

## Chapter Six

### Hare's View of Fact-Value Dichotomy

The genesis of traditional ethics is to make ethical statements as universal statements. The concept of universal is well known to all of us. The philosophical debate between universal and particular is a well known dichotomy from Greek tradition to the present philosophical discussion. As far as particular is concerned there is no problem, but as far as universal is concerned there is problem. However, attempts have been made to have the concept of universal from the concept of particular. We are equally acquainted with the very concepts of universal and particular in logic. As logic is a formalized form of language, there we do not find any philosophical problem as far as their dealing is concerned. Interestingly, there is a propensity witnessing in ethics where attempts have been made by some philosophers to enlighten ethical statements as universalizable like the logical apprehension of the concept of universal. Here we particularly refer the three classical traditional ethical principles witnessing in Virtue ethics, Kantian deontology and the consequential ethics as developed by ethical utilitarianisms. As far as virtue ethics is concerned, it can be said that any ethical action would be *universally good* if it would have been performed on the basis of or on the dictation of cardinal virtues. As far as Kantian deontology is concerned, it can be said that any moral action would be *universally good* if it would have been performed on the basis of the maxim based on the principle 'duty for the duty sake'. Kant in stating the categorical imperative goes on to say, "Act only on that maxim so that you can at the same time will that it should become a

universal law.”<sup>82</sup> As far as consequentialism is concerned, it can be said that any moral action would be *universally good* if it would have been fulfilled the principle of the greatest number of the greatest happiness. Thus, it would not be an exaggeration if we claim that there always underlies a propensity of ethical statements to be universalisable or generalisable. When it is said ‘You ought to do this work’, it ipso-facto means that ‘Everyone like you ought to do this work in the same situation’. Likewise, when it is said that ‘you ought to run in a burn house’, it actually means, ‘everyone ought to run in a burn house’. Each of the above statement leads to a general statement. What we can say here is that when a moral judgment is associated with the term ‘ought’ or ‘should’, it always earns the dignity of universalizability. Unlike, logic, ethical generalization or universalization is a method of standarising the situation under which something has been generalized. In fact the generalizing process of ethical statement actually hinges on the principle of *ceteris-paribus*. In any general form of is-statement, there underlies an ethical principle which ultimately turns the moral judgments towards its universal application. For example, when it is said that, “If everyone did then the consequences would be disastrous” it leads to the moral standard like this, “One ought not to do that”. However, the situations in which this sort of moral consideration might be advanced are, of course, exceedingly diverse. When it is asked, “If no one voted, then democratic government would collapse”, it entails finally the moral judgment, “Everyone should vote”. What we want to say here is that there underlies an ethical predisposition towards ethical generalization and in fact this would be the genesis of ethics. It states:

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<sup>82</sup> Kant, I, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, Translated and analysed by H.J.Paton, Harper & Row Publishers, 1948, p.30.

*"What is right for one person must be right for everyone in the same or similar circumstance or circumstances."*

It should equally be kept in mind that even though ethical situation is important while generalizing ethical statements, but side by side one should give due importance on characteristics, relationships or abilities on the part of moral agent while generalizing ethical statement. In standardising the principle of ethical generalization the ability on the part of moral agent should be taken into account barring the principle of *ceteris paribus*. Accordingly, the web of moral universalization or moral generalization can further be qualified as:

*"What is right or duty for one person is also to be right for or a duty for anyone in similar circumstances provided the person under consideration has got the ability to do the moral responsibility."*

### **Hare on Moral Universalizability**

The theory of *moral universalizability* is intimately associated Hare's moral philosophy. Besides Hare, we can also mention the name of Kant in this context. However, in this sequel we particularly confine ourselves within Hare's proposal of moral universalizability. The philosophical novelty of Hare is that he alone conceives moral judgments as imperatives or rather attribute moral judgments as imperative judgments. He then attempts to show that all imperative moral judgments are *potentially* universalizable. In his article "Prescriptive universalizability", Hare tries to show in various ways how prescriptive judgments are claimed to be universalizable. Hare clearly and elaborately outlines the principle of moral universalizability in his book *Freedom and Reason*. In his book *Freedom and Reason*, Hare has

developed his theory that moral judgments are universalizable. In this regard, Hare at the very outset mentioned Kant. In fact, the concept of moral universalizability actually lie submerged in Kantian ethics. Kantian model of categorical imperatives is a classical system of the principle of moral universality. Following Kant, Hare seems to conceive that 'whatever rules any agent applies to one person; he must also apply it to himself and vice-versa. However, there are some points of discussion where we sense a clear-cut discrepancy between Hare and Kant as far as their understanding of the theory of moral or ethical universalizability is concerned.

While establishing the principle of universalizability, Hare actually intends to establish how the is-ought dichotomy can be minimized. Hare inclines to say that the concept of universality is a logical concept. There we find some universal proposition in logic as well as some universal principle applied in logic. His understanding of the concept of universality is not theoretical at this present juncture. Hare tells us that descriptive statements (i.e. is-statements) are universal because they are guided by some logical principles. Hare claims that like descriptive judgment, prescribe judgments too would be universalizable because they have the *descriptive content* like descriptive judgment. According to Hare, when a man thinks something morally, he is compelled to universalize his volitions which would definitely be a logical compulsion – a compulsion which cannot be misapprehended and ruled out.

Hare, of course, tries to establish the principle of moral universalizability of prescriptive (moral) judgments rather indirectly. He has taken into account the well founded universal concept of descriptive judgment He

then tries to show that the descriptive contents for which descriptive judgments are claimed to be universal are also present in the prescriptive judgments. Therefore, there is no point of ignoring the view that prescriptive judgments would be universalizable. Thus, Hare's originality lies not in establishing the principle of universalizability of imperative judgment, but to show that moral judgment or precisely imperative judgments are universalizable simply because there are some common elements in imperative judgments like descriptive judgments for which imperative judgments would be claimed to be universalizable. Accordingly, Hare at first attempts to clarify for what grounds descriptive judgments are universalizable and then he moves on to establish that the elements for which descriptive judgments are universal are elements common in prescriptive or imperative judgments. Accordingly, Hare's logical argument can be formulated like the following:

*Any judgment having descriptive meaning must be universalizable.*

*Moral (imperative) judgments do have descriptive meaning.*

*Therefore, moral (imperative) judgments are universalizable.*

The sanctity of the above logical argument is based on the explicit answer of the following questions:

- (i) What does Hare mean by descriptive meaning?
- (ii) In what sense or senses moral judgments do have descriptive meaning?
- (iii) In what sense a moral judgment having descriptive meaning is universalizable?

While explicating descriptive meaning, Hare, at the very outset begins with descriptive judgment. According to Hare, a judgment is said to be

descriptive if it has descriptive contents and the judgment would be indicative or assertive. Hare says, "A judgment is descriptive if in it the predicate or predicates are descriptive terms and the mode is indicative."<sup>83</sup> The very characteristic of a descriptive judgment is that it has descriptive content for which it would turn into universal. Now Hare claims that prescriptive or imperative moral judgments do have descriptive contents. The only difference between them is that unlike a descriptive statement, an imperative statement does not have indicative or assertive mood. For example, the word, 'silent' in the indicative sentence 'Be silent' is said to be a descriptive term but the sentence under consideration should not be considered as descriptive judgment because it is not in the indicative mood. Other important aspect of a descriptive judgment, Hare conceives, is that besides one place predicate, it may have relational predicate. The predicate 'hit', e.g., as used in the sentence 'John hit Jones' is understood as a two place relational predicate as it is predicated of the ordered pair of the subjects John and Jones.

According to Hare moral utterances are essentially imperatives. However, from this it does not follow that moral imperatives are similar to singular imperatives. According to Hare moral imperatives differ from singular imperatives because unlike singular imperatives moral imperatives are universalizable because of possessing descriptive contents. Hare contends that singular imperative, say, e.g., 'I say to John: Shut the door' is not universalizable as it actually means 'John shut the door here and now'. In the case of singular imperative, the imperative term is associated with or related to singular person.

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<sup>83</sup> Hare, R. M. *Freedom and Reason*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1963, p.199.

Accordingly, it cannot take home the right to be universalizable. However, instead of this, when we say that 'John ought to shut the door', we are thereby inclined to say, 'Let everyone in John's circumstances to shut the door'. According to Hare every moral utterance must possess two fundamental features, namely, prescriptively and universalizability. Singular imperatives, Hare claims, do have prescriptively, but they do not have the property of universalizability.

Thus, Hare at the very outset classifies imperatives into two types, such as, singular imperatives and other than singular imperatives. He then goes on to say that except singular imperatives, all other imperatives are claimed to be universalizable because of the very fact that they do have descriptive content or meaning like descriptive judgments. Let us explain following Hare in what sense or senses imperatives do have descriptive meaning? Hare mentions a number of points through which he defends himself in this regard. He claims that imperatives do have descriptive meaning common to indicative. At the beginning, Hare makes it clear by making a distinction between *phrastic* and *neustic*. According to Hare there must have some common element between the imperative, e.g., 'Shut the door' and the indicative, e.g. 'You are going to shut the door' as both are about the same thing, namely, 'your shutting the door in the immediate feature'. Hare attributes this common property the *phrastic*. Hare says, " I shall call the part of the sentence that is common to both moods 'your shutting the door in the immediate feature' the *phrastic*; and the part that is different in the case of commands and statements ('yes' or please'); the *neustic*."<sup>84</sup> Hare

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<sup>84</sup> Hare, R. M. *The Language of Morals*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992, p.18.

further contends that the procedural part *phrastic* means 'to point out' or 'to indicate' and the procedural or technical part *neustic* means 'to nod assent'. Hare conceives that both *phrastic* and *neustic* are used differently in imperative and indicative speech. Following the very meaning of the words *phrastic* and *neustic*, the utterance of the sentence containing these words can be linguistically paraphrased as:

(i) The speaker points out or indicates what he is going to state to be the case or command to make the case.

(ii) He nods, as, if to say, 'It is the case or do it'.

Thus, it seems clear from the above consideration that it is mainly for the phrastic part that an imperative possesses descriptive meaning. That is why prescriptive statements are universalizable. Apart from this, Hare also inclines to believe that there are some other common grounds between indicative and imperatives for which the demand for universalizability of imperative judgments can be further strengthened. He goes on to say that sometimes it seems to be the case that the assent of both indicatives and imperatives is common. For example, when I said, 'you are going to shut the door' and you replied 'yes', this would be a sign of assent. This type of assent appears at par with the assent arising from imperative, say, e.g., when I said 'shut the door', and you replied, yes Sir.

Secondly, Hare contends that the negation sign 'not' has the part of the *phrastic* of both indicatives and imperatives. The sentence, 'you are going to shut the door', can be linguistically paraphrased similar to 'your not shutting the door in the immediate future, yes'. Likewise, the sentence 'do not shut the door' can be linguistically analysed similar to the sentence 'your not shutting the door in the immediate future,

please'. Here the negation sign 'not' has got the same use in the case of *neustic*. It appears in the modal sentence containing the word 'may', The modal sentence, 'you may shut the door' equally means, ' I do not tell you not to shut the door' and this in turn again is transformed into 'your not shutting the door in the immediate future, not please'. Likewise, the modal sentence, 'you may be going to shut the door; can finally be transformed into 'your not shutting the door in the immediate feature, not-please.'

Thirdly, Hare further claims that like the negation sign 'not' , the other logical connectives, such as, 'either-or', 'if-then', etc., can also be regarded as part of *phrastic* of sentences. They have also common basis between indicatives as well as imperatives. The same is true also in the case of quantifiers, namely, 'all' and 'some' or universal and particular. Generally, it may be the case that the use of these words in the case of indicatives differs from the use of these words in the case of imperatives. But Hare tells us that the surface disparity of use is mainly caused by an accident of grammar. In this regard, Hare goes on to say that 'by using the ordinary logical connectives, as they are used in the indicative mood in the *phrastic* of our remodeled imperative sentences, we could do with the revised imperative mood everything that we now do with the natural one.'<sup>85</sup> Accordingly, it would be possible for us to have an indicative sentence instead of a simple command. The simple command 'shut the door or put the door in position, said to John', can linguistically be transformed into an indicative sentence 'John is going to shut the door or put the door stop in position; true.

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<sup>85</sup> Ibid. p.21.

Fourthly, the principle of contradiction can equally be taken into account in the *phrastic* of both indicatives and imperatives. According to Hare like two indicatives, two imperatives can also be shown contradictory with each other. The simple indicatives, for example, 'you are going to shut the door' is contradictory to 'you are not going to shut the door'. Likewise, the simple imperative, 'shut the door' is contradictory to 'do not shut the door'. However, Hare elsewhere reminds that sometimes the contradiction of simple imperative may not seem apparent. In a situation like this, it would be possible for us to have the sense of contradiction by giving due importance on some other considerations.

Fifthly, the law of *excluded middle*, in symbol ' $p \vee \neg p$ ' can also be relevant in case of imperatives. According to Hare one's non-utterance of the sentence 'shut the door' does not clearly indicate 'do not shut the door'. It may actually mean 'You may either shut the door or not to shut the door' or 'it can say nothing at all'. Similarly, one's non-utterance of the sentence 'you are not going to shut the door' does not clearly indicate 'you are not going to shut the door'. Rather it may actually mean 'you may be going to shut the door or you may be going not to shut the door' or it can say nothing at all. However, the situation would be complexly different if anybody is being asked 'Are you going to shut the door or not?' In a situation like this, if he is willing to reply, he has to reply in the form of ' $p \vee \neg p$ ', i.e. in the form 'Either I am going to shut the door or I am not going to shut the door'. Similarly, if he is asked 'shall you shut the door or not?' He has to reply: 'Either shut it or do not shut it'.

Finally and importantly, like indicatives the relation of entailment also holds in the case of imperative. To say that *P entails Q*, means 'it would be logically impossible that P is true but Q is false'. Or in alternatively, it can be said that 'it is necessary that P implies Q'. Similarly, in moral language, it can be said that a sentence P entails a sentence Q if and only if the fact that a person assents to P but dissents from Q is a sufficient condition for saying that he has misunderstood one or other of the sentences. Now, if it is claimed, of course following Hare, that imperatives are supposed to be universalizable, then they have the logical form of 'all'. Now let us consider the following argument based on the relation of entailment"

*Take all the boxes to the station.*

*This is one of the boxes.*

*Therefore, take this box to the station.*

The above argument is based on the relation of entailment. Here anybody who understands the meaning the premises of the argument under consideration and also understands the meaning of the conclusion, he will definitely involve into a contradiction if he assents the premises and dissents the conclusion. More succinctly, it can be said that one who understands the meaning of the imperative 'Take all the boxes to the station', and also understands the meaning of the descriptive statement 'This is one of the boxes', but refuses the conclusion 'Take this box to the station', it logically means to say that he actually fails to make out any of these three sentences used in the argument. This failure is simply for the fact that he somehow or other is missing the relation of entailment as embedded in the argument.

So far we have after Hare have developed various ways through which the parallelism between indicative and imperatives can be established. What has been seen above is that both imperatives and indicatives have the same *phrastic* element. We think that this *phrastic* part is related to the possible state of affairs. For example, there underlies a possible state of affairs referred to by the *phrastic*:

Your shutting the door in the immediate feature.

An immediate question may crop up. Does the state of affair associate with the imperative can be verified at all? Can we then say that imperatives can be verified like indicatives as they are related to state of affairs? At this juncture, one can raise a point by saying that as all the *phrastic* part of both indicatives and imperatives are related to a state of affairs, what would be wrong in claiming that imperatives are very much similar to the descriptive statements as conceived by the logicians? Hare, however, does not rule out the relevance of such question. Anticipating the gravity of such objection, Hare then goes onto say that " it would be unfortunate if the verification criterion were thought to impugn the meaningfulness of all but indicative sentences – as if 'shut the door' was as meaningless as ' Frump the bump.' <sup>86</sup>

So far we have established in what sense an imperative judgment is linked with a state of affairs. We have also seen that like descriptive statement, imperative statement possesses all logical principles, such as, the principle of negation, the principle of contradiction, the principle of excluded-middle, the principle of entailment, etc. Hare also indicates that like a descriptive statement (is-statement) an imperative statement (ought-statement) may possess descriptive content. Let us pass on to

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<sup>86</sup> Ibid. p.24.

envisage the question in what sense a moral judgment having descriptive meaning is universalizable. Before delving into the issue, let us first examine in what sense a descriptive judgment is claimed to be universal? Let us examine the following argument:

Premise: This is red.

Conclusion; Therefore, everything like this in the relevant respect is red.

In the above argument there is one premise. Here the conclusion is deduced from the single premise. In this argument, the premise is conceived as a descriptive statement. It is a singular descriptive statement. Here the premise actually entails the conclusion 'Everything like this in the relevant respect is red'. In the above argument there underlies the principle of entailment which turns out this argument as valid. In the argument the phrase such as 'relevant respect' is important in the sense that the validity of this argument actually hinges on the very meaning of the phrase 'relevant respect'. It actually means that a person who under certain circumstance is allowed to call a thing red is also allowed to call every other thing is red in the same circumstances or in the relevantly similar circumstances. The fulfillment of the term same 'circumstances' is said to be the verbal force or linguistic force. Here the verbal force of the conclusion is logically entailed by the verbal force of the premise. Accordingly, to assert the premise and to deny the conclusion leads one into inconsistency. That means, to admit that 'This is red' and to deny that 'some other things which resemble it in the relevant respect are red' is nothing but simply to misuse the word 'red'. That is why the word 'red', says Hare, is supposed to be the descriptive term. Hare says, "...to say that something is red is to say that it is of a

certain kind, and so to imply that anything which is of that kind is red."<sup>87</sup>

One may raise a question by saying that the conclusion of the above argument cannot be universalizable as it contains the singular term 'this'. The term 'this' is a demonstrative pronoun. So such term cannot be taken as universalizable even in the predicate logic. Therefore, the term 'this' in 'Everything like this in the relevant respect is red' cannot be regarded to be universalizable. Hare, however, rules out this objection. He says that although the word 'this' is a singular term, but in the above cases it is associated with the word 'like'. When a singular term or demonstrative pronoun is associated with the term 'like', it can be designated as universalizable in moral philosophy. Hare says, "...when singular term is governed by the word 'like' or its equivalent, it has the property of being turnable into a universal term by substituting for 'like this' a term which describes the respects in which the thing in question is being said to be like this."<sup>88</sup>

Unlike logic here we find a different interpretation. It states that there is a property such that the predicates 'red' has got it and such that everything which has it is red. Logically, there is as property 'x' such that 'R' (red) possesses 'x' and for all values of y, if y possesses x, then y is similar to R'. Importantly, in the later interaction the singular term 'this' is not found and hence it should be considered as universalizable. The property which is ascribed in the descriptive term 'red' is redness. When we come to know what sort of the predicate term 'red' is, we ipso-facto come to know that it is a descriptive word. According to Hare, the proposition 'There is a property such that everything which

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<sup>87</sup> Hare, R. M. *Freedom and Reason*, op. cit. 11.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.* p.11.

has it is red' is trivial or obvious as the word 'red' being a descriptive word is trivial and the judgment in which the word 'red' is applied must be universalizable in an obvious manner. Hare seems to have conceived that any singular descriptive judgment is universalizable in a trivial sense. According to Hare to commit a singular descriptive judgment is to commit that everything exactly similar to a descriptive judgment in the relevant respects must possess the property attribute to it.

However, there is a point that needs to be addressed upon. The linguistic expression 'exactly similar' is difficult to define. It is really difficult to say under what circumstance one thing is exactly similar to another thing. In logic, Leibnitz's principle of indiscernible holds that two things cannot be established similar to each other. Mackie says, "...in practice no two cases will ever be exactly alike, even if they were, they would still be numerically different just because they are two. Universalizability would be trivial and useless, therefore, if we could not rule out many of the inevitable differences as irrelevant."<sup>89</sup> Hare, however, thinks the other way round as he claims that the problem of detecting two similar objects in the relevant circumstance does not come into being if the meaning of the descriptive term is properly apprehended. In such case the concept of similarity is important to be noted in detecting descriptive meaning. According to Hare to claim that any singular descriptive judgment is universalizable is equal in claiming that the meaning rules for the descriptive term or terms are universal rules of a certain type. So to identify two similar objects in the tribulation of resolving the unique meaning in which the speaker is

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<sup>89</sup> Mackie, J. L. *Ethics*, Penguin Books, 1977, p.13.

being used 'x is red', we mean to say that anything which is exactly similar for x in the relevant respects is red. However, if we are asked what we exactly mean by the phrase 'the relevant respect', we may possibly reply that it is about x that makes us to call it red. Such type of interpretation is nothing but simply the definition of the term red.

It has been objected by saying that the predicate term 'red' at times may not be defined specifically. It is to be noted here that one who calls a thing red may not be regarded as red by somebody else. Thus, there always underlies a possibility of misunderstanding regarding the very term 'red' as far as its definition is concerned. The disagreement, however, may not be about colour vision, but simply for the use of the word red. Hare, however, somehow manages to overcome the problem above. He says that by using the word red in any occasion the speaker must get some sense of an object in mind to which he is drawing attention in using the word in question. Having been acquired knowledge of an object in this process, the speaker may be ambivalent about the precise boundaries of the object under consideration. Irrespective of this difficulty, it can be said that there always underlies something regarding the object in question which eventually authorizes the speaker to call that object 'red'. Hare conceives that if anybody fails to follow the due course of procedure that one needs to have that what he intends to say would have no descriptive meaning at all.

According to Hare the principle of universality of descriptive statement is obvious. Many would like to say that as the so-called universal proposition generated by any singular descriptive judgment is a mere matter of meaning of the descriptive terms contained in the judgment, it cannot be a matter of substance. When Hare goes on to say that 'x is red

and anything which is similar to  $x$  is all red', he thus employs some universal rules by using the descriptive term 'red'. However, this view has been criticized by saying that the so-called universal rule gives rise to the meaning of 'red'. It is verbal explanation or linguistic clarification of how the word 'red' is being used. Hare, however, anticipates the logical force of this objection. He inclines to say that unlike the evaluative terms the meaning rules of descriptive terms are verbal. The universal rule which are employing in all descriptive expressions are meaning-rules. Meaning rules are supposed to be universal. Accordingly, the logical argument of the descriptive universalizability can be formulated in the following manner:

Every descriptive judgment must possess meaning rules.

Meaning -rule are universalizable.

Therefore, every descriptive judgment is universalizable.

When Hare claims that a singular descriptive judgment entails a universal judgment, he thereby means to say that the meaning-rule of a singular descriptive judgment leads to the meaning-rule of universal judgment. Accordingly, it can be said that the entailment relation between the above mentioned judgment hinges on linguistic explanation. However, in many philosophical contexts such type of verbal explanation seems to be unworthy even though it deserves a special attention in measuring or evaluating the universality of value judgment. Hare says, "The way which I have chosen of explaining what I mean by this is by saying that the feature of value judgment which I shall call universalizability is simply that which they share with

descriptive judgments; namely the fact that they both carry descriptive meaning.”<sup>90</sup>

According to Hare moral judgments are universalizable simply because like descriptive judgments moral judgments do have descriptive meaning. We have seen in the course of our discussion that Hare himself categorically stated this view by the *phrastic* term. When we claim that ‘x is red’, we equally mean to say that ‘everything which is like x in the relevant respects is red’. This is exactly the same case that we do establish in the moral judgment. In the case of moral judgment when we say that ‘x is good’, we are equally obliged to say that ‘anything which is similar to x in the relevant respects is good’. However, if we very much careful regarding the judgments cited above we find that there underlies a subtle distinction between them. The universal rules that determine the descriptive meaning of descriptive judgment are *meaning-rules*, whereas the universal rules that determine the descriptive meaning of moral judgment are not mere meaning-rules, *but moral principle of substance*. That is why Hare introduces the term *neustic*. A naturalist, however, does not agree with the proposal. He may think that the rules which determine value words are completely descriptive meaning rules. For him a value term is at par with a descriptive term. According to Hare to understand a value word with a descriptive word does not mean to say that it is the soul view of naturalism. Besides a naturalist, we can also mention a non-naturalist descriptivist, namely, Moore who actually understands value word at par with the descriptive terms. But there of course underlies a specific distinction between a naturalist and a non-naturalist descriptivist.

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<sup>90</sup> Hare, R. M. *Freedom and Reason*, op. cit. p.15.

Unlike a naturalist descriptivist, a non-naturalist descriptivist holds that a value-word is *sue-generis*.

What position does Hare hold? Is he a naturalist or non-naturalist? We think that Hare is neither a naturalist, nor a non-naturalist descriptivist. He is a prescriptivist. In fact Hare introduces the doctrine of prescriptivism in moral philosophy. While introducing the doctrine of prescriptivism, Hare does not rule out the descriptive element of moral judgment. This is made clear with the help of the following explanation. Let us assume that 'U' stands for the thesis: moral judgments are prescriptive. We think that Hare's thesis of moral universalizability is the combination of both U and P. It is also to be noted here that the prescriptive character of moral judgment is twofold, namely, the *stronger* and the *weaker*. Let us again presuppose that the letter 'd' stands for the stronger sense. We asserts that the descriptive meaning of moral judgment exhaust their meaning. This theory is called prescriptivism. Again let us suppose 'di' stands for the weaker form of prescriptivism which states that moral judgments though may possess other elements in their meaning, still they have descriptive meaning. As a universal prescriptivist Hare affirms 'P', 'U' and 'di'. For him they are mutually consistent. He holds that 'di' logically entails 'U'. To say that moral judgments do have descriptive meaning is to say that they are universalizable. Hare further contends that P is consistent with 'di'. For him to say that a moral judgment is prescriptive is not to say that the prescriptive meaning is the sole meaning it has, rather it means that it does carry prescriptive meaning along with other meaning. This makes sense to say that the prescriptive meaning rules are not exhaustive as far as understanding of the prescriptive judgment is concerned.

According to Hare, any combination of 'P and U' or 'P and di' is morally valid. However, Hare denies the combination of 'P' and 'd' as it leads into inconsistency. According to Hare both 'P' and 'd' do not co-exist. So the logical argument is again restated like the following:

*Any judgment having descriptive meaning must be universalizable.*

*Moral judgments, though prescriptive, do have descriptive meaning.*

*Therefore, moral judgments are universalizable.*

### **Our point of Contention**

The objective of my thesis is not to establish moral universalizability after R. M. Hare, but to explicate his own reflection regarding the classical *is-ought dichotomy*. We have established Hare's position of moral universalizability of prescriptive judgment. In this process we have noticed a few important aspects through which we can reflect on the classical is-ought dichotomy. Let us point out these issues in the following ways:

- (1) According to Hare is-statements are very much descriptive statements or assertive statements. Every descriptive statement can be expressed in terms of proposition. When an argument is formed along with descriptive statements and where the conclusion is logically followed from the premise or premises, the conclusion is said to valid universally. The descriptive universality is pure in the sense that there we do not entertain any other proposition except descriptive proposition. Now, Hare indirectly claims that like descriptive statement, prescriptive statement can also be universalizable. The only problem or so to speak the only difference between a

descriptive argument and a prescriptive argument is that unlike a descriptive argument, a prescriptive argument is not pure. A descriptive argument is formulated only by descriptive proposition; whereas in the case of a prescriptive argument, there remains at least one descriptive proposition. In this sense, it can be said that the concept of moral universality as we have noticed in the case of prescriptive argument is a *weaker form* of moral universalizability. Our point is that even though the moral universalizability as established by Hare in the case of prescriptive judgment is not the same as we notice in the case of descriptive judgment, but there remains a considerable relevance of deducing an ought statement from a descriptive or is-statement.

- (2) Hare tries to show that the rules and principles which are common in the case of descriptive arguments are also common in the case of prescriptive argument. In this regard, he has explained the rule of entailment, negation, contradiction, excluded middle, etc. It is important to point out here that the rule of entailment plays an important role in establishing the principle of universalizability. Hare shows us in what sense the rule of entailment has played the similar role in establishing the concept of universalizability both in the case of descriptive judgment as well as in the case of prescriptive judgment. We think that the relevance of entailment in the case of prescriptive judgment actually boosts the logical possibility of moral universalizability.

(3) Hare classifies different meaning rules. Meaning rules according to Hare would be two different types. Some meaning rules are purely descriptive in nature which is intimately associated with brute facts. However, there are other kinds of descriptive meaning rules which are equally associated with prescriptive judgment as well. Such meaning rules are called *moral principle of substance* by Hare. Thus, prescriptive judgments do have a very specific descriptive meaning, *a weaker form of descriptive meaning* (di) by means of which Hare has attempted to deduce an ought-statement from an is-statement.

(4) In his *The Language of Morals*, Hare appears to use the term 'evaluative' and 'descriptive' in slightly different context. Therefore, his attempt of deriving an imperative statement (evaluative in broad sense) is relative. For Hare, a value word, or a word used evaluatively, has both evaluative and descriptive meaning, and is to be contrasted with a purely descriptive use of a word, which has no evaluative meaning. Thus, it seems clear to us that Hare gives two different types of interpretation as far as his understanding of descriptive statement is concerned. In one type of descriptive statement, there is no evaluative meaning and it is a pure form of descriptive statement and in another form there is both descriptive and prescriptive meaning. Only in the later case, an evaluative statement, i.e. an ought statement can be logically deduced from an is-statement.

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