

**REGIONAL COOPERATION IN SOUTH ASIA : A STUDY
OF SAARC IN THE CONTEXT OF INDO-PAK
RELATIONS (1985-2002).**

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CONTENTS

	page
PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT i
CHAPTER I : Introduction 01
CHAPTER II : Bilateral Relations , South Asia and the SAARC 24
CHAPTER III : India and Pakistan – Historical Background 132
CHAPTER IV : Indo Pak Relations 185
CHAPTER V : India and Pakistan : the waring partners 224
CHAPTER VI: Indo-Pak Relations — Its impact on the SAARC 300
CHAPTER VII : Summary of findings and concluding observations 345
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 363



Preface & Acknowledgement

One of the most significant features of the post-Second World war world has been the proliferation of large number of regional organizations with diverse aims and objectives ranging from politico-strategic alliance building to social, cultural and economic cooperation. Despite tremendous potentiality, however, South Asian region was a late starter in this direction. With the institutionalization of regional cooperation in 1985, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation(SAARC) started its pious journey towards the end of meaningful cooperation among the seven member states, viz, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Till today, as many as twelve Summit meetings SAARC countries have already been held within the short span of twenty-five years of its existence, each unfolding new directions towards the cause of cooperation. One of the most laudable area that the SAARC has moved toward has been the beginning of the era of South Asian Preferential Trade Area (SAPTA) aiming at reaching the stage of South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) in line with European Union (EU) and North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA). The Organization is said to be steady, though slow, in its mission to cater to the needs of cooperation with the proper appropriation of the potentialities of the region for such cooperation in order to attain self-reliance.

However, despite all the potentialities and a bright future, the SAARC is alleged to have been bogged down in view of a number of obstacles that come in the way of meaningful cooperation among the member states of the SAARC. Among these, the strained relationship between India and Pakistan seems to leave profound impact on the efficacy and of the SAARC as a viable regional organization. It is the bilateral issues between India and Pakistan that are said to be impairing much of the prospective success of the Organization thus making the latter virtually an ornamental organization to make Declarations only.

Given this general background, the present thesis has modestly ventured to explore and probe the impact of Indo-Pak relations on the efficacy of the SAARC. The thesis has tried to focus upon the issues that strain the relationship between India and Pakistan and their cumulative impact on the success and / or failure of the SAARC.

The thesis has been arranged into seven chapters. Chapter – I is the introductory chapter that contains the specific research problem and the objective of the study, theoretical framework, overview of existing literature, significance of the

study and the methodology that was followed in collecting information for the study. Chapter – II deals exclusively with SAARC as a regional organization in South Asia in the overall framework of bilateral relations between the countries of the region. Chapter – III focuses on the historical background of India and Pakistan as two independent states of the region in which lies the root of discontent between the two countries. Chapter – IV and Chapter – V have been devoted to the intricacies of the relationship between India and Pakistan. Chapter – VI measures the impact of the relationship between India and Pakistan on the overall success and / or failure of the SAARC. Chapter – VII summarizes the findings and enlists the concluding observations.

It is, indeed, not a ritual at all for me to acknowledge the help and assistance I received during the research work. In fact, it would not have been possible for me to complete the work without the help, assistance and cooperation that I was privileged to receive from different sources. At the outset, I would like to put on record my indebtedness to my supervisor, Dr. M. Yasin, Professor, Department of Political Science, University of North Bengal for his able and encouraging guidance and supervision. It was his keen desire to see my research completed and sincere and scholarly guidance that helped me a lot to proceed and complete my work. I express my deep sense of gratitude to this ideal teacher.

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My parents were all along a great source of strength and inspiration for me. My father, who is no more now, laid my academic foundation and wanted to see me well placed academically and otherwise. It is the high time to recall his contribution. My mother who has always been with me as my friend, philosopher and guide deserve special mention. It was her unflinching guidance, caring socialization and affectionate shouldering of all my responsibilities including the responsibility of my son, Goldy that really enabled me to bother least of other matters and concentrate fully on my study and research. No formal acknowledgement of indebtedness for this great lady would be enough to put on record the kind and amount of contribution and sacrifice she made and still she is doing for me, my academic career, my research and above all, for my life. Goldy, my beloved son suffered the loss of my companion for a long time as I had to be busy with my research work besides my routine responsibilities of the College. Often, I used to find myself helpless whenever he used to ask me as to when my research will be complete. Even though I cannot repay the loss he suffered, I can put on record his sacrifice that went a long way to finish this thesis. Finally, I cannot afford to belittle the contribution of Dr. Mrinal Roy, my husband by expressing my formal indebtedness to him. He was so caring about every bit of my life that he did not mind my remaining busy with research for months and years together. The only thing that I can do now is to share the completion of my research with him.

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CHAPTER – I

Introduction

A new international system is being formed with unprecedented changes taking place in the recent decades. There is a continuous search for a durable structure to consign the bi-polar cold war world of history. Such a structure will have to accommodate the asymmetry between nation and states and the increasing interdependence between them. Thus, it is held that by recognizing the role of regionalism, more efficient global institutions can be brought into being.

In the search for this new world order to replace the bi-polar system of the Cold War era, it is hoped that global interaction will move in the positive direction with a regional thrust. Chapter 8 of the UN Charter recognizes the rights of the states to form regional organizations though the reference has been directly to the maintenance of international peace and security. Regional cooperation implies association of states to promote common goals, meet common needs and resolve common problems. The commonality of interest is the central motivating force for their cooperation on a regional basis and also for determining the level, area and extent of cooperation, including institutional arrangements for such cooperation.

This process of evolution of regional organization or idea of regional cooperation took shape after Second World War, when it became apparent that the pattern of international relationship which was taking shape in the post-war-world would not be able to solve problems like population explosion, arms race, economic backwardness, poverty, unemployment, decline in natural resources etc. which most of the countries were facing and which can be better solved through joint efforts by the community of nations. Though it had been decided at Dumbarton Oaks that regional issues were to be subordinated to global concerns and that regional bodies only had power to settle local disagreements with Security Council approval Article 52 of the UN Charter recognized the role of regional arrangements in bringing about peaceful settlement of local problems and Article 54 reaffirmed the Security Council's interest in regional agencies and their role in maintaining world peace.

Thus, in the post World War II period, the advent of regionalism in international politics is a major development and is rather a new phenomenon in

international politics. As such, a number of regional organizations with diverse nature, content and objectives emerged in the post War period like the NATO, SEATO, CENTO, WARSAW PACT, OAS, OAU, NAFTA, ASEAN, EU, etc.

The idea of regional cooperation among the South Asian states is comparatively of recent origin. In fact, the concept of South Asia as a region itself has a recent origin. For long, the present South Asia was considered as a part of South East Asia and later Southern Asia. Afterwards, both were separated and South Asia was regarded as an independent region. The need for regional cooperation in South Asia had been felt since much earlier by the leaders of the region. Nehru said in the Indian Parliament on 8th March 1949 that there is a need for the regional cooperation in several regions of Asia. However, because of India's preoccupations with global politics and Nehru's personal ambitions of India's status in world politics, the idea of South Asian regional cooperation could not be mooted. It was also not clear as to what should be the pattern of regional cooperation. But the smaller states of the region, because of their own problems took interest in regional cooperation. The idea of formation of an exclusive association of the South Asian countries was not seriously considered until Zia-Ur-Rahman, late President of Bangladesh played a pioneering role in this regard. He realized that for the inherent geographical and cultural unity South Asia needed an institutional expression and proceeded accordingly to give it a concrete shape. As such, he first made proposals for regional cooperation during his visit to neighbouring states between 1977 and 1980 and it was immediately endorsed by other states of the region. It was with the beginning of the 80's that their idea took a concrete shape to promote peace and stability on the one hand, and to encourage economic development on the other. Both aims were highlighted in the Memorandum of Association signed by seven South Asian States in New Delhi on 2nd August 1983 which was called the 'Declaration of South Asian Regional Cooperation', thereby christening the very first regional cooperation scheme known as SAARC. It was in 1985 that SAARC was formally launched at the Dhaka Summit of heads of States or Governments with Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka as members.

Thus, the SAARC was born to accelerate the process of socio-economic development in the region through a cooperative endeavour of the member states on

the agreed areas with a purpose to cooperate positively for regional betterment and not to get bogged down by bilateral contentious issues affecting the countries.

SAARC is thus a manifestation of the determination of the peoples of South Asia to cooperate regionally, to work together towards finding solutions to their common problem in a spirit of friendship, trust and understanding and to create an order based on mutual respect, equity and shared benefits. As South Asia's first and only regional organization, its performance, problems and prospects are of vital interest to the people of the region. But no doubt, at its present state of evolutions, SAARC is faced with several constraints in the form of differing politico-security perceptions of the member states, diversity in terms of their size and levels of development, economic disparities, mutual distrust and suspicion and the like. In such a setting, SAARC was expected to play a crucial role in bringing the member states and their people closer, to realize beneficial integration at the international level but in reality, SAARC has not been able to emerge as an effective and viable regional organization. Besides other constraints it is the strained relations between India and Pakistan that seems to come in the way of efficient and fruitful working of the SAARC in its mission for effective regional cooperation thus making the organization allegedly for making wishful and laudable declarations only.

2. Objective of the Study

Explaining the necessity of SAARC, particularly in the economic field, the Bangladesh Working Paper said. "The efforts have not fully exploited the vast potential of regional cooperation that exists and the consequential benefit that this will bring, collectively and individually, to the countries of this region". Collective economic benefit has been the main rationale as well as the drive behind SAARC, but even economic cooperation is dictated so heavily by political constraints that it may be hard to exploit the regions potential. Thus potential avenues for regional cooperation among the South Asian Countries are many and varied. In fact, the full potential of regional cooperation, however, cannot be realized until the core sectors of development are brought within its ambit like trade, industrial cooperation in terms of the processed and manufactures consumer goods, capital goods and technology transfer, infrastructural goods and equipments. Goods like consumer electronics,

consumer durables, processed agricultural products, finer varieties of textile products as well as the simpler varieties of sports, stationary and cultural items would appear to have reasonable potential for increased intra-regional trade.

Given the relative difference in the stages of industrial and technological developments within the region there is a great deal of potential for soft technology transfer through training and consultancy activities.

South Asia's energy resources are far from adequate, but the potential for hydroelectric power in the Himalayas is enormous which will solve many of the problems of the North Indian States, subsequently Bangladesh and even Pakistan could benefit from it. Similarly, there are vast resources of natural gas in Bangladesh while India is rich in coal and also possesses some natural gas and petroleum. Thus, the process of SAARC was generally viewed by all the member states as a positive development with a huge potential for the region, not only in economic and social terms, but also in the long run in terms of political cooperation among member states.

But since its inauguration in 1985, SAARC has progressed with halts. The SAARC institutions have not functioned as effectively as they should have. The Summit meetings have also lost regularity through occasional postponements. The regional political environment may be one of the major explanations for this painfully slow growth. There is no doubt that there are important economic reasons behind the slow progress of SAARC, particularly in the field of trade, industry and finance but there has been a feeling among the elite of most of the members of SAARC that cooperation in these fields would mainly benefit India and not the other countries of the region whose interests might indeed suffer as a consequence of it.

Another real shortcoming of success of SAARC today which explain its present dilemma of uncertainty and falling short in performance are indeed its institutional deficiencies on which much has been said but very little has been done.

SAARC is still a fledgling regional organization and its future is uncertain. It is greatly handicapped by the legacy of the past, the many tensions that exist within and among the South Asian nations, and the profound asymmetry because of the overwhelming size and weight of India. Under the circumstances, the success of SAARC depends upon two fundamental factors. The first is the internal distribution

of power and bilateral relations among the different member states and the second is the degree of unity among the member states in the security, political and mainly economic fields. In other words, what is the relationship between the member states that hope for a community of interests in the agreed areas of cooperation and the actual economic security and political interests of individual member states? Are the economic interests of India and Pakistan strong enough to counteract and even to transcend their unfulfilled national aspirations? Would regionalism overcome nationalism? – these are still the moot questions that blur the vision of the SAARC. At the Dhaka Summit in 1985, Prime Minister of India, late Rajiv Gandhi apprehended that if bilateral issues were allowed in SAARC deliberations they would generate stresses and strains impinging on regional cooperation and ultimately jeopardizing its very existence. But the major hurdles that effectively hamper and jeopardize SAARC's progress is regional bilateral disputes. Perhaps the most important impediment on the road to collective self-reliance is not the incumbent asymmetry and the overwhelming stature of India but how other members perceive Indian intentions, attitude and policies.

Thus, a combination of factors has been responsible for the prevailing strategic discord in South Asia on various bilateral and global issues such as divergences in political systems, regime sustenance and nation building strategies, developmental patterns and defence and security policies, hierarchical power structure of the region with wide gap in the capabilities of India on the one hand and rest of the neighbors on the other, exploitation of these divergence and power asymmetry of the region by interested external powers in pursuance of their interests, etc.

Beside these, in South Asia, the major perceived threats are seen as arising from internal tensions and conflicts, especially in India and Pakistan which have had serious spill over effects, jeopardizing the security of neighbouring states as well and form tensions and conflicts with each other.

Thus, for a cooperative venture like SAARC to succeed, the member countries need to have a high degree of trust in one another. But, the major bilateral problems in the region e.g. Farakka, Tamils in Sri Lanka, Indian-Nepal migration and above all, Kashmir issue reinforce the fear that India endangers all the surroundings

very much and thus vitiates the relations of the countries of the region at the bilateral level and in turn, the process of regional cooperation. Perhaps, it would not be out of context to remark here that the idea of avoiding bilateralism in the SAARC has so far remained theoretical – honoured more in breach than in observance.

From the above discussion, it thus appears that SAARC presents a unique example of coexistence with conflict relationship. In fact, the centre piece of South Asia's potential system is the Indo-Pakistan relationship to which the prospects of SAARC are linked. Indian Pakistan relations for most of the period since independence have been marked by confrontation with each other, resulting in an arms race, unproductive wars and the wastage of their scarce resources on arms instead of using them for the developmental purposes to ameliorate the problems of the long suffering people on both sides of the border.

In the ultimate analysis it is the Indo-Pakistan relationship on which the viability of SAARC depends and the future of the SAARC is closely linked with mutual perceptions that both Pakistan and India have about each other.

In fact, there are several issues from the beginning on which India and Pakistan are confronting each other. India's threat perception about Pakistan became alive right at the creation of Pakistan as a very anti thesis of India's core values. Indian policy had to gear up when Pakistan became a partner in the US-led military alliances. Pak-US military relations kept growing all through the 1950s causing concern to India's security interests. On the other, Pakistani logic behind entering the military pacts was based on mutuality of interests between herself and the US in general and the requirement of the safety net against the perceived threat from India and India's policy of secularism that refuted the very basis of Pakistan, that is, the two-nation theory.

Another issue affecting India's policy towards Pakistan is Pakistan's support to terrorism and secessionism in India and it is believed that ISI is the main body of Pakistan that facilitate transfer of weapons across the border to the militants in the North-East, Punjab and Kashmir. Similarly, the nuclear programme of both the countries aggravates the environment. Both India and Pakistan have not signed the NPT and the CTBT for different reasons. India finds NPT and CTBT discriminatory and the failure of the nuclear powers in putting into practice any measures or

obligations towards nuclear disarmament; whereas Pakistan has refused to sign the NPT and the CTBT because India has not done so. India believes in global approach towards nuclear disarmament while Pakistani perception is that the issue can best be tackled by a regional approach.

Again, Indo-Pakistan relations have suffered setbacks to Pakistani attempts at internationalization of the Kashmir dispute much against the Simla spirit. India believes that more the issue is internationalised, the less chances of finding an amicable solution to the problem and it will complicate the matter further. For instance, in response to what Pakistan calls Kashmir as the "Unfinished agenda of partition", the then Indian Prime Minister, Narasimha Rao, retorted by saying that "the only unfinished task in Kashmir was the restoration of Pakistan occupied Kashmir to India."

Given all these, the proposed study seeks to identify and analyse the potentialities of the South Asian region in general and the SAARC in particular; relative success and/or failure of the SAARC as a viable organization for regional cooperation; and the reasons for the success and/or failure of the SAARC in its mission. While addressing to the reasons for the success and/or failure of the SAARC, the study also intends to measure the impact of the bilateral relations between the member states in general and India and Pakistan in particular that are alleged to have impaired the working and development of the SAARC.

3. Theoretical Framework

The post-war world, witnessed a proliferation of regional arrangements in the name of maintaining peace and security, socio-economic cooperation, resisting hegemony and expressing, defending and establishing identity at the international level. As such, a number of analytical frameworks were developed to explain the contemporary developments in the international system. All these are clubbed as the theory of integration in international relations. Among the important theoretical approaches under the umbrella of the integration theory are the 'functionalism', 'neo-functionalism', 'federalism', 'pluralism' and 'regionalism'. The integration theory lays emphasis on integrative process or relationships, whereby governments are cooperatively knit together by growing cultural homogeneity, attitudinal

responsiveness, socio-economic needs and interdependences accompanied by the establishment of supranational institutions in multiple dimensions to fulfill common needs. The ultimate outcome of an integrative process would be political union of separate states at global or regional level. If integration at the regional level is more institutionalised, centralized and closely knit through some supranational structures as is found in the federalist and neo-functionalist approaches then it is state-centric. On the other hand, less institutionalized, decentralized, loosely knit and emotional regional integration as is reflected in the pluralist and functionalist approaches results in community-centric regional organization where more emphasis is laid on the character of the relationship between the peoples – both the elites and the general public – whose states are involved in the process of integration. However, the regionalist approach speaks of either of the two models – state-centric model or community-centric model.

All these approaches, despite their explanatory capabilities of the formal institutional and structural aspects of regional organizations, appear to be limited in explaining the regional organization in South Asia, that is, the SAARC. The SAARC has emerged neither as a variant of state centric model with a supranational authority to bind the member states in their international behaviour nor has it developed as a community centric model with the people playing a predominant role in shaping and guiding the organization. On the contrary, the Organisation seems to be bogged down constantly by the bilateral relations of the member states in general and the relationship of India and Pakistan in particular. As such, the existing theoretical models appear to be lacking in explaining the working and development of the SAARC and its functional inefficiency due to the strained Indo-Pak relations that is more for subjective considerations and compulsions of the ruling elites of both the countries.

Under the circumstances, the proposed study seems to test the existing theoretical frameworks in the explanation of the SAARC and to propose a new framework of analysis that may take into consideration the reasons of strained bilateral relations among the member states that leave profound impact on the viability of the organization.

4. Research Questions

Given the broad objective of the proposed study and the theoretical framework outlined above, the study seeks to address to the following research questions :

- What are the motivational forces for the creation of the regional organizations in general and SAARC in particular?
- What are the potentialities of effective cooperation in South Asia and for that matter, of the SAARC?
- Why the SAARC could not emerge as the state-centric or community-centric regional organization ?
- To what extent does the bilateral relations between the member states impair the functioning of the SAARC as a viable regional organization ?
- To what extent and why does the Indo-Pakistan relations affect the functioning and development of the SAARC ?
- How could the SAARC be made a viable regional organization ?

5. A Brief Overview of Existing Literature

There is a vast literature on regional cooperation in general and SAARC and Indo-Pak relations in particular both at the theoretical level and in the context of SAARC and Indo-Pak relations. Various international and regional observers come out with their comprehensive and intensive studies relating to the constraints of multi-dimensional and analytical overview of South Asian Regional Cooperation and of the future of SAARC with focus on regional developments. These constitute important guidelines to research and policy formulation on redesigning SAARC and its inter and intra regional relations among the seven member countries.

On theory in general, there is abundance of scholarly writings with different perspectives. Theoreticians have proposed various approaches from different angles through their preference. In this connection, international integration theory claimed to be 'empirically-based theory' is an umbrella for a great variety of approaches and methods – functionalism, neo-functionalism, federalism, pluralism and regionalism.

Chief exponents of the federalist sub-school of thought are Rana, Paul Taylor, Ernest, Clark, Etzioni Nye and the like. They focus on many new sociological approaches in their books. A.P.Rana in his book 'Integrative possibilities of Regional order in the Third World. The theoretical writings point out that a central concern of regionalist organizations in the third world ought to be the alleviation of some of the more dysfunctional traditional aspirations of the sovereign state system on the ordering of its international relations. Prof. Rana categorises the writings under three differentiated headings. They focus on many new sociological approaches that have been advanced to challenge or to supplement the classical federalist theory - various writings on Greek city-states, pacifism, liberalism, constitutionalism, legalism etc. Duclos identified various notions of 'functional federalism.' Riker's bargaining approach applied to broader social process on the formation of supernational state out of a system of sovereign states. However, from the discussion of the above theoreticians analyses it is clear that the scope of federalism itself is much broader than the study of international integration.

Another school of thought identified with neo-functionalism which has its origin in a systematic critique of the functionalism. It has derived much of its dynamism and sustenance from the success of the European Economic Community and it took much of its conceptual and explanatory apparatus from the development of American political science in the fifties and sixties. The neo-functionalists assume the psychology of elites in an integration ideally culminating in the emergence of a new political system, whereas the older functionalists stressed a popular psychology of an integration process leading to a 'Universal Social-Psychological Community'. But Ernst B. Haas has been identified as one of the major exponent of this theory in his books *Beyond the Nation-State : Functionalism and International Organisation*, *Uniting of Europe : Political, Social and Economic Forces*. *The Study of Regional Integration : Religions on the Joy and Anguish of Pre- Theorizing*, 2 proposes to reformulate the older or classical functionalists proposition in the light of three requirements : first, that of making them more realistic and meaningful, secondly, that of bringing them into an ordered relationship with other theoretical approaches and themes in social sciences and thirdly, that of producing verifiable propositions

which could be tested against the empirical evidence obtainable from the history of European integration.

Functionalism is the oldest theory of integration or it would be appropriate to call it as a precursor of integration theory. After the coming of neo-functionalism it became older or classical functionalism. Most important proponent and forerunner of functionalism is David Mitrany. Mitrany in his *A Working Peace System and The Functionalist Theory of Politics* gives precedence to economics over politics. The father of functionalism, David Mitrany believes that functionalism is 'A Working Peace System'³ as it emphasizes the common index of needs.

Other known functionalists are Claude, Leonard Wolf, Norman Angel, Robert Cecil, G.D.H. Cole, Jean Monet Taylor and Groom.. Taylor in his book *International Cooperation Today*⁴; A.J.R.Groom in *Approaches to Conflict and cooperation in International Relations : Lessons from Theory for Practice*⁵ and *The Ford Foundation Lectures in International Relations Studies* lay emphasis not on creation of a world federal structure with all its constitutional structures but rather on building "Peace by Pieces" through transnational organizations that concentrated on "Shaping of Sovereignty" rather than on its surrender to supranational institutions(*Functionalism : Theory & Practice in International Relations*).⁶

Another subsequent school of thought identified with Karl W. Deutsch and his associates, employs the pluralist approach. Deutsch in his book *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, France, Germany and the Western Alliance – A Study of Elite Attitudes on European Integration and World Politics and the Analysis of International Relations*⁷ analyses the approach which is known as one of the earliest and most significant approaches to a theory of international integration. Deutsch's assumption is that the tendencies of states to integrate or conflict with their neighbours are based on public attitudes and patterns of behaviours. Another basic assumption of his theory is the belief that the nation state is both the central fact of modern political analysis. Theodore A. Coulombis and James H. Wolfe in *Introduction to International Relations – Power and Justice*⁸ hold that pluralist security communities are mostly larger areas, such as the North American Continent and Western Europe. "For the communications school of thought, then, integration

can be seen both as a process leading toward political unification and as the end product of that process – amalgamated and pluralist security communities.”

Technically regional integration and regionalism are two different concepts. However, regionalism, under the umbrella of Integration Theory, has been used in the sense of regional integration to maintain uniformity of the other theories namely – federalism, secularism, functionalism and neo-functionalism. The chief exponents of regional approach are Russett, Cantori and Spiegel, Falk and Mendlovitz, Nye, Myrdal and Hindberg and Scheingold.

Russett in *International Regions and the International System : A Study in Political Ecology* ; Cantori and Spiegel in *International Politics of Region : A Comparative Approach* ; Falk and Saul H. Mendlovitz in *Regional Politics and World Order.*; Nye in *International Regionalism*,⁹ Myrdal in his book *Realities and Illusions in Regard to Inter-Governmental Organisations* and Hindberg and Scheingold in *European Economic Integration*¹⁰ high light the different dimensions of regional approach to international relations and political dynamics. Hansen in *Regional Integration*¹¹ provide that regionalism is becoming a central and most vital approach to integration theory. These studies hold that success of the integration theory is possible only via regional integration.

Besides, *SAARC – Challenge and Opportunities*¹² by Nasir A Naqash : A.P. Rana's *Integrative Possibilities of Regional Order in the Third World : The Theoretical Organisations : A Third World Perspective*, Govind Ram Agarwal's *Nepal and Non-Alignment : Its South Regional Cooperation Perspective*¹³, David Seddon's - *Nepal – A State of poverty*¹⁴ . Sridhar Kr. Khatre's *South Asian Regional Cooperation : Consideration of Some Models and its Implications For Nepal* : Pramod Kumar Mishra's *South Asia in International Politics* ; A.J.R.Groom and Paul Taylor's *Functionalism : Theory and Practice in International Relations* ; Joseph S. Nyre's *Peace in Parts ; Integration and Conflict in Regional Organisations* ; Ross Masood Hussain's , *The Dynamics of South Asia Regional Cooperation and SAARC* , advocate that political integration is the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new centre and look at the regional cooperative process as a transitional stage of regional integration rather than as an end in itself.

Some other scholars like Bhabani Sengupta, Amit Gupta, Prakash Nanda in their *Regional Cooperation and Development in South Asia*¹⁵ spoke of Institutional approach to regionalism and regional cooperation that was incorporated in the UN Charter, founded on the clashing power politics of the two power blocks in the post-Western approach to world politics known as the world order approaches and Richard A. Fald and Rajni Kothari are the noted protagonists of the world order approach.

Surya Bahadur Thapa, the former Prime Minister of Nepal spoke of a one-and-half track approach (*South Asian Survey*, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1999) and focuses on South Asian Cooperation. Sederal Raja in his *South Asian Cooperation in Industry, Energy and Technology* aimed mostly at increasing national developmental capabilities rather than regional economic integration and restructuring of regional production adopting regional import substitution approach. Susil Kumar (*International Studies* Vol. 36, 2, 1999) in his State Centric approach and A.Z. Hilali (*Asian Studies*, XII, No.2, 1994) in his Experimental and Incremental Approach spoke of security in different policy areas by realizing its goals in opposition to private pressures.

In general, a comprehensive study on regionalism has been made by various international and regional scholars of the new nations of Asia, Africa and Arab League. Scholars like B. Ramesh Babu in *Globalization and the South Asian State*,¹⁶ Naren Chitty in *Framing South Asian Transformation – An Examination of the Regional Views on South Asian Cooperation*,¹⁷ view that SAARC is a creation of South Asian governing elites in response to internal pressures for regional development as well as challenges in the global environment with immense potentialities. In the perception of an Indian scholar A.P.Rana, regionalism with its supposedly limited geographical scope and its shared interests and values, is bestowed with an effective way of tackling problems of economic development, inter-state conflict and the hegemony of the super powers. Bimal Prasad in *Regional Cooperation in Sout Asia – Problems and Prospects*¹⁸ spoke of promoting the welfare of the people of South Asia through the countries that are in hurdles and difficulties. He also deals with economic background, potentialities, political imperatives, institutional framework and cultural dimensions of regional cooperation.

Scholars like Pramanand in *Political Development in South Asia*¹⁹ and B.S. Khanna in *Rural Local Government in India and South Asia*²⁰ aim to sketch the overall development of the seven nations included in the SAARC. As there is no integrated volume to give a comprehensive and comparative picture of political development of the seven countries, Pramanand logically and historically develops the theme from projecting the demographic data to the problems confronting the nations in keeping stability and bringing political acculturation. In this book, the author handles the problem of political development in the region with a reference to the context of colonialism and nationalism and makes a concise exposition of the various ramifications of political development in South Asia within a comparative framework. Khanna also devoted his study to examine the role of the seven countries in terms of their democratization and developments.

Besides, on SAARC, there have been made innumerable studies. Scholars like Partha Ghosh in *Cooperation and Conflict in South Asia*²¹ Eric Gonsalves in *South Asian Cooperation: An Agenda and a vision for the future*,²² Nancy Jetly in *Democratisation and Regional Cooperation in South Asia*²³ Govind R. Agarwal's *SAARC: Quest for a new Political and Economic Order*,²⁴ and Bimal Prasad in *India's Foreign Policy: Studies in Continuity and Change*,²⁵ take into account the problems and prospects involved in South Asia's march from conflict to cooperation. Gonsalves and Jetly in their book advocate the need for enhancing dialogue between the countries of South Asia in order to find a common ground both at the regional and at the global level.

Then, in the context of Indo-Pak relations, which is the core of the proposed research studies have also been made by different scholars in this respect. Even since the birth of Pakistan, the relations between India and Pakistan have been far from friendly as both the countries feel threatened by each and hence the story of Indo-Pak relations is a story of conflict. Keeping this in mind, the authors like Eric Gonsalves and Nancy Jetly in *The Dynamics of South Asia: Regional Cooperation and SAARC*²⁶, Verinder Grover and R. Arora in *World Community and Indo-Pak Relations: Events and Documents of Indo-Pak Relations*²⁷ Selig S. Harrison, Paul H. Kreissberg and Deunix Kux in their noted book *India and Pakistan: The First Fifty Years*²⁸ and E. James and Subroto Roy in their *Foundation of Pakistan's Political*

Economy : Towards an agenda for 1990s²⁹ focus mainly on Indo-Pak relations, on deadly conflicts, cooperation, on peace and on ups and downs, their bilateral relation, negotiation which is the cultural theme of the proposed work. Their volumes are an extended exercise in mapping out inter-state relations in the areas of political relations, security concerns, technological and commercial issues, intellectual and cultural commonalities and the impact of foreign aid.

In addition, Norton James H.W. in *The Third World*³⁰, Jain : Rashmi in *US – Pak Relations, 1947-83*,³¹ Venkataramani, M.S. in *Alliance with Pakistan : The Evolution and Cause of An Uneasy Partnership*³²; R.C.Gupta in his *US Policy Towards India and Pakistan*³³, Kheli Shirum Tahir, in *The United States and Pakistan : The Evolution of an Influence Relations*,³⁴ M.A.Chaudhry in *Pakistan and the Great Power*³⁵, Veric, L.J, *India's quest for Security*³⁶, Bohari Imtihan, H, in his *South Asian Regional Cooperation : Progress, Potential and Proposal*,³⁷ Rehman Sobhan in *Political Dimensiosn of South Asia Cooperation . The Perspective of Bangladesh*³⁸, V.P. Menon in his *The Story of the Integration of the Indian States*³⁹ have made an objective evaluation of Indo-Pak relations.

From a different angle, in addition, there has been a large number of micro or macro studies dealing with some specific phenomena of Indo-Pak relations. To mention a few, Harish Kapur in *India's Foreign Policy, 1947-1992*⁴⁰ shadows and substance. Shelton U. Kodikara in *External Compulsions of South Asian Politics*,⁴¹ S.P.Verma and K.P.Misra (eds). *Foreign Policies in South Asia*; Kalyan Dutta in *Third World Countries; Struggle for New Economic Order* analyse foreign policy behaviours of India and other South Asian countries which has evolved since independence as well as the factors that have contributed to their evolution and explore the interactions of domestic policies in the South Asian States, and the larger question of the impact of the international environment on the region. Arif A. Waqif in *Regional Cooperation on Industry and Energy : Prospects for South Asia*.⁴² Mohammad Ayoob in *Conflict and Intervention in the Third World*,⁴³ Ponna Wignaraja and Akmal Hussain in *The Challenge in South Asia ., Development, Democracy and Regional Cooperation*⁴⁴ S. K. Khanna and K.N.Sundaram in *Encyclopaedia of South Asia : Allan Heston in Economic Policies and Performance of India and Pakistan*; Krishnalekha Sood in *Trade and Economic Development :*

India, Pakistan and Bangladesh ; Robert Laporte's Pakistan in 1995 : The Continuing Crisis ; Deepak Tripathi's India's Foreign Policy ; Shahid Javed Burki's Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons – All the Pieces in Place ; J. Bandopadhyaya's The Making of India's Foreign Policy : Determinants, Institutions, Processes and Personalities.⁴⁶ Masoor Ahmed Beg's Defence and Economic Growth in Developing Countries; C.P.Bhambhri's Foreign Policy of India⁴⁷ ; Robert W. Bradnock in India's Foreign Policy Since 1971; Abha Dixit's Sino-Pakistan Relations and Their Implications for India ; Narottam Gaan in Indira Gandhi and Foreign Policy Making : The Bangladesh Crisis ; Pranay gupta's The Challenge of Change; Bimal Jalan on The Indian Economy ; Problems and Prospects; Edward A. Kolodzij and Robert E. Hartzey in Security Policies of Developing Countries ; N. Krishnan in Africa Funds ; Y. Yertzburger in The Political Economy of Sino-Pak Relations; Bhavani Sengupta in Towards Good Neighbourness⁴⁸ Pran Chopra and M. Shamsul Huq et al ⁴⁹. Future of South Asia – all offer large chunk of knowledge in economic, political and foreign policy issue, in trade and commerce and other fields of the countries of South Asia particularly of India and Pakistan including their foreign policy issue.

In addition, Virendra Narain and B.C.Upreti in their edited book SAARC : A Study of Perceptions and Policies⁵⁰ opine that though there are always conflicts and tensions among the member countries on ethnic, cultural, political economic issues, there are some commonalities among the States of the region that make them able to live under the same umbrella.

S.D.Muni in his book Understanding South Asia⁵¹ has focused on India's interactions with one or more neighbours and the domestic thrusts of the foreign policy questions.

The book Intra and Inter-State Conflicts in South Asia⁵² edited by Sudhir Jacob George gives a detailed analysis of intra and inter-state conflicts of South Asian countries and covers a wide range of conflicts emanating from political, social environmental security related issues.

M.G.Chitkara in his book Indo-Pak Relations; Challenges before New Millennium⁵³ has discussed about the never ending conflict between India and Pakistan regarding Kashmir issue. The author expresses his hope that the mutual



understanding and cooperation is likely to make Indian subcontinent an economically viable unit. And with this the book *South Asian Perspectives, Seven Nations in Conflict and Cooperation*⁵⁴ by Bhabani Sengupta gives a collage of perspectives on South Asia. It tries to look at major problems of South Asia from the perspectives of all its component members. It begins with a comprehensive issues in South Asia, which are currently and will remain in the coming years, the single most potential source of domestic and inter-state conflicts in the region. The rest of the articles deal with inter-state relations in South Asia, domestic issues that have a bearing and reports on individual countries cited by the author.


In addition, Koasar J. Ajam, in his *Ethnicity, Identity and the State in South Asia*⁵⁵ divided his book into three sections and gives a detailed analysis of theoretical perspectives and of Regionalism in South Asia with some case studies of SAARC countries.

T. Nirmala Devi in both her books *Socio-Economic Profile of SAARC Countries and Population and Development in SAARC*⁵⁶ sheds light on policy implications. The second book also focuses on population growth and development in the region. The first one also covers the information relating to the members of SAARC and highlights economic, political, social, historical or sociological progress in detail. These two books endeavour to look at the region in an inter-regional framework and also to highlight the gaps that exist in our understanding. Rajesh S. Kharat in his *Bhutan in SAARC, Role of a Small State in a Regional Alliance*⁵⁷ investigates the role of Bhutan in SAARC and it examines the major factors behind its joining the regional forum. This book also traces the contribution of Bhutan in the various stages of development of SAARC through its participation in different programmes and committees. This book also emphasizes the significance of SAARC for Bhutan to secure its foreign policy objective and extent of relations with the outside world other than India.

In addition, S K Khanna and K N Sudarshan, in their *Encyclopaedia of South Asia*,⁵⁸ aims to make their work accessible to as wide a public as possible. The seven volumes are arranged in chapters that readers may absorb a large chunk of knowledge, say in history or in culture.

216605

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Vishnu Prajapati in his *South Asia : Power and Politics*⁵⁹ in three volumes deals respectively with political evolution and power structure, India's national interests and international commitments, and political priorities and economic imperatives. In his another book *Politics and Power in South Asia*,⁶⁰ he presents a truthful and in-depth analysis of the political, power structure and evolution of South Asian sub-continent.

Lastly V. Jayapalan in his *India and her Neighbours*⁶¹ and Farhat Ehsas in *SAARC – Relevance in New World Order*⁶² deals with all aspects of India and her neighbours in detail and the last chapter 'India and SAARC studies India's relations with SAARC in a lucid manner and evaluate SAARC as a living and developing organization and efforts have been made to cover all the aspects in an objective manner.

6. Significance of the Study

However, in all these studies reviewed we find that these studies either deal with regional cooperation at the theoretical level, or exclusively on the evolution, organization, functioning and evolution of the SAARC or on the intricacies involved in the complexity of Indo-Pak relations. Hardly, there is any serious research work that links the functioning of the SAARC with the constraints of Indo-Pak strained relations. In other words, there is an obvious research gap in the chain of knowledge as to what extent the strained relationship between India and Pakistan tend to affect the success and/or failure of the SAARC. Herein lies the significance of the present research as it intends to enrich the theoretical understanding of regional cooperation in general as also to identify the irritations of the Indo-Pak relations that come in the way of effective functioning of the SAARC as the formal institutional mechanism for regional cooperation in the South Asian region.

7. Methodology

Since the objective of the present study is to identify and analyse the potentialities of the SAARC as a regional organization and to measure the impact of strained Indo-Pak relation that is thought to impair the viability of SAARC, the present study is going to be an exploratory research. As such, the research design of

exploratory research was followed by way of surveying the literature on the problem followed by survey and scrutiny of experiences of personalities involved with the SAARC and Indo-Pak relations. Attempts were also made to identify some in-sight stimulating cases relating to the impaired relations between India and Pakistan that has its impact felt on the functioning and impairing of the SAARC to supplement informations to be collected through survey of literature and the exsperience survey. Thus, maximum reliance was on the historical-analytical technique.

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CHAPTER II

Bilateral Relations , South Asia and the SAARC

'Bilateral' versus 'regional' is a politically sensitive and long-standing question of debate in South Asian relations. Article 10 of the SAARC charter specifies that no bilateral, contentious issue will be considered in the framework. Nevertheless, it remains a hard fact that every progress in the SAARC activity is heavily dictated by political constraints. Almost every bilateral controversy includes India as a party because it is only India which has common geographical, socio-cultural and economic bonds with each of the South Asian countries. But it is unrealistic to attempt regional solution to specific bilateral issues, such as the Kashmir issues between India and Pakistan, sharing of river water between India and Bangladesh, Tamil issue between India and Sri Lanka, the problem of trade and transit between India and Nepal, etc. The smaller countries are busy making their best efforts to discuss their bilateral problems within the SAARC forum to join a better bargaining deal vis-à-vis India, without realizing the fact that it is against the spirit of the SAARC charter. Not only this, the countries are often making an attempt to embarrass India publicly, the example being Sri Lanka deciding not to attend the seventh session of the SAARC Council of Ministers which was to be held from 1 July 1989 at Islamabad, following the dispute with India over the withdrawal of IPKF from Sri Lanka. Ultimately the meeting had to be postponed.

All the states in the region have one or the other kind of problem with India. It is for this reason that they have been more enthusiastic towards SAARC, while India may view that it is a ganging up of her neighbours against her. The bilateral issues are also important, whether it would be possible to solve various bilateral problems between India vis-à-vis other states of the region at its regional level is a moot question. Indeed the bilateral relations would affect the political environment in the region and determine the future of SAARC.

It is not only India's role and attitude that would determine the survival and sustenance of SAARC, but the attitude of smaller states is equally crucial. The

politico-strategic needs of states and their strategic perceptions are important factors whether or not SAARC can be an effective alternative to bilateralism. It may be noted that India's own policy and approach towards the neighbouring countries may also have a direct bearing on SAARC and determine attitude of the smaller states towards it. Sri Lanka's decision not to attend the Islamabad Summit of SAARC countries against India's decision to air drop food packets in Jafna is an important point in this connection.

The South Asian states have never been out of the influence of regional powers and the superpowers. Nepal, Bangladesh and Pakistan have often talked about China as an important factor in South Asia. They may even like to include China as a partner in the SAARC. Nepal has often tried to play the China card against India. Pakistan has been a major recipient of American arms aid and has friendly relations with it. India had friendly relations with the Soviet Union. It is, therefore, necessary to keep in view the attitude and policies of these major world powers with regard to regional cooperation in South Asia.

It is in this context that a study of the attitude of the member states as well as the major powers of the world towards the SAARC becomes relevant.

One of the most welcome developments in South Asia since the end of British colonial rule has undoubtedly been the emergence of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Till now, the countries of South Asia bearing mutual distrust, suspicion, and experiencing pulls and pressures of extra-regional powers, has been forging relationship across the oceans and mountains instead of looking inward at the prospects of mutually beneficial inter-relationships.

It is true that SAARC still represents seeds in the wind which have yet to be grounded and take root. But the significant thing is that despite blowing of hot and cold winds both internally and from external directions, the movement for cooperation has not come to a standstill. One happy augur has been that much before Dhaka's initiative (May, 1980) which led to the establishment of SAARC, intellectual interactions for Cooperation in South Asian region had become a growing phenomenon.

To many, SAARC is still a dream that remains distanced from fulfillment. Despite frequent meetings/summits the advance towards the cherished goal has so far remained hopelessly slow. South Asia, before the launching of SAARC, and South Asia now, that is, almost three decades after, does not look different either economically or politically. The scenario of bilateral relations in the SAARC community remains unimproved. It does not need much mental or intellectual exercise to explain this discordance between ideal and reality. The plain and simple explanation is that, SAARC remains hostage to those contentious issues that negate cooperation but beget suspicion and mistrust, even conflict or confrontation.

Conflict Resolution has become part of the peace-building process since the end of the cold war. Several conflicts have been resolved, some bilaterally, others though multilateral mechanisms. Both the legitimate when a conflict is deep-rooted and does not yield to easy solution nations now a days build fences of confidence – building measures with two objectives : first to ensure that the conflict does not escalate, and second to steadily, even if slowly, bring it to the threshold of resolution.

And if one takes a look at a map of conflicts around the world since the Second World War, one finds a common factor in these containment and resolution. The common factor is the willingness of the main actors in the conflict to limit and resolve it. In other words, bilateral readiness to resolve conflict is an essential factor for conflict resolution. Most conflicts being bilateral, a conflict bends towards limitation of resolution when the two actors agree that continuance or escalation is no longer to the advantage of either side. In this context, it is pertinent to appreciate merits of quiet diplomacy and even the non official dialogues. As is known, the United States and the USSR the non-official dialogues. As is known, the United States and the USSR worked bilaterally to bring down their stockpiles of nuclear warheads. Similar were the cases of Angola, Mozambique, etc.

The Sino-Soviet border conflict, the Sino-Vietnam war of 1979, the Iran-Iraq war the India-China border war, were all resolved bilaterally. All this does not rule out the case for conflict resolution through multilateral mechanism as happened in the case of Cambodia. Though , at it must be noted, it was preceded by Paris meetings between Heng Semín and Prince Sihanouk. With this as the background it

would be useful to examine the four tormenting issues that plague the sub continent.

India and Pakistan, one says with deep regret, were born as adversary states and the two have fought three wars over Kashmir and are now locked in what is called a low-intensity conflict since last five years.

The two neighbours are frontier with bilateral, trilateral and arbitration mechanism to resolve serious differences. The Indus river water disputes which hurt the agriculture of both countries was resolved with the help of the World Bank. The Ran of Kutch dispute was referred to an international arbitration tribunal whose verdict was accepted by both countries. In the fifties, crisis situations created by population movements were resolved by the Prime Minister of the two countries. After the 1965 war both countries accepted mediation by the USSR but the Tashkent Agreement did not find favour with Pakistan and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was able to bring about the exit from power of FM Ayub Khan in 1968.

The Simla Agreement on the other hand was a product of bilateral diplomacy, it held the peace in Kashmir for as many as 17 years though no talks were held between the two countries on the provisions of the Agreement.

The present conflict in Kashmir is of a peculiar nature. A political disquiet in the valley was adopted by Pakistan with all help and support. A pertinent question that now confronts the Governments of India and Pakistan is to determine whether the contentious issue is bilateral, i.e., between India and Pakistan or is it trilateral, i.e., to include the people of Kashmir? Policy-makers in the United States have been projecting it is a trilateral dispute. Apart from Ms. Raphael, President Clinton himself had said so after his meeting with Ms. Bhutto. The American sponsored track – compared of some eminent and distinguished scholars from India and Pakistan seems to be moving in this direction.

The Governments of India and Pakistan will have to face this issue frontally and jointly since some elements of the Kashmir polity on both sides of the border – claim that they are an equal party to the conflict and there can be no solution without their full participation and consent.

Whether the conflict is settled bilaterally or multilaterally, the first essential requirements is that the government of India and Pakistan agree that it must be resolved. The two sides have to talk to determine the nature of the conflict, the parties to it, and the ways and means of resolving it. For them to agree to solve the conflict, two prior situations are essential. First, both have to realize that the cost of the conflict for outweighs the gains. Second, both have to realize that neither can win it at the cost of the other. Only when these two conditions are realized can win it at the cost of the other. Only when these two conditions are realized will the prime ministers of the two countries agree to talk about a solution. Unfortunately, the prerequisite conditions have not been met yet.

The two sides positions are so rigidly polarised and are so totally irreconcilable that it is difficult to expect them to make compromises and accommodations for a solution. Will they agree to bring Kashmir people as a third party? Even if they do – which is a very big 'if' how do you translate people into persons? What can a third party like the United States do when the two sides hold on to irreconcilable positions? Impose a solution on them? Assume the task of the policeman 'in the subcontinent? Risk losing one as a friend by swording - or appearing to award – what may be seen by the order side as a partisan award? How can one assume that the US will be able to deliver in the nineties what USSR failed to do in the sixties?

The Nepal-Bhutan conflict had an Indian angle too. As is known, about 1000,000 Bhutanese are languishing in refugee camps in Nepal. There is a feeling in Nepal that the issue is trilateral since 'these refugees have traveled on Indian soil before reaching Nepal'. While all of us we are keen to sort this out peacefully, India does not wish to get dragged into a dispute amongst two nations that are friendly.

A more contentious issues pertained to the water dispute between India and Bangladesh. The need for augmentation of water resource from the Brahmaputra is self-evident in this regard. In the last analysis, only channel sing its massive flow can meet the ever-increasing needs of the two countries. But rigidity continues to bare the way.

The fourth tormenting issue is South Asia is the continuing Sri Lankan agony. The efforts being made by President Mrs. Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga to resolve the knotty issue deserve support. The absence of serious bilateral conflicts and the existence of a sense of common political purpose are two essential starting points for an undertaking aimed at regional co-operation.

The countries of South Asia share many common values that are rooted in their social, ethnic, cultural and historical traditions. Perceptions about certain specific events or political situation of the world may differ, but such differences do not seem to create a gulf between them that cannot be bridged. In fact, the beginning of co-operation on a regional basis may be a positive force in generating a climate of harmony conducive to a better perception of what the countries in the region have in common and the value of this shared heritage.¹

In South Asia, as in other regions of the world, we have countries at different levels of development, some are relatively less developed than others. Any proposal for economic co-operation must consequently be formulated with the great care in order to ensure that the weak are not exploited and that the strong do not dominate. The areas selected should be only those in which cooperation will mutually benefit all the countries irrespective of existing economic disparities.

During the time Bangladesh presented its proposal of regionalism in South Asia, India was isolated from her neighbors due to her stand on Afghanistan, Kampuchia and Indian Ocean. In addition to the mention of the economic aspects of regional co-operation, Zia-ur-Rehman had also referred to 'peace, stability and security' in the region.

Pakistan also seemed to be apprehensive of the Bangladesh initiative because they thought that any framework for regional cooperation in South Asia would ultimately result in the economic and political domination of India in the region. Mistrust and suspicion grown out of the four decade old conflictual bilateral relations overshadowed Pakistani approach to the idea of South Asian Regionalism. Pakistan feared that deep involvement in a South Asian framework would gradually weaken its association with the West Asian countries. Thus it was clear that Pakistanis' hesitations stemmed from 'Indo-Phobia', a fear that such an association

would provide India an opportunity to institutionalise its domination over the South Asian region in general and Pakistan in particular.

Introductory part of the paper mentioned that the idea of regional cooperation in South Asia is not new. Countries of the regionally and regionally under the umbrella of such forms as Economic and Social Commission for Asia and Far East (EGCAP), the Non-aligned movement and the Commonwealth.

The Draft however, has explained that these efforts have not fully exploited the vast potential of regional cooperation than exists and the consequential benefits that this will bring, collectively and individually to the countries of the region. The feasibility of such cooperation was informally discussed in various capitals at different times but until recently no concrete step was taken.

South Asia which include Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Maldives and Sri Lanka. Five of the seven nations that constitute the region are part of the same subcontinent. Maldives and Sri Lanka are islands closely situated to the shores of the mainland.

Bangladesh is the most easterly of the SAARC countries, surrounded on three sides by Indian territory and Burma. On the South-east lies Burma, the one and only non-Indian border of Bangladesh.

Bangladesh came to existence in 1971, before that it was the eastern wing of Pakistan, since 1947.

Bhutan is a landlocked country located in high mountains of the Himalayas, with India on the South and China on the North. The political system is absolute monarchy, established in 1879.

The Bhutanese economy is amalgamated with the Indian economy. Politically and economically Bhutan has a special tie-up with India. It is the integral part of the Indian defence set up. Bhutan is a member of the United Nations since 1971 and enjoys membership in eight specialized agencies. Bhutan has diplomatic relations only with India, Bangladesh, Nepal, Maldives, Kuwait, Japan and a half a dozen European countries. But it maintains embassies only in New Delhi and Dhaka

besides a permanent representative at the UN and consulates in a couple of other countries.

The Union of India occupies a key position in Asia. It is bounded on the north, north-east and north-west by the mighty Himalayas, on the south-east by the Bay of Bengal and on the South west by the Arabian Sea. The southern tip is washed by the blue waters of the Indian Ocean.

India shares its political borders with Pakistan on the west and Bangladesh and Burma on the east. The northern boundary is made up of the Sinkiang province of China, Tibet, Nepal and Bhutan.

Maldives is an archipelago in the Indian ocean, to the west of Sri Lanka and South-west of India. Maldives got independence on July 26, 1965 and it became a republic in November 1968. Maldives is a member of the United Nations since 1968 and it enjoys membership in fourteen specialized agencies of the U.N.

The kingdom of Nepal is situated between India and China in the Southern slope of the Himalayas. Nepal is geo-politically part of India and strategically important in the defence of the Indo-Gangetic Plain.

The Islamic Republic of Pakistan came into existence in 1947, following the partition of the subcontinent into two states, India and Pakistan.

Sri Lanka is an island separated from India by the shallow Palk Strait and the Gulf of Mannar. It is bounded on the west by the Palk Strait and the Gulf of Mannar on the north and east by the Bay of Bengal and the South by the Indian Ocean.

Note has also to be taken of the fact that no region of the world is free from bilateral conflicts among the countries within it. Besides it is quite possible for countries given by some bilateral problems or conflicts to move towards cooperation among themselves for certain common purposes. The formation of SAARC is itself a proof of this assumption. However, it is also a fact that such cooperation cannot go very far unless there is a general feeling of confidence in each other's bonafides among its members. It, therefore, becomes imperative to identify the roots of political discord in South Asia and see how this discord can be met if not ended, in order to enable the movement of regional cooperation to grow stronger.

As Rajiv Gandhi highlighted in his statement at the Bangalore SAARC Summit: "Whether we will it or not, there is a symbiotic interchange between intensified regional cooperation and cordial bilateral relationships.² Haunting memories of past conflicts and tensions need not cleared the vision of statesman like leaders which South Asia urgently needs to resolve the various bilateral problems which obstruct the smooth progress of SAARC. It is important to cognize that in the technological environment of today history cannot be permitted to have a permanent too; on the peaceful and definitive settlement of even the most chaotic emotive disputes.³ In particular, since Indo Pakistan relations are bound to remain, the around which the fortunes of SAARC resolve, a rapprochement of this hypersensitive relationship is an organic cogency for promoting the cause of regional cooperation. Also since India is a common factor in most of the bilateral disputes, a special effort is needed from the India side to improve the political climate in South Asia.

The recent eruption of longstanding bilateral problems into major showdowns has made for qualitative determination in the political environment belying all hopes for a thaw in the regional equation in the wake of superpower dialogue, opening up the possibility of restructuring of international relations based on cooperation instead of conflict. It is not within the scope of this paper to go into the pools of the problems in South Asia but it is to be noted that at any given time India has had problems with one or another of its neighbours. Indo-Bangladesh ties remained stable, Indo-Sri Lanka relations took a sharp decline. Even as Indo-Sri Lankan relations remained poised for an upward turn, Indo-Nepalese relations touched a new low. More important, the core Indo-Pakistani relationship, which lies at the heart of South Asian political climate, has continued to remain slumped over a host of irritants – old and new. In the final analysis, it is on this conflict ridden relationship that any viable regional arrangement would hinge. It was no coincidence that it was only when India and Pakistan endorsed the idea of regional cooperation that SAARC really look off. This fact has it anything became more self-evident, India's proposals for inclusion of core economic areas in the SAARC agenda and the establishment of a Regional Fund were foredoomed to failures in the face of Pakistani resistance.

Similarly, Pakistan's plea for forging links with ASEAN could not take off the ground for want of India's endorsement.

The main problem with the South Asian region has been that there are sharp differences among its member countries.⁴ These countries contrast with each other in terms of population, size natural resources, level of economic development, political ideologies and institutions. They also have competitive economics as well. But, at the same time there are numerous similarities. All these countries belong to the same geographical region. Even the Maldives islands and Sri Lanka which are separated from the subcontinent geographically through a small stretch of sea are tied up with the region by numerous other factors. All the South Asian countries share common historical experiences, religion, culture, civilization, language, etc. These factors together provide a shape to South Asia as a region. It may also be noted that apart from these differences and similarities, the South Asian states are also faced with inter-state tensions and conflicts particularly with India. As a result they have followed not only different foreign policy perception but the development of harmonious relationships has also been hindered.

Apart from this, anxieties with regard to neighbours at the national level have led most of the South Asian nations to interact more intensively. Differences over the Ganga water between Bangladesh and India, for instance, probably contributed to the normalization and improvement of Bangladesh-Pakistan relations. Bhutan's special relations with India might have been prompted by Bhutan's anxieties over its sizeable Nepalese minority. Nepal's posture of equidistance from India and China and its proposal to declare itself as a zone at peace got enthusiastic support from Bangladesh and Pakistan.⁶

There are misunderstandings even now between India and Bangladesh between India and Pakistan and anxieties on the part of Nepal about its neighbours. There is however, one problem which has proved intractable in the past and is likely to remain in the foreseeable future and that is the Kashmir problem. Unfortunately, this is not merely a territorial problem, it seems to involve a sense of national identity. After the Simla Agreement, this problem has also been contained, though Pakistan strongly disagree with India over the interpretation of that agreement. Even then one can reasonably hope that regional cooperation involving both India and Pakistan may

be possible though in the perception of Pakistan the Kashmir problem remains to be solved. After normalization of bilateral relations and with the improvement of political climate, it may be possible to settle the outstanding issues including the Kashmir problem though some analysis view it as a kind of problem that can only be "dissolved and not solved" with the passage of time.⁷

Thus it became clear that success of SAARC depends on smooth relations among the member states.

The charter provided that "decisions at all levels shall be taken on the basis of unanimity" and "bilateral and contentious issues shall be excluded from the deliberations."

Any study of peace and stability in South Asia has to take into account the behaviour of India. The neighbours very much feel the self-awareness of India's pre-eminence and India's quest to assert itself in the affairs of the region. Every Indian neighbour, except perhaps Bhutan and Maldives, is involved, at least, in one dispute with India, like sharing of river waters, fencing the border, ethnic-religious conflicts, territorial dispute, nuclear policy or the desire to get declared a zone of peace, involvement in one another's internal problems to mention a few. Each state in South Asia perceives a threat to its territorial integrity from their big neighbour in the region. The fear of Indian dominance keeps them away from cultivating closer bonds based on common historical and cultural homogeneity. Smaller South Asian states felt that they are 'confronted with an India which is imperial in outlook and difficult to persuade.'¹ It is true that India has problems with all its neighbours in South Asia but that is because India alone shares land or maritime borders with other states in the sub-continent. The 'core geographic location and ethnic religious pluralism made India the common factor in any study of inter-state relations in South Asia. The dispute that marred India's relationship with Pakistan are different from its difficulties with Nepal or Bangladesh or Sri Lanka. This fact needs to be recognized while making an analysis of the nature, trends and shifts in bilateral relations in South Asia. What should be borne in mind in this context is that the success or failure of regional cooperation in the region depends on the positive or negative nature of India's bilateral interaction with Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal. There exists no major difficulties in India's bilateral relations with Bhutan and Maldives.

South Asia has been a conflict prone region right from the days of independence. Hindu-Muslim communalism with its far-flung ramifications, Bangladesh migration, sharing of waters of common rivers, c\disputes involving 'Tin Bigha' and New more Islands, border wire fencing of the Indo-Bangladesh – Borders, maritime boundary, Chakma refugee problem, Tamil tensions and the problem of Nepali . Ethnic in India and Indians in Nepal are the sources of bilateral conflicts in South Asia. The discussions of some these issues would help to understand the political situation of South Asia and to explore the possibilities of a security community in the Denschian frame work or a modified form. In relation to peace and security in South Asia, one important factors needs to be mentioned. As noted by Satish Kumar "One fact little or noted outside the region is that all of the South Asian states except Pakistan have already been brought within the matrix of an Indian security system which is regional rather than national in scope. In some cases, this is through formal agreements, in other through the unilateral extension of the Indian system to neighbouring states".² Obviously only Pakistan posed a challenge to the Indian doctrine of regional security. Thus, the major hurdles to this "United but rather unique form of regional security system" has been Indo-Pak relations.

India and Pakistan are the traditional rivals in the region. So, the heart of the question of regional cooperation is the question of Indo-Pak understanding. The relation between India and Pakistan are "the keystone for South Asian cooperation of any kind."³ and the relations between the two countries suffer from the "Crucial dichotomy of unmitigated personal warmth and undivided national suspicion and animosity."⁴ A fundamental and long term improvement in relations between those two countries are to be achieved for the viability of regional cooperation in South Asia. What is required is a reconciliation of the basic contradictions with regard to political values, political frameworks, international perceptions and attitude.⁵

The first ever summit of the South Asian heads of state and Government clearly brought out the attempt, by the neighbouring countries except perhaps Maldives. to isolate and pressurize India. The manner in which Sri Lanka President, Jayabardana praised Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. He termed Rajiv Gandhi and praised him as the chosen leader of India and said, " on Rajiv Gandhi we rest our

hopes, he must not fail us. He cannot, our duty is to help him to the utmost. He should tell us what each of us should do and we must respond as best we can". About India he said : "India the largest in every way larger than all the rest of us combined can by deeds and words create the confidence among us so necessary to make a beginning." Similarly General Zia-ul-Haq praised India and Rajiv. During the course of his address he departed from the prepared text of the speech and mentioned the consensus arrived at between himself and Jayawardana in the informal discussions on the eve of the Summit.⁶

Significantly on the eve of the summit, a Bangladesh daily carried an interview with General Zia. In this interview he listed various commonalities among the seven states and added : 'There is more than one factor that is common to all. There has been only one aspect and that is the India factor. India with whom we would like to join hands and be in the mainstream and play that much of a role which can generate confidence rather than fear for smaller neighbours. But unfortunately, it is only India which has some sort of disputes with every country.'⁷ He viewed the size of India as an inhibiting factor, 'Through SAARC we hope to convince India that it must take measures to play its part as the Central figure is South Asia but with the recognition that there in it nobody big or small. They are equal independent and autonomous states. India must also realize that is the smaller states which have the greater ego. It wants to coast India to play low profile and generate confidence in others. Let India buy something from small countries and only in this way we can live in peaceful co-existence.'⁸

Rajiv Gandhi viewed regional cooperation in a different way. To him the regional framework would not demand reshaping of foreign policies of the member countries. We have not sought to melt our bilateral relationship into a common regional identity, by rather to fit South Asian cooperation into our respective foreign policies as an additional dimension.

This summit provided opportunities to discuss the bilateral issues informally. Thus Rajiv Gandhi met Zia-ul-Haq, General Ershad and President Jayawardane separately to discuss bilateral problems.

The Bangalore Summit was significantly different from that of the first the sense that there was no collective effort to corner India.

Rajiv Gandhi inaugurated the Summit and stated that SAARC would not be a political association. Referring to bilateral relations he said ; "Bilateral relations have their difficult moments. SAARC reminds us that at such moments we should seek what unite us and not what divides. We have consciously decided not to burden SAARC with our bilateral concords." The Bangalore Summit, however, was clouded by tensions between the two larger powers India accused the Pakistan authorities of aiding Sikh separation in its Punjab state and of developing a nuclear bomb. In his talks with Rajiv Gandhi, Prime Minister Junejo denied reports that his country tested a triggering mechanism for a nuclear bomb. But Gandhi told the reporters : "To be honest, we are not utterly convinced." The bilateral squabble was brought up by Junejo in his speech referring to the troop movements : "We in South Asia should agree to notify one another significant troop movements. We shall agree also to invite observers when the movements exceed in agreed threshold." He said Pakistan was deeply oppressed to nuclear free zone. He then referred to 300 million Muslims in South Asia and gave a piece of advice to Rajiv Gandhi to follow the admirable of Example of Bangladesh President Ershad who had visited other countries of the region during his tenure as chairman of SAARC. Turning to Rajiv Gandhi, Junejo said, President Ershad had set a fine example, " A good example needs to be followed. We recommended it for your consideration, Mr. Chairman."⁹

The informal bilateral contact between Rajiv and Junejo did not arouse much enthusiasm. In fact it was far from cordial. That was because both sides failed to prepare the ground for the talks. Sattar asserted that the principle of bilateralism did not exist in the Simla Agreement.

At the same time, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Sri Lankan President Jayawardene held discussions in a cordial atmosphere with the Sri Lankan side stressing that it wanted India to continue its good offices.

As expected Hameed made a fervent plea for evolving a new mechanism, where at every meeting at Foreign Ministers level we have informal closed door meetings where could air we view candidly. He underscored : "SAARC must not

end up as a deaf, dumb and blind association. What I am saying is that as we grow we must face new challenges, new situations, new developments. I believe solutions to problems have to be found and worked out from within." While, "in our wisdom we had thought that it would be prudent to avoid speaking of bilateral issues, making such a rule sacrosanct, in the long run could spell disaster," he asserted. The issues were trans border terrorism, cross-border ethnic and religious affinity and differing perception of foreign policies. He spoke of ethnic, religious affinities among communities and warned against "Cross border affect bilateral relations and underline the SAARC Spirit".

Sri Lanka, strongly supported by Pakistan called for a change in the basic concept of the Association so as to provide for a discussion and possible more for settlement of bilateral problems.

India's opposition to SAARC taking up bilateral and contentious issues was made clear by External Affairs Minister N.D.Tiwari, at the very outset. In polite but categorical terms he told his colleagues from South Asia that relations between neighbours could not be wholly free from problems and therefore cooperation under SAARC was based on the primacy of over "common concerns" are individual differences. "We should not seek to derive full advantage from whatever unite us. Our is an effort to wider the area of agreement and cooperation, otherwise "we will end up in a statement and miss the immense opportunities that regional cooperation offers." He explained that Indian position on" cooperation under SAARC is predicted on the premise that our common concerns should be considered more important than our individual differences. We should seek to derive full advantage from whatever unite us. Our is an effort to wider the area of agreement and cooperation in spite of bilateral differences. That is precisely the reason why we took a conscious decision not to burden SAARC, with one bilateral concerns. For we realized that by doing so we will end up in a statement and miss the immense opportunities that regional cooperation offers. It is thus clear that India firmly rejected the suggestion that the forum of SAARC be used for sorting out bilateral problems. India maintained the review the SAARC had been set up to promote cooperation in technical, economic and social fields. In South Asia on the basis of immunity and

the inclusion of bilateral controversies in its scope would impose unbearable burdens on the grouping. Thus, bilateral issues just could not be raised in SAARC.

India and Pakistan had two ranks of ministerial level discussions on normalization of bilateral relations. Rajiv Gandhi and Junejo discussed a wide range of bilateral matters and agreed to accelerate the dialogue on outstanding issues. The two Prime Ministers decided to hold an early meeting of the secretaries for economic affairs of the two countries to discuss the promotion of economic cooperation and increasing trade.

Sri Lankan President spell out in detail how the peace accord between India and Sri Lanka how significance for the whole region. "success of SAARC or not will have to depend on the extent to which we can confront and solve bilateral problems we may have between us." "Sri Lanka's separatist problem" he added further, "Provides a convincing illustration in support of the generalized observations that have been made," And at the same time, "We have established for the conduct of our foreign relations on the principles that nothing would be done either, that could be detrimental to the other in any way," This, he said has to be "regarded as an unexceptionable principle and indeed prerequisite for good neighbourly relations." It would contribute to the stability of the region.

Bangladesh President Ershad said pointedly, 'we can't, of course, deviate from our commitments enshrined in our charter, particularly the respect for principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, national independence, non-use of force.'¹⁰ He noted that political issues at the bilateral level had been purposefully kept out of the SAARC agenda for co-operation but "we have certainly albeit informally addressed issues that are of concern to us, internationally, regionally and even bilaterally."

The President of Maldives Abdul Gayoom, noted that although bilateral relations did not come under the banner of SAARC was sure that "every one of us is happy to note the new understanding reached between the two brotherly countries as a result of accord." He paid growing tributes to the Indo-Sri Lankan accord and said he saluted the political wisdom of both President Jayawardane and Prime

Minister Rajiv Gandhi is arriving at a very difficult solution to a four year old ethnic problem.

The king of Bhutan, Jigme Singye Wangchuk said that the most notable event in South Asia during the tenure of Rajiv Gandhi as Chairman of SAARC was the Indo-Srilanka Agreement "By bringing about the peace accord Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and President Jayawardane have demonstrated their deep devotion to the spirit of SAARC and its noble objective of promoting peace and stability in our region.

However, the main SAARC show has been sidelined by the bilateral talks between Rajiv Gandhi and Benazir Bhutto. With an earnest desire to work towards a new phase of relationship but the Prime Minister exchanged views on the bilateral issues. The emphasis in the Indian diplomatic approach, that there could be no discussion on confidence building measure until Pakistan abandoned its covert support terrorism in Punjab has undergone a significant shift. As a result three agreements, on the basis of the directions given by the two Prime Ministers, were signed.

1. An agreement on the prohibition of attack against nuclear installations and facilities of both countries.
2. A cultural cooperation agreement; and
3. An agreement on the avoidance of double taxation of income from international air transport.

While the first two were signed by the foreign Secretaries of the two countries, the third one was signed by the Ambassador of India in Pakistan and his counterpart in India.

Therefore the most important factor hampering SAARC's progress is the ongoing bilateral dispute between different countries. Again it needs to be mentioned here that almost all the present disputes are Indian-Centred. Among the disputes that deserve to be pointed out here are Indo-Bangladesh tensions, Indo-Sri Lankan problems are the direct outcome of India's assertion of a self visualized dominance role in South Asia. Historically Indo Sri Lankan relation have remain cordial and

tension free. However, the last two decades have witnessed gradual deterioration of relationship primarily because of 'India's' hegemonic interference in the domestic affairs of its West Southern neighbour.¹² With the correct and overt support to Islands Tamils by both the central and state governments, a situation of armed confrontation developed initially which has later transformed into an armed conflict. The conflict managed to survive even with the arrival of the IPKE under the 1987 Accord and its subsequent departure from the Island. Indo-Nepali complication is product of India's continuous desire to maintain a tight control over Nepal's trade with other countries. Finally, the dispute that has dominated the region since India's independence is the ongoing dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir. It is neither necessary nor intended to give a detailed history of this dispute here but it needs to be stressed that this dispute can be easily resolved if India agrees to hold a plebiscite in accordance with UN resolutions acceptable to both India and Pakistan. The magnitude of the cost involved in denying the right of self-determination to the people of Kashmir is indeed enormous for India as well as for the region. The Kashmir dispute embittered relationship between India and Pakistan since partition in 1947 and has caused three major wars (1948, 1965, 1971) and innumerable border clashes. Over there are enormous resources have been allocated to military preparedness primarily because of the impending danger of war stemming from the ongoing dispute over Kashmir. With the advent of indigenous struggle for the exercise of their right of self-determination, the situation in Kashmir has become acutely complex and the tensions between India and Pakistan have also acquired alarming proportions. The tragedy of the situation is that the magnitude of economy working cost involved is fully realized by both parties, yet a major effort to resolve this dispute continues to remain elusive.

Another thorn in the flesh of SAARC is Indian haste and insolence in hegemonistic maneuvers. Hegemony and zones of influence are recognized by neo realists as facts of international life with a stabilizing role. But somehow India has chosen to rub its small neighbors repeatedly on the wrong side in transmitting its message of superiority. In Sri Lanka, India is perceived to be the wicked cause of years of devastation by Tamil insurgency, which in turn Indian Army failed to contain coming in aid of Sri Lanka after the latter hand acceded to India's demands for

exercise of an imposing naval presence in Trincomali. Indian slight upon Sri Lankan President over the last SAARC summit was also unfortunate. Trade blockade of Nepal by India finally helped a more obliging government into power there, but very strong and articulate opposition is also surfacing in Nepal against Indian water-plans, and a general air of suspicion, far from diminishing is now resounding. In Bhutan, the agitating Nepalese immigrants were perceived to be a Sikkimisation maneuver masterminded by India. The suspicion has since been somewhat dimmed by subsequent Indian aloofness for the time being on the issue of Nepalese evicted from Bhutan, for whom some international care only has been mobilized at present and refuge camps set up within Nepal. In Bangladesh, India is regarded by most people as the villain of the peace of statement on Ganges water sharing and for sheltering cross-border Chaka violence. In turn, people in Bangladesh betray undisguised sympathy for Kashmir, Khalistan and Assam separatist insurgency, which they see as genuine national liberation movements, although the last one has overtly anti Bengali bias. In fact quite a few in Bangladesh like to believe that if Assam separates, there many increased scope of revived of traditional cooperation between Assam and Bangladesh at grassroots level, whereas right now all traffic is virtually closed. With the growing realization of the importance of neighbourly people to people contacts for sustainable development, some in Bangladesh also dream of expanded relationship with Lusai Hills people in the new future, Cross border trade in Bangladesh is now limited to West Bengal, Bihar, Meghalaya, Tripura. Small entrepreneurs in Bangladesh what in expansion all the way around denied at the moment. Relationship nevertheless, at the governmental level between Bangladesh and India has markedly improved after the opening of the Tin Bigha Corridor.

Yet it is no wonder that smaller maritime states in the SAARC welcome , as indeed so some other Indian ocean states, Pakistan's unequal attempt to deny Indian naval domination of the Indian ocean. On the other hand, U.S. and Indian joint naval exercise as well as Indian Defense , Ministers goodwill visit to China point to a changing scenario in Asian Security perspective that cannot fail to be taken note of.

How can Bangladesh then find solace in SAARC ? Threatened as Bangladesh is from within SAARC itself and it has to explore multiple involvements to underpin its security. A SAARC security cooperation at the moment is a far cry. Independent military exchanges between Bangladesh and China, Bangladesh and USA, Bangladesh and Thailand, Bangladesh and Pakistan as well as Bangladesh and Saudi Arabia contribute to a limited assurance on the ground. For greater self-assurance, Bangladesh of necessity shall have to evolve its own peculiar non-conventional mix of deterrent national services and supportive international pressures.

As the largest and the stablest democratic power, India has a special responsibility in setting the tone for bilateral relationships and giving a lead in evolving an acceptable framework of cooperative relations in the region. Indeed, if India has to rise to the challenge of true leadership, it can hardly fight shy of taking steps for meaningful accommodation with its smaller neighbours. Its ability to influence regional affairs would essentially depend on how it carries neighbors with it in creating a climate conducive for accelerating peace and development in the region.

Charges of India assuming the mantle of a regional manager - notwithstanding its recent showdowns with Sri Lanka and Nepal and its action in Maldives - are too factor. There is, however, need for India not only projecting itself in terms of sheer power but also attaining greater sensitivity to the needs and aspirations of its smaller neighbours. Sustained efforts must be made by India to explore the possibilities of wider mutuality than strict reciprocity in Seeking good-neighbourness.

This is not to argue that the smaller nations of South Asia have no responsibility towards building a climate trust and friendship' in the region. They would indeed do well to eschew deliberate, distortions of the existing geopolitical realities in the region. It is self-evident therefore that they would have to learn to come to terms with themselves - in overcoming the problem of national identity and pressures of political challenges - before they can come to terms with India.

It is not however, beyond the reach of collective wisdom for all South Asian countries, big or small to rise above the confines of narrow individual interests to address themselves to the common concern of the region. Regionalism, in order to be meaningful, would have to be essentially supportive of bilateral relationships. Given the geopolitical imperatives, bilateralism is going to remain an enduring feature of the region and SAARC cannot obviate the need for bilateral settlement of bilateral problems. Even the staunchest advocates of India must concede that such a gesture of offering generous, even unilateral concessions to its neighbours will have to be made in a bilateral setting and can't be worked out in a regional forum.

The basic dilemma for India remains how to reconcile its preference for bilateralism as a model for building relationships with the compulsions of regionalism. This assumes significance in view of the fact that efforts have been made to bring in bilateral issues like India's role in Sri Lanka and the Ganges water dispute into the SAARC forum not so much in the belief of finding solutions in a regional framework as employing bargaining tactics to put pressure on New Delhi. India reacted sharply to Sri Lanka's boycott of the Foreign Ministers meeting in August 1988 on the issue of IPFK presence on Sri Lankan soil as constituting a violation of the SAARC charter.¹³

It is one thing for SAARC to provide a neutral setting for backstage high level bilateral contacts major breakthrough were achieved by Gandhi – Jayawardena meeting at Bangalore and Gandhi-Bhutto meeting at Islamabad – but it is entirely different matter if SAARC meets were to be reduced to seem a bilateral exchanges. What is not being adequately appreciated in some circles is that the real question involved in this test case is whether SAARC can afford to lend itself to being made a hostage to not only bilateral pressures, but, more important, domestic compulsions of an individual states. If SAARC is to achieve its true potential the impulses for both strengthening of the existing bilateralism and exploring of new avenues of regional cooperative must be allowed to move on their independent tracks. The twin tracks once not mutually exclusive and can indeed be simultaneously pursued without forcing the space in either direction.

India Bangladesh Relations –

As a noted scholar reiterates : "Commonalities in South Asia are mostly bilateral between India and each of the neighbors countries separately and individually. There is a bit of India in every other country of South Asia. As against this, there is hardly anything of significance which is common between India's one neighbor and the other. All the South Asian countries have only one thing in common amongst themselves and that is India.³³ Sovereign states and formal boundaries can of course, hardly check cultural overlaps. But what aggravate the South Asian Scenario is the perception that India desires to play a regional role commensurate with its regional pre-eminence, 'regional primary', as a commentator opines, has been an 'unstated but clearly pursued objective' of India's neighbourhood policy.³⁴ The frequently highhanded nature of Indian efforts at establishing and emphasizing their regional preponderance worsen the situation even more : as Bekhari argues," in their attempts to get India accepted as a dominant regional power the Indians have only succeeded in projecting it as the domineering regional power.³⁵ Inevitably, though regrettably, all this generates apprehensions, arouses suspicions and contributes to the grievous lack of trust and confidence between the South Asian Seven.

Likewise, India has a host of difficulties with other neighbours like Bangladesh (sharing of river waters, the Chakmas and the influx of migrants) and Nepal (differences over 'zone of Peace' concept, whether there should be separate treaties for trade and Transit, etc) along with some minor irritants in the case of Bhutan and Maldives. All these contentious issues and the manner in which Sri Lanka has held SAARC verily to ransom are indicative of the fact that despite pious hopes to the contrary, unresolved bilateral disputes are bound to exert a negative influence on the process of regional cooperation.

As a consequence of producing nearly the same or similar goods, the South Asian seven inevitably compete in world markets for almost identical exports : India and Bangladesh compete for jute goods, India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka

compete in respect of manpower exports to West Asia although the impact of this competition is not yet actually realized due to volume of the demand.

The fundamental dissonance between India and the others is also a major handicap; as a renowned economist asserts, "The vastness of the economy of one of the member countries of the group, India, and its growing industrial infrastructure makes economic cooperation – leaving aside trade – between the countries difficult. The fear of becoming economically dependent upon India haunts the psyche of other SAARC nations and explains, for instance, why Pakistan imports iron ore from Africa and not from India, and Sri Lanka imports apples from Australia instead of India. In both cases, the neighbours suffer from the misgiving that dependence upon India might imply that at any times India could exploit or even obstruct their natural growth and prosperity and this anxiety impels them to prefer extra-regional power for foreign aid and assistance for national development. Not surprisingly, a recent analysis highlights : "since the withdrawal of colonial rule, the independent South Asian States have consciously pursue policies aims at distancing their respective economics from each other As a result of these policies, now a sizeable and extremely powerful budget commercial, industrial and professional interests have come into existence in these countries which do not see any advantage in enhancing regional economic cooperation. Such cooperation, on the contrary, is seen as harmful and destabilizing.³⁶ As a result of all these, constraints, the noted economist cited earlier, in response to the rhetorical query of whether an economic justification exists for SAARC, asserts that "there is no economic rationale."³⁷

No wonder, a noted scholar asserts that "the greatest obstacle in the way of regional cooperation among countries in South Asia is the exceedingly meager knowledge about each other's country in terms of their needs, perceptions and sensitivities.

India's second diplomatic strategy was the politics of bilateralism in her relations with her South Asian neighbours. This was openly projected as the performed model for building relations with neighbouring countries.

For India, such a strategy has considerable advantages. The first is that the bilateral approach can take into account the unique features of each relationship. The standardized model of uniforming the terms and patterns of bilateral interaction can be avoided. The needs of countries like Bhutan, Nepal and the Maldives are for example, very different from those of other countries in the region. They can be met more easily than those of the more defiant and bigger neighbour.

The second is that through a process of bilaterism, India can avoid the internationalization of contentious issues. In South Asia in which she may have to reckon with many actors. Almost all the post-Nehru governments have made this into a major objective of India's diplomatic strategy. One of the principal explanations for this pattern of behaviour is the bitter experience India had on the Kashmir issue when New Delhi internationalized it by referring the matter to the UN after the Pakistani invasion of Kashmir in 1948. The UN refusal to take a position on the merits of the case generated a general opposition to the reference of any contentious bilateral issue again to international for .

The third perceived advantage of bilaterism is that it provides India the possibility of avoiding any situation where all the other countries could unite against her. Since all of India's neighbours have serious reservations about her, such an eventuality can hardly be excluded. India, therefore, has always avoided such a situation. Even at the time of establishing the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), India insisted on separating bilateral from any multilateral cooperation.

The fourth is the appropriate leverage that bilaterism gives to India of being generous to some nations and harsh to others. Such a behaviour has indeed been discernible in Indian Diplomacy. To risk a generalization, it could be argued that while with most states, Indian diplomacy was a combination of generous big brother behaviour giving aid, seeking common ground, and pressing them to fall in line on issues where India's national interests were at stake, relations with Pakistan on the other hand, have been consistently antagonistic.

This bilateral strategy became evident after 1971 Bangladesh war when all the negotiations with Pakistan were carried out bilaterally, and when the Simla

Agreement of July 1972 between Indira Gandhi and Z.A. Bhutto clearly incorporated India's preference for bilateralism over multilateralism. All differences, it was agreed, were to be settled through bilateral negotiations'.³⁹ In line with the Indian thinking the Simla Agreement clearly stipulated that Indians and Pakistanis alone were responsible for the maintenance of peace along the border. Though such a strategy was not completely successful since Pakistan had often tried to revenge upon this agreement, India has consistently refused to accept the involvement of any third party in Indo-Pakistan relations.

With other countries of South Asia, India was, however, more successful in imposing the strategy of bilateralism. They were less recalcitrant. None of them could really defy India, even if attempts were made to extricate themselves from an excessive Indian hold, since all of them were dependent on India in one way or the other. An open border with India, for example, is Nepal's and Bhutan's life-line. Neither of them landlocked as they are would be able to survive economically if India were to cut them off. Nepal's attempts to become more independent were rapidly stymied by India's decision to cut transit arrangement with her. Sri Lanka's ability to manage the Tamil crisis without some cooperation from India is doubtful. If the massive Indian military intervention in Sri Lanka in 1987 to force the Tamil Tigers to abandon their demand for independence and to re-enter the political process, was not successful it is difficult to imagine that the Sri Lankan Government can handle the crisis on her own. The Maldives, off the Indian coast, can hardly survive (as illustrated by India's 1989 military intervention) as a viable state without some protection from India.

Though Bangladesh is more resistant to Indian pressures, she has been just as unsuccessful in breaking out of the straitjacket of bilateralism as she has been of saving herself from the cruel annual cycle of flood and drought. Her river system draws water from rivers in India, Nepal, Bhutan and China, all of which have to pass through Indian territory – a formal Dependence from which she can hardly escape.⁴⁰ The Bangladesh government proposed a six country meeting that would have given her some diplomatic monosure. But India scratched the proposal.

India's apartment determination to continue the politics of bilateralism vis-à-vis her neighbors has created an asymmetrical situation in which Indian is clearly the

beneficiary. It is, therefore, hardly probable that she will abandon such a position, even if she is criticized by the international media for having become a 'regional bully'.⁴¹ and for having developed an Indian variant of the Monroe Doctrine⁴²

Indian destabilization, therefore, can't be attributed domestic reasons only, but is also determined by what happens in the neighbourhood. The link is clearly evident. The foreign policy of India is no more just simple interaction with the other South Asia, and of reacting to situations whenever it becomes necessary India's policy is no longer based on the politics of non-intervention. Establishing its predominance in the region is generally perceived as being vital for India's national security. India's decision to intervene in Sri Lanka, stop the Tamil Tigers from becoming independent, stigma a coup d'etat against the existing government in the Maldives, pressure the Nepalese not to buy arms from the Chinese, propose to participate in Bhutanese negotiations with China, insist on the return of the Chakma refugees to Bangladesh and warn Pakistan of the dangerous consequences of her support to Kashmiri and Sikh dissidents are growing signs of India's determination to play a predominant role in South Asia.

Considering the fact that practically all the six small states of South Asia are faced with growing systemic instability, India had to mobilize all the different components of her diplomacy that would make her relations with them viable and effective.

Bilateral relations with each of the six states thus was the principal Indian strategy in South Asia. And, with the passage of time, India has used this strategy more and more openly and more and more pathless to clearly express her interest in Development in the region. Bilateralism has become very much a major component of India's policy which no government in India can possibly afford to ignore.⁴³

In the Determination of Indo-Bangla relations, just as with India Pak relations, domestic political factors play an important role. There is, however, one vital difference – that it is virtually a one way street unlike Indo-Pak relations. The Indian politics. The only exception in Indo-Bangla relations is the issue of Chakma

insurgency while the agitation against Bangladeshi infiltrations into Assam has the potential to result in political difficulties for India and thereby strain bilateral relations.

Indo-Bangladesh relations started on a happy note. India's role in the Bangladesh liberation war, particularly military intervention, earned for India the friendship of Bangladesh, resulting in the signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Peace between the two countries in March 1972. August 1975) represented a period of good relations between the two countries when the domestic and foreign policy thrust was in tune with that of India. Two basic elements of state policy – the use of religion for nation-building and external support (mainly that of a super power) for regime stability, elements which have contributed most to the enmity between India and Pakistan, did not find any place in the policies of Bangladesh. Mujib enunciated a secular, democratic and socialistic policy of nation-building, and he steered clear of alliances with super powers.⁴⁴

As the champion of Panchasila, India has maintained cordial relations with neighbouring countries. So also it has maintained a cordial relationship with Bangladesh right from its emergence in 1971. It has been a consistent and vitally important principle of Indian Foreign Policy to refrain any interference in the internal affairs of other countries and more particularly, in the internal affairs of its neighbours. But the dirty struggle for power that emerged in Pakistan after the first ever general elections held in March 1970, created a highly taxing and dangerous situation in East Pakistan, which forced India to support, on humanitarian grounds, the rights of the Bengalese living in East Pakistan.⁴⁵

However, these moves and others failed to produce any meaningful result in 1971, India became aware of the fact that it would have to intervene in the crisis for effecting a settlement of this crisis. On 15th June 1971, Mrs. Indira Gandhi declared in the Rajya Sabha that, "We will have to go through hell to meet the challenge posted by the developments in Bangladesh." From then onward India stated providing help to the refugees and their Mukti-Bahini for securing their rights, which involved the liberation of Bangladesh. The crisis soon developed into the December 1971 Indo Pak War. The Indian Army formed against the West Pakistan army in East Bengal. After a highly efficient and successful military operation of nearly two weeks the joint command, led by Lt. General Jagjit Singh Arora, was in a

position to secure the liberation of Bangladesh on 16 December, 1971, India had granted recognition to Bangladesh. After the defeat of West Pakistani army in Bangladesh the administration of the country was entrusted to the leaders of Bangladesh. Soon afterwards, Bangladesh was granted recognition by other state and this completed the process of liberation of Bangladesh.

India played a leading role in the liberation of Bangladesh. Its people made bold sacrifices for securing to the people of Bangladesh their freedom and their rights. These historic and unparalleled sacrifices made by the people of India and the material and moral support that they gave to the people of Bangladesh combined together to provide a solid foundation for the development of warm and highly friendly and cooperation relations between India and Bangladesh.⁴⁶

It was on 6th December 1971, the Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi, amidst thunderous applause informed the Lok Sabha the decision of the Government of India to grant recognition to the peoples Republic of Bangladesh. Since the fateful day, the two countries have been engaged in the process of developing friendly and cooperative relations between them. The immediate goal of security the liberation of Bangladesh from the clutches of Pakistan was accomplished and December 16, 1971, by the Joint Army Command of the two states and this was followed by certain bold steps to usher the history of Indo Bangladesh relations into an era of friendship and cooperation based upon the spirit of mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, and commitment to the principals of Panchashela, non-alignment, beneficial bilateralism and peaceful means for the settlement of all issues and problems.

The similarities in the foreign policy perceptions of the two countries, the understanding regarding the common needs, goals and objectives, the recognition of the sacrifices made by India for securing the liberation of Bangladesh, the dependence of Bangladesh on India for meeting the immediate security and economic needs and the mutual understanding among the leaders of the two countries gave good support to the cause of developing highly cooperative and friendly Indo-Bangladesh relations. The tone was set right on 6th December 1971, when Mrs. Indira Gandhi, while announcing the decision to grant recognition to Bangladesh observed "In future the Governments and people of India and

Bangladesh who share common ideals and sacrifices, would forge a relationship based on principles of mutual respect for each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-intolerance in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit.⁴⁷

The first chancery of Bangladesh was formally opened on 9th December 1971, and it was formally announced that the two countries had entered into a number of mutual agreements in lateral relation. By these agreements India pledged its military support, help and involvement in the struggle (war) for the liberation of Bangladesh. India further undertook the pledge to withdraw its armed forces from liberated Bangladesh, agreed that liberated areas would be immediately handed over to the Government of Bangladesh, and that India would defend Bangladesh against any external threat. The agreements affirmed allegiance to Panchsheel and non-alignment. However, no restriction was sought to be placed on the rights of the people of Bangladesh to have their own independent foreign policy. By another agreement, India decided to give Rs. 100 crores immediately to Bangladesh for helping the initiation of the process of socio-economic reconstruction in that country. Both the Governments also entered into a detailed trade agreement envisaging an annual trade of 100 crores between the two countries. On 16th December, 1971, Bangladesh was liberated and the Government of Bangladesh took over the administration of the country. It was on 8th January 1972 that Pakistan announced its decision to release 'Sheikh Mujib, who was under detention in Pakistan since 25th March 1971. During his brief stop at New Delhi, on 10th January 1972, Shaikh Mujib, paid glowing tributes to India for her historic role in the liberation of Bangladesh. He observed that the people of his country would never forget the sacrifices made by their Indian brothers for making it possible for them to achieve liberation. He declared that bonds of friendship and cooperation between the two countries are bound to become more and more mature and developed in the times to come.⁴⁸

On March 19, 1972, India and Bangladesh signed a 25 years Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Peace. It was a bold attempt to cement the Indo-Bangladesh friendship. The Treaty, with 12 Articles under preamble was designed to maintain protocol and good neighbourly relations, to transform the borders into a border of external peace and friendship, to uphold non-alignment, peaceful co-

existence, to safeguard peace stability and security, to promote and strengthen the existing relations of friendship and cooperation and to reaffirm the determination to follow peaceful means for the settlement of disputes well as to uphold the aims and principles of the U.N. Charter.

The 12 Articles of the Treaty provided for the steps agreed by both the countries as the means for securing the ideals and objectives listed in the preamble. Both the countries declared that there shall be lasting peace and friendship between the two countries and their people and that each side shall respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the other and refrain from interfering in the internal affairs, of the other side, The two shall further develop and strengthen the relations of friendship, good neighbourliness and all round cooperation existing between them. Under Article 2, both sides condemned colonialism and racism in all forms and affirmed their determination to strive for their final and complete elimination. Both agreed to cooperate with other states in achieving these aims. Under Articles 3 and 4, both the sides reaffirmed their faith in non-alignment and peaceful co-existence and to resolve to maintain regular mutual conflicts on major international problems affecting the interests of both the states. Both sides reaffirmed their faith in non-alignment and peaceful co-existence and to resolve to maintain regular mutual conflict on major international problems affecting the interests of both the states. In the next Article i.e., Article 5, both the countries agreed to continue to strengthen and widen their mutually advantages and abroad cooperation in economic, scientific, technical trade transport and communications fields. Under Articles 6 and 7 both the countries agreed to make joint studies and take action in the field of flood control river basin development and the development of hydro-electric power and irrigation, and further to promote relations in the fields of art, literature, education culture, sports and health. Each side solemnly declared under Article 8 that it shall not enter into or participate in any military alliance directed against the other party and that both the countries shall refrain from any aggression against the other and shall not allow the use of its territory for committing any act that may cause military damage to or constitute a threat to the security of the other. Article 10 of the Treaty declared that ; "Each of the high contracting parties shall refrain from giving any assistance to any third party

taking part in an armed conflict against the other party. In a case either party is attacked or threatened with attack the high contracting parties shall immediately enter into mutual consulting in order to take appropriate affective measures to eliminate the threat and thus ensure peace and security of their countries. Each of the high contracting parties solemnly declares that it shall not undertake any commitment, secret or open towards one or more states which may be incompatible with the present treaty." In the last two articles it was stated that the Treaty was for 25 years and was renewable by mutual agreement, and that any differences in interpreting the Treaty that may arise shall be settled bilaterally through peaceful means in a spirit of mutual respect and understanding.

Evaluation : with these provisions the Treaty constituted a bold attempt towards the securing of peace stability in South Asia. This Treaty affirmed India's respect for the sovereign equality and territorial integrity of Bangladesh and set at rest the western and Pakistani propaganda that India has an eye over Bangladesh. The Treaty, observed the Patriot, was the first formal and certainly unique step taken up by two important Asian countries for the stabilization of peace in this sub-continent. It commented the growing Indo-Bangla friendship and laid solid foundations for the extension of bilateral cooperation between the two countries. It was neither defence pact nor a security pact designed against any other country. Like the Indo-Bangladesh Treaty was a bilateral treaty for positive bilateral cooperation. It was a solemn treaty solemnly signed for strengthening both world peace and bilateral relations. Indeed, this treaty was a welcome and fruitful way of ushering Indo-Bangla relations into an era of enduring peace, friendship and cooperation.⁴⁹

After the signing of the Treaty, both the countries conducted further negotiations for enlarging trade between them. On March 28, 1972, the two countries entered into a trade agreement providing for a trade of nearly Rs. 100 crores. Firstly, the agreement provided for border trade for people living within 15 km. belt of the borders and its aim was to help the people of border areas to meet their day to day requirement. But, a the trade was restricted to specific commodities. Secondly, it provided for a Rs. 50 crore two way trade goods of special interest of both the countries on a balanced basis. Thirdly, this agreement laid down that if India

exported goods worth more than its share 25 crores, then the payment of the overflow shall be in the form of temporary loan to Bangladesh and shall not carry any interest. This agreement was indeed a symbol of liberal and friendly attitude of India towards its new neighbor. On July 5, 1973, India and Bangladesh signed a new 3 year Trade Agreement and it was agreed that the two countries would now export goods worth of Rs. 305 crores each way. The trade relations were given a new big boost on May 16, 1974 through a number of agreements on wide ranging bilateral economic and trade cooperation.

For presenting cooperation in the fields of science and technology. India and Bangladesh agreed, on June 10, 1972, for cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy and space research. On August 27, 1973, a treaty was signed for exchange of information on atomic research and literature between the two countries, scientists of both the countries were to be given opportunities for research and training in atomic research laboratories in either country. In May 1974, when India conducted for first underground and fully controlled peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE), Bangladesh welcomed the development as an important step towards the development of developing countries. The Bangla Times, an influential daily at Bangladesh, described India's PNE as a matter of pride for developing countries. It wrote that this explosion will have deep impact on the politics of Asia and the subcontinent. It called upon the neighbours not to feel unduly apprehensive from India because India's policy was a peaceful policy.

Thus, close cooperation in the fields of trade, commerce, education, cultural activities and sports was registered in the post-Treaty period of Mujib era. Particularly after the understanding reached during May and September 1974, meetings between the leaders and delegations of the two countries, some very important and major agreements were reached for effecting closer cooperation between the two countries. The May 1974 Summit Conference between India and Bangladesh produced very healthy and fruitful results. The following Four Joint ventures were cleared : (i) W.A. Uonont Plant Joint phatak in Bangladesh based on limestone supplied from Meghalaya in India; (ii) A clinker plant in Meghalaya for supplying either to Bangladesh; (iii) A Fertilizer Plant in Bangladesh for the supply of urea of India and (iv) A sponge Iron Plant in Bangladesh with the supply of iron ore from

India. The decision to constitute a joint commission on Jute was another landmark achieved at the summit. All these steps for bilateral economic collaboration were commendable. For promoting cooperation in the fields of science and technology, India and Bangladesh agreed on 10 June, 1972 for cooperating in the peaceful use of atomic energy and space research. On 27 August 1973, a treaty was signed for exchanging information on atomic research and literature between the two countries. Scientists of both the countries were to be given opportunities for doing research and training in atomic research laboratories in either country.

Realising the necessity of settling the border problem, with India and Bangladesh conducted negotiations which led to the signing of Border Agreement on May 19, 1974. Under this agreement, India retained the Berubari enclave and in exchange Bangladesh received Dahagram and Angarpata enclaves under perpetually leased corridor for connecting Dahagram and Angarpata enclaves and a perpetually leased corridor for connecting Dehagram with Pambari Mouza of Bangladesh. "The border demarcation was to be so framed as to cause the least disturbance to the population, to be as the as possible on both sides and to make it easy to recognize the borders between the two countries." It also provided for exchange "expeditiously of all enclaves." Another feature of the agreement was regarding the fixation of midstream boundaries along Muhuri and Fenny rivers. This ensured that two sides would get water from the rivers all the time. The Border Agreement was as the Tribute on May 21, 1974, observed "can example in good neighbourliness and a major friction remover."

Increased controls and exchange of visits became regular features of Indo-Bangladesh relations in the Post-Treaty years of Mujib era. In November 1972, President of Bangladesh, Mr. Abu Sayeed Chowdhury paid a 10 days state visit to India and in June 1974, President of India, Mr. V.V.Giri returned the state visit to Bangladesh. Both the visits strengthened the bonds of friendship between the two countries. The visits revealed that there was close identity of rivers between the two countries. Similar contacts at the ministerial level covers also maintained. In April 1973, the Foreign Minister of Bangladesh visited India and in return Mr. Swarn Singh, Indian Minister of External Affairs, paid on official visit to Bangladesh relations and cooperation was reviewed. After the discussions the deterioration to give

practical shape to the deeply felt and just aspirations of the people of two countries for socio-economic well being, was expressed.

With a view to further strength on the very friendly relations existing between the two countries a Summit Conference between Mrs. Indira Gandhi and Sheikh Mujib was held on May 1, 1974. It was during this conference that important discussions were held over matters of views was held in an atmosphere of friendship, cordiality and in the background of traditional friendship and understanding between the two countries. Discussions on matters like trade and commerce sharing of Ganga waters, functioning of Joint Rivers Commission, boundary disputes, expansion of cooperation in field on Jute export, issues of joint ventures etc., were objectively discussed and certain agreements were reached. Similarly international problems, like energy crisis were discussed. On May 19, 1974, India and Bangladesh signed the Border Agreement and announced that an understanding had been reached regarding the resolution of Farakka barrage issue.

Similarly, India and Bangladesh exhibited complete understanding cooperation at the time of Simla Summit between India and Pakistan. Bangladesh welcomed whole heartedly the Simla Agreement and the Delhi Agreement between India and Pakistan as two positive steps towards peace and stability in South Asia. India kept Bangladesh fully informed about the nature, scope and progress of the discussions with Pakistan. In April 1973, India and Bangladesh jointly prepared a three point programmes on the basis of which was to conduct negotiations with Pakistan. The Indo-Pak agreement of 1973, reflected the fact that India fully upheld the commitments that had been made with Bangladesh in respect of the repatriation POWs and refugees.

Further, India left no stone unturned for helping Bangladesh to get recognition from other countries and its due place in the United Nations. India gave full support to the August 9, 1971 application made by Bangladesh for getting the membership of the United Nations. However, the Chinese veto against Bangladesh prevented surprise in this direction. In February 1974, Pakistan gave recognition to Bangladesh and it was followed by the accord of recognition by China. This development cleared the way of Bangladesh entry into United Nations. In the context of Indo-Pak-Bangladesh relations, the April 1974, tripartite talks

between India, Pakistan and Bangladesh produced an important agreement leading to the repatriation of Pakistani POWs who were still being detained in India because of Bangladesh earlier decision to try them on charges of genocide and war crimes.

Even the complex issue of Farakka was temporarily resolved through interim agreement of April 18, 1975. Under an interim and short term agreement reached at Dacca, it was agreed that India was to draw a specified quantity of water for its feeder canal for the benefits of Calcutta Port.

It was further agreed that a joint team of experts would supervise and observe the effect of withdrawals on Bangladesh and the Hoogly river. A joint team was to be stationed at Farakka was keeping a record of the water fed into the feeder canals.

The agreement was an important breakthrough in the Farakka dispute between India and Bangladesh. It was hoped that this short term agreement would pave the way for an amicable long term accord on Farakka. It was an agreement reached through bilateral negotiations and this gave it added importance.

The above account of Indo-Bangladesh during the Mujib era, clearly reveals that the conduct of relations between the two countries got a positive and good start. During a short period of joint four years both the countries were in a position to solve the Border disputes and reach an interim agreement on Farakka. Both were in a position to establish highly friendly and peace gave a solid foundation to Indo-Bangladesh friendship and cooperation. India, after having helped the emergence of Bangladesh as a sovereign independent republic, came forward whole heartedly to help the new country in overcoming the problems at socio-economic reconstruction. Through loans and aid, material and moral support and a series of trade and economic agreements, India gave valuable help to Bangladesh during the initial years of its independence. The Government of Bangladesh, particularly Prime Minister of Bangladesh Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, recognized fully the sacrifices made and the help given by India to Bangladesh and therefore, felt indebted to India. All the agreements reached during this period was backed by complete understanding and mutual respect for each other's needs, desires and interests.

However, along with his positive development, the march of time produced certain irritants in Indo-Bangladesh relations, particularly, the carrying out of anti-India propaganda by certain sections of Bangladesh press and vested interests, at times, made the environment became a source of concern particularly towards the close Mujib era. Some scholars even go to the extent of saying that Mujib's friendship with India was a factor in the August 1975 coup against Mujib's regime. The following factors were responsible for the emergence of anti India propaganda in Bangladesh during the closing years of Mujib era :

- 1) Existence of Pro-Pakistan factors in Bangladesh.
- 2) Internal opposition to Sheikh Mujib's policies particularly to the centralization and concentration of authority into his own hands.
- 3) The Pakistani and Chinese propaganda that India was having imperialistic designs over Bangladesh.
- 4) The difference over Farakka Barrage issues.
- 5) Rise of communalism in Bangladesh.
- 6) The strong dissatisfaction in Bangladesh over the increased corruption, shortage of essential commodities, particularly foodstuff, and uncontrolled smuggling on Indo-Bangladesh borders.
- 7) The strong criticism by the Indian press (West Bengal based) of the role of opposition in Bangladesh, produced a strong reaction and gave rise to considerable opposition to the role of India in the sub-continent. In particular, this made Moulana Bhashani and his party a strong critic of India.
- 8) This failure of the Government of Bangladesh to effectively run the administration and check the spread of an-India propaganda.⁵⁰

Indian and Bangladesh were in confrontation over a number of issues : the Borubari corridor is the New Moore Island/Talpatty territorial dispute which degenerated into a minor military incident; Indian involvement in the armed struggle of the Chakma tribals, the Farakka Barrage and river water disputes; and India attempts to "repatriate" from Assam illegal "Bangladeshi" Muslim

migrants and to build a protective fence along portions of the border. None of these, except temporarily the Farakka Barrage issue, were solved."

Again and again, then Bangladesh came up against what it was India "Pressure". The issues themselves – except perhaps the river waters were – it regarded as trivial. Dhaka's view was that India could, virtually not cost, meet Bangladesh concerns on all of them. New Delhi's reluctance to do so was seen as arising from its desire to use these issues as pressure protagonist to punish Bangladesh for its lack of "gratitude", destabilize its governments, limit its autonomy in respect of foreign and domestic policy, and enforce a regional order under India "hegemony". Thus, for Bangladesh, as for the other South Asian states, India was the primary "internal" and "external" threat.

To deal with the Indian threat, Bangladesh, like the other states in the region, sought extra – original "balancing" against New Delhi – the United States, China, Pakistan, and the Islamic states. However, none of these was particularly "reliable".⁵¹

Border Problem

It was in 1974, that the Delhi Agreement was reached between India and Bangladesh and the problem of ex gratias was solved. However, in the post Mujib era, the Government of Bangladesh once again tried to activate the border problem with India. It was along the Tripura, Meghalaya and Assam borders that Bangladesh Rifles resorted to firing first in April 1976. In April 1976 and then in November 1976. In April 1976, the border out-post at Dumkura, in the Garo Hills district at Meghalaya was fired upon by the Bangladesh Rifles. In November, 1976, the Bangladesh authorities claimed an Indian area measuring about 8 hectares in the Muhuri char area in the Belonia sub-division of Tripura. It became the object of dispute between India and Bangladesh and the crisis became deeper when the Bangladesh Rifles repeatedly opened fire upon the Indian farmers. The demarcation of border along Tripura, Assam, Meghalaya had been pending issue because of certain changes in the course of Muhuri river. To sort out the matter, the first of talks between Bangladesh Rifles and Indian Border Security Force representatives was held at Comilla on 11 November 1976, but there could be reached no agreement. Each side

then blamed the other for talking rigid and unreasonable stand. Bangladesh accused India of having unilaterally constructed nine spurs for deflecting the course of Muhuri river. The allegation was related by India. A second round of talks was held in Dacca on November 19, and both the sides agreed to prevent the recurrence of border incidents. After a meeting of the Joint Rivers Commission in Dacca, it was declared on November 20 that both sides have tried to understand each other's view point regarding the border near Muhuri Charland and that both sides have agreed to take steps for removing the irritants. A Committee for river site and for determining the issues of spurs was instituted. This was a welcome move but the net result negligible because on November 22, Bangladesh Rifles again resumed firing in this sector. The civil defence exercised and the hectic activity on the Bangladesh side of the border further made the issue more complicated. To defuse the situation, 6 member Bangladesh delegation came to India on December 12 and held discussion with the counterpart over the issue of difference over border demarcation as stipulated in the 1974 Boundary Agreement. The talks again failed to produce any tangible result. The Bangladesh delegation refused to accept the steps listed by India for normalizing the situation on Tripura-Bangladesh border. It demanded that the whole of Muhuri Char area should be made a 'no man's land' with the provision for joint patrolling on the Indian side by Indian and Bangladesh border forces. This was an indirect way of inducing a change in the 1974 Agreement and hence it was rejected by India. The talks produced only one small agreement where by both sides agreed to maintain normally in the Muhuri char area.

In February 1980, Secretary level meetings between India and Bangladesh were held in Dacca for resolving the issue. The talks, however, ended after just friking a Of optimism for future course of India-Bangladesh relations.

The economic and trade agreement which had been signed during 1972-75 period did not succeed in reaping a rich harvest in the form of increased and diversified trade between India and Bangladesh. The complimentary nature of their economics, geographical contiguity and the trade agreements as well as Indo Bangladesh Treaty could not lead to the expected vital and close economic and trade links between the two countries because of the existence of certain problems

and irritants. Even the switch over from barter to free convertible currency dealings failed to produce the desired results. The political instability in Bangladesh after August 1975 coup and the consequent emergence of strong anti-India propaganda in Bangladesh, created a situation in which both the countries found it difficult to capitalize through mutual trade and economic links. Nevertheless, the two sides kept on trying to maintain and improve mutual trade and economic cooperation

Controversy over the New Moore Island

Towards the middle of 1981, Indo-Bangladesh relations developed serious strains over the issue of occupation and ownership of the New Moore Island or the South Talpatty as Bangladesh calls it born in 1970, with barely 1.5 sq. in area, the New Moore Island became a major matter of dispute between India and Bangladesh. So much so that in May 1981, there appeared a danger of armed naval clash between the two countries. Before 1970, this land-mass was nothing more than a low tide elevation which became visible only when the sea subsided during a low tide. It surfaced in an effective was only in 1970.

The Island has great economic implications and its ownership involves various maritime and other territorial rights over about 4000 sq. nautical miles of the sea. The possibility of using the land mass and sea around the New Moore Island for securing sea food, mineral resources and natural gas makes the Island very important in the eyes of India and Bangladesh.

Indian cage regarding the ownership and sovereignty over the Island is clear and supported by facts. It has been in possession of New Moore ever since 1970. The Island lies at a distance of barely 5.2 km from the nearest Indian landmass as against 7.6 km from the nearest land-mass of Bangladesh. As such it is relatively close to India than Bangladesh.

The Indian Navy made an early survey of the Island and erected identification pillars on it in 1974 in accordance with international practice. India further notifies the British Adminality and the U.S.navy about the existence of Island and its Indian ownership.

The New Moore Island continues to be an issue in Indo-Bangladesh relations. Bangladesh continues to base its claim for ownership over the island on the basis of

the satellite map. India is equally clear and forthright in asserting its claim which is based upon 3 main foundations : (i) that New Moore Island is closer to Indian land mass; (ii) That the main channel of the Hariabhanga on the estuary flows along the eastern side of the island and not the western, side as claimed by Dacca; (iii) That India owns the island since its birth in 1970.⁵²

The differences between India and Bangladesh over the Chakma refugees from the Chittagong hill tracts provide another example of problems caused by trans-border migrations. The disturbances in the Indian state of Assam due to the influx of people from Bangladesh over a period of time also illustrate the same point. The reactions of the people in Pakistan to the out break of communal riots in India, which is unfortunately not infrequent, and the resentment caused by them in the Indian political circles are of course, in a class apart. But this also shows that cultural affinity is not always conducive to cordiality in inter-state relationships.

As Dr. Shaukat Hassan has pointed out the sole ethnic problem in Bangladesh is that between the Chakmas, a hill tribe inhabiting the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), and the Government of Bangladesh. The problem was partly one of cultural divergence — the Chakmas were not only overwhelmingly Buddhist, speaking non-Bengali dialects and, with their Mongoloid features looking ethnically distinct from the Bengali Muslims. But also, during colonial times, the British had left these tribal people more or less to themselves except for purposes of revenue collection. The request of the (HT) People's Association, at the time of partition that they be included in India rather than Pakistan was rejected by the Radcliffe Commission.⁵⁴ and the CHT lost its status as an excluded area.

The Pakistan government's policy was to encourage actively the settlement of outsiders was adopted by Bangladesh when Mujiber Rahman's secular commitment gave way to increasing Islamisation of the State, particularly after the time of Ziaur Rahman. While the proportion of tribal people to outsiders was 91 percent to 9 percent in 1951, the ratio had dropped to 67.1 percent and 35.9 percent by 1980.⁵⁵ The Chakma insurgency developed not only due to these enforced demographic changes. Development projects carried out by the government in the area did not benefit the tribal people; on the contrary, they interfered with traditional occupations, such as jhum (China farming). The construction of the

Karnaphuli (Kaptai) hydro-electric project in 1962, for example submerged 54,000 acres of settle cultivable land affecting about 100,000 people, 90 percent of whom were Chakmas.⁵⁶

The insurgency was dormant in Bangladesh's early years, but already in 1972 the Hill Tracts People's solidarity Association (PCJSS or Parbattya Chattegram Jana Sangheta Samiti) had been formed, and in 1975 it had a militant wing called Shanti Bahini with a reported strength of 15,000 members.⁵⁷ By 1978, the Chakma insurgency had become a major problem for Bangladesh and allegations were already being made that the Shanti Bahini had the support of India as well as the Soviet Union. The influx, in increasing numbers, of Chakma-insurgents into India did create problems for the latter, too, and the charge that India was encouraging and supporting the insurgency must remain speculative. Partha Ghosh has this to say on this point.

India's involvement with the Chakma, can only be inferred through circumstantial evidence. The Mizo Insurgency that India faced till recently offers a clue, considering the distrust that existed between the Mizo tribe and the Chakma tribe. At the time when relations were cordial between the Mujib regime and the Indian government, there was co-operation between the two governments to jointly put down the insurgencies. Mujib had secretly allowed the Indian army to operate in the jungles of the CHT to fight the MNF (Milo) guerillas. In the process they also took on the Razakars members of the pro-Pakistani para-military force who also received support from the Chakma insurgents, which was to Mujib's advantage. In the post Mujib phase, distrust developed between the two governments and India accused Bangladesh of assisting Mizo rebels. The counter accusation that India was sympathetic to, if not actively cooperating with the CHT insurgents is plausible, though it cannot be substantiated.⁵⁸

Perhaps the most sensitive issue confronting contemporary Indo-Bangladesh relations relates to the alleged illegal migration of Bangladeshis to the Indian State of Assam, and quite a different problem concerning a two-way process of migration which has involved Chakma insurgents seeking refuge from their habitat in the Chittagong Hill Tracts to the Indian state of Tripura, and conversely, the erstwhile Mizo insurgents seeking refuge in Bangladesh; with each country conniving and

supporting the insurgencies in the other country. Since the Mizo problem in India has now been resolved within the framework of a new state of Mizoram, we shall deal here essentially with the Chakma problem, mainly in terms of its fall-out on Indo-Bangladesh relations.⁵⁹

Another major irritant in the Indo-Bangladesh relations of post 1975 era continues to be the dispute over Farakka.

The Indo-Bangladesh task over the question of ways to argument the flow of Ganga, however, got deadlocked because of a big difference in the approach and ideas of the two countries whereas Bangladesh wanted to against the flow of Ganga during lean season by using water stored in serious which were to be constructed in Nepal, Himalayas. India advocated the construction of Brahmaputra – Ganga link canal for achieving the desired goal. Further, whereas Bangladesh wanted to involve Nepal in negotiations over Farakka. India wanted to settle the issue bilaterally.

From that day till today, the dispute over Farakka continues to be irritant in the Indo-Bangladesh relations. The Interim Agreement of 1975 failed to be a basis for future settlement of dispute. In fact, it was a patch-work which could neither satisfy the objective of security the health of Calcutta Port nor could meet the irrigation needs of the two countries. The agreement was signed with the united or objective of enabling the running of Feeder Canal till the determination of allocation of the minimum flow of Ganga during the lean months.

In the Post-Mujib era, the atmosphere for further talks in Farakka became vitated because of the Bangladesh Press which included the demand for a prior approval by Bangladesh of any water that India wanted to withdraw from Farakka. In February 1976, when India sent an official proposal to Dacca for discussions of the lean month discharges from Farakka, Dacca came out with the view that all such talks are bound to be meaningless so long as India continues to unilaterally withdraw Ganga waters at Farakka. Along with such a stand, Bangladesh started highlighting the alleged ill effects of such withdrawals on the irrigation, economic and industrial needs of the country. It even tried to internationalise the issue. Later on, Dacca realized the importance of bilateral talks on Farakka and the two rounds of talks

between the officials of the two countries took place in April and May 1976. It was agreed that the two teams would jointly observe the effect of Farakka Barrage and its Feeder Canal at Haldia and Farakka. However, the opposition parties of Bangladesh in general and Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani's Awami Party in particular, started a vicious tirade against India on the Farakka issue. At one time Maulana Bhashani threatened to cross the borders, ghereaos Farakka and stop its functioning. This threat could not materialise because of a strong Indian stand and Mrs. Indira Gandhi's firm declaration that "India was willing to discuss and settle the Farakka issue peacefully and any attempt to solve it through threats and agitations shall be harmful and counter productive." The March to Farakka, as organized by Maulana Bhashani, was abandoned at Sibganj, about 5k. from Indian border of Malda. In May, 1976, General Zia-ur-Rahman, while participating in the Islamic Ministers Conference at Islamabad, called upon the Muslim countries to support Bangladesh on the Farakka issue. In August 1976, again an attempt was made to raise this issue at the Colombo Summit of the Non-aligned nations.

In the first week of September, 1976, India sent an invitation to Bangladesh for holding bilateral negotiations on Farakka. Along with it, India declared that there were to be no preconditions and negotiations were to be conducted with an open mind. The invitation was accepted by Bangladesh and Indo-Bangla talks on Farakka opened on September 8, 1976.

India, therefore, asked the U.N. to support bilateral efforts for reaching a solution to this problem.

Farakka issue, however, continued to be, the major problem of Indo-Bangladesh relations. It is hoped that the two countries would be successful in resolving the issue through mutual efforts. The commitment to keep up and strengthen further the friendly cooperation between the two countries provide a good basis for this prophecy.⁶⁰

Conclusion

It is true that India did not show the same 'generosity' towards its neighbour all the time on setting all the bilateral issues. India too had its national interests - no

more, no less than those of its neighbours. But India always trying to resolve the disputes amicably within the bilateral framework.

The trend in India's neighbourhood policy suggests us to conclude that a neighbour can achieve concessions from India on the spirit of friendship if it approaches the bilateral problems in a friendly way, India will not be amenable to the pressure tactics of any neighbouring country. At the same time, India is not prepared to compromise on its national interests for the sake of good neighbourly relations. A good illustration of this point to India's blank refusal to yield to Bangladeshi's opposition to India fencing its long border with that country because of tremendous illegal immigration from it.

India's policy towards its neighbours was also dictated by India's considerations for stability, peace and order among the neighbours. Any disturbances among the latter (especially having security implications) would tend to distract Indian attention from its overwhelming preoccupation internal political and economic progress.

Despite India's comparatively large and strong defence forces they had no relevance to India's security relations with its neighbours excepting Pakistan (and China outside the Indian sub-continent). India has consistently insisted on political solutions to all disputes with its neighbours. This is a noteworthy point, because particularly in academic writings and intellectual discussions in the neighbouring countries, the fact of India's more size and its large defence forces are insinuated as threatening the security of all smaller neighbour. After all, Indian armed forces have been used outside India only at the request by other nations (or the United Nations) or in self-defence.⁶¹

Indo – SriLanka Relations

In South Asia, as well as other regions, internal political economic and social processes within countries are seen to affect the nature of relationship between than at both bilateral and regional levels. Therefore, various conflicts within the countries of South Asia "generate internal pulls and pressures which effect inter-state relations within the region."⁶²

Among the Bilateral relationship India as with its neighbours, the domestic factor is the most pronounced in the case of Sri Lanka. The ethnic composition of the island is such that not only does a sizeable minority there claim its origin in India (ironically, even the majority is of Indian origin), it also looks upon India as its potential saviour. On its part India can't afford to ignore the problems of this minority because of the co-ethnics in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu. The government in New Delhi has to take cognizance of the Tamil emotionally charged chauvinistic concern for the said minority for political reasons of its own. India-Sri Lanka relations thus have been caught in a complex web of domestic politics from which neither nation is able to extricate itself. The strategic cleavage that has developed between them is also largely an offshoot of this essentially domestic conflict.

India's policy towards Sri Lanka from the time of their independence to the present, may be divided broadly into two phases. The first phase lasted virtually three decades, from the 1950s through the 1970s, when India was primarily concerned with the problem of Indian Tamils. Although the problem was never solved, in the 1980, it was overshadowed by the ethnic conflict between the majority Sinhales and the minority Sri Lanka Tamils. Since the problem had serious international ramifications, more so for India-Sri Lanka relations, India became deeply involved in it.⁶³

Hence, the deteriorating ethnic conflict has been a major problem inhibiting relations between India and Sri Lanka from 1983 onwards.⁶⁴

By the early 1980s when the issue of Indian Tamils seemed to have become virtually statement and both India and Sri Lanka appeared to have reconciled themselves to living with a unresolved yet not so critical problem, there was serious deterioration in ethnic relations between the Sinhales and the Sri Lanka Tamils. The new phase began with the outbreak of anti-Tamil riots in Colombo in July, 1983. The riots drew international attention. An essentially internal problem of Sri Lanka became internationalised with India developing a major State in its solution India's involvement in the Tamil problem has had domestic and external dimensions over since both countries became independent but in recent years there have been significant changes in the latter making it almost impossible for the Sri Lanka authorities to deal with its ethnic problem purely as an internal affairs. The changes

in the global strategic environment, an ever-growing militarisation of the Indian Ocean region in particular, have also contributed to this shift. Domestically speaking the concurrents of Tamil Nadu politics have influenced New Delhi's position vis-à-vis Sri Lanka's ethnic policy.⁶⁵

In respect of Sri Lanka, Indian Foreign Policy has always been governed by the desire to assure Sri Lanka that India fully respects the sovereignty and integrity of Sri Lanka. Moreover India is keen to cement the traditional, cultural and trade ties by taking concrete steps towards the development of a more meaningful friendship and fruitful cooperation between the two countries.

Prime Ministers Nehru, Mrs. Indira Gandhi and Mr. Rajiv Gandhi took keen interest to maintain peace and friendship with Sri Lanka. So also the DMK and A.J.A.D.M.K. governments Tamilnadu took sympathetic attitude towards Sri Lanka. In short the Indian leaders have always been at pains to assure Sri Lanka that India fully accepts and respects the sovereign equality of Sri Lanka and its state as an important and equal member of the community of Nation.

Both the Sinhalese and Tamilians, who constitute respectively the 70 percent and 12 percent of Sri Lanka's total population accept their traditional links with India. The Sinhalese accept themselves as the descendents of the Dravidians of South India. The Sinhalese language bears the influence of Hindi. Similarly the Tamilians speak Tamil the language of a large number of Indians living in the South. Buddhism was introduced in Sri Lanka by India and even till today it continues to be the religion of the majority of the people of Sri Lanka. The National Day celebrations of Sri Lanka commence with a religious ceremony at Sri Mahabodhi, the sacred tree that was grown from a sapling from the Bodhi tree brought in the third centuries from Bodh Gaya in North India. Such cultural links between the people of the two countries have been a source of strength and have helped them to better understand and adjust with each other.

The similarities in the foreign policy of the two countries again constitute a helping and positive factor in Indo-Sri Lanka relations.

Both have, over the past 38 years forged important economic, trade, industrial communication and cultural links.

Both have successfully resolved the issue of demarcation of the Maritime Boundary and ownership of Kachhativu island in a spirit of mutual reconciliation and adjustment.

Both the countries have a similar perception about the desired status of Indian Ocean as a zone of peace.

The peaceful way in which both the countries reached agreements for repatriation of the people of Indian origin in Sri Lanka, also has been a source of satisfaction. Both have willingly showed their respective responsibilities towards the decision regarding the status of the stateless persons in Sri Lanka.

Both are committed to Non-alignment; both have firm faith in Panchsheela both are opposed to colonialism and radicalism.

The following factors and disputes have been the source of fear, suspicion and tension in Indo-Sri Lankan relations during the past 45 years.

- i. Sri Lanka's fear of India and the complex that being a small country its interests and security is bound to be dependent upon the interests and policy objectives of India, has been a hindering factor in Indo-Sri Lankan relations.
- ii. The slow progress towards the implementation of agreement regarding the repatriation and settlement of people of Indian origin and the recent differences over the fate of the previous agreement over this issue, has been another hindering factor in Indo-Sri Lankan relations.
- iii. India believes that it has the right and the need to develop under technology for peaceful purpose and as such is opposed to the non-proliferation treaty(NPT).India conducted its first PNT in May 1974 and holds that it necessary it shall conduct more such explain for implementing the peaceful nuclear energy utilization programme which is essential for promoting the prosperity and welfare of its people. Sri Lanka, on the other hand, feels otherwise and wants that India should sign the NPT. It did not look with favour the

1974 peaceful nuclear explosion conducted by India. Much to the dislike of India, Sri Lanka currently even supports the Pakistani demand for making South Asia nuclear free zone.

- iv. The existence of subversive elements in Sri Lanka ; which became active at times, to demand autonomy/statehood for certain areas which are inhabited by minorities, has been a source of irritation in Indo-Sri Lankan relations because a section of the people of Sri Lanka, consisting of mostly Sinhalese and the members of ruling elite, feels that the insurgents and terrorists operating in their country have their roots and bases in India.
- v. Sri Lanka was on the first few countries who supported the demand for making the Indian ocean a zone of peace. At the moment Sri Lanka, however, appears to be a little hesitant in making determined efforts for securing this objective. Behind this lack of efforts on its part is the fear that countries like India, and even China, would try to fill the power vacuum after the elimination of super power naval presence in the Indian ocean. Sri Lanka, therefore, wants that the declaration of Indian ocean as a zone of peace must also involve a commitment from the littoral states that none of them would increase its naval presence and strength in the area of Indian ocean.
- vi. The desire of Sri Lanka to play safe and keep at a safe distance from both India and China has also been a hindering factor in Indo-Sri Lanka relations. In the sixties, Sri Lanka even tried secure friendship with China as a counterpoise to India. These negative factors have been responsible for the slow progress of Indo-Sri Lankan cooperation in various spheres. At times, there had been factors responsible for generating tension and stratus for Indo-Sri Lankan relations.

While commenting upon the history of Indo-Sri Lanka relations, Dr. S.C.Gangal in his article 'Indo-Lanka Ties Ambivalent (The Tribune, 3 July 1982)

writes : "Indeed during the last 30 years Indo-Sri Lanka relationship has been marked by a sort of ambivalence – an alteration between warmness, goodwill and cooperation on the one hand and fear suspicion and political and territorial disputes on the other. "Such a conclusion is fully supported by the facts of Indo-Sri Lanka relations since 1948.

A study of the history of relations between these two South Asian States, which have strong cultural links between them, reveal that on the one hand they have been successful in reaching agreements and resolving disputes through peaceful negotiations and in the spirit of mutual accommodation but on the other hand there has been continuously present a sense of fear, suspicion and political problems and disputes between them. Even after 68 years of peaceful, friendly and cooperative living as India's South Asian neighbour, Sri Lanka continues to regard India as a critical factor in the South Asian regional power system and as a potential power which can inflict at will any harm to the security and other interest of Sri Lanka.

The recent tensions over the Tamil problem in Sri Lanka have once again made Indo-Sri Lanka relations somewhat strained and tense. The Colombo outburst against Indian nationals and property during the July, 1983, riots, once again brought chilling winds for the bilateral relations of the two countries. Since her independence, Sri Lanka has been in search of a counterpoise which can match or neutralize the growing power of India as a major power in South Asia. It continues to fear India as a state which can harm or limit the freedom of action and choice of Sri Lanka. It is on record that Mr. Jayawardane, the President of Sri Lanka once remarked : "If some tyrant should get hold of India and wants to invade Ceylon, nothing on the earth is going to stop the invasion." Undoubtedly it is a conditional statement, yet it clearly reveals that Sri Lanka accepts the possibility of an invasion by India. This factor, along with many other differences over the two of stateless persons of Indian origin, the issue of alleged Indian support for Tamil separatists in Sri Lanka, the nature of Indian Ocean a peace zone and the issue of trade imbalances between the two countries, continue to be the sources of suspicion, tensions and strains in Indo-Sri Lanka relations. However, the existence of traditional links, similarities in policies and the realization to the need of each other's

help and support have been a source of strength which has helped the two countries to resolve the conflict of a number of issues – peacefully and through bilateral agreements. The step initiated by Prime Minister Mr. Rajiv Gandhi for allaying Sri Lankan fears and for stepping up of Indo-Sri Lanka cooperation. During the past 38 years, the two countries have been successful in securing some important and major agreements which have been a source of big satisfaction for the two countries.⁶⁶

Gradually, with Rajiv Gandhi replacing his mother as India's Prime Minister upon her assassination, Indo-Sri Lanka relations showed definite signs of improvement.

Sri Lanka's fear of 'Indian expansionism', the complex regarding the small population and size of Sri Lanka as compared with India, the existence of the minority profession in Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka's fear regarding the emergence of communist movement in South India, the suspicions regarding the demand for a separate state by the DMK of India, and differences over the issue of citizenship of the people of Indian origin in Sri Lanka, further prevented the growth of Indo-Sri Lanka relationship.

In 1965, political environment in Sri Lanka again underwent a change when Dull Dudley Senanayaka formed a National Government in Sri Lanka. This change also proved more helpful to India because in his bid to check the Sri Lankan tilt towards China, as appeared during Srimava's regime. Mr. Senanayaka decided to improve relations, not only with the West but also with India. Similarly, during the second tenure of Srimavo as the Prime Minister in the United Front Government in Sri Lanka important and meaningful efforts were made by both sides to maintain and develop the bilateral relations between India-Sri Lanka. The efforts produced agreement on Boundary Demarcation and Kadshativu island, India-Sri Lanka parts on the issue of the citizenship and repatriation of stateless people of Indian origin in Sri Lanka, led to the strengthening of bilateral trade and economic links. This healthy trend continued till recently. In fact, with the emergence of J.R. Jayawardhana (UNP) as the leader of Government in Sri Lanka there appeared a welcome change in the psychological environment that governed the relations between India and Sri Lanka. These appeared even a mature understanding between the leaders of the

two countries and they started maintaining high level contacts for improving Indo-Sri Lanka cooperation in various spheres. No doubt, there continued to be differences over such issues as Indo-Sri Lanka problem. Trade imbalances and Balance of Payment problem, but through a better understanding of each others view point India and Sri Lanka always tried to resolve these problems. The level of understanding between New Delhi and Colombo that has been increased after Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhis initiative and his June 1985 Summit meeting with President Jayawardene, can surely help the two countries to resolve their differences, and to build up a stronger and matured friendly cooperation between the two countries.

But there are some major issues and problems between this two countries. These are :

The Island Problem

Along with this issue, the question of ownership over the Kachhativu island became a hot issue between the two countries.

The Dialogue and the Agreement

Both India and Sri Lanka claimed the island on the basis of the historical links, records and the location of the island.

Maritime Boundary Agreements of 1974 and 1976 :

On 28th June, 1974, the international boundary between Indian and Sri Lanka in their historical waters in Pak Strait and Palk Bay was demarcated and the issue of overlap in the territorial seas of the two countries in this region was resolved. It placed Kachhativu on the Sri Lankan side of the boundary. A boundary line was drawn falling one mile off the west coast of Kachhativu. An important adjunct of this agreement was that each country was to be free to explore and exploit all petroleum and mineral deposits lying on its side of boundary, provision being made by the two countries to agree on the most effective method of exploration where petroleum or mineral deposits were found to extend from one side of the boundary to the other. "This agreement was made keeping an eye on Indo-Sri Lanka

relations in the eighties particularly in the context of India's recent oil strike in this region."

Issue of Citizenship

The issue of citizenship of the stateless persons has been a major thorny irritant in Indo-Sri Lanka relations.

Indo-Sri Lanka Accord on Stateless Persons in Sri Lanka

On January 16, 1986, India and Sri Lanka agreed to resolve, once for all, the problems of stateless persons of Indian origin in Sri Lanka. It was agreed that India will proceed with the process of conferring citizenship on 85,000 people of Indian origin who applied for Indian citizenship prior to October 30, 1981, and Sri Lanka will simultaneously take necessary legislative and executive action to grant Sri Lankan citizenship to all the remaining personages of Indian origin, estimated to be 4,69,000 and their natural increase, including those who have already been given Sri Lankan citizenship. This agreement has finally clinched the issue of stateless persons of Indian origin in Sri Lanka.

Because of these differences, Indo-Sri Lanka problem continues to be a big problem. The recent controversy regarding India expression of concern for the Tamils of Sri Lanka, has further affected the environment of Indo-Sri Lanka relations. It is bound to give a setback to the efforts to settle the thorny issue of stateless persons. India expressed its concern with the fate of Tamils, purely on humanitarian ground and did not in any way wish to interfere with the internal affairs of Sri Lanka. The Government of Sri Lanka and the press there has played this up for diverting the attention of the people from the grim domestic situation. The Tribune in its editorial : A Needless Irritant (25 July 1983) observed, "Sri Lanka is making a mountain of a malchill by its "over reaction" to Indian Government's mildly expressed concern for the safety of the people of Indian Origin. "This development has further made the Indo-Sri Lanka problem more difficult. A few months ago President Jayawardene declared that his Government was considering the grant of 'civic rights' to stateless, but the Sinhalese pressure and the recent development in Sri Lanka have prevented him from taking any effective steps. The problem as much is bound to remain an irritant in Indo-Sri Lanka relations in the coming year.

However, since both the countries are committed to settle all their problems and disputes peacefully and through bilateral efforts, it is hoped that the two countries would continue to work for securing a mutually acceptable solution to this issue.

The economic aspect of Indo-Sri Lanka relations is an important and significant aspect. India has been one of Sri Lanka's largest trading partners, but the trade relations have not been always very smooth. The unpopularity of Indian businessmen and money lenders in Sri Lanka and the trade deficit and imbalances have been the major irritants. The similar export interests, as both the countries are engaged in the export of tea, coconut and rubber, have tended to make the two countries trade value in the world markets. Further, being a better developed and technologically advanced countries. India can export many things to Sri Lanka. Even today, it accounts for 10 percent of Sri Lanka's total imports. As against this Sri Lanka has very limited export potential and as such cannot sell much to India. The net result has been a trade imbalance between India and Sri Lanka.

Both the countries have been trying to restore the trade balance, but their efforts have failed to click positively. There exists a strong need for giving a face lift to Indo-Sri Lanka trade relations. India being a bigger and better developed country must take effective steps for developing trade with Sri Lanka and for restoring the balance. Joint Industrial ventures on a buy-back basis, expansion of mutual trade and export sales to third countries, further utilization of the existing facilities in the various fields of industrial and agricultural development corporation and tourism etc., can be some of the measures which can help the achievement of the objective. Dr. Urmila Phadnis in one of her articles in India and Sri Lanka relations has suggested: "India's Sri Lanka policy should necessarily comprise and policies to stimulate trade not only with India but also in the Asian region. It should provide for economic linkage between the two countries that would make for the maximum utilization of resource endowments to the two countries. India should also take steps for liberalizing the imports from Sri Lanka." There exists a strong need for strengthening Indo-Sri Lanka trade relations.

Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace

Besides these major issues reference must also be made to certain other issues which have been influencing the course of Indo-Sri Lanka relations. Both the countries are committed to secure Indian ocean as a Zone of Peace (IDPZ Indian Ocean Peace Zone). Sri Lanka was one of the first few countries who took the initiative in demanding both in the meetings of the non-aligned countries and in the United Nations that the Indian Ocean should be made a zone of peace. However, since early 1980s it has been advocating that after the securing of IDPZ, no littoral state should increase its naval presence in the area. Apparently this demand has its roots in the 'Fear of India' with which Sri Lanka has been living since its independence. Sri Lanka wants that after securing IOPZ no littoral state of Indian Ocean should increase its presence in this area. India stands committed to the objective of securing IOPZ, but is not willing to undertake any commitment involving the future security interests of India. It wants an unconditional acceptance of IOPZ and the liquidation of super power military bases in the Indian Ocean. India wants Sri Lanka to collaborate fully for securing this objective. But Sri Lanka now appears to be not very enthusiastic about IOPZ.

The Tamil problem in Sri Lanka constitutes the biggest irritant in the contemporary phase of Indo-Sri Lankan relations. It is an internal problem of Sri Lanka but it has been source of big strains on Indo-Sri Lankan relations because of socio-political and geographic conditions that constitute the environment of the relations between these two countries. The Indian concern for Sri Lankan Tamils and Sri Lanka's allergy to the issues have been the two main factors which are conditioning the bilateral interactions during the current phase of their relations.

On July 29, 1987, India and Sri Lanka signed a historic pact which heralded a new era of their bilateral relations. It constituted a bold attempt on the part of both the countries to adopt a cooperative approach not only in regard to the limited issue of resolving the ethnic problem in Sri Lanka but also with regard to all round relations between the two countries. The pact was described by Mr. Rajiv Gandhi as "big and unusual as such an accord for mutual and collective benefit has been signed perhaps for the first time in the history of international relations."

The Peace Pact

"Affecting utmost importance to nurturing intensifying the strengthening of traditional friendship of India and Sri Lanka, and acknowledging the imperative need of resolving the ethnic problem of Sri Lanka and the consequent violence and for the safety, well being and prosperity of people belonging to all communities i.e. Sri Lanka have this day entered into the following agreement to fulfill this objective...."

The pact-reaffirmed a faith in a unity, sovereignty, territorial integrity, multi-ethnic and a multilingual plural society of Sri Lanka and recognized that each ethnic group has a distinct cultural and linguistic identity which is to be carefully nurtured. It averted the need for organizing the adjoining provinces to join to form one administrative unit with the exception. Of those areas whose people may, through referendum, decide to remain out an separate unity. It enumerated in detail the provision for holding the referendum for the constitution of provincial councils. It was further agreed that the Emerging in Jaffna area shall be lifted by August 15, 1987.

A very striking feature of the pact was the provision that the Government of Indian will underwrite and guranteed the accord and cooperate in the implementation of its provision ... The role of India forward the implementation of the accord was described as under :

- (A) India will take all necessary steps to ensure that Indian territory is not used for activities projudical to the unity, integrity and security of Sri Lanka.
- (B) The Indian Navy/Coast Guards will cooperate with the Sri Lankan navy in preventing Tamil militant activity from affecting Sri Lanka.
- (C) In the event that the Government of Sri Lanka requests the Government of India to afford military assistance to implement these proposals,s the Government of India will cooperate by giving to the Government of Sri Lanka such military assitance as and when requested.

- (D) The Government of India will expedite repatriation from Sri Lanka of Indian citizens to India who are resident there concurrently with the repatriation of Sri Lankan refugees from Tamil Nadu.
- (E) The Government of India and Sri Lanka will cooperate in ensuring the physical security and safety of all communities inhabiting the northern and eastern provinces.

These clauses made it the responsibility of India to ensure the implementation of the pact.

Further, it was agreed that a cessation of hostilities will come into force all over the island within 24 hours of the signing of this pact. All arms held by the militants will be surrendered. The process of surrendering of arms and confining of security personnel to the barracks will be completed within 72 hours of cessation of hostilities.

Praising the provisions of the accord Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi described it as momentous event in the history of the two countries "it heralds peace. It is a compact in the cause of brotherhood. It promised national reconstitution in Sri Lanka. It has created conditioning for the return of refugees. It has dispelled the clouds that had hovered over the relationship between India and Sri Lanka. Every agreement is an act of faith. Triumph needs unremitting toll and unflinching determination. In democracies, critics are often more vocal than supporters. It is up to us to defend this agreement and bring round its detractors."⁶⁷

Although one cannot predict in definite terms what course Indo-Sri Lankan relations will follow but from the perspective of domestic politics it can be said that the future prospects for good neighbourliness are not bright. The Indo-Sri Lankan accord has failed in two important respects. It has failed to project India as a nation committed to respect its small neighbour's national sensitivities which, in the long run is bound to boomerang against India. And it has not so far been able to work out a lasting solution to Sri Lanka's ethnic crisis on which a major component of Indo-Sri Lankan relating is critically dependent.⁶⁸

However, it appears that the SAARC can be a meaningful option for Sri Lanka. It is more realistic for Sri Lanka to cultivate regional cooperation with

neighbours than seek allies elsewhere for survival and sustenance. Sri Lanka should however realize that it would be in its interest to develop friendly relations with India; and it must see the utility of the SAARC in this context. SAARC can be of immense help to Sri Lanka in the economic sphere. For instance, it along with India and Bangladesh, can regulate the international price of tea through the forum of SAARC. Simultaneously, Sri Lanka could benefit more by cooperation with India in the coconut, coconut oil, coffee and jewels markets. Diplomatically too, Sri Lanka has much to gain from taking an active part in fostering closer cooperation among the South Asian countries.⁷⁰ The recent experiences (regarding Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement of 29 July, 1987) should make the Sri Lankan policy makers prudent enough to understand this reality and adjust the country's foreign policy accordingly. However, it appears that Sri Lanka has not given sufficient cognizance to the possibilities of economic cooperation through the SAARC forum.

From the above analysis, it can be assessed that the Indo-Lankan Accord was a positive development in the bilateral realizations which guaranteed the security and stability of Sri Lanka. In this context, the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord was a positive development for India, as it assured an active and responsible Indian role in the Sri Lankan affairs.⁷¹

Consequent to the bilateral relations, India had to support the legitimate interests of the Tamils in Sri Lanka within the framework of Sri Lankan unity and territorial integrity. In pursuing these objectives, Indian approach and moves were conditioned by the developments in Sri Lanka's ethnic situation and the Sri Lankan government's foreign and defence policy initiatives and moves. In this context, the Indo-Lanka Accord was the high point of bilateral understanding and cooperation between the two countries. In the final analysis, the role of India in the Sri Lankan conflict, despite some lapses and migrations has been one of the constructive engagement. It shows a close link between Indian willingness to guarantee the peace and security of Sri Lanka in return for the accommodation of its security concerns. In this direction the Indo-Lankan Accord has served its security concern and also as a step towards the peaceful resolution of the conflict.⁷²

To conclude, it can be said that unless and until the ethnic crisis in Sri Lanka is resolved, its attitude towards the SAARC would remain confined to the

problem of security, particularly keeping in view its own problem of terrorism. Although the economic issues could have been more beneficial, Sri Lanka would not give importance to this because of its own domestic political problems.

Sri Lanka can also benefit or save a lot of hard currency by establishing many industries in the island with Indian collaboration and in such areas as electrical goods and agro-industries, tea canteen, sugar, cement and paper plants, rice mills, cycle industries, garment fabrication, railway. Coach factories, nylon, rubber and plastic goods industries. The items are imported by Sri Lanka from outside countries with high language traffic. In this regard, India has an exportable technological knowledge and productive capacity and Sri Lanka has enough raw material. These, joint efforts in trade and commerce may be beneficial to both the country and helpful in strengthening South Asian Regional Cooperation. But as started earlier, Sri Lanka's domestic political problems do not allow it at the moment to focus on these dimensions of regional cooperation, as it has perceived security and terrorism on the more important issues. Nevertheless, once the ethnic problem is solved and peace and stability maintains in the Island, it is expected to exploit the possibilities to expand economic cooperation of the regional level under one auspices of the SAARC.⁷³

India – Nepal Relations

According to Dr. M.S. Rajan, "In language and religion, goods and goodesses, food and clothing the two countries, India and Nepal, have more in common with each other than with any third country of the world." The observation rightly reflects the strong bonds that bind India and Nepal. Both have been a war between them. Since its Independence, India has always been very keen to maintain and develop further, the friendship and cooperation with Nepal.

India and Nepal are tied by the silken bonds of geography, history and culture. Together they constitute the those determinates or more realistically speaking, the conditioning factors of Indo-Nepalese relations.

Geographically, the two countries inevitably form one geographic unit. Each one can be regarded as a territorial extension of the other depending upon

whether one surveys the subcontinent from the mountain end or the sea end. With the existence of an open boundary between them, the people of the countries have developed almost a shared living in the border areas.

Historically, the two countries originated from the same source. Ruling dynasties of one have mingled with those of the other and have even ruled areas which now fall within the bonds of the other. In the past, people of one country migrated to the other either in search of livelihood or business or on a spiritual quest.

For the two countries, the geographical contiguity and common historical past have given rise to a similar culture. "In language and religion, goods and goddesses, food and clothing, writer M.S. Rajan two countries have more in common with each other than with any third country of the world."

Indeed the above three factors have been a source of strength and gratification for India-Nepalese relations. Both the countries have always accepted the need to develop friendship and cooperation on the basis of these links and the similarities in the goals of their national interests. Both accept that the security of one is linked with the strength and stability of the other. For India, Nepal's strength, stability, progress and friendship together constitute an essential healthy condition for its national interests in South Asia. Particularly after 1962, India has come to realize the importance of Nepal for the security of India's northern border. The Chinese occupation of Tibet and the continued Chinese aggression of Indian borders have made India realize the importance of Nepal as a frontline buffer state. India has an open border with Nepal and the latter northern border runs along the Tibetan frontier, therefore, if Nepal falls under the influence of China or any inimical power, Indian security would get exposed to dangers. It is in this respect that Nepal occupies an important strategic position in India's security system. India has an eye over Nepal. What India wants is the stability of Nepal as a nonaligned country with strengthened bonds of friendship and cooperation with Nepal and regards Panchashila, besides the common historical and cultural links, as the basis for Indo-Nepalese relations.

Nepal also realize the importance of its relations with India. No one can go to Nepal without passing through India. Being a land-locked country with little scope for trade on northern border, Nepal finds its economic and trade interests linked with relation with India. The nature and extent of trade and India. The nature and extent of trade and transit facilities p[rovided by India constitute a determining factor of Nepalese economic and trading interests. Further, Nepal is fully aware of the inter-dependence of the national security systems of South Asia. It realizes the important link between its security and the security of India. The presence of Chinese in Tibet and the existence of a boundary dispute between its two big neighbours – India and China, have made Nepal highly conscious of its security and of the need to maintain friendly and good neighbourly relations with India and China. The existence of close cultural links with India gives strength to the development of friendship and cooperation with India. Consequently, both India and Nepal have been engaged in the process of building warm, friendly and highly cooperative biulateral relations between them.⁷⁴

If China's main interests in Nepal is the expansion of Communist influence, India's interest is economic and cultural as well is strategic. In a sense, Chinese penetration in Nepal Himalaya is merely designed to secure a stepping stone to fresh expansion of their power in South Asia. But India is in a different geopolitical position as far as Nepal is concerned. Hergeography and economic cultural connections make essential the development of close contact with the Himalayan kingdom, not merely as an a credit unect to her economy, but also as a strategic necessity. This position in turn involves the maintenance of political strength in order to prevent interference with or discrimination against her economic and political interests in Nepal. As Prime Minister Nehru put it in Parliament in December, 1950.

Our interest in the internal condition of Nepal has become still more acute and personal because of the developments across our borders, to be frank, especially those in China and Tibet. Besides our sympathetic interest in Nepal, we were also interested in the security of our own country. From time immemorial, the Himalayas lie mostly on the northern border of Nepal. We cannot allow anything

to go wrong in Nepal on permit that barrier to be crossed or weakened because that would be a risk to our own security.⁷⁵

Achievement of the objective indicated by Nehru demands a subtle and imaginative Indian policy based on close understanding has not yet been fully attained, and consequently Indo-Nepal relations have in recent years been recent years been somewhat strained.

India-Nepal Relations are characterized by two closely inter related phenomena the military strategic and the domestic political. The strategic location of Nepal between two Asian big powers – China and India – not only gives them opportunity to influence the politics of Nepal to suit their respective interests, it also provides the Nepalese ruling circles with a handle to play one power against the other on the one hand, and on the other, by raising the bogey of external interference, to perpetuate their sway over the political machinery at the cost of political development. Since for both socio-historical and geographic reasons India is more relevant to Nepalese politics than China, India becomes the bogey of external interference more often than does China.⁷⁶

Unfortunately, however, the path of Indo-Nepal relations has not been very smooth. The resistance of certain irritants have prevented the development of highly cooperative relations between the two countries. Their relations have been generally friendly and cooperative but neither fully smooth nor high, cooperative. These have been characterized by ups and downs. Even today the issue, of Nepalese demand for being accepted as a zone of peace continues to be an initiating issue, in Indo-Nepal relations. The following factors can be negatively influenced the course of Indo-Nepal relations.⁷⁷

Like Sri Lanka, the problem of ethnic, nationalizing has also affected Indo-Nepalese nations. For instance, the people of Indian origin in Nepal are more often, ill at ease with the treatment meted out to them by the Nepalese government, whereas some sections from the people of Nepalese origin in India have been sympathetic towards the demand of Gorkhaland. Under Skubhash Ghisingh's leadership the Gorkha people have been struggling to carve out a place for themselves within the Indian Union by promoting their demand for

Gorkhaland through a sustained agitation. What is more, the people of Nepalese origin in Bhutan have also been allegedly backing the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) morally as well as materially. Finally, the flow of Chakma refugees from Bangladesh to the North Eastern states of India continues to sour lies between India and Bangladesh. In fact, the migrants from Bangladesh have come to India before 1971, as well as after the birth of Bangladesh in 1971.⁷⁸

Unlike Sikkim's and Bhutan's, Nepal's relations with India are complicated and delicate. A treaty (which like the Indo-Sikkim treaty, was signed in 1990) provides for consultation between India and Nepal in the event of external threat to the independence or security of either of them. The nature of the Indian goal in Nepal – to protect Indian security through the development of a government capable of performing needed services and of carrying out needed reforms – has shown clearly in Indian policy during the last decade. In spite of pressing needs at home, Indian experts have been dispatched to Nepal to train an army and a civil service, to build schools and roads where almost none existed before. The financial efforts India is making in Nepal are shown by the fact that since 1950 India has spent millions of dollars in that country for development purposes. Undoubtedly, Indian aid in Nepal, involving calculations of high strategy, economic planning, and military and programs, are designed to bring maximum returns for the expenditures. This aid is intended to build a shield to keep Chinese power contained north of the Great Himalaya. However, Nepalese politicians, suspicious of Indian imperialism have frequently fulminated against India.

Extreme sensitivity to Indian domination generates strong anti-Indian feeling in Nepal. Because of the Indian criticism of the democratic setback in Nepal, the anti Indian feeling run high after the king's dismissal of elected government in December, 1960. The anti Indian sentiment affords excellent propaganda for enemies of democracy and free world. The Indians point to the contemporary Chinese expansion and repeat India's desire to encourage democracy, to raise literacy, and to increase living standards of the people. Yet, in spite of the logic of the Indian view point, the Nepalese adopt a skeptical approach. A Nepalese politician even warned Sikkim and Bhutan of Indian designs, asked them to free

themselves from Indian interference, and called for a federation of Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan, under Nepali's leadership.

Several explanations can be offered for the existence of anti-Indian feeling in Nepal. To begin with the Rana elements had been dissatisfied with India since 1951 because of its policy toward the incidents that led to the overthrow of the feudal government by the Rana family at that time. Second, the Nepalese public have suspected an Indian hand in making or breaking the massive cabinets which came into power since 1951. Third, the elected government of Koirala was accused by his opponents of having pro-Indian leanings; although the charge was far from true, it reinforced anti-Indian sentiment. Fourth, the occasional management of the huge Indian aid by Indian personnel and technicians led to further criticism of India. Finally, behind Nepal's anti-Indian feeling is the real fear of a larger nation dominating its economy and trade. More than 90 percent of Nepal's foreign trade is controlled by the Indian business community.

The existence of anti-Indian feeling should not be overemphasized, however, although no one can deny the anti-Indian statement in Kathmandu valley, the majority of the Hindi-speaking people of the Terai (nearly 60 percent of the total population) – are pro-Indian. In the mountain areas outside the Kathmandu valley, people generally follow a friendly policy toward India while ex-army Gorkha soldiers stand by India. But strongly, the small anti-Indian feudal elements in Nepal feel that the Tibetan revolt against China and the subsequent influx of refugees from Communism was the result of a clash between India and China.

In recent years several factors have produced tension between India and Nepal. Most of the political and economic factors creating tension are relatively minor, but potentially they are capable of causing serious rifts. Significant among the political factors causing tension are the presence of the Indian military mission, started in 1952 to train and reorganize the Royal Nepal Army; the Indian radio operators on the 14 checkposts on the northern border who are accused of spying, and the five Indian commercial attaches in South Nepal who are branded as 'intelligence men.'⁷⁹

The 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship and the letters accompanying it embody the quintessential spirit of understanding between Nepal and India an security and economic development and envisage a close and continuous cooperation between the two governments in co-ordinating their actions and policies in these matters on a mutually advantageous basis. In todays world security is not only a defence related matter but is ritally concerned with economic amaliation and ecological protection. The models furnished by the European Community and the U.S. Canada relationship may be adopted and adapted with necessary modifications to work out a cooperative framework for comprehensive long term relationship between Nepal and India but such an arrangement will undoubtedly call for magnaninuty on the of India as the larger neighbour with a higher level of economic development, , India called help Nepal transform their bilateral relationship from dependence to interdependence through half a dozen multipurpose projects for power, industries, irrigation and water transport it is high time that mutual suspicion and fruitless debates give place to positive cooperation in the economic sphere. Given mutual trust, goodwill and understanding there is no reason why a modes vivenol cannot be envolved to enable Nepal and India to undertake such mutually beneficial projects which may have far reaching implications.

Further, in the context of the carnging international relations India might also take the initiative in evolving a bold well-informed and imaginative policy armed at turning the whole of South Asia into a region of peace friendship and cooperation. If the region vast human and natural resources resosurces could only be pooled together and purposefully directed, it would not be difficult to realize the desired and with untold benefit for all concerned. Voluntary cooperation between states in matters of security and development does not necessarily imply subservience on the part of the either. Nor does it detra of from their respective independence and sovereignty. But latent doubts about an arrangement or lurking suspicion concerning anyone of its stipulations, may render the agreement ineffective at the hour of trial. Therefore the basic understanding between the two countries on matters of security and development meet not be taken for granted but must be revitalized from time to time in the light

of changes in the regional and global environment. The aim of course should always be one of reinforcing the historic bonds between Nepal and India with an eye to the pressing challenges of the present and the future.

The continued need for close cooperation between the two countries can never be overemphasized. Their interdependence may not be equal in both direction. It may not consist of equal degrees of dependence. But an essential interdependence does exist.⁸⁰

Thus, India's relations with Nepal are embroiled rather similarly with the factors of disparity centrality, and perceptions of threat, including a specific one relating to population overflows, leading upto an interplay with extra regional power factors. This interplay in a low key compared with the one at the southern edge, but it is also an intricate one and the economic consequences are damaging.⁸¹

Despite strong geographical historical and cultural links, Nepal has been quite apprehensive about India's role in the region. Being a small state, it fears India. Although there has never been a war between the two countries, Nepal fears that India can attempt an intermention in Nepal for securing its interests vis-à-vis China. Further, Nepal has been living with the fear of Indian interference in its internal affairs. The origin and spread of democratic movement in Nepal was regarded as a fall out of Indian National Movement. After independence, India's support for the liberal democratic movement in the kingdom gave additional strengthen to such Nepalese fears. The sense of dependence in India for conducting sea trade has been a source of fear for Nepal. It believes that India can exert political and economic pressures in Nepal for securing certain goals. The accession of Sikkim to India has been a source of disturbance for Nepal. China and Pakistan have been trying hard to exploit such Nepalese fears for securing their objectives which induce the objective of preventing the development of highly friendly and cooperative relations between the two 'Hindu States' – India and Nepal. The recent explosions in Kathmandu have again aroused fears in Nepal that anti-Nepalese elements having bases in India are behind these explosion. However, there has been no substance in such a wild thinking. Thus, Nepal's fear of India has prevented the speedier development of Indo-Nepal friendship and cooperation.

During the initial years of its independence, India Foreign Policy did not give much importance to relations with Nepal.

During the period 1947-55, Indian foreign policy was governed by the perception of the thesis for India's special relations with Nepal. On 6 December, 1950 Prime Minister Nehru, in his speech, in the Parliament observed, "We recognize Nepal as an independent country and wish her well. But even a child knows that one cannot go to Nepal without passing through India. Therefore, no other country can have a intimate a relationship with Nepal as our is. We would like every other country to appreciate the intimate geographical and cultural relationship that exists between India and Nepal." The statement clearly indicates the Indian thesis of "special relations with Nepal." This view gave the impression that India regarded Nepal as an 'area of India's influence.' It was such a thinking and the perception of its security system on the basis of British legacy that made free India adopt the old British policy towards Nepal.

It signed treaty of peace and friendship with India but felt concerned about he provisions. Naturally then, when India developed big strains and conflict in relations with China, Nepal did not hesitate to develop relations with China and to attempt a balance between India and China. This change in Nepalese attitude became particularly visible after 1960 and brought with it strains in Indo-Nepal relations. India tried to correct the things by following a policy of appeasement towards Nepal but the move failed to repair the damage. Thus, theirs of 'special relations with Nepal' proved to be a harmful factor in Indo-Nepalese relations.

Nepal wants that all countries should accept Nepal as a Zone of Peace. It, particularly wants India to accept and support this proposal India, on the other hand, has not been quite willing to accept this proposal. It is believed that this proposal, accepted, would involve certain limitations for Indian foreign policy in South Asia. India believes that Nepal does not really need such a status. With India, it has already a Treaty of Peace and friendship and the acceptance of this proposal would tantamount to an abrogation of the Treaty. Nepal, however, continues to regard this proposal as a vital necessity for securing its national interest and world peace. The peace zone concept has already become a national aspiration in Nepal. It stands enshrined in the constitution of Nepal. India's

hesitation towards the acceptance of this proposal has been a source of irritation for Nepal India would have to take clear stand on this issue in the near future. Preferably, India should use diplomatic means for satisfying Nepalese desire in respect of this issue. A tacit recognition to this proposal can create a large amount of goodwill for India in Nepal.⁸²

After the return of Mrs. Indira Gandhi to power in January 1980, the process of development of Indo-Nepal friendship and cooperation continued to progress satisfactorily:

Mrs. Indira Gandhi was quite alert to the need for maintaining good neighbouring relations with Nepal. Despite some differences over certain issues, the Government and leaders in the two countries should exemplary pragmatism and realism. The two countries were successful in maintaining and developing further bilateral trade and took steps to overcome trade imbalances and balance of payment problem. Both started cooperating in giving a meaningful start to the process of South Asian economic and trade cooperation the chance of increased cooperative among the countries of South Asian region, further brightened, after the August 1983, New Delhi conference of the Foreign Ministers of the seven South Asian Countries.

The regular contacts and direct communications between the leaders of the two countries helped the growth of understanding between the two countries. In November 1980 Indian Foreign Minister Mr. Narashima Rao visited Nepal and held important discussions on a number of subjects with the Prime Minister Surya Bhadur Thapa and the Panchayat Minister of Nepal. Mr. Navraj Subedi observed, "Indo-Nepalese relations had been further strengthened in recent times by our mutual trust and common aspiration" Mrs. Narasimha Rao also reaffirmed that, "India attached the highest importance in nurturing of friendly and cooperative relations with Nepal." In December 1981, President Neelam Sanjeeva Reddy paid a state visit to Nepal. Speaking at the civic reception accorded to him at Kathmandu. President Reddy observed, "Relations between India and Nepal have been historically built on the solid foundations of extensive people to people contacts which make for abiding understanding."

This realization about the necessity of cooperation and friendship between Nepal and India indeed helped the two countries to overcome problems and resolve their differences and keep up the process of development of friendship and cooperation. Both have been able to maintain and develop further trade links and economic cooperation. India maintained its commitments regarding the completion of hydroelectric projects in Nepal.

Prime Minister Mr. Rajiv Gandhi has stepped up the drive to secure more friendly and cooperative relations with this Himalayan Kingdom, New Delhi has shown full respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and stability of Nepal by giving due importance to Nepal the emergence of SAARC has indeed helped and is bound to strengthen further the economic trade and cultural cooperation among the countries of South Asia in general and among India and Nepal in particular because of deep and historical ties between those two countries.

The king of Nepal's visits to India in 1986 has helped the two countries to review their relations. Difference over zone of peace status for Nepal continued to surrender the talks. However, both the Nepalese King and Indian Prime Minister, did not allow this negative factor to adversely affect the course of growing Indo-Nepalese friendly cooperation in economic trade cultural and technological spheres. Both accepted that the Panchsheela spirit and five principles constituted the best basis for conducting their bilateral relations.

Thus, India and Nepal continue to fulfil their desire to increase bilateral cooperative and to strengthen the bonds of friendship. India fully respects the sovereignty of Nepal and deals with Nepal on an equal basis. Realising the strategic importance of Nepal, Indian foreign policy has now very actively engaged in the process of developing Indo-Nepali ties. Nepal also now realized better the importance of its relations with India. It has become confident that India does not want to interfere with the internal political affairs of Nepal. The development of trade links and economic relations have helped Nepal in achieving the objectives of its national policy. Both the countries are now working towards the further cementing of their relations. "In the current scheme of things," writes Dr. Bimal Prasad, "Nepal is likely develop cooperative relations with India on the basis of co-equality co-sharing non-dominance and non-dictator." The only outstanding

issue that needs careful holding is the Nepalese proposal for getting the status of a peace zone. Indian diplomacy must come forward to amicably sort out and settle the issue.⁸³

Continuously supported the SAARC and its various activities, and have looked towards it with a high hopes. Nepal has indeed viewed SAARC as a forum to solve its bilateral problems at the regional level. SAARC has been considered as an important step in the direction of multilateralism. Nepal seems to have believed that the SAARC can provide economic independence to smaller nations of the region against the big powers, particularly India. Therefore, it has used it as a forum to raise a number of bilateral issues to India's discomfort.

Nepal has stressed upon the development of the SAARC on the pattern of United Nations at the global level. In the New Delhi conference of the SAARC countries Nepal's foreign minister said, "the principles of the UN Charter enshrined in the SAARC charter were vital." Nepal has emphasized upon the maximization of benefits by optimal use of natural resources in the region. It was also wished that the benefits should be shared on the basis of equality. In the Kathmandu meeting, King Birendra had voiced Nepal's opposition to balkenization of states and occupation of one country by another. But despite its active role in the SAARC, Nepal appears to have tried to maintain a low profile in certain cases where controversy had crept up on bilateral matter.

Until a few years back, South Asia was the only region which did not have any regional organization of its own. The SAARC can be considered a welcome development because of the fact that the South Asian States have many differences in their political style, economic development, size, etc. Based on the principals of equality and common interest, it provides a forum for the smaller states of the region to assert their independence and national identity. The SAARC provides an opportunity to participate independently, discuss and take decision on various issues of common interest. It can also prove as a catalyst for the economic of the South Asian States by providing increased opportunities of trade and aid.

Nepal has obviously viewed SAARC as a forum to maintain its national identity, particularly against its southern neighbours which has indeed been a problem of the Nepalese foreign policy. Although Nepal has been trying to reduce its dependence over India but, so far it has not succeeded beyond a limit. Certain common interests can of course be served through SAARC. But it should be noted that the regional cooperation cannot be an alternative to bilateral arrangements. Particularly, in the present State of interstate relationship and the issues involved therein, the SAARC cannot be helpful beyond a limit.

So far as the politico-strategic aspect is concerned it is a fact that Nepal has strategic importance for India. Both the countries have tried to develop an understanding on mutual strategic issues. In spite of minor irritants from the Nepalese side, the 1950 treaty still provides a base for such a bilateral understanding. So long as this understanding is maintained any attempts towards regionalization of strategic issues will not matter much for Nepal and India. Moreover, any common consciousness on collective regional security is yet to emerge. The South Asian countries have generally believed that the subcontinent should be free from superpower interference but their politics have been just opposed to it. In those circumstances collective regional security approach is hardly possible.

In economic matters as well there are serious bilateral overtones. Nepal's economy is highly influenced by India. Nepal's landlocked position has made Nepal virtually India-locked on economic matters. Even if Nepal would try to increase its regional trade it would only be possible after India provides adequate transit facilities. In the case of exploitation of its natural resources, particularly water resources, India can be the most convenient partner. In fact, in certain cases India's cooperation is not merely desirable but essential. Thus, keeping these constraints in view, it can be said that Nepal will have to rely heavily on bilateral approach unless and until its economy reaches a stage of self reliance. But this does not mean to suggest that the SAARC is an exercise in disguise from the Nepalese point of view. It can indeed be helpful in solving certain common problems. It is possible to make joint efforts towards developing appropriate technology, exchanging experiences and knowledge regarding education science,

planning, etc. and searching remedies for problems like poverty and population control. Regional cooperation can also be helpful in generating goodwill among the member countries, which may be helpful in resolving their disputes. Moreover, it also gives some sort of a psychological satisfaction to the identity problem with which the smaller South Asian States are faced.⁸⁴

India - Bhutan Relations

The small but independent kingdom of Bhutan in the eastern Himalayas occupies a somewhat anomalous position in South Asia. It is the only state in the region without a substantial 'Indian' component in its population, which is made up almost entirely of Tibeto-Burma speaking groups and some recent immigrants from Nepal. Moreover, traditional ties in the past were largely directed northwards to Tibet. Today it is the only country which upholds a form of Barmuist Buddhism as its state religion. And among South Asian countries it has the lowest population density, located in a range of mountains to which access from the north is made difficult by the main Himalayan range and from the south by dense subtropical forests. Bhutan's geographical isolation is not the only cause of its unique and sovereign status today. Historical and cultural factors can readily be shown to have conspired with geography to ensure its continuing survival.⁸⁵

Since 1907, Bhutan has been ruled autocratically, but the feudalistic system of government is changing slowly, and the country seems to be evolving peacefully into a new democratic nation under India's guidance and protection.

Although Bhutan is "guided by the advice of the government of India in regard to its external relations", certain Bhutanese leaders are developing "Sovereignty consciousness". The desire that Bhutan become a sovereign state has been expressed in the states advisory council, and the issue of 'guidance' by India has been the subject of heated discussion in the kingdom. Prime Minister Nehru has advised Bhutan against establishing diplomatic relations with foreign countries, and the king has accepted Nehru's advice. The present king, Jigme Singhye Wangchuk, a young man of 45, has made drastic changes in the system of government that may eventually lead to the establishment of a constitutional

monarchy. Changing patterns in Bhutanese affairs are to be recognized in all aspects of the kingdom's politico geographic development.⁸⁶

Before 1949, Indo-Bhutan relations were governed by the 1865 Treaty as amended by January 1910 Treaty. Under this Treaty, the British Government undertook to exercise no interference in the internal affairs of Bhutan and the Bhutan Government agreed to be guided by the advice of the British Government in regard to its external relations.

After Independence, the Government of India concluded a fresh treaty with Bhutan on 8 August 1949. Under this treaty the Government of Bhutan agreed to be guided by the Government of India in regard to its external relations, and the Government of India undertook not to interfere in the internal administration of Bhutan.

Bhutan is a sovereign state India has been successful in assuring Bhutan that its sovereignty and internal autonomy standfully acknowledged and respected by India. In 1971, India sponsored Bhutan for membership of the United Nations and this put to an end to all such suspicions that India has designs over Bhutan. Since this development Indo-Bhutan relations have become closer and maturer. Bhutan feels fully satisfied with its relations with India. It has successfully resisted temptation of entering into diplomatic relation with other countries. In particular, it has been keeping away 'The China feelers'.

Bhutan fully realizes that her security is closely linked with India. Her rulers have been wise enough to have a special treaty relationship with India. They know, opines T.N.Kaul; that if it comes to the crunch, India would defend their security because it is vital to her own. China does not seem to have reconciled herself to this special relationship but has not dared to violate it. She has thrown gentle feelers, followed by vague threats through Bhutanese graziers, cowherds and frontier guards, from time to time, but Bhutan has stood firmly by her Treaty with India. In 1975, when Sikkim became a part of the Indian Union, many countries, particularly, China, tried hard to impress upon Bhutan the need to secure Bhutan against possible Sikkim type Indian role in Bhutan. The ruler of Bhutan, King Jigme Singhs Wangechuk, however, paid no heed to such propaganda and felt assured

of India's respect for the sovereignty of Bhutan, India's decision to sponsor Bhutan's membership of the United Nations, was quoted as the clear proof of Indian good will towards Bhutan. New Bhutan her diplomatic relations with Bangladesh and Nepal and consular relation with Singapore, Kuwait and Hong-Kong. Bhutan is a member of the world bank.

India on her part has been fully alive to the developmental needs of Bhutan, and has always contributed generously towards the economic development of Bhutan. India has provided economic, material and technical help to Bhutan for developing transport, communication and industrial facilities in the small Himalayan kingdom. India has built the beautiful 200 km. long mountain road for ; Phuntsoling in North Bengal to Thimpu, the capital of Bhutan and airstrips at Paro and Thimpu. In 1975, India undertook to meet the entire cost (estimated at Rs. 83 crores) of the ambitious Bhutanese hydro-electric project on the Chukha river and Purden Cement Plan. Bhutan, on its part has always acknowledged and appreciated India's cooperation and has tried to maintain and develop cordial relations with India. There exists good neighbourliness between India and Bhutan, as king Wangchuk has on many occasion observed that "India is not only our close neighbour but our genuine friend, "India is fully aware of the need to maintain and further strengthen friendship and cooperation with Bhutan. However, things should not be taken for granted. So far, Bhutan has followed a closer relationship with India because it accords with the security and national interest of both the countries. This close relation must be given more substance and strength on a reciprocal basis, through continued contacts, meetings and consultations at highest levels. India should prevent Bhutan from succumbing to Chinese pressures and for this, it should more readily come forward to accommodate the needs and aspirations of Bhutan. The past history of cooperation must be used as a basis for strengthening the relationship in the times to come. T.N.Kaul, in his book *Diplomacy in Peace and War*, has beautifully analysed the Indo-Bhutan relations within the border context of India's policy towards its small neighbours. He writes , "We should avoid the mistakes as we made in Nepal and not take smaller countries for granted or act as their big brother. They are sensitive, even touchy, on small things, proud and

easily hurt, we must respect their sensibilities, honour their national aspirations and win their trust and confidence. They are subject to many rules and pressures, stresses and strains internally and can't bear these alone without understanding and respect of a friendly neighbour like India." It is a matter of satisfaction that relations between India and Bhutan are friendly and are developing along the right lines. They could become a model relations between a big country and a small. We should make efforts, honestly and sincerely, towards this end "Bhutan has come of age and we can depend on the new king and his people to reciprocate our efforts in further strengthening friendly relations."⁸⁷

But Bhutan, another Himalayan kingdom like Nepal, with asymmetrical ties with India dating back to the late Parties, also went through a similar process of striving for greater autonomy Trading carefully, perhaps more carefully than Nepal. She first took a number of steps to ease her way out of India's shadow, and to activate her presence and participation in international politics. Bhutan, for example, replaced Hindi, India's main language, with English as her language of education, diminished the number of expatriate Indians working in the civil service and made it difficult for Indians to obtain entry permits easily. At the same time, she activated her diplomacy to seek other trade partners, and other aid donors, widened her network of diplomatic relations, and sought a role for herself in international organizations. To bypass India in her international communication links, she sought Japanese assistance to build a satellite earth station.⁸⁸

In diplomatic terms, and quite apart from considerations of vital strategy, India treats Bhutan and the other Himalayan kingdoms as a regional unit within the Indian defence perimeter. India-Bhutan relations traditionally emphasize the strengthening of peace and security through frequent consultations and cooperative action.

A major difficulty in Bhutan-India relationships is the extreme dependence of the Himalayan kingdom upon India for its economic development and prosperity. It is essentially a relationship between a small and entirely undeveloped country and a partly developed, large nation itself in need of massive economic aid. What Bhutan needs is a great capital investment to improve communications, set up agricultural production and develop its natural resources.

In his talks with Indian officials in February, 1961, the Bhutanese maharaja made it clear that Bhutan will have no direct dealings with China, despite Peking's refusal to accept India's privileges in Bhutan's foreign relations.⁸⁹ During 1961-1962 India took several effective measures to strengthen Bhutan's defense in matters relating to China's threat and the border dispute. A high level meeting held in February, 1961, presided over by Prime Minister Nehru and attended by the maharaja of Bhutan and India's defense minister and service chiefs, chalked out a new programme for the discharge of India's responsibility for the defense of Bhutan. The strength of the Indian defense forces stationed to answer rapidly a call from Bhutan has been substantially increased. An intensive study of the facilities for Indian Air Force operations over Bhutan is being made.

The maharaja of Bhutan has agreed with India that in the present situation, when Bhutan's major problems are its dispute with China and the need for rapid communications development, it was not propitious to think of links with international organizations or western countries. Despite this agreement, Bhutan became a full participant in the Colombo Plan with Indian sponsorship.

Bhutan, like India, emphasizes peace and disarmament but the two countries do not agree on the nuclear issues. While Bhutan signed nuclear non-proliferation treaty in 1985, India is not prepared to sign it since it considers the treaty discriminatory. Besides, Thimphu has also developed divergence on the proposal to make the South Asian region a nuclear free zone. India has been opposed to the idea of nuclear free zones in selected areas of the world and to the legitimization of the possession of nuclear weapons by a few powers. Till recently Bhutan had been willing in the UN General Assembly against the Pakistan - sponsored resolution calling for the establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone in South Asia. At the last session of the UN General Assembly, Bhutan supported the resolution sponsored by Pakistan and several other countries. Pakistan has been making this proposal since 1974. India is opposed to the proposal on the ground that nuclear war would not remain confined to a particular zone but would engulf the whole world.

Bhutan and India also differ on the issue of mobilizing external assistance to SAARC. Thimphu seeks to expand economic cooperation within the framework of

SAARC even with the help of external assistance. At the SAARC ministerial meeting at Kathmandu on 31 October, 1987, Bhutan's foreign minister, Tyonpo Dawa Tsering, said that tapping of external aid from appropriate source would not negate the efforts for collective self-reliance.

While Bhutan and Bangladesh underlined the need for external assistance, India stressed the virtue of self-reliance in the regional context. The latter made it clear that once external aid was accepted by SAARC, it would be difficult to keep it from the dangers of neo-colonialism and external pressures.⁹⁰ Bhutan's stance on nuclear issues and external assistance may have been influenced by its genuine desire for peace and development. But the small states of the South Asian region are swayed by other considerations. Some scholars hold that "because of the preponderance of India in the area, a dichotomy exists between India on the one hand, and its respective neighbours on the other."⁹¹ Nevertheless there is no evidence that the disparity between India and its neighbours has in any way enabled the former to impose its own preferences or policies upon the latter.

As a matter of fact, the regional cooperation in South Asia will amount to cooperation of all other South Asian States with India, but the small states of South Asia have ambivalent attitudes towards cooperation with India.

But the political sceneri of Bhutan is somewhat different from other South Asian States. Unlike Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Srilanka. Bhutan is not faced with any political trouble. Under the present stage of political development of the kingdom there are no political factions that thrive on anti Indian planks nor are political dissidents who look to the Indian support that is why Bhutan's relations with India are characterized not by fear or apprehensions but by mutual trust and the spirit of mutual cooperation. Hence, Thimphu seeks to strengthen not only SAARC but also desires to expand its cooperation with India. For instance, with Indian assistance it has been able to reduce its trade deficit with India by developing hydroelectric projects and cement industries with Indian assistance and exporting surplus cement and electricity to India. However, Bhutan like other small states of South Asia is concerned about its identity and security. It is not inclined to cultivate political links with extra regional powers as some South Asian States have sought to strengthen their security by forging relationship with extra regional

powers, especially the US and China. This has created a politics strategic divide in the region that hampers and progress of SAARC, in fact, extra – regional powers have sought to promote their own interests in the region.” The South Asian States can of course strengthen their security as well as ensure the success of SAARC by resorting to regional approach to the problems of identify and security.

In conclusion it may be said that Bhutan has not so far posed any serious challenge to Indian foreign policy and strategic planning, nor has it put forward an earnest demand for the revision of the 1949 treaty but the relations between the two countries can't be taken for granted for too long. At the least, India must reconsider its premise that Bhutan should necessarily hold identical views on international and regional affairs. We have seen already that regarding Afghanistan and Kampuchea Bhutan has held views different from those of India. There are new indications that even on South Asian regional affairs Bhutan's position on certain vital issues is not identical with that of India. On the question of super power involvement in South Asian affairs Bhutan probably continues to respect Indian sensitivities.⁹² but on the crucial question of declaring the region as a nuclear free zone its position tends to oppose that of India and support Pakistan's.

In apparent support of Pakistani Prime Minister M.K. Junejo's efforts at the third SAARC Summit in Kathmandu in November 1987 to strive for "regional non-proliferation" which he saw as "inherently achievable, King Jigme Singye Wangchuk expressed" serious concern at the prospect of nuclear weapons development in South Asia" and said that "we can hardly call upon the major powers to curtail their nuclear weapons programmes if we ourselves are not prepared to prevent its development in our own region. SAARC can provide a forum to conduct a meaningful dialogue among our countries on this vital issue."⁹³ In contrast, India's stand is global non-proliferation in which there is no scope for any regional arrangement.

The holding of SAARC meeting in Thimpu as well as the Tamil Sri Lankan talks at Thimpu, has infused a new confidence in Bhutan as a country with respect, prestige and role in international relations. Bhutan fully realizes and appreciates India's efforts in securing her national interests without in any way affecting the prestige and status of Bhutan in international relations. Rajiv Gandhi's initiation to

encourage and develop more nature and deep friendship and cooperation with India's neighbours has given further strength to the cause of Indo-Bhutanese highly friendly and cooperative relations. Bhutan also fully realizes the fact that because of the topography and geo-politics of the area the security and progress of the kingdom stands related to the concept of special relations with India. Bilateral friendly cooperation as members of the SAARC has been developing in a very satisfactory and healthy manner.⁹⁴

India – Maldives Relations

Maldives is the smallest nation of the South Asian Region but it gains importance for its strategic and geopolitical situation in the Indian ocean. It is a group of 1,190 coral islands which extend in the sea from 9°6' North latitude to 4°42' South latitude and from 72°33' to 73°44' East longitude. Like Chagos and Lakshadweep, Maldives also has its base on the mountains underneath the sea, covered with reefs built by the coral polyps.

At one time in the history, the island nation was colonized by the Portuguese and then by the British. The country became an independent sovereign nation in the year 1965 as a result of the process of decolonization.

One of the peculiar features of the Maldivian society, which is not to be seen in any of the South Asian countries, is that it has only one caste and one religion Sunny Muslims. Even Pakistan, which got separated on the basis of religion can hardly boast of being purely a Muslim society the way Maldives can. There are instances in the history of Maldivian society and culture wherein it is evident that the island also had Buddhism that was replaced by Islam when Yusuf Shamsuddin came from Persia as an apostle of Islam. Unlike other SAARC countries, the Maldives may not face any ethnic problem. But there can scarcely be any doubt about the fact that the smallness of the country poses too many problems. Other factors accounting for its slow rate of development are scanty resources and absence of local expertise in almost every field. For very technical advice, the nation depends on foreign help. This apart, even for its security, the nation depends on foreign military assistance. The country totally depends on foreign

capital, technology and management expertise for its social and economic development. This small nation has to depend on foreign borrowings even to meet its domestic requirements.⁹⁵

From the examination of the above facts it emerges that smallness of the country gives rise to several internal as well external problems. But Artuc of being small in size the island nation is very prove to coups. Within ten years the country witnessed four important political upheavals which were absent till such time it was a British protecto rate. In spite of the fact that the British vacated the land they continued their foothold in the Gan island using it as their naval base. The Gan island attracts so many countries of the world because each one of them is interested in having it for their military base in the Indian ocean. Another cause of Gan island's importance is that it is the nearest to Diego Garcia where the US Central Command base is situated. In this competition of power rivalry it is very difficult at times for small nations to dony the additional incentives offered by powerful nations. At times, it gives rise to internal fragmentation in the society and te entire social fabric is threatened. As a result , the nation gets divided into two rival factions. Instability thus created in the polity invites political intrigues leading to coups aided and abetted by interested foreign powers. Maldives is no exception to it. The country faced November 1988coups because of this reason. It is very clear by the development .. of events that Iran, Libiya and Soviet Union gave attractive incentives to Maldives just to have their base on Gan island.

Under such pressing conditions it becomes imperative for a small nation to align with a more powerful country or international forums for its security, and SAARC came in handy for Maldives. But joining SAARC the member country neither loses its sovereignty nor suffers from the complex of being small and weak. There is no difference in the status between India, the biggest country of the region and the most powerful of the SAARC members and the Maldives, the smallest and the weakest.

The subordinate status fall the South Asian countries in the international economic system should be viewed as the backdrop for the formation of SAARC. All the member countries have similar problems having similar political and social background. SAARC presupposes unilateral modes of action based on collective

self reliance amongst its member countries. It also emphasizes the significance of negotiations and bargaining amongst its members. The idea of regional cooperation amongst the countries of South Asia is not altogether a novel one in the sense that these countries already have an experience of some sort of collaboration in the forums like ESCAP, NAM and commonwealth. It was, however, felt that smallest countries of the region with a view to facilitate socio-economic development should be encouraged and helped to come together in some form of regional cooperation, which would also help them in safeguarding their national independence and bilateral integrity against countervailing pressure of strong neighbours.

The idea of SAARC was not solid immediately in the beginning. Most important, countries like India, Pakistan and even Sri Lanka took quite sometime to really think over this arrangement of regional cooperation. In fact, Sri Lanka joined it very late only when it was convinced that it would not be granted membership of ASEAN – the important international forum of South East Asian countries. But once Sri Lanka joined SAARC, it did not fancy it just as an intellectual exercise or merely as a means of harmonizing an assessment of regulations but as a treaty constructive element in the development process. SAARC emphasized the trust amongst its member countries. To be a member of SAARC is a decision consciously taken by its members without any ideological bias. Regarding SAARC, Maldives believed that since economy of any country was paramountly interdependent, hence without a well-knit network of cooperation among te neighbours, peace and development could not be achieved. Hence goodwill and trust are supposed to be the hallmarks for such kind of cooperation.

Although there is no dearts of bilateral problems among the SAARC member countries, such issues are prevented from undermining the cherished goal of regional cooperation. In the first few years of its inception, SAARC was threatened by the deteriorating Indo-Sri Lanka relations, then by Indo-Pak relations, by Indo-Nepal relations and also Chakma refugees of Bangladesh, but it was owing to the genuine political will that SAARC could survive through these turmoils. These bilateral problems were, to some extent, solved by mediation of the third SAARC fellow member country and provided no Scope for any external

force for its role in the region. SAARC was not to be hindered with bilateral concerns, otherwise it would have created a stumbling block in the process of regional cooperation. The SAARC charter states : "Regional cooperation cannot be reconciled with ignorance in or encouragement to acts directed against the sovereignty, unity and integrity of neighbours.

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At the Foreign Minister's meet at New Delhi, Pakistan had almost tried to amend the charter by joining Sri Lanka for raising bilateral issues at the SAARC meetings. What Maldives thought about was that expansion of SAARC activities should be based on the principle of equitable benefits, given the various economic and other capacities that existed within the region. The Foreign Minister of Maldives expressed the views of his government in Kathmandu, that the SAARC members should develop a common strategy to deal with the "arrogance of protectionism" and foreign debts.

The President of Maldives, Abdul Gayam, paid glowing tributes to the Indo-Sri Lanka accord and the wisdom of Jayawardene and Rajiv Gandhi for arriving at a very difficult solution to a four-year old ethnic problem. Referring to the economic problem he said that the global economic situation was more than discouraging, leaving the developing countries in a deep debt. Speaking on the 'SAARC-2000 regional Plan' the Maldivian Foreign Secretary, Ibrahim Hussain Zaki, said that for preventing and eliminating terrorism in the region cooperation amongst the fellow members is very essential and the "scooge of terrorism has assumed new and alarming proportions." It was agreed that 325,000 Maldivian Rufiyas will be contributed towards establishing regional institutions for SAARC activities.⁹⁶

Once common factor amongst all the South Asian countries is that they all suffer from a fear of threat from India. But the fact remains that the security of all its neighbours is on India's interest and is vital to its own security and stability. The smaller SAARC nation suffer from this threat perception for which there is no validity. In case of sending IPKF to Sri Lanka it was in the interest of Indian external security and also internal peace and stability. When on 3 November 1988, India sent military help to Maldives into combat the coup, it was again in the SAARC spirit and also to establish peace in the region. No threat was involved in either of these cases to these small fellow SAARC members.

But Indian help to Maldives was in true SAARC spirit and real test for cooperation and understanding.

As has been discussed earlier, the small size of any country is one of the factors to get aligned with a mono powerful nation or organization even for its internal stability and security. Maldives had to face opposition from within its own people who, it is said were conserved after President Gayaom's first election to the Presidency. SAARC membership proved very beneficial and also a boom in combating the coup. India's action in maintaining the sovereignty and integrity against an external threat was appreciated by all the SAARC countries.⁹⁷

Maldives is indebted to India for its successful effort to foil a coup attempt in November 1988. Although India's neighbours normally avoid any public commitment to the Indian security system, their own security policies are based on the assumption of an Indian guarantee against extra-regional aggression.⁹⁸ The major exception to the Indian security system is, of course, Pakistan.

Sepaking at Maldives Mrs. Gandhi observed : "We in India do not believe in big and small. We accept the sovereignty of independent nations, and if we want to strengthen ourselves, it is not to make our power felt, but merely to enable us to stand on our own feet and to look after our own people."⁹⁹ Likewise, Vajpayee once told Pakistan's Agha Shahi that "While India happens to be a big country, it's a approach, is not of a big brother."¹⁰⁰

In other words, India's policy towards the neighbours has been based upon friendliness, equality, reciprocity and mutuality to the extent that is possible in the relations between the states so very different in geopolitical and capabilities for me.¹⁰¹

As India withdraw its forces from Male (1990) after the Gayoom regimes had been saved from external intervention.

In such of those cases, India demonstrated its policy interest in a fair, friendly and durable territorial settlement with its neighbours, against any suspicious of Indian desire for acquisition or dismemberment of the territories of its neighbours.

India Pakistan Relations

From the above analysis it became clear in South Asia, India's relations with its smaller neighbours are developing satisfactorily.

Consequently to the restoration of democracy in Nepal, Indo-Nepal relations have undergone a most welcome transformation. India's relations with Bhutan and Maldives have always been models of friendship and cooperation. Lately, even Sri Lanka has begun to show unwanted solicitude for Indian concerns and interests. Relations with Bangladesh will improve as democracies in that country deepen. Pakistan has failed to convert the SAARC process into a going-up against India exercise.

It is axiomatic that India-Pakistan relations will have to reorient to the changing reality. The old paradigms that governed their bilateral contacts will have to be dismantled and a stable working relationship forged, if they are to prevent their isolation from the rest of the world community. For India's foreign policy objectives, although Pakistan and sub-continental affairs will continue to remain top priority items, it will have to be part of its global efforts to increase inter dependency in matters of trade, economics, technology and ecology. India simply can't get bagged down in confrontationist struggles in the region because notions of national sovereignty, economic exclusivity, practices of destabilisation, incitement to terrorism, denial of human rights and repression of democracy have become outdated and irrelevant. In a world that increasingly becomes more interdependent the dangers and consequences of lagging behind the pack far outweigh the advantages of continuing to practice inter-state relations based on outmoded institutions and beliefs.

In a fast integrating world as economics, trade and technology rapidly replace military strength as the currency of international power, Indian foreign policy has to take these new "essential" into account whilst looking for peace in the sub-continent.

New beginnings in India Pakistan relations will have to be made if the two countries are to take advantage of the unique global situation in which peace and development have a chance of surviving. India's Pakistan policy will have to be

predicted upon two sets of initiatives - there would have to be a unilateral component and there would have to be a set of bilateral initiatives that offer Islamabad more than what it can refuse.

The post-partition scenerio and consequent suspicious need to be eradicated. With determination, hope and optimism the democratic government of India and Pakistan have to resume bilateral dialogue to diffuse the tension.

As democratic and secular country, India is committed to non-alignment and peaceful coexistence. Through bilateral approach India has succeeded in resolving several contentious issues with her other neighbours. At various regional and international for India has justified its position on Kashmir and the Nuclear issue. Both India and Pakistan willingly concluded the Simla agreement in 1972 and resolved to sort out the Kashmir issue bilaterally. India's attitude towards foreign affairs in the preceding decades shows that it was mainly guided by the consideration of bilateral and regional issues which emphasized socio-economic development and consolidation of democratic processes. India has pursued a consistent policy to keep at bay external powers from the South Asian region. Therefore, the democratic Government of India expects similar response from the democratic government of Pakistan. It might be recalled that Simla Agreement was concluded between the two democratic governments (led by Mrs. Indira Gandhi and Z.A.Bhutto) in 1972. Later on, the two democratic Governments (led by Rajiv Gandhi and Benajir Bhutto) concluded bilateral agreements not to attack each other nuclear installations in 1989. However, at the present moment the democratic governments led by Narasimha Rao and Benajir Bhutto are facing problems, somewhat hampering bold policy initiatives to resume dialogue. Both the governments are faced with dilemma have to adjust domestic priority with foreign policy requirements. Perhaps benazir Bhutto's government finds itself hampered in taking decisive steps to revamp foreign policy matters. The role of the military establishment in this regard needs corrective measures. The recent tactical exercise and destabilising moves of the apposition leader, Mian Nawaz Sharif, are matters that need serious rethinking. In view of her domestic compulsions and constraints, Benazir Bhutto has seemed to be exhuted into 'Anti-India Trade.'

The Benazir government has to do serious rethinking about the activities of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), since the manifest apprehension is that the ISI has been interfering in India's domestic affairs. Since General Zia's regime the ISI has been alleged to be aiding and abetting terrorists in Punjab and Kashmir. This is a sore-point and needs to be looked into with urgency calls for.

In spite of repeated moves for externalization of the Kashmir issue, the government of Pakistan scored practically little. The world community, including the Muslim world, by and large, hold that the Kashmir issue needs to be settled bilaterally within the framework of the Simla Agreement. Pakistan's parity complex is another hindering factor in making the bilateral approach successful. India's size and strategic position in the South Asian region is the main reason for Pakistan's apprehensions. The image of the blustering 'big brother' has been an impediment. For better or worse, such identity has not helped India wither. Conceding that successive governments in Pakistan have been working under constraints of one kind or the other, India's genuine wish to extend bilaterism need not be suspected. India continues to be optimistic about eventual emergence of bilateral conflict-resolution strategy. It has shown, time and again, its readiness to resolve contentious political and strategic issues taking due cognizance of the principle of 'sovereign equality'. It is India's vested interest the democracy prevails and gets sustenance in Pakistan. The issues of destabilisation, annexation or systemic disruption have no place on the agenda of India's national interest.

The present democratic government of India has optimistically sought to persuade its neighbour to amicably resolve all outstanding issues across the table. Upholding the principles of 'sovereign equality' and 'peaceful existence' India believes that resolution of other minor issues related with Siachen, Waller Baragge & Tulbul navigation project and Sir Creek, would not pose any serious difficulty.

It is the joint responsibility of the two democratic governments that they seriously come together and devise mutually acceptable conflict resolution formulae and confidence building techniques, and desist from taking recourse to populist measures, arousing passions over sensitive issues. It is expected of on both sides of the border that they would not indulge in stinging match and would not be provoked into crossing the limits of civilized norms of inter-state dealings.

Restraint on public statements only conform the integrity and identity of self-governing societies.

The emerging delegations of the new world order permit to no luxury of rhetoric and populations. The past might have been unworldly of recalling with justification. The false barriers and inhibitions ought to go. New vision is the need of the hour just as new horizon await discerning overtures for peace, goodwill harmony and accommodation on the part of both, India and Pakistan. The governments and the thinking peoples on either side, have no other worthy alternative.

The Simla Agreement stipulates that all disputes between India and Pakistan shall be settled bilaterally through negotiations, and the use of force in their dealing shall be avoided.

It was after the 1971 military debacle that Pakistan's strategy towards India underwent a change. Instead of emphasizing the solution of the Kashmir problem as a pre-condition for any normalization of relations, the step by step improvement of their bilateral relations was viewed as conducive to creating a positive environment for addressing complex problems like Kashmir. However, Pakistan was still reluctant about entering into a formal non-aggression treaty with India. That is why the stipulation in the Simla Agreement (1971) that India and Pakistan would not use force against each other was phrased in a manner that is stopped short at a formal non-aggression pact.¹⁰²

If India's successful military action projected has a new regional power, the diplomatic aftermath of the bilateral Simla Agreement was equally important. For the Indo-Pakistan negotiations that took place in that town were a clear recognition of the new power reality. For example, the bilateral accord that was finally concluded clearly stipulated that all the differences between the two countries had to be resolved bilaterally, undoubtedly an implicit recognition by Pakistan that all external influences that she had hitherto used to counter India were no longer permissible.¹⁰³

No other issue has generated so much ill will between India and Pakistan as the Kashmir dispute. Even the end of the cold war and the consequent changes in world order have not been able to dampen the issues. The Pakistan have treated the Kashmir dispute as evidence of broken pledges and Indian duplicity. The Indians of

course consider Kashmir to be an integral part of India and all Pakistani attempts to raise the issue of international for not only invoke strong Indian reactions but are also viewed as a sinister Pakistani device to malign India. While India has been consistently attempting to busy the issue by adopting the strategy of 'focus Shipping', the Pakistan's never miss an opportunity to highlight the issue at the appropriate for a. With the passage of forty three years, the issues has become so complicated that neither government can afford not to assert its respective interpretations.

In the summer of 1993 India and Pakistan initiated bilateral talks for setting the Kashmir dispute. The bilateral talks, first held at the Queens Coronation in June 1953, continued in Karachi and Delhi in July and August. The talks began in an atmosphere of goodwill but soon these became clouded because of certain negative developments. On August, 9, 1953, Sheikh Abdullah was dismissed and detained by the Government of India on charges of anti-national activities. In February 1954, Kashmir's constituent Assembly unanimously ratified the state's accession to India. Both these developments made the atmosphere heavy and suspicious. Further damage was done to the talks when the American decision to provide large quantities of military and the Pakistani decision to join the Western military Alliance were announced in 1959. Despite the efforts made by Pakistani Governor, General Gulosm Meeharmand and the decision of India reciprocate the goodwill no progress could be registered toward an agreement over Kashmir. The Pakistani decision to join American sponsored military alliances was interpreted by India as a device for pressurizing India. Consequently, Indian stand over Kashmir came to be stated as "the inviolability of Kashmir's accession to India." The change of Government in Pakistan in 1956 and Prime Minister Choudhri Mohammed Ali's decision to resume the struggle at the United Nations obviously with the help of Pakistan's new allies, an end to the era of bilateral talks. The Indian stand a Kashmir now rejected the demand for plebiscite on the ground that the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir already has ratified Kashmir's accession to India and the Constitution of Kashmir under Article 111 Stated. The state of J & K is and shall be an integral part of the Union of India' This further handed the Pakistani attitude.

Consequently, India and Pakistan once again became engaged in sharp interactions over Kashmir in the Security Council.

The second major issue invoking security concerns is the nuclear factor. Although there is no real basis for affirming that either Pakistan is close to developing and testing a bomb or India is well on its way to nuclear weapons acquisition, many high priests of non-proliferation have already convicted both of them for endangering the world. Neither government has ever admitted any plans to tread on the forbidden path, yet both accuse each other for advancing towards the eventual weapons acquisition.

The third factor directly impeding the deferred Indo-Pak harmony is the occurrence of periodic domestic upheavals to divert attention from pressing internal problems with an external crisis not a very uncommon practice among Third World Countries. Hostile external responses, of course, make it relatively easy to enhance cohesion by using emotional and sentimental Targan. However, such tactics make the situation extremely critical in those countries which are already beset by complex religious, ethnic and political cleavages. Both India and Pakistan are blessed with a fair share of internal problems. Being laced in a conflictual cobweb, both have periodically exploited each other's internal turmoils and tensions through propaganda and other available means.

The fourth factor taking a heavy toll of Indo-Pak relations is the presence of outside equilibrators. Relatively weaker countries are more prone to seek help from outside if the insiders abandon peaceful pursuits and consistently demonstrate the arrogance of power. Both the Americans and the Soviets were introduced to the area by Pakistan and India, respectively, each seeking to satisfy its perceived security requirements. The Pakistan's sense of insecurity brought the Americans to South Asia and quick Indian reaction to this introduced the Soviets to the region. Had India accepted the birth of Pakistan gracefully and resolved the issues emanating from the ill-planned partition process peacefully, the need for introducing outside equalizers would never have arisen. In many ways, both India and Pakistan have been reacting more to each other rather than initiating innovative processes. Both countries consider the introduction of outsiders as moves to counter the perceived threats. China was initially introduced to the region by India but after the

Sino-Indian border clash, China began to side with Pakistan. Thus for India, China became a major external threat to Indian security particularly in view of its quickly developed close ties Pakistan.¹⁰⁴

Moreover, after independence while India sought to solve its minority problems by establishing a secular state, Pakistan decided to be an Islamic republic. The reports of maltreatment of minority problems by establishing a secular state, Pakistan decided to be an Islamic republic. The reports of maltreatment of minorities in either side started causing serious strains on bilateral relations of India and Pakistan.

The problem of division of assets of India between Pakistan and India too kept Indo-Pak relations tense and strained during the initial years of their relations.

The division of Punjab into West Punjab into West Punjab, which came to be a part of Pakistan and East Punjab which remained with India brought with it the problem of distribution of canal waters. This problem arose out of the unnatural partition Punjab.

In 1966, both countries signed the Tashkent Declaration and agreed to settle all their issues and problems through bilateral negotiations. But this agreement too failed to secure good neighbourly relations between them. It also kept the Kashmir issue unresolved. Towards the ending years of the seventh decade India and Pakistan once again came to develop highly tense and strained relations due to the emergence of Bangladesh crisis. In December, 1971, there broke out the third war between them. But this time India achieved a decisive victory of Pakistan now Bangladesh. India was in a position to capture some vitally important and strategic areas of Pakistan and a large number of Pakistan POW. However, for securing normalization in Indo-Pak relations India decided to hold the Simla Summit with Pakistan and to sign the Simla Agreement of 1972. This Agreement constituted a bold bilateral attempt to normalize Indo-Pak relations.

In the Simla Conference of 1972, Prime Minister Bhutto did raise the Kashmir question but purely at the superficial level. The Simla Agreement included a sub-clause of clause IX and it said, "In Jammu and Kashmir, the line of control resulting from the cease-fire of December 17, 1971, shall be respected by both

sides without prejudice to the recognized position of either side. Neither side shall seek to alter in unilaterally, irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations. Both sides further undertake to refrain from threat or the use of force in violation of this line."¹⁰⁵

Pakistan in fact made use of the SAARC forum to launch an anti-India media campaign during the Dhaka Summit, rousing the Kashmir issue, defending Pakistani nuclear programme and depicting India as a "hegemonist" which was taking a "negative" attitude on SAARC proposals. Given the background of the regional summit and the explicit prohibition of reference to bilateral and continuous issues, such a media blitz through distribution of biased literature was hardly in tune with the so-called SAARC spirit which was said to have pervaded Dhaka during the meeting.

Another instance of the reality's manifestation was the occasion when the SAARC countries were to cancel the special stamp, brought out by them to mark the summer. The Pakistani stamp showed the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir as a separate territory; and Maldives stamp showed Sikkim as a separate entity. India's Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi told the Conference Chairman, President Ershad that he could not share the same platform where such objectionable stamps were to be released. The proposed ceremony was then given up reportedly on the technical objection that such cancellation of stamps could be undertaken only on the territories of the respective countries. While an explanation was forthcoming from Maldives to the effect that its stamp was based on a map of a UN agency, no such explanation came forth from Pakistan. In the process, Pakistan effectively brought in a bilateral contentions issue into the summit through the backdoor. President Zia in his inaugural speech while calling for agreement at the regional level for confidence-building, called for steps to banish nuclear weapons. This again was an issue on which India and Pakistan had divergent views, and in keeping with the SAARC spirit, should not have been raised.¹⁰⁶

The second summit level meeting was held in India at Bangalore in 1986. The seven countries were represented by their heads of the governments but Pakistan was represented by Prime Minister Junejo, as General Zia had reserved himself for nonaligned meet. Junejo brought in the question of reported arms build

up on Indo-Pakistan border, and sought to drag SAARC into a purely bilateral problem. Thus, the realities of the ground situation despite emphasis on the ideals of regional cooperation did hamper the growth of the SAARC spirit.

India as Chairman remained somewhat subdued but adhered to the principles of the SAARC and avoided bilateral irritants to get mixed up with its ideals, even when Pakistan and Sri Lanka made a coordinated attempt to deflect SAARC from its Chartered course. They wanted a discussion on bilateral issues with a clear intention to embarrass India on her air dropping of relief in Jaffna. Pakistan's role in this context particularly was one of a disrupter or in any case it was an attempt on its part to establish itself as a friend of Sri Lanka Vis-à-vis India and a covert expression of her objection to emerge as a regional power in South Asia. Pakistan's hidden ambition to forge behind its repeated efforts to raise bilateral problems at the SAARC forum, despite being fully aware that such an exercise went against both the letter and the spirit of the SAARC.

This Indian policy towards neighbours was its a standing policy in respect of all neighbours, even Pakistan although the latter never credited India with good intentions. Once, early in 1981, Indira Gandhi told some visiting Pakistani Journalists : Nothing is more important to us than good relations with our neighbours and especially, with Pakistan."¹⁰⁸ On a visit to Islamabad, P.V.Narasimha Rao remarked : "India's commitment to friendship with Pakistan incorporates its support for Pakistani well-being and growth I take this opportunity to state unequivocally that we are committed to respect Pakistanis national unity, territorial integrity, political independence and sovereign equality."¹⁰⁸ Unfortunately, such Indian statements on Pakistani soil and elsewhere meant little to the Pakistani Psyche.

Indeed, while relations with Pakistan occupied an important segment of India's policy, Pakistani approach has almost wholly been obsessed with India. India was merely concerned with peaceful coexistence with Pakistan; the latter seemed to be concerned wholly with one upmanship with the former : while India managed to play a modest role in global affairs with a peep-hole to India. This Pakistani dichotomy had little to do with the comparative sizes of the two countries; it had more to do with Pakistani ceteris paribus myopia. In the process, both their larger status

of the region hurt not only their respective national interests but also a greater global role both are singly or together capable of playing.

Given the long history of acrimonious relations, the deep-rooted mutual distrust, and the fact that some of their bilateral disputes are still unresolved, it is unrealistic to expect a speedy normalization of their bilateral relation, particularly now that the Kashmir issue has erupted again. Normalisation is going to be a slow process with periodic interruptions and reversals. However, the policy of India and Pakistan to continue to talk on the contentious issues at the bilateral and multilateral/regional (SAARC) levels is a positive development. This makes one cautiously optimistic that the efforts of the two countries to keep their problems within manageable limits and defuse periodic tension will over time, contribute to establishing an environment of cordinality and trust in South Asia.¹⁰⁹

Other Country's Bilateral Relations

India has always been a dominant factor in South Asian Politics. Regardless of the historical period, the geopolitical environment or the socio-economic conditions, the country always occupied the central stage in the area.

This central position became particularly important with the advent of British colonialism, and with the consequent unification of the subcontinent. A power centre finally emerged to gain control of the Indian Ocean, the whole of the subcontinental land mass and the countries surrounding it.

Ruled by London, the viceregal centre of power established in Delhi, had the authority to decide the broad policy framework for not only India but also for the peripheral areas surrounding the country, including the northern states of Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and Tibet, the eastern state of Myanmar, the nearby islands of Sri Lanka and the Maldives, and the north western state of Afghanistan. All these countries were either British colonies or under British colonies or under British domination.

The whole area had, thus, become a vast British empire or a sphere of influence with the decision making centre located at Delhi.

This disintegration of the viceregal centre of power after World War II, and the final establishment of seven sovereign states in South Asia (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka and the Maldives) did not diminishes the importance of India. First of all, new and independent India dominates the whole area geographically. She is the only country that is either contiguous to or has a large coastal line with, all the other six states, while none of them have any common borders with each other. Her geographical centrality is accentuated all the more by the important fact that there is no other country, equally big in size and sufficiently close by, the counter the predominant Indian position. There is, of course, China to be reckoned with which had, with the occupation of Tibet in 1950, reached the borders of the Asian subcontinent, but her accessibility to the area is hardly comparable with that of India, given the difficulties of the northern terrain. Admittedly, China showed remarkable capacity in overcoming this handicap during the Sino-Indian War of 1962 when the Chinese troops crossed the Indian border, but this can hardly be collated with the centuries of massive and uninterrupted movement of people armies and goods across the plains of the subcontinent. Geographically, it is hardly conceivable that any nation beyond the frontiers of the subcontinent can equal the advantages that India possesses. 'Geography', as K.M. Pannikar has put it, constitutes the permanent basis of every nation's history' including of course, that of India whose internal policies and external relations' are governed largely by its unattainable geographical conditions and their relations in space to other countries'.

The leverage, at least theoretically the India has over the other countries of the region is, therefore, exceptionally powerful. Land locked countries like Nepal and Bhutan, for example, can hardly survive economically without India's cooperation. Most of what they produce is marketed in India, and most of what they consume comes from India, not to speak of the fact that nothing can ingress to or egress from there to other countries without India's approval. Bangladesh is heavily dependent for water on India's Gangetic plain, and Pakistan's main source of water supply for the agriculturally rich Punjab emanants from rivers that originate in or pass through

India. Though the insecular character of the two island states (Sri Lanka and the Maldives) makes them less vulnerable to Indian pressures their proximity to the vast Indian coast line and the strong ethnic Indian presence in the two areas, nonetheless, makes them heavily dependent on India.

The second factor is the sheer size of the country. India is a relative giant. Her size, population, GDP, natural resources, military clout, and so on, are far larger than that of the six countries of the region combined. For example, she accounts for 72% of the total land in the area and 77% of the population of South Asia. 85% of the total land under cultivation is in India. 90% of the coal and petroleum and almost 100% of the iron ore, bauxite, manganese and uranium resources are found in India.

The regional ramifications of giantism are far-reaching. The leverage that India has over her neighbour is considerable. In fact, this is more significant in international relations than in the domestic sector. On the positive side, this makes it possible for her to protect neighbouring countries against external threats, to assist them economically, and to permit them to benefit from the educational, medical and even employment facilities that exist in India. In fact some do. On the negative side, Indian 'giantism' has engendered considerable fear and mistrust among the neighbouring countries, which is inherent in the asymmetrical situation, and can probably only be eliminated if the Indian compound state is dissolved into a dozen 'Thailands' (Lewis, 1991 : 389).

The third characteristic feature is the subcontinent's geographical unity and religio-cultural-ethnic diversity. Its unity stems from the fact that the subcontinent is 'indistinctly a geographical unit' which is 'marked out by nature as a region by itself'¹¹⁰ and which has features that clearly separate it 'as a whole from the surrounding regions.'¹¹¹ 'It is no exaggeration', confirmed Sri Richard Strachey, 'to say that it is possible to go from the Bay of Bengal up the Ganges through the Punjab and down the Indus again to the sea, over a distance of 2000 miles and more, without finding a pebble, however, small.'¹¹²

If this geographical unity accentuates the importance of India in South Asia politics, so does the religio-cultural-ethnic diversity. For India houses all the ethnic

groups, all the different cultural expressions, and all the religious orientations that the six South Asian nation represent.

It is, indeed, the geographical unity and the intermingling of peoples, cultures and religions that imparts a unique quality to inter-state relations in South Asia in which for better or for worse, India undoubtedly is the fulcrum.

The fourth feature is the stability of the Indian political system and the contrasting instability that afflicts the other states of the area. Practically all the states have had their coup d'etats, their civil wars, their ethnic discontent and their authoritarian governments. It is, indeed, hardly possible for India to design the broad framework of her foreign policy without taking this dimension into account; for nothing is worse for the future of a nation than the continuous existence of endemic instability in the areas surrounding the country. In fact, signs of some spill over of this state of affairs is already becoming visible. Though all the difficulties that India is faced with internally cannot be attributed solely to the instability of her immediate environment (some of them are also due to internal issues), it can hardly be denied that the destabilization of Assam is partially due to the influx of refugees into the area from Bangladesh, that the growing difficulties in Tamil Nadu are connected with the ethnic turmoil in Sri Lanka, that the Punjab and Kashmir imbroglios are linked to neighbouring Pakistan, and that the instability of the whole of the north-eastern tribal belt has some connection with the continuously unstable situation that has afflicted Myanmar since independence.

This growing regional interdependence has certainly contributed to the activation of India's policy towards the region, particularly after 1971 when, in the aftermath of the events in Bangladesh, India had become more confident of her power and had acquired greater capacity in managing critical situations in South Asia.

The fifth feature that has also contributed to the manifestation of the new Indian determination to play a more conspicuous role in the area is the core value system to which she adheres. India is a political and secular democracy, and has been so since her independence in 1947 with the exception of a brief period when Indira Gandhi had clamped down an Emergency rule on the country. This has

become very much a part of India's core values, on which there is a wide consensus among the Indian population and among all the mainstream political parties.

However, in contrast to the general acceptance of these core values, the other States of South Asia have been hovering between some form of authoritarianism and some form of indigenously contrived democracy thus generating considerable political uncertainty in the region as a whole. If an unstable South Asian strategic environment is bad for India, a system uncertainly surrounding the country is an equal threat, to which India has to respond by designing a pattern of diplomacy that would closely monitor the overall situation prevailing in the area.

India's policy towards neighbours was to deal with all matters on a bilateral basis. Again, this was a general policy equally applicable towards the neighbours. India felt that all matters with neighbours should be settled bilaterally on the basis of equality and mutual benefit, i.e. without needlessly complicating them by internationalising in multilateral forum, or inviting third party intervention. But this was not reciprocated by Pakistan and sometimes by other neighbours too. Bangladesh actually took (1979) to the UN General Assembly the problem of distribution of the waters of the Ganges in order to bring international pressure on India to solve the dispute in its favour. There have been occasional hints or threats in Nepal and Sri Lanka too to internationalize the problems they had with India. While they did not actually do so, they have not hesitated to air in international for their grievances or atleast their viewpoint, obviously to embarrass, if not pressurize, India. This is an aspect of India's bilateral relations with neighbours, which India could do nothing about, except to plead persuasively that bilateral solutions are more effective and enduring, even if usually a little dilatory; and that internationalization of essentially bilateral matters would not only be conducive to enduring friendly relations between neighbours but also, sometimes unnecessarily complicating the issues and delaying a lasting solution.

The most controversial case of neighbours ignoring these Indian pleas is, of course, Pakistan which has made a habit of referring persistently to the Kashmir question in every international forum. This Pakistani tactics has not only not promoted the Pakistani cause on this or other issues of Indo-Pakistani relations, it

has proved counter – productive in the sense that the solution of the dispute has been greatly delayed. The rest of the world is perfectly aware that the Pakistan posture is not only not in a accord with the terms of the Shimla Accord, but is in violation of it. This Pakistani practice has also inhibited normalization of friendly relations between the two countries, despite regular Indian appeals and efforts to promote confidence building measures and trust between the two neighbours.

Indeed, Pakistan has sometimes even tried to fish in the troubled waters between India and other neighbours, because of Pakistan's previousness with India. Also, by exploiting small neighbours grievances against India, it tried to gong them up against India. A typical example of this was when Pakistan joined Sri Lanka in Blaming India for scutting the SAARC Summit in Colombo in 1991.

Needless to say that until recently, Pakistan never hesitated to involve the interference in sub-continental affairs of extra regional powers for its own self-serving reasons, e.g., China and the United States in the context of the crisis in East Pakistan in 1971-72. If these powers did not show more than symbolic interest in response to Pakistan's plea, it is largely because of India's stern opposition to such extra-regional intervention.

It is perhaps because of this Pakistani tendency of using every international forum available to it for propoganda against India over the Kashmir question, that India was less than enthusiastic initially in agreeing to Pakistani's request for re-entering the Commonwealth of Nations, from whose membership it withdrew in a herff in 1972. Despite the fact that bilateral matters are expressly excluded from discussion in the Commonwealth forum Pakistan had in the Commonwealth forum Pakistan had in the past, raised the question although indirectly and slyly, intermittently over the years. Only when Pakistan came to moving towards a democratic government under Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in 1988, India agreed to relent in its hesitation to agree to its readmission.

In recent years, in respect of resolution of disputes with neighbours, it is not only India that insists in bilateral discussions and settlement, but practically the whole of the rest of the world (including all the five permanent members of the UN Security Council) that have been recommending it, especially in regard to Pakistan's

appeals for third-party intervention for the resolution of the Kashmir question. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that the world community is pretty tired with Pakistani appeals on this matter.

Beside, these are some bilateral relations between the small neighbouring countries also.¹¹³

For instance, there is no tradition of direct relations between Bhutan and Bangladesh. Whatever relations there were between them in the pre-British period were due mainly to the political position of Bhutan and the Mughals in relation to the principalities of Koch, Hajji, Bijul and Cooch Behar. There are also indications that there was trade between Bhutan and Bengal in the past.

King Jigme Dorji Wang Chhuk took keen interest in the liberation of Bangladesh. Bhutan was the second country, after India, to recognize Bangladesh and establish diplomatic relations with it on 7 December 1971. The President of Bangladesh visited Bhutan on the occasion of the coronation of King Jigme Singye Wangchuk. King Jigme Singye paid a state visit to Bangladesh on 28-30 December. Bhutan and Bangladesh signed a treaty of trade and transit in Dhaka in September 1980. Friendly relations subsist between Bhutan and Bangladesh.¹¹⁴

Relations between Bhutan and Nepal are historical. The Bhutanese look upon Nepal as a sacred country. Nepal of the Bagmati valley, where the kagyupa Sect of Buddhism had its strongholds, was one of the first countries to recognize the spiritual and temporal authority of Shabdrung lama nagawang nangyal over Bhutan. Bhutan stationed a monk representative in Nepal for the first time in the second part of the seventeenth century. In the 1770s Bhutan and Nepal developed an understanding to resist the British advance towards the Himalaya border countries. However, despite this, amity between them, Bhutan remained neutral in the Nepalese – Tibetan conflict of 1788-89 and the Anglo-Nepalese war of 1814-16. The special connection between Bhutan and Nepal ended after the Nepalese-Tibetan War of 1855-56. Bhutan then refused to help Nepal against Tibet, the source of its religion and culture. The Bhutanese attached great importance to their sense of cultural affinity with Tibet, the source of its religion and culture. The Bhutanese attached

great importance to their sense of cultural affinity with Tibet. Nepal reciprocated by not helping Bhutan against the British during the Anglo-Bhutanese War of 1864-65.

There have been no direct relations between Bhutan and Nepal since the Anglo-Bhutanese treaty of 8 January 1910, which made Bhutan's external relations a direct concern of the British government of India. The Indo-Bhutanese treaty of 8 August 1949 also allowed no scope for diplomatic relations between Bhutan and Nepal.

When Nepal emerged as a democratic region in the 1950s certain Nepalese politicians evinced keen interest in Bhutan. In December 1964 a number of Bhutanese attempted a coup d'état and, upon their failure to pull it off, escaped to Nepal. Nepal readily gave them asylum. It did so perhaps to annoy India. For Indo-Nepalese relations then were not too happy. The Nepalese action hurt Bhutanese susceptibilities. Most of the Bhutanese fugitives returned to Bhutan after King Jigme Dorji granted them amnesty, but the bitterness remained. Now Bhutan and Nepal have established non-resident ambassador-level diplomatic relations, the ambassadors of Bhutan and Nepal in New Delhi being concurrently accredited to Kathmandu and Thimphu.

Besides religious and historical relations, Bhutan and Nepal also had social relations between them. It may be noted that Dasho Jigme Namgyal (1825-82), an ancestor of the present reigning dynasty of Bhutan, the House of Wang Chhuk once had plans to arrange his daughter's marriage in Nepal.¹¹⁵

Bangladesh and Nepal had identical interests in involving outside intervention against India. Bangladesh after 1976, demanded the inclusion of Nepal in the deliberations of the Joint River Commission which has established under the India-Bangladesh Treaty of 1972. Nepal on the other hand, was out to involve China in the development of water resources of this region, which China was reluctant to commit to itself to such an issue before going into the details of it, India dismissed the logic of the participation of China as it was not a South Asian country.¹¹⁶

A cooperative relationship has grown between Sri Lanka and Pakistan in the last three years. President Zia-ul-Haq has visited Sri Lanka and President Jayewardene has returned the visit. Each was received by the other with the

cordiality and warmth generally reserved for every special friends. The Sri Lankan prime Minister, Mr. Rana Singha Premadasa, has just paid a very special visit to Pakistan receiving the warmest possible welcome in the Principal cities. The friendship that binds Sri Lanka and Pakistan has a clear and sharp anti-India edge.

Some Pakistanis see the friendship of Sri Lanka as a partial compensation for the loss of the eastern wing of the country which is now the people's Republic of Bangladesh wrote the Nation of Lahore, in an editorial on March 29 appraising the significance of Premadasa's visit "Pakistan-Sri Lanka political equitation is a post 1971 phenomenon and its consolidation has stabilized the region to some extent. After the assertion of its great power role India has tensed to put its neighbours on guard Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Pakistan have all experiences this pressure and have sought to counter it through political means SAARC, which created a forum of equal partners, is also directed against the Indian strategy to deal with its neighbours severally from a position of advantage.¹¹⁷

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CHAPTER - III

INDIA AND PAKISTAN : HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The South Asian region, which comprises the present day states of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and the Maldives, has long been significant in world affairs. For 5000 years, it has been one of the main centers of civilization continually enriching societies beyond its borders and in turn, being enriched from outside. Four and a half thousand years ago many millennia of human development reached a striking in the Indus valley cities of Mohenjodaro and Harappa. Two and a half thousand years ago South Asia was the cradle of two major world religions - Hinduism, which became wholly identified with India, and Buddhism, which helped to shape the worlds of South East and East Asia. Over the past 2000 years, there have flourished the high Sanskrit civilization of the classical Hindu age and the Persian civilization of the Mughal empire. Since the eighteenth century, the region has been the focus of the longest and deepest encounter between an Asian civilization and the west which came to be encountered with the political struggle between South Asian nationalism and British Imperialism.¹

Thus, the Third World was not born as a free and fully autonomous entity. The process of colonial and imperial rule was in the nature of a big melting pot into which the Third World societies were sucked and moulded. They emerged out of this melting pot with hybrid structures and distorted personalities. The colonial metropolis, while granting independence to a particular Third World country or region, did not completely sever its cord. It sought to pressure and nurse its basic economic and strategic stakes in that country or region. The post-colonial behaviour of a Third World country or region, therefore, cannot be understood except in the context of this melting-pot process. The continuing involvement of the great powers in the Third World stemmed out of this process as a massive and, perhaps, inevitable legacy.

The conflict in South Asia is no exception to this rule. It has witnessed a whole range of manifestations from informally expressed diplomatic displeasure to

full-scale war. The expressed issues in such interstate conflicts in the region have included territorial disputes, economic issues, threat to political stability and national security, communal attitude of one participant or the other.

The most acrimonious relationship has, however, been between India and Pakistan in this respect.² South Asia is a compact area of geographically proximate states interacting with each other and sharing certain common bonds of history, culture – except India and Pakistan. Other countries of South Asia are small powers. India, by virtue of its geographic dimensions and economic military strength, occupies central position in the region. Indian policies have endeavored to achieve the central status of the South Asian system. Pakistan may not have demanded such a core status for itself, but it always sought a status of parity with India. Pakistan as a major power in the South Asian region can obviously try to limit India's aspirations of leadership. No doubt, Pakistan's limitations to this end came from its geographic location, structure and economic and military development. But with the help of outside powers, it has been able to check India's aspirations, which implies that Pakistan plays the role of major power for India in South Asia. Thus, any proposed system of security of South Asia that aims at establishing a stable order in this region must focus primarily on the core powers, i.e. India and its interaction with major powers, viz. Pakistan.

India and Pakistan have been tied together historically and culturally. Their relations are characterized by a long series of accords and discords. Since the partition, both India and Pakistan have been looking each other with mistrust, suspicion and fear. Instead of devoting all their resources for the development of the economy, both have spent millions of rupees to strengthen their armed forces against each other. The Government of Pakistan keeps the population under the tight wraps reminding them from time to time that India is the only enemy; while India's attitude towards Pakistan has been always determined by her assessment of Pakistan's intentions.³

Again, there can be no doubt that India and Pakistan, situated as they are geographically and otherwise, and with their historical background, cannot carry on for ever as enemies. A half-century ago, Pakistan and India were large Asian nations facing severe problems of economic and political development. They share a historic

experience and at their birth were confronted with the task of charting a course in a fundamentally changing international system. It would thus have seemed that both countries would follow similar courses, and in fact early policy pronouncements by Pakistani leaders could almost as readily have been made by Indians.⁴

When one looks back into half-a-century of India-Pakistan relations there are both feelings of pessimism and optimism for the future. The former is the result of years of confrontation and the latter reflects the changing priorities and the imperative of cooperation in a changing world. The story over the last fifty five years has been one of misunderstandings, misperceptions and even war on four occasions. Deep-rooted mistrust and a mythology of hatred have contributed to the crippling of relations between the two countries. Religion and regional factors have also influenced India-Pakistan relations over the years. Both the countries have also repeatedly got caught in a 'zero sums / score card' in their dealings with major powers. In the past, India - Pakistan had had the tendency to cost off at the slightest provocation. Solution to bilateral disputes still remain elusive, and internally both the countries have to contend with the challenging task of nation building.⁵

Pakistan and India are the major concerns of each other's foreign and security policies. The bilateral interaction is often marred by distrust and an antagonism rooted in the historical legacy, the conflicts that developed at the time of the partition of sub-continent in 1947. The disagreement between Pakistan and India on the power structure in South Asia has also made it difficult for them to harmonize their foreign policies. India aspires for a commanding role in South Asia, and its leaders argue that a strong and powerful India capable of projecting its power in and around the region is a guarantee of South Asia's security and stability⁶ Pakistan is averse to an India-dominated regional power structure, and strongly believes that it can not serve as a basis for durable peace in South Asia because it conflicts with the national aspirations of the smaller states of the region. Pakistan's resolve to protect and promote its national identity is as pronounced as is Indian determination to assert its leadership in the region. This buttresses the deep-rooted ~~distress~~ and acrimony in their relations. The relations between these two Asian countries, thus, have been a source of dismay to the rest of Asia and Africa, to the Commonwealth and to many other countries of the world. Why could not these two

countries, whose geography dictates friendly relations, live like good neighbours during their existence as independent nations? A period of initial misunderstanding and suspicion might not have been unexpected, but it is highly distressing that even today there is much ill feeling, tension and distrust between them. India as the bigger neighbour probably could show a little moderation in her attitudes towards Pakistan. But unfortunately, many Indians continue regarding Pakistan as a "tragic" mistake which might still be corrected, at least as far as East Bengal is concerned.⁷

No denying of the fact that neighbours have quarreled and compromised in contemporary international relations. France and Germany, Iran and Iraq, India and its neighbours namely Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Russia and China, China and Japan etc. are some of the notable examples. More than this, the erstwhile opponents have sought unification. The unification of Vietnam and Germany are its glaring examples. It is being speculated that the Koreans are also involved in such an exercise. Besides, the present international environment is marked by growing regional and global co-operation. But these healthy and helpful trends have little repercussion on the growing antagonism between India and Pakistan. It has survived for 55 years and reconciliation between them still remains remote. The two neighbours – India and Pakistan, though are parts of one civilization and represent the same culture and history of the Indian sub-continent, Pakistanis have however, contested this position.⁸ P.N.Dhar has rightly remarked that "conflict with India will continue till Pakistan becomes a normal nation-state without any messianic pretensions."⁹ They are the two big countries of South Asia, number one and two, but poorest ones in the world. Apparently, friendship, understanding, coordination, consultation, collaboration and cooperation between them would have not only served their interests best but also that of other South Asian countries. But as ill luck would have it, the protracted conflict syndrome between them has cost both of them heavily and served no purpose. They have been forced to divert their vast and valuable resources towards defence requirements retarding their most urgent social and economic development. Air Marshal (Retd.) Asghar Khan admitted that throughout its existence, Pakistan "fought four wars with India without clear objective."¹⁰ The noted Pakistani columnist, Altaf Gauhar argued that the four wars in 1947-48, 1965, 1971 and 1999 were fought under one assumption: India was

coward and would not fight.¹¹ However, such a notion ought to have been dispelled now after Pakistan's defeats in all the four wars.

In the new international environment it is then clear neither India nor Pakistan can afford to ignore the winds of change. The promise and pitfalls of the prolonged quest for durable relations between India and Pakistan have now once again been brought to the fore with the resumption of talks between the two countries. There is need for more intensive dialogue between the two. They have to structure their relationship on the basis of widely accepted principles, and pressure them in as open and transparent a manner as possible. Both the countries stand to gain from regional peace and stability. New Delhi on its part has to lay to rest certain fears in the region that emanate from its sheer size, and reassure the countries in South Asia that it stands for their territorial integrity and development, and indeed, India has doing that.

Both India and Pakistan need to pave the way for a 'Multi-layered framework of cooperation'. The main principles that should guide the relations include mutual respect for each other's independence, sovereignty and integrity; and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. Even if both the countries are not able to make immediate breakthroughs, it is important that they restrain themselves from making provocative statements and/or taking provocative actions.¹²

From the above analysis, it is clear that South Asia as a region has two important characteristics. First, it is Indo-centric in character. Both geographically, and in terms of socio-cultural continuities and economic infrastructure, India occupies a central place. The other countries of the region, like Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, and others have individually and separately more in common with India than with each other. The second characteristic of the region is its asymmetric and hierarchical power structure. India occupies a dominant power position. In population, economic resource base and growth potential, military strength and viability of constitutional, political and administrative structure, India is far superior to any one of its neighbours, or even to all of them put together. These two characteristics in conjunction, make India the proverbial Big Brother in South Asia with all its negative connotations. It generates legitimate and understandable, although often exaggerated, apprehensions among India's neighbours vis-à-vis

New Delhi. It makes the former feel insecure and uncomfortable in the company of such a giant neighbour. Interstate tensions have often been generated as a result of such feeling. It should, however, be kept in mind that this very fact of India's centrality is not inherent in a situation of natural hierarchy of power. On the contrary, endeavours to impose an artificial balance in such a situation may bring about instability and strife. It has seldom been realized by scholars as well as statesmen, particularly of the western world that South Asia is a region where such a dynamic situation prevails. Developments in the region since 1944 have repeatedly demonstrated that conflict has resulted from the efforts to blur and distort the natural power-hierarchy in the sub-continent.

No nation in the present world, therefore, can live in total isolation. In pursuit of one's own national interest, independence, survival and development, an interaction takes place among and between nations which marks the characteristic of the present international system and other subordinate state systems. The international system was also dominated by the Super Powers whose major aim was to increase their "sphere of influence" in all parts of the globe. The subordinate state systems such as South Asia, South East Asia, Middle East Asia, Africa and Latin America were found rife with regional conflicts and wars largely rooted in their historical, territorial and psychological claims. To be contributory to their global interests.¹³

Since India and Pakistan are situated in South Asia – a subordinate state system – their conflict and belligerent relationship since their becoming independent in 1947 is a grave matter of concern. The pre-partition hostility between the Muslim Leagues and the Indian National Congress was found to have determined not only the present state of enmity between India and Pakistan but the contours of their motivations, perceptions and strategies.¹⁴ Thus, the mistrust, antagonism and fear between the two successor states of the British Raj persisted even after the partition of the sub-continent and the emergence of two independent states.¹⁵

Indeed, India is a unique country. In ancient times, this part of the world remained a centre of remarkable civilization reference of which are available on the Vedic literature. Rig Veda, the most ancient written scripture in the world contains

such a heightened knowledge about spirituality, ethics and social system that in the present times even the most advanced nation cannot claim to reach that level. In United India, a vast region with several countries of the modern world, around his country were parts of only one country.¹⁷

Pakistan also is the second-largest nation of the South Asian sub-continent. It lies in the Indus River Valley, between the mountainous border with Afghanistan through which comes the famous Khyber Pass – on the north-west, and on the south east, the great Indian Desert and the Rann of Kutch. Long a band of transition between the rugged steppes of Inner Asia and the plenteous plains of India, Pakistan is today a nation caught between the legacy of a glorious imperial past and the project image of an ideal theocratic future. Its goal to become an exemplary modern religious state, a truly Islamic republic, is affirmed by the name of Pakistan, given by the Muslim Poet Muhammad Iqbal in 1930, means "land of the Pure."

The cultural heritage of the people of Pakistan can be traced back to the earliest – known urban society in South Asia. Excavations of the ancient cities of Harappa and Mahenjadaró, discovered in 1922, have revealed an impressive civilization dating from 3000 B.C. Distinctive for its knowledge of hydrology and its use of irrigation to cultivate the valley with the rich water of the Indus River, it developed an extensive commerce with the emerging civilization in the Mesopotamian Valley to the West. This civilization survived for 1,500 years. Patterns of agriculture, craft and commerce have evolved in this land over many centuries. They persist in the social and economic life of Pakistan to this day.

Islam, a religious faith based upon the teachings of the prophet Mohammed in Arabia during the seventh century A.D., as revealed in the Koran, also has a long heritage in Pakistan. The indigenous peoples were converted to this vibrant new faith during the eighth century by invading prince from the west and by wondering Sufi Mystics, whose spiritual discipline and religious teachings attracted their veneration and submission to the will of Allah. This faith has strengthened in the fabric of the people's lives through the centuries, and was reaffirmed as the basic for the creation of Pakistan as an Islamic republic in 1947.

The invasion of Mughal princes, who marched their conquering forces across the northern plains of South Asia to the Bay of Bengal during the 16th century, marked the period of greatest glory in the heritage of the Pakistani people. The Mughals were militant Turks refined by the elegance of Persia and energized by their Islamic faith. Akbar (1556-1605), the greatest of these emperors, is remembered for the opulence and splendor of his court, for the far-reaching administrative control of his empire, and for elaborate building projects, which still stand as massive tribute to his commanding wealth and intellect. Although it declined in its later years, the Moghul dynasty continued to dominate northern South Asia until the middle of the 19th century, when it fell to British Colonial rule.¹⁸

Thus, the states of South Asia is "a set of closely related beliefs or ideas, or even attitudes characteristic of a group of community."¹⁹ It "provides the believer with a picture of the world both as it is and as it should be²⁰ For States in South Asia, particularly for India and Pakistan, thus, the ideological foundations of their respective states were inherent in the very nature of the movements that led to their emergence. But these related beliefs or ideas disappeared and shadows of disbelief, mistrust came up due to man made problem; due to lack of tranquility and disturbance in domestic political scenario; the legacies of colonial rule, the post independence strategies and processes of nation and state-building; the creation of an unnatural and absurd state system; incomplete demarcation of state boundaries; the unresolved question of the status of ethnic and religious minorities - forced the countries looking each with mistrust, suspicion and fear.²¹

The essence of the Indian National Congress's (INC) ideological disposition, towards the Indian sub-continent, since its inception in 1885 could be placed as follows in this regard. The INC held the view that in an amazingly diverse place like the subcontinent, political separation based on any element of this diversity would open a Pandora's box. It strove to accommodate all such diversities within the broad parameters of Indian nationalism symbolizing 'unity in diversity'. The Muslim League led by Mohammed Ali Jinnah differed with the position of INC. Its basic argument was that Hindus and Muslims constituted two different nations and as such require two separate states. Consequently, only separate states for the two communities would ensure justice to the Muslims who would otherwise be overwhelmed by the

Hindu majority. The INC completely rejected the nation formation theory but accepted partition reluctantly as the price to pay to get rid of the British colonial rule and the intransigent Muslim League.²²

India's independence in 1947 and the process of decolonisation of Asia and Africa thereafter induced a desire among the newly independent states to forge a unity for reconstruction of the nations ravaged by Western colonialism. The Indian leadership even before the dawn of independence had the visions of world peace and an equitable international order on the edifice of Afro-Asian unity. The Indian National Congress (INC) spearheading the struggle for Indian Independence dreamed of an Asiatic Federation. The All India Congress Committee (AICC) in its Bombay session held in July 1921 took note of a resolution passed by the citizens of Bombay in April 1921 urging AICC 'to promote feelings of amity and concord with neighboring States with a view to establishing goodwill and sympathy to formulate a clear and definite foreign policy for India.'²³ Realising that Britain was using India's position and resources to promote its imperialistic designs in India's neighborhood, the AICC in a historic declaration in Delhi on November 4-5, 1921, affirmed –

- i) that the present Govt. of India in no way represent Indian opinion and that their policy has been traditionally guided by considerations more of holding India in subjection than of protecting her burden.
- ii) that India as self-governing country can have nothing to fear from the neighboring states or any state as her people have no design upon any of them, and hence no intention of establishing any trade relation hostile to or not desired by the people of such states ; and
- iii) the people of India regard most treaties entered into with the Imperial Government by neighboring states as mainly designed by the latter to perpetuate the exploitations of India by the Imperial power, and would therefore urge the states having no ill will against the people of India and having no desire to injure her interest to refrain from entering into any treaty with the Imperial Power.²⁴

Anti-imperialism became the cornerstone of the foreign policy of Congress and provided an opportunity for the states of Asia to come together. Gandhi observed that the common lot, no less than territorial homogeneity and cultural affinity, was bringing the Asiatic races wonderfully together and they seemed determined to take their fullest share in the world politics.²⁵ The INC saw the emergence of a great Asiatic Federation as inevitable and participation of India in the union of the oppressed nationality of Asia as the precursor to the freedom of every nationality to bring about world peace. The Congress world view maintained that no nation on earth can really be free when other nations are held in bondage.²⁶

India's role in the fight against imperialist repression was pivotal since she was considered to be the key-stone of the arch of imperialism. The leadership of Indian National Movement before and immediately after Indian independence set before themselves an agenda for regional cooperation and unity in Asia. The INC nursed a sense of grievances that despite India's importance and leadership against colonialism, India could not secure its rightful place as a member of the Security Council of the United Nations on account of its colonized states. The Congress working Committee (CWC) in July 1945 adopted a resolution expressing strong resentment against the position allotted to the smaller nations in the United Nations Organisation. The Committee observed that the great powers not only dominated and completely controlled the new organization but were placed above and beyond the law, they had themselves helped in framing. In accordance with its perception of India's role in national and international fields, the CWC felt that India must attain the status of an independent and sovereign state, having a place in the highest councils of nations, and in a position to contribute to the maintenance of peace, security and freedom.²⁷

It was in keeping with this grandiose image of India that the INC considered India to be the central actor in Asia. Thus, Jawaharlal Nehru, observed that 'whether one talked of the Middle East, of South East Asia, of China, all impinged on India and all dependent on India economically, politically and strategically. They could not help looking at India and India could not help looking them. In the modern world it

was inevitable for India to be the centre of things in Asia."²⁸ Nehru also advocated the creation of a South Asian Federation of India, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and Burma.²⁹

The circumstances in which India and Pakistan became independent did not prove conducive to any harmonious economic and political relations between the two countries. Many issues which arose after partition had generated so much heat that both had fought four major wars. A number of disputed issues between India and Pakistan such as Siachen Problem, Kashmir problem, Canal water dispute, Kutch dispute, Sino-Pak axis, Pak-US relations, nuclear explosion by India, Pakistan's nuclear policy have all contributed to the prolonged strained relations between the two countries. Of course, the uneasy atmosphere prevailing in the interaction of the two countries has always been helpful for politicians of the two countries to fulfill their lust for power and strengthen their unstable political positions.

Because of her size, population and economic inequalities, India is conscious of her strategic importance in Asia in particular and in the world in general. India's economic structure is certainly superior to that of Pakistan, taking into consideration her natural resource reserves as also the manufacturing and processing capacity. Besides, a number of other factors indicate that Pakistan is potentially a weaker nation than India. The industrial base of Pakistan is too narrow to withstand a viable commercial exchange with India. These factors came to the fore in view of the fact that Pakistan is not only observed with her inferiority but desperately tried to overcome some of these handicaps by building up a new balance of power in South Asia with the aid of her western allies.

The pre-partition hostility between the Muslim League and the Indian National Congress was found to have determined not only the present state of enmity between India and Pakistan but the contours of their motivations, perceptions and strategies.³⁰ The "Sub-continent was split by mutual consent, but the mistrust, antagonisms and fear between the two successor states of the British Raj persisted."³¹

Partition and the basis on which Pakistan was carved out of united India in 1947, instead of setting them in their own status-quo exposed to them the

explosive quality of religious symbols as the basis of nation-building in converting the group rivalry before partition into international rivalries in the sub-continent.³² Lack of reconciliation to the partition and a settled fact on the part of India³³ and Pakistan's advocacy of a two-nation theory³⁴ explain largely the hostile relationship between the two countries.

The perception of India's agony over the partition in Pakistani rulers created the impression that India would one day achieve its wish to reunite all its lost territories. As President Ayub Khan once stated: "The Indian leaders have often stated that their true border extends from the Hindukush mountains to the Mekong river, that is to say, wherever the influence of Hinduism existed in the past."³⁵ This type of India's ambitious nationalism may not be without any basis. There was a strong current of opinion in India, totally disregarding the fact of partition as a grave blunder.³⁶ Many Indians felt that "the creation of Pakistan was a tragic mistake which might still be corrected, at least as far as East Bengal is concerned."³⁷ To this may be added India's disapproval of Pakistan's advocacy of the 'two-nation theory' based on religion. "It was perfectly clear", said Jawaharlal Nehru, "that it was quite impossible to divide it on the basis of separating religious groups on one side or the other."³⁸ To accept Pakistan's 'two-nation theory' would mean a collapse of the secularist policy on which the Indian Union rests and a reopening of the conduits of separatism through various religious sensitized groups.

Implicit in these two approaches was the assumption that secularism in the case of India and Islam in the case of Pakistan would help ensure political justice to their respective citizens. India and Pakistan, therefore, sought their ideological security in secularism and Islam respectively. In other words, these two states adopted not only different but also opposing strategies of state building, which by itself created certain tension in their bilateral relations. It was, perhaps, inevitable that Kashmir would become a symbol of this ideological tension that underlay the political foundations of the two states. Thus, Islamic ideology of Pakistan was reinforced by the Pakistani rulers as a shield against its geographical interiority and political nationalism.³⁹

The Founding Fathers of the INC included Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Parsees and Europeans sympathetic to Indian nationalism and its fulfillment in an

Indian Home Rule, more or less like Irish Home Rule. They were firm believers in Parliamentary Democracy of the Westminster Model. During the early years of the Congress it was in the good books of the British authorities and the European community in India. Its General secretary was Mr. A.O. Hume, a member of the Indian Civil Service who resigned in order to organize the Congress as a sort of Parliamentary opposition. This presumed a parliament with elected members, not Government nominees in a legislative Council packed with officials and their favourites. Congress passed resolutions for introducing the system of elections as in Britain and making the Legislative Councils representative of Indian public opinion. The next step would of course be to ask for the formation of Government by the elected representatives of the people as in Britain.

The British bureaucracy in India did not like this course of developments nor did the Indian Princes. To the British bureaucracy and the Indian autocracy was added to Muslim aristocracy led by Sir Sayed Ahmed Khan, later followed by the Aga Khan. The Muslim League came into existence with bureaucratic blessings in order to safeguard Muslim command interests as distinguished from Indian national interests. In its eyes Congress was an advocate of Hindu domination in succession to British. If Democracy was introduced its advantage would be reaped by the Hindu majority. The British bureaucracy equated Congress and Muslim League as equally entitled to consideration, though the one was inclusively India and the other exclusively Muslim. The bureaucrats went so far as to dub Congress a Hindu organization, even though it was presided over by Muslims and Parsis and Europeans as well as Hindus. They simply hated the idea of Home Rule for Indians as they hated it for Irishmen. There they pitted the Protestants against the Catholics, minority against majority, eventually dividing the country. Here the same game was started at the provincial level by Lord Curzon before the Muslim League was founded. The storm of protest against the partition of Bengal led to its reversal, but the ending of the Partition of Bengal was also beginning of the Separate electorate system with the same object; dividing the people instead of dividing their house land. Yet Congress had to swallow it. Otherwise the British would have refused to introduce an elected legislature as a prelude to an elected Government in the provinces, much less at the Centre. No one could at that time think of Non-

Cooperation and Civil Disobedience as a means to Swaraj. Congress was wedded to constitutional methods. Those who disagreed resorted to violence and dreamt of a revolution.

Mr. Jinnah was a Congressman like his mentor, Dadabhai Naoroji. But when separate electorates were introduced he was forced to stand as a candidate from a muslim constituency while his Hindu and Parsee and Christian fellow Congressmen stood from non-Muslim constituencies. In order to ensure his success he became a member of the Muslim League without sacrificing his Congress membership. This was the case with other politicians similarly situated. When questioned he replied, "I am in the Congress because it represents the national interests of India. And I am in the Muslim League because it represents the communal interests of the Muslims of India". This explanation was accepted by both the parties. Thanks to his mediation and that of Tilak the two parties came to sign a Pact at Lucknow in 1916. Congress conceding weightage to the Muslim minorities in the non-Muslim-majority provinces and the League conceding weightage to the non-Muslims in the Muslim – majority provinces. The term 'Hindu' was not used in the Montagu – Chelmsford Reforms which incorporated the system of weightages reached at Lucknow. At that time nobody realized that Congress had signed a Pact on behalf of the non-Muslims as the League had signed one on behalf of the Muslims. And therefore Congress had become a non-Muslim body. In fact, Congress was in a hurry to win Swaraj by constitutional means at the end of the first Great War. It had to swallow the system of weightages, not knowing that it could no longer claim to represent the Muslims if it represented the non-Muslims only. After some fifteen years the term 'non-Muslim' has substituted by the term 'General' in response to protests by the Hindus and others who did not like to be described in a negative fashion by bringing in the Muslims as the principal community. But the new term also created the illusion that those who were elected from the 'general' constituencies represented the inclusive interests of all citizens irrespective of ~~caste or creed.~~

Congress had inadvertently lost something and the Muslim League had artfully gained something. In order to retrieve this loss, Congress set up Congress Muslim candidates in every province and at the centre. This was not contrary to the

provisions of the Pact of 1916. Mr. Jinnah who meanwhile drifted apart, could not charge Congress with a breach of contract. But when he found that Congress Muslims had won numerous seats and on the strength of their majority formed North-West Frontier Province in addition to occupying Ministerial positions in several other provinces he felt himself cheated by Mahatma Gandhi, his old friend and fellow Gujarati Barrister. At one time Jinnah happened to be the President of the Home Rule League and Gandhi an office-bearer under him. So, Jinnah invented the formula: 'The Muslim League alone represented the Muslim of India.' It followed that the Congress Muslims did not represent their community and therefore had no right to form a Government in the North-West Frontier Province nor to be Ministers in any other province. He expected a new Pact to this effect between Congress and the Muslim League as a condition precedent to any change at the Centre. After excluding the Congress Muslims from its quota, Congress was also expected to observe the principle of weightage in the composition of all elected Governments. Originally it applied to the elected legislature only. A third requirement was the recognition of Muslim League minority Veto inside the Governments, if the Congress majority decision did not suit it.

The British had no hand in the formulation of these undemocratic demands. They did not insist that Congress must accept them. But they did not insist that the two leading parties must come to terms prior to a transfer of power. Jinnah then had a veto on any plan to transfer power at the Centre to an elected majority of Indians including Congress Muslims, Sikhs, Christians and Parsees. No plan would be acceptable to his party as the only party of Indian Muslims unless Congress surrendered to his terms prior to a transfer of power. Now the first British plan was the Federation according to the Government of Indian Act of 1935. The Government Block in the Central Legislature was to be replaced by the Princes Block. The remaining seats were to be divided in such a way that Congress could never get an absolute majority unless it won a good number of Muslim seats, which was unlikely, or unless the Princes' Block consisted of the elected representatives of the people of princely states. The Princes backed out of their commitment to the Federal scheme. The Muslim League feared that Congress would push it into a hopeless

minority in the absence of the Princes' nominees. No amount of weightage would secure it a share of power. It would be doomed to a perpetual Opposition.

The British Raj would be succeeded by the Congress Raj and the Hindus would virtually be the dominant power. Fear and ambition drove Jinnah into the arms of the inventors of Pakistan, a separate, independent, sovereign state of the Muslims, exclusive of the non-Muslims. He added to the basic scheme the non-Muslim-majority province of Assam to make it balance 'Hindustan', going back to Lord Curzon's design of balancing Hindu-majority provinces by Muslim Majority provinces plus a province where the Muslims were not in a majority, plus the Centre divided into two, the one balancing the other. This improvement upon the doctrine of balance of power did not originate in a British brain. It was specifically made in India. Jinnah also made an amendment to the British policy of 'Divide and Rule'.

It was one thing to split up a State and it was another to split up a Nation, Jinnah, one of the top leaders of the Indian National Congress, discovered in his old age that the Hindus and Muslims were not two communities but two nations, co-existing under foreign rule. He held that upon the British withdrawal each nation should separately exist in its own homeland. He even went as far as to suggest an exchange of population. It was enough to rouse elements of suspicions and apprehensions between friends and neighbours of a thousand years. In consequence of its intensive propaganda the League won the 1946 elections on the Pakistan issue, defeating the Congress Muslims and Unionist Muslims and Krishak Praja Muslims all over India, barring a few exceptions when Congress insisted on including Mr. Asaf Ali in the Viceroy's 'Interim Government' and the British Prime Minister intervened in favour of Congress. Jinnah rejected the Cabinet Mission Scheme and his Muslim League embarked on a two-pronged 'Direct Action' against the British authorities and the Congress leaders. In practice, it was a call to the Muslim to resist Hindu Raj in succession to British Raj. Terrible riots broke out. Though the League was persuaded to join the 'Interim Government' by the Viceroy its aim was not to work but to wreck. Since the Cabinet Mission Scheme failed, the British fixed a deadline for withdrawal, leaving India united or divided as the parties desired. This ultimatum led to division by consent, not in the cry that Jinnah

contemplated but as modified by Nehru and Patel. Bengal and Punjab were also divided. Lord Curzon was dead, but his policy went marching on.

Thus Congress, an inclusive organization of Indians of all communities, got India as inclusive homeland of all Indians, minus those who accepted Pakistan as their homeland willingly or unwillingly. On the other hand, the Muslim League, an exclusive organization of Muslims only secured Pakistan, an exclusive homeland of Muslim where the Hindus and Sikhs and Christians were treated with discrimination, suspicion and hostility, just because they were 'unbelievers'. Though Jinnah personally made no discrimination on religious grounds the fanatical forces he had unleashed by his campaign for Pakistan and 'Direct Action' compelled him to make Pakistan an 'Islamic State' where Christians might live as Zimmies but idolators had either to flee, be converted or die. Almost the entire Hindu and Sikh population of West Pakistan was eliminated by massacre or fights. In East Pakistan some Hindus were killed and one-third of the Hindu population fled, while two-thirds remained, thanks to the friendly attitude of their Muslim neighbours. That unfortunate phrase 'exchange of population' gave a handle to the Hindu fanatics in India who took the law into their own hands and brought about a limited exchange of population by force. This was contrary to the Congress policy of a secular state. For a time it looked as if India was not a composite nation but a Hindu nation where no Muslim was safe. Gandhi fasted on this issue. He gained his object but lost his life at the hands of a Hindu fanatic. As long as Pakistan remains an Islamic monopoly the Hindu fanatics of India will go on threatening the Muslims, including Congress Muslims and Communist Muslims. In Pakistan, the Muslims themselves are under pressure of 'Islamisation' recalling the early days of Islam. While India is marching forward into the 21st Century Pakistan is marching backward into the 6th Century. She has lost all sense of Nationalism and Democracy. East Pakistan has broken away to preserve both.

The Indo-Pak relations have not yet become normal and are not likely to become normal until there is a reversal of the policy of exclusion on religious grounds. Even in Bangladesh where the Founding Fathers established a Secular State, there is a reaction. The Bengali Muslims fought the non-Bengali Muslims with Bengali Hindus as their comrades. Now all that comradeship has been forgotten. In

the result the Muslims of Bangladesh too have lost their battle for democracy. It will take Pakistan a long time to realize that Pakistan got her independence because India got hers, thanks to the struggle carried on by the Congress

Lord Mountbatten ceased to be the Crown Representative on the 15th August, 1947. On that day every Indian Prince was legally free to decide for himself whether his State would accede to the Dominion of India or the Dominion of Pakistan. He might refuse to accede to either Dominion and declare the independence of his State but in that case neither India nor Pakistan nor Britain would recognize it. There was no provision for another Dominion of the British Commonwealth. Any one could invade it as a No-Man's Land. Its safety lay in accession to either Dominion. The Dominion of its choice should be contiguous to it. Before the announcement of the Radcliffe Award it was everybody's knowledge that Kashmir had no common boundary with the Dominion of India and therefore the Maharaja had no other choice but accession to Pakistan. But when the Award was made public subsequently it contained a surprise.⁴⁰

Radcliff's award created in Pakistan an auger against India which it could never shed. Actually it has been steadily on the increase since it came into existence. Perhaps the Bombay barrister realized that his two-nation theory was untenable in the modern world. In his Presidential address to Pakistan's constituent Assembly in Karachi on 11th August 1947 Jinnah declares: "We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one state In course of time Hindu would cease to be Hindus and Muslim would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense but in the political sense as citizens of the state."⁴¹ Where was this idea of separation of religion from politics when he enunciated his two-nation theory in his demand for partition?

The mantra of Jinnah fell on the president of Pakistan. Like Jinnah he also firmly believes in the doctrine of Balance of Power. Formerly it was between the Hindu majority and the Muslim minority. Now it is between Hindu India and Muslim India or the Indian Union and Pakistan. To maintain this uneven balance he would call in the United States and China and the Islamic Block of Nations. India too had to train the balance in her favour by locking to the Soviet Union.

In fact, a half-century ago, Pakistan and India were large Asian nations facing severe problems of economic and political development. They shared a historic experience and at their birth were confronted with the task of charting a course in a fundamentally changing international system. It would thus have seemed that both countries would follow similar courses, and in fact early policy pronouncements by Pakistani leaders could almost as readily have been made by Indians.

Yet there were factors that led the two in different directions. Jawaharlal Nehru had been the brain and voice of the Congress Party in foreign affairs and when independence came he was able to translate his ideas of non-alignment, socialist orientation, and "Asianness" into Policy. The Muslim League, on the other hand, had had little foreign policy-beyond support for Islam, and even after independence, "Politically aware Pakistanis did have certain attitudes, of course, but these were vague and hardly constituted a basis for a foreign policy."⁴²

More important was, therefore, the factor of religion. The gulf that had emerged between Hindus and Muslims over the centuries had been intensified by British colonial policy and led the Muslim League to demand a separate nation. Islam would inform the foreign policy values of this new nation as a positive tie to other Muslim countries, but also in a negative sense of profound rivalry with India and fear of "Hindu domination."

Pakistan excluded the possibility of accommodation and acceptance of Indian regional leadership as a means of ensuring their own national well-being. After all, they defined their very rationale for existence as being "not India", and the heritage of conflict had been intensified by orders of magnitude through the horrors of partition. A forthcoming approach on the part of New Delhi might conceivably have assuaged these concerns, but the Indians chose a policy of firmness, the armed conflict that immediately developed over Kashmir was seen in Pakistan as proof that India did not accept the legitimacy of the Muslim nation. Kashmir became the focus of relations between India and Pakistan – as a quarrel over territory, but even more as the symbol of the struggle between Islamic Pakistan and Secular India.

Thus from its very inception, Pakistan was an "insecurity state" that perceived itself not only as small and disadvantaged but as on the defensive against a real and present threat, with its survival at stake. Constructing a force within South Asia to balance India was not feasible because India was more powerful than any combination of other states within the subsystem. Thus a central element of Pakistani policy had been to reach outside South Asia to find support that might offset Indian dominance within the system and to avoid bilateral arrangements that would put Pakistan in a one-on-one relationship with India.

Pakistan initially sought to offset geopolitics through religion; it was to be part of the universal community of believers, and as the first nation to be formed in the name of Islam felt that it should and would receive full support of the universal community of Muslims, the 'Ummah'. It was a matter of some convenience that most of the ummah lay to the west of Pakistan, lending the western part of the new nation depth vis-à-vis India.

Pakistan also saw itself as the vanguard of would-be many new nations coming to independence in the following years. Although little tangible support could be expected from the quarter for the time being, Pakistan derived satisfaction from its solidarity with Indonesia's independence struggle and with the Arabs in their resistance to the creation of Israel.

While Pakistan recognized the fact of overwhelming American pre-dominance in the emerging bipolar world of 1947, Pakistan looked seriously for strategic support from a source that was so distant and unclear. The Soviet Union was not uninteresting, but in Pakistan's, early days, Stalin's hard-line policies offered little entitlement and China was still in ill-defined chaos⁴³.

In spite of leaders like B. R. Ambedkar and M.K. Gandhi, India was still ruled by locally entrenched economic and political hierarchies based on caste, gender, class, region, and religion. In many areas, the zamindari system of feudal relations dominated a primarily rural society and included three broad classes; landlords, tenant farmers, and landless labourers. India lacked financial and technical resources, basic and modern industries, social services and enough food to feed itself. Most people worked in the informal sector, with little access either to

productive resources, land, labor, forest, and capital or to education and employment, and were not represented in decision making bodies. Women, children, and bonded laborers, as well as the Scheduled Castes and tribes, were ignored and therefore suffered disproportionately. The founding fathers expected the Central government to play the main role in solving these problems. Their goals were to unify the nation; next to build modern industrial state and promote economic growth, and in the course of those achievements, to reduce poverty and inequalities. Gandhi laid this out clearly. "Recall the face of the poorest and the weakest man whom you may have seen and ask yourself if the step you contemplate is going to be of any use to him In other words, will it lead to self-reliance?"⁴⁴

The new constitution outlined social and economic policies to rectify inequalities and shift power to the weaker elements. Five decades' worth of amendments and laws continued the assault against untouchables and bonded and child labour. And in a crucial way, the Indian civil service, pride of the British Empire, took on primary responsibility for translating all these new plans into reality. In assessing the degree of success that India achieved in meeting its founder's goals, we find not so positive result.

Even before India achieved its independence, Jawaharlal Nehru, one of the principal figures in the Indian nationalist movement, had devoted considerable thought to independent India. He had been a delegate to the international Congress against Colonial Oppression and Imperialism held in Brussels in 1927, and his deep involvement in anti-colonial nationalism profoundly shaped his views about the importance of keeping the country free from any form of external domination. Consequently, Nehru's approach was an effort to maximize India's autonomy in the conduct of foreign policy in the immediate post-war era. Nehru played an active role in promoting decolonization in Asia and also sought to limit the presence of the great powers on the continent. Even before India become formally independent he supported the Indonesian struggle against Dutch colonial rule and sharply condemned the Dutch attacks on Indonesia in 1947-48.

The scenario of the South Asian security has remained grim over the last half decade. To a large extent the agonizing historical past, the mutual interest, distorted perception and the uneasy relationship between India and Pakistan since

1947 are considered to be the cause of insecurity in South Asia. Developments in the region since 1947 have repeatedly demonstrated that conflict has resulted from the efforts to blur and distort the natural power-hierarchy in the sub-continent. With regard to the India-Pakistan conflict the partition of 1947 embodied the worst regain of colonial rule ; the post-independence strategies and the processes of nation and state building. Pakistan was a geographical absurdity which ultimately led to the creation of Bangladesh. The British knew that this was not a viable structure and the last viceroy , Lord Mountbatten, had predicted that East Bengal would break away from Pakistan in a quarter of a century.⁴⁵ What he could not, or did not, predict was that this separation, which came in 1971, would be preceded by an extremely tortuous process including a full-scale war between India and Pakistan. In addition, to this the British indecision, conscious or otherwise, regarding the status of the princely States of Hyderabad, Junagadh and Kashmir added significantly to the conflict potentially inherent in the Indo-Pakistan relationship. The concern expressed about peace in the subcontinent after the position by Harold Macmillan from the opposition benches in the British parliament on 10 July, 1947 clearly indicated that the British were not unaware of the consequences of their final act.

Thus, in the South Asian security complex, like most other post-colonial security complex India and Pakistan were to learn out of a conflict between the Muslim League and the Congress. Pakistan as a separate nation was not created until the departure of the British Raj in 1947. But it was created, especially by the 8 million people who migrated from central India at that time of partition, in to image of a staunch Islamic and glorious imperial past.

The partition of India was mainly a political decision taken by the British and agreed to by the all India Congress to meet the demands of the Muslims for a separate home land. In economic terms, the partition of India could not be as abrupt and complete as in the political sense because united India was an integrated unit on account of the economic policies framed by the British during their colonial rule. The division of the sub-continent, therefore, was bound to have a disastrous effect on the economics of both India and Pakistan. In the words of an observer, "the

economy of Indian empire was violently vivisected.⁴⁶ as a result of the partition of India into two separate, independent and a sovereign states.

On the other side, the Muslim League was formed in 1906 to represent the interests of the Islamic minority in British India in the movement for freedom from colonial domination. Its leaders became convinced through the years of struggle with the British Raj that their people would become oppressed and even destroyed in an independent, Hindu-dominant India. In 1940, the league voted to demand a separate state for the Muslim population of South Asia. Through the persistent, answering leadership of its president Mohammed Ali Jinnah, this objective was realized when the British Raj, in departing in 1947 set the mechanism, to establish for nations instead of one. Those districts under British control (about three-fifths of the subcontinent) where Muslims are predominant would become Pakistan; the districts where Hindus were in the majority would become India. The remaining areas – princely states not under direct British administrative control – would accede by their own determination to either country.

This division created two wings, a smaller but more populous East Pakistan, and a larger, dominant West Pakistan, separated by 900 miles of India. It also created a number of disputes over the appropriate process for occasion of the princely states of British India into the new nations.

Thus, the debris of the Partition of India in 1947 clouded India's relations with Pakistan. The pre-partition political conflict between the Indian National Congress and the All India Muslim League coloured the perceptions of the policy-makers of the two countries regarding each other's motivations and strategies. The Indian Leader's accepted partition, but not the two-nation theory, which was the basis on which Pakistan had come into existence. Most Indian leaders believed that with the withdrawal of British power from the sub-continent, the dust of the pre-Independence era would settle down and that India and Pakistan would be able to come closer and establish harmonious relations with each other. This found hope of the Indian leaders died by subsequent events. Nehru's dream of peaceful and brotherly relations with Pakistan went in vain. The Pakistani leaders perceived new India as a country that is out to undo partition and dismember their country. This perception dominated their foreign-policy thinking ever since 1947.

In a speech, Nehru said: 'In regard to Pakistan, the position has been a very peculiar one owing to the way Pakistan was formed and India was divided. And there have not only been all the upsets that you knew but something much deeper, and that is a complete emotional upset of all the people in India and Pakistan because of this. It is a very difficult thing to deal with a psychological thing which cannot be dealt with superficially There is no doubt at all in my mind that it is inevitable for India and Pakistan to have close relation, very close relations, some time or other in future. I can not state when this will take place., but situated as we are, with all our past, we cannot be just indifferent neighbours. We can be either rather hostile to each other or very friendly with each other. Ultimately we can only be really very friendly, whatever period of hostility may intervene in between because our interests are so closely interlinked'.⁴⁷

During the entire pre-colonial phase, security threats emanated principally from the states beyond the north western was the long history of the so-called Hindu period, approximately spanning 1500 BC to AD 1000, which was beset with invasions by the Aryans, the Achalmenians, the Greeks, the Parthianas, the Kushavs and the Huns. There was the relatively short Muslim period, stretching from the Turkish raids in AD 1000 until the mid-eighteenth century which was also characterized by invasions by the Turks, the Afghan and the Mughals who followed each other in close succession.

During this entire period there really was 'no theory of war and 'no system of defence', to speak of.⁴⁸ And, despite the introduction of cavalry during the Muslim period, there was no 'military tradition developed in India'.⁴⁹ The infantry was neither trained nor organized nor even equipped as a serious arms of war. There was just a multitude of people assembled without reference to rank and file.⁵⁰

It was only after the arrival of the British on the subcontinent, and with their final occupation of what is now South Asia, that a modern defence system was really organized and Britain established a network of client buffer states that constituted a protective barrier between other competing powers and the land approaches to India, and had not, whenever necessary, any such threat by having a military showdown beyond the borders of India.

India's independence in 1947 and the process of decolonisation of Asia and Africa thereafter induced a desire among the newly independent states to forge a unity for reconstruction of the nations ravaged by Western colonization. The Indian leadership even before the dawn of independence wore the visions of world peace and an equitable international order on the edifice of Afro-Asian unity. The Indian national Congress spearheading the struggle for Indian independence dreamt of an Asiatic Federation. The All India Congress Committee in its Bombay session held in July 1921 took note of a resolution passed by the citizens of Bombay in April 1921 urging AICC to promote feelings of amity and concord with neighbouring states with a view to establish goodwill and sympathy to formulate a clear and definite foreign policy for India.⁵¹

Anti – imperialism became the cornerstone of the foreign policy of Congress and provided an opportunity for the States of Asia to come together. Gandhi observed that the common lot no less than territorial homogeneity and cultural affinity was bringing the Asiatic races wonderfully together and they seemed determined to take their fullest share in world politics.⁵² The INC saw the emergence of a great Asiatic Federation as inevitable and participation of India in the Union of the oppressed nationalities of Asia as the precursor to the freedom of every nationality to bring about World peace. The Congress world-view maintained that no nation on earth can really be.. when other nations are held in bondage.⁵³

India's role in the fight against imperialist repression was pivotal since she was considered to be the key stone of the arch of imperialism. The leadership of Indian National Movement before and immediately after independence set before themselves an agenda for regional cooperation and Unity in Asia.

Freedom became thus one at the beacon lights and it remained so ever since India was under British rule, but had been struggling for freedom. Though freedom was earned on August 14 and 15, 1947, the price was too enormous to describe in human term. The country was partitioned into Bharat (India) and Pakistan, now two independent nations. After the departure of the British in 1947, the overall situation in the area – and indeed in the world – therefore radically changed necessitating the designing of a wholly new concept of national security.

Hence, India achieved independence under Independence Act, 1947 and so emerged two nation states carved out of the boundaries of the erstwhile British India. The country was divided, partitioned, rather vivisected on the basis of the two-nation theory on the basis of religion. After partition most of the people appear to have reconciled with secular India and have stayed back. During the exchange of population, i.e., Hindus to India and Muslims to Pakistan most of the Muslims stayed back in India and their population, who left Pakistan for India, were primarily not received as Hindus but as Pakistani refugees. Similarly, the Muslims from India to Pakistan were, basically and primarily not received as Muslims but as Indian refugees - Mohajirs, though the country was partitioned on the basis of two nation theory. Thus, the outcome of partition, so far as two communities are concerned, was a strange phenomenon. Both Hindus and Muslims became strangers in their own country. Since their birth, tensions began between them, dragging them into four wars. However, last war (1999), was most crucial in its consequences.

The British Raj would be succeeded by the Congress Raj and the Hindus would virtually be the dominant power. Gandhi would boss over Jinnah if he joined the Government. Fear and ambition drove Jinnah into the arms of the inventors of Pak, a separate, independent, Sovereign state of the Muslims, exclusive of the non Muslims. He added to the basic scheme the non Muslim majority province of Assam to make it balance 'Hindustan', going back to Lord Curzon's design of balancing Hindu majority provinces by Muslim majority provinces plus a province where the Muslims were not in a majority, plus the centre divided into two, the one balancing the other. This improvement upon the doctrine of balance of power did not originate in a British brain. It was specifically made in India. Jinnah also made an amendment to the British Policy of 'Divide and Rule'. When Gandhi called upon the British to 'Quit India' he said 'Divide and Quit'.

Pakistan and India met their crest with destiny as independent nations within twenty four hours of each other. In his very first statement as Prime Minister of Independent India, Pandit Nehru declared that 'we look upon the world with clear and friendly eyes. I bring today to my friends in Pakistan that same message. We have common consensus and friendship is the basic necessity.' The Independence of India and Pakistan signaled the beginning of the end of Western

Colonialism and the emergence of new nation states in much of Asia and Africa. Fifty years after the achievement of their independence, India & Pakistan, with 29 percent of the world's population, have made significant economic, social and political progress, but they continue to confront major challenges. In South Asia, there is a wide range of opinion on every issue relating to the evolution of India and Pakistan. Although the British wisely left their Indian colony peacefully in 1947, the violence that accompanied partition shaped the development of the two states and set the stage for four wars between them.

The emergence of new political leaders at the helm of affairs did not improve matters. They had no defence policy to speak of. Also, they had come to conclusion that in the post-independence situation in India it was not possible to continue to follow a forward policy in the north and have blue water navy in the South. The country simply did not have the means to do both. Poverty stricken and problem ridden India had, in their view, other priorities to judiciously use her unexploited resources. Furthermore, they had a different political goal, which was to contribute to the promotion of peace and welfare of mankind.⁵⁴ Certainly a commendable goal but hardly in consonance with the British imperial strategy of pursuing a forward policy was there but, the Indian political leaders viewed 'the Indian army and its leaders with, alarm, and suspicion' verging onto a 'deep rooted paransia'.⁵⁴ Post independence India thus neither had the power nor the political inclination, nor the military expertise to pursue a century old national security policy designed by Great Britain.

The global strategic environment too was hardly favourable. The post-world war II bipolar system had projected onto the international system two superpowers in a total state of confrontation, determined to absorb other countries into their spheres of influence. The situation between the US and erstwhile USSR and the newly independent countries was so asymmetrical, and the pressures so great that the latter were forced with the problem of maintaining their independence.

Though India, because of her 'gigantism', was more fortunate in withstanding such external pressures than many other newly independent countries, the refusal by the superpowers to accept, in the initial stages India's proclaimed determination

to feud for herself did not argue well for the establishment of a viable security policy.

The regional security environment had also changed considerable, from the time of the British. It had clearly become heated and unstable. On the Western flank, the new India had now to face an unfriendly and suspicious Pakistan with whom difficulties had surged over Kashmir – difficulties that finally exploded into a military conflict only a year after the independence of the subcontinent. On her northern frontiers – soon after the termination of the Chinese civil war – India had to reckon with the Chinese occupation of Tibet. A frontier, kept quiet by the British, had become alive and unstable. And, on her eastern frontier – an addition to unfriendly East Pakistan – India was confronted with a totally unstable Burma where the ongoing civil war between the central government and the different Communist and ethnic forces had generated a highly uncertain situation, the ramification of which could indeed be horrendous for eastern India where rumblings of discontent among the tribal groups were increasingly becoming visible already in the immediate aftermath of Indian independence.

In sum, dimensional external pressures on India were already building up at the time of independence, to which she had to respond. But since, the new political leaders were unable to take over the British mantle, and were unwilling to accept the British concept of defence strategy for the subcontinent, they had to design a new one to force national security problems - problems that stemmed essentially from the outside at the time

It is true that the paths and strategies of social, economic and political developments pursued in each of the South Asian countries were, in a general way, a continuation of the pre-independence 'inheritance'. The socio-cultural identities which were characterized by the factors of continuity and overlap defied the territorial boundaries of the new states. The economics were characterized by the simultaneous existence of dominant feudal and pre-feudal sorts of modes of production along with a marginal and, in some cases, entirely dependent modern sector. These economies were also fraught with strong tendencies of mutual competition and incompatibility owing to their differing growth potentials and directions of development. Politically, the British transferred power to broadly

similar sets of elites but soon the varying socio-economic infrastructure in each of the respective countries started asserting themselves and determining, to a large extent, the respective forms of polity and styles of politics in the various countries. This brought about significant changes in the composition of resting elites and political forces and, consequently, is the structure and dynamics of the political systems. The breakdown of the parliamentary experiment in Pakistan and the emergence of a competitive party system in Sri Lanka, as against the long innings of one party dominance in India, illustrate the point vividly.

It was inherent in the very composition of the freedom – seeking groups/movements which succeeded in India, Sri Lanka and Pakistan during 1947-8 that their respective paths and strategies of nation building could diverge significantly in several respects. There emerged in the South Asian Countries a clearer emphasis on particularistic, religious, ethnic and linguistic components of their respective social fabrics that on the secular and universalistic goals and tendencies in the nation-building processes. The emphasis has been on Islam and Urdu in Pakistan, on Buddhism and Sinhalese in Sri Lanka, on Hinduism in Nepal, on the different sects and varieties of Buddhism in Burma and Bhutan and on Islams and Bengali in Bangladesh. In India also, under the professed goal of secularism, secretarian forces have gradually become powerful in the political processes. As a consequence of these divergent developments, the politics of nation building in each of these countries has got entangled with the minority-majority dilemma. And owing to the socio-cultural continuities in the region, the resulting tensions and complexion have found easy and, at times, magnified reverberations across national boundaries. Intra-regional relations have naturally been affected by such reverberations.⁵⁵

While Partition was sought for and granted on the basis of what came to be called the 'Two Nation' theory and while subsequent Hindu-Muslims\ communal tensions in India and Pakistan have been cited in support of this theory and have been used by interested parties both within and outside the subcontinent to vitiate and embitter bilateral relations, between the two countries, in reality, the 'two nation' theory was the name, given by Jinnah to the 'two states' theory. The Muslim League leadership was to ambitious and adamant on having a state to itself over which it could preside unchanged. In particular, Jinnah's impatience and

idiosyncrasies were allowed to play a larger than life role by the British. This has now been documented.⁵⁶ The support provided to Jinnah by the Muslim officers in the British Indian Army and administration, who naturally had vested interests in reaching the heights of their careers in a new and separate Muslim State, still remains to be fully assessed and accounted for.⁵⁷

The seeds of Partition lay not so much in the so-called antagonism but in the narrow and selfish political interests of the Hindu and the Muslim power-seeking elites. The communal factor was emphasized by them in this power game which they were asked to play through political parties and electoral exercises. This input of the British political culture gradually resulted in communal and religious polarities in the pre-independence Indian political scene which were deftly escalated and exploited by the British rulers for the imperial governance of India. The British introduction of legislative measures, communal representation, administrative and educational policies, and the art of dealing with the freedom movements – all that has been aptly described as the British strategy of divide and rule made no insignificant contribution in making the partition finally inevitable. This communal malady did not subside with the creation of India and Pakistan and the withdrawal of British rule. It got transformed into Indo-Pakistan rivalries and conflict and became an excuse for the great powers' continued intervention in the subcontinent.

India-Pakistan relations, for most of the period since independence have been marked by confrontation with each other, resulting in an arms race, four unproductive wars and the wastage of their scarce resources on arms instead of using them for the developmental purposes to ameliorate the problems of the long-suffering people on both sides of the border.

Indeed, the partition of the Indian sub-continent in India and Pakistan was inevitable. But the organizing ideologies of India and Pakistan have created a clash of values which defy any solution to the conflict relations between the two. Consequently, South Asia has remained an unstable strategic environment. Indian foreign policy has operated under the challenge of hostile neighbours, particularly Pakistan and China, and in an international order which remained enmeshed in power politics which has kept the areas of confrontation alive rather than help ease them. India's concept of national security has, therefore, been based more an

external threats than an internal threats. She has had to constantly guard its core national values of survival, territorial integrity and political independence, secularism, democracy and economic well-being. Pakista has quite now and then made serious bids to subvert the values through wars, proxy war, sowing internal dimensions, and military alliances. India in its quest for security of the system and its core values, has had to embark on various strategic machinations and policy options which have characteristics of being reactive and defensive in nature.

The most critical component of South Asian regional cooperation whenever it becomes fully viable has to be a state of normalized relationship between the two major states of the region – India and Pakistan. In other words, South Asian regionalism presupposes an end to distrust between them. Keeping this fundamental reality in mind, we will analyse the inherent political contradictions that bedveil their relationship and see why it is unlikely that the situation will change for the better in near future.

The essence of Indo- Pak suspicion is political. In this connection three points need to be kept in mind. One, this suspicion originated in the Congress-Muslim League rivalry during the freedom struggle; two, the said rivalry was not communal in essence but it was given a communal appearance by the Muslim league to serve its own political interest; and three, after the partition, the said conflict resulted in two conflicting models of nation building with India's emphasis on secularism, democracy and federalism and that of Pakistan on Islam, authoritarianism and a centrally controlled administration. These two models have not only been mutually incompatible, but having been professed in two contiguous countries with the same socio- historica experience, with no natural boundaries, and with a record of conflictual relationship that developed immediately after independence over Kashmir, they have become patently antagonistic threatening each other's basic principles of state policy.

The Hindu – Muslim communal riots that accompanied partition of the sub-continent and the unprecedented two-way population movements that took place in the midst of violence have left deep scars on the national psyche of both India and Pakistan. It is estimated that about fifteen million Hindus and Muslims were involved

in these cross-national migrations. Of this, a little less than half were Indian Muslims who migrated to Pakistan. In Pre - 1971 Pakistan, they constituted about 10 percent of the population of Pakistan (20 percent after the secession of Bangladesh). Numerically they were not large enough to dominate Pakistan's politics, but the circumstances under which the state was created and the nature of pre-partition politics of the Muslim League earned for them a unique status and purpose which otherwise is denied to an immigrant community. Comprised of relatively more educated people, members of the Indian civil service and the Indian Army, noted business and, most importantly, leaders and sympathizers of the Muslim League which spearheaded the Pakistan movement, these immigrants constituted a political force to reckon with. It may be noted that many top leaders of the Muslim League were categorized either as "refugee" or "returnee". In this list were included no less important leaders than Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan. Among the industrial leaders of Pakistan many belonged to such business communities of western India as Memons, Khojas and Bohkas. In fact, about three-quarters of the so called "twenty two families" who are said to control Pakistan's economy are from outside Pakistan.⁵⁸

The Muslim immigrants who moved to Pak in search of a better home naturally had a stake in the viability of Pakistan. This explains their insistence on strengthening those forces which they thought would help build Pakistan's unity - Islam, Urdu, and the negation of federalism. The Muslim League, both on account of its immigrant leadership as well as the large following that it had among the immigrants, represented these theories of nation-building. Another party which also strongly advocated these ideas was Jamaat-ul-Islami, again a party having a large following among the immigrants. With the gradual decline of the Muslim League it was this party which attracted most of the disillusioned immigrant Muslim Leaguers.⁵⁹

The urban-rural dichotomy in Pakistan's politics also owed its origin partly to the immigrant factor. Because the immigrants contributed to a rapid urbanization of Pakistan, which is one of the fastest in the developing world, their influence in politics was considerable.⁶⁰ Shahid Javed Burki analyses this dichotomy in terms of a political cleavage between, what he calls "insiders and outsiders". The former were

the people who lived in the provinces before partition; they were generally rural and conservative in their outlook. The so-called 'outsiders' who came from India were more educated and urbanized and relatively more progressive. They were concentrated in urban areas – Karachi, Lahore, Hyderabad, Lyallpur and Rawalpindi. As a result, Pakistani society was 'born polarized'. The conflict between these two groups, writes Burki, "determined the course Pakistani society was to take on the road to economic and political development."⁶⁰

Closely related to these issues was the question of relationship with India. Although Theodore Wright, one of the leading authorities on Muslim politics in the subcontinent, has said that foreign policy is one area in which it is most difficult to establish a distinctive immigrant stance,⁶² still if one probes deeper into the theories of statecraft that were propagated by the immigrants we find their essential linkage with foreign policy in general and relations with India in particular. The birth of Pakistan was the culmination of Jinnah's fight for the recognition of his two-nation theory; therefore, the very survival of Pakistan as a nation-state demanded a conscious and continuous effort to keep that theory alive. It was this element which drove a sharp wedge in the relationship between India and Pakistan. Islamic Pakistan and secular India became anathema to each others for the simple reason that the very survival of the states depended upon an assertion of precisely those theories which had resulted in the partition, namely the two-nation theory based on religion versus the one-nation theory based on the territorial and historical concept of "Mother India."

Without going into the details of the origin and development of Muslim nationalism in India, it may be worthwhile to recapitulate in brief the major forces at work during the phase when Muslim separatism gathered Momentum.⁶³ The four important landmarks are the establishment of the All India Muslim League by Md. Iqbal, a Muslim poet and philosopher, to ventilate the idea of a separate homeland for the Muslims of Northwest India; the echo of the said sentiment in 1938 at the provincial meeting of the party in Sind; and finally the formal adoption of this demand by the Muslim League at its Lahore session in 1940.

An analysis of the evolution of Muslim separatism from the establishment of the Muslim League in 1906 through the creation of Pakistan in 1947 clearly reveals

that for political reasons and otherwise modernist Muslim leadership too resorted to communal tactics. According to Paul Brass, the elite Muslim felt threatened by the fast rising Hindu middle class and they therefore articulated their grievances in such a way that they would evoke a response from the Muslim masses. To achieve this goal the Muslim elites built Muslim national myths and images by referring to their glorious past and Islamic heritage.⁶⁴ This thesis, however, has been challenged on the grounds that the sense of Indian Muslim identity, distinct from the Hindu identity, was already existent in Indian society and easily discernible in the 19th and 20th centuries. It is, therefore, argued that it was not the elite leadership which led the Muslim masses but that the latter led the elites to speak in a particular language.⁶⁵ Whatever be the actual reality, the fact remains that the Muslim elites articulated the grievances of their coreligionists; their own material interests were at stake in the face of the challenges posed by an emergent Hindu middle class and they stood to gain politically from the provisions of separate electorates which the British Indian government had introduced.⁶⁶

The Muslim League leadership was not in the hands of orthodox elements. On the contrary, it was criticized by the Muslim clergy for its lack of religiousness.

What is ironic in the fact that the Muslim leadership was thoroughly westernized and secularist and had never claimed religious leadership while Mahatma Gandhi had always presented himself as a Hindu and, under his leadership, the Congress, in spite of its secular-socialist philosophy, had never projected the image of a golden or authentic organization. Furthermore, the more respectable ulema like Maulana Abul Kalam Asada and Maulana Hussain Ahmad Madani had irrevocably committed themselves to the congress, and other Ulemas like Maulana Abul Ala Mandolin and Mashriqi were implacably posed to the League and its irreligious leadership.⁶⁷

Even the mobilization of Muslim masses by the Muslim League was in response to the Congress decision of 1938 to launch "a movement of mass Muslim contact in order to bring them within the Congress fold on the basis of a socialist programme and thus to gripe the League out of existence."⁶⁸ Therefore, the league was practically devoid of any strategy to register the support of the Muslim masses.

But when the socialistic appeal of the Congress and its policy to register the support of the Muslim masses came, it was viewed as a political threat and the League, which feared to lose its only potential constituency, was forced to employ populist methods. Like the Congress it could have opted for progressive socio-economic policies. Indeed, Iqbal, in his letter to Jinnah in 1936, had pleaded for such in order to ameliorate the poverty of the Muslim masses and thereby bring them into the fold of the Muslim League. This was not done.⁶⁹ Instead, the League Leadership decided to make the religious sentiments of the Muslim masses in order to gain their support. But this could not be done without the help of the mullahs who had an inbuilt base among the Muslim masses. The league was obliged to give its commitment in Islam to win the support of the maulahs. It was this commitment which was enshrined in the two-nation theory propounded by Jinnah in 1940. The problem in India, said Jinnah, is not of any inter-commercial character but manifestly of an international one, and it must be treated as such. He concluded by saying : "It is extremely difficult to appreciate only our Hindu friends fail to understand the real nature of Islam and Hinduism. They are not religious in the strict sense of the word, and it is a dream that the Hindus and Muslims can ever evolve a common nationality....."⁷⁰

The ideology of Pakistan based on the twin pillars of Islam and the two nation theory, was the product of the political maneuverings of the Muslim elites; it had no intellectual content until the ulemas joined the Pakistan movement. No theoretical discussion, critical examination or detailed analysis of the bases of this ideology, or of the implications for the state it was to give birth to, were taken up. Between 1940 and 1941 Muslim nationalism was concentrated in a one word programme – Pakistan.⁷¹

The expedience of the political leadership of invoking the religious sentiments of the people so as to enlist their habitual obedience became a feature of Pakistani Politics which the political elites still find difficult to abandon. The slow pace of political development in the country and the rise of the military as a political force there can be attributed largely to this phenomenon. However, it must be noted that in the governance of the country there has been no alliance between the political and religious leaderships. The strategy that the former (including the military

leadership which has developed an almost equal claims to rule Pakistan) has followed is that of reaching the masses in the name of religion over the heads of the religious leadership. It is thus a case of state-sponsored Islam. To understand the implications of this strategy, we have to analyse the importance that each successive government has given to the Islamic ideology as the most important pillar to the nation building and also the states role in indoctrinating its armed forces in Islamic values and a sense of mission. The fact that India's freedom struggle at the end was jeopardized by a demand for partition of the country, the fact that India's independence was greeted by an unprecedented Hindu Muslim holocaust, the fact that India and Pakistan were engaged in armed conflict over the question of Kashmir almost immediately after independence, the fact that the *raison d'être* of Pakistan not only differed from that of India but tended to thrive at India's expense, and finally, the fact that India fought four of its five wars with Pakistan have made the latter the most important foreign policy factor in Indian politics. We have seen how the so-called foreign hand gimmick in Indian politics included Pakistan. Pakistan is alleged to be subversively operating in the communal riots in India, in the insurgencies in the north-east (before the dismemberment of Pakistan), then in Punjab for Khalistan and at present in the Kashmir valley.

Indeed, India and Pakistan lost the very first opportunity to work out a regional détente that came their way when the finishing touches were being given to the modalities for the transfer of power in the subcontinent. Of course, the responsibility was not theirs alone. At the time India became independent it was thought that since both the Indian and Pakistani armies had previously belonged to one common army under the overall British command the security of both the states could be enshrined in a regional security doctrine to which both the states should subscribe. It was probably with this idea in mind that Lord Mountbatten, the last Governor General of India, suggested a joint defence council consisting of both Indian and Pakistani representatives to take care of regional security. This was a tall order considering the amount of distrust that had generated between the two countries. W.H. Morris Jones, who was then serving in India as the Chairman of an advisory committee attached to Mountbatten, suggested that a modest beginning be made such as with cooperation in development research. The entire effort, however, was

rendered futile, as Jones reflected 36 years later, by Mountbatten's personal ambition which was to remain the Governor General jointly for both India and Pakistan. This Jinnah was unwilling to concede as he had himself stated a claim to the Governor Generalship of Pakistan. Morris-Jones writes : "Whatever little lingering hope there may have been for joint authorities was lost that day. Instead of using his influence to build initially modest institutions on which he had the capacity to be somewhat insistent, he preferred to stake everything on his continuing to preside at the top. Through that weakness he ensured that his personal loss became the more serious loss of the subcontinent."⁷²

Besides Mountbatten's personal ambitions and the deep-rooted distrust between the political leaderships of India and Pakistan was the element of the personal ambitions of military officers of both the countries that stymied a joint defence system for the subcontinent. These officers through their long association with the value system of the British military culture were imbued with professionalism and "were quick to apprise their new masters of their own expectations. Thus, early efforts at joint security arrangements came to nothing and the British were gradually phased out of senior command positions, removing the last link between the Indian and Pakistani armies. From that point on, defence questions have remained at or near the focus of attention for the two governments."⁷³

On the question of how much Pakistan influences Indian politics it must be conceded that nothing can be said in precise words. But the fact that the mainstream Indian Politics is heavily Pakistan – centric in its external dimensions speaks volumes for the relevance of the Pakistan factor in Indian Politics.

In Indian politics, the image of Pakistan is that of an enemy which is beset upon destroying the Indian state both by armed aggression as well as internal subversion. For the ultra-right Hindu chauvinists Pakistan is not only a symbol of humiliation inflicted upon Mother India, it also prevents India's ten per cent Muslims from identifying themselves whole hearted, with India. An Indian Muslim's loyalty to India is ever suspected in a Hindu chauvinistic eye and the existence of Pakistan next door is deemed to be its primary cause. For the left, Pakistan is an outpost of Western imperialism; both the nature of the Pakistani state as well as its external

linkages convince the left that it is a part of the capitalist conspiracy aimed at destroying the Indian state. The left considers the Indian state as a bourgeois state but not one which is beyond redemption. Congress rhetoric probably contributed some what to this thinking. Following the middle of the road policy the Congress party also views Pakistan as a symbol which tends to destroy the basic fabric upon which its image of India rests. It thinks that all the four tenets of India's nation building, namely, secularism, democracy, federalism and socialism are under constant threat from Pakistan either directly or indirectly. The cumulative effects of India's power, its image of itself, and the distrust syndromes that govern its relations with Pakistan and vice versa, has created mood in the region in which the smaller states tend to suffer from the uncomfortable feeling of "sleeping with an elephant", to borrow Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau's phrase describing Canada's status in relation to the super power America. Till the Bangladesh war this anxiety was not so pronounced as Pakistan was big enough to neutralize India's superiority to a considerable extent. But after the war as the power pattern in the subcontinent was restructured, India emerged as the pre-eminent power. This, invalidated its small neighbour hitherto persuade strategy and diplomatic manoeuvrability in the region; the psychological apprehensions roused by India as a "colossus" made them develop their links extra-regionally. Recent evidences have suggested that in the immediate aftermath of Bangladesh, Bhutan had proposed close regional interaction among itself, Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Sikkim ostensibly to meet any possible Chinese intervention. The fact that the idea was mooted by Bhutan whose foreign policy was dictated by India and the fact that the idea apparently did not materialise tend to suggest that probably both Nepal and Sri Lanka opposed the move for them it was not China but India which was the threat.

The upper class Hindus, who constitute the ruling class in India today, vehemently opposed the legitimate demands and aspirations of the Indian Muslims who wanted to preserve and foster their own way of life, based on their distinct culture and religion. But the Hindus would not allow this. The systematic suppression of Muslim culture as exemplified in the "Biddha Mandir" scheme of Wardha and the compulsory singing, by all school children, of the idolatrous song, "Bande-Mataram" which offended Muslim religious sentiments made the Muslims all the more

convinced that simple majority rule in India constituted a threat to their religion, culture and way of life.⁷⁶ This strengthened their demand for a separate state of their own. The Hindus could not look with favour upon this legitimate claim to self-determination of the Muslim. They did every thing possible to prevent its implementation. But when they realized that the demand for Pakistan was too strong, too sound to be ignored or suppressed they ultimately had to agree to partition. Yet they did it with a great deal of mental reservation on their part.⁷⁷ They believed that Pakistan would collapse; they did not expect it to be economically viable, nor did they think the Muslims were capable or experienced enough to administer a state. "It was their hope", as Sarwar Hassan has pointed out, "that it would collapse by itself and it was their plan to assist it to collapse."⁷⁸ Anybody who would make a dispassionate and impartial study of Indian actions and policies during the crucial months of 1947-48, following the partition, would be convinced that India was seriously aiming at the annexation of Pakistan. The occupation of Junagadh and the adjoining states; police action in Hyderabad; invasion of Kashmiri refusal to give Pakistan her financial dues and military equipment under the various agreement of the partition killing, looting and driving away of Muslims from India; encouraging the flight of capital and the migration of technical personnel, mostly Hindus, from Pakistan – all these steps were dictated by the overriding objective of annexing Pakistan. But thanks to the dynamic leadership of the Quad-e-Azam, Md. Ali Jinnah, these plans to undo the partition were frustrated.

Nevertheless, the designs to threaten Pakistan's existence as a sovereign state continued. Of these some outstanding instances may be cited. In 1950, the Muslims of West Bengal were massacred in large numbers. They were persecuted to such an extent that martial law had to be imposed in certain parts of West Bengal; still the Muslims continued to live in a state of perpetual fear and misery. To quote the words of Liaquat Ali Khan : "When the day starts they do not know what their fate would be at its end; when the sun sets they do not know whether they will live to see another day."⁷⁹ In the face of this grave provocation when large number of distressed persons were pouring into East Pakistan, there were only one or two minor riots in East Pakistan. Yet, the Indian Government threatened to take "Police action" in East Pakistan. "By the final week of March, 1950, whatever Delhi's

intentions", writes Ian Stephen, a former Editor of the Statesman "war had nearby come; the two countries were within a hair's breadth of it. Troops had been moved on only in Bengal but more perturbingly in the Punjab. India's armored division, to which no real Pakistani counterpart existed, was pushed forward in a way which threatened Lahore."⁸⁰ This grave situation was saved by Liaquat Ali Khan who rushed to New Delhi. His visit resulted in the signing of the famous Liaquat - Nehru Pact which aimed at giving protection and certain fundamental safeguards to the religious minorities in the two countries.

The communal killings, the Partition and the utter chaos of those years were regarded by most national leaders of India as their failure, but this also created a degree of mental antipathy towards the Muslim League. It may or may not be historically correct to blame the Muslim League entirely for the communal situation that developed in India in the mid-forties; but the reality that affected Indian policies towards Pakistan was not what in actual fact the Muslim League's share in the catastrophe might have been, but what the leaders of India perceived to be the role of the Muslim League (and later of Pakistan) in the sub-continent.

It is necessary here to deal with one of the continuing myths about Indian attitudes to the Partition. The occasional declaratory statements made by the leaders of the Indian National Congress during 1940-46 on the essential unity of India have often been cited by publicists in Pakistan as evidence of Indian Leader's mental reservations in accepting the partition, the mention of the ultimate goal of Indian unity in the Congress resolution of June 1947 accepting the Mountbatten Plan has also been quoted as evidence of Indian leaders not being reconciled to the partition.⁸¹ In retrospect, however, we feel that whatever might have been the depth of the feeling against the partition in the early years, effective opinion in the Congress, had not only reconciled itself to the partition idea by the end of 1946, but had in fact begun to regard partition as "a goodriddance."⁸² The most significant pointer in this regard was the public controversy between Abul Kalam Azad on the one hand and Govind Ballabh Pant and Vallabhai Patel on the other regarding the relative merits of the plans presented by the Cabinet Mission and Lord Louis Mountbatten.⁸³ To hard-headed Congress leaders like Nehru and Patel, the retention of a strong centralized authority in a divided India was an infinitely better choice than

the only other that was available; a loose Indian confederation in which the Muslim League and the Princes together would be able to prevent any effort by the Congress to mould in its own way the country's domestic and foreign policies. If some declaratory statements were still made regarding the laudability of the objective of Indian unity, they may well be regarded as the normal attempt that all politicians make everywhere to make a vital change of policy look as consistent with the past as possible by the expression of pious hopes and platitudes. If the Indian leaders had felt as strongly about the division of India as the leaders of some other divided nations feel about theirs, the prevention of the consolidation of Pakistan could have become the first item on the list of Indian foreign policy priorities. It is worthwhile in this connection to quote from two of the early speeches of the two men who made Indian policies although in both of the statements, made within the first few months after freedom, the goal of reunion is mentioned as a vague and distant possibility, the operative parts of both were meant to reassure Pakistan and allay any fears about India that might have existed there :

Patel said at Rajkot on 12 Nov. 1947 : I bear Pakistan no ill will. leave us alone, to pursue our own salvation, and stop meddling with our affairs in place, like far off Tripura. We shall then settle down to our respective destiny. May be, after we have become prosperous, they themselves will awaken to the need for reunion in the interest of both. It is neither our business nor our interest to force a reunion. We only wish to be left alone.....⁸⁴

Nehru declared at the Aligarh Muslim University on 24 Jan. 1948 : Pakistan has come into being rather unnaturally, I think. Nevertheless, it represents the urges of a large number of persons. I believe that this development has been a throw back, but we accepted it in good faith. I want you to understand clearly what our present view is. We have been charged with desiring to strangle or crush Pakistan, and to force it into a reunion with India. That charge or many others is based on fear and complete misunderstanding of our attitude. I believe that for a variety of reasons it is inevitable that India and Pakistan should draw closer to each other or else they will come into conflict. There is no middle way, for one have known each other too long to be indifferent neighbour. I believe indeed that in the present context of the world India must develop a closer union with many other

neighbouring countries. But all this does not mean any desire to strangle or compel Pakistan. Compulsion there can never be, and an attempt to disrupt Pakistan will recoil to India's disadvantage. If we had wanted to break the Partition? It was easier to prevent it than to try to do so now after all that has happened. There is no going back in history. As a matter of fact, it is to India's advantage that Pakistan should be a secure and prosperous state with which we can develop close and friendly relations, if today, by any chance, I were offered the reunion of India and Pakistan I would decline it for obvious reason I do not want to carry the burden of Pakistan's great problems. I have enough of my own. Any closer association must come out of a normal process and in a friendly way which does not end Pakistan as a state, but makes it an equal part of a larger union with which several countries might be associated.⁸⁵

It is not the non-acceptance of the Partition, but the terms of its acceptance which created a real problem to the leaders of India. The partition had become necessary because a part of the body of India had become diseased and the only way to preserve the health of the rest was to perform a major operation. Pakistan was by definition a less modern state; the Muslim league a reaction only and medieval party. A perusal of Nehru's writings on the Muslim League, both in *An Autobiography* and *The Discovery of India*, would reveal an image of the organization and its leaders which could not have created respect for it. As early as April 1940, a month after the Lahore Resolution was passed by the League demanding two sovereign states in India based on the theory of two-nation, Nehru had said that though he could not regard the Hindus and Muslims as two nations, he did regard those who talked in this vein as belonging to a different nation with whom we could not live together.⁸⁶ The course that Pakistan's domestic and foreign policies took after freedom further deepened this feeling, the increasing dependence on the collaboration with the West, the eagerness to befriend all India's adversaries,⁸⁷ the emphasis on religion in the state ideology of Pakistan, the gradual collapse of democracy in Pakistan, the rise of a military regime in its place, the denial of equal rights to the minorities in the Constitution, and the one track devotion to the cause of limiting and curbing India – all appeared on the continuation

of a long story which had begun to unfold itself in the early decades of this country.⁸⁸

It is also necessary to point out that the acceptance of this view of Pakistan by some other countries and the condemnation of Pakistan in some circles perhaps further strengthened the belief in the correctness of the assessment of Pakistan. The main point to be noted is that though the partition was accepted by Indian leaders without mental reservations, there was, in their acceptance of the partition, an inherent aversion to any close or friendly relation with a leadership which had led the people of Pakistan "astray and thrown the process of history" backward.

As against their aversion, it must be noted that there also existed, in the minds of Indian leaders, a belief that Indians and Pakistan constituted the same people and that in the long run India and Pakistan were bound to develop close or intimate relations. They were, therefore, genuinely interested in avoiding any situation which might adversely affect the people of Pakistan. It was not possible for Indian leaders to develop any xenophobia in relation to Pakistan.

The Partition of India was mainly a political decision taken by the British and agreed to by the All India Congress to meet the demands of the Muslims for a separate homeland. In economic terms, the partition of India could not be an abrupt and complete as in the political sense because united India was an integrated unit on account of the economic policies framed by the British during their colonial rule. The division of the sub-continent, therefore, was a demand to have a disastrous effect on the economics of both India and Pakistan. In the words of an observer, "the economy of Indian empire was violently vivisected"⁸⁹ as a result of the partition of India into two separate, independent and sovereign states. Since the sub continental economy had been developed as a single economic unit, the division of Pakistan and India were impelled to enter into some kind of arrangement which could affect the sustenance of their respective economies. Immediately after independence, the two countries signed a standstill agreement under which goods moving from one country to the other would be exempted from customs duty, and, in fact, what amounted to a customs union between the two countries was set

up.⁹⁰ This, however, was an interim arrangement. It lasted only three months following which the two countries became locked in a prolonged "tariff war."

The communal situation had become steadily worse since the Direct Action Day of the Muslim League in August 1946, when it was known that India was to be partitioned on communal lines, minorities in both the Muslim and the Hindu majority areas began to leave their homeland and to migrate to the areas where their community would be in majority. The problem was made extremely complicated when it was realized that in the Punjab almost half the Sikhs would be left over in Pakistan. The Sikhs in the West Punjab were being pushed out by the Muslims even before June 1947 when the Mountbatten scheme of partition was announced. Afterwards they started pushing out the Muslims from East Punjab. During August and September the two Punjabs had almost entirely driven out their minorities although it was brought about at an immense cost in human suffering, material loss and unmentionable barbarities. In the Punjab, the minorities problem ceased to exist as well as in the Frontier Province, Baluchistan and Sind. In Bengal, however, there was no such total exchange. From time to time communal tension disturbed the peace of the two Bengals but it reached dangerous proportions at least on two occasions, once after the devaluation of the Indian rupee in 1949 and the consequent trade war between the two countries and again during the Press War of 1951 which was followed by certain troop movements in both countries. The last spurt of movement of minorities in either direction came just before the introduction of the passport system between the two countries, but on this occasion it was caused not by any large scale action undertaken by the majority community but only by a fear in the mind of the minority about their future occasioned by the imposition of restriction on free movement of persons across the border. Its leaders became convinced through the years of struggle with the British Raj that their people would become oppressed and even destroyed in an independent, Hindu-dominant India. In 1940 the League voted to demand a separate state for the Muslim population of South Asia. Through the persistent, answering leadership of its president, Jinnah, this objective was realized when the British Raj, departing in 1947, ~~was~~ the mechanism, to establish two nations instead of one. Those districts under British control (about three fifths of the sub-continent) where Muslims were predominant

would become Pakistan; the districts where Hindus were in the majority became India. The remaining areas – princely states set under direct British administrative control would accede by their own determination to either country.

This division created two wings, a smaller but more popular East Pakistan, and a larger, dominant West Pakistan separated by 950 miles of India. It also created a number of disputes over the appropriate process for occasion of the princely states of British India into the new nations. The most strenuous of these disputes has been over Kashmir, a former princely state on the border between India and Pakistan that had a Muslim majority but a Hindu Maharaja. The dispute over which country it belongs to has led to two wars between India and Pakistan and an unresolved resolution for a plebiscite. Even today, military units of the two countries fire artillery rounds at each other on the Siachen Glacier, a small, uninhabited Himalayan plateau 20,000 feet high at a cost of \$ 6,000 per soldier per year, with 80 percent of the casualties "environment induced" just to assert their mutual claim to control a divided Kashmir.

Pakistan commits one-third of its annual budget to the military, in part to depend its claim to Kashmir but also to protect itself against the danger of attack from India, its imposing and more powerful neighbour to the east. Pakistan's ambiguous status on the development of nuclear weapons, which has compromised military and economic aid from the United States, while also calling for South Asia to be a nuclear-free zone, reveals how seriously the government takes the threat of India's nuclear capability and dominating presence in the sub-continent.

The dislocations and bloodshed of partition taxed to the limit the meager human resources of the new nation of Pakistan, which lying on what had been the outer edges of British India, lacked adequate administrative services to pull itself together. Jinnah assumed the chief executive duties as Governor General in the interim govt. Unfortunately, he died only 13 months later. Liaquat Ali Khan, who became his successor as prime minister in 1948, was assassinated 3 years later, in 1951. The Muslim League, which had been imported from British India, lost the control of a unifying national agenda to the indigenous traditional sources of provincial power: wealthy landowners and tribal leaders. Even though a constitution

was adapted in 1956 that affirmed the common sovereign identity of the two wings of Pakistan as an Islamic republic, the country clearly was in political disarray.

Realization of inequality in power understanding inspire keener desire to assert equality in states. South Asian regional cooperation was enthusiastically lauded, not least because it could improve political climate of the region, the critical component of SAARC whenever it becomes truly viable has to be a state of normalized relationship between the two major states of the region, i.e. India and Pakistan. Peace and order in South Asia will not be produce of military equality between India and Pak, but depend upon a lasting perception of military stability. South Asian regional cooperation provides a good framework precisely because it is not a forum for resolving bilateral issues but it promotes the habit of consultation. The process, however, can go only thus far, and no further, if India and Pakistan deadlocked on even how far abjure war by a solemn treaty. SAARC presupposes an end to distrust between India and Pakistan.

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CHAPTER IV

INDO-PAK RELATIONS :

India achieved independence, under the Indian Independence Act, 1947. The country was divided, partitioned, and rather vivisected on the bases of the two-nations theory on the basis of religion. The people who were supporters of Partition belonged to the hinterland. After partition most of such people appear to have reconciled with secular India and had stayed back. During the exchange of population, i.e., Hindus to India and Muslims to Pakistan, most of the Muslims stayed back in India and their counterpart, who left Pakistan for India, were primarily not received as Hindus but as Pakistani refugees. Similarly, the Muslims from India to Pakistan were, basically and primarily not received as Muslims but as Indian refugees or 'Mohajirs', though the country was partitioned on the basis of two-nation theory - Hindus and Muslims. Thus, the outcome of partition, so far as two communities are concerned, was a strange phenomenon. Both Hindus and Muslims became strangers in their own country.

The Partition is not only an evil but also a sin. We could not avoid it earlier and now it is, may be, an accomplished fact, but by mutual dialogue on the people to people basis, the partition can be annulled to bring prosperity, happiness and peace in the Indian sub-continent. India and Pakistan have been at odds during almost the last 50 years. In all this time, the security and socio-economic imperatives have been ignored with the result eminently manifest to one and all. Notwithstanding, there is a broad consensus amongst the people of the two countries at the mass level.

What were the real causes that led to the partition, who was responsible for breaking up the integral unity of India; it may not be difficult to find answers to such questions. But it was not necessary to concede the demand for partition and creation of Pakistan that would have avoided so much of bloodshed and wholesale destruction of properties. G.D. Khosla in "Steps Reckoning" states :

There are, and always been differences between the beliefs, habits and outlook of the Muslim and the non-Muslims. But these differences were no more than

an expression of individual personality. Such as may be observed in members of one family where the peculiar traits and features of one branch may be marked enough to distinguish it from another branch, but do not give rise to temperament incompatibility or open hostility.¹

For over a thousand years Muslims and non-Muslims had lived as neighbors and friends, despite these differences, and it was not till the impact of British imperialism that forced them to raise mental and moral differences around themselves and consciousness of their distinctive character was forced upon them. This consciousness was accentuated and exploited by the British rulers. It may not be possible to make an accurate estimate of the total loss of life of Hindus and Muslims and the extent of damage of the property caused by riots immediately preceding partition and soon thereafter. But this was a heavy price and the memory of this painful and costly transaction will linger for years till eternity and continue to embitter the people of the sub-continent, till the very partition itself is annulled by mutual consultation and cooperation. Under whatever circumstances the country might have been partitioned and whosoever might be responsible for the division, it is a curse. As such it, it is the bounding duty of the successors of the persons responsible for such partition to undo the same so that our brethren living in Pakistan, are united with us, as a part and parcel of Indian Nation. We need to remind ourselves what Benjamin Disraeli long ago said :Finality is not the language of politics. And Jawahar Lal Nehru said :Political wisdom consists in anticipating events and guiding them :

The country is in need of such a statesman who can accomplish the job-annulling partition with a view to bring Hindu-Muslim unity and Indo-Pak amity besides restoring peace, tranquility, progress and happiness in the Indian subcontinent. We need to sort out our problems across the table, in consonance with the spirit of Simla. Agreement. And ultimately aim ought to be the annalment of Partition and re-unification of India, Bangladesh and Pakistan with the same bound arise as those at the time of partition.

The Partition was a fraud played on the Muslim by their leaders. Some became governor general, someone else rose to be the Prime Minister and so on. Their financiers became big industrialists. Of the 22 big (industrial) 16 were Gujarati

speaking and who had migrated from Mumbai (like the Habibs) or Kolkata (like the Adamjis). What had the average Gujarati Muslim to gain from the partition, nothing, but the businessman could flourish with Punjabi farmers as competitors. In Mumbai and Kolkata, he had to compete against the Bania, the Marwari, the Parsi, etc. The Politician like M.A. Jinnah had the crown of Pakistan to wear.

Pakistan was a paradoxical absurdity for the Muslim masses although an advantage for the classes to whom the leaders belonged. The sub-continental ummah was divided and in 1971 went on to be bifurcated. Islam was not sufficient to hold the two wings of Pak, together.²

However, the unrealistic Two – Nations theory stood falsified by the efforts of the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi who got East Bengal to emerge as sovereign country-Bangladesh. According to a well-known scholar Mushirul Hasan, the bitter and violent contest over power sharing culminating in the partition, gives out the real mind of the leaders responsible for the vivisection of India. What was the use of remorse ? The damage, which was irreparable, was done.

The principal problem facing the leadership of India's partition and the American Civil War, was identical, in as much as should a nation be divided on the basis of religion or colour ? President Lincon refused and our leadership accepted partition. Both decisions led to widespread bloodshed.

However, even during such a situation, it was the great depression that stopped most of the growth, and consumer demand. But World War II restarted the great American industrial machine, and soon, half the country was engaged in production for war, bringing full employment; but because of the scarcity of consumer goods, Americans saved their money for the future and emerged as a great power. America emerged as a great nation while Indian peninsula remains fractured, weak and poor, as such one can see the land of plenty co-existing with poverty.

India is not really a poor country, though most economists say so. India is no a poor country, it is Indians who are poor. We are all like a poor village Brahmin who can recite Vedas and Puranas in flawless Sanskrit but has to beg for food everyday. This is the mismatch that haunts, as, mismatch between knowledge and resources,

between theory and practice, between knowing and how to do things and the wherewithal to get things done. And of course, it is double talk that has given birth to partition and the problems associated with it.

We people of India are born of the many vicissitudes of a long history, each of the many strands adding to its own special note of colour, of a sudden flash of gold; to the intricate pattern of national life. Out of this pattern emerges our multi-coloured population, with its race mixtures, its various languages and its groups at all stages of social evolution yet all knowing no other home than India. We the people of India include them all, both Hindus and Muslims, as they belong to the same stock. It is the same blood that courses in all our veins and not that of Mongols, Arabs or Turks. The Muslims are only Hindu converts. We are not Arab, Turks or Mongols. We can no longer afford to permit partition of country as a springboard for further aggression and further partition. The partitioned India deserves to be united.

Historians will one day declare that the masses of united India both Hindus and Muslims timidly sleepwalked into the partition of India. They were only vaguely conscious of the real consequences of the two-nation theory. The Congress opposed this theory but yet finally allowed the break-up of the country precisely on the basis of this theory. And tacitly accepting that we are not one but two people. But everything was done in half measures.

Theoretically, India could have accepted the full consequences of the two nations theory and allowed total transfer of populations. Partition did take place at a cost no other people on earth have paid before. Pakistan had driven out most of the Hindus from its territory. On this issue, it was true to its declaration. It wanted a pure Islamic state. The advocates of the two-nation theory lacked the insight of the ultimate reality that they must learn to co-exist with others. The Partition of India was no solution to war problem and it deserves to be annulled.

It is crucial to have friendly relations with each other, and to change the unhappy context of the relation. Then, imagine the kind of change that would come about if India and Pakistan pooled their material resources. A formidable force, not industrial infrastructure of India becomes part of Pakistan's strength and Pakistan's geo-strategic location as well as defence potential becomes as expansion

of India's strength. A subcontinent saw conflict would become a power fact or of great significance on the world scene.

On the basis of Two-Nations theory, India for Hindus and Pakistan for Muslims, India had accepted partition of this great ancient country in good faith, much against its will, spirit's ideal, and the very grain of its people, simply to accommodate wishes of our brothers, who had somehow come to believe that they will be happy and secure, if they lived separately. It was visible, known and clear that it was mistaken concept and theory, that had two distinct religious groups cannot live peacefully and happily in the same land. As a matter of fact true religion does not divide man from man, or separate humanity, there religion, rather provides human bond of love, faith and unity between different people to the way of brotherhood.

Muslim ethics is mainly social. Hospitality is one of the greatest virtues that Islam teaches. It also preaches the Ethics of brotherhood of man and service of humanity.³ Despite the belief in the brotherhood of humanity, the country was divided on the basis of religion. India was partitioned. Pakistan was created on the basis that Hindus and Muslims are different people and cannot live in peace. Muslim majority areas were carved out for believers of Islam. Religious perception helps to unite, man to man. No Rishi, no Buddha, no Mahatma, no Christ, no Prophet, ever tried to establish a religion.

Pakistan resembles the lost, twin of India and they look like. In Partition of India, millions had to leave their homes and hearths because of the compulsions of circumstances and that too beyond their control. The terms of independence were such that perhaps, without accepting partition, some believe that Independence would not have come. Division is over, but its scars are still hurting the body politic of both countries. However, the wise of the three countries India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, realize that the neighbours can hardly remain constantly in a state of eyeball-to-eyeball animosity. And a new chapter of understanding and goodwill has to be initiated. A wider perspective has to be taken. The time has come to realize that Indo-Pakistan animosity soon acquired a new exploitative element of politics. Realistically enough, neither India nor Pakistan can destroy the other. The utmost

they can do is to inflict serious injuries on each other in the State of War. To the contrary, as Nikhil Chakravarty⁴ puts it :

"It is ~~not difficult~~ to visualize that given the necessary goodwill, all the ~~problem~~ ~~ming~~ ~~on the way of~~ friendship can be settled without any rancour or ill-feeling, but in ~~the~~ fullest of understanding as between two friendly countries. Friendly confederations South Asia comprising the huge landmass of India and Pakistan will be a weighty assertion of world peace. As the understanding progresses on its new path of friendship, it is bound to attract the neighbouring states who would understanding the value of amity instead of animosity.

The very basis of healthy community existence is recognition of human rights. Our scriptures have not hesitated to emphasize the prime importance of the principle of common world family, brotherhood of the mankind.⁵ Humanity as a whole is one extended family, with all the obligations of family membership.⁶ History bears evidence to the fact that United India sent missions of love preaching universal brotherhood, a belief in the common brotherhood of mankind. Indians traveled out imbued with the spirit of common brotherhood as envisaged by Guru Nanak: "None is my enemy, none an outsider, all are mine, my brotheren's . And consequence the hearts of people. Let us toil to wipe out not only physical poverty but also the spiritual."⁷

Timeless motto of universal happiness and peace is the heritage of this ancient Indian civilization, which assumed the character of Bharatvarsha in Bharat Khand. Here a nation, which Megasthenes noted "never invaded others and was never invaded", existing long before the ideas of civilization evolved elsewhere.

Thus, the Partition of India and creation of Pakistan, on the⁴ basis of two-nation theory is an outcome of the British diplomacy – "divide and rule", and we were ready and willing to be divided for individual selfish gain. After more than five decades of partition, it is evident that initially people of Punjab and NWFP were opposed to the creation of Pakistan but now having been benefited by its creation ~~want to annex more~~ and more area to it.

Indian sub-continent is being destabilized. The people who may have been responsible for creation of Pakistan belonged to hinterland and perhaps how

reconciled to secular India and have stayed back. Then there appears to be no justification for continuing with India and its extension – Pakistan. At least amicable relations, co-operation, mutual understanding between the two, is must for permanent peace in the sub-continent and also for correcting the past mistakes.

This unfortunate division has unleashed a plethora of misfortunes, which spared us no respite to look for the hope. Still under the lid of the legendary Pandora box, hope lies in unification of the two States; may be in any form. Once it is achieved not only Kashmir problem would wishes way but also a buffer independent Tibet may not be a remote dream.

Sardar Patel soon after partition had emphasized that : "if Pakistan does not change her ways, there may soon be a flare up. The nation must be quite prepared for any emergency. As far as India is concerned, she wants Pakistan to grow into a strong and prosperous country. Some people had talked of a possible reunion just now, atleast not until those who had enamoured for a separate homeland had reaped the harvest they had sown."⁸

Four and a half decades are the sufficient time for realization that the partition of India on the basis of religion was a curse and deserved to annulled. The answer to Kashmir problems lie in the unification. Primarily the Muslims belonging to Bihar and Uttar Pradesh were for creation of Pakistan, bt most of them have not preceded to Pakistan and have stayed back. They appear to have reconciled to secular India during these 55 years. For cooperation, co-ordination and for establishing cordial relations and ultimately unification of India and Pakistan, it is the responsibility of Muslims the hinterland to build bridges of understanding.

Maulana Abul Kalam Azad preferred Hindu Muslims unity, even to Swaraj, when he said : "If an angel descends from the heaven today and proclaims from the Kutub Minar that India can attain Swaraj within twenty four hours provided I relinquish my demand for Hindu Muslim unity, I shall retort to it : No my friend, I shall give up Swaraj, but not Hindu Muslim unity, for it Swaraj is delayed, it will be a loss for India, but if Hindu-Muslim unity is lost, it will be a loss for the whole mankind."⁹

Unification may not be just a far cry. Nature demands it. It is also in consonance with the dream of the great Yogi Aurobindo Ghosh, K.Natwar Singh is justified when he says: "

This is in the hands of cosmic master, unseen yet all-powerful. The really spiritual is beyond science and superstition. Somebody, out march to folly might cease; in the meanwhile, let the cocksure shed claims to the infallibility of science of reason. The bell tolls for them too."¹⁰

Our relationship with our neighbour is paradoxical in countries, one remain sevorn enemies, but on the people-to-people basis one exude warmth and bonding. The common belief that the Muslim community as a whole subscribed to the two-nations theory is far from the truth. That the Muslims did not demand Pakistan as a monolithic and homogenous community is evident from the simple fact that 35 million of them preferred to stay back in India and have continued to live in this country after partition.

What is even more relevant are the Mahatma's words, "The first thing is that politics have divided India today into Hindus and Muslims. I want to rescue people from this quogmere and make them work on solid ground where people are people. Therefore, my appeal here is not to the Muslims nor to the Hindus as Hindus, but to ordinary human beings, and take many other steps so that they can make life better."

The unification of the human world is underway; there is an imperfect initiation organized but struggling against tremendous difficulties. But the momentum is there and it must inevitably increase and conquer. Here too India has begun to play a prominent part. And if she can develop that larger statesmanship which is not limited by the present fact and immediate possibilities but looks into the future and brings it nearer, her presence may make all the difference between slow and timid and a bold and swift development. A catastrophe may intervene and interrupt or destroy what is being done, but even then the final result is sure. For unification is a necessity of Nature, and inevitable movement. Its necessity for the nations is also clear, for without it the freedom of the nations may be at any moment in peril and tap life even of the large and powerful nations insecure. The unification is therefore

to the interest of all. And only human imbecility and stupid selfishness can prevent i.e. but these can not stand forever against the necessity of Nature and Divine W.I.

The Partition of India must go and the greater India, the land of the 'Indu, Bharat, be learn again. The reunification of India and Pak will be only the first step, because ultimately the goal is the reunification of all that was once the greater India and which is today only small fragmented countries with no soul, no direction, no sense.

Pakistan was learn out of the partition of India. Historically speaking this process of creation of Pakistan contains some of principal attributes of Islamabad's foreign policy postures vis-à-vis India. The Muslim League waged a battle against the Indian National Congress for the political liberation of the Muslims¹¹ who, according to its leadership, were unable to attain their collective self-realization so long as they did not have a separate homeland. A general feeling of insecurity was so firmly embodied in the minds of the leadership of the Muslim League that it ultimately accounted for the establishment of Pakistan.¹² This insecurity after partition got strengthened on account of several disputes which India and Pakistan experienced on account of the partitioning process.

Pakistan – a Muslim State emerged from partition of British – India on August 14, 1947 in pursuance to the idea of Separate State for Muslims on the subcontinent. The idea was the part of the theory that Muslims, by virtue of their religion – Islam and cultural distinction, constituted a separate nation. Poet, Philosopher, Barrister, Dr. Muhammad Iqbal a Saproo Kashmiri Pandit convert, articulated the concept of Pakistan in its basic form in 1931, urban he proposed a separate State comprising Muslim majority areas in North Western India. The All India Muslim League under the leadership of Jinnah adopted the concept in 1940.

We never believed in a Muslim nation, but unfortunately, a Muslim Nation was carved out of Indian Nation. We believe that converts do not make a nation, but we have an Islamic nation of converts. Partition is the out of hypocrisy and has paved way for great violence and is likely to end in a bloody war. Gandhiji remind Jinnah in September, 1944 when he said : "I find no parallel in the history for a body of converts and their descendents claiming to be a nation apart from the parent stock.

India was one nation before the advent of Islam, it must remain one in spite of the change of faith of very large body of her children." The partition was forced by religious-biggest, ignoring that religion unites and not divides. Thus, the genesis of the India's problem lies in the partition.

Only chaos followed the partition of India, neither the Hindus nor the Muslims, have benefited from the Partition. The people as a whole have suffered – economically, internationally and spiritually.

B.N.Jog¹³ in his book, "Threat of Islami Indian Dimensions", writes :

Islam was born out of war, bloodshed, atrocities, desecration of idols, etc., and though decades and centuries had elapsed, it had become more barbaric rather than civilized. Religion sublimates the instincts of hate, revenge or enmity but Islam tended the fires of base human instincts. The question may be rightly raised about how can Islam be held responsible for the politically motivated directed action programmed of the Muslim League. However, Pakistan had been demanded as a separate Islamic state and the fires of the direct action movement were being stroked by the Mullamaulavis in mosque.

England had promised Independence to India and the Cabinet Mission Plan had been prepared to achieve this end but had become the cause for conflict and statements. The atmosphere in India had reached ignition point and Hindus and Muslims were drifting further apart and the fitting reply Hindus had started giving to Jinnah's direct action had marked the beginning of a civil war. Maintenance of law and order with the help of police and array was becoming more and more difficult and almost impossible. After above mentioned press interview by Sardar Patel, the British government took a momentous decision and Prime Minister Attlee made the relevant pronouncement in the British parliament in 20th February 1947 about total transfer of power to Indian hands. He declared, "the British government has decided to totally withdraw its power from India before June 1948. To ensure this final transfer with the concurrence of all concerned, Lord Mount batten is being appointed as the Last Viceroy of ~~India~~."

In a few years after the creation of separate country for Muslims, the Pakistan government got Mr. Wheelan, archeological adviser of Pakistan to write a booklet

called '5000 years of Pakistan'. It describes the greatness of the Pre-Pakistan and Pre-Islam life; its culture is praised and it has lauded Pakini, If the stream of this culbos glory starts flowing again, the Muslim community will find it easier to identify itself with it and unity can be forged again. India should certainly encouraged such thoughts. The future of India and its children, both Hindus and Muslims is interlinked. Rafiqh Zakaria advised his Muslim brothern : it is time the Muslims in India understand that their future is linked with Hindus; they will have to co-operate with them and live in peace and amity. They will have to be friend them in every cry. Muslims are as much rooted in India as Hindus. G.M.Sayid of Sing movement said:¹⁴

"Since we are the product of the plains of Ganga-Jamuna we are bound to associate with it. What are we to do with Iran or Iraq."

When the idea of Pakistan was still unborn. Md. Iqbal, a versatile poet capable of touching Olympic heights, described India as the earliest country, and said : Religion does not teach us to be enemy to each other. We all Indians belong to one country, and India is ones". But when he propounded the two-nations theory, Iqbal limited himself to narrow confines of religious bigotry and short himself out from a wide world to proselytize Islam. When this dire of Pakistan found that Pak is likely to be created he confided in his English friend Mr. Thomson and confessed "The Pakistan Plan would be disastrous to the British Government, disastrous to Hindus and disastrous to the Muslim Community."¹⁵

Pakistan was a paradoxical absurdity for the Muslim masses although an advantage for the classes to whom the leaders belonged. Those who might have needed the partition even it for illusory reasons, were deprived. Those who needed nothing more were given a separate country. The subcontinental ummah was divided and in 1971 went on to be bifurcated. Islam was not sufficient to hold the two wings of Pakistan together.

Iqbal lying on his deathbed conveyed similar sentiments to Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru, when he went to see him during his visit to Pakistan. This dilemma has been expressed by A Beg : "The Muslim dilemma is this. Is it better for Muslims to assimilate and thereby lose their identity or are they bound by Islam to preserve their identity and thereby suffer the mental, physical, social and economic

consequences of non-assimilation.”¹⁶ In fact, the first seed of Pakistan was planted when the first non-Muslim was converted to Islam in India. “Neither Islam, nor Muslims, were responsible for the creation of Pakistan. Pakistan was the result of a very complex interplay of forces. If one can say anything with certainty it is that vested interests on both sides that played crucial role in urging about vivisection of the country. Communalism is not the product of religion as many people think, but the product of misuse of religion by vested interest”. Pakistan was not a creation of religious history, it was a creation of the modernists among Muslims. A highly westernized Muslim, Md. Ali Jinnah raised the demand for Pakistan. Jinnah was hardly a believe or a practising Muslim. Jinnah did not down even an elementary knowledge of Islam.”¹⁷

Infact Iqbal saw the vision, M.A.Jinnah gave it a concrete shape, so goes the popular strong about the creation of Pakistan, perhaps the only modern nation other than Ibrad that own its existence to a nationalism inspired by religion.

India on its part objected to the division of the country on the basis of religion. Gandhi was against in the beginning that he used to say that the partition of the country would be possible only over his dead body. He bled profusely Marks can be traced from his statement to Lord Mountbattern , when he explained that he did every thing in his power to ‘keep India United’.

Pak was a divided nation at birth. Islam provided it with its life force but it could not promote national solidarity. This is the Central paradox in Pakistan’s story and it holds as much significance today, as it did fifty give years age. As Governor General of the new state and the people’s great leader Jinnah insisted that Pakistan’s primary concern must be the promotion of principles of equality and social justice for all its citizen. His Pakistan may have been realized through religious expression but he believed that it could be sustained through secular procedures. Before his death in September 1948, he acknowledged that the job of holding Pakistan would be far more different than the one that made independence possible.

Partition and the basis on which Pakistan was carved out of United India in 1947 instead of settling them in their own Status quos exposed to them the explosive

quality of religious symbols as the basis of nation building in converting the group rivalry before partition into international rivalries in the sub-continent national rivalries in the sub-continent.

Lack of reconciliation to the partition and a settled fact on the part of India and Pakistan's advocacy of a two-nation theory explain largely the hostile relationship between the two countries. Even Jinnah said : "We maintain and hold that Muslims and Hindus are two major nations by any definition or test of nation we are a nation with our own distinctive culture and civilization We have our own distinctive outlook on life and of life."¹⁸

The perception of India's agony over the partition in Pakistani rulers, created the impression that India would one day achieve its wish to rewrite all its lost territories. As President Ayub Khan once said : "The Indian leaders have often stated that their true border extends from the Hindu Kush mountain to the Mekong river, that is to say, wherever the influence of Hinduism had existed in the past."¹⁹ This fear of India's ambitious nationalism may not be without any basis. There was a strong current of opinion in India totally disregarding the fact of partition as a grave blunder. Nehru said on 28 No. 1947, "India cannot and will not remain divided. This is my conviction no matter how much I am criticized for having accepted the partition."²⁰ Many Indians felt that "the creation of Pakistan was a tragic mistake which might still be corrected, at least as far as East Bengal is concerned."²¹

Coming to the struggle against English Raj in India, Jinnah was earlier a third rank leader, the first ranks being occupied by Gandhi and other, the second by Muslims like Maulana Asad. During Quit India movement in 1912, when the first two ranks went to 'Jail, Jinnah was able to depict himself as the sole leader of Indian Muslims. He fully exploited the fanaticism of the illiterate followers and could gather enough support for division of the country into India and Pak. Lord Mountbatten, the negotiating Viceroy of India tried to dissuade him arguing that in care of Partition Pak would consist of two inconvenient and vulnerable landmasses or the extreme west and east of India.

The Partition proved to be the biggest political crisis in India since the Battle of Plassey. Due to Partition, the unity of the country was thwarted and it had created

problem both at the national and the international ends. It was an utter failure of Statesman step resultint in mortgaging the future of the country.

Partition was the biggest tragedy of the 20th century. A perusal of the statement issued by Altuf Hussain, leader of Pakistan Muttahian Qaumi Mahament (MQM), issued to IA new service at London on 17 September 2000 shows that the Mohammeden community in Pakistan are repentant about their instance on partition of India. The relevant portion of the statements reads :

"The division of the Indian sub-continent was the biggest blunder in the history of mankind. The dramatic statement is the first by a leader of the Mahajins, who worked the most for the Partition and migrated to Pakistan."

These were primarily the Mahajion who were on the forefront of the separatist movement and creation of the State of Pakistan. Most of them willingly migrated to the Holy Land but today they have no destination and hence no destiny. They are condemned to languish in a tunnel sealed at both the ends. This is due to their misconceptions, which still persist with them. They have not reconciled to the Partition of the country. They want to remain in Pakistan and at the same time wish to meet their relatives kith and kin in India. They aspire to be Pakistanis without identifying themselves with Punjabis, Baluchir Pakhtuns and Sindhis. Even today if the skin is scratched underneath it is not difficult to find that in the heart of their hearts they believe that both India and Pakistan belong to them.

To note that Karachi, the commercial capital of Pakistan, has been in great turmoil during the closing decade of the 20th century, there were thousand killings. The thing to note is that this is not Hindu-Muslim killings, they are Muslim-Muslim killings. More important, though there had been Hindu-Muslim tension in Sindhi it had not been bitter. The truth is that Pakistan is receiving the price of its own Sius Pak has been nurturing, terrorism and waging a proxy war against India, ignoring that the guns can never solve the problems and can only complicate the issues.

It will never be known whether Jinnah really said on his deathbed that partition was the biggest mistake of his life, but there is no surer indication than Pakistan's present plight of how its founder's objective has turned into a nightmare. And even after the emergence of Bangladesh in 1971 had buried the two

nation theory, Pakistan is now coming increasingly under pressure from various costive communities. The future of Pakistan looks bleak and that should be a matter of concern to India. Of course, the idea of Pakistan had come unstuck in 1971 itself when Bangladesh became an independent country. The same idea is under attack from another quarter with Sheika Hasina asking General Parvez Musharaf to apologise for the atrocities committed by Pakistan in Bangladesh before it became free. If he decides to apologise, he should do it fast because time may not be on this side.

The Partition was a far more complex issues than it had been understood to be. A detailed study of the event, along with the implication of the far-reaching decision, should show that the actual impact of the event still lingers.

And the events followed proved that it was right. In these decades of its history every major political change has been witness to nerve-racking twists and turns. Smooth transition has hardly been the rule there.

Questions, debates and mistrusts of a shared social vision by its leaders arose in Pakistan from the outset. Muhammad Ali Jinnah and other Western Oriented professional envisioned a multiethnic, pluralistic and indubitably democratic country, free from the hegemony of any one group. In his inaugural address to the constituent Assembly of Pakistan three days prior to independence, in his capacity as its first President, Jinnah implored, "If we want to make this great state of Pakistan happy and Prosperous we should wholly and solely concentrate on the well-being of the people, and especially of the masses and the poor.²² His vision of Pak was one of a profession of groups working together for the overall well-being of the state regarding of ethnic or religious division.

Leaders from varying backgrounds recognized the substanting political and economic challenges confronting the new state, and most shared the conviction that a popular consensus existed on its necessity, viability, and structured.

But other views also evicted. Some factions initially wanted no part of Pakistan for diverse reasons. Supporters of the Punjab Unionist Party placed their loyalties with the British, their successors still do, as they educate their children in

British – style schools, speak English among themselves and value indigenous aesthetics only as quaint historic relics.

Alternatively, many Islamist groups initially recoiled from the demand for Pakistan on the grounds that Islam could not be bounded by the borders of a nation-state. After partition, however, many with Islamist views migrated out of necessity, to Pakistan. To them, the Pakistan of 1947 was a rough diamond; the possibilities of creating a dar-ul Islam were new boundless, once their message was understood by their new compatriots.

Indeed, despite the assumptions of the Two-Nations theory, Pakistan's formidable Muslim population came from diverse practices and heritages. Jinnah, pluralistic view of Pakistani society was shaken somewhat in the mid-1960, and 1970s as divisions and distinctions between different ethnic and class grouping became more conspicuous. And the 1971 secession of East Pakistan also contributed to unease because not all voices may have a place to be heard in Pakistan.

Robert Laparte, Jar's assessment of Pakistan's political development since 1947 paints an uneasy and troubled picture. Pakistan is a state, Laaporte concludes, which after fifty years is "Still in the making", still striving to find a stable and effective form of government. He sees the two and a half decades from 1947 to 1971 as a time in which ordinary citizens were denied a role in public policy making, regular military intervention in politics began, and efforts to reconcile the political and economic interests of Pakistan's two wings collapsed and led to civil war and division of the country.²³

Fifty years ago, when Pakistan came into existence, constitutional experts, economists, politicians and administrators were almost unanimous in questioning the justification of a separate homeland for the South Asian Muslims. Even those who had a keen sense of history and had watched the evolution of the idea of Pakistan, regard it impracticable. The strongest criticism came from the congress leaders who were joined by the British Statesmen like Amery, the Secretary of State for India, Mountbatten, the last Viceroy of British India, and Sir Regional Coupland in voicing their apprehensions about the new state. These who had fought for it were

also aware of the heavy odds against which a new country was created. But then there were those who perceived a paradise in the contours of history which had given birth to the largest Muslim state in the world.

It was against this background that the post-independence developments in Pakistan were judged. The Pakistanis were supposed to justify their existence not only by merely surviving as an independent entity but also to demonstrate political acumen in fulfilling the objectives laid down during their freedom movements. The logic of history that had created this nation was destined to serve as a reminder as well as a yardstick for the social and economic uplift of the people for whom this territory was sought from the departing British Colonialists.

Thus the burden of historical legacies remained active in shaping the intellectual evolution of Pakistan. Freedom for Pakistan was not considered an aim in itself; they had to explain the rationale of its existence to the west, to the Indians and even to the posterity. The west conceived it 'a crime against civilization' because it had exposed the fragility of the British claim that colonial administration had inculcated the idea of unity and brotherhood amongst different religious and ethnic groups of the subcontinent. The congress leadership equated Pakistan with a sin that was committed against the 'holy' and 'sanctioned' unity of Mother India. The strongest of all these paradoxes was that a nation-state which was created in the name of Islam was opposed by the Islamicists who felt cheated by the secularist like Jinnah. With no administrative infrastructure and without a sizeable middle-class, Pakistan started its journey in 1947.

However, democracy created Pakistan, the poor man's budget rang the bell for independence and Jinnah's formula of August 11 where state stands beyond the faith and the gender of its citizens gave this fifty years old nation a direction. We cannot be free of history, its glories and disasters always sneak into our contemporary affairs but the vision of a better tomorrow is hameased by the lessons from history and not by dreaming of the past. And there are plenty of lessons that can be learned from half a century's experience. If Pakistanis understand that the inner logic of historical events is judged not by the success of an event but by the welfare of the people involved in it, than the road to many more golden jubili is clear,

otherwise history loses its essence and becomes just a burden on weak shoulders or a past time for day dreaming.

India-Pakistan relations defy reason and rationality. The objectives of a country's foreign policy are considered to be the promotion of a country's defence and economic interests. In case of Pakistan ideology takes precedence over all other interests in the 'two nation theory' approach to Indo-Pakistan relations. Though some would attribute this approach to fundamentalists alone but this equally applies to those in the Pakistani Establishment who believe in the so called ideology of Pakistan. 'The two-nation theory' was the *raison de etre* of Pakistan. This was the basis on which the partition of India was demanded in the pre-independence days. The demand for Pakistan was based in the name of Islam but even after more than fifty years after independence apart from some cosmetic measures Islamic state is nowhere in sight even the Shariat Bill proposed by the former Prime Minister of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif in 1998 could not be passed by the National Assembly. He had done this exercise earlier also in 1991 with the same result. There was never any debate in the councils of the Muslim league before independence on the political system, or what would be the security problems etc. of the new state. The very fact that Pakistan would be divided into two wings separated by one thousand miles of Indian territory and the security problems it would be confronted with were scarcely given any attention. The bitter controversies that the two-nations theory sparked between the Indian National Congress and the Muslim league were later translated into the foreign policy of the two countries particularly of the later. These were compounded by the problems generated by the way the partition was implemented. Thus India became the 'enemy country' which had not accepted Pakistan and was out to undo it. India was the only and the main threat to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Pakistan. The idea that a country has a foreign enemy is easy for the mass of the people to understand, and it also provides a powerful stimulators to national unity. For Pakistan, India has filled this role. Consequently the primary objective of Pakistan's foreign policy has been to strengthen her position vis-à-vis India.

Thus the only determinant of Pakistan's foreign policy has been its attempt to equality and parity with India if not superiority over it. From the early years of

seeking military alliance and addurance to U.S. sponsored military pacts like the South East Asia Treaty Organisation and the Central Treaty Organisation. The treat perception from India and the desire to get even with it for the grievance based on the two-nation there over its claim for Kashmir has to the obsession of the Pakistan Establishment for the Indian State. That was the reason for that country to go to war with India to seize the state by force. To give this obsession a veneer of ideology it is called the unfinished agenda of partition.

The Muslim League was formed in 1906 to represent the interests of the Islamic minority in British India in the movement for freedom from colonial domination. Its leaders became convinced through the years of struggle with the British Raj that their people would become oppressed and even destroyed in an independent, Hindu-dominant India. In 1940 the League voted to demand a separate state for the Muslim population of South Asia. Through the persistent, answering leadership of its President Jinnah, this objective was realized when the British Raj, in departing in 1947, set the mechanism, to establish two nations instead of one.

This division created two wints, a smaller but more populous East Pakistan, and a larger, dominant West Pakistan, separated by 900 miles of India. It also created a number of disputes over the appropriate process for occasion of the princely States of British India into the new nations. The most strenuous of these disputes has been over Kashmir; a former princely state on the border between India and Pakistan that had a Muslim majority but a Hindu Maharaja. The dispsute over which country it belongs to has led to three wars between India and Pakistan and an unresolved resolution for a plebiscite even today.

The main thing was to split up a state. As Jinnah made an amendment to the British policy of "Divide and Rule", whereas Gandhi called upon the British to 'Quit India' and he said 'Divide and Quit'. Thus, not to split up a state but to split up a nation, and Jinnah, are of the Indian national Congress, discovered in his old age that the Hindus and Muslims were not two communities, but two nations, coexisting under foreign rule. He held that upon the British withdrawal each nation should separately exist in its own homeland. He even went so far as to suggest an exchange of population but did not mention it a second time. But once was enough to rouse elemental suspicious and apprehensions between friends and neighbours

of a thousand years. In consequence of its intensive propaganda the league won the 1946 elections on the Pakistan issue, defeating the congress Muslims and Unionist Muslims and Krishak Praja Muslims all over India, barring a few exceptions. When Congress insisted on including Mr. Asaf Ali in the Viceroy's Interim Government and the British Prime Minister intervened in favour of Congress Jinnah rejected the Cabinet Mission Scheme and his Muslim League embarked on a two-pronged "Direct Action" against the British authorities and the Congress leaders. In practice, it was a call to the Muslims to resist Hindu Raj in succession to British Raj. Terrible riots broke out though the League was persuaded to join the 'Interim Government' by the Viceroy its aim was not to work but to work. Since the Cabinet Mission Scheme failed the British fixed on deadline for withdrawal, leaving India United or divided as the parties desired. This ultimatum led to division by consent is not in the way that Jinnah contemplated but as modified by Nehru and Patel. Bengal and Punjab were also divided. Lord Curzon was dead, but his policy went marching on.

Thus Congress, an inclusive organization of Indians of all communities, got India, an inclusive homeland of all India's minus those who accepted Pakistan as their homeland willingly or unwillingly. On the other hand, the Muslim League, an exclusive organization of Muslims only secured Pakistan, an exclusive homeland of Muslims where the Hindus and Sikhs and Christians were treated with discrimination, suspicion and hostility, just because they were 'unbelievers'. Though Jinnah personally made no discrimination on religious grounds the fanatical forces he had unleashed by his campaign for Pakistan and 'Direct Action' compelled him to make Pakistan an 'Islamic State' where Christians might live as Zimmies but idolators had either flee, be converted or die. Almost the entire Hindus and Sikhs population of West Pakistan was eliminated by massacre or flight. In East Pakistan some Hindus were killed and one-third of the Hindu population fled, while two-thirds remained, thanks to the friendly attitude of their Muslim neighbours. That unfortunate phrase 'exchange of population' gave a handle to the Hindu fanatics in India who took the law into their own hands and brought about a limited exchange of population by force. This was contrary to the Congress Policy of a secular State. For a time it looked as if India was not a composite nation but a Hindu nation where no

Muslim was safe. Gandhi fasted on this issue. He gained his object but lost his life at the hands of a Hindu fanatic. Sweets were distributed at various places in India by the assassin's supporters. We are not yet out of the wood. As long as Pakistan remains an Islamic monopoly the Hindu fanatics of India will go on threatening the Muslims including Congress Muslims and Communist Muslims. In Pakistan, the Muslims themselves are under pressure of 'Islamisation' recalling the early days of Islam, while India is marching forward into the 21st century Pakistan is marching backward into the 6th century. She has lost all sense of Nationalism and Democracy. East Pakistan has broken away to preserve both.

The Indo-Pak relations have not yet become normal and are not likely to become normal until there is a reversal of the policy of exclusion on religious grounds. Even in Bangladesh where the Founding Fathers established a secular State, there is a reaction. The Bengali Muslims fought the non-Bengali Muslims with Bengali Hindus as their comrades. Now all that comradeship has been forgotten. In the result the Muslims of Bangladesh too have lost their battle for democracy. It will take Pakistan a long time to realize that Pakistan got her independence because India got hers, thanks to the struggle carried on by the Congress. If India loses her independence Pakistan will also lose hers. Democracy is also a fruit of the Congress struggle. Pakistan was a gainer thereby. If she has not it the reason is her isolation from the mainstream. If she ever regains it this will be due to her sacrifice and suffering on the Congress model. She needs someone like Frontier Gandhi to lead her in her struggle for democracy. Lord Mountbatten closed to be Crown Representative on the 15th August 1947. On that date every Indian Prince was legally free to decide for himself whether his State would accede to the Dominion of India or the Dominion of Pakistan what is called Pak today was the site of the Indus valley civilization 5000 years ago. It is a source of Pride to India. If it is the same to Pakistan this common heritage should unite them at heart. Most of the Muslims of the sub-continent live in India and Bangladesh and share a common medieval and modern heritage. The Muslims of Pakistan are only 20 percent of the total. Acquisition of Kashmir will make little difference to their percentage. An arms race will never give them parity or weightage or veto in Indo-Pak affairs. The sooner they recognize the common interests the better. Economically and militarily this

subcontinent is an indivisible unit as the British found it and Nehru made it. The division is religious and political.

Relations with Pakistan have come to represent the core interest of India's Foreign Policy. This pre-eminence in four decades existence as an independent nation has been sustained by an over-deepening feeling of mutual mistrust of each other's intentions, roles and actions. This phenomenon has seen them through (four/three) declared wars, and have not been able to prevent at least another three undeclared ones – Siachen, Kashmir and Punjab – from being pursued without remorse. Religion, distorted history and adversarial posturing for personal gain have led to the ingraining of mutually exclusive ideologies upon the people. This in turn, has taken a heavy toll on a region which suffers from serious challenges to its national building activities and socio-economic development projects.

The partition of the subcontinent into two countries merely confirmed an incorrect and historically untenable position that for religion to prosper in the subcontinent it required separate homelands. The use of religion by the intellectual and political elites led to the unfolding of a trauma where 15 million people, caught in a passionate maelstrom, cross migrated and over a million died in the process. The resultant psychological sear on the general populace was exploited by political elites, mainly in Pakistan, to create a legacy of suspicion and mistrust that has continued to be devil bilateral relations.

In India, partition along communal lines was sought to be countered by promoting a secular society whose function was to tackle the ills afflicting ridden masses. In Pakistan, however, the converse was being attempted by trying to foster a nationalism that was exclusively based on religion. But, within years of promoting the "official ideology", sub-national, cultural and pluralistic identities in the new country began resisting the uniformity sought to be enforced under the guise of religion. The peculiarity of this race validating their respective ideologies comes into sharper focus when India's secular model is compared with other countries in the region. A Hindu Nepal, predominantly Buddhist Sri Lanka and Myanmar, Muslim Afghanistan and Maldives have never felt threatened by this projection.

The ideological race suited Islamabad ruling elites well. They were effectively able to project the Indian secular model as a challenge to the creation of Pak., which gave them the necessary excuse to raise the bogey of an Indian threat to their independent existence. The ruling elite in Islamabad had adopted the ideology of 'Two Nations' essentially to build new bases of public support for themselves. Apart from Mohammad Ali Jinnah and to some extent Liaqat Ali Khan, no Muslim League politician had an identifiable support base within the new state. Pakistan itself was a unique experiment where a political leadership that claimed support in Muslim minority areas of undivided India by heightening their fears of being submerged by the majority community, had abandoned them dearing partition, and were now looking for new support structures on an alien terrain.

For this elite, creating pockets of support in a country that was never exposed to the fears of being swamped by a numerically superior community, meant that the tenuous thread of a common religion had to be strengthened by playing up the Two-Nation theory, and the threat that Indian policies posed to it. This 'threat perception' went well with a people still traumatized by the horrors of partition, but it did not prevent the mushrooming of grassroot movements that sought inclusion of local elements in the ruling elite. By 1971, the once dominant Muslim League was reduced to an insignificant party and the ruling elite was controlled by the Punjabi Pathan combine which accounted for 75 percent of the top military posts in 1968, and 56 per cent of the ruling elite. This, however, did not end the anachronistic perception of the Indian threat within the public. To the new ruling elite, the same misperceptions of the Indian threat within the public. To the new ruling elite, the same misperceptions already prevalent among the people were furthered for their own survival.

The result of the erroneous propaganda efforts by Islamabad had led to a stereotyping of Indian intentions vis-à-vis Pakistan. The in the threat from India may have undergone subtle change to keep pace with changing realities, but the threat has created an 'India - Phobia' among the Pakistani politicians, making it impossible for any Pakistani leader to publicly talk peace with India without being dubbed a traitor to the cause. At one time or another, virtually every imported non-Punjabi leader - be it Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Asghar Khan, Khan Abdul Wali Khan, Quai

ym Khan, Benazir Bhutto, Jam Sadiq Ali or Gulam Mustafa Khar – have had their credentials doubted.

Bhutto, who sent a quiet message to Mrs Gandhi whilst flying back to Pakistan after the Simla Accord that was intended to reassure the Indian leadership of Islamabad's genuine desire for peacefully solving vexed political issues, changed times while addressing a rally in Lahore immediately upon arrived. He expounded to the public his rationale for signing the Simla Agreement which did not speak of the need for peace with India. The Simla Agreement was the only face saving option available to him after the humiliating defeat which was 93,000 soldiers taken as POWs in India.

The costliest misjudgment of India foreign policy was to bite the bait that the Pakistani leadership offered by throwing of to two-nation theory as the alternative model for the region. Ever since, India has been embroiled, despite its global outlook, in a regional acrimony that has plagued every aspect of bilateral relations with Pakistan. Islamabad's ruling elite was able to create a feeling of vulnerability vis-à-vis India and successfully externalize this exaggerated sense of insecurity to achieve its goals.

India's Pakistan Policy was always been reactive and New Delhi is constantly engaged in a policy of denial. It has allowed Pakistan's ruling elite to use issues of its choosing like the communal situation in India for domestic gain, while Indian reference to happenings inside Pakistan on issues like human rights, rights of women, children and minorities, are touted as examples of Indian interference whose end goal is the destruction of Pakistan itself. The resultant threat misperception on both sides of the border is always viewed from a worst case scenario angle.

The process of complete mistrust and suspicion began with Kashmir, where Pakistan preferred using force rather than dialogue and diplomacy to wrench a state. It hardened attitudes regarding Pakistan's motivations and led to the withholding of the transfer of military stores and each balances by India to Pakistan. This, in turn, led to Pakistan dragging its fact over evacuee property and in giving active assistance to the Razakars of Hyderabad.²⁷

To this may be added India's disapproval of Pakistan's advocacy of the 'two-nation theory' based on religion. "It was perfectly clear" said Jawaharlal Nehru, that it was quite impossible to divide it on the basis of separating religious groups on one side of the other."²⁸ To accept Pakistan's 'two-nation thereof' would mean a collapse of the secularistic policy on which the Indian Union rests and a reopening of the condemns of separatism through various religious sensitized groups.

Accordingly, the two-nation theory, which formed the ideological basis for the partition of 1947, had as its corollary a built-in assumption that after independence India and Pakistan would possess not only juridical equality but also equality in power terms and that this should be recognized by the world at large and particularly by the dominant powers. The 'two nation' theory was thus transformed into Independent Pakistan's drive to achieve and enjoy power-parity with India. A perceptive western scholar of Pakistan Affairs has stated :

In large measure, Pakistani feeling towards India has been a continuation of the political struggle before partitionMr Jinnah had never agreed to constitutional formula which would have denoted lesser status for the Muslim League. India contained two nations; one sovereign nation is the equal of any other sovereign nation Many political leaders and most of the articulate section of the population have reacted with emotional intensity to any suggestion of Indian superiority on any field.²⁹

Pakistan's President Ayub, almost verifying this, wrote :

The world today is fighting for equality – equality amongst individuals as among nations, regardless of whether they are big or small. This requires an unequivocal recognition by the world that every nation is entitled to equal rights and opportunities. The degree of a country's sovereignty and self-respect is not determined by the size of its territory or its resources. This sounds simple enough Yet there are no means to enforce it. It is a world of the Big Two, Big Three or four or more. It is they who preside over the destiny of the world and determine its direction. The smaller countries, particularly those in the early stages of industrial development, belong to a lower stratum of existence we too have to establish our identity and fight for a position of equality and honour.

He continued in the same vein :

The cause of our major problem is India's inability to reconcile herself to our existence as a sovereign independent nation At the back of it all was India's ambition to absorb Pakistan or turn her into a satellite.³⁰

However, even after partition of the subcontinent, the state in India still had to contend with not only a large and disoriented Muslim minority but also a multi-ethnic and multi-linguistic society. So the political elite in India naturally persisted with secularism as the glue that could hold in its modernization. The raison deters idea that only a Muslim majority state in the subcontinent could ensure a fair deal to the Indian Muslim. Even after the creation of Pakistan with a Muslim majority, the Pakistani elite found it expedient to reiterate Islam as the binding factor. This, they thought, could not only keep its two wings, separated by a thousand miles of Indian Territory intact but also keep in check potentially centrifugal forces stimulated by ethnicity and language.

Implicit in these two approaches was the assumption that secularism in the case of India and Islam in the case of Pakistan would help ensure political justice to their respective citizens. India and Pakistan, therefore, sought their ideological security in secularism and Islam respectively. In other words, these two states adopted not only different but also opposing strategies of state building, which by itself created certain tension in their bilateral relations. It was, perhaps, irresistible that Kashmir would become a symbol of this ideological tension that underlay the political foundations of the two states.

Pakistan's sense of insecurity stems from the fact that the creation of Pakistan with a Muslim majority failed to impart the necessary cohesion to the Pakistani state. The fear of Hindu domination submerged the differences among Muslims temporarily and they threw their collective weight behind Jinnah's demand for Pakistan. One Pakistan was created, as the ethnic, linguistic and sectarian differences among the Pakistani Muslims, naturally surfaced again. Jinnah, who relentlessly pursued his two nation theory on the sole ground that Hindus and Muslims constituted two nations, was aware of this problem and its implications for Pakistan. So, he found it expedient to make a political volte-face once Pakistan

was conceded. Addressing the Pakistan Constituent Assembly on 11th August 1947, Jinnah's exhortation to the Prospective Pakistani citizen was, "You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go your mosques or to any other place of worship in the state of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed that has nothing to do with the business of the state. We are starting with this fundamental principle that one are all citizens and equal citizens of one state."³¹ However, the creation of Bangladesh, the movements for separation/autonomy in Sind, North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan, the struggle of the Maharajon, the sectarian violence between Sunnis and Shias and the treatment meted out to the so-called 'Azad Kashmir' itself demonstrate that Islam has failed to ensure political justice to these communities in spite of the fact that they are all Muslims in an owedly Islamic State, Ironically, the father of the so called 'Islamic Bomb of Pakistan Dr. Abdul Qadir Khan belongs to the Ahmadiya sect, which has been declared a non-Muslim minority in Pakistan.

It was the two-nation theory of Jinnah which was supposed to provide the ideological and philosophical foundation to Pakistani Muslims in India, it was argued, were so much different culturally and ethnically that they constitute a separate nation altogether. Bhutto described the struggle for Pakistan on the "glorious freedom struggle of the Muslims of the South Asia Sub-continent."³² Way back in 1051 the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan had said :

Pakistan came into being as a result of the urge felt by the Muslims of the sub-continent to secure a territory, however, limited, where the Islamic Ideology and way of life could be practiced and demonstrated to the world. A cardinal feature of this ideology is to make Muslim brotherhood a living reality."³³

That Pakistan was founded on Islam was also stressed by Ayub Khan, he said :

We in Pakistan cannot ignore the fact that our country is the product of the ideology of Islam. This is the foremost justification of its existence and we cannot be true to Pakistan without being true to its ideology."³⁴

The Islamic character of Pakistan has been exploited time and again in order to uphold her distinct identity from that of "Hindu" India . Ever since 1949 when the objectives Resolution was adopted by the constituent Assembly of Pakistan the

Islamic thrust had been a determinant of Pakistan's foreign policy in one form or the other.

Ideologically speaking Islamic Pakistan goes asymmetrical with secular India. But it has also produced a definite strain in Indo-Pak relations. As an Islamic State Pakistan considers it her sacred duty to extend her protectionist role to all the Muslims in the sub-continent including those who are living in India. For her "the Muslims inside Pakistan and across the border in India..... from one nation, though citizens of two states Pakistan therefore still considers the Muslims across the borders as her special responsibility and pressure."³⁵ Therefore whenever there are some communal clashes in India, Pakistan media and also the political leaders find it an occasion to ventilate with the Hindus does clearly negate. Two Nation theory on which Pak was founded. "The fact that many millions of Muslims to live in India", Wave anti-Muslims and Hindu as Imperialists. Therefore at the global level or particularly at the Islamic meets such events are highlighted by Pakistan in order to mobilize diplomatic support against India.

The Islamic base of Pakistan State manifactets itself in yet another form while shaping her relations with India. The orderly coexistence of the Muslims seem perfectly content to live in India, raises the basic question of the identity of Pakistan itself as homeland for persecuted Indian Muslims. It raises a question in secret moments of self-doubt, was Pakistan some kind of cosmic error."³⁶

Infact, Pakistan identity, history, geography and culture are all interwoven with India. Therefore, their problem is how to hold themselves distinct from those of India. Any intimacy with India threatens Pakistan's identity. Hence anti India posture is almost a national compulsion with Islamabad.

For the same reason forces pulling Pakistan away from the sub-continent have been active. Since her inception in 1947. Her special bonds of friendship with the Muslim countries in the neighbourhood, like Iran and with those in the Middle East and in the gulf region can very easily be explained in this framework of analysis. These countries are regarded as the "diplomatic territory" of Pakistan. Any efforts on the part of India to strike special bonds with these countries are looked upon as trespass on Pakistan, natural sphere of interest. Mrs. Gandhi visit to

Saudi Arabia, with which Pakistan has traditionally had very intimate relationship, was regarded by some in Pakistan as "a part of a concerted effort to isolate Pakistan diplomatically."

Pakistan also tried in 1950s to float an alternate model of international relations, when Indian approach of non-alignment and Panchsheel model of world relations seemed to have caught the imagination of several Third world countries. Pakistan sought to build up an international Islamic Group with Pakistan as its epicenter. By hosting and organizing Islamic Conferences Pakistan on the one hand hoped to assume the leadership of the Islamic World but at the same time they tried to mobilize world public opinion on the issue of Kashmir. Viewing international relations as a collection of religious constellations Ayub Khan dreamt that one of the pillars of these constellations will definitely be Pakistan.

The cultural diversities in Pakistan is yet another detrimental of her foreign policy. Though predominantly Muslim State, the regional, ethnic and cultural diversities in Pakistan have been as, if not more, strongly entrenched in her society as in India.

The prevalence of two different types of political systems in India and Pakistan is in itself a source of friction between the two. Pakistan's military projects and programme ever since Islamabad decided to follow alliance and military aid strategy in order to attain "parity" with India have been suspected in the political perceptions of New Delhi. In the context of the hostile exchanges in the past these perceptions have not only hardened but have become firm convictions. The divergence and divide in security perception, can to a large extent be attributed to the pre eminent role which the military factor plays in Pakistan and a fairly strong popular support which the democratic process enjoys in India. Any moves or initiative to restore democracy in Pakistan is convinced to be a threat by the military leadership and the easiest way to discredit such moves will be by proclaiming that they are inspired and supported by India. India baiting seems to have acquired a permanent place in the Foreign and defence policies of Islamabad.³⁷

Indian Democracy in fact, rejects the "Two - Nations' Theory". The 'two - nations' theory is legally and constitutionally unsound and socially and

sociologically reactionary. This theory was never accepted by the Congress prior to independence and has been totally rejected by the Indian constitution. The 'two-nation' theory proceeds on the fallacious and irrational assumption that religions makes a nation. The presence of several multiracial, multi religious, multi lingual nation in the world is a standing territory to the fact that the concept of 'nation' has not direct relation with the concept of religion.

Gandhiji revolted against this 'two – nations' theory, and he expressed his emphatic disapproval of the pernicious doctrine of the 'two-nations' which came to be preached in support of the creation of Pakistan prior to 1947, by declaring that Pakistan would be born over his dead body. Gandhiji's solicitude for the poor and humble of this earth needs no mention. Throughout his life he was a champion of the downtrodden and their saviour. History has naturally acclaimed him as one of the nobled of men. In Gandhiji's philosophy and practice difference in religion was altogether immaterial.

When Gandhiji expressed his whosehearted condemnation of the attempt to create Pakistan on the attempt to create Pakistan on the theory of 'two-nation-what Gandhiji meant was that this permi doctrine would ultimately mean disaster both for India and Pakistan, and that was proved to be true when both India and Pakistan celebrated the birth of the two respective Dominious with great acclaim and celebrations Gandhiji was engaged in the significant though tragic task of quenching the fire of communal fray, which had overwhelmed Bengal. In the address, which he delivered at Calcutta on 14th August, Gandhiji called upon his countrymen to celebrate the accession by a fast and prayer. It is not difficult to imagine how the aftermath of the division must have caused great anguish to Gandhiji . He had always looked upon India as one and invisible . He had never believed in Jinna's two-national theory and never change Nationality. He considered himself as much of Pakistan as of Hindustan. So far as he was concerned, nationalism transcended religious differences. It is also necessary to remember that the formation of Pakistan and India did not, in fact, proceed on and such theory. If the division of India was based in the basis of Muslims being a nation separate from the Hindus and the rest, it would follow on a matter of constitutional law that the

Muslims who remained in India would be alien and that is a proposition which is entirely unthinkable.

Every single provision of the constitution totally rejects the theory of two nations and proclaims that in India Hindu and Muslim, Christian, Sikhs, Parsis and Jews and all them, whatever their religion, are citizens who are equal in their rights and in their obligations. Besides, it the basis of Partition was that the Muslim form a separate nation, why was it necessary to hold a plebiscite in the North-West Frontier Province where 90 percent of the population was Muslim, why again were the legislatures consulted in Bengal and in the Punjab, which has Muslim majorities. It is true that in the result the provinces which had Muslim Majorities formed Pakistan; but this is very much different from saying that the division of India into two Dominions was then made on the basis that the Hindus and Muslim formed two different nations. The presence of over fifty million Muslims in India who are and are entitled to be treated on citizens is a standing and effective answer to this reactionary an unsound theory of two nations. India thus totally and unreservedly rejects the theory of two nations and regards it as medieval, irrational and unscientific.

The genesis of two-nations teory was purely political. The movement for creation Pak., came into existence not because Muslims could not live with the Hindus but because a section of modern English education, westernized Muslims felt that they will not get their due share of political and economic power. And that in the Independent India they will be dominated by Hindus. It was poverty of the masses, as an Important to which the partition of Indian may be traced. Poverty is equal though curable. But it can be cured by economic pragmatism, and by no other ideology secularism can not mean an anti-religion, all religions are given respect and freedom of activity, presided of course they do not impinge upon each other and presided further that foreign help, funds are not allowed to be channelled through Ostensibly religious organization for political pourposes.

The theoru of Pakistan was baseed on the concept of Hindus and Muslims of two nations. Hindus and Muslims might be intermingled all over India and in every region of India; Hindu and Muslims might be having common ancestors, but they were proclaimed to be two Indians – two nations. This premise to basze nationality

an religion was contrary to the every accepted historical definition. A Nation is a historically evolved stable community of language, territory, economic life and psychological make up manifested in a community of culture. None of the above characterized by itself is sufficient to define a nation.

On the other hand, it is sufficient for a single one of the characteristics to be absent and the nation ceases to be a nation. By this test, it is evident that the Muslims of India could not be called one 'nation'. Their languages are different. Ethnically, they are different. Between the Pathan and the Bengali Muslims, the only common feature is religion. But this is hardly sufficient to constitute a nation,

Majorities of the Muslims in India are converts from Hinduism or descendents of converts. How could they constitute themselves into a separate nation, converts never constitute a separate nation. The Hindus and Muslims have lived together for centuries and are destined to live so for times immemorial. They share similar customs and social behaviours and the difference of social practices has never been greater than those of Hindus of Punjab and those living in Madras or in Bengal. They have been one and are destined to remain one.

Has the partition solved the problems for which it was accepted? The obvious answer is :

It has not solved the problem. Rather the problems have been aggravated.

Aurabindo, predicted that in year ahead, India and Pakistan would ultimately come closer and stand united. In the words of Aurobindo, "Unity may finally come about under whatever from the exact form may have a pragmatic but not a fundamental importance. But by whatever mean, in whatever way, the division must go, unity must and will be achieved, for it is necessary for the greatness of India's future."¹²⁶

The ideology of two nation theory began to collapse immediately after Partition. Indo-Pak problems cannot be effectively solved until the partition is annulled, for the partition has solved no problems. It has neither brought peaceful coexistence of the two states – India and Pakistan – nor has it resulted into desired Hindu-Muslim amity. India has always stood for cooperation and friendship with all

and entertains malice towards none. The past unfortunate incidents of armed struggles of 1947, 1965, 1971 and 1999 are unfortunate events.

The last more than 50 years of continued hostility between the two countries, are all harbingers of the end of partition and unification of what nature has created as one inevitable unit – United India. The Partition indeed was an evil. Millions of people were uprooted and yet it did not end in 1947 and for many it was a long drawn unending process. The partition went on for many years, with Partition, the birth places of many, their old homes became foreign land, to them.

From the above discussion, it became clear that the ideology of the Two-Nation Theory is a 'cure'. Most of Pakistan's problems with India are the outcome of the former's adherence to the ideology of the two-nation theory. That ideology is contradictory to that of India Pakistan is a monolithic theocratic state with one religion, one language and one mind. On the other hand, India is the opposite – with many religions, many languages, many communities and many minds. The divergences between the two countries are of a fundamental and multiple nature and they have outstripped any prospect of convergences between them. The foundations of the two countries are not only distinct but different. India achieved independence and nationhood as result of the freedom struggle against the age old British colonialism. On the other hand, Pakistan was the first country in the twentieth century born as a result of the demand by a religious community. It was founded on the basis of the two nation theory, holding that the Hindus and the Muslims were separate nations. The Father of the Nation, Quid-i-Azam, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, had visualized it in 1947 itself that the role of religion in the governance of the country was dangerous and, therefore, he warned that the newly born country was not going to be a theocratic state to be ruled by religious priests. Advocating equal citizenship to all communities and hinting at religious freedom which would unshackle any kind of religious identity, he in his inaugural address to the constituent Assembly said, "..... in the course of time, Hindus will cease to be Hindus and Muslims will cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense because that is the personal faith of the individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the nation."³⁸ He further said, "..... change your past and work together in the spirit that everyone of you, no matter what community he belongs to, is, first, second and last a citizen of the state

with equal rights.³⁹ he confessed on his death – bed that he committed a 'blunder' by creating the state of Pakistan.⁴⁰ as he foreseen that his successor were not going to uphold the values he strived for. The foregoing secular statements of Jinnah amounted to the contradiction of the two-nation theory. Recently Ayesha Jalal, the distinguished is based Pakistan scholar said that Jinnah was against Partition of the Indian Subcontinent.⁴¹ he did not grant a separate country for Muslims. In fact the demand for Pakistan was a bargaining card for securing better deals for the Indian Muslims.

The secession of Bangladesh and Pakistan's humiliating military defeat at the hands of India were the two defining events that continue to haunt Pakistan even today. The emergence of Bangladesh not only exposed the absurdity of the two-nation theory, the very *raison d'être* for Pakistan but also repeatedly reiterated the fact that religion alone was inadequate for Pakistan as a nation-state.

The founding fathers of Pakistan proposed the political idea on the basis of the two nation theory as a homeland for South Asian Muslims. It suited then initially in order to mobilize the Indian Muslims in the struggle to ward's nationhood. After the nationhood was achieved a controversy erupted. Pakistani Muslims of secular mindset believed that religion was not the basis for nationhood and only common territory defines a nation. Their opponents argued that their common religion of Islam was adequate to form a nation. They ultimately prevailed. Thus, Jinnah's successor's finally flouted the secular values he preached. Islam has remained a dominant factor influencing the political destiny of Pakistan. It ensured the survival of the two nation theory. But, unfortunately, Islam has failed to unite the Muslims of Pakistan, create a national ethos and prevent the fractured nature of internal politics. The wish of the founding fathers of Pakistan to create a homeland for the South Asian Muslims proved to be a nightmare. The initial setback came from the decision of a large section of the Indian Muslims to stay away in India. In the process they disapproved the thesis that Muslims in India were ill treated or exploited by the Hindus. Today India commands the second largest Muslims population among the countries of the world. Thus over 120 million Indian Muslims, almost equivalent to the total population of Pakistani Muslims, are firmly loyal to the Indian nation despite frequent provocation and allurements from abroad. Pakistan's former Army Chief

General Jahangir Karamat has also confirmed it by saying, "Indian Muslims remain loyal to India even after the formation of Pakistan as the home for the Muslims of the Indian sub-continent."⁴² India, since time immemorial, has welcomed Islam and continues to be a heaven for Islamies. It is one of the few non-Muslim majority countries that allows Muslims to conduct their life in accordance with Islamic personal laws. India is the biggest centre of Islamic literature in the world even after partition when Muslim-majority areas broke away to form Pakistan. On the contrary, Pakistan has not become the country of even all of its Muslim inhabitants. Quite narrowly, it is primarily the country of dominant Punjabi Muslims. Thus, it represents only a section of its Muslim population ignoring the hopes and aspiration of the people of Singh, Baluchistan and NWFP.

The ideology of two-nation theory now popularly known as the clash of civilization in the light of Samuel P. Huntington's thesis first developed in his essay "A clash of Civilization" published in Foreign Affairs and later expanded into a full-fledged book published in 1996 under the title of A Clash of Civilizations and Remarking of World- Order has been at the root of the 54 years old conflict between India and Pakistan. It is the real core issue between the two countries. The most significant fact is that the Pakistani army is the guardian of the ideology to two-nation theory,⁴³ which never hopes to abandon it.

"The most dangerous country" these are words used by Seymour Hersh in an article published in the Statesman. The words are a description of Pakistan. The question how did Pakistan, founded on 14th August 1947, grow into a dangerous state. It is true that Pakistan created by M A Jinnah on the foundation of an irrational two-nation theory, was crippled at its birth. Jinnah himself called it a "moth-eaten Pakistan". The Boundary Commission did not give it what it wanted, the whole of the Punjab and the whole of Bengal, Delhi and Calcutta and corridor from Karachi to Calcutta.

Mr. Radcliff's award created in Pakistan an anger against India which it could never shed. Actually, it has been steadily on the increase since it came into existence. Perhaps the Bombay barrister realized that his two-nation theory was untenable in the modern world. In his presidential address to Pakistan's Constituent Assembly in Karachi on 11 August 1947. Jinnah declare: "We are starting with this

fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one state In course of time Hindu would cease to be Hindus and Muslim would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense but in the political sense as citizens of the state. (M-A Jinnah, speeches and statement, 1947-1948 (1989) where was this idea of separation of religion from politics when he enunciated his two nation theory in his demand for partition. It is the USA which encouraged Pakistan to become a dangerous state even in those days when its armed forces were busy liberating South Vietnam from Communist rule. America has pampered Pakistan and made it an Alaler Gharer Dulal, a spoiled child, even when it was ruled by a dictator.⁴⁴

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CHAPTER - V

INDIA AND PAKISTAN : THE WARING PARTNERS

War and Conflict is an inevitable legacy for any country. And the region like South Asia is no exception to this rule. It has witnessed a whole range of manifestation from informally expressed diplomatic displeasure to full scale war. The expressed issues in such interstate conflicts in the region have included territorial disputes, economic issues, threat to political stability and national security, communal disharmony and danger to the very survival at one participant or the other. The most acrimonious relationship has, however, been between India and Pakistan who have gone to war with each other for several times before & after partition. And all these wars have brought out in bold relief the extent and intensity of the great power involvement in the region. This is not to imply that the great powers have simply exported to and imposed upon the subcontinent conflicts created outside the region local roots of conflict in the region have, of course, existed, but these local roots were largely the creation of the historical melting – pot process, colonial rule, and the great powers have linked their states and strategies with these roots in order to advise and inflate them much beyond their inherent proportion. Before we take up the various aspects of the great powers' involvement in the Indo-Pakistan conflict, the regional roots of wars and conflict in the subcontinent must be identified and analysed.

India and Pakistan have fought three wars in 21 years, two of them over Kashmir and one over Bangladesh and recently 1991 Kargil War. All the three wars marked the aftermath of Partition of the sub-continent. Pakistan risked war with India in 1948 and 1965 in pursuit of its commitment to gain control of Kashmir. The 1971 war arose from the Pakistani Attempt to prevent by military means the secession of what was then its eastern province. But India's territorial integrity has not been threatened as seriously since the 1971 war as it has been threatened by Pakistan's ill-conceived intrusions across the LOC into the Kargil district of J K in the Summer months of 1999, to physically occupy territory on the Indian side. To

some extent, the Pakistanis have succeeded in internationalizing the Kashmir issue through their intervention in Kashmir. In fact, the military action initiated by Pak in Kargil district has completely derailed the Lahore peace process. Contemporary studies suggests that it is misperceptions about the intentions of one's rival rather than rivalries over real estate or mutually conflicting nationalism that lead to war. In 1948 and 1965 the rulers of Pakistan failed to perceive correctly how India would react to attempts to seize Kashmir by infiltration and military force. The Pakistanis had a completely unreal faith in the fighting ability of their own soldiers and the lack of this ability in the Indian troops.

Pakistan's perceptions of the realities in Kashmir also proved to be hopelessly wrong. The Kashmiri Muslims did not rise against their government and the Indian forces received all the civilian cooperation they needed to defend the valley.

Similar misconception about possible Indian responses also led to the war of 1971. The 1971 war heated the Shimla Agreement of 1972, the only one between the two on Kashmir to date. It binds the two countries to the line of actual control stemming from the 1971 engagements, and to secure a settlement of the dispute entirely through peaceful means. There is enough documentary evidence today to suggest that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto would personally have preferred to settle the Kashmir issue more or less along the line of actual control. He would not because this would not have been accepted by the people of Pakistan, especially in the wake of the defeat in Bangladesh.

For 15 years Pakistan and India have abided by both the letter and the spirit of the Shimla Agreement. But now it is entirely impossible that Kashmir will become the *Casus belli* for a fourth war between the two countries. Was it by accident or design that India and Pakistan got locked in this most dangerous game of brinkmanship? A million troops on either side of a border that has been mutually violated three times in less than 40 years can be no new year joke. Especially when many thousands of them stood almost eyeball to eyeball, grimly attired in battle armour, ready to pounce upon one another. Students of war have tried to show that war breaks out, more often than not, as a result of gross misperceptions of each other's intentions, capabilities and potential resources on the part of belligerent

nations. Henry Stocasinger, an American political scientist, has shown in a book that misperceptions were at the root of the India Pakistan wars of 1948 and 1965. Perceptions get seriously distorted when mutually unfriendly or hostile governments suffer lack of information and communication.

But one thing is important that during the entire pre-colonial phase, security threats emanated principally from the States beyond the north western frontiers of the subcontinent. There was the long history of the so called Hindu period, approximately spanning 1500-B C. to A D 1000, which was beset with invasions by the Aryan, the Achruminius, the Greens, the parthians, the Sakas, the Kushous and the Huns. There was the relatively short Muslim period stretching from the Turkish raids in AD 1000 until the mid-eighteenth century, which was also characterized by invasions by the Turks, the Afghans and the Mughals who followed each other in close succession.

During this entire period, there really was 'no theory of war' and 'no system of defence', to speak of. And despite the introduction of cavalry and cannon during the Muslim period, there was no 'military tradition developed in India'. The infantry was neither trained nor organized nor even equipped as a serious arm of war. There was just 'a multitude of people assembled, without reference to rank or file.

If war only after the arrival of the British on the subcontinents, and with their final occupation of what is now South Asia, that a modern defence system was really organized.

The first war was 1947-48 war which caused partition of India into India and Pakistan and tarnished India's image into second Indo-Pakistan war of 1965. If in 1962, India had been defeated by a powerful enemy, in 1965, she had been impressed by a weaker one. If the 1962 war had the Indian Government to seek external aid, the 1965 war had resulted in the mediation of an external power – the Soviet Union – thus further illustrating India's inability to manage her own crisis.

The another important event that tarnished India's image was paradoxically the Third Indo-Pakistan War or the Bangladesh Crisis in 1971. Though here, India won the War, contributed to the partition of Pakistan, and successfully defied the

Chinese and Americans, her image did not improve. India was now considered a full-blooded regional power with hegemonic designs of her own – a state of affairs that disqualifies a nation from playing the type of role that Nehru had defined. And lastly the Kargil war held in May July 1999 turned into bloodier and intense and the Clinton administration intervened to help defuse the crisis. On July 12, the Congress also turned up the heat on Islamabad, when it passed the “Sense of the House Resolution 227” declaring that it was culpable in sending armed insurgents into the Indian territory, while stressing that India and Pakistan “resolve all of their differences within the framework of the Simla Agreement in order to preserve peace and security in South Asia. It also suggested that the administration lock loans to Pakistan from international financial institution. Following this agreement, beginning on July 11, the infiltrators began retreating from Kargil as India set July 16 as a deadline for the total withdrawal. On July 12, in an address to the nation, the beleaguered Sharif defended his July 4 agreement with Mr. Clinton as well as his request to the intruders to withdraw from the Indian territory. He also defended his Kargil Policy as something designed to draw the attention of the international community to the Kashmir issue. In this war, more than 400 Indian soldiers, 671 intruders, and 30 Pakistani regulars were killed excluding those that were wounded. The Vajpayee Government was blamed quickly for this loss of life despite intelligence reports about the intruders, although paradoxically, the war unified the country and brought a positive in Indo-American relations as O.¹

On July 14-16, 2001, Summit talks were held at Agra, between V. & M., but they failed as the latter insisted on Vajpayee to accept the Kashmir dispute as core issue which Vaj. rejected. Although both leaders had agreed to meet again during the Nov. UN General Assembly meetings, it did not take place as India was angry over the suicide bomb attack of the Jammu and Kashmir State Assembly building on Octo. 1, in which 40 innocent civilians including the three terrorists who had caused the blast were killed. Vaj took a tough stance indicating that he would not talk to Mushraf centres he ceased supporting the cross border terrorism. Neither did foreign minister Jaswant Singh make the scheduled trip to Pakistan to talk to his counterpart. Relations between the two countries again turned tense resulting in intense exchange of fire along the LOC. But the question to explore is why has this

conflict has become so difficult to resolve. Why have India and Pakistan taken an inflexible position? How can one explain this intractable conflict? We want to explain this inflexibility by the two countries in terms of their mutually exclusive claims made to the state on the basis of historic, political, ethno-religious, legal, strategic, and human rights factors. Thus, these four events, in different ways, contributed to the movement of India and Pak away from their goal of a role player in the international system. The two countries were no longer considered to have the moral authority to mediate or fight for great cause. India, thus, lost her prestige when she lost a war and got impassed in another, and did not regain her prestige by winning the second in which she was involved. When a nation loses a war – even if she is a victim – her favourable image gets eroded and is replaced by an image of nation that is incapable of looking after her affairs. On the other hand, when she wins a war, the favourable image is invariably replaced by an image of mistrust.

Thus British India was divided and a new state called Pakistan was born and Bangladesh born during 1971 in blood and fire as an independent country due to growing economic and political differences with West Pakistan which led East Pakistan to declare independence in 1971 as the new nation of 'Bangladesh'.

The emergence of Bangladesh was one of the most important political developments, in South Asia. As the process of its creation shows, Bangladesh at its birth, was a reaffirmation of civil society. Its were representative and participatory democracy in a pluralist setting. Bangladesh, rising like a phoenix from the ashes of war, of course, represented a statement about "basic needs: food, safe water, the limitation of widespread poverty and human misery." But it also signified social statement about "human dignity, security and a feeling of belonging.

Aptly has it been remarked: "For individuals, the state is like a house. It provides shelter, a structure. But society – society is the home that provides the satisfaction of human needs many Societies are threatened within. The State may hold great power, but the threat results from the disintegration of the social fabric. The representative State denies society a house. In pre – 1971 Pakistan, Bengalis of erstwhile East Pakistan found the state denying their society

the house they wanted. Hence they went for to build their own new house, the sovereign state of Bangladesh.

The initiative that grew in Bangladesh to engineer South Asian Cooperation may be reasonably viewed as a move to urge the States of South Asia to build appropriate houses for their respective societies through cooperation. The repressive State denies society a home, but as it happening in South Africa, a State can reclaim society by empowering its people and building bridges of confidence.

The brief December 1971 war between the two countries had far-reaching consequences for the India sub-continent, changed the power structure of the sub-continent, pricked the bubble of the two-nation theory and put Indo-Pakistan relations in new perspective. To super power response to the crisis in Bangladesh, both in the United Nations and outside, the psychological pressure on India, first by the movement of the enterprise on a shady enterprise to the Bay of Bengal and then the massive vote in favour of a US inspired resolution calling upon both India and Pakistan to cease-fire and effect withdrawal to their respective territories,² recalled the stance of the global actors vis-à-vis India and Pakistan during the cold war period. The psychological inputs, however, failed to produce any worthwhile outputs,³ India not only ran over the Pakistani defences in erstwhile East Pakistan, but was successful in penetrating deep into West Pakistani territories also. The collapse of Pakistani defences in Bangladesh resulted in the full of military junta in Pakistan which paved the way for Z.A.Bhutto to ride the Crest of anti-Junta wave to the president lodge in Islamabad.

The resolution of the major problems arising out of the 1971 war produced a noticeable improvement in Pakistan-India relations. However, this improvement was achieved at a slow pace and the normalization process suffered from periodic disruptions for one reason or another. Similarly, their efforts in the eighties to accelerate the peace of improvement of their relations were disrupted time and again or were slowed down due to the legacy of acrimonious relations, divergence in the perspectives of the two states on a number of bilateral, regional and international issues, and the unresolved bilateral problems.

However, the periodic crisis in their relations were never allowed to cross a point which could make these unmanageable whenever the dialogue was interrupted, Pakistan or India took the initiative within a couple of weeks or months to revive it. The redeeming feature of their diplomacy was that they never completely stopped talking to each other. In fact, there was more interaction between Pakistan and India during the eighties than in the past. In addition to the use of the normal diplomatic channels, the heads of state/government, foreign ministers, and semi or officials met formally and informally to discuss their problems. They did not always succeed in resolving the problems but the fact that they did not give up talking on the contentious issues made it possible to de-escalate periodic crisis in their relations.

In fact, the 1971 debacle and dismemberment effectively ended the espousal of the Two-Nation theory and the cease fire on all fronts ordered by India after the fall of Dhaka buried the myth of Indian plans to undo partition forever for the first time, a new opening appeared within sight with the signing of the Simla Agreement. Bhutto momentarily had given evidence that a sense of realism was sweeping through Islamabad. But he too fathered and preferred to galvanise a shell-shocked people by asking them to resist Indian hegemonies.

The 1974 PNE at Pokhran gave Bhutto another opportunity to drive home to his people India's desire to be the regional hegemonies. It also provided him with a legal cover to pursue the nuclear weapon option. The nuclear weapon issue, along with Islamabad's irredentist claims on Kashmir, symbolized the deep rooted suspicious and misgivings that both sides have had of each other's intentions and actions. Democratic intentenders between persistent bouts of military dictatorship have not altered the existing adversarial perceptions, and all issues in bilateral forums like the intentions behind building the Tulbul Project or extending railway lines across international borders, are driven by these perceptions. Trade, culture, sporting contacts and people to people relations have suffered, despite a common desire on either of the border to interact more closely. Zia's martial law that won without popular support, was unable to correct the existing misperceptions. A change of government in a New Delhi in 1977 had presented a unique opportunity to create new bases for bilateratism, but that too was squandered by Zia to ensure his personal survival. The Janata Government, in a spirit of trying to undo the wrongly

perceived idea in Pakistan of India attempting to dominate the smaller nations of the region, was ready to put the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty on the line, if it helped in creating an atmosphere of trust and amity. But the defeat of the Janata government and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan gave Zia the necessary opportunity to traint the incoming Indira Gandhi government with dominating ambitious and also rebuild bridges with the US which would allow the resumption of arms supplies and economic aid to Pakistan.

The Third War of 1971, was most crucial in its consequences. After this war, a number of regional and extra-regional factors emerged in the sub-continent and around it, compelling the two countries to give up their state of hostility and seek mutual accommodation. A slow and cautious process of normalization of relations started between them, which continued smoothly for a decade or so.

In 1970-71, the people of the eastern wing of Pakistan – mainly Bengalese – revolted against the junta with the demands first of autonomy then of independence. This was popularly known as "Bangladesh Crisis (1971). The military elite came down heavily on the Bengalese and mercilessly killed them. It also accused India to have intervened in the Pakistani affairs to make the things more critical. At this juncture, the United States began to normalize its relations with China, Pakistan's military head of State Yahya Khan acted as the intermediary in the negotiations between these two countries. Thus, an undeclared axis between Islamabad, Beijing and Washington was formed. India apprehended that Beijing and Washington might intervene in Pakistan, and instead of counseling her restraint might encourage a flare-up. What Yahya Khan planned was to involve China and the U.S. in a bid to thwart the movements in East Pakistan, to resist the possibility of India's intervention in favour of the Bengalese, and virtually to encircle in India in this region. Given the possibility of outside interference in Pakistan, and for that matter in India – Pakistan affairs. India could not look upon the situation in South Asia with equanimity and had to respond by involving the Soviet Union through the Indo-Soviet friendship Treaty signed in August 1971.

In fact, the Bangladesh crisis reveals the decisive influence of the United States of America on Pakistan in its conflictual relationship with India. This also revealed the United States' till towards Pakistan. Nixon's handling of the crisis was

completely pro-Pakistan and his pro-Pakistan attitude was nothing but a reward to Yahya Khan for his contribution to Nixon's China Visit.⁴ The United States did not condemn Yahya Khan's military atrocities on East Pakistan. The Nixon Administration tended to see the crisis in the eyes of Yahya Khan in terms of Indo-Pak conflict. Nixon did not come forward to the terms of political settlement wanted by the Awami League and India. Nixon's assurance that Pakistan was being worded into a political settlement were proved to be false.⁵ It can be said that Nixon teloeing the line of Pakistan and support to Yahya Khan militarity and diplomatically landed both India and Pakistan in a war in 1971.

From the above analysis it can be generated that the Bangladesh Crisis in 1971 marked the crescendo of United States' siding with Pakistan to the discontentment of India without the diplomatic and material support from the United States, it would have been very difficult on the part of Yahaya Khan to venture a war on India. Here Nixon could have adopted a neutral posture as the United States did in 1965 and made its military and economic linkage with Pakistan conditional on Pakistan agreeing to a political settlement with Mujibar Rahman. It could not have been impossible on the part of Nixon to exercise this course of action. As he himself had stated: "I have probably the most unusual opportunity, the greatest opportunity, of any president in history. I may be able to do things which can create a new structure of peace in the world."⁶ Instead he overlooked the regional imperatives and gave prominence to his global perspective. Because of the United States' direct involvement, a new dimension to the security problems of India was added which India was to neutralize without loosing sight of the China-Pak axis while maintaining its identity, vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. It also marked the emergence of India as a regional dominant power in Sout Asia which made Pakistan more apprehensive of India's expensive designs. Further it bittered the relationship between India and Pakistan.

In fact, Pakistan was a geographical absurdity which ultimately led to the creation of Bangladesh. The British knew that this was not a viable structure and the last viceroy, Mountbatten, had predicted that East Bengal would break away from Pakistan in a quarter of a century.⁷ What he did not, or could not, predict was that this separation, which came in 1971, would be preceded by an extremely tortuous

process including a full-scale war between India and Pakistan. In addition, to this, the British indecision, conscious or otherwise, regarding the status of the princely states of Hyderabad, Janagada and Kashmir added significantly to the conflict potential inherent in the Indo – Pakistan relationship. A part from it, the actual territorial award finalized by Sir Cyril Radcliffe was an extremely buried exercise. Both India and Pakistan resented the final outcome. In 1965, territorial disparities about Dahgram in the east and in the west brought the two countries to war ultimately in 1971.

In the Bangladesh war of 1971, responsibility for the outbreak of hostilities was shared by both parties to some extent. This can be understood in the light of what has been stated earlier, namely that India as the pre-eminent power in the sub-continent was basically interested in preserving and perpetuating in the statusquo and stability in the subcontinent. Pakistan, on the other hand, had deep states in upsetting the statusquo. It was only in the Bangladesh crisis of 1971 that India was interested in altering the statusquo. This was made all the more urgent because of the mounting problem of refugees from East Bengal. The situation in 1971 was also viewed by the resting elite in India as 'an opportunity of the century' which had all the factors present in it to legitimize India's action (if it was a successful one, as it turned out to be) in cutting Pakistan down to size and thus eliminating for a long time to come Pakistan's chances to distort the natural power hierarchy in the subcontinent in which India occupied the dominant place.⁸ A sense of urgency was injected into India's thinking in this context by the then rapidly emerging rapprochements in Sino-America relations. This process, if allowed to continue without an urgent resolution of the Bangladesh crisis, would have favoured Pakistan and would have had very adverse implications for India.

It is interesting to note further that, whereas status-incongruence locked India and Pakistan into a conflict relationship, the outbreak of armed hostilities coincide with periods of near power parity between them, either actual or so perceived. The status of near equality, in terms of relative strength or weakness, between India and Pakistan at the time of the first Kashmir conflict was inherent in the confusion and disorder generated by the very act of Partition.

This situation was radically altered by the dramatic development of the Sino-American rapproachment in 1971. US rethinking on China in this respect had been

induced mainly by considerations that had very little to do with South Asia. The stalemate in Vietnam, the changing strategic balance vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, which was slowly but definitely eroding American superiority, and domestic pressures for opening new economic avenues abroad contributed to this opening towards China. As against this, India's significance to the US had started to decline.⁹ As a result of this sudden shift in great power equations, the initial pattern of linkages between the superpowers and the regional actors was restored with China weighing in on the side of the US and Pakistan. The major consequences of this shift were the Indo-Soviet treaty and the subsequent emergence of Bangladesh following the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971. Henry Kissinger, the then US Secretary of State, was right when he said that "Bangladesh was not merely a local conflict, but an expression of a particular correlations of global forces."¹⁰

Primarily, the Bangladesh developments had precipitated a situation in which it has become urgent for both India and Pakistan to come round to the negotiating table. As pointed out earlier, the requirements of the two countries are different. Nevertheless, both share the need to readjust their relations. Pakistan today has been reduced to the position where it cannot but accept the loss of eastern half of its territory. Besides, its 90 thousand prisoners and more than five thousand square miles of territory are being held by India. The immediate pre-occupation of Pakistan, therefore, is to recover its men and territory.

Further along with the old issues, Bangladesh is a new factor in Indo-Pak relations. As a third Party it has become an essential ingredient for any settlement between India and Pakistan. Bangladesh, however, does not represent a party outside the region but a new and vibrant unit in South Asia having as much stake a peace in the sub-continent as India and Pakistan. The trends in the future relations among India, Pakistan and Bangladesh show that Pakistan may recognize Bangladesh and thus secure an agreement on the specific issue like prisoners of War. Bangladesh may not therefore, be an obstacle in Indo Pak rapprochement.

Fifty five years have passed, since then several developments have taken place during these years affecting Indo-Pak relation. Year 1971 was the watershed year in Pakistani history. Its East wing seceded to become an independent country. This tremendously affected the power balance in the region and as a result several

new developments took place in Indo-Pak relations. Pakistan's foreign policy and India policy in particular experienced some changes. Eighteen years have passed since then. Though we cannot say that the traditional hostility between the two "unfortunate brother nations"¹¹ has ended, yet it will have to be conceded that now for the past few years there is greater understanding between them. Some of the mistrust and confusion has been allayed and there have been signs of co-operation here and there. Though it is always impossible to guess or to have promotions about the future, nor is it advisable in the study of international relations, yet certain developments and events show positive trends now and even encourage us to think cautiously that one may be looking towards an era of co-operations overlooking, if not forgetting the erstwhile conflict and hostility. Thus, the Two-Nation Theory failed on several grounds. Lack of reconciliation to the partition and a settled fact on the part of India and Pakistan's advocacy of a two-nation theory explain largely the hostile relationship between the two countries. Many Indians felt that the creation of Pakistan was a tragic mistake which might still be corrected, at least as far as East Bengal is concerned. To this may be added India's disapproval of Pakistani advocacy of the two nation theory based on religion. "It was perfectly clear", said J.Nehru, "that it was quite impossible to divide it on the basis of separating religious groups on one side or the other."¹² To accept Pakistan's 'Two Nation Theory' would mean a collapse of the secularistic policy on which the Indian Union rests and a reopening of the conduits of separatism through various religious-sensitized groups. The INC completely rejected the Two-Nation Theory but accepted partition reluctantly as the price to pay to get rid of the British colonial rule and the intransigent Muslim League.

Can friendship begin at 55 for India and Pakistan? Until recently, the Chill between the two seemed too deep for even post-cold war global warming to reach. These sibling states have fought four wars since their bloody division into two newly independent states in 1947.

Talking does not always lead to solutions. But it is a start, working groups will now discuss a range of problems, from the Siachen glacier to the fight against terrorism and promotion of trade. The senior officials and leaders of the two countries who will hope to meet again on January 2004 for direct talks on the

theories/issues the future of much fought over Kashmir and ways to enhance peace and security.

In August 1947, India and Pakistan emerged as two nation states, carved out of the boundaries of the erstwhile British India. Since their birth, tensions began between them, dragging them into four wars in a time period of less than twenty five years. However, the Third War of 1971, was most crucial in its consequences. After this war, a number of regional and extra regional factors emerged in the sub-continent and around it, compelling the two countries to give up their state of hostility and seek mutual accommodation. A slow and cautious process of normalization of relations started between them, which continued smoothly for a decade or so.

On the eve of the thirty-seventh birthday of Pakistan, an alliance of banned political parties calling itself the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy launched a campaign for a return to civilian rule in the country. The Indian statements in this regard, were held by the government of Pakistan, as constituting interference in the internal affairs of this country. This happened at a crucial stage in the improvement of Indo-Pak relations, when a joint Ministerial Commission had just been established to explore the possibilities of cooperation. India's attitude during the MRD campaign seemed to preclude the hopes for further improvement in bilateral relations. In fact, the process of normalization of relations received a major setback.

There were a number of regional factors that led India and Pakistan to normalize their relations, like leadership issue, Simla Agreement, Lahore Agreement, Pakistan's Search for a Middle Eastern Role, Psychological factor, Kargil issue, Nuclear issue and border disputes and others.

Besides regional factors, there were many extra-regional factors, which also provided an impetus for India and Pakistan to normalize their relations. But the question is whether the process of normalization or factors would be able to absorb the present shock and begin to move forward again. On the whole, India and Pakistan have in recent years made a great deal of progress in normalizing their relations. The present setbacks are not likely to affect this overall process to the extent of stultifying it. An improvement in internal political conditions in each country will further

reduce the possibilities of tension and conflict between the two. Let us start with the leadership issue that affects mostly to normalize Indo-Pak relations.

The personality factor is being increasingly recognized as a crucial element, perhaps even more crucial than some of the established institutions. It would seem that in a country like India, it is the office of the Prime Minister which performs this role. It is the Prime Minister who is the central figure in the foreign policy sector. It is he who decides, and it is around him that the decision making process really functions. There is really no really other personality that has replaced the Prime Minister as a leader. So any analysis of the decision making process of any country like India, Pakistan, Srilanka or others, has to centre on the leadership, his personality, his belief and his role.

On the other hand, it can be argued that in a country like Pakistan, leadership Charisma plays an important role also, as it is clear from the role played by Zinnah down to Musharaffe. In case of Pakistan, the level of President's influence and the importance of his role is very much contingent on his personality, the magnitude of his interest and the security of his position within the political system like India. Hence, the personality factor and leadership perception of both the countries creates a problem from time to time for successful Indo-Pak relations.

There would have been a safe and smooth transition from the administrative state model to the participatory model as has been in the case of India; had Pakistani leadership been consistently articulate, effective and visionary. As a matter of fact, Pakistani polity has suffered since its inception from what may be called leadership syndrome. Conceptually and perpetually, leadership syndrome means that Pakistani leadership has been sometimes ineffective, and even rootless; at other times, there has been apparently articulate, effective and visionary leadership, but it failed because of some negative qualities such as authoritarian tendencies and lack of political discipline. This syndrome can be explained empirically by analyzing the behaviour and performance of the leaders in certain given situations in terms of qualities both positive and negative.¹⁴⁷ Tolerance of opposition is the essence of democracy. It is inherent in any democratic set up that where there is a political party holding an office in the government there should be another in opposition as well; and the party holding in the central govt. and another in the provincial govt. while in

Pakistan all political parties and political figures have been advocating loudly and vociferously for a democratic set up of govt., while holding office in the govt. they have been extremely intolerant of any opposition – party or party govt. Two glaring examples can be cited here. Within a week of his assumption of the office of the Governor General, Mohammad Ali Zinnah ordered the dismissal of the constitutionally elected Congress govt. in the North West Frontier and installed his own defeated party in power there. Similarly, Z.A. Bhutto toppled the elected govts. of NAP – JUI in the NWFP and Baluchistan to lodge his own party in power there.

In fact, instability delays and inhibits the success of steps taken towards resolving or reducing conflict. Regarding India's outstanding problems with Pakistan the former British Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, quoted Nehru as having said in 1958.

It was impossible to deal with the Pakistan Govt, – they never stayed in office, for more than a few months they had no sound democratic system, there was nobody who could settle any agreement in fact he (Nehru) was not at all hopeful.¹⁴⁷

In tune with Macmillan, it became clear that Jinnah Liaquat leadership did not create any democratic convention. To create healthy democratic conventions, Jinnah could have acted as a figure head like his counterpart in India, leaving the real power with the Prime Minister. But he did not do so. He acted in authoritarian manner; nothing could happen in Pakistan without his approval. He left a legacy of confusion about the powers between the Governor General (later President) and the Prime Minister and about the latter's power to dismiss any govt. irrespective of the support it enjoyed in the provincial Assembly or National Assembly. This paved the way for authoritarianism and political instability for the future and belied the hopes for a federal set up. The dismissal of Prime Minister Khwaja Tazimuddin by Governor General Ghulam Mohammad can be cited as an illustration. Later, Central Cabinets were installed and dismissed several times on the dismissed several times on the whims of the Governor General/President. Instability and personality factor also makes it impossible for the political leadership and the negotiator to adopt an accommodative give-and-take approach. Therefore, the

leadership issue should start from the Nehru – Zinnah's era, otherwise it will be hard to reduce all international behaviour to unilateral actions and bilateral relationships.

Nheru, undoubtedly, was the sole architect of India during most of the period of his mandate (1947-64). Since he was also his own foreign Minister, practically all decisions were taken by him personally, with the infrastructure support of the Ministry of External Affairs. There were really no other institutions to speak of with which he could interact.

The factor of Status inconsistency in international relations has not been adequately emphasized and properly investigated, particularly with reference to interstate conflict and this factor has played a crucial role in the India – Pakistan conflict. The Indian and Pakistani perceptions and self images of their power-status vis-à-vis each other in the regional as well as the global contexts were so mutually incompatible that their driven to achieve these self-perceived status position brought than into armed clashes with each other. The supporting and aggregating impulses and implications of the processes of state and nation building, as also of the historical evolution of the two states, converged and were intricately enmeshed with the question of status – incompatibility. This incompatibility has further determined their respective security and strategic requirements in general and their security postures towards each other in particular. As a result it has conditioned and shaped the totality of their approaches towards each other. It can be easily described as the main propelling force behind the Indo-Pakistani conflict and their respective behaviors. The Nehruvian model envisaged very close and cooperative relations in all vital matters between India and its immediate neighbors – specially Pakistan. Nehru had even talked of forging a 'closer union', 'confederation.. of independent states with common defense and economic possibility in South Asia.¹⁵ India wanted Pakistan to be a friendly and cooperative member of this community, as a sovereign independent state and a stable and favourable regional environment in South Asia was necessary for both countries – which is possible only through the good relations of both the countries.

The new strategy, in Nehru's view, had to be political, while accepting the normal expansion of the armed forces, his perception emissioned the tackling of national security issues essentially through political initiatives. Designing a defence

policy was an anathema to him. Immediately following the partition of the subcontinent, he apparently made it clear that India did not 'need a defence policy since 'we foresee no military threats' and since 'the police are good enough to meet the security needs.'¹⁶

The quintessence of Nehru's thinking on the whole problem of national security – at least at the time of India's independence – thus was that the international configuration of international forces were a sufficiently good protective barrier for the maintenance of India's independence, and that there was nothing in the nature of a crisis that India may be faced with that could not be resolved peacefully.

At the global level, where the threat could have emanated from the politics of the cold war and the resulting super-power pressures, Nehru's perception led him to the conclusion that the existing balance of power in the international system would guarantee India's security.

At the regional level, N's whole thinking and strategy on national security was to seek out political solutions to situations of conflict. For him there was no other alternative for a country like his own which, in his view, should have the ambition of playing an important role in the international system. Though Nehru did not take a benign view of Pakistan – gives his unhappiness over the partition of the subcontinent – his broad strategic thinking on foreign policy pushed him to avoid any confrontation. The Indian decision to take the Kashmir question to the United Nations after the 1947-48 Indo-Pakistan war, for example, illustrated India's approach to conflict situations.

On the other side Pakistan is the other country, which would regard India's rise with alarm. This is, undoubtedly a factor that India will have to take into account. An eventual solution to Indo-Pakistani disputes would have to be sought through serious give and take bilateral negotiations, but there appears to exist a general consensus in India that there is no reason why India should forsake her larger military role in the international system because of objections raised by a neighbor.

At the global level, India built up her image as a non-aligned, peaceful, friendly and anti-imperialist country. Considerable efforts were made during Nehru's premiership to built up this macro image. That India was generally successful in doing so is evident from the string of initiatives that were taken, the stack of friend agreements that were concluded, the magnitude of conferences that were attended, and the abundance of generally acceptable declarations that were made on a wide array of international issues. When one evokes this euphoric period, India's good offices role in Korea, her mediatory role in Indo-China her initiatives in the non-alignment movement, and her firmly anti-imperialist rhetoric in the United Nations come to mind. All this was done with considerable dexterity and with considerable prudence.

If Nehruian diplomacy was successful at the macro level, it can not at the micro-level. If India was a successful performer internationally, she was not regionally.

India's successful intervention in Bangladesh is a major landmark in Indian diplomacy. It was this even and this crisis that generated a major shift from the original Nehruvian tradition of concentrating on the affairs of the world to a more practical and more power-oriented policy, the focal point of which was the mobilization of India's power to safeguard her national interests. And within this broad framework, what has clearly emerged is the centrality of South Asia in Indian diplomatic thinking with a dimension and a coherence that did not exist before.

Since, as the saying goes, nothing succeeds like success, it can also be argued that nothing fails like failure. The military impasse in which India found herself during her first encounter with Pakistan in 1948, and the humiliating defeat that she suffered at the hands of the Chinese in 1962, eroded her image in South Asia. The big India, after all, was not that powerful. And as is often the case in such situations, the countries of the region felt themselves more free to diversity their foreign relations. Some of them even turned to China to counterbalance or forestall any strong pressure that may emanate from India. The cause of our major problem is India's inability to reconcile herself to our existence as a sovereign independent nation. At the back of it all was India's ambition to absorb Pakistan or turn her into a satellite.

Pakistani leaders viewed the acceptance of a lower status vis-à-vis India, in terms of the sub continental balance of power, as the very negation of Pakistan's independent existence. This constituted a source of threat and insecurity to them. The Indian leaders, on the other hand, saw any disturbance of the regional power hierarchy, by way of Pakistan's alliance first with the western block and then with China, as a source of grave danger to peace, security and stability in the sub continent. Thus, the question of status incongruence between the two states was intricately mixed up with their respective perceptions of peace and security. What caused partition continued to cause conflict between India and Pakistan. On the other hand, political instability, when viewed in the context of competition, rivalry and conflict among and within the ruling elites in India and Pakistan, offers further interesting and valuable insights into their conflict relationship. It was the continuous conflict between the political, bureaucratic and military elites in Pakistan, which after Jinnah's death, adversely affected the evolution of a mature foreign policy including the policy towards India. In the early years several well-meaning attempts to reduce the salience of the Indo-Pakistani conflicts were frustrated owing to this internal tug of war. Since the beginning of the 1960's, the undercurrent of rivalry between Bhutto on the one hand and Pakistani leaders like President Ayub, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and even Yahya Khan, on the other, drove Pakistan to the brink of war as well as into armed conflict with India several times. It is now known, for instance, that Bhutto, since 1962, had been advocating a war with India as against a much more cautious approach adopted by Ayub. The former was also not happy with the ceasefire of 1965 and the Tashkent agreement of 1966 which formalized this ceasefire.¹⁷ Even the British attempt at mediation during the kutch conflict (April-May 1965) was delayed and complicated by Bhutto's intransigence.¹⁸ Recent writings have also indicated that Bhutto had a vested interest in the 1971 India-Pakistan war and the eventual separation of Bangladesh from West Pakistan.¹⁹ The result was that Pakistan decision-makers were almost driven to the state where that conflict became inevitable. The same Bhutto, after becoming the Prime Minister of the new Pakistan in 1972, also became the main architect of a policy of détente with India. However, Bhutto's hawkish approach to Indo-Pakistani relations before the emergence of Bangladesh should not be understood as a purely individual and personal exercise. He was representing and articulating the approaches of certain

powerful political interests in Pakistan, be they some sections in the military or bureaucracy or even external influences.

Intra-elite conflicts and competition in India were also not devoid of important implications for a policy towards Pakistan. In the initial period, Sardar Patel was the spokesman for a hardline policy towards Pakistan as against Nehru's approach of greater accommodation. One of the Patel's secretaries has written :

Temperamentally, on matters of dispute with Pakistan Sardar was firm and unyielding though he did not, except in matters of vital importance, trouble himself with details on which Panditji and Gopaldaswamy had their way without interference from him. There is also no doubt that there was an undercurrent of militancy in Sardar's approach; militancy was, however, not synonymous with bellicosity or war-mongering but arose from a realization that that was the only language which Pakistan understood.²⁰

Fortunately for Nehru, Sardar Patel did not live long enough to influence policy towards Pakistan. Amongst the Political Parties, the Jana Sangha advocated a strong Indian Posture towards Pakistan. The same Jana Sangha leadership, when in power in India after March 1977 as a constituent of the Janata Party, claimed to be the Champion of peaceful and friendly relations with Pakistan. There were also a number of Dawlirish elements in the Congress but until Nehru's death they could not have their way easily. They did, however, put pressure on Nehru's successors, Lal Bahadur Shastri, particularly between April and December 1965, to deal with Pakistan firmly. They also opposed the payment to Pakistan falling due in 1965 under the terms of the Indus Water Treaty.²¹ However, as compared to the Pakistani situation, politics in India have had a much wider base and more varied issues for intra-elite conflict. Accordingly, the intensity of India as an issue in Pakistan's domestic politics was much greater than was the case in India – vis-a-vis the Pakistan issue.²²

The legacy and leadership style of Zinnah should be noted here. The influence of Dadabhai Naoroji and Gopal Krishna Gokhale on his own political views brought him in close association with the Indian National Congress and he joined the moderate wing of this organization when in 1910 and 1911, the Council of

the All India Muslim League suggested radical changes in the league's constitution, Jinnah was invited to participate in its deliberation and tender his well-considered advice. In consequence of discussion the All Indian Muslim League at its Lucknow Session in 1913 acknowledged suitable self-government as one of its objects. The way to rapprochement was being opened for a long time (1910) and in compliance with the desire of Maulana Muhammed Ali and Sayyid Wajir Hassan, Jinnah was formally enrolled as a member of the All-India Muslim League in the Autumn of 1913.

Henceforward, he became an active protagonist of both the political organizations, Indian National Congress and the Muslim League – and till the commencement of Gandhi's Non-violent Non-corporation Movement, he continued to draw unadulterated approbation and admiration from both. Jinnah acted as a Mediator between the Hindus and the Muslims and strived to establish goodwill between the two communities, easily winning for himself the title of Ambassador of Hindu – Muslim Unity. The Lucknow Pact of 1916 was, to great extent, the result of his efforts and it was at his initiative that the Memorandum of the Nineteen – Hindu and Muslim members of the Imperial Legislative Council – was submitted to the British Government with a view to obtain for the Indian's a substantial measure of self government.

But the Nagpur session of the Indian National Congress which commenced its sitting on December 26, 1920 proved to be the parting of ways, for it was here that Mahatma Gandhi's programme of Non-Cooperation was finally adopted. Jinnah vehemently opposed it. But this 'was the only dissentient voice' and as an inveterate opponent of Gandhi's tactics, he could no longer remain in the Congress. He resigned his membership after more than two decades of ardent association. Speaking on the Sixth anniversary of late G.K.Gokhale on 19 February, 1921, he told his audience that he was convinced in his mind that the programme of Mahatma Gandhi was taking them to a wrong channel. It was, thus, after the adoption of the plan of Non-Cooperation at Nagpur that Jinnah could be said to have really joined the League for, till then, he had been placing his legs on two stools and was not in a position to devote his exclusive attention to the furtherance of the exclusive cause of Muslim League ideology. The question to be examined here is a straight one –

what led to this change in Jinnah's outlook? His view point should be taken up first for dissection. That he was opposed to the Rowlatt Act was a fact beyond dispute. But in his crusade for righting the country's wrongs he never followed Mahatma Gandhi's programme. In his opinion, "What they wanted was a real political movement based on real political principles and based on the fire which learnt in the heart of every man or his motherland. So long as they had not that as the basis, their programme was defective."

It was further represented that Jinnah was opposed to the policy of boycotting the Councils as it deprived his countrymen of a chance 'to fight face to face with the bureaucrats? The Gandhian programme appeared to him to be not in conformity with constitutional and political methods. His discontentment about the boycott of schools and colleges was great and he understood the utter helplessness of students after their withdrawal from educational institutions. Gandhi had asked them to spin the wheel for four to five hours a day and then if any time was available to devote it to learn Hindi. Jinnah emphatically said that this was 'not really political movement'. The Gandhian programme, being based on soul-force, partook of a spiritual movement. Moreover, Jinnah could never imagine that non-violent non-cooperation was a practicable device. The wearing a khadi also did not appeal to him. He could however, appreciate the efforts of Indians to start 'mill after mill' in competition with foreign manufacturers.

Jinnah's opposition was only to the Gandhian methods of resisting the British Government, there was no possibility of his permanent bifurcation. He parted company with his colleagues of the Congress never to meet again.

That Jinnah assumed Muslim leadership to organize the Muslim League on a sounder basis and to assert its representative character can hardly be questioned in the light of his subsequent conduct. There was also no doubt Mahatma Gandhi's leadership of the Khilafat agitation was detested by the entire orthodox section of the Muslim population. That Jinnah was brought by a desire to bring about the Salvation of the Musalmaus can, to some extent, be accepted. No attempt to minimize the sincerity of Jinnah for his community can be based on facts. It is also a mere truism to state that the effects of the Khilafat and Non-cooperation Movements became apparent long before their termination and that Jinnah saw earlier than any other

contemporary Muslim leader that the advantage of his community lay in a policy of separatism. It was well stated : 'Jinnah repeated the performance of Sir Sayyid. He erected himself like a strong wall On this side of the wall, reorganization work took shape, and soon the Musalman, under the greencrescent bearing banner of Islam, fresh in enthusiasm and happy with their new found faith, were up against all odds.'²³

The Muslim tradition of isolation at best attracted Jinnah and his anxiety for the betterment of his community at the expense hold over his mental frame. But though his appetite for the exclusive uplift of his community was so keen, it does not explain the whole truth about his dramatic change of mind. He was a misfit in the Indian National Congress after its assumption of a new complexion of agitation against the British Government and the new developments in the Congress non-cooperation and the new constitution which made it more of a popular and mass organization were thoroughly disapproved of by him.

Besides, a man of Jinnah's personal ambition could hardly find sufficient scope for personal glory in the Congress which claimed the best intelligence in its fold and where men of all talents were in superfluity. As a member of the Indian National Congress, he could, at best, be one of the top leaders, but in the league he had the chance of being recognized as the leader of a community which would blindly follow his dictatorship. His participation in the National Congress from an early stage of life till his viewpoint was rejected was natural in the absence of any other powerful political organization which provided an opportunity for his progress. It has, therefore, been stated with perfect accuracy that Jinnah would never let slip an opportunity of self-glorification. It has been said that the age of romance and adventure is over and that under modern condition there is hardly scope for such medieval exploits.

The life of Jinnah shows that there is always adventure waiting for the adventurous. Such a scope in the Congress of Mahatma Gandhi who had taken decided and practical step forward to dislodge foreign domination by his non-violent non-cooperation formulae was impossible.

Then, the character and personality of Jinnah also deserve consideration while examine his motives of cutting adrift with the INC and acting in direct opposition to it. His obstinacy became known even to those who came casually in contact with him. Effort after effort was made by the top-ranking leaders of the Congress to bring him round to the point of view conducive to the welfare of the country. But even a man of Dr. Rajendra Prasad's sobriety and self-effacement had to admit later (in 1935) that this talk of agreement with Jinnah failed. This caused him great sorrow, specially because the points which led to breakdown were trivial and to accept them or show obstinacy over them was useless. In fact, Jinnah stood firm on his ground and never let slip an opportunity to improve his position and his prospects". A man with such traits of nature and temperament could not continue to find satisfaction in the Congress ideology of sacrifice and work.

But what happened afterwards is just the reverse of the earlier period of his political career and Jawaharlal Nehru's estimate in one sentence represents the whole truth about the later period. He states, "Later, unhappily, the old Ambassador of unity associated himself with the most reactionary elements in Muslim communalism." It is difficult to agree with the editor or the Modern Review that "till 1973 we do not think that he knew his own political mind", for this would whitewash all his guilt in subsequent stages of the developments of events in India. His attitudes towards the Nehru Report, his part in the Round Table Conferences and his view on the Indian Constitutional Act of 1935 left no doubt regarding his position after leaving the Congress. That he became a die – hard communist is undisputed, though it may be admitted that after 1937 his politics assumed the character of aggressiveness.

However, it may be stated with all frankness that in his rank communalism, he not only sacrificed the interests of his fatherland but also showed an extraordinary degree of implacability. Mr. Wyatt rightly observed: "In every incident Jinnah saw the machinations of the Hindu mind, tricking and thwarting him and every occasion was made. The vehicle for demonstrating his inflexibility, his intransigence and his adherence to the Central principle. I never met him without hearing, at least once, the standard unvarying lecture on the wrongs of the Muslims and the need for Pakistan."

His varied speeches and writings bear eloquent the religious feelings of his easily inflammable community. In his presidential address at the Lucknow session of the All India Muslim League (Octo, 1937) he spoke in the strain of the early Muslim leaders and said : 'Hindi is to be the national languages of India and the Bande Mataram is to be the national song, and is to be forced upon all only the Congress masquerades under the name of nationalism, whereas the Hindu Mahasabha does not mence words.

In his presidential address at the All-Indian Muslim League session held at Patna in December, 1938, he gave another sample of his communal frame of mind. He said : Muslim children must accept Bande Matram as their national song, no matter whether their religious beliefs permit them to do so or not. It is idolatrous and a hymn of hate against Muslims". In the same speech he blamed Gandhi for destroying he Congress ideals and said : "His ideal is to revive Hindu religion and establish Hindu raj in this countr and he is utilizing the Congress to further this object". His bill of indictment against democracy was expressed in his sentiment that it meant only "Hindu raj all over India " in fact ,Jinnah , after this resignation from the Congress , became the recognized leader of Musalmans alone and as such nothing was more tempting to him than to say and write things that pleased his community.²⁵

It would however, be a wrong reading of Jinnah, if his services to the League are not fully appreciated. Under his guidance, as under no other leader's before him, the work of organization to the Muslim league was performed with startling efficiently. N.V.Rajkumar stated the plainest truth on laying down : "The credit for the efficient organization of a backward community undoubtedly goes to Jinnah. His brilliant leadership of the League during the last decade and the success that has come to it in every sphere of Muslim activity, is almost unbelievable, were it not a hard fact.

Mahammed Iqbal, the famous Urdu poet, writing in his private and confidential letter to Jinnah (dated June 21, 1937, Lahore) acknowledged him as the only Musalman capable of guiding the desting of the Muslim community. He wrote : "I know you are a busy man but I do hope you won's mind writing to you so often, as you are the only Muslim in Indian to day to whom the community has a right to look up for safe guidance. through the storm which is coming to N.W.India and perhaps

to the whole of India." What Sayyid Ahmed Khan aspired for the Muslims in the nineteenth century, Jinnah accomplished it in the twentieth. Sayyid Ahmed embedded the lesson of separatism on Muslim minds and taught his community an object loyalty to the British Government, Jinnah carved out a separate Muslim State by a process of Vivisection of his native land and aligned himself definitely with the British government. The two were the counterparts of each other. It can easily be doubted that there could ever been "Jinnah of Partition" without Sayyid's Pioneering activities, though Jinnah overshadowed Sayyid by virtue of his astounding practical achievement.

After Zinnah, Ayub Khan's political system had a great deal of flexibility after he was appointed as a president in 1965, though first appointed as a martial law administrator in 1958 and the year 1965 was also very significant because that year also brought war between India and Pakistan over the Kashmir, resulting in a military stalemate and a renewed UN Cease Fire. Infact, his settlement in the Tashkent Agreement with India in 1966 became a tremendous political setback for Ayub Khan. Though remarkable economic program being made at that time, wanted to follow it up with meaningful participation in political decision making. The institution of Basic Democracies – not the new political parties, not even the constitution of 1962 – gave he Ayub system much of its elasticity.

Within a year of being reflected, Ayub Khan had allowed Pakistan to be drawn into armed conflict with India. The issue was Kashmir; from the evidence that has become available to date, it appears that Ayub reluctantly accepted the advice of some of his close associates – among them Zulfikar Ali Bhutto – that the time had finally come for finding a military solution to the problem that plagued relations between India and Pakistan for nearly twenty years. Beginning a September 6, 1965, the two countries fought a brisk war that lasted for seventeen days, when a cease-fire was finally declared, Pakistan found itself in a situation that was to have some unexpected consequences. But the most important outcome of this conflict was the open disaffection of many young generals with the conduct of the war. In such a situation, Ayub Khan found it increasingly difficult to persist with his political experiment. Finally, perhaps because of these two pressures – the narrow victory in

the elections of 1964 and the aftermath of the 1965 war with India – Ayub Khan's health gave way.

Economic downturn also contributed to Ayub Khan's political problems. As so often happen in systems that do not provide channels for the expression of dissent and disapproval, the movement against Ayub Khan took the form of street agitation. It built up in intensity in the summer and fall of 1968. Despite several attempts to placate the opposition by granting them some form of participation without drastically altering the system, the agitation continued to grow in intensity. By the Spring of 1969, the movement had been taken over by two exceptionally charismatic leaders - Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in West Pakistan and Mujibur Rahman in East Pakistan. When Bhutto and Mujib refused to compromise, the military stepped in, demanded Ayub Khan's resignation, proclaimed martial law, abrogated the constitution, and appointed General Yahya Khan, the military's most senior officer, as president. The 1965 Indo Pakistan war interrupted the remarkable momentum of economic development that had begun with the assumption of office by Ayub Khan. Up until then, the rate of growth in Pakistan's economy was among the highest in the developing world. The war not only diverted toward military use the resources that would have otherwise gone into development; it also resulted in a sharp decline in the flow of external assistance. The nation was asked to tighten its belt and might have been willing to do so if tangible gains had been made on the battlefield. But the war ended in a state of confusion, with both India and Pakistan claiming victory. When the peace agreement was finally signed with India in the southern Russian city of Tashkent, its terms left the impression that the advantage finally lay with India.

The Tashkent Declaration was to be the turning point in the political life of the administration of Ayub Khan. Bhutto, Ayub Khan's foreign minister, left the government, giving the strong impression that what had not been lost on the battlefield was surrendered at Tashkent. India's policy toward Pakistan, he wrote after his departure from the government, will shift from confrontation cooperation, to the spirit of Tashkent'. She will now seek to convert Pakistan into her satellite by holding out inducements of peaceful cooperation". This was a serious warning. people thought – warning issued by a person who, as the former foreign minister,

must understand the full implication of what he was saying. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's words were to echo for a long time in the ears of those who had always believed that Pakistan had to be extremely vigilant if it was to protect its national integrity. By initially basing his campaign against Ayub Khan on the Tashkent Declaration, Bhutto was able to draw toward him the people who had become disenchanted with the military regime. Ayub Khan was an efficient administrator; he was also fully committed to the rapid development of the country, economy but he was not a popular leader.

Bhutto Played his Cards well – Undoubtedly, Z.A. Bhutto emerged as an effective, articulate, visionary and charismatic leader, but he suffered from some negative personality traits, such as the lust for power, unscrupulousness and intolerance. He can be given credit for building democratic structures; he was successful in producing 1973 constitution within a short span of time. But his political conduct was questionable. He subverted the democratic structures and process which he himself had assiduously tried to build. He shifted freedom of speech, expression and organization for which he himself had opposed President Ayub Khan when he fell apart from him. Even within his own party Bhutto did not allow differences of opinion. Instead of resolving them by mutual understanding and accommodation, he resorted to repression of the dissident voice, which resulted in the expulsion of several important and influential leaders who had been instrumental in the creation of mass support for him.¹⁵⁹ Rigging in the 1977 election by the PPP candidates undermined Bhutto's credibility as a genuine democrat and dealt a severe blow to Pakistan's search for or democratic political framework.

This was clearly evident during the Indo-Pakistan, negotiation between Bhutto and Swaran Singh in 1963, since the position of the Nehru Government in India had been greatly weakened as a result of the military humiliation inflicted by China. Similarly in January 1966, at the Tashkent Summit, India was in no position to make any concession on Kashmir because Shastri's government would not have survived such an agreement.¹⁵⁰

Political instability contributed to the Indo-Pakistan conflict in another way also. The weakness and the ultimate breakdown of civilian political order in Pakistan resulted in strengthening the army's role within the political system. It was an

unfortunate coincidence that, as a result of partition, Pakistan was carved out of areas which had a strong feudal base that sustained the role of the Pakistani army in the subsequent years. This, in turn, thwarted democratic impulses and the development of representative institute ones.²⁸ Thus, the miniaturization of politics led to the continuous emphasis on external (in the case Indian) threat and conflict, for that was the reflection of the new septum's ethos and its search for legitimacy. No wonder President Ayub Khan stressed the threat from India theme in his 1965 election campaign.²⁹ The Pakistan military's vested interests in its own expansion and strength and its socialization process also kept alive the hostility towards India and, on accession precipitated armed conflicts with that country.³⁰ A notable aspect of the Pakistani military's dominant role in the political system and in Pakistan's policy towards India was the fact that the military machine received support and sustenance in a big way from the US military assistance programme to Pakistan. In view of these historical experiences, it would not be an exaggeration to say that a civilian regime in Pakistan, preferably with democratic inclinations, is an important precondition for peace and stability in India – Pakistan relations.

Political instability, when viewed in the context of competition rivalry and conflict among and within the ruling elites in India and Pakistan, offers further interesting and valuable insights into their conflict relationship. It was the continuous conflict between the political, bureaucratic and military elites in Pakistan which after Jinnah's death, adversely affected the evolution of a mature foreign policy including the policy towards India. In the early years several well meaning attempts to reduce the salience of the Indo-Pakistani conflict were frustrated owing to this internal tar-of-war. Since the beginning of the 1960's the undercurrent of rivalry between Bhutto on the one hand and Pakistani leaders like President Ayub, drove Pakistan to the brink of you as well as into armed conflict with India several times. It is now known, for instance, that Bhutto, since 1962, had been advocating a war with India as against a much more cautious approach adapted by Ayub. [The former was also not happy with the ceasefire at 1965 and the Tashkent agreement of 1966 which formalized this ceasefire.³¹ Even the British attempt at mediation during the hutch confide (April-May 1965) was delayed and complicated by Bhutto's intransigence.³² Recent writings have also indicated that Bhutto had a vested interest

in the 1971 India-Pakistan war and the eventual separation of Bangladesh from West Pakistan.³³ The result was that Pakistani decision makers were almost driven to the state where that conflict became inevitable. The same Bhutto, after becoming the Prime Minister of the new Pakistan in 1972, also became the main architect of a policy of détente with India. However, Bhutto's hawkish approach to Indo-Pakistani relations before the emergence of Bangladesh should not be understood as a purely individual and personal exercise. He was representing and articulating the approach of certain powerful political interests in Pakistan, be they some sections in the military bureaucracy or even external influences.

Inter-elite conflicts and competition in India were also not devoid of important implications for a policy towards Pakistan. In the initial period, Sardar Patel was the spokesman for a hardline policy towards Pakistan as against Nehru's approach of greater accommodation. One of Patel's secretaries has written.

Temperamentally, on matters of dispute with Pakistan Sardar was firm and unyielding though he did not, except in matters of vital importance, trouble himself with detail, on which Panditji and Gopalswamy had their way without interference from him. There is also no doubt that there was an undercurrent of militancy in Sardar's approach; militancy was, however, not synonymous with bellicosity or war-mongering but arose from a realization that was the only language which Pakistan understood.³⁴

If there lived in Pakistan a single man of cerebral power and political leadership who was an admirer of Jawaharlal Nehru, that man's name is Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. His writings often glittering with imagining and innovative concepts of domestic and foreign policies for Pakistan, candidly reflect much of Nehru's world view and his conceptual framework of non-alignment. Thus the admiration of Bhutto for Nehru changed the bitter scenario of Indo-Pak relations for some time.

Thus two facts come out from Bhutto's tenure (1973-77). One his failure to regard political opposition as legitimate, a fact that cost him the vital support of small traders, merchants and shopkeepers who had initially given him support and later sustained him in a power. In the final analysis the weak institutionalization of

his Pakistan people's party was, prove a crucial factor in the regime's inability to provide a "counterweighed" to the military and the bureaucracy.

Towards the end of the Nehru era, there was a slow erosion of the Nehruvian framework of role playing. Things did not function smoothly any more. The exalted image that the world had of India simply vanished. Though some signs of this decline were already visible during the closing years of the Nehru era, there was a real deterioration under his successors, never to rise again. Since imagery has much to do with the role pattern a nation can play. India's role, (as originally shaped by Nehru) therefore suffered a severe setback in the international system for which Nehru was not sole responsible indeed.

Nehru's immediate successor, Lal Bahadur Shastri, was a self effacing person whose knowledge of the world was negligible, and whose interest in foreign affairs was less than marginal. It would hardly be expected to him to actively follow what Nehru and designed, or to means out a Shastrian version of how India should respond to the global international environment. Besides, he neither had the inclination nor the time to interest himself in foreign affairs, since he was deeply involved in strengthening his domestic position, and since he was at the helm of affairs for only 18 months. Whatever Shastri did in international affairs is what he had to do maintain some degree of formal continuity, or what he was advised to do; attend the Cairo in 1964 non-aligned conference; visit Moscos and London, also in 1964; fight a war with Pakistan (1965) that was imposed on him; and finally and reluctantly, participate in the Indo-Pakistan Tashkent Conference convened by the Russian, on the aftermath of the conflicts.

Shastri will thus be remembered really as being the transition man who contributed to bringing into focus the limits of what India w/could really do in global affairs, and in making the appropriate adjustments in India's foreign policy by shifting her diplomatic focus to her immediate environment.

Lal Bahadur Shastri, was different, in fact very different, from his predecessor. He was a neophyte in external affairs with the exception of a trip to Nepal in March 1963 for discussions with Nepali leaders, and a brief period of assigned responsibility to deal with papers that come to the Prime Minister from the

Ministry of External Affairs during Nehru's last illness, he hardly had any grounding in foreign affairs, in fact, none. There was nothing in his political life, before or after assuming the prime ministership of the country, that gives any clue of any perception that he may have personally, had of international affairs, or of the configuration of international forces, or of the macro issues that faced the world. Most of the declarations that he made on such issues were a report of what Nehru had declared before. His whole political career centred around domestic politics, where he had established a niche for himself with the active support of Nehru. Though, during his brief tenure as Prime Minister, he naturally had to deal with external matters including a war with Pakistan, he was probably uncomfortable and perhaps even insecure taking the complete responsibility of designing India's foreign policy on his own since he was a marvelous success in the negotiations with Pakistan on the Kashmir question, and since he had infinite patience and inexhaustible capacity for endless talk, undoubtedly an asset in diplomacy. Moreover, India under Shastri, became more preoccupied with what was good for India and clearly it was a movement away from the preceding Nehruvian concern with global issues which had a great impact on South Asian relationships also.

With Indira Gandhi at the helm, Shastri's politics of incorporating the Prime Minister's Secretariat in the decision making process was continued. In fact, it was further accentuated, so much so that by the time Mrs. Gandhi was out of office in 1977, it had become the crucial point of foreign policy making. Indira Gandhi took a number of initiatives to strengthen her hand like in 1971 for help the beleaguered Sri Lankan Government against Janatha Vimukti Permana insurrectionaries, to take military action against Pakistan in the same year, to explode a nuclear device in 1974, to merge the Himalayan state of Sikkim with India in 1975 and many others.

Thus, the Indira Gandhi period showed an even more decisive tilt towards this process of ongoing change. By the time Mrs. Gandhi was at the helm of affairs, India had either lost or abandoned her original international role. And no attempt was really made to search for a new role, at least not during her first mandate, in the changed circumstances.

What India really attempted was to become militarily strong by investing in research and development, and by buying sophisticated arms abroad, both of which

were given considerable boost under her mandate. The objective was to become a hegemonic power in South Asia by playing a much more assertive role than she had even done before, keep the nuclear option open by conducting an underground nuclear explosion in May 1974; and launch into the space sector by blasting, in July 1980.

The principal thrust of India's foreign policy was then more power and region oriented than one of seeking out a new global role for herself. Towards the early eighties, during her second mandate, Indira Gandhi sought out a more international role. Now that India had attained the status of a regional power, and was internationally recognized or such, she did make some attempts to seek a more global role by going overseas more than eighteen times attending the North-South Conference in Cancun in April 1981, and hosting in New Delhi a ministerial conference of 122 developing nations in February 1982, a non-aligned summit in March 1983 and a Commonwealth Summit in November of the same year.

If one were to extract the thrust of Mrs. Gandhi's international policy, it can be summed up in a few words :

"disarmament and development. At the different international gatherings Indira Gandhi did express concern for peace." "She underlined the importance of ensuring the development of countries along with the prosperity of the developed nations in circumstances of international peace and security".

But all these initiatives and declarations did not lead to the establishment of a real framework that would have the parameters of India's new global role. This may be partly attributed to the fact that Indira Gandhi disappeared from the political scene before she really had the time to conceptualize her new global role. But the explanation partly lies in the fact that, notwithstanding her enormous experience, she did not have the mental make-up to define a role for India that was not closely connected with India's national interests.

So the only real role that India played under Indira Gandhi was, to use her military clout to partition Pakistan in 1971, and assist the Bandarnaika Government which was being challenged from the left, in the same year. In sum, the very concept of her role had changed. It had become more violent and more assertive in

comparison to Zia-ul-Haq's "Islamisation of a "repressive, unrepresentative" martial law regime or attempt to fulfill Pakistan's raison, dieter , it fanned sectarian divisions. And revealed the difficulties in achieving any scholarly interpretation of the Quaran and the Sunnah. In the event, the General bequaeathed to Pakistan a political process distorted by the eight Amendment which enabled his successors to dismiss elected Prime Ministers with impunity and generated an atmosphere of "bigotry, fanaticism and distorted values."

With Zia's violent death and Benazir Bhutto's return to power, democracy was restarted. But her first tenure in office (1988-90) wads noticeable for its dismal failure to live up to expectations which given the economic and constitutional constraints, she was unable to fulfill. If Benazir Bhutto becomes prime minister of Pakistan in the next two or three years, two young persons, both of the post-partition generation, will be presiding over the destinies of Pakistan and India. Benazir happens to be six or seven years younger than Rajiv Gandhi. The stars governing their lives have seemingly created a string of similarities of a certain fibre of a Greek tragedy. Both are inheritors of charismatic leadership, gifted with what one may described as charisma of association. Benajir's father, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, was removed from power and imprisoned and hanged by the man he had promoted to the office of army chief of staff superceding several claimants. Rajib's mother, Indira Gandhi, fell to the bullets of assassians that were members of her carefully selected bodyguards.

Both have also lost a brother each Indira's assassination created a nationwide sympathy wave, riding the crest of which Rajiv Gandhi won a massive electoral victory in the Lok Sabha in December 1984. Benajir has drawn unprecedented crowds all over Pakistan, since her dramatic home coming on April 10 mostly because she retained in the minds of Pakistanis the fond memories of her father as well as a sense of guilt that they had allowed him to be mercilessly hanged in prison.

Both Benagir Bhutto and Rajiv Gandhi are children of the era of the post-industrial revolution in the advanced countries of the world. Both are modernizer. Neither is a radical. If one were to judge Benajir Bhutto by her speeches and press conference since April 10, one must also perceive her as a reconsider of the deep

cleavages that plague Pakistan's political life and heavily strain its relations with its neighbour amongst whom must now be counted a superpower : the Soviet Union. Unlike General Zia-ul-Haq, she had categorically warned Pakistanis not to get involved with the Khalistan movement for, once again unlike General Zia and the other members of Pakistan's present ruling cooperation, she has the farsight to realize what a real Khalistan would mean for Pakistan itself. She has also very wisely told her countrymen and women that if Pakistan tried to use the Sikh card today, India could use the Sind and the Baluch card tomorrow.

Both have problems with their own political parties and their respective relations with other competing political parties. As in India the ruling Congress has no rival at the national level, so in Pakistan, in a fresh and fair election, the PPP will win a landslide victory in national politics. But neither can the ruling Congress rule in all or even a very large majority of the Indian states, nor can PPP hope to rule in all the three smaller provinces of Pakistan. India's stable and experienced parliamentary democratic system allows the fabrication of normal give and take relationships between the centre and the states whether or not the latter are governed by the same party. Rajiv Gandhi has succeeded in making centre-state relations smoother than they were during his mother's time though there is room for a lot more to be done to establish a normal healthy federal relationship. Perhaps one of the two great tests of Benajir's leadership in Pakistan will be her willingness and ability to work together with the other political parties that may be ruling in one or more provinces or building up political agitations for democratic rights. Her second great leadership test will be in dealing with the army. She cannot afford to make the mistake committed by Cora Aquino and come to power with the help of even a section of the army, in the unlikely event of a split amongst the Generals or the Jawans. Both the leaders have tried to leave the bitterness of the passing generation behind and together place India-Pakistan relations on the track of durable good neighbourliness in the days of dimming light on the horizon of international politics, regional as well as global, which was good to have something to hope for.³⁵

In fact, in the eighties, the situation changed radically. The pattern of role playing, designed and implemented during most of the Nehru years, became irrelevant, even more so than during the Indira Gandhi years. In the other hand,

India's new and the growing determination to become a hegemonic power in South Asia required the continuous expansion of military clout and its eventual utilization. This role, already initiated by Indira Gandhi, was further developed by Rajiv Gandhi with Indian intervention in Sri Lanka and the Maldives, and with India's new determination to use, wherever necessary, the threat of her power to bring other nations of the region in line with India's goals. The focus on South Asia continued. In fact, it became even more concentrated since solid foundations had been laid by his mother for a leading Indian role in South Asian Politics. So the main thrust of Rajiv Gandhi's policy continued in the same direction and made it the focal point of India's foreign policy behaviour.

However, while orienting India's policy even more in the regional direction, Rajiv Gandhi, very early in his political career, had also evinced a far greater interest in global affairs than his mother. And there were clearly concerted attempts, during his mandate, to internally define and externally play an international role that was not linked only to India's national interests. A new international role was conceived, but it had none of the characteristic features of the Nehru era. Features such as moderate anti-imperialist rhetoric, emulation and mediation that Nehru had deployed were no longer relevant in the eighties. Besides, even if India had wanted to follow these goals, she could hardly do so since anti-imperialism in the classical sense had disappeared, since India had no longer anything to offer in terms of emulation for other countries, and since India was no longer a mediatory power. The times had indeed changed. To be more effective at the global level, India had to be more radical, more committed, more down-to-earth and more directly involved in concrete issues than before. Thus a series of factors can be attributed to the shaping of this new pattern at the different level. And right from the beginning, Rajiv Gandhi had displayed a penchant for international affairs. Its glamour was probably more attractive and interesting than mundane and highly intractable domestic issues. Besides, world affairs gave him high visibility, whose impact on the domestic scene could only be beneficial. According to one journalist.³⁶

Whenever he came to the UN complex during his brief visit to New York, heads would turn and hearts would flutter. He looked handsome in his buttoned-to-the-neck Nehru jacket, he smiled a great deal, he was appropriately deferential to

more seasoned world leaders who had come to the UN that Autumn, and he made a couple of well-received speeches. Needless to say, media coverage of his trip was extensive and laudatory. Thus, Rajiv Gandhi did go beyond his predecessor in doing something that took India away from her immediate concern in many international issues with South Asia also mainly style with Benajir. International role playing virtually disappeared after Rajiv Gandhi. The string of Prime Ministers who succeeded him (V.P.Singh, Chandra Sekhar and Narasimha Rao) were either not interested in international affairs, or too encumbered with domestic politics, or too involved in regional politics to take any interest in designing a global role. The little signs of interest that did emerge during the Gulf War were short-lived; and any attempt to do something to ease the situation proved abortive. This was partly due to the fact that India was no longer a nation to whom the international community turned to manage a crisis, and partly due to the fact that India was no longer a nation to whom the international community turned to manage a crisis, and partly due to the fact that the initiatives taken by the G.P.Singh Government or by Rajiv Gandhi as Opposition leader had other motives than really doing something to manage the crisis. Though Rajiv Gandhi's decision to project himself as a mediator in the Gulf crisis was a manifestation of the interest he had developed in international affairs. It was overshadowed to quite an extent by his very obvious intention of gaining some domestic political mileage in the forthcoming elections.

The V.P.Singh Government's decision to send an emissary to Baghdad, Washington and Moscow was neither well-planned nor well thought-out, without any broad proposals to extricate the area from the critical situation. Besides, the whole initiative was carried out at the foreign minister's level, which did not give the political weight to the Indian action that was needed to have any meaningful impact. Furthermore, it would seem that the India's interest in the Gulf Crisis during the V.P.Singh mandate was influenced more by the desire to rescue 180,000 Indians stranded in Kuwait and Iraq than of really wanting to play a mediatory role.

The Chandra Shekhar government was in an even worse situation. It played less of an international role than the preceding government. Neither the Prime Minister nor his foreign minister, V.C.Shukla, were interested in or concerned with

what was happening in the world. Both of them were completely bogged down by domestic affairs, though South Asian or Regional Matters were rather neglected.

Domestic constraints for the Narasimha Rao government are equally considerable, almost comparable to some of his predecessors. He is neither firmly installed, since he does not have a comfortable majority in Parliament, nor does he have a firm control over the Congress Party since he has often been challenged by formidable contenders who are out to dethrone him. Therefore, notwithstanding his considerable knowledge of foreign affairs – much more than any of the other post-Rajiv Prime Ministers – it is hardly possible for him to think out and shape a new global policy for India. India's foreign policy will, therefore, remain tilted on the regional side, the basic underpinning of which is hegemony over South Asia.

The rapprochement that characterized Pakistan India relations during 1982 and the early part of 1983 began to unravel in August – September 1983, when the top Indian leaders issued statements sympathizing with the opposition agitation in Pakistan. Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi expressed her regrets on the efforts of the Pakistan government to suppress the anti-government agitation launched by the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD), a 9 Party Opposition coalition dominated by the Pakistan People's Party (PPP). She also expressed concern over the torture of Mrs. Nusrat Bhutto and demanded the release of Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan.³⁷ These views were orchestrated by India's Minister for external affairs, Narasimha Rao, and India's ambassador to Pakistan, K.D.Sharma. The latter declared that the Indian leadership had simply conveyed the sentiments of the Indian people on the developments in Pakistan and that if the rights of the people were violated in the neighboring country, India could neither stay quiet nor turn a blind eye towards such development.³⁸

The drift in their relations was accelerated by several other developments. India's objection to the dinner hosted by Ziaul Haq for the Islamabad-based diplomats at Gilgit (Nov. 1983); India's charge that the Pakistani authorities had kidnapped two domestic servants of an Indian diplomat in Islamabad who, however, were found to be in New Delhi after a couple of days (Jan, 1984), reciprocal expulsion of airline employees based in Lahore and New Delhi (Feb. 1984); Public reaction in Pakistan to the hanging of Maqbool Butt (a Kashmiri leader)

in India (Feb 1984) and the consequent postponement of India's information minister, visit to Pakistan (Feb. 1984).

The Foreign Secretaries of Pakistan and India met briefly in Feb, 1984 at Udipur while participating in the SAARC meeting, but it was not until their May 1984 meeting at Islamabad that an attempt was made to retrieve the dialogue.³⁹ They signed a protocol on group travel, and three important visits were scheduled – India's information minister, H.K.L Bhagat's once postponed visit to Pakistan 7-11 July; Pakistan's Foreign Secretary's visit to India : 18-21 July; and the 2nd meeting of the Pakistan-India Joint Commission at New Delhi in the first half of August.

However, only Bhagat's visit could take place because a new crisis erupted when India accused Pakistan of active involvement in the Sikh insurgency in East Punjab. This was accompanied with severe criticism of Pakistan's arms procurements and an assertion that Pakistan might soon attack India.⁴⁰ There was an unusual movement of troops by the two countries in the border areas in Sept-Oct., 1984, coupled with a report by Western sources that India was planning to launch an air attack on Pakistan's nuclear installations.⁴¹ The consequent escalation in tension generated from in Pakistan that if something was not done to reverse these negative trends, the two countries might be plunged into another armed conflict. While the two governments were still not sure about the course of action for defusing tension the assassination of Indira Gandhi on October 31, 1984, halted the escalation process. Ziaul Haq went to New Delhi to participate in her funeral and assured India's new Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, of "full support of the government of Pakistan in efforts to build a relationship of trust and confidence between our two countries and create a secure and tranquil environment in the region."⁴² Rajiv Gandhi reciprocated these sentiments in his reply to Ziaul Haq. "The many common ties between our peoples provide a good basis for a relationship of mutual trust, peace, friendship and cooperation between our two countries."⁴³

It was after an informal meeting between the foreign secretaries of the two countries on the eve of the SAARC meeting at Male, the Maldives, Feb, 1985, brief meeting between Ziaul Haq and Rajiv Gandhi in March 1985 at Moscow where they attended the funeral of the Soviet leader chernenko, and detailed meeting between the two foreign secretaries at Islamabad in April 1985, that the bilateral dialogue

was revived. The joint communiqué issued at the conclusion of the April talks reiterated the desire of the two sides to forge a peaceful and cooperative relationship on the basis of the principles enunciated in the Simla Agreement. They also agreed to adapt various measures to "diversify and strengthen" cooperation in various fields as well as "to create an atmosphere of mutual confidence, harmony and trust."⁴⁴

Zia Rajiv Parleys

These positive sentiments were reinforced by Pakistan's foreign minister's two visits to India, in April 1985 to participate in the NAM ministerial meeting, and in July 1985 for the 2nd meeting of the Joint Commission. Ziaul Haq and Rajiv Gandhi met four times during Octo-Dec. 1985 : Octo : New York ; Nov : Muscat, Oman, December ; Dhaka and New Delhi. The last of these meetings a step over in New Delhi on Ziaul Haq's way back from the Maldives proved most fruitful. Ziaul Haq and Rajiv Gandhi agreed in principle on expansion of trade and economic relations, and decided to reopen the dialogue on contentious political issues. They also made a verbal commitment not to attack each other's nuclear installation.

As a follow up of the Zia Rajiv Parleys, a number of positive developments took place in Jan-Feb 1986 which included five high level meetings. An agreement was also signed to open telephone circuits between Lahore and Lucknow, Delhi and Islamabad, and Delhi and Lahore. They also agreed to resume negotiations for the reopening of the Khokra par – Munabao route.

The Finance Minister's meeting produced an agreement in principle to allow the private sector to trade in 42 items. The two sides agreed to strengthen telecommunication, telex air links and shipping arrangements. The defence secretaries discussed the Siachen glacier issue and related matters. The foreign secretaries exchanged views on the no-war pact and the treaty of friendship, text of the treaty for no attaching each other's nuclear installations, and the overall framework of their relations.

The positive impact of these developments could not crystallize as these were punctuated with polemical exchanges on Pakistan's acquisition of weapons from the US. The Indian government employed all normal diplomatic channel as well as visits of Cabinet members and senior officials to commence the U.S

Administration that it should discontinue its military assistance programmes for Pakistan. Vice President George Bush's visit to India in 1984 and Rajiv Gandhi's visit to the U.S. in 1985 provided India with useful opportunities to express strong opposition to the U.S. arm transfer to Pakistan which naturally irritated Pakistan.

Zia's India Policy

The much famous "Peace Offensive" on India also needs to be discussed here. General Zia adopted the policy of covert war with India. It meant a war on all fronts, barring the actual battle front. The "Peace Offensive" was another strategic move in the regard. Pakistan offered India a No War Pact. India Instead of accepting it, offered a broader peace treaty which unfortunately impinged upon the sovereignty of Pakistan directly. Pakistani objections were mainly to India's insistence that Pakistan should make a unilateral declaration not to concede any part to any foreign power on its territory. This gave Pakistan a clear out leverage over India and a pro-pakistan agenda tirade followed. This was indeed a diplomatic success to be rejoiced at by Pakistan. No doubt, the Pakistan Ambassador in India was right when he said: "For the first time in our history of relations with India, we have been able to force India to take a defensive posture in diplomacy."⁴⁵ Pakistan also meddled in India's internal ethnic problems. The Govt. of India has been accusing Pakistan of aiding and abating terrorism in Punjab.

At the newly formed forum of SAARC also, Zia maintained hostile postures and was successful in lobbying against India on several issues including the Indian intervention in Sri Lanka after the July 1987 adventure war too close and the two countries almost came to the brink of an actual war.

The Zia era in Pakistan saw the emergence of another new issue between the two countries. This was the Siachen Glacier issue. A limited war has been going on between the two countries on this issue, with considerable losses to both sides. This has further complicated the relations between the two countries.

Thus looking at the whole eleven years' span of the Zia era in Pakistan we can safely infer that Pakistan's India Policy during this period was a bundle of contradictions; contradictions in proclamations and practice. It was rather a hawkish policy phrased in some of the most deceptive words and presented in an enchanting

manner. As a result, it is often claimed that the military government in Pakistan after taking power in that country has made a special new demarche in extending a hand of friendship to India and has undevoured to accelerate the process of normalization of relations with us. The fact however, speak otherwise.⁴⁶

According to one observer he "produced an absolutely brilliant India Policy. Seek peace on the battlefield, step up the ideological war. Whip us a climate in which the sun of friendship was kept blazing by sweet rhetoric. And in the shadow of that sun ram and give sanctuary to those force within India which could fight for theocracy. Do not use the Pakistani Army to try and break up India for three very good reasons. First, because it could not, even if it wanted to. Second, it was needed to run things at home. Third, there was far cheaper away of achieving the same aim – make Indians fight themselves."⁴⁷ His personal brilliance and finesse apart, such an India policy was highly detrimental for the betterment of Indo-Pak ties as also for the maintenance of peace in the region. It was rightly observed by the Indian Press after his tragic end in the air crash on 17 August 1988. "Indo-Pak relations reached their Nadir during his rule."⁴⁸

"An Ultra-rightist dominance in Pakistan has always thrived upon its hostility towards India. Because of the lack of popular legitimacy, the legitimacy of a 'hostile India does help along with other similarly presumed induced and propogandized threats."⁴⁹

Apart from the domestic reasons, Zia used the pretext of a hostile India to make the maximum out of the existing international situation in this part of the world. This also helped him in successfully countering the growing Indian influence in West Asia as also in proving his Islamic credentials both at home and abroad.

Indo-Pak Relation under Rajiv – Benezir Leadership

Then there was a shift from Zia to Benazir in Pakistan as in India fromn Indira Gandhi to his son Rajiv Gandhi. Benajir's coming to power was hailed not only in Pakistan but also equally warmly in India. Since it was expected, on the basis of her earlier statements from time to time, that her arrival on the Pak scene would help improve bilateral relations between India and Pakistan, speculations have been ripe

since that day as to what would be her India policy will there be a shift from General Zia's beaten track, or the sub-continent will continue to be the "Continent of Cricle". The shift was expected because premier Benazir has always stressed not only the improvement of ties but also of adding the dimension of friendship to these relations. This she has cherished with a degree of sentiment, common and natural among the people of the two nations. She wrote : "I symbolize a new generation, I had never been an Indian. I had been born in independent Pakistan. I was free of the complexes and prejudices which had torn Indians and Pakistanis apart in the bloody trauma of Partition. Perhaps the people were hoping that a new generation could avoid the hostility that had now led to three wars, burying the bitter past of our parents and grand parents to live together as friends. And I certainly fell it possible as I walked the warm and welcoming streets of Shimla. Aid we have to be divided by walls of hatred or would so, like the once warring countries of Europe come to bring with each other.⁵⁰

Therefore the question is will there be a fundamental change in the attitude and approaches of Pakistan's ruling leaders due to Benazir's political personality, or should it be interpreted that a vibrant and new leadership in Pakistan might prove a positive factor in forging better relationship with India ? Whether India and Pakistan will be able to dispel the lingering mutual misperceptions and ment away historical hostility persisting between them. To what an extent Rajiv Gandhi and Benajir Bhutto will be able to contain extra regional powers' interventionist role in the sub-continent ? These are some of the key questions that are of seminal importance in analyzing and evaluating relations between the two countries. Perhaps one may proceed from the central premise that leadership in each country would not be tempted into risking either the country's vital national interests or one's political career sheer out of clan for improving relations between the two countries. The test of their states manship lies in how best they can serve the interests of their respective societies without jeopardizing the interest of the other party . There are a large number of bilateral problems facing the leaders of India and Pakistan. On some of these contentious issues, Pakistani leader Mrs. Bhutto has clearly reiterated that these would be solved within the framework of the Simla Agreement. She also expressed optimism about the positive result from her meeting with Rajiv Gandhi

during the fourth SAARC Summit held in Islamabad at the end of December, 1988. Rajiv Gandhi also came back home commended that the policies of the PPP "will be much better than the previous policies". Such an optimism on the part of Indian leader has some justification in the roots of political background of Mrs. Bhutto. Her rise to political power is a unique phenomenon. Having witnessed the gruesome drama of her father's exit and execution, and having suffered and sustained solitary confinement as well as political exile for a long period, she refused to surrender before the authoritarian regime of Zia and more an easy exit for him. Despite being a Young Muslim lady, she demonstrated political audacity and indomitable will power to carry her relentless struggle on against the bloodcurdling threats of the Zia regime. This is bound to make her a different leader from predecessors, even including her father. Given the background, she represents the forces of democracy and modernity fundamentally opposed to these of militarism and orthodoxy. Her intellectual schooling at Harvard and Oxford has helped her to imbibe liberal values of democracy, and of rule of law. Soon after assuming the office, Mrs. Bhutto reiterated that she would endeavour her best to strengthen roots of democracy in Pakistan. Simultaneously she cautioned the countrymen against antidemocratic forces which are bent upon reversing the process of democracy.⁵¹ In her speech she emphasized that here priority would be to tackle the problems of poverty, economic stagnation, and spur the developmental tasks to ensure social and economic justice. This, she emphasized, required conditions of peace and stability at home and conflict free security environment at regional and global levels.

In her first address to the nation on radio and television, Benajir vehemently attacked Zia's "narrow-based foreign policy", which she added, had 'created an unnecessary environment of security threat for the country.'⁵² She underlined the necessity for making a realistic assessment of the situation, including Pakistan's Afghan Policy. On Pakistan's foreign relations, she "hoped for stronger links with the United States, better relations with Soviet Union once its pull out from Afghanistan was completed, maintenance of traditional tier with China, consolidation of friendship with the Muslim countries and understanding with India."⁵³

If she wants to, as she does, remove deep-seated hostility with India, she will have to minimize the role of military in the decision – making process. Because

over the years the military ruling elites have projected India as their arch enemy number one.

The process of normalization of relations between India and Pakistan has begun with the signing of two agreements between the two governments. The first agreement calls upon the two parties not to attack each other's nuclear installations. It also provides for exchange of locational data on nuclear facilities that include nuclear power and research reactors, fuel fabrication, uranium enrichment and reprocessing facilities. The first clause of article one of the agreement binds the two nations to refrain themselves from "undertaking, encouraging or participating directly or indirectly, any action aimed at causing the destruction of, or damage to, any nuclear installation or facility in the other country."⁵⁴ The second agreement is related to cultural cooperation that aims at "promoting and developing relation in the realms of art, culture, archaeology, education, mass media and sport". The third agreement is related to the avoidance of double taxation on income occurring from international air transport. These agreements have of course set in motion the process of reapproachment between the two countries. The then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi has described them as a 'break through' in the bilateral relationship of India and Pakistan. Prime Minister Benajir Bhutto has also expressed optimism that the agreements will contribute to creating "momentum for peace and friendship between the two countries. Undoubtedly, these are vitally important confidence - building measures towards better mutual understanding. Both the leaders have expressed their willingness to make a new beginning in the relations of New Delhi and Islamabad in the interests and welfare of their people as well as for peace, tranquility and stability in the sub-continent. Benajir reiterated that since both the governments in India and Pakistan are democratically elected, they have "legitimacy" to enter into political dialogue to sort out bilateral problems. It is true that she has good opportunity to respond favourably to India's friendly gestures and improve relations with it. This opportunity should not be missed by both the leaders. Moreover, international climate is also propitious for such a beginning.

Benajir Bhutto it seems is picking up the threads from where her late father was made to leave. She has already stated that she wants the historic Shimla Pact

to be the basis of relationship with India. She has dismissed the "No-War Pact" would resolve the different issues between the two countries ? We felt that the Shimla Agreement had a legitimacy, and we must approach step by step the problem of resolving the issue to help build the confidence as we emerge from one day to another.⁵⁵ She has already emphasized upon the need to improve the people to people relations. As a result of such an approach, vis and travel facilities have been made easier. And according to press reports. Bilateral trade between the two countries has doubled in the first three months of the democratic government. In these connections, SAARC has added a new dimension to improving the Indo-Pak ties. Several programmes to be undertaken under the aegis of SAARC, would positively improve Indo-Pak relations. These include the SAARC passport scheme, the holding of South Asian Cultural Festivals and the SAARC Audio Visual Exchange Programme. Thus India and Pakistan could now under the auspices of SAARC, have the option of taking all those steps which they otherwise could not because of their domestic political compulsions.

Of late, two issues have been greatly impinging upon Indo-Pak relation, the first being Indian acquisitions regarding Pak aid and sympathy to the terrorists operating in Punjab, and the second, the Siachin Glacier issue. Of course, both are Zia legacies. Regarding the first, Prime Minister Ms. Bhutto has assured the Indian Government that she would make maximum effort to stop help to the territories. Tough she has not been much successful in it, yet, for this, Mrs. Bhutto need not be blamed. She is sincere when she says that playing the Sikh card would be disastrous for Pakistan. Her problem is that the mischief in Punjab remains the exclusive preserve of the ISI. Here the Indian Govt will have to exhibit patience and show restraint considering her precarious conditions vis-à-vis the Army and Opposition ruled Punjab. The other issue was the Siachin Glacier. She has avoided any scathing attack on India regarding this and has expressed a keen desire to resolve this issue through peaceful negotiations under the Shimla Agreement. She noted with regret that this was the First ever violation of the Shimla Pact by India. Here also a cooperative and compromising Indian stand would be helpful in resolving this complicated issue and talks regarding this were expected to be held in Islamabad.

Thus, from all account the first months of Benajir Bhutto's rule were indeed encouraging. There was indeed a noticeable shift in Pakistan's India Policy. The shift was manifested clearly in two aspects, first, the overall improvement of the environment in which the two countries interest. Severity of propaganda has gone down and measures for the restoration of confidence and goodwill have been taken. Second, the importance of people to people relationship has been recognized and preliminary steps have been taken in this regard, in the form of relaxed visa and travel facilities. The exchange of information material both through bilateral and SAARC channels has been agreed to. And it has been decided to do more in this regard. However, much will depend upon the stability of the democratic government. Any internal crisis, leading to the destabilization of the Govt. can obstruct this process of normalization. But given the state of affairs now, we can look towards the scheduled meeting of the joint Indo-Pak Commission in July 1989, with a degree of optimism.

Concludingly, Indo-Pak relations should be conducted more cautiously, albeit with a greater sense of understanding each other's susceptibilities. One need not be over enthusiastic due to the induction of democratic order in Pakistan. Also one need not be too much pessimistic about the "atmospheric changes" arguing well for bilateral relationship of the two countries.

There is a good will; but this is not the end. Indeed, a lot is yet to be achieved before the shift in Pakistan's India Policy is clearly manifested. It will depend upon a number of factors apart from those directly concerned with India and Pakistan. But the trend so far has been encouraging and whatever we have achieved in the form of mutual understanding to shun confrontation and return to normalcy is very significant. To quote Winston Churchill, "This is not the end, it is not even the beginning of the end."

With Zia's violent death and Benajir Bhutto's fall, new political scenario started in Pakistan. Nawaj Sharif became the Prime Minister of Pakistan having won the elections with an unprecedented majority in the National Assembly. His stand on India-Pakistan relation was forthright and unambiguous. He developed the permanent state of hostility between the two countries. Nawaj Sharif declared his intention to initiate dialogue with India to resolve all outstanding problems. It may be

remarked here that during his earlier tenure as Prime Minister (1990-99), he had met former Prime Minister of India P.V. Narasimha Rao several times during international conferences and he had got a direct line with earlier Prime Minister Chandra Sekhar. Prime Minister Dev Gowda had written to the former Pakistan Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto offering her resumption of constructive dialogue between the two countries, Benajir procrastinated in responding to the Indian initiative. It can be hoped that Nawaz Sharif will pick up the thread and reopen the communication between the two countries.

The new environment in the world dictates that India and Pakistan normalize their economic relations as early as possible. The new government in Pakistan headed by a businessman should be aware of the mutual benefit that will accrue to both the countries. India could be helpful to Pakistan in several spheres in its economic development.

However, the main problem that Nawaz Sharif may face would be how much autonomy he would be allowed in decision-making by the Pakistan's military bureaucratic establishment. It is known that in Pakistan's relations with India, Kashmir, the nuclear weapons, etc. are the issues on which the establishment does not allow the elected governments to have any say. An analysis of the evolution of India-Pakistan relations during the fifty years since the independence of the two neighbours will, however, be helpful in understanding the formidable task the leaders of the two countries face. The roots of the disputes to go back into history, religious and politics of the Indian sub-continent and developments that led to the emergence of independent India and Pakistan in 1947. The partition of the sub-continent and the consequent bloodshed, violence and disorder left behind a trail of bitterness and rancer. This also promoted an enemy image of each other which has created a midset of hostility and antagonism both at the elite and also at the popular level.

Although these are early days in the long process of normalizing India-Pakistani relations, most South Asian have welcomed the new approach of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and I.K.Gujral of working together to manage the conflicts and find solutions to the problems between the two countries. In India, there is a sense that there will never be a better opportunity to stop cross-border terrorism and

the long confrontation with Pakistan over Punjab and Kashmir which has already cost over 50,000 lives.

The new Indian Prime Minister is one of the few Indian leaders who enjoy the goodwill of a large section of the Pakistani intelligensia. The opportunity this historic "fluke" offers must not be wasted. Even more important now than the historic fluke is the pathbreaking courage shown by both the prime ministers, and particularly Prime Minister Nawaj Sharif, in taking on the hardliners. Gujral too, despite the fragility of this government, has gone more than half way to respond to his counterpart so that, so main Nawaj Sharif noted at the Male Summit both countries could perhaps learn to live like civilized nations and put these uncivilized activities behind us. Fortunately it seems that the majority of the people of Pakistan have transcended the hatreds associated with the partition, fuelled regularly by wars and the fomenting of communal feeling, and now desire, like most Indians' friendship.

However, with Zia's violent death and Benazir Bhutto's return to power, democracy for restored. But her first tenure in office (1988-90) was noticeable for its dismal failure to live up to expectations which given the economic and constitutional constraints, she was, she was unable to fulfill.

Benazir's fall however, had far more to do with the fact that she had "stepped on the army's toes" than the charges of corruption and political horse-treading held out against her. More, here privatization and pro-US policies made the regime "Barely distinguishable from its Muslim League rivals. Under Nawaj Sharif (1990-93) it was more of the same confrontationist politics, a crisis in Sind and Politics, and charges of corruption, all of which had dogged his predecessor. The disparate character, of his Islam's Jumhoori ittehad (JI) coalition with such in incompatible constituents as the Pakistan Muslim League and the Awami National Party, the Jamat -- I -- Islami and both the Mohajir Quami Mahaz and the Jamat-I-Ulema-I-Islam made the government rickety, unstable. Ultimately Nawaj Shariff found that there were too many circles to square. While his attempt to reconcile the twin goals of economic liberalism and islamisation trapped him no end, his Gulf War policy and the Shariat Bill drove the last nails in his political coffin. During her second administration (1993-99), Benazir was politically in a much stronger position

than in her first tenure and seemed headed for a full five year term. Sadly, besides the endemic Civil War in Sind, Punjab again proved to be her nemesis.

Hot on her heels, Nawaz Sharif was to return to power with a "crushing victory" an over-whelming, absolute majority in the National Assembly with 135 seats in the bag against the PPP's nearly 19 while Punjab was his key area of support, both in the NWFP and Baluchistan, the PML made impression electoral gains.

Initial successive electoral gains. Notorious eighth Amendment, ousting an unsympathetic President browbeating a recalcitrant Supreme Court into submission and maneuvering a change in Army House made him no dearth of enemies.

In sum, he squandered his political capital somewhat recklessly. All the while glaring social inequities, deepening incidence of poverty and massive inequalities in access to power made the state increasingly vulnerable Pakistan's five nuclear tests (May 1998) brought their own compulsion for the impact of sanctions on an economy teetering on the brink of collapse led remorselessly to the declaration of a State of emergency (July, 1998).

On the foreign policy front, Shari has already indicated his desire to resume a bilateral dialogue with New Delhi, whether such a dialogue would create tangible results is debatable, but it would certainly improve the overall atmospherics. Key questions still abound about Sharif being given the latitude by the establishment to suggest variations of the present approach in Kashmir, the nuclear questions, mutual reduction of military budgets, bilateral trade and people to people conducts. The Establishment which has become an arbiter of sorts, though the creation of the Council for Defense and National Security (CDNS), would be unlikely to allow Sharif substantial beeway to seeking resolution of its outstanding problems with Indians. For the moment, they would be content in allowing Sharif to resume a bilateral dialogue, to do away with the impression that Pakistan was the spoiler of peaceful negotiations in South Asia. Such an approach would also please Washington which has supported the resumption of a bilateral dialogue.

There is a feeling that Sharif's overtures to New Delhi to resume the bilateral dialogue are necessitated by economic compulsion. Without reducing tensions with India, Sharif would be hard pressed to ask the armed forces to curtail

their expenditures. But given the fact that since 1988, the armed forces consider large military budgets necessary, irrespective of the shape of the economy (Pakistan's economy has been in this type of crisis a few years ago as well). Secondly, any normalization of relations with India would mean resigning from its long held position on Kashmir, a policy that would bring both political opposition and the Establishment together.

On Afghanistan, during the election campaign, Sharif was at pains to point out the mistake of unabashedly supporting the Taliban. Three factors seemed to have determined Sharif's approach to the Afghan question. First, support to the Taliban has led to Islamabad's isolation in Central Asia, which during his first term in office was given enormous importance. Sharif has always believed that the Central Asia Republic could be used as bulwark against India and through closer ties with Central Asia, Islamabad could attempt secondly, being alliance partners of the Awami National party, which can oppose the creation of the Taliban for the fear of a Pashtun backlash, Sharif also had to criticize Benazir's policy, despite it enjoying strong support from a section of the establishment, notably the ISI. Thirdly, Pak-Iran estrangement over Afghanistan could be rectified, if Sharif is able to change tracks in Afghanistan and use his government's influence with the Taliban to work out a broad coalition with at least one of the major ethnic/sectarian groups. Having learnt some lessons from his first term in office, it could be expected that Nawab Sharif would not attempt to take on the establishment immediately. Despite the large numerical majority in Parliament, Sharif will seek to draw a careful compromise in keeping his political interests untouched, while trying to tackle the economic men in the country. Similarly, in other areas Sharif would try to work within the newly created system. Such an approach would rule out any major deviations from its present India Policy. Despite overwhelming economic compulsions, Sharif would be unlikely to make moves for normalization of relation with India. Similarly on Afghanistan, Sharif would seek to work with Washington to make the Taliban and other ethnic factions come into a broad based coalition.

Relations between India and Pakistan during the past four and a half decades have been marked by mutual distrust, acrimony, suspicion and antagonism. Both countries have witnessed changes of regime in their respective

capital, raising hopes of optimism as well as seeing them being dashed to grounds during this period. The event of Congress (I) government led by Prime Minister Narasimha Rao in New Delhi in July revived the hopes of providing fresh impetus to the process of rapprochement between New Delhi and Islamabad. The concomitant factor was the advent of Islami Jamhjoori Ittched (IJI) government led by Nawaj Sharif in Islamabad in early November 1990 which also made some pronouncements designed to normalize relations with India.

In July, 1991 new government handed by P.V.Narasimha Rao was installed in office in New Delhi. The common factor between the two governments in New Delhi and Islamabad was that both were democratically elected regimes hence speculation that serious attempts would be made to rid their mutual relation of the Jinx that has taken a heavy toll on both sides of the border during the past four and a half decades. Soon after taking over Prime Minister, P.V.Narasimha Rao said in Press interview on July 6 this year that his Government would endeavour to normalize relations with Pakistan by forging better links between the people and two governments while keeping aside matters where reconciliation was not immediately possible. He further added, "India has always extended a hand of friendship toward Pakistan, we continue to persuade them and continue to forge friendship and good relation in as many fields as possible."

Prior to the advent in New Delhi of Congress(I) Government headed by Prime Minister P.V.Narasimha Rao, the Predecessor government of Prime Minister Chandra Shekhar and made attempts to bring Indo-Pakistan relations on an even keel, but without any tangible achievement. The Foreign Secretary level third round of talks between India and Pakistan held in Islamabad from December 18 to 20 though registered "some progress" towards defusion of tension in bilateral relations but Kashmir issue, Pakistan's complicity in abetting terrorism in Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir and mutual apprehension's about each other's nuclear programmes remained the main irritants which evaded any satisfactory solution, while apprising Lok Sabha about the Progress made at the third round of parleys between India and Pakistan. The then Foreign Minister of India, V.C.Shukla told Lok Sabha on December 1990 that India would initiate political level talks with Pakistan as soon as the time for it was "propitious".

The then Prime Minister Candra Shekar's style of cultivating "first name term" with his Pakistan counterpart, Nawaz Sharif, since the two first met in Male in the November 1990 at the SAARC Summit, has given rise to speculations in political circle in New Delhi about the beginning of a new era of cordial in the subcontinent. Reinforcing this was Prime Minister Chandra Sheehan's style of having talks with Nawaz Sharif fairly frequently over telephone a step which ignored the tradition of successive Indian Prime Ministers to deal with his or her Pakistan counterpart with a certain degree of circumspection. However, this over enthusiasm of Chandra Shekar government failed to bring any diplomatic dividends for India despite its claim that its Pakistan policy was firmly under control.

Despite the major irritants, both New Delhi and Islamabad excised enough caution to allow any let up in the ongoing Foreign Secretaries level talks between the two countries. The fourth round of Parleys between the foreign secretaries of India and Pakistan scheduled to be held towards the end of February 1991 in New Delhi was postponed because of Pakistan's Premier's visit to Beijing during that period. However, in early August 1991, it was announced by Islamabad that the Pakistan Foreign Secretary Shahriyar M. Khan would be visiting New Delhi on August 18, 1991 as a special envoy of Pakistan Prime Minister to convey to the new Indian government Pakistan's desire to resolve all issues and problems by "fair play and justice".

Nawaz Sharif government's decision to send its foreign secretary to India for talks was welcomed by India. While briefing media persons in New Delhi in this regard, a spokesperson of Ministry of External Affairs said in New Delhi on August 8 this year that the Indian government had always been willing to have discussions with Pakistan to reduce tension in bilateral relations. It was hoped that specific and realistic suggestions for resolving critical issues would be forthcoming. The sudden decision of Nawaj Sharif government to send Shahari yaras "special envoy" to New Delhi especially on the eve of the Commonwealth Summit and the ensuing session of the United Nations General Assembly was seen in political circles in New Delhi as essentially a public relations exercise to help Pakistan : "Internationalize" the Kashmir issue.

However, on his arrival in New Delhi on August 18 this year, Pakistan foreign secretary, Shahariyar M. Khan his counted any misapprehension by asserting that he had come "in all sincerity, please be sure that there is no element of our taking advantage of his visit." He further added that he had come a three-day visit as a special envoy of Pakistan's Prime Minister and his current visit "Stand on its own and should not be linked to the on-going dialogue between the two countries. By making such statement, the special envoy tried to dispel the impression that his visit was intended at taking political advantage. However, the observers in New Delhi felt that Pakistan had taken the exercise of sending a special envoy to India in order to impress western capitals that on its part Islamabad continued to be sincere, flexible and accommodating in defusing the tension in bilateral relations. During his three day sojourn in New Delhi, Shahariyar M. Khan, special envoy of Pakistan Prime Minister, had meeting with Prime Minister, P.V.Narasimha Rao, Defence Minister, Sharad Power and Foreign Secretary, Muchkund Dubey. In his meeting with Indian Prime Minister, the special envoy delivered a message from Nawaj Sharif. Though the nature of contents about Pakistan Prime Minister's message to his Indian Counterpart could not be known but it was widely felt that Shahariyar in his meeting with Narasimha Rao had touched upon specifier though an elaborate case was made for getting out of the old mine sets so as to initiate determined efforts to normalize relations between the two countries.

Making a pointed reference to the message sent by Pakistan's Prime Minister through his special envoy, Prime Minister, Rao in an interview published in Khaleez Times, a Dubai-based English daily, datelined in August 27, 1991 said that the Nawaj Sharif had promised to do certain things to help improve bilateral ties when asked if there were any specific suggestions on Kashmir and nuclear arms race in the Indian subcontinents the Prime Minister said : "It is a general kind of suggestion. It remains general at the moment and presumably includes all issues". Asked to comment on Shahariyar's statement that the sincerity of Pakistani Prime Minister's desire to give a new orientation to the Indo-Pakistan Relations would be proven on the ground in ensuing weeks, Prime Minister of India said : "We will see what they mean by that, Nawaz Sharif promise a difference on the ground level. All

that one can say at the moment is we will wait and see for ourselves what difference there is .”

Similar feelings were expressed by Minister for External Affairs, Madhav Singh Solanki who in a Swuo motu statement made in Lok Sabha on August 23, 1991, said that India hoped that in the coming month, the message conveyed recently by the Pakistan Prime Minister, for normalizing relations would be translated into concrete action. He further added that the special envoy of Nawaz Sharif was apprised that India had consistently worked for the establishment of tension free and good neighbourly relations between the two countries within the framework of Shimla Agreement “We believe this to be in the interests of the people of our two countries and of peace and stability in the region.”

Commenting on his recent visit to New Delhi, Shahariyar M. Khan, Foreign Secretary of Pakistan said in Islamabad on August 25 this year that he had received an encouraging response from the Indian Prime Minister and other leaders to embark on a new chapter of friendly bilateral relation. With the impetus provided by Pakistan's assurance on a fresh, sincere effort to resolve its problems with India, the New Delhi was reportedly drawing up a schedule for bilateral contacts at various levels in the ensuing period which could include the Siachen imbroglio, cut in armaments by two sides, apart from the subjects that figured in the ongoing dialogue between the senior officers of both sides.

In view of the ongoing parleys between the senior officials of the two countries, it is obvious that there is genuine desire and willingness on both sides to defuse tension in their bilateral relations. The thorny issues like Kashmir problem, and misapprehension about each other's nuclear programmes should be shelved for the time being to keep the ongoing process of normalization of relation alive. It would be in the fitness of things to raise the level of talks to the ministerial level and to thrash out the technicalities. And then summit level meeting between the Prime Minister of the two countries should be held as soon as possible.

Peaceful and friendly relations between India and Pakistan are well not only for both the countries but for the entire region of South Asia. This will also help in strengthening the SAARC. One can hope that leadership in New Delhi and

Islamabad would act judiciously to usher in an era of peace, prosperity and stability in the subcontinent.⁵⁷

Indo Pakistan relations require a new thrust so that the two countries come out of fifty four years of bloody conflicts. This is possible only if the leaders on both sides have a dialogue with an open mind.

For the last 55 years Indian and Pakistani leaders have indulged in sheer self elusion, dreaming of friendship with Pakistan vis-à-vis India as a possibility, whereas the history of India-Pakistan relations negates any such possibility. Pakistan's sole objective has been made, through goodwill and generosity to find a peaceful solution to all our bilateral problems. We have been snubbed again and again.

Throughout the long years we have tried to find excuses for Pakistani actions. At first it was a military dictatorship in Pakistan which was to blame when Benajir was elected she spouted nothing but abuse at the United Nations Human Rights Commission, and every other for an imaginable, otherwise it was the ISI which sponsored and has carried out insurgency in Kashmir and other parts of India. There was this continuous refrain that the people of Pakistan wanted peace. Then faith was reposed in the business community to bring about change in India Pakistan relations. Pakistan was a creation of the two nation theory. The same was reduced to ashes when East Pakistan broke away from its western half. Kashmir remains the last fig leaf of the failed two-nation theory. Pakistan can never give up its claim and effort to internationalize the issue. Otherwise it stands to lose the very *raison d'être* for its existence. It is irrelevant which section of the Pakistani State is for peace or for confrontation, Pakistan as an entity cannot give up the Kashmir issue if it is to survive. President General Musharraf has made it clear, in no uncertain terms that any progress in India – Pakistan relations depends on progress on the Kashmir issue. Whether it is commerce, people to people contacts, or cultural exchanges, there has to be a movement first on the Kashmir fronts. The question is how can India give any further concessions. Even if we were to agree to the LOC being converted into an international boundary, we would still be losing 55 percent of the territory which belonged to the erstwhile princely state of J & K. Pakistan has 35 percent and another 20 percent has given away unilaterally by Pakistan to China. So where is the room for further concessions? But Vajpayee is a ray of hope in the

surrounding darkness. He gave more importance to humanitarian than political issues : So, dialogue with an open mind is needed.

Vajpayee has not only invited Musharraf, but has given him undeserved legitimacy. It is difficult for the Pakistanis to challenge the CEO of Pakistan for declaring himself President, he has the strong argument that he has to talk to the leader of the world's largest democracy from a position of strength . Besides, it gives him a term of five years extendable at his own whim and fancy. He could always cite the example of his military predecessor Zia-Ul-Haque, who literally remained President for life.

This great yearning for a place in history seems to infect every leader in India. Is it the complex that India has had no great man since Gandhi and Nehru. Most great leaders of the world were born in the 19th century. The 20th century produced no awesome charismatic leaders, except perhaps for Nelson Mandela, that also if one wishes to place him on the same pedestal.

Nehru had his idealistic vision of Afro-Asian solidarity, particularly for an India-China détente. He led the Non-Aligned movement and fought colonialism on the world stage. There were misjudgements on Kashmir, Tibet, China and other matters. But he has assured his place in history. There are times when the personality of one man gives him far greater importance, on the world stage, than is warranted by the political, economic and military strength of his country. Nehru was one such personage.

Indira Gandhi made her name through war and not peace. The dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971 may well have been her greatest achievement coupled with the nuclear explosion in 1974. The emergency, Operation Bluestar and her economic policies left much to be desired but she has left her imprints on the sands of time. Her image of the "Durga" and destroyer of institutions will also not be forgotten.

Narasimha Rao became Prime Minister by accident; he was not even a Member of Parliament. He will be best remembered for initiating economic reform, demolition of the Babri Masjid, and corruption assuming gigantic proportions. The demise of the Congress also took place during his time. He was succeeded by Shri

V.P.Singh. The duration of short timed Prime Ministers like V.P.Singh, Dev Gowra and I.K.Gujral hardly made any everlasting impact on the domestic as well as on Foreign Policy fronts.

Now one come to the present Prime Minister. By making India a nuclear weapon power, he has already assured his place in history. However, there are very few other achievements in the past three of his tenure. The second generation of economic reforms has not taken off, there is no investor confidence in India and the Sangh Parivan is aligned against him. The BJP is losing ground in UP and Gujrat, and has no major presence in the other states in India. The NDA is glared together in an effort to keep the numbers on their side for the survival of this government. So Vajpayee takes the gamble by inviting Musharraf, after the failure of the cease-fire in Kashmir. The recent incidents in Tamilnadu have further tarnished the image of the BJP.

There is nothing to suggest, taking the past history of fifty years of deceit on the part of Pakistan, that this Summit can lead to a successful start of a new chapter. It would be too much to expect any concrete result in July, but it is equally doubtful if a process can be started which will eventually lead to peace or a final solution to peace or a final solution to the Kashmir problem. Bhutto's unfulfilled promises to Indira Gandhi, the Lahore visit followed by Kargil, the total disregard for the unilateral cease fire in Kashmir, do not augur well for an understanding of any kind between the two countries.

There are grave doubts if Musharaff can deliver the goods. There are many that feel that only a military dictator in Pakistan can dare to make concessions. It is becoming clearer that the Pakistani President/military dictator does not have the support of the political parties in Pakistan or the fundamentalist groups. The real test will come after the summit, when Musharaf will have to show some real progress in curbing terrorism in J & K, for the dialogue to continue towards a satisfactory outcome.

The West Asian Cauldron continues to boil and there seem no chances for any real peace in the region. Another long-standing dispute between Turkey and Greece, over Cyprus, is making some progress. CBMs have been instituted and

greater trade and cultural exchanges are taking place between the two sides. The foreign Minister of the two countries have been having cordial meetings. Turkey still adheres to Ataturk's principles and is not fundamentalist, though the religious parties have made considerable headway in the last decade.

The West Asian problem, and Kashmir, are more difficult to resolve because both have the involvement of die hard Islamic fundamentalists unlike Cyprus. This is the crux of the matter and it remains to be seen whether Musharraf can curb the Taliban, his own terrorists outfits operating out of Pakistan, and a Islamicised Pakistani army sympathetic to the Jihadis.

No doubt there has been US pressure. But Vajpayee has made this sudden, and unexpected, volte-face for his own reasons, the major one being to leave his footprints on the sands of time.⁵⁸

The summit talks between Pervez Musharraf and Atal Behari Vajpayee, to be held at Agra during July 2001 is, therefore, a right step in the right direction.

Saner voices in Pakistan are asserting and urging those who fees concerned to end the five decade long Indo-Pak conflict on Kashmir. Find a solution and begin the battle against poverty. That is the message. Indo-Pakistan relations require a new thrust so that the two countries come out of these long years of bloody conflicts. This is possible only if the leaders on both sides have a dialogue with an open mind. This is what Mr. Vajpayee has been wanting. General pervez Musharraf, too, has suddenly shown a degree of willingness for talks. He has openly stated that he is coming to India to make history'. We need peace on the sub-continent will tackle poverty and that makes the history.

Atal Behari Vajpayee made this clear when he pointed out in his invitation to General Pervez Musharraf that our common enemy was poverty. Pakistan, on the economic front, needs peace even more than we do. The Indian economy has been growing at a steady 6 percent annually whereas Pakistan's has been hardly growing at all at around 2 percent. The General's recent decision to cut the defence budget for the first time in history – indicated that he recognizes that the jihad is becoming unaffordable Pakistan's Jihad foreign policy extends not just to Kashmir but to ago Afghanistan as well and increasingly the world is beginning to become

less tolerant of such an attitude of Pakistan. As APJ Abdul Kalam said 'a developed India 2020 , or even earlier, is not a dream. It need not even be a mere vision in the minds of many Indians. It is a mission we can, all take up and succeed'.

The Agra Summit had aroused 'unprecedented enthusiasm among the people of the subcontinent and no other Summit had ever done in the past. This was not the first Indian Pakistan Summit and other meetings between heads of the two countries have been held in equally historic circumstance unlike other Summits this was the first meeting to produce not even a joint statement as happened at Agra. The newly self-anointed President of Pakistan General Musharraf had taken to India a three-point agenda. First, he wanted India to accept the centrality of the Kashmir issue. Second, he wanted India to agree on a structured arrangement for talks on Kashmir. And thirdly, he wanted India to promise a time-frame for concluding an agreement on Kashmir.⁵⁹ Pakistan was going to focus only on this and as the President had himself stated he would agree to discuss anything else if there was time left. It is not difficult to know that Islamabad could not have been so ignorant not to know that this agenda could not succeed at the Summit. Then why did Musharraf press forward with this agenda. That is the essence of India-Pakistan relations. It would be naïve for anyone to believe that this agenda would have led to making of history. A yearning for changing history requires denial of past history. For this, it was necessary to jettison Simla Agreement of 1972 and the Lahore Declaration of 1999 which Gen. Musharraf announced at least twice before and after the Summit.⁶⁰

The failure of the Summit had come about because there was no negotiating space left for Gen. Musharraf from the narrow mandate he had taken from the political class in Pakistan in the run up to the Summit. From Qazi-Husain Ahmed of the Jama at-I-Islami to Gen. Gul Hameed, former Director of ISI they were unanimous that he should not develop cultural and economic relations with India until the Kashmir issue was resolved. This has won him on return from Agra support from the fundamentalist and the militants outfits. The question arises if Gen. Musharraf had known that his Kashmir line had no flexibility and was unlikely to provide any scope for a compromise what did he hope to get at Agra. The question is often asked does Pakistan want to solve the Kashmir question ? Gen. Musharraf had early and after his take over, had stated that tensions and conflicts between

India and Pakistan would remain even after the Kashmir issue is resolved. The only answer to this question is that Kashmir is not only a territorial issue between the two neighbours but an ideological dispute. As already noted it is the enemy image of India that lies at the root of Pakistan's hostility to India. Kashmir is not the cause of India Pakistan conflict but it is its consequence. The root of this conflict goes to the ideological dispute which had led to the partition in 1947. India Pakistan represent two ideologies and two world issues.⁶¹ India seems unwilling to deal with the consequences of acknowledging the real problem. Kashmir is not the central issue in Indo-Pakistan relations it is the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.⁶² Pakistan's India policy is also rooted in its insecurity vis-à-vis the larger neighbour. India is many times larger in size, population, economic strength and scientific and technical development. Therefore Pakistani establishments long term aim is to keep it engaged or somehow cut it down by divisions and splintering. That is why Pakistan's former ISI Director Ge. Javed Nasir has talked of inflicting thousands cuts on India or what the former foreign minister threatened that there would be hundreds of Kargil. The Agree Summit has not been able to fulfill the expectations of the people of India and Pakistan and was a failure in all respects but one. It has broken the deadlock between the two countries created in the wake of the Kargil war and the October 1999 military coup. The Agra Summit has also highlighted the complexity of the issues that bedevit the relations between the two countries and which do not admit of easy solutions.

Just as war is not an option for Pakistan it is no longer an option for India. Average person in both the countries is ready for a change having realized the futility of prolonged hostility which never seems to bring tangible results but add only more misery. At the ordinary level of existence the vast majority of the people of India and Pakistan would like nothing better than to consign the planners of both the countries to the neither region in perpetuity. If the impose has got prolonged beyond its natural life span, the Indian leadership is as much to blame. If Pakistan has artificially stunted its growth by remaining in India's shadow for half a century, the Indian leadership too become or trich like by adapting a Pak tinted worldview. whatever the sins of omission or commission in the past, the Indian leadership must appreciate the altered ground realities. Today, India and Pakistan are seen to be

the most painful squabber of the second half respecting Indians and Pakistanis felt ashamed of Mr. Klaus Natorp, a specialist on the Indian subcontinent, said in a dispatch in the 'Frankfurter Allegemein Zeitung' about the dilemma of foreign dignitaries visiting Pakistan over the Kashmir issue. "No guest can escape it (Kashmir). Pakistani politicians and military are obsessed by the theme", he wrote. Recently in her visit to United States, Benazir Bhutto was addressed as the 'Madam Prime Minister of India' by the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate in an official reception. Later on when he was asked about the mistake, he clarified that Benazir in her meeting with for two hours talked about Kashmir and India only. She did not make even a passing reference of Pakistan and other countries. Thus in his sub-conscious mind her picture as the Prime Minister of India has emerged. What the chairman was trying to point out was the obsession she carried about India. Later on she regretted for this.

But enough is enough much water has flown in Ravi since then we will have to stop it otherwise we will become a victim of laughing stock before the world. It is heartening to note that most of Pakistani top intellectual and right thinking persons have started thinking positively in this direction. Even Gen. Musharraf has asked the hardcore mullas and other elements to stop anti Indian propaganda. In 1930, Muhammad Iqbal saw the vision and got Pakistan after nearly two decades. On this 125th anniversary of the father of nation, can't one see another vision of a 'United India and Pakistan again'. The models are before us. The world is shrinking. Globalisation is the creed now. In the recent year we have seen the union of Vietnam, the collapse of Berlin was and the disappearance of communism. The sworn enemies of yesterday have become bosom friends rather brothers. The Germans can unite, Vietnams can unite. Efforts are being made to unite South and North Korea. The same can happen here also. Vasudhaiva Kutam Vakam is an old adage here and is a part of India's global vision.

We do not foresee this union today or tomorrow or in near future. But this can be reality say after 10 or 20 years or even after 50 years. But this will be possible only if we see this vision today and pave the way for it. There is no dispute in the world, which can not be solved. Particularly family disputes can not linger on forever. We have close cultural, emotional and family relations with the common people of

Pakistan. The division was artificial. The line of wagher drawn on the hearts of the people. The sooner we met in the better it will be.

In this direction some beginning has to be made. Let us not touch the disputed issues. Bilateral trade, cultural and educational exchange should get precedence over the political matters. Let there be heart to heart talk between the people of both the countries. Mistrust can be replaced by trust and once it is done the problems of Kashmir and Karachi will evaporate. This was also what was visualized by Mahatma Gandhi nearly 50 years ago. "It is open to both the new states (India and Pakistan) to aim at a family of independent world states. If by our efforts such a world federation of free and independent states is brought into being. The hope of the kingdom of God, otherwise called Ramarajya may legitimately be entertained. There can not be a better occasion to make a honest beginning for this than the proposed meeting of Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and Ge. Pervez Musharraf in July 2001 in the Historic town of Agra.

In 19th April, 2001, Prime Minister said his fresh offer of talks with Pakistan was subject to Islamabad "stopping cross-border terrorism and dismantling the terror infrastructure". He also reiterated his commitment to talks with elected representative and promised to create more jobs.

At a press conference in Srinagar at the end of his two-day visit to the state, Vajpayee said ; if Pakistan denounces the policy of terrorism and dismantles the terror infrastructure, I as the Prime Minister would waste no time in departing a senior foreign ministry official to discuss the modalities of talks with Islamabad. I'll send a foreign ministry official to Islamabad tomorrow to chalk out the agenda. India, he said was ready to discuss with Pakistan all issues including Kashmir which has remain unresolved for last 50 years.

Pakistan to welcome the offer. "I hope they'll reply because it's important that talks take place . But the talks can't be held urban we've militants stationed on the border."The doors are open for all, included elected representatives and various other sections of public opinion, who were interested in talks with the government. Justifying his move of fresh offer of friendship, he said how long will India and Pakistan continue to live in an atmosphere of violence and hatred. "There

must be an end to this. Despite failure and hopeful that my fresh offer of friendship will succeed : The issue of Kashmir has been dragging on for the last 50 years, but the changed global order following the Iraq war makes it necessary for the two countries to hold talks.⁶³

In truth, there is considerable domestic opposition in both countries to resuming the dialogu. Since entrenched interests are opposed to normalizing bilateral relations, their resistance can be exaggerated and used by the political leadership to equivocate in this matter. Much depends on the political will of the two leaderships to explore the peace process, and how strongly international influence is exercised upon them to get serious.

Hopefully, the Indo-Pak leadership would be mindful of the systemic factors that favour the generation of political will to ; proceed with the bilateral dialogue and peace process. These disparate but wide ranging factors include: the several Track II efforts that are proceeding; attempts by common citizens to re-establish people to people contracts; and initiatives taken by SAARC and the chambers of commerce to enlarge bilateral trade relations. Besides, a new post-Simla generation is coming into positions of responsibility in both countries that is most largely concerned with economic betterment and less with dwelling on the stultifying memories of a bitter, conflictual past. A ray of hope , emerges from the fact that the twice-weekly that plies between New Delhi and Lahore continued to operate at full capacity at the height of the kargil conflict over six weeks ahead.¹⁹⁷ Pakistan's excluded the possibility of accommodation and acceptance of Indian Regional leadership as a means of ensuring their own national well being. After all, they defined their very rationale for existence as being "not-India", and the heritage of conflict had been intensified by orders of magnitude through the horrors of partition. A forthcoming approach on the part of New Delhi might conceivably have assuaged these concerns, but the Indians chose a policy of firmness. The armed conflict that immediately developed over Kashmir was seen in Pakistan as proof that India did not accept the legitimacy of the Muslim nation. Kashmir became the focus of relations between India and Pakistan as a quarrel over territory, but even more as the symbol of the struggle between Islamic Pakistan and secular India.

Thus from its very inception, Pakistan was an "insecurity State" that perceived itself not only as small and disadvantaged but as on the defensive against a real and present threat, with its survival at stake. Constructing a force within South Asia to balance India was not feasible because India was more powerful than any combination of other States within the subsystem". Thus Central element of Pakistan policy has been to reach outside South Asia to find support that might offset Indian dominance within the system and to avoid bilateral arrangements that would put Pakistan in a one-on-one relationship with India. Pakistan initially sought to offset geopolitics through religion : it was to be part of the universal community of believers, and as the first nation to be formed in the name of Islam felt that it should and would receive full support of the universal community of Muslims, the 'Ummah'. It was a matter of some convenience, that most of the 'ummah' lay to the west of Pakistan, lending the western part of the new nation depth vis-à-vis India.

Pakistan also saw itself in the vanguard of what would be many new nations coming to independence in the following years. Although little tangible support could be expected from that quarter for the time being, Pakistan derived satisfaction from its solidarity with Indonesia independence struggle and with the Arabs in their resistance to the creation of Israel.

While Pakistan recognized the fact of overwhelming American Predominance in an essentially unipolar world of 1947, it would be some time before Pakistan looked seriously for strategic support from a source that was so unclear and so distant. Pakistan's foreign policy, lauffeted from many sides, would go through a series of fairly well defined phases over the next half century. One element or another would be most prominent at any given time, but with little change, this menu of options would comprise the elements of the stream of Pakistan's foreign policy on it flowed over a very rocky bed defined by hostility toward a vastly stronger India.⁶⁵

Pakistan infact had witnessed leadershiup vacuum. For the first time, this phenomenon came in evidence after the demise of Jinnah Ali Khan. In the eighties , after Bhutto's execution there was created a leadership vacuum. There is no dearth of political leaders in Pakistan. Nusrat Bhutto, Benazir Bhutto, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, Asgar Khan, Khan Wali Khan, G.M.Syed and others have there leaders of

Bhutto's stature. Benazir Bhutto tried in vain, to invoke street power by emulating the example of Phillipine's Cory Acquire to project a charismatic leadership⁶⁶ However, after General Zia-ul-Haq's death by aircrash hopes are being pinned on her in the November 16 election.

Since its inception there has been ideological confusion in Pakistan. It is an offshoot of the leadership syndrome. This confusion revolve around the issue of how to correlate the democratic aspirations of the people with their Islamic aspirations. Whenever this confusion was the worst confounded, there was created an ideological vacuum. At times attempts were made to fill the ideological vacuum. Formulation of ideology rests with the political leaders and intelligential. There is no dearth of politicians and intellectuals in Pakistan. What Pakistan lacks is the tradition of evolving consensus on certain vital issues of national concern, encompassing political, social, economic and cultural fields. Looking back, one finds, the responsibility of state building and nation building was developed upon the Muslim League, which had spearheaded itself as the vanguard of Pakistan movement. But it failed to give an ideological content to the movement, except for propounding Two Nation Theory, which did not rest on infallible grounds. Pakistani nation builder did not have a clear perspective on problems, much less to their solutions that the new state would face. A queer mixture of Islamism and secularism was reflected in the minds of Jinnah and Liaquat. The specific ideological confusion prevailed over constitution – making.

In this connection, it will be pertinent to refer to 1949 objective Resolution, which was pushed through by Liaquat Ali Khan. It took over five years to work out the resolution was framed, its wording in the first instance seemed to satisfy both the Islamists and the secularists or modernists. But when the reports of the Basic Principles Committee, which was appointed to work out the resolution, came out, it simply disappointed everybody.⁶⁸ The ideological confusion became manifest in the modification of reports one after the other, particularly in respect of Islamic provisions. This prompted Maulana Maudoodi to remark : "If a secular and godless, instead of Islamic constitution was to be introduced what was the sense in all this struggle for a separate Muslim homeland. We could have and it all without that."⁶⁹

In the wake of leadership vacuum, there prevailed ideological vacuum. Political leaders having been thrown to the oblivion by the bureaucracy and army, a lip-service continued to be paid to Islamic ideals for more than a decade and various forms of democracy were conceived and projected – such as –controlled”, “guided” and “basic” and were thrust upon the people much against their wishes.

To fill the ideological vacuum, Z.A.Bhutto's PPP raised fourfold slogan to formulate Pakistan's ideology : “ Islam is our faith , Democracy is our polity, Socialism is our economy and All-Power to the People”. Populist approach to politics led to 1970 elections – for the first time based on adult franchise and relatively free elections. It was not a mean achievement but it became a casualty of the leadership syndrome.²⁰³

Of late, Indo-Pak relations appear to have entered into a new phase. Conscious of the unfavourable political image created by his orgy of collecting arms from the U.S.A., China and the Arab countries, President Zia of Pakistan has held out to India to olive branch of a no-war pact. But this cannot disguise the contradictions inherent in the relationship between the two countries Pakistan's adventurism manifested itself in several wars, culminating in the war which led to the emergency of Bangladesh as a separate sovereign state. India herself had offered a no-war pact to Pakistan, but this was turned down by the latter. President Zia's offer of a no-war pact caught the Indian side totally off guard. Not surprisingly, India's procrastination over her reply was put forward in the Pakistani and Pro-Pakistani International press as a sign of her reluctance to mend the fences with that country. A flurry of aide memories criss-crossed between Islamabad and New Delhi while the two Ambassadors, Abdeus Sattar and Natwar Singh, made frantic air dashes to their respective capitals for urgent briefings.

Then came the visit of Mr. Agha Shali, Pakistani Foreign Minister, to New Delhi for talks with India's Foreign Minister, Mr. P.V.Narasimha Rao, and also with Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi. The talks dragged on for four days, but nothing very concrete emerged, except that it was agreed that they should be continued at the official level. Although Mr. Narasimha Rao told Parliament on February 19, 1982 that after the recent discussions, India and Pakistan were in a position to undertake specific consideration of the elements which could constitute the substance of an

agreement on non-aggression, it was couched in diplomatic verbiage which could mean anything or nothing. Mr. Rao added that both sides had detailed discussions on areas of bilateral cooperation and that it was recognized that such contact had to be maintained at various levels on a frequent and regular basis. In addition, to allay Pakistan's fears, Mrs. Gandhi categorically declared that, pacts or no pact, India would never attack Pakistan. She also agreed to the setting up of a Joint Commission to review Indo-Pakistani relations.

Almost immediately after his return to Islamabad, Mr. Aga Shahi resigned. Although this was offensively attributed to his failing wealth, diplomatic observers believe that there were significant differences between him and President Zia over the manner in which he had conducted the negotiations in New Delhi. Whatever the real reason, the recent outburst of his elder brother, Mr. Aga Hilaly, at a meeting of the United Nations Human Rights Commission in Geneva shows that the Pakistan offer of a no-war pact is not as sincere as it is made out while discussing colonial and alien domination, Mr. Hilaly talked up the Kashmir issue and tried to equate it with self determination for the people of Palestine and Namibia. It naturally evoked strong protest from Mr. B.R. Bhagat, who was leading the Indian delegation at the Geneva meeting. He asserted that Kashmir won an integral part of India and it was for Pakistan to vacate the aggression in that area. Saying that the two countries are committed to the Simla agreement for a peaceful solution of the problem through bilateral discussions, Mr. Bhagat wondered only Pakistan chose to make propagandist statements at international forums.

The reason, of course, is obvious. Pakistan wishes to use the offer of a no-war pact as a smoke screen for her adventurist activities. She uses the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan as a pretext for stepping up of acquisition sophisticated armaments, including nuclear weapons, but the interesting fact is that more of her armoured divisions and air force units are deployed near the Indian frontier rather than on the Afghan border. Quite pertinently Mrs. Indira Gandhi wondered why President Zia should produce the no-war rabbit out of his braided hat shortly after having signed the arms deal with the USA.

There is also a feeling in certain quarters that Pakistan want to avenge her defeat in the previous Indo-Pak conflicts. President Zia is on shavy grounds on the

domestic front and the only way in which he can remain in power is by making a spectacular attack on India (while talking of peace in the same breath) and grabbing that portion of Kashmir which is still outside his physical control. With direct or indirect help from USA and China, President Zia hopes to whip up the Pakistani frenzy over Kashmir and consolidate his position within his country.

Even so, the Indian govt. and the people of India would like to see lasting peace established between the two countries. But it cannot be unilateral. There is deep distrust in India about the intention of Pakistan. Islamabad's special relationship with USA and China – a relationship which is proclaimed and advertised almost and nauseum is a fact which cannot but cause worry to India.

What should India do in this situation ? India must remain ever vigilant in regard to Pakistan's moves and counter-moves. She must acquire modern and up-to-date arms from whichever country is prepared to sell them to her. It is unfortunate that this arms race is diverting so much resources from economic development to the instruments of war and defence, but India has got no option in the matter. She must also continue to nurture her friendship with the USSR - as a counterpoise to the blatant support given Pakistan by USA and China.

Meanwhile, the dialogue must go on for what is worth. A voidable irritants should be removed and the scope for extending trade and cultural relations and improving the postal, railway, telephone, telegraph and travel facilities between the two countries should be pursued. Exchanges may also be made in educational scientific and technological fields to mutual advantage. India has already extended her hand of friendship in many of these areas will Pakistan respond ?

Two new generations have come into existence in both the countries since the partition of the sub-continent, while this opens up the prospects of a better relationship in the not-too-distant future, it may also mean that headliners in both the countries would get the upper hand over their more moderate compatriots and try to frustrate all attempts at reconciliation.

Simla Agreement

Since the transformation of Pakistan into a modern democratic state is most desirable, the present leadership in India has shown willingness to strengthen the

hand of the Bhutto government by approaching the Indo-Pak question in a conciliatory tone. India's main objective has been to persuade Pakistan to settle the mutual problem between themselves. In this respect, the Simla Agreement, despite its severe limitations, could be considered as historic for it reflects the urgency for evolving a common approach to minimize antagonism between South Asia's two oldest rivals.

The rise of new power relations Sino US-Pak axis with the Soviet Union at the back of India increased the antagonisms between India and Pakistan. The Simla Agreement signed in 1972 did not heal the grounds suffered by Pakistan in the 1971 war. In an interview to a foreign magazine, Bhutto viewed the perspective of adjustment with India under the Simla Agreement, as "dim".⁷¹ During the phase of implementation, of the Simla Agreement, Bhutto's attitude seemed to have hardened by the United States' announcement of lifting of the arm embargo on Pakistan on 14 March 1973 and supplying it with 300 armoured personnel carriers, aircraft engines, military spare parts and parachutes. This move of the United States of America was very much resented by Foreign Minister Swaran Singh of India in the Rajya Sabha, that it would strengthen Pakistan's anti-India and militaristic policy.⁷²

From the very day of signing the Simla Agreement onwards, though many other agreements were signed relating to trade, commerce and aviation between the two countries, the relationship between them had not been cordial enough to avoid mutual conflicts suspicious and aggression for all times to come. It would be idle to say that Pakistan had forgotten its humiliation of 1965 and 1971. Kashmir was still a major cause for confrontation between them.⁷³ Pakistan only waited for time and opportunity to strengthen its bargaining position and get on edge over India by growing militarily with the help of external power. This has always been the perception of Indian leaders that the external factor is the main stumbling factor is the main stumbling block to durable peace believe, the two countries.⁷⁴

The Simla Agreement of July 1972 seems to have put both India and Pakistan on a course of gradual normalization of their relations. The protocol signed in New Delhi between the two countries on 30 November 1974 resuming expectations has raised considerable expectations in India with regard to the prospects of fruitful economic cooperation between the two countries, including

some sort of a regional framework for trade in the sub-continent. The two countries would extend the most favoured nation treatment to each other, in accordance with the provisions of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs. To begin with, trade would be conducted on a government to – government basis or through public sector agencies. However, private trade could also take place by mutual agreement in specific cases. At a later stage, the private sector would be given a bigger role. The two delegations concluded that there were immediate trade possibilities in items like cotton, engineering goods, jute manufacturers, iron-ore, railway equipment, rice and tea.⁷⁵ A former trade agreement incorporating the clauses of 30 November 1971 protocol was signed on 23rd Jan. 1975, which came into force with immediate effect and was to be valid for one year with a provision for extension by a further period of two years.⁷⁶ As a starting point for the resumption of trade, India agreed to import 200,000 bales of 15 to 16 inches staple cotton from Pakistan at a price ranging from 33 centres. The structural changes that have taken place in the economics of the two countries over the years and revival of trade on the established pattern may not allow trade in the traditional commodities.

Though, there is considerable optimism in the Indian trade circles about the Indo-Pak trade prospects, as reflected in the mass media, Pakistani press appears to be somehow skeptical about such prospects – its contention being that both the economics are competitive and not complementary and the nine years of rapture of commercial ties between the two economics had brought a lot of changes to the pattern of bilateral trade and commerce. The external trade of each country has certainly been following different courses of development during the past decade. At the same time, Pakistan is in the habit of linking up politics with trade, thereby creating doubts about the viability of any permanent arrangement between the two countries. For instance, if Pakistan is willing to supply raw cotton on a permanent basis, in return, say, for jute products for the next five years, both the countries can conveniently plan the acreage under these crops. But the past Indian experience with Pakistan has shown that the latter was willing to sell cotton only when the demand in the international market was low. Even the current agreement was signed when raw cotton stocks had piled up in Pakistan. Therefore, trade with Pakistan may have follow the same pace as that of building mutual trust in their other bilateral dealings.

Although the Simla Pact of July 1, 1972 did not include any formal undertaking for war avoidance it however pledged to normalize Indo-Pakistan relations and settle disputes peacefully. In the Simla Pact, both New Delhi and Islamabad expressed their opposition to the threat or use of force and their respect for each other's territorial integrity. Apart from settling details regarding building a new relationship in the situation, India and Pakistan pledged to hold talks for the final settlement of their territorial disputes, the formation of economic, cultural and scientific ties and the restoration of diplomatic relations.⁷⁷

Nevertheless, the Simla agreement gave an opportunity to the two warring states to put an end to their conflicts and confrontation and promote goodwill harmony leading to the establishment of durable peace in the sub continent. According to an Indian author, "In the Simla agreement India and Pakistan agreed to follow the policy of peaceful coexistence. That the basic issues and causes of conflict be devilling their relations for the past 25 years could be resolved by peaceful means; they shall always respect each other's national unity, territorial integrity, political independence and sovereign equality and that in accordance with the charter of the UN they will refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of each other. Both governments also undertook to take all steps within their power to encourage the dissemination of such information as would promote the development of friendly relations between them."⁷⁸

From any account, the Simla agreement provided a suitable framework for bilateral cooperation and avoidance of future outbreak of hostilities in the sub continents. The two countries restored diplomatic relations, returned their captured territories, released POWs and resumed communication, postal, telegraphic, sea-land and air-link. But, beyond that no substantial progress was achieved to seek a permanent solution of Indo-Pakistan conflicts. Some Indian Writers expressed their antagonism that when the final settlement of the Kashmir dispute was mentioned in the text of Simla Agreement. As pointed out by Pannalal Dhar, "What was gained on the battlefield by the Indian armed forces was frittered away by Indian political leadership in Simla treaty by conceding that Kashmir dispute still existed and that both India and Pakistan would meet in future

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CHAPTER VI

Indo-Pak Relations — Its impact on the SAARC

No nation in the present world can live in total isolation. In pursuit of one's own national interest, independence, survival and development, an interaction takes place among and between nations which marks the characteristic of the present international system and other subordinate state systems. The international system is dominated by the super power whose major aim is to increase their sphere of influence in all parts of the globe. The subordinate state systems such as South Asia, South East Asia, Middle East, Africa and Latin America are rife with regional conflicts, and wars largely rooted in their historical territorial and psychological claims. Though both the international system and subordinate systems are affected by each other, the former basically sets broad limits, context, and direction of regional conflicts in the subordinate state systems.¹

South Asia, where lives a large number of the human race, is passing through a difficult situation. Conflicts between the countries of the region are assuming new and complex forms. External forces are also impinging upon the region in ever more powerful ways. Interactions between the two trends are making each more pretentious.

South Asia, over the years, has become a theatre of diverse kinds of conflicts. There are on going ethnic, regional, ecological, linguistic and border related tensions within the states as well as between the state in South Asia. The nature of conflicts has a wide range starting from ethnic conflicts within states to inter-state disputes over lack of demarcation of mutually acceptable frontiers between states, viz. India - Pakistan, India - Bangladesh. These wide ranging conflicts in turn have acquired new dimensions in the context of globalisation especially in certain issues such as cross border terrorism, flow of arms/ drugs that have arrested international attention. Similarly, the flow of refugees across borders due to the inability of a concerned state to protect the rights of its ethnic minorities is also arresting international attention. The flow of Tamils of Sri Lanka in to Tamil Nadu, Chakmas of the Chittagong Hills Tracts of Bangladesh to the North East Indian state of Tripura,

Nepali, Bhojpuri from Bhutan into Nepal and India are cases in point. The magnitude, depth and dimensions of conflicts in South Asia have had an adverse impact on the quality of governance, development and inter-state ties in the region. India, a combination of factors such as historical circumstances that drew the boundaries of these states under colonialism, geo-strategic aspirations of the post colonial states to exercise control over vital strategic regions, an inherent urge of the marginalized social groups to fight for self determination and struggles to capture scarce resources towards developmental purposes among the rival states have cumulatively contributed to the complexities of conflicts on South Asia and hamper the smooth operation of SAARC.

The region is at a loss to understand and adjust with the varied and complex implication of the end of the cold war. The one superpower situation on the one hand and the growing economic fortification on the other are shrinking the prospects of resilience and manoeuvrability available to the South Asian countries earlier. It is indeed unfortunate that even under such pressures and uncertainties, the countries of the region have not been able to put their act together and advance regional understanding and cooperation. Perhaps, the respective internal chaos and disintegration is not allowing them to think boldly and constructively, perhaps the countries and the region lack visionaries and statesman; perhaps, the politicians in command of the respective state structures are preoccupied with the avenues of cooperation and short term gains denied to them by the mighty and powerful at the global level.

On the other hand, India, wedded to western liberal institutions, though with minor adjustments, has not been able to establish its relative advantages in meeting the people's requirements. The economic conditions of the two most populous nations thus remaining utterly unsatisfactory, and that in contrast with the spectacular economic performance of some of their small Asian neighbours with meager natural endowments, both are seeking fresh remedies. Besides, the common ailments like covetousness and corruption even among the top echelon, gross inefficiency and irresponsiveness of the officialdom, increasingly poorer performance of all state institutions, with the resultant loss of credibility by the leadership and the erosion of

people's faith in a better future, raise pertinent questions about the suitability of either set up.

Any study of peace and stability in South Asia has to take into account the behaviour of India or what others perceive the behaviour of India. The neighbours very much feel the self-awareness of India's pre-eminence and India's quest to assert itself in the affairs of the region. Every Indian neighbour, except perhaps Bhutan and Maldives, is involved, at least, in one dispute with India like sharing of river waters, tension relating to the border, ethnic-religious conflicts, territorial dispute, nuclear policy or the desire to get declared as a champion of peace, involvement in one another's internal problems, to mention a few. Each state in South Asia perceives a threat to its territorial integrity from their neighbour in the region, India in particular. The fear of Indian dominance keeps them away from cultivating closer bonds based on common historical and cultural homogeneity. Smaller South Asian states felt that they are confronted with India which is imperial in outlook and difficult to persuade.² It is true that India has problems with all its neighbours in South Asia but that is because India alone shares land or maritime borders with other states in the sub-continent. The core geographic location and ethnic religious, pluralism³ made India the common factor in any study of inter-state relations in South Asia. The dispute that marred India's relationship with Pakistan is different from its difficulties with Nepal or Bangladesh or Sri Lanka. This fact needs to be recognized while making analyses of the nature, trends and shifts in bilateral relations in South Asia. What should be borne in mind in this context is that the success or failure of regional co-operation in the region depends on the positive or negative nature of India's bilateral interaction with Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal. There exists no major difficulties in India's bilateral relations with Bhutan and Maldives. All of the South Asian states except Pakistan have already been brought within the matrix of an Indian security system which is regional rather than national in scope. In some cases, this is through formal agreements, in others through the unilateral extension of the Indian system to neighbouring states⁴. Obviously only Pakistan posed a challenge to the Indian Doctrine of regional security. Thus the major hurdle to this united but rather unique form of regional security has been Indo - Pak relation.

India and Pakistan are the traditional rivals in the region. So the basic question of regional co-operation is the question of Indo-Pak understanding. The relations between India and Pakistan are the keystone for South Asian co-operation of any kind⁵ and the relations between those two countries suffer from the crucial dichotomy of unmitigated personal warmth and undivided national suspicion and animosity.⁶ A fundamental and long-term improvement in relations between these two countries needs to be achieved for the viability of regional co-operation in South Asia. What is required is a reconciliation of the basic contradictions with regard to political values, political frameworks, international perceptions and attitude.⁷

The Indo-Pakistan strife over Kashmir continues to get remarkably worsened and certainly not significantly better. Owing to the sensitivity of the issue, there is a great deal of suspicion between the two largest countries in South Asia. In the more recent past, the delay in arriving at an agreement on South Asia preferential trading arrangement which has now been ratified was mainly due to Pakistan's reluctance to place faith in a matter where India was involved. Worse still, this mistrust between two of the leading countries within South Asia has even provoked the eruption of conflict and confrontation. To get over this chequered and embittered tangle between India and Pakistan is no easy task.

While on the post-War European scene there had loomed a common threat and a common hostile ideology, the countries in South Asia have faced no such common antagonistic or threat perception. Similarly, unlike South East Asia, South Asia did not entertain fears from countries such as China or Japan or the ideology of Communism, which could have brought them together like the ASEAN countries.⁸ In South Asia, not only was such a common threatening ideological force perceived, India herself, which is geographically at the core of South Asia, is looked upon with fear and suspicion by the smaller countries within the region. There is a lurking fear that India nurses hegemonic ambitions and could subsume the smaller neighbours. This had militated against smoother cooperation in South Asia.⁹

Any discussion of how much SAARC has achieved since its inception is immaterial from the perspective. What is important in retrospect, however, is whether SAARC has taken any firm steps to fulfill the objectives proclaimed in the charter or it not then whether it is in the process of doing so.

On the other hand, the use of the goal achievement criteria in assessing the performance of SAARC is useful in separating the rhetoric from the reality of progress made through co-operation. As in all organizations, SAARC functions through objectives which are both explicit and tacit in character. According to the charter, the organization's scope of activity is clearly centred around the goals at accelerating economic growth and promoting social and cultural development through collaboration in various fields of activities. But, in working out the modus operandi of the organization, political leaders have accepted that in as much as politics plays a crucial role in shaping the future growth of the SAARC, the process of cooperation must also provide a dividend which must result in ameliorating the political condition within the region. Even though the social and cultural dimensions have a stronger base for cooperating in the region due to historical factors it is the progress in the political and economic arena which will in fact determine the overall efficacy of the organization.

To state in mutedly, the achievements of SAARC in the political realm have been very limited, the original boldness with which political leaders initiated the process of cooperation a decade ago has yet to be matched by programmes which can draw the regional body close to its ostensible objectives. In working out the modalities of cooperation, SAARC has only succeeded in establishing an acceptable political understanding for proceeding with the debate for cooperation, but has not been able to agree on political condition which would be acceptable to all the parties for implementing the core economic objectives which are inherent in the general scheme of regionalism. As a result, organizational activities to date have been caught in the vortex of a 'spill-around' process where the scope of regional stakes have increased significantly, by without increasing the level of regional decision making or moving beyond the state, encapsulating strategy of what might be conservatively termed as veiling only with non-contentious issues.¹⁰

The achievement of SAARC is not possible as ever since both the countries felt threatened by each other. The story of Indo-Pak relations has been mainly a story of conflict. It was expected that the Simla pact of July 1, 1972 would usher in a new era in the Indo-Pak relations. Although Simla pact did not include any formal

undertaking for war avoidance, it, however, pledged to normalize relations and settle disputes peacefully.

The Simla Pact remained a non-starter. Even today, after 30 years of this agreement, there is no sign of rapprochement. Threat of war looms large and even there is irresponsible talk of the use of nuclear weapons. Pakistan has, for the last few years unleashed low-cost proxy war against India by training and financing terrorist outfits to kill innocent people, create terror and destroy properties in Kashmir, Punjab and some other parts of India. Such activities create animosity and not friendly relations. In fact, Pakistan is waging war against India in all but name.

India's desire to live in peace with Pakistan has not been reciprocated, India's the then Prime Minister, I. K. Gujral and Nawaz Sharif, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan made sincere efforts to come to some settlement but Pakistan's governmental machinery has aborted these attempts. Thus the future of South Asia seemed to rest entirely on India and Pakistan.

All South Asian countries have to play their due role in determining whether the region will remain locked in conflictual relations or progress towards regional co-operation. For more than fifty years now, the still volatile Indo-Pakistani antagonism is the major obstacle. Yet, in view of India's pre-eminent position in the region, its attitude is the most important determinant of South Asia's future.

Thus, although nature has created the Indian sub-continent as a single strategic whole, and although relevant parts of the subcontinent have been a single strategic area for long periods in the past, during the past four decades inter-country relations throughout South Asia have been poised by conflicting perceptions of threat, which have been of four main types. First, one South Asian country feels threatened by another directly, and believes itself to be the victim of actual or potential aggression by the other. In the second type a South Asian country under threat from a country outside South Asia suspects the latter has an accomplice or a proxy within South Asia. The third type is the intrusion of super power rivalries into South Asia in forms which make, or seem to make one South Asian Country an enemy of another. The most pernicious type is the fourth in which two or more of the first three types interact with each other and reinforce all of them.

The clearer and the most durable example of the first type is the relation between India and some of its neighbours. If for no other reason— though there are other too—the disparity between the size of India and the size of most of its neighbours, the latter harbour a perception that they feel threatened by India. Pakistan has felt so ever since East Pakistan broke away, with India's help, to form Bangladesh. But India itself has not been entirely free of it. Within weeks of becoming independent, India came under attack from Pakistan over Kashmir. India believes that it was Pakistan again which was the aggressor in the 1965 war between the two countries, and many Pakistanis agree with that.¹⁰

Pakistan is also an example of the second type of that perception. It feels threatened by the Soviet Union. But it also suspects that India might act on behalf of the Soviet Union, and for the Soviet Union's reasons even if not for India's own. Sri Lanka also feels this fear to some extent. Both Pakistan and India are also examples of the third types. In the implacable confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, Pakistan is or is perceived to be on the side of the United States and India on the side of the Soviet Union. Through these actual or perceived roles of the two main South Asian countries and their mutual antagonisms, the global cold war between the two super powers extended down into South Asia. So did the Sino-Soviet cold war through India's connection with the Soviet Union and Pakistan with China.

These cold war extensions are examples of the fourth and worst type. Worst because they form a vicious cycle. In fact two vicious cycles, cause and consequence aggravating each other within each cycle and between them. Pakistan feels threatened by India and for the reason, though not only for that reason, turns to an alliance with the United States. India sees a threat in the alliance more than it sees one in Pakistan alone, and throws itself open the special relationships which the Soviet Union has developed with it. That aggravates Pakistan's insecurity and it seeks an even deeper American embrace and the cycle repeats itself. So does the other cycle. As relations between the United States and the Soviet Union become more bitter, so do the relations between India and Pakistan and as these latter relations deteriorate each of these two countries allows itself more willingly to get drawn more tightly into the ever rising bitterness of the global cold war.¹¹

So long as this goes on, South Asia can never resume being a single strategic whole, and unless it does, South Asian regional co-operation will remain superficial. Neither India nor Pakistan will allow economic cooperation between them to grow beyond a point as long as they are unsure of continued peace between themselves, and such is the pre-eminence of these two countries of the region that will also not go very far unless it goes far enough between India and Pakistan.¹² Therefore if South Asian regional cooperation is to grow, the barriers of real or perceived hostility which divide the region up will have to come down.

The most obvious thing in this respect is that their own relations with each other are more within the jurisdiction and compliance of the South Asian countries themselves than are the actions of the global actors and their impact upon this region. The second and more important reason is that it is the dissensions between the South Asian Countries themselves which creates opportunities for the super power conflicts to intrude into this region. These dissensions provide not only opportunities for the intrusions, they are the basic cause, and this is the third and most important reason.¹³

The cleavage between India and Pakistan is the best examples of one which has continued to exist as a creature of the mind long after it vanished as a real issue. It is also the best example of the use made by extra regional powers of the gateway given by the mistrust between India and Pakistan. From the moment they became independent, India and Pakistan became embroiled in a war over Kashmir. Whether the causes of the war were created by the two countries themselves or a trap set for both by someone else has been a subject of various interpretations. But no one doubts that if they had mutually decided to settle the dispute, no one could have prevented them from doing so, and that if they had settled it the subsequent course of relation between them could have been very different.

Since they chose, not to settle it and the war dragged in, and also aggravated all the other issues outstanding between them as a result of the partition of India in 1947, the whole complex of their domestic and external policies acquired a certain predominant slant which particularly influenced their policies, but the whole way of their looking at things and their relations with the major external powers. As this slant persisted it caused two things to happen. It created an opening for external powers

and their interests to intrude into South Asia and having gained entry to strengthen the slant since it suited them to strengthen it.

Secondly, it inhibited the autonomy of action of both the countries, though not perhaps to same extent in the two countries. Initially India and Pakistan might have been guided by their own reasons in adopting the kind of relations they accepted with the major powers but certain compulsions gradually grew out of that which gave the major powers and added capacity to manipulate events in South Asia and diminish the autonomy of action of South Asian actors.

So, the dissensions between India and Pakistan first became an opportunity for external intervention, and then gave the interveners opportunity to expand their intervention, and then become a cause of further intervention. The South Asian countries concerned became less and less able to check this process, because within some of these countries strong interest arose which acquired a stake in the continuation of intervention. These interests often did not represent a majority opinion within their country but were able to ensure continuation of the intervention despite the heavy price the country concerned had to pay for it.¹⁴

Similar questions, some economic, some related to security perception, are being raised in other South Asian countries just as there is renewed examination of the political and military consequences which India faces as a result of its relationship of mistrust with its neighbours. The central point about this widespread questioning is that whether mistrust of India by its neighbours and the reverse mistrust by India are founded on fact or fiction the fact is that they exist and are strong enough to persuade the whole South Asian region to go on suffering the political, economic and strategic distortions they have imposed upon the policies of all the countries of the region. Therefore, the fears must be accepted as real and tackled as such, both in their economic and political manifestations. Any proposal, such as India's that Pakistan should not allow US military bases on its soil, which seeks to reassure India against superpower military intrusions into South Asia, is inadequate if it does not simultaneously reassure India's neighbours against military, political or adverse economic intrusions by India. Similarly, any proposal, such as Pakistan's no war pact proposal to India, is inadequate if it does not also pressure India against extra regional intrusions which in the given context became a threat to India. Therefore, the

mistrust arising from the inadequacy syndrome must be comprehensively tackled because the mistrust itself is comprehensive; it affects all neighbours and all aspects of their relation with India and also SAARC rule security.

Asymmetry is not peculiar to the South Asian region. It exists globally. Though some 200 members states of the United Nations are politically sovereign equals, in all other respects they are unequal. In varying degrees, asymmetry is found among the countries in various regions and sub-regions resulting in various kinds of arguments for mutual accommodation and understanding. The most striking positive political phenomenon in the contemporary world is, indeed, the emergence of grouping of nations formed with a view to promoting national interests through regional and sub-regional cooperation. A new dimension has thus been added to another contemporary world trend namely the growing interdependence of the nation states through mutually beneficial cooperation. Among the countries of South Asia asymmetry is placed in sharp relief as a major factor in shaping their security perceptions for a number of reasons. Important among them are : The vast superiority of India in economic and military strength and the misgivings in the minds of her neighbours as to how India would use this enormous strength in her relations with the neighbours. Unresolved bilateral problems have fuelled these misgivings. The continuing trend of widening disparity in economic and military respects between India and her neighbours excepting Pakistan has accentuated the fear complex among India's neighbours.

The slower pace of India's neighbours in developing sound political institution capable of countering and containing the turbulent centrifugal forces inherent in the state of underdevelopment.

Differences in ideology, political and social structure and regime perceptions of national interests, are also applicable, even to India, as observed in her changing foreign policy postures following regime changes and their bearing on relation with neighbours. An opt example is the Indo-Bangladesh agreement on sharing of the waters of the Ganges which underwent many changes which are perceived by Bangladesh to be regimes changes in India, thus hindering growth of stable bilateral relations.

Peculiar manifestations of the "big-small neighbours" complex is also a point in this connection in the form of a fear psychoses for both the big and small neighbours. The symmetry in economic development seems to take on a different complexion when viewed in the regional perspective.

Thus in these cases the mistrust, asymmetry hamper progress of the SAARC and it is no wrong to say that Indo-Pak antagonism is the major obstacle for the successful operation of the SAARC.

Until the mid 1980s, South Asia was notoriously the largest section of the world's population which had been unwilling or unable to produce a regional organisation. This was mainly because of prevailing Indo Pakistan mutual suspicions or more generally, because of Indian beliefs that such an organisation would be a device for concerting anti-Indian coalitions or, by contrast, the fear held by all the neighbours of India that it could become an instrument for promoting India's regional hegemony.

Moreover, conflict and cooperation are also the outcome of the geo-political realities of the region. One of the most important geo-political realities of the region is, of course, India's population resources, economic and military power, as compared to those of its South Asian neighbours. Equally important is the centrality of India's position in South Asia. While most of the other South Asian countries are not associated with each other through common borders, almost all of them have common borders with India, either by land or sea.

Their international relation in South Asia comprises mainly relations with India. The constant presence of a number of grievances against India in most of the South Asian countries is largely the result of the situation. So is their apprehension that India harbours hegemonistic designs in the region. When India pleads for collective self-reliance and warns against allowing external powers any foothold in the region, as it often does, this regarded as a proof of such designs. Thus, while India would like all the South Asian countries to cooperate in the political field in order to prevent the region from being involved in the power politics of the major external powers, most of India's neighbours welcome the latter's involvement in South Asian affairs with a view to safeguarding their own autonomy vis-à-vis India. This keeps India also

wary of the designs of its neighbours, even the smallest of whom can pose a threat to its security, it prepared to allow itself to be used as a base for a great power hostile to India.

Apart from these geo-political realities, history has contributed in a good measure to the long prevailing atmosphere of disrupt in the South Asian region. This is particularly true of the relationship between India and Pakistan. The greatest obstacle to the rapid growth of Pakistan as a result of the then partition of India in 1947, after bitter and bloody struggle, in the atmosphere of mistrust which has cast a deep shadow of suspicion and distrust in the relationship between the two countries since their birth as two independent states.

The South Asian policies of the external powers, particularly the United States and China, further add to tensions in the region. Being unhappy with India's foreign policy based on its own independent view of world affairs and seeking to restrict the role of external powers in South Asia as far as possible they have consistently sought to limit India's role in South Asian by bolstering up the anti- There is, thus, no doubt that the existence of these differences between India and its neighbours creates serious hurdles in the path of the speedy growth of such cooperation.

India prefers a comprehensive peace, friendship, cooperation and treaty with Pakistan for providing a solid foundation to the future course of their relations. India wants treaty aimed at promoting beneficial bilateralism in all aspects of Indo-Pak relations. A mere no-war pact can be no remedy to the irritant that characterises Indo-Pak relations. India believes that a comprehensive Indo-Pak treaty alone can solve the real problems of their relations and usher the two countries into an era of peace, friendship, harmony, and cooperation. India views a treaty with Pakistan as a culmination of the process of normalisation, whereas Pakistan views the no-war pact as the first step which will pave the way for future normalisation in due course of time. As such, there exists a gap between the perceptions of the two countries.

So far as the irritants are concerned, India believes that some of the current Pakistani policies and moves constitute major hindrances in the way of full normalisation of relationship between the two countries.. These are : Pakistan's import of disproportionately large quantities of highly sophisticated and

technologically advanced offensive weapons. Secondly, Pakistan's nuclear programme which from all indications constitute the ability to enrich uranium, possessions of the nuclear trigger, open talk of Islamic bombs and assertion of Pakistan's right to manufacture nuclear weapons - all indicate that the Pakistan is following a weapon-oriented nuclear programme. Thirdly, Continued Pakistani support to anti-India elements, particularly to the extremists in Panjab, the North-East and Kashmir who continue to get help and training in Pakistan. Fourthly, Pakistan's unwillingness to open trade relation with India, as reflected in its decision to import Americans instead of Indian wheat. Fifth, Pakistan's attempts to forcibly occupy Siachen Glacier. Sixth, The continuance of anti-India propaganda by several Pakistani leaders and sections of the press. Seventh, Sino-Pak relations with their known anti-India character. Eighth, Pakistan's apprehension that Indian emphasis on bilateralism is aimed at imposing its hegemony on Pakistan. Ninth, differences over the provisions of the Indian draft of a peace-friendship cooperation treaty and the Pakistani draft of a no-war pact.

And finally, Pakistan's encouragement to anti-India activities in Kashmir and its continued desire to activate the Kashmir issue in all international forums.

All these irritants, believes India, are keeping the Sino-Pak dialogue over no-war pact peace treaty limited and unproductive. Pakistan on her parts regards India's unhelpful role in the Afghanistan crisis, growing strength of India's power, India's refusal to sign NPT and later, the CTBT, India's nuclear structural interferences in Pakistan etc. as the major hindrances in the way of full normalisation of their relations. The existence of mutual suspicions, fears and disagreements continue to keep the process of Indo-Pak normalisation slow and limited even during the era of their mutual relations in which the leaders of both the countries fully realized the need for full normalisation. Only by adopting a mere positive approach, by exposing their mutual anxieties and concerns and by adjusting there national perceptions and correlating them to the political and strategic imperatives of South Asia and the world at large, the two countries can overcome the existing era of continued suspicions and fears. what Mr. N. T. Kaul observed in his article, 'India in South Asia' (World Focus, Fourth Annual Number, November – December, 1983), while analysing the scope of Indo-Pak normalisation as a part of drive for peace and stability in South Asia, holds

true even today. To quote him, "Unless therefore, Pakistani rulers are willingly ready and sincere to enter into a long term agreement with Indian leaders to stop their subversive activities and encourage more peaceful and fruitful ventures there is little likelihood of any lasting peace and friendship between the two countries. At the same time, it is necessary that any suspicion in the minds of the Pakistani people about India's intentions and motives regarding Pakistan be removed. "It is for the purpose there is every need to maintain and develop further the present system of increased contacts between the two countries both at the formal governmental as well as non-governmental informal people's level".¹⁵

Strategic schism is an inexorable offshoot of this intricate and incongruous regional predicament. Asymmetry in security parameters of South Asian states and the differing perceptions of threat to systemic security, regimes security and territorial integrity constitute major obstacles for the growth of strategic harmony in the region. There is a fundamental dissonance between India and other South Asian states about the question of security : "while the former regards the entire region as forming its security parameter and wants latter to collaborate with it in keeping the external powers out of the regions political and military affairs, the latter welcomes the presence of the external powers because they see the principal threat to their security in India."¹⁶ Consequently, while the fear of the neighbours' 'ganging up' to enfeeble India's regional pre-eminence is an ever present phobia afflicting Indian diplomacy, a recurrent nightmare that frequently distorts Indian assessment envisions a South Asian neighbour becoming "a Trojan horse of an extra-regional power threatening India's strategic interests".¹⁷

Inevitably, despite frequent lip service to the common ideal of non-alignment, South Asian states have perceived widely divergent foreign policy. Major global powers who display a marked tendency to fish in troubled waters have also played a significant part in aggravating South Asian Cleavages. As a commentator observes : "Complicating further the evolution of strategic consensus in the region has been the pronounced propensity of the superpowers - the Soviet Union, the United States and China to evaluate South Asian regional groupings in the context of their global strategic moves".¹⁸ In particular, the two core countries of South Asia, India and Pakistan, have followed conflicting Diplomatic paths whereby the South Asian

strategic divide appears to be an extension of the global East-West bipolarity. Thus, dichotomous international linkages not only vitiate the political atmosphere in South Asia but also constitute a grave impediment for mutually beneficial and corporative coexistence.

Furthermore, a variety of longstanding bilateral disputes pollute the South Asian environment. At the root of the crisis gripping South Asia, is of course, the acute Indo Pakistan animus. The genesis of this antagonism can be traced to the traumatic partition which simmered the subcontinent, brought Pakistan into existence, and left a legacy of enduring bitterness. The almost intractable problem of Kashmir, the attendant issue of the Siachen Glacier, the sordid history of a number of wars and the horrors which inevitably accompany the same, mutual recriminations regarding ill-treatment of minorities and recurrent accusations about 'interference in internal affairs', a spiraling arms race typified by an incessant quest for nuclear capability - all these are merely outward manifestations of the ingrained attitude of mistrust and hostility which afflicts Indo-Pakistan relations. The basic reason for the estrangement between the two principal South Asian nations is quite obvious : While India has persisted with its 'big-brotherly' psyche displaying an apathetic attitude towards the fears and sensibilities of its sensitive sibling, Pakistan has remained inflexibly intransigent about acquiring a "parity relationship" with India in terms of Political Strategic status and military armed strength. Consequently, the desire to utilize SAARC as a vehicle for 'one-upmanship' is not only an irresistible temptation but also a major constraint for the credibility and effectiveness of the organization.

India - Pakistan conflictual situation provides the greatest challenge to the entire range of issues on the new world order agenda - the asymmetry of intention on the nuclear issue, the ferment bid by Islamabad to sponsor terrorism across international borders, its destabilization efforts in Punjab and Kashmir, shielding of human rights abuses under the guise of national sovereignty and the presence of deep rooted and ingrained hostility towards each other that has always kept tensions at high levels, and increased defence spending and the propensity to use force to settle disputes.

In fine, SAARC has been bogged down due to several reasons. These are, among others, the divergent perceptions of the two countries, demographic

configuration of the two countries that renders each the so-called legitimate right to intervene, and above all the question of identity. Needless to say, India has always been a dominant factor in South Asian politics. Regardless of the historical period, the geopolitical environment or the socio-economic conditions, the country always occupied the central stage in the area.

The disintegration of the center of power after World War II, and the final establishment of seven foreign states in South Asia (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka and the Maldives) did not diminish the importance of India. First of all, new and independent India dominated the whole area geographically. She is the only country that is either contiguous to, or has a large coastal line with all the other six states, while none of them have any common borders with each other. Her geographical centrality is accentuated all the more by the important fact that there is no other country, equally big in size and sufficiently close by, to counter the predominant Indian position.

The leverage, at least theoretically that India has over the other countries of the region is therefore, exceptionally powerful. Land locked countries like Nepal and Bhutan, for example, can hardly survive economically without India's cooperation. Most of what they produce is marketed in India, and most of what they consume comes from India, not to speak of the fact that nothing can ingress to or egress from there to other countries without India's approval. Bangladesh is heavily dependent for water on India's Gangetic plain and Pakistan's main source of water supply for the agriculturally rich Punjab emanates from rivers that originate in or pass through India. Though the insular character of the two island states (Sri Lanka and the Maldives) makes them less vulnerable to Indian pressures, their proximity at the vast Indian coastline and the strong ethnic Indian presence in the two areas, nonetheless, makes them heavily dependent on India.

The regional ramifications of gigantism are far reaching.¹⁹ The leverage that India has over her neighbours is considerable. In fact, this is more significant in international relations than in the domestic sector. On the positive side, this makes it possible for her to protect neighboring countries against external threats, to assist

them economically, and to permit them to benefit from the educational, medical and even employment facilities that exist in India. In fact some do.²⁰ On the negative side, Indian 'gigantism' has engendered considerable fear and mistrust among the neighboring countries which is inherent in the asymmetrical situation.

The third characteristic feature is the subcontinent's geographical unity and religio-cultural-ethnic diversity. Its unity stems from the fact that the subcontinent is 'indisputably a geographical unit' which is marked out by nature as a region by itself,²¹ and which has features that clearly separates it 'as a whole from the surrounding regions.'²² 'It is no exaggeration,' confirmed Sir Richard Starchy, 'to say that it is possible to go from the Bay of Bengal up to the Ganges through the Punjab and down the Indus again to the sea, over a distance of 8,000 miles and more, without finding a pebble, however small.'²³

Historical experience shows that friendly relations can be easily evolved between nations geographically separated by great distances. The reason is obvious : there is no quarrels over controversial borders, or distribution of river waters, or ethnic cross-border linkages, or other typical contentious issues between neighboring countries that overshadow their relationship. On the other hand, the likelihood of immediate neighbours falling out with each other is greater when their constant need is to reach a compromise on everyday problem or, in certain cases, to solve disputes inherited from the past is not matched by an adequate ability to negotiate peacefully and successfully.

In the world, there are certain things which can't be changed. Among them are some facts of geography like India's central position in South Asia, its having a land border with or direct access by sea to all the other countries of the region, which do not have such borders between themselves, and its vast site and resources. This situation can't be altered or remedied. All concerned must recognize these facts and adjust themselves to it – India as much as its neighbours. Each has to keep in mind the susceptibilities of the other, arising out of the facts of geography.

The South Asian political environment has been further vitiated by geo-political factors that have unleashed an arms build - up in India with aid from Soviet Russia and in Pakistan with aid from the United States. They have deepened the fear psychosis in mutual relations. Though till now the region as such has been spared direct super power intrusion, super power presence at times bordered on the region with the Russian presence in Afghanistan and the increasing presence of both USA and USSR in the Indian Ocean. Apparently the strategic interest of each super power is to see a balance of power in the region which at least would not be more favorable to its adversary.

History, asymmetry and geo-politics have combined to produce some awesome contradictions: As members of the UN and the non-aligned movement, the countries of the region are committed to goals and principles which are directly antithetical to the anachronistic security doctrines as a legacy of the colonial era which underlay the present bipolar power configuration with all its frightening implications.

One such is the continuing great power domination. A modern variant is the extension of the concept of the sphere of influence. Side by side with their own spheres of influence commanding strategic areas and materials, the super powers find it an expedient strategy to boost selected countries as "regional powers" under one name or other. India has the unique privilege of being treated as one of them by both super powers.²⁴ Though India has been prudent and cautious and has not claimed such a status for itself, the mini arms race between India and Pakistan, with its unclear undertone,²⁵ increasing expenditure on arms by both and allegations and counter allegations against each other, naturally have the effect of deepening the distrust, fear and suspicion that already vitiated the South Asian political environment and distorted inter - state relations.

As the foregoing analysis shows, the security perceptions of the countries in the region are currently focused almost entirely or preeminently on external threats as perceived by them. Threats to the national security of a developing country which are rooted in domestic causes, like the problems of national cohesion, poverty, disease, illiteracy, are not adequately reflected in their security and strategic concerns.

The harsh geo-political realities cannot but have their impact on the developing countries including countries in the South Asian region. In all likelihood each of them has tried to raise its defense capability as much as its resources permitted. To the extent the South Asian countries had to depend on external aid in building up such defense capability, this region became further polarized between the two power blocs. This particularly affected relations between India and Pakistan.

In sum, the geo-political environment beyond doubt favoured the existing bipolar power configuration in its various manifestations. It distorted the security perceptions of the developing countries. Combined with regional and domestic factors, it produced a security dilemma, clouding an objective perceptions of the paramount importance of the overall nation building process to the security interests of all the states in the region. It would be unrealistic to expect any easy or immediate change in this scenario.

Indeed, SAARC, embracing a quarter of the world's population is an important step in this direction and offers a unique opportunity for meaningful cooperation in nation building efforts and the creation of a climate of mutual confidence, trust and understanding essential for peace, stability and progress in the region.

The basic factor behind the slow growth of regional co-operation in South Asia is not economic, but political. As Jigme Wang Chuk, the king of Bhutan, observed at the first SARC summit (1985) : 'In the geopolitical realities of our region it would be unrealistic to ignore the primacy of the political factor, as in the final analysis, it will be the political environment of the region which will determine the shape and scope of regional cooperation in South Asia'.

As in the economic field, so in the political, the basic element is the centrality of India's position in the region and its vast size, population, resources and economic and military power as compared to those of its South Asian neighbors. This keeps almost all the South Asian neighbors of India apprehensive of the latter's supposedly hegemonistic designs in the region. India's plea for collective self-reliance in the region and warning against allowing external powers any foothold are interpreted by them as born out of such designs. This leads to a peculiar situation in the region. While India wants all the South Asian countries to cooperate in the political field in

order to safeguard the region's autonomy and security vis-à-vis major external powers, most of India's neighbors are constantly on the look out to forge political and other linkages with those very external powers in order to counter balance India and safeguard their own autonomy and security against possible encroachment by India. This makes India apprehensive about the designs of its neighbours though it has not much to fear from any one. But even the smallest neighbor, in league with a great power or as the latter's base, can seriously jeopardize India's security. This keeps India constantly on its toes and had in the past led to the forging of its special relationship with one of the then super powers. All these have created a situation which cannot be described as conducive to the growth of regional cooperation.

Political and security factors such as Pak entry into western sponsored military alliance system, Indo – Russian alignment, Indo – China and Pak-China relations have, to a large extent, influenced the foreign policy perceptions of the major states of South Asia and India – Pakistan relations in particular.

Diversity of opinion prevails from country to country in the region regarding the security issue. While India, the core state, is inclined to evolve a security framework in regional terms, the majority among the rest of the states tend to be guided more so by interregional rivalries and fear perceptions, leading to trans – regional linkages. Thus, Pakistan's security frame has been conditioned by its antagonism towards India and of late, by Afghan issue. Nepal and Bhutan have the problem of weak buffer states. Bangladesh is moved by powerful emotion of nationalism, independent identity, being almost surrounded by India. Sri Lanka is an Island Republic, whose orientations have been not only bound by its status as a south Asian state but also by the great power politics in the Indian Ocean.

Thus, while some states in the region have in the past pursued policies that have admitted various forms of foreign interests, India, in line with its policy of opposing foreign powers in the regional affairs and partly motivated by its close ties with Russia, has been opposing it. Nevertheless, it too had to conclude a friendship treaty with the erstwhile Soviet Union, which although not ostensibly a defence pact, had acted as one and was a source of weaponry supply to it. In later years, however India came closer to USA also. Thus, the situation changed to a great extent. Besides Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh have also been displaying a pro-west

inclination, while Nepal has been showing desires to consolidate links with external power including China and United States. Maldives, the only South Asian state without any bilateral – regional differences, has close ties with certain extra regional powers including the United States.

Nevertheless, the states of the region have, on occasions also displayed some collective and cooperative orientations in their external relationships. For example, in 1950's, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka cooperated in promoting Colombo powers and later the Afro-Asian movement. Most of the states of South Asia are members of Non alignment Movement and subscribe to its objectives.

It follows, therefore, that the states in South Asia, despite some collective initiative have more or less exhibited asymmetrical and competitive attitudes towards each other. They have not been able to settle their territorial disputes, boundary disputes and disputes over sharing of river waters. They have failed to evolve a common regional policy in the United Nations regarding declaring South Asia as a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone or a common stand on the nonproliferation treaty. Instead, they have engaged in efforts to win supports for their goals from nations outside the region. Pakistan, for instance, has been canvassing for the support of West Asian countries in its dispute with India over Kashmir. The latter, no doubt, have been voicing sympathy for Pakistan's position, but have not attempted to intervene in any tangible way. Even on occasions, Pakistan has been raising questions of safety of minority rights in India in international forums like Organization of Islamic Countries(OIC). The two neighbours were unable to respond coherently to Afghan imbroglio or Iraq's aggression against Kuwait, the neighboring gulf region, nor on multilateral intervention in theory but American intervention in practice. Likewise, Sri Lanka has been trying to elicit support from the countries outside the region with respect to India's intervention in its internal affairs.²⁶

To avoid hypocrisy, the overriding role of power considerations, geo-strategic and economic constraints have to be underlined, as ideological aspects are to be thought only of secondary importance. This can be illustrated by the strategic relations both Pakistan and India evolved during the heyday of the cold war. It was an authoritarian Pakistan, ruled by martial law for many years that took sides with the US, the leading democracy and advocate of human rights. On the other hand, India

despite its proud heritage of being the 'world's largest democracy, established strategic links with the former Soviet Union, the very antithesis to a free, democratic system.

Although only of minor relevance in formulating the basic concept of foreign policy, a common ideological outlook, however, can play an important role in implementing such a concept, or to put it in modern commercial language, in marketing one's own foreign interests. It is well – known that to a large degree diplomacy depends on symbolic gestures and rhetorical appeal to values shared by both countries or the respective group of countries. Here, the ideological component of a country's foreign policy profile can be highly instrumental. To give one recent example, the changed international system after the break up of the Soviet Union and the end of the bipolar bloc confrontation forced India to design a new 'marketing strategy'. Projecting itself as a champion of non – alignment had lost its rhetorical appeal. Rather, a new ideological coinage was needed. It was soon offered by a recently awakened obsession, to which some US and Western politicians feel victim, by having discovered a vaguely defined 'Islamist threat' as the new 'ideological evil'. Fear of a well – organized, internationally operating terrorism, an increasing number of terrorist attacks on highly symbolic targets like the World Trade Center in the US, seemed to give credence to such a perceived threat. Consequently, India projected itself as a free and democratic bastion against Islamist terrorism which had already spread to Indian soil in the Kashmir Valley with the help of Pakistani collaborators.

This leads to another assumption. One may deduce that for India, as well as for Pakistan, the hostile neighboring country is needed as a negative example to clearly define one's own ideological image. The adversary is projected as the opposite pole in order to impress common ideological bonds on like minded or would be strategic partners.²⁷

Most states have ideological underpinnings of some sort. Ideology, in a broad sense, is "a set of closely related beliefs or ideas, or even attitudes, characteristics of a group or community."²⁸ "It provides the believer with a picture of the world both as it should be....."²⁹ For states in South Asia, particularly for India and Pakistan, the ideological foundations of their respective states were inherent in the very nature of the movements that led to their emergence.

When India and Pakistan were partitioned on the basis of religious affiliation it was not the two nation theory as such which led to a basic ideological antagonism between the two countries. Rather it was the ideological antagonism framework within which India and Pakistan formulated their respective political, philosophical, constitutional and normative principles. The ideological antagonism turned into a conflictual bilateral factor because of its subsequent instrumentalisation by both countries in their domestic politics and foreign policies.

Another source of conflict in South Asia has been created by the antagonistic security strategies. This conflictual factor has also been of utmost importance.

One way of co-existing with a hostile neighbor is by turning one's back to each other and looking at the opposite direction. Strategic alignments, foreign relations and economic ties are being forged with neighboring countries bordering on the opposite boundaries. Overall geo-strategic orientation and foreign interaction are diverted from the inimical neighbor, while a heavily guarded border ensures a well-protected rear. A telling example of such a strategy was given by the two German states, shielded from each other by the proverbial 'Iron Curtain'.

Quite the reverse of this strategic approach, however, has been followed by India and Pakistan. What may be described as their basic security dilemma is the fact that their very security strategies are bound to make them clash with each other.

When the viceroy of British – India finally handed over power to the two new states, independent India joined the international community as the legal successor to British – India, while Pakistan, in terms of international law, was recognized 'only' as a new state. Perceiving itself as the right heir of a former colonial power, the Indian Union also took over the imperial security strategy. Accordingly, the entire subcontinent - from the Himalayan barrier in the north to the adjoining areas of the Indian Ocean in the South was considered by India as its legitimate security sphere. No outside power, no non regional international actor was to be allowed to interfere in Indian's sub - continental sphere of influence. It was only much later that this security was formally announced. This was done on the occasion of legitimizing

India's interference in Sri Lanka's Tamil conflict in 1983. First termed the 'Indira Doctrine', it has since been changed into the 'South Asian Doctrine'.

Pakistan, on the other hand, soon learned its lesson during the first Kashmir war. In spite of being strong in terms of population, territorial size and resources, it nevertheless could not match by itself India's over whelming might. Instead, it had to cope with the geopolitical disadvantage of living next door an over shadowing neighbour. The only way to compensate this imbalance was by aligning with outside powers. Analyzing its foreign policy and security strategy through out the decades, one encounters what might be called the 'strategic leitmotif' of Pakistan to establish friendly relations with strategic partners, be they the US or China or Saudi Arabia, in order to counter balance India's great military force, it's playing the role of a regional power and its aspirations to a higher international states. Pakistan's risky arms policy of secretly obtaining a nuclear deterrence has been inspired by the same leitmotif.

Consequently, instead of backing off from each other, both hostile neighbors went on a collision course. Where India considered non alignment to be the best guarantee of its national sovereignty , Pakistan opted for an alignment. This, in turn, was perceived by India as a fundamental threat to its security. Unable to overcome this basic security dilemna, both countries have ended up by stockpiling nuclear deterrents in their hidden basements, purchasing fighter aircraft and developing or acquiring ballistic missiles as carrier systems.

India and Pakistan have been locked in mutual hostility for long and arms race is endemic in their relationship. Conventional arms race was tolerated, even aided and abetted, by great powers including the United States. But their nuclear options and capabilities are seen from different perspectives. Indeed, the nuclear arms competition between the two countries not only heralded a more dangerous dimension to their enmity but also was detrimental to global arms control and disarmament regime. At least, this is the position that Washington takes in regards to its non-proliferation policy in South Asia. Security is the principal motivation of India's and Pakistan's nuclear options, like any other country possessing or aspiring to possess nuclear weapons. As for India, it was the war with China in 1962 that spurred the drive towards attaining nuclear capability.

India officially downplays the Pakistan factor in justifying its nuclear capability. As an Indian author has written, India's main strategic goal " is to build a small but credible nuclear arsenal; in India's nuclear planning, Pakistan occupies a subordinate position. However, it is the India Pakistan equation that comes to the forefront. The reason is that the thing does not belong to South Asia in a strict geographical sense and it is an acknowledged NWS in the existing non – proliferation regime. Moreover, New Delhi's threat perceptions from China lose some justification in view of the important advances in Sino – Indian relations in recent years. For New Delhi, however, these are no consolation. Rather, the fact that China is a legitimate NWS, and India is a potential nuclear force, reinforces Indian resolve to carry its nuclear option. Also, from this point of view, New Delhi thinks that the standard American practice of targeting India and Pakistan regarding proliferation is "misguided and even insulting".³⁰ In short, at present both India and Pakistan are nuclear – capable countries and it is feared that any future war between them may not remain confined to conventional fighting. This fear is reflected in the statement made by the then CIA Director, James Woolsey, while testifying before a Senate committee on 24 February 1993. He said: "The arms race between India and Pakistan poses perhaps the most probable prospect for future use of weapons of mass destruction including weapons."³¹

Moreover, in the Indian opinion South Asia is not a "distinct zone but a sub-region and an integral part of Asia and the Pacific."³² For all intents and purposes, therefore, the nuclear issue has become another boniest contention between the two South Asian adversaries. Both sides put forward differing perspectives of the problem as to befit their perceived security interests. So far as the NPT is concerned, Islamabad has frequently offered to sign it if India also did so. But since India has categorically refused to join the treaty, Pakistan's sincerity in making the offer largely motivated by American pressure, cannot be tested with any certainty. India has regarded the Pakistani offer as a bluff, 'but it is a bluff New Delhi has been unwilling to call.'³³

However, the regional situation in South Asian politics may undergo a change if India and Pakistan, both regarded by military analysis as threshold nuclear powers with the capability to develop nuclear weapons, actually acquire such a capability,

such an eventuality would, beyond doubt, raise the level of threat to the security of the region. But even that would not diminish the rationale for regional cooperation. Those countries would command more destructive power. But nuclear powers have not so far used nuclear weapons against one another for fear of mutual destruction. India and Pakistan cannot do so either without destroying themselves.

Hopefully, the perception of such a common danger may herald a radical change in the chemistry of their relations, making it more conducive to good neighbourly relations and friendly co-operation. Of course, the leaders of both countries deny having any intention of developing nuclear weapons and reiterate their commitment to the peaceful uses of the nuclear power. In any event, for industrially and technologically advanced India waiting to enter the "high-tech" age and for Pakistan, enjoying comparative prosperity with the highest per capita income in the region, military confrontation at this stage appears to be totally irrational.

Globally viewed, though the acquisition of nuclear capability by the so called threshold nuclear powers would mean a further proliferation of nuclear power, its impact on global security would be rather marginal. No greater threat could conceivably be posed to international security than what already exist in the huge and deadly nuclear arsenals in the possession of the two power blocs and the continuing vertical proliferation by them.³⁴ Admittedly, the emergence of new nuclear powers adds a new dimension to the stature of international security and power configuration. But their nuclear capability is unlikely materially to affect the present power configuration in the foreseeable future.

The relations between India and Pakistan are the keystone for South Asian cooperation of any kind and it is these two countries that have in fact turned to one or the other of the super powers for the supply of war material and modern weapons to meet their defence requirements and, to be more explicit, to meet the threats of war they seem to perceive from each other. Under the circumstances, it is difficult for other countries to take seriously their possessions against the intrusion of super power politics in the region. Neither the Simla Agreement of 1971 between India and Pakistan nor the subsequent discussions between them on their respective proposals

for a treaty of peace and friendship and a no war pact seems to have removed their mutual fear and suspicion.

India was the first to test a nuclear device at Pokharan in 1974. Pakistan has since pursued a determined policy of nuclear research aimed at devising its own process of enriching uranium in such a way that it could be used both for peaceful purposes and for making weapons. Pakistani leaders have made periodic claims of their nuclear status technology: "...We will go for nuclear status even if we have to eat grass."³⁵ Kofi Annan argued that the nuclear tests had highlighted the indo-Pak tensions and call Kashmir an international problem of grave concern.³⁶ Both India and Pakistan have refused to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty or to accept international inspection of their activities related to research and development in the field of nuclear power.

The nuclear tests conducted by India (and Pakistan) in May 1998 raised troubling questions about the strategic future of South Asia. In India, the heated debate that followed tended to present nuclear weapons in extreme terms, either as source of instability and conflict or as harbingers of peace and stability in the region. The debate reflected, if anything, very little appreciation of the reality of nuclear weapons. (Basur 1998). This in itself seemed to bear out Stephan Cohen's wary comment in the mid nineties that "several half doctrines, more appropriately half backed doctrines, have circulated in the higher levels of the Pakistan military and among Indian civilian planners (Cohen, 1995 : 23). The National Security Council (NSC) which is entrusted with the task of strategic planning was created after the nuclear tests of 1998. Recent reports indicate that the NSC is still some distance away from formulating a coherent nuclear strategy owing to serious differences among strategic experts on its advisory board. For all these reasons, there is room for apprehension that India's nuclear future is an uncertain and even dangerous one.

Pakistan continues to fear that India had hegemonies intensions in South Asia, Particularly in relations with Pakistan (The Tribune, August 5, 1985). It views the fast growing power of India as a dangerous development for the security and integrity of Pakistan. India's secularism and its advocacy of people to people

relations is viewed as attempts at the cultural invasion of Pakistan. Further, Pakistan, particularly due to the Soviet intervention and continued presence in Afghanistan, viewed growing Indo-Soviet friendship and cooperation as a danger signal for its security. As a way out, Pakistan regards the acquisition of U.S. weapons, development of highly close ties with China and U.S.A., and the strengthening of Pakistan by developing its own nuclear technology including the ability to manufacture weapons, as the sine quo non of Pakistan's security and developmental needs. The continued desire to secure Kashmir further makes Pakistan adopt a very cautious approach towards relations with India. It, therefore, wants a sort of no war pact with India which will reduce the security threat to Pakistan from its eastern borders but which will not in any way check its drive to strengthen its military might and to acquire full nuclear technology. Pakistan wishes to have perceptibly reduced level of hostility with India but would like to be left alone to pursue its options of defence and economic linkages away from it. While Pakistan is keen on concluding a simple agreement to exchange guarantees on non-use of force, it wants to leave aside the basic question of how the two countries stand in relation to each other in the context of the world and the security environment of the sub-continent.

In an interview to "The Muslim" – a Pakistan daily, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi gave a categorical assurance to Pakistan that India had no designs against any of its neighbours, especially Pakistan. He however, called upon Pakistan to stop acquiring highly sophisticated offensive weapons and respond positively to India's fresh initiatives to establish confidence and trust between the two countries. The quantum jump in the level of arms technology in the regions, resulting from Pakistan's present policy of importing U.S. weapon can only work to the detriment of the people. Hoping that a more positive response would be forthcoming from Pakistan, the Prime Minister advocated the need for bringing about a sort of de-escalation, step-by-step approach for normalization. This, he said, was necessary for making successful the forthcoming ministerial level Indo-Pak joint commission talks on the issue of no-war pact / treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation. He cautioned against a nuclear arms race in the Indian sub – continent, saying that it would only subject both the people to crust fate on earth. The rivalry between India

and Pakistan in developing nuclear power has thus added a newer dimension to the problem of security in the South Asian region.

Ethnic movements have challenged the constitutional legitimacy of virtually all the states in South Asia.³⁷ Ethno-nationalist movements have not only created serious security problems but have very often spilled over into bordering states thereby creating major inter-state conflicts, although, such conflicts have not always been violent. Ethnic movements have however, occasioned the use of arms between conflicting nation – states in South Asia, or have threatened to give rise to violent conflict between them. India and Pakistan fought two wars over Kashmir. India and Pakistan went to battle over the liberation of Bangladesh, and the war came after a bloody civil war that resulted from political repressions of Bengali ethno nationalism by the west Pakistani political elite.

The claims by the Pakistani establishment of clear evidence of collusion between various anti state ethnic movements in Pakistan and the Indian state cannot be explained by commonality of ethnicities or group solidarity across borders. Such cases illustrate a fundamental point: Nation State often develop independent stakes in ethnic conflicts and inter state-conflicts stemming from secessionist or separatist ethno nationalism need not necessarily result from ethnic or group solidarity across territorial boundaries of nation-state. The vertical dimension of ethnic competition or conflicts that is virtually common to all ethnic disturbances in South Asia, because the ethnic communities have defined themselves against the territorial nationalism of the state.

Inter – ethnic group relations in South Asia continue to be fragile not only due to the arbitrariness of the state, but due to the manifest structural limitations in the power of communities to build social capital. This is adequately reflected in the great variations that often exist between intra and inter – segmental networking in South Asia. South Asia is in serious jeopardy by separatist ethno – nationalism and the states are required to organize their strategies to safeguard borders from internal dissolution and external intervention.

Ambivalence is a basic characteristic of the multifaceted issue of ethnic mobilization. Its tendency is to escalate to separatist movements and its potential to spill over at the regional level. Its ambivalent nature is caused by the fact that the ethnic crisscrossing of the national boundaries between India and its neighbouring countries can work both ways : it may support regional cooperation and, at the same time, is likely to hamper it. Demographic and ethnic problems tend to cause disharmony among the South Asian States, but they also work in a positive way by contributing to building regional consciousness and cooperation.

It is conducive to intra regional cooperation insofar as it opens up informal channels of communication and people – to – people contacts when direct interaction between the state governments is deadlocked because of burning conflictual issue. On the other hand, it aggravates strained relations between inimical neighbours when the concerned ethnic group draws support, both material and moral, from its contiguous ethnic group outside the state to be able to cooperate among themselves. The South Asian governments have to look beyond their respective national interests and identity priorities on a regional rather than strictly national basis. If this is impeded by ethnically based polarization in their own multiethnic societies then governments naturally tend to give priority to their national concerns. This is in particular the case when a government suspects its neighbouring country of aiding and abetting an ethnic separation movement across the border. Consequently, it will resort to a confrontational attitude vis-à-vis its neighbour, as is presently demonstrated by the renewed tension between India and Pakistan on account of the Kashmir conflict. In this context the optimistic assumption that old conflict in the region have lost much of their edge, unfortunately, has to be corrected. It seems to be the tragedy of the South Asian states that their cautious effort to overcome the manifold obstacles and move towards regional cooperation are frustrated by long-standing conflicts. Ethnic separatist movement seems to be particularly prone to lying dormant for sometime, but may flare up again as a consequence of political group mobilization and overall political transformation in their respective state.

The phenomenon of ethnic conflicts is also linked to the core issues of the Indo-Pakistani antagonism, i.e. the elites' ideological perceptions of the concept of 'nation' - how does the central leadership define and by what means does it

promote 'nationality' and 'national integration' in multiethnic states. In essence, the controversy revolves around the relationship between 'nation' and 'state'.

It has been observed that 'Nation' is the cultural embodiment of the state. One complements the other to the extent of being virtually synergized. Threats to the nation state emanate from within as much as assail if from without. As regards, the threats from within, ethnic heterogeneity – under-scoring sectional localities – is one of its major concomitants'.³⁸

Ethnic conflicts arise when the multiethnic personality of such a state - centric nation is not adequately expressed in its power structure and its political system. If it is reduced to the virtual dominance of the major ethnic group, then the very rationale of the 'nation' is jeopardized and provokes political self-assertion of minority ethnic groups. In South Asia in general, and in India and Pakistan in particular, the discourse of the substance and spirit of 'nation' is beset with strong emotive invocations. It is viewed as a potentially explosive issue because it offers large scope for maneuvering and mobilizing the people. Furthermore, it can be used by the central leadership of its domestic opponents for manipulative purposes. The controversy on the 'secular' or 'pseudo secular' nature of the Indian state is a telling example.

In this context, it was rightly stated that internal factors are the most problematic obstacles to regional cooperation. Just to take one example, the issue of cross-national ethnic and religious minorities poses enormous difficulty for the states within the region. For example, no South Asian Country is able to defend its claim of domestic jurisdiction while dealing with the struggles of ethnic and religious minorities. Even when each South Asian Country is most reluctant to interfere in the domestic affairs of another country, and each entertains its claim of domestic jurisdiction, contemporary events have repeatedly proved that ethnic minority explosions not only strain bilateral and multilateral relations but sometimes even create inter state crises.³⁹

Discussing the ambivalent repercussions of nation-building and ethnic mobilization, one soon ends up by analyzing the causes for conflict between the South Asian States. Since the Indo-Pakistani antagonism is the core obstacle to

regional Cooperation, two basic determinants of their conflictual relationship are outlined below.

Given the ethnic composition of South Asia, and the manifest non-coincidence of national and state boundaries of this region, it is doubtful whether the geo-political vision of the contemporary South Asian State system will ever achieve the desired security of ethnic stabilization of the sub-continent in new millennium. The relationship between ethnic identity assertion and security will therefore, continue to remain indeterminate both for and in spite of the state.

To sum up seven of the eight South Asian states have inter-state ethno political problems which are now the principal source of inter-state tensions and conflicts in the region. India has ethno political problems with each of the five neighbours with whom it shares international borders. Pakistan has serious ethno political problems with Aftganistan. Nepal and Bhutan have a latent ethno political cause of tension. Inter-state relations between Pakistan and Bangladesh are strained by an ethno political issue. This ethno political issues hamper the success of SAARC.

Throughout the late fifties and early sixties the influx of refugees from Pakistan to India continued to be a source of trouble. For Indo Pak relations even in 1971, a large number of Hindus and Muslim refugees crossed over to India after a military coup down and massacre war let loose in East Pakistan by the Government of Pakistan. The influx of refugees became an important reason for the outbreak of war between India and Pakistan in December, 1971. Thus, after partition, the refugee problem came to be a source of big strain of Indo-Pak relations. Even after 50 years of partition the problem of illegal migration of refugees from Sindh (Pakistan) into India continues to be there.

India, being the territorially biggest, population wise the largest, development wise technologically and industrially the most developed country of the South Asia, displayed and continues to play a big role in the successful operationalisation of SAARC programmes for cooperation and development among the member states. India has accepted the SAARC as a voluntarily organized association of sovereign equal states for consolidating and expanding regional cooperation for development.

India firmly believes that SAARC spirit can help the countries of South Asia to develop and to resolve their bilateral issues outside the SAARC platform.

However, India's role in SAARC is bound to remain limited because other countries, with the exceptions of Bhutan and Maldives, fear India and have bilateral disputes with India. Pakistan at the SAARC platform gave a call for limiting the arms race in South Asia, and yet it has been instrumental in generating an arms race by importing or getting high technology weapons from the United States in the name of parity or balance with India. India has a very long sea coast to protect, longest border with China - a country opposed to India's interests, and a big land border with Pakistan, Nepal and Bangladesh. As such, its defence requirements are bigger than Pakistan and yet Pakistan wants parity with India. Indo-Pak conflict despite the new hopes generated by Rajiv - Benazir is a reality of South Asia. Indo-Srilanka conflict over the withdrawal of IPKF from Sri Lanka, Indo-Nepalese differences conflict over the trade and transit treaty Indo-Bangladesh conflict over Farakka and Chakma Refugee issues, the continued problem of terrorist activities, smuggling and drug pedaling etc., all combines to make SAARC environment unhealthy for the growth of regional cooperation. In July 1989, Sri Lankan boycott of SAARC Foreign Ministers' Conference reflects that brittle nature of SAARC fabric. Sri Lanka has failed to realize the difference between bilateral relations and regional relations and this constitute a danger signal for SAARC.

India's predicament regarding its role in SAARC results from the fact that if it decides to play a leadership role, it is charged of being a hegemonistic power, and if it keeps restraints and plays an equal role, the SAARC fails to function. Just as ASEAN countries have realized the natural leadership role of Indonesia in ASEAN, the SAARC countries must also accept India's role as the biggest and relatively most developed country of South Asia which alone can serve as the nucleus for the development of SAARC and thus the question of regional power status creates an irritation between the member countries of SAARC other than India ultimately hampering the successful operations of SAARC.

As is well known, the Kashmir issue has difficult historical, religious, ethnic, socio-political and economic dimensions. Several attempts to resolve it over the last five decades have not been successful. The US also supports the Pakistani

viewpoint that Kashmir is a core issues resolution of which has to be part of a comprehensive approach to other issues. It clearly suggests that Kashmir issue could not be treated in isolation from other problems between India and Pakistan which include nuclear proliferation also.⁴⁰ Pakistan also believes that unless the Kashmir problem is first resolved it would be fruitless to proceed with establishing any bilateral cooperative measures to defuse bilateral tension with India. Since for Pakistan, India constitutes the basic security threat and therefore, it insists that Kashmir and the nuclear question are closely linked and resolution of Kashmir issues is a necessary pre-condition for the nuclear disarmament in South Asia.

In fact, both India and Pakistan strongly support their national positions on Kashmir. India's position since 1947 is that Kashmir's accession to India in 1948 cannot be challenged and questioned anywhere. India also supports the view that any issue between India and Pakistan should be resolved bilaterally according to the provisions of the Simla agreement of 1972 and emphasizes that it should not be made international. On the contrary, Pakistan not only challenges the accession but also demands that a plebisite should be held to ascertain the wishes of the people of Kashmir as per the Resolution of the United Nations. Although, throughout the cold war period the US also held the view that Kashmir was a disputed territory but it never questioned the validity of its accession to India. But the post cold war era seems to have brought changes in the US perception about Kashmir due to its strategic location.

The core of the continuing dispute between Pakistan and India has been Kashmir where vast resources have been drained from the budgets of both countries by two large armies facing one another for decades over a disputed boundary. Like all complicated and perennial problems, the problem of Kashmir may have become trapped in hackneyed definitions and misdefinitions.

It is because of a divided and disputed boundary in Kashmir that we have had two large armies facing one another in anger, referring to each other as enemy. And it is clear that the resulting arms race and elite rivalry has greatly impoverished the general budgets of both Pakistan and India. If it has benefited important sections of the political and military elites of both countries, it has done so only at the expense of the general welfare of the masses. So long as the arms race continues, the

economies of both countries are likely to remain severely distorted, and there may be little genuine prospect of improvement in mass welfare or the large scale economic development of either country.

The paradox of Kashmir is that in all the debates, bargaining and negotiations in the decades which proceeded 1947, nobody on any side predicted that it was going to be Kashmir, of all things, which would become the cardinal problem in the future of the peoples of the subcontinent. There seems to have been discussions about everything else, about this majority and that minority, about undivided Punjab and United Bengal, about joint electorates and protected electorates, absolute Centre – province relations, about this constituent Assembly or that, about a weak centre and a strong centre, and so on and so forth. But nobody seemed to have talked about Kashmir. How is it that in all these discussions none of the founding fathers of Pakistan or India even once predicted what was really going to become the crucial problem? Were they so lacking in foresight that none could anticipate that within a matter of months, it would be Kashmir that was going to be the base, interminable and pivotal problem facing the subcontinent for the next five decades? That it would be Kashmir which would lead to a large standing armies facing the another in anger, causing the economic impoverishment of the entire subcontinent? Kashmir has become the security pivotal and interminable problem. As things stand today we ourselves keeps us prisoners of superficial definitions of who we are or might be.

The subcontinent could evolve its political identity over a period of time. On the pattern of western Europe, with open borders and tariffs to the outside world, with the free movement of people, capital ideas and culture. Large armed forces could be reduced and transforms in a menace that would enhance the security of each nation. The real and peaceful economic revolution of the masses of the subcontinent would then be able to begin which is.⁴¹

Kashmir has been the most major issue and a bone of contention between India and Pakistan. The partition gave rise to many disputes and problems. All of these disputes except the dispute over Kashmir were solved gradually through mutual negotiations one through the mediation of World Bank and another through Arbitration. Despite a series of lengthy, firing and patient attempts by many

individuals, nations and organizations, a solution to the Kashmir issue acceptable to both India and Pakistan has yet to emerge. Since 1947, it has been a major irritant in Indo-Pak relations.

India, since 1948, has been maintaining that Kashmir is an integral part of Indian Union and its accession to India is full and first. For India, Kashmir problem means the issues of securing the liberation of Pakistan occupied Kashmir. Pakistan, however, still advocates that the future of Kashmir is yet to be settled in accordance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir. As such there are present strong Indo Pak differences over the issue and Kashmir constitutes a determinant of the bilateral relations between these two South-Asian countries. A reviews of Indo-Pak relations since 1947 shows the its impact on the SAARC has been disproportionate and as such, the SAARC appears to be too dim.

Even without further effort one can easily state that the role of the great powers in the regional conflict in South Asia has been both vital to and inseparable from of the regional roots of the conflict. Whereas the regional roots lay in the history of the evolution of Indian and Pakistan as independent entities, in the status incongruence in the subcontinent, in the Kashmir dispute, etc., the two parties to the conflict received the confidence and actual capacity to enter into hostility with each other from their respective allies and supports amongst for the great power. The great powers, on the other hand, found the South Asian conflict an essential regional component of their own conflict as signified in the cold war. They, therefore, found it irresistible to feed and reinforce the regional roots of the South Asian, The great power involvement was so deep and pervasive that one is tempted to believe that the great powers, in pursuance of their global and regional objectives would have invented a conflict in South Asia if none had existed.

As has been discussed above United States has remained an intrusive and external power in the relations between India and Pakistan. It has always taken advantage of this growing hostility between the two countries for its own national interests and carried towards Pakistan to ensure its dependence. United States strategic imperatives placed Pakistan in the category of an ally in a global

confrontation and India in the low priority bracket of a potential regional power."⁴² If the United States was really interested to normalize relations between India and Pakistan, it would not have resumed military aid to Pakistan after the 1965 war and meted out an equal treatment to both India the victim and Pakistan – the aggressor in the 1965 and 1971 wars. Its complete identification and tilt towards Pakistan reached its height in the 1971 war. In all international forums the United States has been always on the side of Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. Had it been really interested, it could have made supply of military aid conditional on Pakistan abandoning the Kashmir issues or accepting an Indian compromise on this issue.⁴³ But to force Pakistan to such a stance would mean abdication of all the imperatives of Pakistan remaining an accomplice in the United States' global strategic system. This does not mean that the United States was not averse to continuation or repetition of wars between India and Pakistan, which entitled the possibility of India's exposure to Soviet influence.

This policy of balancing one against the other was the old game of the cold war phase – the guiding principle of the international sovereign state system and balance of power. Of course, this policy stance was more the cause than the consequence of India's tilt towards the Soviet Union. As a result, the United States policy, instead of restraining Pakistan has widened Pakistan's appetite for more arms and ammunition to spend to India from a position of strength. Had India expressed its nuclear option like China, a new power relation would have emerged.

It can be said that the main strategy of militarily arming Pakistan by the United States is more the cultivation of Pakistan as an ally than containment of India's growing power.⁴⁴ and opposition to the rise of a strong independent centre of power in Asia.⁴⁵ It has been seen that notwithstanding all changes in the configuration of power relations in the global system. Pakistan has survived as an ally in the United States' global system. Pakistan's intimacy with China in an era of Sino-US rivalry, its dependence on the Soviet Union, the military and security pacts like SEATO and CENTO during the close of seventies though irked the United States but the strategic importance of Pakistan to America's global interest particularly in the West Asian region led America to treat Pakistan as it did. The advocacy by some of a theory of 'scrupulous detachment' by the policy makers of the United States to Indo-Pak

rivalry,⁴⁶ sounds sense but is vastly undone, because of the play of real politic in the United States; strategic outlook.

So long Pakistan does not cease to be a partner in the United States' global strategy, the United States would remain as a preponderant factor in Indo-Pak relations. Though there has been a de-escalation of nuclear brinkmanship between the Soviet Union and the United States achieved recently at Geneva, the possibility of de-escalation of national interests at global level between the super powers is far from remote. Hence Pakistan will count as a frontier state to the United States.⁴⁷ In any conflict between India and Pakistan the United States is to maintain a posture of neutrality and non-partisan stand would be too costly a conclusion. The removal of this external factor exacerbating the bitter conflict between India and Pakistan largely depends on India working out a good relationship with the United States not at the risk of closing Soviet Union's goodwill which India should have not by tarnishing its non aligned identity. Its susceptibility leaning towards the Soviet Union could be corrected establishing a good relationship with both the United States and China not causing apprehensions in the Soviet Union about the bonafides of India's friendship.

India fully realized the importance of normalization of relations with Pakistan for keeping South Asia free from power rivalry, arms race and super power interferences. India further fully realized that normalization with Pakistan beside helping her to concentrate fully on internal socio economic development, strengthen her vis-à-vis China. The ability of China and to some extent of the USA fully to exploit Indo-Pak conflict/confrontation for keeping Pakistan dependent for security and its defence needs, ultimately limits India's ability to concentrate on her internal development. By pumping huge quantities of sophisticated and advanced technology weapons into Pakistan, the USA, is indirectly forcing India to spend large sums on military purchases from the Soviet Union and other countries like France and England. India wants a normalization in relations with Pakistan as a means for checking the impending arms race. India is greatly concerned about the "possibility of third party linkage" in form of foreign military bases in Pakistan and the possible fall out on India's strategic interests. India is, therefore, keen to pursue Indo-Pak, talks over no-war pact/treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation.

The third broad Indian strategy was to eliminate or reduce Chinese influence on the states of the region. Though India has consistently frowned upon any abnormal external presence in South Asia, China's presence has been increasingly singled out as the most bonafied of all of them to India's national interests. Much of Indian diplomacy is, therefore, geared to the task of monitoring Chinese presence in the region, competing with her northern neighbouring in the areas, and eroding her influence wherever possible.

In this connection, Indian diplomatic strategy and the pressure exerted by India have varied from country to country. Great pressure has been exerted on those nations dependent on India, while it has been more indirect and more subtle on those nations which were less dependent.

The SAARC is essential for accelerating the economic development for building individual and collective self-reliance and also for enhancing the SAARC countries' bargaining strength in multilateral forums. The SAARC has created forum to evolve unified policies regarding women, children and transference of technologies of agriculture and to set up a food bank.

Indian goods have proved to be very competitive in Pakistan where demand for consumer products is relatively high. At one stage, when cheap and industrial products started reaching Pakistan, it was felt that these would convey a picture of India to Pakistan which was different from what they had been made to believe. Also imports from India in some cases started hitting the local industrial sector that is why some items were completely banned. That is why Indo-Pak relations have remained paged at low levels.

The fruitful implementation of the efforts to further strengthen the Indo-Pak normalization and development of more cooperative economic and cultural relations came in June 1983, when the first meeting of Indo-Pak Joint Commission was held at Islamabad. In this meeting foreign ministers of the two countries not only exchanged the instruments of satisfaction pertaining to the establishment of the joint commission but also more significant progress on substantive matters.

The commission set up four sub-commissions on (a) economic matters dealing with industry, agriculture, communication, health, science, and technology,;

(b) Trade, education, culture, space, social science, (c) Travel tourism. The success towards the institutionalization of Indo-Pak economic trade and cultural relations is indeed an important breakthrough. It has brightened the hopes that through mutual accommodation and good will, the two countries shall be in a position to narrow down further differences over the issue of no war pact and a treaty of peace and friendship. As a result of negotiations through sub-commissions it was agreed to exchange the visits of businessmen and industrialists for identifying opportunities for collaboration between them.

The state of economic warfare between the two countries has now partially ended. Although Pakistan has been able to do without trade with India and India, in spite of much hardship to her people and damage to her economy, has been able to hold her own it is not a situation from which either could continue to derive satisfaction for long. If trade policies in the two countries were determined by economic considerations, the flow of goods and commodities between them would undoubtedly have been much larger than in the past year. Peaceful and happy relations between them would certainly help in the process.

In view of recent changes in the global economic system, there is considerable scope for India and Pakistan to collaborate in the economic field. India and Pakistan cannot remain aloof from the trends of world wide economic liberalization and globalisation. The economies of India and Pakistan are complementary in more than one way. The SAPTA agreement between the member countries of SAARC provides ample scope for bilateral and regional cooperation in the field of trade and consumers. At present, Pakistan, is importing several items from other countries at a relatively higher cost. Those items could be imported from India on cheaper rates. For instance, Pakistan could import fibres, textile machinery, consumer goods and intermediaries and it can export pig iron, scrap, wheat, and long-staple cotton to India. At various SAARC meetings Pakistan has disclosed that in all 571 items could be imported from India. Various items, at present, are routed through Afghanistan or via West Asia. Similarly though Pakistan is a large tea importer, it imports little from India despite the lower price, superior quality and lower transport cost. The false notions hitherto held, in this regard have to be discarded.

Specific long-term agreements between India and Pakistan would certainly help in discouraging wasteful expenditure. Joint economic and commercial ventures between the two countries would not only boost the morale of the business community of both the countries but also be conducive to accelerate the pace of economic activity. If the government of India and Pakistan agree to lift out moved restrictions and prepare a cost-effective economic strategy, cross-border trade and investment will flourish.

The economic reform programmes of the SAARC present a blue print for considerable impetus for improvement of economic relations between India and Pakistan. Both the countries are also under IMF – led economic adjustment which signifies that among other things 100 percent foreign ownership is allowed in most industries. These developments will certainly encourage viable economic relations between India and Pakistan.

There is no doubt that there are important economic reasons behind the slow progress of SAARC particularly in the field of trade, industry and finance. There has been a feeling among the elite of most of the members of SAARC that cooperation in these fields would mainly benefit India and not the other countries of the region whose interests might indeed suffer as a consequence of it. In view of India's size, population, resources and level of economic development as compared to those of the other South Asian countries such apprehensions are quite natural. In this connection it may be recalled that the areas now included in Pakistan as well as Bangladesh constituted the rural hinterland of the industrial base of undivided India. This was true even with regard to those products like cotton in Pakistan and jute in Bangladesh which was produced in bulk in those areas. However, it is not beyond human ingenuity to device measures to safeguard the interests of India's smaller neighbours against the plausible adverse effects on them of such cooperation. It is also to be noted that the smaller countries will gain immensely by gaining access to a much larger market that can be provided by their own territories if the entire region of South Asia becomes available to them for free sale of the goods and services. The problem created by the growth of vested interest in close economic relations with the West, in certain influential sections of the bourgeoisie in several South Asian

countries, because of high profits they earn from such relations, may be difficult to overcome

There is also a greater realization of the importance of economic development and the potential of free trade as under lined by the SAARC commitment to work for SAFTA within the stipulated time. This is a very interesting trend which depicts the changing perception of the relatively smaller SAARC member states who are no more apprehensive of the dominance influence of India and are interested in speeding up cooperation in trade and transit. Describing the trend, Muni says that the 'Big is no longer awesome and ugly instead it is becoming beautiful.⁴⁸ In such an environment of enhanced trust and understanding amongst the regional players, SAARC can increasingly provide an effective mechanism for effective and durable cooperation benefiting all the countries of the region.

Given all these, it seems that there had tremendous potentiality of regional cooperation among the South Asian countries benefiting each for there respective development. But unfortunately, it is due to the strained relationship between India and Pakistan that the SAARC has been a regional organization with a low capability. Since most of the time SAARC forum is infected with bilateral and contentious issues between India and Pakistan, it has lost and is loosing its credibility.

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CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

The world has cultivated itself into a global village, in the real sense of the terms. The earth has shrunk and distances have virtually ceased to be. In such a state of affairs, the meaning of nationally and polity are also changing day by day. Now geographical boundaries have no relevance. Hence, a tendency of unity beyond borders. Various nations have come into a fold, for creating a common forum or group, in order to secure their interests – commercial, cultural and political as well. European Union, Arab League and ASEAN are some examples of the same approach. SAARC is an experiment on the same line. SAARC is a small organization, with only seven members, but this does not lessen its importance.

SAARC is the best example of small, but pretty and apparently insignificant, but really very important. SAARC is the first major step of a long journey towards the regional integration on the pattern of European Union. The increasing degree of regional cooperation among SAARC countries would prove to be of immense socio-economic and political importance to this region which is the ultimate aim and objective of SAARC. SAARC consists of seven countries viz, India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Bhutan and Nepal in Indian Subcontinent; and Sri Lanka and Maldives in Indian Ocean. It was established on 8th December 1985 after four and a half years of ground work. The basic aim of the Association is to accelerate the process of economic and social development in member countries through joint action in the agreed areas of cooperation. All the seven member countries are separate nations, independent and sovereign and have their won identities. But these nations have a common history. Five of these, viz, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Maldives have a shared colonial past. The rest too, viz., Nepal and Bhutan had managed to remain free of the shackles of direct slavery, but they were also under immense imperial pressure, bound by treatise. Hence, a common past again.

Further, all the SAARC nations have a common heritage and culture. By and large, it's a homogenous region, more or less like Central Asia or Western Europe.

However, it took almost four decades for the South Asian nations to conclude that they badly required a common platform for improving material relation and developing cooperation for their economic growth.

The idea of regional cooperation in South Asia was first mooted in November 1980. After consultation, the Foreign Secretaries of the seven countries met for the first time in Colombo in April 1981. This was followed up, a few months later, by a meeting of the Committee of the whole, which identified five broad areas for regional cooperation. The foreign Ministers, at their first meeting in New Delhi in August 1983, adapted the Declaration on South Asian regional Cooperation. The Heads of State or Government at their first SAARC Summit held in Dhaka on 7-8 December 1985 adopted the Charter formally establishing the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).

The objectives, principles and general provisions as mentioned in the SAARC charter are as follows :

Objectives :

- To promote the welfare of the peoples of South Asia and to improve their quality of life.
- To accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region and to provide all individuals the opportunity to live in dignity and to realize their full potentials.
- To promote and strengthen collective self reliance among the countries of South Asia.
- To contribute to mutual trust, understanding and appreciation of one another's problems.
- To promote active collaboration and mutual assistance in the economic, social, cultural, technical and scientific fields.
- To strengthen cooperation with other developing countries.
- To strengthen cooperation among themselves in international forms on matters of common interests; and

- To cooperate with international and regional organizations with similar aims and purposes.

Principles

- Cooperation within the framework of the Association is based on respect for the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, political independence, non-interference in the internal affairs together states and mutual benefit.
- Such cooperation is to complement and not to substitute bilateral or multilateral cooperation.
- Such cooperation should be consistent with bilateral and multilateral obligations of Member States.

General Provisions

- Decision at all levels in SAARC are taken on the basis of unanimity.
- Bilateral and contentious issues are excluded from the deliberation of the Association.

SAARC is thus a manifestation of the determination of the peoples of South Asia to cooperate regionally, to work together towards finding solution to their common problems in a spirit of friendship, trust and understand, and to create an order based on mutual respect, equity and shared benefits. As South Asia's first and only regional organization, its performance, problems and prospects are of vital interest to the people of the region. SAARC does not appear to have done too badly. Not being a formal security oriented alliance as block, and with 'bilateral and contentious issues' specifically excluded from its deliberation, the Association has neither solved, nor was it intended to solve, any of the contentious problems that plague and divide the nations of South Asia. But it has emerged as the region's finest confidence building measure. No doubt at its present stage of evolution, SAARC is faced with several constraints in the form of differing politico security perceptions of the member states, diversity in terms of their size and levels of development, besides economic disparities. In such a setting, SAARC is likely to play a crucial role in bringing the member states and their people close, to realize beneficial integration at an international level.

Though the regional organization has already survived many severe setbacks than any other such organization in comparable conditions, today, despite the fact that old disputes and disorders in the region continue under new clothing, yet a positive trend is growing, though hesitant, with regard to functionalist approach of SAARC, as a sure catalyst to regional understanding and confidence building. It is hoped that regional cooperation in the non-political, economic, social, cultural and scientific fields will not only help the SAARC states to overcome problems of poverty and backwardness, but will in turn lead to cooperation in the political sphere among the South Asian Countries in future, as political trust and cooperation are regarded essential for any economic cooperation to bear fruit.

The highest authority of the Association rests with the Heads of State or Government, who meet annually at Summit level. To date, eleven meetings of the Heads of State or Government have been held in Dhaka (1985), Bangalore (1986), Kathmandu (1987), Islamabad (1988), Male (1990), Colombo (1991), Dhaka (1993), New Delhi (1995), Male (1997), and Colombo (1998), respectively. The Eleventh SAARC Summit was held in Kathmandu (2002) while the 12th Summit was stated to be held in Islamabad in 2003.²

SAARC is thus a manifestation of the determination of the people of South Asia to Cooperate regionally, to work together towards finding solutions to their common problems in a spirit of friendship, trust and understanding, and to create an order based on mutual respect, equity and shared benefits. Since its establishment in 1985 and twelve subsequent SAARC Summits, SAARC has been involved in several kinds of programmes and projects.

The first comprises activities in the 12 agreed areas of cooperation covering the Integrated Programme of Action (IPA) which is key component of the SAARC process and includes a number of important areas of cooperation as agriculture, education, meteorology, rural development, women in development preparation of 'State of the Art's reports etc. Technical Committees numbering eleven at present have been designated to coordinate work in the identified areas of cooperation.

In response to the emphasis given by successive Summits on the need to further consolidate and streamline IPA and to make it more result oriented, a

comprehensive set of guidelines and procedures was adapted in 1992 for the rationalization of SAARC activities. As a result of this, there is now a greater focus on activities that would bring tangible benefits to the people of South Asia. The highlights of the activities of the areas covered by the IPA under each Technical Committee are as follows :

Forestry and Agriculture

Agriculture was among the original five areas identified for fostering regional cooperation. Subsequently, forestry was also included in the functions of the committee. Under the work of this Technical Committee, Member States have been exchanging Germ-Plasm, Breeding Materials on Livestock and Fishery in accordance with the quarantine regulations in force in their respective countries. Regular meetings of Counterpart Scientists is an important feature of the Committee's Programme. In the light of the discussion on the occasion, the committee recommended by that the the member countries should step up efforts to strengthen regional cooperation as part of a comprehensive strategy to address the main challenges facing the agricultural sector in the SAARC region.³

TC on Telecommunications and JC on Postal services both established in 1983 were amalgamated into a single JC on communications with effect from 1993. With a view to bringing about an overall improvement in the postal services in the region, the work programme in postal sector includes training, seminar, workshops study tours etc., covering a number of areas.

While recognizing, the need for better and cheaper telecom links between SAARC countries, the Council of Ministry at its XVIIth session (Dec. 1996), discussed several possibilities, including a SAARC satellite, updating, expansion and harmonization of telecom hardware in the region.

SAARC programme was also spelt out by the leaders at the Second SAARC Summit held in Bangalore in 1986. This covers, of SAARC Audio-Visual Exchange Programme, of SAARC Documentation Centre, c) Scheme for promotion of Organised Tourism, d) SAARC Youth Volunteers Programme etc.⁴

JC on Education (established in 1989) and JC on Sports, Arts, and culture (established in 1983) were amalgamated into a single TC on Education and Culture

in January 1993. The priority theme identified for cooperation in the field of education are common and education - Universal primary education, Literacy, Post Literacy etc. Nodal points for establishing a network arrangement for sharing information on Mass Literacy Programme have been identified. The modalities and operational framework for this purpose have also been prepared.⁵

Another category of activities that concerns the SAARC Regional Institutions, was established in Dhaka in 1988. SAARC Tuberculosis Centre became operational in 1992 in Kathmandu and the SAARC Documentation centre in 1994 in New Delhi, SAARC Meteorological Research Centre became functional in Dhaka in 1995 and would concentrate on the research aspects of weather forecasting, concentrate on developing climate change and sea-level rise scenario through country specific studies and sharing of information data in this respect.⁶

Health and Population Activities was one of the original five areas of cooperation, identified by member states. The first meeting of the Technical Committee regarding these subjects was held in 1984 and since then fifteen meetings have been held so far. The primary focus of the committee has been on children, population welfare and Policy, maternal and child health Primary health care, disables and handicapped persons, control and eradication of major diseases in the region such as malaria, leprosy, tuberculosis, diarrhea diseases, rabies, AIDS, and iodine deficiency, disorder. Important health issues have also been at the centre of SAARC's social agenda. The SAARC member states have thus taken a number of initiatives to address several key issues relating to population control, serious problems in the area of health care and disease control.⁷

The development and well-being of children is another principal area of cooperation identified by SAARC from its very inception. The objective of building a region wise consensus on social action for achieving the right of the child and the goals set for them within the framework of the survival, development and protection strategy was addressed during three ministerial conferences held in 1986, 1992 and 1995 respectively.

In the area of child development, SAARC has been very closely cooperating with international agencies such as UNICEF with which SAARC has signed an MOU

in December 1993. The SAARC-UNICEF MOU envisages cooperation in implementing the relevant SAARC decision relating to children through an annual agenda which include joint studies, exchange of documentation and monitoring of implementation. Other agencies such as WHO and UNFPA have also shown interest to cooperate with SAARC in advancing the social development agenda of SAARC.⁸

Since its establishment in 1987, the Committee has implemented a number of programmes in law enforcement, prevention, treatment and rehabilitation as essential elements of a coordinated original strategy in combating drug trafficking and drug abuse. Meetings of selected NGO involved in Drug Abuse Prevention have been held.⁹

Rural Development is one of the five original areas identified for cooperation under the UA. Several workshops/seminars and training courses covering practically all aspects of rural development including regional planning, poverty focused development rural energy, design of agricultural projects, local level planning, inter-country comparison, social forestry, rural communication and development of agricultural markets have been conducted in member states under the committee.

The decision to establish a shelter Information Network "SHELTERNET" is being followed by the Committee which is now undertaking in-depth examination of the proposal including the operational modalities and funding. The Committee has also been entrusted with the implementation of the SAARC Youth Volunteers Programme, which had begun from November 1989.

Later, several concrete steps were taken to prioritise the activities of the TC on Rural Development and during the Fifteenth Meeting in Kathmandu in November 1999 an eleven-point priority list was drawn up to facilitate promotion of cooperation among the member countries on various issues germane to rural development in South Asia.¹⁰

Since its establishment in 1983, Technical Committee on Science and Technology have undertaken a wide variety of programme which include short term activities such as seminar/workshops/meetings of experts, preparation of State-of-the-art reports and compilation of directories, joint research projects etc.¹¹

Development of Tourism Committee was established in 1991 to promote cooperation in the field of tourism in the region. At its first meeting held in Colombo in October 1991, the Committee decided on an Action Plan on tourism to promote cooperation in the areas such as training programme, exchange of information, joint promotion, joint venture investment, intra-regional tourism, etc. The Committee is also charged with the responsibility of reviewing the progress on the SAARC Scheme for promotion of organized Tourism. On the recommendation of the Committee, tourism ministers of SAARC countries met in Colombo in September 1997. The activities relating to the constitution of a group of experts on tourism to prepare a comprehensive strategic plan for the overall development of tourism for the next five year period is in progress.

The next activities of SAARC is related to Structure of Transport established in 1983, that covers three major segments, i.e., land-transport divided into inland, water crops and shipping; and air transport. Transport has been recognized as a vital area in providing access to products and markets and opening up new areas of productivity, particularly with the operationalisation of SAPTA.¹² Indeed, the goal is to reach the stage of SAFTA in line with the NAFTA.

Women in Development was included as an area of cooperation under the IPA in 1986 and since then twelve meetings have been held so far. Specific issues taken up by the Committee include preparation of a Regional Plan of Action for women, effective dissemination of technical information relating to common in development generated by member states. SAARC has also been at the forefront of these issues with their commitment to issues of gender equality and to bring coment into the mainstream development.

Poverty Eradication has been placed high on the social agenda of SAARC since the sixth SAARC summit (Colombo, 1991). The Summit accorded the highest priority to the alleviation of poverty in South Asia and decided to establish an Independent South Asian Commission on Poverty Alleviation (ISACPA) consisting of eminent persons from member states to conduct an in-depth study of the diverse experiences of member states. A consensus on poverty eradication was adapted at the Seventh SAARC Summit (Dhaka 1993) to eradicate poverty from South Asia preferably by the year 2002 through an agenda of action which would, inter alia,

include a strategy of social mobilization, policy of decentralized agricultural development and small scale labour intensive industrialization and human development. The summit also stressed that within the conceptual approach of "Dal-Bhaat", the right to work and primary education should receive priority.¹³

Besides, there are many regional centers such as SAARC Agricultural Information Centre (SAIC), SAARC Tuberculosis Centre (STC), SAARC Documentation Centre (SDC), SAARC Meteorological Research Centre (SMRC), SAARC Human Resource Development Centre (SHRDC). SAIC, the first regional institution was established in Dhaka in 1988. Its Governing Board formulates policy matters, approves projects, recommends budget estimates, monitors and evaluates administrative and overall activities of SAIC.

The main objective of STC is to work towards the prevention and control of tuberculosis in the SAARC region through better coordination of efforts of the member states especially their tuberculosis control programmes. The centre is actively engaged in collection and distribution of information on national tuberculosis control programme in SAARC countries, networking arrangements among member countries on tuberculosis related subjects as well as circulation of information on research activities in the region on tuberculosis.

Moreover, the other centers are also aims at developing human resources in member states, inter-alia, in social, economic, educational and environmental fields.¹⁴

The idea of establishment of South Asian Development Fund (SADF) was mooted at the Sixth SAARC Summit in Colombo in December, 1991 to mobilize the global surpluses for the development of South Asia to provide finances for industrial development, poverty alleviation, protection of environment and balance of payments support.

Lastly and possibly the most important area of concerns matters pertaining to trade and economic cooperation. These include a) economic cooperation in the 'core' group of trade, manufactures and services, b) plan modeling techniques, c) establishment of data bank of socio-economic indicator, d) setting up of an expert group on statistics, and e) joint ventures in certain selected areas.¹⁵

In the last category are some of the notable achievements of SAARC, such as :

- a) The establishment of the SAARC Food Security Reserve in 1988 in pursuance of an agreement to that effect signed at the Third Summit in Kathmandu in 1987. This reserve is meant to meet emergency situations in the region.
- b) The agreement and ratification of the SAARC Regional Convention on suppression of 'terrorism', which provides for the extradition and prosecution of persons connected with a wide variety of offences involving acts of terrorism and for exchange of information, intelligence and expertise in preventive action to combat terrorism.
- c) The agreement on the 'SAARC Regional Convention on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substance' signed at the Fifth SAARC Summit held in May in 1990 and which came into force in 1993 following ratification by all member states.
- d) The framing of guidelines and procedures for granting recognition by SAARC to Regional Apex Bodies with a view to ensuring greater of the non-governmental organization, (NGO's) including professional bodies in the private sector, in the process of promoting socio-economic and cultural development of South Asia as envisaged in the SAARC charter.¹⁶

Moreover, through its various institutional arrangements, SAARC is capable of adopting planned, coordinated and well-directed strategies since its institutional mechanisms provide it with the capability of not only expanding its scope through the identification of additional areas of cooperation but also with the ability to formulate and implement concrete and tangibly beneficial programmes and activities. Thus, the policy-level meeting, well supported by the reports and recommendations of the technical bodies, have in fact led to a continuous process of expansion, at least in the non-controversial areas of cooperation. Care can also be taken to ensure that participation in SAARC does not adversely affect the bilateral and multilateral dealings of member states.

In the area of development, SAARC has gradually began to make progress towards achieving regional Cooperation in the socio-economic and cultural spheres in a structured and organized way. The aim is to select such areas of cooperation in

which there would be mutual benefits for all members states, irrespective of levels of economic development and other fiscal disparities.¹⁷

But, political weather in this region is more tricky and unpredictable that works in abundance of psychology of fear, suspicion, triggering moves and counter moves on the part of South Asian States.

The South Asian States face the problems of underdevelopment, political order and national integration though their intensity and extent varies from state to state. Parochialism, ethnic regional and linguistic identities pose challenges to the national political order and national identity.¹⁸ India has constantly faced political problems in the shape of communal and ethnic violence, and separatist movements. The political volume and turmoil has ripped through Bangladesh a number of occasions. The problem of national identity and political order still elude its political elite. Sri Lanka is facing intermittent violence, fuelled by ethnic and economic cleavages. Problems of legitimacy, political order and national integration are mounting strains on national political order and national integration are mounting strains on national political system of Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan and Maldives.

South Asia has many unresolved political disputes and India is involved in almost all of them. There is growing realization among the states of the region that in an atmosphere of unresolved disputes, there are clear limits to the progress of regional cooperation. The problems being much more the result of historical legacies, physical circumstances fear perceptions, domestic instability and ethno linguistic strip, have a tendency to generate trans-border conflicts. Thus, the Tamil Problem in Sri Lanka affects India, the Mahajir problem in Pakistan affects India, internal problems of Bangladesh leading to trans-border migration affects India, friction between Nepalese factions affect India. Moreover, in many cases, India has been accusing Pakistan of its involvement in Punjab and Kashmir, Pakistan in turn accuses it of sponsoring terrorism in its Sind province. Such and similar issues have an explosive potential, could result in 'wars' between India and Pakistan and the circumstances leading to the creation of Bangladesh, where the collusion of India made it a reality, 'bullying like the notorious food-drop by India on Jaffna, the trade blockade of Nepal and the like.

Living in the midst of these problems, both India and Pakistan, the two major sates in the region, have been demonstrating a certain degree of ambiguity towards the SAARC. Both of them appeared as unwilling participants, when the organization was launched. The Indian hesitancy was the byproduct of an apprehension that Pakistan and the rest of the small South Asian States may convert the forum into an anti-India Platform.¹⁹ Likewise Pakistan, too, saw no reason to provide India yet another forum from which India could project its greatness.²⁰

However, unlike India and Pakistan, the rest of the South Asian States have been enthusiastic about regional cooperation in varied fields. For these smaller states, regional cooperation promises both economic and political advantages. While it will help them strengthen their economies, it is also likely to advance their national interests by providing them an equal footing and greater room to maneuver in their dealings with the large regional powers, particularly India.²¹

Since the 'threat perception' of most of the member states are in many ways 'India centred' a somewhat common policy has emerged, whereby these states support the 'regionalization' and internationalization of their bilateral issues with India, since this strategy 'would help reduce the chances of the dominant power to exercise power arbitrarily.'²² In this context, President Jayawardene for example, at the Bangalore Summit expressed the hope that, 'SAARC would one day be in a position when members would be able to bring bilateral and contentious issues before this forum.'²³ Hameed, the then Sri Lankan Foreign Minister also warned that unless SAARC dealt with the bilateral issues, it will end up as a deaf, dumb and blind Association.²⁴

On economic level, all the seven South Asian States fall in the category of less developed States of Third World.²⁴ All of them are faced with the challenges of low rate of economic growth, high rate of population growth, under utilization of manpower resources, high incidence of poverty, income inequalities, food shortage, inflation and similar other related problems.

The reason for the deliberate restraint in the economic cooperation is the disparity in the relative level of economic development among the countries of the region. This is more so in case of Pakistan, the second largest sate in South Asia,

which has never shown any willingness neither to expand bilateral trade relation, with India, nor any eagerness to include trade in the accepted areas of cooperation within SAARC. Thus, before initiating any meaningful cooperation in core economic area, it is imperative to devise means so that the more industrially advanced states in the region can be restrained from emerging into a threat to the industrialization of the member states in the forum.²⁶

And lastly, on a smaller scales the power politics of the cold war era and the role played by the US in the post cold era can also be considered crucial for the prevailing situation of insecurity in South Asia. The national interest, economic imperatives and global perspective of the world's superpower has always guided the US foreign policy towards South Asia. Therefore, in the post cold war era the US is still in a position to aggregate or ease and redeem such a situation of insecurity in this region. Although the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war has produced drastic changes in the international relation yet these changes have failed to produce any perceptible change in the relationship between India, Pakistan and the United States.²⁷

However, it is clear that until all fears in the minds of the rest of the South Asian States regarding Indian Economic dominance are not put at rest, the regional cooperation in core economic area is going to remain limited. As Rajiv Gandhi opined, 'Indeed the interests of none of us can be secured by damaging the interests of any one else.'²⁸

Therefore, it can be said that for the SAARC to show greater degree of success, the member states need to frame a decisive agenda for the near future. They should stick to the policy of beneficial bilateralism, keeping off the contentious issues from the forum and taking recourse to mutually beneficial trade offs. They need to harmonise their outlook, reach an understanding on security issues and arrive at a common policy in relation with the external power.

No doubt, the pace of cooperation through SAARC is yet slow and covers a limited number of areas and it is likely to take several years before it may achieve an ASEAN type stature.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

The emergence of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation marked the beginning of a new era with South Asian Region as this institutional arrangement of the South Asian countries raised new hopes for meaningful cooperation among the countries of the region. In fact, the countries of the region realized, in spite of their strained relationship, the need for cooperation through collective approach and action. The most important step in the direction of encouraging cooperation among the countries of South Asia was taken by President Ziaur Rahman of Bangladesh. As a result of his initiative and successive deliberations a fairly broad based and comprehensive schemes of South Asian Regional Cooperation was evolved. In December 1985 the heads of states and governments of seven South Asian Countries namely, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka held a Summit meeting at Dhaka and unanimously made a declaration for the creation of SAARC. The Declaration stated the objective of the Association as promotion of welfare of people; improvement in the quality of life of people, acceleration of economic growth; promotion of collective self-reliance; promotion of mutual trust and understanding; promotion of collaboration in economic, social, cultural, technical and scientific fields; strengthening of cooperation with other developing countries and themselves besides cooperation with regional and international organization with similar objective. The cooperation amongst the members is to be based on respect for principles of sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, political independence, non-interference in internal affairs of other states and mutual benefit. Further, decisions at all levels are to be taken by consensus and that bilateral and contentious issues are to be excluded from the deliberations.

Over the years, the countries of South Asia have realized the need of cooperation. But the progress in this regards has been quite slow. However, despite the slow progress of regional cooperation, the actual working of the SAARC since its establishment has raised high hopes of peace in this region bedeviled by conflicts of all kinds. Though the SAARC as such has not played any effective role in resolving the differences among its members, yet its periodical meetings provide an opportunity for private consultation among the leaders of various member stands. It

is well known that the meetings provide an opportunity as did the Dhaka and Bangalore meetings, to iron out the differences and greatly contribute to the reduction of tensions between the states as was the case with India and Pakistan and India and Srilanka. It is true that the SAARC has not been able to play as effective a role as its supporters would expect it to play but it cannot be denied that its establishment does provide an instrument that might, over time and in small steps, build new confidence by solving non-controversial, non-political problems. If that confidence can be built the chances for solving the region's political problems, would considerably improve.

The presence of conditions like fertile soil, vast hydel energy, forest resources, unexploited wealth of the ocean, presence of raw materials essential for development contribute to cooperation among the states of the region. Given this, the countries of South Asia are keen to improve the living standards of their people by sharing the knowledge and experiences of their fellow neighbours as they try to do. The deepening world economic crisis has also given a boost to the spirit of cooperation in the region. In this connection, mention may be made of the efforts relating to the beginning of SAPTA (South Asian Preferential Trade agreement) that ushered in the beginning of intensive trade among the member states. This effort has culminated in the beginning of SAFTA (South Asian Free Trade Area) that is going to boost the trade among the member states. So, in the economic field, SAARC has made commendable contribution.

However, inspite of considerable progress since its establishment, the SAARC is confronted with a number of challenges that come in the way of its effective role. The challenges are :

In the first place, the political climate prevailing in the region is not conducive to its successful working. An atmosphere of mutual hostility exists among various countries of the region, namely, India and Pakistan.

Secondly, the disparity in the regional resources of various member states hampers the growth of true corporation among the members. India, in comparison to other countries of the region is not only very large in size but also possess disproportionate

national resources. As a result, the smaller states suffer from the fear that membership of the SAARC would enhance their dependence on the region.

Thirdly, though all the countries of SAARC are under-developed, but their state of development differs. As a result, the less developed countries like Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Maldives are always apprehensive that in the present schemes of cooperation they are bound to be at a disadvantageous position.

Fourthly, the lack of interdependence of the countries of the region in matters of trade also poses a serious challenges. The intra-regional trade constitutes only about 5 percent of the global trade of South Asian region.

Further, the inadequacy of transport and communication facilities among the members of SAARC also constitutes an impediment in the way of smooth working of SAARC.

Finally, the bilateral wrangles among member states have also adversely affected the working of SAARC. The strained relationship between India and Pakistan in particular is one of the most important reasons for the ineffective role of the SAARC.

To conclude, despite these challenges, it cannot be denied that the formation of SAARC is a significant step forward because it has stimulated regional cooperation through collective approach and action. No doubt the seven countries have different political systems, ideologies and links, but they are also beset with identical problems of growth and development which encourage them to cooperate with each other and evolve a common approach for development. This is particularly true of India and Pakistan. The strained relationship between these two countries must not be allowed to go disproportionate as was the cases in 1948, 1965, 1971, and 1999. None of two countries benefit from the ongoing bickering between them. Most important, both the countries, Pakistan in particular should realize that anti-Indian stance might give the rulers temporary legitimacy only and it will not last long. So they need to adopt a more realistic approach to their policy vis-à-vis India that would benefit the country most. That will help the SAARC to be effective and viable regional organization of the South Asian countries.

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