

# CHAPTER – I

## INTRODUCTION - THE PROBLEM- CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

### I

It is said that in the middle of 1950s, there was a revival of interest in what Arend Lijphart has referred to as non-majoritarian democracy, most particularly federalism and consociationalism, as distinctive forms of political organisation with their own rules which are to be understood on their own terms and not as incomplete or deficient expressions of majoritarian democracy.<sup>(1)</sup>

In the opinion of Daniel J. Elazar, “The exploration of both federalism and consocioatinalism proceeded along parallel tracks for the next two decades”<sup>(2)</sup>.

With a view to situating the concept of federalism in the proper perspective (and also to making a distinction between federal

arrangements and consociational arrangements), new concept like “non-territorial federalism” began to find its place in the discourse on federal arrangements.

Lijphart, while explaining his ideas on the relationship between federalism and consociationalism, has identified eight characteristics of consensus democracy.<sup>(3)</sup>

These are : (1) Executive power- sharing; (2) balanced executive – legislative relations; (3) strong bicameralism; (4) multi – party system; (5) multi – dimensional party system; (6) proportional representation; (7) federalism and decentralization and (8) a written constitution and minority veto.

Moreover, five secondary attributes of federalism are generally cited. These are :<sup>(4)</sup>

- a) a written constitution which specifies the division of powers and guarantees to both the central and regional governments that their allotted powers cannot be taken away;
- b) a bicameral legislature in which one chamber represents the people at large and the other, the component units of the federation;

- c) over-representation of the smaller component units in the federal chamber of the bicameral legislature;
- d) the right of the component units to be involved in the process of amending the federal constitution and to change their own constitutions unilaterally; and
- e) decentralized government, that is, the regional governments' share of power in a federation is relatively large compared with that of regional governments in unitary states.

Besides these five characteristics, the following eight features have been identified as the foundations of a federal democratic system:<sup>(5)</sup>

- 1) Executive power – sharing : instead of one – party, a federal democratic set up tends to have coalition governments of two or more parties that together have the support of a broad majority in parliament. The most far reaching form of executive power – sharing is a grand coalition of all the important parties.
- 2) Balanced executive – legislative relations : instead of an executive that dominates the legislature, a federal democratic system is characterized by an executive and legislature that are in a rough balance of power with each other, which may be reinforced

by a formal constitutional separation of powers as in the U.S.A. and Switzerland.

3) Strong bicameralism : instead of concentrating all legislative power into the hands of the majority in a unicameral legislature, legislative power may be shared with a second chamber in which certain minorities enjoy special representation. Two conditions have to be fulfilled if this majority representation is to be meaningful : the second chamber has to be elected on a different basis than the first chamber; and it must have significant power – ideally, as much power as the first chamber.

4) Multi-party system : a condition where more than one party seek to have share in the process of power holding.

5) Multi – dimensional party system : in addition to the socio-economic issue dimension, the parties tend to differ from each other along one or more issue dimensions, such as religion, language and ethnicity.

6) Proportional representation : in contrast with the plurality method of election, the basic aim of proportional representation is to divide the parliamentary seats among the parties in proportion

to the votes they receive.

7) Federalism and decentralization : instead of centralizing power at a single centre, it is distributed between the centre and the constituent units in such a manner as may be convenient for the both sets of governments to play their respective role within the prescribed limit.

8) Written Constitution : instead of the flexibility of an unwritten constitution, federalism is characterized by a more rigid written constitution which can be amended only by following the prescribed provision of the constitution – a process where both the Houses enjoy equal powers and the constituent units have their role in special circumstances.

Robert G. Dixon,<sup>(6)</sup> while contrasting majoritarian with consensus democracy lists these components to be essential in this regard :  
“Federal structure, separation of powers, the bicameral structure of legislatures, with each house representing a somewhat different electorate and requiring a double scrutiny of all measures.....  
The state-based rather than nation – based party system, requirements for extra – ordinary majorities to enact certain kinds

of measures.

Keeping the American model in view, Robert A Dahl while summarising the Madisonian theory, points to a very set of constitutional checks and balances : “The separate constituencies for electing president, senators and representatives, ..... a bicameral congress; ..... federalism ..... judicial review ; decentralized political parties”.<sup>(7)</sup>

Herman Finer holds that both a rigid constitution and bicameralism are “Part of federalism”.<sup>(8)</sup>

Another authority on federalism, William H. Riker, puts emphasis on the “Problem of the second chamber” is one of the “Special constitutional features of federalism”.<sup>(9)</sup>

Ivo D. Duchacek identified ten “yardsticks of federalism”, two of which are a “rigid constitution” and “bicameralism and equal representation of unequal states”.<sup>(10)</sup>

K.C. Wheare holds that “the supreme constitution and the written constitution” are “essential institutions to a federal government”. Moreover, he adds : ‘Many people regard it as essential to a government if it is to be federal that the regional should have

equal representation in the upper house of the general legislature”.<sup>(11)</sup>

Daniel J. Elazar,<sup>(12)</sup> while analysis the nature of federalism, has identified “six ambiguities” associated with federalism as a theoretical and operational concept :

- 1) Federalism involves both structures and processes of government;
- 2) Federalism is directed to the achievement and maintenance of both unity and diversity ;
- 3) Federalism is both a political and social phenomenon ;
- 4) Federalism concerns both ends and means ;
- 5) Federalism is pursued for both limited and comprehensive purposes ;
- 6) There are several varieties of political arrangements to which the term “Federal” has properly been applied.

Federalism has been generally considered as “a form of governmental structure”<sup>(13)</sup> In the opinion of Elazar,<sup>(14)</sup> ‘If a political

system is established by compact and has at least two ‘arenas’, ‘planes’, ‘spheres’, ‘tiers’ or ‘levels’ of government, each endowed with independent legitimacy and a constitutionally guaranteed place in the overall system, and possessing its own set of institutions, powers and responsibilities, it is deemed to be federal.”

He further holds : “Proponents of federalism properly argue that this structural dimension is a key to the operationalization of the federal principle because it creates a firm institutional framework for the achievement of the goals for which federalism was instituted in the first place”.<sup>(15)</sup>

One may notice that in the early stages of the study of modern federalism, emphasis was laid on the structural considerations as these were deemed to be “essential” for federal arrangement. The underlying assumption behind this approach was that the introduction of a proper federal structure would create ‘a functioning federal system’. But gradually the limits of such an approach became clear as many polities with federal structures were not federal in practice – “the structures marked a centralized concentration of power that stood in direct contradiction to the



federal principle. <sup>(16)</sup>

Federalism is as much a matter of process as of structure, particularly 'if the process is broadly defined to include a political cultural dimensions as well'.<sup>(17)</sup> Thus, a federal process should include :

- a) a sense of partnership on the part of the parties to the federal compact ;
- b) manifestation of negotiated cooperation on issues and programmes ;
- c) commitment to open bargaining between all parties to an issue for achieving consensus ;
- d) spirit of accommodation which protects the fundamental integrity of all the partners.

Federalism, in the truest sense, must combine both structure and process. Where a federal structure exists with any support from the federal process, the operational aspect of federalism is bound to be weak. On the other hand, if there may be cases where federal process works with out there being any federal structure, but in

the ultimate analysis it will be seen that such a federal structure should gain the support of federal process in order to become both theoretically and operationally acceptable. But whatever may be position, it can be concluded that structure alone is not sufficient in determining the federal character of any particular polity.

Elazer is right when he asserts : “With regard to federalism, this ambiguity is reflected in a certain terminological confusion. The terms ‘federalism’, ‘federalist’ and ‘federalize’ are commonly used to describe both the process of political unification and the maintenance of the diffusion of political power.”<sup>(18)</sup>

In this sense, federalizing involves both the ‘creation and maintenance’ of unity and the ‘diffusion of power’ in the name of diversity. Federalism is not to be located on the ‘centralization – decentralization continuum’ but on a different continuum altogether, one that is ‘predicated on non-centralization, or the effective combination of unity and diversity’.<sup>(19)</sup> It has been very correctly observed by Elazer : “When discussing federalism, it is a mistake to present unity and diversity as opposites. Unity should be contrasted with disunity and diversity with homogeneity, emphasizing the political dimensions and implications of each.”<sup>(20)</sup>

In modern sense, federalism is both a political and social phenomenon. Apart from being a structure of political relationships among different political units, it also studies relationships among people as individuals in families or groups to cover every aspect of life, not just in the political realm. The French and Russian thinkers had tried to find solutions to their social problems through the achievement of harmonious social relationships as well as appropriate form of political organizations. To many, Federalism is not merely a tool for achieving other goals but embodies the goals themselves as well the means for their attainment or realization. Thus the basic question is : Is it possible to examine federalism in its limited or comprehensive scope?

Morton Grodzins holds that federalism like all forms of government, must be judged as a means of fostering democratic ends.<sup>(21)</sup> Again, Aritai Etzioni views federalism as a means to attain political integration of different forces and factors prevailing in a polity<sup>(22)</sup>.

Going beyond this debate, there is an opinion<sup>which</sup> argues that federalism is simply one of several means to attain certain political ends, perhaps even a valuable one, but no more than that. That is

why, Elazar concludes : “ Clearly, there is a close relationship between those who see federalism as a comprehensive end and those who perceive it as having both political and social dimensions. Similarly, those who see federalism as one comprehensive end may be more likely to emphasize the strictly political character of the federal principle – which is almost certain to be the case for those who see federalism as a limited means for achieving certain other goals”.<sup>(23)</sup>

Thus viewed, it may be said that federalism is “a matter of the form of a polity” Which “permeated and shapes every aspect of the polity and is constitutionally anchored”<sup>(24)</sup>

Regarding the nature of the federal polity, Elazar has identified three models which are designed around the concept of power and its concentration or distribution :<sup>(25)</sup>

- (1) One such model is the hierarchical one in which power is organized in a pyramidal fashion and is, accordingly, concentrated at the top.
- (2) A second model involves a strong centre with an appropriate periphery, where power is concentrated in the centre although

the centre itself may be composed of representatives of the periphery.

- (3) Finally, there is the cybernetic model in which power is distributed through a matrix of centres and in which the general government provides the frame for the matrix.

At the end of this theoretical formulation, Elazar concludes :<sup>(26)</sup>

“It is true that there are two kinds of federal systems – those in which the purpose of federalism is to share power broadly, pure and simple, and those in which the purpose of federalism is to give individual national communities a share in the power of the state. The former is more simply devoted to advancing the cause of popular government, while the latter may rely upon other mechanisms for securing popular government and merely add federalism as an extra device”.

Herman Bakvis,<sup>(27)</sup> admitting the importance of the concepts of structure and power in federal polity as identified by Elazar, points to its “limitations” and “misleading” nature. He has argued that under certain circumstances, political structure can play an important role in defining or promoting federal arrangements, even

if such structures are originally the result of social forces.

An additional point to be noted is that in federal arrangements, the relationship between structure and process is essentially reciprocal. It is suggested that more attention should be paid to the differences in the kinds of structures found in the federal system of governance.

It appears that Elazar's scheme ignores the role of structure in society generally. Philip Selznick<sup>(28)</sup> has shown the extent to which social life is institutionalized and how this institutionalization affects both social and political behaviour. Secondly, Elazar's definition ignores the highly organized nature of sub-cultures through which religions and other social values are propagated and maintained. Moreover, in this context, the problem of elite accommodation becomes a major problem in creating "a cohesive and powerful social entity."<sup>(29)</sup> In the words of Bakvis<sup>(30)</sup>. "Initial social economic and political considerations give rise to federal arrangement; the political rules and structures governing the distribution of powers and resources then often have the reciprocal effect of reinforcing identities and character of the sub-culture blocs in question, frequently in combination with entrepreneurship

on the part of political and social elites. These identities and activities, in turn, will affect the formal structures and so on.”

The foregoing leads one to look the issue of federal governance from another perspective - the relationship between ethnicity and the federalizing process. It is argued that ethnicity, as an aspect of political process, should be viewed “dynamically” as “ethnic heterogeneity is a pervasive feature of the contemporary world.”<sup>(31)</sup>

The problem of ethnicity becomes more complete in a plural society which is divided from within because of many segmental social cleavages. The problem is one of “reconciling ethnic diversity with overarching loyalty to the state”. This is more problematic because “the state is not neutral force in mediating political conflict ; A plural society is thus “One in which Politics is ethicized, in which Political Competition is overtly drawn along ethnic lines”.<sup>(32)</sup> Jinadu thus holds : “Ethnicity par se need not generate conflict ; but once it is situated in a particular type of social or plural diversity, it assumes political conflict significance.”<sup>(33)</sup>

It appears to be a correct assessment by Duchacek when he asserts, “we should be reasonably close to an acceptable answer to the question what constitutes real federalism – but we are not”. The

concept brings before us “infinite variety of the federal theme in different times and different national environments.” He agrees with William Livingstone who holds. “The essence of federalism lies not in the institutional or constitutional structure but in the society itself. Federal government is a device by which the federal qualities of society are articulated and protected.”<sup>(34)</sup>

Thus it is seen that the concept of federalism has many meanings, manifestations and mechanisms depending upon the nature and context of political dynamics of a particular governing system. It has been very correctly stated: “Federalism is difficult to define. It is also inadvisable to consider federal system in any particular country as the model of federalism... A Federal system, whether centralizing or peripheralizing during any particular period, always remains in tension, or in a mode of 'intransigent cooperation'. Too much of centralization is as damaging for it as too much of peripheralization.”<sup>(35)</sup>

Any study regarding the nature of India's Federal Governance brings to fore a number of issues which had been hidden or did not come to the surface at the time of the framing the constitution for free India. An examination of the debates that took place in the



Constituent Assembly of India will establish the fact that the Founding Fathers were mostly concerned with the idea of Providing a stable and workable governing system based on the federal structure. In fact, that was the demand of the hour. A newly independent nation with a dilapidated and shattered economy could not afford to have a loosely framed federal type of democratic system. Needless to mention, that was one of the reasons why the Founding Fathers preferred the term “ Union of states” to be incorporated in the Constitution.

Thus a system as envisaged by the framers emerged as something, which, strictly speaking, does not conform to any set pattern of ideal federal governance of any federation of the world. It is interesting to note that this system backed by a virtual one party dominance worked smoothly upto 1966. But the total scenario underwent significant changes since 1967 with the coming into power of some non-congress parties at some State Government level. In fact, it marked the beginning of a new power equation both at the centre and at the State levels. It may not be incorrect to say that the 1967 Fourth General Elections can be seen as the ‘watershed’ in the course of the political process in India and

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the emergence of coalition politics in India.

Since then qualitative changes have taken place in the working of the federal system. It may not be an exaggeration to say that the process which began in 1967 found its culmination in 1977 when, for the first time, a non-congress coalition government was formed at the centre. The demand for more power, particularly in the field of financial authority almost changed the nature of power-equation. In place of dominance of Power holding, there emerged a new sense of sharing of Power by all the federating units. In place of conciliation, there appeared policies of confrontation. In place of federation by direction from the above, there emerged a federation based on bargaining and ultimately this led to what is called co-operative federalism. Such were the changes in the federal governance which calls for an in-depth analysis of the causes and consequences and probable impact on the Political dynamics of the country.

Generally speaking, there are two views about these charges: one such view holds that the issues involved are more political than legal-institutional in nature and this may help, in a meaningful way, unfold the nature of forces at work since 1967 in general and

1977 in particular. The second line of thinking proceeds on the line that the present maladies in the federal governing system in India can be suitably corrected by judicious and conscious rearrangement of the institutional structure by formal alterations of revisions in the governing rules so that greater legitimacy is brought to bear on those structures which have to respond to the challenges and systematic crisis.

It is further held that both the centre and the states have, over the years, failed in developing a pattern of relationship based on mutual cooperation, broad understanding and satisfactory working arrangement and the fault, if there be any, does not lie with the constitutional system. Centralisation of authority and resources can not be the answer to India's gigantic problems. Political decentralization seems to be an absolute necessity, since the constituent states are charged with heavy responsibilities for plan implementation and development administration, their willing partnership and autonomous enterprise, rather than a paramount, paternalistic position of the centre, should be the pre-condition for the discharge of such responsibilities.

The states in India are historical entities. Here lies the difference

between the Indian situation and the position found in many Western states. Regional diversities in India can not be overlooked or oversingled on the plea that there are heavy doses of centralization of authority in the institutional arrangements that the constitution envisages. Since there have emerged new areas of both conflict and cooperation between the centre and the states, the entire notion of India's federal governance demands a new approach making sufficient space for the regions to play their distinct roles.

### **OBJECTIVES OF THE PROPOSED STUDY.**

The proposed study seeks to analyse the causes and impact of the emergence of coalition politics in India and the nature of federal governance in post 1977 political scenario. It has been accepted by all these developments have changed the nature and working of India's federal system both qualitatively and quantitatively. A new power equation emerged and the nature of coalition politics allowed the states to play more effective roles in managing the federal affairs. The non-congress governments in states began to demand for greater financial power that was reflected in the meetings of the planning commission and the National Development Council. Its impact was profound; the changes could be seen in the

scope and functioning of the Finance Commission - the instrument primarily responsible for making financial allocations among the states.

Besides these, another development became very evident, with the demolition of the Congress hegemony both at the centre and the states which Rajni Kothari could describe as 'One -dominant party system', smaller parties, mostly regional in nature began to make their presence felt in the national politics. The process of regionalization of Indian politics began simultaneously with the emergence of coalition politics in India.

The rise of regional political parties has brought with it two important changes. In the first place, the national political parties were forced to depend on these regional political parties while forming a coalition government. Secondly, politics of domination was replaced by what is called politics of bargaining. Local issues began to find important places on the national agenda. Moreover, it has also been noticed that some regional parties in a coalition government could form their own 'regional lobby' which became small centres of powers within a broad coalition system.

All these phenomenon and other related issues exerted tremendous influence on the federal pattern in India. A clear departure was visible from the federal arrangement that was made by the framers of the Constitution. New terms began to appear in the vocabulary to describe the emerging federal pattern like co-operative federalism, bargaining federalism, competitive federalism and the like.

### **RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

The proposed study seeks to answer the following questions in order to explain the phenomena already outlined. These are:

- a) What had been socio - economic compulsions which prompted the makers of the Constitution to opt for a federation largely based on the Government of India Act, 1935?
- b) What kind of changes have taken place in the working of the federal governance since 1967 as a prelude to developments since 1977?
- c) To what extent, has the coalition politics been responsible for changing the nature and extent of federal system in India?

- d) How far has the emergence of coalition politics in India changed the nature of India's federal governance both quantitatively and qualitatively?
- e) What have been the general trend in Indian politics since 1967?

### METHODOLOGY

The study is primarily analytical in nature. It is dependent on the examination of both primary and secondary source materials. References will be made to Constituent Assembly Debates and correspondences of the framers of the constitution. Besides other primary sources like government documents and other related papers will be taken into consideration. Any study of this nature calls for a thorough analysis of secondary sources as well. Books and papers on India's federal governance provide many clues to the understanding of many subtle issues which lie beneath the normal institutional arrangement, issues of federal governments in India as viewed by political parties as the main actors of the game will also be considered. These are mostly revealed through the publication of party documents containing the position a party

takes on this vital issue. In a word, the study would not only highlight the historical aspect of the federal governance in India but also identify and analyse the nature of political factors governing the federal political dynamics in India.

### **OVERVIEW OF EXISTING LITERATURE**

There have been a good number of works on the nature and functioning of India's federal system. Generally speaking, most of these studies tried to explain the nature of India's federation strictly from the legal-constitutional perspectives. As such, these included literal and strict meaning of the constitutional provisions without going beyond the scope of the requirements of the constitutional dictation. The section dealing with the "Select Bibliography" will show that experts began analysing these issues within the pattern of Centre - State relations under "one-dominant party system" as was rightly pointed out by Rajni Kothari.

But since 1967, phenomenal changes have taken place in the nature of Centre - State relations with the disintegration of the Congress System. A new power - equation began to be visible where non-Congress state governments began to demand for greater power,



mainly financial powers. A new situation emerged where the states began to play “active” rather than “passive” role in the game of the federal power politics. A clear shift was visible where it became imperative for the observers to look beyond the formal working of federal system by taking into account the areas of “conflict” and “cooperation” among the partners of the game. Attempts were made to identify the forces at play and understand the actual nature of political dynamics.

Thus a new shift of emphasis from mere formal - constitutional - legal framework to the actual working of the system brought to the fore a number of issues which did not attract the attention of the scholars for a long time. A new kind of multi - dimensional approach began to substitute the uni-dimensional approach in the field of the study.

Broadly speaking, studies relating to federal governance made so far cover major dimensions which included, among other things, constitutional framework, finance and planning, the role of the governors and the emergency provisions, administrative and judicial relations and some aspects of informal politics. For better understanding , the whole gamut of such studies can be brought

under the following sub-themes :

- a) Political Process and Centre - State Relations.
- b) Political Parties.
- c) Language Politics.
- d) President's Rule.
- e) Coalition Politics and Centre - State Relation.
- f) Inter State and Centre - State Disputes.

Mention should be made on the work by Amal Ray under the title "Tension - Areas in India's Federal System". The work puts emphasis on the changing political process and the interplay of various forces. According to the author, the breakdown of one - party dominance in 1967 resulted in a profound alteration of the political setting of Indian federalism. A new pattern in the decision - making process emerged where the states were given due place to play their roles. He is of the opinion that the only possible way to regain consensus in place of conflict and orderly operation of the center - state relations is through genuine accommodation and compromise and speedy implementation of egalitarian economic

programmes. At the end of the study Ray holds that the other alternative, the violent and radical method, if employed, might weaken the very foundation of the federal system. The work is unique in the sense that it seeks to highlight the inter-connection between constitutional and political forces in the federal process in India.

Another very important work has been done by Subrato Sarkar under the title "The Centre and the States". Sarkar has forcefully brought out the defects in the constitutional provisions where the centre has been made more powerful as against the states. To him, this positional disadvantage of the states is the root cause of the conflicts between the centre and states.

"State Politics in India" edited by Prof. Iqbal Narain is considered to be the very first attempt by the Indian Scholars to analyse the nature of state politics in the general backdrop of the nature and scope of India's federal governance. The major part of this study has been devoted to the exploration of the working of the federal system during the period between 1967 and 1971. But a closer look at the papers included in this volume would show that the contributors have thrown very little light on the various forces

and factors that lie behind the operation of the federal governance in India.

There are many works done on the basis of institutional approach which include "The Indian Federal System" by K. Subba Rao, "The Republic of India" by Alan Gledhill, "The System of Grants-in-Aid in India" by P.P. Agarwal, "Foundations of Indian Federalism" by K.R. Bombwall.

Another type of works, mostly on the analytical approach was undertaken in consideration of the post -1967 developments in India. "Language and politics in India" by Prakash Karat, "Agony of West Bengal" by Ranojit Roy, "Internal Colony" by Sachidananda Sinha and "The Centre and The States" by Subrato Sarkar fall in this category.

"India's Static Power-structure" by J.D Sethi and "The Politics of Defection : A Study of State Politics in India" by S.C. Kashyap and "Party Politics in an Indian State" by K.L. Kamal set a trend of discussing the nature of federal governance from the perspective of the role of the political parties.

Atul Kohli has been a keen researcher on the nature and direction

of Indian politics. His works which include “The Success of Indian Democracy” (2001) or “Democracy and Discontent : India’s Growing Crisis of Governability” cover many dimensions and issues on the nature of India’s society, economy and polity. These works touch upon issues like Centre - State relations and demand for autonomy, regional movement and the like which are very relevant for any study of India’s federal governance.

“Federalism in India : Origin and Development” a edited book by Nirmal Mukherjee and Balveer Arora is a very significant contribution in the field of any study on India’s federation. It contains a good number of papers relating to the nature and changing dimensions of federal governance in India. The introduction to the book is a valuable addition and it has detailed out the entire problem of the study. Likewise, the work entitled “Federalism without a Centre : The Impact of political and Economic Reforms on India’s Federal System” by Saez Lawrence analyses the impact of political and economic reforms on the nature and working of the federal governance in India in the post-globalization scenario. This work is, in fact very much topically relevant as very attempts have so far been made to assess the impact of globalization on the working

of the federal pattern in India.

Schoenfeld, Benjamin N. in his 'Federalism in India' has examined the nature of federalism in India strictly from the position of power distribution. In that way, the focus is primarily on institutional aspect and very few words have been said about its the functional dynamics of federal pattern in India.

Sharada Rath in her book 'Federalism today: approaches, issues and trends' deals with the approaches to the study of federation in the contemporary world. As the title suggests, the works highlights other factors like issues and trends in the working of the federal system.

Asok Kumar Chanda's work 'Federalism in India: A Study of Union-State Relations' is significant because a scholar like Chanda has analysed the entire fields of federal pattern from the perspective of centre-state relations. The work was published at a time when there were signs of federal restructuring as India was to enter into a period of confrontation among the various units of the federation.

Tarun Chandra Bose in his book 'Indian Federalism: Problems and Issues' seeks to identify the problems and issues of India's federation. The work is the outcome of a Seminar where speakers

tried to analyse various dimensions of both the nature and functioning of the federal system.

Granville Austin in his celebrated work 'The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a nation' has dealt with in details the story behind the framing of the Indian Constitution. He has made extensive survey of the debates of the Constituent Assembly to show how the framers of the Constitution tried to accommodate different views in the body of the Constitution.

C. H. Alexandrowicz in his 'Constitutional Development in India' has discussed the history of constitutional development in India. The study is primarily historical and deals with the analysis of various important legislative acts passed leading to the creation of the new Republic of India.

S. Bhatnagar and Pradeep Kumar in his book 'Regional Political Parties in India' has analysed the nature of regional parties and their impact on the political dynamics. The author have very categorically stated that the process of regionalization in India is the outcome of new party configuration where one can notice the interplay of many forces both political and non-political in nature.

H. H. Das and B. C. Choudhury in their work 'federal and state politics in India' have discussed the issue of federal governance in the backdrop of state politics . It is admitted that with the changes in the nature and extent of state politics in India, there have been substantial changes in the nature of federal governance.

Babulal Fadia's book 'State Relations in India' 2 volumes, is a very good contribution to the field of state politics in India in general and that of federal politics in particular. This is, in fact, to be read along with two earlier publications by Iqbal Narain and Myron Weiner published under the title 'State Politics in India'. These two works, in that sense, marked the beginning of the study of state politics in India in a general way.

Rasheeduddin Khan has approached the problem of federal governance from a new perspective. He has tried to focus on the dimension change in the federal set-up in India and in that respect, the work is a distinct one with its emphasis on the methodological orientation.

Chandra Pal's work on 'State Autonomy in Indian Federation' is another important work in this field. The problem of autonomy



and regional assertions arising out of the demand for autonomy has added new dimension to the federal governance in the country.

The entire issue of center-state relations in India and for that matter, the nature and working of federalism in India has been studied by Bhaskar Dutta in his work 'Coalition Governments and Fiscal policies in India'. The issues of economic relations, grants-in-aid and the problem of resource allocation have been discussed in this work.

Majeed Akhtar in his edited volume 'Federalism Within the Union: Distribution of Responsibilities in the Indian System (2004) has tried to analyse the working of India's federation from the point of view of distribution of resource allocation.

In a similar way , Akhtar in another edited volume 'Coalition Politics and Power-Sharing'(2000) has discussed the issue of coalition building, coalition-maintenance and holding of power through coalition power-sharing.

Mahendra Prasad Singh and Anil Mishra in their edited volume 'Coalition Politics in India: Problems and Prospects' (2004) have discussed the major issues in coalition-building in India. The

authors also have tried to indicate the future trend in Indian politics.

Harihar Bhattacharyya in his book 'Federalism in Asia: India, Pakistan and Malaysia' (2006) has discussed the issue of federalism from the Asian perspective with special reference to three federations of three countries. In that respect, it offers a comparative perspective on a pan-Asian basis.

D. J. Elazar in his edited volume 'Constitutional Design and the Power-Sharing in the Post-Modern Epoch' (1991) has discussed issues relating to power-sharing in a constitutional frame. In this volume, the contribution by I. D. Duchachek under the title 'Comparative Federalism' deserves special mentioning.

Some other works with different titles deserve special mentioning as these touch upon the federal governance while analyzing the nature of India's democracy. These are :

"Democratic Governance in India : challenges of Poverty, Development and Identity" by Niraja Gopal Jayal and Sudha Pai (ed).

"Indian Democracy : Meanings and practices" by Rajendra Vora and Suhas Palshikar (ed).

“Democracy and Social Change in India : A Cross National Analysis of the National Electorate” by Subrata Kr. Mitra and V.B. Singh (ed)

“Gods of power : Personality Cult and Indian Democracy” by Kalyani Shankar.

“Democracy in India” by Niraja Gopal Jayal (ed).

“State Politics : New Dimensions” by Sudha Pai.

This list can not, by any means, <sup>be</sup> an exhaustive one. It is not possible to scan the vast sea of literature on this field. Only some of the important works of representative nature have been discussed and analysed. However, the section on ‘Select Bibliography’, though illustrative by nature, can present a glimpse of the entire storehouse of knowledge on federal governance in India.

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