

## CHAPTER - IV

### Some Problems Concerning The Theories of Inference

#### Forwarded By The Naiyāyikas And The Buddhists

This section deals with the problems whether the property of being uncontradicted (*avisamvādatva*) is inconsistent to the phenomenon of momentariness admitted by the Buddhists. One may raise a question that an uncontradicted experience cannot be known within a moment. Hence to admit cognition as uncontradicted is to accept its non-momentary character. Such problem will arise in connection with the concept of *svalaksana*. In this work an effort will be made that there is no such contradiction so far as the Buddhist theory is concerned.

To the Buddhists the valid cognition (*pramā*) is defined as a cognition corresponding to the reality (*avisamvādakam jñānam*).<sup>1</sup> The term *samvāda* means one to one correspondence or transparent to the reality. Whatever is in one's cognition must correspond to what really exists in the external world for being a valid cognition. If there is a successful communication between a speaker and a hearer, it is also called *samvāda* in the sense of dialogue. In such case also there is transparency in correspondence. If a hearer understands what the speaker says and the vice-versa, we may describe it as correspondence (*samvāda* or *avisamvāda*). The Buddhists have preferred to the usage of the term – *avisamvādaka* i.e., cognition which does not have an unsuccessful or failing correspondence as found in the case of illusion, doubt etc. The

originated cognition capable of apprehending the real object is also the means of cognition (*pramāna*).<sup>2</sup>

To the Buddhists a source of knowledge (*pramāna*) is not different from the valid cognition itself (*pramā*), because the valid cognition of an entity depends on its external feature or form. The form which is in an object of valid cognition becomes the source of its knowing and both *pramā* and *pramāṇa* having the same form must be identical. In this case the object of valid cognition is the form of an object, which becomes at the same time the source of it.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, both *pramā* and *pramāṇa* must be originated simultaneously without any temporal gap, as such gap is not permissible in their philosophy due to the acceptance of the theory of momentariness. Hence they are to be taken as non-different. As *pramā* here is different from illusion, doubt etc, the *pramāṇa* is also the same. A valid cognition is the presentation of an object what it really is while illusion represents an object as what it really is not (*atattvānubhava*) e.g. water in mirage etc. In the same way doubt is taken as an uncertain cognition (*anavadhāraṇātmaka – jñāna*), as it bears cognition of uncertain object e.g. a man or a post (*sthāṇnurvā puruṣo veti*). And hence such cognition cannot be taken as a valid one. In other words, this is the general definition of *pramana* given by Dharmakirti in his *Pramāṇavārttika*. Right cognition is uncontradicted in the sense that it does not mislead one, i.e. an object indicated by the right knowledge or *pramana* in a particular place and a particular time could actually attained by one. In common discussion also an individual is said to be a 'dependable guide' if his informations correspond to the actual state of being (*samvādaka*). In the like manner, *pramāṇa* is to be understood. *Pramāṇa* only reveals the true nature of an object and it can lead

correctly an individual to the attainment of the object. The false cognition, which is not *pramāṇa*, is contradicted by experience. To them the validity of *pramāṇa* cannot be doubted, since the nature of an object as revealed by it is in conformity of the actual order of things. Hence the Buddhists have defined valid cognition as an uncontradicted experience (*avisamvādakajñāna*).

An objection may be raised by the opponents in the following way. A valid cognition remains in an agent (*pramātā*) and an object of the cognition is the thing known (*meva*), which remains outside the *pramātā*. It is not correct to call valid cognition *pramāṇa* if it cannot lead an individual to attain the object i.e. *prameya*. Due to the non-availability of the real object in the practical field (*aprāpakatvāt*) it cannot be said as *pramāṇa*. In reply, the Buddhists are of the opinion that the cognition or valid cognition cannot compel an individual to perform some activity or to attain object compulsorily, because it depends on the agent's will. But with the help of *pramāṇa* he ascertains the exact nature or essential nature of an object as such and such type (*evambhūtamidam vastusvarūpam*), but not otherwise (*nānyathā*). *Pramāṇa* provides an individual with such certainty. If there is any necessity, a person can utilise his valid cognition by way of attaining the object in the external world, otherwise not. One is having certain knowledge about an object which he may encash or may not. If it is utilised, it proves the uncontradictory nature of *pramāṇa*. The generation of the sense of certitude regarding cognition is the mark of *pramāṇa*.<sup>4</sup>

It may again be argued that the fact of unfailing correspondence is confirmed through the real attainment of the object seen

(*dr̥ṣṭārthapāṇa*). What is seen or perceived cannot be attained due to the continuous change of the nature of an object as per the theory of momentariness. The external form of an object which is seen is not touched, because the object seen has been lost in the continuous flow of time. How can the validity of cognition be established in terms of its uncontradicted nature?

The Buddhists reply this problem in the following way. To them it is true that the object seen cannot be attained due to the effect of momentariness. Though a different object is apprehended altogether yet we have a strong and definite cognition (*adhyavasāya*) in the form – ‘the object which is perceived is apprehended’ (*dr̥ṣṭameva prāptam*). It is the case of the attainment of what has been perceived (*pratitaprapana*), but not the attainment of the unperceived. When there is the cognition of water in the case of mirage, it is the case of the attainment of the unperceived, because the perceived object is mirage and attained object is water. In fact, there is no capability of attaining the perceived i.e. the real nature of an object (*aprāpanayogya*).<sup>5</sup>

The problem does not come to an end here. In fact, whether an object is capable of causing us to attain an object seen earlier or not cannot be determined until its causal efficacy is known (*arthakriyāprāpti*). In other words, whether an object is really water or mirage is known through its causal efficacy i.e. quenching thirst, which is not possible in the same moment. It cannot also be said that the distinction between a valid and an invalid cognition is known at the point of its origination, because the causal efficacy of it cannot be known at this moment. How can it be known as right cognition? In response to the

above-mentioned charge the Buddhists argue that, though it is very difficult to know the distinction between valid and invalid cognition at the time of its origination in general, the distinction of one from another can be known through the acquaintance with the specific cognition of the features of the object (*jñānaviśesodayāt*). A less intelligent person cannot apprehend the validity or invalidity of cognition of an object at the time of origination due to the absence of the knowledge of its unfailing correspondence (*avisamvādatva*) or failing correspondence (*visamvādatva*). Though it is true, the same individual can apprehend the validity of the same through the causal efficacy of an entity, (e.g. water) in the forms of bathing, washing, drinking etc. In the same way, he can know the validity of fire through the perception of burning, cooking etc. or by the emergence of smoke from a distance.

There is another type of man having sharp intellect who can realise the validity of cognition through their keen observation or matured perception (*paṭutara pratyakṣa*). From this it follows that one can know the unfailing character of the cognition or uncontradicted cognition within a moment with the help of one's matured perception – without depending on the fact of its causal efficacy (*na tu arthakriyāpraptyā*).<sup>6</sup>

It may be again be argued that the auditory perception does not enable an individual i.e., hearer to attain the object he knows. If uncontradicted experience is the mark of valid cognition, how is such cognition proved to be valid?

In reply the Buddhists are of the opinion that the validity of cognition lies on the apprehension of the real nature of an object

(*arthasvarūpapratīti*). Such encounter with reality does not always need confirmation through the attainment of the causal efficacy in the external object.<sup>7</sup> This view is subscribed by Dharmakīrti also in his *pramāṇavārttika* (1.1)- “*pramāṇam avisamvādī jñānam arthakriyāsthithih avisamvādanam*”<sup>8</sup>. That is, valid cognition is uncontradicted cognition and uncontradiction means the realisation of causal efficacy in an object. To Dharmakīrti the knowledge of the essential quality of an object is accepted as the causal efficacy. In the case of sound of a word the hearing is the causal efficacy, because the purpose of sound is served if it is heard. In the like manner, the purpose of Sun, Moon, Sky etc. is served if it is seen. The simple act of seeing is their causal efficacy. The essential nature of the object is its causal efficacy (*jñeyasvarūpasamvittih istā tatra kriyāsthithih*).<sup>9</sup> If such nature of an object is known, it is to be known as valid. This exact nature of the object is its causal efficacy, which is different in different object. Due to the differentiation of the causal efficacy a jar is treated as different from a cloth. When a child looks at the jar, it is not of same type, but it is of different type due to meeting diverse needs. As it serves different purpose in different time, it is called momentary. For this reason the causal efficacy is nothing but the realisation of the true nature of an object (*jñeyasvarūpabodha*).

To the Buddhists a wise man comes to know of an object by means of clearer perception (*paṭutara pratyakṣa*). As soon as it is attained, he comes to know of its causal efficacy at the same moment. But the blunt persons come to know of the causal efficacy of an object through inference. Hence the validity of perception is intrinsic to the Buddhists having clearer perception. But others having less intelligence can know of its validity by other cognition i.e., inference. This is

applicable to the persons who fail to ascertain its causal efficacy at the initial moment.<sup>10</sup> Bhasasarvajña puts the Buddhists rejoinder in justifying their position. The Buddhists say that the same *santāna* (continuity), which was perceived, is to be determined (*ya eva santānah, pratyakṣeṇa dṛṣṭah, sa evādhyavasīyate*).<sup>11</sup> Dharmottara has explained it in a clearer manner. To him the same *santāna* of existence which is to be determined (*adhyavaseya*) as non-difference is the object of action of fulfilling a human purpose.<sup>12</sup>

From the above we may draw the conclusion that Dharmakīrti and others believe that if perception is 'perfect', it can reveal both the object and its causal efficacy within a single moment. In this connection a question may be raised: how do the revelation of the object and its causal efficacy arise within a single moment? In normal viewing the object is known first and then its causal efficacy. If it is a habitual knowledge (*abhyāsadaśotpanna jñāna*), the cognition of an object may quickly be followed by its causal efficacy, which may be described as 'Śatapatrabhedanyāya'. Just as a pin can prick hundred of petals, a particular cognition of an object may be followed by its causal efficacy swiftly. However minutest it may be there has to be accepted a temporal gap. In the same way, the thesis that the same *santāna*, which is perceived, is to be determined can be rejected. Bhasasarvajña rejects this in the above-mentioned manner. To him without the moment (*kṣaṇa*) there is no *santāna* in reality (*kṣaṇavyatirekena santānasyāpi vastuto 'sambhavāt*).<sup>13</sup> If there is at all any *santāna*, it is to be taken as existing in different moment.<sup>14</sup>

It is to be pondered how do the Buddhists understand by the word - *patutara pratyaksa* (clearer or matured perception)? They have opined in favour of two types of perception - one by the wise persons and another by the blunts. The above-mentioned objections may be raised by the second category of people. So far as the former is concerned, they have clearer perception (*patutara pratyaksa*). Is it a normal viewing? I think it is a kind of *samyagdṛṣṭi* (right vision) which is connected with our intuition (*prajñā*). This type of perception being intuitive in character can reveal both the object and its causal efficacy within a moment just like a flash of light. Without accepting a transcendental or *yogic* element in viewing the Buddhists position cannot be explained. If an individual possesses such vision, he will have vision to see the object and its causal efficacy within a moment, because it is a kind of subtle perception revealing both. The momentary nature of an entity is to be understood by intuitive introspection (*samvedana*). For, the intuitive introspection indicates that sensation is only a 'momentary flash' and that it is nothing but the reflex of a momentary thing. What a momentary sensation grasps is only the thing that corresponds to the sensation. The sensation of a blue colour apprehends the blue colour and the present moment, but not that which precedes or follows before or after. The external objects are nothing but sense data and corresponding sensation confined in the single moment. This pure sensation points to the instantaneous nature of elements.<sup>15</sup> The entities, even held to be momentary cannot exercise causal efficacy whether in succession or in simultaneity and hence it is just a futile attempt to take refuge in the doctrine of continual flux for them.<sup>16</sup>

In reply Śāntarakṣita says that though several factors of production of the sprout do not have any action one another at the initial stage or at any stage of production yet they cooperate with each other in the matter of producing a 'self-same effect'. For though they do not have mutual interaction, they are not the same or similar entities as before, they, on each one of them, though momentary, having derived its peculiar causal efficiency from its own proper cause, severally contribute to the production of the second set of efficient factors.<sup>17</sup> The idea behind all that has been said above is that without the help of the subsidiaries the fact of the sprout arising out of seed cannot be accounted for. But the difficulty is that, under the doctrine of momentariness, there is no room for mutual assistance amongst the several factors involved in the production of the sprout. It is contended that the seed and all other factors severally derive their causal efficacies from the proper causes of their own. And distinct causal entities thus born of these factors at the second stage are severally endowed with the efficacy to bring out the ultimate cause viz, the sprout. What follows, therefore, is that in the event of each being causally efficient to produce the ultimate effect, there should be no room for so many factors getting involved in the process. In order to understand this one should have a right vision.

Hence a person having such right vision has matured perception (*patutarapratyakṣa*), which can reveal both the object and its causal efficacy within a single moment. Hence there is no inconsistency in their thought.

Excepting *Cārvākas* inference as a *Pramāṇa* has been accepted by all the systems of Indian philosophy. The Buddhists are the fore runners

in refuting the view of the Cārvākas regarding the *prāmāṇya* of Inference, which is supported by the Naiyāyikas also. Though there is a common agreement on the acceptability of *Anumāna* as a *prāmāṇa* between the Buddhist and the Naiyāyikas, there is a lot of controversy about nature of inference, the varieties of inference, means for ascertaining *Vyāpti* etc. as discussed earlier. Due to a different set of metaphysical presuppositions both the systems have looked at inference in different ways so far as its nature and classification are concerned. An effort has been made to give an account of a different set of presuppositions leading to accept different forms of inference and classifications. It has been shown that how the theories like momentariness, non existence of a permanent soul etc work behind the formulation of the nature of inference by the Buddhist. In the same way, the acceptance of the categories in *Nyāya* is working under the formulation of their theory of inference. Even in the classification of inference such presuppositions have got much influence. Moreover, the *Svalakṣaṇa* character of an object is accepted by the Buddhists in the perceptual entity and hence the object which does not come under it is taken as inferential. This meaning is totally unacceptable to *Nyāya*, because the Naiyāyikas do not believe in an entity which is of *svalakṣaṇa* type and all objects that are connected with sense organ are called perceptual even if they are not *svalakṣaṇas*. A comparative and critical study of these two pioneer systems on the issue of inference has been undertaken.

First, the inference is taken as *prāmāṇa* both by the Buddhist and Naiyāyikas. But its nature and classification vary in two systems due to the concept of *pramā* accepted in these systems. In fact, the instrument of *pramā* (*prāmāṇa*) is related to the nature of *pramā*. Hence, a

comparative study on the notions of *pramā* in these systems may lead us to understand the intricacies of the accepted *prāmāṇas*. If something is a momentary, can its unfailing corresponding character (Avisamvāda) be known? In the same way, it has been considered whether memory cognition can be included under *Pramā* or not according to *Nyāya*. Secondly, what is the determinate perception (*savikalpakapratyakṣa*) in *Nyāya* is inferential to the Buddhists. The Buddhists prove the existence of *hetu* in the form of identity, causality and non-cognition and also the relation between *hetu* and *Śādhya*.

Thirdly, the classification given by both the systems need to be pondered upon. For *Nyāya* the *kevalānvayī* is problematic. When nameability is inferred from the knowability, it is called *Kevatanvayī*. Is nameability really inferrable? As soon as we see ‘nameability’, we know its knowability, which may at best be called *jñānalakṣaṇā pratyakṣa* to *Nyāya*, but not inference. Fourthly, Dharmakīrti’s classification of inference as *svārthanumāna*, *parārthanumāna*, and *yogaja* creates some problems. If any *Savikalpaka* – cognition is inferential, it is very difficult to describe it as *svārtha* or *parārtha anumāna*. Moreover *yogaja* is subtle and quick, and then how are its sub classifications conceivable. Lastly, the *Naiyāyikas* have presented some aids to remove the doubt of deviation (*Vyāptigraha śamkā*) like *Sāmānyalakṣaṇā pratyāsatti*, *Tarka* etc. But the Buddhists have not suggested any means to it. From this does it follow that they do not believe in the existence of *saṁśaya*? All these questions are related to the theories of inference.

The Idealistic philosophers like Buddhists do not entertain any relation. For, to them acceptance of relation amounts to the acceptance of

relata and thereby the acceptance of the reality of the relata. The Buddhists do not accept any relation because they do not admit the ultimate reality of this world. The non-acceptance of a relation amounts to the non-acceptance of its relata, which leads to admit the unreality of the world. Though Dharmakīrti has tried to challenge the reality of the world around us with the help of some logic, the main problem remains unsolved whether the same logic can establish that an uncontradicted qualified cognition (*avādhitaviśiṣṭajñāna*) is erroneous. Unless it is established or substantiated, it cannot be said that Dharmakīrti succeeded in refuting all relations. From Nyāya point of view the description and debate involve a relation between the sign (significant) and the object signified (*vācya-vācaka-bhāva-sambandha*). Let us suppose one can show that the concept of relation is problematic, then it would be shown that the Nyāya theory at its basic level rests on a problematic conception. That is why, Dharmakīrti undertakes a polemic against the notion of relation as understood by *Nyāya* in his work- *Sambandha-parīkṣā*.

In order to situate Dharmakīrti's polemic one should understand two Buddhist key-terms: *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*. The first term means 'that which is characterised by itself and the second term 'characterised by general features'. The first is open to a form of perception what the Naiyāyikas call '*nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*' which means 'perception without being transformed' (by a concept), i.e, the cognition of a singular (*svalakṣaṇa*) . Any description, on the other hand, involves ascription of predicates to this singular (*svalakṣaṇa*). The *Sat* or real is asserted by the Buddhists to be the nature of *svalakṣaṇa* on the one hand and the nature of *arthakriyākāritva* (i.e.causal efficaciousness in a

purpose-oriented activity) on the other. That is, 'Sat' is momentary and singular and has a causal efficaciousness in a purpose-oriented activity (*arthakriyākāritva*). Usually perception is distinguished into the act and the objects of perception. 'Svalakṣaṇa' as Buddhists understand, is neither an act nor an object of perception, but rather it is the *experiential singular*. When we attempt to grasp the singular through identifying them as instances of general features (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*), we fail. For, the general features by their very nature are constructions in language. An object in its own nature has got its causal efficacy as it can serve the purpose of an individual but not the quality, name etc. associated with the object. The perception is to know an object devoid of ascriptions and non-erroneous (*kalpanāpodham abhrāntam pratyakṣam*).

An object remaining for only one moment and without having any association with *kalpanā* or ascription is called perceptual. To him this perceptual momentary object is alone real and hence non-perceptual and non-momentary object associated with ascriptions is regarded as unreal because it covers (*samvṛta*) the essential nature of an object.

Grasping in terms of general features involves using predicates, which are linguistic constructions (*kalpanā*). The 'real' escapes the net of language. The *svalakṣaṇa* entity, linguistically mapped, is not the *sadvastu*, rather it is constructed by mental ascriptions through language. In this sense the experience of singular is immediate and experimental general features, mediate i.e. it involves the use of linguistic means. Further, *svalakṣaṇa* should neither be understood in the mode of natural events. For, this distinction itself involves linguistic construction. Even in terms of its definition of *arthakriyākārī* i.e. an activity causally

efficacious when directed to a purpose, the *svalakṣaṇa* cannot be an object of description. These entities and relations in which they stand to each other are brought about by linguistic mapping. What is due to the linguistic mapping cannot be causally efficacious. Hence, the relation called expressed - expressor-relationship (*vācya - vācakabhāva - sambandha*) cannot be taken real in language -level.

If the above - mentioned definition of perception is taken for granted, a problem may be raised as to how the non-erroneous character of an object is to be known. In order to know this character i.e, *abhrāntatva* (non-erroneous) we have to depend on the external world where there is corresponding fact or language or relation which is regarded as *kalpanā* by the Buddhists and hence it is not at all *svalakṣaṇa*. This non-erroneous character of an object, *abhrāntatva*, cannot be taken as having no importance in as much as this phrase alone can differentiate *pratyakṣa* (perception) from *pratyakṣābhāsa* (pseudo-perception). The awareness of water in mirage is a case of *pseudo-perception*, because it does not possess the non-erroneous character of an object. How is this character known in a moment? The causal efficaciousness in a purpose-oriented activity (*arthakriyākāritva*) of an object cannot be known within a moment. If we wait for a few moments to see whether our known objects correspond to the fact or not (i.e, a relation between a known object and its corresponding fact), it will remain no more as a *svalakṣaṇa*, but as a *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*. If an object does not possess *svalakṣaṇa* character, it cannot be taken as a perceptual one. The understanding of non-erroneous character of an object within a moment is not at all possible. The Buddhists have subscribed to the theory of momentariness. This presupposition leads them to reject the

existence of relation, language and universal. The acceptance of these will totally collapse the theory of momentariness.

It has been shown earlier that the acceptance of the theory of impermanence leads to the non-acceptance of language or relation. The Buddhists have accepted language or relation under the category of inference or *ṣāmānyalakṣaṇa* because they are nothing but *kalpanā* or mental constructions, but not real entities or *sadvastu*. Word or language cannot reveal 'the real object'. The fire in reality can serve our purpose (*arthakriyākārī*) but the word 'fire' cannot do the job. In other words, reality exists in the object but not in a word etc. Let us make an effort to show how language is misleading. The use of the term '*dārāḥ*' bearing plural form conveys the idea of only one wife, while the use of the term *ṣannagarī* being a singular form refers to six cities. From these usages it follows that the word has nothing to do with reality. As word, name, universal etc. are not capable of revealing reality, the relation consisting of word, language, qualifier etc. cannot give the true picture of the real world.

The Buddhists are of the opinion that reality is of two types: Absolute Reality (*paramārthasattā*) and phenomenal Reality (*samvṛtisattā*). When an object is known as *such* without the association of the name etc, it is regarded as having absolute reality (*Paramārthasatta*). When it is known in terms of its relation with other objects, name, universal etc, it is called having phenomenal reality (*samvṛtisattā*). The relation, language etc. are called *samvṛti* by virtue of the fact that they cover (but not reveal) the '*true nature*' of reality. The derivative meaning of the term '*samvṛti*' is 'properly concealed or

covered'. The normal function of truth is to reveal an object, but here the truth manifested through language or relation does not reveal the essential characteristic of an object. On the other hand, it properly covers the same (*samyagrūpeṇa vṛta*). The former reveals the essential nature of truth while the latter gives us an idea of covered reality (*samvṛtisatya*) of the object. The *samvṛti* is also described as truth on account of the fact that it, though does not give the essential nature, provides us a hazy idea of the reality which may help to understand the essential character. This is *sat* from standpoint of *samvṛti* but not from the standpoint of absolute reality and hence relation etc. that are known as *sāmānyalakṣaṇas* have got a second order importance in Buddhist philosophy. It is important on account of the fact that through it one can attain the knowledge of Absolute Reality. After ignoring this phenomenal world one cannot reach to the region of Absolute Reality and hence it, though important, has got a second order reality in Buddhist philosophy. All mental constructions (*kalpanā*) come under *samvṛti* as they have covered the true nature of Reality. As relation is an empediment to the attainment of his Ultimate Reality, there is hardly any justification to accept it as a category of real.

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