

CHAPTER V

Advaita Critique of Sāṃkhya

The Sāṃkhya theory advocates the creation of this world through Prakṛti i.e. Prakṛti is the sole cause for world's origination, which is technically called *Pradhānakāraṇatāvāda*'. According to Sāṃkhya Prakṛti has got dynamocity for which creation is possible. It is already stated that Sāṃkhya admitted two categories of reality – Prakṛti and Puruṣa. For creation an effort is needed and Prakṛti has got the same on account of the fact that Puruṣa is indifferent, motionless and actionless. For the sake of the enjoyment of the Puruṣa Prakṛti evolves herself in creation spontaneously. This theory is called *Prakṛtikāraṇatāvāda* or *Pradhānakāraṇatāvāda*.

Sankaracārya in his *Tarkapāda* Chapter of the bhāṣya has tried to establish Brahman as the cause of this world, which is called *Brāhmankāraṇatāvāda* as opposed to *Prakṛtikāraṇatāvāda* by Sāṃkhya. In order to refute the other systems regarding the creation of this world Sankara first attacked the Sāṃkhya as per principle to defeat the prime wrestler (*Pradhāna-malla-nirbahana-nyāya*). In the case of fighting, a wrestler normally attacks the prime one among the opponents in order to demoralize others in the group. In the same way, if there is intellectual battle one should attack the strongest opponents to show his supremacy among the argumentators. Sankara thinks that among the opponents Sāṃkhya is more firm footed than other opponents so far as their

argumentation is concerned. That is why Sankara takes the strong opponent i.e. Sāṁkhya system at the very outset.

Sankara is of the opinion that the ultimate cause from which the world has originated is Brahman. If Sāṁkhya view of Prakṛti is taken into account as the cause of the universe, it will lead to many philosophical problems. It has been argued by Sāṁkhya that the characteristic features of the cause should remain as it is in all the effects. As for example all products made of earth like pot etc. have got the common character earthiness in it and hence their prime cause is to be taken as earth in general. The internal and external world of experience in our daily life has got the common characteristic features like pleasant, unpleasant and dull (infatuative). From these three types of experience we may come to the conclusion that the ultimate cause of these experiences common with those which are constituted by pleasure, pain and dullness. In our daily life Sāṁkhya believes, we have a feeling of enjoyment which may be of pleasant type, unpleasant type and dull type. This ultimate common cause is called Prakṛti or Pradhāna bearing three-fold characteristic features of pleasure, pain and dullness and it is unconscious just like a lump of clay capable of being transformed. For the sake of the enjoyment of conscious spirit or Puruṣa. The unmanifest Pradhāna or Prakṛti is manifested in different kinds on effect.

The first objection raised by Sankara against Sāṁkhya is of the following type. To him, this wonderful world cannot be

originated from the unconscious Pradhāna or Prakṛti. It is contrary to our experience that an object is originated from an unconsciousness stuff. It is found in the external world that an unconscious object without being guided by a conscious agent cannot produce something. It is not possible for the unconscious object Pradhāna to create this wonderful world where diverse needs of diversified persons are fulfilled. It is a matter of our experience that houses, beds etc are made by some intelligent person with the help of the materials like brick, cement etc that are unconscious in nature. These things like bed etc are meant for the enjoyment of human beings. People want to have these in order to get enjoyment as well as to avoid pain. The external world is created in such a manner that an individual can enjoy his results of action performed by him. He will enjoy happiness for the good actions and pain for the bad ones. The material elements like earth, water etc help to build this world which is the place for the enjoyment of the result of actions. Even the bodies of human beings and those of other animals are created in a planned way so that there is an internal coordination among the parts. This related coordination among the created parts makes a human being or an animal survive in this world. The organs are made in such a manner that they can easily function to avail diverse experience. Such a planned body is impossible to create for a man having a keen intelligence. In other words, a person having highest intelligence cannot conceive of such a preplanned body for the sake of enjoyment and day to day function. If it is true, how can unconscious Pradhāna create this wonderful world?¹ This problem remains unanswered by the Sāṅkhya philosophers.

The material objects like earth, stone etc. should be presented in a fashionable manner if they are designed artistically. This has been done by an intelligent potter or sculpture. In the same manner if we think that world is created beautifully, we should presume for the existence of a conscious being like an artist behind this. If Pradhāna is taken as material cause of this universe, it must be guided and controlled by some intelligent being in order to produce the effect. It is quite natural that the material cause can not create the universe without being guided by the efficient cause. In other words, earth, stone, etc may be taken as efficacious for production, if there is the association with the efficient causes like potter, carpenter etc. While emphasizing the material cause one should not ignore the importance of efficient cause. Hence, we must accept some intellectual agency as the ultimate cause of the world. If we do not accept this, it will go against the scriptural injunction. Because it is said in the śruti that there is an idea of an intelligent agent behind the creation of this world. To accept Pradhāna, the ultimate cause of the world is to go against the śruti. Moreover, the wonderful creation of the world presupposes, the diverse intellectual agency which is beyond the capacity of pradhāna. In the śruti text it is said that peacocks are painted by the divine being (*Mayūrāściritā yena*). From this example it follows that the beautiful animals like peacock etc. are made so with the help of various colourful combinations and constituents which are beyond the capacity of an unconscious element like Prakṛti to make hence, an intelligent agent like Brahman has to be accepted as the creator.²

From the internal and external effects, we have a feeling of pleasure, pain and dullness and therefore the ultimate cause of this i.e. Pradhāna should have the same feeling. But it is contrary to what we experience in our life. Actually we feel Pleasure, Pain, etc. in our inner states and hence they cannot characterize external objects. The external objects have got their own characteristics like colour, sound etc. which are unlike pleasure, pain etc. The external qualities of things become instrumental to the causes of pleasure and pain. But they are not pleasant or painful themselves. The Advaitins have raised another problems in this connection. One and the same object may seem to be pleasant or painful for a particular individual depending on their different mental conditions. The same colour or sound may seem to be pleasant or painful to someone and may not be the same to others. It depends on the psychological make up of the person concerned. Had the object been taken as having inherently pleasant, it would have created pleasure to all coming in contact to that, but not pleasant to some or painful to others. This is due to different types of mental conditions of different people. If an object were endowed with pleasure, it would uniformly provide a soothing feeling to all the perceivers but in the actual world it is not found.

In response to the above reasoning Sāṃkhya might rejoin the following :

The internal and external objects are limited and have some finite capacities and that is why they are distinct from each other.

Now the question arises how do we feel that these are limited objects? They are limited by virtue of the fact that they are constituted by the conjunction of several elements.

Let us take an example of a limited object. Roots, sprout etc. are to be taken as limited because they are composed of several elements which are instrumental to their production. These objects are complex in nature due to having several elements for their creation. If Brahman is taken as the cause of creation it would be misleading because the nature of Brahman is simple and undifferentiated having no scope of any plurality of elements. Hence Brahman can never be the cause of multiple products of this earth. On the other hand Pradhāna can be their cause because it is of complex nature having three elements - *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. From this it is concluded that the complex Pradhāna having three elements can create the objects having such elements.

The Advaitins are of the opinion that if a limited object is having conjunction of several elements, then *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* having the same limited character would have conjunction and have been produced by several elements. But according to Sāṃkhya the three *guṇa*-s do not require any other cause but they themselves constitute the ultimate reality, Pradhāna.³

Apart from the above Sankara says it is not reasonable to substantiate that the unconscious Pradhāna can be established as

the cause of all the objects of experience through the simple relation of cause and effect. Though the causal relation remains in beds and chairs, they are not produced by unconscious material object but by an intelligent being. Any type of causal relation should not be confined within the material cause, but it can be extended to intelligent operation also. If so the effect would come into being.

If we keep the question of creating this wonderful world aside even then Sāṃkhya position is not problem free. A new problem may come on the way of our understanding. How can there be an activity in an unconscious Prādhāna through which it can create or produce the world. At the state of equilibrium no activities are found in Pradhāna. Activities possible when one or the three constituents predominates another. That is not the state of equilibrium. The creative activity begins when the state of equilibrium is disturbed through the prominence of one quality over another. But at the state of equilibrium no creation is possible. The activity as interpreted by Sāṃkhya is unintelligible or inconceivable on account of the fact that an activity is not found to be originated in an unconscious object like wood or clay, if not associated with the conscious being. So an activity is not found in an unconscious object like Pradhāna and hence it can not be taken as an independent cause of the universe.⁴

The Sāṃkhya is of the view that in a solely intelligent object activity cannot be found. Activity is possible in an unintelligent object associated with intelligent or conscious being. Had there

been an activity in mere intelligence, there would arise a problem of locus of that intelligence. The intelligence needs some locus for its activity. There can not be intelligence in the void i.e. without the association of conscious being. Hence, the theory that an activity remains only in intelligence as supported by Sankara is not tenable. It can be explained with the metaphor of chariot. Just as activity is found in an unconscious object like chariot, which is associated with a conscious being, activity is generated in an unconscious body which is associated with a conscious being.

It is the conjecture of the Advaitins that in the external world activity is not always found in intelligence or consciousness even when it is connected with unconscious object. One may be confused if activity remains in conscious object or not. In reply Sāṃkhya argues that there is no confusion regarding the locus of existence of activity. Normally the activity lies there where it is found to exist since the movement of an object or its motion are the matters of direct perception if it is said that consciousness is the seat of activity, it will be misleading because motion is found in a chariot but not in the conscious being. In the same way it can be said that the activity is found in the body alone. That is why the Cārvākas argue that consciousness belongs to body because the marks of consciousness like motion etc are found in the body. It is remarkable contribution of the Sāṃkhya to the Philosophy of materialism when they support Cārvāka in favour of their thesis. As the Cārvākas are in favour of the Sāṃkhya, they will find their position more firm – footed. Being empowered by Cārvākas,

Sāṃkhya can safely declare that activity really belongs to the material object i.e. Prakṛti.⁵ The Vedāntins are of the view that it is true the movement etc are seen in an unconscious object as pointed out by Sāṃkhya. But the question is, can unconscious object alone generate movement? Certainly not. The unconscious object can produce movement etc. if and only if it is associated with consciousness. The properties of burning and lighting are found to be existent in a piece of wood which is burning but not found in mere fire. Fire is not available when fuel is isolated and hence nobody thinks that the properties of burning and light are caused by wood. It is a fact that the properties are due to fire on account of the fact these are found when fire exists. In like manner the activity is due to consciousness though it is found in an unconscious object. This position has also been accepted by Cārvākas because they believe that consciousness is found in a man which is an amalgamation of body and consciousness. In other words, it is found as belonging to the body when body is conjoined with consciousness. Therefore, consciousness is the ground of all activities.⁶

Sāṃkhya has raised another difficulty in the above argument. Self is wholly inactive by nature. If it is so how can it be active being associated with an unconscious body because inactive object cannot initiate action in anything. This difficulty can easily be removed if it is realised that an object which is not active itself makes other active, if it is in contact with the appropriate thing. As for example, a magnet without moving itself can make the iron

particles move towards it, if they are brought in close proximity. Colour etc., make eye and other sense-organs receptive towards them while they are themselves inactive. In like manner, God without being active Himself activates all beings and things in the world. Another difficulty would come of in the following manner.⁷ If God is the unmoved mover of this world, it would imply that there is duality between God, the mover and the universe to be moved. It will go against the Vedāntins' doctrine that the ultimate reality is one and non-dual (*Ekameva advitīyam*). Hence, the Vedantins' position can not be sustained. According to them, Brahman alone is real and hence there is no distinction (*bheda*) either homogeneous (*sajātīya*), heterogeneous (*bijātīya*) or internal (*svagata*).

In response to this problem, the Advaitins may rejoin in the following manner. The above-mentioned problem of mover and the moved (i.e. distinction or duality), may occur in the level of phenomenal reality, which is endowed with names and forms as the product of nescience or ignorance. But at the level of ultimate reality there is no question of dichotomy or distinction between the mover and the moved. As there is no world as separated from Brahman, there is unity but not diversity and hence there does not arise any question of duality as shown by the Sāṅkhya. Though the world is an appearance according to them from the empirical point of view, it has to be taken as the effect of our ignorance. As soon as ignorance is dispelled by knowledge of Brahman, the duality ceases.⁸

The Sāṃkhya-thinkers have argued in favour of their position quite consistently. To them the activity found in Prakṛti is not due to some external force or agent but spontaneous. In order to prove the spontaneity of the action of Prakṛti they have taken two metaphors – *milk and water*. Just as the milk flows automatically from the cow for the enjoyment or survival of the calf and water flows downwards spontaneously for the benefit of human beings, Prakṛti can move by itself without being unconscious and is capable of fulfilling human needs spontaneously.⁹

The Advaitins try to refute this standpoint by saying that the movement found in the milk and water is not spontaneous, but due to the existence of some consciousness. It is already an established fact that an inanimate chariot cannot move forward without the association of a conscious being. In like manner, the present case can be justified. In the case of milk we find some consciousness in the animal i.e. cow. The spontaneous discharge of milk is not so in the true sense of the term but due to its desire to feed the calf who will suck it. In like manner it can be said that water flows down due to low level of land but not spontaneously as suggested. When any movement is found in an inanimate being, it is due to some extraneous condition or factor. Hence it is decided that for all types of movement found in an unintelligent being is due to the existence of some conscious principle, which is also supported in the *Śruti* text. It is said in the Bṛhadāraṇyakoṇiṣad that it is the conscious Principle or God who guides and controls the activities and movements of water and rivers.¹⁰

Moreover, the Sāṃkhyas cannot explain the fact why Pradhāna who is taken to be independent moves to activity. By virtue of being independent Prakṛti is not supposed to be affected by external factors. Pradhāna is constituted by three *guṇa*-s which remain in perfect equilibrium and hence there is no external cause through which this equilibrium may be disturbed. So Pradhāna is not supposed to move. Puruṣa again is absolutely indifferent and inactive. Hence, Puruṣa cannot be the cause for Pradhāna's movement. We do not find any external cause which makes or does not make Prakṛti to modify itself into various effects like *mahat* etc. To the Advaitins such problem does not arise because God is taken as all known and all powerful. For this reason He can be active or inactive depending on the demand of the situation with the help of his magical power (*māyā*) producing appearances.¹¹

The Sāṃkhya may say that Prakṛti can transform itself into *mahat* etc. naturally without the help of any efficient or auxiliary cause, just as grass changes itself into milk without the help of any other causes.

This view does not stand in the eye of logic according to the Advaitins. A process is certainly necessary for the transformation of grass into milk. It is found in experience that grass taken by a cow may be transformed into milk, otherwise not. Hence it is not natural as claimed by the Sāṃkhya.¹²

The Sāṃkhya reiterates the earlier position and says that the transformation of grass into milk does not need any other factor. We do not find any factor affecting this change. If this factor were known to us, we would have applied this and got milk in the need of hour. But actually it is not found and hence the change of grass into milk is a natural phenomenon. In a similar manner it can be proved that Pradhāna transforms itself independently and naturally.¹³

The Advaitins do not agree again. To them the above change is not natural on account of the fact that it is transformed into milk when taken by a cow. If it is taken by a bull, it is not transformed into milk. From this it is known to us that some external factor works in making grass into milk. A man cannot transform grass into milk. From this, it is not proved that such transformation is natural and independent. It is found from our experience that some of the changes are caused by a human agent and some are performed by the Divine will. It is not true that human agency fails in transforming grass into milk. It is found that people feed the cows in a better way for having more quantity of milk. In the same way we can say that the theory of the Sāṃkhya is not true, because of the unreality of the fact that Pradhāna changes itself into effects naturally or independently.¹⁴

Again the Advaitins argue that even if it is admitted that Pradhāna is capable of changing itself into various effects independently, we do not find any motive behind this transformation. Pradhāna does not need any auxiliary cause or any

helping cause for its modification. If it is admitted, it will be tantamount to not having any motive or purpose of its own.

If this be the case, the Sāṃkhyaś may assert that Pradhāna has some purpose of fulfilling the ends of Puruṣa and for this reason it undergoes changes. Pradhāna does not need any cause for its modification. From this, it does not follow that it will have no purpose behind.¹⁵

If this view is admitted the Advaitins may ask : what is this purpose? Is it the enjoyment of Puruṣa or his release? If it is said that it is the enjoyment (*bhoga*) of Puruṣa, it is not seen. That is, we fail to see the enjoyment of Puruṣa in this world. Apart from this, if Puruṣa's enjoyment is the fundamental to Pradhāna's activity, the Puruṣa will not receive freedom from bondage of enjoyment. If the Puruṣa's freedom from enjoyment is the main intention of Pradhāna's activity, the Puruṣa may be free before the activities of Prakṛti start, Prakṛti's activity would seem to be useless and unnecessary, because the purpose for which the activity of Pradhāna is started is already fulfilled in Puruṣa. Moreover, if the achievement of freedom is the end, there would be no enjoyment at all. If both enjoyment and freedom are end there would be no limit to enjoyment leading to non-attainment of freedom, because the items of enjoyment are infinite and endless. If it is admitted that the activity of Pradhāna is only to meet its curiosity or satisfaction, the question arises whose satisfaction or curiosity it is. Because Pradhāna being unconscious in nature cannot have satisfaction or

curiosity of its own. As Puruṣa is indifferent and passive it cannot have curiosity. If Pradhāna is not active the creative power of Pradhāna and cognitive power of Puruṣa would become purposeless and useless. In order to justify this, the Sāṃkhya must admit a generative power in Pradhāna just like cognitive power in Puruṣa. If it exists, there would be no final freedom. Due to all such complications it is not reasonable to say that Pradhāna becomes active for the enjoyment and release of Puruṣa.¹⁶

Now the Sāṃkhya is trying to explain the world of experience with the help of the cooperation between Puruṣa and Prakṛti. It has explained this with the analogy of blind and lame men and magnet and iron. Just as through mutual cooperation a blind man can go through the road smoothly being guided by the lame man who is on his shoulder, Prakṛti, though unconscious can have inclination towards creation for the enjoyment of Puruṣa being guided by Puruṣa who is inactive. This cooperation between Puruṣa and Prakṛti is analogous to that of blind and lame man. A blind cannot see, but is capable of walking while a lame can see but not capable of walking. That is why, they are compared with Puruṣa and Prakṛti. Just as a magnet, without moving itself, can easily move other iron-particles towards itself, Puruṣa may lead Prakṛti for inclination towards activity.¹⁷

If this view is taken for granted, it will go against the basic presupposition of the Sāṃkhyas. The Sāṃkhya claims that Prakṛti becomes active independently i.e., without any external pressure.

But if it is said that Prakṛti is led by Puruṣa, then Pradhāna's activities are not to be taken as independent, but due to external pressure. Moreover, if Puruṣa engages Prakṛti to certain activities, it will be presumed that it has lost its indifference and inactive character, which is unusual. Moreover, the metaphor of blind and lame man cannot be applied here. Puruṣa cannot be compared with a lame man, because a lame man can guide the blind with the help of his words and directions, but Puruṣa lacks this power due to his inactivity. If it is argued that Puruṣa may lead Prakṛti to perform certain activities due to their proximate existence just as a magnet can influence the iron-particles due to their proximate existence, they will have to admit that the activity should continue for endless or longer period of time due to their proximity, which is not possible. It is known to us that the magnet can move the iron-particles due to their proximity, but this is always occasional, transitory but not atemporal. The necessary proximity between them has to be brought with the help of some other actions. Moreover, all magnets are not always capable of creating actions in iron-particles. They can do so if they are cleaned and maintained from time to time. Hence, the analogy of a magnet and iron-particle does not match with Puruṣa and Prakṛti.¹⁸

One may extend one's argument by saying that a relation between Puruṣa and Prakṛti cannot be conceived because Puruṣa is indifferent and Prakṛti is unconscious. How can an indifferent substance be related to an unconscious one? There is no third agency through the interference of which the said relation is

possible. If it is said that only their capability of being related is taken as a relating factor, their relation will continue for ever or endlessly leading to the cessation of release of Puruṣa. If the release of Puruṣa is desirable, it will be accepted that no relation between Puruṣa and Prakṛti is admissible. From this, it is proved that relation is not possible between them for metaphysical reason also.

Moreover, the earlier objections raised against the inclination of Puruṣa towards activities will stand as they are. It is not understandable why Puruṣa will feel for performing activities. In the Advaita framework this is easily explained. Puruṣa, though essentially indifferent and inactive, can involve in activities through the illusory creative power called *Māyā*.

It is admitted by Sāṃkhya that Prakṛti has three constituents – *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, which remains at first in equilibrium without overpowering one another. At this stage there is no subordination of the one by another, because all the constituents remain in equilibrium. Hence, they are having independence in the true sense of the term. It is very difficult to understand why they have left their independent status and started subordinating one another. Due to this loss of equilibrium there is subordination of one constituent over another, on account of which there is creation and activity. But the question remains : who has disturbed this equilibrium and why? There is no external agency to disturb them

leading to the land of creativity. The Sāṃkhya cannot provide suitable reply to this.¹⁹

The Sāṃkhya still argues that Pradhāna and its constituents are not imagined but experienced in their life. They have seen the world and inferred the characteristics of the primordial cause of the world. The three constituents of Prakṛti are not to be taken as inactive and changeless. To them these three constituents are changing themselves and it is true even at the state of equilibrium. Hence, there always remains a possibility of disturbing the state of equilibrium.

Even if these are admitted, the creation of this beautiful world would quite be impossible from an unconscious and unintelligent agent, Prakṛti. If the Sāṃkhya gives an attribute of intelligence to Prakṛti, their position would be taken as equal to the Advaitins. To Sāṃkhya, even at the stage of equilibrium or the state of equipose may be disturbed and the constituents of Prakṛti, may be distributed unequally. For this reason it may be said that such disturbance would not happen without a cause, which is not found anywhere. If it is said that such disturbance may occur any time without any cause, it would continue for endless period of time. If it continues, the creation of this world would continue for endless period of time leading to the cessation of dissolution (*Pralaya*). If it is taken for granted, the final release would become virtually impossible. For all these reasons the Sāṃkhya system is accepted as unacceptable to the Advaitins because it is full of inconsistent statements.²⁰ Now

the Advaitins are pointing out so many contradictory statements in other cases also. The Sāṃkhya sometimes opines that sense organs are seven in number, sometimes eleven. They sometimes subscribe to the view that the subtle elements (*tanmātras*) originate from the evolute *Mahat* and sometimes from the ego (*Ahaṃkāra*). So far as internal sense organ is concerned, some say that it is three in number and sometimes one. Moreover, the Advaitins think that the Sāṃkhya view is not honoured by the orthodox systems on account of the fact that it is opposed by Śruti which believes in the existence of God as the ultimate cause of the universe and also by Smṛti following Śruti.²¹

Now the Sāṃkhya has shown its critique to the Advaita view. To the Sāṃkhyas the system of Advaita Vedānta is not free from various logical defects. According to Advaita Vedānta, one unitary principle called Brahman or Ātmān is the sufficient cause of the origin, maintenance and destruction of the whole universe. If it is admitted, the sufferer and causes of suffering would not belong to different categories but two modes of the same self. If this view is accepted, the self would never be free from two modes because they are identified with it. It is said in the scripture that an individual will be free from suffering through the right knowledge of self. If the Self is not free from these two special modes the above mentioned scriptural injunction would be in vain. A characteristic feature of an object cannot be separated from the object where it remains just as heat and light cannot be separated. It may be argued by the Vedāntins that there is dichotomy between water and

its agitated states in the forms of waves and ripples. It may seem two at this condition. When the water remains calm and non-agitated condition, the said dichotomy vanishes. In like manner, it may be said that though initially there is suffering in Self it may get rid of the same afterwards. This view is also not acceptable to Sāṃkhya. To them water can never be made free from waves and ripples, which may appear or disappear, but they remain as identified with water. In the same way, the sufferer and cause of suffering remain in the same Self. The Advaitins seem to ignore this point. The multiplicity (*nānātva*) of world has been explained by them with the single unitary principle called Brahman.²²

It is also true that the distinction between a seeker and sought is always prominent and hence they can be kept separate. One can seek an object which is completely different from oneself. It is a matter of a contradiction if someone seeks something which remains within oneself and forms the constituting part of oneself. A lamp does seek for light because it remains within itself. Had there been no object which is not distinct from oneself, one would be taken virtually as seeker of oneself. That is, under this circumstance, he will seek for his own self to justify himself as 'seeker', because there is nothing in the external world other than himself. This is quite unnatural or rather unusual.²³

Moreover, the seeker and the sought are taken as relative terms, because the property of being a seeker is determined (*nirūpita*) in terms of the object sought for and vice-versa. For this

reason we must admit a relation between them, which always remains in two as per the definition – '*dviṣṭhaḥ sambandhaḥ*' (i.e. relation abiding in two). The relation cannot be established if there is only one object. Hence the distinction between a seeker and the sought must remain for the sake of their relationship and hence they are to be taken as separate entities.²⁴

The Sāṃkhya is forwarding another argument in favour of the distinction between suffering and the causes of it. There are two types of object whom we want to obtain and want to avoid. In order to distinguish between the two it is necessary to accept their separate existence. In these two the former is called good and the latter bad or evil. What affects us favourably is called our good generating happiness (*anukūla vedanīyaṃ sukhaṃ*) while that which affects us unfavourably is called evil generating misery (*pratikūla-vedanīyaṃ dukhaṃ*). If we look to the external world, we shall see that the objects generating happiness are very few in comparison to those generating misery. Hence, it has been presumed that all objects of our desire in one way may be called evil, which generates pain or misery. The object which seems to be pleasant is not so in the true sense of the term, because ultimately it leads to our suffering. Hence self is the sufferer. If the sufferer and the cause of suffering are not kept separate, but identified as done by the Advaitins while admitting a unitary principle of all objects, there is no possibility of availing freedom in the sense of emancipation or release. If an individual identifies himself with the objects of suffering, he will remain in the midst of suffering leading to the non-

attainment of liberation. If suffering and the cause of it are kept in a separate way, an individual can see the situation and explore the possibility of eradicating sufferings. He would succeed in removing the suffering if he would be able to remove the causes of it. If causes are removed there would be no suffering, which ultimately leads him to the attainment of liberation.

The objections may be raised by the Sāṃkhya are to be taken in a true spirit if the sufferer and the causes of suffering are taken to be related as subject and object. But actually such relationship cannot be found between them. In an absolute unity no such relation is possible according to Advaita Vedānta. The Advaitins have tried to elaborate their view points with the help of fire. Fire which is one and which has got heat and light, does not illumine or burn itself. In the same manner, there is only one immutable Brahman under which the relation between sufferer and the causes of suffering is not at all possible.

A question may be raised; where shall we find the relation of the sufferer and the causes of suffering? If the meaning of the Sanskrit 'tāpa' is taken literally, it may denote both 'heat' and 'suffering'. From this we can take human body as being heated i.e., having suffering or sufferer and the sun is taken as the cause of the heat or suffering. It may be noted here that suffering is possible for an intelligent being only, but not for an unintelligent body. Had suffering belonged to body, it would have been vanished as soon as the body is destroyed. In other words, after the cessation of body

individual would attain release or freedom. If it be so, no man would try to undergo spiritual training for the removal of pain or to get liberation.²⁵

But it is not logically possible to believe that suffering belongs to soul. Because, to suffer entails undergoing some changes or modification. It is not possible in Pure Self. We cannot say similarly that the body and self constitute a composite whole, because such combination is not allowed for Self. If self is associated with body and makes a composite whole, it would lose its pure character. Self, if pure, cannot be conjoined with body. It is also meaningless to say that suffering suffers itself.

The Sāṃkhya may justify their standpoint by explaining the possibility of suffering. They may explore the relation between a sufferer and the cause of suffering in the following manner. The Sāṃkhyas may say that one of the constituents of Prakṛti i.e. *sattva*, the cause of the experience of light and darkness, is the sufferer and the other constituent called *rajas* which is the cause of all activities, movements and painful experience is the cause of suffering. The Self which alone has got the 'feeling' cannot feel identified with these constituents and hence cannot share the suffering caused in them or by them. Sāṃkhya would argue that Self appears to be suffering while actually the *sattva* constituent suffers. Self is reflected in *sattva* constituent of Pradhāna and thinks itself sufferer being identified with the suffering of *sattva* element.

It is known so far that self does not suffer really. Though it is true, self appears itself to be sufferer due to ignorance. This standpoint is quite acceptable to the Advaitins also. But Sāṃkhya like Vedāntins cannot admit that suffering is not real but apparent. To Sāṃkhya the experience of suffering is as true as other real objects. If it is admitted, it would be difficult for Sāṃkhya to believe in final release of the Self. If this status of suffering is taken for granted, it would lead them to admit that there would be no release of Self. For, the causes of suffering, being constituents of Prakṛti, are eternal. Hence there will always be the possibility of its suffering.

In order to solve this problem Sāṃkhya adds that though the capacity of suffering in the self and the causes of suffering in the constituents of Pradhāna are there the real suffering occurs when there is a specific conjunction between self and Pradhāna. This specific conjunction follows from a cause, which is the non-discrimination of Pradhāna and the Self. When the cause in the form of non-discrimination is removed, the possibility of further suffering comes to an end.

The above-mentioned solution is not a solution in the true sense of the term. The Advaitins think that even the non-discrimination, the cause of suffering, is itself caused by the *tamas* – constituent of Prakṛti. This constituent, being always there, there is always the possibility of suffering.

The Advaitins are now challenging Sāṃkhyas on their basic presuppositions. They believe that creation starts, when there is lack of equilibrium among three constituents of Prakṛti. In other words, it has been admitted by them that, when the three *guṇā*s are disturbed, one or the other *guṇā*s of these gets overpowered over the rest. It is quite illogical that it is left undetermined how and when this preponderance of one over another happens. If it is not determined, the specific conjunction and disjunction of self with Pradhāna which points to creation and destruction of the whole world remain undetermined. From this it follows that there is an uncertainty of getting one's final release. The theory of Pradhāna-Kāraṇatā is thus refuted by the Advaitins.²⁶

REFERENCES :-

1. *Brahmasūtra* : 2.2.01. *Śaṅkarabhāṣya* on 2.2.01
2. *Ibid.*
3. *Ibid.*
4. '*Pravṛtteśca*' – *Brahmasūtra* , 02/02/02.
5. *Śaṅkarabhāṣya* on 02/02/02.
6. *Ibid.*

7. *Ibid.*
8. *Ibid.*
9. *'Payo'mbuvaccetātrāpi' Brahmasūtra – 02/02/03.*
10. *Śankarabhāṣya on 02/02/03*
11. *'Vyatirekānavasthiteścānapersatvāt'
Brahmasūtra 02/02/04 Sankarabhāṣya on 02/02/04.*
12. *'Anyatrābhāvācca na tṛ ṇā chivat
Brahmasūtra - 02/02/05.*
13. *Śankarabhāṣya on 02/02/05.*
14. *Ibid.*
15. *"abhyupagame' pyarthābhāvāt",
Brahmasūtra – 02/02/06. Sankarabhāṣya 02/02/06.*
16. *Ibid.*
17. *Puruṣāśmavaditi cettathāpi Brahmasūtra – 02/02/07.*
18. *Śankarabhāṣya on 02/02/07.*
19. *Ibid.*
20. *'vijpratīṣedhāccāsamañjasam' Brahmasūtra – 02/02/10.*

21. *Śankarabhāṣya* on 02/02/10.

22. *Ibid.*

23. *Ibid.*

24. *Ibid.*

25. *Ibid.*

26. *Ibid.*