards¹ (Subba, 1955) and municipalities in the district of Darjeeling. The AIGL raised the demand of Uttarakhand Pradesh in 1949 under Randhir Subba, demanding the formation of Uttarkhand Pradesh consisting of Darjeeling district and Sikkim, Jalpaiguri and Cooch Behar. A meeting was held on 30.11.1949, in Darjeeling attended by delegates from Darjeeling hills,(namely, Rupnarayan Sinha, Shib Kumar Rai, Ari Bahadur Gurung,Randhir Subba); Sikkim, Jalpaiguri and Coochbehar. The support base of AIGL was reflected when in 1951 it could capture all three seats from Darjeeling districts with Dalbahadur Singh Gahatraj, Shib Kumar Rai and George Mahabert Subba winning over the election to the Assembly of West Bengal. The AIGL submitted a petition to Nehru when he visited Darjeeling in 1952 for a separate homeland for the Gorkhas outside Bengal. However, it failed to register its presence to the State Reorganisation Commission when it had visited Darjeeling.

The AIGL had started losing its grounds before Deo Prakash Rai emerged as a young leader representing new generation, outcasting other leaders in the hills. However, the death of Deo Prakash Rai in 1981 led to the decline of AIGL as his successor could not hold the members

¹ The then Dr. P.C.Ghosh Government in West Bengal had continued the system of 'nominated membership' in the District Board of Darjeeling whereas the system of election to these sort of District Boards had been introduced in other parts of West Bengal immediately after independence.

and supporters together. The emergence of Pranta Parishad in the 1980s also contributed to the decline of the party as the members started joining the Parishad as because of the moderate and compromising attitude of the party then. Pranta Parishad, advocating that nothing short of full fledged statehood for Drajeeling hills is acceptable, could sustain only for short period of time owing to its leadership crisis and moreover, the marginalisation by the emergence of GNLF under Subash Ghising. The AIGL, the oldest political party in the hills and the symbol of Gorkha unity in the country, was outlived by the emergence of GNLF under the leadership of Subash Ghising. Renulina Subba, the only representative of AIGL in the west Bengal Assembly, had to resign on the call by the GNLF. However, the AIGL associated itself with the GNLF for some time for the cause of a separate state of Gorkhaland outside Bengal. It (AIGL) also submitted a memorandum to the then President, Zial Singh demanding for a separate state for the Gorkhas and appealed to the different political parties to come together for the formation of Gorkhaland.

4.3. GNLF under the Leadership of Ghising (1980s) and Movement Dynamics

With the emergence of Shri Subhash Ghising as a young, aggressive and radical leader of the Gorkhas, in 1986 the Gorkhaland National Liberation Front under Ghising's leadership demanded a separate state of Gorkhaland. Ideologically and strategically, Ghising represented radicalism. This probably owes to the fact that Ghising had the

background of being a military soldier. The violent and radical method of protest and armed struggle proposed by Ghising, a legacy that he owed to the similar movements in Northeast India during his service there, reined the Hills into a cauldron of violence. However, the justification of the use of violence in the movement of the 1980s is worth noting. In his speech delivered at Dr Graham's Homes, Kalimpong on September 1986, Ghising held that:

*"...this movement have reached to a climax because of the 'Blood' sacrificed by our people. Gorkhaland is a Temple, a Church and a Monastery. ---Everyone around us says, 'our well wishes are there', but I answer them saying that well wishes nowadays are meant only for the newly married couples, not for the revolutionaries. What do we do with your well wishes when the Police and the CRP uses guns on us? A well wish does no work....."*² (Gorkha, 1996).

After two years of fighting and the loss of at least 200 lives, the government of West Bengal and the central government finally agreed on an autonomous hill district. In July 1988, the Gorkhaland National Liberation Front gave up the demand for a separate state, and in August the Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council came into being with Ghising as chairman.

² The text is researcher's own free translation from the speeches of Subash Ghising in Nepali language compiled by Nagendra Gorkha, in his, *Mato, Jati ra Rashtriya Chinariko Prashnama Subash Ghisingka Aitihāsik Baktavyaharu*.

Ghising's leadership was effective initially for a plurality of reasons. First, his ability to bring Darjeeling area for the first time to national and international attention in the mid 1980s; secondly, leaders need knowledge of local idioms, values, and practices, the components of the cultural arena, to connect with a mass base (Barker, Johnson, and Lavalette 2001). Subhash Ghising, then a budding literary figure, had the knowledge of the cultural arena of Darjeeling. Thirdly, to galvanize aggrieved populations, leaders need deep understanding of their community's circumstances and experiences, 'localized cultural capital'. Ghising had this capital with him as he was the first to articulate the suppressed feelings of Indian Nepalis; Moreover, they need media skills, persuasive rhetorical abilities and strategic savvy to identify opportunities and overcome obstacles in the political arenas where they operate. Ghising being a mastermind in manipulating public sentiment fulfilled this criterion as well and claimed the status of an undisputed leader of the Gorkhas in India. Thus, the Gorkhaland leadership under Ghising came to a situation of perceiving Ghising as Gorkhaland and vice-versa. Thus the movement got personified in its leader. This has led to identifying the movement to a single leadership and therefore, has eclipsed the role played by other leaders occupying a peripheral position in the party.

The personification of the movement to the leadership of Ghising provided a structure whereby Ghising as a leader got an edge to manipulate political institutions and processes to his advantage. The trend exposed the possibility of marginalization of the leadership in the

second rung immediately below Ghising in terms of economic, political, social, and psychological rewards. Reciprocally, Ghising too felt the smell of possible power competition from young and aspiring leadership from within his political loyalists. The situation apparently produced leadership conflicts within the undisputed GNLF.

This was coupled with the fact that, even after over 20 years of the formation of the DGHC under GNLF nothing seemed to have changed for good in Darjeeling. Frustration with the DGHC's inability to work as a full fledged governing body for the Hills has grown from all sides. Moreover, Ghising's attempt to register a Sixth Schedule status for Darjeeling and shelve aside the original demand for a separate state for Indian Nepalis was seen by the masses as divisive of the society and weakening of the pan Gorkha identity. To this effect, the opposition bodies claimed that Ghising is a paranoid and corrupt megalomaniac. At this juncture, movement witnessed a few implications. First, it sensed a death knell for the movement; second, it opened new vistas for the aspiring leadership to come to the forefront, with a plea to fulfill the promise of a separate homeland for the Gorkhas within the framework of the Indian Constitution once again. The leadership conflict was mature enough to displace Ghising's monopolistic leadership in Hill politics. In the later half of 2007, a new leadership with a new political party emerged in the Hills once again, with a strong promise of realizing the statehood for the people of the Hills.

Ghisingh's leadership affected the Gorkhaland movement in multiple ways. Most of the impacts were positive seen from the perspective of the movement itself. It was under his leadership that the Gorkhaland Movement for the first time emerged as an identity based protest movement, and defined the objectives and goals of the movement. The feeling of nationhood and a sense of galvanized community solidarity first emerged under Ghisingh's leadership. Above all, his commitment to an armed movement suddenly captured the attention of the media both at local and national levels and of the government, thereby establishing firmly of the existence of such a movement in the North Bengal region. It was under his leadership that DGHC was formed as an administrative mechanism to address the issues confronting the Gorkhas in India. In other words, Gorkhaland Movement in the present form is the brainchild of the GNLF supremo Subhash Ghising. The credit for the consolidation of the movement goes to him. Hence, under his leadership, the movement was formally born and matured. However, Ghisingh's leadership also had negative impacts on the movement. The experience of failed development and malgovernance of the Hills by the DGHC under Ghisingh's GNLF for over 20 years since the Darjeeling Accord in 1988, the movement under him apparently was dying out. The autocratic attitude and eccentric behaviour of the Supremo and his push for the Sixth Schedule status for the Hills was seen as compromising with the movement for the state of Gorkhaland. Hence, his leadership had mixed impacts on movement dynamics. Whereas initially it was his leadership that gave birth to the movement and reached its zenith; later on it was

again under his leadership that the movement witnessed fissures and fractures in the form of leadership dissensions for having abandoned the demand for separate state in exchange of the Sixth Schedule status for the Hills. The movement deteriorated, and suffered internal contradictions until the new leadership unearthed it from entering its grave.

4.4. Gorkha Jana Mukti Morcha under the Leadership of Bimal Gurung and Movement Dynamics

Darjeeling once again started reeling through the politics of protest since September 2007 by a new political party, Gorkha Janmukti Morcha, under the leadership of Shri Bimal Gurung. The disaffection with the functioning of the DGHC crystallised into the re-emergence of the Gorkhaland demand under the leadership of Bimal Gurung and the Gorkha Jan Mukti Morcha (GJMM). Ghising had started showing signs of eccentricities by the end of 2000s. The hill people were affected by the fast deteriorating quality of life under Ghising's rule as the Chairman of the Council and its rampant corruption. People had started questioning the credibility of Ghising as their leader. It was at this critical juncture that Bimal Gurung emerged as the messiah of the people of the hills.

Gurung had been Ghising's lieutenant during the earlier phase of the movement. Later, when the DGHC was formed he became an elected Council member. However, with the passage of time, Gurung gradually came to be relegated to the backyard in Ghising's political camp. It was the short message service (SMS) campaign in 2007 for Prashant

Tamang, a promising young Gorkha singer from Darjeeling competing for the Indian Idol Session 3 (Reality Show by Sony Television) crown that brought Gurung into the limelight. Unlike Ghisingh who was disdainful of the young lad's efforts, Gurung actively campaigned for Tamang who eventually won. It was this electronic campaign which brought Gurung into the forefront of Gorkha solidarity. The GJMM was formed soon after in October 2007 and took up the cause of a separate Gorkhaland state again.

Subash Ghising and Bimal Gurung fell out in 2007 over the attempt to extend 6th Schedule Status to Darjeeling. Under the 6th Schedule of the Indian Constitution, certain tribal-majority areas are given autonomy in administration. While the GNLFF wanted the 6th Schedule status with enhanced powers for the Hill Council, the GJM desired full statehood. The Centre introduced the 6th Schedule to the Constitution Amendment Bills in Parliament in December 2007 but it was shelved.

There are major turns that the demand for a separate state, under the leadership of Gurung, has taken that distinguishes it from the earlier movement. First, the movement aims to achieve the goal of a separate state through the means of non violence following the Gandhian ideals. Second, the map for the current Gorkhaland envisages not only the three hills subdivisions of Darjeeling, Kalimpong and Kurseong, but also Siliguri and parts of the Dooars that fall in the Jalpaiguri districts in North Bengal, extending up to the River Sunkosh on the border with Bhutan. While the

GNLF had included Dooars in its programme, it did not push for its inclusion in their map of Gorkhaland as a result of which, when the DGHC was formed, only the hill subdivisions were included in it, leaving out chunks of the plains where large populations of Gorkhas reside. The GJM has managed not only to garner the support of Gorkhas in the plains, but also of the Adivasis, who form a substantial percentage of the population of the Dooars. Secure in the knowledge of people's support in the hills, Gurung turned his attention to the plains, mainly Siliguri town and the areas of Dooars. In order to extend his influence in Siliguri and the adjoining *Dooars* area, protest actions in the form of bandhs, meetings and demonstrations were initiated by GJMM.

The Gorkha Janamukti Morcha, under the leadership of Bimal Gurung, after the formation in 2007, in a very short period of time, turned out to be a massive organization in the hills as well as having expanded its activities in the plains of Siliguri and the Dooars area. Since its inception, Gurung's leadership emphasized on a non-violent method for the achievement of its objective of the creation of a separate state of Gorkhaland.

The immediate objective of GJMM after its formation was protesting the proposed Sixth Schedule by Subash Ghising as the Morcha leadership contended that the sixth schedule status would bring about disintegration amongst the Gorkhas in lines of caste, colours, creeds and religion. It also believed that the major issue confronting the Gorkhas being the

question of identity, only Statehood status for the Gorkhas would address this problem, for which Sixth Schedule status could not be a substitute. The GJMM launched its protests by burning of the Memorandum of Settlement signed between the Government of India, the Government of West Bengal and Subash Ghising³. The Morcha supporters went on an indefinite hunger strike demanding the scrapping of the sixth schedule. The outcome of these protests was that the bill for the amendment of the Constitution to implement the sixth schedule status in the hills was stalled after a Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs called for a fresh assessment of the ground realities in the hills.

The other immediate objective of the Morcha leadership was to remove Subash Ghising from the post of Caretaker Administrator of DGHC. The frontal organizations of Morcha, particularly the Janamukti Asthai Karmachari Sangathan went on an indefinite hunger strike for the regularization of jobs for the adhoc employees of the DGHC. The GJMM protested by calling long strikes in the hills. These protests ultimately led to the resignation from the post of caretaker administrator of DGHC by Subhash Ghising on March 10, 2008.

The most significant difference the Morcha leadership has with that of the previous leadership is its call for a non-violent form of protest that took the form of non co-operation and home rule movement by way of non payment of taxes to the Government including electricity bills, phone bills,

³ On November 15, 2007, the copies of the Settlement on the Sixth Schedule Status for Darjeeling Hills were burnt all over the hills of Darjeeling.

vehicle taxes, land taxes, housing taxes, etc. Vehicles in the hills were asked to use GL (Gorkhaland) number plates in place of WB (West Bengal). Shops and other establishments in the hills were asked to write Gorkhaland on their sign boards to mark the home rule in the hills of Darjeeling.

However, the issue of central importance to us here is as to how the new leadership impacted on the movement. First, Gurung's leadership with the emergence

4.5. The Madan Tamang Era of AIGL: Leadership of AIGL as an Opposition in Darjeeling Hills

The re-emergence of AIGL, however, was visible in the second half of 1990s when some prominent leaders of GNLF, namely, Tsheten Sherpa, N.T.Moktan and others joined the AIGL to revolt against Subash Ghising. It, under the new leadership, tried to regain the lost glory by trying to curtail the influence of the GNLF and Subash Ghising.

Madan Tamang's entry into the AIGL has been a significant development as far as the re-emergence of the party is concerned. Madan Tamang had entered politics in 1969. While still in college he became a close associate of the AIGL leader of the time, Deo Prakash Rai. Through the 1970s, he headed *Tarun Gorkha*, the youth wing of AIGL and became well known for his oratory skills. Eventually, he became the District Secretary of the Gorkha League in 1977, though he resigned in 1980 to

join a new outfit, *Pranta Parishad*, where he worked closely with Subash Ghising for some time till Ghising started GNLF in 1980 and demanded the state of Gorkhaland. Meanwhile, the Pranta Parishad along with organizations like the *Nepali Bhasa Manyata Samiti* started a campaign to include the Nepali language in the Eighth Schedule of the Constitution, and also turned to be an important rival of Ghising. Between 1986 and 1988, he openly criticized Ghising for corruption and use of violence for which his ancestral house was torched. After lying low for some time, in 1992, Tamang started the Gorkha Democratic Front (GDF) to counter GNLF's opposition of the inclusion of the Nepali language in the Constitution because it wanted Gorkhali instead. In 2001, the GDF merged with AIGL, and Madan Tamang became the president of it.

The activities and campaigns of AIGL could not be materialized before Subash Ghising because Ghising had a mass support base which remained more or less same with minor variations. In 1998, the AIGL, in alliance with other political parties like, Communist Party of Revolutionary Marxists (CPRM), Congress, Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), founded the Peoples' Democratic Front (PDF) against the GNLF. Madan Tamang, the President of AIGL was elected as the President of the PDF.

The AIGL, under the leadership of Madan Tamang, had been opposing the so called dictatorial activities of GNLF and Subash Ghising. The most significant attempt that came from the AIGL leadership was that of opposing the sixth schedule proposal initiated by Subash Ghising in

2005. It condemned the proposed sixth schedule on the ground that it cannot meet the aspirations of the people of the hills for a separate state of Gorkhaland. However, the leadership did not offer any alternative to it nor did it any specific programme for the achievement of a separate state of Gorkhaland.

Ghising's attempt to enforce the sixth schedule led to the rift in the GNLF leadership when Bimal Gurung vehemently opposed the proposed sixth schedule which led to the expulsion of Gurung from GNLF. Bimal Gurung founded the Gorkha Janamukti Morcha(GJMM) on 7th October, 2007 with the objective of rejecting the proposed sixth schedule, removal of Subash Ghising as the caretaker administrator of the Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council (DGHC), and the formation of a separate state of Gorkhaland.

After the downfall of Subhash Ghisingh and GNLF and the rise of a new party Gorkha Janamukti Morcha under the leadership of Bimal Gurung, Madan Tamang became a vocal opponent of the GJM and leveled corruption charges against Bimal Gurung and other GJM leaders. There had been always a difference between the AIGL and the GJMM since the formation of GJMM as the AIGL, under the leadership of Madan Tamang, was proposing for a collective leadership while, on the other hand, Bimal Gurung and his GJMM was least interested in it.

Madan Tamang blamed the immigration policy of the Government of India for the infiltration of illegal immigrants from Bangladesh, which

reduced the Gorkhas to an insignificant minority. He also cautioned the GJMM of its friendship with the KPP alleging that the KPP President Atul Roy had submitted a memorandum to the Union Home Ministry in 2005 stating that the Gorkhas were not Indians.

Madan Tamang warned the GJMM that the hills would go up in flames if Bimal Gurung –led GJMM inks an agreement for an interim set up for Darjeeling hill⁴ as the process had been initiated then. The AIGL leadership reiterated that the sacrifices of the people of Darjeeling hills are not for any sort of interim set-up but for the state of Gorkhaland. On the initiative of AIGL leadership, on 8th May, 2010 eight political parties in the hills including the AIGL, CPRM, BJP, GNLF(C), Gorkha Rashtriya Congress and others formed an alliance called Democratic Front to oppose the efforts to set up an interim arrangement for the administration of Darjeeling hills which the State, the Centre and the GJMM was working out with. Madan Tamang, on behalf of Democratic Front appealed to GJMM to withdraw its proposed strikes⁵, as it would hit the tourism industry and the common people. A delegation of the Front met the Governor M.K.Narayanan during his visit to Darjeeling and sought his intervention to end the imbroglio in the Darjeeling hills.

The GJMM had always been indifferent or hostile to Madan Tamang and the AIGL as he had always been levelling corruption charges against the leaders of GJMM, questioning the Gorkha Janamukti's sincerity, through

⁴ Draft proposal for Interim Arrangement for Darjeeling submitted to P. Chidambaram, the Honble Home Minister of India, by Bimal Gurung, President of GJMM.

⁵ The Gorkha Janamukti Morcha had called for an indefinite strike in the hills of Darjeeling.

electronic and print medias, about the Gorkhaland movement and the objective of attaining the statehood. He attempted to hold public meetings several times in the Darjeeling hills, but failed to do so. However, on 21st May, 2011, Madan Tamang decided to hold a public meeting at Chowk Bazar, Darjeeling, to mark the 68th foundation day of the AIGL. The Janamukti Asthayi Karmachari Sangathan (JAKS) ⁶also chose the same venue to hold their meeting. Apprehending a possible collision between his supporters and that of the GJMM, Tamang shifted his venue from Chowk Bazar to Clubside Motor Stand, ~~Gandhi~~ Road. Madan Tamang had earlier postponed the rally to 21st May after the GJMM under Bimal Gurung had called a two-day strike ostensibly to oppose the Centre's refusal to include Nepalese-dominated pockets of the Dooars and the Terai in the proposed autonomous interim set-up. Around 9.15 a.m. when Madan Tamang was busy preparing for the meeting, about 150 armed assailants stormed at the venue of the meeting and hacked Madan Tamang with khukuris. Tamang was rushed to the nearby Planters Hospital, but immediately referred to the District Hospital, where he was declared dead (The Times of India, 22nd May, 2010).

The movement for the formation of a separate state of Gorkhaland took a different turn, though for a short while, in the aftermath of the death of Madan Tamang. There arose resentment from all quarters against the GJMM and its leadership as it was alleged to have planted the murder of

⁶ Janamukti Asthayi Karmachari Sangathan is a GJMM affiliated organization of the casual/contractual employees of DGHC.

Madan Tamang⁷. The emotions of sorrow and anger among the residents of Darjeeling were exploded through the slogans against the GJMM, tearing apart posters and banners of GJMM and its leaders, etc. Immediately after the incidence, some of the senior leaders of GJMM along with those who constituted the Study Forum of GJMM⁸ submitted their resignation from the party. However, most of them withdrew their resignation after few days. The assassination of Madan Tamang was a great setback to the Morcha Leadership because the Tripartite meeting between the Central Government, the State Government and the GJMM was scheduled to be held at that moment and the allegations against the Morcha leadership for the murder of Tamang questioned the position of the leadership therein. The CPI (M) led government had asked for a people's mandate to the GJMM leadership as it believed that the Morcha had lost its hold in the hills pertaining to the murder of Madan Tamang.

The other political parties in the hills, like the GNLF, the CPRM accused the state government of neglecting the incidence alleging that it could have prevented the murder if it had desired so.

However, all the opposition parties in the state of West Bengal, barring their corresponding units in Darjeeling Hills, including the Indian National Congress (INC), Trinamool Congress (TMC) and Bharatiya Janata Party

⁷ Laxman Pradhan, the General Secretary of AIGL, had lodged an FIR against the top leaders of GJMM including Bimal Gurung.

⁸ The Study Forum is a body of intellectuals (Doctors, Professors, Former IAS officers, etc.) constituted by GJMM to prepare the draft plan of the Morcha and participate in the meetings with the State and the Central Government.

(BJP) have been united in their opposition to the idea of a separate Gorkhaland as championed by GJMM under Bimal Gurung's leadership. In other words political parties with stakes in the plains were hardly willing to jeopardise their electoral chances by supporting the demand for a separate Gorkhaland state. Here even the BJP which had deputed its senior leader Jaswant Singh to fight the Lok Sabha election from Darjeeling with a promise to the Hill Party to fight for the formation of the State of Gorkhaland if it came to power after the 14th Lok Sabha elections, with the support of the GJMM, had engaged in doublespeak⁹. This of course allowed a certain national exposure to GJMM and bore fruit in the elections as Jaswant Singh won the seat with an overwhelming margin of 2,53,000 votes¹⁰. However, the National Democratic Alliance's (NDA) defeat at the national level ultimately plunged the prospect of Gorkhaland into uncertainty.

4.6. State Response to the Gorkhaland Movement and the Movement Dynamics

Political consciousness of the Indian Gorkhas and their political participation has always suffered a setback owing to its suppression at

⁹ While in the hills, Singh had promised to raise the issue of a separate Gorkhaland in Parliament if elected, his compatriots in the plains had maintained that "the party had not made any commitment to fulfil the demand for Gorkhaland, but only to look into the matter sympathetically" (*The Telegraph*, 17 April 2009). However, some opine that this equivocation suggests the quandary in which the BJP found itself. By fielding Jaswant Singh as the BJP candidate from Darjeeling supported by GJMM, it had found itself isolated in the plains. Consequently it sought to dissociate itself from the promise of a separate Gorkhaland made in the hills, even as the GJMM had welcomed the candidature of Jaswant Singh as an ex-army man and a prospective weighty voice for a separate Gorkhaland in Parliament.

¹⁰ Significantly, the BJP candidate polled only 85,000 votes in the plains, which, however, was 30,000 more votes than in the 2004 elections (*The Times of India*, 18 May 2009).

various levels since the colonial days.¹¹ The state government's response to the renewed agitation in the hills was predictably majoritarian. It maintained that the demand for a separate Gorkhaland was an attempt to further divide West Bengal, thereby evoking the bogey of partition and its association of loss. Further while the government was willing to accede to demands of greater autonomy and had even proceeded to initiate consultations to include the DGHC under the Sixth Schedule, it was not amenable to suggestions of a separate Gorkhaland. Moreover, it felt that the conflict between Ghising's GNLF and Gurung's GJMM was internecine conflict among the Gorkhas.

Media, Leadership and Movements

Darjeeling, a favoured destination of the British and its winter headquarters during colonial period had the privilege of being a centre for learning. As a result, history of Darjeeling has to its credit a large number of publications in Nepali, English, Bengali and Tibetan, which owed largely to the contributions made by the British rulers and the missionaries by way of the establishment of schools and other institutions of learning. During the colonial period too, the demand for a separate administrative apparatus for the Gorkhas was in place, and hence,

¹¹ The Gandhian Non-Cooperation movement of the 1920s was welcome by the tea plantation workers of Darjeeling Hills. Many workers in the Hills actively participated in the movement. However, the British Tea Planters, in an attempt to curb the movement thought it wise to appeal to the then Prime Minister of Nepal assuming the Nepali tea workers alleged allegiance to him. A representative of the Planters, Mr. Webb wrote to the Prime Minister of Nepal to ask the Nepali tea workers in Darjeeling to refrain from participating in the Gandhian Non-Cooperation Movement, which was a part of the Indian National Movement. See Letter of Tea Planters to the Maharaja of Nepal to Suppress the Gandhian Movement in Darjeeling Hills by Mr. G. A. Webb dated 8th May, 1921, cited in Joseph, K. J., *British Forest Policy in Darjeeling*, 2010, Appendix XV.

several Gorkha leaders propounded these ideas and propagated them through a huge number of magazines and news letters. Several vernacular publications in the likes of *Gorkha Bharat Jiban* (1886- (Motiram Bhatt), *Gorkha Khabar Kagat* (1901-Ganga Prasad Pradhan) were published from Darjeeling, investigating different aspects of hill society and culture, propagation of the republican ideals and the condemnation of the social evils like child marriage (especially between 1912 and 1939) engaging basically in socio-cultural reform. The publications in Tibetan took place especially after the arrival of the Tibetan refugees to Darjeeling in the later part of the 1950s, and, most of their publications focus on the plight of the refugees, reflections on their religious and cultural traditions, their determination to free Tibet, and so on. Some Nepali novels (like *Noyo*) also focus on the story of the inhuman treatment meted to the Tibetans and the flight of the refugees from Tibet to India etc. As regards the associations, most of them were formed in for the assertion of the cultural and ethnic identity of the people of the hills (for instance, the NEBULA) barring some (like Gorkha Dukkha Niwarak Sammelan- GDNS and Nepali Sahitya Sammelan) which devoted to socio-cultural and literary endeavours. Their aspirations were exposed through these associations. Nepali Sahitya Sammelan published Nepali Sahitya Sammelan Patrika. Gorkha Dukkha Nibarak Samity published 'Khoji' by Rupnarayan Sinha to ventilate their thoughts and ideas, to highlight their socio-political and economic demands and problems. The trend continued in the aftermath of the Indian independence and the mobilisation of the print media got further

accelerated for the movement in the 1980s under Subash Ghisingh. Ghising himself was a literary figure. Apart from propagating his political ideas for mass mobilisation through his literary pieces in vernacular, Subash Ghising who led the Gorkhaland movement in the 1980s sent letters regarding the status of Darjeeling and the need for immediate intervention for its resolution to His Majesty, the King of Nepal and also to the International Court of Justice of the United Nations. The copies of the letters were also sent to the Government of India, the President of the USA, Russia and many others. He regards this move as a tactic to pressurise the Indian and Nepali governments and to get recognition to the problems of the hill people. His intention was to draw the attention of the international media so that the movement could not be suppressed. Further, during Ghising's movement, he mobilised the local media like the Himalchuli and made it the mouthpiece of the movement. In the current phase of the Gorkhaland movement under Bimal Gurung, apart from mobilising the traditional print media, electronic media has been mobilised. The GJMM has created its own homepage which provides information on various issues, strategies and developments in the movement. Apart from the leadership spearheading the movement (GJMM), the leaders of the opposition have also resorted to electronic media for mobilisation. For instance, in the aftermath of the death of Madan Tamang, a weblog named Madan Manch has been developed as a virtual space wherein supporters of the ABGL could come together, interact and mobilise popular support by way of mobilising sympathy towards the League leader. Therefore, as evidenced, the Gorkhaland

movement in Darjeeling has experienced leadership's attempt to mobilise media- both print and electronic, in the course of the movement. Such mobilisation has contributed more often than not towards consolidation of the support base and strengthening of the movement.

Analysis and Conclusion

An analysis of the Gorkhaland movement over time reveals the fact that the movement has traversed a long history since its premature beginning in 1907. The Movement was influenced and shaped in its course by the movement leadership belonging to various organisations, starting with the Hillman's Association, to Gorkha League, to the Communist party of India, to Pranta Parishad, then to GNLF and finally under the leadership of the GJMM in 2007. The movement in its century long history witnessed a series of shifts in terms of issues and objectives, strategies and tactics with the change of the leaders spearheading the movement at each point of time. Initially, it began with the issue of separate administrative apparatus for the Darjeeling Hills, under the leadership of the Hillman's Association and the All India Gorkha League. Around the time of Indian Independence, the CPI leaders shifted the focus to the creation of a separate state of 'Gorkhastan' for the region. The Pranta Parishad leaders, and later on, the GNLF, the leadership of which was again mostly drawn from the membership of the Pranta Parishad, kept the issue of the creation of the state of 'Gorkhaland', on the lines of the arguments placed by the CPI leaders prior to Indian independence. However,

recognition of the Nepali language had remained equally important issue for them. Finally, the GJMM led new phase of the Gorkhaland movement under the leadership of Bimal Gurung reiterated the demand for the separate state of Gorkhaland within the Indian federation, however, shelving aside the politics of language but harping on the issue of underdevelopment and unemployment as base arguments for the demand for a separate state. At each phase, the leadership employed different strategies and tactics, transforming the movement in terms of its character and content. Whereas the Hillmen's Association and the AIGL favoured legal constitutional methods of struggle, the CPI with its leftist ideology favoured radical strategy and approach, although nothing significant in terms of a mass protest was witnessed under it. The 1980s saw a radical transformation in strategies under GNLF leadership who advocated violent methods including armed struggle for the protest. Finally, the current phase of the movement under the GJMM is a clear departure from the earlier strategies and tactics, with the movement declaring itself as Gandhian with Satyagraha and passive, peaceful resistance being its prime strategies. Thus, the movement has moved and transformed with the change in leadership. The leadership has change has been central to the movement dynamics in case of the Gorkhaland movement.

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CHAPTER 4

THE KAMTAPUR MOVEMENT

1. INTRODUCTION

The Kamtapur movement is a protest movement of the Koch-Rajbanshis in North Bengal¹. Since the later half of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, the Kamtapur movement has become visible in the North Bengal region of West Bengal. It has a long history since the formation of the Uttarkhanda Dal in 1969. The North Bengal region is a home for several protest movements across history –including the movements like the Tebhaga², Naxalbari³, Gorkhaland⁴ and the Greater Cooch Behar⁵

¹ In the initial stage, immediately after the great partition of 1947, the term 'North Bengal' was a vague one. From that time this term 'North Bengal' took the shape of a verbal geographical area which had no official recognition. But its socio-political and cultural character remained something different which did not come to be highlighted. Though North Bengal is a particular geographical area in the northern part of West Bengal comprising five districts (presently six districts) of the northern part of West Bengal, still its remarkable Socio-cultural feature, and identity cannot be denied. During recent times so many Scholars of different fields are trying their best to explore and highlight the issues of North Bengal. Even some measures have already been taken from the part of administration (Government) considering its importance. But the root of this issues and problems are yet to be investigated and emphasis should be given properly on the particular points which are related with socio-cultural practices and identity question.

² The Tebhaga movement was one of the proudest moments in the history of the farmers' movement in undivided Bengal. Tebhaga, simply put, mean that 2/3rds of the crops tilled by the Baradyas and Adhiyars would have to go to the farmers. The idea was to enact a law to give recognition to this demand. 41% of the farmers, according to the Land & Revenue Commission in 1940 were Baradyas and Adhiyars.

³ Naxalbari is the stretch of land on the Terai region at the base of the Himalayas. To the west of Naxalbari, across the border river Mechi lies Nepal. Naxalbari became famous for being the site of a left-wing poor peasants uprising called the Naxalbari Movement in 1967, which began with the "land to tiller" slogan. The "Naxalbari" incident was triggered on 25 May 1967 at Bengai Jote village in Naxalbari when the police opened fire on a group of villagers who were demanding their right to the crops at a particular piece of land. The firing killed 9 adults and 2 unknown children.


⁴The Gorkhaland Movement is one of the oldest statehood movements in the North Bengal region of West Bengal, with the history often being traced as far back as 1907. See Chapter 3 of the present research on the details of the Gorkhaland movement.

movement. However, in the present chapter, we shall dwell with only the Kamtapur movement and its leadership, focussing on the relationship between the movement dynamics and the role of political leadership therein. However, before venturing into the analysis of the movement and the role of movement leadership therein, we shall briefly explore the profile of the study area which would serve as the basis for the understanding of the origin and development of the movement in the region.

2. PROFILE OF THE STUDY AREA

The geographical area of North Bengal districts (proposed districts for the Kamtapur state), is 21325 square kilometers which is 1/4th of West Bengal with majority of population belonging to Scheduled castes and Scheduled tribes. The Rajbanshis (Kamtapuris) are considered to be the earliest settlers in the region along with other ethnic groups. They primarily inhabit the rural areas and constitute almost 60 percent of the total population of North Bengal who are concentrated in the districts of Coochbehar and Jalpaiguri. (Mukhopadhyay, 2005). The map below represents the proposed state of Kamtapur:

⁵ The Greater Cooch Behar Movement is a movement spearheaded by the Greater Coochbehar Peoples' Association formed in 1998. The Movement has been demanding the formation of a separate Greater Cooch Behar state comprising Cooch Behar, Darjeeling, Jalpaiguri, North and South Dinajpur districts and the undivided Goalpara district of Assam.



Forests, tea, jute, rice-wheat and minerals are the valuable resources of North Bengal. Forest covers over 8 lakhs acres, Tea over 6 lakhs acres, Jute over 6 lakhs, rice-wheat over 30 lakhs acres of land, pulses, oilseeds and spices over 1.5 acres of land, sweet fruits like banana, mango, oranges over 5 lakhs acres of land. Tea, Timber, Tobacco and Tourism are the invaluable wealth and revenue sources of the region.

North Bengal has huge mineral resources as well. There are coal mines, sufficient amount of copper, iron, mica, lead, limestone, soapstone, etc. Large industries can be set up with these valuable mineral resources in the region. It also has the potential of power generation as there are number of rivers like Mahananda, Tista, Jaldhaka, etc which carry water throughout the year. Lakhs of acres of land can be irrigated and used for

producing crops along with the production of fish and generation of electricity if suitable irrigation projects are taken up.

3. GENESIS OF THE MOVEMENT

The genesis of the Kamtapur Movement in North Bengal is a contested terrain. According to Mukhopadhyay (1987), its genesis cannot be understood in isolation of the movements spearheaded by the different groups and organisations in different ways and manners in different times. This is because, for instance, according to Ghosh (2007), the attempts of the Rajbanshi community to establish themselves as Kshatriyas in the first half of the 20th century under the leadership of Rai Saheb Panchanan Barma assumed the form of a movement popularly known as the Rajbanshi Kshatriya Movement, which eventually acted as the base of various ethno-political movements in North Bengal (Barman, 2000). The Rajbanshi Kshatriya Samity, a central organisation of the Rajbanshi community was essentially a social organisation. However, they began to change their outlook and decided to take part in politics also. As a result, the Samity fielded candidates in the Council Elections between 1920 and 1929 and the Assembly Elections of 1937 and 1946. It also fielded candidates against the national organisations, the All India Congress Committee and the Communist Party. Rooted to this may be traced the origin of the Kamtapur movement. However, it was, as Ghosh (ibid) contends, Jogendra Nath Mandal, the leader of the East Bengal Scheduled Caste community, who made, for the first time, the demand for separate state for the scheduled caste people of North Bengal, in

1947, which forms the basis of the present Kamtapur movement. Jogendranath's demand was the creation of a separate state 'Rajasthan' (in the name of the Rajbanshi people), which would be comprised of Jalpaiguri and Dinajpur districts and central portions of Rangpur and Darjeeling districts as well as Purnea in Bihar and Goalpara district in Assam., which was mostly inhabited by the Rajbanshi people (Ghosh, *ibid*).

The movement was followed by the Hitasadhani movement (Das, 2007), primarily in the princely state of Cooch Behar towards the end of the 1930s. The movement was basically started by some high level officials of the kingdom of Cooch Behar⁶, initially aimed at organising the forces against the merger of the state to the Union of India. The Hitasadhani movement⁷, however, was concerned only with the Cooch-Bihar Native state and they shifted their demands in different stages⁸. In spite of the

⁶ Satish Chandra Singha Sarkar and Amanatulla Khan Chudhury, two main ministers in the council of Cooch Behar Maharaja were the main leaders of the Hitasadhani Movement.

⁷ The Uttarkhand Movement emerged out of deliberate and organised effort on the part of a class of Rajbanshis to attain certain goals. Creation of a separate state (Kamtapur) for the Rajbanshi or for the "sons of the soil" was the ultimate goal of the movement. The leaders of the Uttarkhand movement propagated the idea of the promised land of 'Kamptapur' which would include the five districts of North Bengal (Mukhopadhyay). The motive behind the Uttarkhand movement was to brand a particular section of people (Bhatias) as outsiders and demand their expulsion from North Bengal. The Bhatias had been identified by the Uttarkhand leaders as their chief competitors in economic, social and political spheres in this region. Moreover, there was a feeling that even while the Rajbanshi are members of the dominant indigenous community, they are subjected to the domination of the so-called alien population. Thus, a kind of intense distrust against the alien communities arose out of a quite distinct psychological attitude on the part of the Uttarkhand leaders (Mukhopadhyay).

⁸ First, they demanded a separate state, in the second stage, they demanded that Cooch Behar be a centrally administered territory, and in the third instance they demanded that Cooch Behar be merged with Assam and not with West Bengal. and

hindrances, the demand for a separate state raised by the *Hitasadhini Movement* did not get obliterated completely. On October 30th, 1949, the representatives of Cooch Behar State Praja Congress, along with Darjeeling Gorkha League, Sikkim Praja Sammelan, assembled in Darjeeling and together called for a separate state as 'Uttarkhand Pradesh Sangha'. On 5th July, 1969, the Uttarkhand Dal (Party) was formed at the historical Jalpesh temple of Mainaguri of Jalpaiguri district with Panchanan Mallick, Kalindranath Barman, Hiramohan Barman, Soma Oraon, Sitanath Roy and many others to set apart North Bengal from South Bengal and create a prosperous Indian state called 'Kamtapur'⁹ in order to protect the people of North Bengal from the exploitation of 'Calcutta-centric capitalist leaders'. The party assured that in their proposed new state the people would reside peacefully irrespective of caste, class and creed (Ghosh, 2007).

4. CHARACTER, COURSE AND CONTENT OF THE MOVEMENT

As revealed from the discussion on the genesis of the movement, the Kamtapur movement has a long history, scattered through various

raised before the then Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, when he came to Darjeeling in 1952, the demand for a separate state of Uttarkhand Pradesh Sangha (Ghosh, 2007).

⁹ They adopted the name of 'Kamtapur' because of historical traditions. In the colonial literature, the Rajbanshis were generally regarded as purified group of the Koch (a semi-aboriginal tribe) who had adopted Hindu manners and customs by abandoning some of their traditional cultural practices. Panchanan Barman, the first intellectual of the Rajbanshi community suggested a historical link of the present Rajbanshi community with Bhaskar Varman, King of Kamrup (Present Assam) in the 7th century A.D. it is said that after the exit of the Palas of Kamrup in 12th century A.D, their capital Kamarupanagara might have grown into Kamtanagara during the reign of the Khens or Sens in the 15th century. Husian Shah ousted these Khens and assumed the title "Conqueror of Kamta". It was in the beginning of the 16th century that the Koch chieftan Visvasimha drove away the Muslim intruders and established the Narayani dynasty with his capital at Kamtanagari (Das, 2007).

stages, and with changing objectives, strategies, tactics and leadership. The nature, character and content of the movement, its strategies and objectives have undergone series of changes with the change in the leadership styles and methods.

The Uttarakhand movement led by the Uttarakhand Dal in the early 1970s started peacefully through public meeting covering the villages of North Bengal. The movement, according to Haripada Ray (2007), under the leadership of the Uttarkhand Dal came forward with several demands, some of which are:

- Equalisation of the Personal Wealth in money's worth,
- Rationalisation of Government and Non-Government Services,
- Reclassification of ration card,
- Implementation of the slogan "Matri Bhasa Matri Dugdha-sama" by introducing the medium of education in mother tongue like Rajbanshi/Kamtapuri,
- Renaming the North Bengal University as Thakur Panchanan University,
- Establishment of agro-based small and medium sized industries in the villages like jute spinning, weaving, paper, tobacco and timber products,
- Introduction of free education up to class XII,
- Introduction of subsidy to the poor and marginal cultivators,

- Establishment of High Court, Medical College, Agricultural College, Engineering Colleges, Law College and more Technical Educational Institutions in North Bengal,
- Promotion, preservation, maintenance and development of the cultural heritage of North Bengal, etc.(Ray).

However, it was in only in the 1980s that the Uttarakhand Dal made a general call for a separate state for North Bengal- the Kamtapur state. It gave wide publicity to the concept of statehood through various leaflets, pamphlets, manifestos and public meetings under the leadership of Panchanan Mullik, Sampad Ray and others. The Dal came forward with a charter of demands that included, among others,

- Formation of Kamtapur State consisting of five districts of North Bengal,
- Reservation of 80% of jobs of Central, State, and other semi government for the sons of the soil,
- Introduction of Kamtapuri as the medium of education up to school level,
- Broadcasting of news, and other programmes relating to agriculture, music, drama, and other cultural functions in Kamtapuri language on all the radio stations of North Bengal,
- Reservation of 80% of recruits from North Bengal in defence services for the sons of the soil, setting up Recruitment Boards in

each district and relaxation of age and height for Rajbanshi, Rava and Mech candidates,

- Following the Indira-Mujib agreement, 1971, should be the base year for citizenship,
- Reservation of seats for the residents of North Bengal in North Bengal University, North Bengal Medical College, Jalpaiguri Engineering College and Cooch Behar Agriculture College,
- No handing over of the Tin Bigha of Cooch Behar to Bangladesh,
- Exchange of Chit Mahals of India and Bangladesh,
- Setting up of High Court in North Bengal, etc.

In the later part of the 1980s, the Uttarakhand Dal came to be known as Kamtapur Gana Parishad. It rose on the lines of the All Assam Students' Union (AASU) and the Asom Gana Parishad (AGP). The Kamtapur Peoples' Party (KPP) formed in 1995 was an offshoot of the Kamtapur Gana Parishad.

Meanwhile, the students of various educational institutions in North Bengal working on the problems of Dalit felt that the so called main stream upper class leadership of students were reluctant to look into their problems and as such they have to form a separate organisation for highlighting and resolving their own problems (Das, 2007). The dalit students formed an organisation in North Bengal University in August, 1976 with 11 students under the name "*Uttar Banga Viswavidhlaya Tapashilee Jati O Adivasi Chhatra Sangathan*" to deal with the problems

of admissions, stipend and also misbehaviour from the upper class students. It was in 1977, that the necessity of a broad based student organisation was felt and led to the formation of "*Uttar Banga Tapashilee O Adivasi Students' Organisation*". The students launched movement (led by Bijay Chandra Barman, Pradip Kumar Roy, Sukhbilas Barma and others) throughout North Bengal in various institutions to implement the government declared facilities for the dalit students and uplift the economic conditions of the down trodden people.

The movement launched by the students led to the formation of "*Uttar Banga Tapashilee Jati O Adivasi Sangathan*". The organisation submitted a memorandum to the Sub Divisional Officer, Tufanganj in December 1978, with the following demands:

- (i) The members of Scheduled castes and Scheduled tribes be provided with loan facilities for improving their financial conditions,
- (ii) Vested land be distributed as per provisions of West Bengal Land Reforms Act with priorities to scheduled tribes, scheduled castes and general castes,
- (iii) The students be allowed to write in any application in column of mother tongue, their own mother language, i.e. Rabha, Oraon and Kamtapuri etc. in place of Bengali (Das, *ibid*).

With the formation of the Kamtapur Peoples' Party under the leadership of Atul Roy in 1995, the party has been demanding the formation of a

Kamtapur state comprising six districts of North Bengal , namely, Cooch Behar, Jalpaiguri, Darjeeling, Malda, North and South Dinajpur. The formation of Kamtapur Peoples' Party has marginalised virtually all other organisations to their call for the creation of a separate state of Kamtapur. The total area of proposed Kamtapur State will be 21699 square kilometres with a population of approximately 20 million. The KPP, apart from the six districts of North Bengal, has also demanded Goalpara district of Assam, but they are not very clear in this issue.

The KPP argues that the region is the original homeland of the Kamtapuris i.e. predominantly Rajbanshis, Khens, Meches, Koibartyas and that there is a constant marginalisation of the Kamtapuris by the intruders, there is a need for the creation of separate state of Kamtapur for the Kamtapuris. The basic argument is that the Kamtapuris constitute 65% of the total population of North Bengal and are culturally, linguistically, socially, and historically different from that of Bengalis. The KPP attempts to create a Kamtapuri identity and not a Rajbanshi identity by claiming that they speak a language called Kamtapuri and not Rajbanshi. This is a deliberate attempt to mobilise other sections of population (other than Rajbanshis) into the movement. The KPP argues that Kamtapuris are economically backward and that the Government of West Bengal is responsible for this. It argues that the dignity, socio-cultural identity and economic interest of the local people would be protected only with the creation of a separate state for Kamtapuris.

The objective of the KPP, according to the constitution of the Party, is the protection of the interest of the Kamtapuri speaking people and scheduled castes and scheduled tribes of Kamtapur, to protect their culture, language and identity, to end colonial exploitation and neglect by the establishment of the Kamtapur state within the framework of the constitution of India.

The Kamtapur movement which has seen an upsurge in the Jalpaiguri, Darjeeling, Cooch-Bihar, North and South Dinajpur districts (North Bengal) of West Bengal is an ultimate outcome of the struggle for power and the associated privileges between the indigenous communities (particularly, the Koch Rajbanshis) and the Bengalis (Das, 2007). The main argument is that the North Bengal region originally belongs to the Kamtapuris who are predominantly Rajbanshis in terms of caste and are culturally, linguistically, socially and historically distinct from the Bengalis. It argues that the Kamtapuris, though they constitute 65 percent of the total population of North Bengal, have lost their identity because of the continuous influx of Bengalis or Bhatias from Bangladesh (Jana, 2008).

It exemplifies the efforts of an indigenous community in putting up a resistance to their gradual economic marginalisation and erosion of culture and linguistic identity in the guise of a development process which was primarily derived through land acquisition. The marginalisation and pauperization of the indigenous Rajbanshis has given a general feeling of alienation and unrest among them which is further aggravated by the

apathy shown by the mainstream society primarily composed of the upwardly mobile Bengali community. For maintaining their cultural and linguistic identity, they find themselves at the receiving end of a degrading eco-system and an alien social structure which is indifferent to their traditional identity. This has led to a feeling of deprivation and disillusionment among the Rajbanshis who are now growing more and more identity conscious, in terms of their history, language, traditional social structure, occupation and land rights.

5. LEADERSHIP AND MOVEMENT DYNAMICS

According to Rupkumar Barman, (2000) it was during the colonial subjugation that the Rajbanshis began to lose their identity. In 1874 the then British Indian Government created a new Chief Commissioner's Province known as 'Assam', by incorporating a portion of Rangpore district (Goalpara) and Kamrup district which once were a parts of the Koch Kingdom. This political/territorial fragmentation of the Rajbanshi community actually began their present-day identity- crisis. The Rajbanshis who had been identified by the British Government as 'Koch' revolted against their being considered a low tribe or low caste by the census officials. The claim of the Rajbanshis to be enumerated as a Kshatriya but not Koch (tribe) began to take the shape of a movement at the time of the census of 1891. They pressed the government through persistent agitation that:

- i). the Rajbanshis be recorded separately from the Koch; and

ii). the Rajbanshis be recognised as Kshatriyas by descent.

(Mukhopadhyay, 1999)

However, in the adverse situation under the British impact, there were not many strong leaders who could have united the Rajbanshis into a particular resistant force before the emergence of Panchanan Barma. Only Haramohan Khajanchi could organise a '*Bratya Khatriya Jatir Unnati Bidhayani Sabha*' in 1891. However, it was Panchanan Barma, who founded the Kshatriya Samiti in 1910 with the objective to the social position of the Rajbanshis from the rank of Bratyakshatriyas to Kshatriyas. (Rajbanshis officially obtained the Bratyakshatriya status in 1891, march 15, from the Rangpore Dharmasabha. Panchanan Barma obtained the permission for Kshatriyaization of the Rajbanshi community from the Brahmins of Coochbehar, Kamrup, Mithila and Navadip after consultaion with them).

The objective of the movement led by Panchanan Barma was to bring up the Rajbanshi community who were considered to be in the lower strata of the Hindu caste hierarchy by institutionalising the use of sacred thread for them. It was a symbolic protest against the domination and oppression of the upper castes. The movement aroused the Kshatriya sentiment of the Rajbanshis and helped their unification under a Kshatriya banner.

The first demand for a separate homeland was raised by a section of the Rajbanshi community of Coochbehar through the Hitasadhini Sabha

under the leadership of Satish Chandra Singha Roy and Khan Choudhury Amanat-Ulla-Ahmed. After independence on the question of joining of the native state Coochbehar into the Indian Union, the Sabha demanded for the proclamation of Coochbehar as a separate state. However, the demand for a separate state made by the Hitasadhini Sabha was different from that of the demands of the Uttarakhand Dal and the present Kamtapur Movement. The Sabha was concerned mainly with the Coochbehar Native state. The Hitasadhini sabha also shifted their demands at different stages of their movement. At the first stage, they demanded the formation of a separate state. At the second stage, they demanded that Coochbehar be centrally administered territory, and at the third stage, they demanded that Coochbehar be merged with Assam and not with West Bengal. The movement was basically meant for the welfare of the local people and mobilisation of the local people against the outsiders i.e., the Upper caste Hindus. It was with the formation of the Uttarakhand Dal in 5th July, 1969, that the demand for a separate state gained momentum. It was formed at the historic Jalpesh temple of Mainaguri in the district of Jalpaiguri with Panchanan Mallick, Kalindranath Barman, Jogendranath Bhattacharya, Hiramohan Barman, Soma Oraon, Sitanath Roy, as the founding members and the leaders of the Uttarakhand Dal.

The objective of the Uttarakhand Dal was the setting apart of the region of North Bengal from that of South Bengal and the creation of a separate state called 'Kamtapur' state for protecting the people of North Bengal

from the exploitation of South Bengal. The leaders of the Uttarkhand Dal demanded for the creation of a separate state of Kamtapur, as they argued that the states have been created on the basis of language and culture.

5.1. Leadership in the Kamtapur People's Party and Movement Dynamics

The demand for the formation of a separate state of Kamtapur has been an important issue in the wake of the formation of the Kamtapur Peoples' Party formed in 1995 under the leadership of Mr. Atul Roy. To him the objective of the movement is to peacefully agitate in a democratic manner for the creation of a separate state of Kamtapur outside West Bengal, comprising of the six districts of North Bengal, viz., Cooch Behar, Jalpaiguri, Darjeeling, Malda and North and South Dinajpur. The Kamtapur Peoples' Party's main argument is that the Kamtapuris are economically backward and deprived under the Government of West Bengal, and they are on the verge of losing their socio-cultural identity because of the immigration from other parts of India and because of the refugee influx from Bangladesh. The Party also put forward that North Bengal originally belongs to the Kamtapuris who are culturally, linguistically, socially and historically distinct from the Bengalis. Atul Roy (in an interview to Tapas Ganguly, (the Week, Nov. 16, 2003) alleges that there has been no development in North Bengal region after independence. The worst- affected are the Kamtapuris, who have lost their land and are unable to find jobs. The leadership tries to convince the

people that the movement for a separate homeland is necessary because the state government has failed to look after the interests of the Kamtapuris in particular and the common people of North Bengal in general.

In one of the speeches delivered by Atul Roy, he declared,

“...the security and the integrity of the country are immensely important to me. Our demand for a separate homeland is based on our distinct linguistic, cultural and historical identity. And the demand we have raised is within the framework of the Indian constitution. We are not anti-national. The nation’s unity is dear to us”.

He also stated that KPP is committed to have the state because the overall development of North Bengal can never be achieved through the people of South Bengal (Kolkattiya Bengalis). The objectives of KPP leadership are the overall economic development of North Bengal, which can be achieved only after the formation of a separate Kamtapur state. The KPP leadership also contend that the Kamtapuri carry a distinguished tradition - a history, social existence and culture distinct from the Bengalis, and hence demand formation of a separate state on the basis of recognition of these distinctive features.

The KPP put forward a charter of demands containing eleven demands.

Among its demands are:

- Carving out a separate state of Kamtapur comprising several North Bengal districts in order to enable the Kamtapuri people to govern their own lives by reason of ethnical, linguistical, historical, cultural, social distinction from the rest of the people of West Bengal,
- Recognition of their vernacular language by including Kamtapuri language in the 8th schedule of the constitution of India,
- By the base year of 1971 (Indira-Mujib Accord) regarding expulsion of illegal foreigners from the land of Kamtapuris be implemented,
- Imposition of 'Inner Permit Line' in order to curb illegal influx of immigrants in North Bengal,
- Erection of 'Barbed Wire' on the border of India and Bangladesh in order to restrain the intrusion of illegal foreigners,
- Telecast various cultural programmes of Kamtapuris on television by opening Fulbari Door-darshan substation centre,
- Decleration of 'Teesta-Irrigation Project' as National Project,
- Broadcast various cultural programmes of Kamtapuris through All India Radio, Siliguri,
- Set up a central University (Roy Saheb Thakur Panchanan Barma University) in the district of Coochbehar,
- Exchange of enclaves in India and Bangladesh,
- Publication of a 'White Paper' regarding economical status, culture, population, and ethnic identity of the aboriginal people of North Bengal.

The KPP leadership feel that the solution to all their problems lies in the creation of a separate state in which they will constitute a majority. This numerical majority will ensure them political power and control over administration which can be used for cultural development.

The Kamtapur movement under KPP and its leadership is a well organized movement compared to that of UKD and other associations which had demanded for the creation of a separate state of Kamtapur. There are several frontal organizations that operate and mobilize support for the movement. These organizations include the All Kamtapur Students' Union (AKSU), Kamtapur Vasha Sahitya Parishad (KVSP), the intellectual front, the Kamtapur Womens' Rights Forum which is the womens' front. The most militant and controversial of the organization is the Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO). However, the nature of relationship between the KPP and the KLO is not known.

According to Rajat S. Mukhapadhyay (2005) the premise from which the leaders of KPP want to mobilize their community members in favour of Kamtapur movement is that of 'Cultural rights', i.e., the rights of the indigenous Rajbanshis to preserve their culture and language. Therefore, they demanded appropriate constitutional and administrative recognition of their language called Kamtapuri. The KPP leaders, thus potently make use of the linguistic affinity and sentiments to cultivate 'we' feeling among Rajbanshis across North Bengal. And the appealing slogan "Kamtapuri is a language of heart, a medium of self expression" has been used as booster to hasten the mood of protest and keep their community

members somewhat emotionally charged. Therefore, to Mukhopadhyay, the movement under the new leadership has adopted a strategy of cultural revivalism. Several outfits like All Kamtapur Students' Union (AKSU), Kamtapur Vasha Sahitya Parishad (KVSP) are revitalizing the past history, language, culture and traditions of the Rajbanshis.

The KPP leadership, in order to create awareness about their language and culture has been organizing, from the very beginning, conferences and seminars in different places (like Kalier Hat, in Dhupguri, Champasari, in Siliguri and other places), which are often attended by important dignitaries. In one of the discussions, Mr. Girindra Narayan Roy said that, "Language is the identity of man, through which, unit of states, state and culture are formed.... who gets language, they capture the power". Therefore, recognition of Kamtapuri language and nourishment of language, history and culture have been accorded the highest priority in the movement.

5.2. Leadership Differences, Splits in Leadership and Movement Dynamics

The differences in leadership in KPP, particularly with the two leaders Atul Roy and Nikhil Roy, had been brewing since 2001. It was in 2001 that Nikhil Roy, without the knowledge of Atul Roy, the then President of KPP, made some independent initiatives like forming the Coordination Committee of Kamtapuri Organization, calling of a 72 hour bandh in North Bengal, etc.

Since 2001, on the other hand, resentment in the KPP against its President, Atul Roy was increasing. This was because of Atul Roy's certain acts without consulting other members of the party. The dissolution of the Coochbehar and Jalpaiguri district committees of the party by Atul Roy, his planning for a meeting with the JMM in Kolkata and his failure to get the recognition of the party from the election Commissioner, particularly, on the eve of Assembly polls in West Bengal, all these had certainly created a resentment amongst the members of the party against him.

It was in 2003 (March, 9th) that the KPP elected Nikhil Roy, who was then underground, President of the party, by unseating the then President, Atul Roy. However, after being elected as President, Nikhil Roy surrendered to the authorities of the West Bengal Government. Subhas Barman was made the General Secretary of the party.

Atul Roy, in turn, in 2006, broke away from KPP and formed a new party as Kamtapur Progressive Party. However, the objective of both the factions was similar as both the parties were primarily concerned with mobilizing support for the creation of a separate state of Kamtapur.

The split in the party and the formation of Kamtapur Progressive Party was a big setback for the movement. The Kamtapur Peoples' Party and the new Kamtapur Progressive Party differed on several issues pertaining to the movement, its objectives, and its strategies, including that of

alliance building. Hence, the division weakened the movement because of having lost the strength of the unified force. With the division in the Party, the support base also got divided because of the obvious divisions of their loyalties. Since the two groups were opposed to each other, there was a clear current of fear that the mobilisation of any of the factions by the opposition forces in their favour would be deadening for the movement. Hence, the movement lost its vigour and profile, became shaky with each group sustaining with dwindling support bases and contestations over the objectives, issues, strategies and techniques of the movement. Hence, the split resulted in a form of contradiction within the movement, providing it a driving force to move and transform. Thus, the split in the leadership of the movement was significant in terms of movement dynamics and transformations.

5.3. Leadership in Kamtapur Progressive Party and Movement Dynamics

The Kamtapur Progressive Party was formed after a split away from the Kamtapur People's Party, ahead of the 2006 West Bengal Legislative Assembly election, under the Presidentship of Atul Roy. Unlike the Kamtapur Peoples Party, the Kamtapur Progressive Party became supportive of the Gorkha Janmukti Morcha (GJM). Taking a different political and ideological stand vis-a vis the Kamtapur Peoples Party, according to the Progressive president Mr Atul, his organisation along with allies, the Greater Cooch Behar Democratic Party and the All Koch Rajbanshi Students' Union, would do everything possible to achieve the

common goal of a separate Kamtapur state. Apart from the paramount statehood demand, it was further declared that the party would press the Centre to stop infiltration from across the Bangladesh border and to bestow a Constitutional recognition to the Kamtapur language. As a part of its activities, a seven-member delegation of the Kamtapur **Progressive Party** headed by office secretary Darshan Chandra Singha submitted a memorandum to Home Secretary, Government of West Bengal Ardhendu Sen on its demand for a Kamtapur state comprising entire North Bengal and Lower Assam. In March 2009, Kamtapur Progressive Party (KPP) forced a 24-hour shutdown to protest the state administration's refusal to let it hold a public meeting. Demanding the dismissal of the district magistrate, superintendent of police and sub-divisional officer of Jalpaiguri, Kamtapur Progressive Party activists put up roadblocks on the National Highway 31A, cutting off supplies to Sikkim for some time. Protestors squatted on railway tracks to disrupt train movement. Long distance trains were delayed.

In the Party's struggle with its opponent camp to emerge as the dominant party of the Kamtapur movement, the Progressive Party, as revealed from the above discussions, threw open a large number of programmes and activities, covered everyday by the regional and local media. The competition among the two parties led to production of a series of news columns in the dailies. This had a twofold impact on the movement. First, the movement developed a sort of internal contradiction capable of disintegrating the movement. However, the second impact was more

positive. The competition also resulted in the production of counter expertise by the movement, through various research activities, countering the oppositional forces of the movement. In a bid for competition, both the Kamtapur Peoples' Party and the Kamtapur Progressive Party published series of pamphlets and their activities reported in the news media acted as educative agencies for those involved in the movement. The net result was that the disintegrative tendency of the movement was balanced by the production of knowledge on various issues central to the movement.

However, the nomenclature adopted by the new party leadership as the party being a 'Progressive' party too had several implications. Reflections and retrospection on the part of the Kamtapur Peoples Party as to whether it means that the old Peoples' Party was regressive in its methods and activities, led to the party adopting more proactive role in designing the strategies of the movement, and democratising it to accommodate the younger generations in to the party's fold. Self christening of the party as 'Progressive' by the new leadership compelled them to make the party organisation more democratic and open in its organisational structure and functioning, with clear envisioning of the movements objectives, goals and strategies. Consequently, the leadership of the two parties moved forward being more democratic, opening space for future merger of the parties in to a single force to champion the cause of the movement.

5.4. Leadership and Movement Dynamics: The Mainaguri Merger and After

The rift between the leaders of Kamtapur Peoples' Party, under Nikhil Roy and Kamtapur Progressive Party, under Atul Roy, seems to have come to an end as both the factions decided for the merger as it was realized on their part that the objectives of the movement cannot be achieved with a division in the leadership itself and followers and supporters being divided into two different and hostile camps. It was on the initiative of both the leaders Nikhil Roy and Atul Roy that a joint meeting was organized on October, 10th, 2010 where they decided for a merger into a single party the Kamtapur Peoples' Party.

In an interview with the Statesman (October, 13th, 2010) Atul Roy said,

"There had been difference between us, leading to the formation of the new party. However, we found it tough to carry on with th campaign for the separate kamtapur state and the recognition of the Kamtapuri language. The support of the movement was getting divided between two of us. The followers felt discouraged by the rift between the two parties and there was pressure from them for the merger".

Nikhil Roy added,

" It was important that we were together as there was no denying the fact that both the groups had grown weak in

terms of support base. We had lost the spontaneous support of the Rajbanshi population”.

It was in October, 10th, 2010 that the two factions invited delegates from all over North Bengal at Mainaguri, in the district of Jalpaiguri where more than 2000 people gathered to give their consent on the merger of the two groups, keeping aside their differences and to carry out the objective of the movement together ,i.e., carving out of a separate state of Kamtapur under a single party Kamtapur Peoples' Party . After the merger, Atul Roy was re elected as the President and Nikhil Roy as the General Secretary of the party.

However, it is interesting to note that such mergers are quite rare. Hence, the merger is often speculated as being either a result of the question of survival of such breakaway factions within the movement, or as a consequence of the attempts at accommodation of whatsoever different interests held by the two dissenting groups. This, however, has remained largely unexplored. The present research does not intend to analyse the merger as either a survival strategy or an accomodationist technique. What interests the present research is the fact that the merger has strengthened the movement in terms of both the leadership as well as the support base, thereby giving the movement an impetus to further move and transform.

5.5. The Radical Fringe Leadership and Movement Dynamics: KLO Leaders in Perspective

Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO) is a radical wing within the Kamtapur Movement. The origin of the Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO) can be traced to the attempts of certain members of the Rajbongshi community belonging to the all Kamtapur Students' Union (AKSU) to organise an armed struggle for a separate Kamtapur State. The group perceived the failure of other party organizations spearheading the movement in realizing the goal of the creation of a separate state of Kamtapur as owing to the strategies and tactics adopted by these party organizations which were primarily legal-constitutional and hence, passive and mild. They felt the necessity of a radical group with radical strategies and techniques like an armed rebellion for the realization of their objective of Kamtapur statehood. For this purpose, they approached the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA, which is reportedly said to have agreed to train them. The KLO came into existence on December 28, 1995. At the time of its formation, its cadre strength was an estimated to be approximately 60 persons. However, subsequently, it is said to have increased its cadre-base to approximately 300 active cadres. The objective of the KLO was to carve out a separate Kamtapur State comprising six districts—Cooch Behar, Darjeeling, Jalpaiguri, North and South Dinajpur and Malda—of West Bengal and four contiguous districts of Assam—Kokrajhar, Bongaigaon, Dhubri and Goalpara. At its inception, the KLO was an over-ground organisation and was formed to address problems such as large-scale unemployment, land alienation,

perceived neglect of Kamtapuri language and identity, and grievances of economic deprivation. Soon, its strategy transformed into waging armed struggle, as a consequence of which, it, in a short while, became underground.

The KLO was armed in its inception with a host of radical leaders. Tamir Das alias Jibon Singha, who headed the organization as its chairman. He was arrested in October 1999. However, he regained control over the outfit after he was released by the Assam Police in a bid to make the other KLO cadres surrender. Milton Burman alias Mihir Das took the position of the second in command of the outfit. Tom Adhikary alias Joydeb Roy became the outfit's *crack squad* chief. Both of them were arrested by the Royal Bhutan Army (RBA) during the December 2003 operations. Bharati Das, Chairperson of the Women's Wing, was arrested from Jalpaiguri district in West Bengal on August 7, 2002. The outfit's operations chief, Suresh Roy, surrendered on January 24, 2002. Some of the other prominent KLO insurgents who could be in positions of decision-making are Hiten Roy, Ravi Rajbongshi, Rahul Roy and Kajal Roy. With the operations by the RBA, the radical wing of the movement lost its relevance.

Although the emergence of the KLO as a part of the Kamtapur movement led to a spur of activities towards the achievement of the avowed goal of Kamtapur state and gained lots of attention by the media, local, regional and national, yet the activities of the KLO were apt to attract state criticism as a terrorist organisation and warranted immediate action

against it. The state could, in the name of lynching the violent force, could employ the coercive measures at its disposal not only to quell the KLO but also to suppress the entire movement. Although KLO disappeared from the scene in a short while, its death simultaneously weakened the movement because of the use of coercion against the movement and its participants by the state.

5.6. State Responses to the Movement, Movement Leadership and Movement Dynamics

Like in case of Darjeeling, the state response to protest politics was not favourable even in the doors and terai region of present West Bengal, which constitutes the area of Kamtapur Movement today. The practice of suppression is rooted in its colonial history and legacy. To quote an instance, During the course of Non-Cooperation movement some students of Victoria College, presently ABN Seal College, Cooch Behar were getting prepared to take part in this movement. In this context, His Highness the Maharaja of Cooch Behar Sir Jitendra Narayan Bhup-Bahadur K.C.S.I. delivered a warning speech to the students of Victoria College, Cooch Behar, on 24th of March, 1921 stating that,

"It has been reported to me that there was some trouble among the students of my college here over the movement generally known as Non-Cooperation..... The Victoria College was established primarily and entirely for my subject and those who come and join this college from British India are only allowed to do so if there are vacancies in the classes after

*admitting my subjects..... I shall first address those students whose only connection with my state's the college. I have heard that most of the troubles which arose here, was at the instigation of these students. To them, I would say if you do not like the system of education which I have adopted for my college, there is nothing to prevent you from going else where to seek the system you want."*¹⁰

The state responses to the Kamtapur Movement today is also not very different from the nature of responses to political protests during the colonial period. Ipsita Halder (2000) and Rajat S. Mukhopadhyay (2011) have critically analyzed the response of the state of West Bengal towards the Kamtapur movement. According to him, from the beginning the state of west Bengal (the left front government) branded the Kamtapur movement as a secessionist movement. The argument, according to Mukhopadhyay (2011), of the state against the creation of a separate Kamtapur state has been built on linguistic and cultural foundations, grossly unsubscribing to the economic factors. From Jyoti Basu to Ashok Bhattacharya to the then tribal welfare minister Dinesh Dakua, all held the movement as an 'anti people forces', restricted to a handful of disgruntled people with no popular support (Mukhopadhyay, 2011). Of course the government time and again reiterated the availability of space for dialogue to address the issues raised by the movement, paradoxically,

¹⁰ See for details, Upendra Nath Barman, *Uttar Banglar Sckal O Amar Jiban Smriti* (In Bangla), Temple Street, Jalpaiguri, 1392 B.S. p. 31

however, the movement was time and again suppressed with the use of force, branding it to be a law and order problem. In a nutshell, the response of the state was confrontational and was characterized by a conspicuous absence of judicious statecraft in handling the movement.

This confrontationalist method of the state in handling the Kamtapur movement met with similar responses by the movement participants and movement leadership. Consequently, the movement gained more currency to counter state coercion, which led to the strengthening of the movement. The ultimate consequence was the series of transformations in the character and content of the movement, rejuvenating each time with a new vigour.

Media, Leadership and Movements

In North Bengal press publication was a latecomer. This owed to several reasons, the prime one being the infrastructural disadvantages. The region was socio-culturally backward characterized by low literacy rate, lack of printing machinery, and absence of railway communication and institutions of higher learning. North Bengal also witnessed the wave of Bengal renaissance quite late. The combined effect of these factors could be seen in the press and media emerging in North Bengal quite late. Yet the Kamtapur movement has benefited in terms of making use of news media in their efforts towards the mobilisation for protest. Arjun Das (2007) appropriately appreciates the role played by the media in transmitting to the movement participants the discourses of protest,

counterexpertise discourses by the movement against the hegemonic knowledge about the movement, etc. However, it needs to be noted here that there seems that a negligible amount of efforts have been made by the leaders of the Kamtapur movement to mobilise for protest through media coverage and media participation. Although news reporting by local and national dailies like the Uttarbanga Sambad, Ananda Bazar Patrika, the Talaegraph and the Statesman sometimes cover on the movement issues, the role of leadership in categorically mobilising the media for the cause of the movement has remained a far cry. Possibly because of this, the movement has not assumed its strength in comparison to such movements elsewhere.

Concluding Note

The study of the Kamtapur movement in a historical perspective reveals that the movement has spanned over a long period of time. In its course the movement has matured, fragmented, weakened, united, and reborn with newer strength and continues to mature further. In other words, the movement has originated, grown, moved and transformed in its various phases. The primary role in movement's dynamics has been played by the leadership – of the movement and of the majority party forming the government in the state. The impact of the leadership on movement dynamism has been such that they have acted as active agencies transforming the objectives, strategies, and methods of the movement, and consequently resulted in variations in the movement support base as well. Whereas able, determined and committed leadership have

strengthened the movement at times with re-definitions of objectives, goals, and strategies of the movement, the conflicts in leadership has led to divisions and factions weakening the movement and its base. Further, the conflicts in leadership have marred the clarity and purpose of the movement often leading to the emergence of radical fringes within the movement determined to achieve the objectives through revolutionary and violent methods. However, the violent and revolutionary methods adopted by the radical fringe leadership of the movement opened space for the state to resort to coercion to combat and suppress the movement. Although the popular movement response to the state sponsored atrocities over the movement was huge, the course, content and character of the movement experienced shifts, changes and transformations, with each attempt of the movement leadership to respond to the state atrocities. In a nutshell, the history of the leadership's role in the Kamtapur movement reveals that the leaders and their design of the movement in relation to the various forces and factors confronting the movement has resulted in movement dynamics with noticeable changes in its strategies and tactics towards the achievement of their avowed goal of the State of Kamtapur, and the recognition of the Kamtapur language officially as an independent language, different from the dominant Bengali language in the state.

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CHAPTER 5

LEADERSHIP AND MOVEMENT DYNAMICS: MOVEMENTS COMPARED

INTRODUCTION

Social movements move by transforming identities and emotions, by focusing attention and by directing and coordinating actions. Movements are often spurred into existence by cognitively framed emotions, anger, frustration, shame, guilt, which move individuals and groups to protest, to publicly express and display discontent, engaging in what McAdam, Tilly and Tarrow (2001) call 'contentious' actions. This sequence of events can set in motion a process of collective will formation whereby individual identities and biographies are fused into a collective characterized by feelings of group belongingness, solidarity, common purpose and shared memory, a 'movement' in other words. A central mechanism here is a set of ritual practices which are performed as part of collective protest. Public displays of commitment and solidarity, often build around collective voicing and parading, ritual practices which are also transformative in that they help blur the boundaries between individual and collective, between the private and public, and help fuse a group through creating strong emotional bonds between participants. "The repeated experience of ritual participation produces a feeling of solidarity--'we are all here together', 'we must share something', and finally, it produces collective memory--'we were all there together' (Berezen 2001:93). A collective story emerges, linking places and events together and a metaphor, the

movement, is applied. This act of collective self presentation ---the process of collective identity formation, and, the articulation and objectification of the movement is performed by movement leadership in the time-space context of a given movement. In the light of this understanding, we shall explore and compare in the two movements, the role played by the movement leadership, touching upon various aspects of the movements in the following sections.

Arun K. Jana (2009) argues that even though ethnic minorities, linguistically and culturally distinct from the Bengali's are spread throughout the state but are numerically more prominent in the northern region of the state. The two most distinct minorities in the North Bengal region are the Nepali's mostly inhabitants of the Darjeeling hills and the Rajbansis who inhabit the plains of Darjeeling and the adjoining North Bengal districts of the state. There have been discontents in the two communities - the Rajbansis and the Nepalis, which have been ventilated in the form of identity politics in the region. It is economic underdevelopment of the region and the consequent poverty of the ethnic communities that is crucial for an understanding of the movements for separate states by the two communities. However, despite a seeming proximity in the nature of the two movements, it needs to be stressed here that the two movements differ significantly in terms of the history of origin of the movements, the issues and objectives of the movement, the nature and character of the movement, and finally, the nature and character of the leadership leading the movement, which determine the dynamics of the movements. In the sections below, we present a brief

comparative analysis of the two movements in question, with a particular focus on the role of leadership in the dynamics of the two movements.

THE CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND OF THE ORIGIN OF THE MOVEMENTS: A COMPARISON

Location:

The area and population of Gorkhaland are quite small: about 3.5% of the area and 2% of the population of West Bengal. Those of Kamtapur are much larger: about % of the area and % of the population of West Bengal. The former occupies most of one district in northern West Bengal, Darjeeling, while the latter occupies three districts in North Bengal districts of West Bengal and parts of Assam, Most leaders of the Gorkhaland movement would like to extend its boundaries to encompass the plains areas of Darjeeling District, including the city of Siliguri, but this aspiration is opposed by the government of West Bengal. Moreover, it is interesting to note that a large part of the North Bengal region in the Dooars has become a hotbed of tension. This is because of the fact that it embraces areas which fall under the proposed maps of both the state of Kamtapur and Gorkhaland.

NATURE OF THE MOVEMENTS: MOVEMENT OBJECTIVES AND ISSUES COMPARED

Movement Objectives:

Advocates of both the Kamtapur and Gorkhaland movements have laid out why people should support their efforts in terms of lists of problems/aspirations autonomy would solve/achieve. These are aggregates of popular aspirations. Each aspiration may appeal more to one segment of the population than to other segments. These lists change somewhat over time, but a general sense of the formal and persistent reasons would include the following:

The following objectives are common to both the movements:

- Respect and preservation of identity, e.g., full recognition of language (Nepali language in case of Gorkhaland Movement; and, recognition of the Kamtapuri language in case of the Kamtapur movement).
- Economic development, e.g., the tea gardens should be assisted, tourism, encouraged, and investment fostered.
- Equitable extraction and return of revenue.
- Fair distribution of resources, e.g., land should be given to the landless, government offices should not be shifted to Siliguri.
- Ecological balance, e.g., denuded forests should be replaced.

Of course, as seen above, a lot of objectives are shared in common by the two movements; the two movements differ in subtle ways in terms of some other objectives as discussed below:

- Security, e.g., removal of the uncertainties associated with Nepali citizenship is central to the Gorkhaland movement which is conspicuously absent in case of the Kamtapur movement.
- Education, e.g., a university should be developed for hill people alone.
- Job opportunities, e.g., “Sons of the soil” should be employed in the Gorkhaland area.
- End backwardness and unequal distribution of state resources (in case of the Kamtapur movement).

Movement Issues

The two movements are built up on such issues which are common to both. This commonality owes to their similarities in terms of their geographical location, that is, North Bengal, which is characterised by economic underdevelopment, unemployment, land alienation of the indigenous communities, around which the politics of identity is weaved. Although there is a multiplicity of these and such like issues concerning the movements, the two issues which are central to both of them are (a) the issue of identity; and, (b), the issue of development. Let us briefly see the two issues in the two movements in a comparative perspective.

Identity: In both cases, leaders have cultivated a common identity among people in the Kamtapur and Gorkhaland regions. That does not mean that the regional identity always trumps the many other identities individuals have (McHenry, 2006). In the Kamtapur case, a

Kamtapuri/Rajbanshi identity has been persistently reinforced by political leaders, although with an equally stronger attempt on the part of the mainland Bengali intelligentsia to deconstruct the possibility of such an identity. In the Gorkhaland case too, identity constitutes the primary concern. The movement recurs with renewed vigour time and again on the issue that Gorkhas in India are maltreated because of being deterritorialised. Since they do not have a homeland of their own in terms of a separate Gorkhaland state within the Indian federal framework, the Gorkhas feel that all political, social, cultural and economic jeopardies confronting them emanate out of this. However, most scholars argue that the many cleavages within the dominant Nepali community in the area have been submerged into a common Nepali or Gorkha identity. But, circumstances may lead to challenges to such an identity. T. B. Subba, a well-respected scholar, points out that the strength of this Nepali identity is not as great as others suggest:

"Their ethnicity is actually much weaker than what is made out to be. The historical, racial, cultural, spatial, and now, class and occupational, diversities have been successful in acting as a deterrent to the emergence of a strong ethnic solidarity among them. This could not emerge even in Darjeeling. Otherwise there would not occur so many fratricidal clashes and killings between the supporters of the GNLF and the Communist party of India (Marxist), and

between the former and the Gorkha Volunteer Cell members..." (Subba, 2003, p. 65).

Although as pointed out by Subba, there have been clashes within the Gorkha community in Darjeeling Hills, the leaders of the Gorkhaland movement have been able to place the Gorkha Identity as primary before other smaller identities; and this has worked sufficiently effectively in terms of movement mobilisation.

An analysis of the issue of 'identity' in the two movements reveals one difference. Whereas in case of the Gorkhaland movement the Nepali/Gorkha language has been recognised under the VIII Schedule of the Indian Constitution in 1992, the Kamtapuris/Koch-Rajbanshis in North Bengal are still pressing for the recognition of the Kamtapuri Language. The earlier GNLFF led Gorkhaland Movement pressed for the recognition of the Gorkha/Nepali language under the VIII Schedule as one of its prime issues¹. However, conspicuously, the new phase of the movement under the GJMM is silent about it; it has been conveniently shelved aside as a 'non-issue' by the movement, although there are avenues of further development of the language as a philosophy of life and mode of expression of the community. Hence, it is seen that whereas in case of

¹ After the then Prime Minister Morarji Desai labeled the Nepali Language as a foreign language during a meeting with the All India Nepali Bhasa Samiti in Darjeeling, the movement for the recognition of the language further intensified. Further, the then leaders of the Gorkhaland movement could capitalize on this to mobilize the masses for the movement as the statement of the Prime Minister hit the Nepali/Gorkhali sentiment. For details, see Gorkha Janamukti Morcha, The Case for Gorkhaland: Creating a New State out of Darjeeling District and Dooars, a Case Paper presented at the Tripartite Talks between Government of India, Government of West Bengal and Gorkha Janamukti Morcha held in New Delhi on September 8th, 2008.

the Kamtapur movement that language still remains a central focus in the politics of recognition, in case of the Gorkhaland movement language does not anymore constitute a central concept in the politics of identity. Here, the prominence is given a pan-Gorkha ethnic distinctiveness and geographical territory.

Development: Yasin and Dasgupta (2003) propose that the origin of a protest movement owes to the feeling of a sense of deprivation in the minds of the elites of the deprived classes. The entire of the region of North Bengal excepting a small pocket of Siliguri town, has been witnessing a fast deteriorating economy. The economic underdevelopment of the region owes to a plurality of factors, both economic and political. The specificities of the economy of North Bengal characterised by land alienation, declining agricultural productivity, dwindling tea industry, unproductive cinchona plantations, rising unemployment, pressing poverty and absence of livelihood diversification opportunities has affected various social groups and classes in significant ways and have left the imprints on a series of protest movements unfolding in the region. In Darjeeling, poor tea production over the years, closure of tea gardens, problem with cinchona plantations, inadequate supply of power, and inadequate water supplies, etc, among others, has left the entire region in economic shambles. Similarly, in the plains, absence of land rights to tea plantation workers, land alienation, absence of major industries, unemployment are major issues confronting the people. Subalterns cannot speak. The grievances spiral. The two

dominant communities- the Nepalis/Gorkhas in Darjeeling hills and the Koch-Rajbanshis in the plains do not have a strong educated middle class which can compete with the vast Bengali middle class. Therefore, the ventilation of their grievances can offer only through the political elites of the region who too feel neglected and deprived vis-à-vis the political elites in the state. It is, therefore, the elites of these deprived classes who manufacture the politics of protest movements around the issues of economic underdevelopment and backwardness. However, the political articulation in the form of protest movements have not confined to the elitist sections of the society. In both the cases, since the protest is articulated around the basic necessities of life and the issues and concerns of the everyday, it has been deeply internalise by the masses who are the victims of economic backwardness and underdevelopment. Hence, the strength of the movements reflect the strength of the masses wherein the protest movements have been taking deeper roots not easily uprootable. In other words the political leadership of the movements have efficiently framed the movements and mobilised mass supports on the issue of development in the region.

ROLE OF LEADERSHIP AND MOVEMENT DYNAMICS: A COMPARISON

According to the theory of collective action advanced by Sidney Tarrow (1998) and his research cohort, movements operate within a complex context of changing political opportunities and constraints. Movement leadership utilizes opportunities in order to advance movement goals and

are set back by constraints. This understanding portrays movements as shifting back and forth from offensive to defensive political positions depending on both internal and external political forces. Hence, movements move and transform, and in this process, ideological orientations of the movement leadership, leadership's choice of resources and methods of mobilisation and struggle, conflicts in leadership, among others affect the movement in terms of its objectives, nature, character and content. We shall briefly explore and compare how different factors and forces as opportunities and constraints have shaped the two movements under study.


Ideological Orientations of the Leadership and Movement Dynamics

Ideology is considered as one of the most important components of protest movements (Yasin and Dasgupta, 2003). This, according to Padam Nepal (2009), is because ideology is the legitimising force of a movement, and it is the ideological orientation of a movement, that determines the objective of protest, and the strategy it needs to adopt to secure the goal so defined. Hence, a social movement is characterised by a set/sets of ideologies based on which it develops the strategy of protest. It implies that a protest movement may be determined of its nature and character by the ideological orientations of the actors involved in the movement. Sometimes a movement may have more than one set of, and quite often than not conflicting ideological orientations. This impinges on the nature and course of the movement. In the following sections we shall delineate the different actors involved in the movements

under scrutiny, their ideological premises and the consequent impact on the respective movement dynamics.

The figure below illustrates the various actors involved in the two movements under study and their ideological orientations, from which, the nature of movement and its dynamics could be analysed.

Figure 5.1: Ideological Orientations of the Leadership of the Two Movements under Study



As revealed from the above figure, both the movements under study have been influenced by multiple ideological shades represented by the diverse actors involved in the movement. Whereas the major actors in the Gorkhaland Movement have been the All India Gorkha League (AIGL),

the Gorkha National Liberation Front (GNLF) and the Gorkha Janamukti Morcha (GJMM), the Kamtapur Peoples' Party (KPP) and the Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO) are the primary actors in the Kamtapur Movement.

While Kamtapur Peoples' Party (KPP) and the All India Gorkha League (AIGL) shared some similarities in terms of their ideological orientations, KLO and GNLF too shared some amount of similarity. Both the AIGL and the KPP believed primarily in legal constitutional method of protest by way of adopting strategies like petitioning, submission of memoranda, demonstrations, etc. On the other hand, both the movements came under, at least in one of their phases strongly and intermittent entry and exit at other times, the influence of radical ideological fringes. GNLF in the Gorkhaland Movement and the KLO in the Kamtapur Movement represented the radical ideological fringe in the movements under study. Under the influence of the radical ideological premises, both these organisations espoused violent protest strategies. However, the GJMM in the Gorkhaland Movement adopted Gandhism as its avowed ideological premise although not without criticisms and allegations, no prominent actor in Kamtapur Movement has espoused Gandhian ideology.

The strategies adopted by the various organisations involved in the movement based on their ideological groundings contributed to movement dynamics in each of the movements, sometimes weakening the movement, and yet at other times, strengthening it. For instance, the

tacit legal constitutional mechanisms adopted by KPP in Kamtapur Movement and by the AIGL in Gorkhaland Movement conspicuously failed to evoke any meaningful response from the state. Since Kamtapur Movement is led primarily by the KPP, the result has been such that it has failed to produce any landmark difference in favour of the movement participants as yet. Similarly, the AIGL could hardly attract supporters from the grassroots. The party at best could supply meaningful opposition to the dominant parties in the agitation, specially since the movement in the 1980s. The multiple levels of the complex processes of interactions between and amongst these movement actors too contributed to the changes in strategies, objectives and issues of the movement, quite often than not weakening the movement. For instance, Guljit Kumar Arora (2004, p. 138) has criticized the leaders of the Gorkhaland movement for their lack of consistency in the means they have advocated to achieve the avowed objectives of the movement: Arora contends, "One finds shifting stands—from independent nation to a separate state to the demand for getting this region included in the sixth schedule of the constitution. Ghising justified the demand for the inclusion of the region, 'a stepping stone towards statehood'".

Strategies and Tactics Adopted by the Leadership and Movement Dynamics

Movements make leaders as much as they are made by them. In the case of both the movements under study, various strategies have been used to achieve the objectives of the movement. However, such

strategies have varied from leader to leader, often leading to discontinuities of actions at some phases of the movement. The strategies range from passive resistance to violent rebellion to armed struggle. In the following sections we shall explore the movement strategies adopted by a particular leadership at a particular space-time context; and also make a comparative analysis of such strategies and their overall impact on movement dynamics.

Let us begin with the Gorkhaland Movement. The Gorkhaland movement has a long history since 1907, passing through several stages – under the League leadership, the GNLF leadership, and finally, the GJMM leadership. At each of the stages, the objectives of the movement have either been altered, modified or replaced by a new one. The changes in the goals and objectives of the movement have impacted on the nature of the strategies and tactics adopted by the movement leadership. Whereas the League (ABGL/AIGL) leadership adopted mostly legal constitutional methods and mechanisms for the realisation of the movement's objectives, which primarily constituted of identity issues pertinent to an Indian Gorkha, the recognition of language and access to development opportunities. The movement was carried on via submissions of petitions and memoranda to the government, peaceful demonstrations, and moves in legislative assemblies, among others.

In the 1980s, with the Pranta Parishad breaking off to give birth to a new political (GNLF) party, the movement transformed radically in terms of

goals, objectives, issues and strategies. During this time the movement was an exclusive privilege of the GNLF. The prime leader of the new party, with his military background adopted a radical movement strategy for the realisation of its prime objective – the creation of a separate Gorkhaland state within the Indian constitutional framework, which supposedly had the potential to address the issue of identity crisis confronting the Indian Gorkhas. To this effect, he mobilised the supporters and prepared them for a violent armed struggle. However, given the context of politico-administrative set up in Darjeeling wherein protests were usually met with dire consequences,² initially he had to resort to less censored media to communicate his political messages to the mass of people. The soft media to communicate was the popular songs. He employed 'sorrow' songs, as central signifier of the Gorkha culture, as a central aspect of the Gorkha identity, as a '*deterritorialised Gorkha*' nation in India. The sorrow songs reflected the wariness of the Gorkhas in India, and generated in them a feeling of alienation and oppression for which only a 'Gorkha homeland' within the Indian federal structure would give them a political space---a space defining their identity (Nepal, 2008). Hearing such songs is hearing history for them. They constituted a part of the collective memory that when recalled connected the present hearer with his past. The mapping out of the Indian Nepali/Gorkha heritage acted as an essential part of the Gorkha cultural nationalism, which formed an important resource for the

² In the past, many leaders in the Pranta Parishad were arrested and imprisoned for attempts to call protest demonstrations and strikes in Darjeeling. See for details, Jiwan Labar, *Darjeeling Ko Rajnitik Sandarva ma Dawa Bomzon Ani Tarun Sangh*, Chandmari, Darjeeling: Yugal Prakashan, 1999.

Gorkhaland movement. Music provided a basis of common understanding and common experience for a generation in revolt (ibid). The later songs made overwhelming presence of blood (*ragaat*) in them, most often associated with the land (*maato*) and introduced the theme of sacrifice. As for instance in *Sahid ko Samjhana* (a song used during the movement), it says, “ *Ragat ko puraskar chadai gaye birle yo mato ma/ Sahid le bhagya banai gaye hamro yo dharti ma*”. By giving their lives, the martyrs create unity among the people who remember them, praise them, and worship them as sacred. Despite their deaths, the martyrs are shown to play a decisive role in the future course of the movement (Nepal, 2011). Moreover, a protest movement required strategies of unification of people from different walks of life, divided in terms of religion, language, culture and other socio-economic privileges. Partly, this cementing of the bond was fulfilled through the political messages in the songs. However, other mechanisms of unification were equally important. Under the leadership of Subhas Ghising, the GNLFF Supremo and the chief architect of the Gorkhaland Movement of the 1980s, Gorkha category has been more statutorily used to represent the community sentiments and cementing the bond between them. Having served in Gorkha battalion, his strategies were unique in the sense that they amalgamated culture with politics. For example, he stressed on the use of Khukri (curved knife, the traditional weapon of the Nepalese) so as to symbolize martial prowess and the use of typical Nepali cap as a symbol of Gorkha culture. It is under his leadership that political platform for women (Gorkha National Women Organisation), students (All Gorkha

Student Union) started emerging up. The term Gorkha in its present political manifestation stood for a community composed of people from the hills, ignoring the religious, linguistic and other such barriers (Middleton and Sneiderman, 2008).

However, Ghisingh was averse to passive methods of struggle; and therefore questioned the applicability and relevance of such strategies. For instance, in his speech delivered at Dr Graham's Homes, Kalimpong on 19th September 1986, Ghising held that 'Everyone around us says, 'our well wishes are there', but I answer them saying that well wishes nowadays are meant only for the newly married couples, not for the revolutionaries' (Gorkha, 1996). Further, Ghising held that people can be explosive like volcano to fight for their rights and bring justice back in. Through this, Ghising intended to give a violent, revolutionary strategy to the movement. To quote Ghising, "People means a cyclone...a volcano..." (Ghising's Speech on December 07, 1987, in Gorkha, 1996, p. 61). Thus Ghising believed that the movement gained significance and reached its climax because of the use of violent strategies and tactics. Ghising held that '...this movement have reached to a climax because of the 'Blood' sacrificed by our people' (ibid). Ghising was not averse to using 'threat' as a movement tactic along with his other radical strategies. For instance, to quote Ghising again, "If the Demand of Gorkhaland is not considered by the Central Government of India, then the whole other Indian community will be treated as foreigner" (Speech by Subhash Ghising on June 2, 1985 in Gorkha, ibid. p. 20). It is evident from this that

Ghising even made use of the 'threat of secession' if his 'legitimate' demand for the creation of the state of Gorkhaland was not met by the Union Government of India.

Ghising's strategy of violent armed struggle did not disappoint him.³ It resulted in the creation of Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council (DGHC), an autonomous council for the three hill subdivision of Darjeeling district in 1988.⁴ He became an undisputed leader of the Gorkha community, and was unanimously elected to head the council. Coming to power was easy but the newly formed council had much to deliver. Bountiful of promises for the development and welfare of the Gorkha community were not easy to be fulfilled; but the failure to meet the promises had the potential to tumble down the newly held position of power. As the council matured, it paradoxically failed more and more to address the aspirations of the people. The strategy of the party in power (GNLF) had to change. Ghising's leadership had no option but to divert the attention of the people from their fast disappearing livelihood opportunities and the manifest contradictions of development failure. The leadership in its attempt to retain power made several attempts to digrate people's

³ Strategy of violent movement espoused by Ghising finally resulted in the creation of the DGHC, a territorial council for the Gorkhas in West Bengal. For the first time in Indian history, such an arrangement was conceded for the Gorkhas, which reflects the achievement of Ghising's method of protest. However, the arrangement was far from the avowed objective of the creation of a separate state for the Gorkhas. Hence, Ghising's strategy, with his settling for the Council is seen both as an achievement and as a failure.

⁴The DGHC was created by way of the Tripartite Agreement between Subash Ghising (GNLF), the Government of West Bengal and the Union Government dated 22nd August, 1988. Subsequently, the DGHC came into being with the Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council Act, 1988.

attention through his several acts of insanity.⁵ Ultimately the strategy weakened the GNLFF stronghold in the hills to give birth to a new messiah.

The Gorkhaland Movement took a new turn with the formation of a new political party, the Gorkha Janamukti Morcha (GJMM) in September 2007 under the leadership of Bimal Gurung, who had been the right hand of Subash Ghising in the earlier movement. The new leadership closely followed the footsteps of GNLFF in its definition of the issues and objectives of the movement, but conspicuously differed widely in terms of the strategies and methods for the realisation of the movement objectives. Whereas the GNLFF led movement of the 1980s concentrated on issues like the citizenship and identity of the Indian Gorkhas, creation of Indian Gorkha regiment and the inclusion of the Gorkha language in the VIII Schedule of the Indian Constitution, the new phase of the movement concentrated on the issue of identity alone and held that only the creation of Gorkhaland state within the Indian federal structure would address the identity crisis of the Indian Gorkhas. Hence, the movements' prime objective was the establishment of Gorkhaland. It conveniently dropped the other issues which were a part of the earlier movement like the Gorkha Regiment and the recognition of language, probably because the new leadership did not feel the necessity, for instance, of the development of language in the aftermath of its constitutional recognition within the VIII Schedule, to serve as effective medium of expression of

⁵ See for instance the contents of various speeches made by Shri Subsh Ghising between early 2000s to 2007, up to the formation of the GJMM.

the philosophy of life by its adherents. With the single agenda in mind, the leadership designed movement strategy, which radically differed from what was adopted by the earlier movement. Grounded on the Gandhian ideological premises, the new movement espoused a non-violent, satyagrahic Gandhian model of strategy, however, with few tactics still sharing commonalities with the previous radical phase of the movement. The GJMM's adoption of the Gandhian methods of protest can be understood with reference to the GJMM's *Aachar Samhita* (the model code of conduct) of the party, thus:

"Ahimsa (Non-Violence) is humanity's biggest power. Gandhism and Ahimsa constitute the main mantra of the Gorkha Jana Mukti Morcha. What we have achieved and what we lost in our violent movement of the past is self explanatory. Let us understand that Ahimsa is our avowed religion. Let us refrain from violent activities; to fight amongst ourselves is antithetical to Gandhian principles. Our objectives can be achieved through constitutional mechanisms. Since the Constitution provides for such provisions, we can invoke the constitutional provisions to achieve our goals. It is futile to adopt violent strategies..." (Gorkha Janmukti Morcha, *Aachar Samhita*, p. 3)

Hence, in case of the Gorkhaland movement, what is discernible is the fact that the movement strategies have changed along with the

continuous definition and redefinition of goals and objectives of the movement. With each redefinition of the movement objectives and consequent alteration of the movement strategies, the movement has moved and transformed. However, with the change in leadership, there have also been changes in objectives and strategies of the movement, thereby giving the movement a dynamic nature.

Moving on to the Kamtapur Movement, one finds similar changes in terms of strategies adopted by movement leadership at different points of time in the history of the movement. Whereas the KPP confined its strategy of protest to legal constitutional methods, it was the radical wing of the movement, the KLO leadership which, with its commitment to armed struggle in the lines of the method adopted by the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) that impacted the movement much. Since the KLO espoused a violent revolutionary method, it was declared as a terrorist outfit, banned, and finally even a joint operation was done by the Royal Bhutan Army (RBA) and the Indian security forces to wipe the cadres out of their haven in the Indo-Bhutan border forests. This was a big blow to the entire movement. The radical strategy of the KLO invited an unbecoming setback for the Kamtapur movement.

Leadership Conflicts and Movement Dynamics

The differences and consequent splits in political leadership, the leaderships craving for power and the inevitable power competition have characterised both the movements under study. In case of the

Gorkhaland movement, the first discernible differences in leadership and its styles can be traced to Pranta Parishad led by Indra Bahadur Rai. The differences of opinions of the members of the Parishad later on became manifest in the wake of mass eviction of the Gorkhas from the north eastern states of India. as a consequence, the Parishad split to give birth to a new organisation, the Gorkha National Liberation Front. This split, although rendered the pranta Parishad functionless and inactive and relegated it to the backyard, yet it strengthened the demand for a separate state of Gorkhaland under the leadership of Subash Ghising. All leaders were not in favour of a violent armed struggle as a movement strategy as espoused by Ghising. Ghising faced oppositions from leaders who advocated peaceful, legal-constitutional methods of protests. One of the protagonists of such strategy was the ABGL leader, Madan Tamang the movement under Ghising could not tolerate political opposition, and hence, resulted in clashes of leadership with consequences like the burning of a wooden bungalow, an ancestral property of Madan Tamang in Meghna in Darjeeling. This conflict too had no adverse impact on the Gorkhaland movement; the movement continued till the formation of the DGHC in 1988. Another major leadership conflict resulted out of Ghising's political arrogance. Bimal Gurung, an erstwhile close associate of Ghising was ousted from Ghising's GNLF for his political ambitions. The frustrations of the ousted leader could find a safe haven in people's discontent resulting from massive corruption and mal development in the hills under Ghising's regime. Gurung mobilised the popular sentiment against Ghising's complacency towards underdevelopment and

calculated ignorance of corruption. Ultimately, the conflict escalated into the second wave of the Gorkhaland movement since Sept. 2007. The Ghising-Bimal conflict had a positive contribution towards the movement as it emerged from its deteriorating position to a renewed one with popular support from not only Darjeeling but by the Gorkhas in the entire of India. However, the movement suffered a huge setback owing to a conflict between GJMM chief Bimal Gurung and the ABGL leader Madan Tamang. The conflict between the two leaders ultimately led to the murder of ABGL chief Madan Tamang on May 21, 2010, which derailed, at least for the time being, the entire movement. Although the GJMM could show off its mass support against the state's allegation that it had no popular support, the movement entered a phase of confusion, weakening the movement itself. In a bid to strengthen the movement, the GJMM attempted to play with the nomenclature, rechristening the proposed state as Gorkha-Adivasi Pradesh instead of Gorkhaland and renaming the movement as the movement for Gorkha-Adivasi Pradesh. However, the movement still appears to be in a weakened state since then, and specially more so with the change of government in the state wherein the Trinamul Congress has come to power of which the GJMM is an ally.

Although the Kamtapur movement also has a long history, it is characterised by negligible incidence of leadership conflicts. The most prominent conflict of leadership in case of the Kamtapur movement took place with the formation of the Kamtapur Progressive Party by the breakaway faction of the Kamtapur People's Party. The two prominent

leaders of the Kamtapur People's Party- Atul Roy and Nikhil Roy differed in terms of strategies and tactics of the movement. The difference led to the forming of Kamtapur Priogressive Party by Atul Roy. With the two competing political parties under two strong leaders did nothing good for the movement. The movement weakened as a result of political competition between the two strong leaders. Further, another radical group of the Rajbanshis could neither fit themselves within the frameworks of Nikhils Kamtapur Peoples Party, nor of Atul's Progressive party. The emergence of the armed organisation under the leadership emerging Kamtapuri youths further contributed in paralysing the movement. It was an oportune moment for the government to suppress it as a terrorist organisation. In nutshell, it can, therefore, be said that both the instances of conflicts, unlike in the Darjeeling Gorkhaland movement, produced only negative externalities for the movement. However, the Mainaguri merger of the KPP (Atul) and the KPP (Nikhil) reinvigorated the movement, giving its aspirants a new lease of life.

Role of the State Leadership, State Responses to the Movement, and Movement Dynamics

The State of West Bengal has adopted a confrontationist method in handling the two movements under study. For instance, the Gorkhaland movement of the 1980s was dubbed as being 'secessionist, anti-people and anti-national'.⁶ Further, the state used force and coercion to repress

⁶ Jyoti Basu, the then Chief Minister of West Bengal called an All Party Meeting on Tuesday, August 19, 1986 at Writers' Building, Calcutta to deliberate and delineate strategies to handle the Gorkhaland movement under Subash Ghising. The meeting adopted a resolution declaring the GNLF led movement as secessionist, a nti-people

the movement. It mobilised a huge number of companies of the military including the CRPF and BSF to subdue the movement.⁷ Consequently, the movement gained more currency to counter state coercion, which led to the strengthening of the movement. The ultimate consequence was the series of transformations in the character and content of the movement, rejuvenating each time with a new vigour. The peoples' representatives like the MPs and MLAs opposed such moves by the state. Renulina Subba, the then MLA in the State Legislative Assembly from the Hills categorically stated that the Gorkhaland movement in Darjeeling Hills cannot be suppressed with the help of bullets.⁸

Several other methods were adopted by the state leadership to weaken the movement and ease its suppression. As in case of any other social movement, 'Fund' is an essential component necessary for movement organizations. Sufficiency or otherwise of the fund is likely to determine the effectiveness of movement mobilizations and hence its nature and course (Nepal, 2010). The state even tried to weaken the movement by pointing out to its alleged foreign funding.⁹ The movement had to respond to such threats as investigations etc of its fund sources for which the movement had to develop a counter discourse and a material basis for

and anti-national. This has been reported in *Himalchuli*, dated August 21, 1986, p. 2, paragraph 2.

⁷ *Amrita Bazar Patrika* dated 28th August 1986 reported that the state mobilised nine companies of the CRPF and the BSF in the different pockets of the Darjeeling Hills to tackle the movement. The state's response was coercive and not democratic, which in turn compelled the movement to design methods to become strong.

⁸ See *Himalchuli*, dated 26th September 1986 for details.

⁹ See Subash Ghising's interview with Monideep Banerjee of *Onlooker*, New Delhi 9 October 1-15), 1986 for details.

the justification that it is not supported by any outside agency with nefarious designs that would hinder national security and sovereignty, but sustained on small contributions made by local grassroots participants of the movement. The state government and the state leadership dubbed the new phase of the Gorkhaland movement in Darjeeling Hills beginning 2007 under the leadership of Shri Bimal Gurung too on similar lines with similar strategies and tactics.

Similar confrontationalist response was adopted by the government towards the Kamtapur Movement. According to Mukhopadhyay (2011), from the beginning the state of west Bengal From Jyoti Basu to Ashok Bhattacharya, all held the movement as an 'anti people forces', restricted to a handful of disgruntled people with no popular support (ibid.). Of course the government time and again reiterated the availability of space for dialogue to address the issues raised by the movement, paradoxically, however, the movement was time and again suppressed with the use of force, branding it to be a law and order problem. In a nutshell, the response of the state was confrontational and was characterized by a conspicuous absence of judicious statecraft in handling the movement.

Hence, the two movements, having similar issues and objectives and located in a similar geo-physical space met similar treatment by the state. The commonality of treatment owes to the fact that the state of West Bengal is against carving out a new state from within it. Since both the movements are movements for the creation of new states within West

Bengal, the response of the state and state political leadership has been similar, similarly affecting the movements under study in terms of their character, content and course.

Movement, Media and Leadership:

In chapters 3 and 4 we have discussed the two movements under study in detail. One of the concerns had been to evaluate as to how leadership in each of the movements has mobilised the media for achieving the objectives of the movement. Whereas in case of Kamtapur movement it was found that the leaders took no special initiative to mobilise the media for the sake of the movement, just the contrary situation was observed in case of the Gorkhaland movement. The study revealed that in case of the Gorkhaland movement, media was mobilised by the leadership since the inception of the movement during the colonial period. Both the active phases of the movement- 1980s and the post 2007 made extensive use of media for movement mobilisation. The leadership in the Gorkhaland movement resorted even to electronic media for mobilisation. Obviously, because of the contributions of the media, the Gorkhaland movement which has extensively mobilised the media has emerged as a stronger movement in the region vis-à-vis the Kamtapuri movement which has, to an equal extent, failed to mobilise the media.

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

Within protest movement literature, there has been a call for further research into the causal mechanisms and processes that shape episodes

of contentious politics. Social movement analysts often respond to this call with the study of tactics and strategies utilized by movement actors and their opponents, the marking of pivotal moments that dictate a movement's ebb and flow and the impact of internal and external political opportunities and constraints on a movement's direction. In the case of the two movements under investigation, the issue of 'identity' and the 'political space', a 'territorial marker' of a nationalist/ethnic identity in the form of a 'separate state' has been deemed the spark that invigorates the movement. Some studies of the past have focused on the leadership change that occurs during the course of a given movement. Blumer (1969) posited that leaders must shift roles acting as prophets during the first stages of protests, then as official representatives during the formalization of the movement, and finally as administrators as the movement institutionalizes. Rothman (1974) argued that different types of leaders may become prominent at various phases of protest, for instance, militant leaders dominating during the initial phases of protest while more accommodationist leaders coming to the forefront as the movement negotiates with its opponents. However, the study presented here reveals that Bloomer's argument of different types of leadership at different phases of movement is sometimes provided by same leader or group of leaders of a movement which traverses different levels of protest politics from emergence to institutionalisation. For instance, in case of the Gorkhaland movement, in both its active phases, i.e., the 1980s and the post 2007, has seen the protest movement germinating, maturing and institutionalising. For instance, an active Gorkhaland movement sprouted

out of years of hibernation, grew and institutionalised with the formation of the DGHC under the GNLF leadership. Similarly, in the second phase under GJMM, the movement arose after a couple of decades of recess, grew and is finally institutionalising with the new arrangement in the form of Gorkhaland Regional Authority (GRA) under GJMM's leadership. In both these cases, leadership, more particularly the prominent in the movement, have assumed militaristic role in the initial phase of the movement and a more accommodationist role at the later stages. Similar evidences are discernible in case of the Kamtapur movement as well. Hence, they have played multiple roles in multiple styles in multiple contextual settings, with differing strategies and techniques, giving a dynamic nature to the movements.

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CHAPTER 6

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The present study entitled '*Leadership and Protest Movement Dynamics: A Study in the Context of Gorkhaland and Kamtapuri Movements in West Bengal*' has discussed the evolution of the protest movements in North Bengal region of West Bengal with particular reference to the Gorkhaland Movement in Darjeeling Hills and the Kamtapur Movement in the Terai and Dooars. The study has evaluated the role of political leadership in the life and course of these protest movements and attempted to locate the leadership types in the available theoretical models on political leadership. The study has designed some three odd research questions to guide us along our research. The purpose of the research as stated in the introduction (See Research Questions) is to trace the role played by the political leadership in determining the nature, course, character and content of the movement, and finally the fate of the movement as such, and the overall consequences of such role of the leadership on the protest publics in particular and the society in general. It has been attempted to analyse the role of the political leadership as well as the role and response of the state towards the movement. Further it also aimed to compare and contrast the role of leadership in protest movement dynamics, however, by way of analyzing the two movements which are apparently in a similar geopolitical and administrative space with similar objectives and demands, but are markedly different in terms of parameters and reasons

for mobilization to protest. The following sections on the summary of chapters and major findings would point out the answers to our research questions.

The present work has been designed in six chapters. Our summary consists of three sections. The first section is an overview of the different chapters. The second section throws some light on the major findings of the present study, and, the final section points out to the necessities of and agenda for future research on the area.

Summary of Chapters

We started off our investigation in an organic manner, moving from general to particular. Chapter 1 is entitled *Introduction*. In this Chapter, we have introduced the problem under study, presented a brief overview of the existing literature on the subject to justify the necessity of the present research, designed our research questions, developed the framework for the study and explained our methodological orientations. The section also points out the significance of the present study and makes an honest confession on the major limitations of the study. The chapter also, at the end, finally gives a bird's eye view of the organization of the entire thesis.

Chapter 2 bears a title *Leadership and Protest Movement Dynamics: Theoretical Explorations*, which is self explanatory of its contents. It introduces the concept of leadership with a particular focus on political

leadership and explores various theoretical models on leadership, conceptualises protest movements and surveys its various theories, links the relationship between protest movement dynamics and the movement leadership, and finally, proposes to analyse the leadership of the movements taken for study and the leadership styles therein and examine whether they fit in to any of the existing theoretical models on leadership.

The third chapter entitled '*Leadership and the Gorkhaland Movement*' presents a brief profile of the study area, analyses the contextual underpinning on the origin of the Gorkhaland movement, its course, character and content in the first part. In the second part of the chapter, the role of leadership in the dynamics of the Gorkhaland movement has been studied.

Chapter 4 bears the title '*Leadership and the Kamtapur Movement*'. The chapter introduces the geographical area of North Bengal covered by the movement as the site of the movement under study and analyses the context of the origin of the Kamtapur movement tracing its history since the Hitasadhini movement of the Rajbangshis for Khastriyaisation. The chapter also maps the course of the movement and analyses its character and content in the first part. Finally, the chapter evaluates the role played by the Kamtapuri leadership in determination of issues and objectives of the movement, the strategies adopted by the movement leaders at different points of time, and as to how this leadership changes

and the role of various leaders has led to the emergence of the Kamtapur in the present form and content.

In Chapter 5, 'Leadership and Movement Dynamics: Movements Compared', we have compared the territorial location of the movement, broad objectives of the two movements, their central issues, particularly 'identity' question and the demand for separate 'state', and, the question of 'underdevelopment' in the region and the 'political articulation of underdevelopment' in the two movements. Finally, a comparative analysis of how political leadership has influenced the content, course and character of the movements under study has been undertaken. This has been analysed under a couple of broad categories like the ideological commitment of the movement leadership and movement dynamics, strategies of protest adopted by the leadership and its impact on movement dynamics, leadership conflicts and movement dynamics, and, the role played by the state level leadership in determining the movement character and content.

Major Findings of the Study

The present study began to explore the role of leadership in protest movement dynamics with a particular study of the two movements in the North Bengal region of West Bengal: the Gorkhaland movement in Darjeeling Hills and, the Kamtapur Movement in the plains of North Bengal. The first objective of the research was to explore the general factors accounting for protest movement dynamics. A protest movement

has both structural and agency components. The study unfolded an interplay of various components of the movement itself and some external factors accounting for the transformation of the movement objectives and goals, ideological groundings of the movement, strategies and tactics employed by the movement, and the achievements and/or failure of the movement. The interactions between the agency and structural components (the actors) of the movement determine how movements change and transform in course of their emergence and growth. These components/elements may include socio-structural components like the caste/class and religious affiliations of the movement actors (leaders and supporters), culture and ethnicity, which are organised in an hierarchical order of exploitation. These socially embedded movement elements have the potential to mar the efficiency of movement mobilisations. Whereas in case of the Gorkhaland Movement in Darjeeling Hills it is the ethnic background of the people and the caste-tribe dichotomy that have produced contradictions within the movement, in case of the Kamtapur Movement, it is again the caste--tribe dichotomy that affects the movement mobilisations. For instance, in Darjeeling the pan Gorkha ethnic identity demands that all other identities are subsumed under Gorkha identity for the greater cause of the Gorkha community as a whole in India, the smaller ethnic groups like the Lepchas (often regarded as indigenous community of Darjeeling Hills) and the Bhutia community feel that they are not Gorkhas. Lepchas have even claimed that Darjeeling Hills historically belongs to them and hence, it is a 'Lepchaland', and therefore, they cannot support for Gorkhaland. This

has limited the scope of mobilisation for the movement. Similarly, Lepchas, Bhutias and Sherpas are recognised as Scheduled Tribes under the Constitution of India. The STs get extra perks by way of reservation in educational institutions, in government jobs, and in institutions of local governance. The bandwagon was later joined by other communities like Tamangs and Limboos. Obviously therefore, in the age of ever shrinking , resource base wherein competition for access to resources is intensifying day by day, they would prefer not to join the upper castes in their struggle for recognition as a caste community which would possibly jeopardise their status. Thus, this division on embedded elements as stated above has limited leadership's efforts at movement mobilisations. Similarly, in case of the populace in the Kamtapur movement, the population is divided in terms of caste and tribes. Whereas most of the supporters of the movement belong to Scheduled castes communities, others belong to upper caste Hindu fold. This difference is not insignificant in terms of its impact on movement mobilisation. However, contrary to the Gorkhaland movement, the most significant noticeable part in the Kamtapur movement has been the kind of large alienation of educated upper strata of the Rajbanshi community from the movement. This segment of the society feels comfort to be aligned with the mainstream Bengali culture. Thus, whereas the Gorkhaland movement has its support base mostly among the upper castes, the Kamtapur movement has its support base among the low or uneducated lower class of the Rajbanshi community. in view of this trends of alienation of the educated upper class of the Rajbanshi

community the leadership of the movement has reduced to be relatively weak and as such, devoid of leaving significant mark in the movement dynamics. In the same manner, cultural affiliations and historical legacies of the communities in the movement, national constitutional and legal framework, movement ideology, resource base of the movement, party politics, among others also impact the movements and produce movement dynamism. However, from the two movements undertaken for study, it is revealed that leadership impacts the dynamism and transformation of the movement the most.

The second important thrust area of the present study was to explore as to how leadership affects emergence, mobilising pattern, framing process, media coverage and outcomes of the protest movement. From the study undertaken of the two movements, it is found that generally a feeling of deprivation in the leadership of a particular community acts as a motivating force to mobilise for protest. However, it does not hold good for all protest movements. In the Gorkhaland movement, the emergence of Ghising as a political leader spearheading the protest movement, owes to his sense of deprivation as a lived experience during his service tenure in the Indian Army. Similarly, the emergence of the second phase of the movement in post 2007 period is due primarily to the sense of humiliations and deprivation experienced by Bimal Gurung, the chief architect of the movement, on being ousted by the GNLF. However, such clear instances could not be located in case of the Kamtapur movement. Further, a leader's ability to manipulate and mobilise media of

communication to the general public can generate euphoric situations intensifying movement support. This was found in case of the Gorkhaland movement which could manipulate and mobilise various types of print media at local level, sometimes at the regional, national and international levels. The ultimate outcome of this ability of the leadership has been somewhat positive for the movement as revealed from the recognition of the Nepali language under the Eighth Schedule of the constitution, and the creation of DGHC-an autonomous council for self governance for the Gorkhas in 1988 under GNLF; and the possible creation of a similar arrangement in the form of Gorkhaland Territorial Administration as a result of efficient media mobilisation, among others, by the GJMM leadership in the current phase of the movement. Contrarily it is seen that the leadership of the Kamtapur movement could neither efficiently mobilise media-print and /or electronic and as a result failed to evoke any positive response by the state towards the movement. Infact, the leadership in the Kamtapur movement appears to be weak, not so articulate, and hence, not so appealing to the masses. Being weak in terms of their social, economic, political and most important educational position, it could not mobilize the community to crystallize a well organized movement. This phenomenon may be attributed to the passive attitude of the upper class of the community towards providing leadership to the movement. The Kamtapur movement is found to be led by those who have attributes of the followers only. Even among them, several groups and sub groups are found constantly condemning each other thus making the movement weaker. The movement leadership has failed to

get the Kamtapur language recognised under the Eighth Schedule of the constitution on the one hand and the demand for separate state for Kamtapur has always remained an elusive dream on the other.

Finally, the present work also attempted to locate as to what attributes of leadership affect protest movement dynamics (Research Question No. 3). From the present study it was found that all attributes of a leader ranging from social/family background, personality traits of a leader, leaders psychological characteristics, and the programmatic ideas affect the course and character of a movement, including movement outcomes. The study unfolded the fact that in case of the movement, the two prominent leaders had a social background of having grown in violent environment. Whereas Ghising's life was moulded by his experiences in the military services, Bimal Gurung was an armed cadre under Ghising's leadership in the 1980s movement. If Ghising, moulded by this social-professional upbringing could venture for a violent struggle which could take the movement to its pinnacle with returns as good as the establishment of an autonomous council for the Gorkhas, Bimal's experiences moulded his outlook in an opposite direction, preparing him for a non-violent, passive resistance, again with a potential to give a rebirth to the movement from its possible decay, resulting in a, still debated, alternative administrative set up for the Gorkhas in Darjeeling Hills. Similarly, programmatic ideas of the leaders with appropriate strategies for the movement have strong potential for movement outcomes. For instance, in case of Gorkhaland, keeping in mind the

contemporary compulsions of politics, Gurung adopted Gandhian protest model, which could work wonders when people shunned violence. However, if the movement leadership do not show innovativeness in terms of programmatic ideas, the outcome of the movements is not likely to be attractive. This is revealed by the persistent failure of the Kamtapur movement, the leadership of which has not shown any innovativeness in terms of programmatic ideas or strategies of protest. This is due mainly to the poor educational background of the leadership as well as the low credibility of the leadership before the masses. And the lack of credibility has been due to the absence of those of the community who matter most to the community. Innovative ideas and relevant strategies could have been articulated had the educated section of the community come forward and assumed the leadership of the movement.

Besides, beyond the few specific questions outlined by way of research questions of which we have looked for answers through the study, there are other elements which strongly influence movement dynamics. For instance, as revealed from the present study, the 'fund' sources of a movement, the ideological groundings of the leadership, the conflicts within the leadership of a given movement are other factors which shape the movement dynamics.

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