

SECTION - INEHRU AND INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Jawaharlal Nehru was marked to be a great figure in Indian politics as soon as he joined the Indian freedom movement in the early twenties with an aristocratic family background, education at Harrow and Cambridge and the political backing of his father, Motilal Nehru, Mahatma Gandhi and the other Congress leaders. Along with Subhas Bose, Nehru were already recognised youth leaders of Freedom Movement in the late twenties. But in 1929 he was by no means an organisational leader of the Congress and was elected President of the organisation entirely due to Gandhi's insistence. When in 1936, he was elected congress president again, he was "in office" but not in power yet as Gandhi reminded him after his conflict with the senior members of the Working Committee. From Madras Congress, held in December 1927, Nehru became the recognised spokesman of the Congress on foreign affairs, largely because others occupying comparable position with the congress were not nearly as interested in the subject as he. This thing is most important from the point of view of his future role as the maker of Indian Foreign Policy. (In 1936 the old guard readily granted Nehru's request for opening a foreign Department of the Congress and he appointed a young radical Rammanohar Lohia as its Secretary. Since then practically every resolution of the congress on Foreign affairs was inspired, drafted and piloted by Nehru). In 1927 a Foreign Affairs Department

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of the AICC was established under Jawaharlal Nehru.

Jawaharlal Nehru's interest in international affairs began seriously with his attending the Brussels international congress against colonial oppression and imperialism in 1927. He came in touch there with a number of distinguished radical intellectuals and political figures of the world, including delegates from China, Africa and Latin America and "his mind was receptive to Marxist and radical Ideas". The resolution on India, drafted by Nehru, expressed the hope that the Indian national movement would base its programme on the full emancipation of the peasants and workers of India and would cooperate with the movements for emancipation in other parts of the world. (2)

Although it was not present at the Brussels congress "it was the Soviet Union that now dominated Jawaharlal's mind, just as it had, in unseen presence, dominated the Brussels conference. He read all that he could lay his hands on books both by partisans and by critics, about developments and conditions in that country, and found much to admire. He believed that whatever in tradition of hostility between Britain and Russia, to a free India she would be no threat; and even if India were wholly opposed to communism she would have friendly relations with Russia". He played an active and dynamic role in the conference and came to be recognised as a leading figure in the fight against the forces of colonialism and imperialism. Since then there was no looking back for him. In later years, under his leadership, the congress articulated its views on foreign policy and international relations in

a manner which drew appalause and appreciation from all freedom loving peoples the world over. Even now, past and present generations of freedom fighters in Asia and Africa remember him and draw inspiration from his life and work. (3)

Soon after the Brussels congress Motilal and Jawaharlal Nehru, were invited to attend the tenth anniversary of the Soviet Revolution in November 1927. Jawaharlal Nehru was greatly impressed by what he saw and the result was his first published book "Soviet Russia" (1928), based on articles he wrote about his visit.

In Soviet Russia, Nehru criticised the "Sister nations" (meaning thereby the USA and European poets) who "cèaselessly sought to hamper and destroy the new Russia", which had the 'voices of humanity "with her and which had launched" one of the mightiest experiments in history".

Nehru's writings bear testimony to the fact that his "favourable impression" about the Soviet Union was due to the "Study of Marx and Lenin", which produced "a powerful effect" on his mind, as he himself admitted and helped him "to see history and current affairs in a new light".

It is worth mentioning here that Nehru's observations about Soviet Russia were by no means one sided. In many of his speeches and writings, he referred to things which "pained" him and with which he could only "disagree". But it is easily discernible from Nehru's writings that his appreciation of the Soviets far more

outweighed his criticisms about them. In Soviet Russia, Nehru witnessed "the great and fascinating unfolding of a new order and a new civilization". In his view "The Soviet Revolution and advanced human society by a great leap and had lit a bright flame, which could not be smothered."⁽⁴⁾

Nehru's views about the October Revolution, Lenin, his frequent references to Soviet Russia in his writings and speeches, his first visit to Soviet Union, his sympathetic attitude towards this country and his keen desire to learn from the Soviet experiments created friendly and favourable impressions in India about the Soviet Union.

The anti-fascist attitude of the INC during the Second World War was largely determined by Nehru, who was primarily responsible for the shaping of the international outlook of his party and for the very framing of its views on foreign policy as well.

It is important to note that as the Chief spokesman of ~~xxxx~~ the issue of Foreign Policy, Nehru expressed his deep anxiety over the ever-growing fascist menace in Europe a couple of years before the outbreak of the Second World War. While presiding over the Lucknow congress in April 1936, he referred to the division of the World into two camps - "The imperialist and the fascist on the one side, the socialist and Nationalist on the other", and pledged to take the side of the progressive forces of the world. Nehru had openly declared that "the only key to the solution of the world's problems and of India's problems

lies in Socialism". He called socialism "a new civilisation, radically different from the present capitalist order" and went on to add, "some glimpse we can have to this new civilisation in the territories of the USSR.

When the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union came Jawaharlal Nehru was in prison. He was released only on December 4. A broad based feeling of sympathy and solidarity with the Soviet people, who were fighting heroically with their ~~back~~ backs to the wall, swept through the country, cutting across party lines. Nehru associated himself with the newly formed friends of the Soviet Union organisation and sent through Krishna Menon in London a message of sympathy to Soviet Ambassador Ivan Maisky.

The Second World War ended and it sounded the death knell of colonialism and imperialism, which, however, were yet unwilling to give in. The historical experiences of both India and the USSR by this time had given them some common understanding of the basic world problems lying ahead. Despite turbulent political and military situation prevailing in Europe, the events of far-reaching magnitude taking place in the Indian sub-continent and the gradual emergence of India on the political scene did not escape the attention of the Soviets.

In April 1945, the Soviet delegate supported India's demand for full independence at the Sanfrancisco conference of the United Nations Organisation. The Indian and the Soviet delegates

held friendly and fruitful consultations with each other at the Paris peace conference. India drew the attention of the leading Soviet academicians. The INC was frequently praised as "the most influential" political party and a "progressive organisation" fighting for the emancipation of the country from the British Yoke. Dyakov observed that he was still "the most influential and popular leader" in India. In another article, he praised Nehru's assessment of the international situation and projected his image as a "progressive democrat". Pravda criticised the divide and rule policy of the cabinet Mission plan and later praised Nehru. (5)

Encouraged probably by the above mention favourable comments in the Soviet press, Nehru, who had already taken over as the vice-President of the Interim Government, and had paid eloquent tributes to the Soviet Union in the course of his broadcast from New Delhi on 7 September 1946, instructed K.P.S. Menon and V.K. Krishna Menon (India's delegates to the UNO) to establish contacts with foreign Minister V. M. Malotov, the leader of the Soviet delegation. After meeting Malotov in New York on 28 September 1946, V.K. Krishna Menon observed that he did not see any reason as to why the strongest feelings of friendship between India and the USSR should not form the permanent basis of closer Indo Soviet relations. Menon delivered Nehru's personal message to Malotov asking for assistance to meet the famine situation in India. The Indian delegate held preliminary talks with him in connection with the establishment of diplomatic relations with the USSR. Dyakov

Wrote in praise of the composition of Indian delegation to the UNO and paid tributes to Nehru.

Jawaharlal Nehru's visit to the US capital (11 October - 7 November 1949) led to some apprehensions. It is interesting to note that in April 1949, when the North Atlantic Treaty organisation was just taking shape, Senator Hubert Humphery urged the white House to bring India into the "Council of democratic world organisation" being formed by the US "around the frame work of the Atlantic pact". In May 1949, the US Government invited Nehru to visit Washington. Editorially welcoming the Indian Prime Minister's arrival in the US capital, New York Times wrote, "Washington wants India to be a bulwork against communism". "India is potentially a great counter weight to China" - it added. On 20 October, John Foster Dulles observed that the Indian Prime Minister could fill the role of a leader against anti-communist expansion drive in the far East. These comments in the US press attracted the attention of the Soviets. Referring to Nehru's visit to Washington, Dyakov noted that India, was sought to be used for the suppression of people's movement in Asia by turning her into a military base of the imperialists. Such Soviet reservation were based on such facts as that until 1949 the British commanders headed all the three wings of the fighting forces of Independent India, the continuance of several British Governors in the Indian provinces and the ~~xxxxx~~ predominant share of British capital in the Indian economy.

Pandit Nehru was wise enough to detect the patent unsoundness of American policy with regard to the containment of

communism. He expressed his opinion regarding this containment doctrine to president Truman, when he visited America in 1949. Another feature of the attitude of Nehru regarding the ~~ununderstanding~~ understanding of international communism is largely different from that of the West. Nehru did not regard the international communist movement led by Stalin as something monolithic. He perceived a fundamental difference between China led by Mao - Tse - Tung and Russia led by Stalin. He did not lump the two together as the west did. In the development of these understanding, the view of Tite, P. C. Joshi and M. N. Roy was of great help to Nehru. M. N. Roy even told Nehru that Mao would prove to be a Second Tite and Nehru believed it. The U.S.A. and her allied regarded Mao and Maoists as nothing but Stalin stooges when Nehru clearly understood the position of Maoists and Stalinists in international communist movement.

It was the distinctive contribution of Jawaharlal Nehru in the domestic sphere, and as a reflection thereof in foreign affairs too, to workout a consistent set of values which formed the basis of his policies at home and abroad. He was a liberal individualist in the sense that he believed in individual rights and freedom and in civil liberty. He was a socialist, and though he believed that equality should be enforced as a matter of policy and not merely as a right, he continued to cherish civil liberty and was unwilling to suppress dissent except when this was absolutely necessary. He did not therefore, approve of practices in some

socialist countries where he thought civil liberty was unduly restricted and dissent stifled.

As a socialist, Nehru believed in the planned development of the country and placed considerable reliance on the state owned public sector. In particular, he wanted India to be self-reliant. He was prepared to accept financial aid from foreign countries provided they were without "strings". Indeed, the First Five Year Plan warned us against excessive external assistance and stated that "External assistance is acceptable only if it carries no conditions, explicit or implicit, which might affect even remotely the countries ability to take an independent line in international affairs. It is no wonder therefore that he regarded the Indian struggle after independence for self-reliant development as a part of the struggle of all developing countries of the world, in Asia, Africa and Latin America, against racism and the new form which imperialism had taken, namely, neo-colonialism. His vision was of a resurgent Asia, no less than an Africa and Latin America, where each nation, equal and sovereign in its own right, development peacefully according to its own lights, free from interference of and domination by mere powerful nations.

It is often said, undoubtedly with some validity that the foreign policy of India after independence was shaped by Jawaharlal Nehru. And yet, this is only partially true, for foreign policy was not something conceived and shaped by Nehru after independence. It was merely a projection into foreign

affairs, into concrete international relations of the values developed and of national interests as perceived during years of freedom struggle. Undoubtedly, Nehru, next only to the Mahatma, had the major hand in developing these values and perceiving these interests, but they became built into the freedom movement as the dominant, if not the only, set of perceptions. When freedom came these were projected into foreign affairs, and came to be recognised as the foreign policy of the country. What really happened after independence was they were articulated and shaped in the context of the current international relations so that they could be implemented as the country's foreign policy. (6)

Thus we see that India's foreign policy was a logical continuation of Nehru's world outlook developed over many decades before independence. This was confirmed in 1954 when India and China signed the panchal Declaration, on the basis of five principles. Nehru's attitude towards the USSR was dictated by an independent appraisal of both western and Soviet policies and India's self-interest and he refused to be influenced by cold war propaganda against 'Communism', even at times when communists in India attacked his foreign policy and the Chinese attacked India in 1962. The Soviet Union on its part did not support China in 1962.

Since the 20th Congress of the CPSU, the Soviet Union was drawn closer to India's foreign policy perceptions. As is well known, the basic elements of India's foreign policy are opposition to colonialism and racism, non-alignment with military power blocs

and straining for world peace on the basis of co-existence of different systems and universal disarmament. The USSR shares with India these ideas and though it is the leader of Warsaw pact it has positively responded to many initiatives taken by the non-aligned movement for peace.

The emergence of India as an important factor in world affairs a factor for peace and justice in the result of Nehru's vision of India as a part of the world community. (7)

NEHRU AND NON-ALIGNMENT MOVEMENT

Non-alignment appeared in the international arena in the mid 1950's and continued to develop actively in the 60. The doctrine of non-alignment emerged soon after the first newly freed Asian countries began to elaborate the basic principles of their foreign policy.

The non-alignment doctrine, policy and movement owe their emergence to a whole number of external and internal factors. The victory of the allied coalition over German Nazism, Italian fascism and Japanese militarism in the second world war, in which the USSR played a decisive role, the emergence of the socialist system and the changed relationship between the forces of imperialism and those of socialism on a whole-wide scale influenced the development of colonial countries and the peoples. The appearance of the Non-aligned Movement was to a large extent brought about by the cold war unleashed by imperialist forces in the late 1940s,

while the doctrine itself was to a certain degree, a response to the cold war policy. The cold war waged by imperialists against the USSR and against the countries which had embarked on the path of socialist development was seen reinforced by the policy of the united states and other imperialist powers aimed at entangling the newly-freed Asian countries in various military political blocs hostile to the socialist state and to the growing national-liberation movement.

It was in this complicated international situation that the doctrine of non-alignment was evolved. The doctrine was formulated by the outstanding Indian statesman and first Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. He understood very well that the future of India and of any other newly freed country depended largely on its ability to take an independent position in the international arena. (8)

An important landmark in the development of the politic of non-alignment was the conference of Asian and African countries held in April 1955 in Bandung, Indonesia.

The Bandung conference was attended by 29 countries - 23 from Asia and six from Africa. Nehru played a significant role in Bandung conference.

The success of the conference was especially remarkable keeping in mind the fact that its participants were countries with different levels of economic development, representing various

political regimes and socio-political system. The principal achievement of the Bandung conference was the recognition by all the delegations of the need for solidarity among all newly freed Asian and African countries in order jointly to fight colonialism. The position taken by the Bandung conference towards the African people's struggle against colonialism was highly instrumental in accelerating the process of decolonisation in Africa. The participants ~~took~~ took a broad, constructive and far-reaching attitude to the problems of international cooperation and strove to impart to it a spirit of peaceful co-existence based on the panchsheel principles, which were known throughout the world by that time. A year before the Bandung conference, on April 1954, during a summit meeting of the leaders of ~~India~~ India and the peoples Republic of China, the panchsheel principles of peaceful co-existence were proclaimed. These included Mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference in one another's domestic affairs, equality, mutually beneficial cooperation and peaceful co-existence.

The Bandung principles partly codified the progressive and peace-loving aims of the foreign policy of newly-freed countries and laid the foundation for working out the principles of the nonalignment movement. The convening of the Bandung conference was actively supported by the USSR and other socialist countries. The Soviet Union welcomed the very idea of holding an Afro-Asian forum and hailed its results, regarding these as a manifestation of the growing political awareness and consolidation of Asian peoples against racial oppression and for strengthening political indepen-

dence relaxation of international tension and preservation of
 (9)
 peace on earth.

NEHRU AND THE POLICY OF NON-ALIGNMENT.

Nehru made a deep study of Indian philosophy while he was in prison in the forties, and came under the lasting influence of vedanta, though he disliked its supra social and divine moorings. He was also deeply influenced by modern European humanist philosophy. A devout nationalist freedom fighter and lover of the tradition and culture of his own society, he was at the same time a deeply committed internationalist, and visualised a unified mankind in a co-operative international order, often referred to by him as the ideal of one world.

Thus there were many different cross currents in Nehru's intellectual make up which in the opinion of his biographer, he was unable to synthesize into a coherent intellectual pattern. (10) But in fact Nehru never tried to reduce his ideas into a doctrinaire ideology, since it was his constant endeavour to avoid the dogmatic approach and adopt the scientific approach to social and political problems. Probably he considered it more rational to adopt a broad approach to national and international politics in which idealism and realism, the long view and the short, would be conciliated into an equilibrium, or as ~~the~~ close as approximation to it as circumstances would permit. So he tried to remain basically a realist to develop a powerful state structure in India including a strong economic infrastruc-

ture, armed forces a stable and viable constitutional and administrative system.

The concrete character of India's national interest is dependent on some basic factors as geography, economic development, political tradition domestic milieu and international milieu. A question naturally arise to what extent Nehru combine idealism and realism in formulating the policy of non-alignment along with basic determination.

So far as geography is concerned, Nehru frequently referred to the importance of India's location and size as a determinant of the policy of non-alignment.

Nehru argued, by virtue of location, India not only occupied a pivotal position in Asia but also a kind of meeting ground between the East and West. For this reason, she was in a position, if she followed an independent policy, to influence the course of Asian and world politics effectively and to ease international tension and promote World order. India's vast size also. Nehru often argued, dictated a policy of non-alignment. Such a big country with relatively abundant natural resources was a potentially big power in its own right, and could not be expected to be the camp follower of any other country or group of countries.

Jawaharlal Nehru was certainly one of the first and most important leader of a national liberation movement who apart from the communists understood the meaning of the rise of fascism and the menace that it represented not just to democracy but also to

anti-imperialist freedom battles. His international connections as a leader of the Indian National Congress took him as a delegate to the league of struggle against imperialism conference in 1927. Where his colleagues were Ho Chi Minh, ~~And~~ Albert Einstein, Soong Ching Ling and others. It took him to the Soviet Union as far back as full six decades ago. It made him establish contacts with the communist international, the ward party in Egypt, the Kuemintang and the communist party in China, the nationalist movements in Indonesia, Burma and Srilanka. It made him travel to Spain to express solidarity with the anti-fascist Republican Government. It was his influence, above all, that made the famous quit India Resolution of August 1942 itself express solidarity with the Soviet Union and China then engaged in mortal combat with Nazi Germany and imperialist Japan.

Thus, for pandit Nehru the basic point was not only the geographical or the geopolitical location of country but the inter connection of our national liberation movement with the global revolutionary process. At the same time his sensitive historical sense made him aware of the Asian dimensions of our historically evolved ~~max~~ identity and the potential of continental anti-imperialism.

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In his report to the all India Congress committee on the Brussels congress, he referred "the rising imperialism of the united States" and predicted that US imperialism would in future be a greater danger than British imperialism and that the

two might even combine in order to dominate the world. The same year he paid a visit to the Soviet Union with father on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Russian Revolution. Although this visit lasted only four days and was confined to Moscow, Nehru was deeply impressed by what he saw. On his return to India he moved radical resolutions at the Madras Congress, published a book entitled "Soviet Russia", containing the impressions of his visit, and toured the length and breadth of the country making fiery near communist speeches, which almost led to a rupture with Gandhi, in 1929 Gandhi strongly backed him for the presidentship of congress- presumably in order to prevent him from going over to the extreme left.

(12)

After the achievement of Independence India was faced with the gigantic task of rebuilding its vast economy as quickly as possible. Nehru believed that it is only possible through a strong foreign policy. He went to the extent of saying that in the ultimate analysis foreign policy was the outcome of economic policy. The relatively conciliatory followed by him towards China and Pakistan, were also largely due to the fact that he had assigned top priority to India's economic development and regarded peace on the borders as an essential precondition for it. The path taken by India for her economic development has been characterised by mixed economy in the context of the somewhat syncretistic ideology of democratic socialism, also made it necessary for India to secure economic aid from both of the mutually opposed political and ideological blocs. Nehru had realised, in other words, that non-alignment

was a logical necessity from the point of view of India's economic development. (13)

It is obvious that the policy of non-alignment was closely related with the domestic milieu. In 1969 Nehru explained this relationship by saying that "The internal policy and foreign policy of a country affect each other. They should, broadly, be in line with each other, and have to be ~~interna~~ integration". (14) The bulk of the Indian people would have regarded an alliance with either of the two power blocs as a betrayal of the Indian freedom movement, and as the Prime Minister and foreign Minister of a democratic State Nehru could not afford to ignore this basic fact. The policy of non-alignment was in fact a great harmonizer of conflicting domestic interests. During Nehru era the policy of non-alignment effectively promoted the national political integration. It would perhaps not be an-exaggeration to say that this policy gave the people of India in general a certain role-feeling and sense of purpose in world politics. During Nehru era the principle of non-alignment was accepted by all the segments of the people though there was some differences of opinion regarding particular aspects of foreign policy.

The given international milieu during Nehru era, considers that a policy of non-alignment is the only possible rational policy for India. The diplomacy of the big powers, the logic of nuclear weapons, the united nations, the emergence of Asia and Africa, and the rise of Pakistan and communist China all combined to make it imperative for India to play an Independent role in interna-

tional politics for promoting a better world order which would serve not only India's national interest, but also that of International system as a whole. Nehru was quite right when he said in 1960 that "so far as India was concerned, placed as she was historically and geographically, it would have been quite astonishingly foolish to fall into this business of the cold war, either on grounds of principle or on grounds of expediency." (15) His relatively idealistic view of internationalism is also proved by his frequent reference to the ideal of one world, his dedication to the United Nations and his constant, almost monotonous theme of world peace. Anti-imperialism and anti-racialism, according to him, constituted the kernel of his foreign policy and were undoubtedly major determinants of the policy of non-alignment.

Nehru has disclaimed any personal credit for the policy of non-alignment in his own words ; "It is completely incorrect to call our policy" Nehru policy. It is incorrect because all that I have done is to ~~take~~ give voice to that policy. I have not originated. It is a policy inherent in the circumstances of India, inherent in the past thinking of India, inherent in the whole mental outlook of India, inherent in the conditioning of the Indian mind during our struggle for freedom and inherent in the circumstances of the world to day.

Nehru's view is correct in the sense that a policy of non-alignment was logically indicated by the basic determinants of India's foreign policy. But it is wrong ~~that~~ in the equally

important sense that what was logical was not inevitable; it has never been so in the history of international relations. It requires a rational statesman to see the logical implications of given facts and situation for policy decisions and to act upon them. History would not otherwise abound with irrational decisions on the part of Statesman. In this sense Nehru was personally responsible for the policy of non-alignment.

Nehru has characterised Indian foreign policy as that of non-alignment. According to him it has two aspects. On the one hand it avoids cold war and on the other hand it enables ~~exists~~ India to act as it thinks best. He believed that non-alignment is an independent and positive policy which is definite and dynamic. By non-alignment he means only non-alignment with either of the two military blocks non-alignments is not isolation from what concerns freedom in any part of the world. As the Nehru proclaimed "where freedom is menaced or justice ~~threaten~~ threaten or where aggression takes place. We can not be and shall not be neutral."
(16)

Nehru considered the principles of non-alignment is the only solution of world problems. When all nations are trying to find their shelter under the umbrella of super-powers this principle might give a nation an avenue to come out from super-power rivalry.

NEHRU'S PREFERENCE FOR MAO'S CHINA

Relations with the peoples Republic of China continued to develop leading to the signing of ~~the famous~~ famous panchshila agreement was based on a profound sympathy and even affinity with the Chinese Revolution. It was also based on the view that revolutionary China would not necessarily be always ~~together~~ together with the Soviet Union but would strikeout along its own independent path which could also be influenced by Chauvinism. (17)

Nehru did not commit the mistake of regarding Mao's as a stooges of Stalin. He rather regarded his as an Asian leader having some liberal humanist trends in him. That is why Nehru liked to work in co-operation with Mao more than with Stalin. So, Nehru tried to explore the ground for a united front of Afro-Asian states leading to panchashila doctrines and the Bandung conference. The Bandung politics essentially made a militant anti-colonial and anti imperialist united front of Afro-Asian States from which the Soviet Union was to be keptout. These were the days of Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai.

But it was too hot a politics for Nehru. After the rise of Khrushchev, a process of De-Stalinisation began in the USSR and Nehru enthusiastically moved forward towards Khrushchev, sign an ~~an~~ opportunity of building bridges of understanding between the two super powers. The Indian policy makers build the relationship with the communist powers exactly in this order - China first, in the 50's leading to 1954 friendship agreement,

Then Soviet Union in 1955 and massive Soviet help during the 2nd Five year plan and latter Eastern Europe in the 60's. This is how India's relationship grow with ~~these~~ three segments of socialist camp.

Nehru was successful enough in helping both contesting Joints of the Communist camp - The Soviet Union by giving up the Bundung line of militant opposition to imperialism and exclusion of Soviet Union from Afro-Asian politics by stressing that the basic issues before mankind was that of peace or war which he advocated from the Balgrade meet. Being intolerant of communist experiments in Kerala, Nehru began to ~~condem~~ condemn the Chinese line of militant and violent overthrow of bourgeoisie imperialist rule wherever it existed. Finding Khrushchev less perturbed over the dismissal of Kerala ministry. Nehru took a taff line on border issues with the Chinese. Though he himself did not plan to go to a large scale war with China. He was not at all in a mood to tolerate Chinese presence near the border of India. So he ordered his troops to clear out the Chinese. Thus began the armed confrontation between India and China on the borders. That is how the process of domestic reconstruction got stalled by Nehru and he took up the policy of large scale military build up in India. Nehru left the Indian seen when this shift in the domestic and foreign policy occurred. The relation of India came to be closer when Soviet Union took imaginative initiative in South Asian politics by proping up the Indian ~~Stand~~ Stand rather than the Chinese. Nehru did not live longer to reap to fruits of these New Policy.

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3. Ibid., p. 44.
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11. Haksar P.N. op.cit., p. 55.
12. Bandyopadhyaya, J - op.cit., p. 228.
13. Ibid., p. 1.
14. Ibid., p 83.
15. Ibid., p. 4.
16. Ibid., p. 255.
17. Haksar P. N. (Ed.) op.cit., p. 56.

INDO - SOVIET COOPERATION ECONOMIC

India is struggling to build a relatively self-reliant capitalist system in the context of collective neo-colonialism and the growing role of the socialist countries in world affairs. A little elaboration is required to highlight the specific strategies adopted by India to develop a relatively self-reliant capitalist system. First, the Indian state is the motive force of capitalist development of India. During the last four decades, the Indian state through a system of economic planning has mobilised domestic resources to establish the industrial, scientific and technological base for capitalist development. Second, the state sector is the major vehicle of industrial and agricultural development of India. Third, the strategies of development followed during the last four decades have broken economic stagnation by integrating agricultural and industry in the overall framework of capitalist national market.

Two factors are responsible for deepening of friendship and cooperation between India and the Soviet Union. First, the material transformation of India was the basic agenda of the ruling classes but this was not their sole concern. Second, the material transformation of India was linked with the strengthening of national sovereignty and not by the opening of India to imperialism. In achieving these two inter-related goals, the Indian ruling classes looked positively towards the Soviet Union. Further, the patriotic masses of India would not have allowed the Indian

ruling classes to convert the country to neo-colonial penetration and exploitation. In spite of many ups and downs, Indo-Soviet friendship is based on large scale popular support in India and this has facilitated the growing cooperation between the two countries. (1) The successful visits of Jawaharlal Nehru to the USSR and of Nikita Khrushchev to India were turning points in Indo-Soviet relations. They brought the Indian and the Soviet people closer to each other.

Soviet aid to India began against the background of dramatic circumstances. India first approached Britain and other Western countries for assistance, particularly for the construction of a steel plant. This was denied on the ground that India had taken the wrong path of development. It was said that India did not have resources and technological competence. It was at this time that the Soviet Union agreed to assist India in its industrialisation. (2)

The two countries began engaging in large scale economic cooperation back in the 1950s. Though the Soviet Union was still facing tremendous difficulties due to the need to restore its war-ravaged economy. It was the first state to offer India aid in the development of heavy industries in the state sector of the economy.

Attaching exceptional importance to this aid, Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first Prime Minister said :

"I should imagine that two tests of the progress of

a nation are : how much iron and steel and how much power it is producing. I would say it is essential to have heavy industry even for preserving your freedom and independence. (3)

However, one must note that though there was no major Indo-Soviet agreement on economic matters in the early period., the first step in trade was already taken in December 1940 with the Soviet offer of certain capital goods and by signing the border trade deal in April 1949. This was followed up in 1950 when an agreement on sea communications was signed and by a barfer trade agreement in June 1951 with the Soviet Union for supplying wheat in exchange of Indian tea, tobacco and Jute. On December 2, 1953 the two countries signed their first eever long-term trade agreement which was valid for Five Years. But we still had no agreement with the Soviet Union for securing assistance in our industrialisation programme. The first five year plan of India was as is known, oriented towards agriculture, as per Western prescription. The idea touted was : carry on an improve agriculture, and the west will help in our industrial needs. (4)

The baneful effect of the lopsided first five year plan was perceived quickly and the task of rapid industrialisation was undertaken which found expression in the second five year plan. And already before the first plan ended, negotiations were taken up with the Western sources for the establishment of steel plants in our country in the public sector. In this, India received a shock from the Western countries, instead of assistance.

The Western companies were not anxious to help us build the steel industry, and if at all it had to be done, it could be only small ones and that too at their terms. For example, the West German Krupp and Demag wanted 12 percent interest plus a share in the equity and that too for a half a million tonne plant. The British went on hedging and the Americans showed no interest. They did not want India to become self reliant in steel. (5)

The central issue is how far has the Indo-Soviet cooperation helped and facilitated the development of self reliant capitalism in India. A few facts may be mentioned here. First, beginning with 1953, there is no looking back of Indo-Soviet economic cooperation. Second, the Soviet cooperation has facilitated India in the development of heavy and basic industries. Third, the rupee barter trade between India and the Soviet Union has been on the increase. Fourth the Soviet cooperation has been extended to India in the field of training of scientists and development of crucial areas of technology in the fields of steel, coal and oil exploration. Fifth, the foreign credits extended by the Soviet Union to India are at a nominal rate of interest of 2.5 percent and these credits are repayable by India in its own currency. (6)

The agreement to build the Bhilai Steel Plant, signed on 2 February, 1955 heralded the beginning of the era of Indo-Soviet economic cooperation which has gone on expanding with the passage of time. The importance of the enterprises built with Soviet economic and technical help is clear from the fact that they contribute

40 percent of steel production, 35 percent of oil production and account for more than 10 percent of electricity generation. When completed they will be responsible for 53 percent of oil refining and 41 percent of coal mining capacity. The total permanent direct employment opportunities provided by Indo-Soviet projects amount to more than 1.6 lakh. (7)

The Soviet Union and Bhilai agreement helped us for the first time to beat back the neo-colonial moves of Western powers and challenge their enorous terms. For the first time again Bhilai marked the beginning of India's path towards the attainment of self beginning of India's path towards the attainment of self reliance, a march towards economic independence.

Massive economic assistance was received by the public sector in all fields of industry and agriculture. This was the time when the industrial policy resolution of 1956 was adopted in India. Soviet assistance covered 10 out of 17 industries. Which were established through this policy. These included iron and steel, heavy castings and forgings of iron and steel, heavy machinery and plant required for iron and steel production, for mining, for machine tool manufacture and for such other basic industries which would be specified by the Government, heavy electrical plant, coal and lignite, mineral oils, mining of iron or mining and processing of copper, lead, zinc, tin, etc. aircraft, and power. (8)

The USSR's economic and technical assistance was

above all intended to facilitate the creation of a modern industrial base for India's economy within the shortest possible period of time. In accordance with the strategy of development laid down in India's five-year plans, Soviet aid in the 1950s and 1960s was mainly concentrated on the creation of heavy industries that would be engaged in the manufacture of means of production, metal-making (54 percent) engineering (12 percent), oil extraction (16 percent) power generation (14 percent) and coal mining (2 percent).

According to M. Sobastian, an Indian economist, during the period of accelerated industrialisation (i.e. during the Second and third five-year plan periods, 1956-1966), the USSR's aid accounted for approximately 50 percent of the basic investment in state sector industries and for about 60 percent of the investment in India's heavy industry. ⁽⁹⁾

Soviet aid (about 90 percent) went to build India's public sector, mainly basic and heavy industries. But aid from the West was largely used for the import of essential seeds. The contribution of Western aid to industrial development was marginal. However, from the sixties Western private investment began to rise.

From the very outset, India was able to see certain advantages in the economic and trade relations with the Soviet Union. To enumerate : 1) India imported only necessary items at comparable prices and matching quality. It was not bound to accept a package of items as in the case of Western aid. (2) India secured

technology, technical know how and capital goods on long-term credits, repayable through the export of goods, giving the USSR no residual right in the enterprises. (3) India exported new items of manufactures, which otherwise faced stiff competition in the Western countries. For instance, footwear, hand-tools, fruit juices, thermosflasks, surgical products, pharmaceuticals, Knitwear and many other goods. Sales of these items to the Soviet market enabled India to improve their quality and export them to the West later. (4) The unit price fetched for exports to the USSR was more often higher than what India could set elsewhere (incidentally this had a stabilising effect on the world prices of these products), (5) Exports to the USSR helped to bring about a spurt in production of cash crops, like Cotton, Cashew, Coffee and many others, (6) Trade with the USSR helped to promote planning and discipline in India's foreign trade, (7) It enabled import essential equipment and raw materials against rupee payment and (8) India was able to conserve its precious foreign exchange.

Soviet military assistance began even before the India-China conflict of 1962, since then Soviet military aid to India has been substantial, for example, supply of military ~~planes~~ planes and assistance to build a MIG factory, the supply of tanks and submarines and others. Normally, military aid involves only the sale of ornaments but in India, the Soviet Union showed willingness to not only supply the items but also to create production facilities. The western world was not so ready to do so till the late seventies.

The following table shows the capacities either build or were being built by 1965.

Gross Annual Capacities created

Industries	Capacities
Sum	
Steel	4.9 million tonnes
Steel castings and forgings	50,000 tonnes
Heavy equipment production (Metallurgical, Mining and others)	1,00,000 tonnes
Oil refining	6 million tonnes
Coal	9.2 million tonnes
Iron ore	6.5 million tonnes
Oil exploration	6.5 million tonnes
Electric power (hydel and Tharmal)	3 million KW
Electric power equipment	3.2 million KW
Antibiotics	290 tonnes
Synthetic drugs (Finished goods)	850 tonnes
Synthetic drugs (Chemicals)	4500 tonnes
Surgical instruments	2.5 million pieces
Precision instruments	Rs. 20 crore worth
Aluminium products	1 lakh tonnes

The Soviet contribution to the public sector capacity was substantial by 1965. For example in steel it was over 40 percent, in power generation over 20 percent, in the production of

heavy equipment about 80 percent, oil production about 80 percent, oil refining about 40 percent, coal over 10 percent, As for drugs and pharmaceuticals, the public sector medical industry was ~~xxxxx~~ largely a Soviet contribution at this stage.

The following are some of the major projects which were built with Soviet assistance during the Nehru era.

Steel

Bilai Steel Plant.

Power

Neyveli Thermal power station.

Korba Thermal power station.

Obra Thermal power station.

Bhakra Right Bank Hydro power station.

Oil refinery

Baruini Oil refinery

Keyali Oil refinery

Oil exploration

Ankleshwar Oil field

Cambay Gas field.

Oil and Gas prospecting in Gujrat.

(Kalal, Sanand, Navagam, Kasamba, Olpad).

Oil and Gas prospecting in Karaikal, Purnea off-shore seismic survey for oil in West Coast and Madras Coast.

Engineering

Ranchi Heavy Machine Building Plant.

Durgapur Coal mining Machinery Plant.

Hardwar Heavy Electrical Equipment Plant.

Kerba Central Electrical and Mechanical Workshop.

Kota precision instrument.

Pharmeceuticals

Madras surgical instruments plant

Rishikesh Antibiotics plant.

Hyderabad Synthetic drugs plant.

Durgapur ophthalmic glass factory.

Mining

Korba coal mines (3)

Kathara coal washery

Agricultural

Suratgarh Central Mechanised Farm

Jetsar Central Mechanised farm

Training

Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay Central Engineering and Design Bureau.

Soviet economic aid to India began at a critical phase in India's development, when India had already exhausted its sterling balances held in London. The Soviet aid was, therefore, timely, and in a way ~~amazing~~ spectacular in impact. The Soviet credits amounted to about Rs. 1000 crore by 1964.

In December 1953, the Soviet Union and India signed their first five-year trade agreement. The USSR and India have signed a total of Seven long term trade agreements which cover the

period from 1954 to 1990. In 1965, the Soviet Union took 84 per cent of the export of Indian garments, 68 percent of woolen knitwear, 61 percent of fruit juices, 47 percent of leather footwear and 46 percent of accumulators.

The rate of increase of Soviet purchases from India was much higher than the rate of increase of Soviet imports as a whole from the developing countries. Thus while the Soviet imports as a whole from developing countries rose to 152.6 percent by 1965. (10) imports from India rose by 275 percent.

INDO-SOVIET MILITARY COOPERATION : Primary State.

The international situation changed radically after that and the rivalry between England and Russia was substituted by that between the USA and the Soviet Union, but there were two elements of continuity in Nehru's perception. Scepticism about fears spread by the West about Soviet designs, which were regarded as highly exaggerated and conviction about a certain complementarity of interests between India and the Soviet Union. This perception was strengthened by Moscow's vigorous espousal of the causes that were dearest to the emerging countries of the world and was particularly reinforced by its support to India on vital national issues. India was virtually wholly dependent on the sympathetic attitude of the Soviet Union in the security council to obviate the adoption by the council of totally hostile resolutions that were sought to be moved by the Western countries on the Kashmir issue. This was followed in 1955 by unequivocal Soviet

acceptance of the position that Kashmir was an integrate part of India. Also indispensable was the Soviet aid in developing a heavy industrial complex in India. Then came the Soviet refusal to accept the Chinese arguments and position on the conflict with India and its criticism of China for the armed action against India in the Winter of 1962. (11)

At the sametime Moscow offered for the first time assistance in the field of military hardware. The offer to help set up a MIG manufacturing plant in India was not with drawn. This resulted in an agreement signed on september 11, 1964 for the supply of defence equipment to India. It was claimed by the Defence Minister in a statement in Rajya Sabha on September 21 that there were no strings attached to the Soviet Military assistance. The supply of military weapons by Moscow was to assume highly significant ~~proportions~~ proportions later. Although this was a beginning, in time to come, Moscow became an indispensable source of supply of military weapons not available elsewhere.

India was among the first third world countries the Soviet Union offered military hardware. That was in 1954. The offer was not taken up at the time, but in the late 1950s a squadron of IL-14 transport aircraft was inducted by the IAF. In 1960, for the first time, the Border Road Development Board contracted for MI-4 helicopters, AN-12 aircrafts and some engineering equipment. In the first week of August 1962 the MIG deal was signed. In August 1964, Fresh contracts were negotiated for three squadrons

of MIG-21 interceptors, plant and machinery for the proposed MIG plant, PT-76 amphibious and 130 medium guns. The financial terms for the purchases were made more advantageous to India and the repayment was to be adjusted within the trade exchange between the ~~two~~ two countries. Under the agreement of 1962, a MIG complex was set up under the Hindustan Air crafts Ltd. (Later Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd.) at Nasik (where the air frame would be fabricated) and Hyderabad (where the avionics factory would be located).⁽¹²⁾

There was, of course, a hue and cry in the country and abroad over India's decision to buy Soviet equipment. The western propaganda was that India had abandoned its non-alignment and gone into the Soviet camp. The US which had always considered the movement "immoral" put forward the pernicious concept of "equidistance" between the Great powers as a true indicator of "genuine non-alignment".

The concept envisaged an "equal" treatment to be meted out to the Great powers by any of the developing countries which sought to forge close relations with the Soviet Union. Translated into practical terms it would mean that if you buy a certain weapons system from the Soviet Union orders must also be placed for equipment from the US to establish ~~some~~ bonafides in the eyes of the powers that be in Washington. Some countries have been taken in by this but Jawaharlal Nehru rejected it outright and was quite categorical in his rejection of the concept of equidistance. He maintained that no sovereign, independent country could agree to

the proposition that India's purchase of aircraft or other equipment could be voted by another country. (13)

A factor which obtruded upon India's efforts to buy Western defence equipment was the en-going agitation in Goa for the overthrow of portuguese colonialism and a return to Indian Suzereinty. Portugal was a member of NATO and just as the US would pander to Pakistani predilections because it was a member of CENTO and SEATO on the Kashmir issue so also Wishington refused see the anachronism of a "metropolitan area" of portugal on Indian ~~xxxx~~ soil. John Fester Dulles Never tired to pointing out that "the whole, world knew" that Goa had been a part of Portugal for the past four hundred years. Thus the US had two reasons to hesitate to sell arms to India or help in any way to enable it to achieve its goal of self-reliance in defence production.

1964 Defence Minister Y.B. Chavan visited the US to try and persuade it to sell the F-104 star fighters but to no avail. On a visit to Moscow, however, another major deal was struck for more MIG aircraft to be paid for in rupees generated through the export of Indian goods over a period of 10 years at 2 percent interests.

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KASHMIR CRISIS AND THE SOVIET UNION

Peace in Kashmir was disturbed on 21 October when Pakistan tribesmen numbering about 50,000 invaded the State and within a few day's started heading towards the valley. The whole of Kashmir was thus subjected to wanton act of aggression, openly aided and abetted by the regular fighting forces of Pakistan. The Maharaja of Kashmir, Hari Singh, who had not earlier acceded either to India or to Pakistan, signed the instrument of ~~the~~ accession on 26 October and thus Jammu and Kashmir became an inalienable part of the Union of India.

On 1st January 1948, the Government of India referred the Kashmir question to the security council. There was a lengthy debate in the council on 15 January during which India claimed her "legal, constitutional and moral responsibility" in Kashmir and asked for self-determination in the state. In its statement before the council, the Government of Pakistan clearly admitted that "a certain number of independent tribesmen and persons from Pakistan are helping as volunteers the Azad Kashmir Government in their struggle for liberty". The representative of Pakistan, however, called for the council's intervention and formation of a UN committee. At a meeting of the council held on 17 January, Andrei Gromyko, representing the USSR observed : "..... the whole question should be adopted as soon as possible on the substance of the question in order to rectify and improve the situation in Kashmir and to settle relations between India and Pakistan.

On 22 January, the security council changed the

Kashmir question into an Indo-Pak question at the request of Pakistan. India was not even consulted. The Soviet delegate opposed this change on the ground that the council's president did not have the right to alter an item on the agenda without a formal decision of the whole body. The US delegate, however, supported the action of the president. (1)

In subsequent security council debates also the Soviet Union came out fully in support of the Indian stand and opposed US and UK attempts to impose their "Solution" of Kashmir on India which as Soviet delegate Jacob Malik put it, was "annexationist and imperialist in character and sought to convert the Indian state in to an 'Anglo-American colony', a "Protectorate of the US and the UK under the garb of democratic phraseology" and "a military and strategic base". (2)

The Soviet delegate, Jacob Malik, in the council's meeting held on 17 January 1952 described asThe purpose of these plans is interference by the United States and the United Kingdom in the internal affairs of Kashmir, the prolongation of the dispute between India and Pakistan into a protectorate of the United states and the United Kingdom under the pretext of rendering it "assistance through the United Nations". Finally, the purpose of these plans in connection with Kashmir is to secure the introduction of Anglo-American troops into the territory of Kashmir and convert Kashmir into an Anglo-American colony and a military strategic base

He added The USSR Government considers that the Kashmir question can be resolved successfully only by giving the people of Kashmir an opportunity to decide the question of Kashmir's constitutional status by themselves, without outside interference. This can be achieved if that status is determined by a constituent Assembly democratically elected by the Kashmir people. Such a solution of the Kashmir question would be in harmony with the principles and purpose of the United Nations charter and, in particular, with Article-I there of which lays down that it is one of the purpose of the United Nations "to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self determination of peoples"⁽³⁾.

The Soviet delegate's long speech was dubbed as "truly astonishing" by the U.S. and the British delegates. Gladcoyn Jebb, the delegate of UK, brushed aside the aforesaid arguments of the Soviet representative as "extraordinary fantasies" and alleged that the Soviet Union was unduly governed by low level poisonous mists of suspicion".

From the above discussion on Kashmir in the security council it becomes clear that the main thrust of Soviet argument was on the resolution of the conflict through bilateral ~~effort~~ efforts without any outside intervention. In the security council meeting referred to above, the Soviet delegate took a very active part in the deliberations and opposed the demilitarization plans of the West on the ground of induction of Western military presence in sensitive area, close to Soviet borders. From the very

beginning of the conflict, pravda and Izvestia kept on criticizing the West for poking its nose in the affairs of Kashmir. (4)

Soviet support to India on the question of Kashmir, which was raised again in the security council in February 1957 at the request of Pakistan, became rather more pronounced.

In the security council meeting held on 24 January 1957, a Five power draft resolution, sponsored by Australia, Columbia, Cuba UK and USA was moved. The Soviet delegate tried his best to counteract the efforts of Pakistan's friends in the security council. He opposed the draft resolution for its failure. Sobolev, the delegate of the USSR, alleged that "these powers were guided primarily by their own interests, which were aimed at penetration into this region as one of great strategic importance". Referring then to the series of actions taken by the constituent Assembly of Kashmir with regard to the integration of this state with the Union of India, he declared that (5) "The Kashmir question was thus settled by the Kashmir people themselves who consider themselves to be an inalienable part of the Republic of India. The security council can not disregard these facts". (6)

In the council's meeting held on 18 February, the Soviet delegate suggested amendments to the draft resolution and strongly opposed any proposal regarding demilitarization and plebiscite in Kashmir". The charter does not provide for the use of UN forces to impose by force a plebiscite in any country" - he declared.

In another meeting of the council, held on 20 February, the Soviet delegate again supported "direct approach" of bilateral negotiations and set aside any attempt at demilitarization and plebiscite in Kashmir with the help of the UN forces. He argued that Article 42 of "the UN charter encouraged only one task for armed forces of the United nations : that of repelling aggression and restoring international peace in this or that part of the world". The Soviet delegate again suggested several amendments to the draft resolution.

The Soviet amendments to the draft resolution, referred to above, were put to vote in the second meeting held on 20 February. The Soviet delegate naturally voted for, the representatives of Cuba and philipines against and the rest of the members of the council abstained. Then the draft resooution sponsored by the UK, USA, Cuba and Australia was put to vote. Sweden abstained, the Soviet Union used her first veto on the issue of Kashmir in the security council and all other members voted for. Due to the negative vote of the Soviet Union, the draft resolution failed of adoption. (7)

The Soviet delegate took part a long debate for same issue, which were held on 5 November, He said ".....As is well known, in September 1951 the first general election was held in Kashmir for the purpose of establishing a constituent Assembly. In February 1954 that Assembly unanimously ractified the accession of Kashmir to India and in November 1956 it adopted a State cons-

titution formulizing the Status of Kashmir as a self-governing state within the Republic of India. In March 1957, the population of Kashmir, together with all the peoples of India, participated in election to the Indian parliament and also elected a legislative assembly of their own State By now it should be clear to every one that the people of Kashmir have decided their own destiny once and for all, that they regard Kashmir as an inalienable part of the Republic of India and that they do not want any interference in their affairs by any self appointed guardians. (8)

The delegate of the USSR again took the floor on 21 November, referring to the British draft resolution calling upon araham to renew his effort and make recommendations which implied demilitarization in Kashmir, he blamed the USA "For penetration into the strategically important ~~xxxx~~ area of Kashmir". He urged the security council not to disregard the Indian Governments statement that the draft resolution under consideration was unacceptable to it. "The USSR delegation can not support the draft resolution" - he stressed in conclusion and threatened to use his veto in case it would be put to vote.

In ~~his~~ view fo the strong opposition of the Soviet delegate to the draft proposal under discussion, sponsored by UK, USA and others, the Swedis delegate amended it in the security council meeting held on 2 December. In Soviet view, this amended draft resoolution was also not favourable and hence when the voting on this issue took place, her delegate abstained.

Three main factors appear to have promoted the Soviets to take recourse to the exercise of veto on the Kashmir issue. Pakistan's active participation in the US sponsored military alliances aimed at the USSR and her military bases in the strategically important area adjacent to the Soviet border liked Moscow. Secondly, the Soviet took into account the finality of Kashmir's integration with India, which had taken place through a constitutional procedure and confirmed further in democratically held elections in the State. Finally, the induction of UN troops into a state for the purpose of facilitating plebiscite against the will of a party concerned was contrary to the charter itself and hence the Soviets used their veto on the Kashmir issue. (9)

It was on the Kashmir issue that the Soviet Union provided in the acrimonious UN debates in the security council the much necessary moral and diplomatic support that India ~~needed~~ needed in its early years of independence and during its initial exposure to the international community. Particularly significant and crucial Soviet support in the UN security council came in 1952 and then again in February 1957 when Soviet veto saved India's prestige and interest in its hour of need, at a time when a Western sponsored resolution was being adopted for the induction of a UNO force for arranging a plebiscite Soviet veto again saved the situation for India in 1962. However a turning point in Indo-Soviet relations took place in 1955, when Khrushchev and Bulganin during their historic visit to this country unequivocally declared that Kashmir was an integral part of India. The Soviet support outside the United nations and the threat or the use of veto inside the

security council acted as an umbrella against determined Western pressure in favour of Pakistan and to the detriment of India. (10)

MOSCOW'S SUPPORT FOR GOA'S LIBERATION

India got full threatened support of the Soviets during the liberation of Goa in December 1961. Incidentally the Chairman of the presidium of the supreme Soviet, Leonid Brezhnev was on a visit to India, when events in Goa took place. While speaking at a civic reception held in his honour at Bombay on 17 December, he saluted the step that was taken by India and viewed it with full understanding and sympathy. Soviet support to India on the issue of Goa became more pronounced in the meeting of the security council held on 18 December 1961, Zorin, the Soviet delegate, raised objection against the very adoption of the agenda. (11)

The Soviet delegation can not agree with that evaluation and can not regard that letter as a basis for a discussion of the question by the security council. In its opinion, the situation in territories which are part of a Sovereign state can not, under the charter be a subject for consideration by any United Nations body, including the security council. The present matter, in our view, is one which false exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of India, because Goa and the other portuguese colonies in Indian territory can not be regarded as other than temporarily under the colonial demination of portugal. These territories are linked with the Indian Union by reason of their geographical position and by their history, culture, lan-

guage and traditions. They were wrested from the Indian state at the time when the (European) countries were establishing their colonial empires, and we can but marvel at the patience shown by the people of India with regard to those hotbeds of colonialism in their territory.

Therefore the question submitted by the representative of Portugal can not be the basis for a discussion of the whole problem in the security council. (12)

This was the issue on which the entire Western world was, as it were, up-in-arms against India, assailing it in the UN Fora for duplicity, Treachery, and a fall from its own declared Gandhian principles of non-violence etc. The Western attack on India in effect provided support and legitimacy to the dubious portuguese colonialism, which justified its tenacious hold on Goa, Diu and Daman on the so-called 'historic claim' of acquisition rights granted to it by a medieval papal Bul and to its right of annexation and conquest in the age of gun-boat diplomacy. It was the forthright Soviet political and diplomatic support for India's liberation of its own territory of Goa (recognized by several analysts as India's first major act of political maturity in the realm of real politic), culminating in the Soviet veto in the security council debate in 1961, that helped India is one of the most difficult phases of its diplomatic existence. (13) When a vote on this procedural matter was taken, the ceylonese and Soviet delegates stood against it. UAR and Liberia abstained while all others voted

for the adoption of the agenda.

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In the course of discussions that followed, US delegate Adlai Stevenson referred to India's action in Goa and expressed his deep "anxiety for the future of this organisation". He went to the extent of even comparing India's action in Goa to aggressive action Korea and Suez Canal. The US delegate demanded immediate cease fire in Goa, withdrawal of armed forces from the area and negotiations between Portugal and India. Patrick Dean, the British delegate, also felt "shocked" and "dismayed" on Indian's action in Goa and quoted the British secretary of state for foreign affairs who had already regretted it.

In the next meeting of the Council, the French delegate termed India as an aggressor. At this meeting of the Council, two draft resolutions were presented. The US sponsored draft resolution deplored the use of force by India in Goa, Daman and Diu. It demanded cease fire, withdrawal up to the position ~~ax~~ of status quo and peaceful negotiations with the assistance of the UN secretary General. Another draft resolution presented by Ceylon, UAR and Liberia, sought "to reject the Portuguese complaint of aggression against India and to call upon ~~ptx~~ Portugal to terminate hostile action to cooperate with India in the liquidation of her colonial possessions in India. First the Ceylonese draft resolution was put to vote. Ceylon, Liberia, UAR and USSR voted for, others against when the US sponsored draft resolution was put to vote, the Soviet delegate voted against it along

with three ~~xxxx~~ others, referred to above. Due to the negative vote of the USSR, the US sponsored draft resolution failed of adoption.

Moscow's stand in the Security Council on the liberation of Goa served one very important purpose. It saved India from running into an awkward situation in which the West was determined to pass a cease fire and withdrawal resolution. Had any such resolution been passed by the council, certainly India was not bound to accept it. But by vetoing the draft resolution, the Soviets saw that such an occasion should not arise and for that they earned the people of India which contributed to the further strengthening of relations between these two countries. (14)

SOVIET STAND ON SINO-INDIAN BORDER CONFLICT

Ever-growing understanding between India and the USSR was put to much more severe trial when China triggered off fresh military offensive against India in the summer of 1962 and further aggravated the border situation after 8 September. On 20 October, regular Chinese troops crossed the well-defined McMahon line and subsequently serious fighting erupted all along the Sino-Indian border. Not beyond expectations, India proved outgunned, out manned and out witted. She had never thought of the vast military preparations China had been making over the years. On 24 October, China put forward three proposals : Cease-fire, 20 KM withdrawal from the line of actual control and nego-

tiations. Nehru refused to negotiate under duress. The Cuban crisis gave China a freehand. However, when the crisis subsided, China unilaterally declared cease-fire on 27 November. The border clash thus came to a halt. (15)

1962 put Indo-Soviet friendship to a severe test. By adopting a neutral attitude to the Indo-China border crisis, the Soviet Union had shown its preparedness to face Chinese displeasure while serving the cause of peace and of Indo-Soviet friendship.

The purpose of the Western powers was to set India and China into a continuous conflict. On the other hand, the Soviet Union was of the firm opinion that in the existing situation the most important thing was to cease fire and open negotiation of peaceful settlement of the conflict. (16)

The first Soviet reaction to the Sino-Indian border conflict came in the form of Editorials in Pravda and Izvestia on 25 October. Pravda editorial was critical of the Mc Mohan line and cautioned that the border conflict would disrupt the Soviet Union's relations with fraternal China and friendly India. It expressed deep satisfaction over the development of cooperation between the Soviet Union and India. India's contribution to the struggle for peace was applauded. Since the straining of relations between China and India would benefit only their common enemy, it was suggested to India to accept China's three proposals. This conflict, the editorial emphasized, would serve the interest of certain reactionary circles inside India and imperialism and

hence, it should be settled by peaceful means, through negotiations and without any pre-conditions. The Izvestia editorial carried identical comments.

The Second Pravda editorial on the aforesaid border conflict came out on 5 November 1962. It expressed deep concern on the clashes going on between China, a Socialist State, and India, "a powerful force in the newly emerged countries". Besides draining away India's economic resources and deflecting the Indian people from their social and cultural regeneration, the editorial added, this conflict would encourage the anti-progressive and anti-democratic forces in India to drive her from the position of non-alignment into the embrace of the aggressive military alliances. While pointing out towards the flow of Western arms to India and the 'phoney Silence' in the West on China's proposal for cease fire, the Editorial said that the Soviet people would not remain "indifferent", when blood of brother and friends the Chinese and the Indian peoples was being shed. This editorial asked for cease fire and negotiations without pre-conditions. (17)

It is evident from these two sets of editorials that the Soviet Union's main concern was that the fighting should stop and the two sides reach a peaceful settlement. In clearcut terms on 6 November 1962, first Deputy Prime Minister of the USSR A. N. Kosygin, regretted the Sino-Indian border incidents and asked for cease-fire and negotiations.

Although the Chinese attack on India came as a got-

sent to the right wing political parties and groups in India to mount an attack on India's independent foreign policy of friendship with the Soviet Union, Nehru remained firm. Conscious of the heavy price he would have to pay and disregarding the international and national pressures to which he was being subjected, Nehru firmly defended his policy of non-alignment, his faith in the friendship with the Soviet Union, and personally refuted the anti-Soviet tirade, pointing out that in the face of the Cuban crisis even the Soviet call for cease fire and peaceful solution was an endorsement of the Indian Stand for, India too wanted a
(18)
cease fire and peaceful settlement.

India's vote in favour of the people's Republic of China's admission into the UNO on 30 October baffled these who were writing elegies on the death of non-alignment. In Lok Sabha on 8 November 1962, Nehru made it clear that Western military aid to India would have no bearing on her policy of non-alignment. He observed, "this help is un-conditional and without strings. It does not affect directly our policy of non-alignment, which we value. These countries, which have helped us, do not expect us to leave that policy" subsequently, he scalded the adventurists for their "hysterical Chauvinism" and "venom against international
(19)
communism".

He came out publicly against Chauvinism and anti-communism which had become the refrain of all reactionaries including the socialists aligned with the international right wing

social-democracy. After the Chinese unilateral cease fire Nehru in a letter to the Soviet Prime Minister on October 24, wrote "your Statesman like ~~wisdom~~ wisdom has helped to remove the immediate danger". Indian exclusive interview to the American Broad casting company, ~~Nehru~~ Nehru observed that the Soviets were friendly to India and remained neutral throughout. On November 12 he told a group of foreign journalists of the "embarrassing situation" in which the Soviet had found themselves, and on November 14, he told the Lok Sabha that "the Soviet Union had been consistently friendly to us all along".⁽²⁰⁾

The Soviet Union confirmed its commitments for the supply of MIG fighter planes agreed two months before the outbreak of India China hostilities in August 1962 and two years later in 1964, through a new agreement it broadened the scope of supply of defence requirements.⁽²¹⁾ In fact the problems between India and China were becoming a test for the growing Indo-Soviet relationship. The border incidents were intensified and the Chinese launched a fault scale offensive on October 20 at a time when the Soviet Union was preoccupied with the Cuban crisis and was faced with the danger of this crisis developing into a thermo-nuclear catastrophe. It was therefore natural for the Soviet leaders to have maintained a guarded silence as situation on India's Himalayan borders ~~deteriorated~~ deteriorated.⁽²²⁾

No better assessment of the Soviet attitude towards the whole India-China border situation could be given than the one

Nehru himself offered to the House. It is important to note that this attitude of the Soviets was construed in Peking as "great betrayal". While making it a pretext for launching a more vigorous offensive against both India and the USSR, the Chinese leadership brought their clandestine polemics with the Soviets quite into
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open.

Such a Soviet interest in ending the Indo-China conflict was welcomed by Indian people. The Soviet Union took a strictly neutral position in the Indo-Chinese conflict and this could only mean that Soviet Union was fully convinced of India's peaceful intension and attached great value to her friendship. Soviet neutrality in the Indo-China crisis though embarrassed, pleased India in time.

Notes and References.

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