

CHAPTER - III

INDIA AND PAKISTAN : HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The South Asian region, which comprises the present day states of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and the Maldives, has long been significant in world affairs. For 5000 years, it has been one of the main centers of civilization continually enriching societies beyond its borders and in turn, being enriched from outside. Four and a half thousand years ago many millennia of human development reached a striking in the Indus valley cities of Mohenjodaro and Harappa. Two and a half thousand years ago South Asia was the cradle of two major world religions - Hinduism, which became wholly identified with India, and Buddhism, which helped to shape the worlds of South East and East Asia. Over the past 2000 years, there have flourished the high Sanskrit civilization of the classical Hindu age and the Persian civilization of the Mughal empire. Since the eighteenth century, the region has been the focus of the longest and deepest encounter between an Asian civilization and the west which came to be encountered with the political struggle between South Asian nationalism and British Imperialism.¹

Thus, the Third World was not born as a free and fully autonomous entity. The process of colonial and imperial rule was in the nature of a big melting pot into which the Third World societies were sucked and moulded. They emerged out of this melting pot with hybrid structures and distorted personalities. The colonial metropolis, while granting independence to a particular Third World country or region, did not completely sever its cord. It sought to pressure and nurse its basic economic and strategic stakes in that country or region. The post-colonial behaviour of a Third World country or region, therefore, cannot be understood except in the context of this melting-pot process. The continuing involvement of the great powers in the Third World stemmed out of this process as a massive and, perhaps, inevitable legacy.

The conflict in South Asia is no exception to this rule. It has witnessed a whole range of manifestations from informally expressed diplomatic displeasure to

full-scale war. The expressed issues in such interstate conflicts in the region have included territorial disputes, economic issues, threat to political stability and national security, communal attitude of one participant or the other.

The most acrimonious relationship has, however, been between India and Pakistan in this respect.² South Asia is a compact area of geographically proximate states interacting with each other and sharing certain common bonds of history, culture – except India and Pakistan. Other countries of South Asia are small powers. India, by virtue of its geographic dimensions and economic military strength, occupies central position in the region. Indian policies have endeavored to achieve the central status of the South Asian system. Pakistan may not have demanded such a core status for itself, but it always sought a status of parity with India. Pakistan as a major power in the South Asian region can obviously try to limit India's aspirations of leadership. No doubt, Pakistan's limitations to this end came from its geographic location, structure and economic and military development. But with the help of outside powers, it has been able to check India's aspirations, which implies that Pakistan plays the role of major power for India in South Asia. Thus, any proposed system of security of South Asia that aims at establishing a stable order in this region must focus primarily on the core powers, i.e. India and its interaction with major powers, viz. Pakistan.

India and Pakistan have been tied together historically and culturally. Their relations are characterized by a long series of accords and discords. Since the partition, both India and Pakistan have been looking each other with mistrust, suspicion and fear. Instead of devoting all their resources for the development of the economy, both have spent millions of rupees to strengthen their armed forces against each other. The Government of Pakistan keeps the population under the tight wraps reminding them from time to time that India is the only enemy; while India's attitude towards Pakistan has been always determined by her assessment of Pakistan's intentions.³

Again, there can be no doubt that India and Pakistan, situated as they are geographically and otherwise, and with their historical background, cannot carry on for ever as enemies. A half-century ago, Pakistan and India were large Asian nations facing severe problems of economic and political development. They share a historic

experience and at their birth were confronted with the task of charting a course in a fundamentally changing international system. It would thus have seemed that both countries would follow similar courses, and in fact early policy pronouncements by Pakistani leaders could almost as readily have been made by Indians.⁴

When one looks back into half-a-century of India-Pakistan relations there are both feelings of pessimism and optimism for the future. The former is the result of years of confrontation and the latter reflects the changing priorities and the imperative of cooperation in a changing world. The story over the last fifty five years has been one of misunderstandings, misperceptions and even war on four occasions. Deep-rooted mistrust and a mythology of hatred have contributed to the crippling of relations between the two countries. Religion and regional factors have also influenced India-Pakistan relations over the years. Both the countries have also repeatedly got caught in a 'zero sums / score card' in their dealings with major powers. In the past, India - Pakistan had had the tendency to cost off at the slightest provocation. Solution to bilateral disputes still remain elusive, and internally both the countries have to contend with the challenging task of nation building.⁵

Pakistan and India are the major concerns of each other's foreign and security policies. The bilateral interaction is often marred by distrust and an antagonism rooted in the historical legacy, the conflicts that developed at the time of the partition of sub-continent in 1947. The disagreement between Pakistan and India on the power structure in South Asia has also made it difficult for them to harmonize their foreign policies. India aspires for a commanding role in South Asia, and its leaders argue that a strong and powerful India capable of projecting its power in and around the region is a guarantee of South Asia's security and stability⁶ Pakistan is averse to an India-dominated regional power structure, and strongly believes that it can not serve as a basis for durable peace in South Asia because it conflicts with the national aspirations of the smaller states of the region. Pakistan's resolve to protect and promote its national identity is as pronounced as is Indian determination to assert its leadership in the region. This buttresses the deep-rooted ~~distress~~ and acrimony in their relations. The relations between these two Asian countries, thus, have been a source of dismay to the rest of Asia and Africa, to the Commonwealth and to many other countries of the world. Why could not these two

countries, whose geography dictates friendly relations, live like good neighbours during their existence as independent nations? A period of initial misunderstanding and suspicion might not have been unexpected, but it is highly distressing that even today there is much ill feeling, tension and distrust between them. India as the bigger neighbour probably could show a little moderation in her attitudes towards Pakistan. But unfortunately, many Indians continue regarding Pakistan as a "tragic" mistake which might still be corrected, at least as far as East Bengal is concerned.⁷

No denying of the fact that neighbours have quarreled and compromised in contemporary international relations. France and Germany, Iran and Iraq, India and its neighbours namely Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Russia and China, China and Japan etc. are some of the notable examples. More than this, the erstwhile opponents have sought unification. The unification of Vietnam and Germany are its glaring examples. It is being speculated that the Koreans are also involved in such an exercise. Besides, the present international environment is marked by growing regional and global co-operation. But these healthy and helpful trends have little repercussion on the growing antagonism between India and Pakistan. It has survived for 55 years and reconciliation between them still remains remote. The two neighbours – India and Pakistan, though are parts of one civilization and represent the same culture and history of the Indian sub-continent, Pakistanis have however, contested this position.⁸ P.N.Dhar has rightly remarked that "conflict with India will continue till Pakistan becomes a normal nation-state without any messianic pretensions."⁹ They are the two big countries of South Asia, number one and two, but poorest ones in the world. Apparently, friendship, understanding, coordination, consultation, collaboration and cooperation between them would have not only served their interests best but also that of other South Asian countries. But as ill luck would have it, the protracted conflict syndrome between them has cost both of them heavily and served no purpose. They have been forced to divert their vast and valuable resources towards defence requirements retarding their most urgent social and economic development. Air Marshal (Retd.) Asghar Khan admitted that throughout its existence, Pakistan "fought four wars with India without clear objective."¹⁰ The noted Pakistani columnist, Altaf Gauhar argued that the four wars in 1947-48, 1965, 1971 and 1999 were fought under one assumption: India was

coward and would not fight.¹¹ However, such a notion ought to have been dispelled now after Pakistan's defeats in all the four wars.

In the new international environment it is then clear neither India nor Pakistan can afford to ignore the winds of change. The promise and pitfalls of the prolonged quest for durable relations between India and Pakistan have now once again been brought to the fore with the resumption of talks between the two countries. There is need for more intensive dialogue between the two. They have to structure their relationship on the basis of widely accepted principles, and pressure them in as open and transparent a manner as possible. Both the countries stand to gain from regional peace and stability. New Delhi on its part has to lay to rest certain fears in the region that emanate from its sheer size, and reassure the countries in South Asia that it stands for their territorial integrity and development, and indeed, India has doing that.

Both India and Pakistan need to pave the way for a 'Multi-layered framework of cooperation'. The main principles that should guide the relations include mutual respect for each other's independence, sovereignty and integrity; and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. Even if both the countries are not able to make immediate breakthroughs, it is important that they restrain themselves from making provocative statements and/or taking provocative actions.¹²

From the above analysis, it is clear that South Asia as a region has two important characteristics. First, it is Indo-centric in character. Both geographically, and in terms of socio-cultural continuities and economic infrastructure, India occupies a central place. The other countries of the region, like Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, and others have individually and separately more in common with India than with each other. The second characteristic of the region is its asymmetric and hierarchical power structure. India occupies a dominant power position. In population, economic resource base and growth potential, military strength and viability of constitutional, political and administrative structure, India is far superior to any one of its neighbours, or even to all of them put together. These two characteristics in conjunction, make India the proverbial Big Brother in South Asia with all its negative connotations. It generates legitimate and understandable, although often exaggerated, apprehensions among India's neighbours vis-à-vis

New Delhi. It makes the former feel insecure and uncomfortable in the company of such a giant neighbour. Interstate tensions have often been generated as a result of such feeling. It should, however, be kept in mind that this very fact of India's centrality is not inherent in a situation of natural hierarchy of power. On the contrary, endeavours to impose an artificial balance in such a situation may bring about instability and strife. It has seldom been realized by scholars as well as statesmen, particularly of the western world that South Asia is a region where such a dynamic situation prevails. Developments in the region since 1944 have repeatedly demonstrated that conflict has resulted from the efforts to blur and distort the natural power-hierarchy in the sub-continent.

No nation in the present world, therefore, can live in total isolation. In pursuit of one's own national interest, independence, survival and development, an interaction takes place among and between nations which marks the characteristic of the present international system and other subordinate state systems. The international system was also dominated by the Super Powers whose major aim was to increase their "sphere of influence" in all parts of the globe. The subordinate state systems such as South Asia, South East Asia, Middle East Asia, Africa and Latin America were found rife with regional conflicts and wars largely rooted in their historical, territorial and psychological claims. To be contributory to their global interests.¹³

Since India and Pakistan are situated in South Asia – a subordinate state system – their conflict and belligerent relationship since their becoming independent in 1947 is a grave matter of concern. The pre-partition hostility between the Muslim Leagues and the Indian National Congress was found to have determined not only the present state of enmity between India and Pakistan but the contours of their motivations, perceptions and strategies.¹⁴ Thus, the mistrust, antagonism and fear between the two successor states of the British Raj persisted even after the partition of the sub-continent and the emergence of two independent states.¹⁵

Indeed, India is a unique country. In ancient times, this part of the world remained a centre of remarkable civilization reference of which are available on the Vedic literature. Rig Veda, the most ancient written scripture in the world contains

such a heightened knowledge about spirituality, ethics and social system that in the present times even the most advanced nation cannot claim to reach that level. In United India, a vast region with several countries of the modern world, around his country were parts of only one country.¹⁷

Pakistan also is the second-largest nation of the South Asian sub-continent. It lies in the Indus River Valley, between the mountainous border with Afghanistan through which comes the famous Khyber Pass – on the north-west, and on the south east, the great Indian Desert and the Rann of Kutch. Long a band of transition between the rugged steppes of Inner Asia and the plenteous plains of India, Pakistan is today a nation caught between the legacy of a glorious imperial past and the project image of an ideal theocratic future. Its goal to become an exemplary modern religious state, a truly Islamic republic, is affirmed by the name of Pakistan, given by the Muslim Poet Muhammad Iqbal in 1930, means "land of the Pure."

The cultural heritage of the people of Pakistan can be traced back to the earliest – known urban society in South Asia. Excavations of the ancient cities of Harappa and Mahenjadaró, discovered in 1922, have revealed an impressive civilization dating from 3000 B.C. Distinctive for its knowledge of hydrology and its use of irrigation to cultivate the valley with the rich water of the Indus River, it developed an extensive commerce with the emerging civilization in the Mesopotamian Valley to the West. This civilization survived for 1,500 years. Patterns of agriculture, craft and commerce have evolved in this land over many centuries. They persist in the social and economic life of Pakistan to this day.

Islam, a religious faith based upon the teachings of the prophet Mohammed in Arabia during the seventh century A.D., as revealed in the Koran, also has a long heritage in Pakistan. The indigenous peoples were converted to this vibrant new faith during the eighth century by invading prince from the west and by wondering Sufi Mystics, whose spiritual discipline and religious teachings attracted their veneration and submission to the will of Allah. This faith has strengthened in the fabric of the people's lives through the centuries, and was reaffirmed as the basic for the creation of Pakistan as an Islamic republic in 1947.

The invasion of Mughal princes, who marched their conquering forces across the northern plains of South Asia to the Bay of Bengal during the 16th century, marked the period of greatest glory in the heritage of the Pakistani people. The Mughals were militant Turks refined by the elegance of Persia and energized by their Islamic faith. Akbar (1556-1605), the greatest of these emperors, is remembered for the opulence and splendor of his court, for the far-reaching administrative control of his empire, and for elaborate building projects, which still stand as massive tribute to his commanding wealth and intellect. Although it declined in its later years, the Moghul dynasty continued to dominate northern South Asia until the middle of the 19th century, when it fell to British Colonial rule.¹⁸

Thus, the states of South Asia is "a set of closely related beliefs or ideas, or even attitudes characteristic of a group of community."¹⁹ It "provides the believer with a picture of the world both as it is and as it should be²⁰ For States in South Asia, particularly for India and Pakistan, thus, the ideological foundations of their respective states were inherent in the very nature of the movements that led to their emergence. But these related beliefs or ideas disappeared and shadows of disbelief, mistrust came up due to man made problem; due to lack of tranquility and disturbance in domestic political scenario; the legacies of colonial rule, the post independence strategies and processes of nation and state-building; the creation of an unnatural and absurd state system; incomplete demarcation of state boundaries; the unresolved question of the status of ethnic and religious minorities - forced the countries looking each with mistrust, suspicion and fear.²¹

The essence of the Indian National Congress's (INC) ideological disposition, towards the Indian sub-continent, since its inception in 1885 could be placed as follows in this regard. The INC held the view that in an amazingly diverse place like the subcontinent, political separation based on any element of this diversity would open a Pandora's box. It strove to accommodate all such diversities within the broad parameters of Indian nationalism symbolizing 'unity in diversity'. The Muslim League led by Mohammed Ali Jinnah differed with the position of INC. Its basic argument was that Hindus and Muslims constituted two different nations and as such require two separate states. Consequently, only separate states for the two communities would ensure justices to the Muslims who would otherwise be overwhelmed by the

Hindu majority. The INC completely rejected the nation formation theory but accepted partition reluctantly as the price to pay to get rid of the British colonial rule and the intransigent Muslim League.²²

India's independence in 1947 and the process of decolonisation of Asia and Africa thereafter induced a desire among the newly independent states to forge a unity for reconstruction of the nations ravaged by Western colonialism. The Indian leadership even before the dawn of independence had the visions of world peace and an equitable international order on the edifice of Afro-Asian unity. The Indian National Congress (INC) spearheading the struggle for Indian Independence dreamed of an Asiatic Federation. The All India Congress Committee (AICC) in its Bombay session held in July 1921 took note of a resolution passed by the citizens of Bombay in April 1921 urging AICC 'to promote feelings of amity and concord with neighboring States with a view to establishing goodwill and sympathy to formulate a clear and definite foreign policy for India.'²³ Realising that Britain was using India's position and resources to promote its imperialistic designs in India's neighborhood, the AICC in a historic declaration in Delhi on November 4-5, 1921, affirmed –

- i) that the present Govt. of India in no way represent Indian opinion and that their policy has been traditionally guided by considerations more of holding India in subjection than of protecting her burden.
- ii) that India as self-governing country can have nothing to fear from the neighboring states or any state as her people have no design upon any of them, and hence no intention of establishing any trade relation hostile to or not desired by the people of such states ; and
- iii) the people of India regard most treaties entered into with the Imperial Government by neighboring states as mainly designed by the latter to perpetuate the exploitations of India by the Imperial power, and would therefore urge the states having no ill will against the people of India and having no desire to injure her interest to refrain from entering into any treaty with the Imperial Power.²⁴

Anti-imperialism became the cornerstone of the foreign policy of Congress and provided an opportunity for the states of Asia to come together. Gandhi observed that the common lot, no less than territorial homogeneity and cultural affinity, was bringing the Asiatic races wonderfully together and they seemed determined to take their fullest share in the world politics.²⁵ The INC saw the emergence of a great Asiatic Federation as inevitable and participation of India in the union of the oppressed nationality of Asia as the precursor to the freedom of every nationality to bring about world peace. The Congress world view maintained that no nation on earth can really be free when other nations are held in bondage.²⁶

India's role in the fight against imperialist repression was pivotal since she was considered to be the key-stone of the arch of imperialism. The leadership of Indian National Movement before and immediately after Indian independence set before themselves an agenda for regional cooperation and unity in Asia. The INC nursed a sense of grievances that despite India's importance and leadership against colonialism, India could not secure its rightful place as a member of the Security Council of the United Nations on account of its colonized states. The Congress working Committee (CWC) in July 1945 adopted a resolution expressing strong resentment against the position allotted to the smaller nations in the United Nations Organisation. The Committee observed that the great powers not only dominated and completely controlled the new organization but were placed above and beyond the law, they had themselves helped in framing. In accordance with its perception of India's role in national and international fields, the CWC felt that India must attain the status of an independent and sovereign state, having a place in the highest councils of nations, and in a position to contribute to the maintenance of peace, security and freedom.²⁷

It was in keeping with this grandiose image of India that the INC considered India to be the central actor in Asia. Thus, Jawaharlal Nehru, observed that 'whether one talked of the Middle East, of South East Asia, of China, all impinged on India and all dependent on India economically, politically and strategically. They could not help looking at India and India could not help looking them. In the modern world it

was inevitable for India to be the centre of things in Asia."²⁸ Nehru also advocated the creation of a South Asian Federation of India, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and Burma.²⁹

The circumstances in which India and Pakistan became independent did not prove conducive to any harmonious economic and political relations between the two countries. Many issues which arose after partition had generated so much heat that both had fought four major wars. A number of disputed issues between India and Pakistan such as Siachen Problem, Kashmir problem, Canal water dispute, Kutch dispute, Sino-Pak axis, Pak-US relations, nuclear explosion by India, Pakistan's nuclear policy have all contributed to the prolonged strained relations between the two countries. Of course, the uneasy atmosphere prevailing in the interaction of the two countries has always been helpful for politicians of the two countries to fulfill their lust for power and strengthen their unstable political positions.

Because of her size, population and economic inequalities, India is conscious of her strategic importance in Asia in particular and in the world in general. India's economic structure is certainly superior to that of Pakistan, taking into consideration her natural resource reserves as also the manufacturing and processing capacity. Besides, a number of other factors indicate that Pakistan is potentially a weaker nation than India. The industrial base of Pakistan is too narrow to withstand a viable commercial exchange with India. These factors came to the fore in view of the fact that Pakistan is not only observed with her inferiority but desperately tried to overcome some of these handicaps by building up a new balance of power in South Asia with the aid of her western allies.

The pre-partition hostility between the Muslim League and the Indian National Congress was found to have determined not only the present state of enmity between India and Pakistan but the contours of their motivations, perceptions and strategies.³⁰ The "Sub-continent was split by mutual consent, but the mistrust, antagonisms and fear between the two successor states of the British Raj persisted."³¹

Partition and the basis on which Pakistan was carved out of united India in 1947, instead of setting them in their own status-quo exposed to them the

explosive quality of religious symbols as the basis of nation-building in converting the group rivalry before partition into international rivalries in the sub-continent.³² Lack of reconciliation to the partition and a settled fact on the part of India³³ and Pakistan's advocacy of a two-nation theory³⁴ explain largely the hostile relationship between the two countries.

The perception of India's agony over the partition in Pakistani rulers created the impression that India would one day achieve its wish to reunite all its lost territories. As President Ayub Khan once stated: "The Indian leaders have often stated that their true border extends from the Hindukush mountains to the Mekong river, that is to say, wherever the influence of Hinduism existed in the past."³⁵ This type of India's ambitious nationalism may not be without any basis. There was a strong current of opinion in India, totally disregarding the fact of partition as a grave blunder.³⁶ Many Indians felt that "the creation of Pakistan was a tragic mistake which might still be corrected, at least as far as East Bengal is concerned."³⁷ To this may be added India's disapproval of Pakistan's advocacy of the 'two-nation theory' based on religion. "It was perfectly clear", said Jawaharlal Nehru, "that it was quite impossible to divide it on the basis of separating religious groups on one side or the other."³⁸ To accept Pakistan's 'two-nation theory' would mean a collapse of the secularist policy on which the Indian Union rests and a reopening of the conduits of separatism through various religious sensitized groups.

Implicit in these two approaches was the assumption that secularism in the case of India and Islam in the case of Pakistan would help ensure political justice to their respective citizens. India and Pakistan, therefore, sought their ideological security in secularism and Islam respectively. In other words, these two states adopted not only different but also opposing strategies of state building, which by itself created certain tension in their bilateral relations. It was, perhaps, inevitable that Kashmir would become a symbol of this ideological tension that underlay the political foundations of the two states. Thus, Islamic ideology of Pakistan was reinforced by the Pakistani rulers as a shield against its geographical interiority and political nationalism.³⁹

The Founding Fathers of the INC included Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Parsees and Europeans sympathetic to Indian nationalism and its fulfillment in an

Indian Home Rule, more or less like Irish Home Rule. They were firm believers in Parliamentary Democracy of the Westminster Model. During the early years of the Congress it was in the good books of the British authorities and the European community in India. Its General secretary was Mr. A.O. Hume, a member of the Indian Civil Service who resigned in order to organize the Congress as a sort of Parliamentary opposition. This presumed a parliament with elected members, not Government nominees in a legislative Council packed with officials and their favourites. Congress passed resolutions for introducing the system of elections as in Britain and making the Legislative Councils representative of Indian public opinion. The next step would of course be to ask for the formation of Government by the elected representatives of the people as in Britain.

The British bureaucracy in India did not like this course of developments nor did the Indian Princes. To the British bureaucracy and the Indian autocracy was added to Muslim aristocracy led by Sir Sayed Ahmed Khan, later followed by the Aga Khan. The Muslim League came into existence with bureaucratic blessings in order to safeguard Muslim command interests as distinguished from Indian national interests. In its eyes Congress was an advocate of Hindu domination in succession to British. If Democracy was introduced its advantage would be reaped by the Hindu majority. The British bureaucracy equated Congress and Muslim League as equally entitled to consideration, though the one was inclusively India and the other exclusively Muslim. The bureaucrats went so far as to dub Congress a Hindu organization, even though it was presided over by Muslims and Parsis and Europeans as well as Hindus. They simply hated the idea of Home Rule for Indians as they hated it for Irishmen. There they pitted the Protestants against the Catholics, minority against majority, eventually dividing the country. Here the same game was started at the provincial level by Lord Curzon before the Muslim League was founded. The storm of protest against the partition of Bengal led to its reversal, but the ending of the Partition of Bengal was also beginning of the Separate electorate system with the same object; dividing the people instead of dividing their house land. Yet Congress had to swallow it. Otherwise the British would have refused to introduce an elected legislature as a prelude to an elected Government in the provinces, much less at the Centre. No one could at that time think of Non-

Cooperation and Civil Disobedience as a means to Swaraj. Congress was wedded to constitutional methods. Those who disagreed resorted to violence and dreamt of a revolution.

Mr. Jinnah was a Congressman like his mentor, Dadabhai Naoroji. But when separate electorates were introduced he was forced to stand as a candidate from a muslim constituency while his Hindu and Parsee and Christian fellow Congressmen stood from non-Muslim constituencies. In order to ensure his success he became a member of the Muslim League without sacrificing his Congress membership. This was the case with other politicians similarly situated. When questioned he replied, "I am in the Congress because it represents the national interests of India. And I am in the Muslim League because it represents the communal interests of the Muslims of India". This explanation was accepted by both the parties. Thanks to his mediation and that of Tilak the two parties came to sign a Pact at Lucknow in 1916. Congress conceding weightage to the Muslim minorities in the non-Muslim-majority provinces and the League conceding weightage to the non-Muslims in the Muslim – majority provinces. The term 'Hindu' was not used in the Montagu – Chelmsford Reforms which incorporated the system of weightages reached at Lucknow. At that time nobody realized that Congress had signed a Pact on behalf of the non-Muslims as the League had signed one on behalf of the Muslims. And therefore Congress had become a non-Muslim body. In fact, Congress was in a hurry to win Swaraj by constitutional means at the end of the first Great War. It had to swallow the system of weightages, not knowing that it could no longer claim to represent the Muslims if it represented the non-Muslims only. After some fifteen years the term 'non-Muslim' has substituted by the term 'General' in response to protests by the Hindus and others who did not like to be described in a negative fashion by bringing in the Muslims as the principal community. But the new term also created the illusion that those who were elected from the 'general' constituencies represented the inclusive interests of all citizens irrespective of ~~caste or creed.~~

Congress had inadvertently lost something and the Muslim League had artfully gained something. In order to retrieve this loss, Congress set up Congress Muslim candidates in every province and at the centre. This was not contrary to the

provisions of the Pact of 1916. Mr. Jinnah who meanwhile drifted apart, could not charge Congress with a breach of contract. But when he found that Congress Muslims had won numerous seats and on the strength of their majority formed North-West Frontier Province in addition to occupying Ministerial positions in several other provinces he felt himself cheated by Mahatma Gandhi, his old friend and fellow Gujarati Barrister. At one time Jinnah happened to be the President of the Home Rule League and Gandhi an office-bearer under him. So, Jinnah invented the formula: 'The Muslim League alone represented the Muslim of India.' It followed that the Congress Muslims did not represent their community and therefore had no right to form a Government in the North-West Frontier Province nor to be Ministers in any other province. He expected a new Pact to this effect between Congress and the Muslim League as a condition precedent to any change at the Centre. After excluding the Congress Muslims from its quota, Congress was also expected to observe the principle of weightage in the composition of all elected Governments. Originally it applied to the elected legislature only. A third requirement was the recognition of Muslim League minority Veto inside the Governments, if the Congress majority decision did not suit it.

The British had no hand in the formulation of these undemocratic demands. They did not insist that Congress must accept them. But they did not insist that the two leading parties must come to terms prior to a transfer of power. Jinnah then had a veto on any plan to transfer power at the Centre to an elected majority of Indians including Congress Muslims, Sikhs, Christians and Parsees. No plan would be acceptable to his party as the only party of Indian Muslims unless Congress surrendered to his terms prior to a transfer of power. Now the first British plan was the Federation according to the Government of India Act of 1935. The Government Block in the Central Legislature was to be replaced by the Princes Block. The remaining seats were to be divided in such a way that Congress could never get an absolute majority unless it won a good number of Muslim seats, which was unlikely, or unless the Princes' Block consisted of the elected representatives of the people of princely states. The Princes backed out of their commitment to the Federal scheme. The Muslim League feared that Congress would push it into a hopeless

minority in the absence of the Princes' nominees. No amount of weightage would secure it a share of power. It would be doomed to a perpetual Opposition.

The British Raj would be succeeded by the Congress Raj and the Hindus would virtually be the dominant power. Fear and ambition drove Jinnah into the arms of the inventors of Pakistan, a separate, independent, sovereign state of the Muslims, exclusive of the non-Muslims. He added to the basic scheme the non-Muslim-majority province of Assam to make it balance 'Hindustan', going back to Lord Curzon's design of balancing Hindu-majority provinces by Muslim Majority provinces plus a province where the Muslims were not in a majority, plus the Centre divided into two, the one balancing the other. This improvement upon the doctrine of balance of power did not originate in a British brain. It was specifically made in India. Jinnah also made an amendment to the British policy of 'Divide and Rule'.

It was one thing to split up a State and it was another to split up a Nation, Jinnah, one of the top leaders of the Indian National Congress, discovered in his old age that the Hindus and Muslims were not two communities but two nations, co-existing under foreign rule. He held that upon the British withdrawal each nation should separately exist in its own homeland. He even went as far as to suggest an exchange of population. It was enough to rouse elements of suspicions and apprehensions between friends and neighbours of a thousand years. In consequence of its intensive propaganda the League won the 1946 elections on the Pakistan issue, defeating the Congress Muslims and Unionist Muslims and Krishak Praja Muslims all over India, barring a few exceptions when Congress insisted on including Mr. Asaf Ali in the Viceroy's 'Interim Government' and the British Prime Minister intervened in favour of Congress. Jinnah rejected the Cabinet Mission Scheme and his Muslim League embarked on a two-pronged 'Direct Action' against the British authorities and the Congress leaders. In practice, it was a call to the Muslim to resist Hindu Raj in succession to British Raj. Terrible riots broke out. Though the League was persuaded to join the 'Interim Government' by the Viceroy its aim was not to work but to wreck. Since the Cabinet Mission Scheme failed, the British fixed a deadline for withdrawal, leaving India united or divided as the parties desired. This ultimatum led to division by consent, not in the cry that Jinnah

contemplated but as modified by Nehru and Patel. Bengal and Punjab were also divided. Lord Curzon was dead, but his policy went marching on.

Thus Congress, an inclusive organization of Indians of all communities, got India as inclusive homeland of all Indians, minus those who accepted Pakistan as their homeland willingly or unwillingly. On the other hand, the Muslim League, an exclusive organization of Muslims only secured Pakistan, an exclusive homeland of Muslim where the Hindus and Sikhs and Christians were treated with discrimination, suspicion and hostility, just because they were 'unbelievers'. Though Jinnah personally made no discrimination on religious grounds the fanatical forces he had unleashed by his campaign for Pakistan and 'Direct Action' compelled him to make Pakistan an 'Islamic State' where Christians might live as Zimmies but idolators had either to flee, be converted or die. Almost the entire Hindu and Sikh population of West Pakistan was eliminated by massacre or fights. In East Pakistan some Hindus were killed and one-third of the Hindu population fled, while two-thirds remained, thanks to the friendly attitude of their Muslim neighbours. That unfortunate phrase 'exchange of population' gave a handle to the Hindu fanatics in India who took the law into their own hands and brought about a limited exchange of population by force. This was contrary to the Congress policy of a secular state. For a time it looked as if India was not a composite nation but a Hindu nation where no Muslim was safe. Gandhi fasted on this issue. He gained his object but lost his life at the hands of a Hindu fanatic. As long as Pakistan remains an Islamic monopoly the Hindu fanatics of India will go on threatening the Muslims, including Congress Muslims and Communist Muslims. In Pakistan, the Muslims themselves are under pressure of 'Islamisation' recalling the early days of Islam. While India is marching forward into the 21st Century Pakistan is marching backward into the 6th Century. She has lost all sense of Nationalism and Democracy. East Pakistan has broken away to preserve both.

The Indo-Pak relations have not yet become normal and are not likely to become normal until there is a reversal of the policy of exclusion on religious grounds. Even in Bangladesh where the Founding Fathers established a Secular State, there is a reaction. The Bengali Muslims fought the non-Bengali Muslims with Bengali Hindus as their comrades. Now all that comradeship has been forgotten. In

the result the Muslims of Bangladesh too have lost their battle for democracy. It will take Pakistan a long time to realize that Pakistan got her independence because India got hers, thanks to the struggle carried on by the Congress

Lord Mountbatten ceased to be the Crown Representative on the 15th August, 1947. On that day every Indian Prince was legally free to decide for himself whether his State would accede to the Dominion of India or the Dominion of Pakistan. He might refuse to accede to either Dominion and declare the independence of his State but in that case neither India nor Pakistan nor Britain would recognize it. There was no provision for another Dominion of the British Commonwealth. Any one could invade it as a No-Man's Land. Its safety lay in accession to either Dominion. The Dominion of its choice should be contiguous to it. Before the announcement of the Radcliffe Award it was everybody's knowledge that Kashmir had no common boundary with the Dominion of India and therefore the Maharaja had no other choice but accession to Pakistan. But when the Award was made public subsequently it contained a surprise.⁴⁰

Radcliff's award created in Pakistan an auger against India which it could never shed. Actually it has been steadily on the increase since it came into existence. Perhaps the Bombay barrister realized that his two-nation theory was untenable in the modern world. In his Presidential address to Pakistan's constituent Assembly in Karachi on 11th August 1947 Jinnah declares: "We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one state In course of time Hindu would cease to be Hindus and Muslim would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense but in the political sense as citizens of the state."⁴¹ Where was this idea of separation of religion from politics when he enunciated his two-nation theory in his demand for partition?

The mantra of Jinnah fell on the president of Pakistan. Like Jinnah he also firmly believes in the doctrine of Balance of Power. Formerly it was between the Hindu majority and the Muslim minority. Now it is between Hindu India and Muslim India or the Indian Union and Pakistan. To maintain this uneven balance he would call in the United States and China and the Islamic Block of Nations. India too had to train the balance in her favour by locking to the Soviet Union.

In fact, a half-century ago, Pakistan and India were large Asian nations facing severe problems of economic and political development. They shared a historic experience and at their birth were confronted with the task of charting a course in a fundamentally changing international system. It would thus have seemed that both countries would follow similar courses, and in fact early policy pronouncements by Pakistani leaders could almost as readily have been made by Indians.

Yet there were factors that led the two in different directions. Jawaharlal Nehru had been the brain and voice of the Congress Party in foreign affairs and when independence came he was able to translate his ideas of non-alignment, socialist orientation, and "Asianness" into Policy. The Muslim League, on the other hand, had had little foreign policy-beyond support for Islam, and even after independence, "Politically aware Pakistanis did have certain attitudes, of course, but these were vague and hardly constituted a basis for a foreign policy."⁴²

More important was, therefore, the factor of religion. The gulf that had emerged between Hindus and Muslims over the centuries had been intensified by British colonial policy and led the Muslim League to demand a separate nation. Islam would inform the foreign policy values of this new nation as a positive tie to other Muslim countries, but also in a negative sense of profound rivalry with India and fear of "Hindu domination."

Pakistan excluded the possibility of accommodation and acceptance of Indian regional leadership as a means of ensuring their own national well-being. After all, they defined their very rationale for existence as being "not India", and the heritage of conflict had been intensified by orders of magnitude through the horrors of partition. A forthcoming approach on the part of New Delhi might conceivably have assuaged these concerns, but the Indians chose a policy of firmness, the armed conflict that immediately developed over Kashmir was seen in Pakistan as proof that India did not accept the legitimacy of the Muslim nation. Kashmir became the focus of relations between India and Pakistan – as a quarrel over territory, but even more as the symbol of the struggle between Islamic Pakistan and Secular India.

Thus from its very inception, Pakistan was an "insecurity state" that perceived itself not only as small and disadvantaged but as on the defensive against a real and present threat, with its survival at stake. Constructing a force within South Asia to balance India was not feasible because India was more powerful than any combination of other states within the subsystem. Thus a central element of Pakistani policy had been to reach outside South Asia to find support that might offset Indian dominance within the system and to avoid bilateral arrangements that would put Pakistan in a one-on-one relationship with India.

Pakistan initially sought to offset geopolitics through religion ; it was to be part of the universal community of believers, and as the first nation to be formed in the name of Islam felt that it should and would receive full support of the universal community of Muslims, the 'Ummah'. It was a matter of some convenience that most of the ummah lay to the west of Pakistan, lending the western part of the new nation depth vis-à-vis India.

Pakistan also saw itself as the vanguard of would-be many new nations coming to independence in the following years. Although little tangible support could be expected from the quarter for the time being, Pakistan derived satisfaction from its solidarity with Indonesia's independence struggle and with the Arabs in their resistance to the creation of Israel.

While Pakistan recognized the fact of overwhelming American pre-dominance in the emerging bipolar world of 1947, Pakistan looked seriously for strategic support from a source that was so distant and unclear. The soviet Union was not uninteresting, but in Pakistan's, early days, Stalin's hard-line policies offered little entitlement and China was still in ill-defined chaos⁴³.

In spite of leaders like B. R. Ambedkar and M.K.Gandhi, India was still ruled by locally entrenched economic and political hierarchies based on caste, gender, class, region, and religion. In many areas, the zamindari system of feudal relations dominated a primarily rural society and included three broad classes; landlords, tenant farmers, and ~~landless~~ labourers. India lacked financial and technical resources, basic and modern industries, social services and enough food to feed itself. Most people worked in the informal sector, with little access either to

productive resources, land, labor, forest, and capital or to education and employment, and were not represented in decision making bodies. Women, children, and bonded laborers, as well as the Scheduled Castes and tribes, were ignored and therefore suffered disproportionately. The founding fathers expected the Central government to play the main role in solving these problems. Their goals were to unify the nation; next to build modern industrial state and promote economic growth, and in the course of those achievements, to reduce poverty and inequalities. Gandhi laid this out clearly. "Recall the face of the poorest and the weakest man whom you may have seen and ask yourself if the step you contemplate is going to be of any use to him In other words, will it lead to self-reliance?"⁴⁴

The new constitution outlined social and economic policies to rectify inequalities and shift power to the weaker elements. Five decades' worth of amendments and laws continued the assault against untouchables and bonded and child labour. And in a crucial way, the Indian civil service, pride of the British Empire, took on primary responsibility for translating all these new plans into reality. In assessing the degree of success that India achieved in meeting its founder's goals, we find not so positive result.

Even before India achieved its independence, Jawaharlal Nehru, one of the principal figures in the Indian nationalist movement, had devoted considerable thought to independent India. He had been a delegate to the international Congress against Colonial Oppression and Imperialism held in Brussels in 1927, and his deep involvement in anti-colonial nationalism profoundly shaped his views about the importance of keeping the country free from any form of external domination. Consequently, Nehru's approach was an effort to maximize India's autonomy in the conduct of foreign policy in the immediate post-war era. Nehru played an active role in promoting decolonization in Asia and also sought to limit the presence of the great powers on the continent. Even before India become formally independent he supported the Indonesian struggle against Dutch colonial rule and sharply condemned the Dutch attacks on Indonesia in 1947-48.

The scenario of the South Asian security has remained grim over the last half decade. To a large extent the agonizing historical past, the mutual interest, distorted perception and the uneasy relationship between India and Pakistan since

1947 are considered to be the cause of insecurity in South Asia. Developments in the region since 1947 have repeatedly demonstrated that conflict has resulted from the efforts to blur and distort the natural power-hierarchy in the sub-continent. With regard to the India-Pakistan conflict the partition of 1947 embodied the worst regain of colonial rule ; the post-independence strategies and the processes of nation and state building. Pakistan was a geographical absurdity which ultimately led to the creation of Bangladesh. The British knew that this was not a viable structure and the last viceroy , Lord Mountbatten, had predicted that East Bengal would break away from Pakistan in a quarter of a century.⁴⁵ What he could not, or did not, predict was that this separation, which came in 1971, would be preceded by an extremely tortuous process including a full-scale war between India and Pakistan. In addition, to this the British indecision, conscious or otherwise, regarding the status of the princely States of Hyderabad, Junagadh and Kashmir added significantly to the conflict potentially inherent in the Indo-Pakistan relationship. The concern expressed about peace in the subcontinent after the position by Harold Macmillan from the opposition benches in the British parliament on 10 July, 1947 clearly indicated that the British were not unaware of the consequences of their final act.

Thus, in the South Asian security complex, like most other post-colonial security complex India and Pakistan were to learn out of a conflict between the Muslim League and the Congress. Pakistan as a separate nation was not created until the departure of the British Raj in 1947. But it was created, especially by the 8 million people who migrated from central India at that time of partition, in to image of a staunch Islamic and glorious imperial past.

The partition of India was mainly a political decision taken by the British and agreed to by the all India Congress to meet the demands of the Muslims for a separate home land. In economic terms, the partition of India could not be as abrupt and complete as in the political sense because united India was an integrated unit on account of the economic policies framed by the British during their colonial rule. The division of the sub-continent, therefore, was bound to have a disastrous effect on the economics of both India and Pakistan. In the words of an observer, "the

economy of Indian empire was violently vivisected.⁴⁶ as a result of the partition of India into two separate, independent and a sovereign states.

On the other side, the Muslim League was formed in 1906 to represent the interests of the Islamic minority in British India in the movement for freedom from colonial domination. Its leaders became convinced through the years of struggle with the British Raj that their people would become oppressed and even destroyed in an independent, Hindu-dominant India. In 1940, the league voted to demand a separate state for the Muslim population of South Asia. Through the persistent, answering leadership of its president Mohammed Ali Jinnah, this objective was realized when the British Raj, in departing in 1947 set the mechanism, to establish for nations instead of one. Those districts under British control (about three-fifths of the subcontinent) where Muslims are predominant would become Pakistan; the districts where Hindus were in the majority would become India. The remaining areas – princely states not under direct British administrative control – would accede by their own determination to either country.

This division created two wings, a smaller but more populous East Pakistan, and a larger, dominant West Pakistan, separated by 900 miles of India. It also created a number of disputes over the appropriate process for occasion of the princely states of British India into the new nations.

Thus, the debris of the Partition of India in 1947 clouded India's relations with Pakistan. The pre-partition political conflict between the Indian National Congress and the All India Muslim League coloured the perceptions of the policy-makers of the two countries regarding each other's motivations and strategies. The Indian Leader's accepted partition, but not the two-nation theory, which was the basis on which Pakistan had come into existence. Most Indian leaders believed that with the withdrawal of British power from the sub-continent, the dust of the pre-Independence era would settle down and that India and Pakistan would be able to come closer and establish harmonious relations with each other. This found hope of the Indian leaders died by subsequent events. Nehru's dream of peaceful and brotherly relations with Pakistan went in vain. The Pakistani leaders perceived new India as a country that is out to undo partition and dismember their country. This perception dominated their foreign-policy thinking ever since 1947.

In a speech, Nehru said: 'In regard to Pakistan, the position has been a very peculiar one owing to the way Pakistan was formed and India was divided. And there have not only been all the upsets that you knew but something much deeper, and that is a complete emotional upset of all the people in India and Pakistan because of this. It is a very difficult thing to deal with a psychological thing which cannot be dealt with superficially There is no doubt at all in my mind that it is inevitable for India and Pakistan to have close relation, very close relations, some time or other in future. I can not state when this will take place., but situated as we are, with all our past, we cannot be just indifferent neighbours. We can be either rather hostile to each other or very friendly with each other. Ultimately we can only be really very friendly, whatever period of hostility may intervene in between because our interests are so closely interlinked'.⁴⁷

During the entire pre-colonial phase, security threats emanated principally from the states beyond the north western was the long history of the so-called Hindu period, approximately spanning 1500 BC to AD 1000, which was beset with invasions by the Aryans, the Achalmenians, the Greeks, the Parthianas, the Kushavs and the Huns. There was the relatively short Muslim period, stretching from the Turkish raids in AD 1000 until the mid-eighteenth century which was also characterized by invasions by the Turks, the Afghan and the Mughals who followed each other in close succession.

During this entire period there really was 'no theory of war and 'no system of defence', to speak of.⁴⁸ And, despite the introduction of cavalry during the Muslim period, there was no 'military tradition developed in India'.⁴⁹ The infantry was neither trained nor organized nor even equipped as a serious arms of war. There was just a multitude of people assembled without reference to rank and file.⁵⁰

It was only after the arrival of the British on the subcontinent, and with their final occupation of what is now South Asia, that a modern defence system was really organized and Britain established a network of client buffer states that constituted a protective barrier between other competing powers and the land approaches to India, and had not, whenever necessary, any such threat by having a military showdown beyond the borders of India.

India's independence in 1947 and the process of decolonisation of Asia and Africa thereafter induced a desire among the newly independent states to forge a unity for reconstruction of the nations ravaged by Western colonization. The Indian leadership even before the dawn of independence wore the visions of world peace and an equitable international order on the edifice of Afro-Asian unity. The Indian national Congress spearheading the struggle for Indian independence dreamt of an Asiatic Federation. The All India Congress Committee in its Bombay session held in July 1921 took note of a resolution passed by the citizens of Bombay in April 1921 urging AICC to promote feelings of amity and concord with neighbouring states with a view to establish goodwill and sympathy to formulate a clear and definite foreign policy for India.⁵¹

Anti – imperialism became the cornerstone of the foreign policy of Congress and provided an opportunity for the States of Asia to come together. Gandhi observed that the common lot no less than territorial homogeneity and cultural affinity was bringing the Asiatic races wonderfully together and they seemed determined to take their fullest share in world politics.⁵² The INC saw the emergence of a great Asiatic Federation as inevitable and participation of India in the Union of the oppressed nationalities of Asia as the precursor to the freedom of every nationality to bring about World peace. The Congress world-view maintained that no nation on earth can really be.. when other nations are held in bondage.⁵³

India's role in the fight against imperialist repression was pivotal since she was considered to be the key stone of the arch of imperialism. The leadership of Indian National Movement before and immediately after independence set before themselves an agenda for regional cooperation and Unity in Asia.

Freedom became thus one at the beacon lights and it remained so ever since India was under British rule, but had been struggling for freedom. Though freedom was earned on August 14 and 15, 1947, the price was too enormous to describe in human term. The country was partitioned into Bharat (India) and Pakistan, now two independent nations. After the departure of the British in 1947, the overall situation in the area – and indeed in the world – therefore radically changed necessitating the designing of a wholly new concept of national security.

Hence, India achieved independence under Independence Act, 1947 and so emerged two nation states carved out of the boundaries of the erstwhile British India. The country was divided, partitioned, rather vivisected on the basis of the two-nation theory on the basis of religion. After partition most of the people appear to have reconciled with secular India and have stayed back. During the exchange of population, i.e., Hindus to India and Muslims to Pakistan most of the Muslims stayed back in India and their population, who left Pakistan for India, were primarily not received as Hindus but as Pakistani refugees. Similarly, the Muslims from India to Pakistan were, basically and primarily not received as Muslims but as Indian refugees - Mohajirs, though the country was partitioned on the basis of two nation theory. Thus, the outcome of partition, so far as two communities are concerned, was a strange phenomenon. Both Hindus and Muslims became strangers in their own country. Since their birth, tensions began between them, dragging them into four wars. However, last war (1999), was most crucial in its consequences.

The British Raj would be succeeded by the Congress Raj and the Hindus would virtually be the dominant power. Gandhi would boss over Jinnah if he joined the Government. Fear and ambition drove Jinnah into the arms of the inventors of Pak, a separate, independent, Sovereign state of the Muslims, exclusive of the non Muslims. He added to the basic scheme the non Muslim majority province of Assam to make it balance 'Hindustan', going back to Lord Curzon's design of balancing Hindu majority provinces by Muslim majority provinces plus a province where the Muslims were not in a majority, plus the centre divided into two, the one balancing the other. This improvement upon the doctrine of balance of power did not originate in a British brain. It was specifically made in India. Jinnah also made an amendment to the British Policy of 'Divide and Rule'. When Gandhi called upon the British to 'Quit India' he said 'Divide and Quit'.

Pakistan and India met their crest with destiny as independent nations within twenty four hours of each other. In his very first statement as Prime Minister of Independent India, Pandit Nehru declared that 'we look upon the world with clear and friendly eyes. I bring today to my friends in Pakistan that same message. We have common consensus and friendship is the basic necessity.' The Independence of India and Pakistan signaled the beginning of the end of Western

Colonialism and the emergence of new nation states in much of Asia and Africa. Fifty years after the achievement of their independence, India & Pakistan, with 29 percent of the world's population, have made significant economic, social and political progress, but they continue to confront major challenges. In South Asia, there is a wide range of opinion on every issue relating to the evolution of India and Pakistan. Although the British wisely left their Indian colony peacefully in 1947, the violence that accompanied partition shaped the development of the two states and set the stage for four wars between them.

The emergence of new political leaders at the helm of affairs did not improve matters. They had no defence policy to speak of. Also, they had come to conclusion that in the post-independence situation in India it was not possible to continue to follow a forward policy in the north and have blue water navy in the South. The country simply did not have the means to do both. Poverty stricken and problem ridden India had, in their view, other priorities to judiciously use her unexploited resources. Furthermore, they had a different political goal, which was to contribute to the promotion of peace and welfare of mankind.⁵⁴ Certainly a commendable goal but hardly in consonance with the British imperial strategy of pursuing a forward policy was there but, the Indian political leaders viewed 'the Indian army and its leaders with, alarm, and suspicion' verging onto a 'deep rooted paransia'.⁵⁴ Post independence India thus neither had the power nor the political inclination, nor the military expertise to pursue a century old national security policy designed by Great Britain.

The global strategic environment too was hardly favourable. The post-world war II bipolar system had projected onto the international system two superpowers in a total state of confrontation, determined to absorb other countries into their spheres of influence. The situation between the US and erstwhile USSR and the newly independent countries was so asymmetrical, and the pressures so great that the latter were forced with the problem of maintaining their independence.

Though India, because of her 'gigantism', was more fortunate in withstanding such external pressures than many other newly independent countries, the refusal by the superpowers to accept, in the initial stages India's proclaimed determination

to feud for herself did not argue well for the establishment of a viable security policy.

The regional security environment had also changed considerable, from the time of the British. It had clearly become heated and unstable. On the Western flank, the new India had now to face an unfriendly and suspicious Pakistan with whom difficulties had surged over Kashmir – difficulties that finally exploded into a military conflict only a year after the independence of the subcontinent. On her northern frontiers – soon after the termination of the Chinese civil war – India had to reckon with the Chinese occupation of Tibet. A frontier, kept quiet by the British, had become alive and unstable. And, on her eastern frontier – an addition to unfriendly East Pakistan – India was confronted with a totally unstable Burma where the ongoing civil war between the central government and the different Communist and ethnic forces had generated a highly uncertain situation, the ramification of which could indeed be horrendous for eastern India where rumblings of discontent among the tribal groups were increasingly becoming visible already in the immediate aftermath of Indian independence.

In sum, dimensional external pressures on India were already building up at the time of independence, to which she had to respond. But since, the new political leaders were unable to take over the British mantle, and were unwilling to accept the British concept of defence strategy for the subcontinent, they had to design a new one to force national security problems - problems that stemmed essentially from the outside at the time

It is true that the paths and strategies of social, economic and political developments pursued in each of the South Asian countries were, in a general way, a continuation of the pre-independence 'inheritance'. The socio-cultural identities which were characterized by the factors of continuity and overlap defied the territorial boundaries of the new states. The economics were characterized by the simultaneous existence of dominant feudal and pre-feudal sorts of modes of production along with a marginal and, in some cases, entirely dependent modern sector. These economies were also fraught with strong tendencies of mutual competition and incompatibility owing to their differing growth potentials and directions of development. Politically, the British transferred power to broadly

similar sets of elites but soon the varying socio-economic infrastructure in each of the respective countries started asserting themselves and determining, to a large extent, the respective forms of polity and styles of politics in the various countries. This brought about significant changes in the composition of resting elites and political forces and, consequently, is the structure and dynamics of the political systems. The breakdown of the parliamentary experiment in Pakistan and the emergence of a competitive party system in Sri Lanka, as against the long innings of one party dominance in India, illustrate the point vividly.

It was inherent in the very composition of the freedom – seeking groups/movements which succeeded in India, Sri Lanka and Pakistan during 1947-8 that their respective paths and strategies of nation building could diverge significantly in several respects. There emerged in the South Asian Countries a clearer emphasis on particularistic, religious, ethnic and linguistic components of their respective social fabrics that on the secular and universalistic goals and tendencies in the nation-building processes. The emphasis has been on Islam and Urdu in Pakistan, on Buddhism and Sinhalese in Sri Lanka, on Hinduism in Nepal, on the different sects and varieties of Buddhism in Burma and Bhutan and on Islams and Bengali in Bangladesh. In India also, under the professed goal of secularism, secretarian forces have gradually become powerful in the political processes. As a consequence of these divergent developments, the politics of nation building in each of these countries has got entangled with the minority-majority dilemma. And owing to the socio-cultural continuities in the region, the resulting tensions and complexion have found easy and, at times, magnified reverberations across national boundaries. Intra-regional relations have naturally been affected by such reverberations.⁵⁵

While Partition was sought for and granted on the basis of what came to be called the 'Two Nation' theory and while subsequent Hindu-Muslims\ communal tensions in India and Pakistan have been cited in support of this theory and have been used by interested parties both within and outside the subcontinent to vitiate and embitter bilateral relations, between the two countries, in reality, the 'two nation' theory was the name, given by Jinnah to the 'two states' theory. The Muslim League leadership was to ambitious and adamant on having a state to itself over which it could preside unchanged. In particular, Jinnah's impatience and

idiosyncrasies were allowed to play a larger than life role by the British. This has now been documented.⁵⁶ The support provided to Jinnah by the Muslim officers in the British Indian Army and administration, who naturally had vested interests in reaching the heights of their careers in a new and separate Muslim State, still remains to be fully assessed and accounted for.⁵⁷

The seeds of Partition lay not so much in the so-called antagonism but in the narrow and selfish political interests of the Hindu and the Muslim power-seeking elites. The communal factor was emphasized by them in this power game which they were asked to play through political parties and electoral exercises. This input of the British political culture gradually resulted in communal and religious polarities in the pre-independence Indian political scene which were deftly escalated and exploited by the British rulers for the imperial governance of India. The British introduction of legislative measures, communal representation, administrative and educational policies, and the art of dealing with the freedom movements – all that has been aptly described as the British strategy of divide and rule made no insignificant contribution in making the partition finally inevitable. This communal malady did not subside with the creation of India and Pakistan and the withdrawal of British rule. It got transformed into Indo-Pakistan rivalries and conflict and became an excuse for the great powers' continued intervention in the subcontinent.

India-Pakistan relations, for most of the period since independence have been marked by confrontation with each other, resulting in an arms race, four unproductive wars and the wastage of their scarce resources on arms instead of using them for the developmental purposes to ameliorate the problems of the long-suffering people on both sides of the border.

Indeed, the partition of the Indian sub-continent in India and Pakistan was inevitable. But the organizing ideologies of India and Pakistan have created a clash of values which defy any solution to the conflict relations between the two. Consequently, South Asia has remained an unstable strategic environment. Indian foreign policy has operated under the challenge of hostile neighbours, particularly Pakistan and China, and in an international order which remained enmeshed in power politics which has kept the areas of confrontation alive rather than help ease them. India's concept of national security has, therefore, been based more an

external threats than an internal threats. She has had to constantly guard its core national values of survival, territorial integrity and political independence, secularism, democracy and economic well-being. Pakista has quite now and then made serious bids to subvert the values through wars, proxy war, sowing internal dimensions, and military alliances. India in its quest for security of the system and its core values, has had to embark on various strategic machinations and policy options which have characteristics of being reactive and defensive in nature.

The most critical component of South Asian regional cooperation whenever it becomes fully viable has to be a state of normalized relationship between the two major states of the region – India and Pakistan. In other words, South Asian regionalism presupposes an end to distrust between them. Keeping this fundamental reality in mind, we will analyse the inherent political contradictions that bedveil their relationship and see why it is unlikely that the situation will change for the better in near future.

The essence of Indo- Pak suspicion is political. In this connection three points need to be kept in mind. One, this suspicion originated in the Congress-Muslim League rivalry during the freedom struggle; two, the said rivalry was not communal in essence but it was given a communal appearance by the Muslim league to serve its own political interest; and three, after the partition, the said conflict resulted in two conflicting models of nation building with India's emphasis on secularism, democracy and federalism and that of Pakistan on Islam, authoritarianism and a centrally controlled administration. These two models have not only been mutually incompatible, but having been professed in two contiguous countries with the same socio- historical experience, with no natural boundaries, and with a record of conflictual relationship that developed immediately after independence over Kashmir, they have become patently antagonistic threatening each other's basic principles of state policy.

The Hindu – Muslim communal riots that accompanied partition of the sub-continent and the unprecedented two-way population movements that took place in the midst of violence have left deep scars on the national psyche of both India and Pakistan. It is estimated that about fifteen million Hindus and Muslims were involved

in these cross-national migrations. Of this, a little less than half were Indian Muslims who migrated to Pakistan. In Pre - 1971 Pakistan, they constituted about 10 percent of the population of Pakistan (20 percent after the secession of Bangladesh). Numerically they were not large enough to dominate Pakistan's politics, but the circumstances under which the state was created and the nature of pre-partition politics of the Muslim League earned for them a unique status and purpose which otherwise is denied to an immigrant community. Comprised of relatively more educated people, members of the Indian civil service and the Indian Army, noted business and, most importantly, leaders and sympathizers of the Muslim League which spearheaded the Pakistan movement, these immigrants constituted a political force to reckon with. It may be noted that many top leaders of the Muslim League were categorized either as "refugee" or "returnee". In this list were included no less important leaders than Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan. Among the industrial leaders of Pakistan many belonged to such business communities of western India as Memons, Khojas and Bohkas. In fact, about three-quarters of the so called "twenty two families" who are said to control Pakistan's economy are from outside Pakistan.⁵⁸

The Muslim immigrants who moved to Pak in search of a better home naturally had a stake in the viability of Pakistan. This explains their insistence on strengthening those forces which they thought would help build Pakistan's unity - Islam, Urdu, and the negation of federalism. The Muslim League, both on account of its immigrant leadership as well as the large following that it had among the immigrants, represented these theories of nation-building. Another party which also strongly advocated these ideas was Jamaat-ul-Islami, again a party having a large following among the immigrants. With the gradual decline of the Muslim League it was this party which attracted most of the disillusioned immigrant Muslim Leaguers.⁵⁹

The urban-rural dichotomy in Pakistan's politics also owed its origin partly to the immigrant factor. Because the immigrants contributed to a rapid urbanization of Pakistan, which is one of the fastest in the developing world, their influence in politics was considerable.⁶⁰ Shahid Javed Burki analyses this dichotomy in terms of a political cleavage between, what he calls "insiders and outsiders". The former were

the people who lived in the provinces before partition; they were generally rural and conservative in their outlook. The so-called 'outsiders' who came from India were more educated and urbanized and relatively more progressive. They were concentrated in urban areas – Karachi, Lahore, Hyderabad, Lyallpur and Rawalpindi. As a result, Pakistani society was 'born polarized'. The conflict between these two groups, writes Burki, "determined the course Pakistani society was to take on the road to economic and political development."⁶⁰

Closely related to these issues was the question of relationship with India. Although Theodore Wright, one of the leading authorities on Muslim politics in the subcontinent, has said that foreign policy is one area in which it is most difficult to establish a distinctive immigrant stance,⁶² still if one probes deeper into the theories of statecraft that were propagated by the immigrants we find their essential linkage with foreign policy in general and relations with India in particular. The birth of Pakistan was the culmination of Jinnah's fight for the recognition of his two-nation theory; therefore, the very survival of Pakistan as a nation-state demanded a conscious and continuous effort to keep that theory alive. It was this element which drove a sharp wedge in the relationship between India and Pakistan. Islamic Pakistan and secular India became anathema to each others for the simple reason that the very survival of the states depended upon an assertion of precisely those theories which had resulted in the partition, namely the two-nation theory based on religion versus the one-nation theory based on the territorial and historical concept of "Mother India."

Without going into the details of the origin and development of Muslim nationalism in India, it may be worthwhile to recapitulate in brief the major forces at work during the phase when Muslim separatism gathered Momentum.⁶³ The four important landmarks are the establishment of the All India Muslim League by Md. Iqbal, a Muslim poet and philosopher, to ventilate the idea of a separate homeland for the Muslims of Northwest India; the echo of the said sentiment in 1938 at the provincial meeting of the party in Sind; and finally the formal adoption of this demand by the Muslim League at its Lahore session in 1940.

An analysis of the evolution of Muslim separatism from the establishment of the Muslim League in 1906 through the creation of Pakistan in 1947 clearly reveals

that for political reasons and otherwise modernist Muslim leadership too resorted to communal tactics. According to Paul Brass, the elite Muslim felt threatened by the fast rising Hindu middle class and they therefore articulated their grievances in such a way that they would evoke a response from the Muslim masses. To achieve this goal the Muslim elites built Muslim national myths and images by referring to their glorious past and Islamic heritage.⁶⁴ This thesis, however, has been challenged on the grounds that the sense of Indian Muslim identity, distinct from the Hindu identity, was already existent in Indian society and easily discernible in the 19th and 20th centuries. It is, therefore, argued that it was not the elite leadership which led the Muslim masses but that the latter led the elites to speak in a particular language.⁶⁵ Whatever be the actual reality, the fact remains that the Muslim elites articulated the grievances of their coreligionists; their own material interests were at stake in the face of the challenges posed by an emergent Hindu middle class and they stood to gain politically from the provisions of separate electorates which the British Indian government had introduced.⁶⁶

The Muslim League leadership was not in the hands of orthodox elements. On the contrary, it was criticized by the Muslim clergy for its lack of religiousness.

What is ironic in the fact that the Muslim leadership was thoroughly westernized and secularist and had never claimed religious leadership while Mahatma Gandhi had always presented himself as a Hindu and, under his leadership, the Congress, in spite of its secular-socialist philosophy, had never projected the image of a golden or authentic organization. Furthermore, the more respectable ulema like Maulana Abul Kalam Asada and Maulana Hussain Ahmad Madani had irrevocably committed themselves to the congress, and other Ulemas like Maulana Abul Ala Mandolin and Mashriqi were implacably posed to the League and its irreligious leadership.⁶⁷

Even the mobilization of Muslim masses by the Muslim League was in response to the Congress decision of 1938 to launch "a movement of mass Muslim contact in order to bring them within the Congress fold on the basis of a socialist programme and thus to gripe the League out of existence."⁶⁸ Therefore, the league was practically devoid of any strategy to register the support of the Muslim masses.

But when the socialistic appeal of the Congress and its policy to register the support of the Muslim masses came, it was viewed as a political threat and the League, which feared to lose its only potential constituency, was forced to employ populist methods. Like the Congress it could have opted for progressive socio-economic policies. Indeed, Iqbal, in his letter to Jinnah in 1936, had pleaded for such in order to ameliorate the poverty of the Muslim masses and thereby bring them into the fold of the Muslim League. This was not done.⁶⁹ Instead, the League Leadership decided to make the religious sentiments of the Muslim masses in order to gain their support. But this could not be done without the help of the mullahs who had an inbuilt base among the Muslim masses. The league was obliged to give its commitment in Islam to win the support of the maullahs. It was this commitment which was enshrined in the two-nation theory propounded by Jinnah in 1940. The problem in India, said Jinnah, is not of any inter-commercial character but manifestly of an international one, and it must be treated as such. He concluded by saying : "It is extremely difficult to appreciate only our Hindu friends fail to understand the real nature of Islam and Hinduism. They are not religious in the strict sense of the word, and it is a dream that the Hindus and Muslims can ever evolve a common nationality....."⁷⁰

The ideology of Pakistan based on the twin pillars of Islam and the two nation theory, was the product of the political maneuverings of the Muslim elites; it had no intellectual content until the ulemas joined the Pakistan movement. No theoretical discussion, critical examination or detailed analysis of the bases of this ideology, or of the implications for the state it was to give birth to, were taken up. Between 1940 and 1941 Muslim nationalism was concentrated in a one word programme – Pakistan.⁷¹

The expedience of the political leadership of invoking the religious sentiments of the people so as to enlist their habitual obedience became a feature of Pakistani Politics which the political elites still find difficult to abandon. The slow pace of political development in the country and the rise of the military as a political force there can be attributed largely to this phenomenon. However, it must be noted that in the governance of the country there has been no alliance between the political and religious leaderships. The strategy that the former (including the military

leadership which has developed an almost equal claims to rule Pakistan) has followed is that of reaching the masses in the name of religion over the heads of the religious leadership. It is thus a case of state-sponsored Islam. To understand the implications of this strategy, we have to analyse the importance that each successive government has given to the Islamic ideology as the most important pillar to the nation building and also the states role in indoctrinating its armed forces in Islamic values and a sense of mission. The fact that India's freedom struggle at the end was jeopardized by a demand for partition of the country, the fact that India's independence was greeted by an unprecedented Hindu Muslim holocaust, the fact that India and Pakistan were engaged in armed conflict over the question of Kashmir almost immediately after independence, the fact that the raison d'être of Pakistan not only differed from that of India but tended to thrive at India's expense, and finally, the fact that India fought four of its five wars with Pakistan have made the latter the most important foreign policy factor in Indian politics. We have seen how the so-called foreign hand gimmick in Indian politics included Pakistan. Pakistan is alleged to be subversively operating in the communal riots in India, in the insurgencies in the north-east (before the dismemberment of Pakistan), then in Punjab for Khalistan and at present in the Kashmir valley.

Indeed, India and Pakistan lost the very first opportunity to work out a regional détente that came their way when the finishing touches were being given to the modalities for the transfer of power in the subcontinent. Of course, the responsibility was not theirs alone. At the time India became independent it was thought that since both the Indian and Pakistani armies had previously belonged to one common army under the overall British command the security of both the states could be enshrined in a regional security doctrine to which both the states should subscribe. It was probably with this idea in mind that Lord Mountbatten, the last Governor General of India, suggested a joint defence council consisting of both Indian and Pakistani representatives to take care of regional security. This was a tall order considering the amount of distrust that had generated between the two countries. W.H. Morris Jones, who was then serving in India as the Chairman of an advisory committee attached to Mountbatten, suggested that a modest beginning be made such as with cooperation in development research. The entire effort, however, was

rendered futile, as Jones reflected 36 years later, by Mountbatten's personal ambition which was to remain the Governor General jointly for both India and Pakistan. This Jinnah was unwilling to concede as he had himself stated a claim to the Governor Generalship of Pakistan. Morris-Jones writes : "Whatever little lingering hope there may have been for joint authorities was lost that day. Instead of using his influence to build initially modest institutions on which he had the capacity to be somewhat insistent, he preferred to stake everything on his continuing to preside at the top. Through that weakness he ensured that his personal loss became the more serious loss of the subcontinent."⁷²

Besides Mountbatten's personal ambitions and the deep-rooted distrust between the political leaderships of India and Pakistan was the element of the personal ambitions of military officers of both the countries that stymied a joint defence system for the subcontinent. These officers through their long association with the value system of the British military culture were imbued with professionalism and "were quick to apprise their new masters of their own expectations. Thus, early efforts at joint security arrangements came to nothing and the British were gradually phased out of senior command positions, removing the last link between the Indian and Pakistani armies. From that point on, defence questions have remained at or near the focus of attention for the two governments."⁷³

On the question of how much Pakistan influences Indian politics it must be conceded that nothing can be said in precise words. But the fact that the mainstream Indian Politics is heavily Pakistan – centric in its external dimensions speaks volumes for the relevance of the Pakistan factor in Indian Politics.

In Indian politics, the image of Pakistan is that of an enemy which is beset upon destroying the Indian state both by armed aggression as well as internal subversion. For the ultra-right Hindu chauvinists Pakistan is not only a symbol of humiliation inflicted upon Mother India, it also prevents India's ten per cent Muslims from identifying themselves whole hearted, with India. An Indian Muslim's loyalty to India is ever suspected in a Hindu chauvinistic eye and the existence of Pakistan next door is deemed to be its primary cause. For the left, Pakistan is an outpost of Western imperialism; both the nature of the Pakistani state as well as its external

linkages convince the left that it is a part of the capitalist conspiracy aimed at destroying the Indian state. The left considers the Indian state as a bourgeois state but not one which is beyond redemption. Congress rhetoric probably contributed some what to this thinking. Following the middle of the road policy the Congress party also views Pakistan as a symbol which tends to destroy the basic fabric upon which its image of India rests. It thinks that all the four tenets of India's nation building, namely, secularism, democracy, federalism and socialism are under constant threat from Pakistan either directly or indirectly. The cumulative effects of India's power, its image of itself, and the distrust syndromes that govern its relations with Pakistan and vice versa, has created mood in the region in which the smaller states tend to suffer from the uncomfortable feeling of "sleeping with an elephant", to borrow Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau's phrase describing Canada's status in relation to the super power America. Till the Bangladesh war this anxiety was not so pronounced as Pakistan was big enough to neutralize India's superiority to a considerable extent. But after the war as the power pattern in the subcontinent was restructured, India emerged as the pre-eminent power. This, invalidated its small neighbour hitherto persuade strategy and diplomatic manoeuvrability in the region; the psychological apprehensions roused by India as a "colossus" made them develop their links extra-regionally. Recent evidences have suggested that in the immediate aftermath of Bangladesh, Bhutan had proposed close regional interaction among itself, Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Sikkim ostensibly to meet any possible Chinese intervention. The fact that the idea was mooted by Bhutan whose foreign policy was dictated by India and the fact that the idea apparently did not materialise tend to suggest that probably both Nepal and Sri Lanka opposed the move for them it was not China but India which was the threat.

The upper class Hindus, who constitute the ruling class in India today, vehemently opposed the legitimate demands and aspirations of the Indian Muslims who wanted to preserve and foster their own way of life, based on their distinct culture and religion. But the Hindus would not allow this. The systematic suppression of Muslim culture as exemplified in the "Biddha Mandir" scheme of Wardha and the compulsory singing, by all school children, of the idolatrous song, "Bande-Mataram" which offended Muslim religious sentiments made the Muslims all the more

convinced that simple majority rule in India constituted a threat to their religion, culture and way of life.⁷⁶ This strengthened their demand for a separate state of their own. The Hindus could not look with favour upon this legitimate claim to self-determination of the Muslim. They did every thing possible to prevent its implementation. But when they realized that the demand for Pakistan was too strong, too sound to be ignored or suppressed they ultimately had to agree to partition. Yet they did it with a great deal of mental reservation on their part.⁷⁷ They believed that Pakistan would collapse; they did not expect it to be economically viable, nor did they think the Muslims were capable or experienced enough to administer a state. "It was their hope", as Sarwar Hassan has pointed out, "that it would collapse by itself and it was their plan to assist it to collapse."⁷⁸ Anybody who would make a dispassionate and impartial study of Indian actions and policies during the crucial months of 1947-48, following the partition, would be convinced that India was seriously aiming at the annexation of Pakistan. The occupation of Junagadh and the adjoining states; police action in Hyderabad; invasion of Kashmir; refusal to give Pakistan her financial dues and military equipment under the various agreement of the partition; killing, looting and driving away of Muslims from India; encouraging the flight of capital and the migration of technical personnel, mostly Hindus, from Pakistan – all these steps were dictated by the overriding objective of annexing Pakistan. But thanks to the dynamic leadership of the Quad-e-Azam, Md. Ali Jinnah, these plans to undo the partition were frustrated.

Nevertheless, the designs to threaten Pakistan's existence as a sovereign state continued. Of these some outstanding instances may be cited. In 1950, the Muslims of West Bengal were massacred in large numbers. They were persecuted to such an extent that martial law had to be imposed in certain parts of West Bengal; still the Muslims continued to live in a state of perpetual fear and misery. To quote the words of Liaquat Ali Khan : "When the day starts they do not know what their fate would be at its end; when the sun sets they do not know whether they will live to see another day."⁷⁹ In the face of this grave provocation when large number of distressed persons were pouring into East Pakistan, there were only one or two minor riots in East Pakistan. Yet, the Indian Government threatened to take "Police action" in East Pakistan. "By the final week of March, 1950, whatever Delhi's

intentions", writes Ian Stephen, a former Editor of the Statesman "war had nearby come; the two countries were within a hair's breadth of it. Troops had been moved on only in Bengal but more perturbingly in the Punjab. India's armored division, to which no real Pakistani counterpart existed, was pushed forward in a way which threatened Lahore."⁸⁰ This grave situation was saved by Liaquat Ali Khan who rushed to New Delhi. His visit resulted in the signing of the famous Liaquat - Nehru Pact which aimed at giving protection and certain fundamental safeguards to the religious minorities in the two countries.

The communal killings, the Partition and the utter chaos of those years were regarded by most national leaders of India as their failure, but this also created a degree of mental antipathy towards the Muslim League. It may or may not be historically correct to blame the Muslim League entirely for the communal situation that developed in India in the mid-forties; but the reality that affected Indian policies towards Pakistan was not what in actual fact the Muslim League's share in the catastrophe might have been, but what the leaders of India perceived to be the role of the Muslim League (and later of Pakistan) in the sub-continent.

It is necessary here to deal with one of the continuing myths about Indian attitudes to the Partition. The occasional declaratory statements made by the leaders of the Indian National Congress during 1940-46 on the essential unity of India have often been cited by publicists in Pakistan as evidence of Indian Leader's mental reservations in accepting the partition, the mention of the ultimate goal of Indian unity in the Congress resolution of June 1947 accepting the Mountbatten Plan has also been quoted as evidence of Indian leaders not being reconciled to the partition.⁸¹ In retrospect, however, we feel that whatever might have been the depth of the feeling against the partition in the early years, effective opinion in the Congress, had not only reconciled itself to the partition idea by the end of 1946, but had in fact begun to regard partition as "a goodriddance."⁸² The most significant pointer in this regard was the public controversy between Abul Kalam Azad on the one hand and Govind Ballabh Pant and Vallabhai Patel on the other regarding the relative merits of the plans presented by the Cabinet Mission and Lord Louis Mountbatten.⁸³ To hard-headed Congress leaders like Nehru and Patel, the retention of a strong centralized authority in a divided India was an infinitely better choice than

the only other that was available; a loose Indian confederation in which the Muslim League and the Princes together would be able to prevent any effort by the Congress to mould in its own way the country's domestic and foreign policies. If some declaratory statements were still made regarding the laudability of the objective of Indian unity, they may well be regarded as the normal attempt that all politicians make everywhere to make a vital change of policy look as consistent with the past as possible by the expression of pious hopes and platitudes. If the Indian leaders had felt as strongly about the division of India as the leaders of some other divided nations feel about theirs, the prevention of the consolidation of Pakistan could have become the first item on the list of Indian foreign policy priorities. It is worthwhile in this connection to quote from two of the early speeches of the two men who made Indian policies although in both of the statements, made within the first few months after freedom, the goal of reunion is mentioned as a vague and distant possibility, the operative parts of both were meant to reassure Pakistan and allay any fears about India that might have existed there :

Patel said at Rajkot on 12 Nov. 1947 : I bear Pakistan no ill will. leave us alone, to pursue our own salvation, and stop meddling with our affairs in place, like far off Tripura. We shall then settle down to our respective destiny. May be, after we have become prosperous, they themselves will awaken to the need for reunion in the interest of both. It is neither our business nor our interest to force a reunion. We only wish to be left alone.....⁸⁴

Nehru declared at the Aligarh Muslim University on 24 Jan. 1948 : Pakistan has come into being rather unnaturally, I think. Nevertheless, it represents the urges of a large number of persons. I believe that this development has been a throw back, but we accepted it in good faith. I want you to understand clearly what our present view is. We have been charged with desiring to strangle or crush Pakistan, and to force it into a reunion with India. That charge or many others is based on fear and complete misunderstanding of our attitude. I believe that for a variety of reasons it is inevitable that India and Pakistan should draw closer to each other or else they will come into conflict. There is no middle way, for one have known each other too long to be indifferent neighbour. I believe indeed that in the present context of the world India must develop a closer union with many other

neighbouring countries. But all this does not mean any desire to strangle or compel Pakistan. Compulsion there can never be, and an attempt to disrupt Pakistan will recoil to India's disadvantage. If we had wanted to break the Partition? It was easier to prevent it than to try to do so now after all that has happened. There is no going back in history. As a matter of fact, it is to India's advantage that Pakistan should be a secure and prosperous state with which we can develop close and friendly relations, if today, by any chance, I were offered the reunion of India and Pakistan I would decline it for obvious reason I do not want to carry the burden of Pakistan's great problems. I have enough of my own. Any closer association must come out of a normal process and in a friendly way which does not end Pakistan as a state, but makes it an equal part of a larger union with which several countries might be associated.⁸⁵

It is not the non-acceptance of the Partition, but the terms of its acceptance which created a real problem to the leaders of India. The partition had become necessary because a part of the body of India had become diseased and the only way to preserve the health of the rest was to perform a major operation. Pakistan was by definition a less modern state; the Muslim league a reaction only and medieval party. A perusal of Nehru's writings on the Muslim League, both in *An Autobiography* and *The Discovery of India*, would reveal an image of the organization and its leaders which could not have created respect for it. As early as April 1940, a month after the Lahore Resolution was passed by the League demanding two sovereign states in India based on the theory of two-nation, Nehru had said that though he could not regard the Hindus and Muslims as two nations, he did regard those who talked in this vein as belonging to a different nation with whom we could not live together.⁸⁶ The course that Pakistan's domestic and foreign policies took after freedom further deepened this feeling, the increasing dependence on the collaboration with the West, the eagerness to befriend all India's adversaries,⁸⁷ the emphasis on religion in the state ideology of Pakistan, the gradual collapse of democracy in Pakistan, the rise of a military regime in its place, the denial of equal rights to the minorities in the Constitution, and the one track devotion to the cause of limiting and curbing India – all appeared on the continuation

of a long story which had begun to unfold itself in the early decades of this country.⁸⁸

It is also necessary to point out that the acceptance of this view of Pakistan by some other countries and the condemnation of Pakistan in some circles perhaps further strengthened the belief in the correctness of the assessment of Pakistan. The main point to be noted is that though the partition was accepted by Indian leaders without mental reservations, there was, in their acceptance of the partition, an inherent aversion to any close or friendly relation with a leadership which had led the people of Pakistan "astray and thrown the process of history" backward.

As against their aversion, it must be noted that there also existed, in the minds of Indian leaders, a belief that Indians and Pakistan constituted the same people and that in the long run India and Pakistan were bound to develop close or intimate relations. They were, therefore, genuinely interested in avoiding any situation which might adversely affect the people of Pakistan. It was not possible for Indian leaders to develop any xenophobia in relation to Pakistan.

The Partition of India was mainly a political decision taken by the British and agreed to by the All India Congress to meet the demands of the Muslims for a separate homeland. In economic terms, the partition of India could not be an abrupt and complete as in the political sense because united India was an integrated unit on account of the economic policies framed by the British during their colonial rule. The division of the sub-continent, therefore, was a demand to have a disastrous effect on the economics of both India and Pakistan. In the words of an observer, "the economy of Indian empire was violently vivisected"⁸⁹ as a result of the partition of India into two separate, independent and sovereign states. Since the sub continental economy had been developed as a single economic unit, the division of Pakistan and India were impelled to enter into some kind of arrangement which could affect the sustenance of their respective economies. Immediately after independence, the two countries signed a standstill agreement under which goods moving from one country to the other would be exempted from customs duty, and, in fact, what amounted to a customs union between the two countries was set

up.⁹⁰ This, however, was an interim arrangement. It lasted only three months following which the two countries became locked in a prolonged "tariff war."

The communal situation had become steadily worse since the Direct Action Day of the Muslim League in August 1946, when it was known that India was to be partitioned on communal lines, minorities in both the Muslim and the Hindu majority areas began to leave their homeland and to migrate to the areas where their community would be in majority. The problem was made extremely complicated when it was realized that in the Punjab almost half the Sikhs would be left over in Pakistan. The Sikhs in the West Punjab were being pushed out by the Muslims even before June 1947 when the Mountbatten scheme of partition was announced. Afterwards they started pushing out the Muslims from East Punjab. During August and September the two Punjabs had almost entirely driven out their minorities although it was brought about at an immense cost in human suffering, material loss and unmentionable barbarities. In the Punjab, the minorities problem ceased to exist as well as in the Frontier Province, Baluchistan and Sind. In Bengal, however, there was no such total exchange. From time to time communal tension disturbed the peace of the two Bengals but it reached dangerous proportions at least on two occasions, once after the devaluation of the Indian rupee in 1949 and the consequent trade war between the two countries and again during the Press War of 1951 which was followed by certain troop movements in both countries. The last spurt of movement of minorities in either direction came just before the introduction of the passport system between the two countries, but on this occasion it was caused not by any large scale action undertaken by the majority community but only by a fear in the mind of the minority about their future occasioned by the imposition of restriction on free movement of persons across the border. Its leaders became convinced through the years of struggle with the British Raj that their people would become oppressed and even destroyed in an independent, Hindu-dominant India. In 1940 the League voted to demand a separate state for the Muslim population of South Asia. Through the persistent, answering leadership of its president, Jinnah, this objective was realized when the British Raj, departing in 1947, ~~was~~ the mechanism, to establish two nations instead of one. Those districts under British control (about three fifths of the sub-continent) where Muslims were predominant

would become Pakistan; the districts where Hindus were in the majority became India. The remaining areas – princely states set under direct British administrative control would accede by their own determination to either country.

This division created two wings, a smaller but more popular East Pakistan, and a larger, dominant West Pakistan separated by 950 miles of India. It also created a number of disputes over the appropriate process for occasion of the princely states of British India into the new nations. The most strenuous of these disputes has been over Kashmir, a former princely state on the border between India and Pakistan that had a Muslim majority but a Hindu Maharaja. The dispute over which country it belongs to has led to two wars between India and Pakistan and an unresolved resolution for a plebiscite. Even today, military units of the two countries fire artillery rounds at each other on the Siachen Glacier, a small, uninhabited Himalayan plateau 20,000 feet high at a cost of \$ 6,000 per soldier per year, with 80 percent of the casualties "environment induced" just to assert their mutual claim to control a divided Kashmir.

Pakistan commits one-third of its annual budget to the military, in part to depend its claim to Kashmir but also to protect itself against the danger of attack from India, its imposing and more powerful neighbour to the east. Pakistan's ambiguous status on the development of nuclear weapons, which has compromised military and economic aid from the United States, while also calling for South Asia to be a nuclear-free zone, reveals how seriously the government takes the threat of India's nuclear capability and dominating presence in the sub-continent.

The dislocations and bloodshed of partition taxed to the limit the meager human resources of the new nation of Pakistan, which lying on what had been the outer edges of British India, lacked adequate administrative services to pull itself together. Jinnah assumed the chief executive duties as Governor General in the interim govt. Unfortunately, he died only 13 months later. Liqat Ali Khan, who became his successor as prime minister in 1948, was assassinated 3 years later, in 1951. The Muslim League, which had been imported from British India, lost the control of a unifying national agenda to the indigenous traditional sources of provincial power: wealthy landowners and tribal leaders. Even though a constitution

was adapted in 1956 that affirmed the common sovereign identity of the two wings of Pakistan as an Islamic republic, the country clearly was in political disarray.

Realization of inequality in power understanding inspire keener desire to assert equality in states. South Asian regional cooperation was enthusiastically lauded, not least because it could improve political climate of the region, the critical component of SAARC whenever it becomes truly viable has to be a state of normalized relationship between the two major states of the region, i.e. India and Pakistan. Peace and order in South Asia will not be produce of military equality between India and Pak, but depend upon a lasting perception of military stability. South Asian regional cooperation provides a good framework precisely because it is not a forum for resolving bilateral issues but it promotes the habit of consultation. The process, however, can go only thus far, and no further, if India and Pakistan deadlocked on even how far abjure war by a solemn treaty. SAARC presupposes an end to distrust between India and Pakistan.

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