

INDIAN MATERIALISM : A CRITICAL STUDY


**A Thesis Submitted To The
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PREFACE

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CHAPTER- I

**INDIAN MATERIALISM AVAILABLE IN EPICS
AND
TEXT PRIOR TO CĀRVĀKA SYSTEM**

Materialism is the name given to the metaphysical doctrine which holds the matter is the only reality. This doctrine tries to explain consciousness as the product of matter. Materialism in some form or other has always been present in India as occasional references of it are found in the Vedas, the Buddhist literature, the Epics like Rāmāyana and Mahābhārata as well as in the later philosophical works.

Apart from the arguments which are found in books like TattvopaplavaSimha of Jayarāsi and Śataśāstra of Āryadeva. Cārvāka is the word that generally stands for "materialist". According to one view, a sage called Cārvāka was the original founder of the Cārvāka school. According to another view the word "Cārvāka" is not a proper name but a common name given to a materialist, either because his words are nice, pleasant and attractive (carv-nice, vāk word) to

ears. According to some, Bṛhaspati a sage, is the founder of this school and it is, therefore, also known as the philosophy of Bṛhaspati. Whatever may be the original meaning of the word "Cārvāka" it has become synonymous with the materialist. Another synonym of Cārvāka is *Lokāyata*. The view is called *Lokāyata-mata* because it regards this world to be the only world and denies the existence of any other transcendental world. Just like other systems of Indian Philosophy questions raised by these Indian materialists also can be subdivided into epistemological, metaphysical and ethical problems. And it must be pointed out that the entire philosophy of the Cārvākas may be said to depend logically on their epistemology or theory of knowledge. The Cārvāka holds that perception is the only *pramāṇa* or valid source of knowledge and the metaphysics or the theory of reality held by the Carvaka School is also influenced by this epistemological conclusion. According to the Cārvāka, matter is the only reality because it alone can be perceived. Material objects are the only objects whose existence can be asserted. The Indian materialist or the Cārvākas, thus come to establish materialism or the theory that matter is the only

reality. And their ethics or the theory of morality is obviously in conformity with their metaphysical theories. Contrary to the view of all other philosophers, the materialist Cārvāka holds that liberation as freedom from all pain is an impossible ideal and pleasure, though mixed with pain, is the only possible good. The ethics of the Carvaka is only the logical outcome of his materialism.

This Indian materialism has drawn the attention of the thinkers belonging to the traditional Indian philosophy, particularly because it preaches against the view accepted traditionally. Every system of Indian thought tried to meet the Cārvāka objections and made the Cārvāka a touchstone of its theories. The Carvaka view thus compels indirectly other thinkers to give up dogmatism, and become critical and cautious in speculation as well as in statement of views. But like the Epicureans of Greece, the Cārvākas in India have been more hated than understood. "Cārvāka" in the mind of people at large is a term of reproach. And perhaps, for this reason an analytical discussion of the Cārvāka metaphysics and ethics have not been made so far. The present project is an attempt to analyze those arguments in

an unbiased way and to compare the Cārvāka view with western pragmatism and logical positivism. The goal of this analysis would be to find out whether the Indian materialism is a theory acceptable to an unbiased rational mind.

If we go through the two epics the Rāmāyana and the Mahābhārata written perhaps in the sixth century BC, we find that materialism was prevalent in that period. Regarding this period it has been told by Radhakrishnan that: *“It was the period of intellectual and philosophical development. It was an age of contrast ideas. There arose lack of mental balance and restraint of passion among the people. It was the era of the Cārvākas and the Buddhists. It was a period when intuition was giving place to inquiry, religion to philosophy. Differences of thoughts, unbelief, chaos and unsystematic attempts, made the epic period an eventful era in the history of Indian thought. Through the help of art, knowledge and morality there was an attempt to heal the sickly attitude of the people or there were among the people intoxication, ecstasy, bewilderment and madness. Many new systems were put forward in the age.”*¹

Perhaps free speculation and scepticism started during this period. Too much importance given to ceremonial religion and at the same time development of political crisis gradually made people rebellious to some extent. Some People were in search of a new way which would free them from the shackles of rituals and ceremonies. Ascetics, Trithānkāras or ford makers were founders of this new path. And Gautama or Siddhārtha and Vardhamāna were then found to be the most prominent social reformers. There were also other heretical teachers like Sanjaya, the sceptic, who limited his inquiries to the question of attainment of peace. During this period materialism came into existence.

It is found from the early texts that there was a saint called Ajita-Keśakambalin, the fatalist who held that man had no power over life and death. The Buddhists and the Jainas gave emphasis on the theistic sides of the Upaniṣads. But Buddhism and Jainism failed to satisfy the spiritual wants and emotions of the ordinary people. The spiritual thirst of the masses could not be satisfied by the Upaniṣads or the Vedas or the moral principles of

Jainas. There were preconstruction which made religion less formal less cold and more satisfying than the Upaniṣadic cult.

Materialism or the Sanskrit term 'Cārvāka darśana' is the first school of thought challenging the Vedic views. According to some, it was the name of the disciple to whom the doctrine was first taught by its founder. The word 'Cārvāka' means sweet tongued (cār-vāka) "Carv means" to eat. The Cārvākas were exponents of the doctrine of egoistic hedonism. Their views were attractive to the common people. Therefore they were called Lokāyatikas and their doctrine was called Lokāyata-mata. Materialistic philosophy which is known as the Lokāyata, the Cārvākas or the Bārhaspatya school is a very old school of thought. In the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, there were a number of views in which we find the doctrine that matter or the elements (bhutāni) is the ultimate principle. We find its reference even in Arthaśāstra of Kautilya where it is compared with Sāmkhya and yoga as a logical science (Lokeṣu āyatah lokāyata) Kautilya explained three systems viz., the Sāmkhya, yoga and the Lokāyata.

It was called Lokāyata because it was prevalent (āyatah) among the people (Lokeṣu). The name 'Lokāyata' is found in the writing of many scholars, both ancient and modern. H. P. Sastry has used the word Lokāyata to mean the worldly outlook of the people. S. N. Sengupta, in the Buddhist text, *Divyābadāna*, used the word Lokāyata to mean what was prevalent among the people. Gunaratna, the Jaina commentator of the 14th century A.D., in *Saddarśanasamuccaya* and Haribhadra in 8th century A. D, have stated "*Lokāyatikas are those common people who cannot show good judgement.*"²

Madhavāchārya is also of the same opinion why the materialistic view is called the Lokāyata view. He, like his guru Śankarāchārya, who lived in the 8th century A.D, in his commentary on *Brahmaśūtra*, has said that "*the followers of 'Lokāyata' are nothing but uncultured and uneducated people (prākṛtajanāh)*"³. Panchanan Tarkaratna said, "*This philosophy was called Lokāyata because it believed in the material world (Loka) only and denied everything beyond.*"⁴

Rajkrishna Mukhopadhyaya is of the opinion that "*Lokāyata has laid emphasis on the natural world.*"⁵ (Loka or iha-loka). Buddhaghosa, the Buddhist commentator of the 5th century A. D has said, "The word "āyatah" or "āyatana" means the foundation on which the material world (loka) rests."

Haribhadra says, "*Loka is the object of sense perception.*"⁶ Manibhadra says, "*Loka means "padārtha sārtha or padārtha samūha"*"⁷ which is the totality of the material existence. He says "Lokā" means materialistic philosophy. So, Lokāyata means not only the philosophy of the people but the philosophy of worldliness or materialism.

Radhakrishnan defines "*Lokāyata is directed to the world of sense. It is the Sanskrit word for materialism.*"⁸ Dasgupta is of the opinion that "Lokāyata (that which is found among people) is the name by which all the Cārvāka doctrines were generally known." Some are of the opinion that Lokāyata is the result of the breakdown of traditional authority. Some said Lokāyata was originally imported into India from ancient Sumeria. Others

said it originally formed part of the Indian priest craft.

It has been claimed by a number of thinkers that Lokāyata did not belong merely to the ancient times because it still survives in the country in the form of certain obscure and highly obscure cults. All these interpretations of Lokāyata are opposed to each other and its place being taken up by scepticism which says "*Lokāyata as a branch of ancient Indian philosophy never existed at all.*"⁹ These are the results of the confidence on Mādhava's views of the Lokāyata.

Radhakrishnan's opinion was that "*During the epic period, the ideas of the intellectuals were unsettled in 600 B.C to A.D 200. At that time, the faith of the people in the authority was diminishing. Under such circumstances, materialism was playing a historic role. People rejected traditional customs, religion and magic. They wanted spiritual independence.*"¹⁰

The Cārvāka philosophy made much effort to check the dogmatic attitude of the Indian philosophical system to a great extent. It encouraged the spirit of

free thinking among the philosophers belonging to other schools and asked them not to accept a theory merely out of reverence for the time honoured tradition unless it had satisfied their reason. It attempted to do a constructive work of speculation.

The Lokāyata denied the reality of inference, the authority of the Vedas, the reality of God, soul and rejected any value except the gross sensual pleasures. The traditional society, however, never accepted the Lokāyata view.

In the Rāmāyana, Lokāyatikas are blamed as “clever in useless things.” In Harṣcharita, the Lokāyatikas are classed by the Vedantists as heretics.

About 500 B.C, the word Lokāyata meant nature-lore-wise saying, riddles, rhymes and theories. In the 14th century, the great theologian Mādhava, is of the opinion that Lokāyatikas are the extreme forms of the “Let us eat and drink for tomorrow we die”. This philosophy is the view of life. He said the Lokāyata was the lowest system of philosophy.

In ancient times there was only one word, Lokāyata alternatively called Cārvāka or Brhāspatya philosophy. Lokāyata meant the philosophy of the people and the philosophy of this worldliness or materialism. Lokāyata means not only the philosophy of the people but the philosophy of this worldliness or materialism.

Mādhava's account of Lokāyata is clear and consistent. The epistemology, metaphysics and ethics of the Lokāyatikas are presented by Mādhava in a neatly woven logical contradiction. The Lokāyatikas contend that perception is the only pramāṇa and denied other sources of knowledge. They do not admit the existence of any non-sensible transcendent spiritual reality like God and immaterial soul. Lokāyatikas denied all religious and moral values and cared only for sensual pleasures. Mādhava did not praise this Lokāyatika view. He said that materialism is the cult of those crude people who did not understand the higher values of human life. Modern scholars also are out of sympathy with the materialistic philosophy as Mādhava was. To the modern scholars however, Mādhava's account of the Lokāyata is a satisfactory

one. It has been claimed by them that Lokāyata did not belong merely to the ancient times because it survives in the country in the form of certain obscure cults.

In conclusion, the theory has the virtue of simplicity. The simplicity is the result of an over attachment to Mādhavā's views. The essence of the account of *Sarva-darśana-Saṅgraha* and *Sarva siddhānta-saṅgraha* are negative in character.

The Lokāyata denied the reality of inference and verbal testimony. They rejected moral values and accepted gross sensual pleasures. But it has played a historic role. It has given a deathblow to all traditional thoughts and values and thus created the need for rethinking and revaluation necessary for our ancestors to be free from the old religion of custom and magic in order to move forward to the great constructive efforts of speculation. And Lokāyata contributed to this emancipation.

The Lokāyata view as a matter of fact brought the freedom of speculation in ancient India by causing a breakdown of the ancient faith. It became possible

then for one to remain a Brahmin and yet go on preaching the Lokāyata views. For we find in the *Rāmāyana* that Jābali though a Brāhmin himself tried to persuade Ramāchandra to heretical ideas.

The Brāhmanical sources or Bṛhāspati from whom Lokāyata is called Bārhaspatya or Bārhaspatya-mata which means “nīti of Bṛhaspati.” We must not think that Lokāyata belonged to ancient India only for even today we can find Lokāyata sects in India from Bṛhaspati-śūtra and in the writings of Jaina commentator Guṇaratna who said that Lokāyatikas and Kāpālikas have close relation. According to Bṛhaspati, they are two distinct sects, but according to Guṇaratna they are identical. Kāpālikas still exist today.

Sastri is of the opinion *“that the impact of Lokāyatikas and Kāpāikas is still prevalent in India. There is a sect who believed deha or the material body should be cared for and their religious practices are concerned with the union of man and woman and their success (siddhi). These vary according to the duration of the union. These are Vaisnavas, but they do not believe in Vishnu or Krishna or his*

incarnation."¹¹ It might be mentioned in this context that there is a sect of the Buddhist from Mahāyāna; they are called Sahajiā in the last four centuries of its existence in India.

In the fourteenth century, the great theologian Sāyana Mādhāva is of the opinion that the Lokāyatikas are the extreme forms of the "*let us eat and drink for tomorrow we die*" of Pyrrhonism in philosophy and of atheism in theology. All the descriptions he has made are, however, from his imagination and his statements are based on certain worthless verses which cannot form the part of the Lokāyata views.

Mādhāva was himself a vedantist and did not hesitate to impose the vedāntic pattern of arguing on the Lokāyatikas. Arguments will be valid if these are subordinate to śrūti, according to vedantists. But the Lokāyatikas say these śrūtis are formed by lazy cheats. Lokāyatikas denied the authority of śrūti and smṛti which mocked the Brāhminical rituals and other world or heaven. The scholars are of the opinion that Lokāyatikas were ancient sophists and skeptics who were individual philosophers. But

Lokāyata did not mean a philosophy preached by a few individuals. It is a belief or practice which is deeply rooted in the lives of the people.

The view that the Lokāyatikas were against the Brāhminical rituals does not mean they were opposed to rituals. These rituals were actually rooted in the belief to which orthodox Brahminism was opposed.

Lokāyata was materialistic view in the sense that it gave importance to the material human body and the material universe around us. Lokāyata is an expression of this worldly attitude on one hand; on the other hand it is associated with certain types of rituals. This is evident from a passage found in the *Saddharma-pundarīka* in which the word Lokāyata mantra dhāraka and Lokāyatika are mentioned together.

In *Divyavādāna* which is a Buddhist text, there is a phrase “Lokāyata yajana mantresu nisnatah”, which means expert in Lokāyata yajana (ritual) and mantra (spell).

According to the Asura view, there was a Cārvāka who was originally a rākṣasa or a demon; this Cārvāka was killed by the holy Brahmin. In the *Mahābhārata*, this Cārvāka was very powerful due to his mortification. He then started subduing the devas and the Gods.

The *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* describes how the Great Deceiver Māyāmoha tempted the Daityas to do evil by accepting the two heretical views, the Bauddha and the Jaina. They explained the origin of the Lokāyata thus, the great deceiver beguiled the Daityas by means of heresy. These daityas abandoned the entire system founded on the ordinance of the triple Veda, some reviled the Veda, others the gods, some the ceremonial of sacrifices and some the Brāhmins. Muir has already convincingly argued that the view described here could only have the Lokāyata view. *Maitrāyaṇī Upaniṣad* mentioned the same view regarding the origin of the devilish, false and the non-Vedic views of the Lokāyatikas. *Brahmavaivartapurāṇa* describes demons as those persons who are hostile to the Brahmins and gods, who are slanderers of their preceptors and gods, who rebel against the authority of their spiritual guides,

who do not worship and offer sacrifices to gods, and who are devoid of virtue and mercy.

In the *Pāli canon* the materialistic view of Ajita-Keśakambalin is given. He maintains that a body is composed of earth, water, fire and air, which return to the respective elements on death, and that there is no survival after death. He denies virtue and vice, heaven and hell, and fruits of actions. Pāyāsi also identifies the soul with the body, and denies future life and rebirth. These views are similar to the Cārvāka materialism.

Lokāyata originally meant *“those obscure beliefs and practices which were broadly related to Tantrism.”*¹² Lokāyatikas argued in favour of the importance of agriculture. It is “loka” and “āyata”. The word “āyata” may be derived as atyat+ a; “a” means **a**, yat means to make effort. *“Loka is preceded by “u” and “u” may be a prefixed vowel “u-loka” is a dialectical form of “Loka” u-loka” is abridged form of uru-or-ava loka which means free or open space.”*¹³ *“The word ‘loka’ resembles the Latin word ‘lucas’ which means cleaning of a forest and to the Lithurian ‘Laukas’ means ‘a field.’*¹⁴

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In books like *Bṛhaspatīsūtra* and *Prabodhachandrodaya*, the *Lokāyatikas*, gave importance to 'vārtā' which meant agriculture. So *Vāmācāra* of Tantrism was the belief of the people who were engaged in agriculture. Therefore, identity of tantra and *Lokāyata* became legitimate. But Tantrism forced back to the modern ideas due to its hunting attitude towards sex. The problem of ancient *Lokāyata* thus became the problem of finding out its original significance. In the collection of Pāli passages by Rhys David, the word *Lokāyatikas* occurs. *Buddhaghoṣa* says, 'Lokāyata is a vitandā vādasattham.'

Vitandā means tricky disputation. According to *Nyāyasūtra*, *Vitandā* is tricky logical discussion which only criticizes the thesis of the opponents without establishing his own thesis. *Vāda* is, according to them, the logical discussion for the ascertainment of truth. So, *Vitandā* cannot be a *vāda*. Thus the words *vitandāvāda* would be self contradictory. *Buddhagoṣa* has given a few examples of *vitandā* in explaining the term 'Lokā khāyikā' which means 'popular story or popular philosophy'.

“So Lokāyata means a kind of tricky disputation, sophistry, which did not increase any knowledge but led astray from the path of Heaven and of release.” ¹⁵

Lokāyata is counted as a science among other sciences in Dighanikāya, in *Angutara* and also *Divyāvadāna*. It is regarded as a special branch of study which had a ‘bhṣya’ and a ‘pravacana’ (commentaries and annotations on it).

Lokāyata Śāstra existed as early as the time of Kātyāyana i.e, about 300 B.C. The author of the ‘*Vārttika Śūtra*’, Kātyāyana says, there was a book called the Lokāyata, and there was one commentary of it the date of which may be earlier than 150 B.C or even earlier than 300 B.C. There is a vārtika rule associated with ‘Varnaka-tantave upasamā khyanam’. The word ‘varnaka’ means a blanket or a wrapper (prāvaraṇa). Patanjali, about 150 B.C, while interpreting the *Vārttika sūtra*, says, *“the formation of the word Varnaka is only the sense of cotton or woollen wrapper.”* In the feminine form it would be Varnikā or Vāttikā (for eg, meaning Bhāguri commentary on the Lokāyata . (Lokāyata-Varnikā-

By the seventh century, the Lokāyata or the Cārvāka Sūtra had two commentaries which represented two different schools of interpretation. Several views are found in the commentaries of Kamalaśīla, Jayanta, Prabhācandra, Guṇaratna etc. from the seventh to the fourteenth century, these commentaries are ascribed to the Cārvāka and some to the Lokāyata and in the fourteenth century, Guṇaratna has attributed to Bṛhaspati. Kamalaśīla has made the division among Cārvākas as “Dhūrta Cārvāka” and “Suśikṣita Cārvāka”.. Prior to Patanjali and Kātyāyana there was at least one commentary on the Lokāyata and by the seventh century, the Lokāyata or the Cārvāka had at least two commentaries which showed two different schools having opponent ideas. The date of the science of sophistical school and its association with materialistic theories is quite unknown and how it was hated by Buddhism, Jainism and Hinduism was not described. The art of disputation is formed in India in the first century A.D. In Cārvāka Samhitā and Agniveśa-Samhitā in the first or the second century A.D., such discussion

is formed which is only a revision of the earlier text. In Nyāya and Āyurveda, people learnt these sophisticated modes of dispute to defend themselves from their opponents.

In AśvamedhaParva of Mahābhārata we find such hetuvādins (sophists and logicians). For the art of disputation, the word Vokavākya is used in Chāndogya_Upaniṣad. So this art of disputation is very old.

Now in *Manu*, we find that the Brahmin who through the knowledge of the science of logic (*Hetu-śāstra*) does not regard the authority of the Vedas and the smṛti are nāstikas who should be driven out by a good man. So the question arises, 'who were these nāstikas?' To Patanjali, 'āstika' is that person who thinks it exists and nāstika is a person who thinks it does not exist.

Jayaditya in his Kāśkaā commentary defines 'nāstika' "as a person who does not believe in the next world (para-loka) and 'diṣṭika' as one who believes only what can be logically exhibited."

So far we have dealt with the view called Lokāyata or materialism as found in the epics and ancient texts. Lokāyatikas are different from the Buddhists. Just like Cārvāka thinkers Buddha also denied the existence of God. It is true that Buddhism is a religion without God. But Buddhism unlike Cārvāka materialism gave emphasis on practice of austeriority and Dhamma. The character of Sitā has got much importance in Buddhist philosophy; Cārvākas, however, totally ignored the importance of morality in human life. They only emphasized on worldly enjoyment. Their motto, as we have mentioned earlier, was '*eat, drink and enjoy.*'

Thus it can be concluded that Lokāyata view is another name for the Cārvāka view. In the next chapters, the Cārvāka view will be discussed in detail.

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CHAPTER- II

CĀRVĀKA MATERIALISM: EPISTEMOLOGY, METAPHYSICS AND ETHICS OF CĀRVĀKA

Our discussion in the previous chapter shows that materialism was prevalent in India even before Cārvāka.

The advocates of this school hold that wealth and desire are the only ends of man. It is meaningless to believe in the existence of any transcendental object like self or God. This is evident from the saying viz., *"While there is life, live joyously because no one can escape from death, if the frame of ours will burn, how it can return again?"*¹

According to Garbe, this theory had several adherents from the pre-Buddhist times to the present day. The Lokāyata admits perception as the only means to knowledge and rejects inference, testimony, comparison and other ways of knowing accepted by the theist philosophers. To the Cārvāka thinkers, the four elements of matter are only real. When a body is formed by the combination of these elements, the consciousness is produced there just like intoxicating liquor is produced by mixing of non-intoxicating material ingredients. After death, the body is burnt and consciousness returns again into nothingness. They do not believe on merit and demerit. This system exhibits

itself as the crudest Eudemonism for this system is of the view that the enjoyment of maximum quality of sensual pleasure is the sole desirable good.

Cārvāka philosophy began to make progress during the epic period and the time of Buddha. In those days Buddhist witchcraft and science, scepticism and faith, license and ascetism were mingled together. Institution was replaced by enquiry, religion by philosophy. Opinion was against opinion and ideal against ideal. Political life was unstable due to the impact of the outside invaders and the intense greed and lust of the princes ruling at that time. In a word, the entire society became unstable; we find the description of that period in the writings of Radha Krishnan.

"Due to the failure of state and society, the faith of the people began to shatter like a dream. This was an age of moral weakness and there were the materialist with the world of sense and the Buddhist with their valuable psychological teaching and high ethics." ¹

Thus the Cārvāka philosophy started to influence the people when the social and cultural life of the people became unstable. In 600-400 B.C., the Ionians, the Atomists and the Sophists flourished in Greece. Dale Riepe says. "The heretical thinkers like Cārvākas opined

that the epics, Vedas and Upanishads should be rejected. There is no God, no immortal soul. There will be nothing after the death of the body.”² The Cārvākas had their own epistemology, metaphysics and ethics. Let us now discuss the epistemology of the Cārvāka which emphasizes that perception is the only source of knowledge.

According to Cārvāka, "perception is the only valid source of knowledge" *"Perception is a definite and true cognition of objects produced by sense object contact."*³

To explain the perception is of two kinds, internal and external. In external perception cognition is produced by five sense organs and in the internal perception the cognition is produced by the mind. Thus all knowledge is derived from the senses. Mādhavāchārya, in order to explain the Cārvāka view wrote in, his *Sarva-darśana-sangraha*, "the enjoyment of sensual pleasure is the only end of human life." He pointed out that this cannot be called the end of man as it is mixed with pain. So we have to enjoy pure pleasure as much as we can ignore pain which accompanies it. *"A man who uses fish takes its scales and bones having taken as much as he wants, desists. So nature is sympathetic towards us and gives pleasure, we must not abandon pleasure due to pain."*⁴

It may be remarked here that the Cārvāka view has a close similarity with the view of the ancient Greek thinker, Lucretius. 400 years ago, the Greek philosopher Lucretius asked, "Does reason wholly spring from the senses? Unless they are true, all reasons become false." Charles S. Peirce, the founder of American Pragmatism said, "*Being a pragmatist or radical empiricist, I do not believe in anything that I do not perceive, I far from believe the whole of that.*"⁵

According to the Cārvākas, the world is real because it is perceived by the five sense organs. The things which are not perceived by the sense organs are not real. Heaven and Hell cannot be perceived and therefore these are not real.

The visual sense organ perceives everything. The tactual sense organ perceives softness, hardness, heat, cold, roughness and smoothness. The gustatory organ perceives taste. The olfactory organ perceives disagreeable and agreeable odours. The auditory organ perceives sound. The world is an aggregate of perceptible things and qualities. From this, one might emphatically say that the Cārvākas may be said to advocate naive realism and empiricism.

The Cārvāka thinkers have refuted the validity of inference on the following grounds.

- a) The inference presupposes a universal relation (vyāpti) between the middle term (linga) and the major term (sādhya). But this vyāpti is only an assumption. No source of valid knowledge can guarantee it. It might be remarked in this context that in European logic Hume's denial of the universal and necessary relation is the nearest parallel idea to this.

- b) Again the inference of fire (sādhya) from smoke (linga) can be valid only when it is established that all cases of smoke in past, present and future are cases of fire (vyāpti). But no source of valid knowledge can justify the universal relation between smoke and fire. For perception is limited to particulars, and, therefore, it cannot establish this universal relation required. Inference itself being dependent on vyāpti cannot generate it. Testimony which is based on perception cannot also be the basis of vyāpti. So inference is not possible.

The Cārvākas thus do not regard inference as a valid source of knowledge. Inferential knowledge is probable and not certain as we cannot obtain certain knowledge by inference in all cases. As regards deductive

inference, it involves the fallacy of “petitio principi” or “Arguing in a circle as the conclusion itself is assumed” in the premise or premises the material truth of which is just assumed. Induction tries to prove what deduction takes for granted i.e. the material truth of the premises but it is not authorized to do it as the process of generalization involves a leap from the known to the unknown. The Naiyāyika points out that in an inference like, "All smoky things are fiery; we are authorized to make a leap from the known (smoke in the hill) to the unknown (fire in the hill) because of our previous knowledge of the universal invariable relation (vyāpti) between smoke and fire. But the Cārvākas state that the universal invariable relation between smoke and fire can never be established for all the cases of relation between smoke and fire either at present or in the past or in the future cannot be perceived. So we are not authorized to pass from the known to the unknown on the basis of invariable relation (vyāpti) which is regarded by Naiyāyika as the ground of inference. This relation of vyāpti can never be known with the help of another inference for then there would be the fallacy of "infinite regress". It might be mentioned here that there is difference of opinion among Cārvākas themselves regarding the usefulness of inference. Purandara in 700 A.D. states that *"Inference is valid in regard to the perceptible world, but it is not valid in regard to super*

sensible entities."⁶ But the other Cārvākas deny the validity of inference in both perceptible and super-sensible entities.

Some Cārvākas hold that "Inference may be accidentally true. But truth is not the essential characteristic of inference. It is an accident of inference. In fact probability is the guide of life."

Further the Cārvākas brought other objections against the possibility of a valid inference.

It has been emphasized by them that impressions made by inferential knowledge are not as vivid (*aspaṣṭatvāt*) as those produced by perception. Inference also has to depend on other things for the determination of its object. The Cārvākas do not regard inference as a dependable source of knowledge. If a man acquires knowledge about an unperceived object, it is based on (*aitihya*) general belief. "*None of the knowledge produced is certain as far as the object part is concerned. But knowledge which is not certain with reference to the object part cannot be valid since the effect in the inferential cognition is not a kind of valid knowledge. The instrument (Karaṇa) by which it is produced cannot be a source of valid knowledge.*"⁷

Inference depends upon the perception of a mark and the recollection of invariable concomitance. Inference is called anumāna, because it is a kind of knowledge (māna) which we get after (anu) some other knowledge or perception.

According to the Cārvākas, the instrument for acquiring valid knowledge is the sense organ. But it reveals the relation of one thing with another in an individual case but not of a class. Knowledge acquired by invariable concomitance of class is based on general belief. So inferential cognition is not valid and its instrument invariable concomitance would not be a pramāṇa. Inference has to depend on other things for the determination of its object. It has to depend on perceptual statements. Inferential knowledge is not directly produced by its objects. Again, inference is not concrete (avastu viṣyatvāt) and so is often contradicted.

So there is no proof which may establish that every case of the presence of the reason (hetu) should also be a case of the presence of the probandum (sādhyā) i.e., there is no proof establishing the invariable and unconditional concomitance between the middle and the major terms.

Thus according to Mādhavāchārya, Lokāyata epistemology gives emphasis only on perception. Vādideva Sūri says that inferential processes are only secondary (gauṇa). The Lokayata gave primary importance to sense perception. Manibhadr in his commentary on *Saddarśanasamuccaya*__ showed reasons why the Lokāyata gave emphasis on sense perception. *"Valid knowledge which is non-erroneous is ascertained to be the only one produced by the senses. That is, perception is the only source of valid knowledge"*⁸

This view of the Cārvākas has, however, not been accepted by other thinkers. Hiriyana says, firstly, Cārvākas regard perception (pratyakṣa) as the only source of valid knowledge and reject inference (anumāna) as the source of pramāṇa because there is no ground to believe on the basis of inference in vyāpti. Our belief in the validity of inference is due to associations established during observation which is purely a psychological process with no implication.

Secondly, to deny the validity of inference as a source of valid knowledge is to deny the possibility of all thoughts, all discussions, all doctrines, all affirmations and denials, proofs and disproof.

Thirdly, the Cārvākas can understand the views of others and make their views known to others by inference. Is it not self-contradictory?

Fourthly, perception which is regarded by the Cārvākas as *pramāṇa* turns out to be false on many occasions. The earth is round but we perceive it as flat. In such case, knowledge obtained through perception is false.

Fifthly, it is through inference that the Cārvākas prove the invalidity of inference as a source of *pramāṇa*. Thus the very refutation of inference by the Cārvākas is itself based on inference. Hiriyana says, "*It would then refute itself for what is rejected would be admitted in the very act of rejecting it*"⁹

Sixthly, according to the Cārvākas, inference is sometimes true, sometimes false. So inference cannot be the source of knowledge. Then how can one accept as unconditionally true the Cārvākas' statement that perception is the valid source of *pramāṇa* as this is arrived at through inference. Besides, all perceptions are not authoritative and dependable; some perceptions are found to be illusory.

Lastly, since we cannot perceive the thoughts and ideas of other persons, one must admit that they can be

known only through inference. To accept the validity of perception and at the same time and from the same stand point to refute the validity of inference is a thoughtless self contradiction.

“The Cārvāka was satisfied to refute the views of his opponents. He neither tried to state his view formally nor tried to convince others of its rightness.”¹⁰

Thus we find that Cārvākas position is self refuted and nonsense. It is not a system of philosophy. Perception itself is found to be untrue. It might be mentioned here that this Cārvāka position is the Crude Cārvāka position.

According to the author of *Nyāya Manjarī* Jayanta Bhatta, “The more sophisticated Cārvākas (he calls them, Suśikṣita Cārvākas) maintain that there were two kinds of inference such as "Utpannapratīti" which is the inference about which knowledge is already existent and the other one is utpādya pratīti which is the inference where knowledge is non-existent (inference about God, Soul after life etc).”¹¹ Hiriyana comments on this: *“It is commonly assumed by the critics that the Cārvākas denounced reasoning totally as a pramāṇa: they seem to have rejected only such reasoning as was ordinarily thought sufficient by others for establishing the*

*existence of God, of a future life, etc. Such discrimination in using reason alters the whole complexion of the Cārvāka view. But this is only a stray hint we get about the truth. What we generally have is a caricature."*¹²

S.N. Dasgupta sums up Purandara's views as, "He acknowledges the usefulness of inference in determining all worldly things where perceptual experience is present but regarding transcendental world such as God, Soul, and life after death, law of Karma, inference cannot be explored. The difference between transcendental truths and ordinary experiences is due to that we make inductive generalizations by observing a large number of cases of agreement in presence and agreement in absence. The transcendent spheres such as God, soul and life after death cannot be perceived until these are existed. So in such cases agreement in presence cannot be observed. In transcendental world no case of *hetu* (reason) agree with the presence of *sadhya* (probandana) can be observed. So in such sphere, inductive generalization cannot be made"¹³

We find in Vedānta philosophy also that Venkatanātha, a follower of Rāmānuja, criticized the Cārvāka refutation of the validity of inference by pointing out that Invalidity of inference cannot be known by perception.

*“Anumānāpramāṇatvam nādhyakṣenaiva gamyate
Nānumanena tenaiva tadvirodhaprasangatah
Na vyāptir nirṇayāyogād iti vyāptam idam na vā
Vyāptam cet svīkṛtā vyāptir na vyāptam cenna
dūṣaṇam.”*

The Cārvāka argues that no inference is possible owing to the absence of any reason (hetu). Inference of a particular instance viz., the probandum (eg. fire) from a particular instance of the probans (eg. smoke) is not possible because the invariable concomitance (vyāpti) between particular instances of the probans and the probandum can never be known. The Cārvāka gives a reason (hetu) or probans to prove the invalidity of inference. So he must admit the invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum in order to prove the invalidity of inference. If he admits the invariable concomitance between them then there is no invariable concomitance between particular instances of the probans and particular instances of the probandum in his inference. So he contradicts himself when he tries to prove the invalidity of inference by an inference through a reason (hetu). The Cārvāka argues that all reasons are initiated by conditions (upādhi). Then the reason cited by him to prove the invalidity of inference also is cited by conditions and cannot

therefore prove the invalidity of inference. If the reason cited by him is held to be not cited by any condition then it is wrong to assert that all reasons are not initiated by conditions nor is known by inference because this inference would then be valid. Invalidity of all inferences cannot be proved by valid inference, because it is self contradictory. They say that inference prompts positive action (pravṛtti) and negative action (nivṛtti) because it is doubtful.

Perception also prompts positive action and negative action because it is doubtful. Just as perception is regarded as certain because it is not contradicted by a definite knowledge so inference also should be regarded as certain because it is not contradicted by definite knowledge. Naiyāyika Udayana criticizes in this way the Cārvāka doctrine of invalidity of inference. The Cārvāka maintains that inference is not valid but that probability (sambhāvanā) is the guide of life. Perception of a particular smoke produces a presumption that there may be fire. The presumption leads a person to bring fire. If he gets fire, the presumption or probability is wrongly regarded as valid knowledge. It is purely accidental (kākatāliya); the probability leads to successful activity.

Presumption is a kind of doubt which is invalid knowledge. But doubt cannot arise where one perceives smoke for then there is definite knowledge of smoke; again when one does not perceive smoke there is the definite knowledge of the non-existence of smoke. This definite knowledge is opposed to doubt. Udayana says that if there is doubt then there must be inference and that if there is no doubt then the inference must be valid. The Cārvāka refers to future time and remote places whenever and wherever there are conditions (upādhi) which may vitiate the invariable concomitance of the probans with the probandum. But how can the Cārvāka prove the existence of future time and remote places which are not perceived? If they are existent, their existence can be proved by inference. Therefore even the doubt of the Cārvāka as to the existence of conditions presupposes the validity of inference which proves the existence of future time and remote places.

The Cārvākas also refute verbal testimony because śabda or knowledge by testimony is based on understanding the meaning of the statement of a trustworthy person. If the words of reliable persons refer to perceptible objects, we can consider that knowledge to be valid. But if these words mean unperceived objects, eg., the incorporeal self, God, heaven, hell etc, and then knowledge derived through

such words must be regarded as invalid. Testimony refers to the words of reliable persons but whether a person is reliable or not can be known only through inference. It is on the basis of the conduct of a person that we infer if he is reliable or not. Besides, testimony is based on inference. When we accept the words of a reliable person we argue that the words of this man should be accepted, because he is reliable and words of all reliable persons should be accepted. But as inference is not a valid source of knowledge, testimony which is based on inference cannot be accepted as *pramāṇa* or valid source of knowledge.

Hence according to the *Cārvākas*, testimony is not a valid source of knowledge. The *upamāna* or comparison is not recognized by *Cārvākas* as a source of knowledge. According to them, *upamāna* is not a *pramāṇa* at all since it cannot give us any true knowledge about the denotation of the words. Before finishing the discussion of *Cārvāka* epistemology, it is essential to mention the view of *Jayarāśi Bhatta*, who might be regarded as a stalwart of *Cārvāka* scepticism. His method is called *Vitandā* as he only refuted the views of other schools and did not establish any theory of his own. He examines the theory of *pramāṇas* admitted by different philosophical schools. In the opinion of *Pandit Sukhlaji Sanghavi*, "Jayarāśi had a great respect for *Bṛhaspati*"

who is regarded as the founder of the Cārvāka school. His book is entitled *TattvopaplavaSimha*; *Tattvopaplava* means the total destruction of all *tattva* or all realities. He says, “*Bārhaspatya is anti philosophic or agnostic. He discards all the idealistic means of valid knowledge.* So far we have discussed briefly the epistemology of the Cārvākas. Let us now look at the metaphysics of the Cārvākas.

Cārvākas’ metaphysics is the direct result of their epistemological position. Materialism is a metaphysical doctrine opposed to spiritualism. According to spiritualism, spirit or self is the ultimate reality and it does not deny the existence of matter but it says spirit or self or consciousness is the primary reality. The Cārvāka is the chief adherent of materialism although the materialistic thoughts are found in the Vedas in the epics and in the early Buddhist literature.

According to Cārvāka’s materialism, the world consists of four elements namely, earth, water, fire and air. They believe in the existence of the world because it is perceived. To them, matter is the ultimate reality. It reduces everything to matter. Every object in this world is some form of matter. Every vital process of organisms and the mental processes are explained by this doctrine with the forms and functions of matter. The existence of

God, soul, pre-existence and next life are denied by them. So, this theory denies the reality and uniqueness of life and mind and denies all forms of transcendental realities. It has been held by them that whatever exists must be perceptible and God, soul etc., do not exist because they are not perceived. The absolute self or God does not exist because he cannot be perceived. The existence of consciousness is admitted by them because consciousness can be perceived by them. They say, Soul is nothing but the body. *“Cārvāka’s metaphysics” according to Riepe “is unqualified materialistic Monism.”*¹⁴

As soul is identical with the body qualities like leanness, tallness, shortness are qualities of the body; soul is admitted to be identical with the body endowed with consciousness. Consciousness is produced by the material elements; when these are destroyed, consciousness is also destroyed. When betel leaf, nut, lime, and catechu get combined they produce a red colour, though this colour is absent in any one single element.

Similarly, when the unconscious material elements of the body are modified, consciousness is produced as intoxicating liquor is produced from unintoxicating material elements. So earth, water, fire and air these

four elements though originally unconscious can produce consciousness in a body when they become combined together. Thus consciousness is the by-product of matter because it has no separate existence from the body. When the sense organs come in contact with the object, consciousness is produced in the form of sensations of colour, smell, taste and the like. How can consciousness be produced by the material elements? In answer to this question, the Cārvāka says that the sense organs and objects are mere aggregates of earth, water, fire and air which are directly perceived. An aggregate means collection of the constituent elements. It has no existence apart from the elements. If there is invariable concomitance between two things they are casually connected with each other. As consciousness is produced from the material elements, the body should be regarded as the material cause of consciousness. Consciousness is experienced in the body and is never experienced outside it. So, according to the Cārvākas, it is a property of the body. It is not a property of the soul which is distinct from the body. The famous Cārvāka thinker Kambalāsvatara (500 B.C) says "consciousness arises from the body itself through the operation of the vital functions of "pramā apramā and other bio motor faculties."¹⁵ So soul is nothing but the conscious Living Body. (chaitanya viśiṣṭa deha eva ātmān) There is no incorporeal entity like soul distinct

from the body. It is not a quality of any non-perceptible transcendental substance. It might be mentioned here that according to Hiriyana, “the *Cārvāka* does not refute the conscious or spiritual principle but he refuses to accept that it is ultimate.”¹⁶ Consciousness exists in the body and when the body is destroyed, it is destroyed too. It has been held by the *Cārvākas* that at death, consciousness cannot be said to be transferred to another body. There cannot be the same series of consciousness in two different bodies because the mental state of an ass cannot go in the body of a horse. By “reals” are meant only the four elements viz. earth, water, fire and air and things like the body, senses and the objects of senses are nothing but the combinations of these four elements. One might ask: How can the existence of the four elements be admitted if there is no knower (*grāhaka*) or the self? *Cārvāka* however replies that when a living body is formed by the combination of four gross elements viz., earth, water, fire and air, a new quality emerges which is known as consciousness. Consciousness is the power which exhilarates (*madaśakti*). Moreover, consciousness has agreements and disagreements in presence and absence with the body. The relation of cause and effect is always ascertained through elements in presence and absence and in the present case also such agreements are

available. When there is a body, there is consciousness and vice versa.

According to Pāyāsī, "Soul is identical with the body and there is no life after death. These are similar to Cārvāka materialism. Mādhavāchārya in *Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha* states the Cārvāka position as "Soul is only the body distinguished by the quality of intelligence".

The Cārvāka says consciousness exists when the body exists. It does not exist, when there is death of the body. *"The school of Suśikṣita Cārvāka holds that so long as the body remains there is an entity which remains, always perceives, enjoys all experiences. But when the body is destroyed no such thing exists."*¹⁷

This Cārvāka position has been however criticized from different corners. Here are some of the criticisms.

The Nyāya philosophers refute the Cārvāka's doctrine of consciousness by saying that though consciousness exists in the body, it is not the quality of the body. According to Vātsyāyana, fluidity is the quality of water. It is perceived in water. Similarly, though consciousness is perceived in the body, yet it is not its quality, but it is the quality of the soul, which is different from the body. Like complexion, consciousness exists as long as the

body exists, but it ceases to exist when the body dies. The body is composed of many parts; so if consciousness were the quality of the body then it would be the quality of many parts of the body. Therefore it is not the quality of the body but the quality of the self (ātman) which is different from the body.

Further according to the Cārvākas, consciousness is the subtle form of matter but it is not eternal and all pervading. Udayana points out that the size of the body always goes on increasing, from childhood to youth. Now if consciousness were the quality of the body, then one could recollect the incident of childhood in youth.

Moreover if the body is not the substratum of consciousness, recollection and apperception cannot be explained. If consciousness is the quality of the body, any modifications of the body will lead to the increase and decrease of consciousness. But this is never found. Therefore consciousness cannot be the quality of the body. If consciousness were the natural quality of the body, it would be found in deep sleep, swoon and even in death. According to Vijnānabhikṣu, if consciousness would exist in the separate parts of the body, then it could be produced by their combinations in the whole body. But consciousness is not found in the separate parts of the body. This proves that consciousness does

not exist in the material ingredients of the body. If consciousness does not exist in parts of the body, it cannot be produced in the whole body. Now consciousness is not found in separate parts. So it cannot be produced by their combination.

Cārvāka's doctrine of consciousness has been refuted by the Advaita Vedāntins like Sankara and Vcaspati. According to them, consciousness cannot be the quality of the body and the reasons given by them are as follows:-

a) Consciousness does not exist in deep sleep, swoon and the like though the body exists.

b) If it is granted for the sake of argument that consciousness is a quality of the body then the question arises whether it is a generic quality or a specific quality. It is not however a generic quality like magnitude, conjunction and the like. But as long as the substance exists, its specific quality exists. So it is not a specific quality. We must think it to be a specific quality of the body. It has been stated in the *śrutis* that consciousness exists in the disembodied soul after the death of the body. It proves that consciousness is not the quality of the corporeal body. It has been emphasized by the opponents of the Cārvākas that

consciousness cannot be regarded as produced by the material elements because it apprehends the four material elements and their products as objects. Consciousness is selfluminous and the material objects are revealed by consciousness. Therefore consciousness cannot be identical with the material objects. Further if the body is endowed with consciousness, it cannot account for memory, recognition, unity and continuity of consciousness which presuppose the identity of the permanent self. In dreams the body becomes inactive and there are many dream cognitions. Lastly, there is no visual perception without light, but visual perception is not the property of light. Light is the condition of visual perception. In our life there is no consciousness without the body but it is not a property of the body. So soul is different from the body and consciousness is not the quality of the body.

Cārvāka's doctrine of consciousness is also criticized by Rājaśekhara Sūri in the following way. Let us take for example the statement "I know Mādhava". This gives testimony of I or the self, the act of knowing and an object of knowledge, we cannot deny the existence of the self. The body is unconscious and is not a knower. The self is one which combines sensations of colour, sound, taste, smell and touch into the unity of an object. Our self can be known by selfconsciousness in one's own

body. Consciousness is not the quality of the body of the self. The self in a body is one permanent thing and has personal identity. It gives the unity of knowledge.

Cārvāka doctrine of consciousness has been criticized by the Jaina philosophers also. If consciousness were the quality of the body then it could never be known by introspection which is uncontradicted. Consciousness is always self-revealed in introspection; if it is regarded as known by another consciousness then it would lead to infinite regress. Again, the characteristic of the body is hardness. Self awareness is the characteristic of consciousness. The body is known by external perception through the sense organs. Consciousness is known by self-awareness which is independent of external sense organs. So consciousness is different from the body.

In the absence of material cause (upādāna kāraṇa) the material elements, the auxiliary causes cannot produce consciousness. Consciousness, the Cārvāka may urge, is produced by the material elements in the absence of its material cause just as fire is produced by wood in the absence of its material cause. But this is wrong. Invisible fire is the material cause of visible fire. So dormant consciousness is the cause of manifest consciousness when it is produced by the material

elements which are its auxiliary causes, (sahakārikāraṇa).

Śankara also tried to refute the Lokāyata "no soul theory." The main points in the Lokāyata argument are that since consciousness exists only when body exists and does not exist when there is no existence of the body. consciousness must be the product of the body. Life movements, consciousness, memory and other intellectual functions also belong to the body since these are experienced only in the body and not outside of it. To this, Śankara's reply is that life movements and memory etc do never exist even when the body exists, therefore, they cannot be the product of the body. The qualities of the body such as colour, form, etc can be perceived by everyone. Again though these are perceived so long as the living body exists, yet there is no proof that it does not exist when this body is destroyed. If consciousness were product of the body, it could not grasp the body.

Again if the self is found to manifest itself in relation with a body, this shows that the body is its instrument but it does not prove that the self is the product of the body as stated by the Cārvākas. If consciousness is produced by an aggregate of the material elements it should appear when earth, water, fire and air are

combined with one another. But it is not true. If they produce consciousness, they should possess consciousness. If the body and the sense organs produce consciousness, they must possess consciousness. Hence the body is neither the cause nor the producer of consciousness. If consciousness were the quality of the body, it would exist in a dead body, and would be perceived by the external sense organs. If it is said that consciousness cannot be perceived because of its subtlety like atoms of the body, in which it exists, then consciousness would not be perceived in a living body also. The parts and the whole body are not different from each other in nature, so it cannot be said that the qualities of the parts of the body are not qualities of the body. There is consciousness in the living body but not in the dead body. If consciousness existed in the atoms of the body it would be imperceptible in a living body and a dead body alike. Consciousness is apprehended by perception. If consciousness is a property of the body, then all could have perceived it in the same way as they perceive other material properties "But consciousness being intimately private, consciousness of one person cannot be shared by other persons". As Hiriyana observes, "*The form or complexion of our body, for instance, is perceived not only by ourselves, but also by others. A person's thoughts, feelings, dreams and memories on the other*

hand, while they are immediate facts to him are not known to any other in the same way”.

Moreover, if the self is identified with the living body with the quality of consciousness it becomes different to explain recollection, the process of perception and the synthesis of different sensations. As body is changeable, consciousness being the quality of the body should also be changeable and in that case recollection will not be possible. A man fails to retain memory of his childhood. The Cārvākas claim that combination of gross material elements produce consciousness in the living body. But as it cannot be perceived, it is not proved; it is simply a guess work of the Cārvākas.

Apart from this, the subject must not be identified with the object. The soul being the subject must have a separate existence apart from the object and should not be identified with the living body. So consciousness is the quality of the soul. The Cārvāka doctrine of consciousness is criticized by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, two Buddhist philosophers. According to them, the body cannot be the cause of consciousness; it is an aggregate of atoms either with the sense organs or without them. The body as a single composite whole (avayavin) cannot be the cause of consciousness. Since according to the Buddhists, there is no whole other

than an aggregate of parts: The Buddhist denies the existence of the whole. Earth, water fire and air cannot form a single whole. The body with the sense organs cannot produce consciousness. The sense organs cannot produce consciousness, because consciousness is produced even when the motor organs are paralyzed, and consciousness appears even when the cognitive organs are destroyed one after another. The body within the sense organs also cannot produce consciousness. The body cannot be the material cause of consciousness. That is regarded as a material cause of an effect, which undergoing modifications modifies its effect. If the body has sometimes a direct bearing upon consciousness, which is produced by its material cause, consciousness does not cease if the body exists. Hence body cannot be the material cause or the auxiliary cause of consciousness.

According to C.D. Sharma, "If after death of the body, the existence of the soul cannot be demonstrated, its non existence also cannot be demonstrated. Like all material properties it must be perceived, if it is the property of the body. But it is neither smelt, nor tasted, nor heard, nor touched."¹⁸

The Jainas and the Naiyāyikas admitted permanent souls, but the idealistic Buddhists denied it. Thus

Vidyānandi on his Tattvārtha-śloka-vārtika says that *"the chief cause why the soul cannot be regarded as a product of matter is the fact of certainty, continuity and universal self consciousness which is unlimited by time and space."*¹⁹

It has been emphasized by him further that *"If any consciousness requires another consciousness to have itself attested, then that would involve a vicious infinite and the first consciousness would have to be admitted as unconscious since consciousness exists even without the sense, and since it may not exist even when there is the body and the senses as in a dead body, consciousness cannot be regarded as depending on the body."*²⁰ *"Thus the self is directly known as different from the body, by the testimony of self consciousness."*²¹

The other arguments of Vidyānandi are directed against the idealist Buddhists who do not believe in a permanent self but believe in the beginning less series of conscious states.

The Suśikṣita Cārvākas, however, hold that there is one perceiver so long as the body exists, but the perceiver (pramātā) does not transmigrate, but is destroyed, when the body is destroyed. The soul is not immortal, but there is no afterworld after the destruction of the body.

But Jayanta refutes this by saying that if a self is admitted to exist during the lifetime of the body, then the self is different from the body, and since it is partless and non-physical by nature no one can destroy it. No one has seen the self to be burnt or torn to pieces by birds or animals as a dead body can be. Since it cannot be destroyed, it is immortal. The self resides neither in any part of the body nor throughout the body but is all pervading and behaves as the possessor of that body with which it becomes associated through the bonds of Karma. Jayanta defines paraloka or after life as rebirth or the association of the soul with another body after death.

Cārvākas do not believe in causal relations. Fire is hot, ice is cold. Who has created this difference? The Cārvākas regard that they are due to the intrinsic nature of the elements. So the world is the outcome of the natural laws. The doctrine by which the Cārvākas explain the origin of the world may be termed as Naturalism or *Svabhāvavāda* or *Yadṛaccāvāda*. So we find that the Cārvākas are atheists and they do away with the idea of God as the creator of the world.

The Nyaya however criticizes the Cārvāka's doctrine of accidentalism (yadṛcchāvāda) or spontaneous generation. According to Goutama, *“things are produced*

*without any cause, like sharpness of thorns, coldness of ice, hardness of stones etc. They have material causes and not efficient causes. Vātsyāyana says "that of things originate from non cause (animitta) then the non-cause being a cause, production of an effect is not uncaused and spontaneous."*²²

*Udayana states "Accidentalism (ākāṣmikatāvāda) is denial of a cause, denial of production of an effect, denial of an indefinable or unreal cause, or affirmation of nature (svabhāva) as a cause."*²³

Rajasekhara Suri refutes the Cārvāka accidentalism by stating that if effects did not depend upon causes they would either always exist or they would always not exist. According to him, time (Kāla) nature (Svabhāva), destiny (niyati) and fate (bhavitavya) are causes of all things.

Udayana and Vardhamāna criticize naturalism (Svabhāva vāda). Svabhāva is the natural property of a thing. But Nyāya does not accept this view. If Svabhāva is the nature of an effect, the Naiyāika pointed out, then it would produce its effect spontaneously. A particular effect depends upon a particular cause; otherwise it would not be produced at a particular time; so mere inherent nature cannot account for the production of

particular effects. .Effects is produced by particular causes at one particular time. "A person is happy or sad due to the laws of nature. Everything exists due to the laws of nature."²⁴ Who paints the peacocks or who makes the cuckoos sing? There exists no cause except nature." ²⁵

So the Cārvākas deny the origin of the world from five elements (pancabhūta) namely earth (kṣiti) water (ap) air (vāyu) fire (agni) ether (ākāśa). They admit the existence of first four elements viz., earth, water, air and fire as they can be perceived. They do not admit the existence of the last element, ether (ākāśa) as it is not perceived but is known through inference. The world with all its objects is composed of these four gross elements. Atoms of earth, water and fire have not been recognized by the Cārvākas because they are not perceptible. The combination of these four gross elements give rise not only to non-living material beings but also to living organisms like plants and animal bodies. At the time of destruction, both animate and inanimate objects merge into four gross elements. This theory of the world advocated by the Cārvākas is known as *Bhūtachatuātayavāda* as they admit the existence of four gross elements.

According to the Cārvākas, God does not exist, because He cannot be perceived. So God cannot be the Creator of the world. The four material elements may be the material cause of this world, but in the absence of an efficient cause how is it possible for the unconscious material elements to give rise to this wonderful world? There is the necessity of an efficient cause to combine the material elements to give shape and design to the present world. According to the Cārvākas, the world comes into existence by the combination of four material elements and is not the creation of any designer. So the Cārvākas are atheists and they do not accept God as a transcendental Reality.

As Cārvākas are against traditionalism, they deny the authority of the Vedas. They reject the testimony of the Vedas because according to them the Vedic texts are false; the Vedic statements are false for those statements are incompatible with one another. The same statements are repeated several times; so they are tautologies. One text says. "The performance of putreṣṭi sacrifice makes a man able to have a son but the son is not born just after the performance of that sacrifice. If one performs Agnihotra sacrifice, he is destined to go to heaven.

There are three different Vedic injunctions regarding the Agnihotra sacrifice. These are, viz.

a) The sacrifice should be offered before sunrise

b) The sacrifice should be offered after sunrise.

c) The sacrifice should be offered before sunrise after the stars have become invisible. These injunctions it is obvious, are incompatible with each other. There is, according to the Cārvākas, want of agreement (Asamvāda) incompatibility (Visamvāda'), there is contradiction (Vyāghāta) among the Vedic texts. So the Vedas have no validity as a source of knowledge.

Cārvākas' views regarding the Vedas and the rituals like different sacrifices show their hatred towards the saints, priests and the traditional sense of morality. It has been held by them that there is no use of dabbing oneself with ashes. These are only the means of livelihood that Brahmins have established for themselves. They have neither understanding, nor energy. Cārvākas asked if in the Jyotiṣtoma sacrifice, the animal is killed for exaltation to heaven why does not the worshipper sacrifice his own father? "The authors of the Vedas are buffoons, knaves and demons. The well known mantras of the pandits are nothing but jarphari, turphari .In an aśvamedha sacrifice the embraces of the horse must be received by the queen. What nonsense!! "

It has been held by the Lokāyata that dharma is futile. It conduces to wealth (for the priest). It has been emphasised that morning and evening rites, reciting mantras everything is done for wealth. The Vedas are full of earthly desires to hide one's own unlimited desires.

It has been held by them sarcastically that *"To drink wine and perform sexual acts with women is Agnihotra"*²⁸ The Lokāyata view on morality and dharma has been elaborated by D.R. Shāstri as *"Persons who are weak take the help of prayer. Without will power to do anything, worship is an insincere egoism to save oneself from the tortures of hell; prophets are the greatest liars among men. The Vedas are no authority. There are mantras in the Vedas which do not convey any meaning whatsoever, some mantras are ambiguous, some are absurd, some are contradictory, some repeat what is already known. As regards the other portions of the Vedas, we always find discrepancies and contradictions among them. Cases are not rare where a line of action prescribed by one text is condemned by another. Again they speak of results that are not realized. Some portions are rejected by the Vedicists themselves as interpolations. There are proper names and epithets as well as foolish statements like the ravings of a madman. Hence the Vedas are not only human compositions, but*

*even worse. The buffoon, the knave, and the demon-
these are the three authors of the Vedas. All the obscure
rites commended for the queen in the horse sacrifice have
been invented by knaves.”*²⁹

So also the custom of offering gifts to priests and of eating flesh have been commended by night prowling demons. If it were possible for the sacrifices to make one reach heaven after their performance ceased, the performers themselves perished and the requisites were used up then the trees of a forest burnt down by fire might produce abundant fruit. The exercise of religion and the practice of asceticism are merely a means of livelihood for men devoid of intellect and manliness. Therefore the so called sacred books, the three Vedas, have been composed by rogues and can command no authority. A putreṣṭi sacrifice performed at the birth of a child may yield either of two results - positive and negative which is doubtful. When a child is born, the knaves say that it is due to the power of their incantations uttered in performing the rites. When a child is not born, they explain the event as being due to the rites being incomplete in some way or another. The priests say that a beast slain in a sacrifice will itself go to heaven. How is it that they do not kill their own old fathers in a sacrifice in order to send them directly to heaven? If the offerings in a funeral ceremony may

produce gratification to beings who are dead, then in the case of travelers, when they start it is needless to give provisions for the journey. All these ceremonies were ordered by the Brahmins as a means of their livelihood. They are worth no better than that. Hence our religious ceremonies, our endeavour to propitiate the gods, to satisfy them with prayers and offerings are vain and illusive. Religion is the invention of individuals desirous of deceiving their fellow men in order to further their own selfish and ambitious motives. So "let us eat, drink and be merry, for tomorrow we may die." They have looked down upon the spiritual outlook of the other systems of philosophy because they consider matter to be the ultimate reality. They do not admit the existence of spirit or transcendental realities. It might be noted here that the fundamental characteristics of Lokāyata materialism is deha-vāda which means self is nothing but the body. The deha-vāda of Lokāyata as it has been said earlier resembles deha -vāda of original Tantrism. Lokāyata cosmogony is related to Tantrism. It meant a popular 'cult' which is characterized by rituals of worldly character. Lokāyatikas deny the authority of śṛuti and smṛti, which mock the Brāhmanical rituals and the other world or heaven. The scholars are of the opinion that Lokāyatikas are the ancient sophists, sceptics or atheists and individual philosophers, but Lokāyata does not mean a

philosophy preached by a few individuals. It is a belief or practice which is deeply rooted in the lives of the people. Lokāyatikas are against the Brāhmanical rituals which do not mean they are opposed to rituals. These rituals are rooted in the beliefs to which orthodox Brahmanism was opposed. Lokāyata is materialistic which realizes the material human body and the material universe around us. Lokāyata is an expression of this worldly attitude on one hand and on the other hand it is associated with certain type of rituals. In support of this view, there are two groups of evidences - First Lokāyata rejects other- worldliness. Secondly, commentators of Manu have said, they are nāstikas and haitukas. According to Medhātithi, Lokāyatikas are “nāstidattam nāsti hutam nāsti paralokam iti”. It means there is no (meaning of) gift, no (efficacy of) sacrificial offerings and no next world. Lokāyatikas are called the haitukas or nāstikas and were materialistic with worldly attitude.

However, in spite of the rejection of the other world, the Lokāyatikas presuppose some rituals of their own. As for example in *Svadharmā pundarīka* , there is a passage in which the word Lokāyata-mantra dhāraka and Lokāyatika are mentioned together. Kern has translated the passage which stands as follows “When he does not serve, not court, want upon adopts at

worldly spells (Lokāyata mantra dhāraka) and vagary of a world philosophy (Lokāyatika).”In *Divyavadana*, a Buddhist text, there is a phrase "Lokāyata yojna, mantresu misnatah" which means expert on Lokāyata yojana (rituals) and mantra (spell) According to Belvalkar and Ranade , "Lokāyata enjoyed extensive vogue and seductive charm in the country.” If we reject this point of view we shall be led to an absurd idea that the Indian masses were deeply influenced by the view of certain individuals and philosophers who were sceptics, sophists, atheists and materialists in the modern sense of the term.

A later philosopher and critic, Guṇaratna, in his commentary on the *Saddarśanasamuccaya* says, “*Cārvākas are nihilistic sect who only eat and they say there is no virtue and vice and do not believe except what they perceive. Each year men and women gather together and indulge in drinking wine and free sex. They behave like common people, so they are called Lokāyata.*”³⁰ It was not the sign of moral depravity because the deprived persons do not have a special day of the year for orgies. If promiscuity was a ritual so must have been the practice of eating meat and drinking wine. So in Guṇaratana’s writing there are three "mas" of the Tāntrikas. The five fold ritual of the Tāntrikas is called "panca makāra" or the five mas

because these practices begin with the letter 'Ma'. There are madya(wine), mamsa (meat) maithuna (sexual intercourse) mudrā (fried cereals) matsya (fish) The first three are important. Guṇaratna wanted to identify the Tantra with the Lokāyata. The Cārvākas do not recognize virtue and vice. The world is made up of four elements. According to some Cārvākas or empty space is the fifth element. So they say the world is made up of five elements. Consciousness comes out in these elements like intoxicating power. Man is nothing but body endowed with consciousness. They involve in sexual activities, drinking wine and eating meat. On special occasions they do so. According to them there is no 'dharma'. To drink and chew is their motto. They are called Cārvākas, because they chew (carv). They are like ordinary people. Their doctrine is produced by Bṛhaspati that is why they are called Bṛhaspatyas. Guṇaratna gave the name to Cārvākas as Lokāyatikas. Bāhaspatyas and Kāpālikas dab their bodies with ashes. Kāpālikas are Tāntrikas. Guṇaratna is of the opinion that they practice tāntrika rituals as "madya, māmsa, and maithuna". Tantrism was materialism wrapped in archaic fantasies. Tantrism was much older than the origin of the spiritualistic ideas. H.P. Sastri says, "Guṇaratna identifies the Kāpālikas with the Lokāyatikas. In the *Bṛhaspati Sūtra* edited by Thomas, we find two aphorisms, first referring to Lokāyatikas

and the second to the Kāpālikas. According to Sastri, these aphorisms are quite genuine. *Bṛhaspati Sūtra* said that the Kāpālikas sect is ancient sect, as ancient as the Lokāyatas with their materialistic philosophy which made the beginning of the science of economics. The Kāpālikas made the science of erotics (amator). Bṛhaspati suggested Lokāyatikas were related to Kāpālikas but Gunṇaratna identified the two. According to Sastri this science of erotics of the Kāpālikas is related to the ideal of 'artha sādhana' or the enhancement of material wealth. Tāntrika cult had the source in the archaic belief which says material production could be enhanced by the imitation or contagion of human reproduction which means 'kāma sādhana' and 'artha sādhana' are related to each other.

It is evident from the discussion so far that the Cārvākas or the Lokāyatas had no respect for the moral practices performed in the traditional society. In *Sarva-darśana-sangraha*, "*We find that their only goal of life is enjoyment of sensual pleasure.*"³¹

According to Lokāyata, "*While life remains let a man lives happily, let him feed on ghee even though he runs in debt.*"³² "*Pleasure which one gets from the embrace of a woman and other objects of enjoyment is highest good.*"³³

"Anganālinganādijanvam sukham eve purusārtha." The pain that accompanies pleasure should be avoided as far as possible.

The pain which accompanies should be experienced for the sake of pleasure. It is not good to discard pleasure through fear of pain that inevitably accompanies it. "Dukhabhayanna nu kúlavedanīyam sukham tyaktum vicitam." It is foolish to abandon pleasure which is produced by the intercourse of the senses with their objects, because it is attended with pain. "Tyajam sukham viṣaya sangamajanma pumsam dukkhopasṛtam iti mūrkhā vicāranaisa." It is found in the commentary of Guṇaratna that Cārvākas are nihilistic sect, who only eat and drink and there are no virtues and vices; they do not believe, except what they perceive."

The Cārvākas have emphasized on individual welfare and not on collective good. They accept only two puruṣārthas or human values namely - attainment of worldly pleasure (karma) and the means of securing it (artha-wealth). They reject religious merit (dharma) and liberation (mokṣa). The Cārvākas do not disregard pleasure because it is not found unmixed with pain. A person should separate bones and scales from the fish to enjoy the pleasure of eating it. He should not refuse it because it has scales and bones. He should take the

trouble of separating the husk from the paddy to enjoy the pleasure of eating fine rice. It is foolish not to sow seeds of corn because there are wild animals which may devour the corns. It is foolish not to cook food because beggars may pester us for a share of food. It is unwise to refuse pleasure because of fear of pain that accompanies it. If anyone were so timid to abandon present pleasure, he would indeed be foolish like a beast, as has been said by the poet. "The pleasure which arises to men from contact with sensible objects is to be relinquished because it is accompanied with pain - such is the reasoning of fools."

"The berries of paddy, rich with the finest white grains, what man, seeking his true interest, would fling away because covered with husk and dust?" Cārvākas do not differentiate the pleasures of the body from the pleasures of the mind but accept immediately available pleasures of tomorrow. Dale Riepe correctly said, "*The philosophy of Cārvākas fits unqualifiedly in the highest level of naturalism. Cārvāka's epistemological outlook is empirical, its metaphysics materialistic, and its ethics hedonistic.*" ³⁴

By Hedonism is meant a form of naturalistic ethics. It has failed to differentiate the indefinable quality of good. Good is unanalysable, says Prof. Sidgwick. Pleasure is

the only good. It is a mere intuition. It is a form of naturalism. "Hedonism is the doctrine that pleasure alone is good as an end. Good is a means to an end." Hedonism states, "Pleasure is the highest good and supreme end of life." This proposition is based on two assumptions, a metaphysical assumption and a psychological assumption. The metaphysical assumption is that the self is sensuous by nature. It is a series of sensations, feelings, impulses and instincts. Man has reason, but reason is subordinate to passion. Psychological assumption is that man naturally seeks pleasure and avoids pain. We do not desire an object for its own sake. We desire things or objects for the sake of pleasure. The dominant tendency in man is the gratification of sensibility. This theory states that human beings always seek pleasure. Cārvāka's hedonism might be called Egoistic Hedonism. It states that every man ought to seek his own greatest pleasure. An action is good if it promotes the agent's own greatest pleasure. The maxim of the system is "Everyone is for himself." But if a man seeks his own pleasure, how do then we explain the social feelings which we find in him? Hobbes who is an egoist hedonist explains the origin of society and the social feelings in the following way. Men are by nature egoists. The state of nature was a state of disagreement among various ideas of the people. They wanted everything for their own

preservation and enjoyment. There was clash among their interests. Gradually they wanted co-operation and help from other individuals. Hence they entered into a social contract by which each person agreed to sacrifice his own good for the sake of others, and to contribute to the good of the society as a whole for the sake of greater good. Thus Hobbes states society has an egoistic basis. Man works for the good of his fellow beings for the sake of his own larger interest. Egoistic Hedonism is of two types – a) Gross of Egoistic Hedonism. b) Refined Egoistic Hedonism.

Gross or sensualistic egoism was advocated by the Greek philosopher Aristippes of Cyrene. According to him, life, nature or beauty is means of pleasure. His doctrine is known as Cyrenaicism. An individual's own pleasure is the only good of life. He says, "Pleasure should be obtained at any cost. To sacrifice present pleasure is foolish. So this theory just like Cārvākas says, "let us eat, drink and be merry for tomorrow we may die."

According to him, pleasure differs only in intensity and duration. We must choose the intense one among other pleasures. We should not give preference to intellectual pleasures over sensual pleasures. This view is strikingly similar with the Cārvākas view. According to Cārvākas,

pleasure is the highest good. There is neither heaven nor hell. The body is endowed with consciousness. There is no permanent immortal soul. Enjoyment of maximum amount of pleasure is the highest aim of human life.

According to the refined Egoistic Hedonism we should not seek any and every pleasure. We are rational beings, and reason plays an important place in our moral life. If future brings higher pleasure then we have to sacrifice present pleasure. Reason guides us to attain true happiness. Similarly we should be prepared to undergo suffering in the present to get rid of suffering in future. This view has been advocated by Epicureans.

Epicureans have given importance to intellectual pleasure than bodily pleasures. Physical pleasure is not permanent; it is momentary. But intellectual pleasure is pure and refined. So we should seek intellectual or mental pleasure.

The Refined Egoistic Hedonism advocated by Epicurus is however more effective than the gross egoistic view. But the Refined Hedonism is also defective because happiness is not so much positive pleasure as freedom from pain. It regards pleasure as the negation of pain.

But morality consists in activity rather than in a painless inactive life.

According to Altruistic Hedonism, however, universal happiness is the ultimate moral standard. We ought to aim at the "greatest happiness of the greatest number." This doctrine is known as Utilitarianism, because this theory states, "actions are to be judged according to their utility or usefulness as means for the promotion of greatest happiness of the greatest number." This theory teaches to promote fellow feeling and prevents him from doing injustice to them. Bentham and Mill are the exponents of Altruistic Hedonism or Utilitarianism, but Bentham deals with the quantitative difference of pleasure and Mill with qualitative difference of pleasure.

According to Utilitarianism we ought to aim at the happiness of all persons or "greatest happiness of the greatest number" But the Cārvāka doctrine says, maximum amount of sensual pleasure of the individual in this life is the highest good. The pleasure of body or sensual pleasure, being the keenest is preferable to the pleasure of the soul.

According to Hiriyana, *"The doctrine of Cārvāka draws away man's mind altogether from the thought of a higher life and fixes it upon the world of sense."*³⁵ So this theory

is no moral theory at all. It ignores the rational restraint in which morality exists". According to this theory, indiscriminate gratification of hunger, thirst, sex and other bodily appetites constitute the highest good. But to a rational man the life of a "pig satisfied" is never acceptable.

It has been held by Cārvākas that money is desirable as a means to happiness and is desired for its own sake, or as an end to itself. It is a means to pleasure. The authors of NītiŚāstra and Kāmasūtra say that pleasure and wealth both constitute the human good. This view is accepted by the Cārvākas who deny the other worldly good. "Nītikāmasāstrānusārena arthakāmameva purusārthau manyamānāh pārālaukikam artham apahnuvanās cārvākamat manuvartamānāh."

When we satisfy our desire, we get the maximum of pleasure. Virtue consists in the enjoyment of sensual pleasure due to the gratification of desire. It is the highest virtue.

An action which gives excess of pleasure over pain is right. An action which gives excess of pain over pleasure is wrong. This is gross egoistic Hedonism like that of Aristtipus. The Brāhmanas who were the composers of the Vedas asked the foolish people to think that some

kind of food can be taken and others cannot. The faithfulness to one's wife is a virtue and adultery is a vice. The Cārvākas opinion is that the authors of the Vedas are hypocrites, knaves and demons. They are cunning priests who cheat ignorant people for self aggrandizement. According to the Cārvākas, the present is certain. The past is gone. The future is uncertain, so one should enjoy pleasures of the present moment disregarding the past and the future. Enjoy the maximum of bodily pleasures with the minimum of pain discarding the next world. Pursuit of distant, uncertain heavenly happiness at the cost of certain immediate perceptible earthly pleasures is foolish. After death, nothing remains, so enjoy earthly pleasures as much as possible.

The only thing that the Cārvākas cared for was the momentary sense pleasure, unrestricted enjoyment of sensual joys. They did not believe in sacrificing present joys to obtain happiness in the future. So they did not aim at increasing the total happiness and well being of all the people. Immediate sense pleasures were all that they wanted. It is unwise to display prudence or restraint which leads to the sacrifice of present pleasures. The Cārvākas' ethical position followed from metaphysical and epistemological doctrine that sense perception is only real and there is no transcendental

reality such as God, soul etc. To them, there are no different types of pleasure. So there must not be any restriction to anybody to indulge in sense pleasure.

The theory of Cārvākas, however, suffers from the following defects. According to this theory, we have to seek our own pleasure. But if we run eagerly after pleasure, we get less pleasure. True happiness comes from our performing duties sincerely than running after pleasure. Moreover this theory states that man is by nature egoist and selfish. But it is found that human nature is egoistic as well as altruistic. Man is more altruistic than egoistic. Both altruism and egoism exist side by side. Egoistic Hedonism is based on Psychological Hedonism. But this psychological Hedonism itself is a faulty doctrine. We desire an object which gives us pleasure after obtaining the same.

Again Egoistic Hedonism does not give a uniform moral standard; for what is pleasure to one is painful to another.

Further, Egoistic Hedonism calculates the comparative value of pleasure which is however impracticable. It is a very difficult task for our feelings vary according to our mood, temperament etc.

The Gross Egoistic theory of Cārvākas has no morality at all. It ignores the part played by reason in which morality consists. This theory states, the highest end of human life is the enjoyment of sensual pleasure. No rational being can accept this view.

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CHAPTER- III

PRAGMATISM AND LOGICAL POSITIVISM

The word 'Pragmatism' is derived from the Greek word 'Pragma' which means 'things done'. It is the subjective idealistic view in modern philosophy. Due to its practical utility it determines the value of truth and solves the philosophical problems by comparing its practical problems. It is a theory of truth. Let us discuss in this chapter Pragmatism and Logical positivism and compare these two views with the Cārvāka materialism.

According to James, the word pragmatism is derived from the Greek word "npayvia" which means 'practice' or 'action'. The theory of pragmatism is the major contribution of America to the world of philosophy. It influenced thinkers like George Simmel, Wilhelm Ostwald, Edmund Husserl, Hansvaihinger, Richard Muller-Freinfels, Hanshahn, Giovanni Papini, Giovanni Vailati, Henry Bergson and Edouard Le Roy. The theory of Cārvākas gave the sensualistic standard of pleasure as the guiding principle of morality so it is the major contribution to the Indian philosophical world. Pragmatism has similarity with the Cārvākas' view on

the point that both the views gave emphasis on practical consequences. Pierce says that according to William James “*Pragmatism means the end of man is action.*”¹ It will be shown now that there are close similarities between Pragmatism and Cārvāka philosophy. The pragmatists say that the root of knowledge is found in experience. Some say that ‘experience’ means sense experience alone. James begins his empiricism by stating sense experience as the only ultimate source of knowledge and sensible things as the only realities directly known. “*These percepts, these ‘termini’ these sensible things, these matters of acquaintance are the realities we ever directly know.*”² Again he takes wider view of sensation and says, ‘percepts as the only realm of reality’ and treats concepts as a coordinate realm. He includes not only perception and conception but also our feelings of activity (such as sustaining, persevering, striking, anticipating, excepting, fearing, doubting and all moral, aesthetic feelings). Everything that we directly feel has practical consequence. He calls this view “radical empiricism” and the all inclusive stuff “pure experience”.³ He again says “*Pragmatist theory of truth is a step of first rate importance in making radical empiricism prevail.*”⁴

Experience is a neutral entity which is neither mental nor material. "Inference according to pragmatists is circuituous.". It prolongs the experiment. It delays action; it tests a truth claim not directly by acting on it but by the meditation of other judgments. According to Cārvākas, in the world of experience, we often perceive two things together e.g. smoke and fire together in the kitchen. We also perceive that when one of them is absent the other is also absent. In this way, we come to know universal concomitance which serves as the basis of inference. But the things of the transcendental world remain completely beyond the domain of our ordinary perception and no knowledge of universal concomitance between two things of that world is possible. Therefore, inference about the things of the transcendental world is not possible as there is no knowledge of universal concomitance as its basis. But though Cārvākas recognize the validity of inference relating to worldly things, they regard the results of such inferences as simply probable. There is no certainty about them. This view of Cārvākas about inference is closely similar to the view of the pragmatists. These Western philosophers maintain that any general truth established regarding any object of ordinary experience is never certain. It is always probable.

It has been discussed earlier that according to the Cārvākas, perception is the only source of knowledge and there is nothing else except what is perceived by the senses. They rejected other means of valid knowledge such as inference (anumāna) and verbal testimony (śabda). According to them, inference is “a mere leap in the dark.” Charles. S. Pierce, the founder of American Pragmatism once said, “I myself happen in common with a small but select circle, to be a pragmatist, or radical empiricist and as such I do not (as I think) perceive and I am far from believing the whole of that.” It is thus seen that the Cārvāka pragmatic hedonism though as old as the Vedas and Upaniṣads is a more or less consistent theory. The Cārvākas admit that we have immediate knowledge of our mental states and processes through internal perception and on the basis of these mental states and processes we have direct knowledge of consciousness. So the existence of consciousness can be proved by perception, but the existence of any immaterial unchanging soul substance as the substratum of consciousness cannot be perceived and as such its existence cannot be proved. Consciousness is an emergent quality of the body; it is not a quality of a non-perceptible transcendental substance called soul. When a living body is formed by the combination of the four perceptible elements e.g. earth, water, fire and air, then

in that body a new quality emerges, which is known as consciousness. The pragmatists however, do not deny consciousness. In his celebrated article, James asks, “*Does consciousness exist?*”⁵ He affirms that consciousness is “the name of a non-entity and has no right to a place among first principles.” But though denying consciousness as an entity of this kind, James does not deny it altogether. He says that to “deny the word stands for an entity, but I say, it does stand for a function”. C.E Moore says, “When I perceive a room or remember it or imagine it, it is just the room which appears and there is no additional appearance of the consciousness of the room. Consciousness is nothing but a description of the presence of the room in the stream of experiences constituting my biography; it is the room in the context of other experiences of mine.”

James does not find in internal perception any such phenomena, but he feels breathing and other internal activities as always going on out of which philosophers constructed the imaginary entity which they call consciousness. They admit “*consciousness is diaphanous or transparent.*”⁶

When we perceive a bed, it is the bed that is present in the mind and not any consciousness of it just as when we see through a glass we see the object and not the

glass. James unlike empiricists is not a materialist. He warns his readers against a materialistic interpretation of his empiricism. In his psychology and later works, he has explained 'consciousness' and self in terms of physiological experiences and goes to the length of replacing Kant's 'I think' by 'I breathe'. What still stands in between his position and materialism is his neutralism, his theory that matter like mind is also a construction out of neutral experience.

*"Pragmatism' says Schiller, provides ethical basis of metaphysics, by making will, conduct and practical consequences the basis of human life and its values. Ethics is the most fundamental of all sciences, and ethical questions should be solved by their practical bearings, by consequences empirically observed in life."*⁷

The very first result of the pragmatic approach to ethics is the denial of eternal and transcendental values, the abstract idea of the ultimate good. *"Ethics should help man, regulate enjoyment in the light of the scientific knowledge of consequences and not simply formulate theories."*⁸ All goods are inherent in human nature, and they are good until they are the means of good and desirable results in life. So all goods are instrumental. There is nothing essentially good i.e. good for its own sake without reference to the practical result it

produces. They do not identify good with immediate pleasure. The ideal state of affairs must have enlightened control of life in all its aspects.

There must be reconstruction of economic, political and religious institutions which must fully utilize scientific knowledge. We find in D. M. Dutta's writing that Dewey writes in his book, *Freedom and Culture* "there must be international understanding, for securing and maintaining peace, freedom, democracy and all the values that civilization has taught man to prize"⁹. Pragmatists say that the world can be made better for man if he exerts his free will. This doctrine is called Meliorism (melior = better) to distinguish it from pessimism (pessimus – worst) and optimism (optimus – best). Meliorism will be accepted by all, who practice self improvement and social reform and realize the ideals, and would show that the world can be really made better. But the materialist Cārvākas considers enjoyment of sensual pleasure to be the highest good of life. Hiriyana says, "It draws away man's mind altogether humble thought of a higher life and fix it upon the world of sense."¹⁰ Man makes a compromise with evil instead of overcoming it. Man is so impatient of obtaining pleasure that he even tries to secure freedom from pain. Cārvākas are advocates of Gross Egoistic Hedonism; they seek not universal pleasure but own

pleasure; there is no place of practical life of temperance, self control, spiritual discipline and gratification of passions.

According to Pragmatism, there are various possibilities regarding the exact nature of God. God, the Supreme power, who has various other super human forces, is responsive to the needs of man and co-operative with him for the salvation of the world. James remarks, "The original polytheism of mankind sublimated itself into monotheism and monotheism has viewed God as helper *"primus inter pares in the midst of all shapers of the great world's fate."*¹¹

*"Pragmatism can be religious, if you allow that religion can be pluralistic or melioristic in type."*¹² But everyone has to take decision himself, what form of religion suits him because *"evidence for God lies primarily in inner personal experiences."*¹³

James says, religion is primarily a matter and necessity of life. It is a biological reaction. A religious man may express his thoughts differently, but he may have the same feelings and conduct. When we survey the whole field of religion, we find a great variety in the thoughts that have prevailed there but the feelings on one hand and conduct on the other are almost always the same.

“Religion in her fullest exercise of function, is not a mere illumination of facts already elsewhere given , not a mere passion , like love, which views things in a rosier light. It is indeed that, as we have seen abundantly. But it is something more, namely a postulator of new facts as well. The world interpreted religiously is not the materialistic world over again, with an altered expression; it must have over and above altered expression, a natural constitution different at some point from that which a materialistic world would have. It must be such that different events can be expected in it, different conduct must be required. This thoroughly pragmatic view of religion has usually been taken as simple matter of course by common men.”¹⁴

Throughout his work, James propagated that pragmatism was immensely right in theory because it constituted in practice a philosophy that is a far more demanding an option for many persons. Similarly, according to the Cārvākas, what they do in practice is right whether it conforms to the norms of the society or not. To keep extra-marital affairs is wrong according to the norms of the society, but Cārvākas say if one gets pleasure then nothing is wrong in being involved in sensual enjoyment, because pleasure is the summum bonum of life. Similarly, Cārvākas regard what they

practice or do is right because their motto is enjoying as much as possible until death comes.

James tries to interpret each concept by tracing its practical consequences. Similarly, Cārvākas try to interpret each concept by tracing its practical consequences. A man takes alcohol and says he has not taken it and gets maximum pleasure but tells others that he is not drunk; this for the Cārvākas is not wrong for according to them, to get pleasure is man's motto, whether he tells lie or not. After the death of the body, the soul also gets destroyed and nobody can go to heaven or hell. After the death of the body, the body becomes ashes, so the Cārvākas try to interpret each concept by its practical utility.

Materialism means the denial of eternal moral order and letting loss of ultimate hope. In Cārvākas view there is no virtue or vice. The welfare of the nation is merely a fiction, or a nightmare. For the Pragmatists, "truth is made just as health, wealth and strength are made in the course of experience."

*"Man is thus found to be the maker of realities and truth. Realities are not found by us readymade but are made by us."*¹⁵ In their view also, the act of committing a

crime may hold no truth, because “truth in reality is just a creation of man’s mind.”

According to James, “pragmatism is a revolt against the static metaphysics.” Similarly, the theory of Cārvākas revolted against the blind acceptance of dogmas without subjecting them to critical examination and careful scrutiny, this theory gave a death blow to all traditional thoughts and values, and thus created the need for rethinking and revaluation, necessary for all living philosophy.

Pragmatism is chiefly a theory of knowledge, a new conception of the nature, meaning and function of the knowing process. It is a revolt against intellectualism or rationalism of the Absolute Idealist and therefore often described as anti-intellectualism. Similarly, the theory of Cārvākas has its novelty in challenging all the traditional values.

Let us now look at the logical positivism and try to find out its similarities with the Cārvāka school of thought.

The twentieth century movement is sometimes called logical or Linguistics Empiricism. In a narrower sense it carries the name of the Vienna circle. Certain thinkers as Rudolf Carnap, Herbert Feigh, Otto Neurath, Moritz

Schlick and Frederick Waisman formed an influential study group in Vienna in early 1920s to unite and to spread the group's positive ideas. In the broader sense, Logical Positivism includes Non-Viennese thinkers as A.J. Ayer, C.W. Morris, Arne Naess and Earnest Nagel.

The central idea of the movement's doctrine is the principle of verifiability, or the verification principle. Logical positivism can be seen as a natural outgrowth of radical British Empiricism and Logical Atomism. It is the driving force of positivism and attachment to the verifiability criterion for the meaningfulness of cognitive statements. When they accepted this principle, they were led to reject many assertions of religion, morality and metaphysics.

By the early thirties it had become widespread as the ideological basis of the neo-positivist philosophy of science in bourgeoisie scientific circles. Since the late thirties the centre of logical positivism has moved in the U.S.A, where it is formed in a considerably modified form as compared with the days of the Vienna circle and is known as Logical Empiricism. It was succeeded to empirical criticism and general subjective idealist tradition originating from Berkeley and Hume. According to this principle, a scientific philosophy is

possible only as a logical analysis of the language of science.

The function of Logical analysis is –

1. To get rid of metaphysics (philosophy in the traditional sense)
2. To investigate the logical structure of scientific knowledge in order to determine the empirically verifiable scientific concepts and assertions.

The ultimate object of this investigation was-

- I) The reorganization of the scientific knowledge within a system known as the unity of science.
- II) The eradication of the distinctions between the separate sciences viz., physics, biology, psychology, sociology etc.
- III) To regard the logical mathematics as ‘formal sciences’ not as knowledge of the world but as a collection of ‘analytical’ assertions, which make the rules of formal transformation.

In the early thirties, logical positivism tried to free itself of some of the unpleasant effects of the principle of the “*protocol statement*”. It accepted the conception of physicalism, but this did not change the subjective nature of philosophy. Carnap, Reichenbach, and others tried to investigate moral judgements by means of

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formal logic and the methodologies used by the neo-positivists in the natural and the exact sciences. The result was – a) the treatment of moral phenomena to extreme simplification of their nature and to a number of scientifically inconsistent conclusions. b).The origin and development of morality were left uninvestigated and unexplained. c) The advocates of logical positivism in ethics ignored the fact that morality is a special form of social relations and consciousness; they made the moral language the only object of their studies. d) They made the scope of ethics narrow, which led false interpretation of moral concepts and judgments; for example, good and evil are not perceived by the sense organs or by observation and experiment. Therefore, according to them these concepts have no meaning at all. e).They regarded that these moral judgments are “*meaningless*” or “*pseudo judgments*” for these judgments cannot be verified. f) Thus their methodology led to general nihilistic conclusions on morality. The overemphasis on the verifiability principle has led to the logical positivists to reject religion, morality as well as metaphysics.

It might be remarked that the Cārvākas also rejected all transcendental realities; God, Soul, Morality, Heaven and Hell, vice and virtue and thus the outlook of both are found to be the same.

Logical positivists gave attachment to the verifiability criterion for the meaningfulness of cognitive statements. Positivists are radical empiricists and perceptionists. Similarly, Cārvākas also regarded perception as the only valid pramāṇa.

Logical positivists made the scope of ethics narrow, which led false interpretation of moral concepts and judgments since good and evil cannot be the object of perception by the sense organs or by observation and experiment. Similarly there are no vice and virtue according to the Cārvākas. They regarded moral concepts meaningless; similarly the Cārvākas also regarded the moral concepts meaningless. The methodology of logical positivists led to general nihilistic conclusions, Cārvākas are also nihilistic because they deny all the transcendental realities. They doubt in the existence of everything and the extreme Cārvākas even doubt perception as the source of Pramāṇa.

Inference about the things of the transcendental world is not possible for there is no knowledge of universal concomitance as its basis. But though some Cārvākas recognize the validity of inference relating to worldly things, they regard the results of such inferences as simply probable and they admit no certainty about them. This view about inference parallels the views of

modern logical positivists and the pragmatists of the western world. These western philosophers maintain that any general truth regarding any object of ordinary experience is never certain; it is always probable. We cannot claim here that all the evidences necessary for the complete proof of such truth have been observed. So the view expressed by the Cārvākas about inference is very important and relevant in the context of modern trend of thought.

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CHAPTER- IV

IF PERCEPTION IS TAKEN AS A PRAMĀNA, HOW IS ETHICS POSSIBLE IN A SOCIETY?

According to the Cārvāka Philosophy, perception is the only reliable source of knowledge. What is not perceptible is not real, if imperceptible objects are supposed to exist, then even imaginary things would exist, and the poor would remove their poverty with imaginary wealth; servants would become masters by imagining themselves to be rich, and all would become masters by imagining themselves to be rich and would fulfill their desires with imaginary objects. The distinction between perceptible things and imaginary things would then be abolished. There would therefore be total collapse of practical life, which depends upon the distinction between perceptible and imaginary things.

*“Kim capratyaksam apyastitayabhya pagamyate
cejjagodana pahamtam era syat daridro his varṇarasir
mestityanudhyaya helayciva danhsthyan dalayet”.¹*

Thus imperceptible things do not exist. According to them there are no transcendental realities, God, soul, heaven, hell and no liberation.

According to Cārvāka, perception is the only pramāna and this theory rejects inference as a dependable source of knowledge. But religion springs from our belief in some transcendental reality, the existence of which is established by inference. But since God's existence cannot be perceived as a consequence there is no God according to Cārvāka.

We all know that here is a relation of ethics to theology or morality to religion. Religion involves cognitive, emotional and volitional factors and manifests itself in the form of faith in a deity or deities, respected and worshipped. Dr. Flint says that "Religion is man's belief in a Being or Beings, mightier than himself and inaccessible to his sense, but not different to his sentiments and actions with the feelings and practices which flow from such belief. Existence of God and immortality of the soul are the fundamental article of faith in religion."

According to Descartes and Locke "Religion is the source of morality." Morality arises out of religion. Acts

are right or wrong simply because they are commanded or forbidden by God.

But God is the perfect being and righteousness is an element of this nature. What is right or good is in harmony with God's nature, and what is wrong or bad is repugnant to it. This view holds that men obey the moral laws simply because God is Almighty and he will reward or punish them accordingly. According to Kant, however, acts done from fear of punishment or in the hope of any reward do not have any moral worth. Moral actions spring from our consciousness. According to him, morality leads to religion. Our idea of the highest good contains in it the idea of the greatest happiness. Highest good is virtue. But complete good is virtue in harmony with happiness. We have a condition that virtue will lead to happiness and vice to pain. But our experience shows that virtuous men are often unhappy while sinful persons are in happiness. So the relation between virtue and happiness and that between vice and pain are not inseparable. If virtue does not necessarily lead to happiness and vice to pain, then what will inspire man to virtuous actions? For this Kant says, that there must be some personal and moral power behind the world that will ultimately combine virtue with happiness and vice with pain if not in this life, then in the future life. This moral power is God.

Hence the existence of God is a postulate of morality. Morality is thus the basis of religion. Martineau also says, "morality leads to religion." We get intuition of right and wrong by our conscience or moral faculty, so the ultimate source of moral authority is God who is Omniscient and Omnipresent. We are under moral obligation to God to do what is right and to refrain from what is wrong. The notion of God is closely connected with morality.

But Cārvākas have denied both God and morality. Let us first see their arguments against the existence of God.

According to Cārvākas, God's existence cannot be perceived. The four kinds of material elements have produced the world. So God is not the creator of the world. One might ask: can the material elements give rise by themselves to this wonderful world? Even the production of an object like an earthen pot requires an efficient cause in the form of a potter in addition to the material cause viz. clay. The desired form is given by the efficient cause i.e. the potter. The four material elements earth, water, fire and air are the material causes of the world. There is the need of a shaper and designer who turns the material elements into this beautiful world. But according to Cārvākas , the

material elements each have its fixed and inherent nature (svabhāva). These material elements combine by the nature and laws inherent in them to form this world. This view, as mentioned earlier, is known as naturalism or svabhāva -vāda. So there is no necessity of God. There is no proof that the materials of the world follow a design. They can move by the mechanical or accidental combination of the material elements. This is known as accidentalism or mechanism (yadṛcchā -vāda). Śankarāchārya defines "yadṛcchā" as 'ākaṣmikaprāptih' or co-occurrence. They deny uniformity of nature (kārya kāraṇa bhāva). The theory states some products arise due to various antecedents and for this there must be an invariable relation between cause and effect.

Yadṛcchā and svabhāva are identical regarding rejection of the principle. In svabhāvavāda there is a niyama or rule which is called svabhāvaniyama. In yadṛcchāvāda there is no such restriction.

Udayana in his Nyāyā-kusumānjali says that svabhāvavāda is one of the five forms of ākasmikatvavāda. The remaining four forms are:

1. ahetuvāda
2. abhūtivāda

3. svatant pada vāda and

4. anupakhyot pādavāda

The first view is the denial of causality but not of production. The second view is rejection of production (bhāvanā) itself. The third view is a strange doctrine in which the duality is set up between its cause and effect. This view is in Nāgārjunā's Mādhyamikakārikā. The last doctrine is some form of śūnyāvāda in which product appears from void or nothing. In this view of causality, the reality of both upādāna and nimitta is denied. Ujvaladatta divides svabhāva into two, nisarga and svabhāva. The former is 'habit ' and latter is 'nature'. Habit originates from conscious and regular effort in the past but nature is spontaneous without any source or origin. Rājaśekhara sūri criticizes accidentalism or svabhāvavāda. Its effects do not depend upon definite causes; they either always exist or they do not exist. But if they depend upon other causes, then only they can appear at a particular time. So they are produced by particular causes.

Udayana and Vardhamāna criticize naturalism (svabhāvavāda) thus. Svabhāva is one's own nature or peculiar character. It is either the peculiar nature of the cause or the peculiar nature of the effect. It does not exist before the effect and so cannot determine its

production at a particular time. The nature of an effect cannot exist before its production. If svabhāva is the nature of the cause, then the effect has a cause. If the cause does not exist it cannot have a nature or svabhāva. If it exists and has a nature from which the effect springs, then it has a cause. Thus naturalism is undermined. Svabhāva (śakti) may be said to be the power of a cause. Mere inherent nature (svabhāva) cannot account for the production of particular effects by particular causes at particular times. Thus naturalism is not tenable.

The Cārvāka, however, argues that if there is really any omnipotent, omniscient and kind God why He does not remove the doubts in mind of a learner by revealing Himself to him? If again it is argued that God is the judge of our good and bad actions, then the charges of partiality and cruelty may be leveled against him. If God punishes us for our faults, he is our enemy, and it is better that such a cruel God should not exist. In reality there is no God. God is not existent. The king who rules over the people is the supreme Lord (parameśvra). The king is perceived by all. The king is God. The king possesses enormous powers. An intelligent person always keeps the king in good humour and thereby earns a good deal in cash and kind from him and thus leads a happy life. No one can testify to the creation of

the world by God. The first creatures did not know how they were born. Nor could they know the state of things prior to the creation of the world by God. If they relied on the assertion of the creator, they might be deceived. God might not create the world and yet tell them that He did so in order to show His power. So God cannot be regarded as the creator of the world. Similarly there is no evidence to prove that God is the destroyer of the world. There is none to testify to the fact that He destroys the world. So God can be regarded as neither the creator nor the destroyer of the world.

Further, God has no motive to create the world. Compassion for living creatures cannot be His motive since there were no living creatures before creation for which He could feel compassion. Moreover, if He was moved by compassion to create the world, He would create only happy things. But the world is full of suffering and misery. God who is benevolent cannot create so much suffering in the world. If He cannot create a world free from evil, He is not omnipotent. If He were omnipotent he could certainly create a world free from evil. If He depended on moral laws and natural laws and instruments, this independence would be compromised. If He created a world without a motive then He is not intelligent. Even a fool does not act without a motive. If God created the world for

amusement (kridā) He would not be perfectly happy and contented and creation would involve Him in wearisome toil.

As it has been stated earlier the Cārvākas reject the authority of the Vedas. According to Kautsya an elderly author, the hymns of the Vedas are meaningless and contradictory. Religious ceremonies are futile and illusive. Religion is the invention of individuals for cheating their fellowmen in order to fulfill their selfish attitudes. So religion is nothing but priest craft. There is no other hell than the mundane causes as thorns. The supreme head is the earthly monarch, who is perceived by all living beings.

The Cārvākas do not even admit the existence of the soul. There is no existence of an indivisible, unchangeable, immaterial soul which is immortal. They say that soul is nothing but the living body endowed with consciousness. We have direct knowledge of our mental states and processes through perception; but the existence of any immaterial unchanging soul substance as the substratum of consciousness cannot be perceived and it does not exist. So soul is nothing but the conscious living body (chaitanya viśiṣṭa deha eva ātmā) .There is no immaterial soul distinct from the body. If the soul were identical with the body the soul

would also die with the death of the body and there would be no question of liberation of the soul. The Cārvākas further point out that liberation in the sense of complete extinction of sufferings cannot be obtained in this life. It can be obtained only by death and no wise man would willingly work for that end. The scholars of the Vedānta and Jaina schools state that liberation is the state of positive bliss. Again there are other systems which regard liberation as a state of the soul's emancipation from the bondage of the body and the existence of the self in its natural condition. In the state of liberation, the self abides in its essential nature. But the Cārvākas do not believe in the existence of an invisible, unchangeable and immortal soul and the liberation of the soul from the bondage of the body does not arise. Again if perception is the only source of Pramāṇa, heaven is not existent as it is not 'perceived'. According to the Cārvākas, heavenly happiness is a figment of imagination. Sacrifices, agnistoma for example; involving expenditure of huge amount of money and intense bodily pain should not be performed because they do not produce happiness in heaven, which is non-existent. Sacrifices, charity and other acts of piety are performed for profit, fame, self glorification and achieving power over other people. They are motivated by self interest and prudence. These actions are not altruistic. If perception is the only pramāṇa

according to the Cārvāka, then it is obvious that hell is also non-existent. There is no other hell than bodily pain produced by thorns and the like. Mundane pain is hell. Actions cannot have visible and invisible effects. They have no two series of consequences, mundane and supra mundane. They have no effects which will appear in the next world or future birth. For the Cārvākas, paradise can only be on this earth. *"The enjoyment of heaven is eating delicious food, keeping company of charming ladies wearing beautiful clothes, perfume, garlands, sandal paste etc."*³ *"The pain of hell lies in the troubles given by the enemies, weapons and diseases while liberation is death which is the emancipation from life breath."*⁴

These Cārvākas are also called Ucchedavādi as they reject all familiar beliefs in God, soul and liberation. They are also called Dehātma-vādi, for their admission of the identity of the soul with the body. According to the famous saying of Cabanis "the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile." There is no need for us to look upon the soul as distinct from the body. "The ātman is the body itself which is characterized by such attributes as are implied in the expressions "I am stout" "I am young" "I am old" "I am an adult." We have no evidence of the separate existence of the soul and the body. We do not see the self without a body. Sadānanda

is of the opinion that there are four different materialistic schools. The chief point of dispute is about the conception of the soul. One school regards the soul as identical with the gross body, another with the senses, a third with the breath and a fourth with the organ of thought.

According to the Cārvākas "there is no other world, other than this, neither heaven, nor hell. These are the inventions of imposters. Religion is a foolish aberration, a mental disease. God is not necessary to account for the world. Under the dominance of religious prejudices men are accustomed to the idea of another world and of God and when the religious illusion is destroyed they feel a sense of loss and have an uncomfortable void and privation. Nature is absolutely dead to all human values. It is indifferent to good and bad. The sun shines equally on the good and the evil. If nature has any quality it is that of transcendent immortality. The majority of men thanks to their weakness believe that there are deities, protectors of innocence, who are open to persuasion and flattery. All this is due to the lack of thinking. We falsely interpret natural phenomena when we trace them to Gods and demons.

Nature does things herself without any meddling by Gods. Fire is hot; water is cold because of their own

properties. "Who colours wonderfully the peacocks, or who makes the cuckoos sing well?" This is due to nature itself.

According to the Cārvākas, the theory of re-birth also cannot be accepted. All Indian thinkers except the Cārvākas and the Bauddhas regard self as a permanent conscious entity. It does not die with the death of the body. For the enjoyment of the fruits of its past actions, the self transmigrates from its old and worn out body to another new body when the old one perishes. The Buddhists also accept re-birth in a different way. For them, the generation of a new process of life from the old process is what is meant by re-births. The Cārvākas have rejected this view. They think that there is no self apart from the body. Consciousness is always experienced within a physical body. No instance of simple consciousness without a body is found anywhere. Consciousness that exists within a body is destroyed with the destruction of the body. The self is nothing but the conscious living bodies so when our bodies burn how it will ever return again? Moreover, it cannot also be accepted that after the death of the body the conscious process present in it generates another process of life. So re-birth is not possible in the form of transmigration of self or in the form of generation of one

life from another. The Cārvākas thus criticize the entire social, moral, and religious views of orthodox Hindus.

The Cārvākas who are known as Indian materialists do not admit the existence of any non-sensible transcendental spiritual reality and as such God. They do not believe in the immortality of the soul because no insensible soul exists. According to them, heaven and hell are the creation of the cunning priest according to them. So performance of rituals cannot enable a man to enjoy heaven after his death as heaven does not exist at all. They do not believe in virtue and vice and consider the enjoyment of sensual pleasures to be the highest good of life. They look down upon the spiritual outlook of the other systems of Philosophy because they consider matter to be the ultimate reality. They do not admit existence of spirit and other insensible realities. Transcendental realities do not exist; whatever exists is perceptible. Therefore perception is taken as a *pramāṇa*, ethics is not possible in such a society.

*While life is yours, live joyously;
None can escape Death's searching eye:
When once this frame of ours, they burn,
How shall it e'er again return?*²⁵

But we may ask: How we can live in such a society where there is no morality, no existence of God, no existence of soul and its liberation, no existence of future life and no existence of vice and virtue? Is it possible at all to imagine such a society where there would then be virtually no difference between human society and animal society?

Ethics as a science of morality deals with the rightness and wrongness of human action. When we pass moral judgment on the actions of a man, we generally use the terms 'right' and 'wrong'. When we judge an action to be right we may ask: what makes an action right? The term 'right' is derived from the Latin word 'Rectus' which means 'straight' or according to rule, when an action is said to be right, it means that it conforms to the rule or law. The term 'wrong' is related to the word 'wring' which means 'twisted' that is not according to rule. Rightness or wrongness of an action consists in its conformities with the rule. Right action means that which is in conformity with the moral law. Wrong action on the other hand is an action which does not conform to the moral law. It is thus evident that the notions of 'right' and 'wrong' have a special reference to rule or law. The term 'good' is connected with the German word 'gut'. A thing is good when it is valuable for some end. When we speak of one's conduct as good, we mean that

it is serviceable for the end of ideal we have in view. The term 'good' is also used to signify not something which itself is an end. Thus the *Summum Bonum* or Supreme Good means the supreme end we aim for. When we say that ethics is concerned with the rightness or goodness of human conduct we mean that it is concerned with the consideration of serviceableness of our conduct for some end or ideal which we aim at and with the rules or general principles by which our conduct should be directed so that this end may be attained. The supreme good which is intrinsically good is the ultimate end to which all other relative goods are subordinate. And ethics is the science of the highest good. The *Cārvākas*, however, have looked down upon the higher values of human life which are thought to make human life dignified and save men from falling down to the level of beasts. A life of sensual pleasure cannot be the end of human life. If man is engaged so much in sensual desire, he will be characterless, and even he will do immoral actions, because character implies a peculiarity of mental constitution which differentiates one man from another. Character is formed through the uniform exercise of will in certain directions. The tendencies and dispositions out of which character is formed are to some extent inherited, but it is really built up by uniform and repeated conduct. Character is a permanent mental disposition built out of repeated

voluntary acts involving the rational control of natural impulses and addressed to a definite moral ideal. Character arises out of our emotions, impulses and instincts. The factors which influence the growth of character are-

- (1) Strength of will and habit of self control.
- (2) Proper estimate of duty and a wider conception of the moral ideal.
- (3) Habit of regular performance of the duties of life.
- (4) Rational power
- (5) Sincerity and earnestness in every work.

Lack of these factors may degenerate the character of an individual. Man's character depends on the physical and social conditions but personal effort is the most important in the formation of character. Self realization is the highest good of human beings. The supreme good is to be attained through personal efforts. Full development of character will consist in this effort of self realization. Self realization of a man will be attained only when he uses his rational power and self control and realizes physical, mental, economic, ethical and aesthetical values and tries to develop himself in full. Man should be morally conscious and he should have

awareness of rightness and wrongness of an action. But if Cārvākas say to enjoy maximum pleasure with minimum pain there would be no question of moral consciousness.

The special features of moral consciousness are –

1. Moral consciousness is obligatory. If we say, an action is right we feel an urge to do it. If we say an action is wrong, we will be prevented from doing it.

2. Moral consciousness is more or less intellectual. If we determine the moral quality of an action, we will compare the moral ideal and we judge the motive behind the action. Such act of comparison requires thinking and reasoning.

3. Moral consciousness is active. The question of moral judgment arises in connection with voluntary actions, because, such actions keep open various paths before the agent, who may choose any one of them so the question of moral consciousness arises in connection with activities.

4. Moral consciousness is social. Moral judgment is passed upon actions of individuals living in society. The motive of every good action includes the question of the good of the other. If we are to determine our duties, we

are to do soon the perspective of our relation to other social beings.

5. Moral consciousness is sentimental. It involves a reverential attitude to the moral ideal. Performance of good action produces a good mood and a bad action produces a bad mood. Man is a moral being. Man has not only self consciousness but man is born in the society with the consciousness of right and wrong, obligation and responsibility. Ethics tries to trace the growth and development of moral consciousness but in Cārvākas' ethics there is no place for the development of moral consciousness which manifests itself in the life of the community. But it must be emphasized that human nature is fundamentally moral. Morality does not arise from non-moral elements. The morality that is latent in man gradually develops itself through certain stages. Moral progress is the progress of morality; it is not a progress from non-morality to morality.

From the history of human civilization, there are moral elements in the life of a man. The primitive men did not make any distinction between moral conduct and customary behaviours. To the primitive man, the tradition of the tribe or community was the standard of right and wrong. Custom is habitual conduct which is obligatory for all the living beings of the community.

Germens of morality are found in these customs. The primitive men thought these customs obligatory. These customs were their duty and they were ready to lay down their lives for upholding these customs. In the moral consciousness of the primitive people, there is clearly a sense of group solidarity. What is good for the tribe is good and what is bad for the tribe is bad. Hence the primitive stage of morality is called the customary or institutional or group morality. Moral consciousness of man does not develop till man progresses from the external qualities of morality to its internal qualities. The external quality of morality means those laws or rules which are imposed on us by some external agency. The violation of these rules are punishable whereas the internal qualities of morality means what our conscience presents to us and what we impose upon ourselves, because these rules are imposed on us by our rational self, they are obligatory and we obey the rules not out of any fear of punishment by external agency. We gradually come to understand that the proper object of moral judgment is the motive and character and not the external conduct and its consequences. Moral law should be obeyed on its own account, "the meaning of development and progress of morality means the discovery by stages, the real self of man." Moral progress means 'advancing' i.e., 'moving forwards'. 'Progress' means a continuous process,

moving towards the higher stage, until the final end is reached. Moral progress means the development of character. Moral progress means progress from a lower stage to higher stage. Germs of morality are inherent in man. Of all the moral ideals, the ideal of self realization is the supreme ideal. Thus moral progress is the continuous development of character towards this ideal of perfection. In the beginning, human actions were morally evaluated with reference to their overt actions and behaviour. When the moral consciousness gradually developed, a change of outlook took place and human actions came to be judged more and more from an internal standpoint i.e., by motives and intentions. Previously we aimed at purity of outer conduct, and then we aim at purity of inner life. At first stern and visible virtues e.g. courage values were given a high place. But with moral progress, the more benevolent virtues obtain the foremost place, and the sterner virtues occupy a subordinate place. A higher value is placed on sympathy and forgiveness than upon physical courage.

At first, man remains self-centered. Then he discovers good. He understands that the highest good is the common good. His self regard then extends to the regard for the family. Regard for family breaks its barriers and identifies itself with regard for one's

country, which ultimately breaks the barriers of nationality and transforms itself into world brotherhood. The moral progress of a person is helped by:

- (a) Cultivation of intelligence.
- (b) Controlling passions and inclinations and a steady adherence to truth,
- (c) Acute consciousness of his own shortcomings and an attempt to remove them.
- (d) The influence of good company
- (e) The study of the lives of saints and noble persons and being influenced by their ideals. These factors influence the moral progress of an individual.

But the Cārvāka philosopher believes in a society devoid of ethics. The factors which are essential for the moral progress of a man are absent in such society where pleasure is the highest end of human life. The moral life of a man is based on four virtues, such as –

1. Wisdom
2. Courage
3. Temperance and
4. Justice.

Wisdom includes all other virtues. It is an all embracing virtue. But the Cārvākas did not recognize any of these virtues. Virtue means moral worth or excellence- the excellence of inner character or disposition as manifested in outward conduct or activity. One who is truly virtuous or righteous is a conscientious man of action. He not only is good but does good. He gladly and scrupulously performs his duties high and low to the best of his judgment and ability. He possesses the power of self-control and overcomes temptations. He lives not for himself but for others. He does not renounce society but tries to promote social well being in the best possible way. While loving and serving his country and humanity at large, he is not unmindful of his duties towards himself and his own family. His moral nature is at once exalted and in touch with the common affairs of life. Endowed with a strong sense of responsibility and obligation he does not go away from discharging even the lowest duties of life. His life is a consecrated one- a life of ceaseless beneficence or active goodness. He cannot spend his time being idle in frivolous matters or immoral amusements. As a dutiful man of action he cannot decide to retire from the life of virtuous activity or even take rest from it. He cannot be an opportunist violating the laws of morality whenever he thinks it convenient or prudent to do so. Undivided, continuous loyalty to morality characterizes a really

good man. Whatever is done by him should be in accordance with the dictates of conscience.

The ideal of ethics is self-realization. Moral conduct is self-realized conduct if by the self we mean not only the empirical self with all its weakness and vulgarity, selfishness and smallness but the deeper nature of man free from all fetters of selfish individuality. The lusts and passion of the self, the desires and ambitions of egoism make men fall to lower level. A moral life is a life of understanding and reason, and not only of sense and instinct. *"Man is not in the least elevated above mere animalism, by the possession of reason; if his reason is only used in the same fashion as that in which animals use their instincts."*⁶ If instead of reason our senses guide us, our life will be a mirror of passing and temporary inclinations. He who leads such a life will have to be written down, like Dogberry an ass. *"His life which will be a disconnected episode will have no purpose to take, no work to carry out, no end to realize. In a rational life, every course of action, before it is adopted, is brought before the bar of reason and its capacity to serve the highest end is tested, and if found suitable adopted by the individual."*⁷ The Upaniṣads tell us that if we want to escape from sin, we must give up our selfish motives and desires. A life of reason is a life of unselfish devotion to the world. He is a good man

who subordinates his personal desire to the social desire, and he is a bad man who does the opposite. We should realize in our life and conduct that all things are in god and of God. The man who knows this truth will hate all selfish desires. In the Upaniṣads, morality is individualistic for its aim is self-realization. *"Moral life is a God -centered life, a life of passionate love and compassion for humanity, of seeking the infinite through the finite, and not a mere selfish adventure for small ends."*⁸

But according to Cārvāka philosophy, sensual desire is the highest end of human life. But 'Kama' or sensual desire according to the Upaniṣads is the lust, the impulsive craving of the brute man. Freedom from Kama is enjoined, we have to give up lust and greed from the fascination of outward desires, from the fulfillment of instinctive cravings. The true saint is described as śānta śrānta, dānta upāratā samāhita. These all imply the conquest of passion. But *"The only thing that the Cārvākas cared for was the momentary sense-pleasure, unrestrained enjoyment of sensual joys."*⁹ Pursuit of distant, uncertain and super sensible, heavenly happiness at the cost of certain, immediate perceptible, earthly pleasures are foolish.

They did not aim at increasing the total happiness and wellbeing of the whole life as we find on the ethical scheme of the Cārvākas. For them, "A pigeon today was better than a peacock tomorrow," "better to have a sure copper coin today than a doubtful gold coin in the future." Thus immediate sense pleasures were all that they wanted. There is no glory in pain and suffering. It might be emphasized, however, that in a society, egoistic desires should be conquered and the Cārvākas' theory is gross egoistic Hedonism. Egoism or the sense of 'I' and 'Mine' should be eradicated. One who renounces all selfish desires, who lives a selfless and desireless life devoid of egoism, acquires peace. One who runs after various objects of desire never knows peace. But one who is unperturbed by desires and unruffled like a deep ocean, acquires peace. Kant enjoins extirpation of all feelings and emotions except respect for the moral law. He says virtue, good will or rational will is the highest good, and virtue in harmony with happiness is complete good. "Attachment for object of enjoyment is bondage. Dispassion for them is release. Egoism is bondage. Egoless ness is release. "

*"Mokṣo viṣayavairāgyam bandho vaiṣayiko rasah.
Yadā nāham tadā mokṣo yadāham bandhanām
tadā"*¹⁰

According to the ethics of Mahabharata, pleasure and pain go together. Pleasure is followed by pain. Pain is followed by pleasure. Ungratified desire for pleasure gives rise to pain. Pain springs from non-attainment of pleasure or excess of pleasure. Pleasure and pain succeed one another. Sentient pleasure in pain is not eternal. The body is the source of sensuous pleasure and pain. Attachment to objects of enjoyment generates affection for them. When they are lost, grief arises. Loss of wealth and dear ones give rise to grief. So pleasure cannot be the goal of life. Egoism is the root of love and hatred, pleasure and pain; it is the sense of 'I' and 'Mine'. Pleasure and pain can be conquered by indifference, discrimination and knowledge of reality. Detachment can destroy attachment and gives rise to supreme bliss. True knowledge of the self as distinct from the body can destroy desire for pleasure. Complete renunciation of desires for pleasure is a condition of intuition of the self. It is to be concluded, therefore, that the Cārvāka philosopher believes in a society devoid of any ethics, because in such a society there is no morality, no existence of God, no regard for the Vedas, and no existence of virtue and vice. The Cārvāka's ethics is based on their materialistic thinking, especially to the cunning

Cārvākas, enjoyment of sensual pleasures is the only end of life. *"Eat, drink, and be merry, the past is dead and gone. It never returns."*¹¹ An action which gives excess of pleasure over pain is right. An action which gives excess of pain over pleasure is wrong. The Cārvākas advocate gross egoistic hedonism like Aristippus. According to the Cārvākas, "pleasure is the highest good. Therefore run into debt and enjoy pleasure."

Typical form of gross or sensualistic egoism was also advocated by the Greek philosopher Aristippus of Cyrene (B.C 435-356). His doctrine came to be known as Cyrenaicism. According to Aristippus, "the only good of life is the individual's own pleasure. Pleasure should be pursued by any means and at any cost. There is no glory in pain and suffering. To sacrifice the present to the future is a foolish act. The future is doubtful and uncertain. Trust no future, however, pleasant. Only the present is certain. The present is all that we have. Let us, therefore, make the most of the present. Aristippus recognizes no qualitative differences among pleasures. All pleasures are alike. They differ only in intensity and duration. If we are to choose among the pleasures we should choose the one which is more intense. The pleasures of body or sensuous pleasures bring the keenest, the preferable to the pleasures of the soul. We

therefore ought to seek present momentary pleasures of the senses and should not give preference to intellectual pleasures over bodily pleasures. The past is dead and gone. The future is doubtful. The present is all that we have. Let us make the most of it. While life remains, let a man live happily, let him feed on ghee even though he runs in debt.

The theory of Cārvākas suffer from the following shortcomings-

1) They hold that everyone ought to seek his own pleasure. But they forget that from direct pursuit of pleasure, we get less pleasure. True happiness comes from a disinterested discharge of our duties, and not from our hankering after pleasure.

2) According to the Egoistic Hedonists man by nature is an egoist and selfish. But a correct analysis of the human nature reveals that the human nature involves egoistic as well as altruistic elements. Man is more altruistic than egoistic. It is not true to say that altruism arises out of egoism. Both co-exist in human nature.

3) Egoistic Hedonism or Cārvākas is based on Psychological Hedonism. But Psychological Hedonism is

itself a fallacious doctrine. We desire an object which gives pleasure when it is attained.

4) Egoistic Hedonism fails to give us any uniform moral standard, what is pleasure to one may be pain to another. What is most pleasurable to one may be less pleasurable to another. Thus this doctrine offers no uniform standard of morality.

5) This theory requires us to calculate the comparative value of pleasures. This is an extremely difficult task. Subjective feelings cannot be measured quantitatively. Our feelings often depend on variation in mood, temperament etc. Thus, the Hedonistic calculation is impracticable.

6) Gross Egoistic Theory of Cārvākas is no moral theory at all.

This theory ignores the rational restraint in which morality consists. According to this theory, indiscriminate gratification of hunger, thirst, sex and other bodily appetites constitute the highest good. But to a rational man the life of a "pig satisfied" is never acceptable.

According to the gross or sensualistic Egoism of Cārvāka, present enjoyments should never be sacrificed for the sake of future pleasures because the future is uncertain. This theory is totally inconsistent with morality. It ignores rational selfrestraint in which morality consists. In its extreme form, it supposes that reason is a drawback of human nature and that animal life is the happiest. It is no doubt true that feeling has a place in moral life. A feeling of satisfaction attends virtuous activity.

Virtuous activity is always pleasant though no properly virtuous act is performed with the idea of pleasure. Pleasure will be possible for both men and animals, but happiness will be possible only for a rational being and will arise from the rational self's consciousness that it is, or is becoming, what it should be. Pleasure is ordinarily a momentary enjoyment arising from the satisfaction of a passing desire or wish, and at most it may embrace the gratification of several desires. Happiness is a lively mode resulting from harmony among desires. It is a rational satisfaction arising from harmony among desires. It is a rational satisfaction arising from a due regulation of desires. Happiness is thus possible to the hero in the moment of danger and the martyr on his way to death. The Cārvākas say "the only end of man is enjoyment produced by sensual

desire. Man being by nature sensible of no other pleasures than those of the sense, their pleasures are the only object of his desires and passions.”

This theory of Cārvākas say, man is by nature egoistic, and all the higher feelings and springs of action are modes of self love. But human nature is egoistic as well as altruistic and man is more altruistic than egoistic. We live more for the sake of others than for our own. Even among lower animals it is found that their energies are not spent simply in the satisfaction of their self-regarding wants. They give themselves up for the benefit of their offspring. We can give many examples of such feeling of altruism, a cow giving milk to the calf, a tree giving shadow, and fruits to man and animals. Man is a rational, social being, so he must have the heart of doing welfare for others. Spencer points out *"Without gratis benefits to offspring, life could not have continued."*¹²

The theory of Cārvākas does not recognize the existence of virtue and vice. The virtuous man is conscientious man of action. He not only is good, but does good. He gladly performs his duties to the best of his judgment and ability. He possesses the power of self control, which makes him resist and overcome temptations. He lives not for himself alone but for others. He tries to

promote social well-being in the best possible way while loving and serving his country and humanity at large. He is not remindful of his duties towards himself and his own family. Endowed with a strong sense of responsibility and obligation, he does not shrink from discharging even the lowliest duties of his life. His life is a life of consecrated life, a life of beneficence or active goodness. He cannot spend his time in idleness, frivolous pursuits or in immoral amusements. A dutiful man of action as he is he cannot decide to retire from the life of virtuous activity or ever to take rest from it.

But the Cārvākas regard pleasure (Kama) and the means of securing (artha) as the two ultimate goals of life, which means they have turned deaf ears to the three values of life viz., Truth, Goodness and Beauty and also other values which are essential for self realization. For the Suśikṣita Cārvākas refined pleasure is the end of life, but they are also skeptics and agnostics for they have denied the reality of all supersensuous objects like God, life after death, merits and demerits, vice and virtue, liberation. For them also, there is no meaning of the values of life. So hedonism of Cārvākas cannot remain in society.

So far we have discussed the Cārvāka egoistic ethics and we conclude that it is not the ethics of theory of

morality in the proper sense. Now a question: Is aesthetic value or non hedonistic value another worldly affair? If this value is also this worldly they are also Lokāyata affair. For that which is available in this worldly domain is called Lokāyatika.

Human beings must have the sense of value, which makes man do common good i.e. goodness in the good human being, the good society and the good life. Those who value money, power and status will direct all their attempts towards them ignoring the social, human and ethical implications of their pursuits. Again these persons who value morality, kindness, compassion and love may do anything for the common good. Swami Yuktananda says, "Values are the very core of our behaviour, the motive force of our lives," Rockeach defines value thus. A value is an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end state of existence. A value system is an enduring organization of beliefs concerning preferable modes of conducts or end state of existence along a continuum of relative importance. "A good life must be free of wants. The basic needs of human life such as food, clothing, shelter, health care must be fulfilled. Values related with the material aspect of living are called material values. A good life

can be lived only in a good society. In such a society there is peace, harmony, well being and growth of all. Its economic and political life is governed by the principle of justice and equality. In a good society, individuals are given their human right, or dignified way of earning a livelihood. These are social values. A person should have sound mental health to lead a good life. Life should be free of psychological conflicts, strains and stress.

Creation and enjoyment of beauty is an essential part of a good life. A refined aesthetic sense is the sign of a cultured person. It needs conscious cultivation to grow a taste for appreciating beauty in art, nature and life.

Aesthetics is the branch of philosophy devoted to conceptual and theoretical inquiry into art and aesthetic experience. The term aesthetics was first used by a German eighteenth century philosopher Baumgarten. He defined the term thus "Aesthetics is the science of how things are cognized by the senses. It is the science of sensuous knowledge, whose aim is beauty as contrasted with logic, whose aim is truth." Hegel in 1820 established the word in its present sense by his writing on art under the title of "Aesthetik".. Recent aesthetics has laid stress on a descriptive, factual approach to the phenomena of art, history,

archaeology and cultural history in stressing theoretical organization of materials in terms of recurrent types and tendencies rather than chronological or genetic one. It investigates the forms and characteristics of art, which psychology does not do.

Aesthetic values are concerned with our internal sense of beauty. To perceive, to enjoy and to create things of beauty are very important human activities. Our life becomes happy and colourful, when we experience beauty. It can touch our hearts and arouse human sentiments and provide harmony, peace and unity. A person who is aesthetically sensitive can rise to higher realm of existence, by perceiving a beautiful flower, by hearing a peaceful musical composition. A refined aesthetic sensitivity has always been regarded as an important mark of a cultured person. Some two thousand years ago Bhartṛhari said, 'Sāhitya sangita kalābihīnah/ sākṣāt Paśuh pucha biṣāna hīnah'

"A person devoid of taste for literature, music and arts is veritably an animal, if without horns and tail."

Philosophically, Beauty, Truth and Goodness are very well known creeds of the Indian tradition. Aesthetic values are essential components of all that is valuable

for human beings which contribute a good life to human beings.

Nature provides different kinds of aesthetic experience. When we walk over a patch of grass, we feel the morning dew under our feet, the sweet fragrance of a beautiful rose, the pretty colouring of a peacock's wings, and the beautiful scenery of the snow-clad mountains, the meandering of the river on its plain stage. These are all aesthetic experience provided by nature. Man is also the creator of beauty. He expresses his perception of beauty through art, literature, painting, carving and music. For the expression of ideas and emotions, society provides refined idioms and grammar. The decoration work in temple, art, wall paintings of Ajanta, the immortal writings of Kalidasa and Shakespeare all belong to the category of great art. Their beauty lies not only in their external form but in the emotions and thoughts. They inspire us how to live happily and nobly. So a truly great work of art develops our aesthetic sensibilities and refines our life as a whole. Our life provides several occasions for the perception of beauty. The experiences of beauty in human nature are moments of living warmth, happiness and unity. Extending a helping hand in compassion for the needy and the downtrodden, smiling face on meeting the loved ones after long separation, the sweet smile of a sleeping

baby -----these are examples of aesthetic experience in human relationships. How is beauty different from other values? Plato ranks beauty with truth and goodness. The three are similar absolute values for him. Keats had identified beauty with truth. Enquiry about truth is a cognitive experience. It tries to gain true knowledge about things and distinguishes it from error or false knowledge. A scientist or a philosopher discovers truth; an artist tries to project beauty. Goodness is another value. Objects of art and beauty, a flower or a beautiful painting do not make a moral demand on us. Aesthetic sensibility is a great ally in the development of our moral sense. A person of refined aesthetic sense has great hatred towards immoral actions. In today's world there is exploitation, violence, cruelty which is not only immoral but ugly for a person of refined aesthetic sensibility.

Besides aesthetic values there are non-hedonistic values. These are moral and ethical values. Morality means acting according to 'nīti' i.e., principled conduct. It aims at realizing the value of goodness in human life. All the other values are meaningful only in the glow of moral values. In the Indian value terminology the growth of ethical consciousness is a movement from seeking fulfillment of personal ends to work for the good of others, or for the common good. The individual is an

integral part of the collective; the good of one is embodied in the good of all. Even the personal good cannot be adequately secured without improving the lot of the society. To be able to do good require two things- to be good and to know what is good. One does not imply the other. In the words of Jesus Christ, *“So in everything, do to others, what you would have them do to you.”*¹³

The implication of this canon is that when judging the moral goodness of the course of action, put yourself at the receiving end, and then imagine what its impact would be like. It is the essential virtue of empathy to put oneself in the shoes of the other and then feel the pinch. If the view from the other end is good then the action is good. To be good is to be virtuous. Virtues are ethically approved traits of character. Their alteration is an essential sign of a moral personality; courage, justice and temperance are noble virtues according to Greeks, but according to Christians, Love, Kindness, Humility, and Patience are virtues. The four major virtues recommended by Buddha are compassion, friendliness towards all, sharing in the joy of others. According to Confucius, virtues are gentlemanly behaviour .

The virtue of open-mindedness is essential for living a good life. It protects us from vices such as intolerance

and rigidity. Persons with vices find difficulty in adjusting themselves in new work groups, in new social situations and with members of younger generation. The virtue of open mindedness and tolerance are essential at the social level. They are able to examine their own conduct, motivations and values in an objective fashion. This helps them become good persons through continuous self- examination and self-improvement. They are open to suggestions and criticisms for others. Pursuit of material values is very essential for good life, just as food is essential for remaining alive. Material values should be seen as the means for pursuit of the whole value which makes a good life. Every sphere of economic activity should be related to moral and human ends. For the good life and good person, self restraint is very important.

So the aesthetic value or non-hedonistic values are not otherworldly affair, but this worldly affair. So these are also Lokāyata affairs because Indian value tradition takes this idea of oneness of mankind. Its spiritual perception is the unity of all beings. These are lokāyata affairs because its social ideal is Lokasangraha. The word 'Loka' implies the collectivity of all beings and the word 'sangraha' a combination of welfare and nurturance. Thus a good society is one, where the principle of welfare and nurturance of all beings would

be the basis of social organization. The overall framework of duties, responsibilities, obligations of different persons in different walks of life are to achieve the social ideal. In such a society there would be a combination of human values of universal love and unity. Human beings will be looked upon as ethical and spiritual beings imbued with the values of freedom, creativity, love, wisdom and not merely as economic and social entities. It will emphasize human duties, responsibilities and obligation rather than merely human rights. All these values are this worldly affair. "They are concerned to this 'Loka' and how they can make their life good." In discussing Nehru's humanism Sabira Zaidi says, 'Man does not live by bread alone, though he cannot live without bread either. Any way he does not live for bread. Man lives for creative pursuits, for the completion and creation of beauty, for the pursuit of truth, for the cultivation of goodness, for the joys of love and friendship, for intellectual adventures and spiritual quests, for tasting the many fruits of life including the forbidden fruit of knowledge, for the enrichment of his personality and service of his fellows."

"Loka" means the common world. "Lokāyata" means that they āyatanti' that is to say, they exert themselves about it, strive about it, through the pleasure they take in discussion." All these values are also Lokāyata

affairs. The acceptance of Indian Materialism leads to a Solipsistic world, Is it desirable?

The term 'Solipsism' has been derived from the word 'solus' which means 'alone' and 'ipse' which means 'self'. The doctrine which gives prime importance to the self is known as Solipsism. For the moralists and psychologists, the notion of the self is 'egoism'. The second notion of the self for the metaphysicians is "reality solipsism". The third is the notion of the self, and it states as the only object of real knowledge and the origin of any problematic knowledge of other existence. This is called epistemological knowledge which is known as "knowledge solipsism." It is found in the works of an apostate Jesuit Giulio Clemente Scotti. The work is titled "La Monarchie des Solipses" published in 1652 which describes a kingdom of self seekers. In France, Jesuits were subject to an epithet "Solipsists." The doctrine of self -seeking is different from metaphysical, philosophical and epistemological doctrine. The self- seeking denies that, there is no reality but only self. Metaphysical solipsism says, every claim relating to the existence and non-existence of anything is grounded in experience and cannot go beyond it. An existential claim can never claim with full intelligibility more than the existence of the

experiencing self and can never claim more than the moment of the experience.

Descartes introduced the doctrine of Solipsism as a recognized problem. He expressed doubt in everything such as sky, air, earth, colour, shapes and sounds, or any existence. At the end of his work he rejected the solipsistic doubt as being extravagant and ridiculous. The Solipsism he assigned a purely rhetorical role which disturbed many later philosophers, who did not support Solipsism, but believed that it might be true. Of the two Solipsisms, metaphysical and epistemological, the former is more familiar and more reciting for it has seldom identified by a short phrase like 'only I exist' or "self is the whole of reality."

Locke helped the metaphysical doctrine of Solipsism. According to him, "knowledge is the perception of the connection of an agreement or disagreement of our ideas". Locke's ideas have been supported by Berkeley and later on by Hume. According to Berkeley, "I and my ideas alone exist." To the continued existence of a thing Berkeley has introduced the notion of God. Had he not done that, then the whole world would have been reduced to psychical states of an individual and would have been logically led his view to Solipsism i.e. "I and my ideas alone exist." Fichte is of the opinion that

Solipsism was acceptable in theory through faith. In the practices of actual life, solipsism can be avoided. In this point of view, Fichte is like Hume. W.B Gallie, Norman Malcom and Rush Rhess have maintained that meanings are social and that a meaningful assertion must be of such a nature that it is a check or correction by other persons. According to epistemological solipsism, all empirical knowledge originates in inner cognitive states of persons and the self is the origin of knowledge of existence. In the first case, knowledge about existence and non-existence of everything outside the self originates in immediate experience or "the given" which is not strictly shared. Secondly, to any given person the intelligibility of existential claims originates in his own immediate experience. The term "methodological Solipsism" advocated by Hans Driesch and adopted by Rudolf Carnap is used for a provisional solipsism.

The second thesis shows part of the empiricist syndrome that persisted from Locke to the logical positivists. The definition of knowledge given by Locke that it is nothing but the perception of the relations between our ideas led to paradox in Berkeley's theory of "esse est percipi". J.S. Mill accepted Hamilton's view that what is directly known is in truth. Von Schubert Soldem was also an out and out Solipsist. Bradley wrote

that "through my experience is not the whole world, yet that world appears in my experience is and so far as it exists there it is my state of mind." W.T. Stace wrote that "the first position of every mind must be Solipsistic." In conclusion it may be said solipsism does not differ from one another in having or not having resemblance to reality but rather in the degree of that resemblance.

Indian materialism advocated by the Cārvākas is Gross Egoistic Hedonism. An action is good when it gives the agents the greatest pleasure. To sacrifice the present to the future is a foolish act. The future is doubtful and uncertain. Trust no future, however pleasant. Only the present is certain. The present is all that we have. Let us make the most of the present. "Let us eat, drink, and be merry, for tomorrow we may die." They say, everyone ought to seek his own pleasure. But they forget that the direct pursuit of pleasure generally defeats its own pleasure. They say, man is egoist and selfish by nature. But a correct analysis involves egoistic as well as altruistic elements. Man is more altruistic than egoistic. So the acceptance of Indian materialism leads to Solipsistic world, which gives prime importance to self or egoism. It is not desirable because in his egoism man becomes isolated from the rest of reality and engages himself in the pursuit of selfish motives and desires.

But man is not an isolated being. He is a part of the whole reality.

When man realizes that he is inseparably bound up with the rest of reality he cannot remain selfish. He then is able to command greater confidence in himself and other persons who are integral members of the same reality. He feels a surging love for others. This surging love for others enables him to serve his fellow beings and lead them towards the ideal of perfection.

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CHAPTER- V

CONCLUDING REMARKS

According to Cārvākas, perception is the valid source of knowledge. As God cannot be perceived, God does not exist. Cārvākas are atheists, and they want to do away with the idea of God as a transcendental reality.

The word 'atheist' is derived from the Greek word 'a'- 'not' and 'theos'-'God' - the view that there are no Gods. A widely used sense denotes (merely) not believing in God and is consistent with agnosticism. Socrates was accused of atheism for not believing in the official Athenian Gods. Some people distinguish between theoretical atheism and practical atheism. A theoretical atheist is one who self -consciously denies the existence of a Supreme Being where as a practical theist may believe that a supreme being exists, but lives as though there is no God. So Cārvākas are theoretical atheists.

Let us say that everything must be created and that was done by an omnipotent God -- A God which stands above time and space. It is a moral existence which is self sustaining in it and has its own cause.

The Cārvākas have rejected inference as a reliable source of knowledge. They believe that there is no

reality beyond the perceptible world. But the idea of God springs from our belief in some transcendental reality, the existence of which is established by inference. But they do not believe in the existence of any such reality i.e. supersensible reality. If there is no omnipotent being, the four kinds of material elements cannot produce the world. The supposition of a creator of this world is necessary. So the question arises: Can the material elements give rise to this wonderful world? Even the production of an object like an earthen pot requires an efficient cause in the form of a potter in addition to the material cause viz, clay. It is the efficient cause that gives rise to the matter the desired form. The four material elements earth, water, fire and air are the material causes of the world.

We require an efficient cause like God as the shaper and designer who turns the material elements into the wonderful and beautiful world.

God is the postulate of existence that keeps the order and harmony of the universe. This reveals us to believe there is a Creator – a Being capable of creating this ordered cosmos. There is a unity behind even contradictory facts. That shows there is a principle of unity viz. a God behind this creation who is ultimately responsible for the unity evident in creation.

God is the object of love, hope and aspirations. He feels that our basic urges require satisfaction and explanation. These urges can have no other explanation than the explanation in terms of the Supreme. Nobody can deny that man at times specially at some crucial moments of his life, feels the need of some super human being and hopes for strength. Religions sprang up to satisfy the human need. This desire for the unknown is a fact. The order, harmony and the law of the universe cannot be explained unless an intelligent law giver is pre-supposed, and that intelligent law giver is a transcendental Being who is God. Sometimes the voice of conscience gives the idea of divinity in man. It has an awareness of the good and the bad. It sanctions the good and condemns the bad. It creates an exalted feeling when the good is done and it pricks whenever a wrong step is taken. There is no other explanation of this call of conscience except the fact that it is a representation of a Being, who is the embodiment of supreme goodness. God reveals himself daily to every human being. But Cārvākas shut their eyes, their heart and soul to feel His existence.

God satisfies a very important aspect of our life. If we survey our life we find that over and above the wants, and needs of everyday existence, we do have an urge of

a different kind which cannot be satisfied with the usual materialistic fulfillments of life and which demands a spiritual satisfaction, we become keenly conscious of such an urge in the moments of anxiety and crisis, when we feel forsaken by all worldly and materialistic ways of life. Then we clearly realize that we are in need of a supreme object of love by having faith in which we can derive strength, solace, peace and happiness. So God's presence can do so by a living faith. God can be felt through actual experiences, that are moral sense and moral experience and that also is not to outline the nature of experience but to provide a way for testing one's religious faith. God not only transcends senses, but is a matter of inner realization and faith.

The whole of nature teaches us that there is a personal being who is the ruler of this universe, who is the architect of this universe. This vastness, harmony and the grandeur of the world leads us to suppose that the architect must be an intelligent designer of the universe.

God's idea is necessary on various grounds. It is necessary because it is the Truth and Truth is necessary. It is necessary because it is freedom. The fact of human freedom presupposes the ideal of

absolute freedom, which is nothing but Divine Freedom. It is necessary because it is inherently present in man. God thus is necessary, because the very condition of existence involves God. In order to explain ourselves, our existence, we have to think of a cause, a creative capacity which could create beings like us. Of course such a cause will not be an ordinary cause, depending upon some prior causes. The divine cause therefore must have a self- dependent cause. The world is not chaos but a cosmos. But man has made it chaotic. The purposive character of the universe cannot be explained unless a divine intelligence is present to explain it. The rational purposive character of the universe gives us enough justification for presuming the reality of a spiritual being, who is God.

Our moral life presupposes a moral governor of the universe. Our sense of morality itself will lose all its effectiveness unless it is backed up by the belief that one is accountable for his good and bad deeds, that is, unless it is believed that the universe is being governed by a moral governor, a God, who keeps an eye on everything good and bad.

The most important evidence of God's existence is the possibility of intuitive experience of divine nature. Everybody is capable of having spiritual experience. We

try to apprehend something that transcends our normal and ordinary capacities which is evidence in favour of the reality of spiritual experiences. These experiences show us the fact that the world is not a chaos which is progressively trying to attend its goal. These experiences show that the reality itself is wholly spiritual, so that it may cause and give sustenance to all kinds of spiritual experiences.

If God is imperceptible, His existence can be inferred from His action through knowledge, desire and volition. Hence the existence of God cannot be denied on the ground of His imperceptibility.

In the Bible in John 1:3, it is written: *“God is the creator of the universe, designer and the Supreme Being. Through Him all things were made, without him nothing was made that has been made.”*¹

So Cārvāka’s attitude towards God is blasphemous attitude. *“You shall not misuse the name of the Lord, your God, for the lord will not hold anyone guiltless who misuses His name.”*² Hence, Cārvāka’s denial of god cannot be accepted. If they deny the existence of God they deny religion also. Morality culminates in religion and religion finds its expression in morality. Hence God exists as a postulate of morality. If there is no God,

people will do whatever they like, because there will be nobody to reward or punish them. Those who deny God's existence are fools and despise wisdom and instruction. God leads man to the path of righteousness, justice, equity and every good path. The fear of god delivers man from the way of evil. The exercise of religion and the practices of ascetism are not the means of livelihood for men as the Cārvākas think. Religion makes man surrender to God's will by subordinating one's body and mind to the call of truth, self sacrifice, renunciation, love and tolerance. If according to the Cārvākas, there is no God, man in a society will be lovers of themselves, lovers of money, boasters, proud, blasphemers, disobedient to parents, thankless, unholy, unloving, unforgiving, slanderers, without self control, brutal, despisers, of good, traitors, lovers of pleasure rather than lovers of God. But the love of God makes man peace-loving, gentle, virtuous and compassionate. Virtuous man avoids excess pleasure and amusements, extreme licentiousness and repression of the senses and accepts the mean between the two. Self -realization is the highest ideal of human life. Real happiness and peace of mind can be obtained only through self determination and faithfully doing one's duty. A real virtuous life is a happy life and life devoid of virtue is not a happy life. The man who enjoys

sensual pleasure for a short time may lose peace of mind in the long run.

The Cārvākas deny vice and virtue, heaven and hell, liberation of the soul and above all the existence of God. So they are '*deniers or negativists.*' They think, there is no world beyond and no retribution of good and bad actions. Guṇaratna in his commentary on the Śaddarśana-samuccaya speaks of the Cārvākas as being nihilistic sect who only eat and do not trust anything other than what can be directly perceived. They drink wine and eat meat and are given to unrestricted sex-indulgence. Each year they gather together on a particular day and have unrestricted intercourse with women. They behave like common people and for this reason they are called Lokāyatas ; they hold views originally framed by Bṛhaspati. Thus, it is difficult to say whether the word Cārvāka is the name of real parsonage or a mere allusive term applied to the adherents of the Lokāyata view.

But both Haribhadra and Mādhava have counted the Lokāyata or Cārvāka philosophy as darśana or system of philosophy. It holds a new logic, a destructive criticism of most of the cherished views of other systems of Indian philosophy, a materialistic philosophy, and it denies morality, moral responsibility, and religion of

every kind. The Cārvāka philosophy is a philosophy of scepticism.

Sceptics are those who doubt the existence of everything. The Greek term 'skeptikos' meant 'inquirers'. Philosophical sceptics have been engaged in inquiry into human achievements in different fields to see if any knowledge has been or could be gained by them. They have questioned whether any necessary or certain information can actually be obtained about the real nature of things. Sceptics have organized their questions into systematic sets of arguments aimed at raising doubts. Extreme scepticism questions all knowledge even immediate experience, except of logic and mathematics. Limited or moderate scepticism questions particular types of knowledge-claims made by the theologians, metaphysicians, scientists or mathematicians which go beyond experience, but it admits some limited probabilistic kinds of knowledge. Some sceptics are of the opinion that no knowledge beyond experience is possible while others have doubted whether even the much could be definitely known. Cārvākas also say, no knowledge is possible beyond experience. Some extreme Cārvākas like Jayarāṣi say that knowledge derived from perception also is not possible.

Ādi Cārvākas do not accept the doctrines of other schools of philosophy. They criticize other philosophical theories. They are known as Vaitandika.. They do not accept the authority of the Vedas, and do not believe in God, immortal soul, life after death and liberation of the soul. They even do not accept perception as a source of valid knowledge. They adopted a method of very subtle and complex criticism and attempted to refute all the other doctrines and methods of valid knowledge proposed by other thinkers.

Jayarāśi Bhatta is one of the defenders of this extreme form of Cārvāka philosophy. He is the author of '*Tattvopaplava-simha*'. He states, "Everything is unreal and we have no valid knowledge of anything". According to him, all sources of valid knowledge, even perception and all views regarding the world, life and God are defective. So they are to be treated as rejected. As all doctrines are rejected, the ultimate reality is regarded as unknown and unknowable. Cārvākas of this group are extreme sceptics, because they are not ready to admit any knowledge in the true sense. To them all knowledge is a guess work, lacking certitude and necessary truths.

Jayarāśi's method is called critical method. He says that system of knowledge depends on the means of

knowledge, which in order to be valid must conform to reality. But he says valid means of knowledge is unfounded. He wants to show the incapacity of knowledge to know anything. His Tattvopaplava-simha is the total destruction of realities.

Hence the doctrine of Tattvopaplava-simha is equal to absolute scepticism. It is against the Naiyāyikas, the Mimāmsakas, the Buddhists, the Jainas and others but in support of Bṛhaspati, the materialist.

Jayarāṣi is a worshipper of ill logic, because he is a materialist. He claims that he has become able to show the philosophical errors, which were not even shown by Bṛhaspati himself who was a very early philosopher, and he comes in the later period. For these Ādi Cārvākas, all knowledge is a mere guess work, lacking certitude and necessary truths.

The Dhūrta Cārvākas are unrefined Cārvākas. Their negative attitude is not helpful for establishing any positive philosophical doctrine. These Dhūrta Cārvākas admitted perception as the source of valid knowledge but rejected inference, testimony, comparison and all other sources of knowledge. Their opinion is that there is no soul apart from the physical body. Soul is nothing but conscious living body, as we perceive life and

consciousness within the body and not apart from it. Four gross elements namely, earth, water, fire and air are perceived as the constituents of the world and its objects. These elements are unconscious. But consciousness is produced from a combination of these elements, known as living body. Soul is destroyed along with the body and therefore we should enjoy pleasure as much as possible. They denied the existence of God, heaven and hell, virtue, vice, rebirth, transmigration of soul, and liberation of the soul. These Cārvākas are *Uccedavādi*, as they reject belief in God, soul and its liberation. They are *Dehātmavādi*, because they identify soul with the body. They are sceptics as they reject the reality of all super sensuous objects like God, heaven, soul and the liberation of the soul.

Suśikṣita Cārvākas do not deny inference totally as a source of knowledge. They accept perception as a *pramāṇa*. They even admit inference as a source of valid knowledge for our practical life. They reject only “such reasoning as was ordinarily thought sufficient by others for establishing the existence of God, of a future life etc.” According to them, pleasure (*Kāma*) and the means of obtaining pleasure is the highest goal of human life. Difference between Dhūrta Cārvākas and Suśikṣita Cārvākas is that while the former take gross and transitory sensual pleasure as the goal of human life,

the latter regard refined and broad based pleasure as the only ideal of life. They regard subjects like economics, sexology, science of medicine, science of cultivation and such other natural sciences as valid and useful for our practical life. These Suśikṣita Cārvākas are also sceptics, for they refute the reality of all super sensuous objects, like God, life after death, etc.

Mādhavāchārya has stated only the view of unrefined Cārvākas (Dhūrtta Cārvākas) in his treatise. In his discussion of Cārvāka philosophy, there is no mention of the view of refined Cārvākas like Purandara and others who accept the validity of inference as far as it relates to perceptible objects. His treatise also does not contain the views of extreme sceptical Cārvākas like Jayarāśi Bhatta, who rejects the validity of all pramānas including perception. Surendranath Dasgupta has pointed out that the Cārvāka's opinion is not negative so far as the validity of inference is concerned. Purandara is a refined Cārvāka who states that in knowing 'the nature of objects of our direct sense experience, we cannot deny the necessity of inference. They are sceptics because they do not admit any knowledge in the true sense. All knowledge is a mere guess work lacking certitude and necessary truth. Like Jayarāśi, another sceptic like Mauthner, a critique of language, also completely denied the possibility of

genuine knowledge. Mauthner called himself “Godless”. So Cārvākas are also godless people for they deny the existence of God and doubt the possibility of genuine knowledge.

Metaphysicians such as the Buddhists take great pains to refute the Cārvāka philosophy. At the latter part of the medieval period, materialism virtually disappeared and all the surviving Indian schools claimed to have a religious goal of some kind.

“Like the philosophy of Democritus, the Cārvāka philosophy is a fanatical effort made to rid the age of the weight of the past that was oppressing it. The removal of dogmatism which it helped to effect was necessary to make room for the great constructive efforts of speculation.”⁴

The importance of this doctrine is that it has given freedom to express thoughts and it has a great importance regarding philosophical activity of ancient India. The Cārvākas do not deny a conscious or spiritual principle but denies regarding it as ultimate or independent. It is a property of the body and disintegrates when the body is destroyed. This view resembles the views of “Modern Behaviourism”.

He Cārvāka is impatient to attain pleasure. He does not try to secure freedom from pain. He makes a compromise with evil instead of overcoming it. The Cārvāka doctrine has denied what is accepted by other schools of philosophy, so it has not made much contribution to Indian thought.

Hedonism of Cārvāka is gross or sensualistic as well as egoistic. Happiness of the self which is counted in the last resort and regard for others with a view of self gratification are the only form of altruism which is rational or proper. If we discriminate between sensual and refined pleasures in view of qualitative superiority it is condemned as foolish.

The Suśiksita or refined Cārvākas and the Dhūrta or astute Cārvākas besides the Lokāyātikas have represented different grades of refined hedonism in their ethical teaching. They have taught materialism, naturalism and scepticism in their metaphysical and psychological doctrines. Pleasure to them is the only end of human life. Their view allows licentiousness to become predominant in society. That is why during Cārvākas' time; India lost its supremacy, freedom of society, freedom of religion and freedom of politics. People became slaves of their senses but pleasure is never free of pain. How then can pleasure be the highest

end of human life? If pleasure is fraught with pain, should we reject our life? Should we fling away sheaves of paddy rich with the finest white grains, because they are covered with husk and dust? We cannot find unmixed happiness in this universe. We become happy when we see our daughter's smiling face and sad seeing her weeping face. So, existence of troubles is natural. The more we have agony of thirst, the more there will be delight in drinking cold water. There is not a single house where there is no sorrow. Nowhere can we escape from misery and pain. So it is foolishness to say, "Enjoy pleasure as much as possible". One should not carry out the commands of Kama as Cārvāka thinks. Man should conquer his senses, observe sex restraint and must be self controlled.

Some Indian philosophers regard the four ends of human life (puruṣārtha) viz. wealth (artha) sensual pleasures (kāma) virtue (dharma) and liberation (mokṣa). Of these four, the Cārvākas regard wealth and enjoyment of sensual pleasure to be the proper ends of human life. Wealth is the means to the enjoyment of sensual pleasures to them. But when wealth is pursued for its own sake, it radiates a degrading effect on the personality of man. Due to the worship of money, he gets depersonalized and dehumanized. He loses the

sense of emotional values of personal affection and aesthetic appreciation.

Goldsmith's warning, "Where wealth accumulates, man decays" comes true. Even Julian Huxley, a great biologist, has given a warning against converting the legitimate pursuit of wealth and material pleasure into the worship of money and the cult of crude hedonism.

The Upaniṣads had clearly given the warning thousands of years ago "*Na Vittena tarpaṇīyo manuṣyah*" *material wealth cannot fully satisfy man*. Hence Huxley rightly asks "*to abandon the pernicious habit of evaluating every human project solely in terms of its material utility or profit.*"⁵ "*For the love of money is a root of all kinds of evil, for which some have strayed from the faith in their greediness and pierced themselves through many sorrows.*"⁶

Cārvākas regard, "enjoyment of sensual pleasure as the supreme end of life." But the word Kāma has several meanings. It means desire as well as an object of desire. It means the pleasure one gets from the satisfaction of desire and also affection or love. It is one of the four ends of life. Its connotation ranges from sensual enjoyment to aesthetic joy. In other words, it should not be exclusively identified to sex only. Man's activities are

motivated by various needs and desires. Freud is rightly criticized by some psychoanalysts for his undue insistence on sex and aggressions as the twin motives of human actions. Kāma as a value must be distinguished from lust or desire for carnal gratification. The unrestrained desire or sensual enjoyment or carnal gratification is not accepted as value. It is a value provided and it is pursued in accordance with moral and social norms.

Hence Vātsyāyana, the classical writer in sexology, (Kāmasūtra) advocates the importance of moderation and the significance of reflecting lustful methods of love making.

Modern man has however been too much influenced by technical and mechanical view of man. The result is mechanical and reductionist attitude towards man and sex. This vitalizes sex in man. As a result of this, man is reduced to the level of a machine (Homunculus) in which everything human is refused and rejected. Such type of sex is not only dehumanizing and depersonalizing but also de-eroticizing because it is de-emotionalizing.

Man is a rational being. Without any cause, no rational being thinks of doing injury to others only for his own

pleasure only. If we accept Cārvākas' view, it would misguide us to commit sin, to do immoral actions, to fall into adultery. Injury to others in thought, word and deed, falsehood, cunningness, craftiness, deceit and dishonesty would be the social outcome of Cārvākas theory. This theory does not preach subjective morality, purity of mind, self control and the objective social morality of the pursuit of common good for humanity. By supporting this doctrine children will have no reverence for their parents, affection for children, love for husband and wife, love for brothers, love for fellow human being ---everything will be in vain. In such a society there will be no discipline in children, in grown up, family, in society and in nation.

If "eat, drink and be merry" is the sole aim of human life, and parents spend all their income in a few days for obtaining pleasure, the result will be disastrous. Parents are the prime protectors and nurturers of children. After birth, children need care of parents. Their housing, clothing and feeding all are dependent on parents. The money earned by parents is needed for food, clothes, shelter, education and all other requirements. Through parents, the society's new member first learns the basic values and norms and the cultures of society. In the course of his development, children first learn the normative behavior of their

parents and elders who share the behaviour and the ways of the particular society. It is here that children first learn to distinguish between 'right' and 'wrong', 'good' and 'bad' behaviour. The role behaviour that is learned within the family becomes the model or prototype for behavior in other segments of society. If parents are only after pleasure, they cannot think about the future of their children. In such a family, children become undisciplined and immoral. When they grow up they become social evil. This is evident from the newspapers and television. So parents are wholly responsible for moulding the character of their children. The child's social placement is generally determined by his family members. In him specific habits, traits of character and values commensurate with the role he has to play.

Parents have to do their best to guide, encourage and support their children in giving them education. The extent to which children really benefit from and make full use of their education is determined by the attitudes of their parents and the facilities provided by the family.

The most important duty of the parents is to give children moral and emotional support, provide defence against loneliness as well as satisfying his need for

personal happiness, for love and affection, for warmth and comfort. The family is a “psychological relief station” in which one can safely relax and forget the tension of the outside world. A home thus acts as a powerful agency for mental health. But accepting the Cārvāka doctrine, parents will be irresponsible because they will be engaged in lust, and they want to enjoy as much as possible thinking that once the body dies, it becomes ashes, there is no recurrence.

Being a rational animal, man should give up sexual immorality, impurity, lust, evil desires and greed but should clothe themselves with compassion, kindness, humility, gentleness and patience.

So, true happiness springs from renunciation of desires. Sentient pleasure due to fulfillment of desires is not true abiding happiness. Desires are not pacified by gratification but by renunciation. Attachment is the root cause of misery. It springs from egoism or the sense of ‘I’ and ‘mine’. They can be conquered by destruction of egoism.

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