

PROPER NAMES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY AMONG MILL, RUSSELL AND FREGE

A THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE
OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (PHILOSOPHY)
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH BENGAL

By

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Under the Guidance of

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**DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY
NORTH BENGAL UNIVERSITY
RAJA RAMMOHUNPUR, DIST-DARJEELING**

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06 JUN 2015

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**DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH BENGAL
RAJA RAMMOHUNPUR
DARJEELING
2013**

*Dedicated to
The departed soul
of my
deceased Mother*



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Preface

It is now a recognized philosophical conviction that language matters to philosophy because philosophical problems are in some sense or other linguistic in nature. Language indeed matters to philosophy because language reveals reality or ontology for us. This conviction did not last long even in the family of linguistic philosophers. Linguistic philosophers after the appearance of linguistic turn have detected a few shortcomings in natural language and accordingly they proposed linguistic revision of ordinary or natural language. Linguistic philosophers, particularly semantists, advocated in favour of ideal language. Thus, there we witness *division of labour* in language. According to them every form of language cannot perform the same job. They revealed that only proper names can be the suitable vocabularies for making the relationship between language and reality. As a result they have advocated in favour of proper names as the minimum vocabularies of ideal language- i.e, a kind of formalized language that would be adequate in revealing the relationship between language and reality. In this way proper names, as such, has been a matter to philosophy.

In this thesis attempt has been made to make a comparative study among Mill, Russell and Frege regarding their views about proper names. We do not think that Mill was a linguistic philosopher. But interestingly, Mill in his book *A System of Logic* had outlined the theory of proper names from which the later and contemporary theory of proper names has been developed. In fact, it was Russell and Frege, the two great classical thinkers of proper names, who took the help

from Mill. Russell developed his realist theory of proper names as well as his description theory of proper names by borrowing clues from Mill. Equally, Frege developed his descriptive theory of proper names by taking philosophical clues from Mill's theory of proper names. In this sense we can say that in the real sense of the term Mill actually ingrained the clues of the contemporary literature of the theory of proper names. Thus a comparative study among Mill, Russell and Frege is philosophically worthy.

The New Theory of Proper Names which indeed is the contention of present day linguistic philosophers is directly linked with the classical theory of proper names as developed by Mill, Russell and Frege. In fact, Searle's cluster theory of proper names is further an extension of Frege's descriptive theory of proper names. Again, the New Theory of Proper Names as developed by Kripke, Putnam, Kaplan and Marcus is a further extension of Russell's realist theory of proper names. Like Russell, the proponents of the New Theory of Reference just stated above have emphasized on the no sense theory of proper names. Again like Russell, they have nullified referential failure in proper names. However, the New Theory of Proper Names is a further extension of Russell's realist theory of proper names in the sense that they have introduced modal necessity by introducing the concept of possible-world. In this way they have established that proper names, in the true sense of the term, are rigid designators. Thus, unlike Russell and Wittgenstein, philosophers such as Kripke, Putnam, Kaplan and Marcus have established proper names as rigid designators by bring the concept of modal necessity. Having said they, they, in some sense or other, bring back epistemic relevance. We think that the concept of

**Natural kind terms of Putnam does not forfeit epistemic relevance.
Natural kind terms, such as, 'gold', 'tiger', etc., has causal relevance
and developed on the basis of historicity and baptismal ceremony.**

Acknowledgements

In acknowledging the help I have received from others during the writing of this thesis, I must, at the very outset, begin by recording that my greatest debt is to my supervisor Dr. Kantilal Das, Professor of Philosophy, North Bengal University, who inspired me to complete this thesis within a stipulated period. In spite of his busy academic schedules and other engagements, he gave me lot of time to complete this thesis. I must owe my deep sense of gratitude to my supervisor for his generous cooperation and suggestions during my research work. Without his kind cooperation and suggestions it would not be possible for me to complete this thesis.

I have been very fortunate to be a student of the Department of Philosophy, North Bengal University. Since my Master degree I have been getting generous help from my beloved teachers in all accounts relating to academic enlightenment. Therefore, I must acknowledge my extensive debt to my teachers of this faculty.

I also express my deep sense of gratitude to the office bearers of the Department of Philosophy, the staff members of the Registrar Office, the librarians and the staff members of the central library and others members of the University who have directly or indirectly helped in completing the thesis.

I owe my deep sense of appreciation to my parents, my wife Monalisa Mondal and other relatives and friends for their generous love and blessing in completing this thesis.

Finally, I have given my best effort to make this thesis flawless in all accounts. Having said this, if any errors or inadequacies that may remain in this work, the responsibility is entirely my own.

Sadek Ali

General Introduction

The objective of this thesis is to analyze and examine the philosophical concept of proper name with a comparative outlook among J.S. Mill, B. Russell and G. Frege. Even though the title of the thesis regarding proper name is associated with the names of Mill, Russell and Frege; but in the course of our discussion we propose to analyze and examine with critical outlook the ongoing development of the theory of proper names. However, the title of the thesis is still justified because the development of the theory of proper names even today is originated from the philosophical contribution of J.S. Mill at first and subsequently from Russell and Frege. Indeed Mill in his book *A System of Logic* actually planted the seed of proper names. Later on Russell and Frege were influenced by Mill's theory of proper names. Apparently, Mill's theory of proper names looks like grammatical and logical rather than philosophical. His classification of proper names is at par with the grammatical classification of names. However, from this it does not lead us to assume that Mill actually develops grammatical classification of names. His book is logical and definitely there are some logical implications of Mill's classification of names. However, before delving into the theory of Mill, Russell and Frege, let us, at the very outset, explicate the question: why do proper names matter to philosophy? Why do linguistic philosophers incline towards proper names?

The pertinent question that needs to be addressed here is that why do proper names in particular matter to philosophy? It is, in fact, true to say that philosophy of language is not all about of proper names. Philosophy of language or so to speak linguistic philosophy is all about of clarification of language. If this should be the case then why proper

names alone are important to the philosophers of language? Why do proper names relevant to philosophy of language? So long the answer of this question will not be taken care of, the relevance of the title of my thesis would remain obscure.

It is true to say that the very objective of 'linguistic turn' or 'linguistic revolution' appeared in the first few decades of 20th century was to demolished metaphysics or, so to speak, speculative metaphysics. Among many reasons, the most important one was that metaphysical sentences, according to linguistic philosophers, were meaningless. They were meaningless in the sense that they could not be interpreted in terms of truth and falsity. According to logical positivism, a sentence would be literally meaningful if it would be completely verifiable or completely falsifiable by means of some observational data. There are no observational data in metaphysical assertions. Therefore, according to the principle of verification, metaphysical sentences are meaningless. In fact, linguistic philosophers like the logical positivists give over emphasize on the criterion of meaningfulness. They have interpreted meaningfulness in terms of truth and falsity. Thus the term 'meaningful' is interpreted by linguistic philosopher in terms of truth and falsity. As metaphysical sentences are neither true nor false, they should be rejected as meaningless. This was the philosophical propensity that had been established by logical positivists. A. J. Ayer sets out the criteria of the 'Principle of Verification' by means of which he enables to show in what sense metaphysical sentences would be regarded as meaningless. Even though the glory of logical positivism did not last long, but metaphysics did not revive at all in the subsequent treatment of the linguistic philosophers.

However after the revolution of linguistic turn, we witness a considerable difference among linguistic philosophers regarding the very nature of

language. Regarding the question: "What should be the nature of suitable language?" linguistic philosophers were involved into a tug of war and subsequently they were broadly classified into two groups, namely, ideal language philosophers and ordinary language philosophers. Those who believe ordinary language have considered ordinary language as suitable and adequate for doing philosophy and those who advocate ideal language would suggest a substantial revision of ordinary language in favour of logical or artificial language.

It is important to note here that the language which would be used in our day to day life and in our day to day conversation is known as ordinary or natural language. In fact, ordinary language can survive within the requirements of many generations. Therefore, the believer of ordinary language claims that ordinary language is adequate for doing philosophy. However philosophers of other wing have realized that ordinary language suffers from ambiguity, vagueness, unspicuousness. Therefore, ordinary language can not be regarded as a suitable method for doing philosophy. Instead of ordinary language a separate language needs to be constructed for doing or practicing philosophy. Thus, the question of linguistic revisionism comes into being.

My objective in this thesis is to find out a suitable answer of the question: why do proper names matter to philosophy? Now, we are in a position to give an answer of the question. When ideal language philosophers have divorced or rejected ordinary language philosophy because of its ambiguity and thereby have given a proposal to construct an artificial language, then the question arises: what would be the suitable vocabulary of such artificial language? In responding to this question, it has been proposed that the minimum vocabulary of artificial language would be name or proper name. Why do proper names be treated as the minimum vocabulary? Again in responding to this question, it is claimed that in

natural language only name i.e. noun are the only vocabulary which would be adequate for showing the relationship between language and reality.

The question again arises: what specific property do proper names possess by means of which the relationship between language and reality can be adequately established? In answering to this question, it can be said that names, in general, do possess a special property which other linguistic items do not possess. It is a regimented philosophical perception in the community of linguistic philosophers or philosophy of language that to be a name is to be a name of an object. In normal or usual circumstance a name denotes an object. Barring names or so to speak proper names and their corresponding pronouns, no other linguistic item in the part of speech enables to denote an object. Therefore, philosophers of ideal language believers would suggest that names, as such, would be the minimum vocabulary of ideal language. According to them with the help of name, the word (Language) object (Reality) relationship can be adequately established. That is why; in the domain of philosophy of language or linguistic philosophy proper names deserve special treatment. We think that it was Mill who in his book *A System of Logic*¹ gave an adequate account of names. Even though Mill was not a recognized philosopher of language, but his classifications of names give rise to a voluminous clues to the linguistic philosophers by means of which they subsequently developed the theory of proper names. We think that Mill's classification of name appeared in his book *A System of Logic* is more grammatical than philosophical. His own classification of names in many ways has a simile to the grammatical classification of names. However, Mill, being a philosopher, has given some philosophical insights through his classification of name which would be helpful to the linguistic

¹ Mill, J.S. "A System of Logic", Chap-2 London, Longmans, 1843.

philosophers of extenuating aspiration or objective of philosophy of language they indeed desire to have. Therefore, in the **First Chapter** of my thesis I propose to analyze and examine Mill's views of names at great length and it would be entitled as: **Mill's theory of Proper Names**. When linguistic philosophers have settled down regarding proper names as the minimum vocabulary of ideal language, it was B. Russell who moved forward against such proposal. According to Russell, names as such or names in general cannot be regarded as the minimum vocabulary of ideal language. In this regard, Russell classifies names into two types, such as, ordinary proper name and logically proper name. According to Russell, ordinary proper name, though they look like proper name at first glance, but in proper sense they are disguised descriptions. According to Russell, where there is a scope of description, there is a scope of ambiguity because description belongs to natural language. Therefore, as the minimum numbers of vocabulary Russell out rightly has rejected the legitimacy of ordinary proper names and instead of that he accepted only logically proper name as the minimum numbers of vocabularies of ideal language. Therefore Russell's form of ideal language would be constituted by logically proper name.

There is no question of doubt that Mill's had implemented the seed of proper names in the domain of philosophy on the basis of which the subsequent development has made possible. However, if we carefully focus on the subsequent development of this literature, we will find that there are two diametrically opposite developments that have been developed from Mill's theory of proper names. One development has been led by B.Russell and the other development has been forwarded by G.Frege. Therefore, in my thesis, we, first of all, analyze and examine Russell's position of proper names. Interestingly, Russell's theory of proper names deserves worthy of philosophical consideration mainly for

the fact he unlike others gives us two different types of theories of proper names. Actually Russell classifies proper names into logical and ordinary. Logical proper names are associated with the theory that is philosophically known as the *realistic theory of proper names* and ordinary proper names lead to another kind of theory what is again philosophically known as the *description theory of proper names*. Therefore, when we deal with Russell's view of proper names, we do explicate his both accounts of proper names. Therefore, in the First Section of the **Second Chapter** which would entitled as **Russell's Theory of Proper Names**, we propose to analyze and examine **Russell's Realist theory of Proper Names** and in the Second Section of the same Chapter we propose to **analyse and examine Russell's Description theory of Proper Names**.

Like Russell, Frege was equally influenced by Mill's theory of proper names. In fact, Frege's theory of proper names is the best account of descriptivist theory of proper names. Like Russell, Frege does not make a distinction between logical and ordinary proper names. He gives us a general perspective of the theory of proper names where sense or mode of presentation has counted the most. In fact, Frege takes a different position regarding proper name which is very much contrary in many senses of Russellian tradition. According to Frege, a name must have a sense or mode of presentation whatever its referent may be. Unlike Russellian tradition, Frege gives due importance on the connotational aspect of meaning. Frege does not classify name as ordinary and logical. Instead of that his understanding of name must have a sense or mode of presentation by means of which its referent can be determined. Frege's theory of sense and reference gives us plenty of clues regarding his own understanding of names. We, therefore, analyze and examine Frege's theory of name in

Chapter Three which would be entitled as: **Frege's Descriptive theory of Proper Names.**

We notice subsequent development of the descriptive theory of proper names in Searle's writings. In fact, Searle is an ardent proponent of Frege. According to Searle, we can use proper names in existential propositions. Here, proper names cannot be said to refer because no such object of an existential statement can refer. If it does, then according to Searle we have to say that existence would be a real predicate. However, it has been already established that existence cannot be a real predicate. Even Frege once asserts that existence is a second order concept. Following Frege, Searle equally asserts that an existential sentence no longer refers any object; rather it would express a concept. As a result, Searle would like to say that proper names must have conceptual or descriptive content. Without conceiving the descriptive content of a proper name, it would not be possible for us to admit the concept of informative identity as developed by Frege. The concept of informative identity actually hinges on the descriptive content of the proper names. Thus, Searle inclines to say that the principle of identification demands that an utterance of a proper name must convey a description. Accordingly, in the **Fourth Chapter** of this thesis we propose to analyze and examine with critical outlook Searle's theory of proper names and it would be entitled as **Searle on the Cluster theory of Proper Names**

The descriptivist account of proper names Russell and Frege has been vehemently criticized by the proponent of causal theory of reference. In this regard, we can, at first, mention the name of Saul Kripke. In fact, after Russell, it was Saul Kripke who interpreted names in terms of rigid designator. However, Kripke gives a different interpretation of proving the rigidity of proper names. Unlike Russell, Frege gives modal interpretation of proper names. According to Kripke, a name is a rigid

designator if it designates the same objects in every possible world of an actual world. As far as the 'referential' aspect is concerned, there we find continuity from Russell to Wittgenstein down to Kripke. However, as far as the understanding of the name is concerned Kripke was non-committal regarding name. When Kripke claims that a name is a rigid designator, he does not specify whether the name he conceives as rigid designator is a logically proper name or not. Rather he conveys that a name is a rigid designator if it designates the same object in every possible world of an actual world. We propose to analyze and examine Kripke's theory of proper name in **Chapter Five** and it would be named as: **Kripke's theory of Proper Names.**

After the development of Kripke's theory of proper name as rigid designator, there we notice in recent times the development of another thesis known as *natural kind terms* as rigid designator. This theory has been propounded by H. Putnam in his paper "The Meaning of 'Meaning'". According to Putnam, a natural kind term is a term having baptism ceremony or conventional background on the basis of which such terms designate the same objects in every possible situation. Putnam's theory of natural kind terms, we think, opens up a new dimension in the history of proper names. One important dimension of Putnam theory of natural kind terms is that it encompasses these terms as natural kind terms having descriptive content. According to Putnam, gold, tree, water etc. are natural kind term. They are descriptive in nature based on baptism ceremony. But they are rigid designator because they designate the same object in every possible situation. Even though Putnam's theory of natural kind terms fulfills the rigidity of the designation like Kripke's proper name, but unlike Russell, Wittgenstein, Kripke, Putnam talks about natural kind terms having *descriptive content* only. We have seen that Russell's was talking about logically proper name having no

descriptive content; Wittgenstein was talking about logical proper name applicable in the logical space and also lacking descriptive content; Kripke was talking of name as rigid designator applicable in the possible world; but Putnam concept of natural kind terms having descriptive content that clearly a deviation from the earlier thinkers cited above. Even though Frege's theory of name is philosophically important, but it has been challenged by many. The **Twin Earth argument** of Hilary Putnam throws a challenge to Frege's theory of sense and reference and this in turn goes against Frege's theory of names. We shall therefore analyze and examine the Twin Earth argument of H. Putnam as a critical account of Frege's philosophical concept of name with regard to his article sense and reference. In recent times we can also mention the name of Marcus who introduces the concept of 'Tag' to mean rigid designator. Kaplan also introduces the concept 'Dhat' to mention the rigidity of object of name. All these things will be discussed in **Chapter Six** and it would be named as **Recent Outlook of Proper Names**. In the **First Section** of this Chapter we propose to analyze and examine Putnam's natural kind terms of rigid designator along with his famous metaphor of **Twin-Earth**; in the **Second Section**, we propose to explain **Kaplan's concept of 'dthat'** and in the **Third Section** of this Chapter we propose to explain **Marcus' concept of tag**. We think that there underlies some sort of referential consistency among Putnam, Marcus and Kaplan as far as their understanding of the concept of proper name is concerned.

In **Chapter Seven** which would be entitled as **Concluding Remarks** we propose to analyze and examine with critical outlook the recent development of the literature of the proper names. We propose to show in what sense natural kind terms would be rigid designators and even if they would be rigid designators then in what sense natural kind terms would be different from logically proper name as propounded by Russell,

Wittgenstein and Kripke. The concept of logically proper name as expounded by Russell and Wittgenstein has narrow application even though its application is effective in formal discipline. Putnam's introduction of natural kind terms would certainly extend the scope of the application of the literature of proper name in terms of rigid designator. Whether we should involve in the classification of names or not would be a matter of philosophical decision but it seems, at the end, that the division as conceived by Russell would not be so effective if Putnam's theory of natural kinds is taken into account.

.....X.....

Chapter One

Mill's theory of Proper Names

While talking about proper names one naturally begins with the John Stuart Mill. Mill's theory was the earliest and perhaps the best known theory on the subject. Mill was the first philosopher who implemented the seed of proper names. Although, Mill had not been recognized as a linguistic philosopher in the true sense of the term but from his grammatical classification of proper names later philosophers had gained ample clues on the basis of which they developed the concept of proper name.

According to Mill, every name denotes an object or every name either denotationally or connotationally or in the form of *de re* or *de dicto* is associated with an object. In short, it can be said that to be a name is to be a name of an object. According to Mill, 'a proper name is an unmeaning mark which we connect in our mind with the idea of the object.'²

According to Mill, a proper name like 'Paul' or 'caesar' is a singular name which is devoid of all connotations. But here a question arises: what is a name? What is it to be a singular? What is it to be devoid of all connotations? Though the word 'name' is used in somewhat extraordinary sense in Mill as well as in much of traditional logic, it is not difficult to see what he meant by it. Generally, he thinks that a name is a word or a group of words. But this does not mean that not all words or group of words can be regarded as names. For example-'Paul', 'the first emperor of Rome', 'Man', 'Redness' are all names. But 'of', 'to', 'heavy' etc. are not names at all. According to Mill, the words of the second group can not be regarded as names because 'these words do not express

² Mill, J. S. *A System of Logic*, Chap-2, London, Longmans, 1843, pp. 34-38.

things of which anything can be affirmed or denied.’³ We can say significantly that ‘Paul died young’ or that ‘the first emperor of Rome was a great warrior’ but at the same time we can not say that ‘of’ is a relation or that ‘heavy’ is difficult to carry. So it is clear, according to Mill, that ‘a word or a group of words would be a name only if it could be used in the position of the subject of some assertion.’⁴ It seems possible to add also that a name, in Mill’s view, is what many contemporary philosophers have called ‘a referring expression’.

What does Mill mean by a singular name? It is better to remember that Mill distinguished between a singular name and a general name. According to Mill, ‘an individual or singular name is a name which is only capable of being truly affirmed, in the same sense of one thing.’⁵ So ‘Ram’ and ‘the king who succeeded William the Conqueror’, as well as ‘the king’ under suitable circumstances, are individual or singular names. But ‘Man’ on the other hand, is not an individual or singular name; rather it is a general name because it can be truly affirmed of an indefinite number of individuals.

Again Mill says that a singular name is a name of a single thing or person. A name in Mill’s opinion is that which can be used in the position of the subject in a subject-predicate statement.

Now it is clear that what Mill means by a singular name. Let us see what does Mill mean by a non-Connotative name? Mill says that ‘a non-Connotative term (name) is one which signifies a subject only or an attribute only’⁶. On the other hand, ‘a Connotative term is one which denotes a subject and implies an attribute.’⁷ In this regard, Mill

³ Ibid, p.34.

⁴ Ibid, p. 34.

⁵ Ibid. p.34.

⁶ Ibid, p.35.

⁷ Ibid. p.35.

distinguishes between subject and predicate of a statement. A Name being a non-connotative term always occupies the subject position. On the other hand, connotative term always occupies the predicate position of a statement. That is why, connotative term not only denotes a subject or attribute. Connotative term always denotes an object and its properties or attributes. So Mill thinks that a name means a singular name and a singular non-connotative name which is positioned in the subject of some assertion.

According to Mill, 'a non-connotative term is such that it applies to a thing or things we can not infer that the thing or things to which it applies are possessed of some properties.'⁸ Mill again says that a singular non-connotative term is a term which can be used to refer to some single thing, but from the fact that it can be used to refer to certain thing we can not infer that the thing is possessed of any properties. In this regard, Mill again gives an argument to accept that 'Caesar' is a non-Connotative term. According to Mill, a proper name like 'Caesar' applies to some individual, it is also correct, but we can not infer that the individual is possessed of any properties. From the fact that the term 'man' cannot be non-connotative because by the term 'man' we infer that he is possessed of the property of being an animal; where the term 'Caesar'(correctly) applies to an individual. We can not infer that the individual is possessed of some properties.

While discussing about proper name after Mill there we have two terms 'Connotative' and 'non-Connotative'. According to Mill, a proper name is always non-Connotative, because for Mill a non- Connotative term always signifies a subject only or an attribute only. On the other hand, a Connotative term denotes a subject and implies an attribute. In this regard, Mill's distinction between Connotative and non-Connotative

⁸ Ibid. p. 35.

terms needs further clarification. Mill says that "a non-Connnotative term is one which signifies a subject only. A Connnotative term is one which denotes a subject and implies an attribute"⁹ Mill uses the terms 'signifies' and 'denotes' inter-changeably, so the difference between the two types, as it is here presented, is that 'the Connnotative term does something in addition to what the non-Connnotative terms does.'¹⁰ This presentation of the Connnotative term as doing something more turns out not to be justified by Mill subsequent explanation.

First, what is it that the two types of terms have in common? In Mill's varying terminology they both "signify", "denote", "stand for" or are "names of" the things of which they can be truly predicated. To use Mill's own examples, both 'Socratise' (a non-connnotative term) and 'virtuous (a connnotative term) denote Socratise. We can truly say of this man that he is Socratise and that he is virtuous. What connnotative and nonconnnotative terms have in common is that each of them has a range of correct application and an extension.

But how do these two terms differ? They differ in the ways in which they come to have their extensions. The connnotative term 'virtuous' applies to Socrates and others, 'in consequence of an attribute which they are supposed to posses in common the attribute which has received the name of virtuous"¹¹.

By contrast, the non-connnotative concrete term 'Socrates' and the connnotative abstract term 'virtuous' apply to the man and the attribute respectively in consequence of these terms having been on these individuals to be "simply marks used to enable those individuals to be

⁹ Ibid. p.36.

¹⁰ Ibid. p. 36.

¹¹ Ibid. p.36.

made subject of discourse”¹². The attribute in consequence of which a non-connotative term applies is not one that is independent of the term rather it is just the attribute of bearing the term as a ‘mark’ (name).

Mill’s explanation makes it clear that this difference in the conditions of application is the crucial difference between the terms. A connotative term is one that applies to an individual. A non-connotative term is one that applies to an individual simply because the term has been bestowed on it as a label. One consequence of this distinction is that a connotative term may be either general or singular depending on whether the attribute that “gives the name” is shareable, but a non-connotative term will always be a singular term applying just to the individual that bears the term as a proper name.

But what can be made of the claim with which Mill introduces his distinction—that connotative terms do something’s more than non-connotative terms? The extra that they are said to do is to “imply an attribute”. This is, of course, not something that connotative terms do independently of denoting. They denote just those individuals that have the “implied” attributive. To predicate a Connotative term is to ascribe an attribute. However, a non-connotative term also denotes only in virtue of certain attributes. They denote just the individual that bears the terms as names. Consequently, to predicate a non-connotative term is to ascribe the attribute of bearing the term as a name.

Mill, though, insists that non-connotative terms lack something that connotative terms have. He regards connotation as information or signification. He then says, “The only names of objects which connote nothing are proper names; and these have strictly speaking, on signification.”¹³ However there is confusion somewhere, for he has to

¹²Ibid. p. 37.

¹³ Ibid. p.37.

admit that it is informative to be told of a town that it is York. He tries to dismiss this by saying that there is no information except that 'York' is its name. He contrasts it with the information that the town is built of marble. Here, we have entirely new information, according to Mill. The identification of the town as York may easily be a new information because of the fact that it is built of marble.

The difference between predication of the non connotative term and the predication of the connotative term is simply is the kind of information imparted. The first gives information of a relation between the town and the term itself – the town has the name 'York'; while the other gives term independent of information about the material used in the construction of the town. The different in the kind of information expressed is precisely the difference between non- connotative terms and connotative terms. The former applies to those that have the attribute of having been labeled with the term. The latter applies to those things that possess some attribute other than bearing the term itself as a proper name.

Classification of Proper names

Mill has divided name into various types which are as follows:

Singular and general names

Mill classifies name as general and individual (or singular) name and then distinguishes between them. A general name is familiarly defined as a name which is capable of being truly affirmed, in the same sense of an indefinite number of things. 'An individual or singular name is a name which is only capable of being truly affirmed, in the same sense of one thing.'¹⁴

Thus, man is capable of being truly affirmed of John, George, Marry and other persons without assignable limit; and it is affirmed of all of them in the same sense; for the word man expresses certain qualities and when we

¹⁴ Ibid. p. 38.

predicate it of those persons, we assert that they all possess those qualities. But John is only capable of being truly affirmed of one single person, at least in the same sense. For though there are many persons who bear that name, it is not conferred upon them to indicate any qualities or any thing which belongs to them in common; and can not be said to be affirmed of them in any sense at all, consequently not in the same sense. "The king who succeeded William the conqueror" is also an individual name. For there cannot be more than one person of whom it can be truly affirmed, is implied in the meaning of the words. Even 'the king' when the occasion or the context defines the individual of whom it is to be understood, may justly be regarded as an individual name.

It is not unusual, by way of explaining what is meant by a general name, to say that it is the name of a class. But this, though a convenient mode of expression for the some purposes, is objectionable as a definition. It would be more logical to reverse the proposition and then turn it into a definition of the word class: "A class is the indefinite multitude of individuals denoted by a general name."

It is necessary to distinguish general names from collective names. A general name is one which can be predicated of each individual of a multitude; a collective name can not be predicated of each separately, but only of all taken together. "The 76th regiment of foot in the British Army", which is a collective name, is not a general but an individual name; for though it can be predicated of a multitude of individual soldier taken jointly, it can not be predicated of them severally. We may say 'John is a soldier' and Thompson is a soldier and Smith is a soldier but we can not say Johns is the 76th regiment and Thompson is the 76th regiment and Smith is the 76th regiment. We can only say, John and Thompson and Smith and Brown and so forth are the 76th regiment.



“The 76th regiment” is a collective name, but not a general one. A regiment’ is both a collective and a general name. General with respect to all individual regiments, of each of which separately it can be affirmed; collective with respect to the individual soldiers of whom any regiment is composed.

Concrete and Abstract names

Mill admits Concrete and Abstract name. According to Mill a concrete name is a name which stands for a thing; an abstract name is a name which stands for an attribute of a thing. Thus ‘John’, ‘the sea’, ‘this table’ are names of things. ‘White’, also is a name of a thing. Whiteness is the name of a quality or attribute of those things. ‘Man’ is the name of many things; humanity is a name of an attribute of those things.’¹⁵ Old is a name of a thing; old age is a name of one of their attributes.

We have used the words concrete and abstract in the sense annexed to them by the schoolmen, who, notwithstanding the imperfections of their philosophy, were unrivalled in the construction of technical language, and whose definitions, in logic at least, though they never went more than a little way into the subject, have seldom, I think, been altered but to be spoiled. A practice, however, has grown up in more modern times, which, if not introduced by Locke has gained currency chiefly from his example, of applying the expression “abstract name” to all names which are the result of abstraction or generalization, and consequently to ‘all general names, instead of confining it to the names of attributes.’¹⁶ A more wanton alteration in the meaning of a word is rarely to be met with; for the expression general name, the exact equivalent of which exists in all languages I am acquainted with, was already available for the purpose to which abstract has been misappropriated, while the misappropriation

¹⁵ Mill, J.S. *A System of Logic*, London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1972. pp.90-112..

¹⁶ *Ibid.* p. 91.

leaves that important class of words, the names of attributes, without any compact distinctive appellation. The old acceptance, however, has not gone so completely out of use, as to deprive those who still adhere to it of all chances of being understood. Thus, Mill goes on to say that by 'abstract, then, I shall always, in Logic, mean the opposite of concrete: by an abstract name, the name of an attribute; by a concrete name, the name of an object'.

Do abstract names belong to the class of general or to the class of singular name?

Mill says that some abstract names are certainly general. However, some of those which are name, but not of one single and definite attribute but of a class of attributes. The word 'color' which is a name common to whiteness, redness and so forth. Even the word whiteness, in respect of the different shades of whiteness to which it is applied in common; the word magnitude, in respect of the various degrees of magnitude and the various dimensions of space; the word weight, in respect of the various digress of weight, such also is the word attribute itself, the common name of all particular attribute. But when only one attribute, neither variable in degree nor in kind, is designated by the name; as variables, tangibleness, equality, squariness, milk-whiteness, then the name can hardly be considered general; for though it denotes an attribute of many different object, 'the attribute itself is always conceived as one, not many.'¹⁷ To avoid needless logomachies, the best course would probably be to consider these names as neither general nor individual, and to place in the class apart.

It may be objected to our definition of an abstract name, that not only the names which we have called abstract, but adjective, which we have placed in the concrete class, are names of attributes; that white, for

¹⁷ Ibid. p. 92.

example, is as much as the name of the colour as whiteness is. But a word ought to be considered as the name of that which we intend to be understood by it when we put it to its principal use, that is, when we employ it in predication. When we say, snow is white, milk is white, linen is white; we do not mean it to be understood that snow, or linen, or milk, is a colour. We mean that they are things having the colour. The reverse is the case with the word whiteness. Here what we affirm to be whiteness is not snow, but the colour of snow. Whiteness, therefore, is the name of the colour exclusively. But white is a name of all things whatever having the colour; a name, not of the quality whiteness, but of every white object. It is true. This name was given to all those various objects on account of the quality. We may therefore say, without lack of decorum, that the quality forms part of its signification; but a name can only be said to stand for, or to be a name of, the things of which it can be predicated. We shall presently see that all names which can be said to have any signification, all names by applying which to an individual we give any information respecting that individual, may be said to imply an attribute of some sort; but they are not names of the attribute; it has its own proper abstract name.

Connotative and non-connotative names

Mill divides names into connotative and nonconnotative, the latter sometimes, but improperly, called absolute. This is one of the most important distinctions which we shall have occasion to point out, and of those which go deepest into the nature of language.

A non- connotative term is one which signifies a subject only or an attribute only. "A connotative term", Mill opines, "is one which denotes a subject, and implies an attribute."¹⁸ By the term subject here is meant anything which possesses attributes. Thus John, or London, or England,

¹⁸ Mill, J. S. *A System of Logic*, London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1949. p93.

are names which signify a subject only. Whiteness, length, virtue, signify attribute only. None of these names, therefore, is connotative. But white, long, virtuous are connotative. The word 'white, denotes all white things, as snow, paper, the foam of the sea, and so forth, and implies, or as it was termed by the schoolmen, connotes, the attribute whiteness.'¹⁹ The word white is not predicated of the attribute, but of the subject, snow, and so forth; but when we predicate it of them, we imply, or connote, that the attribute whiteness belongs to them. The same may be said of the other words cited above. Virtuous, for example, is the name of a class, which includes Socrates, Howard, the Man of Ross, and an indefinable number of other individuals, past, present, and to come. These individuals, collectively and severally, can alone be said with propriety to be denoted by the word: of them alone can it properly be said to be a name. But it is a name applied to all of them in consequence of an attribute which they are supposed to possess in common, the attribute which has received the name of virtue. It is applied to all beings that are considered to possess this attribute; and to none which are not so considered.

All concrete general names are connotative. The word man, for example, denotes Peter, Jane, John and an indefinite number of other individuals, of whom, taken as a class, it is the name. But it is applied to them, because 'they possess, and to signify that they possess, certain attributes.'²⁰ These seem to be, corporeity, animal life, rationality, and a certain external form, which for distinction we call the human. Every existing thing, which possessed all these attributes, would be called a man; and anything which possessed none of them, or only one, or two, or even three of them without the fourth, would not be so called. Or, if such newly-discovered beings possessed the form of man without any vestige

¹⁹ Ibid. p. 94.

²⁰ Ibid. p. 95.

of reason, it is probable that some other name than that of man would be found for them. How it happens that there can be any doubt about the matter, will appear hereafter. The word man, therefore, signifies all these attributes, and all subjects which possess these attributes. But it can be predicated only of the subjects. What we call men are the subject, the individual Stiles and Nokes; not the qualities by which their humanity is constituted. The name, therefore, is said to signify the subject directly, the attributes indirectly; it denotes the subject, and implies, or involves, or indicates, or as we shall say henceforth connotes, the attributes. It is a connotative name.

Connotative names have hence been also called *denominative*, because the subject which they denote is denominated by, or receives a name from, the attribute which they connote. Snow, and other objects, receives the name white, because they possess the attribute which is called whiteness. Peter, James, and other receive the name man, because they possess the attributes which are considered to constitute humanity. The attribute, or attributes, may therefore be said to denominate those objects, or to give them a common name.

It has been said that all concrete general names are connotative. Even abstract names, though the names only of attributes, may in some instances be justly considered as connotative; for attributes themselves may have attributes ascribed to them; and 'a word which denotes attributes may connote an attribute of those attributes.'²¹ This word is a name common to many attributes, and connotes hurtfulness, an attribute of those various attributes. When, for example, we say that slowness, in a horse, is a fault, we do not mean that the slow movement, the actual change of place of the slow horse, is a bad thing, but that the property or

²¹ Ibid. p. 96.

peculiarity of the horse, from which it derives that name, the quality of being a slow mover, is an undesirable peculiarity.

With regard to those concrete names which are not general but individual, a distinction must be made. Proper names are not connotative: they denote the individuals who are called by them; but they do not indicate or imply any attributes as belonging to those individuals. According to Mill when we designate, for example, a child by the name Paul or a dog by the name Caesar, we actually make sense to say that these 'names are simply marks used to enable those individuals to be made subjects of discourse.'²² It may be said, indeed, that we must have had some reason for giving them those names rather than any others; and this is true; but the name, once given, is independent of the reason. A man may have been named John, because that was the name of his father; a town may have been named Dartmouth, because it is situated at the mouth of the Dart. But it is no part of the signification of the word John, which the father of the person so called bore the same name; nor even of the word Dartmouth, to be situated at the mouth of the Dart. If sand should choke up the mouth of the river, or an earthquake change its course, and remove it to a distance from the town, the name of the town would not necessarily be changed. That fact, therefore, can form no part of the signification of the word; for otherwise, when the fact confessedly ceased to be true, no one would any longer think of applying the name. 'Proper names are attached to the objects themselves, and are not dependent on the continuance of any attribute of the object.'²³

But there is another kind of names, which, although they are individual names, that is, 'predicable only of one object, are really connotative.'²⁴ For, though we may give to an individual a name utterly unmeaning,

²² Ibid. p. 97.

²³ Ibid. p. 97.

²⁴ Ibid. p. 98.

which we call a proper name- a word which answers the purpose of showing that thing it is we are talking about, but not of telling anything about it; yet a name peculiar to an individual is not necessarily of this description. It may be significant of some attribute, or some union of attributes, which, being possessed by no object but one, determines the name exclusively to that individual. "The sun" is a name of this description; "God" when used by a monotheist, is another. These, however, are scarcely examples of what we are now attempting to illustrate, being, in strictness of language, general, not individual names; for, however they may be, in fact, predicable only of one object, there is nothing in the meaning of the words themselves which implies this: and, accordingly, when we are imagining and not affirming, we may speak of many suns; and the majority of mankind have believed, and still believe, that there are many gods. But it is easy to produce words which are real instances of connotative individual names. It may be part of the meaning of the connotative name itself, that there can exist but one individual possessing the attribute which it connotes, for or instance, "the only son of John Stiles" or "the first emperor of Rome." Or the attribute connoted may be a connexion with some determinate event, and the connexion may be of such a kind as 'only one individual actually had; and this may be implied in the form of the expression.'²⁵ "The father of Socrates" is an example of the one kind (since Socrates could not have had two father); "the author of the Iliad," "the murderer of Henri Quatre," of the second. For, though it is conceivable that more persons than one might have participated in the authorship of the Iliad, or in the murder of Henri Quatre, the employment of the article implies that, in fact, this was not the case. What is here done by the word the, is done in other cases by the context: thus, "Caesar's army" is an individual name, if it appears from

²⁵ Ibid. p. 102.

the context that the army meant is that which Caesar commanded in a particular battle. The still more general expressions, "the Roman army", or "the Christian army", may be individualized in a similar manner. Another case of frequent occurrence has already been noticed; it is the following. The name, being a many worded one, may consist, in the first place, of a general name, capable therefore in itself of being affirmed of more things than one, but which is, in the second place, so limited by other words joined with it, that the entire expression can only be predicated of one object, consistently with the meaning of the general term. This is exemplified in such an instance as the following: "the present prime minister of England." Prime Minister of England is a general name; the attributes which it connotes may be possessed by an indefinite number of persons: in succession however, not simultaneously; since the meaning of the name itself imports that there can be only one such person at a time. This being the case, and the application of the name being afterwards limited by the article and the word present, to such individuals as possess the attributes at one indivisible point of time, it becomes applicable only to one individual. And as this appears from the meaning of the name, without any extrinsic proof, it is strictly an individual name.

Positive and negative names

The fourth principal division of names is positive and negative. 'Positive, as man, tree, good; negative, as not man, not tree, not good.'²⁶ To every positive concrete name, a corresponding negative one might be framed. After giving a name to any one thing, or to any plurality of things, we might create a second name which should be a name of all things whatever, except that particular thing or things. The negative names are employed whenever we have occasion to speak collectively of all things

²⁶ Ibid. p. 103.

other than some thing or class of things. When the positive name is connotative, the corresponding negative name is connotative likewise; but in a peculiar way, connoting not the presence but the absence of an attribute. Thus, not-white denotes all things whatever except white things; and connotes the attribute of not possessing whiteness. For the non possession of any given attribute is also an attribute, and may receive a name as such; and thus 'negative concrete names may obtain negative abstract names to correspond to them.'²⁷

Names which are positive in form are often negative in reality, and others are really positive though their form is negative. The word inconvenient, for example, does not express the mere absence of convenience; it expresses a positive attribute, that of being the cause of discomfort or annoyance. So the word unpleasant, notwithstanding its negative form, does not connote the mere absence of pleasantness, but a less degree of what is signified by the word painful, which, it is hardly necessary to say, is positive. Idle, on the other hand, is a word which, though positive in form, expresses nothing but what would be signified either by the phrase not working, or by the phrase not disposed to work; and sober, either by not drunk or by not drunken.

According to Mill, 'there is a class of names called privative.'²⁸ A privative name is equivalent in its signification to a positive and a negative name taken together; being the name of something which has once had a particular attribute or for some other reason might have been expected to have it, but which has it not. Such is the word blind, which is not equivalent to not seeing or to not capable of seeing, for it would not, except by a poetical or rhetorical figure be applied to stocks and stones. A thing is not usually said to be blind, unless the class to which it is most

²⁷ Ibid. p. 103.

²⁸ Ibid. p. 111.

familiarly referred, or to which it is referred on the particular occasion, be chiefly composed of things which can see, as in the case of a blind man, or a blind horse; or unless it is supposed for any reason that it ought to see; as in saying of a man, that he rushed blindly into an abyss, or of philosophers or the clergy that the greater part of them are blind guides. The names called privative, therefore connote two things: the absence of certain attributes, and the presence of others, from which the presence also of the former might naturally have been expected.

Critical observation of Mill's Theory of Proper Names

We have already stated that Mill actually brings the concept of proper names in the arena of linguistic philosophy or philosophy of language. Even though the later development of the theory of proper names takes different philosophical implications, but there is no question of doubt that philosophers like Russell and Frege took clues from Mill's theory of proper names. Even the concept of proper name that we have noticed in Kripke's philosophy is somehow or other is Millian. We think that Millian understanding of the concept of proper name as non-connotative impacts a lot on those linguistic philosophers who have developed no-sense theory of proper name. In short, there is no question of doubt that Mill's book *A System of Logic* brings a unique concept of proper names on which linguistic philosophers later on pay much attention. In recent time some philosophers, such as, Michael Devitt and Kim Sterelny raise some objections against Mill's theory of proper names. Mill held that the meaning of a name is just the referent of the name. In this regard, he says, "...proper names are not connotative: they denote the individuals who are called by them; but they do not indicate or imply any attribute as belonging to those individuals."²⁹ Devitt and Sterelny in their book *Language and Reality: An Introduction to Philosophy of Language* go

²⁹ Mill, *A System of Logic*, op. cit. p.20

over four well-known arguments against Mill's theory. In this regard, they follow Frege and postulate sense. However, David Cole in his recent paper entitled "A Defense of Mill's Theory of Names" supported Mill by giving plausible answers to the objections raised by Devitt and Sterelny against Mill.

The first objection that has been raised by Devitt and Sterelny against Mill is about identity statements. According to Devitt and Sterelny, the statement 'Everest is Everest' is not informative, whereas the statement "Everest is Gaurisanker" is informative. On Mill's account, they have the same meaning by virtue of the fact that they refer to the same object. However, according to Devitt and Sterelny, the sentences as cited above do differ in meaning. As the sentences under consideration differ in meaning, the names containing these sentences also differ in meaning. Accordingly, Mill view is wrong because Mill tells us that the meaning of a name is just the referent of the name.

To overcome this objection as raised by Devitt and Sterelny against Mill, David Cole intends to say that this objection to Mill's theory turns on epistemic considerations that are irrelevant to the semantics of names. By arguing that the sentences differ in meaning, Devitt and Sterelny actually have intended to say that as these sentences play different roles in peoples' lives, "they are epistemically and cognitively so different"³⁰ However, Cole claims that they do not show that any of that sentence bears on meaning, particularly on their prefer account of meaning in terms of truth conditions. Cole then quips: why should we suppose that the two sentences differ in truth-conditions, given that 'Everest' and 'Gaurisanker' co-refer? How do we know that the first sentence is true? Is it not a contingent rule that in a single context each occurrence of a name

³⁰ Devitt and Sterelny, *Language and Reality: An Introduction to Philosophy of Language*, Basil Blackwell, 1987, p.26.

has the same referent as every other? If it does, then that only tells us pseudo-apriori that the first is true, not what it means. Again if it does, then Cole observes that someone could know that the first is true without knowing what it means. Accordingly, the meaning of the referring term "Everest" is irrelevant to the special epistemic status that the first sentence enjoys. It enjoys that status only because of certain knowledge we have about how our language works. According to Cole, Mill perhaps could concur that the two sentences differ in that we might know that the first is true but not know that the second is true. However, this does not lead us to assume that we come to know what either means, or do we know that they differ in meaning. Let us consider the following two meta-statements:

"Everest" and "Everest" co-refer.

"Everest" and "Gaurisankar" co-refer.

If we carefully examine these statements, it seems to us that at this meta-level, it is true on Mill's theory that the first statement is not informative, but the second may be an important discovery. What then is the discovery? According to Cole, the discovery is a discovery about the same meaning of "Everest" and "Gaurisanker". As Mill's theory assumes that the former sentence is inconsequential but the later can be an important discovery, the difference can hardly be cited against Mill's theory of name. Cole then concludes by saying that it is quite possible to assume that at times sentences under consideration have the same meaning even though not all people know this. When this happens, the sentence will play different roles in those people's lives and may have different epistemic status.

The second objection is about *negative existence statements*. Indeed negative existence sentence creates immense trouble in philosophy of language. According to Devitt and Sterelny, if Mill's view of proper

name holds good then the true sentence “James Bond does not exist”, would have a subject term having no referent at all. As a result, it can be said that Mill’s theory of name would lack all meaning as Mill emphatically confessed that the referent is the only meaning a name has. Now the problem that arises here is that how a sentence would be true even if its subject term, i.e., the name indeed lacks referent.

According to Cole, sentence about existence statement as cited above actually concerns *the exotic or striking realm of truth in fiction*. Perhaps the sentence can best be understood as saying: The “James Bond”- stories are fictional. In such a case even though, prima-facially, the works which appear to refer to one “James Bond”, but in real sense of the term “James Bond” does not, in fact, refer. Such way of understating has been attributed by Quine as “semantic ascent” where one can move to the meta-level and produce paraphrases of the original sentence. This is similar to the way we may treat the ‘nobody’ constructions in the King’s confusions in Alice in Wonderland. Here we use paraphrases to clarify and avoid unwanted ontological commitment. In the process of paraphrasing there we notice a considerable departure. Here what appears to be a referential position in the original sentence does not occupy that position in the paraphrases that more clearly capture the truth-conditions. As the sentence under consideration is fictional, the paraphrase involves talking about certain myths and works of fiction. This move, Cole opines, however, does not involve us in assuming that “James Bond” refers to a “fictional character” nor even to an idea so to speak; rather it simply suggests that like “nobody”, “James Bond” does not refer to anyone or anything at all.

The second objection of Devitt and Sterelny about negative existence statement actually leads to the third objection that has been termed as *Empty Names Objections*. According to Devitt and Sterelny, the sentence

'James Bond is disgustingly successful'- is true. But on Mill's account the sentence could not be true as the subject term of the sentence under consideration does not denote. As the subject term fails to denote anything, it would be meaningless and this, in turn, would make the sentence meaningless. Devitt and Sterelny thus elevate objection by saying that don't try to tell us it refers to a fictional character which gives us all sense of reality or do not pretend to being it scientific or an idea.

In replying the objection raised by Devitt and Sterelny against Mill, Cole inclines to say that this sentence and other sentences, very similar to this, are misleading in nature which does not hamper Mill's original position of proper names. Indeed, Cole observes, these are peculiar constructions on which to rest a refutation of a theory. In fact, anyone who did not know the Fleming stories would indeed suppose that there was a real person named "James Bond" Therefore, Cole claims that prima facially this sentence appears to be misleading. Even one should not reject outrightly the concept of truth in fiction. Even David Lewis holds that truth conditions are close to those in "Truth in Fiction". In case of truth in fiction, we do enter into a little make-believe pretence where the stories are supposed to be true. Accordingly, it has been suggested by saying that there is no incompatibility with Mill's theory as far as handing fictional truth we are talking about. According to Cole, if "James Bond" actually denoted a person with the biography set forth by Fleming that person would be disgustingly successful. Cole insists that in the original sentence, we are not trying to refer by uttering "James Bond", rather we are making a claim about the representations made in the novels.

The fourth objection has been termed as *opacity* by Devitt and Sterelny. According to Devitt and Sterelny, sentences such as:

- (a) Falwell believes Bob Dylan corrupted America and

(b) Falwel does not believe Robert Zimmerman corrupted America are both true.

However, as far as Mill's theory is concerned Bob Dylan and Robert Zimmerman are the same person because these names mean the same thing. As a result, it can be said that both the sentences mean the same thing (compositionality). However, the only notable distinction is that sentence (a) is affirmative; whereas sentence (b) is negative. However, Devitt and Sterelny claim that on the basis of these sentences, it can be said that Mill's theory actually suffers from contradiction. According to Cole the problem with this objection actually lies in finding out the correct distinction between *referring* and *mentioning*. Linguistic philosophers often confuse in finding out the subtle distinction between *mentioning and referring*. Accordingly, if we do not use the names "Bob Dylan" and "Robert Zimmerman" in terms of referring but to use and understand these names in terms of mentioning, then the objection that has been raised by Devitt and Sterelny against Mill in terms of opacity does not find its foothold. According to Cole, here we are describing a certain mental representation that Falwell has. Even if Falwell believes "Boby Dylan corrupted America", and also even if he believes " Bob Dylan" is a name of a person who corrupted America, this does not make inconsistent with Mill's view. According to Cole, in *de dicto* belief attribution the attributer is not using the terms in the attribution, and importantly is not using them to refer. Further, an atheist, Cole opines, does not contradict himself in saying "Falwell believes God will punish Bob Dylan". This is simply for the fact that here on account of *de dicto* readings of belief attribution, there is mention of terms where referring is irrelevant. Further, let us consider a parallel argument to this objection to Mill, which does not turn on Mill's theory but rather on ordinary synonymy: Falwell believes telling lies is immortal, but Falwell does not

believe mendacity is immortal. Here the term ‘mendacity’ and ‘telling lies’ mean the same thing. Accordingly, the sentences are contradictory in the sense that both are true even though they possess different sense. Cole thus suggests that the problem that has been raised by Devitt and Sterelny against Mill’s theory will be solved if we do not take the opaque contexts *as use, but as mention*. There is nothing wrong in claiming that two expressions that mean the same thing might appear in otherwise identical *de- dicto* belief attributions where the one be true and the other be false. Accordingly, there is nothing surprising if this actually happens with names. If it does, then there remains nothing wrong in Mill’s theory. Therefore, the objection that has been raised against Mill’s theory in terms of opacity fails to stand up.

.....X.....

Chapter Two

Russell's theory of Proper Names

Russell's theory of proper name may be said to be a development of some of the basic ideas of J.S. Mill, because Mill was the first philosopher who ingrained the seed of proper name. From Mill's classification of names, Russell takes some clues in developing his theory of the concept of proper name. Although, Russell's interpretation of proper name is more logical than philosophical, he, however, agrees with Mill in maintaining that proper names are devoid of all connotation i.e., devoid of descriptive content or meaning. But Russell equally differs from Mill in maintaining that the expressions which Mill used as proper names in ordinary usage are not proper names at all, they are only abbreviated or 'disguised descriptions'.³¹

In comparison to other philosophers, we think Russell's philosophical understanding of proper name is more technical as well as logical. Of course, there is no question of doubt that Russell's understanding of proper name is a development of some of the basic ideas of J.S. Mill, but Russell differs from Mill on many accounts. However, before delving into this issue, let us, at first, define straightway what does Russell actually mean by a proper name. The basic idea of Russell's theory of proper name is, we think, the contrast between name and what he calls's description. 'Scott' is a name, but 'the author of Waverly' is a description. 'Armstrong' is a name but 'the first man on the moon' is a description. According to Russell, 'a name in the strict sense of the term can never be a description and a description in the strict sense of the term can never be name.'³²

³¹ Russell, B. "Description" in *The Philosophy of Language*, ed. A.P. Martinich. P. 212-18.

³² Ibid. p. 213.

Unlike other philosophers, Russell classifies names into two different types, such as, logical proper names and ordinary proper names. According to Russell a logical proper name is a name that can be known by acquaintance; whereas an ordinary proper name which apparently looks like a proper name, but in the true sense of the term it is a disguised or abbreviated descriptions. Thus for Russell, ordinary proper names are not proper in the strict logical sense. Accordingly, we have two different approaches in Russell's philosophy of language. The theory that has been developed by Russell on the basis of logical proper name is known as *the realist theory of naming* and the theory that has been developed by Russell on the basis of ordinary proper names is called description theory of naming. Therefore, in the First Section of this sequel, we explain Russell's realist theory of naming and in the Second Section of this sequel; we analyse and examine Russell's description theory of naming.

First Section

Russell's Realist theory of Proper Names

From the above idea that there is an irreducible contrast between a name and a description, Russell seems to have picked up the difference in function between the subject and predicate of a categorical proposition, i.e., subject-predicate statement. Consider the statement: "Socrates is human". Here the subject 'Socrates' is a name because it mentions or refers to an individual, and the predicate 'human' describes the individual by ascribing some properties, namely, the humanly properties, to it. So Russell says that the function of the subject is that of naming and not one of describing, while the function of the predicate is that of describing and not one of naming. One may think that the subject of a categorical statement may look like to be descriptions but this appearance is illusory. Because such statements are not categorical rather they are general. For

example 'Man is a social animal'. Here the subject term 'man' looks like a particular name but it is not a particular rather it is a general name because it designates an indefinite number of individuals, hence it is not categorical statement but general statement. Again, Russell says that a general statement would be either universal or particular and it can show that no general statement is categorical in the strict logical sense of the term. Thus, the above statement can be reduced to the universal conditional: 'For all values of x, if x is a man then x is a social animal' wherein the word 'man' has been removed to the predicate position, to which alone it legitimately belongs. One consequence of the thesis that 'no general statement is categorical is indeed that all categorical statements are singular, and this consequence is accepted by Russell'³³. Another consequence of this thesis is that all names are singular names, and that there are no general names. This consequence is also accepted by Russell, and by accepting it he rejects Mill's classification of names into singular and general. According to Russell, name means singular name but there are no general names. He says that a singular name always occupies the *subject position* of a categorical proposition and that a general name is not genuine name rather it is general description which occupies the *predicate position*. So, a general name is not really a genuine name in proper, description always inheres into this name.

Russell says that a genuine name does not have any descriptive function or it can not have any descriptive content either. According to him, if a name is not devoid of all descriptive content, then it cannot be a name in proper. Thus Russell arrives at the position very similar to the one which was taken earlier by Mill, namely that proper names are non-connotative, for what Mill calls 'connotation' is virtually the same as what Russell

³³ Ibid p. 214.

calls 'descriptive content or meaning'.³⁴ According to Russell a genuine name always non-connotative in the sense that it can always designate the single object or an attribute only. It does not have connotation nor have any meaning. For Mill a connotative term is that which designates the individual and its attributes only. For Russell if a proper name does not have any connotation or meaning or descriptive content then it designates the object directly. So for him, all proper names that do not have any connotation are genuine names which are directly acquainted with the object.

Mill's classification of name is fully rejected by Russell. Mill classifies name into singular and general. Singular names also divided into concrete and abstract and concrete names also divided into connotative and non-connotative. Again Mill says that general name can be divided into concrete and abstract. The whole of this classification is rejected by Russell, for there are no general names as all names are singular, and there are no connotative names as the so-called connotative names, being descriptions, are not names at all. It is not difficult to maintain that the terms which Mill calls 'general names' are not genuine names, for they can always be removed to predicate position in the manner explained above. But it seems more difficult to maintain that the terms which he calls 'singular connotative names' are not names at all. Take the term 'the present king of France'. Since it is connotative, it is not a name, says Russell. But if it is not a name then it should be a predicate. But it can not be a predicate for it applies, if at all, to only one individual, while all predicates are universal. So it seems that the term 'the present king of France' is a name after all, for if it to be used at all in a statement it should be used in the subject position, and what can be so used in the subject position should be regarded as a name. Russell solves this

³⁴ Ibid. p. 215.

difficulty by saying that this term is neither a predicate nor a name; it is an 'incomplete symbol'³⁵ which has an altogether different function in the statement in which it may happen to occur. The rule that the expression must occur either in the subject position or in the predicate position is valid only in the case of a statement which is genuinely categorical and thus admits of a clean subject-predicate analysis. But the statements in which the expression 'the present king of France' might occur are not genuine categorical statements, and they do not admit of a clean subject-predicate analysis. The expression 'The present king of France is bald' is equivalent with 'There is atleast one x, such that x is king of France, and for all y, y is king of France if and only if y is identical with x, and x is bald'; and consequently, it is not a categorical, but a general statement. It is also noteworthy that, after the analysis is made, the expression 'the present King of France' no longer occurs in the statement to trouble us.

Russell goes against Mill's view that 'Paul', 'Caesar', 'John'; 'Brown' etc. is all ordinary proper names. Here Russell says that these names are not really names but disguised descriptions. In fact, all the names which we, as well as the grammarians, should usually call 'proper names' would be regarded as *disguised descriptions or abbreviated descriptions* by Russell. So 'Socrates' is only an abbreviation of 'the Master of Plato' or 'the philosopher who drank hemlock', and 'Homer' is only an abbreviation of 'the author of the Iliad and the Odyssey'. The only expressions which can be regarded as proper names, in the strict logical sense of the term, are demonstratives, and, particularly, the demonstratives 'this', 'that', 'it' and the pronoun, such as 'I'. Russell says that only logically proper names are the genuine proper names. So, according to Russell names are divided into two types such as logically proper names and ordinary proper names.

³⁵ Ibid. p. 215.

Russell's division of proper names into logical proper names and ordinary proper names

Russell classifies name into two types such as logically proper name and ordinary proper name. Russell has two theories of name. One applies to what he calls 'logically proper names' and is associated with the realist theory of meaning and the principle of acquaintance. The other applies to what he calls 'ordinary proper names. For example Aristotle, Troy' Margaret, etc. are ordinary proper names. These are 'truncated or telescoped' descriptions."³⁶ Russell's over all account regarding proper names has two aspects. On the one hand, there is a body of doctrines which supposedly effect is contrast between two semantic functions, one ascribed to logically proper names, and the other ascribed to descriptions. We shall call these functions, respectively, naming and describing. Unlike many philosophers, Russell classifies name into two types, such as logically proper name and ordinary proper name. According to Russell, a logically proper name is a genuine name whereas an ordinary proper name is not a genuine proper name but an *abbreviated description*. Russell actual says that although an ordinary proper name apparently looks like a name, but it is a *disguised description*. So Russell strictly rejects 'ordinary proper name as a genuine proper name.'³⁷

Russell makes a distinction between ordinary proper name and logically proper name. Russell says that an ordinary proper name is known by *description*; whereas a logical proper name is known by *acquaintance*. Russell says that a logically proper name has some fundamental features which are as follows:

(a) A logically proper name, for Russell, is a singular name.

³⁶Russell, B. 'Principle of Logical Atomism', in *Contemporary British Philosophy: Personal Statements*, First Series, London and New York, 1924. p. 243.

³⁷ Ibid. p. 244.

(b) Since a logically proper name is singular, it is equally to be a particular.

(c) A logically proper name can take the subject position alone.

(d) A logically proper name, according to Russell, is devoid of any descriptive content.

(e) A logically proper name is known by acquaintance.

By understanding a logically proper name as singular as well as a particular, Russell thereby means the individual constant of formal logic. According to Russell, only demonstrative pronouns, such as-‘this’, ‘that’, ‘it’, etc. are used to refer to one’s current *sense data* and the pronoun ‘I’.³⁸ He held that ordinary proper names are really abbreviated or disguised definite descriptions. Definite descriptions, in turn, according to Russell’s famous theory of description, function not as referring expressions but as *quantificational phrases*. So far we have discussed Russell’s theory of logically proper names. Now we propose to discuss ordinary proper name as the theory of Description or definite description or disguise description.

Second Section

Russell’s Description theory of Proper Names

Russell’s theory of descriptions (RTD) can be appreciated against the background of Russell’s view about the connections between language and the world, although this view is not itself a part of the theory. Russell held that one can infer things about the nature of the world by examining the language that truthfully describes the world. In his *Principles of Mathematics* (1903),³⁹ he held that every well formed denoting phrase

³⁸ Ibid. p. 245.

³⁹ .Russell, B. *Principles of Mathematics* , 2nd edn (London: George Allen and Unwine, 1937)

denotes, and that definite description, phrases of the form of “the-so-and-so”, denotes the right things-things satisfying the descriptions. This view suggests that such definite descriptions as “The Golden Mountain”, and “The Round Square”, “The winged horse of Greek Mythology” do in fact, denote things that fit or satisfy them. RTD, originally set forth in Russell’s, “On Denoting” (1905)⁴⁰ represents his attempt to account for the meaningfulness of sentences in which such expressions occur in a way that does not commit him to the existence of such entities.

Russell Theory of Description is used to analyze sentences in which definite descriptions occur in places in which proper names may occur. It is an early work in analytic philosophy and it represents one form of philosophical analysis. Such a sentence as,

- (1) John is bald is a subject- predicate sentence containing an occurrence of the proper name “John”.

The sentence,

(2) The tallest spy is bald, appears to be a subject-predicate sentence in which the definite description, “the tallest spy” occurs the place in which the proper name, ‘john’ occurs in (1). This theory entails that these two sentences should not be treated in the same way; definite description should not be treated as if they were proper names. Russell maintained that although sentences, like (2) , have the grammatical form of subject-predicate sentences, they do not have the logical form of subject-predicate sentences, and that the correct analysis of such a sentence as the (2), will not treat it as a subject-predicate sentence. He was led to this position by three ‘motivating puzzles.’⁴¹

A. Scott and the author of Waverly.

⁴⁰ Russell. B. ‘On Denoting’, *Mind*, 14 (1905), pp. 479-93.

⁴¹ *Ibid.* p. 480.

B. The king of France.

C. The difference between A and B.

(A) 'Scott and the author of Waverly.'

Russell observed that a sentence like,

(3) George IV wished to know if Scott is the author of Waverly,

Might well be true, even though

(4) George IV wished to know if Scott is Scott,

was false and

(5) Scott is the author of Waverly,

was true. If (3) is true, then it would appear that George IV was uncertain

about the truth of (5) and if (4) were true, it would appear that George IV

was uncertain about the truth of

(6) Scott is Scott

Furthermore, if (5) is true, and the expression "the author of Waverley,"

functioned as a proper name in (5), then (5) would appear to say the same

thing as (6). Yet, if (5) and (6) said the same thing, it is hard to see how

(3) could be true while (4) is false.

B 'The present king of France.'

Russell observed that sentence,

(7) The present King of France is bald,

is not true. France is not a monarchy. He also maintained that

(8) The present king of France is not bald,

is not true. For the set of non-bald things does not contain a present king

of France. The law of excluded middle,

LEM (Law of excluded middle) for any proposition p , either p is true or

not- p , the negation or denial of p , is true,

It seems to imply that there is no middle ground-for any given sentence, either 'that sentence or its denial is true.'⁴² Since (7) is not true and (8) is the apparent denial of (7), it would seem to follow that (8) is true. We have seen, however, that there are reasons for thinking that (8) is not true. C. 'The difference between A and B.'⁴³

Two quantities, A and B, are of the same magnitude: $A-B=0$. Hence, there is no numerical difference between A and B. We might then think that

(9) There is no difference between A and B,
is true; this, in turn, suggests that

(10) The difference between A and B does not exist,
is true.

(10), if true, would appear to attribute non-existence to the difference between A and B; that would seem to entail that the difference between A and B is such that it does not exist.

However, how can the difference between A and B be such that it does not exist, if, in fact, there is no such thing as the difference between A and B? Hence, it seems that there is no way to deny truthfully that a given thing exists.

Russellian solution of the puzzles

Russell's solution to these puzzles is to stop treating sentences containing definite descriptions as if the descriptions functioned as proper names. Russell had treated such expressions as, "The Present king of France," "the round square," and "the difference between A and B," as he treated proper names, and would treat sentences in which such expressions occur as grammatical subjects as if they were 'genuine subject-predicate

⁴² Ibid. p. 483.

⁴³ Ibid. pp. 483-85.

sentences.’⁴⁴ Under RTD, such sentences would be regarded as existentially quantified general sentences.

Such a sentence as

(11) Some person is wise,

It is an existentially quantified sentence. Russell would analyze, or interpret, (11) as:

(12) There is an x such that x is a person and x is wise.

Russell maintained that despite their apparent grammatical form that of subject-predicate sentences—the sentence that gives rise to the puzzles are, in fact, *existentially quantified sentences*. They have the grammatical form of subject-predicate sentence but the logical form of existentially quantified sentences, and it is the logical form of sentences that should serve as our guide for drawing inferences from sentences.

On the analysis afforded by RTD,

(5) Scott is the author of Waverley is analyzed as

(5’) There is an x such that x authored Waverley, x alone authored Waverley, and x is Scott.

Therefore, on this analysis,

3) George IV wished to know if Scott is the author of Waverley, which contains (5) as an embedded clause, is analyzed as

(3’) George IV wished to know if there is an x such that x authored Waverly, x alone authored Waverley, and x is Scott.

It is generally recognized that (3’) could be true even if (4) is false, and, hence that, as analyzed by the theory, that (3) can be true even if (4) is false.

Now the sentence

(7) The present King of France is bald,

is analyzed as:

⁴⁴ Ibid. p. 486.

(7') There is an x such that x is a present King of France, nothing else is a present king of France, and x is bald.

This sentence is false; France is not a monarchy. The theory yields two analyses of the sentence

(8) The present king of France is not bald.

One of the two analyses is,

(8w) There is an x such that: x is a present King of France, nothing else is a present king of France, and x is not bald.

The other of the two analyses is,

(8n) it is not the case that there is an x such that: x is a present King of France, nothing else is a present king of France, and x is not bald.

(8w), the interpretation of (8) on which the definite description gets "wide scope," is false; it falsely asserts that there is a present King of France, and then goes on to assert that there is just one such king, and that he is bald.

But since France is not a monarchy, there is no present king of France, (8n), the interpretation of (8) on which the definite description gets "narrow scope," is true; for it asserts the denial of (7'), and (7') is false. In this way, Russell satisfied the requirement that either (7) or its denial is true; for, strictly speaking, (8n), and not (8w) is the denial of (7') – and (7') is the theory's analysis of (7).

Finally,

(13) The difference between A and B exists.

It is analyzed as:

(13') there is an x such that x is a difference between A and B and x alone is a difference between A and B,

And (13') can be false in the case where there is no such thing as the difference between A and B. As a result, one can truthfully assert the existence of something. That is,

(14') It is not the case that there is an x such that x is a difference between A and B and x alone is a difference A and B .

RTD also analyzes sentences that contain indefinite descriptions. Such a sentence as:

(15) A man is running,

It contains the indefinite description, "a man". In a place that could be occupied by a proper name. Russell maintained that such expressions should not, however, be treated as proper names, and would have offered something like,

(15') :There is an x such that x is a man and x is running,

As an analysis of (15).

The Significance of Russell's Description theory of Names

The theory of description has already been discussed above. Let us now explicate the significance of Russell's description theory of naming. According to Russell, definite description is a disguise description, it is not an actual proper name but it has played an important role in philosophy. One major point here is summed up in the slogan: "definite descriptions are incomplete symbols". What does Russell mean by an incomplete symbol? Here he says, "a symbol which is not supposed to have any meaning in isolation, but is only defined in certain contexts".⁴⁵ Why should we think that, according to the theory of descriptions, a definite description has no meaning in isolation? Russell's fundamental idea of meaning is referential: a symbol has a meaning if it stands for something, and the thing for which it stands is its meaning. There is a certain sense in which a definite description may stand for some thing—"The President of the USA in 1999" we may say, stands for a certain

⁴⁵ Russell, B. "Principia Mathematica", *Mind*. vol. 1, 1913. p. 66.

man. But according to the theory of descriptions, a definite description does not function referentially. In a proposition expressed by a sentence using a definite description, that is to say, 'there is no entity for which the definite description stands.'⁴⁶ The proposition expressed by "The President of the USA in 1999" does not contain Bill Clinton. Nor does it contain a denoting concept which denotes him. There is no entity in that proposition for which the definite description stands. That is what Russell means by saying that 'definite descriptions have no meaning in isolation.'⁴⁷ Sentences in which definite descriptions occur, however, often succeed in expressing propositions: the sentences as a whole are meaningful. This is what Russell means by saying that definite descriptions, like other incomplete symbols, are "defined in certain contexts". An incomplete symbol makes a systematic contribution to a sentence in which it occurs; only it does not do so by indicating an entity which is contained in the proposition.

The idea of an incomplete symbol made an immense difference to Russell's thought. Before "On Denoting"⁴⁸ he had generally taken the unit of analysis to be subsentential. A referring term, or a predicate, is analyzed to see exactly what entity it stands for. A paradigm here is the analysis of numbers in terms of classes: we understand a number word by seeing that it should be taken as standing for a certain class. Another way of putting the same point is to say that analysis will, at least in general, leave unaltered the overall form of the sentence being analyzed. The constituents of the proposition may not be those suggested by the parts of the sentence, but each part of the sentence will generally stand for some constituent in the proposition, and the constituents will generally be arranged in the sort of way suggested by the arrangement of the parts of

⁴⁶ Ibid. p. 67.

⁴⁷ Ibid. p. 68.

⁴⁸ Russell, B. 'On Denoting', *Mind*, 14, 1905.

the sentence. Thus in "Principles of Mathematics" he says: "The correctness of our philosophical analysis of a proposition may... be usefully checked by the exercise of assigning the meaning of each word in the sentence expressing the proposition. On the whole, grammar seems to me to bring us much nearer to a correct logic than the current opinions of philosophers...."⁴⁹

After "On Denoting", Russell's idea of analysis is quite different. He comes to assume that analysis of a sentence will generally reveal that it expresses a proposition of a quite different logical form. The unit of analysis becomes the sentence, and Russell's attention is focused on the logical forms of propositions. The analysis of sentences containing definite descriptions is a paradigm here: the sentence has subject-predicate form, but analysis in accordance with the theory of descriptions reveals that it expresses a proposition which is an existential quantification.

A consequence of Russell's new view is that he comes to take it for granted that 'our ordinary language is generally misleading.'⁵⁰ In sharp contrast to his view in principles, he holds that our sentences generally have forms quite different from the real forms of the propositions which they express. A primary task of philosophy thus becomes that of getting past the misleading surface structure of language to the underlying structure. Here we have a crucial contribution to an important theme in twentieth century analytic philosophy quite generally: the idea that language is systematically misleading in philosophically significant ways. We also have one of the points of origin for the more specific idea of a contrast between the surface structure of language and its deep structure,

⁴⁹ Russell, B. "*The Principles of Mathematics*", Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1910-13. p.42.

⁵⁰ Wittgenstein, L. "*Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*", (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1922). P.13.

or between grammatical form and underlying logical form. Along with this, however, Russell is also forced to pay more attention to language and symbolism. In principle, language in the sense was never at the centre of his attention; he treated it as a more or less transparent medium through which we can perceive the underlying reality which is our concern. Now, he has to be more self-conscious about symbolism, if only to avoid being misled by it. In a course of his lectures given early in 1918, Russell said: "There is a great deal of importance of philosophy in the theory of symbolism, a good deal more than at one time I thought. I think the importance is almost entirely negative, i.e., the importance lies in the fact that unless you are fairly self-conscious about symbol...you will find yourself attributing to the thing properties which only belong to the symbol".⁵¹

This shift of attention towards language- towards the actual words spoken or written- was to be of the greatest importance both for Russell's own thought and for that of philosophers who came after him.

A further aspect of the importance of the idea of an incomplete symbol in Russell's thought is simple that it goes along with the notion of contextual definition- that is, that in order to define a symbol it is sufficient to define the contribution that it makes to all the sentences in which it may occur. This was an idea that Russell exploited increasingly over the ensuing ten years, perhaps most notably with his definition of classes in terms of propositional functions. According to this definition, a subject-predicate sentence whose subject is a class symbol is to be understood as an existential quantification, asserting the existence of a propositional function satisfying certain conditions.

⁵¹ Russell, B. "Principle of Logical Atomism", papers 8, 1972. p. 166.

Russell's idea of an incomplete symbol is clearly new with "On Denoting".⁵² According to the theory of denoting concepts definite descriptions do stand for constituents of propositions, namely, denoting concepts; hence they are not incomplete symbols. In the case of other, Russellian ideas which are also associated with the theory of descriptions, however, the contrast is less clear-cut. I have in mind here Russell's views having to do with names, acquaintance, and the elimination of non-existent concreta. These views could have been developed in the context of the theory of denoting concepts and to a limited extent were. But it was the theory of descriptions which provided the context within which the views were developed in detail. To some extent, we may have here coincidences of timing: Russell's views on a number of related topics began to shift, or at least to become sharper, at around the same time that he developed the theory of descriptions or perhaps a little earlier. This may not entirely be a matter of coincidence, however, Russell's theory of denoting concepts was, as we have emphasized, in rather an open conflict with his fundamental metaphysical tenets. Under these circumstances, one might expect him to shrink from taking steps which would require heavy use of that theory. The theory of descriptions (except for the worry about generality) was, by contrast, right in line with his basic views, and it is not surprising that he was ready to exploit it to the full.

Let us begin with the question of one-existent concreta- whether there is, in some sense, such a thing as the planet Vulcan or the present king of France. As we saw, the theory of denoting concepts, in fact, gives Russell the means to avoid accepting that there are any such things. He can say that whenever we appear to have a proposition containing a non-existent concretum, what we really have is a proposition containing a denoting

⁵² Russell, B. "On Denoting", *Mind* n. s. 14 (1905), pp. 479-93; Papers 4, pp. 415-27; very widely reprinted.

concept which lacks a denotation. Russell, as we saw, came to appreciate this possibility before “On Denoting”⁵³ but, whether by coincidence of timing or not, he does not fully exploit it. Once the theory of descriptions is in place, by contrast, he has no hesitation in exploiting that theory to rid his ontology of non-existent concreta. What appears to be a definite description of such an object is, of course, analyzed to show that the proposition does not contain the alleged object, but only properties which are claimed to be uniquely satisfied. More strikingly, names which appear to name such objects must be treated in the same fashion. They are, on this view, not genuine proper names at all, but rather disguised definite descriptions. Understanding a sentence in which a (non-genuine) name of this sort appears does not involve simply fastening the name to an object with which one is acquainted. It involves, rather, having in mind (being acquainted with) a property and asserting that it is uniquely satisfied.

How widely is this tactic to be applied? Obviously, it is to be applied whenever we have a sentence which appears or purports to be about a concrete object which in fact does not exist. What of sentences which appear to be about concrete objects which, as far as the speaker knows, may or may not exist? Russell seems to think that the analysis of a proposition should be available to one who understands it. But clearly he does not think that merely by analyzing propositions one can tell whether some supposed object in fact exists. So, the general rule is: if there is a proposition apparently about a certain concrete object, but the existence of that object is at all open to doubt then the proposition is to be analyzed in accordance with the theory of descriptions, i.e., as not really containing the object after all. So the presence of “a name in a sentence does not indicate the presence of the named object in the corresponding

⁵³ Ibid. p.418.

proposition unless we have a guarantee that the object really exists.”⁵⁴ Without such a guarantee the name is thus not, by Russell’s standards a genuine proper name at all.

What could give us such a guarantee? From within Russell’s thought, the answer is easy: our being acquainted with an object of course guarantees that it is real (and hence, if it is a concrete object that it exists). In a proposition which I can understand, all the constituents must be entities with which I am acquainted. At the end of “On Denoting” Russell claims that this principle- sometimes known as ‘the Principle of Acquaintance- is a result of the theory of descriptions.’⁵⁵ Superficially this claim is quite misleading. In one sense the Principle of Acquaintance is by no means new in Russell’s thought with the theory of descriptions; it is implicit, at least, in principle, and I think Russell would have accepted it at any time from 1900 onwards. But in a deeper sense there is something new. Russell’s denial of non-existent concreta goes along with a difference in the role that acquaintance plays in his thought. (This new role, and the denial of non-existent concreta, perhaps could have been worked out in terms of the theory of denoting concepts, but in fact were not.)

In principle Russell took a very lax attitude towards acquaintance: if the exigencies of his theorizing required that we be acquainted with objects of a certain kind, then he was willing to assert that we are, in fact, acquainted with objects of that kind. The notion of acquaintance, we might say, functioned to deflect epistemological worries but did not impose any constraints on Russell’s thought. This changes from 1905 on; over following decade the constraints imposed by the notion of acquaintance come to dominate his views. The denial of non-existent

⁵⁴ Ibid. p. 419.

⁵⁵ Russell, Bertrand. “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description” *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 11, 1910-11. p.154.

concreta is the first step in this process. We are not acquainted with the planet Vulcan. By the argument which we indicated above, it seems that we cannot be acquainted with the actual planet Mars either, since we have not absolute epistemological guarantee of its existence. But then it is clearly an open question: with what (concrete) objects are we acquainted? Once Russell's attention is focused on this question, he draws narrower and narrower limits to the scope of our acquaintance with concrete objects. (In the case of abstract objects, however, it is notable that Russell continues to think that acquaintance has a very wide scope; here, it seems, the notion continues to impose no independent constraints.)

Russell's thought after 1905(at least up to and including his lectures on the "Philosophy of Logical Atomism"⁵⁶, given in the first few months of 1918) thus makes heavy use of the theory of descriptions. He no longer took at face value most- or, as time went by almost all words which appears to refer to concrete objects, the most familiar words there are. Instead of being thought of as names of the relevant objects, such words were treated as definite descriptions, and analyzed accordingly. He invoked the notion of a sense-datum in order to have appropriate objects for us to be acquainted with. When I look at and touch a familiar table, say, what I am actually acquainted with is not the table itself but certain immediate deliverances of the senses-a certain colored shape and a certain sensation of hardness, perhaps. A sentence which is, as we ordinarily say, about the table, in fact expresses a proposition which does not contain the table itself but rather contains immediate deliverances of the senses- sense-data-and uses them to give a definite description of the table. Here we have a vivid illustration of the point made in connection with incomplete symbols: most sentences that we utter, perhaps in the end

⁵⁶ Russell, Bertrand. 1918 "*Philosophy of Logical Atomism*", papers 8, 1972. p. 154.

just about all of them, express propositions whose real constituents, and real structure, are quite different from what is suggested by the superficial structure of the sentence uttered. Language is systematically misleading.

Objections to Russell's description theory

The concern of this essay, as of this volume, is with Russell, to this point we have dealt primarily with Russell's reasons for adopting the theory of descriptions and with the significance of that theory in his thought. In this final section, however, we shall shift focus and consider objections made to Russell's theory since 1950. The discussion will, necessarily, be very brief; the aim is merely to give some idea of the best known objections to Russell's theory. These objections can be divided into two sorts: those that concern the analysis of definite descriptions and those that concern the idea that some or all proper names can be treated as if they were definite descriptions. It will be convenient to discuss these separately.

1. Objection to the theory as an analysis of definite description

One objection of this sort is put forward by Strawson, who argued that Russell's theory is mistaken or misleading about what we ordinarily mean by sentences of the form "The F is G". Such a sentence, Strawson claims, does not assert that there is one and only thing which is F, rather it presupposes that fact. If someone said that "The king of France is wise", then we would not say that he had said something false (as we should, on Russell's view), nor, of "would be inclined, with some hesitation" to say that "the question of whether his statement was true or false simply did not arise".⁵⁷

It is hard to assess this objection. One fundamental point at stake is how we are to think of the relation between ordinary language and the notation of modern logic, and on this point we have a true missing of minds. The

⁵⁷. Ibid. p. 154.

advantages of the sort of method of analysis that Russell adopts, it might be said, are precisely that they make explicit what is otherwise merely presupposed- that is, they replace presupposition with assertion. But this is the very thing to which Strawson objects. We can think of the advantages of the theory of descriptions as arising from the fact that it shows us how we can smoothly incorporate the idiom of definite descriptions into logic, with corresponding gains in clarity. Standard modern logic, the logic inherited from Frege and Russell, leaves no room for the category of the merely presupposed, as opposed to the asserted. Strawson rejects the theory of descriptions on the grounds that it does not do justice to the nuances of ordinary usage. Proponents of the theory, such as Quine, 'may insist upon the benefits of the theory in facilitating inference and may claim that strawson's concern with ordinary usage is not to the point.'⁵⁸ This may seem to leave matters at a complete impasse, but there is more that can be said on each side.

The Strawsonian side might emphasize that there are systems of logic which take some account of the idea of presupposition. This fact holds out the prospect of the best of both worlds: enabling us to have the advantages of representing our ordinary discourse in logical terms without giving up on idea of presupposition which is, presumably, part of that discourse. It may be doubted, however, whether any system of logic will really do what the Strawsonian wants. It may be doubted, that is to say, whether it is possible to do full justice to the nuance and subtlety of ordinary discourse while also imposing on that discourse the sort of clarity of form that would enable us to subject it to the mathematical treatment of modern logic.

⁵⁸ Quine, "*Ways of Paradox*", Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966, pp. 137-157.

On Russellian or Quinean side, it may be possible to undermine the idea that ordinary discourse is really committed to the notion of presupposition. Strawson bases his claim upon the fact that we do not actually say, of a sentence containing a definite description which we know to be empty, that it is false; we tend to use more complicated terms of criticism. For all that, it might be said, such sentences are false. The reason we do not call them false, according to this suggestion, is not that they are not false, or even that we do not hold them to be false. It is, rather, that calling them false is liable to be misleading, by suggesting that they are false in the most straightforward way. Our reluctance simply to say of such a sentence that it is false is, on this account, to be explained in terms of our wish to avoid misleading our audience- a reluctance which therefore does not suggest that the sentence is in fact anything other than false. 'This line of thought gets some encouragement and theoretical baking from ideas of Paul Grice's.'⁵⁹ Grice emphasizes that the thought conveyed in a sentence is often not, or not only, what the sentence literally says. Thus, to adopt his famous example, suppose I am asked to give my opinion of a student of mine who is being considered for a position teaching philosophy, and I say: "He has Beautiful handwriting, and is always punctual". If that is all that I say, then the reader of my letter will quite rightly infer that I have a poor opinion of the student's ability. Yet that is certainly not what my letter literally says, as is shown by the fact that I could without contradiction add a paragraph saying how able the student is, what a good philosopher, and how well read. Similarly, it might be said that our reluctance to say of a sentence such as "The King of France is bald" that it is false, and nothing else, arises from the fact that we could reasonably expect our audience to infer, from our

⁵⁹ Grice. Paul. "Logic and Conversation", in studies in the *Ways of Words*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989.

saying that, that there is a king of France; we wish to prevent that inference. So our reluctant to say that the sentence is false, even when all the facts are before us, may be compatible with the sentences in fact being false.

Another kind of criticism of the theory of descriptions arises from the fact that our definite descriptions are very often radically incomplete. Strawson gives as an example the sentence: "The table is covered with books"⁶⁰ Certainly there are contexts in which this sentence seems to express something true; yet there are, of course, a large number of tables in the world, not only one. The response to this sort of case is that much of what we say is dependent upon the context in which we say it, and not only when we are using definite descriptions. Russell was largely concerned with the context-independent propositions of mathematics, and so perhaps gave this point less weight than it should carry. On the way to a party with a group of friends I may say "No one knows the street number"; once safely at the party I may say "There's no more wine". In each case, the remark may be perfectly appropriate, yet each is obviously false unless one supposes some tacit restriction_ no one in my group of friends knows the street number; there is no more wine at the party . In the case of the table, if the remark is a sensible one then most likely we are in a room containing only one table, or one table in the room is more noticeable than any other . Yet perhaps there are cases where the room contains two tables, equally noticeable but for the fact that one of them is covered with books. In such a case "the table" is perhaps being used to mean "that table". Perhaps this usage can be dismissed as incorrect; if we accept it as correct, then we have here a limited class of exceptions to the theory of descriptions.

88. Strawson, *Logico-Linguistic Papers* 7, p. 14.

'Another category of criticism of the theory of descriptions is associated with Keith Donnellan.'⁶¹ Suppose we are at a party, and I see a man, looking slightly inebriated, drinking a clear liquid from a martini glass. (Suppose further, if you like, that there are open bottles of gin and vermouth on the table besides him, and that everyone else in the room is, quite evidently, drinking red wine.) I know that he is a famous philosopher, and say to you: "The man drinking the martini water is a famous philosopher". In fact, however, his glass contains water.

Building on this kind of example, Donnellan distinguishes two kinds of uses of the definite descriptions: the attributive use, which is as the theory of descriptions claims, and the referential use, in which a definite description is used simply to refer to some person or thing, without regard for whether the descriptive predicate in fact holds uniquely, or holds at all, of the object being referred to. On Donnellan's account, the example of the previous paragraph is a referential use. I use the phrase to refer to the inebriated-looking man with the martini glass and go on to say something about him; since he, in fact, is a famous philosopher, my utterance is true. As interpreted by the theory of descriptions, by contrast, the utterance is false (since there is no man- with in the relevant context- drinking a martini).

Donnellan appeals to the alleged fact that, in the above sort of example, the utterance clearly is a true one. But a number of philosophers who have discussed this sort of case dispute this claim. They appeal to the same Grecian distinction which we invoked above. Clearly, one of the things I mean when I make my remark is that that man, the one we can both see, is a famous philosopher. Perhaps, in context, it is clear that this is the thing I mostly mean to convey. Yet the fact is compatible with the

⁶¹ Donnellan, Keith. "Reference and Definite Descriptions", *Philosophical Review*, 77 (1966), pp. 203-215.

idea that what I literally say is something else, something in accord with the way the sentence reads according to the theory of descriptions. Further plausibility accrues to this idea from the thought that what I say at the party has both something right about it and something wrong. The Russellian line as supplemented by Grice seems able to do justice to this: what I literally say is false, but what I clearly mean to convey is correct. Donnellan's line, however, seems harder pressed to explain why there is anything at all wrong with what I say.

Both Donnellan and his opponents here agree that there is such a thing as what I literally say in such a case. Perhaps it is fitting to close this section on a note of partial skepticism about this assumption. If we are to fit our language into the scheme of logic, then we have to find a definite claim made by any given utterance. To think that Russell's theory gives us as good a way of doing this as any is compatible with acknowledging that any such schematization will distort our ordinary thought and language, if only because in causal contexts we are not as definite as logic requires.

2. Objections to the theory as a way of treating ordinary proper names

Our concern here is with objections not to Russell's analysis of definite descriptions but rather to the idea that it can be extended to ordinary proper names, via the claim that names are 'disguised definite descriptions'. All the objections that I shall mention are to be found in Kripke's "Naming and Necessity".⁶²

One objection here concerns the behavior of proper names and definite descriptions in counterfactual or modal contexts. Suppose I say for example,

a) Alexander Fleming might have died in childhood

⁶² Kripke, S. *Naming and Necessity*, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1980.

I am inviting my audience to imagine circumstances which (fortunately) did not actually occur. To whom, in those circumstances, does the name “Alexander Fleming” refer? To Alexander Fleming, the same person to whom it refers in fact, in the actual circumstances. But consider the description, “the inventor of penicillin”, which is perhaps the most plausible description to use if we think of the name as a disguised definite description. To whom does that description refer in the imagined circumstances? Not to Alexander Fleming, for in those circumstances he would not have been the inventor of penicillin. Kripke puts the point by saying that proper names are “rigid designators”, meaning that they designate the same thing in all possible circumstances; whereas a definite description is not, for it may designate various distinct objects in various counterfactual situations. Hence, he of course concludes, proper names cannot be satisfactorily analyzed as definition descriptions.

Kripke claims that this distinction can make a difference. Contrast a) with:

b) The inventor of penicillin might have died in childhood

a) seems to be straightforwardly true (at least as straightforwardly as claims about what might have been are). b) However, is less clear. If it is making the claim that penicillin might have been discovered by a child genius who then died young we may be inclined to dismiss it as false; discovering penicillin, in fact, took more scientific sophistication, and more time, than any child could have had. Clearly, however, this is not the only or even the most natural way in which to construe b). Perhaps because we tend to interpret what we are told charitably, we would be more likely to construe it as saying that the person who in fact (that is, in the actual circumstances, not in the counterfactual circumstances we are being asked to imagine) discovered penicillin might have died in childhood. This ambiguity can be captured by Russell’s analysis.

Another ground on which Kripke objects to using Russell's theory to analyze names is that people often use names although they have in mind nothing like an identifying description of the thing or person they are talking about. Kripke's example is the physicist, Feynman. Non-specialists are unlikely to be able to produce a definite description of him. Nevertheless, Kripke says: "The man in the street...may ...still use the name 'Feynman'. When asked he will say: well he's a physicist or something. He may not think that this picks out anyone uniquely. I still think he uses 'Feynman' as a name for Feynman".⁶³ It is, however, unclear that Kripke's man in the street really does lack identifying knowledge of Feynman, because he knows enough to use his name. The description: "famous physicist called Feynman" presumably applies uniquely to Feynman. Russell, indeed, seems to have anticipated this point. When we talk of Julius Caesar, he says: "We have in mind some description of Julius Caesar...perhaps, merely 'the man whose name was Julius Caesar'". Kripke objects to this idea on the grounds of circularity, but it is not clear that his objections in this regard are conclusive. If they are not, then one might use Russell's theory to get a picture not unlike that which Kripke himself suggests: some people have identifying descriptions of (say) Feynman which are independent of uses of his name; other (most of us) do not, but refer to him as the person called 'Feynman', the person so-called by member of the first group.

The last objection I shall consider arises in a different way. Most people who have a identifying description of Gödel which is not dependent upon his being called "Gödel" probably identify him as the person who proved the incompleteness of any formalization of arithmetic, or the person who proved the completeness of first-order logic. But, Kripke asks, what if the

⁶³ Dummett, M. Frege: *Philosophy of Language* (London: Duckworth, 1973), especially p. 81.

man called “Kurt Gödel”, who held a position at the institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, did not, in fact, prove those results? What if he stole them from someone else, who died “under mysterious circumstances”?⁶⁴ Nevertheless, Kripke maintains, our ordinary uses of the name “Gödel” would refer to the man who lived in Princeton, not the one who died in Vienna in the nineteen-thirties. Again, the example is compelling, however, it is not entirely clear that it shows as much as Kripke claims. For one thing, it may be that “the man who was called ‘Gödel’” is a crucial part of the identifying description of Gödel for all of us who did not actually know that famous logician. For another, the non-expert would perhaps make no very clear distinction between identifying Gödel as “the man who proved such and such” and identifying him as “the man who is widely thought to have proved such and such”. The experts to whom the second description implicitly defers would presumably have other ways of referring to Gödel, which would survive any discoveries about the true provenance of the theorems attributed to him.

.....X.....

⁶⁴ Ibid, p. 84.

Chapter Three

Frege's Descriptive Theory of Proper Names

Like Russell, Frege also introduces a descriptive theory of names. However, Frege differs from Russell on many accounts. Russell's theory of proper name is called referentially theory but Frege's theory of proper name is called sense theory. According to Frege, a proper name is a name of an object. It is fairly obvious that by 'a name of an object' he means 'a name of a single object'. So like Mill and Russell, he takes a proper name to be a singular name. But here a question arises: what does he means by an 'object'? Frege, however, does not explain in explicit term what he means by an object, but if we careful about his writings, we find some clues to understand what he actually means by an object. According to Frege, 'an object is not a concept that constitutes the reference of predicate.'⁶⁵ Thus, "in the statement 'Bucephalus is a horse', that which corresponds to the one place predicate 'is a horse' is a concept and that which corresponds to the expression 'Bucephalus' is an object."⁶⁶ Frege says, a concept can be converted into an object. Now we discuss with an example: how does a concept can be converted into an object? For example 'Buciphalus is a horse'; here the term 'horse' is a concept, because 'horse' is positioned in the predicate of this statement. Professor Sen says, in the statement "the concept horse is easily formed" the concept horse which takes the subject positioned does not occurs as a concept, but 'it occurs as an object'⁶⁷. Thus according to Frege, concept can be converted into an object. Like Russell, Frege also says that the subject and predicate of a statement are irreversible, that is, a proper

⁶⁵ Frege, G. *On Concept and Object* (Oxford, Blackwell, 1997). Pp. 121-30.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.* p. 123.

name which can figure as subject can never be figured as a predicate and what can be figured as a predicate can never be figured as a subject. According to Frege sense is most important to discuss the concept of proper name. Frege says “proper names have sense as well as reference.”⁶⁸ According to Frege ‘sense’ is the mode of presentation of an object. A proper name is meaningful if it has sense. Frege defines sense as *objective, eternal and timeless entities*. It is because of their objective nature they are distinguished from subjective or psychological experiences, such as, ideas and images. But how is this objective and independent nature of sense established? Frege takes the help of identity statement to establish this point. It is well known to mention here the details of Frege’s analysis. However, the basic import of Frege’s analysis may be briefly stated how sense constitutes the semantic blocks of language.

The two well-known examples of Frege’s identity statements are:

The morning star *is* the evening star.

The morning star *is* the morning star.

Both sentences are qualified as true identity statements. The reason for the first sentence being true is that the “two expressions ‘The morning star’ and ‘The evening star’ have the same referent.”⁶⁹ The reason for the second sentence being true is that it results from the first one by virtue of being substituted by co-referential expressions. It may be noted that there is a fundamental assumption involved here. The meaning of a sentence, according to Frege, is the function of its constituent parts. This is known as the compositionality theory of meaning. Considering this, the meaning of an expression will remain the same if an expression is substituted by another expression by retaining the same meaning. The same Fregean

⁶⁸ Frege, G. “On Sense and Reference” in *Translation from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege*, trans. Peter Geach and Max Black (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1952; Reprinted, 1977), pp. 56-78.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.* p. 56.

assumption holds in the present case also where 'the first sentence is said to have the same meaning as the second because the second sentence is obtained from the first sentence by way of the substitution of co-referential expressions.'⁷⁰

However, as Frege pointed out, both the sentences cannot have the same meaning on the three fundamental grounds. First, the first sentence expresses a contingent truth because the truth expresses can be always otherwise whereas the second sentence expresses a necessary truth. Second, the first sentence expresses aposteriori truth because its truth is known by empirical investigation, whereas the second sentence is an expression of apriori truth. Third, it is because of its empirical/ aposteriori character, the first sentence turns out to be informative whereas the necessary/apriori nature of the second sentence makes it uninformative.

In view of these differences, a question may now be raised: How do these sentences claim to have same meaning? This is where Frege introduced the notion of sense and made the distinction between sense and reference. According to Frege, the difference between these two sentences arises due to difference in sense. In other words, these two sentences differ in sense but they are same in reference. Linguistic expressions have this dual semantic character. There is the level of sense concerned with what the language expresses i.e., what the content of a sentence is. The other is the level of reference concerned with what the word/the sentence refer to. The sense structure of language essentially points out that there is a structure of thought which is represented in the structure of language. Hence, it is on the basis of sense that Frege explains the difference between two identity statements. Latter Frege distinguished between sense and reference.

⁷⁰ Ibid. p. 57.

Sense and Reference

Frege maintains that a proper name has both a sense and a reference, and what he means by 'sense' comes so close to what is called 'connotation' by Mill, and to what is called 'descriptive' meaning by Russell, that we can take all these terms to stand, at least, in the present context, for the same idea. The sense of a proper name is the mode of presentation of the object of which it is a name. The mode of presentation is the aspect or aspects under which the object is presented to us, when 'it is presented to us as the reference of the name.'⁷¹ This aspect of the object presumably consists in a set of properties which determine the object forces, since the sense of a name, Frege says, is the concept of the object which the name is a name of, and concepts have been explicitly equated with properties by Frege.

Equally, Frege, of course, faces some challenging questions which are not altogether easy to answer. Is it a relation or relation between objects, or between names or signs of objects? In *Begriffsschrift* Frege assumed the latter. The reasons which seem to favour this are the following: $a=a$ and $a=b$ is obviously statements of differing cognitive value; $a=a$ holds a priori and according to Kant, is to be labeled analytic, while statements of the form $a=b$ often contain very valuable extensions of our knowledge and can not always be established a priori. The discovery that the rising sun is not new every morning, but always, the same, was one of the most fertile astronomical discoveries. Even today the identification of a small planet or a comet is not always a matter of course. Now if we were to regard equality as a relation between that which the name 'a' and 'b' designate, it would seem that $a=b$ could not differ from $a=a$ (i.e., provided $a=b$ is true). A relation would thereby be expressed of a thing to itself,

⁷¹ Ibid. p.58.

and indeed one in which each thing stands to itself but to no other thing. What is intended to be said by $a=b$ seems to be that the signs or names 'a' and 'b' designate the same thing, so that those signs themselves would be under discussion; a relation between them would be asserted. But this relation would hold between the names or signs only in so far as they named or designated something. It would be mediated by the connexion of each of the two signs with the same designated thing. But this is arbitrary. Nobody can be forbidden to use any arbitrarily producible event or object as a sign for something. In that case the sentence $a=b$ would no longer refer to the subject matter, but only to its mode of designation; we would express no proper knowledge by its means. But in many cases this is just what we want to do. If the sign 'a' is distinguished from the sign 'b' only as object, not as sign, the cognitive value of $a=a$ becomes essentially equal to that of $a=b$, provided $a=b$ is true. 'A difference can arise only if the difference between the signs corresponds to a difference in the mode of presentation of that which is designated'⁷². Let a, b, c be the lines connecting the vertices of a triangle with the mid points of the opposite sides. The point of intersection of a and b is then the same as the point of intersection of b and c. So we have different designation for the same point, and these names ('point of intersection of a and b', 'point of intersection of b and c') likewise indicate the mode of presentation; and hence the statement contains actual knowledge.

It is natural, now to think of there being connected with the sign (name, combination of the words, letter), besides that to which the sign refers. It may be called the reference of the sign, also what we should like to call the sense of the sign, wherein the mode of presentation is contained. In our example, accordingly, the reference of the expressions 'the point of

⁷² Ibid. p.58.

intersection of a and b' and 'the point of intersection of b and c' would be the same, but not their senses. "The reference of 'evening star' would be the same as that of 'morning star', but not the sense."⁷³

It is clear from the context that by 'sign' and 'name' we have here understood any designation representing a proper name, which thus has as its reference a definite object, but not a concept or a relation. The designation of a single object can also consist of several words or other signs. For brevity, let every such designation be called a proper name.

The sense of a proper name is grasped by everybody who is sufficiently familiar with the language or totality of designations to which it belongs; but this serves to illuminate only a single aspect of the reference, supposing it to have one. Comprehensive knowledge of the reference would require us to be able to say immediately whether any given sense belongs to it. To such knowledge we never attain. The regular connection between a sign, its sense and its reference is of such a kind that to the sign there correspond a definite sense and to that in turn a definite reference, while to a given reference (an object) there does not belong to a single sign. 'The same sense has different expression in different language.'⁷⁴

To be sure, exceptions to this behavior occur. To every expression belonging to a totality of signs, there should certainly correspond a definite sense; but natural language often do not satisfy this condition, and one must be content if the same word has the same sense in the same context. It may perhaps be granted that every grammatically well formed expression representing a proper name always has a sense. But this is not to say that to the sense there also corresponds a reference. The words 'the celestial body most distant from the earth' have a sense, but it is very

⁷³ Ibid. p.59.

⁷⁴ Frege, G. 'Thought: A Logical Inquire', in *Philosophical Logic*, P.F.Strawson (ed), Oxford Reading in Philosophy, 1965. pp. 289-311.

doubtful if they also have a reference. The expression 'the least rapidly convergent series' has a sense; but it is known to have no reference, since for every given convergent series, another convergent, but less rapidly convergent, series can be found. 'In grasping a sense, one is not certainly assured of a reference.'⁷⁵

If words are used in the ordinary way, what one intends to speak of is their reference. It can also happen, however, that one wishes to talk about the words themselves or their sense. This happens, for instance, when the words of another are quoted. One's own words then first designate words of the other speaker, and only the latter have their usual reference. We then have signs of signs. In writing, the words are in this case enclosed in quotation marks. Accordingly, 'a word standing between quotation marks must not be taken as having its ordinary reference.'⁷⁶

The reference and sense of a sign are to be distinguished from the associated idea. If the reference of a sign is an object perceivable by the senses, our idea of it is an internal image, arising from memories of sense impressions which we have had and act, both internal and external, which we have performed. Such an idea is often saturated with feeling; the clarity of its separate parts varies and oscillates. The same sense is not always connected, even in the same man, with the same idea. The idea is subjective: one man's idea is not that of another. There result, as a matter of course, a variety of differences in the idea associated in the same sense. A painter, a horse man, and a zoologist will probably connect different idea with the name 'Bucephalus'. This constitutes an essential distinction between the idea and the sign's sense, which may be the common property of many and therefore is not a part of a mode of the

⁷⁵ Ibid. p. 290.

⁷⁶ Ibid. p. 293.

individual mind. For one can hardly deny that mankind has a common store of thoughts which is transmitted from one generation to another.

In the light of this, one need have no scruples in speaking simply of the sense, whereas in the case of an idea one must, strictly speaking, add to whom it belongs and at what time. It might perhaps be said: 'just as one man connects this idea, and another that idea, with the same word, so also one man can associate this sense and another that sense. Still remains a difference in the mode of connection.'⁷⁷ They are not prevented from grasping the same sense; but they can not have the same idea. If two persons picture the same thing, each still has his own idea. It is indeed sometimes possible to establish differences in the ideas, or even in the sensations, of different men; but an exact comparison is not possible, because we can not have both ideas together in the same consciousness.

The reference of a proper name is the object itself which we designate by its means: the idea, which we have in the case, is wholly subjective; in between lays the sense, which is indeed no longer subjective like the idea, but is yet not the object itself. The following analogy will perhaps clarify these relationships. Somebody observes the Moon through a telescope. We compare the Moon itself to the reference; it is the object of the observation, mediated by the real image projected by the object glass in the interior of the telescope, and by the retinal image of the observer. 'The former we compare to the sense, the latter is like the idea or experience.'⁷⁸ The optical image in the telescope is indeed one sided and dependent upon the stand point of observation; but it is still objective, inasmuch as it can be used by several observers. At any rate it could be arranged for several to use it simultaneously. But each one would have his own retinal image. On account of the diverse shapes of the observer's

⁷⁷ Ibid. p. 298.

⁷⁸ Ibid. p. 299.

eyes, even a geometrical congruence could hardly be achieved, and an actual coincidence would be out of the question. This analogy might be developed still further, by assuming A's retinal image made visible to B; or A might also see his own retinal image in a mirror. In this way we might perhaps show how an idea can itself be taken as an object, but as such is not for the observer what if directly is for the person having the idea. But to pursue this would take us too far a field.

We can now recognize three levels of difference between words, expressions, or whole sentences. The difference may concern at most the ideas, or the sense but not the reference, or finally, the reference as well. With respect to the first level, it is to be noted that, on account of the uncertain connexion of idea with words, a difference may hold for one person, which another does not find. The difference between a translation and the original text should properly not overstep the first level. To the possible differences have belonged also the coloring and shading which poetic eloquence seeks to give to the sense. Such coloring and shading are not subjective, and must be evoked by each hearer or reader according to the hints of the poet or the speaker. Without some affinity in human ideas art would certainly be impossible; but it can never be exactly determined how far the intentions of the poet realized.

In what follows there will be no further discussion of ideas and experiences; they have been mentioned here only to ensure that the idea aroused in the hearer by a word shall not be confused with its sense or its reference.

To make short and exact expressions possible, let the following phraseology be established: "A proper name (word, sign, sign combination, expression) expresses its sense, stands for or designates its

reference. By means of a sign we express its sense and designate its reference.”⁷⁹

Idealists or skeptics will perhaps long since have objected: ‘you talk’, with out further ado, of the Moon as an object; but how do you know that the name “the Moon” has any reference? We reply that when we say ‘the Moon’, we do not intend to speak of our idea of the Moon, nor are we satisfied with the sense alone, but we presuppose a reference. To assume that in the sentence ‘The Moon is smaller than the earth’, the idea of the Moon is, in question, would be flatly to misunderstand the sense. If this is what the speaker wanted, he would use the phrase ‘my idea of the Moon’. Now we can of course be mistaken in the presupposition, and such mistakes have indeed occurred. But the question whether the presupposition is perhaps always mistaken need not be answered here in order to justify mention of the reference of a sign it is enough, at first, to point out our intention in speaking or thinking.

So far we have considered ‘the sense and reference only of such expressions, words or signs as we have called proper names.’⁸⁰ We now inquire concerning the sense and reference for an entire declarative sentence. Such a sentence contains a thought. Is this thought, now, to be regarded as its sense or its reference? Let us assume for the time being that the sentence has reference. If we now replace one word of the sentence by another having the same reference, but a different sense, this can have no bearing up on the reference of the sentence. Yet we can see that in such a case the thought changes; since e.g., the thought in the sentence ‘The morning star is a body illuminated by the sun’. Anybody who did not know that ‘the evening star is the morning star might hold

⁷⁹ Frege, G. ‘On Sense and Reference’, in *Translation from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege*, P. Geach and Max Black (eds) Oxford: Basil- Blackwell, 1970.pp. 60-79.

⁸⁰ Ibid. p. 63.

the one thought to be true, the other false.’⁸¹ The thought, accordingly, can not be the reference of the sentence, but must rather be considered as the sense. What is the position now with regard to the reference? Have we a right even to inquire about it? Is it possible that a sentence as a whole has only a sense, but no reference? At any rate, one might expect that such sentences occur, just as there are parts of sentences having sense but no reference. And sentences which contain proper names without reference will be of this kind. The sentence ‘Odysseus was set ashore at Ithaca while sound asleep’ obviously has a sense. But since it is doubtful whether the name ‘Odysseus’, occurring therein, has reference, it is also doubtful whether the whole sentence has one. Yet it is certain, nevertheless, that any one who seriously took the sentence to be true or false would ascribe to the name ‘Odysseus’ a reference, not merely a sense; for it is of the reference of the name that the predicate is affirmed or denied. Whoever does not admit the name has reference can neither apply nor withhold the predicate. But in that case it would be superfluous to advance the reference of the name; one could be satisfied with the sense, if one wanted to go no further than the thought. If it would be unnecessary to bother with the reference of a part of the sentence; only the sense, not the reference, of the part is relevant to the sense of the whole sentence. The thought remains the same whether ‘Odysseus’ has reference or not. The fact that we have concern ourselves at all about the reference of a part of the sentence indicates that we generally recognize and expect a reference for the sentence itself. The thought loses value for us as soon as we recognize that the reference of one of its parts is missing. We are therefore justified in not being satisfied with the sense of a sentence, and in inquiring also as to its reference. But now why do we

⁸¹ Ibid. p.64.

want every proper name to have not only a sense, but also a reference? Why is the thought not enough for us? This is not always the case. In hearing an epic poem, for instance, apart from the euphony of the language we are interested only in the sense of the sentences and the images feelings thereby aroused. The question of truth would cause us to abandon aesthetic delight for an attitude of scientific investigation. Hence it is a matter of no concern to us whether the name 'Odysseus', for instance, has reference, so long as we accept the poem as a work of art. It is the striving for truth that drives us always to advance from the sense to the reference.

We have seen that the reference of a sentence may always be sought, whenever the reference of its components is involved; and that this is the case when and only when we are inquiring after the truth value.

We are therefore driven into accepting the truth value of a sentence as constituting its reference. By the truth value of a sentence we understand the circumstance that it is true or false. There are no further truth values. For brevity we call the one the true, the other the false. Every declarative sentence with the reference of its words is therefore to be regarded as a proper name, and its reference, 'if it has one, is either the True or False.'⁸² These two objects are recognized, if only implicitly, by everybody who judges something to be true and so even by a sceptic. The designation of the truth values as objects may appear to be an arbitrary fancy or perhaps a mere play upon words, from which no profound consequences could be drawn. What we mean by an object can be more exactly discussed only in connexion with concept and relation.

One might be tempted to regard the relation of the thought to the true not as that of sense to reference, but rather as that of subject to predicate. One can, indeed, say: 'The thought, that 5 is a prime number, is true.' But

⁸² Ibid. p. 65.

closer examination shows that nothing more has been said than in the simple sentence '5 is a prime number'. The truth claim arises in each case from the form of the declarative sentence, and when the latter lacks its usual force, e.g. in the mouth of an actor upon the stage, even the sentence 'the thought that 5 is a prime number is true'. It follows that the relation of the thought to the true may not be compared with that of subject to predicate. Subject and predicate are indeed elements of thoughts; they stand on the same level for knowledge. By comparing subject and predicate, one reaches only a thought, never passes from sense to reference, never from a thought to its truth value. One moves at the same level but never advances from one level to the next. 'A truth value can not be a part of a thought, any more than, say, the sun can, for it is not a sense but an object.'⁸³

If our supposition that the reference of a sentence is its truth value is correct, the latter must remain unchanged when a part of the sentence is replaced by an expression having the same reference. And this is in fact the case. Leibniz gives the definition: '*Eadem sunt, quae sibi mutuo substitui possant, salva veritate.*'⁸⁴ What else but the truth value could be found, that belongs quite generally to every sentence if the reference of its components is relevant, and remains unchanged by substitutions of the kind in question?

If now the truth value of a sentence is its reference, then on the one hand all true sentences have the same reference and so, on the other hand, do all false sentences. From this we see that in the reference of the sentence all that is specific is obliterated. We can never be concerned only with the reference; but again the mere thought alone yield no knowledge, but only the thought together with its reference, i.e., its truth value. Judgments can

⁸³ Ibid. p. 66.

⁸⁴ Ibid. p. 66.

be regarded as advances from a thought to a truth value. Naturally, this cannot be a definition. Judgment is something quite peculiar and incomparable. One might also say that judgments are distinctions of parts within truth values. Such distinction occurs by a return to the thought. To every sense belonging to a truth value there would correspond its own manner of analysis. However, we have here used the word 'part' in a special sense. We have in fact transferred the relation between the parts and the whole of the sentence to its reference, by calling the reference of 'a word part of the reference of the reference of the sentence, if the word itself is a part of the sentence.'⁸⁵ This way of speaking can certainly be attacked, because the whole reference and one part of it do not suffice to determine the remainder, and because the word 'part' is already used in another sense of bodies. A special term would need to be invented.

The supposition that the truth value of a sentence is its reference shall now be put to further test. We have found that the truth value of a sentence remains unchanged when an expression is replaced by another having the same reference: but we have not yet considered the case in which the expression to be replaced is 'itself a sentence.'⁸⁶ Now if our view is correct, 'the truth value of a sentence containing another as part must remain unchanged when the part is replaced by another sentence having the same truth value.'⁸⁷ Exceptions are to be expected when the whole sentence or its part is direct or indirect quotation; for in such cases, as we have seen, the words do not have their customary reference. In direct quotation, a sentence designates another sentence, and in indirect quotation a thought.

We are thus led to consider subordinate sentences or clauses. These occur as parts of a sentence complex, which is, from the logical

⁸⁵ Ibid. p.70.

⁸⁶ Ibid. p.67.

⁸⁷ Ibid. p. 67.

standpoint, likewise a sentence- a main sentence. But here we meet the question whether it is also true of the subordinate sentence that its reference is a truth value. Of indirect quotation we already know the opposite. Grammarians view subordinate clauses as representatives of parts of sentences and divided them accordingly into noun clauses, adjective clauses, and adverbial clauses. This might generate the supposition that the reference of a subordinate clause was not a truth value but rather of the same kind as the reference of a noun or adjective or adverb – in short, of a part of a sentence, whose sense was not a thought but only a part of a thought. Only a more thorough investigation can clarify the issue. In so doing, we shall not follow the grammatical categories strictly, but rather group together what is logically of the same kind. Let us first search for cases in which the sense of the subordinate clause, as we have just supposed, is not an independent thought.

The case of an abstract noun clause, introduced by ‘that’, includes the case of indirect quotation, in which we have seen ‘the words to have their indirect reference coinciding with what is customarily their sense.’⁸⁸ In this case, then, the subordinate clause has for its reference a thought, not a truth value; as sense not a thought, but the sense of the words ‘the thought, that...’, which is only a part of the thought in the ‘entire complex sentence.’⁸⁹ This happens after ‘say’, ‘hear’, ‘be of the opinion’, ‘be convinced’, ‘conclude’, and similar words. There is a different, and indeed somewhat complicated, situation after words like ‘perceive’, ‘know’, ‘fancy’, which are to be considered later.

That in the cases of the first kind the reference of the subordinate clause is in fact the thought can also be recognized by seeing that it is indifferent to the truth of the whole whether the subordinate clause is true or false.

⁸⁸ Ibid. p. 68.

⁸⁹ Ibid. p. 69.

Let us compare, for instance, the two sentences ‘Copernicus believed that the planetary orbits are circles’ and ‘Copernicus believed that the apparent motion of the sun is produced by the real motion of the Earth’. ‘One subordinate clause can be substituted for the other without harm to the truth.’⁹⁰ The main clause and the subordinate clause together have as their sense only a single thought, and the truth of the whole includes neither the truth nor the untruth of the subordinate clause. In such cases it is not permissible to replace one expression in the subordinate clause by another having the same customary reference, but only by one having the same indirect reference, i.e., the same customary sense. If somebody were to conclude: The reference of a sentence is not its truth value, for in that case it could always be replaced by another sentence of the same truth value; he would prove too much; one might just as well claim that the reference of ‘morning star’ is not Venus, since one may not always say ‘Venus’ in place of ‘morning star’.⁹¹ One has the right to conclude only that the reference of a sentence is not always its truth value, and that ‘morning star’ does not always stand for the planet Venus, viz. when the word has its indirect reference. An exception of such kind occurs in the subordinate clause just considered which has a thought as its reference. If one says ‘It seems that...’ one means ‘It seems to me that...’ or ‘I think that ...’ we therefore have the same case again. The situation is similar in the case of expressions such as ‘to be pleased’, ‘to regret’, ‘to approve’, ‘to blame’, ‘to hope’, ‘to fear’. If, toward the end of the battle of Waterloo, Wellington was glad that the Prussians were coming, the basis for his joy was a conviction. Had he been deceived, he would have been no less pleased so long as his illusion lasted; and before he became so

⁹⁰ Frege, G. 1956, “The Thought: A Logical Inquiry”, *Mind*, 65(259): pp. 289-311.

⁹¹ Op.cit. pp.70-72.

convinced he could not have been pleased that the Prussians were coming- even though in fact they might have been already approaching.

Adverbial final clauses beginning 'in order that' also belong here; for obviously the purpose is a thought; therefore: 'indirect reference for the words, subjective mood.'⁹²

A subordinate clause with 'that' after 'command', 'ask', 'forbid' would appear in direct speech as an imperative. Such a clause has no reference but only a sense. A command, a request, is indeed not thoughts, yet they stand on the same level as thoughts. Hence in subordinate clauses depending upon 'command', 'ask', etc., words have their indirect reference.⁹³ The reference of such a clause is therefore not a truth value but a command, a request, and so forth.

Now we return to our starting point. When we found 'a=a' and 'a=b' to have different cognitive values, the explanation is that for the purpose of knowledge, the sense of the sentence, viz., the thought expressed by it, is no less relevant than its reference, i.e. its truth value. If now a=b, then indeed the reference of 'b' is the same of 'a', and hence the truth value of 'a=b' is the same as that of 'a=a'. In spite of this, the sense of 'b' may differ from that of 'a', and thereby the sense expressed in 'a=b' differs from that of 'a=a'. In that case the two sentences do not have the same cognitive value.

So Frege's theory of proper names is called *sense theory*. Sense is most important in Frege's theory of proper name. According to him a proper name is meaningful if it has minimum sense to designate the object or nominatum. In the above consideration Frege gives an example like as 'The morning star is the evening star'- in this sentence the term 'morning star' and 'the evening star' have the different cognitive value. Anybody

⁹² Ibid. p. 73.

⁹³ Ibid. p. 76.

who did not know that 'morning star is the evening star'; think that they have different sense but the same referent, planet Venus. This view is challenged by Hilary Putnam. In his book "The Meaning of 'Meaning'" he shows that the reference is different but the sense remains the same. In the subsequent chapter we propose to show in what sense "Twin Earth" concept of Putnam goes against Frege's theory of proper names.

A comparison between Frege and Russell

Frege's and Russell's views are obviously different, but because of certain superficial similarities in how they handle certain famous puzzles about proper names, they are often assimilated. As far as proper names are concerned, both Frege and Russell are often described together as "descriptivist". But their views are fundamentally different. To see that, let's look at the puzzle of names, such as, the Fido-Fido theory.

According to Mill, "a proper name is but an unmeaning mark which we connect in our mind with the idea of the object, in order that whenever the mark meets our eyes or occur to our thoughts, we may think of that individual object".⁹⁴ The function of proper names, Mill thought, is not to convey general information but rather "to enable individuals to be made the subject of discourse;" names are "attached to the objects themselves, and are not dependent on... any attribute of the object".⁹⁵ As a result, our use of names in communication can accommodate such pervasive facts as that a person, place, or thing can change over time, that one's conception of something can change over time, that we can be mistaken in our conceptions of it, and that different people's conceptions of the same thing can differ. All this is possible if by using a name in thinking of or referring to an object is not a matter of representing it as having certain

⁹⁴ Mill, J.S. 1872. *A System of Logic*, definitive 8th edition. 1949 reprint, London: Longmans, Green and Company. Pp 34-38.

⁹⁵ Ibid. p.36.

properties but, as Russell said, “merely to indicate what we are speaking about; (the name) is no part of the fact asserted ...it is merely part of the symbolism by which we express our thought”.⁹⁶

An obvious problem with this simple view is that if the role of names were simply to refer to their bearers, names without bearers would be meaningless. Yet names without bearers seem perfectly meaningful and sentences in which they occur seem to express propositions. Otherwise, how could a sentence like ‘Santa Claus does not exist’ be not only meaningful but true? Descriptivism about proper names avoids this problem, as well as Frege’s two famous puzzles (about the informative of identity statements and about failure of substitution in indirect quotation and attitude reports). Descriptivism is often referred to as the “Frege-Russell view.” However, their views were quite different. I’ll call Frege’s view “sense” descriptivism and Russell’s view “abbreviational” descriptivism. Let’s take up Russell’s view first, although it came second. Russell’s view concerned “ordinary proper” names, like ‘Bill Clinton’ and ‘Santa Claus’. He contrasted these with “logically proper name”, i.e. the individual constants of formal logic, which he regarded as Millian. For reasons connected with his doctrine of acquaintance, he thought that the only logically proper names of ordinary language, English in particular, are the demonstratives ‘this’ and ‘that’, as used to refer to one’s current sense data, and the pronoun ‘I’.⁹⁷ He held that ordinary proper names are really “abbreviated” or “disguised” definite descriptions. Definite descriptions, in turn, according to Russell’s famous Theory of Descriptions, function not as referring expressions but as

⁹⁶ Russell, Bertrand. 1919. *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*. London: George Allen and Unwin. P.175.

⁹⁷ Russell, Bertrand. 1917. “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description.” In *Mysticism and Logic*, paperback edition. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1957.p. 216.

quantificational phrases. We should not be misled by Russell's characterization of "denoting phrases", because for Russell denotation is a semantically inert property. That is, proposition expressed by a sentence in which a description occurs is the same whether the description has a denotation or not. So its denotation does not enter into that proposition. As Russell explains, "The actual object which is the denotation is nota constituent of propositions in which descriptions occur, and this is the reason why , in order to understand such propositions, we need acquaintance with the constituents of the description , but do not need acquaintance with its denotation."⁹⁸

Thus, for any sentence containing a definite description, grammatical form is misleading as to logical form. For example, "The inventor of silly putty got rich" is not subject-predicate form grammatically but not logically - it is not really about the inventor of silly putty. According to Russell's famous theory of description, a simple subject-predicate sentence of the form 'The F is G' does not express a singular proposition , of the subject-predicate form 'a is G', but a general, existential propositional ,what might be called a "uniqueness proposition". The quantificational structure of such a proposition is revealed only after the definite description is "broke up", to yield (in modern notation) the form $(\exists x)(y)(Fy \rightarrow y=x) \& Gx$, in which the description, not being a semantic unit, does not even appear. Accordingly, for Russell, if a proper name is a disguised description, e.g., if "George Kistiakowski" is short for 'the inventor of silly putty', the bearer of the name does not enter into the proposition expressed by a sentence in which the name occurs. This is not because the name has a sense (in Frege's sense of 'sense') but because it abbreviates a definite description.

⁹⁸ Ibid.p.222.

Russell's view is clear from what he says about the name 'Bismarck'. In his view, "the thought in the mind of a person using a proper name correctly can generally only be expressed explicitly if we replace the proper name by a description"⁹⁹ Russell makes allowances for the fact that the requisite description will vary for different people, or for the same person at different times (the description in our minds will probably be some more or less vague mass of historical knowledge far more, in most cases, than is required to identify him) ,... but so long as the object to which the name applies remains constant, the particular description involved usually makes no difference to the truth or falsehood of the proposition in which the name appears.¹⁰⁰

For purposes of illustration, he uses the description 'the first Chancellor of the German Empire.' Russell first considers the situation of Bismarck himself, who "might have used the name directly to designate himself..... to make a judgment about himself," with himself as a constituent.¹⁰¹ "Here the proper name has the direct use which it always wishes to have, as simply standing for a certain object, and not for a description of the object." When we make a statement about something known only by description, we often intend to make our statement, not in the form involving the description, but about the actual thing described. That is, when we say anything about Bismarck, we should like, if we could, to make the judgment which Bismarck alone can make, namely, the judgment of which he himself is a constituent. But in this we are necessarily defeated. What enables us to communicate in spite of the varying descriptions we employ is that we know there is a true proposition concerning the actual Bismarck and that, however we may

⁹⁹ Ibid. p. 208.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid. 208-9.

¹⁰¹ Ibid. 209.

vary the description, the proposition described is still the same. This proposition, which is described and is itself, and do not know it, though we know it is true.¹⁰²

The proposition that “interests us” is a singular proposition, but we cannot actually think it—we can know it only by description, that is, by entertaining a general proposition which is, if true, made true by a fact involving Bismarck. But this general proposition does not itself involve Bismarck, and would be thinkable even if Bismarck never existed.

Frege is a descriptivist of a different sort than Russell. Like Russell, Frege does not claim that proper names are disguised descriptions but that they have senses as well as references. The sense of a name is both the mode of presentation and the determinant of its referent (it is also functions for Frege as the “indirect”(as opposed to “customary”) reference when the name is embedded in a context of indirect quotation or propositional attitude ascription). Frege agrees with Russell and with Mill for that matter, that words are ordinarily used to talk about things, not ideas: “If words are used in the ordinary way, what one intends to speak of their reference”.¹⁰³ Even so, in so using them we must associate reference-determining properties with our words. Moreover, insofar as our words express our thoughts, they must correspond to constitute of those thoughts. Thus, for Frege, the semantic and the cognitive significance of expressions are intimately related. Indeed, an expression can have a sense without having a reference, Frege holds that the constituents of thoughts are senses, not references.

Frege does not hold that every proper name is equivalent to some definite description but rather that expressions of both kinds are of the same

¹⁰² Ibid. 210-211.

¹⁰³ Frege, G. 1892. “On Sense and Reference.” Reprinted in P. Geach and M. Black, eds., *Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1960. p. 58.

semantic genus, which he calls “Eigennamen” (literally translated as ‘proper names’ but better paraphrased as ‘singular terms’). Unlike Russell, he does not assimilate definite descriptions to quantificational phrases but treats them, like proper names, as semantic units capable of having individuals as semantic values, determined by their senses. The sense of such an expression plays the semantic role of imposing a condition that an individual must satisfy in order to be the referent. A proper name, like a definite description, contributes its sense to that of a sentence in which it occurs regardless of which individual actually is its referent and even if it has no referent at all. This is because the condition imposed by sense, the determinant of reference, is independent of that which it determines. For example, Frege says, “the thought remains the same whether ‘Odysseus’ has reference or not”.¹⁰⁴ The same object can be presented in different way, under different modes of presentation, but it is not essential to any mode of presentation that it actually presents anything at all.

Frege’s conception of sense does not entail that every proper name has the sense of some definite description, or that the sense of every proper name is an individual concept expressible by some definite description. His conception of sense leaves open the possibility of non-descriptive senses, such as percepts. If one thinks of an object by means of a percept, as one does when visually attending to it, this is not equivalent to thinking of it under a description of the form ‘the thing that looks thus-and-so.’ One might verbally express a thought about an object one is looking at by saying something of the form , ‘the thing that looks thus-and-so is ...,’ but ,as Frege says about indexical thoughts, “the mere wording...does not suffice for the expression of the thought”.¹⁰⁵ He does not explicitly make

¹⁰⁴ Ibid. p. 63.

¹⁰⁵ Frege, Gottlob. 1918. “The Thought: A Logical Inquiry.” Reprinted in P. F. Strawson, ed., *Philosophical Logic*. Oxford University Press, 1967. p. 24.

the analogous point in regard to proper names, but nowhere does he explicitly assert that each proper name is equivalent to some definite description, and this overall theory of sense and reference does not require this equivalence.

Russell's conception of presentation is quite different from what Frege means by 'presentation' (in mode of presentation). For Russell, any object that can be presented at all cannot be presented in different ways. Russell's restrictive notion of acquaintance is a "direct cognitive relation" and, indeed, is "simply the converse of the relation of object and subject which constitutes presentation".¹⁰⁶ Notoriously, Russell disqualifies public objects as objects of acquaintance, but this is the price he is willing to pay to avoid the problem of names without bearers as well as Frege's puzzles (about identity statements and about indirect quotation and attitude reports). He avoids having to appeal to senses to solve them. The notion of sense, as the determinant of reference, has no place in Russell's theory of language or thought. Constituents of propositions are individuals (particular and individuals), and the Principle of Acquaintance requires every proposition which we can understand must be composed wholly of constituents with which we are acquainted".¹⁰⁷ For Frege modes of presentation are the constituents of thoughts, and the objects which modes of presentation present are not. Because the relation between subject to object is mediated by a sense, this relation is indirect, unlike Russellian acquaintance. So, the difference between Frege two-tiered and Russell's one-tiered semantics is reflected in their different epistemological views on presentation. They are, in their respective ways, descriptivist about singular thought as well as about proper names.

¹⁰⁶ Op. Cit. p.202.

¹⁰⁷ Russell, Bertrand. 1917. "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description." In *Mysticism and Logic*, paperback edition. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1957. p. 211.

Russell held that ordinary proper names are *abbreviated definite descriptions*, but he denied that definite descriptions have two - level semantic significance. This was the central point of "On Denoting" (1905).¹⁰⁸ For Russell, what distinguishes both definite descriptions and ordinary proper names from genuine, "logically" proper names, like the individual constant of logic, is not that they do have senses but that they do not have references. For Frege there are two levels of semantic significance, sense and reference, and sense is primary. Despite their differences, neither Frege's sense-descriptivism nor Russell's abbreviational descriptivism is susceptible, as Mill's view is, to the problem of names without bearers. On both views, a proper name can play its semantic role whether or not it belongs to anything. But this is so for different reasons. For Russell, the reason is the semantic inertness of denotations; for Frege it is the independence of sense from reference.

Observation

After comparing Russell and Frege's theory of proper names, it is clear that Russell's definite description and Frege's sense theory of name are the same. But Russell's logically proper name is not related to the sense theory of Frege rather it is called referential theory, which is supported by Kripke's theory of rigid designator. But in this regard an important question arises here: Are natural kind terms related to referential theory of name or Fregean theory of name? In this regard, Russell says that natural kind terms (lemon, tiger, water, etc.) are descriptive term; such terms are meaningful, when these terms are positioned in a sentence. So, Russell says that such terms are incomplete symbols. At the same time Kripke also support the referential theory of name, which is associated with Russell's theory of logically proper name. Kripke's proper name is

¹⁰⁸ Russell, Bertrand. 1905. "On Denoting" Reprinted in R.C. Marsh, ed., *Logic and Knowledge*. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1956.

called rigid designator. His view is that a proper name is called a rigid designator when it designates the same object in all possible worlds of an actual world. So Frege's sense theory is rejected out rightly by Saul Kripke and latter Hilary Putnam also rejected Frege's sense theory by his 'Twine Earth Argument'.

Twin Earth Argument of Hilary Putnam: A challenge towards Frege

To discuss about the concept of proper name, Frege actually says that every proper names have sense as well as reference. Frege defines "sense as objective, eternal and timeless entities."¹⁰⁹ It is because of their objective nature they are distinguished from subjective or psychological experiences, such as, ideas or images. But how is this objective and independent nature of sense established? Frege takes the help of identity statement to establish this point. It is well known to mention here the details of Frege's analysis. However, the basic import of Frege's analysis may be briefly stated how sense constitutes the semantic blocks of language.

The two well-known example of Frege's identity statements are:

The morning star *is* the evening star.

The morning star *is* the morning star.

Both sentences are qualified as true identity statements. The reason for the first sentence being true is that the two expressions 'The morning star' and 'The evening star' have the 'same referent.'¹¹⁰ The reason for the second sentence being true is that it results from the first one by virtue of being substituted by co-referential expressions. It may be noted that there is a fundamental assumption involved here. The meaning of a sentence, according to Frege, is the function of its constituent parts. This is known as compositionality theory of meaning. Considering this, the meaning of

¹⁰⁹ Frege, G. "On Sense and Reference", in Translation from the Philosophical Writings of G. Frege, P. Geach and Max Black (eds) Oxford: Basil-Blackwell, 1970. p. 72.

¹¹⁰ Ibid. p. 74.

an expression will remain the same if an expression is substituted by another expression with having the same meaning. The same Fregean assumption holds in the present case also where the first sentence is said to have the same meaning as the second because the second sentence is obtained from the first sentence due to the substitution of co-referential expressions.

However, as Frege pointed out, both the sentences cannot have the same meaning on three fundamental grounds. First, the first sentence expresses a contingent truth because the truth it expresses can be always otherwise whereas the second sentence expresses a necessary truth. Secondly, the first sentence expresses a posteriori truth because its truth is known by empirical investigation, whereas the second sentence is an expression of a priori truth. Thirdly, it is because of its empirical/a posteriori character, the first sentence turns out to be informative whereas the necessary a priori nature of the second sentence makes it uninformative.

In view of these differences, a question may be raised: How do these sentences claim to have the same meaning? This is where Frege introduced the notion of sense and made the distinction between sense and reference. According to Frege, the difference between these two sentences arises due to difference in sense. In other words, these two sentences differ in sense but they are same in reference. In the above example, Frege shows that 'the morning star' and 'the evening star' refers to the same object planet Venus but they have different sense. Anybody who did not know that the morning star is the evening star might hold morning star is the morning star is true but morning star is the evening star is false. Moreover, they refer the same object but in different sense. Here Putnam challenges Frege and then says that sense is the same but the reference is different. He defends it with the help of his famous Twin Earth argument.

As stated earlier, Putnam's reformulation of sense provides him the basis for the construct his critique of sense. His reformulation brings out the inherent mentalistic nature of the sense model. The main thrust of Putnam's critique is to show the untenability of the view that meanings are mental. His argument is that such a view will make the sense model logically inconsistent and incoherent which will virtually mean collapse of the model. In this respect, the Fregean thesis that meaning determines reference which constitutes the basic tenet of the sense model is particularly relevant since in the mentalistic interpretation, as Putnam argues, this thesis will be proved to be inconsistent and semantically vacuous. In this interpretation, to say that sense determines reference will actually imply that a particular psychological state of a speaker determines the reference. But the fact is, as Putnam's counter example shows that, two speakers who are in the same mental states while grasping the sense of an expression may differ in terms of reference. This possibility points out that, first, meanings are not mental or, to put it in Putnam's characteristic phrase, "meanings are not in the head".¹¹¹ Second, meaning does not determine reference. These are not two separate theses. In fact, they are inseparable since the former is established in the light of the latter. With this, we now go to the main theme of Putnam's arguments establishing these two theses. The strategy that Putnam laid down was based on an innovative argument which proposed a complete refutation of the model of sense through the construction of a genuine counter- example.

The Twin earth Argument: The story of 'Twin Earth' argument is the story of a science fiction. For the sake of convenience and brevity, the story may be presented in three constructive parts.

¹¹¹ H.Putnam. 'Meaning of meaning', in, *Mind, Language and Reality*: Philosophical Papers, Vol2.

1. The Structure: It is imagined that there is a planet which is exactly like ours with minor differences. This planet may be thus named as 'Twin Earth'. There is a further supposition regarding the human inhabitants on the Twin Earth. It is imagined that all speakers on the Twin Earth are exactly the same as the speakers on the earth. In other words, for every speaker on the earth, 'there is an exact counterpart or Doppelganger existing on the Twin Earth.'¹¹² It is because of this identity, both the sets of speakers have the same appearance, the same feelings, the same thoughts, in sort, the same mental biography.

2. Differences: It is admitted that there are some differences between the earth and the Twin Earth. In this respect, one major difference is that the liquid that is used as water on the Twin Earth is not the same as water used on the Earth. Superficially, of course, there is no difference between the two since the liquid used in the Twin Earth has the same observable or phenomenological features as that of water on the Earth. But what distinguishes the liquid of the Twin Earth from water is that it has the molecular structure which is not H₂O but is expressed as XYZ. The final part of the story is now about the consequences focusing on the issue concerning whether sense determines references.

3. The Consequences: Let us imagine that people from the Earth go to visit the Twin Earth. Initially, they think that the liquid on the Twin Earth is the same as water. This apparent similarity makes them to conclude that water has the same meaning both on the Earth and on the Twin Earth. But after this initial period is over, they discover the difference between these two samples of water. One has the molecular structure H₂O and the other has XYZ. The result of this discovery will naturally lead them to say that on the Twin Earth the word water means XYZ. The same is true of the speakers of Twin Earth. After their visit to the Earth, they also hold

¹¹² Ibid. p. 240.

a similar but a different conclusion, namely, the word 'water' on the Earth means H₂O.

Now let us go back to history and place ourselves in the year 1790 when the discovery of the chemical compound of water on the Earth and the Twin Earth was not made. The real story begins from here. In this respect, there are two important facts to be noted. First, the discovery of the chemical compound of water on the Earth and on the Twin Earth, did not affect, in no way, the actual meaning of the two. In spite of our lack of scientific knowledge, water on the earth unknowingly meant by us as H₂O and water on the Twin Earth was unknowingly meant by inhabitants there as XYZ. Second, it has been assumed that speakers in these two planets have identical mental structure and thus share the same mental state while understanding the meaning of an expression. The same is true of the use of 'water'. The word 'water' when used by speakers of the Earth and the Twin Earth, they are in the same mental state. The reason is that they understand the meaning of the water in the same way. Since chemical theory was not discovered, they understood the meaning of both these liquids on the basis of their phenomenological features. But the fact remains that a speaker on the Earth when says 'water' she understands by it H₂O and similarly a speaker on the Twin Earth understands 'water' by XYZ. The crucial issue involved here is the notion of reference. The two speakers of the Earth and the Twin Earth though have the same mental state with regard to the meaning of the word 'water' refer to two different objects. This shows that meaning is the same but extensions are different. The extension of the term 'water' does not follow from the psychological state of the speaker.

The 'Twin Earth' argument offers a genuine counter example to the sense model. 'It does not only refute the cardinal doctrine of the sense model that meaning determines reference but as an offshoot to this argument it

shows that meanings are not in the head.¹¹³ An adequate semantic theory must allow how to identify the referent of a term uniquely. The Twin Earth example shows that the sense model cannot do so. This is evident from the structure of sense mechanism itself. There is nothing in its structure which can explain how the term 'water' gets attached to both H₂O and XYZ. The 'Twin Earth' argument shows that reference has its own place and it cannot be made subservient to sense. It thus allows the way towards the primacy of reference.

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¹¹³ Putnam, Hilary, "The Meaning of 'Meaning'" in *Mind, Language and Reality*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1975. pp.222-7.

Chapter Four

Searle on the Cluster theory of Proper Names

Searle's theory of proper names is known as the *cluster theory of proper names*. Searle's cluster theory of proper names is the continuation of the descriptivist theory of proper names that has been developed by Russell, Frege and later Wittgenstein. The main contention of this sequel is to analyze and examine with critical outlook whether Searle's cluster theory of proper names indeed do have sense or not. The issue whether proper names do have sense or not is a debatable issue in the arena of linguistic philosophy. Frege, for example, holds that proper names do have sense. On the contrary, Russell, Wittgenstein and many other contemporary thinkers including Kripke, Putnam, Kaplan, and Marcus hold that proper names do not have any sense. Thus their view of proper names is philosophically known as 'no sense theory of proper names'. If proper names do have sense, then in what sense they have sense and if proper names do not have sense, then again in what sense they do not have sense would be the matter of serious discussion.

In the history of linguistic philosophy the concept of proper name has widely been pronounced. When linguistic philosophers were involved into a tug of war regarding the very nature of language and accordingly proposed linguistic revision for overcoming the unperceptibility of ordinary language, they eventually proposed proper names as the minimum vocabulary of ideal language. Proper names have been chosen as the minimum vocabularies of ideal language because they are denotational in nature. It has been claimed that every name denotes an object or that every proper name stands for an object.

But what is meant by the linguistic term 'stand for'? Do proper names 'stand for' in the same way like definite descriptions 'stand for'? Such questions can easily be answered by seeking the answer of the question: "Do proper names have sense?" Searle raises the quip: Is there any similarity between the way a definite description picks out its referent and the way a proper name picks out its referent? Is proper name a shorthand description? Again two diametrically opposite views can be witnessed. One response stands with the conviction that proper names do not have sense. They are meaningless marks. They have 'denotation (direct referent) but do not have connotation'.¹¹⁴ The concept of logically proper name of Russell and the concept of name as rigid designator of Kripke are cases in point. The other response stands with the conviction that proper names have sense. They are not meaningless marks. They have mode of presentation. Frege's theory of proper name is a case in point. We think this distinction would be made clear if we sense properly Russellian distinction between logically proper names and ordinary proper names or Kripkian distinction between rigid and non-rigid or accidental designators. According to Russell a logically proper name is *known by acquaintance*, whereas an ordinary proper name is *known by descriptions*. An ordinary proper name is a disguised description, a surrogate description. Kripke, however, interprets rigid designator in terms of actual and possible-worlds. For Kripke a rigid designator is one which designates the same objects *in all possible worlds of an actual world*. That means if a rigid designator designates a certain object in the actual world; it would equally designate the same object in all other possible worlds. In the language of Modal Logic it can be said that a rigid designator is at par with the concept of necessarily true. The proposition P is necessarily true (Lp) in an actual world, namely, W1, if and only if it

¹¹⁴ J.S. Mill. *A System of Logic*, London and Colchester, 1949, Book1, Chapter 2, Para 5.

would be true in all other possible –worlds, such as, W2, W3, etc., of W1. On the other hand, a non-rigid designator is one which does not designate the same object in all possible-worlds of an actual world. In this sense, a non-rigid designator may be called a relative, ad-hoc designator or accidental designator.

Let us make this distinction clear by citing a few examples. **‘The square root of 4’** is a rigid designator according to Kripke for it designates the same object in all possible-worlds of an actual world. Contrary to this, **‘The President of USA in 1970’** is non-rigid designator for it does not designate the same individual in all possible-worlds. Even though it designates Richard Nixon in the actual world, but this is made possible due to the actual outcome of the relevant Presidential election. However, the result of this election might have been different and there underlies no apparent contradiction if the outcome of the result would be different from what actually happened. Thus, according to Kripke ‘the President of USA in 1970’ is a non-rigid designator because it would designate any man other than Richard Nixon who, in fact, incidentally won the election. Even though Russell did not mention the concept of possible-world and actual –world while introducing his concept of logical proper names like Kripke, but we think the philosophical implication of both Russell and Kripke remained the same as both would accept the **no sense theory of proper name**. According to Russell, a logically proper name is known by acquaintance and in this sense a logically proper name does not describe the object at all. Thus in the case of a logically proper name one can be acquainted with an object because here the object under consideration is designated by demonstrative pronoun. That means there is no chance of *denotational or referential failure* in case of a logically proper name. However, the only difference between Russell’s logical proper name and Kripke’s rigid designator is that for Kripke a rigid designator would

designate the **same object** in all possible- world; whereas for Russell a logical proper name, proper name in short, denotes an object with which one must be acquainted. The philosophical implication of non-rigid designator of Kripke and definite description of Russell would remain the same. According to Russell, an ordinary proper name, even though looks like a proper name, but in true sense it would be a disguised description. Accordingly, it can be said after Russell that unlike a logical proper name, a description (an ordinary proper name in Russell sense and non-rigid designator in Kripke's sense) describes some aspect of that object. Thus, it can be said that a logically proper name of Russell and the rigid designator of Kripke does not describe any object whatsoever; whereas an ordinary proper name of Russell and a non-designator of Kripke describes some aspect of the object. Searle says, " To know that a definite description fits an object is to know a fact about the object, but to know its name is not so far to know any facts about it. ...we can often turn a definite description (a referring expression) into an ordinary predicative expression by simply substituting an indefinite article for the definite."¹¹⁵

What we sense from the above observation is that a logically proper name is not connected with any aspects of the object as descriptions are; rather a logically proper name is *tied to the object itself*. According to Searle descriptions stand for aspects or properties of an object, whereas logical proper names stand for the real thing. This actually leads us to the metaphysical cleavage between objects and properties or aspects of objects and it has been attached with the distinction between proper names and definite descriptions. Even Wittgenstein in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* says, "The name means the object. The object is its meaning." (TLP: 3.203)

¹¹⁵ J.R.Searle, *Speech Acts*, University Press, 1997, p.163.

Arguments in favour of no - sense theory of reference

Those who adhere to the view that proper names do not have sense would defend themselves on the basis of the following arguments:

First: If a proper name has a sense then it can be said that the reference of the proper name is determined by its sense. As sense is conceived in terms of *mode of presentation*, there, of course, will remain certain well defined conditions whatever the conditions may be and the object under consideration is designated by the name if and only if it would satisfy those conditions. Now the point is that if the reference of a proper name is determined in this way, then a proper name cannot be a rigid designator because in such a case 'there is no guarantee that the object which satisfies the condition associated with the proper name in the actual world would also satisfy it in all other possible worlds'.¹¹⁶ It would even be the case that some other objects would satisfy those conditions in another possible-world. Thus, it seems clear that if the reference of a proper name is determined by its sense or mode of presentation in Fregean term, then it would be a non-rigid designator as it may happen in the case of non-rigid designator like 'the President of the USA in 1970'. But for Kripke, a proper name is a rigid designator. Therefore, a proper name does not bear any sense. But how do we know that a proper name is a rigid designator? We have already outlined in terms of actual-possible world concepts in what sense a proper name is held to be a rigid designator. Elsewhere Kripke gave us a straightforward answer of bearing in mind that a proper name is a rigid designator. Here Kripke claims that a proper name is a rigid designator because otherwise we could not make *counterfactual assertions* with their help. That means *counterfactual assertions* would indirectly ensure that proper names are rigid designators. For example, we can say that the man who was actually the

¹¹⁶ Pranab Sen, *Logic, Induction and Ontology*, p.233.

President of the USA in 1970 might not have been the President. For it was just a contingent, an *ad hoc* matter of fact that he won the election and we can use the name of the person and accordingly make the counterfactual assertion by saying, 'Nixon might not have been the President of the USA in 1970'. However, according to Kripke, this counterfactual assertion does not work unless the proper name 'Nixon' designated the same individual in both the actual world in which Nixon is a President and the possible world in which Nixon is not a President.

Second: From Russellian point of view it can be said that proper names (logical proper names) do not have sense. Russell, of course, has admitted that ordinary proper names do have sense because ordinary proper names are not genuine proper names. They are *disguised* descriptions. Therefore, for Russell only logical proper names are genuine proper names. Logical proper names do not have sense because they are known by acquaintance and there is no scope of descriptions or mode of presentation in the Fregeian sense. In this regard, Russell conceived *demonstrative pronouns*, such as 'this', 'that', 'it', etc., as logically proper names. According to Russell any object that has been associated with the utterance of any one of the demonstrative pronouns must be acquainted with the person who utters it. Here there is no scope for description or knowing the aspects or properties of an object under consideration.

Possible objections against the no-sense theory of proper names

There are some possible objections that can be raised against the no-sense theory of proper names. These are as follows:

(i) According to Searle we can use proper names in existential propositions. As every proper name denotes an object, there is no point of making such assertion that the object as denoted by a proper name is null or void or empty. For example, 'There is such a place as Africa' is a

straightforward existential statement. According to Searle, here the proper name cannot be said to refer, for no such subject of an existential statement can refer. If it does, then we have to admit that 'existence would be a real predicate'. But we come to know that 'existence cannot be a real predicate'. Every existential statement states that a certain predicate is instantiated. The same has been reflected in Frege's thought when Frege put it that 'existence is a second order concept'. What Searle insists here is that an existential sentence does not refer to an object, nor does it state that it exists; on the contrary, it expresses a concept and accordingly states that the concept can be instantiated. This would lead us to assume that a proper name must have some conceptual or descriptive content. Russell of course has attempted to overcome this charge by conceding such expressions as *disguised descriptions*. However, Searle thinks that there is something wrong in the Russellian assumption.

(ii) It would be a general perception that sentences containing proper names can be used to make identity statements which would convey factual information instead of linguistic information. For example, the sentence, 'Everest is Chomolungma' can be used to make an assertion having geographical import as an alternative of lexicographical import. The point here is that if it were to be the case that proper names do not have senses, then the sentence under consideration did not convey no more information than does an assertion made with the sentence 'Everest is Everest'. Unlike the sentence 'Everest is Chomolungma', the sentence 'Everest is Everest' is an obvious identity sentence and it gives no information whatsoever. The sentence 'Everest is Chomolungma' is an informative identity statement and the sentence 'Everest is Everest' is an obvious identity statement. To know that an informative statement can be regarded as an identity statement can lead us to assume that proper names must have descriptive content and they must have sense. The force of this

argument is Fregean in nature. Unlike the no-sense theorists, Frege has anticipated that proper names do have sense or mode of presentation.

(iii) How do we know that a particular name denotes the same object in all possible worlds of an actual world? One can know it with the help of the *Principle of Identification*. According to Searle the principle of identification requires that an utterance of a proper name must convey a description just as the utterance of a definite description must if the reference is to be consummated. This would lead us to assume that at least a proper name is a kind of shorthand description. Russell, of course, anticipated *shorthand descriptivity* in the case of ordinary proper names, but the proponents of sense-theorists of proper names would like to say that the concept of shorthand descriptivity is very much present even in the case of rigid designators as anticipated by Kripke and logically proper names as expounded by Russell.

The above three objections against no-sense theory actually hinge on the solitary assertion that proper names are **shorthand description**. However, according to Searle such conclusion cannot be right apart from its bizarre implausibility. It is incoherent with so many other obvious truths. If it were supposed to be the case that proper names are shorthand descriptions then there would be some descriptions which would be treated as equivalent in definition for proper names. Can we have the definitions of proper names? Certainly we do not have. Even if we go through dictionaries of proper names, we may find descriptions of the bearers of the names, but in most cases their descriptions are not definitional equivalents for the names since they are only contingently true of the bearers. Moreover, it can be said that if proper names are shorthand descriptions because of the fact that there are descriptions which are definitional equivalents for the names, then it may perhaps be the case that proper names can be substituted for descriptions. However,

Searle claims that if we try to give a complete description of the object as the sense of the name, odd consequences would arise. For Searle any true statement about the object using the name as subject would be analytic and any false one is self-contradictory. More importantly, the meaning of the name would change every time there was any change at all in the object. Accordingly, the name would have different meanings for different people. Thus, we can say that proper names are a shorthand description is not tenable.

Let us evaluate Kripke's position against the sense theory of proper names. If proper name has a sense, then there is associated with every proper name a certain condition such that a proper name designates an object *if and only if* the object under consideration satisfies the condition. It has further been presupposed that the condition *fixes the reference* of the name because the fulfillment of the condition is logically necessary and sufficient for the object's being designated by the name. For example, the condition involved in the description 'the length of the standard meter bar in Paris' is associated with the designator by 'One metre'. Now instead of 'one metre', we may use a different condition for fixing the reference of the designator, e.g., the length which is equal to 39.37 inches. Thus, it would be possible that the meter bar slightly changing its length and may still be designated by the same designator. Now if one holds that a proper name has sense would equally maintain that some condition or other is associated with every proper and such condition may be transparent or changing from time to time from situation to situation as it may happen in the case of 'the length of the standard metre bar in Paris'. However, if the condition is to constitute the sense or meaning of the name, the relation between the condition and the name must be more intimate, coherent than a mere fixing of the reference

as suggested by the sense theorists' of proper names. According to Sen, there must be a *logical connection* between the two.¹¹⁷

Kripke elsewhere maintains that if the reference of a name is determined by its sense, it cannot be a rigid designator because in such a case a name designates an object if and only if it satisfies a certain condition. In this regard, Professor Sen expresses reservation regarding Kripke's position. According to Kripke 'the square root of 4' is a rigid designator because it refers the same object, namely, the 'square root of 4 is 2' in all possible - worlds of an actual world. One may, however, argue by saying that 'the square root of 4' could still be a rigid designator even if its sense determines its reference because the sense consists of a property, what may be termed as the real essence of things, which is indispensable to the number it designates. In defense of Kripke what we can say here, of course following Locke, is that the real essences of things are not in general knowable and cannot be regarded as the identifying marks of proper names. What is necessary for the use of proper names, Sen opines, is to look for the means of identifying objects they are intended to refer to. In this way we would be in a position to assess which objects they are supposed to be a name of. This can even be done with the help of the accidental characteristics according to Sen. I think that Kripke's position that 'if the reference of a proper name is determined by its sense then it cannot be a rigid designator' is too strong and it would be very difficult to sustain keeping the nature of the literature of the theme is concerned. The standard of proper name as rigid designator, which Kripke sets forth is admirable and it would perhaps be regarded the primary or basic criterion of determining a proper name as rigid designator, but when we anticipate the view that 'natural kind terms are rigid designators', then one can take the advantage of descriptive contents at least secondarily.

¹¹⁷ Ibid. p.234.

Relating to the question do proper names have sense, Professor Searle finds a weaker and a stronger interpretation. The weaker interpretation states: "Are any such statements at all analytic?" and the stronger interpretation states: "Are any statements where the subject is a proper name and the predicate an identifying description analytic?"¹¹⁸ To say that statements containing proper names are analytic is to say that they refer to the same object in all possible situations or all possible-worlds of an actual world. This has been accepted by Kripke as he maintained that a proper name is such that it would refer to the same object in every possible-world. That means the object as referred to by a proper name in every possible-world would remain the same and this in turn presupposes the criterion of identity. In Searlian language it can be said that 'the object at time t.1 is the same as *what* the object at time t.2.'¹¹⁹ Here Searle anticipates a gap that has been indicated by the word *what* and it has to be filled by a descriptive general term, like, it is the same mountain, the same person, the same river, etc. where each gives rise to a temporal criterion of identity. Searle claims that this would actually give an affirmative answer of the weaker interpretation of the question: Do proper names have sense? Here some general term is analytically tied to any proper name, e.g., Everest is mountain, the Mississippi is a river, etc. One may, however, raise an objection by saying that if we continue to call an object 'Everest' on the basis of the criterion that the property of being called 'Everest' is sufficient to guarantee that it is the same on the basis of the principle of identity then we involve into a circularity, because in such a case we call an object 'Everest' and to give as the reason that it is called 'Everest' would be circular. What I observe here is that the concept of analyticity involved in the weaker interpretation as cited above actually

¹¹⁸ J.R.Searle, *Speech Acts*, op. cit.p.166.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*p.167.

hinges on the principle of identity which would be informative in nature. In this regard, at least we can say that proper names do have connotations.

We think that partial fulfillment of the weaker interpretation of the very question do proper names have sense, does not entail the same answer to the stronger interpretation. Searle thinks that the stronger interpretation actually plays the all important role in determining whether a proper name has a sense in the Fregean sense. Frege conceives sense in terms of 'mode of presentation' and mode of presentation of an object actually determines the referent of the object. However, single descriptive predicate does not give rise to an identifying description. For Searle, the sentence 'Socrates is a man' may be analytically true because the name 'Socrates' has the same mode of presentation, but the predicate term 'man' is not an identifying description. Even though 'Socrates' belongs to the class 'man', but the term 'man' does not identify Socrates in isolation. As far as the principle of identification is concerned, it can be said that anyone who uses a proper name must be prepared to substitute an identifying description of the object referred to by a name. If anybody fails to fulfil the principle of identification just stated, then he would not be in a position to identify the object he is talking about. That is why; Frege has claimed that a proper name must have a sense or the mode of presentation and that the identifying description constitutes that sense. According to Frege, so long our descriptive backing for the name remained the same; we are not in a position even of speaking the same language. We think that the identifying descriptions of an object denoted by a name contain so many sub-informations. The identifying description of an object may vary from situation to situation not in terms as a whole, but in terms of its inner sub-informations. However, this does not hamper the overall status of identifying description because the relationship of

sub-information of identifying description is not conjunctive but disjunctive in nature. In Wittgenstein's sense it can be said that there remains a *family resemblance* among identifying descriptions of an object as referred to by a name in every possible situation. Accordingly, the identifying description of 'Aristotle' in one situation may be different from the identifying description of 'Aristotle' in another situation and it may continue. But this does not vitiate the principle of identification because there remains a similarity and dissimilarity, *criss-cross* and overlapping, something common and something uncommon within the sub-descriptive contents of identifying description. The mode of presentation would remain the same in every situation because of the application of *disjunctive rule* among the sub-descriptive contents of identifying description. Thus, it can be said that the disjunction of the descriptions of Aristotle is analytically tied to the name 'Aristotle' and the same will happen in every other object as well. It thus gives a quasi-affirmative answer to the stronger interpretation as mentioned above.

So far I have examined the arguments for and against of the very question: Do proper names have sense? I think it would be very difficult to affirm or deny the same without begging question. If it has been asked whether proper names are used to describe *specific characteristics* of objects, the answer of this question would be negative. However, instead of this, if it has been asked whether or not proper names are logically connected with characteristics of the object to which they refer, the answer would be affirmative, of course, in a very loose sense. There is nothing wrong to suggest that the identity statement using proper names, namely, 'Everest is Chomolungma' states that the descriptive backing of both names is true of the same object. If the descriptive backing of the two names as cited above is the same or one contains the other, the statement would be analytic, if not it would be synthetic. Frege perhaps

was right when he claimed that we could make factually informative identity statements using proper names having sense. But at the same time he was wrong in supposing that this sense is as straightforward as in a definite description. For example, 'The morning star is the evening star' is a case in point. Searle comments that although the sense of these names 'morning star' and 'evening star' is straightforward, they are not paradigm proper names; they stand in the periphery of definite descriptions and proper names. It would even be the case that the principle of identification works although different persons describe the same object differently. That means to say that different identifying description would refer to the same object if the descriptions are true with reference to the object. The sense may be different; the reference would be the same. Thus, what we observe here is that even if it has been presumed that proper names have sense, but the sense they possess would be imprecise one.

Why do we have the proper names at all? An obvious answer to such question is that we do require proper names in order to refer to individuals. Interestingly, we can do the same with the help of description as well. Mill, Russell and Kripke have identified proper names in order to refer to individuals without admitting the sense of proper names; whereas Frege takes the help of descriptive contents of proper names to do the same. One may refer 'Aristotle' either in terms of denotation or in terms of connotation, either in terms of *di-re* or in terms of *di-dicto*. The denotational aspect of reference is philosophically known as 'no sense theory of proper names', the connotational aspect of reference is philosophically known as 'sense theory of reference'. However, the literature of the theory of proper names is not strict and precise as it is supposed to be the case. From Mill onwards we have observed so many overlapping interpretations of the concept of proper names. Even though

Mill actually planted the seed of proper names, but his interpretation of the concept of proper names, I think, is far more grammatical than philosophical. Frege and Russell took the clue from Mill. But again there we notice overlapping among Mill, Russell and Frege. There are some similarities and dissimilarities among them as far as their interpretations of the concept of proper names are concerned. Russell classifies proper names into logically proper names and ordinary proper names and then claims that logically proper names are known by means of acquaintance and ordinary proper names are known by descriptions. Thus, if we understand Russell in terms of logically proper names, then there we notice a considerable debate between Russell and Frege because logical proper names are associated with 'no sense theory of proper names', but Frege admits 'sense theory of proper names'. On the other hand, if we interpret Russell in terms of ordinary proper names, then he would be closer to Frege as far as naming theory is concerned. However, the discrepancy between Russell and Frege regarding proper names is well known in philosophy of language because Russell has been treated as a firm believer of logically proper names than ordinary proper names. His elsewhere remarks that logically proper names do not bear any sense and ordinary proper names even though apparently look like names but in real sense they are disguised descriptions.

If we take note on Kripke's proper names, we again find that Kripke was very close to Russell than Frege. His understanding of name as rigid designator is a replica of Russell's theory of logically proper names. However, at the same time there we sense a conceptual deflection between Kripke and Russell. Russell's interpretation of logically proper names favour 'no-sense theory of proper names' in the absolute sense, but I do not think the same in Kripke's case. Kripke has introduced the concept of possible-world, a modal notion, while interpreting his concept

of proper names as rigid designators. But interestingly, Kripke's vocabulary of proper names incorporates 'natural kind terms' where the relevance of descriptive concepts is prominent. Moreover, Russell's criterion of principle of acquaintance as applied in logically proper names is a direct prescription; it is form of *one to one identification* and it deifies any form of conceptuality in this process. However, Kripke's prescription of proper names as rigid designators incorporates different form of description or criterion of identification of natural kind terms. Thus, in a sense, Kripke's natural terms are unlike Russellian logical proper names. Having said this, the only distinctive similarity between Kripke and Russell is that both of them ensured the referential foothold of proper names, logically proper names in Russell and proper names as rigid designators in Kripke. The other similarity is that both of them believe 'no-sense theory of proper names'.

We have already stated that Russell differs from Frege, because Russell believe the 'no-sense theory of proper names', whereas Frege does not. Russell ensures the referential foothold of reality, whereas Frege ensures 'the sense theory of proper names' and perhaps would be non-committal regarding the referential foothold of reality. Thus, in a sense the domain of proper names as conceived by Frege is larger than the domain of proper names as conceived by Russell and Kripke. Kripke differs from Frege because unlike Frege, Kripke acknowledges the 'no-sense theory of proper names'. However, I think, Kripke's interpretation of natural kinds terms has a simile with Fregean interpretation of mode of presentation. What I claim here is that Fregean sense or mode of presentation is very much relevant in the natural kind terms of Kripke, but the only difference between them is that such mode of presentation does not ensure the sense aspect of proper names as rigid designators. There is no question of doubt that the concept of possible-world being a modal concept ensures *an*

entailment relationship between a proper name and what it designates in all possible-worlds. Russell's formulation of logically proper names ensures *an implicative relationship* between a name and what it denotes. Thus, both Russell and Kripke have ensured the referential aspect of proper names. Contrary to them, Frege insists on the sense or meaning aspect of names and is non-committal about the referential aspect of names.

I think the concept of proper name as rigid designator actually hinges in Mill's theory proper names. Mill at once tells us that a proper name is a name of the thing itself. It actually means that a proper name designates the object which it designates irrespective of the properties it may or may not have. Only in this respect one can say that a proper name stands for the thing itself. If we strict to this formulation, then there is no point of denying the view that a proper name is a rigid designator. Russell's anticipation of the demonstrative pronouns was an insightful reflection of Mill's theory of proper name. In recent time, Kripke's and Kalpan's view of proper names are the reflection of Mill. Accordingly, it can be said that a proper name being a designator stands for the object itself if and only if it refers to it directly. To say that a proper name being a rigid designator stands for the object itself and it refers to the object directly equally means to say that a proper name does not bear any sense. From Kripkian perspective it can be said that a proper name, being a rigid designator, actually paves the way of nullifying its possibility of sense.

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Chapter Five

Kripke's theory of Proper Names

The concept of proper name has already been discussed by Mill. Because Mill was the first philosopher who ingrained the seed of proper name from which the subsequent philosophers have developed the concept of proper names. Even though Mill has not been a recognized linguistic philosopher but from his classification of names later philosophers got many important clues on the basis of which they have enabled to develop the concept of proper name. Mill says that proper names have connotation as well as denotation. Mill divided name into singular and general. Singular names are non-connotative and it denotes a single thing or an attribute only but the general name are connotative and designate an indefinite number of individuals. So, according to Mill proper names has connotational aspect. Frege's sense theory of name is similar to Mill's theory of general connotative names. Frege also says that proper names have sense as well as reference. On the other hand, Russell's theory of definite description is akin to Frege's sense theory of name. Again, Russell's theory of logically proper name is a direct referential theory which is accepted by Kripke. He opines that proper names do not have any sense. Kripke constructs his views in opposition to Russell's description view and Frege's theory that the sense of a term determines the reference of that term, a view that is probably mistakenly. Contrary to Russell, Kripke argues that names cannot be disguised descriptions' on three grounds:

- (a) "There are numerous instances where a name is not associated with any uniquely identifying description or cluster of descriptions.

(b) A person may know how to use a proper name without knowing the appropriate set of descriptions associated with that name. Speakers often legitimately use proper names to refer to individuals without having the required information which would uniquely identify that individual to them.

(c) Certain names, proper names and natural kind terms in particular, are rigid designators in the sense that they are not disguised description.”¹²⁰

Kripke's argument regarding proper name is based mainly on the distinction between what he calls rigid and non-rigid or accidental designators. A rigid designator is one which designates the same object in all possible worlds; i.e., if it designates a certain object in the actual world then it designates the same object in all other possible worlds in which the object exist at all (it being inconceivable that there are some possible worlds in which the object does not exist). “A non- rigid designator, on the other hand, is one which does not designate the same object in all possible worlds; i.e., there are possible world in which the designator designates objects that are different from what it designates in the actual world”.¹²¹ ‘The square root of 4’ is a rigid designator for it designates the same object, namely, the number 2, in all possible worlds; but ‘the president of the USA in 1970’ is a non-rigid designator for it does not designate the same individual in all possible worlds: it designates Richard Nixon in the actual world, but that is only due to the actual outcome of the relevant Presidential election, and the result of the election need not have been what it actually was; the result of election might have been different and a different man might have been elected.

¹²⁰ Kripke.Saul. *Naming and Necessity*: 1980: Oxford: Blackwell: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. P. 321.

¹²¹ *Ibid.* p. 322.

In terms of this distinction between rigid and non-rigid designators, we can now formulate Kripke's basic argument against the theory that proper names have sense as well as reference. The following is my formulation of the argument:

"If a proper names has a sense then the reference of the proper name is determine by its sense, i.e., there is associated with a proper name a certain condition, whatever that condition may be, and an object is designated by the name if and only if it satisfies that condition. If this is how the reference of a proper name is determined then a proper name can not be a rigid designator; at least it can not in general be a rigid designator."¹²² For, there is no guarantee that the object which satisfies the condition associated with the proper name in the actual world would also satisfy it in all other possible worlds. It may well be that some other object satisfies the condition in another world. In fact, if the reference of a proper name is determined by its sense, it will be a non-rigid designator and behave exactly like 'the president of the USA in 1970'. But a proper name is a rigid designator. It does not have any sense.

How can we show that a proper name is a rigid designator? Kripke's argument for this is quite straightforward. A proper name must be a rigid designator for; otherwise, we could not make counterfactual assertions by their help, as we can actually do. In order to assert that the man who was actually the president of the USA in 1970, by virtue of having won the relevant election, might not have been the president, for it was just a contingent matter of fact that he won the election, now we can use the name of the person and say 'Nixon might not have been the President of the USA in 1970'. This counterfactual could not mean what its means unless the proper name 'Nixon' designated the same individual in both

¹²² Ibid. p. 323.

the actual world, in which he is the President, and the possible world, in which he is not.

Let us consider briefly whether Kripke's argument really amounts to a refutation of the sense theory of proper names. There is no doubt that the argument is valid in the sense that if the premises are all true then the conclusion is also true. So, the question is whether the premises of the argument are all true.

The first premise of the argument is: if the proper name has a sense, then there is associated with every proper name a certain condition such that the proper name designates an object if and only if the object satisfies the condition. We think that this premise is true. In order to see that it is, it is necessary clearly to distinguish two significantly different ways in which one may maintain that a proper name is associated with a condition. One may maintain that a proper name is associated with a condition in that the condition only fixes the reference of the name. Again, one may maintain that a proper name is associated with a condition not only in that the condition fixes the reference of the name, but also in that the fulfillment of the condition by the object is strictly entailed by its being designated by the name, so that the fulfillment of the condition is 'logically necessary and sufficient for the object's being designated by the name.'¹²³

One may maintain that the condition involved in the description 'the length of the standard metre bar in Paris' is associated with the designator 'One metre', but only by way of determining its reference, and that is why it is logically possible that the length designated by 'one metre' would cease to satisfy the condition- it would cease to satisfy the condition in the logically possible event of the metre bar changing in its length, and would still continue to be designated by the same designator. Now, we think that it should be clear that one who wants to maintain that

¹²³ Ibid. p. 325.

a proper name has sense must maintain that some condition or the other is associated with every proper name not in the first but in the second manner, For, if the condition is to constitute the sense or meaning of the name, the relation between the condition and then name must be more intimate than what a mere fixing of the reference would demand. There must, in fact, be a logical connection between the two.

Let us now consider the second premise of Kripke's argument in my formulation: if the reference of a name is determined by its sense, if, that is, a name designates an object if and only if it satisfies a certain condition, then it can not be a rigid designator. This premise is really doubtful, especially in view of certain thing which Kripke himself has said. As Kripke has pointed out, some designators which are of this kind are rigid designator, e.g., 'the square roots of 4'. It is not the case that this designator stands for one number in the actual world and a different number in another possible world. The square root of 4 is to be in all possible worlds. One may, however, argue at this juncture that 'the square root of 4' could be a rigid designator in spite of the fact that its sense determines its reference because the sense consists of a property which is essential to the number it designates but, for the first thing, 'the square root of 4' is not really a proper name, and, for the next, what it designates is not one of those things which are usually supposed to be designated by proper names – persons, things and places – and it is extremely doubtful whether they can be said to have any essential properties. But this way out of the difficulty is not open to Kripke himself, because he has not only maintained but has actually argued at length that particular persons and things, typical bearers of proper names, can be said to have essential properties. To quote two of his own examples, "the property of being born to the parents to whom he is in fact born is an essential property of

Nixon, and the property of being made of the block of wood of which it is actually made is an essential property of a wooden table.”¹²⁴

We think, however, that we can pursue this line a little more in defence of Kripke. What is important, it may be said, is not whether things designated by proper names have essence, but whether these essences play any role in the designation of objects by proper names. It can be argued that they do not. In the first place, Locke may indeed be right in maintaining that these real essences of things, as these essences have to be are not in general knowable, and, as such, can not be used by those who use proper names. In the second place, even if these essences are knowable, it is not by their help that the references of the proper names is, or need be, determined. What may be said to be necessary for use of proper names is that we should have a means of identifying the objects they are intended to refer to; i.e., we should be in a position to tell which objects they are supposed to be names of. But this can be done by the help of accidental characteristics: the description which may be used for the purpose of fixing the reference of a proper name need not be necessarily satisfied by what the name designated. Here, we may again refer to the the relation between Nixon’s and ‘the president of USA in 1970’ or the relation between ‘one metre’ and ‘the length of the standard metre bar in Paris’

We have a feeling that this is the line in which a defence for Kripke has not been sought. But we are not sure whether it would constitute a defence of Kripke’s second premise in my formulation, viz., that ‘if the reference of a name is determined by its sense then it can not be rigid designator.’¹²⁵ This seems to be the line to take if what we want to prove is that a proper name does not have any sense at all. For if it is not the

¹²⁴ Ibid. P.325.

¹²⁵ Ibid. p. 336.

essential property which determines the reference of the name for its users then it is not the essential property which constitutes its sense. But this indeed is a strange, if not an absurd, conclusion to draw.

This uncertainty over the second premise of the argument which we have attributed to Kripke surely weakens it. We should, nevertheless, take a look at the third premise of the argument: a proper name is a rigid designator. This premise has an intrinsic interest of its own, although, if there is any thing wrong with the second premise, it would not save Kripke's argument.

We think that being a rigid designator is an essential characteristic of a proper name, and that lying emphasis on this and showing its various important implications are Kripke's major contribution to the subject, even if what we have described as his argument to refute the sense theory of proper name does not succeed. But, at the same time, we believe that the basic insight behind the principle that proper names are rigid designators was formulated by John Stuart Mill. At one place, Mill tells us that 'a proper name is a name of the thing itself.'¹²⁶ We take this to mean that the proper name designates the objects which it designates irrespective of the properties it may or may not have, whether or not it satisfies a certain description or condition. If, thus, the proper name stands for the thing itself, independently of all those consideration, then there is no reason why the proper name should not be a rigid designator. To strengthen this point, we may not that we are, in any case, in need of rigid designators. If we do not have such designators, we shall never be able to say significantly that this or that object satisfies, or fails to satisfy, such and such conditions, or that this or that object might not have satisfied such and such conditions, or that it satisfies the conditions only contingently, at all. And what could such a designator, a designator which

¹²⁶ Mill, J. S. *A System of Logic* (London: Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1875).

refers to the thing itself, cutting through, so to say, all descriptive trappings, be, if it is not a proper name? The counterfactuals to which Kripke calls our attention do show that we have in proper names such designators as we need. Another basic insight into the nature of proper names was captured quite early by Russell, and is now developed in great detail by David Kaplan in the context of demonstrative in his brilliant monograph 'demonstratives'. It is that a proper name refers to its referent directly, and not via any characteristics. We think that the ideas that a designator stands for the object directly and that it stands for the object itself are strictly logically equivalent with each other: 'a designator stands for the object itself if and only if it refers to it directly.'¹²⁷

We want to conclude our discussion of the thesis is that the proper name is a rigid designator by saying that it seems to me that this thesis and the thesis that it does not have any sense both follow from the same basic characteristic, viz, that the proper name stands for the object itself, or, equivalently, that it refers to the object directly. It is not the case that either of these theses is a consequence of the other; in particular, it is difficult to maintain, for reasons we have already discussed, that a proper name's being a rigid designator is a consequence of its not having sense.

Thus, we do not think that what seems to be Kripke's argument against the sense theory of proper names succeeded. But the argument involves a number of ideas which are fundamental to the very notion of a proper name. The roots of all these ideas are to be found in Mill's and Russell's work.

The rigidity of a name depends upon its reference which is direct and non-contingent. If the object exists at all, then it exists necessarily in the sense that it cannot but be that object in any possible situation. Therefore the name has to be rigid across all possible situations.

¹²⁷ Kaplan, David. "Dthat" in *The Philosophy of Language*, ed. A.P. Martinich, pp. 316-29.

A possible situation is a possible world, according to Kripke. It contains the same objects as those that exist in the actual world though in different relations. Therefore a possible world differs from the actual world only in the way the objects are configured, that is, in their relations and their properties. The objects or the substances themselves do not change whereas their properties change. Thus, the names of the objects must refer to the objects necessarily and not contingently. 'The possible world , for Kripke, are the possible situations that present alternative ways of describing the world and are not distant planet – like places which we see through a telescope.'¹²⁸ Therefore, whenever we talk of a possible world, we mean the alternative way of describing the world and its substances such that we can now refer to a person or thing in that world and ascribe a certain property to it. In the actual world, for example, Nixon is the American president in 1970, but in a possible world W1 he is a farmer and in another possible world W2 he is just a businessman. In all these possible worlds, Nixon remains the same person though he bears new properties "like being a farmer", "being a businessman", etc. Thus the rigid designator, "Nixon", has an unalterable referent though what it refers to has new properties in each possible world.

Kripke arrives at a very novel notion of necessity in his theory of proper names and possible worlds. A sentence is necessarily true if it is true across all possible worlds or more succinctly in all possible-worlds of an actual –world. If a sentence is contingently true in the actual world like "Aristotle is the teacher of Alexander", it can not be true in another possible world where Aristotle did not go for pedagogy at all. Aristotle might have been a doctor and therefore it will not be true that in that world he is the teacher of Alexander. Thus the sentence "Aristotle is the

¹²⁸ Kripke.Saul. "Naming and Necessity" in *Semantic of Natural Languages*, eds. Davidson and Harman.P,267.

teacher of Alexander” is only contingently true. But the sentence “Aristotle is Aristotle” remains true necessarily across all possible worlds. This may seem to be a triviality that Aristotle is Aristotle. But it cannot be a triviality because much depends on the self-identity of the person, Aristotle. To do away with the triviality, Kripke has another example of a necessary statement, e.g. “Hesperus is Phosphorus”. Here the two names “Hesperus” and “Phosphorus” refers to the same thing, the planet Venus. But they name the same individual across all possible-worlds and so the sentence “Hesperus is Phosphorus” is necessarily true. But the necessity being talked about here is not the necessity of the logical kind where necessity and analyticity are the same. This kind of necessity is called ‘metaphysical necessity.’¹²⁹

Metaphysical necessity can best be characterized as the necessity that follows from the fact that names refer rigidly to the substances they stand for and that the substances themselves have a rigid metaphysical structure. The structure is the underlying stuff of the substances which can be revealed only in a unique ostensive way. For example, water has the structure of H₂O, and gold has the atomic number 79. These structures are scientifically discovered and the metaphysical in character. Thus, the sentences “Water is H₂O” and “Gold has the atomic number 79” are epistemically a posteriori, but are yet metaphysically necessary. Their being empirical in nature does not go against their being necessarily true in every possible world. According to Kripke, the epistemological and metaphysical categories are very different from each other. What is metaphysically necessary need not be epistemologically so and vice versa. That is, there could be a truth which is apriori and yet metaphysically contingent just as there are truths which are

¹²⁹ Ibid.Pp.263-264.

metaphysically necessary but epistemologically a posteriori. This rejects the positivist theory that the only necessity is logical necessity.

The natural-kind terms such as “water”, “gold” etc.¹³⁰ bear certain characteristics which are true in all possible worlds. These characteristics constitute the very structure of the substances they stand for. Since the structures are essential to the substances, any description of them has to be necessary. In that sense, water is necessarily H₂O and the sentence “Water is H₂O” representing that structure is a necessary truth. This truth is an essential truth is scientific discovery and so has a metaphysical status. For Kripke, the truth of the statement is based on the consideration of the essential nature of the properties ascribed to the substance, water. So, metaphysical necessity and essentialism can move together.

Essentialism is the doctrine of the realists who impute an essential structure to the substances found in the world. For them, the substances are having essential as well as contingent properties such that language has to devise ways and means to refer to the essential structure. This can be done directly through ostensive definitions or through descriptions which represent the essential structure. In the latter case the descriptions have to be necessary and so constitutive. The constitutive truths have to be such that they are not analytically true but true as a matter of constitution. The direct reference takes place in such a way that we have a direct route to the essence of the things in our language. The natural kind terms can be taken as names that directly stand for the substances. ‘These terms are thus not only indexical in their referring function but also are such that they refer to the substances as directly and primitively as possible.’¹³¹

¹³⁰ Ibid. p. 264.

¹³¹ Ibid.

Kripke's theory of direct reference tends towards a causal theory of reference in that it converges on proposing that the names, including the natural kind terms, causally fix their referents. Kripke's argument is this: proper names are conferred on persons at a particular point of their life and that is called baptism. The name, after such 'baptism, spreads across society through a causal chain and thus is repeatedly used by his or her contemporaries.'¹³² This chain continues to be used by people who are far away in space and time. That is how the names "Nixon", "Gandhi", etc. are used by people in our society. Here the actual **dubbing ceremony** is important because the name is used for the child for the first time. That is the first link in the causal chain and that makes other links possible. In this way 'the names acquire the significance they have as a matter of causal determination.'¹³³

The causal theory of naming, as the name suggests, goes beyond the ordinary conception of name as a tag or at best as an unmeaning symbol for use in interpersonal communication. According to the causal theory, *names are significant bits of referring devices*. They are used for communication purposes under certain causal conditions such that once a name is introduced; it goes on acquiring new significance as the use accumulates. Thus there is a direct causal source of the names and they are accountable in terms of the habits and preferences of the linguistic community. The linguistic community is the ultimate determinant of the causal sufficiency of the names. Even then, the causal theorists are not description theorists and they prefer the direct reference theory because they think that in it alone there are both necessary and sufficient conditions for the explanation of how the naming takes place. The causal theory has been to some extent espoused by Donnellan, Putnam and

¹³² Ibid.p.264.

¹³³ Ibid. p. 265.

Evans apart from Kripke himself. It states that there is “a direct, though causally determined, route to the referents from the names.”¹³⁴ Kripke outlines the theory in the following way: “For species, as for the proper names, the way the reference of a term is fixed should not be regarded as a synonym for the term. In the case of proper names, the reference can be fixed in various ways. In the initial baptism it is typically fixed by an ostensive or a description. Otherwise, the reference is usually determined by a chain, passing the name from link to link.”¹³⁵

The theory thus makes a departure from the thesis that names are arbitrary and that they could be easily changed in a society. The theory makes it a necessary historical fact that names are a stable feature of the ongoing social convention of having recorded names.

So from the above discussion we see that Russell’s theory of logically proper name is a genuine proper name that designates the same object in every possible world of an actual world as admitted by Kripke. As far as ‘reference’ aspect is concerned there we find continuity from Russell to Wittgenstein to Kripke. These three philosophers have relevance opinion regarding the concept of proper names. As Russell’s theory of logically proper name and Wittgenstein picture theory of name and Kripke’s rigid designator are the same view or related to each other. The only difference among them is that Russell interprets logical proper names in terms of *acquaintance*, Wittgenstein in terms of *logical space* and Kripke in terms of *modal necessity*.

¹³⁴ Evans, Gareth. “The Causal Theory of Names” in *The Philosophy of Language*, ed. Martinich, pp. 295-307.

¹³⁵ Kripke, Saul. “Naming and Necessity” in *Semantics of Natural Language*, eds. Davidson and Harman, p. 328.

Chapter Six

Recent Outlook of Proper Names

Section One

Putnam's Natural Kind Terms and Twin Earth Argument

After the development of Kripke's theory of proper name as rigid designator, there we notice in recent times the development of another thesis known as *natural kind terms as rigid designator*. This theory has been propounded by H. Putnam in his "The meaning of 'meaning'".¹³⁶ According to Putnam *a natural kind term is a term having baptism ceremony or conventional background on the basis of which such terms designates the same objects in every possible situations*. Putnam's theory of natural kind terms, we think, opens up a new dimension in the history of proper names.

Saul Kripke's argument against description theories of names inaugurated a revolution in the philosophy of language. One of the first acts of that revolution was an application of similar arguments against a similarly descriptive theory of another sort of expression-so-called natural-kind terms. Kripke himself has claimed that natural-kind terms are rigid designators. Kripke and Putnam thus have been acknowledged as the creators of the new theory of proper name. In fact, these two philosophers first proposed about that new theory of natural-kind terms.

But what are natural-kind terms? Are natural kind terms at par with proper names in the Russellian sense? Are they differing from the general perception of proper names? We think that natural-kind terms differ from proper names in the sense that proper names are being used to pick out individuals; whereas natural kind terms are being used to pick out kinds.

¹³⁶ Putnam, H. "The Meaning of 'meaning'" in *Mind, Language and Reality*, p.240.

Favourite examples are 'tiger' and 'water'. Unlike proper names, natural-kind terms form a *grammatically variegated class*. Although they are all terms for kinds in some sense or other, they may be the terms for kinds of objects (like 'tiger', 'mammal', 'fish', and 'whale') or for kinds of stuff (like 'water', 'gold', 'aluminium'). It's generally assumed that this difference is not important for the issues which Kripke is concerned with. Putnam endorses Kripke's theory that proper names as well as natural kind terms are *rigid designators*. That is the names rigidly designate their referents in such a way that they can be supposed to be true of the referents across all possible worlds. This may be called the theory of direct reference. In "The Meaning of 'Meaning'", Hilary Putnam presents several arguments to show that 'natural kind terms do not have a Meaning or "sense" of a Fregean sort'.¹³⁷ Instead, he says, they function much like indexicals such as "this", 'that' or the pronoun "I", whose reference is determined by the circumstances of their use, not by unique properties of the referent that might be "expressed" in a sense. Putnam further argues that this account covers most general terms in our language, not just kind terms like "water" and "tiger". He thus presents a serious challenge for the traditional notion of meaning, for if he is right only a few score words would be left with a meaning.

Here we wish to distinguish three arguments which appear intermingled in "The Meaning of 'Meaning'". Two of the arguments make explicit use of the same science-fiction example of a "Twine Earth" while the third uses a related example, and all three might be seen as showing that kind terms are like "rigid designators".¹³⁸ Our point of contention is to develop the theory of meaning. In fact, the only argument that relates

¹³⁷ Putnam, Hilary, "The Meaning of Meaning", in *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, vol. 7. Edited by K. Gunderson, 1975, pp. 131-193.e, vol. 7. Edited by K. Gunderson, 1975, pp. 131-193.

¹³⁸ Ibid. p. 132.

kind terms to rigid designators is the one that presents the least difficulty for a classical theory of meaning.

The “Twin Earth” arguments established three different conclusions: (1) the kind terms must have at least some *indexical component* in their meanings; (2) that kind terms are rigid designators, and (3) that there are no analytic truths about natural kinds of a sort to which the traditional theory seems committed. The first point raises a difficulty for the theory of meaning. The second point, we shall argue, presents the least difficulty for the classical theory. The third point prevents a serious challenge to the theory of meaning. Its success, however, is based on a hypothesis about the epistemological function of kind terms that is not argued for in “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’”.¹³⁹

We think that Putnam’s arguments against the classical theory of meaning actually tell us in what sense the fundamental doctrines of the classical theory conflict in the case of kind terms. He states them as follows:

- (1) That knowing the meaning of a term is just a matter of being in a certain psychological state.
- (2) That ‘the meaning of a term (in the sense of “intension”) determines its extension (in the sense that sameness of intension entails sameness of extension).’¹⁴⁰

Thesis (1) is needed to explain the “cognitive” features of meaning; the function of meaning in communication, learning a language, etc. Thesis (2) makes the connection between the meaning of sentence and its truth conditions.

While Frege’s anti-psychologism concerning meanings is well known, his theory must be accompanied by some account of what it is to grasp a meaning. This, Putnam suggests, must at least mean that differences in

¹³⁹ Ibid. p. 134.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid. p. 135.

the meaning of terms will be reflected in a difference of the psychological states which constitute “knowing the meaning” of those terms. It is just theses 1 and 2 that concern Putnam most. Whether Frege held both is beyond the scope of this discussion. On the other hand, objections to 1 and 2 can be used against many other theories of meaning. If one maintains that the intensions of speakers or the use they will make of words are distinct where the “Meanings” of the words are distinct and that those features must make some difference in psychological states of speakers. Putnam’s arguments will succeed. Thesis (1) is thus stated strongly.

One can, however, make an analogy between Putnam’s own analyses of kind terms with indexical expressions. The extension or denotation of a particular token of a word like “that” or “I” is not determined by any properties expressed by those terms, but rather by facts about the situation of their use.¹⁴¹ The lack of any feature which is “grasped” in learning kind terms is comparable to the absence of predicates in the formal representation of indexicals. Putnam represents the classical theory as treating the sense of kind terms like a definite description, where the content of the description represents what is “grasped”. Putnam’s project is to show that the definite description theory of kind terms cannot satisfy both (1) and (2). His indexical account resolves the conflict by abandoning (1). Note, however, that these are just analogies and that one need not require that the meaning of a term be expressible by some other term in the same language.

Putnam explicates his position by using the science-fiction example of “Twin Earth”. In each case the term ‘water’ is shown not to have the extension that would be predicated by a theory that satisfies condition (1). Putnam describes it: Twin Earth is very much like earth; in fact, people

¹⁴¹ Ibid. p. 136.

on Twine Earth even speak English. In fact, apart from the differences we shall specify in our science-fiction examples, the reader may suppose that Twin Earth is exactly like earth.

One of the peculiarities of Twine Earth is that the liquid called “water” is not H₂O but a different liquid whose chemical formula is very long and complicated. I shall suppose that XYZ is indistinguishable from water at normal temperatures and pressures. In particular, it tastes like water and it quenches thirst like water. Also, we will suppose that ‘the oceans and lakes and seas of Twin Earth contain XYZ and not water and that it rains XYZ on Twin Earth and not water, etc...’¹⁴²

Putnam’s three arguments are made by taking Twine Earth as a distant planet, another possible world, and as a guide to “epistemologically” possible worlds, how this world might have turned out to be. It is important to understand the motivation of Putnam’s assertion that XYZ is not water. This claim relies on what Putnam calls a “realistic” attitude towards sciences.¹⁴³ It is this attitude that makes us see the progress of science as a process of discovery about various entities in the world. Thus, one sees a term like “water” as having always had the same extension (just the quantities of H₂O in the world) whether that extension could be identified or not. The discovery that water is H₂O is then simply that, recognition of what it is that a particular term has been true of all along. This claim contrasts with the view of those who argue that terms such as “water”, when used by people with greatly different theories of the world, are just not comparable. It is for them the role of a term in a particular theory that determines its extension. This attitude also rules out seeing kind terms as expressing “open-textured” concepts whose meaning is changed by decisions of scientists as new discoveries are made. If the

¹⁴² Ibid. p. 140.

¹⁴³ Ibid. p. 154.

intension of kind terms is to determine exactly one extension through time that intension cannot change.

In his Twin Earth argument example Putnam relies on our agreement that XYZ is not water because it is not H₂O, whether that is known to the residents of the two earths or not. It is, in fact, this independence of reference, or the use of kind terms to identify some stuff, from our particular beliefs about that stuff, that is crucial to Putnam's most successful argument. We shall consider and elaborate this argument later stage. At the stage of describing the Twin Earth, this point manifests itself in the claim that XYZ is not water even though at some earlier time (say before 1750) no person would know or believe anything about the one that he would not know or believe about the other. Only H₂O is, or has ever been water.

Putnam's First Argument

Putnam first argument takes 'Twin Earth as a distant planet in our universe.'¹⁴⁴ We are asked to consider what we would say if such a planet were discovered. By hypothesis the psychological state of those on Twine Earth is the same as that of people on Earth. Any theory of meaning which makes meaning both determine extension, and correspond uniquely to a psychological state, will say that XYZ is in the extension of "water". But it is not. Only H₂O is water. XYZ might be called "water" on "Twine Earth", but it is the chemical structure of the stuff called "water" on Earth which determines what water on "Twin Earth" is. This shows a similarity between kind terms and indexical expressions such as "this stuff here". The extension of that term is not determined by any properties it expresses but rather by *the situation of its utterance*. We must conclude that no description of water in terms of features that are relevant to psychological states, nothing like the definite descriptions or

¹⁴⁴ Ibid. p. 155.

lists of properties discussed earlier, can correctly determine the extension of kind terms.

Putnam's Twin Earth example recalls familiar arguments. This sort of example has been used to show that no definite description based solely *on qualitative features* can be guaranteed to have a unique referent. Definite descriptions are intended to identify only a unique individual. But one can argue that no matter how well an individual is described it is always possible that some other individual on a distant "Twin" planet also satisfies the description. In practice we guarantee that descriptions have at most one referent by including in them proper names or indexicals. Thus, we know that "the Queen of England", or rather "the Present Queen of England", can only identify one woman because that particular country can have only one monarch at a time. It might be claimed, however, that any description of a "queen of a large island whose daughter rides horses, etc..." could always be satisfied as well by a Twin Elizabeth on as Twin Earth.

What Putnam has shown, then, is much the same as some who have argued that definite descriptions alone cannot represent the sense of singular terms.¹⁴⁵ He has shown that no definite description involving purely qualitative features or features which correspond to a psychological state of one who knows of them, can correctly determine the extension of kind terms. The response that can be given in the case of singular terms applies as well to kind terms. It runs as follows: What has been shown in that kind terms must have an indexical element. Just as one might argue with Strawson that any referring expression must contain an indexical or "demonstrative" element, one might agree with Putnam and argue that kind terms include an indexical element.¹⁴⁶ "Water" would

¹⁴⁵ Strawson, P. F. *Individual*, Methuen, 1959. p. 18.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.* p. 21.

mean something like “the kind around here which is...”¹⁴⁷. It is the extension of such terms in the place where language users live, earth that determines the extension of those terms. Putnam has not shown, however, that kind terms are purely indexical, like “that”, i.e., their meaning contains no feature that might be represented by a predicate, or that is relevant to the psychological state of one who grasps the term.

This is a problem for the classical theory of meaning, but one that has been confronted before. The corresponding difficulty with singular terms is to explain how a sense can guarantee that a term has one and only one referent.¹⁴⁸ So, the theory of meaning must also explain how a sense can identify just one kind and not be true as well of some kind on a distant Twin Earth unknown to us. This is Putnam’s first use of Twin Earth.

Putnam’s Second Argument

The second argument demonstrates that kind terms are “rigid designator”, and it is applied to general terms. A kind term is rigid *if it applies to members of the same kind in all possible worlds*. To say that “water” is rigid is just to say that it is true of members of the same kind in each possible world, just H₂O molecules. Suppose now that Twin Earth is not another planet but rather another possible world just as we say that XYZ on another planet is not water. So XYZ in another possible world would not be water in term. Therefore “Water” must be a rigid term.

Does this conclusion show that kind terms do not have sense that can satisfy both conditions (1) and (2) of the classical theory? Putnam’s response perhaps would be negative. Putnam has once again presented a claim about the extension of kind terms which is supposed to be incompatible with any “psychological” component in their sense. But

¹⁴⁷ The term “here” must identify Earth, otherwise “water” on Twin Earth will name XYZ. This requires a distinction in the logic of indexicals like the made for definite descriptions in second argument below.

¹⁴⁸ Burks, A. “A Theory of Proper names”, *Philosophical Studies* 2, 1951. p. 78.

there is no such incompatibility. Consider again the analogy with definite descriptions. A term like “the Queen of England” might name a different individual in another possible world, perhaps Ann. Thus, as usually constructed, definite descriptions do not rigidly designate any particular individual. Some definite descriptions can be rigid designators if they refer to an object via an “essential” property. Perhaps “the square root of 49” rigidly designates seven.

The sort of descriptions that could identify a kind is not likely to be of that rigid sort. However, Putnam’s argument can be directed against a “description” theory of kind terms as follows. Kind terms are rigid. Definite descriptions, at least of the sort that we could associate with a kind, are not rigid. Therefore definite descriptions cannot represent the sense of kind terms.

This argument relies on ignoring a familiar feature of the logic of definite descriptions in modal contexts. One can distinguish between what has been called the *de re* and *de dicto* uses of definite descriptions. One can see statements such as “Necessarily the number of the planets is greater than 7” as either true or false, depending on the interpretation of the definite descriptions. The *de re* makes a statement about the necessary properties of the individual, viz. the number nine, that is, in fact, the number of the planets. The *de dicto* use, however, yields a statement about whatever number of planets there may be, even for instance, five, making the sentence false. Following Smullyan one can see this distinction as a difference in interpreting the scope of the descriptions when they are eliminated using Russell’s theory of descriptions.¹⁴⁹ Kripke seems to assert that this analysis shows that descriptions are not

¹⁴⁹ Smullyan, A. “Modality and Description”, *The Journal of Symbolic Logic*, 134. 1948.

ambiguous, and have only one use.¹⁵⁰ They certainly are not ambiguous in the manner of a word like “bank” whose sense could just as well be represented by distinct words. The “sense” of a definite description is related logically and if represented directly in a language might be indicated by an operator rather than distinct terms. Still, it seems that one can take a sentence with descriptions in two ways and ascribe that difference to what might be called “uses” of the description, whether a formal language of modalities will treat it as an ambiguity or a scope distinction.

We shall then speak of *de re* and *de dicto* uses of kind terms. “Water” taken as a definite description in the *de re* use would designate H₂O in all possible worlds. “Water” taken this way satisfies all of Putnam’s insights about what should be water on Twin Earth. Yet, like all descriptions, the sense of “water” would have something which could be “grasped”. “Water” taken as *de re* satisfies both conditions (1) and (2) of the classical theory. The content of the description is grasped in learning the terms, but it identifies the same stuff, H₂O, in all possible worlds, and thus the correct extension, satisfying (2).

Putnam argues that kind terms can be used rigidly or perhaps that their most common use is as a rigid term. He in this regard considers the scope distinction as applying to kind terms, but sees it as an exclusive distinction; kind-terms must be either rigid or non-rigid.¹⁵¹ The analogy with definite descriptions, however, indicates that kind terms, like descriptions, have two uses, one rigid and the other not. We have argued that Putnam uses “Water” as a rigid designator in all examples he provides. The pertinent question arises at this juncture: Are there *de dicto* uses of the term? Perhaps, there are. Consider the identity “Water =

¹⁵⁰ Kripke, Saul. “Naming and Necessity”, in *Semantics of Natural Language*, edited by D. Davidson and G. Harman, Reidel, 1972, p. 346.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.* p. 148.

H₂O". As both terms have been treated as rigid designators, this must be a necessary truth if true at all. On the other hand, our intuition that XYZ might be water in Twin Earth is captured by representing "Water" in the *de dicto* use. With this analysis of kind terms one can, in fact, hold with both sides in the dispute about such identities. One can agree with Putnam that "Water" is singled out as the same stuff as H₂O, in each world, yet it would perhaps be the case that "Water = H₂O" is contingently true. These two positions actually rely on different uses of "Water". *The de re use is best paraphrased as "The stuff which is in fact water is H₂O". The de dicto as "H₂O happens to be the water of this world".*

This view, while saving the classical theory of meaning from Putnam, does alter it in another respect. In Fregean terms, one might say that the classical theory holds that the relation between a predicate and the "concept" it denotes is directly given by the sense of the predicate. To understand a predicate like "is a bachelor" is to know what concept is expressed. No one has ever thought that there is such a direct connection between singular terms and their referents. To know that thing as the "evening star", one must know some facts of astronomy. On the analysis we have proposed the predicate "is water" will be like a definite description. "x is water" ascribes a property to x (namely being H₂O) but only because that is the property which satisfies certain conditions. One might have been ascribing the structure XYZ to x with that predicate. The semantic relation between a predicate and its extension will thus be mediated by another element, a kind. Kind terms will identify different kinds, such as H₂O or XYZ in different worlds, each kind having members in different worlds. This, however, is just to recognize in another way that the meaning of a kind term can determine its extension, not to abandon (2).

We see time and again that Putnam's arguments do not show conclusively that kind terms lack a sense. At best we do claim that they show how a "definite description" oriented model must be taken if it is to represent how the extension of kind terms is determined. He shows that any account of kind terms must explain how they can be rigid; but that does not exclude the sense of the term under consideration.

Putnam endorses Kripke's theory that proper names as well as natural-kind terms are rigid designators; that is, the names rigidly designate their referents in such a way that they can be supposed to be true of the referents across all possible worlds. This may be called the theory of direct reference. It combines the indexicality of the referring expressions with rigidity in their standing as referents. Putnam also endorses the view that a causal chain is necessarily the underlying mechanism of reference. He, however, brings into prominence the community of language-users and the environment in the determination of the causal chain underlying the reference mechanism.

Putnam explains the notion of reference in connection with his thought-experiment about the **Twin Earth**. This experiment is like this: imagine another earth and that there are people exactly like us on this Twin Earth also. Just as the people on Earth speak English, the people on the Twin Earth also speak a language like English. Let us imagine that the word "Water" occurs in the Twin Earth-English. There is stuff on Twin Earth which looks like water and is very much used in the same way. Before 1750, neither the Earthian nor the Twin Earthians knew about the chemical structure of water. But because of new developments in science, now it is known that water on Earth is H₂O and the water on Twin Earth is XYZ. The question now is: What is the referent of the word "Water" in the Earthian English and in the Twin Earthian English? Is it the same or different? On the surface both the words "Water", "Water" mean the

same thing and are representing the same concept, and so they refer to the same substance. But at the deeper level they are different. The meaning is not the same, though they may represent the same concept. They, in fact, refer to two different things such as H₂O on Earth and XYZ on Twin Earth. When the Earthians drink water they drink the stuff which is H₂O and not XYZ and vice versa. Thus 'reference is tied to the stuff directly presented to us without the help of concepts.'¹⁵²

Putnam then holds that proper names and natural kind terms are such that they directly refer and are not determined by the concepts and meanings supposed to be in the mind of the speakers. That is to say that the "psychological states"¹⁵³ do not determine the extension of natural kind terms. The idea that what the speakers have in mind determined the referent is an old psychologistic doctrine which both Frege and Wittgenstein have rejected. This has played havoc in semantics and Putnam has rightly rejected it. Meanings are not "in the head"¹⁵⁴ as Putnam has rightly pointed out. Those who suppose that meanings are ideas or concepts may fall into the trap of psychologism and so are likely to believe that the referents are determined by these meanings. In that case, if the meanings are the same, the referents are also the same. But this is not the case as has been shown in the **Twin Earth example**.

Reference, like meaning, is a matter of what the name is used to do in the linguistic community and in the world that it is supposed to refer to. In view of this, it is certain that names do not derive their meaning from the mental contents of the speakers; rather they get their meaning from their use in language. The names are meaningful because they can be used to

¹⁵² Putnam, Hilary. "The Meaning of 'Meaning'" in *Mind, Language and Reality* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1975). Pp. 131-193.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.* p. 133.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.* p. 134.

refer to objects according to certain rules. Besides, the names are indexicals standing for their referents directly and without hinges. The indexical use of names is the source of the meaning of names. Thus, meaning and extension of a term converge as the same name refers to the same referent across all possible worlds. Putnam explains: “The theory that natural-kind words like “water” are indexicals leaves it open, however, whether to say that “water” in the twin earth dialect of English has the same meaning as “water” in the Earth dialect and a different extension...thereby giving up the doctrine that “meaning(intension) determines extension”; or to say, as we have chosen to do, that difference in extension is *ipso-facto* a difference in meaning for natural kind terms, thereby giving up the doctrine that meaning are concepts, or, indeed, mental entities of any kind.”¹⁵⁵

The theory of names proposed here rejects intensions or concepts as the determinants of meaning and reference. Neither reference nor meaning is a matter of the mental contents of speakers.

Like Kripke, Putnam argues that names as well as natural-kind terms do refer to their objects rigidly and indexically and they do not depend on description for securing their reference. He rejects the description theory because it is wrong in committing itself to the idea that names are synonymous with descriptions. Putnam suspects that *the cluster theory of names as has been developed by Searle*, does not suffice to fix reference. That is the reason why he accepts the Kripkean view that names are rigid designators. The names can ostensively refer or can fix their reference by stereotypes which abound in our language. Stereotypes are the established ways of talking about the natural-kind terms such as “gold”, “water” etc. Reference –fixing is done by them. Putnam says: “... the stereotypes of a

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 135.

tiger does enable want to recognize tigers (unless they are albino, or some other typical circumstance is present), and the stereotype of a lemon generally enables one to recognize lemons. In the extreme case, the stereotype may be just the marker: the stereotype of molybdenum might be just that molybdenum is a metal.”¹⁵⁶

The stereotypes thus enable us to recognize substance and thereby facilitate communication amongst the speakers. In this connection, Putnam introduces the notion of the “**division of linguistics labour**”,¹⁵⁷ which suggest that it is the expert alone who can tell what are the stereotypes associated with a *natural-kind term*. The expert in each area of language knows what are the exact or the near –exact stereotypes that are structured in the semantics of those words. Putnam further writes: “Every linguistic community exemplifies the sort of division of linguistic labour just discussed: that is , possesses at least some terms whose associated ‘criteria’ are known only to a subclass of the speakers who acquire the term, and whose use by other speakers depends upon a structured cooperation between them and the speakers in the relevant subsets.”¹⁵⁸

The criteria mentioned above draw the boundary of a term and thus facilitate the use of that term in language. So the “structured cooperation” follows as a matter of necessity because all other agree one what the experts say.

The operational definition that Putnam talks about is a matter of what the stereotypes are and how they are used. This fulfills the need of giving the criteria of the use of certain terms. But from this it does not follow that there is any analytic relation between the properties of the substance and

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., p 137.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 138.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., p.228.

the natural-kind term as such. The natural-kind terms are such that they can not be analytically defined by the stereotypes. The later is meant for only fixing the reference of the terms concerned. Putnam says: "Rather, the operational definition, like the ostensive one, is simply a way of pointing out a standard-pointing out the stuff in the actual world such that for x to be water, in any world, is for x to bear the same relation L to the normal members of the class of local entities to satisfy the operational definition."¹⁵⁹

Taking the clue from Kripke, Putnam thus makes the indexicality of natural-kind terms as the primary feature of the cross-world identification of natural kinds. The cross-world identification is possible because of the continuity of the same substance across possible worlds. Putnam says: "In fact, once we have discovered the nature of water, nothing counts as a possible world in which water does not have that nature. Once we have discovered that water (in the actual world) is H₂O, nothing counts as possible world in which water is not H₂O. In particular, if a "logically possible" statement is one that holds in 'some "logically possible world", it is not logically possible that water is not H₂O.'¹⁶⁰

Putnam and Kripke thus agree that the concept of necessity plays a very important role in the theory of direct reference. The theory remains incomplete without the concept of necessity in the sense that necessity is associated with the modal structure of language. This also signals the fact that the notion of necessity as analyticity has failed to make itself available for understanding the modal structure of language. Logical necessity eliminates reference altogether, since it has nothing to do with what the language refers to, but only with the rules of language. However, the necessity that is being talked of here is metaphysical in

¹⁵⁹ Ibid. p.232.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., p.233

character since it takes into account the world and its inner structure. Both Putnam and Kripke have accepted that the “world has hidden structures”¹⁶¹ which can be revealed in language.

Philosophers have been exercised over the issue whether the sentence “Cicero=Tully” is necessary or not. Nobody doubts that “Tully=Tully” is analytic and so necessary. But if we go by Kripke’s principle, the former statement is equally necessary because we can not imagine a possible world where Cicero is not Tully since they are the same person. This is not a descriptively analytic statement because here ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ are not having the same sense and yet, from Kripke’s standpoint, ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ necessarily refer to the same individual. Thus, the necessity that is involved here is not analytic necessity but metaphysical involved in the continuity of the same individual across all possible worlds.

This rules out the Quine’s worry that modality is referentially opaque¹⁶² as it cannot preserve necessity in all possible worlds. For example, it is necessary that 9 is greater than 7 and also necessary that the number of planets=9. But from this it does not follow *necessarily* that the number of planets is greater than 7, because it is not necessary that in every possible world the number of planets is 9. This is a *referential opacity* which Quine takes as a *stumbling block* to the possibility of modal logic and the concept of modal necessity.¹⁶³

Kripke and Putnam have successfully overcome this referential opacity precisely on the ground that necessity is dependent on reference across possible- world. For them, necessity, that is, metaphysical necessity is so defined that the sentence in all possible worlds assures symmetry. The

¹⁶¹ Kripke, Saul. “Naming and Necessity” in *Semantics of Natural Language*, eds. Davidson and Harman.

¹⁶² Quine, W. O. “Reference and Modality” in *Reference and Modality*, ed. Linsky, pp. 20-21.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.* p. 21.

possible worlds are situations *which contain alternative descriptions of the world*. The same individuals continue to exist across the possible worlds. An individual is identifiable across the possible worlds because of its structure and thus it is tagged with a particular name that rigidly refers to it. The possible- worlds are closer to one another in terms of the individuals they contain and the possible truth-values assignable to the sentences. In this sense, water=H₂O is true in all possible- worlds which have water in them because there is no possible world in which water is not H₂O. This is because of the inner structure of the substance called water. Thus, necessity follows from the idea that substances exist across all possible- worlds and they have inner structure. Putnam writes: "It is only by confusing metaphysical necessity with epistemic necessity that we can conclude that if the (metaphysically necessary) truth-condition for being water is being H₂O, then water must be synonymous with H₂O, in which case it is certainly a term of science. And similarly, even though the predominant sense of 'lemon' is one in which to be a lemon some thing has to have the genetic code of a lemon (I believe), it does not follow that 'lemon' is synonymous with a description which specifies the genetic code explicitly or otherwise."¹⁶⁴

Thus, metaphysical necessity is dependent on the fact that substances have inner structures that can be referentially secured across possible-worlds. All identity sentences of the type cited above are necessary on this ground. Salmon writes: "By ordinary modal semantics, an identity sentence is true with respect to possible world *w* if and only if the denotations of the two contained terms are the same with respect to *w*they share the same denotation with respect to every possible world.

¹⁶⁴ Putnam, Hilary "The Meaning of 'Meaning'" in *Mind, Language and Reality*, p.240.

Hence, the identity sentence “Hesperus =Phosphorus” is true with respect to every possible world, i.e., necessary.”¹⁶⁵

Thus the concept of necessity brings out the modal structure of the theory of direct reference. It shows how natural-kind terms with singular reference have a built in modal character because of which they refer to the same individuals across possible worlds.

Section Two

Kaplan notion of *Dthat*

We think that Kaplan’s notion of *dthat* is a further development of the theory of proper name in contemporary era. In fact, Kaplan’s most influential contribution to the philosophy of language is his semantic analysis of *indexicals and demonstratives* which is outlined in progressively greater detail in a series of article of which ‘*Dthat*’ is the pioneer one. Kaplan’s insights actually hinges on two key distinctions, which may be seen as responses to the inability of Frege’s semantics to deal with *context-sensibility* in language. First, in place of sense (*Sinn*) and reference (*Bedeutung*), Kaplan introduces the notions of *character* and *content*. According to Kaplan *character* is the linguistic meaning of an expression and *content* is the proposition or propositional component expressed by an expression in a context. Besides, Kaplan equally makes an explicit distinction between the context of an utterance and the circumstances of evaluation of the proposition expressed by an utterance. Context can be formalized as a set composed of a speaker, a place, a time, and a possible world. Circumstances of evaluation play a role very similar

¹⁶⁵ Nathan U. Salmon, Reference and Essence, p. 79.

to possible worlds in modal semantics. Kaplan then goes on to define character and content more precisely. Character defines a function associated by convention with an expression, which, in turn, takes contextual elements and yields content as values. Content, on the other hand, defines a function taking as arguments those elements of the circumstance of evaluation relevant to determining extension, and yielding the extension (reference or truth-value) as a value.

According to Kaplan, an expression is context-sensitive if and only if its character defines a non-constant function. That is, in the case of context sensitive, a linguistic expression gives rise to different content-values given different context element-arguments. Again, an expression, Kaplan opines, is context sensitive if and only if its character defines a constant function. Further, Kaplan inclines to say that the so-called distinction between character and content breaks down in the case of context sensitive expressions, and convention associates each such expression directly with content. On the contrary, an expression is directly referential just in case its content defines a constant function from circumstances of evaluation to extension. Kaplan equally characterizes directly referential expressions as those that refer without the mediation of a Fregean sense (Sinn). Thus, in the case of directly referential expression, i.e., *dthat*, we can say that the distinction between content and referent breaks-down. Like Russell's realistic theory of proper name, Kaplan goes on to say that any singular term is *directly referential*. For Kaplan the meaning of an indexical is a rule taking us from some part of the context to an expression, and the meaning of an expression is a bit of propositional content (reference in Fregean sense) that determines the extension in each possible world. We think in one sense, Kaplan was close to Russell by claiming that singular term is directly referential, but at the same time Kaplan deviated from Russell and went very close to Kripke by

introducing the modal concept of possible-world while developing his theory of proper name.

Thus, the semantic scheme of Kaplan is associated with the application concerning the relationship between necessary and a priori truth. An utterance, according to Kaplan, is held *to be necessary true just in case the content (referent) it expresses is true in every possible circumstances* and an utterance is said to be true *a priori just in case it expresses a content that is true in the circumstances that context is part of*. According, 'I am here now' is true a priori, because each of the indexical expressions, such as, 'I', 'now', 'here', used in this sentence directly refer to the speaker, the location and the time of utterance. However, the utterance under consideration is not *necessarily true* because any given speaker might have been in at a different place at that time, given different circumstances of evaluation. However, the utterance "I am David Kaplan" as spoken by David Kaplan, is necessarily true, because here the terms, such as 'I' and 'David Kaplan' are *directly referential* expressions. As a result, they refer to the same object in every circumstance of evaluation. However, this statement is not true a priori, because if it were spoken in a different context, where the speaker is indeed other than Kaplan, then this utterance may appear as false.

The significance of Kaplan theory of proper names is that it enables to solve Frege's puzzles for indexical. Here the puzzle arises as indexicals are thought to directly referential, because they do not refer by means of a Fregean *Sinn*. Basically, Frege explains cognitive value in terms of *Sinn*. It is indeed true to say that the sentences, such as 'I am David Kaplan' spoken by David Kaplan; 'he is David Kaplan', spoken by someone pointing to David Kaplan, and 'David Kaplan is David Kaplan', spoken by anyone, all express the same content (reference) as they refer to the same individuals. Does it then lead us to assume that each of them has the

same cognitive value? We do not think so, because it is possible to believe one while denying the other. That is why; Kaplan explains this by associating cognitive value with *character* rather than *content*.

In this connection, it is worth bringing in Kaplan's theory of direct reference, especially his notion of 'dthat'¹⁶⁶ which carries the import of singular reference. Kaplan has developed a theory of singular reference which has the unique distinction of keeping the Kripkean mode of rigid reference with a degree of the Fregean sense such that reference for him is *no more a matter of pure ostension*, but of reference with contextual determinations and the speaker's intentions. Thus, for Kaplan, we must understand the use of 'Dthat' only with reference to the speaker's *parameters of contextualized intentions* and the possible determinations of the sense of the linguistic symbols. Kaplan writes:

"I will speak of a demonstrative use of a singular denoting phrase when the speaker intends that the object for which the phrase stands be designated by an associated demonstration."¹⁶⁷ That is to say that the demonstrative use of a referring expression must be accompanied by the associated contextual determinations and the speaker's intentions. Speaker's intentions matter for the reason that without referring to what the speaker intends to do we can not understand what he refers to.

But reference in the proper context must be indicated by the reference-indicating device 'dthat' which is supposed to indicate that a singular reference has been made to an object in the right context. 'Dthat' is the *referential device* that shows that a certain reference has been made as in the following example: Dthat (the speaker points to a picture) is a picture of one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century. Here the speaker is referring to a picture hanging on the wall, it being the picture

¹⁶⁶ Kaplan, David "Dthat" in *The Philosophy of Language*, ed. A.P. Martinich, pp. 316-29.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 321.

of Rudolf Carnap. The singular reference is to Carnap's picture and not to anything else. 'Dthat' shows that the reference is uniquely fixed in this case.

But suppose that without the speaker's knowledge Carnap's picture has been replaced by that of Spirow Agnew. In this case, is there still singular reference? Kaplan is of the opinion that singular reference does not remain intact if the object itself has been misidentified. Though the speaker intends to refer to Carnap's picture only, he has by mistake referred to Agnew's picture. That is why the reference has not been successful as the **speaker's intention** has not been taken into account. **As a result, Kaplan holds that singular reference must be taken into account the speaker's intention.** The latter alone can guarantee what has been referred to in a given context.

Kaplan, like Kripke, believes that reference across possible worlds is a must if the determinate character of reference has to be laid down. We can therefore utter a person name that can refer to an object in a possible world such that we can determine the truth value of the sentence in which the name occurs. Kaplan writes: "The content of an utterance is that function which assigns to each possible world the truth value which the utterance would take if it were evaluated with respect to that world."¹⁶⁸

The utterance takes its truth value from the fact that it refers to a possible world in a unique way. Here also the role of *dthat* can be fixed in the following way: Dthat (the first child to be born in the twenty-first century) will be bald.

Thus, there is a reference to a possible-world in which a child yet to be born will be bald. The reference is directed to a child who does not exist

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 324.

now in the actual world but is in a possible- world. Thus, reference can be made to a possible- world with the help of 'dthat'.

According to Kaplan, reference-fixing is done in a linguistic as well as social context such that the act of referring is pinned down to the speaker's social and linguistic world. It is only from the speaker's point of view that reference can be given a determinate character. The necessity of such identity statement as the following remains intact because of the determine character of the symbol involved: *Dthat* (the morning star) is identical with *dthat* (the evening star).

Here the statement is a case of identity in which necessity is preserved because of the rigidity of reference in the Kripkean sense. Kaplan is of the opinion that 'dthat' (direct reference) makes rigid reference necessity-preserving.

According to Kaplan during the *Golden Age of Pure Semantics* we were developing a nice homogeneous theory, with language, meanings, and entities of the world each properly segregated and related one to another in contented ways. This trend was reached in its heyday through Carnap's *Meaning and Necessity*¹⁶⁹. The semantics in Golden Age ran with the firm conviction that each designator has both an intension and an extension. Sentences have truth-values as extensions and propositions as intentions; properties have classes as extensions and properties as intentions, terms have individuals as extensions and individual concepts as intentions, and so on. Having said this, there remained some nagging doubts regarding intensional conceptuality of proper names, demonstratives and quantification. According to Kaplan proper names may be a practical convenience in our everyday transactions, but they are

¹⁶⁹ Carnap, *Meaning and Necessity*,

a theoretician's nightmare.¹⁷⁰ According to Kaplan, *proper names are just like bicycles in the sense that everyone easily learns to ride, but no one can accurately make clear how he does it.* While using proper names as everyone's bicycles, linguistic philosophers over the century used proper name as the subject of a subject-predicate proposition. The very objective of proper name is to make a relationship between the name and its reference or to make an intimate relationship between a proper name and its bearer. Russell once remarked that in contrast with a common noun, such as, 'unicorns', a proper name means what it names. If a proper name names nothing, it means nothing. That makes sense to say, like Frege and many others; Russell did not accept empty names as logical proper names. When Russell says that a proper name denotes an object with which we are directly acquainted, he thereby rules out the possibility of empty proper names. The *dthat* of Kaplan is very similar to this as far as referential authentication is concerned. Having said this, one should not rule out the descriptive meaning or sense of empty proper names. According to Kaplan proper name, such as, unicorns have descriptive meaning on the basis of which we make use of in looking for such things. But in the case of the name, such as, 'Moravcsik', there is just Moravcsik. In fact, there is no basis in asking whether Moravcsik exists or not. Such a question, according to Russell, Kaplan opines, is meaningless.

Having said this, it seems to us that Kaplan theory of *dthat* functioning as a singular referential nominee faces a problem. More succinctly, it can be said that Kaplan semantic theory faces a problem with proper names which both seem *directly referential* and *context-insensitive*. On Kaplan's accounts, this means that constant functions are defined by both a proper

¹⁷⁰ David Kaplan, "Dthat", included in *The Philosophy of Language* edited by a. p. Martinich, Oxford University Press, 1985, p.317.

name's character and its content, which would imply that proper names have no meaning other than their reference. In this sense Kaplan like Russell and early Wittgenstein advocates *a no-sense theory of proper names*. Commentators would like to say that this approach to proper names is not novel simply because Mill long back in his book *A System of Logic* had developed this view. According to Mill, proper name being singular and capable of direct reference has no meaning. After Mill, it was Russell who adhered to the view that logical proper names do not have any sense or meaning. Many contemporary thinkers, such as, Joseph Almog, David Braun, Michael Devitt, John Perry, Nathan Salmon, Scott Soames and many more would like to say that even though Frege's puzzle is thought to cast doubt on any such account, but truly speaking, no solution has been widely accepted.

Section Three

Ruth Marcus' notion of Tag

Ruth Barcan Marcus (1991-2012) was an American philosopher and logician who developed the theory of direct reference by introducing the metaphor 'Tag'. Marcus' name has been associated with the new theory of proper names which asserts that proper names as 'tag' refer directly to items, with contrast to the traditional or old theory of proper names. Traditional or old theory of names asserts that names are relevantly similar locations express descriptive senses or are disguised descriptions. However, the new theory holds that names as rigid designator are direct referential nominees. Thus, the new theory of names identify names as rigid designator (Kripke), direct reference (Kaplan), identity across possible worlds, the necessity of identity, a posteriori necessities, singular propositions, essentialism about natural kinds. There are a good numbers of philosophers of language, namely, Marcus, Kripke, Kaplan, Donnellan,

Putnam, Perry, Salmon, Soames, Almog, Wittstein and a number of other contemporary philosophers who have paid significant contribution in developing the new theory of proper names.

It is important to note here that there is a serious controversy about the origins of the New Theory of Proper names and reference. It has been widely believed that Kripke was the architect of the New Theory of proper names that appeared in his articles 'Naming and Necessity' and 'Identity and Necessity'. However, we think that Marcus was the first philosopher who had developed the idea of the New Theory of proper names and reference. Perhaps the influence of Kripke at that time was far more than Marcus and perhaps that is why Kripke's contribution had been highlighted far more than Marcus. But it seems to us that the idea of the New Theory of Reference actually appeared in Marcus' articles "Modalities and Intentional Languages" in 1962 and it was almost 10 years prior to Kripke's famous article "Naming and Necessity" that had been appeared in 1972. However, if we go through the literature of the New Theory of Proper names and Reference during their era, we find that the said theory had been attributed predominantly to Kripke and the name of Marcus had hardly been mentioned. A recent example in Recanati's article in *Philosophical Studies* states, "My starting point will be the ...notion of rigidity, introduced by Saul Kripke in the philosophical literature"¹⁷¹. Even Paging through recent issues of *Nous* emphatically highlighted the contribution of Kripke, Kaplan, Salmon, Soames and others, but hardly remember Marcus as the originator of the New Theory of Proper Names and Reference. Even David Kaplan in some of his published works, attributes the New Theory of Proper Names to Kripke. Kaplan writes: "He (Kripke) uses it in connection with his controversial, though, I believe, correct claim that proper names, as well as many

¹⁷¹ Recanati, *Philosophical Studies*, 1998, p.103.

common nouns, are rigid designators.”¹⁷² It is true to say that Marcus did not make a claim for the rigidity of common nouns and in this idea is rightly credited to Kripke, but this does not lessen the contribution of Marcus towards the development of the New Theory of Proper Names. This, indeed, is an intellectual injustice. However, what we intend to assert here is that by introducing the metaphor ‘Tags’ as proper names, Marcus has done a remarkable contribution towards the development of this theory.

Marcus while developing the concept of *Tag* as the mark of proper names appears in the New Theory of Proper Names outlines six main ideas. Here we explain each of these in turn in the following:

First, According to Marcus, proper names are directly referential and are not abbreviated or disguised descriptions or definitions like Russell and Frege and many others up to 1970. In this regard, Marcus writes: “But to give a thing a proper name is different from giving a unique description... (An) identifying tag is a proper name of the thing.... This tag, a proper name, has no meaning. It simply tags. It is not strongly equitable with any of the singular descriptions of the thing.”¹⁷³ Marcus then claims that this should be the bases of the contemporary ‘direct reference’ theory of the proper names where proper names are argued not to be camouflaged or disguised descriptions. For example, ‘Scott’ refers directly to Scott and does not express a sense expressible by such a definite description as “the author of *Waverly*”. We think that Marcus’s position has a simile to Russell’s concept of logical proper names. The only difference that we note here is that Marcus while introducing her concept of tag as the mark of proper names takes the help of modal necessity unlike Russell.

¹⁷² David Kaplan, 1989, p.492.

¹⁷³ Marcus, 1961, pp.309-310.

Secondly, Marcus inclines to say that we can single out a thing by a definite description, but the important point is that this description serves only to single out, not to be strongly equitable with a proper name of the thing. This position of Marcus is interesting. She does not negate the relevance of definite description as an identifying mark of the object under consideration. But what she intends to claim is that even though one can take the help of definite description as an weapon of identifying object, but proper name has a definite status altogether and it cannot be robbed by definite description. In this regard, Marcus says, "It would also appear to be a precondition of language [especially assigning names] that the singling out of an entity as a thing is accompanied by many ...unique descriptions, for otherwise how would it be singled out? But to give a thing a proper name is different from giving a unique description".¹⁷⁴ We think this position of Marcus later became widely disseminated through Kripke's discussion of how referring fixing descriptions are sometimes used to single out a thing as a bearer of a name, but that the names are not disguised descriptions. In this regard, Kripke says, "It seems plausible to suppose that, in some cases, the reference of a name is indeed fixed via a description [but that the description is not "part of the meaning of the name"]."¹⁷⁵ While illuminating the concept of novel idea in his "Naming and Necessity" , Kripke goes on to say that in other cases other than proper names, the reference of names may be secured by a historical causal chain stemming back to the original 'baptism'.¹⁷⁶ This position of Kripke again reflects that his understanding of proper names as 'rigid designators' actually takes some clues from Marcus' concept of tag as the mark of proper names.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid. p.309.

¹⁷⁵ Kripke, 1972, p.276.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., p.298.

Thirdly, Marcus while developing his theory of tag as the mark of proper names brings the concept of modal necessity. In order to develop the position that proper names are directly referential rather than disguised contingent descriptions, Marcus takes clues from modal argument. Here the comment of Salmon is particularly relevant. Nathan Salmon in his article "The modal arguments are chiefly due to Kripke" claims that they are (modal arguments) due to Marcus. Salmon further contends that it is indeed true to say that even Kripke presents modal arguments in his "Naming and Necessity" without attributing Marcus. In fact, it was not SKripke, but Marcus, who indeed first introduced the concept of modal arguments while developing his metaphor tag as the mark of proper names appeared in the New Theory of Proper Names. Let us understand Marcus' position by examining the following two sentences:

(1) The evening star *eq* the morning star

(2) Scott *is* the author of Waverly.

In (1) the symbol 'eq' stands for some equivalence relation. It is indeed well known to us that types of equivalence relation include identity, indiscernibility, congruence, strict equivalence, material equivalence and others. Even though equivalence relation, being a logical concept, has deserves its own gravity in the truth-functional logic, but Marcus suspects or so to speak doubts the soundness of equivalence relation. According to Marcus, the equivalence relation that we sense in the above cited statements is not strong enough to support the relevant theses of the 'disguised contingent description' theory of proper name. In this regard, Marcus writes, "If we decide that "the evening star" and "the morning star" are [proper] names for the same thing, and that "Scott" and "the author of Waverley" are [proper] names for the same thing, then they must be intersubstitutable in every context. In fact it often happens, in a growing, changing language that a descriptive phrase comes to be used as

a proper name – an identifying tag- and the descriptive meaning is lost or ignored.”¹⁷⁷

What Marcus intends to assert at this juncture is that according to her not all of the relevant expressions are names for the same thing. Even though apparently they look like similar expressions, but they are not intersubstitutable in modal contexts. In fact, if they, (1) and (2) as stated above, express a true identity, then ‘Scott’ ought to be anywhere intersubstitutable for ‘the author of Waverly’ in modal contexts, and similarly for ‘the morning star’ and ‘the evening star’. Marcus then goes on to say, “ In fact if it happens, in a growing, changing language, that a descriptive phrase comes to be used as a proper name – an identifying tag – and the descriptive meaning is lost or ignored.”¹⁷⁸ Marcus’ modal argument shows how and why the apparent equivalence relation on the part of language in the case of ‘disguised contingent description’ theory of proper names is false. We may claim that the above statements are equivalence on the basis of the prior conception that the verb ‘is’ as used in these statement stands for identity relation. However, Marcus shows that as (1) and (2) do not express identities, the expressions flanking ‘is’ are not proper names of the same thing. Here the so-called supposed equivalence relation should be unpacked by a theory of descriptions.

Fourthly, the modal argument of Marcus goes back to her formal proof of the necessity of identity in her extension of S4. It is supposed to be the fourth component she introduced into the New Theory of Proper Names. Here she shows the logical equation:

$$(T) (xIy) = L(xIy)$$

is a theorem of QS4. The theory of Marcus’QS4 is nothing but simply a quantification extension of Lewis’S4. The double bar here means ‘strict

¹⁷⁷ Marcus, “ Modalities and Intensional Languages”, *Synthese*, 1961, p.308-309.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.* p.311.

equivalence'. Since identities are necessary, a failure of intersubstitutivity in modal contexts will show that a proper name does not express the relevant descriptive sense. For example, if "Scott" is not intersubstitutable with "the author of Waverly", "Scott" does not express the sense expressed by this definite description. This, in turn, actually opens the door to the theory that proper names do not express descriptive senses but instead are directly referential. Of course, this argument does not prove that proper names do not express senses, merely that they do not express senses of contingent definite descriptions. If proper names do have any sense at all, it would be a very specific or distinct sense expressible by necessary definite descriptions. According to Marcus, the sense that proper names do have is nothing but modally stable sense. Accordingly, it can be said after Marcus, that "Scott" may express the modally stable sense of "the actual author of Waverly". However, in order to rule out the modally stable descriptive theory of proper names, one needs further argumentation, such as the *epistemic argument* that proper names, so to speak, are directly referential. If the descriptive theory of proper names is true in the sense that proper names as such are defined by descriptions, then "Venus is the evening star" should express a truth knowable a priori, i.e., merely by reflection upon the concepts involved. But according to Marcus, it cannot be known a priori that Venus is the evening star; rather it is known a posteriori through observation of the empirical facts. In this context, Marcus says, "You may describe Venus as the evening star, and I may describe Venus as the morning star, and we may both be surprised that, as an empirical fact, the same thing is being described. But it is not an empirical fact that:

Venus I Venus

where "I" is the identity symbol. Now our point of contention is that if "Venus" expresses the modally stable sense expressible by "whatever is

actually the evening star and morning star”, then the persons designated by “you” and “I” in the passage quoted from Marcus’ article should be able to know a priori, simply by reflection upon the semantic content of the expressions “Venus”, “the morning star”, and “the evening star” that Venus is both the morning star and the evening star. The fact that they cannot know this indicates that “Venus” does not express the modally stable sense expressed by “whatever is actually the evening star and morning star”.

Thus, Marcus’ arguments for the “direct reference theory” associated with proper names make manifest her discovery of a fifth crucial component of the New Theory of Proper Names, the concept of Tag. “Hesperus” is intersubstitutable *salva veritate* with either occurrence of “Phosphorous” in “Necessarily, Phosphorus is Phosphorus.” Here each of these two names actually designates Venus in respect of *every possible world of an actual world* in which Venus exists and does not actually designate anything in respect of worlds in which Venus does not exist. Now the point is that, if these two names were not equivalent to contingent descriptions, e.g., “the morning star” and “the evening star”, they would not be intersubstitutable *salva veritate* in this modal context and thus they would be treated as non-rigid designators. Marcus in her paper “Essential Attribution”, claims that “individual names don’t alter their reference, except to the extent that in (respect to) some worlds they may not refer at all.”¹⁷⁹

Marcus’ sixth idea of the New Theory of Reference is the idea of a posteriori necessity. Consider the expression “Hesperus is Phosphorus”, we do not know this to be true a priori. It is an analytic assertion whose truth value is conceived just by analyses of the concepts involved.

¹⁷⁹ Marcus, “Essential Attribution”, *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol.68, 1971, p.194.

Nevertheless, it is necessary true because both expressions directly refer to the same thing. Accordingly we can assert the assertion:

Hesperus I Phosphorus

Here, the assertion “Hesperus I Phosphorus” can be viewed as a synthetic a posteriori necessary truth. It actually means “Hesperus, if it exists, is Phosphorus”. That is, it is a kind of assertion that is true in every possible world. This statement is very similar to “water is H₂O”. We think that the relevance or influence of modal logic is prominent in Marcus’ interpretation of proper names as Tags. Even Marcus sometimes needs or wants the assumption that everything has a “name”. This, of course, would perhaps be true in ordinary sense, but for the purpose of interpretation and defense of modal logic what matters is not so much that “names” with certain features should be in existence but that they should be capable of being introduced. However, Marcus denies the view that when she emphasizes more on the concept of names; she actually intends to say about ordinary proper names. In this regard, she says, “This identifying tag is a proper name of the thing”, what is being called a “name” is thus not a name in the ordinary sense. According to Marcus, if $a=b$ is a true identity, where a and b are names, then a and b should be intersubstitutable in all pertinent contexts. We think that Marcus should be credited with a variant of the stability argument, and also as an original and positive contribution beyond Russell as unlike Russell, Marcus brings modal stability while interpreting her concept of proper names. Marcus, in fact, enables to make a comparison of the concept of necessity in the sense of *counterfactual stability* and other notions of ‘necessity’ adopted by Lewis. She can also be credited with recognizing that possibility in the ‘metaphysical’ sense of what is or is not *potentially could have been the case is not to be analyzed or as conflated with possibility in the ‘logical’*

sense of what it is not logically or analytically self-contradictory to assert or assume actually is the case.

Observation on Marcus

Marcus introduced the concept of proper names in terms of 'tags'.¹⁸⁰ According to Marcus, tag is used to refer to an object, which is the bearer of the name. The meaning of the name thus is regarded as exhausted by this referential function. This position of Marcus has a similarity with the referential theorists. According to the referential theorists, every proper name refers to an object and the very meaning of the proper name is determined whether the name under consideration refers to an object and whether there underlies a referential connection between the name and the object what is being referred to by the name. That means the referential connection between the name and the object constitutes the meaning of the proper name. As a result, it can be said that the meaning of the name has been exhausted by the referential function. Thus, we can say that Marcus' position may be contrasted with late Russell's description theory of proper names as well as Searle's cluster theory of proper names. Even some great thinker has identified Marcus' theory of tag very similar to the reference theory of Kripke appeared in his *Naming and Necessity*.

While illuminating the philosophical gravity of Marcus' theory of tag, Professor Timothy Williamson says, "One of the ideas in them that resonates most with current philosophy of language is that of proper names as mere tags, without descriptive content. This is not Kripke's idea of names as rigid designators, designating the same object with respect to all relevant worlds, for 'rigidified' definite descriptions are rigid designators but still have descriptive content. Rather, it is the idea, later developed by David Kalpan and others that proper names are directly

¹⁸⁰ Ruth Barcan Marcus, "Modalities and Intentional Languages", *Synthese*, 1961.

referential in the sense that they contribute only their bearer to the propositions expressed by sentences in which they occur.”¹⁸¹

Thus, Marcus introduced the new theory of reference which states that proper names are directly referential and by no means equivalent to definite descriptions. While reflecting on Marcus theory of tag as proper name, Soames admits that Marcus did present the idea that proper names are directly referential and not equivalent to definite descriptions, but claims that Marcus’ presentation of this idea was antedated by Fitch and Smullyan. Soames in this regard says, “Although Marcus did regard proper names as directly referential, and did not take them to be disguised descriptions, she did not introduce the idea; nor did she claim to. As we have seen, Smullyan and Fitch both invoked that idea in earlier responses to Quine that Marcus took herself to be repeating and elaborating.”¹⁸²

Soames further claims that Smullyan earlier developed the idea that names are directly referential and are not disguised descriptions.

The other important dimension of Marcus’ theory of tag is that she introduced the idea that entities are singled out by definite descriptions, but that assigning the entities a name is semantically different than describing them. Marcus’ view is that singling out an entity by unique descriptions is a precondition of language, and that singling out entities this way is the only way to single them out.¹⁸³ It actually means that when we dispense a name to a thing that we have singled out on the basis of the principle that a name denotes or refers to an object or a thing, we can assign the name only on the basis of a unique description that we are using to single out the thing. Soames, however, claims that this does not imply that a specific description is linked as a matter of semantics to a

¹⁸¹ Timothy Williamson’s Tribute to Barcan Marcus on the Occasion of her Receipt of the Lauener Prize, *Leiter Reports: A Philosophical Blog*, October 14, 2008.

¹⁸² Soames, pp. 198-99.

¹⁸³ Marcus, 1961, p.309.

name, and thereby that Marcus did not originally state the idea of referring –fixing descriptions later stated by Kripke. Many would like to say that Soames here perhaps appears to misunderstand Marcus and the concept of a fixing description.

The causal theory of naming, as the name suggests, goes beyond the ordinary conception of name as a tag or at best as an unmeaning symbol for use in interpersonal communication. According to the causal theory, names are significant bits of referring devices. They are used for communication purposes under certain causal conditions such that once a name is introduced; it goes on acquiring new significance as the use accumulates. Thus, there is a direct causal source of the names and they are accountable in terms of the habits and preference of the linguistic community. The linguistic community is the ultimate determinant of the causal sufficiency of the names. Even then, the causal theorists are not description theorist and they prefer the direct reference theory because they think that in it alone there are both necessary and sufficient conditions for the explanation of how the naming takes place. The causal theory has been to some extent espoused by Donnellan, Putnam and Evans apart from Kripke himself. The refrain of the theory is that “there is a direct, though causally determined, route to the referents from the names.”¹⁸⁴

Thus, Marcus introduced the notion of direct reference, or originated the idea that identity is necessary. Marcus endorses the very well known, but at the same time not very popular, view of Mill that names have no descriptive meaning, as well as some only slightly less well known view of Russell, including the view that true identity statements involving ‘names’ are ‘tautologies’. Besides, Marcus also applies the views

¹⁸⁴ Evans. G., “The Causal Theory of Names” in *The Philosophy of Language*, ed. Martinich, pp. 295-307.

endorsed to the interpretation and defense of formalized systems of modal logic, elaborating on early applications of this kind by Smullyan.

.....X.....

Chapter Seven

Concluding Remarks

Linguistic revolution of 20th century appeared not only to destroy *speculative metaphysics* as a meaningless enterprise; it equally aimed at to establish a perfect relationship between language and reality. However regarding the nature of language, linguistic philosophers have expressed divergence of opinions. Some of them adhere to the view that ordinary language is all right in dealing with philosophy and some other would like to say that ordinary language by its very nature is ambiguous and vague. So ordinary or natural language should be revised in such a way so that the true logical structure of language can reveal the true structure of reality. Those who suggest revision in ordinary language are called revisionists. They suspect the substantiation of ordinary language as a genuine method of linguistic philosophy. For them since ordinary language, by its very nature, is ambiguous and vague, it would be better for us to construct a new form of language known as ideal language or artificial language. In this regard, proper names are supposed to be the minimum vocabulary of constructed language. According to the linguistic philosophers, to be a name is to denote an object or more specifically every name refers to an object either in the form of denotation or in the form of connotation; either in the form of *de-re* or in the form of *de-dicto*.

However, a serious philosophical debate is witnessed in determining the nature of proper names. If we look back to Mill, we come to know that Mill gives a comprehensive analysis of proper names through which the later development of proper names has been flourished. Although Mill had not been regarded as a linguistic philosopher in the strict sense of the

term, but very fortunately he had ingrained the concept of name in his book *A System of Logic*.¹⁸⁵ His classification of naming theory is very similar to or rather, so to speak, is very close to grammatical classification of names. However, Mill gave a few important clues or insights of proper names from which the later development of proper name has taken a different shape altogether.

We think that in the true philosophical sense, the theory of proper names as the minimum vocabulary of ideal language has taken a complete shape in Russell's philosophy of language. In fact, Russell's insightful classification of names as logical and ordinary proper names actually gives an ultimate and rigor interpretation of proper names. Indeed, there are many linguistic philosophers who have voiced in favour of linguistic revisionism and also in favour of constructing an ideal or constructed language. But like Russell, no other linguistic philosopher gives much importance in the classification of names as *logical and ordinary*. Of course, we think that Russell took clues from Mill and Russell's concept of logical proper names is very similar to Mill's non-connotative names. Having said this, we still believe that the concept of logical proper name of Russell actually opens up an ultimate interpretation of the concept of proper names. Russell in this regard introduces the concept of *demonstratives pronouns* as the suitable vocabulary of logically proper names.

The other important insight that we sense from Russell's theory of names is that he alone introduces two different kinds of theory, such as realist theory of proper names and description theory of proper names. With the help of logical proper names, Russell has developed *realist theory of proper names* and with the help of ordinary proper names; Russell develops *description theory of proper names*. In this sense we can say

¹⁸⁵ Mill, J.S. *A System of Logic*, London: Longmans, Green, and Dyer, 1875. p.90.

that Russell actually gives us a comprehensive and complete account of the theory of proper names and his understanding of proper names as *logical and ordinary* bears a lot of philosophical insight on the basis of which many contemporary linguistic philosophers have been benefited.

Frege has been attributed as the father of modern linguistic philosophy. Like Russell and many others, Frege too voices in favour of constructing ideal language. Frege regards ordinary language as eyes and logical language as microscope. In this regard, there is nothing wrong to say that Frege has been regarded as the proponent of linguistic revisionism. However, like Russell, Frege does not make the distinction between logical proper names and ordinary proper names like Russell. His understanding of proper names as the minimum vocabulary of ideal language is comprehensive. Even unlike Russell, Frege includes or incorporates phrase, clauses as proper names. This is made possible because unlike Russell, Frege gives importance on the sense of proper names. According to Frege, any linguistic expression would be regarded as proper names if it bears a sense. Here we sense a distinctive gulf between Russell and Frege. Russell while developing his theory of proper names gives much emphasize *on the referential aspect of names*. According to Russell every proper name, in the true sense of the term, must refer to an object through sense-data with which we are directly acquainted. Even when Russell develops his description theory of proper names by ordinary proper names, he insists on existential proposition. Clearly it seems to us that Russell was an ardent proponent of reference theory of meaning where the reference of the sentence or precisely speaking, the reference of the proper names must refer to an object with which we are directly acquainted. His sophisticated version of referential theory actually tells us that a sentence would be (philosophically) meaningful if it refers to something other than the sentence itself and

there must be a referential connection between the sentence and what it refers to. That means that the referential connection actually constitutes the meaning of the sentence under description. We can say here that Russell gives much emphasize on the *referential aspect of meaning* while developing his theory of names.

Now, if we compare Russell with Frege, we find an altogether different theory. Like Russell, Frege too, has developed the descriptivist theory of proper names. In fact, Frege's descriptive theory of proper names is much more popular and philosophically well known theory than Russell. We have already stated that Frege's descriptive theory of proper names is much more comprehensive than Russell because like Russell, Frege does not make any distinction between logically proper names and ordinary proper names. Moreover, beyond logically proper names and ordinary proper names, Frege includes some other linguistic items in the category of proper names. It is possible for Frege, we think, simply for the reason that unlike Russell and many others, Frege emphasizes on the sense of a proper name. Frege, as we have observed, has interpreted the sense of a proper names in terms of *mode of presentation*. Accordingly, it can be said after Frege that even empty names would be regarded as proper names if they have sense. Thus, Russell and Frege belong to two different poles, as Russell insists more on the referential aspect of proper names whereas Frege insists more on the sense aspect of proper names. We think that early Wittgenstein perhaps would be closer to Russell than Frege as far as his understanding of logically proper name is concerned. Even though Wittgenstein has developed his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* on the basis of proper names and in this regard, he was influenced by Russell, but he understands everything in terms of logical space. Russell while developing his logical proper names did not mention about logical space like Wittgenstein. Russell's theory of acquaintance is

a direct reference theory where there is no scope for description. More precisely, we can say that Russell theory of *knowledge by acquaintance* is linked with his very concept of sense-data and according to Russell sense-data can be known directly. However, Wittgenstein's concept of *logical space* is completely different in the sense that it is predominantly truth-functional in nature. Having said this, the only similarity between Russell and Wittgenstein, we think, is that there underlies *no referential failure* as far as logically proper name is concerned. Russell says that a logically proper name is known by acquaintance; whereas according to Wittgenstein a proper name must denote an object in logical space.

On the basis of the different nature of the theory of proper names as developed by Russell and Frege, there appears two different theory of names, such as, *no-sense theory of name* and *sense theory of names*. Russell's realist theory of name is philosophically known as no-sense theory of name because Russell while developing this theory denies the meaning of proper names. According to Russell, the question of meaning in the case of proper names simply does not arise because the very function of proper name is to denote an object with which we are acquainted and in this process of knowledge we cannot take the help of description. That is why Russell's realist theory of proper names is philosophically termed as *no-sense* theory of proper names. Contrary to this, we notice an altogether different approach in Frege. Frege, unlike Russell, develops the theory of proper name as *sense-oriented proper names*. According to Frege, every proper name without exception bears a sense or mode of presentation. Frege says that proper names must have sense as well as reference.¹⁸⁶ According to him a proper name is meaningful if it has 'sense'. Sense, for Frege, is the mode of presentation.

¹⁸⁶ Frege, G. 'On Sense and Reference', in P. Geach and M. Black (eds.) *Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege*, Oxford: Blackwell (1952).

According to Frege, a proper name is a name of an object. By the term 'a name of an object' Frege means 'a name of a single object'. Frege shows that two names have the same referent but different senses. For examples: (1) the morning star = the evening star and (2) the morning star = the morning star. The first is informative and synthetic and the second is uninformative but analytic. Anyone who does not know that morning star is the evening star must hold that 'morning star is the morning star' is true but 'the morning star is the evening star' is false. So Frege says that, 'morning star' and the 'evening star' have the same referent planet Venus but have different sense. So to Frege sense is important. Thus, even though both Russell and Frege took clues from Mill, both of them developed different theories of proper names. In fact, the recent development of the literature of proper names is either Russellian or Fregeian in some sense or other.

One should not, however, make mistake by assuming that Frege does not give importance on reference. According to Frege, in normal course of case, any proper name or any singular term having sense or mode of presentation should have a reference. However, unlike others, Frege asserts *mock names* or *empty proper* names which fail to refer anything. According to Frege even *mock-assertions* or *mock names* do have sense, but they fail to refer anything in the true sense of the term and hence lack semantic value. Except empty proper names, all other proper names, Frege claims, must have reference. Thus, in the strict sense of the term, we can say that Frege does not anticipate sense-failure in any proper names or singular terms, but he accepts referential failure in case of mock-assertions or mock-names.

We have already stated that that Mill's actually gave the clue of proper names and linguistic philosophers later on got the clues from Mill's. We have also noted that Russell agrees with Mill as far as non-connotative

singular term or name is concerned. But at the same time, Russell disagrees with Mill about general names. Indeed, Russell's realistic theory of names does not incorporate general names as non-connotative. Again, if we stand by Russell's theory of logical proper names, then we find or extract so many discrepancies between Frege and Russell. In the strict sense, we can say that Russell while developing his logical proper name through his realistic account, rules out referential failure. Secondly and more importantly, he gives us *no-sense theory of reference*. According to Russell, logical proper names do not have any sense or mode of presentation. On the other hand, we find something different in Frege's descriptivist theory of proper names. According to Frege any singular term would be regarded as a name. Every name, whether empty or non-empty, must have sense. A name without a sense would no longer be regarded as a name according to Frege. However, Frege tells us that in the case of mock-names or empty names, there is a referential failure because empty proper names fail to refer anything and hence they do not have cognitive or semantic value.

The descriptivist theory of Russell, perhaps, makes a closer tie with Frege. However, the fate of the descriptivist theory did not last long. It has been severely criticized by the proponents of causal theory of reference. In this regard, we can particularly mention the name of Saul Kripke. By criticizing the descriptivist theory, Kripke actually develops a kind of theory which is philosophically revolutionary. Frege in this regard introduces the concept of proper name as *rigid designator*. According to Frege, a proper name is held to be rigid if it refers to the same object in every possible-world of an actual world. Here Kripke brings the concept of *modal necessity* as well as the concept of *possible-world*. Thus, by introducing the concept of modal necessity, Kripke attempts to boil down the philosophical foundation of descriptive theory of proper names. By

introducing the concept of *rigid designator* as the attribute of proper name, Kripke denies Frege at great length and also Russell's descriptive theory of proper name.

Having said this, Kripke's development of proper name as rigid designator, in some sense or other, is very close to Russell's realist theory of proper name. Russell's realist theory of proper name is the outcome of his logical proper name. As we have already observed after Russell that every logical proper name must denote an object with which we are acquainted. Thus, in the case of logical proper name, Russell denies any sort of referential failure. Russell also denies the descriptive content of logical proper name. Now, as far as referential substantiation or validation is concerned, there we notice a close relationship between Russell and Kripke. Like Russell, Kripke, we think, equally denies referential failure in the case of proper names by treating them as rigid designators. However, the only difference between Russell and Kripke is that Russell, like Kripke, does not use the concept of possible-world. As Russell claims that only demonstrative pronouns, such as, 'this', 'that', 'it', etc., are logically proper names. Now, demonstrative pronouns are singular in nature. When we utter any sentence with the help of 'this' or 'that' or 'it', it actually refers to an object with which we are directly acquainted. Thus, Russell's interpretation of proper name with the help of demonstrative proper name is a matter of distributive application unlike the modal application of Kripke. Russell claims that every sentence containing a demonstrative pronoun, must designate an object with which *we are directly acquainted*.

Like Russell, Kripke, H. Putnam and Kaplan and Marcus have asserted that reference of a proper name is important. In this respect Russell's theory of logically proper name, Putnam's Twin-Earth argument, Kaplan's notion of 'Dthat', Kripke's notion of rigid designator and

Marcus' notion of tag are called new referential theories of names. Kripke says that a proper name is rigid if it designates the same object in all possible worlds of an actual world. Putnam's Twin-Earth argument goes against Frege's sense theory and proves that two names have the same sense but in different reference. Both Kaplan and Marcus use the metaphors, such as, 'dthat' and 'tag' respectively in the sense of direct reference.

We think that Putnam endorses Kripke's theory of proper names as well as natural-kind terms as rigid designators; that is, the names rigidly designate their referent in such a way that they can be supposed to be true of the referents across all possible worlds. This position is philosophically attributed as the new theory of direct reference. It combines the indexicality of the referring expressions with rigidity in their standing as referents. Putnam also endorses the view that a causal chain is necessarily the underlying mechanism of reference.

Putnam explains the notion of reference in connection with his thought-experiment about the *Twin Earth*. This experiment is like this: imagine another earth and there are people exactly like us on this Twin Earth also. Just as the people on Earth speak English, the people on the Twin Earth also speak a language like English. Let us imagine, that the word "water" occurs in the Twin Earth which looks like water and is very much used in the same way. Before 1750, neither the earthians nor the Twin Earthians knew about the chemical structure of water. But because of new developments in science, now it is known that water on earth is H₂O and the water on Twin Earth is XYZ. The question now is: What is the referent of the word "water" in the earthian English and in the Twin Earthian English? Is it the same or different? On the surface the words "water" (in the Earth) and "water" (in the Twin Earth) stands for the same thing and is also representing the same concept. Accordingly, they refer

to the same substance. However, at the deeper level they are different. The meaning is not the same, though they may represent same concept. They, in fact, refer to two different things such as H₂O on Earth and XYZ on Twin Earth. When the Earthians drink water, they drink that stuff which is H₂O and not XYZ but when the Twin Earthians drink water they drink XYZ but not H₂O. Thus, here it proves that reference is different but the sense remains the same. This view of Putnam certainly goes against Frege in the sense that by introducing the concept of informative identity with his famous example, the morning star is identical with the evening star (i.e., a = b). Frege tells us that two or more expressions having different meaning or sense may have the same referent. But we notice the opposition in Putnam's Twin-Earth argument. Here Putnam claims that two expressions having same meaning may have different reference.

We think that there is a clear deviance of the theory of names at the hand of the linguistic philosophers who have advocated the New Theory of Reference. We can in this context mention two important aspects on the basis of which the New Theory of Reference had been deviated from the classical theory of names as has been developed by Frege and Russell. We also think that the New Theory of Reference is a mix bag of the classical theory of reference as well. Having said this, we think that New Theory of Reference has much more affinity towards Russell's realistic theory of names than Frege's descriptive theory of proper names.

The New Theory of Reference appears as an alternative theory of proper names of the descriptive theory of proper names as developed by Frege in general. According to the New Theory of Reference, proper names do not have any descriptive content. Now the point is that while developing the realistic theory of proper names, Russell has claimed that logical proper names do not have any descriptive content. In this sense there we find a

similarity between Russell and the linguistic philosophers who have advocated the New Theory of Proper names. This does not make sense to say that the New Theory of Names is nothing but Russellian. We cannot say so. We think that there underlies a considerable departure between Russell's realistic theory of names and the New Theory of Names as developed by Kripke, Putnam, Kaplan, Marcus and others. As Russell has claimed that every logical proper name denotes an object with which we are directly acquainted. He, in this regard, says that only demonstratives pronouns are said to be logical proper names. When we utter any sentence whatsoever with the help of demonstrative pronouns, such as, 'this' or 'that' or 'it', we must ensure all without exception that the sentence under consideration refers to an object with which we are directly acquainted. This, while advocating the realist theory of proper names, Russell ensures that there is no referential failure in his theory. Thus, Russell gives us two important features of his realist theory of proper names, such as (i) there is no referential failure; and (ii) there is no descriptive content. We think that the New Theory of Reference has accepted both the features of Russell's realist theory of names. However, the New Theory of Reference differs from Russell in an important sense. Russell does not mention the concept of modal necessity or the concept of possible-world while developing his realist theory of proper names; whereas the modal necessity or the concept of modal possible world is the defining features of the New Theory of Proper names. Each and every linguistic philosophers as the advocator of the New Theory of Proper names introduces a metaphor while developing their respective position. For example, Kripke brings the revolutionary concept 'rigid designator' in exploring his concept of proper names. Indeed Kripke, as we all know, interprets the concept of 'rigid designator' with regard to the concept of possible-world that is exclusively marked the 'modal concept of

necessity'. Putnam brings the concept of "Twin-Earth" and also the concept of 'Natural kind terms' to develop his idea of proper names. In this regard, Putnam confessed his indebtedness to Kripke. In fact, Putnam, we think, develops his idea of 'natural kind-term' with the philosophical background of Kripke's concept of 'rigid designator'. Kaplan also used the metaphor 'Dthat' as the mark of 'direct reference' and also develops it in terms of modal necessity and the concept of possible-world. Finally, Marcus uses the metaphor 'Tag' as the mark of proper name as direct referential entity. Marcus too takes the concept of modal necessity and also the concept of possible-world while developing her theory of proper names with the classic metaphor 'tag'. We note passing difference among the philosophers belonging to the New Classical Theory of Names, but we do not give emphasize more on this issue. Rather we develop a philosophical position in what sense or senses the New Classical Theory of Reference developed over the period from the classical theory of reference and in what sense the New Theory of Names differs from the classical theory of names. The other important aspect of the New Theory of Names is causal necessity.

The causal theory of names as it has been expounded recently by Kripke says that 'names including proper names are causally connected with their referents.'¹⁸⁷ The proponents of the causal theory are of the opinions that the linguistic symbols containing the function of proper names are so used that they have a causal link with external objects. The objects outside the symbol-system exert a causal influence on the use of proper names in which case the latter are used as a response to the former. For example, a man is called by a certain name so that he can respond to the audience in a communication network. The person named Krishna is

¹⁸⁷ Kripke, Saul. "Naming and Necessity" in *Semantics of Natural Language*, eds. Davidson and Harman. Pp. 23-30.

addressed as Krishna so that he responds to the address and communicates accordingly. Thus, names are useful in the address system such that we are all trained to respond positively to an address by our names. The causal theory of names captures the theoretical framework of the naming system so far as names have a causal link with the objects named.

Besides, the causal link may take a circuitous route rather than a linear one in view of the fact that names have a very complex life in our languages. First of all, names are ceremonially conferred on people or objects which are called baptism. Then the names make rounds throughout the linguistic community till they get a permanent foothold so that their causal origin is taken for granted. Kripke and Donnellan have highlighted this form of *circuitous causation* as the very foundation of the causal theory of names. In this respect they hold that the naming activity gets its 'historically linkages'¹⁸⁸ with the initial baptism such that the present use of a name is very much historically linked with its past use. *The first use is the causal background of the present uses.*

However, both the linear and circuitous forms of causal link between names are so designed to make the name-object relationship a matter of conventional association between language and the world. Even while being conventional, it does not cease to be strongly rigid as Kripke holds, since we can always make room for the name referring to the same object across possible- worlds. The name has its natural history in the complex network of other names and thus gains its strength and rigidity from its common background. Kripke is aware that names could not have been non-natural and non-causal in their origin as in them puts down the whole burden of the theory of necessity he propounds.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid. p. 24.

Even then the causal theory of names is found to be flawed on many counts. The critics of the causal theory point out that the causal theory has not sufficiently explained how the causal link is established between names and objects. There are names which do not stand immediately for any object. There are empty names like "centaur" which stand for nothing. Besides, there are many names for the same object just as the same name can refer to many objects in different contexts. So it is difficult, if not impossible, to establish causal relation between names and objects.

The strongest criticism of the causal theory is that the relation between name and the object is not a direct one but mediated by conventions, sense and above all the intentional contents of the speaker's mind. All these are possible alternative ways of explaining the name-object relationship. Gareth Evans says: "The causal theory again ignores the importance of surrounding context, and regards the capacity to denote something as a magical trick which has somehow been passed on, and once passed on cannot be lost."¹⁸⁹ Thus, according to him, the causal theory misses the main contents of the name-object relationship by postulating a direct relationship which is never actually found. All names bear certain *socio-cultural contents* which enter the picture.

Evans opposes the direct reference theory since, according to him; names have *a social rather than a causal origin*. That is, names have been invented and used for the social purpose of communication and also for the sake of identification and re-identification of the persons and the objects concerned.

57. Evans, Gareth. "The Causal Theory of Names" in *The Philosophy of Language*, ed. A.P. Martinich, pp. 295-307.

Hence, according to Evans, names are part of a network of linguistic symbols and of a “name-using practice.”¹⁹⁰ The name-using practice is a social institution carrying the accepted norms conventions. Thus, the speaker, while referring to a thing or person, must abide by the rules laid down for the purpose. Evans further writes: “The ‘social dimension’ of language is not wholly absent from these referential performances, since the speaker relies upon the existence of a practice, within the community, of using this or that expression (e.g. ‘he’) to refer to a certain sort of thing (e.g., a male thing).”¹⁹¹

Thus, the social character of naming goes to point out that the linguistic performances including the referential ones are all system-embedded and are rule bound. Naming is a part of the language game played according to rules, to put in Wittgenstein’s words.

Searle has introduced in this connection the concept of intentional content to explain how the naming act carries the intentional content in its use in the social institution of naming.¹⁹² Names, according to him, are directed towards the objects referred to such that even when the actual referent is not present, the name carries its directedness towards the possible object. This directedness is the intentionality of the name and so every name whatsoever has this intentional content as it is used in a speech act. Searle writes: “Since linguistic reference is always dependent on a form of mental reference and mental reference is always in virtue of Intentional content including Background and Network, proper names must in some way depend on Intentional content.....”¹⁹³

¹⁹⁰. Evans, Gareth. *The Varieties of Reference*, ed. John McDowell. Clarendon Press, Oxford and Oxford University Press, New York, 1982.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 373.

¹⁹² Searle, John. “Proper Names and Intentionality” in *The Philosophy of Language*, ed. A.P. Martinich, pp. 330-346.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, p.330.

Searle's theory of intentionality thus emphasizes that the naming act is a world-directed act like any speech act so that to name is to intend to refer to something and also to express one's cognitive relation with that. These relations are very much structured into the mental content of naming, so that the names cannot be taken in isolation. The relation between name and object is thus intentional to the core and it has to be seen in the proper perspective of the network of similar intentional acts expressed in language. Searle very aptly says: "All reference is in virtue of Intentional content, whether the reference is by way of names, descriptions, indexicals, tags, labels, pictures, or whatever. 'The object is preferred to only if it fits or satisfies some condition or set of conditions expressed by or associated with the device that issued to refer to it.'¹⁹⁴

Thus the intentional theory of naming goes straight to show that names are not causally connected with the world and that if any relation fits the solution, it must be the intentional one. The category of causality itself is intentional and therefore even if the relation is causal to some extent it remains broadly intentional.

The causal theory is opposed to the description theory of names, whereas the intentional theory incorporates the description theory in its network. Names are not just *tags* and do not refer without the prior descriptive and intentional contents. Agreeing with Frege that senses are important for the fixing of reference, Searle moves towards the intentional content to oppose the direct reference theory. Searle's is a clever move to block the direct reference theorist's effort to reduce names to just tags in our language.

We think that the intentional content and the so-called descriptive content definitely exist in any form of proper names. However, in some case it

¹⁹⁴ Ibid., p.344.

does not require to emphasize on and in some other case it has been reflected. When Frege, for example, develops his descriptive theory of proper names, he has been very focused on the mode of presentation. However, from this, it does not follow that Frege is not conscious of the reference of the terms. Otherwise, there is no point of Frege in advocating linguistic revisionism. We also think that Putnam's concept of natural kind terms equally enables to liquidate the rigid boundary of the proper names because it directly or indirectly opens up the scope of proper names as rigid designators. We think that the so-called natural kind terms have descriptive content in the sense that their rigidity actually hinges on the foundation of baptismal ceremony and historicity. Putnam, of course, finds distinction between natural kind terms and artifacts. Unlike natural kind terms artifacts are not rigid. However, both artifacts and natural kind terms have descriptive content. Thus, we think by introducing natural kind terms as rigid designator, Putnam denies the view that proper names do not have sense.

The concept of causal nexus is another important dimension that needs to be taken care of. While developing the concept of sense or mode of presentation, Frege does not say anything about the casual nexus of proper names. We do not sense the same even in Russell's realist theory of names. However, when we read Putnam's natural kind terms as rigid designators, we find that there underlies a causal nexus in the natural kind terms in the name of baptismal ceremony. Without causal link or nexus, natural kind terms having descriptive content cannot be rigid designators. Finally, we think that the New Theory of Names is directly linked with Russell's realist theory of proper names in the sense that it asserts no sense theory of proper names which is Russellian. Even Mill also endorsed the same. The other similarity we observe in the New Theory of Names is that like Russellian realist theory of proper names it rules out

referential failure. Having said this, the New Theory of Names actually strengthens the concept of rigidity by introducing the concept of modal necessity.

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