

CHAPTER III

THE BUDDHISTS NOTION OF INFERENCE

Refutation of Inference by the Cārvākas

Valid knowledge or *Pramā* is that where the determinans or *Prakāra* actually remains in the determinandum. Or the knowledge about which we do not have any doubt and the knowledge which corresponds to the object is called *Pramā*, e.g. “*Ghaṭe ayam ghaṭa*” – This kind of *anubhāva* of *ghaṭa* is called valid knowledge as in this *anubhāva* “*ghaṭa*” is determinandum, *ghaṭatva* is determinans and “*ghaṭatva*” as determinans resides in the *ghaṭa*, the determinandum. Determinandum, determinans and the relation, are the three objects in *Viśiṣṭa – Buddhi*. In the case of *Viśiṣṭa Buddhi* “*ayam ghaṭa*” “*ghaṭa*”determinandum, “*ghaṭatva*” determinans and the inference relation appears as the object. In the above – mentioned part the relation is not separately described as mainly *Tadvati Tatprakāratva* has been explained here. The instrument of valid knowledge is called *Pramāṇa*.

In all the schools of Indian Philosophy as the instrument of valid knowledge (*Pramā*) *Pramāṇa* is admitted. But in respect of the number of *Pramāṇa* there is difference of opinion about them. Cārvāka Philosophy admits only perception as *Pramāṇa*. In Buddha Philosophy both perception and inference are admitted. Perception, inference and testimony – these three are accepted s *Pramāṇas* in Sāṁkhya and Jaina Philosophy. In Nyāya Philosophy perception, inference, comparison and

testimony are accepted as four *Pramāṇas*. In Mimāmsa and Advaita Vedānta the six *pramāṇas* namely perception, inference, comparison, testimony, arthapatti and non – cognition are accepted as *Pramāṇas*. Cārvāka is the only Philosophy that does not admit inference as *pramāṇa*.

The arguments the Cārvākas exhibit to falsify the inference as *Pramāṇa* are as follows :

If by *Pramāṇa* we mean indubitable and faultless *anubhāva*, inference cannot be accepted as *pramāṇa*. According to them only perception can be such *Pramāṇa*. Because in the case of inference when we acquire knowledge from the perceived smoke to the presence of the unperceived fire, we leap in the dark. Perhaps the Naiyāyikas support this kind of difference by formerly acquired *Vyāpti Jñāna* between the smoke and the fire.

The Cārvākas doubt the knowledge of *Vyāpti* which plays most important role in the case of *anumāna*. *Vyāpti* is the concomitance relation between the probans (*Hetu*) and the probandum (*Sādhyā*) or the co-existence of probans with probandum is meant here. As for example – in the case of famous inferential instance ‘hill’ is subject (*pakṣa*) ‘Fire’ is probandum (*Sādhyā*) and ‘smoke’ is probans (*hetu*). In this the concomitance relation is ‘where ever there is smoke, there is Fire’. In the case of any knowledge of *Vyāpti* there will be knowledge of concomitance relation devoid of knowledge of *vyabhicāra*. The knowledge of concomitance relation is of two kinds – *Anvaya* and *Vyatireka*. *Anvaya Sahacāra* is “*Tat Sattve tat Sattva*” or the presence of one indicates the presence of another, as for example – where there is

smoke, there is fire. On the other hand, the knowledge of *Vyatireka Sahacāra* is “*Tadasattve tadasattva*” or the absence of one indicates the absence of another, as for example – where there is the absence of fire there is absence of smoke. For acquiring the knowledge of *Vyāpti* the knowledge of *Anvaya* and *Vyatireka Vyabhihcāra* accompanying with the knowledge of *Sahacāra* is required. The knowledge of *anvaya vyabhihcāra* is this “*Tadasattve tadasattva*” or one will be absent instead of the presence of another. As for example – there will be the presence of fire in the case of the absence of smoke. For acquiring the knowledge of *Vyāpti* ‘instead of the presence of fire there will be the absence of smoke’ this fact will be observed. “*Tadasattve Tadasattva*” is *Vyatireka Vyabhihcāra* knowledge. In case of *Vyatireka Vyabhihcāra* one will be present instead of another is absent. As for example – there will be presence of smoke instead of the absence of fire. The fact “there will be no smoke instead of the absence of fire” will be noticed for accomplishing the knowledge of *Vyāpti*. Only the knowledge of *Sahacāra* is not sufficient for the indubitable Knowledge of *Vyāpti*, the absence of the knowledge of *Vyabhihcāra* accompanying with the knowledge of *sahacāra* is vital for the certain knowledge of *Vyāpti*.

By considering all kinds of *Pramāṇas* the Naiyāyikas try to show that the origin of the knowledge of *Vyāpti* is not possible by any kind of *Pramāṇas*. According to them, *Pratyakṣa* is primary and important *pramāṇa* of all *Pramāṇas*. Cārvākas attack against the productivity of *Pratyakṣa* as the origin of the knowledge of *Vyāpti*. Ordinary *Pratyakṣa* is of two kinds - external and internal. In the case of external *Pratyakṣa* there is a contact between external sense organ and presently existent object. So external perception is able to acquire knowledge about present

object. It cannot acquire knowledge about past and future object. The knowledge of concomitance of all smoke and fire formerly produced, presently existent and what will be produced in future, is essential for the relation of *Vyāpti* i.e. 'wherever there is smoke, there is fire'. It is not possible for all smoke and fire of past and future to contact with the sense organ of the person who infers. Even all smoke and fire presently existent in this world cannot be connected with the sense organ of the person who infers. In *Tattvopaplavasingha* it has been described that the main hindrance of establishing the relation between the smoke and fire by observing every individual incident is the difference of space, time and characteristics. Jayarasi Bhaṭṭa thinks that this is not inconsistent to anticipate the colour perception in the case of gustatory perception by means of tongue as it is the case to anticipate the existence of the object that cannot be perceived directly. In this reference the supporters of inference may say that the invariable relation between smoke and fire can be established by the observation of some special incidents for this there is no need to observe every incident. It has been described in *Tattopaplavasingha* that the difference of space, time and characteristics is the main hindrance to establish the relation between smoke and fire by observing every incident. Jayarasi Bhaṭṭa thinks that if it is imagined the existence of the object that is not directly perceived it will not be inconsistent to imagine the appearance of the colour in the case of the tasting the water by the tongue. In this context the supporters of inference may say that the relation between smoke and fire can be established on the basis of the observation of some special incident, it is needless to observe every incident for this purpose. In the book *Tattvopaplavasingha* it has been described that this is applicable only in the cases where this

relation has been established on the basis of the incidents related, it is not applicable in the other cases. Because it is inconsistent to imagine the *gamaktva* of other in response to other.

The propounder of inference theory thinks that although all the cases of smoke and all the cases of fire is not possible to perceive, it is possible to perceive the class character “smokehood” & ‘firehood’ that is in all cases of smoke and fire and as a result of this consequence it is also perceivable the relation between the class – character smokehood and firehood. But according to Cārvāka perceiving each and every particular case of ‘smoke’ and ‘fire’ it is not possible for the external organ of human being, to perceive the class – character “smokehood” & “firehood”. Cārvākas rejects the possibility of attaining the knowledge of *Vyāpti* through internal perception. Separately internal organ cannot attain knowledge about the object of outer world. Because inner organ of a man has to depend on outer organ to attain the knowledge of outer world.

According to Naiyāyikas to attain actual knowledge of *Vyāpti* it is absolutely necessary to observe the every case of co-presence of probans (*Hetu*) and probandum (*Sādhya*) as well as it is necessary to observe each and every case of the absence of the probandum (*Sādhya*) with the absence of probans (*Hetu*) i.e., the knowledge of *Vyāpti* should be verified by both the method, the method of agreement and the method of difference. But the thinkers of Cārvākas opines that in the practical field it is more difficult to apply the method of difference than the method of agreement. Though it is possible to observe the co-presence of smoke and fire in many places, it is almost impossible to observe each and every

incident of the absence of smoke in case of the non – existence of fire. Because the absence of fire will be perceived in the every object of the world except fire. The truth of the knowledge of *Vyāpti* is not proved by any method that is method of agreement and the method of difference. As a result of this it is proved the uncertainty of the validity of that inference whose ground is the knowledge of *Vyāpti*.

The relation of *Vyāpti* is not knowable with the help of inference. If we think that this kind of knowledge of co-herence relation between all cases of smoke and all cases of fire is obtained with the help of inference, then we have to infer another inference for that inference. Again that another inference will be established with the help of the knowledge of *Vyāpti*. In this way there will be fallacy of *infinite regress* if we establish the knowledge of *Vyāpti* with the help of inference and again to establish inference with the help of the knowledge of *Vyāpti* and thus validity of inference is never proved.

According to the propounder of the inference theory that inference can be treated as *Pramāṇa* which is based on faultless probans. That probans which is devoid of condition is called faultless probans. The concomitance relation of unconditional probans with probandum is called *Vyāpti*. As for example, if in any places it is inferred that there is fire by observing smoke then it is implied that smoke is not dependent on any element except fire. But if anyone infers – ‘The hill is smoky as it is fiery’, the inference is wrong because the co-location relation between fire and smoke is the co – location due to condition of wet fuel. In the red

hot iron ball there is no smoke although there is fire. Some fire is limited out of all fire by the condition called 'relation of wet – fuel' and if such kind of acts as reason then the inference will be faulty.

The Cārvāka philosophers put this argument against the acceptance of inference as *pramāṇa* that it is not at all possible to be certain that in all places and time whether the reason is unconditional. As a result of this there remains doubt about the knowledge of concomitance which is accepted as the ground of inference. There is no rule that condition always will be perceptible. This is not directly known whether there is any super - sensuous condition attached to the reason. So there remains doubt whether the probans is devoid of all types of condition. So with the help of inference we cannot determine whether the probans is condition less. Because we think that the conditionless of the probans will be determined with the inference, but the conditionlessness of the probans including that very inference is not anyway possible. So indubitable knowledge of invariable concomitance cannot be possible.

The other means of instrument of knowledge (*Pramāṇa*) that is *Śabda pramāṇa* also is not the cause of knowledge of invariable concomitance, because verbal testimony is not separate instrument of knowledge. According to propounders of the 'verbal testimony' by the uses of trustworthy person people is acquainted with unknown meaning of the world. As a result of this it is proved that 'verbal testimony' is included in the instrument of knowledge of inference. So the defect which comes from the determination of the inference as a means of the invariable concomitance, the same defect will occur if verbal testimony is pointed out as a means of the knowledge of invariable concomitance.

Testimonial statement is the statement of the trustworthy person. To determine the truth of statement is only possible when we become indubitable about the existence of the knowledge of another invariable concomitance which indicates the all time inseparable relationship between sentence and its meaning. As the validity of the testimonial statement depends on the knowledge of invariable concomitance, that testimonial statement cannot be considered as a basis of the knowledge of invariable concomitance.

It is not possible to acquire the knowledge of invariable concomitance with the help of comparison, in case of comparison with the help of probans named 'the cognition of similarity' the relation of similarity is established between a term (*Samjñā*) and what it stands for *Samjñin*. so the comparison is not the separate instrument of knowledge and this is only a kind of inference. The objection arises in case of attainment of the knowledge of invariable concomitance with the help of inference, comparison also faces the same objection.

So as the knowledge of invariable concomitance which is the main ground of inference is not possible to acquire by any instrument of knowledge, inference also is proved as dubitable. So according to Cārvākas perception is only the means of the instrument of knowledge.

But the Cārvākas think that the common usage of people may be possible with the help of that possibility which comes through the clue of inference. By the perception of smoke the possibilities of fire comes out on our mind, but there is no certainty in this. This possibility is the main influence of the maximum work of our life. For most of the time the

possibility may be true but this is nothing but *post hoc ergo propter hoc* (*Kākatāliya*).

The relation of causality may be mentioned as the father of knowledge of invariable concomitance which is the base of inference. But the Cārvākas who do not believe in the law of causality think that in many cases occurrence of two incidents happen one by one is groundless and from this it is not inferred that in future the past incidents will be repeated. People accepts stone for property or to cure disease, they apply *mantras* or take medicine. According to Cārvākas in some cases the goal may be attained through this, but there is no causal relationship between the usage of this and the attainment of result. Because in many times we do not get any result by applying stone, mantras or medicine. Again in some cases without applying these sometime some people get the same result. According to the language of Cārvākas the relationship between both of them for getting result is described as accidental. In case of world the incidents which seem to be apparently related as causal relation, in same judgement it may be said without depending on the cause or any rule all these objects are produced accidentally. The Cārvākas said that, there is no cause in case of the diversity of the world. The diversity of nature is explained with the help of nature. The hotness of fire, coldness of water, the hardness of stone are natureal and as those things are not connected with any cause. Similarly the various incidents of the world, the sorrow, pleasure etc. of people happens naturally. As the cause of these there is no reason of accepting *Aḍṛṣṭa*, *Dharma*, *Adharma* etc.

Justification of Inference as a Pramāna from Sāṃkhya, Jaina, Bauddha and Nyāya standpoints

Many heterodox and orthodox philosophers vehemently attacks the opinions of Cārvākas who belief *perception* as the instrument of knowledge.

The Sāṃkhya Philosophers reject the objections of the Cārvākas by the argument that the non existence of the object is not proved if the object is not perceived. If any object is situated in far distance, the object is not perceivable for the long distance. We cannot perceived the existence of the flying bird which flies on the high range of the sky. Collyrium of eye is not capable of being seen due to proximity.

If any person becomes blind and dumb, he cannot perceive the colour and sound of any object. Due to the inattentiveness of mind any object is not perceivable. A man who thinks of his wife, the man whose mind is in sorrow for the death of his near relative cannot perceive the object which is situated in front of the eye and bright light. For the subtleness the object is not apprehended by the perception. Though the person is attentive cannot be perceived atom, due to its subtleness. Partition by the wall or covered by the clothes the object is not perceived for the distance. If any object becomes ecstatic trance by the another object, then through this ecstatic trance those stricken object cannot be perceived. As for example – during day time star and planets cannot be observed as they are stricken by extreme sun – rays. We cannot separate the cloudless water drops in the pond due to same type of object.

An object can not be perceived due to its non origination. Before production the effect remains in latent content in the inherent cause and for this latent presence the effect is not perceived. For example – the curd is not perceived as the curd remains in latent content in the milk. The inconstancy arises if non – existence admitted due to the imperceptibility of the object. If any person who is out side the house can determine, the nonexistence of the relative who cannot be perceived in the house. But this cannot be done due to genuine reason. So this should be admitted that if there is adequate imperceptibility than non existence will be admitted. Wherever there is imperceptibility there is non existence of object – this kind of relation of invariable concomitance is not right. The relation of invariable concomitance will be such “wherever there is adequate imperceptibility, there is in non existence of object”.

Perception is the only source of valid knowledge. The Jaina Philosophers reject this statement of Cārvākas by various arguments. The Jaina philosophers put questions to Cārvākas ---- whether the Cārvākas can exhibit any argument in favour of the statement ‘perception is the only source of valid knowledge’? If Cārvākas philosophers fail to exhibit the argument then their statements will not be acceptable as they are not supported by reason. On the other hand, if the Cārvākas support their statements with the help of this argument that perception is valid source of knowledge because perception can never be falsified, then infact they admit inference indirectly. Because any argument is the another name of inference. Inference is the determination of probandum in the subject with the help of probans. The Cārvākas can say in support of their statement that “perception is valid source of knowledge”, as perception reveals object without any exception. But perception does not always

reveal object without any exception. But sometimes perception gives us opposite result. As drinking and bathing of water in illusion of desert is not able to give result, so the knowledge of the perception of water is false and there is no validity of such knowledge. A person who is attacked by jaundice perceives a moon as two and there is no validity of such kind of knowledge too. If inference and verbal testimony is not acceptable as sometimes they are falsified, then for the same reason perception is undependable as perception gives us opposite result. So any instrument of knowledge will be considered as valid if it is able to produce effective knowledge. To know water as water is effective knowledge and effective knowledge is *pramā* or veridical *Anubhava*. *Pramā* is the key of effective activity like perception if inference and verbal testimony is able to give such practical result then they also will be considered be as valid instrument of knowledge (*Pramāṇa*).

Besides the Cārvākas have admitted inference as valid instrument of knowledge as they have denied imperceptible object like rebirth, immortality of soul, internal soul beyond the body, God etc. Because they have proved the probandum 'non existence' in the category like soul by the Probans "imperceptibility", in this case the form of the inference of Cārvākas 'that what is not the object of the knowledge of perception, is non existent; soul etc is not the object of knowledge of perception, so soul etc. is non existence.

When the Cārvākas said that perception is the only source of valid knowledge, then their conclusion is applicable to the perception of knowledge as a whole. The statement of knowledge of Cārvākas will be self – contradictory if they wanted to present their opinion as "perceptual

knowledge of all person, in all places and at all times is the instrument of valid knowledge. According to the conclusion of Cārvākas it is revealed that own perceptual knowledge of each person is the instrument of valid knowledge. Because the perception of any person will not be considered as existent in the sight of another person, because which is non existent can not be considered as the instrument of valid knowledge. So if Cārvākas want to prove the knowledge of perception of all knower of all places and time, they have to accept inference in another way. When Cārvākas engage in the discussion with another person to establish their own statement, they try to establish their own statement knowing the intention of the mind of the person who engages in the discussion. Indeed without help of inference it is not possible to know intention of other's mind.

The Buddhists who are against the opinion of Cārvākas who reject inference as instrument of valid knowledge said that the knowledge of invariable concomitance is possible and this knowledge of invariable concomitance is acquired by the principles of essential identity and causality. Without cause the production of effect is impossible. There can be no doubt about the co-relation between cause and effect. The production of any effect is due to cause. The effect is probans. Cause is probandum. In the case of inference 'the hill has fire as it has smoke', 'smoke' is probans and 'fire' is probandum. Fire is the cause of smoke. Smoke is the effect of fire. Perceiving the smoke, that means the effect in the hill, the fire that means the cause is inferred. Smoke and fire is related in the relation of invariable concomitance as effect and cause. Effect is possible without cause – if it is admitted then self contradiction arises and our day to day life becomes impossible. Therefore Udayan said

'*Vyāghātavadhirāsankā*' that means doubt in a particular case is possible until contradiction arises. So we have to admit the relation of cause and effect as the relation of invariable concomitance. The relation of invariable concomitance between cause and effect can be determined by the means of *pañckaraṇī*. These are as follows :

- i) The effect is not known before it is produced.
- ii) The knowledge of cause.
- iii) The knowledge of effect in immediate succession of the knowledge of cause.
- iv) The knowledge of non apprehension of cause.
- v) The knowledge of the non apprehension of the effect in immediate succession of the knowledge of the non – apprehension of the cause. If these five knowledge come one after another we become doubtless about the knowledge of invariable concomitance between the cause and the effect. Similarly the knowledge of invariable concomitance is certified by the principles of essential identity. The relation of essential identity is the relation of difference and identity.

The two things which are in the relation of essential identity, neither different nor identical with one another. The two objects who are in the relation of essential identity, remain in the same locus. There exists the relation of essential identity between *Śimśapāhood* and treehood. If it is said that *Śimśapā* is different from tree, *Śimśapā* loses its own genetic property. Again any type of tree is not *Śimśapā*. So we have certain

knowledge of the relation of essential identity between *Śimśapāhood* and treehood. From the knowledge of the relation of the essential identity between *Śimśapāhood* and treehood it is known that there is relation of invariable concomitance between them.

Lastly Buddhist philosophers arise one question to Cārvākas whether they give any argument for admitting the validity of inference. If they do not give any argument their statement will not be acceptable. '*Ekākinī pratijñā hi pratijñātam na sādhayet.*' If the Cārvākas give reasons to establish the truth of their statement, this exhibition of reason will stand against their original statement. Now they may say that as inference is mentioned in Nyāya philosophy, so they also bring the context of reason. So they accept the statement of Nyāya as the statement of trustworthy person. But those who do not admit inference as the instrument of valid knowledge if they admit verbal testimony other than perception, there arises a practical inconsistency.

Naiyāyikas also establish the validity of inference by rejecting the arguments given by the Cārvākas. The main arguments of the Cārvākas in favour of non accepting other *Pramāṇas* except perception is "That what is beyond observation is non existent". Naiyāyikas prove that *Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa* is contradicted according to the own arguments of the Cārvākas. *Pratyakṣa* is not accepted as *Pramāṇa* because eye etc. sense organs cannot be perceived. That what is perceived is a ball, not sense organ. The existence of eye etc. sense organ is established through inference. But the Cārvākas admit eye etc. sense organ instead of

imperceptible of those organs. Thus there arises fault for admitting the existence of imperceptible sense organs and it is not possible to ascertain the absence of any object with the help of the probans like 'imperceptible'. If the object is not perceived is determine the absence of that object then if Cārvākas goes to another place he will be sure to know the absence his wife and children as he cannot perceive his wife and children and he will cry in sorrow after returning home. In reality it is seen that after returning home he is accompanied by his relatives. As the relatives exist in the state of imperceptibility, it is to be admitted the 'imperceptibility' cannot be counted as probans in respect of ascertaining the non – existence of any object.

The Cārvākas think that there may be imperceptible condition in response to established invariable relation between smoke and fire. But according to Naiyāyikas this fear is baseless. As we perceive the relation between smoke and fire in the places like kitchen, cow – shed etc, the invariable relation which is established between smoke and fire is unconditional. Only in the cases where the invariable relation between smoke and fire will be established in future, there may be imperceptible condition. But that invariable relation which will be established between smoke and fire placed in another time and place cannot be known by perception. That invariable relation only can be known by inference. Therefore if Cārvākas expect imperceptible condition then they have to admit inference and if they do not apprehend (expect) condition there is no problem for them to ascertain the invariable condition and as a result inference is proved. According to Naiyāyikas the imperceptible condition which may be in case of the invariable relation between any type of

smoke and fire can be removed with the help of *Vipakṣa Bādhaka Tarka* which is related to invariable relation.

Buddhists Theory of Perception

Right knowledge is the cause of every successful action in respect of all these various human ends. Thus, after rightly determining the nature of an object through perceptual knowledge etc, one avoids the object like spears, poison, thorns etc ; takes up the objects like flowers, garlands etc and remains indifferent to objects other than these.

The expression ‘the attainment of all human ends’ is equivalent to ‘that which causes the attainment of all human ends’. The word ‘attainment’ (*siddhi*) is here used in the sense of ‘that which causes the attainment’ (*sādhaka*). It is shown thereby that right knowledge is necessarily the cause of the attainment of all human ends.

The word *iti* is used in the sense of ‘therefore’. The two words *yat* and *tat* are invariably correlated. Thus, it is finally asserted that, since right knowledge invariably precedes the attainment of human end, it is here expounded.

In the expression ‘it is expounded’, the word ‘it’ is to be understood not be understood as referring to right knowledge, ¹ because it is mentioned in the neuter gender. The word ‘it’ should not be understood as referring to the attainment of all human ends, though it is in ‘immediate proximity’ (*avyavahita*), because of its [relative] non-importance (*aprādhānyā*)./1/

Right knowledge is of two kinds – perception and inference. *Nyāya bindu*
1/2

This right knowledge can be properly comprehended only when the four types of ‘contradictory notions’ (*vipratipatti*) regarding its nature are removed.² The four types of contradictory notions are the contradictory notions relating to its number (*Samkhyā*), nature (*svarūpa*), object (*viṣaya*) and effect (*phala*).

Of these, the contradictory notions relating to its number are the following. Some logicians, namely, the followers of the Cārvākas school, maintain that right knowledge is of only one kind. Some others, namely, the followers of the Sāṃkhya school, maintain that it is of three kinds. According to the followers of the Nyāya school, it is of four kinds, while, the followers of the Mīmāṃsā school admit six kinds of right knowledge.

The contradictory notions relating to its nature are the following. According to some, Perception is determined (*savikalpaka*). But according to other Perceptions is only indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*)

The contradictory notions relating to its object are the following. Some say that the ‘unique particular’ (*svalakṣaṇa*) alone is the object of perception and the universal (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*) alone is the object of inference. Other logicians speak of other kinds of objects as the objects of perception and inference.

The contradictory notions relating to its effect are the following. Some logicians maintain that the effect of employing an instrument of

knowledge is something different, while others argue that there is no difference between the instrument of knowledge and its effect. Thus, the nature of right knowledge is comprehended, quite free from any error, only when these four types of contradictory notions are removed.

To remove, at the outset, the contradictory notions relating to its number, the another says, "Right knowledge is of two kinds". The expression 'is of two kinds' means that it has two different varieties. The word denoting the number is mentioned to express clearly the significance that right knowledge has only two kinds and not more. This excludes the possibility of its being of three kinds, of four kinds and so on. The word denoting the number merely refers to its two-foldness. But what actually are the two kinds? Why should knowledge be not regarded as of four kinds? In answer to these queries, the author specifically mentions the name of the two kinds, "Perception and inference."

The term *Pratyakṣa* (perception) means etymologically 'dependent upon the senses'. This 'indeclinable particle' (*nipāta*) merely suggests that the object of knowledge also is a factor in the production of perception. This, however, does not mean that the term *Pratyakṣa* or perception is to be applied to that kind of perception only which is always dependent upon the senses. For example, a particular animal is called go i.e. a cow because of its movement (*gamana*). But in this case movement is only an accidental indicator of cowness (*gotva*). Hence it is found that any particular 'lump of flesh' (*piṇḍa*), which is a locus of cowness, is to be denoted by the term go irrespective of whether it moves or not.

Here also the fact of its i.e. of perception being dependent upon the senses merely suggests that the object of knowledge too is a factor in the production of perception and as such, all the four types of perception including those which are not dependent upon the senses, e.g., mental perception etc are denoted by the term 'perception'.³

The word *māna* in the term *anumāna* etymologically means 'that by which an object is measured i.e. cognized.' That is to say, *māna* means an instrument which rightly specifies the nature of an object. The particle *anu* means 'subsequently' (*ānantarya*). Thus the term *anumāna* is equivalent in meaning to 'subsequent cognition'. That is, inference is a form of knowledge which appears subsequent to 'the perception of the reason as belonging to the subject' (*Pakṣa-dharma-graha*) as well as the 'reconciliation of the invariable concomitance between the reason and the inferable property' (*pratibandha-smaraṇa*).⁴

The two terms *Pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* have been mentioned separately with different case-suffixes (*vibhakti*). That there is difference also in the nature of the object⁵ revealed by them follows by implication. That is, just as they are different as regards the case-suffix added to them, so also they are different as regards the nature of the objects revealed by them.⁶

The conjunction 'and' (*ca*) is used in the sense of aggregation (*samuccaya*). It gathers the additional significance that perception and inference have 'equal capability' (*samavalatva*).⁷

Just as perception, being produced directly by an object, becomes non-erroneous and is a real instrument of knowledge, similarly inference

also, having invariable connection with the object through identity (*tādātmya*) and causation (*tadutpatti*), becomes non-erroneous and is a real instrument of knowledge. This repudiates the view, as held by some logicians, that, of all the instruments of knowledge, perception is the primary (*mukhya*) one. Because, both of them are 'equally non-erroneous'. There are, indeed, logicians who have tried to show the primariness of perception. (*Nyāyabindu* 1 / 2)

To remove the contradictory notions relating to its nature, the author gives the correct definition of perception, namely. "Of these, perception is knowledge which is free from construction and is not illusory". The word *tatra* is used in the sense of selection (*nirdhāraṇa*) Thus perception is here singled out from the two kinds of right knowledge with the help of its definition just mentioned. The term perception stands for 'what is to be defined' (*lakṣya*) and the expression 'free from construction and not illusory' stands for the definition (*lakṣaṇa*). Thus the meaning conveyed is : whatsoever is free from construction and is not illusory is to be viewed as perception.⁸

The meaning as expressed by the component members of the expression taken individually will now be stated. The expression *kalpanāpodha* means that which is free 'from all kinds of mental construction' (*kalpanābhyaḥ*), i.e. pure knowledge as separated from construction. Or, the expression *kalpanāpodha* means that which is not connected 'with any kind of mental construction' (*kalpanayā*) i.e. pure knowledge as not mixed up with mental construction.⁹ The word *abhrānta* means 'not illusory', i.e. which is not contradictory in respect of the knowledge 'that makes one reach the object' (*prāpaka*)

Buddhistic conception of inference

The Buddhists are the forerunners in establishing the means of ascertaining *Vyāpti* through *tādātmya* (the law of Identity and *tadutpatti* (law of causality). But the Buddhist concept of inference is somehow peculiar in nature and they accept it as a second order means of knowing, as it cannot reveal the real nature of an object. To them only perception can provide acquaintance with the real nature of the same. Let us understand the definition of *Pramāṇa* which goes as follows. *Pramāṇa* is a kind of trustworthy cognition (*avisamvādakam jñānam*). Trustworthiness does not remain merely in the sentences uttered by a reliable person (*āptavacana*) as said by the *Naiyāyikas*, but it remains in the capacity of producing successful activity (*samārhapravṛtṭijanakatva*). To the Buddhists it is not the instrument of the right cognition (*pramākarāṇa*), but it is a defining characteristic of *pramā*. What is called *pramāṇa* by them is nothing but the *pramā* itself, because the *pramāṇa* and *pramā* is grasped at the same moment. According to many schools of Indian Philosophy the relation between *pramāṇa* and *pramā* is a causal one – *pramāṇa* is the instrumental cause (*karāṇa*) while *pramā* is the result (*phala*) produced by the instrumental cause. In fact, there is no hard and fast distinction between *pramā* and *pramāṇa*.

The Buddhists admit two types of *pramāṇa*, viz. perception and inference. Perception reveals the entities called *svalakṣaṇa*, which are ultimately real (*pāramārhikasat*), while inference reveals objects known as *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* which are imaginary constructions (*kalpanā*). As

judgemental assertion is not directly connected with the reality, it cannot be regarded as ultimately real. These *sāmānyalakṣaṇas* cannot also be described as fictional entities like hare's horn etc., as these revealing some objects lead us to successful activity and by way of this they can serve some purpose (*arthakriyākārī*). Hence the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* objects are empirically real (*vyavahārikasat*). In their opinion there are two types of *pramāṇa* due to two types of object to be known *prameyadvaidhyāt pramāṇadvaidhyam*. Each *pramāṇa* is confined to a specific type of object. Hence, perception can reveal only *svalakṣaṇa* objects, while inference can reveal only *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* objects. Perception is defined as *kalpanāpodham abhrāntamī* *Pratyakṣam* i.e., perception is a kind of cognition which is free from mental constructions (*kalpanā*) and non – erroneous (*abhrantā*). In this case only *indeterminate* perception (*nirvikalpaka*) is perception in the true sense of the term. It cannot cover the determinate or judgemental perception (*savikalpakapratyakṣa*) which is known through inference.

The arguments for not accepting *savikalpaka* or judgemental expression as a form of perception are as follows :

- i) The philosophers which accept *savikalpaka* perceptin admit five kinds of mental constructions (*kalpanā*)-*nāmakalpanā*, *jātikalpanā*, *guṇakalpanā*, *karmakalpanā* and *dravyakalpanā*. The first one cannot be perceptual, for, names or words cannot feature in any cognition produced by sense – organ and sense – object – contact. The second, third and fourth are ruled out on the ground that prior to the so-called *savikalpaka* perception these are not apprehended in

isolation from the entity which they qualify. Moreover, the entities like universal etc. are unreal and hence cannot feature in perception. The last one is also ruled out on the reason that such a qualificative judgement follows apprehension, recognition, synthesis and addition of words – functions that can never be performed by sense – organ which is merely receptive.

- ii) *Svalakṣaṇa* is inexpressible since expressibility entails conceptualization which includes relation. Our language is so structured. *Svalakṣaṇa* enjoys a non – linguistic ontology. If one attempts to communicate the experience of *svalakṣaṇa* then it must involve *kalpanā*. That which ‘is’ is momentary (*yat sat tat kṣanikam*). An object persisting through moments must be unreal (*asat*). An object seen through theoretic constructions is a post eventum affair. Moments do pass between apprehending a singular and its judgemental acknowledgement through the use of concepts and relations. The Buddhists call it *anumāna*.

Inference For Oneself

Dharmakīrti in his *Nyāyabindu* has given an analysis of inference which is nothing but a cognition known through mental ascription (*kalpanāyukta*). Any type of conceptual cognition, to him, comes under mental construction. The conceptual cognition includes a cognition known through the glass of language, universal, etc. That is why, this type of cognition is called *samvṛti satya* (covered reality) which is of

second order truth in Buddhism. Let us try to give a short description of inference according to Dharmakirti.

Inference is twofold – for one’s own sake (*svārtha*) and for the sake of others (*parārtha*). (Nyāyabindu 2/1).

Right knowledge has been explained to be of two kinds, namely, perception and inference. Of these, perception has already been explained in details. To begin the explanation of inference, the Dharmakirti says, “Inference is twofold”. It is to be noted that there are only two types of inference.

There can be no general definition¹⁰ covering both *svārthānumāna* and *parārthānumāna* which are respectively of the nature of “cognition” (*jñāna*) and “verbal communication” (*abhidhāna*)¹¹ This shows that the two are different by nature.

How can, therefore, a general definition be stated first? On the other hand, it would be easier to state the definitions pertaining to each class when they have been classified. That is why the classification has been mentioned first.¹²

The terms *svārtha* and *parārtha* are added to show specifically that inference is of two kinds only. The word *artha* here means purpose (*prayojana*). Finally, the terms *svārtha* and *parārtha* therefore respectively mean ‘what serves one’s own purpose’ and ‘what serves the purpose of somebody else’. Thus, it is to be noted that a *svārthānumāna* is what is the cause of one’s own cognition, and a *parārthanumana* is what is the cause of the cognition of somebody else. (Nyāyabindu 2/1).

The compounded word *trirūpa* means what possesses three characteristics. The word 'mark' (*liṅga*) means that by which an object is indicated (*liṅgyate*). An inferable object is what is known through inference. Thus, a *svārthānumāna* means a cognition which is produced through a reason (*hetu*) having three specific characteristics and pertains to the inferable object.

Even a cognition which is produced through a *pseudo-mark* (*liṅgabhāsa*) would have become inference and hence, to exclude it from the purview of proper inference the expression 'having three characteristics' has been added. The cognition of the mark itself would have become inference and hence, to exclude it from the purview of proper inference the expression '(that) pertains to an inferable object' has been added. The mark itself would have become inference and hence, to prevent such a possibility the word 'cognition' has been added.¹³ (*Nyāyabindu* 2/2).

If the cognition of the inferable object itself is admitted to be the instrument of valid knowledge, what, then, would be the effect (*phala*) produced by it? Apprehending such an objection the Dharmakīrti says - just as in the case of perception the cognition itself has been said to be the effect, so also here the inferential cognition itself would be the effect produced by the instrument of valid knowledge, because it i.e. the cognition is of the nature of the ascertainment of an object.

Just as the instrumentality of perception consists in its coordination with the object, so also the instrumentality of inference, too, consists in

its co-ordination with the object, because the ascertainment of an object is accomplished by force of it i.e. co-ordination. (*Nyāyabindu*2/3).

It has been said that inference is cognition produced through a mark having three characteristics. What, then, are these three characteristics? In answer to such a query, Dharmakīrti says - the word *trairūpya* etymologically means the general property of what possesses three characteristics .

The first characteristics of a valid mark is its presence in the inferable object which will be defined subsequently. By mentioning the word *sattva* (presence) there, the author excludes the pseudo – reasons like “because it is perceived by the visual sense” (*cākṣuṣatva*)¹⁴ in the inference of non-eternality in sound and such others. By mentioning the additional word *eva*. the author excludes the pseudo – reasons like ‘one whose presence is unproved in some of the cases under the scope of the subject’ (*Pakṣa-ekadeśa-asiddha*)¹⁵ and such others.

The second characteristic of a valid mark is its presence only in a similar case. By mentioning the word *sattva* (presence) here, the author excludes the *pseudo – reason* known as the “extra – ordinary irregular” (*asādhāraṇa – anaikāntika*).¹⁶ By mentioning the additional word *eva*, the author excludes the pseudo-reason known as the ‘ordinary irregular’ (*sādhāraṇa - anaikāntika*).¹⁷ By mentioning both of these together, the author excludes the pseudo – reason known as the contradicted (*viruddhā*)¹⁸

The third characteristics of a valid mark is its absence in all the dissimilar cases.

By mentioning the word *asattva* (absence) here, the author excludes the *pseudo – reasons* known as the ordinary irregular and the contradicted.¹⁹ By mentioning the additional word *eva*, the author excludes the *pseudo – reason* “which is present in some of the instances under the scope of a dissimilar case” (*vipakṣaekadeśa-vṛtti*).²⁰

The expression ‘properly ascertained’ is to be understood as related to all the three characteristics, because it has been mentioned in the end. All the three characteristics are to be accepted only when they are properly ascertained by one’s own self through the instruments of valid knowledge. Otherwise it would be impossible to have any faith [in the efficacy of the mark] in the case of the inferable object.²¹ (*Nyāyabindu* 2/4).

What is the nature of an inferable object? To answer such a query, the author says - the word ‘here’ means ‘while considering the definition of the reason’.²² The expression ‘sought to be known’ means ‘desired to be ascertained’. The word ‘property’ means ‘a distinguishing characteristic’. The compounded expression *jijñāsita – viśeṣa* means something the property of which is sought to be known. A substratum is an object which possesses some characteristic. Thus, by the term ‘inferable entity’ is meant a substratum – some property of which one desires to ascertain.

It is also stated hereby that this definition of a substratum is to be understood in the context of the definition of a reason. Elsewhere²³ an inferable entity is simply a substratum as possessing a property. (*Nyāyabindu* 2/5).

What is to be understood as a similar case? To answer such a query, the author says - the word *samāna* (similar) literally means what possesses equal measure (*māna*). In other words, it means what is perceived through an analogous piece of knowledge,²⁴ i.e. finally, similar (*sadṛśa*). Thus, by a similar case is to be understood an object which possesses such similarity.

But how is it that the two i.e. the similar case and the subject of inference are similar in kind? To this, the author says, ‘Through the possession of the general inferred property,’²⁵ An inferred property (*Sādhyadharmā*) is something which is a property and which is also sought to be proved by inference. The general inferred property means such a property considered in its general aspect. The inferred property is actually different in every case, because its connection is restricted to that particular object only. Thus, the inferred property being different in every case, it would be inconsistent to maintain that the two are similar through the possession of the inferred, property only and that is why the two are said to be similar through the possession of the inferred property considered in its general aspect. (*Nyāyabindu* 2/6.)

What is to be understood as a dissimilar case? To answer such a query, the author says - by the term ‘dissimilar case’ is to be understood each and every one of the cases which are not similar. The expression ‘different from it’ means what is different from a similar case. As for example, in the inference of warm touch, a dissimilar case of this form is a substance characterized by temperate touch.

The expression “contrary to it” means contrary to a similar case. As for example, in the inference of warm touch, again, a dissimilar case of this form is a substance characterized by cold touch.

The expression ‘its absence’ means the absence of a similar case. As, for example, in the inference of non – eternity in the *Sautrāntika* view, a dissimilar case of this form is a substance characterized by the absence of non – eternity i.e. a substance which is eternal, because in the Sautrāntika view even *ākāśa* and the like are not admitted to be characterized by eternity.

A dissimilar case is thus to be understood as not similar in each of the three senses. In the sense of absence, it is understood as not similar actually. But in the sense of difference or contrariety, it is understood as not similar in an indirect way.²⁶ (*Nyāyabindu* 2/7)

How many are the marks that possess the characteristics of a valid mark as already mentioned? To answer such a query, the author says - the three characteristics, as already mentioned, can relate to only three and not to any greater [number of marks]. This is the meaning conveyed by the additional [word *eva*]. It is to be noted that each one of the three varieties of the marks must possess all the three characteristics and not merely any one or any two of them.²⁷ (*Nyāyabindu* 2/8)

What, then, are the three marks? To answer such a query, the author says - here the three marks are specifically mentioned by their names. (*Nyāyabindu* 2/9) The author begins the explanation of the nature of non – apprehension with the words, “Of these, a case of non – apprehension” etc. The word *yathā* means generalisatoin

(*upapradarśana*) i.e. it is used here to signify that there may be many other similar cases of non –apprehension.

In the expression ‘there is no jar on a particular spot somewhere’, the spot referred to is a spot which is in close proximity to the observer. The implication here is as follows. In the expression “there is no jar on a particular spot somewhere”, the word ‘somewhere’ refers to the subject (*dharmin = pakṣa*). The expression ‘a particular spot’ specifies the scope of it. Thus the meaning is : There is no jar on the spot indicated by the speaker (*vādin*).

If the subject is simply mentioned as ‘a spot’, each and every spot would come under the scope of the subject and it would be impossible to prove the absence of a jar. Besides, it i.e. each and every spot anywhere is also not ‘capable of being cognized’ (*yogya*).

The expression ‘which fulfils the conditions of cognisability’ has been mentioned as a qualification to the reason. The word *upalabdhi* in *upalabdhi-lakṣaṇa-prāpta* means perceptual knowledge. The word *lakṣaṇa* in the same expression means what “is marked” (*lakṣyate*) through a piece of cognition, i.e. finally, an object of knowledge. The compounded expression *upalabdhi – lakṣaṇa* means an object which can be revealed by a piece of cognition; and lastly, the compounded expression *upalabdhi –lakṣaṇa– prāpta* means what has attained the status of such an object, i.e. finally, anything that can be an object of sense – cognition.

The expression ‘because of non – apprehension’ is equivalent in meaning to ‘because of non – perception’. The full meaning is thus as follows : because there is non – perception of a cognizable jar on the spot or any such locus, i.e. finally, because of the perception of a spot without a jar.²⁸ (*Nyāyabindu 2/10*).

But what exactly is meant by this fulfillment of the conditions of cognisability? To answer such a query, the author says that the word *upalambha* means cognition. The compounded expression *upalambha – pratyayāntara* means the other conditions of such cognition.²⁹ The object – condition (*upalambhapratyaya = alambana – pratyaya*) there is the jar itself. The other conditions different from it are the “immediate homogeneous condition” (*anantara – pratyaya*) and the like.

The totality of the conditions of cognition means the aggregate of all such conditions. By the word ‘totality’ is meant their ‘collective presence’ (*samāveśa*). An object characterized by a distinct nature means what has its own peculiar nature and is as well distinguished from other objects. These two namely, the totality of conditions and the peculiar object are here referred to by the expression “the fulfillment of the conditions of cognisability”. (*Nyāyabindu 2/11*).

Now what is exactly meant by an object characterized by a distinct nature? To answer such a query, the author says - by the term *svabhāva – viśeṣa* is meant an entity which is not rendered inaccessible (*viprakṛṣṭa*) by any of the three preconditions of inaccessibility and thus, which, being present, can be perceived when the necessary factors, namely, the visual

organ and the like are available. Thus, the meaning finally conveyed is that there is no jar here, because, in spite of the presence of the visual organ etc., there is non – apprehension of a perceptible jar. (Nyāyabindu 2/12).

To state the definition of a reasons based on identity, the author says - the expression ‘its own existence only’ means the existence of the reason only. The expression *[sva]-sattāmātra – bhāvinī* means what always exists in its own [i.e. of the reason] existence only. Thus, it is to be noted that a reason based on identity is employed to infer such an inferable property as owes its existence only to the existence of the reason. As for example : this is a tree, because it is of the nature of *Śimśapā*. Here the tree is related to every form of *śimśapā* and hence the existence of the tree is deduced from it i.e. from being of the nature of *Śimśapā*. (Nyāyabindu 2/13).

Here the author gives an illustration of a reason based on causation. It is ascertained that wherever there is smoke there is also fire, because the generation of smoke is dependent on fire. (Nyāyabindu 2/14).

But how then can it be specifically established that the marks are only of three kinds. To answer such a query, the author says - since the inferable entity is only of two kinds, namely, positive (*bhāva*) and negative (*abhāva*), the reasons also are of two kinds – what proves a positive entity and what proves negation. The inferable entity which is positive in nature is, again, of two kinds, namely, different from the reason and identical with the reason.

As the inferable entity which is positive in nature is of two kinds, the reason proving such a positive entity also is of two kinds. To explain : a reason identical with the inferable entity cannot prove the inferable entity, if the inferable entity and the reason are different in nature. Again, a reason different from the inferable entity cannot prove the inferable entity, if the inferable entity and the reason are identical in nature. When the reason and the inferable entity are identical in nature, we have a reason based on identity, and when the inferable entity and the reason are different in nature, we have a reason based on causation. the reason in the form of non – apprehension is the cause for establishing negation.

Hereby it is shown that, since two forms of the reason establish a positive entity and the other one is the cause for establishing negation, the reason also is of three kinds – two proving positive entities and one proving negation. (*Nyāyabindu* 2/15)

But how is it that only two forms of the reasons prove positive entities? To this the author says - the compounded expression *svabhāva – pratibandha* means being connected through one's intrinsic nature. Thus, finally, the implication is that the thing offered as the mark can establish the existence of the thing sought to be inferred, when it is found that the two are connected with each other by their own nature. (*Nyāyabindu* 2/16)

How is it that a thing can indicate the existence of another thing, only when there is a connection through one's intrinsic nature? To this, the author says-since what is not connected through one's intrinsic nature cannot invariably and necessarily lead to the ascertainment of the other

object, the 'relation of the indicator and the indicated' (*gamyā – gamaka – bhāva*) is to be understood as subsisting between two things only when there is such an invariable connection; and not otherwise. (*Nyāyabindu 2/17*).

To show what the connection pertains to and also the manner in which the connection is established. The author says - since the mark is sometimes identical in nature with the inferable entity itself, it must therefore be invariably connected with that inferable entity. 'Because it actually originates from the inferable entity'. Since the mark sometimes originates from the inferable entity itself, it must be invariably connected with that inferable entity. (*Nyāyabindu 2/18*).

But how is it maintained that the mark has invariable connection, because of its identity with the inferable entity or because of its origination from the inferable entity? To this, the author says - how can it i.e. the supposed mark be said to have invariable connection with that inferable entity, if it is something which is not identical in nature with the inferable entity or if it is something which does not originate from the inferable entity? But anything which is not invariably connected cannot be a mark, because absurdities would follow. It is to be admitted therefore that invariable connection is established through identity and causation, and not otherwise. (*Nyāyabindu 2/19*).

Let it be so. What does then follow from it? To this, the author says - 'Identity' establishes invariable connection in the case of a reason having an identical nature. 'Causation' establishes invariable connection

in the case of a reason having a causal relation. And hence it has been said that these two alone prove the existence of a positive entity.

Since identity and causation belong only to a reason having either an identical nature or a causal relation, it is possible to prove the existence of a positive entity by these two alone, and not by anything else which is not invariably connected. Thus, it is to be concluded that a positive entity is established only by two forms of the reason. (*Nyāyabindu* 2/20).

It has already been said that of the three forms of the reason one is the cause for establishing negation (text 15). What is the nature of this third form of the reason? To this, the Dharmakīrti says - it has already been said : there is no jar on this particular spot, because there is non - apprehension of what fulfils the conditions of cognisability (text 10) and these two factors [viz. non - apprehension as well as the cognisability of the object] are the causes that prove the negation of an object. (*Nyāyabindu* 2/21).

How is it so? To this the author says - that is, if an entity is actually present, its non - apprehension would not be possible. (*Nyāyabindu* 2/22). How is it that the same non - apprehension as previously mentioned is also the ground for one's 'behaviour in respect of the absence of an entity' (*vastu - abhāva - vyavahara*)? To this the author says - if the above - mentioned specific condition viz. non - apprehension and cognisability taken together is not admitted, there can be no ascertainment of an absence in the case of objects which are

inaccessible – temporally, spatially or by nature, objects which do not thus fulfil the conditions of cognisability, even though the perception of a knower has ceased to function. The particle *ca* is to be understood as meaning ‘because’.

The compounded expression *deśa-kāla-svabhāva* means space, time and nature – taken together. The expression *deśa-kāla svabhāva – viprakṛṣṭa* thus means objects which are inaccessible in these three ways. Of these, the objects which are made distant by immense intervening space are the objects spatially inaccessible. The objects which are made distant by immense intervening amount of time are the objects temporally inaccessible. And the objects which are imperceptible are to be understood as objects inaccessible by nature.

Thus, the expression “what does not fulfil the conditions of cognisability” (*anupalabdhi – lakṣana – prāpta*) is used here to signify the absence of the totality of the conditions of cognisability. The expression “inaccessible – spatially, temporally and by nature” is added to show that there may be absence due to the presence of certain peculiar circumstances. It is to be concluded therefore that an absence is proved by the same non – apprehension as previously mentioned.³⁰

It is also stated hereby that in certain cases when there is non – cognition (*agraha*) relating to some particular period of time, the absence is proved by the same non – apprehension as has just been mentioned. (*Nyāyabindu 2/23*).

To show how an absence is proved by non – cognition relating to some particular period of time – which fact has been referred to above – the

author now says - the term 'reminiscent impression' means an impression which is the cause of recollection – in other words, the 'root cause' (*vīja*) of recollection. The expression *amūḍha – smṛitisamskara* means anything – a jar or the like – in respect of which the reminiscent impression has not been obliterated.

“The cessation of the perception of a knower referring to the past or the present”. The two words 'past' (*atīta*) and 'present' (*vartamāna*) refer to an object – a jar or the like which is as cognizable as the particular spot etc. – that is, an empty spot or the like which constitutes the object of a cognition occurring in the past or at present. Otherwise, when there is an absence of a jar on some spot etc., how can there be a reference as 'past' or 'present'?

A knower means any person such as Devadatta or somebody else. An object- a jar or the like – is characterized as 'perceived' when it is rightly revealed in the perceptual cognition of such a person. Here also the term 'perception' refers to a perceptible jar or the like, because it is also equally capable of being cognized just as the particular spot etc. which are revealed in a perceptual cognition. If there is the absence of a jar in reality, i.e., if the jar is something imperceptible how can there be perception at all?

Thus, in the said manner, the cessation of the perception of a knower referring to the past or the present – being founded on an absence – becomes a pointer to something else, i.e. finally, points to something which is nothing but a particular spot, where a jar or the like is absent.

The behaviour in respect of an absence consists of a cognition in the form 'no jar is present here', the statement of this cognition in words and the activity (*pravṛtti*) in the form of movement towards the spot etc. without any misgiving (*śamkā*). The cause of successful behaviour in respect of an absence signifies the means (*sādhani*) by which such behaviour in respect of an absence – consisting of a cognition, a statement in words and a certain form of activity – can be accomplished.

It is also stated hereby that the cause of successful behaviour in respect of an absence is only that form of non – apprehension which has for its object anything produced either in the past or at present ; and not also that form of non – apprehension which has for its object anything to be produced in future. To explain, the substratum related to the future time, namely, the spot related to the future or the like is not yet perceived, and there cannot also be any non – apprehension in the form of the cognition of an empty spot as related to the future. But the substratum related to the past had been perceived and the spot having no jar is also recollected.

The expression 'provided the reminiscent impression has not been obliterated' is added to collect both these conditions, namely, the previous cognition and the recollection. Hence, the behaviour in respect of an absence becomes successful when there is a recollection of the spot etc. having no jar as related to the past days. Again, the substratum related to the present, namely, the spot having no jar, is itself revealed by

perception and hence the behaviour in respect of an absence in such a place is easily successful.

By adding the expression ‘that in respect of which the reminiscent impression has not been obliterated’, the author removes the fallacy of the “unproved reason” (*hetvasiddhi*). Otherwise, if there is no recollection of an empty spot etc. non – apprehension itself would not be possible. The words “past” and “present” refer to the particular periods as mentioned above.

By adding the expression ‘the perception of a knower’ the author leaves out of scope the perception of all the knowers i.e. perception in general. Had there been a reference here to the perception of all the knowers, the reason itself would have been unproved. The cessation of the perception of all the knowers is a fact which is not admissible even to the opponent (*prativādin*). (*Nyāyabindu* 2/24).

How is it that only the same non – apprehension as has just been mentioned is to be regarded as the cause of successful behaviour in respect of an absence? To this, the author says - an absence can be ascertained only through the cessation of the perception of a knower which has for its object anything produced either in the past or at present, provided the reminiscent impression *smṛti* – *vīja*, lit. the root – cause of recollection thereof has not been obliterated. But such an ascertainment is not possible through any other form of non – apprehension which has for its object anything to be produced in future.³¹ (*Nyāyabindu* 2/25).

The author has thus explained, with the help of the reason mentioned earlier [under text 10], the nature of non – apprehension and the particular periods of time to which it may refer.

To show the different varieties of its formulation, the author now says – the term ‘formulation’ means expressing through words a reason having three characteristics. Thus, non apprehension – following the difference in such formulation – may assume eleven forms. (*Nyāyabindu* 2/26).

To mention the different forms [one by one], the author says - the term *svabhāvānupalabdhi* literally means the non – apprehension of the nature (*svābhāva*), i.e., the essential properties of an object i.e. ultimately, the object itself (*Nyāyabindu* 2/27).

To give an illustration of the above, the author says - the expression “as for example” is used to indicate that it is just an illustration. This is to be understood in all the cases of non – apprehension mentioned subsequently. The word ‘here’ refers to the substratum. The expression ‘smoke does not exist’ refers to the entity to be inferred. (*Nyāyabindu* 2/28).

That is, in spite of the presence of the other conditions of cognition, there is non – apprehension of smoke which is perceptible by nature. (*Nyāyabindu* 2/29).

The term *kāryānupalabdhi* is now explained. The compound is to be expounded as *karyasya* of the effect *anupalabdhiḥ* (non – apprehension). The illustration is given by the words : as for example, the efficient causes of smoke do not exist here. The efficient causes of smoke

are the fire, fuel and such other things whose productive capacity has not been impeded. The word 'here' refers to the substratum. The expression 'the efficient causes of smoke do not exist here' refers to the entity to be inferred.

'Because there is no smoke'. it means finally : since there is the absence of smoke itself, there must also be the absence of its causes. If the causes of smoke having their productive capacity not impeded would have been present, the effect, viz. smoke, would also have been produced.³² (*Nyāyabindu* 2/30).

The term *vyāpakānupalabdhi* is now explained. The word 'pervader' means what pervades (*vyāpaka*) i.e.. what has greater extension and the compounded term non – apprehension of such a pervader. The illustration is given by the words : as for example, a *śimśapā* does not exist here, because there is no tree. The tree is a pervader of *śimśapā*, because the term *ṛkṣa* refers to all kinds of trees while the term *śimśapā* refers to a particular kind of tree only and its denial leads to the denial of the other [i.e. of *śimśapā*]. The word 'here' refers to the substratum. The expression 'because there is no smoke' states the reason. The expression 'a *śimśapā* does not exist here' refers to the entity to be inferred. (*Nyāyabindu* 2/31).

The term *svabhāva – viruddhopalabdhi* is now explained. The compounded word *svabhāva – viruddhā* means what is opposed (*viruddhā*) by nature (*svabhāva*). the whole expression thus means the apprehension of such an incompatible object. An illustration is given : as for example, sensation of cold does not exist here, because there is fire.

The word 'here' refers to the substratum. The reason is given by the expression 'because there is fire'. The expression 'sensation of cold does not exist here' refers to the entity to be inferred. Thus, fire and sensation of cold being incompatible with each other, cold touch is negated by the presence of fire. (*Nyāyabindu* 2/32).

The term *viruddhā – kāryopalabdhi* is now explained. The compounded word *viruddhā – kārya* means an effect produced by the opposite. The whole expression thus means the apprehension of such an effect. It is illustrated by the words : as for example, sensation of cold does not exist here, because there is smoke. The word 'here' refers to the substratum. The reason is given by the expression 'because there is smoke'. The expression 'sensation of cold does not exist here' refers to the entity to be inferred. Fire is intrinsically opposite to sensation of cold and smoke is an effect produced by it. Therefore, wherever there is smoke, there is also fire. How then can sensation of cold exist in a place where fire exists ? (*Nyāyabindu* 2/33).

The term *viruddhā – vyāptopalabdhi* is now explained. The compounded word *viruddhā – vyāpta* means what has invariable concomitance with the opposite. The whole expression thus means the apprehension of such an invariable concomitant. An illustration is given : as for example, the destruction of even a produced entity is not something constant.³³ The term 'constant' ultimately means 'what has the characteristics of being existent always'. The expression 'even of a produced entity' means 'even of an entity which is something originated'. The phrase 'the destruction of even a produced entity' refers to the substratum. The expression 'is not something constant' denotes to the

entity to be inferred. Thus, the final implication comes to this : it cannot be maintained that the destruction of even an entity which is produced is something constant.

What is the ground for such a conclusion? To this, the author says, “Because it depends on a further cause”. This dependence on a further cause is explained to be the ground as follows. Whatever has dependence on a further cause is not necessarily constant, as for example, the red colour in a piece of cloth made of thread.

Here the property of ‘being constant’ is opposite to the property of ‘being not constant’. The characteristic of ‘having dependence on a further cause’ is invariably connected with the property of ‘being not constant’. Therefore, whatever is dependent upon a further cause is also not constant. Add how can anything possessing the property of ‘being not constant’ be characterized by the property of ‘being constant’? (*Nyāyabindu* 2/34).

The term *kārya-viruddhopalabdhi* is now explained. The compounded work *kārya – viruddhā* means what is opposed in nature to the effect. The whole expression thus means the apprehension of such an entity. An illustration is given : as for example, the efficient causes of cold do not exist here, because there is fire. The word ‘here’ refers to the substratum. The reason is given in the words : because there is fire. The phrase ‘the efficient causes of cold do not exist here’ refers to the entity to be inferred. Here the effect produced by the causes of cold is sensation of cold. Sensation of cold is opposed to fire. How can there be sensation of cold if there is fire? The efficient causes of cold can never be present

where there is no sensation of cold, because, had such causes been present sensation of cold too would have been necessarily experienced. (*Nyāyabindu* 2/35).

The term *vyāpakā – viruddhopalabdhi* is now explained. The compounded word *vyāpakā – viruddhā* means what is opposed to the pervader. The whole expression thus means the apprehension of such an entity. An illustration is given : as for example, the touch inhering in ice does not exist here, because there is fire. The word ‘here’ refers to the substratum. The reason is given in the words : because there is fire. The expression ‘the touch inhering in ice does not exist here’ refers to the entity to be inferred. The touch inhering in ice is touch inhering in frozen water. Sensation of cold in general is the pervader of such touch. Fire is opposed to sensation of cold in general. Therefore, how can there be sensation of cold if there is fire, and there can never be any touch inhering in ice where sensation of cold in general does not exist. (*Nyāyabindu* 2/36).

The term *kāraṇānupalabdhi* is now explained. The compound is to be dissolved as *karaṇasya* (of the cause) *anupalabdhiḥ* (non – apprehension). An illustration is given : as for example, smoke does not exist here, because there is no fire. The word ‘here’ refers to the locus. The expression ‘because there is no fire’ gives the reason as free from any fallacy. The expression ‘smoke does not exist here’ refers to the entity to be inferred. Here smoke is the effect produced by fire and as such smoke can never exist where there is no fire. (*Nyāyabindu* 2/37).

The term *kāraṇa – viruddhopalabdhi* is now explained. The compounded word *kāraṇa – viruddhā* means what is opposed to the cause. The whole expression thus means the apprehension of such an entity. An illustration is given : as for example, this person does not betray any special symptom of cold such as having erect hair etc. The words ‘this person’ refer to the locus. The expression ‘does not betray any special symptom of cold such as having erect hair etc.’ refers to the entity to be inferred. ‘Having erect hair’ means that the hair stands on its end. ‘Having erect hair etc’ means the various symptoms beginning with it. The term ‘etc’. covers the other symptoms like the chattering of the teeth, shivering of the body and so on.

The expression *romahaṛṣādiviśeṣa* means nothing but these special symptoms of having erect hair and the like. Hair may stand erect due to various other causes, such as fear, joy etc. the word ‘special’ has been added to exclude such cases. Thus, having erect hair here is to be understood as referring only to one who is afflicted by cold wind.

In the expression *sannihita – dahana – viśeṣatvāt* (lit. because there is nearby a specific form of what burns)), the word *dahanaviśeṣa* means a specific form of fire. The word *sannihita* means what stands nearby. The expression *sannihita – dahana – viśeṣa* means an object which has a specific form of fire nearby. The expression *sannihita – dahanaviśeṣatva* signifies the general characteristic of such an object. The expression *sannihita – dahanaviśeṣatvat* means because of such general characteristic. The words “a specific form” have been added to indicate the presence of that particular type of fire which is actually capable of removing the sensation of cold. Thus, in this case, sensation of cold is the

cause of the special symptoms of cold such as having erect hair and the like, and fire is opposed to it, for heat produced from fire removes sensation of cold. And, if sensation of cold is negated, the special symptoms like having erect hair etc. also can never exist. (*Nyāyabindu* 2/38).

The term *kāranaviruddhā – kāryopalabdhi* is now explained. The word *kāraṇa – viruddhā* means what is opposed to the cause. The word *kāraṇa – viruddhā – kārya* means the effect produced by it. The whole term *kāraṇa – viruddhā – kāryopalabdhi* means the apprehension of it i.e. of *kāraṇa – viruddhā – kārya*. An illustration is given : as for example, this spot is not characterized by a person who has the special symptoms of cold such as having erect hair etc., because there is smoke. The words ‘this spot’ refers to the substratum. The expression ‘because there is smoke’ gives the reason. The expression ‘is not characterized by a person who has the special symptoms such as having erect hair etc.’ refers to the entity to be inferred. The expression *romaharṣādiviśeṣa – yukta* means one possessing the special symptoms such as having erect hair etc. the expression *romaharṣādiviśeṣayukta – puruṣa* means an individual as is characterized by the special symptoms of having erect hair etc. The expression *romaharṣādiviśeṣayukta – puruṣavat* means the spot characterized by an individual who has the special symptoms of cold such as having erect hair etc.

Here the cause of the special symptoms of having erect hair etc., is the sensation of cold. Fire is opposed to it and smoke is the effect produced by fire. Therefore, wherever there is smoke, there is **fire and**

sensation of cold, how can there be any special symptoms such as having erect hair etc., which are nothing but the effects of the sensation of cold? (*Nyāyabindu* 2/39).

At the outset, only one form of non – apprehension - that is, non – apprehension of what fulfils the conditions of cognisability – has been mentioned as the cause for establishing an absence. But how is it stated now that an absence is proved by the non – apprehension of the effect and the like as well as the apprehension of the incompatible and the like?

To this, the author says - the word “these” means the ones mentioned just now. The word “all” means the ten forms of non – apprehension without any exception. All the ten forms of formulation based on non – apprehension can be included into the non – apprehension of the perceptible.³⁴ (*Nyāyabindu* 2/40).

But it may be argued that a formulation based on the non – apprehension of the perceptible is something quite different from the formulation based on the non – apprehension of the effect and the like and, again, any formulation based on the non – apprehension of the effect is something quite different from the formulation based on the non – apprehension of the perceptible. Thus, in the case of the non – apprehension of the effect and the like, something else is negated ; but in the case of the apprehension of the incompatible and the like, something else is affirmed.

How can therefore all the forms of formulation based on non – apprehension be included in it i.e. the non – apprehension of the perceptible? It is argued by Dharmakirti that though the various forms of formulation actually differ from one another – since they either affirm or negate something else – still their inclusion in it i.e. the first form is intended to be in an indirect way and not in reality. Thus, for example, in the case of the non – apprehension of the effect, an absence is apprehended when the absence of the efficient causes of smoke has been proved on the basis of the absence of smoke. Wherever there is the absence of smoke, there is the non – apprehension of the causes of smoke which fulfill the conditions of cognisability, and thus it can be included in the non – apprehension of the perceptible.

This difference is due to the difference in the mental process of the various knowers. Some persons ascertain the absence of the cause on the basis of the absence of the effect, while others ascertain the same on the basis of the absence of something perceptible by nature. Similarly is to be understood the indirect inclusion of the non – apprehension of the prevader as well as the non – apprehension of the cause.

In the case of the apprehension of the incompatible, the absence of the sensation of cold is ascertained through the existence of fire. Wherever there is fire, there is the non – apprehension of the sensation of cold which fulfills the conditions of cognisability, and thus it can be included in the non – apprehension of the perceptible. In the case of the apprehension of the invariable concomitant of the opposite, the emergence of the various colours due to their dependence on various

further causes can be likened to the non – apprehension of the perceptible.

Also in the case of the apprehension of the effect produced by what is opposed to the cause, fire is first proved through the existence of smoke. Thus the sensation of cold being negated there, the absence of a person possessing the special symptoms of cold such as having erect hair etc. – which is opposed to it i.e. presence of fire is ascertained. This however is nothing but the non – apprehension of such a person – who fulfills the conditions of cognisability and thus it can be included in the non – apprehension of the perceptible. (*Nyāyabindu 2/41*).

It may be objected that in the case of the apprehension of the incompatible and the like, absence of an object is conveyed by a source of knowledge quite different in nature, and thus what can be likened to what i.e. the formulations are actually different? Besides there can be no formulation in the case of *svārthānumāna*. How is it then mentioned in the chapter on *svārthānumāna* that there are eleven forms of formulation based on non – apprehension? To Dharmakīrti the word - ‘consideration of formulation’ (*prayoga-darśana*) means cognizing in the form of a formulation. Its repetition (*abhyāsa*) means having such a cognition again and again. Thus, due to proficiency in the act of formulation, even when one has oneself an ascertainment of an absence, the ascertainment is produced just in the form of a formulation. That is why the formulations based on non – apprehension are specially mentioned even under the discussion of inference for one’s own sake.

The word *vyavaccheda – pratīti* means the ascertainment of an absence. Or, the word *vyavaccheda – pratīti* may be understood as the cognition of some distinguishing character. (*Nyāyabindu 2/42*).

The distinct nature of *svabhāvanupalabdhi* has been explained. But, in the cases of *kāryānupalabdhi* etc., it i.e. the distinct nature which makes *svabhāvanupalabdhi* non – erroneous is absent and as such, how can they also be regarded as non – erroneous? To this, the author says - various forms of non – apprehension have been mentioned as the causes for successful behaviour in respect of an absence. But all these are to be understood virtually as some particular forms of the non – apprehension of the perceptible, because the absence of an effect etc. can be proved only when there is the non – apprehension of a cause etc., which fulfill the conditions of cognisability, and not otherwise. (*Nyāyabindu 2/43*).

The apprehension of the incompatible can prove the absence of the opposite only if it fulfils the conditions of cognisability and not otherwise. Why is it so? To this , the author says - the expression *virodha-kāryākāraṇabhāva – abhāva* means opposition, causal relation and their non – existence – taken together. The non – establishment of all these is meant here. It is thus shown that in the case of those which do not fulfil the conditions of cognisability – opposition is unproved, non – existence of opposition is unproved, the causal relation is unproved and lastly, the non – existence of the causal relation is unproved.

To explain, if an object is found to be non – existent in the presence of any of the objects that are invariably connected with

something that fulfils the conditions of cognisability, it is to be understood that the object absent is opposed to the one present and , again, the object present is also so i.e. opposed to the one absent. If it i.e. one of the two is found to be existing in the presence of the other, it is ascertained that there is no opposition between the two.

Similarly, if an entity – previously absent – is found present when there appears another entity that fulfils the conditions of cognisability and, again, it is not found present when the other entity is absent, it follows that the one is produced by the other and hence a causal relation is established between two entities, if one of them is found to appear even in the absence of the other. In this way, here also it is maintained that successful behaviour in respect of an absence is based on the non – apprehension of what fulfils the conditions of cognisability. (*Nyāyabindu* 2/44).

It may be objected however, that behaviour in respect of an absence be based somewhere on something else. To this, the author says - an object which is inaccessible (*viprakṛṣṭa*) and by nature negates the possibility of being perceived or being inferred becomes only a source of doubt and cannot be the cause for successful behavior in respect of an absence. (*Nyāyabindu* 2/45).

Why is it so? To this, the author says - the non – apprehension of an inaccessible object implies the negation of *pramāṇa*. But the negation of *pramāṇa* does not necessarily prove the absence of an object. *Pramāṇa* i.e. knowledge is an effect produced by the object cognized and hence the

negation of *pramāṇa* i.e. the effect does not prove the absence of the cause i.e. the object.³⁵ (*Nyāyabindu* 2/46).

Inference for Others

To begin the discussion on inference for the sake of others,³⁶ Dharmakīrti states – an inference for the sake of other is the statement of a mark having three characteristics. (*Nyāyabindu* 3/1) The word ‘statement’ means by which something is stated, i.e. a group of words. The expression ‘having three characteristics’ refers to something which possesses three characteristic features. The expression ‘a mark having three characteristic features’ means what is a mark and possesses as well all the three characteristics. An inference for the sake of others means the statement of such a mark. (*Nyāyabindu* 3/1)

Inference has been mentioned as a form of right cognition. How is it now stated that it is a group of words ? To this, the author says – ‘word’ is the cause and ‘inference’ is the effect and thus by metamorphically attributing ‘inference’ [i.e. the effect] to ‘word’[i.e. the cause], word itself is characterized as inference. That is, word is characterized as inference since it is the cause of inference. (*Nyāyabindu* 3/2)

In the statement ‘it is of two kinds’, the word ‘it’ stands for inference for the sake of others. It has been said that it is only a statement of a mark having the three characteristic features. How can it be then of two kinds? To this, the author says, “According to the difference in formulation”. ‘Formulation’ means expressing through words and

inference is admitted to be of two kinds, because of the difference in such formulation. (*Nyāyabindu* 3/3)

What are the two forms ? The author says - an object which possesses characteristics common to something else is said to be similar. Similarly means the general property of similar objects. An inference is called *sādharmyavat* when it is based on such similarity, which means 'having the property of similarity'. An object which possesses characteristics not common [to something else] is said to be dissimilar. Dissimilarity means the general property of dissimilar objects. An inference is called *vaidharmyavat* i.e. having dissimilar properties when it is based on such dissimilarity. Finally, the two forms of *parārthānumanā* are those based on 'positive concomitance' (*anvaya*) as well as those based on 'negative concomitance' (*vyatireka*). (*Nyāyabindu* 3/4)

If a formulation based on similarity is characterized by positive concomitance, and if again, a formulation based on dissimilarity is characterized by negative concomitance, there should be some difference between them in point of fact also. How can it be maintained, therefore, that it is of two kinds just because of the difference in formulation ? A formulation based on similarity is dependent on a mark having three characteristic features and a formulation based on dissimilarity too is dependent on a mark having three characteristic features. As such, a mark having three characteristics being present in every case, there is not the least amount of difference in point of fact.

“Except the difference in formulation”. It means that the difference here concerns the mode of formulation only and is not in other respects.³⁷ Thus, in the first form, though actually positive concomitance is expressed, negative concomitance too is understood through implication. In the second form, though actually negative concomitance is expressed, positive concomitance too is understood through implication. (*Nyāyabindu* 3 / 5.)

Of the two forms of *parā^३hānumāna*, the one based on similarity is mentioned first. Anything which in spite of satisfying the conditions of cognisability is not found present is accepted to be an object of successful behaviour concerning the non-existent. Positive concomitance in the case of non-apprehension is mentioned here. For example, something like the horns on a hare’s head etc., established as objects of such behaviour. There are things which are established as objects of successful behaviour concerning the non-existent. An example of such an object is the horn on a hare’s head or the like. The word *dṛṣṭa* [Lit. seen] means established (*siddha*), i.e. finally, examined through the instrument of valid knowledge.³⁸ It is therefore offered as an example.³⁹ (*Nyāyabindu* 3 / 6.)

In *Nyāyabindu* Dharmakīrti indicates the ‘presence of the mark in the subject’ (*Pakṣadharmā*). (*Nyāyabindu* 3 / 7). In this context the term ‘dharma’ means ‘existence’ in the subject of inference.

An example of a formulation based on identity is ‘whatever⁴⁰ is existent is non-eternal, e.g. a jar or the like’ and this is a formulation showing an unqualified (*suddha*) reason based on identity. “A formulation based on identity”. It illustrates a formulation showing the

second form of reason as based on similarity. “whatever is existent is non – eternal, e.g. a jar or the like”. Here ‘whatever’ stands for any existent entity that is perceptible. All such entities, without exception, are non – eternal. This is a statement of the positive concomitance.

“A formulation showing an unqualified reason based on identity”. It means finally a formulation showing a reason based on identity - having no qualifying attribute. The statement ‘whatever is characterized by origin is non – eternal’ shows the positive concomitance as in the case of the second type of the reason based on identity.

“A formulation showing a reason based on identity, in which the property constituting the very nature is viewed as something different.” A formulation is given here to show a reason based on identity, by viewing the essential properties of an object as something different from it. Thus, origin (*utpatti*) of an object means its coming into existence and the two are actually the same. But here the existent is sought to be mentioned as a different kind of object – as something characterized by origination.

The statement ‘whatever is a product is non-eternal’ shows the positive concomitance of the third type of the reason based on identity. In the expression *upādhi-bhedena*, the word *upadhi* means a qualifying attribute. Thus, finally, [the third type of the reason based on identity having a qualification not expressly stated.⁴¹ A reason may be based on diversity of limiting adjuncts. (*upādhi bhedena*).

How does it have a qualification not expressly stated ? To this, the author says, “A product means a positive entity which depends on the function of something else for the production of its nature”. The

compound in *apekṣita-para—vyāpāra* is to be expounded as meaning what has dependence on the function of something else, i.e. a positive entity which depends on the function of the causes for the production of its peculiar nature.

But here such an entity is referred to by the simple term ‘product’ and as such, it is admitted to be another particular type of the reason based on identity, viz. one having a qualification not expressly stated. (*Nyāyabindu 3 / 8*)

An entity is said to be produced by conscious effort when it is caused through conscious effort, i.e. after the appropriate causes have been made to function. Hence the formulation ‘it is non-eternal, because it is produced by conscious effort’ is [to be understood as showing] a reason based on identity, having a qualification not expressly stated.

Pratyayabheda means a change in the cause. *Pratyaya-bheda-bheditva* means the general property of such a thing, i.e. finally, having a form varying according to the change in the cause. For example, when the lump of clay is small, the jar produced from it is also small. But when the lump of clay is bigger, the jar produced from it also becomes bigger. Again, if a jar is produced through the activity of an expert potter, it looks nice. But if it is produced through the activity of a potter who is not expert, it does not look nice.

Therefore, the formulation ‘it is non-eternal, because it varies concomitantly with a change in the cause’ is also to be understood as showing a reason based on identity, having a qualification not expressly stated. (*Nyāyabindu 3/9*)

In the preceding texts, only the positive concomitance of the three types of reasons based on identity has been mentioned. Following the same order, the presence of each in the subject is now shown.

The word 'or' is used to indicate three separate formulations : (i) sound is existent, (ii) sound is characterized by origination and (iii) sound is a product. (*Nyāyabindu* 3 / 10.)

The definition of a reason based on identity has already been mentioned : identity is the reason in relation to an inferable property which is invariably connected with nothing but it [i.e. the characteristic offered as the reason]. To show when and how it is to be applied, the author says, "All these characteristics offered as the reasons (etc)". That is, the three types of reasons based on identity – the presence of which in the subject has just been shown.

The Phrase 'Property by the appropriate instruments of valid knowledge' means 'by its own instrument of knowledge', i.e. the instrument of knowledge as appropriate for each one.

"To be considered in relation to an inferable property with which the invariable concomitance of nothing but the characteristic offered as the reason has been properly established". The expression *siddha-sadhana-dharmamātrānubandha* is now analysed. *Sadhana-dharmamātra* means nothing but the characteristic offered as the reason. *Sadhanadharmamātrānubandha* means invariable concomitance with nothing but the characteristic offered as the reason. Anubandha means invariable connection, i.e. finally, positive invariable concomitance.

Thus, the meaning of the whole expression is : in relation to an inferable property with which the invariable concomitance of nothing but the characteristic offered as the reason has been properly established. The characteristics present in the subject can be considered as real logical reasons only when it has been established that the inferable property is invariably connected with nothing but these characteristics offered as the reasons. (*Nyāyabindu 3 /11.*)

How is that the inferable property would be invariably connected with nothing but the characteristic offered as the reason ? To this, the author says -it is the very nature of a product that, in reality, it is non-eternal. It can never be said 'it is a product, but is different from the non-eternal' or 'it is non-eternal, but is different from a product'.

Why is it so ? Because whatever is produced by causes and such other factors must be subject to destruction. (*Nyāyabindu 3/12*).

Here an essential property of the inferable entity has been given as the reason. How can it be not connected with the inferable entity ? Thus, it is proved that it must be invariably connected with nothing but such a characteristic, offered as the reason. (*Nyāyabindu 3 / 13*).

What again is the ground for the above assertion ? To this, the Dharmakirti says - if the inferable property, e.g. non-eternality or the like, is not established even when the property offered as the reason, e.g. being a product or the like, is established, the two properties of non-eternality and being a product cannot be viewed as identical. (*Nyāyabindu 3 / 14.*)

If it were possible that a product is first brought into existence and afterwards the property of non-eternality is created in it by certain other causes such as a stick or the like, then there would have been an irregularity of the connection ; because a stick and the like also depend for their coming into being on their own causes. Hence it follows that whatever is not a product can also never be destroyed. (*Nyāyabindu* 3/15.)

“A formulation showing a reason based on causation.” is shown a formulation with a reason having casual relation – as in an inference based on similarity. “Wherever there is smoke, there is fire”. The statement beginning with ‘wherever’ shows the positive concomitance, viz. whatever particular spot is characterized by smoke is always characterized by fire.

“For example, in the kitchen or any similar place”. It refers to a corroborative instance. “And smoke exists here”. This shows the presence of the reason in the subject, viz. in the particular spot intended (*abhimata*) smoke is found to be present. (*Nyāyabindu* 3 /16)

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1. A pronoun would naturally stand for a noun which is mentioned in closer proximity to it. The work *tat* would then stand for *siddhi* or attainment and ‘it is expounded’ would be equivalent to ‘attainment is expounded’. But such a meaning is obviously not intended here. To remove the difficulty, Vinitadeva remarks that

the word *tat* being in the neuter gender refers to the noun which also is in the neuter gender, viz. *samyag-jñāna*, and not to the noun which is in the feminine gender, viz. *siddhi*. A further ground for such an explanation is that ‘right knowledge’ is here undoubtedly more important than ‘attainment’.

The difficulty can however be avoided more easily by saying that *tat* here should refer to right knowledge, because in that case alone the intention of the author is adequately explained. The implication of a word is to be determined, not simply by its position or formal aspect, but in accordance with the intention of the speaker as well (cf. *Hetu Bindu Tika*) p.3 : *vaktur abhiprāyānuvidhāyitayā śabdavṛtteḥ..... and the well known verse : arthāt prakaraṇāl lingād aucityād deśakālataḥ! Sābdārthas tu vibhajyante na rūpād eva kevalāt!!*

2. The word *vipratipatti* literally means, ‘contradictory knowledge’ (*viruddhā pratipattih*). It is used here in the sense of the causes of contradictory notions, i.e. the views upheld by the philosophers belonging to other systems. One’s own position becomes unassailable and quite properly established only when the views of others opposing it stand refuted.

There may also be a further logical justification for referring to the divergent views of other philosophers. According to Nyāya methodology, doubt is the very pre-condition for any critical discussion. As Vatsyāyana (*Nyāya Bhāṣya* p. 35. cf. also *Nyaya Sutra* 1.1 41) puts it, “An argument (*Nyāya*, lit. an inference for

others) is to be advanced in respect of only what is not known for certain (*samsāyita*) and not in respect of either what is completely unknown (*anupalabdha*) or what is already known for certain (*nirṇīta*)". Thus the statements concerning the conflicting views of different philosophers would lead to a doubt and this doubt in its turn would justify a logical discussion.

3. The term *pratyakṣa* is a compounded word formed by the combination of the particle *prati* and the word *akṣa*. The particle *prati* here is equivalent to *pratigata* or dependent upon and the word *akṣa* signifies the five (external) senses. Thus, the term *pratyakṣa* would etymologically mean knowledge which is dependent upon the senses. But then the second form of perception (viz. *manovijñāna*) cannot be denoted by this term inasmuch as it is not produced by any of the senses and mind is not accepted to be a sense in the Buddhist view. To obviate this difficulty, Vinītadeva says that the term *pratyakṣa* only draws attention to the fact that the object cognized is one of the factors required for the production of perceptual knowledge. It does not specify that the characteristic of being dependent upon the senses is necessarily a pre-condition for being denoted by the term *pratyakṣa*. The word *gō*, for instance etymologically means an animal which is moving. But the word is applied to mean a cow even when it sits down or stands still. Dharmottara (*Nyaya bindu tika* p. 11) too argues in the same way, though he puts the answer in a more pointed and better form : 'Being dependent upon the senses' is only an 'indication of the etymology of the term' (*vyutpatti-nimitta*) and not an 'essential mark for its application' (*pravṛtti-nimitta*).

4. This account of inference should be taken only as an etymological analysis of the term *anumāna* and not as a definition too, for both Vinītadeva (under text 1, ch.2) and Dharmottara (*Nyaya bindu tika* p.29) point out that a single definition covering both *svārthānumāna* and *parārthānumana* is not possible. See however note 3, ch. 2.

5. The tenet that each of the two sources of valid knowledge reveal quite specific type of objects is the very basis of the Buddhist objection to the Nyāya theory of *pramāṇa-samplava*. An object of knowledge must be either a *svalakṣaṇa* or a *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, for there is no other third type. If it is a *svalakṣaṇa* it would be an object of perception and if it is a *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* it would be an object of inference. Just as perception cannot cognise a *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, so also inference cannot cognise a *svalakṣaṇa*.

Following the account of Vācaspati (*Nyāya Vārtika Tātparya Tika* p 13) and Jayanta (*Nyāyamañjuri* I, p.28) the Buddhist view of *pramāṇa-vyavasthā* may briefly be described as follows. Perception is capable of revealing an object (*artha*) only because it is produced through the efficiency (*sāmarthya*) of an object. And such a thing alone can be an object of perception as is able to attribute its own form (*paribhāsa-ākāra*) to the piece of cognition. But a universal which is totally incapable of producing an “action in respect of an object” (*artha – kriyā*) can never do so. It can be done only by the unique particular which is essentially real, for a thing is essentially real only when it is characterized by the capability of producing an action in respect of an object. It is to be

admitted therefore that the unique particular alone is cognized by perception. On the other hand, the unique particular can never be cognized by inference. Inference results from the ascertainment of an invariable relation between two entities, which is established through either identity or causation. Such a relation however can never be established between two unique particulars and as such it is to be accepted as subsisting between two universals only. But a universal which is one and resides in different individuals at different times and under different conditions can never be a reality. Hence a universal is nothing but “an object of mental construction” (*vikalpādhiṣṭhāna*) originating from a beginningless stream of ideation (*vāsanā*). In other words, perception cognizes a unique particular or what is essentially real and inference cognizes a universal or what is illustory. Since there is neither any other source of valid knowledge nor any other object to be cognized, one has got to admit the theory of *pramāṇa – vyavasthā*.

Again, it is claimed by the Naiyāyikas that the same thing may be an object of different *pramāṇa*-s. As for instance, fire in the mountain is inferred by one at a distance, but the same is perceived by one after reaching the actual spot. To this, the Buddhist argues : Do both of the *pramāṇa*-s reveal the object exactly in the same way or in different ways? If they reveal the object exactly in the same way, one of them would be redundant. If they reveal the object in different ways, the cognition produced by the former would be contradicted by the cognition produced by the latter.

Besides, if perception and inference are admitted to have one and the same thing for their object, the cognition produced there fore should also be of the same nature. But that is simply absurd. The sensations of burning as apprehended by the tactual sense and as apprehended through words are quite different. (For an annotated translation of the complete passage in Nyaya Vartita Tatparya Tika, Buddhist Logic ii, pp. 301-8).

6. The author of the *tippaṇī* (p.16) quotes these lines and informs that Śāntabhadra too held the same view. He however rejects it with the remark that the two terms had to be shown separately because otherwise the particle *ca* cannot be added to bring out the implication that perception and inference have equal efficiency.
7. It appears from these remarks of Vinītadeva (which are very similar to those of Dharmottara) that the equal capability of perception and inference consists in their being equally non-erroneous and having thereby equal status as a source of valid knowledge. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla (TS verse 460) also share the same view. These remarks are probably added also with a view to emphasizing the point that inference, in spite of having for its object something which is only a mental construction and not real, must be considered a real source of valid knowledge.

Though Vinītadeva establishes the equal capability of perception and inference, and also refutes, in the same breath, the primariness of perception on the ground that both are equally non-erroneous, it does not seem quite convincing. Those who advocate

the primariness of perception justify it by an altogether different argument, namely, that inference can never proceed except on the basis of a specific form of perception (cf. *Tattvacintāmani* p.5: and this cannot be denied even by the Buddhists.

Besides, the two words *samavalatva* and *mukhyatva* usually have quite different implications and the use of both in the same context seems somewhat confusing. Arcata (*Hetu bindu tika*, P.40) mentions no less than three grounds for extreme importance (*Prādhanya*) of inference.

First the ascertainment of the four noble truths (*āryasatya*) which leads to the 'highest goal of human existence' (*prādhana-puruṣārtha*) is possible only through inference. Secondly, if there arises any dispute regarding the nature of an object perceived, there is no other means except inference which can lead to a final ascertainment. Thirdly, inference alone is the cause of human activity (*pravṛtti*) in general. When one wishes to acquire or avoid an object, one must first determine it as a cause of either pleasure (*sukha*) or pain (*duhkha*). But the presence of any such capability in an object which is yet to produce an effect in the form of a feeling of either pleasure or pain cannot be proved beforehand by perception. It is to be admitted that the specific determination of an object as a (future) cause of either pleasure or pain can be made only through inference and as such, inference is the underlying cause of human activity in general.

As one of the instances in which inference is to be considered more authoritative than perception, *Śrīdhara* (Nyāya kandli p. 375) mentions the cause of one having a ‘mistaken notion regarding the directions’ (dinmoha) and quotes in support the words of the ‘older people’ (*vṛddha*).

- 8 This is the most celebrated Buddhist definition of perception. It has been quoted and discussed in almost every later work on logic or philosophy of all the systems.

Perception is generally of two kinds, indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*) and determinate (*savikalpaka*). Indeterminate perception is the perception of an object as such, without any qualification. Determinate perception is the perception of an object as qualified by name, class or the like.

Here perception is defined as knowledge free from construction (*kalpanā*), i.e. as a kind of pure sensation – a piece of cognition by which the object is revealed only in its simple and pure nature, bare of all attributes and associations. Like the sensation of a young child or of the dumb, such a piece of cognition can never be verbally communicated in as much as any connection with a “verbal expression” (*abhilāpa*) would necessarily involve an element of construction. This definition of Dharmakīrti thus applies only to the indeterminate form of perception.

9. Haribhadraśuri (NPV p.35) dissolves the compound in *Kalpanāpoḍha* in no less than three ways. In this connecton also note the use of the word *alpaśah* in Pāṇini. ii. 1-38.

10. This contention however does not seem to be convincing. A general definition of inference may be given as ‘a cognition produced by the apprehension of a mark having the three characteristics or a mark having invariable concomitance with the infereable property’ (cf. Vinītadeva under ch.i, text 2; NP p.7; NV pp.161, 163). The objection that it would not apply to *parārthānumāna* as consisting of only a group of propositions would be simply out of the place, because the definition is not at all intended to cover it. The group of propositions does not really constitute the essence of an inference which is admitted only as a form of right cognition. Dharmakīrti himself points out at the beginning of the third chapter that the term *parārthānumāna* is applied to a proposition conveying a valid mark only in a secondary sense (*upacāra*) on the ground that ‘through an indirect chain of causal connections’ (*paramparayā*), it also helps to produce a cognition in somebody else (which actually constitutes *pararthānumāna* and to which the above definition applies). CF. also VD p. 375.
11. This peculiar Buddhist tenet of an essential distinction between *svārthānumāna* and *parārthānumana* – as a process of thought and as a mode of communicating it – was first set forth by *Dignāga* himself. Buddhist Logic ii, p. 47, n 2 and also Fragments, p. 82.
12. The violation of the accepted logical procedure that a general definition should precede classification is thus justified. Dharmottara (*Nyāyabindu tikā* p. 29) further points out that here the statement of classification actually becomes a ‘precondition for

the statement of the definitions' (*lakṣaṇanirdeśā – aṅga*) and that is why classification is given first.

13. Vinitadeva here shows the justification for the separate mention of each of the three terms (*pratipadavyāvṛtti*) in the general definition of *svārthānumāna*, which states that it (i) would be produced through a mark having three characteristics, (ii) would pertain to the inferable object and (iii) would be a piece of cognition.

The first clause prevents the definition from being applied to a piece of (false) cognition produced through a pseudo – reason (*lingābhāsa*), for a pseudo - reason is always deficient in one or several of the three characteristics.

If the second clause is omitted, *svārthānumāna*, according to the definition, would be simply a cognition produced through a mark having three characteristics. It would apply even to the mere perception of such a mark, for – the object cognized also being one of the causes producing perceptual knowledge – the perception of the mark also would be a cognition produced through the mark itself.

The third clause is added to point out specifically that, as against the claim of some, inference (as an instrument of valid knowledge) is represented only by the cognition produced through a mark and not by the mark itself.

14. i.e. a mark in spite of its presence in a similar case (*sapakṣa*) as well as its absence in a dissimilar case (*vipakṣa*) would be a

pseudo-reasons and not a valid mark, if it is absent in the subject (*anumeya* = *pakṣa*). As an illustration, Vinitadeva refers to the following false inference cited by Dharmakīrti himself as an example of *ubhāyasiddha* (ch. 3, text 68) : sound is non – eternal, because it is visible. Here the reason ‘visibility’ is not present in ‘sound’, which is only audible.

15. i.e. the particle *eva* has been added to emphasise the point that the mark must cover by its presence the whole class comprising the subject and not merely a part of it. The violation of this condition would lead to the pseudo – reason known as *pakṣaikadeśasiddha*. Dharmottara (*Nyāyabindu tikā* p. 31) illustrates it with the following Jaina inference that seeks to establish the animation of plants : trees are conscious beings, because they sleep. In the case of trees, ‘sleep’ which has been offered here as the mark means the closing of the leaves at night. But such sleep is proved as related to only a part of the subject, because only some kinds of trees – and not trees in general – close their leaves at night.

Praśastapāda’s enumeration (see note 7 above) does not contain any such additional word. In its explanation, Śrīdhara (*Nyāyakandali* p. 478f) who uses the term *bhāgāsiddha* in place of *pakṣaikadeśasiddha* and give a different illustration shows that even then there is no scope for the definition being applied to a case involving the above – mentioned pseudo – reason. According to the line of argument indicated by him, the objection against the above illustration of Dharmottara would be that, in the inference cited, the subject actually is ‘trees in general’ and not trees as

particular members. 'Sleep' is present only in some kinds of trees and not trees in general. In other words, the reason 'sleep' is not present in the actual subject and as such no objection is possible.

Dharmottara draws attention also to the position of *eva* in the *sutra*. The particle has been intentionally placed after the word *sattva* and not before it. If it were placed before the word *sattva*, it would have syntactical connection with the word *anumeya* and the meaning finally would be that a mark is some thing which belongs exclusively to the subject and nothing else. In other words, a mark should always be something which is an "exclusive property" (*asādhāraṇadharmā*) of the subject. Thus, in the inference of non – eternality in sound one would have to state as the reason nothing but the property of audibility (*Śrāvaṇatva*). To avoid such an absurdity the particle *eva* has been so placed.

The above interpretation of Dharmottara however does not seem to have much significance, for the difficulty mentioned by him is avoided by the second characteristics of a valid mark, viz. its presence in a similar case. 'Audibility' being an exclusive property of sound cannot belong to any other non – eternal object and as such, its presence in a similar case is also not established.

16. I.e. the violation of this second condition would lead to the fallacy of *asādhāraṇanaikāntika*. This fallacy occurs when the mark is present only in the subject and neither in a similar case nor in a dissimilar case. An illustration would be : sound is non – eternal, because it possesses sound - ness (*śabdatva*). Here the reason

‘sound – ness’ is located exclusively in the subject ‘sound’. According to Dharmottara, the second characteristic excludes a reason involving the fallacy of *viruddhā* (cf. note 11 below).

17. The particle *eva* coming immediately after the word *sapakṣa* implies that the mark must be located in a similar case only and not also in a dissimilar one. It therefore excludes a reason involving the fallacy of *sādhāraṇānaikāntika* which is present in both similar and dissimilar cases. An illustration would be : sound is non – eternal, because it is provable (*prameya*). Here the reason “provability” is present in all entities – both eternal and non – eternal.
18. The fallacy of *viruddhā* occurs when the mark has an invariable connection with the absence of the inferable property, i.e, when the mark is present always in a dissimilar case and never in a similar one. An illustration would be : sound is eternal, because it is something produced. Here the reason ‘being produced’ is present only in non – eternal entities.

By the word *ubhaya* Vinītadeva seems to refer to the words *saPakṣa* and *eva*. His explanation that they are mentioned together to exclude a pseudo – reason in the form of *viruddha* is quite unnecessary.

Dharmottara further explains that the significance of putting the particle *eva* just before the word *sapakṣa* is to indicate that a mark even if ‘it is not present in all the similar cases but only in some of them’ (*sapakṣāvyāpi*) is to be regarded as a valid reason. Thus, for instance, in the inference ‘sound is non – eternal, because

it is produced by conscious effort (*prayatnāntarīyaka*),’ the reason ‘being produced by conscious effort’ is ‘valid’, though it is absent in some similar cases such as the flash of lightning etc.

19. A *sādhāraṇanaikāntika* reason is present in both similar and dissimilar cases, while a *viruddhā* reason is present only in dissimilar cases.
20. As an illustration of *vipakṣaikadeśavṛtti* Dharmottara cites the following inference : sound is produced by conscious effort, because it is non –eternal. Here the reason ‘*non – eternity*’ is present only in some of the dissimilar cases such as lightning etc. (which are not produced by conscious effort and are non – eternal), while it is absent in some other dissimilar cases such as space etc. (which are not produced by conscious effort and are eternal). In other words, the reason here involves the fallacy of *sādhāraṇanaikāntika*.
21. i.e. all these three characteristics must be ascertained by the knower beforehand. Otherwise even if a person apprehends a valid mark in a certain place, he would not be able to deduce the presence of the inferable property there, for the efficacy of the mark would remain doubtful to him.
22. i.e. in the preliminary stage when a person with a view to formulating an inference determines the presence of a mark in a certain substratum in respect of which he seeks to establish a certain property, that substratum alone would represent the

anumeya, for the presence of the particular property there is yet to be established.

23. i.e. in the final stage when one has established through a valid mark the presence of the property sought to be established, the *anumeya* would be represented by the substratum (i.e. *Pakṣa* or *Dharmin*) as possessing that particular property (i.e. *sādhyadharmā*).

Dharmottara adds a further alternative : at the stage of ascertaining the invariable concomitance between the reason and the inferable property, the *anumeya* would be represented by a property (*dharma*). Thus, when one determines “wherever there is smoke there is fire and wherever there is the absence of fire, there is the absence of smoke”, the inferable fact is the invariable relation of smoke which is a property of fire.

As to the actual object of inference, divergent views have been held. For *Dignāga*'s view which is identical with that of *Kumārila*, *Fragments* pp.18-21.

24. Thus in the inference *parvato vahnimān* the similar cases would be the kitchen (*mahānasa*), the cowshed (*goṣṭha*), the yard (*catvara*) and the like. Every one of them can be the object of an apprehension in the same form “It possesses fire” (*vahnimān*). A simpler definition current in *Nyāya – Vaiśeṣika* texts (cf. *Tarkasamgraha* p. 43) is : *sapakṣa* is an indisputable locus of the inferable property (*niścitasādhyavān*).

25. i.e. the point of similarity between *Pakṣa* and *sapakṣas* would consist in the common possession of the inferred property alone and nothing else. Thus, in the inference of fire in the hill, a lake would not be *sapakṣa* in spite of being similar to the hill by the common possession of the property of knowability (*jñeyatva*) which is not sought to be established.

26. Nyāya bindu tīka p. 34f.

27. This is because deficiency in one or several such characteristics would invalidate the reason and make it a pseudo-reason. Cf *Praśastapāda's* remark (following the enumeration of the three essential characteristics of a valid mark) :

viparitam ato yat syād ekena dvītayena vā /

viruddhā siddhasandigdham alingam kāśyapo vṛavīt //

28. It is to be noted that in the Buddhist view, the term *anupalabdhi* does not signify simply a total absence of cognition. The particle *nañ (=an-)* forming a part of the above term is to be taken, as Dharmakṛiti points out (HB p.64), as a *paryudāsa*. In a *paryudāsanañ*, the force of affirmation is predominant and the force of negation is subordinate (*cf. prādhānyam tu vidher yatra niṣedhe ca' prādhānatā*). As for instance, the expression *abhakṣya grāmya – kukkuṭāḥ* (literally, domestic fowls are non – eatables) actually implies that all other fowls except the domestic ones – i.e. the wild ones – are eatable (*cf. Mahābhāṣya* p.41). Similarly, the term *anupalabdhi* also really signifies the cognition of something

else, i.e. of an entity other than the absent one – but similar to it in a certain respect. That is why Vinītadeva here equates ‘non – perception of a cognizable jar on the spot’ with ‘the perception of a spot without a jar’. Dharmottara’s concluding remark (Nyaya bindu tika p. 36, 11.18f) also is virtually the same.

Arcata (Hetu bindu tika p. 167) informs that the opposite view was held by logicians like *īśvarasena* and others who maintain that the particle *nan* in the above term is to be taken as a *prasajyapraṭiṣedha* in which the force of negation is predominant and the force of affirmation is subordinate (cf. *aprādhānyaṃ vidher yatra niṣedhe ca prādhānatā*) and hence *anupalabdhi* should be regarded as nothing but a total absence of cognition. One of the objections against such a contention is that it would lead to the absurdity of infinite regress (*anavasthā*). The absence of a jar is to be established by ‘non – apprehension of the jar’. But this ‘non – apprehension of the jar’ can lead to such establishment only when it is itself ascertained. Thus a second non – apprehension would be necessary for the ascertainment of the first one (i.e. the non – apprehension of the jar). On similar considerations, a third non – apprehension would be required for the ascertainment of the second one, a fourth one for the third one and so on. As a result, it would be necessary to assume an endless series of non – apprehensions. (cf. Nyāyanmañjuri i, p. 54).

The four *pratyaya* – s admitted by the Buddhist (as for instance in the perception of a jar) are : i) *hetu – pratyaya – light etc.*, ii) *samanantara – pratyaya* – a preceding piece of cognition, iii)

adhipati – *pratyaya* – the visual organ etc., and iv) *ālambana* – *pratyaya* – the jar etc. cf. Durveka (p.381) on Hetu Bindu Tika.

30. According to Hetu Bindu Tika which classifies non – apprehension under three heads only – I) *svābhavānupalabdhi* establishes simply the behaviour in respect of an absence, ii) *vyāpakānupalabdhi* establishes the absence of the pervaded as well as the behaviour in respect of it and iii) *Kāraṇānupalabdhi* establishes the absence of the effect as well as the behaviour in respect of it.
31. As Dharmottara (Nyāya Bindu Tika p.47) explains, the very existence of a future non – apprehension is uncertain and thus being itself unproved, it cannot lead to the ascertainment of an absence.
32. Dharmottara (Nyaya Bindu Tika p. 48) adds further that *kāryānupalabdhi* is resorted to when the cause is invisible (*adrśya*) ; if the cause is visible (*drśya*) it would be a case of the non – apprehension of the perceptible (*drśyānupalabdhi* = *svabhāvañupalabdhi*). He also gives an elaborate description of the exact circumstances under which *kāraṇānupalabdhi* would become effective. He makes similar remarks under the explanation of the subsequent forms of non – apprehension also.
33. Stcherbatsky's *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. ii
34. It is very difficult to state the exact number of non – apprehensions admitted by *Dharmakīrti*. Jayanta who generally offers a very faithfully account of the views of *Dharmakīrti* as well as other

Buddhist philosophers quotes (Nyaya mañjuri I, p. 53) these eleven forms almost in the same order, along with the same illustrations (only occasionally substituting synonyms for certain words). But in HB (p. 68) only three forms of non – apprehension have been recognized (see note 27 above), while PVS (p.4) speaks of eight forms in all.

35. The argument here seems to be as follows. The absence of the effect does not necessarily indicate the absence of the cause, as for instance, a stick producing a jar may be present on a particular spot even if the jar itself is absent there. Here *pramāṇa* (which is nothing but a piece of valid cognition) is the effect and the object cognized is the cause. Hence the absence of *pramāṇa* (=effect) does not indicate the absence of the object (=cause).
36. Jayanta (*Nyāyamañjuri* ii, p.130) and Sridhara (*Nyāya-kandali* p.504) mention and discard a view according to which the very idea of *pararthānumāna* is an absurdity. The objection may briefly be put as follows. Even in the case of an alleged *pararthānumāna* there is no difference in the inferential process and the knowledge is acquired by the hearer himself and not by anybody else. Just as sometimes one may one self perceive a mark having invariable concomitance and ascertain the presence of the inferable property, so also sometimes one may oneself ascertain a valid mark through the statement of another person and come to know of the presence of the inferable property, nor can it be argued that *pararthānumāna* is so called on the ground that in such a case there is a statement made for the benefit of others. Thus, for instance, when one

communicates one's own perceptual cognition to somebody else for the benefit of the latter, it would never be recognized as *parārtha-pratyakṣa* on a similar ground.

In answering the above objection Jayanta says that it is quite true that the inferential knowledge in the case of *parārthānumāna* also pertains only to the hearer himself. Still it is so called because the hearer becomes aware of a mark having invariable concomitance – which he himself does not ascertain – through the words of somebody else who has already ascertained it, and he is subsequently led to the inference. The basis of the inference is thus furnished by a different person. With regard to the hearer, it is *svārthānumāna* ; but with regard to the speaker, it is *parārthānumāna*. As to the case of the communication of a piece of perceptual cognition, there is no question of similar admission, because there the words of the speaker do not help the hearer to have any subsequent perceptual knowledge.

37. Dharmottara (Nyāyabindu-tikā p.63) explains the point as follows. The two forms of inferences are different with regard to only the verbal structure and not with regard to the implication they are intended to convey. The verbal structure which follows only the 'ordinary meaning' (*abhidheya*) may vary. But it does not mean that the implication 'intended to be conveyed' (*parkāśya*) also becomes different. As for instance, the two expressions 'this plump Brahmin does not eat at daytime' and 'this plump Brahmin eats only at night' have different ordinary meanings. But the implication they convey is the same. Similarly, the two forms of

parārthānumana also vary only with regard to the verbal arrangement, but they are identical with regard to the implication intended to be conveyed, namely, revealing a mark having three characteristics.

38. As Dharmottara (Nyāyabindu-tīkā p.64) explains, no horn on the head of a hare is ever cognized through the eyes ; but it is proved to be an object of successful behaviour concerning the non-existent through *drśyanupalambha* (=svabhāvānupalabdhi).
39. i.e. an object can be offered as an example only when the characteristic sought to be illustrated is already proved to be present in it. That is why the subject (Pakṣa) of an inference can never be offered as an instance corroborating the invariable concomitance.
40. Dharmottara (Nyāyabindu-tīkā p.65) says that the word sarva (whatever) has been added to specify that whatever is real must be non-eternal and (as against the views of some other philosophers) there is no entity which is both real and eternal. Reality (*vastutva* or *arthakriyakāritva*) can co-exist with non-eternality alone, and never with eternality. Cf. TS versa 394.
41. Dharmottara (Nyāyabindu-tīkā p.66) applies slightly different terms. According to him, the three varieties of reasons here are – i) *śuddha* or a reason without any attribute, ii) *avyātirikta-viśeṣaṇa* or a reason with an attribute which is not separable from it and iii) *vyātirikta- viśeṣaṇa* or a reason with an attribute which is separable from it.