

## Chapter Seven

### Concluding Remarks

Linguistic revolution of 20<sup>th</sup> century appeared not only to destroy *speculative metaphysics* as a meaningless enterprise; it equally aimed at to establish a perfect relationship between language and reality. However regarding the nature of language, linguistic philosophers have expressed divergence of opinions. Some of them adhere to the view that ordinary language is all right in dealing with philosophy and some other would like to say that ordinary language by its very nature is ambiguous and vague. So ordinary or natural language should be revised in such a way so that the true logical structure of language can reveal the true structure of reality. Those who suggest revision in ordinary language are called revisionists. They suspect the substantiation of ordinary language as a genuine method of linguistic philosophy. For them since ordinary language, by its very nature, is ambiguous and vague, it would be better for us to construct a new form of language known as ideal language or artificial language. In this regard, proper names are supposed to be the minimum vocabulary of constructed language. According to the linguistic philosophers, to be a name is to denote an object or more specifically every name refers to an object either in the form of denotation or in the form of connotation; either in the form of *de-re* or in the form of *de-dicto*.

However, a serious philosophical debate is witnessed in determining the nature of proper names. If we look back to Mill, we come to know that Mill gives a comprehensive analysis of proper names through which the later development of proper names has been flourished. Although Mill had not been regarded as a linguistic philosopher in the strict sense of the

term, but very fortunately he had ingrained the concept of name in his book *A System of Logic*.<sup>185</sup> His classification of naming theory is very similar to or rather, so to speak, is very close to grammatical classification of names. However, Mill gave a few important clues or insights of proper names from which the later development of proper name has taken a different shape altogether.

We think that in the true philosophical sense, the theory of proper names as the minimum vocabulary of ideal language has taken a complete shape in Russell's philosophy of language. In fact, Russell's insightful classification of names as logical and ordinary proper names actually gives an ultimate and rigor interpretation of proper names. Indeed, there are many linguistic philosophers who have voiced in favour of linguistic revisionism and also in favour of constructing an ideal or constructed language. But like Russell, no other linguistic philosopher gives much importance in the classification of names as *logical and ordinary*. Of course, we think that Russell took clues from Mill and Russell's concept of logical proper names is very similar to Mill's non-connotative names. Having said this, we still believe that the concept of logical proper name of Russell actually opens up an ultimate interpretation of the concept of proper names. Russell in this regard introduces the concept of *demonstratives pronouns* as the suitable vocabulary of logically proper names.

The other important insight that we sense from Russell's theory of names is that he alone introduces two different kinds of theory, such as realist theory of proper names and description theory of proper names. With the help of logical proper names, Russell has developed *realist theory of proper names* and with the help of ordinary proper names; Russell develops *description theory of proper names*. In this sense we can say

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<sup>185</sup> Mill, J.S. *A System of Logic*, London: Longmans, Green, and Dyer, 1875. p.90.

that Russell actually gives us a comprehensive and complete account of the theory of proper names and his understanding of proper names as *logical and ordinary* bears a lot of philosophical insight on the basis of which many contemporary linguistic philosophers have been benefited.

Frege has been attributed as the father of modern linguistic philosophy. Like Russell and many others, Frege too voices in favour of constructing ideal language. Frege regards ordinary language as eyes and logical language as microscope. In this regard, there is nothing wrong to say that Frege has been regarded as the proponent of linguistic revisionism. However, like Russell, Frege does not make the distinction between logical proper names and ordinary proper names like Russell. His understanding of proper names as the minimum vocabulary of ideal language is comprehensive. Even unlike Russell, Frege includes or incorporates phrase, clauses as proper names. This is made possible because unlike Russell, Frege gives importance on the sense of proper names. According to Frege, any linguistic expression would be regarded as proper names if it bears a sense. Here we sense a distinctive gulf between Russell and Frege. Russell while developing his theory of proper names gives much emphasize *on the referential aspect of names*. According to Russell every proper name, in the true sense of the term, must refer to an object through sense-data with which we are directly acquainted. Even when Russell develops his description theory of proper names by ordinary proper names, he insists on existential proposition. Clearly it seems to us that Russell was an ardent proponent of reference theory of meaning where the reference of the sentence or precisely speaking, the reference of the proper names must refer to an object with which we are directly acquainted. His sophisticated version of referential theory actually tells us that a sentence would be (philosophically) meaningful if it refers to something other than the sentence itself and

there must be a referential connection between the sentence and what it refers to. That means that the referential connection actually constitutes the meaning of the sentence under description. We can say here that Russell gives much emphasize on the *referential aspect of meaning* while developing his theory of names.

Now, if we compare Russell with Frege, we find an altogether different theory. Like Russell, Frege too, has developed the descriptivist theory of proper names. In fact, Frege's descriptive theory of proper names is much more popular and philosophically well known theory than Russell. We have already stated that Frege's descriptive theory of proper names is much more comprehensive than Russell because like Russell, Frege does not make any distinction between logically proper names and ordinary proper names. Moreover, beyond logically proper names and ordinary proper names, Frege includes some other linguistic items in the category of proper names. It is possible for Frege, we think, simply for the reason that unlike Russell and many others, Frege emphasizes on the sense of a proper name. Frege, as we have observed, has interpreted the sense of a proper names in terms of *mode of presentation*. Accordingly, it can be said after Frege that even empty names would be regarded as proper names if they have sense. Thus, Russell and Frege belong to two different poles, as Russell insists more on the referential aspect of proper names whereas Frege insists more on the sense aspect of proper names. We think that early Wittgenstein perhaps would be closer to Russell than Frege as far as his understanding of logically proper name is concerned. Even though Wittgenstein has developed his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* on the basis of proper names and in this regard, he was influenced by Russell, but he understands everything in terms of logical space. Russell while developing his logical proper names did not mention about logical space like Wittgenstein. Russell's theory of acquaintance is

a direct reference theory where there is no scope for description. More precisely, we can say that Russell theory of *knowledge by acquaintance* is linked with his very concept of sense-data and according to Russell sense-data can be known directly. However, Wittgenstein's concept of *logical space* is completely different in the sense that it is predominantly truth-functional in nature. Having said this, the only similarity between Russell and Wittgenstein, we think, is that there underlies *no referential failure* as far as logically proper name is concerned. Russell says that a logically proper name is known by acquaintance; whereas according to Wittgenstein a proper name must denote an object in logical space.

On the basis of the different nature of the theory of proper names as developed by Russell and Frege, there appears two different theory of names, such as, *no-sense theory of name* and *sense theory of names*. Russell's realist theory of name is philosophically known as no-sense theory of name because Russell while developing this theory denies the meaning of proper names. According to Russell, the question of meaning in the case of proper names simply does not arise because the very function of proper name is to denote an object with which we are acquainted and in this process of knowledge we cannot take the help of description. That is why Russell's realist theory of proper names is philosophically termed as *no-sense* theory of proper names. Contrary to this, we notice an altogether different approach in Frege. Frege, unlike Russell, develops the theory of proper name as *sense-oriented proper names*. According to Frege, every proper name without exception bears a sense or mode of presentation. Frege says that proper names must have sense as well as reference.<sup>186</sup> According to him a proper name is meaningful if it has 'sense'. Sense, for Frege, is the mode of presentation.

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<sup>186</sup> Frege, G. 'On Sense and Reference', in P. Geach and M. Black (eds.) *Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege*, Oxford: Blackwell (1952).

According to Frege, a proper name is a name of an object. By the term ‘a name of an object’ Frege means ‘a name of a single object’. Frege shows that two names have the same referent but different senses. For examples: (1) the morning star = the evening star and (2) the morning star = the morning star. The first is informative and synthetic and the second is uninformative but analytic. Anyone who does not know that morning star is the evening star must hold that ‘morning star is the morning star’ is true but ‘the morning star is the evening star’ is false. So Frege says that, ‘morning star’ and the ‘evening star’ have the same referent planet Venus but have different sense. So to Frege sense is important. Thus, even though both Russell and Frege took clues from Mill, both of them developed different theories of proper names. In fact, the recent development of the literature of proper names is either Russellian or Fregeian in some sense or other.

One should not, however, make mistake by assuming that Frege does not give importance on reference. According to Frege, in normal course of case, any proper name or any singular term having sense or mode of presentation should have a reference. However, unlike others, Frege asserts *mock names* or *empty proper names* which fail to refer anything. According to Frege even *mock-assertions* or *mock names* do have sense, but they fail to refer anything in the true sense of the term and hence lack semantic value. Except empty proper names, all other proper names, Frege claims, must have reference. Thus, in the strict sense of the term, we can say that Frege does not anticipate sense-failure in any proper names or singular terms, but he accepts referential failure in case of mock-assertions or mock-names.

We have already stated that that Mill’s actually gave the clue of proper names and linguistic philosophers later on got the clues from Mill’s. We have also noted that Russell agrees with Mill as far as non-connotative

singular term or name is concerned. But at the same time, Russell disagrees with Mill about general names. Indeed, Russell's realistic theory of names does not incorporate general names as non-connotative. Again, if we stand by Russell's theory of logical proper names, then we find or extract so many discrepancies between Frege and Russell. In the strict sense, we can say that Russell while developing his logical proper name through his realistic account, rules out referential failure. Secondly and more importantly, he gives us *no-sense theory of reference*. According to Russell, logical proper names do not have any sense or mode of presentation. On the other hand, we find something different in Frege's descriptivist theory of proper names. According to Frege any singular term would be regarded as a name. Every name, whether empty or non-empty, must have sense. A name without a sense would no longer be regarded as a name according to Frege. However, Frege tells us that in the case of mock-names or empty names, there is a referential failure because empty proper names fail to refer anything and hence they do not have cognitive or semantic value.

The descriptivion theory of Russell, perhaps, makes a closer tie with Frege. However, the fate of the descriptivist theory did not last long. It has been severely criticized by the proponents of causal theory of reference. In this regard, we can particularly mention the name of Saul Kripke. By criticizing the descriptivist theory, Kripke actually develops a kind of theory which is philosophically revolutionary. Frege in this regard introduces the concept of proper name as *rigid designator*. According to Frege, a proper name is held to be rigid if it refers to the same object in every possible-world of an actual world. Here Kripke brings the concept of *modal necessity* as well as the concept of *possible-world*. Thus, by introducing the concept of modal necessity, Kripke attempts to boil down the philosophical foundation of descriptive theory of proper names. By

introducing the concept of *rigid designator* as the attribute of proper name, Kripke denies Frege at great length and also Russell's descriptive theory of proper name.

Having said this, Kripke's development of proper name as rigid designator, in some sense or other, is very close to Russell's realist theory of proper name. Russell's realist theory of proper name is the outcome of his logical proper name. As we have already observed after Russell that every logical proper name must denote an object with which we are acquainted. Thus, in the case of logical proper name, Russell denies any sort of referential failure. Russell also denies the descriptive content of logical proper name. Now, as far as referential substantiation or validation is concerned, there we notice a close relationship between Russell and Kripke. Like Russell, Kripke, we think, equally denies referential failure in the case of proper names by treating them as rigid designators. However, the only difference between Russell and Kripke is that Russell, like Kripke, does not use the concept of possible-world. As Russell claims that only demonstrative pronouns, such as, 'this', 'that', 'it', etc., are logically proper names. Now, demonstrative pronouns are singular in nature. When we utter any sentence with the help of 'this' or 'that' or 'it', it actually refers to an object with which we are directly acquainted. Thus, Russell's interpretation of proper name with the help of demonstrative proper name is a matter of distributive application unlike the modal application of Kripke. Russell claims that every sentence containing a demonstrative pronoun, must designate an object with which *we are directly acquainted*.

Like Russell, Kripke, H. Putnam and Kaplan and Marcus have asserted that reference of a proper name is important. In this respect Russell's theory of logically proper name, Putnam's Twin-Earth argument, Kaplan's notion of 'Dthat', Kripke's notion of rigid designator and

Marcus' notion of tag are called new referential theories of names. Kripke says that a proper name is rigid if it designates the same object in all possible worlds of an actual world. Putnam's Twin-Earth argument goes against Frege's sense theory and proves that two names have the same sense but in different reference. Both Kaplan and Marcus use the metaphors, such as, 'dthat' and 'tag' respectively in the sense of direct reference.

We think that Putnam endorses Kripke's theory of proper names as well as natural-kind terms as rigid designators; that is, the names rigidly designate their referent in such a way that they can be supposed to be true of the referents across all possible worlds. This position is philosophically attributed as the new theory of direct reference. It combines the indexicality of the referring expressions with rigidity in their standing as referents. Putnam also endorses the view that a causal chain is necessarily the underlying mechanism of reference.

Putnam explains the notion of reference in connection with his thought-experiment about the *Twin Earth*. This experiment is like this: imagine another earth and there are people exactly like us on this Twin Earth also. Just as the people on Earth speak English, the people on the Twin Earth also speak a language like English. Let us imagine, that the word "water" occurs in the Twin Earth which looks like water and is very much used in the same way. Before 1750, neither the earthians nor the Twin Earthians knew about the chemical structure of water. But because of new developments in science, now it is known that water on earth is H<sub>2</sub>O and the water on Twin Earth is XYZ. The question now is: What is the referent of the word "water" in the earthian English and in the Twin Earthian English? Is it the same or different? On the surface the words "water" (in the Earth) and "water" (in the Twin Earth) stands for the same thing and is also representing the same concept. Accordingly, they refer

to the same substance. However, at the deeper level they are different. The meaning is not the same, though they may represent same concept. They, in fact, refer to two different things such as H<sub>2</sub>O on Earth and XYZ on Twin Earth. When the Earthians drink water, they drink that stuff which is H<sub>2</sub>O and not XYZ but when the Twin Earthians drink water they drink XYZ but not H<sub>2</sub>O. Thus, here it proves that reference is different but the sense remains the same. This view of Putnam certainly goes against Frege in the sense that by introducing the concept of informative identity with his famous example, the morning star is identical with the evening star (i.e., a = b). Frege tells us that two or more expressions having different meaning or sense may have the same referent. But we notice the opposition in Putnam's Twin-Earth argument. Here Putnam claims that two expressions having same meaning may have different reference.

We think that there is a clear deviance of the theory of names at the hand of the linguistic philosophers who have advocated the New Theory of Reference. We can in this context mention two important aspects on the basis of which the New Theory of Reference had been deviated from the classical theory of names as has been developed by Frege and Russell. We also think that the New Theory of Reference is a mix bag of the classical theory of reference as well. Having said this, we think that New Theory of Reference has much more affinity towards Russell's realistic theory of names than Frege's descriptive theory of proper names.

The New Theory of Reference appears as an alternative theory of proper names of the descriptive theory of proper names as developed by Frege in general. According to the New Theory of Reference, proper names do not have any descriptive content. Now the point is that while developing the realistic theory of proper names, Russell has claimed that logical proper names do not have any descriptive content. In this sense there we find a

similarity between Russell and the linguistic philosophers who have advocated the New Theory of Proper names. This does not make sense to say that the New Theory of Names is nothing but Russellian. We cannot say so. We think that there underlies a considerable departure between Russell's realistic theory of names and the New Theory of Names as developed by Kripke, Putnam, Kaplan, Marcus and others. As Russell has claimed that every logical proper name denotes an object with which we are directly acquainted. He, in this regard, says that only demonstratives pronouns are said to be logical proper names. When we utter any sentence whatsoever with the help of demonstrative pronouns, such as, 'this' or 'that' or 'it', we must ensure all without exception that the sentence under consideration refers to an object with which we are directly acquainted. This, while advocating the realist theory of proper names, Russell ensures that there is no referential failure in his theory. Thus, Russell gives us two important features of his realist theory of proper names, such as (i) there is no referential failure; and (ii) there is no descriptive content. We think that the New Theory of Reference has accepted both the features of Russell's realist theory of names. However, the New Theory of Reference differs from Russell in an important sense. Russell does not mention the concept of modal necessity or the concept of possible-world while developing his realist theory of proper names; whereas the modal necessity or the concept of modal possible world is the defining features of the New Theory of Proper names. Each and every linguistic philosophers as the advocator of the New Theory of Proper names introduces a metaphor while developing their respective position. For example, Kripke brings the revolutionary concept 'rigid designator' in exploring his concept of proper names. Indeed Kripke, as we all know, interprets the concept of 'rigid designator' with regard to the concept of possible-world that is exclusively marked the 'modal concept of

necessity'. Putnam brings the concept of "Twin-Earth" and also the concept of 'Natural kind terms' to develop his idea of proper names. In this regard, Putnam confessed his indebtedness to Kripke. In fact, Putnam, we think, develops his idea of 'natural kind-term' with the philosophical background of Kripke's concept of 'rigid designator'. Kaplan also used the metaphor 'Dthat' as the mark of 'direct reference' and also develops it in terms of modal necessity and the concept of possible-world. Finally, Marcus uses the metaphor 'Tag' as the mark of proper name as direct referential entity. Marcus too takes the concept of modal necessity and also the concept of possible-world while developing her theory of proper names with the classic metaphor 'tag'. We note passing difference among the philosophers belonging to the New Classical Theory of Names, but we do not give emphasize more on this issue. Rather we develop a philosophical position in what sense or senses the New Classical Theory of Reference developed over the period from the classical theory of reference and in what sense the New Theory of Names differs from the classical theory of names. The other important aspect of the New Theory of Names is causal necessity.

The causal theory of names as it has been expounded recently by Kripke says that 'names including proper names are causally connected with their referents.'<sup>187</sup> The proponents of the causal theory are of the opinions that the linguistic symbols containing the function of proper names are so used that they have a causal link with external objects. The objects outside the symbol-system exert a causal influence on the use of proper names in which case the latter are used as a response to the former. For example, a man is called by a certain name so that he can respond to the audience in a communication network. The person named Krishna is

<sup>187</sup> Kripke, Saul. "Naming and Necessity" in *Semantics of Natural Language*, eds. Davidson and Harman. Pp. 23-30.

addressed as Krishna so that he responds to the address and communicates accordingly. Thus, names are useful in the address system such that we are all trained to respond positively to an address by our names. The causal theory of names captures the theoretical framework of the naming system so far as names have a causal link with the objects named.

Besides, the causal link may take a circuitous route rather than a linear one in view of the fact that names have a very complex life in our languages. First of all, names are ceremonially conferred on people or objects which are called baptism. Then the names make rounds throughout the linguistic community till they get a permanent foothold so that their causal origin is taken for granted. Kripke and Donnellan have highlighted this form of *circuitous causation* as the very foundation of the causal theory of names. In this respect they hold that the naming activity gets its ‘historically linkages’<sup>188</sup> with the initial baptism such that the present use of a name is very much historically linked with its past use. *The first use is the causal background of the present uses.*

However, both the linear and circuitous forms of causal link between names are so designed to make the name-object relationship a matter of conventional association between language and the world. Even while being conventional, it does not cease to be strongly rigid as Kripke holds, since we can always make room for the name referring to the same object across possible-worlds. The name has its natural history in the complex network of other names and thus gains its strength and rigidity from its common background. Kripke is aware that names could not have been non-natural and non-causal in their origin as in them puts down the whole burden of the theory of necessity he propounds.

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<sup>188</sup> Ibid. p. 24.

Even then the causal theory of names is found to be flawed on many counts. The critics of the causal theory point out that the causal theory has not sufficiently explained how the causal link is established between names and objects. There are names which do not stand immediately for any object. There are empty names like “centaur” which stand for nothing. Besides, there are many names for the same object just as the same name can refer to many objects in different contexts. So it is difficult, if not impossible, to establish causal relation between names and objects.

The strongest criticism of the causal theory is that the relation between name and the object is not a direct one but mediated by conventions, sense and above all the intentional contents of the speaker’s mind. All these are possible alternative ways of explaining the name-object relationship. Gareth Evans says: “The causal theory again ignores the importance of surrounding context, and regards the capacity to denote something as a magical trick which has somehow been passed on, and once passed on cannot be lost.”<sup>189</sup> Thus, according to him, the causal theory misses the main contents of the name-object relationship by postulating a direct relationship which is never actually found. All names bear certain *socio-cultural contents* which enter the picture.

Evans opposes the direct reference theory since, according to him; names have *a social rather than a causal origin*. That is, names have been invented and used for the social purpose of communication and also for the sake of identification and re-identification of the persons and the objects concerned.

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57. Evans, Gareth. “The Causal Theory of Names” in *The Philosophy of Language*, ed. A.P. Martinich, pp. 295-307.

Hence, according to Evans, names are part of a network of linguistic symbols and of a “name-using practice.”<sup>190</sup> The name-using practice is a social institution carrying the accepted norms conventions. Thus, the speaker, while referring to a thing or person, must abide by the rules laid down for the purpose. Evans further writes: “The ‘social dimension’ of language is not wholly absent from these referential performances, since the speaker relies upon the existence of a practice, within the community, of using this or that expression (e.g. ‘he’) to refer to a certain sort of thing (e.g., a male thing).”<sup>191</sup>

Thus, the social character of naming goes to point out that the linguistic performances including the referential ones are all system-embedded and are rule bound. Naming is a part of the language game played according to rules, to put in Wittgenstein’s words.

Searle has introduced in this connection the concept of intentional content to explain how the naming act carries the intentional content in its use in the social institution of naming.<sup>192</sup> Names, according to him, are directed towards the objects referred to such that even when the actual referent is not present, the name carries its directedness towards the possible object. This directedness is the intentionality of the name and so every name whatsoever has this intentional content as it is used in a speech act. Searle writes: “Since linguistic reference is always dependent on a form of mental reference and mental reference is always in virtue of Intentional content including Background and Network, proper names must in some way depend on Intentional content.....”<sup>193</sup>

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<sup>190</sup>. Evans, Gareth. *The Varieties of Reference*, ed. John McDowell. Clarendon Press, Oxford and Oxford University Press, New York, 1882.

<sup>191</sup> Ibid., p. 373.

<sup>192</sup> Searle, John. “Proper Names and Intentionality” in *The Philosophy of Language*, ed. A.P. Martinich, pp. 330-346.

<sup>193</sup> Ibid., p.330.

Searle's theory of intentionality thus emphasizes that the naming act is a world-directed act like any speech act so that to name is to intend to refer to something and also to express one's cognitive relation with that. These relations are very much structured into the mental content of naming, so that the names cannot be taken in isolation. The relation between name and object is thus intentional to the core and it has to be seen in the proper perspective of the network of similar intentional acts expressed in language. Searle very aptly says: "All reference is in virtue of Intentional content, whether the reference is by way of names, descriptions, indexicals, tags, labels, pictures, or whatever. 'The object is preferred to only if it fits or satisfies some condition or set of conditions expressed by or associated with the device that issued to refer to it.'<sup>194</sup>

Thus the intentional theory of naming goes straight to show that names are not causally connected with the world and that if any relation fits the solution, it must be the intentional one. The category of causality itself is intentional and therefore even if the relation is causal to some extent it remains broadly intentional.

The causal theory is opposed to the description theory of names, whereas the intentional theory incorporates the description theory in its network. Names are not just *tags* and do not refer without the prior descriptive and intentional contents. Agreeing with Frege that senses are important for the fixing of reference, Searle moves towards the intentional content to oppose the direct reference theory. Searle's is a clever move to block the direct reference theorist's effort to reduce names to just tags in our language.

We think that the intentional content and the so-called descriptive content definitely exist in any form of proper names. However, in some case it

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<sup>194</sup> Ibid., p.344.

does not require to emphasize on and in some other case it has been reflected. When Frege, for example, develops his descriptive theory of proper names, he has been very focused on the mode of presentation. However, from this, it does not follow that Frege is not conscious of the reference of the terms. Otherwise, there is no point of Frege in advocating linguistic revisionism. We also think that Putnam's concept of natural kind terms equally enables to liquidate the rigid boundary of the proper names because it directly or indirectly opens up the scope of proper names as rigid designators. We think that the so-called natural kind terms have descriptive content in the sense that their rigidity actually hinges on the foundation of baptismal ceremony and historicity. Putnam, of course, finds distinction between natural kind terms and artifacts. Unlike natural kind terms artifacts are not rigid. However, both artifacts and natural kind terms have descriptive content. Thus, we think by introducing natural kind terms as rigid designator, Putnam denies the view that proper names do not have sense.

The concept of causal nexus is another important dimension that needs to be taken care of. While developing the concept of sense or mode of presentation, Frege does not say anything about the causal nexus of proper names. We do not sense the same even in Russell's realist theory of names. However, when we read Putnam's natural kind terms as rigid designators, we find that there underlies a causal nexus in the natural kind terms in the name of baptismal ceremony. Without causal link or nexus, natural kind terms having descriptive content cannot be rigid designators. Finally, we think that the New Theory of Names is directly linked with Russell's realist theory of proper names in the sense that it asserts no sense theory of proper names which is Russellian. Even Mill also endorsed the same. The other similarity we observe in the New Theory of Names is that like Russellian realist theory of proper names it rules out

referential failure. Having said this, the New Theory of Names actually strengthens the concept of rigidity by introducing the concept of modal necessity.

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