

CHAPTER - II

THE NYĀYA THEORY OF INFERENCE

Definition of Inference – as given by old & new Logicians

Cognition (*Buddhi*) is knowledge and is a quality, which is the ground of all linguistic usages. In other words, characteristic features of an object are revealed through knowledge just as the nature of an object is revealed through the light of a lamp. This knowledge is of two kinds : recollection (*smṛti*) and presentative knowledge (*anubhava*)¹. Recollection or *smṛti* is a kind of knowledge which is produced by the trace alone². All knowledge other than memory is called the presentative knowledge or *anubhava* which is, again, divided into two categories : valid (*yathārtha*) and invalid (*ayathārtha*)³. A valid knowledge always represents the real character of the object and an invalid knowledge does not represent the real character of the object.⁴ A valid presentative knowledge which is technically known as *pramā* is of four kinds : perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumiti*) comparison (*upamiti*) and verbal testimony (*Śabda*). Its special cause (*Karaṇa*) is also of four kinds which are known as perception (*Pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), comparison (*upamāna*) and verbal testimony (*Śabda*)⁵. The knowledge which is produced from the contact of the sense organ with object and which is not caused due to words (*avyapadeśya*), which is, again invariably related to the object (*avyabhicari*) and certain (*vyavasāyātmaka*) is called perception.⁶ Perception is the immediate

knowledge of present object through a sense organ. We can attain the perceptual knowledge of an object directly without taking help of previous knowledge of an object e.g. when we perceive a jar, we can know it without taking any help of inferential or any other sources of valid knowledge. So perception does not depend on other knowledge. Without perception no other instrument of valid knowledge is possible. Perception is different from inference, comparison and testimony, which are not produced by the sense-object contact. Though perception is the fundamental basis of all kinds of knowledge yet other sources of valid knowledge like inference etc. play an important role in our everyday life. We can know only the present object through perception. But in order to know the past, future and remote objects as well as present and near object we have to depend on inference.⁷

Inference is the knowledge in which perception must be present as an antecedent. So inference is mediate knowledge of an object. Inference can reveal those objects that are not within the reach of our sense organs. With the help of inference we can know definitely the existence and the nature of an object, which is doubtful.⁸

According to old logicians, inference is followed by 'something' which is expressed by the term '*Tat*'⁹ Here the term '*tat*' refers to perception without which inference is not possible at all. In the case of inference, the perception of the probans and the invariable co-existence between the probans and the probandum are highly essential.¹⁰ e.g., the syllogistic argument in the form : 'The mountain is fiery as it has got smoke.' The real ground of this inference is not the perception of smoke

alone, but knowledge of the invariable co-existence between smoke and fire is also ground.

According to the latter logicians, inference is the knowledge, which is produced out of consideration.¹¹ But what is to be understood by the term ‘consideration’ or ‘*parāmarśa*’? According to them, *parāmarśa* or consideration is the factor through the operation of which the inferential conclusion can be attained.¹² *parāmarśa* has been defined as the knowledge of the existence of the *hetu* or reason in the *pakṣa* or subject, which reason is characterized by its being concomitant with the *Sādhyā*. In the valid syllogistic argument in the form. ‘The Mountain is fiery as it has got smoke’, the cognition in the form – ‘The Mountain has got smoke which is pervaded by fire’ is consideration¹³ (*parāmarśa*) which is the intermediate cause (*vyāpāra*)¹⁴ in attaining inferential knowledge of fire.

But what is to be understood by the term intermediate cause or *vyapara*? It has been defined in the following manner.

That which, being produced by a particular object, becomes the producer of some entity produced by the same (i.e. first) particular object, is called *vyāpāra* or intermediate cause.¹⁵ As consideration, being produced by knowledge of *vyāpti*, becomes the producer of inference which is again produced by knowledge of *vāpti*, it is considered as an intermediate cause (*vyāpāra*) of inference.¹⁶ The knowledge of *vyāpti* is taken as the special cause of inference.¹⁷ But what is to be known by the term special cause or *kaṛaṇa*?

The uncommon cause associated with the intermediary is called special cause or *kaṛaṇa*.¹⁸ Here knowledge of *Vyāpti* which is associated

with the knowledge in the form of consideration is the special cause of inference or instrument to inference.

In the syllogistic argument, 'The mountain is fiery as it has got smoke on it', there are five mental or psychic process. At first we have to gather the knowledge in the form : 'where there is smoke there is fire' in various places like kitchen etc., this invariable relation between smoke and fire is called *vyāpti*. After sometimes it has been found that the smoke is arising from the mountain having an uninterrupted connection with the surface of the mountain. This is the second step in attaining inferential knowledge. Then recollection of the knowledge in the form 'where there is smoke there is fire' i.e. *vyāpti (karaṇa)* is necessary and after that we attain the knowledge in the form : 'The mountain has got smoke which is invariably connected with fire'. This knowledge is known as consideration (*parāmarśa*) after which the conclusion in the form – 'The mountain is fiery' can be drawn.¹⁹

In the above process of inference the knowledge in the form of *parāmarśa* is actually caused by the knowledge of invariable concomitance of probans (*hetu*) with the probandum (*sādhya*) and the knowledge of the existence of the *hetu* in the subject. Hence the knowledge of *vyāpti* is considered as highly essential in order to attain inferential knowledge. And that is why, the question about the nature of *vayāpti*, the special cause of inference, has been raised by Gangesa Upadhyaya in the beginning of his famous book *Vyāptipañcakam*.²⁰

The invariable co-existence in the form – 'where there is smoke, there is fire' is known as *vyāpti* or invariable concomitance.²¹ Here the

invariable co-existence between the probans and probandum (i.e. smoke and fire) is the definition of *vyāpti*. The term ‘co-existence’ means remaining in the same locus of the probans with the probandum, which is not the counter positive of the absolute negation existing in the locus of the *hetu*.²² As for example, ‘The mountain is fiery, as there is smoke’. In this particular syllogistic argument, smoke has been taken as probans, the locus of which is mountain in which there is the absolute negation of a jar. The counter positive of this absence is the jar itself and the non-counter-positive of it is fire. The co-existence of smoke with such type of fire is called *vyāpti*.²³

In the invalid syllogistic argument in the form “The mountain is smoky as there is fire on it.” ‘fire’ has been taken as probans. One of the loci of the probans is red hot iron ball in which there is the absolute negation of smoke. The counter positive of it (but not the non counter positive) is the smoke, which is the probandum. So the definition of *vyāpti* cannot be applied in this invalid inference.²⁴ Though there is diversity of opinion among the philosophers of the different schools in respect of the definition, function and nature of *vyāpti* or invariable concomitance, all of them are of the view of that inference is not possible without proper knowledge of *vyāpti* or invariable concomitance which has been considered as a special cause (*karaṇa*) of inference by the logicians.

The first and second definition of Vyāpti

The first definition of *Vyāpti* is formulated by Viśvanātha in the following way. *Vyāpti* is the non-existence of the middle term (*hetu*) on the loci, which are differing from those (loci) of the probandum or *sādhya*.²⁵ As for example, “The Mountain is fiery as it has amoke” (*parvato vahimān dhūmāt*). In this example, the probandum (*sādhya*) is the fire; the loci of the probandum are kitchen etc. The loci, which are different from those of the probandum, are water, lake etc. in which there is the non-existence of middle term or *hetu*. So we can safely conclude that between smoke and fire there is the relation of invariable concomitance or *vyāpti*.²⁶

Now the Naiyāyikas are of the opinion that the same definition cannot be applied to the invalid inference – “The mountain has smoke as it has fire on it” (*parvato dhūmavānvahneḥ*). In this example, the probandum (*sādhya*) is smoke, the loci of which are kitchen etc. The locus, which is different from the loci of the smoke, is electric bulb in which there is the existence (but not the non-existence) of fire, that is, middle term or *hetu*.²⁷ So it cannot be said that between fire and smoke there is the relation of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*).

If the above-mentioned definition of *vyāpti* is accepted, there will arise the defect of *avyāpti* or too narrow in the valid inference in the form “The mountain has fire, as it has got smoke”;. By the tem ‘*sādhya*’ fire may be taken and the locus of *sādhya* will be a part of fire (*vahnyavayava* but not kitchen). The locus, which is different from that of *sādhya* (a

part of fire) is kitchen etc. in which there is the existence (but not the non existence) of the *hetu*, that is, smoke in this particular instance. So there would arise the defect of *avyāpti* in the valid inference mentioned above.

According to the Naiyāyikas, the locus of *sādhyā* should be taken through that relation in which probandum (*sādhyā*) exists on the subject (*paksa*). Such relation is called the limiting relation of *sādhyatā* (*sādhyatāvacchedakasambandha*). In the above mentioned inference the probandum (fire) exists on the subject (mountain) through the relation of contact (*saṃyoga*). The locus of *sādhyā* should be taken through the same relation, that is, contact. A part of fire is the locus of fire through the relation of inherence (*samavāya*), which is not permissible here. The locus of *sādhyā* through the relation of contact will be kitchen etc. and different from that will be water etc. in which there is the non-existence of the probans (smoke). So there is no question of *avyāpti*.²⁸

But there will arise another problem if the above-mentioned definition of *vyāpti* is taken for granted. This definition cannot be applied to the valid inference mentioned above. Here the 'fire' may be taken as probandum through the relation of contact and the locus of the probandum through the same relation will be kitchen (*mahānasa*). The locus, which is different from the locus of *Sādhyā*, will be cowshed (*goṣṭha*) in which there is the existence of the probans, that is, smoke. So it leads to the defect of *avyāpti*. In order to avoid this defect (*avyāpti*) the Naiyāyikas explain the term – 'sādhyavadanya' (i.e., the locus which is different from that of *sādhyā*) in a different way, which runs as follows.

The meaning of the above term is the object, which has got the mutual absence, the counter-positive of which is limited by the locusness of the *sādhyā* (*sādhyavattvāvacchinnapratiyogitākābhedaṅ*). This mutual absence is in the form : ‘This is not the locus of *Sādhyā* (*sādhyavān na*)’. In the above example, the mutual absence of the above form cannot exist in the railway engine or cowshed, which is taken as the locus, which is different from that of *sādhyā*. Though there is no fire in the railway engine or cowshed at present yet it can be the locus of fire in near or remote future. It cannot be said that it can never be a locus of the *sādhyā*. Though there is no fire yet therein lies the potentiality of existing fire and hence the absence of *sādhyavān* i.e. the locus of *sādhyā* cannot remain there. On the other hand, water, lake, river, sea etc can be the locus of the absence of *sādhyā*, because these are the places where *sādhyā*, can never exist. The above mutual absence exists in these places. So there does not arise the defect which is called *avyāpti* or too narrow.²⁹

The non-existence of the *hetu* on the locus, which is different from the locus of *sādhyā*, should be taken through the limiting relation of the reasonness (*hetutāvachhedakasambandha*), that is, through that relation which exists between subject (*pakṣa*) and *hetu*. In the syllogistic arguments in the form – ‘The mountain is fiery as there is smoke’ (*parvato vahnimān dhūmāt*) limiting relation of the reasonness (*hetutavachhedakasambandha*) is contact (*samyoga*). In this inference, a part of smoke can be taken as the locus which is different from the locus of *sādhyā* (*sādhyavadanya*) and in which there is the existence of *hetu* through the relation of inherence (as smoke exists in its part through the relation of inherence), but not through the relation of contact, which is the limiting relation of the reasonness (*hetutāvachhedakasambandha*, i.e., the

relation existing between *hetu* and *pakṣa*). Hence, it cannot be taken into consideration.³⁰

The absence of the superstratumness of the *hetu* from the locus of *sādhyā* (*Sādhyavadanyavṛttitva*) must be an absence, the counter-positive of which is limited by the generic property existing in the superstratumness of that which is different from the locus of *sādhyā* (*sādhyavadanyavṛttitvāvachinnapratiyogitākābhāvah*). The absence of the superstratumness must be determined by all the loci, which are different from those of *sādhyā*.³¹ In the invalid syllogistic argument in the form – ‘The mountain has got smoke as it has got fire, ‘(*Parvato dhūmavān vahneh*) there is the absence of the superstratumness of the *hetu* determined by water etc. that are different from the locus of *sādhyā*. Yet it cannot be said that there is the defect called ‘*ativyāpti*’ or ‘too wide’ as there is the existence of *hetu* in an electric bulb or a red-hot iron ball, which is also different from the locus of *sādhyā*. In other words, the absence of the existence of *hetu* must be determined by all the loci different from those of *sādhyā*. In the present case there is no defect of *ativyāpti* as the absence of the existence of *hetu* is not determined by all the loci different from those of *sādhyā*. Here the absence of the existence is vitiated by the presence of *hetu* in two places. On account of this there does not arise any question of *ativyāpti*.

It has been stated earlier that *Vyāpti* is the absence of all the superstratumness determined by that which is different from the locus of *sādhyā*. This definition is also defective, as it cannot be applied in the following valid syllogistic argument : ‘This is a substance as it has got existence or *sattā* qualified by that which is different from quality and

action.’ (*idam dravyam guṇakarmānyatvaviśiṣṭasattvāt*). Here substanceness is the probandum and the existence qualified by that different from quality and action is the probans or *hetu*. This substanceness exists in quality and action. The locus which is different from the locus of *sādhyā* is quality and action in which there is the existence (but not the non-existence of *hetu*) i.e., the existence of the qualified *sattā* also, according to the dictum – ‘A qualified *sattā* is not different from a pure one i.e. *sattā*³². So there is the defect called *avyāpti* in the valid inference mentioned above.

In order to avoid this defect it has been stated that the absence of the superstratumness (*vṛttitvabhāva*) should be taken as a capacity of being the limiter of reasonness (*hetutāvachedakarūpeṇa*). In the above *hetu* the limiter of reasonness will be generic property existing in a *sattā* qualified by that, which is different from quality and action (*guṇakarmānyatvaviśiṣṭasattātva*). In quality and action, which are different from the locus of *sādhyā*, the qualified *sattā* exists as a capacity of *satta* but not as a capacity of qualified *sattā*. Though in quality and action which are different from locus of *sādhyā* there is the existence of superstratumness limited by generic property existing in a *satta* (*sattātvāvachinnavṛttitva*), there is the absence of stratum limited by a generic property existing in a qualified *satta* (*viśiṣṭa-sattātva*) which is the limiter of reasonness. So in the probans in the form of qualified *sattā* the above definition of *Vyāpti* can be applied.³³

The first definition of *Vyāpti* cannot be applied in the syllogistic arguments like ‘It is knowable as it is capable of being expressed’ (*idam jñeyam vācyatvat*). As each and every object of this world is knowable in

character, the locus that is different from that of *sādhyā* i.e. knowability is not possible. So in the first definition there is the defect called *avyāpti* or too narrow.³⁴

In order to avoid this difficulty of the first definition of *vyāpti* Vīśvanātha has formulated the second definition of it, which runs as follows :

“Athavā hetumanniṣṭhvirahāpratiyoginā

Sādhyena hetoraikādhikarāṇyam vyāptirucyate”

- *Bhāṣāpariccheda* Verse No. 69

Vyāpti is the co-existence of the *hetu* with the *sādhyā*, which is not the counter positive of the absence existing in the locus of *hetu*. As for example, in the syllogistic argument ‘The mountain is fiery as there is smoke’, here ‘smoke’ is taken as the probans or *hetu*, the locus of which is kitchen in which there is the absence of jar. The counterpositive or absentee of this absence is the jar itself and the non-counter-positive or non-absentee of it is fire, which is the probandum or *sādhyā*. The co-existence of the smoke with such type of fire is known as *Vyāpti*³⁵

The newly formed second definition of *Vyāpti* can remove the difficulty arising in the exclusive affirmative inferences like ‘*Idam vācyam jñeyatvāt*’ etc. In this inference the *hetu* is *jñeyatva*, the loci of which are all the knowable objects. In a knowable object there might be the absence of any entity other than the absence of *vācyatva* or knowability, as each and every object having existence is knowable in nature. Hence *vācyatva* or knowability must be the non-counterpositive

or non-absentee of the absence existing in the locus of *hetu*, which rules out the possibility of the defect of *avyāpti* in such cases of *kevalānvayī* inferences as shown earlier.

But it has been argued that in the valid syllogistic argument in the form – ‘The mountain is fiery as there is smoke’ (*parvato vahnimān dhūmāt*), the second definition of *vyāpti* cannot be applied. That is, in the second definition there would arise the defect called *avyāpti* as it cannot cover a valid inference. In the kitchen, which is the locus of smoke, the probans, there may exist the absence of field-fire, the non-counterpositive or non-absentee of which is the kitchen-fire, but not fire-in-general. In this way, we shall get the absence of every specific type of fire (i.e. kitchen – fire, mountain-fire, engine-fire etc.) like the principle involved in the operation of a sieve (*cālanīyanyāya*). So there would occur the defect called *avyāpti* in the second definition.³⁶

It can be argued that between smoke and fire existing in the same locus (*samānādhikaraṇa*) there is the relation of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*). In the mountain there is the non-existence of kitchen-fire, which is the counter-positive, or the absentee of the absence, but the mountain-fire cannot be the counter-positive or the absentee of the absence, as mountain-fire exists in the mountain. The co-existence of the mountain-smoke with the mountain-fire existing in the same locus is *vyāpti*.

In the same way, though there is the absence of the mountain-fire in the kitchen, there is the existence of kitchen-fire. So the co-existence of the kitchen-smoke with the kitchen-fire existing in the same locus is called *vyāpti*.

But the above-mentioned view is not tenable. It cannot be said that the coexistence of smoke with fire existing in the same locus is called *vyāpti*. For, though there is the existence of one object, it seems to us that 'there is the non-existence of two or of both' (*dvayam nāsti*). If it is said that there is the non-existence of both the entities in the mountain, it implies that there is non-existence of both the jar and fire on the mountain. So in the mountain we have got the non-existence of mountain-fire. Here the mountain-fire existing in the same locus of the mountain-smoke becomes the counterpositive of the absence of both the entities (*ubhayabhāva*) existing in the locus of probans, and hence there is the defect called *avyāpti*. Moreover, there would occur the defect called *avyāpti* in the following syllogistic argument also - "It is the locus; of attribute as it has not the substanceness" (*guṇavān_dravyatvāt*). There is the absence of yellow colour or red colour in a substance, which is the locus of substanceness, the probans. So the probandum in the form of attribute or quality becomes the counter-positive of the absence existing in the locus of *hetu*. So there is the defect called *avyāpti*.³⁷

This difficulty can be avoided by giving the new interpretation of the definition. According to the new interpretation, *vyāpti* is the co-existence of the *hetu* with the *sādhyā*, which is limited by the limiter of *sādhyatā* (*sādhyatāvacchedaka*), which is the non-limiter of the counter-positiveness (*pratiyogitānavacchedaka*) of the absence existing in the locus of the *hetu*. According to this interpretation, the non-limiter of the counter-positiveness of the absence of a jar existing in the: kitchen, the locus of smoke (*hetu*) will be fireness, which is the limiter of *sādhyatā*. As this fireness exists in all types of fire, *vyāpti* between smoke-in-general and fire-in-general will be possible.³⁸

The new interpretation of the second definition of *vyāpti* is not tenable, because it again creates problem in a particular case. Because such type of interpretation does not hold well in the valid syllogistic argument in the form- “The jar is the locus of the universal pervaded by colourness as it has got earthness” (*Rūpatvavyāpyajātimattvān pṛthivītvāt*). Here earthness is the probans or *hetu*, the locus of which is earth as found in a blue jar. There may be the absence of red jar, yellow jar etc., i.e., other than the blue jar. The counter-positive or absentee of the absence is the red jar, yellow jar etc. The non-counter-positive or the non-absentee of the absence is the blue jar. The limiter of the counter-positiveness (but not the non-limiter of the counter-positiveness) is the redness, yellowness etc. other than blueness, which is the limiter of the counter-positiveness. The probandum of the above inference is the locus of the: universal pervaded by colourness (*rūpatva-vyāpya-jātim'at*), which implies blue, red etc. and the universal pervaded colourness (*rūpatvāvyāpyajātim'at*) implies blueness, redness etc. So the probandum, i.e., the locus of the universal pervaded colourness (*rūpatvavyāpyajātimat*) is blue, red etc, (seven colours). The limiter of the *sādhyatā* (i.e. the locus of the universal pervaded by colourness) is blueness, redness, yellowness etc. The limiter of the counter-positiveness (but not the non- limiter of the counter-positiveness) of the absence is blueness, redness etc. which is the limiter of *sādhyatā*, (i.e. blueness, redness). Here the limiter of *sādhyatā* is the limiter of counter-positiveness but not the non- limiter of the counter-positiveness of the absence existing in the locus of *hetu*. So in this particular syllogistic argument there is a defect called *avyāpti*.

In order to remove this defect the Naiyāyikas are of the view that

the limiter of the *sādhyatā* should be taken through the indirect relation known as *svāśrayāsamavāya*. Here the generic property existing in the universal pervaded colourness (*rūpatvavyāpyajātiva*) will be the limiter of *sādhyatā*. In this context the term 'sva' means *jātiva*, which remains in *jāti*, which is again inhered in an object pervaded by the colourness (*rūpatvavyāpya*). It is difficult to say that in the earth there is the absence of the locus of universal pervaded by colourness (*rūpatvavyāpyajātimān*) e.g., blue, yellow etc. So it can be said that in the earth there is the non-existence of the absence of the locus of the universal qualified by the generic property existing; in the universal pervaded by colourness (*rūpatvavyāpya-jātitvaviśiṣṭa-jātimān*) e.g. red colour, yellow colour etc. through the indirect relation known, as *svāśrayāsamavāya*. That is to say, in the earth. which is the locus of *hetu*, there is the existence of locus of universal qualified by the generic property existing in universal (*rūpatvavyāpya-jātitvaviśiṣṭa*) e.g. red colour, yellow colour etc. In such cases there would arise a contingency of availing a cognition in the form: 'there is the absence of an entity having universal pervaded by colourness" (*rūpatva-vyāpya-jatiman nāsti*). which is virtually impossible due to the presence of red colour etc in the locus of *hetu*. As there cannot be the absence of the locus of *hetu*, it cannot be the limiter of the counter-positiveness of the absence in the locus of *hetu*. So it becomes the non-limiter of the counter-positiveness of that absence. So there is no defect of *avyāpti* in the above-mentioned valid inference.³⁹

The above-mentioned clarification of the definition cannot be accepted, as it cannot be applied to the valid syllogistic arguments like "It is the locus of the holder of the stick, as it has contact with the holder of the stick (*dandimān dandīsamयोगāt*). Here the locus of the probans is the

ground in which there is the absence of the particular individual holder of the stick. Though there is the existence of the holder of the red stick, there may be the absence of the holder of the blue stick etc. In this way, in the locus of *hetu*, there will be the absence of all the particular individual holders of the stick, i.e. the absence of the holder of the stick in general according to the principle involved in the operation of a sieve (*cālanīyanyāya*). The counter-positive of the said generic absence of the holder of the stick is the holder of the stick. The limiter of the counter-positiveness of that absence is the stick, which is the limiter of *sādhyatā* (here *danḍī* i.e. the holder of a stick is *sādhyā* and the stick only is the limiter of *sādhyatā*). So there is the defect of *avyāpti*.

In order to avoid this defect we shall take stickness i.e. *dandatva* as the limiter of *sādhyatā* through the indirect relation known as *svāśrayāśrayatva*. Here by the term "sva" stickness or *dandatva* has been taken. The locus of this *dandatva* is stick or *dandā*, which again exists in *danḍī* i.e., the holder of the stick. As on the ground there is the existence of the holder of the stick in which there is the existence of stickness, there cannot be the absence of it (i.e., the absence of the holder of the stick). So *dandatva* or stickness, the limiter of *sādhyatā* becomes the non-limiter of counter-positiveness of the absence existing in the locus of the *hetu*. So there does not arise any question of *avyāpti*.⁴⁰

The above-mentioned definition of *vyāpti* again cannot be applied in the following valid syllogistic argument – “It is a substance as it has got the generic property called *satta* other than that existing in quality and action” (*dravyam guṇa-karmānyatva-viśiṣṭa-sattvāt*). Here qualified *sattā* is the probans which is not different from the pure *satta* according to the

dictum – “A qualified *sattā* is not different from the pure one.” If it is so, quality and action will be the loci of that qualified *satta* and the absence of the probandum i.e., the absence of the substanceness will be taken as an absence existing in the locus of *hetu*. For, there is the absence of substanceness in quality and action also. The limiter (but not the non-limiter) of the counter-positiveness is *dravyatvatva*, which is the limiter of *sādhyatā* (*sadhyatāvacchedaka*). So there is the defect called *avyāpti* in the above inference.

In order to avoid this defect it has been stated that the locus of *hetu* must be qualified by the limiter of *hetutā* or reasonness (*hetutāvacchedaka*). In the previous instance the *hetu* is the qualified *sattā* and the limiter of *hetuta* is the generic property existing in qualified *sattā* (*viśiṣṭosāttātva*). The locus of the qualified *sattā* which is limited by the generic property existing in a qualified *sattā* will be the substance only, but not quality and action. In this substance, the locus of *hetu*, there may have the absence of jar. cloth etc. but not the absence of substanceness. So the absence of substanceness cannot be taken as the absence existing in the locus of *hetu*. So the generic property existing in the substanceness (*dravyatvatva*), which is the limiter of *sādhyatā* must be the non-limiter of the counter-positiveness of the absence existing In the locus of *hetu*⁴¹

The locus of the *hetu* should be taken through the limiting relation of the reasonness (*hetutāvacchedaka-sambandha*). In the above-mentioned case of valid inference, the limiting relation of the reasonness is contact (*saṁyoga*). The relation between subject (*pakṣa*) and probans (*hetu*), which is contact (*saṁyoga*) in the present case., is called the

limiting relation of reasonness (*hetutāvacchedakasambandha*). So the locus of *hetu* should be taken through the relation of contact (*samyoga*) and in this relation kitchen should be taken as the locus of the *hetu* but not a part of smoke. Because a part of smoke is the locus of smoke through the relation of inherence, which is not the limiting relation of reasonness. So there is no harm⁴².

But in a particular syllogistic argument in the form- "It is the locus of the contact of a monkey as it has got this treeness" (*Kapisamyogi_etadvṛkṣatvāt*), there would occur the defect called *avyāpti*. For in 'this tree' which is the locus of the *hetu* (i.e. this treeness) there may have the absence of contact of a monkey (*kapisamyogābhāva*) limited by the base of the tree (*mūlāvacchedena*). The limiter of the counter-positiveness (but not the non-limiter of the counter-positiveness) is the contactness of the monkey (*kapisamyogābhāva*), which is the limiter of *sādhyatā*. So there would occur time defect mentioned above.

In order to remove this difficulty it has been mentioned by *Viśvanātha* that the absence, which exists in the locus of the *hetu* (*hetusamānādhikaraṇa*) and does not exist in the locus of the counter-positive (*Pratigyadyadhikaraṇa*) should be taken into the consideration. According to this interpretation, in the locus of the *hetu* (i.e. in this tree) the absence of the contact of a monkey (*kapisamyogābhāva*) cannot be taken, as this tree is the locus of the counter-positive (*pratigyadyadhikaraṇa*). So the absence of a jar should be taken in this tree. The non-limiter of the counter-positiveness of the absence would be the contactness of a monkey (*kapisamyogābhāva*) which is the limiter of *sādhyatā*. So there does not arise any question of *avyāpti*.⁴³

What is the meaning of the term '*pratiyogivyadhikaraṇatvam*'?

Does it mean '*pratiyogyanadhikaraṇavṛttitva*' i.e., the existence of *hetu* in a non-locus of the absentee. If this interpretation were taken into account, it would, lead to the defect of *avyāpti* in the following syllogistic argument: '*Kapisamyogi etadvṛkṣatvāt* (This has the contact of a monkey, as it has got this-treeness),

The second definition of *vyāpti* can be applied in the invalid inference in the form – “It is the locus of the qualified *sattā* as it is universal” (*viśiṣṭasattāvān jāteh*). In this inference, quality and action can be taken as the loci of the universal, the probans, there may be the absence of a qualified, *sattā*, the counter-positive of which will be the qualified *satta* as well as pure *sattā* according to the principle – “A qualified *satta* is not different from the pure one”. Under this situation the absence of the qualified *satta* will exist in the locus of the counter-positive, which can never be taken. Instead of that the absence of a jar should be taken into account, the -non- limiter of the counter-positiveness of which will be the qualified *sattātva*, which is again the limiter of *sādhyatā*. So there is the defect of the definition known as *ativyāpti* (over coverage).

In order to avoid this defect it has been argued by the Naiyāyikas that counter-positive is that which is limited by the limiter of the counter-positiveness (*pratiyogitāvachhedakāvachhinna*). According to this new interpretation, the counter-positive of the absence of a qualified *sattā* which is taken earlier in quality and action will be the qualified *sattā* only but not the pure *sattā*, as it is not limited by the limiter of the counter-positiveness. So the limiter of the counter-positiveness is the qualified

sattatva, which is the limiter of *sādhyatā*. So there is no difficulty.

The non-locus of the counter positive: should be taken, through the limiting relation of *sādhyatā* (*sādhyatāvacchedakasambandha*). Otherwise, there would occur the defect called *avyāpti* in the valid syllogistic argument in the form “The Mountain has fire as there is smoke” (*Parvato vahnimān dhūmāt*). In this example, there may be the existence of the absence of fire through the relation called inherence in the kitchen, which is the locus of the *hetu*. This absence can be regarded as existing in the non-locus of the counter positive through the relation called inherence, which is not the limiting relation of *sādhyatā*. So there would occur the defect called *avyāpti*. In order to avoid the above difficulty it has been mentioned that the non-locusness of the counter-positive should be taken through the limiting relation of *sādhyatā* (*sādhyatāvacchedakasambandha* i.e.. contact or *samyoga* in the particular case). According to this principle, the absence of a jar should be taken in the kitchen through the relation of contact, which is the limiting relation of *sādhyatā* and in this way, the defect called *avyāpti* can be avoided.⁴⁴

It has already been mentioned that the absence, which is inserted in the second definition of *vyāpti*, must have two characteristic features: (i) existing in the locus of *hetu* and (ii) existing in the non-locus of the counter positive. The non-locus of the counter positive, which is limited by the limiter of the counter-positiveness, should be taken into account.

Now the question arises whether it denotes the non-locus of any of the counter- positives limited by the limiter of wants for or of all the counter- positiveness or of all the counter-positives limited by any of the

limitors of the counter positiveness.⁴⁵

The first alternative is not tenable, as there would occur the defect called *avyāpti* in the valid inference like "It is the locus of the contact of a monkey, as it has got this-treeness". In this tree, which is the locus of *hetu* there, the absence of the contact of monkey exists in another tree, which is the non-locus of the counter positive (i.e. this tree). The limitor of the counter-positiveness would be the contactness of a monkey, which is the limitor of *sādhyatā*. So there is the defect called *avyāpti* as non-locus of any of the counter-positives limited by the limitor of the counter-positiveness has been taken into the account.⁴⁶

If the second alternative were taken into account (i.e. if the non-locus of all the counter-positives limited by the limitor of counter-positiveness is taken into account), then there would occur the defect called *avyāpti*.

In the syllogistic argument "The Mountain is fiery as there is smoke on it", we can take the absence of a jar in the kitchen, the locus of the *hetu* and this absence may exist for two or three moments. In the second moment, there is the absence of the absence of a jar attained at the first moment, the counter-positive of which is the absence of a jar, which exists, in the second moment. So the absence of the above-mentioned form exists in the locus (but not the non-locus the counter positive), which leads to the defect called *avyāpti*. In this way, each and every individual manifestation of absence can be regarded as existing in the locus of the counter positive for which second alternative cannot be accepted.⁴⁷

The third alternative cannot be accepted, as there will occur the defect called *avyāpti* in the valid syllogistic argument in the form - "It is the locus of the absence of the contact of a monkey as it has got soulness" (*Kopisamyogābhāvavān āmatvāt*). In the soul, which is the locus of *hetu*, there exists the absence of the absence of the contact of monkey. The limitors of the counter-positiveness of this absence will be the generic property existing in the absence of the contact of a monkey (*kopisamyoga-sāmānyābhāvatva*) as well as the generic property existing in the generic property exists in the absence of the quality (*guṇasamanyabhāvatva*). If the third alternative is taken into account, the above-mentioned form exists in the non-locus of the counter-positive. The limiter (but not the non-limiter) of the counter-positiveness of that absence is the generic property existing in the absence of the contact of the monkey, which limiter of *sādhyatā*, which leads to the defect called *avyāpti*⁴⁸. The above-mentioned defect can be avoided after giving a new interpretation. By the term "Non-locus of the counter-positive limited by the limiter of the counter-positiveness", the non-locusness of that which is limited by that type of counter-positiveness, the non-limiter of which is the limiter of *sādhyatā* is to be understood. Through the light of this new interpretation the defect occurred in the above-mentioned cases can smoothly be avoided.⁴⁹

Now, let us see how the above-mentioned defect do not occur in the light of a new interpretation mentioned above. There would not occur the defect called *avyāpti* in the syllogistic argument in the form: "It is the locus of the contact of a monkey as it has got this treeness" (*kapisamyogi etatvṛkṣatvāt*). Through the non-locusness (*anadhikaraṇatva*) of the contact of a monkey existing in another tree can be taken in this particular

tree. which is the locus of the probans, the limiter of the counter-positiveness would be the contactness of a monkey existing in an object other than this tree through an indirect relation on the strength of the term “*Yādrśapratiyogitavyāpti*” inserted in the new interpretation. The non-limiter of that counter-positiveness would be the pure contactness. which is the limiter of *sādhyatā* So there is no *avyāpti*.

It has been stated earlier that the defect called *avyāpti*. will occur in the 'case of inference in the form: “The mountain is fiery as there is smoke,” if the second alternative of the interpretation is taken into account. Though each and every individual manifestation of absence can be regarded as existing in the locus of the counter-positiveness in the way mentioned earlier, the limiter of the counter-positiveness of the absence of a jar in the kitchen (the locus of the *hetu*) would be the jarness on the strength of the term ‘*Yādrśapratiyogitā*’. The non-limiter of the counter-positiveness would be the fireness, which is the limiter *sādhyata*. So there does not arise the defect called *avyāpti*.

It has always been discussed, that in the valid syllogistic argument in the form: “It is the locus of the absence of the contact of a monkey as it has got soulness”, there would occur the defect called *avyāpti*, if the third alternative is taken into account. This defect can be avoided through the light of new interpretation. The generic absence of quality has been taken as the counter-positive of the absence of generic absence of quality. The limiter of the counter-positiveness will be the generic property existing in the generic absence of quality (*guṇasāmānyabhavatva*) on the; strength of the term – “*Yādrśa-pratiyogitā*.” The non-limiter of it would be the generic property existing in the absence of the contact of a monkey

(*kapisamyogābhāvatva*), which is the limiter of *sādhyatā*. So there does not arise any defect called *avyāpti*.⁵⁰

The Concept of Parāmarśa in Nyāya Logic

The cognition of invariable concomitance or *vyāpti* is an important factor for attaining inferential cognition. Hence it is called *karāṇa* or special uncommon cause (*asādhāraṇakāraṇa*) of inference. An individual who has got the knowledge of the invariable concomitance of smoke with fire in kitchen etc. sees, afterwards, the trail of smoke connected with the surface of the mountain (*avicchinna-mūla dhūmarekhā*). Then he recollects the invariable concomitance in the form: 'Smoke is pervaded by fire' (*dhūmo vahnivyāpyah*). Afterwards, he comes to know that this mountain is the locus of something which is pervaded by fire: (*vahnivyāpyadhūmavān ayam*).⁵¹ This type of knowledge is called *parāmarśa* or consideration from which the inferential cognition in the form - 'The Mountain is fiery' is drawn.

It has been said by Viśvanātha that the cognition of the existence of probans or *hetu* in the subject of inference along 'with the cognition of the Probans or *hetu* as pervaded by *sādhyā* is called *parāmarśa* (*pakṣasya vyāpyavṛttitvadhīh parāmarśa ucyate*).⁵² It may also be explained in the following way. The cognition of the existence of a *hetu*, which is characterized by *Vyāpti*, is called *parāmarśa* (*vyāpti-viśiṣṭapakṣadharmatājñānam parāmarśah*). It is called an intermediate condition of inferential cognition (*Vyāpāra*). Because such cognition being produced through the earlier cause i.e. *vyāpti* becomes the

producer of inference To Viśvanātha this is an invariable step for the attainment inferential cognition.

The Mīmāṃsakas do not think that such a step is at all essential for attaining inferential cognition as it has go no new information other than the conjunction of the two i.e., the cognition of the existence of *hetu* in the *pakṣa* (*pakṣadharmatājñāna*) and the cognition of the *hetu* as pervaded by *Vyāpti* (*vyāptiviśiṣṭa*). The conditions *vyāptijñāna* (the knowledge of invariable concomitance) and *pakṣadharmatājñānam* (i.e., the cognition of the existence of the probans in the subject) are accepted as essential isolately, but so far as *parāmarśa* concerned, it is, according to them, quite uncalled for. In the syllogistic argument in the form: 'The mountain is fiery as it has got smoke (*parvato vahnimān dhūmāt*) and wherever there is smoke, there is fire' (*yatra yatra dhūmastatra tatra vahniḥ*). In this case, the inferential cognition follows from the knowledge of the invariable concomitance and the knowledge of the existence of *hetu* in a *pakṣa* (*vyāptijñāna* and *pakṣadharmatājñāna*). An individual who does not have these two conditions cannot attain the inferential cognition that the mountain has got smoke. Hence these two cognitions have to be admitted as the necessary conditions for having inferential cognition. They are not merely necessary, but sufficient also, according to the Mīmāṃsakas-thinkers, to produce the inferential state. It is being so the postulation of an additional condition called *Parāmarśa* or the cognition 'The Mountain has got smoke pervaded by fire' seems to be unnecessary. The Mīmāṃsakas do not say indeed that such an additional cognition is never found as instrumental to the emergence of the inferential state. But they emphasise that since it is not a uniform antecedent, it cannot be regarded as one of the necessary conditions for

anumiti.⁵³ The Naiyāyikas claim that even there such cognition has to be admitted for the sake of logical economy (*lāghava*). They explain that there is such a thing as *parāmarśa* leading to an inferential state and that if *parāmarśa* has to be admitted even for once as a condition for some inferential cognition then for the sake of a unified causal theory it should be admitted as a uniform condition for all inferential cognitions.⁵⁴

According to the Nyāya cognition like *parāmarśa* has to be admitted as a necessary condition for all inferential cognitions. In the case of a person inferring the existence of fire in a hill on the strength of the smoke coming out of the mountain and remembering that wherever there is smoke there is fire, the ensuing *parāmarśa* is of the nature of an immediate cognition. But an individual may infer the presence of fire on the mountain on hearing from others that the hill in question has smoke, which is invariably associated with fire. In this case the inference undoubtedly caused by his verbal knowledge mentioned earlier, which is again of the nature of *parāmarśa*. If *parāmarśa* is admitted it as a necessary condition for a particular inference, why is not accepted in all cases? Hence the Naiyāyikas have accepted a uniform condition called *parāmarśa* for inferential cognition for the sake of logical economy (*lāghava*). Moreover, there would arise a possibility of inferential cognition from the statement. 'The mountain is smoky' (*parvato dhūmavān*), because the cognition of the existence of a *hetu* i.e. smoke (in *Pakṣa*) characterized by 'smokeness' which has become the limiter of the pervadedness (*vyāpyatāvachchedakībhūtaprakāra*) is very much present here. It cannot be said that the cognition of the existence of the *hetu* (in *Pakṣa*), which is characterized by the limiter of the pervadedness, which is known, becomes the cause of inferential cognition. For, if the above

criterion is accepted, there would arise the possibility of attaining inferential cognition from the knowledge of *Vyāpti* attained by an individual called Caitra and from the cognition of the existence of *hetu* in *pakṣa* attained by another individual, called Maitra.⁵⁵

If it is said again that the cognition of the *hetu* characterized by the limiter of the pervadedness attained by an individual and the cognition of the existence of *hetu* in *Pakṣa* attained by the same individual become the causes of the inferential cognition by the same individual, there would have to be accepted innumerable forms of causal relations, because different individual form of causal relation has to be accepted for the inferential cognition drawn by each individual. In order to avoid such complication a solution is suggested by Visvan^{at}tha. The cognition of *hetu* (in a *Pakṣa*), which is characterized by *Vyāpti* attained through the relation of inherence, can produce an inferential cognition through the relation of inherence. Hence there does not arise the question of innumerable causal relations.⁵⁶

If it is said that the cognition of the existence of innumerable causal relations, and the cognition of *hetu* characterized by *Vyāpti* (*vyāptiprakāraṅgam jñānam*) are taken as an independent cause of inferential cognition, then two forms: of causal theory would have to be accepted. If it is taken for granted, there would arise inferential cognition from two independent cognition in the forms; 'The smoke is pervaded by fire' (*vahnivyapyo dhumah*) and 'the mountain is possessing light (*ālokavān pārvataḥ*), as, there are two cognitions mentioned above. The latter cognition is described as *pakṣadharmatājñāna* because 'light (*āloka*) which is like smoke is pervaded by fire.'⁵⁷

In order to avoid this problem the Naiyāyikas prefer to admit a qualified cognition which is a unitary whole in the form *vyāptiviśiṣṭa-pakṣadharmātājñānam'* i.e., the cognition of the existence of *hetu* (in *Pakṣa*), which is characterized by *Vyāpti*. if there is at all any defect of *gourava* it is of virtuous type, as it does not become an impediment: to the attainment of inferential cognition.⁵⁸

The Concept of Tarka

Vyāpti is an important factor in attaining the inferential cognition. The Naiyāyikas admit that the knowledge of coexistence between *hetu* and *sādhya* as well as the knowledge of the absence of deviation are the causes of ascertaining *Vyāpti*. In cases of doubt of *Vyāptigraha Tarka* is the method by applying which the said doubt of deviation between *hetu* and *sādhya* can be removed. Hence the role of *Tarka* in such cases cannot be ignored and hence its significance should be brought forward.

In the Nyāya system the cognition is of two types : definite cognition and the cognition in the form of doubt. The doubt of deviation may arise in some cases from the doubt of limiting adjunct (*upādhi*), and sometimes from the knowledge of the common attributes (of *hetu* and *sādhya*) like coexistence etc. along with the absence of the knowledge: of any specific characteristic features of them. That is, the absence of the knowledge of the specific characteristic feature as well as the knowledge of common attributes like coexistence etc) give rise to the doubt of deviation. Such doubt can be removed by *Tarka* (*Reductio-ad-absurdum*), which counters the oppsite standpoint (*vtpakṣabādhaka*). The doubt of

deviation can be removed through the application of *Tarka*, which is the limit (*avadhi*) of doubt. So *Tarka* along with the perception of the coexistence of *hetu* and *sādhya* and non-perception of that deviation (*vyabhicāra*) of the same would become the cause of ascertaining *vyāpti*.

It cannot be argued that *Tarka*, is not possible without repeated observations. For a wise can apply *Tarka* with the help of the perception of the coexistence and non-perception of deviation (*vyabhicāra*) of the same in only one instance.

If the above-mentioned view is accepted, there would occur the defect called Infinite Regress (*Anavasthā*) as *Tarka* is not possible without having the knowledge of *vyāpti*. It can be explained in the following manner.

The definition of *Tarka* as found in the *Nīlakanthiprakāśikā* on *Dīpikā* of *Tarkasaṅgraha* run as follows: '*Āhāryavyāpakavattābhramajanya āhāryavyapyavattābhramastarkaḥ*' . That is, *Tarka* is an imposed (*āhārya*) erroneous cognition of the existence of a pervader (*vyāpaka*), which is produced, by another imposed erroneous cognition of the existence of a pervaded (*vyāpya*). What is to be understood as *Āhāryajñāna* (imposed cognition)? In reply it can be said that the knowledge which is produced out of one's desire at the time when there is the contrary knowledge is known as *aharyajñāna* or imposed cognition (*Virodhijñānakalīnec-chāprayojoyajñānatvam āhāryajñānatvam*). If the knowledge in the form: There is fire in the lake (*hrado vahnyabhāvan*) is produced out of one's desire at the time when there is the existence of the contrary knowledge in the form-'There is the

absence of fire in the lake" (*hrado vahnyābhāvavān*), it is called an imposed one.

Such *Tarka* is of two types: determinant of the definite valid knowledge (*viśayapariśodhaka*) and remover of the doubt of deviation (*vyabhicāraśamkānivartaka*). The former in the form: 'If it has no fire, it has no smoke' (*yadyam vahnimānna syāttadā dhūmavān na syāt*) determines the certainty of the existence of fire in a particular locus (i.e., mountain). Here by the absence of the *Āpādya* or the consequence (i.e., by the absence of the negation of fire) the certainty of, the existence of the absence of *Āpādaka* (i.e., the absence of the negation of smoke) is ascertained. In such a way doubt as to the existence of fire on the mountain in this particular case may be removed by applying this type of *Tarka*.

The perception of the coexistence with the help of the methods of agreement and difference is to be understood as the cause and effect relation (*kāryākāraṇabhāva*) between smoke and fire. As this type of *Tarka* is not sufficient for ascertaining *vyāpti*, the latter type of *Tarka* i.e., *vyabhicāraśamkānivartaka tarka* is to be resorted to. In the *Tarka* in the form: 'If smoke be deviated from fire, it will not be caused by fire' (*Dhūmo yadi vahnivyabhicāri syāt tarhi vanhijanyo na syāt*), the first part is known as *Āpādaka* or ground and the second part *Āpādya* or consequence. In *Āpādaka* there is invariable concomitance determined by *Āpādya*.

The form of *Vyāpti* is 'where there is deviation of fire, there is the negation of being a product of fire' (*yatra yatra vahnivyabhicāritvam*,

tatra tatra vahnijanyatvābhāvah). In this form of *vyāpti* the first part is *vyāpya* (pervaded) and the second one *vyapaka* (pervader). In the same way, it can be said that the *Āpādaka* -part is the pervader and the *Āpādya*-part is pervaded. So *vyāpti* or invariable relation, is included in *Tarka*. In order to remove doubt about the existence of *vyāpti* determined by *Āpādya* and existing in *Āpādaka* in the form: 'whether *Āpādaka* is pervaded by *Āpādya* or not' (*Āpādaka āpādyaivyāpyo na va*) in this *vyāpti*, the necessity of applying another *Tarka* will come into being. In this *Tarka* also there is another *vyāpti*. In order to remove the doubt of the above-mentioned form existing in this *vyāpti* also, another *Tarka* will have to be resorted to and in this way the defect called *infinite regress* (*anavasthā*) would crop up.

The above-mentioned view is not tenable. For, the doubt of deviation does not arise in *vyāpti* of a *Tarka*, for it would involve contradiction (*vyāghāta*) in respect of one's own activity and hence, the necessity of another *Tarka* does not arise at all. One can doubt so long as there does not arise any contradiction in respect of one's own practical activity. A man is permitted to bear any doubt about *vyāpti* between smoke and fire, as he seeks fire in his practical life to get smoke without any hesitation. If he has a slightest doubt regarding *vyāpti* between smoke and fire, he would not seek fire for having smoke. In this way, it can be said that a man takes food to satisfy his hunger and takes recourse to words to make others understanding his desire etc. So, one's own activities indicate the absence of doubt in them. Moreover, if we on doubt, our doubting would be subject of doubt.

Tarka is a kind of hypothetical argument. Both the parts of *Tarka*

are full of imaginary thought. If smoke were endowed with doubt of deviation of fire, it would not be caused by fire. If the first part is true, the second, part would also be true. But it is known through experience that the second part is not true in so far as we do not get any smoke, which is not caused by fire. From the falsity of the second half, the falsity of first half (i.e., smoke is deviated from fire) is determined. In our everyday life also we remove doubt in respect of something after following this method of argumentation, From the knowledge of consequence the idea of an antecedent is revealed *Tarka*, being a kind of mental construction, is useful for removing doubt and hence *Tarka*, though invalid (in the sense of not being a source of valid cognition) is the promoter of the *Pramāṇas*. 'This *Tarka* is otherwise known as *Āpatti* i.e., the introduction of the undesired through which the desire is established. It is also a kind of indirect method through which the truth is ascertained. If the negation of P is proved as absurd, it would automatically follow that P is true, For these various reasons much importance has been laid on this method in the Navya Nyāya.

The Concept of Logical Fallacies (Hetvābhāsa)

That which appears as reason or *hetu* (but actually not) due to the existence of some similarities with a *hetu* is called *hetvābhāsa* (i.e. fallacy of inference). According to Raghunath Shiromani, the author *Dīdhiti*, the defect of *hetu* are called *hetvābhāsas* or fallacies (*hetorābhāsaḥ doṣaḥ hetvābhāsaḥ*). When the knowledge of an object becomes impediment to the attainment of inferential cognition is

otherwise called *hetvabhāsa*. That is to way, the knowledge of an object, which becomes an impediment to the knowledge of *Vyāpti* and consideration or *parāmarśa* is described as *hetvābhāsa* (*yadviṣayakatvenajñānasyanumiiivirodhitvam tattvam*)⁵⁹

This *hetvābhāsa* is of five types : (i) Inconstant reason (*anaikāntika* or *savyabhicāra*) (if) Unfounded (*aśidha* or *asiddhi*) (iii) Contradictory (*viruddha* or *virodha*) (iv) counterbalanced (*satpratipakṣa* or *satpratipakṣita*) and (v) Incongruous

(*vādhita* or *vādha*).

a) Inconstant reason (*anaikāntika* or *savyabhicāra*) is of three types: I) common (*sādhāraṇa*) ii) uncommon (*āsādhāraṇa*) end c) inconclusive (*anupasamhārī*). Common inconstant reason (*sādhāraṇa anaikantika*)

According to the Neo-logicians, the reason, which exists in a place, which is different from the locus of *Sādhyā*, is called common inconstant reason (*Sādhyā bhāvādhikaraṇavṛttiḥ hetuḥ sādharmaṇah*).⁶² As for example, "The Mountain has got smoke as it has got fire' (*parvato dhūmavān vahnēḥ*). In this inference 'smoke' is taken as *sādhyā*, the loci of which are kitchen etc. and different from the locus of *Sādhyā* is red-hot iron ball in which there is fire. Hence in this case fire is the common inconstant reason. According to the old logicians, the reason existing in both similar as well as contrary instances is called common inconstant reason (*sapakṣa-vipakṣa-vṛttiḥ sādharmaṇah*). The definition can be applied to the above-mentioned example. The similar instances are mountain, kitchen etc where *sādhyā* or probandum certainly exists (*niścitasādhyavān sapakṣah*) and the contrary instances are red-hot iron

ball, electric heater etc where *sādhya* does not exist without any exception (*niścitasādhyaḥbhāvavān vipakṣah*). As the *hetu* or reason 'fire' exists, in the mountain etc and also in red-hot iron ball etc. this reason is fallacious. The fallacy is called common inconstant reason (*sādhāraṇa anaikāntika*)⁶³

To the Navya Naiyāyikas the reason or *hetu*, which does not co-exist in the locus of *sādhya*, is called uncommon inconstant reason (*sādhyaśāmānādhikaraṇo hetuḥ asādhāraṇah*). In the inference "The sound is non-eternal, as it has got soundness in it" (*śabdaḥ anityah śabdatvāt*), the 'non-eternity' (*anityatva*) is taken as *sādhya*, the loci of which are cloth, jar etc in which there is the absence of soundness. So the reason (*hetu*) is called uncommon inconstant reason (*asādhāraṇa anaikāntikaḥ hetuḥ*). So far as the view of the old logicians is concerned, the reason, which does not exist in the similar instances as well as contrary instances, is called uncommon inconstant reason (*asādhāraṇah anaikāntikaḥ hetuḥ*). The original definition runs as follows : *sapakṣa-vipakṣa vyāvṛttah asādhāraṇah*. In the above mentioned instance the *hetu* 'soundness' (*śabdatva*) does not exist in the cloth etc as well as in the space etc. but exists in the subject i.e.. *pakṣa* i.e.. sound alone. Hence, this *hetu* is called uncommon inconstant reason (*asādhāraṇah anaikāntikah hetvābhāsah*).⁶⁴

An inference where the *sādhya* etc do not become the absentee of the absolute negation is called inconclusive inconstant reason (*anupasamhārī anaikāntika hetvābhāsa*), the definition of which is as follows: *Anupasamhārī cātyantābhāvapratiyogisādhyaśādhiḥ*. In the inference 'All is nameable as it is knowable' (*sarvam abhidheyam*

jñeyatvāt), i.e. *sādhyā* 'nameability' (*abhidheyatva*) is not the absence of the absolute negation of nameability. Such an absence is not at all possible as each and every object in this world is nameable in character. This inconclusive inconstant reason may be explained in another way, The *hetu* of which the subject or *pakṣa* is based on exclusively affirmative (*kevalānvayī*) method, (*kevalānvāyīpakṣakaḥ anupasamhārī*). The definition can be based on exclusively affirmative method alone. There is no scope for applying the method of difference as 'all' has been taken as the subject or *pakṣa*. Hence there lies a fallacy called *anupasamhārī* (fallacy of inconclusiveness).

(2) Unfounded (*asiddhi*): This fallacy is again subdivided into three a) unfounded with regard to substratum (*āśrayāsiddhi*), b) unfounded in respect of essence (*svārūpāsiddhi*); c) unfoundedness from the standpoint of pervadedness (*vyāpyatāsiddhi*).

Unfoundedness regarding substratum (*āśrayāsiddhi*) remains there where there is the absence of the limiter of subjectness in a subject (*pakṣe pakṣatāvachedakasya abhāvah*). In the inferential argument 'The sky-flower is fragrant, as it has got floweriness in it' (*ākāśakusumam surabhi kusumatvāt*) 'the sky flower' (*ākāśakusuma*) is the *pakṣa* or subject where there is the absence of flowers (*kusumatva*) which is the limiter of *pakṣata* (*pakṣatāvachedaka*). Here there is the *hetvābhāsa* called *āśryāsiddhi*.

If there is the absence of *hetu* in the subject of inference (*pakṣa*), there occurs the fallacy called *svārūpāsiddhi* (unfoundedness in respect of essence), the definition of which is as follows: *Pakṣe*

vyāpyatvābhimatasya abhāvah svarūpasiddhih). In the

inference 'The lake is a substance as it has get smoke in it', the 'smoke' is a *hetu*' or pervaded (*vyāpya*) which is absent in the subject of inference (*paksa*) i.e. in lake. Hence there occurs a fallacy called *svārūpasiddhi*.

Unfoundedness in respect of pervadedness (*vyāpyatvāsiddhi*) is of two types: *sādhyāsiddhi* and *sādhanāsiddhi*. When there is an absence of the limiter of *sādhyatā* in a *sādhya*, it is called *sādhyāsiddhi*. (*Sādhye sādhyatāvachchedakasyābhāvah sādhyāsiddhih*), in the same way if there is the absence of the limiter of *hetuta* in a *hetu*, it is called *sādhanāsiddhi*, (*sādhane sadhanatāvachchedakasya abhāvah sādhanāsiddhih*). In the inference 'The mountain has golden fire as it has got blue smoke' (*parvatah kāñcanavahnimān niladhūmāt*), there is the absence of the limiter of *sādhyatā* i.e. *dhūmatva* in the *sādhya* i.e.. *kañcanavahni* and the absence of the limiter of *hetutā* i.e., *dhūmatva* in blue smoke (*nīladhūmā*) which is the *hetu* here, and hence there arises the fallacy of *sādhyāsiddhi* and *sādhanāsiddhi* respectively which are sub-types of *vyāpyatāsiddhi*. It is also worth-mentioning in this connection that the golden fire (*kañcanavahni*) and blue smoke (*nīladhūma*) are absurd entities and hence they are *asiddha*.⁶⁵

Contradiction (*viruddha*) : The reason or *hetu* which is the counterpositive of the absence which is the pervader of the *sādhya* is called a contradicted one (*viruddha*) (*sādhyavyāpakābhūtābhāvapratīyagī viruddha*).

In other words, the reason which is pervaded by the absence of the *sādhya* is called as contradicted one (*sādhyābhāvavyāpto hetuh*

viruddhah). In the example - 'The sound is eternal, as it is produced' (*śabdah nityah kṛtakatvāt or kāryatvāt*), the *hetu* *kṛtakatva* or *kāryatva* (producedness) proves the absence of eternity (i.e. non-eternity) or *anityatva*. Where there is the property of being produced, there is the property of being non-eternal (*anityatva*), which is the absence of *sādhya* in this particular case. Another example - "The Mountain is fiery, as it has got water should be cited as *viruddha* and it can be explained in the similar way.⁶⁶

Counterbalanced (*satpratipakṣa*): A rival argument that establishes the absence of *sādhya* is called counter-balanced (*satpratipakṣah prati hetuh sādhyābhāvasādhakah*). In the inference- 'The sound is eternal as there is audibility (*śabdah nityah śrāvaṇatvāt*) the *sādhya* is 'eternity' (*nityatva*) which can be counterbalanced by another rival argument, in the form: 'The sound is non-eternal, as it has got producedness' (*śabdah anitya kāryatvāt*). Hence the earlier argument is suffering from the fallacy of *satpratipakṣa*.⁶⁷

Incongruous (*vādhita*). If there is the absence of the *sādhya* in the subject of inference, it is called *vādhita* or incongruous *hetvābhāsa* (*pakṣe sādhyābhāvah*). It can also be described as incongruity (*vādhah*), which is defined-by the neo-thinkers in the following way: "*Sādhyasūnyo yatra pakṣastvāsau vādha udāhrtah*". When, a *pakṣa* becomes free from *sādhya* or *pakṣa* is; endowed with the absence of *sādhya*, it is called *vādha*. In the inferential argument in the form: "The fire is the locus of the absence of heat, as it is a substance" (*vahniḥ anuṣṇah dravyatvāt*), the absence of heat' (*anuṣṇatva*) is taken as the *sādhya* in 'fire' is taken as *pakṣa* or subject of inference. In this case of fire the absence of heat' is

not possible. As the: existence of heat in fire is known through another *pramāṇa* i.e. perception, it is fallacious for having a fallacy called *vādhita*. Considering this the old Naiyāyikas have defined in the following way: '*Yasya sādhyābhavah pramāṇāntareṇa niścitah sa vādhitah*'. That is when the absence of *sādhyā* is ascertained through other means of knowing, it is called *vādhita* as found in the above-mentioned inference.⁶⁸

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2. *Ibid.*
3. *Ibid*, p. xix
4. *Ibid*
5. *Ibid*, xx
6. *Nyāyasūtra* – 1.1.4.
7. *Nyāyabhāṣya* on Sūtra No. 1.1.5.
8. *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* on verse no. 51, p. 263, Edited by Panchanan Bhattacharya, Calcutta, 1374 (bangabda),after *Siddhāntamukīāvalī*.
9. *Nyāyasūtra* – 1.1.5.
10. *Nyāyabhāṣya* on Sūtra no. 1.1.5.
11. *T. S.*, p. xxv (same edition)
12. *Bhāṣāpariccheda* Verse no. 68 and 66
13. *T.S.* p.xxv.
14. *Bhāṣāpariccheda* verse no. 66
15. *T. S. Dīpika*, p. xxviii.

16. *Nyāyabodhinī* on T.S., p. 47, with seven commentaries, Ed. Satkari Sharma Bangiya, Chowkhamba, 1974.
17. *Bhāṣāpariccheda* Verse no. 66
18. *T. S.* p.xx
19. *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* on verse no. 66
20. Gangeśa : *Vyāptipañcakam*, p1,
21. *T.S.* p. xxv.
22. *T.S. Dīpika*, p. xxvi
23. *Nīlakanṭhī* on T.S. p. 258, Ed. Satkari Sharma bangiya, Chowkhamba, 1974.
24. *Ibid.*
25. “Vyāptih sādhyavadanyasminnasambandha udāhṛtha”.
Bhasāpariccheda, verse no. 68
26. “Vahnimān dhūmādityādau sādhyo vahnih, sādhyavān mathānasādih, tadanyo jala-hradādih, tadavṛttitvam dhūmasyeti lakṣaṇa-samanvayah.”
Siddhāntamuktāvalī on *Bhāṣāpariccheda* verse no 68, *Kārikāvalī-Muktāvalī with Dinakarī and Rāmarudrī*, Edited by Harirama Shukla, Chowkhamba, 1941.
27. “Dhūmavān vanherityādau sādhyavadanyasminstaptayaḥ Pinḍādau vanheḥ sattvānnātivyāptih’ - *Ibid*
28. “Atra yena sambandhena sādhytam, tenaiva sambandhena sādhyavān bodhyah. Anyathā samavāyasmabandhena vahnimān vahneravayavastadanya mahānasādih, tatra dhūmasya vidyamāntvadavyāptiprasangāt.” – *Ibid.*

29. “Sādhyavadanyaśca sādhyavattvāvaccinnapratyogitākabhedavan bodhyah. Tena yatkiñcid – vanhimato mahānasāderbhinne parvatādau dhūmasya sattve’pi na kṣatih” – Ibid.
30. “Yena sambadhena hetutā, tenaiva sambadhena sādhyavadanya- vṛttivam bodhyam. Tena sādhyavadanyasmin dhūmāvayave dhūmasya samavāyasambandhena sattve’ pi na kṣatih” – Ibid.
31. Sādhyavadanyavṛttivañca
sādhyavadanyavṛttivatvavācchinnapratyogitākābhāvah Tena dhūmavān vahnerityatra sādhyavadanyajalahradādivṛttivābhāve pi nātivyapatih” – Ibid.
32. “Viśṣṭam śuddhānātiricyate”. (There is a rule that a qualified entity is nothing but the pure one. Because to them if an old palace, for example, is renovated or made *visista*, it is not changed altogether. The palace is described as the same known in earlier time. Hence pure object remains same even if it is changed through its renovation. This is a view expressed by a section of Philosophers.
33. “Atra yadyapi dravyam guṇakarmānyatvaviśiṣṭasattvādityādau viśistasattāyah śuddha-sattāyāścaikyāt sādhyavadanyasmin guṇādāvavṛttivam nāsti, tathapi hetutāvachedakarūpeṇavṛttitvam vacyam” – Ibid.
34. “Nanu kevalanvayini jñeyatvādau sādhye sādhyavadanyasyaprasiddhatvādvayāptih” – Ibid.
35. “Atra yadyapi vanhimān dhūmādityādau hetvadhikaraṇaparvatādivṛttyabhāvapratyogitvam tattadvahuyaderastiyavyāptih” – Ibid.
36. Ibid

37. “Na ca samānādhikaraṇa vahnidhūmayoreva vyāptiriti vācyam. Tattadvahnyāderapyubhayabhāvasattvāt, ekasattve’pi dvayam nāstīti pratīteh, guṇavān dravyatadityadāvavyāpteśca. Ibid.
38. Tathāpi pratiyogitānavacchedakam yat sādhyatāvacchedakam tadavacchinna-sāmānadhikaranyam vyāptiriti vācyam”. Ibid.
39. “Nanu rūpatvavyāpyajātīmattvān pṛthivītvādityādau sādhyatāvacchedika rūpatvavyāpyajātayastasañca suklatvādirjātinam nilaghatādivṛtṭyabhāvapratiyogitavacchedakatvamastityavyāptiriti cet, na, tara Paramaparayā rūpatvavyāpyajātityasyaiva sadhyatavacchedakatvat. Na hi tādrśadharnavacchinnābhavah kvapi pṛthivya masti rūpatvavyāpyajātīman nastīti buddhyapatteh” Ibid.
40. “Evam dandyāḍau sādhye paramaparasambaddham danḍatvādikameva sādhyatāvacchedakam, tacca pratiyogitānavacchedakamiti”. Ibid.
41. “Tena dravyam guṇakarmānyatviśiṣṭasactvādiyādau śuddhasattādhikaraṇaguṇadiniṣṭhābhāvapratiyogitve’pi dravyatvasya navyāptih.” – Ibid.
42. “Hetautāvacchedakasambadhena hetvadhikaraṇam bodhyam. Tena samavāyena dhūmādhikaraṇatādavayavar iṣṭhābhāvapratiyotitive pi vanhernayyāptih” – Ibid.
43. “Abhāvaśca pratiyogivyadhikaraṇo bodhyah. Tena kapisamyogī etadvṛkṣatvādityādau mūltāvacchedenaitadvṛkṣavṛttikapisamyogābhāvapratiyogitave’pi kapisamogasya nāvyāptih” – Ibid.

44. “Atra sādhyatāvachedakāsambandhena
pratiyogyanadhikaraṇatvam bodhyam... Itthañca vahnimān
dhūmādityādau dhūmādhikaraṇe samavāyena vehnivirahasattve’ pi
na kṣatiḥ”. Ibid.
45. “Nanu pratiyogitāvachedakavacchinnasya yasya kasyacit
pratiyogino’ nadhikaraṇatvam tatsāmānyasya vā,
yatkiñcitpratiyogitāvachedakāvaccchinnanādhikaraṇatvam va
vivakṣtam?”. Ibid.
46. “Ādye kapisamyogi etadvṛkṣatvādityatra tathaivavyāptiḥ,
kapisamyogābhāvapratiyogitā vacchedakāvaccchinno vṛkṣā-
vṛttikapisaryogo’ gi bhavati, tadandhikaraṇaṅca vṛkṣa iti” – Ibid.
47. “Dvitiyetu pratiyogivyadhikaranābhāvāprasiddhiḥ,
sarvvasyaivābhāvasya
pūrvakṣaṇaviṛttitvāviśiṣṭasvabhāvātmakapratiyogisamānādhikaraṇa
tvāt”. – Ibid.
48. “Trīye tu kapisamyogābhāvāvān ītmarvādityādāvyāptiḥ,
tarrātmavṛttikapisamyogābhāvābhāvah kapisamyogastasya ca
guṇatvāt tatpratiyogirāvachedakam gunasāmānyabhātvampai,
tadavaccinnādhikaraṇatvam hetuadhikaraṇasyātmana iti.” –
Ibid.
49. “Maivam. Yādrśapratiyogitāvachedakāvacchinnanadhikaraṇatvam
hetumatastādṛśapratiyogitānavachedakatvasya Vivaṣita vāt.” -
Ibid
50. “Thathā ca kapisamyogābhāvavānāttnatvādiryādau
hetvadhikaraṇasyātmano guṇasāmānyābhāvavārūpapra
atiyogitāyacchedakenāvacchinnasyaivāṇadhikaraṇatvād
yādrśapratiyogitāpadena

guṇasāmānyābhāvatvāvachchinnapratyogitāya upādānāl
tadanavacchedakatvasya sādhyatvāvchedake sattvānnāvvyiptih”
Super commentary known as *Mukāāvatisamgraha on Siddhānta-*
muktāvali. P358 (Panchanan Bhattacharyya edition) 1374 Ben.

51. Visvanatha : *Bhāsāpariccheda*, Verse no. 68 and *Siddhānta-*
muktāvalī on the same verse, Ed. Panchanan Bhattacharya,
Calcutta, 1374 (bangabada). Henceforth *Bhāṣāpariccheda and*
Siddhāntamuktāvalī
52. *Bhāṣāpariccheda* Verse No. 66.
53. *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* on Verse no. 66.
54. *Ibid*
55. *Ibid*
56. *Ibid*
57. *Ibid*
58. *Ibid*
59. Viśvanātha : *Siddhāntanwatāvalī* on *Bhāsāpariccheda* verse no.
71, Ed. Panchanan Bhattacharya, Calcutta. 1374 (Bangabca).
Henceforth, *Siddhantamuktavali and Bhasaparincheda*.
60. *Bhāṣāpariccheda* Verse No. 71
61. *Ibid* , Verse No. 72
62. *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* on verse no. 72
63. *Ibid* on verse nos. 72 & 73 and *Bhasaparincheda* Verse no. 73.
64. *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* on verse no. 73
65. *Bhāṣāpariccheda* Verse No. 75-76-77
66. *Bhāṣāpariccheda and Siddhāntamuktāvalī* on verse no. 74
67. *Ibid* on verse no. 77
68. *Ibid* on verse no. 78