

CHAPTER-VII

THE RETREATING STATE, GOVERNANCE REFORMS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN INDIA

CHAPTER - VII

THE RETREATING STATE, GOVERNANCE REFORMS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN INDIA

I. Prospects for Democracy and Development

The reforms introduced in 1991, mediated the process of Globalization in Indian Society, is of a distinctive character which fundamentally altered the face of Politics in India by shifting the focus away from the all-encompassing state of Nehruvian India to a market friendly regime.¹ The reforms was 'nothing less than a repudiation of India's distinctive approach to development - a repudiation, that is, of Nehru's vision of Socialist self-reliance'.² The Nehruvian model of development with social democratic goals at its core, coupled with faster economic growth spurred by statist interventions was, essentially, in sync with modernization theories. Thus, India's programme of Planned Development, initially, received a lot of support from Economists and policy makers as they were being carried out in a nonpolitical and rational manner in the face of pulls and pressures of party politics. Moreover, it was considered to be an appropriate strategy to grapple with the glaring disparities in wealth and privilege that do exist in Indian society and its nonviolent and democratic nature of implementation.³ However, prior to the introduction of Economic reforms, India was already moving from a 'command polity' to a 'demand polity' and remained a 'weak-strong state', notwithstanding. (Rudolph and Rudolph, 1987). Thus, the Indian State, despite assuming 'the commanding heights of the economy', could not trigger economic growth on a scale which was expected of it, largely because of the demands thrust upon it by different sections of society taking advantage of the democratic system.⁴ As Pranab Bardhan argues, "The Indian public economy has thus become an elaborate network of patronage and subsidies. The heterogeneous proprietary classes fight and bargain for their share in the spoils of the system and often strike compromises in the form of 'log-rolling' in the usual fashion of pressure

group politics".⁵ Therefore, the Indian experience suggests as pointed out by several studies, the failure of state-led development may be attributed to the lack of autonomy of state from organized interests in society which distorted decision-making and prevented the implementation of redistributive policies. The 'crisis of Governability' thesis as advanced by Atul Kohli (1991) also has its roots in the inability of the state to effectively pursue public goals because of such pressures.⁶ In any case, India's experiments with 'socialist' planning may have contributed enormously by strengthening the economic foundations of balanced economic growth, but, it failed to harness India's growth potential. More importantly, the dirigiste development phase worked easily in favour of those who could negotiate access to the license and permit Raj than empowering and benefiting the poor except indirectly as a result of revised Government spending policies in the 1970s, and 1980s.⁷

India could have shifted from an import substitution regime to an export oriented policy from the mid-1960s as the objective conditions of the international economy might have favoured countries like India to leverage on labour intensive products. With the world economy reaching a dizzy heights after the second World War, there were virtually no competitor other than Japan in labour intensive products.⁸ P. N. Dhar, an economic administrator during that period, writes in this respect, 'The economic side of the multidimensional crisis arose from the weaknesses of the earlier heavy-industry oriented development strategy, namely, under-emphasis on agriculture and over-emphasis on foreign aid. The initiation of Green revolution for expanding crop production by raising the yield per hectare with the adaptation of chemical-biological technology was the response to the first problem which met with remarkable success. The adjustment to the declining foreign aid following the war with Pakistan was to reduce public investment and accept the consequent slow down in the rate of growth'.⁹ This low growth syndrome was perpetrated since the late 1960s because of the radicalization of politics in the wake of multi-dimensional crisis which saw tightening of controls on the market

and the private sector and huge expansion of the public sector in the name of Nehruvian socialism. The political and bureaucratic interference and soft-budget constraint, large over-staffing, higher wages and salary bills crippled the public sector, and nonetheless, a number of Economic interests and political constituencies which it created, enjoyed enormous power.¹⁰ As early as the Third Five year plan, Nehru himself began to realize that a high rate of growth sustained over a long period could be a real trigger for achieving a rising level of living for all citizens, people in low income groups or lacking of opportunity to work, in particular.¹¹

However, the country has taken significant strides since independence in developing an industrial base and achieving substantial increases in per capita GDP. Thus, it was successful in warding off the threat of famine which used to loom large over large part of India during the colonial period. Not only that, state intervention has been proved to be critical in Jacking up per capita food grain availability, in lowering the poverty ratio to some extent, in almost doubling life expectancy at birth, in raising the literacy rate on a modest scale and also, in scaling down the infant mortality rate and so on. It is true that the achievements could have been far more impressive, but, it does not imply that we rubbish them off altogether.¹²

The enduring legacy of the Nehruvian State, Zoya Hasan writes, 'was not its economic achievements, but in the establishment of a viable structure of a relatively autonomous and democratic nation state at the core of society, committed to the idea of building a reformist, politically independent, capitalist society. During this period, the state stabilized, assumed responsibility to direct economic development, established a constitutional regime, accumulated for itself a wide array of powers and responsibilities, ranging from the abolition of untouchability, establishment of places of higher education and culture, to building dams and nuclear reactors (Khilnani 1997: 38). The combined effect of developmentalism and democratic mobilization was a rapid penetration of the state into domains of society hitherto untouched by the state.

Nevertheless, we should not overrate the state's ability to restructure social economic formations".¹³ But, the Nehruvian world-view had a contradiction at its centre between the rhetorical idea that the people are the creators of history and a pragmatic mistrust of their capacity to think rationally even about their most local needs. Thus, Political Practice moved in two completely different pathways. The duality of the Political world of the Congress in the early decades, the idealistic and the unprincipled, contributed to the system's durability. The political bloc, comprising of the state bureaucracy and a new class of professional politician, has come to acquire a peculiar ideological and practical relation with the Nehruvian State. They seemed to be disinterested for radical social reform for which it was originally intended. More importantly, they were running short of enthusiasm for dismantling the license permit regime and the increasing complexity associated with it. Again, contradictions arose out of the official pronouncements of the Nehru era which claimed the beneficiaries of the land reforms ought to be the poorest in the rural area, but, as a matter of fact, benefits accrued to the richest farmer following dissolution of feudal classes. The Green Revolution strategy for agricultural growth in the early 1960s, created new opportunities for the richer farmers with the state supporting them with subsidies. This richer segment of the farming community became very keen on translating their financial muscle into political power. This led to the creation of parties with exclusive following from the farming community in the 1960s and who eventually, shifted their loyalties to the oppositions culminating in the defeat of Congress in the fourth general elections. However Indira Gandhi renegotiated the distribution of economic benefits to their great advantage and effectively ensured these groups return to the fold of the Congress Party.¹⁴

The state-sector Industries which was to attain the commanding heights of the economy in sync with Nehruvian strategies, turned out to be inefficient, wasteful and unresponsive to valid criticism which prompted Sudipta Kaviraj to comment, "The use of public resource for

private ends and the bending of collective principles of operation to a new form of pre-feudalism and electorally sanctioned privilege have hollowed out all vestigial 'Socialist' pretences of the public sector. What has failed decisively is, therefore, not the public sector that Nehru established, but a travesty which had, taking advantage of the absent mindedness of political public, usurped its name and symbols instead of showing that the public sector had failed, the Indian experience shows beyond doubt that the sector had failed to remain really 'public' in any reasonable sense of that term".¹⁵ Writing at the end of the 1970s, Francine Frankel blamed India's slow and uneven rates of economic growth since independence on the country's accommodationist politics and the failure of the state to effect radical land reforms. (Francine Frankel, *India's political economy ... 1947-1977* (1978). During the Nehru years the period in which the foundations of India's modern Industrial economy were built the centre was greatly limited in what it could accomplish by way of institutional changes to help the poor in the vast rural sector. The prime minister and a host of committed officials inducted by him into the advisory planning commission could only lay down general principles of policy. But the actual power of implementation belonged to the state legislatures. The leaders of these state Governments, although virtually all Congressmen until 1967, either belonged to or depended upon locally dominant land-holding castes to mobilize the rural vote and win state and national elections. ¹⁶ Thus, the progressive policy designed to benefit the vast masses of the rural population was, virtually, derailed by the state level leadership whose interests operated, obviously, at cross-purposes with that of the policy bequeathed to them by the centre. Stuart Corbridge and John Harriss, are, perhaps, very correct in assessing Nehru's plans for India when they argue, "The failure of the Nehruvian dream of modernity might be explained, in part, in terms of the failure of successive Governments in India to invest in the educational systems which Nehru thought would bring reason to India's towns and villages. Moreover, the failure of the Nehruvian design for India and we agree that it was a failure

in large part should not be taken as evidence that all parts of that project failed in equal measure, or that its legacies have yet been fully worked out".¹⁷ However, the Indian state eventually emerged as an interventionist, rather than a welfare state. This interventionism did not shed off a welfarist orientation, but its primary goal was developmentalist. The Developmental initiatives of the state were, however, geared to largely serve the modern Industrial sector, while welfarist initiatives were mainly directed towards redressal of poverty arising out of inequalities in the ownership and use of land. However, it tried to achieve the lofty goal of eradication of poverty without disturbing the rural power structure.¹⁸

The project of state building suffered serious setbacks in the post-Nehru period. The axis of connection between state and society-the 'Congress System' - was under some real threats. The relationship between the centre and the states became a little uneasy and unfriendly following centralizing tendencies of the union Government came to the fore. And, the rise of rich peasantry following the Green Revolution, heralded far-reaching politico-economic changes.¹⁹ The crisis in the economy and the setbacks suffered by the Congress party led to a new emphasis on agriculture. Alongside this Agrarian model, public policy agenda focused on redistribution and poverty alleviation since the early 1970s. This strategy promoted by Indira Gandhi had the effect among the poor and the oppressed groups who appreciated the importance of elections, democratic participation and finally, that access to power was crucial determining factor for their well being. As a result, the state had to contend with popular pressures by creating opportunities for the economic progress of these new groups.²⁰ Francine Frankel points out in this context, "Democracy and expanding participation in the Indian social and cultural context, resulting in a 'Democracy of castes' and caste and communal competition and conflict, has placed the majority-minority framework at risk, and also exacerbated the fundamental tension between a strong Government and decentralizing tendencies."²¹

As a matter of fact, Indira Gandhi through '*Garibi hatao*' slogan, recognized, for the first time, the need for separate dedicated programmes aimed at tackling poverty and unemployment. This was in contradistinction to the earlier official economic strategy whose underlying assumption was that the benefits of growth would automatically "trickle-down" to the poor and the underprivileged. This period beginning from 1971 was marked by heavy taxation, rural public works programmes, deficit financing, massive state investments in agriculture, agricultural subsidies, state price support to and procurement of food grains, the public distribution system (PDS), abolition of privy purses and nationalization of Banks.²² Nevertheless, she could not succeed partly because she was more attracted by an authoritarian, populist style of politics, partly because she could hardly ignore Congress notables and their 'Vote Banks'. So, Congress under her leadership faced with a terrible dilemma either it had to dislodge democracy in order to put social reforms into action or it continued with the pattern of conservative democracy.²³ As a result, the state had entered a phase which is underpinned by some kind of a structural crisis. The ugly manifestations of this were the promulgation of national emergency in 1975-77 and the problems confronted by the secular polity since the mid 1980s. Mrs. Gandhi pioneered a process of centralization of Government functions under a politicized bureaucracy. Emergency facilitated the concentration of power within the offices in New Delhi. As a direct fall out of these policies, the space that existed in the Nehru era for the independent exercise of power by congress leaders at the State and district levels, shirked to a considerable extent and in the process, affecting adversely the party, the Government and the state itself and eventually, hastened the process of decline of the Congress which was under way since the late 1960s.²⁴ In a desperate bid, after 1980, Mrs. Gandhi embraced a Majoritarian strategy to rebuild her party in the Hindi Heart-land and adopted a more pragmatic, pro-business attitude for giving a fillip to economic growth, which, she felt, might win back Industrial and business groups to her

party's fold. This strategy marks a break from her earlier pet-themes of "Secularism and Socialism" and possibly, positioned her towards liberalizing the economy. Simultaneously, she might feel that even a watered down version of "Socialism" would help her to bolster up Congress's dwindling support among the poor.²⁵

Rajiv Gandhi was thrust into the Vacancy left by Indira's assassination amid the post-assassination trauma and crisis. However, the new regime led by Rajiv Gandhi was going to usher "in a new beginning" rather than continuity with the past. In the political sphere, he seemed to be favoring a more accommodating and compromising set of policies which stood in stark contrast to his mothers' approach to dealing with Punjab and Assam. Rajiv himself, after winning the election by a huge margin, stated clearly that his Government's economic approach would be characterized by "a judicious combination of deregulation, import liberalization and easier access to foreign technology". So, this approach itself gave a decent burial to Nehru as well as Indira Gandhi's emphasis on "Socialism, planning and self-reliance" is self explanatory.²⁶

The business community and upper middle classes seemed solidly behind Rajiv's new economic experiments.²⁷ However, opposition came to the surface from within his own party with senior political leaders singing a different tune as Rajiv attempted to prune India's public expenditure on poverty programmes. As a matter of fact, different components of the liberalization package hurt the interests of groups cutting across social landscape. But, the opposition from the rural groups branded Rajiv's new policy measures as pro-city and pro-rich. In fact, Rajiv's new policies led to substantial increase in Industrial production, durable consumer goods, in particular The Government also came out with a slew of measures that induced urban consumer to consume more.²⁸

As Atul Kohli writes in this context, "The resulting development strategy was, and could thus be easily characterized as, benefiting the urban rich. Peasant leaders took advantage of the new opportunity and

successfully mobilized rural groups against the Congress Party. When the Congress cost the election in 1987 in the crucial, Hindi heart-land state of Haryana, only then did Rajiv Gandhi realize how politically expensive the new economic rationality had become".²⁹ Congress under Rajiv was, steadily, suffering from electoral reverses, especially in many state elections between 1986 and 1987. It may not be entirely true to attribute to the Government's new economic policies for Rajiv's Generally declining popularity, but, there is reason to believe that the economic policies incurred the wrath of two numerically important rural groups, namely, the "middle peasants" and the scheduled Castes which eventually proved to be politically expensive for the Congress. With opposition parties like CPI(M) and the Lok Dal teaming up together under the leadership of V.P Singh espousing an economic strategy that focuses on "broad based, agriculture led development" and in view of the declining popularity, Rajiv wanted to shed off the "Pro-rich" image associated with his economic policies and his name, and committed himself in a populist direction.³⁰ No single party has been able to win a majority of seats in India's parliamentary election since 1989. Neither Congress nor the BJP, the country's two largest parties, can form a national Government without support from the smaller parties. Political parties became aware of the need to build electoral support by appealing to particular castes, tribes, and religious communities. In the parliamentary elections of 1989, the Congress party was unable to win a majority of seats. This facilitated the formation of a national front coalition Government led by the Janata Dal leader, V. P. Singh, with support from the BJP. V.P. Singh's efforts to enhance and consolidate his support base among the OBCs by promising reservation and his opposition to the campaign by Hindu Nationalists for constructing a temple to replace the sixteenth century mosque at Ayodhya led the BJP to withdraw its support. The tragic murder of Rajiv Gandhi on the eve of the parliamentary elections in 1991, must have helped congress considerably to emerge as the single largest party. P. V. Narasimha Rao with support from a few smaller parties constituted a minority

Government.³¹ Zoya Hasan Captured the finer points involved in this evolving nature of Indian politics of this period beautifully when she writes, "During the brief period from 1989 to 1990, the Janata Dal led Government in New Delhi carved out a distinctive ideology based on the dual demands of the rural majority. One was for greater opportunities through investment in agricultural infrastructure and employment, and the other for higher social status through quotas for lower castes and OBCs in recruitment to the elite all India services. Ironically, the Janata Dal itself was the major victim of its political mobilization strategy. Subsequently, state and local leaders of the backward classes and Dalits rejected the mediation of national parties such as the Janata Dal, even though it was essentially a party of OBCs. Instead, they attempted to enhance their access to public resources of the state through direct participation in the bargaining process that preceded the formation of Governments at both the central and State levels."³² In any case, by the late 1980s, caste questions began to occupy center-stage in national debates about modernity and citizenship in India.³³ The heightened political awakening among the lower castes and dalits challenged the structure of representation of power-sharing conceived and practised by the Congress and wanted to represent themselves by seeking direct control over the state by these hitherto excluded social groupings.³⁴

In the subsequent years, the politics of identity continued to become increasingly important as the Babri Masjid was destroyed leading to a communal cauldron boiling across the nation. The most intriguing part of the whole episode is the resurrection of religion as another live political issue. It has generated identity-based social movements on the one hand and on the other, sought to grab political power through electoral competition. Around this time, two main contenders for political power in Uttar Pradesh were the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP a dalit based political party) and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP, a Hindu right Political Party). The BSP was keen on protecting its dalit constituency by thwarting co-optation bid by BJP to its upper caste dominated, largely all-

encompassing Hindu political outfit championing organic unity. BSP also sought to put a secular front in place by weaving together the dalits, scheduled tribes, some lower castes and Muslims, in particular, in response to the challenges posed by the BJP's Hindu revivalist politics.³⁵

Once again Zoya Hasan, writes in this context, "By polarizing castes into blocs and demanding representation on a bloc basis, the politics of caste identity disrupts the traditional definitions of caste based hierarchy in Hindu Society. Using political rather than religious criteria, caste-based political mobilization converges on control of the State. Such strategies of caste polarization can destabilize the political system, but appear necessary to achieve justice for lower caste group. In other words, what may be seen as destabilizing political process from one perspective, can be seen as deepening democracy by those groups who capture state power for the first time. By contrast, the politics of communalism practised by the BJP attempts to unify all Hindus within a traditional and hierarchical social order. The BJP is not known for its commitment to justice or democracy. The very concept of pluralism which is at the heart of India's democracy is challenged by its project to privilege a singular, Majoritarian identity".³⁶ The new lower caste politics hinges on a growing preference for the recognition of group claims on grounds of social discrimination. This has been used to increase group-based representation in existing political institutions. In sync with this strategy, the BSP champions a single point programme wherein proportional representation for all groups in Government, bureaucracy and educational institutions is emphasized. So, the Congress's welfarist approach was ignored, and BSP, successfully, exhorted the dalits to have share in power.³⁷ The most visible outcome of this social churning process, after Congress's popularity nosedived, led to the displacement of upper castes from positions of power which, in turn, catapulted backward and lower castes into positions of authority. This political development is equated with a quiet social revolution.³⁸ (Frankel and Rao, 1989). No doubt, the BSP has managed to promote a strong dalit identity whilst at the same time reaching working arrangements with the

political representatives of the wider population. But, BSP's Quest for social justice appears to be rather partial and exclusivist in nature as they remain silent on any programme of distributive justice.³⁹ A commentator has, very nicely, brought this limitations of BSP to the fore: "Nothing has happened during periods of BSP rule to change the structure of landholding or the conditions of agricultural labour or to shake up the appalling state of the public education system nor is there any evidence that the BSP has made any contribution to halting the decline of UP and its increasingly poor record in public policy. The BSP has transformed the politics of UP and created a new phase of Dalit politics. It has restored Ambedkar's legacy to a central position in Indian politics but there is still no sign of exactly what the BSP wants to do or where it wants to go with its newly acquired power".⁴⁰

However, the emergence of Hindutva, no doubt, posed the most serious challenge to the constitutional vision of the liberal democratic state. The Hindutva ideology championed by BJP as a unifying basis of national unity, may, eventually, jeopardize secularism and minority rights guaranteed in the constitution of 1950. Since 1996, there were three coalition Governments at the centre in which BJP was either important partner or led them. But, unlike the first two, the 1999 coalition Government headed by BJP enjoyed a parliamentary majority. With ideologically dissimilar partners supporting them, BJP had to make major concessions on its core Hindutva agenda and possibly, this moderation was an imperative to govern effectively a modern and culturally diverse society like India.⁴¹

Nevertheless, the BJP's electoral expansion would continue to be impeded by three factors. Firstly, Muslim voters would be solidly opposed to the idea of BJP's coming to power. Secondly, the backward castes have been sharply divided into adherents of the BJP and the supporters of the left-Janata Parties. And, finally, the BSP has achieved a near total grip over the most numerous caste among the scheduled caste voters especially in U.P.⁴²

II. The State, reforms and the state of Democracy, Development in India.

Development and democracy were arguably integral and even non-negotiable parts of the modernizing project of the Indian State at independence, though the relationship between them could be said to have been ambivalent. As the strategy of imitatively traversing a path rehearsed and charted elsewhere, development was unproblematically assumed to encompass not only an industrial economy, but also a democratic polity, and a programme of social transformation. Thus, comprehensively defined, the project of Development was inspired by the happy if naïve image of a successful transition-institutional and ideological-from tradition to modernity, eventually mirroring the western experience.⁴³ Ramachandra Guha argued that India's programmes of planned industrial, development have plagued the country with 'a gross caricature of European Capitalism, reproducing and intensifying its worst features without holding out the promise of a better tomorrow'.⁴⁴ In a recent book, Prabnab Bardhan while assessing the economic rise of China and India, highlighted the positive legacy of communist rule over a couple decades or more, which provided China with a head start vis-à-vis India in terms of some key social and physical infrastructures. They are:

- A solid base of minimum social infrastructure (broad based education and health care) for workers,
- A fast pace of rural electrification that facilitated growth of agro-processing and rural Industrialization,
- A highly egalitarian land redistribution, which provided a minimum rural safety net that in the early years eased the process of market reform, with all its wrenching disruptions and dislocations,
- A system of regional economic decentralization making country Governments responsible for production enterprises and thereby creating a huge pool of manufacturing experience, skills, and net

works which contributed handsomely to the phenomenal rural industrialization in China during the post-reform period.

- Laying the foundation of a national system of basic scientific research and innovation by large scale transfer of fund towards this specific end.
- High female labour force participation and education leading to women's enhanced contribution to economic growth.⁴⁵

World Development Report 2006 of the World Bank also confirms this view though in a veiled manner when they argue, "The key to china's equitable development was the combination of initial conditions and the economic reforms".⁴⁶

Liberal ideas actually define the broad bases of modern Indian political thought. The idea of Nationalism, Socialism and even some variants of religious politics have evolved over this base and more importantly, this provided the foundation upon which India's democracy has been built.⁴⁷ For the Indian political elite, civil liberties mattered a great deal. The section on fundamental rights in the Indian constitution, with a core of civil liberties, bears testimony to this. The idea of fundamental rights remains potent even today.⁴⁸

Sunil Khilnani traces the impact of liberalism on the nascent Indian state in these words, "Thus, the liberal belief in individual rights was given a communitarian slant: while the individual was seen a sovereign in the spiritual realm of belief and conscience, in the social realm individual rights might be curtailed so as to allow, for instance, diverse religions to co-exist, when it came to economic exchange, Indian drew on the liberal critique of monopoly as destructive of liberty. The remedy they proposed though, was not the free market, but more conscientious regulation. Again, Indian deployed the liberal critique of the state not to limit or weaken it, but to call for a more benign, welfarist state".⁴⁹ Socialist critique of individual rights is based on the fact that political and civil rights suffer from inadequacy when they are not accompanied by social

and economic rights. In other words, civil and political rights are reduced to a hollow shell without rights that ensure the basic conditions for a meaningful life.⁵⁰ The concept of rights as enshrined in the constitution, emphasizes formal equality and invokes the notion of abstract individualism. Thus, it fails to take note of relevant differences between individuals that call for diverse treatment. Again, It looks upon individual only as a citizen of the polity and brushes aside all other forms of personal identity. Hence, It becomes unable to take cognizance of the varied locations of identity which puts the diversified nature and complexity of social and political life beyond its comprehensibility.⁵¹

Rajni Kothari has made a very succinct point in this connection when he argued, "The point is that distributive justice also has to be institutionalized, just as are liberal freedoms and concepts such as equality before law. There is nothing automatic about either the institutions of parliamentary democracy or economic growth leading to distributive justice. It has to be deliberately built into the design for national development, and into the nature of the state structure. Failing this, liberal freedoms too would go under, at any rate for large sections of the people, 'Equality' then becomes an empty slogan which is used to take away the freedoms that exist, instead of providing benefits to the poor, raising their hopes, and, on that basis, gaining their loyalty and their votes."⁵²

As a matter of fact, India's electoral multi-party Democracy failed to ensure good Governance in the economic realm.⁵³ In fact, the Nehruvian dream of India was challenged from the start. The mass of the Indian population never fully grasped or shared Nehru's plans for India. So, the commands of New Delhi were subjected to varied interpretations by bureaucrats and politicians who were based at India's states, districts or blocks.⁵⁴ Nehru's goal of development was attainable through Industrialization. And, the agent of Development was the State which was to play the leading role in the whole scheme of development. The development was to be achieved through the national economic planning

embedded in the macro-economic policy instruments, promoted at Bretton Woods. In fact, planned Development played an important part of the legitimating ideology of the Congress in power. But, 'planning', remained beyond the political domain only to become a vital instrument of politics eventually. The Nehruvian regime as well as any of its successors in India were manifestly lacking the requisite capacities to direct and manage economic and social development in the pursuit of National interest in as much as these were effectively done by political elites of major East Asian Countries.⁵⁵

However, Nehru's design for the country contributed handsomely for secularizing India's polity. (Bil-Grami, 1994) (Corbridge and Harriss, 2000). Following Nehru's Death and with the beginnings of the end of the congress's preponderance as characterized by one party system, the first Democratic upsurge in independent India took place. (Yadav, 1996). This, perhaps, led Khilnani to suggest that: 'The Democratic idea has penetrated the Indian political imagination and has begun to erode the authority of the social order and of a paternalist state. Democracy as a manner of seeing and acting upon the world is changing the relations of Indian to themselves.'⁵⁶

However, Indian Democracy suffered from a peculiar inadequacy and took an illiberal direction. Both Nehruvian reformists and populist politicians regarded the state as the primary agency for creating equality. This has resulted in a huge democratic pressure which, paradoxically, led to increase in the powers of the state on a sustained basis. The state is viewed as an agency championing equality for two reasons. First, the legislature has the power to enact reform legislations, and the executive has the responsibility to implement them; second, the state being a major provider of employment, so, expansion of the economic sphere under its control helps translate such legislations into reality. The discourse of this democratic force does not encourage an encirclement of the state by an active, oppositional, constantly vigilant 'civil society'. Thus, justification is provided for the expansion of the powers of the state, and at times, the

state displays scant regard for juridical restraint in the name of undertaking reforms on an urgent basis. Analyses of Indian politics demand more careful attention to the precarious balance between the elective and other dimensions of democratic politics and procedure. Elections constitute a hugely significant element in the procedural structure of democracy, but, there are other, equally important procedural and deliberative dimensions. An overemphasis upon the elective side might lead to evaporation of confidence in the whole structure if the politicians continue to harbour the idea that with the electoral mandate on their side and election being an indispensable constituent of democracy, they have the right to use or abuse legal rules at their sweet will.⁵⁷ The challenges confronting Indian Democracy in the 1990s are distinctive in nature and it marks the beginning of an altogether new phase in Indian politics. The challenges posed to Indian Democracy came, mainly, from two sources: First, the process of globalization and its domestic face, economic reforms facilitating liberalization and this, in turn, led to the hollowing out of the state on the economic sphere, in particular; and, second, the advent of a discourse of civil society essentially underpinned by the mushrooming growth of Non-Governmental organizations (NGOs), who are willing to take over the development functions of the state which prior to the introduction of economic reforms were considered to be an exclusive preserve of the state. This signals a retreat of the all encompassing state of Nehruvian India calling for a re-definition of the existing modes of Governance.⁵⁸ This fundamental transformation of the nature of state is beautifully captured by Dolly Arora when she says, "What is accomplished in this era of 'reforms' is not really the separation of social and economic issues but a reversal of their relationship. Social concerns are not expected to interfere with economic processes of state or market, but market principles are supposed to become the defining rule of social issues - health, education, housing, commons, Jobs and Job security, etc. should be privatized and made to run with profit motive as the guiding norm. This is the intent of

liberalization. And this is meant to increase efficiency. The question of access to this efficiency is not considered important. Access comes to be defined as an individual problem, not a social concern. The social content of economic issues is thus easily dismissed in the logic of liberalization. Not only that, many social problems are simply dismissed as individual problems, calling for individual solutions."⁵⁹

The notion of Good Governance in its current phase, appeared in a 1989 World Bank report on Africa, which argued that, "underlying the litany of Africa's development problems is a crisis of Governance".⁶⁰ In a subsequent publication, Bank's definitive statement on Governance and Development was confirmed when it treats Good Governance as being Co-terminus with sound development management.⁶¹ This managerial approach towards Governance and Development was readily endorsed by a good number of Western Governments led by United States of America. Soon, they were joined by the main international development institutions and a variety of cooperative, intergovernmental and regional organizations. Despite differences of their views on the relationship of Governance, democracy and development, a common thread was running through the concept of democratic good Governance in keeping with the Bank's prescriptive formulae on Governance and Development.⁶² As Adrian Leftwich tries to comprehend the evolving notion of Governance in these words, "Governance thus denotes the structures of political and, crucially, economic relationships and rules by which the productive and distributive life of a society is governed. In short, it refers to a system of political and socio-economic relations or, more loosely, a regime. In current usage there is no doubt that good Governance means a democratic capitalist regime, presided over by a minimal state which is also part of the wider Governance of the New world order."⁶³

The Indian constitution contains the concept of equality which is essentially of a liberal flavour, is supposed to guide the action of the Indian state. Given the legacy of structured inequalities and power differentials in society, It could not have achieved anything but a modest

success so far. But, the adoption of the new Governance agenda which is characterized by a more market-oriented approach, would be necessarily shifting the focus from redistribution of basic resources and welfare to making the poor economically self-reliant while in a poor country, it should have been ideal for the state to undertake responsibility for empowering the people.⁶⁴ As Niraja Gopal Jayal argues, "In a third world context, the idea of Governance as a more or less technical facilitator of development, delinked from conceptions of democracy and welfare, is a highly impoverished notion."⁶⁵ Social inequality in India is a very widespread phenomenon. It throws a spanner not only on the way of attaining balanced development but also causes aberration in the logic of Democracy. This calls for effective welfare programmes on the part of the state in order to safeguard the interests of the underprivileged which cannot be attainable through Governance alone.⁶⁶ The good Governance agenda contains, among other things, freedom of information, a strong legal system and an efficient administration. These are, no doubt, vital instruments which ought to be available with the underprivileged segments of the society in realizing their demands of equality. However, the 'success' crucially depends upon popular mobilization through social movements or political parties.⁶⁷ Peter Evans, reflecting on stateness in the context of Globalizations opines, "East Asia demonstrates the possibility of a positive connection between high stateness (albeit not Nettle's classic European variety) and success in a globalizing economy and puts historical meat on Cameron and Rodrik's regression results. If such a positive connection exists, then the currently pervasive belief that the institutional centrality of the state is incompatible with globalization must be explained in terms of the ideological face of the current global order."⁶⁸ However, a scholar has tried to explore the link between Democracy and Development more dispassionately in the context of Japan and the East Asian newly Industrializing nations (NICs) and this explanation involves three steps in specific terms, First, it involved a wider institutionalist approach with decentring the focus on either the

state or the market, and the role played by extra statal institutions was particularly recognized. Second, using the distinction between the 'economic', civil' and 'political' dimensions of 'liberal democracy', it was argued how Japan and East Asian NICs have been reasonably successful in guaranteeing economic development with a different mix of these three components of liberal democracy embedded in a set of institutions which were at variance with each other as well as from western ones. Thirdly and more importantly, this produced some of the elements characterizing the democracy development link such as 'security', stability' and 'openness and information'. To put it in a different way Economic development has been the outcome of a definite set of functions and relations of state societal institutions that have given some of the virtues that have been believed to be peculiar to liberal democracy' itself, but not by virtue of providing 'liberal democracy'.⁶⁹ Thus, Prof. Jayal argues forcefully in this connection "The answer, therefore, is not to look towards the state, but at different ways of approaching and defining both democracy and development: a view of democracy, for instance, that goes beyond the procedural to seek the substantive democratization of not only the state, but also society and social relations; and a view of development that possibly departs from the conventional ways of measuring this goal by focusing not on GDP and GNP, but on the enlargement of human capabilities and the enhancement of the quality of life for all citizens."⁷⁰ Therefore, the Generation of substantial freedom, substantive equality or justice as championed by noted liberals like J.S. Mill, Ronald Dworkin and John Rawls would remain a pipe dream, if the minimalist version of democracy as prescribed by the votaries of formal democracy with the end in view of structuring a post socialist world in a particular fashion, is adhered to.⁷¹ This minimalist avatar of democracy is in conformity with the contemporary invocation of a thinned out civil society which eulogizes the market principles and simultaneously, insists on abdication of responsibility of state from the social sectors in the name of furthering democracy. But, this watered down version of civil society as

conceptualized by donor agencies, would be consisted of non-Governmental organizations (NGOs) or the voluntary sector only to take charge of the 'social service delivery' following the 'roll back' of the state from social sectors.⁷² As Dolly Arora warns in this respect, "The accent on civil society institutions in the globalization and reforms discourse does not, however, provide any significant support to those elements in society which derive strength from their struggle among people. Mere reduction of civil society to NGOs, with little or no regard for movements for people's rights which may pose a challenge to all manner of top down reforms cannot be seen very positively".⁷³ As a result, the concept of 'franchise State' has emerged with NGOs acting as public service contractor for the state. With privatizing the functions of the state there is a possibility that democracy is rendered toothless and meaningless.⁷⁴ However, the franchisee aspect of NGOs or even their co-operative relationship with the state should not be generalized to cast them into a 'basket category' There are NGOs who are essentially engaged in mobilizing people to tap the transformative potential of democratic politics. They don't allow them to be co-opted by the state to act as passive service provider: In India, the work of Tarun Bharat Sangh (TBS) in regenerating the natural water sources of the Alwar district in Rajasthan or of the Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan in demanding the right to information are two shining examples of this category. In Ralegan Shindi of Maharashtra, Anna Hazare mobilized community to build storage ponds and embankments to collect rainwater and contain the run off. This resulted in recharging the ground water table which eventually boosted agricultural productivity. Anna Hazare also embarked upon a campaign for forestation and crusade against corrupt officials. Therefore, the mobilization technique followed by these category of NGOs, generates awareness among the people and the creation of awareness led to politicization, Naturally, NGOs indulged in such activities, are pitted against the state eventually and in the process, incur the wrath of the State.⁷⁵

Niraja Goal Jayal, further, writes "However, while such movements challenge the state, they do not seek to truncate its functions. They seek rather to make the state more sensitive and responsive to the needs and rights of ordinary citizens, and less a captive of the modernizing developmental elites to the interests of which it has thus far pandered."⁷⁶

National Sample Survey (NSS) data reveal that the rate of decline in poverty did not accelerate between 1993-2005, the period which witnessed intensive opening of the economy compared to the 1970s and 1980s. In fact agricultural output grew at a slower rate in the past decade compared to the earlier decade. This may be attributed to the decline in public investment in rural infrastructure such as irrigation, roads, and prevention of soil erosion. Again, this has virtually nothing to do with Globalization.⁷⁷ It is obvious that throughout varying political and economic regimes beginning with state oriented "Nehru model and since the 1990s, the market-oriented strategy of reforms agriculture has continued to be the casualty resulting in persistence of severe rural poverty even in the face of economic development.⁷⁸ Kohli maintains that higher economic growth rate in India in recent decade is characterized by increasing inequalities, growing capital intensity of the economy, increasing concentration of ownership of private Industry and almost stagnant growth in employment, especially in manufacturing Industries (Kohli. 2006: 1368) (Kameshwar Choudhary) PP. 34-35). In any case, slow growth in employment and feeble public action accentuates inequality as increasing output and income benefited the richer section of the population. The massive increase in wealth of the Indian 'corporate world' would not have been possible, except through transfer on land from the state and central Governments to the private corporations in the name of "Public purpose", for mining, industrialization and special economic zones (SEZs). Ironically, India of the 21st century has the dubious distinction of being, the home of the largest number of homeless, ill-fed, and illiterates in the world. About half of Indian children under six years are under weight and malnourished. Nearly 80 percent of them suffer from. Anemia.

Again, 40 per cent of Indian adults are crippled by chronic energy deficit. So, destitution, hunger and poverty do accompany them. The picture is even grimmer in rural India, among small children, pregnant women, dalits and Adivasis in the poorer states, in particular.⁷⁹ Even in the mid 1990s more than one in ten rural newborns died before attaining the age of one, female illiteracy was as high as 60 percent and nearly 40 percent of the population could not even afford to consume food in conformity with requisite calorie in-take.⁸⁰

There is, however, ambiguity regarding decline in poverty but inequality has widened. The increasing informalization of labour has led to the weakening of their unions. Reforms have, certainly, hurt the interests of the marginalized sections of society which include the poor peasantry, landless labourers, Industrial and service sector labourers, the lower middle classes and people who belong to scheduled caste and scheduled tribe category. It is feared that this vulnerable segment of the society might get further marginalized. ⁸¹ A survey data revealed that there is a strong feeling among the people that the benefits arising out of the new economic policy went in favour of the rich and well-to-do while the poor have very little to benefit from the policy of economic reforms.⁸²

Social needs for which the perceived returns are deemed to be high is a moral question based on ideas of equality and justice. There is also a strong economic rationale for acquiring basic capabilities such as education and health. If half the population is malnourished and illiterate, then, this might lead to a situation characterized by a real shortage of labour endowed with basic capabilities of education and health in view of the expanding job opportunities, particularly, in the context of India's economy where labour is abundantly available. Therefore, if markets do not work in societies where people are steeped in abject poverty, good Governance requires for putting successful alternative arrangements in place for promoting these services in order to remedy the market failures.⁸³ A scholar has very clearly highlighted the point in these words, "Given the current knowledge that calorie in-take,

Quality of human capital and hence labour productivity, are major factors accounting for the growth performance of a country, policy responses to achieve growth will have to adapt accordingly. Thus, there is a need for a shift from the current emphasis on productivity growth from improvement in resource allocation, towards productivity growth from improvement human capital, and in turn, towards policies for public investment in human capital".⁸⁴ Dreze and Sen (1998) have held the view that India needs to go well beyond "liberalization" for effectively addressing its problems. They plead for a widely shared participatory economic expansion. They identified the overregulated economic Governance over the decades as primary contributing factor for retarding the growth process that eventually sapped the future potential of economic expansion. They believe that market can be 'an important yet quite incomplete part' towards expansion of social opportunities. They meant to suggest that these opportunities are, sometimes, constrained by counter-productive regulations and controls, by restrictions on economic activities, by the stifling of competition and its efficiency-augmenting advantages and so on. The dismantling of these restrictions and roadblocks must be viewed as playing a critical role in this respect. The major challenge, according to them, lies in creating and using social opportunities which require much more than mere market-reforms of course, the expansion of markets is an important wherewithal for promoting human capabilities and can provide the much needed thrust towards fast removal of endemic deprivation in India. But, this has to be combined with more relevant Government activity and public action towards the end.⁸⁵ Let us quote Jan Nederveen pieterse to appreciate the finer points involved in the issue, "There is no question as to the central and enduring importance of the state. In the words of Robert Cuttner: 'until word Government arrives the nation-state is the necessary locus of social contracts between market and society', unfettered markets increase inequality and in the age of information economies, which puts a premium on human resource development, inequality is an economic

liability. Generally, then, current arguments go far beyond the ideological dispute of state versus market, the real issue is the kind of role that the state is to play".⁸⁶

The contemporary Global cacophony for democracy seems to be directed for setting up polyarchy rather than genuine democracy. Regimes are given multiple definitions so as to describe them as low intensity democracy, pseudo democracy, illiberal democracy, restricted democracy, mechanical democracy etc. periodic elections are held for legitimizing democratic power, but democratic norms and institutions are flouted in a systematic way through a good number of undemocratic methods like using money and muscle power, rigging polls, patronage based-political support, rule by a handful of leaders in parties, absence of inner-party democracy etc. Thus, democracy is reduced to a formality by stripping it of its elixir and essence.⁸⁷ Commenting on this contemporary democratization process, Sylvia Chan writes, "The paradox is that the very modes of transition that appear to enhance initial survivability by limiting unpredictability may compromise the liberties of some groups and preclude the future democratic self-transformation of the economy or polity. In other words, the conditions that permit democracies to persist in the short run may constrain the potential for resolving the enormous problems of poverty and inequality that continue to characterize so many parts of the developing world, which in turn affect the institutional content of democracy, often negatively, resulting in what Karl has called 'frozen' democracies".⁸⁸

Turning the spotlight on India, by the late 1980s the Indian politics witnessed the development of the "new social movements" which resulted in a resurgence of assertions based on ethnic identities, of language, tribe, religion, farmer's interests, dalits and low castes. The strangle-hold of the Congress Party over the polity has finally been broken and the promise of distributive justice inspired by the Nehruvian model of development has been Questioned.⁸⁹ Some scholars have found the recent politico-institutional churning as supportive of democratic consolidation

in India. First, the coming to end of the hegemony of a single party, especially via family rule, is indicative of the vibrant nature of India's democracy. Second, this is further buttressed by the fact that a fundamentalist party like BJP had to moderate its ruling strategy for it could not defy the logic of Democracy. Though, there is no guarantee that the BJP would stick to its moderate ruling strategy in the future too but, India's current institutional matrix won't perhaps, allow them to pursue their 'original dreams'. And, thirdly, the new ruling arrangement in India characterized by both centralizing and decentralizing tendencies, would be more accommodating in nature and the chances of generation of conflict would be minimized.⁹⁰ The dalit challenge to the state entails a new stirring of consciousness emanating from their subjugation for over centuries which is premised upon rejection of patronizing attitudes by the ruling elite, to be replaced by a legitimate and due share in the power structure of the society.⁹¹

In any case, at this juncture of history, the Indian nation has to make some fundamental choices. Its people have to interrogate whether accommodating unrestrained special interests of Global Capitalism will have any positive impact on the quality of life of India's overwhelming 'social majorities'. The other important issue revolves around the survival of secularism and the role of the civil society institutions in safeguarding democracy.⁹² As far as the Globalization and its impact on the future of democracy is concerned, Quan Li and Rafael Reuveny give us a stern warning in these words, "our analysis implies that globalization erodes the prospects for democracy. The post 1945 model of embedded liberalism served to sustain democratic Governance in the DCs with open economies. However, this model cannot be easily implemented in LDCs in the current Globalization. The emerging democracies among the LDCs lack the financial and managerial resources needed to build social safety-nets. As trade liberalization continues, the negative effect of trade on democracy may increase".⁹³

However, it would be a sheer exaggeration to say that democracy has failed in India. As Ashutosh Varshney argues, "The democratic temper of India's first generation leaders contributed handsomely to building up the system's democratic base once such a solid base was in place, it became hard completely to undermine the democratic edifice, as Mrs. Gandhi's failure showed. Her attempt to centralize politics and suppress dissent in formal politics only led to a flowering of political activity in civil society, as groups feeling marginalized formed organizations outside the state and mobilized the people, thus exerting democratic pressure on the state."⁹⁴

Rajuvenated judiciary and Indian democracy

Even Judicial focus on non-justifiable social rights after the emergency became sharper to 'seek new, historical bases of legitimation of judicial power and 'a bold' but controversial response to the perceived implications of social inequality and economic deprivation'.⁹⁵ So, during the 1980s, the judiciary in India began to transform itself into an independent institution of Governance by expanding its powers to include public interest litigation. Supreme court also armed the social activists, lawyers and journalists with alternative avenue for protecting the law against abuses by other institutions of Governance. Towards the end, the judiciary took upon itself the responsibility of upholding the avowed goals of social justice as enshrined in the constitution. Thus, the judiciary became successful in establishing an agenda independent of the Government which made it the most controversial institution of Indian Governance.⁹⁶ Epp's Survey of cases brings to light that the court's support for rights claim went up from 35 percent during Emergency to about 70 per cent in 1990. The judge-led social action litigation created a vibrant support structure of NGOs and other groups in environmental concerns.⁹⁷ However, the supreme court of India has, of late, taken a position favouring flexible labor law regime in the country. In an important judgement recently, the Apex court of India nullified the claims

of daily wage-earners for regularization of their services even if they worked for years together.⁹⁸

As Rajeev Dhawan writes, "This retreat is self evident in the new labour and landlord tenant jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, and in the Supreme Court's problem solving decisions in the Affirmative Action, President's Rule, and Babri Masjid cases. However, this cozy retreat had to be cut off by insistent circumstances that the judges could not ignore. To begin with, it soon became clear that Indian Governance was riddled with corruption and human rights atrocities on a disturbingly excessive scale. The second and parallel concern was that corruption and atrocities were not just eating into the foundations of the rule of law, but eroding India's infrastructure of natural, ecological, human and administrative resources to levels from which there could conceivably be no reprieve."⁹⁹

In a democratic country like India, it is only through the process of law, social change can be brought about. So, the legal process can be a potent weapon for bringing about change in the life conditions of the poverty-stricken people. It is through the process of law, benefits of welfare legislation can accrue to the poor and underprivileged segments of society. The legal process can also be of some help in eliminating administrative corruption, oppressive and lawless forces and abuse and misuse of power.¹⁰⁰

However, in a democracy, legal action is not the only option for holding the state accountable to the people vis-a-vis its responsibilities. The failure to enforce rights through the courts may swing into action other democratic means such as parliamentary interventions, the electoral process, the media, international solidarity, street action or even civil disobedience.¹⁰¹

The judicial activism is the outcome not only as response to state processes but also from the interaction between state and civil society. The 1980s witnessed the birth of a colossal number of non-Governmental voluntary organizations and social movements dedicated to multiple goals

and causes, from opposing environmental degradation and big dams to exposures of child and bonded labour, dalit empowerment and historical and cultural preservation. A growing synergistic relationships have been found between the supreme and high court justices, a resurgent civil society and reform-orientated members of the middle classes.¹⁰²

However, depending solely on the judiciary's pronouncements for getting the economic and social rights implemented, is fraught with the danger of non-implementation. For example, it was possible to implement the supreme court order on mid-day meals for school children on account of active public pressure on the Government. But, on the same day, the supreme court also issued an identical order for strengthening the integrated child development services (ICDS) in every habitation. However, this supreme court order did not receive as much attention and sincere effort on the part of the Government as the order on mid-day meal did. This explains the role of active public pressure for supplementing the court order and upholds the effective combination of legal action and social action in furthering the steady progress on economic and social rights.¹⁰³

III. Refurbished election commission and Indian Democracy .

Ever since T.N. Sheshan became the chief election commissioner in 1991, election commission (EC) focused upon improving legal conditions facilitating representative Government and democratic participation in tandem with the supreme court. Since 1990s, the electoral process in India was increasingly polluted by a host of factors such as criminalization, violence, bribery and intimidation by gun-toting goons in order to capture "booths" or deprive people of their constitutionally guaranteed right to vote. Therefore, the challenge before the election commission was to restore and maintain free and fair elections in India.¹⁰⁴ To start with, election commission initiated a good number of measures to minimize the inadequacies that render the participation of marginalized segments of society in the electoral process a difficult task. This may be

comfortably regarded as one of the contributing factors of higher levels of voting among lower castes inclusive of dalits and underprivileged segments of the society.¹⁰⁵

The most important achievement of the election commission was to get India's parties and candidates agreed to its code of conduct. The code puts a blanket ban on ministers and other authorities making promises of financial grants for any new construction activity or the laying of foundation stones for projects of any kind or even combining official visit with electioneering from the time elections are announced. The political parties are also prevented from reducing places of worship to platforms of political campaigning. They are also required to apply restraint in appealing to caste or communal sentiments in a bid to whip up casteist or communal passions, respectively. However, the election commission, still, faces the daunting task vis-à-vis criminalization of politics and making the parties internally democratic.¹⁰⁶ Notwithstanding the fact, curbing the influence of black money in politics, in general and during the election time, in particular, remains a perpetual issue in Indian politics.

Revitalized Panchayats raj institutions and Indian democracy

One of the epoch-making constitutional Amendments that devolve power to institution of local self-Government, have been hailed as the only radical alternative to emerge from within the womb of the state itself.¹⁰⁷ The 73rd and 74th Amendments to the constitution provided for regular elections, minimal suppression of Panchayati Raj (PR) bodies through administrative fiat, and regular finances through statutory distribution by state finance commission. The objective was to create a conducive climate whereby the decentralized institutions can be rejuvenated with people actively participating in the decision making processes.¹⁰⁸

The Gram Sabha (village assembly) has been conceived as the base of this democratic structure without specifying its powers and functions in greater details. These Amendments have, surely, contributed positively in opening up empowerment opportunities to the erstwhile excluded

groups and, in the process, giving a Fillip to the Democratization endeavours. However, the decentralization of Governance appears to have suffered due to the stiff opposition emanating, predictably, from the structures of social and economic dominance in local society.¹⁰⁹

The bureaucracy in India also epitomizes the legacy of colonial power, and, seems committed to safeguarding its well-entrenched interests in the political system. It is opposed to any attempt that belittles its power and prestige. However, the bureaucracy has always helped the predatory forces in society to thrive using its autonomy. This calls for bringing it under the purview of effective political control and social accountability.¹¹⁰ Nevertheless the value of electoral spirit in general, and the penetration of local bodies and participation in them by the lower-strata of rural society is of utmost significance in a democracy. As Subrata K. Mitra writes, "By and large, diffusion of the norms of legal equality and the egalitarian ethos, and the steady expansion of Government into areas of village life that were for centuries immune to political manipulations from outside, have provided the lower strata of the rural society with the institutional means with which to confront the power of the upper strata. As such, elections to local bodies as well as to the central and state legislatures and, perhaps, more, the electoral spirit that is in the process of pervading the whole range of group activities in rural life, have been a major factor in the devolution of power.¹¹¹ Therefore, the deepening of democracy at least, offers an opportunity to the overwhelming majorities of Indian people to have some grip over the economic and political structures which determine their lives and thereby facilitating the process of their empowerment in the desired direction.¹¹²

The Democracy that travelled to India some six decades ago, was in the nature of charity, benevolence and paternalism (Jayal, 2001). As Kaviraj (1995) has pointed out very succinctly, "Democratic Government functioned smoothly in the early years after 1947 precisely because it was not taking place in a democratic society; as democratic society has slowly emerged, with the spread of a real sense of political equality, it has made

the functioning of democratic Government more difficult". The "turmoil from below" was a necessary condition for democratic movement forward and group self assertion. (Pranab Bardhan, 2010). The anti-poverty commitments of the Nehruvian state was a failed mission essentially because of inability of the state to deliver services for the poor, in particular, due to a failure of Governance.¹¹³

The Rights-based articulation of demands of the lower caste people and the under privileged was directed to the state. However , the developmental project of the state was a great source of discouragement and despair for them as it was perpetuating the prosperity of the rich and poverty of the poor. The structures and practices of Governance tended to consolidate the power of the rich and the influential groups at the expense of the claims of the poor and the powerless.¹¹⁴

The basic rationale for a welfare state is to prevent the exploitation of weaker members in an unequal society. This is accomplished through the transfer of resources by the state. Although, the traditional notion of welfare was marked by 'charitable mentalities' towards elimination of poverty and deprivation, but the modern concept encourages an idea of citizenship based upon entitlement. The welfare logic underwent a sea change with the recent dominance of neoliberalism which considers welfare state as destructive of growth and is accompanied by vices like inefficient delivery of services, creating obstacles to development and fostering dependency. It also advocates a leaner state with a decisive capacity for ensuring the free play of market forces.¹¹⁵ with the collapse of communism in the former Soviet Union and the dismantling of the Berlin Wall in the 1980s and more particularly in the 1990s, an effort was afoot to near-universal mainstreaming of a particular brand of liberal ideology which is referred to as neoliberalism. Neoliberalism envisages a blueprint which legitimizes a conception of freedom based on private power, espouses individual choice in the market place and criticizes the public realm and accompanying ideas of collectivity and society. More importantly, neoliberal ideology promotes a set of essentially local,

western norm as universal and emphasizes upon Global economic integration and champions it as the most natural and the universal path towards Economic Growth. So, this is regarded as the panacea for developmental needs of all humanity. These norms have been actively promoted by the key public institutions such as the IMF, the world bank, other Multilateral Development Banks and the world trade organization (WTO) etc.¹¹⁶

Again, the good Governance agenda which is emerging from the womb of these institutions, stands for a project for the elimination of politics, for its banishment from the nation state' (Jayal, 1997). It refuses to accept that a Governance agenda ought to be the outcome of democratic politics. The notion of Good Governance throws up a truncated version of participation. Thus, the discussion about the model of development, decision about development priorities, and non acceptability of particular development intervention strategy is accorded low priority in this scheme of Good Governance. As Leftwich writes, "To make market friendly strategies work, Developmental states in many societies will also need to liberate the poor, especially the rural poor from the continued domination of traditional landed elites and anti-developmental oligarchs who both oppose empowerment and often stand in the way of development and Democracy. All this is therefore not just a matter of 'Governance' as the technicist illusion would have us believe; It is a matter of politics".¹¹⁷ The welfare of a society is mediated by the structure of entitlements available to its members and the legal system and Governance framework managing the society's functioning crucially determines the nature and scope of these entitlements.¹¹⁸ The adherents of increased welfare expenditure are inclined to give more power to the ordinary people. They are also tolerant of popular challenge to the authority of the state. The political protest which germinates outside the normal machinery of representative democracy, is viewed as a way of securing changes. Conversely, those who oppose welfare expenditure, are also likely to be hostile to any challenge to the established system. To

them, legitimacy of challenges to the authority of Government is more important than the opinions that support for social service and welfare benefit expenditure. Thus, support for the redistribution of power to ordinary people is intertwined with support for the redistribution of income and wealth.¹¹⁹

However, Habermas and Mouffe contend that liberal democratic institutions may not be able to deliver adequately on such liberal goals as participation and freedom. It may happen so that avenues for public contestation and redress are fore-closed. Therefore, politicization of public spaces could be a necessary tool for taming and reining in state and market power. Habermas, further, makes a strong case for democratization of public institutions. He is of the view that opening up an administration to public participation, scrutiny and contestation is a surefire recipe for deepening democracy.¹²⁰

Good Governance implies a better quality of life for the vast majority of people. It also means an equitable distribution of wealth, income and natural resources among the members of a society. It calls for dismantling of highly concentrated structures of property ownership. It presupposes full employment, access to housing, health and education, restraining privileges of elites, the right to choose alternatives, cultural development and so on and so forth. A good Governance system envisages a situation whereby all public policy matters are managed in a consensual, accountable, transparent, participatory and equitable manner. Such a scheme of Good Governance has not been achieved in the developed west, so, naturally it remains a pipe dream for the poor and the developing world.¹²¹

Therefore, the agenda of Good Governance as it is being pushed forward by the World Bank and others, is essentially, fraught with the danger of undermining both economic growth and democracy in developing countries like India. Thus the notion of democratic good Governance ends up being an integral part of the emerging politics of the

new world order. As Brett Bowden Warns, "Basic human rights, a decent standard living, and a just system of Government are achievable in societies that are something other than replicas of the west. There need not be an arbitrary distinction between "civilized" and "uncivilized" societies, the former looking down upon the latter with an unjustifiable sense of superiority closely accompanied by a missionary zeal. The "realistic utopia" of a Huxleyesque Brave new world is not the answer. People will revolt not only against totalitarianism, but against any universalizing system, be it well meaning and seemingly benign or otherwise".¹²²

The Globalization process is resulting in highly uneven distribution of gains and thus, inequality accentuated, may, further, nosedive with all its accompanying implications without concerted action to reverse this trend. As a matter of fact, human security requires strategies that favour redistribution at their core rather than developmental strategies that are being dished out currently by Global Governance institutions. (Caroline Thomas, 2001)

In a country like India, through the constitution and the set of legislative Acts, there is formal recognition of the needs of the people. But, the demands now revolves around for a more universal de facto claim to these entitlements with the Global integration gathering momentum, market outcomes with distribution of material goods and services have become highly unequal. This along with the constraints of community and hierarchy of Indian society, exacerbated further tension between the egalitarian demands of political democracy and the distributionally inequitable possessive individualism of the market.¹²³

However, Democracy can offer the best hope to the vast majority of the people who can engage themselves in struggles over questions of survival and sustained opportunities for them by re-inventing the meaning of democracy to remain ever vigilant against obscurantist and oppressive forces from within and outside. As M.J. Akbar, one of the

leading columnist of our times, redefines democracy rescuing it from the Schumpeterian procedural orthodoxy, in these words. "..... that leaves 800 million dependent on goodwill. Democracy is not about generosity It is about entitlement. Democracy is not about patronage. It is about equality. Democracy is about being inclusive, not exclusive. Democracy is about an equal vote in the political boardroom, not just in the ballot-box."¹²⁴

Notes and References :

1. Niraja Gopal Jayal, (2001). "Re-inventing the State: The emergence of Alternative models of Governance in India in the 1990s", in "Democratic Governance in India - Challenges of Poverty, Development and Identity", Niraja Gopal Jayal and Sudha Pai (Eds.) SAGE Publications (New Delhi), p.132
2. Survey of India, February 1997), quoted in Stuart Corbridge and John Harriss, (2001). "Re-inventing India-Liberalization, Hindu Nationalism and Popular Democracy", Oxford University Press, New Delhi, p.157
3. Sarah Joseph, (2001). "Democratic Good Governance - New agenda for change", in Economic and Political weekly, March 24, p.1011
4. Niraja Gopal Jayal, Op.cit., No., p.135
5. Pranab Bardhan, (1984). "The Political economy of Development in India", Oxford University Press (New Delhi), pp.65-66
6. Sarah Joseph, Op.cit., No.3, p.1011
7. Stuart Corbridge and John Harriss, (2001). "Re-inventing India-liberalization, Hindu Nationalism and Popular Democracy" Oxford, (New Delhi), p.144
8. Review article by Suresh D. Tendulkar, (2003). "The evolution of Economic Policy in India: Selected essays" by P.N. Dhar: Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2003, appeared in Economic and Political Weekly, August 02, p.3249
9. Ibid., pp.3249-3250
10. Ibid., p.3250
11. Ibid., p.3251
12. Prabhat Patnaik, (2000). "Economic Policy and its Political Management in the current conjuncture," in "Transforming India-Social and political dynamics of Democracy," Francine R. Frankel,

- Zoya Hassan, Rajeev Bhargava, Balveer Arora (Eds.) Oxford University Press, New Delhi, P. 241.
13. Zoya Hassan, (2000). "Introduction - The political career of the state in independent India", in 'Politics and the state in India", Zoya Hasan (Ed.) SAGE Publications New Delhi, P. 18.
 14. Sudipta Kaviraj, "The Modern State in India", in politics and the state in India", Zoya Hasan (Ed.) PP. 52-55).
 15. Ibid., P. 55.
 16. Francine Frankel, (1997). "Decline of a social order" in "Politics in India," Sudipta Kaviraj (Ed.), Oxford University Press (New Delhi) P. 374.
 17. Stuart Corbridge and John Harriss, Op.cit., No.7, P. 237.
 18. Niraja Gopal Jayal (1994), Op.cit., No.1, P. 20.
 19. Zoya Hasan, Op.cit., No.13, PP. 18-19.
 20. Ibid., PP. 19-20.
 21. Francine R. Frankel, (2000). "Introduction: contextual Democracy: Intersections of society, culture and politics in India", in "Transforming India-Social and political dynamics of the Democracy", Francine R. Frankel, Zoya Hasan, Rajeev Bhargava, Balaveer Arora (Eds.) Oxford University Press, New Delhi, P. 12.
 22. Mihir Shah, (2008). "Structures of power in Indian Society: A response" in Economic and political weekly, Vol XLIII No. 46, November 15-21, PP. 79-80.
 23. Christophe Jaffrelot, (2003). "India's silent Revolution, The rise of low castes in North Indian Politics". Permanent Black, (New Delhi), P. 492.
 24. Zoya Hasan, Op.cit., No.13, P. 21.

25. Atul Kohli, (1992). "Democracy and Discontent: India's growing crisis of Governability", Cambridge University Press, (New Delhi) P. 311.
26. Ibid., P. 316.
27. Ibid., P. 318.
28. Atul Kohli, (2000). "Centralization and powerlessness: India's Democracy in a comparative perspective", in "Politics and the state in India", Zoya Hasan (Ed.) Sage Publications, New Delhi, P. 224.
29. Ibid., P. 225.
30. Atul Kohli, Op.cit., No.25, PP. 334-337.
31. Myron Weiner, (2002). "The struggle for equality: caste in Indian Politics" in "The success of India's Democracy", Atul Kohli (Ed.), Cambridge University Press, New Delhi, PP. 218-219.
32. Zoya Hasan, (2000). "Representation and redistribution: the new lower caste politics of North India" in "Transforming India - Social and political dynamics of Democracy", Francine R. Frankel, Zoya Hasan, Rajeev Bhargava, Balveer Arora (Eds.) Oxford University Press, New Delhi, PP. 149.
33. Gopal Guru and Anuradha Chakraborty, (2005). "Who are the country's poor ? Social movement politics and Dalit Poverty", in "Social movements in India-poverty, power, and politics", Raka Ray and Mary Fainsod Katzenstein (Eds.) Oxford University Press (New Delhi) P. 141.
34. Zoya Hasan, Op.cit., No.32, PP. 152-153
35. Gopal Guru and Anuradha Chakraborty, Op.cit., No.33, PP. 141-142.
36. Zoya Hasan, Op.cit., No.32, PP. 151-152.
37. Ibid., PP. 158-159.

38. Zoya Hasan, *Op.cit.*, No.13, P. 26.
39. Niraja Gopal Jayal, *Op.cit.*, No.1, P. 98.
40. Ian Dun-Can, (2000). "Scheduled Caste, Dalit and the Bahujan: Political Mobilization and electoral politics among the former untouchables and the case of Uttar Pradesh", in "Post-colonial India-History, Politics and culture", Vinita Damodaran, Maya-Unnithan Kumar (Eds.), Manohar, New Delhi, PP. 141-142.
41. Zoya Hasan, *Op.cit.*, No.13, PP. 25-26.
42. Paul R. Brass, (2000). "The strong state and the fear of disorder, in "Transforming India - Social and political dynamics of democracy", Francine R. Frankel, Zoya Hasan Rajeev Bhargava, Balveer Arora (Eds.), Oxford University Press, P. 83.
43. The Problem-Seminar 451 March, 1997, P. 12
44. Ramachandra Guha, (1989). "The unquiet woods: Ecological change and peasant resistance in the Himalaya", Delhi: Oxford University Press, P. 195.
45. Pranab Bardhan, (2010). "Awakening Giants-feet of clay-Assessing the economic rise of China and India", Oxford University Press,, (New Delhi), PP. 8-9.
46. World Bank, World development report 2006, P. 122.
47. Sunil Khilnani, (2011). "Dialogues with liberalism-liberal ideas define the broad foundation of modern Indian political thought, The Times of India, Kolkata, Saturday, November, 19.
48. Rajeev Bhargava, (2000). "Democratic vision of a New Republic, 1950" in "Transforming India-social and political dynamics of democracy," Francine R. Frankel, Zoya Hasan, Rajeev Bhargava, Balveer Arora, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, PP. 34-35.
49. Sunil Khilnani, *Op.cit.*, No.47.

50. Neera Chandhoke, (2003). "The conceits of civil society", Oxford University Press, (New Delhi), P. 17
51. Gurpreet Mahajan, (2001). "Identities and Rights-aspects of liberal Democracy in India", Oxford University Press, (New Delhi), P.176.
52. Rajni Kothari, (2000). "The decline of the moderate state", in 'Politics and the state in India", Zoya Hasan (Ed.), SAGE Publications, New Delhi, P. 182.
53. Bob Currie, (1996). "Governance, democracy and economic adjustment in India-conceptual and empirical problems", Third world quarterly Vol. 17, No. 4, P. 803.
54. Stuart Corbridge and John Harriss, Op.cit., No.7, P. 236.
55. Ibid., PP. 57-59.
56. Sunil Khilnani, (1997). "The idea of India", London: Hamish Hamilton, P. 17.
57. Sudipta Kaviraj, (2000). "Democracy and social inequality" in "Transforming India social and political dynamics of democracy", Francine R. Frankel, Zoya Hasan, Rajeev Bhargava, Balveer Arora (Eds.) Oxford University Press, New Delhi, P. 112.
58. Niraja Gopal Jayal, Op.cit., No.1, PP. 132-133.
59. Dolly Arora, (2002). "Reorganisation of institutional space-state market and public domain", Man & Development, December, PP. 61-62
60. World Bank, (1993). Sub-Saharan Africa: From crisis to sustainable growth, Washington D.C. The World Bank, 1989, also in, Adrian Leftwich, "Governance, democracy and development in the Third World". Third world quarterly. Vol. 14 no. 3, p.610.
61. World Bank, Governance and development, Washington D.C; World Bank, 1992. P. I

62. Adrian Leftwich, (1993). "Governance, democracy and Development in the Third World"; *Third world quarterly*, Vol. 14 No. 3, PP. 610-611.
63. *Ibid.*, P. 611.
64. Sarah Joseph, *Op.cit.*, No.3, P 1014.
65. Niraja Gopal Jayal, (1997). "The Governance Agenda Making Democratic Development Dispensable", *Economic and political weekly*, February 22, P. 411.
66. *Ibid.*, P. 412.
67. Sarah Joseph, *Op.cit.*, No.3, P 1014
68. Peter Evans, (1997). "The eclipse of the state?" Reflections on stateness in an era of Globalization, *World Politics*, Vol. 50, NO. 1, October, P. 2.
69. Sylvia Chan, (2002). "Liberalism, Democracy and Development", Cambridge University Press (Cambridge). P. 231.
70. Niraja Gopal Jayal, *Op.cit.*, No.65, P. 412.
71. Neera Chandhoke, *Op.cit.*, No.50, PP. 6-7.
72. *Ibid.*, PP. 8-9.
73. Dolly Arora, (2007). "Globalization and reorganization of institutional space: meaning for democracy and peoples rights", in 'Globalization, Governance reforms and development in India', Kameshwar Choudhary (Ed), SAGE Publications, (New Delhi), P. 91.
74. Geof Wood, (1997). "States without citizens: The problem of the Franchise state". In David Hulme and Michael Edwards (Eds), "NGOs, States and Donors: Too close for comfort"? London: MacMillan in association with save the children. P. 81.
75. Niraja Gopal Jayal, *Op.cit.*, No.1, PP. 146-147
76. *Ibid.*, P. 140.

77. Pranab Bardhan, (2010). "Poverty and inequality in China and India elusive link with Globalisation", *Economic and Political Weekly*, September 22, 2007. Also in Pranab Bardhan, "Awakening Giants-Feet of clay-Assessing the economic rise of China and India", Oxford University Press, New Delhi, P. 94
78. Gail Omvedt, (2006). "Farmers' movements and the debate on poverty and economic reforms in India", in "Social movements in India-poverty, power, and politics", Raka Ray and Mary Fainsod Katzenstein (Eds.) Oxford University Press New Delhi, P. 198.
79. Amit Bhaduri, (2008). "Predatory growth", *Economic and Political Weekly*, April 19, P. 12
80. Michael Lipton, (2000). "Poverty and public policy in India since independence", in "Post-colonial India- politics and culture", Vinita Damodaran and Maya-Unnithan Kumar (Eds.) Manohar (Delhi), P. 163
81. Kameshwar Choudhary, (2007). "Globalizations, Governance reforms and Development: An introduction" in "Globalization, Governance reforms and Development in India," Kameshwar Choudhary (Ed.) SAGE publications (New Delhi). P. 37.
82. Sanjay Kumar, (2004). "Impact of Economic reforms on Indian electorate," *Economic and political weekly*, April 17, P. 1627.
83. Anup Sinha, (2004). "Good Governance, market friendly Globalization and the changing space of state intervention", in "Good Governance, Democratic Societies and Globalization", Surendra Munshi and Biju Paul Abraham (Eds.), SAGE Publication, New Delhi, PP. 116-117.
84. M. H. Suryanarayana, (1997). "Food security in India: measures, norms and issues", *Development and change*, Vol. 28, No. 4 October, P. 787.

85. Jean Dre'ze and Amartya Sen, (2007). "Public action and social inequality' in Illfare in India", Barbara Harriss White and S. Subramanian(Eds.), SAGE Publications, (New Delhi) 1999. Also in Kameswar Choudhary, "Globalization Governance reforms and Development : An introduction, in 'Globalization; Governance reforms and development in India", Kameshwar Choudhary (Ed.) SAGE Publications, New Delhi, PP. 65-66.
86. Jan Nederveen Pieterse, (2001). "Development Theory deconstruction / reconstruction," Vistaar publications, New Delhi, P. 44.
87. Kameshwar Choudhary, Op.cit., No.81, PP. 56-57
88. Sylvia Chan, Op.cit., No.69, PP. 72-73.
89. Gail Omvedt. (1993), "Reinventing revolution (New York: ME Sharpe)", P. XII Also in , Neera Chankdoke, (2003). "The conceits of civil society", Oxford University Press, New Delhi PP. 20-21.
90. Atul Kohli, (2002). (Introduction) "The success of India's Democracy", Atul Kohli (Ed.) Cambridge University Press published in India in arrangement with foundation books (New Delhi), P. 10.
91. Niraja Gopal Jayal and Sudha pai, (2001). (Introduction) in "Democratic Governance in India Challenges of poverty development, and identity", Niraja Gopal Jayal / Sudha Pai (Eds.) SAGE publications (New Delhi), P. 25
92. Vinita Damodaran, Maya Unnithan-Kumar, (2000). "Emerging perspectives on post-colonial India in 'post-colonial India-politics and culture", Vinita Damodaran, Maya Unnithan Kumar (Eds.) Manohar (New Delhi), P. 30.
93. Quan Li and Rafael Reuveny, (2003). "Economic Gobalization and Democracy: An Empirical analysis", British journal of political science, Vol. 33. Part-I, January. P. 53.

94. Ashutosh Varshney, (1998). "Why democracy survives - India defies the odds," *Journal of Democracy*, July, P. 48.
95. Upendra Baxi, (1985). 'Taking suffering seriously: Social Action litigation in the supreme court of India', in "Judges and the judicial power", R. Sudarshan, Rajeev Dhavan and Salman Khurshid (Eds.). Bombay: Tripathi. Also in Shylashri Shankar, (2009). "Scaling justice India's supreme court, Anti Terror laws, and social Rights", Oxford University Press (New Delhi), P. XIV.
96. Francine R. Frankel, *Op.cit.*, No.21, PP. 18-19.
97. Shylshri Shankar, (2009). "Scaling Justice India's Supreme Court Anti-terror laws, and social rights", Oxford University Press (New Delhi), P. 183.
98. Kameshwar Choudhary *Op.cit.*, No.81, PP. 32-33
99. Rajeev Dhavan, (2000). "Judges and Indian Democracy: the lesser evil"? in "Transforming India-social and political dynamics of democracy," Francine R. Frankel, Zoya Hasan, Rajeev Bhargava, Balveer Arora (Eds.) Oxford University Press (New Delhi), P. 333.
100. Ram Kishore Choudhary and Tapash Gan Choudhary, (2008). "Judicial reflections of justice Bhagwati," Academic foundation & publication Pvt. Ltd : (Kolkata), P. 40.
101. Jean Dre'ze, (2004). "Democracy and Right to food", *Economic and political weekly* April 24, P. 1727.
102. Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, (2002). "Redoing the constitutional design: from an interventionist to a regulatory state", in "The success of India's democracy," Atul Kohli (Ed.) Cambridge University Press (New Delhi), PP. 136-137
103. Jean Dre'ze, *Op.cit.*, No.101, P. 1728.
104. Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph; *Op.cit.*, No.102, PP. 154-155.

105. The improvement of protection and the security environment in the run up to the elections underwent a perceptible change following the Election Commission measures like deploying security forces in large numbers to allay fears of the lower caste and poor people, which might have been one of the factors that facilitated participation among them.
106. Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, *Op.cit.*, No.102, PP. 157-159
107. Niraja Gopal Jayal, *Op.cit.*, No.1, P. 148.
108. Kuldeep Mathur, (2001). "Strengthening bureaucracy: State and development in India" in "Democratic Governance in India- challenge of poverty, Development and identity", Niraja Gopal Jayal and Sudha Pai (Eds.), SAGE Publications (New Delhi), P. 125.
109. Niraja Gopal Jayal, *Op.cit.*, No.1, PP. 148-149.
110. Kuldeep Mathur, *Op.cit.*, No.108, PP. 128-129.
111. Subrata K. Mitra, (1999). "Culture and rationality. The politics of social change in post-colonial India", SAGE Publications, New Delhi, P. 146-147.
112. Stuart Corbride and John Harriss, *Op.cit.*, No.7, P. 239.
113. Raka Ray and Mary Fainsod Katzenstein, (2006). "Introduction: In the beginning, there was the Nehruvian State", in "Social movements in India-poverty, power and politics", Raka Ray and Mary Fainsod Katzenstein, Oxford University Press (New Delhi), P. 4
114. Niraja Gopal Jayal, *Op.cit.*, No.1, P. 139.
115. Kameshwar Choudhary, *Op.cit.*, No.81, PP. 54-55.
116. Caroline Thomas, (2001). "Global Governance, development and human security: Exploring the links", *Third World Quarterly*, 22:2, P. 167.
117. Adrian Leftwich, *Op.cit.*, No.62, PP. 620-621.

118. Sriram Panchu, (1999). "Legal institutions for development - some aspects of welfare, governance and the law in India", in 'Illfare in India', Barbara Harriss White and S. Subramoniam (eds.), SAGE Publications, (New Delhi), P. 372.
119. Peter Taylor Gooby, (1983). "The Welfare state and individual freedom : Attitudes to welfare spending and to the power of the state", political studies, XXXI, PP 647-648
120. Ilan Kapoor, (2002). "Deliberative democracy or Agonistic pluralism ? The relevance of the Habermas Mouffe debate for Third World Politics", Alternatives, P. 468.
121. Kameshwar Choudhary, Op.cit., No.81, p.63.
122. Brett Bowden, (2004). "In the Name of Progress and Peace: The "Standard of Civilization" and the Universalizing project', in "Alternatives", Vol.29, No.I, January-February, p.65.
123. Anup Sinha, Op.cit., No.83, p.126.
124. M.J. Akbar, (2010). "Danger from the New Brahmins" in The Sunday Times of India, Kolkata, February, 07.