

CHAPTER- IV

IF PERCEPTION IS TAKEN AS A PRAMĀNA, HOW IS ETHICS POSSIBLE IN A SOCIETY?

According to the Cārvāka Philosophy, perception is the only reliable source of knowledge. What is not perceptible is not real, if imperceptible objects are supposed to exist, then even imaginary things would exist, and the poor would remove their poverty with imaginary wealth; servants would become masters by imagining themselves to be rich, and all would become masters by imagining themselves to be rich and would fulfill their desires with imaginary objects. The distinction between perceptible things and imaginary things would then be abolished. There would therefore be total collapse of practical life, which depends upon the distinction between perceptible and imaginary things.

*“Kim capratyaksam apyastitayabhya pagamyate
cejjagodana pahamtam era syat daridro his varṇarasir
mestityanudhyaya helayciva danhsthyan dalayet”.¹*

Thus imperceptible things do not exist. According to them there are no transcendental realities, God, soul, heaven, hell and no liberation.

According to Cārvāka, perception is the only pramāna and this theory rejects inference as a dependable source of knowledge. But religion springs from our belief in some transcendental reality, the existence of which is established by inference. But since God's existence cannot be perceived as a consequence there is no God according to Cārvāka.

We all know that here is a relation of ethics to theology or morality to religion. Religion involves cognitive, emotional and volitional factors and manifests itself in the form of faith in a deity or deities, respected and worshipped. Dr. Flint says that "Religion is man's belief in a Being or Beings, mightier than himself and inaccessible to his sense, but not different to his sentiments and actions with the feelings and practices which flow from such belief. Existence of God and immortality of the soul are the fundamental article of faith in religion."

According to Descartes and Locke "Religion is the source of morality." Morality arises out of religion. Acts

are right or wrong simply because they are commanded or forbidden by God.

But God is the perfect being and righteousness is an element of this nature. What is right or good is in harmony with God's nature, and what is wrong or bad is repugnant to it. This view holds that men obey the moral laws simply because God is Almighty and he will reward or punish them accordingly. According to Kant, however, acts done from fear of punishment or in the hope of any reward do not have any moral worth. Moral actions spring from our consciousness. According to him, morality leads to religion. Our idea of the highest good contains in it the idea of the greatest happiness. Highest good is virtue. But complete good is virtue in harmony with happiness. We have a condition that virtue will lead to happiness and vice to pain. But our experience shows that virtuous men are often unhappy while sinful persons are in happiness. So the relation between virtue and happiness and that between vice and pain are not inseparable. If virtue does not necessarily lead to happiness and vice to pain, then what will inspire man to virtuous actions? For this Kant says, that there must be some personal and moral power behind the world that will ultimately combine virtue with happiness and vice with pain if not in this life, then in the future life. This moral power is God.

Hence the existence of God is a postulate of morality. Morality is thus the basis of religion. Martineau also says, "morality leads to religion." We get intuition of right and wrong by our conscience or moral faculty, so the ultimate source of moral authority is God who is Omniscient and Omnipresent. We are under moral obligation to God to do what is right and to refrain from what is wrong. The notion of God is closely connected with morality.

But Cārvākas have denied both God and morality. Let us first see their arguments against the existence of God.

According to Cārvākas, God's existence cannot be perceived. The four kinds of material elements have produced the world. So God is not the creator of the world. One might ask: can the material elements give rise by themselves to this wonderful world? Even the production of an object like an earthen pot requires an efficient cause in the form of a potter in addition to the material cause viz. clay. The desired form is given by the efficient cause i.e. the potter. The four material elements earth, water, fire and air are the material causes of the world. There is the need of a shaper and designer who turns the material elements into this beautiful world. But according to Cārvākas , the

material elements each have its fixed and inherent nature (svabhāva). These material elements combine by the nature and laws inherent in them to form this world. This view, as mentioned earlier, is known as naturalism or svabhāva -vāda. So there is no necessity of God. There is no proof that the materials of the world follow a design. They can move by the mechanical or accidental combination of the material elements. This is known as accidentalism or mechanism (yadṛcchā -vāda). Śankarāchārya defines "yadṛcchā" as 'ākaṣmikaprāptih' or co-occurrence. They deny uniformity of nature (kārya kāraṇa bhāva). The theory states some products arise due to various antecedents and for this there must be an invariable relation between cause and effect.

Yadṛcchā and svabhāva are identical regarding rejection of the principle. In svabhāvavāda there is a niyama or rule which is called svabhāvaniyama. In yadṛcchāvāda there is no such restriction.

Udayana in his Nyāyā-kusumānjali says that svabhāvavāda is one of the five forms of ākasmikatvavāda. The remaining four forms are:

1. ahetuvāda
2. abhūtivāda

3. svatant pada vāda and

4. anupakhyot pādavāda

The first view is the denial of causality but not of production. The second view is rejection of production (bhāvanā) itself. The third view is a strange doctrine in which the duality is set up between its cause and effect. This view is in Nāgārjunā's Mādhyamikakārikā. The last doctrine is some form of śūnyāvāda in which product appears from void or nothing. In this view of causality, the reality of both upādāna and nimitta is denied. Ujvaladatta divides svabhāva into two, nisarga and svabhāva. The former is 'habit ' and latter is 'nature'. Habit originates from conscious and regular effort in the past but nature is spontaneous without any source or origin. Rājaśekhara sūri criticizes accidentalism or svabhāvavāda. Its effects do not depend upon definite causes; they either always exist or they do not exist. But if they depend upon other causes, then only they can appear at a particular time. So they are produced by particular causes.

Udayana and Vardhamāna criticize naturalism (svabhāvavāda) thus. Svabhāva is one's own nature or peculiar character. It is either the peculiar nature of the cause or the peculiar nature of the effect. It does not exist before the effect and so cannot determine its

production at a particular time. The nature of an effect cannot exist before its production. If svabhāva is the nature of the cause, then the effect has a cause. If the cause does not exist it cannot have a nature or svabhāva. If it exists and has a nature from which the effect springs, then it has a cause. Thus naturalism is undermined. Svabhāva (śakti) may be said to be the power of a cause. Mere inherent nature (svabhāva) cannot account for the production of particular effects by particular causes at particular times. Thus naturalism is not tenable.

The Cārvāka, however, argues that if there is really any omnipotent, omniscient and kind God why He does not remove the doubts in mind of a learner by revealing Himself to him? If again it is argued that God is the judge of our good and bad actions, then the charges of partiality and cruelty may be leveled against him. If God punishes us for our faults, he is our enemy, and it is better that such a cruel God should not exist. In reality there is no God. God is not existent. The king who rules over the people is the supreme Lord (parameśvra). The king is perceived by all. The king is God. The king possesses enormous powers. An intelligent person always keeps the king in good humour and thereby earns a good deal in cash and kind from him and thus leads a happy life. No one can testify to the creation of

the world by God. The first creatures did not know how they were born. Nor could they know the state of things prior to the creation of the world by God. If they relied on the assertion of the creator, they might be deceived. God might not create the world and yet tell them that He did so in order to show His power. So God cannot be regarded as the creator of the world. Similarly there is no evidence to prove that God is the destroyer of the world. There is none to testify to the fact that He destroys the world. So God can be regarded as neither the creator nor the destroyer of the world.

Further, God has no motive to create the world. Compassion for living creatures cannot be His motive since there were no living creatures before creation for which He could feel compassion. Moreover, if He was moved by compassion to create the world, He would create only happy things. But the world is full of suffering and misery. God who is benevolent cannot create so much suffering in the world. If He cannot create a world free from evil, He is not omnipotent. If He were omnipotent he could certainly create a world free from evil. If He depended on moral laws and natural laws and instruments, this independence would be compromised. If He created a world without a motive then He is not intelligent. Even a fool does not act without a motive. If God created the world for

amusement (kridā) He would not be perfectly happy and contented and creation would involve Him in wearisome toil.

As it has been stated earlier the Cārvākas reject the authority of the Vedas. According to Kautsya an elderly author, the hymns of the Vedas are meaningless and contradictory. Religious ceremonies are futile and illusive. Religion is the invention of individuals for cheating their fellowmen in order to fulfill their selfish attitudes. So religion is nothing but priest craft. There is no other hell than the mundane causes as thorns. The supreme head is the earthly monarch, who is perceived by all living beings.

The Cārvākas do not even admit the existence of the soul. There is no existence of an indivisible, unchangeable, immaterial soul which is immortal. They say that soul is nothing but the living body endowed with consciousness. We have direct knowledge of our mental states and processes through perception; but the existence of any immaterial unchanging soul substance as the substratum of consciousness cannot be perceived and it does not exist. So soul is nothing but the conscious living body (chaitanya viśiṣṭa deha eva ātmā) .There is no immaterial soul distinct from the body. If the soul were identical with the body the soul

would also die with the death of the body and there would be no question of liberation of the soul. The Cārvākas further point out that liberation in the sense of complete extinction of sufferings cannot be obtained in this life. It can be obtained only by death and no wise man would willingly work for that end. The scholars of the Vedānta and Jaina schools state that liberation is the state of positive bliss. Again there are other systems which regard liberation as a state of the soul's emancipation from the bondage of the body and the existence of the self in its natural condition. In the state of liberation, the self abides in its essential nature. But the Cārvākas do not believe in the existence of an invisible, unchangeable and immortal soul and the liberation of the soul from the bondage of the body does not arise. Again if perception is the only source of Pramāṇa, heaven is not existent as it is not 'perceived'. According to the Cārvākas, heavenly happiness is a figment of imagination. Sacrifices, agnistoma for example; involving expenditure of huge amount of money and intense bodily pain should not be performed because they do not produce happiness in heaven, which is non-existent. Sacrifices, charity and other acts of piety are performed for profit, fame, self glorification and achieving power over other people. They are motivated by self interest and prudence. These actions are not altruistic. If perception is the only pramāṇa

according to the Cārvāka, then it is obvious that hell is also non-existent. There is no other hell than bodily pain produced by thorns and the like. Mundane pain is hell. Actions cannot have visible and invisible effects. They have no two series of consequences, mundane and supra mundane. They have no effects which will appear in the next world or future birth. For the Cārvākas, paradise can only be on this earth. *"The enjoyment of heaven is eating delicious food, keeping company of charming ladies wearing beautiful clothes, perfume, garlands, sandal paste etc."*³ *"The pain of hell lies in the troubles given by the enemies, weapons and diseases while liberation is death which is the emancipation from life breath."*⁴

These Cārvākas are also called Ucchedavādi as they reject all familiar beliefs in God, soul and liberation. They are also called Dehātma-vādi, for their admission of the identity of the soul with the body. According to the famous saying of Cabanis "the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile." There is no need for us to look upon the soul as distinct from the body. "The ātman is the body itself which is characterized by such attributes as are implied in the expressions "I am stout" "I am young" "I am old" "I am an adult." We have no evidence of the separate existence of the soul and the body. We do not see the self without a body. Sadānanda

is of the opinion that there are four different materialistic schools. The chief point of dispute is about the conception of the soul. One school regards the soul as identical with the gross body, another with the senses, a third with the breath and a fourth with the organ of thought.

According to the Cārvākas "there is no other world, other than this, neither heaven, nor hell. These are the inventions of imposters. Religion is a foolish aberration, a mental disease. God is not necessary to account for the world. Under the dominance of religious prejudices men are accustomed to the idea of another world and of God and when the religious illusion is destroyed they feel a sense of loss and have an uncomfortable void and privation. Nature is absolutely dead to all human values. It is indifferent to good and bad. The sun shines equally on the good and the evil. If nature has any quality it is that of transcendent immortality. The majority of men thanks to their weakness believe that there are deities, protectors of innocence, who are open to persuasion and flattery. All this is due to the lack of thinking. We falsely interpret natural phenomena when we trace them to Gods and demons.

Nature does things herself without any meddling by Gods. Fire is hot; water is cold because of their own

properties. "Who colours wonderfully the peacocks, or who makes the cuckoos sing well?" This is due to nature itself.

According to the Cārvākas, the theory of re-birth also cannot be accepted. All Indian thinkers except the Cārvākas and the Bauddhas regard self as a permanent conscious entity. It does not die with the death of the body. For the enjoyment of the fruits of its past actions, the self transmigrates from its old and worn out body to another new body when the old one perishes. The Buddhists also accept re-birth in a different way. For them, the generation of a new process of life from the old process is what is meant by re-births. The Cārvākas have rejected this view. They think that there is no self apart from the body. Consciousness is always experienced within a physical body. No instance of simple consciousness without a body is found anywhere. Consciousness that exists within a body is destroyed with the destruction of the body. The self is nothing but the conscious living bodies so when our bodies burn how it will ever return again? Moreover, it cannot also be accepted that after the death of the body the conscious process present in it generates another process of life. So re-birth is not possible in the form of transmigration of self or in the form of generation of one

life from another. The Cārvākas thus criticize the entire social, moral, and religious views of orthodox Hindus.

The Cārvākas who are known as Indian materialists do not admit the existence of any non-sensible transcendental spiritual reality and as such God. They do not believe in the immortality of the soul because no insensible soul exists. According to them, heaven and hell are the creation of the cunning priest according to them. So performance of rituals cannot enable a man to enjoy heaven after his death as heaven does not exist at all. They do not believe in virtue and vice and consider the enjoyment of sensual pleasures to be the highest good of life. They look down upon the spiritual outlook of the other systems of Philosophy because they consider matter to be the ultimate reality. They do not admit existence of spirit and other insensible realities. Transcendental realities do not exist; whatever exists is perceptible. Therefore perception is taken as a *pramāṇa*, ethics is not possible in such a society.

*While life is yours, live joyously;
None can escape Death's searching eye:
When once this frame of ours, they burn,
How shall it e'er again return?*²⁵

But we may ask: How we can live in such a society where there is no morality, no existence of God, no existence of soul and its liberation, no existence of future life and no existence of vice and virtue? Is it possible at all to imagine such a society where there would then be virtually no difference between human society and animal society?

Ethics as a science of morality deals with the rightness and wrongness of human action. When we pass moral judgment on the actions of a man, we generally use the terms 'right' and 'wrong'. When we judge an action to be right we may ask: what makes an action right? The term 'right' is derived from the Latin word 'Rectus' which means 'straight' or according to rule, when an action is said to be right, it means that it conforms to the rule or law. The term 'wrong' is related to the word 'wring' which means 'twisted' that is not according to rule. Rightness or wrongness of an action consists in its conformities with the rule. Right action means that which is in conformity with the moral law. Wrong action on the other hand is an action which does not conform to the moral law. It is thus evident that the notions of 'right' and 'wrong' have a special reference to rule or law. The term 'good' is connected with the German word 'gut'. A thing is good when it is valuable for some end. When we speak of one's conduct as good, we mean that

it is serviceable for the end of ideal we have in view. The term 'good' is also used to signify not something which itself is an end. Thus the *Summum Bonum* or Supreme Good means the supreme end we aim for. When we say that ethics is concerned with the rightness or goodness of human conduct we mean that it is concerned with the consideration of serviceableness of our conduct for some end or ideal which we aim at and with the rules or general principles by which our conduct should be directed so that this end may be attained. The supreme good which is intrinsically good is the ultimate end to which all other relative goods are subordinate. And ethics is the science of the highest good. The *Cārvākas*, however, have looked down upon the higher values of human life which are thought to make human life dignified and save men from falling down to the level of beasts. A life of sensual pleasure cannot be the end of human life. If man is engaged so much in sensual desire, he will be characterless, and even he will do immoral actions, because character implies a peculiarity of mental constitution which differentiates one man from another. Character is formed through the uniform exercise of will in certain directions. The tendencies and dispositions out of which character is formed are to some extent inherited, but it is really built up by uniform and repeated conduct. Character is a permanent mental disposition built out of repeated

voluntary acts involving the rational control of natural impulses and addressed to a definite moral ideal. Character arises out of our emotions, impulses and instincts. The factors which influence the growth of character are-

- (1) Strength of will and habit of self control.
- (2) Proper estimate of duty and a wider conception of the moral ideal.
- (3) Habit of regular performance of the duties of life.
- (4) Rational power
- (5) Sincerity and earnestness in every work.

Lack of these factors may degenerate the character of an individual. Man's character depends on the physical and social conditions but personal effort is the most important in the formation of character. Self realization is the highest good of human beings. The supreme good is to be attained through personal efforts. Full development of character will consist in this effort of self realization. Self realization of a man will be attained only when he uses his rational power and self control and realizes physical, mental, economic, ethical and aesthetical values and tries to develop himself in full. Man should be morally conscious and he should have

awareness of rightness and wrongness of an action. But if Cārvākas say to enjoy maximum pleasure with minimum pain there would be no question of moral consciousness.

The special features of moral consciousness are –

1. Moral consciousness is obligatory. If we say, an action is right we feel an urge to do it. If we say an action is wrong, we will be prevented from doing it.

2. Moral consciousness is more or less intellectual. If we determine the moral quality of an action, we will compare the moral ideal and we judge the motive behind the action. Such act of comparison requires thinking and reasoning.

3. Moral consciousness is active. The question of moral judgment arises in connection with voluntary actions, because, such actions keep open various paths before the agent, who may choose any one of them so the question of moral consciousness arises in connection with activities.

4. Moral consciousness is social. Moral judgment is passed upon actions of individuals living in society. The motive of every good action includes the question of the good of the other. If we are to determine our duties, we

are to do soon the perspective of our relation to other social beings.

5. Moral consciousness is sentimental. It involves a reverential attitude to the moral ideal. Performance of good action produces a good mood and a bad action produces a bad mood. Man is a moral being. Man has not only self consciousness but man is born in the society with the consciousness of right and wrong, obligation and responsibility. Ethics tries to trace the growth and development of moral consciousness but in Cārvākas' ethics there is no place for the development of moral consciousness which manifests itself in the life of the community. But it must be emphasized that human nature is fundamentally moral. Morality does not arise from non-moral elements. The morality that is latent in man gradually develops itself through certain stages. Moral progress is the progress of morality; it is not a progress from non-morality to morality.

From the history of human civilization, there are moral elements in the life of a man. The primitive men did not make any distinction between moral conduct and customary behaviours. To the primitive man, the tradition of the tribe or community was the standard of right and wrong. Custom is habitual conduct which is obligatory for all the living beings of the community.

Germens of morality are found in these customs. The primitive men thought these customs obligatory. These customs were their duty and they were ready to lay down their lives for upholding these customs. In the moral consciousness of the primitive people, there is clearly a sense of group solidarity. What is good for the tribe is good and what is bad for the tribe is bad. Hence the primitive stage of morality is called the customary or institutional or group morality. Moral consciousness of man does not develop till man progresses from the external qualities of morality to its internal qualities. The external quality of morality means those laws or rules which are imposed on us by some external agency. The violation of these rules are punishable whereas the internal qualities of morality means what our conscience presents to us and what we impose upon ourselves, because these rules are imposed on us by our rational self, they are obligatory and we obey the rules not out of any fear of punishment by external agency. We gradually come to understand that the proper object of moral judgment is the motive and character and not the external conduct and its consequences. Moral law should be obeyed on its own account, "the meaning of development and progress of morality means the discovery by stages, the real self of man." Moral progress means 'advancing' i.e., 'moving forwards'. 'Progress' means a continuous process,

moving towards the higher stage, until the final end is reached. Moral progress means the development of character. Moral progress means progress from a lower stage to higher stage. Germs of morality are inherent in man. Of all the moral ideals, the ideal of self realization is the supreme ideal. Thus moral progress is the continuous development of character towards this ideal of perfection. In the beginning, human actions were morally evaluated with reference to their overt actions and behaviour. When the moral consciousness gradually developed, a change of outlook took place and human actions came to be judged more and more from an internal standpoint i.e., by motives and intentions. Previously we aimed at purity of outer conduct, and then we aim at purity of inner life. At first stern and visible virtues e.g. courage values were given a high place. But with moral progress, the more benevolent virtues obtain the foremost place, and the sterner virtues occupy a subordinate place. A higher value is placed on sympathy and forgiveness than upon physical courage.

At first, man remains self-centered. Then he discovers good. He understands that the highest good is the common good. His self regard then extends to the regard for the family. Regard for family breaks its barriers and identifies itself with regard for one's

country, which ultimately breaks the barriers of nationality and transforms itself into world brotherhood. The moral progress of a person is helped by:

- (a) Cultivation of intelligence.
- (b) Controlling passions and inclinations and a steady adherence to truth,
- (c) Acute consciousness of his own shortcomings and an attempt to remove them.
- (d) The influence of good company
- (e) The study of the lives of saints and noble persons and being influenced by their ideals. These factors influence the moral progress of an individual.

But the Cārvāka philosopher believes in a society devoid of ethics. The factors which are essential for the moral progress of a man are absent in such society where pleasure is the highest end of human life. The moral life of a man is based on four virtues, such as –

1. Wisdom
2. Courage
3. Temperance and
4. Justice.

Wisdom includes all other virtues. It is an all embracing virtue. But the Cārvākas did not recognize any of these virtues. Virtue means moral worth or excellence- the excellence of inner character or disposition as manifested in outward conduct or activity. One who is truly virtuous or righteous is a conscientious man of action. He not only is good but does good. He gladly and scrupulously performs his duties high and low to the best of his judgment and ability. He possesses the power of self-control and overcomes temptations. He lives not for himself but for others. He does not renounce society but tries to promote social well being in the best possible way. While loving and serving his country and humanity at large, he is not unmindful of his duties towards himself and his own family. His moral nature is at once exalted and in touch with the common affairs of life. Endowed with a strong sense of responsibility and obligation he does not go away from discharging even the lowest duties of life. His life is a consecrated one- a life of ceaseless beneficence or active goodness. He cannot spend his time being idle in frivolous matters or immoral amusements. As a dutiful man of action he cannot decide to retire from the life of virtuous activity or even take rest from it. He cannot be an opportunist violating the laws of morality whenever he thinks it convenient or prudent to do so. Undivided, continuous loyalty to morality characterizes a really

good man. Whatever is done by him should be in accordance with the dictates of conscience.

The ideal of ethics is self-realization. Moral conduct is self-realized conduct if by the self we mean not only the empirical self with all its weakness and vulgarity, selfishness and smallness but the deeper nature of man free from all fetters of selfish individuality. The lusts and passion of the self, the desires and ambitions of egoism make men fall to lower level. A moral life is a life of understanding and reason, and not only of sense and instinct. *"Man is not in the least elevated above mere animalism, by the possession of reason; if his reason is only used in the same fashion as that in which animals use their instincts."*⁶ If instead of reason our senses guide us, our life will be a mirror of passing and temporary inclinations. He who leads such a life will have to be written down, like Dogberry an ass. *"His life which will be a disconnected episode will have no purpose to take, no work to carry out, no end to realize. In a rational life, every course of action, before it is adopted, is brought before the bar of reason and its capacity to serve the highest end is tested, and if found suitable adopted by the individual."*⁷ The Upaniṣads tell us that if we want to escape from sin, we must give up our selfish motives and desires. A life of reason is a life of unselfish devotion to the world. He is a good man

who subordinates his personal desire to the social desire, and he is a bad man who does the opposite. We should realize in our life and conduct that all things are in god and of God. The man who knows this truth will hate all selfish desires. In the Upaniṣads, morality is individualistic for its aim is self-realization. *"Moral life is a God -centered life, a life of passionate love and compassion for humanity, of seeking the infinite through the finite, and not a mere selfish adventure for small ends."*⁸

But according to Cārvāka philosophy, sensual desire is the highest end of human life. But 'Kama' or sensual desire according to the Upaniṣads is the lust, the impulsive craving of the brute man. Freedom from Kama is enjoined, we have to give up lust and greed from the fascination of outward desires, from the fulfillment of instinctive cravings. The true saint is described as śānta śrānta, dānta upāratā samāhita. These all imply the conquest of passion. But *"The only thing that the Cārvākas cared for was the momentary sense-pleasure, unrestrained enjoyment of sensual joys."*⁹ Pursuit of distant, uncertain and super sensible, heavenly happiness at the cost of certain, immediate perceptible, earthly pleasures are foolish.

They did not aim at increasing the total happiness and wellbeing of the whole life as we find on the ethical scheme of the Cārvākas. For them, "A pigeon today was better than a peacock tomorrow," "better to have a sure copper coin today than a doubtful gold coin in the future." Thus immediate sense pleasures were all that they wanted. There is no glory in pain and suffering. It might be emphasized, however, that in a society, egoistic desires should be conquered and the Cārvākas' theory is gross egoistic Hedonism. Egoism or the sense of 'I' and 'Mine' should be eradicated. One who renounces all selfish desires, who lives a selfless and desireless life devoid of egoism, acquires peace. One who runs after various objects of desire never knows peace. But one who is unperturbed by desires and unruffled like a deep ocean, acquires peace. Kant enjoins extirpation of all feelings and emotions except respect for the moral law. He says virtue, good will or rational will is the highest good, and virtue in harmony with happiness is complete good. "Attachment for object of enjoyment is bondage. Dispassion for them is release. Egoism is bondage. Egoless ness is release. "

*"Mokṣo viṣayavairāgyam bandho vaiṣayiko rasah.
Yadā nāham tadā mokṣo yadāham bandhanām
tadā"*¹⁰

According to the ethics of Mahabharata, pleasure and pain go together. Pleasure is followed by pain. Pain is followed by pleasure. Ungratified desire for pleasure gives rise to pain. Pain springs from non-attainment of pleasure or excess of pleasure. Pleasure and pain succeed one another. Sentient pleasure in pain is not eternal. The body is the source of sensuous pleasure and pain. Attachment to objects of enjoyment generates affection for them. When they are lost, grief arises. Loss of wealth and dear ones give rise to grief. So pleasure cannot be the goal of life. Egoism is the root of love and hatred, pleasure and pain; it is the sense of 'I' and 'Mine'. Pleasure and pain can be conquered by indifference, discrimination and knowledge of reality. Detachment can destroy attachment and gives rise to supreme bliss. True knowledge of the self as distinct from the body can destroy desire for pleasure. Complete renunciation of desires for pleasure is a condition of intuition of the self. It is to be concluded, therefore, that the Cārvāka philosopher believes in a society devoid of any ethics, because in such a society there is no morality, no existence of God, no regard for the Vedas, and no existence of virtue and vice. The Cārvāka's ethics is based on their materialistic thinking, especially to the cunning

Cārvākas, enjoyment of sensual pleasures is the only end of life. *"Eat, drink, and be merry, the past is dead and gone. It never returns."*¹¹ An action which gives excess of pleasure over pain is right. An action which gives excess of pain over pleasure is wrong. The Cārvākas advocate gross egoistic hedonism like Aristippus. According to the Cārvākas, "pleasure is the highest good. Therefore run into debt and enjoy pleasure."

Typical form of gross or sensualistic egoism was also advocated by the Greek philosopher Aristippus of Cyrene (B.C 435-356). His doctrine came to be known as Cyrenaicism. According to Aristippus, "the only good of life is the individual's own pleasure. Pleasure should be pursued by any means and at any cost. There is no glory in pain and suffering. To sacrifice the present to the future is a foolish act. The future is doubtful and uncertain. Trust no future, however, pleasant. Only the present is certain. The present is all that we have. Let us, therefore, make the most of the present. Aristippus recognizes no qualitative differences among pleasures. All pleasures are alike. They differ only in intensity and duration. If we are to choose among the pleasures we should choose the one which is more intense. The pleasures of body or sensuous pleasures bring the keenest, the preferable to the pleasures of the soul. We

therefore ought to seek present momentary pleasures of the senses and should not give preference to intellectual pleasures over bodily pleasures. The past is dead and gone. The future is doubtful. The present is all that we have. Let us make the most of it. While life remains, let a man live happily, let him feed on ghee even though he runs in debt.

The theory of Cārvākas suffer from the following shortcomings-

1) They hold that everyone ought to seek his own pleasure. But they forget that from direct pursuit of pleasure, we get less pleasure. True happiness comes from a disinterested discharge of our duties, and not from our hankering after pleasure.

2) According to the Egoistic Hedonists man by nature is an egoist and selfish. But a correct analysis of the human nature reveals that the human nature involves egoistic as well as altruistic elements. Man is more altruistic than egoistic. It is not true to say that altruism arises out of egoism. Both co-exist in human nature.

3) Egoistic Hedonism or Cārvākas is based on Psychological Hedonism. But Psychological Hedonism is

itself a fallacious doctrine. We desire an object which gives pleasure when it is attained.

4) Egoistic Hedonism fails to give us any uniform moral standard, what is pleasure to one may be pain to another. What is most pleasurable to one may be less pleasurable to another. Thus this doctrine offers no uniform standard of morality.

5) This theory requires us to calculate the comparative value of pleasures. This is an extremely difficult task. Subjective feelings cannot be measured quantitatively. Our feelings often depend on variation in mood, temperament etc. Thus, the Hedonistic calculation is impracticable.

6) Gross Egoistic Theory of Cārvākas is no moral theory at all.

This theory ignores the rational restraint in which morality consists. According to this theory, indiscriminate gratification of hunger, thirst, sex and other bodily appetites constitute the highest good. But to a rational man the life of a "pig satisfied" is never acceptable.

According to the gross or sensualistic Egoism of Cārvāka, present enjoyments should never be sacrificed for the sake of future pleasures because the future is uncertain. This theory is totally inconsistent with morality. It ignores rational selfrestraint in which morality consists. In its extreme form, it supposes that reason is a drawback of human nature and that animal life is the happiest. It is no doubt true that feeling has a place in moral life. A feeling of satisfaction attends virtuous activity.

Virtuous activity is always pleasant though no properly virtuous act is performed with the idea of pleasure. Pleasure will be possible for both men and animals, but happiness will be possible only for a rational being and will arise from the rational self's consciousness that it is, or is becoming, what it should be. Pleasure is ordinarily a momentary enjoyment arising from the satisfaction of a passing desire or wish, and at most it may embrace the gratification of several desires. Happiness is a lively mode resulting from harmony among desires. It is a rational satisfaction arising from harmony among desires. It is a rational satisfaction arising from a due regulation of desires. Happiness is thus possible to the hero in the moment of danger and the martyr on his way to death. The Cārvākas say "the only end of man is enjoyment produced by sensual

desire. Man being by nature sensible of no other pleasures than those of the sense, their pleasures are the only object of his desires and passions.”

This theory of Cārvākas say, man is by nature egoistic, and all the higher feelings and springs of action are modes of self love. But human nature is egoistic as well as altruistic and man is more altruistic than egoistic. We live more for the sake of others than for our own. Even among lower animals it is found that their energies are not spent simply in the satisfaction of their self-regarding wants. They give themselves up for the benefit of their offspring. We can give many examples of such feeling of altruism, a cow giving milk to the calf, a tree giving shadow, and fruits to man and animals. Man is a rational, social being, so he must have the heart of doing welfare for others. Spencer points out *"Without gratis benefits to offspring, life could not have continued."*¹²

The theory of Cārvākas does not recognize the existence of virtue and vice. The virtuous man is conscientious man of action. He not only is good, but does good. He gladly performs his duties to the best of his judgment and ability. He possesses the power of self control, which makes him resist and overcome temptations. He lives not for himself alone but for others. He tries to

promote social well-being in the best possible way while loving and serving his country and humanity at large. He is not remindful of his duties towards himself and his own family. Endowed with a strong sense of responsibility and obligation, he does not shrink from discharging even the lowliest duties of his life. His life is a life of consecrated life, a life of beneficence or active goodness. He cannot spend his time in idleness, frivolous pursuits or in immoral amusements. A dutiful man of action as he is he cannot decide to retire from the life of virtuous activity or ever to take rest from it.

But the Cārvākas regard pleasure (Kama) and the means of securing (artha) as the two ultimate goals of life, which means they have turned deaf ears to the three values of life viz., Truth, Goodness and Beauty and also other values which are essential for self realization. For the Suśikṣita Cārvākas refined pleasure is the end of life, but they are also skeptics and agnostics for they have denied the reality of all supersensuous objects like God, life after death, merits and demerits, vice and virtue, liberation. For them also, there is no meaning of the values of life. So hedonism of Cārvākas cannot remain in society.

So far we have discussed the Cārvāka egoistic ethics and we conclude that it is not the ethics of theory of

morality in the proper sense. Now a question: Is aesthetic value or non hedonistic value another worldly affair? If this value is also this worldly they are also Lokāyata affair. For that which is available in this worldly domain is called Lokāyatika.

Human beings must have the sense of value, which makes man do common good i.e. goodness in the good human being, the good society and the good life. Those who value money, power and status will direct all their attempts towards them ignoring the social, human and ethical implications of their pursuits. Again these persons who value morality, kindness, compassion and love may do anything for the common good. Swami Yuktananda says, "Values are the very core of our behaviour, the motive force of our lives," Rockeach defines value thus. A value is an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end state of existence. A value system is an enduring organization of beliefs concerning preferable modes of conducts or end state of existence along a continuum of relative importance. "A good life must be free of wants. The basic needs of human life such as food, clothing, shelter, health care must be fulfilled. Values related with the material aspect of living are called material values. A good life

can be lived only in a good society. In such a society there is peace, harmony, well being and growth of all. Its economic and political life is governed by the principle of justice and equality. In a good society, individuals are given their human right, or dignified way of earning a livelihood. These are social values. A person should have sound mental health to lead a good life. Life should be free of psychological conflicts, strains and stress.

Creation and enjoyment of beauty is an essential part of a good life. A refined aesthetic sense is the sign of a cultured person. It needs conscious cultivation to grow a taste for appreciating beauty in art, nature and life.

Aesthetics is the branch of philosophy devoted to conceptual and theoretical inquiry into art and aesthetic experience. The term aesthetics was first used by a German eighteenth century philosopher Baumgarten. He defined the term thus "Aesthetics is the science of how things are cognized by the senses. It is the science of sensuous knowledge, whose aim is beauty as contrasted with logic, whose aim is truth." Hegel in 1820 established the word in its present sense by his writing on art under the title of "Aesthetik".. Recent aesthetics has laid stress on a descriptive, factual approach to the phenomena of art, history,

archaeology and cultural history in stressing theoretical organization of materials in terms of recurrent types and tendencies rather than chronological or genetic one. It investigates the forms and characteristics of art, which psychology does not do.

Aesthetic values are concerned with our internal sense of beauty. To perceive, to enjoy and to create things of beauty are very important human activities. Our life becomes happy and colourful, when we experience beauty. It can touch our hearts and arouse human sentiments and provide harmony, peace and unity. A person who is aesthetically sensitive can rise to higher realm of existence, by perceiving a beautiful flower, by hearing a peaceful musical composition. A refined aesthetic sensitivity has always been regarded as an important mark of a cultured person. Some two thousand years ago Bhartṛhari said, 'Sāhitya sangita kalābihīnah/ sākṣāt Paśuh pucha biṣāna hīnah'

"A person devoid of taste for literature, music and arts is veritably an animal, if without horns and tail."

Philosophically, Beauty, Truth and Goodness are very well known creeds of the Indian tradition. Aesthetic values are essential components of all that is valuable

for human beings which contribute a good life to human beings.

Nature provides different kinds of aesthetic experience. When we walk over a patch of grass, we feel the morning dew under our feet, the sweet fragrance of a beautiful rose, the pretty colouring of a peacock's wings, and the beautiful scenery of the snow-clad mountains, the meandering of the river on its plain stage. These are all aesthetic experience provided by nature. Man is also the creator of beauty. He expresses his perception of beauty through art, literature, painting, carving and music. For the expression of ideas and emotions, society provides refined idioms and grammar. The decoration work in temple, art, wall paintings of Ajanta, the immortal writings of Kalidasa and Shakespeare all belong to the category of great art. Their beauty lies not only in their external form but in the emotions and thoughts. They inspire us how to live happily and nobly. So a truly great work of art develops our aesthetic sensibilities and refines our life as a whole. Our life provides several occasions for the perception of beauty. The experiences of beauty in human nature are moments of living warmth, happiness and unity. Extending a helping hand in compassion for the needy and the downtrodden, smiling face on meeting the loved ones after long separation, the sweet smile of a sleeping

baby -----these are examples of aesthetic experience in human relationships. How is beauty different from other values? Plato ranks beauty with truth and goodness. The three are similar absolute values for him. Keats had identified beauty with truth. Enquiry about truth is a cognitive experience. It tries to gain true knowledge about things and distinguishes it from error or false knowledge. A scientist or a philosopher discovers truth; an artist tries to project beauty. Goodness is another value. Objects of art and beauty, a flower or a beautiful painting do not make a moral demand on us. Aesthetic sensibility is a great ally in the development of our moral sense. A person of refined aesthetic sense has great hatred towards immoral actions. In today's world there is exploitation, violence, cruelty which is not only immoral but ugly for a person of refined aesthetic sensibility.

Besides aesthetic values there are non-hedonistic values. These are moral and ethical values. Morality means acting according to 'nīti' i.e., principled conduct. It aims at realizing the value of goodness in human life. All the other values are meaningful only in the glow of moral values. In the Indian value terminology the growth of ethical consciousness is a movement from seeking fulfillment of personal ends to work for the good of others, or for the common good. The individual is an

integral part of the collective; the good of one is embodied in the good of all. Even the personal good cannot be adequately secured without improving the lot of the society. To be able to do good require two things- to be good and to know what is good. One does not imply the other. In the words of Jesus Christ, *“So in everything, do to others, what you would have them do to you.”*¹³

The implication of this canon is that when judging the moral goodness of the course of action, put yourself at the receiving end, and then imagine what its impact would be like. It is the essential virtue of empathy to put oneself in the shoes of the other and then feel the pinch. If the view from the other end is good then the action is good. To be good is to be virtuous. Virtues are ethically approved traits of character. Their alteration is an essential sign of a moral personality; courage, justice and temperance are noble virtues according to Greeks, but according to Christians, Love, Kindness, Humility, and Patience are virtues. The four major virtues recommended by Buddha are compassion, friendliness towards all, sharing in the joy of others. According to Confucius, virtues are gentlemanly behaviour .

The virtue of open-mindedness is essential for living a good life. It protects us from vices such as intolerance

and rigidity. Persons with vices find difficulty in adjusting themselves in new work groups, in new social situations and with members of younger generation. The virtue of open mindedness and tolerance are essential at the social level. They are able to examine their own conduct, motivations and values in an objective fashion. This helps them become good persons through continuous self- examination and self-improvement. They are open to suggestions and criticisms for others. Pursuit of material values is very essential for good life, just as food is essential for remaining alive. Material values should be seen as the means for pursuit of the whole value which makes a good life. Every sphere of economic activity should be related to moral and human ends. For the good life and good person, self restraint is very important.

So the aesthetic value or non-hedonistic values are not otherworldly affair, but this worldly affair. So these are also Lokāyata affairs because Indian value tradition takes this idea of oneness of mankind. Its spiritual perception is the unity of all beings. These are lokāyata affairs because its social ideal is Lokasangraha. The word 'Loka' implies the collectivity of all beings and the word 'sangraha' a combination of welfare and nurturance. Thus a good society is one, where the principle of welfare and nurturance of all beings would

be the basis of social organization. The overall framework of duties, responsibilities, obligations of different persons in different walks of life are to achieve the social ideal. In such a society there would be a combination of human values of universal love and unity. Human beings will be looked upon as ethical and spiritual beings imbued with the values of freedom, creativity, love, wisdom and not merely as economic and social entities. It will emphasize human duties, responsibilities and obligation rather than merely human rights. All these values are this worldly affair. "They are concerned to this 'Loka' and how they can make their life good." In discussing Nehru's humanism Sabira Zaidi says, 'Man does not live by bread alone, though he cannot live without bread either. Any way he does not live for bread. Man lives for creative pursuits, for the completion and creation of beauty, for the pursuit of truth, for the cultivation of goodness, for the joys of love and friendship, for intellectual adventures and spiritual quests, for tasting the many fruits of life including the forbidden fruit of knowledge, for the enrichment of his personality and service of his fellows."

"Loka" means the common world. "Lokāyata" means that they āyatanti' that is to say, they exert themselves about it, strive about it, through the pleasure they take in discussion." All these values are also Lokāyata

affairs. The acceptance of Indian Materialism leads to a Solipsistic world, Is it desirable?

The term 'Solipsism' has been derived from the word 'solus' which means 'alone' and 'ipse' which means 'self'. The doctrine which gives prime importance to the self is known as Solipsism. For the moralists and psychologists, the notion of the self is 'egoism'. The second notion of the self for the metaphysicians is "reality solipsism". The third is the notion of the self, and it states as the only object of real knowledge and the origin of any problematic knowledge of other existence. This is called epistemological knowledge which is known as "knowledge solipsism." It is found in the works of an apostate Jesuit Giulio Clemente Scotti. The work is titled "La Monarchie des Solipses" published in 1652 which describes a kingdom of self seekers. In France, Jesuits were subject to an epithet "Solipsists." The doctrine of self -seeking is different from metaphysical, philosophical and epistemological doctrine. The self- seeking denies that, there is no reality but only self. Metaphysical solipsism says, every claim relating to the existence and non-existence of anything is grounded in experience and cannot go beyond it. An existential claim can never claim with full intelligibility more than the existence of the

experiencing self and can never claim more than the moment of the experience.

Descartes introduced the doctrine of Solipsism as a recognized problem. He expressed doubt in everything such as sky, air, earth, colour, shapes and sounds, or any existence. At the end of his work he rejected the solipsistic doubt as being extravagant and ridiculous. The Solipsism he assigned a purely rhetorical role which disturbed many later philosophers, who did not support Solipsism, but believed that it might be true. Of the two Solipsisms, metaphysical and epistemological, the former is more familiar and more reciting for it has seldom identified by a short phrase like 'only I exist' or "self is the whole of reality."

Locke helped the metaphysical doctrine of Solipsism. According to him, "knowledge is the perception of the connection of an agreement or disagreement of our ideas". Locke's ideas have been supported by Berkeley and later on by Hume. According to Berkeley, "I and my ideas alone exist." To the continued existence of a thing Berkeley has introduced the notion of God. Had he not done that, then the whole world would have been reduced to psychical states of an individual and would have been logically led his view to Solipsism i.e. "I and my ideas alone exist." Fichte is of the opinion that

Solipsism was acceptable in theory through faith. In the practices of actual life, solipsism can be avoided. In this point of view, Fichte is like Hume. W.B Gallie, Norman Malcom and Rush Rhess have maintained that meanings are social and that a meaningful assertion must be of such a nature that it is a check or correction by other persons. According to epistemological solipsism, all empirical knowledge originates in inner cognitive states of persons and the self is the origin of knowledge of existence. In the first case, knowledge about existence and non-existence of everything outside the self originates in immediate experience or "the given" which is not strictly shared. Secondly, to any given person the intelligibility of existential claims originates in his own immediate experience. The term "methodological Solipsism" advocated by Hans Driesch and adopted by Rudolf Carnap is used for a provisional solipsism.

The second thesis shows part of the empiricist syndrome that persisted from Locke to the logical positivists. The definition of knowledge given by Locke that it is nothing but the perception of the relations between our ideas led to paradox in Berkeley's theory of "esse est percipi". J.S. Mill accepted Hamilton's view that what is directly known is in truth. Von Schubert Soldem was also an out and out Solipsist. Bradley wrote

that "through my experience is not the whole world, yet that world appears in my experience is and so far as it exists there it is my state of mind." W.T. Stace wrote that "the first position of every mind must be Solipsistic." In conclusion it may be said solipsism does not differ from one another in having or not having resemblance to reality but rather in the degree of that resemblance.

Indian materialism advocated by the Cārvākas is Gross Egoistic Hedonism. An action is good when it gives the agents the greatest pleasure. To sacrifice the present to the future is a foolish act. The future is doubtful and uncertain. Trust no future, however pleasant. Only the present is certain. The present is all that we have. Let us make the most of the present. "Let us eat, drink, and be merry, for tomorrow we may die." They say, everyone ought to seek his own pleasure. But they forget that the direct pursuit of pleasure generally defeats its own pleasure. They say, man is egoist and selfish by nature. But a correct analysis involves egoistic as well as altruistic elements. Man is more altruistic than egoistic. So the acceptance of Indian materialism leads to Solipsistic world, which gives prime importance to self or egoism. It is not desirable because in his egoism man becomes isolated from the rest of reality and engages himself in the pursuit of selfish motives and desires.

But man is not an isolated being. He is a part of the whole reality.

When man realizes that he is inseparably bound up with the rest of reality he cannot remain selfish. He then is able to command greater confidence in himself and other persons who are integral members of the same reality. He feels a surging love for others. This surging love for others enables him to serve his fellow beings and lead them towards the ideal of perfection.

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