

CHAPTER THREE
PUBLIC POLICY MAKING
IN INDIA

3.1 PUBLIC POLICY MAKING IN INDIA :

Normative Frame-work of Policy Making in India Ideology .

Public policy making is necessarily shaped within the frame work of a country's constitutional system of which three features stand out most prominently in the case of India : the parliamentary form of government, federalism and a broad band of social, economic and political philosophy articulated in the preamble, the directive principles of state policy and the fundamental rights. The five year plan of the country acquires finality only after parliament has accorded its approval. Similarly, parliament has over a period of time passed a number of policy resolutions such as the Industrial policy Resolution, Policy Resolution on Science and Technology, Resolution on National Education Policy etc. and these policies thus come to acquire sanctity of the highest level.

Today, the legislative leadership has undisputedly shifted into the hands of the Executive and this process has been further reinforced and strengthened in India by the long continuing single party dominance system of the country, particularly by the congress culture of functioning. The sub-servience has become much more deeply marked since 1984 under the prime ministership of Rajiv Gandhi. The passage of the Muslim (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 by the parliament in the face of stiff nationwide opposition is an evidence of the Executive controlled status of the people's elected body, the initiative firmly moving elsewhere notably in the direction of the Prime Minister's House.

Policy-making process in India has equally to contend

with the federal form of the country's policy. Indian federalism, which has evolved out of extreme unitarism is marked by some unique features, while the constitution attempts a division of functions between the two levels of government. All 'line' or substantive functions remain entrusted with the state government. Most subjects, which constitute the ingredients of development administration are constitutionally within the states' direct jurisdiction : agriculture, education, housing, industries, public health and sanitation, family planning, water supply, animal husbandry, minor irrigation, forests, fisheries and local government, while many others like electricity, labour, economic and social planning etc., are in the concurrent list, subject to state as well as Central jurisdiction with the Centre exercising over-riding power but effective one nonetheless remaining with the states. Because the financial resources are concentrated in the Central Government the States have necessarily to look to the Centre for funds.

The Social, Political and economic message of the Indian constitution is enshrined in the preamble, the fundamental rights and the directive principle of state policy. The judiciary of the land does take into account the directive principles of the state policy while interpreting the fundamental rights and even other issues and thus the dichotomy between them has been rightly put to rest. Both levels of the government are thus under an obligation to formulate public policies so as to work towards the realisation of the directive principles. Thus

the constitution of India provides enough policy options and can accomodate even a redical government within its frame work as is the case in West Bengal and Tripura.

Yet it must be admitted that the socio-economic provisions of the constitution can be made to operate only by the political processes and dynamics of the land. How irrelevant the directive principles can be is proven in the case of the Govern-ent's determination to push through the Muslim (Protection of Rights of Divorce) Act in 1986 in total defiance of the Supreme Court's earlier verdict in the Shah Bano Case, the directive principles and even public opinion.

Policy Making : Institutions:

Although the Indian policy is federal in character, the administrative system is highly integrated, the state governments acting as implementing agencies of the centre in a large variety of matters. Public policy cannot be made by one or few individuals however exalted by their station. Nor can it be separated from administration. Public policy necessarily involves a large number of persons and institution operating in hierarchi-cal order or otherwise such as ministers civil servants, parliamentarians, politicians, pressure groups, professional etc. Policy making functionaries are the Prime Minister and his office (1) including his advisers, ministers and the secretaries. Consula-tions with the state governments take place on a wide variety of matters all the time : and committees are formed, conferances convened to develop consensus and acceptance, so necessary in a

federal system. Third world countries are unusually sensitive to international policy thoughts and many of these are deeply influenced by the current thinking in the west. India's public policies in relation to poverty, women's rights, environment etc. is largely a consequence of fall out of debate in the west. The party system is itself a source of policy making in many democracies, especially the western ones. In India, however no such claim can be seriously made. The Congress party which has been the dominant party and perhaps the only most powerful one in the country, has no recognisable organ within itself to undertake systematic investigations and researches to formulate in coherent terms policy alternatives and strategies for adoption.

The Cabinet :

Policies acquire final approval at various levels of governance depending on their import and nature. Certain proposals are required to be brought before the cabinet for its decision and the cabinet may take them up either directly or may refer them to one of its sub-committees for a more detailed examination. The Cabinet functioning on the principle of collective responsibility in the top policy-making body in the government but only major proposals are taken to it for its decision, other matters being disposed of by the minister at his own level. Much more systematically powerful as policy making mechanisms are its sub-committees, particularly the political affairs committee and the Economic Affairs Committee, both presided over by the Prime Minister and consisting of key ministers.

The Prime Minister and His Office :

The President of India is the titular head of State and the Prime Minister exercises executive authority in regard to matters of governance. The Prime Minister always enjoys a special position in the realm of policy making and other ministers play varying levels of subordinate role. The subservice on the part of other functionaries has always persisted except for brief periods when the Prime Minister was not very powerful. Jawaharlal Nehru was rendered rather less effective after the humiliation suffered in the Chinese war in 1962 and Parliament emerged as a powerful body from then onwards till his death in 1964. He was succeeded by a then uncertain Lal Bahadur Shastri who was still consolidating his position but death removed him from the scene. Indira Gandhi became the third Prime Minister was not very powerful in the beginning depending on the older members of the Congress. In 1969 she caused a split in the Congress Party, making her wing - the Congress(R) - depend on other non-Congress(O) - opposition parties, which had the effect of restricting her options and manoeuvres in policy making. Rather some other parties on which she depended for parliamentary support were seen to ride on her wings and influencing policy making. She became powerful after the 1971 election which gave a massive victory to her party. From this time onwards Indira Gandhi became the single most powerful person engaged in policy making. The present Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, who occupies the central and most crucial position in the entire policy making process, did not hesitate in

covering subjects which are even the state's direct responsibility. He appoints and removes the ministers, allocates work to them, and the ministers survive in their position on his goodwill. To-day, he stands peerless and all major policies are either initiated by him or endorsed by him. There is a high level of centralisation of policy initiative and policy making, at least so far as major ones are concerned, and what is more, nearly all functionaries and institutions involved in policy making have implicitly accepted the position by quietly submitting to it. The Prime Minister has appointed some advisers such as Adviser to the Prime Minister on Administrative Reform (the post is vacant at the moment, its incumbent having resigned to become a member of the Rajya Sabha), Adviser to the Prime Minister on Economic Affairs, Adviser to the Prime Minister on Science and Technology, Adviser to the Prime Minister on Cultural Affairs etc. Besides, an Economic Advisory Council to the Prime Minister exists since early eighties.

The Planning Commission :

A mention even though brief, must have to be made of the Planning Commission which has emerged as a policy making organ of key importance on a wide range of subjects, especially developmental and what is more, for both the levels of Government. The terms of reference which the commission functions includes formulation of the five year plans for the most effective and balanced utilisation of the country's resources' and 'working out of priorities in the plan', which delineates very

clearly the policy making functions of the commission. The commission works in consultation with the central Government ministries and departments as well as State governments, and the five year plan which it prepares after discussion and consultation with both the levels of government becomes the national policy register of the union valid for a five year term.

The Seceratriate :

Of the policy making organs in the Government of India the Secretariat stands at an exceptionally high pedestal. Indeed, it is designed as the policy making organ, being the seat of the Government of India.

Technically speaking, the Government of India does not possess a permanent civil service of its own, except the Central Secretariat Service. It has always been the official policy to fill the middle and higher management level positions at the headquarters of the Government -- the Secretariat -- by deputation of officers from the state governments as well as from the various Central Services, controlled as they are by their respective departments, the only exceptions being the External Affairs, Railways and Posts and Telegraphs Ministers. Such an arrangement was always defended and even when the federation - creating Government of India Act 1935 was enacted, no departure was permitted.

The principal argument advanced in favour of the staffing arrangement is that higher civil servants engaged in policy-making experience of working in the field to keep the

actions and decisions of the Central Government as close to reality and as meaningful to the people possible.

The Secretariat of the Government of India is a collective noun as it were, and today it includes as many as sixty ministries and departments. The identification of major policy-making organs in the Government, is not a sure proof of their compulsory involvement in the exercise. The perceived gravity of a proposed policy is a factor, but not the only one, determining which agencies are to be consulted, in which order and with what weightage. Sponsorship is itself critically important; if the Prime Minister or his office proposes a policy it may not be thoroughly discussed in all the units on this network and in the process some organs may even get completely by passed, their consent having been assumed. Behind policy making operate many interests, many factors, many perceptions and the map is not necessarily the same or similar even with the same or similar problem emerging again. The definition of rationality is ever varying. Indeed a top level policy-maker in India told the present author : "Policies are seldom framed the way we read in books. Krishna Mohan (a left oriented political leader who was close to Jawaharlal Nehru and was even the defence minister for some time during his term) once told me, what we read in Sir Ivor Jennings works and other treatises are hardly observed while making policies." Policy-making experience additional constraint under a coalition as in the case of the Janata Party (a coalition in disguise) rule in the past (1977-79) or the united front rule

in West Bengal. The Chief executive does not occupy that commanding height nor can his writ run all over the government, he being viewed more in the nature of a Chairman or Primus inter pares. A coalitional government generally leaves out for policy making those areas where the collaborating parties have disagreements.

3.2 POLICY MAKING PROCESS : A CRITIQUE :

Absence of systematic study and Research :-

In 1918, the Machinery of Government Committee, popularly known as the Haldane committee after the name of its Chairman Viscount Haldane of Cloan had observed that Britain had no arrangement or provision for systematic application of thought as parliamentary to policy formulation and implementation. The committee pointed out 'It appears to us that adequate provision has not been made in the past for the organised acquisition of facts and information and for the systematic application of thought, as preliminary to the settlement of policy and its subsequent administration. In India, the Administrative Reforms Commission's study team on the Machinery of the Government of India and its procedures of work suggested in 1968 the creation of an 'office of planning and policy' in each ministry for purposes of over-all planning and also a 'the unit for formulation of policy in the ministry in the strategic field. This suggestion is yet to be implemented. The necessary research and enquiry should be out or supervised by a separate department specially charged with this responsibility but working in the closest collaboration with the administrative departments concerned with its activities. Also special attention should be

paid to the recruitment methods of personnel for such specialised work. Equally necessary the senior officers in all departments must debate, which they presently do not do, an adequate amount of time to enquiry, research and reflection and initiate meaningful inter-action with researchers which at present is negligible. Mention may here be made of an advisory mechanism, called by policy Advisory Committee, attached to the Cabinet Secretariat and consisting of the Minister of State for External Affairs, the Minister of State in Internal Security the Minister of State for Defence Research and some Senior Civil Servants and experts, in existence since April 1986 (4) for a constant assessment of major developments and for ensuring an integrated response to critical problems. Postings in the Secretariat are governed by the Central Staffing Scheme under which the doors are theoretically open to all higher Civil Services. In practice, however, there has emerged a group of officers which has developed inordinate liking for Central postings, in ministries and agencies managing economic affairs, with the ultimate aim of moving to an international organisation like the World Bank or its subsidiaries. These imbalances and distortions are of a grave nature, especially in the context of the increasing range, level and volume of public responsibilities as well as mounting expectations of the people from the Government. A beginning must be made by immediately reinstating the first principles of the personnel system by ensuring a rhythmic operation of the tenure system. The Secretariat as operation today suffers from other weaknesses also. A need for

strengthening policy planning mechanisms in it is acute. Modern side made available by advances in technology should be widely used in streamline decision-making. Many other structural and procedural reforms in the Secretariat appear to be over due. It is also happening that new positions and organs within the public bureaucracy are being created ostensibly for policy-making purposes. What is more, some of these position directly advising the political chief executive are seen in practice to develop their own hierarchy causing a needless proliferation of structures. Apparently, the original motivating force was to improve the quality of policy-making and cut down delays, these have in effect created fresh problems of coordination and added to delay.

Departmentalism:

A Hindrance to Policy-Making Public Policy Making suffers from yet another weakness, in that it tends to be formulated very narrowly to fit into a narrowly specialised perception set. Each department of the government has its peculiar viewpoints which makes it difficult for it to see beyond its narrow specialism. Indeed, departmentalism hinders sound policy making and obstructs implementation. The British Government in India was aware of the evils of departmentalism; and to encourage policy makers to rise above it, it devised the nomenclature of 'Secretary of the Government of India.' The device has not been very availing as the Secretariats tend to think and act excessively in narrow idioms of their individual departments. In his famous Report known as 'Reports on the Re-organisation of the

Central Government. R. Tottenham emphasised in 1946 the need for the secretaries to think in government wide, not narrow departmental terms. He observed 'Our Secretaries are Secretaries to the Government of India as a whole and not to any particular Member (that is, minister) of it. It would be a good thing if this could be given more practical recognition than appears to be the case'. He continued : 'I confess that I have been somewhat shocked by the intensity of the departmental feeling that I have come across in the course of my investigations'. The problem has got aggravated since Tottenham wrote in 1946, and today it is a serious impediment both at the policy making and implementation stages.

Information Gap

Policy making, necessarily, is based on data, and in India data in many spheres of social action is weak and unreliable. Most of the information on which policies at higher levels are made emanates from the district collector and this may not be trustworthy. One noted Russian economic historian, G.C. Kotovsky, has publicly declared agricultural data in India, particularly in regard to agricultural labourers, as 'bogus'. Information base of policy making must have to be made sound and authentic.

Centralism in Policy-making:

In the Indian federal system the states carry nearly all programmatic responsibilities, and no less significant is the fact that the centre itself depends on them for implementation of many of its own tasks. Broadly speaking, the state Governments are the implementing agencies of the centre. It is here, moreover,

that impact of public administration is felt and the policies tested out. Truly speaking, the embryo of basic public policies is born and takes shape in the states. All India services are common to both the levels of government; and the Indian Administrative Service is manifestly designed to occupy policy making positions at both the Centre and in the States. The need is for decentralisation so that the grass root may get charged with life and thousand points get strengthened the extreme centralist culture pervading at present has a stifling influence all round. Communication system, especially bottom up one, is weak and intermittent citizen participation remains at best a ritual.

A consequence of the present centralist cult is that the national objectives are not always defined in clear terms and policies suffer from deliberately planted ambiguity and ambivalence. Local need remain unaccounted for in policy making, and local resources, both men and material, remain neglected. Inevitably the policy so conceived is destined to be a failure, to cover up which another set of policies, again employing the same worn out methodology, get formulated. Often, we hope from the failure to another and rarely look at the feed back. A genuine effort must be made to strengthen state, districts and block administration, and popular local level popular institutions must be endowed with adequate resources and power.

Poor Implementation:

Implementation of policies is generally lackadevisical and is deeply enmeshed in local politics. In India, the pressure

groups are not as vocal and active at the stage of policy making as at that of implementation. Very often, this strategy pays them also. A consequence could be that implementation of socio-economic policies gets ultimately determined by local political interests pressures and in the process the underlying policy remains frustrated and benefits get concerned by other than the target groups. Monitoring of programme implementation is weak. (6)

3.3 THE POLICY PROCESS AND GOVERNMENTAL PLANNING:

In a strategy of Decision Braybrooke and Lindblom argue, as against Simon's ideal, that it is both inevitable and desirable policies should be made within a very narrow spectrum of possible alternatives their concept of marginal incrementalism, contends that an actor in any situation cannot at best achieve more than a very limited and non-radical change of policy and direction he prefers. Their other notion of partisan mutual adjustment assert that the various view-points or interests which ought to be considered in a decision will be better rerued through the accommodation reached between partisan protagonists, than through the determinations of some supposedly unbiared and comprehensive decision-maker, These authors conclude that policy-making involves no more than limited and mostly on co-ordinate adjustments to an existing situation, with decision-makers responding seriatism to the proposals of other protagonists, or to unforeseen consequences of their decisions (disjointed incrementalism). This apparently is as it should be there is a, therefore, no scope or need for the ideal of comprehensive decision-making, which is unworkable in a situation of

competing interests and view-point and would work hardly in a non
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-competitive one.

These theories are of course very general. They can be porited of relations organisations as well as between them and they clearly assume a democratic pluralist system. Even on this basis, the concept of incrementalism and partisanship are necessarily very broad, despite attempt by the authors to give them precision. For example, would the Redetiffe - Maud proposals for the reform of english local government come within the limits of merginal incrementalism ? One would assume not. The require a drastic break with the existing local government system, and the creation of require new areas and types of authority.

The theorists of marginal incrementalism might view these very facts as suggesting a probability that the Maud Report will not be implemented, as his indeed proved to be the case. What then was the purpose of the commission in making such implausible proposals? The answer might be that the commission hoped to bring about marginal changes by proposing more drastic ones, although this does not seem to have been their their intention since they proposed a comprehensive plan which was very difficult to modify. The conservative Government's revised proposals (1971) were less redical than the Maud ones, but even so will entail the abolition of most of the substantial powers which large towns (country bor- oaghs) have accumulated in England over several centuries. Is
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this or is that not merginal incrementalish ?

The British army, navy and air departments were highly

partisan before they were merged into the ministry of Defence. Each wished to develop its own specification of increasingly expensive weapon systems, and mutual adjustment mainly took the form of accepting unwillingly such arbitrations and economic as the Cabinet managed to improve. The creation of an integrated ministry did not remove this partisanship, but it did reduce it. Initially, the Central planning staffs of the ministry were swollen by the presence of many representatives from such departments, who stressed the claims of their respective service. Subsequently, the ministry introduced a functional system of organisation, which introduced on intermediate level of organisation concerned with strategic planning ; weapon systems ; and logistic personnel but separate organisations for the services continued at a lower level, although their partisanship was modified gradually through the imposed requirements of cooperation. Thus even through going administrative centralisation does not exclude a good deal of partisan mutual adjustment; More to the point perhaps, it seems very difficult to state in general terms how much partisanship desirable.

The Braybrooke - Lindblom thesis has a certain explanatory appeal to participants in the policy process. It corresponds very much better with the experience of most officials than does the rationalist thesis of Harbert Simon (which is of course anyhow an ideal), and perhaps officials feel comforted and flattered to be told that procedures which they supposed merely unavoidable are in fact the best possible. Yet the thesis is too

broad and loss to be of such use as description and marginal incrementalism cannot really be bent to cover the sudden increase of public expenditure of switches of public policy which occur from time to time.

As a prescriptive theory, this thesis as flatly pragmatic as the Simon view is Utopian. Essentially, it amounts to a recommendation for as much polycentricity as possible for example multiplication of separate points of decision or of effective influence upon eventual decisions. Collective decision, such as these made by a Cabinet, in principle seem preferably to unitary decisions, for example by according to Lindblom, a polycentric pattern of budgeting whereby the budget is shaped by bargains struck between multiple decision centres, willenable all relevant interests to be expressed and accommodated in the most satisfactory way; and the American budgetary process as described by Saron Wildavsky ⁽⁹⁾ conforms very well with this specification. This polycentricity occurs primarily because the president's Bureau of the Budget does not, as happens in almost every other country, produce a definitive budget which the legislature must accept, but a document which is unsticked and re-assembled by the appropriations committees of the House of Representatives and the Senat. The president's budget is stilla broadly endorsed, but the actual budget is stiched up according to lastminute bargains reached within and between the two chambers of Congress, and the Scope for Congressional revision also causes for stronger and more overt bargaining within the executive branch then would otherwise occur.

All participants in the budgetary process perform a useful function, while each adjusts his role from experience of those of other participants. The spending agencies submit estimates which reflect their priorities. The secretaries of the large departmental policy, while not offending the constituent agencies unduly. The Bureau of the Budget reflects the President's policy priorities, where known as well as searching for economics. The appropriation committees of House Representatives typically make economy cuts, while those of the Senate often act as a sort of Court of appeal for dissatisfied agencies. Many other interests, for example client groups, appear at several stages of the process, while there is also ample scope for such special view points as the wish of some Congressional groups to spend money more freely than the relevant department. The argument is that these specialised, incremental fragmented and sequential budgetary procedures (10) maximise total satisfactions much better than would a more centralised and comprehensive system of budgeting. Clearly such broad arguments are difficult to judge, but two points need to be stressed. One is that the satisfactions felt by participants in the budgetary process ought not be equated with those received by the ultimate public. The system is sensitive enough to prominent Congressmen who want Federal benefits extended to their areas or Federal Offices and other facilities located therein; and towards client organisations who will benefit from the expansion of some agency's work; but is less sensitive towards the general

interests of consumers and taxpayers in avoiding an uneconomic or inconvenient location of facilities, or a wasteful duplication of services. It is indeed the special duty of the President, whose constituency is nation-wide, to reflect these broader interests, but the price of Congressional support and of harmony within the Executive branch is numerous concessions to the American political systems is no argument for saying that they maximise final benefits from public expenditure.

The second point is that while all valuation of public expenditure are in a sense political, political costs and benefits can themselves to some extent be measured objectively. For example, one can analyse the probable effects of various subsidies upon the incomes of different groups of farmers, or the likely effects upon unemployment levels of alternative ways of allocating a given quantum of assistance. Since these factors can be measured according to a variety of methods and assumptions, full objectivity is impossible, but objectivity should at least increase as the view-point becomes more general and less influenced by special interests. Those urging the need for a comprehensive decision stress that important environmental effects will be overlooked, because they occur relatively slowly and do not fall within the purview of the authority initiating action. The polycentric theorists could suggest that if important interests are being overlooked the proper course is not to centralise the decision but to secure a more effective voice for the mining interests. This could be done in two ways, either of which will

depent upon achieving sufficient public and political support.

One method would be to place part at lease of the indirect social costs caused by a decision upon the agency responsible; for example, a noise tax could be lived upon the airports authority (and indirectly upon the airlines), which would influence the authority's choice towards less noisy sites and provide funds for comprehensive. This method has the great advantage of preserving the freedom of organisations to meke their own decisions within known financial constraints - Leaving aside difficulties of assessment and implementation, the limitation of this methods is that it can cover clea effects of a decision which can be isolated and measured, but not outcomes of a more uniquekind which result only partially or indirectly from the decision, yet this outcomes may be important.

The secondmethod would be to strengthen to powers of those authorities whose influence is considered inadequate, or to introduce an additional authorty for example, a body pledged to the reduction of noise. The limitation of this method is that the multiplication of powers and authorities is inclined to produce deadlocks or prolonged delays. The 'polycentric' model works smoothly, whether or not it works well, when the initiation authority has reasonable freedom of action. subject to the necessity of co-operating with other authorities upon appropriate points, but if other authorities can block a decision which is not their direct responsibility, and whose postponment may for them be a matter of indifference, the system breaks down. One

need not hypothesise in this instance, since it has recently proved impossible to find any cite for a major airport within about forty miles of New York which is acceptable both to the airports authorities, and to local government and local opinion, and the consequent congestion at the existing New York airports has dislocated air service throughout the world.

Yet the problem is not really so formidable. First, the experience and views of interested bodies will be available to, indeed thrust upon, the review agency; in this sense: partisan mutual adjustment continues. Secondly, an expert team can be assembled by the review body. Its skill will probably be more numerous than those available to any previous participant, and tainly will be deployed within less partisan and limited terms of reference. The intellectual contribution of such a team will certainly assist the reconciliation of institutional conflicts.

A difficulty throughout this whole discussion has been that the administrative system is so complex and inter-related that conflicts between "polycentricity" and planning or between autonomy and control are often subtle question of degree. In general, the development of modern administration is away from the polycentric and self-regulating model, and towards complex forms of administrative co-origination and planning. It is not much use offering general support or disapproval for this trend unless the analysis is related to certain typical situation which occurs in government. This has been attempted in a limited way in the case of the airport.

Since we have been dealing with only one type of comprehensive decision, it is useful to conclude with a summary of three ways in which such decisions may be brought about.

a) Thread-hoc resolution of a complex single issue, such as the airport case. In this case, Central Planning is confined to a single important decision, after which all bodies concerned revert in principle to their previous roles.

b) The imposition of a central policy or plan which binds within its terms all decisions taken by organisations. In this case the autonomy of participating agencies is permanently limited while the plan remains operative.

c) Full integration of all or many of the organisation concerned into a single agency. In this event, problem of internal co-ordination and planning are substituted for external relationship the legal and organisational scope for comprehensive planning is increased, but the elimination of independent viewpoint may reduce the equality of decisions.

The results have been some interesting empirical studies throwing a little light upon particular aspect of organisational behaviour, but a complete failure of grand theory. In the end, one is left with a great diversity of partial explanations of organisational behaviour with no rear academic way of synthesising them or choosing between them when they conflict. The most honest position frequently is accepticism, as is nicely illustrated by the test pages of Simon's own book organisations (written with Jems March), when the authors can not abide how

much truth exists in Adam Smith's old belief in the motive of self improvement. (11) In this situation, it is not uncommon for a writer to make a shopping list of all the experts of organisation which should be identified for study. But however long the list, it remains somewhat idiosyncratic and yet not comprehensive because the possible modes of analysis are illimitable. These writers make the mistake of supposing that any distinctions that are intellectually possible may be interesting or useful. (12)

Simon's rationalism is basically of the same kind though more complicated, only paradoxically he expects still more of it. By taming the famous principles of organisation into diagnostic criteria he makes their practical use dependent upon the nature of organisational objectives. Thus a still greater load is placed upon this notion of objectives than occurs to even Gulick or Urwick.

The scientific administration, human relations and systems theories schools share one important general characteristic. Their general concern is with problems of management, and their usual view-point is that of the manager. (13) True, the human relations group may claim to be more humanist, and system theorists more genuinely scientific, than their predecessors but this does not alter the point. This modern management theories can draw electrically upon contributions from all three schools without running into inevitable contradictions. Knowledge of human relations can be used to assist the goals of managers, without involving any necessary rejection of some of the older

principles of organisation and prescriptions about decision-making and communication can be added on to prescriptions about organisation and co-ordination of work. It is true that such a synthetic brew becomes rather weak and tasteless, but so long as it provides a loose rationale for the practical work of consultancy, it may be considered by the consultants to have done enough.

This implicit understanding, as Baker explains, depends upon the ability of officials to make variable judgements about the policy implications of cases. Now it may be that this is the result of an underivable degree of political indeterminacy, but a fully explicit treatment of organisational relations may not be desirable either. In the Report of the Fulton committee on the British Civil Service, these political factors treated by the Committee's consultants as a series of barriers to the adoption of management by objectives; it does not occur to the consultants that the barriers may be so large as to vitiate their
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prescriptions.

Secondly, one turns to the interesting switch of view point introduced by the theories of Bray books and Lindblom. Organisations are there judged not for their responsiveness to the goals of managers, but for their congruence with modes of policy-making in a democratic society. The focus shifts from the impact of goals upon organisations to the policy outcomes of various organisational systems (a political criterion). One need not agree with the theories of marginal incrementalism to appreciate the value for government administration of this second approach.

One can carry the same approach to the study of the internal structure of organisations. Thus Blau and Scott attempt a classification of organisations according to the taste of which principal ~~ities~~ efficiency each one ought to serve. On this basis, business concerns exist primarily to serve their owners; social science agencies to serve their clients; commowalth organisations (such as army as policy) to servs the public-at-large and mutual benefit associations (parties, unions clubs, sects) to serve their members.

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