

## CHAPTER - V

### **INDIA AND PAKISTAN : THE WARING PARTNERS**

War and Conflict is an inevitable legacy for any country. And the region like South Asia is no exception to this rule. It has witnessed a whole range of manifestation from informally expressed diplomatic displeasure to full scale war. The expressed issues in such interstate conflicts in the region have included territorial disputes, economic issues, threat to political stability and national security, communal disharmony and danger to the very survival at one participant or the other. The most acrimonious relationship has, however, been between India and Pakistan who have gone to war with each other for several times before & after partition. And all these wars have brought out in bold relief the extent and intensity of the great power involvement in the region. This is not to imply that the great powers have simply exported to and imposed upon the subcontinent conflicts created outside the region local roots of conflict in the region have, of course, existed, but these local roots were largely the creation of the historical melting – pot process, colonial rule, and the great powers have linked their states and strategies with these roots in order to advise and inflate them much beyond their inherent proportion. Before we take up the various aspects of the great powers' involvement in the Indo-Pakistan conflict, the regional roots of wars and conflict in the subcontinent must be identified and analysed.

India and Pakistan have fought three wars in 21 years, two of them over Kashmir and one over Bangladesh and recently 1991 Kargil War. All the three wars marked the aftermath of Partition of the sub-continent. Pakistan risked war with India in 1948 and 1965 in pursuit of its commitment to gain control of Kashmir. The 1971 war arose from the Pakistani Attempt to prevent by military means the secession of what was then its eastern province. But India's territorial integrity has not been threatened as seriously since the 1971 war as it has been threatened by Pakistan's ill-conceived intrusions across the LOC into the Kargil district of J K in the Summer months of 1999, to physically occupy territory on the Indian side. To

some extent, the Pakistanis have succeeded in internationalizing the Kashmir issue through their intervention in Kashmir. In fact, the military action initiated by Pak in Kargil district has completely derailed the Lahore peace process. Contemporary studies suggests that it is misperceptions about the intentions of one's rival rather than rivalries over real estate or mutually conflicting nationalism that lead to war. In 1948 and 1965 the rulers of Pakistan failed to perceive correctly how India would react to attempts to seize Kashmir by infiltration and military force. The Pakistanis had a completely unreal faith in the fighting ability of their own soldiers and the lack of this ability in the Indian troops.

Pakistan's perceptions of the realities in Kashmir also proved to be hopelessly wrong. The Kashmiri Muslims did not rise against their government and the Indian forces received all the civilian cooperation they needed to defend the valley.

Similar misconception about possible Indian responses also led to the war of 1971. The 1971 war heated the Shimla Agreement of 1972, the only one between the two on Kashmir to date. It binds the two countries to the line of actual control stemming from the 1971 engagements, and to secure a settlement of the dispute entirely through peaceful means. There is enough documentary evidence today to suggest that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto would personally have preferred to settle the Kashmir issue more or less along the line of actual control. He would not because this would not have been accepted by the people of Pakistan, especially in the wake of the defeat in Bangladesh.

For 15 years Pakistan and India have abided by both the letter and the spirit of the Shimla Agreement. But now it is entirely impossible that Kashmir will become the *Causus belli* for a fourth war between the two countries. Was it by accident or design that India and Pakistan got locked in this most dangerous game of brinkmanship? A million troops on either side of a border that has been mutually violated three times in less than 40 years can be no new year joke. Especially when many thousands of them stood almost eyeball to eyeball, grimly attired in battle armour, ready to pounce upon one another. Students of war have tried to show that war breaks out, more often than not, as a result of gross misperceptions of each other's intentions, capabilities and potential resources on the part of belligerent

nations. Henry Stocasinger, an American political scientist, has shown in a book that misperceptions were at the root of the India Pakistan wars of 1948 and 1965. Perceptions get seriously distorted when mutually unfriendly or hostile governments suffer lack of information and communication.

But one thing is important that during the entire pre-colonial phase, security threats emanated principally from the States beyond the north western frontiers of the subcontinent. There was the long history of the so called Hindu period, approximately spanning 1500-B C. to A D 1000, which was beset with invasions by the Aryan, the Achruminius, the Greens, the parthians, the Sakas, the Kushous and the Huns. There was the relatively short Muslim period stretching from the Turkish raids in AD 1000 until the mid-eighteenth century, which was also characterized by invasions by the Turks, the Afghans and the Mughals who followed each other in close succession.

During this entire period, there really was 'no theory of war' and 'no system of defence', to speak of. And despite the introduction of cavalry and cannon during the Muslim period, there was no 'military tradition developed in India'. The infantry was neither trained nor organized nor even equipped as a serious arm of war. There was just 'a multitude of people assembled, without reference to rank or file.

If war only after the arrival of the British on the subcontinents, and with their final occupation of what is now South Asia, that a modern defence system was really organized.

The first war was 1947-48 war which caused partition of India into India and Pakistan and tarnished India's image into second Indo-Pakistan war of 1965. If in 1962, India had been defeated by a powerful enemy, in 1965, she had been impressed by a weaker one. If the 1962 war had ..... the Indian Government to seek external aid, the 1965 war had resulted in the mediation of an external power – the Soviet Union – thus further illustrating India's inability to manage her own crisis.

The another important event that tarnished India's image was paradoxically the Third Indo-Pakistan War or the Bangladesh Crisis in 1971. Though here, India won the War, contributed to the partition of Pakistan, and successfully defied the

Chinese and Americans, her image did not improve. India was now considered a full-blooded regional power with hegemonic designs of her own – a state of affairs that disqualifies a nation from playing the type of role that Nehru had defined. And lastly the Kargil war held in May July 1999 turned into bloodier and intense and the Clinton administration intervened to help defuse the crisis. On July 12, the Congress also turned up the heat on Islamabad, when it passed the “Sense of the House Resolution 227” declaring that it was culpable in sending armed insurgents into the Indian territory, while stressing that India and Pakistan “resolve all of their differences within the framework of the Simla Agreement in order to preserve peace and security in South Asia. It also suggested that the administration lock loans to Pakistan from international financial institution. Following this agreement, beginning on July 11, the infiltrators began retreating from Kargil as India set July 16 as a deadline for the total withdrawal. On July 12, in an address to the nation, the beleaguered Sharif defended his July 4 agreement with Mr. Clinton as well as his request to the intruders to withdraw from the Indian territory. He also defended his Kargil Policy as something designed to draw the attention of the international community to the Kashmir issue. In this war, more than 400 Indian soldiers, 671 intruders, and 30 Pakistani regulars were killed excluding those that were wounded. The Vajpayee Government was blamed quickly for this loss of life despite intelligence reports about the intruders, although paradoxically, the war unified the country and brought a positive ..... in Indo-American relations as O.<sup>1</sup>

On July 14-16, 2001, Summit talks were held at Agra, between V. & M., but they failed as the latter insisted on Vajpayee to accept the Kashmir dispute as core issue which Vaj. rejected. Although both leaders had agreed to meet again during the Nov. UN General Assembly meetings, it did not take place as India was angry over the suicide bomb attack of the Jammu and Kashmir State Assembly building on Oct. 1, in which 40 innocent civilians including the three terrorists who had caused the blast were killed. Vaj took a tough stance indicating that he would not talk to Mushraf centres he ceased supporting the cross border terrorism. Neither did foreign minister Jaswant Singh make the scheduled trip to Pakistan to talk to his counterpart. Relations between the two countries again turned tense resulting in intense exchange of fire along the LOC. But the question to explore is why has this

conflict has become so difficult to resolve. Why have India and Pakistan taken an inflexible position? How can one explain this intractable conflict? We want to explain this inflexibility by the two countries in terms of their mutually exclusive claims made to the state on the basis of historic, political, ethno-religious, legal, strategic, and human rights factors. Thus, these four events, in different ways, contributed to the movement of India and Pak away from their goal of a role player in the international system. The two countries were no longer considered to have the moral authority to mediate or fight for great cause. India, thus, lost her prestige when she lost a war and got impassed in another, and did not regain her prestige by winning the second conflict in which she was involved. When a nation loses a war – even if she is a victim – her favourable image gets eroded and is replaced by an image of a nation that is incapable of looking after her affairs. On the other hand, when she wins a war, the favourable image is invariably replaced by an image of mistrust.

Thus British India was divided and a new state called Pakistan was born and Bangladesh born during 1971 in blood and fire as an independent country due to growing economic and political differences with West Pakistan which led East Pakistan to declare independence in 1971 as the new nation of 'Bangladesh'.

The emergence of Bangladesh was one of the most important political developments, in South Asia. As the process of its creation shows, Bangladesh at its birth, was a reaffirmation of civil society. Its ..... were representative and participatory democracy in a pluralist setting. Bangladesh, rising like a phoenix from the ashes of war, of course, represented a statement about "basic needs: food, safe water, the limitation of widespread poverty and human misery." But it also signified a social statement about "human dignity, security and a feeling of belonging.

As it has been remarked: "For individuals, the state is like a house. It provides shelter, a structure. But society – society is the home that provides the satisfaction of human needs ..... many ..... Societies are threatened ..... within. The State may hold great power, but the threat results from the disintegration of the social fabric. The representative State denies society a house. In pre – 1971 Pakistan, Bengalis of erstwhile East Pakistan found the state denying their society

the house they wanted. Hence they went for to build their own new house, the sovereign state of Bangladesh.

The initiative that grew in Bangladesh to engineer South Asian Cooperation may be reasonably viewed as a move to urge the States of South Asia to build appropriate houses for their respective societies through cooperation. The repressive State denies society a home, but as it happening in South Africa, a State can reclaim society by empowering its people and building bridges of confidence.

The brief December 1971 war between the two countries had far-reaching consequences for the India sub-continent, changed the power structure of the sub-continent, pricked the bubble of the two-nation theory and put Indo-Pakistan relations in new perspective. To super power response to the crisis in Bangladesh, both in the United Nations and outside, the psychological pressure on India, first by the movement of the enterprise on a shady enterprise to the Bay of Bengal and then the massive vote in favour of a US inspired resolution calling upon both India and Pakistan to cease-fire and effect withdrawal to their respective territories,<sup>2</sup> recalled the stance of the global actors vis-à-vis India and Pakistan during the cold war period. The psychological inputs, however, failed to produce any worthwhile outputs,<sup>3</sup> India not only ran over the Pakistani defences in erstwhile East Pakistan, but was successful in penetrating deep into West Pakistani territories also. The collapse of Pakistani defences in Bangladesh resulted in the fall of military junta in Pakistan which paved the way for Z.A. Bhutto to ride the Crest of anti-Junta wave to the president lodge in Islamabad.

The resolution of the major problems arising out of the 1971 war produced a noticeable improvement in Pakistan-India relations. However, this improvement was achieved at a slow pace and the normalization process suffered from periodic disruptions for one reason or another. Similarly, their efforts in the eighties to accelerate the pace of improvement of their relations were disrupted time and again or were slowed down due to the legacy of acrimonious relations, divergence in the perspectives of the two states on a number of bilateral, regional and international issues, and the unresolved bilateral problems.

However, the periodic crisis in their relations were never allowed to cross a point which could make these unmanageable whenever the dialogue was interrupted, Pakistan or India took the initiative within a couple of weeks or months to revive it. The redeeming feature of their diplomacy was that they never completely stopped talking to each other. In fact, there was more interaction between Pakistan and India during the eighties than in the past. In addition to the use of the normal diplomatic channels, the heads of state/government, foreign ministers, and semi or officials met formally and informally to discuss their problems. They did not always succeed in resolving the problems but the fact that they did not give up talking on the contentious issues made it possible to de-escalate periodic crisis in their relations.

In fact, the 1971 debacle and dismemberment effectively ended the espousal of the Two-Nation theory and the cease fire on all fronts ordered by India after the fall of Dhaka buried the myth of Indian plans to undo partition forever for the first time, a new opening appeared within sight with the signing of the Simla Agreement. Bhutto momentarily had given evidence that a sense of realism was sweeping through Islamabad. But he too fathered and preferred to galvanise a shell-shocked people by asking them to resist Indian hegemonies.

The 1974 PNE at Pokhran gave Bhutto another opportunity to drive home to his people India's desire to be the regional hegemonies. It also provided him with a legal cover to pursue the nuclear weapon option. The nuclear weapon issue, along with Islamabad's irredentist claims on Kashmir, symbolized the deep rooted suspicious and misgivings that both sides have had of each other's intentions and actions. Democratic intentenders between persistent bouts of military dictatorship have not altered the existing adversarial perceptions, and all issues in bilateral forums like the intentions behind building the Tulbul Project or extending railway lines across international borders, are driven by these perceptions. Trade, culture, sporting contacts and people to people relations have suffered, despite a common desire on either of the border to interact more closely. Zia's martial law that won without popular support, was unable to correct the existing misperceptions. A change of government in a New Delhi in 1977 had presented a unique opportunity to create new bases for bilateratism, but that too was squandered by Zia to ensure his personal survival. The Janata Government, in a spirit of trying to undo the wrongly

perceived idea in Pakistan of India attempting to dominate the smaller nations of the region, was ready to put the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty on the line, if it helped in creating an atmosphere of trust and amity. But the defeat of the Janata government and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan gave Zia the necessary opportunity to traint the incoming Indira Gandhi government with dominating ambitious and also rebuild bridges with the US which would allow the resumption of arms supplies and economic aid to Pakistan.

The Third War of 1971, was most crucial in its consequences. After this war, a number of regional and extra-regional factors emerged in the sub-continent and around it, compelling the two countries to give up their state of hostility and seek mutual accommodation. A slow and cautious process of normalization of relations started between them, which continued smoothly for a decade or so.

In 1970-71, the people of the eastern wing of Pakistan – mainly Bengalese – revolted against the junta with the demands first of autonomy then of independence. This was popularly known as "Bangladesh Crisis (1971)". The military elite came down heavily on the Bengalese and mercilessly killed them. It also accused India to have intervened in the Pakistani affairs to make the things more critical. At this juncture, the United States began to normalize its relations with China, Pakistan's military head of State Yahya Khan acted as the intermediary in the negotiations between these two countries. Thus, an undeclared axis between Islamabad, Beijing and Washington was formed. India apprehended that Beijing and Washington might intervene in Pakistan, and instead of counseling her restraint might encourage a flare-up. What Yahya Khan planned was to involve China and the U.S. in a bid to thwart the movements in East Pakistan, to resist the possibility of India's intervention in favour of the Bengalese, and virtually to encircle India in this region. Given the possibility of outside interference in Pakistan, and for that matter in India – Pakistan affairs. India could not look upon the situation in South Asia with equanimity and had to respond by involving the Soviet Union through the Indo-Soviet friendship Treaty signed in August 1971.

In fact, the Bangladesh crisis reveals the decisive influence of the United States of America on Pakistan in its conflictual relationship with India. This also revealed the United States' tilt towards Pakistan. Nixon's handling of the crisis was

completely pro-Pakistan and his pro-Pakistan attitude was nothing but a reward to Yahya Khan for his contribution to Nixon's China Visit.<sup>4</sup> The United States did not condemn Yahya Khan's military atrocities on East Pakistan. The Nixon Administration tended to see the crisis in the eyes of Yahya Khan in terms of Indo-Pak conflict. Nixon did not come forward to the terms of political settlement wanted by the Awami League and India. Nixon's assurance that Pakistan was being worded into a political settlement were proved to be false.<sup>5</sup> It can be said that Nixon teloeing the line of Pakistan and support to Yahya Khan militarity and diplomatically landed both India and Pakistan in a war in 1971.

From the above analysis it can be generated that the Bangladesh Crisis in 1971 marked the crescendo of United States' siding with Pakistan to the discontentment of India without the diplomatic and material support from the United States, it would have been very difficult on the part of Yahaya Khan to venture a war on India. Here Nixon could have adopted a neutral posture as the United States did in 1965 and made its military and economic linkage with Pakistan conditional on Pakistan agreeing to a political settlement with Mujibar Rahman. It could not have been impossible on the part of Nixon to exercise this course of action. As he himself had stated: "I have probably the most unusual opportunity, the greatest opportunity, of any president in history. I may be able to do things which can create a new structure of peace in the world."<sup>6</sup> Instead he overlooked the regional imperatives and gave prominence to his global perspective. Because of the United States' direct involvement, a new dimension to the security problems of India was added which India was to neutralize without loosing sight of the China-Pak axis while maintaining its identity, vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. It also marked the emergence of India as a regional dominant power in Sout Asia which made Pakistan more apprehensive of India's expensive designs. Further it bittered the relationship between India and Pakistan.

In fact, Pakistan was a geographical absurdity which ultimately led to the creation of Bangladesh. The British knew that this was not a viable structure and the last viceroy, Mountbatten, had predicted that East Bengal would break away from Pakistan in a quarter of a century.<sup>7</sup> What he did not, or could not, predict was that this separation, which came in 1971, would be preceded by an extremely tortuous

process including a full-scale war between India and Pakistan. In addition, to this, the British indecision, conscious or otherwise, regarding the status of the princely states of Hyderabad, Janagada and Kashmir added significantly to the conflict potential inherent in the Indo – Pakistan relationship. A part from it, the actual territorial award finalized by Sir Cyril Radcliffe was an extremely buried exercise. Both India and Pakistan resented the final outcome. In 1965, territorial disparities about Dahgram in the east and in the west brought the two countries to war ultimately in 1971.

In the Bangladesh war of 1971, responsibility for the outbreak of hostilities was shared by both parties to some extent. This can be understood in the light of what has been stated earlier, namely that India as the pre-eminent power in the sub-continent was basically interested in preserving and perpetuating in the statusquo and stability in the subcontinent. Pakistan, on the other hand, had deep states in upsetting the statusquo. It was only in the Bangladesh crisis of 1971 that India was interested in altering the statusquo. This was made all the more urgent because of the mounting problem of refugees from East Bengal. The situation in 1971 was also viewed by the resting elite in India as 'an opportunity of the century' which had all the factors present in it to legitimize India's action (if it was a successful one, as it turned out to be) in cutting Pakistan down to size and thus eliminating for a long time to come Pakistan's chances to distort the natural power hierarchy in the subcontinent in which India occupied the dominant place.<sup>8</sup> A sense of urgency was injected into India's thinking in this context by the then rapidly emerging rapprochements in Sino-America relations. This process, if allowed to continue without an urgent resolution of the Bangladesh crisis, would have favoured Pakistan and would have had very adverse implications for India.

It is interesting to note further that, whereas status-incongruence locked India and Pakistan into a conflict relationship, the outbreak of armed hostilities coincide with periods of near power parity between them, either actual or so perceived. The status of near equality, in terms of relative strength or weakness, between India and Pakistan at the time of the first Kashmir conflict was inherent in the confusion and disorder generated by the very act of Partition.

This situation was radically altered by the dramatic development of the Sino-American rapproachment in 1971. US rethinking on China in this respect had been

induced mainly by considerations that had very little to do with South Asia. The stalemate in Vietnam, the changing strategic balance vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, which was slowly but definitely eroding American superiority, and domestic pressures for opening new economic avenues abroad contributed to this opening towards China. As against this, India's significance to the US had started to decline.<sup>9</sup> As a result of this sudden shift in great power equations, the initial pattern of linkages between the superpowers and the regional actors was restored with China weighing in on the side of the US and Pakistan. The major consequences of this shift were the Indo-Soviet treaty and the subsequent emergence of Bangladesh following the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971. Henry Kissinger, the then US Secretary of State, was right when he said that "Bangladesh was not merely a local conflict, but an expression of a particular correlations of global forces."<sup>10</sup>

Primarily, the Bangladesh developments had precipitated a situation in which it has become urgent for both India and Pakistan to come round to the negotiating table. As pointed out earlier, the requirements of the two countries are different. Nevertheless, both share the need to readjust their relations. Pakistan today has been reduced to the position where it cannot but accept the loss of eastern half of its territory. Besides, its 90 thousand prisoners and more than five thousand square miles of territory are being held by India. The immediate pre-occupation of Pakistan, therefore, is to recover its men and territory.

Further along with the old issues, Bangladesh is a new factor in Indo-Pak relations. As a third Party it has become an essential ingredient for any settlement between India and Pakistan. Bangladesh, however, does not represent a party outside the region but a new and vibrant unit in South Asia having as much stake a peace in the sub-continent as India and Pakistan. The trends in the future relations among India, Pakistan and Bangladesh show that Pakistan may recognize Bangladesh and thus secure an agreement on the specific issue like prisoners of War. Bangladesh may not therefore, be an obstacle in Indo Pak rapprochement.

Fifty five years have passed, since then several developments have taken place during these years affecting Indo-Pak relation. Year 1971 was the watershed year in Pakistani history. Its East wing seceded to become an independent country. This tremendously affected the power balance in the region and as a result several

new developments took place in Indo-Pak relations. Pakistan's foreign policy and India policy in particular experienced some changes. Eighteen years have passed since then. Though we cannot say that the traditional hostility between the two "unfortunate brother nations"<sup>11</sup> has ended, yet it will have to be conceded that now for the past few years there is greater understanding between them. Some of the mistrust and confusion has been allayed and there have been signs of co-operation here and there. Though it is always impossible to guess or to have promotions about the future, nor is it advisable in the study of international relations, yet certain developments and events show positive trends now and even encourage us to think cautiously that one may be looking towards an era of co-operations overlooking, if not forgetting the erstwhile conflict and hostility. Thus, the Two-Nation Theory failed on several grounds. Lack of reconciliation to the partition and a settled fact on the part of India and Pakistan's advocacy of a two-nation theory explain largely the hostile relationship between the two countries. Many Indians felt that the creation of Pakistan was a tragic mistake which might still be corrected, at least as far as East Bengal is concerned. To this may be added India's disapproval of Pakistani advocacy of the two nation theory based on religion. "It was perfectly clear", said J.Nehru, "that it was quite impossible to divide it on the basis of separating religious groups on one side or the other."<sup>12</sup> To accept Pakistan's 'Two Nation Theory' would mean a collapse of the secularistic policy on which the Indian Union rests and a reopening of the conduits of separatism through various religious-sensitized groups. The INC completely rejected the Two-Nation Theory but accepted partition reluctantly as the price to pay to get rid of the British colonial rule and the intransigent Muslim League.

Can friendship begin at 55 for India and Pakistan? Until recently, the Chill between the two seemed too deep for even post-cold war global warming to reach. These sibling states have fought four wars since their bloody division into two newly independent states in 1947.

Talking does not always lead to solutions. But it is a start, working groups will now discuss a range of problems, from the Siachen glacier to the fight against terrorism and promotion of trade. The senior officials and leaders of the two countries who will hope to meet again on January 2004 for direct talks on the

theories/issues the future of much fought over Kashmir and ways to enhance peace and security.

In August 1947, India and Pakistan emerged as two nation states, carved out of the boundaries of the erstwhile British India. Since their birth, tensions began between them, dragging them into four wars in a time period of less than twenty five years. However, the Third War of 1971, was most crucial in its consequences. After this war, a number of regional and extra regional factors emerged in the sub-continent and around it, compelling the two countries to give up their state of hostility and seek mutual accommodation. A slow and cautious process of normalization of relations started between them, which continued smoothly for a decade or so.

On the eve of the thirty-seventh birthday of Pakistan, an alliance of banned political parties calling itself the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy launched a campaign for a return to civilian rule in the country. The Indian statements in this regard, were held by the government of Pakistan, as constituting interference in the internal affairs of this country. This happened at a crucial stage in the improvement of Indo-Pak relations, when a joint Ministerial Commission had just been established to explore the possibilities of cooperation. India's attitude during the MRD campaign seemed to preclude the hopes for further improvement in bilateral relations. In fact, the process of normalization of relations received a major setback.

There were a number of regional factors that led India and Pakistan to normalize their relations, like leadership issue, Simla Agreement, Lahore Agreement, Pakistan's Search for a Middle Eastern Role, Psychological factor, Kargil issue, Nuclear issue and border disputes and others.

Besides regional factors, there were many extra-regional factors, which also provided an impetus for India and Pakistan to normalize their relations. But the question is whether the process of normalization or factors would be able to absorb the present shock and begin to move forward again. On the whole, India and Pakistan have in recent years made a great deal of progress in normalizing their relations. The present setbacks are not likely to affect this overall process to the extent of stultifying it. An improvement in internal political conditions in each country will further

reduce the possibilities of tension and conflict between the two. Let us start with the leadership issue that affects mostly to normalize Indo-Pak relations.

The personality factor is being increasingly recognized as a crucial element, perhaps even more crucial than some of the established institutions. It would seem that in a country like India, it is the office of the Prime Minister which performs this role. It is the Prime Minister who is the central figure in the foreign policy sector. It is he who decides, and it is around him that the decision making process really functions. There is really no really other personality that has replaced the Prime Minister as a leader. So any analysis of the decision making process of any country like India, Pakistan, Srilanka or others, has to centre on the leadership, his personality, his belief and his role.

On the other hand, it can be argued that in a country like Pakistan, leadership Charisma plays an important role also, as it is clear from the role played by Zinnah down to Musharaffe. In case of Pakistan, the level of President's influence and the importance of his role is very much contingent on his personality, the magnitude of his interest and the security of his position within the political system like India. Hence, the personality factor and leadership perception of both the countries creates a problem from time to time for successful Indo-Pak relations.

There would have been a safe and smooth transition from the administrative state model to the participatory model as has been in the case of India; had Pakistani leadership been consistently articulate, effective and visionary. As a matter of fact, Pakistani polity has suffered since its inception from what may be called leadership syndrome. Conceptually and perpetually, leadership syndrome means that Pakistani leadership has been sometimes ineffective, and even rootless; at other times, there has been apparently articulate, effective and visionary leadership, but it failed because of some negative qualities such as authoritarian tendencies and lack of political discipline. This syndrome can be explained empirically by analyzing the behaviour and performance of the leaders in certain given situations in terms of qualities both positive and negative.<sup>147</sup> Tolerance of opposition is the essence of democracy. It is inherent in any democratic set up that where there is a political party holding an office in the government there should be another in opposition as well; and the party holding in the central govt. and another in the provincial govt. while in

Pakistan all political parties and political figures have been advocating loudly and vociferously for a democratic set up of govt., while holding office in the govt. they have been extremely intolerant of any opposition – party or party govt. Two glaring examples can be cited here. Within a week of his assumption of the office of the Governor General, Mohammad Ali Zinnah ordered the dismissal of the constitutionally elected Congress govt. in the North West Frontier and installed his own defeated party in power there. Similarly, Z.A. Bhutto toppled the elected govts. of NAP – JUI in the NWFP and Baluchistan to lodge his own party in power there.

In fact, instability delays and inhibits the success of steps taken towards resolving or reducing conflict. Regarding India's outstanding problems with Pakistan the former British Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, quoted Nehru as having said in 1958.

It was impossible to deal with the Pakistan Govt, – they never stayed in office, for more than a few months they had no sound democratic system, there was nobody who could settle any agreement in fact he (Nehru) was not at all hopeful.<sup>147</sup>

In tune with Macmillan, it became clear that Jinnah Liaquat leadership did not create any democratic convention. To create healthy democratic conventions, Jinnah could have acted as a figure head like his counterpart in India, leaving the real power with the Prime Minister. But he did not do so. He acted in authoritarian manner; nothing could happen in Pakistan without his approval. He left a legacy of confusion about the powers between the Governor General (later President) and the Prime Minister and about the latter's power to dismiss any govt. irrespective of the support it enjoyed in the provincial Assembly or National Assembly. This paved the way for authoritarianism and political instability for the future and belied the hopes for a federal set up. The dismissal of Prime Minister Khwaja Tazimuddin by Governor General Ghulam Mohammad can be cited as an illustration. Later, Central Cabinets were installed and dismissed several times on the dismissed several times on the whims of the Governor General/President. Instability and personality factor also makes it impossible for the political leadership and the negotiator to adopt an accommodative give-and-take approach. Therefore, the

leadership issue should start from the Nehru – Zinnah's era, otherwise it will be hard to reduce all international behaviour to unilateral actions and bilateral relationships.

Nheru, undoubtedly, was the sole architect of India during most of the period of his mandate (1947-64). Since he was also his own foreign Minister, practically all decisions were taken by him personally, with the infrastructure support of the Ministry of External Affairs. There were really no other institutions to speak of with which he could interact.

The factor of Status inconsistency in international relations has not been adequately emphasized and properly investigated, particularly with reference to interstate conflict and this factor has played a crucial role in the India – Pakistan conflict. The Indian and Pakistani perceptions and self images of their power-status vis-à-vis each other in the regional as well as the global contexts were so mutually incompatible that their driven to achieve these self-perceived status position brought than into armed clashes with each other. The supporting and aggregating impulses and implications of the processes of state and nation building, as also of the historical evolution of the two states, converged and were intricately enmeshed with the question of status – incompatibility. This incompatibility has further determined their respective security and strategic requirements in general and their security postures towards each other in particular. As a result it has conditioned and shaped the totality of their approaches towards each other. It can be easily described as the main propelling force behind the Indo-Pakistani conflict and their respective behaviors. The Nehruvian model envisaged very close and cooperative relations in all vital matters between India and its immediate neighbors – specially Pakistan. Nehru had even talked of forging a 'closer union', 'confederation.. of independent states with common defense and economic possibility in South Asia.<sup>15</sup> India wanted Pakistan to be a friendly and cooperative member of this community, as a sovereign independent state and a stable and favourable regional environment in South Asia was necessary for both countries – which is possible only through the good relations of both the countries.

The new strategy, in Nehru's view, had to be political, while accepting the normal expansion of the armed forces, his perception emissioned the tackling of national security issues essentially through political initiatives. Designing a defence

policy was an anathema to him. Immediately following the partition of the subcontinent, he apparently made it clear that India did not 'need a defence policy since 'we foresee no military threats' and since 'the police are good enough to meet the security needs.'<sup>16</sup>

The quintessence of Nehru's thinking on the whole problem of national security – at least at the time of India's independence – thus was that the international configuration of international forces were a sufficiently good protective barrier for the maintenance of India's independence, and that there was nothing in the nature of a crisis that India may be faced with that could not be resolved peacefully.

At the global level, where the threat could have emanated from the politics of the cold war and the resulting super-power pressures, Nehru's perception led him to the conclusion that the existing balance of power in the international system would guarantee India's security.

At the regional level, N's whole thinking and strategy on national security was to seek out political solutions to situations of conflict. For him there was no other alternative for a country like his own which, in his view, should have the ambition of playing an important role in the international system. Though Nehru did not take a benign view of Pakistan – gives his unhappiness over the partition of the subcontinent – his broad strategic thinking on foreign policy pushed him to avoid any confrontation. The Indian decision to take the Kashmir question to the United Nations after the 1947-48 Indo-Pakistan war, for example, illustrated India's approach to conflict situations.

On the other side Pakistan is the other country, which would regard India's rise with alarm. This is, undoubtedly a factor that India will have to take into account. An eventual solution to Indo-Pakistani disputes would have to be sought through serious give and take bilateral negotiations, but there appears to exist a general consensus in India that there is no reason why India should forsake her larger military role in the international system because of objections raised by a neighbor.

At the global level, India built up her image as a non-aligned, peaceful, friendly and anti-imperialist country. Considerable efforts were made during Nehru's premiership to built up this macro image. That India was generally successful in doing so is evident from the string of initiatives that were taken, the stack of friend agreements that were concluded, the magnitude of conferences that were attended, and the abundance of generally acceptable declarations that were made on a wide array of international issues. When one evokes this euphoric period, India's good offices role in Korea, her mediatory role in Indo-China her initiatives in the non-alignment movement, and her firmly anti-imperialist rhetoric in the United Nations come to mind. All this was done with considerable dexterity and with considerable prudence.

If Nehruian diplomacy was successful at the macro level, it can not at the micro-level. If India was a successful performer internationally, she was not regionally.

India's successful intervention in Bangladesh is a major landmark in Indian diplomacy. It was this even and this crisis that generated a major shift from the original Nehruvian tradition of concentrating on the affairs of the world to a more practical and more power-oriented policy, the focal point of which was the mobilization of India's power to safeguard her national interests. And within this broad framework, what has clearly emerged is the centrality of South Asia in Indian diplomatic thinking with a dimension and a coherence that did not exist before.

Since, as the saying goes, nothing succeeds like success, it can also be argued that nothing fails like failure. The military impasse in which India found herself during her first encounter with Pakistan in 1948, and the humiliating defeat that she suffered at the hands of the Chinese in 1962, eroded her image in South Asia. The big India, after all, was not that powerful. And as is often the case in such situations, the countries of the region felt themselves more free to diversity their foreign relations. Some of them even turned to China to counterbalance or forestall any strong pressure that may emanate from India. The cause of our major problem is India's inability to reconcile herself to our existence as a sovereign independent nation. At the back of it all was India's ambition to absorb Pakistan or turn her into a satellite.

Pakistani leaders viewed the acceptance of a lower status vis-à-vis India, in terms of the sub continental balance of power, as the very negation of Pakistan's independent existence. This constituted a source of threat and insecurity to them. The Indian leaders, on the other hand, saw any disturbance of the regional power hierarchy, by way of Pakistan's alliance first with the western block and then with China, as a source of grave danger to peace, security and stability in the sub continent. Thus, the question of status incongruence between the two states was intricately mixed up with their respective perceptions of peace and security. What caused partition continued to cause conflict between India and Pakistan. On the other hand, political instability, when viewed in the context of competition, rivalry and conflict among and within the ruling elites in India and Pakistan, offers further interesting and valuable insights into their conflict relationship. It was the continuous conflict between the political, bureaucratic and military elites in Pakistan, which after Jinnah's death, adversely affected the evolution of a mature foreign policy including the policy towards India. In the early years several well-meaning attempts to reduce the salience of the Indo-Pakistani conflicts were frustrated owing to this internal tug of war. Since the beginning of the 1960's, the undercurrent of rivalry between Bhutto on the one hand and Pakistani leaders like President Ayub, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and even Yahya Khan, on the other, drove Pakistan to the brink of war as well as into armed conflict with India several times. It is now known, for instance, that Bhutto, since 1962, had been advocating a war with India as against a much more cautious approach adopted by Ayub. The former was also not happy with the ceasefire of 1965 and the Tashkent agreement of 1966 which formalized this ceasefire.<sup>17</sup> Even the British attempt at mediation during the kutch conflict (April-May 1965) was delayed and complicated by Bhutto's intransigence.<sup>18</sup> Recent writings have also indicated that Bhutto had a vested interest in the 1971 India-Pakistan war and the eventual separation of Bangladesh from West Pakistan.<sup>19</sup> The result was that Pakistan decision-makers were almost driven to the state where that conflict became inevitable. The same Bhutto, after becoming the Prime Minister of the new Pakistan in 1972, also became the main architect of a policy of détente with India. However, Bhutto's hawkish approach to Indo-Pakistani relations before the emergence of Bangladesh should not be understood as a purely individual and personal exercise. He was representing and articulating the approaches of certain

powerful political interests in Pakistan, be they some sections in the military or bureaucracy or even external influences.

Intra-elite conflicts and competition in India were also not devoid of important implications for a policy towards Pakistan. In the initial period, Sardar Patel was the spokesman for a hardline policy towards Pakistan as against Nehru's approach of greater accommodation. One of the Patel's secretaries has written :

Temperamentally, on matters of dispute with Pakistan Sardar was firm and unyielding though he did not, except in matters of vital importance, trouble himself with details on which Panditji and Gopaldaswamy had their way without interference from him. There is also no doubt that there was an undercurrent of militancy in Sardar's approach; militancy was, however, not synonymous with bellicosity or war-mongering but arose from a realization that that was the only language which Pakistan understood.<sup>20</sup>

Fortunately for Nehru, Sardar Patel did not live long enough to influence policy towards Pakistan. Amongst the Political Parties, the Jana Sangha advocated a strong Indian Posture towards Pakistan. The same Jana Sangha leadership, when in power in India after March 1977 as a constituent of the Janata Party, claimed to be the Champion of peaceful and friendly relations with Pakistan. There were also a number of Dawlirish elements in the Congress but until Nehru's death they could not have their way easily. They did, however, put pressure on Nehru's successors, Lal Bahadur Shastri, particularly between April and December 1965, to deal with Pakistan firmly. They also opposed the payment to Pakistan falling due in 1965 under the terms of the Indus Water Treaty.<sup>21</sup> However, as compared to the Pakistani situation, politics in India have had a much wider base and more varied issues for intra-elite conflict. Accordingly, the intensity of India as an issue in Pakistan's domestic politics was much greater than was the case in India – vis-a-vis the Pakistan issue.<sup>22</sup>

The legacy and leadership style of Zinna should be noted here. The influence of Dadabhai Naoroji and Gopal Krishna Gokhale on his own political views brought him in close association with the Indian National Congress and he joined the moderate wing of this organization when in 1910 and 1911, the Council of

the All India Muslim League suggested radical changes in the league's constitution, Jinnah was invited to participate in its deliberation and tender his well-considered advice. In consequence of discussion the All Indian Muslim League at its Lucknow Session in 1913 acknowledged suitable self-government as one of its objects. The way to rapprochement was being opened for a long time (1910) and in compliance with the desire of Maulana Muhammed Ali and Sayyid Wajir Hassan, Jinnah was formally enrolled as a member of the All-India Muslim League in the Autumn of 1913.

Henceforward, he became an active protagonist of both the political organizations, Indian National Congress and the Muslim League – and till the commencement of Gandhi's Non-violent Non-corporation Movement, he continued to draw unadulterated approbation and admiration from both. Jinnah acted as a Mediator between the Hindus and the Muslims and strived to establish goodwill between the two communities, easily winning for himself the title of Ambassador of Hindu – Muslim Unity. The Lucknow Pact of 1916 was, to great extent, the result of his efforts and it was at his initiative that the Memorandum of the Nineteen – Hindu and Muslim members of the Imperial Legislative Council – was submitted to the British Government with a view to obtain for the Indian's a substantial measure of self government.

But the Nagpur session of the Indian National Congress which commenced its sitting on December 26, 1920 proved to be the parting of ways, for it was here that Mahatma Gandhi's programme of Non-Cooperation was finally adopted. Jinnah vehemently opposed it. But this 'was the only dissentient voice' and as an inveterate opponent of Gandhi's tactics, he could no longer remain in the Congress. He resigned his membership after more than two decades of ardent association. Speaking on the Sixth anniversary of late G.K.Gokhale on 19 February, 1921, he told his audience that he was convinced in his mind that the programme of Mahatma Gandhi was taking them to a wrong channel. It was, thus, after the adoption of the plan of Non-Cooperation at Nagpur that Jinnah could be said to have really joined the League for, till then, he had been placing his legs on two stools and was not in a position to devote his exclusive attention to the furtherance of the exclusive cause of Muslim League ideology. The question to be examined here is a straight one –

what led to this change in Jinnah's outlook? His view point should be taken up first for dissection. That he was opposed to the Rowlatt Act was a fact beyond dispute. But in his crusade for righting the country's wrongs he never followed Mahatma Gandhi's programme. In his opinion, "What they wanted was a real political movement based on real political principles and based on the fire which learnt in the heart of every man or his motherland. So long as they had not that as the basis, their programme was defective."

It was further represented that Jinnah was opposed to the policy of boycotting the Councils as it deprived his countrymen of a chance 'to fight face to face with the bureaucrats? The Gandhian programme appeared to him to be not in conformity with constitutional and political methods. His discontentment about the boycott of schools and colleges was great and he understood the utter helplessness of students after their withdrawal from educational institutions. Gandhi had asked them to spin the wheel for four to five hours a day and then if any time was available to devote it to learn Hindi. Jinnah emphatically said that this was 'not really political movement'. The Gandhian programme, being based on soul-force, partook of a spiritual movement. Moreover, Jinnah could never imagine that non-violent non-cooperation was a practicable device. The wearing a khadi also did not appeal to him. He could however, appreciate the efforts of Indians to start 'mill after mill' in competition with foreign manufacturers.

Jinnah's opposition was only to the Gandhian methods of resisting the British Government, there was no possibility of his permanent bifurcation. He parted company with his colleagues of the Congress never to meet again.

That Jinnah assumed Muslim leadership to organize the Muslim League on a sounder basis and to assert its representative character can hardly be questioned in the light of his subsequent conduct. There was also no doubt Mahatma Gandhi's leadership of the Khilafat agitation was detested by the entire orthodox section of the Muslim population. That Jinnah was brought by a desire to bring about the Salvation of the Musalmaus can, to some extent, be accepted. No attempt to minimize the sincerity of Jinnah for his community can be based on facts. It is also a mere truism to state that the effects of the Khilafat and Non-cooperation Movements became apparent long before their termination and that Jinnah saw earlier than any other

contemporary Muslim leader that the advantage of his community lay in a policy of separatism. It was well stated : 'Jinnah repeated the performance of Sir Sayyid. He erected himself like a strong wall ..... On this side of the wall, reorganization work took shape, and soon the Musalman, under the greencrescent bearing banner of Islam, fresh in enthusiasm and happy with their new found faith, were up against all odds.'<sup>23</sup>

The Muslim tradition of isolation at best attracted Jinnah and his anxiety for the betterment of his community at the expense hold over his mental frame. But though his appetite for the exclusive uplift of his community was so keen, it does not explain the whole truth about his dramatic change of mind. He was a misfit in the Indian National Congress after its assumption of a new complexion of agitation against the British Government and the new developments in the Congress non-cooperation and the new constitution which made it more of a popular and mass organization were thoroughly disapproved of by him.

Besides, a man of Jinnah's personal ambition could hardly find sufficient scope for personal glory in the Congress which claimed the best intelligence in its fold and where men of all talents were in superfluity. As a member of the Indian National Congress, he could, at best, be one of the top leaders, but in the league he had the chance of being recognized as the leader of a community which would blindly follow his dictatorship. His participation in the National Congress from an early stage of life till his viewpoint was rejected was natural in the absence of any other powerful political organization which provided an opportunity for his progress. It has, therefore, been stated with perfect accuracy that Jinnah would never let slip an opportunity of self-glorification. It has been said that the age of romance and adventure is over and that under modern condition there is hardly scope for such medieval exploits.

The life of Jinnah shows that there is always adventure waiting for the adventurous. Such a scope in the Congress of Mahatma Gandhi who had taken decided and practical step forward to dislodge foreign domination by his non-violent non-cooperation formulae was impossible.

Then, the character and personality of Jinnah also deserve consideration while examine his motives of cutting adrift with the INC and acting in direct opposition to it. His obstinacy became known even to those who came casually in contact with him. Effort after effort was made by the top-ranking leaders of the Congress to bring him round to the point of view conducive to the welfare of the country. But even a man of Dr. Rajendra Prasad's sobriety and self-effacement had to admit later (in 1935) that this talk of agreement with Jinnah failed. This caused him great sorrow, specially because the points which led to breakdown were trivial and to accept them or show obstinacy over them was useless. In fact, Jinnah stood firm on his ground and never let slip an opportunity to improve his position and his prospects". A man with such traits of nature and temperament could not continue to find satisfaction in the Congress ideology of sacrifice and work.

But what happened afterwards is just the reverse of the earlier period of his political career and Jawaharlal Nehru's estimate in one sentence represents the whole truth about the later period. He states, "Later, unhappily, the old Ambassador of unity associated himself with the most reactionary elements in Muslim communalism." It is difficult to agree with the editor or the Modern Review that "till 1973 we do not think that he knew his own political mind", for this would whitewash all his guilt in subsequent stages of the developments of events in India. His attitudes towards the Nehru Report, his part in the Round Table Conferences and his view on the Indian Constitutional Act of 1935 left no doubt regarding his position after leaving the Congress. That he became a die – hard communist is undisputed, though it may be admitted that after 1937 his politics assumed the character of aggressiveness.

However, it may be stated with all frankness that in his rank communalism, he not only sacrificed the interests of his fatherland but also showed an extraordinary degree of implacability. Mr. Wyatt rightly observed: "In every incident Jinnah saw the machinations of the Hindu mind, tricking and thwarting him and every occasion was made. The vehicle for demonstrating his inflexibility, his intransigence and his adherence to the Central principle. I never met him without hearing, at least once, the standard unvarying lecture on the wrongs of the Muslims and the need for Pakistan."

His varied speeches and writings bear eloquent the religious feelings of his easily inflammable community. In his presidential address at the Lucknow session of the All India Muslim League (Octo, 1937) he spoke in the strain of the early Muslim leaders and said : 'Hindi is to be the national languages of India and the Bande Mataram is to be the national song, and is to be forced upon all only the Congress masquerades under the name of nationalism, whereas the Hindu Mahasabha does not mence words.

In his presidential address at the All-Indian Muslim League session held at Patna in December, 1938, he gave another sample of his communal frame of mind. He said : Muslim children must accept Bande Matram as their national song, no matter whether their religious beliefs permit them to do so or not. It is idolatrous and a hymn of hate against Muslims". In the same speech he blamed Gandhi for destroying he Congress ideals and said : "His ideal is to revive Hindu religion and establish Hindu raj in this countr and he is utilizing the Congress to further this object". His bill of indictment against democracy was expressed in his sentiment that it meant only "Hindu raj all over India " in fact ,Jinnah , after this resignation from the Congress , became the recognized leader of Musalmans alone and as such nothing was more tempting to him than to say and write things that pleased his community.<sup>25</sup>

It would however, be a wrong reading of Jinnah, if his services to the League are not fully appreciated. Under his guidance, as under no other leader's before him, the work of organization to the Muslim league was performed with startling efficiently. N.V.Rajkumar stated the plainest truth on laying down : "The credit for the efficient organization of a backward community undoubtedly goes to Jinnah. His brilliant leadership of the League during the last decade and the success that has come to it in every sphere of Muslim activity, is almost unbelievable, were it not a hard fact.

Mahammed Iqbal, the famous Urdu poet, writing in his private and confidential letter to Jinnah (dated June 21, 1937, Lahore) acknowledged him as the only Musalman capable of guiding the desting of the Muslim community. He wrote : "I know you are a busy man but I do hope you won's mind writing to you so often, as you are the only Muslim in Indian to day to whom the community has a right to look up for safe guidance. through the storm which is coming to N.W.India and perhaps

to the whole of India." What Sayyid Ahmed Khan aspired for the Muslims in the nineteenth century, Jinnah accomplished it in the twentieth. Sayyid Ahmed embedded the lesson of separatism on Muslim minds and taught his community an object loyalty to the British Government, Jinnah carved out a separate Muslim State by a process of Vivisection of his native land and aligned himself definitely with the British government. The two were the counterparts of each other. It can easily be doubted that there could ever been "Jinnah of Partition" without Sayyid's Pioneering activities, though Jinnah overshadowed Sayyid by virtue of his astounding practical achievement.

After Zinnah, Ayub Khan's political system had a great deal of flexibility after he was appointed as a president in 1965, though first appointed as a martial law administrator in 1958 and the year 1965 was also very significant because that year also brought war between India and Pakistan over the Kashmir, resulting in a military stalemate and a renewed UN Cease Fire. Infact, his settlement in the Tashkent Agreement with India in 1966 became a tremendous political setback for Ayub Khan. Though remarkable economic program being made at that time, wanted to follow it up with meaningful participation in political decision making. The institution of Basic Democracies – not the new political parties, not even the constitution of 1962 – gave he Ayub system much of its elasticity.

Within a year of being reflected, Ayub Khan had allowed Pakistan to be drawn into armed conflict with India. The issue was Kashmir; from the evidence that has become available to date, it appears that Ayub reluctantly accepted the advice of some of his close associates – among them Zulfikar Ali Bhutto – that the time had finally come for finding a military solution to the problem that plagued relations between India and Pakistan for nearly twenty years. Beginning a September 6, 1965, the two countries fought a brisk war that lasted for seventeen days, when a cease-fire was finally declared, Pakistan found itself in a situation that was to have some unexpected consequences. But the most important outcome of this conflict was the open disaffection of many young generals with the conduct of the war. In such a situation, Ayub Khan found it increasingly difficult to persist with his political experiment. Finally, perhaps because of these two pressures – the narrow victory in

the elections of 1964 and the aftermath of the 1965 war with India – Ayub Khan's health gave way.

Economic downturn also contributed to Ayub Khan's political problems. As so often happen in systems that do not provide channels for the expression of dissent and disapproval, the movement against Ayub Khan took the form of street agitation. It built up in intensity in the summer and fall of 1968. Despite several attempts to placate the opposition by granting them some form of participation without drastically altering the system, the agitation continued to grow in intensity. By the Spring of 1969, the movement had been taken over by two exceptionally charismatic leaders - Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in West Pakistan and Mujibur Rahman in East Pakistan. When Bhutto and Mujib refused to compromise, the military stepped in, demanded Ayub Khan's resignation, proclaimed martial law, abrogated the constitution, and appointed General Yahya Khan, the military's most senior officer, as president. The 1965 Indo Pakistan war interrupted the remarkable momentum of economic development that had begun with the assumption of office by Ayub Khan. Up until then, the rate of growth in Pakistan's economy was among the highest in the developing world. The war not only diverted toward military use the resources that would have otherwise gone into development; it also resulted in a sharp decline in the flow of external assistance. The nation was asked to tighten its belt and might have been willing to do so if tangible gains had been made on the battlefield. But the war ended in a state of confusion, with both India and Pakistan claiming victory. When the peace agreement was finally signed with India in the southern Russian city of Tashkent, its terms left the impression that the advantage finally lay with India.

The Tashkent Declaration was to be the turning point in the political life of the administration of Ayub Khan. Bhutto, Ayub Khan's foreign minister, left the government, giving the strong impression that what had not been lost on the battlefield was surrendered at Tashkent. India's policy toward Pakistan, he wrote after his departure from the government, will shift from confrontation cooperation, to the spirit of Tashkent'. She will now seek to convert Pakistan into her satellite by holding out inducements of peaceful cooperation". This was a serious warning. people thought – warning issued by a person who, as the former foreign minister,

must understand the full implication of what he was saying. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's words were to echo for a long time in the ears of those who had always believed that Pakistan had to be extremely vigilant if it was to protect its national integrity. By initially basing his campaign against Ayub Khan on the Tashkent Declaration, Bhutto was able to draw toward him the people who had become disenchanted with the military regime. Ayub Khan was an efficient administrator; he was also fully committed to the rapid development of the country, economy but he was not a popular leader.

Bhutto Played his Cards well – Undoubtedly, Z.A. Bhutto emerged as an effective, articulate, visionary and charismatic leader, but he suffered from some negative personality traits, such as the lust for power, unscrupulousness and intolerance. He can be given credit for building democratic structures; he was successful in producing 1973 constitution within a short span of time. But his political conduct was questionable. He subverted the democratic structures and process which he himself had assiduously tried to build. He shifted freedom of speech, expression and organization for which he himself had opposed President Ayub Khan when he fell apart from him. Even within his own party Bhutto did not allow differences of opinion. Instead of resolving them by mutual understanding and accommodation, he resorted to repression of the dissident voice, which resulted in the expulsion of several important and influential leaders who had been instrumental in the creation of mass support for him.<sup>159</sup> Rigging in the 1977 election by the PPP candidates undermined Bhutto's credibility as a genuine democrat and dealt a severe blow to Pakistan's search for or democratic political framework.

This was clearly evident during the Indo-Pakistan, negotiation between Bhutto and Swaran Singh in 1963, since the position of the Nehru Government in India had been greatly weakened as a result of the military humiliation inflicted by China. Similarly in January 1966, at the Tashkent Summit, India was in no position to make any concession on Kashmir because Shastri's government would not have survived such an agreement.<sup>150</sup>

Political instability contributed to the Indo-Pakistan conflict in another way also. The weakness and the ultimate breakdown of civilian political order in Pakistan resulted in strengthening the army's role within the political system. It was an

unfortunate coincidence that, as a result of partition, Pakistan was carved out of areas which had a strong feudal base that sustained the role of the Pakistani army in the subsequent years. This, in turn, thwarted democratic impulses and the development of representative institutions.<sup>28</sup> Thus, the miniaturization of politics led to the continuous emphasis on external (in the case Indian) threat and conflict, for that was the reflection of the new septum's ethos and its search for legitimacy. No wonder President Ayub Khan stressed the threat from India theme in his 1965 election campaign.<sup>29</sup> The Pakistan military's vested interests in its own expansion and strength and its socialization process also kept alive the hostility towards India and, on accession precipitated armed conflicts with that country.<sup>30</sup> A notable aspect of the Pakistani military's dominant role in the political system and in Pakistan's policy towards India was the fact that the military machine received support and sustenance in a big way from the US military assistance programme to Pakistan. In view of these historical experiences, it would not be an exaggeration to say that a civilian regime in Pakistan, preferably with democratic inclinations, is an important precondition for peace and stability in India – Pakistan relations.

Political instability, when viewed in the context of competition rivalry and conflict among and within the ruling elites in India and Pakistan, offers further interesting and valuable insights into their conflict relationship. It was the continuous conflict between the political, bureaucratic and military elites in Pakistan which after Jinnah's death, adversely affected the evolution of a mature foreign policy including the policy towards India. In the early years several well meaning attempts to reduce the salience of the Indo-Pakistani conflict were frustrated owing to this internal tar-of-war. Since the beginning of the 1960's the undercurrent of rivalry between Bhutto on the one hand and Pakistani leaders like President Ayub, drove Pakistan to the brink of you as well as into armed conflict with India several times. It is now known, for instance, that Bhutto, since 1962, had been advocating a war with India as against a much more cautious approach adapted by Ayub. [The former was also not happy with the ceasefire at 1965 and the Tashkent agreement of 1966 which formalized this ceasefire.<sup>31</sup> Even the British attempt at mediation during the hutch confide (April-May 1965) was delayed and complicated by Bhutto's intransigence.<sup>32</sup> Recent writings have also indicated that Bhutto had a vested interest

in the 1971 India-Pakistan war and the eventual separation of Bangladesh from West Pakistan.<sup>33</sup> The result was that Pakistani decision makers were almost driven to the state where that conflict became inevitable. The same Bhutto, after becoming the Prime Minister of the new Pakistan in 1972, also became the main architect of a policy of détente with India. However, Bhutto's hawkish approach to Indo-Pakistani relations before the emergence of Bangladesh should not be understood as a purely individual and personal exercise. He was representing and articulating the approach of certain powerful political interests in Pakistan, be they some sections in the military bureaucracy or even external influences.

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If there lived in Pakistan a single man of cerebral power and political leadership who was an admirer of Jawaharlal Nehru, that man's name is Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. His writings often glittering with imagining and innovative concepts of domestic and foreign policies for Pakistan, candidly reflect much of Nehru's world view and his conceptual framework of non-alignment. Thus the admiration of Bhutto for Nehru changed the bitter scenario of Indo-Pak relations for some time.

Thus two facts come out from Bhutto's tenure (1973-77). One his failure to regard political opposition as legitimate, a fact that cost him the vital support of small traders, merchants and shopkeepers who had initially given him support and later sustained him in a power. In the final analysis the weak institutionalization of

his Pakistan people's party was, prove a crucial factor in the regime's inability to provide a "counterweighed" to the military and the bureaucracy.

Towards the end of the Nehru era, there was a slow erosion of the Nehruvian framework of role playing. Things did not function smoothly any more. The exalted image that the world had of India simply vanished. Though some signs of this decline were already visible during the closing years of the Nehru era, there was a real deterioration under his successors, never to rise again. Since imagery has much to do with the role pattern a nation can play. India's role, (as originally shaped by Nehru) therefore suffered a severe setback in the international system for which Nehru was not sole responsible indeed.

Nehru's immediate successor, Lal Bahadur Shastri, was a self effacing person whose knowledge of the world was negligible, and whose interest in foreign affairs was less than marginal. It would hardly be expected to him to actively follow what Nehru and designed, or to means out a Shastrian version of how India should respond to the global international environment. Besides, he neither had the inclination nor the time to interest himself in foreign affairs, since he was deeply involved in strengthening his domestic position, and since he was at the helm of affairs for only 18 months. Whatever Shastri did in international affairs is what he had to do maintain some degree of formal continuity, or what he was advised to do; attend the Cairo in 1964 non-aligned conference; visit Moscos and London, also in 1964; fight a war with Pakistan (1965) that was imposed on him; and finally and reluctantly, participate in the Indo-Pakistan Tashkent Conference convened by the Russian, on the aftermath of the conflicts.

Shastri will thus be remembered really as being the transition man who contributed to bringing into focus the limits of what India w/could really do in global affairs, and in making the appropriate adjustments in India's foreign policy by shifting her diplomatic focus to her immediate environment.

Lal Bahadur Shastri, was different, in fact very different, from his predecessor. He was a neophyte in external affairs with the exception of a trip to Nepal in March 1963 for discussions with Nepali leaders, and a brief period of assigned responsibility to deal with papers that come to the Prime Minister from the

Ministry of External Affairs during Nehru's last illness, he hardly had any grounding in foreign affairs, in fact, none. There was nothing in his political life, before or after assuming the prime ministership of the country, that gives any clue of any perception that he may have personally, had of international affairs, or of the configuration of international forces, or of the macro issues that faced the world. Most of the declarations that he made on such issues were a report of what Nehru had declared before. His whole political career centred around domestic politics, where he had established a niche for himself with the active support of Nehru. Though, during his brief tenure as Prime Minister, he naturally had to deal with external matters including a war with Pakistan, he was probably uncomfortable and perhaps even insecure taking the complete responsibility of designing India's foreign policy on his own since he was a marvelous success in the negotiations with Pakistan on the Kashmir question, and since he had infinite patience and inexhaustible capacity for endless talk, undoubtedly an asset in diplomacy. Moreover, India under Shastri, became more preoccupied with what was good for India and clearly it was a movement away from the preceding Nehruvian concern with global issues which had a great impact on South Asian relationships also.

With Indira Gandhi at the helm, Shastri's politics of incorporating the Prime Minister's Secretariat in the decision making process was continued. In fact, it was further accentuated, so much so that by the time Mrs. Gandhi was out of office in 1977, it had become the crucial point of foreign policy making. Indira Gandhi took a number of initiatives to strengthen her hand like in 1971 for help the beleaguered Sri Lankan Government against Janatha Vimukti Permana insurrectionaries, to take military action against Pakistan in the same year, to explode a nuclear device in 1974, to merge the Himalayan state of Sikkim with India in 1975 and many others.

Thus, the Indira Gandhi period showed an even more decisive tilt towards this process of ongoing change. By the time Mrs. Gandhi was at the helm of affairs, India had either lost or abandoned her original international role. And no attempt was really made to search for a new role, at least not during her first mandate, in the changed circumstances.

What India really attempted was to become militarily strong by investing in research and development, and by buying sophisticated arms abroad, both of which

were given considerable boost under her mandate. The objective was to become a hegemonic power in South Asia by playing a much more assertive role than she had even done before, keep the nuclear option open by conducting an underground nuclear explosion in May 1974; and launch into the space sector by blasting, in July 1980.

The principal thrust of India's foreign policy was then more power and region oriented than one of seeking out a new global role for herself. Towards the early eighties, during her second mandate, Indira Gandhi sought out a more international role. Now that India had attained the status of a regional power, and was internationally recognized or such, she did make some attempts to seek a more global role by going overseas more than eighteen times attending the North-South Conference in Cancun in April 1981, and hosting in New Delhi a ministerial conference of 122 developing nations in February 1982, a non-aligned summit in March 1983 and a Commonwealth Summit in November of the same year.

If one were to extract the thrust of Mrs. Gandhi's international policy, it can be summed up in a few words :

"disarmament and development. At the different international gatherings Indira Gandhi did express concern for peace." "She underlined the importance of ensuring the development of countries along with the prosperity of the developed nations in circumstances of international peace and security".

But all these initiatives and declarations did not lead to the establishment of a real framework that would have the parameters of India's new global role. This may be partly attributed to the fact that Indira Gandhi disappeared from the political scene before she really had the time to conceptualize her new global role. But the explanation partly lies in the fact that, notwithstanding her enormous experience, she did not have the mental make-up to define a role for India that was not closely connected with India's national interests.

So the only real role that India played under Indira Gandhi was, to use her military clout to partition Pakistan in 1971, and assist the Bandanaika Government which was being challenged from the left, in the same year. In sum, the very concept of her role had changed. It had become more violent and more assertive in

comparison to Zia-ul-Haq's "Islamisation of a "repressive, unrepresentative" martial law regime or attempt to fulfill Pakistan's raison, dieter , it fanned sectarian divisions. And revealed the difficulties in achieving any scholarly interpretation of the Quaran and the Sunnah. In the event, the General bequaeathed to Pakistan a political process distorted by the eight Amendment which enabled his successors to dismiss elected Prime Ministers with impunity and generated an atmosphere of "bigotry, fanaticism and distorted values."

With Zia's violent death and Benazir Bhutto's return to power, democracy was restarted. But her first tenure in office (1988-90) wads noticeable for its dismal failure to live up to expectations which given the economic and constitutional constraints, she was unable to fulfill. If Benazir Bhutto becomes prime minister of Pakistan in the next two or three years, two young persons, both of the post-partition generation, will be presiding over the destinies of Pakistan and India. Benazir happens to be six or seven years younger than Rajiv Gandhi. The stars governing their lives have seemingly created a string of similarities of a certain fibre of a Greek tragedy. Both are inheritors of charismatic leadership, gifted with what one may described as charisma of association. Benajir's father, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, was removed from power and imprisoned and hanged by the man he had promoted to the office of army chief of staff superceding several claimants. Rajib's mother, Indira Gandhi, fell to the bullets of assassians that were members of her carefully selected bodyguards.

Both have also lost a brother each Indira's assassination created a nationwide sympathy wave, riding the crest of which Rajiv Gandhi won a massive electoral victory in the Lok Sabha in December 1984. Benajir has drawn unprecedented crowds all over Pakistan, since her dramatic home coming on April 10 mostly because she retained in the minds of Pakistanis the fond memories of her father as well as a sense of guilt that they had allowed him to be mercilessly hanged in prison.

Both Benagir Bhutto and Rajiv Gandhi are children of the era of the post-industrial revolution in the advanced countries of the world. Both are modernizer. Neither is a radical. If one were to judge Benajir Bhutto by her speeches and press conference since April 10, one must also perceive her as a reconsider of the deep

cleavages that plague Pakistan's political life and heavily strain its relations with its neighbour amongst whom must now be counted a superpower : the Soviet Union. Unlike General Zia-ul-Haq, she had categorically warned Pakistanis not to get involved with the Khalistan movement for, once again unlike General Zia and the other members of Pakistan's present ruling cooperation, she has the farsight to realize what a real Khalistan would mean for Pakistan itself. She has also very wisely told her countrymen and women that if Pakistan tried to use the Sikh card today, India could use the Sind and the Baluch card tomorrow.

Both have problems with their own political parties and their respective relations with other competing political parties. As in India the ruling Congress has no rival at the national level, so in Pakistan, in a fresh and fair election, the PPP will win a landslide victory in national politics. But neither can the ruling Congress rule in all or even a very large majority of the Indian states, nor can PPP hope to rule in all the three smaller provinces of Pakistan. India's stable and experienced parliamentary democratic system allows the fabrication of normal give and take relationships between the centre and the states whether or not the latter are governed by the same party. Rajiv Gandhi has succeeded in making centre-state relations smoother than they were during his mother's time though there is room for a lot more to be done to establish a normal healthy federal relationship. Perhaps one of the two great tests of Benajir's leadership in Pakistan will be her willingness and ability to work together with the other political parties that may be ruling in one or more provinces or building up political agitations for democratic rights. Her second great leadership test will be in dealing with the army. She cannot afford to make the mistake committed by Cora Aquino and come to power with the help of even a section of the army, in the unlikely event of a split amongst the Generals or the Jawans. Both the leaders have tried to leave the bitterness of the passing generation behind and together place India-Pakistan relations on the track of durable good neighbourliness in the days of dimming light on the horizon of international politics, regional as well as global, which was good to have something to hope for.<sup>35</sup>

In fact, in the eighties, the situation changed radically. The pattern of role playing, designed and implemented during most of the Nehru years, became irrelevant, even more so than during the Indira Gandhi years. In the other hand,

India's new and the growing determination to become a hegemonic power in South Asia required the continuous expansion of military clout and its eventual utilization. This role, already initiated by Indira Gandhi, was further developed by Rajiv Gandhi with Indian intervention in Sri Lanka and the Maldives, and with India's new determination to use, wherever necessary, the threat of her power to bring other nations of the region in line with India's goals. The focus on South Asia continued. In fact, it became even more concentrated since solid foundations had been laid by his mother for a leading Indian role in South Asian Politics. So the main thrust of Rajiv Gandhi's policy continued in the same direction and made it the focal point of India's foreign policy behaviour.

However, while orienting India's policy even more in the regional direction, Rajiv Gandhi, very early in his political career, had also evinced a far greater interest in global affairs than his mother. And there were clearly concerted attempts, during his mandate, to internally define and externally play an international role that was not linked only to India's national interests. A new international role was conceived, but it had none of the characteristic features of the Nehru era. Features such as moderate anti-imperialist rhetoric, emulation and mediation that Nehru had deployed were no longer relevant in the eighties. Besides, even if India had wanted to follow these goals, she could hardly do so since anti-imperialism in the classical sense had disappeared, since India had no longer anything to offer in terms of emulation for other countries, and since India was no longer a mediatory power. The times had indeed changed. To be more effective at the global level, India had to be more radical, more committed, more down-to-earth and more directly involved in concrete issues than before. Thus a series of factors can be attributed to the shaping of this new pattern at the different level. And right from the beginning, Rajiv Gandhi had displayed a penchant for international affairs. Its glamour was probably more attractive and interesting than mundane and highly intractable domestic issues. Besides, world affairs gave him high visibility, whose impact on the domestic scene could only be beneficial. According to one journalist.<sup>36</sup>

Whenever he came to the UN complex during his brief visit to New York, heads would turn and hearts would flutter. He looked handsome in his buttoned-to-the-neck Nehru jacket, he smiled a great deal, he was appropriately deferential to

more seasoned world leaders who had come to the UN that Autumn, and he made a couple of well-received speeches. Needless to say, media coverage of his trip was extensive and laudatory. Thus, Rajiv Gandhi did go beyond his predecessor in doing something that took India away from her immediate concern in many international issues with South Asia also mainly style with Benajir. International role playing virtually disappeared after Rajiv Gandhi. The string of Prime Ministers who succeeded him (V.P.Singh, Chandra Sekhar and Narasimha Rao) were either not interested in international affairs, or too encumbered with domestic politics, or too involved in regional politics to take any interest in designing a global role. The little signs of interest that did emerge during the Gulf War were short-lived; and any attempt to do something to ease the situation proved abortive. This was partly due to the fact that India was no longer a nation to whom the international community turned to manage a crisis, and partly due to the fact that India was no longer a nation to whom the international community turned to manage a crisis, and partly due to the fact that the initiatives taken by the G.P.Singh Government or by Rajiv Gandhi as Opposition leader had other motives than really doing something to manage the crisis. Though Rajiv Gandhi's decision to project himself as a mediator in the Gulf crisis was a manifestation of the interest he had developed in international affairs. It was overshadowed to quite an extent by his very obvious intention of gaining some domestic political mileage in the forthcoming elections.

The V.P.Singh Government's decision to send an emissary to Baghdad, Washington and Moscow was neither well-planned nor well thought-out, without any broad proposals to extricate the area from the critical situation. Besides, the whole initiative was carried out at the foreign minister's level, which did not give the political weight to the Indian action that was needed to have any meaningful impact. Furthermore, it would seem that the India's interest in the Gulf Crisis during the V.P.Singh mandate was influenced more by the desire to rescue 180,000 Indians stranded in Kuwait and Iraq than of really wanting to play a mediatory role.

The Chandra Shekhar government was in an even worse situation. It played less of an international role than the preceding government. Neither the Prime Minister nor his foreign minister, V.C.Shukla, were interested in or concerned with

what was happening in the world. Both of them were completely bogged down by domestic affairs, though South Asian or Regional Matters were rather neglected.

Domestic constraints for the Narasimha Rao government are equally considerable, almost comparable to some of his predecessors. He is neither firmly installed, since he does not have a comfortable majority in Parliament, nor does he have a firm control over the Congress Party since he has often been challenged by formidable contenders who are out to dethrone him. Therefore, notwithstanding his considerable knowledge of foreign affairs – much more than any of the other post-Rajiv Prime Ministers – it is hardly possible for him to think out and shape a new global policy for India. India's foreign policy will, therefore, remain tilted on the regional side, the basic underpinning of which is hegemony over South Asia.

The rapprochement that characterized Pakistan India relations during 1982 and the early part of 1983 began to unravel in August – September 1983, when the top Indian leaders issued statements sympathizing with the opposition agitation in Pakistan. Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi expressed her regrets on the efforts of the Pakistan government to suppress the anti-government agitation launched by the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD), a 9 Party Opposition coalition dominated by the Pakistan People's Party (PPP). She also expressed concern over the torture of Mrs. Nusrat Bhutto and demanded the release of Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan.<sup>37</sup> These views were orchestrated by India's Minister for external affairs, Narasimha Rao, and India's ambassador to Pakistan, K.D.Sharma. The latter declared that the Indian leadership had simply conveyed the sentiments of the Indian people on the developments in Pakistan and that if the rights of the people were violated in the neighboring country, India could neither stay quiet nor turn a blind eye towards such development.<sup>38</sup>

The drift in their relations was accelerated by several other developments. India's objection to the dinner hosted by Ziaul Haq for the Islamabad-based diplomats at Gilgit (Nov. 1983); India's charge that the Pakistani authorities had kidnapped two domestic servants of an Indian diplomat in Islamabad who, however, were found to be in New Delhi after a couple of days (Jan, 1984), reciprocal expulsion of airline employees based in Lahore and New Delhi (Feb. 1984); Public reaction in Pakistan to the hanging of Maqbool Butt (a Kashmiri leader)

in India (Feb 1984) and the consequent postponement of India's information minister, visit to Pakistan ( Feb. 1984).

The Foreign Secretaries of Pakistan and India met briefly in Feb, 1984 at Udipur while participating in the SAARC meeting, but it was not until their May 1984 meeting at Islamabad that an attempt was made to retrieve the dialogue.<sup>39</sup> They signed a protocol on group travel, and three important visits were scheduled – India's information minister, H.K.L Bhagat's once postponed visit to Pakistan 7-11 July; Pakistan's Foreign Secretary's visit to India : 18-21 July; and the 2<sup>nd</sup> meeting of the Pakistan-India Joint Commission at New Delhi in the first half of August.

However, only Bhagat's visit could take place because a new crisis erupted when India accused Pakistan of active involvement in the Sikh insurgency in East Punjab. This was accompanied with severe criticism of Pakistan's arms procurements and an assertion that Pakistan might soon attack India.<sup>40</sup> There was an unusual movement of troops by the two countries in the border areas in Sept-Oct., 1984, coupled with a report by Western sources that India was planning to launch an air attack on Pakistan's nuclear installations.<sup>41</sup> The consequent escalation in tension generated from in Pakistan that if something was not done to reverse these negative trends, the two countries might be plunged into another armed conflict. While the two governments were still not sure about the course of action for defusing tension the assassination of Indira Gandhi on October 31, 1984, halted the escalation process. Ziaul Haq went to New Delhi to participate in her funeral and assured India's new Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, of "full support of the government of Pakistan in efforts to build a relationship of trust and confidence between our two countries and create a secure and tranquil environment in the region."<sup>42</sup> Rajiv Gandhi reciprocated these sentiments in his reply to Ziaul Haq. "The many common ties between our peoples provide a good basis for a relationship of mutual trust, peace, friendship and cooperation between our two countries."<sup>43</sup>

It was after an informal meeting between the foreign secretaries of the two countries on the eve of the SAARC meeting at Male, the Maldives, Feb, 1985, brief meeting between Ziaul Haq and Rajiv Gandhi in March 1985 at Moscow where they attended the funeral of the Soviet leader chernenko, and detailed meeting between the two foreign secretaries at Islamabad in April 1985, that the bilateral dialogue

was revived. The joint communiqué issued at the conclusion of the April talks reiterated the desire of the two sides to forge a peaceful and cooperative relationship on the basis of the principles enunciated in the Simla Agreement. They also agreed to adapt various measures to "diversify and strengthen" cooperation in various fields as well as "to create an atmosphere of mutual confidence, harmony and trust."<sup>44</sup>

### **Zia Rajiv Parleys**

These positive sentiments were reinforced by Pakistan's foreign minister's two visits to India, in April 1985 to participate in the NAM ministerial meeting, and in July 1985 for the 2<sup>nd</sup> meeting of the Joint Commission. Ziaul Haq and Rajiv Gandhi met four times during Octo-Dec. 1985 : Octo : New York ; Nov : Muscat, Oman, December ; Dhaka and New Delhi. The last of these meetings a step over in New Delhi on Ziaul Haq's way back from the Maldives proved most fruitful. Ziaul Haq and Rajiv Gandhi agreed in principle on expansion of trade and economic relations, and decided to reopen the dialogue on contentious political issues. They also made a verbal commitment not to attack each other's nuclear installation.

As a follow up of the Zia Rajiv Parleys, a number of positive developments took place in Jan-Feb 1986 which included five high level meetings. An agreement was also signed to open telephone circuits between Lahore and Lucknow, Delhi and Islamabad, and Delhi and Lahore. They also agreed to resume negotiations for the reopening of the Khokra par – Munabao route.

The Finance Minister's meeting produced an agreement in principle to allow the private sector to trade in 42 items. The two sides agreed to strengthen telecommunication, telex air links and shipping arrangements. The defence secretaries discussed the Siachen glacier issue and related matters. The foreign secretaries exchanged views on the no-war pact and the treaty of friendship, text of the treaty for no attaching each other's nuclear installations, and the overall framework of their relations.

The positive impact of these developments could not crystallize as these were punctuated with polemical exchanges on Pakistan's acquisition of weapons from the US. The Indian government employed all normal diplomatic channels as well as visits of Cabinet members and senior officials to commence the U.S

Administration that it should discontinue its military assistance programmes for Pakistan. Vice President George Bush's visit to India in 1984 and Rajiv Gandhi's visit to the U.S. in 1985 provided India with useful opportunities to express strong opposition to the U.S. arm transfer to Pakistan which naturally irritated Pakistan.

### **Zia's India Policy**

The much famous "Peace Offensive" on India also needs to be discussed here. General Zia adopted the policy of covert war with India. It meant a war on all fronts, barring the actual battle front. The "Peace Offensive" was another strategic move in the regard. Pakistan offered India a No War Pact. India Instead of accepting it, offered a broader peace treaty which unfortunately impinged upon the sovereignty of Pakistan directly. Pakistani objections were mainly to India's insistence that Pakistan should make a unilateral declaration not to concede any part to any foreign power on its territory. This gave Pakistan a clear out leverage over India and a pro-pakistan agenda tirade followed. This was indeed a diplomatic success to be rejoiced at by Pakistan. No doubt, the Pakistan Ambassador in India was right when he said: "For the first time in our history of relations with India, we have been able to force India to take a defensive posture in diplomacy."<sup>45</sup> Pakistan also meddled in India's internal ethnic problems. The Govt. of India has been accusing Pakistan of aiding and abating terrorism in Punjab.

At the newly formed forum of SAARC also, Zia maintained hostile postures and was successful in lobbying against India on several issues including the Indian intervention in Sri Lanka after the July 1987 adventure war too close and the two countries almost came to the brink of an actual war.

The Zia era in Pakistan saw the emergence of another new issue between the two countries. This was the Siachen Glacier issue. A limited war has been going on between the two countries on this issue, with considerable losses to both sides. This has further complicated the relations between the two countries.

Thus looking at the whole eleven years' span of the Zia era in Pakistan we can safely infer that Pakistan's India Policy during this period was a bundle of contradictions; contradictions in proclamations and practice. It was rather a hawkish policy phrased in some of the most deceptive words and presented in an enchanting

manner. As a result, it is often claimed that the military government in Pakistan after taking power in that country has made a special new demarche in extending a hand of friendship to India and has undevoured to accelerate the process of normalization of relations with us. The fact however, speak otherwise.<sup>46</sup>

According to one observer he "produced an absolutely brilliant India Policy. Seek peace on the battlefield, step up the ideological war. Whip us a climate in which the sun of friendship was kept blazing by sweet rhetoric. And in the shadow of that sun ram and give sanctuary to those force within India which could fight for theocracy. Do not use the Pakistani Army to try and break up India for three very good reasons. First, because it could not, even if it wanted to. Second, it was needed to run things at home. Third, there was far cheaper away of achieving the same aim – make Indians fight themselves."<sup>47</sup> His personal brilliance and finesse apart, such an India policy was highly detrimental for the betterment of Indo-Pak ties as also for the maintenance of peace in the region. It was rightly observed by the Indian Press after his tragic end in the air crash on 17 August 1988. "Indo-Pak relations reached their Nadir during his rule."<sup>48</sup>

"An Ultra-rightist dominance in Pakistan has always thrived upon its hostility towards India. Because of the lack of popular legitimacy, the legitimacy of a 'hostile India does help along with other similarly presumed induced and propogandized threats."<sup>49</sup>

Apart from the domestic reasons, Zia used the pretext of a hostile India to make the maximum out of the existing international situation in this part of the world. This also helped him in successfully countering the growing Indian influence in West Asia as also in proving his Islamic credentials both at home and abroad.

### **Indo-Pak Relation under Rajiv – Benezir Leadership**

Then there was a shift from Zia to Benazir in Pakistan as in India fromn Indira Gandhi to his son Rajiv Gandhi. Benajir's coming to power was hailed not only in Pakistan but also equally warmly in India. Since it was expected, on the basis of her earlier statements from time to time, that her arrival on the Pak scene would help improve bilateral relations between India and Pakistan, speculations have been ripe

since that day as to what would be her India policy will there be a shift from General Zia's beaten track, or the sub-continent will continue to be the "Continent of Cricle". The shift was expected because premier Benazir has always stressed not only the improvement of ties but also of adding the dimension of friendship to these relations. This she has cherished with a degree of sentiment, common and natural among the people of the two nations. She wrote : "I symbolize a new generation, I had never been an Indian. I had been born in independent Pakistan. I was free of the complexes and prejudices which had torn Indians and Pakistanis apart in the bloody trauma of Partition. Perhaps the people were hoping that a new generation could avoid the hostility that had now led to three wars, burying the bitter past of our parents and grand parents to live together as friends. And I certainly fell it possible as I walked the warm and welcoming streets of Shimla. Aid we have to be divided by walls of hatred or would so, like the once warring countries of Europe come to bring with each other.<sup>50</sup>

Therefore the question is will there be a fundamental change in the attitude and approaches of Pakistan's ruling leaders due to Benazir's political personality, or should it be interpreted that a vibrant and new leadership in Pakistan might prove a positive factor in forging better relationship with India ? Whether India and Pakistan will be able to dispel the lingering mutual misperceptions and ment away historical hostility persisting between them. To what an extent Rajiv Gandhi and Benajir Bhutto will be able to contain extra regional powers' interventionist role in the sub-continent ? These are some of the key questions that are of seminal importance in analyzing and evaluating relations between the two countries. Perhaps one may proceed from the central premise that leadership in each country would not be tempted into risking either the country's vital national interests or one's political career sheer out of clan for improving relations between the two countries. The test of their states manship lies in how best they can serve the interests of their respective societies without jeopardizing the interest of the other party . There are a large number of bilateral problems facing the leaders of India and Pakistan. On some of these contentious issues, Pakistani leader Mrs. Bhutto has clearly reiterated that these would be solved within the framework of the Simla Agreement. She also expressed optimism about the positive result from her meeting with Rajiv Gandhi

during the fourth SAARC Summit held in Islamabad at the end of December, 1988. Rajiv Gandhi also came back home commended that the policies of the PPP "will be much better than the previous policies". Such an optimism on the part of Indian leader has some justification in the roots of political background of Mrs. Bhutto. Her rise to political power is a unique phenomenon. Having witnessed the gruesome drama of her father's exit and execution, and having suffered and sustained solitary confinement as well as political exile for a long period, she refused to surrender before the authoritarian regime of Zia and more an easy exit for him. Despite being a Young Muslim lady, she demonstrated political audacity and indomitable will power to carry her relentless struggle on against the bloodcurdling threats of the Zia regime. This is bound to make her a different leader from predecessors, even including her father. Given the background, she represents the forces of democracy and modernity fundamentally opposed to these of militarism and orthodoxy. Her intellectual schooling at Harvard and Oxford has helped her to imbibe liberal values of democracy, and of rule of law. Soon after assuming the office, Mrs. Bhutto reiterated that she would endeavour her best to strengthen roots of democracy in Pakistan. Simultaneously she cautioned the countrymen against antidemocratic forces which are bent upon reversing the process of democracy.<sup>51</sup> In her speech she emphasized that here priority would be to tackle the problems of poverty, economic stagnation, and spur the developmental tasks to ensure social and economic justice. This, she emphasized, required conditions of peace and stability at home and conflict free security environment at regional and global levels.

In her first address to the nation on radio and television, Benajir vehemently attacked Zia's "narrow-based foreign policy", which she added, had 'created an unnecessary environment of security threat for the country.'<sup>52</sup> She underlined the necessity for making a realistic assessment of the situation, including Pakistan's Afghan Policy. On Pakistan's foreign relations, she "hoped for stronger links with the United States, better relations with Soviet Union once its pull out from Afghanistan was completed, maintenance of traditional tier with China, consolidation of friendship with the Muslim countries and understanding with India."<sup>53</sup>

If she wants to, as she does, remove deep-seated hostility with India, she will have to minimize the role of military in the decision – making process. Because

over the years the military ruling elites have projected India as their arch enemy number one.

The process of normalization of relations between India and Pakistan has begun with the signing of two agreements between the two governments. The first agreement calls upon the two parties not to attack each other's nuclear installations. It also provides for exchange of locational data on nuclear facilities that include nuclear power and research reactors, fuel fabrication, uranium enrichment and reprocessing facilities. The first clause of article one of the agreement binds the two nations to refrain themselves from "undertaking, encouraging or participating directly or indirectly, any action aimed at causing the destruction of, or damage to, any nuclear installation or facility in the other country."<sup>54</sup> The second agreement is related to cultural cooperation that aims at "promoting and developing relation in the realms of art, culture, archaeology, education, mass media and sport". The third agreement is related to the avoidance of double taxation on income occurring from international air transport. These agreements have of course set in motion the process of reapproachment between the two countries. The then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi has described them as a 'break through' in the bilateral relationship of India and Pakistan. Prime Minister Benajir Bhutto has also expressed optimism that the agreements will contribute to creating "momentum for peace and friendship between the two countries. Undoubtedly, these are vitally important confidence – building measures towards better mutual understanding. Both the leaders have expressed their willingness to make a new beginning in the relations of New Delhi and Islamabad in the interests and welfare of their people as well as for peace, tranquility and stability in the sub-continent. Benajir reiterated that since both the governments in India and Pakistan are democratically elected, they have "legitimacy" to enter into political dialogue to sort out bilateral problems. It is true that she has good opportunity to respond favourably to India's friendly gestures and improve relations with it. This opportunity should not be missed by both the leaders. Moreover, international climate is also propitious for such a beginning.

Benajir Bhutto it seems is picking up the threads from where her late father was made to leave. She has already stated that she wants the historic Shimla Pact

to be the basis of relationship with India. She has dismissed the "No-War Pact" would resolve the different issues between the two countries ? We felt that the Shimla Agreement had a legitimacy, and we must approach step by step the problem of resolving the issue to help build the confidence as we emerge from one day to another.<sup>55</sup> She has already emphasized upon the need to improve the people to people relations. As a result of such an approach, vis and travel facilities have been made easier. And according to press reports. Bilateral trade between the two countries has doubled in the first three months of the democratic government. In these connections, SAARC has added a new dimension to improving the Indo-Pak ties. Several programmes to be undertaken under the aegis of SAARC, would positively improve Indo-Pak relations. These include the SAARC passport scheme, the holding of South Asian Cultural Festivals and the SAARC Audio Visual Exchange Programme. Thus India and Pakistan could now under the auspices of SAARC, have the option of taking all those steps which they otherwise could not because of their domestic political compulsions.

Of late, two issues have been greatly impinging upon Indo-Pak relation, the First being Indian acquisitions regarding Pak aid and sympathy to the terrorists operating in Punjab, and the second, the Siachin Glacier issue. Of course, both are Zia legacies. Regarding the first, Prime Minister Ms. Bhutto has assured the Indian Government that she would make maximum effort to stop help to the territories. Tough she has not been much successful in it, yet, for this, Mrs. Bhutto need not be blamed. She is sincere when she says that playing the Sikh card would be disastrous for Pakistan. Her problem is that the mischief in Punjab remains the exclusive preserve of the ISI. Here the Indian Govt will have to exhibit patience and show restraint considering her precarious conditions vis-à-vis the Army and Opposition ruled Punjab. The other issue was the Siachin Glacier. She has avoided any scathing attack on India regarding this and has expressed a keen desire to resolve this issue through peaceful negotiations under the Shimla Agreement. She noted with regret that this was the First ever violation of the Shimla Pact by India. Here also a cooperative and compromising Indian stand would be helpful in resolving this complicated issue and talks regarding this were expected to be held in Islamabad.

Thus, from all account the first months of Benajir Bhutto's rule were indeed encouraging. There was indeed a noticeable shift in Pakistan's India Policy. The shift was manifested clearly in two aspects, first, the overall improvement of the environment in which the two countries interest. Severity of propaganda has gone down and measures for the restoration of confidence and goodwill have been taken. Second, the importance of people to people relationship has been recognized and preliminary steps have been taken in this regard, in the form of relaxed visa and travel facilities. The exchange of information material both through bilateral and SAARC channels has been agreed to. And it has been decided to do more in this regard. However, much will depend upon the stability of the democratic government. Any internal crisis, leading to the destabilization of the Govt. can obstruct this process of normalization. But given the state of affairs now, we can look towards the scheduled meeting of the joint Indo-Pak Commission in July 1989, with a degree of optimism.

Concludingly, Indo-Pak relations should be conducted more cautiously, albeit with a greater sense of understanding each other's susceptibilities. One need not be over enthusiastic due to the induction of democratic order in Pakistan. Also one need not be too much pessimistic about the "atmospheric changes" arguing well for bilateral relationship of the two countries.

There is a good will; but this is not the end. Indeed, a lot is yet to be achieved before the shift in Pakistan's India Policy is clearly manifested. It will depend upon a number of factors apart from those directly concerned with India and Pakistan. But the trend so far has been encouraging and whatever we have achieved in the form of mutual understanding to shun confrontation and return to normalcy is very significant. To quote Winston Churchill, "This is not the end, it is not even the beginning of the end."

With Zia's violent death and Benajir Bhutto's fall, new political scenario started in Pakistan. Nawaj Sharif became the Prime Minister of Pakistan having won the elections with an unprecedented majority in the National Assembly. His stand on India-Pakistan relation was forthright and unambiguous. He developed the permanent state of hostility between the two countries. Nawaj Sharif declared his intention to initiate dialogue with India to resolve all outstanding problems. It may be

remarked here that during his earlier tenure as Prime Minister (1990-99), he had met former Prime Minister of India P.V. Narasimha Rao several times during international conferences and he had got a direct line with earlier Prime Minister Chandra Sekhar. Prime Minister Dev Gowda had written to the former Pakistan Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto offering her resumption of constructive dialogue between the two countries, Benajir procrastinated in responding to the Indian initiative. It can be hoped that Nawaz Sharif will pick up the thread and reopen the communication between the two countries.

The new environment in the world dictates that India and Pakistan normalize their economic relations as early as possible. The new government in Pakistan headed by a businessman should be aware of the mutual benefit that will accrue to both the countries. India could be helpful to Pakistan in several spheres in its economic development.

However, the main problem that Nawaz Sharif may face would be how much autonomy he would be allowed in decision-making by the Pakistan's military bureaucratic establishment. It is known that in Pakistan's relations with India, Kashmir, the nuclear weapons, etc. are the issues on which the establishment does not allow the elected governments to have any say. An analysis of the evolution of India-Pakistan relations during the fifty years since the independence of the two neighbours will, however, be helpful in understanding the formidable task the leaders of the two countries face. The roots of the disputes to go back into history, religious and politics of the Indian sub-continent and developments that led to the emergence of independent India and Pakistan in 1947. The partition of the sub-continent and the consequent bloodshed, violence and disorder left behind a trail of bitterness and rancer. This also promoted an enemy image of each other which has created a midset of hostility and antagonism both at the elite and also at the popular level.

Although these are early days in the long process of normalizing India-Pakistani relations, most South Asian have welcomed the new approach of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and I.K.Gujral of working together to manage the conflicts and find solutions to the problems between the two countries. In India, there is a sense that there will never be a better opportunity to stop cross-border terrorism and

the long confrontation with Pakistan over Punjab and Kashmir which has already cost over 50,000 lives.

The new Indian Prime Minister is one of the few Indian leaders who enjoy the goodwill of a large section of the Pakistani intelligensia. The opportunity this historic "fluke" offers must not be wasted. Even more important now than the historic fluke is the pathbreaking courage shown by both the prime ministers, and particularly Prime Minister Nawaj Sharif, in taking on the hardliners. Gujral too, despite the fragility of this government, has gone more than half way to respond to his counterpart so that, so main Nawaj Sharif noted at the Male Summit both countries could perhaps learn to live like civilized nations and put these uncivilized activities behind us. Fortunately it seems that the majority of the people of Pakistan have transcended the hatreds associated with the partition, fuelled regularly by wars and the fomenting of communal feeling, and now desire, like most Indians' friendship.

However, with Zia's violent death and Benazir Bhutto's return to power, democracy for restored. But her first tenure in office (1988-90) was noticeable for its dismal failure to live up to expectations which given the economic and constitutional constraints, she was, she was unable to fulfill.

Benazir's fall however, had far more to do with the fact that she had "stepped on the army's toes" than the charges of corruption and political horse-trading held out against her. More, here privatization and pro-US policies made the regime "Barely distinguishable from its Muslim League rivals. Under Nawaj Sharif (1990-93) it was more of the same confrontationist politics, a crisis in Sind and Politics, and charges of corruption, all of which had dogged his predecessor. The disparate character, of his Islam's Jumhoori ittehad (JI) coalition with such in incompatible constituents as the Pakistan Muslim League and the Awami National Party, the Jamat - I - Islami and both the Mohajir Quami Mahaz and the Jamat-I-Ulema-I-Islam made the government rickety, unstable. Ultimately Nawaj Shariff found that there were too many circles to square. While his attempt to reconcile the twin goals of economic liberalism and islamisation trapped him no end, his Gulf War policy and the Shariat Bill drove the last nails in his political coffin. During her second administration (1993-99), Benazir was politically in a much stronger position

than in her first tenure and seemed headed for a full five year term. Sadly, besides the endemic Civil War in Sind, Punjab again proved to be her nemesis.

Hot on her heels, Nawaz Sharif was to return to power with a "crushing victory" an over-whelming, absolute majority in the National Assembly with 135 seats in the bag against the PPP's nearly 19 while Punjab was his key area of support, both in the NWFP and Baluchistan, the PML made impression electoral gains.

Initial successive electoral gains. Notorious eighth Amendment, ousting an unsympathetic President browbeating a recalcitrant Supreme Court into submission and maneuvering a change in Army House made him no dearth of enemies.

In sum, he squandered his political capital somewhat recklessly. All the while glaring social inequities, deepening incidence of poverty and massive inequalities in access to power made the state increasingly vulnerable Pakistan's five nuclear tests (May 1998) brought their own compulsion for the impact of sanctions on an economy teetering on the brink of collapse led remorselessly to the declaration of a State of emergency (July, 1998).

On the foreign policy front, Shari has already indicated his desire to resume a bilateral dialogue with New Delhi, whether such a dialogue would create tangible results is debatable, but it would certainly improve the overall atmospherics. Key questions still abound about Sharif being given the latitude by the establishment to suggest variations of the present approach in Kashmir, the nuclear questions, mutual reduction of military budgets, bilateral trade and people to people conducts. The Establishment which has become an arbiter of sorts, though the creation of the Council for Defense and National Security (CDNS), would be unlikely to allow Sharif substantial beeway to seeking resolution of its outstanding problems with Indians. For the moment, they would be content in allowing Sharif to resume a bilateral dialogue, to do away with the impression that Pakistan was the spoiler of peaceful negotiations in South Asia. Such an approach would also please Washington which has supported the resumption of a bilateral dialogue.

There is a feeling that Sharif's overtures to New Delhi to resume the bilateral dialogue are necessitated by economic compulsion. Without reducing tensions with India, Sharif would be hard pressed to ask the armed forces to curtail

their expenditures. But given the fact that since 1988, the armed forces consider large military budgets necessary, irrespective of the shape of the economy (Pakistan's economy has been in this type of crisis a few years ago as well). Secondly, any normalization of relations with India would mean resigning from its long held position on Kashmir, a policy that would bring both political opposition and the Establishment together.

On Afghanistan, during the election campaign, Sharif was at pains to point out the mistake of unabashedly supporting the Taliban. Three factors seemed to have determined Sharif's approach to the Afghan question. First, support to the Taliban has led to Islamabad's isolation in Central Asia, which during his first term in office was given enormous importance. Sharif has always believed that the Central Asia Republic could be used as bulwark against India and through closer ties with Central Asia, Islamabad could attempt secondly, being alliance partners of the Awami National party, which can oppose the creation of the Taliban for the fear of a Pashtun backlash, Sharif also had to criticize Benazir's policy, despite it enjoying strong support from a section of the establishment, notably the ISI. Thirdly, Pak-Iran estrangement over Afghanistan could be rectified, if Sharif is able to change tracks in Afghanistan and use his government's influence with the Taliban to work out a broad coalition with at least one of the major ethnic/sectarian groups. Having learnt some lessons from his first term in office, it could be expected that Nawab Sharif would not attempt to take on the establishment immediately. Despite the large numerical majority in Parliament, Sharif will seek to draw a careful compromise in keeping his political interests untouched, while trying to tackle the economic men in the country. Similarly, in other areas Sharif would try to work within the newly created system. Such an approach would rule out any major deviations from its present India Policy. Despite overwhelming economic compulsions, Sharif would be unlikely to make moves for normalization of relation with India. Similarly on Afghanistan, Sharif would seek to work with Washington to make the Taliban and other ethnic factions come into a broad based coalition.

Relations between India and Pakistan during the past four and a half decades have been marked by mutual distrust, acrimony, suspicion and antagonism. Both countries have witnessed changes of regime in their respective

capital, raising hopes of optimism as well as seeing them being dashed to grounds during this period. The event of Congress (I) government led by Prime Minister Narasimha Rao in New Delhi in July revived the hopes of providing fresh impetus to the process of rapprochement between New Delhi and Islamabad. The concomitant factor was the advent of Islami Jamhjoori Ittched (IJI) government led by Nawaj Sharif in Islamabad in early November 1990 which also made some pronouncements designed to normalize relations with India.

In July, 1991 new government handed by P.V.Narasimha Rao was installed in office in New Delhi. The common factor between the two governments in New Delhi and Islamabad was that both were democratically elected regimes hence speculation that serious attempts would be made to rid their mutual relation of the Jinx that has taken a heavy toll on both sides of the border during the past four and a half decades. Soon after taking over Prime Minister, P.V.Narasimha Rao said in Press interview on July 6 this year that his Government would endeavour to normalize relations with Pakistan by forging better links between the people and two governments while keeping aside matters where reconciliation was not immediately possible. He further added, "India has always extended a hand of friendship toward Pakistan, we continue to persuade them and continue to forge friendship and good relation in as many fields as possible."

Prior to the advent in New Delhi of Congress(I) Government headed by Prime Minister P.V.Narasimha Rao, the Predecessor government of Prime Minister Chandra Shekhar and made attempts to bring Indo-Pakistan relations on an even keel, but without any tangible achievement. The Foreign Secretary level third round of talks between India and Pakistan held in Islamabad from December 18 to 20 though registered "some progress" towards defusion of tension in bilateral relations but Kashmir issue, Pakistan's complicity in abetting terrorism in Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir and mutual apprehension's about each other's nuclear programmes remained the main irritants which evaded any satisfactory solution, while apprising Lok Sabha about the Progress made at the third round of parleys between India and Pakistan. The then Foreign Minister of India, V.C.Shukla told Lok Sabha on December 1990 that India would initiate political level talks with Pakistan as soon as the time for it was "propitious".

The then Prime Minister Candra Shekar's style of cultivating "first name term" with his Pakistan counterpart, Nawaz Sharif, since the two first met in Male in the November 1990 at the SAARC Summit, has given rise to speculations in political circle in New Delhi about the beginning of a new era of ..... cordial in the subcontinent. Reinforcing this was Prime Minister Chandra Sheehan's style of having talks with Nawaz Sharif fairly frequently over telephone a step which ignored the tradition of successive Indian Prime Ministers to deal with his or her Pakistan counterpart with a certain degree of circumspection. However, this over enthusiasm of Chandra Shekar government failed to bring any diplomatic dividends for India despite its claim that its Pakistan policy was firmly under control.

Despite the major irritants, both New Delhi and Islamabad excised enough caution to allow any let up in the ongoing Foreign Secretaries level talks between the two countries. The fourth round of Parleys between the foreign secretaries of India and Pakistan scheduled to be held towards the end of February 1991 in New Delhi was postponed because of Pakistan's Premier's visit to Beijing during that period. However, in early August 1991, it was announced by Islamabad that the Pakistan Foreign Secretary Shahriyar M. Khan would be visiting New Delhi on August 18, 1991 as a special envoy of Pakistan Prime Minister to convey to the Indian government Pakistan's desire to resolve all issues and problems by "fair play and justice".

Nawaz Sharif government's decision to send its foreign secretary to India for talks was welcomed by India. While briefing media persons in New Delhi in this regard, a spokesperson of Ministry of External Affairs said in New Delhi on August 8 this year that the Indian government had always been willing to have discussions with Pakistan to reduce tension in bilateral relations. It was hoped that specific and realistic suggestions for resolving critical issues would be forthcoming. The sudden decision of Nawaj Sharif government to send Shahari yaras "special envoy" to New Delhi especially on the eve of the Commonwealth Summit and the ensuing session of the United Nations General Assembly was seen in political circles in New Delhi as essentially a public relations exercise to help Pakistan : "Internationalize" the Kashmir issue.

However, on his arrival in New Delhi on August 18 this year, Pakistan foreign secretary, Shahariyar M. Khan his counted any misapprehension by asserting that he had come "in all sincerity, please be sure that there is no element of our taking advantage of his visit." He further added that he had come a three-day visit as a special envoy of Pakistan's Prime Minister and his current visit "Stand on its own and should not be linked to the on-going dialogue between the two countries. By making such statement, the special envoy tried to dispel the impression that his visit was intended at taking political advantage. However, the observers in New Delhi felt that Pakistan had taken the exercise of sending a special envoy to India in order to impress western capitals that on its part Islamabad continued to be sincere, flexible and accommodating in defusing the tension in bilateral relations. During his three day sojourn in New Delhi, Shahariyar M. Khan, special envoy of Pakistan Prime Minister, had meeting with Prime Minister, P.V.Narasimha Rao, Defence Minister, Sharad Power and Foreign Secretary, Muchkund Dubey. In his meeting with Indian Prime Minister, the special envoy delivered a message from Nawaj Sharif. Though the nature of contents about Pakistan Prime Minister's message to his Indian Counterpart could not be known but it was widely felt that Shahariyar in his meeting with Narasimha Rao had touched upon specifier though an elaborate case was made for getting out of the old mine sets so as to initiate determined efforts to normalize relations between the two countries.

Making a pointed reference to the message sent by Pakistan's Prime Minister through his special envoy, Prime Minister, Rao in an interview published in Khaleez Times, a Dubai-based English daily, datelined in August 27, 1991 said that the Nawaj Sharif had promised to do certain things to help improve bilateral ties when asked if there were any specific suggestions on Kashmir and nuclear arms race in the Indian subcontinents the Prime Minister said : "It is a general kind of suggestion. It remains general at the moment and presumably includes all issues". Asked to comment on Shahariyar's statement that the sincerity of Pakistani Prime Minister's desire to give a new orientation to the Indo-Pakistan Relations would be proven on the ground in ensuing weeks, Prime Minister of India said : "We will see what they mean by that, Nawaz Sharif promise a difference on the ground level. All

that one can say at the moment is we will wait and see for ourselves what difference there is .”

Similar feelings were expressed by Minister for External Affairs, Madhav Singh Solanki who in a Swuo motu statement made in Lok Sabha on August 23, 1991, said that India hoped that in the coming month, the message conveyed recently by the Pakistan Prime Minister, for normalizing relations would be translated into concrete action. He further added that the special envoy of Nawaz Sharif was apprised that India had consistently worked for the establishment of tension free and good neighbourly relations between the two countries within the framework of Shimla Agreement “We believe this to be in the interests of the people of our two countries and of peace and stability in the region.”

Commenting on his recent visit to New Delhi, Shahariyar M. Khan, Foreign Secretary of Pakistan said in Islamabad on August 25 this year that he had received an encouraging response from the Indian Prime Minister and other leaders to embark on a new chapter of friendly bilateral relation. With the impetus provided by Pakistan's assurance on a fresh, sincere effort to resolve its problems with India, the New Delhi was reportedly drawing up a schedule for bilateral contacts at various levels in the ensuing period which could include the Siachen imbroglio, cut in armaments by two sides, apart from the subjects that figured in the ongoing dialogue between the senior officers of both sides.

In view of the ongoing parleys between the senior officials of the two countries, it is obvious that there is genuine desire and willingness on both sides to defuse tension in their bilateral relations. The thorny issues like Kashmir problem, and misapprehension about each other's nuclear programmes should be shelved for the time being to keep the ongoing process of normalization of relation alive. It would be in the fitness of things to raise the level of talks the ministerial level and to thrash out the technicalities. And then summit level meeting between the Prime Minister of the two countries should be held as soon as possible.

Peaceful and friendly relations between India and Pakistan are well not only for both the countries but for the entire region of South Asia. This will also help in strengthening the SAARC. One can hope that leadership in New Delhi and

Islamabad would act judiciously to usher in an era of peace, prosperity and stability in the subcontinent.<sup>57</sup>

Indo Pakistan relations require a new thrust so that the two countries come out of fifty four years of bloody conflicts. This is possible only if the leaders on both sides have a dialogue with an open mind.

For the last 55 years Indian and Pakistani leaders have indulged in sheer self elusion, dreaming of friendship with Pakistan vis-à-vis India as a possibility, whereas the history of India-Pakistan relations negates any such possibility. Pakistan's sole objective has been made, through goodwill and generosity to find a peaceful solution to all our bilateral problems. We have been snubbed again and again.

Throughout the long years we have tried to find excuses for Pakistani actions. At first it was a military dictatorship in Pakistan which was to blame when Benajir was elected she spouted nothing but abuse at the United Nations Human Rights Commission, and every other for an imaginable, otherwise it was the ISI which sponsored and has carried out insurgency in Kashmir and other parts of India. There was this continuous refrain that the people of Pakistan wanted peace. Then faith was reposed in the business community to bring about change in India Pakistan relations. Pakistan was a creation of the two nation theory. The same was reduced to ashes when East Pakistan broke away from its western half. Kashmir remains the last fig leaf of the failed two-nation theory. Pakistan can never give up its claim and effort to internationalize the issue. Otherwise it stands to lose the very *raison d'être* for its existence. It is irrelevant which section of the Pakistani State is for peace or for confrontation, Pakistan as an entity cannot give up the Kashmir issue if it is to survive President General Musharraf has made it clear, in no uncertain terms that any progress in India – Pakistan relations depends on progress on the Kashmir issue. Whether it is commerce, people to people contacts, or cultural exchanges, there has to be a movement first on the Kashmir fronts. The question is how can India give any further concessions. Even if we were to agree to the LOC being converted into an international boundary, we would still be losing 55 percent of the territory which belonged to the erstwhile princely state of J & K. Pakistan has 35 percent and another 20 percent has given away unilaterally by Pakistan to China. So where is the room for further concessions? But Vajpayee is a ray of hope in the

surrounding darkness. He gave more importance to humanitarian than political issues : So, dialogue with an open mind is needed.

Vajpayee has not only invited Musharraf, but has given him undeserved legitimacy. It is difficult for the Pakistanis to challenge the CEO of Pakistan for declaring himself President, he has the strong argument that he has to talk to the leader of the world's largest democracy from a position of strength . Besides, it gives him a term of five years extendable at his own whim and fancy. He could always cite the example of his military predecessor Zia-Ul-Haque, who literally remained President for life.

This great yearning for a place in history seems to infect every leader in India. Is it the complex that India has had no great man since Gandhi and Nehru. Most great leaders of the world were born in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. The 20<sup>th</sup> century produced no awesome charismatic leaders, except perhaps for Nelson Mandela, that also if one wishes to place him on the same pedestal.

Nehru had his idealistic vision of Afro-Asian solidarity, particularly for an India-China détente. He led the Non-Aligned movement and fought colonialism on the world stage. There were misjudgements on Kashmir, Tibet, China and other matters. But he has assured his place in history. There are times when the personality of one man gives him far greater importance, on the world stage, than is warranted by the political, economic and military strength of his country. Nehru was one such personage.

Indira Gandhi made her name through war and not peace. The dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971 may well have been her greatest achievement coupled with the nuclear explosion in 1974. The emergency, Operation Bluestar and her economic policies left much to be desired but she has left her imprints on the sands of time. Her image of the "Durga" and destroyer of institutions will also not be forgotten.

Narasimha Rao became Prime Minister by accident; he was not even a Member of Parliament. He will be best remembered for initiating economic reform, demolition of the Babri Masjid, and corruption assuming gigantic proportions. The demise of the Congress also took place during his time. He was succeeded by Shri

V.P.Singh. The duration of short timed Prime Ministers like V.P.Singh, Dev Gowra and I.K.Gujral hardly made any everlasting impact on the domestic as well as on Foreign Policy fronts.

Now one come to the present Prime Minister. By making India a nuclear weapon power, he has already assured his place in history. However, there are very few other achievements in the past three of his tenure. The second generation of economic reforms has not taken off, there is no investor confidence in India and the Sangh Parivan is aligned against him. The BJP is losing ground in UP and Gujrat, and has no major presence in the other states in India. The NDA is glared together in an effort to keep the numbers on their side for the survival of this government. So Vajpayee takes the gamble by inviting Musharraf, after the failure of the cease-fire in Kashmir. The recent incidents in Tamilnadu have further tarnished the image of the BJP.

There is nothing to suggest, taking the past history of fifty years of deceit on the part of Pakistan, that this Summit can lead to a successful start of a new chapter. It would be too much to expect any concrete result in July, but it is equally doubtful if a process can be started which will eventually lead to peace or a final solution to peace or a final solution to the Kashmir problem. Bhutto's unfulfilled promises to Indira Gandhi, the Lahore visit followed by Kargil, the total disregard for the unilateral cease fire in Kashmir, do not augur well for an understanding of any kind between the two countries.

There are grave doubts if Musharaff can deliver the goods. There are many that feel that only a military dictator in Pakistan can dare to make concessions. It is becoming clearer that the Pakistani President/military dictator does not have the support of the political parties in Pakistan or the fundamentalist groups. The real test will come after the summit, when Musharaf will have to show some real progress in curbing terrorism in J & K, for the dialogue to continue towards a satisfactory outcome.

The West Asian Cauldron continues to boil and share seem no chances for any real peace in the region. Another long-standing dispute between Turkey and Greece, over Cyprus, is making some progress. CBMs have been instituted and

greater trade and cultural exchanges are taking place between the two sides. The foreign Minister of the two countries have been having cordial meetings. Turkey still adheres to Ataturk's principles and is not fundamentalist, though the religious parties have made considerable headway in the last decade.

The West Asian problem, and Kashmir, are more difficult to resolve because both have the involvement of die hard Islamic fundamentalists unlike Cyprus. This is the crux of the matter and it remains to be seen whether Musharraf can curb the Taliban, his own terrorists outfits operating out of Pakistan, and a Islamicised Pakistani army sympathetic to the Jihadis.

No doubt there has been US pressure. But Vajpayee has made this sudden, and unexpected, volte-face for his own reasons, the major one being to leave his footprints on the sands of time.<sup>58</sup>

The summit talks between Pervez Musharraf and Atal Behari Vajpayee, to be held at Agra during July 2001 is, therefore, a right step in the right direction.

Saner voices in Pakistan are asserting and urging those who fees concerned to end the five decade long Indo-Pak conflict on Kashmir. Find a solution and begin the battle against poverty. That is the message. Indo-Pakistan relations require a new thrust so that the two countries come out of these long years of bloody conflicts. This is possible only if the leaders on both sides have a dialogue with an open mind. This is what Mr. Vajpayee has been wanting. General pervez Musharraf, too, has suddenly shown a degree of willingness for talks. He has openly stated that he is coming to India to make history'. We need peace on the sub-continent will tackle poverty and that makes the history.

Atal Behari Vajpayee made this clear when he pointed out in his invitation to General Pervez Musharraf that our common enemy was poverty. Pakistan, on the economic front, needs peace even more than we do. The Indian economy has been growing at a steady 6 percent annually whereas Pakistan's has been hardly growing at all at around 2 percent. The General's recent decision to cut the defence budget for the first time in history – indicated that he recognizes that the jihad is becoming unaffordable Pakistan's Jihad foreign policy extends not just to Kashmir but to ago Afghanistan as well and increasingly the world is beginning to become

less tolerant of such an attitude of Pakistan. As APJ Abdul Kalam said 'a developed India 2020 , or even earlier, is not a dream. It need not even be a mere vision in the minds of many Indians. It is a mission we can, all take up and succeed'.

The Agra Summit had aroused 'unprecedented enthusiasm among the people of the subcontinent and no other Summit had ever done in the past. This was not the first Indian Pakistan Summit and other meetings between heads of the two countries have been held in equally historic circumstance unlike other Summits this was the first meeting to produce not even a joint statement as happened at Agra. The newly self-anointed President of Pakistan General Musharraf had taken to India a three-point agenda. First, he wanted India to accept the centrality of the Kashmir issue. Second, he wanted India to agree on a structured arrangement for talks on Kashmir. And thirdly, he wanted India to promise a time-frame for concluding an agreement on Kashmir.<sup>59</sup> Pakistan was going to focus only on this and as the President had himself stated he would agree to discuss anything else if there was time left. It is not difficult to know that Islamabad could not have been so ignorant not to know that this agenda could not succeed at the Summit. Then why did Musharraf press forward with this agenda. That is the essence of India-Pakistan relations. It would be naïve for anyone to believe that this agenda would have led to making of history. A yearning for changing history requires denial of past history. For this, it was necessary to jettison Simla Agreement of 1972 and the Lahore Declaration of 1999 which Gen. Musharraf announced atleast twice before and after the Summit.<sup>60</sup>

The failure of the Summit had come about because there was no negotiating space left for Gen. Musharraf from the narrow mandate he had taken from the political class in Pakistan in the run up to the Summit. From Qazi-Husain Ahmed of the Jama at-I-Islami to Gen. Gul Hameed, former Director of ISI they were unanimous that he should not develop cultural and economic relations with India until the Kashmir issue was resolved. This has won him on return from Agra support from the fundamentalist and the militants outfits. The question arises if Gen. Musharraf had known that his Kashmir line had no flexibility and was unlikely to provide any scope for a compromise what did he hope to get at Agra. The question is often asked does Pakistan want to solve the Kashmir question ? Gen. Musharraf had early and after his take over, had stated that tensions and conflicts between

India and Pakistan would remain even after the Kashmir issue is resolved. The only answer to this question is that Kashmir is not only a territorial issue between the two neighbours but an ideological dispute. As already noted it is the enemy image of India that lies at the root of Pakistan's hostility to India. Kashmir is not the cause of India Pakistan conflict but it is its consequence. The root of this conflict goes to the ideological dispute which had led to the partition in 1947. India Pakistan represent two ideologies and two world issues.<sup>61</sup> India seems unwilling to deal with the consequences of acknowledging the real problem. Kashmir is not the central issue in Indo-Pakistan relations it is the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.<sup>62</sup> Pakistan's India policy is also rooted in its insecurity vis-à-vis the larger neighbour. India is many times larger in size, population, economic strength and scientific and technical development. Therefore Pakistani establishments long term aim is to keep it engaged or somehow cut it down by divisions and splintering. That is why Pakistan's former ISI Director Ge. Javed Nasir has talked of inflicting thousands cuts on India or what the former foreign minister threatened that there would be hundreds of Kargil. The Agree Summit has not been able to fulfill the expectations of the people of India and Pakistan and was a failure in all respects but one. It has broken the deadlock between the two countries created in the wake of the Kargil war and the October 1999 military coup. The Agra Summit has also highlighted the complexity of the issues that bedevit the relations between the two countries and which do not admit of easy solutions.

Just as war is not an option for Pakistan it is no longer an option for India. Average person in both the countries is ready for a change having realized the futility of prolonged hostility which never seems to bring tangible results but add only more misery. At the ordinary level of existence the vast majority of the people of India and Pakistan would like nothing better than to consign the planners of both the countries to the neither region in perpetuity. If the impose has got prolonged beyond its natural life span, the Indian leadership is as much to blame. If Pakistan has artificially stunted its growth by remaining in India's shadow for half a century, the Indian leadership too become or trich like by adapting a Pak tinted worldview. whatever the sins of omission or commission in the past, the Indian leadership must appreciate the altered ground realities. Today, India and Pakistan are seen to be

the most painful squabber of the second half respecting Indians and Pakistanis felt ashamed of Mr. Klaus Natorp, a specialist on the Indian subcontinent, said in a dispatch in the 'Frankfurter Allegemein Zeitung' about the dilemma of foreign dignitaries visiting Pakistan over the Kashmir issue. "No guest can escape it (Kashmir). Pakistani politicians and military are obsessed by the theme", he wrote. Recently in her visit to United States, Benazir Bhutto was addressed as the 'Madam Prime Minister of India' by the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate in an official reception. Later on when he was asked about the mistake, he clarified that Benazir in her meeting with for two hours talked about Kashmir and India only. She did not make even a passing reference of Pakistan and other countries. Thus in his sub-conscious mind her picture as the Prime Minister of India has emerged. What the chairman was trying to point out was the obsession she carried about India. Later on she regretted for this.

But enough is enough much water has flown in Ravi since then we will have to stop it otherwise we will become a victim of laughing stock before the world. It is heartening to note that most of Pakistani top intellectual and right thinking persons have started thinking positively in this direction. Even Gen. Musharraf has asked the hardcore mullas and other elements to stop anti Indian propaganda. In 1930, Muhammad Iqbal saw the vision and got Pakistan after nearly two decades. On this 125<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the father of nation, can't one see another vision of a 'United India and Pakistan again'. The models are before us. The world is shrinking. Globalisation is the creed now. In the recent year we have seen the union of Vietnam, the collapse of Berlin was and the disappearance of communism. The sworn enemies of yesterday have become bosom friends rather brothers. The Germans can unite, Vietnams can unite. Efforts are being made to unite South and North Korea. The same can happen here also. Vasudhaiva Kutam Vakam is an old adage here and is a part of India's global vision.

We do not foresee this union today or tomorrow or in near future. But this can be reality say after 10 or 20 years or even after 50 years. But this will be possible only if we see this vision today and pave the way for it. There is no dispute in the world, which can not be solved. Particularly family disputes can not linger on forever. We have close cultural, emotional and family relations with the common people of

Pakistan. The division was artificial. The line of wagma war drawn on the hearts of the people. The sooner we met in the better it will be.

In this direction some beginning has to be made. Let us not touch the disputed issues. Bilateral trade, cultural and educational exchange should get precedence over the political matters. Let there be heart to heart talk between the people of both the countries. Mistrust can be replaced by trust and once it is done the problems of Kashmir and Karachi will evaporate. This was also what was visualized by Mahatma Gandhi nearly 50 years ago. "It is open to both the new states (India and Pakistan) to aim at ..... a family of independent world states. If by our efforts such a world federation of free and independent states is brought into being. The hope of the kingdom of God, otherwise called Ramarajya may legitimately be entertained. There can not be a better occasion to make a honest beginning for this than the proposed meeting of Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and Ge. Pervez Musharraf in July 2001 in the Historic town of Agra.

In 19<sup>th</sup> April, 2001, Prime Minister said his fresh offer of talks with Pakistan was subject to Islamabad "stopping cross-border terrorism and dismantling the terror infrastructure". He also reiterated his commitment to talks with elected representative and promised to create more jobs.

At a press conference in Srinagar at the end of his two-day visit to the state, Vajpayee said ; if Pakistan denounces the policy of terrorism and dismantles the terror infrastructure, I as the Prime Minister would waste no time in departing a senior foreign ministry official to discuss the modalities of talks with Islamabad. I'll send a foreign ministry official to Islamabad tomorrow to chalk out the agenda. India, he said was ready to discuss with Pakistan all issues including Kashmir which has remain unresolved for last 50 years.

Pakistan to welcome the offer. "I hope they'll reply because it's important that talks take place . But the talks can't be held urban we've militants stationed on the border."The doors are open for all, included elected representatives and various other sections of public opinion, who were interested in talks with the government. Justifying his move of fresh offer of friendship, he said how long will India and Pakistan continue to live in an atmosphere of violence and hatred. "There

must be an end to this. Despite failure and hopeful that my fresh offer of friendship will succeed : The issue of Kashmir has been dragging on for the last 50 years, but the changed global order following the Iraq war makes it necessary for the two countries to hold talks.<sup>63</sup>

In truth, there is considerable domestic opposition in both countries to resuming the dialogu. Since entrenched interests are opposed to normalizing bilateral relations, their resistance can be exaggerated and used by the political leadership to equivocate in this matter. Much depends on the political will of the two leaderships to explore the peace process, and how strongly international influence is exercised upon them to get serious.

Hopefully, the Indo-Pak leadership would be mindful of the systemic factors that favour the generation of political will to ; proceed with the bilateral dialogue and peace process. These disparate but wide ranging factors include: the several Track II efforts that are proceeding; attempts by common citizens to re-establish people to people contracts; and initiatives taken by SAARC and the chambers of commerce to enlarge bilateral trade relations. Besides, a new post-Simla generation is coming into positions of responsibility in both countries that is most largely concerned with economic betterment and less with dwelling on the stultifying memories of a bitter, conflictual past. A ray of hope , emerges from the fact that the twice-weekly .... that plies between New Delhi and Lahore continued to operate at full capacity at the height of the kargil conflict over six weeks ahead.<sup>197</sup> Pakistan's excluded the possibility of accommodation and acceptance of Indian Regional leadership as a means of ensuring their own national well being. After all, they defined their very rationale for existence as being "not-India", and the heritage of conflict had been intensified by orders of magnitude through the horrors of partition. A forthcoming approach on the part of New Delhi might conceivably have assuaged these concerns, but the Indians chose a policy of firmness. The armed conflict that immediately developed over Kashmir was seen in Pakistan as proof that India did not accept the legitimacy of the Muslim nation. Kashmir became the focus of relations between India and Pakistan as a quarrel over territory, but even more as the symbol of the struggle between Islamic Pakistan and secular India.

Thus from its very inception, Pakistan was an "insecurity State" that perceived itself not only as small and disadvantaged but as on the defensive against a real and present threat, with its survival at stake. Constructing a force within South Asia to balance India was not feasible because India was more powerful than any combination of other States within the subsystem". Thus Central element of Pakistan policy has been to reach outside South Asia to find support that might offset Indian dominance within the system and to avoid bilateral arrangements that would put Pakistan in a one-on-one relationship with India. Pakistan initially sought to offset geopolitics through religion : it was to be part of the universal community of believers, and as the first nation to be formed in the name of Islam felt that it should and would receive full support of the universal community of Muslims, the 'Ummah'. It was a matter of some convenience, that most of the 'ummah' lay to the west of Pakistan, lending the western part of the new nation depth vis-à-vis India.

Pakistan also saw itself in the vanguard of what would be many new nations coming to independence in the following years. Although little tangible support could be expected from that quarter for the time being, Pakistan derived satisfaction from its solidarity with Indonesia independence struggle and with the Arabs in their resistance to the creation of Israel.

While Pakistan recognized the fact of overwhelming American Predominance in an essentially unipolar world of 1947, it would be some time before Pakistan looked seriously for strategic support from a source that was so unclear and so distant. Pakistan's foreign policy, lauffeted from many sides, would go through a series of fairly well defined phases over the next half century. One element or another would be most prominent at any given time, but with little change, this menu of options would comprise the elements of the stream of Pakistan's foreign policy on it flowed over a very rocky bed defined by hostility toward a vastly stronger India.<sup>65</sup>

Pakistan infact had witnessed leadershiup vacuum. For the first time, this phenomenon came in evidence after the demise of Jinnah Ali Khan. In the eighties , after Bhutto's execution there was created a leadership vacuum. There is no dearth of political leaders in Pakistan. Nusrat Bhutto, Benazir Bhutto, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, Asgar Khan, Khan Wali Khan, G.M.Syed and others have there leaders of

Bhutto's stature. Benazir Bhutto tried in vain, to invoke street power by emulating the example of Phillipine's Cory Acquire to project a charismatic leadership<sup>66</sup> However, after General Zia-ul-Haq's death by aircrash hopes are being pinned on her in the November 16 election.

Since its inception there has been ideological confusion in Pakistan. It is an offshoot of the leadership syndrome. This confusion revolve around the issue of how to correlate the democratic aspirations of the people with their Islamic aspirations. Whenever this confusion was the worst confounded, there was created an ideological vacuum. At times attempts were made to fill the ideological vacuum. Formulation of ideology rests with the political leaders and intelligential. There is no dearth of politicians and intellectuals in Pakistan. What Pakistan lacks is the tradition of evolving consensus on certain vital issues of national concern, encompassing political, social, economic and cultural fields. Looking back, one finds, the responsibility of state building and nation building was developed upon the Muslim League, which had spearheaded itself as the vanguard of Pakistan movement. But it failed to give an ideological content to the movement, except for propounding Two Nation Theory, which did not rest on infallible grounds. Pakistani nation builder did not have a clear perspective on problems, much less to their solutions that the new state would face. A queer mixture of Islamism and secularism was reflected in the minds of Jinnah and Liaquat. The specific ideological confusion prevailed over constitution – making.

In this connection, it will be pertinent to refer to 1949 objective Resolution, which was pushed through by Liaquat Ali Khan. It took over five years to work out the resolution was framed, its wording in the first instance seemed to satisfy both the Islamists and the secularists or modernists. But when the reports of the Basic Principles Committee, which was appointed to work out the resolution, came out, it simply disappointed everybody.<sup>68</sup> The ideological confusion became manifest in the modification of reports one after the other, particularly in respect of Islamic provisions. This prompted Maulana Maudoodi to remark : "If a secular and godless, instead of Islamic constitution was to be introduced ..... what was the sense in all this struggle for a separate Muslim homeland. We could have and it all without that."<sup>69</sup>

In the wake of leadership vacuum, there prevailed ideological vacuum. Political leaders having been thrown to the oblivion by the bureaucracy and army, a lip-service continued to be paid to Islamic ideals for more than a decade and various forms of democracy were conceived and projected – such as –controlled”, “guided” and “basic” and were thrust upon the people much against their wishes.

To fill the ideological vacuum, Z.A.Bhutto's PPP raised fourfold slogan to formulate Pakistan's ideology : “ Islam is our faith , Democracy is our polity, Socialism is our economy and All-Power to the People”. Populist approach to politics led to 1970 elections – for the first time based on adult franchise and relatively free elections. It was not a mean achievement but it became a casualty of the leadership syndrome.<sup>203</sup>

Of late, Indo-Pak relations appear to have entered into a new phase. Conscious of the unfavourable political image created by his orgy of collecting arms from the U.S.A., China and the Arab countries, President Zia of Pakistan has held out to India to olive branch of a no-war pact. But this cannot disguise the contradictions inherent in the relationship between the two countries Pakistan's adventurism manifested itself in several wars, culminating in the war which led to the emergency of Bangladesh as a separate sovereign state. India herself had offered a no-war pact to Pakistan, but this was turned down by the latter. President Zia's offer of a no-war pact caught the Indian side totally off guard. Not surprisingly, India's procrastination over her reply was put forward in the Pakistani and Pro-Pakistani International press as a sign of her reluctance to mend the fences with that country. A flurry of aide memories criss-crossed between Islamabad and New Delhi while the two Ambassadors, Abdeus Sattar and Natwar Singh, made frantic air dashes to their respective capitals for urgent briefings.

Then came the visit of Mr. Agha Shali, Pakistani Foreign Minister, to New Delhi for talks with India's Foreign Minister, Mr. P.V.Narasimha Rao, and also with Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi. The talks dragged on for four days, but nothing very concrete emerged, except that it was agreed that they should be continued at the official level. Although Mr. Narasimha Rao told Parliament on February 19, 1982 that after the recent discussions, India and Pakistan were in a position to undertake specific consideration of the elements which could constitute the substance of an

agreement on non-aggression, it was couched in diplomatic verbiage which could mean anything or nothing. Mr. Rao added that both sides had detailed discussions on areas of bilateral cooperation and that it was recognized that such contact had to be maintained at various levels on a frequent and regular basis. In addition, to allay Pakistan's fears, Mrs. Gandhi categorically declared that, pacts or no pact, India would never attack Pakistan. She also agreed to the setting up of a Joint Commission to review Indo-Pakistani relations.

Almost immediately after his return to Islamabad, Mr. Aga Shahi resigned. Although this was offensively attributed to his failing wealth, diplomatic observers believe that there were significant differences between him and President Zia over the manner in which he had conducted the negotiations in New Delhi. Whatever the real reason, the recent outburst of his elder brother, Mr. Aga Hilaly, at a meeting of the United Nations Human Rights Commission in Geneva shows that the Pakistan offer of a no-war pact is not as sincere as it is made out while discussing colonial and alien domination, Mr. Hilaly talked up the Kashmir issue and tried to equate it with self determination for the people of Palestine and Namibia. It naturally evoked strong protest from Mr. B.R. Bhagat, who was leading the Indian delegation at the Geneva meeting. He asserted that Kashmir won an integral part of India and it was for Pakistan to vacate the aggression in that area. Saying that the two countries are committed to the Simla agreement for a peaceful solution of the problem through bilateral discussions, Mr. Bhagat wondered only Pakistan chose to make propagandist statements at international forums.

The reason, of course, is obvious. Pakistan wishes to use the offer of a no-war pact as a smoke screen for her adventurist activities. She uses the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan as a pretext for stepping up of acquisition sophisticated armaments, including nuclear weapons, but the interesting fact is that more of her armoured divisions and air force units are deployed near the Indian frontier rather than on the Afghan border. Quite pertinently Mrs. Indira Gandhi wondered why President Zia should produce the no-war rabbit out of his braided hat shortly after having signed the arms deal with the USA.

There is also a feeling in certain quarters that Pakistan want to avenge her defeat in the previous Indo-Pak conflicts. President Zia is on shavy grounds on the

domestic front and the only way in which he can remain in power is by making a spectacular attack on India (while talking of peace in the same breath) and grabbing that portion of Kashmir which is still outside his physical control. With direct or indirect help from USA and China, President Zia hopes to whip up the Pakistani frenzy over Kashmir and consolidate his position within his country.

Even so, the Indian govt. and the people of India would like to see lasting peace established between the two countries. But it cannot be unilateral. There is deep distrust in India about the intention of Pakistan. Islamabad's special relationship with USA and China – a relationship which is proclaimed and advertised almost and nauseum is a fact which cannot but cause worry to India.

What should India do in this situation ? India must remain ever vigilant in regard to Pakistan's moves and counter-moves. She must acquire modern and up-to-date arms from whichever country is prepared to sell them to her. It is unfortunate that this arms race is diverting so much resources from economic development to the instruments of war and defence, but India has got no option in the matter. She must also continue to nurture her friendship with the USSR - as a counterpoise to the blatant support given Pakistan by USA and China.

Meanwhile, the dialogue must go on for what is worth. A voidable irritants should be removed and the scope for extending trade and cultural relations and improving the postal, railway, telephone, telegraph and travel facilities between the two countries should be pursued. Exchanges may also be made in educational scientific and technological fields to mutual advantage. India has already extended her hand of friendship in many of these areas will Pakistan respond ?

Two new generations have come into existence in both the countries since the partition of the sub-continent, while this opens up the prospects of a better relationship in the not-too-distant future, it may also mean that headliners in both the countries would get the upper hand over their more moderate compatriots and try to frustrate all attempts at reconciliation.

### **Simla Agreement**

Since the transformation of Pakistan into a modern democratic state is most desirable, the present leadership in India has shown willingness to strengthen the

hand of the Bhutto government by approaching the Indo-Pak question in a conciliatory tone. India's main objective has been to persuade Pakistan to settle the mutual problem between themselves. In this respect, the Simla Agreement, despite its severe limitations, could be considered as historic for it reflects the urgency for evolving a common approach to minimize antagonism between South Asia's two oldest rivals.

The rise of new power relations Sino US-Pak axis with the Soviet Union at the back of India increased the antagonisms between India and Pakistan. The Simla Agreement signed in 1972 did not heal the grounds suffered by Pakistan in the 1971 war. In an interview to a foreign magazine, Bhutto viewed the perspective of adjustment with India under the Simla Agreement, as "dim".<sup>71</sup> During the phase of implementation, of the Simla Agreement, Bhutto's attitude seemed to have hardened by the United States' announcement of lifting of the arm embargo on Pakistan on 14 March 1973 and supplying it with 300 armoured personnel carriers, aircraft engines, military spare parts and parachutes. This move of the United States of America was very much resented by Foreign Minister Swaran Singh of India in the Rajya Sabha, that it would strengthen Pakistan's anti-India and militaristic policy.<sup>72</sup>

From the very day of signing the Simla Agreement onwards, though many other agreements were signed relating to trade, commerce and aviation between the two countries, the relationship between them had not been cordial enough to avoid mutual conflicts suspicious and aggression for all times to come. It would be idle to say that Pakistan had forgotten its humiliation of 1965 and 1971. Kashmir was still a major cause for confrontation between them.<sup>73</sup> Pakistan only waited for time and opportunity to strengthen its bargaining position and get on edge over India by growing militarily with the help of external power. This has always been the perception of Indian leaders that the external factor is the main stumbling factor is the main stumbling block to durable peace believe, the two countries.<sup>74</sup>

The Simla Agreement of July 1972 seems to have put both India and Pakistan on a course of gradual normalization of their relations. The protocol signed in New Delhi between the two countries on 30 November 1974 resuming expectations has raised considerable expectations in India with regard to the prospects of fruitful economic cooperation between the two countries, including

some sort of a regional framework for trade in the sub-continent. The two countries would extend the most favoured nation treatment to each other, in accordance with the provisions of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs. To begin with, trade would be conducted on a government to – government basis or through public sector agencies. However, private trade could also take place by mutual agreement in specific cases. At a later stage, the private sector would be given a bigger role. The two delegations concluded that there were immediate trade possibilities in items like cotton, engineering goods, jute manufacturers, iron-ore, railway equipment, rice and tea.<sup>75</sup> A former trade agreement incorporating the clauses of 30 November 1971 protocol was signed on 23<sup>rd</sup> Jan. 1975, which came into force with immediate effect and was to be valid for one year with a provision for extension by a further period of two years.<sup>76</sup> As a starting point for the resumption of trade, India agreed to import 200,000 bales of 15 to 16 inches staple cotton from Pakistan at a price ranging from 33 centres. The structural changes that have taken place in the economics of the two countries over the years and revival of trade on the established pattern may not allow trade in the traditional commodities.

Though, there is considerable optimism in the Indian trade circles about the Indo-Pak trade prospects, as reflected in the mass media, Pakistani press appears to be somehow skeptical about such prospects – its contention being that both the economics are competitive and not complementary and the nine years of rapture of commercial ties between the two economics had brought a lot of changes to the pattern of bilateral trade and commerce. The external trade of each country has certainly been following different courses of development during the past decade. At the same time, Pakistan is in the habit of linking up politics with trade, thereby creating doubts about the viability of any permanent arrangement between the two countries. For instance, if Pakistan is willing to supply raw cotton on a permanent basis, in return, say, for jute products for the next five years, both the countries can conveniently plan the acreage under these crops. But the past Indian experience with Pakistan has shown that the latter was willing to sell cotton only when the demand in the international market was low. Even the current agreement was signed when raw cotton stocks had piled up in Pakistan. Therefore, trade with Pakistan may have follow the same pace as that of building mutual trust in their other bilateral dealings.

Although the Simla Pact of July 1, 1972 did not include any formal undertaking for war avoidance it however pledged to normalize Indo-Pakistan relations and settle disputes peacefully. In the Simla Pact, both New Delhi and Islamabad expressed their opposition to the threat or use of force and their respect for each other's territorial integrity. Apart from settling details regarding building a new relationship in the situation, India and Pakistan pledged to hold talks for the final settlement of their territorial disputes, the formation of economic, cultural and scientific ties and the restoration of diplomatic relations.<sup>77</sup>

Nevertheless, the Simla agreement gave an opportunity to the two warring states to put an end to their conflicts and confrontation and promote goodwill harmony leading to the establishment of durable peace in the sub continent. According to an Indian author, "In the Simla agreement India and Pakistan agreed to follow the policy of peaceful coexistence. That the basic issues and causes of conflict between their relations for the past 25 years could be resolved by peaceful means; they shall always respect each other's national unity, territorial integrity, political independence and sovereign equality and that in accordance with the charter of the UN they will refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of each other. Both governments also undertook to take all steps within their power to encourage the dissemination of such information as would promote the development of friendly relations between them."<sup>78</sup>

From any account, the Simla agreement provided a suitable framework for bilateral cooperation and avoidance of future outbreak of hostilities in the sub continent. The two countries restored diplomatic relations, returned their captured territories, released POWs and resumed communication, postal, telegraphic, sea-land and air-link. But, beyond that no substantial progress was achieved to seek a permanent solution of Indo-Pakistan conflicts. Some Indian Writers expressed their antagonism that when the final settlement of the Kashmir dispute was mentioned in the text of Simla Agreement. As pointed out by Pannalal Dhar, "What was gained on the battlefield by the Indian armed forces was frittered away by Indian political leadership in Simla treaty by conceding that Kashmir dispute still existed and that both India and Pakistan would meet in future

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